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\'olume LXMII 

No. 1762 

April 2, 1973 

Transcript of Interview 373 


TranscHpt of Interview 381 

Statement by Assistant Secretai-y Sisco A03 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1762 
April 2, 1973 

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Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 

Following is the transcript of an intervietv 
tcith Secretary Rogers on the Columbia 
Broadcasting Systein's television and radio 
program "Face the Nation" on March 11. 
Interviewing the Secretai'y were George 
Herman of CBS News, James Keat of the 
Baltimore Sun, and Barry Serafin of CBS 

Press release 76 dated March 13 

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretai'y, Canadian Am- 
bassador Michel Gauvin [Chief, Canadian 
delegation to the International Commission of 
Control and Supervision (ICCS)} charges 
that the International Commission charged 
ifith keeping the peace in Viet-Nam is para- 
lyzed by the refusal of Communist delegates 
to investigate charges of violations. Do you 
think Canada actually is going to leave the 
Commission as Mr. Gauvin suggests? 

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Herman, we don't 
know, of course. It's a decision that Canada 
will have to make. We hope very much that 
Canada will decide to continue to serve on 
that Commission, because it plays a vitally 
important role in supervision of the peace 
agreement.' I noticed that the complaint 
really involved a missile site at Khe Sanh, 
and I'm pleased to report here this morning 
that the missile site has been removed from 
Khe Sanh. That was announced by our mili- 
tary command in Saigon. So I think that the 
Canadian activity in connection with the 
supervision has been effective, although they 
did not inspect this site at Khe Sanh. The 
fact that they made the complaint public and 
insisted on seeing it, I think resulted in the 

removal of that missile site. So I think that 
Canada's role is vitally important, and I hope 
very much that it will continue to serve as a 
member of the international supervisory 

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, aside from the 
settlement of the problems at Khe Saiih, do 
you think that the Control Com,mission, the 
four-party Control Commission, is, as the 
Canadians charge, hamstrung by the refusal 
of the Communist delegates to investigate 
something until there is first some proof? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think it's a little 
early to say, Mr. Herman. Obviously in a sit- 
uation of this kind that's so complex, sorting 
out the procedures takes a little time. We 
were disappointed that the Commission was 
not able to move about as freely as they felt 
that they should, but I believe that all parties 
concerned have decided that the peace agree- 
ment should work, and I think that as time 
goes on we will find that the procedures will 
be worked out satisfactorily and that the 
Commission will be able to be effective in 
supervising the cease-fire. 

Mr. Keat: Mr. Secretary, does the provi- 
sion in the agreement you signed in Paris 
about a week ago reqtiiring consultation 
among the 12 parties rule out or in any way 
restrict our ability to use force, airpower 
perhaps, in case of a really massive violation 
of the cease-fire in the South in the future? - 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we're not talking 
about using airpower in South Viet-Nam. 
We expect this peace agreement to succeed, 
and I'm convinced — as I think all of those 

' For texts of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and the protocols 
to the agreement signed at Paris on Jan. 27, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169. 

' For text of the Act of the International Con- 
ference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris on Mar. 2, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 26, 1972, p. 345. 

April 2, 1973 


who've dealt with this subject are convinced 
— that it's going to work, so we're not talking 
about the use of airpower. I'm convinced 
from my discussions with the North Viet- 
namese, and Henry Kissinger's discussions 
with the North Vietnamese and Ambassador 
Sullivan's [William H. Sullivan, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs] discussions, that they've decided that 
force is not the way to solve the problems of 
Indochina. So we think it's going to work, 
and we're not going to talk about any mili- 
tary threats in the event of a violation of the 
cease-fire. We don't think it's going to be 

Mr. Sera fin: Mr. Secretary, in a recent ap- 
pearance before the Hoiise Foreign Affairs 
Committee you were quite optimistic about 
the military future for South Viet-Nam, that 
there wouldn't be any immediate massive 
military actions, but not so optimistic about 
the political future. If the political future 
can't be put together in that country, won't 
that mean a reversion back to military 

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so, Mr. 
Serafin. I think the important thing is to have 
the agreement work insofar as the military 
aspects of it are concerned, in the first in- 
stance ; in other words, to have all the shoot- 
ing stopped, have all of our POW's returned, 
have our military forces out of South Viet- 
Nam, and then we hope that the parties in 
the area will be able to solve their own polit- 
ical problems. The fact that I'm not optimis- 
tic about political solutions doesn't mean that 
I don't have hope that they'll be able to solve 
their problems, but we know from past ex- 
perience how difficult it is to solve some of 
these political problems that have existed for 
so many years. 

So I am quite optimistic that the agree- 
ment will work, that the cease-fire will be 
effective, that our POW's will all be returned 
on time, that we will have all of our troops 
out of there by March 28, and that the cease- 
fire will continue to be effective. Now, after 
that, the parties in the area are getting to- 
gether to see if they can resolve their political 
problems. As you know, they are going to 

meet next week in Paris. I think the first 
meeting is Monday or Tuesday, this next 
week, and we would hope that they will be 
able to come to some accommodations in 
terms of their respective problems. So we 
have hopes it will work — 

Mr. Herman: Exciise me, I didn't mean to 
interrupt. After American troops and Amer- 
ican prisoners are out, what is our responsi- 
bility toward our friends in South Viet-Nam, ? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we're going to 
continue to give them economic assistance. 
The agreement permits us to replace military 
equipment on a one-for-one basis. We con- 
tinue to comply strictly with the terms of 
the agreement, and we would hope that they 
could work out a political process. As you 
know, the peace agreement calls for self- 
determination by the people of South Viet- 
Nam, which means that they will work out 
some kind of an elective process, we hope. 
That's what the agreement calls for, and we 
hope it will work out. 

Effectiveness of the Agreement 

Mr. Keat: Mr. Secretary, there are a num- ■ 
ber of parallels between the two Paris agree- ! 
ments this year and the 195 A Geneva ' 
agreements on Indochina. So far the problems 
that restricted the old ICC [International 
Control Commission^ are beginning to show ■ 
up in the new ICCS. What basis do yoti have 
for your hope or your belief that these agree- ; 
ments are going to be any more successful 
than the Geneva ones were, which were con- i j 
spiciiously unsuccessful ? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, well, this Interna- 
tional Commission, of course, is much larger 
in the first place, very sizable numbers. Sec- 
ondly, we've had a lot of experience with su- ; ! 
pervisory commissions, and that's one of the 
reasons that Canada is insisting that theyi 
have some authority. Now, here we have all 
the teams dispersed throughout the country. 
We have seven regional places, and we have, 
I think, 26 subregional groups, so that the 
International Commission will be dispersed 
throughout the country, and we think it will 
have a deterrent effect. It will be beneficial. 


Department of State Bulletin M 

1 * 


Mr. Kent: But these regional groups aren't 
even in place in — 

Secreta)-y Rogers: Well, most of them are 

Mr. Keat: Yes, but it's si.v weeks into the 
agreement, and they really are not policing 
the countryside very effectively even noiv. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, Mr. Keat, there is 
an improvement. The alleged violations have 
gone down a good deal, and except for Mili- 
tary Rejrion I, the matter is improving a good 
deal. The situation in Laos is much better, so 
we think it's going to work. Now, we never 
expected it was going to work quickly or 
smoothly, but I think it's working about the 
way we expected it would. 

Mr. He)~man: I've been thinking abotit your 
first answers, and I find something in there 
that troubles me. The missiles at Khe Sanh, 
the enemy missiles at Khe Sanh, were re- 
moved without the icork of the International 
Commission, apparently by some other ar- 
rangement, whether it was in our negotiation 
with Hanoi or whatever it may be. Doesn't 
this tend in a tvay to weaken the Commission, 
that these things are accomplished and it's 
left high and dry? Hoiv did we get those 
missiles out? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't think it follows. 
The fact is the Commission did object after 
it asked to travel to the area, and I think the 
other side decided that the best thing to do in 
view of the activity of the Commission was 
to remove the missiles. 

Mr. Serafin: Did ive have discussions with 
North Viet-Nam on that subject? 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, yes, yes. 

Mr. Keat: How do we know that the mis- 
siles have in fact been withdraivn? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, you can tell from 

Mr. Keat: In other words, we are flying 
reconnaissance flights over — 

Secretary Rogers: I'm not sure. I think that 
I — you know, I'm not sure exactly how the 
photographs are obtained, but everyone is 
satisfied that the missiles have been removed, 

and we had photographs before which we 
provided for the International Commission 
which caused them to think that there was a 
violation of the peace agreement. 

Mr. Keat: Then there is some kind of sur- 
veillance over the troubled areas? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes. 

Mr. Hei-man: Hoiv and tvhen did we have 
conversations with the North Vietnamese 
about those missiles? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we are all parties to 
the Four-Power Joint Military Commission, 
and in that Commission we have discussions. 

Mr. Herman: So it loas done inside the 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it was done both 
in there — both in the Commission and also 
in the ICCS. 

Mr. Herman: Did you have any conversa- 
tions — 

Secretary Rogers: Those are two — there 
are two groups ; there is a Four-Power Joint 
Military Commission, consisting of those 
parties that signed the Paris agreement, and 
there is the International Commission, con- 
sisting of Canada, Indonesia, Poland, and 
Hungary. Now, the discussions about Khe 
Sanh took place in both of those bodies. Yes, 
I had some discussions in Paris on that 

Mr. Serafin: Mr. Secretary, it ivas reported 
also that North Viet-Nam ivas using the air- 
strip at Khe Sanh in violation of the agree- 
ment by flying military personnel in and out 
of there. Is that still going on? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't, Mr. Sera- 
fin, want to start making charges about viola- 
tions. I think that is for the ICCS to handle. 
But we are satisfied, as I said, that the peace 
agreement is going to be carried out, and 
that's based on the discussions we've had not 
only with the parties to the Paris agreement 
but also discussions we've had with all of 
those at the Paris conference, all of the na- 
tions represented there. Now, there obviously 
are going to be some problems, and there are 
going to be some violations, and there are 

April 2, 1973 


going to be sporadic instances of gunfire, and 
so forth; but all of the indications are that 
the basic decision has been made that this 
agreement is going to work, will be effective, 
and I'm entirely satisfied on that point. 

And, you know, there've been challenges 
made about the return of the POW's, and a 
lot of people thought it might not work. Well, 
it's working. We've just gotten notice today, 
for example, that we are going to get a list of 
the POW's in the next group, the third group, 
that we're going to get that list tomorrow 
from the North Vietnamese. Those prisoners 
of war will be released in Hanoi on Wednes- 
day, and we will — and the North Vietnamese 
assured us again today, and they assured me 
in my discussions in Paris, that all of our 
POW's would be returned by March 28, as 
the agreement calls for. 

Complex Situation in Cambodia 

Mr. Herman: I noticed in. the wires over- 
night that our bombers were out over Cam- 
bodia again. When do you expect peace in 

Secretary Rogers: It's difficult to make any 
prophecy about that, because the situation is 
particularly complex in Cambodia. One of 
the reasons for that is that the Government 
of Cambodia has difficulty in finding who to 
talk to. The insurgents — the opposition to the 
government is split up. There are those Com- 
munists who follow Sihanouk ; there are other 
Communists who are indigenous to, appar- 
ently, to Cambodia ; there are others that are 
supported by other nations. So there's no 
one group that the Lon Nol government can 
discuss a negotiated settlement with. We hope 
that that will change. We hope that there will 
be some opportunity, through negotiated set- 
tlement, as was done in Laos. 

Mr. Keat: The public statement of Mar- 
shal Lon Nol as offered to the other Khmer 
factions is substantially the kind of thing 
that both the North Vietnamese and the 
Pathet Lao turned down. Do we have any 
expectation that Marshal Lon Nol will make 
some other kind of offer to get talks started, 
something which might be more along the 

lines of the agreements made with North 
Viet-Nam and with the Pathet Lao? 

Secretary Rogers: We just don't know, Mr. j 

Keat. As I say, the principal problem at the i 

moment is how to get discussions started, | 
and with whom. 

Mr. Keat: We played major roles certainly | 

Ml getting the truce in South Viet-Nam, and j 

we played a backstage role in Laos. Is there | 

any role we can play to induce or encourage j 

an agreement in Cambodia? [ 

Secretary Rogers : Yes, I think we can play ! 

a role, but in the final analysis the decisions i 
have to be made by the Cambodians. We are 

playing a role. We're having discussions in ! 

diplomatic channels, hopefully to encourage I 

a negotiated settlement. i 

Mr. Keat: With whom are we having those i 
negotiations? \ 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't want to go j 

into the details. 


Postwar Assistance to Indochina | 

Mr. Serafin: You've been through a num- , 
ber of congressional hearings lately, and ^ 
they've dtvelt largely on the question, of recon- i 
struction aid for North Viet-Nam. You have 
said over and over again that this adminis- 
tration tvoidd consult Congress on this ques- 
tion. But I have not heard you say absolutely . 
that if Congress balks, decides not to provide 
this aid, that the administration ivon't find i 
another way of providing that aid. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I'm not going to 
say that. We think Congress is going to sup- 
port President Nixon. President Nixon was ; 
able to bring this war to a conclusion, and 
he did it consistent with what he promised ; 
the American people he would do. He did it |J 
often over the opposition of a great many 
congressional people. And I think now that 
the American people strongly support the 
President, and I think when we make our 
request for assistance for Indochina — not 
just North Viet-Nam, but for Indochina — 
that Congress will support him. Congress has 
always acted responsibly when requests are 
made. And so I'm not going to talk about 


Department of State Bulletin 


^ what we're going to do if we fail; I'm con- 
fident that we're going to succeed. 

Mr. Serafiti: I gather you ii'ould not be 

, happy if there were a bill passed, as some 

\ Congressmen have suggested, which tvould 

prohibit any aid not approved by Congress. 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think it 
makes any sense; if they want to do that, 
fine. But the point is, we've said over and 
over again that we can't provide assistance 
for Indochina to any degree at all that's 
meaningful unless we have congressional 
support. And if they want to pass a law to 
that effect, or a bill to that effect, we won't 
object very much but we think it is wholly 

Let me say, Mr. Serafin, that we think that 
it is consistent with our traditional role to 
help after a war is ended, that we should 
help the people of Indochina — not just North 
Viet-Nam, but South Viet-Nam, Laos, and 
Tambodia — to heal up the wounds of the war. 
We've always done it. It's a very small price 
to pay indeed for peace, for the maintenance 
of the peace. The cost of assistance to main- 
' tain the peace compared to the cost of the 
war is infinitesimal — very small. 

Now, President Johnson said, when he was 
President, that if we could bring the war to 
a satisfactory conclusion, we w^ould assist in 
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Indo- 
: china. President Nixon said it last year and 
I was supported by almost everyone who made 
I any comment about it. Now, I think that 
when people realize what we have in mind 
and why we have it in mind, what we're 
going to do, they'll support us. I was inter- 
ested to .see that most of the editorial com- 
ment throughout the country has supported 
President Nixon. 

Mr. Serafin: Doesn't it make your job 
'ougher in taking your case to the Congress 
■ that you haven't been able to really rally 
" large international support for an interna- 
tional effort and also that Russia and China 
are talking about aiding only North Viet- 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that our 
problem is not so much that. Our problem has 

April 2, 1973 

been that people start talking about it long 
before we're prepared to make any proposals. 
In other words, we aren't prepared yet to 
make any proposals to Congress, and we 
piobably won't be for another 60 days or 
more. And as you know, we're just beginning 
this week — I think we've got our first meet- 
ing scheduled with the North Vietnamese in 
Paris this next week to discuss the matter. 
So we're a long ways from coming to any 
decisions about what we want to ask for and 
how it's going to be done. 

Mr. Keat: But you have said several times, 
and many Congressmen have said, that we 
want a multinational effort for economic aid 
to North Viet-Nam. We seem to be almost 
alone among the major nations of the world 
in being prepared to engage in that kind of 
effort, in some kind of cooperative effort. Do 
you — can you think of some manner, some 
formula by which we can have a multina- 
tional effort, given the objections of almost 
everyone else to participating in one? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think there, Mr. 
Keat, it depends on the definition — what do 
we mean by "multinational." Now, if that 
means that everybody has to coordinate all of 
our activities in one effoi't, that probably 
won't work. On the other hand, other nations 
have indicated a very serious interest in tak- 
ing part in some program — for example, 
Japan is very anxious to contribute ; the 
European Community has indicated they 
would ; and several of the nations at the Paris 
conference said that they were prepared to Now, how that is going to be done, 
whether it's going to be bilaterally or in some 
kind of a consortium, hasn't been decided. For 
example, we don't know whether the Euro- 
pean nations will do it individually or 
whether they might contribute as part of the 

But in any event, it doesn't make so much 
diflference as long as the efforts are coordi- 
nated. So that, for example, if we are going 
to assist in the construction of a hospital or 
something of that kind, we want to be sure 
that we coordinate that with Japan, so that 
w^e know what they are doing. And that 


doesn't necessarily mean it's multinational, 
but we'll have a coordinated effort, I'm sure. 

Relations With People's Republic of China 

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, have you 
chosen the man or the men who will head 
our m,ission to Peking ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, we haven't. I've 
made some recommendations to the President 
on that, but — 

Mr. Herman: What kind of people are we 
thinking of? The Chinese said that they 
thought it woidd he at least at the rank of 
ambassador. Is that correct? 

Secretary Rogers: I'm not sure what the 
President's going to decide. That of course is 
a matter that he'll decide. 

Mr. Herman: Do we have any idea when 
it will he named? 

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I think we'll do it 
fairly soon. I would hope that we could name 
our people for the liaison office sometime 
within the next 60 days, or maybe before. 

Mr. Serafin: Isn't this trading of missions 
really diplomatic recognition ivithout that 
name, under just a different name ? 

Secretary Rogers: No, it's different than 
having diplomatic relations with the People's 
Republic of China, but it's a very meaningful 

Mr. Keat: Is there anything that these 
liaison officers will do that an embassy — is 
there anything they won't do that a regular 
embassy woidd do? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, they are not going 
to be ambassadors, for one thing, and there 
will be a lot of things that would be in- 
volved if we had full diplomatic relations 
that will not be involved in this case. 

Mr. Herman: Let me ask you something, 
Mr. Secretary. Do you think that this rather 
rapid pace of normalization of relations with 
China is the result of continuing Chinese 
fear of Soviet troops on their border, of con- 
tinuing fear, let's say, of the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't want to 

speculate on why they're improving their re- 
lations with us. There's no doubt that there 
are some serious differences between the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. 
Now, how large a factor that has been in 
their thinking, we don't know for sure. 

Mr. Keat: The Soviet Union has made it 
very clear tfmt it's ner'vous, to say the least, 
about our gradually improved relations with 
China. Is this creating any difjicidties in our 
relations with Moscow ? 

Secretary Rogers: I don't detect any. No, 
I had long discussions with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko when I was in Paris, and I didn't 
detect that. I thought that the relations were 
just as friendly and constructive as they had 
been in the past. And certainly there've been 
no expressions to that effect by the Soviet 

MFN Treatment and Soviet Emigration Policy ! 

Mr. Serafin: Mr. Secretary, one thing that ' 
may he causing some difficulties is the intent | 
of a number of Member's of Congress to at- | 
tach approval of most-favored-nation status i 
for trading purposes to the Soviet Union ivith j 
a change in policy regarding the emigration j 
of Soviet Jews. Can you tell us if anything '. 
has happened on that? We constantly hear ' 
from the State Department and the White ! 
House that quiet diplomacy is at work. What j 
has it accomplished? ' 

Secretary Rogers: Well, it has accom- ■ 
plished a good deal. In 1970, the number of i 
Soviet Jews that were permitted to emigrate i 
from the Soviet Union was really just a few ' 
hundred, as I remember. In 1971, about 14,- 
000 were permitted to leave the Soviet Union ; ! 
in 1972, 31,000 were permitted to leave. And ; 
this year it's been at the rate of about 3,000 ; 
a month, which is even a little greater than ' 
last year. So the emigration rate itself has 
substantially increased in the last few years ' 
because, I think, of the good relations we've 
had with the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Serafin: But doesn't that still dis- 
criminate against those who are most edu- 
cated, highly professional, most skilled? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Rogers: The exit fees that you're 
speaking about, we believe, prevent the free 
flow of emigrants. As you know, our policy 
has been that people should be permitted to 
emigrate from any country without any 
barriers. But in the case of these exit fees, 
they're applied across the board, not just to 
Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union. 
But in any event, my point is that we think 
that to attach any conditions to the legislation 
that we propose, or will propose, to the Con- 
gress to improve our trading position with 
the Soviet Union is the wrong way to do it. 
We think what we have been doing for the 
last couple of years is a more successful way 
to do it. 

The Soviet Union says the matter of exit 
fees is an internal matter with them, and 
we have to deal with the situation as it exists. 
And we think that the quiet diplomacy that 
we've used in the past two years has been 

Mr. Sera fin: What will he the result if 
Congress does do this? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't know, Mr. 
Serafin. We certainly hope that when Con- 
gress fully realizes the situation that they 
will enact the legislation that President 
Nixon is going to ask for. Let me say for 
the benefit of the listeners that when we talk 
about MFN — most-favored-nation treatment 
for the Soviet Union — what that really means 
is that we remove the discriminatory tariffs 
that now exist in terms of trade with a Com- 
munist country, that we put them on the 
same basis that other countries are on. And 
when we signed the trade agreement and 
when we settled the lend-lease debt, a condi- 
tion to those two agreements was that we 
would treat the Soviet Union the same as we 
treat other countries in terms of trade. Now, 
that's what we're going to ask Congress to 
do in the legislation that we'll propose fairly 
soon. We hope that the question of the exit 
fees will not be linked to that. W^e think it 
would be a very serious setback for our for- 
eign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union if that 
legislation was not enacted. 

Mr. Kent: Mr. Secretary, the President has 

now had what he called his Mideast month of 
cousultations tvith Arab and Israeli leaders. 
Have these conversations earned the move- 
ment toward some kind of negotiation any 

Discussions on the Middle East 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we've had a very 
good round of discussions with the King of 
Jordan, with Mr. Ismail, who's President 
Sadat's chief assistant, and with Prime Min- 
ister Meir. We've been encouraged by the 
general tenor of the discussions, and we think 
that there is a desire on the part of everyone 
to try to work out a peaceful settlement. The 
problem is how to get the negotiations 

Mr. Keat: Do you think they'll start this 

Secretary Rogers: Oh, I would not want to 
make a prediction. We're going to do every- 
thing we can to see if we can get them 

Mr. Herman: Is there a desire on their 
part to have the United States mediate and to 
work on this problem? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think so. There's 
certainly a desire on the part of Israel, and 
Egypt from time to time has said that they 
felt very much along the lines that the United 
States could play a useful role. In fact, that's 
how we got started in it, on the question of 
the interim settlement. President Sadat said 
he hoped we could play a role. 

Mr. Herman: Mr. Sisco, the Under Secre- 
tary of State, or Assistant Secretary of State, 
rather, for Middle Eastern affairs among 
others, said on this program some tveeks ago 
that he thought the groundwork and the at- 
mosphere had been prepared for a movement 
toward peace. Mrs. Meir, the Prime Minister 
of Israel, said the folloiving week that she 
saw no change, no movement of any kind. 
What do you see? 

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think what she 
had reference to — and that's of course the 
truth — that is, that there's no specific initia- 


April 2, 1973 


tive and no complete change in the negotiat- 
ing position. But in terms of the general 
climate, I noticed an improvement. I think 
Mr. Sisco is right. In the discussions we had 
with Mr. Ismail, for example, he himself 
said that he was very encouraged by those 

Mr. Serafin: Mr. Secretary, we have less 
than a minute left. Following the tragic 
events in the Sudan, what has the United 
States dove to beef tip security for its dip- 

Secretary Rogers: Well, we're doing every- 
thing that we can possibly think of, and 
we're not going to make it public, but we're 
going to be as tough as we possibly can in 
the whole field of terrorism. It's— they're 
savages, literal savages ; and we, the civilized 
community, can't put up with it. We've got 
to find a way to deal with it, and we've got 
to be as tough as we possibly can, and that's 
going to be our position. 

Mr. Serafin: Bo you stand today by your 
statements calling for the death penalty? 

Secretary Rogers: I certainly do. There's 
no other way to deal with them, because each 
time they're placed in custody, then they kid- 
nap another ambassador or hijack a plane 
and insist that the people in custody be re- 
leased. There's only one of them that's left in 
jail. Even all of the ones involved in Munich 
are out now. 

Mr. Herman: Thank you very much. Secre- 
tary of State Rogers, for being with us today 
on "Face the Nation." 

Secretary Rogers: Thank you, Mr. Herman. 

President Nixon Names Committee 
on East-West Trade Policy 

White House press release dated March 6 

President Nixon on March 6 established 
the East-West Trade Policy Committee and 
designated the Chairman of the Council on 
Economic Policy, George P. Shultz, to serve 
as its Chairman. The President also desig- 
nated the Secretary of Commerce, Frederick 
B. Dent, to serve as Vice Chairman of the 
Committee and as Chairman of the Ofiice 
of East-West Trade. The members of the 
East-West Trade Policy Committee will be: i 

The Secretary of State (William P. Rogers) 
The Secretary of the Treasury (George P. Shultz) 
The Secretary of Commerce (Frederick B. Dent) 
The Assistant to the President for National Secu- 
rity Affairs (Dr. Henry A. Kissinger) 
The Executive Director of the Council on Interna- 
tional Economic Policy (Peter M. Flanigan) 
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations 
(Ambassador William D. Eberle) 

James E. Smith, the Deputy Under Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, will serve as Executive 
Secretary of the East-West Trade Policy 

Negotiation of major trade initiatives will 
be handled under the chairmanship of indi- 
viduals to be designated for the specific 
negotiation. The President has designated 
George P. Shultz as Chairman of the U.S. 
section of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commer- 
cial Commission. 

A working group will be established under 
the chairmanship of the Under Secretary 
of the Treasury and will include representa- 
tion from the organizations on the East-West 
Trade Policy Committee. 



Department of State Bulletin 

Deputy Secretary Rush Interviewed for German Television 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
ifith Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush which 
jcas recorded at Washingto7i on March 12 
and broadcast on German television on 
March 13. 

Press release 78 dated March 13 

Q: President Nixon proclaimed this year, 
1973, the year of Europe. Mr. Secretary, 
what must one take this declaration to mean, 
and in what context must it be seen? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: The President was 
referring to the fact that Viet-Nam has 
moved from the center stage and that we are 
now getting back to a normal state of affairs 
where Europe is the center stage. Europe is 
of course the most important part of the 
Western alliance, aside from America, or 
along with America really. 

Through the first four years, the Presi- 
dent and the administration paid a lot of 
attention to Europe. We had the Berlin agree- 
ment, we had the SALT talks [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks], the preparations 
were made for CSCE and MBFR [Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 
mutual and balanced force reductions]. And 
we had many problems with regard to mone- 
tary and economic matters. 

So we have not been neglecting Europe. It 
is just a matter of Viet-Nam moving off the 
stage, and now we see that Europe is the 
center of the stage as it normally is. 

Q: The Americans and the Europeans. 
Mr. Secretary, are partners in security. They 
are rivals in trade. How can this be reconciled 
in the long run? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: The question of 
security is really a question of the free world, 
the open society, being strong enough to pre- 
vent yielding too much to the influence of 
the closed society. And we must of course in 

security maintain a very strong deterrent. 
In any free society, you have competition. 
In this country, for example, we have very 
keen competition, enforced by our antitrust 
laws, among the various corporations, in- 
dustrial organizations, and other parts of our 
society. So the normal state of affairs in 
economics is competition. This does not in 
any sense mean that we are not a unified 
country with regard to security or that in 
our dealings with our allies we cannot deal 
just as strongly with them on security 

Q: The last dollar devaluation, the talk 
about the monetary and trade war, does not 
sound very encouraging. This proves that 
there are strong opposing interests. We can 
expect conflict. How can the confrontation 
between Europe and the United States be 
avoided ? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: The basic prob- 
lem we have here is that the dollar has 
gradually become overvalued, and as a result 
we are having very serious trade imbalances. 
The way to correct these trade imbalances 
is to have the dollar reach its real value as 
compared to the currencies of other countries. 

The balance of trade in our country, for 
example, has shifted from about $7 billion 
on the aflfirmative side in 1964 to about $6.5 
billion on the negative side, in a deficit, in 
1972. Meanwhile, our exports have been in- 
creasing very substantially — about 90 per- 
cent. But our imports have increased about 
197 percent. This results of course from the 
great advances made by the European Com- 
munity and by the Japanese in technology 
and in building large plants and reducing 
costs and the fact that the dollar has been 
overvalued and thereby our trade has been 
hurt. This is of course not to mention non- 
tariff trade barriers, which have been also a 
very serious deterrent. 

April 2, 1973 


Q: Mr. Secretary, of the European NATO 
partners, the Federal Republic has been con- 
tributing most to the maintenance of the 
Atlantic alliance. Now, in vieiv of the dollar 
crisis and the balance of payments deficit and 
the pressing domestic problems of America, 
will Washington ask the Federal Reptiblic for 
even higher contributions during the up- 
coming offset negotiations? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: We have not yet 
determined what our posture will be with 
regard to offset. As I see security, it is a 
matter of the allies bearing on a more equal 
basis the burdens of security and of having 
an effective deterrent. Following World War 
II our country had to bear the main part of 
the burden. We have been a bit too slow, I 
think, in equalizing this burden. Germany 
has shown a very commendable approach in 
terms not only of helping to meet the finan- 
cial problems but also of encouraging the 
European allies to bear a bigger share on 
their own. This is exemplified by EDIP, the 
European Defense Improvement Program, 
initiated by your then Minister of Defense, 
Mr. Schmidt. 

With regard to how much of the burden 
should be borne by your country in terms of 
balance of payments, this is to be negotiated. 
However, one must remember that we still 
have a much larger percentage of our gross 
national product going into defense than 
that of any European country, including 
Germany. And I would certainly hope that 
the European allies, members of the most 
successful military alliance in history, or 
security alliance in history, would see that 
they must bear a bigger share of the burden. 

Q: In this connection, Mr. Secretary, it 
is known in Germany that the quality of the 
7th American Army has recently been im- 
proved. Nevertheless, experts are still of the 
opinion that it has not yet regained its former 
combat strength. Will the 7th Army, in case 
the Federal Republic should increase its con- 
tribution, increase its combat readiness? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: The purpose of the 
offset payments is not designed to pay us 
to improve our army. The purpose of the 
offset payments is to, in part, help us cor- 

rect the balance of payments problem that we 
have in maintaining troops in Germany. 
It is true that during the Viet-Nam war we 
failed to improve the 7th Army as much as 
we would have liked. But great steps have 
been taken to correct this, and of course the 
more we do, the greater the cost and perhaps 
the greater the balance of payments loss. 
But the offset is not designed to pay us for 
doing something in Germany or for improv- 
ing the quality of our troops. It is designed 
to reimburse us in part for the balance of 
payments losses we have from having our 
troops there. 

Q: A last question in relation to the alli- 
ance. Do you think that after the outcome of 
yesterday's parliamentai'y elections in 
France, the attitude of the French Govern- 
ment vis-a-vis NATO, and particularly the 
political tmity of Europe, 7vill change? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, we still have 
in France the same government in power 
that we had before, with a reduced majority 
in the Chamber. I have nothing to indicate 
that the French have any immediate plans 
to change their attitude toward NATO. 

Q: Mr. Rush, the opposition in your Con- 
gress against maintaining the present troop 
level in Europe is increasing and certainly 
is no longer limited to Senator Mansfield and 
his friends. Can the attitude of your Presi- 
dent on the question of the presence of troops 
remain unaffected by this growing opposition 
on Capitol Hill? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: The President has 
said many times that we will not reduce our 
troops unilaterally. His feeling is that we 
should reduce troops only in conjunction with 
reductions on the other side. And this of 
course is the purpose of the talks on mutual 
balanced force reductions. 

We feel that we must maintain a strong 
deterrent in NATO; we must maintain a 
troop level that is as it is now, roughly. 
There is nothing sacred in numbers but it 
certainly is important that we maintain a 
credible deterrent in NATO, with the 6th 
Fleet in the Mediterranean, with the 7th 
Army in Germany. And we have no plans to 


Department of State Bulletin 

reduce troop levels in Germany and will not 
do so unilaterally. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, may I put my question 
more succinctly. There seems to be a sort of 
neoisolationist viood in the United States 
after the end of the Viet-Nam war, and this 
is not limited only to the Democrats, hut 
there are also a number of Republicans — 
that is to say, members of the same party to 
which the President belongs — tvho are 
against future military engagements of the 
United States outside its borders. Will this 
not lead to a considerable complication of 
lour future foreign policy? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Yes, it compli- 
cates our future foreign policy. However, a 
part of our society is that we have those who 
approve of the President's program and those 
who disapprove of the program. This is non- 
partisan ; it always has been nonpartisan. 
There are those who think that we should 
withdraw completely from the rest of the 
world ; there are those that think we should 
be much stronger outside of this country. 
There are those who favor the various 
courses in between. But the majority of the 
American people and the majority of the 
Congress have backed the President in main- 
taining our troop levels in Europe. I feel 
the Congress is a very responsible body, and 
I do not feel that the Congress will attempt 
to i-educe the troop levels in Europe over the 
President's opposition or that they could do 
so politically. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, the historic trips the 
President has undertaken to Moscow and 
Peking as well as the international negotia- 
tions to end the war in Viet-Nam could easily 
give one the impression that in the thinking 
of the American Government the superpower 
diplomacy of triangular irorld policy tvill con- 
tinue to predominate also in the future, also 
after the end of the war. On the other hand, 
it is often emphasized by Washington that 
xcestern Europe represents the first priority. 
Does this not present a real dilemma? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: I do not feel it is 
a true dilemma. Obviously, we must solve 
problems with the other superpower, Russia, 

and with China on a bilateral basis. These 
are problems that relate to us and those coun- 
tries. However, where our allies are con- 
cerned, we inform them fully. We have 
informed them fully about the progress of the 
SALT talks. We have informed them fully 
and consulted them, not only with regard to 
SALT but with i-egard to the preparations 
for the oncoming negotiations on CSCE and 
MBFR. This is true of other countries. For 
example. Chancellor Brandt and his govern- 
ment in a bilateral way introduced the 
Ostpolitik, but they informed us fully. We 
must negotiate both as allies against the 
Warsaw Pact bloc, for example, and we must 
negotiate bilaterally where primarily bilat- 
eral interests are concerned. I see nothing 
contradictory in this at all. 

Q: Nevertheless, the President's trip to Eu- 
rope seems to be delayed. May this have some- 
thing to do with discontent in Washington 
about the reaction of some European grotips 
and governments to the Christmas bombing 
in Viet-Nam? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: I would not say 
that the President's trip has been delayed, 
because he never had a trip plan set that 
could be delayed. 

With regard to the statements by the heads 
of some governments in Europe concerning 
the President's action in Viet-Nam, my feel- 
ing is that where one has allies, true allies, 
and where a country is involved in very im- 
portant activities, a responsible ally will not 
criticize what its other ally is doing without 
knowing the reasons for it. And I feel quite 
sure that many of those who criticized the 
President's action in December very much 
regret doing so now. But it would have been 
far more responsible if the criticism had 
not taken place at the time, because the 
President's problem was greatly increased 
and aggravated by the criticism of some allies 
who themselves would have benefited very 
much from the action the President was tak- 
ing in showing that we were going to bring 
about peace and that he would take whatever 
action was necessary to bring about peace. 

Q: This sounds, Mr. Secretary, as if there 

April 2, 1973 


might be a continued deterioration of rela- 
tions ivith some European nations as a con- 
sequence of this. 

Deputy Secretary Rush: I would certainly 
hope not. I do not think that it would be 
worthwhile for us to allow a deterioration of 
relations with allies who want to be close 
allies with us, nor would it be in their inter- 
ests to have a deterioration of the alliance 
insofar as they are concerned because they at 
some time differed with us over our policy in 
Viet-Nam. I would hope that our relations 
with all of our allies would improve. I was 
merely commenting on the fact that an alli- 
ance calls for a sense of responsibility and a 
sense that each of us must have some faith in 
the judgment of the other ally. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Berlin agreement 
that you negotiated contains the sentence 
that the ties between the Western sectors of 
Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany 
shall be maintained and developed. You your- 
self a year ago said in Berlin, when you said 
goodby to us, that the fulfillment of the four- 
power agreement woidd be watched over very 
closely by Washington. Despite the fact that 
the pi'ovisions of the agreement are very 
clear, the G.D.R. is contimiously protesting 
against meetings of political bodies of the 
Federal Government and most recently, in 
February, even against the meeting of the 
Presidium of the European Parliament. Are 
these protests in your opinion consistent with 
the spirit and the letter of the agreement, and 
if not, will the U.S. Government take any 
steps in this direction? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: We feel that the 
agreement has in large measure been very 
well fulfilled. We cannot, of course, determine 
when the G.D.R. may want to protest some- 
thing or not protest something. But all in 
all, we feel that the observance of the agree- 
ment and living up to its spirit and terms has 
been in good faith by both sides. 

Now, in the unlikely event — unlikely in my 
opinion — that there should be a violation of 
the agreement, we have provisions in the 
agreement which call for consultation by the 
four powers designed to correct any such 

violation, and we would certainly resort to 
those provisions if at any time we felt there 
were a violation of the agreement. We don't 
think there has been. 

Q: So far you think there has not been 
any violation? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: None that has 
been called to our attention. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, before you tvere called 
for public office by the President you used 
to be an industrialist; that is to say, the head 
of a large American corporation. Now, in 
connection with the currency and trade dis- 
cussions, it has been asserted that the U.S. 
products are not competitive on the world 
market and that two dollar devaluations 
would not help to make them competitive 
either. It has also been alleged that Ameri- 
can industry basically has little interest in 
exporting because the huge domestic market 
is more interesting and also more convenient. 
Is this correct, and if so, what are the 

Deputy Secretary Rush: The American in- 
dustrialist and the American farmer are 
very much interested in exporting and in fact 
they do export — last year about $50 billion 
worth of exports, which is a very substantial 
amount. This has increased from about $24 
billion, almost $25 billion, in 1964. There is 
a very strenuous effort on the part of Amer- 
ican companies to export. American com- 
panies are very competitive in certain areas : 
computers, aerospace, aircraft, agriculture 
certainly, which is really industrialized, and 
various things. In many areas there have 
been great inroads in this country by im- 
ports: such things as shoes, television sets, 
and of course steel — automobiles, of course 
— but steel. And we have had to have ar- 
rangements with the European Community 
and Japan to prevent the steel industry from 
being very much harmed by low-cost steel 
from abroad which might be even below the 
cost of production in this country. 

Exports are very vital to the prosperity 
of our country, as they are to the prosperity 
of the rest of the industrialized world. 

The real problems have come from two 


Department of State Bulletin 

basic factors. One of them is the monetary 
factor. The dollar lias been grossly overvalued 
and increasingly so. The monetary readjust- 
ments that have taken place recently, and 
that took place earlier, are designed to cor- 
rect this and I think will correct it in sub- 
stantial measure. The other problems are 
such things as the common agricultural 
policy of the European Market, quotas in 
many cases by some highly industrialized 
countries, preferences in reverse, preferences, 
items of this sort, which operate very un- 
fairly against the American exporter. I think 
we must attack on both these fronts — both 
the monetary front where considerable prog- 
ress has been made and on the removal of 
unfair trade barriers, nontariff trade bar- 
riers, where progress must be made. 

Q: Recently one could have gained the im- 
pression as if certain groups in industry and 
the AFL-CIO labor federation had entered 
into a, let us say, "alliance of protectionists." 
How does the government expect to he able 
to resist the pressure of this mighty bloc 
to obtain trade restrictions from Congress? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: We have always 
had very powerful pressures in this country 
to restrict trade and protect local industry, 
and for many, many years those pressures 
were the dominant ones. Today the pressures 
leading toward freer trade, leading toward 
the con-ection of the factors that make for 
imbalances in trade, are much more popular 
with the American people. And I think the 
way to counteract these is through an edu- 
cational process of those who do not feel this 
way through teaching them the real facts of 
life, in terms of we only harm ourselves when 
we severely restrict trade. 

Now, on the other hand, often the only 
way we can adequately protect ourselves, 
liecause of a lack of cooperation from other 
countries, may be to increase barriers or to 
impose barriers with regard to imports into 
this country, and we of course if necessary 
should look at that way of correcting these 

Q: Mr. Secretary, beyond any doubt dur- 
ing the first years of the alliance the Federal 

Republic has been the model partner of that 
alliance. German foreign policy, tvith its 
opening to the East, tvhich corresponded to 
earlier American wishes, has gained a greater 
measure of independence. Does this make the 
Federal Republic a more difficidt partner, 
and how ivill this affect relations between 
Bonn and Washington? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, Germany 
has grown up so it no longer needs to be 
teacher's pet. It is more of a teacher itself. I 
would say that we welcome the assumption 
more and more by the German people and 
by the German Government of an increasing 
share of responsibility in world affairs. This 
is something we have encouraged. We fully 
backed the Chancellor in his Ostpolitik. We 
have in fact pleaded with the Germans to 
take on more responsibility rather than less 
in the North Atlantic alliance. And we wel- 
come Germany as a full-fledged mature part- 
ner in the community of the NATO alliance 
and in our own bilateral relations. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, may I ask you to answer 
the following question candidly? Do you 
share the concern of some of the German 
experts in the State Department that the 
criticism of primarily young and politically 
engaged Germans of U.S. domestic and for- 
eign policy coidd impair the relations be- 
tween the United States and the Federal 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, you have 
freedom of speech in Germany, and we have 
freedom of speech in this country. We of 
course do not welcome criticism by any group 
that we consider to be biased and unfair. But 
we welcome criticism by those who are ap- 
proaching it in a .sound and analytical way. 
But emotional attacks we deplore, whether 
they occur in our country against another 
country or whether they occur in other coun- 
tries against our country and our leadership. 
However, we do not in any sense consider that 
irresponsible, emotional attacks on our coun- 
try are shared by many of the German peo- 
ple. We have full confidence in the German 
people. We have full confidence in the Gov- 
ernment of Germany. And we feel that our 

April 2, 1973 


alliance with Germany today is as strong as 
it ever has been. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, President Nixon has 
spoken of a five-power balance in the rvorld. 
One of these powers is Europe. Since Europe 
is politically still split into individual states, 
individual governments, this can only refer 
to the European Community. In Washington, 
we often hear complaints that this Commu- 
nity does not speak with one voice. Could 
the absence of communication ivith one uni- 
fied voice be the source of those mysterious 
misunderstandings and frictions which often 
emerge between Europe or the European 
Community and the United States ? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, I feel really 
that in the security area we have had a very 
good relationship with the European — with 
our NATO allies. I feel that in monetary and 
economic matters, both with the European 
Community and with Japan, there have been 
many problems. These problems arise, as I 
mentioned earlier, in any free society. We 
have, as I said earlier, domestic competition 
that gives rise to many problems. This should 
not undercut the strength of the security 
alliance. However, obviously, a failure to co- 
operate in one area has a fallout in other 
areas. If Europe did speak with one voice, 
if we had a politically unified Europe, unified 
of course also economically and monetarily, 
I feel that the free world would be greatly 
strengthened and that the dangers of mis- 
understanding would be less than they are 

Q: Well, the newly appointed Commis- 
sioner for Foreign Affairs [of the European 
Community], Sir Christopher Soames, the 
son-in-law of Winston Churchill, who is an 
important political personality, perhaps 
might he fill the gap? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: I would hope that 
he can work toward a better understanding 
of our problems in trade and in monetary 
matters; and a better understanding, I am 
sure, would lead to an earlier correction than 
may have been true in the past. 

Q: Mr. Secretary, I ivould like to come back 
to the topic of Berlin because you negotiated 

the Berlin agreem,ent. How do you see the 
future of Berlin under the present circum- 

Deputy Secretary Ru^h: I think much of 
the question of the future of Berlin now de- 
pends upon the Berliners themselves, it de- 
pends upon the F.R.G., and it depends upon 
the maintaining and developing of the ties 
between the F.R.G. and West Berlin. If the 
ties are maintained and developed as they 
should be and if the steadfast support of the 
F.R.G. for the economic, cultural, and politi- 
cal development of West Berlin continues as 
it has in the past, I feel that West Berlin will 
be a strong, viable unit. I do not think the 
fact that the G.D.R. is being recognized by 
many Western countries, or that East Berlin 
maybe may have diplomatic embassies, 
should weaken the Western sectors of Berlin. 

But it is up to the Berliners themselves 
and up to the F.R.G. to see that the ties are 
strengthened. And I think the viability of 
West Berlin is in direct proportion to the 
strengthening of the ties between the F.R.G. 
and the Western sectors of Berlin. 

Q: Ladies and gentlemen, this program is 
drawing to a close. There is time for one 
last question. Mr. Secretary, the Federal Re- 
public has repeatedly suggested an organized 
and constructive dialogue between the Euro- 
pean Community and the United States. This 
certainly falls in with American intentions. 
My question is, who is to take the initiative 
for such a dialogue and hoiv can it best be 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, we have an 
excellent dialogue with the Community to- 
day. There is of course much merit in a pro- 
posal to formalize this dialogue. On the other 
hand, there can be very valid objections to 
it. Consideration is being given to this. 

But I feel today we have the organs and 
the relationships that permit an adequate 
dialogue, a very strong dialogue, if they are 

I would not oppose myself a full study of 
the possibilities of having a formalized 
dialogue established, but I do not see the 
urgent need for it. 


Department of State Bulletin 

People's Republic of China 

Releases U.S. Prisoners 

Following is an announcement made to 
news correspondents on Friday, March 9, by 
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to Presi- 
dent Nijco7i. 

while House press release dated March 9 

The White House learned on Wednesday 
evening of the illness of John Downey's 
mother, and the President asked that this 
be communicated to Prime Minister Chou 
En-lai on his behalf, calling to the attention 
of the Prime Minister the facts of Mr. Dow- 
ney's mother's illness. 

The Government of the People's Republic 
of China has informed the President that 
it has decided to commute John Downey's 
term and release him on March 12. 

The Government of the People's Republic 
of China will release Mr. Downey, following 
the decision to commute his term, at the 
border between the People's Republic of 
China and Hong Kong, as I said, on March 

At the same time, the Government of the 
People's Republic of China, and in the same 
communication, has informed the President 
and the United States that they will release 
Lt. Comdr. Robert J. Flynn of the U.S. Navy 
and Maj. Philip E. Smith, of the U.S. Air 
Force, who have been held in the People's 
Republic of China over the past years, on 
the 15th of March. 

As you recall, Dr. Kissinger mentioned to 
you in his briefing here following his return 

from the People's Republic of China that they 
had indicated that Mr. Flynn and Mr. Smith 
would be released during the 60-day period 
of the Indochina agreement.' 

President Nixon wants to express his per- 
sonal appreciation to the Government of the 
People's Republic of China for this action. 

U.S. and North Viet-Nam Establish 
Joint Economic Commission 

Follotving is a joint United States-Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam announcement 
read to nexvs correspondents at Washington 
on March 8 by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec- 
retary to President Nixon. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 12 

A United States-Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam Joint Economic Commission has 
been established and will meet in Paris, be- 
ginning March 15, 1973. The Commission 
consists of the following members: 

For the United States : Maurice Williams, 
John Mossier, Donald E. Syvrud. 

For the Democratic Republic of Vietnam : 
Dang Viet Chau, Nguyen Co Thach, Le Khac. 

The members will be supported by such 
staff as each delegation considers appro- 
priate to its needs. 

^ For the transcript of a news conference held on 
Feb. 22 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, see Bul- 
letin of Mar. 19, 1973, p. 313. 

April 2, 1973 


Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television 

Following is the transcript of an intermeiv 
with Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the 
President for Natiojial Security Affairs, by 
Marvin Kalb, CBS News diplomatic corre- 
spondent, broadcast on February 1. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, thank you so 
much for allowing us to join you in your of- 
fice here at the White House. I would like to 
start immediately on Viet-Nam, which will 
come as no surprise to you, and to ask first 
what is your judgment on the fragility, the 
firmness, of the truce in Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: One has to look at the peace 
in Viet-Nam now in two parts: the terms 
of the agreement and in the spirit in which it 
is going to be carried out/ 

The war has been going on for 25 years. It 
has been partly a civil war, partly an inter- 
national war. It has had some outside inter- 
vention and some local sources. 

The terms themselves of the cease-fire are 
firm, and they are specific. The supervisory 
machinery is as precise as one can make it. 
The biggest task now is to move a generation 
that has known nothing but war toward an 
attitude of peace, and that is an intangible 
quality. The political settlement still has to 
be reached. But I think with good will on all 
sides, and some patience and some wisdom, 
we can manage that transition period. 

Mr. Kalb: Well, the President suggested 
at his netvs conference, and he repeated this 
morning once again, that so much will depend 
on the good will of all of the parties.- Do you 

"■ For background and texts of the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam 
and the protocols to the agreement, see Bulletin 
of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 153. 

' For excerpts from President Nixon's news con- 
ference on Jan. 31, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1973, 
p. 193; for an excerpt from his remarks before the 
National Prayer Breakfast at Washington on Feb. 
1, see ibid., p. 196. 

trust the good ivill of the Vietnamese parties 
right noiv? 

Dr. Kissinger: If you look at the historical 
record you have to say that people who have 
been killing each other for 25 years are not 
animated by exceptional good will toward 
each other. 

On the other hand, they have also suffered 
for 25 years. 

I was struck during the negotiations that 
one of the biggest hurdles was their dif- 
ficulty in imagining peace. If we can now get 
a period of some months in which they get 
used to more peaceful pursuits, then I believe 
many of these factors can begin to assert 
themselves. I don't trust in good will. A lot 
depends on the actions of the Soviet Union, 
the People's Republic of China, and on the 
sort of relationship we will be able to estab- 
lish with North Viet-Nam. So it is a difficult 
period that is ahead. But it gives us an op- 
portunity to build for peace. 

Mr. Kalb: You mentioned the Soviet Union 
and China right now. How do you see their 
role coming up now ? 

Dr. Kissinger: While the war was going 
on, they supplied North Viet-Nam with a 
great deal of its military equipment. When 
peace exists, all of the countries concerned, 
including ourselves, have to ask ourselves not 
only in terms of the local conditions, and of 
the desires of the parties, but in terms of the 
incentives our supplies give to each side to 
resume the fighting; and while we have no 
formal agreement or even formal discussions 
with these parties at this moment, it would 
seem reasonable that everybody will assess 
now its military relationship to the con- 

Mr. Kalb: Well, does that 7nean that you, 
as the diplomats say, have some reason to be- 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

lieve that the Soviet Union or China might 
I reduce the floic of their supplies into North 

Dr. Kissinger: The peace is less than a 
week old, and it is too early to draw any 
conclusions, but there will be an international 
\ confeience at the end of Februaiy at which 
all of these parties are represented. All I am 
saying is that whether the peace is fragile or 
not depends in part on the Vietnamese. It 
depends in part on outside countries. And 
this is what we now have to work out. 

Mr. Kalb: But it ivould he fair to assume 
I from what yoti are saying that a hope of the 
administration is that just as we are pro- 
hibited by the terms of the agreement from 
shipping unlimited supplies of military arms 
to South Viet-Nam, that likewise you would 
like to have the Chinese and the Russians 
reduce their floiv of supplies into the North? 

Dr. Kissinger: We would like the Chinese 
and the Russians to behave responsibly in 
preserving the peace in Indochina; that is 

Mr. Kalb: The Chinese leader today, Chou 
En-lai, made the point that the United States 
really is not living up fully to the terms of 
the agreement because it is continuing the 
%var, as Chou p^it it, in Laos and Cambodia. 
Do you have any sense that very soon tve 
can stop the bombing along the Ho Chi Minh 
Trails in Laos? 

Dr. Kissinger: Our position is clear and has 
been made clear to the North Vietnamese 
during the negotiations. We will observe any 
cease-fii-e that is established in Laos and 
Cambodia. We have reason to believe that 
there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos soon. 
There has been a de facto cease-fire in Cam- 
bodia, in fact, since Monday, and we have 
observed it. 

Mr. Knlb: Are the Communists living up 
to that, too? 

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. 

Mr. Kalb: Yes? 

Dr. Kissinger: And we will continue to ob- 
serve it as long as the Communists live up 
to it de facto. 


April 2, 1973 

In Laos we have hopes that a formal cease- 
fire will be signed in the near future, and in 
that case, the question of our role will be- 
come moot. 

Mr. Kalb: "In the near future" meaning 
perhaps even before the first American pris- 
oners of war come out of North Viet-Nam, 
or is there a connection really between a 
cease-fire in Laos atid when the American 
prisoners are released from North Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: There is no connection be- 
tween the cease-fire in Laos and the release 
of American prisoners. American prisoners, 
according to the terms of the agreement, have 
all to be released within 60 days, and in a 
supplementary protocol it is provided that 
they be released in appi-oximately equal in- 
stallments at 15-day intervals so the latest 
that the first American prisoners can be re- 
leased would be around February 11. But we 
haven't worked out the precise date yet. 

There is no relationship between the re- 
lease of American prisoners and the cease- 
fire in Laos ; but as I said, we expect that a 
cease-fire in Laos will be established soon. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, ivhat about Amer- 
ican prisoners who might be in Laos, those 
missing in action? There is some question 
as to a list that has noiv been turned over. 

Dr. Kissinger: We received today a list of 
prisoners that are being held in Laos. We 
are now examining it. It doesn't look to us 
as if it could be complete, and we are query- 
ing the North Vietnamese to see whether 
they have any supplementary information. 

But, at any rate, we received some names 
today, and we are informing the next of kin. 

Mr. Kalb: What do you mean that you don't 
feel as though you have a complete list on the 
Laos prisoners? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the list was handed 
to us as a list. It was not handed to us with 
the explicit comment that this is the entire 

Mr. Kalb: I see. 

Dr. Kissinger: And since there are sev- 
eral hundred unaccounted for, the relation- 
ship between the number that was handed to 


us and the number that is missing seems to 
be smaller in Laos than it is in Viet-Nam, 
and we have queried Hanoi about this dis- 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, you will be going 
to Hanoi soon, which is the one Communist — 
major Communist capiUil you have not gotten 
to as yet. We understand that the two major 
purposes will be to try to check on how the 
agreement is being implemented and also 
to discuss postwar aid. When was this trip 
first arranged? 

Dr. Kissinger: The trip has been under dis- 
cussion with the North Vietnamese at various 
stages of our negotiations, and it has always 
been under discussion, not in the context of 
the negotiations but in the context of estab- 
lishing a postwar relationship, and I really 
don't quite agree that the purpose is for the 
purpose of determining aid. That is one of the 
possible middle-term outcomes. 

The real problem in relation to North Viet- 
Nam is that here is a country that has been 
almost constantly at war throughout its exist- 
ence. It is a country with which we have 
made armistices in 1954, in 1962, but we 
have never made a genuine peace with it. 
Now we would like to explore the possibility 
of whether after the experiences of the last 
decade, having established a pattern of co- 
existence with Moscow and Peking, it seems 
to us not inconceivable that if we can coexist 
with Peking, we can coexist with Hanoi. 

So the basic purpose of the trip is an ex- 
ploratory mission to determine how we can 
move from hostility toward normalization. 

Now, it has always been part of the Amer- 
ican policy — indeed, it was first established 
by the late President Johnson — that at some 
point the United States would contribute to 
a reconstruction program for all of Indo- 
china ; and this is one of the problems that I 
will discuss in principle while I am in Hanoi. 

As anybody who knows me can tell you, 
my lack of competence in discussing technical 
economic questions is well established, so 
I will not be able to make the final determina- 
tions while I am there. 

So the basic purpose is to establish a new 

relationship, similar perhaps to my first trip 
to Peking. 

Mr. Kalb: Would the new relationship en- 
visage the possibility of establishing relatione 
with North Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, far down the road. 
The first problem is to establish some sort 
of ongoing dialogue, to work out machinery 
for exchanging ideas ; and in principle we are 
willing to explore this, but not as the first 

Mr. Kalb: Isn't there a White House pro- 
jection of $7^2 billion over a five-year period, 
of which $2Y2 billion would be earmarked for 
North Viet-Nam? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, that was a projection 
that was used about a year ago. 

Mr. Kalb: Yes. Is that current? 

Dr. Kissinger: More than a year ago. No, 
we have taken the position that the problem 
of aid to North Viet-Nam would be discussed 
in the context of peacetime relations and not 
as the outcome of a negotiation to end the 
war. We will look at the requirements with 
an open mind. This was a study based on 
reasonable facts at the time. We would have 
to look at the situation again. 

As we said when we briefed the congres- 
sional leaders, as the President repeated 
yesterday, any projection we make would be 
fully discussed with the bipartisan leadership 
and fully discussed in public before it became 
our policy. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, shifting south for 
a moment, to South Viet-Nam, notv that the 
peace agreement has been signed, how would 
you define the nature and depth of the Amer- 
ican commitment to Saigon? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have been allies in a 
bitter and diflJicult war, and we have a re- 
sponsibility to give those with whom we have 
been associated an opportunity to shape 
their own future. Therefore we have a re- 
sponsibility to continue a program of eco- 
nomic assistance along the lines that have 
been developed. 

We also will, as the President pointed out 
in his speech announcing the peace, continue 
that degree of military assistance that the 


Department of State Bulletin 


agreement permits and which is made neces- 
sary by the military situation. 

Now, the agreement permits us to replace 
weapons that are used up, destroyed, dam- 
aged, or worn out. Needless to say, if there 
is no conflict the amount of replacement 
military equipment that is needed will be 
much less than it was during the war. In 
the longer term, it has always been our in- 
tention to enable the South Vietnamese to 
take over the burden of their own military 
defense, and we believe we have left them in 
a position where they can handle most of the 
challenges that we can now foresee. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I 
was trying to get at is what happens — and 
I suppose this question must be asked. In 
the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire 
is going to hold. In the world that we live in it 
may not. President Thieu said in an interview 
tonight oti CBS that he woidd never call upon 
American troops to go back to Viet-Nam 
but he ivonld feel free to call %ipon American 
airpower to go back. And Ambassador Sulli- 
van said only last Sunday that there are no 
inhibitions — 7 believe were his rvords — on 
the use of this airpower.^ Is that correct? 

Dr. Kissinger: That is legally correct. 

Mr. Kalb: Politically and diplomatically? 

Dr. Kissinger: We have the right to do 
this. The question is very difficult to answer 
in the abstract. It depends on the extent of 
the challenge, on the nature of the threat, 
on the circumstances in which it arises; and 
it would be extremely unwise for a responsi- 
ble American official at this stage, when the 
peace is in the process of being established, 
to give a checklist about what the United 
States will or will not do in every circum- 
stance that is likely to arise. 

For the future that we can foresee, the 
' North Vietnamese are not in a position to 
launch an overwhelming attack on the South, 
even if they violate the agreement. What 
happens after a year or two has to be seen in 
the circumstances which then exist. 

'For an interview with William H. Sullivan, Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, on "Meet the Press" on Jan. 28, see Bui^ 
. LETIN of Feb. 19, 197.3, p. 198. 

Most of the violations that one can now 
foresee should be handled by the South 

Mr. Kalb: So that for the next year or tivo, 
if I understand you right, there would be no 
need for a reinvolvement of American mili- 
tary power? 

Dr. Kissinger: Marvin, we did not end this 
war in order to look for an excuse to reenter 
it, but it would be irresponsible for us at this 
moment to give a precise checklist to potential 
aggressors as to what they can or cannot 
safely do. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, let's move the 
clock back about one month at a time when 
the United States was engaged in a very ex- 
tensive bombing program in the Hanoi- 
Haiphong area. We have never heard any 
explanation about ivhy that was really nec- 
essary. Could you give tis your otvn feeling 
on that? 

Dr. Kissinger: The decision to resume 
bombing in the middle of December was per- 
haps the most painful, the most difficult, and 
certainly the most lonely, that the President 
has had to make since he has been in office. 
It was very painful to do this at that particu- 
lar season when the expectation for peace had 
been so high and only six weeks before his 
inauguration. It was very difficult to do it 
under circumstances when the outcome was 
not demonstrable. 

There were really three parts to it. One, 
should we resume bombing? Two, if we 
resume bombing, with what weapons? That 
involved the whole issue of the B-52. And 
three, should we talk to the American peo- 
ple, which was really implied in your ques- 
tion — there has never been an explanation. 

With respect to the first part, why did 
the President decide to resume bombing? 
We had come to the conclusion that the nego- 
tiations as they were then being conducted 
were not serious; that for whatever reason, 
the North Vietnamese at that point had come 
to the conclusion that protracting the nego- 
tiations was more in their interest than con- 
cluding them. 

It was not a case that we made certain 
demands they rejected. It was a case that no 

April 2, 1973 


sooner was one issue settled than three others 
emerged, and as soon as one approached a 
solution, yet others came to the forefront. 

At the same time, the more difficult Hanoi 
was, the more rigid Saigon grew; and we 
could see a prospect, therefore, where we 
would be caught between the two contending 
Vietnamese parties, with no element intro- 
duced that would change their opinion, with 
a gradual degeneration of the private talks 
between Le Due Tho and me into the same 
sort of propaganda that the public talks in 
the Hotel Majestic had reached; and there- 
fore it was decided to try to bring home 
really to both Vietnamese parties that the 
continuation of the war had its price, and 
it was not generally recognized that when we 
started the bombing again of North Viet- 
Nam we also sent General Haig [Gen. Alex- 
ander M. Haig, Jr., then Deputy Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs] 
to Saigon to make very clear that this did 
not mean that we would fail to settle on the 
terms that we had defined as reasonable. So 
we really moved in both directions simul- 

Once the decision was made to resume 
bombing, we faced the fact that it was in 
the rainy season and that really the only 
plane that could act consistently was the B- 
52, which is an all-weather plane. 

You mentioned the Hanoi-Haiphong area, 
but major efforts were made to avoid resi- 
dential areas, and the casualty figures which 
were released by the North Vietnamese of 
something like a thousand tend to support 
that this was the case, because many of these 
casualties must have occurred in the target 
areas and not in civilian residential areas. 

Mr. Kalb: And yet a lot of the civilian areas 
were hit apparently. There were pictures of 
that. And — 

Dr. Kissinger: You can never tell when a 
picture is made how vast the surrounding 
area of destruction is, but of course some 
civilian areas must have been hit. And I 
don't want to say that it was not a very 
painful thing to have to do. 

Now, why did the President decide not to 
speak to the American people? The President 

can speak most effectively when he announces 
a new departure in policy and indicates what 
can be done to bring that particular depar- 
ture to a conclusion. 

He could have done only two things in 
such a speech, which was considered. One 
is to explain why the negotiations had stale- 
mated and, two, to explain under what cir- 
cumstances he would end the bombing. 

The first would have broken the confiden- 
tiality of the negotiations even more than was 
the case anyway through the exchanges that 
were going on publicly, and the second would 
have made the resumption of talks an issue 
of prestige and might have delayed them; 
and therefore the President decided that if 
this action succeeded, then the results would 
speak for themselves in terms of a settle- 
ment, and if a settlement was not reached, 
then he would have to give an accounting to 
the American people of all the actions that 
led to the continuing stalemate. 

Now, whatever the reason, once the talks 
were resumed, a settlement was reached 
fairly rapidly, and we have never made an 
assertion as to what produced it; but you 
asked why was the decision made to resume 
bombing and this was the reasoning that 
led to it. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, isn't the assump- 
tion that you are leaving with us that with- 
out that kind of heavy bombing the North 
Vietnamese ivould not have become serious — 
your term — and that therefore one could con- 
chide that it u'as the bombing that brought 
the North Vietnamese into a serious frame 
of mind? I ask the question only because 
they have been bombed so repeatedly and 
for so many years and still stuck to their 
guns and their position. What was so unique 
about this? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, that it came at the 
end of a long process in which they, too, had 
suffered a great deal. But I don't think at 
this moment when I am preparing to go to 
Hanoi it would serve any useful purpose for 
me to speculate about what caused them to 
make this decision. 

Obviously they made a big decision in Octo- 
ber when they decided to separate the politi- 


Department of State Bulletin 


cal and military issues, and at this moment 
I think it is important to understand that 
the decision was not made lightly; that it 
was made in the interest of speeding the end 
of the war; and that now that the war is 
ended, I think it is best to put tlie acrimony 
behind us. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kisshiger, let's talk for a 
moment about the man with whom you nego- 
tiated. How long was it, with Le Due Tho, 
three and one-half years, something like that? 

Dr. Kissinger: Three and one-half years. 

Mr. Kalb: What kind of a person is he? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, when one talks about 
negotiations and looks at the pictures of my 
opposite number in a garden with me, joking 
and jovial, a great deal of emphasis tends 
to be put on the personal relationship; and 
over three and one-half years of extensive 
negotiations, of course we established a cer- 
tain personal relationship, sometimes hu- 
moi-ous. But one has to remember also what 
sort of a man he is, what his background is. 

Le Due Tho is an impressive man who 
joined the Communist Party as a very young 
man, a man therefore driven in the context of 
this time by a certain missionary zeal ; spent 
seven years at extreme hard labor in a 
French prison ; organized guerrilla move- 
ments ; and finally after long struggle, wound 
up in the Politburo of a country that then 
found itself at war almost immediately. 

He is a man who has never known tran- 
quillity; and where we fight in order to end a 
war, he fights in order to achieve certain 
objectives he has held all his life. He holds 
values quite contrary to ours, and I never had 
any illusions about that. I didn't convert him 
to our point of view. 

He said when he left Paris that we were 
negotiators having different points of view 
who were always correct and courteous. I 
agree with this, and we achieved a conclusion 
when both of us had realized the limits of 
the strengths that we had to achieve our ob- 
jectives, and he realized that in two phases, 
in October and then in January. 

He could be maddening when he didn't 
want to settle, and he was most effective 
when he did want to settle. 

He is a man of great theoretical interests. 
We used to joke with each other that after 
the peace we would exchange professorships, 
he at Harvard and I in Hanoi. 

Mr. Kalb: Well, you may have a chance 
when you go to Hanoi to give one lecture — 

Dr. Kissinger: I might look over the — 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, do you feel that 

the conclusio)i of the Viet-Nam tvar, at least 
for the United States, does mark a jumping- 
off point for American policy? I am thinking 
back four years noiv ivhen you came in. It 
seemed as though the Viet-Nam war blocked 
almost every opportunity to get on tvith the 
major poivers. Do you now see this as an 
opportunity to literally move into some kind 
of a new era in global diplomacy, or is it just 
cosmetics ? 

Dr. Kissinger: When this administration 
came into office four years ago, Viet-Nam 
was really our national obsession. It was 
almost the only foreign policy that was being 
actively debated, the one that absorbed the 
greatest amount of time of the policymakers 
and also the greatest amount of time of our 
domestic debate. 

The President held the view from the be- 
ginning that we had to change the emphasis 
of that concern. He felt that we had to end 
the war on honorable terms so that we would 
be free to be taken seriously in the conduct 
of other events. 

But I think it is fair to say that we didn't 
wait for the end of the Vietnamese war to 
turn to the construction of peace. I think 
major progi'ess was made in our relations 
with the Soviet Union. A breakthrough was 
achieved in oui- relations with the People's 
Republic of China. 

There was a transition in Japan which we 
cannot say we brought about, but which was 
inevitable; and Europe, again not necessarily 
as a result of our actions, but as a result of 
policies that had preceded us, gained more 

So, we took ofl^ce at a time when it was 
possible to think of a global foreign policy 
and of a new structure of peace for the first 
time in the postwar period, apart from deal- 
ing with individual crises. 

April 2, 1973 


Now the end of the Viet-Nam war frees 
us to concentrate even more actively on the 
constructive steps. But I think it is fair to 
say that we probably couldn't have ended the 
Viet-Nam war had we not already during the 
President's first term taken those steps and 
had the President not had the opportunity 
to visit Peking and Moscow. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, I would like to 
talk to you a good bit more about Russia and 
China, and we shall in just a few moments. 

[ Annotmcement.] 

Mr. Kalb: Is it fair to say that your effort 
to establish a new kind of relationship with 
China and Rtissia really is kind of a 19th- 
century approach, in a way, to a late-20th- 
century problem? This balance of poiver is 
certainly something that you wrote about 
before you came to Washington, and one 
could easily get the in^pression that you were, 
in a way, with the President, seeking to set 
up an international mobile consisting of great 
powers and that, as you tvere suggesting a 
moment ago, helped end the Viet-Nam war. 
In what way ivas this balance a way of end- 
ing the war? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, let me make one point, 
because you said that I, with the President, 
was trying to establish something. I think 
it is important to get my role in this into 
perspective, because I essentially have three 
jobs here. One is, when a problem exists, to 
tell the President as honestly as I can what 
choices he has, and I do my best to be fair. 
And secondly, to make recommendations 
when the President asks for them, and 
thirdly, to negotiate when the President 
sends me. 

But the decisions are not made by me, and 
one does not become President of the United 
States by having a weak will. So this is not 
a situation — if you look at the President's 
writings, for example, in 1967 or 1968, I 
think '67, he wrote an article which really 
foreshadowed the Peking initiative. And this 
has to be understood when one discusses who 
does what and what the role of the various 
officials is. 

Now, is the conception that you mentioned 
— a 19th-century conception — one that the 

President also developed in his speech in 
Kansas City in July 1971?^ In fact, he made 
that speech in Kansas City while I was on 
the way to China, and I didn't know he had 
made that speech. And when I arrived in 
China, Chou En-lai asked me about the same 
question you just did. He said, "What about 
this five-power world that your Pi'esident 

Mr. Kalb: The five powers being the United 
States, western Europe, the Soviet Union, 
China, and Japan? 

Dr. Kissinger: So Chou En-lai asked me 
what about this. 

Mr. Kalb: Well, what about it? 

Dr. Kissinger: I said, "What about it?" 
So he had to get a copy of the speech, and 
showed it to me. 

The balance of power in the 19th-century 
sense about which I wrote is obviously not 
applicable to the contemporary situation. 
In the 19th century, you had a large number 
of states of approximately equal strength 
that were trying to prevent marginal changes 
in the international situation because they be- 
lieved that any marginal change could be 
transformed into an overwhelming advan- 
tage sooner or later. 

In the nuclear age the biggest changes in 
the situation can be achieved without any 
territorial acquisition at all. No amount of 
conquest could have given the Soviet Union 
as much additional power as the develop- 
ment of the nuclear and, later, the hydrogen 

So we are talking about a completely dif- 
ferent world than the one that existed in 
the 19th century. 

You can't have these shifting alliances; 
you can't have these endless little wars. But 
there is something in the balance of power 
in two respects. One, no nation can make 
its survival dependent on the good will of 
another state if it has a choice about it, 
especially of a state that announces a hostile 
ideology. So you must have a certain equilib- 

' For excerpts, see Bulletin of July 26, 1971, p. 



Department of State Bulletin 

rium of strength in order to retain some 
freedom over your fate. That is a fact. 

Now, what this administration has at- 
tempted to do is not so much to play a com- 
plicated 19th-century game of balance of 
power, but to try to eliminate those hostilities 
that were vestiges of a particular perception 
at the end of the war and to deal with the 
root fact of the contemporary situation — 
that we and the Soviet Union, and we and 
the Chinese, are ideological adversaries, but 
we are bound together by one basic fact: 
that none of us can survive a nuclear war and 
therefore it is in our mutual interest to try 
to reduce those hostilities that are bureau- 
cratic vestiges or that simply are not rooted 
in overwhelming national concerns. 

Now, we thought it was extremely dan- 
gerous to continue isolating one of the great 
countries in the world. We thought that, with 
the Soviet Union, simply to amass more and 
more nuclear arms without attempting to 
put some control over them was extremely 
risky; and therefore we made the opening 
to China with full realization that they re- 
main ideologically hostile; and we concluded 
an agreement on Berlin with the Soviet Union 
— Berlin, which had brought us to the brink 
of war four times; and we made a first 
major step toward the limitation of nuclear 
arms last May in Moscow with the SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree- 

Now, you ask, in what way has this con- 
tributed to ending the Viet-Nam war? Viet- 
Nam takes on a different perspective for it- 
self and for us when it is an appendage to the 
landmass of Asia than when you make it a 
test case to stop a unified Communist thrust 
across the whole world. When Hanoi realized 
that foreign policy could not be blocked by 
the Viet-Nam war forever, and when we 
realized that there was more to Asia than 
Viet-Nam, we could conduct our negotiations 
in a different framework. 

So it was in this sense. But we, of course, 
continued to know the difference between our 
friends and our opponents, but we have also 
a responsibility to reduce those tensions that 
we can with our opponents, and we are work- 
ing hard at that and seriously at that. 

M>\ Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, so much of what 
you have been talking about now relates to 
the continuing tension and quarrels between 
China and Russia. So much of it almost 
seems to rest at the bottom of an analysis 
that you are giving. Do you worry here that 
China and Russia may, at some point, be 
on a collision course ? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, first of all, Marvin, 
nothing I have said rested on tension be- 
tween China and the Soviet Union. Of course 
we know that China and the Soviet Union 
have had their differences, but the most 
foolish thing we could do is to tiy to maneu- 
ver between those countries. The only pos- 
sible policy for us is to deal openly and 
honestly with each of them on the basis of 
whatever common interests we have with 
them or common problems we have with 

The most certain road to undermining the 
confidence of both would be to engage in 
petty maneuvers, to pit them against each 
other. Their quarrel does not have its origin 
with us, and their quarrel is not being 
fomented by us. 

Mr. Kalb: I understand what you are say- 
ing, sir. Do you worry about them fighting, 
coming to any kind of head-on collision? Or 
is that past us? There certainly was that fear 
in 1969 when you arrived here. 

Dr. Kissinger: When we arrived here, 
there were military clashes along the Sino- 
Soviet border, and we are aware of troop 
concentrations on both sides along the Sino- 
Soviet border, and both sides have accused 
each other of harboring aggressive intent. 

It is hard to believe that two such great 
countries would engage in so suicidal a course 
as fighting with each other. At any rate, this 
is not a decision that we can influence and 
it is not an outcome that we desire. A war 
between the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic of China would be unfortunate for 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, we have talked 
about an international balance of potver and 
I wonder if rve could shift, rather suddenly 
I suppose, to a domestic balance of power. 
The Constitution talks about a balance be- 

April 2, 1973 


tween this office here and Capitol Hill, and 
there is certainly the feeling on Ca'pitol Hill 
of having been ignored and about a vast and 
almost unnecessary accumulation of poiver 
in the White House. What do you feel you 
could do at this point in the second adminis- 
tration to try to eliminate some of this build- 
ing hostility? 

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, Marvin, my spe- 
cialty is foreign policy — 

Mr. Kalb: A lot of people up there are 
interested in it. 

Dr. Kissinger: — not domestic policy. And 
I think we have to look at it from two 
aspects. One, in every modern state there 
has been an accumulation of executive power 
for a variety of reasons— and I am not say- 
ing this is necessarily a good development— 
partly because the issues become so complex 
that it becomes more and more difficult for 
an individual lawmaker to keep sufficiently 
informed of the subtleties, to have a con- 
tinuous influence on the shaping of it. In 
fact, in our system the Congress is much bet- 
ter off than European parliaments. Our Con- 
gress has regular committees with their own 
staff. So I recognize that there is a problem 
and that the uneasiness of some Senators and 
Congressmen has a real root. 

Now, in my field, which is the only one 
that I am competent to talk about, the Presi- 
dent has made major efforts to make it pos- 
sible for Senators and Congressmen to be 
informed about the operations of my office. 
Now, there is the problem of executive privi- 
lege, which is that assistants of the President 
should not be in a position where their pri- 
vate conversations with the President be- 
come subject to congressional subpoena. 

Now, what we have attempted to arrange 
is periodic briefings of Congressmen, usually 
by me; I have met with the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee at about monthly in- 
tervals in settings that maintain the legal 
position of executive privilege ; that is to say, 
we would not meet in a committee room. We 
would meet in a private office of one of the 
Senators. But notes were taken, and we con- 
ducted the conversations as close to a hearing 

as they could be while still maintaining the 
legal fiction of executive privilege. 

Last week the President sent me to Capitol 
Hill to brief any Senator who wanted to 
come and any Congressman. So it is a prob- 
lem, and we are trying to make efforts to deal 
with it. I don't know how satisfactory it will 

Mr. Kalb: Well, ivill you be doing this 
more often over the next year or so? Will 
you be going up to the Hill to see the For- 
eign Relations Committee or the Armed 
Services Committee more often? 

Dr. Kissinger: I have always had the policy 
that I would meet with the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee whenever its chairman 
requested it, as long as the setting was in- 
formal. I have always tried to be available to 
as many Senators as possible on an individ- 
ual basis, and I will go up to the Hill— I 
enjoy meeting with Senators and Congress- 
men and I think it is in our long-term in- 
terest to have the Congress understand what 
we are doing. 

Now, it must be understood, however, that 
it is not my primary job to defend the Presi- 
dent's policy on the Hill. The separation of 
powers makes the President not an officer 
of the Congress. 

This is the responsibility of the Secretary 
of State, and of the statutory members of the 
Cabinet, who of course testify before the ap- 
propriate committees at all times. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, some of the things 
that you might have told Congressmen who 
asked over the past year or so related to 
some of your experiences traveling secretly 
to Peking, secretly to Moscow, and now pub- 
licly to Hanoi. The two principal Communist 
figures, Chou En-lai and Leonid Brezhnev— 
what kind of people are they, representing 
not only different countries but really dif- 
ferent interpretations of communism? 

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, Marvin, you 
i-ecognize they are both leaders with whom 
we will continue to deal and therefore there 
are limitations to what I can say. Again, 
what I said about Le Due Tho has to be 
kept in mind. The type of man who enters 


Department of State Bulletin 

the competition for Communist leadershi]) 
is a different personality than the type of 
man who enters the competition for political 
office in the United States and even more dif- 
ferent from the type of man who enters the 
competition for being bank president in the 
United States or a professor. 

Now, both of them represent different 
stages of Communist evolution. Chou En-lai 
is the first generation of leader. He joined the 
Communist Party at a time when only great 
believers could even conceive of an ultimate 
Communist victory. He is a survivor of the 
Long March, in which tens of thousands died, 
and it is an experience that keeps recurring 
in his conversations ; so he is a more mission- 
ary type, a more prophetic type. Brezh- 
nev's long march has been through the 
bureaucracy of an established Communist 
system. And he runs a state that is much 
more elaborated and much more complex. 
And no doubt there are national differences. 
Chou En-lai is very intellectual and very sub- 
tle. Brezhnev is a more elemental, more phys- 
ical person. But they are both considerable 
figures and you do not get to the top of that 
competition by being a man of weak 

Mr. Kalb: You couldn't, obviously, get to 
Lenin, but you did get into a conversation 
with the President, I understand, ivith Mao 

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. 

Mr. Kalb: Did you get the sense that he 
's in daily charge of China? What are some 
'if the differences there between Mao and 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think that would be 
very difficult to judge on the basis of one 
conversation, but there is no question in 
anybody's mind who has ever seen those two 
Chinese leaders together who is number one, 
and Mao is visibly the dominant figure; but 
how they proportion the daily work among 
themselves I wouldn't wish to speculate on. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, before you got 
to office, you had obviously spent a great 
deal of time at Widener Library at Harvard 
studying all about the world and writing 

about it, and. you came here, as I recall, ivith 
the idea that you ivould be thinking the big 
long strategic thoughts and really ivould not 
involve yourself in tactics as much as you 
have been. When do you get a chance to 
think? When do you get a chance to just sit 
back a»d reflect on whether you are doing 
the right thing, for that matter? 

Dr. Kissinger: Well, before you become a 
Harvard professor the idea that you could be 
fallible is driven out of you. 

But seriously, the problem between plan- 
ning and execution is one which when one 
is on the outside isn't often understood. 

When I was a professor, I used to think 
that the way to get policy made is to plan it, 
to write it out, and then to get somebody 
to adopt it. 

Now, if you look at the history of the 
American bureaucracy, most policy planning 
staffs have not been effective. They have not 
been effective because there was no way they 
could be made relevant to action. Nobody 
who had to do something ever had to ask 
the policy planning staff whether it approved. 

So unless you sit at a strategic point 
at which action is not possible without your 
oflfice, there is a danger that you become 
simply an abstract, an academic adjunct to 
an operating agency. 

Mr. Kalb: There is the other danger, too, 
though, isn't there? 

Dr. Kissinger: There is the other danger, 
too. The other danger is that you become so 
obsessed with tactics that you never ask 
yourself where you are going. 

I must say candidly it is a problem that 
has occupied me. When one comes into oflRce, 
one has had a chance, hopefully, to do a great 
deal of thinking— much of it probably not 
applicable. Then one gains experience, and at 
some point in one's term in oflfice, there is a 
happy balance between one's thinking and 
one's experience. 

Beyond a certain point, the danger you 
mention is very real : that one becomes so 
conscious of the tactical that one forgets 
the purpose it is supposed to serve — and one 
probably is the last person to know that one 
has failed in that. 

April 2, 1973 


Now, I have thought about it. I have a lot 
of time on airplanes, for example, to think, 
and I try to keep groups working on long- 
term projections and to spend at least three 
afternoons a week on long-term projections; 
but what you said is absolutely a problem. 

Mr. Kalb: One of the things that occurred 
to me is that I remember an article you 
wrote back in 1959 warning then-President 
Eisenhower about summitry with the Rus- 
sians, and I recall, too, that then-Vice Presi- 
dent Nixon, I believe, sent you a note of 
congratulations and agreement that he, too, 
had his problems with summitry, and yet 
we find in the evolution over the last four 
years that both of you uniquely have worked 
summitry into almost the major eye-catching 
element of your policy. 

Dr. Kissinger: But I think there is an im- 
portant difference. What I warned against 
in 1959 was to use a summit meeting as a 
substitute for detailed negotiations; and the 
danger that we saw then was that if heads 
of state met without adequate preparation, 
since you could not appeal their disagree- 
ments to anybody the danger of a confronta- 
tion was too great, and therefore you were 
driven into atmospherics and you thought if 
Khrushchev ate hotdogs in a cornfield in 
Iowa that he had changed his basic policy or 
if somebody was received well in Moscow 
that meant a change in policy. 

But what the President has insisted on 
from the first day he came into office, from 
his first press conference, was that all prob- 
lems were related to each other, linked to 
each other; secondly, that summit meetings 
could take place only if they were very 
carefully prepared. 

So when we went to Moscow, we knew the 
probable outcome; at least we knew the 
range of possible outcomes. And as you re- 
member, there were one or two agreements 
announced almost every day ; and we used the 
summit not to start a negotiation, but to 

give an impetus to existing negotiations, to 
bring them to a focus, and to have veiy con- 
crete solutions. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, tve have about 
two minutes left. I ivant to ask you some- 
thing the President mentioned yesterday. He 
looked down at several of the newsmen and 
said that several of you when writing about 
"peace with honor," gag on the expression. 
Since I assume that you can consume the 
expression easily, why has it all been so im- 
portant — "peace with honor," given the im- 
pact of this war on American society, the 
people, the morals, everything ? 

Dr. Kissinger: When we came into office 
this country was torn by the war. No Presi- 
dent has had to take office and was 
immediately greeted by massive public dem- 
onstrations. We thought we were at the edge 
of an era of peace, but the President felt very 
strongly that we could never carry it out if 
the government did not have enough au- 
thority so that its actions meant something 
and could be carried out over a period of 

Secondly, we felt we owed it to the Amer- 
ican people, too, that the war would be ended 
by a decision of its government, and not in an 
act of exhaustion ; and now that the war is 
over, and we have achieved terms better 
than most of our critics thought possible, 
terms that Americans don't have to be 
ashamed of, we think this fact could be the 
basis of a reconciliation of the American 
people. It is no shame to have wanted to 
end the war more quickly than we did. And 
what we attempted to do was to create the 
basis for a constructive policy at home and 
abroad, and this is why the President has 
thought it was so important. 

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, I only have about 
430-odd questions left, but we have run out 
of time. I certainly hope that sometime soon 
you will invite us back. Thank you very much, 
and good night. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Deputy Under Secretary Macomber Discusses Terrorism 
in Interview on "TocJay" Program 

Following is the transcript of an inter- 
view ivith Deputy Under Secretary for Man- 
agement William B. Macomber, Jr., broadcast 
on the National Broadcasting Company's tele- 
vision program "The Today Show" on 
March S. 

Mr. McGee: Deputy Under Secretary of 
State William Macomber ioas sent on an 
urgent mission a feiv days ago to represent 
the United States in negotiations to effect 
the release of Americans being held by the 
Black September terrorists. The American 
diplomats, Cleo Noel and [Georgel CuHis 
Moore, ivere killed before he could get there. 
Mr. Macomber has now returned to Wash- 
ington accompanyiyig the bodies of the two, 
and we want to talk with him about the im- 
plications of these murders. 

He is in our Washington studio with "To- 
day" Washington editor Bill Monroe. Gentle- 

Mr. Monroe: Good morning, Frank. Mr. 
Macomber has also jtist been appointed Am- 
bassador to Turkey. 

Mr. Ambassador, you stopped in Cairo on 
your way to Khartoum. Why? 

Mr. Macomber: Well, there were several 
reasons. First of all, I came down in Cairo 
because I wanted to go into Khartoum in a 
smaller airplane. We thought it might agitate 
the terrorists if we came in with a great big 
American plane. And then I delayed in Cairo 
because we got woi-d through the Egj'ptian 
Foreign Minister that the whole venue might 
shift to Egypt. They were trying to work out 
a deal where both the terrorists and their 
captives would come to Egypt. And I was 
very impressed with the way the Sudanese 
Government was handling the problem. I 
didn't think I was needed there as much as 

I would be needed in Cairo. And finally, that 
last deadline was going to take place before 
I could get to Khartoum in any event. 

So I delayed in Cairo for a little while and 
then when it became clear they weren't going 
to shift the venue, I got in the air and headed 
for Khartoum. But that was when the dead- 
line was reached and our men were murdered. 

Mr. Monroe: You received word in the air 
on the way to Khartoum that the men had 
been killed. 

Mr. Macomber: I did, Bill, yes. 

Mr. Monroe: In retrospect, do you have a 
feeling that your earlier arrival or anything 
else wo7dd have saved these men, or were 
they destined to die because the terrorists 
planned it that way ? 

Mr. Macomber: No. In all my years of 
dealing with this terrorist problem — I have 
dealt with it all over the world — I think the 
Sudanese Government played it as profes- 
sionally and as calmly and as coolly as any 
government I have ever seen. The way they 
played it made the odds as strong as possible 
that we would succeed. I think the men were 
doomed from the moment they were picked 
up. And believe it or not, these savages 
wanted to take our people in an airplane 
and fly them over here to the United States 
and kill them here in the United States. And 
I think what triggered their deaths was as 
soon as they found out that they were not 
going to be allowed to get a plane or get out 
of the Sudan, they decided to kill them. 

Mr. Monroe: There have been reports — / 
would like to have your comment on them — 
that the terrorists brutally mistreated the 
Americans before killing them, deliberately 
tortured them, in other words. 

April 2, 1973 


Mr Macomber: No, they only murdered 
them They did not mistreat them. Those 
reports are in error. But I don't give them 
much credit for that. They were banged up 
at the beginning. Both the Americans were 
wounded, but slightly. The Belgian was 
wounded more seriously. They were not 
tortured in the period in between. They were 
just eventually taken out and shot. 

Mr Monroe: Can you tell us more than we 
have learned about what happened inside 
the Embassy, about how Ambassador Noel 
and his deputy, Mr. Moore, were able to 
handle themselves under these circum- 

Mr Macomber: Well, with unbelievable 
courage and composure. It is just unbeliev- 
able Cleo, Ambassador Noel, when they told 
him he was being taken down to be shot, 
turned to the Saudi Ambassador and shook 
his hand and said, "You know, I'm very 
sorry it has turned out as it has. But I want 
you to know that obviously it is not your 
fault. And we are deeply grateful for you 
having had this party to honor Curt." And 
that is what the party was for— it was to 
honor Curt, who was leaving. He said, "I 
want to thank you and please don't feel badly 
about what has happened." And then calmly 
went downstairs and he was butchered. 

Mr. Monroe: Mr. Macomber, Secretary of 
State Rogers has talked about using very 
extreme measures to protect American dip- 
lomats in the future. What kind of measures 
are possible? 

Mr. Macomber: Well, you work on this 
problem really at two ends. The first thing 
you do is make it as tough as possible to 
pick up American diplomats around the 
world, and we have done a lot on that score. 
And they are harder to get than anybody 
else. We've got more armored cars, we've 
got more follow cars, we've got a lot of de- 
vices that make it tough to get American 
diplomats. But they can get any one of them. 
Mr. Monroe: Bodyguards? 
Mr. Macomber: Well, yes. I don't want to 
go into all the things we do. We do a lot of 


Mr. Monroe: Somewhat the same kind of 
thing the Secret Service does for the 
President ? 

Mr Macomber: That's right. Except that 
we have a lot of people. You can never get 
complete protection. Now, if they want to 
o-et somebody they'll get them sooner or 
fater But you can make it tough. And you 
can make them pay a price. And we do all 
kinds of things to try to have that take place. 
And the result of that is that they begin to 
hit now in the less high-risk areas. Haiti was 
not considered a high-risk area. They didn t 
hit in the Dominican Republic, where we 
had more protection and had expected more 

trouble. , . ■, u 4- 

So you can make it very tough. And what 
they are doing now is going to the areas 
where we have not felt the risk was as great 
and hitting there. So we are just going to 
have to extend the protection. 

But there is no way to get absolute pro- 
tection. You've got to make it tough for them. 
You have to work that at the other end, too 
You have to make it not only painful and 
risky personally for these people to mess 
around with Americans, but then you have 
got— and this is just terrible and coldblooded 
—but you have got to make it clear that 
there isn't going to be any reward. We are 
not going to pay blackmail. The President 
has made it clear, and he is dead right. And 
only when the world comes to this position 
is this terrible thing going to end. 

Mr Monroe: Is one difficulty in this situa- 
tion the fact that Arab governments, notably 
Libya and Egypt, have been quite lenient with 
terrorists, including those who have com- 
mitted murder in the past? 

Mr Macomber: Well, I think as long as 
governments are lenient with this kind ot 
thing it will go on. I think we are going to 
have more losses. Bill. I just think this is— 
I know the Service thinks so, my colleagues 
in the Foreign Service. It is just part of the 
job We are going to lose some more people. 
But we are not going to pay blackmail to 
get them back. And our ambassadors and our 
other diplomats don't think we should. And 
they know what that means for them. But it 

Department of State Bulletin 

is the only way we are poinp to put this to 
an end. We've got a lot of brave men. We've 
pot nobody any braver than tiiese two. But 
the Service as a whole — this is just part of 
the job. It is so outrapeous when you think 
of what these fellows go through, and then 
this "cookie-pusher" image. It's an outrage. 
These are marvelous, courageous people, 
working for the United States all over the 
world in a very professional, very competent 
way. And taking very great risks. 

Mr. Monroe: What about Sudanese justice? 
Do ijou expect in this case that the Govern- 
ment of the Stidan will mete out to the eight 
terrorists arrested justice worthy of the 

Mr. Macomber: Well, I had a long talk with 
President Nimeri when I was there, and with 
other officials, and before the capture they 
promised me there would be no deal. There 
was no deal. And the President said things 
to me that I can't repeat here. But he was 
obviously very concerned by this. And he has 
made certain public statements — I I'ead one 
yesterday where he said that they called the 
Black September organization, "We're going 
to make it a Twelve Months Black organiza- 
tion if they fool ai'ound with us this way." 
He's a very strong man, a strong country. 
And I think they are going to do right. But 
it isn't helpful for people 6,000 miles away 
to start to give them a lot of advice. They 
understand the problem. They are very 
strong men. 

You know, this is a stain on their govern- 
ment. And they knew these two men. And 
they were upset personally as well as from 
the point of view of their government. 

I can't tell you — when we left, the cere- 
monies at the airport were something. As 
soon as these two marvelous women, these 
widows — I just can't say enough about them — 

Mr. Monroe: The ividoivs of Ambassador 
Xoel and Mr. Moore? 

P Mr. Macomber: Yes. As soon as they came 
onto the airport into the field and their feet 
hit the ground, they began walking out to 
the honor guard, the military bands began 
playing "Auld Lang Syne," a slow march, 

over and over again, and they did that for 
15 or 20 minutes while those two women 
said goodl)y to all their friends and many, 
many Sudanese friends — the tears came 
down. That country feels about this. And T 
think what will develop will be helpful in 
ending this problem. But the problem isn't 
going to end for a while. It isn't just what 
one country does. We've got to have the 
fortitude not to pay blackmail, and other 
countries have got to. And eventually, when 
they don't get any benefits from this thing 
and the risks get very high, it will end. But 
we've got to go on for a while. 

Mr. Monroe: Mr. Macomber, what about 
the evidence that the Government of Libya 
may have been involved ivith these terrorists, 
and they have been in touch ivith them, and 
they have encouraged them to do ivhat they 
did in Khartoum? 

Mr. Macomber: Well, the Government of 
the Sudan is conducting a very thorough in- 
vestigation. And let's just see where that 
comes out. But certainly people had helped. 
And it's a criminal thing. 

Mr. Monroe: Supposing Israel and Jordan 
had released the men in prison that the ter- 
rorists wanted released. You ivonld not be 
in favor of that, ivould you? 

Mr. Macomber: No. It would have been the 
worst thing that could have happened. First 
of all, I am not at all sure we would have 
gotten our people out. But certainly it would 
have just encouraged them to kidnap Amer- 
ican diplomats and other diplomats all over 
the world. 

Mr. Monroe: Will this make you feel a little 
bit less secure in your new job in Turkey? 

Mr. Macomber: No. Look, there are prob- 
lems all over the world for all diplomats. 
It is part of the job. No, not at all. There are 
good security services there. This is just part 
of the game. You know, you think about this 
as a probem beyond the seas. Two Turkish 
diplomats were murdered in this country 
very recently. 

Mr. Monroe: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Ambassador, Deputy Under Secretary of 
State William Macomber. 

April 2, 1973 


Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
People's Republic of Bangladesh, M. Hossain 
Ali, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on March 2. For texts of the Ambassa- 
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated 
March 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Guyana, Frederick Hilborn Tal- 
bot, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on March 2. For texts of the Ambassa- 
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see 
Department of State press release dated 
March 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Iceland, Haraldur Kroyer, pre- 
sented his credentials to President Nixon on 
March 2. For texts of the Ambassador's re- 
marks and the President's reply, see Depart- 
ment of State press release dated March 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Ma- 
laysia, Mohamed Khir Johari, presented his 
credentials to President Nixon on March 2. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated March 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ahmedou 
Ould Abdallah, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on March 2. For texts of the 
Ambassador's remarks and the President's 
reply, see Department of State press release 
dated March 2. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Paraguay, Miguel Solano Lopez, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 

on March 2. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated March 

U.S. Members Appointed to Board 
of U.S.-lsrael Science Foundation 

Press release 65 dated March 7 

The Secretary of State announced on 
March 7 the appointment of the five U.S. 
members of the Board of Governors of the 
United States-Israel Binational Science Foun- 
dation. The Board will also include five mem- 
bers appointed by the Government of Israel. 
The U.S. members appointed were: 

Dr. H. Guyford Stever, Director, National Science 
Foundation, Washington, D.C. 

Dr. John P. Schaefer, president. University of Ari- 
zona, Tucson, Ariz. 

Dr. David J. Sencer, Acting Administrator, Health 
Services and Mental Health Administration, De- 
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare. 

Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International 
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department 
of State. 

Albert A. Spiegel, attorney at law, Beverly Hills, 

All terms of appointment were effective 
as of January 1, 1973. 

The United States-Israel Binational Sci- 
ence Foundation was established to promote 
and support cooperation between the United 
States and Israel in research in science and 
technology for peaceful purposes on subjects 
of mutual interest and to continue the excel- 
lent relations in science and technology be- 
tween the two countries. The Foundation was 
created by an agreement between the United 
States and Israel signed September 27, 1972, 
and announced in Department of State press 
release 244 of that date.^ 

The Board of Governors of the Founda- 
tion is responsible for determining financial 
and managerial policies, the subject areas for 
cooperative research, and the research pro- 
grams of the Foundation. 

^ For text of the announcement, see Bulletin of 
Oct. 23, 1972, p. 485. 


Department of State Bulletin 


United States Policy Toward South Asia 

Statemeyit by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistajit Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs^ 

Mr. Chairman: I want to thank you and 
the members of the committee for providing 
the opportunity to review the situation in 
South Asia and to explain our policy toward 
this important region. Our interest in South 
Asia is underscored by the appointment of 
an outstanding figure, Ambassador Moyni- 
han, to India and the President's meeting 
March 8 with President Bhutto's special 
representatives, Governor Mustafa Khar of 
the Punjab and Minister of State Aziz 

Before considering our policies, I would 
like to highlight certain major characteristics 
of the region : 

— The nations of South Asia have attained 
independence or emerged from traditional 
rule since 1945. These countries are proudly 
nationalistic. They are opposed to any trace 
of colonialism. 

— South Asia's most intractable political- 
security problem has been the hostility be- 
tween India and Pakistan. This has caused 
three wars since 1947. It is the principal 
source of regional instability. 

— South Asia is, in economic terms, one of 
the poorest parts of the globe. Despite de- 
termined national commitments, progress 
in raising standards of living remains slow. 

' Made before the Subcommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on Mar. 12. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. 

Per capita income is estimated at roughly 
$100. The problems are enormous, especially 
that of population growth. 

