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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

\'olume LXMII

No. 1762

April 2, 1973

SECRETARY ROGERS INTERVIEWED ON "FACE THE NATION"
Transcript of Interview 373

DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH INTERVIEWED FOR GERMAN TELEVISION

TranscHpt of Interview 381

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD SOUTH ASIA
Statement by Assistant Secretai-y Sisco A03

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN!

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1762
April 2, 1973

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I

ntf

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

Following is the transcript of an intervietv
tcith Secretary Rogers on the Columbia
Broadcasting Systein's television and radio
program "Face the Nation" on March 11.
Interviewing the Secretai'y were George
Herman of CBS News, James Keat of the
Baltimore Sun, and Barry Serafin of CBS
Neivs.

Press release 76 dated March 13

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretai'y, Canadian Am-
bassador Michel Gauvin [Chief, Canadian
delegation to the International Commission of
Control and Supervision (ICCS)} charges
that the International Commission charged
ifith keeping the peace in Viet-Nam is para-
lyzed by the refusal of Communist delegates
to investigate charges of violations. Do you
think Canada actually is going to leave the
Commission as Mr. Gauvin suggests?

Secretary Rogers: Mr. Herman, we don't
know, of course. It's a decision that Canada
will have to make. We hope very much that
Canada will decide to continue to serve on
that Commission, because it plays a vitally
important role in supervision of the peace
agreement.' I noticed that the complaint
really involved a missile site at Khe Sanh,
and I'm pleased to report here this morning
that the missile site has been removed from
Khe Sanh. That was announced by our mili-
tary command in Saigon. So I think that the
Canadian activity in connection with the
supervision has been effective, although they
did not inspect this site at Khe Sanh. The
fact that they made the complaint public and
insisted on seeing it, I think resulted in the

removal of that missile site. So I think that
Canada's role is vitally important, and I hope
very much that it will continue to serve as a
member of the international supervisory
commission.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, aside from the
settlement of the problems at Khe Saiih, do
you think that the Control Com,mission, the
four-party Control Commission, is, as the
Canadians charge, hamstrung by the refusal
of the Communist delegates to investigate
something until there is first some proof?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think it's a little
early to say, Mr. Herman. Obviously in a sit-
uation of this kind that's so complex, sorting
out the procedures takes a little time. We
were disappointed that the Commission was
not able to move about as freely as they felt
that they should, but I believe that all parties
concerned have decided that the peace agree-
ment should work, and I think that as time
goes on we will find that the procedures will
be worked out satisfactorily and that the
Commission will be able to be effective in
supervising the cease-fire.

Mr. Keat: Mr. Secretary, does the provi-
sion in the agreement you signed in Paris
about a week ago reqtiiring consultation
among the 12 parties rule out or in any way
restrict our ability to use force, airpower
perhaps, in case of a really massive violation
of the cease-fire in the South in the future? -

Secretary Rogers: Well, we're not talking
about using airpower in South Viet-Nam.
We expect this peace agreement to succeed,
and I'm convinced — as I think all of those

' For texts of the Agreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam and the protocols
to the agreement signed at Paris on Jan. 27, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.

' For text of the Act of the International Con-
ference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris on Mar. 2, see
Bulletin of Mar. 26, 1972, p. 345.

April 2, 1973

373

who've dealt with this subject are convinced
— that it's going to work, so we're not talking
about the use of airpower. I'm convinced
from my discussions with the North Viet-
namese, and Henry Kissinger's discussions
with the North Vietnamese and Ambassador
Sullivan's [William H. Sullivan, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs] discussions, that they've decided that
force is not the way to solve the problems of
Indochina. So we think it's going to work,
and we're not going to talk about any mili-
tary threats in the event of a violation of the
cease-fire. We don't think it's going to be
required.

Mr. Sera fin: Mr. Secretary, in a recent ap-
pearance before the Hoiise Foreign Affairs
Committee you were quite optimistic about
the military future for South Viet-Nam, that
there wouldn't be any immediate massive
military actions, but not so optimistic about
the political future. If the political future
can't be put together in that country, won't
that mean a reversion back to military
action?

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so, Mr.
Serafin. I think the important thing is to have
the agreement work insofar as the military
aspects of it are concerned, in the first in-
stance ; in other words, to have all the shoot-
ing stopped, have all of our POW's returned,
have our military forces out of South Viet-
Nam, and then we hope that the parties in
the area will be able to solve their own polit-
ical problems. The fact that I'm not optimis-
tic about political solutions doesn't mean that
I don't have hope that they'll be able to solve
their problems, but we know from past ex-
perience how difficult it is to solve some of
these political problems that have existed for
so many years.

So I am quite optimistic that the agree-
ment will work, that the cease-fire will be
effective, that our POW's will all be returned
on time, that we will have all of our troops
out of there by March 28, and that the cease-
fire will continue to be effective. Now, after
that, the parties in the area are getting to-
gether to see if they can resolve their political
problems. As you know, they are going to

meet next week in Paris. I think the first
meeting is Monday or Tuesday, this next
week, and we would hope that they will be
able to come to some accommodations in
terms of their respective problems. So we
have hopes it will work —

Mr. Herman: Exciise me, I didn't mean to
interrupt. After American troops and Amer-
ican prisoners are out, what is our responsi-
bility toward our friends in South Viet-Nam, ?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we're going to
continue to give them economic assistance.
The agreement permits us to replace military
equipment on a one-for-one basis. We con-
tinue to comply strictly with the terms of
the agreement, and we would hope that they
could work out a political process. As you
know, the peace agreement calls for self-
determination by the people of South Viet-
Nam, which means that they will work out
some kind of an elective process, we hope.
That's what the agreement calls for, and we
hope it will work out.

Effectiveness of the Agreement

Mr. Keat: Mr. Secretary, there are a num- ■
ber of parallels between the two Paris agree- !
ments this year and the 195 A Geneva '
agreements on Indochina. So far the problems
that restricted the old ICC [International
Control Commission^ are beginning to show ■
up in the new ICCS. What basis do yoti have
for your hope or your belief that these agree- ;
ments are going to be any more successful
than the Geneva ones were, which were con- i j
spiciiously unsuccessful ?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, well, this Interna-
tional Commission, of course, is much larger
in the first place, very sizable numbers. Sec-
ondly, we've had a lot of experience with su- ; !
pervisory commissions, and that's one of the
reasons that Canada is insisting that theyi
have some authority. Now, here we have all
the teams dispersed throughout the country.
We have seven regional places, and we have,
I think, 26 subregional groups, so that the
International Commission will be dispersed
throughout the country, and we think it will
have a deterrent effect. It will be beneficial.

374

Department of State Bulletin M

1 *

i

Mr. Kent: But these regional groups aren't
even in place in —

Secreta)-y Rogers: Well, most of them are
now.

Mr. Keat: Yes, but it's si.v weeks into the
agreement, and they really are not policing
the countryside very effectively even noiv.

Secretary Rogers: Well, Mr. Keat, there is
an improvement. The alleged violations have
gone down a good deal, and except for Mili-
tary Rejrion I, the matter is improving a good
deal. The situation in Laos is much better, so
we think it's going to work. Now, we never
expected it was going to work quickly or
smoothly, but I think it's working about the
way we expected it would.

Mr. He)~man: I've been thinking abotit your
first answers, and I find something in there
that troubles me. The missiles at Khe Sanh,
the enemy missiles at Khe Sanh, were re-
moved without the icork of the International
Commission, apparently by some other ar-
rangement, whether it was in our negotiation
with Hanoi or whatever it may be. Doesn't
this tend in a tvay to weaken the Commission,
that these things are accomplished and it's
left high and dry? Hoiv did we get those
missiles out?

Secretary Rogers: I don't think it follows.
The fact is the Commission did object after
it asked to travel to the area, and I think the
other side decided that the best thing to do in
view of the activity of the Commission was
to remove the missiles.

Mr. Serafin: Did ive have discussions with
North Viet-Nam on that subject?

Secretary Rogers: Oh, yes, yes.

Mr. Keat: How do we know that the mis-
siles have in fact been withdraivn?

Secretary Rogers: Well, you can tell from
photographs.

Mr. Keat: In other words, we are flying
reconnaissance flights over —

Secretary Rogers: I'm not sure. I think that
I — you know, I'm not sure exactly how the
photographs are obtained, but everyone is
satisfied that the missiles have been removed,

and we had photographs before which we
provided for the International Commission
which caused them to think that there was a
violation of the peace agreement.

Mr. Keat: Then there is some kind of sur-
veillance over the troubled areas?

Secretary Rogers: Yes.

Mr. Hei-man: Hoiv and tvhen did we have
conversations with the North Vietnamese
about those missiles?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we are all parties to
the Four-Power Joint Military Commission,
and in that Commission we have discussions.

Mr. Herman: So it loas done inside the
Commission?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it was done both
in there — both in the Commission and also
in the ICCS.

Mr. Herman: Did you have any conversa-
tions—

Secretary Rogers: Those are two — there
are two groups ; there is a Four-Power Joint
Military Commission, consisting of those
parties that signed the Paris agreement, and
there is the International Commission, con-
sisting of Canada, Indonesia, Poland, and
Hungary. Now, the discussions about Khe
Sanh took place in both of those bodies. Yes,
I had some discussions in Paris on that
subject.

Mr. Serafin: Mr. Secretary, it ivas reported
also that North Viet-Nam ivas using the air-
strip at Khe Sanh in violation of the agree-
ment by flying military personnel in and out
of there. Is that still going on?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't, Mr. Sera-
fin, want to start making charges about viola-
tions. I think that is for the ICCS to handle.
But we are satisfied, as I said, that the peace
agreement is going to be carried out, and
that's based on the discussions we've had not
only with the parties to the Paris agreement
but also discussions we've had with all of
those at the Paris conference, all of the na-
tions represented there. Now, there obviously
are going to be some problems, and there are
going to be some violations, and there are

April 2, 1973

375

going to be sporadic instances of gunfire, and
so forth; but all of the indications are that
the basic decision has been made that this
agreement is going to work, will be effective,
and I'm entirely satisfied on that point.

And, you know, there've been challenges
made about the return of the POW's, and a
lot of people thought it might not work. Well,
it's working. We've just gotten notice today,
for example, that we are going to get a list of
the POW's in the next group, the third group,
that we're going to get that list tomorrow
from the North Vietnamese. Those prisoners
of war will be released in Hanoi on Wednes-
day, and we will — and the North Vietnamese
assured us again today, and they assured me
in my discussions in Paris, that all of our
POW's would be returned by March 28, as
the agreement calls for.

Complex Situation in Cambodia

Mr. Herman: I noticed in. the wires over-
night that our bombers were out over Cam-
bodia again. When do you expect peace in
Cambodia?

Secretary Rogers: It's difficult to make any
prophecy about that, because the situation is
particularly complex in Cambodia. One of
the reasons for that is that the Government
of Cambodia has difficulty in finding who to
talk to. The insurgents — the opposition to the
government is split up. There are those Com-
munists who follow Sihanouk ; there are other
Communists who are indigenous to, appar-
ently, to Cambodia ; there are others that are
supported by other nations. So there's no
one group that the Lon Nol government can
discuss a negotiated settlement with. We hope
that that will change. We hope that there will
be some opportunity, through negotiated set-
tlement, as was done in Laos.

Mr. Keat: The public statement of Mar-
shal Lon Nol as offered to the other Khmer
factions is substantially the kind of thing
that both the North Vietnamese and the
Pathet Lao turned down. Do we have any
expectation that Marshal Lon Nol will make
some other kind of offer to get talks started,
something which might be more along the

lines of the agreements made with North
Viet-Nam and with the Pathet Lao?

Secretary Rogers: We just don't know, Mr. j

Keat. As I say, the principal problem at the i

moment is how to get discussions started, |
and with whom.

Mr. Keat: We played major roles certainly |

Ml getting the truce in South Viet-Nam, and j

we played a backstage role in Laos. Is there |

any role we can play to induce or encourage j

an agreement in Cambodia? [

Secretary Rogers : Yes, I think we can play !

a role, but in the final analysis the decisions i
have to be made by the Cambodians. We are

playing a role. We're having discussions in !

diplomatic channels, hopefully to encourage I

a negotiated settlement. i

Mr. Keat: With whom are we having those i
negotiations? \

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't want to go j

into the details.

i

Postwar Assistance to Indochina |

Mr. Serafin: You've been through a num- ,
ber of congressional hearings lately, and ^
they've dtvelt largely on the question, of recon- i
struction aid for North Viet-Nam. You have
said over and over again that this adminis-
tration tvoidd consult Congress on this ques-
tion. But I have not heard you say absolutely .
that if Congress balks, decides not to provide
this aid, that the administration ivon't find i
another way of providing that aid.

Secretary Rogers: Well, I'm not going to
say that. We think Congress is going to sup-
port President Nixon. President Nixon was ;
able to bring this war to a conclusion, and
he did it consistent with what he promised ;
the American people he would do. He did it |J
often over the opposition of a great many
congressional people. And I think now that
the American people strongly support the
President, and I think when we make our
request for assistance for Indochina — not
just North Viet-Nam, but for Indochina —
that Congress will support him. Congress has
always acted responsibly when requests are
made. And so I'm not going to talk about

376

Department of State Bulletin

i

^ what we're going to do if we fail; I'm con-
fident that we're going to succeed.

Mr. Serafiti: I gather you ii'ould not be

, happy if there were a bill passed, as some

\ Congressmen have suggested, which tvould

prohibit any aid not approved by Congress.

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't think it
makes any sense; if they want to do that,
fine. But the point is, we've said over and
over again that we can't provide assistance
for Indochina to any degree at all that's
meaningful unless we have congressional
support. And if they want to pass a law to
that effect, or a bill to that effect, we won't
object very much but we think it is wholly
unnecessary.

Let me say, Mr. Serafin, that we think that
it is consistent with our traditional role to
help after a war is ended, that we should
help the people of Indochina — not just North
Viet-Nam, but South Viet-Nam, Laos, and
Tambodia — to heal up the wounds of the war.
We've always done it. It's a very small price
to pay indeed for peace, for the maintenance
of the peace. The cost of assistance to main-
' tain the peace compared to the cost of the
war is infinitesimal — very small.

Now, President Johnson said, when he was
President, that if we could bring the war to
a satisfactory conclusion, we w^ould assist in
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Indo-
: china. President Nixon said it last year and
I was supported by almost everyone who made
I any comment about it. Now, I think that
when people realize what we have in mind
and why we have it in mind, what we're
going to do, they'll support us. I was inter-
ested to .see that most of the editorial com-
ment throughout the country has supported
President Nixon.

Mr. Serafin: Doesn't it make your job
'ougher in taking your case to the Congress
■ that you haven't been able to really rally
" large international support for an interna-
tional effort and also that Russia and China
are talking about aiding only North Viet-
nam?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think that our
problem is not so much that. Our problem has

April 2, 1973

been that people start talking about it long
before we're prepared to make any proposals.
In other words, we aren't prepared yet to
make any proposals to Congress, and we
piobably won't be for another 60 days or
more. And as you know, we're just beginning
this week — I think we've got our first meet-
ing scheduled with the North Vietnamese in
Paris this next week to discuss the matter.
So we're a long ways from coming to any
decisions about what we want to ask for and
how it's going to be done.

Mr. Keat: But you have said several times,
and many Congressmen have said, that we
want a multinational effort for economic aid
to North Viet-Nam. We seem to be almost
alone among the major nations of the world
in being prepared to engage in that kind of
effort, in some kind of cooperative effort. Do
you — can you think of some manner, some
formula by which we can have a multina-
tional effort, given the objections of almost
everyone else to participating in one?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think there, Mr.
Keat, it depends on the definition — what do
we mean by "multinational." Now, if that
means that everybody has to coordinate all of
our activities in one effoi't, that probably
won't work. On the other hand, other nations
have indicated a very serious interest in tak-
ing part in some program — for example,
Japan is very anxious to contribute ; the
European Community has indicated they
would ; and several of the nations at the Paris
conference said that they were prepared to
assi.st. Now, how that is going to be done,
whether it's going to be bilaterally or in some
kind of a consortium, hasn't been decided. For
example, we don't know whether the Euro-
pean nations will do it individually or
whether they might contribute as part of the
Community.

But in any event, it doesn't make so much
diflference as long as the efforts are coordi-
nated. So that, for example, if we are going
to assist in the construction of a hospital or
something of that kind, we want to be sure
that we coordinate that with Japan, so that
w^e know what they are doing. And that

377

doesn't necessarily mean it's multinational,
but we'll have a coordinated effort, I'm sure.

Relations With People's Republic of China

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, have you
chosen the man or the men who will head
our m,ission to Peking ?

Secretary Rogers: No, we haven't. I've
made some recommendations to the President
on that, but —

Mr. Herman: What kind of people are we
thinking of? The Chinese said that they
thought it woidd he at least at the rank of
ambassador. Is that correct?

Secretary Rogers: I'm not sure what the
President's going to decide. That of course is
a matter that he'll decide.

Mr. Herman: Do we have any idea when
it will he named?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I think we'll do it
fairly soon. I would hope that we could name
our people for the liaison office sometime
within the next 60 days, or maybe before.

Mr. Serafin: Isn't this trading of missions
really diplomatic recognition ivithout that
name, under just a different name ?

Secretary Rogers: No, it's different than
having diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China, but it's a very meaningful
step.

Mr. Keat: Is there anything that these
liaison officers will do that an embassy — is
there anything they won't do that a regular
embassy woidd do?

Secretary Rogers: Well, they are not going
to be ambassadors, for one thing, and there
will be a lot of things that would be in-
volved if we had full diplomatic relations
that will not be involved in this case.

Mr. Herman: Let me ask you something,
Mr. Secretary. Do you think that this rather
rapid pace of normalization of relations with
China is the result of continuing Chinese
fear of Soviet troops on their border, of con-
tinuing fear, let's say, of the Soviet Union?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't want to

speculate on why they're improving their re-
lations with us. There's no doubt that there
are some serious differences between the Peo-
ple's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.
Now, how large a factor that has been in
their thinking, we don't know for sure.

Mr. Keat: The Soviet Union has made it
very clear tfmt it's ner'vous, to say the least,
about our gradually improved relations with
China. Is this creating any difjicidties in our
relations with Moscow ?

Secretary Rogers: I don't detect any. No,
I had long discussions with Foreign Minister
Gromyko when I was in Paris, and I didn't
detect that. I thought that the relations were
just as friendly and constructive as they had
been in the past. And certainly there've been
no expressions to that effect by the Soviet
Government.

MFN Treatment and Soviet Emigration Policy !

Mr. Serafin: Mr. Secretary, one thing that '
may he causing some difficulties is the intent |
of a number of Member's of Congress to at- |
tach approval of most-favored-nation status i
for trading purposes to the Soviet Union ivith j
a change in policy regarding the emigration j
of Soviet Jews. Can you tell us if anything '.
has happened on that? We constantly hear '
from the State Department and the White !
House that quiet diplomacy is at work. What j
has it accomplished? '

Secretary Rogers: Well, it has accom- ■
plished a good deal. In 1970, the number of i
Soviet Jews that were permitted to emigrate i
from the Soviet Union was really just a few '
hundred, as I remember. In 1971, about 14,-
000 were permitted to leave the Soviet Union ; !
in 1972, 31,000 were permitted to leave. And ;
this year it's been at the rate of about 3,000 ;
a month, which is even a little greater than '
last year. So the emigration rate itself has
substantially increased in the last few years '
because, I think, of the good relations we've
had with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Serafin: But doesn't that still dis-
criminate against those who are most edu-
cated, highly professional, most skilled?

378

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Rogers: The exit fees that you're
speaking about, we believe, prevent the free
flow of emigrants. As you know, our policy
has been that people should be permitted to
emigrate from any country without any
barriers. But in the case of these exit fees,
they're applied across the board, not just to
Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union.
But in any event, my point is that we think
that to attach any conditions to the legislation
that we propose, or will propose, to the Con-
gress to improve our trading position with
the Soviet Union is the wrong way to do it.
We think what we have been doing for the
last couple of years is a more successful way
to do it.

The Soviet Union says the matter of exit
fees is an internal matter with them, and
we have to deal with the situation as it exists.
And we think that the quiet diplomacy that
we've used in the past two years has been
successful.

Mr. Sera fin: What will he the result if
Congress does do this?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't know, Mr.
Serafin. We certainly hope that when Con-
gress fully realizes the situation that they
will enact the legislation that President
Nixon is going to ask for. Let me say for
the benefit of the listeners that when we talk
about MFN — most-favored-nation treatment
for the Soviet Union — what that really means
is that we remove the discriminatory tariffs
that now exist in terms of trade with a Com-
munist country, that we put them on the
same basis that other countries are on. And
when we signed the trade agreement and
when we settled the lend-lease debt, a condi-
tion to those two agreements was that we
would treat the Soviet Union the same as we
treat other countries in terms of trade. Now,
that's what we're going to ask Congress to
do in the legislation that we'll propose fairly
soon. We hope that the question of the exit
fees will not be linked to that. W^e think it
would be a very serious setback for our for-
eign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union if that
legislation was not enacted.

Mr. Kent: Mr. Secretary, the President has

now had what he called his Mideast month of
cousultations tvith Arab and Israeli leaders.
Have these conversations earned the move-
ment toward some kind of negotiation any
closer?

Discussions on the Middle East

Secretary Rogers: Well, we've had a very
good round of discussions with the King of
Jordan, with Mr. Ismail, who's President
Sadat's chief assistant, and with Prime Min-
ister Meir. We've been encouraged by the
general tenor of the discussions, and we think
that there is a desire on the part of everyone
to try to work out a peaceful settlement. The
problem is how to get the negotiations
started.

Mr. Keat: Do you think they'll start this
year?

Secretary Rogers: Oh, I would not want to
make a prediction. We're going to do every-
thing we can to see if we can get them
started.

Mr. Herman: Is there a desire on their
part to have the United States mediate and to
work on this problem?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think so. There's
certainly a desire on the part of Israel, and
Egypt from time to time has said that they
felt very much along the lines that the United
States could play a useful role. In fact, that's
how we got started in it, on the question of
the interim settlement. President Sadat said
he hoped we could play a role.

Mr. Herman: Mr. Sisco, the Under Secre-
tary of State, or Assistant Secretary of State,
rather, for Middle Eastern affairs among
others, said on this program some tveeks ago
that he thought the groundwork and the at-
mosphere had been prepared for a movement
toward peace. Mrs. Meir, the Prime Minister
of Israel, said the folloiving week that she
saw no change, no movement of any kind.
What do you see?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I think what she
had reference to — and that's of course the
truth — that is, that there's no specific initia-

i

April 2, 1973

379

tive and no complete change in the negotiat-
ing position. But in terms of the general
climate, I noticed an improvement. I think
Mr. Sisco is right. In the discussions we had
with Mr. Ismail, for example, he himself
said that he was very encouraged by those
discussions.

Mr. Serafin: Mr. Secretary, we have less
than a minute left. Following the tragic
events in the Sudan, what has the United
States dove to beef tip security for its dip-
lomats?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we're doing every-
thing that we can possibly think of, and
we're not going to make it public, but we're
going to be as tough as we possibly can in
the whole field of terrorism. It's— they're
savages, literal savages ; and we, the civilized
community, can't put up with it. We've got
to find a way to deal with it, and we've got
to be as tough as we possibly can, and that's
going to be our position.

Mr. Serafin: Bo you stand today by your
statements calling for the death penalty?

Secretary Rogers: I certainly do. There's
no other way to deal with them, because each
time they're placed in custody, then they kid-
nap another ambassador or hijack a plane
and insist that the people in custody be re-
leased. There's only one of them that's left in
jail. Even all of the ones involved in Munich
are out now.

Mr. Herman: Thank you very much. Secre-
tary of State Rogers, for being with us today
on "Face the Nation."

Secretary Rogers: Thank you, Mr. Herman.

President Nixon Names Committee
on East-West Trade Policy

White House press release dated March 6

President Nixon on March 6 established
the East-West Trade Policy Committee and
designated the Chairman of the Council on
Economic Policy, George P. Shultz, to serve
as its Chairman. The President also desig-
nated the Secretary of Commerce, Frederick
B. Dent, to serve as Vice Chairman of the
Committee and as Chairman of the Ofiice
of East-West Trade. The members of the
East-West Trade Policy Committee will be: i

The Secretary of State (William P. Rogers)
The Secretary of the Treasury (George P. Shultz)
The Secretary of Commerce (Frederick B. Dent)
The Assistant to the President for National Secu-
rity Affairs (Dr. Henry A. Kissinger)
The Executive Director of the Council on Interna-
tional Economic Policy (Peter M. Flanigan)
The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
(Ambassador William D. Eberle)

James E. Smith, the Deputy Under Secre-
tary of the Treasury, will serve as Executive
Secretary of the East-West Trade Policy
Committee.

Negotiation of major trade initiatives will
be handled under the chairmanship of indi-
viduals to be designated for the specific
negotiation. The President has designated
George P. Shultz as Chairman of the U.S.
section of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commer-
cial Commission.

A working group will be established under
the chairmanship of the Under Secretary
of the Treasury and will include representa-
tion from the organizations on the East-West
Trade Policy Committee.

I

380

Department of State Bulletin

Deputy Secretary Rush Interviewed for German Television

Following is the transcript of an interview
ifith Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush which
jcas recorded at Washingto7i on March 12
and broadcast on German television on
March 13.

Press release 78 dated March 13

Q: President Nixon proclaimed this year,
1973, the year of Europe. Mr. Secretary,
what must one take this declaration to mean,
and in what context must it be seen?

Deputy Secretary Rush: The President was
referring to the fact that Viet-Nam has
moved from the center stage and that we are
now getting back to a normal state of affairs
where Europe is the center stage. Europe is
of course the most important part of the
Western alliance, aside from America, or
along with America really.

Through the first four years, the Presi-
dent and the administration paid a lot of
attention to Europe. We had the Berlin agree-
ment, we had the SALT talks [Strategic
Arms Limitation Talks], the preparations
were made for CSCE and MBFR [Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
mutual and balanced force reductions]. And
we had many problems with regard to mone-
tary and economic matters.

So we have not been neglecting Europe. It
is just a matter of Viet-Nam moving off the
stage, and now we see that Europe is the
center of the stage as it normally is.

Q: The Americans and the Europeans.
Mr. Secretary, are partners in security. They
are rivals in trade. How can this be reconciled
in the long run?

Deputy Secretary Rush: The question of
security is really a question of the free world,
the open society, being strong enough to pre-
vent yielding too much to the influence of
the closed society. And we must of course in

security maintain a very strong deterrent.
In any free society, you have competition.
In this country, for example, we have very
keen competition, enforced by our antitrust
laws, among the various corporations, in-
dustrial organizations, and other parts of our
society. So the normal state of affairs in
economics is competition. This does not in
any sense mean that we are not a unified
country with regard to security or that in
our dealings with our allies we cannot deal
just as strongly with them on security
matters.

Q: The last dollar devaluation, the talk
about the monetary and trade war, does not
sound very encouraging. This proves that
there are strong opposing interests. We can
expect conflict. How can the confrontation
between Europe and the United States be
avoided ?

Deputy Secretary Rush: The basic prob-
lem we have here is that the dollar has
gradually become overvalued, and as a result
we are having very serious trade imbalances.
The way to correct these trade imbalances
is to have the dollar reach its real value as
compared to the currencies of other countries.

The balance of trade in our country, for
example, has shifted from about $7 billion
on the aflfirmative side in 1964 to about $6.5
billion on the negative side, in a deficit, in
1972. Meanwhile, our exports have been in-
creasing very substantially — about 90 per-
cent. But our imports have increased about
197 percent. This results of course from the
great advances made by the European Com-
munity and by the Japanese in technology
and in building large plants and reducing
costs and the fact that the dollar has been
overvalued and thereby our trade has been
hurt. This is of course not to mention non-
tariff trade barriers, which have been also a
very serious deterrent.

April 2, 1973

381

Q: Mr. Secretary, of the European NATO
partners, the Federal Republic has been con-
tributing most to the maintenance of the
Atlantic alliance. Now, in vieiv of the dollar
crisis and the balance of payments deficit and
the pressing domestic problems of America,
will Washington ask the Federal Reptiblic for
even higher contributions during the up-
coming offset negotiations?

Deputy Secretary Rush: We have not yet
determined what our posture will be with
regard to offset. As I see security, it is a
matter of the allies bearing on a more equal
basis the burdens of security and of having
an effective deterrent. Following World War
II our country had to bear the main part of
the burden. We have been a bit too slow, I
think, in equalizing this burden. Germany
has shown a very commendable approach in
terms not only of helping to meet the finan-
cial problems but also of encouraging the
European allies to bear a bigger share on
their own. This is exemplified by EDIP, the
European Defense Improvement Program,
initiated by your then Minister of Defense,
Mr. Schmidt.

With regard to how much of the burden
should be borne by your country in terms of
balance of payments, this is to be negotiated.
However, one must remember that we still
have a much larger percentage of our gross
national product going into defense than
that of any European country, including
Germany. And I would certainly hope that
the European allies, members of the most
successful military alliance in history, or
security alliance in history, would see that
they must bear a bigger share of the burden.

Q: In this connection, Mr. Secretary, it
is known in Germany that the quality of the
7th American Army has recently been im-
proved. Nevertheless, experts are still of the
opinion that it has not yet regained its former
combat strength. Will the 7th Army, in case
the Federal Republic should increase its con-
tribution, increase its combat readiness?

Deputy Secretary Rush: The purpose of the
offset payments is not designed to pay us
to improve our army. The purpose of the
offset payments is to, in part, help us cor-

rect the balance of payments problem that we
have in maintaining troops in Germany.
It is true that during the Viet-Nam war we
failed to improve the 7th Army as much as
we would have liked. But great steps have
been taken to correct this, and of course the
more we do, the greater the cost and perhaps
the greater the balance of payments loss.
But the offset is not designed to pay us for
doing something in Germany or for improv-
ing the quality of our troops. It is designed
to reimburse us in part for the balance of
payments losses we have from having our
troops there.

Q: A last question in relation to the alli-
ance. Do you think that after the outcome of
yesterday's parliamentai'y elections in
France, the attitude of the French Govern-
ment vis-a-vis NATO, and particularly the
political tmity of Europe, 7vill change?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, we still have
in France the same government in power
that we had before, with a reduced majority
in the Chamber. I have nothing to indicate
that the French have any immediate plans
to change their attitude toward NATO.

Q: Mr. Rush, the opposition in your Con-
gress against maintaining the present troop
level in Europe is increasing and certainly
is no longer limited to Senator Mansfield and
his friends. Can the attitude of your Presi-
dent on the question of the presence of troops
remain unaffected by this growing opposition
on Capitol Hill?

Deputy Secretary Rush: The President has
said many times that we will not reduce our
troops unilaterally. His feeling is that we
should reduce troops only in conjunction with
reductions on the other side. And this of
course is the purpose of the talks on mutual
balanced force reductions.

We feel that we must maintain a strong
deterrent in NATO; we must maintain a
troop level that is as it is now, roughly.
There is nothing sacred in numbers but it
certainly is important that we maintain a
credible deterrent in NATO, with the 6th
Fleet in the Mediterranean, with the 7th
Army in Germany. And we have no plans to

382

Department of State Bulletin

reduce troop levels in Germany and will not
do so unilaterally.

Q: Mr. Secretary, may I put my question
more succinctly. There seems to be a sort of
neoisolationist viood in the United States
after the end of the Viet-Nam war, and this
is not limited only to the Democrats, hut
there are also a number of Republicans —
that is to say, members of the same party to
which the President belongs — tvho are
against future military engagements of the
United States outside its borders. Will this
not lead to a considerable complication of
lour future foreign policy?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Yes, it compli-
cates our future foreign policy. However, a
part of our society is that we have those who
approve of the President's program and those
who disapprove of the program. This is non-
partisan ; it always has been nonpartisan.
There are those who think that we should
withdraw completely from the rest of the
world ; there are those that think we should
be much stronger outside of this country.
There are those who favor the various
courses in between. But the majority of the
American people and the majority of the
Congress have backed the President in main-
taining our troop levels in Europe. I feel
the Congress is a very responsible body, and
I do not feel that the Congress will attempt
to i-educe the troop levels in Europe over the
President's opposition or that they could do
so politically.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the historic trips the
President has undertaken to Moscow and
Peking as well as the international negotia-
tions to end the war in Viet-Nam could easily
give one the impression that in the thinking
of the American Government the superpower
diplomacy of triangular irorld policy tvill con-
tinue to predominate also in the future, also
after the end of the war. On the other hand,
it is often emphasized by Washington that
xcestern Europe represents the first priority.
Does this not present a real dilemma?

Deputy Secretary Rush: I do not feel it is
a true dilemma. Obviously, we must solve
problems with the other superpower, Russia,

and with China on a bilateral basis. These
are problems that relate to us and those coun-
tries. However, where our allies are con-
cerned, we inform them fully. We have
informed them fully about the progress of the
SALT talks. We have informed them fully
and consulted them, not only with regard to
SALT but with i-egard to the preparations
for the oncoming negotiations on CSCE and
MBFR. This is true of other countries. For
example. Chancellor Brandt and his govern-
ment in a bilateral way introduced the
Ostpolitik, but they informed us fully. We
must negotiate both as allies against the
Warsaw Pact bloc, for example, and we must
negotiate bilaterally where primarily bilat-
eral interests are concerned. I see nothing
contradictory in this at all.

Q: Nevertheless, the President's trip to Eu-
rope seems to be delayed. May this have some-
thing to do with discontent in Washington
about the reaction of some European grotips
and governments to the Christmas bombing
in Viet-Nam?

Deputy Secretary Rush: I would not say
that the President's trip has been delayed,
because he never had a trip plan set that
could be delayed.

With regard to the statements by the heads
of some governments in Europe concerning
the President's action in Viet-Nam, my feel-
ing is that where one has allies, true allies,
and where a country is involved in very im-
portant activities, a responsible ally will not
criticize what its other ally is doing without
knowing the reasons for it. And I feel quite
sure that many of those who criticized the
President's action in December very much
regret doing so now. But it would have been
far more responsible if the criticism had
not taken place at the time, because the
President's problem was greatly increased
and aggravated by the criticism of some allies
who themselves would have benefited very
much from the action the President was tak-
ing in showing that we were going to bring
about peace and that he would take whatever
action was necessary to bring about peace.

Q: This sounds, Mr. Secretary, as if there

April 2, 1973

383

might be a continued deterioration of rela-
tions ivith some European nations as a con-
sequence of this.

Deputy Secretary Rush: I would certainly
hope not. I do not think that it would be
worthwhile for us to allow a deterioration of
relations with allies who want to be close
allies with us, nor would it be in their inter-
ests to have a deterioration of the alliance
insofar as they are concerned because they at
some time differed with us over our policy in
Viet-Nam. I would hope that our relations
with all of our allies would improve. I was
merely commenting on the fact that an alli-
ance calls for a sense of responsibility and a
sense that each of us must have some faith in
the judgment of the other ally.

Q: Mr. Secretary, the Berlin agreement
that you negotiated contains the sentence
that the ties between the Western sectors of
Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany
shall be maintained and developed. You your-
self a year ago said in Berlin, when you said
goodby to us, that the fulfillment of the four-
power agreement woidd be watched over very
closely by Washington. Despite the fact that
the pi'ovisions of the agreement are very
clear, the G.D.R. is contimiously protesting
against meetings of political bodies of the
Federal Government and most recently, in
February, even against the meeting of the
Presidium of the European Parliament. Are
these protests in your opinion consistent with
the spirit and the letter of the agreement, and
if not, will the U.S. Government take any
steps in this direction?

Deputy Secretary Rush: We feel that the
agreement has in large measure been very
well fulfilled. We cannot, of course, determine
when the G.D.R. may want to protest some-
thing or not protest something. But all in
all, we feel that the observance of the agree-
ment and living up to its spirit and terms has
been in good faith by both sides.

Now, in the unlikely event — unlikely in my
opinion — that there should be a violation of
the agreement, we have provisions in the
agreement which call for consultation by the
four powers designed to correct any such

violation, and we would certainly resort to
those provisions if at any time we felt there
were a violation of the agreement. We don't
think there has been.

Q: So far you think there has not been
any violation?

Deputy Secretary Rush: None that has
been called to our attention.

Q: Mr. Secretary, before you tvere called
for public office by the President you used
to be an industrialist; that is to say, the head
of a large American corporation. Now, in
connection with the currency and trade dis-
cussions, it has been asserted that the U.S.
products are not competitive on the world
market and that two dollar devaluations
would not help to make them competitive
either. It has also been alleged that Ameri-
can industry basically has little interest in
exporting because the huge domestic market
is more interesting and also more convenient.
Is this correct, and if so, what are the
reasons?

Deputy Secretary Rush: The American in-
dustrialist and the American farmer are
very much interested in exporting and in fact
they do export — last year about $50 billion
worth of exports, which is a very substantial
amount. This has increased from about $24
billion, almost $25 billion, in 1964. There is
a very strenuous effort on the part of Amer-
ican companies to export. American com-
panies are very competitive in certain areas :
computers, aerospace, aircraft, agriculture
certainly, which is really industrialized, and
various things. In many areas there have
been great inroads in this country by im-
ports: such things as shoes, television sets,
and of course steel — automobiles, of course
— but steel. And we have had to have ar-
rangements with the European Community
and Japan to prevent the steel industry from
being very much harmed by low-cost steel
from abroad which might be even below the
cost of production in this country.

Exports are very vital to the prosperity
of our country, as they are to the prosperity
of the rest of the industrialized world.

The real problems have come from two

384

Department of State Bulletin

basic factors. One of them is the monetary
factor. The dollar lias been grossly overvalued
and increasingly so. The monetary readjust-
ments that have taken place recently, and
that took place earlier, are designed to cor-
rect this and I think will correct it in sub-
stantial measure. The other problems are
such things as the common agricultural
policy of the European Market, quotas in
many cases by some highly industrialized
countries, preferences in reverse, preferences,
items of this sort, which operate very un-
fairly against the American exporter. I think
we must attack on both these fronts — both
the monetary front where considerable prog-
ress has been made and on the removal of
unfair trade barriers, nontariff trade bar-
riers, where progress must be made.

Q: Recently one could have gained the im-
pression as if certain groups in industry and
the AFL-CIO labor federation had entered
into a, let us say, "alliance of protectionists."
How does the government expect to he able
to resist the pressure of this mighty bloc
to obtain trade restrictions from Congress?

Deputy Secretary Rush: We have always
had very powerful pressures in this country
to restrict trade and protect local industry,
and for many, many years those pressures
were the dominant ones. Today the pressures
leading toward freer trade, leading toward
the con-ection of the factors that make for
imbalances in trade, are much more popular
with the American people. And I think the
way to counteract these is through an edu-
cational process of those who do not feel this
way through teaching them the real facts of
life, in terms of we only harm ourselves when
we severely restrict trade.

Now, on the other hand, often the only
way we can adequately protect ourselves,
liecause of a lack of cooperation from other
countries, may be to increase barriers or to
impose barriers with regard to imports into
this country, and we of course if necessary
should look at that way of correcting these
imbalances.

Q: Mr. Secretary, beyond any doubt dur-
ing the first years of the alliance the Federal

Republic has been the model partner of that
alliance. German foreign policy, tvith its
opening to the East, tvhich corresponded to
earlier American wishes, has gained a greater
measure of independence. Does this make the
Federal Republic a more difficidt partner,
and how ivill this affect relations between
Bonn and Washington?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, Germany
has grown up so it no longer needs to be
teacher's pet. It is more of a teacher itself. I
would say that we welcome the assumption
more and more by the German people and
by the German Government of an increasing
share of responsibility in world affairs. This
is something we have encouraged. We fully
backed the Chancellor in his Ostpolitik. We
have in fact pleaded with the Germans to
take on more responsibility rather than less
in the North Atlantic alliance. And we wel-
come Germany as a full-fledged mature part-
ner in the community of the NATO alliance
and in our own bilateral relations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, may I ask you to answer
the following question candidly? Do you
share the concern of some of the German
experts in the State Department that the
criticism of primarily young and politically
engaged Germans of U.S. domestic and for-
eign policy coidd impair the relations be-
tween the United States and the Federal
Republic?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, you have
freedom of speech in Germany, and we have
freedom of speech in this country. We of
course do not welcome criticism by any group
that we consider to be biased and unfair. But
we welcome criticism by those who are ap-
proaching it in a .sound and analytical way.
But emotional attacks we deplore, whether
they occur in our country against another
country or whether they occur in other coun-
tries against our country and our leadership.
However, we do not in any sense consider that
irresponsible, emotional attacks on our coun-
try are shared by many of the German peo-
ple. We have full confidence in the German
people. We have full confidence in the Gov-
ernment of Germany. And we feel that our

April 2, 1973

385

alliance with Germany today is as strong as
it ever has been.

Q: Mr. Secretary, President Nixon has
spoken of a five-power balance in the rvorld.
One of these powers is Europe. Since Europe
is politically still split into individual states,
individual governments, this can only refer
to the European Community. In Washington,
we often hear complaints that this Commu-
nity does not speak with one voice. Could
the absence of communication ivith one uni-
fied voice be the source of those mysterious
misunderstandings and frictions which often
emerge between Europe or the European
Community and the United States ?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, I feel really
that in the security area we have had a very
good relationship with the European — with
our NATO allies. I feel that in monetary and
economic matters, both with the European
Community and with Japan, there have been
many problems. These problems arise, as I
mentioned earlier, in any free society. We
have, as I said earlier, domestic competition
that gives rise to many problems. This should
not undercut the strength of the security
alliance. However, obviously, a failure to co-
operate in one area has a fallout in other
areas. If Europe did speak with one voice,
if we had a politically unified Europe, unified
of course also economically and monetarily,
I feel that the free world would be greatly
strengthened and that the dangers of mis-
understanding would be less than they are
today.

Q: Well, the newly appointed Commis-
sioner for Foreign Affairs [of the European
Community], Sir Christopher Soames, the
son-in-law of Winston Churchill, who is an
important political personality, perhaps
might he fill the gap?

Deputy Secretary Rush: I would hope that
he can work toward a better understanding
of our problems in trade and in monetary
matters; and a better understanding, I am
sure, would lead to an earlier correction than
may have been true in the past.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I ivould like to come back
to the topic of Berlin because you negotiated

the Berlin agreem,ent. How do you see the
future of Berlin under the present circum-
stances?

Deputy Secretary Ru^h: I think much of
the question of the future of Berlin now de-
pends upon the Berliners themselves, it de-
pends upon the F.R.G., and it depends upon
the maintaining and developing of the ties
between the F.R.G. and West Berlin. If the
ties are maintained and developed as they
should be and if the steadfast support of the
F.R.G. for the economic, cultural, and politi-
cal development of West Berlin continues as
it has in the past, I feel that West Berlin will
be a strong, viable unit. I do not think the
fact that the G.D.R. is being recognized by
many Western countries, or that East Berlin
maybe may have diplomatic embassies,
should weaken the Western sectors of Berlin.

But it is up to the Berliners themselves
and up to the F.R.G. to see that the ties are
strengthened. And I think the viability of
West Berlin is in direct proportion to the
strengthening of the ties between the F.R.G.
and the Western sectors of Berlin.

Q: Ladies and gentlemen, this program is
drawing to a close. There is time for one
last question. Mr. Secretary, the Federal Re-
public has repeatedly suggested an organized
and constructive dialogue between the Euro-
pean Community and the United States. This
certainly falls in with American intentions.
My question is, who is to take the initiative
for such a dialogue and hoiv can it best be
organized?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, we have an
excellent dialogue with the Community to-
day. There is of course much merit in a pro-
posal to formalize this dialogue. On the other
hand, there can be very valid objections to
it. Consideration is being given to this.

But I feel today we have the organs and
the relationships that permit an adequate
dialogue, a very strong dialogue, if they are
used.

I would not oppose myself a full study of
the possibilities of having a formalized
dialogue established, but I do not see the
urgent need for it.

386

Department of State Bulletin

People's Republic of China

Releases U.S. Prisoners

Following is an announcement made to
news correspondents on Friday, March 9, by
Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to Presi-
dent Nijco7i.

while House press release dated March 9

The White House learned on Wednesday
evening of the illness of John Downey's
mother, and the President asked that this
be communicated to Prime Minister Chou
En-lai on his behalf, calling to the attention
of the Prime Minister the facts of Mr. Dow-
ney's mother's illness.

The Government of the People's Republic
of China has informed the President that
it has decided to commute John Downey's
term and release him on March 12.

The Government of the People's Republic
of China will release Mr. Downey, following
the decision to commute his term, at the
border between the People's Republic of
China and Hong Kong, as I said, on March
12.

At the same time, the Government of the
People's Republic of China, and in the same
communication, has informed the President
and the United States that they will release
Lt. Comdr. Robert J. Flynn of the U.S. Navy
and Maj. Philip E. Smith, of the U.S. Air
Force, who have been held in the People's
Republic of China over the past years, on
the 15th of March.

As you recall, Dr. Kissinger mentioned to
you in his briefing here following his return

from the People's Republic of China that they
had indicated that Mr. Flynn and Mr. Smith
would be released during the 60-day period
of the Indochina agreement.'

President Nixon wants to express his per-
sonal appreciation to the Government of the
People's Republic of China for this action.

U.S. and North Viet-Nam Establish
Joint Economic Commission

Follotving is a joint United States-Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam announcement
read to nexvs correspondents at Washington
on March 8 by Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec-
retary to President Nixon.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 12

A United States-Democratic Republic of
Vietnam Joint Economic Commission has
been established and will meet in Paris, be-
ginning March 15, 1973. The Commission
consists of the following members:

For the United States : Maurice Williams,
John Mossier, Donald E. Syvrud.

For the Democratic Republic of Vietnam :
Dang Viet Chau, Nguyen Co Thach, Le Khac.

The members will be supported by such
staff as each delegation considers appro-
priate to its needs.

^ For the transcript of a news conference held on
Feb. 22 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs, see Bul-
letin of Mar. 19, 1973, p. 313.

April 2, 1973

387

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television

Following is the transcript of an intermeiv
with Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for Natiojial Security Affairs, by
Marvin Kalb, CBS News diplomatic corre-
spondent, broadcast on February 1.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, thank you so
much for allowing us to join you in your of-
fice here at the White House. I would like to
start immediately on Viet-Nam, which will
come as no surprise to you, and to ask first
what is your judgment on the fragility, the
firmness, of the truce in Viet-Nam?

Dr. Kissinger: One has to look at the peace
in Viet-Nam now in two parts: the terms
of the agreement and in the spirit in which it
is going to be carried out/

The war has been going on for 25 years. It
has been partly a civil war, partly an inter-
national war. It has had some outside inter-
vention and some local sources.

The terms themselves of the cease-fire are
firm, and they are specific. The supervisory
machinery is as precise as one can make it.
The biggest task now is to move a generation
that has known nothing but war toward an
attitude of peace, and that is an intangible
quality. The political settlement still has to
be reached. But I think with good will on all
sides, and some patience and some wisdom,
we can manage that transition period.

Mr. Kalb: Well, the President suggested
at his netvs conference, and he repeated this
morning once again, that so much will depend
on the good will of all of the parties.- Do you

"■ For background and texts of the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam
and the protocols to the agreement, see Bulletin
of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 153.

' For excerpts from President Nixon's news con-
ference on Jan. 31, see Bulletin of Feb. 19, 1973,
p. 193; for an excerpt from his remarks before the
National Prayer Breakfast at Washington on Feb.
1, see ibid., p. 196.

trust the good ivill of the Vietnamese parties
right noiv?

Dr. Kissinger: If you look at the historical
record you have to say that people who have
been killing each other for 25 years are not
animated by exceptional good will toward
each other.

On the other hand, they have also suffered
for 25 years.

I was struck during the negotiations that
one of the biggest hurdles was their dif-
ficulty in imagining peace. If we can now get
a period of some months in which they get
used to more peaceful pursuits, then I believe
many of these factors can begin to assert
themselves. I don't trust in good will. A lot
depends on the actions of the Soviet Union,
the People's Republic of China, and on the
sort of relationship we will be able to estab-
lish with North Viet-Nam. So it is a difficult
period that is ahead. But it gives us an op-
portunity to build for peace.

Mr. Kalb: You mentioned the Soviet Union
and China right now. How do you see their
role coming up now ?

Dr. Kissinger: While the war was going
on, they supplied North Viet-Nam with a
great deal of its military equipment. When
peace exists, all of the countries concerned,
including ourselves, have to ask ourselves not
only in terms of the local conditions, and of
the desires of the parties, but in terms of the
incentives our supplies give to each side to
resume the fighting; and while we have no
formal agreement or even formal discussions
with these parties at this moment, it would
seem reasonable that everybody will assess
now its military relationship to the con-
testants.

Mr. Kalb: Well, does that 7nean that you,
as the diplomats say, have some reason to be-

388

Department of Stale Bulletin

lieve that the Soviet Union or China might
I reduce the floic of their supplies into North
Viet-Nam?

Dr. Kissinger: The peace is less than a
week old, and it is too early to draw any
conclusions, but there will be an international
\ confeience at the end of Februaiy at which
all of these parties are represented. All I am
saying is that whether the peace is fragile or
not depends in part on the Vietnamese. It
depends in part on outside countries. And
this is what we now have to work out.

Mr. Kalb: But it ivould he fair to assume
I from what yoti are saying that a hope of the
administration is that just as we are pro-
hibited by the terms of the agreement from
shipping unlimited supplies of military arms
to South Viet-Nam, that likewise you would
like to have the Chinese and the Russians
reduce their floiv of supplies into the North?

Dr. Kissinger: We would like the Chinese
and the Russians to behave responsibly in
preserving the peace in Indochina; that is
right.

Mr. Kalb: The Chinese leader today, Chou
En-lai, made the point that the United States
really is not living up fully to the terms of
the agreement because it is continuing the
%var, as Chou p^it it, in Laos and Cambodia.
Do you have any sense that very soon tve
can stop the bombing along the Ho Chi Minh
Trails in Laos?

Dr. Kissinger: Our position is clear and has
been made clear to the North Vietnamese
during the negotiations. We will observe any
cease-fii-e that is established in Laos and
Cambodia. We have reason to believe that
there will be a formal cease-fire in Laos soon.
There has been a de facto cease-fire in Cam-
bodia, in fact, since Monday, and we have
observed it.

Mr. Knlb: Are the Communists living up
to that, too?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Mr. Kalb: Yes?

Dr. Kissinger: And we will continue to ob-
serve it as long as the Communists live up
to it de facto.

I

April 2, 1973

In Laos we have hopes that a formal cease-
fire will be signed in the near future, and in
that case, the question of our role will be-
come moot.

Mr. Kalb: "In the near future" meaning
perhaps even before the first American pris-
oners of war come out of North Viet-Nam,
or is there a connection really between a
cease-fire in Laos atid when the American
prisoners are released from North Viet-Nam?

Dr. Kissinger: There is no connection be-
tween the cease-fire in Laos and the release
of American prisoners. American prisoners,
according to the terms of the agreement, have
all to be released within 60 days, and in a
supplementary protocol it is provided that
they be released in appi-oximately equal in-
stallments at 15-day intervals so the latest
that the first American prisoners can be re-
leased would be around February 11. But we
haven't worked out the precise date yet.

There is no relationship between the re-
lease of American prisoners and the cease-
fire in Laos ; but as I said, we expect that a
cease-fire in Laos will be established soon.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, ivhat about Amer-
ican prisoners who might be in Laos, those
missing in action? There is some question
as to a list that has noiv been turned over.

Dr. Kissinger: We received today a list of
prisoners that are being held in Laos. We
are now examining it. It doesn't look to us
as if it could be complete, and we are query-
ing the North Vietnamese to see whether
they have any supplementary information.

But, at any rate, we received some names
today, and we are informing the next of kin.

Mr. Kalb: What do you mean that you don't
feel as though you have a complete list on the
Laos prisoners?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the list was handed
to us as a list. It was not handed to us with
the explicit comment that this is the entire
list.

Mr. Kalb: I see.

Dr. Kissinger: And since there are sev-
eral hundred unaccounted for, the relation-
ship between the number that was handed to

389

us and the number that is missing seems to
be smaller in Laos than it is in Viet-Nam,
and we have queried Hanoi about this dis-
crepancy.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, you will be going
to Hanoi soon, which is the one Communist —
major Communist capiUil you have not gotten
to as yet. We understand that the two major
purposes will be to try to check on how the
agreement is being implemented and also
to discuss postwar aid. When was this trip
first arranged?

Dr. Kissinger: The trip has been under dis-
cussion with the North Vietnamese at various
stages of our negotiations, and it has always
been under discussion, not in the context of
the negotiations but in the context of estab-
lishing a postwar relationship, and I really
don't quite agree that the purpose is for the
purpose of determining aid. That is one of the
possible middle-term outcomes.

The real problem in relation to North Viet-
Nam is that here is a country that has been
almost constantly at war throughout its exist-
ence. It is a country with which we have
made armistices in 1954, in 1962, but we
have never made a genuine peace with it.
Now we would like to explore the possibility
of whether after the experiences of the last
decade, having established a pattern of co-
existence with Moscow and Peking, it seems
to us not inconceivable that if we can coexist
with Peking, we can coexist with Hanoi.

So the basic purpose of the trip is an ex-
ploratory mission to determine how we can
move from hostility toward normalization.

Now, it has always been part of the Amer-
ican policy — indeed, it was first established
by the late President Johnson — that at some
point the United States would contribute to
a reconstruction program for all of Indo-
china ; and this is one of the problems that I
will discuss in principle while I am in Hanoi.

As anybody who knows me can tell you,
my lack of competence in discussing technical
economic questions is well established, so
I will not be able to make the final determina-
tions while I am there.

So the basic purpose is to establish a new

relationship, similar perhaps to my first trip
to Peking.

Mr. Kalb: Would the new relationship en-
visage the possibility of establishing relatione
with North Viet-Nam?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, far down the road.
The first problem is to establish some sort
of ongoing dialogue, to work out machinery
for exchanging ideas ; and in principle we are
willing to explore this, but not as the first
step.

Mr. Kalb: Isn't there a White House pro-
jection of $7^2 billion over a five-year period,
of which $2Y2 billion would be earmarked for
North Viet-Nam?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, that was a projection
that was used about a year ago.

Mr. Kalb: Yes. Is that current?

Dr. Kissinger: More than a year ago. No,
we have taken the position that the problem
of aid to North Viet-Nam would be discussed
in the context of peacetime relations and not
as the outcome of a negotiation to end the
war. We will look at the requirements with
an open mind. This was a study based on
reasonable facts at the time. We would have
to look at the situation again.

As we said when we briefed the congres-
sional leaders, as the President repeated
yesterday, any projection we make would be
fully discussed with the bipartisan leadership
and fully discussed in public before it became
our policy.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, shifting south for
a moment, to South Viet-Nam, notv that the
peace agreement has been signed, how would
you define the nature and depth of the Amer-
ican commitment to Saigon?

Dr. Kissinger: We have been allies in a
bitter and diflJicult war, and we have a re-
sponsibility to give those with whom we have
been associated an opportunity to shape
their own future. Therefore we have a re-
sponsibility to continue a program of eco-
nomic assistance along the lines that have
been developed.

We also will, as the President pointed out
in his speech announcing the peace, continue
that degree of military assistance that the

390

Department of State Bulletin

i

agreement permits and which is made neces-
sary by the military situation.

Now, the agreement permits us to replace
weapons that are used up, destroyed, dam-
aged, or worn out. Needless to say, if there
is no conflict the amount of replacement
military equipment that is needed will be
much less than it was during the war. In
the longer term, it has always been our in-
tention to enable the South Vietnamese to
take over the burden of their own military
defense, and we believe we have left them in
a position where they can handle most of the
challenges that we can now foresee.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I
was trying to get at is what happens — and
I suppose this question must be asked. In
the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire
is going to hold. In the world that we live in it
may not. President Thieu said in an interview
tonight oti CBS that he woidd never call upon
American troops to go back to Viet-Nam
but he ivonld feel free to call %ipon American
airpower to go back. And Ambassador Sulli-
van said only last Sunday that there are no
inhibitions — 7 believe were his rvords — on
the use of this airpower.^ Is that correct?

Dr. Kissinger: That is legally correct.

Mr. Kalb: Politically and diplomatically?

Dr. Kissinger: We have the right to do
this. The question is very difficult to answer
in the abstract. It depends on the extent of
the challenge, on the nature of the threat,
on the circumstances in which it arises; and
it would be extremely unwise for a responsi-
ble American official at this stage, when the
peace is in the process of being established,
to give a checklist about what the United
States will or will not do in every circum-
stance that is likely to arise.

For the future that we can foresee, the
' North Vietnamese are not in a position to
launch an overwhelming attack on the South,
even if they violate the agreement. What
happens after a year or two has to be seen in
the circumstances which then exist.

'For an interview with William H. Sullivan, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, on "Meet the Press" on Jan. 28, see Bui^
. LETIN of Feb. 19, 197.3, p. 198.

Most of the violations that one can now
foresee should be handled by the South
Vietnamese.

Mr. Kalb: So that for the next year or tivo,
if I understand you right, there would be no
need for a reinvolvement of American mili-
tary power?

Dr. Kissinger: Marvin, we did not end this
war in order to look for an excuse to reenter
it, but it would be irresponsible for us at this
moment to give a precise checklist to potential
aggressors as to what they can or cannot
safely do.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, let's move the
clock back about one month at a time when
the United States was engaged in a very ex-
tensive bombing program in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area. We have never heard any
explanation about ivhy that was really nec-
essary. Could you give tis your otvn feeling
on that?

Dr. Kissinger: The decision to resume
bombing in the middle of December was per-
haps the most painful, the most difficult, and
certainly the most lonely, that the President
has had to make since he has been in office.
It was very painful to do this at that particu-
lar season when the expectation for peace had
been so high and only six weeks before his
inauguration. It was very difficult to do it
under circumstances when the outcome was
not demonstrable.

There were really three parts to it. One,
should we resume bombing? Two, if we
resume bombing, with what weapons? That
involved the whole issue of the B-52. And
three, should we talk to the American peo-
ple, which was really implied in your ques-
tion— there has never been an explanation.

With respect to the first part, why did
the President decide to resume bombing?
We had come to the conclusion that the nego-
tiations as they were then being conducted
were not serious; that for whatever reason,
the North Vietnamese at that point had come
to the conclusion that protracting the nego-
tiations was more in their interest than con-
cluding them.

It was not a case that we made certain
demands they rejected. It was a case that no

April 2, 1973

391

sooner was one issue settled than three others
emerged, and as soon as one approached a
solution, yet others came to the forefront.

At the same time, the more difficult Hanoi
was, the more rigid Saigon grew; and we
could see a prospect, therefore, where we
would be caught between the two contending
Vietnamese parties, with no element intro-
duced that would change their opinion, with
a gradual degeneration of the private talks
between Le Due Tho and me into the same
sort of propaganda that the public talks in
the Hotel Majestic had reached; and there-
fore it was decided to try to bring home
really to both Vietnamese parties that the
continuation of the war had its price, and
it was not generally recognized that when we
started the bombing again of North Viet-
Nam we also sent General Haig [Gen. Alex-
ander M. Haig, Jr., then Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs]
to Saigon to make very clear that this did
not mean that we would fail to settle on the
terms that we had defined as reasonable. So
we really moved in both directions simul-
taneously.

Once the decision was made to resume
bombing, we faced the fact that it was in
the rainy season and that really the only
plane that could act consistently was the B-
52, which is an all-weather plane.

You mentioned the Hanoi-Haiphong area,
but major efforts were made to avoid resi-
dential areas, and the casualty figures which
were released by the North Vietnamese of
something like a thousand tend to support
that this was the case, because many of these
casualties must have occurred in the target
areas and not in civilian residential areas.

Mr. Kalb: And yet a lot of the civilian areas
were hit apparently. There were pictures of
that. And —

Dr. Kissinger: You can never tell when a
picture is made how vast the surrounding
area of destruction is, but of course some
civilian areas must have been hit. And I
don't want to say that it was not a very
painful thing to have to do.

Now, why did the President decide not to
speak to the American people? The President

can speak most effectively when he announces
a new departure in policy and indicates what
can be done to bring that particular depar-
ture to a conclusion.

He could have done only two things in
such a speech, which was considered. One
is to explain why the negotiations had stale-
mated and, two, to explain under what cir-
cumstances he would end the bombing.

The first would have broken the confiden-
tiality of the negotiations even more than was
the case anyway through the exchanges that
were going on publicly, and the second would
have made the resumption of talks an issue
of prestige and might have delayed them;
and therefore the President decided that if
this action succeeded, then the results would
speak for themselves in terms of a settle-
ment, and if a settlement was not reached,
then he would have to give an accounting to
the American people of all the actions that
led to the continuing stalemate.

Now, whatever the reason, once the talks
were resumed, a settlement was reached
fairly rapidly, and we have never made an
assertion as to what produced it; but you
asked why was the decision made to resume
bombing and this was the reasoning that
led to it.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, isn't the assump-
tion that you are leaving with us that with-
out that kind of heavy bombing the North
Vietnamese ivould not have become serious —
your term — and that therefore one could con-
chide that it u'as the bombing that brought
the North Vietnamese into a serious frame
of mind? I ask the question only because
they have been bombed so repeatedly and
for so many years and still stuck to their
guns and their position. What was so unique
about this?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, that it came at the
end of a long process in which they, too, had
suffered a great deal. But I don't think at
this moment when I am preparing to go to
Hanoi it would serve any useful purpose for
me to speculate about what caused them to
make this decision.

Obviously they made a big decision in Octo-
ber when they decided to separate the politi-

392

Department of State Bulletin

i

cal and military issues, and at this moment
I think it is important to understand that
the decision was not made lightly; that it
was made in the interest of speeding the end
of the war; and that now that the war is
ended, I think it is best to put tlie acrimony
behind us.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kisshiger, let's talk for a
moment about the man with whom you nego-
tiated. How long was it, with Le Due Tho,
three and one-half years, something like that?

Dr. Kissinger: Three and one-half years.

Mr. Kalb: What kind of a person is he?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, when one talks about
negotiations and looks at the pictures of my
opposite number in a garden with me, joking
and jovial, a great deal of emphasis tends
to be put on the personal relationship; and
over three and one-half years of extensive
negotiations, of course we established a cer-
tain personal relationship, sometimes hu-
moi-ous. But one has to remember also what
sort of a man he is, what his background is.

Le Due Tho is an impressive man who
joined the Communist Party as a very young
man, a man therefore driven in the context of
this time by a certain missionary zeal ; spent
seven years at extreme hard labor in a
French prison ; organized guerrilla move-
ments ; and finally after long struggle, wound
up in the Politburo of a country that then
found itself at war almost immediately.

He is a man who has never known tran-
quillity; and where we fight in order to end a
war, he fights in order to achieve certain
objectives he has held all his life. He holds
values quite contrary to ours, and I never had
any illusions about that. I didn't convert him
to our point of view.

He said when he left Paris that we were
negotiators having different points of view
who were always correct and courteous. I
agree with this, and we achieved a conclusion
when both of us had realized the limits of
the strengths that we had to achieve our ob-
jectives, and he realized that in two phases,
in October and then in January.

He could be maddening when he didn't
want to settle, and he was most effective
when he did want to settle.

He is a man of great theoretical interests.
We used to joke with each other that after
the peace we would exchange professorships,
he at Harvard and I in Hanoi.

Mr. Kalb: Well, you may have a chance
when you go to Hanoi to give one lecture —

Dr. Kissinger: I might look over the —

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, do you feel that

the conclusio)i of the Viet-Nam tvar, at least
for the United States, does mark a jumping-
off point for American policy? I am thinking
back four years noiv ivhen you came in. It
seemed as though the Viet-Nam war blocked
almost every opportunity to get on tvith the
major poivers. Do you now see this as an
opportunity to literally move into some kind
of a new era in global diplomacy, or is it just
cosmetics ?

Dr. Kissinger: When this administration
came into office four years ago, Viet-Nam
was really our national obsession. It was
almost the only foreign policy that was being
actively debated, the one that absorbed the
greatest amount of time of the policymakers
and also the greatest amount of time of our
domestic debate.

The President held the view from the be-
ginning that we had to change the emphasis
of that concern. He felt that we had to end
the war on honorable terms so that we would
be free to be taken seriously in the conduct
of other events.

But I think it is fair to say that we didn't
wait for the end of the Vietnamese war to
turn to the construction of peace. I think
major progi'ess was made in our relations
with the Soviet Union. A breakthrough was
achieved in oui- relations with the People's
Republic of China.

There was a transition in Japan which we
cannot say we brought about, but which was
inevitable; and Europe, again not necessarily
as a result of our actions, but as a result of
policies that had preceded us, gained more
identity.

So, we took ofl^ce at a time when it was
possible to think of a global foreign policy
and of a new structure of peace for the first
time in the postwar period, apart from deal-
ing with individual crises.

April 2, 1973

393

Now the end of the Viet-Nam war frees
us to concentrate even more actively on the
constructive steps. But I think it is fair to
say that we probably couldn't have ended the
Viet-Nam war had we not already during the
President's first term taken those steps and
had the President not had the opportunity
to visit Peking and Moscow.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, I would like to
talk to you a good bit more about Russia and
China, and we shall in just a few moments.

[ Annotmcement.]

Mr. Kalb: Is it fair to say that your effort
to establish a new kind of relationship with
China and Rtissia really is kind of a 19th-
century approach, in a way, to a late-20th-
century problem? This balance of poiver is
certainly something that you wrote about
before you came to Washington, and one
could easily get the in^pression that you were,
in a way, with the President, seeking to set
up an international mobile consisting of great
powers and that, as you tvere suggesting a
moment ago, helped end the Viet-Nam war.
In what way ivas this balance a way of end-
ing the war?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, let me make one point,
because you said that I, with the President,
was trying to establish something. I think
it is important to get my role in this into
perspective, because I essentially have three
jobs here. One is, when a problem exists, to
tell the President as honestly as I can what
choices he has, and I do my best to be fair.
And secondly, to make recommendations
when the President asks for them, and
thirdly, to negotiate when the President
sends me.

But the decisions are not made by me, and
one does not become President of the United
States by having a weak will. So this is not
a situation — if you look at the President's
writings, for example, in 1967 or 1968, I
think '67, he wrote an article which really
foreshadowed the Peking initiative. And this
has to be understood when one discusses who
does what and what the role of the various
officials is.

Now, is the conception that you mentioned
— a 19th-century conception — one that the

President also developed in his speech in
Kansas City in July 1971?^ In fact, he made
that speech in Kansas City while I was on
the way to China, and I didn't know he had
made that speech. And when I arrived in
China, Chou En-lai asked me about the same
question you just did. He said, "What about
this five-power world that your Pi'esident
mentioned?"

Mr. Kalb: The five powers being the United
States, western Europe, the Soviet Union,
China, and Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: So Chou En-lai asked me
what about this.

Mr. Kalb: Well, what about it?

Dr. Kissinger: I said, "What about it?"
So he had to get a copy of the speech, and
showed it to me.

The balance of power in the 19th-century
sense about which I wrote is obviously not
applicable to the contemporary situation.
In the 19th century, you had a large number
of states of approximately equal strength
that were trying to prevent marginal changes
in the international situation because they be-
lieved that any marginal change could be
transformed into an overwhelming advan-
tage sooner or later.

In the nuclear age the biggest changes in
the situation can be achieved without any
territorial acquisition at all. No amount of
conquest could have given the Soviet Union
as much additional power as the develop-
ment of the nuclear and, later, the hydrogen
bomb.

So we are talking about a completely dif-
ferent world than the one that existed in
the 19th century.

You can't have these shifting alliances;
you can't have these endless little wars. But
there is something in the balance of power
in two respects. One, no nation can make
its survival dependent on the good will of
another state if it has a choice about it,
especially of a state that announces a hostile
ideology. So you must have a certain equilib-

' For excerpts, see Bulletin of July 26, 1971, p.

93.

394

Department of State Bulletin

rium of strength in order to retain some
freedom over your fate. That is a fact.

Now, what this administration has at-
tempted to do is not so much to play a com-
plicated 19th-century game of balance of
power, but to try to eliminate those hostilities
that were vestiges of a particular perception
at the end of the war and to deal with the
root fact of the contemporary situation —
that we and the Soviet Union, and we and
the Chinese, are ideological adversaries, but
we are bound together by one basic fact:
that none of us can survive a nuclear war and
therefore it is in our mutual interest to try
to reduce those hostilities that are bureau-
cratic vestiges or that simply are not rooted
in overwhelming national concerns.

Now, we thought it was extremely dan-
gerous to continue isolating one of the great
countries in the world. We thought that, with
the Soviet Union, simply to amass more and
more nuclear arms without attempting to
put some control over them was extremely
risky; and therefore we made the opening
to China with full realization that they re-
main ideologically hostile; and we concluded
an agreement on Berlin with the Soviet Union
— Berlin, which had brought us to the brink
of war four times; and we made a first
major step toward the limitation of nuclear
arms last May in Moscow with the SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree-
ments.

Now, you ask, in what way has this con-
tributed to ending the Viet-Nam war? Viet-
Nam takes on a different perspective for it-
self and for us when it is an appendage to the
landmass of Asia than when you make it a
test case to stop a unified Communist thrust
across the whole world. When Hanoi realized
that foreign policy could not be blocked by
the Viet-Nam war forever, and when we
realized that there was more to Asia than
Viet-Nam, we could conduct our negotiations
in a different framework.

So it was in this sense. But we, of course,
continued to know the difference between our
friends and our opponents, but we have also
a responsibility to reduce those tensions that
we can with our opponents, and we are work-
ing hard at that and seriously at that.

M>\ Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, so much of what
you have been talking about now relates to
the continuing tension and quarrels between
China and Russia. So much of it almost
seems to rest at the bottom of an analysis
that you are giving. Do you worry here that
China and Russia may, at some point, be
on a collision course ?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, first of all, Marvin,
nothing I have said rested on tension be-
tween China and the Soviet Union. Of course
we know that China and the Soviet Union
have had their differences, but the most
foolish thing we could do is to tiy to maneu-
ver between those countries. The only pos-
sible policy for us is to deal openly and
honestly with each of them on the basis of
whatever common interests we have with
them or common problems we have with
them.

The most certain road to undermining the
confidence of both would be to engage in
petty maneuvers, to pit them against each
other. Their quarrel does not have its origin
with us, and their quarrel is not being
fomented by us.

Mr. Kalb: I understand what you are say-
ing, sir. Do you worry about them fighting,
coming to any kind of head-on collision? Or
is that past us? There certainly was that fear
in 1969 when you arrived here.

Dr. Kissinger: When we arrived here,
there were military clashes along the Sino-
Soviet border, and we are aware of troop
concentrations on both sides along the Sino-
Soviet border, and both sides have accused
each other of harboring aggressive intent.

It is hard to believe that two such great
countries would engage in so suicidal a course
as fighting with each other. At any rate, this
is not a decision that we can influence and
it is not an outcome that we desire. A war
between the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China would be unfortunate for
evei-ybody.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, we have talked
about an international balance of potver and
I wonder if rve could shift, rather suddenly
I suppose, to a domestic balance of power.
The Constitution talks about a balance be-

April 2, 1973

395

tween this office here and Capitol Hill, and
there is certainly the feeling on Ca'pitol Hill
of having been ignored and about a vast and
almost unnecessary accumulation of poiver
in the White House. What do you feel you
could do at this point in the second adminis-
tration to try to eliminate some of this build-
ing hostility?

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, Marvin, my spe-
cialty is foreign policy —

Mr. Kalb: A lot of people up there are
interested in it.

Dr. Kissinger: — not domestic policy. And
I think we have to look at it from two
aspects. One, in every modern state there
has been an accumulation of executive power
for a variety of reasons— and I am not say-
ing this is necessarily a good development—
partly because the issues become so complex
that it becomes more and more difficult for
an individual lawmaker to keep sufficiently
informed of the subtleties, to have a con-
tinuous influence on the shaping of it. In
fact, in our system the Congress is much bet-
ter off than European parliaments. Our Con-
gress has regular committees with their own
staff. So I recognize that there is a problem
and that the uneasiness of some Senators and
Congressmen has a real root.

Now, in my field, which is the only one
that I am competent to talk about, the Presi-
dent has made major efforts to make it pos-
sible for Senators and Congressmen to be
informed about the operations of my office.
Now, there is the problem of executive privi-
lege, which is that assistants of the President
should not be in a position where their pri-
vate conversations with the President be-
come subject to congressional subpoena.

Now, what we have attempted to arrange
is periodic briefings of Congressmen, usually
by me; I have met with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee at about monthly in-
tervals in settings that maintain the legal
position of executive privilege ; that is to say,
we would not meet in a committee room. We
would meet in a private office of one of the
Senators. But notes were taken, and we con-
ducted the conversations as close to a hearing

as they could be while still maintaining the
legal fiction of executive privilege.

Last week the President sent me to Capitol
Hill to brief any Senator who wanted to
come and any Congressman. So it is a prob-
lem, and we are trying to make efforts to deal
with it. I don't know how satisfactory it will
be.

Mr. Kalb: Well, ivill you be doing this
more often over the next year or so? Will
you be going up to the Hill to see the For-
eign Relations Committee or the Armed
Services Committee more often?

Dr. Kissinger: I have always had the policy
that I would meet with the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee whenever its chairman
requested it, as long as the setting was in-
formal. I have always tried to be available to
as many Senators as possible on an individ-
ual basis, and I will go up to the Hill— I
enjoy meeting with Senators and Congress-
men and I think it is in our long-term in-
terest to have the Congress understand what
we are doing.

Now, it must be understood, however, that
it is not my primary job to defend the Presi-
dent's policy on the Hill. The separation of
powers makes the President not an officer
of the Congress.

This is the responsibility of the Secretary
of State, and of the statutory members of the
Cabinet, who of course testify before the ap-
propriate committees at all times.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, some of the things
that you might have told Congressmen who
asked over the past year or so related to
some of your experiences traveling secretly
to Peking, secretly to Moscow, and now pub-
licly to Hanoi. The two principal Communist
figures, Chou En-lai and Leonid Brezhnev—
what kind of people are they, representing
not only different countries but really dif-
ferent interpretations of communism?

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, Marvin, you
i-ecognize they are both leaders with whom
we will continue to deal and therefore there
are limitations to what I can say. Again,
what I said about Le Due Tho has to be
kept in mind. The type of man who enters

396

Department of State Bulletin

the competition for Communist leadershi])
is a different personality than the type of
man who enters the competition for political
office in the United States and even more dif-
ferent from the type of man who enters the
competition for being bank president in the
United States or a professor.

Now, both of them represent different
stages of Communist evolution. Chou En-lai
is the first generation of leader. He joined the
Communist Party at a time when only great
believers could even conceive of an ultimate
Communist victory. He is a survivor of the
Long March, in which tens of thousands died,
and it is an experience that keeps recurring
in his conversations ; so he is a more mission-
ary type, a more prophetic type. Brezh-
nev's long march has been through the
bureaucracy of an established Communist
system. And he runs a state that is much
more elaborated and much more complex.
And no doubt there are national differences.
Chou En-lai is very intellectual and very sub-
tle. Brezhnev is a more elemental, more phys-
ical person. But they are both considerable
figures and you do not get to the top of that
competition by being a man of weak
character.

Mr. Kalb: You couldn't, obviously, get to
Lenin, but you did get into a conversation
with the President, I understand, ivith Mao
Tse-tung?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Mr. Kalb: Did you get the sense that he
's in daily charge of China? What are some
'if the differences there between Mao and
Chou?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I think that would be
very difficult to judge on the basis of one
conversation, but there is no question in
anybody's mind who has ever seen those two
Chinese leaders together who is number one,
and Mao is visibly the dominant figure; but
how they proportion the daily work among
themselves I wouldn't wish to speculate on.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, before you got
to office, you had obviously spent a great
deal of time at Widener Library at Harvard
studying all about the world and writing

about it, and. you came here, as I recall, ivith
the idea that you ivould be thinking the big
long strategic thoughts and really ivould not
involve yourself in tactics as much as you
have been. When do you get a chance to
think? When do you get a chance to just sit
back a»d reflect on whether you are doing
the right thing, for that matter?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, before you become a
Harvard professor the idea that you could be
fallible is driven out of you.

But seriously, the problem between plan-
ning and execution is one which when one
is on the outside isn't often understood.

When I was a professor, I used to think
that the way to get policy made is to plan it,
to write it out, and then to get somebody
to adopt it.

Now, if you look at the history of the
American bureaucracy, most policy planning
staffs have not been effective. They have not
been effective because there was no way they
could be made relevant to action. Nobody
who had to do something ever had to ask
the policy planning staff whether it approved.

So unless you sit at a strategic point
at which action is not possible without your
oflfice, there is a danger that you become
simply an abstract, an academic adjunct to
an operating agency.

Mr. Kalb: There is the other danger, too,
though, isn't there?

Dr. Kissinger: There is the other danger,
too. The other danger is that you become so
obsessed with tactics that you never ask
yourself where you are going.

I must say candidly it is a problem that
has occupied me. When one comes into oflRce,
one has had a chance, hopefully, to do a great
deal of thinking— much of it probably not
applicable. Then one gains experience, and at
some point in one's term in oflfice, there is a
happy balance between one's thinking and
one's experience.

Beyond a certain point, the danger you
mention is very real : that one becomes so
conscious of the tactical that one forgets
the purpose it is supposed to serve — and one
probably is the last person to know that one
has failed in that.

April 2, 1973

397

Now, I have thought about it. I have a lot
of time on airplanes, for example, to think,
and I try to keep groups working on long-
term projections and to spend at least three
afternoons a week on long-term projections;
but what you said is absolutely a problem.

Mr. Kalb: One of the things that occurred
to me is that I remember an article you
wrote back in 1959 warning then-President
Eisenhower about summitry with the Rus-
sians, and I recall, too, that then-Vice Presi-
dent Nixon, I believe, sent you a note of
congratulations and agreement that he, too,
had his problems with summitry, and yet
we find in the evolution over the last four
years that both of you uniquely have worked
summitry into almost the major eye-catching
element of your policy.

Dr. Kissinger: But I think there is an im-
portant difference. What I warned against
in 1959 was to use a summit meeting as a
substitute for detailed negotiations; and the
danger that we saw then was that if heads
of state met without adequate preparation,
since you could not appeal their disagree-
ments to anybody the danger of a confronta-
tion was too great, and therefore you were
driven into atmospherics and you thought if
Khrushchev ate hotdogs in a cornfield in
Iowa that he had changed his basic policy or
if somebody was received well in Moscow
that meant a change in policy.

But what the President has insisted on
from the first day he came into office, from
his first press conference, was that all prob-
lems were related to each other, linked to
each other; secondly, that summit meetings
could take place only if they were very
carefully prepared.

So when we went to Moscow, we knew the
probable outcome; at least we knew the
range of possible outcomes. And as you re-
member, there were one or two agreements
announced almost every day ; and we used the
summit not to start a negotiation, but to

give an impetus to existing negotiations, to
bring them to a focus, and to have veiy con-
crete solutions.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, tve have about
two minutes left. I ivant to ask you some-
thing the President mentioned yesterday. He
looked down at several of the newsmen and
said that several of you when writing about
"peace with honor," gag on the expression.
Since I assume that you can consume the
expression easily, why has it all been so im-
portant— "peace with honor," given the im-
pact of this war on American society, the
people, the morals, everything ?

Dr. Kissinger: When we came into office
this country was torn by the war. No Presi-
dent has had to take office and was
immediately greeted by massive public dem-
onstrations. We thought we were at the edge
of an era of peace, but the President felt very
strongly that we could never carry it out if
the government did not have enough au-
thority so that its actions meant something
and could be carried out over a period of
time.

Secondly, we felt we owed it to the Amer-
ican people, too, that the war would be ended
by a decision of its government, and not in an
act of exhaustion ; and now that the war is
over, and we have achieved terms better
than most of our critics thought possible,
terms that Americans don't have to be
ashamed of, we think this fact could be the
basis of a reconciliation of the American
people. It is no shame to have wanted to
end the war more quickly than we did. And
what we attempted to do was to create the
basis for a constructive policy at home and
abroad, and this is why the President has
thought it was so important.

Mr. Kalb: Dr. Kissinger, I only have about
430-odd questions left, but we have run out
of time. I certainly hope that sometime soon
you will invite us back. Thank you very much,
and good night.

398

Department of State Bulletin

Deputy Under Secretary Macomber Discusses Terrorism
in Interview on "TocJay" Program

Following is the transcript of an inter-
view ivith Deputy Under Secretary for Man-
agement William B. Macomber, Jr., broadcast
on the National Broadcasting Company's tele-
vision program "The Today Show" on
March S.

Mr. McGee: Deputy Under Secretary of
State William Macomber ioas sent on an
urgent mission a feiv days ago to represent
the United States in negotiations to effect
the release of Americans being held by the
Black September terrorists. The American
diplomats, Cleo Noel and [Georgel CuHis
Moore, ivere killed before he could get there.
Mr. Macomber has now returned to Wash-
ington accompanyiyig the bodies of the two,
and we want to talk with him about the im-
plications of these murders.

He is in our Washington studio with "To-
day" Washington editor Bill Monroe. Gentle-
men.

Mr. Monroe: Good morning, Frank. Mr.
Macomber has also jtist been appointed Am-
bassador to Turkey.

Mr. Ambassador, you stopped in Cairo on
your way to Khartoum. Why?

Mr. Macomber: Well, there were several
reasons. First of all, I came down in Cairo
because I wanted to go into Khartoum in a
smaller airplane. We thought it might agitate
the terrorists if we came in with a great big
American plane. And then I delayed in Cairo
because we got woi-d through the Egj'ptian
Foreign Minister that the whole venue might
shift to Egypt. They were trying to work out
a deal where both the terrorists and their
captives would come to Egypt. And I was
very impressed with the way the Sudanese
Government was handling the problem. I
didn't think I was needed there as much as

I would be needed in Cairo. And finally, that
last deadline was going to take place before
I could get to Khartoum in any event.

So I delayed in Cairo for a little while and
then when it became clear they weren't going
to shift the venue, I got in the air and headed
for Khartoum. But that was when the dead-
line was reached and our men were murdered.

Mr. Monroe: You received word in the air
on the way to Khartoum that the men had
been killed.

Mr. Macomber: I did, Bill, yes.

Mr. Monroe: In retrospect, do you have a
feeling that your earlier arrival or anything
else wo7dd have saved these men, or were
they destined to die because the terrorists
planned it that way ?

Mr. Macomber: No. In all my years of
dealing with this terrorist problem — I have
dealt with it all over the world — I think the
Sudanese Government played it as profes-
sionally and as calmly and as coolly as any
government I have ever seen. The way they
played it made the odds as strong as possible
that we would succeed. I think the men were
doomed from the moment they were picked
up. And believe it or not, these savages
wanted to take our people in an airplane
and fly them over here to the United States
and kill them here in the United States. And
I think what triggered their deaths was as
soon as they found out that they were not
going to be allowed to get a plane or get out
of the Sudan, they decided to kill them.

Mr. Monroe: There have been reports — /
would like to have your comment on them —
that the terrorists brutally mistreated the
Americans before killing them, deliberately
tortured them, in other words.

April 2, 1973

399

Mr Macomber: No, they only murdered
them They did not mistreat them. Those
reports are in error. But I don't give them
much credit for that. They were banged up
at the beginning. Both the Americans were
wounded, but slightly. The Belgian was
wounded more seriously. They were not
tortured in the period in between. They were
just eventually taken out and shot.

Mr Monroe: Can you tell us more than we
have learned about what happened inside
the Embassy, about how Ambassador Noel
and his deputy, Mr. Moore, were able to
handle themselves under these circum-
stances?

Mr Macomber: Well, with unbelievable
courage and composure. It is just unbeliev-
able Cleo, Ambassador Noel, when they told
him he was being taken down to be shot,
turned to the Saudi Ambassador and shook
his hand and said, "You know, I'm very
sorry it has turned out as it has. But I want
you to know that obviously it is not your
fault. And we are deeply grateful for you
having had this party to honor Curt." And
that is what the party was for— it was to
honor Curt, who was leaving. He said, "I
want to thank you and please don't feel badly
about what has happened." And then calmly
went downstairs and he was butchered.

Mr. Monroe: Mr. Macomber, Secretary of
State Rogers has talked about using very
extreme measures to protect American dip-
lomats in the future. What kind of measures
are possible?

Mr. Macomber: Well, you work on this
problem really at two ends. The first thing
you do is make it as tough as possible to
pick up American diplomats around the
world, and we have done a lot on that score.
And they are harder to get than anybody
else. We've got more armored cars, we've
got more follow cars, we've got a lot of de-
vices that make it tough to get American
diplomats. But they can get any one of them.
Mr. Monroe: Bodyguards?
Mr. Macomber: Well, yes. I don't want to
go into all the things we do. We do a lot of
things.

400

Mr. Monroe: Somewhat the same kind of
thing the Secret Service does for the
President ?

Mr Macomber: That's right. Except that
we have a lot of people. You can never get
complete protection. Now, if they want to
o-et somebody they'll get them sooner or
fater But you can make it tough. And you
can make them pay a price. And we do all
kinds of things to try to have that take place.
And the result of that is that they begin to
hit now in the less high-risk areas. Haiti was
not considered a high-risk area. They didn t
hit in the Dominican Republic, where we
had more protection and had expected more

trouble. , . ■, u 4-

So you can make it very tough. And what
they are doing now is going to the areas
where we have not felt the risk was as great
and hitting there. So we are just going to
have to extend the protection.

But there is no way to get absolute pro-
tection. You've got to make it tough for them.
You have to work that at the other end, too
You have to make it not only painful and
risky personally for these people to mess
around with Americans, but then you have
got— and this is just terrible and coldblooded
—but you have got to make it clear that
there isn't going to be any reward. We are
not going to pay blackmail. The President
has made it clear, and he is dead right. And
only when the world comes to this position
is this terrible thing going to end.

Mr Monroe: Is one difficulty in this situa-
tion the fact that Arab governments, notably
Libya and Egypt, have been quite lenient with
terrorists, including those who have com-
mitted murder in the past?

Mr Macomber: Well, I think as long as
governments are lenient with this kind ot
thing it will go on. I think we are going to
have more losses. Bill. I just think this is—
I know the Service thinks so, my colleagues
in the Foreign Service. It is just part of the
job We are going to lose some more people.
But we are not going to pay blackmail to
get them back. And our ambassadors and our
other diplomats don't think we should. And
they know what that means for them. But it

Department of State Bulletin

is the only way we are poinp to put this to
an end. We've got a lot of brave men. We've
pot nobody any braver than tiiese two. But
the Service as a whole — this is just part of
the job. It is so outrapeous when you think
of what these fellows go through, and then
this "cookie-pusher" image. It's an outrage.
These are marvelous, courageous people,
working for the United States all over the
world in a very professional, very competent
way. And taking very great risks.

Mr. Monroe: What about Sudanese justice?
Do ijou expect in this case that the Govern-
ment of the Stidan will mete out to the eight
terrorists arrested justice worthy of the
crime?

Mr. Macomber: Well, I had a long talk with
President Nimeri when I was there, and with
other officials, and before the capture they
promised me there would be no deal. There
was no deal. And the President said things
to me that I can't repeat here. But he was
obviously very concerned by this. And he has
made certain public statements — I I'ead one
yesterday where he said that they called the
Black September organization, "We're going
to make it a Twelve Months Black organiza-
tion if they fool ai'ound with us this way."
He's a very strong man, a strong country.
And I think they are going to do right. But
it isn't helpful for people 6,000 miles away
to start to give them a lot of advice. They
understand the problem. They are very
strong men.

You know, this is a stain on their govern-
ment. And they knew these two men. And
they were upset personally as well as from
the point of view of their government.

I can't tell you — when we left, the cere-
monies at the airport were something. As
soon as these two marvelous women, these
widows — I just can't say enough about them —

Mr. Monroe: The ividoivs of Ambassador
Xoel and Mr. Moore?

P Mr. Macomber: Yes. As soon as they came
onto the airport into the field and their feet
hit the ground, they began walking out to
the honor guard, the military bands began
playing "Auld Lang Syne," a slow march,

over and over again, and they did that for
15 or 20 minutes while those two women
said goodl)y to all their friends and many,
many Sudanese friends — the tears came
down. That country feels about this. And T
think what will develop will be helpful in
ending this problem. But the problem isn't
going to end for a while. It isn't just what
one country does. We've got to have the
fortitude not to pay blackmail, and other
countries have got to. And eventually, when
they don't get any benefits from this thing
and the risks get very high, it will end. But
we've got to go on for a while.

Mr. Monroe: Mr. Macomber, what about
the evidence that the Government of Libya
may have been involved ivith these terrorists,
and they have been in touch ivith them, and
they have encouraged them to do ivhat they
did in Khartoum?

Mr. Macomber: Well, the Government of
the Sudan is conducting a very thorough in-
vestigation. And let's just see where that
comes out. But certainly people had helped.
And it's a criminal thing.

Mr. Monroe: Supposing Israel and Jordan
had released the men in prison that the ter-
rorists wanted released. You ivonld not be
in favor of that, ivould you?

Mr. Macomber: No. It would have been the
worst thing that could have happened. First
of all, I am not at all sure we would have
gotten our people out. But certainly it would
have just encouraged them to kidnap Amer-
ican diplomats and other diplomats all over
the world.

Mr. Monroe: Will this make you feel a little
bit less secure in your new job in Turkey?

Mr. Macomber: No. Look, there are prob-
lems all over the world for all diplomats.
It is part of the job. No, not at all. There are
good security services there. This is just part
of the game. You know, you think about this
as a probem beyond the seas. Two Turkish
diplomats were murdered in this country
very recently.

Mr. Monroe: Thank you very much, Mr.
Ambassador, Deputy Under Secretary of
State William Macomber.

April 2, 1973

401

Letters of Credence

Bangladesh

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
People's Republic of Bangladesh, M. Hossain
Ali, presented his credentials to President
Nixon on March 2. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated
March 2.

Gtiyana

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Guyana, Frederick Hilborn Tal-
bot, presented his credentials to President
Nixon on March 2. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated
March 2.

Iceland

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Iceland, Haraldur Kroyer, pre-
sented his credentials to President Nixon on
March 2. For texts of the Ambassador's re-
marks and the President's reply, see Depart-
ment of State press release dated March 2.

Malaysia

The newly appointed Ambassador of Ma-
laysia, Mohamed Khir Johari, presented his
credentials to President Nixon on March 2.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and
the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated March 2.

Mauritania

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Ahmedou
Ould Abdallah, presented his credentials to
President Nixon on March 2. For texts of the
Ambassador's remarks and the President's
reply, see Department of State press release
dated March 2.

Paraguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Paraguay, Miguel Solano Lopez,
presented his credentials to President Nixon

on March 2. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated March
2.

U.S. Members Appointed to Board
of U.S.-lsrael Science Foundation

Press release 65 dated March 7

The Secretary of State announced on
March 7 the appointment of the five U.S.
members of the Board of Governors of the
United States-Israel Binational Science Foun-
dation. The Board will also include five mem-
bers appointed by the Government of Israel.
The U.S. members appointed were:

Dr. H. Guyford Stever, Director, National Science
Foundation, Washington, D.C.

Dr. John P. Schaefer, president. University of Ari-
zona, Tucson, Ariz.

Dr. David J. Sencer, Acting Administrator, Health
Services and Mental Health Administration, De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International
Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department
of State.

Albert A. Spiegel, attorney at law, Beverly Hills,
Calif.

All terms of appointment were effective
as of January 1, 1973.

The United States-Israel Binational Sci-
ence Foundation was established to promote
and support cooperation between the United
States and Israel in research in science and
technology for peaceful purposes on subjects
of mutual interest and to continue the excel-
lent relations in science and technology be-
tween the two countries. The Foundation was
created by an agreement between the United
States and Israel signed September 27, 1972,
and announced in Department of State press
release 244 of that date.^

The Board of Governors of the Founda-
tion is responsible for determining financial
and managerial policies, the subject areas for
cooperative research, and the research pro-
grams of the Foundation.

^ For text of the announcement, see Bulletin of
Oct. 23, 1972, p. 485.

402

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

United States Policy Toward South Asia

Statemeyit by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistajit Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs^

Mr. Chairman: I want to thank you and
the members of the committee for providing
the opportunity to review the situation in
South Asia and to explain our policy toward
this important region. Our interest in South
Asia is underscored by the appointment of
an outstanding figure, Ambassador Moyni-
han, to India and the President's meeting
March 8 with President Bhutto's special
representatives, Governor Mustafa Khar of
the Punjab and Minister of State Aziz
Ahmed.

Before considering our policies, I would
like to highlight certain major characteristics
of the region :

— The nations of South Asia have attained
independence or emerged from traditional
rule since 1945. These countries are proudly
nationalistic. They are opposed to any trace
of colonialism.

— South Asia's most intractable political-
security problem has been the hostility be-
tween India and Pakistan. This has caused
three wars since 1947. It is the principal
source of regional instability.

— South Asia is, in economic terms, one of
the poorest parts of the globe. Despite de-
termined national commitments, progress
in raising standards of living remains slow.

' Made before the Subcommittee on the Near East
and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on Mar. 12. The complete transcript of the
hearings will be published by the committee and
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20402.

Per capita income is estimated at roughly
$100. The problems are enormous, especially
that of population growth.

— South Asia is one of the most densely
populated portions of the globe. More than
700 million people, or one of every five hu-
mans, live there.

— South Asia is a seat of ancient civiliza-
tions and cultures. Through the centuries
the people of South Asia have contributed
greatly to man's spiritual and intellectual
development. While materially poor, they are
culturally rich.

In 1971 President Nixon described our
broad policy objectives in South Asia:-

Our aim is a structure of peace and stability
within which the people of this region can develop
its great potential and their independent vision of
the future. Our policy is to help these nations deal
with their own problems, and to bring our activity
into a stable balance with that of the other major
powers with interests in the area.

These remain our goals. Following a year
of crisis, turmoil, and war, 1972 began a
period of new departures which have raised
hope for the future. As the President stated
in his 1972 foreign policy report:'

'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25, 1971, ap-
pears in the BULLETIN of Mar. 22, 1971; the section
entitled "South Asia" begins on p. 385.

■■"The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap-
pears in the Bulleti.n' of Mar. 13, 1972; the section
entitled "South Asia" begins on p. 383.

April 2, 1973

403

The 700 million people of the subcontinent de-
serve a better future than the tragedy of 1971
seemed to portend. It is for them to fashion their
own vision of such a future. The world has an in-
terest in the regional peace and stability which are
the preconditions for their achieving it.

The past year has seen major developments
that bear on these broad objectives:

— The dramatic relief effort for Ban-
gladesh.

— The commitment of India and Pakistan
to reconciliation.

— The effort of Pakistan to shape a new
political system and find a new equilibrium.

— The beginning of a process designed
to create a more cooperative relationship
between the United States and India.

The attempt by India and Pakistan to
shape a new and less hostile relationship de-
serves further comment. After a generation
of mistrust and strife, India's Prime Minis-
ter and Pakistan's President agreed last
July at Simla to seek reconciliation. This
marks a milestone toward the structure of
peace and stability we seek in South Asia.

Since then, India and Pakistan have agreed
to a line of control in Kashmir and have
withdrawn their troops from the territory
occupied during the 1971 war. At present,
further progress toward reconciliation is
blocked by an impasse on several interrelated
issues: the repatriation of Pakistani POW's
and families from India and of Bengalees
from Pakistan, and the formal recognition
of Bangladesh by Pakistan. We are hopeful
that the parties concerned will make a fresh
effort to break this deadlock.

Progress toward regional stability may
be slow. The issues are complex. Mistrust is
deep and mutual. But we see greater hope
in the present situation than has existed for
many years. The crucial difference is that the
nations of South Asia themselves now wish
to live peacefully with one another and have
themselves undertaken the tasks of building
a durable peace.

We have warmly encouraged this effort.
In accordance with the Nixon doctrine, we
think the search for stability in South Asia is
primarily a task for the nations of the region.
We look to the other major powers with in-

terests in the area to take a similar approach
to the problems of South Asia. As the Presi-
dent said in his 1971 foreign policy report:

We have a deep interest in ensuring that the
subcontinent does not become a focus of great power
conflict.

We will try to keep our activities in the area in
balance with those of the other major powers con-
cerned .... no outside power has a claim to a pre-
dominant influence and . . . each can serve its own
interests and the interests of South Asia best by
conducting its activities in the region accordingly.

We also have a deep and longstanding in-
terest in the development of South Asia's
human and material resources. As an expres-
sion of our interest the region has been a
major recipient of U.S. economic assistance.
Since 1951 about 20 percent of all U.S. eco-
nomic aid has gone to South Asia, demon-
strating our concern for the hundreds of
millions living at or below the subsistence
level.

In recent years levels of U.S. assistance to
South Asia have declined. This reflects a
drop in available U.S. resources and a re-
duced South Asian requirement for foodgrain
imports. Although the current food position
is uncertain following 1972's erratic mon-
soon, there has been dramatic progress in
wheat production during the last decade.
The Green Revolution has raised Indian
wheat crops from 10 to 24 million tons and
Pakistani production from 4.5 to almost 7
million tons. Attention is now focusing on
efforts to achieve a similar breakthrough in
rice production.

At present most public attention is cen-
tered on the food situation in India, where
foodgrain production declined from 105 mil-
lion tons during the 1971 crop year to per-
haps 100 million tons in 1972. To make up
for the shortfall, the Indians have drawn on
their 9 million tons in reserves and also ar-
ranged for the importation of about 2 million
tons. These purchases have been on a com-
mercial basis, including a substantial portion
from the United States. India has not re-
quested any special food assistance such as
title I of P.L.-480.

Looking ahead, we see continuing coopera-

404

Department of State Bulletin

tion for economic development with South
Asia. But our role will be relatively smaller.
Eurojie, Japan, and international lending: in-
stitutions have already become relatively
larper donors. As you know, nearly all the
nations of the world are prepared to launch
new multilateral trade negotiations under
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] later in 1973. The industrial nations,
including the United States, are hopeful that
the negotiations will insure that real eco-
nomic benefits are provided for the develop-
ing countries. In this regard, the United
States remains committed to provide gen-
eralized preferences for the exports of manu-
factures and semimanufactures of the devel-
oping countries.

In the field of security assistance, the
United States in the 1950's and early 1960's
provided a considerable amount of grant
military assistance to Paki-stan and a small
amount to India. Since the 1965 Kashmir
war, our approach toward South Asia has de-
emphasized the U.S. military supply role.
Under a policy that limited sales to nonlethal
equipment and spares for U.S.-origin lethal
equipment, relatively little military equip-
ment was delivered to India and Pakistan be-
tween 1966 and 1971, estimated to be in the
neighborhood of $100 million. Since the 1971
crisis we have maintained a total embargo.

With regard to our bilateral relations, we
desire good ties with all the countries of
South Asia. With India, a great and demo-
cratic nation, we have at times had policy
differences. We are now seeking to shape a
new and more pragmatic relationship based
on what Ambassador Moynihan aptly termed
"a new realism." Sound and cooperative
Indo-U.S. relations are important for both
our countries and will facilitate South Asian
stability. In the past our differences with
India have primarily related to third-country
problems, most recently Viet-Nam and Ban-
gladesh. With these difl^culties behind us, we
sense improved prospects for a constructive
dialogue.

With Pakistan, the United States has close
and friendly relations. We value these ties
and hope they will continue. During the past

year we made substantial new aid commit-
ments to Pakistan. Our assistance should
hel]) Pakistan in overcoming the economic
dislocation caused by the 1971 crisis. On the
political front, Pakistan is trying to establish
a new and democratic political framework
and regain its national equilibrium. We look
with sympathy on this effort.

With Bangladesh, which we recognized
last April, the year has seen progress toward
establishing good relations. Our major con-
cern in Bangladesh has been the massive re-
construction effort. Along with India, the
United States took the lead in channeling
large amounts of humanitarian assistance.
We have provided more than $300 million in
aid to help this brave nation overcome the
terrible human and physical losses suffered
during the 1971 tragedy. As the emergency
period concludes, we expect to shift to a
more normal economic assistance program.
Bangladesh has just completed democratic
general elections in which Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman has won a large mandate from his
people. We look forward to cooperating with
Mujib and his new government.

We have friendly relations with the other
countries of South Asia — the Kingdoms of
Afghanistan and Nepal and the Republic of
Sri Lanka.

In Afghanistan the new government of
Prime Minister Shafiq is energetically seek-
ing to strengthen representative government
and to accelerate its development process.
We have a longstanding and productive eco-
nomic assistance relationship which we be-
lieve has an excellent record.

We similarly have a small but effective
assistance program in the mountain Kingdom
of Nepal. This supplements what Nepal is
doing for itself and serves as tangible evi-
dence of our interest in this land. The new
King of Nepal, Birendra, has just completed
his first year on the throne and has injected
new energy into the country's development
program.

The island Republic of Sri Lanka faced a
major insurgency threat in 1971. We were
pleased that, along with other friends of
Sri Lanka, we were able to provide a small

April 2, 1973

405

amount of military assistance to Madame
Bandaranaike's democratically elected gov-
ernment. At present Sri Lanka faces major
economic problems, and we are providing
P.L.-480 foodgrain assistance to help the
government's efforts to deal with them.

In sum, our policy toward South Asia
parallels that toward other portions of Asia.
We support the growth of healthy national
states capable of maintaining their integrity
and independence free from a predominant
influence of external powers and free to con-

centrate their energies on the vital tasks of
internal political, social, and economic de-
velopment. We will be a hopeful, helpful,
and sympathetic observer, but the primary
responsibility and interest lie with the coun-
tries of South Asia themselves. As the Presi-
dent said during his 1969 trip to India and
Pakistan, "Asian hands must shape the Asian
future."*

' For a statement by President Nixon issued at
Lahore, Pakistan, on Aug. 1, 1969, see BULLETIN
of Aug. 25, 1969, p. 163.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences'

Scheduled April Through June

ECE Group of Experts on Data Requirements and Documenta- Geneva Apr. 2-3

tion; 3d Session.

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety Provisions Italy Apr. 2-6

ECE Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental Geneva Apr. 2-6

Problems.
IOC/UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Global In- London Apr. 2-6

vestigations of Pollution in Marine Environment.

ITU/CCITT World Administrative Conference Geneva Apr. 2-11

U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science Nevir York . . . Apr. 2-13

and Technology to Development.

'■ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on March 15, 1973, lists
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April-
June 1973. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCITT, International
Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; EC, European
Community; EGA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; EFTA, European
Free Trade Association; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization;
ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IHD, International Hydrographical Decade;
IHO, International Hydrographic Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergov-
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission;
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; PAIGH, Pan
American Institute of Geography and History; PIANC, Permanent International Association of Naviga-
tion Conferences; RID, European Convention on Transport of Dangerous Goods by Rail; UNCITRAL,
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, U.N. Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial
Development Organization; UNIDROIT, International Institute for Unification of Private Law; WHO,
World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization.

406

Department of State Bulletin

ECOSOC Committee for Development Planninp: 9th Session . .

U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination . . .

ILO Petroleum Committee: 8th Session

Joint RID 'ECE Group of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous
Goods.

UNCITRAL: 6th Session

ICAO Lecal Subcommittee on Rome Convention

ECE Group of Experts on Automatic Data Processing and Coding

NATO Atlantic Policy Advisory Group

NATO Group of Experts on the Middle East

UNCTAD Committee on Preferences

PIANC Expanded Executive Committee: 11th Session

OAS General Assembly: 3d Regular Session

ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Pro-
cedures.

U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science
and Technology to Development: 18th Session.

NATO Group of Experts on the Maghreb

PAHO Sixth Inter-American Meeting on Foot-and-Mouth Disease
and Zoonoses Control.

CCC Finance Committee: 41st Session

IMCO Facilitation Committee: 7th Session

NATO Planning Board for Ocean Shipping: 25th Plenary Session

7th General Assembly of the International Centre for the Study
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property.

NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society ....

NATO Nuclear Planning Group: Phase II Follow-On

FAO European Committee for Control of Foot-and-Mouth Dis-
ease: 20th Session.

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: Working
Group on Subsidies.

NATO Group of Experts on Africa

FAO Committee on Fisheries: 8th Session

UNESCO International Coordinating Council on Man and the Bio-
sphere: 2d Session.

ECE Preparatory Meeting for the Fourth ECE Seminar on the
Building Industry.

OECD Agricultural Ministerial

ECAFE Plenary: 29th Session

GATT Working Group on Countervailing Duties

GATT Committee on Agriculture

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products: Working
Group on Import Documentation.

NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport .

NATO Group of Experts on the Far East

PAIGH: 10th General Assembly

U.N. ECOSOC: 54th Session

UNIDROIT Governing Council: 52d Session

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Rice: 17th Session

NATO Group of Experts on Latin America

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board

UNIDO Permanent Committee: 2d Session

WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty Interim Committees and Fi-
nance Working Group.

UN/FAO Committee of the World Food Program

ILO: 2d Tripartite Meeting of Timber Industry

UNESCO Executive Board: 92d Session

UNICEF Executive Board

GATT Balance of Payments Committee

ECE Group of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods .

IMCO Panel of Experts on Maritime Satellite Systems: 2d Session

Conference on Sulphur

ECA Executive Committee

GATT Textiles Committee

IHO Meeting of Legal Experts on Host Agreement

New York . .

. Apr. 2-13

New York . .

. Apr. 2-13

Geneva ....

. Apr. 2-13

Bern

. Apr. 2-13

Geneva ....

. Apr. 2-13

Montreal . . .

. Apr. 2-17

Geneva ....

. Apr. 3-4

Mainz, Germany

. Apr. 3-5

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 3-fi

Geneva ....

. Apr. 3-13

Brussels . . .

Apr. 4

Washington . .

. Apr. 4-14

Geneva ....

. Apr. 5-6

New York . .

. Apr. 5-12

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 9

Bogota ....

. Apr. 9-12

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 9-13

London ....

Apr. 9-13

London ....

. Apr. 9-13

Rome ....

. Apr. 9-13

Ottawa ....

. Apr. 10-11

Bonn ....

. Apr. 10-12

Rome ....

. Apr. 10-13

Geneva ....

. Apr. 10-13

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 10-13

Rome ....

. Apr. 10-17

Paris ....

. Apr. 10-19

Geneva ....

. Apr. 11-13

Paris ....

. Apr. 11-13

Tokyo ....

. Apr. 11-23

Geneva ....

. Apr. 12-13

Geneva ....

. Apr. 16

Geneva ....

. Apr. 16-17

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 16-18

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 16-19

Panama . . .

. Apr. 16-May 5

New York . .

. Apr. 17-May 18

Rome ....

. Apr. 19-21

New Delhi . .

. Apr. 23-27

Brussels . . .

. Apr. 24-27

Geneva ....

Apr. 24-May 4

Vienna ....

. Apr. 24-May 5

Geneva ....

. Apr. 25-30

Rome ....

Apr. 25-May 4

Geneva ....

. Apr. 25-May 8

Paris ....

. Apr. 25-May 11

New York . .

. Apr. 26-May 11

Geneva ....

April 30

Geneva ....

. Apr. 30-May 4

London ....

. Apr. 30-May 5

Montreal . . .

April

Addis Ababa .

April

Geneva ....

April

Monaco. . . .

. April

April 2, 1973

407

Calendar of International Conferences — Continued

International Coffee Council London ....

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures Geneva ....

UNESCO Directing Council: International Geological Correlation Paris ....

Program.

OECD Consumer Policy Committee Paris ....

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York .

WIPO: Extraordinary Session of the Coordinating Committee of Geneva. . . .

WIPO.

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Group on Short- Paris ....

Term Economic Prospects.

WHO Governing Council of the International Agency for Re- Lyon, France .

search on Cancer.

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris ....

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: I2th Session .... Geneva ....

IMCO Legal Committee: 18th Session London ....

IOC/UNESCO Executive Council of the Commission: 2d Session . Paris ....

UNIDO Industrial Development Board: 7th Session Vienna ....

ECE Plenary: 28th Session Geneva ....

ICAO Aircraft Accident Data Reporting Panel: 1st Meeting . . Montreal .

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Scientific and New York . .

Technical Subcommittee.

WHO: 26th World Health Assembly Geneva ....

UNCTAD Sugar Conference Geneva ....

OECD High Level Restricted Group on Oil Paris ....

NATO Ad Hoc Drafting Group on the Mediterranean Brussels . . .

OECD Oil Committee Paris ....

OECD Environment Committee Meeting on Pollution Control Paris ....

Costs.

Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences: 18th Meeting Santiago . . .

of the Technical Advisory Committee.

OECD General Working Group on Oil Paris ....

GATT Committee on Trade in Industrial Products Geneva ....

ECE Preparatory Meeting for the Seminar on the Role of Trans- Munich ....

portation in Urban Planning Development and Environment.

Pan American Child Congress Santiago . . .

Inter-American Children's Institute: 53d Meeting of the Directing Santiago . . .

Council.

ECE Group of Experts on Road Traffic Safety Geneva ....

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Food Hy- Washington . .

giene: 10th Session.

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods: 22d Session London ....

NATO Group of Experts on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe Brussels . . .

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices: Paris ....

24th Session.

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ankara . . .

Customs Cooperation Council: 41st-42d Sessions Tokyo and Kyoto

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Bananas, 5th Session, and Sub- Bremen. . . .

Group on Statistics, 6th Session.

GATT Preparatory Committee for the International Trade Ne- Geneva ....

gotiations.

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris ....

WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Industrial Property Vienna ....

ICAO Sonic Boom Committee: 2d Meeting Montreal . . .

OECD Trade Committee Paris ....

NATO Science Committee Brussels . . .

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Processed Washington . .
Fruits and Vegetables: 10th Session.

IMCO/IHO Committee on Navigational Warnings Monte Carlo . .

IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection : 14th Session London ....

Apri!
Apri

April

May

2-4

May

2-4

May

2-4

May

3-4

May

3-4

May

3-11

May

5—

May

7-11

May

7-12

May

7-15

May

7-18

May

7-18

May

7-18

May

7-25

May

7-30

May

8

May

8-11

May

9

May

9-10

May

9-13

May

10

May

10-11

May

12

May

13-19

May

14-16

May

14-18

May

14-18

May

14-18

May

14-18

May

14-18

May

15-16

(tentative)

May

15-24

May

15-25

May

16-18

May

17-18

May

17-June 12

May

18-29

May

21-22

May 21-23

May

21-25

May

21-25

May

21-25

408 Department of State Bulletin

ECOSOC Committee of Review and Appraisal: 2d Session . . . Geneva May 21 -June 8

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 40th Session New York . . . May 21-June 15

GATT Committee on Trade and Development Geneva May 22-25

IC.AO Airworthiness Committee: 10th Meeting Montreal .... May 22-.Iune 8

ECE Committee on Gas: Group of Experts on the Transport and Geneva May 23-25

Storagrc of Gas.

UNESCO IHD Coordinating Council: 8th Session Paris May 23-30

WHO E.xecutive Board: 52d Session Geneva May 28-29

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Food Label- Ottawa May 28-June 1

ling: 8th Session.

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air Pollution Geneva May 28-June 2

ILO: 190th Session of the Governinp Body and Its Committees . Geneva May 28-June 2

ICAO: 9th North Atlantic Systems Planning Group Paris May 28-June 6

ECE Group of Experts for the Meeting of Government Officials Geneva May 29-June 1

Responsible for Standardization Policies: 2d Session.

IMCO Council: 30th Session London May 31-June 8

GATT Agriculture Committee Geneva May

GATT Committee on Administrative, Financial and Budgetary

Questions. Geneva May

GATT Working Party on the EC/EFTA Agreements Geneva May

ICEM Executive Committee: 43d Session Geneva May

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 25th Session (Re- Geneva May

sumed).

International Lead and Zinc Study Groups New York . . . May

ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination: 14th Session New York . . . May-June

CCC Commodity Code Steering Group Brussels .... June 4-6

IMCO Council: 30th Session London June 4-8

UNCTAD Preparatory Committee for a Liner Conference Code . Geneva June 4-29

International Rubber Study Group London June 5-8

OECD Ministerial Council Paris June 6-8

ILO: 58th International Conference Geneva June G-27

NATO Defense Planning Committee Brussels .... June 7

(tentative)

CENTO Ministerial Conference Tehran June 10-11

FAO Council: 60th Session Rome June 11-22

U.N. Environmental Council: 1st Session Geneva June 11-22

U.N. Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites New York . . . June 11-22

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna June 12

NATO Petroleum Planning Committee Brussels .... June 12-13

NATO Ministerial Meeting Copenhagen . . . June 14-15

IOC UNESCO International Coordinating Group for Coopera- Cartagena. . . . June 17-24
tive Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 6th
Session.

OECD Education Committee: 8th Session Paris June 18-20

GATT Balance of Payments Committee Geneva June 18-22

IMCO Legal Committee: 19th Session London June 18-22

CCC Chemists Committee Meeting Brussels .... June 18-30

ECAFE Working Group on Socio-Economic Returns of Family Bangkok .... June 19-30
Planning Programs.

ECE Group of Experts on the Construction of Vehicles .... Geneva June 25-29

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 15th Session. . . London June 25-29

International Wheat Council London June 25-29

WIPO Committee of Experts on the Patent Licensing Convention . Geneva June 25-29

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space New York . . . June 25-July 6

OECD Fiscal Affairs Committee: 5th Session Paris June 26-28

UNCTAD Expert Group on Financial Aid and Flow Targets . . Geneva June 26-29

International Seed Testing Association Copenhagen . . . June 29-July 1

European Civil Aviation Conference: Eighth (Triennial) Plenary Paris June

Session.

GATT Joint Working Group on Import Restrictions Geneva June

GATT Working Party on the Tariff Study Geneva June

OECD Trade Committee: Working Group on Government Pro- Paris June

curement.

UNDP Governing Council: 16th Session Geneva June

April 2, 1973 '♦O'

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New Yorlc
June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959;
for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS
6997.

Accessioyi deposited: Korea (with declaration),
February 8, 1973.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Notification of succession: Fiji, February 14,
1973.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the
convention on international civil aviation, Chi-
cago, 1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170),
with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24,
1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS
6605.
Acceptance deposited: Cuba, March 13, 1973.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC),
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.
Open for signature at the U.N. Office, Geneva,
until January 15, 1973, and at Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)
Headquarters, London, from February 1 until
December 31, 1973, inclusive.'
Signatures: Bulgaria, Hungary, Korea, Poland.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scien-
tific, and cultural materials, with protocol. Done
at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered
into force May 21, 1952; for the United States
November 2, 1966. TIAS 6129.
Accession deposited: Libya, January 22, 1973.

Agreement for facilitating the international cir-
culation of visual and auditory materials of an
educational, scientific, and cultural character,
with protocol. Done at Lake Success July 15,
1949. Entered into force August 12, 1954; for the
United States January 12, 1967. TIAS 6116.
Accession deposited: Libya, January 22, 1973.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an-
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2,
1972. Open for signature at the U.N. Office,'
Geneva, until January 15, 1973, and at U.N. Head-

quarters, New York, from February 1 until
December 31, 1973, inclusive. » !

Signatures: Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Korea, )
Poland. 1

I
Diplomatic Relations i

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at |
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April \
24, 1964; for the United States December 13, [
1972. TIAS 7502. (

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub- i
lie (with a declaration and a reservation), Feb- |
ruary 2, 1973. 1

Judicial Procedures i

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil |

or commercial matters. Done at The Hague i

March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, I

1972. TIAS 7444. ■

Extended to : Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin j

Islands, February 6, 1973. I

Maritime Matters I

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- I
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS '

4044. ;

Acceptance deposited: People's Republic of China,
March 1, 1973. i

Narcotic Drugs j

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at

New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force ]

December 13, 1964; for the United States June i

24, 1967. TIAS 6298. I

Ratification deposited: Haiti, January 29, 1973. '

Protocol amending the single convention on nar- |

cotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva i

March 25, 1972. i [
Ratifications deposited : Costa Rica, February
14, 1973; Haiti, January 29, 1973; Korea, Jan-
uary 25, 1973.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties,
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Sweden, February 8, 1973.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4,
1969.= i

Notification of succession: Fiji (with a reserva-
tion and declarations), January 11, 1973.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London November 26, 1968.'

Acceptance deposited: Israel, February 2, 1973.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London October 21, 1969.'

Acceptance deposited: Israel, February 2, 1973.

' Not in force.

- Not in force for the United States.

410

Department of State Bulletin

Satellite Communications System

Atrrot'inoiit rflatiti),'- to the International Telecom-
nuinications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973.
TIAS 7532.

Accesi^ion deposited : Central African Republic,
March 13. 1973.
Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In-
telsat), with annex. Done at Washington August
20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973.
TIAS 7532.

Signatures: Central African Republic, March 13,
1973; Empresa Nacional de Telocomunicaciones
de la Republica Argentina (Entel) for Argen-
tina, March 13, 1973.

Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with an-
nex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969. i
Accession deposited: Mauritius, January 18, 1973.

BILATERAL

Hungary

Air transport agreement, with schedule and ex-
change of notes. Signed at Washington May 30,
1972.
Entered into force definitively : March 9, 1973.

Iran

Agreement relating to the extension of the military
mission agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended
(TIAS 1666, 1924, 2068, 2947, 3112, 3520, 6594,
6886, 7070, 7207). Effected by exchange of notes
at Tehran August 15, 1972, and January 31, 1973.
Entered into force January 31, 1973.

Korea

.■Vgreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of February 14, 1973
(TIAS 7273). Effected by exchange of notes at
Seoul February 21, 1973. Entered into force Feb-
ruary 21, 1973.

Japan

Agreement on the implementation of the agreement
of April 18, 1969, concerning the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington March 13, 1973. Entered
into force March 13, 1973.

Switzerland

Agreement on rights, privileges and immunities of
the United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics Standing Consultative Commission. Effected by
exchange of notes at Bern February 26 and March
6, 1973. Entered into force March 5, 1973.

Turkey

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. For-
rest Roi/al to Turkey pursuant to the agreement
of October 14, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4117,
5989, 6588, 6925), relating to the loan of vessels.
Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara March
18, 1971. Entered into force March 18, 1971.
TIAS 7158.
Terminated: February 15, 1973.

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Har-
wood to Turkey pursuant to the agreement of
October 14, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4117, 5989,
6925, 7158), relating to the loan of vessels. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Ankara October
27, 1971. Entered into force October 27, 1971.
TIAS 7206.
Tei~minated: February 15, 1973.

Agreement relating to the loan of the U.S.S. Hugh
Purvis to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes
at Ankara July 1, 1972. Entered into force July

1, 1972. TIAS 7403.
Terminated: February 15, 1973.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972
(TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at
Saigon March 2, 1973. Entered into force March

2, 1973.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972
(TIAS 7464). Effected by exchange of notes at
Saigon March 7, 1973. Entered into force March
7, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

Department Releases 1973 Edition
of "Treaties in Force"

Press release 74 dated March 13

The Department of State on March 13 published
"Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1973."

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral rela-
tions of the United States with 156 countries or
other political entities and the multilateral relations
of the United States with other contracting parties
to more than 375 treaties and agreements on 86 sub-
jects. The 1973 edition lists some 315 new treaties
and agreements, including the Montreal convention
for the suppression of unlawful acts against the
safety of civil aviation (sabotage) ; the Vienna con-
vention on diplomatic relations; the seabed arms

April 2, 1973

411

control treaty; the treaty with the U.S.S.R. on the
limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and the
interim agreement on certain measures with respect
to the limitation of strategic offensive arms; the
treaty with Honduras on the Swan Islands; the
agreement with Japan concerning the Ryukyu Is-
lands and the Daito Islands; the treaty to resolve
pending boundary differences and maintain the Rio
Grande and Colorado River as the international
boundary between the United States and Mexico.

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are
arranged by country or other political entity, and
the multilateral treaties and other agreements are
arranged by subject with names of countries which
have become parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and citations
to texts are furnished for each agreement.

This edition includes citations to volumes 1
through 9 of the new compilation entitled "Treaties
and Other International Agreements of the United
States of America 1776-1949" (Bevans).

"Treaties in Force" provides information con-
cerning treaty relations with numerous newly inde-
pendent states, indicating wherever possible the
provisions of their constitutions and independence
arrangements regarding assumption of treaty
obligations.

Information on current treaty actions, supple-
menting the information contained in "Treaties in
Force," is published weekly in the Department of
State Bulletin.

The 1973 edition of "Treaties in Force" (420 pp.,
Department of State publication 8697) is for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for
$3.00.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
S0i02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents. A 25-percent discount is made on
orders for 100 or more copies of any one publica-
tion mailed to the same address. Remittances, pay-
able to the Superintendent of Documents, must
accompany orders.

Loan of Vessels— U.S.S. Pickerel and U.S.S. Volador.

Agreement with Italy. TIAS 7434. 5 pp. lOfC.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ecuador.
TIAS 7436. 6 pp. 10#.

Inter-American Development Bank. Amendments to
the agreement of April 8, 1959, as amended. TIAS
7437. 9 pp. 10^

Finance — Debt Rescheduling Under Certain Agricul-
tural Commodity and Credit and Loan Agreements.

Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 7449. 19 pp. 25?!.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Brazil Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Brazil and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency amending the agree-
ment of March 10, 1967. TIAS 7440. 3 pp. 10<.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Mnrch 12-18

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to March 12 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 65
of March 7.

No. Date Subject

t68 3/12 Casey: Committee for Monetary
Research and Education, Har-
riman, N.Y., Mar. 10.

*69 3/12 Dr. Walter of New York Univer-
sity to tour Belgium, Germany.

*70 3/12 Dr. Deutsch of Harvard to tour
South Asia.

*71 3/12 Dr. de Grazia of New York Uni-
versity to tour India.

*72 3/12 Study group of U.S. National
Committee for International
Radio Consultative Committee
(CCIR), Mar. 30.

*73 3/12 Advisory Committee on Private
International Law, Mar. 24.
74 3/13 Publication of "Treaties in
Force."

*75 3/13 List furnished by PRG of U.S.
civilians to be released in Hanoi
Mar. 16.
76 3/13 Rogers: "Face the Nation," Mar.
11.

*77 3/13 Study groups of U.S. National
Committee for CCIR, Mar. 29.
78 3/13 Rush: interview for German tele-
vision.

*79 3/13 Waldmann sworn in as Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Trans-
portation and Telecommunica-
tions (biographic data).

*80 3/15 Advisory Commission on Interna-
tional Educational and Cultural
Affairs, Apr. 5-6.

*81 3/15 Cancellation of meeting of Ad-
visory Committee on Private
International Law.

*82 3/16 Executive Committee, National
Review Board for East-West
Center, Apr. 9.

■'83 3/16 Government Advisory Committee
on International Book and Li-
brary Programs, Apr. 12-13.

*84 3/16 Dr. Levine of George Washington
University to tour in Europe
and Asia.

*85 3/16 Mr. Berman of National Endow-
ment for the Humanities to
tour Japan.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

412

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX April ^. 1H7J Vol. LXVIU, No. 1762

Asia. United States Policy Toward South Asia.

B(Sisco) 103
Bangladesh
Letters of Credence (Ali) 402
United States Policy Toward South Asia
(Sisco) 403

Cambodia. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on
"Face the Nation" 373

China

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television 388
[People's Republic of China Releases U.S. Pris-
oners (White House announcement) . . . 387
ecretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 373

ngress. United States Policy Toward South
Asia (Sisco) 403

conomic .Affairs

eputy Secretary Rush Interviewed for Ger-
man Television 381

resident Nixon Names Committee on East-
West Trade Policy 380

.S. and North Viet-Nam Establish Joint Eco-
nomic Commission (joint announcement) . . 387

ermany. Deputy Secretary Rush Interviewed
for Gei-man Television 381

Guyana. Letters of Credence (Talbot) .... 402

Iceland. Letters of Credence (Kroyer) .... 402

India. United States Policy Toward South Asia
(Sisco) 403

International Organization and Conferences.

t Calendar of International Conferences . . 406
rael. U.S. Members Appointed to Board of
U.S.-Israel Science Foundation 402
alaysia. Letters of Credence (Khir Johari) . 402

Mauritania. Letters of Credence (Ould Ab-
dallah) 402

Middle East. Secretary Rogers Interviewed on
"Face the Nation" 373

North .Atlantic Treaty Organization. Deputy
Secretary Rush Interviewed for German
Television 381

Pakistan. United States Policy Tou.nri s;,,iit>,
Asia (Sisco) 103

Paraguay. Letters of Credence l.■^oiaIK] Loppz; 402

Publications

Department Releases 1973 Edition of "Treaties

in Force" 411

Recent Releases 412

Science. U.S. Members Appointed to Board of
LT.S.-Israel Science Foundation 402

Sudan. Deputy Under Secretary Macomber
Discusses Terrorism in Interview on "Today"
Program 399

Terrorism

Deputy Under Secretary Macomber Discusses
Terrorism in Interview on "Today" Program 399

Secretary Rogers Interviewed on" "Face the
Nation" 373

Trade. President Nixon Names Committee on
East- West Trade Policy 380

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 410

U.S.S.R.

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television . 388
Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the
Nation" 373

Viet-Nam

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for CBS Television 388
Secretary Rogers Interviewed on "Face the

Nation" 373

U.S. and North Viet-Nam Establish Joint Eco-
nomic Commission (joint announcement) . . 387

Name Index

Ali, M. Hossain 402

Khir Johari, Mohamed 402

Kissinger, Heni-y A -388

Kroyer, Haraldur 402

Macomber, William B., Jr 399

Ould Abdallah, Ahmedou 402

Rogers, Secretary 373

Rush, Kenneth 381

Sisco, Joseph J 403

Solano Lopez, Miguel 402

Talbot, Frederick Hilborn 402

Superintendent of Documents
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/■J^V

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXMII

No. 1763

April 9, 1978

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 15
Excei-pts From Transcript U13

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CHANGING WORLD
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 418

DEPARTMENT GIVES VIEWS ON PROPOSED WAR POWERS LEGISLATION
Statement by Acting Legal Adviser Brotver i34

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back coter

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

VOL. LXVIII, No. 1763
April 9, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE :
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29, foreign $36.25
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the ■'
Office of Media Services, Bureau of '■
Public Affairs, provides the public and ■
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listed.

President Nixon's News Conference of March 15

Folio icing are excerpts relating to foreign
policy from the transcript of a news con-
ference held by President Nixon in the press
briefing room at the White House on
March 15.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 19

The President: Ladies and gentlemen, I
have an announcement with regard to our
Liaison Office in Peking.

The office will open approximately on May
1, and Ambassador David Bruce will be the
Chief of the Liaison Office. In the office will
be approximately a total complement of 20
(30) , of whom 10 will be at what we call the
expert level ; the others, of course, for the
support level.

The two top assistants, top deputies to
Ambassador Bruce — however, we should
note, I call him Ambassador, but his title
will be Chief of the Liaison Office — will be
Mr. [Alfred leS.] Jenkins from the State
Department, who as you know is one of our
top experts on Chinese-American relations in
State; and Mr. [John H.] Holdridge from the
NSC [National Security Council], who is the
top man in the NSC advising in this area
there.

We selected these two men because Mr.
Jenkins and Mr. Holdridge not only are ex-
perts in Chinese — they are bilingual, inci-
dentally, in both Chinese and American; they
speak well ; in fact I remember both assisted
in translations when I have been there — but
in addition to that, they are men who have
from the beginning been participating in the
new initiative between the People's Republic
and the United States. They have accom-
panied me on my trip, and they have accom-
panied Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger on his trips.

A word about why Ambassador Bruce was

selected. We called him out of retirement be-
cause I thought it was very important to
appoint a man of great stature to this posi-
tion. The Chinese accepted that view them-
selves, and we expect soon to hear from them
as to the appointment of the man they will
have as his opposite number here in Wash-
ington. Another reason that I selected Am-
bassador Bruce was because of his great
experience. All of you know that he has been
Ambassador to Britain and Ambassador to
Germany, Ambassador to France, and also
headed our delegation in Paris in the Viet-
Nam talks in 1971 and '72, in the early part
of '72 [August 1970-July 1971].

A third reason perhaps has even greater
significance. Many of you in this room were
on the trip to China, and sometimes I suppose
the feeling must have developed, "Well, this
is a one-shot deal." I never considered it that,
and all of you who reported on it did not con-
sider it that. It was the beginning, we tru.st,
of a longer journey, a journey in which we
will have our diff^erences, but one in which
the most populous nation in the world and
the United States of America can work to-
gether where their interests coincide for the
cause of peace and better relations in the
Pacific and in the world.

It is necessary that this be, therefore, a
bipartisan enterprise in the highest sense of
the word.

Mr. Bruce, as you know, while he has not
been engaged in partisan politics as such, is
a Democrat. He has served four Presidents
with equal distinction. Democratic Presidents
as well as Republicans. And we believe that
appointing him as head of the delegation in-
dicates our intention that this initiative will
continue in the future, whether the Presi-
dency is occupied by a Democrat or a Repub-

April 9, 1973

413

United Stotes Liaison Office in the People's Republic of China

Followmg is an announcement issued by the
White House on March 15.

white House press release dated March 15

The People's Republic of China and the United
States announced last month that Liaison Offices
would be established in Peking and Washington.

The President is pleased to announce today
that one of the most distinguished diplomats in
recent American history will be Chief of our
Liaison Office. Mr. David K. E. Bruce has ac-
cepted his request that he be the head of our
Liaison Office, and the People's Republic of
China has agreed to his appointment.

Ambassador Bruce has had a long and out-
standing career both in the United States and
in representing this country abroad. He served
with great distinction as U.S. Ambassador to
France, to Germany, and to the United Kingdom,
and in this administration he was U.S. Ambas-
sador to the Paris peace talks in 1970-71. He has
thus represented both Democratic and Republi-
can Presidents and will symbolize the bipartisan
support for this administration's policy toward
the People's Republic of China. The President is
grateful for Ambassador Bruce's willingness
once again to leave his well-deserved retirement
to take on this important assignment for his
country.

Ambassador Bruce's principal deputies will be
Alfred Jenkins of the State Department and
John Holdridge of the NSC [National Security
Council] staff. These senior officials are two of
the most experienced and distinguished Chinese
and Asian experts in the Foreign Service. Both
have accompanied the President and Dr. [Henry
A.] Kissinger on their trips to the People's
Republic of China.

The People's Republic of China will shortly
name the Chief of its Liaison Office in Washing-
ton, and that will be announced in due course.
The two countries are still working out the de-
tails of the offices, but the following additional
information is available today. There will be
about nine officers in the U.S. office in Peking.
The total size of the office, including support
personnel, will be about 30 people. It will start
functioning around May 1, and the United States
is sending an advance team of about five people
to Peking around April 1. Further information
on personnel and arrangements will be provided
in the near future.

The President considers the establishment of
these Liaison Offices as a significant step forward
in our relations with the People's Republic of
China. It will facilitate communications and ac-
celerate the already substantial program of
trade and exchanges between our countries.

lican. Of course, I am not making any
predictions as to what will happen when I
leave.

But that is the end of my announcement.
We will now go to your questions.

Q. Mi: President, can you say, sir, how
concerned you are about the reports of cease-
fire violations in Viet-Nam?

The President: Well, I am concerned about
the cease-fire violations. As you ladies and
gentlemen will recall, I have consistently
pointed out in meeting with you that we
would expect violations because of the nature
of the war, the guerrilla nature, and that
even in Korea, in which we do not have a
guerrilla war, we still have violations. They
recede every year, but we still have them
long — 15, 20 years — after the war is over.

In the case of these violations, we are con-

cerned about them on two scores. One, be-
cause they occur, but two, we are concerned
because of another violation that could lead
to, we think, rather serious consequences —
we do not believe it will ; we hope that it will
not — and that is the reports that you ladies
and gentlemen have been receiving from your
colleagues in Viet-Nam with regard to
infiltration.

You will note that there have been reports
of infiltration by the North Vietnamese into
South Viet-Nam of equipment exceeding the
amounts that were agreed upon in the
settlement.

Now, some equipment can come in — in
other words, replacement equipment, but no
new equipment, nothing which steps up the
capacity of the North Vietnamese or the Viet
Cong to wage war in the South. No new
equipment is allowed under the agreement.

Now, as far as that concern is concerned,

414

Department of State Bulletin

particularly on the infiltration — that is the
more important point, rather than the cease-
fire violations, whicli we think, over a period
of time, will he reduced — but in terms of the
infiltration, I am not going to say publicly
what we have said.

I will only suggest this: that we have in-
formed the Nortli Vietnamese of our concern
aluuit this infiltration and of what we believe
it to be. a violation of the cease-fire, the cease-
fire and the peace agreement. Our concern
has also been expressed to other interested
parties. And I would only suggest that based
I on my actions over the past four years, that
I the North Vietnamese should not lightly dis-
regard such expressions of concern, when
they are made, with regard to a violation.
That is all I will say about it.

Q. Mr. President, in connection with this
matter, there is a report also that not just
ri/nipment, but a neio infusion of North Viet-
namese combat personnel have been intro-
duced into South Viet-Nam, which is apaH

, from just equipment. Can you confirm this?

I Is this partly what you are talking about?

The President: Mr. Theis [J. William
Theis, Hearst Newspapers] , the reports that
we get with regard to infiltration, as you
know, are always either too little or too late
I or too much. And I am not going to confirm
that one, except to say that we have noted the
report having been made. We, however, are
primarily concerned about the equipment, be-
cause as far as the personnel are concerned
they could be simply replacement personnel.

r Q. Mr. President.

The President: Go ahead, you are up in
front.

Q. Sir, why have we not gone through the
ICCS [International Commission of Control
and Supervision'l to complain about this
' infiltration?

The President: The ICCS is being used. As

{ you know, there are some problems there.

The Canadians have expressed considerable

concern about the fact that they don't want

to be on a Commission which is not being

efl"ectively used, and we will continue through
the ICCS, and any other body that we can
efl'ectively appeal to, to attempt to get action
thei-e. I can only answer in that way at this
point.

Q. Mr. President, have you decided to sell
materials from the strategic stockpiles, and
if so, tvhat are the safeguards from a secu-
rity standpoint?

The President: We have examined the
stockpile question over the past four years.
I have long felt that these stockpiles were
really irrelevant to the kind of a world situa-
tion we presently confront. The stockpile
numbers were set up at a time that we were
thinking of a very different kind of conflict
than we presently might be confronted with
in the world.

Under the circumstances, after very full
evaluation and discussion within the admin-
istration, I have found that it will be safe
for the United States to very substantially
reduce our stockpiles. And we are going to
go forward and do that.

Now, there are going to be some squeals,
but while the complaints will be made on the
basis of national security, let me just say, I
have made the decision on the basis of na-
tional security. The complaints will be, and
I understand this, from those who produce
and sell some of the materials in which we
are going to .sell the .stockpiles. But we are
going to do this, first, because the govern-
ment doesn't need this much for its national
security and, second, because in this partic-
ular period, we need to take every action we
possibly can to drive down prices or at least
to drive down those particular elements that
force prices up. And selling the stockpiles in
certain areas will help.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us your
travel plans outside of the United States dur-
ing 1973?

The President: Well, I have previously in-
dicated that I had no immediate travel plans
outside the United States. I have received
recommendations from the State Department

April 9, 1973

415

and from the NSC for what they consider to
be urgent travel : one, to Europe, because of
our interest in NATO; second, to Latin
America, because I have not yet had the op-
portunity to go to Latin America; and third,
to Africa, because I have not traveled there.

I do not mean to suggest by that that travel
by the President to these places is absolutely
indispensable to foreign policy, but I think
this is the concern that many of our foreign
policy experts in the State Department and
the NSC, the concern they have. They feel
that the enormous interest that has been cre-
ated by going to Peking and going to Moscovi^
indicates that vi^e don't care about our neigh-
bors in the Western Hemisphere, we don't
care about our friends in Africa, and we do
not care about our friends in Europe as well.
Incidentally, Japan is another that is on the
list.

Now, how we will be able to work some of
these trips in, I do not know. I would suggest
that we are considering the possibility of a
trip sometime during the summer or shortly
before the summer begins, but we have not yet
made a decision because there are so many
other things on, and there will probably be
a trip in the fall. But how we select among
these, I have not yet determined.

Q. There is a published report that the
administration, despite what has been pub-
licly said, is considering at least the possi-
bility of controls on meat prices, possibly on
other raw agrictdttiral products. We have
housetvives strikes now against these tre-
mendous increases in food pi'ices. When are
you going to be in a position to offer the
American consumer some kind of assurance
that this is going to be stopped, this price
spiral in food ?

The President: The difficulty with offering
rigid price controls on meat prices and food
prices is that it would not stop — in the opin-
ion of those whose judgment I value — would
not stop the rise in prices. It might stop them
momentarily, but as a result of discouraging
increased production, we would reap the con-
sequences of greater upward pressure on
prices later.

You can be very sure that if I thought that
price controls on farm products and on food
prices would work, I would impose them
instantly.

The point is that every bit of evidence that
has been presented shows that it would dis-
courage supply, it would lead to black mar-
kets, and we would eventually have to come
to rigid price controls, wage controls, and ra-
tioning. And I don't think the American peo-
ple want that. I think there is a better way.

The better way is, one, to open our imports
to the greatest extent that we possibly can.
For example, we have already taken some
action in that on dairy products. We have al-
ready taken some action on beef products. I
found, at a meeting with the Cost of Living
Council, that we still have a 3 percent tariff
on imported beef. I have asked the Depart-
ment of Agriculture to give me a legal opin-
ion as to whether the President can remove
that tariff. If I can, I will act. If I can't, I
am going to ask the Congress to do it, be-
cause there shouldn't be any tariff on an item
that is in short supply in the United States.
That is on the import side.

On the supply side, we are, of course, re-
ducing our stockpiles, whatever stockpiles
are left, and there are some in which we are
able to act, provided we can get the transpor-
tation. That is the reason the Secretary of
Transportation sat in the meeting with the
Cost of Living Council, because we need flat-
cars and a number of other items in order to
get it moved.

Finally, there is the production side. And
on the production side, as you know, our new
farm policy is designed to increase produc-
tion. We are continuing to examine the situ-
ation. If any further action can be taken that
will work, we will do it. But I can assure you
that I consider it the highest priority to get
the pressure on prices down.

Q. Mr. President, I want to ask you about
peace. You have concentrated on peace in
your administration. Don't you find an incon-
sistency there ivith continuing to give arms
to India and Pakistan and perhaps a hundred
other countries around the world?

416

Department of State Bulletin

The President: First, we are not giving
them, we are selling them.

Q. Isn't that tvorse? That is even worse.

The President: I just wanted to be sure
that we understood the difference, because of
all the concern about aid. But the point that
is involved in the India-Pakistan thing has
been a very difficult one for this administra-
tion because it involves commitments that
were made before we got here. Those com-
mitments were made during the Johnson
administration. I do not criticize the fact that
thoy were made, but they were made.

As far as we were concerned, once the war
between India and Pakistan began, we cut
them off, as you recall. We stopped all eco-
nomic assistance — not all, but some economic
assistance to India, and we stopped all mili-
tary assistance to Pakistan.

Let's look at the numbers: $83 million in
economic assistance to India and $14 million
in military assistance to Pakistan. We have
maintained that embargo up to this point.^
The difficulty was that there were contracts
that had been made, the materials had al-

' On Mar. 14 the Department of State announced
that the embargo imposed on shipments of military
equipment to India and Pakistan in December 1971
was lifted. Under the new policy, similar to that
which was in effect from 1967 to 1971, the United
States will sell to India and Pakistan nonlethal
equipment plus spare parts for previously supplied
U.S.-origin equipment.

ready been, in effect, sold, and under the
circumstances we felt that it was time to
clean the slate.

So what we have done, the Indians are
getting their $83 million in economic assist-
ance; the Pakistanis are being allowed to go
through with their purchases of the arms,
nonlethal arms and spare parts.

Now as far as the whole, the major prob-
lem— and Miss [Sarah] McClendon, you have
put your finger on the major problem — and
that is peace in the area. This in no way, in
no way, jeopardizes the peace in the area.

After the war that broke Pakistan in half,
India's superiority is so enormous that the
possibility of Pakistan being a threat to India
is absurd.

All we are trying to do is to seek good re-
lations with both, and we trust in the future
that our aid to both can be ones that will
turn them toward peace rather than war.

I should also say that in India's case —
while our aid there, our $83 million, is eco-
nomic— India as you know purchases quite
significant amounts of arms from the Soviet
Union and also has an arms capability itself.
So there is no problem in terms of creating
conditions which could lead to another out-
break of war by providing for simply keeping
a commitment that the United States had
made for the sale of spare parts and non-
lethal arms to Pakistan.

April 9, 1973

417

The United States and the Changing World

Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush^

It is an honor and a pleasure to be with
you all here tonight. I am particularly pleased
to have this opportunity to welcome the
nearly 90 visiting Fulbright-Hays scholars
who come from 21 nations and are involved
in a wide variety of academic disciplines.

Each of you has brought to this country
something of the special flavor and perspec-
tive of your own nation. This contribution
is essential to the United States understand-
ing of the world in which it operates and
ultimately to the formulation of constructive
and responsible foreign policy. All of us ap-
preciate how much we are enriched by what
you give this nation.

Seldom is there an opportunity to speak to
a group which combines excellence with such
broad geographic distribution. For this occa-
sion, I would like to say something about how
the United States views the emerging inter-
national environment and to discuss the pur-
poses and policies we will be pursuing as we
go about our international business.

The United States is still evaluating the
meaning and lessons to be drawn from our
involvement in Viet-Nam. Whether such an
evaluation can be completed in this genera-
tion is questionable. I am confident, however,
that President Nixon's ending of the war
under conditions enabling South Viet-Nam
to decide its own future will be judged as a
great contribution to peace and stability, not
only in Asia but elsewhere as well.

1 Made at Washington on Mar. 21 at the annual
dinner honoring Fulbright-Hays scholars sponsored
by the Department of State and the Washington
International Center (press release 87).

But whatever one's judgment on the past,
it would be most unfortunate if the reaction
to our experience there were to distort this
country's approach to foreign relations as
we move further into the vastly different in-
ternational context of the 1970's and 80's.
The world structure that produced the Indo-
china conflict is rapidly disappearing. We
are entering a new environment. The United
States no longer will be required to do as much
in that environment as we have in the past,
but we will remain actively involved, and we
must mold it as well as react to it.

It is difficult to be definitive about the
emerging international environment. Every
assertion contains its own contradiction.
Every attempt to simplify comes across an
underlying complexity. Every verity contains
a paradox. There is, I fear, no adequate word
to express this combination of change, dif-
fuseness, paradox, complexity.

"Multipolar" is the term most generally
used to describe the environment which we
are all entering. That term accurately reflects
both the changes within the Communist
world and the success of our policies in pro-
moting healthy, confident, and independent
nations in Europe, in Asia, and elsewhere.
There is now a multipolar relationship among
an economically powerful Japan, a more
closely unified Europe, a rising China, a more
confident Soviet Union, and ourselves. Yet
the multipolar concept must not be over-
simplified to the point where the world is
seen as a frozen universe composed uniquely
of developed nations, dominated by several
centers of more or less equal power, all out-

418

Department of State Bulletin

ward looking, all treating each other in more
or less the same way. Few things could be
further from the truth.

The new environment we are entering,
rather, is intricate, fluid, interdependent, and
complex.

— For one thing, the principal participants
have different capabilities. Bipolarity still
Iiersists in the strategic relationship between
the United States and the Soviet Union. Eu-
rope is still in the process of developing the
voice and organization to fully reflect its
international economic position. Japan is still
exploring the meaning of its phenomenal
economic growth in terms of its international
role. China's international position primarily
reflects her potential, her great size, and her
potential military strength.

— The relationship among the principal
participants is not the same. On the one
hand, whatever our differences, the indus-
trial democracies — Japan, the European
("ommunity, the United States, and others —
are bound by interest, shared values, and
alliance into especially close association. On
the other hand, we are separated from Mos-
cow and Peking by deeply different ap-
proaches to man and society which are not
subject to early resolution. Mutually bene-
ficial cooperation is replacing hostility in our
relationship with the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China, but the sense of
being adversaries has not ended. And they
are at odds between themselves.

— Also, the participants are interdependent,
not just counterpoi.sed. Nations are increas-
ingly aware that many problems can only be
solved through cooperative international ef-
forts— from building moi-e equitable trade
and monetary structures to dealing with is-
sues such as air piracy, narcotics, pollution,
and exploitation of the oceans' resources.
Interdependence exists, too, in the sense that
nations are closely attuned to each other.
Actions in one part of the globe provoke re-
action and expectation in another. Thus Pres-
ident Nixon's successful determination not to
abandon our support of South Viet-Nam in

achieving peace will impress all with whom
we deal that we will live up to our i)romises.
— The structure of relations will be flexi-
ble and fluid rather than rigid and frozen. I
have no doubt that the changes taking place
in the relationship betw^een the United States
and its allies in Europe and Asia will
strengthen our ties. But it is also true that,
feeling themselves more secure, nations may
find themselves differing more frequently in
many areas — as we have already seen on
some economic matters. On the other hand,
despite differences, the United States and the
Soviet Union and the United States and
China will increasingly find opportunities
to cooperate in endeavors of mutual interest.
The options for smaller nations may be even
broader. In Asia, for example, all nations
may derive greater independence through
China's commitment with the United States
and with Japan to renounce hegemony for
ourselves and to oppose efforts by others to
impose hegemony in the area.

If the new international structure offers
all nations greater freedom and hence greater
benefits, it also imposes on all states certain
responsibilities. The multipower structure
can only work if the participants accept the
principle that the maintenance of reliable
relations is more important than triumph on
any particular issue. Nations are not ex-
pected to sacrifice basic natural interests,
but they should act on the premise that mu-
tual accommodation and restraint are essen-
tial as they pursue international goals.

— Finally, the developing world, while not
yet in the center of world events, will grow
in importance as the new international struc-
ture takes hold. This importance is in part a
result of the interdependence of which I
have already spoken. Effective response to
many of the challenges facing all men will
require the productive engagement of the de-
veloping as well as the developed nations. The
less advantaged nations will play an impor-
tant role in determining whether the world
community is successful in elaborating new
trade and monetary structures to better pro-

April 9, 1973

419

mote an expanding world economy. They will
have to be a major part of any successful
agreements on the exploitation of the sea-
beds, combating of air piracy, control of the
narcotics menace, limitation of nuclear pro-
liferation, protection of the world environ-
ment, and development of sound population
policies. And the larger and more active of
the nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica will play increasing roles in international
problem-solving.

The developed and the developing world
must cooperate to meet these challenges.
Whatever the logic of such cooperation, how-
ever, productive North-South relations may
be made more difficult by the resentment and
destructive nationalism which will feed on
the growing economic gap between rich and
most poor nations.

Any survey of the future role of the de-
veloping world must also note that this area
will probably be the greatest source of vio-
lent conflict for the remainder of the cen-
tury, as poverty, maldistributed income, or
sectarian and communal differences fuel in-
ternal violence or even pit one nation against
another. Such a prospect demands attention
from those of us in developed areas as well.

American interests and concerns dictate
that we be involved in shaping these various
elements into as contructive an international
environment as possible. We are impelled to
this approach by our nuclear relationship
with the Soviet Union. But other realities
also keep us involved : 25 percent of the
agricultural commodities we produce are
exported ; so are 14 percent of our manufac-
tured goods; U.S. direct long-term invest-
ments abroad reached $86 billion in 1971;
we import one-third of our petroleum needs
and will soon import half; and we rely on
imports for one-sixth of our most important
raw materials. Our humanitarian traditions
draw us outward. Finally, we have accepted
involvement through treaty and alliance
which we could not unilaterally renounce
without serious repercussion on international
politics.

A responsible sense of involvement implies
a duty to diff'erentiate rigorously between

what we might like to accomplish and what
we can realistically hope to achieve. But
the very exercise of making such a judgment
can only reaffirm our decision to play an
active, positive, though prudent, role.

New Relationships With U.S.S.R. and China

In seeking to help shape the new environ-
ment our approach, first of all, will be fur-
ther to engage the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China in the construc-
tion of a more cooperative world.

President Nixon's policies have convinc-
ingly demonstrated that adversaries need not
be antagonists. Reason, accommodation, re-
straint, and, on our side, unquestioned
strength have been essential elements in
building these new relationships. Differences
between Moscow and Peking are apparent
to all. But we have carefully avoided any at-
tempt either to exacerbate these tensions or
involve ourselves directly in them, a policy
we will continue to observe scrupulously.

President Nixon's trip to Moscow last year
initiated the building of a major new network
of mutually beneficial relations. In 1972 we
concluded more agreements with the Soviet
Union than in any year since 1933, when
Soviet-U.S. relations were reestablished. As
President Nixon's Ambassador to Germany,
I had the privilege of participating directly
in the negotiations which led to one of those
agreements, the 1972 Berlin agreement.-
Thus I know how difficult the detailed process
of identifying and agreeing upon matters of
common interest can actually be. However,
the accord on Berlin — an issue which lies at
the heart of the division in Europe — is
equally instructive about possibilities of
reaching agreement where both sides ac-
knowledge a mutual interest. There were
times when an agreement appeared impos-
sible, but with our allies and the Soviet rep-
resentative we persevered because we had all
decided we wanted an accord.

- For text of the agreement and related documents,
see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1971; for a statement by
Secretary Rogers made upon signing the final quad-
ripai'tite protocol to the agreement at Berlin on
June 3, 1972, see Bulletin of July 3, 1972, p. 15.

420

Department of State Bulletin

Thus when the initial negotiations opened
in March 1970, the Soviets insisted that the
ties wliich had been built up over the years
between the F.R.G. and Berlin were illegal
and had to be eliminated. The Soviets adhered
to this position until near the end of the ne-
gotiations. But together with our British and
French allies we finally were able to convince
the Soviets that these ties were not only jus-
tified in themselves but essential to the main-
tenance of the viability of the city, and in the
end the Soviets agreed to write into the
agreement, and I quote, "that the ties be-
tween the Western Sectors of Berlin and the
Federal Republic of dermany will be main-
tained and developed."

This year the single most important item
on our agenda with the Soviet Union will be
negotiation for a permanent and comprehen-
sive arms agreement — the SALT Two talks
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]. We hope
that such an agreement w-ill significantly
strengthen the strategic stability between us
and reduce built-in incentives to arms
competition.

In today's world, when nuclear powers are
involved, it is diflficult to isolate issues of
peace. Thus, to name one vital example, we
hope the parties in the Middle East can be
brought to engage in negotiations, direct or
indirect, which can yield an interim agree-
ment opening the road to a permanent set-
tlement based on U.N. Security Council
Resolution 242. We welcome Chairman Brezh-
nev's [Leonid L Brezhnev, General Secretary
of the Soviet Communist Party] statement
that the Vietnamese .settlement "shows that
it is possible to find a peaceful and just solu-
tion to other conflicts — above all in the Middle
East." The lesson of other successful negotia-
tions is that the parties directly involved
must themselves achieve the breakthrough
to meaningful talks and agreement. If the
Soviet Union exercises its influence in that
same direction it could be helpful.

During and following the President's trip
to Peking the Chinese made clear that sig-
nificant further improvements in relations
would follow a settlement in Viet-Nam. Thus,
President Nixon dispatched his adviser on

national security matters, Henry Kissinger,
to Peking immediately after the conclusion
of the Vietnamese peace agreement. Dr. Kis-
singer's Peking talks indeed proved enor-
mously productive, and we are moving more
rapidly in the direction of normal relations
with the Chinese than any of us thought
possible a few months ago.

One of the most important areas in which
we will be building is expanding the already
steady stream of people-to-people visits be-
tween China and the United States. Begin-
ning with ping-pong teams, these visits have
made a significant conti'ibution to the im-
proved climate in our relations. Like the
Fulbright-Hays program and like the many
other official and private exchange programs
the United States is involved in, the flow of
doctors, scholars, acrobats, newsmen, and
others between China and the United States
contributes significantly to the capacity of
our nations to achieve a more accurate per-
ception and deeper understanding of each
other's societies.

Healthy commerce is an important element
in "normal relations." Conclusion of the
agreement in principle between Secretary
Rogers and Chinese Foreign Minister Chi
on the linked issues of frozen Chinese assets
in the United States and U.S. private claims
against China should open the way for an
expansion of trade and for the discussion of
others of the more purely economic issues
that continue to divide us.

Cooperation With European and Asian Allies

Enrichment and reaffirmation of our rela-
tions with our Asian and European allies
will be a second area of our focus. We will
concentrate on what unites us — our common
political, economic, and security interests. We
are convinced that whatever diff'erences may
emerge can only confirm that our relationship
is one of equals and thus basically a healthy
one.

Close cooperation among ourselves and all
the industrialized democracies — western Eu-
rope, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand — is essential to constructive move-
ment on all international issues. Our eco-

April 9, 1973

421

nomic and political concerns can best be
pursued through mutually supportive inter-
national policies. We will be consulting with
these nations this year to explore how we
may improve our institutional ties and
coordination.

Japan will be a major focus in this effort.
We hope to develop our association with the
Japanese so that we will be engaged with
them in the closest consultation on political,
economic, and security matters. In the latter
area, I think we have both found that our
intimate security ties have been assets rather
than liabilities in the improvement of our
relations with China and the Soviet Union.

European relations will be at the center of
our attention. This priority reflects the
United States continued conviction that our
bonds to western Europe provide the essen-
tial strength without which it would be im-
possible to pursue our broad foreign policy
aims. Thus we remain committed to a strong,
unified, self-confident Europe as our close in-
ternational partner. Indeed, Europe's impres-
sive progress toward unification reinforces
our desire to work closely within NATO and
with the enlarged European Community. Our
aim will be to develop a relationship between
ourselves and the Community comparable to
the U.S. -European association in NATO —
one that will assure cooperation and under-
standing on matters of common interest.

Europe is of course central to most issues
of peace. For four years we and our western
European allies have been working closely to
reduce tensions across the continent by get-
ting to their sources. The process began with
the Berlin agreement. That opened the way
for the basic agreement between the two
Germanys, normalizing their relations. This
gigantic step in turn has led to the current
East-West talks in Helsinki and Vienna. Soon
we and our allies will be participating in a
conference of 34 states to seek arrangements
which will assure the greater movement of
people and ideas across Europe and which
will afl^rm the sovereign independence of all
nations. And by the fall, talks should start on
a mutual and balanced reduction of NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces facing each other
in central Europe.

The progress from the Berlin agreement
to the talks in Helsinki and Vienna illustrates
most convincingly how allies and adversaries
can work together pushing back old hostili-
ties, defining areas of mutual interest, pro-
ceeding from definition to formal agreement,
and then building from that agreement into
another round of negotiations.

In Europe and in Asia negotiations to re-
move the sources of tensions have been pos-
sible only because the world knows we will
stand by our commitments. Any move by
the United States to precipitously reduce our
forces stationed abroad would sap the con-
fidence of our partners and undermine the
respect of our adversaries. The only possible
result of such ill-considered action would be
to increase instability and augment tensions
while at the same time frustrating hopes for
the negotiated reduction of forces.

As Ambassador to Germany, as Deputy
Secretary of Defense, and now as Deputy Sec-
retary of State, I have repeatedly witnessed
the intimate relationship between our com-
mitments in Europe and progress in reducing
European tensions. Our allies derive strength
and confidence from our tangible participa-
tion in their defense. We all gain strength
and self-confidence from the intense consulta-
tion and coordination that takes place be-
tween us.

We intend to remain faithful to our Euro-
pean commitments and to do our share. At
the same time we are pleased that the allies
are assuming a greater share of the conven-
tional military burden. The improved Euro-
pean economies have allowed the European
NATO partners to commit themselves in
1973 to increased defense expenditures of
$1.5 billion per year. We will encourage
further steps in that direction, which more
realistically reflects Europe's strengthened
economic position.

Economic issues are of course a chief
source of recent international concern. The
United States must restore the soundness of
our trade and payments positions, and that
necessity is requiring adjustments both by us
and by our friends. Currency realignment
has been a major step. It should go a very
long way toward redressing our trade and

422

Department of State Bulletin

payments lialance — provided the United
States maintains iirice stability.

The cooperative way wliicii tiie United
States, Japan, and tlie European governments
dealt with the recent monetary crisis augurs
well for future economic cooperation. But
the devaluation is no substitute for the long-
term hard decisions that must be taken dur-
ing the pending reform of the world mone-
tary system and in the negotiations for the
reciprocal reduction of trade barriers at the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] talks which begin this fall.

Needs of the Developing Countries

The developing world is a third area in
which the United States intends to be a par-
ticipant and not simply a bystander. The im-
mense potential for cooperation and the
threat of destructive confrontation mandate
that we do so. Neither great structural ob-
stacles to development nor the fact that there
is no simple solution to the riddle of moderni-
zation would justify our lack of interest. We
know, too, that if we are to gain the coopera-
tion of the developing countries in areas of
interest to the United States, we must con-
vincingly demonstrate to them that we share,
support, and understand their desire to bring
a better life to their citizens.

The success of the developing countries'
quest for modernization will be influenced
greatly by the new monetary and trade
structures that emerge from the international
discussions. Thus, the United States sup-
ported representation of the developing na-
tions in the Committee of Twenty which will
remake the world's monetary system. We will
be consulting with them closely in the work
of that committee.

Expanded trade opportunities also are crit-
ical to the developing countries' economies.
Export earnings now provide for four-fifths
of developing countries' foreign exchange re-
.sources and in the future will provide even
more. This dependence on exports explains
why, in spite of our own trade problems, we
still look with favor on generalized prefer-
ences covering a wide variety of developing
country products. We are also convinced that

the developing world will be a major bene-
ficiary of the reduction in trade barriers
we seek from the world trade talks.

The United States does not want nor re-
quire acceptance of our values or emulation
of our system in exchange for cooperation.
Diverse national histories and cultures make
such a demand unrealistic, and our apprecia-
tion of the value of diversity makes it unwise.
However, in a world of diversity, cooperation
requires a mutual desire to resolve outstand-
ing issues as they emerge. When East and
West can negotiate differences there is no
reason why issues cannot be negotiated and
resolved on the North-South axis. Negotia-
tion will, however, require efforts from the
less developed countries as well as from us.
Rules for foreign investment, for example,
need to be stable and well understood, for it
is not productive both to demand foreign
capital for development and to attack the
private enterprises which can provide it.

There is no doubt that the United States
and other developed countries can contribute
significantly to the needs of developing coun-
tries. It is instructive to note that those who
grew impressively in the 1960's were the ones
who follow-ed sound development policies and
had access to substantial foreign resources.
As the world's most prosperous nation we can
provide some of those resources through our
official development assistance — in 1971 we
provided 43 percent of all such assistance
flowing to the developing countries. However,
our country's pi-ivate sector is probably the
most efficient mechanism for transferring
capital and technolog^^ Where it has been
welcomed it has made great contributions.
Trade and investment, as well as population
restraints, must therefore weigh heavily in
any realistic policies for increasing rates of
economic growth in the developing world.
That is why we are putting a new emphasis
upon a comprehensive approach in seeking
to help increase the rate of economic growth
in the developing world.

You Fulbright-Hays scholars here tonight
are participants in one of the most imagina-
tive and fai-seeing foreign affairs programs
undertaken by the U.S. Government. The

April 9, 1973

423

sharing of scholarship it has brought about
is important. Perhaps even more important
is the contribution it has made over the years
in encouraging us all to deal with each other
with restraint, concern, and insight. That is
why I am such a strong supporter of this
program and the many other international ac-
tivities which bring people from differing
nations together in a way that allows them
to share their cultures and their perspectives,
learning to respect the values and rights of
other nations.

I understand that you spent some time yes-
terday with members of our Congress. When
I recently had the opportunity to appear be-
fore Senator Fulbright's Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, several Senators raised
with me questions about the proper balance
between the executive and legislative powers.
In that hearing Senator Fulbright mentioned
a magazine piece he had recently read which
suggested that the Congress is helpless before
the executive.

The exchange program initiated and long
championed by Senator Fulbright and Con-
gressman Hays gives some indication of the
important contribution Congress makes in
our international affairs. Furthermore, the
perspective from this building certainly con-
firms that importance. It is true that the
President, under the Constitution, is the prin-
cipal agent of American foreign policy. But
Congress also has a very important constitu-
tional role. For example, the war powers are
shared powers. This joint responsibility in
foreign affairs is of course part of the way
our Constitution was deliberately con-
structed. Sometimes the Congress and the
Presidency face each other as more or less
friendly adversaries, regardless of who the
incumbents are and even when both branches
are controlled by the same party. Sometimes
they cooperate closely and harmoniously. In
both cases the process has served the United
States well, focusing our national debate on
one issue at a time which people can under-
stand and which can, after due deliberation,
be decided in the light of widespread knowl-
edge of the facts.

The role of Congress in foreign policy will

be particularly important this year on many
matters :

— It will, for example, require a congres-
sional decision to authorize the President to
grant most-favored-nation treatment to the
Soviet Union, a condition necessary for the
full implementation of the trade agreement
negotiated last year between ourselves and
the U.S.S.R.

— Relations with our allies and friends in
the developed world will depend in no little
part on the trade-negotiating authority that
emerges from congressional consideration.

— The Hill's decision on resources available
for security assistance will affect how much
we can do under the Nixon doctrine to help
our allies in defending themselves.

—U.S. force levels throughout the world
are already undergoing congressional scru-
tiny, an exercise whose conclusion could
greatly affect our efforts to reduce world
tensions without lessening world security.

— The level and nature of our economic
assistance to the developing world is ulti-
mately in congressional hands.

— And the Congress will play a critical
role in determining the economic resources
available to help bind up the wounds of war
and build a stable peace in Southeast Asia.

The constitutional role of the Congress in
foreign policy imposes a responsibility on
our executive to conduct business with the'
Hill on the basis of candor, cooperation, and
confidence. But beyond this, we intend to seek
out and work with Senators and Congress-
men on foreign affairs because we are aware
that the executive has no monopoly on experi-
ence, information, knowledge, or creativity
in the foreign policy field. These qualities
exist in abundance on the Hill. They should
be used just as those in the executive branch
are used.

For the United States to play an effective
role in world affairs, the Congress and the
voters must be informed and supportive of
the government's policies. This administra-
tion has made clear its foreign policy goals.
Three Presidential reports to Congress on
foreign policy and two comprehensive reports
by the Secretary of State are an unprece-

424

Department of State Bulletin

dented attempt to inform the people's repre-
sentatives and the people. We intend to
continue to make ourselves freely available
to testify on matters of interest to the
Cong^ress.

Speaking for the Department of State, I
can say that we will be pursuing the closest
possible understanding with the Congress.
Achievement of close cooperation is already,
I believe, closer than it has been for many
years. It will be my endeavor to support the
Secretary of State in making it even closer.

The period of international relations we
are entering holds exceptional promise for
realizing man's yearnings for peace. Hope
will become achievement if all nations join in
a commitment to seek out and develop co-
operative international endeavors and avoid
sterile confrontation. It is this purpose that
shall guide our policies toward adversaries,
our allies, and the developing world. The sup-
port, understanding, and contributions of
our Congress will be essential to our ability
to cany through.

You Fulbright Fellows, all participants in
the program that has been building interna-
tional understanding for 26 years will, I hope,
return home aware of the world we are try-
ing to build and committed to add your
talents to the task in your own way and from
the perspective of your countries.

Commission on Conduct
of Foreign Policy

White House press release dated March 9

President Nixon announced on March 9
the appointment of four members of the
Commission on the Organization of the Gov-
ernment for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.
They are :

R0BE31T D. Murphy, of Washington, D.C. Ambassa-
dor Murphy served with the U.S. Government
from 1916 to 1959. He served as Ambassador to
Belpium and Japan and held a number of other
positions with the rank of Ambassador. Ambas-
sador Murphy was Assistant Secretary of State
for U.N. Affairs, Deputy Under Secretary of
State, then Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs before concluding his career in public

life. He was born on October 28, 1894, in Milwau-
kee, Wis., and is now chairman of Corning Glass
International.

David M. Abshire, of Alexandria, Va. Mr. Abshire
returned to Georgetown University as chairman
and e.xecutive director of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies after serving as As-
sistant Secretary of State for Congressional Re-
lations from April 8, 1970, until .January 8, 1973.
From 1962 to 1970 Mr. Abshire was executive
director of the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies. He was born in Chattanooga,
Tenn., on April 11, 1926.

William .1. Casey, of Roslyn Harbor, N.Y. Mr.
Casey served as Chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission from March 31, 1971, until
he became Under Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs on February 2, 1973. Prior to be-
coming SEC Chairman, Mr. Casey was a partner
in the New York law firm of Hall, Casey, Dickler
& Howley, and the Washington law firm of
Scribner, Hall, Casey, Thornburg & Thompson.
He was born on March 13, 1913, in New York,
N.Y.

AxNE L. Armstrong, of Armstrong, Tex. Mrs. Arm-
strong has been Counsellor to the President and
a member of the Cabinet since February 2, 1973.
Prior to becoming Counsellor to the President
she served as cochairman of the Republican Na-
tional Committee from January 1971 and had
been a Republican national committeewoman from
Texas since 1968. Mrs. Armstrong was born Anne
Legendre on December 27, 1927, in New Or-
leans, La.

The Commission on the Organization of
Government for the Conduct of Foreign
Policy was created by the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 1972 for the purpose
of submitting findings and recommendations
to provide a more effective system for the
formulation and implementation of the Na-
tion's foreign policy. The Commi.ssion is to
report to the President and the Congress by
June 30, 1974, and shall cease to exist 30
days after filing its report.

The Commission will select its own Chair-
man and Vice Chairman from among its
12 members. Four members (two from the
executive branch and two from private life)
are appointed by the President, four mem-
bers (one Senator from each major political
party and two from private life) by the
President of the Senate, and four members
(two Representatives from each major polit-
ical party and two from private life) by
the Speaker of the House.

April 9, 1973

425

Proposals for Unilateral Reduction
of U.S. Forces Abroad Opposed

Following is a statement read to news
correspondents on March 16 by Charles W.
Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations.

I might take a moment to address various
proposals and resolutions passed on the Dem-
ocratic side of the Senate yesterday calling
for a substantial and unilateral reduction of
American forces, bases, and facilities abroad
in the coming 18 months. In our view, the
assumptions on which this resolution is based
are erroneous. The consequences of the ac-
tions proposed would do serious harm both
to our foreign relations and to the national
security.

The resolution assumes that we could save
billions of dollars by reducing U.S. forces
abroad, closing large numbers of bases. It
assumes that this would have beneficial eco-
nomic consequences for the United States. It
assumes that its purposes could be carried
out without impairing our present military
strategy or the foreign policy of the U.S.
Government.

Secretary Rogers believes that these prop-
ositions seriously mislead the American
people.

Secretary Rogers also believes that it is
dangerous to assume that billions of dollars
could be saved without forcing important
changes in our strategy and at the same time
severely affecting our foreign relations.

As you know, our forces and our bases
abroad are principally in Europe and Asia.
In the course of the past four years, the
United States has made very substantial re-
ductions in the forces maintained in Asia and
has closed numerous bases. In our view, the
measures that have been taken have been
prudent in both fiscal and strategic terms.
The measures have been applied in a way
and at a pace which in our judgment leaves
the overall security posture of our allies

stronger today than it was four years ago.

We do believe, however, that major reduc-
tions of the scale and the pace contemplated
in the resolution could weaken the sense of
security which our friends and allies have
acquired and in these lights shake the confi-
dence of our allies and friends in the validity
of American commitments. These results
could easily slow the pace of accommodation
in Korea, for example, and would almost
certainly have an unsettling effect on Japan.

As for Europe, I should remind you that
the policy of this government has been to
maintain our existing force levels and im-
prove their capability. This still seems to us
a prudent policy on both military and politi-
cal grounds.

There is no question that the presence of
American forces in Europe over the past
generation, and their continued presence to-
day, has contributed to deterrence, to a sense
of self-confidence among our European allies,
and to a climate of political stability in Eu-
rope broadly defined from which we, as well
as the Europeans, have drawn major benefits.

It is not too much to say, I believe, that
our presence in both the military and psycho-
logical senses of the word has enabled the
Europeans to enter with some confidence into
negotiations with the states of eastern Eu-
rope, as in the Conference on European Se-
curity and Cooperation, and the preparations
for negotiations on mutual and balanced
force reductions which are now getting
underway.

In summary, given the clear successes of
American foreign policy in recent years, suc-
cesses which have in major part reflected
our strength and the strength of our allies,
this is not the time to undertake precipitous
actions which could directly and immediately
destabilize the international environment.
Nor in the specific case of our forces in Eu-
rope does it seem wise to propose unilateral
reductions when we have the prospect of ef-
fecting mutual force reductions with the So-
viet Union and countries of eastern Europe.

426

Department of State Bulletin

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for NBC Television

Following is ati excerpt from the tran-
script of an interview icith Henry A.
Kissi)iricr, Assistant to the President for Na-
tional Security Affairs, by Barbai'a Walters,
SBC News correspondent, broadcast on Feb-
ruary 25.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, after 10 years of our
fighting a nation we considered our enemy,
we are now asked to give our taxpayers'
money to that former enemy at a time when
there is much that it could be spent on here
at home. Why? Why is it so necessary for us
to do this?

A. First of all, we shouldn't look at it as
aiding our enemy. We should look at it from
the point of view of aiding ourselves. One
has to look at the whole history of North
Viet-Nam. The leaders of North Viet-Nam
have spent most of their lives either in prison
or fighting a guerrilla war, or fighting an in-
ternational war. Never in their lives have
they known quiet; never have they dedicated
themselves to primarily constructive tasks.

Now, it is a difficult psychological problem
for them. Not only have they spent most of
their lives either in conspiracy or in war, but
they really haven't had a normal relationship
with any country ; and we think that if we
can work together with them on some con-
structive tasks this might be a very major
contribution to the peace of Indochina and in
a way cap what has been achieved now in
making a formal settlement. This is the ra-
tionale, not an abstract desire to aid any
particular countiy.

Q. Well, of cotirse, it is a difficult psycho-
logical problem for lis as well. It is estimated
nolo that Congress is tivo to one against ap-
propriating the funds for aid to North Viet-
Nam. Would you think it important enough
for you personally to testify before Congress

so that they would understand your point of
vieiv ?

A. Well, the position of my testifying has
two parts. One, do I talk to Congressmen and
Senators; secondly, do I testify under oath
with records being kept? With respect to the
second point, that is, do I testify before Con-
gress formally, that is governed by the prin-
ciple of executive privilege. That is to say
that Presidential assistants should not be
subpoenaed by Congress and should not be
forced to —

Q. But you could if you ivanted to?

A. No, I couldn't, because it is not my
choice. This depends on the relationship be-
tween the President and the Congress, and
in no administration have Presidential as-
sistants testified before Congress in formal
sessions.

On the other hand, I maintain the closest
relationship with the appropriate congres-
sional committees. I meet the key Senators
personally regularly. I have worked out an
arrangement with the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee and, less frequently, with
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, by
which I appear in sessions that are called
social, and that are called social only be-
cau.se they are not in formal committee rooms
but in the office of some Senator, at which
notes are taken. Every Senator has an oppor-
tunity or every Congressman has an oppor-
tunity to ask questions. The record is kept.
It isn't an official record, but we go as close
to the line of executive privilege as we can,
but I have not in the past testified in formal
sessions. After the Viet-Nam settlement was
negotiated, I testified — or I appeared before
the entire Senate and the entire House an-
swering questions from everybody, so I will
play an active role in explaining our reasons
for recommending a program.

April 9, 1973

427

I will not do it at a formal session, but
that is primarily to protect the position of
future Presidents and future Presidential
assistants. It is in no way an attempt to keep
things from Congress.

Q. I want to go hack once more to the
feeling of the American people, because a
good many of the Senators say that their
action, or their reaction, is based on the mail
which they are receiving from their constitu-
ents and the basic question seems to be, we
yieed so much here in health, in education,
isn't this more important than building up
a nation, or to put it another way, is our
aiding North Viet-Nam absolutely essential
to world peace ?

A. Ever since the end of World War II,
whenever we have had a big decision to
make, the debate has always taken the form
of : Are you active abroad, or are you active
at home? How can you do anything abroad
until you are perfect at home?

Well, we'll never be perfect at home, and
we'll always have tasks abroad. We don't
have the choice between doing things at
home, doing things abroad. If we can't do
both, we won't be able to do either. In the
present circumstances, when you have a
peace that has many precarious aspects, after
10 years of war, of a war that annually cost
10 times as much as what one could conceive
spending, not to consider what may be psy-
chologically, politically, and humanly neces-
sary is simply a wrong allocation of priorities.

Q. But we don't seem to be able to do both.

A. The sums that are in question will not
make a decisive difference. But I don't want
to get into the debate between domestic pri-
orities and foreign priorities. We will pre-
sent our case. We will present where we
think the money should come from, and then
the Congress will have to make the decision.
It is our judgment that some program is
necessary.

Q. While you tvere in Hanoi, what prog-
ress did you make in obtaining an account-
ing of the 1,300 or so men still missing in
action ?

A. We brought along with us our analysis
of the missing in action, particularly where
we had some evidence that a flier had para-
chuted, for example, or where we had collat-
eral evidence that a person might have been
taken prisoner.

We presented it to them in detail. As a
matter of fact, the economic assistance part,
which received so much attention in our
newspapers here, wasn't even discussed until
the third day of my stay in Hanoi. Much of
the first day was devoted to the question of
prisoners and to missing in action.

The North Vietnamese argument is that
their country does not have our means of
communication ; that many of these reports
were concerned with parts of their country
where they would have to make a complex
investigation. They promised us a full
investigation.

We will, of course, also interview all the
prisoners that are released about any infor-
mation they have, and we will make a major
effort.

Now, I must say that I cannot really be-
lieve that the North Vietnamese would hide
prisoners on us. I see nothing that they would
gain from keeping prisoners that they could
not acknowledge in jails in North Viet-Nam.
But we won't rest on this theoretical supposi-
tion. We will make a full investigation, and
we will insist on an accounting.

Q. Notv that you have visited Hanoi and
appraised for yourself the North Vietnamese
leaders, do you think that Hanoi will ever
relinquish its desire to take over South Viet-
Nam and create, as they have ahvays said
they wanted, one Viet-Nam?

A. North Viet-Nam will never relinquish
its desire to take over South Viet-Nam. This
generation of leaders is a group of revolu-
tionaries. They have spent their whole life
making revolutions. They are not in their
sixties going to give up what they have be-
lieved in all their lives.

But that isn't the issue. The issue is, Will
they want to unify Viet-Nam by force, or are
they willing to rely on an evolutionary
process?

428

Department of State Bulletin

We are not opposed to the unification of
Viet-Nani in principle, if Viet-Nam is unified
by peaceful means. If the performance of one
part or the other is so clearly superior to
that of the other that it tends to achieve
moral superiority over the other, that is not
an American concern.

Therefore, if the North Vietnamese are
willing to compete peacefully, if they are
willing to develop their country, if they are
willing to rely on a political process, then we
don't object to their objective, and that is
exactly what we are trying to bring about, to
get a commitment from them, not on paper
but in terms of their action, to a peaceful
evolution in Indochina; and that is precari-
ously poised right now.

Q. There is fighting still going on and
when you met with them — you posed this
question just noiv yourself. I u'onder if you
felt you have the answer but at this point
you don't?

A. No, I do not have the answer now, and
I don't think they have the answer. I do not
think they have fully made up their mind. I
think for the first time in their history and
in their lives they are considering a peaceful
evolution and they are feeling their way to-
ward the sort of relationship they have really
never had with any country, of equality, mu-
tual benefit, consultation.

Can they bring themselves to do it? Can
we manage to establish the right forum?
That is what we are now working on.

Q. This continuous fighting, do you think
this is part of their testing, and mil it per-
haps lead then to a request from President
Thieu for us to again become involved?

A. Well, at this point the South Viet-
namese seem very capable of taking care of
themselves, and what has happened up to now
is a demonstration that Vietnam ization has
substantially succeeded.

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong,
right after the cease-fire, or around the time
of the cease-fire, seized about 300 hamlets.
They have now lost all of them again, and the
fighting in South Viet-Nam, while it still
occurs, is really — if the war was still going

on, these actions would all be reported as
very minor actions but of course under cease-
fire conditions every action has its own
significance.

Q. Did you expect there to be continued
fighting betiveen North and South Viet-Nam?

A. I expected there would be continued
fighting for a few weeks. It has gone on a
little longer than I thought, but —

Q. Are you worried?

A. No, because after all, how are the two
sides going to establish their areas of control
except by testing each other?

Q. But you don't think it is going to mean
a further involvement on our part, or any
request?

A. No.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, as a political historian
and an analyst, what lessons do you think
we have learned from the Viet-Nam experi-
ence? Well, for example, to be more specific —
have we learned that we simply can't vnn a
guerrilla war, even against a very small
nation?

A. You know what got us involved to be-
gin with was the theory that there was one
species of war called guerrilla war which ap-
plied to Indochina, Bolivia, and any other
country.

Viet-Nam is a very special case for many
reasons — in terms of its histo'-ical experi-
ence, in terms of its geography — therefore
I wouldn't make the general statement that
a guerrilla war cannot be won. One can make
the general statement that for a foreign
country to get itself involved in a guerrilla
war is a very significant decision because the
guerrilla is at home, the guerrilla lives with
his own population. The foreigner can never
compete with him on that level. And there-
fore it is our view that, as a general proposi-
tion, domestic security and guerrilla warfare
ought to be the task of the government con-
cerned and that government should be strong
enough to handle attacks below the level of
conventional attacks. That, we would say, is
a general lesson we have learned.

April 9, 1973

429

Q. If we may go back in history a bit,
there are still some questions xvhich nag at
the American, people that you could provide
the ansivers to. At the time the decision tvas
made in December to bomb the Hanoi-
Haiphong area, did you personally advocate
the bombing? I ask this knoiving that your
job involves not only presenting the Presi-
dent with the choices available to him but
also recommending a choice of action, if
asked. So did you support the bombing, or
did you attempt to persuade the President
not to take this step?

A. I have one absolute rule, which is that
I never discuss publicly what I recommend
to the President. That does not mean that I
disagree with the decision. It means that it
is inappropriate for me to provide a checklist
and to create the impression that it is part
of my job to second-guess the President. I do
make recommendations to him, but I do not
publicly state what my position is toward a
particular issue. But you can assume that if
I could not support a major policy I would
resign.

Q. Well, I will ask another question, and
we will see if that is something that can be
answered. There was talk around Washing-
ton late last year that your relationship with
the President had become strained, perhaps
in part because of policy disagreements over
Viet-Nam. There ivas also speculation based
on some evidence that the President raised
the requirements for peace that you had
reached, agreement on in Paris. I am, sure you
are familiar with this speculation. Is there
any truth to it?

A. Some of what I said before applies
here, too. I feel freer to talk about this. I was
never conscious during that period of a
strained relationship with the President. You
have to remember that this town is obsessed
with power and that it lives on reading little
significancies or major significancies into
little acts.

Q. Does he look at you, or does he not;
does the President talk to you —

A. Did he talk to me on the telephone
rather than see me personally? If one knew

all the phone calls between the President and
me and all the conversations, one would have
attached no significance at all to what was
a newspaper speculation once that he was in
town for a day and talked to me on the phone
three or four times but didn't see me. It was
the accident that Ron Ziegler [Ronald L.
Ziegler, Press Secretary to President Nixon]
put out the fact that the conversation had
taken place by telephone that anyone even
attached any significance to it.

Now, its is inevitable that there are always
people on every White House staff — and I
have seen two or three in action — and in the
bureaucracy who put out to newspapermen
their interpretation of what they think is
happening.

Q. Would you like to name these people
here at the White House?

A. Sometimes — I am not saying it was in
the White House — sometimes it is wishful
thinking, but there was no strain in my re-
lationship to the President.

Now, let me turn to the second matter : Did
the President raise the terms of the agree-
ment and therefore undo what allegedly had
been achieved? For this you have to under-
stand how the President and I work. The
President, before I go out on a diplomatic
mission, doesn't write down 20 specific points
that I am supposed to achieve and therefore
the phrase that I didn't live within instruc-
tions, it is really quite meaningless.

What the President does is to write down
for himself, on a yellow sheet, four or five or
six major issues, and the pros and cons of
each issue. Then he will call me in, go over
them and over them, and if I have any ideas
I will present them to him. But he talks much
more in general terms of where we want to
go, so that I clearly understand what he has
in mind.

This is what happened in October. Why
the agreement was not completed — the rea-
son it was not completed was due to many
factors : to the fact that the North Vietnam-
ese were planning an attack at the time of
the cease-fire, the fact that we wanted to get
the International Commission in place, and
the fact that the South Vietnamese Govern-

430

Department of State Bulletin

iiient was not ready to go along at that par-
ticular point.

Q. Did yon thivk they would have been?

A. It was — we had — the President and I
I were in complete agreement before the last
" mission, before I went, that if it appeared at
that particular moment that the cease-fire
was too precarious, that we would not drive
it through at all costs, especially because it
was at the end of an electoral campaign and
because we could not give the impression that
we were doing it in order to gain votes.

So, frankly, when I was in Saigon and
when we made the final decision that led to
the delay, I knew what the President wanted,
and it was not at all true that I w-as pulled
back.

Q. Then xvhy did you come home and put
iioiirself in the very difficult position of say-
ing, "peace is at hand?"

f A. Because you have to understand what
the situation was on whatever the date was,
October 26. But first of all, when you say
"peace is at hand" and then peace comes
along 10 weeks later, of a 10-year war, that

), is not such a very bad prediction. But what
was our problem at the end of October?

We had a public broadcast from Hanoi
that was revealing in a slightly edited ver-
sion some essential agreements which we
had reached and demanding that we sign the
agreement five days later on October 31. We
had Saigon put itself into a position of oppo-
sition to the agreement, and what we had to
make clear and make clear rapidly was, first,
that we were not going to sign on October
31, but nevertheless we were not kicking over
the agreement ; that the agreement was es-
sentially completed as far as we were con-
cerned ; and that it could be completed in a
very brief period of time.

When we said "peace is at hand," we were
telling both Hanoi and Saigon — we told
Hanoi that we were fundamentally sticking
to the agreement. We were telling Saigon
that the agreement as it stood was essentially
what we would maintain.

Now. we thought it could be negotiated in
four or five days. In the interval, for what-

ever reason, Hanoi made the decision to pro-
long the negotiations. Once Hanoi decided
to go back to the negotiations on January 8,
that is, in a serious way, we did settle it in
about six days. And I don't want to say had
I known exactly what would happen, I might
not have chosen a more ambiguous phrase.

Q. China, Dr. Kissinger. Hotv do our new
relations tvith mainland China affect our re-
lations ivith Taiwan? Will tve eventually have
to break our relations with Taiwan as we
come closer and closer to full diplomatic re-
lations— or tvhat are diplomatic relations,
even if ive are not calling them that?

A. We favor the peaceful resolution of
the disagreements between mainland China
and Taiwan. We have no intention at this
time to break diplomatic relations with Tai-
wan. We have established a satisfactory
arrangement with mainland China and we
have established — we will establish an office
there, they are establishing an office in Wash-
ington, and we believe for the foreseeable
future it meets existing needs.

Q. Do you foresee that the Chinese might
be tvilling to join in the arms limitation
talks?

A. The Chinese problem is quite different
from ours and from that of other of the ma-
jor powers. Their nuclear program is in its
infancy, and any of the limitations that are
now being discussed between us and the
Soviet Union occur at a level of nuclear ar-
maments that is probably unimaginable for
the Chinese.

Now, what would be the Chinese attitude
if there was a general conference on, say,
conventional reductions? That I don't know.
Such a conference isn't now in progress, but
up to now the Chinese have taken the attitude
that they would not participate in discussions
on the reduction of nuclear arms. They would
take part in discussions on the elimination
of nuclear arms.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, may we talk a bit about
the Middle East? Friday morning you met
with the National Security Adviser to Presi-
dent Sadat of Egypt, Mr. Hafez Ismail,
whose job hus been likened to yours. I hear

April 9, 1973

431

he has been, called the Egyptian Henry
Kissinger.

A. I told him I was called the American
Ismail.

Q. Was he flattered?

A. I don't know.

Q. Golda Meir is going to come here very
soon. Now, with Viet-Nam off of your num-
ber-one priority list, will you. Dr. Kissinger,
be turning your primary atterition to the
Middle East?

A. I will certainly not turn my primary
attention to the Middle East. First of all,
Mr. Ismail was here not to see me, but to see
the President. Of course, we are taking, the
President is taking a greater interest in Mid-
dle Eastern affairs now and he will be spend-
ing more of his time on the problem.

What we can do, what role we can play,
we will have to decide after Prime Minister
Meir has been here and we have been able
to assess the result of the conversations with
King Hussein, with Mr. Ismail, and then
with Prime Minister Golda Meir.

Diplomatic Cooperation Recovers
Historic German Manuscripts

Following is a report prepared for the
Bulletin by James S. Sutterlin, Director,
Office of Central European Affairs.

Two of the oldest literary works in the
German language were returned to the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany in September 1972
after a 27-year search in which the Depart-
ment of State was involved. The manuscripts,
the Hildebrandlied (Song of Hildebrand)
and the Willehalm Codex, disappeared at
the end of World War II from a bunker
where they had been stored for safekeeping
and found their way to the United States.

The Hildebrandlied, the most important
German-language literary document lost in
the wake of the Second World War, is the

oldest extant German heroic poem or saga.
Believed to have originated around 5.50 A.D.,
it was transmitted orally from generation
to generation until about 810, when it was
written down by the monks of the cloister
at Fulda. The poem recounts the story of
Hildebrand and his son, who meet after
many years of separation and, without rec-
ognizing each other, engage in deadly com-
bat. The Willehalm Codex, consisting of 396
folios and 62 miniatures bound in the 14th
century, is a medieval poem by Wolfram von
Eschenbach relating the heroic deeds of
the Christian knight Willehalm.

The Hildebrandlied and the Willehalm
Codex were removed from the Hesse State
Library in 1943 and stored in a carefully
guarded bunker at Bad Wildungen near
Kassel. In 1945, at the conclusion of the
war, the State Conservator of Greater Hesse
reported to American Military Government
authorities that the bunker had been entered
and the ancient manuscripts were missing.

The Hildebrandlied, consisting of two
pages, was the first of the two manuscripts
to surface in the United States. Page 2 ap-
peared in 1947 when it was offered for sale
to the Pierpont Morgan Library. The library
did not purchase it, perhaps because of its un-
clear antecedents. It reappeared in 1951 in a
private collection on the west coast. Through
the assistance of the Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop of Los Angeles and the Department
of State, that page of the manuscript was
returned to the Hesse State Library at
Kassel.

The search continued for the miss-
ing page and the Willehalm Codex, the pres-
ence of the latter in the United States still
not confirmed by its public appearance.

The Department of State and the Embassy
of the Federal Rejuiblic of Germany in Wash-
ington undertook an official intensified search
for both in 1954. The beginning of that
search was marked by the appearance of an
article in the Department of State Bulletin
of October 4 of that year written by the De-
partment's Arts and Monuments Adviser,
Ardelia Hall. She issued an official appeal for

432

Department of State Bulletin

the return of the niissinp \n\ffe of the Ililde-
brandlied and the Willehalm Codex, as well
as other literary and art treasures missing
since World War II.

That request, as far as the two manuscripts
were concerned, produced no response. Ef-
forts to find both were totally unsuccessful
for more than 15 years. Despite this dis-
couraging: time lapse, the Department and
the German Embassy continued the search.
Early in 1972. Kennedy C. Watkins, a for-
mer Assistant Director of the National Gal-
lery of Art, established contact between the
German Embassy and the A. S. W. Rosen-
bach Foundation of Philadelphia. The Wille-
halm Codex and the missing page of the
Hildebrandlied had been in the foundation's
possession for some years. A series of meet-
ings between representatives of the founda-
tion, the German Embassy, and the Hesse
State Library identified beyond doubt the
authenticity of the manuscripts. The board of
directors of the foundation decided unani-
mously, without any conditions or thought of
compensation, to return the two manuscripts
to the Hesse State Library. Last September
22. the president of the Philip and A. S. W.
Rosenbach Foundation, Dr. Werner L.
Gundersheimer, in a special ceremony in Phil-
adelphia, presented the manuscripts to rep-
resentatives of the GeiTnan Embassy and the
Hesse State Library. The manuscripts were
returned to the Federal Republic of Germany,
after having been on public display in the
German Embassy for several days.

Their return marked the end of an unusual
coordinated effort by officials and ijrivate
citizens in both countries. The stimulus in
this cooperative venture was a recognition
on the part of all who were involved in the
27-year search that these documents should
take their rightful i)lace in Germany, as they
are a significant and unique part of the Ger-
man cultural heritage.

Dr. White To Represent United States
on International Whaling Commission

President Nixon announced on March 9
(White House press release) the appointment
of Robert M. White, Administrator of the
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, as U.S. Commissioner on the
International Whaling Commission. (For
biographic data, see White House press re-
lease dated March 9.) He succeeds J. Lau-
rence McHugh, whose resignation the Presi-
dent accepted on September 11, 1972.

The International Whaling Commission
was established in 1950 to safeguard the re-
maining world whale stocks through studies
and investigations and the promulgation of
regulations relating to whales and whaling.
The Commission meets annually for two
weeks. Two out of every three meetings must
be held at the London, England, headquarters
of the Commission.

April 9, 1973

433

THE CONGRESS

Department Gives Views on Proposed War Powers Legislation

Statement by Charles N. Brower
Acting Legal Adviser ^

I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before this subcommittee on the subject of
proposed war powers legislation. I am par-
ticularly pleased to be able to testify on what
I consider a unique occasion; namely, the first
time in the long history of deliberations on
war powers legislation that we can consider
these proposed bills free from the distraction
of major American involvement in hostilities
overseas and divorced from the special polit-
ical pressures of an election year. The stun-
ning foreign policy successes which Presi-
dent Nixon has achieved in his first term,
precisely through the judicious exercise of
his constitutional authority, must also be con-
sidered in these deliberations. Hopefully, the
perspective can now be more broad.

The changes in the public environment are
particularly significant since war powers leg-
islation has undoubtedly had its genesis in
disenchantment with the protracted hostili-
ties in which the United States became en-
gaged during the last decade. Blaming those
events on the Presidents who were in office
during that time, the proponents of the more
restrictive forms of war powers legislation
seek to avoid similar policies in the future by
diminishing the fundamental authority of the

' Made before the Subcommittee on National Se-
curity Policy and Scientific Developments of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Mar. 13. The
complete transcript of the hearings will be pub-
lished by the committee and will be available from
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Presidency, now and forever. Many such ad-
vocates do concede, albeit reluctantly, that
Congress itself played a role in past policies,
but argue that Congress was led to act un-
wisely because it was supplied inadequate
information and therefore was unable to ex-
ercise its responsibilities competently.

This view of history, which I personally re-
ject, is worth noting because the conclusions
drawn from it by advocates of restrictive war
powers legislation are not logically consistent
with this view. These advocates have sought
to place arbitrarily defined legal obstacles in
the way of expeditious executive branch ac-
tion, while ignoring what from their point of
view should be the real source of concern;
namely, a need for Congress to have more
complete and timely information, to be ca-
pable of better analysis, and to maintain a
more thorough exchange of ideas in the de-
velopment of jiarticular foreign policies.

It is, I would suggest, only through avail-
ability and knowledgeable use of adequate
information, on a timely basis and with the
best possible analysis of what that informa-
tion means, that the executive branch or the
Congress can exercise its respective consti-
tutional responsibilities in the foreign policy
field to the best of its ability. Imperfect per-
formance by one branch of government can-
not be remedied by attempts to undercut or
diminish the fundamental constitutional au-
thority of another branch. Because the war
powers are distributed between the Congress

434

Department of State Bulletin

and the executive, those two branches must
cooperate closely in order for either to exer-
cise its powers effectively, each making the
particular contribution assigned it by the
Constitution. Performance is more likely to
be enhanced by the increased and improved
flow of information to and between those
bodies in an effective and timely manner.

The negative a]iproach to war powers legis-
lation, namely, the interposition of arbitrary
legal obstacles hindering the exercise of ex-
ecutive responsibilities, has an additional se-
rious fault. Proponents of such legislation
overlook the fact that it is impossible for
Congress to tie the hands of the executive
branch without itself suffering a similar lim-
itation of its freedom to act. Every proposed
reduction of Presidential authority in this
area effects a comparable diminution of con-
gressional freedom. If, for example, the
President's exercise of certain powers were
restricted to a period of 30 days, as a practi-
cal matter the President would also become
the beneficiary of a 30-day blank check en-
dorsed by the Congress. If congressional de-
bate were required in all cases immediately
upon the submission of a repoi't from the Pres-
ident or at predetermined intervals which
might have no relevance to the course of
events. Congress would also lose its flexibility
to adjust its own schedule of activities to the
uneven i)ace of unforeseen events. These are
but two examples; yet they are illusti'ative of
the fact that in declaring the executive
branch incompetent to act except in pi'e-
scribed circumstances, Congress would also
be inhibiting its own ability to act except in
a precisely delineated fashion.

The correct balance between the Congress
and the executive in the exercise of war pow-
ers is struck by each branch exercising the
I)owers assigned to it in the most informed,
and hence the most responsible way; that bal-
ance cannot be established or maintained —
indeed, it could well be destroyed — by legis-
lative attempts to alter the basic .scheme
which the drafters of the Constitution so
carefully established. What is needed, I sub-
mit, are processes designed to increase the

likelihood that our government, including
both the executive branch and the Congress,
will be able to exercise its resiionsibilities on
the basis of maximum information, rather
than as a result of sterile confrontation. The
answer to dissatisfaction with a particular
foreign policy is not to be found in alteration
of constitutional authority. It is rather to be
found through enhancement of our respective
abilities, exercised within that authority, to
formulate wise foreign policies for the fu-
ture. From this point of departure, I would
like to address the three bills on which you
have requested our comments.

Specification of Executive Powers

The first bill is S. 440, which would allow
the President to employ the armed forces in
hostilities or situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is indicated by the
circumstances in only four categories of sit-
uations absent a declaration of war. In each
of those four situations the President would
be barred from continuing to use those troops
beyond 30 days without the affirmative con-
sent of Congress unless Congress were physi-
cally unable to meet as a result of an armed
attack on the United States or unless it were
necessary to use troops to protect their own
jirompt disengagement.

The Department of State continues to be-
lieve strongly that it would be unwise and
unconstitutional for the Congress to adopt
this bill. S. 440 seeks by statute to redefine
specifically and restrictively the constitu-
tional allocation of the war powers. The
drafters of the Constitution, however, recog-
nized the extreme difficulty of anticijiating
all circumstances which might in the future
call for the use of the armed forces. As Alex-
ander Hamilton said, writing in "The Fed-
eralist":

... it is impossible to foresee or define the ex-
tent and variety of national exigencies, or the cor-
respondent extent and variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them.

This difliculty was underscored by the re-
peated amendments to the same bill as it was

April 9, 1973

435

being debated last year in the Senate. The
Founding Fathers wisely avoided a precise
definition of the interface between congres-
sional and executive authority, establishing
instead a general structure of shared powers
requiring the cooperation of both branches,
predicated on the assumption that the form
of that cooperation would remain, within
certain limits, sufficiently flexible to accom-
modate many different kinds of circum-
stances. S. 440 would change that scheme by
imposing technical legal prerequisites to ac-
tion and in so doing would insure that every
important national security debate following
emergency action by the President would,
instead of being argued entirely on the mer-
its, be obscured by procedural arguments as
to whether or not the President had acted in
accordance with this new legislation. The
scheme envisaged in S. 440 is a significant
departure from that established in the Con-
stitution and hence could legitimately be ef-
fected only by a constitutional amendment
even if it were desirable.

Contrary to the apparent assertion of sec-
tion 2 of this bill, nothing in the "necessary
and proper" clause of article 1, section 8, of
the Constitution gives Congress this power.
As Alexander Hamilton also made clear in
"The Federalist," the "necessary and proper"
clause was intended principally to guard
against an excessively narrow construction
of the authority of the Union vis-a-vis State
authority. There has never been a judicial
decision which has held that the "necessary
and proper" clause was intended to limit the
principle of separation of powers. In fact, the
case of Myers v. United States (272 U.S. 52
(1926)), in which the Supreme Court held
that Congress did not have the power to con-
dition the President's removal power on the
concurrence of the Senate, indicates that the
separation of powers is not limited by Con-
gress' power under the "necessary and
proper" clause. While this provision gives
Congress the authority to implement both
congressional and executive powers, it does
not empower Congress to change the balance

between those powers by defining and limit-
ing the President's authority.

S. 440 noticeably omits Presidential au-
thority to deploy armed forces abroad as an
instrument of foreign policy in the absence of
an actual attack or imminent threat of attack
on American territory or forces. Yet this
historic Presidential prerogative for nearly
200 years has been essential to resist aggres-
sion and to protect American security inter-
ests. As Secretary Rogers has said: -

. . . such a restriction could seriously limit the
ability of the President to make a demonstration of
force to back up the exercise of our rights and re-
sponsibilities in Berlin or to deploy elements of
the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean in connection
with the Middle East situation.

Elimination of this weapon from the Pres-
idential arsenal could very seriously under-
mine our security posture and likewise cannot
be properly achieved except by constitutional
amendment.

S. 440 also purports to restrict the author-
ity of the President to defend the United
States itself against an actual armed attack
by limiting to 30 days his right to use the
armed forces in such hostilities unless Con-
gress specifically authorizes a continuation
or is physically unable to meet as a result of
the attack. The defense of the United States
against armed attack, however, is a core area
of Presidential authority; Congress cannot
affect the President's constitutional author-
ity in this area. Even the States have consti-
tutional authority to provide for their own
defense when invaded or in imminent danger
of invasion (article I, section 10). Surely the
President can have no less authority or re-
sponsibility for defense than the States,
particularly inasmuch as the Federal Govern-
ment has an unlimited constitutional obliga-
tion to defend the States (article IV, section
4) and the President as Chief Executive (ar-
ticle II, section 1) and Commander in Chief
(article II, section 2) has the responsibility

- For a statement by Secretary Rogers made be-
fore the Senate Committee on Foreigrn Relations on
May 14, 1971, see Bulletin of June 7, 1971, p. 721.

436

Department of State Bulletin

and the authority to provirie that defense.
Surely the Conyiess cannot l)y legishition re-
duce these constitutionally prescribed rights
and obligations.

Since Congress already has the authority
to conduct at any time the same kinds of re-
view that S. MO i)i-oposes to mandate within
SO days, it is dithcult to see what advantages
Congress gains by legislating an arbitrary
deadline. Congress can in any particular case
undertake its consideration in a manner and
within a period of time appropriate to the
circumstances. An arbitrarily fixed time lim-
itation on Presidential authority contributes
nothing to the right of Congress to exercise
its constitutional authority and at the same
time could seriously impede action or under-
mine negotiations in the future in a manner
not desired by either the President or the
Congress at that time. To seek to terminate
Presidential authority if, for whatever rea-
son, the Congress does not expressly affirm
an action within an arbitrary time limit is
neither helpful to the interests of either
branch nor a constructive contribution to the
development of a wise foreign policy.

Termination by Either House

The second bill to which I have been asked
to address myself, H.R. .317, avoids some of
the serious problems of S. 440. It does not
propose to specify the constitutional powers
of the President. Neither does it propose a
fixed and arbitrary time limitation for con-
gressional action in response to Presidential
initiatives. It would call for prompt reports
from the President to the Congress whenever
the armed forces are used in hostilities ab-
sent specific congressional authorization or
a declaration of war.

We question the necessity, and even the
advisability, of requiring, as H.R. 317 would,
that the Congress be convened if not in ses-
sion at the time the President submits such
a report. It is certainly conceivable that the
formality and attention given to a special
session of the Congre.ss could negate the ad-
vantages of quiet diplomacy in the case of an

understated show of .strength. A decision to
convene Congress constitutionally lies within
the discretion of the President and should
dejiend on the circumstances prevailing at the
time.

Section 4 of H.R. 317, entitled "Termina-
tion of Authority," presents difficulty in two
respects. This section proposes that the au-
thority of the President to deploy the armed
forces or to direct or authorize them to en-
gage in hostile action, absent specific con-
gressional authorization or a declaration of
war, is terminated if either House of the Con-
gress adopts a resolution disapproving con-
tinuation of an action the President has
taken. First, the proscription of Presidential
action would seem far too broadly drawn for
both constitutional and policy reasons. Al-
though within its constitutional authority
Congress clearly can decide, for example,
whether or not to appropriate funds to
support policies or programs of which it dis-
approves, it is extremely doubtful, as I men-
tioned earlier, that Congress could terminate
Presidential authority to deploy forces as the
President saw fit; for example, to protect the
United States against an armed attack.

A second difficulty with section 4 of H.R.
317 is that it purports to terminate the au-
thority of the President upon the passage of
a resolution by either House of Congress.
This must be considered an unworkable
standard for a number of reasons. We are
dealing here with a division of power between
the Congress and the executive, not between
the Senate or the House and the executive.
When one branch purports to impose legally
binding restrictions on the exercise of the
authority of the other, it clearly must be act-
ing with its own full authority. The Congress
clearly has authority to approve or not to ap-
prove funds for use by the executive branch.
Such a decision governs to some extent the ac-
tivities of the executive and clearly depends on
the consent of both Houses of the Congress.
A law which states that the same effect can
be accomplished by the passage of a simple
resolution by only one House of Congress is

April 9, 1973

437

constitutionally defective. It impairs the con-
stitutional authority of Congress itself as
well as that of the executive. Furthermore,
what is the true position of Congress if, for
example, one House passes a resolution sup-
porting the President's action and the other
a resolution calling for its termination? It is
clear that in matters of such significance the
Congress must speak with one voice to have
legal force.

Need To Increase Communications

Let me now turn to the third measure I
have been asked to discuss. H.J. Res. 2, in-
troduced by you, Mr. Chairman [Representa-
tive Clement .J. Zablocki], for yourself and
others, is primarily oriented toward increas-
ing the flow of information on which Con-
gress can base its decisions in exercising its
constitutional responsibilities. As I have dis-
cussed at some length, it is this general ap-
proach, rather than that of attempting to
change the underlying authority of either
branch, that we strongly feel is the more
constructive and positive way to proceed. I
would like to mention that we have the great-
est respect and appreciation for your efforts,
Mr. Chairman, over the past several years
to conduct a balanced, responsible, and
searching investigation into the issues raised
by war powers legislation.

Unlike the Zablocki bill passed last year by
the House of Representatives, however, H.J.
Res. 2 includes provisions in section 3 which
could be read as limiting the fundamental
authority of the President to introduce the
armed forces into hostilities or situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated. As I have discussed earlier,
this type of provision leads us into very dif-
ficult constitutional and general policy prob-
lems and does not, in my view, take us very
far along the road to developing responsible
and forward-looking foreign policies in the
future. I do note that H.J. Res. 2 does not
impose any artificial deadline for congres-
sional response to a Presidential initiative,
although of course it maintains the option
for such a response at any time.

In addition, section 6, which provides that
Congress should meet after the President has
committed armed forces as described in sec-
tion .5 in order to decide whether to authorize
such use of the armed forces or the expendi-
ture of funds for that action, seems to imply
that the President may not have authority to
act in the first place. It is clear from what I
have already said, however, that the Presi-
dent possesses broad constitutional authority
to commit military forces in cases contem-
plated by section 5. Finally, as I have
indicated, I do not think it necessarily appro-
priate that Congress be mandatorily con-
vened as required by section 6, upon the
receipt of every report rendered pursuant to
section 5.

It is my hope, Mr. Chairman, that Congress
will reject the highly restrictive approach to
war powers legislation, which is unsound, and
concentrate instead on enhancing its own
ability to participate in the development of
future foreign policies with the executive
branch, as the drafters of the Constitution
intended. To help move us toward that goal,
I would like to repeat for your serious con-
sideration several proposals which the Sec-
retary of State made to the Congress in his
war powers testimony of May 14, 1971. We
are prepared to explore with you ways of
reinforcing the information capability of
Congress on issues involving war and peace.
For example, we would be prepared to have
each geographic Assistant Secretary provide
on a regular basis full briefings on develop-
ments in his respective area. Such bi'iefings
would help the Congress to stay abreast of
developing crisis situations as well as to build
up a deeper background of information in
many areas.

There is, as we have noted many times, the
need to be able to act speedily and sometimes
without prior publicity in crisis situations.
We should concentrate on eflforts to find bet-
ter institutional methods to keep these re-
quirements from becoming an obstacle to the
exercise by Congi-ess of its full and proper
role, rather than on counterproductive efforts
to impede the executive in exercising its role.
We have heard a number of suggestions con-

438

Department of State Bulletin

cerninfr the possibility of establishing- a joint
congressional committee which could act as
a consultative body with the President in
times of emergencies, and as Secretary
Rogers indicated, if there is interest in this
idea in the Congress we would be willing to
discuss this possibility with you to determine
how best we might cooperate.

We must both retain flexibility, for we are
living in a dynamic world; and we must both
work together, for the decisions we make in
*'iis area are frequently momentous and pro-

imd. Let us join together to improve the
quality and facility of our decisions, rather
than inhibit our capacity to make them.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

92d Congress, 2d Session

The Role of U.S. Small Business in Export Trade.
A report of the House Subcommittee on Govern-
ment Procurement to the Select Committee on
Small Business pursuant to H. Res. 5 and 19,
resolutions creating a permanent select committee
to conduct studies and investigations of the
problems of small business. H. Kept. 92-1620.
October 26, 1972. 49 pp.

Financial Statements of the St. Lawrence Seaway
Development Corporation for the Year Ended De-
cember ^1, 1971. Letter from the Comptroller
General of the United States. H. Doc. 92-378. De-
cember 26, 1972. 2.3 pp.

Report of the Activities of the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives,
92d Congress, First and Second Sessions, 1971-
1972. H. Rept. 92-1627. December 29, 1972. 91
pp.

The Decision To Homeport in Greece. Report of the
Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, with
minority and additional views. December 31, 1972.
27 pp.

Legislative Review Activities of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, 92d Congress. H. Rept. 92-1628.
January 2, 1973. 29 pp.

Report on Activities During the 92d Congress of
the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries. H. Rept. 92-1629. January 2, 1973. 73 pp.

Report on the Activitj' of the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, House of Rep-
resentatives, for the 92d Congress. H. Rept.
92-1634. Januarj- 2, 1973. 151 pp.

The Foreign .Assistance Program. Annual Report
to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1971. H. Doc. 92-347.
85 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the conven-
tion on international civil aviation, as amended
(TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170). Done at Rome Septem-
ber 15, 1962.'
Ratification deposited: Iran, February 19, 1973.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972.'
Ratification deposited: Laos, March 22, 1973.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendixes.
Done at Washington March 3, 1973. •
Sigvatiire: Tunisia, March 21, 1973.

Cultural Property

Statutes of the International Centre for the Study
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural
Property. Adopted at New Delhi November-
December 1956; as amended. Entered into force
May 10, 1958; for the United States January 20,
1971. TIAS 7038.

Accessions deposited: Iran, December 18, 1972;
Denmark, December 27, 1972.

Convention on the means of prohibiting and pre-
venting the illicit import, export and transfer of
ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris
November 14, 1972. Entered into force April 24,
1972.=
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, June 22, 1972.

Maritime Matters

Amendment to article 28 of the convention on the
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Orga-
nization (TIAS 4044, 6285). Adopted at Paris
September 28, 1965. Entered into force Novem-
ber 3, 1968. TIAS 6490.
Arreplonce deposited: Cuba, February 9, 1973.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed
at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general
regulations with final protocol and annex, and
the universal postal convention with final pro-

' Not in force.

'-' Not in force for the United States.

I

April 9, 1973

439

tocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo
November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1,
1971, except for article V of the additional proto-
col which entered into force January 1, 1971.
TIAS 7150.
Ratification deposited: Burundi, February 5,

1973.
Accession deposited: People's Republic of China,

February 7, 1973.
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree-
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31,
1971. TIAS 7236.
Ratification deposited: Burundi, February 5,

1973.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered
into force September 1, 1972.=
Ratification deposited: Laos, March 22, 1973.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terror-
ism taking the form of crimes against persons and
related extortion that are of international signifi-
cance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971.^
Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, March 8, 1973.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention en tonnage measurement
of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London
June 23, 1969. ^
Acceptayice deposited: Finland, February 6, 1973.

El Salvador

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement
between the Ministerio de Agricultura y Gana-
deria of El Salvador and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture for the prevention of foot-and-mouth
disease and rinderpest in El Salvador. Effected
by exchange of notes at San Salvador February
28 and March 2, 1973; entered into force March 2,
1973.

Indonesia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re-
lating to the agreement of September 15, 1967
(TIAS 6346). Signed at Jakarta February 14,
1973. Entered into force February 14, 1973.

Korea

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atcmic energy, as amended (TIAS 3490, 4030,
5957). Signed at Washington February 3, 1956.
Entered into force February 3, 1956.
Terminated : March 19, 1973, superseded by the
agreement of November 24, 1972.

Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy, with appendix. Signed at Wash-
ington November 24, 1972.
Entered into force: March 19, 1973.

Yemen Arab Republic

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace
Corps program in the Yemen Arab Republic. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Sana'a September
30, 1972, and January 29, 1973; entered into force
January 29, 1973.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended
(TIAS 2856, 7485). Effected by exchange of notes
at Kabul December 20, 1972, and January 2, 1973.
Entered into force January 2, 1973.

1 Not in force.

- Not in force for the United States.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Raymond J. Waldmann as Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Transportation and Communications, Bu-
reau of Economic Affairs, effective March 12.

440

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX Vol. LXVIII, No. 176S April 9, 1973

American Principles. Department Gives Views
on Proposed War Powers Legislation (Brow-
er) 431

gia. Proposals for Unilateral Reduction of
U.S. Forces Abroad Opposeil (Popnrtment
statement) 426

hina

Kissing-er Interviewed for NBC Television . 427
esident Nixon's News Conference of March

15 (excerpts) 413

l>e United States and the Changing World

(Rush) 418

Jnited States Liaison Office in the People's Re-
public of China (White House announce-
ment) 414

ongress

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 439

epartment Gives Views on Proposed War

Powers Legislation (Brower) 434

lie United States and the Changing World

(Rush) 418

department and Foreign Service. Waldmann
appointed Deputy .-Assistant Secretary for
Transportation and Communications . . . 440

)eveloping Countries. The United States and
the Changing World (Rush) 418

conomic Affairs
President Nixon's News Conference of March

15 (excerpts) 413

The United States and the Changing World

(Rush) 418

Waldmann appointed Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Transportation and Communications 440

itvironment. Dr. White To Represent United
States on International Whaling Commission 433

irope

oposals for Unilateral Reduction of U.S.
Forces Abroad Opposed (Department state-
ment) 426

he United States and the Changing World
(Rush) 418

ermany. Diplomatic Cooperation Recovers His-
toric German Manuscripts (Sutterlin) . . . 432

overnment Organization. Commission on Con-
duct of Foreign Policy 425

pdia. President Nixon's News Clonference of
i'March 15 (excerpts) 413

International OrKanizalionR and Conferences.
Dr. White To Reprrsent United States on
International Whaling Commission .... 433

Japan. Tlie United States and the Changing
World (Rush) 418

Middle East. Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for
NBC Television 427

Military Affairs. Proposals for Unilateral Re-
duction of U.S. Forces Abroad Opposed (De-
partment statement) 426

Pakistan. President Nixon's News Conference
of Mai'ch 15 (excerpts) 413

Presidential Documents. President Nixon's
News Conference of March 15 (excerpts) . . 413

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 439

Viet-Nam

Dr. Kissinger Interviewed for NBC Televi-
sion 427

President Nixon's News Conference of March
15 (excerpts) 413

Name Index

Brower, Charles N 434

Kissinger, Henry A 427

Nixon, President 413

Rush, Kenneth 418

Sutterlin, James S 432

Waldmann, Raymond .1 440

White, Robert M 433

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington. D.C. 20520.

No. Date Sobjcct

'y- '<'''\ , ^- ; . Regional Foreign Policy
Conference, Grand Rapids, Mich,
(as prepared for delivery).
87 3/21 Rush: P'ulbright-Hays scholars
annual dinner.

Not printed.

I

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

U-CI,'

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1764

April 16, 1973

AMERICA'S ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA AND THE WORLD
Address by Under Secretary for Political Affairs Porter HI

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CAPITAL MARKETS
Address by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Casey M8

THE REALITIES OF UNITED STATES-AFRICA RELATIONS
Address by Assistant Secretary Newsom 456

GERMAN-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

IN THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Address by Ambassador Hillenbrand ^62

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside hack cover

THE DEPARTME^fr OF STATE

BULLETI

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1764
April 16, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE :
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29, foreign $36.25
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public and
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of Z7.S. foreign relations and
on the work of the Department and.
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the Wfiite House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to wftich tite'
United States is or may become a
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department of
State, United Nations documents, and
legislative material in the field of
international relations are also listet

■^

America's Engagement in Asia and the World

Address by Williatn J. Porter
Under Secretary for Political Affairs^

President Nixon opened his first inaugural
address with these words:

Each moment in history is a fleeting time, precious
and unique. But some stand out as moments of be-
ginning, in which courses are set that shape decades
or centuries.

The past few years have been such a
moment. We are leaving the postwar world.
Responding to our openings to the People's
Republic of China and the Soviet Union, the
major Communist nations are abandoning
their policy of constant confrontation. New
patterns of international relations are emer-
ging.

The emergence of China, the growing
strength of Japan, and the collective voice of
western Europe are transforming the politi-
cal and economic scene. We encourage this
process. We continue to support the Euro-
pean Community, its enlargement and
strengthening. We welcome Japan's climb to
the opportunities and responsibilities of a
major country. We want good relations with
the U.S.S.R. And the President has launched
a relationship with China which both accepts
and encourages its growing participation in
the affairs of the international community.

The complexity and challenge of this more
fluid environment have led some to counsel
basic changes in our security and economic
policies. Two developments have strength-
ened this view.

' Made at Grand Rapids, Mich., on Mar. 21 be-
fore a regional foreign policy conference cospon-
sored by the Department of State and the World
Affairs Council of Grand Rapids (as delivered; for
the prepared text, see press release 86).

First, we have learned some hard lessons
in international economics. Over the past
two years our imports grew by 40 percent
while our exports increased only 15 percent;
for the first time in this century the United
States has a trade deficit. And second, as
Secretary Rogers recently stated : =

After a long and frequently frustrating military
struggle, there may be some longing among Ameri-
cans to withdraw from the burdens and responsi-
bilities of an active role in world affairs. Twice
before in this century our initial reaction was to
pull back and concentrate on domestic issues.

After World War I, we isolated ourselves
from international responsibilities, but we
could not isolate ourselves from world depres-
sion and world war. After World War II, a
man born in Grand Rapids exactly 89 years
ago tomorrow. Senator Arthur Vandenburg,
saved us from making the same mistake. He
was in many ways the legislative father of
those basic policies that have served us so
well for the past quarter century — in 1945
the founding of the United Nations, in 1947
aid to Greece and Turkey, in 1948 Marshall
plan aid, and in 1949 the establishment of
NATO.

Once again our involvement in war is com-
ing to an end. And once again a native son
of this city is playing a major role in as-
suring that America remains realistically en-
gaged in the world. Congressman Gerald
Ford is a vigorous advocate of the view that,
while we must avoid the overextension of the

' For a statement by Secretary Rogers made be-
fore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
Feb. 21, see Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1973, p. 281.

April 16, 1973

441

past, our own self-interest dictates an active
American involvement in world affairs. In
fact he is such a vigorous advocate, making
some 200 speeches a year, that he puts cau-
tious diplomats like me to shame.

Economic and National Defense Policies

I am undoubtedly preaching to the con-
verted when I encourage this audience to
support our continuing engagement in the
world. Your very presence in a foreign policy
conference indicates your opposition to an
isolationist course. And while some have
claimed the Middle West is a bastion of isola-
tionists, I find quite the opposite to be the
case. In the 1960's Michigan tripled its ex-
ports, which now exceed even the exports of
New York. I understand from Mr. Brush
[Richard F. Brush, general chairman of the
conference] that some 35 companies right
here in Grand Rapids are exporting an in-
creasing portion of their production. Nation-
ally some 31 percent of all our crops and 14
percent of our manufactured goods are ex-
ported. We now depend upon imports for
30 percent of our petroleum needs, and this
dependence is growing.

Our welfare is inextricably linked with the
economic health of the rest of the world. It
is for that reason President Nixon has set a
dual objective in economic policy this year:
both to improve America's competitive posi-
tion in world markets and to reform the
international monetary and trade system.

Within the next few weeks the President
will be submitting a request to Congress for
the authority to negotiate an improvement
in our trading position. For the past quarter
century international trade has increased at
a more rapid rate than world production,
providing an essential stimulus to the most
rapid global economic growth in man's his-
tory. America has shared in this growth.
Our real per capita income has doubled in
this period, and we are by far the most pro-
ductive nation in the world today.

The recent devaluation of the dollar will
greatly strengthen our competitive position.
So will the lowering of European and Japa-

nese barriers to our trade for which we are
pressing. The United States is already com-
petitive in many fields, from computers to
agriculture to pharmaceuticals. Those Amer-
icans who doubt our ability to export should
talk with the Japanese and Europeans, who
are concerned that American goods may flood
their markets. Freer trade — when recipro-
cated by other nations and with proper safe-
guards for adversely affected industries — is
clearly in this nation's best interest. I hope
you will all support the President's trade
legislation.

Just as we must resist pressures to retreat
from our outward-looking economic policies,
so must we resist efforts to radically alter our
national defense policies. It is the security
provided by a strong national defense that
has given us the confidence and ability to
negotiate so successfully.

We all know the costs of maintaining a
sufficient defense capability. What some peo-
ple seem to forget are the greater long-term
costs to ourselves and to our allies if we were
to become a second-rate power militarily.
Since 1969 we have reduced our armed forces
by a third— from 3.5 million to 2.3 million,
men. The defense budget now consumes just
7 percent of our GNP, the lowest share since:

1950.

The new Secretary of Defense, Elliot
Richardson, has pledged to keep defense ex-
penditures as low as is consistent with our
essential needs. To go below this level of
sufficiency would have seriously destabilizing
effects in many parts of the world. It would
prevent us from maintaining the momentum
toward a more peaceful and open world so
noticeable in recent years.

Viet-Nam

I should like to devote
my remarks today to the
Nam, which has occupied
during the past eight years

If all goes well, there
American combat troops
the first time since 1965.
prisoners of war will have

the remainder of
problem of Viet-
much of my time

will soon be no
in Viet-Nam for
All of our known
been released. By

442

Department of State Bulletin

prisoners of war I mean those in Laos as
well as in Viet-Nam, and we expect complete
fulfillment of the promises that have been
made about their release. These things will
mark a day we have long awaited. We shall
have reached it not by abandoning our
friends but by opening the way to self-
determination for all the people of South
Viet-Nam.

There have been problems in Viet-Nam
during these first 60 days of the peace agree-
ment. We consider most of these problems to
be a natural, almost inevitable, residue of
decades of bitter conflict.

In general, the situation is stable, mili-
tary activity has declined, and the relative
strengths of the two sides are unchanged.
But it is easier to stop shooting than start
talking, so solving South Viet-Nam's political
problems may take place more slowly than
was envisaged in the agreement. Nonetheless,
the focus for both sides appears to be shift-
ing to the political from the military.

This is the kind of evolution, if it con-
tinues, that we hoped would be a result of the
cease-fire agreement and the new framework
it provides for testing strengths at the poll-
ing place rather than on the battlefield.

This can, of course, happen only if North
Viet-Nam observes its undertaking to
"strictly and scrupulously" fulfill the peace
agreement. President Nixon has made clear
our concern at North Vietnamese infiltration
of large amounts of equipment into South
Viet-Nam. If it continued, this infiltration
could lead to serious consequences. The
North Vietnamese should not lightly disre-
gard our expressions of concern. But we
hope it will not continue. Mutual restraint
in the supply of arms by all outside parties,
including the Soviet Union and the People's
, Republic of China, is of course an essential
jj aspect of this situation.

A mechanism to monitor and supervise the
cease-fire, the International Commission of
J Control and Supervision, consisting of Can-
fo ada, Indonesia, Poland, and Hungary, is in
fl business. Spurred on by an energetic Cana-
nt dian delegation, the Control Commission has

got itself organized, deployed to the field, and
has undertaken some investigations. Since
Communist governments mix legal arguments
with politics, the Control Commission is still
experiencing some difliculties. However, we
believe that its performance to date has been
creditable and holds the promise of greater
impact as experience is gained.

We note also that high-level political con-
sultations have begun in France between the
two South Vietnamese parties. This is the
forum where complicated internal disagree-
ments will be tackled and, we hope, resolved.

In South Viet-Nam morale has remained
strong. President Thieu realizes the impor-
tance of the political struggle and is directing
more of his government's efli^orts to this area
than ever before. There has been very little
of the political and social unraveling that
some have expected or hoped for. The Viet
Cong, too, are concentrating on the political
struggle, which is in line with our aim of
changing the nature of the struggle in that
unfortunate land.

The United States will continue to support
the eflForts of the South Vietnamese people
to achieve self-determination, as envisaged in
the peace agreement and in the Act of the
International Conference on Viet-Nam.'

Laos and Cambodia

In Laos the cease-fire accords call for the
withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect
for the sovereignty and neutrality of the
Kingdom. They were worked out and signed
solely by the Lao parties. The United States
respects the accords, and we very much hope
that this time North Viet-Nam, and other
nations, also will respect them. To achieve
peace all outside parties must leave the Lao
to settle their own problems. There are still
cease-fire violations in Laos, although far
fewer than in South Viet-Nam, but the

" For text of the Agreement on Endinp the War
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris
on Jan. 27, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169;
for text of the Act of the International Conference
on Viet-Nam signed at Paris on Mar. 2, see Bulletin
of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 345.

et< April 16, 1973

443

parties are slowly working toward the forma-
tion of a provisional government to be named
by March 23.

Cambodia was the last of the Indochinese
states to be drawn into the Indochina con-
flict. It remains the only one without a cease-
fire. At the time of the Viet-Nam cease-fire,
President Lon Nol proclaimed a unilateral
cessation of hostilities clearly designed to
elicit an enemy response. After a few days
of relative quiet, the answer was given in an
upsurge of enemy attacks which has reached
the highest level in over a year and which
shows no sign of abating. Further efforts to
open a dialogue with the insurgent leadership
have received no reply except for threats of
continued war. The situation in Cambodia
must therefore be described as unsatisfactory
at present.

Throughout Indochina we must hasten the
transition from the bitterness of war to the
healing task of reconciliation and reconstruc-
tion. America's long tradition of humani-
tarian concern by itself calls for our active
participation in a program of assistance. We
are convinced that such a program will pro-
vide all parties a strong incentive to observe
the peace. As compared to the heavy expendi-
ture of the war, surely it is worth a small
proportion of that amount to insure that it
is preserved. Preserving the peace will re-
quire a relatively modest outlay.

Accounting for the Missing in Action

We have one other very important item on
our agenda. With the return of our prisoners
of war, we are giving the highest priority to
the task of accounting for the 1,300 Ameri-
cans listed as missing in action in Viet-Nam
and Laos. This is a most serious responsibil-
ity. It is an obligation to those men and to
their families who have waited for them
through the long years, and we shall fulfill
that obligation.

We are making a three-pronged approach
to this subject:

— First, as each returning POW comes
home, he is being debriefed to learn whatever

information he may have on any Americans,
and foreign nationals as well.

— Second, we are proceeding in the Four-
Party Joint Military Commission, composed
of U.S., South Vietnamese, North Viet-
namese, and Viet Cong representatives, to
secure an accounting for all our dead and
missing. Article 8(b) of the peace agreement
contains the most far-reaching language ever
obligating the two sides in an armed conflict
to help each other to get information about
the missing in action and the dead. Secretary
Rogers and I raised this subject directly
with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris dur-
ing the International Conference on Viet-
Nam.

— And third, we have established in Thai-
land a Joint Casualty Resolution Center
manned by American personnel solely re-
sponsible for searching for our personnel
missing in action in Indochina. We will move
as quickly as possible to secure the most
thorough examination and reconciliation of
each MIA case.

I can bring you the assurance of this ad-
ministration that this subject of accounting
for our missing in action will have the high-
est possible priority.

Lessons of Negotiations

Let me complete this rather lengthy dis-
cussion of the situation in Indochina by
sharing with you some of my thoughts about
what working toward peace means. I think
it is important to review the record of how
we achieved a negotiated settlement in Viet-
Nam and to consider some of the lessons
learned along the way.

The negotiations lasted more than four
years. During most of that time — through
one sterile meeting after another — there was
no appreciable progress toward a settlement.
Early in the talks Hanoi demanded that we
first withdraw all our forces unconditionally
and throw out the South Vietnamese
Government as preconditions for serious ne-
gotiations. These demands were clearly un-
acceptable. Had we withdrawn our troops, we

444

Department of State Bulletin

would have had no leverajre with which to
pry out an agreement to release our prison-
ers; had we overthrown the Saigron govern-
ment, we would have also sacrificed the
principle of genuine self-determination by
the South Vietnamese people.

Hanoi refused to alter its position, and
the talks drag'ged on from one year to the
next. I can tell you it was not much fun. It
was easy to get discouraged, and indeed
many at home did. Some critics of our
policy urged our government to concede
ever.\i;hing. Others advocated our breaking
off the talks altogether.

However, the President remained dedi-
cated to the belief that the only satisfactory
way to resolve the conflict was by a settle-
ment at the conference table and that even-
tually Hanoi would agree to undertake the
serious negotiations necessary to bring this
about. At the same time, the President fully
understood North Viet-Nam's sti-ateg>' of
pursuing its goals by coordinated militaiy
and political actions — ^by fighting while
talking.

He therefore developed and pursued a pol-
icy that would both encourage a negotiated
settlement and maintain our commitment to
assist the South Vietnamese people in their
self-defense. By carefully keeping open the
door to negotiations and by making a series
of progressively forthcoming peace proposals
of our own. we demonstrated our readiness
to achieve a just compromise. At the same
time, the President pursued the program of
Vietnamization; this provided us with an
alternative to the stalemated peace talks and
simultaneously served as an inducement for
the other side to negotiate seriously.

As you will recall, the Vietnamese Com-
munists agreed to forsake the battlefield in
favor of the conference table only after their
all-out invasion of the South in the spring
of last year failed. In retrospect, the Presi-
dent's decision to resist that invasion by
mining and bombing in the North was a
critically important factor — indeed, perhaps
the turning point — in bringing them to the
negotiating table in a serious posture. The

President again made clear his resolve when
he resumed the bombing in December in
response to Hanoi's decision to st<ill on reach-
ing a final agreement. I am convinced that
this action was both necessary and effective
in bringing the war to an end.

I think there is an obvious but very im-
portant point to be drawn from this experi-
ence: Seemingly insurmountable obstacles to
a just peace can in fact be overcome by the
patient pursuit of policies which combine
reasonableness and resolve, flexibility of ap-
proach and firmness of purpose. These were
the guidelines that enabled us to reach our
goal in Viet-Nam. They should not be for-
gotten as we continue to move away from
confrontation into an era of reconciliation
both in Indochina and throughout the world.

Policy Objectives in Asia

In concluding, let me turn briefly to the
larger problems of Asia. Why are we there,
and what are our objectives in the years
ahead ?

Some Americans still view Asia as an area
of less vital concern than Europe. There are,
however, certain realities which no one can
question:

— Half the world's people live in Asia.

— Our trade with Asia now equals 85 per-
cent of our trade with western Europe and is
growing more rapidly.

— Three times in a single generation we
have been drawn into war in Asia.

— Four of the world's major powers, the
United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet
Union, come together only in the Pacific.

We must and we will retain an active
American presence in Asia. Our power there
is an encouragement to our friends and is not
provocative to our adversaries. We will be
guided in our approach to Asia's still-uncer-
tain future by two major policy objectives:

— First, to enable our allies to assume the
primary responsibility for their own secu-
rity ; and

— Second, to persuade all Asian nations
that by not interfering in their neighbor's

April 16, 1973

445

affairs a new era of peace and prosperity is
possible.

In 1972 we made extraordinary progress
on both these fronts. The Nixon doctrine of
shared responsibiUties and shared burdens
is clearly succeeding. From South Viet-Nam
to South Korea, our allies' growing military
strength enables them to assume the major
responsibility for their own defense. Amer-
ica's supporting role is rapidly becoming less
onerous. Since 1969 we have reduced the
number of our armed forces in Asia by 70
percent. In addition to the complete with-
drawal of our forces from Viet-Nam, we
have reduced our military presence by
70,000 men in Korea, Japan, the Philippines,
and elsewhere.

However, as we review this record of
progress, we must not lose sight of the sub-
stantial problems ahead. Asia is still far from
achieving the delicate transition from tur-
moil to stability.

The goal that we have set for ourselves is
the establishment of the kind of peaceful
world that the Secretary of State has de-
scribed as one in which :'

. . . dialogue and negotiation have replaced con-
frontation and conflict.

. . . people can move freely and easily across na-
tional borders.

... the sovereignty and independence of all coun-
tries is the first principle of international relations.
. force is relied on less and less as an instru-
ment of national policy.

The Secretary of State also noted that now
"for the first time since the war such a world
has become a practical possibility."

Senator Vandenburg once told the Senate
that Theodore Roosevelt was right to say
that the United States had no choice but to
play a great part in the world and that the
choice was whether to play it well or badly.
He went on to say that no matter how much
we might crave the easier path of lesser re-

sponsibility, we were denied that privilege.
We had to play our part in the world in sheer
defense of our own interests.

My thesis today has been that in bringing
about a still-imperfect peace in Southeast
Asia, in working toward the sort of world we
want, we have played our part well. With
your help, ladies and gentlemen, we shall
keep on striving to do so.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Resume at Geneva

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limita-
tion Talks (SALT) resumed at Geneva on
March 12. Following is a statement by Am- \
bassador U. Alexis Johnson, chief of the U.S.
delegation, made upon arrival at Geneva on
March 10, together with a White House an-
nouncement issued March 7 listing the U.S.
delegation.

AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S ARRIVAL STATEMEW,
MARCH 10

When SALT began in 1969, President
Nixon wrote Ambassador Smith of his hope
that he was beginning a "sustained eflfort"
to limit strategic forces.' That hope has been i
realized. The SALT negotiations have con- 1
tinued for almost 31/2 years and have borne ■
important results. In assuming the leadership
of the U.S. delegation I am profoundly aware
of the immense responsibility I have inher-
ited to pursue this "sustained effort" for a
safer world.

In accordance with the joint Moscow com-
munique of May 29, 1972, our present task is :
to continue active negotiations for the limi-
tation of strategic offensive arms.= Agree-
ment on more complete measures in this field

' For an address by Secretary Rogers made be-
fore the Commonwealth Club at San Francisco,
Calif., on July 18, 1972, see Bulletin of Aug. 14,
1972, p. 185.

iFor text of a message from President Nixon |
read by Ambassador Gerard C. Smith at the open-
ing session of the talks at Helsinki on Nov. 17, 1969,
see BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1969, p. 543. j

- For text of the communique, see Bulletin oi i
June 26, 1972, p. 899. I

446

Department of State Bulletin;

would be a logical next step in the overall
task of further reducing the possibility of
war and of enhancing the security and well-
being of all nations and peoples. As in the
past, we intend to pursue this objective in
a serious and purposeful manner.

The last session of the talks in November
and December was a useful beginning to this
second phase of SALT. However, a great deal
of work remains to be done, and we are grate-
ful to the Government of Switzerland for con-
tinuing to provide this setting in which it
can be carried out.

U.S. DELEGATION

Wbit« House press release dated March 7

The President on March 7 announced the
members of the U.S. delegation to the Stra-
tegic Arms Limitation Talks, which resume
in Geneva on March 12. They are:

Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Representa-
tive and chief of the U.S. delegation. Ambassa-
dor Johnson served as Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs for four years and is the
only Foreigrn Service officer on active duty who
holds the rank of Career Ambassador, the highest
rank in the U.S. Foreign Service.

Paul H. Nitze, former Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security Affairs, Secre-
tary of the Navy, and Deputy Secretary of
Defense, has served on the SALT delegation
since the beginning of the negotiations.

Dr. Harold Brown, former Secretary of the Air
Force and presently president of the California
Institute of Technology, has also been on the
SALT delegation since the beginning of nego-
tiations.

Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowny, a career (Army) of-
ficer, has most recently served in NATO as Dep-
uty Chairman of the Military Committee and as
Chairman of the Working Group on Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions.

Boris H. Klosson is a career Foreign Service offi-
cer who served as Deputy Chief of Mission at
the American Embassy in Moscow from 1969
to 1972.

Sidney N. Graybeal is presently Deputy Assistant
Director, Science and Technology Bureau, Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. He previously
served as Alternate Executive Officer of the
delegation.

John C. Ausland will be Executive Secretary of
the delegation. He is a career Foreign Service

officer who has until recently been Deputy Chief

of Mission at the American Embassy in Oslo.

The U.S. delegation to the SALT One talks
included Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Di-
rector of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency; Mr. Nitze; Dr. Brown; Lt. Gen.
Royal B. Allison, USAF; and Ambassador
Graham Parsons.

Preparations for Establishment
of U.S. Liaison Office in Peking

FoUoiving is a statement read to news
correspondents on March 28 by Charles W.
Bray III, Director, Office of Press Relations.

I would like to note for you that a six-man
advance party, to be led by Alfred leS.
Jenkins, will be leaving Washington for the
People's Republic of China on Saturday
[March 31] to arrange for the establishment
of a U.S. Liaison Office in Peking. The party
will spend several days in consultation with
the American consulate general in Hong
Kong. We anticipate that it will be entering
the People's Republic from Hong Kong on
Thursday, April 5.

In addition to Mr. Jenkins, the advance
party includes Robert R. Blackburn, Jr., who
will be the administrative officer for the liai-
son office; Charles W. Freeman, Jr., country
officer for People's Republic of China affairs,
who will serve as adviser-interpreter for the
advance party; Thomas J. McCay, Jr., a com-
munications engineer; John R. EHis, a re-
gional administrative specialist; and Mr.
Ray E. Jones, a secretary-typist.

As you know, we anticipate that the Liai-
son Office will be opening in May.

The advance party will be primarily con-
cerned with arranging for office space and
housing for the Liaison Office and its staff;
for supervising the installation of furnish-
ings and equipment; for setting up com-
munications facilities; and for other matters
of an essentially administrative and prepara-
tory nature.

April 16, 1973

447

Internationalization of the Capital Markets

Address by William J. Casey

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs^

About a year ago I discussed this subject
at a conference in Milan which was billed as
the first international meeting of stock ex-
changes. Today I plan to assess again the
opportunities and problems arising from a
continuing and growing internationalization
of not only securities markets but also of in-
vestor choice, of preferences in capital-
raising mechanisms, and of activities of
brokers and bankers of diverse shape and
variety. I want to emphasize at the outset
that I firmly intend to refrain from comment
and speculation on short-term capital move-
ments and from any intrusion into the mone-
tary domain, which belongs to the Treasury
and to the floaters and fixed exchange raters,
the monetarists and fiscalists, the interven-
ers and the laissez-faire-ites, the crawling
peggers and snake fanciers, who are so
prominent in this distinguished audience.

A few short weeks after its second devalu-
ation within 14 months, the dollar was hit by
a further crisis of confidence. I want to say
at the outset that I share President Nixon's
conviction that today's dollar is at a sound
value. Certainly our $6 billion trade deficit
and our $10 billion payments deficit are mat-
ters of grave concern. Of even greater con-
cern are the 70 to 80 billion expatriated
dollars held abroad resulting from a two-
front war, one in Viet-Nam and the other
against poverty and other social ills at home.

' Made at Harriman, N.Y., on Mar. 10 before a
conference on "Toward a New World Monetary
System" sponsored by the Committee for Monetary
Research and Education (press release 68 dated
Mar. 12).

But I believe much of the dollar's problem
comes from a failure to properly assess the
solid assets which lie below the surface. The
world has translated the highly visible loss
of the U.S. position in consumer electronics,
sporting goods, and autos into a declining
general technology. An objective analysis
would discover that the United States is still
dominant in computers, photography, phar-
maceuticals, medical technology, aerospace,
nuclear power, homebuilding, heavy indus-
trial machinery, offshore drilling, utility op-
erations, and so on.

We do bring in $7 billion of investment,
royalty, and managerial income while putting
a lot of our foreign earnings back into over-
seas business, and we do have about $90
billion in book value of American direct in-
vestment overseas, which is worth a lot more;
American transportation companies earned
more than $3 billion outside the United States
last year; over 100 American banking insti-
tutions carry on business in nearly 600
branch offices overseas ; some 250 brokerage
offices with over 2,000 salesmen are operating
abroad.

Let's take a broad look at how we might
be able to correct our $10 billion payments
deficit. We could almost wipe it out by keep-
ing our tourists, our military forces, and our
aid home. But we can't afford to withdraw
from the world. We could do it by improving
our trade balance from a $6 billion deficit
position to one of $4 billion surplus. To do
that without reducing imports, we'd have to
export almost 25 percent more than our
present $43 billion of exports. Our trading

448

Department of State Bulletin

f

partners are appalled at this suggestion. But
they forget that in the past two years our
imports grew 40 percent while our exports
grew only 15 percent. We need only reverse
that record to get back into balance. Liberali-
zation in trade and investment restrictions
abroad and a more export-minded business
community with a devalued currency and im-
proved service and marketing facilities
abroad could lift our exports by 25 percent
over a few years.