— South Asia is one of the most densely 
populated portions of the globe. More than 
700 million people, or one of every five hu- 
mans, live there. 

— South Asia is a seat of ancient civiliza- 
tions and cultures. Through the centuries 
the people of South Asia have contributed 
greatly to man's spiritual and intellectual 
development. While materially poor, they are 
culturally rich. 

In 1971 President Nixon described our 
broad policy objectives in South Asia:- 

Our aim is a structure of peace and stability 
within which the people of this region can develop 
its great potential and their independent vision of 
the future. Our policy is to help these nations deal 
with their own problems, and to bring our activity 
into a stable balance with that of the other major 
powers with interests in the area. 

These remain our goals. Following a year 
of crisis, turmoil, and war, 1972 began a 
period of new departures which have raised 
hope for the future. As the President stated 
in his 1972 foreign policy report:' 

'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25, 1971, ap- 
pears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971; the section 
entitled "South Asia" begins on p. 385. 

■■"The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap- 
pears in the Bulleti.n' of Mar. 13, 1972; the section 
entitled "South Asia" begins on p. 383. 

April 2, 1973 


The 700 million people of the subcontinent de- 
serve a better future than the tragedy of 1971 
seemed to portend. It is for them to fashion their 
own vision of such a future. The world has an in- 
terest in the regional peace and stability which are 
the preconditions for their achieving it. 

The past year has seen major developments 
that bear on these broad objectives: 

— The dramatic relief effort for Ban- 

— The commitment of India and Pakistan 
to reconciliation. 

— The effort of Pakistan to shape a new 
political system and find a new equilibrium. 

— The beginning of a process designed 
to create a more cooperative relationship 
between the United States and India. 

The attempt by India and Pakistan to 
shape a new and less hostile relationship de- 
serves further comment. After a generation 
of mistrust and strife, India's Prime Minis- 
ter and Pakistan's President agreed last 
July at Simla to seek reconciliation. This 
marks a milestone toward the structure of 
peace and stability we seek in South Asia. 

Since then, India and Pakistan have agreed 
to a line of control in Kashmir and have 
withdrawn their troops from the territory 
occupied during the 1971 war. At present, 
further progress toward reconciliation is 
blocked by an impasse on several interrelated 
issues: the repatriation of Pakistani POW's 
and families from India and of Bengalees 
from Pakistan, and the formal recognition 
of Bangladesh by Pakistan. We are hopeful 
that the parties concerned will make a fresh 
effort to break this deadlock. 

Progress toward regional stability may 
be slow. The issues are complex. Mistrust is 
deep and mutual. But we see greater hope 
in the present situation than has existed for 
many years. The crucial difference is that the 
nations of South Asia themselves now wish 
to live peacefully with one another and have 
themselves undertaken the tasks of building 
a durable peace. 

We have warmly encouraged this effort. 
In accordance with the Nixon doctrine, we 
think the search for stability in South Asia is 
primarily a task for the nations of the region. 
We look to the other major powers with in- 

terests in the area to take a similar approach 
to the problems of South Asia. As the Presi- 
dent said in his 1971 foreign policy report: 

We have a deep interest in ensuring that the 
subcontinent does not become a focus of great power 

We will try to keep our activities in the area in 
balance with those of the other major powers con- 
cerned .... no outside power has a claim to a pre- 
dominant influence and . . . each can serve its own 
interests and the interests of South Asia best by 
conducting its activities in the region accordingly. 

We also have a deep and longstanding in- 
terest in the development of South Asia's 
human and material resources. As an expres- 
sion of our interest the region has been a 
major recipient of U.S. economic assistance. 
Since 1951 about 20 percent of all U.S. eco- 
nomic aid has gone to South Asia, demon- 
strating our concern for the hundreds of 
millions living at or below the subsistence 

In recent years levels of U.S. assistance to 
South Asia have declined. This reflects a 
drop in available U.S. resources and a re- 
duced South Asian requirement for foodgrain 
imports. Although the current food position 
is uncertain following 1972's erratic mon- 
soon, there has been dramatic progress in 
wheat production during the last decade. 
The Green Revolution has raised Indian 
wheat crops from 10 to 24 million tons and 
Pakistani production from 4.5 to almost 7 
million tons. Attention is now focusing on 
efforts to achieve a similar breakthrough in 
rice production. 

At present most public attention is cen- 
tered on the food situation in India, where 
foodgrain production declined from 105 mil- 
lion tons during the 1971 crop year to per- 
haps 100 million tons in 1972. To make up 
for the shortfall, the Indians have drawn on 
their 9 million tons in reserves and also ar- 
ranged for the importation of about 2 million 
tons. These purchases have been on a com- 
mercial basis, including a substantial portion 
from the United States. India has not re- 
quested any special food assistance such as 
title I of P.L.-480. 

Looking ahead, we see continuing coopera- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tion for economic development with South 
Asia. But our role will be relatively smaller. 
Eurojie, Japan, and international lending: in- 
stitutions have already become relatively 
larper donors. As you know, nearly all the 
nations of the world are prepared to launch 
new multilateral trade negotiations under 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] later in 1973. The industrial nations, 
including the United States, are hopeful that 
the negotiations will insure that real eco- 
nomic benefits are provided for the develop- 
ing countries. In this regard, the United 
States remains committed to provide gen- 
eralized preferences for the exports of manu- 
factures and semimanufactures of the devel- 
oping countries. 

In the field of security assistance, the 
United States in the 1950's and early 1960's 
provided a considerable amount of grant 
military assistance to Paki-stan and a small 
amount to India. Since the 1965 Kashmir 
war, our approach toward South Asia has de- 
emphasized the U.S. military supply role. 
Under a policy that limited sales to nonlethal 
equipment and spares for U.S.-origin lethal 
equipment, relatively little military equip- 
ment was delivered to India and Pakistan be- 
tween 1966 and 1971, estimated to be in the 
neighborhood of $100 million. Since the 1971 
crisis we have maintained a total embargo. 

With regard to our bilateral relations, we 
desire good ties with all the countries of 
South Asia. With India, a great and demo- 
cratic nation, we have at times had policy 
differences. We are now seeking to shape a 
new and more pragmatic relationship based 
on what Ambassador Moynihan aptly termed 
"a new realism." Sound and cooperative 
Indo-U.S. relations are important for both 
our countries and will facilitate South Asian 
stability. In the past our differences with 
India have primarily related to third-country 
problems, most recently Viet-Nam and Ban- 
gladesh. With these difl^culties behind us, we 
sense improved prospects for a constructive 

With Pakistan, the United States has close 
and friendly relations. We value these ties 
and hope they will continue. During the past 

year we made substantial new aid commit- 
ments to Pakistan. Our assistance should 
hel]) Pakistan in overcoming the economic 
dislocation caused by the 1971 crisis. On the 
political front, Pakistan is trying to establish 
a new and democratic political framework 
and regain its national equilibrium. We look 
with sympathy on this effort. 

With Bangladesh, which we recognized 
last April, the year has seen progress toward 
establishing good relations. Our major con- 
cern in Bangladesh has been the massive re- 
construction effort. Along with India, the 
United States took the lead in channeling 
large amounts of humanitarian assistance. 
We have provided more than $300 million in 
aid to help this brave nation overcome the 
terrible human and physical losses suffered 
during the 1971 tragedy. As the emergency 
period concludes, we expect to shift to a 
more normal economic assistance program. 
Bangladesh has just completed democratic 
general elections in which Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman has won a large mandate from his 
people. We look forward to cooperating with 
Mujib and his new government. 

We have friendly relations with the other 
countries of South Asia — the Kingdoms of 
Afghanistan and Nepal and the Republic of 
Sri Lanka. 

In Afghanistan the new government of 
Prime Minister Shafiq is energetically seek- 
ing to strengthen representative government 
and to accelerate its development process. 
We have a longstanding and productive eco- 
nomic assistance relationship which we be- 
lieve has an excellent record. 

We similarly have a small but effective 
assistance program in the mountain Kingdom 
of Nepal. This supplements what Nepal is 
doing for itself and serves as tangible evi- 
dence of our interest in this land. The new 
King of Nepal, Birendra, has just completed 
his first year on the throne and has injected 
new energy into the country's development 

The island Republic of Sri Lanka faced a 
major insurgency threat in 1971. We were 
pleased that, along with other friends of 
Sri Lanka, we were able to provide a small 

April 2, 1973 


amount of military assistance to Madame 
Bandaranaike's democratically elected gov- 
ernment. At present Sri Lanka faces major 
economic problems, and we are providing 
P.L.-480 foodgrain assistance to help the 
government's efforts to deal with them. 

In sum, our policy toward South Asia 
parallels that toward other portions of Asia. 
We support the growth of healthy national 
states capable of maintaining their integrity 
and independence free from a predominant 
influence of external powers and free to con- 

centrate their energies on the vital tasks of 
internal political, social, and economic de- 
velopment. We will be a hopeful, helpful, 
and sympathetic observer, but the primary 
responsibility and interest lie with the coun- 
tries of South Asia themselves. As the Presi- 
dent said during his 1969 trip to India and 
Pakistan, "Asian hands must shape the Asian 

' For a statement by President Nixon issued at 
Lahore, Pakistan, on Aug. 1, 1969, see BULLETIN 
of Aug. 25, 1969, p. 163. 


Calendar of International Conferences' 

Scheduled April Through June 

ECE Group of Experts on Data Requirements and Documenta- Geneva Apr. 2-3 

tion; 3d Session. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Provisions Italy Apr. 2-6 

ECE Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental Geneva Apr. 2-6 

IOC/UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Global In- London Apr. 2-6 

vestigations of Pollution in Marine Environment. 

ITU/CCITT World Administrative Conference Geneva Apr. 2-11 

U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science Nevir York . . . Apr. 2-13 

and Technology to Development. 

'■ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on March 15, 1973, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April- 
June 1973. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCITT, International 
Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; EC, European 
Community; EGA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; EFTA, European 
Free Trade Association; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; 
ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IHD, International Hydrographical Decade; 
IHO, International Hydrographic Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergov- 
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; 
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; PAIGH, Pan 
American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Naviga- 
tion Conferences; RID, European Convention on Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail; UNCITRAL, 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, U.N. Conference on Trade and Devel- 
opment; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization; UNIDROIT, International Institute for Unification of Private Law; WHO, 
World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization. 


Department of State Bulletin 

ECOSOC Committee for Development Planninp: 9th Session . . 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination . . . 

ILO Petroleum Committee: 8th Session 

Joint RID 'ECE Group of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous 

UNCITRAL: 6th Session 

ICAO Lecal Subcommittee on Rome Convention 

ECE Group of Experts on Automatic Data Processing and Coding 

NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group 

NATO Group of Experts on the Middle East 

UNCTAD Committee on Preferences 

PIANC Expanded Executive Committee: 11th Session 

OAS General Assembly: 3d Regular Session 

ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Pro- 

U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science 
and Technology to Development: 18th Session. 

NATO Group of Experts on the Maghreb 

PAHO Sixth Inter-American Meeting on Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
and Zoonoses Control. 

CCC Finance Committee: 41st Session 

IMCO Facilitation Committee: 7th Session 

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 25th Plenary Session 

7th General Assembly of the International Centre for the Study 
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property. 

NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society .... 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group: Phase II Follow-On 

FAO European Committee for Control of Foot-and-Mouth Dis- 
ease: 20th Session. 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: Working 
Group on Subsidies. 

NATO Group of Experts on Africa 

FAO Committee on Fisheries: 8th Session 

UNESCO International Coordinating Council on Man and the Bio- 
sphere: 2d Session. 

ECE Preparatory Meeting for the Fourth ECE Seminar on the 
Building Industry. 

OECD Agricultural Ministerial 

ECAFE Plenary: 29th Session 

GATT Working Group on Countervailing Duties 

GATT Committee on Agriculture 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: Working 
Group on Import Documentation. 

NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport . 

NATO Group of Experts on the Far East 

PAIGH: 10th General Assembly 

U.N. ECOSOC: 54th Session 

UNIDROIT Governing Council: 52d Session 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Rice: 17th Session 

NATO Group of Experts on Latin America 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board 

UNIDO Permanent Committee: 2d Session 

WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty Interim Committees and Fi- 
nance Working Group. 

UN/FAO Committee of the World Food Program 

ILO: 2d Tripartite Meeting of Timber Industry 

UNESCO Executive Board: 92d Session 

UNICEF Executive Board 

GATT Balance of Payments Committee 

ECE Group of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods . 

IMCO Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellite Systems: 2d Session 

Conference on Sulphur 

ECA Executive Committee 

GATT Textiles Committee 

IHO Meeting of Legal Experts on Host Agreement 

New York . . 

. Apr. 2-13 

New York . . 

. Apr. 2-13 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 2-13 


. Apr. 2-13 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 2-13 

Montreal . . . 

. Apr. 2-17 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 3-4 

Mainz, Germany 

. Apr. 3-5 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 3-fi 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 3-13 

Brussels . . . 

Apr. 4 

Washington . . 

. Apr. 4-14 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 5-6 

New York . . 

. Apr. 5-12 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 9 

Bogota .... 

. Apr. 9-12 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 9-13 

London .... 

Apr. 9-13 

London .... 

. Apr. 9-13 

Rome .... 

. Apr. 9-13 

Ottawa .... 

. Apr. 10-11 

Bonn .... 

. Apr. 10-12 

Rome .... 

. Apr. 10-13 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 10-13 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 10-13 

Rome .... 

. Apr. 10-17 

Paris .... 

. Apr. 10-19 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 11-13 

Paris .... 

. Apr. 11-13 

Tokyo .... 

. Apr. 11-23 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 12-13 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 16 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 16-17 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 16-18 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 16-19 

Panama . . . 

. Apr. 16-May 5 

New York . . 

. Apr. 17-May 18 

Rome .... 

. Apr. 19-21 

New Delhi . . 

. Apr. 23-27 

Brussels . . . 

. Apr. 24-27 

Geneva .... 

Apr. 24-May 4 

Vienna .... 

. Apr. 24-May 5 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 25-30 

Rome .... 

Apr. 25-May 4 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 25-May 8 

Paris .... 

. Apr. 25-May 11 

New York . . 

. Apr. 26-May 11 

Geneva .... 

April 30 

Geneva .... 

. Apr. 30-May 4 

London .... 

. Apr. 30-May 5 

Montreal . . . 


Addis Ababa . 


Geneva .... 


Monaco. . . . 

. April 

April 2, 1973 


Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

International Coffee Council London .... 

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures Geneva .... 

UNESCO Directing Council: International Geological Correlation Paris .... 


OECD Consumer Policy Committee Paris .... 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York . 

WIPO: Extraordinary Session of the Coordinating Committee of Geneva. . . . 


OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Group on Short- Paris .... 

Term Economic Prospects. 

WHO Governing Council of the International Agency for Re- Lyon, France . 

search on Cancer. 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris .... 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: I2th Session .... Geneva .... 

IMCO Legal Committee: 18th Session London .... 

IOC/UNESCO Executive Council of the Commission: 2d Session . Paris .... 

UNIDO Industrial Development Board: 7th Session Vienna .... 

ECE Plenary: 28th Session Geneva .... 

ICAO Aircraft Accident Data Reporting Panel: 1st Meeting . . Montreal . 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Scientific and New York . . 

Technical Subcommittee. 

WHO: 26th World Health Assembly Geneva .... 

UNCTAD Sugar Conference Geneva .... 

OECD High Level Restricted Group on Oil Paris .... 

NATO Ad Hoc Drafting Group on the Mediterranean Brussels . . . 

OECD Oil Committee Paris .... 

OECD Environment Committee Meeting on Pollution Control Paris .... 


Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 18th Meeting Santiago . . . 

of the Technical Advisory Committee. 

OECD General Working Group on Oil Paris .... 

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products Geneva .... 

ECE Preparatory Meeting for the Seminar on the Role of Trans- Munich .... 

portation in Urban Planning Development and Environment. 

Pan American Child Congress Santiago . . . 

Inter-American Children's Institute: 53d Meeting of the Directing Santiago . . . 


ECE Group of Experts on Road Traffic Safety Geneva .... 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Food Hy- Washington . . 

giene: 10th Session. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods: 22d Session London .... 

NATO Group of Experts on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Brussels . . . 

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Paris .... 

24th Session. 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ankara . . . 

Customs Cooperation Council: 41st-42d Sessions Tokyo and Kyoto 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Bananas, 5th Session, and Sub- Bremen. . . . 

Group on Statistics, 6th Session. 

GATT Preparatory Committee for the International Trade Ne- Geneva .... 


OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris .... 

WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Industrial Property Vienna .... 

ICAO Sonic Boom Committee: 2d Meeting Montreal . . . 

OECD Trade Committee Paris .... 

NATO Science Committee Brussels . . . 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Processed Washington . . 
Fruits and Vegetables: 10th Session. 

IMCO/IHO Committee on Navigational Warnings Monte Carlo . . 

IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection : 14th Session London .... 











































































17-June 12 





May 21-23 







408 Department of State Bulletin 

ECOSOC Committee of Review and Appraisal: 2d Session . . . Geneva May 21 -June 8 

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 40th Session New York . . . May 21-June 15 

GATT Committee on Trade and Development Geneva May 22-25 

IC.AO Airworthiness Committee: 10th Meeting Montreal .... May 22-.Iune 8 

ECE Committee on Gas: Group of Experts on the Transport and Geneva May 23-25 

Storagrc of Gas. 

UNESCO IHD Coordinating Council: 8th Session Paris May 23-30 

WHO E.xecutive Board: 52d Session Geneva May 28-29 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Food Label- Ottawa May 28-June 1 

ling: 8th Session. 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution Geneva May 28-June 2 

ILO: 190th Session of the Governinp Body and Its Committees . Geneva May 28-June 2 

ICAO: 9th North Atlantic Systems Planning Group Paris May 28-June 6 

ECE Group of Experts for the Meeting of Government Officials Geneva May 29-June 1 

Responsible for Standardization Policies: 2d Session. 

IMCO Council: 30th Session London May 31-June 8 

GATT Agriculture Committee Geneva May 

GATT Committee on Administrative, Financial and Budgetary 

Questions. Geneva May 

GATT Working Party on the EC/EFTA Agreements Geneva May 

ICEM Executive Committee: 43d Session Geneva May 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 25th Session (Re- Geneva May 


International Lead and Zinc Study Groups New York . . . May 

ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination: 14th Session New York . . . May-June 

CCC Commodity Code Steering Group Brussels .... June 4-6 

IMCO Council: 30th Session London June 4-8 

UNCTAD Preparatory Committee for a Liner Conference Code . Geneva June 4-29 

International Rubber Study Group London June 5-8 

OECD Ministerial Council Paris June 6-8 

ILO: 58th International Conference Geneva June G-27 

NATO Defense Planning Committee Brussels .... June 7 


CENTO Ministerial Conference Tehran June 10-11 

FAO Council: 60th Session Rome June 11-22 

U.N. Environmental Council: 1st Session Geneva June 11-22 

U.N. Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites New York . . . June 11-22 

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna June 12 

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Brussels .... June 12-13 

NATO Ministerial Meeting Copenhagen . . . June 14-15 

IOC UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Coopera- Cartagena. . . . June 17-24 
tive Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 6th 

OECD Education Committee: 8th Session Paris June 18-20 

GATT Balance of Payments Committee Geneva June 18-22 

IMCO Legal Committee: 19th Session London June 18-22 

CCC Chemists Committee Meeting Brussels .... June 18-30 

ECAFE Working Group on Socio-Economic Returns of Family Bangkok .... June 19-30 
Planning Programs. 

ECE Group of Experts on the Construction of Vehicles .... Geneva June 25-29 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 15th Session. . . London June 25-29 

International Wheat Council London June 25-29 

WIPO Committee of Experts on the Patent Licensing Convention . Geneva June 25-29 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York . . . June 25-July 6 

OECD Fiscal Affairs Committee: 5th Session Paris June 26-28 

UNCTAD Expert Group on Financial Aid and Flow Targets . . Geneva June 26-29 

International Seed Testing Association Copenhagen . . . June 29-July 1 

European Civil Aviation Conference: Eighth (Triennial) Plenary Paris June 


GATT Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions Geneva June 

GATT Working Party on the Tariff Study Geneva June 

OECD Trade Committee: Working Group on Government Pro- Paris June 


UNDP Governing Council: 16th Session Geneva June 

April 2, 1973 '♦O' 

Current Actions 



Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New Yorlc 
June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; 
for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 

Accessioyi deposited: Korea (with declaration), 
February 8, 1973. 


International air services transit agreement. Done 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Notification of succession: Fiji, February 14, 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the 
convention on international civil aviation, Chi- 
cago, 1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), 
with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 
1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 
Acceptance deposited: Cuba, March 13, 1973. 


International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Open for signature at the U.N. Office, Geneva, 
until January 15, 1973, and at Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) 
Headquarters, London, from February 1 until 
December 31, 1973, inclusive.' 
Signatures: Bulgaria, Hungary, Korea, Poland. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scien- 
tific, and cultural materials, with protocol. Done 
at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered 
into force May 21, 1952; for the United States 
November 2, 1966. TIAS 6129. 
Accession deposited: Libya, January 22, 1973. 

Agreement for facilitating the international cir- 
culation of visual and auditory materials of an 
educational, scientific, and cultural character, 
with protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15, 
1949. Entered into force August 12, 1954; for the 
United States January 12, 1967. TIAS 6116. 
Accession deposited: Libya, January 22, 1973. 


Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 
1972. Open for signature at the U.N. Office,' 
Geneva, until January 15, 1973, and at U.N. Head- 

quarters, New York, from February 1 until 
December 31, 1973, inclusive. » ! 

Signatures: Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Korea, ) 
Poland. 1 

Diplomatic Relations i 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at | 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April \ 
24, 1964; for the United States December 13, [ 
1972. TIAS 7502. ( 

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub- i 
lie (with a declaration and a reservation), Feb- | 
ruary 2, 1973. 1 

Judicial Procedures i 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil | 

or commercial matters. Done at The Hague i 

March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, I 

1972. TIAS 7444. ■ 

Extended to : Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin j 

Islands, February 6, 1973. I 

Maritime Matters I 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- I 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS ' 

4044. ; 

Acceptance deposited: People's Republic of China, 
March 1, 1973. i 

Narcotic Drugs j 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 

New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force ] 

December 13, 1964; for the United States June i 

24, 1967. TIAS 6298. I 

Ratification deposited: Haiti, January 29, 1973. ' 

Protocol amending the single convention on nar- | 

cotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva i 

March 25, 1972. i [ 
Ratifications deposited : Costa Rica, February 
14, 1973; Haiti, January 29, 1973; Korea, Jan- 
uary 25, 1973. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.' 
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, February 8, 1973. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969.= i 

Notification of succession: Fiji (with a reserva- 
tion and declarations), January 11, 1973. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London November 26, 1968.' 

Acceptance deposited: Israel, February 2, 1973. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Israel, February 2, 1973. 

' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Satellite Communications System 

Atrrot'inoiit rflatiti),'- to the International Telecom- 
nuinications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. 
TIAS 7532. 

Accesi^ion deposited : Central African Republic, 
March 13. 1973. 
Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In- 
telsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 
20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. 
TIAS 7532. 

Signatures: Central African Republic, March 13, 
1973; Empresa Nacional de Telocomunicaciones 
de la Republica Argentina (Entel) for Argen- 
tina, March 13, 1973. 


Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with an- 
nex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. i 
Accession deposited: Mauritius, January 18, 1973. 



Air transport agreement, with schedule and ex- 
change of notes. Signed at Washington May 30, 
Entered into force definitively : March 9, 1973. 


Agreement relating to the extension of the military 
mission agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended 
(TIAS 1666, 1924, 2068, 2947, 3112, 3520, 6594, 
6886, 7070, 7207). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tehran August 15, 1972, and January 31, 1973. 
Entered into force January 31, 1973. 


.■Vgreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of February 14, 1973 
(TIAS 7273). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul February 21, 1973. Entered into force Feb- 
ruary 21, 1973. 


Agreement on the implementation of the agreement 
of April 18, 1969, concerning the Trust Territory 
of the Pacific Islands. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington March 13, 1973. Entered 
into force March 13, 1973. 


Agreement on rights, privileges and immunities of 
the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics Standing Consultative Commission. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Bern February 26 and March 
6, 1973. Entered into force March 5, 1973. 


Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. For- 
rest Roi/al to Turkey pursuant to the agreement 
of October 14, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4117, 
5989, 6588, 6925), relating to the loan of vessels. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara March 
18, 1971. Entered into force March 18, 1971. 
TIAS 7158. 
Terminated: February 15, 1973. 

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Har- 
wood to Turkey pursuant to the agreement of 
October 14, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4117, 5989, 
6925, 7158), relating to the loan of vessels. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 
27, 1971. Entered into force October 27, 1971. 
TIAS 7206. 
Tei~minated: February 15, 1973. 

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Hugh 
Purvis to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Ankara July 1, 1972. Entered into force July 

1, 1972. TIAS 7403. 
Terminated: February 15, 1973. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 
(TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon March 2, 1973. Entered into force March 

2, 1973. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 
(TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon March 7, 1973. Entered into force March 
7, 1973. 


' Not in force. 

Department Releases 1973 Edition 
of "Treaties in Force" 

Press release 74 dated March 13 

The Department of State on March 13 published 
"Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States in 
Force on January 1, 1973." 

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral rela- 
tions of the United States with 156 countries or 
other political entities and the multilateral relations 
of the United States with other contracting parties 
to more than 375 treaties and agreements on 86 sub- 
jects. The 1973 edition lists some 315 new treaties 
and agreements, including the Montreal convention 
for the suppression of unlawful acts against the 
safety of civil aviation (sabotage) ; the Vienna con- 
vention on diplomatic relations; the seabed arms 

April 2, 1973 


control treaty; the treaty with the U.S.S.R. on the 
limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and the 
interim agreement on certain measures with respect 
to the limitation of strategic offensive arms; the 
treaty with Honduras on the Swan Islands; the 
agreement with Japan concerning the Ryukyu Is- 
lands and the Daito Islands; the treaty to resolve 
pending boundary differences and maintain the Rio 
Grande and Colorado River as the international 
boundary between the United States and Mexico. 

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are 
arranged by country or other political entity, and 
the multilateral treaties and other agreements are 
arranged by subject with names of countries which 
have become parties. Date of signature, date of 
entry into force for the United States, and citations 
to texts are furnished for each agreement. 

This edition includes citations to volumes 1 
through 9 of the new compilation entitled "Treaties 
and Other International Agreements of the United 
States of America 1776-1949" (Bevans). 

"Treaties in Force" provides information con- 
cerning treaty relations with numerous newly inde- 
pendent states, indicating wherever possible the 
provisions of their constitutions and independence 
arrangements regarding assumption of treaty 

Information on current treaty actions, supple- 
menting the information contained in "Treaties in 
Force," is published weekly in the Department of 
State Bulletin. 

The 1973 edition of "Treaties in Force" (420 pp., 
Department of State publication 8697) is for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
S0i02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent 
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on 
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica- 
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay- 
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must 
accompany orders. 

Loan of Vessels— U.S.S. Pickerel and U.S.S. Volador. 

Agreement with Italy. TIAS 7434. 5 pp. lOfC. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ecuador. 
TIAS 7436. 6 pp. 10#. 

Inter-American Development Bank. Amendments to 
the agreement of April 8, 1959, as amended. TIAS 
7437. 9 pp. 10^ 

Finance — Debt Rescheduling Under Certain Agricul- 
tural Commodity and Credit and Loan Agreements. 

Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 7449. 19 pp. 25?!. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Brazil Cooperation 
Agreement. Agreement with Brazil and the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency amending the agree- 
ment of March 10, 1967. TIAS 7440. 3 pp. 10<. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Mnrch 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to March 12 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 65 
of March 7. 

No. Date Subject 

t68 3/12 Casey: Committee for Monetary 
Research and Education, Har- 
riman, N.Y., Mar. 10. 

*69 3/12 Dr. Walter of New York Univer- 
sity to tour Belgium, Germany. 

*70 3/12 Dr. Deutsch of Harvard to tour 
South Asia. 

*71 3/12 Dr. de Grazia of New York Uni- 
versity to tour India. 

*72 3/12 Study group of U.S. National 
Committee for International 
Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), Mar. 30. 

*73 3/12 Advisory Committee on Private 
International Law, Mar. 24. 
74 3/13 Publication of "Treaties in 

*75 3/13 List furnished by PRG of U.S. 
civilians to be released in Hanoi 
Mar. 16. 
76 3/13 Rogers: "Face the Nation," Mar. 

*77 3/13 Study groups of U.S. National 
Committee for CCIR, Mar. 29. 
78 3/13 Rush: interview for German tele- 

*79 3/13 Waldmann sworn in as Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Trans- 
portation and Telecommunica- 
tions (biographic data). 

*80 3/15 Advisory Commission on Interna- 
tional Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, Apr. 5-6. 

*81 3/15 Cancellation of meeting of Ad- 
visory Committee on Private 
International Law. 

*82 3/16 Executive Committee, National 
Review Board for East-West 
Center, Apr. 9. 

■'83 3/16 Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Apr. 12-13. 

*84 3/16 Dr. Levine of George Washington 
University to tour in Europe 
and Asia. 

*85 3/16 Mr. Berman of National Endow- 
ment for the Humanities to 
tour Japan. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April ^. 1H7J Vol. LXVIU, No. 1762 

Asia. United States Policy Toward South Asia. 

B(Sisco) 103 
Letters of Credence (Ali) 402 
United States Policy Toward South Asia 
(Sisco) 403 

Cambodia. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on 
"Face the Nation" 373 


Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television 388 
[People's Republic of China Releases U.S. Pris- 
oners (White House announcement) . . . 387 
ecretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the 
Nation" 373 

ngress. United States Policy Toward South 
Asia (Sisco) 403 

conomic .Affairs 

eputy Secretary Rush Interviewed for Ger- 
man Television 381 

resident Nixon Names Committee on East- 
West Trade Policy 380 

.S. and North Viet-Nam Establish Joint Eco- 
nomic Commission (joint announcement) . . 387 

ermany. Deputy Secretary Rush Interviewed 
for Gei-man Television 381 

Guyana. Letters of Credence (Talbot) .... 402 

Iceland. Letters of Credence (Kroyer) .... 402 

India. United States Policy Toward South Asia 
(Sisco) 403 

International Organization and Conferences. 

t Calendar of International Conferences . . 406 
rael. U.S. Members Appointed to Board of 
U.S.-Israel Science Foundation 402 
alaysia. Letters of Credence (Khir Johari) . 402 

Mauritania. Letters of Credence (Ould Ab- 
dallah) 402 

Middle East. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on 
"Face the Nation" 373 

North .Atlantic Treaty Organization. Deputy 
Secretary Rush Interviewed for German 
Television 381 

Pakistan. United States Policy Tou.nri s;,,iit>, 
Asia (Sisco) 103 

Paraguay. Letters of Credence l.■^oiaIK] Loppz; 402 


Department Releases 1973 Edition of "Treaties 

in Force" 411 

Recent Releases 412 

Science. U.S. Members Appointed to Board of 
LT.S.-Israel Science Foundation 402 

Sudan. Deputy Under Secretary Macomber 
Discusses Terrorism in Interview on "Today" 
Program 399 


Deputy Under Secretary Macomber Discusses 
Terrorism in Interview on "Today" Program 399 

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on" "Face the 
Nation" 373 

Trade. President Nixon Names Committee on 
East- West Trade Policy 380 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 410 


Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television . 388 
Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the 
Nation" 373 


Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television 388 
Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the 

Nation" 373 

U.S. and North Viet-Nam Establish Joint Eco- 
nomic Commission (joint announcement) . . 387 

Name Index 

Ali, M. Hossain 402 

Khir Johari, Mohamed 402 

Kissinger, Heni-y A -388 

Kroyer, Haraldur 402 

Macomber, William B., Jr 399 

Ould Abdallah, Ahmedou 402 

Rogers, Secretary 373 

Rush, Kenneth 381 

Sisco, Joseph J 403 

Solano Lopez, Miguel 402 

Talbot, Frederick Hilborn 402 

Superintendent of Documents 
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Washington, D.C. 20520. 




Volume LXMII 

No. 1763 

April 9, 1978 

Excei-pts From Transcript U13 

Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 418 

Statement by Acting Legal Adviser Brotver i34 


For index see inside back coter 



VOL. LXVIII, No. 1763 
April 9, 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the ■' 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of '■ 
Public Affairs, provides the public and ■ 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

President Nixon's News Conference of March 15 

Folio icing are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by President Nixon in the press 
briefing room at the White House on 
March 15. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 19 

The President: Ladies and gentlemen, I 
have an announcement with regard to our 
Liaison Office in Peking. 

The office will open approximately on May 
1, and Ambassador David Bruce will be the 
Chief of the Liaison Office. In the office will 
be approximately a total complement of 20 
(30) , of whom 10 will be at what we call the 
expert level ; the others, of course, for the 
support level. 

The two top assistants, top deputies to 
Ambassador Bruce — however, we should 
note, I call him Ambassador, but his title 
will be Chief of the Liaison Office — will be 
Mr. [Alfred leS.] Jenkins from the State 
Department, who as you know is one of our 
top experts on Chinese-American relations in 
State; and Mr. [John H.] Holdridge from the 
NSC [National Security Council], who is the 
top man in the NSC advising in this area 

We selected these two men because Mr. 
Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge not only are ex- 
perts in Chinese — they are bilingual, inci- 
dentally, in both Chinese and American; they 
speak well ; in fact I remember both assisted 
in translations when I have been there — but 
in addition to that, they are men who have 
from the beginning been participating in the 
new initiative between the People's Republic 
and the United States. They have accom- 
panied me on my trip, and they have accom- 
panied Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger on his trips. 

A word about why Ambassador Bruce was 

selected. We called him out of retirement be- 
cause I thought it was very important to 
appoint a man of great stature to this posi- 
tion. The Chinese accepted that view them- 
selves, and we expect soon to hear from them 
as to the appointment of the man they will 
have as his opposite number here in Wash- 
ington. Another reason that I selected Am- 
bassador Bruce was because of his great 
experience. All of you know that he has been 
Ambassador to Britain and Ambassador to 
Germany, Ambassador to France, and also 
headed our delegation in Paris in the Viet- 
Nam talks in 1971 and '72, in the early part 
of '72 [August 1970-July 1971]. 

A third reason perhaps has even greater 
significance. Many of you in this room were 
on the trip to China, and sometimes I suppose 
the feeling must have developed, "Well, this 
is a one-shot deal." I never considered it that, 
and all of you who reported on it did not con- 
sider it that. It was the beginning, we, 
of a longer journey, a journey in which we 
will have our diff^erences, but one in which 
the most populous nation in the world and 
the United States of America can work to- 
gether where their interests coincide for the 
cause of peace and better relations in the 
Pacific and in the world. 

It is necessary that this be, therefore, a 
bipartisan enterprise in the highest sense of 
the word. 

Mr. Bruce, as you know, while he has not 
been engaged in partisan politics as such, is 
a Democrat. He has served four Presidents 
with equal distinction. Democratic Presidents 
as well as Republicans. And we believe that 
appointing him as head of the delegation in- 
dicates our intention that this initiative will 
continue in the future, whether the Presi- 
dency is occupied by a Democrat or a Repub- 

April 9, 1973 


United Stotes Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China 

Followmg is an announcement issued by the 
White House on March 15. 

white House press release dated March 15 

The People's Republic of China and the United 
States announced last month that Liaison Offices 
would be established in Peking and Washington. 

The President is pleased to announce today 
that one of the most distinguished diplomats in 
recent American history will be Chief of our 
Liaison Office. Mr. David K. E. Bruce has ac- 
cepted his request that he be the head of our 
Liaison Office, and the People's Republic of 
China has agreed to his appointment. 

Ambassador Bruce has had a long and out- 
standing career both in the United States and 
in representing this country abroad. He served 
with great distinction as U.S. Ambassador to 
France, to Germany, and to the United Kingdom, 
and in this administration he was U.S. Ambas- 
sador to the Paris peace talks in 1970-71. He has 
thus represented both Democratic and Republi- 
can Presidents and will symbolize the bipartisan 
support for this administration's policy toward 
the People's Republic of China. The President is 
grateful for Ambassador Bruce's willingness 
once again to leave his well-deserved retirement 
to take on this important assignment for his 

Ambassador Bruce's principal deputies will be 
Alfred Jenkins of the State Department and 
John Holdridge of the NSC [National Security 
Council] staff. These senior officials are two of 
the most experienced and distinguished Chinese 
and Asian experts in the Foreign Service. Both 
have accompanied the President and Dr. [Henry 
A.] Kissinger on their trips to the People's 
Republic of China. 

The People's Republic of China will shortly 
name the Chief of its Liaison Office in Washing- 
ton, and that will be announced in due course. 
The two countries are still working out the de- 
tails of the offices, but the following additional 
information is available today. There will be 
about nine officers in the U.S. office in Peking. 
The total size of the office, including support 
personnel, will be about 30 people. It will start 
functioning around May 1, and the United States 
is sending an advance team of about five people 
to Peking around April 1. Further information 
on personnel and arrangements will be provided 
in the near future. 

The President considers the establishment of 
these Liaison Offices as a significant step forward 
in our relations with the People's Republic of 
China. It will facilitate communications and ac- 
celerate the already substantial program of 
trade and exchanges between our countries. 

lican. Of course, I am not making any 
predictions as to what will happen when I 

But that is the end of my announcement. 
We will now go to your questions. 

Q. Mi: President, can you say, sir, how 
concerned you are about the reports of cease- 
fire violations in Viet-Nam? 

The President: Well, I am concerned about 
the cease-fire violations. As you ladies and 
gentlemen will recall, I have consistently 
pointed out in meeting with you that we 
would expect violations because of the nature 
of the war, the guerrilla nature, and that 
even in Korea, in which we do not have a 
guerrilla war, we still have violations. They 
recede every year, but we still have them 
long — 15, 20 years — after the war is over. 

In the case of these violations, we are con- 

cerned about them on two scores. One, be- 
cause they occur, but two, we are concerned 
because of another violation that could lead 
to, we think, rather serious consequences — 
we do not believe it will ; we hope that it will 
not — and that is the reports that you ladies 
and gentlemen have been receiving from your 
colleagues in Viet-Nam with regard to 

You will note that there have been reports 
of infiltration by the North Vietnamese into 
South Viet-Nam of equipment exceeding the 
amounts that were agreed upon in the 

Now, some equipment can come in — in 
other words, replacement equipment, but no 
new equipment, nothing which steps up the 
capacity of the North Vietnamese or the Viet 
Cong to wage war in the South. No new 
equipment is allowed under the agreement. 

Now, as far as that concern is concerned, 


Department of State Bulletin 

particularly on the infiltration — that is the 
more important point, rather than the cease- 
fire violations, whicli we think, over a period 
of time, will he reduced — but in terms of the 
infiltration, I am not going to say publicly 
what we have said. 

I will only suggest this: that we have in- 
formed the Nortli Vietnamese of our concern 
aluuit this infiltration and of what we believe 
it to be. a violation of the cease-fire, the cease- 
fire and the peace agreement. Our concern 
has also been expressed to other interested 
parties. And I would only suggest that based 
I on my actions over the past four years, that 
I the North Vietnamese should not lightly dis- 
regard such expressions of concern, when 
they are made, with regard to a violation. 
That is all I will say about it. 

Q. Mr. President, in connection with this 
matter, there is a report also that not just 
ri/nipment, but a neio infusion of North Viet- 
namese combat personnel have been intro- 
duced into South Viet-Nam, which is apaH 

, from just equipment. Can you confirm this? 

I Is this partly what you are talking about? 

The President: Mr. Theis [J. William 
Theis, Hearst Newspapers] , the reports that 
we get with regard to infiltration, as you 
know, are always either too little or too late 
I or too much. And I am not going to confirm 
that one, except to say that we have noted the 
report having been made. We, however, are 
primarily concerned about the equipment, be- 
cause as far as the personnel are concerned 
they could be simply replacement personnel. 

r Q. Mr. President. 

The President: Go ahead, you are up in 

Q. Sir, why have we not gone through the 
ICCS [International Commission of Control 
and Supervision'l to complain about this 
' infiltration? 

The President: The ICCS is being used. As 

{ you know, there are some problems there. 

The Canadians have expressed considerable 

concern about the fact that they don't want 

to be on a Commission which is not being 

efl"ectively used, and we will continue through 
the ICCS, and any other body that we can 
efl'ectively appeal to, to attempt to get action 
thei-e. I can only answer in that way at this 

Q. Mr. President, have you decided to sell 
materials from the strategic stockpiles, and 
if so, tvhat are the safeguards from a secu- 
rity standpoint? 

The President: We have examined the 
stockpile question over the past four years. 
I have long felt that these stockpiles were 
really irrelevant to the kind of a world situa- 
tion we presently confront. The stockpile 
numbers were set up at a time that we were 
thinking of a very different kind of conflict 
than we presently might be confronted with 
in the world. 

Under the circumstances, after very full 
evaluation and discussion within the admin- 
istration, I have found that it will be safe 
for the United States to very substantially 
reduce our stockpiles. And we are going to 
go forward and do that. 

Now, there are going to be some squeals, 
but while the complaints will be made on the 
basis of national security, let me just say, I 
have made the decision on the basis of na- 
tional security. The complaints will be, and 
I understand this, from those who produce 
and sell some of the materials in which we 
are going to .sell the .stockpiles. But we are 
going to do this, first, because the govern- 
ment doesn't need this much for its national 
security and, second, because in this partic- 
ular period, we need to take every action we 
possibly can to drive down prices or at least 
to drive down those particular elements that 
force prices up. And selling the stockpiles in 
certain areas will help. 

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us your 
travel plans outside of the United States dur- 
ing 1973? 

The President: Well, I have previously in- 
dicated that I had no immediate travel plans 
outside the United States. I have received 
recommendations from the State Department 

April 9, 1973 


and from the NSC for what they consider to 
be urgent travel : one, to Europe, because of 
our interest in NATO; second, to Latin 
America, because I have not yet had the op- 
portunity to go to Latin America; and third, 
to Africa, because I have not traveled there. 

I do not mean to suggest by that that travel 
by the President to these places is absolutely 
indispensable to foreign policy, but I think 
this is the concern that many of our foreign 
policy experts in the State Department and 
the NSC, the concern they have. They feel 
that the enormous interest that has been cre- 
ated by going to Peking and going to Moscovi^ 
indicates that vi^e don't care about our neigh- 
bors in the Western Hemisphere, we don't 
care about our friends in Africa, and we do 
not care about our friends in Europe as well. 
Incidentally, Japan is another that is on the 

Now, how we will be able to work some of 
these trips in, I do not know. I would suggest 
that we are considering the possibility of a 
trip sometime during the summer or shortly 
before the summer begins, but we have not yet 
made a decision because there are so many 
other things on, and there will probably be 
a trip in the fall. But how we select among 
these, I have not yet determined. 

Q. There is a published report that the 
administration, despite what has been pub- 
licly said, is considering at least the possi- 
bility of controls on meat prices, possibly on 
other raw agrictdttiral products. We have 
housetvives strikes now against these tre- 
mendous increases in food pi'ices. When are 
you going to be in a position to offer the 
American consumer some kind of assurance 
that this is going to be stopped, this price 
spiral in food ? 

The President: The difficulty with offering 
rigid price controls on meat prices and food 
prices is that it would not stop — in the opin- 
ion of those whose judgment I value — would 
not stop the rise in prices. It might stop them 
momentarily, but as a result of discouraging 
increased production, we would reap the con- 
sequences of greater upward pressure on 
prices later. 

You can be very sure that if I thought that 
price controls on farm products and on food 
prices would work, I would impose them 

The point is that every bit of evidence that 
has been presented shows that it would dis- 
courage supply, it would lead to black mar- 
kets, and we would eventually have to come 
to rigid price controls, wage controls, and ra- 
tioning. And I don't think the American peo- 
ple want that. I think there is a better way. 

The better way is, one, to open our imports 
to the greatest extent that we possibly can. 
For example, we have already taken some 
action in that on dairy products. We have al- 
ready taken some action on beef products. I 
found, at a meeting with the Cost of Living 
Council, that we still have a 3 percent tariff 
on imported beef. I have asked the Depart- 
ment of Agriculture to give me a legal opin- 
ion as to whether the President can remove 
that tariff. If I can, I will act. If I can't, I 
am going to ask the Congress to do it, be- 
cause there shouldn't be any tariff on an item 
that is in short supply in the United States. 
That is on the import side. 

On the supply side, we are, of course, re- 
ducing our stockpiles, whatever stockpiles 
are left, and there are some in which we are 
able to act, provided we can get the transpor- 
tation. That is the reason the Secretary of 
Transportation sat in the meeting with the 
Cost of Living Council, because we need flat- 
cars and a number of other items in order to 
get it moved. 

Finally, there is the production side. And 
on the production side, as you know, our new 
farm policy is designed to increase produc- 
tion. We are continuing to examine the situ- 
ation. If any further action can be taken that 
will work, we will do it. But I can assure you 
that I consider it the highest priority to get 
the pressure on prices down. 

Q. Mr. President, I want to ask you about 
peace. You have concentrated on peace in 
your administration. Don't you find an incon- 
sistency there ivith continuing to give arms 
to India and Pakistan and perhaps a hundred 
other countries around the world? 


Department of State Bulletin 

The President: First, we are not giving 
them, we are selling them. 

Q. Isn't that tvorse? That is even worse. 

The President: I just wanted to be sure 
that we understood the difference, because of 
all the concern about aid. But the point that 
is involved in the India-Pakistan thing has 
been a very difficult one for this administra- 
tion because it involves commitments that 
were made before we got here. Those com- 
mitments were made during the Johnson 
administration. I do not criticize the fact that 
thoy were made, but they were made. 

As far as we were concerned, once the war 
between India and Pakistan began, we cut 
them off, as you recall. We stopped all eco- 
nomic assistance — not all, but some economic 
assistance to India, and we stopped all mili- 
tary assistance to Pakistan. 

Let's look at the numbers: $83 million in 
economic assistance to India and $14 million 
in military assistance to Pakistan. We have 
maintained that embargo up to this point.^ 
The difficulty was that there were contracts 
that had been made, the materials had al- 

' On Mar. 14 the Department of State announced 
that the embargo imposed on shipments of military 
equipment to India and Pakistan in December 1971 
was lifted. Under the new policy, similar to that 
which was in effect from 1967 to 1971, the United 
States will sell to India and Pakistan nonlethal 
equipment plus spare parts for previously supplied 
U.S.-origin equipment. 

ready been, in effect, sold, and under the 
circumstances we felt that it was time to 
clean the slate. 

So what we have done, the Indians are 
getting their $83 million in economic assist- 
ance; the Pakistanis are being allowed to go 
through with their purchases of the arms, 
nonlethal arms and spare parts. 

Now as far as the whole, the major prob- 
lem — and Miss [Sarah] McClendon, you have 
put your finger on the major problem — and 
that is peace in the area. This in no way, in 
no way, jeopardizes the peace in the area. 

After the war that broke Pakistan in half, 
India's superiority is so enormous that the 
possibility of Pakistan being a threat to India 
is absurd. 

All we are trying to do is to seek good re- 
lations with both, and we trust in the future 
that our aid to both can be ones that will 
turn them toward peace rather than war. 

I should also say that in India's case — 
while our aid there, our $83 million, is eco- 
nomic — India as you know purchases quite 
significant amounts of arms from the Soviet 
Union and also has an arms capability itself. 
So there is no problem in terms of creating 
conditions which could lead to another out- 
break of war by providing for simply keeping 
a commitment that the United States had 
made for the sale of spare parts and non- 
lethal arms to Pakistan. 

April 9, 1973 


The United States and the Changing World 

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush^ 

It is an honor and a pleasure to be with 
you all here tonight. I am particularly pleased 
to have this opportunity to welcome the 
nearly 90 visiting Fulbright-Hays scholars 
who come from 21 nations and are involved 
in a wide variety of academic disciplines. 

Each of you has brought to this country 
something of the special flavor and perspec- 
tive of your own nation. This contribution 
is essential to the United States understand- 
ing of the world in which it operates and 
ultimately to the formulation of constructive 
and responsible foreign policy. All of us ap- 
preciate how much we are enriched by what 
you give this nation. 

Seldom is there an opportunity to speak to 
a group which combines excellence with such 
broad geographic distribution. For this occa- 
sion, I would like to say something about how 
the United States views the emerging inter- 
national environment and to discuss the pur- 
poses and policies we will be pursuing as we 
go about our international business. 

The United States is still evaluating the 
meaning and lessons to be drawn from our 
involvement in Viet-Nam. Whether such an 
evaluation can be completed in this genera- 
tion is questionable. I am confident, however, 
that President Nixon's ending of the war 
under conditions enabling South Viet-Nam 
to decide its own future will be judged as a 
great contribution to peace and stability, not 
only in Asia but elsewhere as well. 

1 Made at Washington on Mar. 21 at the annual 
dinner honoring Fulbright-Hays scholars sponsored 
by the Department of State and the Washington 
International Center (press release 87). 

But whatever one's judgment on the past, 
it would be most unfortunate if the reaction 
to our experience there were to distort this 
country's approach to foreign relations as 
we move further into the vastly different in- 
ternational context of the 1970's and 80's. 
The world structure that produced the Indo- 
china conflict is rapidly disappearing. We 
are entering a new environment. The United 
States no longer will be required to do as much 
in that environment as we have in the past, 
but we will remain actively involved, and we 
must mold it as well as react to it. 

It is difficult to be definitive about the 
emerging international environment. Every 
assertion contains its own contradiction. 
Every attempt to simplify comes across an 
underlying complexity. Every verity contains 
a paradox. There is, I fear, no adequate word 
to express this combination of change, dif- 
fuseness, paradox, complexity. 

"Multipolar" is the term most generally 
used to describe the environment which we 
are all entering. That term accurately reflects 
both the changes within the Communist 
world and the success of our policies in pro- 
moting healthy, confident, and independent 
nations in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere. 
There is now a multipolar relationship among 
an economically powerful Japan, a more 
closely unified Europe, a rising China, a more 
confident Soviet Union, and ourselves. Yet 
the multipolar concept must not be over- 
simplified to the point where the world is 
seen as a frozen universe composed uniquely 
of developed nations, dominated by several 
centers of more or less equal power, all out- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ward looking, all treating each other in more 
or less the same way. Few things could be 
further from the truth. 

The new environment we are entering, 
rather, is intricate, fluid, interdependent, and 

— For one thing, the principal participants 
have different capabilities. Bipolarity still 
Iiersists in the strategic relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. Eu- 
rope is still in the process of developing the 
voice and organization to fully reflect its 
international economic position. Japan is still 
exploring the meaning of its phenomenal 
economic growth in terms of its international 
role. China's international position primarily 
reflects her potential, her great size, and her 
potential military strength. 

— The relationship among the principal 
participants is not the same. On the one 
hand, whatever our differences, the indus- 
trial democracies — Japan, the European 
("ommunity, the United States, and others — 
are bound by interest, shared values, and 
alliance into especially close association. On 
the other hand, we are separated from Mos- 
cow and Peking by deeply different ap- 
proaches to man and society which are not 
subject to early resolution. Mutually bene- 
ficial cooperation is replacing hostility in our 
relationship with the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China, but the sense of 
being adversaries has not ended. And they 
are at odds between themselves. 

— Also, the participants are interdependent, 
not just counterpoi.sed. Nations are increas- 
ingly aware that many problems can only be 
solved through cooperative international ef- 
forts — from building moi-e equitable trade 
and monetary structures to dealing with is- 
sues such as air piracy, narcotics, pollution, 
and exploitation of the oceans' resources. 
Interdependence exists, too, in the sense that 
nations are closely attuned to each other. 
Actions in one part of the globe provoke re- 
action and expectation in another. Thus Pres- 
ident Nixon's successful determination not to 
abandon our support of South Viet-Nam in 

achieving peace will impress all with whom 
we deal that we will live up to our i)romises. 
— The structure of relations will be flexi- 
ble and fluid rather than rigid and frozen. I 
have no doubt that the changes taking place 
in the relationship betw^een the United States 
and its allies in Europe and Asia will 
strengthen our ties. But it is also true that, 
feeling themselves more secure, nations may 
find themselves differing more frequently in 
many areas — as we have already seen on 
some economic matters. On the other hand, 
despite differences, the United States and the 
Soviet Union and the United States and 
China will increasingly find opportunities 
to cooperate in endeavors of mutual interest. 
The options for smaller nations may be even 
broader. In Asia, for example, all nations 
may derive greater independence through 
China's commitment with the United States 
and with Japan to renounce hegemony for 
ourselves and to oppose efforts by others to 
impose hegemony in the area. 

If the new international structure offers 
all nations greater freedom and hence greater 
benefits, it also imposes on all states certain 
responsibilities. The multipower structure 
can only work if the participants accept the 
principle that the maintenance of reliable 
relations is more important than triumph on 
any particular issue. Nations are not ex- 
pected to sacrifice basic natural interests, 
but they should act on the premise that mu- 
tual accommodation and restraint are essen- 
tial as they pursue international goals. 

— Finally, the developing world, while not 
yet in the center of world events, will grow 
in importance as the new international struc- 
ture takes hold. This importance is in part a 
result of the interdependence of which I 
have already spoken. Effective response to 
many of the challenges facing all men will 
require the productive engagement of the de- 
veloping as well as the developed nations. The 
less advantaged nations will play an impor- 
tant role in determining whether the world 
community is successful in elaborating new 
trade and monetary structures to better pro- 

April 9, 1973 


mote an expanding world economy. They will 
have to be a major part of any successful 
agreements on the exploitation of the sea- 
beds, combating of air piracy, control of the 
narcotics menace, limitation of nuclear pro- 
liferation, protection of the world environ- 
ment, and development of sound population 
policies. And the larger and more active of 
the nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer- 
ica will play increasing roles in international 

The developed and the developing world 
must cooperate to meet these challenges. 
Whatever the logic of such cooperation, how- 
ever, productive North-South relations may 
be made more difficult by the resentment and 
destructive nationalism which will feed on 
the growing economic gap between rich and 
most poor nations. 

Any survey of the future role of the de- 
veloping world must also note that this area 
will probably be the greatest source of vio- 
lent conflict for the remainder of the cen- 
tury, as poverty, maldistributed income, or 
sectarian and communal differences fuel in- 
ternal violence or even pit one nation against 
another. Such a prospect demands attention 
from those of us in developed areas as well. 

American interests and concerns dictate 
that we be involved in shaping these various 
elements into as contructive an international 
environment as possible. We are impelled to 
this approach by our nuclear relationship 
with the Soviet Union. But other realities 
also keep us involved : 25 percent of the 
agricultural commodities we produce are 
exported ; so are 14 percent of our manufac- 
tured goods; U.S. direct long-term invest- 
ments abroad reached $86 billion in 1971; 
we import one-third of our petroleum needs 
and will soon import half; and we rely on 
imports for one-sixth of our most important 
raw materials. Our humanitarian traditions 
draw us outward. Finally, we have accepted 
involvement through treaty and alliance 
which we could not unilaterally renounce 
without serious repercussion on international 

A responsible sense of involvement implies 
a duty to diff'erentiate rigorously between 

what we might like to accomplish and what 
we can realistically hope to achieve. But 
the very exercise of making such a judgment 
can only reaffirm our decision to play an 
active, positive, though prudent, role. 

New Relationships With U.S.S.R. and China 

In seeking to help shape the new environ- 
ment our approach, first of all, will be fur- 
ther to engage the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China in the construc- 
tion of a more cooperative world. 

President Nixon's policies have convinc- 
ingly demonstrated that adversaries need not 
be antagonists. Reason, accommodation, re- 
straint, and, on our side, unquestioned 
strength have been essential elements in 
building these new relationships. Differences 
between Moscow and Peking are apparent 
to all. But we have carefully avoided any at- 
tempt either to exacerbate these tensions or 
involve ourselves directly in them, a policy 
we will continue to observe scrupulously. 

President Nixon's trip to Moscow last year 
initiated the building of a major new network 
of mutually beneficial relations. In 1972 we 
concluded more agreements with the Soviet 
Union than in any year since 1933, when 
Soviet-U.S. relations were reestablished. As 
President Nixon's Ambassador to Germany, 
I had the privilege of participating directly 
in the negotiations which led to one of those 
agreements, the 1972 Berlin agreement.- 
Thus I know how difficult the detailed process 
of identifying and agreeing upon matters of 
common interest can actually be. However, 
the accord on Berlin — an issue which lies at 
the heart of the division in Europe — is 
equally instructive about possibilities of 
reaching agreement where both sides ac- 
knowledge a mutual interest. There were 
times when an agreement appeared impos- 
sible, but with our allies and the Soviet rep- 
resentative we persevered because we had all 
decided we wanted an accord. 

- For text of the agreement and related documents, 
see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1971; for a statement by 
Secretary Rogers made upon signing the final quad- 
ripai'tite protocol to the agreement at Berlin on 
June 3, 1972, see Bulletin of July 3, 1972, p. 15. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Thus when the initial negotiations opened 
in March 1970, the Soviets insisted that the 
ties wliich had been built up over the years 
between the F.R.G. and Berlin were illegal 
and had to be eliminated. The Soviets adhered 
to this position until near the end of the ne- 
gotiations. But together with our British and 
French allies we finally were able to convince 
the Soviets that these ties were not only jus- 
tified in themselves but essential to the main- 
tenance of the viability of the city, and in the 
end the Soviets agreed to write into the 
agreement, and I quote, "that the ties be- 
tween the Western Sectors of Berlin and the 
Federal Republic of dermany will be main- 
tained and developed." 

This year the single most important item 
on our agenda with the Soviet Union will be 
negotiation for a permanent and comprehen- 
sive arms agreement — the SALT Two talks 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. We hope 
that such an agreement w-ill significantly 
strengthen the strategic stability between us 
and reduce built-in incentives to arms 

In today's world, when nuclear powers are 
involved, it is diflficult to isolate issues of 
peace. Thus, to name one vital example, we 
hope the parties in the Middle East can be 
brought to engage in negotiations, direct or 
indirect, which can yield an interim agree- 
ment opening the road to a permanent set- 
tlement based on U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 242. We welcome Chairman Brezh- 
nev's [Leonid L Brezhnev, General Secretary 
of the Soviet Communist Party] statement 
that the Vietnamese .settlement "shows that 
it is possible to find a peaceful and just solu- 
tion to other conflicts — above all in the Middle 
East." The lesson of other successful negotia- 
tions is that the parties directly involved 
must themselves achieve the breakthrough 
to meaningful talks and agreement. If the 
Soviet Union exercises its influence in that 
same direction it could be helpful. 

During and following the President's trip 
to Peking the Chinese made clear that sig- 
nificant further improvements in relations 
would follow a settlement in Viet-Nam. Thus, 
President Nixon dispatched his adviser on 

national security matters, Henry Kissinger, 
to Peking immediately after the conclusion 
of the Vietnamese peace agreement. Dr. Kis- 
singer's Peking talks indeed proved enor- 
mously productive, and we are moving more 
rapidly in the direction of normal relations 
with the Chinese than any of us thought 
possible a few months ago. 

One of the most important areas in which 
we will be building is expanding the already 
steady stream of people-to-people visits be- 
tween China and the United States. Begin- 
ning with ping-pong teams, these visits have 
made a significant conti'ibution to the im- 
proved climate in our relations. Like the 
Fulbright-Hays program and like the many 
other official and private exchange programs 
the United States is involved in, the flow of 
doctors, scholars, acrobats, newsmen, and 
others between China and the United States 
contributes significantly to the capacity of 
our nations to achieve a more accurate per- 
ception and deeper understanding of each 
other's societies. 

Healthy commerce is an important element 
in "normal relations." Conclusion of the 
agreement in principle between Secretary 
Rogers and Chinese Foreign Minister Chi 
on the linked issues of frozen Chinese assets 
in the United States and U.S. private claims 
against China should open the way for an 
expansion of trade and for the discussion of 
others of the more purely economic issues 
that continue to divide us. 

Cooperation With European and Asian Allies 

Enrichment and reaffirmation of our rela- 
tions with our Asian and European allies 
will be a second area of our focus. We will 
concentrate on what unites us — our common 
political, economic, and security interests. We 
are convinced that whatever diff'erences may 
emerge can only confirm that our relationship 
is one of equals and thus basically a healthy 

Close cooperation among ourselves and all 
the industrialized democracies — western Eu- 
rope, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand — is essential to constructive move- 
ment on all international issues. Our eco- 

April 9, 1973 


nomic and political concerns can best be 
pursued through mutually supportive inter- 
national policies. We will be consulting with 
these nations this year to explore how we 
may improve our institutional ties and 

Japan will be a major focus in this effort. 
We hope to develop our association with the 
Japanese so that we will be engaged with 
them in the closest consultation on political, 
economic, and security matters. In the latter 
area, I think we have both found that our 
intimate security ties have been assets rather 
than liabilities in the improvement of our 
relations with China and the Soviet Union. 

European relations will be at the center of 
our attention. This priority reflects the 
United States continued conviction that our 
bonds to western Europe provide the essen- 
tial strength without which it would be im- 
possible to pursue our broad foreign policy 
aims. Thus we remain committed to a strong, 
unified, self-confident Europe as our close in- 
ternational partner. Indeed, Europe's impres- 
sive progress toward unification reinforces 
our desire to work closely within NATO and 
with the enlarged European Community. Our 
aim will be to develop a relationship between 
ourselves and the Community comparable to 
the U.S. -European association in NATO — 
one that will assure cooperation and under- 
standing on matters of common interest. 

Europe is of course central to most issues 
of peace. For four years we and our western 
European allies have been working closely to 
reduce tensions across the continent by get- 
ting to their sources. The process began with 
the Berlin agreement. That opened the way 
for the basic agreement between the two 
Germanys, normalizing their relations. This 
gigantic step in turn has led to the current 
East-West talks in Helsinki and Vienna. Soon 
we and our allies will be participating in a 
conference of 34 states to seek arrangements 
which will assure the greater movement of 
people and ideas across Europe and which 
will afl^rm the sovereign independence of all 
nations. And by the fall, talks should start on 
a mutual and balanced reduction of NATO 
and Warsaw Pact forces facing each other 
in central Europe. 

The progress from the Berlin agreement 
to the talks in Helsinki and Vienna illustrates 
most convincingly how allies and adversaries 
can work together pushing back old hostili- 
ties, defining areas of mutual interest, pro- 
ceeding from definition to formal agreement, 
and then building from that agreement into 
another round of negotiations. 

In Europe and in Asia negotiations to re- 
move the sources of tensions have been pos- 
sible only because the world knows we will 
stand by our commitments. Any move by 
the United States to precipitously reduce our 
forces stationed abroad would sap the con- 
fidence of our partners and undermine the 
respect of our adversaries. The only possible 
result of such ill-considered action would be 
to increase instability and augment tensions 
while at the same time frustrating hopes for 
the negotiated reduction of forces. 

As Ambassador to Germany, as Deputy 
Secretary of Defense, and now as Deputy Sec- 
retary of State, I have repeatedly witnessed 
the intimate relationship between our com- 
mitments in Europe and progress in reducing 
European tensions. Our allies derive strength 
and confidence from our tangible participa- 
tion in their defense. We all gain strength 
and self-confidence from the intense consulta- 
tion and coordination that takes place be- 
tween us. 

We intend to remain faithful to our Euro- 
pean commitments and to do our share. At 
the same time we are pleased that the allies 
are assuming a greater share of the conven- 
tional military burden. The improved Euro- 
pean economies have allowed the European 
NATO partners to commit themselves in 
1973 to increased defense expenditures of 
$1.5 billion per year. We will encourage 
further steps in that direction, which more 
realistically reflects Europe's strengthened 
economic position. 

Economic issues are of course a chief 
source of recent international concern. The 
United States must restore the soundness of 
our trade and payments positions, and that 
necessity is requiring adjustments both by us 
and by our friends. Currency realignment 
has been a major step. It should go a very 
long way toward redressing our trade and 


Department of State Bulletin 

payments lialance — provided the United 
States maintains iirice stability. 

The cooperative way wliicii tiie United 
States, Japan, and tlie European governments 
dealt with the recent monetary crisis augurs 
well for future economic cooperation. But 
the devaluation is no substitute for the long- 
term hard decisions that must be taken dur- 
ing the pending reform of the world mone- 
tary system and in the negotiations for the 
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers at the 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] talks which begin this fall. 

Needs of the Developing Countries 

The developing world is a third area in 
which the United States intends to be a par- 
ticipant and not simply a bystander. The im- 
mense potential for cooperation and the 
threat of destructive confrontation mandate 
that we do so. Neither great structural ob- 
stacles to development nor the fact that there 
is no simple solution to the riddle of moderni- 
zation would justify our lack of interest. We 
know, too, that if we are to gain the coopera- 
tion of the developing countries in areas of 
interest to the United States, we must con- 
vincingly demonstrate to them that we share, 
support, and understand their desire to bring 
a better life to their citizens. 

The success of the developing countries' 
quest for modernization will be influenced 
greatly by the new monetary and trade 
structures that emerge from the international 
discussions. Thus, the United States sup- 
ported representation of the developing na- 
tions in the Committee of Twenty which will 
remake the world's monetary system. We will 
be consulting with them closely in the work 
of that committee. 

Expanded trade opportunities also are crit- 
ical to the developing countries' economies. 
Export earnings now provide for four-fifths 
of developing countries' foreign exchange re- 
.sources and in the future will provide even 
more. This dependence on exports explains 
why, in spite of our own trade problems, we 
still look with favor on generalized prefer- 
ences covering a wide variety of developing 
country products. We are also convinced that 

the developing world will be a major bene- 
ficiary of the reduction in trade barriers 
we seek from the world trade talks. 

The United States does not want nor re- 
quire acceptance of our values or emulation 
of our system in exchange for cooperation. 
Diverse national histories and cultures make 
such a demand unrealistic, and our apprecia- 
tion of the value of diversity makes it unwise. 
However, in a world of diversity, cooperation 
requires a mutual desire to resolve outstand- 
ing issues as they emerge. When East and 
West can negotiate differences there is no 
reason why issues cannot be negotiated and 
resolved on the North-South axis. Negotia- 
tion will, however, require efforts from the 
less developed countries as well as from us. 
Rules for foreign investment, for example, 
need to be stable and well understood, for it 
is not productive both to demand foreign 
capital for development and to attack the 
private enterprises which can provide it. 

There is no doubt that the United States 
and other developed countries can contribute 
significantly to the needs of developing coun- 
tries. It is instructive to note that those who 
grew impressively in the 1960's were the ones 
who follow-ed sound development policies and 
had access to substantial foreign resources. 
As the world's most prosperous nation we can 
provide some of those resources through our 
official development assistance — in 1971 we 
provided 43 percent of all such assistance 
flowing to the developing countries. However, 
our country's pi-ivate sector is probably the 
most efficient mechanism for transferring 
capital and technolog^^ Where it has been 
welcomed it has made great contributions. 
Trade and investment, as well as population 
restraints, must therefore weigh heavily in 
any realistic policies for increasing rates of 
economic growth in the developing world. 
That is why we are putting a new emphasis 
upon a comprehensive approach in seeking 
to help increase the rate of economic growth 
in the developing world. 

You Fulbright-Hays scholars here tonight 
are participants in one of the most imagina- 
tive and fai-seeing foreign affairs programs 
undertaken by the U.S. Government. The 

April 9, 1973 


sharing of scholarship it has brought about 
is important. Perhaps even more important 
is the contribution it has made over the years 
in encouraging us all to deal with each other 
with restraint, concern, and insight. That is 
why I am such a strong supporter of this 
program and the many other international ac- 
tivities which bring people from differing 
nations together in a way that allows them 
to share their cultures and their perspectives, 
learning to respect the values and rights of 
other nations. 

I understand that you spent some time yes- 
terday with members of our Congress. When 
I recently had the opportunity to appear be- 
fore Senator Fulbright's Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee, several Senators raised 
with me questions about the proper balance 
between the executive and legislative powers. 
In that hearing Senator Fulbright mentioned 
a magazine piece he had recently read which 
suggested that the Congress is helpless before 
the executive. 

The exchange program initiated and long 
championed by Senator Fulbright and Con- 
gressman Hays gives some indication of the 
important contribution Congress makes in 
our international affairs. Furthermore, the 
perspective from this building certainly con- 
firms that importance. It is true that the 
President, under the Constitution, is the prin- 
cipal agent of American foreign policy. But 
Congress also has a very important constitu- 
tional role. For example, the war powers are 
shared powers. This joint responsibility in 
foreign affairs is of course part of the way 
our Constitution was deliberately con- 
structed. Sometimes the Congress and the 
Presidency face each other as more or less 
friendly adversaries, regardless of who the 
incumbents are and even when both branches 
are controlled by the same party. Sometimes 
they cooperate closely and harmoniously. In 
both cases the process has served the United 
States well, focusing our national debate on 
one issue at a time which people can under- 
stand and which can, after due deliberation, 
be decided in the light of widespread knowl- 
edge of the facts. 

The role of Congress in foreign policy will 

be particularly important this year on many 
matters : 

— It will, for example, require a congres- 
sional decision to authorize the President to 
grant most-favored-nation treatment to the 
Soviet Union, a condition necessary for the 
full implementation of the trade agreement 
negotiated last year between ourselves and 
the U.S.S.R. 

— Relations with our allies and friends in 
the developed world will depend in no little 
part on the trade-negotiating authority that 
emerges from congressional consideration. 

— The Hill's decision on resources available 
for security assistance will affect how much 
we can do under the Nixon doctrine to help 
our allies in defending themselves. 

—U.S. force levels throughout the world 
are already undergoing congressional scru- 
tiny, an exercise whose conclusion could 
greatly affect our efforts to reduce world 
tensions without lessening world security. 

— The level and nature of our economic 
assistance to the developing world is ulti- 
mately in congressional hands. 

— And the Congress will play a critical 
role in determining the economic resources 
available to help bind up the wounds of war 
and build a stable peace in Southeast Asia. 

The constitutional role of the Congress in 
foreign policy imposes a responsibility on 
our executive to conduct business with the' 
Hill on the basis of candor, cooperation, and 
confidence. But beyond this, we intend to seek 
out and work with Senators and Congress- 
men on foreign affairs because we are aware 
that the executive has no monopoly on experi- 
ence, information, knowledge, or creativity 
in the foreign policy field. These qualities 
exist in abundance on the Hill. They should 
be used just as those in the executive branch 
are used. 

For the United States to play an effective 
role in world affairs, the Congress and the 
voters must be informed and supportive of 
the government's policies. This administra- 
tion has made clear its foreign policy goals. 
Three Presidential reports to Congress on 
foreign policy and two comprehensive reports 
by the Secretary of State are an unprece- 


Department of State Bulletin 

dented attempt to inform the people's repre- 
sentatives and the people. We intend to 
continue to make ourselves freely available 
to testify on matters of interest to the 

Speaking for the Department of State, I 
can say that we will be pursuing the closest 
possible understanding with the Congress. 
Achievement of close cooperation is already, 
I believe, closer than it has been for many 
years. It will be my endeavor to support the 
Secretary of State in making it even closer. 

The period of international relations we 
are entering holds exceptional promise for 
realizing man's yearnings for peace. Hope 
will become achievement if all nations join in 
a commitment to seek out and develop co- 
operative international endeavors and avoid 
sterile confrontation. It is this purpose that 
shall guide our policies toward adversaries, 
our allies, and the developing world. The sup- 
port, understanding, and contributions of 
our Congress will be essential to our ability 
to cany through. 

You Fulbright Fellows, all participants in 
the program that has been building interna- 
tional understanding for 26 years will, I hope, 
return home aware of the world we are try- 
ing to build and committed to add your 
talents to the task in your own way and from 
the perspective of your countries. 

Commission on Conduct 
of Foreign Policy 

White House press release dated March 9 

President Nixon announced on March 9 
the appointment of four members of the 
Commission on the Organization of the Gov- 
ernment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. 
They are : 

R0BE31T D. Murphy, of Washington, D.C. Ambassa- 
dor Murphy served with the U.S. Government 
from 1916 to 1959. He served as Ambassador to 
Belpium and Japan and held a number of other 
positions with the rank of Ambassador. Ambas- 
sador Murphy was Assistant Secretary of State 
for U.N. Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary of 
State, then Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs before concluding his career in public 

life. He was born on October 28, 1894, in Milwau- 
kee, Wis., and is now chairman of Corning Glass 

David M. Abshire, of Alexandria, Va. Mr. Abshire 
returned to Georgetown University as chairman 
and e.xecutive director of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies after serving as As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Congressional Re- 
lations from April 8, 1970, until .January 8, 1973. 
From 1962 to 1970 Mr. Abshire was executive 
director of the Center for Strategic and Inter- 
national Studies. He was born in Chattanooga, 
Tenn., on April 11, 1926. 

William .1. Casey, of Roslyn Harbor, N.Y. Mr. 
Casey served as Chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission from March 31, 1971, until 
he became Under Secretary of State for Eco- 
nomic Affairs on February 2, 1973. Prior to be- 
coming SEC Chairman, Mr. Casey was a partner 
in the New York law firm of Hall, Casey, Dickler 
& Howley, and the Washington law firm of 
Scribner, Hall, Casey, Thornburg & Thompson. 
He was born on March 13, 1913, in New York, 

AxNE L. Armstrong, of Armstrong, Tex. Mrs. Arm- 
strong has been Counsellor to the President and 
a member of the Cabinet since February 2, 1973. 
Prior to becoming Counsellor to the President 
she served as cochairman of the Republican Na- 
tional Committee from January 1971 and had 
been a Republican national committeewoman from 
Texas since 1968. Mrs. Armstrong was born Anne 
Legendre on December 27, 1927, in New Or- 
leans, La. 

The Commission on the Organization of 
Government for the Conduct of Foreign 
Policy was created by the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act of 1972 for the purpose 
of submitting findings and recommendations 
to provide a more effective system for the 
formulation and implementation of the Na- 
tion's foreign policy. The Commi.ssion is to 
report to the President and the Congress by 
June 30, 1974, and shall cease to exist 30 
days after filing its report. 

The Commission will select its own Chair- 
man and Vice Chairman from among its 
12 members. Four members (two from the 
executive branch and two from private life) 
are appointed by the President, four mem- 
bers (one Senator from each major political 
party and two from private life) by the 
President of the Senate, and four members 
(two Representatives from each major polit- 
ical party and two from private life) by 
the Speaker of the House. 

April 9, 1973 


Proposals for Unilateral Reduction 
of U.S. Forces Abroad Opposed 

Following is a statement read to news 
correspondents on March 16 by Charles W. 
Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

I might take a moment to address various 
proposals and resolutions passed on the Dem- 
ocratic side of the Senate yesterday calling 
for a substantial and unilateral reduction of 
American forces, bases, and facilities abroad 
in the coming 18 months. In our view, the 
assumptions on which this resolution is based 
are erroneous. The consequences of the ac- 
tions proposed would do serious harm both 
to our foreign relations and to the national 

The resolution assumes that we could save 
billions of dollars by reducing U.S. forces 
abroad, closing large numbers of bases. It 
assumes that this would have beneficial eco- 
nomic consequences for the United States. It 
assumes that its purposes could be carried 
out without impairing our present military 
strategy or the foreign policy of the U.S. 

Secretary Rogers believes that these prop- 
ositions seriously mislead the American 

Secretary Rogers also believes that it is 
dangerous to assume that billions of dollars 
could be saved without forcing important 
changes in our strategy and at the same time 
severely affecting our foreign relations. 

As you know, our forces and our bases 
abroad are principally in Europe and Asia. 
In the course of the past four years, the 
United States has made very substantial re- 
ductions in the forces maintained in Asia and 
has closed numerous bases. In our view, the 
measures that have been taken have been 
prudent in both fiscal and strategic terms. 
The measures have been applied in a way 
and at a pace which in our judgment leaves 
the overall security posture of our allies 

stronger today than it was four years ago. 

We do believe, however, that major reduc- 
tions of the scale and the pace contemplated 
in the resolution could weaken the sense of 
security which our friends and allies have 
acquired and in these lights shake the confi- 
dence of our allies and friends in the validity 
of American commitments. These results 
could easily slow the pace of accommodation 
in Korea, for example, and would almost 
certainly have an unsettling effect on Japan. 

As for Europe, I should remind you that 
the policy of this government has been to 
maintain our existing force levels and im- 
prove their capability. This still seems to us 
a prudent policy on both military and politi- 
cal grounds. 

There is no question that the presence of 
American forces in Europe over the past 
generation, and their continued presence to- 
day, has contributed to deterrence, to a sense 
of self-confidence among our European allies, 
and to a climate of political stability in Eu- 
rope broadly defined from which we, as well 
as the Europeans, have drawn major benefits. 

It is not too much to say, I believe, that 
our presence in both the military and psycho- 
logical senses of the word has enabled the 
Europeans to enter with some confidence into 
negotiations with the states of eastern Eu- 
rope, as in the Conference on European Se- 
curity and Cooperation, and the preparations 
for negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions which are now getting 

In summary, given the clear successes of 
American foreign policy in recent years, suc- 
cesses which have in major part reflected 
our strength and the strength of our allies, 
this is not the time to undertake precipitous 
actions which could directly and immediately 
destabilize the international environment. 
Nor in the specific case of our forces in Eu- 
rope does it seem wise to propose unilateral 
reductions when we have the prospect of ef- 
fecting mutual force reductions with the So- 
viet Union and countries of eastern Europe. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for NBC Television 

Following is ati excerpt from the tran- 
script of an interview icith Henry A. 
Kissi)iricr, Assistant to the President for Na- 
tional Security Affairs, by Barbai'a Walters, 
SBC News correspondent, broadcast on Feb- 
ruary 25. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, after 10 years of our 
fighting a nation we considered our enemy, 
we are now asked to give our taxpayers' 
money to that former enemy at a time when 
there is much that it could be spent on here 
at home. Why? Why is it so necessary for us 
to do this? 

A. First of all, we shouldn't look at it as 
aiding our enemy. We should look at it from 
the point of view of aiding ourselves. One 
has to look at the whole history of North 
Viet-Nam. The leaders of North Viet-Nam 
have spent most of their lives either in prison 
or fighting a guerrilla war, or fighting an in- 
ternational war. Never in their lives have 
they known quiet; never have they dedicated 
themselves to primarily constructive tasks. 

Now, it is a difficult psychological problem 
for them. Not only have they spent most of 
their lives either in conspiracy or in war, but 
they really haven't had a normal relationship 
with any country ; and we think that if we 
can work together with them on some con- 
structive tasks this might be a very major 
contribution to the peace of Indochina and in 
a way cap what has been achieved now in 
making a formal settlement. This is the ra- 
tionale, not an abstract desire to aid any 
particular countiy. 

Q. Well, of cotirse, it is a difficult psycho- 
logical problem for lis as well. It is estimated 
nolo that Congress is tivo to one against ap- 
propriating the funds for aid to North Viet- 
Nam. Would you think it important enough 
for you personally to testify before Congress 

so that they would understand your point of 
vieiv ? 

A. Well, the position of my testifying has 
two parts. One, do I talk to Congressmen and 
Senators; secondly, do I testify under oath 
with records being kept? With respect to the 
second point, that is, do I testify before Con- 
gress formally, that is governed by the prin- 
ciple of executive privilege. That is to say 
that Presidential assistants should not be 
subpoenaed by Congress and should not be 
forced to — 

Q. But you could if you ivanted to? 

A. No, I couldn't, because it is not my 
choice. This depends on the relationship be- 
tween the President and the Congress, and 
in no administration have Presidential as- 
sistants testified before Congress in formal 

On the other hand, I maintain the closest 
relationship with the appropriate congres- 
sional committees. I meet the key Senators 
personally regularly. I have worked out an 
arrangement with the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee and, less frequently, with 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, by 
which I appear in sessions that are called 
social, and that are called social only be- they are not in formal committee rooms 
but in the office of some Senator, at which 
notes are taken. Every Senator has an oppor- 
tunity or every Congressman has an oppor- 
tunity to ask questions. The record is kept. 
It isn't an official record, but we go as close 
to the line of executive privilege as we can, 
but I have not in the past testified in formal 
sessions. After the Viet-Nam settlement was 
negotiated, I testified — or I appeared before 
the entire Senate and the entire House an- 
swering questions from everybody, so I will 
play an active role in explaining our reasons 
for recommending a program. 

April 9, 1973 


I will not do it at a formal session, but 
that is primarily to protect the position of 
future Presidents and future Presidential 
assistants. It is in no way an attempt to keep 
things from Congress. 

Q. I want to go hack once more to the 
feeling of the American people, because a 
good many of the Senators say that their 
action, or their reaction, is based on the mail 
which they are receiving from their constitu- 
ents and the basic question seems to be, we 
yieed so much here in health, in education, 
isn't this more important than building up 
a nation, or to put it another way, is our 
aiding North Viet-Nam absolutely essential 
to world peace ? 

A. Ever since the end of World War II, 
whenever we have had a big decision to 
make, the debate has always taken the form 
of : Are you active abroad, or are you active 
at home? How can you do anything abroad 
until you are perfect at home? 

Well, we'll never be perfect at home, and 
we'll always have tasks abroad. We don't 
have the choice between doing things at 
home, doing things abroad. If we can't do 
both, we won't be able to do either. In the 
present circumstances, when you have a 
peace that has many precarious aspects, after 
10 years of war, of a war that annually cost 
10 times as much as what one could conceive 
spending, not to consider what may be psy- 
chologically, politically, and humanly neces- 
sary is simply a wrong allocation of priorities. 

Q. But we don't seem to be able to do both. 

A. The sums that are in question will not 
make a decisive difference. But I don't want 
to get into the debate between domestic pri- 
orities and foreign priorities. We will pre- 
sent our case. We will present where we 
think the money should come from, and then 
the Congress will have to make the decision. 
It is our judgment that some program is 

Q. While you tvere in Hanoi, what prog- 
ress did you make in obtaining an account- 
ing of the 1,300 or so men still missing in 
action ? 

A. We brought along with us our analysis 
of the missing in action, particularly where 
we had some evidence that a flier had para- 
chuted, for example, or where we had collat- 
eral evidence that a person might have been 
taken prisoner. 

We presented it to them in detail. As a 
matter of fact, the economic assistance part, 
which received so much attention in our 
newspapers here, wasn't even discussed until 
the third day of my stay in Hanoi. Much of 
the first day was devoted to the question of 
prisoners and to missing in action. 

The North Vietnamese argument is that 
their country does not have our means of 
communication ; that many of these reports 
were concerned with parts of their country 
where they would have to make a complex 
investigation. They promised us a full 

We will, of course, also interview all the 
prisoners that are released about any infor- 
mation they have, and we will make a major 

Now, I must say that I cannot really be- 
lieve that the North Vietnamese would hide 
prisoners on us. I see nothing that they would 
gain from keeping prisoners that they could 
not acknowledge in jails in North Viet-Nam. 
But we won't rest on this theoretical supposi- 
tion. We will make a full investigation, and 
we will insist on an accounting. 

Q. Notv that you have visited Hanoi and 
appraised for yourself the North Vietnamese 
leaders, do you think that Hanoi will ever 
relinquish its desire to take over South Viet- 
Nam and create, as they have ahvays said 
they wanted, one Viet-Nam? 

A. North Viet-Nam will never relinquish 
its desire to take over South Viet-Nam. This 
generation of leaders is a group of revolu- 
tionaries. They have spent their whole life 
making revolutions. They are not in their 
sixties going to give up what they have be- 
lieved in all their lives. 

But that isn't the issue. The issue is, Will 
they want to unify Viet-Nam by force, or are 
they willing to rely on an evolutionary 


Department of State Bulletin 

We are not opposed to the unification of 
Viet-Nani in principle, if Viet-Nam is unified 
by peaceful means. If the performance of one 
part or the other is so clearly superior to 
that of the other that it tends to achieve 
moral superiority over the other, that is not 
an American concern. 

Therefore, if the North Vietnamese are 
willing to compete peacefully, if they are 
willing to develop their country, if they are 
willing to rely on a political process, then we 
don't object to their objective, and that is 
exactly what we are trying to bring about, to 
get a commitment from them, not on paper 
but in terms of their action, to a peaceful 
evolution in Indochina; and that is precari- 
ously poised right now. 

Q. There is fighting still going on and 
when you met with them — you posed this 
question just noiv yourself. I u'onder if you 
felt you have the answer but at this point 
you don't? 

A. No, I do not have the answer now, and 
I don't think they have the answer. I do not 
think they have fully made up their mind. I 
think for the first time in their history and 
in their lives they are considering a peaceful 
evolution and they are feeling their way to- 
ward the sort of relationship they have really 
never had with any country, of equality, mu- 
tual benefit, consultation. 

Can they bring themselves to do it? Can 
we manage to establish the right forum? 
That is what we are now working on. 

Q. This continuous fighting, do you think 
this is part of their testing, and mil it per- 
haps lead then to a request from President 
Thieu for us to again become involved? 

A. Well, at this point the South Viet- 
namese seem very capable of taking care of 
themselves, and what has happened up to now 
is a demonstration that Vietnam ization has 
substantially succeeded. 

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, 
right after the cease-fire, or around the time 
of the cease-fire, seized about 300 hamlets. 
They have now lost all of them again, and the 
fighting in South Viet-Nam, while it still 
occurs, is really — if the war was still going 

on, these actions would all be reported as 
very minor actions but of course under cease- 
fire conditions every action has its own 

Q. Did you expect there to be continued 
fighting betiveen North and South Viet-Nam? 

A. I expected there would be continued 
fighting for a few weeks. It has gone on a 
little longer than I thought, but — 

Q. Are you worried? 

A. No, because after all, how are the two 
sides going to establish their areas of control 
except by testing each other? 

Q. But you don't think it is going to mean 
a further involvement on our part, or any 

A. No. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, as a political historian 
and an analyst, what lessons do you think 
we have learned from the Viet-Nam experi- 
ence? Well, for example, to be more specific — 
have we learned that we simply can't vnn a 
guerrilla war, even against a very small 

A. You know what got us involved to be- 
gin with was the theory that there was one 
species of war called guerrilla war which ap- 
plied to Indochina, Bolivia, and any other 

Viet-Nam is a very special case for many 
reasons — in terms of its histo'-ical experi- 
ence, in terms of its geography — therefore 
I wouldn't make the general statement that 
a guerrilla war cannot be won. One can make 
the general statement that for a foreign 
country to get itself involved in a guerrilla 
war is a very significant decision because the 
guerrilla is at home, the guerrilla lives with 
his own population. The foreigner can never 
compete with him on that level. And there- 
fore it is our view that, as a general proposi- 
tion, domestic security and guerrilla warfare 
ought to be the task of the government con- 
cerned and that government should be strong 
enough to handle attacks below the level of 
conventional attacks. That, we would say, is 
a general lesson we have learned. 

April 9, 1973 


Q. If we may go back in history a bit, 
there are still some questions xvhich nag at 
the American, people that you could provide 
the ansivers to. At the time the decision tvas 
made in December to bomb the Hanoi- 
Haiphong area, did you personally advocate 
the bombing? I ask this knoiving that your 
job involves not only presenting the Presi- 
dent with the choices available to him but 
also recommending a choice of action, if 
asked. So did you support the bombing, or 
did you attempt to persuade the President 
not to take this step? 

A. I have one absolute rule, which is that 
I never discuss publicly what I recommend 
to the President. That does not mean that I 
disagree with the decision. It means that it 
is inappropriate for me to provide a checklist 
and to create the impression that it is part 
of my job to second-guess the President. I do 
make recommendations to him, but I do not 
publicly state what my position is toward a 
particular issue. But you can assume that if 
I could not support a major policy I would 

Q. Well, I will ask another question, and 
we will see if that is something that can be 
answered. There was talk around Washing- 
ton late last year that your relationship with 
the President had become strained, perhaps 
in part because of policy disagreements over 
Viet-Nam. There ivas also speculation based 
on some evidence that the President raised 
the requirements for peace that you had 
reached, agreement on in Paris. I am, sure you 
are familiar with this speculation. Is there 
any truth to it? 

A. Some of what I said before applies 
here, too. I feel freer to talk about this. I was 
never conscious during that period of a 
strained relationship with the President. You 
have to remember that this town is obsessed 
with power and that it lives on reading little 
significancies or major significancies into 
little acts. 

Q. Does he look at you, or does he not; 
does the President talk to you — 

A. Did he talk to me on the telephone 
rather than see me personally? If one knew 

all the phone calls between the President and 
me and all the conversations, one would have 
attached no significance at all to what was 
a newspaper speculation once that he was in 
town for a day and talked to me on the phone 
three or four times but didn't see me. It was 
the accident that Ron Ziegler [Ronald L. 
Ziegler, Press Secretary to President Nixon] 
put out the fact that the conversation had 
taken place by telephone that anyone even 
attached any significance to it. 

Now, its is inevitable that there are always 
people on every White House staff — and I 
have seen two or three in action — and in the 
bureaucracy who put out to newspapermen 
their interpretation of what they think is 

Q. Would you like to name these people 
here at the White House? 

A. Sometimes — I am not saying it was in 
the White House — sometimes it is wishful 
thinking, but there was no strain in my re- 
lationship to the President. 

Now, let me turn to the second matter : Did 
the President raise the terms of the agree- 
ment and therefore undo what allegedly had 
been achieved? For this you have to under- 
stand how the President and I work. The 
President, before I go out on a diplomatic 
mission, doesn't write down 20 specific points 
that I am supposed to achieve and therefore 
the phrase that I didn't live within instruc- 
tions, it is really quite meaningless. 

What the President does is to write down 
for himself, on a yellow sheet, four or five or 
six major issues, and the pros and cons of 
each issue. Then he will call me in, go over 
them and over them, and if I have any ideas 
I will present them to him. But he talks much 
more in general terms of where we want to 
go, so that I clearly understand what he has 
in mind. 

This is what happened in October. Why 
the agreement was not completed — the rea- 
son it was not completed was due to many 
factors : to the fact that the North Vietnam- 
ese were planning an attack at the time of 
the cease-fire, the fact that we wanted to get 
the International Commission in place, and 
the fact that the South Vietnamese Govern- 


Department of State Bulletin 

iiient was not ready to go along at that par- 
ticular point. 

Q. Did yon thivk they would have been? 

A. It was — we had — the President and I 
I were in complete agreement before the last 
" mission, before I went, that if it appeared at 
that particular moment that the cease-fire 
was too precarious, that we would not drive 
it through at all costs, especially because it 
was at the end of an electoral campaign and 
because we could not give the impression that 
we were doing it in order to gain votes. 

So, frankly, when I was in Saigon and 
when we made the final decision that led to 
the delay, I knew what the President wanted, 
and it was not at all true that I w-as pulled 

Q. Then xvhy did you come home and put 
iioiirself in the very difficult position of say- 
ing, "peace is at hand?" 

f A. Because you have to understand what 
the situation was on whatever the date was, 
October 26. But first of all, when you say 
"peace is at hand" and then peace comes 
along 10 weeks later, of a 10-year war, that 

), is not such a very bad prediction. But what 
was our problem at the end of October? 

We had a public broadcast from Hanoi 
that was revealing in a slightly edited ver- 
sion some essential agreements which we 
had reached and demanding that we sign the 
agreement five days later on October 31. We 
had Saigon put itself into a position of oppo- 
sition to the agreement, and what we had to 
make clear and make clear rapidly was, first, 
that we were not going to sign on October 
31, but nevertheless we were not kicking over 
the agreement ; that the agreement was es- 
sentially completed as far as we were con- 
cerned ; and that it could be completed in a 
very brief period of time. 

When we said "peace is at hand," we were 
telling both Hanoi and Saigon — we told 
Hanoi that we were fundamentally sticking 
to the agreement. We were telling Saigon 
that the agreement as it stood was essentially 
what we would maintain. 

Now. we thought it could be negotiated in 
four or five days. In the interval, for what- 

ever reason, Hanoi made the decision to pro- 
long the negotiations. Once Hanoi decided 
to go back to the negotiations on January 8, 
that is, in a serious way, we did settle it in 
about six days. And I don't want to say had 
I known exactly what would happen, I might 
not have chosen a more ambiguous phrase. 

Q. China, Dr. Kissinger. Hotv do our new 
relations tvith mainland China affect our re- 
lations ivith Taiwan? Will tve eventually have 
to break our relations with Taiwan as we 
come closer and closer to full diplomatic re- 
lations — or tvhat are diplomatic relations, 
even if ive are not calling them that? 

A. We favor the peaceful resolution of 
the disagreements between mainland China 
and Taiwan. We have no intention at this 
time to break diplomatic relations with Tai- 
wan. We have established a satisfactory 
arrangement with mainland China and we 
have established — we will establish an office 
there, they are establishing an office in Wash- 
ington, and we believe for the foreseeable 
future it meets existing needs. 

Q. Do you foresee that the Chinese might 
be tvilling to join in the arms limitation 

A. The Chinese problem is quite different 
from ours and from that of other of the ma- 
jor powers. Their nuclear program is in its 
infancy, and any of the limitations that are 
now being discussed between us and the 
Soviet Union occur at a level of nuclear ar- 
maments that is probably unimaginable for 
the Chinese. 

Now, what would be the Chinese attitude 
if there was a general conference on, say, 
conventional reductions? That I don't know. 
Such a conference isn't now in progress, but 
up to now the Chinese have taken the attitude 
that they would not participate in discussions 
on the reduction of nuclear arms. They would 
take part in discussions on the elimination 
of nuclear arms. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, may we talk a bit about 
the Middle East? Friday morning you met 
with the National Security Adviser to Presi- 
dent Sadat of Egypt, Mr. Hafez Ismail, 
whose job hus been likened to yours. I hear 

April 9, 1973 


he has been, called the Egyptian Henry 

A. I told him I was called the American 

Q. Was he flattered? 

A. I don't know. 

Q. Golda Meir is going to come here very 
soon. Now, with Viet-Nam off of your num- 
ber-one priority list, will you. Dr. Kissinger, 
be turning your primary atterition to the 
Middle East? 

A. I will certainly not turn my primary 
attention to the Middle East. First of all, 
Mr. Ismail was here not to see me, but to see 
the President. Of course, we are taking, the 
President is taking a greater interest in Mid- 
dle Eastern affairs now and he will be spend- 
ing more of his time on the problem. 

What we can do, what role we can play, 
we will have to decide after Prime Minister 
Meir has been here and we have been able 
to assess the result of the conversations with 
King Hussein, with Mr. Ismail, and then 
with Prime Minister Golda Meir. 

Diplomatic Cooperation Recovers 
Historic German Manuscripts 

Following is a report prepared for the 
Bulletin by James S. Sutterlin, Director, 
Office of Central European Affairs. 

Two of the oldest literary works in the 
German language were returned to the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany in September 1972 
after a 27-year search in which the Depart- 
ment of State was involved. The manuscripts, 
the Hildebrandlied (Song of Hildebrand) 
and the Willehalm Codex, disappeared at 
the end of World War II from a bunker 
where they had been stored for safekeeping 
and found their way to the United States. 

The Hildebrandlied, the most important 
German-language literary document lost in 
the wake of the Second World War, is the 

oldest extant German heroic poem or saga. 
Believed to have originated around 5.50 A.D., 
it was transmitted orally from generation 
to generation until about 810, when it was 
written down by the monks of the cloister 
at Fulda. The poem recounts the story of 
Hildebrand and his son, who meet after 
many years of separation and, without rec- 
ognizing each other, engage in deadly com- 
bat. The Willehalm Codex, consisting of 396 
folios and 62 miniatures bound in the 14th 
century, is a medieval poem by Wolfram von 
Eschenbach relating the heroic deeds of 
the Christian knight Willehalm. 

The Hildebrandlied and the Willehalm 
Codex were removed from the Hesse State 
Library in 1943 and stored in a carefully 
guarded bunker at Bad Wildungen near 
Kassel. In 1945, at the conclusion of the 
war, the State Conservator of Greater Hesse 
reported to American Military Government 
authorities that the bunker had been entered 
and the ancient manuscripts were missing. 

The Hildebrandlied, consisting of two 
pages, was the first of the two manuscripts 
to surface in the United States. Page 2 ap- 
peared in 1947 when it was offered for sale 
to the Pierpont Morgan Library. The library 
did not purchase it, perhaps because of its un- 
clear antecedents. It reappeared in 1951 in a 
private collection on the west coast. Through 
the assistance of the Roman Catholic Arch- 
bishop of Los Angeles and the Department 
of State, that page of the manuscript was 
returned to the Hesse State Library at 

The search continued for the miss- 
ing page and the Willehalm Codex, the pres- 
ence of the latter in the United States still 
not confirmed by its public appearance. 

The Department of State and the Embassy 
of the Federal Rejuiblic of Germany in Wash- 
ington undertook an official intensified search 
for both in 1954. The beginning of that 
search was marked by the appearance of an 
article in the Department of State Bulletin 
of October 4 of that year written by the De- 
partment's Arts and Monuments Adviser, 
Ardelia Hall. She issued an official appeal for 


Department of State Bulletin 

the return of the niissinp \n\ffe of the Ililde- 
brandlied and the Willehalm Codex, as well 
as other literary and art treasures missing 
since World War II. 