Take a look at our agriculture. Through a
technological miracle, 5 percent of our work
force is able to feed all of us and many peo-
ple abroad as well. With all the idle cropland
we have brought into production and liberali-
zation of agricultural trade policies, we be-
lieve a gain of $10 billion a year in farm
exports and an improvement of over $7 bil-
lion in our balance of agricultural trade is
attainable. This would give us a saving of
$4 billion a year in taxes with further savings
at grocery and butcher shops here and abroad
as we exported more feed and livestock and
imported dairy i)roducts.

None of this will happen quickly. Some of
it may not happen at all. We only have to
make half of it to balance our payments. A
third of it would balance our trade.

Capital Markets and Balance of Payments

What I want to talk to you about today
is what we can do in the world capital mar-
kets to contribute to the balancing of our in-
ternational accounts. Trade need no longer be
the only source of major gains in our balance
of pa\Tnents. U.S. investments abroad have
become so large, and their potential both for
retaining earnings to expand equity and for
leveraging through foreign borrowing is now
so great, that the portion of earnings re-
turned home can, alongside the payments re-
ceived for licenses and royalties on American
technologj', be our major positive item for
some years ahead. And in addition, there is
undoubted attraction of the American securi-
ties markets for a substantial share of the
funds that investors abroad wish to invest
for safety and growth. On top of that, there

are substantial attractions to induce the
growth of foreign direct investments in the
United States.

When we look at our investment assets and
income we find the most promising element
in our balance of payments. We have a $6
billion trade deficit and a $7 billion net in-
flow in dividends, interests, royalties, et
cetera, from our investments abroad. As a
country which faces increasing needs for
resources of energy and raw materials from
abroad, we will have to invest abroad and
increase the inflow of investment earnings to
justify that investment.

To balance off" that investment we will
have to attract investments from abroad. We
will have to make securities an export. We
will have to maintain and strengthen our
ability to raise capital throughout the world
as well as at home. Today, by and large, we
have trade deficits with most of the rich
countries of the developed world and a favor-
able balance of trade only with the poor na-
tions of the developing world. The poor
nations will raise their living standards sig-
nificantly and become better markets for our
goods only as they develop indigenous capital
markets. Thus it is clear that we have a
large stake in the creation of better capital
markets and in a better interrelationship of
capital markets around the world. Fortu-
nately, financial know-how is one of our
great assets and the securities markets of
the world are becoming increasingly inter-
nationalized. Competition will be severe as
the London financial community with all its
skill and resources moves into the continen-
tal economy of the European Community and
the Japanese financial community with all its
drive and resources goes global. In our own
country the regulation of and the relation-
ships between the in.stitutions which make up
our financial community derive from histori-
cal experience, much of which may no longer
suit the aggressive, competitive world in
which we live. Yet we have enormous assets,
not the least of which is the high standard of
disclosure, disinterest, and fair dealing which
other nations are only now seeking to
develop.

April 16, 1973

449

Remember that New York, until 1962, was
the only really large capital market for gov-
ernments and international corporations and
other institutions. In July of that year Presi-
dent Kennedy, concerned by increasing out-
flows of long-term capital (from $850 million
in 1960 to an annual rate of nearly twice that
in 1963), introduced the interest equalization
tax. This was followed by other foreign
credit and capital-export restraints.

The net effect has been to encourage in-
vestment in the securities of countries other
than the United States, to develop financial
centers outside the United States that feed on
U.S. securities, to deflect business from U.S.
securities houses to foreign houses, and to
generally distort capital flows. The speed
with which the Eurodollar and Eurobond
markets developed and the magnitude of
capital in these markets are at least largely
attributable to U.S. measures. The fact that
this market has to a very large extent been
centered in London is easily explained, first
by the fact that the traditional skills of
London's merchant banking houses, supple-
mented by a number of American investment
banks which established themselves in Lon-
don, were available to take advantage quickly
of the new opportunities. Active capital mar-
kets developed in Europe due to:

1. The capital provided from the growth
and maturity of European economies;

2. Increased political and economic sta-
bility overseas;

3. The need to finance locally because of
restrictions in the United States;

4. The growing pool of dollars outside of
the United States resulting from the negative
balance of payments; and

5. The development of U.S. investment
banking techniques in Europe caused by the
need for U.S.-based international companies
to finance overseas.

The Eurodollar market, and the Eurobond
market, in short, have flourished in large
part because U.S. controls protected them
from New York competition. The removal of
these controls is likely to lead to a substan-
tial shift of activity back to New York, both

because of more plentiful funds and greater
institutional efficiency and because many cus-
tomers will also find it more convenient to
borrow there. As borrowing shifts back to
New York, interest rates on deposits in Lon-
don will also decline relative to New York,
and deposits will flow back to New York as
well.

This is not to say that the Eurodollar mar-
ket, or the Eurobond market, will disappear
once controls are lifted. Considerable effi-
ciency has been developed, and some custom-
ers will still find it convenient to continue to
borrow and deposit abroad. But it seems
highly likely that a major shift will occur,
given the cost advantage that persists.

Today we have the need and the oppor-
tunity to develop a stronger American role in
world capital markets.

We have become a service economy, with
only 30 percent of our workers producing the
goods that are the stuff of trade. We will
have to increasingly pay for the energy and
the raw materials we need from the world by
intelligent use of our technology, our capi-
tal, and our managerial and financial skills.
This need to rely increasingly on capital and
invisible exports comes at a time when we
face increasing competition in this arena
from Japan and Europe. But we still have
the best skills, the greatest experience, and
the marketplace with the greatest depth and
liquidity. With the announcement that con-
trols on the export of capital are to be phased
out, it is vital for our talented financial com-
munity to unleash itself. There will be an
outflow of capital, but this should be offset
by a greater repatriation of earnings from
foreign operations as it becomes easier to
bring new capital abroad as needed and as
our financial community with its home base
no longer sealed off from the world increases
its ability to raise money for other countries.
The Japanese are opening their capital mar-
kets, and they have a huge supply of dollars
to invest abroad. European markets will con-
tinue to build domestic capital, and the pool
of Eurodollars is unlikely to flow back to the
United States at a rapid pace. Improved
reporting requirements overseas have led to

450

Department of State Bulletin

jrreater investor interest and higher valua-
tion of securities. Finally, demand for capital
in other markets will continue because the
recent currency disruptions and the possi-
bility of permanent or periodic floating ex-
change rates will encourage multinational
and foreign companies to borrow in the
economies where they generate cash.

Coordination of the worldwide capital
markets is critical to the longrun prosperity
of domestic economies. Trade balance can be
achieved, but financial imbalances will per-
sist as long as speculators can isolate cur-
rencies and capital markets. While a move
such as floating exchange rates may prevent
this temporarily, in the long run it must be
accompanied by providing borrowers and
investors with access to all capital markets.
This in turn will require establishment of
common standards of disclosure and coordi-
nation of the "rules of the road" in the vari-
ous capital markets.

Developments in Raising Capital Abroad

Let's look at some recent developments
involving U.S. companies raising capital in
foreign markets. Following the recent relax-
ation of exchange controls and the adoption
of the revised Japanese securities laws. Gen-
eral Telephone and Electronics Corporation
in October 1972, pursuant to dual registra-
tion under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Japanese securities laws, made a direct un-
derwritten offering of 750,000 shares of com-
mon stock into the Japanese market. The
offering was underwritten on a firm basis by
a group of Japanese underwriters. This rep-
resented the first public equity offering by an
American issuer in Japan. Continental Tele-
phone Corporation followed in February of
this year in a direct placement on a best-
efforts underwriting basis to institutional in-
vestors in Japan. The offering was registered
under the Securities Act of 1933 but was not
required to be registered under Japanese law
because of Japan's private placement ex-
emption.

Two investment companies domiciled in
the United States and registered under the

Investment Company Act of 1940 are com-
mencing offerings in Japan. Both offerings
are registered under the Securities Act of
1933 and under the recently enacted "Foreign
Investment Trust Securities" ordinance of
Japan, a separate law relating to mutual
funds. Both offerings utilize Japanese broker-
dealers and/or foreign affiliates of American
broker-dealers. The interesting feature in
these two offerings is that they were required
by Japanese law to use a prospectus which
differed in some respects with the compara-
ble U.S. prospectus. Recognizing this vari-
ance, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) promptly took steps to facilitate
the flow of capital by adopting a rule which
provides, generally speaking, that a Japanese
prospectus is deemed to comply with the in-
formation requirements of section 10(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933.

Two other registration statements declared
effective under the Securities Act of 1933 in
January of this year involve what may be
the forerunner of things to come. These
statements covered 2 million and 1.5 million
shares of common stock of Canteen Corpora-
tion and Avis, Inc., respectively, on a firm
underwriting commitment basis for multiple
simultaneous offerings in the United States,
Bahamas, Belgium, Bermuda, France, Ger-
many, the Netherlands, and the United King-
dom. The Canteen offering in addition in-
cluded Italy and Sweden. The foreign
portions of the offering were underwritten by
foreign organizations and/or foreign aflfili-
ates of American investment bankers.

The SEC has made other efforts to accom-
modate both domestic and foreign issuers, in-
cluding: the policy decision not to assume
jurisdiction in bona fide foreign placements
by U.S. issuei's; the insistence that registered
investment companies offering securities
abroad not discriminate against foreign in-
vestors in the nature and scope of informa-
tion and protections provided; the use of
prospectuses by registered investment com-
panies for foreign offerings which conform
to the customs, usages, and laws of the domi-
cile of the foreign company; the policy of
not requiring compliance by foreign broker-

April 16, 1973

451

dealers under our laws in connection with
bona fide foreign placements of American
issuers; the case-by-case reasonable compro-
mise of our disclosure standards under the
Securities Act of 1933 for public offerings of
foreign issuers; the adoption of special forms
requiring less stringent disclosures for for-
eign issuers who want to list securities on
our national exchanges; the exemptions
granted to foreign issuers from provisions of
our rules relating to proxy solicitations, in-
sider trading, and periodic reporting; and the
broad exemptions granted for issuers of non-
listed securities trading in this country from
registration requirements of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. These exemptions are
conditioned on the extent of disclosure of in-
formation required by the domicile of such
issuers.

Regulation and Reciprocity

The financial creativity we can generate
can bring significant amounts of foreign
savings into our equity markets. Variable
life insurance, now likely to come on the
market within a year, will give people abroad
a combination of family protection and par-
ticipation in the American securities mar-
kets. Legislative proposals developed by a
task force made up from SEC, Treasury,
State, and the Federal Reserve would make
it possible to offer overseas investors the
protection of our securities laws with the tax
advantage of offshore funds.

A trade mission of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce recently returned from Europe
with the conviction that European investors
are turned off by what they consider ob-
stacles to investment in U.S. portfolio stocks.
Examples cited include estate taxes on non-
residents, a range of state and local taxes on
securities trading, and regulation Q. They
urged a comprehensive examination of the
"statutory and regulatory maze affecting for-
eign investment in U.S. securities."

Families in Japan and several European
countries save a larger slice of their income
than we do. Japanese securities firms run
workers' asset-formation programs or sav-

ings plans which have created millions of
shareholders and have made Japanese share-
holders very close to as high a percentage of
their population as we have developed over a
much longer period of time. New money
coming into our capital markets is accounted
for by pension plans. President Nixon's pro-
posal to provide tax deductions for amounts
saved by individuals for their personal pen-
sions can give an enormous lift to our rate
of capital formation and our ability to take
the leadership in the developing global secu-
rities market.

There are important questions of regula-
tion and reciprocity to resolve. Should we
give foreign brokers membership on or access
to our exchanges? Should we condition this
on our broker getting access to foreign mar-
kets, and do we have the legal power to re-
quire this?

Are we trading a watermelon for a grape
if we admit Swiss banks to the New York
Exchange in exchange for admitting Merrill
Lynch to Zurich ? Is it fair to permit German
banks to carry on a securities business in the
LTnited States which would be illegal for
American banks? Will the ability of foreign
brokers and banks to perform brokerage
functions in the United States for European
investors undercut the ability of over 200
American brokerage offices abroad to market
U.S. securities abroad?

What are the problems of regulating and
enforcing our standards against foreign
banks which perform brokerage services as
well as underwrite and invest in companies?

These are very sticky questions, and a
comprehensive review of policy considera-
tions and the authority to deal with them is
needed. I hope we will soon get some recom-
mendations from the committees on interna-
tional investment which the New York Stock
Exchange and the Securities Industry As-
sociation have established.

Accounting and Disclosure Standards

An international capital market calls for
some degree of commonality in accounting
standards between nations if investor under-

452

Department of State Bulletin

J

standing is to be developed. The formidable
task of achieving some acceptable level of
accounting uniformity on an international
basis is being undertaken on several fronts.
There is an International Accounting Study
Group consisting of Canadian. United King-
dom, and United States independent public
accountants. The European Community has
several bodies engaged in developing interna-
tional standards for member nations. There
have been an increasing number of inter-
national conferences on international ac-
counting and financial reporting. A number
of accounting firms from various nations are
joining together for the purpose of develop-
ing internationally acceptable standards of
practice. Government agencies from various
countries have met with the SEC to compare
capital market controls, to discuss reciprocity
for foreign accountants practicing in their
respective countries, and to initiate the de-
velopment of mutually acceptable standards
and practices.

The SEC has accepted the financial state-
ments of foreign registrations as long as they
meet its requirements through supplemental
disclosure, rather than requiring adjustment
of financial statements. It has accepted the
certification of foreign auditors vi^here ex-
pertise in generally accepted U.S. accounting
principles was displayed and where there
were no problems in meeting our standards
of independence.

A developing system of comparable laws
and accounting standards has made possible
the beginning of a truly international market
as evidenced by the emergence of mixed un-
derwriting syndicates involving North Amer-
ican, European, South American, and Asian
investment bankers. This has made possible
larger issues of securities for simultaneous
placement in international markets. We are
seeing the dual listing of securities in
international markets and the increased
interchange of participations of financial
institutions of one nation in the institutions
of others.

For the full development of a truly inter-
national securities market, we need work

toward the establishment of uniform inter-
national standards of minimum disclosure.
This will entail increased endeavors on the
part of all nations to cooperate and to accom-
modate their national requirements to this
common objective. The continuing efforts of
the Eurojjean Community in attempting to
establish uniform regulations and directives
in the areas of stock exchange listing, the
issuance of new securities, and the periodic
reporting of financial and other business in-
formation to investors show the way. The
Community's eflPorts to e.stablish a "European
Company" is an important step. Similar
efforts are going on within the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development
to develop international harmonization of
standards for investor protection for the
member nations. The OECD presently has
under consideration a model "Standard Rule
for the Operations of Institutions for Collec-
tive Investment" (mutual funds) and is
working on listing standards.

We need work to remove investment re-
strictions, which can be just as damaging to
our national economic interests as trade re-
strictions. With our capital-export restric-
tions going off and with Japanese and Middle
East money on the prowl around the world
with lai'ge accumulations of dollars, I would
hope that Europe would no longer feel the
need to conserve its capital by restricting
capital exports. Japan, by limiting capital
imports, has forced U.S. firms to license
technology which might have been exploited
to greater advantage packaged with an in-
vestment. Investment restrictions have im-
paired our trade with Japan by limiting our
marketing and servicing facilities in that
country.

The emergence of international capital and
trading markets necessitates the recognition
of international i)ublic interest and the need
for international investor protection. The
challenge is now before us, and only through
multinational cooperative efforts will we be
able to effectively meet it by generating the
level of capital formation and capital mobil-
ity needed to maintain economic progress in
our own country and around the world.

April 16, 1973

453

Major Trading Nations Agree
on New Monetary Measures

Following are press communiques issued
at Paris March 9 and 16 at the conclusion of
meetings of the Finance Ministers and Cen-
tral Bank Governors of major trading
nations.

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED MARCH 9

Unofficial text

1. The Ministers and Central Bank Governors of
the ten countries participating in the General
Arrangements to Borrow' met in Paris on 9th March,
1973, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Valery Giscard
d'Estaing, the Minister of the Economy and of
Finance of France. Mr. P.-P. Schweitzer, Managing
Director of the International Monetary Fund, took
part in the meeting, which was also attended by Mr.
Nello Celio, head of the Federal Department of
Finance of the Swiss Confederation, Mr. E. Stopper,
President of the Swiss National Bank, Mr. Francois-
Xavier Ortoli, President of the Commission of the
European Economic Community, Mr. E. van Lennep,
Secretary-General of the Organization of Economic
Co-operation and Development and Mr. Rene Larre,
General Manager of the Bank for International
Settlements.

Mr. Ali Wardhana, President of the Committee of
Twenty of the International Monetary Fund, was
specially invited to participate in this meeting.

2. They examined the international monetary sit-
uation in the light of the present crisis and had a
broad exchange of views both on the origins of the
crisis and on ways of dealing with it in a spirit of
co-operation.

3. They agreed that the crisis was due to specula-
tive movements of funds. They also agreed that the
existing relationships between parities and central
rates, following the recent re-alig:nment, correspond,
in their view, to the economic requirements and that
these relationships will make an effective monetary
contribution to a better balance of international pay-
ments. In these circumstances they unanimously ex-
pressed their determination to ensure jointly an
orderly exchange rate system.

4. The Ministers and Governors are agreed that.

1 The Group of Ten comprises six of the member
countries of the European Economic Community
(Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom), as well as four other
countries (Canada, Japan, Sweden and the United
States). The other three member countries of the
E.E.C., Denmark, Ireland and Luxembourg, also
participated in this meeting. [Footnote in original.]

for this purpose, a set of measures needs to be
drawn up.

5. The formulation of these measures requires a
technical study which they have instructed their
Deputies to undertake forthwith.

6. The Ministers and Governors have decided to
meet again on Friday, 16th March, to draw joint
conclusions on the basis of this study and take the j
decisions which are called for, so as to make it i
possible for the E.E.C. countries and Sweden to, i
re-open their exchange markets on Monday, 19th ,
March. I

7. Finally, the Ministers and Governors considered ,
that the recent disturbances underline the urgent ,
need for an effective reform of the international |
monetary system. They decided to take the neces-
sary steps to accelerate the work of the Committee
of Twenty of the International Monetary Fund.

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED MARCH 16

Unofficial text

1. The Ministers and Central Bank Governors of
the ten countries participating in the General Ar-
rangements to Borrow and the member countries
of the European Economic Community met in Paris
on 16th March, 1973 under the Chairmanship of Mr.
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Minister of the Economy
and of Finance of France. Mr. P.-P. Schweitzer,
Managing Director of the International Monetary
Fund, took part in the meeting, which was also
attended by Mr. Nello Celio, head of the Federal
Department of Finance of the Swiss Confederation,
Mr. E. Stopper, President of the Swiss National
Bank, Mr. W. Haferkamp, Vice-President of the
Commission of the European Economic Community,
Mr. E. van Lennep, Secretary General of the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, Mr. Rene Larre, General Manager of the
Bank for International Settlements, and Mr. Jeremy
Morse, Chairman of the Deputies of the Committee
of Twenty of the I.M.F.

2. The Ministers and Governors heard a report
by the Chairman of their Deputies, Mr. Rinaldo
Ossola, on the results of the technical study which
the Deputies have carried out in accordance with the
instructions given to them.

3. The Ministers and Governors took note of the
decisions of the members of the E.E.C. announced on
Monday. Six members of the E.E.C. and certain
other European countries, including Sweden, will
maintain 2% per cent margins between their cur-
rencies. The currencies of certain countries, such as
Italy, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Japan and
Canada remain, for the time being, floating. How-
ever, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland have
expressed the intention of associating themselves
as soon as possible with the decision to maintain
E.E.C. exchange rates within margins of 2% per

454

Department of State Bulletin

cent and meanwhile of remaining in consultation
with their E.E.C. partners.

4. The Ministers and Governors reiterated their
determination to ensure jointly an orderly exchange
rate system. To this end, they agreed on the basis
for an operational approach towards the exchange
markets in the near future and on certain further
studies to be completed as a matter of urgency.

5. They agreed in principle that official interven-
tion in exchange markets may be useful at appro-
priate times to facilitate the maintenance of orderly
conditions, keeping in mind also the desirability of
encouraging reflows of speculative movements of
funds. Each nation stated that it will be prepared
to intervene at its initiative in its own market,
when necessary and desirable, acting in a flexible
manner in the light of market conditions and in
close consultation with the authorities of the na-
tion whose currency may be bought or sold. The
countries which have decided to maintain 2Vi per
cent margins between their currencies have made
known their intention of concerting among them-
selves the application of these provisions. Such inter-
vention will be financed, when necessary, through
use of mutual credit facilities. To ensure fully
adequate resources for such operations, it is en-
visaged that some of the existing "swap" facilities
will be enlarged.

6. Some countries have announced additional
measures to restrain capital inflows. The United
States authorities emphasized that the phasing out
of their controls on longer-term capital outflows
by the end of 1974 was intended to coincide with
strong improvement in the U.S. balance-of-payments
position. Any steps taken during the interim period
toward the elimination of these controls would take
due account of exchange market conditions and the
balance-of-payments trends. The U.S. authorities
are also reviewing actions that may be appropriate
to remove inhibitions on the inflow of capital into
the United States. Countries in a strong payments
position will review the possibility of removing or
relaxing any restrictions on capital outflows, par-
ticularly long-term.

7. Ministers and Governors noted the importance
of dampening speculative capital movements. They
stated their intention to seek more complete under-
standing of the sources and nature of the large
capital flows which have recently taken place. With
respect to Euro-currency markets, they agreed that

methods of reducing the volatility of these markets
will be studied intensively, taking into account the
implications for the longer run operation of the in-
ternational monetary system. These studies will ad-
dress themselves, among other factors, to limitations
on placement of official reserves in that market by
member nations of the IMF and to the possible need
for reserve requirements comparable to those in
national banking markets. With respect to the
former, the Ministers and Governors confirmed that
their authorities would be prepared to take the lead
by implementing certain undertakings that their
own placements would be gradually and prudently
withdrawn. The United States will review possi-
ble action to encourage a flow of Euro-currency
funds to the United States as market conditions
permit.

8. In the context of discussions of monetary
reform, the Ministers and Governors agreed that
proposals for funding or consolidation of official cur-
rency balances deserved thorough and urgent atten-
tion. This matter is already on the agenda of the
Committee of Twenty of the IMF.

9. Ministers and Governors reaffirmed their at-
tachment to the basic principles which have gov-
erned international economic relations since the
last war — the greatest possible freedom for inter-
national trade and investment and the avoidance of
competitive changes of exchange rates. They stated
their determination to continue to use the existing
organisations of international economic co-operation
to maintain these principles for the benefit of all
their members.

10. Ministers and Governors expressed their
unanimous conviction that international monetary
stability rests, in the last analysis, on the success of
national efforts to contain inflation. They are re-
solved to pursue fully appropriate policies to this
end.

11. Ministers and Governors are confident that,
taken together, these moves will launch an interna-
tionally responsible programme for dealing with the
speculative pressures that have recently emerged and
for maintaining orderly international monetary ar-
rangements, while the work of reform of the in-
ternational monetary system is pressed ahead. They
reiterated their concern that this work be expedited
and brought to an early conclusion in the framework
of the Committee of Twenty of the IMF.

April 16, 1973

455

The Realities of United States-Africa Relations

Address by David D. Netvsom
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs^

The Commonwealth is probably the
world's largest and most significant unde-
fined organization. Similarly the relationship
between the United States and the Common-
wealth is undefined and, in some ways, spe-
cial.

As a member of the first staff of the
American Embassy in Karachi in 1947, I was
in at the beginning of the new Common-
wealth. I have followed its fascinating his-
tory since then. I, together with many of my
fellow countrymen, have admired the unique
contribution that the Commonwealth and
the ties between members of the Common-
wealth have made to the history of this last
quarter century.

Today I wish to speak to you about the
relationship of the United States to Africa.
It is most appropriate that I do so in this
Commonwealth atmosphere since this rela-
tionship involves not only key African mem-
bers of the Commonwealth but also a whole
series of questions posed for Africa by the
association of the United Kingdom with the
Common Market.

The U.S. relationship to Africa is both old
and new. It has been both romantic and real-
istic. It has been both positive and negative.

Central to our relationship to Africa is
the ethnic tie, the enforced migration to
America of slaves, largely from the west
African areas of Nigeria, Dahomey, Togo,
and Ghana.

One of the most neglected realities of

' Made before the Royal Commonwealth Society at
London on Mar. 14.

American history is the fact that our nation
started out as a multiracial society. Nearly
one-fifth of the persons living in America be-
fore the American Revolution were of Afri-
can descent. The census of 1790, virtually
the first national act required of the Federal
Government by the new Constitution,
counted 3,929,000 persons, of whom 757,000
were black, including some 60,000 freemen
and 697,000 slaves.

The enormous waves of immigrants from
Europe in the 19th century and the early
20th century tended to diminish the propor-
tion of all of the original groups in the total
population, but persons of African descent
still form about 11 percent of our population.
In their search for their roots in Africa, and
for their identity as Afro-Americans, and in
their contribution to our own and world cul-
ture lie much of the dynamism of my coun-
try's link with Africa.

The existence of our own civil rights
problems means, also, that the complex issues
of southern Africa are seen, whether rightly
or wrongly, as mirrors or extensions of our
own racial difficulties. There is consequently
among both blacks and whites a special at-
tention to these problems. There exists, not
unnaturally, the same divergence of opinion
toward these problems that one finds toward
our own domestic issues.

The black community's interest in Africa
goes back to the early 19th century when
freed slaves, with the help of white contri-
butions, formed the American Colonization
Society to found settlements in west Africa

456

Department of State Bulletin

which eventually became the Republic of
Liberia. Still today, the nation of Liberia,
while not tied to the United States in any
political way, remains a special symbol of
our links with Africa.

The 19th century saw the romantic period.
Americans followed with fascination and ad-
miration the adventures of European mis-
sionaries and explorers making their way
into "the dark continent." Henry M. Stan-
ley's exploits brought the African scene
closer to home. The first U.S. missionary ac-
tivities in black Africa began in the early
1800's in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

American trade with Africa began in the
very early days of our Republic as clipper
ships from Massachusetts rounded the Cape
of Good Hope seeking spices and timber in
east Africa and beyond. We signed a treaty
with Zanzibar and Muscat in 1832.

African Expectations of the United States

As political movements began in Africa in
the 20th century, their leaders found special
interest in the history of the American
colonies — if you will forgive me — in their
struggle for freedom. The writings of Paine,
Jefferson, and others struck responsive
chords. Some of the dissimilarities were
overlooked and the similarities seized upon.

Many of the political leaders in independ-
ent Africa were educated in the United
States — Nkrumah of Ghana, Banda of Ma-
lawi, and Azikiwe of Nigeria.

The result of these ties was that African
nations entered their independence with
great expectations of the United States.

With knowledge of the Marshall plan still
fresh in the minds of many African leaders,
there was expectation that the United States
would provide massive assistance to Africa.

With an awareness of the writings of the
early Americans and of Lincoln, there was
the expectation that we would take the lead
in supporting the struggle for independence
in Africa. Strong sentiments on existing in-
dependence movements were expressed fre-
quently in the United States, giving further
support to this expectation.

A knowledge of the power and wealth of
the Ihiited States fed expectation of a degree
of influence that could, if it wished, change
the internal policies of African governments
and right the wrongs of colonialism and
apartheid.

Each of these positive expectations had,
in a sense, a reverse side.

The fact that Africans identified with
America's support for independence fed con-
cern among expatriates and former colonial
powers that we were out to replace them.

Natural rivalries of commercial competi-
tion served further to feed these anxieties
about our intention.

The image of the wealth of the United
States held by some Africans served to
create apprehensions regarding the exercise
of that wealth. The United States became
feared — and envied.

The impressions of U.S. influence, sparked
by such books as "The Invisible Govern-
ment," gave rise to fears and allegations of
U.S. political manipulation. The CIA became
an ogre and a symbol.

Bases of U.S. Policies Toward Africa

The last few years have been spent getting
the United States and its relationship with
Africa in focus. Particularly has this been
true during the past four years, when, in the
words of President Nixon, we have sought a
relationship of candor: -

Africa's friends must find a new tone of candor
in their essential dialogue with the Continent. All
too often over the past decade the United States
and others have been guilty of telling proud young
nations, in misguided condescension, only what we
thought they wanted to hear. But I know from many
talks with Africans, including two trips to the
Continent in 1957 and 1967, that Africa's new lead-
ers are pragmatic and practical as well as proud,
realistic as well as idealistic. It will be a test of
diplomacy for all concerned to face squarely common
problems and differences of view. The United States
will do all it can to establish this new dialogue.

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970, ap-
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the section
entitled "Africa" begins on p. 305.

April 16, 1973

457

Our policies toward Africa rest, to start
with, on a clear definition of U.S. interests
in Africa.

First, there is the historic and ethnic in-
terest in Africa. While in many ways the
black groups in America still concentrate al-
most totally on domestic issues and have not
yet developed a visibly effective constituency
for Africa, the interest is there. No Amer-
ican policy toward Africa can ignore this
deep and growing interest in a meaningful
relationship to the continent by so large a
group of our citizens.

Secondly, and closely tied to the first, is
the keen interest in the humanity of Africa
on the part of blacks and many whites.
Whether it be a problem of famine or war or
a problem of human rights, the American
policymaker is continually made conscious of
the strong empathy which exists toward
Africa.

More traditional diplomatic and economic
interests also exist. As a major power, we
desire effective diplomatic access to the gov-
ernments of Africa, representing as they do
almost one-third of the members of the
United Nations. In full recognition of the
sensitive nationalism of the newly independ-
ent nations, we desire fair opportunities for
trade and investment.

The United States does not desire — even if
it had the capabilities and resources to do so
— to replace the former colonial powers in
trade and economic relations with the Afri-
can nations. We appreciate and wish to be
responsive to the desire of the African na-
tions to diversify their economic relations.
We continue to believe, however, that the
traditional ties of language, education, and
business that link these nations with the
metropole nations in Europe are important
to both partners, and to the extent each de-
sires to retain them, they should be en-
couraged.

The question frequently is raised, particu-
larly on this side of the Atlantic, of the U.S.
military interest in Africa. We count this a
lesser interest. We have two remaining mili-
tary communications stations in Africa

which we shall presumably need until tech-
nology makes them unnecessary. We recog-
nize the importance to Europe of the cape
route; we do not, however, give this interest
priority over other more direct concerns in
Africa.

Response to African Interests and Concerns

The pursuit of the interests of any nation
in Africa requires, also, an understanding of
African interests and concerns. No policies
are going to be effective which fail to take
these into account and to seek in some meas-
ure to be responsive.

From my own frequent travels in Africa
and my own discussions with African lead-
ers, I would define African interests as
three: nationbuilding and true sovereignty,
survival and development, and a resolution
of the inequities of southern Africa.

American policies seek meaningful re-
sponses to each of these African concerns.

There is the strongest desire among Afri-
cans to build the nations inherited from the
colonial era, with boundaries fixed by that
era, and with institutions compatible with
the customs and traditions of the peoples. We
recognize that there have been and will be
changes in the institutions left behind by
the colonial powers. We accept that there
will be variety in forms of government and
philosophies and that we can deal with na-
tions, regardless of their institutions, on a
basis of mutual respect and common interest.

We recognize that Africans do not wish to
be pawns in a great-power conflict. We ac-
cept their relations with all nations. We ask
only that they be true to their nonalignment
in the balanced treatment and understanding
they give to all. We do not accept that there
can be a double standard according to which
the United States can be condemned for cer-
tain actions while other nations are not.
Neither do we accept that African nations
can turn blind eyes to human disaster within
their own continent while seeking the con-
demnation of others.

In an African Continent understandably
sensitive on the issue of sovereignty, we

458

Department of State Bulletin

Americans have had a special m>i:h to over-
come: the myth of manipulation. I hope that
this is dead. I hope that we have been able to
convince the African ofovernments that we
are not involved in any way in seeking to de-
termine how they are governed or by whom.

African leaders understandably are pre-
occupied with critical economic problems.
Many search for the resources needed for de-
velopment. Others, less fortunate, search for
the resources needed for survival. Sixteen of
the poorest countries of the world are in
Africa.

I will not deny that the response to
Africa's economic needs has presented us
with some very difficult problems. As I
pointed out, African expectations of what we
might i^rovide were high. We have not come
up to those expectations.

Assistance, Investment, and Trade

As Americans, however, coming late into
the scene in Africa, we feel that we have
made a substantia] and meaningful contri-
bution to African development. Bilateral
assistance, both that given directly in coun-
try programs and that provided on a regional
basis, has been maintained at approximately
the same level through the past 10 years:
about $350 million per year. If one adds an-
other $200 million provided annually through
international institutions such as the United
Nations Development Program and the
World Bank, the U.S. contribution repre-
sents about 20 percent of all aid going to
Africa.

In attempting to assert their independence
from the developed countries, which are the
major suppliers of traditional aid, the Afri-
can countries are seeking increased control
over investment and assured market condi-
tions for their primary commodities. As a
major supplier of foreign investment and
consumer of primary products, the United
States has an important interest in these
matters as well. With each side looking at
these matters from its own perspective, how-
ever, there is not always an identity of per-
ceived national interests.

The United States strongly believes that
private foreign investment, as a carrier of
technology, of trade opportunities, and of
capital itself, and as a mobilizer of domestic
resources, in turn becomes a major factor in
promoting economic development. Another
factor is the increasing need of the United
States for energy sources and other primary
resources, an important share of which will
come from Africa.

Yet the terms on which private capital will
accept investment risk in African countries
at times conflict with the strong desire of
the African nations for a greater share in
both the equity and management of invest-
ment projects.

Terms such as "Africanization" and "na-
tionalization" frighten some investors. They
are considered to be political necessities in
many parts of Africa. Fortunately, the re-
sult, so far in Africa, has been in most cases
a sincere effort to find, through negotiations,
ways to meet the needs and respected rights
of both parties. I detect in American busi-
ness a greater recognition of the desire of a
number of African states for participation
in investment. I detect in many African
countries a greater recognition of the impor-
tant and beneficial role played by the private
foreign investor. I hope both trends continue.

African countries such as Ghana and the
Ivory Coast, with a heavy dependence upon
single agricultural commodities, have pressed
for international commodity agreements,
particularly in coffee and cocoa. They have
received strong support from Latin America.

The United States played a leading role in
negotiating the first International Coffee
Agreement in 1962 and has played a leading
role in supporting that agreement. For most
of its period, the agreement operated in the
interests of both producers and consumers,
since it was designed to meet the particular
circumstances which obtained at that time.
On cocoa, we were active participants in the
long series of negotiations which led to con-
clusion of an agreement last fall. We did not
sign it, however, because we believe it is seri-
ously flawed and may not achieve its purpose
of stabilizing cocoa prices and earnings.

April 16, 1973

459

With regard to commodity trade in gen-
eral, we see a growing need for attacks on
the underlying problems and for new ap-
proaches which are not trade restrictive, but
trade creating in nature. We will, however,
continue to consider proposals for traditional
commodity agreements on a case-by-case
basis.

Next year will be the year of a renegotia-
tion of the Yaounde Convention linking the
European Community to Africa. Already
consultations have started on how the Anglo-
phone countries will fit into the older ar-
rangements. Both trade and aid are involved.
The United States recognizes the importance
of the Yaounde Convention to the African
signatories. At the same time, we strongly
oppose the system of special and reverse tar-
iff preferences which forms a part of the
present agreements. In this we are not alone.
Canada and Japan oppose these reverse pref-
erences, and we note that African countries
increasingly are questioning their desira-
bility.

While our trade with Africa does not com-
pare with more traditional suppliers and
markets, we strongly believe that Africa will
benefit if it is open to all on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. This, too, is a critical and difficult
element in our response to Africa's economic
needs.

U.S. Approach to Southern African Issues

This leaves our response to the third Afri-
can preoccupation — the complex issues of
southern Africa. These issues pose very spe-
cial problems for the Commonwealth, as they
do for us.

The American attitude toward this area is
clear. It was defined in President Nixon's
foreign policy report of 1972 in these words: ^

As I have repeatedly made clear, I share the
conviction that the United States cannot be
indifferent to racial policies which violate our na-
tional ideals and constitute a direct affront to Amer-

'The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap-
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972: the section
entitled "Africa" begins on p. 363.

ican citizens. As a nation, we cherish and have
worked arduously toward the goal of equality of
opportunity for all Americans. It is incumbent on
us to support and encourage these concepts abroad,
and to do what we can to forestall violence across
international frontiers.

In our approach to the issues of southern
Africa, we proceed on several premises.
First, in this day and age, the influence of
any nation, however powerful, in the internal
affairs of another is severely limited. The
idea that the United States by any action —
including the use of economic and military
force, if that were realistic — could bring
about fundamental changes in another soci-
ety is without foundation. We certainly can-
not do it in southern Africa. If change comes,
it must come primarily from within.

Secondly, the United States cannot pursue
policies which simply accept the situation in
southern Africa as it is, or contribute to its
perpetuation, nor those which endorse vio-
lence as a means to change. Consequently, we
conscientiously pursue an arms embargo
policy toward all sides in both South Africa
and the Portuguese territories. We exercise
restraint in our commercial and government-
financing activities in both.

Thirdly, we believe that if we are to con-
tribute meaningfully to change in the area,
it is not through the pressure of isolation
but through keeping open the doors of
communication with all elements of the popu-
lation, particularly in South Africa. If peace-
ful change is to come, in our view, it will
come through a general recognition of the
unacceptability of present policies in those
areas brought about by continuing contact
with the world outside.

Certain special problems arise.
One commonly held idea in the United
States is that official insistence on the with-
drawal of our private investment in South
Africa would bring effective pressure for
change. We do not think so. Our investment
represents only 16 percent of the total for-
eign investment in South Africa. It is closely
interlinked with South African interests. It
is doubtful that it could be repatriated, even
if we decreed it. It is not only our view, but

460

Department of State Bulletin

also that of many black South Africans, that
it is far better to encourage those firms
which are there to lead the way to upgrradino-
the work and social conditions of the non-
white labor force. This we do.

Rhodesia, as you all well know, represents
a special case. Except for the symbolically
significant but economically insignificant
breach of Rhodesian sanctions by the action
of our Congress, we fully support the eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia and believe
they are having an effect. We are deeply con-
scious of the grave problem the Rhodesian
situation presents for our British friends.
We hope that your patience will yet find a
way of getting black and white in Rhodesia
together for a workable solution.

The United Nations is another special
situation. The problems of southern Africa
are discussed frequently at the United
Nations, and action is sought increasingly
that exceeds the ability of the organization
to implement.

While s\Tnpathetic with the objectives of
many of the resolutions, the United States
does not find that it can support what it con-
siders unworkable resolutions, sometimes
based on unfair judgments. Such resolutions
also frequently raise questions of precedents
and budget which further prevent our sup-
port. By the simple vote, we sometimes ap-
pear to be anti-African when the issues are
far more complex.

The United States does welcome and sup-

port those efforts which emerge within the
United Nations to bring about discussions
between the parties directly concerned with
these problems.

Such an effort is that undertaken by Secre-
tary General Waldheim on Namibia. An ef-
fort was implied in the vote in December in
the Security Council on the Portuguese ter-
ritories, but has yet to come to fruition. In
our view, whatever the fate of the liberation
approach, talks must ultimately come be-
tween those involved in the problem. How-
ever frail may be the chances, we hope ways
can be found to start.

To the nations of the Commonwealth, as
to the United States, the African Continent
has a special significance. In that continent
are the last hard-core problems of achieving
self-determination, problems which have
both built and divided the Commonwealth.
In that continent lie continuing problems of
human dignity and human rights, of such
great concern to all our peoples.

I should like to assure you today that the
United States recognizes these problems and
the need for their solution. The United States
is neither "neglecting" Africa nor giving it
a "low priority." Out of the conflicting pres-
sures for policies and resources upon and
within a major nation, the United States
seeks to respect Africa's independence, to be
responsive to Africa's needs, and to stand
ready realistically to be helpful in furthering
trends of change.

April 16, 1973

461

German-American Economic and Commercial Relations
in the Atlantic Community

Address by Martin J. Hillenbrand

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany^

I take particular pleasure in addressing
you this evening since this meeting seems to
me to be a most appropriate forum in which
to thank our host, the Steuben-Schurz Gesell-
schaft, for its generous donation to the
American school of a language laboratory.
I have of course been long familiar with this
organization, and I welcome the opportunity
of expressing my appreciation of this latest
example of the society's role in cultivating
the special relationship which has existed
between our two countries over the last 25
years.

Throughout this period a broad sharing of
objectives between the Federal Republic and
the United States, with our close cooperation
in their pursuit, has been a key factor in
some landmark achievements in Atlantic re-
lations : the recovery of western Europe from
wartime destruction, the maintenance of its
security through a strong alliance, and the
promotion of its prosperity and political
strength through European integration and
the growth of freer international trade and
investment.

Today this Atlantic relationship is faced
with a new challenge in the form of a num-
ber of economic imbalances, the adjustment
of which has become imperative. In this
process of adjustment we will need to draw
on the elements of strength and stability in
U.S.-European relations, including the broad
area of understanding between our two coun-

' Made before the Steub«B-Schurz Gesellschaft at
Dusseldorf on Mar. 8.

tries. We need initiative on the part of our
major friends and allies in Europe in rectify-
ing, rather than merely living with, persist-
ing and unsustainable imbalances.

The words "friends," "partners," and
"allies" are not heard enough during these
days when the public media try to enliven
their stories from the drab world of eco-
nomics with images of rivalry and competi-
tion, trade "wars," and "attacks" on the
dollar. I find these images of rivals, winners,
and losers to be both inaccurate and unfor-
tunate. They tend to obscure not only the
common nature of our problems but also the
interdependence of our fate in dealing with
them. Whatever the problems of the moment
may be, we cannot lose sight of the fact that
the major objectives of Europe and Amer-
ica— security and prosperity in particular —
are most likely to be ones that we will both
attain, or fall short of, together. Nations on
both sides of the imbalances of today's in-
ternational economy have, in fact, a single
problem. The balance of payments surplus
country, for example, has an urgent adjust-
ment problem that it shares with deficit
countries. And failure to deal with this prob-
lem threatens domestic policy objectives of
the surplus country just as it does in the case
of the deficit country.

If we can look for a moment beyond the
problem of the recent speculative crisis, I
would like to discuss somewhat longer range
tasks that need to be faced on the way to a
more stable international economic system.
These are: artificial barriers and inflexibili-

462

Department of State Bulletin

'i

ties which impede the adjustment process;
the U.S. -European Community relationship;
and reform of the international monetaiy
system.

Slow Response to New Price Relationships

Recent monetary adjustments, combined
with U.S. success in holding down inflation,
have brought about a sharp change in price
relationships between Europe and America —
a change which is painfully apparent to
Americans living in Europe. Yet investment
and trade flows have not yet responded
strongly to these changed relationships, in
part because the process of change is en-
cumbered by many artificial barriers and
inflexibilities.

In investment matters the barriers to
change seem to be as much a matter of atti-
tude and inertia as anything else. European
firms have stuck to the course of producing
in Europe for export to America. They have
clung to this pattern even in the face of
rapidly rising costs in Europe. Now, after
dollar devaluation, we find some European
firms struggling still harder to maintain the
old pattern, even at the expense of taking
much lower profit margins on export sales
than sales at home. In the past week we have
again seen some major German exporters
raising their dollar prices by little more than
their deutsche mark (DM) prices, absorbing
much of the devaluation in their margin of
profit.

At some point European businessmen may
realize that such price decisions, as reason-
able as they may have looked in isolation at
the time, may represent a missed opportu-
nity. I would hope that many European pro-
ducers will take a longer term look at their
cost situation and consider seriously whether
the most profitable way to sell to America is
not now to produce in America. My govern-
ment encourages such investment.

Dollars to buy plant, labor, and raw ma-
terials in the United States would now cost
the German investor considerably less than
they would have two years ago. Also, the rate
of price increases in the United States has
for some time been lower than in Europe,
including the Federal Republic. We antici-

pate that this year the rate of price increases
in the United States will again be several
percentage points below that in Europe. One
would expect that the response of investment
flows to this trend could be one of the most
significant results of currency realignment
in 1971 and 1973.

Trade imbalances are another area where
adjustments cannot be achieved on the ex-
change rate side alone if inertia and direct
barriers neutralize the effect of price changes
— as they do for some of the key farm ex-
ports of the United States. The United States
continues to have a serious trade deficit, in-
cluding a very large bilateral deficit with the
Federal Republic. According to F.R.G. statis-
tics, the United States in 1971 had a trade
deficit with the Federal Republic of Germany
of approximately DM 700 million; in 1972
this trade deficit widened to approximately
DM 3 billion. As I'm sure you are aware, pro-
motion of American exports now has a very
high priority among the tasks performed by
our six consulates general in Germany, as
well as being the function of our trade cen-
ter in Frankfurt. Our experience with this
trade promotion program has made evident
the difficulty with which a comparative eco-
nomic advantage is translated into dollars
and cents. Although substantial lags must be
expected in realizing shifts in trade flows
from currency realignments, an increase in
U.S. exports to Germany may well become
apparent by the end of this year.

Tasks Before the U.S. and the Community

To an increasing degree, the economic re-
lationship between the Federal Republic and
the United States has been overshadowed by
the relationship between the United States
and the European Community. This broader
relationship, in which the Federal Republic
plays a key part, will have a strong effect
on the bilateral relationship.

Monetary and trade negotiations scheduled
for this year are expected to result in funda-
mental changes in the environment in which
the Community and the United States inter-
act. The objectives and political importance
of these negotiations have been well recog-
nized on both sides of the Atlantic.

April 16, 1973

463

In the communique following the enlarged
Community summit meeting in October of
last year, the European leaders stated that:

. . . the Community is determined, in order to
ensure the harmonious development of world trade:

— To contribute, while respecting what has been
achieved by the Community, to a progressive lib-
eralisation of international trade by measures based
on reciprocity and relating to both tariffs and non-
tariff barriers;

— To maintain a constructive dialogue with the
United States, Japan, Canada and its other indus-
trialized trade partners in a forthcoming spirit,
using the most appropriate methods.

In this context the Community attaches major
importance to the multilateral negotiations in the
context of G.A.T.T. [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade] in which it will participate in accordance
with its earlier statement.

President Nixon responded to this summit
declaration on October 27, as follows : -

... I particularly welcome the Community's de-
clared intent to maintain a constructive, forthcoming
dialogue with us and its commitment to a progres-
sive liberalization of tariff and nontariff barriers
to trade on a comprehensive basis during the major
multilateral negotiations to begin next year.

On behalf of the United States, I wish to reaffirm
our commitment to work with the members of the
European Community for reform of the interna-
tional economic system in a way which will bring
about a new freedom of world trade, new equity in
international economic conduct, and effective solu-
tions to the problems of the developing world.

These are the objectives with which the United
States will approach forthcoming negotiations' on
monetary and trade reform. We will be prepared
to take bold action with our European partners
for a more equitable and open world economic
order. . . .

From this exchange, it is clear that the
negotiations we are now engaged in on trade
and monetary reform have a dual purpose.
They have the classic one of increasing pros-
perity through the more efficient exchange of
goods and services that takes place under
conditions of liberal trade. This has been a
major objective of the successive rounds of
trade negotiations since the thirties which
have reduced the tariffs between the United

States and Europe by 75 percent. But there
is a political objective as well: that of draw-
ing the Western world more closely together
in a stable and equitable structure of eco-
nomic activity which would help, rather than
hinder, the world's movement toward order
and security. As the President put it in his
address to the last annual meeting of the
International Monetary Fund and World
Bank : ^

We must make certain that international com-
merce becomes a source of stability and harmony,
rather than a cause of friction and animosity.

The urgent task now before the United
States and the Community is to translate
this broadly recognized commonality of our
interests and this agreement on the political
importance of these economic negotiations
into the concrete achievements in cooperation
that the relationship needs to endure and
grow.

We, like the European Community, are
now developing our concepts of how these
broad objectives can best be achieved in the
forthcoming trade and monetary negotia-
tions. We will be seeking the closest possible
contact and exchange of views with the Com-
munity throughout this process. Though
preparations are not complete, the broad out-
lines of the negotiating tasks before us seem
to be clear :

We must work toward creation of a system
which will pi'omote domestic growth and
price stability as well as freer trade and
investment flows. A system not meeting this
requirement simply has no chance of adop-
tion by any government, including those of
the Federal Republic and of the United
States. This system should include codes of
economic conduct on such issues as govern-
ment procurement and the trade effects of
product and industry standards. Such basic
rules as "no competitive devaluation" and
"most-favored-nation treatment" have served
us well, but they now need to be reaffirmed
and supplemented in the light of existing
conditions.

''Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 608.

' Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1972, p. 457.

464

Department of State Bulletin .J*pi

I

U.S. Proposals for Monetary Reform

As you know, Secretary of the Treasury
Shultz is meeting with his European, Cana-
dian, Japanese, and Indonesian counterparts
in Paris tomorrow to discuss the interna-
tional monetary situation, and I think in the
circumstances it is better not to discuss the
issues involved in this area this evening. It
might nevertheless be useful to review the
main points in the proposals the United
States has previously made public for the
reform of the international monetary system.
These proposals were spelled out in detail in
a supplement to the Annual Report of the
Council of Economic Advisers in January
1973.

The main thrust of our proposals is that
monetary reform should be directed toward
improving the international adjustment proc-
ess so that large imbalances are prevented
from developing. Although this process must
be strengthened, considerable flexibility can
be left to national governments in their
choice of adjustment instruments.

The U.S. proposals would not require a
government to take some predetermined ac-
tion— such as a change in its exchange rate —
as soon as the reserve figures passed a cer-
tain point and regardless of other circum-
; stances. Instead, the United States proposes
the establishment of a number of reference
points above and below some agreed figure
that would be considered a particular na-
tion's normal level of reserves. Governments
would be expected to act, in their own way
and in accordance with their own timing, to
correct international imbalances long before
the "outer point" above this level or the "low
point" below it was reached.

International sanctions would be available
to pressure a reluctant government into tak-
ing effective adjustment action, but they
would be used only in the extreme and un-
likely event that a government would refuse
to act first on its own. Furthermore, the in-
ternational community, acting through the
International Monetary Fund, could vote to
override the signal given by the change in
reserves whenever it felt that other factors

should be taken into account or whenever it
felt that the government concerned was tak-
ing effective action to correct the situation.

Small adjustments in exchange rates — de-
valuations for countries with balance of
payments deficits, upward revaluations for
countries in surplus — would be one way gov-
ernments could act to keep their interna-
tional payments within reasonable balance.
But they would be free to choose other ap-
propriate methods of adjustment; that is,
methods "consistent with market mecha-
nisms and a liberal world trade and payments
order."

The U.S. proposals are based on the prem-
ise that the new international monetary sys-
tem, if it is to operate effectively, must
include some means of assuring that imbal-
ances in international payments will be ad-
justed. Under the old system, countries with
balance of payments deficits would always
come under pressure to adjust sooner or
later, when their reserves ran out. The U.S.
proposals are designed to put similar pres-
sure on surplus countries to revalue or take
other adjustment action and to encourage
both deficit and surplus countries to act
sooner, before the imbalances become a seri-
ous threat to the stability of the system.

Multilateral Negotiations on Trade Barriers

To a large extent, the monetary disorders
of the last few years reflect more basic dis-
equilibria in world trade. Exchange rate
changes will reduce these imbalances. Multi-
lateral trade negotiations, scheduled to begin
this fall in the GATT, are also essential to
deal with more direct barriers to trade which
can, in some areas, vitiate the effect of
realignment.

The United States, the European Commu-
nity, and Japan have agreed that these ne-
gotiations are to be ones based on reciprocal
concessions and mutual advantage. But the
result should be one that makes the trading
system more responsive to price relationships
and natural comparative advantage. The
United States and other deficit countries can-
not be expected to right their payments bal-

Aprll 16, 1973

465

ances when faced with direct barriers to
important exports. The problem is clear : The
U.S. trade position must be improved. If we
cannot accomplish that objective together in
a framework of freer and fairer trade, there
will be pressure in the United States to re-
treat inward. We must avoid that, for it risks
international recrimination, isolation, and
autarky. The trade negotiations will offer us
unequaled opportunities to make the inevi-
table process of change a fruitful, mutually
beneficial one. For example, we are anticipat-
ing negotiations in which we could find it
possible to make very substantial cuts in tar-
iffs among industrial countries. Perhaps we
should look forward to the elimination, over
the long term, of tariffs on trade and indus-
trial products among developed countries.

But industrial tariffs are only part of the
story. The negotiators this fall will have
broader and more complicated tasks to per-
form than the Kennedy Round or previous
trade liberalizations. For the first time the
negotiators will be dealing with a wide spec-
trum of nontariff barriers to trade, which in
some instances have become greater impedi-
ments to the free flow of goods and services
than customs duties.

One example of nontariff barriers that will
be dealt with is quotas protecting specific
economic sectors. Another is design or per-
formance standards, which are often discrim-
inatory against foreign goods. Restrictive
government procurement practices can also
effectively block foreign competition. Sub-
sidies to exports, too, act as nontariff trade
barriers by distorting the flow of interna-
tional trade.

Negotiating reductions in this sector will
not be easy. Nontariff barriers usually arise
from the need to protect economic areas con-
sidered particularly sensitive for domestic
political, social, or national security reasons.
The distinction between a protective barrier
and legitimate domestic social policy is not
always clear, but it will be an important one.
Where these barriers have a purpose that is
primarily a protective one, negotiations
should aim at a rollback or elimination of
such restrictions. This would appear to ap-

ply, for example, to preferences — formal and
informal — for domestic suppliers under gov-
ernment procurement contracts. Where re-
striction is an incidental effect of regulations
serving a legitimate domestic social or politi-
cal purpose, the approach would logically be
one of harmonization. This may be the best
approach on standards and on environmental
protection. There may also have to be a third,
less formal, approach in the form of pre-
scribing some general rules and consultative
requirements for certain pai-ticularly com-
plex nontariff barriers.

Negotiators in the GATT this fall will also
have the task of formulating a safeguard
system to protect sensitive industries in the
participating countries from rapid shifts in
trade patterns. Members in recent years have
been faced with the problem of abnormally
rapid increases in imports of specific prod-
ucts. In such situations these countries have
often acted unilaterally to impose quotas or,
with the prospect of such action in the ofl^ng,
to negotiate voluntary restraint agreements
with exporting countries. Both the United
States and European Community countries
have adopted such measures. We think that
the problem could be dealt with more fairly,
and with less political heat, if we agreed to
multilateral standards for such action. We
will be putting forward specific proposals to
this effect.

Obstacles to Free Agricultural Trade

Another component of the trade negotia-
tions, a key one from the U.S. point of view,
will be in agriculture. Agriculture is not only
an area that has been largely excluded from
previous rounds of trade liberalization ; it is
also a whole area of trade that has been ex-
empted, by formal waivers as well as by re-
fined evasion, from the rules of fair trade
practices applied to other international trade.
The present situation may be an acceptable
one for countries like the Federal Republic
which earn only 2-3 percent of their export
income from agricultural products. It is,
however, a cause of great concern to the
United States, which has over recent years
earned almost 20 percent of its export income

466

Department of State Bulletin

from agricultural trade. For us some liber-
alization of agricultural trade is an essential
part of the negotiating outcome.

To us this means that one's credentials as
a proponent for trade liberalization are not
judged by his position on tariffs alone. A
German who argues for zero tariffs, while at
the same time citing world trade in agricul-
ture as a hopeless exception to trade liberali-
zation efforts, is probably viewed by many in
my country as a protectionist. I have no
doubt that my hypothetical German would
l)e incredulous when confronted by this view
from my hypothetical American. But let me
try to explain how the European Commu-
nity's treatment of one important American
agricultural export — feed grains — looks from
an American perspective.

As a result of history, geography, climate,
and applied U.S. technology, the United
States is the world's largest and most efficient
producer of feed grains. This is one of our
strongest present and future areas of com-
petitive advantage in international trade.

We are a secure and reliable supplier of
the highest quality feed grains. This year we
have planted about 18 million additional
acres in grain to make sure we can fill inter-
national demand, including any extraordi-
nary demand from the U.S.S.R., as we did
last year. Moreover, we still have 25 million
additional acres that have been withdrawn
from production but could be replanted if
markets were open to us on a competitive
basis. There are not many export product
areas where such a substantial supply re-
sponse is possible in a short time. When we
see our structural and unreducible need for
raw materials imports growing — by over $1
billion annually just for petroleum — this be-
comes very important. In terms of economic
reality, the United States cannot be expected
to concentrate its exports exclusively on in-
dustrial products. A major area of our com-
petitive advantage is elsewhere.

In light of this natural comparative
advantage, it is difficult to explain to Ameri-
can grain farmers — who have been strong
supportei-s of liberal U.S. trading policies —
that the Community considers agriculture a
special case where the normal rules do not

apply ; that variable levies on grain, as high
as 70-80 percent, are not considered as a
possible subject of trade liberalization ne-
gotiations; that the European Community,
where production costs for grain are so much
higher than the U.S. level, is working toward
self-sufficiency in grain production.

The problem of opening trade opportuni-
ties in the Community for imported grain
need not be considered an intractable one,
and it does not require giving up the present
structure of the common agricultural policy.
Simply by allowing a small shift in the feed-
grain-livestock price ratio, the European
Community would encourage more grain
feeding. Such a development may be some-
thing that the Community should encourage
in its own interest regardless of trade nego-
tiations. Here we should remember that to
most European farmers feedgrain prices are
a cost rather than an income item. In short,
present European Community pricing and
trade restrictions on feed grains preclude a
good deal of natural common interest be-
tween American feedgrain farmers and Eu-
ropean livestock producers and deny the
European consumers more abundant quality
meat at lower prices.

Other Utuct in U.S.-Community Relations

The broad areas I have mentioned — indus-
trial tariffs, agriculture, safeguards, and non-
tariff barriers — make up the major items on
the agenda of the multilateral trade negotia-
tions. There remain some longstanding issues
of particular relevance to U.S.-European
Community relations. Some of these issues,
however, could be partially resolved by suc-
cessful trade lib«ralization negotiations. For
example, if we can agree on a deep cut in
tariffs, then the special preferences accorded
by the European Community to some Medi-
terranean countries — thereby discriminating
against U.S. exports — would be less damag-
ing. Similarly, deep tariff cuts would remove
some of the sting from the trade agreements
concluded between the European Community
and members of the European Free Trade
Area — which also discriminate against U.S.
exports.

April 16, 1973

467

The persistent problem of reverse prefer-
ences may also be ripe for resolution. This
system of trade-distorting and economically
expensive preferences, accorded by develop-
ing countries to their imports from some de-
veloped countries, could be replaced by a
multilateral system of generalized prefer-
ences for the exports of less developed coun-
tries. This step would be commensurate with
the enlarged Community's global, as opposed
to regional, responsibility toward developing
countries.

Other items should be cleared from the
table before multilateral negotiations begin,
such as the issues arising from the enlarge-
ment of the European Community. I hope
that in these so-called compensation negotia-
tions with the United States and other third
countries the Community will recognize that
enlargement has indeed created some specific
trade problems for the United States which
do require attention and adjustment.

The monetary and trade negotiations of
1973 should make a significant contribution
to keeping U.S. -European relations on their
long-term course of cooperation in addressing
the problem of the international economy.
Many issues will remain for the future, how-
ever. The dynamic relationship we have
across the Atlantic, by its very nature, con-
tinually creates new challenges. For this rea-
son the United States has welcomed the
European Community's offer, in which the
Federal Republic played a significant part,
of a constructive, continuing dialogue with
the United States. We will follow with great
interest European thinking on how such a
dialogue can best be carried out.

At the same time, a U.S.-European Com-
munity dialogue should not supplant the in-
valuable exchange of views on Atlantic issues
that has characterized U.S.-Federal Republic
contacts throughout the postwar period. In
returning to the Federal Republic last year
after several previous assignments here, I
was impressed once again with the great ca-
pacity for cutting through misunderstanding
and solving problems that resides in the
frank and open dialogue between representa-

tives of the Federal Republic and of the
United States.

I hope that my plain talk on some economic
issues tonight has added in some way to
this important dialogue between our two
countries.

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses U.S. Policy
Toward Cuba

Following is a statement by Robert A.
Hunvitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, made before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Af-
fairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on March 26.^

I am very pleased to have this opportunity
to meet with you today to discuss the policy
of the United States toward Cuba. I am well
aware of the interest in this policy and of
speculation that it might be changed. In this
opening statement I propose to describe the
present policy and the reasons behind it.

As it has been since the early 1960's, U.S.
policy toward Cuba is based on Organization
of American States resolutions urging the
diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba as
long as Cuba remains a threat to the peace
and security of the hemisphere. In our view
this threat results from Cuba's support of
subversion in other countries of Latin
America and its close military ties to the
Soviet Union. We are also mindful of Cuba's
hostile attitude toward us. Since the early
1960's, Cuba has unremittingly vilified this

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

468

Department of State Bulletin

lountry, its policies, and its Presidents. It
has i)ublicly consigned the Organization of
American States to the "garbage heap." Only
last week at the United Nations Security
( 'ouncil meeting in Panama, the Cuban For-
eign Minister continued Cuba's scurrilous
attack upon us and the Organization of
American States.

Nor has Cuba abandoned its goals of sub-
verting other governments in the hemisphere.
It has simply become more cautious, more
selective, and more sophisticated in its
"e.xport of revolution" and has directed its
resources to those areas where it estimates
the opportunity for interference greatest.
While failures have forced the Cuban leaders
to be less dogmatic in their insistence on the
Cuban model as the only way to mount a
revolution, they still openly advocate armed
revolt in propitious situations. These long-
held views of Fidel Castro and his closest
associates are not likely to be lightly dis-
carded even though Cuban deeds may not
always succeed in matching the belligerence
of the rhetoric. To accomplish its objective,
Cuba's apparatus for support to subversion
is functioning and remains a unique phenom-
enon in Latin America — which should give
pause to any nation prepared to believe that
Cuba is now just another state among many.
In short, we are convinced that, regrettably,
the time has not yet arrived when the hemi-
sphere can safely regard Cuba as no longer a
threat to its peace and security or when we
can take Cuba's leaders at less than their
word.

With respect to Cuba's close military ties
to the Soviet Union — ties that are tighter
than ever — what we especially mean is
Tuba's demonstrated willingness to lend its
territory for Soviet military purposes. We
obviously do not question Cuba's right to
maintain an army, or to equip it, or to receive
training. Every nation has such a right.
What concerns us is Cuba's disposition to
cooperate in the strategic goals of an extra-
hemispheric superpower. This was illustrated
by the emplacement of offensive missiles in

October 1962 and more recently by Cuba's
cooperation in 1970 in the Soviet effort to
establish a nuclear submarine facility at
Cienfuegos which, had it succeeded, could
have caused a major disturbance in the hem-
isphere. Any disturbance, even a slight one,
of the balance of military power with the
Soviet Union must remain of concern to us
even as our efforts to develop peaceful con-
tacts with that country continue.

The bases for continuing an "arm's-length"
relationship with Cuba — which I would stress
are Cuba's external activities and not its in-
ternal political, economic, and social arrange-
ments— would seem therefore to be clear.
What, then, would be the advantages to the
United States of a closer relationship? De-
spite Cuba's consistent and flat rejection of
the idea of any normalization of relations
with the United States, some argue that:
(1) to be consistent we should seek the same
kind of pragmatic accommodation with Ha-
vana that we have sought with Peking and
Moscow; (2) Latin American support for the
Organization of American States resolutions
is weakening; (3) we would realize economic
gain from a normalization of relations; and
(4) the Soviet presence in Cuba can only be
reduced if Cuban suspicion of the United
States is allayed by conciliatory steps on our
part.

In my view, there is no inconsistency be-
tween our Cuba policy and President Nixon's
widely applauded overtures toward Peking
and Moscow. Both are adapted to the situa-
tions we find; both are pragmatic. Apart
from the obvious differences in size and im-
portance of the countries involved and the
fact that U.S. policy toward Cuba forms part
of a multilateral OAS policy, there is the
crucial difference that in the Chinese and
Soviet cases we had previous indications of
interest in a new relationship with the United
States. We have received no such signal from
Cuba. I think we have demonstrated our
pragmatism with respect to Cuba: Where
there is no overriding U.S. interest, there are
no grounds for seeking accommodation with

April 16, 1973

469

an openly hostile nation; on matters of mu-
tual interest, however, we have demonstrated
that we can deal with each other. The Cuban
refugee airlift negotiated through the Swiss
in 1965 is one example. The new hijacking
agreement is another, and we hope it will
effectively deter aircraft hijackings to Cuba,
which were contrary to the interests of both
countries.

We recognize that over the years some
nations have decided that the maintenance
of the economic and diplomatic sanctions
against Cuba were no longer warranted. We
have regretted these unilateral decisions be-
cause the sanctions represent a collective
policy and a binding obligation on us and the
other member states to be lifted only when
two-thirds of the members determine that
Cuba is no longer a danger to the peace and
security of the hemisphere. By our count it
is clear that two-thirds do not think so.

Very little, if any, economic benefit would
accrue to the United States from normaliza-
tion of relations with Cuba. Cuba is heavily
mortgaged economically to the Soviet Union
for many years to come, and there is no
foreseeable way it can produce the foreign
exchange to again become an important pur-
chaser in the U.S. market. Its annual trade
deficit, which was running at about $80 mil-
lion in 1959, is now about $500 million, de-
spite the fact that prices for its principal
export commodities, sugar and nickel, are at
peak levels. From Cuba's standpoint, access
to the U.S. market would be important. To
offer Cuba a significant share of our sugar
market would entail an equal reduction in
the quotas of friendly sugar-producing coun-
tries in the hemisphere that over the past
decade have come to depend upon our pur-
chases. Nor do we have real need for the few
other Cuban export products available.

Finally, I think that the notion is illusory
that we can in time break or at least loosen
the Cuban-Soviet link by offering Cuba some
palatable alternative to dependence on the
Soviet Union. Cuba has, particularly in the
past four to five years and without any seri-
ous reservations apparent to us, locked itself

increasingly into a dependent relationship
with the Soviet Union in every sense — eco-
nomic, political, military, and cultural. Un-
doubtedly the U.S.S.R. would welcome U.S.
participation in sharing the $500-million-a-
year burden that Cuba represents, but it is
highly doubtful that the Soviets would lightly
see their first foothold in the hemisphere slip.
Conciliatory gestures to Cuba would convince
Fidel Castro that his course has been correct
all along and that his international behavior
had been vindicated. Cuba-oriented dissident
elements in the hemisphere would similarly
be encouraged, and we might well be faced
with a recrudescence of subversion abroad
without having made any dent at all in the
Cuban-Soviet relationship.

In sum, therefore, we see little if anything
to be gained and considerable disadvantage
in a change in policy toward Cuba under
present circumstances. In our view, Cuba has
through its own policies and actions outlawed
itself from the hemisphere. Should Cuba
demonstrate that it has abandoned those poli-
cies and actions, we would of course reex-
amine our posture in consultation with the
other members of the Organization of Ameri-
can States and move in concert with them
to adapt to the new situation.

Load Line Convention Amendments
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Nixon^

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to acceptance of the
Amendments to the International Convention
on Load Lines, 1966, adopted at London on
October 12, 1971, I transmit herewith a cer-
tified copy of those amendments. I transmit
also the report of the Department of State

' Transmitted on Mar. 22 (White House press
release) ; also printed as S. Ex. D., 93d Cong., 1st
sess., which includes the texts of the amendments jj
and the report of the Department of State. [

470

Department of State Bulletin

with respect to the amendments recommend-
ing early acceptance of the amendments by
tlie United States.

The 1966 Load Lines Convention estab-
lished new uniform rules concerning- the
limits to which ships on international voy-
ages may be loaded. Its purpose was to bring
international load line regulations into ac-
cord with modern developments and tech-
niques in ship construction. The purpose of
the new amendments is to correct errors and
ambiguities in the 1966 Convention on Load
Lines which have become apparent since
1966.

The new Amendments should make the
1966 Convention more effective in bringing
improvements in safety of ships as well as in
the economics of shipping. I recommend that
the Senate give the Amendments early and
favorable consideration.

Richard Nixon.
The White House, March 22, 1973.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement amending the agreement of January 5,
1968 (TIAS 6435), for the application of safe-
guards by the International .Atomic Energy
.Agency to the bilateral agreement between the
United States and Korea of February 3, 1956
(TIAS .3490), as amended, for cooperation con-
cerning civil uses of atomic energy. Sigrned at
Vienna November 30, 1972.
Entered into force: March 19, 1973.

Aviation

.Agreement on the joint financing of certain air nav-
igation services in Iceland. Done at Geneva Sep-
tember 25, 1956. Entered into force June 6, 1958.
TIAS 4048.
Accession deposited: Finland, December 28, 1972.

Agreement on the joint financing of certain air
navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe

Islands. Done at Geneva September 25, 1956.
Entered into force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4049.
Accession deposited: Finland, December 28, 1972.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16,

1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS
7192.

Ratification deposited: Philippines, March 26,
1973.
Protocol to amend the convention for the unification
of certain rules relating to international carriage
by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49
Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at
The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Gua-
temala City March 8, 1971.'

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, December 20,
1972.
Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratification deposited: Bulgaria (with a reserva-
tion), March 28, 1973; Philippines, March 26,
1973.

Expositions

Protocol of amendment of the convention of No-
vember 22, 1928, relating to international exposi-
tions, with appendi.x and annex. Done at Paris
November 30, 1972. Open for signature at Paris
from November 30, 1972, until November 30, 1973.
Enters into force on the date 29 states have be-
come parties by signature without reservation
as to ratification, acceptance, or approval, or have
deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession.

Signatures: Belgium, Byelorussian Soviet Social-
ist Republic,- 3 Bulgaria, ^^ Canada, Denmark, ^
Finland, < France, Federal Republic of Germany,
Hungary, = Israel,* Italy, * Monaco, Norway,
Netherlands,* Poland,-* Spain, Sweden,* Swit-
zerland,* Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist
Republic,-'^ United Kingdom, United States,'-*
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, = ' Novem-
ber 30, 1972.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6,
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS
4044.

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, March 14,
1973.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Signed at Washington August 20,

1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.

Accession deposited: Afghanistan, March 26, 1973.

' Not in force.

= With reservation (s).

' With declaration.

* Subject to ratification.

April 16, 1973

471

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intel-
sat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.

Signature: Ministry of Communications for Af-
ghanistan, March 26, 1973.

BILATERAL

Ethiopia

Agreement amending the treaty of amity and eco-
nomic relations of September 7, 1951, to terminate
notes concerning administration of justice. Effected
by e.xchange of notes at Addis Ababa September
16, 1965, and October 20, 1972. Enters into force
on the date of a note of confirmation presented
to Ethiopia by the United States.
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
27, 1973.

Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
relating to the agreement of October 18, 1967
(TIAS 6381). Signed at Conakry March 15, 1973.
Entered into force March 15, 1973.

Hungary

Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7,
1972.1

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
27, 1973.

Japan

Convention for the protection of migratory birds
and birds in danger of extinction, and their en-
vironment, with annex. Signed at Tokyo March
4, 1972.1

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
27, 1973.

Protocol amending the agreement of February 28,
1968, as amended (TIAS 6517, 7306), concerning

civil uses of atomic energy, with exchange of
notes. Signed at Washington March 28, 1973.
Enters into force on the date each Government
shall have received from the other written notifi-
cation that it has complied with all statutory and
constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Poland

Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972. i
Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
27, 1973.

Romania

Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bu-
charest July 5, 1972.1

Senate advice and consent to ratification: March
27, 1973.

Sudan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
with annex. Signed at Khartoum March 18, 1973.
Entered into force March 18, 1973.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

1 Not in force.

The Senate on March 26 confirmed the follow-
ing nominations:

Dr. Ruth Lewis Farkas to be Ambassador to
Luxembourg.

Marshall Green to be Ambassador to Australia.

V. John Krehbiel to be Ambassador to Finland.

William B. Macomber, Jr., to be Ambassador to
Turkey.

472

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX Apnl 16, 1973 Vol. LXVIII. No. 1764

Africa. The Realities of United States-Africa
Relations (Newsom) 456

Asia. America's Engagement in Asia and the
World (Porter) 441

\u8tralia. Green confirmed as Ambassador . . 172

I ambodia. America's Engagement in Asia and
the World (Porter) 441

('hiiia. Preparations for Establishment of U.S.
I Office in Peking (Department an-

.■ ■ ment) 447

Congress

''ortirmations (Farkas, Green, Krehbiel, Ma-

•nber) 472

I 'cjiartment Discusses U.S. Policy Toward
Cuba (Hunvitch) 468

Ia)Sh\ Line Convention Amendments Trans-
mitted to the Senate (Ni.xon) 470

Cuba. Department Discusses U.S. Policy
Toward Cuba (Hurwitch) 468

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Farkas, Green, Krehbiel, Macomber) . . . 472

Disarmament. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Resume at Geneva (Johnson, list of U.S.
delegation) 446

Economic Affairs

.\merica's Engagement in Asia and the World

(Porter) 441

Gci nian-American Economic and Commercial
Relations in the Atlantic Community (Hill-
enbrand) 462

Internationalization of the Capital Markets

t (Casey) 448
ajor Trading Nations Agree on New Mone-
tary Measures (communiques) 454
irope. German-American Economic and Com-
mercial Relations in the Atlantic Community
(Hillenbrand) 462
Aland. Krehbiel confirmed as Ambassador . . 472
•rmany. German-American Economic and
Commercial Relations in the Atlantic Com-
munity (Hillenbrand) 462

Laoti. America's Engagement in Asia and the
World (Porter) 441

lUxembourg. Farkas confirmed as Ambassador 472

aritime Affairs. Load Line Convention
Amendments Transmitted to the Senate
(Nixon) 470

esidential Documents. Load Line Conven-
tion Amendments Transmitted to the Senate 470

ide. German-American Economic and Com-
mercial Relations in the Atlantic Community
(Hillenbrand) 40 J

eaty Information

rrent Actions 471

ad Line Convention Amendments Trans-
mitted to the Senate (Nixon) 470

Turkey. Macomber confirmed as Ambassador 472

II.S..S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Ri
sume at Geneva (Johnson, list of U.S. dele-
gation) 446

Viet-Xam. America's Engagement in Asia and
the World (Porter) 441

Xante Index

Casey, William J i48

Farkas, Ruth Lewis 172

Green, Marshall i72

Hillenbrand, Martin J . . 462

Hurwitch, Robert A . . . 468

Johnson, U. Alexis 446

Krehbiel, V. John 472

Macomber, William B., Jr 172

Newsom, David D 456

Nixon, President 470

Porter, William J 441

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 26-Aprll 1

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to March 26 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 68
of March 12.

No. Date Subject

*88 3/27 Advisory Committee on Private In-
ternational Law, Study Group on
Enforcement of Foreign Judg-
ments, Apr. 2.

'89 3/2T .Advisory Committee on Private In-
ternational Law, Study Group on
Maritime Bills of Lading, Apr.
11.

*90 3/27 List of U.S. civilian prisoners of
war captured in South Viet-Nam
and released Mar. 27.

*91 3/27 List of U.S. civilian prisoners of
war captured in Laos and to be
released Mar. 28.

•92 3/28 Arena Stage to tour U.S.S.R.

*93 3/29 Executive Committee of the Over-
seas Schools .'Advisory Council,
Apr. 10.

*94 8/29 Program for Washington portion
:' ..fficial visit of Nguyen Van
: I .11, President, Republic of
Viei-Nam.

* Not printed.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
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U^^/'.

^'

7^.

<^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1765

April 23, 1973

AMERICA'S MILITARY STRENGTH: KEY ELEMENT

IN MAINTAINING PROGRESS TOWARD WORLD PEACE

Excerpts From an Address by President Nixon h73

THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES
Remarks by Deputy Secretary Rtish U76

U.S. VETOES U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

ON PANAMA CANAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS

Statements by Ambassador Scali

and Text of Draft Resolution 490

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For indfx see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETII

VOL. LXVIII, No. 1765
April 23, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402
PRICE:
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29, foreign $36.25
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BVLLETIl
a weekly publication issued by t\
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides tfie public
interested agencies of tfie governmei
witfi information on developments
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations ai
on tlie woric of tfte Department
tlte Foreign Service.
Tfte BULLETIN includes selecti
press releases on foreign policy, issi
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depm
ment, and statements, addresst
and news conferences of tfte Presidei^
and tfie Secretary of Stale and otliei
officers of tfie Department, as well as
special articles on various pitases of
international affairs and tfie functions:
of tlie Department. Information is in-^
eluded concerning treaties and inter'
national agreements to wfiicfi
United States is or may become
party and on treaties of general inter-
national interest.
Publications of tfte Department o^
State, United Nations documents, andt
legislative material in tfte field ol^
international relations are also listed.:

>

America's Military Strength: Key Element

in Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace

Address by President Nixoyi (Excerpts)^

Four years and two months ago, when I
first came into tin's office as President, by far
the most difficult problem confionting the
Nation was the seemingly endless war in
Viet-Nam. 550,000 Americans were in Viet-
Nam. As many as 300 a week were being
killed in action. Hundreds were held as pris-
oners of war in North Viet-Nam. No progress
was being made at the peace negotiations.

I immediately initiated a program to end
the war and win an honorable peace.

Eleven times over the past four years I

have reported to the Nation from this room

in the progress we have made toward that

L'-iial. Tonight, the day we have all worked

and prayed for has finally come.

For the first time in 12 years, no American
military forces are in Viet-Nam. All of our
American POW's are on their way home.
The 17 million people of South Viet-Nam
have the right to choose their own govern-
ment without outside interference, and be-
cause of our program of Vietnamization,
they have the .strength to defend that right.
We have prevented the imposition of a Com-
munist government by force on South
Viet-Nam.

There are .still some problem areas. The
provisions of the agreement requiring an
accounting for all mi-ssing in action in Indo-
china, the provisions with regard to Laos
and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting in-

' Made to the Nation on televi.sion and radio on
Mar. 29; for the complete text, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 2,
p. 311.

filtration from North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam, have not been complied with. We
have and will continue to comply with the
agreement. We shall insist that North Viet-
Nam comply with the agreement. And the
leaders of North Viet-Nam should have no
doubt as to the consequences if they fail to
comply with the agreement.

But despite these difficulties, we can be
proud tonight of the fact that we have
achieved our goal of obtaining an agreement
which provides peace with honor in
Viet-Nam.

On this day let us honor those who made
this achievement possible — those who sacri-
ficed their lives, those who were disabled,
those who made every one of us proud to be
an American as they returned from years
of Communist impi-i.sonment, and every one
of the 21/0 million Americans who served
honorably in our Nation's longest war. Never
have men served with greater devotion
abroad with less apparent support at home.

Let us provide these men with the veter-
ans benefits and the job opportunities they
have earned. Let us honor them with the re-
spect they deserve. And I say again tonight,
let us not dishonor those who served their
country by granting amnesty to those who
deserted America.

Tonight I want to express the appreciation
of the Nation to others who helped make
this day possible. I refer to you, the great
majority of Americans listening to me to-
night, who, despite an unprecedented barrage
of criticism from a small but vocal minority.

April 23, 1973

473

stood firm for peace with honor. I know it
was not easy for you to do so.

We have been through some difficult times
together. I recall the time in November 1969
when hundreds of thousands of demonstra-
tors marched on the White House, the time in
April 1970 when I found it necessary to
order attacks on Communist bases in Cam-
bodia, the time in May 1972 when I ordered
the mining of Haiphong and air-strikes on
military targets in North Viet-Nam in order
to stop a massive Cominunist offensive in
South Viet-Nam, and then — and this was
perhaps the hardest decision I have made as
President — on December 18, 1972, when our
hopes for peace were so high and when the
North Vietnamese stonewalled us at the con-
ference table, I found it necessary to order
more airstrikes on military targets in North
Viet-Nam in order to break the deadlock.

On each of these occasions, the voices of
opposition we heard in Washington were so
loud they at times seemed to be the majority.
But across America the overwhelming ma-
jority stood firm against those who advocated
peace at any price — even if the price would
have been defeat and humiliation for the
United States.

Because you stood firm — stood firm for
doing what was right — Colonel McKnight
[Lt. Col. George G. McKnight, USAF] was
able to say for his fellow POW's when he re-
turned home a few days ago, "Thank you for
bringing us home on our feet instead of on
our knees."

Let me turn, finally, tonight to another
gi-eat challenge we face.

As we end America's longest war, let us
resolve that we shall not lose the peace. Dur-
ing the past year we have made great prog-
ress toward our goal of a generation of peace
for America and the world. The war in Viet-
Nam has been ended. After 20 years of
hostility and confrontation we have opened
a constructive new relationship with the
People's Republic of China, where one-fourth
of all the people in the world live. We nego-
tiated last year with the Soviet Union a
number of important agreements, including

an agreement which takes a major step in
limiting nuclear arms.

Now, there are some who say that in view
of all this progress toward peace, why not
cut our defense budget?

Well, let's look at the facts. Our defense
budget today takes the lowest percentage of
our gross national product that it has in 20
years. There is nothing I would like better
than to be able to reduce it further. But we
must never forget that we would not have
made the progress toward lasting peace that
we have made in this past year unless we
had had the military strength that com-
manded respect.

This year we have begun new negotiations
with the Soviet Union for further limita-
tions on nuclear arms. And we shall be par-
ticipating later in the year in negotiations
for mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

If prior to these negotiations we in the
United States unilaterally reduce our defense
budget, or reduce our forces in Europe, any
chance for successful negotiations for mutual
reduction of forces or limitation of arms will
be destroyed.

There is one unbreakable rule of interna-
tional diplomacy : You can't get something
in a negotiation unless you have something
to give. If we cut our defenses before nego-
tiations begin, any incentive for other na-
tions to cut theirs will go right out the
window.

If the United States reduces its defenses
and others do not, it will increase the danger
of war. It is only a mutual reduction of forces
which will reduce the danger of war. And
that is why we must maintain our strength
until we get agreements under which other
nations will join us in reducing the burden
of armaments.

What is at stake is whether the United
States shall become the second strongest na-
tion in the world. If that day ever comes,
the chance for building a new structure of
peace in the world would be irreparably dam-
aged and free nations everywhere would be
living in mortal danger.

A strong United States is not a threat to
peace. It is the free world's indispensable
guardian of peace and freedom.

474

Departmenf of State Bulletin

i

I ask for your support tonijrHt for keeping
tlio strent'tli — tlie strength wliich enabled us
tn make such great progress toward world
peace in the past year and which is indis-
pensable as we continue our bold new initia-
tives for peace in the years ahead.

As we consider some of our problems to-
night, let us never forget how fortunate we
are to live in America at this time in our
history. We have ended the longest and most
difficult war in our history in a way that
maintains the trust of our allies and the re-
spect of our adversaries. We are the strong-
est and most prosperous nation in the world.
Because of our strength, America has the
magnificent opportunity to play the leading
role of bringing down the walls of hostility
which divide the people of the world, in re-
ducing the burden of armaments in the
world, of building a structure of lasting
peace in the world. And because of our
wealth we have the means to move forward
at home on exciting new programs — pro-
grams for progress which will provide better
environment, education, housing, and health
care for all Americans and which will enable
us to be more generous to the poor, the el-
derly, the disabled, and the disadvantaged
than any nation in the history of the world.

These are goals worthy of a great people.
Let us therefoi-e put aside those honest dif-
ferences about war which have divided us
and dedicate ourselves to meet the great chal-
lenges of peace which can unite us. As we
do, let us not overlook a third element, an
element more important even than military
might or economic power, because it is essen-
tial for greatness in a nation.

The pages of history are strewn with the
wreckage of nations which fell by the way-
side at the height of their strength and
.vealth because their people became weak,

soft, and self-indulgent and lost the character
and the spirit which iuul led to their
greatness.

As I speak to you tonight, I am confident
that will not happen to America. And my
confidence has been increased by the fact
that a war which cost America so much in
lives and money and division at home has, as
it ended, provided an opportunity for mil-
lions of Americans to see again the character
and the spirit which made America a great
nation.

A few days ago in this room, I talked to
a man [Col. Robinson Risner, USAF] who
had spent almost eight years in a Communist
prison camp in North Viet-Nam. For over
four years he was in solitary confinement. In
that four-year period he never saw and never
talked to another human being except his
Communist captors. He lived on two meals
a day, usually just a piece of bread, a bowl
of soup. All he was given to read was Com-
munist propaganda. All he could listen to
was the Communist propaganda on radio.

I asked him how he was able to survive it
and come home, standing tall and proud,
saluting the American flag. He paused a long
time before he answered. And then he said,
"It is diflicult for me to an.swer. I am not
very good at words. All I can say is that it
was faith — faith in Cod and faith in my
country."

If men who suffered so much for America
can have such faith, let us who have received
so much from America renew our faith — our
faith in God, our faith in our country, and
our faith in ourselves.

If we meet the great challenges of peace
that lie ahead with this kind of faith, then
one day it will be written: This was Amer-
ica's finest hour.

Thank you and good evening.

'\pril 23, 1973

475

The Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy Objectives

Following are remarks made by Deputy
Secretary Kenneth Rush on March 29 before
the national foreign policy conference for
editors and broadcasters at the Department
of State, together xvith the transcript of the
questions and ansivers which followed.

REMARKS BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH

I am very pleased to be with you today
and to have the opportunity of reviewing
with you President Nixon's foreign policy
objectives and the degree to which he has
been able to accomplish them.

The essence of his foreign policy has been
to move from confrontation to negotiation.
When the President took office in 1969, as
we looked around the world it was a world
where confrontation imperiled the peace in
many, many areas and where active war was
going on in three areas :

— In Nigeria there was a war that was
very serious ; large numbers of people were
being killed and were killed in that war, more
than have been killed in the Viet-Nam war.
That war is now gone.

— In Viet-Nam we had an authorized
strength of 549,000. We reached a peak of
543,500. And as you know, the war was very
bitter. The protagonists were not just the
South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese
and the Viet Cong — and also, of course, war
raging in Laos and in Cambodia — but Russia
was strongly backing North Viet-Nam, as
was China. So it was really a confrontation
between the great powers, and in particular
the superpowers, Russia and our country.

— In the Middle East we were faced with
what at least was a semi-war. The six-day
war was over. But there were constant
clashes in the air, there was bombing, there

was killing going on, although there was, |
of course, no large land action. |

In Europe the cold war was still very j
strong. Berlin, the focal point of conflict be- j
tween East and West, was unresolved. Block-
ades were being imposed. In fact, in my first |
visit to Berlin there was a blockade that was ]
very, very costly on the autobahn. The West i
Berliners could not travel to East Berlin. The j
East Berliners could not get out of East ;
Berlin. The West Berliners could not travel !
to the German Democratic Republic, and j
travel from the G.D.R. to West Berlin or to \
the Federal Republic of Germany, West Ger- \
many, was very seriously curtailed. And j
there was a bitter feeling and bitter re- I |
crimination between the two Germanys. !|,

West Germany itself was called a bitter
revanchist by the Russians; and the hatred
of Germany and the fear that Germany
might regain military strength was a real
source of holding the Warsaw Pact together.

So that in essence we saw war and bitter
confrontations around the world.

What do we have today?

Today we have all of our troops — all
of our combat troops are out of Viet-Nam.
We have a cease-fire in Viet-Nam. We have
a cease-fire in Laos. And the Government of
Cambodia has offered a cease-fire, although
we still do not have a cease-fire there.

In the Middle East we find that a cease-
fire has been in effect for some time. There
is no war going on. We ourselves are talking
to the Egyptians, we are talking to the Jor-
danians, we are talking to the Israelis ; and
we talk to all of them about the need for
talking among them.selves, either by proxim-
ity talks or otherwise. The situation is still j
very dangerous, but not an active war.

And in Europe we find detente going on

476

Department of State Bulletin

apace. We are now enpaped in discussions in
Helsinki leading toward a Conference on
Kuropean Security and Cooperation among
tlie great powers, ^^'e are engaged in discus-
sions in Vienna looking toward talks on mu-
tual and balanced force reductions to reduce
the danger and the threat in central Europe
and to reduce our forces there.

We have a SALT treaty covering defensive
\\ia|Mins, and we have an interim agreement
nl' ii\e years' duration covering offensive nu-
clear weapons. We now have talks going on
in Geneva to lead to a permanent treaty on
offensive weapons, in SALT [Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks].

I Trade talks between us and Russia are
' impending.

And all in all you find a world that is set-
tling its disputes by negotiation.

By negotiation we have returned Okinawa
to our ally Japan.

Now, when we go from an era of confron-
tation to an era of negotiation, this does not
mean that the superpowers — that Russia, for
example, has given up her objectives. The

iectives of Russia remain the same: They
aie to have us withdraw from Europe ; to
weaken NATO ; to prevent the political, mili-
tary, monetary, economic unification of the
Community, the European Community; to
keep Germany divided, to have a recognition
of the division of Germany by the Western
allies.

Our objectives haven't changed either. Our
objectives are, of course, to strengthen NATO
as an instrument of peace; to strengthen the
Community and to press forward to a unified
'■'immunity — militarily, economically, polit-
ically, monetarily — which will be a great
force for peace, in our view; to have the
Warsaw Pact countries and Russia herself
draw closer to the West, leave the closed
society more and more and draw more and
more to the open society.

And so I could go around the world with
regard to objectives.

But the point is that by negotiation we are
able to understand each other much better,
and we are able to push toward our objec-
tives in a civilized wav rather than by the

threat of nuclear war or by desperate con-
frontations such as in the Cuban missile
crisis or the crises in the Middle East or the
crises that recurrently occurred in Berlin.

Negotiation of Berlin Agreement

I might just say a word about Berlin and
my negotiations there to illustrate how one
goes fi-om confrontation to negotiation to an
agreement.

As I said when I arrived in Germany as
Ambassador, the President had previously
told me that obviously we could not go for-
ward with detente in Europe unless we were
able to normalize the situation that was the
most dangerous, that had been the focal point
of controversy and confrontation ; namely,
Berlin. And we were able to get Berlin talks
started in March of 1970.

When we started talking, our positions,
it turned out, were irreconcilable, or so it
seemed. The Russians insisted that they had
absolutely no responsibility for access from
West Germany to West Berlin ; that the ac-
cess routes were under the complete control
of East Germany — of the G.D.R. — and East
Germany was a sovereign state. Their posi-
tion was that East Berlin was the capital
of the sovereign East Germany, G.D.R. , and
that the Four Powers had no right whatever
over East Berlin ; that the Four Power
rights, and certainly the Three Powers, the
three Western Powers, had jurisdiction only
ovei- the Western sectors of Berlin. They in-
sisted that any ties between West Germany
and West Berlin were illegal ; that the some
22,000 governmental employees of West Ger-
many located in West Berlin were there il-
legally; that the President could not visit
legally in an oflicial capacity in West Berlin ;
that Bundestag and Bundesrat committees
could not meet there ; that no official functions
could take place there — and that in essence
West Berlin was a city-state entirely inde-
pendent of any ties with West Germany.

Our position was just the reverse. Our
position was that there are Four Power
rights over Germany as a whole; that all of
Berlin falls within a special status under
Four Power rights and Four Power military

April 23, 1973

477

occupation; that East Berlin is m no sense
a part of East Germany; that the Russians
were responsible for access between West
Germany and West Berlin because their oc-
cupied zone was of course East Germany;
that we could establish any ties we wanted
between West Berlin and West Germany ;
and that West Berliners should be allowed
to go anywhere they wanted in East Berlin.
So that the positions, as is always the case
when you start negotiations, or is often the
case, were irreconcilable.

Now the way we got around this was to
say we will not change the respective legal
positions of the parties, we will not attempt
to do this, and we will try to bring about
practical improvements. We were able then
finally to get an agreement on Berlin where
we stated we were not changing the legal
concepts of any party, but we had a recog-
nition of Four Power rights, which was very,
very important.

Russia did agree that she would guarantee
access between West Germany and West
Berlin. Russia did agree that West Berliners
could travel to East Berlin and to East Ger-
many And Russia did agree that West Ber-
liners could carry West German passports,
could be represented abroad by the consular
and diplomatic offices of West Geraiany, that
West Berlin could hold international con-
ferences—and that in essence the West
Berliners could participate with the West
Germans as not quite but almost West
Germans.

In turn we allowed the Russians a con-
sulate general in West Berlin. The other
powers do have consulates general there-
France and England, and we ourselves have
one now. And the most important thing, ex-
cept access, was that the Russians agreed
that the ties between West Berlin and the
F.R.G., West Germany, would be maintained
and developed. The viability of West Berlin
depends entirely on how close the ties are
with West Germany.

So that we were able to accomplish, with-
out seeming to change the legal status, the
objectives that we needed to accomplish to
remove Berlin as a focal point of controversy.

478

U.S. Military Strength

Now what has been the underlying fact
that made possible this going forward so
successfully into an era of negotiation? The
thing that made it possible was the fact that
the President has stuck strictly to his prin-
ciples, his word can be relied upon, we did
not cop out in Viet-Nam or anywhere else,
and we have maintained our military
strength to the degree necessary m order
that the President can negotiate and that we
can negotiate with the Russians, with the
Chinese, and with others.

This does not mean, of course, that we
haven't reduced our military forces. We have
reduced our armed forces from about
3 550 000— roughly in excess of 1.2 million in
the last four years. Our military budget, m
terms of constant dollars, is lower than 20
years ago. As a percent of gross national
product, as a percent of total public expendi-
tures as a percent of the Federal budget,
our defense budget today is lower than it
has been since the late 1940's and early
1950's. So that we have made very strong

reductions. , ,, ^ u „ '

But the President has insisted that when i,
we determine what our force levels shall be, ,
those force levels shall be stationed where
they will do the most good, they will be de-
ployed where they do the most good.

We hear a lot, for example, about bring-
ing our boys back from Europe. WeH, "o^-
iust what is involved in this issue? What is
involved basically is this: If we brought
our troops back from Europe, if we took our
6th Fleet out of the Mediterranean, we would
no longer be able to convince our European
allies that we are a staunch ally, that we are
o-oing to back them, that our nuclear um-
brella is a shield for peace over them, that
thev can safelv resist pressures from Russia_
The net result would l)e that the nations of
western Europe, which is fragmented polit-
icallv still, would l^e competing with each
other for the favor of Russia. The Russian
influence would spread more and more over
western Europe. Our influence would wane
more and more. And we in time, I thmk,
would find ourselves in a very weakened ana
unsatisfactory position.

Department of State Bulletin

But, moreover, assuming that we have the
force levels that we think we have and de-
ploy them where they will do the most good,
it doesn't cost us any more to have them in
Europe than it does to have those same
troops in the United States.

Today the total cost of maintaining our
forces in Europe, including the 6th Fleet,
runs around $4 billion a year. If we brought
all those troops home and took the 6th Fleet
out of the Mediterranean, we would prob-
ably save about $400 million, or 10 percent.
But if we brought them home and at the
same time had dual bases so that they could
go back in case of need, so that we would
have to position equipment there and bases,
it might cost us over $1 billion a year more
to have them here than it would in Europe.
So we wouldn't save any money — unless we
disarmed. And if we disarm, we then would
be lowering our force levels to a point where,
in the President's opinion, it would not be
safe for us to weaken ourselves to this
degree.

We must remember of course, without be-
ing frightening, that while we have 2.3 mil-
lion forces under arms, the Russians have
over 4 million and the Chinese have over 3.5
million ; that in nuclear weapons the Russians
certainly have a rough parity, and under the
five-year agreement they have roughly IV2
times as many SLBM's and ICBM's [sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles; intercon-
tinental ballistic mi-ssiles] as we have or are
permitted to have. Now, they would have had
many more without the agreement, because
they have had an on-going nuclear program
since 1964 that is just I'eaching the peak of
its momentum, where in 1966 we decided to
build no more nuclear weapons but to im-
prove those v.-e have. Now, this disparity in
numbers doesn't mean that they are stronger
than we are. We are much stronger in bomb-
ers; we are much stronger, we think, in
•luality; we have many more warheads, be-
cause of MIRVing — that is, multiple inde-
pendently targeted warheads on one missile.
So that we feel quite safe.

But we cannot afford to become militarily
inferior to Russia and at the same time hope
to carry on the objectives of being able to

negotiate successfully with the Russians, or
with the Chinese, or with others.

Well, with those few remarks, I will be
very pleased to have your questions.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q. You spoke of our nuclear umbrella and
you spoke about our nuclear force generally.
From your present job, not necessarily your
most recent one, Mr. Secretary,^ do you favor
our going all-out immediately with mxixi-
mum accuratization and maximum techno-
logical improvement of our Minuteman force
particularly?

Deputy Secretary Rush: We have a care-
fully planned progi-am. We are not going
all-out at all. But we have a research and de-
velopment program and a conversion of our
Minuteman and a program of MIRVing our
Minuteman that we think is satisfactory. It
is not all-out. But we maintain our quality
and we must maintain our strength.

Now, actually, according to our best fig-
ures, the Russians spend more on research
and development in the defense field than we
do. The Russians do not have MIRV's. They
are working veiy hard to get them. They
may not be too far away from having them.
If they did MIRV, of course the already very
powerful force they have would be further
strengthened. But we are not going all-out.
We are adopting what I would call a good,
sound program of research and of MIRVing
our Minuteman.

Q. Mr. Secretary, u-hat is the legal and
constitutional justification for the continued
bombing of Cambodia?

Deputy Secretary Rush: As you know, the
President has been working very hard to
bring about peace in Indochina. And as I
mentioned earlier, he has been very success-
ful in this. In Viet-Nam the troops are out,
the prisoners are l)ack, we have a cease-fire.
We have a cease-fire in Laos. We do not yet
have a cea.se-fire in Cambodia, although the
Cambodian Government has offered a cease-

' Deputy Secretary Rush was Deputy Secretary
of Defense from Feb. 22, 1972, to Feb. 2, 197.3.

April 23, 1973

479

fire to the opposing side ; and fighting is con-
tinuing. The President is doing what he
thinks is best to bring about peace there.
Now, I have not personally gone into the
legal problems as to the bases for the various
things we do in the evolving picture in Viet-
Nam, and I would like to defer answering
that question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was note, of
course, that iti the very near future the four-
party overseeing operations by the various
governments in Viet-Nam ivill be ended.
There has been talk recently that there have
been secret talks in Saigon involving the
continuation of that four-party agreement.
What can be done and what will be done if
the four-party agreement and if the four-
party overseeing organization is not there
to make sure that peace is kept in Southeast
Asia?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, the Four-
Party Military Commission has been very
successful. Its life will expire and will not
be extended at the end of the month. That
Commission has done a great deal. Under
that we have seen the release of our prison-
ers of war. We have seen the release of the
prisoners of war between the Viet-Nam
parties. We have seen all of our troops with-
draw from South Viet-Nam. We have seen
the establishment of the six points of entry
for materiel. And we have seen great prog-
ress made under that Commission.

Now, the next thing, of course, is the Two-
Party Commission, and some progress is
being made to have the Two-Party Commis-
sion supercede the Foui'-Party Commission.

Q. In Asia we have the impression that
the negotiation part bi'ought all of the allies
of the United States to lose, and tve lose all
our best allies, like Taiwan, Viet-Nam — all
these countries have the impression they are
deserted by the United States noiv; it is like
abandoned. Mr. Secretary, you .speak about
the strength and the peace in Asia. Most of
the people have the impression that the with-
drawal of the United States is dangerous for
all the allies who are the strongest allies of
the United States.

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, the Presi-
dent's program, under the Nixon doctrine, as
you know, is that we stick to all our alliances,
we do not abandon our friends, we expect our
allies to take care of internal problems them-
selves, if they are threatened from without
we will help them. But we are not in any
sense abandoning Taiwan or any of our al-
lies. In fact, as far as peace is concerned
and the hope of peace, the President's trip
to Peking went a long way to insuring peace
in Asia and went a long way to insuring the
security of Taiwan. I think as a result of the
President's visit to Peking, and his very suc-
cessful visit also to Moscow, both Moscow
and China have reevaluated what are our
objectives. They realize that we were not in
Viet-Nam, in South Viet-Nam, for any kind
of imperialistic purpose. We were there to
pi-otect an independent country fighting for
its freedom. We were not there to fight Rus-
sia ; we were not there to fight China. I
think this realization was a very important
thing in the changed attitude that Russia
and China have had toward peace in Viet-
Nam and their willingness to cooperate in
bringing about that peace.

I think also the fact that the President
has been able to show the Chinese what our
real objectives are — namely, peace — is a pro-
tection for all of our allies, including Taiwan.

Q. Sir, does the administration foresee
any conditions that will alter congressional
opposition to the granting of the most-
favored-nation (MFN) status to Riissia in
light of its policy noiv irith its exit visas?
If )iot, can the Administration continue in
its attempt to secure the MFN for the Rus-
sian nation? ^

Deputy Secretary Rush: We all, of course,
know of the Jackson amendment, which pro-
vides that most-favored-nation treatment
cannot be given to a state economy, a state-
controlled economy, if there are these re-
strictions on emigration.

The great purpose that we have with
regard to Russia and the emigration of the
Jews is to maximize that emigration and to
maximize it across all classes of people, edu-
cated as well as poor and uneducated. Now,

480

Department of State Bulletin

great progress has been made. Just about
three years apo, four years ago, only about
2,000 a year were leaving Russia. Last year
about 32,000 left. This year they are leaving
at the rate of about 2,500 a month, as of
now — so that great progress has been made.

The Russians have also shown I think a
very commendable flexibility in their law, so
that they are now waiving the tax, the edu-
cation tax, levied on emigrants. Of course,
this tax apiilies not just to the Jews but to
anyone who wants to emigrate from Russia —
the Latvians, the Lithuanians, anyone else.

In my opinion, there is grave danger that
we might, by pressing too hard legislatively,
bring about a counterproductive reaction
where you might promote antisemitism in
Russia and we might stop this very favor-
able progress toward emigration in Russia.

What we want is to do whatever we can to
have the free emigration of Jews from Rus-
sia, educated or uneducated. We think the
best way to do this is not to limit the grant-
ing of MFN, not to tie it to the exit tax. Now,
of course people have differing opinions on
this depending upon their evaluation of what
is the best way to reach our objectives.

We would hope for and we expect a very
responsible attitude on the part of the Con-
gress toward this, and we would hope that
we will go forward on our proposed MFN
treatment of Russia and at the same time
that this tax will be waived by the Russians.
Just how this will evolve I cannot forecast
at this time, but I am optimistic.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ?» the groiving Third
World, Lihyn's Qndhafi, who /.<? involved with
us I guess economically and politically, is
quoted recently as sayivg "God damn Amer-
ica." What do you say to Mr. Qadhafi?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well. I would say
Mr. Qadhafi is wrong if he said that. [Laugh-
ter.] Mr. Qadhafi, of course, may not be our
clo.sest friend, but we .still maintain relations
with Libya. We had a little incident recently
where there was an attempted attack made
on one of our planes, a C-130, but no damage
resulted ; and we protested very strongly on
this, as you know, and refused to accept the
reply of the Libyans.

We, of course, have economic interests in
Libya. We are friends of the Libyan people.
We are friends of all people. And I would
hope that Mr. Qadhafi, if he said that, will
change his mind.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your excellent presen-
tation you are using the term "Russia" and
"Russian," and not "Soviet." I wonder
whether if has any political meaning; that is,
the recognition of the fact that the U.S.S.R.
is really not a union of equal Republics
but that Russia is dom.inating nil other
>iationalities.

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, I don't want
to interfere in the internal affairs of Rus-
sia—[laughter] of the U.S.S.R.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there hns been some con-
versation about possible economic aid to
North Viet-Nam folloiving the successful
withdrawal of our troops. Could you com-
ment at this time on what promises possibly
tvere given ivith regard to economic aid to
North Viet-Nam and tvhat part did that play
in the cease-fire?

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, I have noth-
ing to add to what has been stated by Dr.
Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs]
and others with regard to the negotiations
with Viet-Nam.

We do not have our program of aid to
North Viet-Nam. But I feel very strongly
that one of the best ways to peace in South-
east Asia is for us to cooperate in the reha-
bilitation of North Viet-Nam.

You all remember, of course, historically
that aftei' World War I Germany was pros-
trate and the allies did very little to correct
this. She .saved herself from communism
against great odds, but she went into some-
thing even worse or just as bad; and that
was through the poverty that followed and
the disruption of life that followed in Ger-
many we had Hitler, and we had another
war.

After World War U we adopted a very
different approach. Our former enemies,
Japan and Germany — once again in this case
Germany — were devastated, much more so

April 23, 1973

481

than after World War I. But we stepped in
and helped rehabilitate Japan and Germany.
Today two of our closest allies are Japan
and Germany. They are two of the greatest
contributors to peace in the world.

Now, the contrast, I think, can be applied
to North Viet-Nam. In North Viet-Nam we
have men who have been in power for over
30 years. They have known almost nothing
but war. They are turning, we hope, toward
peace. We want to help North Viet-Nam turn
toward peace. How is the best way to do it? I
think the lessons we learned after World War
II are the ones that should be applied to North
Viet-Nam. And I feel very strongly that we
want to have a peaceful North Viet-Nam
and we want to have peace in Indochina and
in the rest of the world.

Q. Earlier Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco,
Assistant Secretary for- Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs~\ again advocated open-
ing the Suez Canal as an interim first step
toward a full agreement in the Middle East.
He didn't discuss the impact of the opening
on. the national security of the United States.
I wonder if any consideration has been given
in this proposal toward the demilitarization
of the canal or a restriction on military —
that is, transit of naval vessels. I ask this
question because, as you know, coming from
the Pentagon, there is a feeling there that
the opening of the canal tvould facilitate
Soviet penetration in the Persian Gulf and
the Indian Ocean.

Deputy Secretary Rusk: Yes — of course
one can go through the canal much quicker
than he can go around the cape. But our pri-
mary objective in the Middle East is to in-
sure the peace and to bring about a just
peace. Now, our feeling is that the way to
accomplish this — because the positions there,
as they were in Berlin and as they were be-
fore the President went to China and as they
have been in so many cases, seem to be ir-
reconcilable— the best way to accomplish this
is to take interim steps leading toward a
peace and to get the two parties, or to get
the parties, to talking to each other. The act
of communication leads to better understand-
ing, leads to a modification of objectives, and

gradually might lead to an accommodation.
I do not feel the security picture would be
very much affected whether the Suez Canal
is opened or closed. But I do feel that it is
very, very important to get Egypt and the
Israelis talking to each other, taking interim
steps leading toward peace and toward an
ultimate settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently we sent Ambas-
sador [David K. E.'] Bruce to China, and I
understand the Chinese have sent someone
here. And I am wondering ivhat we can look
forward to in the immediate future as a re-
sult of that exchange, what the immediate
objectives of this are, and maybe the long-
range objectives.

Deputy Secretary Rush: Well, Mr. Bruce
has not yet gone but he is going to go, and
the Chinese have not yet arrived but they
are going to arrive. These will be very broad
based. They are called liaison offices ; they are
not trade offices, they are liaison offices. And
they will have a broad scope of power. They
will not be diplomatic offices in the strict
sense of the term or in the technical sense of
the term. But the range of subjects that will
be covered by these offices will be very, very
broad. I would hope that from this liaison,
from this relationship — and these two offices
will symbolize it — we will go forward toward
normalizing our relations with China more
and more, which will lead not only to more
peaceful relations around the world, but also
will lead to benefits in trade, in cultural ex-
change, in environmental improvements, and
all the things that come from a close inter-
course and cooperation between great powers.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that we
presumably still have a technological edge in
7nissiles. Noiv, I have noticed that certain of
our export policies to the Soviet Union favor
a narrowing at the very least of this techno-
logical edge. We have helped them out in
computers, we have helped them out in pre-
cision ball bearings; in fact, one type of ball
bea)Jng which is used, I understand, exclu-
sively in stable platforms. The plant that
makes them, is now loorking for Russia — this
is up in Vermont. Could you please explain
that policy?

482

Department of State Bulletin

Deputy Secretary Rtish: I have a farm in
Vermont, so I welcome a fellow \'ermonter —
if you are one — although I am not a citizen
of Vermont.

But in any event, COCOM [Coordinating
Committee on Export Controls (Paris)] is
still working. We still work with our allies
to keep stiategic materials from reaching
Russia.

Now, one could say that anything that is
done by way of trade contributes to the mili-
tary strength of the other party, whether it
is food, cement for roads, ball l)earings. all
this sort of thing. But I think our policy
very wisely, both in COCOM and in our own
country, is in essence not to cut off trade with
Russia on anything that they can get else-
where or with regard to things that have no
direct bearing on military strength. Other-
wise we will never develop good trade rela-
tions, which I think is the way to peace.

I have been deeply involved in this per-
sonally, and I do not think that our trade
policies ai'e undercutting our technological
edge in defense.

Finding of Eligibility for Purchases
Under Foreign Military Sales Act

Presidk.ntial Determination 73-10 '

Eligibility for the Pirchase of Defense Articles
Under the Foreign Military Sales Act, as
.Amended

Memorandum for thi" Secretary of .State

The White House,

Washington, January 2, 1973.

In accordance with the recommendations in your

memorandum of December 4, I hereby find pursuant

to Section :!(a)(l) of the ForeigTi Military Sales

.\ct, as amended, that the sale of defense articles

an<l defense services to: FAR EAST: Australia,
Brunei, Burma. Camt)o<lia, Republic of China, Indo-
nesia, Japan. Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New
Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Republic
of Soutli Vietnam; El'ROPE: .Austria, BelRium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia; WESTERN
HEMISPHERE: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela;
AFRICA: Cameroon, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya, Mali,
Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia, Upper
Volta, Republic of Zaire; NEAR EAST AND
SOUTH ASIA: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Greece, In-
dia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Nepal,
Oman, Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka
(Ceylon), Turkey, the United .Arab Emirates, Ye-
men Arab Republic; INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS: NATO and its agencies, the United
Nations and its agencies, and the Organization of
American States, will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace.

In the implementation of Section 9 of Public Law
91-672, as amended, you are authorized on my be-
half to determine whether the proposed transfer of
a defense article by a foreign country or interna-
tional organization to any foreign country or inter-
national organization not included in the foregoing
enumeration will strengthen the security of the
United States and promote world peace.

In order that the Congress may be informed of the
implementation of the Foreign Military .Sales Act,
you are requested on my behalf to report this find-
ing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.

C^hA^^C:/^

' .38 Fed. Reg. 7211.

April 23, 1973

483

The Current Situation in the Middle East

Remarks by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and Soidh Asian Affairs^

As we view the Middle East today, the
plausible argument could be made that the
status quo in the area has improved over
what it has been in the last several years:

— The U.S.-negotiated cease-fire between
Egypt and Israel is already in its 30th month.
As uneasy as it is, nevertheless, it continues
to hold.

— -Second, contrasted with what the situa-
tion was in the crisis period of September
1970, the situation in Jordan is perhaps more
stable today than it has been at any time
since the June war of 1967.

— Third, along the Lebanese-Israeli border
there has been a progressive reduction of
the number of incidents, and our hope would
be that in time this border can truly become
a border of quiet and tranquillity. Even along
the Syrian-Israeli border, where one reads
from time to time about incidents, actions,
counteractions, while we continue to view
these incidents with concei'n, our hope and
expectation is they will not mushroom into
something which is more serious and which
could embrace other elements in a Middle
East imbroglio.

— And above all, I believe the possibility
of confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union over the Middle East
has been sharply reduced. There are two rea-
sons : first, the results of the discussions that
were held with the Soviets at the summit
last May; and second, the reduced Soviet

^ Made before the national foreign policy confer-
ence for editors and broadcasters at the Department
of State on Mar. 29.

484

presence in Egypt brought about by the de-
cision taken by the Egyptian Government
last summer in turn has reduced the likeli-
hood of confrontation in the Middle East be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union.

I mentioned the summit discussions last
May. You will recall that at the end of those
discussions a communique was issued which
reaflirmed that both the United States and
the Soviet Union continue to seek as an ob-
jective a political solution of the Arab-Israeli
dispute based on the November 1967 Security
Council resolution, a resolution that, you will
recall, laid down not a blueprint for a solu-
tion but rather a framework of principles
within which an agreement presumably could
1)6 achieved on the basis of negotiations be-
tween the parties.^ Alongside what appeared
to be an anodyne communique limited largely
to reaffirming the political objective of a
peaceful solution was a declaration of prin-
ciples which was adopted at that summit, the
main principle of which was that both major
powers should try to avoid any confrontation
over such troubled areas as the Middle East."

In practical terms what the communique
meant was this : While there was not a meet-
ing of the minds between ourselves and the
Soviet Union as to what might constitute a
fair settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the
fact of the matter is that both were agreed

- For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Dec.
18, 1967, p. 843.

■' For texts of the Basic Principles of Relations
and of the joint communique issued at Moscow May
29, 1972, see Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 898 and
p. 899.

Department of State Bulletin

1

I that the political objective should continue to
"^ be a resolution of the jirohlem by peaceful
means i-ather than l)y force and with empha-
sis on no confiontation between the major
powers. In effect this meant that both powers
were sayinp that both should do whatever
they could to try to maintain the present
cease-fire that exists in the area while
further efforts are made to try to make some
practical progress toward a solution. 1
believe the major powers were saying in that
conmuini(|ue that whatever the differences
might be regarding the substance of a settle-
ment, both were agreed that the Middle East
should not l)e an area over which there should
be confrontation between us. This reflects a
parallelism of interest between the United
States and the Soviet Union that the present
status quo, as uneasy as it might be, should
not become the focus of future confrontation
between us.

Series of Discussions With Middle East Leaders

Now, I said that you could make a plau-
sible argument that the status quo has been
very considerably improved, and I believe it
has despite the recent tragic occurrences in
the area. However, it would be a mistake to
view the current situation in the Middle East
with a complacent attitude. It is true that the
cease-fii-e is now in its 30th month, but if
we need a cogent reminder of how fragile
is the cease-fire we need only recall the recent
shooting down of a Libyan aircraft and the
recent murders of our diplomats in Khar-
toum. Moreover, from the point of view of
the United States, as long as the "no war,
no peace" situation continues, with all of the
instability, our national interests cannot be
pursued with maximum effectiveness.

The United States, of course, has a special
relationship with Israel. We have consistently
supi)oi'ted the security of the State of Israel.
At the same time we should bear in mind
that the overall interests of the United States
go beyond any one nation in the area. We
have important political, economic, and stra-
tegic interests that broadly encompa.ss the
area. We will continue to support the .security
of the State of Isi-ael. At the same time, we

will continue to do everything feasible to
develo]) and to nurture and to sti-engthen our
relationships with the individual Arab states,
because the present instability in the area
is too risky, too fragile, too dangerous. The
only entirely satisfactory answer is the
eventual achievement of a stable, just, and
durable peace — a peace in which both sides
are committed on the basis of an exchange of
obligations between them and both sides have
adopted a fundamental attitude of coexist-
ence and live-and-let-live.

What are the prospects? We have had an
important series of discussions with various
leaders of the Middle East during the month
of February.

In the first instance King Hussein was
here, and these discussions afforded us an
opportunity for a full exchange of views on
the current situation in the Middle East and
a number of important aspects of our bi-
lateral relationships. I can summarize these
discussions in this way : Jordan made clear to
us that it feels it has adopted and will con-
tinue to adopt a relatively flexible posture
regarding the question of a solution and it
would like to see the United States actively
and constructively involved in helping to
l)ring about a settlement.

Insofar as our discussions with the Egyp-
tians, some of you may know we have had
here in Washington a visit fi-om the National
Security Adviser of the Egyptian Govern-
ment. [Hafez] Ismail. The.se discussions were
useful and i)rovided an excellent opportunity
for an in-depth exchange of views regarding
the situation in the Middle Ea.st and the
possibilities for diplomacy which currently
may exist. It is no secret that the Egyptian
repre.sentative did not come with any new
proposals. President Sadat confirmed this in
his speech just 48 hours ago. But I believe,
as the Egyptian representative him.self indi-
cated publicly, that the discussions did
contribute to a better atmosphere in our rela-
tions. While no new doors were opened as a
result of the.se in-depth di-scussions, I can
report to you that no doors were closed
either and the possibilities of diplomacy in
the future remain open. I would also make

April 23, 1973

485

this same judgment in the aftermath of the
recent visit of the Israeli Prime Minister to
this country just a couple of weeks ago.

Interim Suez Canal Agreement

Now, the impasse we face can be described
very simply. In our judgment, the chasm on
the overall settlement is too broad to bridge
in the foreseeable future. The Egyptian posi-
tion is: not one inch of territory by way of
any concessions. The Israeli position is that
in order for their security concerns to be
met, substantial territorial adjustments are
required. As long as both sides adhere firmly
to these two positions, we frankly do not see
the gap being bridged in the foreseeable
future.

For this reason, we continue to believe that
the approach must be a more modest ap-
proach, that the most feasible approach to
peace continues to be a step-by-step ap-
proach. And for this reason we continue to
feel that, with the doors of diplomacy re-
maining open, perhaps the most practical
approach continues to be that of trying to
achieve a so-called interim Suez Canal agree-
ment. Such an intermediate agreement would
involve the opening of the Suez Canal, an
extended cease-fire, and some Israeli with-
drawal east of the Canal.

With respect to an interim agreement,
Israel has agreed to engage without precon-
ditions in indirect negotiations between
Israel and Egypt under the aegis of the
United States. The Egyptian position is that
before it could agree to engage in such in-
direct negotiations there must be a prior
commitment by Israel to total evacuation
from Egyptian territory. We have over the
past 18 months tried to make clear that we
feel that this kind of a prior commitment is
unattainable.

We do understand and appreciate, how-
ever, the Egyptian view that any interim
Suez Canal agreement should not become an
end in itself. We understand this because an
interim agreement obviously leaves unre-
solved not only a number of important
territorial and security questions on the
Egyi^tian-Israeli aspect of the settlement but

it leaves untouched the multifarious and
intricate and complex questions that relate to
the Jordanian-Israeli aspect of the question.
An interim agreement, for example, does not
touch the fundamental question of the Pales-
tine problem, and we don't believe any
durable peace is achievable unless such a
peace not only meets the legitimate concerns
of both the established Arab and Israeli
states but of the Palestinians as well ; an
interim agreement does not touch the crucial
question of the West Bank ; an interim agree-
ment does not touch the crucial question of
Jerusalem which is so complicated because
there are so many interests involved.