That request, as far as the two manuscripts 
were concerned, produced no response. Ef- 
forts to find both were totally unsuccessful 
for more than 15 years. Despite this dis- 
couraging: time lapse, the Department and 
the German Embassy continued the search. 
Early in 1972. Kennedy C. Watkins, a for- 
mer Assistant Director of the National Gal- 
lery of Art, established contact between the 
German Embassy and the A. S. W. Rosen- 
bach Foundation of Philadelphia. The Wille- 
halm Codex and the missing page of the 
Hildebrandlied had been in the foundation's 
possession for some years. A series of meet- 
ings between representatives of the founda- 
tion, the German Embassy, and the Hesse 
State Library identified beyond doubt the 
authenticity of the manuscripts. The board of 
directors of the foundation decided unani- 
mously, without any conditions or thought of 
compensation, to return the two manuscripts 
to the Hesse State Library. Last September 
22. the president of the Philip and A. S. W. 
Rosenbach Foundation, Dr. Werner L. 
Gundersheimer, in a special ceremony in Phil- 
adelphia, presented the manuscripts to rep- 
resentatives of the GeiTnan Embassy and the 
Hesse State Library. The manuscripts were 
returned to the Federal Republic of Germany, 
after having been on public display in the 
German Embassy for several days. 

Their return marked the end of an unusual 
coordinated effort by officials and ijrivate 
citizens in both countries. The stimulus in 
this cooperative venture was a recognition 
on the part of all who were involved in the 
27-year search that these documents should 
take their rightful i)lace in Germany, as they 
are a significant and unique part of the Ger- 
man cultural heritage. 

Dr. White To Represent United States 
on International Whaling Commission 

President Nixon announced on March 9 
(White House press release) the appointment 
of Robert M. White, Administrator of the 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration, as U.S. Commissioner on the 
International Whaling Commission. (For 
biographic data, see White House press re- 
lease dated March 9.) He succeeds J. Lau- 
rence McHugh, whose resignation the Presi- 
dent accepted on September 11, 1972. 

The International Whaling Commission 
was established in 1950 to safeguard the re- 
maining world whale stocks through studies 
and investigations and the promulgation of 
regulations relating to whales and whaling. 
The Commission meets annually for two 
weeks. Two out of every three meetings must 
be held at the London, England, headquarters 
of the Commission. 

April 9, 1973 



Department Gives Views on Proposed War Powers Legislation 

Statement by Charles N. Brower 
Acting Legal Adviser ^ 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify 
before this subcommittee on the subject of 
proposed war powers legislation. I am par- 
ticularly pleased to be able to testify on what 
I consider a unique occasion; namely, the first 
time in the long history of deliberations on 
war powers legislation that we can consider 
these proposed bills free from the distraction 
of major American involvement in hostilities 
overseas and divorced from the special polit- 
ical pressures of an election year. The stun- 
ning foreign policy successes which Presi- 
dent Nixon has achieved in his first term, 
precisely through the judicious exercise of 
his constitutional authority, must also be con- 
sidered in these deliberations. Hopefully, the 
perspective can now be more broad. 

The changes in the public environment are 
particularly significant since war powers leg- 
islation has undoubtedly had its genesis in 
disenchantment with the protracted hostili- 
ties in which the United States became en- 
gaged during the last decade. Blaming those 
events on the Presidents who were in office 
during that time, the proponents of the more 
restrictive forms of war powers legislation 
seek to avoid similar policies in the future by 
diminishing the fundamental authority of the 

' Made before the Subcommittee on National Se- 
curity Policy and Scientific Developments of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 13. The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

Presidency, now and forever. Many such ad- 
vocates do concede, albeit reluctantly, that 
Congress itself played a role in past policies, 
but argue that Congress was led to act un- 
wisely because it was supplied inadequate 
information and therefore was unable to ex- 
ercise its responsibilities competently. 

This view of history, which I personally re- 
ject, is worth noting because the conclusions 
drawn from it by advocates of restrictive war 
powers legislation are not logically consistent 
with this view. These advocates have sought 
to place arbitrarily defined legal obstacles in 
the way of expeditious executive branch ac- 
tion, while ignoring what from their point of 
view should be the real source of concern; 
namely, a need for Congress to have more 
complete and timely information, to be ca- 
pable of better analysis, and to maintain a 
more thorough exchange of ideas in the de- 
velopment of jiarticular foreign policies. 

It is, I would suggest, only through avail- 
ability and knowledgeable use of adequate 
information, on a timely basis and with the 
best possible analysis of what that informa- 
tion means, that the executive branch or the 
Congress can exercise its respective consti- 
tutional responsibilities in the foreign policy 
field to the best of its ability. Imperfect per- 
formance by one branch of government can- 
not be remedied by attempts to undercut or 
diminish the fundamental constitutional au- 
thority of another branch. Because the war 
powers are distributed between the Congress 


Department of State Bulletin 

and the executive, those two branches must 
cooperate closely in order for either to exer- 
cise its powers effectively, each making the 
particular contribution assigned it by the 
Constitution. Performance is more likely to 
be enhanced by the increased and improved 
flow of information to and between those 
bodies in an effective and timely manner. 

The negative a]iproach to war powers legis- 
lation, namely, the interposition of arbitrary 
legal obstacles hindering the exercise of ex- 
ecutive responsibilities, has an additional se- 
rious fault. Proponents of such legislation 
overlook the fact that it is impossible for 
Congress to tie the hands of the executive 
branch without itself suffering a similar lim- 
itation of its freedom to act. Every proposed 
reduction of Presidential authority in this 
area effects a comparable diminution of con- 
gressional freedom. If, for example, the 
President's exercise of certain powers were 
restricted to a period of 30 days, as a practi- 
cal matter the President would also become 
the beneficiary of a 30-day blank check en- 
dorsed by the Congress. If congressional de- 
bate were required in all cases immediately 
upon the submission of a repoi't from the Pres- 
ident or at predetermined intervals which 
might have no relevance to the course of 
events. Congress would also lose its flexibility 
to adjust its own schedule of activities to the 
uneven i)ace of unforeseen events. These are 
but two examples; yet they are illusti'ative of 
the fact that in declaring the executive 
branch incompetent to act except in pi'e- 
scribed circumstances, Congress would also 
be inhibiting its own ability to act except in 
a precisely delineated fashion. 

The correct balance between the Congress 
and the executive in the exercise of war pow- 
ers is struck by each branch exercising the 
I)owers assigned to it in the most informed, 
and hence the most responsible way; that bal- 
ance cannot be established or maintained — 
indeed, it could well be destroyed — by legis- 
lative attempts to alter the basic .scheme 
which the drafters of the Constitution so 
carefully established. What is needed, I sub- 
mit, are processes designed to increase the 

likelihood that our government, including 
both the executive branch and the Congress, 
will be able to exercise its resiionsibilities on 
the basis of maximum information, rather 
than as a result of sterile confrontation. The 
answer to dissatisfaction with a particular 
foreign policy is not to be found in alteration 
of constitutional authority. It is rather to be 
found through enhancement of our respective 
abilities, exercised within that authority, to 
formulate wise foreign policies for the fu- 
ture. From this point of departure, I would 
like to address the three bills on which you 
have requested our comments. 

Specification of Executive Powers 

The first bill is S. 440, which would allow 
the President to employ the armed forces in 
hostilities or situations where imminent in- 
volvement in hostilities is indicated by the 
circumstances in only four categories of sit- 
uations absent a declaration of war. In each 
of those four situations the President would 
be barred from continuing to use those troops 
beyond 30 days without the affirmative con- 
sent of Congress unless Congress were physi- 
cally unable to meet as a result of an armed 
attack on the United States or unless it were 
necessary to use troops to protect their own 
jirompt disengagement. 

The Department of State continues to be- 
lieve strongly that it would be unwise and 
unconstitutional for the Congress to adopt 
this bill. S. 440 seeks by statute to redefine 
specifically and restrictively the constitu- 
tional allocation of the war powers. The 
drafters of the Constitution, however, recog- 
nized the extreme difficulty of anticijiating 
all circumstances which might in the future 
call for the use of the armed forces. As Alex- 
ander Hamilton said, writing in "The Fed- 

... it is impossible to foresee or define the ex- 
tent and variety of national exigencies, or the cor- 
respondent extent and variety of the means which 
may be necessary to satisfy them. 

This difliculty was underscored by the re- 
peated amendments to the same bill as it was 

April 9, 1973 


being debated last year in the Senate. The 
Founding Fathers wisely avoided a precise 
definition of the interface between congres- 
sional and executive authority, establishing 
instead a general structure of shared powers 
requiring the cooperation of both branches, 
predicated on the assumption that the form 
of that cooperation would remain, within 
certain limits, sufficiently flexible to accom- 
modate many different kinds of circum- 
stances. S. 440 would change that scheme by 
imposing technical legal prerequisites to ac- 
tion and in so doing would insure that every 
important national security debate following 
emergency action by the President would, 
instead of being argued entirely on the mer- 
its, be obscured by procedural arguments as 
to whether or not the President had acted in 
accordance with this new legislation. The 
scheme envisaged in S. 440 is a significant 
departure from that established in the Con- 
stitution and hence could legitimately be ef- 
fected only by a constitutional amendment 
even if it were desirable. 

Contrary to the apparent assertion of sec- 
tion 2 of this bill, nothing in the "necessary 
and proper" clause of article 1, section 8, of 
the Constitution gives Congress this power. 
As Alexander Hamilton also made clear in 
"The Federalist," the "necessary and proper" 
clause was intended principally to guard 
against an excessively narrow construction 
of the authority of the Union vis-a-vis State 
authority. There has never been a judicial 
decision which has held that the "necessary 
and proper" clause was intended to limit the 
principle of separation of powers. In fact, the 
case of Myers v. United States (272 U.S. 52 
(1926)), in which the Supreme Court held 
that Congress did not have the power to con- 
dition the President's removal power on the 
concurrence of the Senate, indicates that the 
separation of powers is not limited by Con- 
gress' power under the "necessary and 
proper" clause. While this provision gives 
Congress the authority to implement both 
congressional and executive powers, it does 
not empower Congress to change the balance 

between those powers by defining and limit- 
ing the President's authority. 

S. 440 noticeably omits Presidential au- 
thority to deploy armed forces abroad as an 
instrument of foreign policy in the absence of 
an actual attack or imminent threat of attack 
on American territory or forces. Yet this 
historic Presidential prerogative for nearly 
200 years has been essential to resist aggres- 
sion and to protect American security inter- 
ests. As Secretary Rogers has said: - 

. . . such a restriction could seriously limit the 
ability of the President to make a demonstration of 
force to back up the exercise of our rights and re- 
sponsibilities in Berlin or to deploy elements of 
the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean in connection 
with the Middle East situation. 

Elimination of this weapon from the Pres- 
idential arsenal could very seriously under- 
mine our security posture and likewise cannot 
be properly achieved except by constitutional 

S. 440 also purports to restrict the author- 
ity of the President to defend the United 
States itself against an actual armed attack 
by limiting to 30 days his right to use the 
armed forces in such hostilities unless Con- 
gress specifically authorizes a continuation 
or is physically unable to meet as a result of 
the attack. The defense of the United States 
against armed attack, however, is a core area 
of Presidential authority; Congress cannot 
affect the President's constitutional author- 
ity in this area. Even the States have consti- 
tutional authority to provide for their own 
defense when invaded or in imminent danger 
of invasion (article I, section 10). Surely the 
President can have no less authority or re- 
sponsibility for defense than the States, 
particularly inasmuch as the Federal Govern- 
ment has an unlimited constitutional obliga- 
tion to defend the States (article IV, section 
4) and the President as Chief Executive (ar- 
ticle II, section 1) and Commander in Chief 
(article II, section 2) has the responsibility 

- For a statement by Secretary Rogers made be- 
fore the Senate Committee on Foreigrn Relations on 
May 14, 1971, see Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 721. 


Department of State Bulletin 

and the authority to provirie that defense. 
Surely the Conyiess cannot l)y legishition re- 
duce these constitutionally prescribed rights 
and obligations. 

Since Congress already has the authority 
to conduct at any time the same kinds of re- 
view that S. MO i)i-oposes to mandate within 
SO days, it is dithcult to see what advantages 
Congress gains by legislating an arbitrary 
deadline. Congress can in any particular case 
undertake its consideration in a manner and 
within a period of time appropriate to the 
circumstances. An arbitrarily fixed time lim- 
itation on Presidential authority contributes 
nothing to the right of Congress to exercise 
its constitutional authority and at the same 
time could seriously impede action or under- 
mine negotiations in the future in a manner 
not desired by either the President or the 
Congress at that time. To seek to terminate 
Presidential authority if, for whatever rea- 
son, the Congress does not expressly affirm 
an action within an arbitrary time limit is 
neither helpful to the interests of either 
branch nor a constructive contribution to the 
development of a wise foreign policy. 

Termination by Either House 

The second bill to which I have been asked 
to address myself, H.R. .317, avoids some of 
the serious problems of S. 440. It does not 
propose to specify the constitutional powers 
of the President. Neither does it propose a 
fixed and arbitrary time limitation for con- 
gressional action in response to Presidential 
initiatives. It would call for prompt reports 
from the President to the Congress whenever 
the armed forces are used in hostilities ab- 
sent specific congressional authorization or 
a declaration of war. 

We question the necessity, and even the 
advisability, of requiring, as H.R. 317 would, 
that the Congress be convened if not in ses- 
sion at the time the President submits such 
a report. It is certainly conceivable that the 
formality and attention given to a special 
session of the could negate the ad- 
vantages of quiet diplomacy in the case of an 

understated show of .strength. A decision to 
convene Congress constitutionally lies within 
the discretion of the President and should 
dejiend on the circumstances prevailing at the 

Section 4 of H.R. 317, entitled "Termina- 
tion of Authority," presents difficulty in two 
respects. This section proposes that the au- 
thority of the President to deploy the armed 
forces or to direct or authorize them to en- 
gage in hostile action, absent specific con- 
gressional authorization or a declaration of 
war, is terminated if either House of the Con- 
gress adopts a resolution disapproving con- 
tinuation of an action the President has 
taken. First, the proscription of Presidential 
action would seem far too broadly drawn for 
both constitutional and policy reasons. Al- 
though within its constitutional authority 
Congress clearly can decide, for example, 
whether or not to appropriate funds to 
support policies or programs of which it dis- 
approves, it is extremely doubtful, as I men- 
tioned earlier, that Congress could terminate 
Presidential authority to deploy forces as the 
President saw fit; for example, to protect the 
United States against an armed attack. 

A second difficulty with section 4 of H.R. 
317 is that it purports to terminate the au- 
thority of the President upon the passage of 
a resolution by either House of Congress. 
This must be considered an unworkable 
standard for a number of reasons. We are 
dealing here with a division of power between 
the Congress and the executive, not between 
the Senate or the House and the executive. 
When one branch purports to impose legally 
binding restrictions on the exercise of the 
authority of the other, it clearly must be act- 
ing with its own full authority. The Congress 
clearly has authority to approve or not to ap- 
prove funds for use by the executive branch. 
Such a decision governs to some extent the ac- 
tivities of the executive and clearly depends on 
the consent of both Houses of the Congress. 
A law which states that the same effect can 
be accomplished by the passage of a simple 
resolution by only one House of Congress is 

April 9, 1973 


constitutionally defective. It impairs the con- 
stitutional authority of Congress itself as 
well as that of the executive. Furthermore, 
what is the true position of Congress if, for 
example, one House passes a resolution sup- 
porting the President's action and the other 
a resolution calling for its termination? It is 
clear that in matters of such significance the 
Congress must speak with one voice to have 
legal force. 

Need To Increase Communications 

Let me now turn to the third measure I 
have been asked to discuss. H.J. Res. 2, in- 
troduced by you, Mr. Chairman [Representa- 
tive Clement .J. Zablocki], for yourself and 
others, is primarily oriented toward increas- 
ing the flow of information on which Con- 
gress can base its decisions in exercising its 
constitutional responsibilities. As I have dis- 
cussed at some length, it is this general ap- 
proach, rather than that of attempting to 
change the underlying authority of either 
branch, that we strongly feel is the more 
constructive and positive way to proceed. I 
would like to mention that we have the great- 
est respect and appreciation for your efforts, 
Mr. Chairman, over the past several years 
to conduct a balanced, responsible, and 
searching investigation into the issues raised 
by war powers legislation. 

Unlike the Zablocki bill passed last year by 
the House of Representatives, however, H.J. 
Res. 2 includes provisions in section 3 which 
could be read as limiting the fundamental 
authority of the President to introduce the 
armed forces into hostilities or situations 
where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated. As I have discussed earlier, 
this type of provision leads us into very dif- 
ficult constitutional and general policy prob- 
lems and does not, in my view, take us very 
far along the road to developing responsible 
and forward-looking foreign policies in the 
future. I do note that H.J. Res. 2 does not 
impose any artificial deadline for congres- 
sional response to a Presidential initiative, 
although of course it maintains the option 
for such a response at any time. 

In addition, section 6, which provides that 
Congress should meet after the President has 
committed armed forces as described in sec- 
tion .5 in order to decide whether to authorize 
such use of the armed forces or the expendi- 
ture of funds for that action, seems to imply 
that the President may not have authority to 
act in the first place. It is clear from what I 
have already said, however, that the Presi- 
dent possesses broad constitutional authority 
to commit military forces in cases contem- 
plated by section 5. Finally, as I have 
indicated, I do not think it necessarily appro- 
priate that Congress be mandatorily con- 
vened as required by section 6, upon the 
receipt of every report rendered pursuant to 
section 5. 

It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that Congress 
will reject the highly restrictive approach to 
war powers legislation, which is unsound, and 
concentrate instead on enhancing its own 
ability to participate in the development of 
future foreign policies with the executive 
branch, as the drafters of the Constitution 
intended. To help move us toward that goal, 
I would like to repeat for your serious con- 
sideration several proposals which the Sec- 
retary of State made to the Congress in his 
war powers testimony of May 14, 1971. We 
are prepared to explore with you ways of 
reinforcing the information capability of 
Congress on issues involving war and peace. 
For example, we would be prepared to have 
each geographic Assistant Secretary provide 
on a regular basis full briefings on develop- 
ments in his respective area. Such bi'iefings 
would help the Congress to stay abreast of 
developing crisis situations as well as to build 
up a deeper background of information in 
many areas. 

There is, as we have noted many times, the 
need to be able to act speedily and sometimes 
without prior publicity in crisis situations. 
We should concentrate on eflforts to find bet- 
ter institutional methods to keep these re- 
quirements from becoming an obstacle to the 
exercise by Congi-ess of its full and proper 
role, rather than on counterproductive efforts 
to impede the executive in exercising its role. 
We have heard a number of suggestions con- 


Department of State Bulletin 

cerninfr the possibility of establishing- a joint 
congressional committee which could act as 
a consultative body with the President in 
times of emergencies, and as Secretary 
Rogers indicated, if there is interest in this 
idea in the Congress we would be willing to 
discuss this possibility with you to determine 
how best we might cooperate. 

We must both retain flexibility, for we are 
living in a dynamic world; and we must both 
work together, for the decisions we make in 
*'iis area are frequently momentous and pro- 

imd. Let us join together to improve the 
quality and facility of our decisions, rather 
than inhibit our capacity to make them. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

92d Congress, 2d Session 

The Role of U.S. Small Business in Export Trade. 
A report of the House Subcommittee on Govern- 
ment Procurement to the Select Committee on 
Small Business pursuant to H. Res. 5 and 19, 
resolutions creating a permanent select committee 
to conduct studies and investigations of the 
problems of small business. H. Kept. 92-1620. 
October 26, 1972. 49 pp. 

Financial Statements of the St. Lawrence Seaway 
Development Corporation for the Year Ended De- 
cember ^1, 1971. Letter from the Comptroller 
General of the United States. H. Doc. 92-378. De- 
cember 26, 1972. 2.3 pp. 

Report of the Activities of the Committee on 
Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
92d Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1971- 
1972. H. Rept. 92-1627. December 29, 1972. 91 

The Decision To Homeport in Greece. Report of the 
Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, with 
minority and additional views. December 31, 1972. 
27 pp. 

Legislative Review Activities of the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, 92d Congress. H. Rept. 92-1628. 
January 2, 1973. 29 pp. 

Report on Activities During the 92d Congress of 
the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish- 
eries. H. Rept. 92-1629. January 2, 1973. 73 pp. 

Report on the Activitj' of the Committee on Inter- 
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Rep- 
resentatives, for the 92d Congress. H. Rept. 
92-1634. Januarj- 2, 1973. 151 pp. 

The Foreign .Assistance Program. Annual Report 
to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1971. H. Doc. 92-347. 
85 pp. 


Current Actions 



Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven- 
tion on international civil aviation, as amended 
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170). Done at Rome Septem- 
ber 15, 1962.' 
Ratification deposited: Iran, February 19, 1973. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Laos, March 22, 1973. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendixes. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973. • 
Sigvatiire: Tunisia, March 21, 1973. 

Cultural Property 

Statutes of the International Centre for the Study 
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural 
Property. Adopted at New Delhi November- 
December 1956; as amended. Entered into force 
May 10, 1958; for the United States January 20, 
1971. TIAS 7038. 

Accessions deposited: Iran, December 18, 1972; 
Denmark, December 27, 1972. 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and pre- 
venting the illicit import, export and transfer of 
ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris 
November 14, 1972. Entered into force April 24, 
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, June 22, 1972. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendment to article 28 of the convention on the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Orga- 
nization (TIAS 4044, 6285). Adopted at Paris 
September 28, 1965. Entered into force Novem- 
ber 3, 1968. TIAS 6490. 
Arreplonce deposited: Cuba, February 9, 1973. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed 
at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general 
regulations with final protocol and annex, and 
the universal postal convention with final pro- 

' Not in force. 

'-' Not in force for the United States. 


April 9, 1973 


tocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo 
November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 
1971, except for article V of the additional proto- 
col which entered into force January 1, 1971. 
TIAS 7150. 
Ratification deposited: Burundi, February 5, 

Accession deposited: People's Republic of China, 

February 7, 1973. 
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Ratification deposited: Burundi, February 5, 



Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972.= 
Ratification deposited: Laos, March 22, 1973. 


Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terror- 
ism taking the form of crimes against persons and 
related extortion that are of international signifi- 
cance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971.^ 
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, March 8, 1973. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention en tonnage measurement 
of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London 
June 23, 1969. ^ 
Acceptayice deposited: Finland, February 6, 1973. 

El Salvador 

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement 
between the Ministerio de Agricultura y Gana- 
deria of El Salvador and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture for the prevention of foot-and-mouth 
disease and rinderpest in El Salvador. Effected 
by exchange of notes at San Salvador February 
28 and March 2, 1973; entered into force March 2, 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of September 15, 1967 
(TIAS 6346). Signed at Jakarta February 14, 
1973. Entered into force February 14, 1973. 


Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atcmic energy, as amended (TIAS 3490, 4030, 
5957). Signed at Washington February 3, 1956. 
Entered into force February 3, 1956. 
Terminated : March 19, 1973, superseded by the 
agreement of November 24, 1972. 

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy, with appendix. Signed at Wash- 
ington November 24, 1972. 
Entered into force: March 19, 1973. 

Yemen Arab Republic 

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace 
Corps program in the Yemen Arab Republic. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Sana'a September 
30, 1972, and January 29, 1973; entered into force 
January 29, 1973. 



Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro- 
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended 
(TIAS 2856, 7485). Effected by exchange of notes 
at Kabul December 20, 1972, and January 2, 1973. 
Entered into force January 2, 1973. 

1 Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 



Raymond J. Waldmann as Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for Transportation and Communications, Bu- 
reau of Economic Affairs, effective March 12. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX Vol. LXVIII, No. 176S April 9, 1973 

American Principles. Department Gives Views 
on Proposed War Powers Legislation (Brow- 
er) 431 

gia. Proposals for Unilateral Reduction of 
U.S. Forces Abroad Opposeil (Popnrtment 
statement) 426 


Kissing-er Interviewed for NBC Television . 427 
esident Nixon's News Conference of March 

15 (excerpts) 413 

l>e United States and the Changing World 

(Rush) 418 

Jnited States Liaison Office in the People's Re- 
public of China (White House announce- 
ment) 414 


ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 439 

epartment Gives Views on Proposed War 

Powers Legislation (Brower) 434 

lie United States and the Changing World 

(Rush) 418 

department and Foreign Service. Waldmann 
appointed Deputy .-Assistant Secretary for 
Transportation and Communications . . . 440 

)eveloping Countries. The United States and 
the Changing World (Rush) 418 

conomic Affairs 
President Nixon's News Conference of March 

15 (excerpts) 413 

The United States and the Changing World 

(Rush) 418 

Waldmann appointed Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for Transportation and Communications 440 

itvironment. Dr. White To Represent United 
States on International Whaling Commission 433 


oposals for Unilateral Reduction of U.S. 
Forces Abroad Opposed (Department state- 
ment) 426 

he United States and the Changing World 
(Rush) 418 

ermany. Diplomatic Cooperation Recovers His- 
toric German Manuscripts (Sutterlin) . . . 432 

overnment Organization. Commission on Con- 
duct of Foreign Policy 425 

pdia. President Nixon's News Clonference of 
i'March 15 (excerpts) 413 

International OrKanizalionR and Conferences. 
Dr. White To Reprrsent United States on 
International Whaling Commission .... 433 

Japan. Tlie United States and the Changing 
World (Rush) 418 

Middle East. Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for 
NBC Television 427 

Military Affairs. Proposals for Unilateral Re- 
duction of U.S. Forces Abroad Opposed (De- 
partment statement) 426 

Pakistan. President Nixon's News Conference 
of Mai'ch 15 (excerpts) 413 

Presidential Documents. President Nixon's 
News Conference of March 15 (excerpts) . . 413 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 439 


Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for NBC Televi- 
sion 427 

President Nixon's News Conference of March 
15 (excerpts) 413 

Name Index 

Brower, Charles N 434 

Kissinger, Henry A 427 

Nixon, President 413 

Rush, Kenneth 418 

Sutterlin, James S 432 

Waldmann, Raymond .1 440 

White, Robert M 433 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington. D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Sobjcct 

'y- '<'''\ , ^- ; . Regional Foreign Policy 
Conference, Grand Rapids, Mich, 
(as prepared for delivery). 
87 3/21 Rush: P'ulbright-Hays scholars 
annual dinner. 

Not printed. 


Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 


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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 




Volume LXVIII 

No. 1764 

April 16, 1973 

Address by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Porter HI 

Address by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Casey M8 

Address by Assistant Secretary Newsom 456 



Address by Ambassador Hillenbrand ^62 


For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1764 
April 16, 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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Washington, D.C. 20402 
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Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of Z7.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and. 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the Wfiite House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to wftich tite' 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listet 


America's Engagement in Asia and the World 

Address by Williatn J. Porter 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs^ 

President Nixon opened his first inaugural 
address with these words: 

Each moment in history is a fleeting time, precious 
and unique. But some stand out as moments of be- 
ginning, in which courses are set that shape decades 
or centuries. 

The past few years have been such a 
moment. We are leaving the postwar world. 
Responding to our openings to the People's 
Republic of China and the Soviet Union, the 
major Communist nations are abandoning 
their policy of constant confrontation. New 
patterns of international relations are emer- 

The emergence of China, the growing 
strength of Japan, and the collective voice of 
western Europe are transforming the politi- 
cal and economic scene. We encourage this 
process. We continue to support the Euro- 
pean Community, its enlargement and 
strengthening. We welcome Japan's climb to 
the opportunities and responsibilities of a 
major country. We want good relations with 
the U.S.S.R. And the President has launched 
a relationship with China which both accepts 
and encourages its growing participation in 
the affairs of the international community. 

The complexity and challenge of this more 
fluid environment have led some to counsel 
basic changes in our security and economic 
policies. Two developments have strength- 
ened this view. 

' Made at Grand Rapids, Mich., on Mar. 21 be- 
fore a regional foreign policy conference cospon- 
sored by the Department of State and the World 
Affairs Council of Grand Rapids (as delivered; for 
the prepared text, see press release 86). 

First, we have learned some hard lessons 
in international economics. Over the past 
two years our imports grew by 40 percent 
while our exports increased only 15 percent; 
for the first time in this century the United 
States has a trade deficit. And second, as 
Secretary Rogers recently stated : = 

After a long and frequently frustrating military 
struggle, there may be some longing among Ameri- 
cans to withdraw from the burdens and responsi- 
bilities of an active role in world affairs. Twice 
before in this century our initial reaction was to 
pull back and concentrate on domestic issues. 

After World War I, we isolated ourselves 
from international responsibilities, but we 
could not isolate ourselves from world depres- 
sion and world war. After World War II, a 
man born in Grand Rapids exactly 89 years 
ago tomorrow. Senator Arthur Vandenburg, 
saved us from making the same mistake. He 
was in many ways the legislative father of 
those basic policies that have served us so 
well for the past quarter century — in 1945 
the founding of the United Nations, in 1947 
aid to Greece and Turkey, in 1948 Marshall 
plan aid, and in 1949 the establishment of 

Once again our involvement in war is com- 
ing to an end. And once again a native son 
of this city is playing a major role in as- 
suring that America remains realistically en- 
gaged in the world. Congressman Gerald 
Ford is a vigorous advocate of the view that, 
while we must avoid the overextension of the 

' For a statement by Secretary Rogers made be- 
fore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
Feb. 21, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1973, p. 281. 

April 16, 1973 


past, our own self-interest dictates an active 
American involvement in world affairs. In 
fact he is such a vigorous advocate, making 
some 200 speeches a year, that he puts cau- 
tious diplomats like me to shame. 

Economic and National Defense Policies 

I am undoubtedly preaching to the con- 
verted when I encourage this audience to 
support our continuing engagement in the 
world. Your very presence in a foreign policy 
conference indicates your opposition to an 
isolationist course. And while some have 
claimed the Middle West is a bastion of isola- 
tionists, I find quite the opposite to be the 
case. In the 1960's Michigan tripled its ex- 
ports, which now exceed even the exports of 
New York. I understand from Mr. Brush 
[Richard F. Brush, general chairman of the 
conference] that some 35 companies right 
here in Grand Rapids are exporting an in- 
creasing portion of their production. Nation- 
ally some 31 percent of all our crops and 14 
percent of our manufactured goods are ex- 
ported. We now depend upon imports for 
30 percent of our petroleum needs, and this 
dependence is growing. 

Our welfare is inextricably linked with the 
economic health of the rest of the world. It 
is for that reason President Nixon has set a 
dual objective in economic policy this year: 
both to improve America's competitive posi- 
tion in world markets and to reform the 
international monetary and trade system. 

Within the next few weeks the President 
will be submitting a request to Congress for 
the authority to negotiate an improvement 
in our trading position. For the past quarter 
century international trade has increased at 
a more rapid rate than world production, 
providing an essential stimulus to the most 
rapid global economic growth in man's his- 
tory. America has shared in this growth. 
Our real per capita income has doubled in 
this period, and we are by far the most pro- 
ductive nation in the world today. 

The recent devaluation of the dollar will 
greatly strengthen our competitive position. 
So will the lowering of European and Japa- 

nese barriers to our trade for which we are 
pressing. The United States is already com- 
petitive in many fields, from computers to 
agriculture to pharmaceuticals. Those Amer- 
icans who doubt our ability to export should 
talk with the Japanese and Europeans, who 
are concerned that American goods may flood 
their markets. Freer trade — when recipro- 
cated by other nations and with proper safe- 
guards for adversely affected industries — is 
clearly in this nation's best interest. I hope 
you will all support the President's trade 

Just as we must resist pressures to retreat 
from our outward-looking economic policies, 
so must we resist efforts to radically alter our 
national defense policies. It is the security 
provided by a strong national defense that 
has given us the confidence and ability to 
negotiate so successfully. 

We all know the costs of maintaining a 
sufficient defense capability. What some peo- 
ple seem to forget are the greater long-term 
costs to ourselves and to our allies if we were 
to become a second-rate power militarily. 
Since 1969 we have reduced our armed forces 
by a third— from 3.5 million to 2.3 million, 
men. The defense budget now consumes just 
7 percent of our GNP, the lowest share since: 


The new Secretary of Defense, Elliot 
Richardson, has pledged to keep defense ex- 
penditures as low as is consistent with our 
essential needs. To go below this level of 
sufficiency would have seriously destabilizing 
effects in many parts of the world. It would 
prevent us from maintaining the momentum 
toward a more peaceful and open world so 
noticeable in recent years. 


I should like to devote 
my remarks today to the 
Nam, which has occupied 
during the past eight years 

If all goes well, there 
American combat troops 
the first time since 1965. 
prisoners of war will have 

the remainder of 
problem of Viet- 
much of my time 

will soon be no 
in Viet-Nam for 
All of our known 
been released. By 


Department of State Bulletin 

prisoners of war I mean those in Laos as 
well as in Viet-Nam, and we expect complete 
fulfillment of the promises that have been 
made about their release. These things will 
mark a day we have long awaited. We shall 
have reached it not by abandoning our 
friends but by opening the way to self- 
determination for all the people of South 

There have been problems in Viet-Nam 
during these first 60 days of the peace agree- 
ment. We consider most of these problems to 
be a natural, almost inevitable, residue of 
decades of bitter conflict. 

In general, the situation is stable, mili- 
tary activity has declined, and the relative 
strengths of the two sides are unchanged. 
But it is easier to stop shooting than start 
talking, so solving South Viet-Nam's political 
problems may take place more slowly than 
was envisaged in the agreement. Nonetheless, 
the focus for both sides appears to be shift- 
ing to the political from the military. 

This is the kind of evolution, if it con- 
tinues, that we hoped would be a result of the 
cease-fire agreement and the new framework 
it provides for testing strengths at the poll- 
ing place rather than on the battlefield. 

This can, of course, happen only if North 
Viet-Nam observes its undertaking to 
"strictly and scrupulously" fulfill the peace 
agreement. President Nixon has made clear 
our concern at North Vietnamese infiltration 
of large amounts of equipment into South 
Viet-Nam. If it continued, this infiltration 
could lead to serious consequences. The 
North Vietnamese should not lightly disre- 
gard our expressions of concern. But we 
hope it will not continue. Mutual restraint 
in the supply of arms by all outside parties, 
including the Soviet Union and the People's 
, Republic of China, is of course an essential 
jj aspect of this situation. 

A mechanism to monitor and supervise the 
cease-fire, the International Commission of 
J Control and Supervision, consisting of Can- 
fo ada, Indonesia, Poland, and Hungary, is in 
fl business. Spurred on by an energetic Cana- 
nt dian delegation, the Control Commission has 

got itself organized, deployed to the field, and 
has undertaken some investigations. Since 
Communist governments mix legal arguments 
with politics, the Control Commission is still 
experiencing some difliculties. However, we 
believe that its performance to date has been 
creditable and holds the promise of greater 
impact as experience is gained. 

We note also that high-level political con- 
sultations have begun in France between the 
two South Vietnamese parties. This is the 
forum where complicated internal disagree- 
ments will be tackled and, we hope, resolved. 

In South Viet-Nam morale has remained 
strong. President Thieu realizes the impor- 
tance of the political struggle and is directing 
more of his government's efli^orts to this area 
than ever before. There has been very little 
of the political and social unraveling that 
some have expected or hoped for. The Viet 
Cong, too, are concentrating on the political 
struggle, which is in line with our aim of 
changing the nature of the struggle in that 
unfortunate land. 

The United States will continue to support 
the eflForts of the South Vietnamese people 
to achieve self-determination, as envisaged in 
the peace agreement and in the Act of the 
International Conference on Viet-Nam.' 

Laos and Cambodia 

In Laos the cease-fire accords call for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect 
for the sovereignty and neutrality of the 
Kingdom. They were worked out and signed 
solely by the Lao parties. The United States 
respects the accords, and we very much hope 
that this time North Viet-Nam, and other 
nations, also will respect them. To achieve 
peace all outside parties must leave the Lao 
to settle their own problems. There are still 
cease-fire violations in Laos, although far 
fewer than in South Viet-Nam, but the 

" For text of the Agreement on Endinp the War 
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris 
on Jan. 27, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169; 
for text of the Act of the International Conference 
on Viet-Nam signed at Paris on Mar. 2, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 345. 

et< April 16, 1973 


parties are slowly working toward the forma- 
tion of a provisional government to be named 
by March 23. 

Cambodia was the last of the Indochinese 
states to be drawn into the Indochina con- 
flict. It remains the only one without a cease- 
fire. At the time of the Viet-Nam cease-fire, 
President Lon Nol proclaimed a unilateral 
cessation of hostilities clearly designed to 
elicit an enemy response. After a few days 
of relative quiet, the answer was given in an 
upsurge of enemy attacks which has reached 
the highest level in over a year and which 
shows no sign of abating. Further efforts to 
open a dialogue with the insurgent leadership 
have received no reply except for threats of 
continued war. The situation in Cambodia 
must therefore be described as unsatisfactory 
at present. 

Throughout Indochina we must hasten the 
transition from the bitterness of war to the 
healing task of reconciliation and reconstruc- 
tion. America's long tradition of humani- 
tarian concern by itself calls for our active 
participation in a program of assistance. We 
are convinced that such a program will pro- 
vide all parties a strong incentive to observe 
the peace. As compared to the heavy expendi- 
ture of the war, surely it is worth a small 
proportion of that amount to insure that it 
is preserved. Preserving the peace will re- 
quire a relatively modest outlay. 

Accounting for the Missing in Action 

We have one other very important item on 
our agenda. With the return of our prisoners 
of war, we are giving the highest priority to 
the task of accounting for the 1,300 Ameri- 
cans listed as missing in action in Viet-Nam 
and Laos. This is a most serious responsibil- 
ity. It is an obligation to those men and to 
their families who have waited for them 
through the long years, and we shall fulfill 
that obligation. 

We are making a three-pronged approach 
to this subject: 

— First, as each returning POW comes 
home, he is being debriefed to learn whatever 

information he may have on any Americans, 
and foreign nationals as well. 

— Second, we are proceeding in the Four- 
Party Joint Military Commission, composed 
of U.S., South Vietnamese, North Viet- 
namese, and Viet Cong representatives, to 
secure an accounting for all our dead and 
missing. Article 8(b) of the peace agreement 
contains the most far-reaching language ever 
obligating the two sides in an armed conflict 
to help each other to get information about 
the missing in action and the dead. Secretary 
Rogers and I raised this subject directly 
with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris dur- 
ing the International Conference on Viet- 

— And third, we have established in Thai- 
land a Joint Casualty Resolution Center 
manned by American personnel solely re- 
sponsible for searching for our personnel 
missing in action in Indochina. We will move 
as quickly as possible to secure the most 
thorough examination and reconciliation of 
each MIA case. 

I can bring you the assurance of this ad- 
ministration that this subject of accounting 
for our missing in action will have the high- 
est possible priority. 

Lessons of Negotiations 

Let me complete this rather lengthy dis- 
cussion of the situation in Indochina by 
sharing with you some of my thoughts about 
what working toward peace means. I think 
it is important to review the record of how 
we achieved a negotiated settlement in Viet- 
Nam and to consider some of the lessons 
learned along the way. 

The negotiations lasted more than four 
years. During most of that time — through 
one sterile meeting after another — there was 
no appreciable progress toward a settlement. 
Early in the talks Hanoi demanded that we 
first withdraw all our forces unconditionally 
and throw out the South Vietnamese 
Government as preconditions for serious ne- 
gotiations. These demands were clearly un- 
acceptable. Had we withdrawn our troops, we 


Department of State Bulletin 

would have had no leverajre with which to 
pry out an agreement to release our prison- 
ers; had we overthrown the Saigron govern- 
ment, we would have also sacrificed the 
principle of genuine self-determination by 
the South Vietnamese people. 

Hanoi refused to alter its position, and 
the talks drag'ged on from one year to the 
next. I can tell you it was not much fun. It 
was easy to get discouraged, and indeed 
many at home did. Some critics of our 
policy urged our government to concede 
ever.\i;hing. Others advocated our breaking 
off the talks altogether. 

However, the President remained dedi- 
cated to the belief that the only satisfactory 
way to resolve the conflict was by a settle- 
ment at the conference table and that even- 
tually Hanoi would agree to undertake the 
serious negotiations necessary to bring this 
about. At the same time, the President fully 
understood North Viet-Nam's sti-ateg>' of 
pursuing its goals by coordinated militaiy 
and political actions — ^by fighting while 

He therefore developed and pursued a pol- 
icy that would both encourage a negotiated 
settlement and maintain our commitment to 
assist the South Vietnamese people in their 
self-defense. By carefully keeping open the 
door to negotiations and by making a series 
of progressively forthcoming peace proposals 
of our own. we demonstrated our readiness 
to achieve a just compromise. At the same 
time, the President pursued the program of 
Vietnamization; this provided us with an 
alternative to the stalemated peace talks and 
simultaneously served as an inducement for 
the other side to negotiate seriously. 

As you will recall, the Vietnamese Com- 
munists agreed to forsake the battlefield in 
favor of the conference table only after their 
all-out invasion of the South in the spring 
of last year failed. In retrospect, the Presi- 
dent's decision to resist that invasion by 
mining and bombing in the North was a 
critically important factor — indeed, perhaps 
the turning point — in bringing them to the 
negotiating table in a serious posture. The 

President again made clear his resolve when 
he resumed the bombing in December in 
response to Hanoi's decision to st<ill on reach- 
ing a final agreement. I am convinced that 
this action was both necessary and effective 
in bringing the war to an end. 

I think there is an obvious but very im- 
portant point to be drawn from this experi- 
ence: Seemingly insurmountable obstacles to 
a just peace can in fact be overcome by the 
patient pursuit of policies which combine 
reasonableness and resolve, flexibility of ap- 
proach and firmness of purpose. These were 
the guidelines that enabled us to reach our 
goal in Viet-Nam. They should not be for- 
gotten as we continue to move away from 
confrontation into an era of reconciliation 
both in Indochina and throughout the world. 

Policy Objectives in Asia 

In concluding, let me turn briefly to the 
larger problems of Asia. Why are we there, 
and what are our objectives in the years 
ahead ? 

Some Americans still view Asia as an area 
of less vital concern than Europe. There are, 
however, certain realities which no one can 

— Half the world's people live in Asia. 

— Our trade with Asia now equals 85 per- 
cent of our trade with western Europe and is 
growing more rapidly. 

— Three times in a single generation we 
have been drawn into war in Asia. 

— Four of the world's major powers, the 
United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet 
Union, come together only in the Pacific. 

We must and we will retain an active 
American presence in Asia. Our power there 
is an encouragement to our friends and is not 
provocative to our adversaries. We will be 
guided in our approach to Asia's still-uncer- 
tain future by two major policy objectives: 

— First, to enable our allies to assume the 
primary responsibility for their own secu- 
rity ; and 

— Second, to persuade all Asian nations 
that by not interfering in their neighbor's 

April 16, 1973 


affairs a new era of peace and prosperity is 

In 1972 we made extraordinary progress 
on both these fronts. The Nixon doctrine of 
shared responsibiUties and shared burdens 
is clearly succeeding. From South Viet-Nam 
to South Korea, our allies' growing military 
strength enables them to assume the major 
responsibility for their own defense. Amer- 
ica's supporting role is rapidly becoming less 
onerous. Since 1969 we have reduced the 
number of our armed forces in Asia by 70 
percent. In addition to the complete with- 
drawal of our forces from Viet-Nam, we 
have reduced our military presence by 
70,000 men in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, 
and elsewhere. 

However, as we review this record of 
progress, we must not lose sight of the sub- 
stantial problems ahead. Asia is still far from 
achieving the delicate transition from tur- 
moil to stability. 

The goal that we have set for ourselves is 
the establishment of the kind of peaceful 
world that the Secretary of State has de- 
scribed as one in which :' 

. . . dialogue and negotiation have replaced con- 
frontation and conflict. 

. . . people can move freely and easily across na- 
tional borders. 

... the sovereignty and independence of all coun- 
tries is the first principle of international relations. 
. force is relied on less and less as an instru- 
ment of national policy. 

The Secretary of State also noted that now 
"for the first time since the war such a world 
has become a practical possibility." 

Senator Vandenburg once told the Senate 
that Theodore Roosevelt was right to say 
that the United States had no choice but to 
play a great part in the world and that the 
choice was whether to play it well or badly. 
He went on to say that no matter how much 
we might crave the easier path of lesser re- 

sponsibility, we were denied that privilege. 
We had to play our part in the world in sheer 
defense of our own interests. 

My thesis today has been that in bringing 
about a still-imperfect peace in Southeast 
Asia, in working toward the sort of world we 
want, we have played our part well. With 
your help, ladies and gentlemen, we shall 
keep on striving to do so. 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
Resume at Geneva 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks (SALT) resumed at Geneva on 
March 12. Following is a statement by Am- \ 
bassador U. Alexis Johnson, chief of the U.S. 
delegation, made upon arrival at Geneva on 
March 10, together with a White House an- 
nouncement issued March 7 listing the U.S. 


When SALT began in 1969, President 
Nixon wrote Ambassador Smith of his hope 
that he was beginning a "sustained eflfort" 
to limit strategic forces.' That hope has been i 
realized. The SALT negotiations have con- 1 
tinued for almost 31/2 years and have borne ■ 
important results. In assuming the leadership 
of the U.S. delegation I am profoundly aware 
of the immense responsibility I have inher- 
ited to pursue this "sustained effort" for a 
safer world. 

In accordance with the joint Moscow com- 
munique of May 29, 1972, our present task is : 
to continue active negotiations for the limi- 
tation of strategic offensive arms.= Agree- 
ment on more complete measures in this field 

' For an address by Secretary Rogers made be- 
fore the Commonwealth Club at San Francisco, 
Calif., on July 18, 1972, see Bulletin of Aug. 14, 
1972, p. 185. 

iFor text of a message from President Nixon | 
read by Ambassador Gerard C. Smith at the open- 
ing session of the talks at Helsinki on Nov. 17, 1969, 
see BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1969, p. 543. j 

- For text of the communique, see Bulletin oi i 
June 26, 1972, p. 899. I 


Department of State Bulletin; 

would be a logical next step in the overall 
task of further reducing the possibility of 
war and of enhancing the security and well- 
being of all nations and peoples. As in the 
past, we intend to pursue this objective in 
a serious and purposeful manner. 

The last session of the talks in November 
and December was a useful beginning to this 
second phase of SALT. However, a great deal 
of work remains to be done, and we are grate- 
ful to the Government of Switzerland for con- 
tinuing to provide this setting in which it 
can be carried out. 


Wbit« House press release dated March 7 

The President on March 7 announced the 
members of the U.S. delegation to the Stra- 
tegic Arms Limitation Talks, which resume 
in Geneva on March 12. They are: 

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Representa- 
tive and chief of the U.S. delegation. Ambassa- 
dor Johnson served as Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs for four years and is the 
only Foreigrn Service officer on active duty who 
holds the rank of Career Ambassador, the highest 
rank in the U.S. Foreign Service. 

Paul H. Nitze, former Assistant Secretary of De- 
fense for International Security Affairs, Secre- 
tary of the Navy, and Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, has served on the SALT delegation 
since the beginning of the negotiations. 

Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air 
Force and presently president of the California 
Institute of Technology, has also been on the 
SALT delegation since the beginning of nego- 

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, a career (Army) of- 
ficer, has most recently served in NATO as Dep- 
uty Chairman of the Military Committee and as 
Chairman of the Working Group on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions. 

Boris H. Klosson is a career Foreign Service offi- 
cer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission at 
the American Embassy in Moscow from 1969 
to 1972. 

Sidney N. Graybeal is presently Deputy Assistant 
Director, Science and Technology Bureau, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. He previously 
served as Alternate Executive Officer of the 

John C. Ausland will be Executive Secretary of 
the delegation. He is a career Foreign Service 

officer who has until recently been Deputy Chief 

of Mission at the American Embassy in Oslo. 

The U.S. delegation to the SALT One talks 
included Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Di- 
rector of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency; Mr. Nitze; Dr. Brown; Lt. Gen. 
Royal B. Allison, USAF; and Ambassador 
Graham Parsons. 

Preparations for Establishment 
of U.S. Liaison Office in Peking 

FoUoiving is a statement read to news 
correspondents on March 28 by Charles W. 
Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

I would like to note for you that a six-man 
advance party, to be led by Alfred leS. 
Jenkins, will be leaving Washington for the 
People's Republic of China on Saturday 
[March 31] to arrange for the establishment 
of a U.S. Liaison Office in Peking. The party 
will spend several days in consultation with 
the American consulate general in Hong 
Kong. We anticipate that it will be entering 
the People's Republic from Hong Kong on 
Thursday, April 5. 

In addition to Mr. Jenkins, the advance 
party includes Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., who 
will be the administrative officer for the liai- 
son office; Charles W. Freeman, Jr., country 
officer for People's Republic of China affairs, 
who will serve as adviser-interpreter for the 
advance party; Thomas J. McCay, Jr., a com- 
munications engineer; John R. EHis, a re- 
gional administrative specialist; and Mr. 
Ray E. Jones, a secretary-typist. 

As you know, we anticipate that the Liai- 
son Office will be opening in May. 

The advance party will be primarily con- 
cerned with arranging for office space and 
housing for the Liaison Office and its staff; 
for supervising the installation of furnish- 
ings and equipment; for setting up com- 
munications facilities; and for other matters 
of an essentially administrative and prepara- 
tory nature. 

April 16, 1973 


Internationalization of the Capital Markets 

Address by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs^ 

About a year ago I discussed this subject 
at a conference in Milan which was billed as 
the first international meeting of stock ex- 
changes. Today I plan to assess again the 
opportunities and problems arising from a 
continuing and growing internationalization 
of not only securities markets but also of in- 
vestor choice, of preferences in capital- 
raising mechanisms, and of activities of 
brokers and bankers of diverse shape and 
variety. I want to emphasize at the outset 
that I firmly intend to refrain from comment 
and speculation on short-term capital move- 
ments and from any intrusion into the mone- 
tary domain, which belongs to the Treasury 
and to the floaters and fixed exchange raters, 
the monetarists and fiscalists, the interven- 
ers and the laissez-faire-ites, the crawling 
peggers and snake fanciers, who are so 
prominent in this distinguished audience. 

A few short weeks after its second devalu- 
ation within 14 months, the dollar was hit by 
a further crisis of confidence. I want to say 
at the outset that I share President Nixon's 
conviction that today's dollar is at a sound 
value. Certainly our $6 billion trade deficit 
and our $10 billion payments deficit are mat- 
ters of grave concern. Of even greater con- 
cern are the 70 to 80 billion expatriated 
dollars held abroad resulting from a two- 
front war, one in Viet-Nam and the other 
against poverty and other social ills at home. 

' Made at Harriman, N.Y., on Mar. 10 before a 
conference on "Toward a New World Monetary 
System" sponsored by the Committee for Monetary 
Research and Education (press release 68 dated 
Mar. 12). 

But I believe much of the dollar's problem 
comes from a failure to properly assess the 
solid assets which lie below the surface. The 
world has translated the highly visible loss 
of the U.S. position in consumer electronics, 
sporting goods, and autos into a declining 
general technology. An objective analysis 
would discover that the United States is still 
dominant in computers, photography, phar- 
maceuticals, medical technology, aerospace, 
nuclear power, homebuilding, heavy indus- 
trial machinery, offshore drilling, utility op- 
erations, and so on. 

We do bring in $7 billion of investment, 
royalty, and managerial income while putting 
a lot of our foreign earnings back into over- 
seas business, and we do have about $90 
billion in book value of American direct in- 
vestment overseas, which is worth a lot more; 
American transportation companies earned 
more than $3 billion outside the United States 
last year; over 100 American banking insti- 
tutions carry on business in nearly 600 
branch offices overseas ; some 250 brokerage 
offices with over 2,000 salesmen are operating 

Let's take a broad look at how we might 
be able to correct our $10 billion payments 
deficit. We could almost wipe it out by keep- 
ing our tourists, our military forces, and our 
aid home. But we can't afford to withdraw 
from the world. We could do it by improving 
our trade balance from a $6 billion deficit 
position to one of $4 billion surplus. To do 
that without reducing imports, we'd have to 
export almost 25 percent more than our 
present $43 billion of exports. Our trading 


Department of State Bulletin 


partners are appalled at this suggestion. But 
they forget that in the past two years our 
imports grew 40 percent while our exports 
grew only 15 percent. We need only reverse 
that record to get back into balance. Liberali- 
zation in trade and investment restrictions 
abroad and a more export-minded business 
community with a devalued currency and im- 
proved service and marketing facilities 
abroad could lift our exports by 25 percent 
over a few years. 

Take a look at our agriculture. Through a 
technological miracle, 5 percent of our work 
force is able to feed all of us and many peo- 
ple abroad as well. With all the idle cropland 
we have brought into production and liberali- 
zation of agricultural trade policies, we be- 
lieve a gain of $10 billion a year in farm 
exports and an improvement of over $7 bil- 
lion in our balance of agricultural trade is 
attainable. This would give us a saving of 
$4 billion a year in taxes with further savings 
at grocery and butcher shops here and abroad 
as we exported more feed and livestock and 
imported dairy i)roducts. 

None of this will happen quickly. Some of 
it may not happen at all. We only have to 
make half of it to balance our payments. A 
third of it would balance our trade. 

Capital Markets and Balance of Payments 

What I want to talk to you about today 
is what we can do in the world capital mar- 
kets to contribute to the balancing of our in- 
ternational accounts. Trade need no longer be 
the only source of major gains in our balance 
of pa\Tnents. U.S. investments abroad have 
become so large, and their potential both for 
retaining earnings to expand equity and for 
leveraging through foreign borrowing is now 
so great, that the portion of earnings re- 
turned home can, alongside the payments re- 
ceived for licenses and royalties on American 
technologj', be our major positive item for 
some years ahead. And in addition, there is 
undoubted attraction of the American securi- 
ties markets for a substantial share of the 
funds that investors abroad wish to invest 
for safety and growth. On top of that, there 

are substantial attractions to induce the 
growth of foreign direct investments in the 
United States. 

When we look at our investment assets and 
income we find the most promising element 
in our balance of payments. We have a $6 
billion trade deficit and a $7 billion net in- 
flow in dividends, interests, royalties, et 
cetera, from our investments abroad. As a 
country which faces increasing needs for 
resources of energy and raw materials from 
abroad, we will have to invest abroad and 
increase the inflow of investment earnings to 
justify that investment. 

To balance off" that investment we will 
have to attract investments from abroad. We 
will have to make securities an export. We 
will have to maintain and strengthen our 
ability to raise capital throughout the world 
as well as at home. Today, by and large, we 
have trade deficits with most of the rich 
countries of the developed world and a favor- 
able balance of trade only with the poor na- 
tions of the developing world. The poor 
nations will raise their living standards sig- 
nificantly and become better markets for our 
goods only as they develop indigenous capital 
markets. Thus it is clear that we have a 
large stake in the creation of better capital 
markets and in a better interrelationship of 
capital markets around the world. Fortu- 
nately, financial know-how is one of our 
great assets and the securities markets of 
the world are becoming increasingly inter- 
nationalized. Competition will be severe as 
the London financial community with all its 
skill and resources moves into the continen- 
tal economy of the European Community and 
the Japanese financial community with all its 
drive and resources goes global. In our own 
country the regulation of and the relation- 
ships between the in.stitutions which make up 
our financial community derive from histori- 
cal experience, much of which may no longer 
suit the aggressive, competitive world in 
which we live. Yet we have enormous assets, 
not the least of which is the high standard of 
disclosure, disinterest, and fair dealing which 
other nations are only now seeking to 

April 16, 1973 


Remember that New York, until 1962, was 
the only really large capital market for gov- 
ernments and international corporations and 
other institutions. In July of that year Presi- 
dent Kennedy, concerned by increasing out- 
flows of long-term capital (from $850 million 
in 1960 to an annual rate of nearly twice that 
in 1963), introduced the interest equalization 
tax. This was followed by other foreign 
credit and capital-export restraints. 

The net effect has been to encourage in- 
vestment in the securities of countries other 
than the United States, to develop financial 
centers outside the United States that feed on 
U.S. securities, to deflect business from U.S. 
securities houses to foreign houses, and to 
generally distort capital flows. The speed 
with which the Eurodollar and Eurobond 
markets developed and the magnitude of 
capital in these markets are at least largely 
attributable to U.S. measures. The fact that 
this market has to a very large extent been 
centered in London is easily explained, first 
by the fact that the traditional skills of 
London's merchant banking houses, supple- 
mented by a number of American investment 
banks which established themselves in Lon- 
don, were available to take advantage quickly 
of the new opportunities. Active capital mar- 
kets developed in Europe due to: 

1. The capital provided from the growth 
and maturity of European economies; 

2. Increased political and economic sta- 
bility overseas; 

3. The need to finance locally because of 
restrictions in the United States; 

4. The growing pool of dollars outside of 
the United States resulting from the negative 
balance of payments; and 

5. The development of U.S. investment 
banking techniques in Europe caused by the 
need for U.S.-based international companies 
to finance overseas. 

The Eurodollar market, and the Eurobond 
market, in short, have flourished in large 
part because U.S. controls protected them 
from New York competition. The removal of 
these controls is likely to lead to a substan- 
tial shift of activity back to New York, both 

because of more plentiful funds and greater 
institutional efficiency and because many cus- 
tomers will also find it more convenient to 
borrow there. As borrowing shifts back to 
New York, interest rates on deposits in Lon- 
don will also decline relative to New York, 
and deposits will flow back to New York as 

This is not to say that the Eurodollar mar- 
ket, or the Eurobond market, will disappear 
once controls are lifted. Considerable effi- 
ciency has been developed, and some custom- 
ers will still find it convenient to continue to 
borrow and deposit abroad. But it seems 
highly likely that a major shift will occur, 
given the cost advantage that persists. 

Today we have the need and the oppor- 
tunity to develop a stronger American role in 
world capital markets. 

We have become a service economy, with 
only 30 percent of our workers producing the 
goods that are the stuff of trade. We will 
have to increasingly pay for the energy and 
the raw materials we need from the world by 
intelligent use of our technology, our capi- 
tal, and our managerial and financial skills. 
This need to rely increasingly on capital and 
invisible exports comes at a time when we 
face increasing competition in this arena 
from Japan and Europe. But we still have 
the best skills, the greatest experience, and 
the marketplace with the greatest depth and 
liquidity. With the announcement that con- 
trols on the export of capital are to be phased 
out, it is vital for our talented financial com- 
munity to unleash itself. There will be an 
outflow of capital, but this should be offset 
by a greater repatriation of earnings from 
foreign operations as it becomes easier to 
bring new capital abroad as needed and as 
our financial community with its home base 
no longer sealed off from the world increases 
its ability to raise money for other countries. 
The Japanese are opening their capital mar- 
kets, and they have a huge supply of dollars 
to invest abroad. European markets will con- 
tinue to build domestic capital, and the pool 
of Eurodollars is unlikely to flow back to the 
United States at a rapid pace. Improved 
reporting requirements overseas have led to 


Department of State Bulletin 

jrreater investor interest and higher valua- 
tion of securities. Finally, demand for capital 
in other markets will continue because the 
recent currency disruptions and the possi- 
bility of permanent or periodic floating ex- 
change rates will encourage multinational 
and foreign companies to borrow in the 
economies where they generate cash. 

Coordination of the worldwide capital 
markets is critical to the longrun prosperity 
of domestic economies. Trade balance can be 
achieved, but financial imbalances will per- 
sist as long as speculators can isolate cur- 
rencies and capital markets. While a move 
such as floating exchange rates may prevent 
this temporarily, in the long run it must be 
accompanied by providing borrowers and 
investors with access to all capital markets. 
This in turn will require establishment of 
common standards of disclosure and coordi- 
nation of the "rules of the road" in the vari- 
ous capital markets. 

Developments in Raising Capital Abroad 

Let's look at some recent developments 
involving U.S. companies raising capital in 
foreign markets. Following the recent relax- 
ation of exchange controls and the adoption 
of the revised Japanese securities laws. Gen- 
eral Telephone and Electronics Corporation 
in October 1972, pursuant to dual registra- 
tion under the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Japanese securities laws, made a direct un- 
derwritten offering of 750,000 shares of com- 
mon stock into the Japanese market. The 
offering was underwritten on a firm basis by 
a group of Japanese underwriters. This rep- 
resented the first public equity offering by an 
American issuer in Japan. Continental Tele- 
phone Corporation followed in February of 
this year in a direct placement on a best- 
efforts underwriting basis to institutional in- 
vestors in Japan. The offering was registered 
under the Securities Act of 1933 but was not 
required to be registered under Japanese law 
because of Japan's private placement ex- 

Two investment companies domiciled in 
the United States and registered under the 

Investment Company Act of 1940 are com- 
mencing offerings in Japan. Both offerings 
are registered under the Securities Act of 
1933 and under the recently enacted "Foreign 
Investment Trust Securities" ordinance of 
Japan, a separate law relating to mutual 
funds. Both offerings utilize Japanese broker- 
dealers and/or foreign affiliates of American 
broker-dealers. The interesting feature in 
these two offerings is that they were required 
by Japanese law to use a prospectus which 
differed in some respects with the compara- 
ble U.S. prospectus. Recognizing this vari- 
ance, the Securities and Exchange Commis- 
sion (SEC) promptly took steps to facilitate 
the flow of capital by adopting a rule which 
provides, generally speaking, that a Japanese 
prospectus is deemed to comply with the in- 
formation requirements of section 10(a) of 
the Securities Act of 1933. 

Two other registration statements declared 
effective under the Securities Act of 1933 in 
January of this year involve what may be 
the forerunner of things to come. These 
statements covered 2 million and 1.5 million 
shares of common stock of Canteen Corpora- 
tion and Avis, Inc., respectively, on a firm 
underwriting commitment basis for multiple 
simultaneous offerings in the United States, 
Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda, France, Ger- 
many, the Netherlands, and the United King- 
dom. The Canteen offering in addition in- 
cluded Italy and Sweden. The foreign 
portions of the offering were underwritten by 
foreign organizations and/or foreign aflfili- 
ates of American investment bankers. 

The SEC has made other efforts to accom- 
modate both domestic and foreign issuers, in- 
cluding: the policy decision not to assume 
jurisdiction in bona fide foreign placements 
by U.S. issuei's; the insistence that registered 
investment companies offering securities 
abroad not discriminate against foreign in- 
vestors in the nature and scope of informa- 
tion and protections provided; the use of 
prospectuses by registered investment com- 
panies for foreign offerings which conform 
to the customs, usages, and laws of the domi- 
cile of the foreign company; the policy of 
not requiring compliance by foreign broker- 

April 16, 1973 


dealers under our laws in connection with 
bona fide foreign placements of American 
issuers; the case-by-case reasonable compro- 
mise of our disclosure standards under the 
Securities Act of 1933 for public offerings of 
foreign issuers; the adoption of special forms 
requiring less stringent disclosures for for- 
eign issuers who want to list securities on 
our national exchanges; the exemptions 
granted to foreign issuers from provisions of 
our rules relating to proxy solicitations, in- 
sider trading, and periodic reporting; and the 
broad exemptions granted for issuers of non- 
listed securities trading in this country from 
registration requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. These exemptions are 
conditioned on the extent of disclosure of in- 
formation required by the domicile of such 

Regulation and Reciprocity 

The financial creativity we can generate 
can bring significant amounts of foreign 
savings into our equity markets. Variable 
life insurance, now likely to come on the 
market within a year, will give people abroad 
a combination of family protection and par- 
ticipation in the American securities mar- 
kets. Legislative proposals developed by a 
task force made up from SEC, Treasury, 
State, and the Federal Reserve would make 
it possible to offer overseas investors the 
protection of our securities laws with the tax 
advantage of offshore funds. 

A trade mission of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce recently returned from Europe 
with the conviction that European investors 
are turned off by what they consider ob- 
stacles to investment in U.S. portfolio stocks. 
Examples cited include estate taxes on non- 
residents, a range of state and local taxes on 
securities trading, and regulation Q. They 
urged a comprehensive examination of the 
"statutory and regulatory maze affecting for- 
eign investment in U.S. securities." 

Families in Japan and several European 
countries save a larger slice of their income 
than we do. Japanese securities firms run 
workers' asset-formation programs or sav- 

ings plans which have created millions of 
shareholders and have made Japanese share- 
holders very close to as high a percentage of 
their population as we have developed over a 
much longer period of time. New money 
coming into our capital markets is accounted 
for by pension plans. President Nixon's pro- 
posal to provide tax deductions for amounts 
saved by individuals for their personal pen- 
sions can give an enormous lift to our rate 
of capital formation and our ability to take 
the leadership in the developing global secu- 
rities market. 

There are important questions of regula- 
tion and reciprocity to resolve. Should we 
give foreign brokers membership on or access 
to our exchanges? Should we condition this 
on our broker getting access to foreign mar- 
kets, and do we have the legal power to re- 
quire this? 

Are we trading a watermelon for a grape 
if we admit Swiss banks to the New York 
Exchange in exchange for admitting Merrill 
Lynch to Zurich ? Is it fair to permit German 
banks to carry on a securities business in the 
LTnited States which would be illegal for 
American banks? Will the ability of foreign 
brokers and banks to perform brokerage 
functions in the United States for European 
investors undercut the ability of over 200 
American brokerage offices abroad to market 
U.S. securities abroad? 

What are the problems of regulating and 
enforcing our standards against foreign 
banks which perform brokerage services as 
well as underwrite and invest in companies? 

These are very sticky questions, and a 
comprehensive review of policy considera- 
tions and the authority to deal with them is 
needed. I hope we will soon get some recom- 
mendations from the committees on interna- 
tional investment which the New York Stock 
Exchange and the Securities Industry As- 
sociation have established. 

Accounting and Disclosure Standards 

An international capital market calls for 
some degree of commonality in accounting 
standards between nations if investor under- 


Department of State Bulletin 


standing is to be developed. The formidable 
task of achieving some acceptable level of 
accounting uniformity on an international 
basis is being undertaken on several fronts. 
There is an International Accounting Study 
Group consisting of Canadian. United King- 
dom, and United States independent public 
accountants. The European Community has 
several bodies engaged in developing interna- 
tional standards for member nations. There 
have been an increasing number of inter- 
national conferences on international ac- 
counting and financial reporting. A number 
of accounting firms from various nations are 
joining together for the purpose of develop- 
ing internationally acceptable standards of 
practice. Government agencies from various 
countries have met with the SEC to compare 
capital market controls, to discuss reciprocity 
for foreign accountants practicing in their 
respective countries, and to initiate the de- 
velopment of mutually acceptable standards 
and practices. 

The SEC has accepted the financial state- 
ments of foreign registrations as long as they 
meet its requirements through supplemental 
disclosure, rather than requiring adjustment 
of financial statements. It has accepted the 
certification of foreign auditors vi^here ex- 
pertise in generally accepted U.S. accounting 
principles was displayed and where there 
were no problems in meeting our standards 
of independence. 

A developing system of comparable laws 
and accounting standards has made possible 
the beginning of a truly international market 
as evidenced by the emergence of mixed un- 
derwriting syndicates involving North Amer- 
ican, European, South American, and Asian 
investment bankers. This has made possible 
larger issues of securities for simultaneous 
placement in international markets. We are 
seeing the dual listing of securities in 
international markets and the increased 
interchange of participations of financial 
institutions of one nation in the institutions 
of others. 

For the full development of a truly inter- 
national securities market, we need work 

toward the establishment of uniform inter- 
national standards of minimum disclosure. 
This will entail increased endeavors on the 
part of all nations to cooperate and to accom- 
modate their national requirements to this 
common objective. The continuing efforts of 
the Eurojjean Community in attempting to 
establish uniform regulations and directives 
in the areas of stock exchange listing, the 
issuance of new securities, and the periodic 
reporting of financial and other business in- 
formation to investors show the way. The 
Community's eflPorts to e.stablish a "European 
Company" is an important step. Similar 
efforts are going on within the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
to develop international harmonization of 
standards for investor protection for the 
member nations. The OECD presently has 
under consideration a model "Standard Rule 
for the Operations of Institutions for Collec- 
tive Investment" (mutual funds) and is 
working on listing standards. 

We need work to remove investment re- 
strictions, which can be just as damaging to 
our national economic interests as trade re- 
strictions. With our capital-export restric- 
tions going off and with Japanese and Middle 
East money on the prowl around the world 
with lai'ge accumulations of dollars, I would 
hope that Europe would no longer feel the 
need to conserve its capital by restricting 
capital exports. Japan, by limiting capital 
imports, has forced U.S. firms to license 
technology which might have been exploited 
to greater advantage packaged with an in- 
vestment. Investment restrictions have im- 
paired our trade with Japan by limiting our 
marketing and servicing facilities in that 

The emergence of international capital and 
trading markets necessitates the recognition 
of international i)ublic interest and the need 
for international investor protection. The 
challenge is now before us, and only through 
multinational cooperative efforts will we be 
able to effectively meet it by generating the 
level of capital formation and capital mobil- 
ity needed to maintain economic progress in 
our own country and around the world. 

April 16, 1973 


Major Trading Nations Agree 
on New Monetary Measures 

Following are press communiques issued 
at Paris March 9 and 16 at the conclusion of 
meetings of the Finance Ministers and Cen- 
tral Bank Governors of major trading 


Unofficial text 

1. The Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 
the ten countries participating in the General 
Arrangements to Borrow' met in Paris on 9th March, 
1973, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, the Minister of the Economy and of 
Finance of France. Mr. P.-P. Schweitzer, Managing 
Director of the International Monetary Fund, took 
part in the meeting, which was also attended by Mr. 
Nello Celio, head of the Federal Department of 
Finance of the Swiss Confederation, Mr. E. Stopper, 
President of the Swiss National Bank, Mr. Francois- 
Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commission of the 
European Economic Community, Mr. E. van Lennep, 
Secretary-General of the Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development and Mr. Rene Larre, 
General Manager of the Bank for International 

Mr. Ali Wardhana, President of the Committee of 
Twenty of the International Monetary Fund, was 
specially invited to participate in this meeting. 

2. They examined the international monetary sit- 
uation in the light of the present crisis and had a 
broad exchange of views both on the origins of the 
crisis and on ways of dealing with it in a spirit of 

3. They agreed that the crisis was due to specula- 
tive movements of funds. They also agreed that the 
existing relationships between parities and central 
rates, following the recent re-alig:nment, correspond, 
in their view, to the economic requirements and that 
these relationships will make an effective monetary 
contribution to a better balance of international pay- 
ments. In these circumstances they unanimously ex- 
pressed their determination to ensure jointly an 
orderly exchange rate system. 

4. The Ministers and Governors are agreed that. 

1 The Group of Ten comprises six of the member 
countries of the European Economic Community 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom), as well as four other 
countries (Canada, Japan, Sweden and the United 
States). The other three member countries of the 
E.E.C., Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg, also 
participated in this meeting. [Footnote in original.] 

for this purpose, a set of measures needs to be 
drawn up. 

5. The formulation of these measures requires a 
technical study which they have instructed their 
Deputies to undertake forthwith. 

6. The Ministers and Governors have decided to 
meet again on Friday, 16th March, to draw joint 
conclusions on the basis of this study and take the j 
decisions which are called for, so as to make it i 
possible for the E.E.C. countries and Sweden to, i 
re-open their exchange markets on Monday, 19th , 
March. I 

7. Finally, the Ministers and Governors considered , 
that the recent disturbances underline the urgent , 
need for an effective reform of the international | 
monetary system. They decided to take the neces- 
sary steps to accelerate the work of the Committee 
of Twenty of the International Monetary Fund. 


Unofficial text 

1. The Ministers and Central Bank Governors of 
the ten countries participating in the General Ar- 
rangements to Borrow and the member countries 
of the European Economic Community met in Paris 
on 16th March, 1973 under the Chairmanship of Mr. 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Minister of the Economy 
and of Finance of France. Mr. P.-P. Schweitzer, 
Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund, took part in the meeting, which was also 
attended by Mr. Nello Celio, head of the Federal 
Department of Finance of the Swiss Confederation, 
Mr. E. Stopper, President of the Swiss National 
Bank, Mr. W. Haferkamp, Vice-President of the 
Commission of the European Economic Community, 
Mr. E. van Lennep, Secretary General of the Or- 
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment, Mr. Rene Larre, General Manager of the 
Bank for International Settlements, and Mr. Jeremy 
Morse, Chairman of the Deputies of the Committee 
of Twenty of the I.M.F. 

2. The Ministers and Governors heard a report 
by the Chairman of their Deputies, Mr. Rinaldo 
Ossola, on the results of the technical study which 
the Deputies have carried out in accordance with the 
instructions given to them. 

3. The Ministers and Governors took note of the 
decisions of the members of the E.E.C. announced on 
Monday. Six members of the E.E.C. and certain 
other European countries, including Sweden, will 
maintain 2% per cent margins between their cur- 
rencies. The currencies of certain countries, such as 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan and 
Canada remain, for the time being, floating. How- 
ever, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland have 
expressed the intention of associating themselves 
as soon as possible with the decision to maintain 
E.E.C. exchange rates within margins of 2% per 


Department of State Bulletin 

cent and meanwhile of remaining in consultation 
with their E.E.C. partners. 

4. The Ministers and Governors reiterated their 
determination to ensure jointly an orderly exchange 
rate system. To this end, they agreed on the basis 
for an operational approach towards the exchange 
markets in the near future and on certain further 
studies to be completed as a matter of urgency. 

5. They agreed in principle that official interven- 
tion in exchange markets may be useful at appro- 
priate times to facilitate the maintenance of orderly 
conditions, keeping in mind also the desirability of 
encouraging reflows of speculative movements of 
funds. Each nation stated that it will be prepared 
to intervene at its initiative in its own market, 
when necessary and desirable, acting in a flexible 
manner in the light of market conditions and in 
close consultation with the authorities of the na- 
tion whose currency may be bought or sold. The 
countries which have decided to maintain 2Vi per 
cent margins between their currencies have made 
known their intention of concerting among them- 
selves the application of these provisions. Such inter- 
vention will be financed, when necessary, through 
use of mutual credit facilities. To ensure fully 
adequate resources for such operations, it is en- 
visaged that some of the existing "swap" facilities 
will be enlarged. 

6. Some countries have announced additional 
measures to restrain capital inflows. The United 
States authorities emphasized that the phasing out 
of their controls on longer-term capital outflows 
by the end of 1974 was intended to coincide with 
strong improvement in the U.S. balance-of-payments 
position. Any steps taken during the interim period 
toward the elimination of these controls would take 
due account of exchange market conditions and the 
balance-of-payments trends. The U.S. authorities 
are also reviewing actions that may be appropriate 
to remove inhibitions on the inflow of capital into 
the United States. Countries in a strong payments 
position will review the possibility of removing or 
relaxing any restrictions on capital outflows, par- 
ticularly long-term. 

7. Ministers and Governors noted the importance 
of dampening speculative capital movements. They 
stated their intention to seek more complete under- 
standing of the sources and nature of the large 
capital flows which have recently taken place. With 
respect to Euro-currency markets, they agreed that 

methods of reducing the volatility of these markets 
will be studied intensively, taking into account the 
implications for the longer run operation of the in- 
ternational monetary system. These studies will ad- 
dress themselves, among other factors, to limitations 
on placement of official reserves in that market by 
member nations of the IMF and to the possible need 
for reserve requirements comparable to those in 
national banking markets. With respect to the 
former, the Ministers and Governors confirmed that 
their authorities would be prepared to take the lead 
by implementing certain undertakings that their 
own placements would be gradually and prudently 
withdrawn. The United States will review possi- 
ble action to encourage a flow of Euro-currency 
funds to the United States as market conditions 

8. In the context of discussions of monetary 
reform, the Ministers and Governors agreed that 
proposals for funding or consolidation of official cur- 
rency balances deserved thorough and urgent atten- 
tion. This matter is already on the agenda of the 
Committee of Twenty of the IMF. 

9. Ministers and Governors reaffirmed their at- 
tachment to the basic principles which have gov- 
erned international economic relations since the 
last war — the greatest possible freedom for inter- 
national trade and investment and the avoidance of 
competitive changes of exchange rates. They stated 
their determination to continue to use the existing 
organisations of international economic co-operation 
to maintain these principles for the benefit of all 
their members. 

10. Ministers and Governors expressed their 
unanimous conviction that international monetary 
stability rests, in the last analysis, on the success of 
national efforts to contain inflation. They are re- 
solved to pursue fully appropriate policies to this 

11. Ministers and Governors are confident that, 
taken together, these moves will launch an interna- 
tionally responsible programme for dealing with the 
speculative pressures that have recently emerged and 
for maintaining orderly international monetary ar- 
rangements, while the work of reform of the in- 
ternational monetary system is pressed ahead. They 
reiterated their concern that this work be expedited 
and brought to an early conclusion in the framework 
of the Committee of Twenty of the IMF. 

April 16, 1973 


The Realities of United States-Africa Relations 

Address by David D. Netvsom 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs^ 

The Commonwealth is probably the 
world's largest and most significant unde- 
fined organization. Similarly the relationship 
between the United States and the Common- 
wealth is undefined and, in some ways, spe- 

As a member of the first staff of the 
American Embassy in Karachi in 1947, I was 
in at the beginning of the new Common- 
wealth. I have followed its fascinating his- 
tory since then. I, together with many of my 
fellow countrymen, have admired the unique 
contribution that the Commonwealth and 
the ties between members of the Common- 
wealth have made to the history of this last 
quarter century. 

Today I wish to speak to you about the 
relationship of the United States to Africa. 
It is most appropriate that I do so in this 
Commonwealth atmosphere since this rela- 
tionship involves not only key African mem- 
bers of the Commonwealth but also a whole 
series of questions posed for Africa by the 
association of the United Kingdom with the 
Common Market. 

The U.S. relationship to Africa is both old 
and new. It has been both romantic and real- 
istic. It has been both positive and negative. 

Central to our relationship to Africa is 
the ethnic tie, the enforced migration to 
America of slaves, largely from the west 
African areas of Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo, 
and Ghana. 

One of the most neglected realities of 

' Made before the Royal Commonwealth Society at 
London on Mar. 14. 

American history is the fact that our nation 
started out as a multiracial society. Nearly 
one-fifth of the persons living in America be- 
fore the American Revolution were of Afri- 
can descent. The census of 1790, virtually 
the first national act required of the Federal 
Government by the new Constitution, 
counted 3,929,000 persons, of whom 757,000 
were black, including some 60,000 freemen 
and 697,000 slaves. 

The enormous waves of immigrants from 
Europe in the 19th century and the early 
20th century tended to diminish the propor- 
tion of all of the original groups in the total 
population, but persons of African descent 
still form about 11 percent of our population. 
In their search for their roots in Africa, and 
for their identity as Afro-Americans, and in 
their contribution to our own and world cul- 
ture lie much of the dynamism of my coun- 
try's link with Africa. 

The existence of our own civil rights 
problems means, also, that the complex issues 
of southern Africa are seen, whether rightly 
or wrongly, as mirrors or extensions of our 
own racial difficulties. There is consequently 
among both blacks and whites a special at- 
tention to these problems. There exists, not 
unnaturally, the same divergence of opinion 
toward these problems that one finds toward 
our own domestic issues. 

The black community's interest in Africa 
goes back to the early 19th century when 
freed slaves, with the help of white contri- 
butions, formed the American Colonization 
Society to found settlements in west Africa 


Department of State Bulletin 

which eventually became the Republic of 
Liberia. Still today, the nation of Liberia, 
while not tied to the United States in any 
political way, remains a special symbol of 
our links with Africa. 

The 19th century saw the romantic period. 
Americans followed with fascination and ad- 
miration the adventures of European mis- 
sionaries and explorers making their way 
into "the dark continent." Henry M. Stan- 
ley's exploits brought the African scene 
closer to home. The first U.S. missionary ac- 
tivities in black Africa began in the early 
1800's in Liberia and Sierra Leone. 

American trade with Africa began in the 
very early days of our Republic as clipper 
ships from Massachusetts rounded the Cape 
of Good Hope seeking spices and timber in 
east Africa and beyond. We signed a treaty 
with Zanzibar and Muscat in 1832. 

African Expectations of the United States 

As political movements began in Africa in 
the 20th century, their leaders found special 
interest in the history of the American 
colonies — if you will forgive me — in their 
struggle for freedom. The writings of Paine, 
Jefferson, and others struck responsive 
chords. Some of the dissimilarities were 
overlooked and the similarities seized upon. 

Many of the political leaders in independ- 
ent Africa were educated in the United 
States — Nkrumah of Ghana, Banda of Ma- 
lawi, and Azikiwe of Nigeria. 

The result of these ties was that African 
nations entered their independence with 
great expectations of the United States. 

With knowledge of the Marshall plan still 
fresh in the minds of many African leaders, 
there was expectation that the United States 
would provide massive assistance to Africa. 

With an awareness of the writings of the 
early Americans and of Lincoln, there was 
the expectation that we would take the lead 
in supporting the struggle for independence 
in Africa. Strong sentiments on existing in- 
dependence movements were expressed fre- 
quently in the United States, giving further 
support to this expectation. 

A knowledge of the power and wealth of 
the Ihiited States fed expectation of a degree 
of influence that could, if it wished, change 
the internal policies of African governments 
and right the wrongs of colonialism and 

Each of these positive expectations had, 
in a sense, a reverse side. 

The fact that Africans identified with 
America's support for independence fed con- 
cern among expatriates and former colonial 
powers that we were out to replace them. 

Natural rivalries of commercial competi- 
tion served further to feed these anxieties 
about our intention. 

The image of the wealth of the United 
States held by some Africans served to 
create apprehensions regarding the exercise 
of that wealth. The United States became 
feared — and envied. 

The impressions of U.S. influence, sparked 
by such books as "The Invisible Govern- 
ment," gave rise to fears and allegations of 
U.S. political manipulation. The CIA became 
an ogre and a symbol. 

Bases of U.S. Policies Toward Africa 

The last few years have been spent getting 
the United States and its relationship with 
Africa in focus. Particularly has this been 
true during the past four years, when, in the 
words of President Nixon, we have sought a 
relationship of candor: - 

Africa's friends must find a new tone of candor 
in their essential dialogue with the Continent. All 
too often over the past decade the United States 
and others have been guilty of telling proud young 
nations, in misguided condescension, only what we 
thought they wanted to hear. But I know from many 
talks with Africans, including two trips to the 
Continent in 1957 and 1967, that Africa's new lead- 
ers are pragmatic and practical as well as proud, 
realistic as well as idealistic. It will be a test of 
diplomacy for all concerned to face squarely common 
problems and differences of view. The United States 
will do all it can to establish this new dialogue. 

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, ap- 
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the section 
entitled "Africa" begins on p. 305. 

April 16, 1973 


Our policies toward Africa rest, to start 
with, on a clear definition of U.S. interests 
in Africa. 

First, there is the historic and ethnic in- 
terest in Africa. While in many ways the 
black groups in America still concentrate al- 
most totally on domestic issues and have not 
yet developed a visibly effective constituency 
for Africa, the interest is there. No Amer- 
ican policy toward Africa can ignore this 
deep and growing interest in a meaningful 
relationship to the continent by so large a 
group of our citizens. 

Secondly, and closely tied to the first, is 
the keen interest in the humanity of Africa 
on the part of blacks and many whites. 
Whether it be a problem of famine or war or 
a problem of human rights, the American 
policymaker is continually made conscious of 
the strong empathy which exists toward 

More traditional diplomatic and economic 
interests also exist. As a major power, we 
desire effective diplomatic access to the gov- 
ernments of Africa, representing as they do 
almost one-third of the members of the 
United Nations. In full recognition of the 
sensitive nationalism of the newly independ- 
ent nations, we desire fair opportunities for 
trade and investment. 

The United States does not desire — even if 
it had the capabilities and resources to do so 
— to replace the former colonial powers in 
trade and economic relations with the Afri- 
can nations. We appreciate and wish to be 
responsive to the desire of the African na- 
tions to diversify their economic relations. 
We continue to believe, however, that the 
traditional ties of language, education, and 
business that link these nations with the 
metropole nations in Europe are important 
to both partners, and to the extent each de- 
sires to retain them, they should be en- 

The question frequently is raised, particu- 
larly on this side of the Atlantic, of the U.S. 
military interest in Africa. We count this a 
lesser interest. We have two remaining mili- 
tary communications stations in Africa 

which we shall presumably need until tech- 
nology makes them unnecessary. We recog- 
nize the importance to Europe of the cape 
route; we do not, however, give this interest 
priority over other more direct concerns in 

Response to African Interests and Concerns 

The pursuit of the interests of any nation 
in Africa requires, also, an understanding of 
African interests and concerns. No policies 
are going to be effective which fail to take 
these into account and to seek in some meas- 
ure to be responsive. 

From my own frequent travels in Africa 
and my own discussions with African lead- 
ers, I would define African interests as 
three: nationbuilding and true sovereignty, 
survival and development, and a resolution 
of the inequities of southern Africa. 

American policies seek meaningful re- 
sponses to each of these African concerns. 

There is the strongest desire among Afri- 
cans to build the nations inherited from the 
colonial era, with boundaries fixed by that 
era, and with institutions compatible with 
the customs and traditions of the peoples. We 
recognize that there have been and will be 
changes in the institutions left behind by 
the colonial powers. We accept that there 
will be variety in forms of government and 
philosophies and that we can deal with na- 
tions, regardless of their institutions, on a 
basis of mutual respect and common interest. 

We recognize that Africans do not wish to 
be pawns in a great-power conflict. We ac- 
cept their relations with all nations. We ask 
only that they be true to their nonalignment 
in the balanced treatment and understanding 
they give to all. We do not accept that there 
can be a double standard according to which 
the United States can be condemned for cer- 
tain actions while other nations are not. 
Neither do we accept that African nations 
can turn blind eyes to human disaster within 
their own continent while seeking the con- 
demnation of others. 

In an African Continent understandably 
sensitive on the issue of sovereignty, we 


Department of State Bulletin 

Americans have had a special m>i:h to over- 
come: the myth of manipulation. I hope that 
this is dead. I hope that we have been able to 
convince the African ofovernments that we 
are not involved in any way in seeking to de- 
termine how they are governed or by whom. 

African leaders understandably are pre- 
occupied with critical economic problems. 
Many search for the resources needed for de- 
velopment. Others, less fortunate, search for 
the resources needed for survival. Sixteen of 
the poorest countries of the world are in 

I will not deny that the response to 
Africa's economic needs has presented us 
with some very difficult problems. As I 
pointed out, African expectations of what we 
might i^rovide were high. We have not come 
up to those expectations. 

Assistance, Investment, and Trade 

As Americans, however, coming late into 
the scene in Africa, we feel that we have 
made a substantia] and meaningful contri- 
bution to African development. Bilateral 
assistance, both that given directly in coun- 
try programs and that provided on a regional 
basis, has been maintained at approximately 
the same level through the past 10 years: 
about $350 million per year. If one adds an- 
other $200 million provided annually through 
international institutions such as the United 
Nations Development Program and the 
World Bank, the U.S. contribution repre- 
sents about 20 percent of all aid going to 

In attempting to assert their independence 
from the developed countries, which are the 
major suppliers of traditional aid, the Afri- 
can countries are seeking increased control 
over investment and assured market condi- 
tions for their primary commodities. As a 
major supplier of foreign investment and 
consumer of primary products, the United 
States has an important interest in these 
matters as well. With each side looking at 
these matters from its own perspective, how- 
ever, there is not always an identity of per- 
ceived national interests. 

The United States strongly believes that 
private foreign investment, as a carrier of 
technology, of trade opportunities, and of 
capital itself, and as a mobilizer of domestic 
resources, in turn becomes a major factor in 
promoting economic development. Another 
factor is the increasing need of the United 
States for energy sources and other primary 
resources, an important share of which will 
come from Africa. 

Yet the terms on which private capital will 
accept investment risk in African countries 
at times conflict with the strong desire of 
the African nations for a greater share in 
both the equity and management of invest- 
ment projects. 

Terms such as "Africanization" and "na- 
tionalization" frighten some investors. They 
are considered to be political necessities in 
many parts of Africa. Fortunately, the re- 
sult, so far in Africa, has been in most cases 
a sincere effort to find, through negotiations, 
ways to meet the needs and respected rights 
of both parties. I detect in American busi- 
ness a greater recognition of the desire of a 
number of African states for participation 
in investment. I detect in many African 
countries a greater recognition of the impor- 
tant and beneficial role played by the private 
foreign investor. I hope both trends continue. 

African countries such as Ghana and the 
Ivory Coast, with a heavy dependence upon 
single agricultural commodities, have pressed 
for international commodity agreements, 
particularly in coffee and cocoa. They have 
received strong support from Latin America. 

The United States played a leading role in 
negotiating the first International Coffee 
Agreement in 1962 and has played a leading 
role in supporting that agreement. For most 
of its period, the agreement operated in the 
interests of both producers and consumers, 
since it was designed to meet the particular 
circumstances which obtained at that time. 
On cocoa, we were active participants in the 
long series of negotiations which led to con- 
clusion of an agreement last fall. We did not 
sign it, however, because we believe it is seri- 
ously flawed and may not achieve its purpose 
of stabilizing cocoa prices and earnings. 

April 16, 1973 


With regard to commodity trade in gen- 
eral, we see a growing need for attacks on 
the underlying problems and for new ap- 
proaches which are not trade restrictive, but 
trade creating in nature. We will, however, 
continue to consider proposals for traditional 
commodity agreements on a case-by-case 

Next year will be the year of a renegotia- 
tion of the Yaounde Convention linking the 
European Community to Africa. Already 
consultations have started on how the Anglo- 
phone countries will fit into the older ar- 
rangements. Both trade and aid are involved. 
The United States recognizes the importance 
of the Yaounde Convention to the African 
signatories. At the same time, we strongly 
oppose the system of special and reverse tar- 
iff preferences which forms a part of the 
present agreements. In this we are not alone. 
Canada and Japan oppose these reverse pref- 
erences, and we note that African countries 
increasingly are questioning their desira- 

While our trade with Africa does not com- 
pare with more traditional suppliers and 
markets, we strongly believe that Africa will 
benefit if it is open to all on a nondiscrimina- 
tory basis. This, too, is a critical and difficult 
element in our response to Africa's economic 

U.S. Approach to Southern African Issues 

This leaves our response to the third Afri- 
can preoccupation — the complex issues of 
southern Africa. These issues pose very spe- 
cial problems for the Commonwealth, as they 
do for us. 

The American attitude toward this area is 
clear. It was defined in President Nixon's 
foreign policy report of 1972 in these words: ^ 

As I have repeatedly made clear, I share the 
conviction that the United States cannot be 
indifferent to racial policies which violate our na- 
tional ideals and constitute a direct affront to Amer- 

'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap- 
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972: the section 
entitled "Africa" begins on p. 363. 

ican citizens. As a nation, we cherish and have 
worked arduously toward the goal of equality of 
opportunity for all Americans. It is incumbent on 
us to support and encourage these concepts abroad, 
and to do what we can to forestall violence across 
international frontiers. 

In our approach to the issues of southern 
Africa, we proceed on several premises. 
First, in this day and age, the influence of 
any nation, however powerful, in the internal 
affairs of another is severely limited. The 
idea that the United States by any action — 
including the use of economic and military 
force, if that were realistic — could bring 
about fundamental changes in another soci- 
ety is without foundation. We certainly can- 
not do it in southern Africa. If change comes, 
it must come primarily from within. 

Secondly, the United States cannot pursue 
policies which simply accept the situation in 
southern Africa as it is, or contribute to its 
perpetuation, nor those which endorse vio- 
lence as a means to change. Consequently, we 
conscientiously pursue an arms embargo 
policy toward all sides in both South Africa 
and the Portuguese territories. We exercise 
restraint in our commercial and government- 
financing activities in both. 

Thirdly, we believe that if we are to con- 
tribute meaningfully to change in the area, 
it is not through the pressure of isolation 
but through keeping open the doors of 
communication with all elements of the popu- 
lation, particularly in South Africa. If peace- 
ful change is to come, in our view, it will 
come through a general recognition of the 
unacceptability of present policies in those 
areas brought about by continuing contact 
with the world outside. 

Certain special problems arise. 
One commonly held idea in the United 
States is that official insistence on the with- 
drawal of our private investment in South 
Africa would bring effective pressure for 
change. We do not think so. Our investment 
represents only 16 percent of the total for- 
eign investment in South Africa. It is closely 
interlinked with South African interests. It 
is doubtful that it could be repatriated, even 
if we decreed it. It is not only our view, but 


Department of State Bulletin 

also that of many black South Africans, that 
it is far better to encourage those firms 
which are there to lead the way to upgrradino- 
the work and social conditions of the non- 
white labor force. This we do. 

Rhodesia, as you all well know, represents 
a special case. Except for the symbolically 
significant but economically insignificant 
breach of Rhodesian sanctions by the action 
of our Congress, we fully support the eco- 
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia and believe 
they are having an effect. We are deeply con- 
scious of the grave problem the Rhodesian 
situation presents for our British friends. 
We hope that your patience will yet find a 
way of getting black and white in Rhodesia 
together for a workable solution. 

The United Nations is another special 
situation. The problems of southern Africa 
are discussed frequently at the United 
Nations, and action is sought increasingly 
that exceeds the ability of the organization 
to implement. 

While s\Tnpathetic with the objectives of 
many of the resolutions, the United States 
does not find that it can support what it con- 
siders unworkable resolutions, sometimes 
based on unfair judgments. Such resolutions 
also frequently raise questions of precedents 
and budget which further prevent our sup- 
port. By the simple vote, we sometimes ap- 
pear to be anti-African when the issues are 
far more complex. 

The United States does welcome and sup- 

port those efforts which emerge within the 
United Nations to bring about discussions 
between the parties directly concerned with 
these problems. 

Such an effort is that undertaken by Secre- 
tary General Waldheim on Namibia. An ef- 
fort was implied in the vote in December in 
the Security Council on the Portuguese ter- 
ritories, but has yet to come to fruition. In 
our view, whatever the fate of the liberation 
approach, talks must ultimately come be- 
tween those involved in the problem. How- 
ever frail may be the chances, we hope ways 
can be found to start. 

To the nations of the Commonwealth, as 
to the United States, the African Continent 
has a special significance. In that continent 
are the last hard-core problems of achieving 
self-determination, problems which have 
both built and divided the Commonwealth. 
In that continent lie continuing problems of 
human dignity and human rights, of such 
great concern to all our peoples. 

I should like to assure you today that the 
United States recognizes these problems and 
the need for their solution. The United States 
is neither "neglecting" Africa nor giving it 
a "low priority." Out of the conflicting pres- 
sures for policies and resources upon and 
within a major nation, the United States 
seeks to respect Africa's independence, to be 
responsive to Africa's needs, and to stand 
ready realistically to be helpful in furthering 
trends of change. 

April 16, 1973 


German-American Economic and Commercial Relations 
in the Atlantic Community 

Address by Martin J. Hillenbrand 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany^ 

I take particular pleasure in addressing 
you this evening since this meeting seems to 
me to be a most appropriate forum in which 
to thank our host, the Steuben-Schurz Gesell- 
schaft, for its generous donation to the 
American school of a language laboratory. 
I have of course been long familiar with this 
organization, and I welcome the opportunity 
of expressing my appreciation of this latest 
example of the society's role in cultivating 
the special relationship which has existed 
between our two countries over the last 25 

Throughout this period a broad sharing of 
objectives between the Federal Republic and 
the United States, with our close cooperation 
in their pursuit, has been a key factor in 
some landmark achievements in Atlantic re- 
lations : the recovery of western Europe from 
wartime destruction, the maintenance of its 
security through a strong alliance, and the 
promotion of its prosperity and political 
strength through European integration and 
the growth of freer international trade and 

Today this Atlantic relationship is faced 
with a new challenge in the form of a num- 
ber of economic imbalances, the adjustment 
of which has become imperative. In this 
process of adjustment we will need to draw 
on the elements of strength and stability in 
U.S.-European relations, including the broad 
area of understanding between our two coun- 

' Made before the Steub«B-Schurz Gesellschaft at 
Dusseldorf on Mar. 8. 

tries. We need initiative on the part of our 
major friends and allies in Europe in rectify- 
ing, rather than merely living with, persist- 
ing and unsustainable imbalances. 

The words "friends," "partners," and 
"allies" are not heard enough during these 
days when the public media try to enliven 
their stories from the drab world of eco- 
nomics with images of rivalry and competi- 
tion, trade "wars," and "attacks" on the 
dollar. I find these images of rivals, winners, 
and losers to be both inaccurate and unfor- 
tunate. They tend to obscure not only the 
common nature of our problems but also the 
interdependence of our fate in dealing with 
them. Whatever the problems of the moment 
may be, we cannot lose sight of the fact that 
the major objectives of Europe and Amer- 
ica — security and prosperity in particular — 
are most likely to be ones that we will both 
attain, or fall short of, together. Nations on 
both sides of the imbalances of today's in- 
ternational economy have, in fact, a single 
problem. The balance of payments surplus 
country, for example, has an urgent adjust- 
ment problem that it shares with deficit 
countries. And failure to deal with this prob- 
lem threatens domestic policy objectives of 
the surplus country just as it does in the case 
of the deficit country. 

If we can look for a moment beyond the 
problem of the recent speculative crisis, I 
would like to discuss somewhat longer range 
tasks that need to be faced on the way to a 
more stable international economic system. 
These are: artificial barriers and inflexibili- 


Department of State Bulletin 


ties which impede the adjustment process; 
the U.S. -European Community relationship; 
and reform of the international monetaiy 

Slow Response to New Price Relationships 

Recent monetary adjustments, combined 
with U.S. success in holding down inflation, 
have brought about a sharp change in price 
relationships between Europe and America — 
a change which is painfully apparent to 
Americans living in Europe. Yet investment 
and trade flows have not yet responded 
strongly to these changed relationships, in 
part because the process of change is en- 
cumbered by many artificial barriers and 

In investment matters the barriers to 
change seem to be as much a matter of atti- 
tude and inertia as anything else. European 
firms have stuck to the course of producing 
in Europe for export to America. They have 
clung to this pattern even in the face of 
rapidly rising costs in Europe. Now, after 
dollar devaluation, we find some European 
firms struggling still harder to maintain the 
old pattern, even at the expense of taking 
much lower profit margins on export sales 
than sales at home. In the past week we have 
again seen some major German exporters 
raising their dollar prices by little more than 
their deutsche mark (DM) prices, absorbing 
much of the devaluation in their margin of 

At some point European businessmen may 
realize that such price decisions, as reason- 
able as they may have looked in isolation at 
the time, may represent a missed opportu- 
nity. I would hope that many European pro- 
ducers will take a longer term look at their 
cost situation and consider seriously whether 
the most profitable way to sell to America is 
not now to produce in America. My govern- 
ment encourages such investment. 