And it is for this reason we feel that any
interim agreement should and must be a
step toward an overall settlement. In other
words, we continue to maintain that the most
practical and feasible approach is the step-
by-step approach involving the modest objec-
tive of the opening of the Canal and some
Israeli withdrawal, and we consider that such
a step in fact would be a significant practical
test of peace on the ground, a practical test
of peace on the ground which would maxi-
mize the opportunities for further subsequent
efforts toward an overall settlement. Our
view that any interim agreement must be
linked to the November 1967 Security Council
resolution has long been the position of the
United States. So it is a very modest ap-
proach we have in mind for the foreseeable
future.

Energy Needs and the Middle East

I will make one other overall observation
because it is a matter that is on so many
people's minds. I said that we have important
and significant overall political, economic,
and strategic interests in this area. And of
course the question of oil inevitably comes
up, and access to oil by the Western world,
including the United States.

At the outset, in terms of the energy situ-
ation in the future. I believe it is important
that we Americans bear in mind a couple of
fundamentals.

First of all, in the long range — and I em-
phasize in the long range — I believe that we

486

Department of State Bulletin

nave the resources in this country on an
all-resource basis to meet our future needs —
and when I say this I mean oil, I mean gas,
I mean fusion. I mean ooal. I mean shale, and
so on. So we have the capacity to develop
whatever we need in the long- range, and it is
important for us to keep this in mind.

Second, it is not in the national interest
I if the United States to be overly reliant on
any one source or any one area for our en-
orgy needs. It is not in our interest on se-
curity grounds; it is not in our interest on
economic grounds, and specifically I have in
mind the question of balance of payments.
Now having said that, obviously we have
some difficult decisions domestically as well
as internationally that face us. and my ex-
pectation is that there will be at an appro-
priate time an overall statement of policy
on this by the President.

But the question that inevitably arises is
this: How does the question of oil get related
to the whole question of the Arab-Israeli dis-
laite? And here I think one can take either
an overly ojitimistic or overly pessimistic
view of the situation. You can dismiss this
aspect out of hand, which I think would be
foolhardy. On the other hand, I think you
can overdraw the possible implications and
distort what I consider to be the reality of
the situation.

I believe there is a mutuality of interests
that has been manifest over the past number
of decades between producers and consumers
of oil. Most of you know that there have
been adjustments occurring in the financial
arrangements between the jiroducer and the
consumer; for example, recently an agree-
ment between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and
the oil companies on the basis of 25 percent
participation, with 51 percent anticipated
perhaps in the eighties sometime. There is
also a new understanding being negotiated
between the Government of Iran and the oil
companies which embraces a so-called sales
contract approach, with the Iranian Govern-
ment doing a good deal more than it has in
the past in the actual production and
management of the oil installations.

I don't sav that the economic relationships.

the financial relationships, are not in flux
and are not apt to change; they have been
changing in the past and are likely to change
in the future, and I think this adju.stment
will go on. But I have .serious doubts that
the mutuality of interests between the pro-
ducer and the consumer will in fact be jeop-
ardized on the basis of whatever differences
there may or may not be over the question
of the Arab-Israeli dispute and particularly
if we in this country face up to the kind of
decisions required to assure that in the long
range we are not overly reliant on any one
area or any one source for our energy needs.

Dr. Franklin Visits South America
as Lincoln Lecturer

The Department of State announced on
April 2 (press release 96) that John Hope
Franklin, distinguished black historian and
educator, was touring several countries in
South America March 26-April 28 as a U.S.
Government Lincoln Lecturer. Dr. Franklin,
chairman of the Department of History at
the University of Chicago, was to speak
before audiences in Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
and Venezuela. (For biographic data, see
press release 96.)

The Lincoln Lectureships were announced
by President Nixon August 1, 1972, in a
letter to Dr. James H. Billington, Chairman
of the Presidentially appointed Board of
Foreign Scholarships.' That date marked the
completion of 25 years of educational
exchange under the Fulbright-Hays Act.

Dr. Franklin is one of four Americans
selected to be Lincoln Lecturers during the
1972-73 academic year. The others are:
Charles H. Townes. Nobel Prize physicist and
professor at the University of California at
Berkeley; John H. Updike, author, Ipswich,
Mass.; and Paul A. Samuelson, Nobel Prize
economist of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.

' For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Sept. 4,
1972, p. 252.

April 23, 1973

487

U.S. Passports Remain Invalid
for Travel to Certain Areas

Following are the texts of three public
notices which were published in the Federal
Register on March 23.

Public Notice 382 >

Travel Into or Through Cuba
Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use
of U.S. passports for travel into or through Cuba
remains restricted. To permit unrestricted travel
would be incompatible with the resolutions adopted
at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American
States, of which the United States is a member. At
this meeting, held in Washington from July 21 to
26, 1964, it was resolved that the governments of
the American States not maintain diplomatic, con-
sular, trade, or shipping relations with Cuba under
its present government. This resolution was reaf-
firmed in the Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs of the OAS held in September 1967,
which adopted resolutions calling upon Member
States to apply strictly the recommendations per-
taining to the movement of funds and arms from
Cuba to other American nations. Among other
things, this policy of isolating Cuba was intended
to minimize the capability of the Castro government
to carry out its openly proclaimed programs of sub-
versive activities in the Hemisphere.

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into
or through Cuba unless specifically validated for such
travel under the authority of the Secretary of State.
This public notice shall expire on June 25, 1973,
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.=
Effective date. This notice becomes effective on
March 23, 1973.

Dated: March 20, 1973.

[seal]

William P. Rogers,

Secretary of State.

recognized by the U.S. as well as by U.N. resolution
as the only lawful government in Korea, the De-
partment of State believes that wholly unrestricted
travel by American citizens to North Korea would
seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or
through North Korea unless specifically validated
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary
of State.

This public notice shall expire on June 25, 1973,
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Effective date. This Notice becomes effective on
March 23, 1973.

Public Notice 383 '

Travel Into or Through North Korea
Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use
of U.S. passports for travel into or through North
Korea remains restricted. In view of the continued
hostility of the North Korean regime toward the
United States, the unsettled situation along the Mil-
itary Demarcation Line, and the special position of
the Government of the Republic of Korea which is

488

Dated: March 20,

[seal]

1973.

William P. Rogers,

Secretary of State.

Public Notice 384^

Travel Into or Through North Viet-Nam

Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports
Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), the
use of U.S. passports for travel into or through
North Vietnam remains restricted. In the aftermath
of the signing on January 27, 1973, of the Agree-
ment on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Vietnam, tensions continue to be high and conditions
unsettled in the Indo-China area. The Peace Agree-
ment envisages that the implementation of the
Agreement will create conditions for establishing a
new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship be-
tween the United States and North Vietnam. How-
ever, the development of such a new relationship is
still in its earliest stages. In these circumstances
the Department of State believes that unrestricted
travel by American citizens to North Vietnam would
seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs.

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into or
through North Vietnam unless specifically validated
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary

of State.

This public notice shall expire on June 25, 1973,
unless extended or sooner revoked by public notice.

Effective date. This Notice becomes effective on
March 23, 1973.

Dated: March 20, 1973.

[seal]

William P. Rogers,

Secretary of State.

' 38 Fed. Reg. 7588.

" A correction was printed in the Federal Register
of Mar. 27 concerning these three notices. The ex-
piration dates, which in each case appear in the
paragraph preceeding the -Effective date" para-
graph have been incorrectly calculated. These dates,
now reading "June 25, 1973," should read "Septem-
ber 25, 1973."

' 38 Fed. Reg. 7589.

Department of State Bulletin

President Nixon Modifies
Oil Import Program

A proclamation-
Modifying Proclamation No. 3279, Relating to
Imports of Petroleum and Petroleum Products

The Chairman of the Oil Policy Committee, in the
exercise of his responsibility to maintain a constant
surveillance of imports of petroleum and its primary
(li-rivatives in respect to the national security, and
after consultation with the Oil Policy Committee,
has informed me that, in his opinion, the following
circumstance indicates a need for further Presiden-
tial action under section 2.S2 of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1862), as amended, namely:

Petitions now pending before the Oil Import Ap-
peals Board for relief in the form of grants of allo-
cations of imports of crude oil, unfinished oils, and
finished products would, if acted upon favorably by
the Board, exceed in the aggregate the limits of the
maximum levels of imports established in section 2
of Proclamation No. ■S279, as amended; and, in order
that the Board shall be in position to consider such
petitions on their merits, the Board should be em-
powered, without regard to such maximum levels, to
modify, on the grounds of exceptional hardship, any
allocation made to any person under regulations
issued pursuant to section 3 of Proclamation No.
3279, as amended; to grant allocations of imports
of crude oil and unfinished oils in special circum-
-'.ances to persons with importing histories who do
not qualify for allocations under such regulations;
and to grant allocations of imports of finished
products on the grounds of exceptional hardship to
persons who do not qualify for allocations under
such regulations.

The Chairman of the Oil Policy Committee, after
the consultation referred to and in the light of the
circumstance mentioned, has recommended that sec-
tion 4 of Proclamation No. 3279, as amended, be
amended as hereinafter provided.

The Chairman has found that the national secu-
rity will not be adversely affected by the Presi-
dential action which he has recommended.

I agree with the findings and recommentlations of
the Chairman and deem it necessary and consistent
with the national security objectives of Proclama-
tion No. 3279, as amended, that section 4 of Proc-
lamation No. 3279, as amended, be amended as
hereinafter provided.

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of
the United States of America, acting under and by
virtue of the authority vested in me by the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States, including sec-
tion 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, do
hereby proclaim that, effective as of this date, para-
graph (b) of section 4 of Proclamation No. 3279,
as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(b) The Appeals Board may be empowered (1)
within the limits of the maximum levels of imports
established in section 2 of this proclamation, to mod-
ify on the grounds of error any allocation made to
any person under such regulations; (2) without re-
gard to the limits of the maximum levels of imports
established in section 2 of this proclamation, (i) to
modify, on the grounds of exceptional hard.ship, any
allocation made to any person under such regula-
tions; (ii) to grant allocations of imports of crude
oil and unfinished oils in special circumstances to
persons with importing histories who do not qualify
for allocations under such regulations; and (iii) to
grant allocations of imports of finished products on
the grounds of exceptional hardship to persons who
do not qualify for allocations under such regula-
tions; and (3) to review the revocation or suspen-
sion of any allocation or license. The Secretary may
provide that the Board may take such action on
petitions as it deems appropriate and that the de-
cisions by the Appeals Board shall be final."

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this twenty-third day of March, in the year of
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the
Independence of the United States of .America the
one hundred ninety-seventh.

' No. 4202; 38 Fed. Reg. 7977.

April 23, 1973

489

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council Resolution
on Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations

The United Nations Security Council met
at Panama March 15-21. FoUorving are
statements made in the Council on March
20 and 21 by U.S. Representative John Scali,
together with the text of a draft resolution
ivhich ivas vetoed by the United States on
March 21.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 20

USUN press release 21 dated March 21

I join previous speakers to express my
gratitude to the President, the Government,
and the people of Panama for the admirable
organization of this meeting by the Pana-
manian Government and for the welcome
and hospitality that we have received here.
It is indeed an exhilarating experience to
see the determination, dedication, and devo-
tion of the Panamanian people which is
evident in the bustling economic activity,
reflected most visibly in the pace of con-
struction we see around us.

"Consideration of measures for the main-
tenance and strengthening of international
peace and security in Latin America in
conformity with the provisions and princi-
ples of the Charter" — that is the agenda
item. For more than a century, the nations
of Latin America have demonstrated an
enviable and unparalleled record in achiev-
ing and maintaining international peace and
security on this continent. They not only
have avoided major international conflicts
within the hemisphere but have also created
a viable framework for the peaceful resolu-
tion of their diff"erences. Latin American
statesmen have eloquently set forth princi-

ples of international consultation and con-
ciliation springing from the idea and view
that international conflict in this area can
and must be resolved peacefully. Many of
these principles have found their way into
the United Nations Charter and into the
practice of the United Nations.

We note with particular pleasure the
active role played by the people and leaders
of our host country, Panama, who have
been in the forefront of the development of
the inter-American system since the found-
ing of their country. In fact, the first seeds
of pan-Americanism were planted here by
Simon Bolivar, at the Panama Congress
of 1826.

Mr. President, the United States sets
great store by its close and fruitful associa-
tion with the countries of Latin America.
We fully share their deep and genuine con-
cern for the continuation of peace, pros-
perity, political stability, and economic and
.social development in this hemisphere.

The countries of this region were among
the original supporters of the United Na-
tions and have remained among the most
faithful and dedicated of its members. All
of us recognize their role in the United
Nations and their contributions to interna-
tional peace and security. Many Latin Amer-
ican countries have participated directly in
U.N. peacekeeping operations, operations
which go to the heart of this organization's
purposes. All have contributed in many
ways to the resolution of disputes among
nations and of the problems confronting
the world. We are all aware of the high
competence of Latin American jurists in
the field of international law and the un-

490

Department of State Bulletin

wavering support in this hemisphere for
the sanctity of solemn treaty obligations
even as the search for constructive change
continues.

It is in fact the absence of truly threaten-
ing international issues within the Latin
American area which led my government
to question the necessity of our meeting
away from U.N. Headquarters at this time.
Our delegation expressed the views of the
United States very clearly. Meetings of the
Security Council, whether at Headquarters
or away, should be based on its primary
charter responsibility to maintain inter-
national peace and security.

While the Charter of the United Nations
confers this responsibility on the Secu-
rity Council, it also provides — indeed, in
article 33, it specifically enumerates — many
ways to resolve international issues before
such matters are brought directly before
the Council. A look at the efforts now
underway with regard to nearly all the
major pi-oblem areas of the Avorld under-
scores this wide variety of channels, both
inside and outside the United Nations,
which can be used to achieve the charter
goal of practicing tolerance and living
together in peace with one another as good
neighbors :

— The United States and the Soviet Union
have undertaken with each other to do their
utmost to avoid military confrontation and
to respect the -sovereign equality of all
countries.

— The United States and the People's
Republic of China have undertaken to
broaden the understanding between their
peoples, and this process has taken new
strides in recent weeks.

— The United States, together with other
parties to the Viet-Nam conflict, has arrived
at a cease-fire agreement for Viet-Nam,
and other interested nations have pledged
in Paris their full support and cooperation
in strengthening peace in Indochina.

— In Europe, the United States is partici-
pating in preliminary discu.ssions in Helsinki
and Vienna aimed at specific and practical
imi)rovements in East-West relations.

These have all been due in large measure
to the wise and imaginative leadership of
our President, Richard Nixon, as he pur-
sues his great goal of a generation of peace
for all mankind.

Because of his diplomatic initiatives, his
courage to try new approaches, the world
is on the threshold of cooperation and
friendship among nations undreamed of just
a few years ago.

The Unique Infer-American Community

In looking back at what has been achieved,
and forward to what remains to be done,
one is struck by the vai'iety of means, the
wealth of institutions, and the host of rela-
tionships which can be turned to positive
effect.

In this hemisphere our peoples over a
period of 50 years have establi.shed relation-
ships that, in our view, make us a unique
community. There are of course a number
of bilateral questions in this hemisphere
that remain unresolved — many have been
mentioned at this table — but progress is
being made in many of these through patient
negotiations. For instance, the United States
and Panama have been seeking — through
negotiation — a new status for the Panama
Canal which would bring it into harmony
with contemporary political realities.

With respect to multilateral relationships
in this hemisphere, the regional institutions
and ai'rangements we have developed and
the broad and deep contacts joining our
governments and our citizens have grown
into what is now known as the inter-
American system. That system is character-
ized not only by formal institutions but also
by a .sen.se of solidarity and a community
of common interests and objectives on which
we seek to build a lasting foundation for
truly effective inter-American cooperation.
We have a common faith in the benefits of
freedom, the importance of the individual,
the power of reason, and the rule of law.
The conclusion that the inter-American
.system is indeed a foundation of some
permanence is supported by the significant

April 23, 1973

491

intellectual, economic, security, and political
ties which further draw us together.

A system that is both progressive and
evolving, and is notable for its continuing
usefulness to its membership, is a system
which is also able to accommodate diversities.
The most obvious of these are the different
cultural backgrounds, economic conditions,
and political institutions which remind us
that we are individual nations as well as
members of a hemisphere community.

The Organization of American States is
the keystone of the inter-American system.
The OAS exists as a regional organization
within the meaning of chapter VIII of the
United Nations Charter. It is also the oldest
international organization of its kind in the
world, dating from 1890. It has grown from
an institution concerned primarily with com-
mercial affairs into an organization devoted
to the peace and security of the hemisphere.
It is also deeply involved in the region's
economic and .social development, educa-
tional, scientific, and cultural cooperation,
human rights, juridical affairs, and tech-
nical assistance and training, to mention
but a few. As it has grown, it has increased
its capacity to achieve its essential purposes ;
these are to strengthen the peace and secu-
rity of the continent, to prevent possible
causes of difficulty, and to insure the peace-
ful settlement of disputes. It also provides
for common action on the part of the member
states in the event of aggression. It assists
in the search for solutions to political, jurid-
ical, and economic problems when they
arise among the members, and in the area
of development it is concerned with the
promotion of cooperative social and economic
action.

The United States has also warmly sup-
ported the many activities of the United
Nations in the area of economic and social
development in Latin America. However,
for most of the 1960's, the U.S. Government
was the major external contributor of assist-
ance to Latin America in seeking its eco-
nomic and social development. As we agreed
to do at Punta del Este in 1961, the United
States provided over $10 billion for the

development of the American republics dur-
ing the period 1961-72. We kept our prom-
ised word.

In the past few years, the countries of
Latin America have increased their reliance
upon the major multilateral lending institu-
tions for the bulk of their official external
capital assistance. In recognition of this situ-
ation, the United States has channeled an
increasing proportion of its loan funds to
Latin America through multilateral institu-
tions, particularly the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank. In December of last year, for
example, the United States formally signed
the i-eplenishment agreement under which
it agreed to provide $1 billion to the
Fund for Special Operations of the Bank.
The total flow of U.S. funds through all
channels, bilateral and multilateral, has
never been higher.

As a result, the total assistance received
by Latin America from all sources is going
up steadily. The United States has given
special and increasing attention to the eco-
nomic and social concerns of the hemisphere.
Total lending commitments by AID, the
Inter-American Development Bank, and the
World Bank to Latin America in 1972 more
than doubled those of 1964.

The United States has had a long and
cordial relationship with the independent
nations of this hemisphere. Recognizing the
principle of sovereign equality and respect
for the right of states to pursue their own
development, the United States is building
a constantly evolving relationship with Latin
America, a relationship which we trust will
become even more cordial and mutually
beneficial.

Issues Before Other U.N. Bodies

Mr. President, I would like to reflect
briefly regarding the U.S. position on some
other i.ssues which have been raised in
statements before the Council.

The United States has always been, and
continues to be, a strong advocate of the
Latin American nuclear-free zone. We signed
Protocol II of the Treatv for the Prohibition

492

Department of State Bulletin

of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco) on April 1, 1968. The
protocol went into effect for the United
States on May 12, 1971. By these actions,
the United States pledged itself to respect
the denuclearized status of Latin America,
not to contribute to any violation of the
treaty, and not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against any of the con-
tracting parties.

The question of permanent sovereignty
over natural resources is currently an active
item in the U.N., specifically in the ECOSOC
[Economic and Social Council] Committee
on Natural Resources and the Seabed Com-
mittee. We do not question the principle of
"pei'manent sovereignty." However, at the
same time we wish to point out that we do
not believe that complex issue is properly
before this Council. In accepting the prin-
ciple of permanent sovereignty we strongly
reaffirm our support for the principles of
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1803,
including, inter alia, the observance in good
' faith of foreign investment agreements, the
payment of appropriate compensation for
nationalized property as required by inter-
national law, and the recognition of arbi-
tration or international adjudication.

Similarly, we believe that the question
of multinational corporations, which has
been raised in different contexts, should not
be brought before this Council. It is pres-
ently under discussion in several other more
appropriate U.N. bodies. A group of eminent
individuals, appointed by the Secretary
Cenerai under ECOSOC Resolution 1721 of
July 28, 1972, is studying the impact of
multinational corporations. UNCTAD
[United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development] is doing a study of the re-
strictive business practices of multinational
corporations. Finally, ILO [International
Labor Organization] is looking into the re-
lationships of activities of such corporations
to social policy. We fail to see what the
Security Council can effectively accomplish
in this particular field.

We happen to share the judgment of the
ECOSOC resolution that these corporations

"are frequently effective agents for the
transfer of technology as well as capital to
developing countries." No country has to
welcome or even accept foreign investment.
And if it does so, it of cour.se may establish
its own rules. However, it also has the obli-
gation, in that case, to abide by those rules,
to compensate the investor for retroactive
changes in the rules, or in the case of ex-
propriation or nationalization of private
property, to make adequate provision for
just compensation as required by inter-
national law.

Negotiation of New Panama Canal Treaty

And now I come to discuss U.S. relations
with Panama. Our close and mutually bene-
ficial friendship has a long history, charac-
terized, to be sure, by occasional differences
and friction. But the bonds linking our two
peoples continue strong and vibrant.

We rejoice in the progress achieved by
Panama; it has been striking. Over the past
four years the economy has been growing at
a rate of 7-8 percent, one of the highest
rates of growth in the world.

Outside help has contributed to this rate
of growth, but there has also been a high
level of labor and investment by the dedi-
cated Panamanian people. My country is
happy that it was able in 1972 to disburse
in various ways approximately $227 million,
with direct effect, and stimulate the Pana-
manian economy. In fact, our loans and
grants to Panama represent the highest
per capita level of U.S. assistance anywhere
in the world, in part because of our friend-
ship but mostly because Panama has demon-
strated a high capacity to program and
utilize financial assistance effectively.

We believe that all mankind has been
well .served by the Panama Canal since its
completion nearly 60 years ago. During
those years it has never been closed, and it
has been transited by an ever-increasing
number of ships carrying cargo to and from
all parts of the world.

Although the 1903 treaty still governs the
basic relationship between the United States
and Panama concerning the canal, that re-

April 23, 1973

493

lationship was significantly revised, as well
as reaffirmed, in the treaties of 1936 and
1955. On both occasions the United States
relinquished important rights and provided
important new benefits for Panama.

In 1964, recognizing that a comprehensive
modernization of our relationship should be
undertaken, the United States began nego-
tiations with Panama with three essential
objectives in view, which remain valid today:

1. The canal should be available to the
world's commercial vessels on an equal ba-
sis at reasonable cost.

2. So that the canal should serve world
commerce efficiently, the United States
should have the right to provide additional
canal capacity.

3. The canal should continue to be oper-
ated and defended by the United States for
an extended Init specified period of time.

It was recognized then, as it is today,
that these objectives would require the con-
clusion of a new treaty or treaties to replace
the 1903 treaty and its amendments. By 1967
three draft treaties had been negotiated and
agreed to by the two negotiating teams. At
that time the Panamanian Government did
not move to ratify the treaties, but in Octo-
ber of 1970 requested the United States to
renew negotiations. The United States agreed
to do so, and negotiations were in fact re-
newed in June 1971, when the Panamanian
negotiating team arrived in Washington.

During the intensive negotiations which
followed, the United States has fully recog-
nized that the relationship originally defined
in the 1903 treaty needs to be brought into
line with the realities of the world today
as well as with the mutual interests of both
countries.

The United States is ready to conclude
a new treaty promptly. At the same time,
we believe it necessary that the United
States continue to be responsible for the
operation and defense of the canal for an
additional specified period of time, the length
of which is one of many issues to be nego-
tiated.

As a result of the persistent efforts made
by both sides, significant progress has been
made in the treaty talks toward reaching
mutual understanding on major principles.

Mr. President, I would like to make clear
that the United States, no less than others
who have spoken at this table, supports
Panama's just aspirations. The U.S. nego-
tiators, cognizant of those aspirations, have
already recognized that:

1. The 1903 canal treaty should be re-
placed by a new modern treaty.

2. Any new canal treaty should be of
fixed duration, rejecting the concept of per-
petuity.

3. Panama should have returned to it a
substantial territory now part of the Canal
Zone, with arrangement for use of other
areas. Those other areas would be the mini-
mum required for U.S. operations and de-
fense of the canal and would be integrated
into the legal, economic, social, and cultural
life of Panama on a timetable to be agreed
upon.

4. Panama should exercise its jurisdiction
in the canal area pursuant to a mutually
agreed timetable.

5. Panama should receive substantially
increased annual payments for the use of its
tei'ritory relating to the canal.

Accordingly, those who attack the 1903
Treaty are attacking a phantom foe, a non-
existent enemy. The 1903 treaty has already
been revised significantly to Panama's ad-
vantage. We were on the verge of changing
it a third time in 1967, and we are ready to
change it again — to write a new treaty —
when negotiations continue in the spirit of
friendship and cooperation that should be the
hallmark of Panama-U.S. relations.

We recognize that much remains to be
settled ; yet we believe the above points
represent a substantial foundation of im-
portant principles and are confident that
with continued good will by reasonable men
on both sides, and some patience, a mutually
.satisfactory treaty can result.

Mr. President, in reviewing the relation-

494

Department of State Bulletin

r

ships among the 532 million active and
dynamic people residing in this hemisphere,
it would be inconect to leave the impression
there are no jiroblems or no issues needing
attention. Obviously there are, as there are
anywhere. But we know that both the good
will and the diplomatic machinery already
exist within the area to resolve these prob-
lems.

The question then arises as to what con-
tribution the Council can make at this
meeting and what the Council will carry back
to United Nations Headquarters as a result
of its meeting in Latin America.

For Latin American issues, as for issues
in other parts of the world, the members
of the Council must look to what this body
can actually accomplish, the consistency of
their proposed actions with the provisions
of the charter, and their impact on the
chances of resolving existing differences.

For the Council to take a partisan stand
or reflect only a parochial viewpoint would
risk undermining the pi-ocesses of bilateral
and regional diplomacy which have served
this hemisphere so well.

For the Council to pronounce itself on a
wider range of issues not directly concerned
with the maintenance of international peace
and security risks diluting the results al-
ready achieved in other United Nations
organs and would make many question the
seriousness of the Council's purpose in hold-
ing its meeting here.

We have been engaged in discussion since
March 15, Mr. President, and much of what
has been said is valuable, constructive, and
informative. That in itself is a positive ele-
ment. But this series of meetings can be
productive, Mr. President, in other ways.
Tomorrow evening we should be able to
adjourn to return to New York and say that
our de]il)erati<)ns have contributed renewed
vigor to the effective, realistic, and har-
monious search for the realization of the
objectives of the United Nations, not only
in Latin America but everywhere. If we
{ can do that, Mr. President, then these meet-
ings will have been a success.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 21

USUN press release 26 tinted Mnroh Tl

Despite the fact that the Representative
of Panama has expressed himself numerous
times before this Council over the past week
on the Panama Canal, he chose to deliver
another litany this afternoon on the Pana-
manian version of history and the actual
situation today. I have no intention of
subjecting the distinguished members of this
Council to a statement of similar length.

However, he continues to stress the con-
vention of 1903. In fact we have heard a
great deal in recent days of how the
Isthmian Canal Convention was imposed on
the people of Panama. Let us put the facts
of the situation in the Security Council rec-
ord. After the convention of 1903 was signed,
it was sent to Panama for ratification. After
ratification by the Panamanian Government,
the treaty was sent a'ound the country for
consideration by the various elected munici-
pal councils. The ratification of the treaty
with the United States was overwhelmingly
approved by these elected councils, with
unanimous expressions of approval of the
treaty. So much for the imposition of a
treaty.

Now, in 70 years' time the views of the
Government and people of Panama have
changed with respect to the arrangements
of 1903. That is not surprising. The views
of the Government and people of the United
States of America have also changed with
respect to the treaty of 1903. That is what
our two governments are negotiating about —
to work out new an-angements to meet the
just aspirations of Panama and the legit-
imate interests of the United States.

I believe, Mr. President, it is useful to
clarify for the record this historical aspect
of our relationship.

We regiet having had to cast a negative
vote on this resolution, because there is so
much in it with which we could agree. But
our negative vote should have come as no
surprise to our host, the Republic of Pana-

April 23, 1973

495

ma, in view of the repeated exchanges of
views that we have had about this meeting
and about how it might end— and I am
referring not only to discussions during
this Security Council meeting but also to
those that took place even before the Repub-
lic of Panama had pressed its campaign to
have this meeting take place on its territory.
In those discussions the United States
made clear its serious concern that a meeting
designed to put pressure on one party to an
on-going bilateral negotiation could make
those negotiations more difficult and impair
the utility of this major organ of the United
Nations. Up to the moment of our departure
for Panama, we continued to receive assur-
ances that everything would be done to
maintain an atmosphere of moderation and
restraint. I regret to say that while this
proved true of the situation outside this
chamber— and for this I wish to express
our appreciation to our host — it has not
been true of some of the statements made
here.

Members of this Council should know that
my delegation has made strenuous and re-
peated efforts in friendly conversations with
our Panamanian hosts to arrive at a mu-
tually acceptable form for a resolution
but this very sincere effort has been re-
jected. I wish the members of the Council
to know, however, that we were and are
prepared to acknowledge the just aspira-
tions of the Republic of Panama, for we do
recognize those aspirations, along with the
interests of the United States.

I have said that we regret having had to
cast a negative vote on the Panamanian
resolution because there is so much in it with
which we could agree. As I have made clear,
we agree with the Republic of Panama on
the need to replace the 1903 convention by
a totally new instrument reflecting a new
spirit, we agree that such a new instrument
should not run in perpetuity but should have
a fixed term, and we agree on the progressive
integration into the legal, economic, social,
and cultural life of Panama of even those
areas used for the operation and defense
of the canal.

Why, then, when there is so much in it
with vvhich we agree, did we not vote in
favor of the resolution or, as we were urged,
at least abstain? Essentially, for two reasons.
First and foremost, as I have repeatedly
pointed out both in public and in private,
it is because all these matters are in process
of bilateral negotiations. We do not consider
it helpful or appropriate for the Security
Council to adopt a resolution dealing with
matters of substance in a continuing nego-
tiation—and I may note that the Foreign
Minister of Panama has himself spoken of the
negotiations as continuing and not as having
been broken off. Indeed, as many members
know, we have only recently made certain
new approaches to the Government of Pan-
ama. We believe it would be a disservice
to the negotiations and an improper use of
the Security Council if bilateral negotiations
were subjected to this kind of outside pres-
sure.

I am not, of course, suggesting here that
those who cast affirmative votes on the
resolution intended to exert any improper
influence, but this is how the resolution
would have been perceived in many quarters.
The Panamanian resolution, in our view,
is unbalanced and incomplete and is there-
fore subject to serious misinterpretation.
Further, the resolution is cast in the form
of sweeping generalities, when we know
that the real difficulties lie in the application
of these generalities. Although it is true
that the United States and Panama have
reached common understanding over a num-
ber of important general principles, differen-
ces over some principles and many matters
of detail remain. Finally, the present reso-
lution addresses the points of interest to
Panama but ignores those legitimate inter-
ests important to the United States.

The Panama Canal is not a work of na-
ture or — as some have tried to put it —
a natural resource. The canal is a very
complex enterprise, and the working-out
of a new regime for it cannot be accom-
plished by the wave of a hand or the quick
stroke of a pen. It requires thoughtful and
meticulous negotiation to achieve a fair
reconciliation of interests. We have been and

496

Department of State Bulletin

are prepared for such a negotiation. But
the resolution that was just voted upon over-
sinipiifies the issue to the point where it
could have rendered a disservice.

This brinjrs me back to what I said at
the beginning of my intervention. It has
been clear from the first mention of the idea
that holding a Security Council meeting
here to focus on this problem could compli-
cate the process of negotiation. The United
States is disappointed that others failed
to appreciate this risk when lending their
support to this meeting. Surely it should
have been made obvious that the new treaty
which we sincerely wish to negotiate with
Panama must be acceptable to our Congress
and people, as well as the Government and
people of Panama.

Finally. I would respectfully suggest that

we all assess with great care the nature and

lUitcome of this meeting so as to avoid any

lepetition of a course of action that could

lirove damaging to the role and reputation

I if the Security Council. It would be most

unfortunate if the Security Council were

( to be transformed into a small replica of

I the General Assembly, thereby impairing its

V capacity to deal effectively with specific

i.-'sues aff"ecting peace and security.

The U.S. delegation will not be leaving
Panama in a spirit of rancor, far from it.
Our friendship for Panama, for the people
of Panama and of Latin America in general,
is too deep for that. We continue to be willing
to adjust any differences peacefully and in
a spirit of give-and-take. We are, specifically,
prepared to continue the negotiations and
to carry them forward with good will and
seriousness at whatever time the Govern-
ment of Panama chooses. We believe that
both Panama and the United States are
destined by geography and common ideals
to cooperate for their mutual advantage
and to protect the interests of world com-
merce ti'ansiting the canal. That will con-
tinue to be the policy of the United States,
and I am confident that in the end we shall
reach an accord which both governments
can firmly support and which will .strengthen
the close bonds of friendship between our
peoples.

TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION '

The Security Council,

Having considered the question of the Panama
Canal under the item entitled "Consideration of
measures for the maintenance and strengthening
of international peace and security in Latin Amer-
ica in conformity with the provisions and
principles of the Charter",

Recalling that it is a purpose of the United
Nations to bring about, in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace,

Beariyig in mind that the Republic of Panama
is sovereign over its territoi-y and that the free
and fruitful exercise of sovereignty by peoples and
nations over their natural resources should be
fostered through mutual respect among States,
based on their sovereign equality [General As-
sembly resolutions 1514 (XV), 1803 (XVII) and
3016 (XXVII)],

Having heard the statements made before it by
the representatives of the members of the Council
by Latin American Ministers for Foreign Affairs
and by representatives of other States and organi-
zations specially invited,

1. Takes note that the Governments of the Re-
public of Panama and the United States of Amer-
ica in the Joint Declaration signed before the
Council of the Organization of American States,
acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, on
3 April 1964, agreed to reach a just and fair
agreement, with a view to the prompt elimination
of the causes of conflict between them;

2. Takes note also of the willingness shown by
the Governments of the United States of America
and the Republic of Panama to establish in a
formal instrument agreements on the abrogation of
the 1903 convention on the Isthmian Canal and
its amendments and to conclude a new, just and
fair treaty concerning the present Panama Canal
which would fulfil Panama's legitimate aspirations
and guarantee full respect for Panama's effective
sovereignty over all of its territory;

3. Urges the Governments of the United States
of America and the Republic of Panama to con-
tinue negotiations in a high spirit of friendship,
mutual respect and co-operation and to conclude
without delay a new treaty aimed at the prompt
elimination of the causes of conflict between them;

4. Decides to keep the question under considera-
tion.

'U.N. doc. S/10931/Rev.l; the draft resolution
was not adopted owing to the negative vote of a
permanent member of the Council, the vote being
13 in favor, 1 again.st (U.S.), with 1 abstention
(U.K.).

April 23, 1973

497

THE CONGRESS

President Nixon Proposes Plan for Reorganization
of Federal Drug Law Enforcement Activities

Message From President Nixon to the Congress''

To the Congress of the United States:

Drug abuse is one of the most vicious and
corrosive forces attacking the foundations of
American society today. It is a major cause
of crime and a merciless destroyer of human
lives. We must fight it with all of the re-
sources at our command.

This Administration has declared all-out,
global war on the drug menace. As I reported
to the Congress earlier this month in my
State of the Union message, there is evidence
of significant progress on a number of fronts
in that war.=

Both the rate of new addiction to heroin
and the number of narcotic-related deaths
showed an encouraging downturn last year.
More drug addicts and abusers are in treat-
ment and rehabilitation programs than ever
before.

Progress in pinching off the supply of il-
licit drugs was evident in last year's stepped-
up volume of drug seizures worldwide —
which more than doubled in 1972 over the
1971 level.

Arrests of trafl^ckers have risen by more
than one-third since 1971. Prompt Congres-
sional action on my proposal for mandatory
minimum sentences for pushers of hard
drugs will help ensure that convictions stem-
ming from such arrests lead to actual im-
prisonment of the guilty.

Notwithstanding these gains, much more

must be done. The resilience of the interna-
tional drug trade remains grimly impres-
sive— current estimates suggest that we still
intercept only a small fraction of all the
heroin and cocaine entering this country. Lo-
cal police still find that more than one of
every three suspects arrested for street
crimes is a narcotic abuser or addict. And
the total number of Americans addicted to
narcotics, suffering terribly themselves and
inflicting their suffering on countless others,
still stands in the hundreds of thousands.

A Unified Command for Drug Enforcement

Seeking ways to intensify our counterof-
fensive against this menace, I am asking the
Congress today to join with this Administra-
tion in strengthening and streamlining the
Federal drug law enforcement effort.

Funding for this effort has increased sev-
enfold during the past five years, from $36
million in fiscal year 1969 to $257 million in
fiscal year 1974 — more money is not the
most pressing enforcement need at present.
Nor is there a primary need for more man-
power working on the problem, over 2100
new agents having already been added to the
Federal drug enforcement agencies under

' Transmitted on Mar. 28 (Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 2) ; also
printed as H. Doc. 93-69, 93d Cong., 1st sess.

■ For the sixth in a series of messages from
President Nixon to the Congress on the state of
the Union, concerning law enforcement and drug
abuse prevention transmitted on Mar. 14, see Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar.
19, p. 259.

498

Department of State Bulletin

this Administration, an increase of more
tlian 250 percent over the 1969 level.

The enforcement work could benefit sig-
nificantly, however, from consolidation of
nur anti-drug forces under a single unified
rommand. Right now the Federal Govern-
ment is fighting the war on drug abuse under
a distinct handicap, for its efforts are those
'if a loosely confederated alliance facing a
losourceful. elusive, worldwide enemy. Ad-
miral Mahan, the master naval strategist, de-
scribed this handicap precisely when he
wrote that "Granting the same aggregate of
force, it is never as great in two hands as in
line, because it is not perfectly concentrated."

More specifically, the drug law enforce-
ment activities of the United States now are
nut merely in two hands but in half a dozen.
Within the Department of Justice, with no
iverall direction below the level of the Attor-
ney General, these fragmented forces include
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, the Oflice for Drug Abuse Law En-
forcement, the Oflice of National Narcotics
Intelligence, and certain activities of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration. The
Treasury Department is also heavily engaged
in enforcement work through the Bureau of
Customs.

This aggregation of Federal activities has
gi-own up rapidly over the past few years in
response to the urgent need for stronger
anti-drug measures. It has enabled us to
make a very encouraging beginning in the
accelerated drug enforcement drive of this
Administration.

But it al.so has serious operational and or-
ganizational shortcomings. Certainly the

Id-blooded underworld networks that fun-
nel narcotics from suppliers all over the
world into the veins of American drug vic-
tims are no respecters of the bureaucratic
dividing lines that now complicate our anti-
drug efforts. On the contrary, these modern-
day slave traders can derive only advantage
from the limitations of the existing organi-
zational patchwork. Experience has now-
given us a good basis for correcting those
limitations, and it is time to do so.

I therefore propose creation of a single,

comprehensive Federal agency within the
Department of Justice to lead the war
against illicit drug traffic.

Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973,'' which
I am transmitting to the Congress with this
message, would establish such an agency, to
be called the Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion. It would be headed by an Administrator
reporting directly to the Attorney General.

The Drug Enforcement Administration
would carry out the following anti-drug func-
tions, and would absorb the associated man-
power and budgets:

— All functions of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs (which would be abol-
ished as a separate entity by the reorganiza-
tion plan) ;

— Those functions of the Bureau of
Customs pertaining to drug investigations
and intelligence (to be transferred from the
Treasury Department to the Attorney Gen-
eral by the reorganization plan) ;

— All functions of the Office for Drug
Abuse Law Enforcement ; and

— All functions of the Office of National
Narcotics Intelligence.

Merger of the latter two organizations into
the new agency would be effected by an exec-
utive order dissolving them and transferring
their functions, to take effect upon approval
of Reorganization Plan No. 2 by the Con-
gress. Drug law enforcement research cur-
rently funded by the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration and other agen-
cies would also be transferred to the new
agency by executive action.

The major responsibilities of the Drug
Enforcement Administration would thus
include:

— development of overall Federal drug
law enforcement strategy, programs, plan-
ning, and evaluation;

— full investigation and prepai'ation for
prosecution of suspects for violations under
all Federal drug trafficking laws ;

— full investigation and preparation for

"Not printed here; for text, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 2,
p. 309.

April 23, 1973

499

prosecution of suspects connected with illicit
drugs seized at U.S. ports-of -entry and inter-
national borders ;

—conduct of all relations with drug law
enforcement officials of foreign governments,
under the policy guidance of the Cabinet
Committee on International Narcotics
Control ;

—full coordination and cooperation with
State and local law enforcement officials on
joint drug enforcement efforts; and

—regulation of the legal manufacture of
drugs and other controlled substances under
Federal regulations.

The Attorney General, working closely
with the Administrator of this new agency,
would have authority to make needed pro-
gram adjustments. He would take steps
within the Department of Justice to ensure
that high priority emphasis is placed on the
prosecution and sentencing of drug traffick-
ers following their apprehension by the
enforcement organization. He would also
have the authority and responsibility for
securing the fullest possible cooperation—
particularly with respect to collection of
drug intelligence— from all Federal depart-
ments and agencies which can contribute to
the anti-drug work, including the Internal
Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.

My proposals would make possible a more
effective anti-drug role for the FBI, espe-
cially in dealing with the relationship
between drug trafficking and organized
crime. I intend to see that the resources of
the FBI are fully committed to assist in
supporting the new Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration.

The consolidation effected under Reorga-
nization Plan No. 2 would reinforce the
basic law enforcement and criminal justice
mission of the Department of Justice. With
worldwide drug law enforcement responsi-
bilities no longer divided among several
organizations in two different Cabinet de-
partments, more complete and cumulative
drug law enforcement intelligence could be
compiled. Patterns of international and
domestic illicit drug production, distribution

and sale could be more directly compared and
interpreted. Case-by-case drug law enforce-
ment activities could be more comprehen-
sively linked, cross-referenced, and coordi-
nated into a single, organic enforcement
operation. In short, drug law enforcement
officers would be able to spend more time
going after the traffickers and less time
coordinating with one another.

Such progress could be especially helpful
on the international front. Narcotics control
action plans, developed under the leadership
of the Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control, are now being carried
out by U.S. officials in cooperation with host
governments in 59 countries around the
world. This wide-ranging effort to cut off
drug supplies before they ever reach U.S.
borders or streets is just now beginning to
bear fruit. We can enhance its effectiveness,
with little disruption of ongoing enforcement
activities, by merging both the highly effec-
tive narcotics force of overseas Customs
agents and the rapidly developing inter-
national activities of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs into the Drug En-
forcement Administration. The new agency
would work closely with the Cabinet Com-
mittee under the active leadership of the
U.S. Ambassador in each country where
anti-drug programs are underway.

Two years ago, when I established the
Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Pre-
vention within the Executive Office of the
President, we gained an organization with
the necessary resources, breadth, and leader-
ship capacity to begin dealing decisively
with the "demand" side of the drug abuse
problem— treatment and rehabilitation for
those who have been drug victims, and pre-
ventive programs for potential drug abusers.
This year, by permitting my reorganization
proposals to take effect, the Congress can
help provide a similar capability on the
"supply" side. The proposed Drug Enforce-
ment Administration, working as a team
with the Special Action Office, would arm
Americans with a potent one-two punch to
help us fight back against the deadly menace
of drug abuse. I ask full Congressional co-
operation in its establishment.

500

Department of State Bulletin

Improving Port-of-Enfry Inspections

No heroin or cocaine is produced within
the United States; domestic availability of
these substances results solely from their
illegal importation. The careful and complete
inspection of all persons and goods coming
into the United States is therefore an inte-
gral part of effective Federal drug law en-
forcement.

At the present time, however, Federal
responsibility for conducting port-of-entry
inspections is awkwardly divided among sev-
eral Cabinet departments. The principal
agencies involved are the Treasury Depart-
ment's Bureau of Customs, which inspects
goods, and the Justice Department's Immi-
gration and Naturalization Sei-vice, which
insi^ects persons and their papers. The two
utilize separate inspection procedures, hold
differing views of inspection priorities, and
employ dissimilar personnel management
practices.

To reduce the possibility that illicit drugs
will escape detection at ports-of-entry be-
cause of divided responsibility, and to
enhance the effectiveness of the Drug En-
forcement Administration, the reorganiza-
tion plan which I am proposing today would
transfer to the Secretary of the Treasuiy
all functions currently vested in Justice
Department officials to inspect persons, or
the documents of persons.

When the plan takes effect, it is my inten-
tion to direct the Secretary of the Treasury
to use the resources so transferred — includ-
ing some 1,000 employees of the Immigration
and Naturalization Service — to augment the
staff and budget of the Bureau of Customs.
The Bureau's primary re.sponsibilities would
then include:

— inspection of all persons and goods
entering the United States;

— valuation of goods being imported, and
assessment of appropriate tariff duties;

— interception of contraband being smug-
gled into the United States ;

— enforcement of U.S. laws governing
the international movement of goods, ex-
cept the investigation of contraband drugs
and narcotics ; and

— turning over the investigation responsi-
i)ility for all drug law enforcement cases to
the Department of Justice.

The reorganization would thus group most
port-of-enti-y inspection functions in a single
Cabinet department. It would reduce the
need for much day-to-day inter-departmental
coordination, allow more efficient staffing
at some field locations, and remove the basis
for damaging inter-agency rivalries. It would
also give the Secretai-y of the Treasury the
authority and flexibility to meet changing
requirements in inspecting the international
flow of people and goods. An important by-
product of the change would be more con-
venient service for travellers entering and
leaving the country.

For these reasons, I am convinced that
inspection activities at U.S. ports-of-entry
can more effectively support our drug
law enforcement efforts if concentrated in
a single agency. The processing of persons at
ports-of-entry is too closely interrelated with
the in.spection of goods to remain organiza-
tionally separated from it any longer. Both
types of inspections have numerous objectives
besides drug law enforcement, so it is logical
to vest them in the Treasury Department,
which has long had the principal responsi-
bility for port-of-entry inspection of goods,
including goods being transported in con-
nection with persons. As long as the inspec-
tions are conducted with full awareness of
related drug concerns it is neither necessary
nor desirable that they be made a responsi-
bility of the primary drug enforcement or-
ganization.

Declarations

After investigation, I have found that
each action included in Reorganization Plan
No. 2 of 1973 is necessary to accomplish
one or more of the purposes set forth in
Section 901 (a) of Title 5 of the United
States Code. In particular, the plan is re-
sponsive to the intention of the Congress as
expressed in Section 901 (a) (1) : "to pro-
mote better execution of the laws, more
effective management of the executive
branch and of its agencies and functions.

April 23, 1973

501

and expeditious administration of the pub-
lic business;" Section 901 (a) (3): to
increase the efficiency of the operations of
the Government to the fullest extent prac-
ticable;" Section 901 (a) (5): "to ^^^^uce
the number of agencies by consolidating
those having similar functions under a single
head, and to abolish such agencies or func-
tions as may not be necessary for the efficient
conduct of the Government;" and Section
901(a)(6): "to eliminate overlapping ana
duplication of effort." .

As required by law, the plan has one logi-
cally consistent subject matter: consolidation
of Federal drug law enforcement activities
in a manner designed to increase then-
effectiveness. _ ^ 4-
The plan would estal.lish in the Department
of Justice a new Administration designated
as the Drug Enforcement Administration.
The reorganizations provided for in the plan
make necessary the appointment and com-
pensation of new officers as specified m Sec-
tion 5 of the plan. The rates of compensation
fixed for these officers would be comparable
to those fixed for officers in the executive
branch who have similar responsibilities.

While it is not practicable to specify all of
the expenditure reductions and other econo-
mies which may result from the actions pro-
posed, some savings may be anticipated m
administrative costs now associated with the
functions being transferred and consolidated.
The proposed reorganization is a necessary
step in upgrading the effectiveness of our
Nation's drug law enforcement effort. Both
of the proposed changes would build on the
strengths of established agencies, yielding
maximum gains in the battle against drug
abuse with minimum loss of time and mo-
mentum in the transition.

I am confident that this reorganization
plan would significantly increase the overal
efficiency and effectiveness of the Federal
Government. I urge the Congress to allow it
to become effective.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, March 28, 1973.

f

International Economic Report
Transmitted to the Congress

Following is the text of President Nixon's
international economic report, which ivas
transmitted to the Congress oti March 22
together with the first anmuil report of the
Council on Intei-national Economic Policy.'

To the Congress of the United States:

The Nation is again at peace. We also are
firmly on the course of strong economic
growth at home. Now we must turn more of
our attention to the urgent problems we
face in our economic dealings with other
nations. International problems may seem
to some of us to be far away, but they have a
very direct impact on the jobs, the incomes
and the living standards of our people.
Neither the peace we have achieved nor the
economic growth essential to our national
welfare will last if we leave such matters
unattended, for they can diminish our pros-
perity at home and at the same time provoke
harmful friction abroad.

Our major difficulties stem from relying
too long upon outdated economic arrange-
ments and institutions despite the rapid
chano-es which have taken place in the world.
Many countries we helped to rebuild after
World War II are now our strong economic
competitors. Americans can no longer act as
if these historic developments had not taken
place We must do a better job of preparing
ourselves-both in the private sector and m
the Government— to compete more effectively
in world markets, so that expanding trade
can bring greater benefits to our people.

In the summer of 1971, this Administra-
tion initiated fundamental changes m Ameri-
can foreign economic policy. We have also
introduced proposals for the reform of the

"^^[^^TT^nplete text of the 94-page report entitled
■•International Econon.ic Report of t^e Presuien
Toeether With the Annual Report of the •-,o'^""i
IrTnte^national Economic P"l-y" is for sale by h
Superintendent of Do<^""'^"tS' ^.S Governmen
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Stock
Number 4115-00028).

502

Department of State Bulletin

international monetary and trading systems
which have lost their ability to deal with
current problems. The turmoil in world
monetary affairs has demonstrated clearly
that greater urgency must now be attached
to constructive reform.

At home, we have continued our fight to
maintain price stability and to improve our
productivity — objectives which are as im-
portant to our international economic posi-
tion as to our domestic welfare.

What is our next step?

In my State of the Union message on the
economy last month, I outlined certain meas-
ures to strengthen both our domestic and
international economic position.- One of the
most important is trade reform.

In choosing an international trade policy
which will benefit all Americans, I have con-
cluded that we must face uii to more intense
long-term competition in the world's mar-
kets rather than shrink from it. Those who
would have us turn inward, hiding behind a
shield of import restrictions of indefinite
duration, might achieve short-term gains and
benefit certain groups, but they would exact
a high cost from the economy as a whole.
Those costs would be borne by all of us in the
form of higher prices and lower real income.
Only in response to unfair competition, or
the closing of markets abroad to our goods,
or to provide time for adjustment, would
such restrictive measures be called for.

My approach is based both on my strong
faith in the ability of Americans to compete,
and on my confidence that all nations will
recognize their own vital interest in lowering
economic barriers and applying fairer and
more effective trading rules.

The fact that most of these comments are
addressed to the role of our Government
should not divert attention from the vital
role which private economic activity will play
in resolving our current i)roblems. The cooji-
eration and the initiative of all .sectors of our
economy are needed to increase our produc-

tivity and to keep our prices competitive.
This is essential to our international trading
position. Yet there are certain necessary
steps which only the Government can take,
given the worldwide scope of trading activity
and the need for broad international agree-
ment to expand trade fairly and effectively.
I am determined that we shall take those
steps.

I know that the American people and their
representatives in the Congress can be
counted on to rise to the challenge of the
changing world economy. Together we must
do what is needed to further the prosperity
of our country, and of the world in which we
live.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, March 22, 1973.

New Trends and Factors in East Asia
and the Pacific

Following is a statement by Marshall
Green, Assistant Secretary for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, made before the Sub-
committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on
March 28.'

Mr. Chairman [Representative Robert N.
C. Nix] and members of the committee: It
is always an honor and usually a pleasure
to appear before your committee. I have
done so on many previous occasions over
the past dozen or more years. My only regret,
Mr. Chairman, at this time is that I will
be departing shortly for Australia just as
you are assuming the chairmanship of this
subcommittee, but I trust that you and the
other distingui.shed members of the sub-
committee will be visiting the area. You
may be sure that we in the Department will

' For excerpts, see Billetin of Mar. 19, 197.3,
p. .328.

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the roniniittce and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

April 23, 1973

503

do everything we can to facilitate your
ti-avels, and I look forward to keeping in
touch with you and my other friends on the
subcommittee.

I understand that it is your desire in to-
day's discussions to focus on the broader
trends in East Asia and the Pacific with
special reference to how these trends are
likely to shape events in that region and
how the United States should best adjust to
those trends in order to preserve and advance
our national interests — which broadly co-
incide with the interests of our many friends
in Asia.

May I start by saying that events in East
Asia will continue to have a significant effect
on world peace and on the security and
well-being, or otherwise, of the United
States. Certain realities are inescapable:

— A large proportion of the world's
population lives in East Asia, and they
happen to be among the most dynamic and
capable peoples in the world.

— Our trade and investments in Asia are
growing apace, possibly at a greater rate
than anywhere else in the world.

— It is only in East Asia that the interests
of the four largest powers of the world (the
United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet
Union) converge.

— Three times in the last generation we
have been drawn into war in Asia.

It is a commonplace to note that the world
is in flux; nowhere is the transition more
striking than in East Asia. Among the most
significant and evident changes occurring
in this vast area are the following:

— Changes in national leadership. The
first generation of revolutionary leaders,
men who played a great role in gaining the
independence of their countries, are being
replaced by a younger generation, more
skilled in government and administration,
who emphasize orderly development and
growth and improved relations with neigh-
boring countries.

— Increasing economic capabilities. Asians
are now bettei' able to do more with their
own resources and seek to do so, bearing

witness to the strong thrust of nationalism
common to the countries of East Asia. Many
difficulties remain, of course, and most of
these countries are not yet ready to stand
completely on their own ; they still rely on
outside assistance, a responsibility that we
are sharing increasingly with other nations
such as Japan.

— Disappearance of the bipolar, cold war
world. The world of contending Communist
and anti-Communist camps, led respectively
by the U.S.S.R. and the United States, has
gone. Today there are many power centers,
and the interrelationships among them offer
important and potentially useful avenues for
lessening tensions and broadening under-
standing among nations.

— Tentative progress in resolving the con-
tinuing problem of divided countries. The
greatest underlying danger to peace in East
Asia arises from the existence of divided
nations, notably Korea, Viet-Nam, and Laos.
We will accept arrangements worked out be-
tween the divided halves of these countries
for peaceful resolution of their problems. In
this connection, we particularly welcome the
South-North talks in Korea, the recently
concluded cease-fire and political arrange-
ments in Laos, and the expanding dialogue
between North and South Viet-Nam as well
as between the Republic of Viet-Nam and
the PRO [Provisional Revolutionary Gov-
ernment] .

— Entry of the People's Republic of China
into the international mainstream. This has
been facilitated by P.R.C. membership in
the U.N. and other organizations and its
improved bilateral relations with the United
States, Japan, and other countries.

— Our evolving relationship with Japan.
Japan remains our most significant ally in
East Asia. Today, following three summit
meetings between our respective leaders in
the past four years, that relationship is
marked by greater mutuality and resiliency.

Coinciding with these changes in East
Asia, there has been a growing, fully under-
standable, feeling in the United States that
we have taken on a disproportionate share of
the world's problems and that others should

504

Department of State Bulletin

share this burden. At the same time we rec-
ogTiize the importance of continuing to play
our role in promoting stability, peace, and
gi-owth. This is not altruism ; it is based upon
a realistic recognition of our own interests.

U.S. foreign policy has taken into consid-
eration all of the trends and factors that I
have enumerated above, as well as others.
From this has emerged the Nixon doctrine
of shared responsibility, our new relation-
ship with the P.R.C. and all that that implies,
as well as our emerging relationship with Ja-
pan. Beyond that, I would say that these
policies have helped to create an atmosphere
in East Asia where there is greater willing-
ness on the part of most countries to enter
into discussions with each other — even with
adversary powers — and in certain cases to
discuss with each other even the most diffi-
cult and divisive issues. Those issues which
cannot now be resolved can at least be de-
fused and made more manageable awaiting
the time when they are soluble.

President Nixon has made it clear that
the United States is a Pacific power with in-
terests in Asia. He has continually reaffirmed
that we will play our proper role as a Pacific
power, neither overinvolved nor underin-
volved, but pursuing just that degree of in-
volvement that awakens the cooperation of
Dthers and enlists to the maximum extent
possible their support in advancing our com-
mon stake in the peace, stability, and im-
provement of life for the peoples of East
Asia.

This in essence was the message which
President Nixon took to Asia when he first
visited there as President in mid-1969, in-
cluding his celebrated press backgrounder at
Guam that became known as the Nixon doc-
trine.= A week later at Bangkok, he phrased
his position as follows: '

Our determination to honor our commitments is
fully consistent with our conviction that the na-
tions of Asia can and must increasingly shoulder
the responsibility for achieving peace and prog^ress

' For the transcript of President Nixon's remarks
to newsmen in Guam on July 25, 1969, see Public
Pnprr:i of the Presidents: Richard Nixon, lono, p.
544.

' Bulletin of Aug. 25, 1969, p. 154.

in the area. The challenge to our wisdom is to
support the Asian countries' efforts to defend and
develop themselves, without attempting to take
from them the responsibilities which should be
theirs. For if domination by the aggressor can
destroy the freedom of a nation, too much depend-
ence on a protector can eventually erode its
dignity.

In concluding my opening remarks, I wish
to emphasize two points of personal concern
with regard to our future role in Asia.

In the first place, like most Americans, I
greatly welcome the bi-eakthroughs which
have been made in our relationships with
what we used to call adversary powers. I
realize that their objectives have not changed,
but if the I'esult of our efforts is that it en-
courages other countries to seek their goals
thi-ough political as opposed to military
means then I think a great deal has been
accomplished. Yet it i-equires that we be pre-
l)ared to compete with countries whose ob-
jectives may differ widely from our own — and
indeed some of those objectives are directly
contrary to our own. Hopefully, by main-
taining strength at home and in conjunction
with our friends, we and they will be in a
position to negotiate new relationships, in-
cluding even reductions of forces; yet with-
out that degree of strength and solidarity,
the current trend toward detente and to-
ward negotiations could be sharply reversed.

In this connection, we must make clear
that in broadening our relationships, and
hopefully our friendships, with countries we
have regarded as adversary powers, we are
not acting in any way to diminish our friend-
ship and support for old friends. Old friends
are the best friends.

Secondly, I would hope that preoccupation
with our many problems at home will not
weaken our understanding and support of
our proper role in world affairs. No country
can turn completely inward except at the
risk of destroying itself. Whatever the faults
and mistakes of past policies may have
been — I might say they have not been as
great as some would have it — we have played
an impoitant role in helping to bring about
a favorable evolution of events in East Asia.
With more help from others and with the

April 23, 1973

505

countries of East Asia maximizing their own
efforts, there are encouraging vistas opening
up in the decade ahead.

President Nixon has described the past
decade as one of confrontation and the cur-
rent decade as one of negotiation. Indeed,
the first part of the seventies finds us en-
gaged in talks with most of the participants
in the world's most pressing conflicts. One
can still cite support for the thesis that the
human race is moving even closer to the
brink of self-destruction. I believe I have
discerned in Asia, however, a different course
of human development : a process of modern-
ization and improved communications which
is gradually leveling differences between na-
tions, destroying the appeal of aggressive
ideologies, and creating a new faith in prag-
matic principles. This is the process our
policies are designed to serve.

Patent Classification Agreement
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Nixon^

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I
transmit herewith a certified copy of the
Strasbourg Agreement Concerning the Inter-
national Patent Classification, signed March
24, 1971. I transmit also, for the information
of the Senate, the report from the Depart-
ment of State with respect to the Agreement.
The purpose of the Agreement is generally
similar to that set forth in the Nice Agree-
ment Concerning International Classification
of Goods and Services to which Trademarks
are Applied, as revised at Stockholm July 14,
19(i7, and the Locarno Agreement Establish-
ing an International Classification for Indus-
trial Designs, signed October 8, 1968. Both

'Transmitted on Mar. 22 (White House press
release); also printed as S. Ex. E., 9.3d Cons., 1st
sess., which includes the text of the agreement and
the repurt of the Department of State.

of these earlier Agreements were approved
by the Senate on December 11, 1971. The
countries party to the Agreement constitute
a Special Union under the Paris Union estab-
lished by the Paris Convention for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Property, last revised in
1967 at Stockholm. The Special Union con-
sists of an Assembly of all contracting par-
ties and a Committee of Experts. Pursuant
to the Agreement a common classification is
adopted for patents for invention, inventors'
certificates, utility models and utility cer-
tificates, to be known as the "International
Patent Classification" and provisions are in-
cluded for its amendment.

It is important from the standpoint of the
interest of patent owners and from the stand-
point of effective government administration
of its patent functions that the United States
become a party to the Agreement so that it
may participate as a member of the Special
Union.

I recommend that the Senate give early
and favorable consideration to this Agree-
ment and give its advice and consent to
ratification.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, March 22, 1973.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

1972 Annual Report of the United States Tariff
Commission. Fiscal Year Ended June 30. H. Doc.
93-26. 34 pp.

Annual Report of the Bretton Woods Agreement
Act. Communication from the Chairman, National
Advisory Council on International Monetary and
Financial Policies, transmitting the Council's an-
nual report covering the period July 1, 1971-
June 30, 1972. H. Doc. 93-34. January 3, 1973.
231 pp.

Ninth Annual Report of the Advisory Commission
on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.
Communication from the Chairman, U.S. Advi-
sory Commission on International Educational
and Cultural Affairs, transmitting the report. H.
Doc. 93-35. January 3, 1973. 5 pp.

506

Department of State Bulletin

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amondnicnt of article VI of the statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy' Apency of October
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'

Acceptances deposited: Indonesia, April 3, 1973;
Zambia, April 4, 1973.

Aviation

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con-
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago,
1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with
annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968.
Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.
Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, April 5, 1973.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendixes.
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.'
Signatures : Malagasy Republic, April 4, 1973;

Sweden, April 3, 1973; Switzerland, April 2,

1973.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March
19, 1967; for the United States December 24,
1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Jordan, March 7, 1973.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at

t London October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Norway, February 21, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

<" invention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971."
I Ratification deposited: Brazil, February 14, 1973.
■Protocol amending the single convention on nar-
I cotic drugs, 1961 (TIAS 6298). Done at Geneva
I March 25, 1972.'

I Ratifications deposited: Ivory Coast, Jordan, Feb-
I ruary 28. 1973.

Acceasioti deposited: Kenya, February 9, 1973.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London

(October 12, 1971.'
Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, December 21,
1972.

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London
October 15, 1971.'

Acceptance deposited: Lebanon, December 21,
1972.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London October 25, 1967.'

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, March 9, 1973.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London November 26, 1968.'

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, March 9, 1973.
Amendments to the international convention for

the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780).

Adopted at London October 21, 1969.'

Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, March 9, 1973.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London,
and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.
Ratification deposited: Lesotho, April 3, 1973.

Slave Trade

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery.
Done at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered into
force March 9, 1927; for the United States March
21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.
Notification of succession : Mali, February 2, 1973.

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed
at Geneva September 25, 1926, with annex. Done
at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into
force December 7, 1953, for the protocol ; July
7, 1955, for annex to protocol. For the United
States March 7, 1956. TIAS 3532.
Acceptayicc deposited: Mali, February 2, 1973.

Supplementary convention on the abolition of
slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva
September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30,
1957; for the United States December 6, 1967.
TIAS 6418.
Accession deposited: Mali, February 2, 1973.

Space

Treaty on principles governing the activities of
states in the exploration and use of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Opened for signature at Washington, London,
and Moscow January 27, 1967. Entered into force
October 10, 1967. TIAS 6347.
Ratification deposited: Belgium, March 30, 1973.

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered
into force September 1, 1972.-
Acccsslon deposited: Fiji, April 4, 1973.
Ratification deposited: Pakistan, April 4, 1973.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

April 23, 1973

507

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Ratification deposited: Ghana, January 24, 1973.
Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973.
TIAS 7435.

Notifications of approval: Federal Republic of
Germany, December 28, 1972;' Netherlands,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, February
5, 1973.

BILATERAL

Republic of China

Agreement amending the agreement of December
30, 1971 (TIAS 7249), relating to trade in cot-
ton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington March 22, 1973. Entered into force
March 22, 1973.

Agreement relating to annex C of the agreement
of December 30, 1971 (TIAS 7498), concerning
trade in wool and man-made fiber textile prod-
ucts. Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton March 22, 1973. Entered into force March
22, 1973.

El Salvador

Agreement confirming the cooperative agreement
between the Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia
of El Salvador and the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture for the prevention of foot-and-mouth
disease and rinderpest in El Salvador. Effected
by exchange of notes at San Salvador February
28 and March 2, 1973. Entered into force March
2, 1973.

India

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched-
uling of payments under P.L.-480 title I agri-
cultural commodity agreements, with annexes.
Signed at Washington March 30, 1973. Entered
into force March 30, 1973.

Agreement regarding the consolidation and resched-
uling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Govern-
ment and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at
Washington March 30, 1973. Entered into force
March 30, 1973.

Iran

Agreement extending the military mission agree-

' Applicable to West Berlin.

ment of November 27, 1943, as amended and ex-
tended (57 Stat. 1262, TIAS 1941, 2946, 3207,
3519, 6594, 6970, 7069, 7235). Effected by ex-
change of notes at Tehran February 6 and March
3, 1973. Entered into force March 3, 1973.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of September 21, 1972
(TIAS 7466). Effected by exchange of notes at
Islamabad March 19, 1973. Entered into force
March 19, 1973.

Philippines

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of May 4, 1972 (TIAS
7324). Effected by exchange of notes at Manila
March 9, 1973. Entered into force March 9, 1973.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to implementation and enforce-
ment of civil aviation advance charter rules, with
memorandum of understanding. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Washington March 30, 1973.
Entered into force March 30, 1973.

Uruguay

Treaty on extradition and cooperation in penal mat
ters. Signed at Washington April 6, 1973. Enters
into force upon the exchange of ratifications.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of August 29, 1972
(TIAS 7452). Effected by exchange of notes at
Saigon March 19, 1973. Entered into force March
19, 1973.

Agreement correcting the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of March 7, 1973. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 19,
1973. Entered into force March 19, 1973.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Daniel M. Searby as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities,
Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective April 2.

508

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX April 2d, 1973 Vol. LXVIII. No. 1765

Asia. New Trends and Fnrtois in K>ist \sia
and the Pacific (Green) 503

liina. The Nixon Adminisu-.-mon s j-uroiRn
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476

I Congress

rConRrossional Documents Relating' to Foreipi

Policy 506

[International Economic Report Transmitted to

the Congress (Nixon) 502

Jew Trends and Factors in East Asia and the

Pacific (Green) 503

Patent Classification Agreement Transmitted

to the Senate (Nixon) 506

President Nixon Proposes Plan for Reorgani-
zation of Federal Drug Law Enforcement
Activities (message to the Congress) . . . 498

^nba. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for
Travel to Certain ,A.reas (texts of public
notices) 4g8

)epartment and Foreign Service. Appointments
(Searby) 508

Sconomic Affairs

International Economic Report Transmitted to
the Congress (Nixon) 502

Patent Classification Agreement Transmitted

to the Senate (Nixon) 506

irby appointed Deputy .-Assistant Secretary
for Commercial .•Affairs and Business Activ-
ities 508

iucational and Cultural .VfTairs. Dr. Franklin
Visits South America as Lincoln Lecturer . 487

Europe. The Nixon Administration's Foreign
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476

Foreign Aid. Finding of Eligibility for Pur-
chases Under Foreig^n Military Sales Act
(Presidential determination) 483

Sermany. The Nixon Administration's Foreign
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476

»rea. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for
Travel to Certain .Areas (texts of public
notices) 488

fiddle East

The Current Situation in the Middle East
(Sisco) 484

The Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy Ob-
jectives (Rush) ^"''

lilitary Affairs

Lmerica's .Military Strength: Key Element in
Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace
(Nixon) 473

finding of Eligibility for Purchases Under
Foreign Military Sales Act (Presidential de-
termination) 483

jtarcotics Control. President Nixon Proposes
Plan for Reorganization of Federal Drug
Law ^Enforcement Activities (message to the
Congress) 498

■nama. U.S. Vetoes U.N. Security Council
■ ion on Panama Canal Treaty Nego-
(Scali, draft resolution) 490

passports. U.S. Pas.sports Remain Invalid for
Travel to revf.i., \...,.^ tu-t^ ,,f public
I notices) . . . . 488

etroleum. Pro. !• jit Nixon Modifies Oil Import
Pi-ogram I |ii.M.!amation) 489

Presidential Documents

.America's .Military Strength: Key Element in
Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace . 473

Finding of Eligibility for Purchases Under
Foreign Military Sales .Act (Presidential de-
termination) 483

International Economic Report Transmitted to
the Congress 502

Patent Classification Agreement Transmitted
to the Senate 506

President Nixon .Modifies Oil Import Program
(proclamation) 439

President Nixon Proposes Plan for Reorganiza-
tion of Federal Drug Law Enforcement Ac-
t'^'it'es 498

Treaty Information

Current Actions 507

I'ntent Classification Agreement Transmitted to

the Senate (Nixon) 506

L.S.S.R. The Nixon .Administration's Foreign
Policy Objectives (Rush) 476

United Nations. L^S. Vetoes U.N. Security
Council Resolution on Panama Canal Treaty
Negotiations (Scali, draft resolution) . . ". 490

Viet-Nam

.America's Military Strength: Key Element in
Maintaining Progress Toward World Peace
(Ni.xon) 473

The Nixon Administration's Foreign Policy
Objectives (Rush) 476

U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for Travel to
Certain Areas (texts of public notices) . . 488

Navie Index

Green, Marshall 503

Nixon, President . . 473, 483, 489, 498, 502, 506

Rush, Kenneth 476

Scali, John 490

Searby, Daniel .M 508

Sisco, Joseph J 484

No. Date

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Subject

Paul Samuclson to tour East Asian
and Pacific nations (rewrite).

John Hope Franklin to tour South
America ( rewrite) .

U.S. and U.K. reach understanding
on air charters (rewrite).

Rush: U.S. Naval Academy, An-
napolis, Md.

Rush: Canada-U.S. Interparlia-
mentary Conference.

Casey: House Subcommittees on
Europe and Foreign Economic
Policy.

$31 million contract to assist im-
migrants to Israel (rewrite).

Rogers: General Assembly of the
GAS.

U.S. -Uruguay extradition treaty.

Newsom : House Subcommittee on
Africa.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulxetin.

t 96

4/2

96

4/2

t 97

4/2

t 98

4/4

t 99

4/6

tioo

4/6

tlOl

4/6

tl02

4/6

tl03
tl04

4/6
4/6

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. d.c. 20402

POSTAGC AND FlCa PAID
U.S. GOVCRNMKNT MIINTINa OrriCK

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted
service, please renew your subscription promptly
when you receive the expiration notice from the
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re-
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob-
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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

s

/ 7

^ f///^ ^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1766

April 30, 1973

PRESIDENT THIEU OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM
VISITS THE UNITED STATES 509

U.S. POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE: AFFIRMATIVE STEPS
Address by Deputy Secretary Ru.sh 533

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Address by Under Secretary Casey 539

THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973
Message From President Nixon to the Congress 513
Briefing by Secretary Rogers and Other Officials 523

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETI

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1766
April 30, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenta
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402
PRICE:
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29. foreign $36.25
Single copy 66 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).

note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETiB
a weekly publication issued by th
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public i
interested agencies of the governmet{
with information on developments
the field of U.S. foreign relations
on the work of the Department
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes seleet4
press releases on foreign policy, isaui
by the White House and the Depart
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other
officers of the Department, as well as
special articles on various phases o^
international affairs and the function
of the Department. Information is •
eluded concerning treaties and int4
national agreements to which fJ|
United States is or may become',
party and on treaties of general inte
national interest.

Publications of the Department
State, United Nations documents,
legislative material in the field
international relations are also liste

President Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Visits the United States

President Npinje)) Va)i Thieu of the Re-
public of Viet-Nam made an official visit to
the United States April 2-7. He met with
President Nixon and other government offi-
cials at the Western White House at San
Clemente, Calif., April 2-3 and met toith
Vice President Ac/new, leaders of Congress,
and other officials at Washington April 4-6.
Folloicing are exchanges of remarks between
President Nixon and President Thieu at an
arrival ceremony at the Western White
House on April 2 and at a departure cere-
mony on April 3, together with the text of
a joint communique issued April 3.

REMARKS AT ARRIVAL CEREMONY

White House press release (San Clemente. Calif, t dated April 2

President Nixon

Mr. President, all of our distinguished
guests, and ladies and gentlemen : Mr. Pres-
ident, this is the fifth time that I have had
the honor and pleasure of meeting with you,
but for the first time I am honored to wel-
come you in my native land, in my native
State, and here at my home.

As we welcome you today, we think back
to the times we have met before. Particu-
larly I think of the time that we first met as
heads of state at Midway four years ago.'
On that occasion you said after our meeting
that you looked forward to the time when
we could meet not for the purpose of dis-
cussing the conduct of war, but for the pur-
pose of discussing the building of peace; and
now, today, that day has come.

' For remarks by President Nixon and President
Thieu and text of a joint statement issued at Midway
Wand on June 8, 19C9, see Bulletin of June 30,
1969, p. 549.

There are, of course, difiiculties in building
a peace after 25 years of war have torn your
country apart. But, on the other hand, when
we compare the situation today to what it
was four years ago at Midway when we met,
we see the progress that has been made to-
ward that goal. On that day, when there
were over half a million Americans fighting
side by side with your people, we now find
that all the American forces have retui-ned
and the people of Viet-Nam have the strength
to defend their own independence and their
right to choose their government in the years
ahead.

We know that this would not have been
possible without the courage and also the
leadership that you have displayed in provid-
ing an example for the people of your coun-
try and the courage that they have exemplified
and the sacrifices they have made.

Now, as we meet today for two days of
meetings, we meet to work toward the build-
ing of peace, a peace for your land which has
suffered so much and your people who have
suffered so much and a peace, as it is built
there, which can contribute to lasting peace
in the world.

I would say simply as we conclude that the
name of our hou.se here is Casa Pacifica,
which means House of the Pacific and also
House of Peace, and we hope from this day,
as a result of our talks, will come great steps
forward in building the lasting peace, the
real peace that we have fought together for
and that now we want all of our people to
live for.

Thank you.

President Thieu

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, ladies and gen-
tlemen : Thank you very much, Mr. Presi-

April 30, 1973

509

dent, for this warm welcome and for your
very kind words. Mrs. Thieu and I are very
happy to oome here today to this beautiful
land of freedom and prosperity. We appre-
ciate most especially your hospitality.

I find it very significant that the discus-
sions which I will soon hold with you on this
visit, which will establish the new basis for
the cooperation between the United States
and Viet-Nam following the Viet-Nam peace
agreement, are to be held in the Western
White House on the Pacific Coast, because
both the United States and Viet-Nam belong
to the same community of nations bordering
on the Pacific Ocean.

History has proved that there can be no
solid peace in the world unless there is peace
and stability in the Pacific area. History has
also shown that for the Pacific Ocean to de-
serve its peaceful name, courage and tenacity
are as important today as they were to the
navigators who first sailed across this vast
ocean centuries ago.

Mr. President, over three years ago when
we met at Midway at a time when the Viet-
Nam war was raging, we laid down together
the foundations for a promising solution to
the Viet-Nam conflict that came to be known
as the Vietnamization. Today, while over
300,000 American troops still stay in Europe
to bolster the defense of western Europe,
more than a quarter century after World
War II was over, we in Viet-Nam are proud
that, thanks to your help, the Vietnamese de-
fense force was able to repel an all-out
Communist invasion last year at a time
when American ground troops had been
withdrawn.

This made possible a peace with honor
whereby the Communist aggressors, in the
Paris agreement last January, had to rec-
ognize formally the right of self-determina-
tion of the people of South Viet-Nam and the
principle that the problems we will solve in
North Viet-Nam are to be solved by peace-
ful means without coercion and annexation.

While the road to lasting peace is still an
arduous one, a new page has been turned
with the conclusion of the Paris agreement,
and I look forward to having fruitful con-
versation with you, Mr. President, on the

510

various aspects of the relation between our
two countries in this new context.

I earnestly hope that the joint efforts of
our two governments would lead to a consoli-
dation of peace in Indochina and a new era
of constructive cooperation in peace among
all parties concerned. I avail myself on this
occasion to express to you, Mr. President,
and through you to the American people, the
heartfelt gratitude of the Vietnamese Gov-
ernment and people for the generous assist-
ance of your government and the noble
contribution of the American nation to our
long efforts to defend and preserve freedom
for Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY

white House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated April 3

President Nixon

Mr. President and ladies and gentlemen:
As our joint communique indicates, Presi-
dent Thieu and I have had very constructive
talks with regard to how we shall work to-
gether in the years ahead, working for the
program of peace which we now hope will
all be the wave of the future not only for the
Republic of Viet-Nam but for all of the
countries in Indochina.

Mr. President, we have been allies in a
long and difficult war, and now you can be
sure that we stand with you as we continue
to work together to build a lasting peace.

This is a great goal for our two peoples,
and I am very happy that we could have had
these extended talks in developing programs
that will achieve that goal.

We wish you well as you go on to Wash-
ington and as you return to your own coun-
try, and we look forward to the time when
we shall meet again. •

President Thieu

Ladies and gentlemen : I am very happy
to have a few minutes with you on the con- J
elusion of this meeting with President Nixon. ;
As you know already, the two main purposes '

Department of State Bulletin

of my visit here are to thank in person the
American people for the peneroiis and dis-
interested assistance given to us during the
past difficult years, and secondly, to have an
opportunity to discuss with President Nixon
about what needs to be done in view of con-
olidating the peace in Viet-Nam and in
Southeast Asia.

As I said earlier in my arrival statement,
my visit here marks at the same time an end
and a beginning: an end to a very difficult
period of time during which our two coun-
tries have endeavored to preserve freedom
for the Vietnamese people and a beginning
in the sense that the newly achieved peace
in Viet-Nam will be the starting point of
what President Nixon calls a generation of
peace for the whole world.
1 I had during these two days very thorough
and cordial conversations with President
Nixon which I am sure will help lay the
foundation of lasting peace in our part of
the world and of a fruitful cooperation be-
tween the American and Vietnamese people
in the postwar period.

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.

I look forward to seeing you again, Pres-
ident Nixon.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE, APRIL 3

The President of the United States, Richard M.
Nixon, and the President of the Republic of Viet-
nam, Npuyen Van Thieu, met for two days of dis-
cussions in San Clemente at the outset of President
Thieu's official visit to the United States. Taking
inrt in the.se discussions on the United States side
• re the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers; the
\ssistant to the President for National Security
AfTairs, Henry A. Kissinger; the .Ambassador of the
United States to the Republic of Vietnam, Ellsworth
Bunker; the .Ambassador-designate of the United
States to the Republic of Vietnam, Graham Mar-
;tin; and other officials. On the side of the Republic
of Vietnam the Minister for Foreign .Affairs, Tran
Van I,am; the Minister of Economy, Pham Kim
N'goc; the .Minister of Finance, Ha Xuan Trung; the
Special Assistant to the President for Foreign Af-
fairs, Nguyen Phu Due; the Vietnamese Ambassador
to the United States, Tran Kim Phuong, and other
officials also participated in the discussions.

The discussions were held in a very cordial at-
mosphere appropriate to the enduring relationship

of friendship which exists between the governments
of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States.
The two Presidents discussed the course of U.S.-
Vietnamese relations since their meeting at Midway
Island on June 8, 1969 and the postwar relationship
between the two countries. They reached full con-
sensus in their views.

President Ni.xon and President Thiou reviewed the
progress that has been made in economic, political
and defense affairs in Vietnam since the Midway
meeting. President Nixon expressed gratification
with the proficiency of South Vietnam's armed
forces and noted their effective and courageous per-
formance in halting the invasion launched by North
Vietnam on March 80, 1972. The President also ex-
pressed satisfaction with the development of political
institutions and noted the political stability that has
prevailed in South Vietnam in recent years. Presi-
dent Thieu reaffirmed his determination to assure
social and political justice for the people of South
Vietnam.

The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction at
the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, as well as the Act
of the International Conference on Vietnam which
endorsed this .Agreement." They asserted the deter-
mination of their two governments to implement the
provisions of the Agreement scrupulously. They also
affirmed their strong expectation that the other
parties signatory to the Agreement woukl do the
same in order to establish a lasting peace in Viet-
nam. The two Presidents expressed their apprecia-
tion to the other members of the international com-
munity who helped in achieving the Agreement and
particularly to the four member governments of the
International Commission of Control and Supervi-
sion whose representatives are observing its imple-
mentation. They consider that the International
Commission, acting in cooperation with the Four
Parties to the Agreement, is an essential element in
the structure of restoring peace to Vietnam and
expressed their determination to further encourage
the most effective and objective possible supervision
of the Agreement.

President Nixon informed President Thieu of his
great interest in the meetings between representa-
tives of the two South Vietnamese parties which are
currently taking place in France in an effort to
achieve an internal political settlement in South
Vietnam. President Thieu said that his government
is resolved at these meetings to achieve a settle-
ment which will fully insure the right of self-
determination by the South Vietnamese people in
accordance with the Agreement on Ending the War.
President Thieu expressed his earnest desire for a
reconciliation among the South Vietnamese parties

' For text of the agreement, see Bulu:tin of
Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169; for text of the act, see
Bulletin of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 345.

April 30, 1973

511

which will fulfill the hopes of the South Vietnamese
people for peace, independence, and democracy.

Both Presidents, while acknowledging that prog-
ress was being made toward military and political
settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed
with great concern infiltrations of men and weapons
in sizeable numbers from North Vietnam into South
Vietnam in violation of the Agreement on Ending
the War, and considered that actions which would
threaten the basis of the Agreement would call for
appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed
their conviction that all the provisions of the Agree-
ment, including in particular those concerning mili-
tary forces and military supplies, must be faithfully
implemented if the cease-fire is to be preserved and
the prospects for a peaceful settlement are to be
assured. President Nixon stated in this connection
that the United States views violations of any pro-
vision of the Agreement with great and continuing
concern.

Both Presidents also agreed that there could be
lasting peace in Vietnam only if there is peace in
the neighboring countries. Accordingly they ex-
pressed their earnest interest in the achievement of
a satisfactory implementation of the cease-fire agree-
ment reached in Laos on February 21. They ex-
pressed their grave concern at the fact that Article
20 of the Agreement which calls for the uncondi-
tional withdrawal of all foreign forces from Laos
and Cambodia has not been carried out. They agreed
that this Article should be quickly implemented.

In assessing the prospects for peace throughout
Indochina the two Presidents stressed the need for
vigilance on the part of the governments in the
Indochinese states against the possibility of re-
newed Communist aggression after the departure
of United States ground forces from South Vietnam.
They stressed the fact that this vigilance will re-
quire the continued political, economic, and military
strength of the governments and nations menaced by
any renewal of this aggressive threat. Because of
their limited resources, the nations of the region
will require external assistance to preserve the nec-
essary social and economic stability for peaceful
development.

In this context. President Thieu aflirmed the de-
termination of the Vietnamese people and the Gov-
ernment to forge ahead with the task of providing
adequate and timely relief to war victims, recon-
structing damaged social and economic infrastruc-
tures, and building a strong and viable economy, so
that the Vietnamese nation can gradually shoulder
a greater burden in the maintenance of peace and
the achievement of economic progress for its people.
The two Presidents agreed that in order to attain
the stated economic goals as quickly as possible, the
Republic of Vietnam will need greater external
economic assistance in the initial years of the post
war era. President Nixon reaflirmed his wholehearted
support for the endeavors of post war rehabilitation,

reconstruction and development of the Republic of
Vietnam. He informed President Thieu of the United
States intention to provide adequate and substantial
economic assistance for the Republic of Vietnam
during the remainder of this year and to seek Con-
gressional authority for a level of funding for the
next year suflicient to assure essential economic
stability and rehabilitation for that country as it
now moves from war to peace. He recognized that
the economic development and self-sufficiency of
South Vietnam depend to a significant extent on
its ability to promote and attract foreign investment.
He also expressed his intention to seek Congres-
sional support for a longer range program for the
economic development of South Vietnam now that
the war has ended.

The two Presidents expressed their earnest hope
that other nations as well as international institu-
tions will act promptly on a positive and concerted
program of international assistance to the Republic
of Vietnam. They also agreed that consultations
should soon be held in this regard with all interested
parties.

The two Presidents expressed hope that the imple-
mentation of the Agreement on Vietnam would per-
mit a normalization of relations with all countries
of .Southeast .\sia. They agreed that this step and
a regional reconstruction program will increase the
prospects of a lasting peace in the area.

President Nixon discussed the future security of
South Vietnam in the context of the Nixon Doctrine.
The President noted that the assumption by the Re-
public of Vietnam of the full manpower require-
ments for its own defense was fully in keeping with
his doctrine. He aflSrmed that the United States
for its part, expected to continue, in accordance with
its Constitutional processes, to supply the Republic
of Vietnam with the material means for its defense
consistent with the Agreement on Ending the War.

President Thieu asked President Nixon to convey
to the American people and particularly to families
bereaved by the loss of loved ones, the deep and
abiding appreciation of the people of South Vietnam
for the sacrifices made on their behalf and the assist-
ance given to the Republic of Vietnam in its long
struggle to maintain its freedom and preserve its
right of self-determination.

Prior to the departure of President Thieu for
Washington to continue his official visit to the United
States, both Presidents agreed that through the
harsh experience of a tragic war and the sacrifices
of their two peoples a close and constructive rela-
tionship between the American and the South Viet-
namese people has been developed and strengthened.
They affirmed their full confidence that this associa-
tion would be preserved as the foundation of an
honorable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

President Thieu expressed his gratitude for the
warm hospitality extended to him and his party by
President Nixon.

512

Department of State Bulletin

President Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act of 1973
to the Congress

Message From President Nixon to the Congress^

To the Congress of the United States:

The Trade Reform Act of 1973. which I
am today proposing to the Congress, calls for
the most important changes in more than a
decade in America's approach to world trade.

This legislation can mean more and better
jobs for American workers.

It can help American consumers get more
for their money.

It can mean expanding trade and expand-
ing prosperity, for the United States and for
our trading partners alike.

Most importantly, these proposals can
help us reduce international tensions and
.strengthen the structure of peace.

The need for trade reform is urgent. The
task of trade reform requires an effective,
working partnership between the executive
and legislative branches. The legislation I
submit today has been developed in close
consultation with the Congress and it envi-
sions continuing cooperation after it is en-
acted. I urge the Congress to examine these
proposals in a spirit of constructive partner-
ship and to give them prompt and favorable
consideration.

This legislation would help us to:

— Negotiate for a more open and equitable
world trading system ;

— Deal effectively with rapid increases in
imports that disrupt domestic markets and
displace American workers ;

— Strengthen our ability to meet unfair
competitive practices ;

'Transmitted on Apr. 10 (White House press
release) ; also printed as H. Doc. 93-80, 93d Cong.,
1st sess.

— Manage our trade policy more efficiently
and use it more effectively to deal with spe-
cial needs such as our balance of payments
and inflation problems ; and

— Take advantage of new trade opportu-
nities while enhancing the contribution trade
can make to the development of poorer
countries.

Strengthening the Structure of Peace

The world is embarked today on a pro-
found and historic movement away from
confrontation and toward negotiation in re-
solving international differences. Increas-
ingly in recent years, countries have come
to see that the best way of advancing their
own interests is by expanding peaceful con-
tacts with other peoples. We have thus be-
gun to erect a durable structure of peace in
the world from which all nations can benefit
and in which all nations have a stake.

This structure of peace cannot be strong,
however, unless it encompasses international
economic affairs. Our progress toward world
peace and stability can be significantly un-
dermined by economic conflicts which breed
political tensions and weaken security ties.
It is imperative, therefore, that we promptly
turn our negotiating efforts to the task of
resolving problems in the economic arena.

My trade reform proposals would equip
us to meet this challenge. They would help us
in creating a new economic order which both
reflects and reinforces the progress we have
made in political aflfairs. As I said to the
Governors of the International Monetary
Fund last September, our common goal

April 30, 1973

513

should be to "set in place an economic struc-
ture that will help and not hinder the world's
historic movement toward peace." =

Toward a New International Economic Order

The principal institutions which now gov-
ern the world economy date from the close
of World War II. At that time, the United
States enjoyed a dominant position. Our
industrial and agricultural systems had
emerged from the war virtually intact. Our
substantial reserves enabled us to finance a
major share of international reconstruction.
We gave generously of our resources and our
leadership in helping the world economy get
back on track.

The result has been a quarter century of
remarkable economic achievement — and pro-
found economic change. In place of a splin-
tered and shattered Europe stands a new and
vibrant European Community. In place of a
prostrate Japan stands one of the free
world's strongest economies. In all parts of
the world new economic patterns have de-
veloped and new economic energies have
been released.

These successes have now brought the
world into a very diiTerent period. America
is no longer the sole, dominating economic
power. The new era is one of growing eco-
nomic interdependence, shared economic
leadership, and dramatic economic change.
These sweeping tran.sformations, however,
have not been matched by sufUcient change
in our trading and monetary systems. The
approaches which served us so well in the
years following World War II have now be-
come outmoded; they are simply no longer
equal to the challenges of our time.

The result has been a growing sense of
strain and stress in the international econ-
omy and even a resurgence of economic iso-
lationism as some have sought to insulate
themselves from change. If we are to make
our new economic era a time of progress
and prosperity for all the world's peoples,
we must resist the impulse to turn inward
and instead do all we can to see that our in-

ternational economic arrangements are sub-
stantially improved.

Momentum for Change

The United States has already taken a
number of actions to help build a new inter-
national economic order and to advance our
interests within it.

Our New Economic Policy, announced

on August 15, 1971, has helped to improve
the performance of our domestic economy,
reducing unemployment and inflation and
thereby enhancing our competitive position.^

The realignment of currencies achieved

under the Smithsonian Agreement of Decem-
ber 18, 1971,^ and by the adjustments of re-
cent weeks have also made American goods
more competitive with foreign products in
markets at home and abroad.

—Building on the Smithsonian Agreement,
we have advanced far-reaching proposals
for lasting reform in the world's monetary
system.

We have concluded a trade agreement

with the Soviet Union that promises to
strengthen the fabric of prosperity and

peace.^

—Opportunities for mutually beneficial
trade are developing with the People's Re-
public of China.

We have opened negotiations with the

enlarged European Community and several
of the countries with which it has concluded
special trading agreements concerning com-
pensation due us as a result of their new
arrangements.

But despite all these efforts, underlying
problems remain. We need basic trade re-
form, and we need it now. Our efforts to im-
prove the world's monetary system, for ex-
ample, will never meet with lasting success
unless basic improvements are also achieved
in the field of international trade.

- Bulletin of Oct. 23, 1972, p. 457.

■■■For President Nixon's address to the Nation
on Aug. 15, 1971, see Bulletin of Sept. 6, 1971,

''' ' For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1972,

p. 32. „ .

"For text of the agreement, see Bulletin ot

Nov. 20, 1972, p. 595.

5V4

Department of State Bulletin

Building a Fair and Open Trading World

A wific variety of barriers to trade still
distort the world's economic relations, harm-
ing our own interests and those of other
countries.

— Quantitative barriers hamper trade in
many commodities, including some of our
potentially most profitable exports.

— Agricultural harriers limit and distort
trade in farm products, with special damage
to the American economy because of our
comparative advantage in the agricultural
field.

— Preferential trading arrangements have
spread to include most of Western Europe,
Africa and other countries bordering on the
Mediterranean Sea.

— Non-tariff barriers have greatly prolif-
erated as tariffs have declined.

These barriers to trade, in other countries
and in ours, presently cost the United States
several billion dollars a year in the form of
higher consumer prices and the inefficient
use of our resources. Even an economy as
strong as ours can ill afford such losses.

Fortunately, our major trading partners
have joined us in a commitment to broad,
multilateral trade negotiations beginning
this fall. These negotiations will provide a
unique opportunity for reducing trading bar-
riers and expanding world trade.

It is in the best interest of every nation to
sell to others the goods it produces more
efl^ciently and to purchase the goods which
other nations produce more efficiently. If we
can operate on this basis, then both the earn-
ings of our workers and the buying power of
our dollars can be significantly increased.

But while trade should be more open, it
.should also be more fair. This means, first,
that the rules and practices of trade should
be fair to all nations. Secondly, it means that
the benefits of trade should be fairly distrib-
uted among American workers, farmers,
businessmen and consumers alike and that
trade .should create no undue burdens for any
of these groups.

I am confident that our free and vigorous
American economv can more than hold its

own in open world competition. But we must
always insist that such competition take place
under equitable rules.

The Urgent Need for Action

The key to success in our coming trade
negotiations will be the negotiating authority
the United States bi-ings to the bargaining
table. Unless our negotiators can speak for
this country with sufficient authority, other
nations will undoubtedly be cautious and
non-committal — and the opportunity for
change will be lost.

We must move promptly to provide our
negotiators with the authority their task
requires. Delay can only aggravate the
strains we have already experienced. Dis-
ruptions in world financial markets, deficits
in our trading balance, inflation in the in-
ternational marketplace, and tensions in the
diplomatic arena all argue for prompt and
decisive action. So does the plight of those
American workers and businesses who are
damaged by rapidly rising imports or whose
products face barriers in foreign markets.

For all of these reasons, I urge the Con-
gress to act on my recommendations as ex-
peditiously as possible. We face pressing
problems here and now. We cannot wait until
tomorrow to solve them.

Providing New Negotiating Authorities

Negotiators from other countries will
i)ring to the coming round of trade discus-
sions broad authority to alter their barriers
to trade. Such authority makes them more
effective bai-gainers; without such authority
the hands of any negotiator would be se-
verely tied.

Unfortunately, the President of the United
States and those who negotiate at his direc-
tion do not now possess authorities compar-
able to those which other countries will bring
to these bargaining sessions. Unless these
authorities are provided, we will be badly
hampered in our effoi-ts to advance American
interests and improve our trading system.

My proposed legislation therefore calls
upon the Congress to delegate significant

April 30, 1973

515

new negotiating authorities to the executive
branch. For several decades now, both the
Congress and the President have recognized
that trade policy is one field in which such
delegations are indispensable. This concept
is clearly established ; the questions which
remain concern the degree of delegation
which is appropriate and the conditions un-
der which it should be carried out.

The legislation I submit today spells out
only that degree of delegation which I be-
lieve is necessary and proper to advance the
national interest. And just as we have con-
sulted closely with the Congress in shaping
this legislation, so the executive branch will
consult closely with the Congress in exercis-
ing any negotiating authorities it receives.
I invite the Congress to set up whatever
mechanism it deems best for closer consulta-
tion and cooperation to ensure that its views
are properly represented as trade negotia-
tions go forward.

It is important that America speak au-
thoritatively and with a single voice at the
international bargaining table. But it is also
important that many voices contribute as the
American position is being shaped.

The proposed Trade Reform Act of
1973 would provide for the following new
authorities :

First, I request authority to eliminate, re-
duce, or increase customs duties in the con-
text of negotiated agreements. Although this
authority is requested for a period of five
years, it is my intention and my expectation
that agreements can be concluded in a much
shorter time. Last October, the member gov-
ernments of the European Community ex-
pressed their hope that the coming round of
trade negotiations will be concluded by 1975.
I endorse this timetable and our negotiators
will cooperate fully in striving to meet it.

Secondly, I request a Congressional decla-
ration favoring negotiations and agreements
on non-tariff barriers. I am also asking that
a new, optional procedure be created for ob-
taining the approval of the Congress for such
agreements when that is appropriate. Cur-
rently both Houses of the Congress must
take positive action before any such agree-
ment requiring changes in domestic law be-

comes effective — a process which makes it
difficult to achieve agreements since our
trading partners know it is sub,iect to much
uncertainty and delay. Under the new ar-
rangement, the President would give notice
to the Congress of his intention to use the
procedure at least 90 days in advance of
concluding an agreement in order to pro-
vide time for appropriate House and Senate
Committees to consider the issues involved
and to make their views known. After an
agreement was negotiated, the President
would submit that agreement and proposed
implementing orders to the Congress. If
neither House rejected them by a majority
vote of all members within a period of 90
days, the agreement and implementing or-
ders would then enter into effect.

Thirdly, I request advance authority to
carry out mutually beneficial agreements
concerning specific customs matters primar-
ily involving valuation and the marking of
goods by country of origin.

The authorities I outline in my proposed
legislation would give our negotiators the
leverage and the flexibility they need to
reduce or eliminate foreign barriers to
American products. These proposals would
significantly strengthen America's bargain-
ing position in the coming trade negotiations.

Objectives in Agricultural Trade

I am not requesting specific negotiating
authority relating to agricultural trade. Bar-
riers to such trade are either tariff or non-
tariff in nature and can be dealt with under
the general authorities I am requesting.

One of our major objectives in the coming
negotiations is to provide for expansion in
agricultural trade. The strength of Ameri-
can agriculture depends on the continued
expansion of our world markets — especially
for the major bulk commodities our farmers
produce so efficiently. Even as we have been '
moving toward a great reliance on free
market forces here at home under the Agri-
cultural Act of 1970, so we seek to broaden
the role of market forces on the international i
level by reducing and removing barriers to
trade in farm products.

516

Department of State Bulletin

I am convinced that the concerns which
all nations have for their farmers and con-
sumers can be met most effectively if the
market plays a far greater role in determin-
ing patterns of agricultural production and
consumption. Movement in this direction can
do much to help ensure adequate supplies of
food and relieve pressure on consumer prices.

Providing for Import Relief

As other countries agree to reduce their
trading barriers, we expect to reduce ours.
The result will be expanding trade, creating
more and better jobs for the American peo-
ple and providing them with greater access
to a wider variety of products from other
countries.

It is true, of course, that reducing import
barriers has on some occasions led to sudden
surges in imports which have had disruptive
effects on the domestic economy. It is impor-
tant to note, however, that most severe
problems caused by surging imports have not
been related to the reduction of import bar-
riers. Steps toward a more open trading
order generally have a favorable rather than
an unfavorable impact on domestic jobs.

Nevertheless, damaging import surges,
whatever their cause, should be a matter of
great concern to our people and our Govern-
ment. I believe we should have effective in-
struments readily available to help avoid
serious injury from imports and give Ameri-
can industries and workers time to adjust to
increased imports in an orderly way. My
I)roposed legislation outlines new measures
for achieving these goals.

To begin with, I recommend a less restric-
tive test for invoking import restraints. To-
day, restraints are authorized only when the
Tariff Commission finds that imports are the
"major cause" of serious injury or threat
thereof to a domestic industry, meaning
that their impact must be larger than that
of all other causes combined. Under my pro-
posal, restraints would be authorized when
import competition was the "primary cause"
of such injury, meaning that it must only be
the largest single cause. In addition, the pres-
ent requirement that injury must result

from a previous tariff concession would be
droi)ped.

I also recommend a new method for de-
termining whether imports actually are the
primary cause of serious injury to domestic
producers. Under my proposal, a finding of
"market disruption" would constitute prima
facie evidence of that fact. Market disrup-
tion would be defined as occurring when im-
ports are substantial, are rising rapidly both
absolutely and as a percentage of total do-
mestic consumption, and are offered at prices
substantially below those of competing do-
mestic products.

My proposed legislation would give the
President greater flexibility in providing ap-
propriate relief from import problems — in-
cluding orderly marketing agreements or
higher tariffs or quotas. Restraints could be
imposed for an initial period of five years
and, at the discretion of the President, could
be extended for an additional period of two
years. In exceptional cases, restrictions could
be extended even further after a two-year
period and following a new investigation by
the Tariff Commission.

Improving Adjustment Assistance

Our responsibilities for easing the prob-
lems of displaced workers are not limited to
those whose unemployment can be traced to
imports. All displaced workers are entitled
to adequate assistance while they seek new
employment. Only if all workers believe they
are getting a fair break can our economy
adjust effectively to change.

I will therefore propose in a separate
message to the Congress new legislation to
improve our systems of unemployment in-
surance and compensation. My proposals
would -set minimum Federal standards for
benefit levels in State programs, ensuring
that all woi-kers covered by such programs
are treated equitably, whatever the cause of
their involuntary unemployment. In the
meantime, until these standards become ef-
fective, I am recommending as a part of
my trade reform proposals that we imme-
diately establish benefit levels which meet

April 30, 1973

517

these proposed general standards for work-
ers displaced because of imports.

I further propose that until the new stand-
ards for unemployment insurance are in
place, we make assistance for workers more
readily available by dropping the present
requirement that their unemployment must
have been caused by prior tariff concessions
and that imports must have been the "major
cause" of injury. Instead, such assistance
would be authorized if the Secretary of
Labor determined that unemployment was
substantially due to import-related causes.
Workers unemployed because of imports
would also have job training, job search
allowances, employment services and relo-
cation assistance available to them as per-
manent features of trade adjustment assist-
ance.

In addition, I will submit to the Congress
comprehensive pension reform legislation
which would help protect workers who lose
their jobs against loss of pension benefits.
This legislation will contain a mandatory
vesting requirement which has been devel-
oped with older workers particularly in mind.

The proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973
would terminate the present program of ad-
justment assistance to individual firms. I
recommend this action because I believe this
program has been largely ineffective, dis-
criminates among firms within a given in-
dustry and has needlessly subsidized some
firms at the taxpayer's expense. Changing
competitive conditions, after all, typically act
not upon particular firms but upon an in-
dustry as a whole and I have provided for
entire industries under my import relief
proposals.

Dealing With Unfair Trade Practices

The President of the United States pos-
sesses a variety of authorities to deal with
unfair trade practices. Many of these author-
ities must now be modernized if we are to
respond effectively and even-handedly to un-
fair import competition at home and to prac-
tices which unfairly prejudice our export
opportunities abroad.

To cope with unfair competitive practices

in our own markets, my proposed legislation
would amend our antidumping and counter-
vailing duty laws to provide for more expedi-
tious investigations and decisions. It would
make a number of procedural and other
changes in these laws to guarantee their
effective operation. The bill would also
amend the current statute concerning patent
infringement by subjecting cases involving
imports to judicial proceedings similar to
those which involve domestic infringement,
and by providing for fair processes and
effective action in the event of court delays.
I also propose that the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act be amended to strengthen our
ability to deal with foreign producers whose
cartel or monopoly practices raise prices in
our market or otherwise harm our interest
by restraining trade.

In addition, I ask for a revision and ex-
tension of my authority to raise barriers
against countries which unreasonably or un-
justifiably restrict our exports. Existing law
provides such authority only under a complex
array of conditions which vary according to
the practices or exports involved. My pro-
posed bill would simplify the authority and
its use. I would prefer, of course, that other
countries agree to remove such restrictions
on their own, so that we should not have to
use this authority. But I will consider using
it whenever it becomes clear that our trading
partners are unwilling to remove unreason-
able or unjustifiable restrictions against our
exports.

Other Major Provisions

Most-Favorcd-Nation Authority. My pro-
posed legislation would grant the Presi-
dent authority to extend most-favored-nation
treatment to any country when he deemed
it in the national interest to do so. Under
my proposal, however, any such extension to
countries not now receiving most-favored-
nation treatment could be vetoed by a major-
ity vote of either the House or the Senate
within a three-month period.

This new authority would enable us to
carry out the trade agreement we have nego-
tiated with the Soviet Union and thereby

518

Department of State Bulletin

ensure that country's repayment of its lend-
lease debt. It would also enable us to fulfill
our commitment to- Romania and to take
advantage of opportunities to conclude bene-
ficial agreements with other countries which
do not now receive most-favored-nation
treatment.

In the case of the Soviet Union, I recog-
nize the deep concern which many in the
Congress have exjn-essed over the tax levied
on Soviet citizens wishing to emigrate to
new countries. However, I do not believe that
a policy of denying most-favored-nation
treatment to Soviet exports is a proper or
even an effective way of dealing with this
problem.

One of the most important elements of
our trade agreement with the Soviet Union
is the clause which calls upon each party to
reduce exports of products which cause mar-
ket disruptions in the other country. While
I have no reason to doubt that the Soviet
Union will meet its obligations undei- this
clause if the need arises, we should still have
authority to take unilateral action to prevent
disruption if such action is warranted.

Because of the special w-ay in which state-
trading countries market their products
abroad, I would recommend two modifications
in the way we take such action. First, the
Tariff Commission should only have to find
"material injury" rather than "serious in-
jury" from imports in order to impose appi'o-
priate restraints. Secondly, such restraints
should apply only to exports from the offend-
ing country. These recommendations can
simplify our laws relating to dumping ac-
tions by state-trading countries, eliminating
the difllcult and time-consuming problems a.s-
sociated with trying to reach a constructed
value for their exports.

Balance of Paijmeyitf^ Avthnrity. Though
it should only be used in exceptional circum-
stances, trade policy can sometimes be an
effective supplementary tool for dealing with
our international payments imbalances. I
therefore request more flexible authority to
raise or lower import restrictions on a tem-
poi-ary basis to help correct deficits or sur-
pluses in our payments position. Such

restraints could be applied to imports from
all countries across the board or only to
those countries which fail to correct a per-
sistent and excessive surplus in their global
payments position.

Anti-Inflation Authority. My trade recom-
mendations also include a proposal I made
on March 30th as a part of this Administra-
tion's effort to curb the rising cost of living."
I asked the Congress at that time to give the
President new, permanent authority to re-
duce certain import barriers temporarily and
to a limited extent when he determined that
such action was necessary to relieve infla-
tionary pressures within the United States.
I again urge prompt approval for this im-
jiortant weapon in our war against inflation.

Generalized Tariff Preferences. Another
significant provision of my proposed bill
would permit the United States to join with
other developed countries, including Japan
and the members of the European Commu-
nity, in helping to improve the access of
poorer nations to the markets of developed
countries. Under this arrangement, certain
products of developing nations would benefit
from prefei'ential ti'eatment for a ten-year
period, creating new export opportunities for
such countries, raising their foreign ex-
change earnings, and permitting them to
finance those higher levels of imports that
are essential for more rapid economic
growth.

This legislation would allow duty-free
treatment for a bi'oad range of manufac-
tured and semi-manufactured products and
for a selected list of agricultural and pri-
mary products which are now regulated only
by tariflTs. It is our intention to exclude cer-
tain import-sensitive products such as textile
products, footweai', watches and certain steel
pi-oducts from such preferential treatment,
along with products which are now subject
to outstanding orders re.stricting imports.
As is the case for the multilateral negotia-
tions authority, public hearing procedures
would be held befoi-e such prefei'ences were
granted and preferential imports would be

'See p. 532.

April 30, 1973

519

subject to the import relief provisions which
I have recommended above. Once a particu-
lar product from a given country became
fully competitive, however, it would no
longer qualify for special treatment.

The United States would grant such tariff
preferences on the basis of international
fair play. We would take into account the
actions of other preference-granting coun-
tries and we would not grant preferences to
countries which discriminate against our
products in favor of goods from other indus-
trialized nations unless those countries
agreed to end such discrimination.

Permanent Management Authorities. To
permit more efficient and more flexible man-
agement of American trade policy, I request
permanent authority to make limited reduc-
tions in our tariflTs as a form of compensa-
tion to other countries. Such compensation
could be necessary in cases where we have
raised certain barriers under the new im-
port restraints discussed above and would
provide an alternative in such cases to in-
creased barriers against our exports.

I also request permanent authority to offer
reductions in particular United States bar-
riers as a means of obtaining significant
advantages for American exports. These re-
ductions would be strictly limited ; they
would involve tariff cuts of no more than
20 percent covering no more than two per-
cent of total United States imports in any
one year.

Reforming International Trading Rules

The coming multilateral trade negotiations
will give us an excellent opportunity to re-
form and update the rules of international
trade. There are several areas where we will
seek such changes.

One important need concerns the use of
trade policy in promoting equilibrium in the
international payments system. We will seek
rule changes to permit nations, in those ex-
ceptional cases where such measures are
necessary, to increase or decrease trade bar-
riers across the board as one means of help-
ing to correct their payments imbalances.
We will also seek a new rule allowing nations

to impose import restrictions against indi-
vidual countries which fail to take effective
action to correct an excessive surplus in
their balance of payments. This rule would
parallel the authority I have requested to
use American import restrictions to meet
our own balance of payments problem.

A second area of concern is the need for
a multilateral system for limiting imports
to protect against disruptions caused by rap-
idly changing patterns of international trade.
As I emphasized earlier, we need a more
effective domestic procedure to meet such
problems. But it is also important that new
arrangements be developed at the inter-
national level to cope with disruptions caused
by the accelerating pace of change in world
trade.

We will therefore seek new international
rules which would allow countries to gain
time for adjustment by imposing import
restrictions, without having to compensate
their trading partners by simultaneously re-
ducing barriers to other products. At the
same time, the interests of exporting coun-
tries should be protected by providing that
such safeguards will be phased out over a
reasonable period of time.

Promoting Export Expansion

As trade barriers are reduced around the
world, American exports will increase sub-
stantially, enhancing the health of our entire
economy.

Already our efforts to expand American
exports have moved forward on many fronts.
We have made our exports more competitive
by realigning exchange rates. Since 1971,
our new law permitting the establishment of
Domestic International Sales Corporations
has been helping American companies or-
ganize their export activities more effec-
tively. The lending, guaranty and insurance
authorities of the Export-Import Bank have
been increased and operations have been
extended to include a short-term discount
loan facility. The Department of Commerce
has reorganized its facilities for promoting
exports and has expanded its services for
exporters. The Department of State, in co-

520

Department of State Bulletin

operation with the Department of Commerce,
is giving increased emphasis to commercial
service programs in our missions abroad.

In addition, I am today submitting sepa-
rate legishition which would amend the Ex-
port Trade Act in order to clarify the legal
framework in which associations of export-
ers can function. One amendment would
make it clear that the act applies not only
to the export of goods but also to certain
kinds of services — architecture, construction,
engineering, training and management con-
sulting, for example. Another amendment
would clarify the exemption of export asso-
ciations from our domestic antitrust laws,
while setting up clear information, disclosure
and regulatory requirements to ensure that
the public interest is fully protected.

In an era when more countries are seeking
foreign contracts for entire industrial proj-
ects— including steps ranging from engineei--
ing studies through the supply of equipment
and the construction of plants — it is essen-
tial that our laws concerning joint export
activities allow us to meet our foreign com-
petition on a fair and equal basis.

The Growth of International Investment

The rapid growth of international invest-
ment in recent yeai-s has raised new ques-
tions and new challenges for businesses and
governments. In our own country, for exam-
ple, some people have feared that American
investment abroad will result in a loss of
American jobs. Our studies show, however,
that such investment on balance has meant
more and better jobs for American workers,
has improved our balance of trade and our
overall balance of payments, and has gener-
ally strengthened our economy. Moreover, I
strongly believe that an open system for in-
ternational investment, one which eliminates
artificial incentives or impediments here and
abroad, offers great promise for improved
prosperity throughout the world.

It may well be that new rules and new
mechanisms will be needed for international
investment activities. It will take time, how-
ever, to develop them. And it is important

that they be developed as much as possible
on an international scale. If we restrict the
ability of American firms to take advantage
of investment opportunities abroad, we can
only expect that foreign firms will seize these
opi)oi'tunities and prosper at our expense.

I therefore urge the Congress to refrain
from enacting broad new changes in our
laws governing direct foreign investment
until we see what possibilities for multilat-
eral agreements emerge.

It is in this context that we must also
shape our system for taxing the foreign
profits of American business. Our existing
system permits American-controlled ])usi-
nesses in foreign countries to operate under
the same tax burdens which apply to its
foreign competitors in that country. I believe
that system is fundamentally sound. We
should not penalize American business by
placing it at a disadvantage with respect
to its foreign competitoi's.

American enterprises abroad now pay sub-
stantial foi-eign income taxes. In most cases,
in fact, Americans do not invest abroad be-
cause of an attractive tax situation but be-
cause of attractive business opportunities.
Our income taxes are not the cause of our
trade problems and tax changes will not
solve them.

The Congi-ess exhaustively reviewed this
entire matter in 1962 and the conclusion it
reached then is still fundamentally sound:
there is no reason that our tax credit and
deferral provisions relating to overseas in-
vestment should be subjected to drastic
surgery.

On the other hand, ten years of experience
have demonstrated that in certain specialized
cases American investment abroad can be
subject to abuse. Some artificial incentives
for such investment still exist, distorting the
flow of capital and producing unnecessary
hardship. In those cases where unusual tax
advantages are off"ered to induce investment
that might not otherwise occur, we should
move to eliminate that inducement.

A number of foi-eign countries presently
grant major tax inducements such as ex-
tended "holidays" from local taxes in order

April 30, 1973

521

to attract investment from outside their
borders. To curb such practices, I will ask
the Congress to amend our tax laws so that
earnings from new American investments
which take advantage of such incentives will
be taxed by the United States at the time
they are earned — even though the earnings
are not returned to this country. The only
exception to this provision would come in
cases where a bilateral tax treaty provided
for such an exception under mutually ad-
vantageous conditions.

American companies sometimes make for-
eign investments specifically for the purpose
of re-exporting products to the United
States. This is the classic "runaway plant"
situation. In cases where foreign subsidiaries
of American companies have receipts from
exports to the United States which exceed
25 percent of the subsidiaries' total receipts,
I recommend that the earnings of those sub-
sidiaries also be taxed at current American
rates. This new rule would only apply, how-
ever, to new investments and to situations
where lower taxes in the foreign country are
a factor in the decision to invest. The rule
would also provide for exceptions in those
unusual cases where our national interest
required a different result.

There are other situations in which Ameri-
can companies so design their foreign oper-
ations that the United States treasury bears
the burden when they lose money and deduct
it from their taxes. Yet when that same
company makes money, a foreign treasury
receives the benefit of taxes on its profits. I
will ask the Congress to make appropriate
changes in the rules which now allow this
inequity to occur.

We have also found that taxing of min-
eral imports by United States companies
from their foreign affiliates is subject to
lengthy delays. I am therefore instructing
the Department of the Treasury, in consul-
tation with the Department of Justice and
the companies concerned, to institute a pro-
cedure for determining inter-company prices
and tax payments in advance. If a compliance
program cannot be developed voluntarily,

I shall ask for legislative authority to create
one.

The Challenge of Change

Over the past year, this Administration
has repeatedly emphasized the importance of
bringing about a more equitable and open
world trading system. We have encouraged
other nations to join in negotiations to
achieve this goal. The declaration of Euro-
pean leaders at their summit meeting last
October demonstrates their dedication to the
success of this effort. Japan, Canada and
other nations share this dedication.

The momentum is there. Now we — in this
country — must seize the moment if that mo-
mentum is to be sustained.

When the history of our time is written,
this era will surely be described as one of
profound change. That change has been par-
ticularly dramatic in the international eco-
nomic arena.

The magnitude and pace of economic
change confronts us today with policy ques-
tions of immense and immediate significance.
Change can mean increased disruption and
suffering, or it can mean increased well-
being. It can bring new forms of depriva-
tion and discrimination, or it can bring
wider sharing of the benefits of progress. It
can mean conflict between men and nations,
or it can mean growing opportunities for fair
and peaceful competition in which all parties
can ultimately gain.

My proposed Trade Reform Act of 1973
is designed to ensure that the inevitable
changes of our time are beneficial changes —
for our people and for people everywhere.

I urge the Congress to enact these pro-
posals, so that we can help move our country
and our world away from trade confronta-
tion and toward trade negotiation, away
from a period in which trade has been a
source of international and domestic friction
and into a new era in which trade among
nations helps us to build a peaceful, more
prosperous world.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, April 10, 1973.

522

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Rogers and Other Officials Brief Foreign Ambassadors
on Provisions of Trade Reform Act of 1973

A briefing on the Trade Refo7in Act of
197S was held at the Department of State on
April 10 for foreign ambasfiadors to the
United States. Following are opening state-
ments made by Secretary Rogers; William J.
Casey. Under Secretary for Economic Af-
fairs; Julius Katz, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for International Resources and Food
Policy; Willis C. Armstrong, Assistant Secre-
farij for Economic and Business Affairs; and
William J. Eberle, President Nixon's Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations.^

SECRETARY ROGERS

Ladies and gentlemen : I appreciate very
much your coming here this morning to give
us the opportunity to talk to you briefly about
the President's trade message, called the
Trade Reform Act of 1973. I will just make
a few preliminary comments, and then I will
ask the gentlemen here on my left to go into
more detail.

The purpose of the briefing is to give you
some advance information about the message
that the President will send up and the bill
that he will send up. Although parts of it
may not be of interest to all of you, I think
there are portions of the bill that all of you
will be interested in.

As you know, early in 1972 the United
States declared its intention to work actively
for the opening of multilateral trade nego-
tiations on both tariff and nontariff barriers,
both in agricultural and industrial products.

Our basic objectives in these trade negotia-
tions are:

— To build on and expand international

' The questions and answers which followed are
not printed here.

economic efficiency and prosperity by re-
moving obstacles to the freer play of market
forces in determining the level and pattern of
world trade. One key change would be the
development of agreed rules under which
safeguards could be invoked when abrupt in-
creases in competition threaten to disrupt
markets.

— Also, to obtain changes in the system
under which nations conduct their trade re-
lations to insure that the rules are fair and
apply equitably to all parties.

Today the President is submitting to the
Congress the Trade Reform Act of 1973,
broad and basic legislation designed to pro-
vide the basis for achieving this fair and
o])en world economy.

This proposed act represents President
Nixon's major initiative to expand world
trade and reform international commercial
policies and practices. When approved by
the Congress, it will grant the U.S. Govern-
ment exceptionally broad authority in a new
round of GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] negotiations aimed at
lowering tariff and nontariff barriers in
trade in industrial and agricultural products.

The basic provisions of the bill are as
follows.

First, it would give the President authority
to lower or raise tariffs without limit. This
would apply only to trade agreements which
are entered into within five years of the en-
actment of this bill. In other words, this
broad authority to lower tariffs or to raise
tariffs has to be exercised in the context of
trade negotiations.

Second, the President would be authorized
to enter into agreements to reduce, eliminate,
or harmonize nontariff barriers in certain
cases. Now, in certain cases, and you will

April 30, 1973

523

see from the bill, he can do this without any
legislative approval after this bill is enacted.
In other cases, he would be able to do so if
the agreement is not vetoed by one House
of Congress within 90 days. So this gives
him very broad authority to lower tariffs or
raise tariffs and gives him very broad au-
thority to reduce or eliminate nontariff bar-
riers in the context of a trade agreement.

The authority that I have spoken about,
both tariff and nontariff barrier authority,
does not distinguish between agriculture and
industry, but covers all trade.

The escape clause procedures would be
relaxed so that the U.S. businessmen and
workers injured by imports could have easier
access to temporary import relief.

The President would be permitted also to
impose restrictions if needed to help correct
serious balance of payments deficits. He would
be authorized to lower tariffs when the United
States is in a durable surplus situation.

The President would be given increased
power to retaliate against unjustifiable or
unreasonable foreign trade practices. And we
will give you more specific information about
that in a moment.

The President could extend most-favored-
nation treatment under certain conditions to
countries not now eligible for such treatment
under the U.S. law.

And the President would be authorized to
grant tariff preferences to less developed
countries. I note this latter point with partic-
ular satisfaction. I have often stressed this
government's intention to submit preference
legislation. Inclusion of generalized prefer-
ences in this bill is, I know, of particular
importance to Latin American and other de-
veloping country representatives here today.

So this bill will provide authority, then,
which we need and which our trading part-
ners have urged us to obtain, not only to ne-
gotiate for the reduction of trade barriers
and improvements in the rules governing in-
ternational trade but also to implement
agreements for lower tariffs and new rules in
many areas.

We can also negotiate an agreement on any
nontariff barrier with the assurance that the

agreement could be implemented unless one
House of Congress voted against the agree-
ment within 90 days after submission of the
agreement. And we think this is a great im-
provement over previous attempts in this
field.

I would hope and expect that by the time
of the meeting of the GATT in Tokyo next
September, the legislation would have pro-
gressed far enough in the Congress that we
would be sufficiently assured of the authority
needed to participate fully in the multilateral
negotiations which are scheduled to be
launched at that meeting.

The bill provides that the authority to en-
ter into trade agreements will endure for five
years. The President in his message to the
Congress submitted with the bill accepts the
target of 1975 for completion of an agree-
ment which was set by the leaders of the
European Economic Community at their
summit meeting last October.

Today we find ourselves in a period where
the rules established 25 years ago need to
be improved. It is also a period in which
economic distortions anywhere must be of
concern to people everywhere. The very suc-
cess of the economic system that was set up
after World War II has increased the stake
of all nations and all peoples in promptly re-
forming that system so that it can meet new
challenges.

Last September, speaking before the Gov-
ernors of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), our President suggested that our
common goal should be to set in place an
economic structure that will help and not
hinder the world's historic movement toward
peace. The cooperation demonstrated in deal-
ing with the recent monetary disturbance
is very encouraging, as is the work going on
in the Committee of Twenty to develop fun-
damental reform of the world monetary sys-
tem. The OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] is working
on the development of fair standards for na-
tional investment policies. And the GATT is
preparing for multilateral negotiations to
improve the rules governing the world trad-
ing system.

524

Department of State Bulletin

The preamble to the hill our President is
sending to the Congress today stales it^ pur-
pose in these words :

To provide authority in the trade field supporting
United States participation in an interrelated effort
to develop an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world
economic system through reform of international
trade rules, formulation of international standards
for investment and tax laws and policies, and im-
provement of the international monetary system; . . .

Therefore, gentlemen, I lielieve that this
bill, if enacted into law — and we think it will
be — will establish a broad charter for the
United States to work constructively with
all of you in the OATT, the IMF. and the
OECD in the fields of trade, money, and
investment.

Our purpose will be to build an interna-
tional economic structure which reflects and
reinforces the goals of peace and mutual help
we have been seeking in the political realm.

Now I would like to call upon the follow-
ing gentlemen in this order to give you more
specific information and, if we have time,
to answer any questions you may have about
this legislation. We will provide, if we have
not already, a draft of the bill, the Presi-
dent's message, a short summary of the bill,
and we will attempt to answer any questions
you may have.

First I would like to ask Under Secretary
of State William Casey to speak on the au-
thority to negotiate that is provided in the
bill and to implement the trading agreement.
Then I will call on Julius Katz, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State, who will speak on
permanent trade management authority;
third, Assistant Secretary of State Willis
Armstrong, who will speak on generalized
preferences and MFN [most-favored-na-
tion] ; and then I will ask Ambassador Wil-
liam Eberle, who is Special Trade Repre-
sentative in the WTiite House, to conclude the
meeting.

UNDER SECRETARY CASEY

(iood morning, ladies and gentlemen. To-
gether with Assistant Secretary Armstrong
and Deputy Assistant Secretary Katz, I will
describe for you in some greater detail how
the Trade Reform Act of 1973 works.

Let us first understand that it does three
separate things.

The first is to provide the temporary au-
thority to negotiate and carry out the broad
multilateral trade agreement that most of
us are committed to seek in the GATT dur-
ing the next few years. I will talk primarily
about that.

The second thing it does is to provide per-
manent authority to manage our trade rela-
tions, to make limited adju.stments in our
tai-iffs, to make compensating adjustments
required by the GATT rules, to react against
trade measures that discriminate against
U.S. trade, to deal with balance of payments,
anti-inflation, and national security needs,
and to make our antidumping and our coun-
tervailing-duty laws woik more satisfacto-
rily. Deputy Assistant Secretary Katz will
describe that part of the bill to you.

And the third thing it does is to provide
for authority to develop a system of general-
ized preferences for the less developed coun-
tries and to enter into bilateral agreements
with countries to which we are not now able
to extend most-favored-nation treatment. As-
sistant Secretary Armstrong will describe
those provisions to you.

Some concern has been expressed that this
bill grants broad powers to increase as well
as to reduce trade barriers. Our system and
the unknown requirements of negotiating
in the future make it necessai-y to ask for
broad and flexible authority. This bill would
do no more than give our President the same
power.s to make trade adjustments that most
other governments already have. In the par-
liamentary system, the close and immediate
relationship between the executive and the
Parliament provides very quickly and almost
automatically the authority which our trad-
ing partners have asked that our President
obtain in advance.

In asking for authority to negotiate in the
future and carry out an agreement not yet
made, it is necessary to ask for broad au-
thority. The bill provides the authority to
modify duties up as well as down in order
to carry out the trade agreement we all hope
to negotiate over the next two years.

April 30, 1973

525

The preamble of the bill makes it clear
that it will be our objective to reduce tariffs
and other barriers to trade. To accomplish
this it may be necessary to increase the tariff
on some items, perhaps to achieve harmoni-
zation— which is one of the objectives the
European Community is considering for this
round of negotiations. It may be necessary,
in order to eliminate a quota, to convert it
to a tariff or to increase a tariff temporarily
and then scale it down over a period of years.

Thus, all of us may need the flexibility to
increase tariffs, temporarily we hope, as
well as to reduce them in order to work to-
ward a general lowering of barriers over a
period of time.

The authority in this bill would permit us
to eliminate as well as to adjust tariffs, and
the authority will last for five years. The only
limitation is that any adjustment must be
staged over a period of five years. There
would be a gradual scaling down, and I am
sure all of us will want to introduce tariff
reductions on this kind of a gradual basis.

The bill also provides the authority to ne-
gotiate the reduction, elimination, or har-
monization of nontariff barriers. It would
give the President the power to order the
implementation of any agreement on customs
valuation. This can include something like
the use of the "American selling price" to
compute the tariff on chemicals. He can
order changes in methods of assessing quan-
tities. This could cover agreements on wine
and whisky bottles, for example. He could
establish rules so that requirements to use
expensive methods of marking the country of
origin could not serve as an indirect barrier
to trade.

Then, on any agreement to change or
eliminate any other kind of a nontariff
barrier, as Secretary Rogers indicated, the
President would have the authority to im-
plement, if he gives Congress 90 days' notice
of intent before he signs the agreement and
then 90 additional days elapse after the
agreement is filed with the Congress without
one House of Congress having voted against
the agreement.

Thus, this bill goes as far as possible to

provide a definiteness and a certainty in our
ability to carry out agreements and to change
or modify laws and regulations which serve
as nontariff barriers to trade.

The bill sets out a procedure, a set of
prenegotiation requirements, consultative
arrangements, for us to follow in the course
of developing our negotiating posture. The
President would first file with the Tariff
Commission a list of articles to be considered
in the negotiation. And the Tariff Commis-
sion would be required to investigate the
impact of lower tariffs on these articles, the
impact on workers, on firms, on consumers.
And there would be hearings, public hear-
ings, after which, within six months after
the filing of this list, the Tariff Commission
would be required to file a report with the
President, and then the President could make
the offer of adjustment which would begin
the negotiation from our standpoint.

The bill also calls for two Members of the
House of Representatives and two Members
of the Senate to be accredited as members of
the U.S. delegation to the negotiation.

Now let me turn to the provisions of im-
port relief.

Today change comes rapidly. And this bill
has provisions for temporary relief when
changing patterns of trade bring a flood
of imports which could disrupt a market.
We use the term "safeguard" to describe this
relief. There is some concern that these safe-
guards may be protectionist in nature. It
is our view that the kind of safeguards we
have in mind are a liberalizing force, a force
for freer and more open trade. They would
be temporary in character. And these tem-
porary reductions, or temporary restrictions,
would be phased down to permit a continued
growth in the volume of trade. And we
would hope there would be agreement on a
multilateral system of temporary safeguards
which would permit a continued growth in
the volume of trade and also protect workers
and provide time for firms in every country
to adjust to new competition from countries
which achieve advantages in cost and
efficiency.

We view these safeguards as a force for

526

Department of State Bulletin

liheralizinp trade because without providing
this kind of opportunity for adjustment it
will he much more difficult for any govern-
ment to scale down tariffs and other barriers
which protect their industries. And thus we
see the availability of temjiorary safeguards
as necessaiy for all of us to muster the will
and lubricate the way to a more open trading
world.

Here is how the safeguard system would
work as envisaged in this bill.

First, anyone could petition for import
lelief. It would be necessary to show a pur-
pose to transfer resources to other uses or
to otherwise adapt to competition from
abroad. Then the Tariff Commission would
he required to find that there is serious in-
jury or the threat thereof and that imports
are the primary cause of injury. This would
be established if market disruption is shown,
and "market disruption" is defined as a con-
dition where imports are substantial and
increasing rapidly, both absolutely and as a
percentage of the market, and being offered
at a price below comparable domestic
products.

The Tariff Commission would be required
to hold a public hearing and report on the
petition within three months.

Then the President would be required to
consider the impact of import relief on work-
ers, on consumers. He would be required to
consider the possibility and feasibility of the
firms affected being able to adjust within the
period of relief. He would also consider the
compensation required in the GATT, under
GATT rules, if import relief is granted.

After this consideration, he could then
grant import relief, which could take the
form of a change in tariff or a quota, or the
institution of an orderly marketing agree-
ment.

Whatever form of import relief were de-
termined, it would have to be phased out
within five years unless the President au-
thorized an extension, which would only be
granted on the showing of due cause, and
that extension would be limited to two years.

So that any safeguard, any import relief,
would last for a maximum of seven years,

if a two-year extension were granted, and
would be scaled down within that period of
time.

Now, these safeguards could be set up uni-
laterally with the i-equirement for compen-
sation under the rules of the GATT, or they
could be instituted without compensation on
an agreed multilateral basis, if that can be
negotiated; and it will be one of our objec-
tives to negotiate such a multilateral safe-
guard system during this Nixon round of
trade negotiations.

Now I will ask Deputy Assistant Secretary
Katz to describe the permanent authority for
managing our trade relations which the bill
will provide.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KATZ

The draft bill contains two titles dealing
with permanent trade authorities.

The first of these has to do with unfair
trade practices. And this title revises four
principal existing authorities in law dealing
with unfair trade practices.

The first of these, in chapter 1, revises
and expands the existing section 252 of the
Trade Expansion Act. This provision author-
izes the President to take action or to re-
taliate against foreign countries which
maintain unreasonable or unjustified tariff
or other import policies. There are two prin-
cipal changes in this provision from existing
law. One is to remove the distinction between
agricultural and nonagricultural trade. The
new provision would apply to all articles of
trade. And secondly, there is a provision
dealing with subsidies which affect U.S. ex-
ports in third-country markets.

The second chapter of this title amends
the Antidumping Act and consolidates certain
regulations of the Treasury applying to anti-
dumping. The amendments would apply to
a time limit on investigations of the Treas-
ury Department and require the Secretary
of the Treasury to make determinations
within .specified periods of time, six months
in most cases and nine months in more com-
plicated cases. Secondly, there will be a re-
quirement for public hearings and a public

April 30, 1973

527

record to be open and available, except that
certain material provided in confidence could
not be made public. And finally, this draft
amends certain provisions of the Antidump-
ing Act dealing with determinations of pur-
chase price and export sales price.

The third chapter of this title deals with
countervailing duties, and it makes several
important changes. The present countervail-
ing-duty statute only applies to dutiable
articles ; that is, it does not apply to duty-
free articles of trade. The draft bill provides
that it shall apply to nondutiable trade as
well. However, in this case it will be subject
to an injury finding as required by the
GATT; that is, there will be a requirement
for a finding by the Tariff Commission of
material injury. And then finally, there is
authority to set aside the application of this
law, or this provision, where action under
the law would be significantly detrimental to
U.S. interests or where an existing quantita-
tive restriction would be considered to be an
adequate substitute for action under the
countervailing-duty statute. There is also a
time limit for investigations and determina-
tions by the Secretary of the Treasury, which
will be one year.

The last chapter of this title has to do
with a provision of the existing Tariff Act,
section 337, which deals with unfair trade
practices in general and certain specific ones,
such as patent infringement, antitrust vio-
lations. This proposed amendment would
limit the application of section 337 to patent
infringement cases, and it would expand the
procedures. A parallel piece of legislation
would turn over to the Federal Trade Com-
mission the other unfair trade practices
which are referred to presently in section
337.

The second title of this draft bill, title IV,
which deals with permanent authority, per-
manent trade policy management, has a
number of provisions.

The first provides an explicit and flexible
authority to deal with balance of payments
situations, including the temporary imposi-
tion of import surcharges or other import
limitations to deal with very serious balance

of payments problems. The President would
be authorized to impose import restrictions
or surcharges under certain specified con-
ditions— if the United States is in a balance
of payments deficit position for four consec-
utive quarters, or if the United States has
suffered a serious loss of reserves, or there
has been or threatens to be an alteration in
the foreign exchange value of the dollar and
he expects that this situation will continue.
The authority is permissive; it is not obliga-
tory. The payments deficit would be meas-
ured on a basic balance or official settlements
basis, and it would not merely depend on the
trade balance.

The second section of this title would pro-
vide an authority for the President to exer-
cise fully rights contained in the GATT or
other trade agreements. This would enable
the President to increase duties, for example,
under article 28 of the GATT. In this case
he could not increase tariffs more than 50
percent above the column 2 rate, which is
the Smoot-Hawley rate, or 50 percent ad
valorem, whichever is higher. This authority
would also enable the President to maintain
existing trade agreement concession rates
after a trade agreement were terminated.
Under the present law, the authority for
maintaining concessions is linked to the ex-
istence of the agreement. If the agreement
should terminate for one reason or another,
the rate would also go back to the statutory
or Smoot-Hawley rate. This provision would
enable the President to continue that rate
notwithstanding the termination of the
agreement.

The third section in this title would pro-
vide a continuing authority to negotiate tar-
iff concessions, or trade concessions, of
limited scope affecting not more than 2 per-
cent of our trade. But this would be authority
that would continue beyond the five-year
limitation Under Secretary Casey referred
to earlier.

The fourth section provides an authority
to compensate other countries as required
under GATT provisions where there has
been an increase in a tariff rate or an import
restriction, perhaps under an escape clause
action. This would provide a permanent au-

528

Deparfment of State Bulletin

thority to compensate, something that we
have not had in the last six years.

The fifth section would authorize the re-
duction of import restrictions to deal with
conditions of inflation. In order to restrain
inflation, the President could reduce tariffs
or remove quantitative restrictions, and he
could take action provided that it did not
aflFect more than 30 percent of the total
estimated imports during the period the
action was contemplated.

There are a number of other provisions
in this title which are essentially carryovers
from the existing law, having to do with
procedural matters such as reservation from
negotiations of articles which are subject to
national security or escape clause actions,
the general most-favored-nation provision,
the termination authority, the period for
trade agreements, public hearings — all of
these are standard provisions which have
been in the law for some time and are in the
current law.

And finally, there is an authority for an
appropriation to GATT, which is a little
domestic i)roblem we have had. We have
not previously had an explicit authorization
to contribute to GATT.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMSTRONG

Ladies and gentlemen : I am going to talk
first about the provision in the Trade Reform
Act of 1973 for giving preferential treatment
to manufactured or semimanufactured goods
from developing countries.

Title VI of the law provides for such au-
thority for the President. It specifies that
the President may extend preferential treat-
ment to manufactured or semimanufactured
goods which are determined to be eligible
from specified developing countries.

There is a provision for an administrative
process whereby the list of articles which
would be given such treatment is to be estab-
lished. There is a procedure by which the
President would decide what countries would
be eligible. These criteria include the wish
of the country, the level of development,
whether the country receives such prefer-

ences from other major developed countries,
and whether the country has taken action re-
garding American investments which might
be described as contrary to international law.
These are criteria which the President will
use. No single criterion is considered binding.

There is a limitation on what the Pres-
ident may do in extending these preferences.
The tariff may either be the MFN rate, or
it may be zero. There is no provision for
anything in between.

The safeguards provisions just described
by Under Secretary Casey will apply in such
circumstances and will be a part of the re-
gime of generalized preferences.

There is a significant and important lim-
itation, which is that generalized prefer-
ences are not to be granted to developing
countries which extend reverse preferences
to other developed countries, unless these
are eliminated by the 1st of January 1976.

There are other exception.s. Anything
which is now handled or might be handled
under the national security exception of our
trade law would not be eligible for preferen-
tial treatment. There would also be a limita-
tion to the effect that no country which does
not now receive, or which does not in the
future receive most-favored-nation treat-
ment, could get generalized preferences.

The object of the legislation is that the
program should run for 10 years unless the
Congress should extend it. There is written
into the law a provision whereby a country
may become ineligible for such preferences
if it supplies 50 percent of the total value of
the imports into the United States of a par-
ticular good, or $25 million worth, on an
annual basis over a representative period.
The President may, however, waive this
requirement.

These are essentially the provisions of
title VI, which covers the extension of gen-
eralized preferences.

I will now move to title V, which contains
authority for the President to enter into a
commercial arrangement and to give most-
favored-nation treatment to countries to
which it is not now extended. This could be
done either bilaterally through a particular

April 30, 1973

529

trade agreement or through the extension to
the other country of most-favored-nation
treatment when that country becomes affili-
ated with the GATT.

Specifically, this title applies to countries
which have basically state-trading systems.
The arrangement whereby the President
could extend such MFN treatment requires
that, once he has reached agreement with
such country, he places the agreement before
the Congress. The agreement would enter
into effect and he would be authorized to
extend most-favored-nation treatment only
if the majority of neither House has disap-
proved within 90 days of the receipt of the
agreement.

Bilateral agreements negotiated under this
title are to be on a three-year basis, renew-
able, but subject to suspension for national
security reasons.

There is an illustrative list of matters
that might be covered by such bilateral
agreements. One is market disruption. One
is the protection of industrial property. An-
other one is the settlement of commercial
disputes. Another one is the question of busi-
ness facilities such as trade and tourist
offices.

It is interesting that there is a provision
for market disruption which is comparable
to the safeguard provisions described by
Secretary Casey. In the case of market dis-
ruption by a country under this title, how-
ever, the President could act to curb imports
selectively, and not on a global basis.

There are, further, two items which are
not contained in title V but which are found
in title VII, in section 706. What the legal
language in section 706 of title VII means
is the repeal of the legislation which provides
for an embargo on certain furs from the
U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China
and also the repeal of what is known as the
Johnson Debt Default Act. These two pro-
visions of title VII are to be read in con-
junction with the objectives of title V, the
purpose of which is to enable us to expand
and improve and normalize our trade re-
lations with countries with state-trading
systems.

AMBASSADOR EBERLE

Under Secretary Casey: This bill provides
that the chief negotiator will be the Presi-
dent's Special Trade Representative. And
Ambassador Eberle is here with us. He's the
President's Special Trade Representative.
And he's going to describe some other bills
that are companions to the trade bill. Am-
bassador Eberle.

Ambassador Eberle: It's a pleasure for an
outsider to be associated with my friendly
State Department colleagues.

The total picture in this trade legislation
area, if you are to understand it completely,
requires a look at a number of other bills
that will be going up this week that are asso-
ciated with this.

First of all, there will be a comment in the
President's message related to taxes. There
is nothing in the trade bill that relates to
taxes themselves, but the message will in-
clude these comments : that the President is
not, and this administration is not, recom-
mending any major change in the taxation
of our corporations. At the same time, after
10 years we are recommending some very
specific changes in three ways.

First of all, where other countries which
do not have a tax treaty with us grant major
tax holidays, we will, in looking at those
tax holidays, because they distort investment
around the world, consider taxing as cur-
rent income and not on a deferral basis any
income from that operation even though it
is tax-deferred or subject to a tax holiday
in that country.

A second change recommended in this
same area of taxation on foreign-source in-
come— these are American corporations with
branches abroad — are those places where 25
percent of the earnings of the subsidiary
corporations come from products which are
manufactured in the foreign country and, in
turn, returned to the United States. In those
cases, on a pro rata basis, income will be
taxed on a current basis.

And the third change recommended will
be in the area of deductions of tax losses
against tax credits so as to postpone corpo-

530

Department of State Bulletin

rate income tax in the United States. We
will look at tliis to be sure that those losses
are consistent with the provisions of the laws
of the United States.

We think these changes make for a more
equitable situation for investments and in-
vestment incentives. This will only appear in
the message, and it will be then up to the
House ^^'ays and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee to put this in the
form of a bill.

In the adjustment assistance area there
will be two bills involved. As explained by
my colleagues here, under the adjustment
assistance it is primarily in the worker area.

On Wednesday of this week a bill on un-
employment insurance, which would set
national standards for unemployment insur-
ance, which is part of the benefits that will
become effective for the adjustment assist-
ance for workers, will go up. This is a sub-
stantial improvement and will apply to all
workers whether the problem is caused by
imports or not.

On Thursday of this week a bill relating
to private pension plans will go up. This is
the other part of the benefit relief under the
adjustment assistance bill. This will fix the
vesting of pensions so that if people lose their
jobs as a result of imports or otherwise they
will have their pensions fixed and they will
know they will receive those benefits.

These are the two major areas. And the
trade bill itself is linked to these two bills
with a transitional period of time involved
for the benefits under it .so that there will be
no gap here, and then the benefits of the
trade bill will be phased out as these two
bills come into effect.

A third bill that will be going up today is
' a bill which will amend the parts of the
I Webb-Pomerene Act. This is the bill that is,
in part, called the Export Expansion Act.
-At the present time our antitrust laws are
very restrictive about American companies
getting together. If companies want to put
an architect or an engineer, a manufacturing
company, together in a unit to bid on some-
thing overseas, our laws do not allow this
technically. The Justice Department has

worked out a bill which will allow these
groups of companies to get together as their
competitors can do, so that our companies
can offer a complete service in competition
with other companies around the world.
This bill will also be going up today, and it
will give more flexibility. It also would apply
to foreign companies doing business here
who want to use their American subsidiaries
to get together with other companies around
the world in competition.

Let me conclude by saying to you this
morning at 8:30 the President held his first
of a series of bipartisan leadership meetings.
This bipartisan meeting was for the purpose
of briefing the House and Senate leadership
on the bills that you've heard today.

The press is being briefed on this today,
and you will receive the Ways and Means
Committee draft of the bill.

The President, though, in describing this —
and I want to emphasize this to all of you —
and I think it has come through clear in the
description by Secretary Rogers and Secre-
tary Casey that this is part of an ovei'all
approach of the President toward the inter-
national economic aff'airs of this country.
And I simply call your attention and cite for
you his discussion here that the world is
embarked today on a profound and historic
movement away from confrontation and to-
ward negotiation in resolving international
differences. Increasingly in recent years
countries have come to see the best way of
advancing their interests is by expanding
peaceful contacts with other people. This
structure of peace cannot be strong, how-
ever, unle.ss it encompasses international
economic affairs. Our progress toward world
peace and stability can be significantly un-
dermined by economic conflicts which breed
political tensions and weaken security ties.
It is imperative, therefore, that we turn
our negotiating efforts to the task of resolv-
ing problems in the economic area.

These are the President's comments:

My trade reform proposals would equip us to
meet this challenge. They would help us in creating
a new economic order which both reflects and rein-
forces the progress we have made in political affairs.
As I said to the Governors of the International

April 30, 1973

531

Monetary Fund last September, our common goal
should be to "set in place an economic structure that
will help and not hinder the world's historic move-
ment toward peace."

In doing this, it's two things. It's first to
put us in a position of being able to nego-
tiate with our partners, you, and secondly,
to improve the system within the United
States so that we have the same kind of
authority and can take those steps that keep
us on a more uniform international system.

So, in closing, we want a more open
world, we want a more equitable world, and
we're prepared to work toward that.

Anti-Inflation Trade Bill Transmitted
to the Congress

Following is the text of a letter dated
March 30 from President Nixon to Speaker
of the House Carl Alberts

White House press release dated March 30

Dear Mr. Speaker: I herewith transmit
a draft bill, "to authorize reduction or sus-
pension of import barriers to restrain
inflation."

The proposed legislation would authorize
the President to reduce or suspend tempo-
rarily any duty applicable to any article and
to increase temporarily any value or quantity
of articles which may be imported under any
import restriction whenever the President
determines that supplies of the article im-
ported are inadequate to meet domestic de-
mand at reasonable prices.

The enactment of this bill is necessary to
provide an important additional means of
restraining inflation and aiding the Amer-
ican consumer.
Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.

' An identical letter was sent to President of the
Senate Spiro T. Agnew.

Contract Signed for Assistance
to Immigrants to Israel

The Department of State announced on
April 6 (press release 101) that a contract
providing $31 million to assist Soviet Jews
migrating to Israel was being signed that
day between the Department of State and
United Israel Appeal, Inc. (UIA), an ac-
credited American voluntary agency. Frank
L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the Secretary
for Refugee and Migration Afl'airs, signed
for the Department. Melvin Dubinsky of
St. Louis, president and chairman of the
board of directors, and Gottlieb Hammer of
New York, executive vice chairman, signed
for UIA.

The contract represents the Department's
first expenditure from $50 million appro-
priated by the Congress to aid in the re-
settlement of emigrants from the Soviet
Union. Signed at the same time were agree-
ments in which UIA designates the Jewish
Agency for Israel (JAI) to act as author-
ized agent in expenditure of the funds. Max
M. Fisher of Detroit, chairman of the board
of governors, signed these agreements for
the JAI.

The contract provides that the funds will
be used for care and maintenance of mi-
grants during transit to Israel, for expansion
of a transit center in Austria, for absorption
centers in Israel to receive the immigrants,
for a hospital wing for migrants, for hous-
ing, for language training, and for voca-
tional and professional training or retrain-
ing.

Other expenditures from the appropria-
tion during fiscal year 1973 will be $2 mil-
lion to the Intergovernmental Committee
for European Migration to cover loans for
air charter fare for the migrants from Aus-
tria to Israel and $500,000 for assistance
to Soviet migrants to countries other than
Israel. The Department presently is nego-
tiating for expenditure of the remaining
$16.5 million during fiscal year 1974.

532

Department of State Bulletin

U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Affirmative Steps

Addj-ess by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush '

For the past three days you have been
discussing Europe. Looking ahead, it seems
likely that 1973 will be a year of substantial
progi-ess both within Europe and in relations
between Europe and the United States.

— There should be continued improvement
in the condition of Berlin, further develop-
ment of the dialogue between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the German Demo-
cratic Republic, and the admission of both
into the United Nations.

— Negotiations have already begun be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union to limit offensive strategic weapons
permanently.

— The United States and the newly en-
larged European Community will explore
new methods of economic and political co-
operation designed to strengthen our associa-
tion.

— There will be negotiations on reducing
the military forces which still confront each
other in central Europe.

— And there will be a Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe which
could accelerate the momentum toward more
I normal contact between eastern and western
Europe and between the states of eastern
Europe and the United States.

All of these advances will be important.
But what I want to discuss with you today
i.s the prospect that this year we may be
able to achieve a marked expansion of our

' Made before the 13th annual students conference
on foreign affairs at the U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 4 (press release 98).

ties with eastern Europe and a decisive
improvement in relationships among all the
states of Europe.

We in this country have a natural bond
with the 120 million people who inhabit the
countries to the west of the Soviet Union —
Poland and Czechoslovakia in the north,
Hungary and Romania in the center, and
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania in the
.south.

Over 15 million Americans trace their ori-
gins directly to these countries.

The United States has more citizens of
Polish descent than any nation in the world
other than Poland itself.

We have more persons of Czech and Slovak
origin than any other country save Czechoslo-
vakia itself.

There are nearly as many ethnic Hungar-
ians in the United States as there are in
Budapest.

These cultural bonds are matched by his-
torical ties.

Woodrow Wilson labored to insure that
the peoples of eastern Europe emerged from
World War I with the right to run their own
affairs. No fewer than six of Wilson's 14
points were directed to the goal of self-
determination for the peoples of eastern
Europe. And it was through eastern Euro-
pean issues that the two World Wars had
their origin — the first in a shot fired on be-
half of national autonomy in Sarajevo in
present-day Yugoslavia, the second in the
concessions made in Munich at the expense
of Czechoslovakia and in the Nazi invasion
of Poland.

It is natui'al, therefore, that we should

April 30, 1973

533

welcome a return to our once wider associa-
tion with the nations of eastern Europe.

When President Nixon took office in 1969,
our relations in the area — Yugoslavia ex-
cepted— were clouded by two decades of cold
war division, enmity, and mistrust. Presi-
dent Johnson's efforts to repair those rela-
tions had met with deep suspicion. The
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968
set back relations still further.

By 1969, however, changing conditions
were making a new approach feasible.

Eastern Europe's growing demand for
trade and technology was not being fully
satisfied from within the Communist world.

West Germany's enlightened efforts to im-
prove relations with its eastern European
neighbors had begun to contribute to a less
suspicious evaluation of Western intentions.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia had dem-
onstrated the lengths to which the Soviet
Union was prepared to go to protect what
it considered to be its security. But the de-
sire for a growing detente persisted in
eastern as well as in western Europe. Af-
firmative steps to promote more normal
trade and human contacts were therefore
likely to find a favorable response.

Progress Toward Improved Relations

Thus, early in his first administration
President Nixon made clear that we were
prepared to begin a new era in our relations
with eastern Europe. Our objective was to
develop normal and mutually beneficial rela-
tions wherever possible, treating each coun-
try separately.

By early summer we had begun to take
concrete steps in pursuit of this policy. They
led to President Nixon's visit to Bucharest
in August 1969 — the first visit ever made
l)y an American President to a Communist
capital. In Romania the President stressed
that "We stand ready to reciprocate the ef-
forts of any country that seeks normal re-
lations with us." -

-' For a toast by President Nixon at an official
dinner at Bucharest on Aug. 2, 1969, see Bulletin
of Aug-. 25, 1969, p. 169.

That visit gave our bilateral relations with
Romania an impetus which they have never
lost. President Ceausescu visited the United
States in October 1970. Our two-way trade
has more than tripled. We have extended our
bilateral contacts in other fields. And during
Secretary Rogers' visit to Bucharest last July
he signed the first consular convention be-
tween Romania and the United States since
1881.

There was a second Presidential visit to
a Communist capital in early fall 1970 —
this time to nonaligned Yugoslavia. Our
bonds of friendship and cooperation with
Yugoslavia go back more than two decades.
Thus the President's visit was a matter less
of initiating new directions than of under-
lining that ties across political lines can be
durable. I might mention in this connection
the outstanding impression our sailors and
officers have left in Yugoslav ports during
the regular visits of our ships from the
6th Fleet.

We want our ties with Yugoslavia to be
a model of the cooperation that can exist
between states with quite different social
systems. Success in this, of course, depends
on both countries.

In the spring of 1972 the President took
a third major step in our relations with
eastern Europe — a visit to Poland. In War-
saw the United States and Poland signed a
consular convention, and will open consulates
this year in New York City and in the old
university town of Krakow, the center of
much Polish emigration to the United States.

Relations have begun to improve with a
fourth eastern European state — Hungary.
In July Secretary Rogers visited Budapest,
the first visit to Hungary ever made by an
American Cabinet official. Deputy Premier
Valyi was in Washington last month, the
highest Hungarian official to visit the United
States in 25 years. Hungary has now agreed
to pay $22 million for war-damaged and
nationalized American property, and we have
agreed to seek authority from Congress to
negotiate a trade agreement including most-
favored-nation treatment. We are discussing
with the Hungarians an agreement on cul-

M:

534

Department of State Bulletin

tural and scientific exchanges. In fact a
Foreij;!! Service (ifticer wiio has been teach-
ing at this Academy for the past two years,
Mr. Harry Gilmore, will shortly assume
charjre of the Washington end of these many
negotiations with Hungary.

The progress we have already made with
the states of eastern Europe during Presi-
dent Nixon's first administration is substan-
tial. I know from my own recent trips to
I'oland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary that
our relations have undergone a substantial
rlumge for the better. One measure of this
is the fact that visitors from eastern Europe
under our exchange programs increased by
40 percent in 1972.

Respect for Independence and Sovereignty

As the President's second term begins,
our mutual desire for continued progress
offers hope for even greater advances. To
that end the policy of the United States is
to engage the countries of eastern Europe in
an expanding set of close and individual
relationships with ourselves and with their
neighbors to the west.

We intend to pursue our policy of engage-
ment diligently and prudently. We will not
seek to force the pace. We do seek to en-
courage a process we believe to be advan-
tageous to world peace.

In pursuing this policy we intend to fol-
low three principles.

The first is that we will deal with each
country of eastern Europe as an independent
sovereign state entitled to be free of all
outside interference. This approach animated
Woodrow Wilson's policies; it is our ap-
proach today.

In Moscow last spring President Nixon
and r.eneral Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I.
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union] set their signatures to pledges
to recognize the sovereign equality of all
states, to make no claim to any special rights
or advantages in world affairs, and to seek
to promote conditions in which no country

will be subject to outside interference in its
internal aff"airs. ^

Those commitments reflect long-established
American policies. Their joint adoption by
the two countries can help in promoting
the detente so many now desire. The right
of countries to develop according to their
own desires is fundamental to peaceful rela-
tions among states. A country may not be
denied the right of full sovereignty simply
because it is small. It may not be denied that
right simply because geography has placed
it next to a larger country. It may not be
denied that right simply because it shares the
same political and social system with a
stronger power. Indeed, as Chairman Ko-
sygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.] and
Prime Minister Bratteli of Norway affirmed
in a communique last year, the principles of
noninterference and respect for national sov-
ereignty must be implemented consistently,
irrespective of the political and social sys-
tems of the states involved.

On our part, certainly there is no desire
to intervene in the domestic affairs of east-
ern European states. We are ready not only
to coexist with them but to cooperate with
them in bilateral efforts toward peace and
understanding and toward wider contact and
associations among our people.

In that spirit we will seek to consolidate
ties with those countries with which sub-
stantial progi-ess has been made.

We will also move forward toward im-
I^rovements with countries with which there
has been little or no bilateral progress.

In their conversations with Secretary
Rogers at the United Nations last October,
both the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian For-
eign Ministers expressed the firm desire of
their governments for concrete improve-
ments in our relations. We welcome this
desire, we share it, and we are responding
to it.

With Czechoslovakia we have begun ne-

' For text of the Basic Principles of Relations
Between the United States and the U.S.S.R sipned
at Moscow on May 29, 1972, aee Bulletin of June
26, 1972, p. 898.

April 30, 1973

535

gotiations on a consular convention and hope
to be in a position this year to begin talks
also on an agreement covering cultural and
scientific exchanges, and later on the resolu-
tion of long-pending financial and trade
issues.

Of all the Communist governments with
which we have diplomatic relations, our ties
have been least extensive with Bulgaria.
We have recently resumed negotiations on
a consular convention. We are preparing to
work with the Bulgarian Government to
resolve a number of bilateral cultural and
economic problems which have clouded our
relationship. Our desire for better relations
is reflected in our readiness to welcome
Bulgaria's Deputy Prime Minister to the
United States this year.

Only with Albania has there been no visi-
ble progress. In light of our expanding ties
with all other countries in eastern Europe,
it seems anachronistic that Albania should
continue to wish to function in such isola-
tion. Albania still speaks of us in the con-
tentious rhetoric of an earlier era. Whether
it wishes to resume relations we do not know.
If and when it does, it will find us prepared
to respond.

With all of the east European nations we
will measure their willingness to improve
relations with us in a wider context as well.
We must all demonstrate mutual restraint
in our rhetoric toward one another and a
spirit of cooperation rather than confronta-
tion at the United Nations and in other inter-
national forums. We particularly look to
Hungary and Poland to play a responsible
role on the International Commission of
Control and Supervision in Viet-Nam.

Trade and Commercial Issues

As our relations with individual east Euro-
pean nations improve, we will pursue the
second basic principle of our policy — to
create a continuing economic relationship
with the countries of eastern Europe by
expanding our trade and by encouraging
their growing receptivity to foreign invest-
ment.

During the last four years our trade with

eastern Europe has grown steadily, though
from a modest base. In 1968 overall trade
totaled about $450 million; the figures for
1972 were about $800 million — a healthy in-
crease of over 75 percent. During the next
four years we believe we can at least double
the current trade. Last fall we directed our
Ambassadors in eastern Europe to place
trade promotion at the very top of the list
of our policy priorities in the area.

The nations of eastern Europe consistently
list commercial issues as the top bilateral
problem. They contend that U.S. trade regu-
lations toward the area contain elements of
discrimination from the past.

To help achieve a substantially higher
trade volume we intend progressively to re-
move a number of those restrictions.

— We have reexamined in the light of
changing conditions the strategic importance
of goods whose export to eastern Europe is
still restricted. A number of changes have
already been made. In the near future we
expect to make further significant reductions
in the number of U.S. products on the re-
stricted list.

— We are ready to consider a broader
availability of Export-Import Bank credits
and guarantees for the sale of U.S. goods
as relations improve with individual coun-
tries.

— It is also our intention, as relations
improve, to extend most-favored-nation sta-
tus to the exports of a larger number of
eastern European countries. So far only the
products of Yugoslavia and Poland enjoy
this status, although for a year we have been
urging similar legislation for Romania. In
this session of Congress the President will
submit and request early passage of general
legislation that will permit us to extend
most-favored-nation status to eastern Euro-
pean countries as the status of our economic
and political relations warrants. Normaliza-
tion of our trading relations is required for
the United States to realize fully the eco-
nomic and political benefits of expanded
trade.

While the policies of eastern European

536

Department of State Bulletin

countries have piven first priority to trade.
Yugoslavia, Romania, Poland, and Hungary
have also shown an interest in foreign in-
vestment in their domestic enterprises. Even
within the framework of a cautious Com-
nuinist attitude toward private investment,
an increase in joint ventures throughout the
area should offer concrete benefits to all
concerned.

As we seek to respond to eastern Europe's
ilesire for closer economic relations, we our-
selves can no longer afford to ignore the
advantages to our own domestic economy
tliat the commercial potential in eastern
Europe offers. At a time when we have a
trade deficit with most areas of the world,
our balance of trade surplus with eastern
Europe is particularly welcome.

We would like to see more American busi-
nessmen begin to pursue profitable business
deals in Hungary as in Belgium ; in Bulgaria
as in Norway; in Poland as in Uruguay. We
encourage them to sell, invest, and buy in
these countries as opportunity permits and
in confidence that doing business in eastern
Europe is fully consonant with the U.S.
national interest. We are strengthening our
) commercial manpower, and last month we
opened a new east-west trade center in Vien-
na.

Such policies look to the day when the
course of trade between the United States
and the countries of eastern Europe can be
as normal as it is between the United States
and countries with economic and social sys-
tems similar to our own.

Relations Between East and West Europe

Just as we wish to deepen our own politi-
cal and economic ties with eastern Europe, we
also encourage the growing engagement of
its countries in the affairs of Europe as a
whole. To promote such engagement is the
third basic principle of our policy. We feel,
in fact, that it is fully as important for us
to promote a deepening of political and eco-
nomic relations between the countries of
eastern and western Europe as it is to de-
velop eastern European ties with us. This
should not diminish our close and essential

partnei'.ship with our Atlantic allies.

It is natural that all European nations
should aspire to the sense of community
that has enriched Europe in the higher mo-
ments of its long history. The artificial bar-
riers of the cold war have divided the
continent for a generation. That is already
too long.

This year will see two events which, with
good will on both sides, can contribute to the
restoration of that sense of community.

Preparatory talks began in January for
negotiations on ways to reduce the forces
of the countries of NATO and the Warsaw
Pact which still confront each other in the
center of Europe. A mutual and balanced
reduction of those forces could appreciably
reduce tensions and make a real contribution
to Europe's security. It is important that
the substantive negotiations begin on sched-
ule this fall and that they be carried to a
successful conclusion.

As we are about to begin negotiations for
a reduction of forces by both sides in Europe,
it makes no sense at all to cut in half the
American forces there suddenly and uni-
laterally. Some critics of our defense policy
in Congress and elsewhere advocate that we
follow just such a course. Clearly the Soviet
Union would have no incentive to reduce its
troop presence in eastern Europe if we ac-
cepted this advice. And nothing could more
endanger the momentum we have created for
building a more stable and peaceful world.
I want to reiterate here this evening this
administration's firm determination to ful-
fill our commitments to our NATO allies by
maintaining American troop strength in Eu-
rope.

Preiiaratory talks have been underway in
Helsinki since last November to pave the
way for a Confei-ence on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, which we hope can be-
gin early this summer. Such a conference
must become a vehicle for concrete progress
toward greater unity among Europe's peo-
ples. Specific steps to increase contact —
through the freer movement of people, ideas,
and goods acro.ss the entire continent — is the
surest way to achieve that objective.

April 30, 1973

537

This approach causes the Soviet Union
some concern. But the many U.S. -Soviet
agreements recently negotiated are already
demonstrating that greater cooperation and
contact, far from being a threat to any
country's security, can contribute to the wel-
fare of all. Certainly we in this country are
convinced that more open borders and more
normal human communication will reduce
rather than increase tensions and will en-
courage peoples and nations to live and let
live in friendship.

A Europe based on separation can never
be really secure. The last quarter century
was a period of separation ; it was not a
period of security. As President Nixon stated
in 1970, "Stability and peace in Europe will
be enhanced once its division is healed." ■*
The next quarter century should be a time
for all Europe's nations to evolve according
to their own desires. It will be a period for
Europe's people to communicate with each
other more freely. It will be an era of co-
operation— and of competition — one of peace
and a spirit of community.

In keeping with our own close associations
with Europe and our firm conviction that
Europe's security is indivisible from our
own, we in America must also desire a Eu-
rope with the closest bonds among its states
as well as a Europe linked in friendship and
cooperation with our own country. Those
twin goals will form the essence of our poli-
cy toward Europe during the next four years.

Pan American Day and
Pan American Week

A PROCLAMATION'

Eighty-three years ago the International Union of
American Republics was established, the forerunner
of the Organization of American States. There
have been differences among the member nations in
those eighty-three years, and some of these differ-
ences continue today. But far more significant is
the fact that, despite dramatic changes and our
great cultural and political diversity, the members
of the hemispheric community have maintained and
strengthened our common forum in a general climate
of friendship and understanding.

It is an intangible force which forms the basis of
solidarity among the Americas — a combination of
idealism and realism and a capacity to grow and
adjust with the times. The Organization of Amer-
ican States is the focal point of this force, a place
where cooperation rather than confrontation
strengthens the common ties shared by the nations
of the hemisphere.

This unity of the Americas is based on respect
for the historic personality of each of the countries
of the Americas and demands a mutual under-
standing and respect for each country.

Now, THEREFORE, I, RICHARD NiXON, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
Saturday, April 14, 1973, as Pan American Day,
and the week beginning April 8 and ending April
14 as Pan American Week, and I call upon the
Governors of the fifty States, the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and appropriate
officials of all other areas under the flag of the
United States to issue similar proclamations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this seventh day of April, in the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the
one hundred ninety-seventh.

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970,
appears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the
section entitled "Eastern Europe" begins on p. 325.

^^^.JLV^^^

No. 4205; 38 Fed. Reg. 9151.

538

Department of State Bulletin

1

THE CONGRESS

U.S. Policy Toward the European Community

Stateiticnt hij William J. Casey

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs *

It is a pleasure to participate in your
hearings on the United States and the Euro-
pean Community. You have timed your
hearings well, for our relations with the
enlarged Community are in a formative
stage. The hearings are well timed for me
personally because I have just returned from
extensive consultations in Europe. I would
like to share with you this morning the same
impressions and thoughts about those con-
sultations and the direction of our relations
with the European Community which I re-
ported to Secretary Rogers earlier this week.

But first let me attempt to place these re-
lations in a larger perspective. Four develop-
ments have combined to radically alter our
relationship and to make it vastly more com-
plex:

— First, generally improved relations with
the Communist powers have decreased inter-
national tensions and brought a new flexi-
bility to political ties.

— Second, western Europe, Canada, and
Japan have developed relatively greater eco-
nomic strength, and we have developed the
need to deal with them on a basis of equality.
They are not only our best trading partners
but also our keenest competitors.

— Third, two decades of American balance
of payments deficits fueled both our own and
the world's economic growth, but successive

' Made before the Subcommittees on Europe and
Foreifrn Economic Policy of the House Committee on
Foreipn Affairs on Apr. 5 (press release 100). The
complete transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

crises finally led to the realization that the
jiostwar system requires major revisions.

— Fourth, we have achieved unprecedented
interdependence with other industrial de-
mocracies, an interdependence which has as-
sured record prosperity for all but has
brought new problems which require new
approaches to the management of our eco-
nomic policies.

The next few years will be a time of test-
ing for our bonds with all the industrialized
democi'acies as we develop new relations to
cope with these new complexities. This is
clearly no time for complacency, but it is
equally clearly no time to accept the counsel
of those who despair, of those who seem to
believe in the inevitability of confrontation
— for our common interests and our common
vision of the world far outweigh our specific
and passing differences.

President Nixon has consistently stressed
our continuing belief in the necessity for
strong ties with Europe. These ties form an
indispensable part of his strategy for world
peace. The Nixon doctrine makes clear that
others now have the ability and responsi-
bility to do their share. As the President said
in his fii-st report to Congress on foreign
policy, "America cannot — and will not —
conceive all the plans, design all the pro-
grams, execute all the decisions and under-
take all the defense of the free nations of
the woild." -■ He went on to say, however.

-' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 18, 1970,
appears in the Bulletin of Mar. 9, 1970; the
introduction begins on p. 274.

April 30, 1973

539

that "America cannot live in isolation if it
expects to live in peace. We have no intention
of withdrawing from the world."

In particular, the administration has made
it quite clear that it regards our relationship
with Europe to be the cornerstone of the
whole structure of peace. European unity
adds to the strength of our transatlantic
relationship and enables us to proceed to a
new era of detente with the East from a
position of greater strength in the Atlantic
area. This is why the President affirmed last
October a strong support for the European
Community summit's announced intention to
transform by 1980 the whole complex of its
member state relations into a European
Union — and I quote: "It is, and always has
been, my own deeply held view that progress
toward a unified Europe enhances world
peace, security, and prosperity." ^

We continue to feel that political and de-
fense cooperation within Europe will be the
fulfillment of European unity. Two strong
powers in the West would add flexibility to
Western diplomacy and increasingly share
the responsibility of decision. But European
unity has come first in the economic field.
This increasing unity has brought benefits
and opportunities for increasing cooperation.
It has also brought problems of adjustment
to the new relationship. The President has
taken the initiative to begin managing the
new relationship so as to enhance the bene-
fits to us, take advantage of the opportunities
for increased cooperation, and deal with the
problems of adjustment. Left to fester, these
problems could in fact lead to a confronta-
tion neither we nor the Europeans desire.

Dialogue With Western Europe

Just a month after his first inauguration,
President Nixon symbolized the importance
he attaches to this subject by visiting west-
ern Europe. During that visit he met with
the President and the Commission of the
European Community. Subsequent more dra-
matic visits to Peking and Moscow should

" For a statement by President Nixon issued on
Oct. 27, 1972, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 1972, p. 608.

not obscure this fact, nor should they obscure
the continued high level of U.S. -EC consul-
tation since 1969.

In 1970 we initiated the practice of semi-
annual meetings with the European Commu-
nity. I have just headed our delegation to
the sixth round of these increasingly frank,
wide-ranging, and useful consultations. In
recent months the U.S. -EC dialogue has
reached an unprecedented level of intensity
and substance. In December Secretary Rog-
ers met in Brussels with the Commission.
In mid-February the new EC Commissioner
for External Relations, Sir Christopher
Soames, visited Washington for a series of
informal discussions. He saw the President
and leading members of the Cabinet, and
he held extended conversations with me and
other senior government officials concerned
with U.S. -EC relations. In February the
President sent Peter Peterson [former Secre-
tary of Commerce] to Europe where he met
with leaders of the Community both in Brus-
sels and national capitals to discuss the
entire range of our relationship with western
Europe. In March Secretary [of the Treas-
ury George P.] Shultz visited the key capi-
tals of western Europe and discussed our
economic policies, especially monetary re-
form and trade negotiations, with the Com-
mission and national leaders.

Last October, as part of the process of
intensifying the dialogue with western Eu-
rope and other developed countries, the
OECD [Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development], largely at U.S. ini-
tiative, initated a new style of executive
committee to enable high-level policymakers
to focus more frequently on the broad range
of questions which concern the more econom-
ically developed nations, and on my recent
trip I headed our delegation to the second
of these meetings.

As NATO's Secretary General Joseph
Luns noted last week during the Europe-
America Conference, "I cannot think of a
period when there has been so much diplo-
matic activity, so many meetings and con-
ferences."

We particularly welcome the steps taken
by this committee to intensify the American

540

Department of State Bulletin

dialogue with Europe. Your growing rela-
tions with the European Parliament and
the European Conlmunity are iiighly de-
sirable. We are prepared to facilitate this
process in any way that you believe useful —
for it is clear that without the support and
participation of both the Congress and the
American people we cannot succeed in our
jroal this year of building such lasting ties
that our relations with the Community will
It', like those we" have in NATO, a solid and
emiuring pillar of U.S. -European association
and cooperation.

All of this activity is part of the process
of dealing with our overall relationship with
western Europe which the President has
moved to the "front burner." I want to stress
that he regards the problem of managing our
new economic relationship as inextricably
linked to the maintenance and enhancement
of our political-security relationship.

And during my recent visit to Europe, I
found quick and ready recognition of the
importance to our overall political and secu-
rity relationship of the successful manage-
ment of our economic problems. Successful
management requires for the long run a
fundamental reordering of the world eco-
nomic system to make it more open and
equitable, more flexible, and better suited to
solving problems such as those which face
the developing countries. In the short run,
it requires better management of specific
problems with the Community as they arise.

Reordering the World Economic System

As you know, we are working on the re-
ordering of the world economic system
through reform of the world monetary sys-
tem in the Committee of Twenty and through
preparations for major multilateral trade
negotiations in the GATT [General Agree-
ment on Tarifi"s and Trade] beginning this
September. In addition, in the OECD we
have launched an examination of the prob-
lems of international investment with a view
to assuring that this area does not become
contentious among governments as we move
to new understandings in the trade and mon-
etarv fields. In all these matters western

Europe plays a vital role. If we are to
successfully reorder the world economic sys-
tem to make it more open and equitable,
U.S. -European cooperation will prove in-
dispensable.

As we approach formal trade negotiations
in the GATT this September, the first re-
quirement will be to assure that both we and
the EC place a highei' priority upon mutual
growth than on individual protection, on
further lowering trade barriers rather than
creating preferential arrangements. Rapidly
increasing trade was an essential stimulus
over the past quartei- century to the most
substantial global economic growth in man's
history. The reduction of barriers to trade
made this conti-ibution possible. We have
participated and l)enefited from this process.

Further substantial trade liberalization is
essential if we are to maintain and enhance
our prosperity. But the political aspect of
the future trade negotiations is equally im-
portant. The Community has made its great-
est progress toward unity in the field of
trade. Sir Christopher Soames, the Commu-
nity's "Foreign Minister," has made clear
that the trade negotiations will be at the cen-
ter of the Community's future relations with
the United States and will be crucial to those
relations. He has urged the Community not to
forget that negotiations must be situated in
the wider political framework of U.S.-EC
relations.

I wish to stress this point to these two
subcommittees, which are interested in both
the political and economic aspects of our
relationship with Europe. Passage of the
trade bill the President will submit to Con-
gress in a few days will be vital to the im-
plementation of the President's strategy on
improving the relationship with Europe.

During my trip to Europe I contin-
ued the process launched by Secretary
Shultz of informing European leaders of
the main outlines of the bill the President
intends to submit. I found a generally fa-
vorable reaction to what we have in mind.

I found, however, some misgivings about
the surcharge and safeguard features of
our propo.sed trade legislation. But generally
this kind of sensitivity seemed to dissipate

April 30, 1973

.541

as it was pointed out that we are merely
seeking for the President the same broad
authority to negotiate already possessed
by European governments. The reactions
against safeguards moderate when they are
presented as a liberalizing force. Without
providing sensitive industries time to ad-
just to changing patterns of trade, govern-
ments are not likely to muster the will to
open up trade. I also pointed out that the
shape and implementation of our legislation
would be importantly affected during the
coming months by our ability to deal satis-
factorily with some of the shortrun trade
issues with the EC, notably the GATT nego-
tiations over the impairment to our trade
arising from the enlargement of the Com-
munity.

Agricultural and Energy Problems

I also found some concern in Europe,
which I attempted to dispel, that the United
States might try to split the Community on
specific and fundamental issues. For exam-
ple, the European press has been pushing
hard on what it sees as a possible common
interest of the United States and Great
Britain in breaking down the common agri-
cultural policy (CAP). Our view, as I ex-
plained, is that we are not seeking to destroy
the CAP but only to bring about agricultural
liberalization which would work in the mu-
tual interest of both the United States and
Europe. Rather than hoping to split the
Community, we look forward to cooperating
with it in every significant area of economic
endeavor in which the Community and the
United States share a common interest.

With regard to agriculture, I might add
that there exists a growing recognition in
western Europe that the fight to manage
their serious inflation problem will require
some modification of the high degree of
agricultural protectionism which presently
exists. We would of course welcome any
move on their part in the grain-livestock
area which would give them cheaper cereals
and cheaper meat and at the same time
improve the prospects for U.S. grain and

feed exports. We have recently taken steps
in the United States to dismantle longstand-
ing governmental I'estraints on agricultural
production. In the interest of keeping down
their prices, we would hope that the
Europeans will move toward substantial
liberalization of their highly protectionist
agricultural system. We expect to include
agricultural trade as an important element
of the forthcoming multilateral trade nego-
tiations and to seek meaningful easing of
restrictions on a reciprocal basis.

I also found common ground in Europe
in our shared concern over the emerging
energy problem. Europeans are awaiting the
President's forthcoming energy message
with great interest. They are discussing
this issue among themselves on a priority
basis, and the EC leaders, at their Paris
summit meeting, have called for the formu-
lation of a common EC energy policy as soon
as possible. When viewed from the stand-
point of the domestic economy and balance
of payments, energy and agriculture emerge
as two of the most critical fields for future
economic cooperation between the United
States and western Europe.

Both western Europe and the United
States also face a common task in seeking
effective solutions to the problems of the
developing countries. We have viewed with
considerable misgivings the increasing pro-
liferation of the Community's preferential
trading arrangements with those developing
countries of Africa and the Mediterranean
with whom they have maintained historically
close ties. These arrangements may soon
expand to include the Commonwealth coun-
tries of Africa and the Caribbean as well.
We support the special relationships between
the Community and these countries and
agree that they foster stability and peace
in the areas involved. However, we fail to
see the justification for the discriminatory
trade aspects of these relationships, particu-
larly reverse preferences, which could lead
to the creation of closed North-South trading
blocs. In drawing up our own trade bill,
we do not see how we can justify the ex-
tension of generalized preferences by the

542

Department of State Bulletin

United States to those developing countries
which discriminate against us in favor of
imports from otiier industrialized countries.
Clearly we must seek a common solution to
this problem which will work to the benefit
of the developing countries. It is a matter
which I have already discussed and which
we will he discussing in some detail with
the Community in the near future.

In all of these areas we must insure that
adequate means exist for a full and frank
dialogue with the European Community. A
number of leading Europeans have talked
about a more compi-ehensive and institu-
tionalized mechanism for a dialogue between
the United States and the European Com-
munity, but the Community has yet to agree
on a formula. We have told the Europeans
that we would consider seriously any sug-
gestions they might advance and that our
concern is with the substance of our dialogue
rather than with its form.

My overall impression is that our rela-
tionships with the European Community are
moving in the right direction but they need
constant attention and effective collaboration
on our great common interests in the politi-
cal and security realms and on our common
problems in energy, development, and the
whole economic and financial realm. That
problems exist between us is a consequence
of our growing interdependence as well as
the special circumstances surrounding the
need to work out basic and overdue reforms
in the trade and monetary fields which will
take full account of the changed economic
conditions. The new leaders of the Commis-
sion have impressed me very favorably, and
we are conducting a frank and open dia-
logue with them. They recognize, as do we,
that the common bonds between the United
States and the Community far outweigh
-ur differences and that we must maintain
I sense of proportion in our relationship.
With good will on both sides, I am confident
that we will succeed in the common tasks
which lie before us. As the President has
tated, it is of the highest importance that
I the United States and Europe work closely
together.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency of Octo-
ber 26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284).
Done at Vienna September 28, 1970.'
Acccptcince deposited: Finland, April 12, 1973.

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.
Ratifications deposited: Jordan, February 13,
1973; Portugal, January 15, 1973.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force
March 19, 1967; for the United States Decem-
ber 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Guatemala, February 9, 1973.
Ratification deposited: Australia, February 12,
1973.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Australia, February 12, 1973.

Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC),
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972."
Signature: Yugoslavia, March 20, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24,
1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Singapore, March 15, 1973.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow,
and Washington December 29, 1972."
Signature: Netherlands, April 12, 1973.

' Not in force.

April 30, 1973

543

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done
at Washington June 19, 1970.'
Accession deposited: Cameroon, March 15, 197,5.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964
(TIAS .5881), as amended by additional protocol,
general regulations with final protocol and an-
nex, and the universal postal convention with
final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional
protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971.

TIAS 7150. , .. • .

Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates

(with a declaration), March 2, 1973.
Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed
at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general
regulations with final protocol and annex, and
the universal postal convention with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo Novem-
ber 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 19 a, ex-
cept for article V of the additional protocol, which
entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, January 19, 1972;-

Jordan, January 3, 1973.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done
at New York Jauary 31, 1967. Entered into force
October 4, 1967; for the United States Novem-
ber 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Mali, February 2, 1973.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered
into force September 1, 1972.=
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, April 9, 1973.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave
traffic, as amended by the protocol of May 4, 1949
(TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904.
Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United
States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.
Notification of succession: Mali, February 2, 1973.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement confirming the memorandum of under-
standing between the U.S. National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the Brazilian Insti-
tute de Pesquisas Espaciais concerning coopera-
tive research in remote sensing for earth surveys.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
April 6, 1973. Entered into force April 6, 1973.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement supplementing the agreement of Novem-
ber 20, 1962, as supplemented (TIAS 5518, 7386,
7507), for conducting certain educational exchange
programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn
and Bonn-Bad Godesberg March 2 and 9, 1973.
Entered into force March 9, 1973.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the amendment of March 17,
1972 (TIAS 7287), to the civil air transport
agreement of November 4, 1966, as amended (TIAS
6135 6489). Effected by exchange of notes at
Moscow January 11, 1973. Entered into force
January 11, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

= Ratification of the general regulations of the
Universal Postal Union deposited on February 21,
1973.

' Not in force for the United States.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department
of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25 percent dis-
count is made on orders for 100 or more copies of
amj one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, must accompany orders.

Colorado River Salinity. Agreement with Mexico.
TIAS 7404. 7 pp. 15(f.

Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classi-
fication of Goods and Services to Which Trademarks
Are Applied. TIAS 7418. 16 pp. 25(.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Phil-
ippines amending the agreement of May 4, 1972.
TIAS 7431. 5 pp. 15(f.

Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1971 Partial Revision-
Space Telecommunications. TIAS 7435. 922 pp.
$9.00.

544

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX April 30. 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1766

Concress

Anti Inrtation Trade Bill Transmitted to the

CoTiuross (letter from President Nixon) . . 532
I'r, Sill, lit Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act

of I'.'TS to the ConRTess (text of message) . 513
U.S. Policy Toward the European Community

(Casey) 539

Economic Affairs

.\nti-Infl;ition Trade Bill Transmitted to the
('"n>riiss (letter from President Nixon) . .

I'lfsidiiit Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act
of 197:! to the Congress (text of message) .

Secretary Ropers and Other Officials Brief For-
eign Ambassadors on Provisions of Trade Re-
form Act of 1973 (Armstrong, Casey, Eberle,
Katz, Rogers)

■(U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Affirma

the European Commu-

tive Steps (Rush)
U.S. Policy Toward
^ nity (Casey)

^lEurope

^■U.S. Policy Toward Eastern Europe: Affirma-
nt ative Steps (Rush)

^■U.S. Policy Toward the European Commu-
^F nity (Casey)

™^9rael. Contract Signed for Assistance to
Immigrants to Israel

itLatin America. Pan American Day and Pan
American Week (proclamation)

[Presidential Documents
Inti-Inflation Trade Bill Transmitted to the

Congress •

?an American Day and Pan American Week

(proclamation)

fpresident Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act

of 1973 to the Congress

'resident Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam
Visits the United States

532
513

523
533
539

533
539

532

538

532
538
513
509

Publications. Recent Releases 544

iTrade ,

lAnti-Inflation Trade Bill Transmitted to the
Congress (letter from President Nixon) . .

President Nixon Transmits Trade Reform Act
of 1973 to the Congress (text of message) .

Secretary Rogers and Other Officials Brief
Foreign Ambassadors on Provisions of Trade
Reform Act of 1973 (Armstrong, Casey,
Eberle, Katz, Rogers)

Treaty Information. Current Actions ....

532
513

523
543

Viet-Nam. President Thieu of the Republic of
Viet-Nam Visits the United States (Nixon,

Tliipu. idint communique) 509

Same Index

Armstrong, Willis C 523

Casey, William .1 523, 539

Eberle, William J 523

Katz, Julius L 523

Nixon, President 509, 513, 532, 538

Rogers. Secretary 523

Rush, Kenneth 533

Thieu, Nguyen Van 509

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 9-15

Press releases may bo obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C, 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 9 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
98 of April 4, 100 of A'pril 5, and 101 of April
6.

No. Date

*105 4/10

*106 4/10

*107 4/10
•108 4/11

»109 4/11

•110 4/11

♦111 4/12

Subject

Luther I. Replogle award for
management improvement es-
tablished.

Regional foreign policy confer-
ence, Riverside, Calif., May 5.

U.S.-Canada fishery talks.

Study group 6 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for CCIR,
Apr. 20.

Program for official visit of
Giulio Andreotti, President of
the Council of Ministers of the
Italian Republic.

Subcommittee on Code of Conduct
for Liner Conferences, Ship-
ping Coordinating Committee,
Apr. 11.

Farkas sworn in as Ambassador
to Luxembourg (biographic
data).

' Not printed.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402

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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob-
lems involving your subscription will receive im-
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
M'ashington, D.C. 20520.

6Vf<

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

\^olume LXVIIT • No. 1767 • Mnv 7, 1973

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 1972:
A REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Li'ttfi- of Transmittal to the Congress and Introductory Comment
by the Secretary of State 545

PRESIDENT NIXON'S NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 567

DEPARTMENT REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON ASPECTS

OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA

Statements by Assistant Secretary Newsom 578

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1767
May 7, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
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PRICE:
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Single copy 65 cents
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agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN, ]
a weekly publication issued by the\
0/Kce of Media Services, Bureau o/j
Public Affairs, provides tfte public andi
interested agencies of tfte governmenti
witfi information on developments imi
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and^
on tfie work of t/ie Department and i
tfie Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued]
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,]
and news conferences of tfte President-i
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officers of tfie Department, as well asl
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United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report
of the Secretary of State

"United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Re-
•ort of the Secretary of State" was trans-
litted to the Congress on April 19. Reprinted
I re are the letter of transmittal and intro-
'xctory comment by the Secretary of Stated

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

April 19, 1973.

IM AR Mr. Chairman: Once again I am
l>kased to present to the Congress my annual
report on United States Foreign Policy. This
report provides a comprehensive record of
the events and policies of 1972. In a brief
introductory comment, I set forth nine ma-
jor policy objectives for 1973 and a table of
key indices shovi'ing the state of the world in
statistics.

Previous reports have traced the develop-
ment of new policies for resolving conflict
and reducing world tension. The year 1972
marked a point of high achievement in our
effort to free international relations from the
rigidities of confrontation and the tensions
of the past. 1973 will be a year of building,
a year of intensive negotiations that will
move us forward into the structure of peace
which President Xixon has made our fore-
most national goal.

In my first foreign jiolicy report I wrote
that my greatest hope was to help create
among Americans a new national unity and
purpose in our foreign policy. Now with the
major source of division within our country

' Copies of the 74.3-page report are available from
the Government Bookstore, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520 (Department of State pub-
lication 8699; stock no. 4400-01450; $4.20 postpaid).

behind us, there is every reason to believe
we all can work together to restore that com-
mon purpose.

Sincerely yours,

William P. Rogers.
The Honorable

J. William Fulbright, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,

and
The Honorable

Thomas E. Morgan, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENT
BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

1973— A YEAR OF BUILDING

1973 will be a year of building in American
foreign policy — for in 1973 we will be initi-
ating new negotiations and developing new
relationships which could determine the polit-
ical-economic structure of the world for the
remainder of this century. As President
Nixon stated in his second Inaugural Ad-
dress: "We are embarking on an era that
presents challenges as great as those any
nation or any generation has ever faced."

We have reached this formative stage in
international affairs as a result of the dra-
matic changes of the past year, changes due
in substantial measure to innovations we be-
gan to introduce into American foreign policy
four years ago.

We can take special pride in the four ac-
complishments of last year that are enabling

Moy 7, 1973

545

us to complete the transition from the con-
cerns of the past to the construction of a
new and more peaceful international environ-
ment.

— The profound transformation the United
States brought about during- 1972 in our
relations with the People's Republic of China
is opening new opportunities for an Asia at
peace. A "new start" was the phrase Premier
Chou En-lai used in his toast during Presi-
dent Nixon's first night in Peking. Today—
as the first official Americans to reside in
Peking since 1949 have already arrived—
there is no question that a new start in our
relations is being carried forward. We are
particularly hopeful that progress in U.S.-
Chinese relations will lead toward an im-
proving international climate throughout
Asia.

— Firm foundations for a new era of co-
operative efforts between the world's two
most powerful nations now exist in the after-
math of the Moscow Summit. A fabric of
common interests and of instruments of co-
operation is being created that will serve to
perpetuate better relations. And agreements
to limit offensive and defensive arms have
been concluded that may well be viewed his-
torically as the critical point when risks of
nuclear conflict between us turned perma-
nently downward.

—The flash point of Europe's dangers for
25 years, Berlin, has been defused, and the
Quadripartite Agreement has proven to be
a major stimulant to favorable evolution in
the European situation. Not only has the
inner German agreement followed, but move-
ment toward conferences on European secu-
rity and cooperation and on mutual and bal-
anced force reductions has been hastened as
a result.

— The Paris Agreement on Vietnam is
bringing an end to this century's longest
war. Though it is yet imperfectly observed a
cease-fire has been established in Vietnam
and Laos. And a framework for a peaceful
environment in Indochina has been estab-
Ushed.

1972 was thus a year of achievement in

our efforts to turn away from the rigidity of I

confrontation and the tensions of the cold ,

war. 1973 will be a year during which we i

will concentrate on forging this progress into |

a durable structure of peace. In doing so we [

shall seek to accomplish nine objectives. I

First, we will cooperate with Europeans, \
eastern and western, in ivhat ive hope tvill be |
«, decisive lowering of barriers to Europe's
sense of unity — seeking to enhance mutual
security through strategic arms limitations
and mutual and balanced force reductions |
and to free the flow of people and ideas \
throughout the continent. \

Of the many significant developments ';
taking place in U.S.-Soviet relations, negotia- \
tions this year on a permanent and compre- ;
hensive strategic offensive arms agreement j
will be the single most important. A success-
ful conclusion of those negotiations will also
be of importance to Europe as a whole, fur- |
ther stabilizing strategic relations under j
which Europe derives its basic protection. j
On this as on so many other issues close i
cooperation between us and our allies in j
NATO continues to be of fundamental im- j
portance. We will consult closely with them \
throughout the course of these negotiations
to ensure that their interests are taken fully j
into account. j

The ABM Treaty we signed last year is a !
major contribution to strategic stability, but ,
it must be accompanied by a permanent
agreement on offensive strategic arms. The
a'bM Treaty could not have been achieved :
until the principle of equivalence had been;
met to the satisfaction of both sides. There :
should not be one standard for defensive and {
another for offensive arms. Essential equiv- j
alence must be achieved in this area as|
well— equivalence based on the principles of {
comparable security and no unilateral advan- ;
tage to either side. An agreement based onj
this approach would contribute to the mainte-i
nance of a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic rela-j
tionship and enhance the security of bothj
countries and of the entire world. I

546

Department of State Bulletin j

Exi)Ioratory talks have bepun on a mutual
and balanced reduction of forces in central
Kurojie. Full scale nepotiations are expected
to bejjin in tlie fall. Reductions in the forces
that have so lonp faced each other in central
Kurojie would further contribute to the
strenjrtheninp of peace in Europe. Our own
policies have been a motivating force in these
nejrotiations. We will pursue them to a con-
clusion that reduces the confrontation of
forces in central Europe.

In the meantime it is important that we
do not unilaterally reduce our own forces, as
some have advocated, and risk in conse-
quence both the prospect of negotiating an
agreed limitation on forces in central Europe
and an unbalancing of the military relation-
ship.

Freer Relations Within Europe. Just as we
will seek to reduce the confrontation that im-
pedes cooperation, so will we endeavor to
help lower the political barriers that divide
Europe. In the forthcoming Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe we are
well aware that the Soviet Union will be at-
taching considerable importance to the in-
violability of present territorial boundaries.
The Soviet Union must be equally aware of
ir determination that this issue not be used
as a pretext for ratifying a political divi-
sion of Europe.

Fortunately barriers are lessening and
each state in eastern Europe is now officially
seeking to imjM-ove its coopei'ation with west-
vn Europe. The Conference will provide an
\cellent opportunity to widen the frame-
work of relationships which engage them
with ourselves and their neighbors. It is of
particular importance that the Conference
achieve objectives agreed upon at the last
meeting of NATO: closer, more open and
freer relationships among all people in
Europe, and a wider flow of information and
ideas.

It would be erroneous to presume that
widely divergent national perspectives on
the range of these freedoms do not exist. But
we accept General Secretary Brezhnev's re-
cent statement that the possibilities here are

"quite broad" as an expression of a welcome
intent to move toward us in an area of rela-
tions where we have such deeji convictions.

Relations With States of Eastern Europe.
We anticipate also that significant advances
will be made this year in our bilateral rela-
tions with states in eastern Europe. Since the
President's visit to Romania in 1969 concrete
improvements have been achieved with Ro-
mania, Poland, and Hungary in trade, in
consular protection and services, in scien-
tific and technological cooperation, and in
cultural contacts. Our relations with non-
aligned Yugoslavia have continued to pro-
gress.

During 1973 we hope to achieve substantial
improvements with Czechoslovakia and Bul-
garia. The Foreign Ministers of both coun-
tries told me at the U.N. General Assembly
session last fall their governments would
welcome concrete imi)rovements. We share
that desire and are responding to it. As has
been the case with other states in eastern
Europe the conclusion of consular conven-
tions will be the starting point.

In Moscow last spring President Nixon
and General Secretary Brezhnev pledged our
countries to recognize the sovereign equality
of all states, to make no claim to any special
rights or advantages in world affairs, and to
seek to promote conditions in which no coun-
try will be subject to outside interference in
its internal affairs. Full application of these
principles is central to the detente so many
now desire.

Economic Relations. Both the Soviet Union
and eastern European nations place commer-
cial issues high on their agenda of bilateral
interests. We also give high priority to ex-
l)anding our trade with eastern Europe.
During 1973 as our relations with individual
countries improve we will move to normalize
trade and to initiate broader trade arrange-
ments. We have submitted and are seeking
approval of legislation which will authorize
the President to extend most-favored-nation
treatment to the Soviet Union and to those
countries of eastern Europe and elsewhere
who do not now have it. Such congressional

j Moy 7, 1973

547

action would be consistent with tlie improve-
ment in our political relations; it will be of
central importance in our efforts to increase
trade with the Soviet Union and eastern

Europe.

The trade agreement we signed with the
Soviet Union in October contemplates that
U.S.-Soviet trade will triple over the 1969-71
level, rising to an aggregate amount of at
least $1.5 billion. And in eastern Europe we
will endeavor to increase our exports sig-
nificantly.

Second, we are turning our energies to the
task of helping to build what hopefully will
be Asia's first period of peace in W years into
a network of stability based on commitments
to mutual noninterference, with the ultimate
aim of bringing about cooperation among all
of Asia's peoples.

To solidify and perpetuate the peace that
has now been achieved in most of Indochina
is, of course, a pressing objective to which
we are devoting a maximum effort. Although
a certain unsettled period is to be expected
in the immediate aftermath of a cease-fire,
to date we are not satisfied with implementa-
tion of the Agreement. We are scrupulously
carrying out the provisions of the settlement,
and we expect others to do so as well. The
International Conference on Vietnam held in
Paris from February 26 to March 2, 1973,
was an important step in this direction. The
Conference participants endorsed the Viet-
nam Peace Agreement, pledged to observe
its terms and support its full implementa-
tion, and to associate themselves with the
peacekeeping process. They also agreed to
respect the independence and sovereignty of
Cambodia and Laos with a view to help bring
durable peace to those countries as well.

Our wider objective and hope is that with
this peace all Asians can be freed from the
bitterness of past confrontation so that they
may concentrate on building and renewing
cooperative relationships throughout the
area. The United States supports and will
continue to support efforts of Asian and Pa-
cific nations to develop and expand regional
cooperation.

548

At the same time America's role in Asia
must remain strong and active. Continued
American engagement in Asia is mandated
not only by the volume of our current eco-
nomic and political interests (our total trade
with Asia now equals 8.5 percent of our trade
with western Europe), but by the need to
prevent a recurrence of the conditions that
brought America into warfare in Asia three
times within one generation.

The growing rapprochement in Asia, in
eluding of course our own and Japan's with
China, will contribute to achieving stability
throughout the continent. We take seriously
the mutual commitment which the People's
Republic of China and we made in the
Shanghai Communique that each of us would
eschew and oppose attempts by anyone to
impose hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region.
Scrupulous adherence to this principle can be
the building block from which more normal
relations can be constructed throughout the
area. \

U.S.-P.R.C. Relations. In our bilateral re- ,
lations with China we will work thought-
fully and energetically to ensure that last
year's initial improvements prosper and ex-
pand during 1973. The establishment of liai-
son offices in our respective capitals, the
ao-reement already reached on further cul-
tural exchange, and the progress anticipated
in economic relations will all contribute to
further development of normal relations. In
Paris last month I was able to reach agree-
ment in principle on the issues of U.S. private
claims against the P.R.C. and frozen Chinese
assets in the United States. We expect our
trade in 1973 to increase significantly. We
will urge that larger numbers of Chinese be
sent to the United States as well as encour-
age an increase in the number of Americajis
going to China.

Reconstruction in Indochina. 1973 must
also be the year when the nations of Indo-
china shift decisively from the concerns of
war to the tasks of reconciliation and recon-
struction. A reconstruction program m In-
dochina will not only hold out hopes of a
better life to the peoples of these nations; it

Department of State Bulletin

will be a major influence in ensuriii<;' the in-
tegrity of the peace we have ao:reed vipon and
even in altering" the framework of relation-
ships between us and Xorth \'ietnam. We
look forward to a more constructive relation-
ship with North Vietnam but neither this —
nor economic assistance — will be possible un-
less the Vietnam Agreement is fully carried
out.

We see such a reconstruction program as
a fundamental aspect in our effort to extend
the accomplishments of the peace agreement
into broad stability throughout Southeast
Asia and to Asia as a whole. We will be de-
voting particularly close attention this spring
to ensuring that we have the means and ca-
pability of pursuing this policy to a succes.s-
ful completion. The program will and should
be one in which other nations — notably -Japan
and members of the European Community —
also make an imjiortant contribution. We
will consult closely with Congress on this
program.

South Asia. For historical and cultural
reasons Americans — and many Asians — tend
to think of Asia in far eastern and Pacific
terms. But the continent-wide stability and
cooperation we seek to bring about cannot
be complete without the participation of the
nations of South .Asia.

The United States seeks a close relation-
ship with each of the nations in South Asia.
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India will all have
an imi)ortant influence and effect upon Asian
stability.

We will continue our strong support for
the viability and cohesion of Pakistan be-
cause of our longstanding relationship and
1 ' if its importance to the stability of

t.i I ,,i,.e region. Our support for the eff'orts
f the new government of Bangladesh to
|ilace the nation on a firm foundation of .sta-
liility and progress will continue. In recent
months, India has expressed a desire to im-
prove relations with the United States. We
recii)rocate that desire. We will look to In-
dia, as South Asia's largest nation, to play
a leading role in building a climate for ]ieace
in South .Asia which wil contribute to peace
throughout the continent.

Third, ill the Middle East, the only remain-
ing area of chronic conflict in the world
irhere no negotiations are in progress, ire
ivill actirely encourage the parties to initiate,
during 1973, a genuine negotiating process.

Some people claim that the conflict be-
tween Israel and the Aiabs, which has now
lasted in chronic or acute stages for 2.5 years,
is impossible to resolve.

— Yet it has already proven possible to
make progress through negotiation in other
areas of passionate differences: in South and
North Korea. South and North Vietnam,
Pakistan and India, West and East Germany.

— New prospects for an improved quality
of life lie before all peoples of the Middle
East which could bring about a national and
human resurgence when a just i^eace releases
energies from preoccupation with the past.

— And the relaxation of tensions between
the major powers, the continuing que.st for
a peaceful settlement in many countries of
the area, and the maintenance of military
calm make 197-3 a favorable time for the
process to get underway.

We know of no other way to arrive at tlie
mutual clarifications of national interests nec-
essary for progress toward peace than to
engage, whether directly or indirectly, in ne-
gotiation. Outside forces cannot impose a
settlement. We see no prospect for any other
external means of narrowing difl'erences.

For many months we have sought in the
Middle East to convey one fundamental
point: that agreement to negotiation requires
no change of objectives but only a thoughtful
approach to the possibility of mutually ad-
vantageous accommodation. That is the proc-
ess that has taken place to the common
benefit of peoples elsewhere — a process we
ourselves have benefited from in Vietnam. It
is a process that would also benefit the peo-
ples in the Middle East — Palestinian, Israeli,
and the peoples in the Arab states concerned.
It is in such a process, and not in nihilistic
terrorism of the kind that took the lives of
two of our finest diplomats in Khartoum, that
hope for a better future lies.

If, as a first step, negotiations on an interim

May 7, 1973

549

Suez Canal agreement can be brought about
and pursued to successful implementation, as
we believe possible, the result would: rein-
force the cease-fire, separate the military
forces of the two sides, result in partial Is-
raeli withdrawal, open the Suez Canal to in-
ternational commerce, and, most importantly,
create momentum toward a permanent set-
tlement based on U.N. Resolution 242.

I have placed such emphasis upon an in-
terim agreement (not as an end in itself but
as a step toward final agreement) because
of our continuing judgment that it is there
where the issues are most susceptible to suc-
cessful results. We continue, of course, to be
open to any ideas the parties may suggest.
We do not, however, view an interim agree-
ment as an end in itself and recognize the
relationship between any first step toward
peace and the broader context of a final
Arab-Israeli settlement. As recent visits to
Washington by King Hussein, President
Sadat's emissary Mr. Ismail, and Prime Min-
ister Meir have emphasized, we remain in
close consultation with the governments most
intimately concerned.

Fourth, we tuill loork to deepen our com-
munity of interest with the states of Latin
America on global as well as hemispheric
issues, supporting in particular the expand-
ing roles so many Latin American states are
assuming in world affairs.

The community which the two American
continents have created is a community of
broadly shared objectives, underlying mutual
interests, geographic association, and sig-
nificant intellectual, political, and security
ties. It is, as well, a community of economic
cooperation : some 38 percent of Latin Amer-
ica's total foreign trade is with the United
States; Mexico is a trading partner of the
United States on the level of France and
Italy; and over half of U.S. private invest-
ment in the developing world is in Latin
America.

At the same time we live in a period when
isolation of the hemisphere has disappeared
and when Latin America's involvement in
an interdependent world is rapidly acceler-

550

ating. Its foreign trade with Europe and
Japan is now slightly higher than that with
the United States. Mexico's established role
in international afi'airs has for many years
been an outstanding one. More recently con-
tinental-sized Brazil has sought a global
role commensurate with its rapidly expand-
ing strength. Other states, small as well as
large, have contributed to the success of
multilateralism in the United Nations and
elsewhere.

Both they and we are now looking upon
our community in new ways — upon the col-
lective contributions that can be made by the
states of this hemisphere in world as well as
hemispheric affairs. All of us will benefit
from this wider role, for despite vicissitudes
the contributions we individually make will
largely complement one another. We intend,
in fact, to work with the countries within
this hemisphere in much the same pragmatic
atmosphere of equality and cooperation and
in the same global context as we do with
those in the other community with which we
are closely associated — western Europe.

But cooperation in global matters cannot
be isolated from the health of our hemi-
spheric association. I hope we will be able to
bring about a franker and more useful ex-
change of views through instituting private
consultations among Foreign Ministers at
the start of OAS sessions. The opportunity to
exchange opinions informally would be a val-
uable contribution to imijroving cooperation
and understanding. It would, for example,
give us an opportunity to share views on
world political developments and to ascertain
how we can work together on such matters
as the forthcoming trade negotiations.

We do not expect to eliminate difi'erences
of opinion and approach. But if our associa-
tion is to realize its potential for mutual
benefit, indeed if it is to avoid becoming a
format for sterile recrimination, we and our
neighbors will have to build upon areas of
mutual interest and to resolve those conflicts
which exist.

I recently told the Foreign Ministers of the
Organization of American States that with

Department of State Bulletin

the progress that lias been made toward a
more ijeaceful world we are now in a position
to give our relations with Latin America
more consistent attention. I will jiarticipate
personally in this effort and will soon ful-
fill my longstanding desire to visit Latin
America.

As part of our increased effort we are now
seeking approval of the generalized prefer-
ence legislation we felt it necessary to defer
in 1972. And Latin America will continue to
be the recipient of substantial assistance —
aid which totaled $1.2 billion in 1972. But it
is through trade, i>rivate investment, and the
normal course of international economic re-
lations that the largest share of cooperation
in develoi)ment for the hemisphere has al-
ways come and always will come. That is one
of the reasons why it is important for coun-
tries who desire investment to apply stable
rules upon which investors can count. And
that is why we are approaching all economic
cooperation with the developing world from a
comiirehensive, not merely an assistance
policy approach.

Fifth, ire irill continue to broaden our
natural cultural and political relationship
tvith Africa by strengthening our economic
ties, in paiiicular by accelerating the groivth
in trade and investment already taking place
under policies we adopted in 1970.

In the last three years U.S. trade with
Africa has risen by 30 percent and our in-
vestments by 50 percent. The still relatively
modest dollar levels of these relations ($3
billion in trade and $4 billion in investment)
can be significantly expanded.

Increased African production of raw ma-
terials and energy resources to meet the
growing needs of industrializefl societies will
account for much of the increase of our im-
ports and simultaneously provide opportuni-
ties for mutually beneficial investment. Ni-
geria and Libya, negligible oil producers in
1960. now rank seventh and ninth in world
production. Natural gas from Algeria —
whose resei"ves are among the highest in the
world — has recently begun to arrive in U.S.
ports. And Guinea ranks with Australia in

possessing bauxite reserves almost 100 times
those of the United States.

For the first time in many years, and in
spite of i)romotional efforts, U.S. exports to
Africa declined in 1972. There are, nonethe-
less, good opportunities for expanding our
exports to Africa's rapidly developing mar-
kets. We intend to pursue them.

As the first Secretary of State to visit
Africa, I know from my own experience how
highly African states are motivated to de-
velop their economic resources and their
standards of living. We will contribute to
that in'ocess both through grant and loan
assistance and through the expansion of our
normal economic contacts, a process of in-
creasing contact and cooperation we expect
to lead to more soundly based political rela-
tions as well.

In Nigeria, American investments now^ to-
tal $800 million. Dynamic and well on the
way to recovery from its civil war, Nigeria
is one of those leadership countries in Africa
and in world affairs with which we anticipate
continued increases in consultation and co-
operation.

In focusing upon the growth of economic
ties we imply no dilution of American sup-
port for self-determination in those parts of
Africa which have not yet had the opportu-
nity to choose their own future. We will con-
tinue to encourage productive diplomatic
means — such as Secretary General Wald-
heim's initiatives of last year — to give the
peoples of southern Africa the same choice
as to their future that the bulk of the con-
tinent has already experienced.

Sixth, we will endeavor both to restore our
international economic position and to reach
agreement on principles to govern an ex-
panding international trade and monetary
system.

In both i)revious reports on foreign policy
I emphasized our expectation that economic
relations will assume major importance in
our foreign policy over the rest of this cen-
tury. Economic policy increasingly occupies
our time at all levels of government at home
and of our diplomacy abroad. With the cessa-

iMay 7, 1973

551

tion of the war in Southeast Asia and the im-
provement of relations with China and the
Soviet Union, economic policy will be par-
ticularly prominent in 1973.

We will, as a matter of urgency, be seeking
(1) to improve the ability of American work-
ers and businessmen to compete in world
markets and (2) to restructure the interna-
tional economic system so that the unprece-
dented growth of the world economy of re-
cent years can be extended into the future.

The American economy remains by far the
largest and most productive economy in the
world. We must not let our concern over cur-
rent problems obscure that basic strength.
But obstructive trade barriers continue to
distort the smooth and equitable growth of
world trade. The world economy will benefit
by the removal of such obstacles, as will the
United States.

The currency realignments of 1971 and
1973 will be major steps in making it possi-
ble to restore our trading position. But mone-
tary steps must now be supplemented by
elimination of previously tolerated trading
practices and restrictions that put extra bur-
dens upon the dollar or upon the American
exporter or investor. Changes are particu-
larly necessary to make our access to Japa-
nese markets more equivalent to their access
to ours. They also are needed in Europe,
where in the course of enlargement of the
Common Market some obstacles to U.S. ex-
ports have been extended more widely, espe-
cially in agriculture, and where our trade
account went into deficit in 1972 for the first
time.

Accordingly we will be negotiating com-
pensation in the GATT for impairment of
trade interests which resulted from the en-
largement of the European Community and
from its special arrangements with other
European countries. We will continue to
press the Community to ease its restrictions
on agicultural trade and to eliminate reverse
preferences for Community exports. We will
work with Japan for an early reduction or
elimination of import quotas and tariffs, im-
proved access to the Japanese market for
U.S. investors and businessmen, and in-

creased Japanese Government purchases of
American products.

Our economic health is increasingly linked
to that of the world's long-run economic
health. Consequently we also will be pressing
this year for basic reform of the interna-
tional monetary and trade systems.

Monetary Reform. The broad principles of
monetary reform which we wish to see
adopted by the IMF Board of Governors this
September were set forth by Secretary of the
Treasury Shultz at the annual meeting of
the International Monetary Fund last Sep-
tember. At the March 16 meeting of the
Ministers of the Group of Ten countries and
the European Community agreement was
reached on measures to ensure maintenance
of an orderly exchange rate system while the
effort to reform the international monetary
system is pressed ahead. This is a positive
and encouraging result.

While considerable time is required before
exchange rate changes can alter the balance
of payments, we are satisfied that if accept-
able trade arrangements can also be made
we will soon move toward sustainable equi-
librium in our payments position. But a sense
of urgency in the current negotiations within
the IMF's Committee of Twenty is now nec-
essary so that the favorable effect of the
devaluations of the dollar can be realized
and a stable system created. We hope that
the Committee would be able to report agree-
ment on broad ijrinciples of reform by the
time of the annual meeting of the IMF in
Nairobi this fall.

Trade Negotiations. While the monetary
talks proceed, the first session of related ne-
gotiations on trade will open this September
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.

The Administration has submitted to the
Congress a request for the comprehensive
negotiating authority we consider necessary
to attack agricultural as well as industrial
restrictions and nontariff as well as tariff
barriers. In these negotiations we will insist
that American products be given fair and
reasonable treatment.

The authority which the President is seek-

552

Department of State Bulletin

'Kl

'\i\g to raise tariffs in particular cases is de-
signed to achieve that i)urpose, not to brinff
about increased barriers to trade. In fact our
objective is quite the opposite. For the past
quarter century international trade has in-
creased at a more rapid rate than world pro-
duction, providing an essential stimulus to
the most rapid global economic growth in
man's history. The reduction of barriers to
trade made this contribution possible. It
must be continued.

During the trade negotiations we will, in
particular, seek approval on these principal
approaches:

-That tariff barriers on both industrial
and agricultural goods should be reciprocally
reduced to the point where they form no ap-
preciable imi)ediment to the flow or direction
of international trade.

— That nontariff restraints should be re-
duced over a moderate period of time and
that remaining restrictions should be regu-
lated under international agreement.

-That trade should continue to be orga-
nized on a global basis, not on the basis of
trading blocs, and that reverse prefei-ences
favoring particular groups of developed
countries should be removed:

— That particular account should be taken
of the need to find solutions to the problems
of developing countries.

-That an internationally supervised sys-
tem of safeguards should be agreed upon to
give industries adversely affected by shift-
ing trade patterns time to adjust.

Neither the negotiations on trade nor on
monetary matters will be completed in 1973.
But success in e.stablishing agreement on
such basic principles will go far toward
building tomorrow's economic system.

Seventh, we intend to employ our economic
policies more comprehensively than in the
past to support the efforts of developing
countries to accelerate their per capita rate
of economic growth beyond current levels.

If the forthcoming trade negotiations are
successful, the poorer nations of the world
will benefit fully as much as the developed
world. But neither trade nor assistance, de-

veloped nor developing nations' policies, in-
vestment nor nationalization, nor other sep-
arate efforts will suffice for dealing with
what may well be the most important but
dillicult requirement of the next quarter
century — that of escalating the economic
growth rate of the developing world.

Despite the high i)riority given to eco-
nomic growth in most of the poorer nations,
two decades of international assistance, and
decisive breakthroughs in .several states, the
overall per capita growth rate in the develop-
ing world has only reached that of the indus-
trialized countries in the past two years.
Even with that accomplished, the fact re-
mains that a 3 percent per capita growth
rate in a country like India produces an an-
nual income increase of only $3 while in the
United States it produces $120. Thus no end
is in sight in the increasing disparity between
income levels of developing and developed
nations. And within the developing coun-
tries, the benefits of modernization have
been unevenly distributed, causing internal
social and political problems.

We must collectively seek to narrow these
disparities lest North-South dissension re-
place the receding East-West conflict. We
therefore intend to pursue a comprehensive
policy designed to help stimulate social and
economic progress, particularly higher rates
of per capita economic growth, in the devel-
oping world — a policy not of aid alone but
employing a wide variety of economic rela-
tionships, a policy involving coordination
with other developed countries and requiring
principal efforts from the developing coun-
tries themselves. We will pursue it in recog-
nition of the fact that just as the developing
nations need access to the capital and coojier-
ation of the developed countries, so will we
increasingly need their cooperation and ac-
cess to what they can produce. The rapidly
burgeoning needs of the industrialized world
for energy and raw material resources offer
new trade possibilities that will both aug-
ment production and foreign exchange earn-
ings in the developing world.

I have asked the new Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs, William Casey,

May 7, 1973

553

to give special attention to this matter. Mr.
Casey will be using the full resources of the
Department and the government to coordi-
nate the use of such elements as restraints on
population growth, international investment,
trade expansion, preferences, multilateral in-
stitutions, grant and loan assistance, and
debt relief in support of this purpose.

Eighth, we ivill seek during 1973 both to
strengthen the economic and political rela-
tionship among the world's industrialized,
democratic countries and to create associa-
tions among tis tvhich will be more global in
scope and more regular in nature than has
previously been the case.

During 1973 we will be engaged in im-
portant separate consultations with the Euro-
pean Community, Japan, and other key
friends. But bilateral approaches are no
longer sufficient to handle the growing
agenda of common political and economic
concerns. A substantially higher level of
worldwide coordination and cooperation is
required among Japan, Canada, western
Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States if we are to solve common
trade and monetary problems, continue the
rapid expansion of the world's economy, and
assist in the growth of the developing world.
It is through wider cooperation also that we
can best contribute our complementary
strengths and common ideals toward building
a politically sounder world.

We are one another's best trading partners
and one another's most significant competi-
tors. Our governments derive their authority
from the freely expressed consent of their
citizens. Our people share a common desire
for an open and peaceful world. No longer
can any of us satisfactorily think solely in
Asian terms, in European terms, or in North
American terms. For the health and strength
of us all we must think and act in terms
of us all.

One way in which this can be approached
will be through enhanced cooperation in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, the one organization whose
membership is closely linked to these states.

Last year the Executive Committee of the
OECD was transformed into a high-level
policy forum for consultations on the entire
spectrum of our economic relationships.

We would like the new high-level policj,
forum to address the interrelationship of all
aspects of economic policies — domestic and
international — and their impact upon the
total economic system. We believe the OECD
should be a center for coordination of the
more comprehensive development policies we
consider necessary. And we would like to see
it continue to be involved in an area it has
only recently begun to deal with — interna-
tional investment, including the role of the
multinational corporation.

At OECD Ministerial meetings we plan to
continue our policy of including a senior
State Department representative in our dele-
gation. We hope that the OECD may increas-
ingly become a forum for broad cooperation
beyond the technical items on specific agen-
das.

The presence of Foreign Ministers at the
United Nations General Assembly each year
also provides a further opportunity for co-
ordination at the policy level. I have found
the various meetings I have each year with
NATO Foreign Ministers, Australia, New
Zealand and Japan to be highly useful. An
occasional opportunity for Foreig-n Ministers
from these countries to exchange views col-
lectively should improve coordination on the
many matters that now affect us all. I hope
we will be able to find time for such an ex-
change this fall.

We will of course be consulting with our
friends about these ideas, as they may have
other suggestions for strengthening our
relationship.

European Community. The enlargement of
the European Community and the consequent
strengthening of western Europe's economic
capabilities assure that 1973 will be a year
of special attention to relations between the
European Community and the United States.
We hope to be able to build such lasting
ties that our relations with the Community
will in time become a solid pillar of U.S.-

554

Department of State Bulletin

I'Ajroiiean association such as we already have
in NATO. To acliieve this however we must
overcome a number of economic differences
arising out of the chanjres in Europe and
out of our bah\nce-of-pa.vments situation.
Western Europe as a whole now produces
three-quarters as much as we do, and it has
a greater share of world trade. We will ac-
cordingly be looking to them to assume a
more equal share of common responsibilities.

Japan. We will also be engaged during
1973 in reinforcing our long-range political
and economic association with Japan, an as-
sociation as important to us across the Pa-
cific as is our relationship with western
Europe across the Atlantic.

Last September Prime Minister Tanaka
and President Nixon concurred that strength-
ening of our close ties would be "an impor-
tant factor for peace and stability in the
evolving world situation." The solidity of
these ties will be of particular importance as
we each proceed to build closer relations with
China and the Soviet Union.

A major correction in the trade imbalance
between us ($4.2 billion in 1972 — two-thirds
of our overall trade deficit) understandably
has high priority. Japan has accepted this
correction as being one of its top priority
tasks. We welcome its intention to lower
tariffs and to promote import and capital
liberalization, its decision to permit the yen
to appreciate in the exchange market, and its
stated desiie to achieve an external equilib-
rium within the next two or three years.

Canada. Our attention has understandably
been drawn most recently to the changes in
western Europe and to Japan's dramatic
growth. But it is Canada which will remain
our largest single trading partner and the
major locus of ])rivate American investment.
We hope to examine with Canada such areas
as automotive trade and defense procurement
to assure that benefits from our close trading
ties are fully shared. And we intend to engage
in more intense and varied coojieration with
Canada to meet the environmental and en-
ergy jiroblems of North America, in particu-
lar in carrying out the purposes of the Great

Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972.
The next few years will be a time of test-
ing of our bonds with all the industrialized,
democratic nations as we work toward new
relationships based on current security, eco-
nomic and political imjieratives. The adjust-
ment will be neither simple nor painless. But
we approach this adjustment with the con-
fidence that it can lead to an era of coopera-
tion bountiful for all our peoples.

Ninth, we will press fonvard toward
building a irorld of yyiultiluteral cooperation
and orderly relations under law, giving spe-
cial attention in 1973 to preliminary agree-
ment in the United Nations on a global law
of the sea that ivill transform the oceans from
an area of groiring conflict into a source of
growing wealth and cooperation.

In many concrete ways we are seeking to
strengthen the contribution of multilateral
institutions — in particular of the United
Nations agencies — in creating a more cooper-
ative and better regulated international com-
munity. Of substantial importance in the
extension of such cooperation will be the
first session of the U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, which will open this fall in
New York following two years of prepara-
tory work. That meeting will set into process
an international negotiation in whose success
all nations have an important stake.

The international communication made
possible by the freedom of the seas and the
potential resources that the seas contain in
energy, food and raw materials are too im-
portant to permit the oceans to become cen-
ters of conflict. Yet the varying interests of
coastal states in security and of naval powers
in freedom of navigation, of coastal states
in their adjacent resources and of the world
community in the resources of the deep sea
will produce just such conflicts unless we all
accommodate for our long-range advantage.

That is why we are striving to reach early
agreement on a comprehensive legal regime
for the seas. Negotiation of a treaty will re-
quire most of 1974, but we will urge that this
fall's opening session concur upon the objec-
tives of:

May 7, 1973

555

—A maximum breadth of 12 miles for the
territorial sea;

Free transit through and over straits

used for international navigation;

— Broad coastal state economic jurisdic-
tion over mineral and fisheries resources in
areas adjacent to the territorial sea, tempered
by international standards which will protect
legitimate interests of other states;

—An international regime including ma-
chinery to authorize the exploration and ex-
ploitation of the deep seabed under agreed
regulations;

—Standards and controls to protect the
marine environment from pollution; and

An agreed regime which would promote

marine scientific research.

Narcotics and Terrorism. A deeper com-
mitment to orderly relations under law is
also urgently required in the campaign to
outlaw hijackers and drug smugglers. As
Chairman of the Cabinet Committees on In-
ternational Terrorism and International Nar-
cotics Control, I will continue during 1973
to pursue our war against these two threats
to a more civilized world.

In 1972 we developed comprehensive anti-
narcotics plans with each of the 59 nations
involved in production, consumption or trans-
shipment of illicit hard drugs. During 1973
we will translate these plans into action.
With the movement toward eliminating Tur-
key as a source of opium well underway and
with progress developing in Southeast Asia,
we will especially concentrate upon interdic-
tion of the drug traflic. Enforcement and im-
proved intelligence are our two top priorities.
We are obtaining increased cooperation from
other countries in both areas. Our programs
have already caused shortages of heroin with-
in the United States, hindering the recruit-
ment of new addicts, and hopefully driving
many existing addicts into treatment. In
1973 we intend to intensify this pressure.

The international community's response to
the narcotic issue has been gratifying. But
its response to initiatives to suppress hijack-
ing and terrorism has been disappointing,
even shortsighted. An atmosphere not suf-

556

ficiently hostile to assaults upon civilized
comity among nations, such as the recent
slaughter of two American and a Belgian
diplomat in the Sudan, must be changed.
Although 63 airliners from 24 countries were
hijacked and 24-5 passengers and crew killed
or wounded in 1972, most nations of the
world have so far been unwilling to take
meaning-ful new action on hijacking or ter-
rorism either at the United Nations or in
the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion.

On the bilateral front we have been more
successful due to the agreement with Cuba
on the extradition or punishment of hijack-
ers. We hope to reach similar agreements
with other countries, particularly in north-
ern Africa.

We will also press again at the ICAO Con-
ference this August for a new international
convention to prevent safe havens for hi-
jackers. At the very minimum we will ex-
pect the Assembly to establish international
machinery to make investigations and rec-
ommendations in hijacking or sabotage cases.
If there was any doubt that international
treaties should be adopted to provide for the
protection of diplomats and for the extradi-
tion or punishment of persons who kill, se-
riously injure or kidnap innocent persons in
a foreign state for political purposes, this
year's outrages should terminate it. We will
pursue the latter treaty vigorously in the
U.N. ad hoc committee on terrorism sched-
uled to meet this summer. And we be-
lieve the United Nations should complete the
treaty on protection of diplomats at this
fall's General Assembly.

* * * * *

This introduction can only hope to outline
the most important of the Administration's
foreign policy objectives. I have elaborated
here upon those which collectively give 1973
the characteristic of a year of building— the
building of relations and institutions that
could determine the course of the rest of the
century. Given the President's strong inter;
est and leadership in this eflfort, we have
every reason to expect that further substan

Department of State Bulletin

i

tial progrress toward lasting peace and coop-
eration will lie made in the cominjr year.

It is now commonplace to hear that there
are no more dramatic accomplishments possi-
ble in foreigrn affairs. I do not ajrree. 1973
can be a dramatic year — not in breaking old
patterns but in building new ones, a year
when we begin to erect the framework for a
generation of peace.

But 1973 will be just beginning. The road
ahead will be as difficult and dangerous as it
will be iiromi.sing. It will require the con-
tinued perseverance and engagement of this
great nation. That is why our foreign policy
must continue to be a policy of engagement —
engagement with adversaries in building co-
operation, engagement with allies on a basis
of shared values and interests, engagement
with developing nations in the effort to raise
the living standards of their people.

For many years the economic and political
health of the world has been heavily affected
by the state of the American society. Now
our condition increasingly is affected by the
welfare of others. The degree of interdepend-
ence among nations and many of the princi-
pal trends of international affairs are
succinctly evident in the statistical indi-
cators of the state of the world I have ap-
pended to this introduction. In concise terms
they illustrate both the necessity of our en-
gagement in the world and the nature of
many of the issues the world must still face.

In my first foreign policy report, I ex-
pressed the hope that we could fashion a for-
eign policy which would overcome the deep
and destructive divisions within this country
and restore a sense of common purpose in
.America's approach to world affairs. Today
the obstacles to such a common purpose have
been overcome, and we have found a new
self-confidence, devoid both of arrogance and
of destructive self-doubts. The foreign policy
objectives we are setting forth are moderate
and constructive ones. It will be my earnest

endeavor so to carry them out that the Ad-
ministration and the Congress, the leader-
ship of both parties, the government and the
citizenry can again move forward harmoni-
ously in their su])port. With such cooperation
1973 will be a year of substantial progress
toward the more peaceful and prosperous
world we all desire.

THE STATE OF THE WORLD IN STATISTICS*

I. Human Welfare
Gross World Product

(billions 1971$)
World Product

Per Capita (1971$)
GWP Growth Rate (%)
Population (billions)
Population Growth Rate (%)

Infant Mortality (%)

Literacy (7r)

II. Interdependence
World Energy Imported ( Vr )
World Product

Exported (%)
Industrial Product

Exported {%)
International Mail

(billions of items)
International Travel

(millions)
International Travel/World

Population (^/r)
HI. Military

Men Under Arms (millions)
Men Under Arms/Population

(per thousand)
Military Expenditures/

GWP (%)

I960

2,214

1965

2,852

730

853

1,003

4.9

5.2

5.2

3

3.3

3.7

1.7

1.8

1.8

11

10

9

48

56

64

21

27

30

8.7

8.9

9.7

12.7

13.6

18.5

4.5

7.1

13.0

102

135

178

3.1

4.1

4.8

19

21

23

6.3

6.3

6.4

7.6

6.8

6.5

3,673

' International statistics are sufficiently reliable
to indicate trends. However, there are significant
problems in comparability among national statistics
that make up the data, as well as in collection of
some items. All world figures must therefore be
taken as the best available approximations.

May 7, 1973

557

THE STATE OF THE UNITED STATES
AND THE WORLD

Like other nations, the United States is becoming more closely tied to and
interdependent with the rest of the world.

ENERGY IMPORTED/ENERGY
I CONSUMED

\^-^- PERCENT 30.4

: WORLD 26 9

20 6 iilll

100 99

11.3;

I I II

1960 1965 1970

US. EXPORTS OF
MANUFACTURES/TOTAL
U.S. MANUFACTURING

PERCENT

1960 1965 1970

INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL

MILLIONSOF PEOPLE

178 3

1346

102 4

35.7

40.7

52.1

■ Ill

■

1

1960 1965 1970

1960 1965

1970

TOTAL U.S. FOREIGN
INVESTMENTS AND
WORLD INVESTMENTS
IN U.S.

BILLIONS

117.5

DIRECT U.S. INVESTMENTS
ABROAD/DIRECT CAPITAL
ASSETS IN US

PERCENT

U.S. FOOD EXPORTS/
WORLDWIDE FOOD

1960 1965 1970

1960 1965 1970

558

Department of State Bulletin

THE STATE OF THE DEVELOPED
AND DEVELOPING NATIONS

White the economies of both developed and developing nations grew substantially,
the gap between them also grew ond most of the world's people remained poor.

!f : ' " -^

LDC
U.S.

GNP PER CAPITA
CURRENT DOLLARS

4,756

208
1960 1965 1970

GNP PER CAPITA
GROWTH RATE

CONSTANT 47

1971 DOLLARS

33

24

1960

27

1965

3.4

522

1970

ANNUAL KWH OUTPUT
PER PERSON

5,U0

220
LDC

DC

LITERACY

97%

40%

IDC

DC

DEATHS PER 1,000
LIVE BIRTHS

no

21

LDC

DC

There are two and a half times as many people in the developing countries as in the developed
and they are growing almost two and a half times as fast.

POPULATION
MILLIONS OF PEOPLE

2,355
2,130

880|

2,666

181

195

I960

RATE OF POPULATION GROWTH
PERCENT

25
2.4

'm. mm

I960 1965

1970

INCLUDES UNITED STATES

May 7, 1973

559

THE STATE OF THE WORLD POPULATION
AND PRODUCT

POPULATION

DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES

49.5%

OTHER

DEVELOPED

COUNTRIES

11.4%

DEVELOPED
(COMMUNIST)
' 9.2%

DEVELOPING
(COMMUNIST)
-^ 24.4%

PRODUCT

DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
16.0% —

DEVELOPING

(COMMUNIST)

4.4%

DEVELO
(COMMU
18.7%

OTHER
DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES
-33.3%

I

* INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS ARE SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO INDICATE TRENDS. HOWEVER, THERE ARE
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN COMPARABILfTY AMONG NATIONAL STATISTICS THAT MAKE UP THE DATA,
AS WELL AS IN COLLECTION OF SOME ITEMS. ALL WORLD FIGURES MUST THEREFORE BE TAKEN AS
THE BEST AVAILABLE APPROXIMATIONS.

i

560

Department of State Bulletin

President Nixon's National Energy Policy

President Nixon transmitted to the Con-
!/riss on April 18 n meifsage nu enerqii pol-
icy. Following are a statement by President
Nixon recorded that day for television and
radio; excerpts from the messaf/e; the tran-
script of a news conference held at the White
House that day by Secretary of the Treasunj
George P. Shultz; and the text of an Execu-
tive order establishing a Special Committee
on Energy and a National Energy Office.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT NIXON

White House press release dated April IK

America's enerpy demands have grown so
rapidly that they now outstrip our energy
supplies. As a result, we face the possibility
of temporary fuel shortages and some in-
creases in fuel prices in America.

This is a serious challenge, but we have the
ability to meet it. If our energy resources are
properly developed, they can fulfill our en-
erg>' requirements for centuries to come.

What is needed now is decisive and respon-
sible action to increase our energy supplies —
action which takes into account the needs of
our economy, of our environment, and of our
national security — and that is why I am mov-
ing forward today on several fronts.

I am ending quantitative controls on oil
impoi-ts and establishing a National Energj^
Office.

I am ordering an acceleration in the leasing
of oil lands on the outer continental shelf and
increasing our ability to prevent oil spills.

I am also taking new steps to maintain our
vital coal industry.

In addition, I am asking the Congress to
act quickly on several proposals. One would
remove government regulations which now
discourage the growth of our domestic nat-
ural gas industry. Another would help us
establish the research and technological

groundwork for developing new forms of
energy with a long-range future. And .still
others would peiniil licensing of new deep-
water ports in our oceans and would open
the way for the long-delayed Alaska oil
l)ipeline.

Each of these steps can help us meet our
energy needs and meet those needs without
sacrificing our environment or endangering
our national security, so that we can continue
to build a better life for all of our people in
this country.

EXCERPTS FROM MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS '

To the Congress of the United States:

At home and abroad, America is in a time
of transition. Old problems are yielding to
new initiatives, but in their place new prob-
lems are arising which once again challenge
our ingenuity and require vigorous action.
Nowhere is this more clearly true than in the
field of energy.

As America has become more prosperous
and more heavily industrialized, our demands
for energy have soared. Today, with 6 per-
cent of the world's population, we consume
almost a third of all the energy used in the
world. Our energy demands have grown so
rapidly that they now outstrip our available
supplies, and at our present rate of growth,
our energy needs a dozen years from now will
be nearly double what they were in 1970.

In the years immediately ahead, we must
face up to the possibility of occasional energy
shortages and some increase in energy prices.

Clearly, we are facing a vitally important
energy challenge. If pre.sent trends continue
unchecked, we could face a genuine energy
crisis. But that crisis can and should be

' For the complete text, sec Weekly Compilation of
Prfisidential Documents dated Apr. 23, p. 389.

May 7, 1973

561

averted, for we have the capacity and the
resources to meet our energy needs if only
we take the proper steps — and take them
now.

More than half the world's total reserves of
coal are located within the United States.
This resource alone would be enough to pro-
vide for our energy needs for well over a
century. We have potential resources of bil-
lions of barrels of recoverable oil, similar
quantities of shale oil and more than 2,000
trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Properly
managed, and with more attention on the
part of consumers to the conservation of
energy, these supplies can last for as long as
our economy depends on conventional fuels.

In addition to natural fuels, we can draw
upon hydroelectric plants and increasing
numbers of nuclear powered facilities. More-
over, long before our present energy sources
are exhausted, America's vast capabilities in
research and development can provide us
with new, clean and virtually unlimited
sources of power.

Thus we should not be misled into pessi-
mistic predictions of an energy disaster. But
neither should we be lulled into a false sense
of security. We must examine our cir-
cumstances realistically, carefully weigh the
alternatives — and then move forward deci-
sively.

Weighing the Alternatives

Over 90 percent of the energy we consume
today in the United States comes from three
sources: natural gas, coal and petroleum.
Each source presents us with a different set
of problems.

Natural gas is our cleanest fuel and is most
preferred in order to protect our environ-
ment, but ill-considered regulations of nat-
ural gas prices by the Federal Government
have produced a serious and increasing scar-
city of this fuel.

We have vast quantities of coal, but the
extraction and use of coal have presented
such persistent environmental problems that,
today, less than 20 percent of our energy
needs are met by coal and the health of the
entire coal industry is seriously threatened.

Our third conventional resource is oil, but
domestic production of available oil is no
longer able to keep pace with demands.

In determining how we should expand and
develop these resources, along with others
such as nuclear power, we must take into
account not only our economic goals, but also
our environmental goals and our national se-
curity goals. Each of these areas is pro-
foundly affected by our decisions concerning
energy.

If we are to maintain the vigor of our
economy, the health of our environment, and
the security of our energy resources, it is
essential that we strike the right balance
among these priorities.

The choices are difficult, but we cannot re-
fuse to act because of this. We cannot stand
still simply because it is difficult to go for-
ward. That is the one choice Americans must
never make.

The energy challenge is one of the great
opportunities of our time. We have already
begun to meet that challenge, and realize its
opportunities.

National Energy Policy

In 1971, I sent to the Congress the first
message on energy policies ever submitted by
an American President. In that message I
proposed a number of specific steps to meet
our projected needs by inci'easing our supply
of clean energy in America.

Those steps included expanded research
and development to obtain more clean en-
ergy, increased availability of energy re-
sources located on Federal lands, increased
efforts in the development of nuclear power,
and a new Federal organization to plan and
manage our energy programs.

In the twenty-two months since I sub-
mitted that message, America's energy re-
search and development efforts have been
expanded by 50 percent.

In order to increase domestic production
of conventional fuels, sales of oil and gas
leases on the Outer Continental Shelf have
been increased. Federal and State standards
to protect the marine environment in which
these leases are located are being tightened.
We have developed a more rigorous surveil-

562

Department of State Bulletin

lance capability and an improved ability to
prevent and clean up oil spills.

We are planning to proceed with the devel-
opment of oil shale and peothermal energy
sources on Federal lands, so long as an eval-
uation now underway shows that our envi-
ronment can be adequately protected.

We have also taken new steps to expand
our uranium enrichment capacity for the
production of fuels for nuclear power plants,
to standardize nuclear power plant designs,
and to ensure the continuation of an already
enviable safety record.

We have issued new standards and guide-
lines, and have taken other actions to in-
crease and encourage better conservation of
energy.

In short, we have made a strong beginning
in our effort to ensure that America will al-
ways have the power needed to fuel its pros-
perity. But what we have accomplished is
only a beginning.

Now we must build on our increased knowl-
edge, and on the accomplishments of the past
twenty-two months, to develop a more com-
prehensive, integrated national energy policy.
To carry out this policy we must:

— increase domestic production of all forms
of energy ;

— act to conserve energy more effectively ;

— strive to meet our energy needs at the
lowest cost consistent with the protection of
both our national security and our natural
environment;

— reduce excessive regulatory and admin-
istrative impediments which have delayed or
prevented construction of energy-producing
facilities;

— act in concert with other nations to con-
duct research in the energy field and to find
ways to prevent serious shortages ; and

— apply our vast scientific and technologi-
cal capacities — both public and private — so
we can utilize our current energy resources
more wisely and develop new sources and new
forms of energy.

The actions I am announcing today and
the proposals I am submitting to the Con-
irress are designed to achieve these objec-
tives. They reflect the fact that we are in a

period of transition, in which we must work
to avoid or at least minimize short-term
supply shortages, while we act to expand
and develop our domestic supplies in order to
meet long-term energy needs.

We should not suppose this transition pe-
riod will be easy. The task ahead will require
the concerted and cooperative efforts of con-
sumers, industry, and government.

Importing To Meet Our Energy Needs
Oil Imports

In order to avert a short-term fuel short-
age and to keep fuel costs as low as possible,
it will be necessary for us to increase fuel
imports. At the same time, in order to reduce
our long-term reliance on imports, we must
encourage the exploration and development
of our domestic oil and the construction of
refineries to process it.

The present quota system for oil imports —
the Mandatory Oil Import Program — was
established at a time when we could produce
more oil at home than we were using. By
imposing quantitative restrictions on im-
ports, the quota system restricted imports of
foreign oil. It also encouraged the develop-
ment of our domestic petroleum industry in
the interest of national security.

Today, however, we are not producing as
much oil as we are using, and we must import
ever larger amounts to meet our needs.

As a result, the current Mandatory Oil Im-
port Program is of virtually no benefit any
longer. Instead, it has the very real potential
of aggravating our supply problems, and it
denies us the flexibility we need to deal
quickly and efliciently with our import re-
quirements. General dissatisfaction with the
program and the apparent need for change
has led to uncertainty. Under these condi-
tions, there can be little long-range invest-
ment planning for new drilling and refineiy
construction.

Effective today, I am removing by procla-
mation all existing tariffs on imported crude
oil and products. = Holders of import licenses

• For text of Proclamation No. 4210, see 38 Fed.
Rcfl. 9645.

May 7, 1973

563

will be able to import petroleum duty free.
This action will help hold down the cost of
energy to the American consumer.

Effective today, I am also suspending di-
rect control over the quantity of crude oil
and refined products which can be imported.
In place of these controls, I am substituting a
license-fee quota system.

Under the new system, present holders of
import licenses may import petroleum exempt
from fees up to the level of their 1973 quota
allocations. For imports in excess of the
1973 level, a fee must be paid by the importer.

This system should achieve several ob-
jectives.

First, it should help to meet our immediate
energy needs by encouraging importation of
foreign oil at the lowest cost to consumers,
while also providing incentives for explora-
tion and development of our domestic re-
sources to meet our long-term needs. There
will be little paid in fees this year, although
all exemptions from fees will be phased out
over several years. By gradually increasing
fees over the next two and one-half years to
a maximum level of one-half cent per gallon
for crude oil and one and one-half cents per
gallon for all refined products, we should
continue to meet our energy needs while en-
couraging industry to increase its domestic
production.

Second, this system should encourage re-
finery construction in the United States, be-
cause the fees are higher for refined products
than for crude oil. As an added incentive,
crude oil in amounts up to three-fourths of
new refining capacity may be imported with-
out being subject to any fees. This special
allowance will be available to an oil company
during the first five years after it builds or
expands its refining capacity.

Third, this system should provide the flexi-
bility we must have to meet short and long-
term needs efficiently. We will review the fee
level periodically to ensure that we are im-
posing the lowest fees consistent with our
intention to increase domestic production
while keeping costs to the consumer at the
lowest possible level. We will also make full
use of the Oil Import Appeals Board to en-
sure that the needs of all elements of the

petroleum industry are met, particularly
those of independent operators who help to
maintain market competition.

Fourth, the new system should contribute
to our national security. Increased domestic
production will leave us less dependent on
foreign supplies. At the same time, we will
adjust the fees in a manner designed to en-
courage, to the extent possible, the security
of our foreign supplies. Finally, I am direct-
ing the Oil Policy Committee to examine
incentives aimed at increasing our domestic
storage capacity or shut-in production. In
this way we will provide buff"er stocks to
insulate ourselves against a temporary loss
of foreign supplies.

Deepwater Ports

It is clear that in the foreseeable future,
we will have to import oil in large quantities.
We should do this as cheaply as we can with
minimal damage to the environment. Un-
fortunately, our present capabilities are in-
adequate for these purposes.

The answer to this problem lies in deep-
water ports which can accommodate those
larger ships, providing important economic
advantages while reducing the risks of col-
lision and grounding. Recent studies by the
Council on Environmental Quality demon-
strate that we can expect considerably less
pollution if we use fewer but larger tankers
and deepwater facilities, as opposed to the
many small tankers and conventional facili-
ties which we would otherwise need.