Dollars to buy plant, labor, and raw ma- 
terials in the United States would now cost 
the German investor considerably less than 
they would have two years ago. Also, the rate 
of price increases in the United States has 
for some time been lower than in Europe, 
including the Federal Republic. We antici- 

pate that this year the rate of price increases 
in the United States will again be several 
percentage points below that in Europe. One 
would expect that the response of investment 
flows to this trend could be one of the most 
significant results of currency realignment 
in 1971 and 1973. 

Trade imbalances are another area where 
adjustments cannot be achieved on the ex- 
change rate side alone if inertia and direct 
barriers neutralize the effect of price changes 
— as they do for some of the key farm ex- 
ports of the United States. The United States 
continues to have a serious trade deficit, in- 
cluding a very large bilateral deficit with the 
Federal Republic. According to F.R.G. statis- 
tics, the United States in 1971 had a trade 
deficit with the Federal Republic of Germany 
of approximately DM 700 million; in 1972 
this trade deficit widened to approximately 
DM 3 billion. As I'm sure you are aware, pro- 
motion of American exports now has a very 
high priority among the tasks performed by 
our six consulates general in Germany, as 
well as being the function of our trade cen- 
ter in Frankfurt. Our experience with this 
trade promotion program has made evident 
the difficulty with which a comparative eco- 
nomic advantage is translated into dollars 
and cents. Although substantial lags must be 
expected in realizing shifts in trade flows 
from currency realignments, an increase in 
U.S. exports to Germany may well become 
apparent by the end of this year. 

Tasks Before the U.S. and the Community 

To an increasing degree, the economic re- 
lationship between the Federal Republic and 
the United States has been overshadowed by 
the relationship between the United States 
and the European Community. This broader 
relationship, in which the Federal Republic 
plays a key part, will have a strong effect 
on the bilateral relationship. 

Monetary and trade negotiations scheduled 
for this year are expected to result in funda- 
mental changes in the environment in which 
the Community and the United States inter- 
act. The objectives and political importance 
of these negotiations have been well recog- 
nized on both sides of the Atlantic. 

April 16, 1973 


In the communique following the enlarged 
Community summit meeting in October of 
last year, the European leaders stated that: 

. . . the Community is determined, in order to 
ensure the harmonious development of world trade: 

— To contribute, while respecting what has been 
achieved by the Community, to a progressive lib- 
eralisation of international trade by measures based 
on reciprocity and relating to both tariffs and non- 
tariff barriers; 

— To maintain a constructive dialogue with the 
United States, Japan, Canada and its other indus- 
trialized trade partners in a forthcoming spirit, 
using the most appropriate methods. 

In this context the Community attaches major 
importance to the multilateral negotiations in the 
context of G.A.T.T. [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade] in which it will participate in accordance 
with its earlier statement. 

President Nixon responded to this summit 
declaration on October 27, as follows : - 

... I particularly welcome the Community's de- 
clared intent to maintain a constructive, forthcoming 
dialogue with us and its commitment to a progres- 
sive liberalization of tariff and nontariff barriers 
to trade on a comprehensive basis during the major 
multilateral negotiations to begin next year. 

On behalf of the United States, I wish to reaffirm 
our commitment to work with the members of the 
European Community for reform of the interna- 
tional economic system in a way which will bring 
about a new freedom of world trade, new equity in 
international economic conduct, and effective solu- 
tions to the problems of the developing world. 

These are the objectives with which the United 
States will approach forthcoming negotiations' on 
monetary and trade reform. We will be prepared 
to take bold action with our European partners 
for a more equitable and open world economic 
order. . . . 

From this exchange, it is clear that the 
negotiations we are now engaged in on trade 
and monetary reform have a dual purpose. 
They have the classic one of increasing pros- 
perity through the more efficient exchange of 
goods and services that takes place under 
conditions of liberal trade. This has been a 
major objective of the successive rounds of 
trade negotiations since the thirties which 
have reduced the tariffs between the United 

States and Europe by 75 percent. But there 
is a political objective as well: that of draw- 
ing the Western world more closely together 
in a stable and equitable structure of eco- 
nomic activity which would help, rather than 
hinder, the world's movement toward order 
and security. As the President put it in his 
address to the last annual meeting of the 
International Monetary Fund and World 
Bank : ^ 

We must make certain that international com- 
merce becomes a source of stability and harmony, 
rather than a cause of friction and animosity. 

The urgent task now before the United 
States and the Community is to translate 
this broadly recognized commonality of our 
interests and this agreement on the political 
importance of these economic negotiations 
into the concrete achievements in cooperation 
that the relationship needs to endure and 

We, like the European Community, are 
now developing our concepts of how these 
broad objectives can best be achieved in the 
forthcoming trade and monetary negotia- 
tions. We will be seeking the closest possible 
contact and exchange of views with the Com- 
munity throughout this process. Though 
preparations are not complete, the broad out- 
lines of the negotiating tasks before us seem 
to be clear : 

We must work toward creation of a system 
which will pi'omote domestic growth and 
price stability as well as freer trade and 
investment flows. A system not meeting this 
requirement simply has no chance of adop- 
tion by any government, including those of 
the Federal Republic and of the United 
States. This system should include codes of 
economic conduct on such issues as govern- 
ment procurement and the trade effects of 
product and industry standards. Such basic 
rules as "no competitive devaluation" and 
"most-favored-nation treatment" have served 
us well, but they now need to be reaffirmed 
and supplemented in the light of existing 

''Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 608. 

' Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1972, p. 457. 


Department of State Bulletin .J*pi 


U.S. Proposals for Monetary Reform 

As you know, Secretary of the Treasury 
Shultz is meeting with his European, Cana- 
dian, Japanese, and Indonesian counterparts 
in Paris tomorrow to discuss the interna- 
tional monetary situation, and I think in the 
circumstances it is better not to discuss the 
issues involved in this area this evening. It 
might nevertheless be useful to review the 
main points in the proposals the United 
States has previously made public for the 
reform of the international monetary system. 
These proposals were spelled out in detail in 
a supplement to the Annual Report of the 
Council of Economic Advisers in January 

The main thrust of our proposals is that 
monetary reform should be directed toward 
improving the international adjustment proc- 
ess so that large imbalances are prevented 
from developing. Although this process must 
be strengthened, considerable flexibility can 
be left to national governments in their 
choice of adjustment instruments. 

The U.S. proposals would not require a 
government to take some predetermined ac- 
tion — such as a change in its exchange rate — 
as soon as the reserve figures passed a cer- 
tain point and regardless of other circum- 
; stances. Instead, the United States proposes 
the establishment of a number of reference 
points above and below some agreed figure 
that would be considered a particular na- 
tion's normal level of reserves. Governments 
would be expected to act, in their own way 
and in accordance with their own timing, to 
correct international imbalances long before 
the "outer point" above this level or the "low 
point" below it was reached. 

International sanctions would be available 
to pressure a reluctant government into tak- 
ing effective adjustment action, but they 
would be used only in the extreme and un- 
likely event that a government would refuse 
to act first on its own. Furthermore, the in- 
ternational community, acting through the 
International Monetary Fund, could vote to 
override the signal given by the change in 
reserves whenever it felt that other factors 

should be taken into account or whenever it 
felt that the government concerned was tak- 
ing effective action to correct the situation. 

Small adjustments in exchange rates — de- 
valuations for countries with balance of 
payments deficits, upward revaluations for 
countries in surplus — would be one way gov- 
ernments could act to keep their interna- 
tional payments within reasonable balance. 
But they would be free to choose other ap- 
propriate methods of adjustment; that is, 
methods "consistent with market mecha- 
nisms and a liberal world trade and payments 

The U.S. proposals are based on the prem- 
ise that the new international monetary sys- 
tem, if it is to operate effectively, must 
include some means of assuring that imbal- 
ances in international payments will be ad- 
justed. Under the old system, countries with 
balance of payments deficits would always 
come under pressure to adjust sooner or 
later, when their reserves ran out. The U.S. 
proposals are designed to put similar pres- 
sure on surplus countries to revalue or take 
other adjustment action and to encourage 
both deficit and surplus countries to act 
sooner, before the imbalances become a seri- 
ous threat to the stability of the system. 

Multilateral Negotiations on Trade Barriers 

To a large extent, the monetary disorders 
of the last few years reflect more basic dis- 
equilibria in world trade. Exchange rate 
changes will reduce these imbalances. Multi- 
lateral trade negotiations, scheduled to begin 
this fall in the GATT, are also essential to 
deal with more direct barriers to trade which 
can, in some areas, vitiate the effect of 

The United States, the European Commu- 
nity, and Japan have agreed that these ne- 
gotiations are to be ones based on reciprocal 
concessions and mutual advantage. But the 
result should be one that makes the trading 
system more responsive to price relationships 
and natural comparative advantage. The 
United States and other deficit countries can- 
not be expected to right their payments bal- 

Aprll 16, 1973 


ances when faced with direct barriers to 
important exports. The problem is clear : The 
U.S. trade position must be improved. If we 
cannot accomplish that objective together in 
a framework of freer and fairer trade, there 
will be pressure in the United States to re- 
treat inward. We must avoid that, for it risks 
international recrimination, isolation, and 
autarky. The trade negotiations will offer us 
unequaled opportunities to make the inevi- 
table process of change a fruitful, mutually 
beneficial one. For example, we are anticipat- 
ing negotiations in which we could find it 
possible to make very substantial cuts in tar- 
iffs among industrial countries. Perhaps we 
should look forward to the elimination, over 
the long term, of tariffs on trade and indus- 
trial products among developed countries. 

But industrial tariffs are only part of the 
story. The negotiators this fall will have 
broader and more complicated tasks to per- 
form than the Kennedy Round or previous 
trade liberalizations. For the first time the 
negotiators will be dealing with a wide spec- 
trum of nontariff barriers to trade, which in 
some instances have become greater impedi- 
ments to the free flow of goods and services 
than customs duties. 

One example of nontariff barriers that will 
be dealt with is quotas protecting specific 
economic sectors. Another is design or per- 
formance standards, which are often discrim- 
inatory against foreign goods. Restrictive 
government procurement practices can also 
effectively block foreign competition. Sub- 
sidies to exports, too, act as nontariff trade 
barriers by distorting the flow of interna- 
tional trade. 

Negotiating reductions in this sector will 
not be easy. Nontariff barriers usually arise 
from the need to protect economic areas con- 
sidered particularly sensitive for domestic 
political, social, or national security reasons. 
The distinction between a protective barrier 
and legitimate domestic social policy is not 
always clear, but it will be an important one. 
Where these barriers have a purpose that is 
primarily a protective one, negotiations 
should aim at a rollback or elimination of 
such restrictions. This would appear to ap- 

ply, for example, to preferences — formal and 
informal — for domestic suppliers under gov- 
ernment procurement contracts. Where re- 
striction is an incidental effect of regulations 
serving a legitimate domestic social or politi- 
cal purpose, the approach would logically be 
one of harmonization. This may be the best 
approach on standards and on environmental 
protection. There may also have to be a third, 
less formal, approach in the form of pre- 
scribing some general rules and consultative 
requirements for certain pai-ticularly com- 
plex nontariff barriers. 

Negotiators in the GATT this fall will also 
have the task of formulating a safeguard 
system to protect sensitive industries in the 
participating countries from rapid shifts in 
trade patterns. Members in recent years have 
been faced with the problem of abnormally 
rapid increases in imports of specific prod- 
ucts. In such situations these countries have 
often acted unilaterally to impose quotas or, 
with the prospect of such action in the ofl^ng, 
to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements 
with exporting countries. Both the United 
States and European Community countries 
have adopted such measures. We think that 
the problem could be dealt with more fairly, 
and with less political heat, if we agreed to 
multilateral standards for such action. We 
will be putting forward specific proposals to 
this effect. 

Obstacles to Free Agricultural Trade 

Another component of the trade negotia- 
tions, a key one from the U.S. point of view, 
will be in agriculture. Agriculture is not only 
an area that has been largely excluded from 
previous rounds of trade liberalization ; it is 
also a whole area of trade that has been ex- 
empted, by formal waivers as well as by re- 
fined evasion, from the rules of fair trade 
practices applied to other international trade. 
The present situation may be an acceptable 
one for countries like the Federal Republic 
which earn only 2-3 percent of their export 
income from agricultural products. It is, 
however, a cause of great concern to the 
United States, which has over recent years 
earned almost 20 percent of its export income 


Department of State Bulletin 

from agricultural trade. For us some liber- 
alization of agricultural trade is an essential 
part of the negotiating outcome. 

To us this means that one's credentials as 
a proponent for trade liberalization are not 
judged by his position on tariffs alone. A 
German who argues for zero tariffs, while at 
the same time citing world trade in agricul- 
ture as a hopeless exception to trade liberali- 
zation efforts, is probably viewed by many in 
my country as a protectionist. I have no 
doubt that my hypothetical German would 
l)e incredulous when confronted by this view 
from my hypothetical American. But let me 
try to explain how the European Commu- 
nity's treatment of one important American 
agricultural export — feed grains — looks from 
an American perspective. 

As a result of history, geography, climate, 
and applied U.S. technology, the United 
States is the world's largest and most efficient 
producer of feed grains. This is one of our 
strongest present and future areas of com- 
petitive advantage in international trade. 

We are a secure and reliable supplier of 
the highest quality feed grains. This year we 
have planted about 18 million additional 
acres in grain to make sure we can fill inter- 
national demand, including any extraordi- 
nary demand from the U.S.S.R., as we did 
last year. Moreover, we still have 25 million 
additional acres that have been withdrawn 
from production but could be replanted if 
markets were open to us on a competitive 
basis. There are not many export product 
areas where such a substantial supply re- 
sponse is possible in a short time. When we 
see our structural and unreducible need for 
raw materials imports growing — by over $1 
billion annually just for petroleum — this be- 
comes very important. In terms of economic 
reality, the United States cannot be expected 
to concentrate its exports exclusively on in- 
dustrial products. A major area of our com- 
petitive advantage is elsewhere. 

In light of this natural comparative 
advantage, it is difficult to explain to Ameri- 
can grain farmers — who have been strong 
supportei-s of liberal U.S. trading policies — 
that the Community considers agriculture a 
special case where the normal rules do not 

apply ; that variable levies on grain, as high 
as 70-80 percent, are not considered as a 
possible subject of trade liberalization ne- 
gotiations; that the European Community, 
where production costs for grain are so much 
higher than the U.S. level, is working toward 
self-sufficiency in grain production. 

The problem of opening trade opportuni- 
ties in the Community for imported grain 
need not be considered an intractable one, 
and it does not require giving up the present 
structure of the common agricultural policy. 
Simply by allowing a small shift in the feed- 
grain-livestock price ratio, the European 
Community would encourage more grain 
feeding. Such a development may be some- 
thing that the Community should encourage 
in its own interest regardless of trade nego- 
tiations. Here we should remember that to 
most European farmers feedgrain prices are 
a cost rather than an income item. In short, 
present European Community pricing and 
trade restrictions on feed grains preclude a 
good deal of natural common interest be- 
tween American feedgrain farmers and Eu- 
ropean livestock producers and deny the 
European consumers more abundant quality 
meat at lower prices. 

Other Utuct in U.S.-Community Relations 

The broad areas I have mentioned — indus- 
trial tariffs, agriculture, safeguards, and non- 
tariff barriers — make up the major items on 
the agenda of the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions. There remain some longstanding issues 
of particular relevance to U.S.-European 
Community relations. Some of these issues, 
however, could be partially resolved by suc- 
cessful trade lib«ralization negotiations. For 
example, if we can agree on a deep cut in 
tariffs, then the special preferences accorded 
by the European Community to some Medi- 
terranean countries — thereby discriminating 
against U.S. exports — would be less damag- 
ing. Similarly, deep tariff cuts would remove 
some of the sting from the trade agreements 
concluded between the European Community 
and members of the European Free Trade 
Area — which also discriminate against U.S. 

April 16, 1973 


The persistent problem of reverse prefer- 
ences may also be ripe for resolution. This 
system of trade-distorting and economically 
expensive preferences, accorded by develop- 
ing countries to their imports from some de- 
veloped countries, could be replaced by a 
multilateral system of generalized prefer- 
ences for the exports of less developed coun- 
tries. This step would be commensurate with 
the enlarged Community's global, as opposed 
to regional, responsibility toward developing 

Other items should be cleared from the 
table before multilateral negotiations begin, 
such as the issues arising from the enlarge- 
ment of the European Community. I hope 
that in these so-called compensation negotia- 
tions with the United States and other third 
countries the Community will recognize that 
enlargement has indeed created some specific 
trade problems for the United States which 
do require attention and adjustment. 

The monetary and trade negotiations of 
1973 should make a significant contribution 
to keeping U.S. -European relations on their 
long-term course of cooperation in addressing 
the problem of the international economy. 
Many issues will remain for the future, how- 
ever. The dynamic relationship we have 
across the Atlantic, by its very nature, con- 
tinually creates new challenges. For this rea- 
son the United States has welcomed the 
European Community's offer, in which the 
Federal Republic played a significant part, 
of a constructive, continuing dialogue with 
the United States. We will follow with great 
interest European thinking on how such a 
dialogue can best be carried out. 

At the same time, a U.S.-European Com- 
munity dialogue should not supplant the in- 
valuable exchange of views on Atlantic issues 
that has characterized U.S.-Federal Republic 
contacts throughout the postwar period. In 
returning to the Federal Republic last year 
after several previous assignments here, I 
was impressed once again with the great ca- 
pacity for cutting through misunderstanding 
and solving problems that resides in the 
frank and open dialogue between representa- 

tives of the Federal Republic and of the 
United States. 

I hope that my plain talk on some economic 
issues tonight has added in some way to 
this important dialogue between our two 


Department Discusses U.S. Policy 
Toward Cuba 

Following is a statement by Robert A. 
Hunvitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs, made before the 
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Af- 
fairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on March 26.^ 

I am very pleased to have this opportunity 
to meet with you today to discuss the policy 
of the United States toward Cuba. I am well 
aware of the interest in this policy and of 
speculation that it might be changed. In this 
opening statement I propose to describe the 
present policy and the reasons behind it. 

As it has been since the early 1960's, U.S. 
policy toward Cuba is based on Organization 
of American States resolutions urging the 
diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba as 
long as Cuba remains a threat to the peace 
and security of the hemisphere. In our view 
this threat results from Cuba's support of 
subversion in other countries of Latin 
America and its close military ties to the 
Soviet Union. We are also mindful of Cuba's 
hostile attitude toward us. Since the early 
1960's, Cuba has unremittingly vilified this 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Department of State Bulletin 

lountry, its policies, and its Presidents. It 
has i)ublicly consigned the Organization of 
American States to the "garbage heap." Only 
last week at the United Nations Security 
( 'ouncil meeting in Panama, the Cuban For- 
eign Minister continued Cuba's scurrilous 
attack upon us and the Organization of 
American States. 

Nor has Cuba abandoned its goals of sub- 
verting other governments in the hemisphere. 
It has simply become more cautious, more 
selective, and more sophisticated in its 
"e.xport of revolution" and has directed its 
resources to those areas where it estimates 
the opportunity for interference greatest. 
While failures have forced the Cuban leaders 
to be less dogmatic in their insistence on the 
Cuban model as the only way to mount a 
revolution, they still openly advocate armed 
revolt in propitious situations. These long- 
held views of Fidel Castro and his closest 
associates are not likely to be lightly dis- 
carded even though Cuban deeds may not 
always succeed in matching the belligerence 
of the rhetoric. To accomplish its objective, 
Cuba's apparatus for support to subversion 
is functioning and remains a unique phenom- 
enon in Latin America — which should give 
pause to any nation prepared to believe that 
Cuba is now just another state among many. 
In short, we are convinced that, regrettably, 
the time has not yet arrived when the hemi- 
sphere can safely regard Cuba as no longer a 
threat to its peace and security or when we 
can take Cuba's leaders at less than their 

With respect to Cuba's close military ties 
to the Soviet Union — ties that are tighter 
than ever — what we especially mean is 
Tuba's demonstrated willingness to lend its 
territory for Soviet military purposes. We 
obviously do not question Cuba's right to 
maintain an army, or to equip it, or to receive 
training. Every nation has such a right. 
What concerns us is Cuba's disposition to 
cooperate in the strategic goals of an extra- 
hemispheric superpower. This was illustrated 
by the emplacement of offensive missiles in 

October 1962 and more recently by Cuba's 
cooperation in 1970 in the Soviet effort to 
establish a nuclear submarine facility at 
Cienfuegos which, had it succeeded, could 
have caused a major disturbance in the hem- 
isphere. Any disturbance, even a slight one, 
of the balance of military power with the 
Soviet Union must remain of concern to us 
even as our efforts to develop peaceful con- 
tacts with that country continue. 

The bases for continuing an "arm's-length" 
relationship with Cuba — which I would stress 
are Cuba's external activities and not its in- 
ternal political, economic, and social arrange- 
ments — would seem therefore to be clear. 
What, then, would be the advantages to the 
United States of a closer relationship? De- 
spite Cuba's consistent and flat rejection of 
the idea of any normalization of relations 
with the United States, some argue that: 
(1) to be consistent we should seek the same 
kind of pragmatic accommodation with Ha- 
vana that we have sought with Peking and 
Moscow; (2) Latin American support for the 
Organization of American States resolutions 
is weakening; (3) we would realize economic 
gain from a normalization of relations; and 
(4) the Soviet presence in Cuba can only be 
reduced if Cuban suspicion of the United 
States is allayed by conciliatory steps on our 

In my view, there is no inconsistency be- 
tween our Cuba policy and President Nixon's 
widely applauded overtures toward Peking 
and Moscow. Both are adapted to the situa- 
tions we find; both are pragmatic. Apart 
from the obvious differences in size and im- 
portance of the countries involved and the 
fact that U.S. policy toward Cuba forms part 
of a multilateral OAS policy, there is the 
crucial difference that in the Chinese and 
Soviet cases we had previous indications of 
interest in a new relationship with the United 
States. We have received no such signal from 
Cuba. I think we have demonstrated our 
pragmatism with respect to Cuba: Where 
there is no overriding U.S. interest, there are 
no grounds for seeking accommodation with 

April 16, 1973 


an openly hostile nation; on matters of mu- 
tual interest, however, we have demonstrated 
that we can deal with each other. The Cuban 
refugee airlift negotiated through the Swiss 
in 1965 is one example. The new hijacking 
agreement is another, and we hope it will 
effectively deter aircraft hijackings to Cuba, 
which were contrary to the interests of both 

We recognize that over the years some 
nations have decided that the maintenance 
of the economic and diplomatic sanctions 
against Cuba were no longer warranted. We 
have regretted these unilateral decisions be- 
cause the sanctions represent a collective 
policy and a binding obligation on us and the 
other member states to be lifted only when 
two-thirds of the members determine that 
Cuba is no longer a danger to the peace and 
security of the hemisphere. By our count it 
is clear that two-thirds do not think so. 

Very little, if any, economic benefit would 
accrue to the United States from normaliza- 
tion of relations with Cuba. Cuba is heavily 
mortgaged economically to the Soviet Union 
for many years to come, and there is no 
foreseeable way it can produce the foreign 
exchange to again become an important pur- 
chaser in the U.S. market. Its annual trade 
deficit, which was running at about $80 mil- 
lion in 1959, is now about $500 million, de- 
spite the fact that prices for its principal 
export commodities, sugar and nickel, are at 
peak levels. From Cuba's standpoint, access 
to the U.S. market would be important. To 
offer Cuba a significant share of our sugar 
market would entail an equal reduction in 
the quotas of friendly sugar-producing coun- 
tries in the hemisphere that over the past 
decade have come to depend upon our pur- 
chases. Nor do we have real need for the few 
other Cuban export products available. 

Finally, I think that the notion is illusory 
that we can in time break or at least loosen 
the Cuban-Soviet link by offering Cuba some 
palatable alternative to dependence on the 
Soviet Union. Cuba has, particularly in the 
past four to five years and without any seri- 
ous reservations apparent to us, locked itself 

increasingly into a dependent relationship 
with the Soviet Union in every sense — eco- 
nomic, political, military, and cultural. Un- 
doubtedly the U.S.S.R. would welcome U.S. 
participation in sharing the $500-million-a- 
year burden that Cuba represents, but it is 
highly doubtful that the Soviets would lightly 
see their first foothold in the hemisphere slip. 
Conciliatory gestures to Cuba would convince 
Fidel Castro that his course has been correct 
all along and that his international behavior 
had been vindicated. Cuba-oriented dissident 
elements in the hemisphere would similarly 
be encouraged, and we might well be faced 
with a recrudescence of subversion abroad 
without having made any dent at all in the 
Cuban-Soviet relationship. 

In sum, therefore, we see little if anything 
to be gained and considerable disadvantage 
in a change in policy toward Cuba under 
present circumstances. In our view, Cuba has 
through its own policies and actions outlawed 
itself from the hemisphere. Should Cuba 
demonstrate that it has abandoned those poli- 
cies and actions, we would of course reex- 
amine our posture in consultation with the 
other members of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States and move in concert with them 
to adapt to the new situation. 

Load Line Convention Amendments 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to acceptance of the 
Amendments to the International Convention 
on Load Lines, 1966, adopted at London on 
October 12, 1971, I transmit herewith a cer- 
tified copy of those amendments. I transmit 
also the report of the Department of State 

' Transmitted on Mar. 22 (White House press 
release) ; also printed as S. Ex. D., 93d Cong., 1st 
sess., which includes the texts of the amendments jj 
and the report of the Department of State. [ 


Department of State Bulletin 

with respect to the amendments recommend- 
ing early acceptance of the amendments by 
tlie United States. 

The 1966 Load Lines Convention estab- 
lished new uniform rules concerning- the 
limits to which ships on international voy- 
ages may be loaded. Its purpose was to bring 
international load line regulations into ac- 
cord with modern developments and tech- 
niques in ship construction. The purpose of 
the new amendments is to correct errors and 
ambiguities in the 1966 Convention on Load 
Lines which have become apparent since 

The new Amendments should make the 
1966 Convention more effective in bringing 
improvements in safety of ships as well as in 
the economics of shipping. I recommend that 
the Senate give the Amendments early and 
favorable consideration. 

Richard Nixon. 
The White House, March 22, 1973. 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement amending the agreement of January 5, 
1968 (TIAS 6435), for the application of safe- 
guards by the International .Atomic Energy 
.Agency to the bilateral agreement between the 
United States and Korea of February 3, 1956 
(TIAS .3490), as amended, for cooperation con- 
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Sigrned at 
Vienna November 30, 1972. 
Entered into force: March 19, 1973. 


.Agreement on the joint financing of certain air nav- 
igation services in Iceland. Done at Geneva Sep- 
tember 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1958. 
TIAS 4048. 
Accession deposited: Finland, December 28, 1972. 

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air 
navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe 

Islands. Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. 
Entered into force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4049. 
Accession deposited: Finland, December 28, 1972. 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 

1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Philippines, March 26, 
Protocol to amend the convention for the unification 
of certain rules relating to international carriage 
by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 
Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at 
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Gua- 
temala City March 8, 1971.' 

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, December 20, 
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria (with a reserva- 
tion), March 28, 1973; Philippines, March 26, 


Protocol of amendment of the convention of No- 
vember 22, 1928, relating to international exposi- 
tions, with appendi.x and annex. Done at Paris 
November 30, 1972. Open for signature at Paris 
from November 30, 1972, until November 30, 1973. 
Enters into force on the date 29 states have be- 
come parties by signature without reservation 
as to ratification, acceptance, or approval, or have 
deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval, or accession. 

Signatures: Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Social- 
ist Republic,- 3 Bulgaria, ^^ Canada, Denmark, ^ 
Finland, < France, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Hungary, = Israel,* Italy, * Monaco, Norway, 
Netherlands,* Poland,-* Spain, Sweden,* Swit- 
zerland,* Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic,-'^ United Kingdom, United States,'-* 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, = ' Novem- 
ber 30, 1972. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, March 14, 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement relating to the International Telecom- 
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), 
with annexes. Signed at Washington August 20, 

1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 

Accession deposited: Afghanistan, March 26, 1973. 

' Not in force. 

= With reservation (s). 

' With declaration. 

* Subject to ratification. 

April 16, 1973 


Operating agreement relating to the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel- 
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 

Signature: Ministry of Communications for Af- 
ghanistan, March 26, 1973. 



Agreement amending the treaty of amity and eco- 
nomic relations of September 7, 1951, to terminate 
notes concerning administration of justice. Effected 
by e.xchange of notes at Addis Ababa September 
16, 1965, and October 20, 1972. Enters into force 
on the date of a note of confirmation presented 
to Ethiopia by the United States. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 
27, 1973. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of October 18, 1967 
(TIAS 6381). Signed at Conakry March 15, 1973. 
Entered into force March 15, 1973. 


Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7, 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 
27, 1973. 


Convention for the protection of migratory birds 
and birds in danger of extinction, and their en- 
vironment, with annex. Signed at Tokyo March 
4, 1972.1 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 
27, 1973. 

Protocol amending the agreement of February 28, 
1968, as amended (TIAS 6517, 7306), concerning 

civil uses of atomic energy, with exchange of 
notes. Signed at Washington March 28, 1973. 
Enters into force on the date each Government 
shall have received from the other written notifi- 
cation that it has complied with all statutory and 
constitutional requirements for entry into force. 


Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges 
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972. i 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 
27, 1973. 


Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bu- 
charest July 5, 1972.1 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March 
27, 1973. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
with annex. Signed at Khartoum March 18, 1973. 
Entered into force March 18, 1973. 



1 Not in force. 

The Senate on March 26 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

Dr. Ruth Lewis Farkas to be Ambassador to 

Marshall Green to be Ambassador to Australia. 

V. John Krehbiel to be Ambassador to Finland. 

William B. Macomber, Jr., to be Ambassador to 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX Apnl 16, 1973 Vol. LXVIII. No. 1764 

Africa. The Realities of United States-Africa 
Relations (Newsom) 456 

Asia. America's Engagement in Asia and the 
World (Porter) 441 

\u8tralia. Green confirmed as Ambassador . . 172 

I ambodia. America's Engagement in Asia and 
the World (Porter) 441 

('hiiia. Preparations for Establishment of U.S. 
I Office in Peking (Department an- 

.■ ■ ment) 447 


''ortirmations (Farkas, Green, Krehbiel, Ma- 

•nber) 472 

I 'cjiartment Discusses U.S. Policy Toward 
Cuba (Hunvitch) 468 

Ia)Sh\ Line Convention Amendments Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Ni.xon) 470 

Cuba. Department Discusses U.S. Policy 
Toward Cuba (Hurwitch) 468 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 
(Farkas, Green, Krehbiel, Macomber) . . . 472 

Disarmament. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
Resume at Geneva (Johnson, list of U.S. 
delegation) 446 

Economic Affairs 

.\merica's Engagement in Asia and the World 

(Porter) 441 

Gci nian-American Economic and Commercial 
Relations in the Atlantic Community (Hill- 
enbrand) 462 

Internationalization of the Capital Markets 

t (Casey) 448 
ajor Trading Nations Agree on New Mone- 
tary Measures (communiques) 454 
irope. German-American Economic and Com- 
mercial Relations in the Atlantic Community 
(Hillenbrand) 462 
Aland. Krehbiel confirmed as Ambassador . . 472 
•rmany. German-American Economic and 
Commercial Relations in the Atlantic Com- 
munity (Hillenbrand) 462 

Laoti. America's Engagement in Asia and the 
World (Porter) 441 

lUxembourg. Farkas confirmed as Ambassador 472 

aritime Affairs. Load Line Convention 
Amendments Transmitted to the Senate 
(Nixon) 470 

esidential Documents. Load Line Conven- 
tion Amendments Transmitted to the Senate 470 

ide. German-American Economic and Com- 
mercial Relations in the Atlantic Community 
(Hillenbrand) 40 J 

eaty Information 

rrent Actions 471 

ad Line Convention Amendments Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon) 470 

Turkey. Macomber confirmed as Ambassador 472 

II.S..S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Ri 
sume at Geneva (Johnson, list of U.S. dele- 
gation) 446 

Viet-Xam. America's Engagement in Asia and 
the World (Porter) 441 

Xante Index 

Casey, William J i48 

Farkas, Ruth Lewis 172 

Green, Marshall i72 

Hillenbrand, Martin J . . 462 

Hurwitch, Robert A . . . 468 

Johnson, U. Alexis 446 

Krehbiel, V. John 472 

Macomber, William B., Jr 172 

Newsom, David D 456 

Nixon, President 470 

Porter, William J 441 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 26-Aprll 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to March 26 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 68 
of March 12. 

No. Date Subject 

*88 3/27 Advisory Committee on Private In- 
ternational Law, Study Group on 
Enforcement of Foreign Judg- 
ments, Apr. 2. 

'89 3/2T .Advisory Committee on Private In- 
ternational Law, Study Group on 
Maritime Bills of Lading, Apr. 

*90 3/27 List of U.S. civilian prisoners of 
war captured in South Viet-Nam 
and released Mar. 27. 

*91 3/27 List of U.S. civilian prisoners of 
war captured in Laos and to be 
released Mar. 28. 

•92 3/28 Arena Stage to tour U.S.S.R. 

*93 3/29 Executive Committee of the Over- 
seas Schools .'Advisory Council, 
Apr. 10. 

*94 8/29 Program for Washington portion 
:' ..fficial visit of Nguyen Van 
: I .11, President, Republic of 

* Not printed. 

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U.S. government printing office 



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Volume LXVIII 

No. 1765 

April 23, 1973 



Excerpts From an Address by President Nixon h73 

Remarks by Deputy Secretary Rtish U76 



Statements by Ambassador Scali 

and Text of Draft Resolution 490 


For indfx see inside back cover 


VOL. LXVIII, No. 1765 
April 23, 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BVLLETIl 
a weekly publication issued by t\ 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public 
interested agencies of tfie governmei 
witfi information on developments 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations ai 
on tlie woric of tfte Department 
tlte Foreign Service. 
Tfte BULLETIN includes selecti 
press releases on foreign policy, issi 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depm 
ment, and statements, addresst 
and news conferences of tfte Presidei^ 
and tfie Secretary of Stale and otliei 
officers of tfie Department, as well as 
special articles on various pitases of 
international affairs and tfie functions: 
of tlie Department. Information is in-^ 
eluded concerning treaties and inter' 
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United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
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Publications of tfte Department o^ 
State, United Nations documents, andt 
legislative material in tfte field ol^ 
international relations are also listed.: 


America's Military Strength: Key Element 

in Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace 

Address by President Nixoyi (Excerpts)^ 

Four years and two months ago, when I 
first came into tin's office as President, by far 
the most difficult problem confionting the 
Nation was the seemingly endless war in 
Viet-Nam. 550,000 Americans were in Viet- 
Nam. As many as 300 a week were being 
killed in action. Hundreds were held as pris- 
oners of war in North Viet-Nam. No progress 
was being made at the peace negotiations. 

I immediately initiated a program to end 
the war and win an honorable peace. 

Eleven times over the past four years I 

have reported to the Nation from this room 

in the progress we have made toward that 

L'-iial. Tonight, the day we have all worked 

and prayed for has finally come. 

For the first time in 12 years, no American 
military forces are in Viet-Nam. All of our 
American POW's are on their way home. 
The 17 million people of South Viet-Nam 
have the right to choose their own govern- 
ment without outside interference, and be- 
cause of our program of Vietnamization, 
they have the .strength to defend that right. 
We have prevented the imposition of a Com- 
munist government by force on South 

There are .still some problem areas. The 
provisions of the agreement requiring an 
accounting for all mi-ssing in action in Indo- 
china, the provisions with regard to Laos 
and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting in- 

' Made to the Nation on televi.sion and radio on 
Mar. 29; for the complete text, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 2, 
p. 311. 

filtration from North Viet-Nam into South 
Viet-Nam, have not been complied with. We 
have and will continue to comply with the 
agreement. We shall insist that North Viet- 
Nam comply with the agreement. And the 
leaders of North Viet-Nam should have no 
doubt as to the consequences if they fail to 
comply with the agreement. 

But despite these difficulties, we can be 
proud tonight of the fact that we have 
achieved our goal of obtaining an agreement 
which provides peace with honor in 

On this day let us honor those who made 
this achievement possible — those who sacri- 
ficed their lives, those who were disabled, 
those who made every one of us proud to be 
an American as they returned from years 
of Communist impi-i.sonment, and every one 
of the 21/0 million Americans who served 
honorably in our Nation's longest war. Never 
have men served with greater devotion 
abroad with less apparent support at home. 

Let us provide these men with the veter- 
ans benefits and the job opportunities they 
have earned. Let us honor them with the re- 
spect they deserve. And I say again tonight, 
let us not dishonor those who served their 
country by granting amnesty to those who 
deserted America. 

Tonight I want to express the appreciation 
of the Nation to others who helped make 
this day possible. I refer to you, the great 
majority of Americans listening to me to- 
night, who, despite an unprecedented barrage 
of criticism from a small but vocal minority. 

April 23, 1973 


stood firm for peace with honor. I know it 
was not easy for you to do so. 

We have been through some difficult times 
together. I recall the time in November 1969 
when hundreds of thousands of demonstra- 
tors marched on the White House, the time in 
April 1970 when I found it necessary to 
order attacks on Communist bases in Cam- 
bodia, the time in May 1972 when I ordered 
the mining of Haiphong and air-strikes on 
military targets in North Viet-Nam in order 
to stop a massive Cominunist offensive in 
South Viet-Nam, and then — and this was 
perhaps the hardest decision I have made as 
President — on December 18, 1972, when our 
hopes for peace were so high and when the 
North Vietnamese stonewalled us at the con- 
ference table, I found it necessary to order 
more airstrikes on military targets in North 
Viet-Nam in order to break the deadlock. 

On each of these occasions, the voices of 
opposition we heard in Washington were so 
loud they at times seemed to be the majority. 
But across America the overwhelming ma- 
jority stood firm against those who advocated 
peace at any price — even if the price would 
have been defeat and humiliation for the 
United States. 

Because you stood firm — stood firm for 
doing what was right — Colonel McKnight 
[Lt. Col. George G. McKnight, USAF] was 
able to say for his fellow POW's when he re- 
turned home a few days ago, "Thank you for 
bringing us home on our feet instead of on 
our knees." 

Let me turn, finally, tonight to another 
gi-eat challenge we face. 

As we end America's longest war, let us 
resolve that we shall not lose the peace. Dur- 
ing the past year we have made great prog- 
ress toward our goal of a generation of peace 
for America and the world. The war in Viet- 
Nam has been ended. After 20 years of 
hostility and confrontation we have opened 
a constructive new relationship with the 
People's Republic of China, where one-fourth 
of all the people in the world live. We nego- 
tiated last year with the Soviet Union a 
number of important agreements, including 

an agreement which takes a major step in 
limiting nuclear arms. 

Now, there are some who say that in view 
of all this progress toward peace, why not 
cut our defense budget? 

Well, let's look at the facts. Our defense 
budget today takes the lowest percentage of 
our gross national product that it has in 20 
years. There is nothing I would like better 
than to be able to reduce it further. But we 
must never forget that we would not have 
made the progress toward lasting peace that 
we have made in this past year unless we 
had had the military strength that com- 
manded respect. 

This year we have begun new negotiations 
with the Soviet Union for further limita- 
tions on nuclear arms. And we shall be par- 
ticipating later in the year in negotiations 
for mutual reduction of forces in Europe. 

If prior to these negotiations we in the 
United States unilaterally reduce our defense 
budget, or reduce our forces in Europe, any 
chance for successful negotiations for mutual 
reduction of forces or limitation of arms will 
be destroyed. 

There is one unbreakable rule of interna- 
tional diplomacy : You can't get something 
in a negotiation unless you have something 
to give. If we cut our defenses before nego- 
tiations begin, any incentive for other na- 
tions to cut theirs will go right out the 

If the United States reduces its defenses 
and others do not, it will increase the danger 
of war. It is only a mutual reduction of forces 
which will reduce the danger of war. And 
that is why we must maintain our strength 
until we get agreements under which other 
nations will join us in reducing the burden 
of armaments. 

What is at stake is whether the United 
States shall become the second strongest na- 
tion in the world. If that day ever comes, 
the chance for building a new structure of 
peace in the world would be irreparably dam- 
aged and free nations everywhere would be 
living in mortal danger. 

A strong United States is not a threat to 
peace. It is the free world's indispensable 
guardian of peace and freedom. 


Departmenf of State Bulletin 


I ask for your support tonijrHt for keeping 
tlio strent'tli — tlie strength wliich enabled us 
tn make such great progress toward world 
peace in the past year and which is indis- 
pensable as we continue our bold new initia- 
tives for peace in the years ahead. 

As we consider some of our problems to- 
night, let us never forget how fortunate we 
are to live in America at this time in our 
history. We have ended the longest and most 
difficult war in our history in a way that 
maintains the trust of our allies and the re- 
spect of our adversaries. We are the strong- 
est and most prosperous nation in the world. 
Because of our strength, America has the 
magnificent opportunity to play the leading 
role of bringing down the walls of hostility 
which divide the people of the world, in re- 
ducing the burden of armaments in the 
world, of building a structure of lasting 
peace in the world. And because of our 
wealth we have the means to move forward 
at home on exciting new programs — pro- 
grams for progress which will provide better 
environment, education, housing, and health 
care for all Americans and which will enable 
us to be more generous to the poor, the el- 
derly, the disabled, and the disadvantaged 
than any nation in the history of the world. 

These are goals worthy of a great people. 
Let us therefoi-e put aside those honest dif- 
ferences about war which have divided us 
and dedicate ourselves to meet the great chal- 
lenges of peace which can unite us. As we 
do, let us not overlook a third element, an 
element more important even than military 
might or economic power, because it is essen- 
tial for greatness in a nation. 

The pages of history are strewn with the 
wreckage of nations which fell by the way- 
side at the height of their strength and 
.vealth because their people became weak, 

soft, and self-indulgent and lost the character 
and the spirit which iuul led to their 

As I speak to you tonight, I am confident 
that will not happen to America. And my 
confidence has been increased by the fact 
that a war which cost America so much in 
lives and money and division at home has, as 
it ended, provided an opportunity for mil- 
lions of Americans to see again the character 
and the spirit which made America a great 

A few days ago in this room, I talked to 
a man [Col. Robinson Risner, USAF] who 
had spent almost eight years in a Communist 
prison camp in North Viet-Nam. For over 
four years he was in solitary confinement. In 
that four-year period he never saw and never 
talked to another human being except his 
Communist captors. He lived on two meals 
a day, usually just a piece of bread, a bowl 
of soup. All he was given to read was Com- 
munist propaganda. All he could listen to 
was the Communist propaganda on radio. 

I asked him how he was able to survive it 
and come home, standing tall and proud, 
saluting the American flag. He paused a long 
time before he answered. And then he said, 
"It is diflicult for me to an.swer. I am not 
very good at words. All I can say is that it 
was faith — faith in Cod and faith in my 

If men who suffered so much for America 
can have such faith, let us who have received 
so much from America renew our faith — our 
faith in God, our faith in our country, and 
our faith in ourselves. 

If we meet the great challenges of peace 
that lie ahead with this kind of faith, then 
one day it will be written: This was Amer- 
ica's finest hour. 

Thank you and good evening. 

'\pril 23, 1973 


The Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy Objectives 

Following are remarks made by Deputy 
Secretary Kenneth Rush on March 29 before 
the national foreign policy conference for 
editors and broadcasters at the Department 
of State, together xvith the transcript of the 
questions and ansivers which followed. 


I am very pleased to be with you today 
and to have the opportunity of reviewing 
with you President Nixon's foreign policy 
objectives and the degree to which he has 
been able to accomplish them. 

The essence of his foreign policy has been 
to move from confrontation to negotiation. 
When the President took office in 1969, as 
we looked around the world it was a world 
where confrontation imperiled the peace in 
many, many areas and where active war was 
going on in three areas : 

— In Nigeria there was a war that was 
very serious ; large numbers of people were 
being killed and were killed in that war, more 
than have been killed in the Viet-Nam war. 
That war is now gone. 

— In Viet-Nam we had an authorized 
strength of 549,000. We reached a peak of 
543,500. And as you know, the war was very 
bitter. The protagonists were not just the 
South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese 
and the Viet Cong — and also, of course, war 
raging in Laos and in Cambodia — but Russia 
was strongly backing North Viet-Nam, as 
was China. So it was really a confrontation 
between the great powers, and in particular 
the superpowers, Russia and our country. 

— In the Middle East we were faced with 
what at least was a semi-war. The six-day 
war was over. But there were constant 
clashes in the air, there was bombing, there 

was killing going on, although there was, | 
of course, no large land action. | 

In Europe the cold war was still very j 
strong. Berlin, the focal point of conflict be- j 
tween East and West, was unresolved. Block- 
ades were being imposed. In fact, in my first | 
visit to Berlin there was a blockade that was ] 
very, very costly on the autobahn. The West i 
Berliners could not travel to East Berlin. The j 
East Berliners could not get out of East ; 
Berlin. The West Berliners could not travel ! 
to the German Democratic Republic, and j 
travel from the G.D.R. to West Berlin or to \ 
the Federal Republic of Germany, West Ger- \ 
many, was very seriously curtailed. And j 
there was a bitter feeling and bitter re- I | 
crimination between the two Germanys. !|, 

West Germany itself was called a bitter 
revanchist by the Russians; and the hatred 
of Germany and the fear that Germany 
might regain military strength was a real 
source of holding the Warsaw Pact together. 

So that in essence we saw war and bitter 
confrontations around the world. 

What do we have today? 

Today we have all of our troops — all 
of our combat troops are out of Viet-Nam. 
We have a cease-fire in Viet-Nam. We have 
a cease-fire in Laos. And the Government of 
Cambodia has offered a cease-fire, although 
we still do not have a cease-fire there. 

In the Middle East we find that a cease- 
fire has been in effect for some time. There 
is no war going on. We ourselves are talking 
to the Egyptians, we are talking to the Jor- 
danians, we are talking to the Israelis ; and 
we talk to all of them about the need for 
talking among them.selves, either by proxim- 
ity talks or otherwise. The situation is still j 
very dangerous, but not an active war. 

And in Europe we find detente going on 


Department of State Bulletin 

apace. We are now enpaped in discussions in 
Helsinki leading toward a Conference on 
Kuropean Security and Cooperation among 
tlie great powers, ^^'e are engaged in discus- 
sions in Vienna looking toward talks on mu- 
tual and balanced force reductions to reduce 
the danger and the threat in central Europe 
and to reduce our forces there. 

We have a SALT treaty covering defensive 
\\ia|Mins, and we have an interim agreement 
nl' ii\e years' duration covering offensive nu- 
clear weapons. We now have talks going on 
in Geneva to lead to a permanent treaty on 
offensive weapons, in SALT [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks]. 

I Trade talks between us and Russia are 
' impending. 

And all in all you find a world that is set- 
tling its disputes by negotiation. 

By negotiation we have returned Okinawa 
to our ally Japan. 

Now, when we go from an era of confron- 
tation to an era of negotiation, this does not 
mean that the superpowers — that Russia, for 
example, has given up her objectives. The 

iectives of Russia remain the same: They 
aie to have us withdraw from Europe ; to 
weaken NATO ; to prevent the political, mili- 
tary, monetary, economic unification of the 
Community, the European Community; to 
keep Germany divided, to have a recognition 
of the division of Germany by the Western 

Our objectives haven't changed either. Our 
objectives are, of course, to strengthen NATO 
as an instrument of peace; to strengthen the 
Community and to press forward to a unified 
'■'immunity — militarily, economically, polit- 
ically, monetarily — which will be a great 
force for peace, in our view; to have the 
Warsaw Pact countries and Russia herself 
draw closer to the West, leave the closed 
society more and more and draw more and 
more to the open society. 

And so I could go around the world with 
regard to objectives. 

But the point is that by negotiation we are 
able to understand each other much better, 
and we are able to push toward our objec- 
tives in a civilized wav rather than by the 

threat of nuclear war or by desperate con- 
frontations such as in the Cuban missile 
crisis or the crises in the Middle East or the 
crises that recurrently occurred in Berlin. 

Negotiation of Berlin Agreement 

I might just say a word about Berlin and 
my negotiations there to illustrate how one 
goes fi-om confrontation to negotiation to an 

As I said when I arrived in Germany as 
Ambassador, the President had previously 
told me that obviously we could not go for- 
ward with detente in Europe unless we were 
able to normalize the situation that was the 
most dangerous, that had been the focal point 
of controversy and confrontation ; namely, 
Berlin. And we were able to get Berlin talks 
started in March of 1970. 

When we started talking, our positions, 
it turned out, were irreconcilable, or so it 
seemed. The Russians insisted that they had 
absolutely no responsibility for access from 
West Germany to West Berlin ; that the ac- 
cess routes were under the complete control 
of East Germany — of the G.D.R. — and East 
Germany was a sovereign state. Their posi- 
tion was that East Berlin was the capital 
of the sovereign East Germany, G.D.R. , and 
that the Four Powers had no right whatever 
over East Berlin ; that the Four Power 
rights, and certainly the Three Powers, the 
three Western Powers, had jurisdiction only 
ovei- the Western sectors of Berlin. They in- 
sisted that any ties between West Germany 
and West Berlin were illegal ; that the some 
22,000 governmental employees of West Ger- 
many located in West Berlin were there il- 
legally; that the President could not visit 
legally in an oflicial capacity in West Berlin ; 
that Bundestag and Bundesrat committees 
could not meet there ; that no official functions 
could take place there — and that in essence 
West Berlin was a city-state entirely inde- 
pendent of any ties with West Germany. 

Our position was just the reverse. Our 
position was that there are Four Power 
rights over Germany as a whole; that all of 
Berlin falls within a special status under 
Four Power rights and Four Power military 

April 23, 1973 


occupation; that East Berlin is m no sense 
a part of East Germany; that the Russians 
were responsible for access between West 
Germany and West Berlin because their oc- 
cupied zone was of course East Germany; 
that we could establish any ties we wanted 
between West Berlin and West Germany ; 
and that West Berliners should be allowed 
to go anywhere they wanted in East Berlin. 
So that the positions, as is always the case 
when you start negotiations, or is often the 
case, were irreconcilable. 

Now the way we got around this was to 
say we will not change the respective legal 
positions of the parties, we will not attempt 
to do this, and we will try to bring about 
practical improvements. We were able then 
finally to get an agreement on Berlin where 
we stated we were not changing the legal 
concepts of any party, but we had a recog- 
nition of Four Power rights, which was very, 
very important. 

Russia did agree that she would guarantee 
access between West Germany and West 
Berlin. Russia did agree that West Berliners 
could travel to East Berlin and to East Ger- 
many And Russia did agree that West Ber- 
liners could carry West German passports, 
could be represented abroad by the consular 
and diplomatic offices of West Geraiany, that 
West Berlin could hold international con- 
ferences—and that in essence the West 
Berliners could participate with the West 
Germans as not quite but almost West 

In turn we allowed the Russians a con- 
sulate general in West Berlin. The other 
powers do have consulates general there- 
France and England, and we ourselves have 
one now. And the most important thing, ex- 
cept access, was that the Russians agreed 
that the ties between West Berlin and the 
F.R.G., West Germany, would be maintained 
and developed. The viability of West Berlin 
depends entirely on how close the ties are 
with West Germany. 

So that we were able to accomplish, with- 
out seeming to change the legal status, the 
objectives that we needed to accomplish to 
remove Berlin as a focal point of controversy. 


U.S. Military Strength 

Now what has been the underlying fact 
that made possible this going forward so 
successfully into an era of negotiation? The 
thing that made it possible was the fact that 
the President has stuck strictly to his prin- 
ciples, his word can be relied upon, we did 
not cop out in Viet-Nam or anywhere else, 
and we have maintained our military 
strength to the degree necessary m order 
that the President can negotiate and that we 
can negotiate with the Russians, with the 
Chinese, and with others. 

This does not mean, of course, that we 
haven't reduced our military forces. We have 
reduced our armed forces from about 
3 550 000— roughly in excess of 1.2 million in 
the last four years. Our military budget, m 
terms of constant dollars, is lower than 20 
years ago. As a percent of gross national 
product, as a percent of total public expendi- 
tures as a percent of the Federal budget, 
our defense budget today is lower than it 
has been since the late 1940's and early 
1950's. So that we have made very strong 

reductions. , ,, ^ u „ ' 

But the President has insisted that when i, 
we determine what our force levels shall be, , 
those force levels shall be stationed where 
they will do the most good, they will be de- 
ployed where they do the most good. 

We hear a lot, for example, about bring- 
ing our boys back from Europe. WeH, "o^- 
iust what is involved in this issue? What is 
involved basically is this: If we brought 
our troops back from Europe, if we took our 
6th Fleet out of the Mediterranean, we would 
no longer be able to convince our European 
allies that we are a staunch ally, that we are 
o-oing to back them, that our nuclear um- 
brella is a shield for peace over them, that 
thev can safelv resist pressures from Russia_ 
The net result would l)e that the nations of 
western Europe, which is fragmented polit- 
icallv still, would l^e competing with each 
other for the favor of Russia. The Russian 
influence would spread more and more over 
western Europe. Our influence would wane 
more and more. And we in time, I thmk, 
would find ourselves in a very weakened ana 
unsatisfactory position. 

Department of State Bulletin 

But, moreover, assuming that we have the 
force levels that we think we have and de- 
ploy them where they will do the most good, 
it doesn't cost us any more to have them in 
Europe than it does to have those same 
troops in the United States. 

Today the total cost of maintaining our 
forces in Europe, including the 6th Fleet, 
runs around $4 billion a year. If we brought 
all those troops home and took the 6th Fleet 
out of the Mediterranean, we would prob- 
ably save about $400 million, or 10 percent. 
But if we brought them home and at the 
same time had dual bases so that they could 
go back in case of need, so that we would 
have to position equipment there and bases, 
it might cost us over $1 billion a year more 
to have them here than it would in Europe. 
So we wouldn't save any money — unless we 
disarmed. And if we disarm, we then would 
be lowering our force levels to a point where, 
in the President's opinion, it would not be 
safe for us to weaken ourselves to this 

We must remember of course, without be- 
ing frightening, that while we have 2.3 mil- 
lion forces under arms, the Russians have 
over 4 million and the Chinese have over 3.5 
million ; that in nuclear weapons the Russians 
certainly have a rough parity, and under the 
five-year agreement they have roughly IV2 
times as many SLBM's and ICBM's [sub- 
marine-launched ballistic missiles; intercon- 
tinental ballistic mi-ssiles] as we have or are 
permitted to have. Now, they would have had 
many more without the agreement, because 
they have had an on-going nuclear program 
since 1964 that is just I'eaching the peak of 
its momentum, where in 1966 we decided to 
build no more nuclear weapons but to im- 
prove those v.-e have. Now, this disparity in 
numbers doesn't mean that they are stronger 
than we are. We are much stronger in bomb- 
ers; we are much stronger, we think, in 
•luality; we have many more warheads, be- 
cause of MIRVing — that is, multiple inde- 
pendently targeted warheads on one missile. 
So that we feel quite safe. 

But we cannot afford to become militarily 
inferior to Russia and at the same time hope 
to carry on the objectives of being able to 

negotiate successfully with the Russians, or 
with the Chinese, or with others. 

Well, with those few remarks, I will be 
very pleased to have your questions. 


Q. You spoke of our nuclear umbrella and 
you spoke about our nuclear force generally. 
From your present job, not necessarily your 
most recent one, Mr. Secretary,^ do you favor 
our going all-out immediately with mxixi- 
mum accuratization and maximum techno- 
logical improvement of our Minuteman force 

Deputy Secretary Rush: We have a care- 
fully planned progi-am. We are not going 
all-out at all. But we have a research and de- 
velopment program and a conversion of our 
Minuteman and a program of MIRVing our 
Minuteman that we think is satisfactory. It 
is not all-out. But we maintain our quality 
and we must maintain our strength. 

Now, actually, according to our best fig- 
ures, the Russians spend more on research 
and development in the defense field than we 
do. The Russians do not have MIRV's. They 
are working veiy hard to get them. They 
may not be too far away from having them. 
If they did MIRV, of course the already very 
powerful force they have would be further 
strengthened. But we are not going all-out. 
We are adopting what I would call a good, 
sound program of research and of MIRVing 
our Minuteman. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, u-hat is the legal and 
constitutional justification for the continued 
bombing of Cambodia? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: As you know, the 
President has been working very hard to 
bring about peace in Indochina. And as I 
mentioned earlier, he has been very success- 
ful in this. In Viet-Nam the troops are out, 
the prisoners are l)ack, we have a cease-fire. 
We have a cease-fire in Laos. We do not yet 
have a in Cambodia, although the 
Cambodian Government has offered a cease- 

' Deputy Secretary Rush was Deputy Secretary 
of Defense from Feb. 22, 1972, to Feb. 2, 197.3. 

April 23, 1973 


fire to the opposing side ; and fighting is con- 
tinuing. The President is doing what he 
thinks is best to bring about peace there. 
Now, I have not personally gone into the 
legal problems as to the bases for the various 
things we do in the evolving picture in Viet- 
Nam, and I would like to defer answering 
that question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was note, of 
course, that iti the very near future the four- 
party overseeing operations by the various 
governments in Viet-Nam ivill be ended. 
There has been talk recently that there have 
been secret talks in Saigon involving the 
continuation of that four-party agreement. 
What can be done and what will be done if 
the four-party agreement and if the four- 
party overseeing organization is not there 
to make sure that peace is kept in Southeast 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, the Four- 
Party Military Commission has been very 
successful. Its life will expire and will not 
be extended at the end of the month. That 
Commission has done a great deal. Under 
that we have seen the release of our prison- 
ers of war. We have seen the release of the 
prisoners of war between the Viet-Nam 
parties. We have seen all of our troops with- 
draw from South Viet-Nam. We have seen 
the establishment of the six points of entry 
for materiel. And we have seen great prog- 
ress made under that Commission. 

Now, the next thing, of course, is the Two- 
Party Commission, and some progress is 
being made to have the Two-Party Commis- 
sion supercede the Foui'-Party Commission. 

Q. In Asia we have the impression that 
the negotiation part bi'ought all of the allies 
of the United States to lose, and tve lose all 
our best allies, like Taiwan, Viet-Nam — all 
these countries have the impression they are 
deserted by the United States noiv; it is like 
abandoned. Mr. Secretary, you .speak about 
the strength and the peace in Asia. Most of 
the people have the impression that the with- 
drawal of the United States is dangerous for 
all the allies who are the strongest allies of 
the United States. 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, the Presi- 
dent's program, under the Nixon doctrine, as 
you know, is that we stick to all our alliances, 
we do not abandon our friends, we expect our 
allies to take care of internal problems them- 
selves, if they are threatened from without 
we will help them. But we are not in any 
sense abandoning Taiwan or any of our al- 
lies. In fact, as far as peace is concerned 
and the hope of peace, the President's trip 
to Peking went a long way to insuring peace 
in Asia and went a long way to insuring the 
security of Taiwan. I think as a result of the 
President's visit to Peking, and his very suc- 
cessful visit also to Moscow, both Moscow 
and China have reevaluated what are our 
objectives. They realize that we were not in 
Viet-Nam, in South Viet-Nam, for any kind 
of imperialistic purpose. We were there to 
pi-otect an independent country fighting for 
its freedom. We were not there to fight Rus- 
sia ; we were not there to fight China. I 
think this realization was a very important 
thing in the changed attitude that Russia 
and China have had toward peace in Viet- 
Nam and their willingness to cooperate in 
bringing about that peace. 

I think also the fact that the President 
has been able to show the Chinese what our 
real objectives are — namely, peace — is a pro- 
tection for all of our allies, including Taiwan. 

Q. Sir, does the administration foresee 
any conditions that will alter congressional 
opposition to the granting of the most- 
favored-nation (MFN) status to Riissia in 
light of its policy noiv irith its exit visas? 
If )iot, can the Administration continue in 
its attempt to secure the MFN for the Rus- 
sian nation? ^ 

Deputy Secretary Rush: We all, of course, 
know of the Jackson amendment, which pro- 
vides that most-favored-nation treatment 
cannot be given to a state economy, a state- 
controlled economy, if there are these re- 
strictions on emigration. 

The great purpose that we have with 
regard to Russia and the emigration of the 
Jews is to maximize that emigration and to 
maximize it across all classes of people, edu- 
cated as well as poor and uneducated. Now, 


Department of State Bulletin 

great progress has been made. Just about 
three years apo, four years ago, only about 
2,000 a year were leaving Russia. Last year 
about 32,000 left. This year they are leaving 
at the rate of about 2,500 a month, as of 
now — so that great progress has been made. 

The Russians have also shown I think a 
very commendable flexibility in their law, so 
that they are now waiving the tax, the edu- 
cation tax, levied on emigrants. Of course, 
this tax apiilies not just to the Jews but to 
anyone who wants to emigrate from Russia — 
the Latvians, the Lithuanians, anyone else. 

In my opinion, there is grave danger that 
we might, by pressing too hard legislatively, 
bring about a counterproductive reaction 
where you might promote antisemitism in 
Russia and we might stop this very favor- 
able progress toward emigration in Russia. 

What we want is to do whatever we can to 
have the free emigration of Jews from Rus- 
sia, educated or uneducated. We think the 
best way to do this is not to limit the grant- 
ing of MFN, not to tie it to the exit tax. Now, 
of course people have differing opinions on 
this depending upon their evaluation of what 
is the best way to reach our objectives. 

We would hope for and we expect a very 
responsible attitude on the part of the Con- 
gress toward this, and we would hope that 
we will go forward on our proposed MFN 
treatment of Russia and at the same time 
that this tax will be waived by the Russians. 
Just how this will evolve I cannot forecast 
at this time, but I am optimistic. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ?» the groiving Third 
World, Lihyn's Qndhafi, who /.<? involved with 
us I guess economically and politically, is 
quoted recently as sayivg "God damn Amer- 
ica." What do you say to Mr. Qadhafi? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well. I would say 
Mr. Qadhafi is wrong if he said that. [Laugh- 
ter.] Mr. Qadhafi, of course, may not be our 
clo.sest friend, but we .still maintain relations 
with Libya. We had a little incident recently 
where there was an attempted attack made 
on one of our planes, a C-130, but no damage 
resulted ; and we protested very strongly on 
this, as you know, and refused to accept the 
reply of the Libyans. 

We, of course, have economic interests in 
Libya. We are friends of the Libyan people. 
We are friends of all people. And I would 
hope that Mr. Qadhafi, if he said that, will 
change his mind. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your excellent presen- 
tation you are using the term "Russia" and 
"Russian," and not "Soviet." I wonder 
whether if has any political meaning; that is, 
the recognition of the fact that the U.S.S.R. 
is really not a union of equal Republics 
but that Russia is dom.inating nil other 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, I don't want 
to interfere in the internal affairs of Rus- 
sia— [laughter] of the U.S.S.R. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there hns been some con- 
versation about possible economic aid to 
North Viet-Nam folloiving the successful 
withdrawal of our troops. Could you com- 
ment at this time on what promises possibly 
tvere given ivith regard to economic aid to 
North Viet-Nam and tvhat part did that play 
in the cease-fire? 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, I have noth- 
ing to add to what has been stated by Dr. 
Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs] 
and others with regard to the negotiations 
with Viet-Nam. 

We do not have our program of aid to 
North Viet-Nam. But I feel very strongly 
that one of the best ways to peace in South- 
east Asia is for us to cooperate in the reha- 
bilitation of North Viet-Nam. 

You all remember, of course, historically 
that aftei' World War I Germany was pros- 
trate and the allies did very little to correct 
this. She .saved herself from communism 
against great odds, but she went into some- 
thing even worse or just as bad; and that 
was through the poverty that followed and 
the disruption of life that followed in Ger- 
many we had Hitler, and we had another 

After World War U we adopted a very 
different approach. Our former enemies, 
Japan and Germany — once again in this case 
Germany — were devastated, much more so 

April 23, 1973 


than after World War I. But we stepped in 
and helped rehabilitate Japan and Germany. 
Today two of our closest allies are Japan 
and Germany. They are two of the greatest 
contributors to peace in the world. 

Now, the contrast, I think, can be applied 
to North Viet-Nam. In North Viet-Nam we 
have men who have been in power for over 
30 years. They have known almost nothing 
but war. They are turning, we hope, toward 
peace. We want to help North Viet-Nam turn 
toward peace. How is the best way to do it? I 
think the lessons we learned after World War 
II are the ones that should be applied to North 
Viet-Nam. And I feel very strongly that we 
want to have a peaceful North Viet-Nam 
and we want to have peace in Indochina and 
in the rest of the world. 

Q. Earlier Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, 
Assistant Secretary for- Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs~\ again advocated open- 
ing the Suez Canal as an interim first step 
toward a full agreement in the Middle East. 
He didn't discuss the impact of the opening 
on. the national security of the United States. 
I wonder if any consideration has been given 
in this proposal toward the demilitarization 
of the canal or a restriction on military — 
that is, transit of naval vessels. I ask this 
question because, as you know, coming from 
the Pentagon, there is a feeling there that 
the opening of the canal tvould facilitate 
Soviet penetration in the Persian Gulf and 
the Indian Ocean. 

Deputy Secretary Rusk: Yes — of course 
one can go through the canal much quicker 
than he can go around the cape. But our pri- 
mary objective in the Middle East is to in- 
sure the peace and to bring about a just 
peace. Now, our feeling is that the way to 
accomplish this — because the positions there, 
as they were in Berlin and as they were be- 
fore the President went to China and as they 
have been in so many cases, seem to be ir- 
reconcilable — the best way to accomplish this 
is to take interim steps leading toward a 
peace and to get the two parties, or to get 
the parties, to talking to each other. The act 
of communication leads to better understand- 
ing, leads to a modification of objectives, and 

gradually might lead to an accommodation. 
I do not feel the security picture would be 
very much affected whether the Suez Canal 
is opened or closed. But I do feel that it is 
very, very important to get Egypt and the 
Israelis talking to each other, taking interim 
steps leading toward peace and toward an 
ultimate settlement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently we sent Ambas- 
sador [David K. E.'] Bruce to China, and I 
understand the Chinese have sent someone 
here. And I am wondering ivhat we can look 
forward to in the immediate future as a re- 
sult of that exchange, what the immediate 
objectives of this are, and maybe the long- 
range objectives. 

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, Mr. Bruce 
has not yet gone but he is going to go, and 
the Chinese have not yet arrived but they 
are going to arrive. These will be very broad 
based. They are called liaison offices ; they are 
not trade offices, they are liaison offices. And 
they will have a broad scope of power. They 
will not be diplomatic offices in the strict 
sense of the term or in the technical sense of 
the term. But the range of subjects that will 
be covered by these offices will be very, very 
broad. I would hope that from this liaison, 
from this relationship — and these two offices 
will symbolize it — we will go forward toward 
normalizing our relations with China more 
and more, which will lead not only to more 
peaceful relations around the world, but also 
will lead to benefits in trade, in cultural ex- 
change, in environmental improvements, and 
all the things that come from a close inter- 
course and cooperation between great powers. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that we 
presumably still have a technological edge in 
7nissiles. Noiv, I have noticed that certain of 
our export policies to the Soviet Union favor 
a narrowing at the very least of this techno- 
logical edge. We have helped them out in 
computers, we have helped them out in pre- 
cision ball bearings; in fact, one type of ball 
bea)Jng which is used, I understand, exclu- 
sively in stable platforms. The plant that 
makes them, is now loorking for Russia — this 
is up in Vermont. Could you please explain 
that policy? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Deputy Secretary Rtish: I have a farm in 
Vermont, so I welcome a fellow \'ermonter — 
if you are one — although I am not a citizen 
of Vermont. 

But in any event, COCOM [Coordinating 
Committee on Export Controls (Paris)] is 
still working. We still work with our allies 
to keep stiategic materials from reaching 

Now, one could say that anything that is 
done by way of trade contributes to the mili- 
tary strength of the other party, whether it 
is food, cement for roads, ball l)earings. all 
this sort of thing. But I think our policy 
very wisely, both in COCOM and in our own 
country, is in essence not to cut off trade with 
Russia on anything that they can get else- 
where or with regard to things that have no 
direct bearing on military strength. Other- 
wise we will never develop good trade rela- 
tions, which I think is the way to peace. 

I have been deeply involved in this per- 
sonally, and I do not think that our trade 
policies ai'e undercutting our technological 
edge in defense. 

Finding of Eligibility for Purchases 
Under Foreign Military Sales Act 

Presidk.ntial Determination 73-10 ' 

Eligibility for the Pirchase of Defense Articles 
Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as 

Memorandum for thi" Secretary of .State 

The White House, 

Washington, January 2, 1973. 

In accordance with the recommendations in your 

memorandum of December 4, I hereby find pursuant 

to Section :!(a)(l) of the ForeigTi Military Sales 

.\ct, as amended, that the sale of defense articles 

an<l defense services to: FAR EAST: Australia, 
Brunei, Burma. Camt)o<lia, Republic of China, Indo- 
nesia, Japan. Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Republic 
of Soutli Vietnam; El'ROPE: .Austria, BelRium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit- 
zerland, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia; WESTERN 
HEMISPHERE: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
AFRICA: Cameroon, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Mali, 
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Upper 
Volta, Republic of Zaire; NEAR EAST AND 
SOUTH ASIA: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Greece, In- 
dia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nepal, 
Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka 
(Ceylon), Turkey, the United .Arab Emirates, Ye- 
ZATIONS: NATO and its agencies, the United 
Nations and its agencies, and the Organization of 
American States, will strengthen the security of the 
United States and promote world peace. 

In the implementation of Section 9 of Public Law 
91-672, as amended, you are authorized on my be- 
half to determine whether the proposed transfer of 
a defense article by a foreign country or interna- 
tional organization to any foreign country or inter- 
national organization not included in the foregoing 
enumeration will strengthen the security of the 
United States and promote world peace. 

In order that the Congress may be informed of the 
implementation of the Foreign Military .Sales Act, 
you are requested on my behalf to report this find- 
ing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
and to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee. 


' .38 Fed. Reg. 7211. 

April 23, 1973 


The Current Situation in the Middle East 

Remarks by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and Soidh Asian Affairs^ 

As we view the Middle East today, the 
plausible argument could be made that the 
status quo in the area has improved over 
what it has been in the last several years: 

— The U.S.-negotiated cease-fire between 
Egypt and Israel is already in its 30th month. 
As uneasy as it is, nevertheless, it continues 
to hold. 

— -Second, contrasted with what the situa- 
tion was in the crisis period of September 
1970, the situation in Jordan is perhaps more 
stable today than it has been at any time 
since the June war of 1967. 

— Third, along the Lebanese-Israeli border 
there has been a progressive reduction of 
the number of incidents, and our hope would 
be that in time this border can truly become 
a border of quiet and tranquillity. Even along 
the Syrian-Israeli border, where one reads 
from time to time about incidents, actions, 
counteractions, while we continue to view 
these incidents with concei'n, our hope and 
expectation is they will not mushroom into 
something which is more serious and which 
could embrace other elements in a Middle 
East imbroglio. 

— And above all, I believe the possibility 
of confrontation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union over the Middle East 
has been sharply reduced. There are two rea- 
sons : first, the results of the discussions that 
were held with the Soviets at the summit 
last May; and second, the reduced Soviet 

^ Made before the national foreign policy confer- 
ence for editors and broadcasters at the Department 
of State on Mar. 29. 


presence in Egypt brought about by the de- 
cision taken by the Egyptian Government 
last summer in turn has reduced the likeli- 
hood of confrontation in the Middle East be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet Union. 

I mentioned the summit discussions last 
May. You will recall that at the end of those 
discussions a communique was issued which 
reaflirmed that both the United States and 
the Soviet Union continue to seek as an ob- 
jective a political solution of the Arab-Israeli 
dispute based on the November 1967 Security 
Council resolution, a resolution that, you will 
recall, laid down not a blueprint for a solu- 
tion but rather a framework of principles 
within which an agreement presumably could 
1)6 achieved on the basis of negotiations be- 
tween the parties.^ Alongside what appeared 
to be an anodyne communique limited largely 
to reaffirming the political objective of a 
peaceful solution was a declaration of prin- 
ciples which was adopted at that summit, the 
main principle of which was that both major 
powers should try to avoid any confrontation 
over such troubled areas as the Middle East." 

In practical terms what the communique 
meant was this : While there was not a meet- 
ing of the minds between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union as to what might constitute a 
fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the 
fact of the matter is that both were agreed 

- For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Dec. 
18, 1967, p. 843. 

■' For texts of the Basic Principles of Relations 
and of the joint communique issued at Moscow May 
29, 1972, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 898 and 
p. 899. 

Department of State Bulletin 


I that the political objective should continue to 
"^ be a resolution of the jirohlem by peaceful 
means i-ather than l)y force and with empha- 
sis on no confiontation between the major 
powers. In effect this meant that both powers 
were sayinp that both should do whatever 
they could to try to maintain the present 
cease-fire that exists in the area while 
further efforts are made to try to make some 
practical progress toward a solution. 1 
believe the major powers were saying in that 
conmuini(|ue that whatever the differences 
might be regarding the substance of a settle- 
ment, both were agreed that the Middle East 
should not l)e an area over which there should 
be confrontation between us. This reflects a 
parallelism of interest between the United 
States and the Soviet Union that the present 
status quo, as uneasy as it might be, should 
not become the focus of future confrontation 
between us. 

Series of Discussions With Middle East Leaders 

Now, I said that you could make a plau- 
sible argument that the status quo has been 
very considerably improved, and I believe it 
has despite the recent tragic occurrences in 
the area. However, it would be a mistake to 
view the current situation in the Middle East 
with a complacent attitude. It is true that the 
cease-fii-e is now in its 30th month, but if 
we need a cogent reminder of how fragile 
is the cease-fire we need only recall the recent 
shooting down of a Libyan aircraft and the 
recent murders of our diplomats in Khar- 
toum. Moreover, from the point of view of 
the United States, as long as the "no war, 
no peace" situation continues, with all of the 
instability, our national interests cannot be 
pursued with maximum effectiveness. 

The United States, of course, has a special 
relationship with Israel. We have consistently 
supi)oi'ted the security of the State of Israel. 
At the same time we should bear in mind 
that the overall interests of the United States 
go beyond any one nation in the area. We 
have important political, economic, and stra- 
tegic interests that broadly the 
area. We will continue to support the .security 
of the State of Isi-ael. At the same time, we 

will continue to do everything feasible to 
develo]) and to nurture and to sti-engthen our 
relationships with the individual Arab states, 
because the present instability in the area 
is too risky, too fragile, too dangerous. The 
only entirely satisfactory answer is the 
eventual achievement of a stable, just, and 
durable peace — a peace in which both sides 
are committed on the basis of an exchange of 
obligations between them and both sides have 
adopted a fundamental attitude of coexist- 
ence and live-and-let-live. 

What are the prospects? We have had an 
important series of discussions with various 
leaders of the Middle East during the month 
of February. 

In the first instance King Hussein was 
here, and these discussions afforded us an 
opportunity for a full exchange of views on 
the current situation in the Middle East and 
a number of important aspects of our bi- 
lateral relationships. I can summarize these 
discussions in this way : Jordan made clear to 
us that it feels it has adopted and will con- 
tinue to adopt a relatively flexible posture 
regarding the question of a solution and it 
would like to see the United States actively 
and constructively involved in helping to 
l)ring about a settlement. 

Insofar as our discussions with the Egyp- 
tians, some of you may know we have had 
here in Washington a visit fi-om the National 
Security Adviser of the Egyptian Govern- 
ment. [Hafez] Ismail. discussions were 
useful and i)rovided an excellent opportunity 
for an in-depth exchange of views regarding 
the situation in the Middle and the 
possibilities for diplomacy which currently 
may exist. It is no secret that the Egyptian 
repre.sentative did not come with any new 
proposals. President Sadat confirmed this in 
his speech just 48 hours ago. But I believe, 
as the Egyptian representative him.self indi- 
cated publicly, that the discussions did 
contribute to a better atmosphere in our rela- 
tions. While no new doors were opened as a 
result of in-depth di-scussions, I can 
report to you that no doors were closed 
either and the possibilities of diplomacy in 
the future remain open. I would also make 

April 23, 1973 


this same judgment in the aftermath of the 
recent visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to 
this country just a couple of weeks ago. 

Interim Suez Canal Agreement 

Now, the impasse we face can be described 
very simply. In our judgment, the chasm on 
the overall settlement is too broad to bridge 
in the foreseeable future. The Egyptian posi- 
tion is: not one inch of territory by way of 
any concessions. The Israeli position is that 
in order for their security concerns to be 
met, substantial territorial adjustments are 
required. As long as both sides adhere firmly 
to these two positions, we frankly do not see 
the gap being bridged in the foreseeable 

For this reason, we continue to believe that 
the approach must be a more modest ap- 
proach, that the most feasible approach to 
peace continues to be a step-by-step ap- 
proach. And for this reason we continue to 
feel that, with the doors of diplomacy re- 
maining open, perhaps the most practical 
approach continues to be that of trying to 
achieve a so-called interim Suez Canal agree- 
ment. Such an intermediate agreement would 
involve the opening of the Suez Canal, an 
extended cease-fire, and some Israeli with- 
drawal east of the Canal. 

With respect to an interim agreement, 
Israel has agreed to engage without precon- 
ditions in indirect negotiations between 
Israel and Egypt under the aegis of the 
United States. The Egyptian position is that 
before it could agree to engage in such in- 
direct negotiations there must be a prior 
commitment by Israel to total evacuation 
from Egyptian territory. We have over the 
past 18 months tried to make clear that we 
feel that this kind of a prior commitment is 

We do understand and appreciate, how- 
ever, the Egyptian view that any interim 
Suez Canal agreement should not become an 
end in itself. We understand this because an 
interim agreement obviously leaves unre- 
solved not only a number of important 
territorial and security questions on the 
Egyi^tian-Israeli aspect of the settlement but 

it leaves untouched the multifarious and 
intricate and complex questions that relate to 
the Jordanian-Israeli aspect of the question. 
An interim agreement, for example, does not 
touch the fundamental question of the Pales- 
tine problem, and we don't believe any 
durable peace is achievable unless such a 
peace not only meets the legitimate concerns 
of both the established Arab and Israeli 
states but of the Palestinians as well ; an 
interim agreement does not touch the crucial 
question of the West Bank ; an interim agree- 
ment does not touch the crucial question of 
Jerusalem which is so complicated because 
there are so many interests involved. 

And it is for this reason we feel that any 
interim agreement should and must be a 
step toward an overall settlement. In other 
words, we continue to maintain that the most 
practical and feasible approach is the step- 
by-step approach involving the modest objec- 
tive of the opening of the Canal and some 
Israeli withdrawal, and we consider that such 
a step in fact would be a significant practical 
test of peace on the ground, a practical test 
of peace on the ground which would maxi- 
mize the opportunities for further subsequent 
efforts toward an overall settlement. Our 
view that any interim agreement must be 
linked to the November 1967 Security Council 
resolution has long been the position of the 
United States. So it is a very modest ap- 
proach we have in mind for the foreseeable 

Energy Needs and the Middle East 

I will make one other overall observation 
because it is a matter that is on so many 
people's minds. I said that we have important 
and significant overall political, economic, 
and strategic interests in this area. And of 
course the question of oil inevitably comes 
up, and access to oil by the Western world, 
including the United States. 

At the outset, in terms of the energy situ- 
ation in the future. I believe it is important 
that we Americans bear in mind a couple of 

First of all, in the long range — and I em- 
phasize in the long range — I believe that we 


Department of State Bulletin 

nave the resources in this country on an 
all-resource basis to meet our future needs — 
and when I say this I mean oil, I mean gas, 
I mean fusion. I mean ooal. I mean shale, and 
so on. So we have the capacity to develop 
whatever we need in the long- range, and it is 
important for us to keep this in mind. 

Second, it is not in the national interest 
I if the United States to be overly reliant on 
any one source or any one area for our en- 
orgy needs. It is not in our interest on se- 
curity grounds; it is not in our interest on 
economic grounds, and specifically I have in 
mind the question of balance of payments. 
Now having said that, obviously we have 
some difficult decisions domestically as well 
as internationally that face us. and my ex- 
pectation is that there will be at an appro- 
priate time an overall statement of policy 
on this by the President. 

But the question that inevitably arises is 
this: How does the question of oil get related 
to the whole question of the Arab-Israeli dis- 
laite? And here I think one can take either 
an overly ojitimistic or overly pessimistic 
view of the situation. You can dismiss this 
aspect out of hand, which I think would be 
foolhardy. On the other hand, I think you 
can overdraw the possible implications and 
distort what I consider to be the reality of 
the situation. 

I believe there is a mutuality of interests 
that has been manifest over the past number 
of decades between producers and consumers 
of oil. Most of you know that there have 
been adjustments occurring in the financial 
arrangements between the jiroducer and the 
consumer; for example, recently an agree- 
ment between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and 
the oil companies on the basis of 25 percent 
participation, with 51 percent anticipated 
perhaps in the eighties sometime. There is 
also a new understanding being negotiated 
between the Government of Iran and the oil 
companies which embraces a so-called sales 
contract approach, with the Iranian Govern- 
ment doing a good deal more than it has in 
the past in the actual production and 
management of the oil installations. 

I don't sav that the economic relationships. 

the financial relationships, are not in flux 
and are not apt to change; they have been 
changing in the past and are likely to change 
in the future, and I think this adju.stment 
will go on. But I have .serious doubts that 
the mutuality of interests between the pro- 
ducer and the consumer will in fact be jeop- 
ardized on the basis of whatever differences 
there may or may not be over the question 
of the Arab-Israeli dispute and particularly 
if we in this country face up to the kind of 
decisions required to assure that in the long 
range we are not overly reliant on any one 
area or any one source for our energy needs. 

Dr. Franklin Visits South America 
as Lincoln Lecturer 

The Department of State announced on 
April 2 (press release 96) that John Hope 
Franklin, distinguished black historian and 
educator, was touring several countries in 
South America March 26-April 28 as a U.S. 
Government Lincoln Lecturer. Dr. Franklin, 
chairman of the Department of History at 
the University of Chicago, was to speak 
before audiences in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Venezuela. (For biographic data, see 
press release 96.) 

The Lincoln Lectureships were announced 
by President Nixon August 1, 1972, in a 
letter to Dr. James H. Billington, Chairman 
of the Presidentially appointed Board of 
Foreign Scholarships.' That date marked the 
completion of 25 years of educational 
exchange under the Fulbright-Hays Act. 

Dr. Franklin is one of four Americans 
selected to be Lincoln Lecturers during the 
1972-73 academic year. The others are: 
Charles H. Townes. Nobel Prize physicist and 
professor at the University of California at 
Berkeley; John H. Updike, author, Ipswich, 
Mass.; and Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel Prize 
economist of the Massachusetts Institute of 

' For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Sept. 4, 
1972, p. 252. 

April 23, 1973 


U.S. Passports Remain Invalid 
for Travel to Certain Areas 

Following are the texts of three public 
notices which were published in the Federal 
Register on March 23. 

Public Notice 382 > 

Travel Into or Through Cuba 
Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports 
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use 
of U.S. passports for travel into or through Cuba 
remains restricted. To permit unrestricted travel 
would be incompatible with the resolutions adopted 
at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American 
States, of which the United States is a member. At 
this meeting, held in Washington from July 21 to 
26, 1964, it was resolved that the governments of 
the American States not maintain diplomatic, con- 
sular, trade, or shipping relations with Cuba under 
its present government. This resolution was reaf- 
firmed in the Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of For- 
eign Affairs of the OAS held in September 1967, 
which adopted resolutions calling upon Member 
States to apply strictly the recommendations per- 
taining to the movement of funds and arms from 
Cuba to other American nations. Among other 
things, this policy of isolating Cuba was intended 
to minimize the capability of the Castro government 
to carry out its openly proclaimed programs of sub- 
versive activities in the Hemisphere. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into 
or through Cuba unless specifically validated for such 
travel under the authority of the Secretary of State. 
This public notice shall expire on June 25, 1973, 
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.= 
Effective date. This notice becomes effective on 
March 23, 1973. 

Dated: March 20, 1973. 


William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State. 

recognized by the U.S. as well as by U.N. resolution 
as the only lawful government in Korea, the De- 
partment of State believes that wholly unrestricted 
travel by American citizens to North Korea would 
seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or 
through North Korea unless specifically validated 
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary 
of State. 

This public notice shall expire on June 25, 1973, 
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice. 

Effective date. This Notice becomes effective on 
March 23, 1973. 

Public Notice 383 ' 

Travel Into or Through North Korea 
Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports 
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use 
of U.S. passports for travel into or through North 
Korea remains restricted. In view of the continued 
hostility of the North Korean regime toward the 
United States, the unsettled situation along the Mil- 
itary Demarcation Line, and the special position of 
the Government of the Republic of Korea which is 


Dated: March 20, 



William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State. 

Public Notice 384^ 

Travel Into or Through North Viet-Nam 

Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports 
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), the 
use of U.S. passports for travel into or through 
North Vietnam remains restricted. In the aftermath 
of the signing on January 27, 1973, of the Agree- 
ment on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam, tensions continue to be high and conditions 
unsettled in the Indo-China area. The Peace Agree- 
ment envisages that the implementation of the 
Agreement will create conditions for establishing a 
new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship be- 
tween the United States and North Vietnam. How- 
ever, the development of such a new relationship is 
still in its earliest stages. In these circumstances 
the Department of State believes that unrestricted 
travel by American citizens to North Vietnam would 
seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or 
through North Vietnam unless specifically validated 
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary 

of State. 

This public notice shall expire on June 25, 1973, 
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice. 

Effective date. This Notice becomes effective on 
March 23, 1973. 

Dated: March 20, 1973. 


William P. Rogers, 

Secretary of State. 

' 38 Fed. Reg. 7588. 

" A correction was printed in the Federal Register 
of Mar. 27 concerning these three notices. The ex- 
piration dates, which in each case appear in the 
paragraph preceeding the -Effective date" para- 
graph have been incorrectly calculated. These dates, 
now reading "June 25, 1973," should read "Septem- 
ber 25, 1973." 

' 38 Fed. Reg. 7589. 

Department of State Bulletin 

President Nixon Modifies 
Oil Import Program 

A proclamation- 
Modifying Proclamation No. 3279, Relating to 
Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products 

The Chairman of the Oil Policy Committee, in the 
exercise of his responsibility to maintain a constant 
surveillance of imports of petroleum and its primary 
(li-rivatives in respect to the national security, and 
after consultation with the Oil Policy Committee, 
has informed me that, in his opinion, the following 
circumstance indicates a need for further Presiden- 
tial action under section 2.S2 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862), as amended, namely: 

Petitions now pending before the Oil Import Ap- 
peals Board for relief in the form of grants of allo- 
cations of imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and 
finished products would, if acted upon favorably by 
the Board, exceed in the aggregate the limits of the 
maximum levels of imports established in section 2 
of Proclamation No. ■S279, as amended; and, in order 
that the Board shall be in position to consider such 
petitions on their merits, the Board should be em- 
powered, without regard to such maximum levels, to 
modify, on the grounds of exceptional hardship, any 
allocation made to any person under regulations 
issued pursuant to section 3 of Proclamation No. 
3279, as amended; to grant allocations of imports 
of crude oil and unfinished oils in special circum- 
-'.ances to persons with importing histories who do 
not qualify for allocations under such regulations; 
and to grant allocations of imports of finished 
products on the grounds of exceptional hardship to 
persons who do not qualify for allocations under 
such regulations. 

The Chairman of the Oil Policy Committee, after 
the consultation referred to and in the light of the 
circumstance mentioned, has recommended that sec- 
tion 4 of Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, be 
amended as hereinafter provided. 

The Chairman has found that the national secu- 
rity will not be adversely affected by the Presi- 
dential action which he has recommended. 

I agree with the findings and recommentlations of 
the Chairman and deem it necessary and consistent 
with the national security objectives of Proclama- 
tion No. 3279, as amended, that section 4 of Proc- 
lamation No. 3279, as amended, be amended as 
hereinafter provided. 

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, acting under and by 
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti- 
tution and laws of the United States, including sec- 
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do 
hereby proclaim that, effective as of this date, para- 
graph (b) of section 4 of Proclamation No. 3279, 
as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows: 

"(b) The Appeals Board may be empowered (1) 
within the limits of the maximum levels of imports 
established in section 2 of this proclamation, to mod- 
ify on the grounds of error any allocation made to 
any person under such regulations; (2) without re- 
gard to the limits of the maximum levels of imports 
established in section 2 of this proclamation, (i) to 
modify, on the grounds of exceptional hard.ship, any 
allocation made to any person under such regula- 
tions; (ii) to grant allocations of imports of crude 
oil and unfinished oils in special circumstances to 
persons with importing histories who do not qualify 
for allocations under such regulations; and (iii) to 
grant allocations of imports of finished products on 
the grounds of exceptional hardship to persons who 
do not qualify for allocations under such regula- 
tions; and (3) to review the revocation or suspen- 
sion of any allocation or license. The Secretary may 
provide that the Board may take such action on 
petitions as it deems appropriate and that the de- 
cisions by the Appeals Board shall be final." 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-third day of March, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the 
Independence of the United States of .America the 
one hundred ninety-seventh. 

' No. 4202; 38 Fed. Reg. 7977. 

April 23, 1973 



U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council Resolution 
on Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations 

The United Nations Security Council met 
at Panama March 15-21. FoUorving are 
statements made in the Council on March 
20 and 21 by U.S. Representative John Scali, 
together with the text of a draft resolution 
ivhich ivas vetoed by the United States on 
March 21. 


USUN press release 21 dated March 21 

I join previous speakers to express my 
gratitude to the President, the Government, 
and the people of Panama for the admirable 
organization of this meeting by the Pana- 
manian Government and for the welcome 
and hospitality that we have received here. 
It is indeed an exhilarating experience to 
see the determination, dedication, and devo- 
tion of the Panamanian people which is 
evident in the bustling economic activity, 
reflected most visibly in the pace of con- 
struction we see around us. 

"Consideration of measures for the main- 
tenance and strengthening of international 
peace and security in Latin America in 
conformity with the provisions and princi- 
ples of the Charter" — that is the agenda 
item. For more than a century, the nations 
of Latin America have demonstrated an 
enviable and unparalleled record in achiev- 
ing and maintaining international peace and 
security on this continent. They not only 
have avoided major international conflicts 
within the hemisphere but have also created 
a viable framework for the peaceful resolu- 
tion of their diff"erences. Latin American 
statesmen have eloquently set forth princi- 

ples of international consultation and con- 
ciliation springing from the idea and view 
that international conflict in this area can 
and must be resolved peacefully. Many of 
these principles have found their way into 
the United Nations Charter and into the 
practice of the United Nations. 

We note with particular pleasure the 
active role played by the people and leaders 
of our host country, Panama, who have 
been in the forefront of the development of 
the inter-American system since the found- 
ing of their country. In fact, the first seeds 
of pan-Americanism were planted here by 
Simon Bolivar, at the Panama Congress 
of 1826. 

Mr. President, the United States sets 
great store by its close and fruitful associa- 
tion with the countries of Latin America. 
We fully share their deep and genuine con- 
cern for the continuation of peace, pros- 
perity, political stability, and economic and 
.social development in this hemisphere. 

The countries of this region were among 
the original supporters of the United Na- 
tions and have remained among the most 
faithful and dedicated of its members. All 
of us recognize their role in the United 
Nations and their contributions to interna- 
tional peace and security. Many Latin Amer- 
ican countries have participated directly in 
U.N. peacekeeping operations, operations 
which go to the heart of this organization's 
purposes. All have contributed in many 
ways to the resolution of disputes among 
nations and of the problems confronting 
the world. We are all aware of the high 
competence of Latin American jurists in 
the field of international law and the un- 


Department of State Bulletin 

wavering support in this hemisphere for 
the sanctity of solemn treaty obligations 
even as the search for constructive change 

It is in fact the absence of truly threaten- 
ing international issues within the Latin 
American area which led my government 
to question the necessity of our meeting 
away from U.N. Headquarters at this time. 
Our delegation expressed the views of the 
United States very clearly. Meetings of the 
Security Council, whether at Headquarters 
or away, should be based on its primary 
charter responsibility to maintain inter- 
national peace and security. 

While the Charter of the United Nations 
confers this responsibility on the Secu- 
rity Council, it also provides — indeed, in 
article 33, it specifically enumerates — many 
ways to resolve international issues before 
such matters are brought directly before 
the Council. A look at the efforts now 
underway with regard to nearly all the 
major pi-oblem areas of the Avorld under- 
scores this wide variety of channels, both 
inside and outside the United Nations, 
which can be used to achieve the charter 
goal of practicing tolerance and living 
together in peace with one another as good 
neighbors : 

— The United States and the Soviet Union 
have undertaken with each other to do their 
utmost to avoid military confrontation and 
to respect the -sovereign equality of all 

— The United States and the People's 
Republic of China have undertaken to 
broaden the understanding between their 
peoples, and this process has taken new 
strides in recent weeks. 

— The United States, together with other 
parties to the Viet-Nam conflict, has arrived 
at a cease-fire agreement for Viet-Nam, 
and other interested nations have pledged 
in Paris their full support and cooperation 
in strengthening peace in Indochina. 

— In Europe, the United States is partici- 
pating in preliminary discu.ssions in Helsinki 
and Vienna aimed at specific and practical 
imi)rovements in East-West relations. 

These have all been due in large measure 
to the wise and imaginative leadership of 
our President, Richard Nixon, as he pur- 
sues his great goal of a generation of peace 
for all mankind. 

Because of his diplomatic initiatives, his 
courage to try new approaches, the world 
is on the threshold of cooperation and 
friendship among nations undreamed of just 
a few years ago. 

The Unique Infer-American Community 

In looking back at what has been achieved, 
and forward to what remains to be done, 
one is struck by the vai'iety of means, the 
wealth of institutions, and the host of rela- 
tionships which can be turned to positive 

In this hemisphere our peoples over a 
period of 50 years have establi.shed relation- 
ships that, in our view, make us a unique 
community. There are of course a number 
of bilateral questions in this hemisphere 
that remain unresolved — many have been 
mentioned at this table — but progress is 
being made in many of these through patient 
negotiations. For instance, the United States 
and Panama have been seeking — through 
negotiation — a new status for the Panama 
Canal which would bring it into harmony 
with contemporary political realities. 

With respect to multilateral relationships 
in this hemisphere, the regional institutions 
and ai'rangements we have developed and 
the broad and deep contacts joining our 
governments and our citizens have grown 
into what is now known as the inter- 
American system. That system is character- 
ized not only by formal institutions but also 
by a of solidarity and a community 
of common interests and objectives on which 
we seek to build a lasting foundation for 
truly effective inter-American cooperation. 
We have a common faith in the benefits of 
freedom, the importance of the individual, 
the power of reason, and the rule of law. 
The conclusion that the inter-American 
.system is indeed a foundation of some 
permanence is supported by the significant 

April 23, 1973 


intellectual, economic, security, and political 
ties which further draw us together. 

A system that is both progressive and 
evolving, and is notable for its continuing 
usefulness to its membership, is a system 
which is also able to accommodate diversities. 
The most obvious of these are the different 
cultural backgrounds, economic conditions, 
and political institutions which remind us 
that we are individual nations as well as 
members of a hemisphere community. 

The Organization of American States is 
the keystone of the inter-American system. 
The OAS exists as a regional organization 
within the meaning of chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter. It is also the oldest 
international organization of its kind in the 
world, dating from 1890. It has grown from 
an institution concerned primarily with com- 
mercial affairs into an organization devoted 
to the peace and security of the hemisphere. 
It is also deeply involved in the region's 
economic and .social development, educa- 
tional, scientific, and cultural cooperation, 
human rights, juridical affairs, and tech- 
nical assistance and training, to mention 
but a few. As it has grown, it has increased 
its capacity to achieve its essential purposes ; 
these are to strengthen the peace and secu- 
rity of the continent, to prevent possible 
causes of difficulty, and to insure the peace- 
ful settlement of disputes. It also provides 
for common action on the part of the member 
states in the event of aggression. It assists 
in the search for solutions to political, jurid- 
ical, and economic problems when they 
arise among the members, and in the area 
of development it is concerned with the 
promotion of cooperative social and economic 

The United States has also warmly sup- 
ported the many activities of the United 
Nations in the area of economic and social 
development in Latin America. However, 
for most of the 1960's, the U.S. Government 
was the major external contributor of assist- 
ance to Latin America in seeking its eco- 
nomic and social development. As we agreed 
to do at Punta del Este in 1961, the United 
States provided over $10 billion for the 

development of the American republics dur- 
ing the period 1961-72. We kept our prom- 
ised word. 

In the past few years, the countries of 
Latin America have increased their reliance 
upon the major multilateral lending institu- 
tions for the bulk of their official external 
capital assistance. In recognition of this situ- 
ation, the United States has channeled an 
increasing proportion of its loan funds to 
Latin America through multilateral institu- 
tions, particularly the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank. In December of last year, for 
example, the United States formally signed 
the i-eplenishment agreement under which 
it agreed to provide $1 billion to the 
Fund for Special Operations of the Bank. 
The total flow of U.S. funds through all 
channels, bilateral and multilateral, has 
never been higher. 

As a result, the total assistance received 
by Latin America from all sources is going 
up steadily. The United States has given 
special and increasing attention to the eco- 
nomic and social concerns of the hemisphere. 
Total lending commitments by AID, the 
Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
World Bank to Latin America in 1972 more 
than doubled those of 1964. 

The United States has had a long and 
cordial relationship with the independent 
nations of this hemisphere. Recognizing the 
principle of sovereign equality and respect 
for the right of states to pursue their own 
development, the United States is building 
a constantly evolving relationship with Latin 
America, a relationship which we trust will 
become even more cordial and mutually 

Issues Before Other U.N. Bodies 

Mr. President, I would like to reflect 
briefly regarding the U.S. position on some 
other i.ssues which have been raised in 
statements before the Council. 

The United States has always been, and 
continues to be, a strong advocate of the 
Latin American nuclear-free zone. We signed 
Protocol II of the Treatv for the Prohibition 


Department of State Bulletin 

of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco) on April 1, 1968. The 
protocol went into effect for the United 
States on May 12, 1971. By these actions, 
the United States pledged itself to respect 
the denuclearized status of Latin America, 
not to contribute to any violation of the 
treaty, and not to use or threaten to use 
nuclear weapons against any of the con- 
tracting parties. 

The question of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources is currently an active 
item in the U.N., specifically in the ECOSOC 
[Economic and Social Council] Committee 
on Natural Resources and the Seabed Com- 
mittee. We do not question the principle of 
"pei'manent sovereignty." However, at the 
same time we wish to point out that we do 
not believe that complex issue is properly 
before this Council. In accepting the prin- 
ciple of permanent sovereignty we strongly 
reaffirm our support for the principles of 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803, 
including, inter alia, the observance in good 
' faith of foreign investment agreements, the 
payment of appropriate compensation for 
nationalized property as required by inter- 
national law, and the recognition of arbi- 
tration or international adjudication. 

Similarly, we believe that the question 
of multinational corporations, which has 
been raised in different contexts, should not 
be brought before this Council. It is pres- 
ently under discussion in several other more 
appropriate U.N. bodies. A group of eminent 
individuals, appointed by the Secretary 
Cenerai under ECOSOC Resolution 1721 of 
July 28, 1972, is studying the impact of 
multinational corporations. UNCTAD 
[United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development] is doing a study of the re- 
strictive business practices of multinational 
corporations. Finally, ILO [International 
Labor Organization] is looking into the re- 
lationships of activities of such corporations 
to social policy. We fail to see what the 
Security Council can effectively accomplish 
in this particular field. 

We happen to share the judgment of the 
ECOSOC resolution that these corporations 

"are frequently effective agents for the 
transfer of technology as well as capital to 
developing countries." No country has to 
welcome or even accept foreign investment. 
And if it does so, it of may establish 
its own rules. However, it also has the obli- 
gation, in that case, to abide by those rules, 
to compensate the investor for retroactive 
changes in the rules, or in the case of ex- 
propriation or nationalization of private 
property, to make adequate provision for 
just compensation as required by inter- 
national law. 

Negotiation of New Panama Canal Treaty 

And now I come to discuss U.S. relations 
with Panama. Our close and mutually bene- 
ficial friendship has a long history, charac- 
terized, to be sure, by occasional differences 
and friction. But the bonds linking our two 
peoples continue strong and vibrant. 

We rejoice in the progress achieved by 
Panama; it has been striking. Over the past 
four years the economy has been growing at 
a rate of 7-8 percent, one of the highest 
rates of growth in the world. 

Outside help has contributed to this rate 
of growth, but there has also been a high 
level of labor and investment by the dedi- 
cated Panamanian people. My country is 
happy that it was able in 1972 to disburse 
in various ways approximately $227 million, 
with direct effect, and stimulate the Pana- 
manian economy. In fact, our loans and 
grants to Panama represent the highest 
per capita level of U.S. assistance anywhere 
in the world, in part because of our friend- 
ship but mostly because Panama has demon- 
strated a high capacity to program and 
utilize financial assistance effectively. 

We believe that all mankind has been 
well .served by the Panama Canal since its 
completion nearly 60 years ago. During 
those years it has never been closed, and it 
has been transited by an ever-increasing 
number of ships carrying cargo to and from 
all parts of the world. 

Although the 1903 treaty still governs the 
basic relationship between the United States 
and Panama concerning the canal, that re- 

April 23, 1973 


lationship was significantly revised, as well 
as reaffirmed, in the treaties of 1936 and 
1955. On both occasions the United States 
relinquished important rights and provided 
important new benefits for Panama. 

In 1964, recognizing that a comprehensive 
modernization of our relationship should be 
undertaken, the United States began nego- 
tiations with Panama with three essential 
objectives in view, which remain valid today: 

1. The canal should be available to the 
world's commercial vessels on an equal ba- 
sis at reasonable cost. 

2. So that the canal should serve world 
commerce efficiently, the United States 
should have the right to provide additional 
canal capacity. 

3. The canal should continue to be oper- 
ated and defended by the United States for 
an extended Init specified period of time. 

It was recognized then, as it is today, 
that these objectives would require the con- 
clusion of a new treaty or treaties to replace 
the 1903 treaty and its amendments. By 1967 
three draft treaties had been negotiated and 
agreed to by the two negotiating teams. At 
that time the Panamanian Government did 
not move to ratify the treaties, but in Octo- 
ber of 1970 requested the United States to 
renew negotiations. The United States agreed 
to do so, and negotiations were in fact re- 
newed in June 1971, when the Panamanian 
negotiating team arrived in Washington. 

During the intensive negotiations which 
followed, the United States has fully recog- 
nized that the relationship originally defined 
in the 1903 treaty needs to be brought into 
line with the realities of the world today 
as well as with the mutual interests of both 

The United States is ready to conclude 
a new treaty promptly. At the same time, 
we believe it necessary that the United 
States continue to be responsible for the 
operation and defense of the canal for an 
additional specified period of time, the length 
of which is one of many issues to be nego- 

As a result of the persistent efforts made 
by both sides, significant progress has been 
made in the treaty talks toward reaching 
mutual understanding on major principles. 

Mr. President, I would like to make clear 
that the United States, no less than others 
who have spoken at this table, supports 
Panama's just aspirations. The U.S. nego- 
tiators, cognizant of those aspirations, have 
already recognized that: 

1. The 1903 canal treaty should be re- 
placed by a new modern treaty. 

2. Any new canal treaty should be of 
fixed duration, rejecting the concept of per- 

3. Panama should have returned to it a 
substantial territory now part of the Canal 
Zone, with arrangement for use of other 
areas. Those other areas would be the mini- 
mum required for U.S. operations and de- 
fense of the canal and would be integrated 
into the legal, economic, social, and cultural 
life of Panama on a timetable to be agreed 

4. Panama should exercise its jurisdiction 
in the canal area pursuant to a mutually 
agreed timetable. 

5. Panama should receive substantially 
increased annual payments for the use of its 
tei'ritory relating to the canal. 

Accordingly, those who attack the 1903 
Treaty are attacking a phantom foe, a non- 
existent enemy. The 1903 treaty has already 
been revised significantly to Panama's ad- 
vantage. We were on the verge of changing 
it a third time in 1967, and we are ready to 
change it again — to write a new treaty — 
when negotiations continue in the spirit of 
friendship and cooperation that should be the 
hallmark of Panama-U.S. relations. 

We recognize that much remains to be 
settled ; yet we believe the above points 
represent a substantial foundation of im- 
portant principles and are confident that 
with continued good will by reasonable men 
on both sides, and some patience, a mutually 
.satisfactory treaty can result. 

Mr. President, in reviewing the relation- 


Department of State Bulletin 


ships among the 532 million active and 
dynamic people residing in this hemisphere, 
it would be inconect to leave the impression 
there are no jiroblems or no issues needing 
attention. Obviously there are, as there are 
anywhere. But we know that both the good 
will and the diplomatic machinery already 
exist within the area to resolve these prob- 

The question then arises as to what con- 
tribution the Council can make at this 
meeting and what the Council will carry back 
to United Nations Headquarters as a result 
of its meeting in Latin America. 

For Latin American issues, as for issues 
in other parts of the world, the members 
of the Council must look to what this body 
can actually accomplish, the consistency of 
their proposed actions with the provisions 
of the charter, and their impact on the 
chances of resolving existing differences. 

For the Council to take a partisan stand 
or reflect only a parochial viewpoint would 
risk undermining the pi-ocesses of bilateral 
and regional diplomacy which have served 
this hemisphere so well. 

For the Council to pronounce itself on a 
wider range of issues not directly concerned 
with the maintenance of international peace 
and security risks diluting the results al- 
ready achieved in other United Nations 
organs and would make many question the 
seriousness of the Council's purpose in hold- 
ing its meeting here. 

We have been engaged in discussion since 
March 15, Mr. President, and much of what 
has been said is valuable, constructive, and 
informative. That in itself is a positive ele- 
ment. But this series of meetings can be 
productive, Mr. President, in other ways. 
Tomorrow evening we should be able to 
adjourn to return to New York and say that 
our de]il)erati<)ns have contributed renewed 
vigor to the effective, realistic, and har- 
monious search for the realization of the 
objectives of the United Nations, not only 
in Latin America but everywhere. If we 
{ can do that, Mr. President, then these meet- 
ings will have been a success. 


USUN press release 26 tinted Mnroh Tl 

Despite the fact that the Representative 
of Panama has expressed himself numerous 
times before this Council over the past week 
on the Panama Canal, he chose to deliver 
another litany this afternoon on the Pana- 
manian version of history and the actual 
situation today. I have no intention of 
subjecting the distinguished members of this 
Council to a statement of similar length. 

However, he continues to stress the con- 
vention of 1903. In fact we have heard a 
great deal in recent days of how the 
Isthmian Canal Convention was imposed on 
the people of Panama. Let us put the facts 
of the situation in the Security Council rec- 
ord. After the convention of 1903 was signed, 
it was sent to Panama for ratification. After 
ratification by the Panamanian Government, 
the treaty was sent a'ound the country for 
consideration by the various elected munici- 
pal councils. The ratification of the treaty 
with the United States was overwhelmingly 
approved by these elected councils, with 
unanimous expressions of approval of the 
treaty. So much for the imposition of a 

Now, in 70 years' time the views of the 
Government and people of Panama have 
changed with respect to the arrangements 
of 1903. That is not surprising. The views 
of the Government and people of the United 
States of America have also changed with 
respect to the treaty of 1903. That is what 
our two governments are negotiating about — 
to work out new an-angements to meet the 
just aspirations of Panama and the legit- 
imate interests of the United States. 

I believe, Mr. President, it is useful to 
clarify for the record this historical aspect 
of our relationship. 

We regiet having had to cast a negative 
vote on this resolution, because there is so 
much in it with which we could agree. But 
our negative vote should have come as no 
surprise to our host, the Republic of Pana- 

April 23, 1973 


ma, in view of the repeated exchanges of 
views that we have had about this meeting 
and about how it might end— and I am 
referring not only to discussions during 
this Security Council meeting but also to 
those that took place even before the Repub- 
lic of Panama had pressed its campaign to 
have this meeting take place on its territory. 
In those discussions the United States 
made clear its serious concern that a meeting 
designed to put pressure on one party to an 
on-going bilateral negotiation could make 
those negotiations more difficult and impair 
the utility of this major organ of the United 
Nations. Up to the moment of our departure 
for Panama, we continued to receive assur- 
ances that everything would be done to 
maintain an atmosphere of moderation and 
restraint. I regret to say that while this 
proved true of the situation outside this 
chamber— and for this I wish to express 
our appreciation to our host — it has not 
been true of some of the statements made 

Members of this Council should know that 
my delegation has made strenuous and re- 
peated efforts in friendly conversations with 
our Panamanian hosts to arrive at a mu- 
tually acceptable form for a resolution 
but this very sincere effort has been re- 
jected. I wish the members of the Council 
to know, however, that we were and are 
prepared to acknowledge the just aspira- 
tions of the Republic of Panama, for we do 
recognize those aspirations, along with the 
interests of the United States. 

I have said that we regret having had to 
cast a negative vote on the Panamanian 
resolution because there is so much in it with 
which we could agree. As I have made clear, 
we agree with the Republic of Panama on 
the need to replace the 1903 convention by 
a totally new instrument reflecting a new 
spirit, we agree that such a new instrument 
should not run in perpetuity but should have 
a fixed term, and we agree on the progressive 
integration into the legal, economic, social, 
and cultural life of Panama of even those 
areas used for the operation and defense 
of the canal. 

Why, then, when there is so much in it 
with vvhich we agree, did we not vote in 
favor of the resolution or, as we were urged, 
at least abstain? Essentially, for two reasons. 
First and foremost, as I have repeatedly 
pointed out both in public and in private, 
it is because all these matters are in process 
of bilateral negotiations. We do not consider 
it helpful or appropriate for the Security 
Council to adopt a resolution dealing with 
matters of substance in a continuing nego- 
tiation—and I may note that the Foreign 
Minister of Panama has himself spoken of the 
negotiations as continuing and not as having 
been broken off. Indeed, as many members 
know, we have only recently made certain 
new approaches to the Government of Pan- 
ama. We believe it would be a disservice 
to the negotiations and an improper use of 
the Security Council if bilateral negotiations 
were subjected to this kind of outside pres- 

I am not, of course, suggesting here that 
those who cast affirmative votes on the 
resolution intended to exert any improper 
influence, but this is how the resolution 
would have been perceived in many quarters. 
The Panamanian resolution, in our view, 
is unbalanced and incomplete and is there- 
fore subject to serious misinterpretation. 
Further, the resolution is cast in the form 
of sweeping generalities, when we know 
that the real difficulties lie in the application 
of these generalities. Although it is true 
that the United States and Panama have 
reached common understanding over a num- 
ber of important general principles, differen- 
ces over some principles and many matters 
of detail remain. Finally, the present reso- 
lution addresses the points of interest to 
Panama but ignores those legitimate inter- 
ests important to the United States. 

The Panama Canal is not a work of na- 
ture or — as some have tried to put it — 
a natural resource. The canal is a very 
complex enterprise, and the working-out 
of a new regime for it cannot be accom- 
plished by the wave of a hand or the quick 
stroke of a pen. It requires thoughtful and 
meticulous negotiation to achieve a fair 
reconciliation of interests. We have been and 


Department of State Bulletin 

are prepared for such a negotiation. But 
the resolution that was just voted upon over- 
sinipiifies the issue to the point where it 
could have rendered a disservice. 

This brinjrs me back to what I said at 
the beginning of my intervention. It has 
been clear from the first mention of the idea 
that holding a Security Council meeting 
here to focus on this problem could compli- 
cate the process of negotiation. The United 
States is disappointed that others failed 
to appreciate this risk when lending their 
support to this meeting. Surely it should 
have been made obvious that the new treaty 
which we sincerely wish to negotiate with 
Panama must be acceptable to our Congress 
and people, as well as the Government and 
people of Panama. 

Finally. I would respectfully suggest that 

we all assess with great care the nature and 

lUitcome of this meeting so as to avoid any 

lepetition of a course of action that could 

lirove damaging to the role and reputation 

I if the Security Council. It would be most 

unfortunate if the Security Council were 

( to be transformed into a small replica of 

I the General Assembly, thereby impairing its 

V capacity to deal effectively with specific 

i.-'sues aff"ecting peace and security. 

The U.S. delegation will not be leaving 
Panama in a spirit of rancor, far from it. 
Our friendship for Panama, for the people 
of Panama and of Latin America in general, 
is too deep for that. We continue to be willing 
to adjust any differences peacefully and in 
a spirit of give-and-take. We are, specifically, 
prepared to continue the negotiations and 
to carry them forward with good will and 
seriousness at whatever time the Govern- 
ment of Panama chooses. We believe that 
both Panama and the United States are 
destined by geography and common ideals 
to cooperate for their mutual advantage 
and to protect the interests of world com- 
merce ti'ansiting the canal. That will con- 
tinue to be the policy of the United States, 
and I am confident that in the end we shall 
reach an accord which both governments 
can firmly support and which will .strengthen 
the close bonds of friendship between our 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the question of the Panama 
Canal under the item entitled "Consideration of 
measures for the maintenance and strengthening 
of international peace and security in Latin Amer- 
ica in conformity with the provisions and 
principles of the Charter", 

Recalling that it is a purpose of the United 
Nations to bring about, in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law, adjust- 
ment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the 

Beariyig in mind that the Republic of Panama 
is sovereign over its territoi-y and that the free 
and fruitful exercise of sovereignty by peoples and 
nations over their natural resources should be 
fostered through mutual respect among States, 
based on their sovereign equality [General As- 
sembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1803 (XVII) and 
3016 (XXVII)], 

Having heard the statements made before it by 
the representatives of the members of the Council 
by Latin American Ministers for Foreign Affairs 
and by representatives of other States and organi- 
zations specially invited, 

1. Takes note that the Governments of the Re- 
public of Panama and the United States of Amer- 
ica in the Joint Declaration signed before the 
Council of the Organization of American States, 
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, on 
3 April 1964, agreed to reach a just and fair 
agreement, with a view to the prompt elimination 
of the causes of conflict between them; 

2. Takes note also of the willingness shown by 
the Governments of the United States of America 
and the Republic of Panama to establish in a 
formal instrument agreements on the abrogation of 
the 1903 convention on the Isthmian Canal and 
its amendments and to conclude a new, just and 
fair treaty concerning the present Panama Canal 
which would fulfil Panama's legitimate aspirations 
and guarantee full respect for Panama's effective 
sovereignty over all of its territory; 

3. Urges the Governments of the United States 
of America and the Republic of Panama to con- 
tinue negotiations in a high spirit of friendship, 
mutual respect and co-operation and to conclude 
without delay a new treaty aimed at the prompt 
elimination of the causes of conflict between them; 

4. Decides to keep the question under considera- 

'U.N. doc. S/10931/Rev.l; the draft resolution 
was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a 
permanent member of the Council, the vote being 
13 in favor, 1 (U.S.), with 1 abstention 

April 23, 1973 



President Nixon Proposes Plan for Reorganization 
of Federal Drug Law Enforcement Activities 

Message From President Nixon to the Congress'' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Drug abuse is one of the most vicious and 
corrosive forces attacking the foundations of 
American society today. It is a major cause 
of crime and a merciless destroyer of human 
lives. We must fight it with all of the re- 
sources at our command. 

This Administration has declared all-out, 
global war on the drug menace. As I reported 
to the Congress earlier this month in my 
State of the Union message, there is evidence 
of significant progress on a number of fronts 
in that war.= 

Both the rate of new addiction to heroin 
and the number of narcotic-related deaths 
showed an encouraging downturn last year. 
More drug addicts and abusers are in treat- 
ment and rehabilitation programs than ever 

Progress in pinching off the supply of il- 
licit drugs was evident in last year's stepped- 
up volume of drug seizures worldwide — 
which more than doubled in 1972 over the 
1971 level. 

Arrests of trafl^ckers have risen by more 
than one-third since 1971. Prompt Congres- 
sional action on my proposal for mandatory 
minimum sentences for pushers of hard 
drugs will help ensure that convictions stem- 
ming from such arrests lead to actual im- 
prisonment of the guilty. 

Notwithstanding these gains, much more 

must be done. The resilience of the interna- 
tional drug trade remains grimly impres- 
sive — current estimates suggest that we still 
intercept only a small fraction of all the 
heroin and cocaine entering this country. Lo- 
cal police still find that more than one of 
every three suspects arrested for street 
crimes is a narcotic abuser or addict. And 
the total number of Americans addicted to 
narcotics, suffering terribly themselves and 
inflicting their suffering on countless others, 
still stands in the hundreds of thousands. 

A Unified Command for Drug Enforcement 

Seeking ways to intensify our counterof- 
fensive against this menace, I am asking the 
Congress today to join with this Administra- 
tion in strengthening and streamlining the 
Federal drug law enforcement effort. 

Funding for this effort has increased sev- 
enfold during the past five years, from $36 
million in fiscal year 1969 to $257 million in 
fiscal year 1974 — more money is not the 
most pressing enforcement need at present. 
Nor is there a primary need for more man- 
power working on the problem, over 2100 
new agents having already been added to the 
Federal drug enforcement agencies under 

' Transmitted on Mar. 28 (Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 2) ; also 
printed as H. Doc. 93-69, 93d Cong., 1st sess. 

■ For the sixth in a series of messages from 
President Nixon to the Congress on the state of 
the Union, concerning law enforcement and drug 
abuse prevention transmitted on Mar. 14, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 
19, p. 259. 


Department of State Bulletin 

this Administration, an increase of more 
tlian 250 percent over the 1969 level. 

The enforcement work could benefit sig- 
nificantly, however, from consolidation of 
nur anti-drug forces under a single unified 
rommand. Right now the Federal Govern- 
ment is fighting the war on drug abuse under 
a distinct handicap, for its efforts are those 
'if a loosely confederated alliance facing a 
losourceful. elusive, worldwide enemy. Ad- 
miral Mahan, the master naval strategist, de- 
scribed this handicap precisely when he 
wrote that "Granting the same aggregate of 
force, it is never as great in two hands as in 
line, because it is not perfectly concentrated." 

More specifically, the drug law enforce- 
ment activities of the United States now are 
nut merely in two hands but in half a dozen. 
Within the Department of Justice, with no 
iverall direction below the level of the Attor- 
ney General, these fragmented forces include 
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs, the Oflice for Drug Abuse Law En- 
forcement, the Oflice of National Narcotics 
Intelligence, and certain activities of the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration. The 
Treasury Department is also heavily engaged 
in enforcement work through the Bureau of 

This aggregation of Federal activities has 
gi-own up rapidly over the past few years in 
response to the urgent need for stronger 
anti-drug measures. It has enabled us to 
make a very encouraging beginning in the 
accelerated drug enforcement drive of this 

But it has serious operational and or- 
ganizational shortcomings. Certainly the 

Id-blooded underworld networks that fun- 
nel narcotics from suppliers all over the 
world into the veins of American drug vic- 
tims are no respecters of the bureaucratic 
dividing lines that now complicate our anti- 
drug efforts. On the contrary, these modern- 
day slave traders can derive only advantage 
from the limitations of the existing organi- 
zational patchwork. Experience has now- 
given us a good basis for correcting those 
limitations, and it is time to do so. 

I therefore propose creation of a single, 

comprehensive Federal agency within the 
Department of Justice to lead the war 
against illicit drug traffic. 

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973,'' which 
I am transmitting to the Congress with this 
message, would establish such an agency, to 
be called the Drug Enforcement Administra- 
tion. It would be headed by an Administrator 
reporting directly to the Attorney General. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration 
would carry out the following anti-drug func- 
tions, and would absorb the associated man- 
power and budgets: 

— All functions of the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs (which would be abol- 
ished as a separate entity by the reorganiza- 
tion plan) ; 

— Those functions of the Bureau of 
Customs pertaining to drug investigations 
and intelligence (to be transferred from the 
Treasury Department to the Attorney Gen- 
eral by the reorganization plan) ; 

— All functions of the Office for Drug 
Abuse Law Enforcement ; and 

— All functions of the Office of National 
Narcotics Intelligence. 

Merger of the latter two organizations into 
the new agency would be effected by an exec- 
utive order dissolving them and transferring 
their functions, to take effect upon approval 
of Reorganization Plan No. 2 by the Con- 
gress. Drug law enforcement research cur- 
rently funded by the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration and other agen- 
cies would also be transferred to the new 
agency by executive action. 

The major responsibilities of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration would thus 

— development of overall Federal drug 
law enforcement strategy, programs, plan- 
ning, and evaluation; 

— full investigation and prepai'ation for 
prosecution of suspects for violations under 
all Federal drug trafficking laws ; 

— full investigation and preparation for 

"Not printed here; for text, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 2, 
p. 309. 

April 23, 1973 


prosecution of suspects connected with illicit 
drugs seized at U.S. ports-of -entry and inter- 
national borders ; 

—conduct of all relations with drug law 
enforcement officials of foreign governments, 
under the policy guidance of the Cabinet 
Committee on International Narcotics 
Control ; 

—full coordination and cooperation with 
State and local law enforcement officials on 
joint drug enforcement efforts; and 

—regulation of the legal manufacture of 
drugs and other controlled substances under 
Federal regulations. 

The Attorney General, working closely 
with the Administrator of this new agency, 
would have authority to make needed pro- 
gram adjustments. He would take steps 
within the Department of Justice to ensure 
that high priority emphasis is placed on the 
prosecution and sentencing of drug traffick- 
ers following their apprehension by the 
enforcement organization. He would also 
have the authority and responsibility for 
securing the fullest possible cooperation— 
particularly with respect to collection of 
drug intelligence— from all Federal depart- 
ments and agencies which can contribute to 
the anti-drug work, including the Internal 
Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. 

My proposals would make possible a more 
effective anti-drug role for the FBI, espe- 
cially in dealing with the relationship 
between drug trafficking and organized 
crime. I intend to see that the resources of 
the FBI are fully committed to assist in 
supporting the new Drug Enforcement Ad- 

The consolidation effected under Reorga- 
nization Plan No. 2 would reinforce the 
basic law enforcement and criminal justice 
mission of the Department of Justice. With 
worldwide drug law enforcement responsi- 
bilities no longer divided among several 
organizations in two different Cabinet de- 
partments, more complete and cumulative 
drug law enforcement intelligence could be 
compiled. Patterns of international and 
domestic illicit drug production, distribution 

and sale could be more directly compared and 
interpreted. Case-by-case drug law enforce- 
ment activities could be more comprehen- 
sively linked, cross-referenced, and coordi- 
nated into a single, organic enforcement 
operation. In short, drug law enforcement 
officers would be able to spend more time 
going after the traffickers and less time 
coordinating with one another. 

Such progress could be especially helpful 
on the international front. Narcotics control 
action plans, developed under the leadership 
of the Cabinet Committee on International 
Narcotics Control, are now being carried 
out by U.S. officials in cooperation with host 
governments in 59 countries around the 
world. This wide-ranging effort to cut off 
drug supplies before they ever reach U.S. 
borders or streets is just now beginning to 
bear fruit. We can enhance its effectiveness, 
with little disruption of ongoing enforcement 
activities, by merging both the highly effec- 
tive narcotics force of overseas Customs 
agents and the rapidly developing inter- 
national activities of the Bureau of Narcotics 
and Dangerous Drugs into the Drug En- 
forcement Administration. The new agency 
would work closely with the Cabinet Com- 
mittee under the active leadership of the 
U.S. Ambassador in each country where 
anti-drug programs are underway. 

Two years ago, when I established the 
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Pre- 
vention within the Executive Office of the 
President, we gained an organization with 
the necessary resources, breadth, and leader- 
ship capacity to begin dealing decisively 
with the "demand" side of the drug abuse 
problem— treatment and rehabilitation for 
those who have been drug victims, and pre- 
ventive programs for potential drug abusers. 
This year, by permitting my reorganization 
proposals to take effect, the Congress can 
help provide a similar capability on the 
"supply" side. The proposed Drug Enforce- 
ment Administration, working as a team 
with the Special Action Office, would arm 
Americans with a potent one-two punch to 
help us fight back against the deadly menace 
of drug abuse. I ask full Congressional co- 
operation in its establishment. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Improving Port-of-Enfry Inspections 

No heroin or cocaine is produced within 
the United States; domestic availability of 
these substances results solely from their 
illegal importation. The careful and complete 
inspection of all persons and goods coming 
into the United States is therefore an inte- 
gral part of effective Federal drug law en- 

At the present time, however, Federal 
responsibility for conducting port-of-entry 
inspections is awkwardly divided among sev- 
eral Cabinet departments. The principal 
agencies involved are the Treasury Depart- 
ment's Bureau of Customs, which inspects 
goods, and the Justice Department's Immi- 
gration and Naturalization Sei-vice, which 
insi^ects persons and their papers. The two 
utilize separate inspection procedures, hold 
differing views of inspection priorities, and 
employ dissimilar personnel management 

To reduce the possibility that illicit drugs 
will escape detection at ports-of-entry be- 
cause of divided responsibility, and to 
enhance the effectiveness of the Drug En- 
forcement Administration, the reorganiza- 
tion plan which I am proposing today would 
transfer to the Secretary of the Treasuiy 
all functions currently vested in Justice 
Department officials to inspect persons, or 
the documents of persons. 

When the plan takes effect, it is my inten- 
tion to direct the Secretary of the Treasury 
to use the resources so transferred — includ- 
ing some 1,000 employees of the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service — to augment the 
staff and budget of the Bureau of Customs. 
The Bureau's primary re.sponsibilities would 
then include: 

— inspection of all persons and goods 
entering the United States; 

— valuation of goods being imported, and 
assessment of appropriate tariff duties; 

— interception of contraband being smug- 
gled into the United States ; 

— enforcement of U.S. laws governing 
the international movement of goods, ex- 
cept the investigation of contraband drugs 
and narcotics ; and 

— turning over the investigation responsi- 
i)ility for all drug law enforcement cases to 
the Department of Justice. 

The reorganization would thus group most 
port-of-enti-y inspection functions in a single 
Cabinet department. It would reduce the 
need for much day-to-day inter-departmental 
coordination, allow more efficient staffing 
at some field locations, and remove the basis 
for damaging inter-agency rivalries. It would 
also give the Secretai-y of the Treasury the 
authority and flexibility to meet changing 
requirements in inspecting the international 
flow of people and goods. An important by- 
product of the change would be more con- 
venient service for travellers entering and 
leaving the country. 

For these reasons, I am convinced that 
inspection activities at U.S. ports-of-entry 
can more effectively support our drug 
law enforcement efforts if concentrated in 
a single agency. The processing of persons at 
ports-of-entry is too closely interrelated with 
the in.spection of goods to remain organiza- 
tionally separated from it any longer. Both 
types of inspections have numerous objectives 
besides drug law enforcement, so it is logical 
to vest them in the Treasury Department, 
which has long had the principal responsi- 
bility for port-of-entry inspection of goods, 
including goods being transported in con- 
nection with persons. As long as the inspec- 
tions are conducted with full awareness of 
related drug concerns it is neither necessary 
nor desirable that they be made a responsi- 
bility of the primary drug enforcement or- 


After investigation, I have found that 
each action included in Reorganization Plan 
No. 2 of 1973 is necessary to accomplish 
one or more of the purposes set forth in 
Section 901 (a) of Title 5 of the United 
States Code. In particular, the plan is re- 
sponsive to the intention of the Congress as 
expressed in Section 901 (a) (1) : "to pro- 
mote better execution of the laws, more 
effective management of the executive 
branch and of its agencies and functions. 

April 23, 1973 


and expeditious administration of the pub- 
lic business;" Section 901 (a) (3): to 
increase the efficiency of the operations of 
the Government to the fullest extent prac- 
ticable;" Section 901 (a) (5): "to ^^^^uce 
the number of agencies by consolidating 
those having similar functions under a single 
head, and to abolish such agencies or func- 
tions as may not be necessary for the efficient 
conduct of the Government;" and Section 
901(a)(6): "to eliminate overlapping ana 
duplication of effort." . 

As required by law, the plan has one logi- 
cally consistent subject matter: consolidation 
of Federal drug law enforcement activities 
in a manner designed to increase then- 
effectiveness. _ ^ 4- 
The plan would estal.lish in the Department 
of Justice a new Administration designated 
as the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
The reorganizations provided for in the plan 
make necessary the appointment and com- 
pensation of new officers as specified m Sec- 
tion 5 of the plan. The rates of compensation 
fixed for these officers would be comparable 
to those fixed for officers in the executive 
branch who have similar responsibilities. 

While it is not practicable to specify all of 
the expenditure reductions and other econo- 
mies which may result from the actions pro- 
posed, some savings may be anticipated m 
administrative costs now associated with the 
functions being transferred and consolidated. 
The proposed reorganization is a necessary 
step in upgrading the effectiveness of our 
Nation's drug law enforcement effort. Both 
of the proposed changes would build on the 
strengths of established agencies, yielding 
maximum gains in the battle against drug 
abuse with minimum loss of time and mo- 
mentum in the transition. 

I am confident that this reorganization 
plan would significantly increase the overal 
efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal 
Government. I urge the Congress to allow it 
to become effective. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, March 28, 1973. 


International Economic Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Following is the text of President Nixon's 
international economic report, which ivas 
transmitted to the Congress oti March 22 
together with the first anmuil report of the 
Council on Intei-national Economic Policy.' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

The Nation is again at peace. We also are 
firmly on the course of strong economic 
growth at home. Now we must turn more of 
our attention to the urgent problems we 
face in our economic dealings with other 
nations. International problems may seem 
to some of us to be far away, but they have a 
very direct impact on the jobs, the incomes 
and the living standards of our people. 
Neither the peace we have achieved nor the 
economic growth essential to our national 
welfare will last if we leave such matters 
unattended, for they can diminish our pros- 
perity at home and at the same time provoke 
harmful friction abroad. 

Our major difficulties stem from relying 
too long upon outdated economic arrange- 
ments and institutions despite the rapid 
chano-es which have taken place in the world. 
Many countries we helped to rebuild after 
World War II are now our strong economic 
competitors. Americans can no longer act as 
if these historic developments had not taken 
place We must do a better job of preparing 
ourselves-both in the private sector and m 
the Government— to compete more effectively 
in world markets, so that expanding trade 
can bring greater benefits to our people. 

In the summer of 1971, this Administra- 
tion initiated fundamental changes m Ameri- 
can foreign economic policy. We have also 
introduced proposals for the reform of the 

"^^[^^TT^nplete text of the 94-page report entitled 
■•International Econon.ic Report of t^e Presuien 
Toeether With the Annual Report of the •-,o'^""i 
IrTnte^national Economic P"l-y" is for sale by h 
Superintendent of Do<^""'^"tS' ^.S Governmen 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Stock 
Number 4115-00028). 


Department of State Bulletin 

international monetary and trading systems 
which have lost their ability to deal with 
current problems. The turmoil in world 
monetary affairs has demonstrated clearly 
that greater urgency must now be attached 
to constructive reform. 

At home, we have continued our fight to 
maintain price stability and to improve our 
productivity — objectives which are as im- 
portant to our international economic posi- 
tion as to our domestic welfare. 

What is our next step? 

In my State of the Union message on the 
economy last month, I outlined certain meas- 
ures to strengthen both our domestic and 
international economic position.- One of the 
most important is trade reform. 

In choosing an international trade policy 
which will benefit all Americans, I have con- 
cluded that we must face uii to more intense 
long-term competition in the world's mar- 
kets rather than shrink from it. Those who 
would have us turn inward, hiding behind a 
shield of import restrictions of indefinite 
duration, might achieve short-term gains and 
benefit certain groups, but they would exact 
a high cost from the economy as a whole. 
Those costs would be borne by all of us in the 
form of higher prices and lower real income. 
Only in response to unfair competition, or 
the closing of markets abroad to our goods, 
or to provide time for adjustment, would 
such restrictive measures be called for. 

My approach is based both on my strong 
faith in the ability of Americans to compete, 
and on my confidence that all nations will 
recognize their own vital interest in lowering 
economic barriers and applying fairer and 
more effective trading rules. 

The fact that most of these comments are 
addressed to the role of our Government 
should not divert attention from the vital 
role which private economic activity will play 
in resolving our current i)roblems. The cooji- 
eration and the initiative of all .sectors of our 
economy are needed to increase our produc- 

tivity and to keep our prices competitive. 
This is essential to our international trading 
position. Yet there are certain necessary 
steps which only the Government can take, 
given the worldwide scope of trading activity 
and the need for broad international agree- 
ment to expand trade fairly and effectively. 
I am determined that we shall take those 

I know that the American people and their 
representatives in the Congress can be 
counted on to rise to the challenge of the 
changing world economy. Together we must 
do what is needed to further the prosperity 
of our country, and of the world in which we 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, March 22, 1973. 

New Trends and Factors in East Asia 
and the Pacific 

Following is a statement by Marshall 
Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, made before the Sub- 
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
March 28.' 

Mr. Chairman [Representative Robert N. 
C. Nix] and members of the committee: It 
is always an honor and usually a pleasure 
to appear before your committee. I have 
done so on many previous occasions over 
the past dozen or more years. My only regret, 
Mr. Chairman, at this time is that I will 
be departing shortly for Australia just as 
you are assuming the chairmanship of this 
subcommittee, but I trust that you and the 
other distingui.shed members of the sub- 
committee will be visiting the area. You 
may be sure that we in the Department will 

' For excerpts, see Billetin of Mar. 19, 197.3, 
p. .328. 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the roniniittce and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

April 23, 1973 


do everything we can to facilitate your 
ti-avels, and I look forward to keeping in 
touch with you and my other friends on the 

I understand that it is your desire in to- 
day's discussions to focus on the broader 
trends in East Asia and the Pacific with 
special reference to how these trends are 
likely to shape events in that region and 
how the United States should best adjust to 
those trends in order to preserve and advance 
our national interests — which broadly co- 
incide with the interests of our many friends 
in Asia. 

May I start by saying that events in East 
Asia will continue to have a significant effect 
on world peace and on the security and 
well-being, or otherwise, of the United 
States. Certain realities are inescapable: 

— A large proportion of the world's 
population lives in East Asia, and they 
happen to be among the most dynamic and 
capable peoples in the world. 

— Our trade and investments in Asia are 
growing apace, possibly at a greater rate 
than anywhere else in the world. 

— It is only in East Asia that the interests 
of the four largest powers of the world (the 
United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet 
Union) converge. 

— Three times in the last generation we 
have been drawn into war in Asia. 

It is a commonplace to note that the world 
is in flux; nowhere is the transition more 
striking than in East Asia. Among the most 
significant and evident changes occurring 
in this vast area are the following: 

— Changes in national leadership. The 
first generation of revolutionary leaders, 
men who played a great role in gaining the 
independence of their countries, are being 
replaced by a younger generation, more 
skilled in government and administration, 
who emphasize orderly development and 
growth and improved relations with neigh- 
boring countries. 

— Increasing economic capabilities. Asians 
are now bettei' able to do more with their 
own resources and seek to do so, bearing 

witness to the strong thrust of nationalism 
common to the countries of East Asia. Many 
difficulties remain, of course, and most of 
these countries are not yet ready to stand 
completely on their own ; they still rely on 
outside assistance, a responsibility that we 
are sharing increasingly with other nations 
such as Japan. 

— Disappearance of the bipolar, cold war 
world. The world of contending Communist 
and anti-Communist camps, led respectively 
by the U.S.S.R. and the United States, has 
gone. Today there are many power centers, 
and the interrelationships among them offer 
important and potentially useful avenues for 
lessening tensions and broadening under- 
standing among nations. 

— Tentative progress in resolving the con- 
tinuing problem of divided countries. The 
greatest underlying danger to peace in East 
Asia arises from the existence of divided 
nations, notably Korea, Viet-Nam, and Laos. 
We will accept arrangements worked out be- 
tween the divided halves of these countries 
for peaceful resolution of their problems. In 
this connection, we particularly welcome the 
South-North talks in Korea, the recently 
concluded cease-fire and political arrange- 
ments in Laos, and the expanding dialogue 
between North and South Viet-Nam as well 
as between the Republic of Viet-Nam and 
the PRO [Provisional Revolutionary Gov- 
ernment] . 

— Entry of the People's Republic of China 
into the international mainstream. This has 
been facilitated by P.R.C. membership in 
the U.N. and other organizations and its 
improved bilateral relations with the United 
States, Japan, and other countries. 

— Our evolving relationship with Japan. 
Japan remains our most significant ally in 
East Asia. Today, following three summit 
meetings between our respective leaders in 
the past four years, that relationship is 
marked by greater mutuality and resiliency. 

Coinciding with these changes in East 
Asia, there has been a growing, fully under- 
standable, feeling in the United States that 
we have taken on a disproportionate share of 
the world's problems and that others should 


Department of State Bulletin 

share this burden. At the same time we rec- 
ogTiize the importance of continuing to play 
our role in promoting stability, peace, and 
gi-owth. This is not altruism ; it is based upon 
a realistic recognition of our own interests. 

U.S. foreign policy has taken into consid- 
eration all of the trends and factors that I 
have enumerated above, as well as others. 
From this has emerged the Nixon doctrine 
of shared responsibility, our new relation- 
ship with the P.R.C. and all that that implies, 
as well as our emerging relationship with Ja- 
pan. Beyond that, I would say that these 
policies have helped to create an atmosphere 
in East Asia where there is greater willing- 
ness on the part of most countries to enter 
into discussions with each other — even with 
adversary powers — and in certain cases to 
discuss with each other even the most diffi- 
cult and divisive issues. Those issues which 
cannot now be resolved can at least be de- 
fused and made more manageable awaiting 
the time when they are soluble. 

President Nixon has made it clear that 
the United States is a Pacific power with in- 
terests in Asia. He has continually reaffirmed 
that we will play our proper role as a Pacific 
power, neither overinvolved nor underin- 
volved, but pursuing just that degree of in- 
volvement that awakens the cooperation of 
Dthers and enlists to the maximum extent 
possible their support in advancing our com- 
mon stake in the peace, stability, and im- 
provement of life for the peoples of East 

This in essence was the message which 
President Nixon took to Asia when he first 
visited there as President in mid-1969, in- 
cluding his celebrated press backgrounder at 
Guam that became known as the Nixon doc- 
trine.= A week later at Bangkok, he phrased 
his position as follows: ' 

Our determination to honor our commitments is 
fully consistent with our conviction that the na- 
tions of Asia can and must increasingly shoulder 
the responsibility for achieving peace and prog^ress 

' For the transcript of President Nixon's remarks 
to newsmen in Guam on July 25, 1969, see Public 
Pnprr:i of the Presidents: Richard Nixon, lono, p. 

' Bulletin of Aug. 25, 1969, p. 154. 

in the area. The challenge to our wisdom is to 
support the Asian countries' efforts to defend and 
develop themselves, without attempting to take 
from them the responsibilities which should be 
theirs. For if domination by the aggressor can 
destroy the freedom of a nation, too much depend- 
ence on a protector can eventually erode its 

In concluding my opening remarks, I wish 
to emphasize two points of personal concern 
with regard to our future role in Asia. 

In the first place, like most Americans, I 
greatly welcome the bi-eakthroughs which 
have been made in our relationships with 
what we used to call adversary powers. I 
realize that their objectives have not changed, 
but if the I'esult of our efforts is that it en- 
courages other countries to seek their goals 
thi-ough political as opposed to military 
means then I think a great deal has been 
accomplished. Yet it i-equires that we be pre- 
l)ared to compete with countries whose ob- 
jectives may differ widely from our own — and 
indeed some of those objectives are directly 
contrary to our own. Hopefully, by main- 
taining strength at home and in conjunction 
with our friends, we and they will be in a 
position to negotiate new relationships, in- 
cluding even reductions of forces; yet with- 
out that degree of strength and solidarity, 
the current trend toward detente and to- 
ward negotiations could be sharply reversed. 

In this connection, we must make clear 
that in broadening our relationships, and 
hopefully our friendships, with countries we 
have regarded as adversary powers, we are 
not acting in any way to diminish our friend- 
ship and support for old friends. Old friends 
are the best friends. 

Secondly, I would hope that preoccupation 
with our many problems at home will not 
weaken our understanding and support of 
our proper role in world affairs. No country 
can turn completely inward except at the 
risk of destroying itself. Whatever the faults 
and mistakes of past policies may have 
been — I might say they have not been as 
great as some would have it — we have played 
an impoitant role in helping to bring about 
a favorable evolution of events in East Asia. 
With more help from others and with the 

April 23, 1973 


countries of East Asia maximizing their own 
efforts, there are encouraging vistas opening 
up in the decade ahead. 

President Nixon has described the past 
decade as one of confrontation and the cur- 
rent decade as one of negotiation. Indeed, 
the first part of the seventies finds us en- 
gaged in talks with most of the participants 
in the world's most pressing conflicts. One 
can still cite support for the thesis that the 
human race is moving even closer to the 
brink of self-destruction. I believe I have 
discerned in Asia, however, a different course 
of human development : a process of modern- 
ization and improved communications which 
is gradually leveling differences between na- 
tions, destroying the appeal of aggressive 
ideologies, and creating a new faith in prag- 
matic principles. This is the process our 
policies are designed to serve. 

Patent Classification Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I 
transmit herewith a certified copy of the 
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the Inter- 
national Patent Classification, signed March 
24, 1971. I transmit also, for the information 
of the Senate, the report from the Depart- 
ment of State with respect to the Agreement. 
The purpose of the Agreement is generally 
similar to that set forth in the Nice Agree- 
ment Concerning International Classification 
of Goods and Services to which Trademarks 
are Applied, as revised at Stockholm July 14, 
19(i7, and the Locarno Agreement Establish- 
ing an International Classification for Indus- 
trial Designs, signed October 8, 1968. Both 

'Transmitted on Mar. 22 (White House press 
release); also printed as S. Ex. E., 9.3d Cons., 1st 
sess., which includes the text of the agreement and 
the repurt of the Department of State. 

of these earlier Agreements were approved 
by the Senate on December 11, 1971. The 
countries party to the Agreement constitute 
a Special Union under the Paris Union estab- 
lished by the Paris Convention for the Pro- 
tection of Industrial Property, last revised in 
1967 at Stockholm. The Special Union con- 
sists of an Assembly of all contracting par- 
ties and a Committee of Experts. Pursuant 
to the Agreement a common classification is 
adopted for patents for invention, inventors' 
certificates, utility models and utility cer- 
tificates, to be known as the "International 
Patent Classification" and provisions are in- 
cluded for its amendment. 

It is important from the standpoint of the 
interest of patent owners and from the stand- 
point of effective government administration 
of its patent functions that the United States 
become a party to the Agreement so that it 
may participate as a member of the Special 

I recommend that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to this Agree- 
ment and give its advice and consent to 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, March 22, 1973. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

1972 Annual Report of the United States Tariff 
Commission. Fiscal Year Ended June 30. H. Doc. 
93-26. 34 pp. 

Annual Report of the Bretton Woods Agreement 
Act. Communication from the Chairman, National 
Advisory Council on International Monetary and 
Financial Policies, transmitting the Council's an- 
nual report covering the period July 1, 1971- 
June 30, 1972. H. Doc. 93-34. January 3, 1973. 
231 pp. 

Ninth Annual Report of the Advisory Commission 
on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. 
Communication from the Chairman, U.S. Advi- 
sory Commission on International Educational 
and Cultural Affairs, transmitting the report. H. 
Doc. 93-35. January 3, 1973. 5 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amondnicnt of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy' Apency of October 
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970.' 

Acceptances deposited: Indonesia, April 3, 1973; 
Zambia, April 4, 1973. 


Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with 
annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. 
Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, April 5, 1973. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendixes. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.' 
Signatures : Malagasy Republic, April 4, 1973; 

Sweden, April 3, 1973; Switzerland, April 2, 


Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Jordan, March 7, 1973. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at 

t London October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Norway, February 21, 1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

<" invention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971." 
I Ratification deposited: Brazil, February 14, 1973. 
■Protocol amending the single convention on nar- 
I cotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva 
I March 25, 1972.' 

I Ratifications deposited: Ivory Coast, Jordan, Feb- 
I ruary 28. 1973. 

Acceasioti deposited: Kenya, February 9, 1973. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 

(October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, December 21, 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, December 21, 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 25, 1967.' 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, March 9, 1973. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London November 26, 1968.' 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, March 9, 1973. 
Amendments to the international convention for 

the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). 

Adopted at London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, March 9, 1973. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in 
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, 
and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force 
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Lesotho, April 3, 1973. 

Slave Trade 

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. 
Done at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into 
force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 
21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183. 
Notification of succession : Mali, February 2, 1973. 

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed 
at Geneva September 25, 1926, with annex. Done 
at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into 
force December 7, 1953, for the protocol ; July 
7, 1955, for annex to protocol. For the United 
States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532. 
Acceptayicc deposited: Mali, February 2, 1973. 

Supplementary convention on the abolition of 
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and 
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva 
September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 
1957; for the United States December 6, 1967. 
TIAS 6418. 
Accession deposited: Mali, February 2, 1973. 


Treaty on principles governing the activities of 
states in the exploration and use of outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies. 
Opened for signature at Washington, London, 
and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force 
October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347. 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, March 30, 1973. 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972.- 
Acccsslon deposited: Fiji, April 4, 1973. 
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, April 4, 1973. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

April 23, 1973 



International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, January 24, 1973. 
Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as 
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space 
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva 
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. 
TIAS 7435. 

Notifications of approval: Federal Republic of 
Germany, December 28, 1972;' Netherlands, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, February 
5, 1973. 


Republic of China 

Agreement amending the agreement of December 
30, 1971 (TIAS 7249), relating to trade in cot- 
ton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington March 22, 1973. Entered into force 
March 22, 1973. 

Agreement relating to annex C of the agreement 
of December 30, 1971 (TIAS 7498), concerning 
trade in wool and man-made fiber textile prod- 
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton March 22, 1973. Entered into force March 
22, 1973. 

El Salvador 

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement 
between the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia 
of El Salvador and the U.S. Department of Agri- 
culture for the prevention of foot-and-mouth 
disease and rinderpest in El Salvador. Effected 
by exchange of notes at San Salvador February 
28 and March 2, 1973. Entered into force March 
2, 1973. 


Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of payments under P.L.-480 title I agri- 
cultural commodity agreements, with annexes. 
Signed at Washington March 30, 1973. Entered 
into force March 30, 1973. 

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched- 
uling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Govern- 
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at 
Washington March 30, 1973. Entered into force 
March 30, 1973. 


Agreement extending the military mission agree- 

' Applicable to West Berlin. 

ment of November 27, 1943, as amended and ex- 
tended (57 Stat. 1262, TIAS 1941, 2946, 3207, 
3519, 6594, 6970, 7069, 7235). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Tehran February 6 and March 
3, 1973. Entered into force March 3, 1973. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of September 21, 1972 
(TIAS 7466). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Islamabad March 19, 1973. Entered into force 
March 19, 1973. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 4, 1972 (TIAS 
7324). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila 
March 9, 1973. Entered into force March 9, 1973. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement relating to implementation and enforce- 
ment of civil aviation advance charter rules, with 
memorandum of understanding. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington March 30, 1973. 
Entered into force March 30, 1973. 


Treaty on extradition and cooperation in penal mat 
ters. Signed at Washington April 6, 1973. Enters 
into force upon the exchange of ratifications. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 29, 1972 
(TIAS 7452). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon March 19, 1973. Entered into force March 
19, 1973. 

Agreement correcting the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of March 7, 1973. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 19, 
1973. Entered into force March 19, 1973. 



Daniel M. Searby as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, 
Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective April 2. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 2d, 1973 Vol. LXVIII. No. 1765 

Asia. New Trends and Fnrtois in K>ist \sia 
and the Pacific (Green) 503 

liina. The Nixon Adminisu-.-mon s j-uroiRn 
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476 

I Congress 

rConRrossional Documents Relating' to Foreipi 

Policy 506 

[International Economic Report Transmitted to 

the Congress (Nixon) 502 

Jew Trends and Factors in East Asia and the 

Pacific (Green) 503 

Patent Classification Agreement Transmitted 

to the Senate (Nixon) 506 

President Nixon Proposes Plan for Reorgani- 
zation of Federal Drug Law Enforcement 
Activities (message to the Congress) . . . 498 

^nba. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for 
Travel to Certain ,A.reas (texts of public 
notices) 4g8 

)epartment and Foreign Service. Appointments 
(Searby) 508 

Sconomic Affairs 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (Nixon) 502 

Patent Classification Agreement Transmitted 

to the Senate (Nixon) 506 

irby appointed Deputy .-Assistant Secretary 
for Commercial .•Affairs and Business Activ- 
ities 508 

iucational and Cultural .VfTairs. Dr. Franklin 
Visits South America as Lincoln Lecturer . 487 

Europe. The Nixon Administration's Foreign 
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476 

Foreign Aid. Finding of Eligibility for Pur- 
chases Under Foreig^n Military Sales Act 
(Presidential determination) 483 

Sermany. The Nixon Administration's Foreign 
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476 

»rea. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for 
Travel to Certain .Areas (texts of public 
notices) 488 

fiddle East 

The Current Situation in the Middle East 
(Sisco) 484 

The Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy Ob- 
jectives (Rush) ^"'' 

lilitary Affairs 

Lmerica's .Military Strength: Key Element in 
Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace 
(Nixon) 473 

finding of Eligibility for Purchases Under 
Foreign Military Sales Act (Presidential de- 
termination) 483 

jtarcotics Control. President Nixon Proposes 
Plan for Reorganization of Federal Drug 
Law ^Enforcement Activities (message to the 
Congress) 498 

■nama. U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council 
■ ion on Panama Canal Treaty Nego- 
(Scali, draft resolution) 490 

passports. U.S. Pas.sports Remain Invalid for 
Travel to revf.i., \...,.^ tu-t^ ,,f public 
I notices) . . . . 488 

etroleum. Pro. !• jit Nixon Modifies Oil Import 
Pi-ogram I |ii.M.!amation) 489 

Presidential Documents 

.America's .Military Strength: Key Element in 
Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace . 473 

Finding of Eligibility for Purchases Under 
Foreign Military Sales .Act (Presidential de- 
termination) 483 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress 502 

Patent Classification Agreement Transmitted 
to the Senate 506 

President Nixon .Modifies Oil Import Program 
(proclamation) 439 

President Nixon Proposes Plan for Reorganiza- 
tion of Federal Drug Law Enforcement Ac- 
t'^'it'es 498 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 507 

I'ntent Classification Agreement Transmitted to 

the Senate (Nixon) 506 

L.S.S.R. The Nixon .Administration's Foreign 
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476 

United Nations. L^S. Vetoes U.N. Security 
Council Resolution on Panama Canal Treaty 
Negotiations (Scali, draft resolution) . . ". 490 


.America's Military Strength: Key Element in 
Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace 
(Ni.xon) 473 

The Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy 
Objectives (Rush) 476 

U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel to 
Certain Areas (texts of public notices) . . 488 

Navie Index 

Green, Marshall 503 

Nixon, President . . 473, 483, 489, 498, 502, 506 

Rush, Kenneth 476 

Scali, John 490 

Searby, Daniel .M 508 

Sisco, Joseph J 484 

No. Date 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 2-8 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 


Paul Samuclson to tour East Asian 
and Pacific nations (rewrite). 

John Hope Franklin to tour South 
America ( rewrite) . 

U.S. and U.K. reach understanding 
on air charters (rewrite). 

Rush: U.S. Naval Academy, An- 
napolis, Md. 

Rush: Canada-U.S. Interparlia- 
mentary Conference. 

Casey: House Subcommittees on 
Europe and Foreign Economic 

$31 million contract to assist im- 
migrants to Israel (rewrite). 

Rogers: General Assembly of the 

U.S. -Uruguay extradition treaty. 

Newsom : House Subcommittee on 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulxetin. 

t 96 




t 97 


t 98 


t 99 










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/ 7 

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Volume LXVIII 

No. 1766 

April 30, 1973 


Address by Deputy Secretary 533 

Address by Under Secretary Casey 539 

Message From President Nixon to the Congress 513 
Briefing by Secretary Rogers and Other Officials 523 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1766 
April 30, 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenta 
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note: Contents of this publication are not 
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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETiB 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public i 
interested agencies of the governmet{ 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations 
on the work of the Department 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes seleet4 
press releases on foreign policy, isaui 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
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special articles on various phases o^ 
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eluded concerning treaties and int4 
national agreements to which fJ| 
United States is or may become', 
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Publications of the Department 
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international relations are also liste 

President Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
Visits the United States 

President Npinje)) Va)i Thieu of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam made an official visit to 
the United States April 2-7. He met with 
President Nixon and other government offi- 
cials at the Western White House at San 
Clemente, Calif., April 2-3 and met toith 
Vice President Ac/new, leaders of Congress, 
and other officials at Washington April 4-6. 
Folloicing are exchanges of remarks between 
President Nixon and President Thieu at an 
arrival ceremony at the Western White 
House on April 2 and at a departure cere- 
mony on April 3, together with the text of 
a joint communique issued April 3. 


White House press release (San Clemente. Calif, t dated April 2 

President Nixon 

Mr. President, all of our distinguished 
guests, and ladies and gentlemen : Mr. Pres- 
ident, this is the fifth time that I have had 
the honor and pleasure of meeting with you, 
but for the first time I am honored to wel- 
come you in my native land, in my native 
State, and here at my home. 

As we welcome you today, we think back 
to the times we have met before. Particu- 
larly I think of the time that we first met as 
heads of state at Midway four years ago.' 
On that occasion you said after our meeting 
that you looked forward to the time when 
we could meet not for the purpose of dis- 
cussing the conduct of war, but for the pur- 
pose of discussing the building of peace; and 
now, today, that day has come. 

' For remarks by President Nixon and President 
Thieu and text of a joint statement issued at Midway 
Wand on June 8, 19C9, see Bulletin of June 30, 
1969, p. 549. 

There are, of course, difiiculties in building 
a peace after 25 years of war have torn your 
country apart. But, on the other hand, when 
we compare the situation today to what it 
was four years ago at Midway when we met, 
we see the progress that has been made to- 
ward that goal. On that day, when there 
were over half a million Americans fighting 
side by side with your people, we now find 
that all the American forces have retui-ned 
and the people of Viet-Nam have the strength 
to defend their own independence and their 
right to choose their government in the years 

We know that this would not have been 
possible without the courage and also the 
leadership that you have displayed in provid- 
ing an example for the people of your coun- 
try and the courage that they have exemplified 
and the sacrifices they have made. 

Now, as we meet today for two days of 
meetings, we meet to work toward the build- 
ing of peace, a peace for your land which has 
suffered so much and your people who have 
suffered so much and a peace, as it is built 
there, which can contribute to lasting peace 
in the world. 

I would say simply as we conclude that the 
name of our here is Casa Pacifica, 
which means House of the Pacific and also 
House of Peace, and we hope from this day, 
as a result of our talks, will come great steps 
forward in building the lasting peace, the 
real peace that we have fought together for 
and that now we want all of our people to 
live for. 

Thank you. 

President Thieu 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gen- 
tlemen : Thank you very much, Mr. Presi- 

April 30, 1973 


dent, for this warm welcome and for your 
very kind words. Mrs. Thieu and I are very 
happy to oome here today to this beautiful 
land of freedom and prosperity. We appre- 
ciate most especially your hospitality. 

I find it very significant that the discus- 
sions which I will soon hold with you on this 
visit, which will establish the new basis for 
the cooperation between the United States 
and Viet-Nam following the Viet-Nam peace 
agreement, are to be held in the Western 
White House on the Pacific Coast, because 
both the United States and Viet-Nam belong 
to the same community of nations bordering 
on the Pacific Ocean. 

History has proved that there can be no 
solid peace in the world unless there is peace 
and stability in the Pacific area. History has 
also shown that for the Pacific Ocean to de- 
serve its peaceful name, courage and tenacity 
are as important today as they were to the 
navigators who first sailed across this vast 
ocean centuries ago. 

Mr. President, over three years ago when 
we met at Midway at a time when the Viet- 
Nam war was raging, we laid down together 
the foundations for a promising solution to 
the Viet-Nam conflict that came to be known 
as the Vietnamization. Today, while over 
300,000 American troops still stay in Europe 
to bolster the defense of western Europe, 
more than a quarter century after World 
War II was over, we in Viet-Nam are proud 
that, thanks to your help, the Vietnamese de- 
fense force was able to repel an all-out 
Communist invasion last year at a time 
when American ground troops had been 

This made possible a peace with honor 
whereby the Communist aggressors, in the 
Paris agreement last January, had to rec- 
ognize formally the right of self-determina- 
tion of the people of South Viet-Nam and the 
principle that the problems we will solve in 
North Viet-Nam are to be solved by peace- 
ful means without coercion and annexation. 

While the road to lasting peace is still an 
arduous one, a new page has been turned 
with the conclusion of the Paris agreement, 
and I look forward to having fruitful con- 
versation with you, Mr. President, on the 


various aspects of the relation between our 
two countries in this new context. 

I earnestly hope that the joint efforts of 
our two governments would lead to a consoli- 
dation of peace in Indochina and a new era 
of constructive cooperation in peace among 
all parties concerned. I avail myself on this 
occasion to express to you, Mr. President, 
and through you to the American people, the 
heartfelt gratitude of the Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment and people for the generous assist- 
ance of your government and the noble 
contribution of the American nation to our 
long efforts to defend and preserve freedom 
for Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia. 

Thank you very much. 


white House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated April 3 

President Nixon 

Mr. President and ladies and gentlemen: 
As our joint communique indicates, Presi- 
dent Thieu and I have had very constructive 
talks with regard to how we shall work to- 
gether in the years ahead, working for the 
program of peace which we now hope will 
all be the wave of the future not only for the 
Republic of Viet-Nam but for all of the 
countries in Indochina. 

Mr. President, we have been allies in a 
long and difficult war, and now you can be 
sure that we stand with you as we continue 
to work together to build a lasting peace. 

This is a great goal for our two peoples, 
and I am very happy that we could have had 
these extended talks in developing programs 
that will achieve that goal. 

We wish you well as you go on to Wash- 
ington and as you return to your own coun- 
try, and we look forward to the time when 
we shall meet again. • 

President Thieu 

Ladies and gentlemen : I am very happy 
to have a few minutes with you on the con- J 
elusion of this meeting with President Nixon. ; 
As you know already, the two main purposes ' 

Department of State Bulletin 

of my visit here are to thank in person the 
American people for the peneroiis and dis- 
interested assistance given to us during the 
past difficult years, and secondly, to have an 
opportunity to discuss with President Nixon 
about what needs to be done in view of con- 
olidating the peace in Viet-Nam and in 
Southeast Asia. 

As I said earlier in my arrival statement, 
my visit here marks at the same time an end 
and a beginning: an end to a very difficult 
period of time during which our two coun- 
tries have endeavored to preserve freedom 
for the Vietnamese people and a beginning 
in the sense that the newly achieved peace 
in Viet-Nam will be the starting point of 
what President Nixon calls a generation of 
peace for the whole world. 
1 I had during these two days very thorough 
and cordial conversations with President 
Nixon which I am sure will help lay the 
foundation of lasting peace in our part of 
the world and of a fruitful cooperation be- 
tween the American and Vietnamese people 
in the postwar period. 

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 

I look forward to seeing you again, Pres- 
ident Nixon. 


The President of the United States, Richard M. 
Nixon, and the President of the Republic of Viet- 
nam, Npuyen Van Thieu, met for two days of dis- 
cussions in San Clemente at the outset of President 
Thieu's official visit to the United States. Taking 
inrt in discussions on the United States side 
• re the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers; the 
\ssistant to the President for National Security 
AfTairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the .Ambassador of the 
United States to the Republic of Vietnam, Ellsworth 
Bunker; the .Ambassador-designate of the United 
States to the Republic of Vietnam, Graham Mar- 
;tin; and other officials. On the side of the Republic 
of Vietnam the Minister for Foreign .Affairs, Tran 
Van I,am; the Minister of Economy, Pham Kim 
N'goc; the .Minister of Finance, Ha Xuan Trung; the 
Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Af- 
fairs, Nguyen Phu Due; the Vietnamese Ambassador 
to the United States, Tran Kim Phuong, and other 
officials also participated in the discussions. 

The discussions were held in a very cordial at- 
mosphere appropriate to the enduring relationship 

of friendship which exists between the governments 
of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. 
The two Presidents discussed the course of U.S.- 
Vietnamese relations since their meeting at Midway 
Island on June 8, 1969 and the postwar relationship 
between the two countries. They reached full con- 
sensus in their views. 

President Ni.xon and President Thiou reviewed the 
progress that has been made in economic, political 
and defense affairs in Vietnam since the Midway 
meeting. President Nixon expressed gratification 
with the proficiency of South Vietnam's armed 
forces and noted their effective and courageous per- 
formance in halting the invasion launched by North 
Vietnam on March 80, 1972. The President also ex- 
pressed satisfaction with the development of political 
institutions and noted the political stability that has 
prevailed in South Vietnam in recent years. Presi- 
dent Thieu reaffirmed his determination to assure 
social and political justice for the people of South 

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction at 
the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, as well as the Act 
of the International Conference on Vietnam which 
endorsed this .Agreement." They asserted the deter- 
mination of their two governments to implement the 
provisions of the Agreement scrupulously. They also 
affirmed their strong expectation that the other 
parties signatory to the Agreement woukl do the 
same in order to establish a lasting peace in Viet- 
nam. The two Presidents expressed their apprecia- 
tion to the other members of the international com- 
munity who helped in achieving the Agreement and 
particularly to the four member governments of the 
International Commission of Control and Supervi- 
sion whose representatives are observing its imple- 
mentation. They consider that the International 
Commission, acting in cooperation with the Four 
Parties to the Agreement, is an essential element in 
the structure of restoring peace to Vietnam and 
expressed their determination to further encourage 
the most effective and objective possible supervision 
of the Agreement. 

President Nixon informed President Thieu of his 
great interest in the meetings between representa- 
tives of the two South Vietnamese parties which are 
currently taking place in France in an effort to 
achieve an internal political settlement in South 
Vietnam. President Thieu said that his government 
is resolved at these meetings to achieve a settle- 
ment which will fully insure the right of self- 
determination by the South Vietnamese people in 
accordance with the Agreement on Ending the War. 
President Thieu expressed his earnest desire for a 
reconciliation among the South Vietnamese parties 

' For text of the agreement, see Bulu:tin of 
Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169; for text of the act, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 345. 

April 30, 1973 


which will fulfill the hopes of the South Vietnamese 
people for peace, independence, and democracy. 

Both Presidents, while acknowledging that prog- 
ress was being made toward military and political 
settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed 
with great concern infiltrations of men and weapons 
in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam into South 
Vietnam in violation of the Agreement on Ending 
the War, and considered that actions which would 
threaten the basis of the Agreement would call for 
appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed 
their conviction that all the provisions of the Agree- 
ment, including in particular those concerning mili- 
tary forces and military supplies, must be faithfully 
implemented if the cease-fire is to be preserved and 
the prospects for a peaceful settlement are to be 
assured. President Nixon stated in this connection 
that the United States views violations of any pro- 
vision of the Agreement with great and continuing 

Both Presidents also agreed that there could be 
lasting peace in Vietnam only if there is peace in 
the neighboring countries. Accordingly they ex- 
pressed their earnest interest in the achievement of 
a satisfactory implementation of the cease-fire agree- 
ment reached in Laos on February 21. They ex- 
pressed their grave concern at the fact that Article 
20 of the Agreement which calls for the uncondi- 
tional withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos 
and Cambodia has not been carried out. They agreed 
that this Article should be quickly implemented. 

In assessing the prospects for peace throughout 
Indochina the two Presidents stressed the need for 
vigilance on the part of the governments in the 
Indochinese states against the possibility of re- 
newed Communist aggression after the departure 
of United States ground forces from South Vietnam. 
They stressed the fact that this vigilance will re- 
quire the continued political, economic, and military 
strength of the governments and nations menaced by 
any renewal of this aggressive threat. Because of 
their limited resources, the nations of the region 
will require external assistance to preserve the nec- 
essary social and economic stability for peaceful 

In this context. President Thieu aflirmed the de- 
termination of the Vietnamese people and the Gov- 
ernment to forge ahead with the task of providing 
adequate and timely relief to war victims, recon- 
structing damaged social and economic infrastruc- 
tures, and building a strong and viable economy, so 
that the Vietnamese nation can gradually shoulder 
a greater burden in the maintenance of peace and 
the achievement of economic progress for its people. 
The two Presidents agreed that in order to attain 
the stated economic goals as quickly as possible, the 
Republic of Vietnam will need greater external 
economic assistance in the initial years of the post 
war era. President Nixon reaflirmed his wholehearted 
support for the endeavors of post war rehabilitation, 

reconstruction and development of the Republic of 
Vietnam. He informed President Thieu of the United 
States intention to provide adequate and substantial 
economic assistance for the Republic of Vietnam 
during the remainder of this year and to seek Con- 
gressional authority for a level of funding for the 
next year suflicient to assure essential economic 
stability and rehabilitation for that country as it 
now moves from war to peace. He recognized that 
the economic development and self-sufficiency of 
South Vietnam depend to a significant extent on 
its ability to promote and attract foreign investment. 
He also expressed his intention to seek Congres- 
sional support for a longer range program for the 
economic development of South Vietnam now that 
the war has ended. 

The two Presidents expressed their earnest hope 
that other nations as well as international institu- 
tions will act promptly on a positive and concerted 
program of international assistance to the Republic 
of Vietnam. They also agreed that consultations 
should soon be held in this regard with all interested 

The two Presidents expressed hope that the imple- 
mentation of the Agreement on Vietnam would per- 
mit a normalization of relations with all countries 
of .Southeast .\sia. They agreed that this step and 
a regional reconstruction program will increase the 
prospects of a lasting peace in the area. 

President Nixon discussed the future security of 
South Vietnam in the context of the Nixon Doctrine. 
The President noted that the assumption by the Re- 
public of Vietnam of the full manpower require- 
ments for its own defense was fully in keeping with 
his doctrine. He aflSrmed that the United States 
for its part, expected to continue, in accordance with 
its Constitutional processes, to supply the Republic 
of Vietnam with the material means for its defense 
consistent with the Agreement on Ending the War. 

President Thieu asked President Nixon to convey 
to the American people and particularly to families 
bereaved by the loss of loved ones, the deep and 
abiding appreciation of the people of South Vietnam 
for the sacrifices made on their behalf and the assist- 
ance given to the Republic of Vietnam in its long 
struggle to maintain its freedom and preserve its 
right of self-determination. 

Prior to the departure of President Thieu for 
Washington to continue his official visit to the United 
States, both Presidents agreed that through the 
harsh experience of a tragic war and the sacrifices 
of their two peoples a close and constructive rela- 
tionship between the American and the South Viet- 
namese people has been developed and strengthened. 
They affirmed their full confidence that this associa- 
tion would be preserved as the foundation of an 
honorable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia. 

President Thieu expressed his gratitude for the 
warm hospitality extended to him and his party by 
President Nixon. 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act of 1973 
to the Congress 

Message From President Nixon to the Congress^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

The Trade Reform Act of 1973. which I 
am today proposing to the Congress, calls for 
the most important changes in more than a 
decade in America's approach to world trade. 

This legislation can mean more and better 
jobs for American workers. 

It can help American consumers get more 
for their money. 

It can mean expanding trade and expand- 
ing prosperity, for the United States and for 
our trading partners alike. 

Most importantly, these proposals can 
help us reduce international tensions and 
.strengthen the structure of peace. 

The need for trade reform is urgent. The 
task of trade reform requires an effective, 
working partnership between the executive 
and legislative branches. The legislation I 
submit today has been developed in close 
consultation with the Congress and it envi- 
sions continuing cooperation after it is en- 
acted. I urge the Congress to examine these 
proposals in a spirit of constructive partner- 
ship and to give them prompt and favorable 

This legislation would help us to: 

— Negotiate for a more open and equitable 
world trading system ; 

— Deal effectively with rapid increases in 
imports that disrupt domestic markets and 
displace American workers ; 

— Strengthen our ability to meet unfair 
competitive practices ; 

'Transmitted on Apr. 10 (White House press 
release) ; also printed as H. Doc. 93-80, 93d Cong., 
1st sess. 

— Manage our trade policy more efficiently 
and use it more effectively to deal with spe- 
cial needs such as our balance of payments 
and inflation problems ; and 

— Take advantage of new trade opportu- 
nities while enhancing the contribution trade 
can make to the development of poorer 

Strengthening the Structure of Peace 

The world is embarked today on a pro- 
found and historic movement away from 
confrontation and toward negotiation in re- 
solving international differences. Increas- 
ingly in recent years, countries have come 
to see that the best way of advancing their 
own interests is by expanding peaceful con- 
tacts with other peoples. We have thus be- 
gun to erect a durable structure of peace in 
the world from which all nations can benefit 
and in which all nations have a stake. 

This structure of peace cannot be strong, 
however, unless it encompasses international 
economic affairs. Our progress toward world 
peace and stability can be significantly un- 
dermined by economic conflicts which breed 
political tensions and weaken security ties. 
It is imperative, therefore, that we promptly 
turn our negotiating efforts to the task of 
resolving problems in the economic arena. 

My trade reform proposals would equip 
us to meet this challenge. They would help us 
in creating a new economic order which both 
reflects and reinforces the progress we have 
made in political aflfairs. As I said to the 
Governors of the International Monetary 
Fund last September, our common goal 

April 30, 1973 


should be to "set in place an economic struc- 
ture that will help and not hinder the world's 
historic movement toward peace." = 

Toward a New International Economic Order 

The principal institutions which now gov- 
ern the world economy date from the close 
of World War II. At that time, the United 
States enjoyed a dominant position. Our 
industrial and agricultural systems had 
emerged from the war virtually intact. Our 
substantial reserves enabled us to finance a 
major share of international reconstruction. 
We gave generously of our resources and our 
leadership in helping the world economy get 
back on track. 

The result has been a quarter century of 
remarkable economic achievement — and pro- 
found economic change. In place of a splin- 
tered and shattered Europe stands a new and 
vibrant European Community. In place of a 
prostrate Japan stands one of the free 
world's strongest economies. In all parts of 
the world new economic patterns have de- 
veloped and new economic energies have 
been released. 

These successes have now brought the 
world into a very diiTerent period. America 
is no longer the sole, dominating economic 
power. The new era is one of growing eco- 
nomic interdependence, shared economic 
leadership, and dramatic economic change. 
These sweeping tran.sformations, however, 
have not been matched by sufUcient change 
in our trading and monetary systems. The 
approaches which served us so well in the 
years following World War II have now be- 
come outmoded; they are simply no longer 
equal to the challenges of our time. 

The result has been a growing sense of 
strain and stress in the international econ- 
omy and even a resurgence of economic iso- 
lationism as some have sought to insulate 
themselves from change. If we are to make 
our new economic era a time of progress 
and prosperity for all the world's peoples, 
we must resist the impulse to turn inward 
and instead do all we can to see that our in- 

ternational economic arrangements are sub- 
stantially improved. 

Momentum for Change 

The United States has already taken a 
number of actions to help build a new inter- 
national economic order and to advance our 
interests within it. 

Our New Economic Policy, announced 

on August 15, 1971, has helped to improve 
the performance of our domestic economy, 
reducing unemployment and inflation and 
thereby enhancing our competitive position.^ 

The realignment of currencies achieved 

under the Smithsonian Agreement of Decem- 
ber 18, 1971,^ and by the adjustments of re- 
cent weeks have also made American goods 
more competitive with foreign products in 
markets at home and abroad. 

—Building on the Smithsonian Agreement, 
we have advanced far-reaching proposals 
for lasting reform in the world's monetary 

We have concluded a trade agreement 

with the Soviet Union that promises to 
strengthen the fabric of prosperity and 


—Opportunities for mutually beneficial 
trade are developing with the People's Re- 
public of China. 

We have opened negotiations with the 

enlarged European Community and several 
of the countries with which it has concluded 
special trading agreements concerning com- 
pensation due us as a result of their new 

But despite all these efforts, underlying 
problems remain. We need basic trade re- 
form, and we need it now. Our efforts to im- 
prove the world's monetary system, for ex- 
ample, will never meet with lasting success 
unless basic improvements are also achieved 
in the field of international trade. 

- Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1972, p. 457. 

■■■For President Nixon's address to the Nation 
on Aug. 15, 1971, see Bulletin of Sept. 6, 1971, 

''' ' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1972, 

p. 32. „ . 

"For text of the agreement, see Bulletin ot 

Nov. 20, 1972, p. 595. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Building a Fair and Open Trading World 

A wific variety of barriers to trade still 
distort the world's economic relations, harm- 
ing our own interests and those of other 

— Quantitative barriers hamper trade in 
many commodities, including some of our 
potentially most profitable exports. 

— Agricultural harriers limit and distort 
trade in farm products, with special damage 
to the American economy because of our 
comparative advantage in the agricultural 

— Preferential trading arrangements have 
spread to include most of Western Europe, 
Africa and other countries bordering on the 
Mediterranean Sea. 

— Non-tariff barriers have greatly prolif- 
erated as tariffs have declined. 

These barriers to trade, in other countries 
and in ours, presently cost the United States 
several billion dollars a year in the form of 
higher consumer prices and the inefficient 
use of our resources. Even an economy as 
strong as ours can ill afford such losses. 

Fortunately, our major trading partners 
have joined us in a commitment to broad, 
multilateral trade negotiations beginning 
this fall. These negotiations will provide a 
unique opportunity for reducing trading bar- 
riers and expanding world trade. 

It is in the best interest of every nation to 
sell to others the goods it produces more 
efl^ciently and to purchase the goods which 
other nations produce more efficiently. If we 
can operate on this basis, then both the earn- 
ings of our workers and the buying power of 
our dollars can be significantly increased. 

But while trade should be more open, it 
.should also be more fair. This means, first, 
that the rules and practices of trade should 
be fair to all nations. Secondly, it means that 
the benefits of trade should be fairly distrib- 
uted among American workers, farmers, 
businessmen and consumers alike and that 
trade .should create no undue burdens for any 
of these groups. 

I am confident that our free and vigorous 
American economv can more than hold its 

own in open world competition. But we must 
always insist that such competition take place 
under equitable rules. 

The Urgent Need for Action 

The key to success in our coming trade 
negotiations will be the negotiating authority 
the United States bi-ings to the bargaining 
table. Unless our negotiators can speak for 
this country with sufficient authority, other 
nations will undoubtedly be cautious and 
non-committal — and the opportunity for 
change will be lost. 

We must move promptly to provide our 
negotiators with the authority their task 
requires. Delay can only aggravate the 
strains we have already experienced. Dis- 
ruptions in world financial markets, deficits 
in our trading balance, inflation in the in- 
ternational marketplace, and tensions in the 
diplomatic arena all argue for prompt and 
decisive action. So does the plight of those 
American workers and businesses who are 
damaged by rapidly rising imports or whose 
products face barriers in foreign markets. 

For all of these reasons, I urge the Con- 
gress to act on my recommendations as ex- 
peditiously as possible. We face pressing 
problems here and now. We cannot wait until 
tomorrow to solve them. 

Providing New Negotiating Authorities 

Negotiators from other countries will 
i)ring to the coming round of trade discus- 
sions broad authority to alter their barriers 
to trade. Such authority makes them more 
effective bai-gainers; without such authority 
the hands of any negotiator would be se- 
verely tied. 

Unfortunately, the President of the United 
States and those who negotiate at his direc- 
tion do not now possess authorities compar- 
able to those which other countries will bring 
to these bargaining sessions. Unless these 
authorities are provided, we will be badly 
hampered in our effoi-ts to advance American 
interests and improve our trading system. 

My proposed legislation therefore calls 
upon the Congress to delegate significant 

April 30, 1973 


new negotiating authorities to the executive 
branch. For several decades now, both the 
Congress and the President have recognized 
that trade policy is one field in which such 
delegations are indispensable. This concept 
is clearly established ; the questions which 
remain concern the degree of delegation 
which is appropriate and the conditions un- 
der which it should be carried out. 

The legislation I submit today spells out 
only that degree of delegation which I be- 
lieve is necessary and proper to advance the 
national interest. And just as we have con- 
sulted closely with the Congress in shaping 
this legislation, so the executive branch will 
consult closely with the Congress in exercis- 
ing any negotiating authorities it receives. 
I invite the Congress to set up whatever 
mechanism it deems best for closer consulta- 
tion and cooperation to ensure that its views 
are properly represented as trade negotia- 
tions go forward. 

It is important that America speak au- 
thoritatively and with a single voice at the 
international bargaining table. But it is also 
important that many voices contribute as the 
American position is being shaped. 

The proposed Trade Reform Act of 
1973 would provide for the following new 
authorities : 

First, I request authority to eliminate, re- 
duce, or increase customs duties in the con- 
text of negotiated agreements. Although this 
authority is requested for a period of five 
years, it is my intention and my expectation 
that agreements can be concluded in a much 
shorter time. Last October, the member gov- 
ernments of the European Community ex- 
pressed their hope that the coming round of 
trade negotiations will be concluded by 1975. 
I endorse this timetable and our negotiators 
will cooperate fully in striving to meet it. 

Secondly, I request a Congressional decla- 
ration favoring negotiations and agreements 
on non-tariff barriers. I am also asking that 
a new, optional procedure be created for ob- 
taining the approval of the Congress for such 
agreements when that is appropriate. Cur- 
rently both Houses of the Congress must 
take positive action before any such agree- 
ment requiring changes in domestic law be- 

comes effective — a process which makes it 
difficult to achieve agreements since our 
trading partners know it is sub,iect to much 
uncertainty and delay. Under the new ar- 
rangement, the President would give notice 
to the Congress of his intention to use the 
procedure at least 90 days in advance of 
concluding an agreement in order to pro- 
vide time for appropriate House and Senate 
Committees to consider the issues involved 
and to make their views known. After an 
agreement was negotiated, the President 
would submit that agreement and proposed 
implementing orders to the Congress. If 
neither House rejected them by a majority 
vote of all members within a period of 90 
days, the agreement and implementing or- 
ders would then enter into effect. 

Thirdly, I request advance authority to 
carry out mutually beneficial agreements 
concerning specific customs matters primar- 
ily involving valuation and the marking of 
goods by country of origin. 

The authorities I outline in my proposed 
legislation would give our negotiators the 
leverage and the flexibility they need to 
reduce or eliminate foreign barriers to 
American products. These proposals would 
significantly strengthen America's bargain- 
ing position in the coming trade negotiations. 

Objectives in Agricultural Trade 

I am not requesting specific negotiating 
authority relating to agricultural trade. Bar- 
riers to such trade are either tariff or non- 
tariff in nature and can be dealt with under 
the general authorities I am requesting. 

One of our major objectives in the coming 
negotiations is to provide for expansion in 
agricultural trade. The strength of Ameri- 
can agriculture depends on the continued 
expansion of our world markets — especially 
for the major bulk commodities our farmers 
produce so efficiently. Even as we have been ' 
moving toward a great reliance on free 
market forces here at home under the Agri- 
cultural Act of 1970, so we seek to broaden 
the role of market forces on the international i 
level by reducing and removing barriers to 
trade in farm products. 


Department of State Bulletin 

I am convinced that the concerns which 
all nations have for their farmers and con- 
sumers can be met most effectively if the 
market plays a far greater role in determin- 
ing patterns of agricultural production and 
consumption. Movement in this direction can 
do much to help ensure adequate supplies of 
food and relieve pressure on consumer prices. 

Providing for Import Relief 

As other countries agree to reduce their 
trading barriers, we expect to reduce ours. 
The result will be expanding trade, creating 
more and better jobs for the American peo- 
ple and providing them with greater access 
to a wider variety of products from other 

It is true, of course, that reducing import 
barriers has on some occasions led to sudden 
surges in imports which have had disruptive 
effects on the domestic economy. It is impor- 
tant to note, however, that most severe 
problems caused by surging imports have not 
been related to the reduction of import bar- 
riers. Steps toward a more open trading 
order generally have a favorable rather than 
an unfavorable impact on domestic jobs. 

Nevertheless, damaging import surges, 
whatever their cause, should be a matter of 
great concern to our people and our Govern- 
ment. I believe we should have effective in- 
struments readily available to help avoid 
serious injury from imports and give Ameri- 
can industries and workers time to adjust to 
increased imports in an orderly way. My 
I)roposed legislation outlines new measures 
for achieving these goals. 

To begin with, I recommend a less restric- 
tive test for invoking import restraints. To- 
day, restraints are authorized only when the 
Tariff Commission finds that imports are the 
"major cause" of serious injury or threat 
thereof to a domestic industry, meaning 
that their impact must be larger than that 
of all other causes combined. Under my pro- 
posal, restraints would be authorized when 
import competition was the "primary cause" 
of such injury, meaning that it must only be 
the largest single cause. In addition, the pres- 
ent requirement that injury must result 

from a previous tariff concession would be 

I also recommend a new method for de- 
termining whether imports actually are the 
primary cause of serious injury to domestic 
producers. Under my proposal, a finding of 
"market disruption" would constitute prima 
facie evidence of that fact. Market disrup- 
tion would be defined as occurring when im- 
ports are substantial, are rising rapidly both 
absolutely and as a percentage of total do- 
mestic consumption, and are offered at prices 
substantially below those of competing do- 
mestic products. 

My proposed legislation would give the 
President greater flexibility in providing ap- 
propriate relief from import problems — in- 
cluding orderly marketing agreements or 
higher tariffs or quotas. Restraints could be 
imposed for an initial period of five years 
and, at the discretion of the President, could 
be extended for an additional period of two 
years. In exceptional cases, restrictions could 
be extended even further after a two-year 
period and following a new investigation by 
the Tariff Commission. 

Improving Adjustment Assistance 

Our responsibilities for easing the prob- 
lems of displaced workers are not limited to 
those whose unemployment can be traced to 
imports. All displaced workers are entitled 
to adequate assistance while they seek new 
employment. Only if all workers believe they 
are getting a fair break can our economy 
adjust effectively to change. 

I will therefore propose in a separate 
message to the Congress new legislation to 
improve our systems of unemployment in- 
surance and compensation. My proposals 
would -set minimum Federal standards for 
benefit levels in State programs, ensuring 
that all woi-kers covered by such programs 
are treated equitably, whatever the cause of 
their involuntary unemployment. In the 
meantime, until these standards become ef- 
fective, I am recommending as a part of 
my trade reform proposals that we imme- 
diately establish benefit levels which meet 

April 30, 1973 


these proposed general standards for work- 
ers displaced because of imports. 

I further propose that until the new stand- 
ards for unemployment insurance are in 
place, we make assistance for workers more 
readily available by dropping the present 
requirement that their unemployment must 
have been caused by prior tariff concessions 
and that imports must have been the "major 
cause" of injury. Instead, such assistance 
would be authorized if the Secretary of 
Labor determined that unemployment was 
substantially due to import-related causes. 
Workers unemployed because of imports 
would also have job training, job search 
allowances, employment services and relo- 
cation assistance available to them as per- 
manent features of trade adjustment assist- 

In addition, I will submit to the Congress 
comprehensive pension reform legislation 
which would help protect workers who lose 
their jobs against loss of pension benefits. 
This legislation will contain a mandatory 
vesting requirement which has been devel- 
oped with older workers particularly in mind. 

The proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973 
would terminate the present program of ad- 
justment assistance to individual firms. I 
recommend this action because I believe this 
program has been largely ineffective, dis- 
criminates among firms within a given in- 
dustry and has needlessly subsidized some 
firms at the taxpayer's expense. Changing 
competitive conditions, after all, typically act 
not upon particular firms but upon an in- 
dustry as a whole and I have provided for 
entire industries under my import relief 

Dealing With Unfair Trade Practices 

The President of the United States pos- 
sesses a variety of authorities to deal with 
unfair trade practices. Many of these author- 
ities must now be modernized if we are to 
respond effectively and even-handedly to un- 
fair import competition at home and to prac- 
tices which unfairly prejudice our export 
opportunities abroad. 

To cope with unfair competitive practices 

in our own markets, my proposed legislation 
would amend our antidumping and counter- 
vailing duty laws to provide for more expedi- 
tious investigations and decisions. It would 
make a number of procedural and other 
changes in these laws to guarantee their 
effective operation. The bill would also 
amend the current statute concerning patent 
infringement by subjecting cases involving 
imports to judicial proceedings similar to 
those which involve domestic infringement, 
and by providing for fair processes and 
effective action in the event of court delays. 
I also propose that the Federal Trade Com- 
mission Act be amended to strengthen our 
ability to deal with foreign producers whose 
cartel or monopoly practices raise prices in 
our market or otherwise harm our interest 
by restraining trade. 

In addition, I ask for a revision and ex- 
tension of my authority to raise barriers 
against countries which unreasonably or un- 
justifiably restrict our exports. Existing law 
provides such authority only under a complex 
array of conditions which vary according to 
the practices or exports involved. My pro- 
posed bill would simplify the authority and 
its use. I would prefer, of course, that other 
countries agree to remove such restrictions 
on their own, so that we should not have to 
use this authority. But I will consider using 
it whenever it becomes clear that our trading 
partners are unwilling to remove unreason- 
able or unjustifiable restrictions against our 

Other Major Provisions 

Most-Favorcd-Nation Authority. My pro- 
posed legislation would grant the Presi- 
dent authority to extend most-favored-nation 
treatment to any country when he deemed 
it in the national interest to do so. Under 
my proposal, however, any such extension to 
countries not now receiving most-favored- 
nation treatment could be vetoed by a major- 
ity vote of either the House or the Senate 
within a three-month period. 

This new authority would enable us to 
carry out the trade agreement we have nego- 
tiated with the Soviet Union and thereby 


Department of State Bulletin 

ensure that country's repayment of its lend- 
lease debt. It would also enable us to fulfill 
our commitment to- Romania and to take 
advantage of opportunities to conclude bene- 
ficial agreements with other countries which 
do not now receive most-favored-nation 

In the case of the Soviet Union, I recog- 
nize the deep concern which many in the 
Congress have exjn-essed over the tax levied 
on Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate to 
new countries. However, I do not believe that 
a policy of denying most-favored-nation 
treatment to Soviet exports is a proper or 
even an effective way of dealing with this 

One of the most important elements of 
our trade agreement with the Soviet Union 
is the clause which calls upon each party to 
reduce exports of products which cause mar- 
ket disruptions in the other country. While 
I have no reason to doubt that the Soviet 
Union will meet its obligations undei- this 
clause if the need arises, we should still have 
authority to take unilateral action to prevent 
disruption if such action is warranted. 

Because of the special w-ay in which state- 
trading countries market their products 
abroad, I would recommend two modifications 
in the way we take such action. First, the 
Tariff Commission should only have to find 
"material injury" rather than "serious in- 
jury" from imports in order to impose appi'o- 
priate restraints. Secondly, such restraints 
should apply only to exports from the offend- 
ing country. These recommendations can 
simplify our laws relating to dumping ac- 
tions by state-trading countries, eliminating 
the difllcult and time-consuming problems a.s- 
sociated with trying to reach a constructed 
value for their exports. 

Balance of Paijmeyitf^ Avthnrity. Though 
it should only be used in exceptional circum- 
stances, trade policy can sometimes be an 
effective supplementary tool for dealing with 
our international payments imbalances. I 
therefore request more flexible authority to 
raise or lower import restrictions on a tem- 
poi-ary basis to help correct deficits or sur- 
pluses in our payments position. Such 

restraints could be applied to imports from 
all countries across the board or only to 
those countries which fail to correct a per- 
sistent and excessive surplus in their global 
payments position. 

Anti-Inflation Authority. My trade recom- 
mendations also include a proposal I made 
on March 30th as a part of this Administra- 
tion's effort to curb the rising cost of living." 
I asked the Congress at that time to give the 
President new, permanent authority to re- 
duce certain import barriers temporarily and 
to a limited extent when he determined that 
such action was necessary to relieve infla- 
tionary pressures within the United States. 
I again urge prompt approval for this im- 
jiortant weapon in our war against inflation. 

Generalized Tariff Preferences. Another 
significant provision of my proposed bill 
would permit the United States to join with 
other developed countries, including Japan 
and the members of the European Commu- 
nity, in helping to improve the access of 
poorer nations to the markets of developed 
countries. Under this arrangement, certain 
products of developing nations would benefit 
from prefei'ential ti'eatment for a ten-year 
period, creating new export opportunities for 
such countries, raising their foreign ex- 
change earnings, and permitting them to 
finance those higher levels of imports that 
are essential for more rapid economic 

This legislation would allow duty-free 
treatment for a bi'oad range of manufac- 
tured and semi-manufactured products and 
for a selected list of agricultural and pri- 
mary products which are now regulated only 
by tariflTs. It is our intention to exclude cer- 
tain import-sensitive products such as textile 
products, footweai', watches and certain steel 
pi-oducts from such preferential treatment, 
along with products which are now subject 
to outstanding orders re.stricting imports. 
As is the case for the multilateral negotia- 
tions authority, public hearing procedures 
would be held befoi-e such prefei'ences were 
granted and preferential imports would be 

'See p. 532. 

April 30, 1973 


subject to the import relief provisions which 
I have recommended above. Once a particu- 
lar product from a given country became 
fully competitive, however, it would no 
longer qualify for special treatment. 

The United States would grant such tariff 
preferences on the basis of international 
fair play. We would take into account the 
actions of other preference-granting coun- 
tries and we would not grant preferences to 
countries which discriminate against our 
products in favor of goods from other indus- 
trialized nations unless those countries 
agreed to end such discrimination. 

Permanent Management Authorities. To 
permit more efficient and more flexible man- 
agement of American trade policy, I request 
permanent authority to make limited reduc- 
tions in our tariflTs as a form of compensa- 
tion to other countries. Such compensation 
could be necessary in cases where we have 
raised certain barriers under the new im- 
port restraints discussed above and would 
provide an alternative in such cases to in- 
creased barriers against our exports. 

I also request permanent authority to offer 
reductions in particular United States bar- 
riers as a means of obtaining significant 
advantages for American exports. These re- 
ductions would be strictly limited ; they 
would involve tariff cuts of no more than 
20 percent covering no more than two per- 
cent of total United States imports in any 
one year. 

Reforming International Trading Rules 

The coming multilateral trade negotiations 
will give us an excellent opportunity to re- 
form and update the rules of international 
trade. There are several areas where we will 
seek such changes. 

One important need concerns the use of 
trade policy in promoting equilibrium in the 
international payments system. We will seek 
rule changes to permit nations, in those ex- 
ceptional cases where such measures are 
necessary, to increase or decrease trade bar- 
riers across the board as one means of help- 
ing to correct their payments imbalances. 
We will also seek a new rule allowing nations 

to impose import restrictions against indi- 
vidual countries which fail to take effective 
action to correct an excessive surplus in 
their balance of payments. This rule would 
parallel the authority I have requested to 
use American import restrictions to meet 
our own balance of payments problem. 

A second area of concern is the need for 
a multilateral system for limiting imports 
to protect against disruptions caused by rap- 
idly changing patterns of international trade. 
As I emphasized earlier, we need a more 
effective domestic procedure to meet such 
problems. But it is also important that new 
arrangements be developed at the inter- 
national level to cope with disruptions caused 
by the accelerating pace of change in world 

We will therefore seek new international 
rules which would allow countries to gain 
time for adjustment by imposing import 
restrictions, without having to compensate 
their trading partners by simultaneously re- 
ducing barriers to other products. At the 
same time, the interests of exporting coun- 
tries should be protected by providing that 
such safeguards will be phased out over a 
reasonable period of time. 

Promoting Export Expansion 

As trade barriers are reduced around the 
world, American exports will increase sub- 
stantially, enhancing the health of our entire 

Already our efforts to expand American 
exports have moved forward on many fronts. 
We have made our exports more competitive 
by realigning exchange rates. Since 1971, 
our new law permitting the establishment of 
Domestic International Sales Corporations 
has been helping American companies or- 
ganize their export activities more effec- 
tively. The lending, guaranty and insurance 
authorities of the Export-Import Bank have 
been increased and operations have been 
extended to include a short-term discount 
loan facility. The Department of Commerce 
has reorganized its facilities for promoting 
exports and has expanded its services for 
exporters. The Department of State, in co- 


Department of State Bulletin 

operation with the Department of Commerce, 
is giving increased emphasis to commercial 
service programs in our missions abroad. 

In addition, I am today submitting sepa- 
rate legishition which would amend the Ex- 
port Trade Act in order to clarify the legal 
framework in which associations of export- 
ers can function. One amendment would 
make it clear that the act applies not only 
to the export of goods but also to certain 
kinds of services — architecture, construction, 
engineering, training and management con- 
sulting, for example. Another amendment 
would clarify the exemption of export asso- 
ciations from our domestic antitrust laws, 
while setting up clear information, disclosure 
and regulatory requirements to ensure that 
the public interest is fully protected. 

In an era when more countries are seeking 
foreign contracts for entire industrial proj- 
ects — including steps ranging from engineei-- 
ing studies through the supply of equipment 
and the construction of plants — it is essen- 
tial that our laws concerning joint export 
activities allow us to meet our foreign com- 
petition on a fair and equal basis. 

The Growth of International Investment 

The rapid growth of international invest- 
ment in recent yeai-s has raised new ques- 
tions and new challenges for businesses and 
governments. In our own country, for exam- 
ple, some people have feared that American 
investment abroad will result in a loss of 
American jobs. Our studies show, however, 
that such investment on balance has meant 
more and better jobs for American workers, 
has improved our balance of trade and our 
overall balance of payments, and has gener- 
ally strengthened our economy. Moreover, I 
strongly believe that an open system for in- 
ternational investment, one which eliminates 
artificial incentives or impediments here and 
abroad, offers great promise for improved 
prosperity throughout the world. 

It may well be that new rules and new 
mechanisms will be needed for international 
investment activities. It will take time, how- 
ever, to develop them. And it is important 

that they be developed as much as possible 
on an international scale. If we restrict the 
ability of American firms to take advantage 
of investment opportunities abroad, we can 
only expect that foreign firms will seize these 
opi)oi'tunities and prosper at our expense. 

I therefore urge the Congress to refrain 
from enacting broad new changes in our 
laws governing direct foreign investment 
until we see what possibilities for multilat- 
eral agreements emerge. 

It is in this context that we must also 
shape our system for taxing the foreign 
profits of American business. Our existing 
system permits American-controlled ])usi- 
nesses in foreign countries to operate under 
the same tax burdens which apply to its 
foreign competitors in that country. I believe 
that system is fundamentally sound. We 
should not penalize American business by 
placing it at a disadvantage with respect 
to its foreign competitoi's. 