If we do not enlarge our deepwater port
capacity, it is clear that both American and
foreign companies will expand oil transship-
ment terminals in the Bahamas and the
Canadian Maritime Provinces. From these
terminals, oil will be brought to our conven-
tional ports by growing numbers of small
and medium size transshipment vessels,
thereby increasing the risks of pollution from
shipping operations and accidents. At the
same time, the United States will lose the
jobs and capital that those foreign facilities
provide.

Given these considerations, I believe we
must move forward with an ambitious pro-

564

Department of State Bulletin

gram to create new deepwater ports for
receiving petroleum imports.

The devcioinnent of ports has usually been
a responsibility of State and local govern-
ments and the private sectoi'. However,
States cannot issue licenses beyond the three-
mile limit. I am therefore proposing legisla-
tion to permit the Department of the Interior
to issue such licenses. Licensing would be
contingent upon full and proper evaluation
of environmental impact, and would provide
for strict navigation and safety, as well as
proper land use requirements. The proposed
legislation specifically provides for Federal
cooperation with State and local authorities.

International Cooperation

The energy challenge confronts every na-
tion. Where there is such a community of in-
terest, there is both a cause and a basis for
cooperative action.

Today, the United States is involved in a
number of cooperative, international effoi-ts.
We have joined with the other 22 member-
nations of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development to produce a
comprehensive report on long-term problems
and to develop an agreement for sharing oil
in times of acute shortages. The European
Economic Community has already discussed
the need for cooperative efforts and is pre-
paring recommendations for a Community
energy policy. We have expressed a desire
to work together with them in this effort.

We have also agreed with the Soviet Union
to pursue joint research in magnetohydrody-
namics (MHD), a highly efficient process for
generating electricity, and to exchange in-
formation on fusion, fission, the generation of
electricity, transmission and pollution control
tochnology. These efforts should be a model
for joint research efforts with other coun-
tries. Additionally, American companies are
looking into the possibility of joint projects
with the Soviet Union to develop natural re-
sources for the benefit of both nations.

I have also instructed the Department of
State, in coordination with the Atomic En-
erg>' Commission, other appropriate Govern-

ment agencies, and the Congress to move
i'ai)idly in developing a program of interna-
tional cooperation in i-esearch and devel-
opment on new forms of energy and in
developing international mechanisms for
dealing with energy questions in times of
critical shortages.

I believe the energy challenge provides an
impoi'tant opportunity for nations to pursue
vital objectives through peaceful coopera-
tion. No chance should be lost to .strengthen
the structure of peace we are seeking to build
in the world, and few issues provide us with
as good an opportunity to demonstrate that
there is more to be gained in pursuing our
national interests through mutual coopera-
tion than through destructive competition
or dangerous confrontation.

Conclusion

Nations succeed only as they are able to
respond to challenge, and to change when cir-
cumstances and opportunities require change.

When the first settlers came to America,
they found a land of untold natural wealth,
and this became the cornerstone of the most
prosperous nation in the world. As we have
gi-own in population, in prosperity, in indus-
trial capacity, in all those indices that re-
flect the constant upward thrust in the
American standard of living, the demands
on our natural resources have also grown.

Today, the energy resources which have
fueled so much of our national gi-owth are
not sufficiently developed to meet the con-
stantly increasing demands which have been
placed upon them. The time has come to
change the way we meet these demands. The
challenge facing us represents one of the
great opportunities of our time — an oppor-
tunity to create an even stronger domestic
economy, a cleaner environment, and a bet-
ter life for all our people.

The proposals I am submitting and the
actions I will take can give us the tools to
do this important job.

The need for action is urgent. I hope the
Congress will act with dispatch on the pro-
posals I am submitting. But in the final analy-

May 7, 1973

565

sis, the ultimate responsibility does not rest
merely with the Congress or with this Ad-
ministration. It rests with all of us — with
government, with industry and with the in-
dividual citizen.

Whenever we have been confronted with
great national challenges in the past, the
American people have done their duty. I am
confident we shall do so now.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, April 18, 1973.

NEWS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY SHULTZ

white House press release dated April 18

Mr. Ziegler [Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Sec-
retary to President Nixon']: You have copies
of the President's message to Congress on
energy. The President met this morning for
close to an hour with the bipartisan leader-
ship to discuss the message. Secretary Shultz
and Charles DiBona, the Special Consultant
to the President on this subject, attended the
leadership meeting and are here to take your
questions, together with the Deputy Secre-
tary of the Treasury, William E. Simon. We
will begin with comments by Secretary
Shultz, and they will all be prepared to take
your questions.

Secretanj Shultz: I have had the privilege
of meeting in recent weeks quite a few times
with the Finance Ministers around the world.
It has been quite striking to me in those
meetings that it is as though there are two
agendas; that is, we have our formal meet-
ing and discuss the exchange rate system and
things of that kind, and then in the coffee
breaks and at lunch and so on, everybody
wants to talk about the energy problem.

Finance Ministers, of course, see it in
terms of the flows of dollars and the problems
that that suggests. But the fact that it is so
much on everybody's mind, not only here but
abroad, suggests that this is a problem that
is of great magnitude and importance. It
represents a potential crisis which we can
avoid if we take the proper steps, and I think
that the President's mes.sage and the actions
that are suggested represent a set of policies
that can help us avoid a possible crisis, and

these represent a set of policies that he is
putting forward here today that we will build
on as we move ahead.

Now, I think the strategy for the United
States represented in this message is, in a
sense, threefold : first, to build up our domes-
tic energy resources in every way we can
through an integrated set of policies in-
volving incentives for prices, involving ef-
forts to see how we can do the things we
must do consistent with maintaining envi-
ronmental standards that are important to
us, and to see how best to use the great po-
tential and abilities we have in research and
development to achieve these ends. So this
is part 1 of the strategy.

Part 2 — we all know, as you can see if you
analyze the figures involved, that we have
great immediate needs that are going to mean
a considerably increased flow of imports,
largely imports of oil. So we see that we have
that immediate need, and our problem is to
use the devices we have at hand so that the
manner in which we import helps us encour-
age domestic production and refining and
producing capacity.

Therefore, third, in developing in these
two manners, we work toward self-suffi-
ciency ; and thereby as we approach it, we
have the impact of making imports more
reasonable in price and making us less vul-
nerable to possible interruptions to them.

That is the overall strategy. There are a
great many items in the energy message.
You have had it and looked at it, and I
won't attempt to go through it all, because
it is lengthy and detailed and technical. Let
me just mention a few items and then we will
have questions.

First of all, on the Oil Import Program,
this is a program that has gradually be-
come obsolete. It has become the subject of
annual realignments. It has had frequent al-
terations to meet immediate needs and has
the character of something that by this time
has a patchwork quality to it ; and that fact
has led to a lot of uncertainty in people's
minds in government, industry, and else-
where about its future course, and that un-
certainty is bad from the standpoint of
developing our own domestic resources.

566

Departmenf of State Bulletin

I

Therefore the President lias decided to
make a very substantial change in the sys-
tem, and this work was done under the
chairmanship of William Simon, the Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury, who is also Chair-
man of the Oil Policy Committee.

The change involves, first, the elimination
of (juantitative restrictions on imports of oil ;
second, a movement to a license-fee system
for imports — and the structure of those fees
is listed in the material that you have, a sort
of two-tier structure which, on the one hand,
is a transitional phasing that will protect
consumer prices and at the same time help
maintain the position of independent refiners
and others who have developed in part in
response to the current system, and with
special arrangements for people such as those
in the petrochemical industry who bring in
feedstock and then export it out.

So that represents a major change in the
oil import system ; and the fact that we ex-
pect to see substantial imports suggests the
importance, in the sense of integration of this
package the President is presenting, of the
material on deepwater ports, which also is
listed in your material.

Second, by way of stimulating domestic
production, we note that 40 percent of the
estimated reserves of oil and gas of the
United States are in the outer continental
shelf, so the President is putting forward
here an aggressive program designed to
triple the annua] leases by 1979 so that we
put ourselves in the position of taking ad-
vantage of these gi-eat reserves and that we
do so consistent, again, with environmental
concerns.

We will see in the gulf coast expansion of
leasing beyond the 200-meter water depth ;
in the Pacific we will resume leasing beyond
the Channel Islands based on individual en-
vironmental as.sessment. This will always be
present.

In the Atlantic and in the Alaska C.ulf, we
will have a study led by the Council on En-
vironmental Quality (CEQ), which we ex-
pect to see completed in a year, and which
will, we hope, enable us to move forward
there.

I migiit say in connection with the desire
to stimulate genuine exploration in this coun-
try, the President is also proposing the ap-
plication of the principle of the investment
tax credit to this area, and we would propose
a t;ix credit for exploration, and we believe
we can define exploration adequately on the
iiasis of 7 percent for a dry hole and 12 per-
cent for a wet hole. That is, we are going
to pay off more highly for success. On the
other hand, you must encourage risk taking;
and that means when somebody takes a risk
and it doesn't pan out, they also should be
taken account of.

Beyond this, we have the Alaska pipeline.
The identified reserves in Alaska, if turned
into a flow, would be the equivalent of a third
of our current imports, just to give an idea
of the importance of what is in Alaska, and
I lielieve myself that there are good grounds
for thinking that these identified reserves do
not represent the full amount that is there.
And so I think this right-of-way legislation
that is now up is of great importance, and
the President strongly supports that and we
must get this Alaska pipeline built.

In the field of natural gas we have another
type of example. Here is a fuel that is our
best fuel from the standpoint of the envi-
ronment, and yet we have priced it at such
a level that on the one hand we encourage
relatively inefficient use and on the other
hand we discourage the enlargement of our
supply.

It is basically a price problem, and so the
President is proposing competitive — as dis-
tinct from regulated — price treatment of new
natural gas with a reservation that the Sec-
retary of the Interior can impo.se a ceiling
according to certain criteria if it looks as
though it is necessary.

Now, I might just say, from the stand-
point of the consumer, it is important to
note, fir.st, that it is better to have some gas
at a higher, though reasonable, price than
no gas at a low price. We are getting familiar
with that kind of proposition. Beyond that,
with the provision of this applying only to
new gas and rolling it in, so to speak, to the
distribution system, you have the price eff"ect
as far as the consumer is concerned, very

May 7, 1973

567

gradual. Furthermore, it is worth noting that
the wellhead price is less than 20 percent of
the delivered price. In other words, a very
high proportion of this price is represented
in transportation and distribution costs.

On the subject of research and develop-
ment, I think here the important thing is our
posture; that is, here we have an important
problem. We are going to address it with an
aggressive research and development pro-
gram, and we must be willing, as it says in
the message, to spend the money that can be
effectively used in this area. And as we de-
velop and find effective ways to use the
money, then we will look around and we will
find the money.

Now, there has been a very rapid buildup
in R. & D. expenditures in the energy field
on the part of the Federal Government, and
no doubt that will continue. We must, how-
ever, not just simply throw a lot of money
out there, but have a good idea of what that
money is going to be spent for and have a
sense that it is going to be spent effectively.

I would say also in connection with the R.
& D. efforts that it is important for us to
organize this in such a way that we have a
balance between the private sector and the
public sector as we address this problem. A
billion dollars or so per year are spent by the
private sector in this area, R. & D. in this
field, and it is very important to keep that
alive and keep a good interaction between
public and private efforts and not have the
Federal Government just come in and sort
of preempt the field.

So, this research effort would apply, among
other things, to other areas, the coal gasifi-
cation and liquefication areas, the problem
with coal of taking this tremendously abun-
dant source we have — we have plenty of coal
to last us practically forever, if we can learn
how to mine it consistent with our environ-
mental concerns and if we can learn how to
use it consistent with our environmental con-
cerns. It is there. And the question is how do
we exploit that resource effectively, and there
are measures proposed here.

Or you take the field of atomic energy.
There are many problems, strong research
there. One of the problems we have is that

if you take the same company to build a
plant and the same specifications for the
plant and you tell that company to build
the plant in Japan or western Europe, they
can do it in half the time that they can do
it here — the same company, the same plant.
Why ? Because we have a very complex set of
administrative arrangements and appeals
procedures and so forth that just delay
everything and will even delay things when
a plant is built and ready to go critical and
there it sits held up.

So, we must take measures to allow our-
selves to use the abilities that we have in
this area, again consistent with the concerns
that these procedures represent, but let's
clean up the procedures so they can be gone
through in a more rapid and decisive
manner.

Well, these are a picking and choosing
among a great many areas that are men-
tioned in the energy message. And as was
suggested, I am surrounded here by Charles
DiBona, who is our person heading the staff
work on this in the Executive Office of the
President, and William Simon, who is Chair-
man of the Oil Policy Committee, and if you
will address your questions to one of them
and let me off easy, I will appreciate it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ire have a question
which I think is appropriate for you. It has
to do with taxes. What do you estimate the
reventie cost of the investment credit ex-
ploration woidd he, and hoiv do you feel in
principle about diminishing the tax incentive
for exploration abroad?

Secretary Shidtz: We talked about ex-
ploration abroad when we discussed the
trade bill, and you see what we are doing
here is in effect trying to shift the balance
of incentives and say to our companies, "We
are changing this, and we think it is better
to give you an incentive to explore here than
it is to explore abroad."

So, we are trying to shift that balance.
These amounts are significant, although
they are not overwhelming. I think the
estimated impact of the investment tax
credit application that I mentioned here this
morning is on the order of $60 million, I

568

Department of State Bulletin

believe, ami I don't offhand havo tlio impact
of the other side of it.

Q. Sixty tnillion dollars ttext year, but in
the future hoic much icould it be?

Secretory ShuHz: Well, it is a little hard
to tell, but that is our estimate based on
1973 income levels, but it is sort of a full-
year basis, it isn't on the basis of some part
year. But, at any rate, this is all part of
a consistent pattern that we started unfold-
ing with the trade bill, that we are continu-
ing to unfold, to tie all these subjects togrether
and go about this in an integrated manner,
and we will have more to say in this general
area as we bring forth our general tax pro-
posals.

Q. Secretary Shultz, recognizing the com-
plexity of these proposals and the affected
air quality and everything else, do you have
any idea hoir this ivoidd affect the consumer
if all of these pi-oposals toere adopted, would
the energy crisis tend to rise or increase or
stabilize?

Secretary Shultz: From the standpoint of
the consumer, if these proposals are adopted,
he and she will have more energy at lower
prices than they would if the proposals
were not adopted.

Now, I think that we obviously will see,
for instance, in the case of natural gas,
higher prices. And the question is. What
would happen if we didn't do this? We would
not exploit the supply of resources that we
have. We would continue to use it in an
uneconomic way. Our reserves are going
down pretty fast, and pretty soon we
wouldn't have any.

So, I think that the intere.sts of the con-
sumer are very well served by these pro-
posals, even though I think we all must face
up to the fact that energy costs are going to
rise, in part because those costs will reflect
the thrust of the environmental concerns
that are in effect imposed on the production
and consumption of energy.

Secretary Peterson [former Secretary of
Commerce Peter G. Peterson], I think, ex-
pres.sed this all very well in a clever phra.se
a few months ago. He said, "Popeye has run

out of cheap spinach." and that is about
what it has come down to.

Q. What effect tvill the President's actions
today have on the current gasoline shortage,
Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Shultz: Well, they will help to
meet any shortages that have developed or
may develop by removing all quantitative
restrictions on imports, by setting a struc-
ture for the industry to operate on with
respect to imports, with respect to our inten-
tions on the outer continental shelf, with
respect to the investment tax credit, and so
on. The industry will be encouraged to
import, as it can, and to produce a balanced
structure of supply. So, I think this will be
helpful, although we do face some important
potential problems there.

Q. Mr. Secreta7-y, on the subject of im-
ports, what is the latest projection of im-
ports by the end of this; decade, taking into
account the proposals here?

Secretary Shultz: Well, the proposals here
will affect that in important ways, and
just quantitatively how much will depend of
course on how rapidly we can move forward
on the outer continental shelf, whether we
can get the Alaska pipeline promptly, what
happens to the supply response as far as
natural gas is concerned, and our R. & D.
efforts, and so on.

There are a lot of question marks here, and
I think that the point is that if we do noth-
ing, our need to import will rise very rapidly.
It is going to rise anyway, and the thing
to do is to get cracking on as many workable
significant things as we can and reduce this
dependence on imports as rapidly as we can.

I don't want to try to fix a precise number,
in other words.

Q. You talked about tradeoff of energy
versus price, Mr. Secretary, but there is also
a clear implication here of what seems to
be another very important tradeoff — that is,
energy versus environment — which seems to
be implicit in the need for high-sulphur oil
and expanded offshore drilling and so forth.
What, in a nntshell, is the n dm inist ration's
philosophical position on this tradeoff in any

May 7, 1973

569

unresolvable crunch between energy and en-
vironment ?

Secretary Shtdtz: I think that the objec-
tive, of course, is to work with all of our
ingenuity and research and so forth to see
how we can do the things that we must do
on the energy side, how we can do those
things in a way that meets the environ-
mental conditions that we must do every-
thing we can to meet.

So, to a degree, we try to avoid the trade-
off by solving the problem. On the other
hand, there are certain things — for example,
in the area of coal, we have primary
standards and we have secondary standards.
The primary standards reflect health and
safety. Now, I think it is a fair question,
and in the message the President puts it to
the States on this, to postpone the impact
of the secondary standards in the interest of
using the coal that we have. Now, that does
not bother anybody's health and safety.

So I think we have to face up to some of
these tradeoffs and take them one by one
and be concerned with the environment and
also be concerned with the energy that we
need and the prices that we can afford to
pay and regard these things as a balanced
proposition. We certainly have no intention
whatever of letting up in the effort to im-
prove the quality of the environment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you consider making
any stronger recommendMions than you did
to limit the consumption of energy, such as
smaller cars, or less horsepower, rather than
just these labeling proposals and insulation
of homes?

Secretary Shultz: There is a combination
of ongoing things that are beefed up here.
There is an Office of Energy Conservation
proposed in the Department of the Interior,
and I think what we are trying to give is
a sense of an ongoing effort to address this
problem. And no doubt there will be further
things.

The question of the horsepower of cars
is one that we have thought about and have
been working on, and we do not have a pro-

posal on that at this point. I think this is an
area, incidentally, where that saying that I
think the environmental groups brought for-
ward very effectively, is quite apt, "We have
met the enemy and it is us." And to a certain
extent this conservation effort is a question
of everybody trying to do with a little less,
and it is a voluntary proposition, basically.
For example, I understand that the aver-
age home in the United States is about five
degrees warmer in the wintertime than it is
in the summertime nowadays. That is an
interesting little juxtaposition of people's
preference on temperature. Far be it from
me to suggest, and I am not suggesting in
any way, that we should try to impose any-
thing on anybody in that regard, but people
might think it over and wonder if they
couldn't keep their houses a little bit warmer
in the summer and cooler in the winter.

Q. Do you have a target date for Atlantic
coast lease sale?

Secretary Shultz: The CEQ lead study,
we expect, can be completed within a year,
and we expect out of that study to have
reflected properly on all aspects of that
problem including the environmental prob-
lem and then be ready to move forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that we might
have to rely on increased imports to handle
the gasoline shortage this summer —

Secretary Shultz: We will have to have
increased imports as we go along. We know
that.

Q. My question is, Why are the initial fees
so high for imported refined gasoline?

Secretary Shultz: Well, they aren't, and
I appreciate your question. I believe Secre-
tary Simon is going to brief in detail on the
oil import quota right after this, but there
is now a tariff on imports, all imports. There
are also lots of quota tickets outstanding.
Imports with those quota tickets pay that
tariff.

Now, what we are doing is eliminating the
tariff and instituting the license-fee system.

570

Department of State Bulletin

The license fee applies to imports that do
not take place in connection with a quota
ticket. A (luota ticket holder gets his import
without paying the fee.

Now, there are a very laige number of
tickets outstanding right now. we believe
enough to pretty much handle the imports
that we will need this year.

Therefore in the way this is constructed.

as it unfolds over time, we in effect are

I reducing the tariff on any import for the

balance of 1973 to zero, or for all practical

purposes that way, and then it will build u]).

Now, we are balancing here longrun and

1) shortrun considerations and we have tried

' to work that into the system, and I think

Secretary Simon has done a very ingenious

job of it, and his colleagues.

So, as this unfolds we will give encourage-
ment to domestic exploration and production
by the differential in the license fees, we
will give encouragement to i-efinery produc-
tion in the United States, in building, which
is badly needed, by the two-tier fee system ;
that is, one on crude and the other on prod-
uct. So that is the way that would unfold.

Q. What are the prospects voiv for a
major arrangement to import liquefied
'latural gas from the Soviet Union? It is
not mentioned anyplnce.

Secretary Shultz: That is a long-term
proposition that is being studied by officials
of the Soviet Union and several of our
companies; and it is, I think, promising, but
there is a tremendous amount of work yet
to be done to see whether it is really feasible.

What it comes down to is, we know the
gas is there, so the question is how much is
it going to cost to get it and get it out and
get it here in comparison with other sources
of fuel, including natural gas here; that is,
what will happen to the supply of natural
gas from domestic sources if the price in-
creases significantly? We know that will
bring in more supply.

We know there is supply there, but it
cannot be brought out unless the costs that it
takes to get that more costly gas are reflected

in the price. Now, how elastic the supply is
you can find experts debating about very
hotl.v, and it is probably well for us to make
a conservative assumption and not expect
the moon to arrive on the platter, but at any
rate, these are some of the uncertainties
involved. We are pursuing that and it is
promising, but a lot of questions have to be
answered.

Q. Can you give us any feel for the initial
reaction of the congressional leadership that
urns briefed today on the legislative pro-
posals?

Secretary Shultz: Many of the proposals
are similar to proposals now being processed,
and in that sense, of course, they are part
of an ongoing process. People are taking
positions on them. I think there is by this
time almost a universal acknowledgment
that we have a problem of serious propor-
tions. We don't have a crisis, in the sense
that w-e have a terrific supply of energy here,
but we could work ourselves into one very
easily unless we take some positive policy
actions along the lines of the President's
suggestions.

Of course, the individuals in the leadership
who were here will speak for themselves. I
thought, on the whole, it was a constructive
meeting. A number of suggestions were
made, and the President's mood, I would
note, is that when he hears a suggestion of
something that somehow we didn't seem to
have included as prominently as we might,
he says to me or he says to Mr. DiBona or
Mr. Simon, "Let's get after that. Talk with
the Senator, talk with the Congressman, and
let's work on that and see what can be done."

In other words, there is a positive, ag-
gressive thrust to solve a problem here, and
it seemed to me that was the general tenor
of everybody's stance.

Q. Mr. Secretary, tvill the changed import
program be sufficient to head off serious
shortages in oil and gas over the next year
to two years, this very crucial period?

Secretary Shtdtz: It will be very helpful.

May 7, 1973

571

and I do not think anyone knows precisely
what will happen. It is certainly going to be
helpful to us, and we hope will resolve the
problems. Prices will be higher, but we still
have problems, and I don't want to say that
there are none.

You always are operating with a certain
amount of uncertainty on these things. I
remember when we opened up on beef, every-
body said, well, that was okay, but nothing
would happen, and the fact is, we have 20
percent more imports so far this year than
we had last year. So something happened.

I think these incentives and so on, if you
will reflect on them, do work, and we hope
that they do in this case.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in regard to that, since
you brought up meat, it is very appropriate.
I was toondering —

Secretary Shultz: Oh, dear; I am sorry
I brought it up. [Laughter.] That is a source
of energy, too, isn't it — a different kind?

Q. Right, and in view of the administra-
tion's efforts to increase plantings by
farmers, and the problems of shortages of
diesel and gasoline in farm States, how is
this program today going to help meet the
shortrun, very immediate needs of those
areas ?

Secretary Shtdtz: Well, it helps, and I
think the thrust of bringing in imports, the
way in which the new oil import control
system is arranged in order to give the
holders of quota tickets something of value
that they can exchange for crude and bring
that in to the independent refiners, which
have served some of those markets — not ex-
clusively by a long shot, but they have played
an important part — all of this will help and
provides an additional reason for getting
going on this.

The effective date, incidentally, of the
change in the Oil Import Program is May 1.

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivoidd you outline the
pieces that probably will go into the pro-
posed legislation for the Department of

Energy and Natural Resources? There is no
outline in the material about what would go
where.

Mr. Ziegler: Without trying to describe in
detail something that hasn't been fully
settled, I cannot. I would say that it will be
broadly similar to the proposal the President
made two years ago, except that there will be
a greater emphasis on the energy problem,
both in sort of explicit content and in spirit,
than one saw there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your position
on use of Federal authority to allocate sup-
plies of gasoline or heating oil if there are
shortages? There is nothing about that in
this message, is there?

Secretary Shultz: I believe that under the
emergency preparedness legislation — do you
want to respond to what authorities you
have on this?

Darrell Trent (Acting Director, Office of
Emergency Preparedness): The authorities
are that it is necessary, first of all, to have a
disruption in the needs for the defense sector
of the economy to such an extent that it is
necessary to allocate from the civilian side
of the economy to the defense side. Only
after this is satisfied in the Defense Reduc-
tion Act is it possible to move further with
allocations in rationing on the civil side of
the economy.

Q. Is that adequate authority to deal with
the impending situation? That is the
question.

Secretary Shultz: We think that we are
all right. We have a rather perverse situa-
tion all the time. There is an effort to thi'ust
authority upon the President in this area,
and it may be that that will succeed. We hope
that the measures taken will obviate the need
for that, and we certainly will lean on people
a little bit to get reasonable allocations, and
we have done some of that, and there seems
to be a response.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you say this
program differs from what the oil and the

572

Department of State Bulletin

(/fl.s- (Did the coal companies hare been aslcinp
for?

Secretary Shultz: I think one of the
interestinp thinps is that the various in-
dustry jri'oups ask for difl'ercnt things. The
coal people will say. "You should place more
emphasis on coal." and so on and so on. I
believe what is happening, though, is a
greater and greater sense, all around — in
government, in the executive, in the Con-
gress, among the industry groups, consumer
groups, environmental groups — a recogni-
tion that there is a general jiroblem, and
that we have to work at it, both in the sense
of taking fuel by fuel and working at that
i)ut also in the sense of examining all of
the crosscurrents that exist among these
different ones.

But as to listing all the proposals that
I^eople from the various industry groups
have made, and then contrasting, I wouldn't
be able to begin that. It would be such an
exhau.stive thing.

The Press: Thank yon, gentlemen.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11712^

Special Committee on Energy
AND National Energy Office

This Administration is determined to continue to
develop a more comprehensive, integrated national
ener^ policy to meet the emerRing enerjry chal-
ienge. Many steps have been taken toward that end,
including measures to increase domestic production
of all forms of energy without violating our natural
environment, to conserve the energy we produce, to
better utilize our current resources, and to use our
vast scientific and technological capacities to develop
new sources and new forms of energy. I have now
determined that in order to protect and promote the
interests of the people of the United States as energy
users, and to coordinate the policies of the executive
branch in this area, it is necessary to establish a
Sppcial Committee on Energy and a National Energy
Office.

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority
vested in me as President of the United States by
the Constitution and statutes of the United States, it
is hereby ordered as follows :

Special Committee on Energy
Section 1. Three Assistants to the President, John

v. Ehrlichnian, Henry A. Kissinger, and George P.
Shultz, shall constitute a Special Committee on En-
ergy. The Director of the National Energy Office
shall perform his functions under this order in ac-
cordance with policies and guidance provided him
by the Special Committee.

Extablishmcnt of the Office
Sec 2. There is hereby established in the Execu-
tive Office of the President a National Energy
Office. The Office shall be under the immediate su-
pervision and direction of a Director who shall be
designated by the President. The Director shall re-
port to the President through the Special Com-
mittee on Energy.

Functions of the Director
Sec. 3. (a). The Director shall advise the Presi-
dent, through the Special Committee on Energy, with
respect to all Federal energy programs, activities,
and related matters.

(b) The Director shall recommend policies and
guidelines pertaining to energy matters for all en-
ergy related programs within the Executive Branch.
To the maximum extent permitted by law. Federal
officers and Federal departments and agencies shall
cooperate with the Director in carrying out his
functions under this Order.

(c) In addition, the Director shall —

(1) assure the development of comprehensive
plans and programs to insure the availability of
adequate and dependable supplies of energy;

(2) assure that Federal energy policy is properly
coordinated;

(3) evaluate all such programs;

(4) advise the heads of departments and agencies
of his findings and recommendations, when appro-
priate;

(5) make recommendations to the Director of the
Office of Management and Budget concerning pro-
posed funding of energy programs and activities;

(6) constitute a clearinghouse for the prompt con-
sideration of energy problems brought to his atten-
tion by Federal departments and agencies and by
other public and private entities, organizations,
agencies, or individuals; and

(7) report, through the Special Committee on
Energy, from time to time, to the President con-
cerning the foregoing.

(/hjL^ ^^K^:/^

the WHITEHOUSE, April IS, 1973.

' .38 Fed Reg. 9657.

May 7, 1973

573

Presidents Nixon and Thieu Hail
"Land to the Tiller" Program

Following is an exchange of letters between
President Nixon and President Nguyen Van
Thieu of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

White House press release (San Clemente, Calif.) dated April 2

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT NIXON

March 24, 1973.

Dear Mr. President: I very much ap-
preciate your warm message of March 20
which described the achievements of the
"Land to the Tiller" program and expressed
the gratitude of the Vietnamese people for
our assistance in this great work of social
reform and economic development.

With deep interest and satisfaction, I
learned from your letter that on March 26
your country will celebrate the fulfillment of
its three-year goal of redistributing titles
for one million hectares of land to tenant
farmers under the "Land to the Tiller" pro-
gram. This program, I know, is one of the
most ambitious and far-reaching land dis-
tribution programs undertaken by any coun-
try in recent times. It will ultimately benefit
over one million rural families in South Viet-
nam and should virtually eliminate farm ten-
ancy. The fact that this program has been
completed under the difficult war-time con-
ditions of the past three years makes the
accomplishment that much more admirable.
This program also represents tangible evi-
dence of concern for and responsiveness to the
needs of the people and encourages us to look
with confidence to the future of your coun-
try as it pursues its goals of a lasting and
fruitful peace.

On behalf of the American people, I con-
gratulate the government and the people of
the Republic of Vietnam on the success of
this land reform endeavor. Americans are
pleased to have cooperated with Vietnamese
in this historic undertaking.

In the postwar period, we look forward
with equal interest to joining your govern-

ment and people in the important task of
reconstruction and long-term economic de-
velopment.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.
letter from president thieu

March 20, 1973.

Dear Mr. President: March 26th, 1973 marks
the third anniversary of the signing of the "Land
to the Tiller" law in the Republic of Vietnam. On
this memorable occasion, I take pleasure in com-
municating to you the highlights of our land reform,
one of the top priority programs for the welfare
of the rural people. This also constitutes, in my view,
an important aspect of the social and economic
revolution, in the present ideological contest in
Vietnam.

Upon the promulgation of the "Land to the
Tiller" law in 1970, I pledged to distribute free
of charge 1,000,000 hectares (approximately 2.5
million acres) of land in three years to 800,000
tenant farmers who actually tilled the land. To
date, 1,003,353 hectares of land have been distribu-
ted to 858,821 former tenant farmers. Our planned
goal has been achieved and surpassed.

The "Land to the Tiller" program has reduced
farm tenancy from around 60 percent three years
ago to almost the vanishing point. It has thus
undercut the main theme of communist propaganda
vis-a-vis the rural population.

Our farmers have not been merely passive re-
cipients of government largesse but have enthu-
siastically participated in the program to improve
their lives. They are using the additional income
from the sale of crops formerly paid in rent to
develop the rural economy, thus contributing to
the growth of the nation. Our farmers have now
a new sense of personal worth and dignity and
have become masters of their destiny, free men
with reasons to preserve their freedom.

These accomplishments are attributable, in no
small measure, to the dedicated support and co-
operation of Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and
the American AID Mission staff in Vietnam and
to the financial assistance of the American people
through your government.

For this, I would like to convey, on behalf of
the Vietnamese people, our deep gratitude to you,
and through you to the people of the United States
of America.

I wish also to express the hope that the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam will continue to
have help and support from your government and
people to not only complete the land reform pro-

574

Department of State Bulletin

pram but to help carry forward vigorously the
implementation of the five-year rural economic
development plan, which will solidify and build on
the tremendous benefits of land distribution, and
of our postwar reconstruction plan which is to
heal the wounds of war and to promote development
and prowth in an era of peace.
Sincerely yours,

NGirvEN Van Thieu.

y Prime Minister Lee of Singapore
Visits Washington

Pnme Minister Lee Kiuin Yew of Singa-
pore met with President Nixon and other
(jovernment officials at Washington during a
jirivate visit to the United States March
25-April 11. Follon'ing is an exchange of
toasts between President Nixon and Prime
Minister Lee at a dinner at the White House
f April 10.

Wftkly ronipilatlon of Prpsideotlal Documents dated April 10

PRESIDENT NIXON

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Vice President,
ladies and ofentlemen: We have welcomed
many distinguished ofuests in this room, and
I would say that none is more deserving of
our respect and of being honored, as we
honor him tonight, than the Prime Minister
and. I may say, his wife.

I recall the occasions that we have met
previously in his country and also here, and
I recall also the enormous impression that
the Prime Minister has made on various
emissaries from the United States who
have visited his country. The Vice President
and Mrs. Agnew have had the ojjportunity to
visit Singapore, Secretary Rogers and Mrs.
Rogers. I have not, since coming into this
office.

I think perhaps the best summary of the
attitude of all of those who have visited Singa-
pore during the past three to four years,
since I have been having rather regular re-
ports on the situation, was when Secretary

("oniially returned from his trip around the
world when he was Secretary of the Treas-
ury. He came into my office and said, "Singa-
I)ore is the best run country in the world."
And here is the man who runs it.

I would add to that, however, by saying
that the best run country in the world could
mean a country that was run very well with-
out freedom, because I suppose that if you
look at countries around the world those that
have the least obvious problems are those
that have no freedom and therefore it would
be the best run.

And the Prime Minister tonight deserves
our honor and our respect because in this
relatively new country, with a very old his-
tory and a very able people, he has been able
to run it well, but run it with respect for the
great traditions of freedom which our two
countries both adhere to, and for this we all
of course hold him in very high regard.

On the two previous occasions he has been
here since I have been in this office, he came
alone, and consequently on one occasion we
had a stag dinner. This time, fortunately, he
brought Mrs. Lee with him. Now, I had read
-something about their courtship. I knew
that, like Secretary Rogers and Mrs. Rogers,
they had gone to school together, they had
both graduated from law school in the same
class, and so tonight, very early in the
evening, when you saw me turning to Mrs.
Lee, I said, "Mrs. Lee, tell me, is it true that
you were number one in the class at Cam-
bridge Law School and your husband was
number two?" And she said, "Mr. President,
do you think he would have married me if
that were the case?"

But I probed further, and I found that, as
a matter of fact, Mrs. Lee, our distinguished
guest, did receive a first at Cambridge Law
School. Her husband did also, but like a very
loyal wife, she said, "He had a first with a
star after his name, and that is something
very special."

But the purpose of that is simply to say
that we are very happy here to welcome our

May 7, 1973

575

distinguished guests because of tiieir per-
sona! qualities, because of their great ability,
and because of the leadership they have given
to their own country.

I would only add this: In the talks that I
have had with the Prime Minister, in 1967
when we first met — at a time that neither
he nor I had any idea that we would be meet-
ing again today in this place — but in any
event, in 1967 when we first met, on the other
two occasions, what has impressed me enor-
mously has been his profound understanding
not just of his own country and not just of
Southeast Asia, of which his own country is
a very important part, but of the entire
world scene. In other words, we honor tonight
and we welcome here a world statesman of
the first rank who has contributed, with his
intelligence, with his understanding, to all of
us in helping us to develop the kinds of pol-
icies that will maintain a world in which
freedom can survive for larger countries like
the United States and for smaller countries
like Singapore.

There is no more articulate and intelligent
spokesman for what I would call free soci-
eties in the world than the Prime Minister of
Singapore, and for that I'eason I know all of
you will want to join me in raising your
glas-ses to Prime Minister Lee : Prime Min-
ister Lee.

PRIME MINISTER LEE

Mr. President, Mr. Vice President, ladies
and gentlemen: It is always a mild embar-
rassment when I receive such lavish praise.
They say I run Singapore well. Well, it makes
me worried because I am away so long and
it is still running. It disproves the thesis that
I am the man that makes it run.

It is a great pleasure and a privilege, as
you have mentioned, Mr. President, to have
shared several occasions we have had to-
gether, particularly that memorable one
when you were just an American citizen and
not the President of the United States.

My wife and I would like to thank Mrs.
Nixon and you for the great warmth and

friendship with which we are being received
and for this dinner which you have arranged
in our honor.

Perhaps it may be appropriate if I were
to mention that when you were just an
American citizen, we could speak more can-
didly, even brusquely, and now the courtesies
of oflice sometimes have to muffle some of
the rougher edges.

But few, I think, could have dared to pre-
dict the tenacity with which you have pur-
sued your declared policies of negotiations
with the great Communist powers instead
of confrontation. Even fewer have dared pre-
dict the hopeful results that have emerged.
But none could have dared to hope that even
once you carried on these negotiations with
both Peking and Moscow, you steadily, sys-
tematically, disengaged American troops
from Viet-Nam in such an orderly fashion
that instead of a rout which so many people
predicted would happen when there were too
few to defend themselves, they ceremoniously
furled up their flags and departed, leaving
not chaos out of which a revolutionary move-
ment would have seized power, but the
South Vietnamese Government very much
in charge.

As one who has not been in America in
recent months, I had expected to meet a Pres-
ident of the United States who had become
remote and a recluse. [Laughter.] I must say
I was greatly relieved to find that I did not
have such a forbidding figure to meet.
[Laughter.]

Well, it was Southeast Asia's good fortune
that there was a President in America who
considered it his primary purpose to dis-
charge his onerous responsibilities to Amer-
ica and to the world, and this fortune could
be turned to permanent gains if, after the
thumping majority that you obtained last
November, Mr. President, you could com-
plete your second term, complete the hope-
ful beginnings that you initiated in your
first.

In the last few days in this country, I have
discovered that any statement, any argument,
however dispassionate, however blandly

576

Department of State Bulletin

couched, which can be faintly directly or in-
directly construed as in su])))ort of or in sym-
pathy with any of the hopes, policies, or
aspirations of this administration finds very
scant si)ace in the mass media. [Laughter.]
So I was sorely tempted to couch my argru-
ments in (luerulous, tendentious terms in or-
der to get that scant space.

But ijerhaps there is more benefit in fol-
lowing your example, Mr. President, of the
detached — the cultivated detachment of mind
which enables you to pursue what is right in
the long run, never mind what it is in the
short run, whether it wins rapturous ap-
plause or otherwise.

I was privileged this morning to hear your
frank overview of America's position vis-a-
vis Asia, not just Southeast Asia, and placed
in the context of the whole world, a global
I)erspective. You were kind enough to make a
reference to my outlook on these matters.
Weil, I have to.

We are a very small country placed stra-
tegically at the southernmost tip of Asia, and
when the elephants are on the rampage, if
you are a mouse there and you don't know
the habits of the elephants, it can be a very
painful business. [Laughter.]

I was encouraged that you believed that
this new balance, new world order in which
there is greater peace, greater prosperity,
could be achieved not by America in isolation,
but with the participation of America's allies,
in particular western Europe and Japan, and
of course jjarticularly that there should be
fairer and more equal terms of trade.

Now, if this negotiating package can be
settled, and if that can be matched in nego-
tiations with both the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China for a steady and
a stable continuing detente, then peace and
prosperity without war is not just an Amer-
ican dream but a world vision of the future,
reassuring for all mankind who have to live
in this ever smaller, more interrelated, and
more interdependent world.

I believe I now understand you better,
what you meant when you stated over tele-
vision, if I may paraphrase you, that you had

to have a strong America if you were going
to get concessions, for only a strong America
can make concessions in return.

May I express this hoiie that in your sec-
ond term you will be able to complete the
new chapter which you have started in your
first term through the policies which you
initiated with great promise.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, may I ask
you to di-ink with me to the health of the
President of the United States: Mr. Presi-
dent.

Letters of Credence

Costa Rica

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Costa Rica, Marco Antonio Lo-
l)ez Aguero, presented his credentials to
President Nixon on April 9. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated April 9.

Daho7ney

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Dahomey, Tiamiou Adjibade,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on April 9. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated
April 9.

Iran

The newly appointed Ambassador of Iran,
Ardeshir Zahedi, presented his credentials
to President Nixon on April 9. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated April 9.

Israel

The newly appointed Ambassador of Is-
rael, Simcha Dinitz, presented his credentials
to President Nixon on April 9. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated April 9.

May 7, 1973

577

Department Reports to Congress on Aspects
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa

Following are statements by David D.
Newsom, Assistant Secretary for African Af-
fairs, made before the Subcommittee on
Africa of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on March 27 and April 6.^

STATEMENT OF MARCH 27

I welcome this opportunity, as always, to
meet with this committee to discuss aspects
of our foreign policy relating to Africa.

It is my understanding that the commit-
tee seeks this week to examine U.S. business
involvement in South Africa, Namibia, and
the Portuguese territories in Africa. Prior
commitments involving official visitors from
Africa will not make it possible for me to
meet with the committee on the two subse-
quent days. I would like today, therefore, to
make some general comments on our official
policies and actions with respect to the in-
volvement of U.S. private enterprise in these
areas of southern Africa. Mr. [Robert S.]
Smith, our highly qualified Deputy Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs, who has fol-
lowed these matters particularly closely, will
be on hand for each of the sessions.

I am assuming that the primary interest of
the committee in this set of hearings is in the
extent of U.S. business involvement in each
of these areas and our official policies relating
to that involvement. At the base of the com-
mittee's inquiry, I am certain, is the question
of whether this involvement supports or

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

serves to perpetuate institutions or policies of
racial discrimination or the continuation of
white-minority rule in southern Africa. Con-
versely, I would assume there is also the
question of whether there are feasible ac-
tions which could restrict or curtail this in-
volvement as a means of influencing change
in that region.

Basic to a review of the U.S. Government's
relationship to this issue are an understand-
ing of the economic programs which fall
within the scope of current governmental
authority and a comparison of these pro-
grams as they are ai)plied in southern Africa
to how they may be applied in other areas.

Specifically, these are the activities in
which there is governmental authority to
engage in economic programs:

1. Under voluntary direct investment con-
trols administered by the Department of
Commerce, varying schedules of investment
are permitted in different countries accord-
ing to their level of development. Schedule A
is the most liberal in this connection, sched-
ule C the most restrictive. (This program
was initiated, of course, to protect the U.S.
balance of payments rather than to restrict
investment per se.)

2. The Export-Import Bank can assist
U.S. exporters in various ways by direct
loans, by guaranteeing bank loans, by dis-
counting bank loans, and by extending credit
to foreign banks to enable the latter to fi-
nance imports from the United States.

3. The Department of Commerce in con-
sultation with the Department of State can
govern the degree of official activity on be-

578

Department of State Bulletin

half of I'.S. exporters and U.S. products;
this involves trade promotion, trade missions,
participation in fairs, and the facilitation of
direct contacts between U.S. businessmen
and jirospective foreign customers.

4. The Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration can offer g^uarantees and insurance
to firms ojieratinp: in developino^ areas of the
world. With respect to Anpola and Mozam-
bique. OPIC does consider applications for
insurance apainst the political risks of cur-
rency inconvertibility and expropriation.
These applications are referred to the De-
jiai'tment of State for foreijm policy guid-
ance. Otherwise OPIC is not involved
throughout the remainder of white-domi-
nated southern Africa.

Xow, before dealing with each of these
areas in turn in connection with southern
Africa, let me briefly put U.S. investment in,
and trade with, South Africa into perspective.

The United States today has approximately
SI billion in investments in South Africa,
represented by about 300 firms. Trade with
South Africa amounted in 1972 to .$.597.1
million in exports; $.324.7 million in imports.

To put the investment into perspective,
this represents approximately 15 percent of
total foreign investment in South Africa.
For the United States, this represents 25
percent of our total investment on the Af-
rican Continent. During recent years (1968-
71), our total investment in other parts of
the continent has been rising at a rate of 15
percent annually, in contrast to an annual
increase in investment in South Africa of
12.8 percent.

Our trade with South Africa, similarly,
has been rising at a lower rate than our trade
with the rest of the continent. Further, it
has been rising at a substantially lower rate
than South Africa's trade with other devel-
oped countries. Japan's trade with South
Africa, for example, rose 171.5 percent from
1966 to 1971.

South Africa is, with its growing market,
sophisticated infrastructure, and generally
favorable climate for investment, particu-

larly attractive to much of the U.S. private
sector. Nevertheless, consistent with its de-
clared policy of opposition to the apartheid
system in South Africa, the I'nited States
has exercised official I'estraint in the pro-
motion of both investment and trade.

The agencies of the U.S. Government re-
sponsible refrain from any promotion of
either investment or trade of the type car-
ried out in other countries. We counsel with
in'ospective investors on the situation in
South Africa to be sure they understand the
economic as well as the political and social
conditions in that country. We neither en-
courage them nor discourage them. We ex-
tend neither guarantees nor insurance on
investment noi- any official financing. South
Africa, by the advanced nature of its econ-
omy, is under schedule C, the most restrictive
schedule of the foreign direct investment
program.

Despite the fact that we have a major
balance of payments problem and that South
Africa is a major and economically attractive
market, we limit our commercial activities
in South Africa to low^-key facilitative serv-
ices. We do not participate in special pro-
motions, in trade missions, or trade fairs.
The Export-Import Bank restricts its facil-
ities to discount loans through private banks,
with a limit of $2 million per transaction.
It extends insurance and guarantees but no
credits. We have been particularly conscious
of the implications of involvement in any
major South African Government enter-
prises.

As the subcommittee is aware, we adopt a
much more restrictive i)olicy with respect to
Namibia, particularly because of our posi-
tion that South Africa's presence in the ter-
ritory is illegal since the termination of its
mandate in 1966. (The legal soundness of
this position has subsequently been estab-
lished authoritatively by the International
Court of .Justice advisory opinion of June 21,
1971.) Since May 1970, we have followed a
policy of discouraging further American in-
vestment in the territory and have advised
potential investors that we will not intercede

May 7, 1973

579

to protect their investment against claims of
a future legitimate government in the terri-
tory. The Export-Import Bank and OPIC
provide no facilities for activities in Namibia.
Any American firms which have decided to
invest there since 1970 can be presumed to
have done so in spite of their awareness of
U.S. policy. In this connection, I am aware
of the subcommittee's concerns that we
might not have reached all potential in-
vestors to advise them of our policy. I be-
lieve we have. We are checking the files to
confirm this and will provide the facts for
the record.

We do not have complete figures on the
total American investment in Namibia. The
bulk of it, some $45-$50 million in the
Tsumeb Corporation, predates the termina-
tion of South Africa's mandate for the terri-
tory and the announcement of our policy on
discouraging investment there.

U.S. investment in the Portuguese terri-
tories amounts to about $220 million. Most
of this is represented by the operations of
the Cabinda Gulf Oil Corporation in Angola.
We do not formally discourage trade and
investment with the Portuguese territories,
but neither do we make an effort to encour-
age it. Despite the obvious losses to U.S.
exporters, we have not encouraged involve-
ment in major jjrojects in these territories.

Mr. Chairman, I know how important this
issue is to members of this committee and
to many in this country concerned with the
situation in southern Africa. I am keenly
aware that there are two sincere points of
view toward the relationship between our
business involvement and change, particu-
larly in South Africa. One calls for with-
drawal of U.S. investment. This point of
view believes that this would encourage
change; some who hold this view believe that,
even if it did not, it would at least register
the moral indignation of this country at the
continued existence of racial discrimination
in South Africa and would withdraw us
from involvement in it. The other point of
view suggests that, if U.S. firms are to re-

main in South Africa, they should then seek
to have an impact through improving their
own labor practices and their own attention
to the social and educational needs of their
non-white employees.

While sharing the view that we should
contribute to peaceful change in southern
Africa, we in the Department do not look
upon either withdrawal of investment or
trade embargoes as feasible courses of ac-
tion. Our investment in southern Africa is, in
many cases, closely tied to South African
corporate structures. There is a real ques-
tion whether U.S. capital as a practical mat-
ter could be withdrawn from South Africa*
There is little to suggest that other major
investing countries would follow suit; some
would be inclined, rather, to fill the gap. Our
experience with trade embargoes against
even smaller countries has not been salutary.
Also, there is a genuine question regarding
the opinion of non-white South Africans on
this question. We are impressed by the many
with whom we have talked who wish U.S.
investment to stay, provided it can positively
promote better conditions. Finally I must
again point out the positive balance of pay-
ments this country enjoys through its trade
and investment in South Africa.

Officially, therefore, we have seen the more
feasible exercise of influence to be through
those U.S. firms willing actively to upgrade
the practices and policies toward their non-
white employees. We have been prepared to
counsel with them generally on how this may
be done, both in Washington and in South
Africa. We can furnish to the committee for
the record examples of our presentations on
this subject. We have, further, in our con-
sultations with other major investing coun-
tries encouraged their attention to this issue,
since we cannot be blind to the competitive
aspects of extra expenditures in these areas.
U.S. private interests are involved in a com-
plex and controvei'sial area in southern Af-
rica. The U.S. Government recognizes this
and, within the limits of its authority, seeks
to make that involvement constructive.

580

Department of State Bulletin

STATEMENTS OF APRIL 6
Opening Statement

I'r.ss r.l.M.s.' liil ,|al.-.l April (i

I am pleased to appear before the subcom-
mittee today as it continues its hearings on
the r.S. arms embargoes against South Af-
rica and the Portuguese territories in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, over the period of a decade
we have maintained strict arms embargoes
toward botii Soutii Africa and the Portuguese
territories. We have done so as a tangible
demonstration of our support for self-deter-
mination and our desire to avoid any support
for the imposition of apartheid. Our desire
is to avoid giving encouragement to any side
to rely on military solutions to the complex
of southern African problems. The arms em-
bargo policy has been reaffirmed and enforced
by succeeding administrations since the early
1960's. To put the significance of the embar-
goes into perspective, I would like to empha-
size that although the maintenance of an
arms embargo may sound like a passive act, it
is not. It requires constant attention to com-
merce with the area. It means considerable
sacrifice on the i^art of U.S. exporters who
have seen substantial sales in southern Af-
rica go to countries less conscientious about
the embargo and less criticized by the Af-
ricans.

In the case of Portugal, it has been U.S.
])olicy since 19fil, following the uprisings in
Angola, to embargo the sale or supply of arms
and military equipment for use in the Portu-
guese territories in Africa. The embargo
against arms for use in the Portuguese terri-
tories in Africa is implemented by asking
the Portuguese Government for formal as-
surances that any embargoed equipment sup-
plied to that countiy shall be used only
within the NATO area as defined in the North
.Atlantic Treaty. There has been no change
in this practice since the embargo was an-
nounced in 1961. No supportable evidence has
ever been presented to us that such assur-
ances have not been adhered to.

The embargo on anns for South Africa has

been in ett'ect in its i)resent form since 1963.
Prior to that time the United States had ap-
plied a more limited embargo on arms which
could be used by vSouth Africa to enforce
apartiieid. In announcing our embargo
against South Africa on August 2, 1963, Am-
bassador Stevenson stated before the United
Nations that we would cease the sale of all
military equipment to the Government of
South Africa by the end of that year. He
noted two exceptions to this general policy
which we would be obliged to observe: We
would have to continue to honor contracts
which were already in existence, and w^e
would reserve the right to interpret the pol-
icy in the light of requirements for assuring
the maintenance of international peace and
security. We have not been faced with the
necessity of invoking the latter exception.
With regard to preexisting contracts we have
made two exceptions to the arms embargo:
We have permitted the continued supply of
spare parts, maintenance information, and
services for seven aircraft which were sold
to the South African Air Force prior to the
embargo, and we have permitted two small
shipments of equipment to the South African
Navy in connection with a sale of torpedoes
which also predated the embargo. We are in
the process of compiling a report on these
transactions and will su])ply it for the record.

In the enforcement of the South African
embargo, the United States does not make
distinctions with i-egard to whethei- arms are
intended for external defense, internal de-
fense, or the enforcement of apartheid. All
sales of military equipment for such purposes
are prohibited. There has been no change in
this regard since 1963.

In addition to arms, our embargoes include
restrictions on the export of communications
equipment, military vehicles, and radar
equipment as well as a variety of other mili-
tary equii)ment. Applications for the export
of U.S.-manufactured components for mili-
tary aircraft produced in third countries are
aKso examined under the terms of the arms
embargoes. We do not have any pending ap-

May 7, 1973

581

plications for the export of such components
to third countries for inclusion in aircraft
destined for South Africa.

With these policy considerations in mind,
Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn to the
specific questions you raised in your letter to
the Department of State of March 19, 1973,
requesting our attendance at these hearings.

You asked about the sale of light aircraft
to Mozambique. I understand the Department
of Commerce has undertaken to supply in-
formation on these transactions for the rec-
ord, but I would like to mention here that the
United States has licensed a variety of civil
aircraft for sale to Mozambique, including
the types you inquired about. In most cases
these exports involved Export-Import Bank
support. These exports are in conformity
with U.S. Government policy which permits
the sale of civilian aircraft for civilian use
in the Portuguese territories. Prior to ap-
proving the issuance of licenses in such trans-
actions, we satisfy ourselves in each case that
aircraft are destined for legitimate civilian
use and are not likely to be diverted for mili-
tary purposes. Some of the purposes for
which we have licensed aircraft are telephone
line repair, harbor supervision, and ambu-
lance service.

You also inquired about what guidance has
been furnished to interested U.S. aircraft
manufacturers in light of my announcement
in September 1970 that we would consider
applications for the export of limited num-
bers of executive-type aircraft, not readily
adaptable for combat or security purposes,
for VIP transport by the South African mili-
tary. Interested aircraft manufacturers are
advised by the Department of Commerce that
the export of light aircraft for possible mili-
tary use would not be approved but that fa-
vorable consideration would likely be given to
export license applications for a reasonable
number of executive-type transport aircraft
to the South African defense forces if the end
use is assured to be for executive transport
only. To date, no such applications have been
filed. I understand that the Department of
Commerce has sent to the chairman a letter
in reply to this question.

Your letter also asked what decisions have
come before the State Department in "gray
areas" in the last six years. Since this in-
volves obtaining files from past years, we will
undertake to supply a reply for the record.
With regard to your request for information
on any training of the South African and
Portuguese military and on the distribution
of Department of Defense films to South
Africa or Portugal, I do not believe we can
add to the information supplied by the De-
partment of Defense. In brief, we do not pro-
vide military training to South Africa, and
that given to Portugal is in fields related to
its NATO responsibilities.

You have raised a number of questions re-
garding U.S. exports of herbicides. The De-
partment of Commerce has replied to some
of your questions and is, I believe, undertak-
ing to supply export statistics of these sub-
stances for the record. However, I would like
to comment on some aspects of this question
at this time. The United States maintains
two types of controls over the export of herbi-
cides. Those substances which are preferred
for defoliant use in military operations are
under the licensing control of the Ofiice of
Munitions Control of the Department of
State. In addition, two substances commonly
called 2, 4-D and 2, 4, 5-T are on the vali-
dated license list maintained by the Depart-
ment of Commerce. Applications for licenses
to export these substances would be sub-
jected to scrutiny under the terms of the arms
embargoes. There has been no export of these
substances to southern Africa for military
purposes. There are a wide variety of agri-
cultural herbicides which are not under spe-
cific controls. These are substances which are
manufactured by a large number of coun-
tries, are available from diverse sources, and
are in common agricultural use throughout
the world. Portugal itself, for instance, man-
ufactures a wide range of herbicides includ-
ing 2, 4-D.

We have noted Mr. Agostinho Neto's letter
to the U.N. Secretary General charging that
Portugal is using herbicides for defoliant use
in military operations in Africa. We cannot
say whether those charges are true. However,

582

Department of State Bulletin

I

there is no evidence or even allegations in the
letter to the effect that herbicides under the
control of the United States are being used
for such purposes.

Supplemental Stafemenf

Since the i)re|)aration of my formal state-
ment, I have read the transcripts of the pre-
vious committee sessions on this subject. I
should like to make some supplemental com-
ments.

I think it is important to define precisely
what we are discussing. In my view there is
a tendency to suggest that major changes in
U.S. policies have taken place with respect
to the arms embargo and to suggest a level
of support to the military efforts of South
Africa and Portugal in Africa which is not
substantiated by the facts.

I believe it is clear from the statements of
witnesses to date that the United States has
not supplied, since the imposition of these
embargoes, any arms or equipment of a
strictly military character not covered by
previously stated exceptions to either of
these areas. I believe it is also pertinent to
point out that the arms and military equip-
ment on which these areas depend are sup-
plied from Europe or are manufactured by
the countries themselves.

What we are discussing is that area of
items of essentially a civilian character which
conceivably could be adapted for use in the
support of military operations. We are
discussing civilian aircraft, computers, agri-
cultural defoliants, and civilian electronic
equipment. I do not argue that these are un-
important to a country's ability to wage war
or to maintain internal security. I do argue
that, in the face of problems in our own
aerospace industry, in the light of balance of
]iayments problems, and in the face of severe
competition from others, the question of
whether restraints shall be put on the sale of
civilian items because of their possible use
in support of a military effort is not an easy
one. I do stress also that, in presenting the
problems and the decisions, we are talking
about restraints which we place on our own

commerce more strict than those being ap-
I)lied by any other counti-y. Finally, I stress
that we are not talking about those basic
sinews of war — guns, ammunition, fighters
and bombers, tanks, armored cars, et cetera —
all of which, since the embargoes went into
effect, have been supplied from non-American
sources.

There has been much discussion about how
we can be sure that items we have sold are
not being used improperly. Our means, ad-
mittedly, are not perfect. The representative
of the Department of Defense described how
we make use of our diplomatic missions, our
consulates, our MAAG's [Military Assistance
Advisory Groups] , and our attaches for these
purposes. I should add that we have on many
occasions said to the African nations that we
are prei)ared at any time to examine any
evidence they can produce that items are be-
ing used in Africa in violation of our arms
embargoes. I have done so several times
publicly in Africa. The companies which
manufacture civilian items in this country
are also interested in seeing that they are not
misused. I wish to repeat, further, that we
are prepared to examine any evidence which
any of the previous witnesses before this
committee may wish to bring forward. To
date we have not seen any conclusive evi-
dence of violations of the embargoes as we
administer them.

I must confess, also, Mr. Chairman, to a
certain disquiet at allegations regarding our
policies toward southern Africa set forth by
those who have an interest in portraying
those policies in a certain light and at the
repetition of such statements suggesting that
these are in fact our i)olicies. I refer to the
extensive statement by South Africa's Ad-
miral Biermann [Adm. H. H. Biermann,
Chief, South African Defense Forces] quoted
by one witness. I would suggest that the ap-
propriate statements of policies should come
from those who make them and that there
are not, as some have suggested before this
committee, hidden areas of policy toward
southern Africa.

There are continuing references to NATO
weapons. There are no NATO weapons — in

Moy 7, 1973

583

Europe, in Africa, or anywhere else. There
are weapons manufactured by individual
countries to agreed NATO specifications, but
they are national weapons and the nations
of manufacture are responsible for their dis-
position. The United States therefore has
neither control nor a role in the disposition of
weapons manufactured by other nations not
containing our components or made under
our license, whatever the I'elationship to
NATO standardization.

As one who has had a major share in the
administration of the arms embargoes over
the past three-and-a-half years, I believe we
have conscientiously and positively followed
the meaning and the letter of the U.S. actions
and of our official statements at that time.
There have been decisions — both affirmative
and negative — in the difficult gray area, but
these in sum have represented a continuation
of our basic and declared policies. While these
policies involve other agencies, I shall be pre-
pared in my discussions with you to admit
to the key role of the Department of State in
many of the decisions and to assume the re-
sponsibility for them.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific and Technical
Commission Holds First Meeting

National Science
March 21

Foundation press release 73—131 dated

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on
Scientific and Technical Cooperation on
March 21 announced approval of over 25 ac-
tion programs of direct cooperation in six
general areas of strong mutual interest and
benefit to both countries. The Joint Commis-
sion also considered six additional areas for
possible cooperation which were judged to
offer promise of balanced and effective
programs.

The announcement came after the first
meeting of the Joint Commission, established
under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement on Co-
operation in the Fields of Science and Tech-
nology; the agreement was signed during
President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May
1972.' The cooperative effort also is expected

to help strengthen relations between the two
countries.

The Commission's first meeting, held in
Washington, D.C., lasted three days and cov-
ered a wide range of topics in addition to the
six areas which had been originally identified
as showing promise for direct cooperation. -
The six areas are energy, computer applica-
tions to management, agricultural research,
microbiological synthesis, chemical catalysis,
and water resources.

U.S. Chairman of the Joint Commission is
Dr. H. Guyford Stever, Director of the Na-
tional Science Foundation. The Soviet Chair-
man for this meeting was Academician V. A.
Trapeznikov, First Deputy Chairman of the
U.S.S.R. State Committee for Science and
Technology (SCST). He replaced Academi-
cian V. A. Kirillin, Chairman of the U.S.S.R.
State Committee for Science and Technology
and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Min-
isters of the Soviet Union, who was ill and
unable to attend.

The Joint Commission, which reviewed re-
ports and recommendations of joint working-
groups, selected five areas for priority im-
plementation in the field of energy research
and development. The five areas are: electric
power systems, transmission lines, magneto-
hydrodynamics, solar energy, and geothermal
energy. Additional topics for cooperation will
be selected after work is effectively under-
way in the five priority topics.

In the field of application of computers to
management, the Commission decided that i
work should be started on all five projects !
recommended by the joint working group. ;
The projects are: theory of systems analysis i
applied to economics and management; com- 1
initer applications and software for creating '
system solutions for large general-purpose |
problems in the field of management; econo-^
metric modeling (development of forecasting'
models for analysis of various branches ofj
the economy); the use of computers fori

' For text of the agreement, see Bulletin of June
26, 1972, p. 925.

-For text of a record of discussions signed at I
Washington and Moscow on July 28, 1972, see BUL-j
LETIN of Aug. 21, 1972, p. 216. •

584

Department of State Bulletir

manapenient of large cities; and theoretical
foundation for tiie design, development, and
production of software.

Three areas of agricultural research were
declared ready for priority implementation
by the Joint Commission. The three areas are :
research in the field of breeding, growing,
and protection of fai'm crojis; research on
methods to increase production of farm ani-
mals and poultry; and mechanization of agri-
( ultural production.

In the field of microbiological synthesis, it
was decided that the U.S. side of the joint
working group should visit the U.S.S.R. for
further discussions with the Soviets before
defining jiriority projects for cooperative
work.

Four projects in the area of water re-
sources were selected by the Commission for
priority imi)lementation. The projects in-
clude: planning, utilization, and management
of water resources; cold-weather construc-
tion techniques; methods and means of auto-
mation and remote control in water resource
systems; and plastics in construction.

In the field of chemical catalysis, the Com-
mission decided that work should jiroceed on
five projects recommended by the joint work-
ing group. A catalyst is a substance which
can change the course of a chemical reaction
but which can be reclaimed at the end of the
reaction. The five in-ojects are: catalysis by
coordination complexes and organometallic
compounds; catalytic reactor modeling; an
in-depth study of selected catalytic systems;
application of catalysis to life support sys-
tems for possible use in future space explora-
tion; and catalysis in environmental control.

The Commission al.so considered additional
specific activities which had been previously
discussed between the two sides. These in-
clude the Deep Sea Drilling Project (DSDP) ,
a sym])osium on scientific and technical in-
formation, and science policy. The Commis-
sion reaffirmed its approval of the jiroposals
made in October 1972 by rejiresentatives of
the U.S. National Science Foundation and
the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences that the
Soviet Union will join the Deep Sea Drilling

Project. The agreement provides that the
Institute of Oceanology of the U.S.S.R. Acad-
emy of Sciences will become a member of
the Joint Oceanograi)hic Institutions for
Deep Earth Sampling, the advisory bodv for
the DSDP.

In addition, the Joint Commission consid-
ered the following areas for possible coopera-
tion : forestry, standards and standardization,
oceanographic research, transportation, phys-
ics, and electrometallurgy.

The second meeting of the Joint Commis-
sion is scheduled to take place in the U.S.S.R.
toward the end of 1973 at a mutually agreed
date.

Under the Scientific and Technical Coop-
eration Agreement, forms of cooperation
may include: exchange of scientists and spe-
cialists; exchange of scientific and technical
information; joint research, development,
and testing, and exchange of research results
and exijerience between scientific research
institutions and organizations; organization
of joint cour.ses, conferences, and symposia;
rendering of help, as api^ropriate, on both
sides in establishing contacts and arrange-
ments between United States firms and So-
viet enterprises where a mutual interest
develops; and other forms of scientific and
technical cooperation as may be mutually
agreed.

Other American members of the Joint
Commission are Dr. James B. Fisk, chairman
of the board. Bell Telephone Laboratories;
Dr. Harvey Brooks, National Academy of
Sciences and Harvard University; Herman
Pollack, Director of the State Department's
Bureau of International Scientific and Tech-
nological Affairs; Dr. Eugene Fubini, E. G.
Fubini Consultants, Ltd.; Dr. Clarence Lar-
son, Commissioner, Atomic Energj^ Commis-
sion; and William Letson. General Counsel,
Department of Commerce.

Other Soviet members of the Commission
are N. M. Zhavoronkov, representing the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences; N. F. Kras-
nov. First Deputy Minister of Higher and
Secondary Specialized Education; and D.N.
Pronskiy, Director of the SCST Department
of Foreign Relations.

May 7, 1973

585

U.S.-Canada Interparliamentary
Conference Held at Washington

Remarks by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush'

I greatly appreciate your kind invitation
to be with you at the opening session of this
15th United States-Canada Interparliamen-
tary Conference. It is a particular pleasure
to welcome to Washington our distinguished
visitors from the Senate and House of Com-
mons of Canada, who represent the 22 mil-
lion people of our great neighbor to the
north.

It is most fitting that the representatives
of the people, from both sides of the border,
should come together from time to time to
discuss issues of mutual concern. Some of
these issues are global in nature; others are
of concern primarily to our two nations. Our
examination together of these issues in-
evitably reflects the long history of our
unique relationship. I know that many words
have been devoted to semantic discussions of
"the special relationship" between us — what
it is, whether it exists, and so forth. I do not
propose to add to the debate on this question.
I would merely assert that it is abundantly
clear that geography has placed us next to
each other, that through decades of history
we have lived side by side in peace and
friendship, and that we share a common set
of basic values.

The relationship is both complex and in-
timate. The 49th parallel is crossed every day
of the week by more goods and more people
than any other international border. We both
recognize that immense benefits flow to both
countries from this relationship. We should
never blind ourselves, however, to the fact
that there are many opportunities for fric-
tion as well. It should surprise no one that
we have problems. The surprising thing is
that we do not have more of them.

I am conscious that particular problems
may be very much on your minds at the
moment. We have unresolved trade issues

^ Made before the opening session of the con-
ference at Washington on Apr. 5 (press release 99).

between us. I know that there is genuine and
widespread concern in Canada over the role
of private American investment there. It will
not be easy to find equitable and mutually sat-
isfactory solutions to cross-border energy
problems. We have both recognized belatedly
that we share serious environmental prob-
lems.

As we approach discussions of these issues,
however, I trust none of us will lose sight of
the long and remarkable record we have of
together finding solutions. Some of them
have become routine and are taken for
granted. Some have required patient negoti-
ation and imaginative genius. Many were un-
precedented in their time.

It was over a century and a half ago, for
example, that we concluded the Rush-Bagot
Treaty, the world's first significant disarma-
ment agreement. It took some years to work
out the problems, but we have joined together
in the St. Lawrence Seaway to the immense
benefit not only ourselves but indeed of
world commerce in general. Together we
have successfully collaborated in the defense
of this continent.

Indeed, our collaboration has gone far
beyond North America, and we find ourselves
allies in NATO and active associates in the
solution of vexing and frustrating problems
elsewhere in the world, each of our govern-
ments contributing in its own fashion in the
light of its own best judgment. In this
regard, I would be remiss if I did not mention
specifically the respect and admiration we in
the United States feel for Canada's assump-
tion of an important but often frustrating
task in the wake of the recent settlement in
Viet-Nam.

It seems to me the key to solution of our
common problems is the spirit in which we
approach them. Let us be mindful of the
benefits our proximity brings us both; let us
never forget that we are sovereign and
independent nations; let us be patient when
necessary; let us be respectful of our unsur-
passed record of resolving differences; and
let us never cease to attempt to understand
each other's viewpoint.

I know this is the spirit with which you

586

Department of State Bulletin

approach your deliberations over the next
two days. I wish you well, and I reiterate to
our Canadian guests a most cordial welcome.
We are pleased and honored by your pres-
ence. The consultative process which brings
you here has now become a high tradition
and will surely remain a vital element in the
relationship between Canada and the United
States.

IMF Committee of Twenty Discusses
International Monetary Reform

FoUounng is the text of a communique
xvhich was issued on March 27 at the conclu-
sion of the meeting of the IMF Committee
of Twenty.

1. The Committee of the Board of Governors of
the International Monetary Fund on RefoiTn of the
International Monetary System and Related Issues
(the Committee of Twenty) held its second meeting
in Washington on March 26 and 27, 1973, under
the chairmanship of Mr. Ali Wardhana, Minister
of Finance for Indonesia. By the courtesy of the
Organisation of American States the meeting was
held in the Pan American Union Building. Mr.
Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund, took part in the meet-
ing which was also attended by Mr. Wilhelm Hafer-
kamp, Vice-President of the E.E.C. [European
Economic Community], Mr. Rene Larre, General
Manager of the B.I.S. [Bank for International
Settlements], Mr. Olivier Long, Director-General of
the G.A.T.T. [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade], Mr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Secretary-
General of the U.N.C.T.A.D. [United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development], Sir Denis
Rickett, Vice-President of the I.B.R.D. [International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and
Mr. Emile van Lennep, Secretary-General of the
O.E.C.D. [Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development].

2. The Committee received a report in which the
Chairman of their Deputies, Mr. Jeremy Morse,
summarised the Deputies' discussions to date on the
adjustment process and exchange rate mechanism,
reserve assets and convertibility, and capital flows.

3. The Members of the Committee reaffirmed the
need for a world monetary order, based on coopera-
tion and consultation within the framework of a
strengthened International Monetary Fund, that will
encourage growth of world trade and employment as
well as economic development and will support the
domestic efforts of monetary authorities throughout
the world to counteract inflation.

4. The Members of the Committee exchanged views
on the substance of international monetary reform
in the light of recent developments in exchange
markets and of countries' policy reactions to these
developments, and instructed their Deputies to take
account of these events and their implications in
their continuing work. The Members of the Com-
mittee recognised that the various elements of
reform are inter-linked. Their discussion of a re-
formed system centered on the following points:

(a) There should be a better working of the ad-
justment process, in which adequate methods to
assure timely and effective balance of payments
adjustment by both surplus and deficit countries
would be assisted by improved international consul-
tation in the Fund including the use of objective
indicators. It was noted that the Deputies are estab-
lishing a technical group on indicators. The im-
portance of effective domestic policies for balance
of payments adjustment was underlined. Members
of the Committee recognised that exchange rates
must be a matter for international concern and
consultation and that in the reformed system the
exchange rate regime should remain based on stable
but adjustable par values. It was also recognised that
floating rates could provide a useful technique in
particular situations. There was also general agree-
ment on the need for exchange market stability and
on the importance of Fund surveillance of exchange
rate policies.

(b) There should be better international man-
agement of global liquidity. The role of reserve cur-
rencies should be reduced and the S.D.R. [special
drawing rights] should become the principal re-
serve asset of the reformed system. The Deputies
were asked to study further the conditions for a
resumption of general convertibility, including
questions relating to consolidation of excess reserve
currency balances and to methods of settlement.

(c) An intensive study should be made of effec-
tive means to deal with the problem of disequilibrat-
ing capital flows by a variety of measures, including
controls, to influence them and by arrangements to
finance and offset them. It was noted that the Dep-
uties are establishing a technical group on dis-
equilibrating capital flows, including those associated
with Euro-currency markets.

(d) There should be a strong presumption against
the use of trade controls for balance of payments
purposes. Developing countries would, however, be
exempt wherever possible from trade and capital
controls imposed by other countries and their par-
ticular circumstances would be taken into account
in assessing controls that they themselves felt it
necessary to apply. •

5. The Members of the Committee recognised the
concerns of developing countries under current con-
ditions and their interests in a reformed system.
They affirmed the desirability on the occasion of
the reform of promoting economic development and

May 7, 1973

587

the flow of real resources from developed to de-
veloping countries.

6. The Committee approved their Deputies' pro-
gram of future work. In directing the attention of
the Deputies to those aspects of reform which have
an important bearing on the current situation, they
recognised that procedures are already established
for coordinating the work of the Executive Direc-
tors of the Fund with that of the Deputies. They
noted that the Deputies plan to expand their meet-
ing schedule and to intensify their work between
meetings, and they instructed the Deputies to pro-
ceed urgently with the preparation of a draft out-
line of the reform, in which the major issues would
be presented to the Committee for decision.

7. The Committee will meet again at a time to
be proposed by the Chairman in the light of the
progress of the Deputies' work.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.
Ratification deposited: Sudan, April 9, 1973.

Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relat-

ing to amendments to the convention. Done at

Washington October 6, 1970.'

Ratification, deposited: Spain, April 16, 1973.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 196.5.
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Accession deposited: Qatar, March 27, 1973.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement relating to an interpretation of article IV
of the treaty of February 27, 1950 (TIAS 2130),
relating to uses of the waters of the Niagara
River. Eff'ected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton April 17, 1973. Entered into force April 17,
1973.

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement
of April 24, 1970, as extended (TIAS 6879, 7323),
on reciprocal fishing privileges in certain areas off
the coasts of the United States and Canada. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington April
19, 1973. Entered into force April 19, 1973.

Malaysia

Agreement amending the agreement of September 8,
1970 (TIAS 6954), relating to trade in wool and
man-made fiber textile products. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Kuala Lumpur December 1,
1972, and February 9, 1973. Entered into force
February 9, 1973.

Pakistan

Agreement excluding "Pakistan items" from the
purview of the agreement of May 6, 1970, as ex-
tended and amended (TIAS 6882, 7369), relating
to trade in cotton textiles, with annex. Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington April 11, 1973.
Entered into force April 11, 1973.

Not in force.

588

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX Mail 7, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1767

Africa

Department Reports to Congress on Aspects
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa
(Newsom) 578

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report
of the Secretary of State (letter of trans-
mittal and introductory comment) .... 545

Asia. United States Foreign Policy 1972: A
Report of the Secretary of State (letter of
transmittal and introductory comment) . . 545

Canada. U.S. -Canada Interparliamentary Con-
ference Held at Washington (Rush) . . . 586

Congress

Department Reports to Congress on Aspects
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa
(Newsom) 578

President Nixon's National Energy Policy
(Nixon. Shultz) 561

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of
the Secretary of State (letter of transmittal
and introductory comment) 545

Costa Rica. Letters of Credence (Lopez Aguero) 577

Dahomey. Letters of Credence (Adjibade) . . 577

Developing Countries. United States Foreign
Policy 1972: K Report of the Secretary of
State (letter of transmittal and introductory
comment) 545

Economic .\ffairs

Department Reports to Congress on Aspects
of U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa
(Newsom) 578

LMF Committee of Twenty Discusses Interna-
tional Monetary Reform (communique) . . 587

President Nixon's National Energy Policy
(Nixon, Shultz) 561

United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report
of the Secretary of State (letter of trans-
mittal and introductory comment) .... 545

Europe. United States Foreign Policy 1972: A
Report of the Secretary of State (letter of
transmittal and introductory comment) . . 545

Iran. Letters of Credence (Zahedi) .... 577

Israel. Letters of Credence (Dinitz) .... 577

Latin America. United States Foreign Policy
1972: A Report of the Secretary of State
(letter of transmittal and introductory
comment) 545

fiddle East. United States Foreign Policy
1972: A Report of the Secretary of State
(letter of transmittal and introductory
comment) 545

lilitary Affairs. Department Reports to Con-
gress on -Aspects of U.S. Policy Toward
Southern Africa (Newsom) 578

petroleum. President Nixon's National Energy
Policy (Nixon, Shultz) 561

Presidential Documents

Presidents Nixon and Thieu Hail "Land to the

Tiller" Program 574

President Nixon's National Energy Policy . . 561
Prime Minister Leo of Singapore Visits Wash-
ington 575

Science. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific and Technical
Commission Holds First Meeting .... 584

Singapore. Prime Minister Lee of Singapore
Visits Washington (exchange of toasts with
President Nixon) 575

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 588

U.S.S.R. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Scientific and Technical
Commission Holds First Meeting .... 584

Viet-Nam. Presidents Nixon and Thieu Hail
"Land to the Tiller" Program (exchange of
letters) 574

Name Index

Adjibade, Tiamiou 577

Dinitz, Simcha 577

Lee Kuan Yew 575

Lopez .Agruero, Marco Antonio 577

Newsom, David D 578

Nixon, President 561, 574, 575

Rogers, Secretary 545

Rush, Kenneth 586

Shultz, George P 561

Thieu, Nguyen Van 574

Zahedi, Ardeshir 577

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington. D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 16 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 99
of April 5 and 104 of April 6.

Subject

U.S.-Canada fisheries negotia-
tions.
U.S. and Germany reach under-
standing on air charters (re-
write).
4/20 U.S. Advisory Commission on In-
ternational Educational and
Cultural Affairs to meet May 4.
tll5 4/20 Appointment of Advisory Com-
mittee on Science and Foreign
Affairs.

No. Date

tll2 4/16

tll3 4/16

•114

♦ Not printed.

+ Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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1

i

^

<^y^7^^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

\'olume LXVIII

No. 1768

May 14, 1973

THE NECESSITY FOR STRENGTH IN AN ERA OF NEGOTIATIONS
Address by Secretary Rogers 589

THE YEAR OF EUROPE
Address by Presidential Assistant Kissinger 593

U.S T7FPLIES TO D.R.V. CHARGES OF VIOLATIONS

OF VIET-NAM CEASE-FIRE

Note Verbale to PaHicipants in Paris Conference 599

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CONCLUDES CONVENTION
ON TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILDLIFE 608

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

for index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Note: Contents of this publication are not
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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

BULLETI

VOL. LXVIII, No. 1768
May 14, 1973

The Department of State BVLLETtl
a weekly publication issued by
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public
interested agencies of the governm^
with information on developments
the field of U.S. foreign relations
on the work of the Department ani^
the Foreign Service. /^-j

The BULLETIN includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued;/
by the Wfiite House and the Depart-'']
ment, and statements, addresses, \
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and other^
officers of the Department, as well
special articles on various phases
international affairs and the functit
of the Department. Information is
eluded concerning treaties and ini
national agreements to which
United States is or may become \
party and on treaties of general (it^
national interest.

Publications of the Department
State, United Nations documents,
legislative material in the field
international relations are also liste^

The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Negotiations

Address by Secretary Rogers^

It is a privilege to join you this evening
in honoring the United States Committee of
the International Committee To Free Jour-
nalists in Southeast Asia. We have followed
tlieir efforts with great sympathy and re-
spect. We share the hope of the U.S. com-
mittee— the hope of people everywhere
— that your colleagues missing or captured
in Indochina will be returned. If there is
anything that we in the State Department
can do to assist, you can count on my com-
plete support.

Few periods are as decisive for a nation's
history as the period when the transition
is made from war to peace. War does not
provide solutions. However, the course we
take this year as we move from war to peace
is of the utmost importance and undoubtedly
will influence our foreign policy for the rest
of this century.

There is, I believe, a clear agreement in
this country that a substantially changed
international situation requires reassess-
ment of our policies and programs. Both the
administration and Congress are engaged in
this process. But this does not mean that
we should alter fundamentally the policies
which have been pursued with such success
during recent years.

You know the broad outlines of these
policies. We will continue to improve our
relations with the People's Republic of China
on a steady and expanding basis. As contacts
increase, friendship and understanding be-
tween the Chinese people and American
people will increase. It is our hope — and

' Made before the Overseas Press Club at New
York, N.Y., on Apr. 23 (press release 116).

theirs, too, I am convinced — that the develop-
ing political, social, and commercial relations
with the People's Republic of China will
contribute to future stability in the Pacific.

We will seek to improve our relations with
the Soviet Union, both in the political field
and in trade, science, and technology. We
are now engaged in Phase Two of the SALT
talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks].
This summer we will participate in the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe and in a manner and with a deter-
mination not to weaken our alliances with
western Europe, with Japan, or with other
nations in the free world that have come to
rely on us as a result of treaty obligations.

In Indochina we will pursue every diplo-
matic path, use every diplomatic device, to
bring about full implementation of the Paris
agreement. It is not surprising that many
serious problems remain. However, the con-
vergence of interests and influences that
brought about the agreement still remains in
play. Thus I believe that with renewed efforts
on the part of all concerned the Paris agree-
ment still holds out the best promise — and
I believe a realistic hope — for peace and
stability in Indochina.

The Middle East continues to be a matter
of major concern where emotion and hatred
at times seem to make meaningful dialogue
an impossibility. However, it has been al-
most three years now since the initiative by
the United States resulted in a cease-fire
between Egypt and Israel. Our major im-
mediate objective will be to strive to main-
tain the fragile cease-fire while attempting
to get negotiations started among the nations
concerned. If there could now be a cease-fire

May 14, 1973

589

on inflammatory rhetoric, a cease-fire on bel-
ligerent statements of ultimate and rigid
positions, and a cease-fire from violence of
all kinds from whatever source, I am con-
vinced that progress toward a permanent
solution could be achieved. The principal
parties concerned have said they want to
keep the doors of diplomacy open. We intend
of course to take them at their word.

I am heartened and I know you are by the
progress that has been made in international
affairs in the past few years in many areas
of the world. And I feel confident that war
among major nations may be averted during
our lifetime if present trends continue.

But this will not be easy. Neglect and iso-
lation are apt to flourish in the pleasant
climate of detente.

So in addition to pursuing the policies of
the President which have proved so success-
ful in foreign affairs we will have to fight
the attitudes which develop as a corollary
to success. For example, we cannot accept
recent proposals :

— ^To substantially reduce U.S. troops sta-
tioned overseas in the next 18 months ;

— To reduce to the maximum extent the
U.S. role in furnishing defense articles and
defense services to foreign countries and
eliminate all grant military assistance by
1975; and

— To reverse the direction of our foreign
policy over the past quarter century by turn-
ing inward, radically reducing our active role
in world affairs, and erecting barriers to
imports.

Continuing U.S. Engagement in the World

However tempting these approaches may
seem superficially, to pursue them would be
folly.

First, to remain prosperous the United
States must remain economically engaged
with the rest of the world. An increasing
portion of our economy is dependent upon
exports for growth — 31 percent of all our
crops and 14 percent of our manufactured
goods are now exported. We depend upon
imports for 30 percent of our petroleum
needs, and this share is growing.

The proposed trade legislation which Pres-
ident Nixon submitted to the Congress this
month is designed to keep the United States
engaged. We will insist upon fairer treatment
for American exports and a less burden-
some role for the dollar during this fall's
trade and monetary negotiations. However,
our major objective in economic policy this
year is not merely to protect the American
economy at current levels of productivity but
to stimulate it to expand as part of an ex-
panding world economy.

Second, to build the stable and peaceful
world we all want, the United States must
maintain its political and defense commit-
ments.

In recent years we have succeeded in shar-
ing the burdens of leadership and security
more equitably with our allies. But of course
there continues to be a central role only the
United States can play. While we will strive
to engage our adversaries in a widening
network of negotiations, fundamental dif-
ferences remain. The dramatic progress that
has been made in recent years is not ir-
reversible.

With this firmly in mind, the administra-
tion is determined not to upset the develop-
ing balance by unilaterally reducing our
strength.

Over the past decade the Soviet Union
increased its military manpower by 30 per-
cent, doubled its published military budget,
and vastly increased its nuclear forces.

The People's Republic of China maintained
over the decade the world's largest army,
increased its air and naval forces, and has
developed a nuclear missile delivery system.

We on the other hand have reduced our
defense capabilities by about one-third. In
Asia we have already reduced the number
of our armed forces by 70 percent over the
past four years. In addition to the with-
drawal of more than half a million men from
Viet-Nam, we have reduced our military
presence by 70,000 men in Korea, Japan, the
Philippines, and elsewhere.

Further substantial force reductions now
could lead to miscalculation and even upset
the new and still-delicate relationships that
have been so carefully developed.

590

Department of State Bulletin

For exam|)le. we believe that the main-
tenance of our defense capability is particu-
larly important to reassure Japan about the
continuing validity of our security arrange-
ments. American withdrawal from Asia
could well lead Japan to consider new secu-
rity arrangements, major rearmament, and
even nuclearization — a course it prefers not
to pursue.

The new and essential emphasis in our
policy of building a new Asian structure of
peace, however, is to increase the responsi-
bility of Asian nations, small as well as
large, to defend themselves. All our allies
have accepted this approach as the correct
one. Our security assistance program is
designed to achieve it. Therefore we are
opposed to substantial cuts in American
security assistance. They would undermine
our effort to transfer greater shares of re-
sponsibility to our allies and could induce
costly overreaction by them to find new
gfuarantees for their security. Not only would
they see their own bargaining leverage in
negotiations reduced, their economic develop-
ment would be hindered by the requirement
to spend more for defense.

Maintaining U.S. Forces in Europe

It is important, too, for the United States
to maintain its strength in Europe, and we
fully intend to do so. In the early part of
this century Europe was an area typified
by gross instability which proved to be the
incubator for two massively destructive wars
within a generation. The United States
learned to its sori'ow that however much we
wanted to, we could not in fact remain aloof
from those wars. As a result, following World
War II we were the leaders in constructing
a peacetime edifice in which our voice and
iir interests would be pei-manently repre-
sented.

Pursuant to this concord the United States
and its allies have erected a significant de-
fensive .structure. What is perhaps more
important, our involvement in European se-
curity affairs is not provocative to our ad-
versaries but is essential to our allies. To
risk this major accomplishment of diplo-

macy, a risk we would surely run if we be-
gan a unilateral reduction of our forces in
Europe, is both unnecessary and dangerous.

If there was ever a time not to withdraw
our forces unilaterally from Europe surely
it is now — at a time when we are beginning
negotiations with the Warsaw Pact nations
on mutual reduction of forces. If we uni-
laterally cut in half our own troop strength
or made any other significant reduction it
would destroy all prospects for a successful
negotiation on mutual reduction. Such a
step would also seriously undermine the
Western position at this summer's Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Despite these facts, there may be serious
efforts in Congress to substantially cut Amer-
ican forces in Europe.

There are sound militaiy reasons for main-
taining our forces in Europe. The military
forces posing a potential threat to NATO
have not been reduced. However remote we
may regard the possibilities of direct Soviet
military aggression in Europe, the fact is
that Soviet forces are stronger today than
they have ever been. They are well equipped,
well trained, and well deployed. Over 600,000
Soviet troops are stationed in eastern Eu-
rope. These forces are backed up by over
9,000 tanks and 3,000 tactical aircraft.

In these circumstances American and
NATO forces must be a serious military ef-
fort and not just a "tripwire." NATO to-
day is in fact a formidable defensive force.
In central Europe, for example, NATO has
available roughly the same number of forces
as the Warsaw Pact.

Defense Costs and Basic U.S. Interests

We are all concerned about the costs of
our defense. But there is another and greater
concern — that our defense programs support
this country's basic interests. The i.ssue is
whether we are maintaining a larger defense
than the protection of these interests re-
quires. I believe not.

What are the facts? In 1968, the defense
budget was 9 percent of GNP. Next year it
will be 6 percent. This is not an unacceptable
burden for a country with a GNP of over

May 14, 1973

591

$1 trillion. In terms of the Federal budget,
defense will claim less than one-third of the
total Federal spending, as compared with
one-half of the Federal budget that will be
spent on social welfare and human resources.
This exactly reverses the proportions of four
years ago.

The defense budget for next year in terms
of purchasing power will be less than that
of any defense budget in the last 10 years.
It will pay fewer people, buy less hardware,
involve fewer industries, and maintain fewer
bases than any defense budget since 1950.

Since 1968 the Nixon administration has
reduced the size of our armed forces from
3.5 million to 2.3 million. Thus 1.2 million
men and women in the armed forces have
been demobilized. In terms of divisions, naval
vessels, and aircraft, our military forces are
at their lowest level since 1951.

Fortunately there now seems to be little
controversy over the need to maintain our
nuclear strength as we enter the second
round of strategic nuclear arms talks. In-
stead, recent suggestions for basic changes
in defense policy primarily focus on a major
reduction in conventional forces.

Those who advocate substantial reductions
in our general purpose forces seem to believe
that we can adequately protect U.S. security
interests by relying more heavily on our
strategic nuclear power. This is an extremely
dangerous line of thinking in today's world.

The time is long past when we could or
should rely primarily on the threat of nu-
clear retaliation to deter aggression against
another nation. We must have diverse op-
tions to fit diverse threats if potential aggres-
sors are to respect America's commitments to
our friends and allies.

While we have made substantial progress

in the past four years in reducing inter-
national tensions and in transferring the re-
sponsibility for local defense to our allies,
the main continuing fact of international
life is the competitive nature of nations. We
still have many differences with other na-
tions which could bring us into sharp con-
frontation in the future. Should the United
States be faced with such a confrontation,
the President must have a range of responses,
including conventional responses which are
credible, available to him. This will insure
that our response could be on as limited a
scale as possible and yet still be effective.

We have been able to make substantial
reductions in the size of our military estab-
lishment not by wishful thinking about our
adversaries nor by abandoning commitments
to our allies. On the contrary, we have done
it by making concrete progress toward a
more stable world, by building the strength
of our allies and reducing tensions among
the major powers, and by reducing our mili-
tary strength in a manner commensurate
with these reduced tensions.

For the first time in our lifetime there are
realistic prospects for a world in which na-
tions adopt higher standards of acceptable
international behavior. There are realistic
prospects for a world in which negotiated
resolution of international issues takes a
clearer precedence over unilateral threats or
resort to force.

On every major question of national de-
fense for the past quarter century Congress
has supported the President. When the Con-
gress gives full and thoughtful consideration
to the consequences of major cuts in our de-
fense or to unilateral reduction in our troop
strength in Europe, I am confident that it
will again act responsibly.

*!!'

592

Department of State Bulletin

The Year of Europe

Address bji Henrij A. Kissinger

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs^

This year has been called the year of
Europe, but not because Europe was less
important in 1972 or in 1969. The alliance
between the United States and Europe has
been the cornerstone of all postwar foreign
policy. It provided the political framework
for American engag^ements in Europe and
marked the definitive end of U.S. isolation-
ism. It insured the sense of security that
allowed Europe to recover from the devasta-
tion of the war. It reconciled former enemies.
It was the stimulus for an unprecedented
endeavor in European unity and the princi-
pal means to forge the common policies that
safeguarded Western security in an era of
prolonged tension and confrontation. Our
values, our goals, and our basic interests are
most closely identified with those of Europe.

Nineteen seventy-three is the year of Eu-
rope because the era that was shaped by
decisions of a generation ago is ending. The
success of those policies has produced new
realities that require new approaches:

— The revival of western Europe is an
established fact, as is the historic success
of its movement toward economic unification.

— The East-West strategic militar>' bal-
ance has shifted from American preponder-
ance to near-equality, bringing with it the
necessity for a new understanding of the
requirements of our common security.

— Other areas of the world have grown in
importance. Japan has emerged as a major
power center. In many fields, "Atlantic" so-
lutions to be viable must include Japan.

— We are in a period of relaxation of

' Made before the annual meeting of the Asso-
ciated Press editors at New York, N.Y., on Apr. 23.

tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the
past two decades diminish, new assertions
of national identity and national rivalry
emerge.

— Problems have arisen, unforeseen a gen-
eration ago, which require new types of co-
operative action. Insuring the supply of
energy for industrialized nations is an
example.

These factors have produced a dramatic
transformation of the psychological climate
in the West — a change which is the most
profound current challenge to Western
statesmanship. In Europe, a new generation
to whom war and its dislocations are not
personal experiences takes stability for
gi-anted. But it is less committed to the unity
that made peace possible and to the effort
required to maintain it. In the United States,
decades of global burdens have fostered, and
the frustrations of the war in Southeast
Asia have accentuated, a reluctance to sus-
tain global involvements on the basis of pre-
ponderant American responsibility.

Inevitably this period of transition will
have its strains. There have been complaints
in America that Europe ignores its wider
responsibilities in pursuing economic self-
interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is
not carrying its fair share of the burden of
the common defense. There have been com-
plaints in Europe that America is out to
divide Europe economically, or to desert
Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe dip-
lomatically. Europeans appeal to the United
States to accept their independence and their
occasionally severe criticism of us in the
name of Atlantic unity, while at the same

May 14, 1973

593

time they ask for a veto on our independent
policies— also in the name of Atlantic unity.
Our challenge is whether a unity forged by
a common perception of danger can draw
new purpose from shared positive aspira-
tions.

If we permit the Atlantic partnership to
atrophy, or to erode through neglect, care-
lessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been
achieved and we shall miss our historic op-
portunity for even greater achievement.

In the forties and fifties the task was
economic reconstruction and security against
the danger of attack; the West responded
with courage and imagination. Today the
need is to make the Atlantic relationship as
dynamic a force in building a new structure
of peace, less geared to crisis and more con-
scious of opportunities, drawing its inspira-
tions from its goals rather than its fears.
The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh
act of creation equal to that undertaken by
the postwar generation of leaders of Europe
and America.

This is why the President is embarking on
a personal and direct approach to the leaders
of western Europe. In his discussions with
the heads of government of Britain, Italy,
the Federal Republic of Germany, and
France, the Secretary General of NATO, and
other European leaders, it is the President's
purpose to lay the basis for a new era of
creativity in the West.

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic
problems comprehensively. The political, mil-
itary, and economic issues in Atlantic re-
lations are linked by reality, not by our
choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading
one off against the other. The solutions will
not be worthy of the opportunity if left
to technicians. They must be addressed at
the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed rela-
tions with our adversaries to lighten the
burdens of fear and suspicion.

In 1973 we can gain the same sense of
historical achievement by reinvigorating
shared ideals and common purposes with our
friends.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic
partners that by the time the President

travels to Europe toward the end of the
year we will have worked out a new Atlantic
charter setting the goals for the future,
a blueprint that :

—Builds on the past without becoming its
prisoner.

—Deals with the problems our success

has created.

—Creates for the Atlantic nations a new
relationship in whose progress Japan can
share.

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and
ultimately Japan to join us in this effort.

This is what we mean by the year of
Europe.

Problems in Atlantic Relationships

The problems in Atlantic relationships are
real. They have arisen in part because dur-
ing the fifties and sixties the Atlantic com-
munity organized itself in different ways in
the many different dimensions of its common
enterprise.

—In economic relations the European
Community has increasingly stressed its re-
gional personality ; the United States at the
same time must act as part of, and be re-
sponsible for, a wider international trade
and monetaiy system. We must reconcile
these two perspectives.

In our collective defense we are still

organized on the principle of unity and in-
tegration, but in radically different strategic
conditions. The full implications of this
change have yet to be faced.

Diplomacy is the subject of frequent

consultations but is essentially being con-
ducted by traditional nation-states. The
United States has global interests and re-
sponsibilities. Our European allies have re-
gional interests. These are not necessarily
in conflict, but in the new era neither are
they automatically identical.

In short, we deal with each other re-
gionally and even competitively on an
Tntegrated basis in defense, and as nation-
states in diplomacy. When the various col-
lective institutions were rudimentary, the
potential inconsistency in their modes of

594

Department of State Bulletin

I oration was not a problem. But after a
jrt'neration of evolution and with the new
\\ eipht and strength of our allies, the various
I»arts of the construction are not always in
harmony and sometimes obstruct each other.

If we want to foster unity we can no
lunger ignore these problems. The Atlantic
iKitions must find a solution for the manage-
nient of their diversity to serve the common
I'lijectives which underlie their unity. We
lan no longer afford to pursue national or
legional self-interest without a unifying
framework. We cannot hold together if each
country or region asserts its autonomy when-
ever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to
curtail the independence of others.

We must strike a new balance between self-
interest and the common interest. We must
identify interests and positive values beyond
security in order to engage once again the

mmitment of peoples and parliaments. We
need a shared view of the world we seek to
build.

Agenda for the Future
Economic

No element of American postwar policy
has been more consistent than our support of
European unity. We encouraged it at every
turn. We knew that a united Europe would
be a more independent partner. But we as-
sumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our
common interests w^ould be assured by our
long history of cooperation. We expected that
political unity would follow economic inte-
gration and that a unified Europe working
cooperatively with us in an Atlantic part-
nership would ease many of our interna-
tional burdens.

It is clear that many of these expectations
are not being fulfilled.

We and Europe have benefited from Euro-
pean economic integration. Increased trade
within Europe has stimulated the growth
of European economies and the expansion of
trade in both directions acro.ss the Atlantic.

"But we cannot ignore the fact that Eu-
rope's economic success and its transforma-
tion from a recipient of our aid to a strong
competitor has produced a certain amount

of friction. There have been turbulence and
a sense of rivalry in international monetary
relations.

In trade, the natural economic weight of
a market of 250 million people has pressed
other states to seek special arrangements to
protect their access to it. The prospect of a
closed trading system embracing the Euro-
pean Community and a growing number of
other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean,
and Africa appears to be at the expense of
the United States and other nations which
are excluded. In agriculture, where the
United States has a comparative advantage,
we are particularly concerned that Commu-
nity protective policies may restrict access
for our products.

This divergence comes at a time when we
are experiencing a chronic and growing defi-
cit in our balance of payments and pi'otec-
tionist pressures of our own. Europeans in
turn question our investment policies and
doubt our continued commitment to their
economic unity.

The gradual accumulation of sometimes
petty, sometimes major, economic disputes
must be ended and be replaced by a deter-
mined commitment on both sides of the At-
lantic to find cooperative solutions.

The United States will continue to support
the unification of Europe. We have no in-
tention of destroying what we worked so
hard to help build. For us, European unity
is what it has always been : not an end in
itself but a means to the strengthening of
the West. We shall continue to support Euro-
pean unity as a component of a larger At-
lantic partnership.

This year we begin comprehensive trade
negotiations with Europe as well as with
Japan. We shall also continue to press the ef-
fort to reform the monetary system so that it
promotes stability rather than constant dis-
ruptions. A new equilibrium must be achieved
in trade and monetary relations.

We see these negotiations as a historic
opportunity for positive achievement. They
must engage the top political leaders, for
they require above all a commitment of
political will. If they are left solely to the ex-
perts the inevitable competitiveness of eco-

May 14, 1973

595

nomic interests will dominate the debate.
The influence of pressure groups and special
interests will become pervasive. There will be
no overriding sense of direction. There will
be no framework for the generous solutions
or mutual concessions essential to preserve
a vital Atlantic partnership.

It is the responsibility of national leaders
to insure that economic negotiations serve
larger political purposes. They must recog-
nize that economic rivalry, if carried on
without restraint, will in the end damage
other relationships.

The United States intends to adopt a broad
political approach that does justice to our
overriding political interest in an open and
balanced trading order with both Europe
and Japan. This is the spirit of the Presi-
dent's trade bill and of his speech to the In-
ternational Monetary Fund last year. It will
guide our strategy in the trade and mone-
tary talks. We see these negotiations not as
a test of strength, but as a test of joint
statesmanship.

Defense

Atlantic unity has always come most
naturally in the field of defense. For many
years the military threats to Europe were
unambiguous, the requirements to meet them
were generally agreed on both sides of the
Atlantic, and America's responsibility was
preeminent and obvious. Today we remain
united on the objective of collective defense,
but we face the new challenge of maintaining
it under radically changed strategic condi-
tions and with the new opportunity of en-
hancing our security through negotiated
reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear pre-
dominance that permitted it in the fifties and
sixties to rely almost solely on a strategy of
massive nuclear retaliation. Because under
conditions of nuclear parity such a strategy
invites mutual suicide, the alliance must
have other choices. The collective ability to
resist attack in western Europe by means
of flexible responses has become central to
a rational strategy and crucial to the main-
tenance of peace. For this reason, the United
States has maintained substantial conven-

tional forces in Europe and our NATO allies
have embarked on a significant effort to
modernize and improve their own military
establishments.

While the Atlantic alliance is committed
to a strategy of flexible response in principle,
the requirements of flexibility are complex
and expensive. Flexibility by its nature re-
quires sensitivity to new conditions and
continual consultation among the allies to re-
spond to changing circumstances. And we
must give substance to the defense posture
that our strategy defines. Flexible response
cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around
the defense structure that emerges from low-
est-common-denominator compromises driven
by domestic considerations. It must be seen
by ourselves and by potential adversaries
as a credible, substantial, and rational pos-
ture of defense.

A great deal remains to be accomplished
to give reality to the goal of flexible response:

— There are deficiencies in important areas
of our conventional defense.

— There are still unresolved issues in our
doctrine; for example, on the crucial ques-
tion of the role of tactical nuclear weapons.

— There are anomalies in NATO deploy-
ments as well as in its logistics structure.

To maintain the military balance that has
insured stability in Europe for 25 years, the
alliance has no choice but to address these
needs and to reach an agreement on our
defense requirements. This task is all the
more difficult because the lessening of ten-
sions has given new impetus to arguments
that it is safe to begin reducing forces uni-
laterally. And unbridled economic competi-
tion can sap the impulse for common defense.
All governments of the Western alliance
face a major challenge in educating their
peoples to the realities of security in the
1970's. i

The President has asked me to state that
America remains committed to doing its
fair share in Atlantic defense. He is ada-
mantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of
U.S. forces from Europe. But we owe to our
peoples a rational defense posture, at the
safest minimum size and cost, with burdens

596

Department of State Bulletin

fqiiitably shared. This is what the President
believes must result from the dialogue with
our allies in 1973.

When this is achieved, the necessary Amer-
ican forces will be maintained in Europe, not
simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear
weapons but as an essential contribution to
an agreed and intelligible structure of West-

I em defense. This, too, will enable us to
engage our adversaries intelligently in ne-

r gotiations for mutual balanced reductions.

'' In the next few weeks the United States
will present to NATO the product of our
own preparations for the negotiations on
mutual balanced force reductions which will
begin this year. We hope that it will be a

I contribution to a broader dialogue on secu-
rity. Our approach is designed not from the
point of view of special American interests,
but of general alliance interests. Our position
will reflect the President's view that these
negotiations are not a subterfuge to with-
draw U.S. forces regardless of consequences.
No formula for reductions is defensible,
whatever its domestic appeal or political
rationale, if it undermines security.

Our objective in the dialogue on defense is
a new consensus on security, addressed to
new conditions and to the hopeful new possi-
bilities of effective arms limitations.

Diplomacy

We have entered a truly remarkable pe-
riod of East-West diplomacy. The last two
years have produced an agreement on Berlin,
a treaty between West Germany and the
U.S.S.R., a strategic arms limitation agree-
ment, the beginning of negotiations on a
European Security Conference and on mu-
tual balanced force reductions, and a series
of significant practical bilateral agreements
between Western and Eastern countries, in-
cluding a dramatic change in bilateral re-
lations between the United States and the
U.S.S.R. These were not isolated actions, but
steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried
forward as a collective effort. Our approach
to detente stressed that negotiations had to
be concrete, not atmospheric, and that con-
cessions should be reciprocal. We expect to

carry forward the policy of relaxation of
tensions on this basis.

Yet this very success has created its own
prol)Iems. There is an increasing uneasiness
— all the more insidious for rarely being
made explicit — that superpower diplomacy
might sacrifice the interests of traditional
allies and other friends. Where our allies'
interests have been affected by our bilateral
negotiations, as in the talks on the limita-
tion of strategic arms, we have been scru-
pulous in consulting them ; where our allies
are directly involved, as in the negotiations
on mutual balanced force reductions, our ap-
proach is to proceed jointly on the basis of
agreed positions. Yet some of our friends
in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord
America the same trust in our motives as
they received from us or to grant us the
same tactical flexibility that they employed
in pursuit of their own policies. The United
States is now often taken to task for flexi-
bility where we used to be criticized for
rigidity.

All of this underlines the necessity to
articulate a clear set of common objectives
together with our allies. Once that is accom-
plished, it will be quite feasible, indeed de-
sirable, for the several allies to pursue these
goals with considerable tactical flexibility.
If we agree on common objectives it will
become a technical question whether a par-
ticular measure is pursued in a particular
forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or
multilaterally. Then those allies who seek
reassurances of America's commitment will
find it not in verbal reafl[irmations of loyalty,
but in an agreed framework of purpose.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In
many areas of the world our approaches will
differ, especially outside of Europe. But we
do require an understanding of what should
be done jointly and of the limits we should
impose on the scope of our autonomy.

We have no intention of buying an illu-
sory tranquillity at the expense of our friends.
The United States will never knowingly
sacrifice the interests of others. But the per-
ception of common interests is not automatic;
it requires constant redefinition. The relaxa-
tion of tensions to which we are committed

May 14, 1973

597

makes allied cohesion indispensable yet more
difficult. We must insure that the momentum
of detente is maintained by common objec-
tives rather than by drift, escapism, or com-
placency.

America's Contribution

The agenda I have outlined here is not an
American prescription, but an appeal for a
joint effort of creativity. The historic op-
portunity for this generation is to build a
new structure of international relations for
the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic
partnership is indispensable for it. The
United States is prepared to make its con-
tribution :

— We will continue to support European
unity. Based on the principles of partner-
ship, we will make concessions to its further
growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit
of reciprocity.

— We will not disengage from our solemn
commitments to our allies. We will maintain
our forces and not withdraw from Europe
unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each
ally a fair share of the common effort for
the common defense.

— We shall continue to pursue the relaxa-
tion of tensions with our adversaries on the
basis of concrete negotiations in the common
interest. We welcome the participation of our
friends in a constructive East- West dialogue.

— We will never consciously injure the
interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia.
We expect in return that their policies will
take seriously our interests and our respon-
sibilities.

— We are prepared to work cooperatively
on new common problems we face. Energy,
for example, raises the challenging issues of
assurance of supply, impact of oil revenues
on international currency stability, the na-
ture of common political and strategic
interests, and long-range relations of oil-
consuming to oil-producing countries. This
could be an area of competition; it should
be an area of collaboration.

— Just as Europe's autonomy is not an
end in itself, so the Atlantic community can-
not be an exclusive club. Japan must be a
principal partner in our common enterprise.

We hope that our friends in Europe will
meet us in this spirit. We have before us
the example of the great accomplishments
of the past decades and the opportunity to
match and dwarf them. This is the task
ahead. This is how, in the 1970's, the Atlan-
tic nations can truly serve our peoples and
the cause of peace.

Dr. Samuelson Tours East Asia
Under Lincoln Lectureships

The Department of State announced on
April 2 (press release 95) that Paul A.
Samuelson, Nobel Prize-winning professor
of economics at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, had visited five Asian and
Pacific countries in March as a U.S. Govern-
ment Lincoln Lecturer. Dr. Samuelson ad-
dressed audiences in Japan, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Australia, and New Zealand. (For
biographic data, see press release 95.)

The Lincoln Lectureships were announced
by President Nixon August 1, 1972, in a let-
ter to Dr. James H. Billington, Chairman of
the Presidentially appointed Board of For-
eign Scholarships. > That date marked the
completion of 25 years of educational ex-
change under the Fulbright-Hays Act.

Dr. Samuelson is one of four Americans
selected by the Board of Foreign Scholar-
ships as Lincoln Lecturers during the 1972-
73 academic year. The others are : John Hope
Franklin, professor of history at the Uni-
versity of Chicago; Charles H. Townes, No-
bel Prize physicist and professor at the
University of California at Berkeley; and
John H. Updike, author, Ipswich, Mass.

1

' For text of the letter, see Bulletin of Sept. 4,
1972, p. 252.

598

Department of State Bulletin

U.S. Replies to D.R.V. Charges of Violations of Viet-Nam Cease-Fire

Following is a vote verbale transmitted to
U.S. Missions on April 20 for delivery to
participants in the InternatiotMl Conference
on Viet-Nam.

Pr«» release 117 dated April 24

1. The Department of State of the United
States of America presents its compliments
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry
of E.xternal Affairs of [Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, People's Republic of China,
Great Britain, France, Republic of Vietnam,
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Hungary.
Poland, Indonesia, Canada; and Secretary
General of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has
the honor to refer to a note dated April 16,
1973, transmitted by the Government of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the Gov-
ernment of the United States and, it is as-
sumed, also to the other signatories of the
Act of the International Conference on
Vietnam.'

2. In its Note, the Government of the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Vietnam, on its own be-
half and occasionally also in the name of
the "Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment", purports to describe the situation in
South Vietnam and lodges charges against

" the Government of the United States and the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

3. The United States rejects as utterly
I groundless the accusations of the Democratic
\ Republic of Vietnam, and views this note as
I an ill-disguised attempt by the Democratic
'Republic of Vietnam to divert attention away

from its own numerous and extremely seri-
ous violations of the ceasefire.

4. Contrary to the contentions listed in the
note, it is abundantly clear that the main
obstruction to peace consists of the military

activities carried out by the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam and forces under its con-
trol in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia
in direct and inexcusable contravention of
the Agreement on Ending the War and Re-
storing Peace in Vietnam and of the Agree-
ment on the Restoration of Peace and Recon-
ciliation in Laos.

5. Of extreme concern is the vast quantity
of military equipment shipped clandestinely
since January 28 from North Vietnam into
South Vietnam without the least effort to
observe Articles 7 and 20 of the Peace Agree-
ment of January 27.- Evidence is overwhelm-
ing of continued illegal movement of equip-
ment and supplies out of North Vietnam into
or through Laos and Cambodia and into
South Vietnam for the use of the military
forces opposing the legitimate governments
of those countries. Included in the supplies
reaching South Vietnam are over 400 tanks
and armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces of
various types and vast quantities of ammuni-
tion, vehicles, etc. For examjile, from the
time of the Vietnam ceasefire through April
18, 1973, over 27,000 short tons of military
supplies have been moved through the de-
militarized zone into South Vietnam. In the
same period, over 26,000 short tons were
moved from North Vietnam into Laos. Also
during this period, we have detected over
17,000 military truck movements from North
Vietnam into Laos and over 7,000 crossing
the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam.
None of the peace-keeping organs established
by the Peace Agreement has been given the
opportunity to monitor these shipments.

6. Evidence of an intention to persist in
violations of Article 20 of the Agreement is

' For text of the Act of the International Con-
ference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris on Mar. 2, see
BiLLETiN of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 345.

' For text of the ARreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris
on Jan. 27, see Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.

May 14, 1973

599

the substantial effort being made to upgrade
the road system within Laos and adjoining
parts of South Vietnam. Bridge and drainage
ditch construction have been observed on
Route 7, the primary route into the Plain of
Jars from North Vietnam and on Routes 4
and 4/7 which transit the northern plain in
an east-west direction. Furthermore, there is
evidence of continuing North Vietnamese
efforts to construct a road from southern
Laos into Quang Tri and Quang Ngai Prov-
inces. This cross-border route is not close to
any of the designated entry points and its
only logical use could be as a clandestine
supply highway into the central coastal re-
gions of South Vietnam.

7. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam
also has moved military personnel and mili-
tary equipment in and through the demil-
itarized zone in direct violation of Articles
7 and 15(B) of the Peace Agreement and of
Article 7 of the Ceasefire Protocol.

8. In most serious violation of the Agree-
ment, more than 30,000 North Vietnamese
army personnel are known to have continued
moving through Laos and Cambodia into
South Vietnam after the ceasefire on Janu-
ary 28. These combat replacements have
greatly increased the capability of North
Vietnamese army units in the south. In addi-
tion there is evidence that new North
Vietnamese army organizations, such as
anti-aircraft artillery units, entered South
Vietnam after January 28. For example, the
Khe Sanh airfield complex has recently been
ringed with SA-2 missiles, which clearly
were not present prior to the ceasefire.

9. Not content with illegally building up
its military potential, the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam has since the ceasefire ac-
tually employed these and other forces under
its command to launch attacks on hamlets,
villages and Republic of Vietnam military
positions throughout the country in unequiv-
ocal violation of the fundamental purpose of
the Peace Agreement as embodied in Articles
2 and 3. The assaults have generally consisted
of mortarings and shellings, frequently fol-
lowed by ground attacks in an obvious effort

to expand the area controlled by forces under
North Vietnamese command. In some cases
the assaults were of such intensity as to
require withdrawal of government defending
forces, for example, from positions at Hoang
Hau near Hue, on the Cambodian border in
Chau Due Province and in Bac Lieu Prov-
ince. Other beleaguered outposts long oc-
cupied by the Republic of Vietnam armed
forces continue to hold out despite persistent
harassment, such as at Tonle Cham in Tay
Ninh, at Rach Bap in Binh Duong and in the
Hong Ngu and Cai Cai districts of Kien
Phong Province.

10. North Vietnamese forces, moreover,
continue larger military offensives aimed at
opening up new supply routes and expanding
their control, such as in the Sa Huynh area
of southern Quang Ngai Province.

11. Troops under the control of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam also have placed
many mines in violation of Article 5 of the
Ceasefire Protocol and have tried to inter-
fere with resumed train service. Earlier this
month, in Phu Yen Province, a mine was set
under a train and a ground attack was
launched on a track repair crew.

12. These forces, moreover, have fired
mortars and artillery indiscriminately into
many cities, refugee camps and other centers
of population, for example in Tan Chau and
Phan Thiet, causing heavy civilian casualties.
They have even mortared the team locations
of the International Commission of Control
and Supervision at Tri Ton and Hong Ngu.

13. In addition to widespread attacks on
Republic of Vietnam territorial security
forces, agents of the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam have continued their acts of ter-
rorism including assassinations, tossing gre-
nades in public places, minings of public
thoroughfares and widespread abductions.

14. Another serious impediment to peace
is the record of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam and the "Provisional Revolution-
ary Government" of clear and calculated
obstructionism in the Four Party Joint Mil-
itary Commission. Both consistently refused
to participate meaningfully in any Four

600

Department of State Bulletin

Party Joint Military Commission investiga-
tion which would not benefit their cause.
Accordingly, they blocked or prevented in-
vestigation of the downing of a CH-47 heli-
copter, of the Sa Huynh attack and the Khe
Sanh missile installation, to cite only three
representative examples.

15. The tactic to stall and obstruct was
also clearly evident in the refusal to deploy
fully to the field. The North Vietnamese de-
ployed to only five of the seven regional
headquarters, and their associates of the
"Provisional Revolutionary Government" to
only one. Deployment to sub-regional teams
was minimal. The "Provisional Revolution-
ary Government" had less than one quarter
of its authorized contingent functional at any
one time.

16. Thus the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam and the "Provisional Revolutionary
Government" must bear the respon.sibility
for failure of the Four Party Joint Military
Commission to fulfill its assigned functions.

17. Of particular concern to the United
States is the failure to date of the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam to provide infor-
mation about Americans missing in action
in Indochina or those known to have died
there, as required by Article 8 (B) of the
Paris Agreement.

18. The charges levied against the United
States by the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam in its note, include the allegation that
the United States gave "backing" to the
Government of the Republic of Vietnam in
failing to observe the ceasefire and thereby
seriously violated Articles 2 and 3 of the
Agreement on Ending the War and Restor-
ing Peace in Vietnam. The entire charge
is without foundation. The United States
concentrated instead after January 28 on ob-
serving the terms of the Agreement scrupu-
lously by withdrawing its own military forces
from Vietnam and refraining from partici-
pating in any hostilities in Vietnam. Any
arms and military equipment provided to the
Republic of Vietnam have been strictly in
accordance with Article 7 of the Paris Agree-
ment and Article 7 of the Ceasefire Protocol.

19. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam

also alleges that the withdrawal of United
States forces has been concluded in a manner
at variance with Articles 5 and 6 of the Paris
Agreement and accuses the United States of
failing to withdraw its armaments and dis-
mantle its bases as required by those
Articles. Ai-ticle 5, however, required with-
drawal only of those armaments, munitions,
and war material which the United States
(or allies of the United States and the Re-
public of Vietnam) may have owned in South
Vietnam at the date of or subsequent to the
date of entry into force of the Agreement.
It did not require the withdrawal from South
Vietnam of any armaments which the United
States, prior to the entry into force of the
Agreement, no longer owned because of prior
transfer. This was the meaning of the phrase
"of the United States" in Article 5. The same
phra.se with the same meaning was used in
Article 6 with respect to military bases to
be dismantled. The United States has fully
complied with these provisions. All military
equipment and military base facilities for-
merly owned by the United States forces in
South Vietnam which remained there after
March 28, had been transferred to the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam prior
to January 27.

20. The referenced note makes the fur-
ther charge that the United States has sup-
plied arms, munitions, and war materials
to the Republic of Vietnam in violation of
the Agreement and its Ceasefire Protocol.
This charge is simply without merit. Article
7 of the Agreement permits the South Viet-
namese parties to replace, on a piece-for-
piece basis, destroyed, damaged, worn out
or used up armaments, munitions and war
material. The United States and the Repub-
lic of Vietnam have established procedures
for monitoring arms shipments, to ensure
compliance with these restrictions, and rec-
ords are being maintained which verify this
compliance. Introduction of these replace-
ments, as well as these records and pro-
cedures, are always open to inspection and
observation of the International Commission
of Control and Supervision and the Two
Party Joint Military Commission. Introduc-

May 14, 1973

601

tion of these replacements has been re-
stricted to those three points of entry that
have been designated by the Republic of
Vietnam under the terms of the Agreement.

21. The contention in the note of the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Vietnam that the United
States has left behind over 10,000 military
personnel disguised as civilian advisers has
no basis in fact and is undoubtedly an at-
tempt to dravs' attention from the large num-
bers of North Vietnamese armed forces in
the South. The United States, in accordance
with Article 5 of the Peace Agreement, has
withdrawn its troops and its military and
police advisers. There remain in South Viet-
nam only about 200 American military per-
sonnel, belonging to the Defense Attache
Office, the Embassy Marine Security Guard
and the team attempting to resolve the status
of the missing in action. There are no mili-
tary persons disguised as civilians. As pub-
licly stated, the total number of official
American personnel in South Vietnam is
less than 9,000, the large majority of whom
are filling logistics and maintenance func-
tions which are soon to be taken over by the
South Vietnamese.