American enterprises abroad now pay sub- 
stantial foi-eign income taxes. In most cases, 
in fact, Americans do not invest abroad be- 
cause of an attractive tax situation but be- 
cause of attractive business opportunities. 
Our income taxes are not the cause of our 
trade problems and tax changes will not 
solve them. 

The Congi-ess exhaustively reviewed this 
entire matter in 1962 and the conclusion it 
reached then is still fundamentally sound: 
there is no reason that our tax credit and 
deferral provisions relating to overseas in- 
vestment should be subjected to drastic 

On the other hand, ten years of experience 
have demonstrated that in certain specialized 
cases American investment abroad can be 
subject to abuse. Some artificial incentives 
for such investment still exist, distorting the 
flow of capital and producing unnecessary 
hardship. In those cases where unusual tax 
advantages are off"ered to induce investment 
that might not otherwise occur, we should 
move to eliminate that inducement. 

A number of foi-eign countries presently 
grant major tax inducements such as ex- 
tended "holidays" from local taxes in order 

April 30, 1973 


to attract investment from outside their 
borders. To curb such practices, I will ask 
the Congress to amend our tax laws so that 
earnings from new American investments 
which take advantage of such incentives will 
be taxed by the United States at the time 
they are earned — even though the earnings 
are not returned to this country. The only 
exception to this provision would come in 
cases where a bilateral tax treaty provided 
for such an exception under mutually ad- 
vantageous conditions. 

American companies sometimes make for- 
eign investments specifically for the purpose 
of re-exporting products to the United 
States. This is the classic "runaway plant" 
situation. In cases where foreign subsidiaries 
of American companies have receipts from 
exports to the United States which exceed 
25 percent of the subsidiaries' total receipts, 
I recommend that the earnings of those sub- 
sidiaries also be taxed at current American 
rates. This new rule would only apply, how- 
ever, to new investments and to situations 
where lower taxes in the foreign country are 
a factor in the decision to invest. The rule 
would also provide for exceptions in those 
unusual cases where our national interest 
required a different result. 

There are other situations in which Ameri- 
can companies so design their foreign oper- 
ations that the United States treasury bears 
the burden when they lose money and deduct 
it from their taxes. Yet when that same 
company makes money, a foreign treasury 
receives the benefit of taxes on its profits. I 
will ask the Congress to make appropriate 
changes in the rules which now allow this 
inequity to occur. 

We have also found that taxing of min- 
eral imports by United States companies 
from their foreign affiliates is subject to 
lengthy delays. I am therefore instructing 
the Department of the Treasury, in consul- 
tation with the Department of Justice and 
the companies concerned, to institute a pro- 
cedure for determining inter-company prices 
and tax payments in advance. If a compliance 
program cannot be developed voluntarily, 

I shall ask for legislative authority to create 

The Challenge of Change 

Over the past year, this Administration 
has repeatedly emphasized the importance of 
bringing about a more equitable and open 
world trading system. We have encouraged 
other nations to join in negotiations to 
achieve this goal. The declaration of Euro- 
pean leaders at their summit meeting last 
October demonstrates their dedication to the 
success of this effort. Japan, Canada and 
other nations share this dedication. 

The momentum is there. Now we — in this 
country — must seize the moment if that mo- 
mentum is to be sustained. 

When the history of our time is written, 
this era will surely be described as one of 
profound change. That change has been par- 
ticularly dramatic in the international eco- 
nomic arena. 

The magnitude and pace of economic 
change confronts us today with policy ques- 
tions of immense and immediate significance. 
Change can mean increased disruption and 
suffering, or it can mean increased well- 
being. It can bring new forms of depriva- 
tion and discrimination, or it can bring 
wider sharing of the benefits of progress. It 
can mean conflict between men and nations, 
or it can mean growing opportunities for fair 
and peaceful competition in which all parties 
can ultimately gain. 

My proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973 
is designed to ensure that the inevitable 
changes of our time are beneficial changes — 
for our people and for people everywhere. 

I urge the Congress to enact these pro- 
posals, so that we can help move our country 
and our world away from trade confronta- 
tion and toward trade negotiation, away 
from a period in which trade has been a 
source of international and domestic friction 
and into a new era in which trade among 
nations helps us to build a peaceful, more 
prosperous world. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, April 10, 1973. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Rogers and Other Officials Brief Foreign Ambassadors 
on Provisions of Trade Reform Act of 1973 

A briefing on the Trade Refo7in Act of 
197S was held at the Department of State on 
April 10 for foreign ambasfiadors to the 
United States. Following are opening state- 
ments made by Secretary Rogers; William J. 
Casey. Under Secretary for Economic Af- 
fairs; Julius Katz, Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for International Resources and Food 
Policy; Willis C. Armstrong, Assistant Secre- 
farij for Economic and Business Affairs; and 
William J. Eberle, President Nixon's Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations.^ 


Ladies and gentlemen : I appreciate very 
much your coming here this morning to give 
us the opportunity to talk to you briefly about 
the President's trade message, called the 
Trade Reform Act of 1973. I will just make 
a few preliminary comments, and then I will 
ask the gentlemen here on my left to go into 
more detail. 

The purpose of the briefing is to give you 
some advance information about the message 
that the President will send up and the bill 
that he will send up. Although parts of it 
may not be of interest to all of you, I think 
there are portions of the bill that all of you 
will be interested in. 

As you know, early in 1972 the United 
States declared its intention to work actively 
for the opening of multilateral trade nego- 
tiations on both tariff and nontariff barriers, 
both in agricultural and industrial products. 

Our basic objectives in these trade negotia- 
tions are: 

— To build on and expand international 

' The questions and answers which followed are 
not printed here. 

economic efficiency and prosperity by re- 
moving obstacles to the freer play of market 
forces in determining the level and pattern of 
world trade. One key change would be the 
development of agreed rules under which 
safeguards could be invoked when abrupt in- 
creases in competition threaten to disrupt 

— Also, to obtain changes in the system 
under which nations conduct their trade re- 
lations to insure that the rules are fair and 
apply equitably to all parties. 

Today the President is submitting to the 
Congress the Trade Reform Act of 1973, 
broad and basic legislation designed to pro- 
vide the basis for achieving this fair and 
o])en world economy. 

This proposed act represents President 
Nixon's major initiative to expand world 
trade and reform international commercial 
policies and practices. When approved by 
the Congress, it will grant the U.S. Govern- 
ment exceptionally broad authority in a new 
round of GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] negotiations aimed at 
lowering tariff and nontariff barriers in 
trade in industrial and agricultural products. 

The basic provisions of the bill are as 

First, it would give the President authority 
to lower or raise tariffs without limit. This 
would apply only to trade agreements which 
are entered into within five years of the en- 
actment of this bill. In other words, this 
broad authority to lower tariffs or to raise 
tariffs has to be exercised in the context of 
trade negotiations. 

Second, the President would be authorized 
to enter into agreements to reduce, eliminate, 
or harmonize nontariff barriers in certain 
cases. Now, in certain cases, and you will 

April 30, 1973 


see from the bill, he can do this without any 
legislative approval after this bill is enacted. 
In other cases, he would be able to do so if 
the agreement is not vetoed by one House 
of Congress within 90 days. So this gives 
him very broad authority to lower tariffs or 
raise tariffs and gives him very broad au- 
thority to reduce or eliminate nontariff bar- 
riers in the context of a trade agreement. 

The authority that I have spoken about, 
both tariff and nontariff barrier authority, 
does not distinguish between agriculture and 
industry, but covers all trade. 

The escape clause procedures would be 
relaxed so that the U.S. businessmen and 
workers injured by imports could have easier 
access to temporary import relief. 

The President would be permitted also to 
impose restrictions if needed to help correct 
serious balance of payments deficits. He would 
be authorized to lower tariffs when the United 
States is in a durable surplus situation. 

The President would be given increased 
power to retaliate against unjustifiable or 
unreasonable foreign trade practices. And we 
will give you more specific information about 
that in a moment. 

The President could extend most-favored- 
nation treatment under certain conditions to 
countries not now eligible for such treatment 
under the U.S. law. 

And the President would be authorized to 
grant tariff preferences to less developed 
countries. I note this latter point with partic- 
ular satisfaction. I have often stressed this 
government's intention to submit preference 
legislation. Inclusion of generalized prefer- 
ences in this bill is, I know, of particular 
importance to Latin American and other de- 
veloping country representatives here today. 

So this bill will provide authority, then, 
which we need and which our trading part- 
ners have urged us to obtain, not only to ne- 
gotiate for the reduction of trade barriers 
and improvements in the rules governing in- 
ternational trade but also to implement 
agreements for lower tariffs and new rules in 
many areas. 

We can also negotiate an agreement on any 
nontariff barrier with the assurance that the 

agreement could be implemented unless one 
House of Congress voted against the agree- 
ment within 90 days after submission of the 
agreement. And we think this is a great im- 
provement over previous attempts in this 

I would hope and expect that by the time 
of the meeting of the GATT in Tokyo next 
September, the legislation would have pro- 
gressed far enough in the Congress that we 
would be sufficiently assured of the authority 
needed to participate fully in the multilateral 
negotiations which are scheduled to be 
launched at that meeting. 

The bill provides that the authority to en- 
ter into trade agreements will endure for five 
years. The President in his message to the 
Congress submitted with the bill accepts the 
target of 1975 for completion of an agree- 
ment which was set by the leaders of the 
European Economic Community at their 
summit meeting last October. 

Today we find ourselves in a period where 
the rules established 25 years ago need to 
be improved. It is also a period in which 
economic distortions anywhere must be of 
concern to people everywhere. The very suc- 
cess of the economic system that was set up 
after World War II has increased the stake 
of all nations and all peoples in promptly re- 
forming that system so that it can meet new 

Last September, speaking before the Gov- 
ernors of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), our President suggested that our 
common goal should be to set in place an 
economic structure that will help and not 
hinder the world's historic movement toward 
peace. The cooperation demonstrated in deal- 
ing with the recent monetary disturbance 
is very encouraging, as is the work going on 
in the Committee of Twenty to develop fun- 
damental reform of the world monetary sys- 
tem. The OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] is working 
on the development of fair standards for na- 
tional investment policies. And the GATT is 
preparing for multilateral negotiations to 
improve the rules governing the world trad- 
ing system. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The preamble to the hill our President is 
sending to the Congress today stales it^ pur- 
pose in these words : 

To provide authority in the trade field supporting 
United States participation in an interrelated effort 
to develop an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world 
economic system through reform of international 
trade rules, formulation of international standards 
for investment and tax laws and policies, and im- 
provement of the international monetary system; . . . 

Therefore, gentlemen, I lielieve that this 
bill, if enacted into law — and we think it will 
be — will establish a broad charter for the 
United States to work constructively with 
all of you in the OATT, the IMF. and the 
OECD in the fields of trade, money, and 

Our purpose will be to build an interna- 
tional economic structure which reflects and 
reinforces the goals of peace and mutual help 
we have been seeking in the political realm. 

Now I would like to call upon the follow- 
ing gentlemen in this order to give you more 
specific information and, if we have time, 
to answer any questions you may have about 
this legislation. We will provide, if we have 
not already, a draft of the bill, the Presi- 
dent's message, a short summary of the bill, 
and we will attempt to answer any questions 
you may have. 

First I would like to ask Under Secretary 
of State William Casey to speak on the au- 
thority to negotiate that is provided in the 
bill and to implement the trading agreement. 
Then I will call on Julius Katz, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State, who will speak on 
permanent trade management authority; 
third, Assistant Secretary of State Willis 
Armstrong, who will speak on generalized 
preferences and MFN [most-favored-na- 
tion] ; and then I will ask Ambassador Wil- 
liam Eberle, who is Special Trade Repre- 
sentative in the WTiite House, to conclude the 


(iood morning, ladies and gentlemen. To- 
gether with Assistant Secretary Armstrong 
and Deputy Assistant Secretary Katz, I will 
describe for you in some greater detail how 
the Trade Reform Act of 1973 works. 

Let us first understand that it does three 
separate things. 

The first is to provide the temporary au- 
thority to negotiate and carry out the broad 
multilateral trade agreement that most of 
us are committed to seek in the GATT dur- 
ing the next few years. I will talk primarily 
about that. 

The second thing it does is to provide per- 
manent authority to manage our trade rela- 
tions, to make limited adju.stments in our 
tai-iffs, to make compensating adjustments 
required by the GATT rules, to react against 
trade measures that discriminate against 
U.S. trade, to deal with balance of payments, 
anti-inflation, and national security needs, 
and to make our antidumping and our coun- 
tervailing-duty laws woik more satisfacto- 
rily. Deputy Assistant Secretary Katz will 
describe that part of the bill to you. 

And the third thing it does is to provide 
for authority to develop a system of general- 
ized preferences for the less developed coun- 
tries and to enter into bilateral agreements 
with countries to which we are not now able 
to extend most-favored-nation treatment. As- 
sistant Secretary Armstrong will describe 
those provisions to you. 

Some concern has been expressed that this 
bill grants broad powers to increase as well 
as to reduce trade barriers. Our system and 
the unknown requirements of negotiating 
in the future make it necessai-y to ask for 
broad and flexible authority. This bill would 
do no more than give our President the same 
power.s to make trade adjustments that most 
other governments already have. In the par- 
liamentary system, the close and immediate 
relationship between the executive and the 
Parliament provides very quickly and almost 
automatically the authority which our trad- 
ing partners have asked that our President 
obtain in advance. 

In asking for authority to negotiate in the 
future and carry out an agreement not yet 
made, it is necessary to ask for broad au- 
thority. The bill provides the authority to 
modify duties up as well as down in order 
to carry out the trade agreement we all hope 
to negotiate over the next two years. 

April 30, 1973 


The preamble of the bill makes it clear 
that it will be our objective to reduce tariffs 
and other barriers to trade. To accomplish 
this it may be necessary to increase the tariff 
on some items, perhaps to achieve harmoni- 
zation — which is one of the objectives the 
European Community is considering for this 
round of negotiations. It may be necessary, 
in order to eliminate a quota, to convert it 
to a tariff or to increase a tariff temporarily 
and then scale it down over a period of years. 

Thus, all of us may need the flexibility to 
increase tariffs, temporarily we hope, as 
well as to reduce them in order to work to- 
ward a general lowering of barriers over a 
period of time. 

The authority in this bill would permit us 
to eliminate as well as to adjust tariffs, and 
the authority will last for five years. The only 
limitation is that any adjustment must be 
staged over a period of five years. There 
would be a gradual scaling down, and I am 
sure all of us will want to introduce tariff 
reductions on this kind of a gradual basis. 

The bill also provides the authority to ne- 
gotiate the reduction, elimination, or har- 
monization of nontariff barriers. It would 
give the President the power to order the 
implementation of any agreement on customs 
valuation. This can include something like 
the use of the "American selling price" to 
compute the tariff on chemicals. He can 
order changes in methods of assessing quan- 
tities. This could cover agreements on wine 
and whisky bottles, for example. He could 
establish rules so that requirements to use 
expensive methods of marking the country of 
origin could not serve as an indirect barrier 
to trade. 

Then, on any agreement to change or 
eliminate any other kind of a nontariff 
barrier, as Secretary Rogers indicated, the 
President would have the authority to im- 
plement, if he gives Congress 90 days' notice 
of intent before he signs the agreement and 
then 90 additional days elapse after the 
agreement is filed with the Congress without 
one House of Congress having voted against 
the agreement. 

Thus, this bill goes as far as possible to 

provide a definiteness and a certainty in our 
ability to carry out agreements and to change 
or modify laws and regulations which serve 
as nontariff barriers to trade. 

The bill sets out a procedure, a set of 
prenegotiation requirements, consultative 
arrangements, for us to follow in the course 
of developing our negotiating posture. The 
President would first file with the Tariff 
Commission a list of articles to be considered 
in the negotiation. And the Tariff Commis- 
sion would be required to investigate the 
impact of lower tariffs on these articles, the 
impact on workers, on firms, on consumers. 
And there would be hearings, public hear- 
ings, after which, within six months after 
the filing of this list, the Tariff Commission 
would be required to file a report with the 
President, and then the President could make 
the offer of adjustment which would begin 
the negotiation from our standpoint. 

The bill also calls for two Members of the 
House of Representatives and two Members 
of the Senate to be accredited as members of 
the U.S. delegation to the negotiation. 

Now let me turn to the provisions of im- 
port relief. 

Today change comes rapidly. And this bill 
has provisions for temporary relief when 
changing patterns of trade bring a flood 
of imports which could disrupt a market. 
We use the term "safeguard" to describe this 
relief. There is some concern that these safe- 
guards may be protectionist in nature. It 
is our view that the kind of safeguards we 
have in mind are a liberalizing force, a force 
for freer and more open trade. They would 
be temporary in character. And these tem- 
porary reductions, or temporary restrictions, 
would be phased down to permit a continued 
growth in the volume of trade. And we 
would hope there would be agreement on a 
multilateral system of temporary safeguards 
which would permit a continued growth in 
the volume of trade and also protect workers 
and provide time for firms in every country 
to adjust to new competition from countries 
which achieve advantages in cost and 

We view these safeguards as a force for 


Department of State Bulletin 

liheralizinp trade because without providing 
this kind of opportunity for adjustment it 
will he much more difficult for any govern- 
ment to scale down tariffs and other barriers 
which protect their industries. And thus we 
see the availability of temjiorary safeguards 
as necessaiy for all of us to muster the will 
and lubricate the way to a more open trading 

Here is how the safeguard system would 
work as envisaged in this bill. 

First, anyone could petition for import 
lelief. It would be necessary to show a pur- 
pose to transfer resources to other uses or 
to otherwise adapt to competition from 
abroad. Then the Tariff Commission would 
he required to find that there is serious in- 
jury or the threat thereof and that imports 
are the primary cause of injury. This would 
be established if market disruption is shown, 
and "market disruption" is defined as a con- 
dition where imports are substantial and 
increasing rapidly, both absolutely and as a 
percentage of the market, and being offered 
at a price below comparable domestic 

The Tariff Commission would be required 
to hold a public hearing and report on the 
petition within three months. 

Then the President would be required to 
consider the impact of import relief on work- 
ers, on consumers. He would be required to 
consider the possibility and feasibility of the 
firms affected being able to adjust within the 
period of relief. He would also consider the 
compensation required in the GATT, under 
GATT rules, if import relief is granted. 

After this consideration, he could then 
grant import relief, which could take the 
form of a change in tariff or a quota, or the 
institution of an orderly marketing agree- 

Whatever form of import relief were de- 
termined, it would have to be phased out 
within five years unless the President au- 
thorized an extension, which would only be 
granted on the showing of due cause, and 
that extension would be limited to two years. 

So that any safeguard, any import relief, 
would last for a maximum of seven years, 

if a two-year extension were granted, and 
would be scaled down within that period of 

Now, these safeguards could be set up uni- 
laterally with the i-equirement for compen- 
sation under the rules of the GATT, or they 
could be instituted without compensation on 
an agreed multilateral basis, if that can be 
negotiated; and it will be one of our objec- 
tives to negotiate such a multilateral safe- 
guard system during this Nixon round of 
trade negotiations. 

Now I will ask Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Katz to describe the permanent authority for 
managing our trade relations which the bill 
will provide. 


The draft bill contains two titles dealing 
with permanent trade authorities. 

The first of these has to do with unfair 
trade practices. And this title revises four 
principal existing authorities in law dealing 
with unfair trade practices. 

The first of these, in chapter 1, revises 
and expands the existing section 252 of the 
Trade Expansion Act. This provision author- 
izes the President to take action or to re- 
taliate against foreign countries which 
maintain unreasonable or unjustified tariff 
or other import policies. There are two prin- 
cipal changes in this provision from existing 
law. One is to remove the distinction between 
agricultural and nonagricultural trade. The 
new provision would apply to all articles of 
trade. And secondly, there is a provision 
dealing with subsidies which affect U.S. ex- 
ports in third-country markets. 

The second chapter of this title amends 
the Antidumping Act and consolidates certain 
regulations of the Treasury applying to anti- 
dumping. The amendments would apply to 
a time limit on investigations of the Treas- 
ury Department and require the Secretary 
of the Treasury to make determinations 
within .specified periods of time, six months 
in most cases and nine months in more com- 
plicated cases. Secondly, there will be a re- 
quirement for public hearings and a public 

April 30, 1973 


record to be open and available, except that 
certain material provided in confidence could 
not be made public. And finally, this draft 
amends certain provisions of the Antidump- 
ing Act dealing with determinations of pur- 
chase price and export sales price. 

The third chapter of this title deals with 
countervailing duties, and it makes several 
important changes. The present countervail- 
ing-duty statute only applies to dutiable 
articles ; that is, it does not apply to duty- 
free articles of trade. The draft bill provides 
that it shall apply to nondutiable trade as 
well. However, in this case it will be subject 
to an injury finding as required by the 
GATT; that is, there will be a requirement 
for a finding by the Tariff Commission of 
material injury. And then finally, there is 
authority to set aside the application of this 
law, or this provision, where action under 
the law would be significantly detrimental to 
U.S. interests or where an existing quantita- 
tive restriction would be considered to be an 
adequate substitute for action under the 
countervailing-duty statute. There is also a 
time limit for investigations and determina- 
tions by the Secretary of the Treasury, which 
will be one year. 

The last chapter of this title has to do 
with a provision of the existing Tariff Act, 
section 337, which deals with unfair trade 
practices in general and certain specific ones, 
such as patent infringement, antitrust vio- 
lations. This proposed amendment would 
limit the application of section 337 to patent 
infringement cases, and it would expand the 
procedures. A parallel piece of legislation 
would turn over to the Federal Trade Com- 
mission the other unfair trade practices 
which are referred to presently in section 

The second title of this draft bill, title IV, 
which deals with permanent authority, per- 
manent trade policy management, has a 
number of provisions. 

The first provides an explicit and flexible 
authority to deal with balance of payments 
situations, including the temporary imposi- 
tion of import surcharges or other import 
limitations to deal with very serious balance 

of payments problems. The President would 
be authorized to impose import restrictions 
or surcharges under certain specified con- 
ditions — if the United States is in a balance 
of payments deficit position for four consec- 
utive quarters, or if the United States has 
suffered a serious loss of reserves, or there 
has been or threatens to be an alteration in 
the foreign exchange value of the dollar and 
he expects that this situation will continue. 
The authority is permissive; it is not obliga- 
tory. The payments deficit would be meas- 
ured on a basic balance or official settlements 
basis, and it would not merely depend on the 
trade balance. 

The second section of this title would pro- 
vide an authority for the President to exer- 
cise fully rights contained in the GATT or 
other trade agreements. This would enable 
the President to increase duties, for example, 
under article 28 of the GATT. In this case 
he could not increase tariffs more than 50 
percent above the column 2 rate, which is 
the Smoot-Hawley rate, or 50 percent ad 
valorem, whichever is higher. This authority 
would also enable the President to maintain 
existing trade agreement concession rates 
after a trade agreement were terminated. 
Under the present law, the authority for 
maintaining concessions is linked to the ex- 
istence of the agreement. If the agreement 
should terminate for one reason or another, 
the rate would also go back to the statutory 
or Smoot-Hawley rate. This provision would 
enable the President to continue that rate 
notwithstanding the termination of the 

The third section in this title would pro- 
vide a continuing authority to negotiate tar- 
iff concessions, or trade concessions, of 
limited scope affecting not more than 2 per- 
cent of our trade. But this would be authority 
that would continue beyond the five-year 
limitation Under Secretary Casey referred 
to earlier. 

The fourth section provides an authority 
to compensate other countries as required 
under GATT provisions where there has 
been an increase in a tariff rate or an import 
restriction, perhaps under an escape clause 
action. This would provide a permanent au- 


Deparfment of State Bulletin 

thority to compensate, something that we 
have not had in the last six years. 

The fifth section would authorize the re- 
duction of import restrictions to deal with 
conditions of inflation. In order to restrain 
inflation, the President could reduce tariffs 
or remove quantitative restrictions, and he 
could take action provided that it did not 
aflFect more than 30 percent of the total 
estimated imports during the period the 
action was contemplated. 

There are a number of other provisions 
in this title which are essentially carryovers 
from the existing law, having to do with 
procedural matters such as reservation from 
negotiations of articles which are subject to 
national security or escape clause actions, 
the general most-favored-nation provision, 
the termination authority, the period for 
trade agreements, public hearings — all of 
these are standard provisions which have 
been in the law for some time and are in the 
current law. 

And finally, there is an authority for an 
appropriation to GATT, which is a little 
domestic i)roblem we have had. We have 
not previously had an explicit authorization 
to contribute to GATT. 


Ladies and gentlemen : I am going to talk 
first about the provision in the Trade Reform 
Act of 1973 for giving preferential treatment 
to manufactured or semimanufactured goods 
from developing countries. 

Title VI of the law provides for such au- 
thority for the President. It specifies that 
the President may extend preferential treat- 
ment to manufactured or semimanufactured 
goods which are determined to be eligible 
from specified developing countries. 

There is a provision for an administrative 
process whereby the list of articles which 
would be given such treatment is to be estab- 
lished. There is a procedure by which the 
President would decide what countries would 
be eligible. These criteria include the wish 
of the country, the level of development, 
whether the country receives such prefer- 

ences from other major developed countries, 
and whether the country has taken action re- 
garding American investments which might 
be described as contrary to international law. 
These are criteria which the President will 
use. No single criterion is considered binding. 

There is a limitation on what the Pres- 
ident may do in extending these preferences. 
The tariff may either be the MFN rate, or 
it may be zero. There is no provision for 
anything in between. 

The safeguards provisions just described 
by Under Secretary Casey will apply in such 
circumstances and will be a part of the re- 
gime of generalized preferences. 

There is a significant and important lim- 
itation, which is that generalized prefer- 
ences are not to be granted to developing 
countries which extend reverse preferences 
to other developed countries, unless these 
are eliminated by the 1st of January 1976. 

There are other exception.s. Anything 
which is now handled or might be handled 
under the national security exception of our 
trade law would not be eligible for preferen- 
tial treatment. There would also be a limita- 
tion to the effect that no country which does 
not now receive, or which does not in the 
future receive most-favored-nation treat- 
ment, could get generalized preferences. 

The object of the legislation is that the 
program should run for 10 years unless the 
Congress should extend it. There is written 
into the law a provision whereby a country 
may become ineligible for such preferences 
if it supplies 50 percent of the total value of 
the imports into the United States of a par- 
ticular good, or $25 million worth, on an 
annual basis over a representative period. 
The President may, however, waive this 

These are essentially the provisions of 
title VI, which covers the extension of gen- 
eralized preferences. 

I will now move to title V, which contains 
authority for the President to enter into a 
commercial arrangement and to give most- 
favored-nation treatment to countries to 
which it is not now extended. This could be 
done either bilaterally through a particular 

April 30, 1973 


trade agreement or through the extension to 
the other country of most-favored-nation 
treatment when that country becomes affili- 
ated with the GATT. 

Specifically, this title applies to countries 
which have basically state-trading systems. 
The arrangement whereby the President 
could extend such MFN treatment requires 
that, once he has reached agreement with 
such country, he places the agreement before 
the Congress. The agreement would enter 
into effect and he would be authorized to 
extend most-favored-nation treatment only 
if the majority of neither House has disap- 
proved within 90 days of the receipt of the 

Bilateral agreements negotiated under this 
title are to be on a three-year basis, renew- 
able, but subject to suspension for national 
security reasons. 

There is an illustrative list of matters 
that might be covered by such bilateral 
agreements. One is market disruption. One 
is the protection of industrial property. An- 
other one is the settlement of commercial 
disputes. Another one is the question of busi- 
ness facilities such as trade and tourist 

It is interesting that there is a provision 
for market disruption which is comparable 
to the safeguard provisions described by 
Secretary Casey. In the case of market dis- 
ruption by a country under this title, how- 
ever, the President could act to curb imports 
selectively, and not on a global basis. 

There are, further, two items which are 
not contained in title V but which are found 
in title VII, in section 706. What the legal 
language in section 706 of title VII means 
is the repeal of the legislation which provides 
for an embargo on certain furs from the 
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China 
and also the repeal of what is known as the 
Johnson Debt Default Act. These two pro- 
visions of title VII are to be read in con- 
junction with the objectives of title V, the 
purpose of which is to enable us to expand 
and improve and normalize our trade re- 
lations with countries with state-trading 


Under Secretary Casey: This bill provides 
that the chief negotiator will be the Presi- 
dent's Special Trade Representative. And 
Ambassador Eberle is here with us. He's the 
President's Special Trade Representative. 
And he's going to describe some other bills 
that are companions to the trade bill. Am- 
bassador Eberle. 

Ambassador Eberle: It's a pleasure for an 
outsider to be associated with my friendly 
State Department colleagues. 

The total picture in this trade legislation 
area, if you are to understand it completely, 
requires a look at a number of other bills 
that will be going up this week that are asso- 
ciated with this. 

First of all, there will be a comment in the 
President's message related to taxes. There 
is nothing in the trade bill that relates to 
taxes themselves, but the message will in- 
clude these comments : that the President is 
not, and this administration is not, recom- 
mending any major change in the taxation 
of our corporations. At the same time, after 
10 years we are recommending some very 
specific changes in three ways. 

First of all, where other countries which 
do not have a tax treaty with us grant major 
tax holidays, we will, in looking at those 
tax holidays, because they distort investment 
around the world, consider taxing as cur- 
rent income and not on a deferral basis any 
income from that operation even though it 
is tax-deferred or subject to a tax holiday 
in that country. 

A second change recommended in this 
same area of taxation on foreign-source in- 
come — these are American corporations with 
branches abroad — are those places where 25 
percent of the earnings of the subsidiary 
corporations come from products which are 
manufactured in the foreign country and, in 
turn, returned to the United States. In those 
cases, on a pro rata basis, income will be 
taxed on a current basis. 

And the third change recommended will 
be in the area of deductions of tax losses 
against tax credits so as to postpone corpo- 


Department of State Bulletin 

rate income tax in the United States. We 
will look at tliis to be sure that those losses 
are consistent with the provisions of the laws 
of the United States. 

We think these changes make for a more 
equitable situation for investments and in- 
vestment incentives. This will only appear in 
the message, and it will be then up to the 
House ^^'ays and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee to put this in the 
form of a bill. 

In the adjustment assistance area there 
will be two bills involved. As explained by 
my colleagues here, under the adjustment 
assistance it is primarily in the worker area. 

On Wednesday of this week a bill on un- 
employment insurance, which would set 
national standards for unemployment insur- 
ance, which is part of the benefits that will 
become effective for the adjustment assist- 
ance for workers, will go up. This is a sub- 
stantial improvement and will apply to all 
workers whether the problem is caused by 
imports or not. 

On Thursday of this week a bill relating 
to private pension plans will go up. This is 
the other part of the benefit relief under the 
adjustment assistance bill. This will fix the 
vesting of pensions so that if people lose their 
jobs as a result of imports or otherwise they 
will have their pensions fixed and they will 
know they will receive those benefits. 

These are the two major areas. And the 
trade bill itself is linked to these two bills 
with a transitional period of time involved 
for the benefits under it .so that there will be 
no gap here, and then the benefits of the 
trade bill will be phased out as these two 
bills come into effect. 

A third bill that will be going up today is 
' a bill which will amend the parts of the 
I Webb-Pomerene Act. This is the bill that is, 
in part, called the Export Expansion Act. 
-At the present time our antitrust laws are 
very restrictive about American companies 
getting together. If companies want to put 
an architect or an engineer, a manufacturing 
company, together in a unit to bid on some- 
thing overseas, our laws do not allow this 
technically. The Justice Department has 

worked out a bill which will allow these 
groups of companies to get together as their 
competitors can do, so that our companies 
can offer a complete service in competition 
with other companies around the world. 
This bill will also be going up today, and it 
will give more flexibility. It also would apply 
to foreign companies doing business here 
who want to use their American subsidiaries 
to get together with other companies around 
the world in competition. 

Let me conclude by saying to you this 
morning at 8:30 the President held his first 
of a series of bipartisan leadership meetings. 
This bipartisan meeting was for the purpose 
of briefing the House and Senate leadership 
on the bills that you've heard today. 

The press is being briefed on this today, 
and you will receive the Ways and Means 
Committee draft of the bill. 

The President, though, in describing this — 
and I want to emphasize this to all of you — 
and I think it has come through clear in the 
description by Secretary Rogers and Secre- 
tary Casey that this is part of an ovei'all 
approach of the President toward the inter- 
national economic aff'airs of this country. 
And I simply call your attention and cite for 
you his discussion here that the world is 
embarked today on a profound and historic 
movement away from confrontation and to- 
ward negotiation in resolving international 
differences. Increasingly in recent years 
countries have come to see the best way of 
advancing their interests is by expanding 
peaceful contacts with other people. This 
structure of peace cannot be strong, how- 
ever, it encompasses international 
economic affairs. Our progress toward world 
peace and stability can be significantly un- 
dermined by economic conflicts which breed 
political tensions and weaken security ties. 
It is imperative, therefore, that we turn 
our negotiating efforts to the task of resolv- 
ing problems in the economic area. 

These are the President's comments: 

My trade reform proposals would equip us to 
meet this challenge. They would help us in creating 
a new economic order which both reflects and rein- 
forces the progress we have made in political affairs. 
As I said to the Governors of the International 

April 30, 1973 


Monetary Fund last September, our common goal 
should be to "set in place an economic structure that 
will help and not hinder the world's historic move- 
ment toward peace." 

In doing this, it's two things. It's first to 
put us in a position of being able to nego- 
tiate with our partners, you, and secondly, 
to improve the system within the United 
States so that we have the same kind of 
authority and can take those steps that keep 
us on a more uniform international system. 

So, in closing, we want a more open 
world, we want a more equitable world, and 
we're prepared to work toward that. 

Anti-Inflation Trade Bill Transmitted 
to the Congress 

Following is the text of a letter dated 
March 30 from President Nixon to Speaker 
of the House Carl Alberts 

White House press release dated March 30 

Dear Mr. Speaker: I herewith transmit 
a draft bill, "to authorize reduction or sus- 
pension of import barriers to restrain 

The proposed legislation would authorize 
the President to reduce or suspend tempo- 
rarily any duty applicable to any article and 
to increase temporarily any value or quantity 
of articles which may be imported under any 
import restriction whenever the President 
determines that supplies of the article im- 
ported are inadequate to meet domestic de- 
mand at reasonable prices. 

The enactment of this bill is necessary to 
provide an important additional means of 
restraining inflation and aiding the Amer- 
ican consumer. 

Richard Nixon. 

' An identical letter was sent to President of the 
Senate Spiro T. Agnew. 

Contract Signed for Assistance 
to Immigrants to Israel 

The Department of State announced on 
April 6 (press release 101) that a contract 
providing $31 million to assist Soviet Jews 
migrating to Israel was being signed that 
day between the Department of State and 
United Israel Appeal, Inc. (UIA), an ac- 
credited American voluntary agency. Frank 
L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
for Refugee and Migration Afl'airs, signed 
for the Department. Melvin Dubinsky of 
St. Louis, president and chairman of the 
board of directors, and Gottlieb Hammer of 
New York, executive vice chairman, signed 
for UIA. 

The contract represents the Department's 
first expenditure from $50 million appro- 
priated by the Congress to aid in the re- 
settlement of emigrants from the Soviet 
Union. Signed at the same time were agree- 
ments in which UIA designates the Jewish 
Agency for Israel (JAI) to act as author- 
ized agent in expenditure of the funds. Max 
M. Fisher of Detroit, chairman of the board 
of governors, signed these agreements for 
the JAI. 

The contract provides that the funds will 
be used for care and maintenance of mi- 
grants during transit to Israel, for expansion 
of a transit center in Austria, for absorption 
centers in Israel to receive the immigrants, 
for a hospital wing for migrants, for hous- 
ing, for language training, and for voca- 
tional and professional training or retrain- 

Other expenditures from the appropria- 
tion during fiscal year 1973 will be $2 mil- 
lion to the Intergovernmental Committee 
for European Migration to cover loans for 
air charter fare for the migrants from Aus- 
tria to Israel and $500,000 for assistance 
to Soviet migrants to countries other than 
Israel. The Department presently is nego- 
tiating for expenditure of the remaining 
$16.5 million during fiscal year 1974. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Affirmative Steps 

Addj-ess by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush ' 

For the past three days you have been 
discussing Europe. Looking ahead, it seems 
likely that 1973 will be a year of substantial 
progi-ess both within Europe and in relations 
between Europe and the United States. 

— There should be continued improvement 
in the condition of Berlin, further develop- 
ment of the dialogue between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Demo- 
cratic Republic, and the admission of both 
into the United Nations. 

— Negotiations have already begun be- 
tween the United States and the Soviet 
Union to limit offensive strategic weapons 

— The United States and the newly en- 
larged European Community will explore 
new methods of economic and political co- 
operation designed to strengthen our associa- 

— There will be negotiations on reducing 
the military forces which still confront each 
other in central Europe. 

— And there will be a Conference on Se- 
curity and Cooperation in Europe which 
could accelerate the momentum toward more 
I normal contact between eastern and western 
Europe and between the states of eastern 
Europe and the United States. 

All of these advances will be important. 
But what I want to discuss with you today 
i.s the prospect that this year we may be 
able to achieve a marked expansion of our 

' Made before the 13th annual students conference 
on foreign affairs at the U.S. Naval Academy, 
Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 4 (press release 98). 

ties with eastern Europe and a decisive 
improvement in relationships among all the 
states of Europe. 

We in this country have a natural bond 
with the 120 million people who inhabit the 
countries to the west of the Soviet Union — 
Poland and Czechoslovakia in the north, 
Hungary and Romania in the center, and 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania in the 

Over 15 million Americans trace their ori- 
gins directly to these countries. 

The United States has more citizens of 
Polish descent than any nation in the world 
other than Poland itself. 

We have more persons of Czech and Slovak 
origin than any other country save Czechoslo- 
vakia itself. 

There are nearly as many ethnic Hungar- 
ians in the United States as there are in 

These cultural bonds are matched by his- 
torical ties. 

Woodrow Wilson labored to insure that 
the peoples of eastern Europe emerged from 
World War I with the right to run their own 
affairs. No fewer than six of Wilson's 14 
points were directed to the goal of self- 
determination for the peoples of eastern 
Europe. And it was through eastern Euro- 
pean issues that the two World Wars had 
their origin — the first in a shot fired on be- 
half of national autonomy in Sarajevo in 
present-day Yugoslavia, the second in the 
concessions made in Munich at the expense 
of Czechoslovakia and in the Nazi invasion 
of Poland. 

It is natui'al, therefore, that we should 

April 30, 1973 


welcome a return to our once wider associa- 
tion with the nations of eastern Europe. 

When President Nixon took office in 1969, 
our relations in the area — Yugoslavia ex- 
cepted — were clouded by two decades of cold 
war division, enmity, and mistrust. Presi- 
dent Johnson's efforts to repair those rela- 
tions had met with deep suspicion. The 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 
set back relations still further. 

By 1969, however, changing conditions 
were making a new approach feasible. 

Eastern Europe's growing demand for 
trade and technology was not being fully 
satisfied from within the Communist world. 

West Germany's enlightened efforts to im- 
prove relations with its eastern European 
neighbors had begun to contribute to a less 
suspicious evaluation of Western intentions. 

The invasion of Czechoslovakia had dem- 
onstrated the lengths to which the Soviet 
Union was prepared to go to protect what 
it considered to be its security. But the de- 
sire for a growing detente persisted in 
eastern as well as in western Europe. Af- 
firmative steps to promote more normal 
trade and human contacts were therefore 
likely to find a favorable response. 

Progress Toward Improved Relations 

Thus, early in his first administration 
President Nixon made clear that we were 
prepared to begin a new era in our relations 
with eastern Europe. Our objective was to 
develop normal and mutually beneficial rela- 
tions wherever possible, treating each coun- 
try separately. 

By early summer we had begun to take 
concrete steps in pursuit of this policy. They 
led to President Nixon's visit to Bucharest 
in August 1969 — the first visit ever made 
l)y an American President to a Communist 
capital. In Romania the President stressed 
that "We stand ready to reciprocate the ef- 
forts of any country that seeks normal re- 
lations with us." - 

-' For a toast by President Nixon at an official 
dinner at Bucharest on Aug. 2, 1969, see Bulletin 
of Aug-. 25, 1969, p. 169. 

That visit gave our bilateral relations with 
Romania an impetus which they have never 
lost. President Ceausescu visited the United 
States in October 1970. Our two-way trade 
has more than tripled. We have extended our 
bilateral contacts in other fields. And during 
Secretary Rogers' visit to Bucharest last July 
he signed the first consular convention be- 
tween Romania and the United States since 

There was a second Presidential visit to 
a Communist capital in early fall 1970 — 
this time to nonaligned Yugoslavia. Our 
bonds of friendship and cooperation with 
Yugoslavia go back more than two decades. 
Thus the President's visit was a matter less 
of initiating new directions than of under- 
lining that ties across political lines can be 
durable. I might mention in this connection 
the outstanding impression our sailors and 
officers have left in Yugoslav ports during 
the regular visits of our ships from the 
6th Fleet. 

We want our ties with Yugoslavia to be 
a model of the cooperation that can exist 
between states with quite different social 
systems. Success in this, of course, depends 
on both countries. 

In the spring of 1972 the President took 
a third major step in our relations with 
eastern Europe — a visit to Poland. In War- 
saw the United States and Poland signed a 
consular convention, and will open consulates 
this year in New York City and in the old 
university town of Krakow, the center of 
much Polish emigration to the United States. 

Relations have begun to improve with a 
fourth eastern European state — Hungary. 
In July Secretary Rogers visited Budapest, 
the first visit to Hungary ever made by an 
American Cabinet official. Deputy Premier 
Valyi was in Washington last month, the 
highest Hungarian official to visit the United 
States in 25 years. Hungary has now agreed 
to pay $22 million for war-damaged and 
nationalized American property, and we have 
agreed to seek authority from Congress to 
negotiate a trade agreement including most- 
favored-nation treatment. We are discussing 
with the Hungarians an agreement on cul- 



Department of State Bulletin 

tural and scientific exchanges. In fact a 
Foreij;!! Service (ifticer wiio has been teach- 
ing at this Academy for the past two years, 
Mr. Harry Gilmore, will shortly assume 
charjre of the Washington end of these many 
negotiations with Hungary. 

The progress we have already made with 
the states of eastern Europe during Presi- 
dent Nixon's first administration is substan- 
tial. I know from my own recent trips to 
I'oland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary that 
our relations have undergone a substantial 
rlumge for the better. One measure of this 
is the fact that visitors from eastern Europe 
under our exchange programs increased by 
40 percent in 1972. 

Respect for Independence and Sovereignty 

As the President's second term begins, 
our mutual desire for continued progress 
offers hope for even greater advances. To 
that end the policy of the United States is 
to engage the countries of eastern Europe in 
an expanding set of close and individual 
relationships with ourselves and with their 
neighbors to the west. 

We intend to pursue our policy of engage- 
ment diligently and prudently. We will not 
seek to force the pace. We do seek to en- 
courage a process we believe to be advan- 
tageous to world peace. 

In pursuing this policy we intend to fol- 
low three principles. 

The first is that we will deal with each 
country of eastern Europe as an independent 
sovereign state entitled to be free of all 
outside interference. This approach animated 
Woodrow Wilson's policies; it is our ap- 
proach today. 

In Moscow last spring President Nixon 
and r.eneral Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union] set their signatures to pledges 
to recognize the sovereign equality of all 
states, to make no claim to any special rights 
or advantages in world affairs, and to seek 
to promote conditions in which no country 

will be subject to outside interference in its 
internal aff"airs. ^ 

Those commitments reflect long-established 
American policies. Their joint adoption by 
the two countries can help in promoting 
the detente so many now desire. The right 
of countries to develop according to their 
own desires is fundamental to peaceful rela- 
tions among states. A country may not be 
denied the right of full sovereignty simply 
because it is small. It may not be denied that 
right simply because geography has placed 
it next to a larger country. It may not be 
denied that right simply because it shares the 
same political and social system with a 
stronger power. Indeed, as Chairman Ko- 
sygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.] and 
Prime Minister Bratteli of Norway affirmed 
in a communique last year, the principles of 
noninterference and respect for national sov- 
ereignty must be implemented consistently, 
irrespective of the political and social sys- 
tems of the states involved. 

On our part, certainly there is no desire 
to intervene in the domestic affairs of east- 
ern European states. We are ready not only 
to coexist with them but to cooperate with 
them in bilateral efforts toward peace and 
understanding and toward wider contact and 
associations among our people. 

In that spirit we will seek to consolidate 
ties with those countries with which sub- 
stantial progi-ess has been made. 

We will also move forward toward im- 
I^rovements with countries with which there 
has been little or no bilateral progress. 

In their conversations with Secretary 
Rogers at the United Nations last October, 
both the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian For- 
eign Ministers expressed the firm desire of 
their governments for concrete improve- 
ments in our relations. We welcome this 
desire, we share it, and we are responding 
to it. 

With Czechoslovakia we have begun ne- 

' For text of the Basic Principles of Relations 
Between the United States and the U.S.S.R sipned 
at Moscow on May 29, 1972, aee Bulletin of June 
26, 1972, p. 898. 

April 30, 1973 


gotiations on a consular convention and hope 
to be in a position this year to begin talks 
also on an agreement covering cultural and 
scientific exchanges, and later on the resolu- 
tion of long-pending financial and trade 

Of all the Communist governments with 
which we have diplomatic relations, our ties 
have been least extensive with Bulgaria. 
We have recently resumed negotiations on 
a consular convention. We are preparing to 
work with the Bulgarian Government to 
resolve a number of bilateral cultural and 
economic problems which have clouded our 
relationship. Our desire for better relations 
is reflected in our readiness to welcome 
Bulgaria's Deputy Prime Minister to the 
United States this year. 

Only with Albania has there been no visi- 
ble progress. In light of our expanding ties 
with all other countries in eastern Europe, 
it seems anachronistic that Albania should 
continue to wish to function in such isola- 
tion. Albania still speaks of us in the con- 
tentious rhetoric of an earlier era. Whether 
it wishes to resume relations we do not know. 
If and when it does, it will find us prepared 
to respond. 

With all of the east European nations we 
will measure their willingness to improve 
relations with us in a wider context as well. 
We must all demonstrate mutual restraint 
in our rhetoric toward one another and a 
spirit of cooperation rather than confronta- 
tion at the United Nations and in other inter- 
national forums. We particularly look to 
Hungary and Poland to play a responsible 
role on the International Commission of 
Control and Supervision in Viet-Nam. 

Trade and Commercial Issues 

As our relations with individual east Euro- 
pean nations improve, we will pursue the 
second basic principle of our policy — to 
create a continuing economic relationship 
with the countries of eastern Europe by 
expanding our trade and by encouraging 
their growing receptivity to foreign invest- 

During the last four years our trade with 

eastern Europe has grown steadily, though 
from a modest base. In 1968 overall trade 
totaled about $450 million; the figures for 
1972 were about $800 million — a healthy in- 
crease of over 75 percent. During the next 
four years we believe we can at least double 
the current trade. Last fall we directed our 
Ambassadors in eastern Europe to place 
trade promotion at the very top of the list 
of our policy priorities in the area. 

The nations of eastern Europe consistently 
list commercial issues as the top bilateral 
problem. They contend that U.S. trade regu- 
lations toward the area contain elements of 
discrimination from the past. 

To help achieve a substantially higher 
trade volume we intend progressively to re- 
move a number of those restrictions. 

— We have reexamined in the light of 
changing conditions the strategic importance 
of goods whose export to eastern Europe is 
still restricted. A number of changes have 
already been made. In the near future we 
expect to make further significant reductions 
in the number of U.S. products on the re- 
stricted list. 

— We are ready to consider a broader 
availability of Export-Import Bank credits 
and guarantees for the sale of U.S. goods 
as relations improve with individual coun- 

— It is also our intention, as relations 
improve, to extend most-favored-nation sta- 
tus to the exports of a larger number of 
eastern European countries. So far only the 
products of Yugoslavia and Poland enjoy 
this status, although for a year we have been 
urging similar legislation for Romania. In 
this session of Congress the President will 
submit and request early passage of general 
legislation that will permit us to extend 
most-favored-nation status to eastern Euro- 
pean countries as the status of our economic 
and political relations warrants. Normaliza- 
tion of our trading relations is required for 
the United States to realize fully the eco- 
nomic and political benefits of expanded 

While the policies of eastern European 


Department of State Bulletin 

countries have piven first priority to trade. 
Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary 
have also shown an interest in foreign in- 
vestment in their domestic enterprises. Even 
within the framework of a cautious Com- 
nuinist attitude toward private investment, 
an increase in joint ventures throughout the 
area should offer concrete benefits to all 

As we seek to respond to eastern Europe's 
ilesire for closer economic relations, we our- 
selves can no longer afford to ignore the 
advantages to our own domestic economy 
tliat the commercial potential in eastern 
Europe offers. At a time when we have a 
trade deficit with most areas of the world, 
our balance of trade surplus with eastern 
Europe is particularly welcome. 

We would like to see more American busi- 
nessmen begin to pursue profitable business 
deals in Hungary as in Belgium ; in Bulgaria 
as in Norway; in Poland as in Uruguay. We 
encourage them to sell, invest, and buy in 
these countries as opportunity permits and 
in confidence that doing business in eastern 
Europe is fully consonant with the U.S. 
national interest. We are strengthening our 
) commercial manpower, and last month we 
opened a new east-west trade center in Vien- 

Such policies look to the day when the 
course of trade between the United States 
and the countries of eastern Europe can be 
as normal as it is between the United States 
and countries with economic and social sys- 
tems similar to our own. 

Relations Between East and West Europe 

Just as we wish to deepen our own politi- 
cal and economic ties with eastern Europe, we 
also encourage the growing engagement of 
its countries in the affairs of Europe as a 
whole. To promote such engagement is the 
third basic principle of our policy. We feel, 
in fact, that it is fully as important for us 
to promote a deepening of political and eco- 
nomic relations between the countries of 
eastern and western Europe as it is to de- 
velop eastern European ties with us. This 
should not diminish our close and essential 

partnei'.ship with our Atlantic allies. 

It is natural that all European nations 
should aspire to the sense of community 
that has enriched Europe in the higher mo- 
ments of its long history. The artificial bar- 
riers of the cold war have divided the 
continent for a generation. That is already 
too long. 

This year will see two events which, with 
good will on both sides, can contribute to the 
restoration of that sense of community. 

Preparatory talks began in January for 
negotiations on ways to reduce the forces 
of the countries of NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact which still confront each other in the 
center of Europe. A mutual and balanced 
reduction of those forces could appreciably 
reduce tensions and make a real contribution 
to Europe's security. It is important that 
the substantive negotiations begin on sched- 
ule this fall and that they be carried to a 
successful conclusion. 

As we are about to begin negotiations for 
a reduction of forces by both sides in Europe, 
it makes no sense at all to cut in half the 
American forces there suddenly and uni- 
laterally. Some critics of our defense policy 
in Congress and elsewhere advocate that we 
follow just such a course. Clearly the Soviet 
Union would have no incentive to reduce its 
troop presence in eastern Europe if we ac- 
cepted this advice. And nothing could more 
endanger the momentum we have created for 
building a more stable and peaceful world. 
I want to reiterate here this evening this 
administration's firm determination to ful- 
fill our commitments to our NATO allies by 
maintaining American troop strength in Eu- 

Preiiaratory talks have been underway in 
Helsinki since last November to pave the 
way for a Confei-ence on Security and Co- 
operation in Europe, which we hope can be- 
gin early this summer. Such a conference 
must become a vehicle for concrete progress 
toward greater unity among Europe's peo- 
ples. Specific steps to increase contact — 
through the freer movement of people, ideas, 
and goods the entire continent — is the 
surest way to achieve that objective. 

April 30, 1973 


This approach causes the Soviet Union 
some concern. But the many U.S. -Soviet 
agreements recently negotiated are already 
demonstrating that greater cooperation and 
contact, far from being a threat to any 
country's security, can contribute to the wel- 
fare of all. Certainly we in this country are 
convinced that more open borders and more 
normal human communication will reduce 
rather than increase tensions and will en- 
courage peoples and nations to live and let 
live in friendship. 

A Europe based on separation can never 
be really secure. The last quarter century 
was a period of separation ; it was not a 
period of security. As President Nixon stated 
in 1970, "Stability and peace in Europe will 
be enhanced once its division is healed." ■* 
The next quarter century should be a time 
for all Europe's nations to evolve according 
to their own desires. It will be a period for 
Europe's people to communicate with each 
other more freely. It will be an era of co- 
operation — and of competition — one of peace 
and a spirit of community. 

In keeping with our own close associations 
with Europe and our firm conviction that 
Europe's security is indivisible from our 
own, we in America must also desire a Eu- 
rope with the closest bonds among its states 
as well as a Europe linked in friendship and 
cooperation with our own country. Those 
twin goals will form the essence of our poli- 
cy toward Europe during the next four years. 

Pan American Day and 
Pan American Week 


Eighty-three years ago the International Union of 
American Republics was established, the forerunner 
of the Organization of American States. There 
have been differences among the member nations in 
those eighty-three years, and some of these differ- 
ences continue today. But far more significant is 
the fact that, despite dramatic changes and our 
great cultural and political diversity, the members 
of the hemispheric community have maintained and 
strengthened our common forum in a general climate 
of friendship and understanding. 

It is an intangible force which forms the basis of 
solidarity among the Americas — a combination of 
idealism and realism and a capacity to grow and 
adjust with the times. The Organization of Amer- 
ican States is the focal point of this force, a place 
where cooperation rather than confrontation 
strengthens the common ties shared by the nations 
of the hemisphere. 

This unity of the Americas is based on respect 
for the historic personality of each of the countries 
of the Americas and demands a mutual under- 
standing and respect for each country. 

Now, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NiXON, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
Saturday, April 14, 1973, as Pan American Day, 
and the week beginning April 8 and ending April 
14 as Pan American Week, and I call upon the 
Governors of the fifty States, the Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and appropriate 
officials of all other areas under the flag of the 
United States to issue similar proclamations. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this seventh day of April, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-seventh. 

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, 
appears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the 
section entitled "Eastern Europe" begins on p. 325. 


No. 4205; 38 Fed. Reg. 9151. 


Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Policy Toward the European Community 

Stateiticnt hij William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs * 

It is a pleasure to participate in your 
hearings on the United States and the Euro- 
pean Community. You have timed your 
hearings well, for our relations with the 
enlarged Community are in a formative 
stage. The hearings are well timed for me 
personally because I have just returned from 
extensive consultations in Europe. I would 
like to share with you this morning the same 
impressions and thoughts about those con- 
sultations and the direction of our relations 
with the European Community which I re- 
ported to Secretary Rogers earlier this week. 

But first let me attempt to place these re- 
lations in a larger perspective. Four develop- 
ments have combined to radically alter our 
relationship and to make it vastly more com- 

— First, generally improved relations with 
the Communist powers have decreased inter- 
national tensions and brought a new flexi- 
bility to political ties. 

— Second, western Europe, Canada, and 
Japan have developed relatively greater eco- 
nomic strength, and we have developed the 
need to deal with them on a basis of equality. 
They are not only our best trading partners 
but also our keenest competitors. 

— Third, two decades of American balance 
of payments deficits fueled both our own and 
the world's economic growth, but successive 

' Made before the Subcommittees on Europe and 
Foreifrn Economic Policy of the House Committee on 
Foreipn Affairs on Apr. 5 (press release 100). The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

crises finally led to the realization that the 
jiostwar system requires major revisions. 

— Fourth, we have achieved unprecedented 
interdependence with other industrial de- 
mocracies, an interdependence which has as- 
sured record prosperity for all but has 
brought new problems which require new 
approaches to the management of our eco- 
nomic policies. 

The next few years will be a time of test- 
ing for our bonds with all the industrialized 
democi'acies as we develop new relations to 
cope with these new complexities. This is 
clearly no time for complacency, but it is 
equally clearly no time to accept the counsel 
of those who despair, of those who seem to 
believe in the inevitability of confrontation 
— for our common interests and our common 
vision of the world far outweigh our specific 
and passing differences. 

President Nixon has consistently stressed 
our continuing belief in the necessity for 
strong ties with Europe. These ties form an 
indispensable part of his strategy for world 
peace. The Nixon doctrine makes clear that 
others now have the ability and responsi- 
bility to do their share. As the President said 
in his fii-st report to Congress on foreign 
policy, "America cannot — and will not — 
conceive all the plans, design all the pro- 
grams, execute all the decisions and under- 
take all the defense of the free nations of 
the woild." -■ He went on to say, however. 

-' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign 
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, 
appears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the 
introduction begins on p. 274. 

April 30, 1973 


that "America cannot live in isolation if it 
expects to live in peace. We have no intention 
of withdrawing from the world." 

In particular, the administration has made 
it quite clear that it regards our relationship 
with Europe to be the cornerstone of the 
whole structure of peace. European unity 
adds to the strength of our transatlantic 
relationship and enables us to proceed to a 
new era of detente with the East from a 
position of greater strength in the Atlantic 
area. This is why the President affirmed last 
October a strong support for the European 
Community summit's announced intention to 
transform by 1980 the whole complex of its 
member state relations into a European 
Union — and I quote: "It is, and always has 
been, my own deeply held view that progress 
toward a unified Europe enhances world 
peace, security, and prosperity." ^ 

We continue to feel that political and de- 
fense cooperation within Europe will be the 
fulfillment of European unity. Two strong 
powers in the West would add flexibility to 
Western diplomacy and increasingly share 
the responsibility of decision. But European 
unity has come first in the economic field. 
This increasing unity has brought benefits 
and opportunities for increasing cooperation. 
It has also brought problems of adjustment 
to the new relationship. The President has 
taken the initiative to begin managing the 
new relationship so as to enhance the bene- 
fits to us, take advantage of the opportunities 
for increased cooperation, and deal with the 
problems of adjustment. Left to fester, these 
problems could in fact lead to a confronta- 
tion neither we nor the Europeans desire. 

Dialogue With Western Europe 

Just a month after his first inauguration, 
President Nixon symbolized the importance 
he attaches to this subject by visiting west- 
ern Europe. During that visit he met with 
the President and the Commission of the 
European Community. Subsequent more dra- 
matic visits to Peking and Moscow should 

" For a statement by President Nixon issued on 
Oct. 27, 1972, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 608. 

not obscure this fact, nor should they obscure 
the continued high level of U.S. -EC consul- 
tation since 1969. 

In 1970 we initiated the practice of semi- 
annual meetings with the European Commu- 
nity. I have just headed our delegation to 
the sixth round of these increasingly frank, 
wide-ranging, and useful consultations. In 
recent months the U.S. -EC dialogue has 
reached an unprecedented level of intensity 
and substance. In December Secretary Rog- 
ers met in Brussels with the Commission. 
In mid-February the new EC Commissioner 
for External Relations, Sir Christopher 
Soames, visited Washington for a series of 
informal discussions. He saw the President 
and leading members of the Cabinet, and 
he held extended conversations with me and 
other senior government officials concerned 
with U.S. -EC relations. In February the 
President sent Peter Peterson [former Secre- 
tary of Commerce] to Europe where he met 
with leaders of the Community both in Brus- 
sels and national capitals to discuss the 
entire range of our relationship with western 
Europe. In March Secretary [of the Treas- 
ury George P.] Shultz visited the key capi- 
tals of western Europe and discussed our 
economic policies, especially monetary re- 
form and trade negotiations, with the Com- 
mission and national leaders. 

Last October, as part of the process of 
intensifying the dialogue with western Eu- 
rope and other developed countries, the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooper- 
ation and Development], largely at U.S. ini- 
tiative, initated a new style of executive 
committee to enable high-level policymakers 
to focus more frequently on the broad range 
of questions which concern the more econom- 
ically developed nations, and on my recent 
trip I headed our delegation to the second 
of these meetings. 

As NATO's Secretary General Joseph 
Luns noted last week during the Europe- 
America Conference, "I cannot think of a 
period when there has been so much diplo- 
matic activity, so many meetings and con- 

We particularly welcome the steps taken 
by this committee to intensify the American 


Department of State Bulletin 

dialogue with Europe. Your growing rela- 
tions with the European Parliament and 
the European Conlmunity are iiighly de- 
sirable. We are prepared to facilitate this 
process in any way that you believe useful — 
for it is clear that without the support and 
participation of both the Congress and the 
American people we cannot succeed in our 
jroal this year of building such lasting ties 
that our relations with the Community will 
It', like those we" have in NATO, a solid and 
emiuring pillar of U.S. -European association 
and cooperation. 

All of this activity is part of the process 
of dealing with our overall relationship with 
western Europe which the President has 
moved to the "front burner." I want to stress 
that he regards the problem of managing our 
new economic relationship as inextricably 
linked to the maintenance and enhancement 
of our political-security relationship. 

And during my recent visit to Europe, I 
found quick and ready recognition of the 
importance to our overall political and secu- 
rity relationship of the successful manage- 
ment of our economic problems. Successful 
management requires for the long run a 
fundamental reordering of the world eco- 
nomic system to make it more open and 
equitable, more flexible, and better suited to 
solving problems such as those which face 
the developing countries. In the short run, 
it requires better management of specific 
problems with the Community as they arise. 

Reordering the World Economic System 

As you know, we are working on the re- 
ordering of the world economic system 
through reform of the world monetary sys- 
tem in the Committee of Twenty and through 
preparations for major multilateral trade 
negotiations in the GATT [General Agree- 
ment on Tarifi"s and Trade] beginning this 
September. In addition, in the OECD we 
have launched an examination of the prob- 
lems of international investment with a view 
to assuring that this area does not become 
contentious among governments as we move 
to new understandings in the trade and mon- 
etarv fields. In all these matters western 

Europe plays a vital role. If we are to 
successfully reorder the world economic sys- 
tem to make it more open and equitable, 
U.S. -European cooperation will prove in- 

As we approach formal trade negotiations 
in the GATT this September, the first re- 
quirement will be to assure that both we and 
the EC place a highei' priority upon mutual 
growth than on individual protection, on 
further lowering trade barriers rather than 
creating preferential arrangements. Rapidly 
increasing trade was an essential stimulus 
over the past quartei- century to the most 
substantial global economic growth in man's 
history. The reduction of barriers to trade 
made this conti-ibution possible. We have 
participated and l)enefited from this process. 

Further substantial trade liberalization is 
essential if we are to maintain and enhance 
our prosperity. But the political aspect of 
the future trade negotiations is equally im- 
portant. The Community has made its great- 
est progress toward unity in the field of 
trade. Sir Christopher Soames, the Commu- 
nity's "Foreign Minister," has made clear 
that the trade negotiations will be at the cen- 
ter of the Community's future relations with 
the United States and will be crucial to those 
relations. He has urged the Community not to 
forget that negotiations must be situated in 
the wider political framework of U.S.-EC 

I wish to stress this point to these two 
subcommittees, which are interested in both 
the political and economic aspects of our 
relationship with Europe. Passage of the 
trade bill the President will submit to Con- 
gress in a few days will be vital to the im- 
plementation of the President's strategy on 
improving the relationship with Europe. 

During my trip to Europe I contin- 
ued the process launched by Secretary 
Shultz of informing European leaders of 
the main outlines of the bill the President 
intends to submit. I found a generally fa- 
vorable reaction to what we have in mind. 

I found, however, some misgivings about 
the surcharge and safeguard features of 
our propo.sed trade legislation. But generally 
this kind of sensitivity seemed to dissipate 

April 30, 1973 


as it was pointed out that we are merely 
seeking for the President the same broad 
authority to negotiate already possessed 
by European governments. The reactions 
against safeguards moderate when they are 
presented as a liberalizing force. Without 
providing sensitive industries time to ad- 
just to changing patterns of trade, govern- 
ments are not likely to muster the will to 
open up trade. I also pointed out that the 
shape and implementation of our legislation 
would be importantly affected during the 
coming months by our ability to deal satis- 
factorily with some of the shortrun trade 
issues with the EC, notably the GATT nego- 
tiations over the impairment to our trade 
arising from the enlargement of the Com- 

Agricultural and Energy Problems 

I also found some concern in Europe, 
which I attempted to dispel, that the United 
States might try to split the Community on 
specific and fundamental issues. For exam- 
ple, the European press has been pushing 
hard on what it sees as a possible common 
interest of the United States and Great 
Britain in breaking down the common agri- 
cultural policy (CAP). Our view, as I ex- 
plained, is that we are not seeking to destroy 
the CAP but only to bring about agricultural 
liberalization which would work in the mu- 
tual interest of both the United States and 
Europe. Rather than hoping to split the 
Community, we look forward to cooperating 
with it in every significant area of economic 
endeavor in which the Community and the 
United States share a common interest. 

With regard to agriculture, I might add 
that there exists a growing recognition in 
western Europe that the fight to manage 
their serious inflation problem will require 
some modification of the high degree of 
agricultural protectionism which presently 
exists. We would of course welcome any 
move on their part in the grain-livestock 
area which would give them cheaper cereals 
and cheaper meat and at the same time 
improve the prospects for U.S. grain and 

feed exports. We have recently taken steps 
in the United States to dismantle longstand- 
ing governmental I'estraints on agricultural 
production. In the interest of keeping down 
their prices, we would hope that the 
Europeans will move toward substantial 
liberalization of their highly protectionist 
agricultural system. We expect to include 
agricultural trade as an important element 
of the forthcoming multilateral trade nego- 
tiations and to seek meaningful easing of 
restrictions on a reciprocal basis. 

I also found common ground in Europe 
in our shared concern over the emerging 
energy problem. Europeans are awaiting the 
President's forthcoming energy message 
with great interest. They are discussing 
this issue among themselves on a priority 
basis, and the EC leaders, at their Paris 
summit meeting, have called for the formu- 
lation of a common EC energy policy as soon 
as possible. When viewed from the stand- 
point of the domestic economy and balance 
of payments, energy and agriculture emerge 
as two of the most critical fields for future 
economic cooperation between the United 
States and western Europe. 

Both western Europe and the United 
States also face a common task in seeking 
effective solutions to the problems of the 
developing countries. We have viewed with 
considerable misgivings the increasing pro- 
liferation of the Community's preferential 
trading arrangements with those developing 
countries of Africa and the Mediterranean 
with whom they have maintained historically 
close ties. These arrangements may soon 
expand to include the Commonwealth coun- 
tries of Africa and the Caribbean as well. 
We support the special relationships between 
the Community and these countries and 
agree that they foster stability and peace 
in the areas involved. However, we fail to 
see the justification for the discriminatory 
trade aspects of these relationships, particu- 
larly reverse preferences, which could lead 
to the creation of closed North-South trading 
blocs. In drawing up our own trade bill, 
we do not see how we can justify the ex- 
tension of generalized preferences by the 


Department of State Bulletin 

United States to those developing countries 
which discriminate against us in favor of 
imports from otiier industrialized countries. 
Clearly we must seek a common solution to 
this problem which will work to the benefit 
of the developing countries. It is a matter 
which I have already discussed and which 
we will he discussing in some detail with 
the Community in the near future. 

In all of these areas we must insure that 
adequate means exist for a full and frank 
dialogue with the European Community. A 
number of leading Europeans have talked 
about a more compi-ehensive and institu- 
tionalized mechanism for a dialogue between 
the United States and the European Com- 
munity, but the Community has yet to agree 
on a formula. We have told the Europeans 
that we would consider seriously any sug- 
gestions they might advance and that our 
concern is with the substance of our dialogue 
rather than with its form. 

My overall impression is that our rela- 
tionships with the European Community are 
moving in the right direction but they need 
constant attention and effective collaboration 
on our great common interests in the politi- 
cal and security realms and on our common 
problems in energy, development, and the 
whole economic and financial realm. That 
problems exist between us is a consequence 
of our growing interdependence as well as 
the special circumstances surrounding the 
need to work out basic and overdue reforms 
in the trade and monetary fields which will 
take full account of the changed economic 
conditions. The new leaders of the Commis- 
sion have impressed me very favorably, and 
we are conducting a frank and open dia- 
logue with them. They recognize, as do we, 
that the common bonds between the United 
States and the Community far outweigh 
-ur differences and that we must maintain 
I sense of proportion in our relationship. 
With good will on both sides, I am confident 
that we will succeed in the common tasks 
which lie before us. As the President has 
tated, it is of the highest importance that 
I the United States and Europe work closely 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency of Octo- 
ber 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). 
Done at Vienna September 28, 1970.' 
Acccptcince deposited: Finland, April 12, 1973. 


Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratifications deposited: Jordan, February 13, 
1973; Portugal, January 15, 1973. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force 
March 19, 1967; for the United States Decem- 
ber 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 

Accession deposited: Guatemala, February 9, 1973. 
Ratification deposited: Australia, February 12, 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. 
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United 
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Australia, February 12, 1973. 


International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972." 
Signature: Yugoslavia, March 20, 1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 
1967. TIAS 6298. 
Accession deposited: Singapore, March 15, 1973. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution 
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with 
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, 
and Washington December 29, 1972." 
Signature: Netherlands, April 12, 1973. 

' Not in force. 

April 30, 1973 



Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done 
at Washington June 19, 1970.' 
Accession deposited: Cameroon, March 15, 197,5. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with 
final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 
(TIAS .5881), as amended by additional protocol, 
general regulations with final protocol and an- 
nex, and the universal postal convention with 
final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional 
protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. 

TIAS 7150. , .. • . 

Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates 

(with a declaration), March 2, 1973. 
Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed 
at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general 
regulations with final protocol and annex, and 
the universal postal convention with final protocol 
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo Novem- 
ber 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 19 a, ex- 
cept for article V of the additional protocol, which 
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, January 19, 1972;- 

Jordan, January 3, 1973. 


Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done 
at New York Jauary 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967; for the United States Novem- 
ber 1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Mali, February 2, 1973. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972.= 
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, April 9, 1973. 

White Slave Traffic 

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave 
traffic, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949 
(TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904. 
Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United 
States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979. 
Notification of succession: Mali, February 2, 1973. 



Agreement confirming the memorandum of under- 
standing between the U.S. National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration and the Brazilian Insti- 
tute de Pesquisas Espaciais concerning coopera- 
tive research in remote sensing for earth surveys. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
April 6, 1973. Entered into force April 6, 1973. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement supplementing the agreement of Novem- 
ber 20, 1962, as supplemented (TIAS 5518, 7386, 
7507), for conducting certain educational exchange 
programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn 
and Bonn-Bad Godesberg March 2 and 9, 1973. 
Entered into force March 9, 1973. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement extending the amendment of March 17, 
1972 (TIAS 7287), to the civil air transport 
agreement of November 4, 1966, as amended (TIAS 
6135 6489). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Moscow January 11, 1973. Entered into force 
January 11, 1973. 


' Not in force. 

= Ratification of the general regulations of the 
Universal Postal Union deposited on February 21, 

' Not in force for the United States. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department 
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25 percent dis- 
count is made on orders for 100 or more copies of 
amj one publication mailed to the same address. 
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, must accompany orders. 

Colorado River Salinity. Agreement with Mexico. 
TIAS 7404. 7 pp. 15(f. 

Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classi- 
fication of Goods and Services to Which Trademarks 
Are Applied. TIAS 7418. 16 pp. 25(. 
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Phil- 
ippines amending the agreement of May 4, 1972. 
TIAS 7431. 5 pp. 15(f. 

Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1971 Partial Revision- 
Space Telecommunications. TIAS 7435. 922 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 30. 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1766 


Anti Inrtation Trade Bill Transmitted to the 

CoTiuross (letter from President Nixon) . . 532 
I'r, Sill, lit Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act 

of I'.'TS to the ConRTess (text of message) . 513 
U.S. Policy Toward the European Community 

(Casey) 539 

Economic Affairs 

.\nti-Infl;ition Trade Bill Transmitted to the 
('"n>riiss (letter from President Nixon) . . 

I'lfsidiiit Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act 
of 197:! to the Congress (text of message) . 

Secretary Ropers and Other Officials Brief For- 
eign Ambassadors on Provisions of Trade Re- 
form Act of 1973 (Armstrong, Casey, Eberle, 
Katz, Rogers) 

■(U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Affirma 

the European Commu- 

tive Steps (Rush) 
U.S. Policy Toward 
^ nity (Casey) 


^■U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Affirma- 
nt ative Steps (Rush) 

^■U.S. Policy Toward the European Commu- 
^F nity (Casey) 

™^9rael. Contract Signed for Assistance to 
Immigrants to Israel 

itLatin America. Pan American Day and Pan 
American Week (proclamation) 

[Presidential Documents 
Inti-Inflation Trade Bill Transmitted to the 

Congress • 

?an American Day and Pan American Week 


fpresident Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act 

of 1973 to the Congress 

'resident Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam 
Visits the United States 







Publications. Recent Releases 544 

iTrade , 

lAnti-Inflation Trade Bill Transmitted to the 
Congress (letter from President Nixon) . . 

President Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act 
of 1973 to the Congress (text of message) . 

Secretary Rogers and Other Officials Brief 
Foreign Ambassadors on Provisions of Trade 
Reform Act of 1973 (Armstrong, Casey, 
Eberle, Katz, Rogers) 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 



Viet-Nam. President Thieu of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam Visits the United States (Nixon, 

Tliipu. idint communique) 509 

Same Index 

Armstrong, Willis C 523 

Casey, William .1 523, 539 

Eberle, William J 523 

Katz, Julius L 523 

Nixon, President 509, 513, 532, 538 

Rogers. Secretary 523 

Rush, Kenneth 533 

Thieu, Nguyen Van 509 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 9-15 

Press releases may bo obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C, 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 9 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
98 of April 4, 100 of A'pril 5, and 101 of April 

No. Date 

*105 4/10 

*106 4/10 

*107 4/10 
•108 4/11 

»109 4/11 

•110 4/11 

♦111 4/12 


Luther I. Replogle award for 
management improvement es- 

Regional foreign policy confer- 
ence, Riverside, Calif., May 5. 

U.S.-Canada fishery talks. 

Study group 6 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for CCIR, 
Apr. 20. 

Program for official visit of 
Giulio Andreotti, President of 
the Council of Ministers of the 
Italian Republic. 

Subcommittee on Code of Conduct 
for Liner Conferences, Ship- 
ping Coordinating Committee, 
Apr. 11. 

Farkas sworn in as Ambassador 
to Luxembourg (biographic 

' Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




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service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
M'ashington, D.C. 20520. 




\^olume LXVIIT • No. 1767 • Mnv 7, 1973 


Li'ttfi- of Transmittal to the Congress and Introductory Comment 
by the Secretary of State 545 




Statements by Assistant Secretary Newsom 578 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXVIII, No. 1767 
May 7, 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, ] 
a weekly publication issued by the\ 
0/Kce of Media Services, Bureau o/j 
Public Affairs, provides tfte public andi 
interested agencies of tfte governmenti 
witfi information on developments imi 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and^ 
on tfie work of t/ie Department and i 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued] 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses,] 
and news conferences of tfte President-i 
and tfie Secretary of State and otfteri 
officers of tfie Department, as well asl 
special articles on various pfiases ofd 
international affairs and tfie functionii 
of tlie Department. Information is in- 
eluded concerning treaties and inter-i 
national agreements to wtiicti tftet 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intef^ 
national interest. 

Publications of tfie Department 
State, United Nations documents, am 
legislative material in tfie field 
international relations are also list^ 

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report 
of the Secretary of State 

"United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Re- 
•ort of the Secretary of State" was trans- 
litted to the Congress on April 19. Reprinted 
I re are the letter of transmittal and intro- 
'xctory comment by the Secretary of Stated 


April 19, 1973. 

IM AR Mr. Chairman: Once again I am 
l>kased to present to the Congress my annual 
report on United States Foreign Policy. This 
report provides a comprehensive record of 
the events and policies of 1972. In a brief 
introductory comment, I set forth nine ma- 
jor policy objectives for 1973 and a table of 
key indices shovi'ing the state of the world in 

Previous reports have traced the develop- 
ment of new policies for resolving conflict 
and reducing world tension. The year 1972 
marked a point of high achievement in our 
effort to free international relations from the 
rigidities of confrontation and the tensions 
of the past. 1973 will be a year of building, 
a year of intensive negotiations that will 
move us forward into the structure of peace 
which President Xixon has made our fore- 
most national goal. 

In my first foreign jiolicy report I wrote 
that my greatest hope was to help create 
among Americans a new national unity and 
purpose in our foreign policy. Now with the 
major source of division within our country 

' Copies of the 74.3-page report are available from 
the Government Bookstore, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520 (Department of State pub- 
lication 8699; stock no. 4400-01450; $4.20 postpaid). 

behind us, there is every reason to believe 
we all can work together to restore that com- 
mon purpose. 

Sincerely yours, 

William P. Rogers. 
The Honorable 

J. William Fulbright, Chairman, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 
United States Senate, 

The Honorable 

Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives. 



1973 will be a year of building in American 
foreign policy — for in 1973 we will be initi- 
ating new negotiations and developing new 
relationships which could determine the polit- 
ical-economic structure of the world for the 
remainder of this century. As President 
Nixon stated in his second Inaugural Ad- 
dress: "We are embarking on an era that 
presents challenges as great as those any 
nation or any generation has ever faced." 

We have reached this formative stage in 
international affairs as a result of the dra- 
matic changes of the past year, changes due 
in substantial measure to innovations we be- 
gan to introduce into American foreign policy 
four years ago. 

We can take special pride in the four ac- 
complishments of last year that are enabling 

Moy 7, 1973 


us to complete the transition from the con- 
cerns of the past to the construction of a 
new and more peaceful international environ- 

— The profound transformation the United 
States brought about during- 1972 in our 
relations with the People's Republic of China 
is opening new opportunities for an Asia at 
peace. A "new start" was the phrase Premier 
Chou En-lai used in his toast during Presi- 
dent Nixon's first night in Peking. Today— 
as the first official Americans to reside in 
Peking since 1949 have already arrived— 
there is no question that a new start in our 
relations is being carried forward. We are 
particularly hopeful that progress in U.S.- 
Chinese relations will lead toward an im- 
proving international climate throughout 

— Firm foundations for a new era of co- 
operative efforts between the world's two 
most powerful nations now exist in the after- 
math of the Moscow Summit. A fabric of 
common interests and of instruments of co- 
operation is being created that will serve to 
perpetuate better relations. And agreements 
to limit offensive and defensive arms have 
been concluded that may well be viewed his- 
torically as the critical point when risks of 
nuclear conflict between us turned perma- 
nently downward. 

—The flash point of Europe's dangers for 
25 years, Berlin, has been defused, and the 
Quadripartite Agreement has proven to be 
a major stimulant to favorable evolution in 
the European situation. Not only has the 
inner German agreement followed, but move- 
ment toward conferences on European secu- 
rity and cooperation and on mutual and bal- 
anced force reductions has been hastened as 
a result. 

— The Paris Agreement on Vietnam is 
bringing an end to this century's longest 
war. Though it is yet imperfectly observed a 
cease-fire has been established in Vietnam 
and Laos. And a framework for a peaceful 
environment in Indochina has been estab- 

1972 was thus a year of achievement in 

our efforts to turn away from the rigidity of I 

confrontation and the tensions of the cold , 

war. 1973 will be a year during which we i 

will concentrate on forging this progress into | 

a durable structure of peace. In doing so we [ 

shall seek to accomplish nine objectives. I 

First, we will cooperate with Europeans, \ 
eastern and western, in ivhat ive hope tvill be | 
«, decisive lowering of barriers to Europe's 
sense of unity — seeking to enhance mutual 
security through strategic arms limitations 
and mutual and balanced force reductions | 
and to free the flow of people and ideas \ 
throughout the continent. \ 

Of the many significant developments '; 
taking place in U.S.-Soviet relations, negotia- \ 
tions this year on a permanent and compre- ; 
hensive strategic offensive arms agreement j 
will be the single most important. A success- 
ful conclusion of those negotiations will also 
be of importance to Europe as a whole, fur- | 
ther stabilizing strategic relations under j 
which Europe derives its basic protection. j 
On this as on so many other issues close i 
cooperation between us and our allies in j 
NATO continues to be of fundamental im- j 
portance. We will consult closely with them \ 
throughout the course of these negotiations 
to ensure that their interests are taken fully j 
into account. j 

The ABM Treaty we signed last year is a ! 
major contribution to strategic stability, but , 
it must be accompanied by a permanent 
agreement on offensive strategic arms. The 
a'bM Treaty could not have been achieved : 
until the principle of equivalence had been; 
met to the satisfaction of both sides. There : 
should not be one standard for defensive and { 
another for offensive arms. Essential equiv- j 
alence must be achieved in this area as| 
well— equivalence based on the principles of { 
comparable security and no unilateral advan- ; 
tage to either side. An agreement based onj 
this approach would contribute to the mainte-i 
nance of a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic rela-j 
tionship and enhance the security of bothj 
countries and of the entire world. I 


Department of State Bulletin j 

Exi)Ioratory talks have bepun on a mutual 
and balanced reduction of forces in central 
Kurojie. Full scale nepotiations are expected 
to bejjin in tlie fall. Reductions in the forces 
that have so lonp faced each other in central 
Kurojie would further contribute to the 
strenjrtheninp of peace in Europe. Our own 
policies have been a motivating force in these 
nejrotiations. We will pursue them to a con- 
clusion that reduces the confrontation of 
forces in central Europe. 

In the meantime it is important that we 
do not unilaterally reduce our own forces, as 
some have advocated, and risk in conse- 
quence both the prospect of negotiating an 
agreed limitation on forces in central Europe 
and an unbalancing of the military relation- 

Freer Relations Within Europe. Just as we 
will seek to reduce the confrontation that im- 
pedes cooperation, so will we endeavor to 
help lower the political barriers that divide 
Europe. In the forthcoming Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe we are 
well aware that the Soviet Union will be at- 
taching considerable importance to the in- 
violability of present territorial boundaries. 
The Soviet Union must be equally aware of 
ir determination that this issue not be used 
as a pretext for ratifying a political divi- 
sion of Europe. 

Fortunately barriers are lessening and 
each state in eastern Europe is now officially 
seeking to imjM-ove its coopei'ation with west- 
vn Europe. The Conference will provide an 
\cellent opportunity to widen the frame- 
work of relationships which engage them 
with ourselves and their neighbors. It is of 
particular importance that the Conference 
achieve objectives agreed upon at the last 
meeting of NATO: closer, more open and 
freer relationships among all people in 
Europe, and a wider flow of information and 

It would be erroneous to presume that 
widely divergent national perspectives on 
the range of these freedoms do not exist. But 
we accept General Secretary Brezhnev's re- 
cent statement that the possibilities here are 

"quite broad" as an expression of a welcome 
intent to move toward us in an area of rela- 
tions where we have such deeji convictions. 

Relations With States of Eastern Europe. 
We anticipate also that significant advances 
will be made this year in our bilateral rela- 
tions with states in eastern Europe. Since the 
President's visit to Romania in 1969 concrete 
improvements have been achieved with Ro- 
mania, Poland, and Hungary in trade, in 
consular protection and services, in scien- 
tific and technological cooperation, and in 
cultural contacts. Our relations with non- 
aligned Yugoslavia have continued to pro- 

During 1973 we hope to achieve substantial 
improvements with Czechoslovakia and Bul- 
garia. The Foreign Ministers of both coun- 
tries told me at the U.N. General Assembly 
session last fall their governments would 
welcome concrete imi)rovements. We share 
that desire and are responding to it. As has 
been the case with other states in eastern 
Europe the conclusion of consular conven- 
tions will be the starting point. 

In Moscow last spring President Nixon 
and General Secretary Brezhnev pledged our 
countries to recognize the sovereign equality 
of all states, to make no claim to any special 
rights or advantages in world affairs, and to 
seek to promote conditions in which no coun- 
try will be subject to outside interference in 
its internal affairs. Full application of these 
principles is central to the detente so many 
now desire. 

Economic Relations. Both the Soviet Union 
and eastern European nations place commer- 
cial issues high on their agenda of bilateral 
interests. We also give high priority to ex- 
l)anding our trade with eastern Europe. 
During 1973 as our relations with individual 
countries improve we will move to normalize 
trade and to initiate broader trade arrange- 
ments. We have submitted and are seeking 
approval of legislation which will authorize 
the President to extend most-favored-nation 
treatment to the Soviet Union and to those 
countries of eastern Europe and elsewhere 
who do not now have it. Such congressional 

j Moy 7, 1973 


action would be consistent with tlie improve- 
ment in our political relations; it will be of 
central importance in our efforts to increase 
trade with the Soviet Union and eastern 


The trade agreement we signed with the 
Soviet Union in October contemplates that 
U.S.-Soviet trade will triple over the 1969-71 
level, rising to an aggregate amount of at 
least $1.5 billion. And in eastern Europe we 
will endeavor to increase our exports sig- 

Second, we are turning our energies to the 
task of helping to build what hopefully will 
be Asia's first period of peace in W years into 
a network of stability based on commitments 
to mutual noninterference, with the ultimate 
aim of bringing about cooperation among all 
of Asia's peoples. 

To solidify and perpetuate the peace that 
has now been achieved in most of Indochina 
is, of course, a pressing objective to which 
we are devoting a maximum effort. Although 
a certain unsettled period is to be expected 
in the immediate aftermath of a cease-fire, 
to date we are not satisfied with implementa- 
tion of the Agreement. We are scrupulously 
carrying out the provisions of the settlement, 
and we expect others to do so as well. The 
International Conference on Vietnam held in 
Paris from February 26 to March 2, 1973, 
was an important step in this direction. The 
Conference participants endorsed the Viet- 
nam Peace Agreement, pledged to observe 
its terms and support its full implementa- 
tion, and to associate themselves with the 
peacekeeping process. They also agreed to 
respect the independence and sovereignty of 
Cambodia and Laos with a view to help bring 
durable peace to those countries as well. 

Our wider objective and hope is that with 
this peace all Asians can be freed from the 
bitterness of past confrontation so that they 
may concentrate on building and renewing 
cooperative relationships throughout the 
area. The United States supports and will 
continue to support efforts of Asian and Pa- 
cific nations to develop and expand regional 


At the same time America's role in Asia 
must remain strong and active. Continued 
American engagement in Asia is mandated 
not only by the volume of our current eco- 
nomic and political interests (our total trade 
with Asia now equals 8.5 percent of our trade 
with western Europe), but by the need to 
prevent a recurrence of the conditions that 
brought America into warfare in Asia three 
times within one generation. 

The growing rapprochement in Asia, in 
eluding of course our own and Japan's with 
China, will contribute to achieving stability 
throughout the continent. We take seriously 
the mutual commitment which the People's 
Republic of China and we made in the 
Shanghai Communique that each of us would 
eschew and oppose attempts by anyone to 
impose hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Scrupulous adherence to this principle can be 
the building block from which more normal 
relations can be constructed throughout the 
area. \ 

U.S.-P.R.C. Relations. In our bilateral re- , 
lations with China we will work thought- 
fully and energetically to ensure that last 
year's initial improvements prosper and ex- 
pand during 1973. The establishment of liai- 
son offices in our respective capitals, the 
ao-reement already reached on further cul- 
tural exchange, and the progress anticipated 
in economic relations will all contribute to 
further development of normal relations. In 
Paris last month I was able to reach agree- 
ment in principle on the issues of U.S. private 
claims against the P.R.C. and frozen Chinese 
assets in the United States. We expect our 
trade in 1973 to increase significantly. We 
will urge that larger numbers of Chinese be 
sent to the United States as well as encour- 
age an increase in the number of Americajis 
going to China. 

Reconstruction in Indochina. 1973 must 
also be the year when the nations of Indo- 
china shift decisively from the concerns of 
war to the tasks of reconciliation and recon- 
struction. A reconstruction program m In- 
dochina will not only hold out hopes of a 
better life to the peoples of these nations; it 

Department of State Bulletin 

will be a major influence in ensuriii<;' the in- 
tegrity of the peace we have ao:reed vipon and 
even in altering" the framework of relation- 
ships between us and Xorth \'ietnam. We 
look forward to a more constructive relation- 
ship with North Vietnam but neither this — 
nor economic assistance — will be possible un- 
less the Vietnam Agreement is fully carried 

We see such a reconstruction program as 
a fundamental aspect in our effort to extend 
the accomplishments of the peace agreement 
into broad stability throughout Southeast 
Asia and to Asia as a whole. We will be de- 
voting particularly close attention this spring 
to ensuring that we have the means and ca- 
pability of pursuing this policy to a succes.s- 
ful completion. The program will and should 
be one in which other nations — notably -Japan 
and members of the European Community — 
also make an imjiortant contribution. We 
will consult closely with Congress on this 

South Asia. For historical and cultural 
reasons Americans — and many Asians — tend 
to think of Asia in far eastern and Pacific 
terms. But the continent-wide stability and 
cooperation we seek to bring about cannot 
be complete without the participation of the 
nations of South .Asia. 

The United States seeks a close relation- 
ship with each of the nations in South Asia. 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India will all have 
an imi)ortant influence and effect upon Asian 

We will continue our strong support for 
the viability and cohesion of Pakistan be- 
cause of our longstanding relationship and 
1 ' if its importance to the stability of 

t.i I ,,i,.e region. Our support for the eff'orts 
f the new government of Bangladesh to 
|ilace the nation on a firm foundation of .sta- 
liility and progress will continue. In recent 
months, India has expressed a desire to im- 
prove relations with the United States. We 
recii)rocate that desire. We will look to In- 
dia, as South Asia's largest nation, to play 
a leading role in building a climate for ]ieace 
in South .Asia which wil contribute to peace 
throughout the continent. 

Third, ill the Middle East, the only remain- 
ing area of chronic conflict in the world 
irhere no negotiations are in progress, ire 
ivill actirely encourage the parties to initiate, 
during 1973, a genuine negotiating process. 

Some people claim that the conflict be- 
tween Israel and the Aiabs, which has now 
lasted in chronic or acute stages for 2.5 years, 
is impossible to resolve. 

— Yet it has already proven possible to 
make progress through negotiation in other 
areas of passionate differences: in South and 
North Korea. South and North Vietnam, 
Pakistan and India, West and East Germany. 

— New prospects for an improved quality 
of life lie before all peoples of the Middle 
East which could bring about a national and 
human resurgence when a just i^eace releases 
energies from preoccupation with the past. 

— And the relaxation of tensions between 
the major powers, the continuing for 
a peaceful settlement in many countries of 
the area, and the maintenance of military 
calm make 197-3 a favorable time for the 
process to get underway. 

We know of no other way to arrive at tlie 
mutual clarifications of national interests nec- 
essary for progress toward peace than to 
engage, whether directly or indirectly, in ne- 
gotiation. Outside forces cannot impose a 
settlement. We see no prospect for any other 
external means of narrowing difl'erences. 

For many months we have sought in the 
Middle East to convey one fundamental 
point: that agreement to negotiation requires 
no change of objectives but only a thoughtful 
approach to the possibility of mutually ad- 
vantageous accommodation. That is the proc- 
ess that has taken place to the common 
benefit of peoples elsewhere — a process we 
ourselves have benefited from in Vietnam. It 
is a process that would also benefit the peo- 
ples in the Middle East — Palestinian, Israeli, 
and the peoples in the Arab states concerned. 
It is in such a process, and not in nihilistic 
terrorism of the kind that took the lives of 
two of our finest diplomats in Khartoum, that 
hope for a better future lies. 

If, as a first step, negotiations on an interim 

May 7, 1973 


Suez Canal agreement can be brought about 
and pursued to successful implementation, as 
we believe possible, the result would: rein- 
force the cease-fire, separate the military 
forces of the two sides, result in partial Is- 
raeli withdrawal, open the Suez Canal to in- 
ternational commerce, and, most importantly, 
create momentum toward a permanent set- 
tlement based on U.N. Resolution 242. 

I have placed such emphasis upon an in- 
terim agreement (not as an end in itself but 
as a step toward final agreement) because 
of our continuing judgment that it is there 
where the issues are most susceptible to suc- 
cessful results. We continue, of course, to be 
open to any ideas the parties may suggest. 
We do not, however, view an interim agree- 
ment as an end in itself and recognize the 
relationship between any first step toward 
peace and the broader context of a final 
Arab-Israeli settlement. As recent visits to 
Washington by King Hussein, President 
Sadat's emissary Mr. Ismail, and Prime Min- 
ister Meir have emphasized, we remain in 
close consultation with the governments most 
intimately concerned. 

Fourth, we tuill loork to deepen our com- 
munity of interest with the states of Latin 
America on global as well as hemispheric 
issues, supporting in particular the expand- 
ing roles so many Latin American states are 
assuming in world affairs. 

The community which the two American 
continents have created is a community of 
broadly shared objectives, underlying mutual 
interests, geographic association, and sig- 
nificant intellectual, political, and security 
ties. It is, as well, a community of economic 
cooperation : some 38 percent of Latin Amer- 
ica's total foreign trade is with the United 
States; Mexico is a trading partner of the 
United States on the level of France and 
Italy; and over half of U.S. private invest- 
ment in the developing world is in Latin 

At the same time we live in a period when 
isolation of the hemisphere has disappeared 
and when Latin America's involvement in 
an interdependent world is rapidly acceler- 


ating. Its foreign trade with Europe and 
Japan is now slightly higher than that with 
the United States. Mexico's established role 
in international afi'airs has for many years 
been an outstanding one. More recently con- 
tinental-sized Brazil has sought a global 
role commensurate with its rapidly expand- 
ing strength. Other states, small as well as 
large, have contributed to the success of 
multilateralism in the United Nations and 

Both they and we are now looking upon 
our community in new ways — upon the col- 
lective contributions that can be made by the 
states of this hemisphere in world as well as 
hemispheric affairs. All of us will benefit 
from this wider role, for despite vicissitudes 
the contributions we individually make will 
largely complement one another. We intend, 
in fact, to work with the countries within 
this hemisphere in much the same pragmatic 
atmosphere of equality and cooperation and 
in the same global context as we do with 
those in the other community with which we 
are closely associated — western Europe. 

But cooperation in global matters cannot 
be isolated from the health of our hemi- 
spheric association. I hope we will be able to 
bring about a franker and more useful ex- 
change of views through instituting private 
consultations among Foreign Ministers at 
the start of OAS sessions. The opportunity to 
exchange opinions informally would be a val- 
uable contribution to imijroving cooperation 
and understanding. It would, for example, 
give us an opportunity to share views on 
world political developments and to ascertain 
how we can work together on such matters 
as the forthcoming trade negotiations. 

We do not expect to eliminate difi'erences 
of opinion and approach. But if our associa- 
tion is to realize its potential for mutual 
benefit, indeed if it is to avoid becoming a 
format for sterile recrimination, we and our 
neighbors will have to build upon areas of 
mutual interest and to resolve those conflicts 
which exist. 

I recently told the Foreign Ministers of the 
Organization of American States that with 

Department of State Bulletin 

the progress that lias been made toward a 
more ijeaceful world we are now in a position 
to give our relations with Latin America 
more consistent attention. I will jiarticipate 
personally in this effort and will soon ful- 
fill my longstanding desire to visit Latin 

As part of our increased effort we are now 
seeking approval of the generalized prefer- 
ence legislation we felt it necessary to defer 
in 1972. And Latin America will continue to 
be the recipient of substantial assistance — 
aid which totaled $1.2 billion in 1972. But it 
is through trade, i>rivate investment, and the 
normal course of international economic re- 
lations that the largest share of cooperation 
in develoi)ment for the hemisphere has al- 
ways come and always will come. That is one 
of the reasons why it is important for coun- 
tries who desire investment to apply stable 
rules upon which investors can count. And 
that is why we are approaching all economic 
cooperation with the developing world from a 
comiirehensive, not merely an assistance 
policy approach. 

Fifth, ire irill continue to broaden our 
natural cultural and political relationship 
tvith Africa by strengthening our economic 
ties, in paiiicular by accelerating the groivth 
in trade and investment already taking place 
under policies we adopted in 1970. 

In the last three years U.S. trade with 
Africa has risen by 30 percent and our in- 
vestments by 50 percent. The still relatively 
modest dollar levels of these relations ($3 
billion in trade and $4 billion in investment) 
can be significantly expanded. 

Increased African production of raw ma- 
terials and energy resources to meet the 
growing needs of industrializefl societies will 
account for much of the increase of our im- 
ports and simultaneously provide opportuni- 
ties for mutually beneficial investment. Ni- 
geria and Libya, negligible oil producers in 
1960. now rank seventh and ninth in world 
production. Natural gas from Algeria — 
whose resei"ves are among the highest in the 
world — has recently begun to arrive in U.S. 
ports. And Guinea ranks with Australia in 

possessing bauxite reserves almost 100 times 
those of the United States. 

For the first time in many years, and in 
spite of i)romotional efforts, U.S. exports to 
Africa declined in 1972. There are, nonethe- 
less, good opportunities for expanding our 
exports to Africa's rapidly developing mar- 
kets. We intend to pursue them. 

As the first Secretary of State to visit 
Africa, I know from my own experience how 
highly African states are motivated to de- 
velop their economic resources and their 
standards of living. We will contribute to 
that in'ocess both through grant and loan 
assistance and through the expansion of our 
normal economic contacts, a process of in- 
creasing contact and cooperation we expect 
to lead to more soundly based political rela- 
tions as well. 

In Nigeria, American investments now^ to- 
tal $800 million. Dynamic and well on the 
way to recovery from its civil war, Nigeria 
is one of those leadership countries in Africa 
and in world affairs with which we anticipate 
continued increases in consultation and co- 

In focusing upon the growth of economic 
ties we imply no dilution of American sup- 
port for self-determination in those parts of 
Africa which have not yet had the opportu- 
nity to choose their own future. We will con- 
tinue to encourage productive diplomatic 
means — such as Secretary General Wald- 
heim's initiatives of last year — to give the 
peoples of southern Africa the same choice 
as to their future that the bulk of the con- 
tinent has already experienced. 

Sixth, we will endeavor both to restore our 
international economic position and to reach 
agreement on principles to govern an ex- 
panding international trade and monetary 

In both i)revious reports on foreign policy 
I emphasized our expectation that economic 
relations will assume major importance in 
our foreign policy over the rest of this cen- 
tury. Economic policy increasingly occupies 
our time at all levels of government at home 
and of our diplomacy abroad. With the cessa- 

iMay 7, 1973 


tion of the war in Southeast Asia and the im- 
provement of relations with China and the 
Soviet Union, economic policy will be par- 
ticularly prominent in 1973. 

We will, as a matter of urgency, be seeking 
(1) to improve the ability of American work- 
ers and businessmen to compete in world 
markets and (2) to restructure the interna- 
tional economic system so that the unprece- 
dented growth of the world economy of re- 
cent years can be extended into the future. 

The American economy remains by far the 
largest and most productive economy in the 
world. We must not let our concern over cur- 
rent problems obscure that basic strength. 
But obstructive trade barriers continue to 
distort the smooth and equitable growth of 
world trade. The world economy will benefit 
by the removal of such obstacles, as will the 
United States. 

The currency realignments of 1971 and 
1973 will be major steps in making it possi- 
ble to restore our trading position. But mone- 
tary steps must now be supplemented by 
elimination of previously tolerated trading 
practices and restrictions that put extra bur- 
dens upon the dollar or upon the American 
exporter or investor. Changes are particu- 
larly necessary to make our access to Japa- 
nese markets more equivalent to their access 
to ours. They also are needed in Europe, 
where in the course of enlargement of the 
Common Market some obstacles to U.S. ex- 
ports have been extended more widely, espe- 
cially in agriculture, and where our trade 
account went into deficit in 1972 for the first 

Accordingly we will be negotiating com- 
pensation in the GATT for impairment of 
trade interests which resulted from the en- 
largement of the European Community and 
from its special arrangements with other 
European countries. We will continue to 
press the Community to ease its restrictions 
on agicultural trade and to eliminate reverse 
preferences for Community exports. We will 
work with Japan for an early reduction or 
elimination of import quotas and tariffs, im- 
proved access to the Japanese market for 
U.S. investors and businessmen, and in- 

creased Japanese Government purchases of 
American products. 

Our economic health is increasingly linked 
to that of the world's long-run economic 
health. Consequently we also will be pressing 
this year for basic reform of the interna- 
tional monetary and trade systems. 

Monetary Reform. The broad principles of 
monetary reform which we wish to see 
adopted by the IMF Board of Governors this 
September were set forth by Secretary of the 
Treasury Shultz at the annual meeting of 
the International Monetary Fund last Sep- 
tember. At the March 16 meeting of the 
Ministers of the Group of Ten countries and 
the European Community agreement was 
reached on measures to ensure maintenance 
of an orderly exchange rate system while the 
effort to reform the international monetary 
system is pressed ahead. This is a positive 
and encouraging result. 

While considerable time is required before 
exchange rate changes can alter the balance 
of payments, we are satisfied that if accept- 
able trade arrangements can also be made 
we will soon move toward sustainable equi- 
librium in our payments position. But a sense 
of urgency in the current negotiations within 
the IMF's Committee of Twenty is now nec- 
essary so that the favorable effect of the 
devaluations of the dollar can be realized 
and a stable system created. We hope that 
the Committee would be able to report agree- 
ment on broad ijrinciples of reform by the 
time of the annual meeting of the IMF in 
Nairobi this fall. 

Trade Negotiations. While the monetary 
talks proceed, the first session of related ne- 
gotiations on trade will open this September 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and 

The Administration has submitted to the 
Congress a request for the comprehensive 
negotiating authority we consider necessary 
to attack agricultural as well as industrial 
restrictions and nontariff as well as tariff 
barriers. In these negotiations we will insist 
that American products be given fair and 
reasonable treatment. 

The authority which the President is seek- 


Department of State Bulletin 


'\i\g to raise tariffs in particular cases is de- 
signed to achieve that i)urpose, not to brinff 
about increased barriers to trade. In fact our 
objective is quite the opposite. For the past 
quarter century international trade has in- 
creased at a more rapid rate than world pro- 
duction, providing an essential stimulus to 
the most rapid global economic growth in 
man's history. The reduction of barriers to 
trade made this contribution possible. It 
must be continued. 

During the trade negotiations we will, in 
particular, seek approval on these principal 

-That tariff barriers on both industrial 
and agricultural goods should be reciprocally 
reduced to the point where they form no ap- 
preciable imi)ediment to the flow or direction 
of international trade. 

— That nontariff restraints should be re- 
duced over a moderate period of time and 
that remaining restrictions should be regu- 
lated under international agreement. 

-That trade should continue to be orga- 
nized on a global basis, not on the basis of 
trading blocs, and that reverse prefei-ences 
favoring particular groups of developed 
countries should be removed: 

— That particular account should be taken 
of the need to find solutions to the problems 
of developing countries. 

-That an internationally supervised sys- 
tem of safeguards should be agreed upon to 
give industries adversely affected by shift- 
ing trade patterns time to adjust. 

Neither the negotiations on trade nor on 
monetary matters will be completed in 1973. 
But success in e.stablishing agreement on 
such basic principles will go far toward 
building tomorrow's economic system. 

Seventh, we intend to employ our economic 
policies more comprehensively than in the 
past to support the efforts of developing 
countries to accelerate their per capita rate 
of economic growth beyond current levels. 

If the forthcoming trade negotiations are 
successful, the poorer nations of the world 
will benefit fully as much as the developed 
world. But neither trade nor assistance, de- 

veloped nor developing nations' policies, in- 
vestment nor nationalization, nor other sep- 
arate efforts will suffice for dealing with 
what may well be the most important but 
dillicult requirement of the next quarter 
century — that of escalating the economic 
growth rate of the developing world. 

Despite the high i)riority given to eco- 
nomic growth in most of the poorer nations, 
two decades of international assistance, and 
decisive breakthroughs in .several states, the 
overall per capita growth rate in the develop- 
ing world has only reached that of the indus- 
trialized countries in the past two years. 
Even with that accomplished, the fact re- 
mains that a 3 percent per capita growth 
rate in a country like India produces an an- 
nual income increase of only $3 while in the 
United States it produces $120. Thus no end 
is in sight in the increasing disparity between 
income levels of developing and developed 
nations. And within the developing coun- 
tries, the benefits of modernization have 
been unevenly distributed, causing internal 
social and political problems. 

We must collectively seek to narrow these 
disparities lest North-South dissension re- 
place the receding East-West conflict. We 
therefore intend to pursue a comprehensive 
policy designed to help stimulate social and 
economic progress, particularly higher rates 
of per capita economic growth, in the devel- 
oping world — a policy not of aid alone but 
employing a wide variety of economic rela- 
tionships, a policy involving coordination 
with other developed countries and requiring 
principal efforts from the developing coun- 
tries themselves. We will pursue it in recog- 
nition of the fact that just as the developing 
nations need access to the capital and coojier- 
ation of the developed countries, so will we 
increasingly need their cooperation and ac- 
cess to what they can produce. The rapidly 
burgeoning needs of the industrialized world 
for energy and raw material resources offer 
new trade possibilities that will both aug- 
ment production and foreign exchange earn- 
ings in the developing world. 

I have asked the new Under Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs, William Casey, 

May 7, 1973 


to give special attention to this matter. Mr. 
Casey will be using the full resources of the 
Department and the government to coordi- 
nate the use of such elements as restraints on 
population growth, international investment, 
trade expansion, preferences, multilateral in- 
stitutions, grant and loan assistance, and 
debt relief in support of this purpose. 

Eighth, we ivill seek during 1973 both to 
strengthen the economic and political rela- 
tionship among the world's industrialized, 
democratic countries and to create associa- 
tions among tis tvhich will be more global in 
scope and more regular in nature than has 
previously been the case. 

During 1973 we will be engaged in im- 
portant separate consultations with the Euro- 
pean Community, Japan, and other key 
friends. But bilateral approaches are no 
longer sufficient to handle the growing 
agenda of common political and economic 
concerns. A substantially higher level of 
worldwide coordination and cooperation is 
required among Japan, Canada, western 
Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
United States if we are to solve common 
trade and monetary problems, continue the 
rapid expansion of the world's economy, and 
assist in the growth of the developing world. 
It is through wider cooperation also that we 
can best contribute our complementary 
strengths and common ideals toward building 
a politically sounder world. 

We are one another's best trading partners 
and one another's most significant competi- 
tors. Our governments derive their authority 
from the freely expressed consent of their 
citizens. Our people share a common desire 
for an open and peaceful world. No longer 
can any of us satisfactorily think solely in 
Asian terms, in European terms, or in North 
American terms. For the health and strength 
of us all we must think and act in terms 
of us all. 

One way in which this can be approached 
will be through enhanced cooperation in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, the one organization whose 
membership is closely linked to these states. 

Last year the Executive Committee of the 
OECD was transformed into a high-level 
policy forum for consultations on the entire 
spectrum of our economic relationships. 

We would like the new high-level policj, 
forum to address the interrelationship of all 
aspects of economic policies — domestic and 
international — and their impact upon the 
total economic system. We believe the OECD 
should be a center for coordination of the 
more comprehensive development policies we 
consider necessary. And we would like to see 
it continue to be involved in an area it has 
only recently begun to deal with — interna- 
tional investment, including the role of the 
multinational corporation. 

At OECD Ministerial meetings we plan to 
continue our policy of including a senior 
State Department representative in our dele- 
gation. We hope that the OECD may increas- 
ingly become a forum for broad cooperation 
beyond the technical items on specific agen- 

The presence of Foreign Ministers at the 
United Nations General Assembly each year 
also provides a further opportunity for co- 
ordination at the policy level. I have found 
the various meetings I have each year with 
NATO Foreign Ministers, Australia, New 
Zealand and Japan to be highly useful. An 
occasional opportunity for Foreig-n Ministers 
from these countries to exchange views col- 
lectively should improve coordination on the 
many matters that now affect us all. I hope 
we will be able to find time for such an ex- 
change this fall. 

We will of course be consulting with our 
friends about these ideas, as they may have 
other suggestions for strengthening our 

European Community. The enlargement of 
the European Community and the consequent 
strengthening of western Europe's economic 
capabilities assure that 1973 will be a year 
of special attention to relations between the 
European Community and the United States. 
We hope to be able to build such lasting 
ties that our relations with the Community 
will in time become a solid pillar of U.S.- 


Department of State Bulletin 

I'Ajroiiean association such as we already have 
in NATO. To acliieve this however we must 
overcome a number of economic differences 
arising out of the chanjres in Europe and 
out of our bah\nce-of-pa.vments situation. 
Western Europe as a whole now produces 
three-quarters as much as we do, and it has 
a greater share of world trade. We will ac- 
cordingly be looking to them to assume a 
more equal share of common responsibilities. 

Japan. We will also be engaged during 
1973 in reinforcing our long-range political 
and economic association with Japan, an as- 
sociation as important to us across the Pa- 
cific as is our relationship with western 
Europe across the Atlantic. 

Last September Prime Minister Tanaka 
and President Nixon concurred that strength- 
ening of our close ties would be "an impor- 
tant factor for peace and stability in the 
evolving world situation." The solidity of 
these ties will be of particular importance as 
we each proceed to build closer relations with 
China and the Soviet Union. 

A major correction in the trade imbalance 
between us ($4.2 billion in 1972 — two-thirds 
of our overall trade deficit) understandably 
has high priority. Japan has accepted this 
correction as being one of its top priority 
tasks. We welcome its intention to lower 
tariffs and to promote import and capital 
liberalization, its decision to permit the yen 
to appreciate in the exchange market, and its 
stated desiie to achieve an external equilib- 
rium within the next two or three years. 

Canada. Our attention has understandably 
been drawn most recently to the changes in 
western Europe and to Japan's dramatic 
growth. But it is Canada which will remain 
our largest single trading partner and the 
major locus of ])rivate American investment. 
We hope to examine with Canada such areas 
as automotive trade and defense procurement 
to assure that benefits from our close trading 
ties are fully shared. And we intend to engage 
in more intense and varied coojieration with 
Canada to meet the environmental and en- 
ergy jiroblems of North America, in particu- 
lar in carrying out the purposes of the Great 

Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972. 
The next few years will be a time of test- 
ing of our bonds with all the industrialized, 
democratic nations as we work toward new 
relationships based on current security, eco- 
nomic and political imjieratives. The adjust- 
ment will be neither simple nor painless. But 
we approach this adjustment with the con- 
fidence that it can lead to an era of coopera- 
tion bountiful for all our peoples. 

Ninth, we will press fonvard toward 
building a irorld of yyiultiluteral cooperation 
and orderly relations under law, giving spe- 
cial attention in 1973 to preliminary agree- 
ment in the United Nations on a global law 
of the sea that ivill transform the oceans from 
an area of groiring conflict into a source of 
growing wealth and cooperation. 

In many concrete ways we are seeking to 
strengthen the contribution of multilateral 
institutions — in particular of the United 
Nations agencies — in creating a more cooper- 
ative and better regulated international com- 
munity. Of substantial importance in the 
extension of such cooperation will be the 
first session of the U.N. Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, which will open this fall in 
New York following two years of prepara- 
tory work. That meeting will set into process 
an international negotiation in whose success 
all nations have an important stake. 

The international communication made 
possible by the freedom of the seas and the 
potential resources that the seas contain in 
energy, food and raw materials are too im- 
portant to permit the oceans to become cen- 
ters of conflict. Yet the varying interests of 
coastal states in security and of naval powers 
in freedom of navigation, of coastal states 
in their adjacent resources and of the world 
community in the resources of the deep sea 
will produce just such conflicts unless we all 
accommodate for our long-range advantage. 

That is why we are striving to reach early 
agreement on a comprehensive legal regime 
for the seas. Negotiation of a treaty will re- 
quire most of 1974, but we will urge that this 
fall's opening session concur upon the objec- 
tives of: 

May 7, 1973 


—A maximum breadth of 12 miles for the 
territorial sea; 

Free transit through and over straits 

used for international navigation; 

— Broad coastal state economic jurisdic- 
tion over mineral and fisheries resources in 
areas adjacent to the territorial sea, tempered 
by international standards which will protect 
legitimate interests of other states; 

—An international regime including ma- 
chinery to authorize the exploration and ex- 
ploitation of the deep seabed under agreed 

—Standards and controls to protect the 
marine environment from pollution; and 

An agreed regime which would promote 

marine scientific research. 

Narcotics and Terrorism. A deeper com- 
mitment to orderly relations under law is 
also urgently required in the campaign to 
outlaw hijackers and drug smugglers. As 
Chairman of the Cabinet Committees on In- 
ternational Terrorism and International Nar- 
cotics Control, I will continue during 1973 
to pursue our war against these two threats 
to a more civilized world. 

In 1972 we developed comprehensive anti- 
narcotics plans with each of the 59 nations 
involved in production, consumption or trans- 
shipment of illicit hard drugs. During 1973 
we will translate these plans into action. 
With the movement toward eliminating Tur- 
key as a source of opium well underway and 
with progress developing in Southeast Asia, 
we will especially concentrate upon interdic- 
tion of the drug traflic. Enforcement and im- 
proved intelligence are our two top priorities. 
We are obtaining increased cooperation from 
other countries in both areas. Our programs 
have already caused shortages of heroin with- 
in the United States, hindering the recruit- 
ment of new addicts, and hopefully driving 
many existing addicts into treatment. In 
1973 we intend to intensify this pressure. 

The international community's response to 
the narcotic issue has been gratifying. But 
its response to initiatives to suppress hijack- 
ing and terrorism has been disappointing, 
even shortsighted. An atmosphere not suf- 


ficiently hostile to assaults upon civilized 
comity among nations, such as the recent 
slaughter of two American and a Belgian 
diplomat in the Sudan, must be changed. 
Although 63 airliners from 24 countries were 
hijacked and 24-5 passengers and crew killed 
or wounded in 1972, most nations of the 
world have so far been unwilling to take 
meaning-ful new action on hijacking or ter- 
rorism either at the United Nations or in 
the International Civil Aviation Organiza- 

On the bilateral front we have been more 
successful due to the agreement with Cuba 
on the extradition or punishment of hijack- 
ers. We hope to reach similar agreements 
with other countries, particularly in north- 
ern Africa. 

We will also press again at the ICAO Con- 
ference this August for a new international 
convention to prevent safe havens for hi- 
jackers. At the very minimum we will ex- 
pect the Assembly to establish international 
machinery to make investigations and rec- 
ommendations in hijacking or sabotage cases. 
If there was any doubt that international 
treaties should be adopted to provide for the 
protection of diplomats and for the extradi- 
tion or punishment of persons who kill, se- 
riously injure or kidnap innocent persons in 
a foreign state for political purposes, this 
year's outrages should terminate it. We will 
pursue the latter treaty vigorously in the 
U.N. ad hoc committee on terrorism sched- 
uled to meet this summer. And we be- 
lieve the United Nations should complete the 
treaty on protection of diplomats at this 
fall's General Assembly. 

* * * * * 

This introduction can only hope to outline 
the most important of the Administration's 
foreign policy objectives. I have elaborated 
here upon those which collectively give 1973 
the characteristic of a year of building— the 
building of relations and institutions that 
could determine the course of the rest of the 
century. Given the President's strong inter; 
est and leadership in this eflfort, we have 
every reason to expect that further substan 

Department of State Bulletin 


tial progrress toward lasting peace and coop- 
eration will lie made in the cominjr year. 

It is now commonplace to hear that there 
are no more dramatic accomplishments possi- 
ble in foreigrn affairs. I do not ajrree. 1973 
can be a dramatic year — not in breaking old 
patterns but in building new ones, a year 
when we begin to erect the framework for a 
generation of peace. 

But 1973 will be just beginning. The road 
ahead will be as difficult and dangerous as it 
will be iiromi.sing. It will require the con- 
tinued perseverance and engagement of this 
great nation. That is why our foreign policy 
must continue to be a policy of engagement — 
engagement with adversaries in building co- 
operation, engagement with allies on a basis 
of shared values and interests, engagement 
with developing nations in the effort to raise 
the living standards of their people. 

For many years the economic and political 
health of the world has been heavily affected 
by the state of the American society. Now 
our condition increasingly is affected by the 
welfare of others. The degree of interdepend- 
ence among nations and many of the princi- 
pal trends of international affairs are 
succinctly evident in the statistical indi- 
cators of the state of the world I have ap- 
pended to this introduction. In concise terms 
they illustrate both the necessity of our en- 
gagement in the world and the nature of 
many of the issues the world must still face. 

In my first foreign policy report, I ex- 
pressed the hope that we could fashion a for- 
eign policy which would overcome the deep 
and destructive divisions within this country 
and restore a sense of common purpose in 
.America's approach to world affairs. Today 
the obstacles to such a common purpose have 
been overcome, and we have found a new 
self-confidence, devoid both of arrogance and 
of destructive self-doubts. The foreign policy 
objectives we are setting forth are moderate 
and constructive ones. It will be my earnest 

endeavor so to carry them out that the Ad- 
ministration and the Congress, the leader- 
ship of both parties, the government and the 
citizenry can again move forward harmoni- 
ously in their su])port. With such cooperation 
1973 will be a year of substantial progress 
toward the more peaceful and prosperous 
world we all desire. 


I. Human Welfare 
Gross World Product 

(billions 1971$) 
World Product 

Per Capita (1971$) 
GWP Growth Rate (%) 
Population (billions) 
Population Growth Rate (%) 

Infant Mortality (%) 

Literacy (7r) 

II. Interdependence 
World Energy Imported ( Vr ) 
World Product 

Exported (%) 
Industrial Product 

Exported {%) 
International Mail 

(billions of items) 
International Travel 

International Travel/World 

Population (^/r) 
HI. Military 

Men Under Arms (millions) 
Men Under Arms/Population 

(per thousand) 
Military Expenditures/ 

GWP (%) 



















































' International statistics are sufficiently reliable 
to indicate trends. However, there are significant 
problems in comparability among national statistics 
that make up the data, as well as in collection of 
some items. All world figures must therefore be 
taken as the best available approximations. 

May 7, 1973 



Like other nations, the United States is becoming more closely tied to and 
interdependent with the rest of the world. 


\^-^- PERCENT 30.4 

: WORLD 26 9 

20 6 iilll 

100 99 



1960 1965 1970 



1960 1965 1970 



178 3 


102 4 




■ Ill 



1960 1965 1970 

1960 1965 


IN U.S. 






1960 1965 1970 

1960 1965 1970 


Department of State Bulletin 


White the economies of both developed and developing nations grew substantially, 
the gap between them also grew ond most of the world's people remained poor. 

!f : ' " -^ 




1960 1965 1970 


























There are two and a half times as many people in the developing countries as in the developed 
and they are growing almost two and a half times as fast. 










'm. mm 

I960 1965 



May 7, 1973 











' 9.2% 

-^ 24.4% 


16.0% — 










Department of State Bulletin 

President Nixon's National Energy Policy 

President Nixon transmitted to the Con- 
!/riss on April 18 n meifsage nu enerqii pol- 
icy. Following are a statement by President 
Nixon recorded that day for television and 
radio; excerpts from the messaf/e; the tran- 
script of a news conference held at the White 
House that day by Secretary of the Treasunj 
George P. Shultz; and the text of an Execu- 
tive order establishing a Special Committee 
on Energy and a National Energy Office. 


White House press release dated April IK 

America's enerpy demands have grown so 
rapidly that they now outstrip our energy 
supplies. As a result, we face the possibility 
of temporary fuel shortages and some in- 
creases in fuel prices in America. 

This is a serious challenge, but we have the 
ability to meet it. If our energy resources are 
properly developed, they can fulfill our en- 
erg>' requirements for centuries to come. 

What is needed now is decisive and respon- 
sible action to increase our energy supplies — 
action which takes into account the needs of 
our economy, of our environment, and of our 
national security — and that is why I am mov- 
ing forward today on several fronts. 

I am ending quantitative controls on oil 
impoi-ts and establishing a National Energj^ 

I am ordering an acceleration in the leasing 
of oil lands on the outer continental shelf and 
increasing our ability to prevent oil spills. 

I am also taking new steps to maintain our 
vital coal industry. 

In addition, I am asking the Congress to 
act quickly on several proposals. One would 
remove government regulations which now 
discourage the growth of our domestic nat- 
ural gas industry. Another would help us 
establish the research and technological 

groundwork for developing new forms of 
energy with a long-range future. And .still 
others would peiniil licensing of new deep- 
water ports in our oceans and would open 
the way for the long-delayed Alaska oil 

Each of these steps can help us meet our 
energy needs and meet those needs without 
sacrificing our environment or endangering 
our national security, so that we can continue 
to build a better life for all of our people in 
this country. 


To the Congress of the United States: 

At home and abroad, America is in a time 
of transition. Old problems are yielding to 
new initiatives, but in their place new prob- 
lems are arising which once again challenge 
our ingenuity and require vigorous action. 
Nowhere is this more clearly true than in the 
field of energy. 

As America has become more prosperous 
and more heavily industrialized, our demands 
for energy have soared. Today, with 6 per- 
cent of the world's population, we consume 
almost a third of all the energy used in the 
world. Our energy demands have grown so 
rapidly that they now outstrip our available 
supplies, and at our present rate of growth, 
our energy needs a dozen years from now will 
be nearly double what they were in 1970. 

In the years immediately ahead, we must 
face up to the possibility of occasional energy 
shortages and some increase in energy prices. 

Clearly, we are facing a vitally important 
energy challenge. If pre.sent trends continue 
unchecked, we could face a genuine energy 
crisis. But that crisis can and should be 

' For the complete text, sec Weekly Compilation of 
Prfisidential Documents dated Apr. 23, p. 389. 

May 7, 1973 


averted, for we have the capacity and the 
resources to meet our energy needs if only 
we take the proper steps — and take them 

More than half the world's total reserves of 
coal are located within the United States. 
This resource alone would be enough to pro- 
vide for our energy needs for well over a 
century. We have potential resources of bil- 
lions of barrels of recoverable oil, similar 
quantities of shale oil and more than 2,000 
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Properly 
managed, and with more attention on the 
part of consumers to the conservation of 
energy, these supplies can last for as long as 
our economy depends on conventional fuels. 

In addition to natural fuels, we can draw 
upon hydroelectric plants and increasing 
numbers of nuclear powered facilities. More- 
over, long before our present energy sources 
are exhausted, America's vast capabilities in 
research and development can provide us 
with new, clean and virtually unlimited 
sources of power. 

Thus we should not be misled into pessi- 
mistic predictions of an energy disaster. But 
neither should we be lulled into a false sense 
of security. We must examine our cir- 
cumstances realistically, carefully weigh the 
alternatives — and then move forward deci- 

Weighing the Alternatives 

Over 90 percent of the energy we consume 
today in the United States comes from three 
sources: natural gas, coal and petroleum. 
Each source presents us with a different set 
of problems. 

Natural gas is our cleanest fuel and is most 
preferred in order to protect our environ- 
ment, but ill-considered regulations of nat- 
ural gas prices by the Federal Government 
have produced a serious and increasing scar- 
city of this fuel. 

We have vast quantities of coal, but the 
extraction and use of coal have presented 
such persistent environmental problems that, 
today, less than 20 percent of our energy 
needs are met by coal and the health of the 
entire coal industry is seriously threatened. 

Our third conventional resource is oil, but 
domestic production of available oil is no 
longer able to keep pace with demands. 

In determining how we should expand and 
develop these resources, along with others 
such as nuclear power, we must take into 
account not only our economic goals, but also 
our environmental goals and our national se- 
curity goals. Each of these areas is pro- 
foundly affected by our decisions concerning 

If we are to maintain the vigor of our 
economy, the health of our environment, and 
the security of our energy resources, it is 
essential that we strike the right balance 
among these priorities. 

The choices are difficult, but we cannot re- 
fuse to act because of this. We cannot stand 
still simply because it is difficult to go for- 
ward. That is the one choice Americans must 
never make. 

The energy challenge is one of the great 
opportunities of our time. We have already 
begun to meet that challenge, and realize its 

National Energy Policy 

In 1971, I sent to the Congress the first 
message on energy policies ever submitted by 
an American President. In that message I 
proposed a number of specific steps to meet 
our projected needs by inci'easing our supply 
of clean energy in America. 

Those steps included expanded research 
and development to obtain more clean en- 
ergy, increased availability of energy re- 
sources located on Federal lands, increased 
efforts in the development of nuclear power, 
and a new Federal organization to plan and 
manage our energy programs. 

In the twenty-two months since I sub- 
mitted that message, America's energy re- 
search and development efforts have been 
expanded by 50 percent. 

In order to increase domestic production 
of conventional fuels, sales of oil and gas 
leases on the Outer Continental Shelf have 
been increased. Federal and State standards 
to protect the marine environment in which 
these leases are located are being tightened. 
We have developed a more rigorous surveil- 


Department of State Bulletin 

lance capability and an improved ability to 
prevent and clean up oil spills. 

We are planning to proceed with the devel- 
opment of oil shale and peothermal energy 
sources on Federal lands, so long as an eval- 
uation now underway shows that our envi- 
ronment can be adequately protected. 

We have also taken new steps to expand 
our uranium enrichment capacity for the 
production of fuels for nuclear power plants, 
to standardize nuclear power plant designs, 
and to ensure the continuation of an already 
enviable safety record. 

We have issued new standards and guide- 
lines, and have taken other actions to in- 
crease and encourage better conservation of 

In short, we have made a strong beginning 
in our effort to ensure that America will al- 
ways have the power needed to fuel its pros- 
perity. But what we have accomplished is 
only a beginning. 

Now we must build on our increased knowl- 
edge, and on the accomplishments of the past 
twenty-two months, to develop a more com- 
prehensive, integrated national energy policy. 
To carry out this policy we must: 

— increase domestic production of all forms 
of energy ; 

— act to conserve energy more effectively ; 

— strive to meet our energy needs at the 
lowest cost consistent with the protection of 
both our national security and our natural 

— reduce excessive regulatory and admin- 
istrative impediments which have delayed or 
prevented construction of energy-producing 

— act in concert with other nations to con- 
duct research in the energy field and to find 
ways to prevent serious shortages ; and 

— apply our vast scientific and technologi- 
cal capacities — both public and private — so 
we can utilize our current energy resources 
more wisely and develop new sources and new 
forms of energy. 

The actions I am announcing today and 
the proposals I am submitting to the Con- 
irress are designed to achieve these objec- 
tives. They reflect the fact that we are in a 

period of transition, in which we must work 
to avoid or at least minimize short-term 
supply shortages, while we act to expand 
and develop our domestic supplies in order to 
meet long-term energy needs. 

We should not suppose this transition pe- 
riod will be easy. The task ahead will require 
the concerted and cooperative efforts of con- 
sumers, industry, and government. 

Importing To Meet Our Energy Needs 
Oil Imports 

In order to avert a short-term fuel short- 
age and to keep fuel costs as low as possible, 
it will be necessary for us to increase fuel 
imports. At the same time, in order to reduce 
our long-term reliance on imports, we must 
encourage the exploration and development 
of our domestic oil and the construction of 
refineries to process it. 

The present quota system for oil imports — 
the Mandatory Oil Import Program — was 
established at a time when we could produce 
more oil at home than we were using. By 
imposing quantitative restrictions on im- 
ports, the quota system restricted imports of 
foreign oil. It also encouraged the develop- 
ment of our domestic petroleum industry in 
the interest of national security. 

Today, however, we are not producing as 
much oil as we are using, and we must import 
ever larger amounts to meet our needs. 

As a result, the current Mandatory Oil Im- 
port Program is of virtually no benefit any 
longer. Instead, it has the very real potential 
of aggravating our supply problems, and it 
denies us the flexibility we need to deal 
quickly and efliciently with our import re- 
quirements. General dissatisfaction with the 
program and the apparent need for change 
has led to uncertainty. Under these condi- 
tions, there can be little long-range invest- 
ment planning for new drilling and refineiy 

Effective today, I am removing by procla- 
mation all existing tariffs on imported crude 
oil and products. = Holders of import licenses 

• For text of Proclamation No. 4210, see 38 Fed. 
Rcfl. 9645. 

May 7, 1973 


will be able to import petroleum duty free. 
This action will help hold down the cost of 
energy to the American consumer. 

Effective today, I am also suspending di- 
rect control over the quantity of crude oil 
and refined products which can be imported. 
In place of these controls, I am substituting a 
license-fee quota system. 

Under the new system, present holders of 
import licenses may import petroleum exempt 
from fees up to the level of their 1973 quota 
allocations. For imports in excess of the 
1973 level, a fee must be paid by the importer. 

This system should achieve several ob- 

First, it should help to meet our immediate 
energy needs by encouraging importation of 
foreign oil at the lowest cost to consumers, 
while also providing incentives for explora- 
tion and development of our domestic re- 
sources to meet our long-term needs. There 
will be little paid in fees this year, although 
all exemptions from fees will be phased out 
over several years. By gradually increasing 
fees over the next two and one-half years to 
a maximum level of one-half cent per gallon 
for crude oil and one and one-half cents per 
gallon for all refined products, we should 
continue to meet our energy needs while en- 
couraging industry to increase its domestic 

Second, this system should encourage re- 
finery construction in the United States, be- 
cause the fees are higher for refined products 
than for crude oil. As an added incentive, 
crude oil in amounts up to three-fourths of 
new refining capacity may be imported with- 
out being subject to any fees. This special 
allowance will be available to an oil company 
during the first five years after it builds or 
expands its refining capacity. 

Third, this system should provide the flexi- 
bility we must have to meet short and long- 
term needs efficiently. We will review the fee 
level periodically to ensure that we are im- 
posing the lowest fees consistent with our 
intention to increase domestic production 
while keeping costs to the consumer at the 
lowest possible level. We will also make full 
use of the Oil Import Appeals Board to en- 
sure that the needs of all elements of the 

petroleum industry are met, particularly 
those of independent operators who help to 
maintain market competition. 

Fourth, the new system should contribute 
to our national security. Increased domestic 
production will leave us less dependent on 
foreign supplies. At the same time, we will 
adjust the fees in a manner designed to en- 
courage, to the extent possible, the security 
of our foreign supplies. Finally, I am direct- 
ing the Oil Policy Committee to examine 
incentives aimed at increasing our domestic 
storage capacity or shut-in production. In 
this way we will provide buff"er stocks to 
insulate ourselves against a temporary loss 
of foreign supplies. 

Deepwater Ports 

It is clear that in the foreseeable future, 
we will have to import oil in large quantities. 
We should do this as cheaply as we can with 
minimal damage to the environment. Un- 
fortunately, our present capabilities are in- 
adequate for these purposes. 

The answer to this problem lies in deep- 
water ports which can accommodate those 
larger ships, providing important economic 
advantages while reducing the risks of col- 
lision and grounding. Recent studies by the 
Council on Environmental Quality demon- 
strate that we can expect considerably less 
pollution if we use fewer but larger tankers 
and deepwater facilities, as opposed to the 
many small tankers and conventional facili- 
ties which we would otherwise need. 

If we do not enlarge our deepwater port 
capacity, it is clear that both American and 
foreign companies will expand oil transship- 
ment terminals in the Bahamas and the 
Canadian Maritime Provinces. From these 
terminals, oil will be brought to our conven- 
tional ports by growing numbers of small 
and medium size transshipment vessels, 
thereby increasing the risks of pollution from 
shipping operations and accidents. At the 
same time, the United States will lose the 
jobs and capital that those foreign facilities 

Given these considerations, I believe we 
must move forward with an ambitious pro- 


Department of State Bulletin 

gram to create new deepwater ports for 
receiving petroleum imports. 

The devcioinnent of ports has usually been 
a responsibility of State and local govern- 
ments and the private sectoi'. However, 
States cannot issue licenses beyond the three- 
mile limit. I am therefore proposing legisla- 
tion to permit the Department of the Interior 
to issue such licenses. Licensing would be 
contingent upon full and proper evaluation 
of environmental impact, and would provide 
for strict navigation and safety, as well as 
proper land use requirements. The proposed 
legislation specifically provides for Federal 
cooperation with State and local authorities. 

International Cooperation 

The energy challenge confronts every na- 
tion. Where there is such a community of in- 
terest, there is both a cause and a basis for 
cooperative action. 

Today, the United States is involved in a 
number of cooperative, international effoi-ts. 
We have joined with the other 22 member- 
nations of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development to produce a 
comprehensive report on long-term problems 
and to develop an agreement for sharing oil 
in times of acute shortages. The European 
Economic Community has already discussed 
the need for cooperative efforts and is pre- 
paring recommendations for a Community 
energy policy. We have expressed a desire 
to work together with them in this effort. 

We have also agreed with the Soviet Union 
to pursue joint research in magnetohydrody- 
namics (MHD), a highly efficient process for 
generating electricity, and to exchange in- 
formation on fusion, fission, the generation of 
electricity, transmission and pollution control 
tochnology. These efforts should be a model 
for joint research efforts with other coun- 
tries. Additionally, American companies are 
looking into the possibility of joint projects 
with the Soviet Union to develop natural re- 
sources for the benefit of both nations. 

I have also instructed the Department of 
State, in coordination with the Atomic En- 
erg>' Commission, other appropriate Govern- 

ment agencies, and the Congress to move 
i'ai)idly in developing a program of interna- 
tional cooperation in i-esearch and devel- 
opment on new forms of energy and in 
developing international mechanisms for 
dealing with energy questions in times of 
critical shortages. 

I believe the energy challenge provides an 
impoi'tant opportunity for nations to pursue 
vital objectives through peaceful coopera- 
tion. No chance should be lost to .strengthen 
the structure of peace we are seeking to build 
in the world, and few issues provide us with 
as good an opportunity to demonstrate that 
there is more to be gained in pursuing our 
national interests through mutual coopera- 
tion than through destructive competition 
or dangerous confrontation. 


Nations succeed only as they are able to 
respond to challenge, and to change when cir- 
cumstances and opportunities require change. 

When the first settlers came to America, 
they found a land of untold natural wealth, 
and this became the cornerstone of the most 
prosperous nation in the world. As we have 
gi-own in population, in prosperity, in indus- 
trial capacity, in all those indices that re- 
flect the constant upward thrust in the 
American standard of living, the demands 
on our natural resources have also grown. 

Today, the energy resources which have 
fueled so much of our national gi-owth are 
not sufficiently developed to meet the con- 
stantly increasing demands which have been 
placed upon them. The time has come to 
change the way we meet these demands. The 
challenge facing us represents one of the 
great opportunities of our time — an oppor- 
tunity to create an even stronger domestic 
economy, a cleaner environment, and a bet- 
ter life for all our people. 

The proposals I am submitting and the 
actions I will take can give us the tools to 
do this important job. 

The need for action is urgent. I hope the 
Congress will act with dispatch on the pro- 
posals I am submitting. But in the final analy- 

May 7, 1973 


sis, the ultimate responsibility does not rest 
merely with the Congress or with this Ad- 
ministration. It rests with all of us — with 
government, with industry and with the in- 
dividual citizen. 

Whenever we have been confronted with 
great national challenges in the past, the 
American people have done their duty. I am 
confident we shall do so now. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, April 18, 1973. 


white House press release dated April 18 

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec- 
retary to President Nixon']: You have copies 
of the President's message to Congress on 
energy. The President met this morning for 
close to an hour with the bipartisan leader- 
ship to discuss the message. Secretary Shultz 
and Charles DiBona, the Special Consultant 
to the President on this subject, attended the 
leadership meeting and are here to take your 
questions, together with the Deputy Secre- 
tary of the Treasury, William E. Simon. We 
will begin with comments by Secretary 
Shultz, and they will all be prepared to take 
your questions. 

Secretanj Shultz: I have had the privilege 
of meeting in recent weeks quite a few times 
with the Finance Ministers around the world. 
It has been quite striking to me in those 
meetings that it is as though there are two 
agendas; that is, we have our formal meet- 
ing and discuss the exchange rate system and 
things of that kind, and then in the coffee 
breaks and at lunch and so on, everybody 
wants to talk about the energy problem. 

Finance Ministers, of course, see it in 
terms of the flows of dollars and the problems 
that that suggests. But the fact that it is so 
much on everybody's mind, not only here but 
abroad, suggests that this is a problem that 
is of great magnitude and importance. It 
represents a potential crisis which we can 
avoid if we take the proper steps, and I think 
that the President's mes.sage and the actions 
that are suggested represent a set of policies 
that can help us avoid a possible crisis, and 

these represent a set of policies that he is 
putting forward here today that we will build 
on as we move ahead. 

Now, I think the strategy for the United 
States represented in this message is, in a 
sense, threefold : first, to build up our domes- 
tic energy resources in every way we can 
through an integrated set of policies in- 
volving incentives for prices, involving ef- 
forts to see how we can do the things we 
must do consistent with maintaining envi- 
ronmental standards that are important to 
us, and to see how best to use the great po- 
tential and abilities we have in research and 
development to achieve these ends. So this 
is part 1 of the strategy. 

Part 2 — we all know, as you can see if you 
analyze the figures involved, that we have 
great immediate needs that are going to mean 
a considerably increased flow of imports, 
largely imports of oil. So we see that we have 
that immediate need, and our problem is to 
use the devices we have at hand so that the 
manner in which we import helps us encour- 
age domestic production and refining and 
producing capacity. 

Therefore, third, in developing in these 
two manners, we work toward self-suffi- 
ciency ; and thereby as we approach it, we 
have the impact of making imports more 
reasonable in price and making us less vul- 
nerable to possible interruptions to them. 

That is the overall strategy. There are a 
great many items in the energy message. 
You have had it and looked at it, and I 
won't attempt to go through it all, because 
it is lengthy and detailed and technical. Let 
me just mention a few items and then we will 
have questions. 

First of all, on the Oil Import Program, 
this is a program that has gradually be- 
come obsolete. It has become the subject of 
annual realignments. It has had frequent al- 
terations to meet immediate needs and has 
the character of something that by this time 
has a patchwork quality to it ; and that fact 
has led to a lot of uncertainty in people's 
minds in government, industry, and else- 
where about its future course, and that un- 
certainty is bad from the standpoint of 
developing our own domestic resources. 


Departmenf of State Bulletin 


Therefore the President lias decided to 
make a very substantial change in the sys- 
tem, and this work was done under the 
chairmanship of William Simon, the Deputy 
Secretary of the Treasury, who is also Chair- 
man of the Oil Policy Committee. 

The change involves, first, the elimination 
of (juantitative restrictions on imports of oil ; 
second, a movement to a license-fee system 
for imports — and the structure of those fees 
is listed in the material that you have, a sort 
of two-tier structure which, on the one hand, 
is a transitional phasing that will protect 
consumer prices and at the same time help 
maintain the position of independent refiners 
and others who have developed in part in 
response to the current system, and with 
special arrangements for people such as those 
in the petrochemical industry who bring in 
feedstock and then export it out. 

So that represents a major change in the 
oil import system ; and the fact that we ex- 
pect to see substantial imports suggests the 
importance, in the sense of integration of this 
package the President is presenting, of the 
material on deepwater ports, which also is 
listed in your material. 

Second, by way of stimulating domestic 
production, we note that 40 percent of the 
estimated reserves of oil and gas of the 
United States are in the outer continental 
shelf, so the President is putting forward 
here an aggressive program designed to 
triple the annua] leases by 1979 so that we 
put ourselves in the position of taking ad- 
vantage of these gi-eat reserves and that we 
do so consistent, again, with environmental 

We will see in the gulf coast expansion of 
leasing beyond the 200-meter water depth ; 
in the Pacific we will resume leasing beyond 
the Channel Islands based on individual en- 
vironmental as.sessment. This will always be 

In the Atlantic and in the Alaska C.ulf, we 
will have a study led by the Council on En- 
vironmental Quality (CEQ), which we ex- 
pect to see completed in a year, and which 
will, we hope, enable us to move forward 

I migiit say in connection with the desire 
to stimulate genuine exploration in this coun- 
try, the President is also proposing the ap- 
plication of the principle of the investment 
tax credit to this area, and we would propose 
a t;ix credit for exploration, and we believe 
we can define exploration adequately on the 
iiasis of 7 percent for a dry hole and 12 per- 
cent for a wet hole. That is, we are going 
to pay off more highly for success. On the 
other hand, you must encourage risk taking; 
and that means when somebody takes a risk 
and it doesn't pan out, they also should be 
taken account of. 

Beyond this, we have the Alaska pipeline. 
The identified reserves in Alaska, if turned 
into a flow, would be the equivalent of a third 
of our current imports, just to give an idea 
of the importance of what is in Alaska, and 
I lielieve myself that there are good grounds 
for thinking that these identified reserves do 
not represent the full amount that is there. 
And so I think this right-of-way legislation 
that is now up is of great importance, and 
the President strongly supports that and we 
must get this Alaska pipeline built. 

In the field of natural gas we have another 
type of example. Here is a fuel that is our 
best fuel from the standpoint of the envi- 
ronment, and yet we have priced it at such 
a level that on the one hand we encourage 
relatively inefficient use and on the other 
hand we discourage the enlargement of our 

It is basically a price problem, and so the 
President is proposing competitive — as dis- 
tinct from regulated — price treatment of new 
natural gas with a reservation that the Sec- 
retary of the Interior can a ceiling 
according to certain criteria if it looks as 
though it is necessary. 

Now, I might just say, from the stand- 
point of the consumer, it is important to 
note,, that it is better to have some gas 
at a higher, though reasonable, price than 
no gas at a low price. We are getting familiar 
with that kind of proposition. Beyond that, 
with the provision of this applying only to 
new gas and rolling it in, so to speak, to the 
distribution system, you have the price eff"ect 
as far as the consumer is concerned, very 

May 7, 1973 


gradual. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
the wellhead price is less than 20 percent of 
the delivered price. In other words, a very 
high proportion of this price is represented 
in transportation and distribution costs. 

On the subject of research and develop- 
ment, I think here the important thing is our 
posture; that is, here we have an important 
problem. We are going to address it with an 
aggressive research and development pro- 
gram, and we must be willing, as it says in 
the message, to spend the money that can be 
effectively used in this area. And as we de- 
velop and find effective ways to use the 
money, then we will look around and we will 
find the money. 

Now, there has been a very rapid buildup 
in R. & D. expenditures in the energy field 
on the part of the Federal Government, and 
no doubt that will continue. We must, how- 
ever, not just simply throw a lot of money 
out there, but have a good idea of what that 
money is going to be spent for and have a 
sense that it is going to be spent effectively. 

I would say also in connection with the R. 
& D. efforts that it is important for us to 
organize this in such a way that we have a 
balance between the private sector and the 
public sector as we address this problem. A 
billion dollars or so per year are spent by the 
private sector in this area, R. & D. in this 
field, and it is very important to keep that 
alive and keep a good interaction between 
public and private efforts and not have the 
Federal Government just come in and sort 
of preempt the field. 

So, this research effort would apply, among 
other things, to other areas, the coal gasifi- 
cation and liquefication areas, the problem 
with coal of taking this tremendously abun- 
dant source we have — we have plenty of coal 
to last us practically forever, if we can learn 
how to mine it consistent with our environ- 
mental concerns and if we can learn how to 
use it consistent with our environmental con- 
cerns. It is there. And the question is how do 
we exploit that resource effectively, and there 
are measures proposed here. 

Or you take the field of atomic energy. 
There are many problems, strong research 
there. One of the problems we have is that 

if you take the same company to build a 
plant and the same specifications for the 
plant and you tell that company to build 
the plant in Japan or western Europe, they 
can do it in half the time that they can do 
it here — the same company, the same plant. 
Why ? Because we have a very complex set of 
administrative arrangements and appeals 
procedures and so forth that just delay 
everything and will even delay things when 
a plant is built and ready to go critical and 
there it sits held up. 

So, we must take measures to allow our- 
selves to use the abilities that we have in 
this area, again consistent with the concerns 
that these procedures represent, but let's 
clean up the procedures so they can be gone 
through in a more rapid and decisive 

Well, these are a picking and choosing 
among a great many areas that are men- 
tioned in the energy message. And as was 
suggested, I am surrounded here by Charles 
DiBona, who is our person heading the staff 
work on this in the Executive Office of the 
President, and William Simon, who is Chair- 
man of the Oil Policy Committee, and if you 
will address your questions to one of them 
and let me off easy, I will appreciate it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ire have a question 
which I think is appropriate for you. It has 
to do with taxes. What do you estimate the 
reventie cost of the investment credit ex- 
ploration woidd he, and hoiv do you feel in 
principle about diminishing the tax incentive 
for exploration abroad? 

Secretary Shidtz: We talked about ex- 
ploration abroad when we discussed the 
trade bill, and you see what we are doing 
here is in effect trying to shift the balance 
of incentives and say to our companies, "We 
are changing this, and we think it is better 
to give you an incentive to explore here than 
it is to explore abroad." 

So, we are trying to shift that balance. 
These amounts are significant, although 
they are not overwhelming. I think the 
estimated impact of the investment tax 
credit application that I mentioned here this 
morning is on the order of $60 million, I 


Department of State Bulletin 

believe, ami I don't offhand havo tlio impact 
of the other side of it. 

Q. Sixty tnillion dollars ttext year, but in 
the future hoic much icould it be? 

Secretory ShuHz: Well, it is a little hard 
to tell, but that is our estimate based on 
1973 income levels, but it is sort of a full- 
year basis, it isn't on the basis of some part 
year. But, at any rate, this is all part of 
a consistent pattern that we started unfold- 
ing with the trade bill, that we are continu- 
ing to unfold, to tie all these subjects togrether 
and go about this in an integrated manner, 
and we will have more to say in this general 
area as we bring forth our general tax pro- 

Q. Secretary Shultz, recognizing the com- 
plexity of these proposals and the affected 
air quality and everything else, do you have 
any idea hoir this ivoidd affect the consumer 
if all of these pi-oposals toere adopted, would 
the energy crisis tend to rise or increase or 

Secretary Shultz: From the standpoint of 
the consumer, if these proposals are adopted, 
he and she will have more energy at lower 
prices than they would if the proposals 
were not adopted. 

Now, I think that we obviously will see, 
for instance, in the case of natural gas, 
higher prices. And the question is. What 
would happen if we didn't do this? We would 
not exploit the supply of resources that we 
have. We would continue to use it in an 
uneconomic way. Our reserves are going 
down pretty fast, and pretty soon we 
wouldn't have any. 

So, I think that the intere.sts of the con- 
sumer are very well served by these pro- 
posals, even though I think we all must face 
up to the fact that energy costs are going to 
rise, in part because those costs will reflect 
the thrust of the environmental concerns 
that are in effect imposed on the production 
and consumption of energy. 

Secretary Peterson [former Secretary of 
Commerce Peter G. Peterson], I think, ex- 
pres.sed this all very well in a clever 
a few months ago. He said, "Popeye has run 

out of cheap spinach." and that is about 
what it has come down to. 

Q. What effect tvill the President's actions 
today have on the current gasoline shortage, 
Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Shultz: Well, they will help to 
meet any shortages that have developed or 
may develop by removing all quantitative 
restrictions on imports, by setting a struc- 
ture for the industry to operate on with 
respect to imports, with respect to our inten- 
tions on the outer continental shelf, with 
respect to the investment tax credit, and so 
on. The industry will be encouraged to 
import, as it can, and to produce a balanced 
structure of supply. So, I think this will be 
helpful, although we do face some important 
potential problems there. 

Q. Mr. Secreta7-y, on the subject of im- 
ports, what is the latest projection of im- 
ports by the end of this; decade, taking into 
account the proposals here? 

Secretary Shultz: Well, the proposals here 
will affect that in important ways, and 
just quantitatively how much will depend of 
course on how rapidly we can move forward 
on the outer continental shelf, whether we 
can get the Alaska pipeline promptly, what 
happens to the supply response as far as 
natural gas is concerned, and our R. & D. 
efforts, and so on. 

There are a lot of question marks here, and 
I think that the point is that if we do noth- 
ing, our need to import will rise very rapidly. 
It is going to rise anyway, and the thing 
to do is to get cracking on as many workable 
significant things as we can and reduce this 
dependence on imports as rapidly as we can. 

I don't want to try to fix a precise number, 
in other words. 

Q. You talked about tradeoff of energy 
versus price, Mr. Secretary, but there is also 
a clear implication here of what seems to 
be another very important tradeoff — that is, 
energy versus environment — which seems to 
be implicit in the need for high-sulphur oil 
and expanded offshore drilling and so forth. 
What, in a nntshell, is the n dm inist ration's 
philosophical position on this tradeoff in any 

May 7, 1973 


unresolvable crunch between energy and en- 
vironment ? 

Secretary Shtdtz: I think that the objec- 
tive, of course, is to work with all of our 
ingenuity and research and so forth to see 
how we can do the things that we must do 
on the energy side, how we can do those 
things in a way that meets the environ- 
mental conditions that we must do every- 
thing we can to meet. 

So, to a degree, we try to avoid the trade- 
off by solving the problem. On the other 
hand, there are certain things — for example, 
in the area of coal, we have primary 
standards and we have secondary standards. 
The primary standards reflect health and 
safety. Now, I think it is a fair question, 
and in the message the President puts it to 
the States on this, to postpone the impact 
of the secondary standards in the interest of 
using the coal that we have. Now, that does 
not bother anybody's health and safety. 

So I think we have to face up to some of 
these tradeoffs and take them one by one 
and be concerned with the environment and 
also be concerned with the energy that we 
need and the prices that we can afford to 
pay and regard these things as a balanced 
proposition. We certainly have no intention 
whatever of letting up in the effort to im- 
prove the quality of the environment. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you consider making 
any stronger recommendMions than you did 
to limit the consumption of energy, such as 
smaller cars, or less horsepower, rather than 
just these labeling proposals and insulation 
of homes? 

Secretary Shultz: There is a combination 
of ongoing things that are beefed up here. 
There is an Office of Energy Conservation 
proposed in the Department of the Interior, 
and I think what we are trying to give is 
a sense of an ongoing effort to address this 
problem. And no doubt there will be further 

The question of the horsepower of cars 
is one that we have thought about and have 
been working on, and we do not have a pro- 

posal on that at this point. I think this is an 
area, incidentally, where that saying that I 
think the environmental groups brought for- 
ward very effectively, is quite apt, "We have 
met the enemy and it is us." And to a certain 
extent this conservation effort is a question 
of everybody trying to do with a little less, 
and it is a voluntary proposition, basically. 
For example, I understand that the aver- 
age home in the United States is about five 
degrees warmer in the wintertime than it is 
in the summertime nowadays. That is an 
interesting little juxtaposition of people's 
preference on temperature. Far be it from 
me to suggest, and I am not suggesting in 
any way, that we should try to impose any- 
thing on anybody in that regard, but people 
might think it over and wonder if they 
couldn't keep their houses a little bit warmer 
in the summer and cooler in the winter. 

Q. Do you have a target date for Atlantic 
coast lease sale? 

Secretary Shultz: The CEQ lead study, 
we expect, can be completed within a year, 
and we expect out of that study to have 
reflected properly on all aspects of that 
problem including the environmental prob- 
lem and then be ready to move forward. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that we might 
have to rely on increased imports to handle 
the gasoline shortage this summer — 

Secretary Shultz: We will have to have 
increased imports as we go along. We know 

Q. My question is, Why are the initial fees 
so high for imported refined gasoline? 

Secretary Shultz: Well, they aren't, and 
I appreciate your question. I believe Secre- 
tary Simon is going to brief in detail on the 
oil import quota right after this, but there 
is now a tariff on imports, all imports. There 
are also lots of quota tickets outstanding. 
Imports with those quota tickets pay that 

Now, what we are doing is eliminating the 
tariff and instituting the license-fee system. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The license fee applies to imports that do 
not take place in connection with a quota 
ticket. A (luota ticket holder gets his import 
without paying the fee. 

Now, there are a very laige number of 
tickets outstanding right now. we believe 
enough to pretty much handle the imports 
that we will need this year. 

Therefore in the way this is constructed. 

as it unfolds over time, we in effect are 

I reducing the tariff on any import for the 

balance of 1973 to zero, or for all practical 

purposes that way, and then it will build u]). 

Now, we are balancing here longrun and 

1) shortrun considerations and we have tried 

' to work that into the system, and I think 

Secretary Simon has done a very ingenious 

job of it, and his colleagues. 

So, as this unfolds we will give encourage- 
ment to domestic exploration and production 
by the differential in the license fees, we 
will give encouragement to i-efinery produc- 
tion in the United States, in building, which 
is badly needed, by the two-tier fee system ; 
that is, one on crude and the other on prod- 
uct. So that is the way that would unfold. 

Q. What are the prospects voiv for a 
major arrangement to import liquefied 
'latural gas from the Soviet Union? It is 
not mentioned anyplnce. 

Secretary Shultz: That is a long-term 
proposition that is being studied by officials 
of the Soviet Union and several of our 
companies; and it is, I think, promising, but 
there is a tremendous amount of work yet 
to be done to see whether it is really feasible. 

What it comes down to is, we know the 
gas is there, so the question is how much is 
it going to cost to get it and get it out and 
get it here in comparison with other sources 
of fuel, including natural gas here; that is, 
what will happen to the supply of natural 
gas from domestic sources if the price in- 
creases significantly? We know that will 
bring in more supply. 

We know there is supply there, but it 
cannot be brought out unless the costs that it 
takes to get that more costly gas are reflected 

in the price. Now, how elastic the supply is 
you can find experts debating about very 
hotl.v, and it is probably well for us to make 
a conservative assumption and not expect 
the moon to arrive on the platter, but at any 
rate, these are some of the uncertainties 
involved. We are pursuing that and it is 
promising, but a lot of questions have to be 

Q. Can you give us any feel for the initial 
reaction of the congressional leadership that 
urns briefed today on the legislative pro- 

Secretary Shultz: Many of the proposals 
are similar to proposals now being processed, 
and in that sense, of course, they are part 
of an ongoing process. People are taking 
positions on them. I think there is by this 
time almost a universal acknowledgment 
that we have a problem of serious propor- 
tions. We don't have a crisis, in the sense 
that w-e have a terrific supply of energy here, 
but we could work ourselves into one very 
easily unless we take some positive policy 
actions along the lines of the President's 

Of course, the individuals in the leadership 
who were here will speak for themselves. I 
thought, on the whole, it was a constructive 
meeting. A number of suggestions were 
made, and the President's mood, I would 
note, is that when he hears a suggestion of 
something that somehow we didn't seem to 
have included as prominently as we might, 
he says to me or he says to Mr. DiBona or 
Mr. Simon, "Let's get after that. Talk with 
the Senator, talk with the Congressman, and 
let's work on that and see what can be done." 

In other words, there is a positive, ag- 
gressive thrust to solve a problem here, and 
it seemed to me that was the general tenor 
of everybody's stance. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvill the changed import 
program be sufficient to head off serious 
shortages in oil and gas over the next year 
to two years, this very crucial period? 

Secretary Shtdtz: It will be very helpful. 

May 7, 1973 


and I do not think anyone knows precisely 
what will happen. It is certainly going to be 
helpful to us, and we hope will resolve the 
problems. Prices will be higher, but we still 
have problems, and I don't want to say that 
there are none. 

You always are operating with a certain 
amount of uncertainty on these things. I 
remember when we opened up on beef, every- 
body said, well, that was okay, but nothing 
would happen, and the fact is, we have 20 
percent more imports so far this year than 
we had last year. So something happened. 

I think these incentives and so on, if you 
will reflect on them, do work, and we hope 
that they do in this case. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to that, since 
you brought up meat, it is very appropriate. 
I was toondering — 

Secretary Shultz: Oh, dear; I am sorry 
I brought it up. [Laughter.] That is a source 
of energy, too, isn't it — a different kind? 

Q. Right, and in view of the administra- 
tion's efforts to increase plantings by 
farmers, and the problems of shortages of 
diesel and gasoline in farm States, how is 
this program today going to help meet the 
shortrun, very immediate needs of those 
areas ? 

Secretary Shtdtz: Well, it helps, and I 
think the thrust of bringing in imports, the 
way in which the new oil import control 
system is arranged in order to give the 
holders of quota tickets something of value 
that they can exchange for crude and bring 
that in to the independent refiners, which 
have served some of those markets — not ex- 
clusively by a long shot, but they have played 
an important part — all of this will help and 
provides an additional reason for getting 
going on this. 

The effective date, incidentally, of the 
change in the Oil Import Program is May 1. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivoidd you outline the 
pieces that probably will go into the pro- 
posed legislation for the Department of 

Energy and Natural Resources? There is no 
outline in the material about what would go 

Mr. Ziegler: Without trying to describe in 
detail something that hasn't been fully 
settled, I cannot. I would say that it will be 
broadly similar to the proposal the President 
made two years ago, except that there will be 
a greater emphasis on the energy problem, 
both in sort of explicit content and in spirit, 
than one saw there. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your position 
on use of Federal authority to allocate sup- 
plies of gasoline or heating oil if there are 
shortages? There is nothing about that in 
this message, is there? 

Secretary Shultz: I believe that under the 
emergency preparedness legislation — do you 
want to respond to what authorities you 
have on this? 

Darrell Trent (Acting Director, Office of 
Emergency Preparedness): The authorities 
are that it is necessary, first of all, to have a 
disruption in the needs for the defense sector 
of the economy to such an extent that it is 
necessary to allocate from the civilian side 
of the economy to the defense side. Only 
after this is satisfied in the Defense Reduc- 
tion Act is it possible to move further with 
allocations in rationing on the civil side of 
the economy. 

Q. Is that adequate authority to deal with 
the impending situation? That is the 

Secretary Shultz: We think that we are 
all right. We have a rather perverse situa- 
tion all the time. There is an effort to thi'ust 
authority upon the President in this area, 
and it may be that that will succeed. We hope 
that the measures taken will obviate the need 
for that, and we certainly will lean on people 
a little bit to get reasonable allocations, and 
we have done some of that, and there seems 
to be a response. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you say this 
program differs from what the oil and the 


Department of State Bulletin 

(/fl.s- (Did the coal companies hare been aslcinp 

Secretary Shultz: I think one of the 
interestinp thinps is that the various in- 
dustry jri'oups ask for difl'ercnt things. The 
coal people will say. "You should place more 
emphasis on coal." and so on and so on. I 
believe what is happening, though, is a 
greater and greater sense, all around — in 
government, in the executive, in the Con- 
gress, among the industry groups, consumer 
groups, environmental groups — a recogni- 
tion that there is a general jiroblem, and 
that we have to work at it, both in the sense 
of taking fuel by fuel and working at that 
i)ut also in the sense of examining all of 
the crosscurrents that exist among these 
different ones. 

But as to listing all the proposals that 
I^eople from the various industry groups 
have made, and then contrasting, I wouldn't 
be able to begin that. It would be such an 
exhau.stive thing. 

The Press: Thank yon, gentlemen. 


Special Committee on Energy 
AND National Energy Office 

This Administration is determined to continue to 
develop a more comprehensive, integrated national 
ener^ policy to meet the emerRing enerjry chal- 
ienge. Many steps have been taken toward that end, 
including measures to increase domestic production 
of all forms of energy without violating our natural 
environment, to conserve the energy we produce, to 
better utilize our current resources, and to use our 
vast scientific and technological capacities to develop 
new sources and new forms of energy. I have now 
determined that in order to protect and promote the 
interests of the people of the United States as energy 
users, and to coordinate the policies of the executive 
branch in this area, it is necessary to establish a 
Sppcial Committee on Energy and a National Energy 

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority 
vested in me as President of the United States by 
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it 
is hereby ordered as follows : 

Special Committee on Energy 
Section 1. Three Assistants to the President, John 

v. Ehrlichnian, Henry A. Kissinger, and George P. 
Shultz, shall constitute a Special Committee on En- 
ergy. The Director of the National Energy Office 
shall perform his functions under this order in ac- 
cordance with policies and guidance provided him 
by the Special Committee. 

Extablishmcnt of the Office 
Sec 2. There is hereby established in the Execu- 
tive Office of the President a National Energy 
Office. The Office shall be under the immediate su- 
pervision and direction of a Director who shall be 
designated by the President. The Director shall re- 
port to the President through the Special Com- 
mittee on Energy. 

Functions of the Director 
Sec. 3. (a). The Director shall advise the Presi- 
dent, through the Special Committee on Energy, with 
respect to all Federal energy programs, activities, 
and related matters. 

(b) The Director shall recommend policies and 
guidelines pertaining to energy matters for all en- 
ergy related programs within the Executive Branch. 
To the maximum extent permitted by law. Federal 
officers and Federal departments and agencies shall 
cooperate with the Director in carrying out his 
functions under this Order. 

(c) In addition, the Director shall — 

(1) assure the development of comprehensive 
plans and programs to insure the availability of 
adequate and dependable supplies of energy; 

(2) assure that Federal energy policy is properly 

(3) evaluate all such programs; 

(4) advise the heads of departments and agencies 
of his findings and recommendations, when appro- 

(5) make recommendations to the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget concerning pro- 
posed funding of energy programs and activities; 

(6) constitute a clearinghouse for the prompt con- 
sideration of energy problems brought to his atten- 
tion by Federal departments and agencies and by 
other public and private entities, organizations, 
agencies, or individuals; and 

(7) report, through the Special Committee on 
Energy, from time to time, to the President con- 
cerning the foregoing. 

(/hjL^ ^^K^:/^ 

the WHITEHOUSE, April IS, 1973. 

' .38 Fed Reg. 9657. 

May 7, 1973 


Presidents Nixon and Thieu Hail 
"Land to the Tiller" Program 

Following is an exchange of letters between 
President Nixon and President Nguyen Van 
Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam. 

White House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated April 2 


March 24, 1973. 

Dear Mr. President: I very much ap- 
preciate your warm message of March 20 
which described the achievements of the 
"Land to the Tiller" program and expressed 
the gratitude of the Vietnamese people for 
our assistance in this great work of social 
reform and economic development. 

With deep interest and satisfaction, I 
learned from your letter that on March 26 
your country will celebrate the fulfillment of 
its three-year goal of redistributing titles 
for one million hectares of land to tenant 
farmers under the "Land to the Tiller" pro- 
gram. This program, I know, is one of the 
most ambitious and far-reaching land dis- 
tribution programs undertaken by any coun- 
try in recent times. It will ultimately benefit 
over one million rural families in South Viet- 
nam and should virtually eliminate farm ten- 
ancy. The fact that this program has been 
completed under the difficult war-time con- 
ditions of the past three years makes the 
accomplishment that much more admirable. 
This program also represents tangible evi- 
dence of concern for and responsiveness to the 
needs of the people and encourages us to look 
with confidence to the future of your coun- 
try as it pursues its goals of a lasting and 
fruitful peace. 

On behalf of the American people, I con- 
gratulate the government and the people of 
the Republic of Vietnam on the success of 
this land reform endeavor. Americans are 
pleased to have cooperated with Vietnamese 
in this historic undertaking. 

In the postwar period, we look forward 
with equal interest to joining your govern- 

ment and people in the important task of 
reconstruction and long-term economic de- 


Richard Nixon. 
letter from president thieu 

March 20, 1973. 

Dear Mr. President: March 26th, 1973 marks 
the third anniversary of the signing of the "Land 
to the Tiller" law in the Republic of Vietnam. On 
this memorable occasion, I take pleasure in com- 
municating to you the highlights of our land reform, 
one of the top priority programs for the welfare 
of the rural people. This also constitutes, in my view, 
an important aspect of the social and economic 
revolution, in the present ideological contest in 

Upon the promulgation of the "Land to the 
Tiller" law in 1970, I pledged to distribute free 
of charge 1,000,000 hectares (approximately 2.5 
million acres) of land in three years to 800,000 
tenant farmers who actually tilled the land. To 
date, 1,003,353 hectares of land have been distribu- 
ted to 858,821 former tenant farmers. Our planned 
goal has been achieved and surpassed. 

The "Land to the Tiller" program has reduced 
farm tenancy from around 60 percent three years 
ago to almost the vanishing point. It has thus 
undercut the main theme of communist propaganda 
vis-a-vis the rural population. 

Our farmers have not been merely passive re- 
cipients of government largesse but have enthu- 
siastically participated in the program to improve 
their lives. They are using the additional income 
from the sale of crops formerly paid in rent to 
develop the rural economy, thus contributing to 
the growth of the nation. Our farmers have now 
a new sense of personal worth and dignity and 
have become masters of their destiny, free men 
with reasons to preserve their freedom. 

These accomplishments are attributable, in no 
small measure, to the dedicated support and co- 
operation of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and 
the American AID Mission staff in Vietnam and 
to the financial assistance of the American people 
through your government. 

For this, I would like to convey, on behalf of 
the Vietnamese people, our deep gratitude to you, 
and through you to the people of the United States 
of America. 

I wish also to express the hope that the Govern- 
ment of the Republic of Vietnam will continue to 
have help and support from your government and 
people to not only complete the land reform pro- 


Department of State Bulletin 

pram but to help carry forward vigorously the 
implementation of the five-year rural economic 
development plan, which will solidify and build on 
the tremendous benefits of land distribution, and 
of our postwar reconstruction plan which is to 
heal the wounds of war and to promote development 
and prowth in an era of peace. 
Sincerely yours, 

NGirvEN Van Thieu. 

y Prime Minister Lee of Singapore 
Visits Washington 

Pnme Minister Lee Kiuin Yew of Singa- 
pore met with President Nixon and other 
(jovernment officials at Washington during a 
jirivate visit to the United States March 
25-April 11. Follon'ing is an exchange of 
toasts between President Nixon and Prime 
Minister Lee at a dinner at the White House 
f April 10. 

Wftkly ronipilatlon of Prpsideotlal Documents dated April 10 


Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Vice President, 
ladies and ofentlemen: We have welcomed 
many distinguished ofuests in this room, and 
I would say that none is more deserving of 
our respect and of being honored, as we 
honor him tonight, than the Prime Minister 
and. I may say, his wife. 

I recall the occasions that we have met 
previously in his country and also here, and 
I recall also the enormous impression that 
the Prime Minister has made on various 
emissaries from the United States who 
have visited his country. The Vice President 
and Mrs. Agnew have had the ojjportunity to 
visit Singapore, Secretary Rogers and Mrs. 
Rogers. I have not, since coming into this 

I think perhaps the best summary of the 
attitude of all of those who have visited Singa- 
pore during the past three to four years, 
since I have been having rather regular re- 
ports on the situation, was when Secretary 

("oniially returned from his trip around the 
world when he was Secretary of the Treas- 
ury. He came into my office and said, "Singa- 
I)ore is the best run country in the world." 
And here is the man who runs it. 

I would add to that, however, by saying 
that the best run country in the world could 
mean a country that was run very well with- 
out freedom, because I suppose that if you 
look at countries around the world those that 
have the least obvious problems are those 
that have no freedom and therefore it would 
be the best run. 

And the Prime Minister tonight deserves 
our honor and our respect because in this 
relatively new country, with a very old his- 
tory and a very able people, he has been able 
to run it well, but run it with respect for the 
great traditions of freedom which our two 
countries both adhere to, and for this we all 
of course hold him in very high regard. 

On the two previous occasions he has been 
here since I have been in this office, he came 
alone, and consequently on one occasion we 
had a stag dinner. This time, fortunately, he 
brought Mrs. Lee with him. Now, I had read 
-something about their courtship. I knew 
that, like Secretary Rogers and Mrs. Rogers, 
they had gone to school together, they had 
both graduated from law school in the same 
class, and so tonight, very early in the 
evening, when you saw me turning to Mrs. 
Lee, I said, "Mrs. Lee, tell me, is it true that 
you were number one in the class at Cam- 
bridge Law School and your husband was 
number two?" And she said, "Mr. President, 
do you think he would have married me if 
that were the case?" 

But I probed further, and I found that, as 
a matter of fact, Mrs. Lee, our distinguished 
guest, did receive a first at Cambridge Law 
School. Her husband did also, but like a very 
loyal wife, she said, "He had a first with a 
star after his name, and that is something 
very special." 

But the purpose of that is simply to say 
that we are very happy here to welcome our 

May 7, 1973 


distinguished guests because of tiieir per- 
sona! qualities, because of their great ability, 
and because of the leadership they have given 
to their own country. 

I would only add this: In the talks that I 
have had with the Prime Minister, in 1967 
when we first met — at a time that neither 
he nor I had any idea that we would be meet- 
ing again today in this place — but in any 
event, in 1967 when we first met, on the other 
two occasions, what has impressed me enor- 
mously has been his profound understanding 
not just of his own country and not just of 
Southeast Asia, of which his own country is 
a very important part, but of the entire 
world scene. In other words, we honor tonight 
and we welcome here a world statesman of 
the first rank who has contributed, with his 
intelligence, with his understanding, to all of 
us in helping us to develop the kinds of pol- 
icies that will maintain a world in which 
freedom can survive for larger countries like 
the United States and for smaller countries 
like Singapore. 

There is no more articulate and intelligent 
spokesman for what I would call free soci- 
eties in the world than the Prime Minister of 
Singapore, and for that I'eason I know all of 
you will want to join me in raising your 
glas-ses to Prime Minister Lee : Prime Min- 
ister Lee. 


Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies 
and gentlemen: It is always a mild embar- 
rassment when I receive such lavish praise. 
They say I run Singapore well. Well, it makes 
me worried because I am away so long and 
it is still running. It disproves the thesis that 
I am the man that makes it run. 

It is a great pleasure and a privilege, as 
you have mentioned, Mr. President, to have 
shared several occasions we have had to- 
gether, particularly that memorable one 
when you were just an American citizen and 
not the President of the United States. 

My wife and I would like to thank Mrs. 
Nixon and you for the great warmth and 

friendship with which we are being received 
and for this dinner which you have arranged 
in our honor. 

Perhaps it may be appropriate if I were 
to mention that when you were just an 
American citizen, we could speak more can- 
didly, even brusquely, and now the courtesies 
of oflice sometimes have to muffle some of 
the rougher edges. 

But few, I think, could have dared to pre- 
dict the tenacity with which you have pur- 
sued your declared policies of negotiations 
with the great Communist powers instead 
of confrontation. Even fewer have dared pre- 
dict the hopeful results that have emerged. 
But none could have dared to hope that even 
once you carried on these negotiations with 
both Peking and Moscow, you steadily, sys- 
tematically, disengaged American troops 
from Viet-Nam in such an orderly fashion 
that instead of a rout which so many people 
predicted would happen when there were too 
few to defend themselves, they ceremoniously 
furled up their flags and departed, leaving 
not chaos out of which a revolutionary move- 
ment would have seized power, but the 
South Vietnamese Government very much 
in charge. 

As one who has not been in America in 
recent months, I had expected to meet a Pres- 
ident of the United States who had become 
remote and a recluse. [Laughter.] I must say 
I was greatly relieved to find that I did not 
have such a forbidding figure to meet. 

Well, it was Southeast Asia's good fortune 
that there was a President in America who 
considered it his primary purpose to dis- 
charge his onerous responsibilities to Amer- 
ica and to the world, and this fortune could 
be turned to permanent gains if, after the 
thumping majority that you obtained last 
November, Mr. President, you could com- 
plete your second term, complete the hope- 
ful beginnings that you initiated in your 

In the last few days in this country, I have 
discovered that any statement, any argument, 
however dispassionate, however blandly 


Department of State Bulletin 

couched, which can be faintly directly or in- 
directly construed as in su])))ort of or in sym- 
pathy with any of the hopes, policies, or 
aspirations of this administration finds very 
scant si)ace in the mass media. [Laughter.] 
So I was sorely tempted to couch my argru- 
ments in (luerulous, tendentious terms in or- 
der to get that scant space. 

But ijerhaps there is more benefit in fol- 
lowing your example, Mr. President, of the 
detached — the cultivated detachment of mind 
which enables you to pursue what is right in 
the long run, never mind what it is in the 
short run, whether it wins rapturous ap- 
plause or otherwise. 

I was privileged this morning to hear your 
frank overview of America's position vis-a- 
vis Asia, not just Southeast Asia, and placed 
in the context of the whole world, a global 
I)erspective. You were kind enough to make a 
reference to my outlook on these matters. 
Weil, I have to. 

We are a very small country placed stra- 
tegically at the southernmost tip of Asia, and 
when the elephants are on the rampage, if 
you are a mouse there and you don't know 
the habits of the elephants, it can be a very 
painful business. [Laughter.] 

I was encouraged that you believed that 
this new balance, new world order in which 
there is greater peace, greater prosperity, 
could be achieved not by America in isolation, 
but with the participation of America's allies, 
in particular western Europe and Japan, and 
of course jjarticularly that there should be 
fairer and more equal terms of trade. 

Now, if this negotiating package can be 
settled, and if that can be matched in nego- 
tiations with both the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China for a steady and 
a stable continuing detente, then peace and 
prosperity without war is not just an Amer- 
ican dream but a world vision of the future, 
reassuring for all mankind who have to live 
in this ever smaller, more interrelated, and 
more interdependent world. 

I believe I now understand you better, 
what you meant when you stated over tele- 
vision, if I may paraphrase you, that you had 

to have a strong America if you were going 
to get concessions, for only a strong America 
can make concessions in return. 

May I express this hoiie that in your sec- 
ond term you will be able to complete the 
new chapter which you have started in your 
first term through the policies which you 
initiated with great promise. 

And now, ladies and gentlemen, may I ask 
you to di-ink with me to the health of the 
President of the United States: Mr. Presi- 

Letters of Credence 

Costa Rica 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Costa Rica, Marco Antonio Lo- 
l)ez Aguero, presented his credentials to 
President Nixon on April 9. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated April 9. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Dahomey, Tiamiou Adjibade, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on April 9. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated 
April 9. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran, 
Ardeshir Zahedi, presented his credentials 
to President Nixon on April 9. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated April 9. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Is- 
rael, Simcha Dinitz, presented his credentials 
to President Nixon on April 9. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated April 9. 

May 7, 1973 


Department Reports to Congress on Aspects 
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa 

Following are statements by David D. 
Newsom, Assistant Secretary for African Af- 
fairs, made before the Subcommittee on 
Africa of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on March 27 and April 6.^ 


I welcome this opportunity, as always, to 
meet with this committee to discuss aspects 
of our foreign policy relating to Africa. 

It is my understanding that the commit- 
tee seeks this week to examine U.S. business 
involvement in South Africa, Namibia, and 
the Portuguese territories in Africa. Prior 
commitments involving official visitors from 
Africa will not make it possible for me to 
meet with the committee on the two subse- 
quent days. I would like today, therefore, to 
make some general comments on our official 
policies and actions with respect to the in- 
volvement of U.S. private enterprise in these 
areas of southern Africa. Mr. [Robert S.] 
Smith, our highly qualified Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs, who has fol- 
lowed these matters particularly closely, will 
be on hand for each of the sessions. 

I am assuming that the primary interest of 
the committee in this set of hearings is in the 
extent of U.S. business involvement in each 
of these areas and our official policies relating 
to that involvement. At the base of the com- 
mittee's inquiry, I am certain, is the question 
of whether this involvement supports or 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

serves to perpetuate institutions or policies of 
racial discrimination or the continuation of 
white-minority rule in southern Africa. Con- 
versely, I would assume there is also the 
question of whether there are feasible ac- 
tions which could restrict or curtail this in- 
volvement as a means of influencing change 
in that region. 

Basic to a review of the U.S. Government's 
relationship to this issue are an understand- 
ing of the economic programs which fall 
within the scope of current governmental 
authority and a comparison of these pro- 
grams as they are ai)plied in southern Africa 
to how they may be applied in other areas. 

Specifically, these are the activities in 
which there is governmental authority to 
engage in economic programs: 

1. Under voluntary direct investment con- 
trols administered by the Department of 
Commerce, varying schedules of investment 
are permitted in different countries accord- 
ing to their level of development. Schedule A 
is the most liberal in this connection, sched- 
ule C the most restrictive. (This program 
was initiated, of course, to protect the U.S. 
balance of payments rather than to restrict 
investment per se.) 

2. The Export-Import Bank can assist 
U.S. exporters in various ways by direct 
loans, by guaranteeing bank loans, by dis- 
counting bank loans, and by extending credit 
to foreign banks to enable the latter to fi- 
nance imports from the United States. 

3. The Department of Commerce in con- 
sultation with the Department of State can 
govern the degree of official activity on be- 


Department of State Bulletin 

half of I'.S. exporters and U.S. products; 
this involves trade promotion, trade missions, 
participation in fairs, and the facilitation of 
direct contacts between U.S. businessmen 
and jirospective foreign customers. 

4. The Overseas Private Investment Cor- 
poration can offer g^uarantees and insurance 
to firms ojieratinp: in developino^ areas of the 
world. With respect to Anpola and Mozam- 
bique. OPIC does consider applications for 
insurance apainst the political risks of cur- 
rency inconvertibility and expropriation. 
These applications are referred to the De- 
jiai'tment of State for foreijm policy guid- 
ance. Otherwise OPIC is not involved 
throughout the remainder of white-domi- 
nated southern Africa. 

Xow, before dealing with each of these 
areas in turn in connection with southern 
Africa, let me briefly put U.S. investment in, 
and trade with, South Africa into perspective. 

The United States today has approximately 
SI billion in investments in South Africa, 
represented by about 300 firms. Trade with 
South Africa amounted in 1972 to .$.597.1 
million in exports; $.324.7 million in imports. 

To put the investment into perspective, 
this represents approximately 15 percent of 
total foreign investment in South Africa. 
For the United States, this represents 25 
percent of our total investment on the Af- 
rican Continent. During recent years (1968- 
71), our total investment in other parts of 
the continent has been rising at a rate of 15 
percent annually, in contrast to an annual 
increase in investment in South Africa of 
12.8 percent. 

Our trade with South Africa, similarly, 
has been rising at a lower rate than our trade 
with the rest of the continent. Further, it 
has been rising at a substantially lower rate 
than South Africa's trade with other devel- 
oped countries. Japan's trade with South 
Africa, for example, rose 171.5 percent from 
1966 to 1971. 

South Africa is, with its growing market, 
sophisticated infrastructure, and generally 
favorable climate for investment, particu- 

larly attractive to much of the U.S. private 
sector. Nevertheless, consistent with its de- 
clared policy of opposition to the apartheid 
system in South Africa, the I'nited States 
has exercised official I'estraint in the pro- 
motion of both investment and trade. 

The agencies of the U.S. Government re- 
sponsible refrain from any promotion of 
either investment or trade of the type car- 
ried out in other countries. We counsel with 
in'ospective investors on the situation in 
South Africa to be sure they understand the 
economic as well as the political and social 
conditions in that country. We neither en- 
courage them nor discourage them. We ex- 
tend neither guarantees nor insurance on 
investment noi- any official financing. South 
Africa, by the advanced nature of its econ- 
omy, is under schedule C, the most restrictive 
schedule of the foreign direct investment 

Despite the fact that we have a major 
balance of payments problem and that South 
Africa is a major and economically attractive 
market, we limit our commercial activities 
in South Africa to low^-key facilitative serv- 
ices. We do not participate in special pro- 
motions, in trade missions, or trade fairs. 
The Export-Import Bank restricts its facil- 
ities to discount loans through private banks, 
with a limit of $2 million per transaction. 
It extends insurance and guarantees but no 
credits. We have been particularly conscious 
of the implications of involvement in any 
major South African Government enter- 

As the subcommittee is aware, we adopt a 
much more restrictive i)olicy with respect to 
Namibia, particularly because of our posi- 
tion that South Africa's presence in the ter- 
ritory is illegal since the termination of its 
mandate in 1966. (The legal soundness of 
this position has subsequently been estab- 
lished authoritatively by the International 
Court of .Justice advisory opinion of June 21, 
1971.) Since May 1970, we have followed a 
policy of discouraging further American in- 
vestment in the territory and have advised 
potential investors that we will not intercede 

May 7, 1973 


to protect their investment against claims of 
a future legitimate government in the terri- 
tory. The Export-Import Bank and OPIC 
provide no facilities for activities in Namibia. 
Any American firms which have decided to 
invest there since 1970 can be presumed to 
have done so in spite of their awareness of 
U.S. policy. In this connection, I am aware 
of the subcommittee's concerns that we 
might not have reached all potential in- 
vestors to advise them of our policy. I be- 
lieve we have. We are checking the files to 
confirm this and will provide the facts for 
the record. 

We do not have complete figures on the 
total American investment in Namibia. The 
bulk of it, some $45-$50 million in the 
Tsumeb Corporation, predates the termina- 
tion of South Africa's mandate for the terri- 
tory and the announcement of our policy on 
discouraging investment there. 

U.S. investment in the Portuguese terri- 
tories amounts to about $220 million. Most 
of this is represented by the operations of 
the Cabinda Gulf Oil Corporation in Angola. 
We do not formally discourage trade and 
investment with the Portuguese territories, 
but neither do we make an effort to encour- 
age it. Despite the obvious losses to U.S. 
exporters, we have not encouraged involve- 
ment in major jjrojects in these territories. 

Mr. Chairman, I know how important this 
issue is to members of this committee and 
to many in this country concerned with the 
situation in southern Africa. I am keenly 
aware that there are two sincere points of 
view toward the relationship between our 
business involvement and change, particu- 
larly in South Africa. One calls for with- 
drawal of U.S. investment. This point of 
view believes that this would encourage 
change; some who hold this view believe that, 
even if it did not, it would at least register 
the moral indignation of this country at the 
continued existence of racial discrimination 
in South Africa and would withdraw us 
from involvement in it. The other point of 
view suggests that, if U.S. firms are to re- 

main in South Africa, they should then seek 
to have an impact through improving their 
own labor practices and their own attention 
to the social and educational needs of their 
non-white employees. 

While sharing the view that we should 
contribute to peaceful change in southern 
Africa, we in the Department do not look 
upon either withdrawal of investment or 
trade embargoes as feasible courses of ac- 
tion. Our investment in southern Africa is, in 
many cases, closely tied to South African 
corporate structures. There is a real ques- 
tion whether U.S. capital as a practical mat- 
ter could be withdrawn from South Africa* 
There is little to suggest that other major 
investing countries would follow suit; some 
would be inclined, rather, to fill the gap. Our 
experience with trade embargoes against 
even smaller countries has not been salutary. 
Also, there is a genuine question regarding 
the opinion of non-white South Africans on 
this question. We are impressed by the many 
with whom we have talked who wish U.S. 
investment to stay, provided it can positively 
promote better conditions. Finally I must 
again point out the positive balance of pay- 
ments this country enjoys through its trade 
and investment in South Africa. 

Officially, therefore, we have seen the more 
feasible exercise of influence to be through 
those U.S. firms willing actively to upgrade 
the practices and policies toward their non- 
white employees. We have been prepared to 
counsel with them generally on how this may 
be done, both in Washington and in South 
Africa. We can furnish to the committee for 
the record examples of our presentations on 
this subject. We have, further, in our con- 
sultations with other major investing coun- 
tries encouraged their attention to this issue, 
since we cannot be blind to the competitive 
aspects of extra expenditures in these areas. 
U.S. private interests are involved in a com- 
plex and controvei'sial area in southern Af- 
rica. The U.S. Government recognizes this 
and, within the limits of its authority, seeks 
to make that involvement constructive. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Opening Statement 

I' r.l.M.s.' liil ,|al.-.l April (i 

I am pleased to appear before the subcom- 
mittee today as it continues its hearings on 
the r.S. arms embargoes against South Af- 
rica and the Portuguese territories in Africa. 

Mr. Chairman, over the period of a decade 
we have maintained strict arms embargoes 
toward botii Soutii Africa and the Portuguese 
territories. We have done so as a tangible 
demonstration of our support for self-deter- 
mination and our desire to avoid any support 
for the imposition of apartheid. Our desire 
is to avoid giving encouragement to any side 
to rely on military solutions to the complex 
of southern African problems. The arms em- 
bargo policy has been reaffirmed and enforced 
by succeeding administrations since the early 
1960's. To put the significance of the embar- 
goes into perspective, I would like to empha- 
size that although the maintenance of an 
arms embargo may sound like a passive act, it 
is not. It requires constant attention to com- 
merce with the area. It means considerable 
sacrifice on the i^art of U.S. exporters who 
have seen substantial sales in southern Af- 
rica go to countries less conscientious about 
the embargo and less criticized by the Af- 

In the case of Portugal, it has been U.S. 
])olicy since 19fil, following the uprisings in 
Angola, to embargo the sale or supply of arms 
and military equipment for use in the Portu- 
guese territories in Africa. The embargo 
against arms for use in the Portuguese terri- 
tories in Africa is implemented by asking 
the Portuguese Government for formal as- 
surances that any embargoed equipment sup- 
plied to that countiy shall be used only 
within the NATO area as defined in the North 
.Atlantic Treaty. There has been no change 
in this practice since the embargo was an- 
nounced in 1961. No supportable evidence has 
ever been presented to us that such assur- 
ances have not been adhered to. 

The embargo on anns for South Africa has 

been in ett'ect in its i)resent form since 1963. 
Prior to that time the United States had ap- 
plied a more limited embargo on arms which 
could be used by vSouth Africa to enforce 
apartiieid. In announcing our embargo 
against South Africa on August 2, 1963, Am- 
bassador Stevenson stated before the United 
Nations that we would cease the sale of all 
military equipment to the Government of 
South Africa by the end of that year. He 
noted two exceptions to this general policy 
which we would be obliged to observe: We 
would have to continue to honor contracts 
which were already in existence, and w^e 
would reserve the right to interpret the pol- 
icy in the light of requirements for assuring 
the maintenance of international peace and 
security. We have not been faced with the 
necessity of invoking the latter exception. 
With regard to preexisting contracts we have 
made two exceptions to the arms embargo: 
We have permitted the continued supply of 
spare parts, maintenance information, and 
services for seven aircraft which were sold 
to the South African Air Force prior to the 
embargo, and we have permitted two small 
shipments of equipment to the South African 
Navy in connection with a sale of torpedoes 
which also predated the embargo. We are in 
the process of compiling a report on these 
transactions and will su])ply it for the record. 

In the enforcement of the South African 
embargo, the United States does not make 
distinctions with i-egard to whethei- arms are 
intended for external defense, internal de- 
fense, or the enforcement of apartheid. All 
sales of military equipment for such purposes 
are prohibited. There has been no change in 
this regard since 1963. 

In addition to arms, our embargoes include 
restrictions on the export of communications 
equipment, military vehicles, and radar 
equipment as well as a variety of other mili- 
tary equii)ment. Applications for the export 
of U.S.-manufactured components for mili- 
tary aircraft produced in third countries are 
aKso examined under the terms of the arms 
embargoes. We do not have any pending ap- 

May 7, 1973 


plications for the export of such components 
to third countries for inclusion in aircraft 
destined for South Africa. 

With these policy considerations in mind, 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to the 
specific questions you raised in your letter to 
the Department of State of March 19, 1973, 
requesting our attendance at these hearings. 

You asked about the sale of light aircraft 
to Mozambique. I understand the Department 
of Commerce has undertaken to supply in- 
formation on these transactions for the rec- 
ord, but I would like to mention here that the 
United States has licensed a variety of civil 
aircraft for sale to Mozambique, including 
the types you inquired about. In most cases 
these exports involved Export-Import Bank 
support. These exports are in conformity 
with U.S. Government policy which permits 
the sale of civilian aircraft for civilian use 
in the Portuguese territories. Prior to ap- 
proving the issuance of licenses in such trans- 
actions, we satisfy ourselves in each case that 
aircraft are destined for legitimate civilian 
use and are not likely to be diverted for mili- 
tary purposes. Some of the purposes for 
which we have licensed aircraft are telephone 
line repair, harbor supervision, and ambu- 
lance service. 

You also inquired about what guidance has 
been furnished to interested U.S. aircraft 
manufacturers in light of my announcement 
in September 1970 that we would consider 
applications for the export of limited num- 
bers of executive-type aircraft, not readily 
adaptable for combat or security purposes, 
for VIP transport by the South African mili- 
tary. Interested aircraft manufacturers are 
advised by the Department of Commerce that 
the export of light aircraft for possible mili- 
tary use would not be approved but that fa- 
vorable consideration would likely be given to 
export license applications for a reasonable 
number of executive-type transport aircraft 
to the South African defense forces if the end 
use is assured to be for executive transport 
only. To date, no such applications have been 
filed. I understand that the Department of 
Commerce has sent to the chairman a letter 
in reply to this question. 

Your letter also asked what decisions have 
come before the State Department in "gray 
areas" in the last six years. Since this in- 
volves obtaining files from past years, we will 
undertake to supply a reply for the record. 
With regard to your request for information 
on any training of the South African and 
Portuguese military and on the distribution 
of Department of Defense films to South 
Africa or Portugal, I do not believe we can 
add to the information supplied by the De- 
partment of Defense. In brief, we do not pro- 
vide military training to South Africa, and 
that given to Portugal is in fields related to 
its NATO responsibilities. 

You have raised a number of questions re- 
garding U.S. exports of herbicides. The De- 
partment of Commerce has replied to some 
of your questions and is, I believe, undertak- 
ing to supply export statistics of these sub- 
stances for the record. However, I would like 
to comment on some aspects of this question 
at this time. The United States maintains 
two types of controls over the export of herbi- 
cides. Those substances which are preferred 
for defoliant use in military operations are 
under the licensing control of the Ofiice of 
Munitions Control of the Department of 
State. In addition, two substances commonly 
called 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T are on the vali- 
dated license list maintained by the Depart- 
ment of Commerce. Applications for licenses 
to export these substances would be sub- 
jected to scrutiny under the terms of the arms 
embargoes. There has been no export of these 
substances to southern Africa for military 
purposes. There are a wide variety of agri- 
cultural herbicides which are not under spe- 
cific controls. These are substances which are 
manufactured by a large number of coun- 
tries, are available from diverse sources, and 
are in common agricultural use throughout 
the world. Portugal itself, for instance, man- 
ufactures a wide range of herbicides includ- 
ing 2, 4-D. 

We have noted Mr. Agostinho Neto's letter 
to the U.N. Secretary General charging that 
Portugal is using herbicides for defoliant use 
in military operations in Africa. We cannot 
say whether those charges are true. However, 


Department of State Bulletin 


there is no evidence or even allegations in the 
letter to the effect that herbicides under the 
control of the United States are being used 
for such purposes. 

Supplemental Stafemenf 

Since the i)re|)aration of my formal state- 
ment, I have read the transcripts of the pre- 
vious committee sessions on this subject. I 
should like to make some supplemental com- 

I think it is important to define precisely 
what we are discussing. In my view there is 
a tendency to suggest that major changes in 
U.S. policies have taken place with respect 
to the arms embargo and to suggest a level 
of support to the military efforts of South 
Africa and Portugal in Africa which is not 
substantiated by the facts. 

I believe it is clear from the statements of 
witnesses to date that the United States has 
not supplied, since the imposition of these 
embargoes, any arms or equipment of a 
strictly military character not covered by 
previously stated exceptions to either of 
these areas. I believe it is also pertinent to 
point out that the arms and military equip- 
ment on which these areas depend are sup- 
plied from Europe or are manufactured by 
the countries themselves. 

What we are discussing is that area of 
items of essentially a civilian character which 
conceivably could be adapted for use in the 
support of military operations. We are 
discussing civilian aircraft, computers, agri- 
cultural defoliants, and civilian electronic 
equipment. I do not argue that these are un- 
important to a country's ability to wage war 
or to maintain internal security. I do argue 
that, in the face of problems in our own 
aerospace industry, in the light of balance of 
]iayments problems, and in the face of severe 
competition from others, the question of 
whether restraints shall be put on the sale of 
civilian items because of their possible use 
in support of a military effort is not an easy 
one. I do stress also that, in presenting the 
problems and the decisions, we are talking 
about restraints which we place on our own 

commerce more strict than those being ap- 
I)lied by any other counti-y. Finally, I stress 
that we are not talking about those basic 
sinews of war — guns, ammunition, fighters 
and bombers, tanks, armored cars, et cetera — 
all of which, since the embargoes went into 
effect, have been supplied from non-American 

There has been much discussion about how 
we can be sure that items we have sold are 
not being used improperly. Our means, ad- 
mittedly, are not perfect. The representative 
of the Department of Defense described how 
we make use of our diplomatic missions, our 
consulates, our MAAG's [Military Assistance 
Advisory Groups] , and our attaches for these 
purposes. I should add that we have on many 
occasions said to the African nations that we 
are prei)ared at any time to examine any 
evidence they can produce that items are be- 
ing used in Africa in violation of our arms 
embargoes. I have done so several times 
publicly in Africa. The companies which 
manufacture civilian items in this country 
are also interested in seeing that they are not 
misused. I wish to repeat, further, that we 
are prepared to examine any evidence which 
any of the previous witnesses before this 
committee may wish to bring forward. To 
date we have not seen any conclusive evi- 
dence of violations of the embargoes as we 
administer them. 

I must confess, also, Mr. Chairman, to a 
certain disquiet at allegations regarding our 
policies toward southern Africa set forth by 
those who have an interest in portraying 
those policies in a certain light and at the 
repetition of such statements suggesting that 
these are in fact our i)olicies. I refer to the 
extensive statement by South Africa's Ad- 
miral Biermann [Adm. H. H. Biermann, 
Chief, South African Defense Forces] quoted 
by one witness. I would suggest that the ap- 
propriate statements of policies should come 
from those who make them and that there 
are not, as some have suggested before this 
committee, hidden areas of policy toward 
southern Africa. 

There are continuing references to NATO 
weapons. There are no NATO weapons — in 

Moy 7, 1973 


Europe, in Africa, or anywhere else. There 
are weapons manufactured by individual 
countries to agreed NATO specifications, but 
they are national weapons and the nations 
of manufacture are responsible for their dis- 
position. The United States therefore has 
neither control nor a role in the disposition of 
weapons manufactured by other nations not 
containing our components or made under 
our license, whatever the I'elationship to 
NATO standardization. 

As one who has had a major share in the 
administration of the arms embargoes over 
the past three-and-a-half years, I believe we 
have conscientiously and positively followed 
the meaning and the letter of the U.S. actions 
and of our official statements at that time. 
There have been decisions — both affirmative 
and negative — in the difficult gray area, but 
these in sum have represented a continuation 
of our basic and declared policies. While these 
policies involve other agencies, I shall be pre- 
pared in my discussions with you to admit 
to the key role of the Department of State in 
many of the decisions and to assume the re- 
sponsibility for them. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific and Technical 
Commission Holds First Meeting 

National Science 
March 21 

Foundation press release 73—131 dated 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on 
Scientific and Technical Cooperation on 
March 21 announced approval of over 25 ac- 
tion programs of direct cooperation in six 
general areas of strong mutual interest and 
benefit to both countries. The Joint Commis- 
sion also considered six additional areas for 
possible cooperation which were judged to 
offer promise of balanced and effective 

The announcement came after the first 
meeting of the Joint Commission, established 
under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Co- 
operation in the Fields of Science and Tech- 
nology; the agreement was signed during 
President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 
1972.' The cooperative effort also is expected 

to help strengthen relations between the two 

The Commission's first meeting, held in 
Washington, D.C., lasted three days and cov- 
ered a wide range of topics in addition to the 
six areas which had been originally identified 
as showing promise for direct cooperation. - 
The six areas are energy, computer applica- 
tions to management, agricultural research, 
microbiological synthesis, chemical catalysis, 
and water resources. 