22. Other Americans are performing the
kinds of functions conducted by diplomatic,
consular and AID missions throughout the
world. The purposes and functions of the
personnel of the United States remaining in
South Vietnam are fully known to the Gov-
ernment of the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam and are completely in keeping with the
January 27 Agreement.

23. The United States also is accused of
violating Article 8 of the Act of Paris by
virtue of its military activities in Laos im-
mediately after the conclusion of the cease-
fire agreement between the Lao parties.
United States military activities since the
ceasefire have been very limited. They were
conducted at the request of Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma. They were made neces-
sary by, and were in direct response to, ma-
jor and flagrant violations of that agreement
by the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao
forces, specifically the post-ceasefire attacks
at Pak Song on February 23 and Tha Vieng
on April 13.

24. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam
further alleges United States violation of the
"independence, sovereignty, unity, territorial
integrity and neutrality" of Cambodia by
continuing to conduct military activities in
that country. In fact, these activities are
limited to air support operations in response
to the continued military operations in Cam-
bodia by the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam, and were requested by the Khmer
Republic itself. In late January, the Govern-
ment of the Khmer Republic suspended all
offensive operations and the United States
likewise halted offensive air operations.
However the reaction of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam and Cambodian forces
under its control was a total military offen-
sive, despite obligations assumed by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Article
20 of the Agreement and Article 8 of the
Act of Paris. In order to induce compliance
with those essential provisions, without
which the entire Vietnam Agreement would
be endangered, the United States is giving
air support to the Khmer forces.

25. With respect to allegations by the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam concerning
the continued detention of South Vietnamese
civilians, the Government of the Republic of
Vietnam will doubtless wish to rebut them,
but the Government of the United States
wishes to point out that the "Provisional
Revolutionary Government" has offered to
release only several hundred civilian prison-
ers despite the fact it has captured many
thousands. This is an issue where reciprocity
is clearly essential.

26. The allegation that the United States
Government was deliberately delaying mine-
clearing operations is patently false. The
United States mine-clearing operation has
progressed as rapidly as safety, available
forces, weather and restrictions imposed by
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would
allow. We have been able to adhere to our
agreed schedule despite the loss of two heli-
copters. Every available United States mine
counter-measures unit has been marshalled
for this operation. In fact, a force signifi-
cantly greater than that originally proposed
by the United States and accepted by the

602

Department of State Bulletin

Democratic Republic of Vietnam has been
employed.

27. The fact that only a few mines have
been observed to explode is completely un-
derstandable and not at all surprising. As
has been carefully explained to the Demo-
cratic ReiHiblic of Vietnam rei)resentatives
on numerous occasions, the mines have a
variable neutralization capability that can
be projrrammed and which has resulted in
the neutralization of most of them by now.
Nevertheless, adequate safety cannot be
guaranteed unless all affected areas are
methodically swept with proper equipment
by highly trained personnel.

28. However, in view of the many serious
violations of other provisions of the Agree-
ment by the Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam, which have been discussed above, the
United States has decided to suspend its mine
clearance operations. This suspension is jus-
tified as a response to the numerous material
breaches of the Agreement by the Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam in accordance

I with the rule of international law that a
' material breach of an international agree-
ment by one party entitles the other party
to suspend operation of the Agreement in
whole or in part. This rule of customary in-
ternational law is set forth in Article 60
of the 1969 Convention on the Law of Treat-
ies. The United States is, of course, prepared
to resume mine clearance operations as soon
as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam be-
gins to act in compliance with its obligations
under the Agreement.

29. The Government of the United States
thus categorically rejects the general and
the specific charges that it has violated the
terms of the Agreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. For its
part, except as noted above, the Government
of the United States again afl^rms its in-
tention to adhere to the terms of the Agree-
ment of January 27 and will exert its best
efforts to help bring about a lasting peace
in Indochina. It calls on the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam and all other parties to
the Final Act of the International Con-
ference on Vietnam to lend their support to
this endeavor.

Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy
Visits the United States

Giulio Andreotti, President of the Council
of Ministers of the Itnlian Republic, nutde
an official visit to the United States April
16-22. He met with President Nixon and
other government officials at Washington
April 17-19. Following are an exchange of
greetings between President Nixon and
Prime Minister Andreotti at a welcoming
ccremonij on the South Laivn of the White
House on April 17 and their exchange of
toasts at a dinner at the White House that
evening.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 23

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister and ladies and gentle-
men: There are many reasons why we are
very honored to w^elcome the Prime Minister
to Washington on this occasion. One of them
is that we think of the great debt that we in
America owe to Italy, and particularly to
those of Italian descent. We think of the debt
we owe in the field of art, music, religion,
but most of all, in terms just of people, the
millions of people who are proud of their
Italian background but who are also proud
to be Americans.

We have, of course, an example of what
those of Italian background have contributed
to our Nation in our Ambassador to Italy —
businessman, Governor, Cabinet officer, now
Ambassador. This indicates how in field after
field those of Italian background have en-
riched America, have added to our leadership,
and have helped to make us a great people
and a great country.

Mr. Prime Minister, we are also honored
to welcome you because of your position of
leadership, strong leadershij), of one of
America's strongest friends and best allies
in the world. We have stood together since
the end of World War II. We shall stand to-
gether in peace in the years ahead; and as I

May 14, 1973

603

think of the subjects that we will be discuss-
ing today, the subjects of security, of trade,
areas that will contribute to peace, not only
in Europe and the Mediterranean but in the
world, but will also contribute to prosperity,
a better life for the people of Italy and the
people of America, the people of the world, I
realize how much our talks can contribute to
those goals.

As we meet during these two days, I am
sure it will someday be recorded that Italy
and the United States on this occasion not
only renewed an old friendship and re-
asserted it, but we began the structure of a
new relationship, not only between the United
States and Italy but between the United
States and the new Europe, a new relation-
ship which can bring a better life to all of
our people on both sides of the Atlantic.

So, Mr. Prime Minister, for these and
many other reasons, as you come here to the
White House, you receive not only a warm
welcome here; but every place you go in
America, the hearts of America will go out
to you and the people you represent.

Prime Minister Andreotti

Mr. President: I am very grateful for the
warm welcome which you just gave me and
for the repeated invitation which you sent
me to come to the United States.

I share with you this deep sense of con-
nection and of ties which we have between
our two countries, and I must say that these
feelings were strengthened when we received
in Rome the new American Ambassador a
few weeks ago. That was really a historic
moment for us, and it was a kind of moral
victory for those millions of Italians who
came to America for more than one century
to find a job here. Most of them found this
job, and thus they contributed to the develop-
ment of this second homeland. Others were
less successful; and we were thinking espe-
cially of these latter Italians and Italo-
Americans when we received with great joy
your new Ambassador, John Volpe, in Rome.

Mr. President, when you were reelected a

few months ago for a second term with a
great number of votes, we rejoiced on the
other side of the Atlantic for your reelection.
We are very much convinced by what one of
your closest collaborators once said, that is
to say, that the union between the United
States and Europe is the cornerstone of the
peace structure in the world. And when you
dedicated this year as the year of peace and
the year of Europe, we felt that your political
commitment was being met in a faithful
manner.

For 25 years now the United States and
Europe have defended the peace against the
war, against new wars, and they have thus
laid the foundations for a world of detente.

Your great prestige, Mr. President, has
contributed greatly to this fact, and the great
prestige which you have not only in Western
countries but also many Socialist countries
is not in contradiction with the Atlantic
security policy. On the contrary, this is the
logical development of this policy toward
peace in the whole world.

Today we are confronted by new problems,
as you mentioned, and we are going to dis-
cuss these problems during these two days.
But these problems should be seen in this
prospect: We want to create a great era in
the world, an era of peace and prosperity
where the peoples of Europe and of the
United States may raise even more their
quality of life — and not against the rest of
the world but as pioneers of a universal and
integral democracy.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 23

President Nixon

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Andreotti,
Mr. Vice President and Mrs. Agnew, and all
of our distinguished guests: Mr. Prime Min-
ister, it is my privilege to tell you something
about this audience here in the State Dining
Room and their presence in honoring you.
It is only coincidental that included in the

604

Department of State Bulletin

audience are peojile like Mayor Rizzo from
the City of Philadelphia; Mr. Peter Fosco,
a major labor leader of this country ; a U.S.
Cong-ressman, Silvio Conte; a Senator by the
name of Pastore and another by the name
(if Domenici; and an Ambassador to the
I'nited Xations by the name of Scali — only
I'dincidental — jind that the red wine we had
tonigrht is Louis Martini from California.

I am simply trying: to say, Mr. Prime Min-
ister, that in America, as you know so well,
we are very prateful for the contribution
that has been made to this Nation by the
Mills and daughters of Italian background.
We would like to have all of them here to-
night to honor you, but the room will not
.seat 10 million.

And now to those who are here, I would
like to present the Prime Minister. When I
%\ as a freshman Congressman in 1947, I took
my first trip to Europe. I spent three weeks
in Italy, studying the needs of Italy for re-
construction, which eventually ended in the
Marshall plan. I met many outstanding lead-
ers on that trip, but I was fortunate to meet
and know one of the giants.

We think back to that period, 27 years
ago — Churchill, Eisenhower, Adenauer, De
Gaulle. But a name not forgotten by any who
knew him, but perhaps not well remembered
by people who did not live through that pe-
riod, one of the true giants of the postwar
period, one of the men who helped to build
the free Atlantic community that we pres-
ently enjoy, was Alcide de Gasperi.
I I remember how I, as a freshman Con-
gressman, was impressed by this eloquent,
sincere, intelligent, and very strong man.
And it is interesting to me that the man
whom we honor tonight has written a book
about De Gasperi and that many in his coun-
try and in the world say that Prime Minister
Andreotti is in the tradition of De Gasperi.

I have talked to him today; I know his
background. I can only say that our honored
guest is in that great tradition. He leads a
strong nation and a strong people, and like
De Gasperi, he is a strong man — the kind of

a man that his nation, his people, and the
free world needs at this time.

And for that reason, and many others, I
know all of you will want to join me in a
toast to Prime Minister Andreotti and Mrs.
Andreotti. To the Prime Minister: Salute.

Prime Minister Andreotti

Mr. President: I wish to thank you, first
of all — to repeat my warm thanks to you
and to Mrs. Nixon for your very kind hospi-
tality and reception. And I would like to con-
tinue in what you just said, and to the figure
of De Gasperi whom you just remembered,
by saying that De Gasperi taught us two
things: First, there are no problems of one
nation; there are only problems of the entire
world. And secondly, he taught us that one
should never be afraid of things even when
something is very difficult and in fact he was
not afraid of forming a government without
Communists and without Socialists at a time
when this seemed impossible.

The third thing which De Gasperi taught
us was to initiate the creation of a united
Europe and at the same time to maintain
the solidarity and friendship between Europe
and the United States.

I think that in the few words which I
would like to say tonight, I may quote a sen-
tence of Thomas JeflFerson, who said in 1801,
"Peace, trade, honorable friendship with all,
and close alliances with few."

So this should be our star, the star which
should always guide us and inspire us in our
policy.

This morning at the lunch offered by the
Secretary of State, I said that history teaches
us one thing: that every time that Italy and
Europe went in the same direction as the
United States, things went well for the entire
world, and the opposite was true when there
was disagreement or a lack of friendship
between Europe or Italy and the United
States. And this should inspire us; this should
serve us as inspiration for the future and for
our political action.

You invited here tonight, Mr. President,

li

May 14, 1973

605

some representatives of those people who do
not lose their Italian characteristics, al-
though being very deeply American, and who
transmit to their children those which are
the best characteristics, which make the
healthiest and best Italians; that is to say,
the sentiment of family and of work.

These characteristics of Italo-Americans
insure forever a very deep friendship be-
tween Italians and Americans; and I might
quote as an example of this, the fact that
when President Lincoln died, the citizens of
Rome sent to the United States a stone which
had been taken from the tomb of Servius
Tullius, one of the ancient Roman kings,
who was the first king who liberated the
poorer classes of Rome and who gave some
hope to the humble layers of the population.

So in the past, the United States was a
kind of road to expectations for these Ital-
ians. Some of them had a very brilliant ca-
reer and life in the United States. Some
others were less successful. But we wish to
unite all of them and to remember here their
joys, their successes, their victories, or their
failures.

There are so many Italians in every State
of the United States that this morning at
lunch when I met with Mr. Molisani [How-
ard Molisani, president, United Italian-
American Labor Council] and astronaut
[Michael] Collins, I told him, "At least you
are not Italian," and he told me, "No, I am
not Italian but I was born in Rome."

Mr. President, I am not going to talk poli-
tics. The political orientations which inspire
you and which are based on a very moral con-
ception of public life, however, are something
for which all free men and the entire world
should be grateful to you. And in the difficult
road which leads us to peace and to a better
standard of living for all the humble people in
all nations, your leadership is certainly a de-
cisive factor in order to achieve victories in
this very hard struggle.

I would like to say two small things. First
of all, I would like to present my respects to
Mrs. [Clare Boothe] Luce, who was the Am-
bassador of your country in Rome. She was

very much respected and loved and she was
very good at understanding our country, and
she had much affection for Italy and, I must
say, this aflfection is still today very largely
reciprocated.

Then, Mr. President, I am very grateful
to you and to Mrs. Nixon for inviting Frank
Sinatra. I am going to be able to listen to
him singing here. This is something which
will give much prestige to me with my chil-
dren. [Laughter.]

And lastly, let me use one symbol which
was offered to me. The prophet Isaiah said
that you should change your swords into
plows. Now Secretary Rogers changed
swords into harps, since at lunch I saw an
Army sergeant playing the harp. President
Nixon changes swords into violins and cellos,
because we saw military men playing violins
and cellos. So let me hold this as a symbol
for a better future in which we will have
better men and peace.

And in this spirit, Mr. President, may I
raise my glass to your health, to the well-
being of Mrs. Nixon, and to the greatness
and prosperity of the American people.

United States and Canada Discuss
Fisheries Problems

Press release 112 dated April 16

Delegations of the United States and
Canada met at Washington from April 10 to
14 and considered a wide range of fisheries
problems of mutual concern to the two coun-
tries. The meeting had as a primary purpose
the review of the provisions of the agreement
of April 1970 on fishing within reciprocal
fishing areas off the coasts of the two coun-
tries and consideration of future such ar-
rangements. The U.S. delegation was led by
Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Coordi-
nator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant
for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary
of State; and the Canadian delegation was
headed by C. R. Levelton, Director General

606

Department of State Bulletin d

(Operations) of the Fisheries and Marine
Service, Department of the Environment.

The two delegations found broad areas of
potential agreement in most of the issues con-
fronting them with respect to both the At-
lantic and Pacific coasts. A major subject of
discussion was the provision of the 1970
agreement repardingr fishing for Pacific sal-
mon within the reciprocal fishing areas off
Vancouver Island and the State of Washing-
ton. Certain serious differences had arisen as
to whether this i)rovision should be deleted
or be retained or be modified in some way.
The U.S. delegation proposed that the sal-
mon-fishing privilege be deleted, whereas the
Canadian delegation considered that it should
be retained as part of the overall agreement.
In view of this difference, various solutions
were considered which would involve varying
degrees of reduction of the salmon fishery in
the reciprocal areas.

In considering the salmon question, how-
ever, a major difl^culty was that discussions
are scheduled for early May concerning a
much broader range of matters of mutual
concern regarding the Pacific salmon fisher-
ies of the two countries. In light of this and
of other difficulties the delegations agreed to
recommend to governments that the immedi-
ate question be held in abeyance for a brief
period pending the outcome of the talks in
May and that, in effect, the agreement be ex-
tended for a short time to effect this purpose.

This decision left unsettled, of course,
various other issues of importance regarding
the fisheries on both the Atlantic and Pacific.

Though iirospects ajipeared good for satis-
factory solution of many of these problems,
final decisions could not be reached at this
time and must await the outcome of possible
future discussions.

Mr. Pollner Named U.S. Candidate
for U.N. Narcotics Control Board

Secretary Rogers announced on April 20
(unnumbered press release) the nomination
of Martin R. Pollner, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retaiy of the Treasury for Enforcement and
Director, Office of Law Enforcement, as the
U.S. candidate for election to the Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board (INCB)
for a three-year term to begin March 2,
1974. (For biographic data, see unnum-
bered press release dated April 20.)

The International Narcotics Control Board,
established by the 1961 Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, is the U.N. body which
reviews and monitors the licit drug require-
ments of all nations and is empowered to
take semijudicial measures and call upon
governments for remedial action of treaty
violations involving diversion of drugs into
illicit channels. Election to the INCB is by
vote of the U.N. Economic and Social Coun-
cil, which was to take place in mid-May.
The 11 members of INCB are elected for
three-year terms from among candidates
proposed by member governments and the
World Health Organization.

May 14, 1973

607

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

International Conference Concludes Convention
on Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife

A Plenipotentiary Conference To Conclude
an Intei-national Convention on Trade in
Certain Species of Wildlife was held at Wash-
ington February 12-March 2. Following are
remarks made by Secretary of the Interior
Rogers C. B. Morton on February 12, a mes-
sage from President Nixon read by Secre-
tary Morton that day, and statements made
on Febrivai-y 12 and March 2 by Russell E.
Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality, who ivas head of the U.S. delega-
tion, together ivith the report of the U.S.
delegation, excerpts from the final act of the
conference, and the text of the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
ROGERS C. B. MORTON, FEBRUARY 12

It is a great pleasure for me to welcome
the delegates to this important conference.
You are here today not merely as the repre-
sentatives of individual nations but in a true
sense as the representatives of mankind in a
meeting with his own conscience. In our
molding the world to fit human needs, we
have taken upon our conscience the respon-
sibility for the other species that we threaten,
yet are privileged to share the bounties of
this planet. Their evolution down the cen-
turies has not equipped them to contest man's
supremacy; if they are to survive it must be
owing to man's self-control.

Today all men share the bond of concern
for the future of our planet. That bond is
impervious to geographic, cultural, or ideo-
logical influences. Last year at the Stock-
holm Conference, we crossed the threshold of

an era where all nations and all men agree
to work together to save our natural herit-
age and protect our environment. What you
do at this conference is an important part of
that new international endeavor. For the
threat to the wildlife of our earth — the leop-
ards of the Serengeti, the polar bear of the
Arctic, the whales under the sea — is in a
sense a part of the threat to mankind from
the degradation of his environment.

It is ironic that men can move so rapidly
in doing harm to the environment and so
slowly in protecting it. This conference had
a long incubation period, going back at least
a decade to the original efforts of the Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Na-
ture and Natural Resources (lUCN) in 1963.

But time is moving on, and for many spe-
cies it is moving against the future of our
wildlife. The rate of extinction has been on
the rise dramatically. Of the recorded ex-
tinctions of mammals over the last 2,000
years, fully half have met their final fate
within the last 60 years. It is sad to acknowl-
edge to ourselves that during the 10 years
we have been preparing for this meeting,
perhaps 8 percent of all recorded mammal
extinctions have taken place. My fellow citi-
zens of the world, our task is urgent.

Our task is by its very nature a truly in-
ternational endeavor. In the final analysis,
each country must carry the burden of pro-
tecting its own wildlife. But we have found
that so long as international trade in wild-
life is not controlled, the individual country
acting alone is not able to act effectively to
protect its native species which are threat-
ened or endangered. If the demand is not
controlled, the supplier nation cannot move

608

Department of State Bulletin

i I

effectively to protect itself. And even if one

country acts to control its own demands — as

the I'nited States has in its Endangered

Species Protection Act of lOfJO and the Lacey

Act — the demand will merely move from that

1 country to another, and the market still cre-

, ates the same insoluble iiroblem for the sup-

: plier country. Experience makes it clear:

1 Unless we all act together to control trade in

the endangered species, none of us will be

able to act as effectively as we must to iiro-

tect what is precious and is our own.

Therefore, you do have a vital and urgent
task before you at this conference. In con-
cluding this convention, you are performing
' an honorable duty before future generations.
I You are showing man's responsibility in
safeguarding the fragile legacy of the wild
I species of our world.

In welcoming you on behalf of the U.S.
Government, I assure you that the people of
this country — and truly all the peoples of the
world — salute you in what you are doing.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON, FEBRUARY 12

On behalf of my fellow citizens I extend a
warm welcome to the delegates from around
the world who have come to the United
States to participate in this Endangered Spe-
cies Conference. I continue to be hopeful
about the prospects of international coopera-
tion in the environmental field. It is encour-
aging that the common search for a better
environment can be one of those activities
which serves to unify nations, and the United
States remains fii-mly committed to further-
ing the development of such cooperation.

The rate of extinction of wildlife species
is increasing alarmingly around the world.
At least one of every ten species of wildlife
is subject to serious threat. In the United
States alone we consider fifteen percent of
the forms of our wildlife to be endangered.

We have taken many important steps to
reverse this trend. So have the nations which
you represent. But all of us have found that
ongoing international trade involving the
endangered species is a major threat to these
efforts. And all of us are determined to deal

with this iiroblem directly through a strong
convention backed by vigorous national in-
terest and action. I applaud you for the con-
structive partnership you have formed to
meet a challenge that is everywhere recog-
nized as the responsibility of all nations. You
have a historic opportunity to work together
for the common good, and I wish you every
success in your deliberations.

Richard Nixon.

STATEMENT BY MR. TRAIN, FEBRUARY 12

As chairman of the host country delega-
tion, let me first add my sincere welcome to
that of President Nixon and Secretary Mor-
ton.

This conference represents another mile-
stone in the history of international environ-
mental cooperation. The need to protect
endangered species of life is a global need,
one that is of legitimate concern to all peoples
and all nations. It is a matter of urgency
that we proceed now with expedition to de-
velop a convention which can come into force
at an early date. I am confident that we shall
achieve this goal.

We are demonstrating here that nations of
diverse interests, in differing stages of de-
velopment, and with differing national prior-
ities, can work together cooperatively and
effectively for the i^rotection of our global
environment. We bring different perspectives
to bear on these problems, but we have in
common an overriding self-interest in main-
taining the health of the natural systems of
the earth. We hold these in trust for the
future.

This conference is of particular personal
significance to me. My own career in environ-
mental activities came about through an ini-
tial strong interest in African wildlife.
Concern for its survival led first to my par-
ticipating in the founding of the African
Wildlife Leadership Foundation in 1959,
which I then headed. The foundation's pro-
grams emphasized education to help the
newly independent countries of Africa de-
velop the capacity to manage their own wild-

May 14, 1973

609

life and national park resources. My
subsequent broadening concern with wildlife
and environmental problems on a worldwide
basis led to executive board membership on
the International Union for Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources and vice pres-
idency of the U.S. World Wildlife Fund, of
which I was a founder. Thus I followed with
great interest the lUCN conservation con-
ference in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1961, where
my colleague and fellow delegate, Dr. Lee
Talbot, chaired a group which proposed an
international convention on trade in endan-
gered species. Two years later, I participated
in the lUCN general assembly in Nairobi
when it was decided that lUCN would take
steps to initiate the convention we are meet-
ing here to conclude. In 1969, as Under Sec-
retary of the Interior, I testified in strong
support of the Endangered Species Protec-
tion Act, which called for this conference.
Consequently, I view the occasion of this
conference with very great personal satis-
faction.

Secretary Morton in his opening remarks
clearly presented the need for international
action to protect endangered species through
control of trade. He spoke of the need for
urgency. This point can hardly be overem-
phasized. The pace of bureaucracies is slow
and deliberate, but the pace of extermina-
tions is rapid and accelerating. The rate of
extermination of mammals has increased 55-
fold during the past century and a half. Our
records of mammal exterminations extend
back about 2,000 years; yet about half of
these losses have taken place during the past
60 years. Think of it — 50 percent of the total
exterminations in only the last 3 percent of
this period — and we have been deliberating
this convention for over 10 of these years.
The longer we continue to delay action the
more losses of our irreplaceable plants and
animals we assure.

Recognizing this real urgency, and in re-
sponse to the specific recommendation of the
Stockholm Conference as well as our own
Endangered Species Act of 1969, our govern-
ment has convened this as a plenipotentiary
conference. It is our hope that the resulting

convention, so long under consideration al-
ready, can be signed without delay.

Also recognizing the real urgency involved,
we have accepted and endorsed the proposals
that the convention come into force following
ratification by 10 nations rather than a larger
number, which would almost certainly in-
volve further delay.

I would emphasize that the basic objective
of this proposed convention is conservation —
to help assure that presently endangered spe-
cies do not become extinct and that species
presently safe do not become endangered.

The convention would seek to accomplish
this through an effective system of control
over trade in threatened species. We all rec-
ognize that trade is not the only factor oper-
ating to endanger species, but it is a very
important factor in a number of cases. Trade
involves movements both of live specimens
and of their parts and products. To be effec-
tive, this convention absolutely must cover
both.

Trade in products of animals has been a
major factor in past exterminations and
present endangerment. Some species of little
importance in the live-animal trade are en-
dangered almost solely because of the de-
mand for their products. This is as true today
for the great trade in crocodile hides as it
was during the last century for trade in bird
feathers.

Consider, for example, three endangered
species which have been proposed for pro-
tection under this convention. The figures
speak for themselves. In 1969, prior to en-
forcement of specific national controls, the
United States imported the whole raw hides
of 7,934 leopards, 1,885 cheetahs, and 113,069
ocelots. These incredible figures are a shock-
ing indictment of man's greed — and woman's
vanity. The figures, with the present status of
these species, testify eloquently to the need
for this convention and to the absolutely
essential requirement that the convention
cover products as well as live specimens.

But control of the trade in live specimens
is no less imperative. Few people are aware
of the tremendous volume of trade in live
animals for the pet trade, zoos, and medical

610

Department of State Bulletin

research. In 1971 the United States imported
103,500 live mammals. 995.000 live birds,
391,000 live amphibians, 1,404,200 live rep-
tiles, and 98.971,000 live fish. It should be
clear to all that the stocks of many wild spe-
cies simply cannot continue to meet this
enormous demand, and it has already led to
the near-extinction of many species. In 1970
over 550 cats of species now proposed for
appendix I of this convention were imported
live into the United States. These included
cheetahs, snow leoi)ards, tig:er cats, margays,
and ocelots. In the same year 2,397 primates
representing- eight species on the proposed
appendix I were imported, including 150
golden lion marmosets — a total roughly equal
to the present estimated total wild popula-
tion. One can only feel a sense of outrage at
such statistics. They represent a truly black
page in mankind's history. And while I have
made reference to figures for my country,
proportional volumes of such imjwrts can be
found for most other consumer countries.

In the light of such figures, there simply
cannot be any serious question of the need
for control of this trade. When the United
States initiated national controls, serious
questions were raised about their practical-
ity and workability. We have now had seven
years' experience with such controls over
both live animals and all products of listed
species. We have found that such a system
can work. In the opinion of our specialists
who operate our system, the import and ex-
port permit system proposed in the working
paper would be more easily implemented
than the one which we presently operate. In
the discussions in the coming days, our
specialists will be available to share our expe-
rience in practical implementation. We recog-
nize, of course, that any system of controls
presents problems, but we are convinced that
I they are not insoluble. In fact enforcement of
the pi'oposed convention should offer far less
problems than the enforcement of controls
on currency, drugs, and gems, which nearly
all nations currently operate.

Since the basic objective of the convention
is conservation of the world's endangered
wildlife, it is clear to us that the controls

must apply to all endangered wildlife, re-
gardless of whether or not they originated
within a nation's sovereign territory. In part,
the trade controls proposed by this conven-
tion operate when endangered species, or
their i)roducts, are transported across inter-
national borders. From the standpoint of the
species, and consequently of this convention,
it makes no diflPerence whether the trade in-
volves movement into a state of a specimen
which originated within another state or
which originated outside of any such state.
Consequently, we regard the inclusion under
this convention of specimens admitted from
the sea. from outside any state of origin, as
absolutely essential.

Many endangered species, such as the blue
whale, hawksbill turtle, monk seals, and some
sea birds, are found in, on, or over interna-
tional waters all or part of each year. Some
such species which are involved in trade are
comi)letely unprotected. Others have some
protection by other international agreements,
such as the International Whaling Conven-
tion. However, in such cases, the existing
agreement for the most part only involves
those nations immediately involved in or in-
terested in exploitation of the species in ques-
tion— and sometimes not all such nations, as
in the case of the whaling convention — and
they deal primarily with methods and levels
of exijloitation, but not trade. The proposed
convention potentially would cover all na-
tions and would deal with trade, not actual
exploitation. Consequently, it would be com-
plementary to and supportive of those few
existing other agreements.

It should also be noted that article 12 of
the working paper specifically precludes this
convention from infringing upon other in-
ternational agreements.

The world's endangered wildlife, includ-
ing both animals and plants, is not uniformly
threatened. Some species are in critical dan-
ger. Other species are not yet critically
threatened but are likely to become so unless
adequate control is enforced over their trade.
Con.sequently we support the concept of an
appendix I, listing the critical cases, and an
appendix II, for the potentially endangered

May 14, 1973

611

ones. Appendix I species are in such short
supply that no trade at ail should be allowed
except for purposes of propagation where
such trade will not further endanger the spe-
cies and where the objective is to increase its
numbers for ultimate reintroduction into the
wild. These specimens would require both
export and import permits, since such a dual
system is deemed essential to protect those
few highly vulnerable species. For the less
vulnerable appendix II species, trade would
be controlled, not prohibited, and an export
permit only would be required.

We have endorsed the proposal by the
Government of Kenya that the convention
should include an appendix III. This allows
a nation to list species which it wishes to pro-
tect because it considers the species endan-
gered within its borders, even though it may
not be endangered elsewhere. In essence, the
provision of appendix III means that the
signatory nations agree to respect the con-
servation laws of the other countries by re-
fusing to import certain species which have
been taken illegally in the country of origin.
This is an international extension of the
Lacey Act, an American law prohibiting im-
port of specimens taken illegally in their
country of origin. We have found this system
workable; and the provision of uniform ex-
port permits, called for by the convention,
would make the system considerably more
easily enforced than it is at present.

I wish to emphasize here that the a]3pen-
dices cannot be static things. As our knowl-
edge increases and as the status of various
species changes, we will need to amend and
re-amend the lists. Further, as we come to
know more about the status of the other liv-
ing things with which we share the earth,
we may need to include more types of plants
and animals. The appendices which we de-
cide upon at this conference therefore really
represent only starting points. At the same
time, we believe that the appendices should
only contain species which are affected, or
are likely to be affected, by trade. They are
not to be a catalogue of all endangered
siiecies.

We are breaking new ground with this

convention. We should not underestimate the
difficulty of our work during these next three
weeks; yet we must not overestimate it
either. In the working paper we have the
results of nearly 10 years of consideration
and revisions representing contributions
from many national governments and indi-
viduals. It is not perfect; and my delegation,
among others, will suggest some minor
changes. However, the paper provides a
thorough and well-thought-out basis for our
deliberations.

I am confident that we will bear in mind
the urgency of the problem that faces us
and that we will produce an agreed conven-
tion of which we can be proud and for which
those who follow us can be grateful. We have
a historic opportunity.

STATEMENT BY MR. TRAIN, MARCH 2

Today over 80 nations have signed the
final act of an international conference to
provide protection for endangered wildlife.
The United States is highly gratified with the
agreement reached. All the major objectives
of the conference have been achieved after
intense and fruitful negotiation. Delegates of
all nations have worked together in a spirit
of harmony and dedication, and all have
shown a willingness to compromise in order
to achieve our overall objectives. On behalf
of the host nation, I warmly congratulate all
delegations on this spirit which has con-
tributed so much to today's historic event.

Today, however, we should also add a note
of caution to our elation and optimism.

It will probably be some months before
this convention is ratified by the 10 nations
required for it to come into force. In addi-
tion, it will be considerably longer before the
80 nations present today have all ratified the
convention.

During this period all nations must be
especially protective of their endangered
wildlife. The appendices to this convention
could, in the hands of unscrupulous persons,
be used as a "shopping list" of plants and
animals. The knowledge that these species

612

Department of State Bulletin

are to be controlled, together with the }rrand-
father clause exempting hides and goods
taken prior to the convention cominp into
force, could create high demand and iirices
for these poods.

Theiefore, before the strict controls insti-
tuted by this convention become effective, a
special and destructive demand could be cre-
ated for those very species the convention is
designed to protect. For our part, the United
States will do everything in its power to
guard against this threat, and I warn those
who would seek to profit from this situation
that they will be running very high risks
indeed. I also jioint out that only this past
month President Nixon submitted to the
Congress new legislation strengthening our
own controls over the trade in rare and en-
dangered species.

We urge all nations to redouble their pres-
ent efforts in enforcement, provide imple-
menting legislation for this convention, and
ratify the convention as rapidly as possible.

REPORT OF THE U.S. DELEGATION '

1. Summary

The Government of the United States in-
vited States members of the United Nations,
or of any of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations, or of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, or parties to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice,
to participate in a Pleni])otentiary Confer-
ence to Conclude an International Convention
on Trade in Certain Species of Wildlife,
which was held at Washington, D.C., from
February 12 through March 2, 1973. Both the
Peoples Republic of China and the Republic
of China declined. Both the Federal Republic
i)f Germany and the German Democratic Re-
public attended. The convening of this
Conference had been called for in the Endan-
gered Species Conservation Act of 1969, in a
Recommendation of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment held at
Stockholm in .June, 1972, and in a Resolution
of the 11th General Assembly of the Inter-

• Submitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Train
on Apr. 13.

national Union for the Con.servation of Na-
ture and Natural Resources (lUCN) at
Banff in September, 1972.

Representatives of eighty Governments
participated in the meeting. Also attending
were Observer Delegations from eight Gov-
ernments and seven international organiza-
tions (Attachment A) [final act of the
conference]. The Conference resolved to open
the Convention for signature at Washington
until ."^0 April 1973 and, thereafter, at Berne
until 31 December 1974. Twenty-nine na-
tions have so far signed the Convention.

The title of the treaty became the Con-
vention on International Trade in En-
dangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(Attachment B). The text of the Convention
is consonant with the Endangered Species
Act of 1969 and the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act of 1972. Implementing legis-
lation could be provided by modification
of the proposed Endangered Species Con-
servation Act of 1973 that the Adminis-
tration has submitted to the Congress.

II. BACKGROUNT)

(A) Earlier International Conservation
Conventions
Of all the species of wild animals and
plants found throughout the world, at least
one of ten is believed to be threatened with
extinction. The primary threat to some is in
the destruction of their natural habitat, but
to many the greatest danger is extermination
due to the commercial demand of interna-
tional trade. This trade involves dead ani-
mals as trophies or as skins, such as those of
spotted cats and crocodilians, as well as live
animals for the pet trade, public display, or
medical research. In many cases, the demand
is great because the price offered in "con-
suming nations" is so high that the "pro-
ducing nations" are unable to control their
exploitation. In the case of mammals alone,
nearly 60 percent of recorded extermina-
tions have occurred in the 20th century — in
less than 4 percent of the 2,000 years of
record. In earlier years, the extermination
of many species of wildlife caused little in-
ternational concern. This situation has now

May 14, 1973

613

changed dramatically, and the number and
scope of international agreements for the
preservation of wildlife is mounting rapidly.

Most of the many treaties for the conserva-
tion of wildlife to which the United States
has become a party are primarily catch-
oriented. Their membership comprises na-
tions with a common interest — past or
present — as harvesters of high-seas species;
their motivation is commercial; their method
of implementation consists of agreed manage-
ment measures to achieve the maximum sus-
tainable production of given species. Such
treaties are exemplified by the International
Whaling Convention (IWC), the Interna-
tional Convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, and the Convention on the Conser-
vation of North Pacific Fur Seals. These reg-
ulate techniques, seasons, quotas, and areas
of harvesting and sometimes provide an
agreed basis for sharing the annual catch.

The United States has also become party
to a few treaties for the conservation of wild-
life that are primarily preservation-oriented.
Their membership consists of nations in a
common area within whose jurisdiction —
acknowledged or claimed — migratory species
may be found. Their motivation is ecological,
and their method of implementation consists
of undefined national commitments to pre-
serve natural habitats, protect given species
and regulate their take, importation, expor-
tation, and transit. Examples of such treaties
are the Conventions for the Protection of Mi-
gratory Birds with Canada and Mexico and
the Convention on Nature Protection and
Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemi-
sphere.

Like the above United States agreements,
the London Convention of 1933, relating to
the conservation of African flora and fauna
in their natural state, relied primarily on un-
defined national conservation measures such
as the creation of nature reserves, the en-
forcement of hunting laws, the protection of
threatened species, and the regulation of
trade in trophies. The London Convention
was largely replaced in 1968 when thirty-
eight African nations, using a working paper
that had been principally drafted by the

lUCN with assistance from the FAO and the
UNESCO [Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion; United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization], signed the Afri-
can Convention for the Conservation of Na-
ture and Natural Resources. This Convention
also relied upon undefined national meas-
ures. It emphasized the need for the wise use
of faunal resources and accorded special pro-
tection to animal and plant species "that are
threatened with extinction, or which may
become so." It divided threatened species
into two classes in accordance with the de-
gree of protection needed and, for those most
threatened, made the export subject to an
authorization indicating destination and that
the specimens or trophies had been obtained
legally.

(B) Development of the Convention

Pursuant to Resolution V of its Eighth
General Assembly at Nairobi in 1963, the
lUCN took the initiative toward a treaty to
protect endangered species against interna-
tional trade. It circulated two successive
drafts for comments by Governments and
international agencies in 1967 and 1969. Con-
gress, in the Endangered Species Conserva-
tion Act of 1969, instructed the Secretary of
the Interior, through the Secretary of State,
to seek the convening of an international
ministerial meeting prior to June 30, 1971,
to achieve a convention on the conservation of
endangered species. The lUCN sent its third
draft for comment to all nations of the
United Nations system in March, 1971, and
inquired whether they preferred to sign the
Convention in that form or to attend a for-
mal conference to conclude a Convention.
Although enough nations had indicated a
readiness to sign to bring the Convention
into force, it was believed that a conference
would be preferable. In its response, the
United States expressed the same view. It
noted that it had a congressional mandate to
convene a ministerial conference and pro-
posed that the lUCN collaborate with it both
in the organization and conduct of such a
conference.

From the United States' point of view, the

614

Department of State Bulletin

lUCN draft held much promise but omitted
certain important features. It failed, for ex-
ample, to aiiply the convention to endangered
species in the high seas. Neither did it pro-
vide import controls to assure that specimens
subject to protection in the State of export
had been obtained legally. In preparing its

,; position, the United SUites began to develoj)
its own draft, which it discussed at various
.stages with interested private groups both
directly and under the auspices of the Secre-
tary of State's Advisory Committee on the
United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment.

In April, 1972, Kenya circulated its own
proposed draft. The United States, aware of
its coming responsibility as host Government

I to offer a Working Paper to the Conference
and recognizing that the Conference would
be severely impeded should it be faced with
three competing drafts, sent an informal
mission to the lUCX and to Nairobi which

|l achieved the unified Working Paper subse-
quently used by the Conference.

The Stockholm Conference recommended
(Recommendation No. 99.3) that a plenipo-
tentiary conference be convened as soon as
possible to adopt a Convention on the export,
import and transit of certain species of wild
animals and plants. The Eleventh General
Assembly of the lUCN, meeting at Banff in
September, 1972, followed up with a recom-
mendation urging all Governments to par-
ticipate in the proposed meeting to be held
in Washington, D.C., with target date of
February, 1973. On November 14, 1972, the
United States instructed its Embassies to
issue invitations and to distribute the Work-
ing Paper.

III. Current Convention

The just-concluded Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora is a treaty for the conser-
vation of wildlife that, like the second group
of treaties above, is preservation-oriented. It
has, however, several distinctive features un-
precedented in conservation agreements. Its
scope is world-wide both as to membership
and as to species. Its membership is open

to nations, whether interested primarily as
producers or consumers of wildlife, that wish
to reduce the impact of international trade on
endangered species. It covers only those spe-
cies that participating States agree are (Ap-
pendix I) or may be (Appendix II) threat-
ened with extinction and are or may be
affected by international trade, or that are
listed by a participating State as subject to
protection against exploitation within its
jurisdiction (Appendix III). It covers listed
species whether they are removed from the
wild within national boundaries or on the
high seas. Its method of implementation is
the application of an agreed system of not
only export, but also import, licenses to in-
ternational trade in the listed species. This
system is to be administered by each par-
ticipating State through a Management
Authority with the advice of a Scientific
Authority, thereby bringing scientific criteria
into the process of making decisions on inter-
national trade in endangered species. The
Conference invited the United Nations En-
vironmental Programme to assume secre-
tariat responsibilities, and it is expected that
the Programme will agree to do so.

The Convention consists of two interde-
pendent parts: the text, which establishes
basic principles, operating procedures and
organizational implementation; and Appen-
dices I, II, and III, which list the species to
the specimens of which the text applies. Ap-
pendix IV sets forth a model export permit
and the information it should contain. A sum-
mary of the Convention is contained in the
attached copy of the Secretary's Report to
the President (Attachment C).-

Recognizing that, in the eyes of many na-
tions, the subject matter of the Conference
tended to be important but not urgent, the
United States held a series of preparatory
meetings in the State Department with
Washington representatives of foreign na-
tions, under the auspices of the Bureaus of
African, Inter-American, European, and
Near Ea-stern and South Asian Affairs. At
these meetings, a State Department officer

' See p. 628.

May 14, 1973

615

sketched the background and purpose of the
proposed Convention, and a scientist out-
lined man's interest in preserving endan-
gered species. Comments and questions were
encouraged, and reports of these meetings
were cabled to American Ambassadors in
the field to support their efforts to have for-
eign Governments participate in the Con-
ference and, to the extent possible, include
technically qualified experts in their Delega-
tions.

IV. Major Issues of Negotiation

(A) Definition of Specimen (Article 1(b))

Trade in products made from some en-
dangered species is a great part of the threat
to their survival. The question of defining
"specimen," for purposes of treaty applica-
tion, produced a confrontation between na-
tions whose primary objective was preserva-
tion of the endangered species and nations
determined to adopt only Customs procedures
that could be fully implemented. Several
Delegations did not wish the concept of
"product" to go beyond primary products
such as skins; if the concept were to be more
inclusive, they advocated that the affected
parts of products (such as fur coats or
alligator-skin hand bags) consist only of
those specifically listed in the Appendices.
They also urged strongly that parts and
products should not be subject to re-export
controls. The United States advocated that
the definition of "specimen" include as broad
a definition of "product" as possible. The op-
posing view eventually gained partial accept-
ance with regard to Appendix III, in that
the definition of "specimen" for its purposes
includes only those recognizable parts or de-
rivatives listed specifically in Appendix III.
The more comprehensive view prevailed,
however, in the case of animals on Appendix
I and II: here the definition of "specimen"
includes "any readily recognizable part or
derivative thereof."

(B) Introduction from the Sea (Article

1(e))

As noted above, the concept of applying
the treaty to endangered species taken in the

marine environment not under the jurisdic-
tion of any State was not included in any
lUCN draft, and appeared for the first time
in the Working Paper distributed shortly be-
fore the Conference. In the minds of many
Delegations, this concept raised very serious
questions as to practicality (would a member
nation have to police catches by its own fish-
ing vessels?), and as to its effect on their
positions relative to the territorial sea and
to other conservation agreements (such as
the IWC) dealing with species that the cur-
rent Convention might list. One strong Dele-
gation proposed an amendment to delete all
provisions relating to "introduction from the
sea," and, as the Conference progressed, sev-
eral Delegations had repeatedly to seek in-
structions from their Governments on this
matter.

The United States argued strongly (a)
that endangered species in the high seas have
particular need of international protection
against trade because they enjoy no such
national protection, (b) that the Convention
should not disregard endangered species in
70 percent of the world's area, (c) that the
Convention could extend them protection
with no prejudice to the participating State's
positions relative to the extent of the terri-
torial sea and other conventions such as the
IWC, and (d) that this protection could be
administered easily since it would involve
only a limited number of readily identifiable
marine species. After intensive negotiations
in the Ad Hoc Committee on Introduction
from the Sea, the concept was adopted, and
the Conference agreed to include in Appendix
I the five species of whales not subject to a
moratorium against harvesting under the
IWC. The United States, while reaffirming
its position that there should be a mora-
torium on the commercial taking of all
whales, as well as its right to pursue this
objective in other organizations such as the
IWC, declared that it would not, at this time,
press for the inclusion of "non-moi-atorium"
whales in the Appendices. It offered this
assurance as a compromise, in order not to
jeopardize the current Convention that could
offer protection to the hundreds of other en-

616

Department of State Bulletin

dangrered sjiecies of the world. As part of
the same compromise. Article XIV (1) re-
lieves the IWC nations of obligations of the
current Convention relative to trade in spec-
imens of marine species in Appendix II that
are t;iken by that Stiite in accordance with
the IWC provisions. There is no such ex-
clusion, however, regarding marine species
in Appendix I.

Article XIV (C) is a disclaimer against
any prejudice by the current Convention rel-
ative to the development of the law of the
sea by the coming United Nations Confer-
ence and relative to any States' claims con-
cerning the nature and extent of their
jurisdiction.

(C) Appendix III

Ajipendices I and II include threatened
species by the Parties' common, explicit
agreement. For inclusion in Appendix III,
however, any one party may propose a spe-
I cies that it identifies as subject to conserva-
' tion regulation within its jurisdiction and as
needing the cooperation of other Parties in
the control of trade. This concept was ad-
vanced by Kenya. It was advocated by the
United States because it promised support by
importing nations for the efforts of producer
nations to ijreserve species in their own ter-
ritory that might not be candidates for Ap-
pendices I or II, and because Appendix III
regulations would bolster enforcement pro-
cedures under the Lacey Act.

The Appendix III concept met wide re-
. sistance because as set forth in the Working
Paper it would have enabled any one Party
unilaterally to obligate other Parties in
relation to its Appendix III species. This ob-
jection was obviated through a special
amendment procedure permitting Parties to
enter reservations to specific Appendix III
specimens at any time.

The Appendi.x III concept was opposed
vigorously by major importing nations on the
grounds of Customs impracticability. This
objection was met by tailoring the definition
of "specimen" so as to reduce Customs obli-
gations for Appendix III species.

(D) Procedures for Amending Appendices
(Articles XV and XVI)

The question of determining the procedure
for amending the Appendices — for the pur-
pose of adding or subtracting or transferring
species — i)osed a conflict between sovereign
will of the Parties to have the fullest possible
voice in the procedure, and the need for all
possible flexibility to permit rapid adjust-
ment to the changing conditions of various
species. The importing nations initially fa-
vored amendment only by the active response
of the majority of the Parties. Citing the ex-
ample of the IMCO [Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization] Con-
vention, which had recently shifted from the
active to the i^assive procedure because the
active had produced no decisions on i)roposed
amendments in fourteen years of IMCO's ex-
istence, the United States advocated greater
use of the passive procedure that permits
changes to be adopted in the absence of ex-
plicit objection. A compromise was reached
w^hereby the procedure would commence with
the passive system and fall back on the ac-
tive in the event that a Party were to object
to the proposed amendment.

V. The United States Delegation

The United States Delegation included Al-
ternate Representatives and Advisers from
several branches of the Government, highly
competent in the varied i^roblems that the
Conference presented. The Delegation's ef-
forts were greatly enhanced by the active
Ijarticipation of members of private conserva-
tion groups, and by the Congress' expressed
interest in the achievement of an interna-
tional Convention for the protection of wild-
life.

VI. Need for Early Ratification

This Convention has generated much op-
timism becau.se, for the first time, it pro-
vides a potential means of i)rotecting wildlife
against unregulated exploitation through in-
ternational trade. Some months will probably
I^ass, however, before this convention is rati-
fied by ten nations so that it may come into
force. Possibly many additional months will

May 14, 1973

617

lapse before sufficient nations have ratified it
to make it widely effective. During this pe-
riod the Appendices to this Convention could,
in the hands of unscrupulous persons, be used
as "shopping lists" of endangered animals
and plants. The knowledge that these species
are to be controlled, together with the grand-
father clause exempting specimens taken be-
fore the Convention comes into force, could
create dangerously high prices. To meet the
Convention's objectives of conserving en-
dangered species, it is important that the
United States and other nations ratify the
Convention as soon as possible.

FINAL ACT OF THE CONFERENCE (EXCERPTS),
MARCH 2

Final Act
of the Plenipotentiary Conference to Conclude an
International Convention on Trade in Certain
Species of Wildlife, Washington, D.C.

The Representatives of the Governments of the
Plenipotentiary Conference to Conclude an Inter-
national Convention on Trade in Certain Species of
Wildlife met at Washington, D.C. from February 12
to March 2, 1973, for the purpose of preparing and
adopting a convention on export, import and transit
of certain species of w^ild fauna and flora. The Con-
ference met in fulfillment of the recommendations
stated in Resolution 99.3 of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment held in Stock-
holm, June of 1972, which state as follows: "It is
recommended that a plenipotentiary conference be
convened as soon as possible, under appropriate
governmental or intergovernmental auspices, to pre-
pare and adopt a convention on export, import and
transit of certain species of wild animals and
plants."

The Conference was convened by the Government
of the United States of America. Governments of
the following States were represented at the Con-
ference :

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Bra-
zil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African
Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslo-
vakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El
Salvador, Finland, France, German Democratic Re-
public, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, In-
donesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Khmer Republic, Korea, Republic of, Lebanon, Lux-
embourg, Malagasy Republic, Malawi, Mauritius,
Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Niger, Ni-
geria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Philip-

pines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Swaziland, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia,
Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Republic of, and Zambia.

The Governments of Chad, Chile, Ecuador, Hun-
gary, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kuwait and Norway
were represented by Observers.

The following international organizations were
represented by Observers:

Customs Cooperation Council, European Commu-
nities, Food and Agriculture Organization, Interna-
tional Council for Bird Preservation, International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources, United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization.

The Conference elected as Chairman, Mr. Chris-
tian A. Herter, Jr. (United States) and as Vice
Chairmen, Dr. Francisco Vizcaino Murray (Mexico),
Prof. Dr. Drs. h.c. Hans Karl Oskar Stubbe (Ger-
man Democratic Republic), H.E. Ambassador S. T.
Msindazwe Sukati (Swaziland), Dr. Donald F. Mc-
Michael (Australia) and Minister Abdul Habir
(Indonesia). Dr. Donald F. McMichael (Australia)
was appointed Rapporteur.

The Secretary General of the Conference was
Mr. Francis J. Seidner, U.S. Department of State,
and Mr. Frank Nicholls, International Union for
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(lUCN), and Mr. John K. Mutinda (Kenya) were
Assistant Secretaries General. Technical Secretaries
were Sir Hugh Elliott (lUCN), Mr. Harry A. Good-
win (lUCN), Mr. John W. Grandy IV (National
Parks and Conservation Association) and Mr. Collin
Holloway (lUCN).

The Conference established the following com-
mittees: '

Credentials Committee
Swaziland — Chairman
Mexico — Vice Chairman

Drafting Committee

Dr. Duncan Poore (United Kingdom) — Chairman

Mr. Andres Rozental (Mexico) — Vice Chairman

Steering Committee
United States — Chairman
Secretary General (ex officio)

Committee I (Appendices — Animals)

Prof. Jorge Ibarra (Guatemala) — Chairman

Mr. Perez Olindo (Kenya) — Vice Chairman

Committee II (Appendices — Plants)

Mr. William Hartley (Australia) — Chairman

' The final act included lists of the countries rep-
resented on each committee, which are not printed
here.

618

Department of State Bulletin

Mr. Romeo A. ArgTielles (Philippines) — Vice Chair-
man

Committee III (Customs Matters)

Dr. D.L. O'Connor (Australia)— Mr. Atsushi Toki-

noya (Japan)— Chairmen
Mr. Andrej Florin (German Democratic Republic) —

Vice Chairman

A number of ad hoc committees were appointed to
deal with special problems as the need arose.

The Conference convened in twenty-three Plenary
Sessions.

Following its deliberations, the Conference adopted
the text of a Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. The
Conference accepted the offer of the Government
of the Swiss Confederation to act as Depositary
Government.

The Executive Director of the United Nations
Environment Propramme has indicated he will be
able to provide Secretariat services for the Conven-
tion. To the extent and in the manner he considers
appropriate, he may be assisted by suitable inter-
covernmental or non-g:overnmental, international
and national agencies and bodies technically qualified
in protection, conservation and management of wild
fauna and flora.

The Convention has been opened for sigrnature by
the States participating in the Conference in Wash-
ington, this day until April 30, 1973, and thereafter
shall be open for signature at Berne until December
31. 1974.

In addition to adopting a Convention on Inter-
national Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, the Conference adopted the following
resolutions which are annexed to this Final Act: *

Resolution to Include the Chinese Language;
Resolution to Include the Russian Language;
Resolution on Article XII.

The original of this Final Act, the Chinese, Eng-
lish, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which
are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Government of the Swiss Confederation which shall
transmit certified copies thereof to all States which
participated in the present Conference.

In witness whereof the Representatives have
signed this Final Act.

Done in Washington, on the second day of March
of the year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sev-
enty-three.

Resolution on Article XII

The Conference,

Noting that Article XII of the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora contemplates that the United

Nations Environment Programme shall assume Sec-
retariat responsibilities upon entry into force of the
Convention;

Aware of the fact that this assumption of respon-
sibilities could be considered and determined at the
June 1973 meeting of the Governing Council of the
United Nations Environment Programme;

Recognizing that adequate preparations must be
made to ensure that the Contracting States may
make an informed and well-considered choice in the
event the United Nations Environment Programme
is unable to assume those responsibilities;

1. Expresses the hope that the Governing Council
will approve the undertaking of Secretariat func-
tions by the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme;

2. Decides, in the event the United Nations En-
vironment Programme has not assumed Secretariat
functions by September 1, 1973, to invite any Parties
to the Convention to communicate to the Depositary
Government proposals concerning the possibility of
another existing agency assuming the responsibil-
ities of the Secretariat for consideration at the first
Conference of the Contracting States;

3. Requests the Depositary Government to trans-
mit to the Contracting states such proposals as are
received at least ninety days in advance of the first
Conference;

4. Invites the Depositary Government to assume
Secretariat responsibilities on an interim basis pend-
ing consideration of this matter at the first Confer-
ence of Contracting States if the United Nations
Environment Programme has not done so when the
Convention enters into force. The Depositary Gov-
ernment may request the assistance of intergov-
ernmental or non-governmental, international or
national agencies and bodies technically qualified in
protection, conservation and management of wild
fauna and flora.

TEXT OF THE CONVENTION

Convention on International Trade
IN Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

The Contracting States,

Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their
many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplace-
able part of the natural systems of the earth which
must be protected for this and the generations to
come;

Conscious of the ever-growing value of wild
fauna and flora from aesthetic, scientific, cultural,
recreational and economic points of view;

Recot.nizing that peoples and States are and
should be the best protectors of their own wild
fauna and flora;

' The resolutions to include the Chinese and Rus-
sian languages are not printed here.

° The appendices to the convention are not printed
here.

May 14, 1973

619

Recognizing, in addition, that international co-
operation is essential for the protection of certain
species of wild fauna and flora against over-exploi-
tation through international trade;

Convinced of the urgency of taking appropriate
measures to this end;
Have agreed as follows :

Article I
Definitions

For the purpose of the present Convention, unless
the context otherwise requires:

(a) "Species" means any species, subspecies, or
geographically separate population thereof;

(b) "Specimen" means:

(i) any animal or plant, whether alive or dead;

(ii) in the case of an animal: for species in-
cluded in Appendices I and II, any readily recog-
nizable part or derivative thereof; and for species
included in Appendix III, any readily recognizable
part or derivative thereof specified in Appendix III
in relation to the species; and

(iii) in the case of a plant: for species included
in Appendix I, any readily recognizable part or
derivative thereof; and for species included in Ap-
pendices II and III, any readily recognizable part
or derivative thereof specified in Appendices II and
III in relation to the species;

(c) "Trade" means export, re-export, import and
introduction from the sea;

(d) "Re-export" means export of any specimen
that has previously been imported;

(e) "Introduction from the sea" means transpor-
tation into a State of specimens of any species
which were taken in the marine environment not
under the jurisdiction of any State;

(f) "Scientific Authority" means a national sci-
entific authority designated in accordance with Ar-
ticle IX;

(g) "Management Authority" means a national
management authority designated in accordance
with Article IX;

(h) "Party" means a State for which the present
Convention has entered into force.

Article II
Fundamental Principles

1. Appendix I shall include all species threatened
with extinction which are or may be aflfected by
trade. Trade in specimens of these species must be
subject to particularly strict regulation in order
not to endanger further their survival and must only
be authorized in exceptional circumstances.

2. Appendix II shall include:

(a) all species which although not necessarily now
threatened with extinction may become so unless
trade in specimens of such species is subject to strict
regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible
with their survival ; and

(b) other species which must be subject to regu-
lation in order that trade in specimens of certain
species referred to in sub-paragraph (a) of this
paragraph may be brought under effective control.

3. Appendix III shall include all species which
any Party identifies as being subject to regulation
within its jurisdiction for the purpose of preventing
or restricting exploitation, and as needing the co-
operation of other parties in the control of trade.

4. The Parties shall not allow trade in specimens
of species included in Appendices I, II and III ex-
cept in accordance with the provisions of the present
Convention.

Article III
Regulation of Trade in Specimens
of Species included in Appendix I

1. All trade in specimens of species included in
Appendix I shall be in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Article.

2. The export of any specimen of a species In-
cluded in Appendix I shall require the prior grant
and presentation of an export permit. An export
permit shall only be granted when the following
conditions have been met:

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export
has advised that such export will not be detrimental
to the survival of that species;

(b) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained
in contravention of the laws of that State for the
protection of fauna and flora;

(c) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that any living specimen will be so
prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment; and

(d) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that an import permit has been
granted for the specimen.

3. The import of any specimen of a species in-
cluded in Appendix I shall require the prior grant
and presentation of an import permit and either
an export permit or a re-export certificate. An im-
port permit shall only be granted when the follow-
ing conditions have been met:

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of import
has advised that the import will be for purposes
which are not detrimental to the survival of the
species involved;

(b) a Scientific Authority of the State of import
is satisfied that the proposed recipient of a living
specimen is suitably equipped to house and care
for it; and

(c) a Management Authority of the State of im-
port is satisfied that the specimen is not to be used
for primarily commercial purposes.

4. The re-export of any specimen of a species
included in Appendix I shall require the prior grant
and presentation of a re-export certificate. A re-

620

Department of State Bulletin

export certificate shall only be granted when the
following conditions have been met:

(a) a Management Authority of the State of re-
export is satisfied that the specimen was imported
into that State in accordance with the provisions of
the present Convention;

(b) a Management Authority of the State of re-
export is satisfied that any living specimen will be
so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment; and

(c) a Management Authority of the State of re-
export is satisfied that an import permit has been
granted for any living specimen.

5. The introduction from the sea of any specimen
of a species included in Appendix I shall require the
prior grant of a certificate from a Management Au-
thority of the State of introduction. A certificate
' shall only be granted when the following conditions
have been met:

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of intro-
duction advises that the introduction will not be
detrimental to the survival of the species involved;

(b) a Management Authority of the State of
introduction is satisfied that the proposed recipient

I' of a living specimen is suitably equipped to house
and care for it; and

(c) a Management Authority of the State of in-
troduction is satisfied that the specimen is not to be
used for primarily commercial purposes.

Article IV
Regulation of Trade in Specimens
of Species included in Appendix II

1. All trade in specimens of species included in
Appendix II shall be in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Article.

2. The export of any specimen of a species in-
cluded in Appendix II shall require the prior grant
and presentation of an export permit. An export
permit shall only be granted when the following
conditions have been met:

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of export
has advised that such export will not be detrimental
to the survival of that species;

(b) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained
in contravention of the laws of that State for the
protection of fauna and flora; and

(c) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that any living specimen will be so
prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

3. A Scientific Authority in each Party shall
monitor both the export permits granted by that
State for specimens of species included in Appendix
II and the actual exports of such specimens. When-
ever a Scientific Authority determines that the ex-
port of specimens of any such species should be
limited in order to maintain that species throughout

its range at a level consistent with its role in the
ecosystems in which it occurs and well above the
level at which that species might become eligible
for inclusion in Appendix I, the Scientific Authority
shall advise the appropriate Management Authority
of suitable measures to be taken to limit the grant
of export permits for specimens of that species.

4. The import of any specimen of a species in-
cluded in Appendix II shall require the prior pres-
entation of either an export permit or a re-export
certificate.

5. The re-export of any specimen of a species in-
cluded in Appendix II shall require the prior grant
and presentation of a re-export certificate. A re-
export certificate shall only be granted when the
following conditions have been met:

(a) a Management Authority of the State of re-
export is satisfied that the specimen was imported
into that State in accordance with the provisions
of the present Convention; and

(b) a Management Authority of the State of re-
export is satisfied that any living specimen will be
so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

6. The introduction from the sea of any specimen
of a species included in Appendix II shall require
the prior grant of a certificate from a Management
Authority of the State of introduction. A certificate
shall only be granted when the following conditions
have been met:

(a) a Scientific Authority of the State of intro-
duction advises that the introduction will not be
detrimental to the survival of the species involved;
and

(b) a Management Authority of the State of in-
troduction is satisfied that any living specimen will
be -SO handled as to minimize the risk of injury,
damage to health or cruel treatment.

7. Certificates referred to in paragraph 6 of this
Article may be granted on the advice of a Scientific
Authority, in consultation with other national scien-
tific authorities or, when appropriate, international
scientific authorities, in respect of periods not ex-
ceeding one year for total numbers of specimens to
be introduced in such periods.

Article V
Regulation of Trade in Specimens
of Species included in Appendix III

1. All trade in specimens of species included in
Appendix III shall be in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Article.

2. The export of any specimen of a species in-
cluded in Appendix III from any State which has
included that species in Appendix III shall require
the prior grant and presentation of an export per-
mit. An export permit shall only be granted when
the following conditions have been met:

(a) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that the specimen was not obtained

Moy 14, 1973

621

in contravention of the laws of that State for the
protection of fauna and flora; and

(b) a Management Authority of the State of ex-
port is satisfied that any living specimen will be so
prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.

3. The import of any specimen of a species in-
cluded in Appendix III shall require, except in cir-
cumstances to which paragraph 4 of this Article
applies, the prior presentation of a certificate of
origin and, where the import is from a State which
has included that species in Appendix III, an ex-
port permit.

4. In the case of re-export, a certificate granted
by the Management Authority of the State of re-
export that the specimen was processed in that
State or is being re-exported shall be accepted by
the State of import as evidence that the provisions
of the present Convention have been complied with
in respect of the specimen concerned.

Article VI
Permits and Certificates

1. Permits and certificates granted under the pro-
visions of Articles III, IV, and V shall be in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Article.

2. An export permit shall contain the information
specified in the model set forth in Appendix IV, and
may only be used for export within a period of six
months from the date on which it was granted.

3. Each permit or certificate shall contain the
title of the present Convention, the name and any
identifying stamp of the Management Authority
granting it and a control number assigned by the
Management Authority.

4. Any copies of a permit or certificate issued by
a Management Authority shall be clearly marked
as copies only and no such copy may be used in
place of the original, except to the extent endorsed
thereon.

5. A separate pennit or certificate shall be re-
quired for each consignment of specimens.

6. A Management Authority of the State of im-
port of any specimen shall cancel and retain the
export permit or re-export certificate and any cor-
responding import permit presented in respect of
the import of that specimen.

7. Where appropriate and feasible a Manage-
ment Authority may affix a mark upon any speci-
men to assist in identifying the specimen. For these
purposes "mark" means any indelible imprint, lead
seal or other suitable means of identifying a speci-
men, designed in such a way as to render its imi-
tation by unauthorized persons as difficult as
possible.

Article VII

Exemptions and Other Special Provisions

Relating to Trade

1. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall
not apply to the transit or trans-shipment of speci-

mens through or in the territory of a Party while
the specimens remain in Customs control.

2. Where a Management Authority of the State
of export or re-export is satisfied that a specimen
was acquired before the provisions of the present
Convention applied to that specimen, the provisions
of Articles III, IV and V shall not apply to that
specimen where the Management Authority issues
a certificate to that eff'ect.

3. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall
not apply to specimens that are personal or house-
hold effects. This exemption shall not apply where:

(a) in the case of specimens of a species included
in Appendix I, they were acquired by the owner
outside his State of usual residence, and are being
imported into that State; or

(b) in the case of specimens of species included
in Appendix II:

(i) they were acquired by the owner outside his
State of usual residence and in a State where re-
moval from the wild occurred ;

(ii) they are being imported into the owner's
State of usual residence; and

(iii) the State where removal from the wild oc-
curred requires the prior grant of export permits
before any export of such specimens;
unless a Management Authority is satisfied that the
specimens were acquired before the provisions of the
present Convention applied to such specimens.

4. Specimens of an animal species included in
Appendix I bred in captivity for commercial pur-
poses, or of a plant species included in Appendix I
artificially propagated for commercial purposes,
shall be deemed to be specimens of species included
in Appendix II.

5. Where a Management Authority of the State
of export is satisfied that any specimen of an animal
species was bred in captivity or any specimen of a
plant species was artificially propagated, or is a part
of such an animal or plant or was derived therefrom,
a certificate by that Management Authority to that
effect shall be accepted in lieu of any of the permits
or certificates required under the provisions of Ar-
ticles III, IV or V.

6. The provisions of Articles III, IV and V shall
not apply to the non-commercial loan, donation or
exchange between scientists or scientific institutions
registered by a Management Authority of their
State, of herbarium specimens, other preserved,
dried or embedded museum specimens, and live
plant material which carry a label issued or ap-
proved by a Management Authority.

7. A Management Authority of any State may
waive the requirements of Articles III, IV and V
and allow the movement without permits or certifi-
cates of specimens which form part of a travelling
zoo, circus, menagerie, plant exhibition or other
travelling exhibition provided that:

(a) the exporter or importer registers full de-

622

Department of State Bulletin

tails of such specimens with that Management
Authority;

(b) the specimens are in either of the categories
specified in paragraphs 2 or 5 of this Article; and

(c) the Management Authority is satisfied that
any living specimen will be so transported and cared
for as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to
health or cruel treatment.

Article VIII
Measiires to be Taken by the Parties

1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures to
enforce the provisions of the present Convention and

I to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof.
These shall include measures:

(a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such
specimens, or both; and

(b) to provide for the confiscation or return to
the State of e.\port of such specimens.

2. In addition to the measures taken under para-
graph 1 of this Article, a Party may, when it deems
it necessary, provide for any method of internal re-
imbursement for expenses incurred as a result of
the confiscation of a specimen traded in violation
of the measures taken in the application of the pro-
visions of the present Convention.

3. As far as possible, the Parties shall ensure that
specimens shall pass through any formalities re-
quired for trade with a minimum of delay. To fa-
cilitate such passage, a Party may designate ports
of exit and ports of entry at which specimens must
be presented for clearance. The Parties shall ensure
further that all living specimens, during any period
of transit, holding or shipment, are properly cared
for so as to minimize the risk of injury, damage to
health or cruel treatment.

4. Where a living specimen is confiscated as a
result of measures referred to in paragraph 1 of
this Article:

(a) the specimen shall be entrusted to a Man-
agement Authority of the State of confiscation;

(b) the Management Authority shall, after con-
sultation with the State of export, return the speci-
men to that State at the expense of that State, or
to a rescue centre or such other place as the Man-
agement Authority deems appropriate and consistent
with the purposes of the present Convention; and

(c) the Management Authority may obtain the
advice of a Scientific Authority, or may, whenever
it considers it desirable, consult the Secretariat in

rder to facilitate the decision under subparagraph
lb) of this paragraph, including the choice of a
rescue centre or other place.

5. A rescue centre as referred to in paragraph 4
of this Article means an institution designated by
a Management Authority to look after the welfare
of living specimens, particularly those that have
been confiscated.

6. Each Party shall maintain records of trade in

specimens of species included in Appendices I, II
and III which shall cover:

(a) the names and addresses of exporters and
importers; and

(b) the number and type of permits and certifi-
cates granted; the States with which such trade oc-
curred; the numbers or quantities and types of
specimens, names of species as included in Appen-
dices I, II and III and, where applicable, the size
and sex of the specimens in question.

7. Each Party shall prepare periodic reports on
its implementation of the present Convention and
shall transmit to the Secretariat:

(a) an annual report containing a summary of
the information specified in sub-paragraph (b) of
paragraph G of this Article; and

(b) a biennial report on legislative, regulatory
and administrative measures taken to enforce the
provisions of the present Convention.

8. The information referred to in paragraph 7 of
this Article shall be available to the public where
this is not inconsistent with the law of the Party
concerned.

Article IX
Management and Scientific Authorities

1. Each Party shall designate for the purposes of
the present Convention:

(a) one or more Management Authorities compe-
tent to g^ant permits or certificates on behalf of
that Party; and

(b) one or more Scientific Authorities.

2. A State depositing an instrument of ratifica-
tion, acceptance, approval or accession shall at that
time inform the Depositary Government of the name
and address of the Management Authority author-
ized to communicate with other Parties and with
the Secretariat.

3. Any changes in the designations or authoriza-
tions under the provisions of this Article shall be
communicated by the Party concerned to the Sec-
retariat for transmission to all other Parties.

4. Any Management Authority referred to in
paragraph 2 of this Article shall if so requested by
the Secretariat or the Management Authority of
another Party, communicate to it impression of
stamps, seals or other devices used to authenticate
permits or certificates.

Article X
Trade with States not Party to the Convention

Where export or re-export is to, or import is from,
a State not a party to the present Convention, com-
parable documentation issued by the competent
authorities in that State which substantially con-
forms with the requirements of the present Conven-
tion for permits and certificates may be accepted in
lieu thereof by any Party.

May 14, 1973

623

Article XI

Conference of the Parties

1. The Secretariat shall call a meeting of the
Conference of the Parties not later than two years
after the entry into force of the present Convention.

2. Thereafter the Secretariat shall convene regu-
lar meetings at least once every two years, unless
the Conference decides otherwise, and extraordinary
meetings at any time on the written request of at
least one-third of the Parties.

3. At meetings, whether regular or extraordinary,
the Parties shall review the implementation of the
present Convention and may:

(a) make such provision as may be necessary to
enable the Secretariat to carry out its duties;

(b) consider and adopt amendments to Appen-
dices I and II in accordance with Article XV;

(c) review the progress made towards the resto-
ration and conservation of the species included in
Appendices I, II and III;

(d) receive and consider any reports presented by
the Secretariat or by any Party ; and

(e) where appropriate, make recommendations
for improving the effectiveness of the present
Convention.

4. At each regular meeting, the Parties may de-
termine the time and venue of the next regular
meeting to be held in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph 2 of this Article.

5. At any meeting, the Parties may determine
and adopt rules of procedure for the meeting.

6. The United Nations, its Specialized Agencies
and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as
well as any State not a Party to the present Con-
vention, may be represented at meetings of the
Conference by observers, who shall have the right
to participate but not to vote.

7. Any body or agency technically qualified in
protection, conservation or management of wild
fauna and flora, in the following categories, which
has informed the Secretariat of its desire to be
represented at meetings of the Conference by ob-
servers, shall be admitted unless at least one-third
of the Parties present object:

(a) international agencies or bodies, either gov-
ernmental or non-governmental, and national gov-
ernmental agencies and bodies; and

(b) national non-governmental agencies or bodies
which have been approved for this purpose by the
State in which they are located. Once admitted,
these observers shall have the right to participate
but not to vote.

Article XII
The Secretariat

1. Upon entry into force of the present Conven-
tion, a Secretariat shall be provided by the Executive
Director of the United Nations Environment Pro-

gramme. To the extent and in the manner he con-
siders appropriate, he may be assisted by suitable
inter-governmental or non-governmental interna-
tional or national agencies and bodies technically
qualified in protection, conservation and manage-
ment of wild fauna and flora. <
2. The functions of the Secretariat shall be:

(a) to arrange for and service meetings of the

Parties;

(b) to perform the functions entrusted to it
under the provisions of Articles XV and XVI of
the present Convention;

(c) to undertake scientific and technical studies
in accordance with programmes authorized by the
Conference of the Parties as will contribute to the
implementation of the present Convention, includ-
ing studies concerning standards for appropriate
preparation and shipment of living specimens and
the means of identifying specimens;

(d) to study the reports of Parties and to request
from Parties such further information with respect
thereto as it deems necessary to ensure implemen-
tation of the present Convention ;

(e) to invite the attention of the Parties to any
matter pertaining to the aims of the present
Convention ;

(f) to publish periodically and distribute to the
Parties current editions of Appendices I, II and III
together with any information which will facilitate
identification of specimens of species included in
those Appendices.

(g) to prepare annual reports to the Parties on
its work and on the implementation of the present
Convention and such other reports as meetings of
the Parties may request;

(h) to make recommendations for the implemen-
tation of the aims and provisions of the present
Convention, including the exchange of information
of a scientific or technical nature;

(i) to perform any other function as may be
entrusted to it by the Parties.

Article XIII
International Measures

1. When the Secretariat in the light of informa-
tion received is satisfied that any species included
in Appendices I or II is being affected adversely by
trade in specimens of that species or that the pro-
visions of the present Convention are not being
effectively implemented, it shall communicate such
information to the authorized Management Author-
ity of the Party or Parties concerned.

2. When any Party receives a communication as
indicated in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall,
as soon as possible, inform the Secretariat of any
relevant facts insofar as its laws permit and, where
appropriate, propose remedial action. Where the
Party considers that an inquiry is desirable, such
inquiry may be carried out by one or more persons
expressly authorized by the Party.

624

Department of State Bulletin

3. The information provided by the Party or re-
sulting from any inquiry as specified in paragraph
2 of this Article shall be reviewed by the next Con-
ference of the Parties which may make whatever
recommendations it deems appropriate.

Article XIV
Effect on Domestic Legislation
and International Conventions

1. The provisions of the present Convention shall
in no way affect the right of Parties to adopt:

(a) stricter domestic measures regarding the con-
ditions for trade, taking possession or transport of
specimens of species included in Appendices I, II
and III. or the complete prohibition thereof; or

(b) domestic measures restricting or prohibiting
trade, taking possession, or transport of species not
included in Appendices I, II or III.

2. The provisions of the present Convention shall
in no way affect the provisions of any domestic
measures or the obligations of Parties deriving from
any treaty, convention, or international agreement
relating to other aspects of trade, taking, possession,
or transport of specimens which is in force or sub-
sequently may enter into force for any Party in-
cluding any measure pertaining to the Customs,
public health, veterinary or plant quarantine fields.

3. The provisions of the present Convention shall
in no way affect the provisions of, or the obligations
deriving from, any treaty, convention or interna-
tional agreement concluded or which may be con-
cluded between States creating a union or regional
trade agreement establishing or maintaining a com-
mon external customs control and removing customs
control between the parties thereto insofar as they
relate to trade among the States members of that
union or agrreement.

4. A State party to the present Convention, which
is also a party to any other treaty, convention or
international agrreement which is in force at the
time of the coming into force of the present Con-
vention and under the provisions of which protection
is afforded to marine species included in Appendix
II, shall be relieved of the obligations imposed on it
under the provisions of the present Convention with
respect to trade in specimens of species included
in Appendix II that are taken by ships registered
in that State and in accordance with the provisions
of such other treaty, convention or international
agreement.

5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles III,
IV and V, any export of a specimen taken in ac-
cordance with paragraph 4 of this Article shall only
require a certificate from a Management Authority
of the State of introduction to the effect that the
specimen was taken in accordance with the provi-
sions of the other treaty, convention or international
agfreement in question.

6. Nothing in the present Convention shall preju-

dice the codification and development of the law of
the sea by the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea convened pursuant to Resolution
2750 C (XXV) of the General Assembly of the
United Nations nor the present or future claims and
legal views of any State concerning the law of the
sea and the nature and extent of coastal and flag
State jurisdiction.

Article XV
Amendments to Appendices I and II

1. The following provisions shall apply in relation
to amendments to Appendices I and II at meetings
of the Conference of the Parties:

(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to
Appendix I or II for consideration at the next
meeting. The text of the proposed amendment shall
be communicated to the Secretariat at least 150
days before the meeting. The Secretariat shall con-
sult the other Parties and interested bodies on the
amendment in accordance with the provisions of
sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of this
Article and shall communicate the response to all
Parties not later than 30 days before the meeting.

(b) Amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds
majority of Parties present and voting. For these
purposes "Parties present and voting" means Parties
present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.
Parties abstaining from voting shall not be counted
among the two-thirds required for adopting an
amendment.

(c) Amendments adopted at a meeting shall enter
into force 90 days after that meeting for all Parties
except those which make a reservation in accordance
with paragraph 3 of this Article.

2. The following provisions shall apply in rela-
tion to amendments to Appendices I and II between
meetings of the Conference of the Parties:

(a) Any Party may propose an amendment to
Appendix I or II for consideration between meet-
ings by the postal procedures set forth in this
paragraph.

(b) For marine species, the Secretariat shall,
upon receiving the text of the proposed amendment,
immediately communicate it to the Parties. It shall
also consult inter-governmental bodies having a
function in relation to those species especially with
a view to obtaining scientific data these bodies may
be able to provide and to ensuring coordination with
any conservation measures enforced by such bodies.
The Secretariat shall communicate the views ex-
pressed and data provided by these bodies and its
own findings and recommendations to the Parties
as soon as possible.

(c) For species other than marine species, the
Secretariat shall, upon receiving the text of the
proposed amendment, immediately communicate it
to the Parties, and, as soon as possible thereafter,
its own recommendations.

(d) Any Party may, within 60 days of the date

May 14, 1973

625

on which the Secretariat communicated its recom-
mendations to the Parties under sub-parag-raphs (b)
or (c) of this paragraph, transmit to the Secre-
tariat any comments on the proposed amendment
together with any relevant scientific data and
information.

(e) The Secretariat shall communicate the replies
received together with its own recommendations to
the Parties as soon as possible.

(f) If no objection to the proposed amendment is
received by the Secretariat within 30 days of the
date the replies and recommendations were com-
municated under the provisions of sub-paragraph
(e) of this paragraph, the amendment shall enter
into force 90 days later for all Parties except those
which make a reservation in accordance with para-
graph 3 of this Article.

(g) If an objection by any Party is received by
the Secretariat, the proposed amendment shall be
submitted to a postal vote in accordance with the
provisions of sub-paragraphs (h), (i) and (j) of
this paragraph.

(h) The Secretariat shall notify the Parties that
notification of objection has been received.

(i) Unless the Secretariat receives the votes for,
against or in abstention from at least one-half of the
Parties within 60 days of the date of notification
under sub-paragraph (h) of this paragraph, the
proposed amendment shall be referred to the next
meeting of the Conference for further consideration.

(j) Provided that votes are received from one-
half of the Parties, the amendment shall be adopted
by a two-thirds majority of Parties casting an
affirmative or negative vote.

(k) The Secretariat shall notify all Parties of the
result of the vote.

(1) If the proposed amendment is adopted it shall
enter into force 90 days after the date of the notifi-
cation by the Secretariat of its acceptance for all
Parties except those which make a reservation in
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.

3. During the period of 90 days provided for by
sub-paragraph (c) of paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph
(1) of paragraph 2 of this Article any Party may by
notification in writing to the Depositary Govern-
ment make a reservation with respect to the amend-
ment. Until such reservation is withdrawn the Party
shall be treated as a State not a party to the present
Convention with respect to trade in the species
concerned.

Article XVI
Appendix III and Amendments thereto

1. Any party may at any time submit to the
Secretariat a list of species which it identifies as
being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction
for the purpose mentioned in paragraph 3 of Ar-
ticle II. Appendix III shall include the names of the
Parties submitting the species for inclusion therein,
the scientific names of the species so submitted, and

any parts or derivatives of the animals or plants
concerned that are specified in relation to the species
for the purposes of sub-paragraph (b) of Article I.

2. Each list submitted under the provisions of
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be communicated
to the Parties by the Secretariat as soon as possible
after receiving it. The list shall take effect as part
of Appendix III 90 days after the date of such
communication. At any time after the communica-
tion of such list, any Party may by notification in
writing to the Depositary Government enter a reser-
vation with respect to any species or any parts or
derivatives, and until such reservation is withdrawn,
the State shall be treated as a State not a Party to
the present Convention with respect to trade in the
species or part or derivative concerned.

3. A Party which has submitted a species for in-
clusion in Appendix III may withdraw it at any time
by notification to the Secretariat which shall com-
municate the withdrawal to all Parties. The with-
drawal shall take effect 30 days after the date of
such communication.

4. Any Party submitting a list under the provi-
sions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall submit to
the Secretariat a copy of all domestic laws and regu-
lations applicable to the protection of such species,
together with any interpretations which the Party
may deem appropriate or the Secretariat may re-
quest. The Party shall, for as long as the species in
question is included in Appendix III, submit any
amendments of such laws and regulations or any
new interpretations as they are adopted.

Article XVII
Am,endm,ent of the Convention

1. An extraordinary meeting of the Conference
of the Parties shall be convened by the Secretariat
on the written request of at least one-third of the
Parties to consider and adopt amendments to the
present Convention. Such amendments shall be
adopted by a two-thirds majority of Parties present
and voting. For these purposes "Parties present and
voting" means Parties present and casting an affirm-
ative or negative vote. Parties abstaining from
voting shall not be counted among the two-thirds
required for adopting an amendment.

2. The text of any proposed amendment shall be
communicated by the Secretariat to all Parties at
least 90 days before the meeting.

3. An amendment shall enter into force for the
Parties which have accepted it 60 days after two-
thirds of the Parties have deposited an instrument
of acceptance of the amendment with the Depositary
Government. Thereafter, the amendment shall enter
into force for any other Party 60 days after that
Party deposits its instrument of acceptance of the
amendment.

Article XVIII
Resolution of Disputes
1. Any dispute which may arise between two or

626

Department of Stale Bulletin

more Parties with rospoct to the interpretation or
appliration of the provisions of the present Con-
vention shall be subject to negrotiation between the
Parties involved in the dispute.

2. If the dispute cannot be resolved in accordance
with paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties may,
by mutual consent, submit the dispute to arbitration,
in particular that of the Permanent Court of Arbi-
tration at The Hague, and the Parties submitting:
the dispute shall be bound by the arbitral decision.

Article XIX
Signature

The present Convention shall be open for signa-
ture at Washington until 30th April 1973 and there-
after at Berne until 31st December 1974.

Article XX
Ratification, Acceptance, Approval

The present Convention shall be subject to rati-
fication, acceptance or approval. Instruments of
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be depos-
ited with the Government of the Swiss Confederation
which shall be the Depositary Government.

Article XXI
Accession

The present Convention shall be open indefinitely
for accession. Instruments of accession shall be de-
posited with the Depositary Government.

Article XXII
Entry into Force

1. The present Convention shall enter into force
90 days after the date of deposit of the tenth in-
strument of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, with the Depositary Government.

2. For each State which ratifies, accepts or ap-
proves the present Convention or accedes thereto
after the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratifi-
cation, acceptance, approval or accession, the pres-
ent Convention shall enter into force 90 days after
the deposit by such State of its instrument of rati-
fication, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article XXIII
Reservations

1. The provisions of the present Convention shall
not be subject to general reservations. Specific res-
ervations may be entered in accordance with the
provisions of this Article and Articles XV and XVI.

2. Any State may, on depositing its instrument of
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, enter
a specific reservation with regard to:

(a) any species included in Appendix I, II or III;
or

(b) any parts or derivatives specified in relation
to a species included in Appendix III.

3. Until a Party withdraws its reservation entered
under the provisions of this Article, it shall be
treated as a State not a party to the present Con-
vention with respect to trade in the particular
species or parts or derivatives specified in such
resei-vation.

Article XXIV

Denunciation

Any Party may denounce the present Convention
by written notification to the Depositary Govern-
ment at any time. The denunciation shall take effect
twelve months after the Depositary Government has
received the notification.

Article XXV
Depositary

1. The original of the present Convention, in the
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish lan-
guages, each version being equally authentic, shall
be deposited with the Depositary Government, which
shall transmit certified copies thereof to all States
that have signed it or deposited instruments of
accession to it.

2. The Depositary Government shall inform all
signatory and acceding States and the Secretariat
of signatures, deposit of instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval or accession, entry into force of
the present Convention, amendments thereto, entry
and withdrawal of reservations and notifications of
denunciation.

3. As soon as the present Convention enters into
force, a certified copy thereof shall be transmitted
by the Depositary Government to the Secretariat of
the United Nations for registration and publication
in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of
the United Nations.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipoten-
tiaries, being duly authorized to that effect, have
signed the present Convention.

Done at Washington this third day of March, One
Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-three.

May 14, 1973

627

THE CONGRESS

Senate Asked To Approve Convention
on Trade in Endangered Species

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON'

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith, for the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
signed at Washington on March 3, 1973. The
report of the Department of State is en-
closed for the information of the Senate.
This Convention is designed to establish a
system by which States may strictly control
the international trade in specimens of spe-
cies in danger of becoming extinct and moni-
tor the trade in specimens of species which,
because of present or potential trade in them,
might be expected to become endangered.

The international community has realized
that steps must be taken to halt the rapid
depletion of wildlife. The present Conven-
tion constitutes a major step in this direc-
tion. I strongly recommend that the Senate
give prompt consideration to this Convention
and consent to its ratification.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, April 13, 1973.

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE =

Department of State,
Waiihington, April 5, 1973.
The President,
The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to you
the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora. I recom-
mend that the Convention be transmitted to the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Convention vras. adopted by the Plenipoten-
tiary Conference to Conclude an International Con-

vention on Trade in Certain Species of Wildlife,
which met at Washington February 12-March 2,
1973. The United States Congress in 1969 had called
for the convening of a Conference (Public Law 91-
135, Sec. 5(b), (c)), with the intention that a con-
vention such as this be concluded. Eighty countries
participated in the Conference. On March 3, 1973
the Convention was opened for signature at Wash-
ington. After remaining open for signature at
Washington until April 30, 1973, the Convention
will be open for signature at Bern by the Depositary
Government until December 31, 1974 and thereafter
will be open for accession indefinitely. The Conven-
tion will enter into force ninety days after the date
of deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification or
accession.

The objective of the Convention is to establish an
effective system for regulating the international
trade in specimens of species which are or may be in
danger of becoming extinct as a result of that trade.

As used in this Convention, the term "specimen"
includes plants or animals, whether dead or alive,
and readily recognizable or listed parts or deriva-
tives thereof, and "species" means any species, sub-
species, or geographically separate population
thereof.

This Convention is a culmination of efforts begin-
ning with United States initiatives in 1961 and 1
consequently such a convention was proposed at the '
Eighth General Assembly of the International Union i
for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources (lUCN) in 1963. Formal drafts were cir-
culated by lUCN beginning in 1967. At Stockholm
in June 1972 the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment recommended that a pleni-
potentiary conference be held as soon as possible
to prepare and adopt a convention on export, import
and transit of certain species of wild animals and
plants. After preliminary discussions in July 1972
involving the United States, lUCN and Kenya, all ,'
of which were authors of proposed drafts of this
Convention, a working paper was developed and
circulated along with invitations from the United
States Government to attend a Plenipotentiary Con-
ference to Conclude an International Convention on !
Trade of Certain Species of Wildlife to be held in ;
Washington.

The protection of an endangered species of plants ;
or animals commences under the present Convention <
when it is listed in one of the Appendices of the
Convention. Only species which are or may be af-
fected by international trade are within the purview |
of this Convention. By agreement of the parties
species are included in Appendix I or II depending '.
on the extent to which the species is endangered or ;
whether, though the species not necessarily now
threatened, some regulation is required in order to i

^ Transmitted on Apr. 13 (White House press re-
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. H, 93d Cong., 1st sess.
= S. Ex. H, 93d Cong., 1st sess.

628

Department of State Bulletin

achieve the objectives of this Convention. In addi-
tion, any State party to this Convention may include
in Appendix III any species which that State iden-
tifies as beinp subject to regulation within its juris-
diction for the purposes of preventinp or restricting
exploitation and as needing the cooperation of other
parties in the control of trade. Any State party to
this Convention may reserve specifically with respect
to any species included in Appendix I, II or III and
until such reservation is withdrawn, be treated as a
non-party to this Convention with respect to trade
in specimens of that species.

Article III sets out the procedures for regrulation
of trade in specimens of species included in Ap-
pendix I, such trade being authorized only in excep-
tional circumstances. A permit system, utilizing
both export and import licenses, set out in this
Article requires for such trade that the exporting
State and the importing State each certify that
specified criteria have been met in order to assure
that survival of these species is not further endan-
gered. There are also permit requirements for re-
export of specimens of species included in Appendix
I.

Article IV sets out a permit system utilizing ex-
port licenses for specimens of species included in
Appendix II. This allows the States where such
species are found to monitor exports from their
territories and, if necessary, take measures to limit
these exports. Re-exports are also covered in this
Article.

The trade in specimens of species included in
Appendix III requires export permits from the State
which has included the species in Appendix III. The
import of specimens of these species from States
other than the State that includes the species in
Appendix III requires prior presentation of a cer-
tificate of origin or, in the case of re-export, a certif-
icate from the State of re-export.

This Convention also controls trade in specimens
of endangered species introduced from the sea. The
introduction from the sea is itself treated as im-
portation for the purposes of this Convention and
can occur only after certification by the State of
introduction that certain specified criteria have been
met. There is an exception for a State party to this
Convention which is also party to any other treaty,
convention or international agreement, in force at
the time of the coming into force of the present
Convention and under the provisions of which pro-
tection is afforded to marine species included in Ap-
pendix II. With respect to Appendix II species so
protected, such State is relieved of the obligations
imposed on it by this Convention insofar as speci-
mens of those species are taken by ships registered
in that State and in accordance with the provisions
of such other treaty, convention or international
agreement.

Provision is made for amendment of the Appen-
dices by a mail vote or a meeting of a Conference
of the Parties, which meeting will occur at least

once every two years after entry into force of the
present Convention. Provision is also made for
anienilmcnt of the Convention itself at an ex-
traordinary meeting of the Conference called for
that purpose.

The Conference invited the United Nations En-
vironmental Progrramme to assume Secretariat re-
sponsibilities and it is expected that the Programme
will agree to do so. If the Programme declines, the
Depositary Government will be responsible for per-
formance of the functions until the Contracting
Parties can agree upon a different arrangement.

During the preparatory work on this Convention,
the Department of the Interior prepared a prelim-
inary draft environmental impact statement in Jan-
uary 1973 which addressed itself to the Convention
as represented in the working paper. In compliance
with the implementing guidelines under Section
102(2) (3) of PL 91-190, The National Environ-
mental Policy Act, the Department of the Interior
is revising the preliminary draft to take into account
the provisions which finally evolved into the present
Convention. Comments are being solicited from all
concerned Federal agencies.

The convention has been welcomed by conservation
organizations, and its ratification is favored by all
interested agencies of the Executive Branch.

It is hoped that the Senate at an early date will
give its advice and consent to ratification of the
Convention.

Respectfully submitted.

William P. Rogers.

World Heritage Convention
Transmitted to the Senate

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON'

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith the Convention concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, done at Paris on November 23,
1972. I transmit also, for the information of
the Senate, the report from the Department
of State with respect to the Convention.

This Convention creates international ma-
chinery for the identification and protection
of natural and cultural areas of outstanding

'Transmitted on Mar. 28 (White House press
release) ; also printed as S. Ex. F, 93d Cong., 1st
sess., which includes the text of the convention.

May 14, 1973

629

universal value which constitute the common
heritage of mankind. For this purpose, the
Convention establishes a World Heritage
Committee to develop and maintain lists of
areas of outstanding importance and a World
Heritage Fund to provide international as-
sistance for the protection and conservation
of these areas.

While the Convention places basic reliance
on the resources and efforts of the States
within whose territory these natural and
cultural sites are located, it would also pro-
vide a means of assisting States which have
insufficient resources or expertise m the
protection of areas for the benefit of all

mankind.

I therefore recommend that the Senate give
early and favorable consideration to the
Convention submitted herewith and give its
advice and consent subject to a declaration
for which provision is made under Arti-
cle 16(2), as explained in the report from
the Department of State.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, March 28, 1973

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE =

Department of State,
Washiyigton, March 20, 1973.

The President,
The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to
you, with a recommendation for transmission to the
Senate for advice and consent to ratification, the
Convention concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, done at Pans,
November 23, 1972. The Secretary of the Interior
and the Chairman of the Council on Environmental
Quality concur in this recommendation.

In its final foi-m, the Convention represents the
fulfillment of a proposal contained in your message
of February 8, 1971, in which you directed "the
Secretary of the Interior, in coordination with
the Council on Environmental Quality, and under
the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of
State, to develop initiatives for presentation in ap-
propriate international forums to further the
objective of a World Heritage Trust.'"

The Convention was negotiated under the auspices
of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The Sixteenth

Session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1970
entrusted the Director-General of UNESCO with
the task of drafting a convention for the protection
of monuments and cultural sites of universal value.
Pursuant to this decision, the UNESCO Secretariat
produced and circulated to UNESCO Member States ;
a draft convention for this purpose, and, after
receiving comments from a number of States,
circulated a revised draft for consideration by a i
Special Committee of Experts in April 1972. ,

From the point of view of the United States these
drafts were not entirely satisfactory, particularly |
with regard to their failure to make adequate pro- ,
vision for the protection of natural areas of |
universal value. Accordingly, prior to the meeting ,
of the Special Committee of Experts, the United ;
States delegation tabled a new draft. This draft, |
among other things, provided that both natural and :|
cultural areas be covered on an equal basis, that a ij
World Heritage Register be established to give i
recognition to such cultural sites and natural areas J
of outstanding universal value, that a World ■
Heritage Board be created to draw up the Register ,
and to administer international assistance for sites
and areas on the Register, that the expertise of \
non-governmental organizations such as the Inter-
national Council on Monuments and Sites (ICO
MOS) and the International Union for the Conser-
vation of Nature and Natural Resources (lUCN),
be utilized by the Committee and that a World
Heritage Fund be created from voluntary contribu-
tions to provide international assistance for the
protection of the natural and cultural areas m the
Register, whether or not in immediate danger.

The Special Committee of Experts adopted a
revised Draft Convention which in almost all im-
portant respects accommodated these United States
positions. This Draft Convention was referred to
the UNESCO General Conference which met from
October 17 to November 21, 1972. In the interim,
it was overwhelmingly endorsed by the U.N. Con-
ference on the Human Environment held in Stock-
holm in June 1972. On November 16, the UNESCO
General Conference adopted the Convention.

The Convention places with the Parties the
primary responsibility of taking appropriate actions
to restore and preserve cultural sites and natural
areas within their own territories which may have
universal significance to mankind, and to develop
the scientific and financial resources necessary to
protect them from dangers of any sort. The Con-
vention further provides for a World Heritage
Committee to be established within the UNESCO
framework, to be composed of representatives of a
number of the Parties, which would develop criteria
and compile a World Heritage List of cultural and

= S Ex. F, 93d Cong., 1st sess.

'For excerpts from President Nixon's message
to the Congress on Feb. 8, 1971, see Bulletin of
Mar. 1, 1971, p. 253.

630

Department of State Bulletir

natural sites of universal value, drawn from inven-
tories submitted by Parties, and a List of World
Heritage in Danger of those sites which require
major assistance to avert immediate man-made or
natural threats.

The Convention establishes a World Heritage
Fund to be utilized by the World Heritage Com-
mittee to provide international assistance for the
protection or rehabilitation of sites on the World
Heritage List. Article 16 of the Convention provides
for both voluntary and compulsory contributions by
Parties to the Fund, but permits each Party, at the
time of ratification, to declare whether it will accept
any obligation to make compulsory contributions.

The World Heritage Committee would be assisted
in its work by a secretariat appointed by the

1 Director-General of UNESCO, and by such non-
governmental expert bodies as the International
Centre for the Study of the Preservation and the

, Restoration of Cultural Property (the Rome

I Centre), the International Council of Monuments
and Sites (ICOMOS) and the International Union
for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources

I (lUCN).

, The Convention thus establishes a regular

' mechanism for identifying and protecting areas of
universal importance to the heritage of mankind,
and a source of funding for assistance in the work
which must be done to protect and conserve these
areas. The Convention should prove particularly
critical with regard to those States which do not
have the resources and expertise necessary to pro-
tect sites within their territories, or which have
not become sufficiently aware of the importance of

, these sites or the character of natural or man-made

.threats to them.

An article-by-article analysis setting forth the
details of the Convention is enclosed.

I recommend that the Senate give advice and

iConsent to ratification of the Convention subject to
a declaration under Article 16(2) that the United
States shall not be bound by the provisions of
Article 16(1), which require compulsory contribu-
tions to the World Heritage Fund in amounts de-
termined by the Parties meeting in general
assembly. Such compulsory contributions, as limited
by Article 16, are unlikely to provide anything
more than a small portion of the funds necessary

|to carry out this work, and it is better to rely on
voluntary contributions from States and private
bodies and individuals for this purpose.
I This Convention is of great importance to the
United States and the world community, and repre-
.sents an important step forward in the identification,
protection, conservation and transmission to future
generations of the natural and cultural heritage of
mankind. I hope that the Senate will consider and
approve the Convention at an early date.
I Respectfully submitted.

William P. Rogers.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Anu'ininient of article VI of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.'
Acceptattce deposited: El Salvador, April 24, 1973.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1968, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Headquar-
ters, New York, March 18 through March 31, 1968.
Entered into force December 30, 1968. TIAS 6584.
Ratification deposited: Italy, March 21, 1973.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendixes.
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.'
Signatures: Republic of China, Sudan, April 27,
1973.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964; for the United States December 13,
1972. TIAS 7502.

Ratifications deposited: Central African Republic,
March 19, 1973; Colombia, April 5, 1973.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplo-
matic relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.
Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United
States December 13, 1972.

Ratification deposited: Central African Republic,
March 19, 1973.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load

linos, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at

London October 12, 1971.'

Arciptnnce deposited: Tunisia, April 3, 1973.

Safety at Sec

Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London November 30, 1966.'

Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 28,
1973.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London October 25, 1967.'

Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 28,
1973.

' Not in force.

May 14, 1973

631

Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London November 26, 1968.'

Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 28,
1973.
Amendments to the international convention for the

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted

at London October 21, 1969."

Acceptances deposited: Czechoslovakia, March 28,
1973 ; Viet-Nam, March 22, 1973.

Slave Trade

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery,
as amended. Done at Geneva September 25, 1926.
Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United
States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183; TIAS 3532.
Notification of succession : Zambia, March 26,
1973.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Done at Wash-
ington March 29, 1971. Entered into force June 18,
1971, with respect to certain provisions, July 1,
1971, with respect to other provisions; for the
United States July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.
Ratification of the Wheat Trade Convention de-
posited: Belgium, April 27, 1973; Luxembourg,
April 25, 1973.
Ratification of the Food Aid Convention depos-
ited: Belgium, April 27, 1973; Luxembourg,
April 25, 1973.

BILATERAL

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement relating to travel group charters and
advance booking charters, with memorandum of
understanding. Effected by exchange of letters at
Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godesberg April 13, 1973.
Entered into force April 13, 1973.

Korea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
relating to the agreement of March 25, 1967
(TIAS 6272). Signed at Seoul April 12, 1973.
Entered into force April 12, 1973.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to the expanded use of Ascen-
sion Island. Effected by exchange of notes at
London March 30, 1973. Entered into force March
30, 1973.

" Not in force.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 23 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 95
of April 2 and 112 of April 16.

No. Date Subject

116 4/23 Rogers: Overseas Press Club,

New York.

117 4/24 Note verbale circulated to mem-

bers of the International Con-
ference on Viet-Nam.

*118 4/25 Study Group 6 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for the Inter-
national Radio Consultative
Committee (CCIR), May 11.

*119 4/25 Study Group 4 of the U.S. Na-
tional Committee for CCIR,
May 16.

*120 4/25 Study Group CMTT of the U.S.
National Committee for CCIR,
May 23.

*121 4/26 Program for official visit to
Washington of Willy Brandt,
Chancellor of the Federal Re-
public of Germany.

*121A 4/27 Addendum to itinerary of Chan-
cellor Brandt.

tl22 4/27 Casey: East- West Trade Con-
ference, University of Georgia
Law School.

tl23 4/28 Brower: Regional Conference of
American Society of Interna-
tional Law, Denver.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

632

Department of State Builetlnl

INDEX Man H. 197.i Vol. LXVIII, No. 1768

Bia. The Npcossiiy lor t>ti-pn|rth in an Era of
Negotiations (Ropprs) 589

snada. United States and Canada Discuss
Fisheries Problems 606

on^ess

enate Asked To Approve Convention on Trade
in Endangered Species (Nixon, Rogers) . . 628

l^orld Heritage Convention Transmitted to the
Senate (Nixon, Rogers) 629

conomic Affairs

Jnited States and Canada Discuss Fisheries

Problems 606

The Year of Europe (Kissinger) 593

lucational and Cultural Affairs. Dr. Samuelson
Tours East Asia Under Lincoln Lectureships 598

Snvironment

International Conference Concludes Convention
on Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife
(Nixon, Morton, Train, U.S. delegation re-
port, excerpts from final act of conference,

text of convention) 608

enatc Asked To Approve Convention on Trade
in Endangered Species (Nixon, Rogers) . . 628

/orld Heritage Convention Transmitted to the
Senate (Nixon, Rogers) 629

■rope

The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Ne-
gotiations (Rogers) 589

The Year of Europe (Kissinger) 593

international Organizations and Conferences
jternational Conference Concludes Convention
on Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife
(Nixon, Morton, Train, U.S. delegation re-
port, excerpts from final act of conference,

text of convention) 608

rime Minister Andreotti of Italy Visits the
United States (Andreotti, Nixon) .... 603

iljr. Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy Visits

the United States (Andreotti, Nixon) ... 603

ipan. The Year of Europe (Kissinger) . . . 593

Military .\ITairs

The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Ne-
gotiations (Rogers) 589

The Year of Europe (Kissinger) 593

Narcotics Control. .Mr. Pollner Named U.S.
Candidate for U.N. Narcotics Control Board 607

Presidential Documents

International Conference Concludes Convention

on Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife . 608
Prime Minister Andreotti of Italy Visits the

United States " 603

Senate Asked To -Approve Convention on Trade

in Endangered Species 628

World Heritage Convention Transmitted to the

Senate fi2f»

Treaty Information

Current Actions 631

International Conference Concludes Convention
on Trade in Endangered Species of Wildlife
(Nixon, Morton, Train, U.S. delegation re-
port, excerpts from final act of conference,
text of convention) 608

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Trade
in Endangered Species (Nixon, Rogers) . . 628

World Heritage Convention Transmitted to the
Senate (Nixon, Rogers) 629

United Nations. Mr. Pollner Named U.S. Candi-
date for U.N. Narcotics Control Board . . 607

Viet-Nam. U.S. Replies to D.R.V. Charges of
Violations of Viet-Nam Cease-Fire (not ver-

bale to participants in Intirn.Ttinnnl Crmfpr-

ence on Viet-Nam) . . '99

Name Index

Andreotti, Giulio 603

Kissinger, Henry A 593

Morton, Rogers C. B 608

Nixon, President 603, 608, 628, 629

Pollner, .Martin R 607

Rogers, Secretary 589, 628, 629

Train, Russell E 608

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s

i>?//?69

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volnmr \X\\\\

No. 1769

Mav 21, 1973

SECRETARY ROGERS DISCUSSES SIX CONCERNS

OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Statement Before the Senate Committer nt} Foreign Relatioxfi (joJ

PROSPECTS AND POLICY ON EAST-WEST TRADE
Address by Under Secretary Casey 638

INTERNATIONAL LAW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY
Address by Acting Legal Adviser Brower 644

U.S. OPPOSES MIDDLE EAST VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM

Statements by Ambassador Scali

and Text of U.y. Secunty Council Resolution 656

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

Ut<

THE OffARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Sy the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington. D.C. 20402
PRICE:
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29, foreign $36.25
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29. 1971).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

VOU LXVIII, No. 1769
May 21, 1973

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly pubUeation issued by the
Omee of Media Services, Bureau ot
Public Affairs, provides the public ani
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of US. foreign relations anA
on the work of the Department ani
the Foreign Service. i

The BULLETIN includes seleetei
press releases on foreign policy, issuei
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements, addresses,
and news conferences of the President
and the Secretary of State and othei
officers of the Department, as well ai
special articles on various phases of
international affairs and the functionat
of the Department. Information is in-
eluded concerning treaties and inter",
national agreements to wfdch tlie
United States is or may become t
party and on treaties of general inter
national interest.
PubUcations of the Department oi
State, United Nations documents, am
legislative material in the field at
international relations are also listei

1,

Secretary Rogers Discusses Six Concerns
of American Foreign Policy

Statement by Secretary Rogers'

Under Secretary [Curtis W.] Tarr and my
other colleagues in the Department have al-
ready provided you with our detailed views
on our budget. As you know, the Department
of State has the smallest total budgetary re-
quirements of any Cabinet-level Department.
Over the past decade, in the face of ever-
increasing demands upon our diplomatic re-
sources, we have reduced the number of our
personnel by over 10 percent. For this coming
fi.'^cal year we are requesting authorization to
lire an additional 151 personnel. Ninety of
these are to meet the growing workload in
such areas covered by statutory requirements
as consular services to our citizens overseas.
Most of the rest are required for the major
trade negotiations beginning this fall.

We are requesting authorization for appro-
priations of $578 million. This increase of
$47 million over the current fiscal year is
primarily to meet statutory and mandatory
cost appreciation such as overseas wages and
prices, contributions to the assessed budgets
of international organizations, salary adjust-
ments, and increased passport and consular
workloads. These items comprise over 80
percent of the requested increase. I believe
that both our personnel and budgetary re-
quests are the minimum necessary to ade-
quately support our dii)lomatic establishment
and foreign policy goals.

These policies are comprehensively set
foi-th in my third annual report to the Con-
gress, which you recently received.^ In that
report I discuss the major progress we have
made in the past year toward President
Nixon's goal of moving the world from con-
frontation to negotiation. We substantially
transformed our relations with our adver-
saries, we signed a historic arms limitation
agreement with the Soviet Union, we con-
cluded an agreement on access to Berlin,
and we negotiated a peace agreement in
Viet-Nam.

The foundation for the generation of peace
President Nixon is seeking has been laid.
Nineteen seventy-three therefore will be a
year of building on that foundation. I have
outlined in my rejiort the concrete objectives
we will be pursuing in 1973 as we seek to
build the framework of international rela-
tions for the rest of the century.

Let me focus this morning on six areas of
current concern to both the Congi-ess and the
administration.

Developments in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia developments have been
disappointing in the last few weeks. We are
greatly concerned over the I'epeated and
serious violations of the Viet-Nam peace
agreement by the Communist side, and we

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on Apr. .30 (press release 124). The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

'United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report
of the Secretary of State (Department of State
publication 8699) ; for Secretary Rogers' letter of
transmittal and introductory comment, see BULLETIN
of May 7, 1973, p. 545.

May 21, 1973

633

f

have communicated these concerns very
clearly to the authorities in Hanoi. Earlier
this month, President Nixon and President
Thieu issued a joint communique at San Cle-
mente expressing these concerns. Further,
we have been explicit in informing the North
Vietnamese that any reconstruction assist-
ance that we might provide depends on their
observing the terms of the agreement. Most
recently we have taken additional steps to
emphasize our concerns to Hanoi — for ex-
ample, the Department's note of April 20
citing violations of the agreement, the sus-
pension of mine-clearing operations, and the
return to Washington of our chief delegate to
the Joint Economic Commission meetings in
Paris.

The North Vietnamese are violating article
20 of the Viet-Nam agreement by continuing
to station large numbers of troops in Laos
and Cambodia and by conducting military
operations in these countries — including
large-scale logistics movements. The situa-
tion in Laos, nevertheless, has been more
encouraging. Despite Communist stalling,
negotiations continue between the Laotian
Government and the Pathet Lao on the for-
mation of a provisional government and on
the cease-fire protocols. However, on two
brief occasions and at the request of the
Laotian Government, we did reinitiate air
combat support in response to North Viet-
namese attacks. The Cambodian situation
has been the most difficult. Here we have had
to intensify our air combat support, at the
request of the Cambodian Government, due
to heightened military offensives by Com-
munist forces. As you know, the Cambodian
Government unilaterally suspended offensive
operations following the Viet-Nam cease-
fire, and the United States halted its air op-
erations. These activities were resumed only
when the Communist forces launched a
countrywide offensive and repeated their
"total victory," no-compromise position on
negotiations.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, in re-
ply to your query regarding Presidential au-
thority for bombing in Cambodia, I have
with me today a more detailed discussion

which, if agreeable to you, I can place in
the record.'' An encouraging factor in the
Cambodian situation has been the formation
of the new High Political Council. This
Council will run Cambodian affairs on an
emergency basis for the next six months, and
one of its primary tasks is to find a solution
to the present conflict.

We obviously would prefer that steps such
as the combat air support in Cambodia were
unnecessary. However, we did not sign the
Viet-Nam agreement with the thought that
North Viet-Nam could act in clear violation
of the agreement once our troops were with-
drawn. The agreement was intended to end
military warfare in favor of political action.
We seek full implementation of the agreement
— including the provisions on withdrawal of
foreign forces from Laos and Cambodia and
the cessation of infiltration activities. Con-
tinued North Vietnamese violation of article
20, we firmly believe, threatens to vitiate the
premise of the Viet-Nam agreement and
thereby imperils an important element of the
emerging structure of peace in Asia and
elsewhere.

Despite these troubling events of recent
weeks, we continue to be hopeful that a real
peace can be achieved in Indochina. Ambas-
sador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs]
is now meeting with his North Vietnamese
counterpart in Paris to prepare to review the
implementation of the agreement, prepara-
tory, if the meetings go well, to a meeting at
a later date between Dr. Kissinger [Henry
A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security AflFairs] and Le Due Tho.
We remain convinced that the Viet-Nam
agreement provides the framework upon
which a lasting peace can be accomplished
in Indochina. We will continue to do every-
thing we can to bring this about.

Positive Elements in Middle East Situation

In the Middle East the cycle of violence
continues. Each new outbreak adds to the
heavy burden of suspicion, distrust, and

I

' See p. 652.

634

Department of State Bulletin

itred that has frustrated all efforts to get a
inoaninjrful dialogue started. The obstacles
In progress toward an Arab-Israeli settle-
ment are familiar to all of us. But there are
iMisitive elements in the situation as well:

— The cease-fire between Egypt and Israel
resulting from our initiative almost three
years ago is still holding.

— The principal parties to the Arab-Israeli
conflict still adhere to Security Council Reso-
lution 242, the only commonly accepted
framework for a settlement, and say that
they want to keep the doors of diplomacy
open.

— The risks of major-power confrontation
in the area have been sharply reduced over
the past year.

— Largely due to our firm stand, the
Security Council on April 21 passed a resolu-
tion incorporating language that all con-
cerned recognize as a condemnation of
international terrorism. While we abstained
because the resolution was not sufficiently
balanced, we nevertheless recognize it as a
small step forward in getting the interna-
tional community to face up to this serious
problem.

— There is an encouraging measure of
stability in many countries of the area, Jor-
dan being a prime example. On the whole,
there has been an orderly and .stabilizing
evolution of the situation in the important
Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf area. Most
of the states of that region, with our en-
couragement and support, are themselves as-
suming increasing responsibilities for their
development and security.

As I have said before, if there could now
be a cease-fire on inflammatory rhetoric, a
cease-fire on belligerent statements of ulti-
mate and rigid positions, and a cease-fire
from violence of all kinds from whatever
source, I am convinced that progress toward
a permanent solution could be achieved.

Despite the positive elements I have noted,
we find no grounds for complacency in the
present situation and will continue to work
actively for an honorable negotiating process
to bring peace to the Middle East. Realisti-

cally, we continue to think that such a process
should be based on a step-by-step approach
— an approach that could begin, for examjile,
with an interim agreement between Israel
and Egypt for some Israeli withdrawal from
the Suez Canal and a reopening of the canal
by Egypt, as the first steps in a negotiating
process dedicated to a final settlement imple-
menting Resolution 242 in all its parts.

A word is needed to put in jierspective
recent speculation about the relationship
between our Middle East policy and our pro-
jected need for increasing quantities of Mid-
dle Eastern oil. We of course, and certainly
not for reasons of oil alone, seek good rela-
tions with the Arab countries. We also seek
stable conditions in the area in which mu-
tually beneficial producer-consumer relations
can continue to thrive. These goals, far from
indicating a change in our policy as some
have suggested, only highlight the impor-
tance of pursuing our longstanding policy
of working actively for a Middle East peace
settlement, a settlement which will bring
security and justice to the states and peoples
of the area — the Palestinians, the other
Arabs, and the Israelis alike.

Worldwide Political and Economic Cooperation

In my foreign policy report to you, I
stressed that we will be seeking this year
to strengthen economic and political relation-
ships among all the world's industrialized
democratic countries. It is no longer satisfac-
tory to think solely in Asian terms, in Euro-
l)ean terms, or in North American terms. A
substantially higher level of worldwide co-
operation is required among us all — Japan,
Canada, western Europe, Au.stralia, New
Zealand, and the United States. We will be
seeking to bring such cooperation about in
various ways. One will be through more
intensive cooperation in the OECD [Or-
ganization for Economic Coojieration and
Development], the one organization whose
membershiji is closely linked to these states.
Another will be through augmented coopera-
tion at the policy level, including the possi-
bility of a collective consultation by Foreign

May 21, 1973

635

Ministers from all these countries during
the U.N. General Assembly in the fall.

And last week we proposed to our Atlantic
partners a new relationship designed to re-
invigorate shared ideals and common pur-
poses. In this proposal, President Nixon is
urging a joint effort of creativity with our
allies and not an American blueprint for
action. We have set forth some of the goals
which we believe the alliance should set for
itself in the future. But our hope is that the
allies will work with us to develop more
specific concepts and principles before the
President's trip to Europe later this year.

In 1973 we will also be devoting more
attention to Latin America. I will depart
soon on a major visit to a number of Latm
American states in support of closer coop-
eration among us. As the President said m
his message to the OAS, the days of pater-
nalism are gone. What we are now trymg to
do is to bring about cooperative practices
which will be as pragmatic, as equal, and as
global in concept as those we maintain with
western Europe. Thus we will be seeking
this year to strengthen our community of
interest with the states of Latin America
on global as well as hemispheric issues, par-
ticularly supporting the increasing role so
many of them, are playing in world aifairs.

A More Open World Trading Order

Earlier this month President Nixon re-
quested the Congress to give him the tools
necessary to deal with international trade
problems.^ We need congressional action so
that we can negotiate on an equal basis
with our major trading partners and com-
petitors—Canada, Japan, and the European
Community— toward a more open world
trading order and an improved trading
system. The proposed Trade Reform Act
of 1973 contains provisions that would pro-
tect our industries and workers from sud-
den, massive, or unfair disruption by
foreign goods. It would give the President
authority to take counteraction when other

* For President Nixon's message to the Congress
on Apr. 10, see Bulletin of Apr. 30, 1973, p. 513.

states discriminate against us. These pro-
visions are essential to a successful negotia-
tion and we will apply them if necessary.
But in the words of President Nixon,
what we are seeking is "to set in place an
economic structure that will help and not
hinder the world's historic move toward
peace" There are voices in this country
who feel reform should take the form of ,,
retreat, retreat through an attempt to wall
us off from the world economy. I know that I
I do not have to tell the members of this |
committee that such a course would be un- ,
wise unwise because it would inevitably I
lead to a reduction in our own exports— |
and we now send 31 percent of our crops j
and 14 percent of our industrial production ,
abroad— unwise because it would raise
costs at home and damage our economy as
well as that of other nations, and most im-
portantly, unwise because pursuit of eco-
nomic autarky would jeopardize possibilities
for a more peaceful and secure world order.
Developing economic ties with the Com-
munist nations provide a particularly
important incentive for peace. Thus we
propose in the Trade Reform Act to normal-
ize our economic relations with the Soviet
Union by granting them MEN [most-
favored-nation] status.

I am aware of the continued active inter-
est by the Congress in Soviet emigration
practices. I share your deep concern about
this matter both officially and personally.
But I believe it would be unwise to attempt
to link through legislation these two sepa-
rate, unrelated issues. It is not an appro-
priate or effective way to pursue our goals
in regard either to trade or emigration.
We have already witnessed in the past
four years a significant and favorable evo-
lution in Soviet emigration policy. For
Soviet Jews, it has meant that an unprece-
dented 60,000 of them have been able to
emigrate. For over a year the average
monthly level has exceeded 2,500. I know
some of vou are genuinely apprehensive
over the firmness of present Soviet emi-
gration policy, particularly in regard to the
decision to waive totally collection of the
education tax. However, as you already

636

Department of State Bulletin

know, the President lias been assured by
the Soviet Government that the policy on
total waivers is to be continued indefinitely.
He has also been assured that present Soviet
emigration policy, which has permitted the
current level of emig-ration, will also be
continued indefinitely. I am not in a position
to place into the public record the texts of
confidential communications on this subject,
but those assurances are firm.

Maintaining Adequate Defense Programs

Just as there are voices calling for Ameri-
can retreat from the world's economic sys-
tem, there are also voices calling for retreat
from our defense commitments abroad. For
most of the postwar period, international
political and economic stability has been
primarily based upon the U.S. contribution,
upon an acceptance by the United States
of an unequal burden. The whole thrust of
our foreign policy over the past four years
has been to create a stable international
system which is less dependent upon this
American contribution.

We have already gone a long way down
the road toward such a new international
system. But we are not there yet. Given
the tools by this Congress, we are confident
that we can succeed in creating a system
that is stable without being primarily
dependent upon American leadership and
sacrifice. But this must be done without
sacrificing stability, and stability in the
world requires an adequate defense posture
on the part of the United States.

We are all concerned about the costs of
oui- defense. But there is another and
greater concern — that our defense programs
are adequate and appropriate to support
this country's basic interests as we build a
more stable world. The issue is whether

we are maintaining a larger defense than
the protection of these interests requires.
I believe not.

Two years ago, in my first foreign policy
report to the Congress, I expressed the hope
that we could fashion a foreign policy which
would restore a sense of common purpose in
America's approach to world affairs. I be-
lieve that this is now possible. Clearly we
are all seeking a more prosperous and peace-
ful world. But it is equally clear that such a
world cannot be achieved through retreat.
Twice before in this century we thought we
could find refuge from our world I'ole and
responsibilities — with tragic results. Only
continued involvement in international af-
fairs will move us closer to a stable and
productive peace. The support and contribu-
tion of the Congress will be essential for our
hopes to become achievements.

Letters of Credence

Burundi

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Republic of Burundi, Joseph Ndabaniwe,
presented his credentials to President Nixon
on May 1. For texts of the Ambassador's
remarks and the President's reply, see De-
partment of State press release dated May 1.