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Commission is 
Dr. H. Guyford Stever, Director of the Na- 
tional Science Foundation. The Soviet Chair- 
man for this meeting was Academician V. A. 
Trapeznikov, First Deputy Chairman of the 
U.S.S.R. State Committee for Science and 
Technology (SCST). He replaced Academi- 
cian V. A. Kirillin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. 
State Committee for Science and Technology 
and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Min- 
isters of the Soviet Union, who was ill and 
unable to attend. 

The Joint Commission, which reviewed re- 
ports and recommendations of joint working- 
groups, selected five areas for priority im- 
plementation in the field of energy research 
and development. The five areas are: electric 
power systems, transmission lines, magneto- 
hydrodynamics, solar energy, and geothermal 
energy. Additional topics for cooperation will 
be selected after work is effectively under- 
way in the five priority topics. 

In the field of application of computers to 
management, the Commission decided that i 
work should be started on all five projects ! 
recommended by the joint working group. ; 
The projects are: theory of systems analysis i 
applied to economics and management; com- 1 
initer applications and software for creating ' 
system solutions for large general-purpose | 
problems in the field of management; econo-^ 
metric modeling (development of forecasting' 
models for analysis of various branches ofj 
the economy); the use of computers fori 

' For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of June 
26, 1972, p. 925. 

-For text of a record of discussions signed at I 
Washington and Moscow on July 28, 1972, see BUL-j 
LETIN of Aug. 21, 1972, p. 216. • 


Department of State Bulletir 

manapenient of large cities; and theoretical 
foundation for tiie design, development, and 
production of software. 

Three areas of agricultural research were 
declared ready for priority implementation 
by the Joint Commission. The three areas are : 
research in the field of breeding, growing, 
and protection of fai'm crojis; research on 
methods to increase production of farm ani- 
mals and poultry; and mechanization of agri- 
( ultural production. 

In the field of microbiological synthesis, it 
was decided that the U.S. side of the joint 
working group should visit the U.S.S.R. for 
further discussions with the Soviets before 
defining jiriority projects for cooperative 

Four projects in the area of water re- 
sources were selected by the Commission for 
priority imi)lementation. The projects in- 
clude: planning, utilization, and management 
of water resources; cold-weather construc- 
tion techniques; methods and means of auto- 
mation and remote control in water resource 
systems; and plastics in construction. 

In the field of chemical catalysis, the Com- 
mission decided that work should jiroceed on 
five projects recommended by the joint work- 
ing group. A catalyst is a substance which 
can change the course of a chemical reaction 
but which can be reclaimed at the end of the 
reaction. The five in-ojects are: catalysis by 
coordination complexes and organometallic 
compounds; catalytic reactor modeling; an 
in-depth study of selected catalytic systems; 
application of catalysis to life support sys- 
tems for possible use in future space explora- 
tion; and catalysis in environmental control. 

The Commission considered additional 
specific activities which had been previously 
discussed between the two sides. These in- 
clude the Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP) , 
a sym])osium on scientific and technical in- 
formation, and science policy. The Commis- 
sion reaffirmed its approval of the jiroposals 
made in October 1972 by rejiresentatives of 
the U.S. National Science Foundation and 
the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences that the 
Soviet Union will join the Deep Sea Drilling 

Project. The agreement provides that the 
Institute of Oceanology of the U.S.S.R. Acad- 
emy of Sciences will become a member of 
the Joint Oceanograi)hic Institutions for 
Deep Earth Sampling, the advisory bodv for 
the DSDP. 

In addition, the Joint Commission consid- 
ered the following areas for possible coopera- 
tion : forestry, standards and standardization, 
oceanographic research, transportation, phys- 
ics, and electrometallurgy. 

The second meeting of the Joint Commis- 
sion is scheduled to take place in the U.S.S.R. 
toward the end of 1973 at a mutually agreed 

Under the Scientific and Technical Coop- 
eration Agreement, forms of cooperation 
may include: exchange of scientists and spe- 
cialists; exchange of scientific and technical 
information; joint research, development, 
and testing, and exchange of research results 
and exijerience between scientific research 
institutions and organizations; organization 
of joint, conferences, and symposia; 
rendering of help, as api^ropriate, on both 
sides in establishing contacts and arrange- 
ments between United States firms and So- 
viet enterprises where a mutual interest 
develops; and other forms of scientific and 
technical cooperation as may be mutually 

Other American members of the Joint 
Commission are Dr. James B. Fisk, chairman 
of the board. Bell Telephone Laboratories; 
Dr. Harvey Brooks, National Academy of 
Sciences and Harvard University; Herman 
Pollack, Director of the State Department's 
Bureau of International Scientific and Tech- 
nological Affairs; Dr. Eugene Fubini, E. G. 
Fubini Consultants, Ltd.; Dr. Clarence Lar- 
son, Commissioner, Atomic Energj^ Commis- 
sion; and William Letson. General Counsel, 
Department of Commerce. 

Other Soviet members of the Commission 
are N. M. Zhavoronkov, representing the 
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; N. F. Kras- 
nov. First Deputy Minister of Higher and 
Secondary Specialized Education; and D.N. 
Pronskiy, Director of the SCST Department 
of Foreign Relations. 

May 7, 1973 


U.S.-Canada Interparliamentary 
Conference Held at Washington 

Remarks by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush' 

I greatly appreciate your kind invitation 
to be with you at the opening session of this 
15th United States-Canada Interparliamen- 
tary Conference. It is a particular pleasure 
to welcome to Washington our distinguished 
visitors from the Senate and House of Com- 
mons of Canada, who represent the 22 mil- 
lion people of our great neighbor to the 

It is most fitting that the representatives 
of the people, from both sides of the border, 
should come together from time to time to 
discuss issues of mutual concern. Some of 
these issues are global in nature; others are 
of concern primarily to our two nations. Our 
examination together of these issues in- 
evitably reflects the long history of our 
unique relationship. I know that many words 
have been devoted to semantic discussions of 
"the special relationship" between us — what 
it is, whether it exists, and so forth. I do not 
propose to add to the debate on this question. 
I would merely assert that it is abundantly 
clear that geography has placed us next to 
each other, that through decades of history 
we have lived side by side in peace and 
friendship, and that we share a common set 
of basic values. 

The relationship is both complex and in- 
timate. The 49th parallel is crossed every day 
of the week by more goods and more people 
than any other international border. We both 
recognize that immense benefits flow to both 
countries from this relationship. We should 
never blind ourselves, however, to the fact 
that there are many opportunities for fric- 
tion as well. It should surprise no one that 
we have problems. The surprising thing is 
that we do not have more of them. 

I am conscious that particular problems 
may be very much on your minds at the 
moment. We have unresolved trade issues 

^ Made before the opening session of the con- 
ference at Washington on Apr. 5 (press release 99). 

between us. I know that there is genuine and 
widespread concern in Canada over the role 
of private American investment there. It will 
not be easy to find equitable and mutually sat- 
isfactory solutions to cross-border energy 
problems. We have both recognized belatedly 
that we share serious environmental prob- 

As we approach discussions of these issues, 
however, I trust none of us will lose sight of 
the long and remarkable record we have of 
together finding solutions. Some of them 
have become routine and are taken for 
granted. Some have required patient negoti- 
ation and imaginative genius. Many were un- 
precedented in their time. 

It was over a century and a half ago, for 
example, that we concluded the Rush-Bagot 
Treaty, the world's first significant disarma- 
ment agreement. It took some years to work 
out the problems, but we have joined together 
in the St. Lawrence Seaway to the immense 
benefit not only ourselves but indeed of 
world commerce in general. Together we 
have successfully collaborated in the defense 
of this continent. 

Indeed, our collaboration has gone far 
beyond North America, and we find ourselves 
allies in NATO and active associates in the 
solution of vexing and frustrating problems 
elsewhere in the world, each of our govern- 
ments contributing in its own fashion in the 
light of its own best judgment. In this 
regard, I would be remiss if I did not mention 
specifically the respect and admiration we in 
the United States feel for Canada's assump- 
tion of an important but often frustrating 
task in the wake of the recent settlement in 

It seems to me the key to solution of our 
common problems is the spirit in which we 
approach them. Let us be mindful of the 
benefits our proximity brings us both; let us 
never forget that we are sovereign and 
independent nations; let us be patient when 
necessary; let us be respectful of our unsur- 
passed record of resolving differences; and 
let us never cease to attempt to understand 
each other's viewpoint. 

I know this is the spirit with which you 


Department of State Bulletin 

approach your deliberations over the next 
two days. I wish you well, and I reiterate to 
our Canadian guests a most cordial welcome. 
We are pleased and honored by your pres- 
ence. The consultative process which brings 
you here has now become a high tradition 
and will surely remain a vital element in the 
relationship between Canada and the United 

IMF Committee of Twenty Discusses 
International Monetary Reform 

FoUounng is the text of a communique 
xvhich was issued on March 27 at the conclu- 
sion of the meeting of the IMF Committee 
of Twenty. 

1. The Committee of the Board of Governors of 
the International Monetary Fund on RefoiTn of the 
International Monetary System and Related Issues 
(the Committee of Twenty) held its second meeting 
in Washington on March 26 and 27, 1973, under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Ali Wardhana, Minister 
of Finance for Indonesia. By the courtesy of the 
Organisation of American States the meeting was 
held in the Pan American Union Building. Mr. 
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of the 
International Monetary Fund, took part in the meet- 
ing which was also attended by Mr. Wilhelm Hafer- 
kamp, Vice-President of the E.E.C. [European 
Economic Community], Mr. Rene Larre, General 
Manager of the B.I.S. [Bank for International 
Settlements], Mr. Olivier Long, Director-General of 
the G.A.T.T. [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade], Mr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Secretary- 
General of the U.N.C.T.A.D. [United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development], Sir Denis 
Rickett, Vice-President of the I.B.R.D. [International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and 
Mr. Emile van Lennep, Secretary-General of the 
O.E.C.D. [Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development]. 

2. The Committee received a report in which the 
Chairman of their Deputies, Mr. Jeremy Morse, 
summarised the Deputies' discussions to date on the 
adjustment process and exchange rate mechanism, 
reserve assets and convertibility, and capital flows. 

3. The Members of the Committee reaffirmed the 
need for a world monetary order, based on coopera- 
tion and consultation within the framework of a 
strengthened International Monetary Fund, that will 
encourage growth of world trade and employment as 
well as economic development and will support the 
domestic efforts of monetary authorities throughout 
the world to counteract inflation. 

4. The Members of the Committee exchanged views 
on the substance of international monetary reform 
in the light of recent developments in exchange 
markets and of countries' policy reactions to these 
developments, and instructed their Deputies to take 
account of these events and their implications in 
their continuing work. The Members of the Com- 
mittee recognised that the various elements of 
reform are inter-linked. Their discussion of a re- 
formed system centered on the following points: 

(a) There should be a better working of the ad- 
justment process, in which adequate methods to 
assure timely and effective balance of payments 
adjustment by both surplus and deficit countries 
would be assisted by improved international consul- 
tation in the Fund including the use of objective 
indicators. It was noted that the Deputies are estab- 
lishing a technical group on indicators. The im- 
portance of effective domestic policies for balance 
of payments adjustment was underlined. Members 
of the Committee recognised that exchange rates 
must be a matter for international concern and 
consultation and that in the reformed system the 
exchange rate regime should remain based on stable 
but adjustable par values. It was also recognised that 
floating rates could provide a useful technique in 
particular situations. There was also general agree- 
ment on the need for exchange market stability and 
on the importance of Fund surveillance of exchange 
rate policies. 

(b) There should be better international man- 
agement of global liquidity. The role of reserve cur- 
rencies should be reduced and the S.D.R. [special 
drawing rights] should become the principal re- 
serve asset of the reformed system. The Deputies 
were asked to study further the conditions for a 
resumption of general convertibility, including 
questions relating to consolidation of excess reserve 
currency balances and to methods of settlement. 

(c) An intensive study should be made of effec- 
tive means to deal with the problem of disequilibrat- 
ing capital flows by a variety of measures, including 
controls, to influence them and by arrangements to 
finance and offset them. It was noted that the Dep- 
uties are establishing a technical group on dis- 
equilibrating capital flows, including those associated 
with Euro-currency markets. 

(d) There should be a strong presumption against 
the use of trade controls for balance of payments 
purposes. Developing countries would, however, be 
exempt wherever possible from trade and capital 
controls imposed by other countries and their par- 
ticular circumstances would be taken into account 
in assessing controls that they themselves felt it 
necessary to apply. • 

5. The Members of the Committee recognised the 
concerns of developing countries under current con- 
ditions and their interests in a reformed system. 
They affirmed the desirability on the occasion of 
the reform of promoting economic development and 

May 7, 1973 


the flow of real resources from developed to de- 
veloping countries. 

6. The Committee approved their Deputies' pro- 
gram of future work. In directing the attention of 
the Deputies to those aspects of reform which have 
an important bearing on the current situation, they 
recognised that procedures are already established 
for coordinating the work of the Executive Direc- 
tors of the Fund with that of the Deputies. They 
noted that the Deputies plan to expand their meet- 
ing schedule and to intensify their work between 
meetings, and they instructed the Deputies to pro- 
ceed urgently with the preparation of a draft out- 
line of the reform, in which the major issues would 
be presented to the Committee for decision. 

7. The Committee will meet again at a time to 
be proposed by the Chairman in the light of the 
progress of the Deputies' work. 

Current Actions 



Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Ratification deposited: Sudan, April 9, 1973. 


Protocol to the international convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat- 

ing to amendments to the convention. Done at 

Washington October 6, 1970.' 

Ratification, deposited: Spain, April 16, 1973. 


International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 196.5. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Accession deposited: Qatar, March 27, 1973. 



Agreement relating to an interpretation of article IV 
of the treaty of February 27, 1950 (TIAS 2130), 
relating to uses of the waters of the Niagara 
River. Eff'ected by exchange of notes at Washing- 
ton April 17, 1973. Entered into force April 17, 

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement 
of April 24, 1970, as extended (TIAS 6879, 7323), 
on reciprocal fishing privileges in certain areas off 
the coasts of the United States and Canada. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington April 
19, 1973. Entered into force April 19, 1973. 


Agreement amending the agreement of September 8, 
1970 (TIAS 6954), relating to trade in wool and 
man-made fiber textile products. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Kuala Lumpur December 1, 
1972, and February 9, 1973. Entered into force 
February 9, 1973. 


Agreement excluding "Pakistan items" from the 
purview of the agreement of May 6, 1970, as ex- 
tended and amended (TIAS 6882, 7369), relating 
to trade in cotton textiles, with annex. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington April 11, 1973. 
Entered into force April 11, 1973. 

Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX Mail 7, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1767 


Department Reports to Congress on Aspects 
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa 
(Newsom) 578 

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report 
of the Secretary of State (letter of trans- 
mittal and introductory comment) .... 545 

Asia. United States Foreign Policy 1972: A 
Report of the Secretary of State (letter of 
transmittal and introductory comment) . . 545 

Canada. U.S. -Canada Interparliamentary Con- 
ference Held at Washington (Rush) . . . 586 


Department Reports to Congress on Aspects 
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa 
(Newsom) 578 

President Nixon's National Energy Policy 
(Nixon. Shultz) 561 

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of 
the Secretary of State (letter of transmittal 
and introductory comment) 545 

Costa Rica. Letters of Credence (Lopez Aguero) 577 

Dahomey. Letters of Credence (Adjibade) . . 577 

Developing Countries. United States Foreign 
Policy 1972: K Report of the Secretary of 
State (letter of transmittal and introductory 
comment) 545 

Economic .\ffairs 

Department Reports to Congress on Aspects 
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa 
(Newsom) 578 

LMF Committee of Twenty Discusses Interna- 
tional Monetary Reform (communique) . . 587 

President Nixon's National Energy Policy 
(Nixon, Shultz) 561 

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report 
of the Secretary of State (letter of trans- 
mittal and introductory comment) .... 545 

Europe. United States Foreign Policy 1972: A 
Report of the Secretary of State (letter of 
transmittal and introductory comment) . . 545 

Iran. Letters of Credence (Zahedi) .... 577 

Israel. Letters of Credence (Dinitz) .... 577 

Latin America. United States Foreign Policy 
1972: A Report of the Secretary of State 
(letter of transmittal and introductory 
comment) 545 

fiddle East. United States Foreign Policy 
1972: A Report of the Secretary of State 
(letter of transmittal and introductory 
comment) 545 

lilitary Affairs. Department Reports to Con- 
gress on -Aspects of U.S. Policy Toward 
Southern Africa (Newsom) 578 

petroleum. President Nixon's National Energy 
Policy (Nixon, Shultz) 561 

Presidential Documents 

Presidents Nixon and Thieu Hail "Land to the 

Tiller" Program 574 

President Nixon's National Energy Policy . . 561 
Prime Minister Leo of Singapore Visits Wash- 
ington 575 

Science. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific and Technical 
Commission Holds First Meeting .... 584 

Singapore. Prime Minister Lee of Singapore 
Visits Washington (exchange of toasts with 
President Nixon) 575 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 588 

U.S.S.R. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific and Technical 
Commission Holds First Meeting .... 584 

Viet-Nam. Presidents Nixon and Thieu Hail 
"Land to the Tiller" Program (exchange of 
letters) 574 

Name Index 

Adjibade, Tiamiou 577 

Dinitz, Simcha 577 

Lee Kuan Yew 575 

Lopez .Agruero, Marco Antonio 577 

Newsom, David D 578 

Nixon, President 561, 574, 575 

Rogers, Secretary 545 

Rush, Kenneth 586 

Shultz, George P 561 

Thieu, Nguyen Van 574 

Zahedi, Ardeshir 577 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 16-22 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington. D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 16 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 99 
of April 5 and 104 of April 6. 


U.S.-Canada fisheries negotia- 
U.S. and Germany reach under- 
standing on air charters (re- 
4/20 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs to meet May 4. 
tll5 4/20 Appointment of Advisory Com- 
mittee on Science and Foreign 

No. Date 

tll2 4/16 

tll3 4/16 


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Washington, D.C. 20520. 







\'olume LXVIII 

No. 1768 

May 14, 1973 

Address by Secretary Rogers 589 

Address by Presidential Assistant Kissinger 593 



Note Verbale to PaHicipants in Paris Conference 599 



for index see inside back cover 


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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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VOL. LXVIII, No. 1768 
May 14, 1973 

The Department of State BVLLETtl 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
interested agencies of the governm^ 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations 
on the work of the Department ani^ 
the Foreign Service. /^-j 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued;/ 
by the Wfiite House and the Depart-''] 
ment, and statements, addresses, \ 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other^ 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functit 
of the Department. Information is 
eluded concerning treaties and ini 
national agreements to which 
United States is or may become \ 
party and on treaties of general (it^ 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also liste^ 

The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Negotiations 

Address by Secretary Rogers^ 

It is a privilege to join you this evening 
in honoring the United States Committee of 
the International Committee To Free Jour- 
nalists in Southeast Asia. We have followed 
tlieir efforts with great sympathy and re- 
spect. We share the hope of the U.S. com- 
mittee — the hope of people everywhere 
— that your colleagues missing or captured 
in Indochina will be returned. If there is 
anything that we in the State Department 
can do to assist, you can count on my com- 
plete support. 

Few periods are as decisive for a nation's 
history as the period when the transition 
is made from war to peace. War does not 
provide solutions. However, the course we 
take this year as we move from war to peace 
is of the utmost importance and undoubtedly 
will influence our foreign policy for the rest 
of this century. 

There is, I believe, a clear agreement in 
this country that a substantially changed 
international situation requires reassess- 
ment of our policies and programs. Both the 
administration and Congress are engaged in 
this process. But this does not mean that 
we should alter fundamentally the policies 
which have been pursued with such success 
during recent years. 

You know the broad outlines of these 
policies. We will continue to improve our 
relations with the People's Republic of China 
on a steady and expanding basis. As contacts 
increase, friendship and understanding be- 
tween the Chinese people and American 
people will increase. It is our hope — and 

' Made before the Overseas Press Club at New 
York, N.Y., on Apr. 23 (press release 116). 

theirs, too, I am convinced — that the develop- 
ing political, social, and commercial relations 
with the People's Republic of China will 
contribute to future stability in the Pacific. 

We will seek to improve our relations with 
the Soviet Union, both in the political field 
and in trade, science, and technology. We 
are now engaged in Phase Two of the SALT 
talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. 
This summer we will participate in the Con- 
ference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe and in a manner and with a deter- 
mination not to weaken our alliances with 
western Europe, with Japan, or with other 
nations in the free world that have come to 
rely on us as a result of treaty obligations. 

In Indochina we will pursue every diplo- 
matic path, use every diplomatic device, to 
bring about full implementation of the Paris 
agreement. It is not surprising that many 
serious problems remain. However, the con- 
vergence of interests and influences that 
brought about the agreement still remains in 
play. Thus I believe that with renewed efforts 
on the part of all concerned the Paris agree- 
ment still holds out the best promise — and 
I believe a realistic hope — for peace and 
stability in Indochina. 

The Middle East continues to be a matter 
of major concern where emotion and hatred 
at times seem to make meaningful dialogue 
an impossibility. However, it has been al- 
most three years now since the initiative by 
the United States resulted in a cease-fire 
between Egypt and Israel. Our major im- 
mediate objective will be to strive to main- 
tain the fragile cease-fire while attempting 
to get negotiations started among the nations 
concerned. If there could now be a cease-fire 

May 14, 1973 


on inflammatory rhetoric, a cease-fire on bel- 
ligerent statements of ultimate and rigid 
positions, and a cease-fire from violence of 
all kinds from whatever source, I am con- 
vinced that progress toward a permanent 
solution could be achieved. The principal 
parties concerned have said they want to 
keep the doors of diplomacy open. We intend 
of course to take them at their word. 

I am heartened and I know you are by the 
progress that has been made in international 
affairs in the past few years in many areas 
of the world. And I feel confident that war 
among major nations may be averted during 
our lifetime if present trends continue. 

But this will not be easy. Neglect and iso- 
lation are apt to flourish in the pleasant 
climate of detente. 

So in addition to pursuing the policies of 
the President which have proved so success- 
ful in foreign affairs we will have to fight 
the attitudes which develop as a corollary 
to success. For example, we cannot accept 
recent proposals : 

— ^To substantially reduce U.S. troops sta- 
tioned overseas in the next 18 months ; 

— To reduce to the maximum extent the 
U.S. role in furnishing defense articles and 
defense services to foreign countries and 
eliminate all grant military assistance by 
1975; and 

— To reverse the direction of our foreign 
policy over the past quarter century by turn- 
ing inward, radically reducing our active role 
in world affairs, and erecting barriers to 

Continuing U.S. Engagement in the World 

However tempting these approaches may 
seem superficially, to pursue them would be 

First, to remain prosperous the United 
States must remain economically engaged 
with the rest of the world. An increasing 
portion of our economy is dependent upon 
exports for growth — 31 percent of all our 
crops and 14 percent of our manufactured 
goods are now exported. We depend upon 
imports for 30 percent of our petroleum 
needs, and this share is growing. 

The proposed trade legislation which Pres- 
ident Nixon submitted to the Congress this 
month is designed to keep the United States 
engaged. We will insist upon fairer treatment 
for American exports and a less burden- 
some role for the dollar during this fall's 
trade and monetary negotiations. However, 
our major objective in economic policy this 
year is not merely to protect the American 
economy at current levels of productivity but 
to stimulate it to expand as part of an ex- 
panding world economy. 

Second, to build the stable and peaceful 
world we all want, the United States must 
maintain its political and defense commit- 

In recent years we have succeeded in shar- 
ing the burdens of leadership and security 
more equitably with our allies. But of course 
there continues to be a central role only the 
United States can play. While we will strive 
to engage our adversaries in a widening 
network of negotiations, fundamental dif- 
ferences remain. The dramatic progress that 
has been made in recent years is not ir- 

With this firmly in mind, the administra- 
tion is determined not to upset the develop- 
ing balance by unilaterally reducing our 

Over the past decade the Soviet Union 
increased its military manpower by 30 per- 
cent, doubled its published military budget, 
and vastly increased its nuclear forces. 

The People's Republic of China maintained 
over the decade the world's largest army, 
increased its air and naval forces, and has 
developed a nuclear missile delivery system. 

We on the other hand have reduced our 
defense capabilities by about one-third. In 
Asia we have already reduced the number 
of our armed forces by 70 percent over the 
past four years. In addition to the with- 
drawal of more than half a million men from 
Viet-Nam, we have reduced our military 
presence by 70,000 men in Korea, Japan, the 
Philippines, and elsewhere. 

Further substantial force reductions now 
could lead to miscalculation and even upset 
the new and still-delicate relationships that 
have been so carefully developed. 


Department of State Bulletin 

For exam|)le. we believe that the main- 
tenance of our defense capability is particu- 
larly important to reassure Japan about the 
continuing validity of our security arrange- 
ments. American withdrawal from Asia 
could well lead Japan to consider new secu- 
rity arrangements, major rearmament, and 
even nuclearization — a course it prefers not 
to pursue. 

The new and essential emphasis in our 
policy of building a new Asian structure of 
peace, however, is to increase the responsi- 
bility of Asian nations, small as well as 
large, to defend themselves. All our allies 
have accepted this approach as the correct 
one. Our security assistance program is 
designed to achieve it. Therefore we are 
opposed to substantial cuts in American 
security assistance. They would undermine 
our effort to transfer greater shares of re- 
sponsibility to our allies and could induce 
costly overreaction by them to find new 
gfuarantees for their security. Not only would 
they see their own bargaining leverage in 
negotiations reduced, their economic develop- 
ment would be hindered by the requirement 
to spend more for defense. 

Maintaining U.S. Forces in Europe 

It is important, too, for the United States 
to maintain its strength in Europe, and we 
fully intend to do so. In the early part of 
this century Europe was an area typified 
by gross instability which proved to be the 
incubator for two massively destructive wars 
within a generation. The United States 
learned to its sori'ow that however much we 
wanted to, we could not in fact remain aloof 
from those wars. As a result, following World 
War II we were the leaders in constructing 
a peacetime edifice in which our voice and 
iir interests would be pei-manently repre- 

Pursuant to this concord the United States 
and its allies have erected a significant de- 
fensive .structure. What is perhaps more 
important, our involvement in European se- 
curity affairs is not provocative to our ad- 
versaries but is essential to our allies. To 
risk this major accomplishment of diplo- 

macy, a risk we would surely run if we be- 
gan a unilateral reduction of our forces in 
Europe, is both unnecessary and dangerous. 

If there was ever a time not to withdraw 
our forces unilaterally from Europe surely 
it is now — at a time when we are beginning 
negotiations with the Warsaw Pact nations 
on mutual reduction of forces. If we uni- 
laterally cut in half our own troop strength 
or made any other significant reduction it 
would destroy all prospects for a successful 
negotiation on mutual reduction. Such a 
step would also seriously undermine the 
Western position at this summer's Confer- 
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Despite these facts, there may be serious 
efforts in Congress to substantially cut Amer- 
ican forces in Europe. 

There are sound militaiy reasons for main- 
taining our forces in Europe. The military 
forces posing a potential threat to NATO 
have not been reduced. However remote we 
may regard the possibilities of direct Soviet 
military aggression in Europe, the fact is 
that Soviet forces are stronger today than 
they have ever been. They are well equipped, 
well trained, and well deployed. Over 600,000 
Soviet troops are stationed in eastern Eu- 
rope. These forces are backed up by over 
9,000 tanks and 3,000 tactical aircraft. 

In these circumstances American and 
NATO forces must be a serious military ef- 
fort and not just a "tripwire." NATO to- 
day is in fact a formidable defensive force. 
In central Europe, for example, NATO has 
available roughly the same number of forces 
as the Warsaw Pact. 

Defense Costs and Basic U.S. Interests 

We are all concerned about the costs of 
our defense. But there is another and greater 
concern — that our defense programs support 
this country's basic interests. The i.ssue is 
whether we are maintaining a larger defense 
than the protection of these interests re- 
quires. I believe not. 

What are the facts? In 1968, the defense 
budget was 9 percent of GNP. Next year it 
will be 6 percent. This is not an unacceptable 
burden for a country with a GNP of over 

May 14, 1973 


$1 trillion. In terms of the Federal budget, 
defense will claim less than one-third of the 
total Federal spending, as compared with 
one-half of the Federal budget that will be 
spent on social welfare and human resources. 
This exactly reverses the proportions of four 
years ago. 

The defense budget for next year in terms 
of purchasing power will be less than that 
of any defense budget in the last 10 years. 
It will pay fewer people, buy less hardware, 
involve fewer industries, and maintain fewer 
bases than any defense budget since 1950. 

Since 1968 the Nixon administration has 
reduced the size of our armed forces from 
3.5 million to 2.3 million. Thus 1.2 million 
men and women in the armed forces have 
been demobilized. In terms of divisions, naval 
vessels, and aircraft, our military forces are 
at their lowest level since 1951. 

Fortunately there now seems to be little 
controversy over the need to maintain our 
nuclear strength as we enter the second 
round of strategic nuclear arms talks. In- 
stead, recent suggestions for basic changes 
in defense policy primarily focus on a major 
reduction in conventional forces. 

Those who advocate substantial reductions 
in our general purpose forces seem to believe 
that we can adequately protect U.S. security 
interests by relying more heavily on our 
strategic nuclear power. This is an extremely 
dangerous line of thinking in today's world. 

The time is long past when we could or 
should rely primarily on the threat of nu- 
clear retaliation to deter aggression against 
another nation. We must have diverse op- 
tions to fit diverse threats if potential aggres- 
sors are to respect America's commitments to 
our friends and allies. 

While we have made substantial progress 

in the past four years in reducing inter- 
national tensions and in transferring the re- 
sponsibility for local defense to our allies, 
the main continuing fact of international 
life is the competitive nature of nations. We 
still have many differences with other na- 
tions which could bring us into sharp con- 
frontation in the future. Should the United 
States be faced with such a confrontation, 
the President must have a range of responses, 
including conventional responses which are 
credible, available to him. This will insure 
that our response could be on as limited a 
scale as possible and yet still be effective. 

We have been able to make substantial 
reductions in the size of our military estab- 
lishment not by wishful thinking about our 
adversaries nor by abandoning commitments 
to our allies. On the contrary, we have done 
it by making concrete progress toward a 
more stable world, by building the strength 
of our allies and reducing tensions among 
the major powers, and by reducing our mili- 
tary strength in a manner commensurate 
with these reduced tensions. 

For the first time in our lifetime there are 
realistic prospects for a world in which na- 
tions adopt higher standards of acceptable 
international behavior. There are realistic 
prospects for a world in which negotiated 
resolution of international issues takes a 
clearer precedence over unilateral threats or 
resort to force. 

On every major question of national de- 
fense for the past quarter century Congress 
has supported the President. When the Con- 
gress gives full and thoughtful consideration 
to the consequences of major cuts in our de- 
fense or to unilateral reduction in our troop 
strength in Europe, I am confident that it 
will again act responsibly. 



Department of State Bulletin 

The Year of Europe 

Address bji Henrij A. Kissinger 

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs^ 

This year has been called the year of 
Europe, but not because Europe was less 
important in 1972 or in 1969. The alliance 
between the United States and Europe has 
been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign 
policy. It provided the political framework 
for American engag^ements in Europe and 
marked the definitive end of U.S. isolation- 
ism. It insured the sense of security that 
allowed Europe to recover from the devasta- 
tion of the war. It reconciled former enemies. 
It was the stimulus for an unprecedented 
endeavor in European unity and the princi- 
pal means to forge the common policies that 
safeguarded Western security in an era of 
prolonged tension and confrontation. Our 
values, our goals, and our basic interests are 
most closely identified with those of Europe. 

Nineteen seventy-three is the year of Eu- 
rope because the era that was shaped by 
decisions of a generation ago is ending. The 
success of those policies has produced new 
realities that require new approaches: 

— The revival of western Europe is an 
established fact, as is the historic success 
of its movement toward economic unification. 

— The East-West strategic militar>' bal- 
ance has shifted from American preponder- 
ance to near-equality, bringing with it the 
necessity for a new understanding of the 
requirements of our common security. 

— Other areas of the world have grown in 
importance. Japan has emerged as a major 
power center. In many fields, "Atlantic" so- 
lutions to be viable must include Japan. 

— We are in a period of relaxation of 

' Made before the annual meeting of the Asso- 
ciated Press editors at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 23. 

tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the 
past two decades diminish, new assertions 
of national identity and national rivalry 

— Problems have arisen, unforeseen a gen- 
eration ago, which require new types of co- 
operative action. Insuring the supply of 
energy for industrialized nations is an 

These factors have produced a dramatic 
transformation of the psychological climate 
in the West — a change which is the most 
profound current challenge to Western 
statesmanship. In Europe, a new generation 
to whom war and its dislocations are not 
personal experiences takes stability for 
gi-anted. But it is less committed to the unity 
that made peace possible and to the effort 
required to maintain it. In the United States, 
decades of global burdens have fostered, and 
the frustrations of the war in Southeast 
Asia have accentuated, a reluctance to sus- 
tain global involvements on the basis of pre- 
ponderant American responsibility. 

Inevitably this period of transition will 
have its strains. There have been complaints 
in America that Europe ignores its wider 
responsibilities in pursuing economic self- 
interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is 
not carrying its fair share of the burden of 
the common defense. There have been com- 
plaints in Europe that America is out to 
divide Europe economically, or to desert 
Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe dip- 
lomatically. Europeans appeal to the United 
States to accept their independence and their 
occasionally severe criticism of us in the 
name of Atlantic unity, while at the same 

May 14, 1973 


time they ask for a veto on our independent 
policies— also in the name of Atlantic unity. 
Our challenge is whether a unity forged by 
a common perception of danger can draw 
new purpose from shared positive aspira- 

If we permit the Atlantic partnership to 
atrophy, or to erode through neglect, care- 
lessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been 
achieved and we shall miss our historic op- 
portunity for even greater achievement. 

In the forties and fifties the task was 
economic reconstruction and security against 
the danger of attack; the West responded 
with courage and imagination. Today the 
need is to make the Atlantic relationship as 
dynamic a force in building a new structure 
of peace, less geared to crisis and more con- 
scious of opportunities, drawing its inspira- 
tions from its goals rather than its fears. 
The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh 
act of creation equal to that undertaken by 
the postwar generation of leaders of Europe 
and America. 

This is why the President is embarking on 
a personal and direct approach to the leaders 
of western Europe. In his discussions with 
the heads of government of Britain, Italy, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and 
France, the Secretary General of NATO, and 
other European leaders, it is the President's 
purpose to lay the basis for a new era of 
creativity in the West. 

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic 
problems comprehensively. The political, mil- 
itary, and economic issues in Atlantic re- 
lations are linked by reality, not by our 
choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading 
one off against the other. The solutions will 
not be worthy of the opportunity if left 
to technicians. They must be addressed at 
the highest level. 

In 1972 the President transformed rela- 
tions with our adversaries to lighten the 
burdens of fear and suspicion. 

In 1973 we can gain the same sense of 
historical achievement by reinvigorating 
shared ideals and common purposes with our 

The United States proposes to its Atlantic 
partners that by the time the President 

travels to Europe toward the end of the 
year we will have worked out a new Atlantic 
charter setting the goals for the future, 
a blueprint that : 

—Builds on the past without becoming its 

—Deals with the problems our success 

has created. 

—Creates for the Atlantic nations a new 
relationship in whose progress Japan can 

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and 
ultimately Japan to join us in this effort. 

This is what we mean by the year of 

Problems in Atlantic Relationships 

The problems in Atlantic relationships are 
real. They have arisen in part because dur- 
ing the fifties and sixties the Atlantic com- 
munity organized itself in different ways in 
the many different dimensions of its common 

—In economic relations the European 
Community has increasingly stressed its re- 
gional personality ; the United States at the 
same time must act as part of, and be re- 
sponsible for, a wider international trade 
and monetaiy system. We must reconcile 
these two perspectives. 

In our collective defense we are still 

organized on the principle of unity and in- 
tegration, but in radically different strategic 
conditions. The full implications of this 
change have yet to be faced. 

Diplomacy is the subject of frequent 

consultations but is essentially being con- 
ducted by traditional nation-states. The 
United States has global interests and re- 
sponsibilities. Our European allies have re- 
gional interests. These are not necessarily 
in conflict, but in the new era neither are 
they automatically identical. 

In short, we deal with each other re- 
gionally and even competitively on an 
Tntegrated basis in defense, and as nation- 
states in diplomacy. When the various col- 
lective institutions were rudimentary, the 
potential inconsistency in their modes of 


Department of State Bulletin 

I oration was not a problem. But after a 
jrt'neration of evolution and with the new 
\\ eipht and strength of our allies, the various 
I»arts of the construction are not always in 
harmony and sometimes obstruct each other. 

If we want to foster unity we can no 
lunger ignore these problems. The Atlantic 
iKitions must find a solution for the manage- 
nient of their diversity to serve the common 
I'lijectives which underlie their unity. We 
lan no longer afford to pursue national or 
legional self-interest without a unifying 
framework. We cannot hold together if each 
country or region asserts its autonomy when- 
ever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to 
curtail the independence of others. 

We must strike a new balance between self- 
interest and the common interest. We must 
identify interests and positive values beyond 
security in order to engage once again the 

mmitment of peoples and parliaments. We 
need a shared view of the world we seek to 

Agenda for the Future 

No element of American postwar policy 
has been more consistent than our support of 
European unity. We encouraged it at every 
turn. We knew that a united Europe would 
be a more independent partner. But we as- 
sumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our 
common interests w^ould be assured by our 
long history of cooperation. We expected that 
political unity would follow economic inte- 
gration and that a unified Europe working 
cooperatively with us in an Atlantic part- 
nership would ease many of our interna- 
tional burdens. 

It is clear that many of these expectations 
are not being fulfilled. 

We and Europe have benefited from Euro- 
pean economic integration. Increased trade 
within Europe has stimulated the growth 
of European economies and the expansion of 
trade in both directions the Atlantic. 

"But we cannot ignore the fact that Eu- 
rope's economic success and its transforma- 
tion from a recipient of our aid to a strong 
competitor has produced a certain amount 

of friction. There have been turbulence and 
a sense of rivalry in international monetary 

In trade, the natural economic weight of 
a market of 250 million people has pressed 
other states to seek special arrangements to 
protect their access to it. The prospect of a 
closed trading system embracing the Euro- 
pean Community and a growing number of 
other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean, 
and Africa appears to be at the expense of 
the United States and other nations which 
are excluded. In agriculture, where the 
United States has a comparative advantage, 
we are particularly concerned that Commu- 
nity protective policies may restrict access 
for our products. 

This divergence comes at a time when we 
are experiencing a chronic and growing defi- 
cit in our balance of payments and pi'otec- 
tionist pressures of our own. Europeans in 
turn question our investment policies and 
doubt our continued commitment to their 
economic unity. 

The gradual accumulation of sometimes 
petty, sometimes major, economic disputes 
must be ended and be replaced by a deter- 
mined commitment on both sides of the At- 
lantic to find cooperative solutions. 

The United States will continue to support 
the unification of Europe. We have no in- 
tention of destroying what we worked so 
hard to help build. For us, European unity 
is what it has always been : not an end in 
itself but a means to the strengthening of 
the West. We shall continue to support Euro- 
pean unity as a component of a larger At- 
lantic partnership. 

This year we begin comprehensive trade 
negotiations with Europe as well as with 
Japan. We shall also continue to press the ef- 
fort to reform the monetary system so that it 
promotes stability rather than constant dis- 
ruptions. A new equilibrium must be achieved 
in trade and monetary relations. 

We see these negotiations as a historic 
opportunity for positive achievement. They 
must engage the top political leaders, for 
they require above all a commitment of 
political will. If they are left solely to the ex- 
perts the inevitable competitiveness of eco- 

May 14, 1973 


nomic interests will dominate the debate. 
The influence of pressure groups and special 
interests will become pervasive. There will be 
no overriding sense of direction. There will 
be no framework for the generous solutions 
or mutual concessions essential to preserve 
a vital Atlantic partnership. 

It is the responsibility of national leaders 
to insure that economic negotiations serve 
larger political purposes. They must recog- 
nize that economic rivalry, if carried on 
without restraint, will in the end damage 
other relationships. 

The United States intends to adopt a broad 
political approach that does justice to our 
overriding political interest in an open and 
balanced trading order with both Europe 
and Japan. This is the spirit of the Presi- 
dent's trade bill and of his speech to the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund last year. It will 
guide our strategy in the trade and mone- 
tary talks. We see these negotiations not as 
a test of strength, but as a test of joint 


Atlantic unity has always come most 
naturally in the field of defense. For many 
years the military threats to Europe were 
unambiguous, the requirements to meet them 
were generally agreed on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and America's responsibility was 
preeminent and obvious. Today we remain 
united on the objective of collective defense, 
but we face the new challenge of maintaining 
it under radically changed strategic condi- 
tions and with the new opportunity of en- 
hancing our security through negotiated 
reductions of forces. 

The West no longer holds the nuclear pre- 
dominance that permitted it in the fifties and 
sixties to rely almost solely on a strategy of 
massive nuclear retaliation. Because under 
conditions of nuclear parity such a strategy 
invites mutual suicide, the alliance must 
have other choices. The collective ability to 
resist attack in western Europe by means 
of flexible responses has become central to 
a rational strategy and crucial to the main- 
tenance of peace. For this reason, the United 
States has maintained substantial conven- 

tional forces in Europe and our NATO allies 
have embarked on a significant effort to 
modernize and improve their own military 

While the Atlantic alliance is committed 
to a strategy of flexible response in principle, 
the requirements of flexibility are complex 
and expensive. Flexibility by its nature re- 
quires sensitivity to new conditions and 
continual consultation among the allies to re- 
spond to changing circumstances. And we 
must give substance to the defense posture 
that our strategy defines. Flexible response 
cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around 
the defense structure that emerges from low- 
est-common-denominator compromises driven 
by domestic considerations. It must be seen 
by ourselves and by potential adversaries 
as a credible, substantial, and rational pos- 
ture of defense. 

A great deal remains to be accomplished 
to give reality to the goal of flexible response: 

— There are deficiencies in important areas 
of our conventional defense. 

— There are still unresolved issues in our 
doctrine; for example, on the crucial ques- 
tion of the role of tactical nuclear weapons. 

— There are anomalies in NATO deploy- 
ments as well as in its logistics structure. 

To maintain the military balance that has 
insured stability in Europe for 25 years, the 
alliance has no choice but to address these 
needs and to reach an agreement on our 
defense requirements. This task is all the 
more difficult because the lessening of ten- 
sions has given new impetus to arguments 
that it is safe to begin reducing forces uni- 
laterally. And unbridled economic competi- 
tion can sap the impulse for common defense. 
All governments of the Western alliance 
face a major challenge in educating their 
peoples to the realities of security in the 
1970's. i 

The President has asked me to state that 
America remains committed to doing its 
fair share in Atlantic defense. He is ada- 
mantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of 
U.S. forces from Europe. But we owe to our 
peoples a rational defense posture, at the 
safest minimum size and cost, with burdens 


Department of State Bulletin 

fqiiitably shared. This is what the President 
believes must result from the dialogue with 
our allies in 1973. 

When this is achieved, the necessary Amer- 
ican forces will be maintained in Europe, not 
simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear 
weapons but as an essential contribution to 
an agreed and intelligible structure of West- 

I em defense. This, too, will enable us to 
engage our adversaries intelligently in ne- 

r gotiations for mutual balanced reductions. 

'' In the next few weeks the United States 
will present to NATO the product of our 
own preparations for the negotiations on 
mutual balanced force reductions which will 
begin this year. We hope that it will be a 

I contribution to a broader dialogue on secu- 
rity. Our approach is designed not from the 
point of view of special American interests, 
but of general alliance interests. Our position 
will reflect the President's view that these 
negotiations are not a subterfuge to with- 
draw U.S. forces regardless of consequences. 
No formula for reductions is defensible, 
whatever its domestic appeal or political 
rationale, if it undermines security. 

Our objective in the dialogue on defense is 
a new consensus on security, addressed to 
new conditions and to the hopeful new possi- 
bilities of effective arms limitations. 


We have entered a truly remarkable pe- 
riod of East-West diplomacy. The last two 
years have produced an agreement on Berlin, 
a treaty between West Germany and the 
U.S.S.R., a strategic arms limitation agree- 
ment, the beginning of negotiations on a 
European Security Conference and on mu- 
tual balanced force reductions, and a series 
of significant practical bilateral agreements 
between Western and Eastern countries, in- 
cluding a dramatic change in bilateral re- 
lations between the United States and the 
U.S.S.R. These were not isolated actions, but 
steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried 
forward as a collective effort. Our approach 
to detente stressed that negotiations had to 
be concrete, not atmospheric, and that con- 
cessions should be reciprocal. We expect to 

carry forward the policy of relaxation of 
tensions on this basis. 

Yet this very success has created its own 
prol)Iems. There is an increasing uneasiness 
— all the more insidious for rarely being 
made explicit — that superpower diplomacy 
might sacrifice the interests of traditional 
allies and other friends. Where our allies' 
interests have been affected by our bilateral 
negotiations, as in the talks on the limita- 
tion of strategic arms, we have been scru- 
pulous in consulting them ; where our allies 
are directly involved, as in the negotiations 
on mutual balanced force reductions, our ap- 
proach is to proceed jointly on the basis of 
agreed positions. Yet some of our friends 
in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord 
America the same trust in our motives as 
they received from us or to grant us the 
same tactical flexibility that they employed 
in pursuit of their own policies. The United 
States is now often taken to task for flexi- 
bility where we used to be criticized for 

All of this underlines the necessity to 
articulate a clear set of common objectives 
together with our allies. Once that is accom- 
plished, it will be quite feasible, indeed de- 
sirable, for the several allies to pursue these 
goals with considerable tactical flexibility. 
If we agree on common objectives it will 
become a technical question whether a par- 
ticular measure is pursued in a particular 
forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or 
multilaterally. Then those allies who seek 
reassurances of America's commitment will 
find it not in verbal reafl[irmations of loyalty, 
but in an agreed framework of purpose. 

We do not need to agree on all policies. In 
many areas of the world our approaches will 
differ, especially outside of Europe. But we 
do require an understanding of what should 
be done jointly and of the limits we should 
impose on the scope of our autonomy. 

We have no intention of buying an illu- 
sory tranquillity at the expense of our friends. 
The United States will never knowingly 
sacrifice the interests of others. But the per- 
ception of common interests is not automatic; 
it requires constant redefinition. The relaxa- 
tion of tensions to which we are committed 

May 14, 1973 


makes allied cohesion indispensable yet more 
difficult. We must insure that the momentum 
of detente is maintained by common objec- 
tives rather than by drift, escapism, or com- 

America's Contribution 

The agenda I have outlined here is not an 
American prescription, but an appeal for a 
joint effort of creativity. The historic op- 
portunity for this generation is to build a 
new structure of international relations for 
the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic 
partnership is indispensable for it. The 
United States is prepared to make its con- 
tribution : 

— We will continue to support European 
unity. Based on the principles of partner- 
ship, we will make concessions to its further 
growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit 
of reciprocity. 

— We will not disengage from our solemn 
commitments to our allies. We will maintain 
our forces and not withdraw from Europe 
unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each 
ally a fair share of the common effort for 
the common defense. 

— We shall continue to pursue the relaxa- 
tion of tensions with our adversaries on the 
basis of concrete negotiations in the common 
interest. We welcome the participation of our 
friends in a constructive East- West dialogue. 

— We will never consciously injure the 
interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. 
We expect in return that their policies will 
take seriously our interests and our respon- 

— We are prepared to work cooperatively 
on new common problems we face. Energy, 
for example, raises the challenging issues of 
assurance of supply, impact of oil revenues 
on international currency stability, the na- 
ture of common political and strategic 
interests, and long-range relations of oil- 
consuming to oil-producing countries. This 
could be an area of competition; it should 
be an area of collaboration. 

— Just as Europe's autonomy is not an 
end in itself, so the Atlantic community can- 
not be an exclusive club. Japan must be a 
principal partner in our common enterprise. 

We hope that our friends in Europe will 
meet us in this spirit. We have before us 
the example of the great accomplishments 
of the past decades and the opportunity to 
match and dwarf them. This is the task 
ahead. This is how, in the 1970's, the Atlan- 
tic nations can truly serve our peoples and 
the cause of peace. 

Dr. Samuelson Tours East Asia 
Under Lincoln Lectureships 

The Department of State announced on 
April 2 (press release 95) that Paul A. 
Samuelson, Nobel Prize-winning professor 
of economics at the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, had visited five Asian and 
Pacific countries in March as a U.S. Govern- 
ment Lincoln Lecturer. Dr. Samuelson ad- 
dressed audiences in Japan, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. (For 
biographic data, see press release 95.) 

The Lincoln Lectureships were announced 
by President Nixon August 1, 1972, in a let- 
ter to Dr. James H. Billington, Chairman of 
the Presidentially appointed Board of For- 
eign Scholarships. > That date marked the 
completion of 25 years of educational ex- 
change under the Fulbright-Hays Act. 

Dr. Samuelson is one of four Americans 
selected by the Board of Foreign Scholar- 
ships as Lincoln Lecturers during the 1972- 
73 academic year. The others are : John Hope 
Franklin, professor of history at the Uni- 
versity of Chicago; Charles H. Townes, No- 
bel Prize physicist and professor at the 
University of California at Berkeley; and 
John H. Updike, author, Ipswich, Mass. 


' For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Sept. 4, 
1972, p. 252. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. Replies to D.R.V. Charges of Violations of Viet-Nam Cease-Fire 

Following is a vote verbale transmitted to 
U.S. Missions on April 20 for delivery to 
participants in the InternatiotMl Conference 
on Viet-Nam. 

Pr«» release 117 dated April 24 

1. The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry 
of E.xternal Affairs of [Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics, People's Republic of China, 
Great Britain, France, Republic of Vietnam, 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Hungary. 
Poland, Indonesia, Canada; and Secretary 
General of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has 
the honor to refer to a note dated April 16, 
1973, transmitted by the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and, it is as- 
sumed, also to the other signatories of the 
Act of the International Conference on 

2. In its Note, the Government of the Dem- 
ocratic Republic of Vietnam, on its own be- 
half and occasionally also in the name of 
the "Provisional Revolutionary Govern- 
ment", purports to describe the situation in 
South Vietnam and lodges charges against 

" the Government of the United States and the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam. 

3. The United States rejects as utterly 
I groundless the accusations of the Democratic 
\ Republic of Vietnam, and views this note as 
I an ill-disguised attempt by the Democratic 
'Republic of Vietnam to divert attention away 

from its own numerous and extremely seri- 
ous violations of the ceasefire. 

4. Contrary to the contentions listed in the 
note, it is abundantly clear that the main 
obstruction to peace consists of the military 

activities carried out by the Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam and forces under its con- 
trol in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia 
in direct and inexcusable contravention of 
the Agreement on Ending the War and Re- 
storing Peace in Vietnam and of the Agree- 
ment on the Restoration of Peace and Recon- 
ciliation in Laos. 

5. Of extreme concern is the vast quantity 
of military equipment shipped clandestinely 
since January 28 from North Vietnam into 
South Vietnam without the least effort to 
observe Articles 7 and 20 of the Peace Agree- 
ment of January 27.- Evidence is overwhelm- 
ing of continued illegal movement of equip- 
ment and supplies out of North Vietnam into 
or through Laos and Cambodia and into 
South Vietnam for the use of the military 
forces opposing the legitimate governments 
of those countries. Included in the supplies 
reaching South Vietnam are over 400 tanks 
and armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces of 
various types and vast quantities of ammuni- 
tion, vehicles, etc. For examjile, from the 
time of the Vietnam ceasefire through April 
18, 1973, over 27,000 short tons of military 
supplies have been moved through the de- 
militarized zone into South Vietnam. In the 
same period, over 26,000 short tons were 
moved from North Vietnam into Laos. Also 
during this period, we have detected over 
17,000 military truck movements from North 
Vietnam into Laos and over 7,000 crossing 
the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam. 
None of the peace-keeping organs established 
by the Peace Agreement has been given the 
opportunity to monitor these shipments. 

6. Evidence of an intention to persist in 
violations of Article 20 of the Agreement is 

' For text of the Act of the International Con- 
ference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris on Mar. 2, see 
BiLLETiN of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 345. 

' For text of the ARreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris 
on Jan. 27, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169. 

May 14, 1973 


the substantial effort being made to upgrade 
the road system within Laos and adjoining 
parts of South Vietnam. Bridge and drainage 
ditch construction have been observed on 
Route 7, the primary route into the Plain of 
Jars from North Vietnam and on Routes 4 
and 4/7 which transit the northern plain in 
an east-west direction. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of continuing North Vietnamese 
efforts to construct a road from southern 
Laos into Quang Tri and Quang Ngai Prov- 
inces. This cross-border route is not close to 
any of the designated entry points and its 
only logical use could be as a clandestine 
supply highway into the central coastal re- 
gions of South Vietnam. 

7. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
also has moved military personnel and mili- 
tary equipment in and through the demil- 
itarized zone in direct violation of Articles 
7 and 15(B) of the Peace Agreement and of 
Article 7 of the Ceasefire Protocol. 

8. In most serious violation of the Agree- 
ment, more than 30,000 North Vietnamese 
army personnel are known to have continued 
moving through Laos and Cambodia into 
South Vietnam after the ceasefire on Janu- 
ary 28. These combat replacements have 
greatly increased the capability of North 
Vietnamese army units in the south. In addi- 
tion there is evidence that new North 
Vietnamese army organizations, such as 
anti-aircraft artillery units, entered South 
Vietnam after January 28. For example, the 
Khe Sanh airfield complex has recently been 
ringed with SA-2 missiles, which clearly 
were not present prior to the ceasefire. 

9. Not content with illegally building up 
its military potential, the Democratic Repub- 
lic of Vietnam has since the ceasefire ac- 
tually employed these and other forces under 
its command to launch attacks on hamlets, 
villages and Republic of Vietnam military 
positions throughout the country in unequiv- 
ocal violation of the fundamental purpose of 
the Peace Agreement as embodied in Articles 
2 and 3. The assaults have generally consisted 
of mortarings and shellings, frequently fol- 
lowed by ground attacks in an obvious effort 

to expand the area controlled by forces under 
North Vietnamese command. In some cases 
the assaults were of such intensity as to 
require withdrawal of government defending 
forces, for example, from positions at Hoang 
Hau near Hue, on the Cambodian border in 
Chau Due Province and in Bac Lieu Prov- 
ince. Other beleaguered outposts long oc- 
cupied by the Republic of Vietnam armed 
forces continue to hold out despite persistent 
harassment, such as at Tonle Cham in Tay 
Ninh, at Rach Bap in Binh Duong and in the 
Hong Ngu and Cai Cai districts of Kien 
Phong Province. 

10. North Vietnamese forces, moreover, 
continue larger military offensives aimed at 
opening up new supply routes and expanding 
their control, such as in the Sa Huynh area 
of southern Quang Ngai Province. 

11. Troops under the control of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam also have placed 
many mines in violation of Article 5 of the 
Ceasefire Protocol and have tried to inter- 
fere with resumed train service. Earlier this 
month, in Phu Yen Province, a mine was set 
under a train and a ground attack was 
launched on a track repair crew. 

12. These forces, moreover, have fired 
mortars and artillery indiscriminately into 
many cities, refugee camps and other centers 
of population, for example in Tan Chau and 
Phan Thiet, causing heavy civilian casualties. 
They have even mortared the team locations 
of the International Commission of Control 
and Supervision at Tri Ton and Hong Ngu. 

13. In addition to widespread attacks on 
Republic of Vietnam territorial security 
forces, agents of the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam have continued their acts of ter- 
rorism including assassinations, tossing gre- 
nades in public places, minings of public 
thoroughfares and widespread abductions. 

14. Another serious impediment to peace 
is the record of the Democratic Republic of 
Vietnam and the "Provisional Revolution- 
ary Government" of clear and calculated 
obstructionism in the Four Party Joint Mil- 
itary Commission. Both consistently refused 
to participate meaningfully in any Four 


Department of State Bulletin 

Party Joint Military Commission investiga- 
tion which would not benefit their cause. 
Accordingly, they blocked or prevented in- 
vestigation of the downing of a CH-47 heli- 
copter, of the Sa Huynh attack and the Khe 
Sanh missile installation, to cite only three 
representative examples. 

15. The tactic to stall and obstruct was 
also clearly evident in the refusal to deploy 
fully to the field. The North Vietnamese de- 
ployed to only five of the seven regional 
headquarters, and their associates of the 
"Provisional Revolutionary Government" to 
only one. Deployment to sub-regional teams 
was minimal. The "Provisional Revolution- 
ary Government" had less than one quarter 
of its authorized contingent functional at any 
one time. 

16. Thus the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam and the "Provisional Revolutionary 
Government" must bear the respon.sibility 
for failure of the Four Party Joint Military 
Commission to fulfill its assigned functions. 

17. Of particular concern to the United 
States is the failure to date of the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam to provide infor- 
mation about Americans missing in action 
in Indochina or those known to have died 
there, as required by Article 8 (B) of the 
Paris Agreement. 

18. The charges levied against the United 
States by the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam in its note, include the allegation that 
the United States gave "backing" to the 
Government of the Republic of Vietnam in 
failing to observe the ceasefire and thereby 
seriously violated Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Agreement on Ending the War and Restor- 
ing Peace in Vietnam. The entire charge 
is without foundation. The United States 
concentrated instead after January 28 on ob- 
serving the terms of the Agreement scrupu- 
lously by withdrawing its own military forces 
from Vietnam and refraining from partici- 
pating in any hostilities in Vietnam. Any 
arms and military equipment provided to the 
Republic of Vietnam have been strictly in 
accordance with Article 7 of the Paris Agree- 
ment and Article 7 of the Ceasefire Protocol. 

19. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam 

also alleges that the withdrawal of United 
States forces has been concluded in a manner 
at variance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris 
Agreement and accuses the United States of 
failing to withdraw its armaments and dis- 
mantle its bases as required by those 
Articles. Ai-ticle 5, however, required with- 
drawal only of those armaments, munitions, 
and war material which the United States 
(or allies of the United States and the Re- 
public of Vietnam) may have owned in South 
Vietnam at the date of or subsequent to the 
date of entry into force of the Agreement. 
It did not require the withdrawal from South 
Vietnam of any armaments which the United 
States, prior to the entry into force of the 
Agreement, no longer owned because of prior 
transfer. This was the meaning of the phrase 
"of the United States" in Article 5. The same with the same meaning was used in 
Article 6 with respect to military bases to 
be dismantled. The United States has fully 
complied with these provisions. All military 
equipment and military base facilities for- 
merly owned by the United States forces in 
South Vietnam which remained there after 
March 28, had been transferred to the Gov- 
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam prior 
to January 27. 

20. The referenced note makes the fur- 
ther charge that the United States has sup- 
plied arms, munitions, and war materials 
to the Republic of Vietnam in violation of 
the Agreement and its Ceasefire Protocol. 
This charge is simply without merit. Article 
7 of the Agreement permits the South Viet- 
namese parties to replace, on a piece-for- 
piece basis, destroyed, damaged, worn out 
or used up armaments, munitions and war 
material. The United States and the Repub- 
lic of Vietnam have established procedures 
for monitoring arms shipments, to ensure 
compliance with these restrictions, and rec- 
ords are being maintained which verify this 
compliance. Introduction of these replace- 
ments, as well as these records and pro- 
cedures, are always open to inspection and 
observation of the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision and the Two 
Party Joint Military Commission. Introduc- 

May 14, 1973 


tion of these replacements has been re- 
stricted to those three points of entry that 
have been designated by the Republic of 
Vietnam under the terms of the Agreement. 

21. The contention in the note of the Dem- 
ocratic Republic of Vietnam that the United 
States has left behind over 10,000 military 
personnel disguised as civilian advisers has 
no basis in fact and is undoubtedly an at- 
tempt to dravs' attention from the large num- 
bers of North Vietnamese armed forces in 
the South. The United States, in accordance 
with Article 5 of the Peace Agreement, has 
withdrawn its troops and its military and 
police advisers. There remain in South Viet- 
nam only about 200 American military per- 
sonnel, belonging to the Defense Attache 
Office, the Embassy Marine Security Guard 
and the team attempting to resolve the status 
of the missing in action. There are no mili- 
tary persons disguised as civilians. As pub- 
licly stated, the total number of official 
American personnel in South Vietnam is 
less than 9,000, the large majority of whom 
are filling logistics and maintenance func- 
tions which are soon to be taken over by the 
South Vietnamese. 

22. Other Americans are performing the 
kinds of functions conducted by diplomatic, 
consular and AID missions throughout the 
world. The purposes and functions of the 
personnel of the United States remaining in 
South Vietnam are fully known to the Gov- 
ernment of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam and are completely in keeping with the 
January 27 Agreement. 

23. The United States also is accused of 
violating Article 8 of the Act of Paris by 
virtue of its military activities in Laos im- 
mediately after the conclusion of the cease- 
fire agreement between the Lao parties. 
United States military activities since the 
ceasefire have been very limited. They were 
conducted at the request of Prime Minister 
Souvanna Phouma. They were made neces- 
sary by, and were in direct response to, ma- 
jor and flagrant violations of that agreement 
by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao 
forces, specifically the post-ceasefire attacks 
at Pak Song on February 23 and Tha Vieng 
on April 13. 

24. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
further alleges United States violation of the 
"independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial 
integrity and neutrality" of Cambodia by 
continuing to conduct military activities in 
that country. In fact, these activities are 
limited to air support operations in response 
to the continued military operations in Cam- 
bodia by the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam, and were requested by the Khmer 
Republic itself. In late January, the Govern- 
ment of the Khmer Republic suspended all 
offensive operations and the United States 
likewise halted offensive air operations. 
However the reaction of the Democratic Re- 
public of Vietnam and Cambodian forces 
under its control was a total military offen- 
sive, despite obligations assumed by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Article 
20 of the Agreement and Article 8 of the 
Act of Paris. In order to induce compliance 
with those essential provisions, without 
which the entire Vietnam Agreement would 
be endangered, the United States is giving 
air support to the Khmer forces. 

25. With respect to allegations by the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning 
the continued detention of South Vietnamese 
civilians, the Government of the Republic of 
Vietnam will doubtless wish to rebut them, 
but the Government of the United States 
wishes to point out that the "Provisional 
Revolutionary Government" has offered to 
release only several hundred civilian prison- 
ers despite the fact it has captured many 
thousands. This is an issue where reciprocity 
is clearly essential. 

26. The allegation that the United States 
Government was deliberately delaying mine- 
clearing operations is patently false. The 
United States mine-clearing operation has 
progressed as rapidly as safety, available 
forces, weather and restrictions imposed by 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would 
allow. We have been able to adhere to our 
agreed schedule despite the loss of two heli- 
copters. Every available United States mine 
counter-measures unit has been marshalled 
for this operation. In fact, a force signifi- 
cantly greater than that originally proposed 
by the United States and accepted by the 


Department of State Bulletin 

Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been 

27. The fact that only a few mines have 
been observed to explode is completely un- 
derstandable and not at all surprising. As 
has been carefully explained to the Demo- 
cratic ReiHiblic of Vietnam rei)resentatives 
on numerous occasions, the mines have a 
variable neutralization capability that can 
be projrrammed and which has resulted in 
the neutralization of most of them by now. 
Nevertheless, adequate safety cannot be 
guaranteed unless all affected areas are 
methodically swept with proper equipment 
by highly trained personnel. 

28. However, in view of the many serious 
violations of other provisions of the Agree- 
ment by the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
nam, which have been discussed above, the 
United States has decided to suspend its mine 
clearance operations. This suspension is jus- 
tified as a response to the numerous material 
breaches of the Agreement by the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Vietnam in accordance 

I with the rule of international law that a 
' material breach of an international agree- 
ment by one party entitles the other party 
to suspend operation of the Agreement in 
whole or in part. This rule of customary in- 
ternational law is set forth in Article 60 
of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treat- 
ies. The United States is, of course, prepared 
to resume mine clearance operations as soon 
as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam be- 
gins to act in compliance with its obligations 
under the Agreement. 

29. The Government of the United States 
thus categorically rejects the general and 
the specific charges that it has violated the 
terms of the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. For its 
part, except as noted above, the Government 
of the United States again afl^rms its in- 
tention to adhere to the terms of the Agree- 
ment of January 27 and will exert its best 
efforts to help bring about a lasting peace 
in Indochina. It calls on the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam and all other parties to 
the Final Act of the International Con- 
ference on Vietnam to lend their support to 
this endeavor. 

Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy 
Visits the United States 

Giulio Andreotti, President of the Council 
of Ministers of the Itnlian Republic, nutde 
an official visit to the United States April 
16-22. He met with President Nixon and 
other government officials at Washington 
April 17-19. Following are an exchange of 
greetings between President Nixon and 
Prime Minister Andreotti at a welcoming 
ccremonij on the South Laivn of the White 
House on April 17 and their exchange of 
toasts at a dinner at the White House that 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 23 

President Nixon 

Mr. Prime Minister and ladies and gentle- 
men: There are many reasons why we are 
very honored to w^elcome the Prime Minister 
to Washington on this occasion. One of them 
is that we think of the great debt that we in 
America owe to Italy, and particularly to 
those of Italian descent. We think of the debt 
we owe in the field of art, music, religion, 
but most of all, in terms just of people, the 
millions of people who are proud of their 
Italian background but who are also proud 
to be Americans. 

We have, of course, an example of what 
those of Italian background have contributed 
to our Nation in our Ambassador to Italy — 
businessman, Governor, Cabinet officer, now 
Ambassador. This indicates how in field after 
field those of Italian background have en- 
riched America, have added to our leadership, 
and have helped to make us a great people 
and a great country. 

Mr. Prime Minister, we are also honored 
to welcome you because of your position of 
leadership, strong leadershij), of one of 
America's strongest friends and best allies 
in the world. We have stood together since 
the end of World War II. We shall stand to- 
gether in peace in the years ahead; and as I 

May 14, 1973 


think of the subjects that we will be discuss- 
ing today, the subjects of security, of trade, 
areas that will contribute to peace, not only 
in Europe and the Mediterranean but in the 
world, but will also contribute to prosperity, 
a better life for the people of Italy and the 
people of America, the people of the world, I 
realize how much our talks can contribute to 
those goals. 

As we meet during these two days, I am 
sure it will someday be recorded that Italy 
and the United States on this occasion not 
only renewed an old friendship and re- 
asserted it, but we began the structure of a 
new relationship, not only between the United 
States and Italy but between the United 
States and the new Europe, a new relation- 
ship which can bring a better life to all of 
our people on both sides of the Atlantic. 

So, Mr. Prime Minister, for these and 
many other reasons, as you come here to the 
White House, you receive not only a warm 
welcome here; but every place you go in 
America, the hearts of America will go out 
to you and the people you represent. 

Prime Minister Andreotti 

Mr. President: I am very grateful for the 
warm welcome which you just gave me and 
for the repeated invitation which you sent 
me to come to the United States. 

I share with you this deep sense of con- 
nection and of ties which we have between 
our two countries, and I must say that these 
feelings were strengthened when we received 
in Rome the new American Ambassador a 
few weeks ago. That was really a historic 
moment for us, and it was a kind of moral 
victory for those millions of Italians who 
came to America for more than one century 
to find a job here. Most of them found this 
job, and thus they contributed to the develop- 
ment of this second homeland. Others were 
less successful; and we were thinking espe- 
cially of these latter Italians and Italo- 
Americans when we received with great joy 
your new Ambassador, John Volpe, in Rome. 

Mr. President, when you were reelected a 

few months ago for a second term with a 
great number of votes, we rejoiced on the 
other side of the Atlantic for your reelection. 
We are very much convinced by what one of 
your closest collaborators once said, that is 
to say, that the union between the United 
States and Europe is the cornerstone of the 
peace structure in the world. And when you 
dedicated this year as the year of peace and 
the year of Europe, we felt that your political 
commitment was being met in a faithful 

For 25 years now the United States and 
Europe have defended the peace against the 
war, against new wars, and they have thus 
laid the foundations for a world of detente. 

Your great prestige, Mr. President, has 
contributed greatly to this fact, and the great 
prestige which you have not only in Western 
countries but also many Socialist countries 
is not in contradiction with the Atlantic 
security policy. On the contrary, this is the 
logical development of this policy toward 
peace in the whole world. 

Today we are confronted by new problems, 
as you mentioned, and we are going to dis- 
cuss these problems during these two days. 
But these problems should be seen in this 
prospect: We want to create a great era in 
the world, an era of peace and prosperity 
where the peoples of Europe and of the 
United States may raise even more their 
quality of life — and not against the rest of 
the world but as pioneers of a universal and 
integral democracy. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 23 

President Nixon 

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Andreotti, 
Mr. Vice President and Mrs. Agnew, and all 
of our distinguished guests: Mr. Prime Min- 
ister, it is my privilege to tell you something 
about this audience here in the State Dining 
Room and their presence in honoring you. 
It is only coincidental that included in the 


Department of State Bulletin 

audience are peojile like Mayor Rizzo from 
the City of Philadelphia; Mr. Peter Fosco, 
a major labor leader of this country ; a U.S. 
Cong-ressman, Silvio Conte; a Senator by the 
name of Pastore and another by the name 
(if Domenici; and an Ambassador to the 
I'nited Xations by the name of Scali — only 
I'dincidental — jind that the red wine we had 
tonigrht is Louis Martini from California. 

I am simply trying: to say, Mr. Prime Min- 
ister, that in America, as you know so well, 
we are very prateful for the contribution 
that has been made to this Nation by the 
Mills and daughters of Italian background. 
We would like to have all of them here to- 
night to honor you, but the room will not 
.seat 10 million. 

And now to those who are here, I would 
like to present the Prime Minister. When I 
%\ as a freshman Congressman in 1947, I took 
my first trip to Europe. I spent three weeks 
in Italy, studying the needs of Italy for re- 
construction, which eventually ended in the 
Marshall plan. I met many outstanding lead- 
ers on that trip, but I was fortunate to meet 
and know one of the giants. 

We think back to that period, 27 years 
ago — Churchill, Eisenhower, Adenauer, De 
Gaulle. But a name not forgotten by any who 
knew him, but perhaps not well remembered 
by people who did not live through that pe- 
riod, one of the true giants of the postwar 
period, one of the men who helped to build 
the free Atlantic community that we pres- 
ently enjoy, was Alcide de Gasperi. 
I I remember how I, as a freshman Con- 
gressman, was impressed by this eloquent, 
sincere, intelligent, and very strong man. 
And it is interesting to me that the man 
whom we honor tonight has written a book 
about De Gasperi and that many in his coun- 
try and in the world say that Prime Minister 
Andreotti is in the tradition of De Gasperi. 

I have talked to him today; I know his 
background. I can only say that our honored 
guest is in that great tradition. He leads a 
strong nation and a strong people, and like 
De Gasperi, he is a strong man — the kind of 

a man that his nation, his people, and the 
free world needs at this time. 

And for that reason, and many others, I 
know all of you will want to join me in a 
toast to Prime Minister Andreotti and Mrs. 
Andreotti. To the Prime Minister: Salute. 

Prime Minister Andreotti 

Mr. President: I wish to thank you, first 
of all — to repeat my warm thanks to you 
and to Mrs. Nixon for your very kind hospi- 
tality and reception. And I would like to con- 
tinue in what you just said, and to the figure 
of De Gasperi whom you just remembered, 
by saying that De Gasperi taught us two 
things: First, there are no problems of one 
nation; there are only problems of the entire 
world. And secondly, he taught us that one 
should never be afraid of things even when 
something is very difficult and in fact he was 
not afraid of forming a government without 
Communists and without Socialists at a time 
when this seemed impossible. 

The third thing which De Gasperi taught 
us was to initiate the creation of a united 
Europe and at the same time to maintain 
the solidarity and friendship between Europe 
and the United States. 

I think that in the few words which I 
would like to say tonight, I may quote a sen- 
tence of Thomas JeflFerson, who said in 1801, 
"Peace, trade, honorable friendship with all, 
and close alliances with few." 

So this should be our star, the star which 
should always guide us and inspire us in our 

This morning at the lunch offered by the 
Secretary of State, I said that history teaches 
us one thing: that every time that Italy and 
Europe went in the same direction as the 
United States, things went well for the entire 
world, and the opposite was true when there 
was disagreement or a lack of friendship 
between Europe or Italy and the United 
States. And this should inspire us; this should 
serve us as inspiration for the future and for 
our political action. 

You invited here tonight, Mr. President, 


May 14, 1973 


some representatives of those people who do 
not lose their Italian characteristics, al- 
though being very deeply American, and who 
transmit to their children those which are 
the best characteristics, which make the 
healthiest and best Italians; that is to say, 
the sentiment of family and of work. 

These characteristics of Italo-Americans 
insure forever a very deep friendship be- 
tween Italians and Americans; and I might 
quote as an example of this, the fact that 
when President Lincoln died, the citizens of 
Rome sent to the United States a stone which 
had been taken from the tomb of Servius 
Tullius, one of the ancient Roman kings, 
who was the first king who liberated the 
poorer classes of Rome and who gave some 
hope to the humble layers of the population. 

So in the past, the United States was a 
kind of road to expectations for these Ital- 
ians. Some of them had a very brilliant ca- 
reer and life in the United States. Some 
others were less successful. But we wish to 
unite all of them and to remember here their 
joys, their successes, their victories, or their 

There are so many Italians in every State 
of the United States that this morning at 
lunch when I met with Mr. Molisani [How- 
ard Molisani, president, United Italian- 
American Labor Council] and astronaut 
[Michael] Collins, I told him, "At least you 
are not Italian," and he told me, "No, I am 
not Italian but I was born in Rome." 

Mr. President, I am not going to talk poli- 
tics. The political orientations which inspire 
you and which are based on a very moral con- 
ception of public life, however, are something 
for which all free men and the entire world 
should be grateful to you. And in the difficult 
road which leads us to peace and to a better 
standard of living for all the humble people in 
all nations, your leadership is certainly a de- 
cisive factor in order to achieve victories in 
this very hard struggle. 

I would like to say two small things. First 
of all, I would like to present my respects to 
Mrs. [Clare Boothe] Luce, who was the Am- 
bassador of your country in Rome. She was 

very much respected and loved and she was 
very good at understanding our country, and 
she had much affection for Italy and, I must 
say, this aflfection is still today very largely 

Then, Mr. President, I am very grateful 
to you and to Mrs. Nixon for inviting Frank 
Sinatra. I am going to be able to listen to 
him singing here. This is something which 
will give much prestige to me with my chil- 
dren. [Laughter.] 

And lastly, let me use one symbol which 
was offered to me. The prophet Isaiah said 
that you should change your swords into 
plows. Now Secretary Rogers changed 
swords into harps, since at lunch I saw an 
Army sergeant playing the harp. President 
Nixon changes swords into violins and cellos, 
because we saw military men playing violins 
and cellos. So let me hold this as a symbol 
for a better future in which we will have 
better men and peace. 

And in this spirit, Mr. President, may I 
raise my glass to your health, to the well- 
being of Mrs. Nixon, and to the greatness 
and prosperity of the American people. 

United States and Canada Discuss 
Fisheries Problems 

Press release 112 dated April 16 

Delegations of the United States and 
Canada met at Washington from April 10 to 
14 and considered a wide range of fisheries 
problems of mutual concern to the two coun- 
tries. The meeting had as a primary purpose 
the review of the provisions of the agreement 
of April 1970 on fishing within reciprocal 
fishing areas off the coasts of the two coun- 
tries and consideration of future such ar- 
rangements. The U.S. delegation was led by 
Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Coordi- 
nator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant 
for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary 
of State; and the Canadian delegation was 
headed by C. R. Levelton, Director General 


Department of State Bulletin d 

(Operations) of the Fisheries and Marine 
Service, Department of the Environment. 

The two delegations found broad areas of 
potential agreement in most of the issues con- 
fronting them with respect to both the At- 
lantic and Pacific coasts. A major subject of 
discussion was the provision of the 1970 
agreement repardingr fishing for Pacific sal- 
mon within the reciprocal fishing areas off 
Vancouver Island and the State of Washing- 
ton. Certain serious differences had arisen as 
to whether this i)rovision should be deleted 
or be retained or be modified in some way. 
The U.S. delegation proposed that the sal- 
mon-fishing privilege be deleted, whereas the 
Canadian delegation considered that it should 
be retained as part of the overall agreement. 
In view of this difference, various solutions 
were considered which would involve varying 
degrees of reduction of the salmon fishery in 
the reciprocal areas. 

In considering the salmon question, how- 
ever, a major difl^culty was that discussions 
are scheduled for early May concerning a 
much broader range of matters of mutual 
concern regarding the Pacific salmon fisher- 
ies of the two countries. In light of this and 
of other difficulties the delegations agreed to 
recommend to governments that the immedi- 
ate question be held in abeyance for a brief 
period pending the outcome of the talks in 
May and that, in effect, the agreement be ex- 
tended for a short time to effect this purpose. 

This decision left unsettled, of course, 
various other issues of importance regarding 
the fisheries on both the Atlantic and Pacific. 

Though iirospects ajipeared good for satis- 
factory solution of many of these problems, 
final decisions could not be reached at this 
time and must await the outcome of possible 
future discussions. 

Mr. Pollner Named U.S. Candidate 
for U.N. Narcotics Control Board 

Secretary Rogers announced on April 20 
(unnumbered press release) the nomination 
of Martin R. Pollner, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retaiy of the Treasury for Enforcement and 
Director, Office of Law Enforcement, as the 
U.S. candidate for election to the Interna- 
tional Narcotics Control Board (INCB) 
for a three-year term to begin March 2, 
1974. (For biographic data, see unnum- 
bered press release dated April 20.) 

The International Narcotics Control Board, 
established by the 1961 Single Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs, is the U.N. body which 
reviews and monitors the licit drug require- 
ments of all nations and is empowered to 
take semijudicial measures and call upon 
governments for remedial action of treaty 
violations involving diversion of drugs into 
illicit channels. Election to the INCB is by 
vote of the U.N. Economic and Social Coun- 
cil, which was to take place in mid-May. 
The 11 members of INCB are elected for 
three-year terms from among candidates 
proposed by member governments and the 
World Health Organization. 

May 14, 1973 



International Conference Concludes Convention 
on Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife 

A Plenipotentiary Conference To Conclude 
an Intei-national Convention on Trade in 
Certain Species of Wildlife was held at Wash- 
ington February 12-March 2. Following are 
remarks made by Secretary of the Interior 
Rogers C. B. Morton on February 12, a mes- 
sage from President Nixon read by Secre- 
tary Morton that day, and statements made 
on Febrivai-y 12 and March 2 by Russell E. 
Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental 
Quality, who ivas head of the U.S. delega- 
tion, together ivith the report of the U.S. 
delegation, excerpts from the final act of the 
conference, and the text of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Spe- 
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora. 


It is a great pleasure for me to welcome 
the delegates to this important conference. 
You are here today not merely as the repre- 
sentatives of individual nations but in a true 
sense as the representatives of mankind in a 
meeting with his own conscience. In our 
molding the world to fit human needs, we 
have taken upon our conscience the respon- 
sibility for the other species that we threaten, 
yet are privileged to share the bounties of 
this planet. Their evolution down the cen- 
turies has not equipped them to contest man's 
supremacy; if they are to survive it must be 
owing to man's self-control. 

Today all men share the bond of concern 
for the future of our planet. That bond is 
impervious to geographic, cultural, or ideo- 
logical influences. Last year at the Stock- 
holm Conference, we crossed the threshold of 

an era where all nations and all men agree 
to work together to save our natural herit- 
age and protect our environment. What you 
do at this conference is an important part of 
that new international endeavor. For the 
threat to the wildlife of our earth — the leop- 
ards of the Serengeti, the polar bear of the 
Arctic, the whales under the sea — is in a 
sense a part of the threat to mankind from 
the degradation of his environment. 

It is ironic that men can move so rapidly 
in doing harm to the environment and so 
slowly in protecting it. This conference had 
a long incubation period, going back at least 
a decade to the original efforts of the Inter- 
national Union for the Conservation of Na- 
ture and Natural Resources (lUCN) in 1963. 

But time is moving on, and for many spe- 
cies it is moving against the future of our 
wildlife. The rate of extinction has been on 
the rise dramatically. Of the recorded ex- 
tinctions of mammals over the last 2,000 
years, fully half have met their final fate 
within the last 60 years. It is sad to acknowl- 
edge to ourselves that during the 10 years 
we have been preparing for this meeting, 
perhaps 8 percent of all recorded mammal 
extinctions have taken place. My fellow citi- 
zens of the world, our task is urgent. 

Our task is by its very nature a truly in- 
ternational endeavor. In the final analysis, 
each country must carry the burden of pro- 
tecting its own wildlife. But we have found 
that so long as international trade in wild- 
life is not controlled, the individual country 
acting alone is not able to act effectively to 
protect its native species which are threat- 
ened or endangered. If the demand is not 
controlled, the supplier nation cannot move 


Department of State Bulletin 

i I 

effectively to protect itself. And even if one 

country acts to control its own demands — as 

the I'nited States has in its Endangered 

Species Protection Act of lOfJO and the Lacey 

Act — the demand will merely move from that 

1 country to another, and the market still cre- 

, ates the same insoluble iiroblem for the sup- 

: plier country. Experience makes it clear: 

1 Unless we all act together to control trade in 

the endangered species, none of us will be 

able to act as effectively as we must to iiro- 

tect what is precious and is our own. 

Therefore, you do have a vital and urgent 
task before you at this conference. In con- 
cluding this convention, you are performing 
' an honorable duty before future generations. 
I You are showing man's responsibility in 
safeguarding the fragile legacy of the wild 
I species of our world. 

In welcoming you on behalf of the U.S. 
Government, I assure you that the people of 
this country — and truly all the peoples of the 
world — salute you in what you are doing. 


On behalf of my fellow citizens I extend a 
warm welcome to the delegates from around 
the world who have come to the United 
States to participate in this Endangered Spe- 
cies Conference. I continue to be hopeful 
about the prospects of international coopera- 
tion in the environmental field. It is encour- 
aging that the common search for a better 
environment can be one of those activities 
which serves to unify nations, and the United 
States remains fii-mly committed to further- 
ing the development of such cooperation. 

The rate of extinction of wildlife species 
is increasing alarmingly around the world. 
At least one of every ten species of wildlife 
is subject to serious threat. In the United 
States alone we consider fifteen percent of 
the forms of our wildlife to be endangered. 

We have taken many important steps to 
reverse this trend. So have the nations which 
you represent. But all of us have found that 
ongoing international trade involving the 
endangered species is a major threat to these 
efforts. And all of us are determined to deal 

with this iiroblem directly through a strong 
convention backed by vigorous national in- 
terest and action. I applaud you for the con- 
structive partnership you have formed to 
meet a challenge that is everywhere recog- 
nized as the responsibility of all nations. You 
have a historic opportunity to work together 
for the common good, and I wish you every 
success in your deliberations. 

Richard Nixon. 


As chairman of the host country delega- 
tion, let me first add my sincere welcome to 
that of President Nixon and Secretary Mor- 

This conference represents another mile- 
stone in the history of international environ- 
mental cooperation. The need to protect 
endangered species of life is a global need, 
one that is of legitimate concern to all peoples 
and all nations. It is a matter of urgency 
that we proceed now with expedition to de- 
velop a convention which can come into force 
at an early date. I am confident that we shall 
achieve this goal. 

We are demonstrating here that nations of 
diverse interests, in differing stages of de- 
velopment, and with differing national prior- 
ities, can work together cooperatively and 
effectively for the i^rotection of our global 
environment. We bring different perspectives 
to bear on these problems, but we have in 
common an overriding self-interest in main- 
taining the health of the natural systems of 
the earth. We hold these in trust for the 

This conference is of particular personal 
significance to me. My own career in environ- 
mental activities came about through an ini- 
tial strong interest in African wildlife. 
Concern for its survival led first to my par- 
ticipating in the founding of the African 
Wildlife Leadership Foundation in 1959, 
which I then headed. The foundation's pro- 
grams emphasized education to help the 
newly independent countries of Africa de- 
velop the capacity to manage their own wild- 

May 14, 1973 


life and national park resources. My 
subsequent broadening concern with wildlife 
and environmental problems on a worldwide 
basis led to executive board membership on 
the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources and vice pres- 
idency of the U.S. World Wildlife Fund, of 
which I was a founder. Thus I followed with 
great interest the lUCN conservation con- 
ference in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1961, where 
my colleague and fellow delegate, Dr. Lee 
Talbot, chaired a group which proposed an 
international convention on trade in endan- 
gered species. Two years later, I participated 
in the lUCN general assembly in Nairobi 
when it was decided that lUCN would take 
steps to initiate the convention we are meet- 
ing here to conclude. In 1969, as Under Sec- 
retary of the Interior, I testified in strong 
support of the Endangered Species Protec- 
tion Act, which called for this conference. 
Consequently, I view the occasion of this 
conference with very great personal satis- 

Secretary Morton in his opening remarks 
clearly presented the need for international 
action to protect endangered species through 
control of trade. He spoke of the need for 
urgency. This point can hardly be overem- 
phasized. The pace of bureaucracies is slow 
and deliberate, but the pace of extermina- 
tions is rapid and accelerating. The rate of 
extermination of mammals has increased 55- 
fold during the past century and a half. Our 
records of mammal exterminations extend 
back about 2,000 years; yet about half of 
these losses have taken place during the past 
60 years. Think of it — 50 percent of the total 
exterminations in only the last 3 percent of 
this period — and we have been deliberating 
this convention for over 10 of these years. 
The longer we continue to delay action the 
more losses of our irreplaceable plants and 
animals we assure. 

Recognizing this real urgency, and in re- 
sponse to the specific recommendation of the 
Stockholm Conference as well as our own 
Endangered Species Act of 1969, our govern- 
ment has convened this as a plenipotentiary 
conference. It is our hope that the resulting 

convention, so long under consideration al- 
ready, can be signed without delay. 

Also recognizing the real urgency involved, 
we have accepted and endorsed the proposals 
that the convention come into force following 
ratification by 10 nations rather than a larger 
number, which would almost certainly in- 
volve further delay. 

I would emphasize that the basic objective 
of this proposed convention is conservation — 
to help assure that presently endangered spe- 
cies do not become extinct and that species 
presently safe do not become endangered. 

The convention would seek to accomplish 
this through an effective system of control 
over trade in threatened species. We all rec- 
ognize that trade is not the only factor oper- 
ating to endanger species, but it is a very 
important factor in a number of cases. Trade 
involves movements both of live specimens 
and of their parts and products. To be effec- 
tive, this convention absolutely must cover 

Trade in products of animals has been a 
major factor in past exterminations and 
present endangerment. Some species of little 
importance in the live-animal trade are en- 
dangered almost solely because of the de- 
mand for their products. This is as true today 
for the great trade in crocodile hides as it 
was during the last century for trade in bird 

Consider, for example, three endangered 
species which have been proposed for pro- 
tection under this convention. The figures 
speak for themselves. In 1969, prior to en- 
forcement of specific national controls, the 
United States imported the whole raw hides 
of 7,934 leopards, 1,885 cheetahs, and 113,069 
ocelots. These incredible figures are a shock- 
ing indictment of man's greed — and woman's 
vanity. The figures, with the present status of 
these species, testify eloquently to the need 
for this convention and to the absolutely 
essential requirement that the convention 
cover products as well as live specimens. 

But control of the trade in live specimens 
is no less imperative. Few people are aware 
of the tremendous volume of trade in live 
animals for the pet trade, zoos, and medical 


Department of State Bulletin 

research. In 1971 the United States imported 
103,500 live mammals. 995.000 live birds, 
391,000 live amphibians, 1,404,200 live rep- 
tiles, and 98.971,000 live fish. It should be 
clear to all that the stocks of many wild spe- 
cies simply cannot continue to meet this 
enormous demand, and it has already led to 
the near-extinction of many species. In 1970 
over 550 cats of species now proposed for 
appendix I of this convention were imported 
live into the United States. These included 
cheetahs, snow leoi)ards, tig:er cats, margays, 
and ocelots. In the same year 2,397 primates 
representing- eight species on the proposed 
appendix I were imported, including 150 
golden lion marmosets — a total roughly equal 
to the present estimated total wild popula- 
tion. One can only feel a sense of outrage at 
such statistics. They represent a truly black 
page in mankind's history. And while I have 
made reference to figures for my country, 
proportional volumes of such imjwrts can be 
found for most other consumer countries. 

In the light of such figures, there simply 
cannot be any serious question of the need 
for control of this trade. When the United 
States initiated national controls, serious 
questions were raised about their practical- 
ity and workability. We have now had seven 
years' experience with such controls over 
both live animals and all products of listed 
species. We have found that such a system 
can work. In the opinion of our specialists 
who operate our system, the import and ex- 
port permit system proposed in the working 
paper would be more easily implemented 
than the one which we presently operate. In 
the discussions in the coming days, our 
specialists will be available to share our expe- 
rience in practical implementation. We recog- 
nize, of course, that any system of controls 
presents problems, but we are convinced that 
I they are not insoluble. In fact enforcement of 
the pi'oposed convention should offer far less 
problems than the enforcement of controls 
on currency, drugs, and gems, which nearly 
all nations currently operate. 

Since the basic objective of the convention 
is conservation of the world's endangered 
wildlife, it is clear to us that the controls 

must apply to all endangered wildlife, re- 
gardless of whether or not they originated 
within a nation's sovereign territory. In part, 
the trade controls proposed by this conven- 
tion operate when endangered species, or 
their i)roducts, are transported across inter- 
national borders. From the standpoint of the 
species, and consequently of this convention, 
it makes no diflPerence whether the trade in- 
volves movement into a state of a specimen 
which originated within another state or 
which originated outside of any such state. 
Consequently, we regard the inclusion under 
this convention of specimens admitted from 
the sea. from outside any state of origin, as 
absolutely essential. 

Many endangered species, such as the blue 
whale, hawksbill turtle, monk seals, and some 
sea birds, are found in, on, or over interna- 
tional waters all or part of each year. Some 
such species which are involved in trade are 
comi)letely unprotected. Others have some 
protection by other international agreements, 
such as the International Whaling Conven- 
tion. However, in such cases, the existing 
agreement for the most part only involves 
those nations immediately involved in or in- 
terested in exploitation of the species in ques- 
tion — and sometimes not all such nations, as 
in the case of the whaling convention — and 
they deal primarily with methods and levels 
of exijloitation, but not trade. The proposed 
convention potentially would cover all na- 
tions and would deal with trade, not actual 
exploitation. Consequently, it would be com- 
plementary to and supportive of those few 
existing other agreements. 

It should also be noted that article 12 of 
the working paper specifically precludes this 
convention from infringing upon other in- 
ternational agreements. 

The world's endangered wildlife, includ- 
ing both animals and plants, is not uniformly 
threatened. Some species are in critical dan- 
ger. Other species are not yet critically 
threatened but are likely to become so unless 
adequate control is enforced over their trade. 
Con.sequently we support the concept of an 
appendix I, listing the critical cases, and an 
appendix II, for the potentially endangered 

May 14, 1973 


ones. Appendix I species are in such short 
supply that no trade at ail should be allowed 
except for purposes of propagation where 
such trade will not further endanger the spe- 
cies and where the objective is to increase its 
numbers for ultimate reintroduction into the 
wild. These specimens would require both 
export and import permits, since such a dual 
system is deemed essential to protect those 
few highly vulnerable species. For the less 
vulnerable appendix II species, trade would 
be controlled, not prohibited, and an export 
permit only would be required. 

We have endorsed the proposal by the 
Government of Kenya that the convention 
should include an appendix III. This allows 
a nation to list species which it wishes to pro- 
tect because it considers the species endan- 
gered within its borders, even though it may 
not be endangered elsewhere. In essence, the 
provision of appendix III means that the 
signatory nations agree to respect the con- 
servation laws of the other countries by re- 
fusing to import certain species which have 
been taken illegally in the country of origin. 
This is an international extension of the 
Lacey Act, an American law prohibiting im- 
port of specimens taken illegally in their 
country of origin. We have found this system 
workable; and the provision of uniform ex- 
port permits, called for by the convention, 
would make the system considerably more 
easily enforced than it is at present. 

I wish to emphasize here that the a]3pen- 
dices cannot be static things. As our knowl- 
edge increases and as the status of various 
species changes, we will need to amend and 
re-amend the lists. Further, as we come to 
know more about the status of the other liv- 
ing things with which we share the earth, 
we may need to include more types of plants 
and animals. The appendices which we de- 
cide upon at this conference therefore really 
represent only starting points. At the same 
time, we believe that the appendices should 
only contain species which are affected, or 
are likely to be affected, by trade. They are 
not to be a catalogue of all endangered 

We are breaking new ground with this 

convention. We should not underestimate the 
difficulty of our work during these next three 
weeks; yet we must not overestimate it 
either. In the working paper we have the 
results of nearly 10 years of consideration 
and revisions representing contributions 
from many national governments and indi- 
viduals. It is not perfect; and my delegation, 
among others, will suggest some minor 
changes. However, the paper provides a 
thorough and well-thought-out basis for our 

I am confident that we will bear in mind 
the urgency of the problem that faces us 
and that we will produce an agreed conven- 
tion of which we can be proud and for which 
those who follow us can be grateful. We have 
a historic opportunity. 


Today over 80 nations have signed the 
final act of an international conference to 
provide protection for endangered wildlife. 
The United States is highly gratified with the 
agreement reached. All the major objectives 
of the conference have been achieved after 
intense and fruitful negotiation. Delegates of 
all nations have worked together in a spirit 
of harmony and dedication, and all have 
shown a willingness to compromise in order 
to achieve our overall objectives. On behalf 
of the host nation, I warmly congratulate all 
delegations on this spirit which has con- 
tributed so much to today's historic event. 

Today, however, we should also add a note 
of caution to our elation and optimism. 

It will probably be some months before 
this convention is ratified by the 10 nations 
required for it to come into force. In addi- 
tion, it will be considerably longer before the 
80 nations present today have all ratified the 

During this period all nations must be 
especially protective of their endangered 
wildlife. The appendices to this convention 
could, in the hands of unscrupulous persons, 
be used as a "shopping list" of plants and 
animals. The knowledge that these species 


Department of State Bulletin 

are to be controlled, together with the }rrand- 
father clause exempting hides and goods 
taken prior to the convention cominp into 
force, could create high demand and iirices 
for these poods. 

Theiefore, before the strict controls insti- 
tuted by this convention become effective, a 
special and destructive demand could be cre- 
ated for those very species the convention is 
designed to protect. For our part, the United 
States will do everything in its power to 
guard against this threat, and I warn those 
who would seek to profit from this situation 
that they will be running very high risks 
indeed. I also jioint out that only this past 
month President Nixon submitted to the 
Congress new legislation strengthening our 
own controls over the trade in rare and en- 
dangered species. 

We urge all nations to redouble their pres- 
ent efforts in enforcement, provide imple- 
menting legislation for this convention, and 
ratify the convention as rapidly as possible. 


1. Summary 

The Government of the United States in- 
vited States members of the United Nations, 
or of any of the Specialized Agencies of the 
United Nations, or of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, or parties to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
to participate in a Pleni])otentiary Confer- 
ence to Conclude an International Convention 
on Trade in Certain Species of Wildlife, 
which was held at Washington, D.C., from 
February 12 through March 2, 1973. Both the 
Peoples Republic of China and the Republic 
of China declined. Both the Federal Republic 
i)f Germany and the German Democratic Re- 
public attended. The convening of this 
Conference had been called for in the Endan- 
gered Species Conservation Act of 1969, in a 
Recommendation of the United Nations Con- 
ference on the Human Environment held at 
Stockholm in .June, 1972, and in a Resolution 
of the 11th General Assembly of the Inter- 

• Submitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Train 
on Apr. 13. 

national Union for the Con.servation of Na- 
ture and Natural Resources (lUCN) at 
Banff in September, 1972. 

Representatives of eighty Governments 
participated in the meeting. Also attending 
were Observer Delegations from eight Gov- 
ernments and seven international organiza- 
tions (Attachment A) [final act of the 
conference]. The Conference resolved to open 
the Convention for signature at Washington 
until ."^0 April 1973 and, thereafter, at Berne 
until 31 December 1974. Twenty-nine na- 
tions have so far signed the Convention. 

The title of the treaty became the Con- 
vention on International Trade in En- 
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(Attachment B). The text of the Convention 
is consonant with the Endangered Species 
Act of 1969 and the Marine Mammal Pro- 
tection Act of 1972. Implementing legis- 
lation could be provided by modification 
of the proposed Endangered Species Con- 
servation Act of 1973 that the Adminis- 
tration has submitted to the Congress. 


(A) Earlier International Conservation 
Of all the species of wild animals and 
plants found throughout the world, at least 
one of ten is believed to be threatened with 
extinction. The primary threat to some is in 
the destruction of their natural habitat, but 
to many the greatest danger is extermination 
due to the commercial demand of interna- 
tional trade. This trade involves dead ani- 
mals as trophies or as skins, such as those of 
spotted cats and crocodilians, as well as live 
animals for the pet trade, public display, or 
medical research. In many cases, the demand 
is great because the price offered in "con- 
suming nations" is so high that the "pro- 
ducing nations" are unable to control their 
exploitation. In the case of mammals alone, 
nearly 60 percent of recorded extermina- 
tions have occurred in the 20th century — in 
less than 4 percent of the 2,000 years of 
record. In earlier years, the extermination 
of many species of wildlife caused little in- 
ternational concern. This situation has now 

May 14, 1973 


changed dramatically, and the number and 
scope of international agreements for the 
preservation of wildlife is mounting rapidly. 

Most of the many treaties for t