Federal Republic of Germany

The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Berndt von
Staden, presented his credentials to Presi-
dent Nixon on May 1. For texts of the Am-
bassador's remarks and the President's reply,
see Department of State press release dated
Mav 1.

May 21, 1973

637

Prospects and Policy on East-West Trade

Address by William J. Casey

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs'^

!■

U.S. economic relations with the Soviet
Union, the countries of eastern Europe, and
mainland China are on the threshold of in-
tense and rapid change. After years of cold
war stagnation during which strategic con-
siderations and ideology frustrated the pur-
suit of common economic interest. President
Nixon, in a dramatic series of interrelated
initiatives, set a new environment in which
U.S. economic policies toward Communist
countries can operate to support broader
policies toward these countries and the rest
of the world.

This is a good time to review how far we
have come and what we expect from our
economic relations with the Communist na-
tions.

The United States seeks a normalization
of economic relations with Communist coun-
tries.

We are seeking to build and expand East-
West trade as a pivotal element in a
structure of peace. We see economic inter-
dependence as a great force for peace. We
seek rising economic collaboration to scale
down military competition. We see the build-
ing of living standards bringing into play
an economic equation which will require
scaling down the commitment to arms as it
becomes necessary to expand the commit-
ment to trade and development. We see trade
and all the other strands of economic rela-
tionships as threads with which a structure
of peace can be woven.

In East-West trade, a trade curtain has
existed between China and Russia for 10

' Made before an East-West Trade Conference
at the University of Georgia Law School at Athens,
Ga., on Apr. 27 (press release 122).

years. Japan has had over 10 years of fairly
active experience in trading with China.
Western Europe is far ahead of us in expe-
rience in trading with the state-controlled
economies of eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. The European Community is doing
about five times as much trade as we are
doing with the state-controlled economies.
The differential would be far greater if it
were not for the wheat deal. Thus, in trade
in manufactured goods we are far, far be-
hind the European Community. One of our
primary aims in trade policy is to put our-
selves on an even competitive keel with west-
ern Europe and with Japan in dealing with
state-controlled economies. One of the major
objectives in our economic policy is to go as
far as possible, with due regard to our secu-
rity interests, to eliminate the disadvantages
American business has been under in selling
to the Soviet Union, the eastern European
countries, and mainland China.

Let me speculate a little on the shape
East- West trade will take. The Chinese take
the view that nobody will be permitted to
exploit or develop their resources, but they
are prepared to sell their raw materials.
They are not now prepared to go into debt.
This places severe limitations on our ability
to buy their goods and on their ability to
go into the kind of development projects
that the Soviets seem prepared to entertain ,
in their discussion with Japanese and U.S.
interests on natural gas and in the Occidental-
type fertilizer deal. The Soviets take a
broader view. General Secretary [Leonid L] ,
Brezhnev recently stated there are virtually |
unlimited possibilities for economic coopera- ;
tion. But it appears likely that these possi-

638

Department of State Bulletin

bilities will be outside the traditional pat-
terns of trade. The Soviets take the view
that biiyinji: and sellinp, the traditional forms
of trade, are becoming increasingly less
important. They point out that textiles,
clothing, and other consumer goods make
up a smaller percentage of trade and that
price and other advantages which one coun-
try or another may have in these consumer
goods are fleeting in character. All developed
countries have some access to new tech-
niques. Different countries have different
needs and different types of natural resour-
ces to develop. This presents the opportunity
for development projects along cooperative
lines. Examples are gas companies going in
to build pipelines and liquefaction and ship-
ping facilities. We see French and Italian
companies operating a production line, chem-
ical companies going in with technology and
equipment to utilize local resources in the
production of fertilizer for U.S. and world
markets outside the Soviet Union as well as
inside the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union
points to its natural resources and large
cadres of scientific workers. U.S. firms with
technology-, equipment, and markets have the
opportunity to work on large aggregations
of ores, oil and gas deposits, and great forest
resources. Projects of this kind can con-
tribute to Soviet needs and bring out prod-
ucts that satisfy outside energy and raw
material requirements to the extent neces-
sary to pay for the equipment, the technol-
og>-, the managerial skills, and the risks.
The Soviets seem to be seeking this kind of
economic and commercial cooperation under
long-term arrangements, from 10 to 30
years. The output of these projects can not
only amortize the capital investment in kind
along with a return on capital but also either
satisfy Soviet needs for the product or earn
the foreign exchange in world trade which
the Soviet Union will need to meet its other
economic targets. To play in this league U.S.
companies will have to get together on major
development projects or learn how to barter
their goods for Soviet goods and find ways
to convert the goods in order to eat on world
markets.

Under our system, private business carries
the ball in developing actual transactions
with the state-controlled economies. Let me
spell out the broad policies which this gov-
ernment seeks to develop to facilitate the
operation of development of business in East-
West trade.

Normalization of Economic Relations

Political and economic relations are inex-
tricably intertwined. Recognizing this basic
fact early in his administration. President
Nixon set out first to assure a substantial
degree of stability in political affairs. From
the outset, the guiding principle behind the
normalization of economic relations with
Communist countries has been that eco-
nomic normalization is linked with progress
toward the improvement of political rela-
tions. The pace of advancement in the eco-
nomic sphere thus has been regulated by the
pace of advancement in the political sphere.

I cannot emphasize enough the importance
of this principle. It means that the United
States will initiate and reciprocate along the
entire spectrum of our relations in the in-
terest of building a lasting interdependence
of interests. We will not force the pace in
one area, such as trade relations, in the mere
hope that this will bring on subsequent
progress on political, cultural, or military
matters. We are satisfied with the less
dramatic but more certain step-by-step con-
struction of a balanced structure of rela-
tion.ships.

An objective of our policy is to change the
world view^ of Communist nations from one
of conflicting forces hopelessly locked into
a struggle for survival to one of competing
forces compromising where interests conflict
and cooperating where they coincide. The
economic area is where interests are most
sharply perceived as being mutually bene-
ficial by many Communist leaders at this
point in time. The impressive number of
agreements at and since the Peking and
Moscow summits and the prospects for addi-
tional agreements indicate that the trend
toward negotiation rather than confronta-
tion can become an established pattern.

May 21, 1973

639

I wish to clarify what I mean by economic
normalization, as the concept has such im-
portance for U.S. policy in this era of East-
West trade negotiations. Normalization is
the process of elimination of the barriers
to economic interchange which were con-
structed in the period just after Word
War 11 and during the Korean war. Roughly
speaking, we will have normalized our eco-
nomic relations when our trading relations
are on the same basis now existing between
Communist countries and the rest of the
developed world.

This is a general and imperfect, yet useful,
guide It means the reciprocal extension of
most-favored-nation tariff treatment and
export credit facilities, and the lowering ot
the unique U.S. embargo on the export ot
certain strategic commodities toward inter-
nationally agreed levels. It also means the
establishment of diplomatic relations and
consular arrangements, the settlement of
public and private claims for defaulted debts
and nationalized property, and the estab-
lishment of procedures for the arbitration
of business disputes and for the avoidance
of market disruption. It entails maritime
and civil aviation agreements and business
facilitation arrangements insuring that U.S.
businessmen have access to Socialist markets.
It can mean cooperation in the fields of
science and technology. It can encompass
environmental protection. Instruments such
as trade agreements and joint commissions
which are commonly used as devices to coor-
dinate economic policies in the East-West
trade context will be utilized when it is
clear they will contribute to better economic
relations.

By these standards, we have essentially
normalized relations with Yugoslavia and,
most recently, Poland. We have made great
progress toward this goal over several years
with Romania and, in a whirlwind package
negotiation of issues this year and last, with
the U.S.S.R. Progress toward normaliza-
tion with other countries— Hungary, Czech-
oslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany,
and Mongolia — is somewhere ahead, not too
far we hope.

Changes in World Economic Institutions

Normalization as I have just described it
is a useful guide for policy up to a point, but
what then? We are too accustomed to think-
ing in terms of separate Communist and
capitalist economic worlds bridged tenuously
l)y bilateral arrangements between individ-
ual states. This is a perceptual problem
shared also by most Communist nations.
They have been reluctant to realize that
their policies of economic autarky as indi-
vidual states and as the CEMA [Council for
Economic Mutual Assistance (COMECON)]
trading bloc were counterproductive to then-
own economic interests. There is a world
economic svstem to which all nations must
accommodate to prosper. An increasingly
important objective of U.S. policy, as our
economic relations with Communist states
are normalized, is the encouragement of
stable consumer-oriented societies more fully
integrated into the international trade and
payments system.

The international system itself is under-
going basic change. There is urgent need
for trade and monetary reform in order to
preserve and nurture the historic movement
on a global scale away from confrontation
and toward negotiations in resolving inter-
national differences. Thus, the President is
seeking broad new legislative authority vital
to the United States maintaining the leader-
ship role in the construction of a new inter-
national economic order which reflects
current economic realities.

Only certain Communist countries have
sought active participation in this process
through membership in the foundation insti-
tutions of the international system, the
GATT and the IMF-IBRD [General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade; International
Monetary Fund; International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development]. There is
no reason to expect this situation will alter
in the near future.

In spite of the passive role Communist
nations will play in the construction of the
new international economic order, it is im-
portant that we keep in view the effect new

640

Department of State Bulletin

institutional relationships will have on East-
West trade. The United States will seek to
expand the miiitiiateral economic dialojjiie
with Communist nations in such established
fora as the economic Council of Europe and
in new ones such as the European Security
Conference.

As relations normalize with Communist
states, increasinofly we should be able to
integrate our policies toward them into our
glolial economic strategy'. As a nation we are
committed to reducing barriers which inter-
fere with trade. These obstacles to trade, in
other countries and in the United States,
annually cost us billions of dollars in the in-
efficient use of resources.

The touchstone of our international eco-
nomic policy has been the free trade model.
Increasingly, we will apply the same economic
policy criteria to Communist countries as we
do to the rest of the world. Acting in a
nondiscriminatory manner to Communist
traders, of course we will expect them to
reciprocate in kind.

Bridging the Structural Problems

Structural problems to East-West trade
I exist which are absent between market
economies. There is a role for the U.S.
' Government in bridging them. Private enter-
I prises face obvious problems in doing busi-
; ness with state trading monopolies, and the
' U.S. Government will act to lessen unfair
' advantage.

A good current example is the borrowing
practices of Communist state banks. By
dealing from a monopolistic position and
suppressing vital creditworthiness informa-
tion such as the magnitude, dispersion, and
structure of existing foreign debt, Commu-
ni.st state bankers are often able to obtain
private ciedit at terms which probably
' would not be forthcoming in a normal
market situation. I predict, therefore, that
the U.S. Government will increasingly share
its knowledge of Communist state borrowing
piactices with private enterprise. In the long
run, disclosure of financial information will
insure stable and orderly financial markets

and work to the common advantage of state
and private business.

How far have we come toward normal-
izing economic relations? One measure of
this is the agreements struck which sur-
mount previous obstacles to trade. The im-
pressive negotiating achievements in the past
year are summarized in the International
Economic Report of the President released
this March,-' and I will not repeat them
here. In the longer term, success in normali-
zation will be measured by the quantity and
structure of trade and financial flows. A
major objective of our East-West trade
policy is to substantially increase trade.

Looking backwai'd, the United States in
1928 directed over 2 percent of its total
exports to the U.S.S.R. and to other eastern
European countries excluding East Ger-
many. About one-third of this was machin-
ery and transportation equipment. Under
normal circumstances it is reasonable to
assume that the United States would main-
tain its relative position in the area, yet the
share fell to 0.6 percent in 1969. Our position
only moderately improved by 1971 when the
trade turnover of the area with our free-
world competitors totaled about $20 billion,
more than 30 times our own. In 1972 only
1 percent of total U.S. foreign trade was
with Communist countries whereas most
West European countries conduct 4-5 per-
cent of their trade in this area.

These indications suggest that with a
removal of trade barriers there is a sub-
stantial potential for trade expansion.

It is noteworthy that our exports to the
U.S.S.R. more than tripled, from $162 mil-
lion in 1971 to $547 million in 1972. The
$451 million trade surplus that year with the
U.S.S.R. was the largest for any country. The
end of a 21-year-old embargo on China trade
saw commerce spring to life — in 1972 ex-

' International Economic Report of the President
Together With the Annual Report of the Council
on International Economic Policy; for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Stock
Number 411.5-00028; $2.25 postpaid).

May 21, 1973

641

ports totaling about $60 million, with a
promise of more than doubling in 1973.

With early normalization of trade condi-
tions, U.S. exports to the countries under
consideration could approach the $2 billion
figure in five years. We would expect to con-
tinue to run an export surplus to the area.

Over half of U.S. exports have been in
agricultural goods, and the market for these
is expected to expand, given policies in these
countries to improve consumer welfare. Dra-
matic future gains in exports, however,
should come in machinery and equipment
sectors. This trade will produce jobs and
contribute to the prosperity of important
U.S. industries.

Specific Aspects of Trade Policy

I have discussed policy in general terms
and trade prospects. Now I would like to
deal with specific aspects of trade, financial,
and investment policy that are currently
interesting.

Our Ambassadors have been instructed to
put trade promotion at the top of their list
of priorities. Shortly we will have doubled
the number of State Department employees
serving in commercial positions in the
U.S.S.R., eastern Europe, and China. The
Department of Commerce in Washington has
increased its East-West trade support staff
in the past year by several multiples, and
the State Department is also undergoing
reorganization at home to simultaneously
meet the needs of a substantial negotiating
load and business assistance. In order to an-
ticipate and more efficiently deal with policy
questions as they arise. President Nixon has
created an East-West Trade Policy Com-
mittee under the chairmanship of his princi-
pal economic adviser, George Shultz.

Recent negotiations are indicative of those
we expect to undertake in the area of trade
policy: the reciprocal extension of most-
favored-nation tariff" treatment, Congress
willing; safeguards when necessary to pre-
vent market disruption ; the opening of
consular relations, exchange of government
and private commercial oflices, patent and

copyright agreements, arbitration arrange-
ments, maritime and commercial aviation
agreements, and other arrangements to im-
prove reciprocal commercial access.

There is one important area of trade
policy which is not negotiable at this time,
however: our policy on strategic trade con-
trols. The United States subscribes to the
embargo list maintained and periodically
revised by the international Coordinating
Committee — COCOM, as it is usually called
— whose members are the NATO countries
plus Japan. This strategic control system
is a significant part of our mutual defense
policy. It is designed to restrict the flow of
goods and technology which would make
a significant contribution to the military
potential of any other nation which would
prove detrimental to the national security
of the United States.

It is common sense that we continue these
arrangements but that we be flexible in ad-
justing them to reflect changing conditions.
We are cooperating with other nations in
annual reviews which recently have had the
overall effect of greatly reducing the COCOM
list. In addition, the unilateral U.S. export
control list is being substantially reduced
to bring it much more closely in line with
the COCOM embargo.

Financial and Investment Policy

Financial policy is a key to further East-
West trade expansion. Communist nations as
a group will be net importers of financial
resources in the next decade to support
ambitious development plans. The United
States, as a prospective leading trading
partner and the greatest world financial
power, clearly will play an important East-
West financial role.

With many countries we have already
made good progress in clearing away the
debris of defaulted debts, claims, and other
outstanding financial obligations which nat-
urally have restrained U.S. Government in-
terest in new financing arrangements. The
$800 million lend-lease settlement with the
U.S.S.R. facilitated the opening of Export-

642

Department of State Bulletin \

Import Bank financing of important Soviet-
American development projects. Poland's
interim arrangements with U.S. private
bondholders have influenced the recent ex-
tension of Export-Import Bank credit to
that country.

As of mid-March 1973, Eximbank had an
actual exposure of $547 million to four Com-
munist countries : Yugoslavia, U.S.S.R., Ro-
mania, and Poland. Preliminary commitments
for future lending were even greater.

Exi)ort-Import Bank rates and terms are
competitive with those of other Western
industrial country export credit institutions.

U.S. agricultural exports have been as-
sisted for a longer period of time by the
Commodity Credit Corporation. Outstanding
loans in March were $454 million to the
same group of countries that are eligible for
Eximbank financing. The $750 million CCC
credit arrangement with the Soviet Union
over a three-yeai- period enabled a quantum
jump in U.S. agricultural exports.

The administration is seeking the repeal
of the Johnson Debt Default Act of 1934,
which needlessly restricts private lending to
most Communist nations. One of the Presi-
dent's earliest steps to encourage China
trade was to eliminate the prohibition on
dollar transactions. In these and in other
ways, such as I mentioned earlier, we hope
to strengthen the competitiveness of U.S.
private financial institutions in East-West
trade.

It is understood that U.S. Government and
private export credit institutions will oper-
ate on a businesslike basis. Economic criteria
must predominate in credit decisions.

The Treasury Department is prepared
to negotiate taxation agreements which will
facilitate licensing arrangements for the
exchange of technology and otherwise en-
courage East- West business.

We can learn much from the Japanese
and the Europeans about investment policy.
There are over 500 joint business ventures
in Communist countries with Western partic-
ipants. Very few of them are American.

Japan was one of the first countries to
explore natural resource development proj-
ects in the Soviet Union. In a typical agree-
ment, Japan has provided equipment and
technology for the development of Siberia's
wealth of forest resources and takes pay-
ment in the form of wood chips and pulp.
Japan is discussing vast new projects in
the energy field and in mining.

U.S. firms, as well, are now discussing
large oil and gas development projects with
the Soviets. If one or more is concluded,
U.S. -Soviet trade will move surely toward
the multibillion-dollar level.

A perceived mutuality of interest con-
ceivably could develop between U.S. firms
and the People's Republic of China in the
development of natural resources. This is
a field in which U.S. firms have a compara-
tive advantage.

Several eastern European countries with
long and satisfactory experience with joint
ventures in production and marketing are
now permitting equity investment as a fur-
ther enticement to Western business.

The Overseas Private Investment Corpo-
ration is operating now in Romania and
Yugoslavia in support of U.S. investment
activity. It is unlikely that OPIC programs,
which are geared to investment in less devel-
oped countries, need to be extended to the
more developed northern-tier eastern Euro-
pean countries and the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, I would simply like to re-
iterate that it is U.S. policy to facilitate
and encourage trade with Communist coun-
tries in a broad and comprehensive manner
designed to weave a fabric of peace.

May 21, 1973

643

international Law as an Instrument of National Policy

Address by Charles N. Brower
Acting Legal Adviser '

I am disturbed by the pronounced tend-
ency of our international law fraternity to
bemoan the moribund state of international
law. There appears to be a widespread
presumption that in practice international
rules of law are largely irrelevant to high-
level decisionmaking in governments around
the world and therefore that we have failed.
Since our historical puritan ethic at least
by implication equates failure with sinful-
ness, analysis quickly becomes apologia and
our discussions assume the character of an
expiatory ritual.

I for one, however, believe that our pro-
fession need not act like a timid supplicant
whose very demeanor defies confidence in
his creed. I suggest that international law
today, rather than falling into disuse, is
becoming a more vital force than ever before
in the development of our international rela-
tions. In order better to explain the basis
for this positive outlook, I think it necessary
first to expose the false assumptions on which
our self-deprecating tendencies have been
premised.

In decrying the inefficacy of interna-
tional law we have concentrated too much on
its adjudicatory aspect and, finding an ab-
sence of effective international machinery,
have concluded that international law must
be in sad straits. Speaking conceptually,
however, in.stitutionalized adjudicatory ma-
chinery has a quite diff"erent place in inter-
national law than it does in municipal law.

' Made before a regional conference of the Ameri-
can Society of Intel-national Law at the University
of Denver College of Law at Denver, Colo., on Apr.
28 (press release 123).

644

Nations, more so than private litigants
within a single country, have informal, non-
judicial means of enforcement by virtue of
the fact that their bilateral and multilateral
relations with one another provide a dy-
namic process for the adjustment of their
respective interests, including the satisfac-
tion of legal rights. As our experience of
some hundreds of years has proven, the
absence of a comprehensive and dispositive
system of adjudication does not necessarily
lead to international anarchy. States comply
with law, among other reasons, because it
is politic to do so. Furthermore, domestic
enforcement is heavily devoted to adjustment
of legal disputes between the sovereign and
the governed rather than between private
litigants, and it is precisely these adjust-
ments of legal relations which encompass
a vast majority of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court. There being no international
sovereign, however, there is no international
need of corresponding magnitude for formal-
ized means of redress.

I might say parenthetically that a factor
which tends to compound the gloomy view of
international law is the high rate of unem-
ployment in our chosen field. Very few of
those who style themselves as international
lawyers ever have more than a modest if
even a fleeting chance to practice public
international law. The American Society of
International Law, under whose cosponsor-
ship we are assembled today, has over 5,500
members; yet I doubt that there are even
550 lawyers in the country today substan-
tially engaged in the practice of public
international law, and the vast majority of

Department of State Bulletin

I

them are emiMoyees of government or inter-
national organizations. It is precisely the
lack of a widespread system of adjudication
in this field which accounts in large part
for the dearth of opportunity, particularly
private practice opportunity ; fewer lawsuits
require fewer lawyers. It is natural that a
profession high in numbers relative to oppor-
tunities should exhibit signs of dissatisfac-
tion. If the priesthood consistently e.xceeded
by tenfold the number of parislies available
to be served, one would be inclined to con-
clude that religion was out of style.

Lest there be misunderstanding, I wish
to emphasize that we at the Department of
State shall always be among the first to
promote wider acceptance for the impartial
adjudication of international disputes. Sec-
retary of State Rogers clearly expressed oui-
support for the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ) in his address three years ago
this week on "The Rule of Law and the
Settlement of International Disputes" before
the American Society of International Law,
and we continue to pursue with vigor the
policies outlined in that address.- We reject
the thesis recently advanced by two notable
Canadian authorities (67 A.J.I.L. 229. 235
[1973], "National Jurisdiction and In-
ternational Responsibility: New Canadian
Approaches to International Law," Allan
Gotlieb and Charles Dalfen) to the eff"ect that
the absence of any prospect of international
adjudication actually aids the development
of international law. I only make the point
that we must consider adjudication in per-
spective and not conclude from its relative
absence that international law itself is dead
or even suffering reduced vitality.

It is worth remarking also that utilization
of international litigation and the situation
of the World Court in particular have in
some ways improved during the last few
years. The Court's advisory opinion in the
Namibia case has restored some of its pre-
vious luster, and it appears that judges of
the Court are about to be involved simul-
taneously in a total of five cases. The fact

' For Secretary Rogers' address on Apr. 25, 1970,
see BlLLETlN of May 18, 1970, p. 623.

that two such disputants as India and Paki-
stan can engage in successive litigation,
first the Rann of Kutch arbitration, then the
ICJ appeal relating to the jurisdiction of
the ICAO [International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization] Council, is encouraging. The
action of Belgium, France, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States in
■submitting to the Arbitral Tribunal for Ger-
man External Debts disputes with the
Federal Republic of Germany concerning the
amounts of payments due on the Young
Loan — a matter that has been estimated to
involve up to $14 million for the dollar
tranche alone — is another hopeful sign. Only
time will tell, of course, whether these straws
in the wind foreshadow a greater harvest.

Expansion of the Role of International Law

If we indeed can turn away from our
historical preoccupation with the question
of adjudication, we see that in recent years
the role of international law itself has been
changing and its importance in international
events has swelled. It has graduated from
being a somewhat esoteric discipline incident
to the conduct of international aff"airs to
become an important instrument of national
policy, in the United States and around the
world. This worldwide expansion is abetted
by a growing realization within most govern-
ments that many of the common problems
affecting states can only be solved by inter-
national cooperation. In a number of fields
we in the State Department have found that
the development of international law can
be one of the primary weapons used to
develop an international climate favorable
to the accomplishment of our national aims,
and we are happily participating in this
considerable expansion of the role of inter-
national law.

For example, as your pi'ogram reflects,
the seriousness of drug abuse is well recog-
nized as one of the most critical national
social problems we are facing at the present
time. Because of the international character
of drug production and commerce, it is
clearly impossible to end such abuse through
national measures alone. We have attempted

May 21, 1973

645

to deal with this national crisis, at least in
part, through a substantial effort to broaden
and strengthen international legal provisions
regulating production and traffic in those
-drugs. We have proceeded on the multi-
lateral level, for example, through amend-
ments to the 1961 Single Convention on
Narcotic Drugs and the Convention on Psy-
chotropic Substances and on the bilateral
level through a series of specific agreements
particularly with states which have been the
sources of raw materials for drugs. We have
been able to conclude these agreements, em-
bodied in solemn legal documents, because
other states, too, are increasingly aware of
the dangers which spreading drug abuse
poses to all countries. These international
legal arrangements have already proved
valuable and, hopefully, will be of continuing
significance in reducing the supply of drugs
reaching this country.

Your program also includes a discussion
on terrorism, and I should emphasize here
two projects which are in the forefront of
the international legal struggle against ter-
rorism ; namely, the di'aft Articles on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Diplomatic Agents and Other Inter-
nationally Protected Persons prepared by
the International Law Commission under the
leadership of its American President, Mr.
Richard D. Kearney, and the draft Conven-
tion for the Prevention and Punishment of
Certain Acts of International Terrorism
prepared by the U.S. Government and intro-
duced at the 27th General Assembly of the
United Nations by Secretary of State Rogers.
The forerunner of both of these of course was
the convention on this subject prepared by
the Organization of American States, which
represents a regional approach to this uni-
versal problem.

legal Steps To Protect the Environment

Several other examples are, I think, per-
tinent to drive home the point that inter-
national law is thriving and active as a
national policy instrument. A problem of
profound national as well as international
concern is that of environmental protection.

For example, during the past four years we
have responded to the serious problem of
marine pollution with a series of multilateral
agreements, including: (1) the 1969 Inter-
national Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution and the 1971 Convention for
the Establishment of an International Fund
for Compensation, which together provide
an international system for compensating
victims of damage from vessel oil spills;
(2) the 1969 Convention Relating to Inter-
vention on the High Seas, which provides
for actions on the high seas by coastal states
to protect their coastlines from grave oil
pollution damage resulting from serious
maritime accidents ; (3) several amendments
in 1969 and 1971 to the 1954 International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
of the Sea by Oil designed to strengthen
controls over vessel oil discharges and oil
tanker construction; and (4) the 1972 Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollu-
tion by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, which regulates the disposal at sea
of toxic land-generated wastes. We hope that
this work will be advanced further through
the adoption later this year of a compre-
hensive International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, which
will regulate the intentional or accidental
discharge of all types of harmful substances
from ships, including oil, toxic chemicals,
sewage, and garbage.

Outside of the marine pollution area a
number of other important legal steps have
been taken to protect the world environment
following the 1972 Stockholm Conference,
including: (1) the 1972 World Heritage
Convention, which provided international
funding and machinery to assist govern-
ments in the restoration and protection of
areas of cultural and natural significance;
(2) the 1973 Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, which established controls on
trade in endangered species and their prod-
ucts; and (3) a series of bilateral environ-
mental agreements, including the agreement
with Canada for the protection of the Great
Lakes from pollution and with the Soviet

646

Department of State Bulletin

Union for cooperation and exchange of in-
formation on environmental questions.

We have been able to conclude these agree-
ments largely because we and other states
have realized that our common interests are
far better served by restricting certain of
our own activities, and persuading others
to do likewise, than by continuing to behave
in the free but costly manner with regard
to our environment that we had been pur-
suing. States increasingly realize that broad
international problems can be solved at least
in paii; by broadly based legal agreements.
We have every reason to believe that even
though the operation of these various agree-
ments may not solve all of our problems
completely, they will make a most significant
contribution to their reduction.

Hijacking and Aircraft Sabotage

In the field of hijacking and aircraft sabo-
tage the United States, together with other
countries, has spearheaded strenuous efforts
within the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization which over the past 10 years have
resulted in the conclusion of the Tokyo Con-
vention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, the Hague
Convention for the Suppression of Unlaw-
ful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking Conven-
tion), and the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage Conven-

Ition). I had the pleasure of serving as
chairman of the U.S. delegation at the diplo-
matic conference which approved the third
of these conventions, and I can testify to
the fact that in this very important field
the development of international law has
been a major instrument for the realization
of our own national policy as well as the
shared interests of many other states. The
I bilateral agreement has a role to play here
also, as illustrated by the recent hijacking
agreement with Cuba, which undoubtedly has
been an important factor in the recent total
ab.sence of hijackings to that countr\'. At
the present time strong efforts are concen-
trated on the hoped-for conclusion of an
Air Security Enforcement Convention, which

together with related instruments will be the
subject of a combined diplomatic conference
and Extraordinary Assembly of ICAO to be
held this summer in Rome. In this field even
the mere existence of strong and widely
publicized international law serves to help
eliminate the scourge which for so long
has threatened the safety of international
civil aviation.

As many of you are aware, for several
years the United States and 90 other nations
have been engaged at the United Nations
Seabed Committee in an effort to achieve
international agreement on a comprehensive
new legal regime for the oceans. This is one
of the most extensive and ambitious inter-
national law making projects ever under-
taken. It proposes nothing less than a new
legal regime for the 70 percent of our world
covered by oceans. In doing so it addresses
questions of the breadth of the territorial
sea. international straits, scientific research,
pollution, and exploitation of the living and
nonliving resources of the oceans. Hopefully,
these efforts will produce results at the diplo-
matic conference which is scheduled to con-
vene in New York late this year. While this
effort is motivated in part by the traditional
needs for international regulation, there is
no doubt that now, as compared to the
Geneva Conferences of 1958 and 1960, the
nations involved regard development of the
law of the sea as an important way of
implementing their national policies with
respect to fundamental economic and defense
interests.

Reducing international Conflict

Perhaps the most striking proof of the
new political importance of international law
was presented by the Moscow summit of
last May, whei'e my indefatigable colleague,
the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty
Affaii-s, Mr. Charles I. Bevans, presided over
the execution of nine documents in six days
including agreements on strategic arms limi-
tation, prevention of naval incidents, scien-
tific cooperation, environmental matters, and
joint space ventures, signed by President
Nixon, General Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezh-

May 21, 1973

647

nev, Secretary of State Rogers, and other
senior officials. Those of you who have had
international legal experience in the govern-
ment will know that the bulk of such work
is created by relationships with friendly
countries. Countries with whom relations
are not so friendly, and with which we there-
fore do not have substantial dealings, present
comparatively few legal problems. Many
governments, including ours, feel increas-
ingly that the development of a complex
array of legal relationships should be condu-
cive to a general atmosphere in which mili-
tary conflict is less likely. As this theory
is applied, an ever-increasing wealth of inter-
national legal relationships results. The re-
sult is a deeper and broader network of
structured communications among states,
an expanded range of institutional bases
for cooperation leading to greater reliability
and predictability of state action, a greater
number of formalized standards and chan-
nels for cooperation among states, and in
time, hopefully, a greater tendency to try
to solve problems through international
cooperation rather than conflict.

A special word regarding international
conflict is appropriate at this point. As a
profession we have tended to believe that
international lawyers are too little consulted
in connection with the great crises of war
and peace. Naturally this is the area in
which the most difficulties will be confronted.
Here, too, however, we may rightfully take
heart from recent experience. As is abun-
dantly clear from the documents and corre-
spondence printed in recent issues of the
American Journal of International Law
(66 A.J.I.L. 836-40 [1972] ; 67 A.J.I.L.
325-27 [1973] ) , the Legal Adviser was con-
sulted in a timely fashion with respect to
the mining of North Vietnamese ports an-
nounced by the President on May 8, 1972,
and the President's speech on that occasion
clearly bore the imprint of those consulta-
tions. The various protocols to the Agree-
ment on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace in Viet-Nam signed January 27, 1973,
as well as the succeeding Act of Paris, were
negotiated with the constant personal assist-

ance of my principal deputy, Mr. George H.
Aldrich, and we continue to be very much
involved in decisions related to lingering
conflict in that area. In recent years per-
sonnel of my office have contributed signifi-
cantly not only in this area but in contentious
matters involving Berlin, the Middle East,
and indeed every region of the world. The
broader concern of the government for the
role of international law in armed conflicts
is evidenced by our heavy commitment to
ongoing efforts to revise the humanitarian
international laws related to war. Quite
clearly the role of the international lawyer
as action adviser to his government in times
of conflict is growing along with his role in
building the structure of laws and agree-
ments designed to reduce conflict.

As might be expected, the forces which
have expanded the role of international law
tend to bring change to the profession as
well. In the past, the traditional international
lawyer has been a government employee
functioning primarily as a professional spe-
cialist or technician of a high order. Legal
committees of international organizations
have regarded themselves as technical bodies
into which politics should not intrude. As
international law has begun to play an in-
creasingly important role as an instrument
of national policy, however, those responsible
for its creation and application have become
more politically astute. While government
representatives in international legal meet-
ings still for the most part are highly com-
petent jurists, they increasingly manifest
political sensitivity and talents as well. This
is a development which doubtless will prove
troubling to some who have grown to pro-
fessional manhood in a more traditionalist
environment, and one which should give us
all pause for thought. We must take care that
the process of making international law
not become too politicized, that we do not
through political overexposure impair the
essential character of our chosen instrument.

With this single caveat I believe we may
view the future with justifiable optimism. In-
ternational law and its practitioners now oc-
cupy an increasingly significant role in the

648

Department of State Bulletin

formulation and application of national pol-
icy, and each day brings new opportunities.
Private practice lawyers, too, benefit from
this expansion, reducing the problem of our
professional underemployment. Of the spe-
cific fields previously mentioned at least
three — environmental control, law of the sea,
and civil aviation security — impact directly
on commercial interests, which increasingly
will look to their legal counsel for advice on
international law. Just as the growth of do-
mestic law has been the hallmark of Ameri-
can internal political development over the
past decades, so may international law de-
velopment be a dominant characteristic of
our foreign policy in this and future decades.

President Receives Progress Report
of Classification Review Committee

Follotrhig is the text of a memorandum
submitted to President Nixon by the Inter-
agency Classification Revieiv Committee on
April 24.

White House press release (Key Biscayne, Fla. I dated April 24

Memorandum for the President
From: The Interagency Classification
Review Committee

On the occasion of Ambassador John S. D.
Eisenhower's resignation as our Chairman,
the Interagency Classification Review Com-
mittee herewith submits a progress report on
the Committee's accomplishments since its
establishment.'

On March 8, 1972 you signed Executive
Order 11652, establishing a new, more pro-
gre.ssive system for classification and declassi-
fication of government documents relating
to national security. That Order became ef-
fective on June 1, 1972, and since that date
there has been significant progress in build-
ing this framework for a workable classifica-
tion system.

Executive Order 11652 established the In-

Not printed here.

teragency Classification Review Committee
to oversee compliance with and implementa-
tion of its i)rovisions and the programs es-
tablished thereunder by each Department.
The Progress Report transmitted to you to-
day describes the activities of this Commit-
tee in (1) reducing the number of classified
documents and giving them better protection
during the period of their classification, (2)
applying automatic declassification schedules
to speed declassification of documents orig-
inated after the effective date of the Order,
and (3) expediting the declassification of his-
torical government documents.

In particular, we note the following areas
of progress which are covered in more detail
in the enclosed report:

1. 639^ reduction in all authorized classi-
fiers (exclusive of CIA) — Top Secret, Secret
and Confidential— from 48,814 to 17,883.

2. 71 Sr reduction in authorized Top Secret
classifiers (exclusive of CIA which reduced
Top Secret classifiers by 81% ) from 3,634 to
1,056.

3. Current lists of authorized classifiers by
name and position or title and organization
are maintained by all Departments and sub-
mitted to the Interagency Committee on a
quarterly basis.

4. By December 31, 1972 the National Ar-
chives and Records Service had declassified
approximately 29 million of the 160 million
pages from the World War II )ieriod. It is
still anticipated that this project will be com-
pleted by 1975.

5. Eleven volumes of the Foreign Rela-
tions Series were published this year, the
largest number ever published by the State
Dei)artment in a single year and for the first
time moving toward the goal of reducing the
lag in publication for 26 to 20 years as you
have directed.

6. 2.52 mandatory declassification review
requests were received from June 1 to De-
cember 31, 1972. 136 were granted in full;
12 in part. 62 were denied in full and 42
were pending at the time of the report.

7. The Interagency Committee has re-
viewed and approved the implementing reg-

May 21, 1973

649

ulations of all 34 Departments affected by
the Order.

8. All Departments whose regulations
have been approved have published appro-
priate portions in the Federal Register. Ul-
timately they will appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.

9. A series of five quarterly reports with
forms and instructions have been prepared
to assist the Interagency Committee in moni-
toring the classification program.

10. Detailed instructions have been issued
to guide Departments in implementing the
data index requirement of the National Se-
curity Council Directive. The data index
will permit retrieval of any document in-
dexed. It will assist the Departments and the
Interagencv Committee in monitoring imple-
mentation of the Executive Order. It will
facilitate with respect to documents indexed
automatic declassification, systematic re-
views, and public access after declassifica-
tion.

11. All Departments will begin in phases
implementing the data index for selected
categories of classified documents orig-
inated after December 31, 1972.

The Committee emphasizes its satisfaction
with the achievements realized to date and
its optimism regarding the prospects for the
long term success of the classification reform
which you initiated a year ago.

Dr. Rhoads Named Acting Chairman
of Classification Review Committee

The White House announced on April 24
(White House press release) that President
Nixon had that day designated Dr. James B.
Rhoads, the Archivist of the United States,
as Acting Chairman of the Interagency Clas-
sification Review Committee which was es-
tablished to assist the National Security
Council in implementing Executive Order
11652 on classification and declassification.

(For biographic data, see White House press
release dated April 24.) He will succeed
Ambassador John Eisenhower, who held the
position from May 17, 1972, until April 1,
1973.

Members of Advisory Committee
on Science and Foreign Affairs

I

Press release 115 (corr.) dated April 20

The Department of State announced on
April 20 that Secretary Rogers has appointed
the following as members of a Department
of State Advisory Committee on Science and
Foreign Affairs : f

Lewis Branscomb, chief scientist, IBM Corporation;
former Director, National Bureau of Standards.
W. Kenneth Davis, vice president, Bechtel Corpor-
ation. . .
John Hightower, associate professor of journalism.
University of New Mexico; former Associated
Press correspondent, Department of State.
John Leddy, retired State Department career officer;
former Assistant Secretary of State for European

Affairs.
Gordon MacDonald, director, Environmental
Studies Program, Dartmouth College; former
member of President's Council on Environmental ;

Quality. '

Simon Ramo, vice chairman of the board, Thompson-

Ramo-Wooldridge, Inc. i

Dean Rusk, professor of international law. Univer-
sity of Georgia; former Secretary of State. ,
EUGENE Skolnikoff, chairman. Political Science ■
Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ,

ogy. -

HERMAN POLLACK (ex officio), Director, Bureau of ,
International Scientific and Technological Affairs,
Department of State.

The Committee exists to provide the De-
partment of State with a new source of out-
side expertise and counsel on the wide range
of foreign policy problems and opportunities
created by or involving scientific and tech-
nological developments.

The impact of science and technology on
foreign affairs has grown enormously in
recent years. The resulting foreign policy
problems, such as those in the nuclear

650

Department of State Bulletinj

energy, space, and technology transfer fields,
are now of priority importance.

It is anticipated that the Committee's
advice will be of major assistance to the
Department of State in its handling of
science- and technology-related foreign
policy issues.

President Nixon Increases Quotas
for Import of Cheese

Following is a Cost of Living Council press
release issued April 25.

In response to a request made by the Cost
of Living Council, President Nixon today
signed a proclamation aimed at expanding
cheese supplies and preventing further in-
creases in cheese prices.'

Cost of Living Council Director John T.
Dunlop said : "Intensified demand for cheese,
meat, and all protein foods by American
consumers has been pushing prices upward
in 1973. We are hopeful, by expanding the
supply of imported cheese in the next few
months, that rising cheese prices will at
least level off. This step is the latest of sev-
eral actions by the Economic Stabilization
Program to increase food supplies and re-
strain food price inflation."

The action is designed to increase cheese
imports by 50 percent and bring 64 million
pounds of cheese into the United States be-
fore August. Cheese imports account for 6I4
percent of domestic cheese consumption. The
import quotas cover 11 different cheese
categories.

' For text of Proclamation No. 4213, see 38 Fed.
Reg. 10241.

This increase in cheese import quotas was
prompted by expanding consumer demand
reflected by 5-to-l 0-percent increases in re-
tail and wholesale cheese prices in the last
half of 1972 and in early 1973. Per capita
consumption of cheese by Americans rose
9 percent in 1972, or an average of 1.5
pounds per person. Consumption has risen
from an average of 11 pounds per person in
1953 to 18.4 pounds a person last year.

The Council announced on March 8 that
the President asked the U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion to investigate the need to increase the
quotas. The Commission conducted hearings
in March, and testimony was submitted by
the Cost of Living Council, Department of
Agriculture, industry representatives, and
importers. A report was submitted to the
President by the Commission I'ecommending
that quotas be increased 50 percent for each
supplying country during the period ending
July 31 this year.

The necessary steps have been taken to in-
crease the probability that the additional
64-million-pound quota can be reached by
July 31. Specifically, foreign countries will
be allowed to ship a higher proportion of
low-priced cheese exports to the United
States during this temporary period. This
means that an additional 64 million pounds
over the annual import quota of 128 million
pounds should be entering the U.S. markets
in the next three months.

Current domestic cheese prices appreci-
ably exceed present government purchase
prices under the legislatively mandated
dairy support program and are expected to
remain above the support price until well
into the summer, when increased domestic
cheese production is expected to be available
to meet the growing demand for protein-rich
food items.

May 21, 1973

651

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Presidential Authority To Continue
U.S. Air Combat Operations in Cambodia

Following is a statement submitted to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relatione by
Secretary Rogers on April 30.

Press release 125 dated April 30

The purpose of this memorandum is to
discuss the President's legal authority to
continue United States air combat operations
in Cambodia since the conclusion of the
Agreement on Ending the War and Restor-
ing Peace in Viet-Nam on January 27, 1973,
and the completion on March 28, 1973, of
the withdrawal of United States armed
forces from Viet-Nam and the return of
American citizens held prisoner in Indo-
china. The memorandum also discusses the
background of the Agreement of January 27
and the purposes of various United States
actions in order to clarify the legal issues.

For many years the United States has
pursued a combination of diplomatic and
military efforts to bring about a just peace
in Viet-Nam. These efforts were successful
in strengthening the self-defense capabilities
of the armed forces of the Republic of Viet-
Nam and in bringing about serious negotia-
tions which culminated in the Agreement on
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in
Viet-Nam, signed at Paris on January 27,
1973.' This Agreement provided for a cease-
fire in Viet-Nam, the return of prisoners,
and the withdrawal of United States and
allied armed forces from South Viet-Nam
within sixty days. The Agreement (in Ar-
ticle 20)= also required the withdrawal of all
foreign armed forces from Laos and Cam-
bodia and obligated the parties to refrain
from using the territory of Cambodia and
Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and

security of other countries, to respect the j
neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, and to i
avoid any interfei'ence in the internal af- ;
fairs of those two countries. This Article
is of central importance as it has long been
apparent that the conflicts in Laos and Cam-
bodia are closely related to the conflict in !
Viet-Nam and, in fact, are so inter-related
as to be considered parts of a single conflict. '

At the time the Viet-Nam Agreement was
concluded, the United States made clear to
the North Vietnamese that the armed forces i
of the Khmer Government would suspend all I
offensive operations and that the United
States aircraft supporting them would do

' Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169 [Footnotes
in original].

""(a) The parties participating in the Paris
Conference on Viet-Nam shall strictly respect the
1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962
Geneva Agi'eements on Laos, which recognized the
Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental na-
tional rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty,
unity, and territorial integrity of these countries.
The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cam-
bodia and Laos.

"The parties participating in the Paris Confer-
ence on Viet-Nam undertake to refrain from using
the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos
to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one
another and of other countries.

"(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all
military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally
withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing
into these two countries troops, military advisers
and military personnel, armaments, munitions and
war material.

"(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos
shall be settled by the people of each of these coun-
tries without foreign interference.

"(d) The problems existing between the Indo-
chinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese
parties on the basis of respect for each other's in-
dependence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,
and non-interference in each other's internal
affairs."

I

652

Department of State Bulletin 11

likewise. We stated that, if the other side
reciprocated, a de facto cease-fire would
thereby be brought into force in Cambodia.
However, we also stated that, if the com-
nuinist forces carried out attacks, govern-
ment forces and United States air forces
would have to take necessary counter meas-
ures and that, in that event, we would con-
tinue to carry out air strikes in Cambodia
as necessary until such time as a cease-fire
could be brought into effect. These state-
ments were based on our conviction that it
was essential for Hanoi to understand that
continuance 6f the hostilities in Cambodia
and Laos would not be in its interest or in
our interest and that compliance with Arti-
cle 20 of the Agreement would have to be
reciprocal.

It has recently been suggested that the
withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from
South Viet-Nam and the return of all U.S.
prisoners has created a fundamentally new
situation in which new authority must be
sought by the President from the Congress
to carry out air strikes in Cambodia. The
issue more accurately stated is whether the

! constitutional authority of the President to
continue doing in Cambodia what the United
States has lawfully been doing there expires
with the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces

j from Viet-Nam and the return of American

' prisoners despite the fact that a cease-fire
has not been achieved in Cambodia and

I North Vietnamese troops remain in Cam-
bodia contrary to clear provisions of the
Agreement. In other words, the issue is not

' whether the President may do something
new, but rather whether what he has been
doing must automatically stop, without re-
gard to the consequences even though the
Agreement is not being implemented by the

' other side.

The purposes of the United States in
Southeast Asia have always included seek-
ing a settlement to the Vietnamese war that
would permit the people of South Viet-Nam
to exercise their right to self-determination.
The President has made this clear on many

I occasions. For example, on May 8, 1972,
when he made the proposals that formed
the basis for the ultimately successful ne-

gotiations with North Viet-Nam, he said
there were three purposes to our military
actions against Viet-Nam: first, to prevent
the forceful imposition of a communist gov-
ernment in South Viet-Nam; second, to pro-
tect our remaining forces in South Viet-
Nam ; and third, to obtain the release of our
prisoners.-' The joint communique issued by
the President and Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow
on May 29, 1972,' in which the view of the
United States was expressed, said that nego-
tiations on the basis of the President's May
8 proposals w^ould be the quickest and most
effective way to obtain the objectives of
bringing the militaiy conflict to an end as
soon as possible and ensuring that the polit-
ical future of South Viet-Nam should be left
for the South Vietnamese people to decide
for themselves, free from outside interfer-
ence. The recent opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Mitchell v. Laird makes it
clear that the President has the constitu-
tional power to pursue all of these pur-
poses. In the words of Judge [Charles] Wy-
zanski the President properly acted "with a
profound concern for the durable interests
of the nation — its defense, its honor, its
morality."

The Agreement signed on January 27,
1973, represented a settlement consistent
with these objectives. An important element
in that Agreement is Article 20 which rec-
ognizes the underlying connections among
the hostilities in all the countries of Indo-
china and required the cessation of foreign
armed intervention in Laos and Cambodia.
The importance of this article cannot be
overestimated, because the continuation of
hostilities in Laos and Cambodia and the
presence there of North Vietnamese troops
threatens the right of self-determination of
the South Vietnamese people, which is guar-
anteed by the Agreement.

The United States is gratified that a cease-
fire agreement has been reached in Laos. It
must be respected by all the parties and re-
sult in the prompt withdrawal of foreign

■■ Bulletin of May 29, 1972, p. 747.
' Bulletin of June 26, 1972, p. 899.

May 21, 1973

653

forces. In Cambodia it has not yet been pos-
sible to bring about a cease-fire, and North
Vietnamese forces have not withdrawn from
that country. Under present circumstances,
United States air support and material as-
sistance are needed to support the armed
forces of the Khmer Republic and thereby
to render more likely the early conclusion
of a cease-fire and implementation of Article
20 of the Agreement. Thus, U.S. air strikes
in Cambodia do not represent a commitment
by the United States to the defense of Cam-
bodia as such but instead represent a
meaningful interim action to bring about
compliance with this critical provision in the
Viet-Nam Agreement.

To stop these air strikes automatically at
a fixed date would be as self-defeating as it
would have been for the United States to
withdraw its armed forces prematurely from
South Viet-Nam while it was still trying to
negotiate an agreement with North Viet-
Nam. Had that been done in Viet-Nam, the
Agreement of January 27 would never have
been achieved ; if it were done in Cambodia,
there is no reason to believe that a cease-fire
could be brought about in Cambodia or that
the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces
from Cambodia could be obtained. It can be
seen from this analysis that unilateral ces-
sation of our United States air combat ac-
tivity in Cambodia without the removal of
North Vietnamese forces from that country
would undermine the central achievement of
the January Agreement as surely as would
have a failure by the United States to insist
on the inclusion in the Agreement of Article
20 requiring North Vietnamese withdrawal
from Laos and Cambodia. The President's
powers under Article II of the Constitution
are adequate to prevent such a self-defeat-
ing result. It is worth noting that in reaching
a similar conclusion, the report entitled
"Congress and the Termination of the Viet-
Nam War" recently prepared for your Com-
mittee by the Foreign Affairs Division of the
Congressional Research Service, arrived at
the same general conclusion as to the Presi-
dent's constitutional power.

One must recognize that the scope and ap-
plication of the President's powers under

Article II of the Constitution are rarely free
from dispute. Under the Constitution, the
war powers are shared between the Execu-
tive and Legislative branches of the Gov-
ernment. The Congress is granted the powers
"to provide for the common defense," "to
declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures
on land and water," "to raise and support
armies," "to provide and maintain a navy,"
"to make rules for the government and reg-
ulation of the land and naval forces," and "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the fore-
going powers . . ." '• On the other hand, the
Constitution provides that "the executive
power shall be vested in a President," that
he "shall be Commander-in-Chief of the
army and navy of the United States," and
that "he shall take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." " The President is also
given the authority to make treaties with
the advice and consent of two thirds of the
Senate, to appoint ambassadors with the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate, and to receive
ambassadors and other public ministers.

The proceedings of the Federal Constitu-
tional Convention in 1787 suggest that the
ambiguities of this division of power be-
tween the President and the Congress were
deliberately left unresolved with the under-
standing that they were to be defined by
practice. There may be those who wish the
framers of the Constitution would have been
more precise, but it is submitted that there
was great wisdom in realizing the impossi-
bility of foreseeing all contingencies and in
leaving considerable flexibility for the future
play of political forces. The Constitution is
a framework for democratic decision and
action, not a source of ready-made answers
to all questions, and that is one of its great
strengths.

There is no question but that Congress
should play an important role in decisions
involving the use of armed forces abroad.
With respect to the continuation of U.S. air
combat activity in Cambodia, what is that

•' U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8.

" U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sections 1 and 2.

654

Department of State Bulletin

role? The Congress has cooperated with the
President in establishing the policy of firm-
ness coupled with an openness to negotiation
which has succeeded in bringing about the
Agreement of January 27 and which can
succeed in securing its implementation. This
cooperation has been shown through consul-
tations and through the authorization and
appropriation process. The Congress has
consistently rejected proposals by some
members to withdraw this congi-essional
participation and authority by cutting off
appropriations for necessary military ex-
penditures and foreign assistance. The Con-
gress has also enacted several provisions
with specific reference to Cambodia.' The
President's policy in Cambodia has been and
continues to be fully consistent with these
provisions.

It was, of course, hoped that the Agree-
ment signed at Paris on January 27 would
be strictly implemented according to its
terms, including the prompt conclusion of
cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia and the
withdrawal of foreign troops from those two
countries. What has happened instead is
that, in Laos, the cease-fire has been fol-
lowed by continuing communist stalling in
forming the new government and, in Cam-
bodia, the communists responded to the ef-
forts of the Khmer Government to bring
about a de facto cease-fire with a fierce, gen-
eral offensive. North Vietnamese forces re-
main in Laos and Cambodia and continue to
infiltrate men and war material through
these countries to the Republic of Viet-Nam.
North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia con-
tinue to participate in and to support com-
munist offensive operations.

United States air strikes in Laos were an
important element in the decision by North
Viet-Nam and its Laotian allies to negotiate
a cease-fire in Laos. If United States air
strikes were stopped in Cambodia despite

■ For example. Section 7 of the Special Foreigrn
Assistance Act of 1971 (Pub. L. 91-652, Jan. 5,
1971, 84 Stat. 1942) and Sections 655 and 656 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (added
by Section 304(b) of Pub. L. 92-226, Feb. 7, 1972,
86 Stat. 29).

the communist offensive, there would be
little, if any, incentive for the communists to
seek a cease-fire in that country, and the
temptation would doubtless be great for
North Viet-Nam to leave its troops and sup-
ply lines indefinitely in Laos and Cambodia.
Such a situation would be the opposite of
that prescribed by Article 20 of the Viet-
Nam Agreement and would so threaten the
viability of the settlement in Viet-Nam and
the right to self-determination of the South
Vietnamese people as to be totally unaccept-
able to the Republic of Viet-Nam and to the
United States. In light of these facts, it
seems clear that the argument that the Con-
stitution requires immediate cessation of
U.S. air strikes in Cambodia because of the
Paris Agreement is, in reality, an argument
that the Constitution which has permitted
the United States to negotiate a peace agree-
ment— a peace that guarantees the right of
self-determination to the South Vietnamese
people as well as the return of United States
prisoners and withdrawal of United States
armed forces from Viet-Nam — is a Consti-
tution that contains an automatic self-
destruct mechanism designed to destroy
what has been so painfully achieved. We are
now in the process of having further dis-
cussions with the North Vietnamese with
regard to the implementation of the Paris
Agreement. We hope these discussions will
be successful and will lead to a cease-fire in
Cambodia.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1sl Session

Exchange of Notes with Ethiopia concerning the
Administration of Justice. Message from the
President of the United States transmitting the
exchange of notes. S. Ex. B; January 26, 1973; 6
pp. Report to accompany Ex. B, 93-1. S. Ex.
Kept 93-7; March 21, 1973; 3 pp.

A Bill To Amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958
To Provide a More Effective Program to Prevent
.Aircraft Piracy, and for Other Purposes. Report
to accompany S. 39. Rept. 98-13. February 2,
1973. 76 pp.

May 21, 1973

655

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.S. Opposes Middle East Violence and Terrorism

Following are statements made in the U.N.
Security Council by U.S. Representative John
Scall on April 12, 17, and 21. together loith
the text of a resolution adopted by the Coun-
cil on April 21.

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI
Stctement of April 12

USUN pi-ess release 35 dated April 12

I have taken the unusual action of asking
to speak at this time because of a develop-
ment of grave concern to my government,
and to all those who seek to calm tempers
and restore conditions in v^'hich the search
for peace in the Middle East can go forward.

The tragic events in Lebanon have been
followed by an attempt to spread a big lie
around the world ; namely, a charge that my
government connived, colluded, and in some
way participated in the Lebanon events and
the allegation that the American Embassy
in Beirut is harboring persons who were
involved.

This qualifies, by any definition conceiv-
able, as a massive untruth — a big lie. The
big lie became a standard weapon of psycho-
logical warfare before and during World
War U. It is an art form of the totalitarian
mentality. It seeks to deceive the unwary
public by resorting to a falsehood of gigantic
dimensions. By its enormity it succeeds in
deluding the innocent because no one would
believe that such a massive untruth could
be invented. The monstrous accusation that
the United States somehow helped carry out
the events in Lebanon and is acting as a
shield for those involved originated with
those who oppose at all costs and by any
means a peaceful settlement, who preach and

practice wanton terrorism, and who, for
their own purposes, seek to place the blame
on others — the blame for their failures and
crimes. It is being spread not only by clan-
destine means and by rumor-mongering ; it
is being repeated in recognized information
media in several countries which in many
cases have inexplicably failed to make known
our firm, categorical denials.

This charge, Mr. President, is totally with-
out foundation. It is complete fabrication
from beginning to end. I would hope that
reasonable people everywhere would recog-
nize how defamatory and irresponsible on
its very face such a charge is. Even worse,
it can encourage new violence, more destruc-
tion, and more deaths of innocent people.
And if this big lie succeeds in inflaming new
violence, the responsibility will rest on the
shoulders of those who listened impassively
to the big lie and did nothing to speak the
truth.

Yet another tragic aspect is that many,
when emotions rule over reason, become the
victims of such a bold and monstrous lie —
just as many became victims of the false
charge of American participation in the 1967
Arab-Israeli war, a charge they later came to
recognize and acknowledge as false but which
at the time led to consequences that are still
with us today.

The views of my government on the broad
principles are well known. They have been
stated on many occasions by my predecessors
— most recently in this Council on Sep-
tember 10, 1972.' We deplore violence wher-
ever it occurs and from whatever source it
comes. We deeply regret the mounting toll

' For backgi-ound, see Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1972,
p. 365.

656

Department of State Bulletin

in innocent lives. I will reserve further com-
ment on these aspects of the matter for
later in the debate.

Ti)day, however, I want to make it cate-
gorically cleai- that neither the U.S. Govern-
ment nor any representative thereof had any
part whatsoever in or knowledge of the Is-
raeli raid on Lebanon on April 10. All gov-
ernments concerned have a responsibility to
disassociate themselves from this outra-
geous lie and to take steps to prevent the
spread of such slander, whose consequences,
if it is not checked, can do grave harm to the
cause of peace and incite new destruction
and more deaths of innocent people.

Statement of April 17

USUN pr«M release 36 dated April 17

As we are meeting here today, I think it
is important that we recognize we are con-
fronting a new and more dangerous turn in
the long and fiaistrating search for peace
in the Middle East.

The cycle of violence in this part of the
world is not only continuing but has taken
on newer and uglier dimensions. To the
shame of all mankind, acts of violence and
terror, often striking down innocent people,
are on the verge of becoming a routine foot-
note to the tragic and unresolved Arab-
Israeli conflict.

In focusing attention on violence, I am
not asking that we lose sight of the human
and political problems that have already de-
fied solution for a generation. Rather, I wish
to place in perspective a phenomenon that is
both inherently important and important as
a barrier to further efforts to bring real peace
and security to the Middle East.

In the past few months hundreds have been
killed — innocent men, women, and children,
diplomats, tourists, and bystanders alike.

If we are to do anything about this, it is
important that we understand that this new
turn may be more than a temporaiy phe-
nomenon in the history of mankind. It can
become an accepted way of life.

We are living today at a time when a knock
on the door may signal the visit of an assas-
sin armed with a machinegun or firebomb. It

is intolerable that our fears have now reached
the stage that at a thousand airpoiis around
the world innocent civilians must submit to
complex security searches before boarding
their planes — and pray that their flights will
be safe. It is intolerable that innocent civil-
ians cannot enter their automobiles without
fear that they have been convei-ted into in-
struments of death.

It is intolerable that opening the morning
mail may trigger an explosion. It is intoler-
able that the innocent cannot regard even the
family apartment, the social gathering, the
Olympic sporting field, or the quiet streets as
an abode of peace.

And it is intolerable that diplomats must
conduct their tasks with concern for what
may happen to them or their families in the
future and with grief over what has already
transpired.

Everywhere life, the life of the innocent
bystander, has been made tragically cheap.

Are these acts of terror and counterterror
to become accepted as the new rules of en-
gagement in a tragic unresolved war? Are
these acts, which demonstrate a grisly con-
tempt for life, to become normal — deeds to
be emulated more and more throughout the
world?

Is this the heritage we, the members of a
civilized society, wish to leave behind?

In the Declaration of Human Rights, the
United Nations afl^rmed the right of every
human being to life, liberty, and the security
of person. Is this declaration now to be
forgotten?

So that there will be no misunderstanding,
let me make it emphatically clear that the
United States opposes violence and terror
from whatever source and of whatever kind,

We do not, and will not, condone violations
of the sovereignty of one state by another
state. Neither, however, do we condone mur-
ders in violation of basic human rights by
individuals or groups. Such individuals and
groups depend on the support, or on the ac-
quiescence, of governments on whose terri-
tory they exist and from which they plan and
direct their operations. That support and ac-
quiescence is clearly contrary to the General

May 21, 1973

657

Assembly's Declaration on Friendly Rela-
tions as well as general principles of inter-
national law.

While we are aware of the political reali-
ties which are usually cited to excuse the ac-
tion or inaction of certain governments, it
is the duty of each state not to condone or
abet or close its eyes to these acts of terror-
ism. Indeed, it is the duty of every state
actively to prevent the organization or insti-
gation of such acts on its territory, whether
they are directed against its own citizens or
against the citizens of other countries.

The question now in the Middle East is
not who started what, but how this vicious
cycle is to be broken. This is our real prob-
lem. States must not export violence. Private
groups must not export violence. At this mo-
ment, assessing blame is secondary to the
purpose of ending the misery and suffering
on both sides. The overriding task of this
Council is to seize the present opportunity
and move to put an end to violence so that the
political processes will have a chance to
operate.

The meaning of the Declaration on
Friendly Relations is clear. It reads: ~'

Every State has the duty to refrain from organiz-
ing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts
of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its
territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when the acts referred to in the present
paragraph involve a threat or use of force.

The cycle of violence will not be broken
by drawing distinctions between violence by
conventional forces and violence by individ-
uals and groups. Violence by conventional
forces and violence by terrorists are to be
condemned equally. One is as ugly as the
other. The time has come to recognize that
we must be equally stern in dealing with all
forms of international violence.

The United Nations must leave no doubt
as to the disapproval of the international
community of unwarranted and unnecessary

- For text of the Declaration of Principles of
International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, see Bulletin
of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 627.

loss of innocent lives from acts of interna
tional terrorism and military responses to it.
Action and cooperation by all states is re-
quired. No member state should attack an-
other. Any such action only breeds further
violence. Neither should any state allow its
territory to be used for the launching of
terrorist attacks outside its territory. No
state should harbor elements which attack
other states or nationals of that state, wher-
ever they may be.

We have heard many speeches here con-
demning one side or the other, trying to
assess blame. We believe this is an essentially
sterile approach to the problem. These argu-
ments will not lead to an end to the present
agony, for it is in the nature of a vicious
circle that cause and effect become impossible
to distinguish.

The time has come, indeed it is already
overdue, when there must be a halt to all acts
of terror by all sides. Even as there is a
truce on the ground which has stopped the
major hostilities for 32 months, so, too, must
there be an end to this grisly exchange of
violence and counterviolence which extends
the battlefield to areas where innocent peo-
ple inevitably become its victims. All of us,
regardless of our sympathies, have a duty to
act now — and not by one-sided condemna-
tions or by demands for unequal punishment
which ignores the real world.

Instead, let us move carefully, avoiding
the temptation for the short-term propa-
ganda advantage which inflames rather than
heals. Let us not vie with one another in cata-
loguing our grievances and sufferings. It is
not enough to look backward. It is time to look
forward. My government is prepared to do
so as we continue our search for better un-,
derstanding among these temporary foes —
who one day must be friends.

Let us facilitate the turn from violence to'
peace. An instrument for this lies at hand.
Let us use it; let us use the framework for
an overall settlement that already exists. I
refer to Resolution 242, which points the
way to the goal of a lasting peace through
which ail the peoples of the Middle East can
achieve security and justice. Resolution 242

^

I ?

I

I 1

50'
1 '?n

658

Department of State Bulletin

calls for a just settlement of the refug'ee
problem. The United States recognizes that
peace in the Middle East can only be achieved
by taking into full account the legitimate
aspirations of the Palestinians.

Unless the Council can move from recrim-
ination to evenhanded condemnation of all
forms of violence, there will be no i)rogress
toward peace. Therefore we ask for an end
to both cross-border attacks and individual
acts of violence. If the Council will call for
this, it will create an atmosphere in which we
can move from the assessment of blame to
the making of peace. Let us move ahead ur-
gently to encourage negotiations for a peace-
ful settlement. I appeal to the members of
this Council to act in such a way that this
meeting can contribute to the goal of a last-
ing peace in the Middle East.

Statement of April 21

USUN press release 39 dated April 21

In my remarks before this chamber on
April 17, I asserted the deeply felt view that
the overriding task of this Council is to seize
the present opportunity and move to put an
end to violence in the Middle East so that the
political processes will have a chance to
operate.

I also stated what I believe my delegation
has made emphatically clear on many oc-
casions— that the United States as a matter
of firm principle opposes international vio-
lence and terrorism from whatever source
and of whatever kind. States must not ex-
port violence and terrorism. Private groups
must not export violence and terrorism. As-
sessing blame is secondary to the purpose of
ending the misery and suffering on both
sides. My delegation has called for a move
away from recrimination to evenhanded con-
demnation of all forms of violence. We do
not accept the counsel of despair of those
who witness it, deplore it, and then conclude
that the violence cannot be controlled. Even
less do we accept the view that violence
should be encouraged and supported, regard-
less of its motivation.

We must reject terrorism as equally as we
reject violence now, before humanity is

forced to endure so much of it that it becomes
accepted as normal, as the ugly new rules of
engagement that nations and groups can fol-
low to settle their differences.

My delegation believes that the present
resolution falls short of fully meeting these
principles, these criteria. However, through
the Security Council, the international com-
munity for the first time in the history of this
world organization has rejected the cycle of
violence and counterviolence, a deadly cycle
in which innocent people inevitably become
victims. In our view, the resolution condemns
both violence and terrorism. These are posi-
tive elements. My delegation is pleased that
by its reference in preambular paragraph 6
to "recent acts" the resolution takes note of
the tragedy of Khartoum in violation of Su-
danese sovereignty, incidents in Nicosia vio-
lating Cypriot jurisdiction, and other vicious
acts in many places, particularly in Europe.
In many other places, Mr. President, horrors
have been averted only through the timely
precautions of local authorities. To bring the
matter home to this table, I would also make
the point that except for the vigilance of the
New York police, the recent placing of mas-
sive explosives in three crowded locations in
this great city could have caused indiscrimi-
nate casualties in enormous numbers. Do we
here believe that we and our families are im-
mune to this kind of blind terrorism unless
the international community awakens to the
need for urgent action?

My delegation withheld its positive vote
for two principal reasons. In our view, the
resolution focuses too much on the meaning-
less exercise of trying to parcel out blame.
It falls short of meeting the full dimensions
of the challenge facing the Security Council.

Until this very hour, I and my delegation
have been applying every ounce of our ener-
gies to achieving by quiet diplomacy an
agreed draft that could command the unan-
imous support of this Council. We came close
to succeeding in this, and we are disap-
pointed that we did not achieve this outcome.

Even so, all of us can derive some satis-
faction from the fact that the Security Coun-
cil has grappled vigorously with one of the

May 21, 1973

659

great issues of the time. We should not lose
sight of this fact, even if the result does not
reach our highest aspirations.

No resolution, no legislative act, is perfect.
Each of those who voted for the resolution,
as we have heard, has expressed views of
how it could have been improved by adding
or subtracting some additional element or by
some different emphasis.

But more importantly, no resolution of this
Council can be an end to itself. A resolution's
worth is judged by its effects, and its effects
depend on the actions of the international
community that flow or do not flow from the
resolution.

Mr. President, before I close, I think it im-
portant for the sake of the record to make
some comments on the matter of arms sup-
plies to the Middle East area. In that con-
nection, in the course of this debate we have
heard several distorted and one-sided refer-
ences to U.S. assistance in meeting Israel's
legitimate defense needs. I have sensed an
effort to depict this as a flow of arms through
one pipeline from a single source to a single
destination. There has been no reference to
the fact that even as we sit in this chamber
major deliveries of war material have been
made by certain powers to several other
countries in the area.

Mr. President, the United States has no
intention of taking steps that would alter the
arms balance in the Middle East or otherwise
contribute to instability. However, I would
emphasize that the United States does not
propose to sit idly by while others pour
arms into the Middle East for one side, thus
inevitably tempting some governments to
believe that with these new arms they can
risk another round in the Middle East war.

My government has in the past six years
sought insistently an agreement among ma-
jor arms suppliers to limit weapons ship-
ments to this part of the world. The United
States stands ready at this instant to par-
ticipate in such an arrangement if others are
willing to put aside their special political ob-
jectives and work with us toward the goal
of a reduced military confrontation.

In concluding, I want to affirm that de-

spite the imperfections of the present resolu-
tion my government is determined to do all in
its power to encourage mutual respect of
sovereignty among nations in the Middle
East and to seek to further the international
campaign to protect the innocent against
violence and terror from all sources. Despite
its imperfections, my government will re-
gard the resolution's positive elements as
points of departure for efforts to seek a
new era in the Middle East — an era in which
all the peoples of the Middle East will live
in peace and security, an era in which the
hands of friendship will reach across secure
and recognized borders. Let us all dedicate
ourselves to the achievement of that era.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in docu-
ment S/Agenda/1705,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the
Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/10913),

Having heard the statements of the representa-
tives of Lebanon and Israel,

Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situa-
tion resulting from the violation of Security Council
resolutions,

Deeply deploring all recent acts of violence result-
ing in the loss of life of innocent individuals and
the endangering of international civil aviation,

Recalling the General Armistice Agreement be-
tween Israel and Lebanon of 2.3 March 1949 and !
the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions
233 (1967) and 234 (1967), ^

Recalling its resolutions 262 (1968) of 31 Decern-)
ber 1968, 270 (1969) of 26 August 1969, 280 (1970) li
of 19 May 1970 and 316 (1972) of 26 June 1972,

1. Expresses deep concern over and condemns all
acts of violence which endanger or take innocent ;
human lives;

2. Condemns the repeated military attacks con-,
ducted by Israel against Lebanon and Israel's
violation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and
sovereignty in contravention of the Charter of the]
United Nations, of the Israel-Lebanon Armistice!
Agreement and of th? Council's cease-fire resolu-
tions;

3. Calls upon Israel to desist forthwith from all
military attacks on Lebanon.

•U.N. doc. S/RES/332; adopted by the Security
Council on Apr. 21 by a vote of 11 to 0, with 4
abstentions (U.S., China, Guinea, U.S.S.R.).

660

Department of State Bulletin

United States Urges Practical Approach in Applying
Science and Technology to Development

The United States Economic and Social
Council Committee on Science and Tech-
nology for Development met at New York
March 12-30. Following are statements made
in the cotnmittce by U.S. Representative
Frederick Seitz on March 15 and by U.S.
Alternate Representative Robert W. Kitchen,
Jr.. on March 23.

STATEMENT BY DR. SEITZ, MARCH 15

USIN v.

•^leasc 18 dated March 15

I am pleased to be here representing my
government at this first session of the Com-
mittee on Science and Technology for De-
velopment. Having served for seven years
as President of our National Academy of
Sciences in Washington, I feel very much at
home in our discussions concerning the sci-
ences, the technologies, and the related na-
tional and international policies needed to
nurture development throughout the world.
I am confident that many productive results
and plans will emerge from our work.

My present post as president of the Rocke-
feller University in New York City carries
with it deep involvement in international
science and technology. The university has
undertaken successful international collabo-
rations since its creation at the beginning
of this century.

What should be the role of our committee
in developing a strategy for stimulating
more widespread and increasingly effective
applications of science and technology? This
very impoi-tant decision must rest on a con-
sensus reached by all of us in the days
ahead. As our initial contribution, I would

like to share some thoughts which have
emerged from past U.S. experience.

The strengths of science clearly go beyond
intellectual enlightenment and adventures of
inquiry. Scientific truths are universal and
belong to all of us. They extend across na-
tional boundaries. They are genuinely inter-
national, the possession of all nations. Also,
the applications of science to the needs of
mankind through technology are enormously
varied, essentially infinite in scope. Science
can provide all people with useful tools,
pi'ofitable products, and beneficial services.

When the transistor was invented 25 years
ago, the concept quickly became the property
of all mankind. Those nations which were
already organized to exploit this new concept
rapidly developed revolutionary new indus-
tries. Other nations which were as far ad-
vanced technically and which had an adequate
manpower base did not seize this opportunity,
mainly because they lacked effective national
organizations. It is hardly necessary to add
here that a very large share of the world's
electronic products based on the transistor,
including many products .sold in the United
States, is now manufactured in other
countries.

Planning, Manpower, and Resources

Three important conditions must be .satis-
fied at the national level, particularly in
countries that have not reached the highest
state of technological development, if science
and technology are to serve the needs of the
people. These conditions relate to planning,
to manpower, and to critical levels of ef-
fort. Pei-mit me to outline our view on each
of these.

May 21, 1973

661

First, each nation must have a planning
structure which works out detailed require-
ments and goals. Such planning may be
centralized when the issues are sharply
focused and urgent. But in any case there
must be at least a minimum level of central
and long-range coordination within each
country so that indispensable resources are
initially made available, distributed ration-
ally, and used efficiently. The planning proc-
ess must of course reflect the critical
economic and social factors related to each
major application of science and technology.
The major objective of planning must be
to help create and sustain a total national
environment which is conducive to translat-
ing science and technology into productive
channels.

Secondly, there must be an adequate
manpower base — highly motivated and ap-
pi'opriately trained planners, scientists, engi-
neers, and technicians. They must grasp and
integrate technologies generated both at
home and abroad. They must be linked to
the institutions responsible for implementing
actions. It is unfortunate when scientists
and engineers carry on their research and
development without understanding overall
national resources and needs. But it is even
more unfortunate when planners generate
plans which greatly outrun the manpower
capabilities and resources of their countries.

For example, in the United States and in
many other countries there has long been a
good match between agricultural research
and development activities and the farmer's
day-to-day needs ; in this field there has been
a good combination of centralized and de-
centralized planning involving participation
of vei'satile agricultural scientists. On the
other hand, in the United States we have not
been as successful as we would like in apply-
ing technological innovations in the field of
housing. We have not yet devised optimum
patterns for introducing new construction
techniques, new materials, and new organiza-
tional models into our existing social and eco-
nomic structure. This appears to be another
case where even relatively small modi-
fications of old technology cannot be success-
fully introduced until many institutional

changes have been made and a new cadre of
technically sophisticated entrepreneurs has
emerged.

In this connection it is worth em-
phasizing that a developing country may do
well to downgrade exotic forms of basic re-1
search while it is striving to pass through the
takeoff point in evolving its technical
strength. The United States did not begin
to create a significant capability for basic
research until about 1900, when interna-
tional industrial competition required that we
move in this direction. Up to that time we :
imported much of our science and technology.
The same pattern has been followed by sev-
eral countries which crossed the takeoff
point in recent decades.

The third condition relates to the appro-
priate resources that must be made available
to both the planners and those who execute
programs. Studies in the technically ad- '■
vanced countries show that eventually up to :
about 3 percent of the gross national product
can be used effectively in the support of re-
search and development if careful programs
and shrewd priorities are derived. Of this,
perhaps 10 percent can be invested profitably '
in the most basic work. Practical realities,
however, often determine that the percentage
of GNP devoted to research and development
in developing countries may be less than in !
the most advanced countries because of the
need to satisfy public demands for other uses :
of scarce resources. In such cases the na- i
tional planners should use vigorously their
limited resources to adapt technology gen- j
erated elsewhere. |

Impact of Shared Technology

Perhaps the most important role which
the technically advanced countries can play
is to collaborate with all countries in shar-
ing relevant experiences — the failures along
with the successes. This is not a new concept,
but it is certainly an underutilized concept.
The Green Revolution now sweeping so many
areas of the world provides an ideal example
of the way in which a form of technology
which started in the more advanced lands is
having a truly dramatic impact upon other

!!ire
;iii
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662

Department of State Bulletin 'i,;j

nations. This impact involves not only great
increases in production levels but also signi-
ficant changes in employment and income
patterns.

Our committee's tasks are to focus on the
need for action at the national level and to
pool our understanding of the principles and
the mechanisms which make science and tech-
nology effective. To do this, we should iden-
tify specific topics having significant technical
content as well as great common interest to
member countries and establish gi'oups to
explore them in depth and to stimulate force-
ful national and international action. The
planning and management of R. & D. is an
example of a far-reaching topic which might
be pursued beneficially by a working group
between sessions. In particular, such a group
should carefully examine the ingredients of
success of the international agricultural re-
search networks in the fields of rice, wheat,
and corn and then attempt to extend the les-
sons that have been learned to other research
areas of worldwide importance. Of special
interest is the role of the national, regional,
and international institutes comprising these
networks.

It is sometimes thought that the develop-
ing countries, when importing technology,
can benefit only from special forms of science
particularly designed to match their prob-
lems. This is certainly not always the case.
We might cite many well-known examples
in the fields of health, agriculture, and trans-
portation. Another currently emerging ex-
ample concerns the transistor and the earth
satellite — reflecting very sophisticated tech-
nology— which undoubtedly enable many
countries to catch up in their communica-
tions networks without passing through cum-
bersome and expensive intermediate stages.
In general, then, the most advanced coun-
tries often serve the less advanced simply
by carrying out their own technical activities
and offering their products to the world.

As was mentioned in the opening session,
most of the technically advanced nations,
while recognizing the crucial need for more
--"ience-based technology to maintain or im-
ive their well-being, are also becoming in-
creasingly conscious of the need to assess

May 21, 1973

the consequences of new technological devel-
opments in a constructive way from more
wide-ranging economic, social, and environ-
mental perspectives. This field of analysis,
now designated "technological assessment,"
is by no means new; however, it is rapidly
gaining recognition as a still highly complex
and uncertain, but vitally important, input
to national and international policies. We
should help disseminate knowledge of such
studies and encourage the evolution of this
new discipline.

If we do our work seriously and with
vision, the creation of our committee could be
one of the most important acts of the United
Nations. Let us respond to our challenge
with energy and imagination, recognizing
that we can be of most help to one another
by trading ideas on concrete cases and work-
able plans.

Applying the Potential of the U.N. System

With regard to specific agenda items for
this session, we are increasingly concerned
about the preoccupation of our committee
with overall expenditure targets for research
and development. This is unfortunate because
the principal constraints on more effective
use of science and technology are not now
financial in most countries. They are rooted
in organizational, institutional, and man-
power weaknesses which, unless corrected,
will continue to prevent efficient use of in-
creased funding for science and technology.
The constraints on using modern science in
most countries include internal difl^culties in
providing access to technical and credit as-
sistance for manufacturers and farmers, and
particularly for small entrepreneurs. Fiscal
and monetary policies often tilt technological
choices toward inappropriate processes and
products. Lack of a competitive climate fre-
quently inhibits innovations. In addition,
when markets are limited in size and depth,
nations cannot gain the full benefits from
long production runs and other economies of
scale based on modern technology. Readily
available and relatively inexpensive innova-
tions are frequently ignored in the search
for more dramatic breakthroughs. Too often,
underutilized laboratories and equipment,

663

poorly matched manpower training with job
opportunities, and irrelevant research results
are grim reminders that science undertaken
in isolation from the total development en-
vironment can be both costly and wasteful.

How can the U.N. system help the devel-
oping countries address these limitations and
insure that additional financial resources are
used wisely? This is the challenge that faces
our committee.

We welcome the opportunity to review the
ways in which science and technology are
contributing to progress during the Second
Development Decade, and, more importantly,
how this contribution can be heightened dur-
ing the years to come. At the same time, we
do not believe that any useful purpose would
be served in devoting the time and energy of
this committee in attempting to modify cer-
tain paragraphs of the Second Development
Decade Strategy.' A long and tedious proc-
ess was involved in developing the strategy,
and conditions have not changed sufficiently
to reopen this process. The strategy is broad
enough to accommodate the interest of every
member of this committee. Our job is to be-
gin to fill in this conceptual framework with
specific ideas as to how science and tech-
nology can significantly accelerate particular
components of the developmental process.

Turning to the World Plan of Action, we
join with other delegations in applauding the
extensive efforts of ACASTD [Advisory
Committee on the Application of Science and
Technology to Development] and of the spe-
cialized agencies in preparing this monu-
mental document.^ The world plan is indeed
a landmark reference book for both theore-
ticians and practitioners in development. All
governments and U.N. bodies should crit-
ically examine the concepts set forth in the
plan and should adapt specific recommenda-
tions to their carefully considered interests
and needs.

Finally, with regard to the agenda item
on the role of modern science and technology

' For text of the International Development
Strategy adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
on Oct. 24, 1970 (A/RES/2626 (XXV)), see Bul-
letin of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 612.

"U.N. doc. E/4962 and addenda.

in the development of nations, I commend
the Secretary General's incisive report on the
opportunities for upgrading the quality and
effectiveness of programs within the U.N.
system involving the application of science
and technology. ' He has also correctly pointed
out the substantial lack of involvement on
the part of the world scientific community
with the work of the United Nations system.
This committee should face these two issues
squarely, with practical suggestions for ad-
dressing these problems. Indeed, improving
the performance of the U.N. system in bring-
ing science and technology to the service of
development should be central to all debates
of the committee. While we will of course be
considering specific technologies and nar-
rowly defined problems, the thrust of our ef- ;
forts should remain on clarifying practical
steps to improve the overall quality of U.N. j
efforts. \

Of particular importance to the success of !
this committee will be the relationships de- 1
veloped for working with and influencing the i
activities of member governments, UNDP i
[United Nations Development Program] , the i
U.N. Economic Commissions, the specialized!
agencies, and other U.N. bodies. On the one;
hand, we must have an impact on their !
policies and programs if our work is to be ;
meaningful. But we should be sensitive toj
the operational responsibilities of these or-j
ganizations to insure that our recommenda-!
tions are realistic. Our terms of reference
enable us to take a broad view and choose
specific areas for stimulating action. As we,
select these areas, we should aim for fully i
applying the potential of the U.N. systemi
and steadily extending the impact of thei
committee's recommendations. ;

In closing we wish to stress three major
points.

First, we will use most effectively the time,
at these first meetings and in fact the next
few sessions of this committee by concentrat-
ing on the steps which each one of our na-
tions must take to encourage the growth of
the sciences and technologies relevant to na-
tional goals.

U.N. doc. E/5238 and add. 1.

664

Department of State Bulletin

Second, we must encourage our govern-
ments to include scientists, enoineers, and
economists who are deeply involved in plan-
ning the uses of technology at the national
level among those sent to the meetings of
this committee. With these professionals
involved, exchanges of ideas and subsequent
recommendations will be specific and com-
patible with the resources actually available'
in each nation.

Finally, let us recognize forthrightly that
we share many scientific problems and op-
portunities. The United Nations is in a
unique position to assist in mobilizing the
wealth of the world's scientific talent into
networks of knowledge and collaboration.
Let us rise to this challenge; if we do, our
collective endeavors will far exceed past ex-
pectations for our individual efforts.

STATEMENT BY MR. KITCHEN, MARCH 23

r.^UN pr«sd release 27 dated March 23

We are pleased to elaborate the U.S. views
on assisting the developing countries in using
modern science and technology in their de-
velopmental activities.

We wish to discuss two broad points this
afternoon : first, the current overall research
and development program in the United
States and how that effort relates to any
discussion of financial targets; and second,
some of the particular new programs that the
United States is undertaking and is prepared
to expand in the developing countries and
how these new efforts demonstrate, we be-
lieve, our willingness to participate even
more vigorously and at higher levels of ac-
tivity in the future.

We would like to summarize our overall
position and then amplify a number of spe-
cific points.

As is well known, U.S. governmental and
nongovernmental organizations support a
large and diverse range of science and tech-
nologj- programs in the United States and
worldwide which produce many benefits for
developing countries. Even by the crudest
calculations, the financial resources being

devoted to such activities probably exceed
the financial targets proposed by some dele-
gations. Thus, we are not opposed to the con-
cept of targets out of concern that we are
not doing our share or that we will suffer
embarrassment. On the contrary, we are
proud of the effort we are making in this re-
gard. However, we are convinced that the
concept of abstract targets diverts attention
from the real issues, causes endless confu-
sion in trying to determine what is meant,
and sets an unhealthy precedent in placing
finances ahead of programmatic considera-
tions.

Experience has repeatedly shown that
when there are sound programs, which re-
flect technological reality and take into ac-
count the critical issues of the socioeconomic
environment, funding is available from a
number of sources. Thus, programs should be
the first order of business of this committee.
Therefore we are prepared to discuss in de-
tail what we are doing, what we are plan-
ning, and what else must be done.

Now, with this summary in mind, permit
us to explain in more detail the reasons and
facts involved.

As we stated in our previous intervention,
the United States is currently the source of
about one-half of the world's R. & D. effort.
Oui- current annual R. & D. expenditui-es are
approximately $30 billion — about $17 billion
funded by the Federal Government and $18
billion by the private sector including indus-
try, foundations, and universities. During the
past several years the level of government
support has been about constant while the
support by the private sector has been
growing.

This level of funding supports several
hundred thousand scientists and engineers
engaged in research and development. More
than half of these are employed in industry,
and of course there are several million addi-
tional technical workers engaged in indus-
trial manufacturing operations that require
considerable technological skill. In short, the
money and the manpower involved in the
U.S. R. & D. program are substantial.

We do not mention this simply to praise
ourselves. Rather, we want to point out that.

May 21, 1973

665

for example, a 1 percent shift in our R. & D.
program — equivalent to $300 million an-
nually— would mean a shift of 5,000 scien-
tists and engineers, requiring new laboratory
facilities costing several hundred million
dollars and supporting staffs of several thou-
sand technicians and administrators. To
what specific programs and in what regions
would these resources be assigned? Do we
want biologists or mechanical engineers?
Would work be performed in marine areas
or industrial centers? It makes little sense
to talk about large sums of money until spe-
cific programs are defined. Given the mag-
nitude of our R. & D. base, my government
believes it is unwise to consider even very
small percentage adjustments until we have
a far better idea of what we are doing.

U.S. Research and Development Activities

Now we would like to illustrate what is
already being done in our R. & D. programs.

Any estimate of our expenditures that
benefit developing countries depends on a
variety of judgments concerning the nature
and purpose of R. & D. Mentioning a few
programs may indicate the complexity of
such judgments and at the same time high-
light the types of activities of particular
interest :

—Most of the $1.5 billion program of the
National Institutes of Health directly or in-
directly benefits people throughout the world.

— Many of the seed, pesticide, and fer-
tilizer programs of the Department of Agri-
culture are obviously of immediate value to
many agricultural countries. And in one
sense our entire $350 billion R. & D. pro-
gram in agriculture is pertinent to world-
wide concerns.

— Research of broad international interest
permeates the entire program of the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion. This effort is in the range of $100
million.

— Geophysical prospecting techniques de-
veloped and currently being refined by the
U.S. Geological Survey are in use throughout
the world. This technology rests upon liter-

ally billions of dollars of R. & D. sponsored
by several U.S. agencies over the past 20
years.

— The U.S. Government's energy R. & D.
programs total about $700 million. We are
investing in technologies which will make
energy more plentiful, less costly, and less
polluting for all nations, both in the near
term and in the more distant future.

— Our $200 million governmental R. & D.
effort on education is of course tailored
largely to our own needs at home. But the
focus of much of this work is on achiev-
ing a deeper understanding of how children
learn, and the knowledge gained can in time
provide direct benefits for school systems
throughout the world.

— Expenditures of our foreign aid agency
involving some aspect of science and tech-
nology total in the hundreds of millions of
dollars annually.

— U.S. foundations provide more than $40
million annually in support of R. & D. in de-
veloping countries. And this does not include
the major research programs in several
fields, such as reproductive biology, which
are obviously relevant to development goals.

—More than 100,000 foreign students are
currently being trained in the United States.
This alone represents a U.S. contribution of
more than $100 million.

—The R. & D. efforts of U.S. petroleum
companies have resulted in many large off-
shore discoveries now being exploited by de-
veloping countries.

—United Fruit, General Motors, and Fire-
stone are among the U.S. firms with re-
search laboratories in developing countries.

—Gillette and Standard Oil are among the
U.S. firms supporting small research and ed-
ucation foundations in developing countries.

Any effort to tally up the dollar total of
these and related efforts is plagued with con-
fusion. Are health delivery systems, agri-
cultural extension activities, highway con-
struction, and economic research considered
science and technology? Is all teacher train-
ing included? What types of equipment are
included?

666

Department of State Bulletin

i

An attempt to define what is meant by the
proi)osed targets will involve endless debates
and can at best result only in arbitrary and
meaningless categorizations. But of more
serious concern is that debating targets di-
verts the attention of development practi-
tioners and of this committee away from the
key issues of how science and technology
can be effectively applied. These issues relate
largely to institutional and manpovi^er capac-
ity and to an economic environment that
encourages innovation. In short, the country
must be genuinely ready for science and
technology investments if they are to have an
impact on development. It makes little sense
to earmark a percentage for science and
technology in many countries, especially in
the least developed countries. And perhaps
most importantly, there must be sjiecific pro-
gram approaches that can be judged in
comiietition with other claims on scarce
resources.

Now in line with our views about the im-
portance of concentrating on specific new
programs, we wish to illustrate our actions.

New opportunities range from very dra-
matic possibilities being opened by recent de-
velopments in remote geophysical sensing
from satellites and aircraft — reflected in col-
laborative programs in many countries in-
cluding, for example, the Philippines.
Indonesia, and Brazil — to technological
breakthroughs for overcoming problems that
have long i:)lagued development, such as erad-
ication of the vampire bat in Latin America
and genetic control of mosquitoes in east
Africa.

As the interests of developing countries in
science and technology have risen, the United
States has turned its attention to practical
approaches foi* employing science and tech-
nologj' as perhaps the most promising tool
for reducing the development gap. We are
convinced that a wide range of practical
steps can be taken. Therefore we are pre-
pared to make as firm a commitment as any
nation — in in-ogrammatic terms — to harness-
ing the power of science and technology' to
development. What specifically are we now

jirepared to do in accelerating our efforts
science and technology?

in

Priorities in U.S. Foreign Aid Program

In our foreign aid program, first priority
has been given to reinforcing the efforts
of developing countries to establish and
strengthen their agricultural capabilities and
particularly their research capabilities. In
addition to our support for the World Bank's
Consultative Group, we now participate in
bilateral agricultural research activities in
more than 30 countries. Many of these pro-
grams are multimillion-dollar undertakings.
All of them are veiy serious long-term en-
deavors involving the most gifted and expe-
rienced agricultural research specialists in
the United States.

Another high priority is the health field.
Broad-scale attacks on a number of serious
diseases are currently being launched in co-
operation with WHO [World Health Organi-
zation] throughout the world and particu-
larly in Africa. There is no doubt that U.S.
work in the biomedical sciences has improved
and will continue to improve the lives of
millions of people in developing countries. For
example, through several channels of Fed-
eral and private funding, we are expanding
our research efforts in reproductive biology.
We will continue our efforts to more fully
engage our medical talent in endeavors rele-
vant to development.

A more recent priority of our aid program
is in the field of industrial technology — to
assist developing countries to choose, adapt,
and develop appropriate technologies. One
example of this new effort is a $15 million
assistance program currently being develojjed
with Brazil to assist the State of Sao Paulo
introduce technological innovations which
will lead to increased exports in the fields of
metallurgy, mechanical engineering, and
food technology. In Guatemala, the capabil-
ities of the Central American Technological
Research Institute are being expanded to
serve industry throughout the region. Many
other examples involving the countries repre-

Moy 21, 1973

667*

sented on this committee could also be cited.

In general, with regard to our foreign aid
program, we intend not only to increase the
level of support for science and technology
activities but also to:

—Give new emphasis to attracting the top
U.S. talent to development activities, as ex-
emplified by a recent five-year grant to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology to use
its reservoir of expertise in adapting the in-
dustrial and public works technology in the
United States to the conditions of developing

countries.

—Respond more fully to the specific types
and quality of talent and technologies being
sought by developing countries.

—Begin to translate into concrete pro-
grammatic terms, in a number of fields, the
concept of international networks of research
institutes, a pattern which has proved so
successful in the agricultural field.

—Undertake a long-term commitment to
assist developing countries to identify and
develop technologies which are appropriate
for their capital and labor resources, as re-
flected in recent programs initiated at the
Georgia Institute of Technology and the
Denver Research Institute.

Expand global research efforts to use

modern science in addressing problems that
affect large masses of people in fields such
as housing technology.

Provide greater flexibility in our foreign

aid instruments, such as greater involvement
of local technical talent in feasibility studies
and innovative uses of development loans for
placing technical expertise at the service of
developing countries.

Consultation With the Private Sector

While our foreign aid agency is the only
organization authorized to conduct research
for the benefit of developing countries, we
believe we should maximize the applications
in developing countries from the results of
our domestic R. & D. programs. In this re-
gard we will increase systematic efforts to

review our total R. & D. effort to (a) identify
activities of potential benefit for development
and (b) make available to interested develop-
ing countries those technological reports
which will enable them to begin to exploit
previously untapped benefits. As Dr. Seitz
pointed out in our initial statement, many
concepts and products of our R. & D. have
been and will continue to be almost immedi-
ately transferable without special large
funding.

With regard to the R. & D. activities of U.S.
industry, during the past three years we have
intensified our consultations with many U.S.
multinational corporations interested in de-
veloping countries. The Latin American dele-
gations are familiar with the extensive
discussions that have been carried on with
the Council of the Americas, which repre-
sents the principal U.S. investors in Latin
America. In addition we have carefully sur-
veyed the R. & D. activities of more than
100 U.S. firms which contribute to the tech-
nological infrastructure of developing coun-
tries. We have enlisted the help of the Na-
tional Academy of Engineering to work with
both industry and government in finding
R. & D. approaches that will be mutually ad-
vantageous both to the firms and the develop-
ing countries. As we are all aware, this
process is diflRcult, but it is critical to the
relations among our countries in the years
ahead. The U.S. Government will accelerate
its eflforts to work with the private sector in
our common effort to seek a better harmoni-
zation of commercial and developmental
objectives.

In conclusion, we would like again to pro-
pose a specific activity for this committee
that can have broad program implications in
many areas of science and technology. Rather
than rewriting past reports— or debating
vague future targets— let us bridge the gap
between talk and action. Let us make this
committee's work significant by planning seri-
ous followup tasks. We believe that it would
benefit all members of this committee for the
Secretary General, in collaboration with ap-

668

Department of State Bulletin .

proi)riate experts and ACASTD and with the
cooperation of member governments, to
carry out diirinp the next year a careful and
action-oriented examination of the problems
of planninjr and management of R. & D. in
the developing countries. In particular, such
a study should examine the ingredients of suc-
cess of the international agricultural research
networks in the fields of rice, wheat, and
corn and then attempt to extend the lessons
that have been learned to other research
areas of worldwide importance. This work
would combine attention on the needs for
modern national R. & D. management with a
focus on successful patterns of international
partnerships so that national R. & D. invest-
ments can pay off. We are submitting to the
Secretariat a draft resolution which can pro-
vide the basis for discussion of this proposal
under agenda item 10; a draft copy is also
being circulated to the committee at this
time.'

Turning more directly to the question of
the quantification of science and technology
activities, we are also proposing that the Sec-
retary General give high priority to the re-
search required to answer many of the ques-
tions raised about the feasibility of quantifi-
cation during this session. Specifically, he
should call on appropriate experts to define
with some precision the types of science and
technology activities that can be quantified
in a meaningful way. Assuming that appro-
priate guidelines with worldwide applicabil-
ity can be developed, which is far from clear,
member governments should then be re-
quested to indicate current levels of activity
and recent and projected trends. With this
information in hand, we believe we could
have a discussion of the quantification issue.

In short, our two-pronged i^roposal empha-
sizes the overriding importance of program-
matic efforts but recognizes the need for a
serious response to growing interest in quan-
titative indicators of science and technology
activitv.

United Nations Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeof/rnplied or processed documentx (such as
thoae listed below) may be constdted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
10017.

Security Council

Report of the Secretary General on the activities
of the Special Representative to the Middle East.
S/10792. September 15, 1972. 2 pp.
Lebanon sector. S/10824. November 2, 1972. 2 pp.

Report by the Secretary General on the implementa-
tion of Security Council Resolution 319 (1972)
concerning- the question of Namibia. S/10832.
November 15, 1972. 41 pp.

Report by the Secretary General on the United Na-
tions operation in Cyprus (for the period May
27-December 1, 1972). S/10842. December 1, 1972.
25 pp.

Fifth report of the Security Council committee es-
tablished in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968)
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia.
S/10852. December 22, 1972. 30 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

'Not printed here; for texts of U.S. draft resolu-
tions, see USUN press release 27 dated Mar. 23.

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement
on "Advance Charter" Flights

The Department of State announced on
April 2 (press release 97) that the United
States and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, by means of
an exchange of notes at Washington on
March 30, had accepted a memorandum of
understanding on travel group charters
(TGC's) and advance booking charters
(ABC's) under which each party will ac-
cept as charterworthy transatlantic traffic
originated in the territory of the other party
and organized and operated pursuant to the
"advance charter" (TGC or ABC) rules of
that party. Other provisions of the memo-
randum deal with enforcement and arrange-

Moy 21, 1973

669

ments to minimize administrative burdens on
carriers and organizers of "advance char-
ters." While this is not an exchange of eco-
nomic rights, in discussions leading to the
conclusion of the understanding both gov-
ernments expressed the hope that it would
be possible to accord liberal treatment to
applications for "advance charter" flights.
This understanding with the United King-
dom is the first of a series of such agreements
the United States hopes to be able to conclude
soon with other states to facilitate the oper-
ation of "advance charters." (For texts ot
the exchange of notes and the memorandum
of understanding, see press release 97.)

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.
Acceptance deposited: Swaziland, April 30, 1973.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972.'

Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, April 30,
1973.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices.
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.'
Signatures : Japan, Kenya, Paraguay, Tanzania,
April 30, 1973.

Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation
Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December
15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952;
for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS
7063.
Accession deposited: Mauritius, March 29, 1973.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of

the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9,

1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.-'

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic

(with reservations and a declaration), March

27, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force
December 13, 1964; for the United States June
24, 1967. TIAS 6298.
Accession deposited: Honduras, April 16, 1973.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phono-
grams against unauthorized duplication of their
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971.^
Accession deposited: Argentina, March 19, 1973.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New
York December 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan-
uary 4, 1969."

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic (with a reservation and a declaration),
March 27, 1973.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of
slavery, the slave trade and institutions and
practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva Sep-
tember 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30,
1957; for the United States December 6, 1967. ]
TIAS 6418.

Notification of succession: Zambia, March 26, I
1973. j

Telecommunications i

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as ;
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590) on space
communications, with annexes. Done at Geneva |
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. 1
TIAS 7435. .'

Notification of approval: Ukrainian Soviet So- ;
cialist Republic, January 30, 1973.

White Slave Traffic

Agreement for the suppression of the white slave :
traffic, as amended by the protocol of May 4,
1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904.
Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United:
States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.
Notification of succession: Zambia, March 26,
1973.

Women — Political Rights j|

Convention on the political rights of women. Done \
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force:
July 7, 1954."

Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub- '
lie (with reservations and a declaration), '
March 27, 1973.

BILATERAL

Brazil '■

Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed'
minute, and exchanges of notes. Signed at Brasilia

Not in force.
' Not in force for the United States.

670

Department of State Bulletin

ii

May 0, 1972. Entered into force February 11,

1978.

Proclaimed by the President: April 27, 1973.

Colombia

AkTc'oniont for sales of aRricultura! commodities,
relating to the apreenient of March 4, 1970
(TIAS 7189). Signed at Rogotii April 24, 1973.
Entered into force April 24, 1973.

' Ethiopia

Apreoment amending the treaty of amity and eco-
nomic relations of September 7, 1951, to termi-
nate notes concerning administration of justice.
I Effected by exchange of notes at Addis Ababa
I September 16, 1965, and October 20. 1972.'
Ratified by the President: April 25, 1973.

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the deposit by Guatemala
of ten percent of the value of grant military
assistance and excess defense articles furnished
by the United States. Effected by exchange of
notes at Guatemala May 16 and July 19, 1972.
Entered into force: April 26, 1973.
^Arrangement relating to radio communications be-
tween amateur stations on behalf of third par-
ties. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala
October 21 and November 19, 1971.
Entered into force: May 26, 1973.

Hungary

Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7,
1972.
Ratified by the President: April 16, 1972.

Japan

Understanding relating to the prepayment by Japan
of remaining obligations under the agreement
of January 9, 1962, for the settlement of post-
war economic assistance and the agricultural
commodities agreements of May 31, 1955, and
February 10, 1956. Effected by exchange of notes
at Washington April 30, 1973. Entered into'
force April 30, 1973.

Poland

Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972.
Ratified by the President: April 10, 1973.

Romania

Jonsular convention, with protocol. Signed at

Bucharest July 5, 1972.

Rntit'trd by the President: April 16, 1973.

Sweden

Arrangement relating to certificates of airworthi-
ness for imported aircraft. Effected by exchange
of notes at Stockholm December 22, 1954. Entered
I into force December 22, 1954. TIAS 3159.
" Terminated: April 26, 1973.
Agreement relating to airworthiness certifications.
Effected by exchange of notes at Stockholm
April 24 and 26, 1973. Entered into force April
26, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

' Not in force.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department
of State. Washington, D.C. 20520. A 25-percent dis-
count is made on orders for 100 or more copies of
any one publication mailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, must accompany orders.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each con-
tains a map, a list of principal government officials
and U.S. diplomatic and consular ofl^cers, and a
reading list. (A complete set of all Background
Notes currently in stock — at least 140 — $16.35; 1-
year subscription service for approximately 77 up-
dated or new Notes — $14.50; plastic binder — $1.50.)
Single copies of those listed below are available
at 200 each.

Botswana Catalog No. S1.123:B65/970

Pub. 8046 4 pp.
Colombia Catalog No. S1.123:C71/970

Pub. 7767 8 pp.
Nicaragua Catalog No. S1.123:N51/969

Pub. 7772 4 pp.
Romania Catalog No. S1.123:R66/970

Pub. 7890 7 pp.

i:.S. Trade Prospects With the P.R.C.: A Realistic
Assessment. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign
Policy series is the text of an address by Marshall
Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
and Pacific Affairs, before the China Trade Sym-
posium spon.sored by the University of Southern
California Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion at Los .Angeles, Calif., on Oct. 9, 1972. Pub.
8687. East Asian and Pacific Series 207. 7 pp.
150.

The Role of International Law in Combating Terror-
ism. Statements on this subject by John R. Steven-
son, then Legal Adviser of the Department of State,
and Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Representative
of the United States to Committee V (Legal) of the
U.N. General Assembly, provide the basis for this
pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series. Pub.
8689. General Foreign Policy Series 270. 7 pp.
20< postpaid.

Inaugural Address, January 20, 1973. Text of the
inaugxiral address made by President Nixon at the
Capitol. Pub. 8692. General Foreign Policy Series
271. 7 pp. Not For Sale. A limited number of
copies are available free from the Public Inquiries
Division, Ofl^ce of Media Services, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Omega Navigational Station. ."Vgreement with Japan.
TIAS 7428. 11 pp. 20?.

v^oy 21, 1973

671

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries — Panel Membership
and Regulatory Measures. Protocol to the convention
of February 8, 1949. TIAS 7432. 11 pp. 15(f.

Screwworm Eradication Program. Agreement with
Mexico. TIAS 7438. 12 pp. IS)}.

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Brazil. TIAS 7439. 49 pp. 40^

Weather Stations^Cooperative Meteorological Pro-
gram. Agreement with the Bahamas. TIAS 7441.
5 pp. 15(J.

Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Agrreement
with Argentina. TIAS 7442. 6 pp. 10(f.

Economic Assistance for Relief and Rehabilitation.

Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 7443. 15 pp.

25^

Loan of Vessel — U.S.S. Chevalier. Agreement with
the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7445. 5 pp. 15(i.

Use by Civil Aircraft of Airfield at Grand Turk
Auxiliary Air Base. Agi'eement with the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
TIAS 7446. 9 pp. Ibf.

Prevention of Foot-and-Mouth Disease and Rinder-
pest. Agreement with British Honduras. TIAS
7447. 6 pp. 15^

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Norway
amending annex C to the agreement of January 27,
1950. TIAS 7448. 3 pp. 15(4.

Cooperation in Combating Illicit International Traffic
in Narcotics and Other Dangerous Drugs. Memo-
randum of understanding with Argentina. TIAS

7450. 4 pp. 10^:.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesia
amending the agreement of May 26, 1972. TIAS

7451. 2 pp. 15^

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam. TIAS 7452. 4 pp. 15('.

Treaty on the Swan Islands with Honduras. TIAS
7453. 7 pp. 15^!.

Swan Islands Cooperative Meteorological Program.

Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 7454. 15 pp.
200.

Swan Islands— Electric Power for Certain Facilities.

Agreement with Honduras supplementing the me-
teorological program agreement of November 22,
1971. TIAS 7455. 4 pp. 150.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam amending the agreement of June 28, 1971, as
amended, and the agreement of April 19, 1972, as
amended. TIAS 7456. 2 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan
amending the agreement of March 9, 1972, as
amended. TIAS 7457. 2 pp. 150.

Social Security. Agreement with Argentina. TIAS
7458. 4 pp. 100.

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Military As-
sistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Saudi Arabia.
TIAS 7459. 5 pp. 100.

Binational Science Foundation. Agreement with Is-
rael. TIAS 7460. 10 pp. 150.

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1971. Agreement with Paraguay. TIAS
7461. 4 pp. 100.

Commission for Educational Exchange. Agreement
with Denmark amending the agreement of May 28,
1962, as amended. TIAS 7462. 4 pp. 150.

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Convention with
Belgium. TIAS 7463. 79 pp. 550.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam. TIAS 7464. 3 pp. 100.

International Plant Protection. TIAS 7465. 35 pp.
300.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan.
TIAS 7466. 3 pp. 100.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam
amending the agreement of April 19, 1972, as
amended. TIAS 7467. 2 pp. 150.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Re-
public of China correcting the agreement of Decem-
ber 30, 1971. TIAS 7468. 2 pp. 150.

Military Training Scholarships — Deposits Under For-
eign Assistance Act of 1971. Agreement with Mexico.
TIAS 7469. 4 pp. 150.

Committee on Water Quality in the St. John River
Basin. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 7470. 7
pp. 150.

Whaling — Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention of 1946. Adopted at the
Twenty-fourth Meeting of the International Whal-
ing Commission. TIAS 7471. 3 pp. 150.

Settlement of Lend Lease, Reciprocal Aid and Claims, i

Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- {
publics. TIAS 7478. 12 pp. 15«*.

It

672

Department of State Bulletin

\i

±j^^ r « < < ,

A V ly. J / 1/47

Secrptary Rofjers Discusses Six Concerns
American Foreign Policy (statement
fore Senate Committee on Foreiffn Rela-
ions) 633

F BnrnndL Letters of Credence (Ndabaniwc) . . 637

r.imbodia. Department Discusses Presidential
\uthority To Continue U.S. Air Combat

I^^Oporations in Cambodia (.statement sub-
^niitted to Senate Committee on Foreign
^■Relations) 652

CSiina. Prospects and Policy on East- West

de (Casey) 638

ssional Documents Relating- to Foreign

'olicy 655

rtment Discusses Presidential Authority

o Continue U.S. Air Combat Operations

Cambodia (statement submitted to Senate

mmittee on Foreign Relations) .... 652

tary Rogers Discusses Six Concerns of

merican Foreign Policy (statement before

ate Clommittee on Foreign Relations) . . 633

rtment and Foreign Service. Members of
dvisory Committee on Science and Foreig^n
ffairs 650

'eloping Countries. United States Urges
actical Approach in Applying Science and
'echnology to Development (Kitchen, Seitz) 661

omic Affairs. I*resident Nixon Increases
luotas for Import of Cheese 651

pe

ts and Policy on East-West Trade

Casey) 638

tary Rogers Discusses Six Concerns of
merican Foreign Policy (statement before
mate Committee on Foreign Relations) . . 633

any. Letters of Credence (von Staden) . 637

ernment Operations

Rhoads Named Acting Chairman of Classi-

ation Review Committee 650

ident Receives Progress Report of Classi-
ation Review Ck>mmittee (memorandum
m Committee) 649

< International I^w. International Law as an

Instrument of National Policy (Brower) . . 644

I^tin America. Secretary Rogers Discusses Six
Concerns of American Foreign Policy (state-
ment before Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations) 633

b Middle East

l^taeretary Rogers Discusses Six Concerns of

m^merican Foreign Policy (statement before

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) . 633

■i. Opposes Middle East Violence and Terror-
sm (. Seal i, text of resolution) 656

Military Affairs. Secretary Rogers Discusses
iHBix Concerns of American Foreign Policy
I^Hstatement before Senate Committee on
I^Voreign Relations fi'''i

I^Btlications. Recent Releases r>71

IKde

i^ogpects and Policy on East-West Trade

Casey) 638

retary Rogers Discu.sses .Six Concerns of
\merican F'oreign Policy (statement before

B Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) . . 633
I

Treaty Information

Current Actions 670

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement on "Advance
Charter" Flights 669

United Nations

United Nations Documents 669

U.S. Opposes Middle East Violence and Terror-
ism (Scali, text of resolution) 656

United States Urges Practical Approach in
Applying Science and Technology to De-
velopment (Kitchen, Seitz) 661

Viet-Nam. Department Discusses Presidential
Authority To Continue U.S. Air Combat
Operations in Cambodia (statement sub-
mitted to Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations) 652

Name Index

Brower, Charles N 644

Casey, William J 638

Kitchen, Robert W., Jr 661

Ndabaniwe, .Joseph 637

Rhoads, James B 650

Rogers, Secretary 633

Scali, John 656

Seitz, Frederick 661

von Staden, Berndt 637

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 30— May 6

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 6 which ap-
pear in this issue of the BuujrriN are Nos.
97 of April 2, 115 of April 20, 122 of April 27,
and 123 of April 28.

No. Date Sabject

124 4/30 Rogers: Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations.

125 4/30 Statement on Presidential au-

thority to continue U.S. air
combat operations in Cambodia.

*126 5/1 Handley named Senior Adviser
to the Secretary of State and
Coordinator for International
Narcotics Matters (biographic
data).

*127 5/1 Shipping Coordinating Commit-
tee meeting, May 23.

tl28 5/2 Rush: Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations.

*129 5/2 Architect Louis Kahn to partic-
ipate in Department of State
program abroad.

•130 6/2 Paul W. McCracken to lecture
in Europe for Department of
State.

-131 5/3 Cancellation of meeting of Ed-
ucational and Cultural Affairs
Advisory Commission.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. government printing office

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402

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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

>^' u^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1770

May 28, 1973

1972: A YEAR OF HISTORIC NEGOTIATIONS
Remarks by President Nixon 673

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1973 TRANSMITTED

TO THE CONGRESS

Message From President Nixon 693

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974
Statement by Deputy Secretary Rush 696

OAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETS AT WASHINGTON 675

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1770
May 28, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
PRICE :
52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
dome-stic $29, foreign $36.25
Single copy 65 cents
Use of funds for printing this publication ap-
proved by the Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971).

/Vote .' Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETS
a weekly publication issued by
Office of Media Services, Bureau
Public Affairs, provides the public i
interested agencies of the government
with information on developments in
the field of U.S. foreign relations
on the work of the Department
the Foreign Service.
The BULLETIN includes select^
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Departs
ment, and statements, addressed
and news conferences of the Presideiit
and the Secretary of State and othtf
officers of the Department, as well 01
special articles on various phases m
international affairs and the functions
of the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and intetr
national agreements to which tA
United States is or may become
party and on treaties of general i/ifcj
national interest.

Publications of the Department i
State, United Nations documents, ami
legislative material in the field (it
international relations are also liste

1972: A Year of Historic Negotiations

Remarks by President Nixon^

The year 1972 was a time of more dra-

itic progress toward a lasting peace in the

lid than any other year since the end of

'.rid War II. But as encouraging as that

pi ogress was, we cannot rest on our laurels

'A'.

Nineteen seventy-three and the years to
c ime will test whether America will go for-
ward into a new era of international rela-
• ns or whether we will go backward into

occupation with ourselves, thus allowing
world to slip back into its age-old pat-
• I ns of conflict.

If we meet this test, the rewards can be

at. If we do not, a priceless opportunity
.:.ay be tragically lost.

It is against this background of hope and
lianger that I have today submitted to the

ngress my fourth annual report on United

ites foreign policy. Tonight I want to
share with you some highlights of that
report.

Since the time of my last foreign policy
review, we have witnessed historic achieve-
ments on a number of fronts. After more
than two decades of hostility and isolation,
we have begun an entirely new relationship
with the People's Republic of China when I
visited Peking last year.

Travel, exchanges, and trade between our
two countries are accelerating. This month
we shall open Liaison Offices in each other's
capitals, headed by distinguished senior
diplomats.

The United States and the Soviet Union

The complete text of President Nix-
on's fourth annual foreign policy report
to the Congress, "United States Foreign
Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Dura-
ble Peace," tvill appear in the June h
issue of the Bulletin.

' Recorded for broadcast on radio on May 3
(Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
lated May 7).

have taken a decisive turn away from the
confrontation of the past quarter century.
At our meeting last May, the Soviet leaders
and I established a set of basic principles to
govern our relations.

We signed a series of cooperative agree-
ments, and we laid the foundation for major
increases in trade. Most importantly, w^e
reached an unprecedented agreement limit-
ing the nuclear arsenals that have haunted
the world for a generation.

In the early months of 1973, intensive ne-
gotiations and a decisive military policy
brought us at last to a just settlement of the
long and costly war in Viet-Nam. We
achieved our fundamental objectives — a
cease-fire, the return of our prisoners, a com-
mitment to account for those missing in ac-
tion, the honorable withdrawal of our forces,
and the right of the people of South Viet-
Nam to determine their own political future.

But the peace in Viet-Nam and the parallel
peace in Laos remain fragile because of
North Viet-Nam's continued violations of
the peace agreement. A cease-fire still has
not been reached in Cambodia. We earnestly
hope these problems can be solved at the con-
ference table. We will not turn our back on
our friends and allies while Hanoi makes a

May 28, 1973

673

mockery of its promise to help keep the
peace.

During recent months, with less fanfare
than in negotiations with our adversaries
but with no less dedication, we have also
been working closely with our Atlantic and
Pacific partners. In addition, we have moved
toward major reform of the international
economic system, although the process of
readjustment is still marked by crises.

We have continued to share more respon-
sibilities with our friends under the Nixon
doctrine. In sum, recalling the challenges we
faced and the goals we set at the outset of
this administration, all Americans can take
satisfaction in the record of the recent past.

But our progress in the early 1970's has
been more marked in reducing tensions than
in restructuring partnerships. That is why
we must make 1973 not only the year of
Europe, as some have called it, but also the
year of renewal for all of America's alliances
and friendships.

In this spirit, we shall cooperate with our
European friends to forge even stronger
partnerships, cemented by a new articula-
tion of the goals we share.

There will be the closest collaboration on
such major issues as the mutual and balanced
reduction of forces in Europe, the European
Security Conference, and the current round
of strategic arms limitation talks. Before
the end of the year I will visit our Atlantic
allies.

We shall also continue to attach the high-
est priority to our relations with our major
Pacific ally, Japan. Prime Minister Tanaka
will visit the United States this summer for
talks on this subject.

We shall work with all concerned nations
to create a stable monetary system and to
promote freer trade. To make this possible,
I again urge the Congress to pass promptly
the crucial trade legislation I submitted last
month.

We are also seeking in 1973 to further the

positive mementum in our relations with the
Soviet Union. I look forward to welcoming
the Soviet leadership to this country later in
the year.

Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, As-
sistant to the President for National Secu-
rity Affairs] leaves tonight for Moscow to
prepare for that visit. New U.S.-Soviet talks
are already underway aiming for further
agreements on controlling nuclear weapons.

We shall also continue this year to build
our promising new relationship with the
People's Republic of China.

We shall pay particular attention to our
neighbors in this hemisphere. Secretary Rog-
ers is soon to embark on a trip to Latin
America, and I look forward to a similar
journey myself during my second term.

We shall do our part with others to reduce
tensions and increase opportunity in such
areas as the Middle East, South Asia, and
Africa.

We shall continue building new partner-
ships of shared responsibilities with all our
friends around the globe. Approval of the
foreign aid bill which I sent to the Congress
this week will be fundamental to this effort.

Our policy in the world for the next four
years can be summarized quite simply :

Where peace is newly planted, we shall
work to make it thrive.

Where bridges have been built, we shallf
work to make them stronger. ;

Where friendships have endured, we shallS
work to make them grow. j

We shall keep America strong, involved!
in the world, meeting the responsibilities'
which no other free nation is able to meet in
building a structure of peace.

I said upon taking office more than fouri
years ago that a nation could aspire to no| ^
higher honor than the title of peacemaker, i
America has done much to earn that title^
since then. Let us resolve to do still more
in the years ahead.

f

674

Department of State Bulletirj

OAS General Assembly Meets at Washington

The third regnlar session of the General
Assembly of the Organization of American
States met at Washington April 4-15. FoU
lo^L'ing are texts of a message from Presi-
dent Nixon to Aristides Calvani, Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela and Presi-
dent of the Assembly, which tvas read before
the Assembly on April 5; a statement by
Secretary Rogers, chairman of the U.S. dele-
gation, made in plenai~y on April 6; a state-
ment by Acting Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs John Hugh Crim-
mins, a vice chairman of the U.S. delega-
tion, made in General Committee on April
11; and a resolution and a declaration
adopted by the Assembly on April 15.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON

It is with great pleasure that I extend my
warmest best wishes, and those of the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America,
to you and your fellow Foreign Ministers as
you begin this historic Assembly of the Or-
ganization of American States. The discus-
sions— and the decisions — of this gathering
can have a decisive influence on the shape of
future relations within the American family.

These relations have gone through an im-
portant transition over the past few years.
The days of paternalism have ended. The
days of promising more than could ever be
realized have also ended. In the process, each
of our countries has taken a careful look at
its own situation — at its problems and what
it could do about them. I am convinced that
'we have now laid the foundation for an en-
tirely new and beneficial relationship, for
what I some time ago called a "mature part-
nership" in the Americas.

That kind of partnenship implies many
things. It implies that there are common
goals to which we aspire. It implies a trust
and confidence in one another. It implies

that we can attain our goals more effectively
by pursuing them more cooperatively. Above
all, it implies that we consider interdepend-
ence an essential ingredient in the life of
our hemisphere.

There are obvious differences among us.
Some countries are large and others small.
Some are moving forward rapidly in eco-
nomic development, while others face very
difficult barriers to progress. Each country
has its own unique system of government.
Yet we have developed in this hemisphere
an understanding of those differences, and
a respect for the ways of others.

It would be a profound mistake, however,
for us to concentrate too much on our differ-
ences. For down that road lies only contro-
versy and confrontation.

I hope that in the discussions that lie ahead
we can focus on the areas where our inter-
ests converge. There are many such ai'eas.
Some concern us uniquely as countries of
the Western Hemisphere. Others — such as
building a sound and reliable monetary sys-
tem, and encouraging the fairer and freer
flow of trade — are of concern to countries
all over the world.

This month honors Pan American Week
and also marks the 25th Anniversary of the
signing of the OAS Charter of 1948. It is an
auspicious time to renew our faith in the
Inter-American system by beginning to plan
our common future. It is my hope that your
deliberations will point the way to a strong
new relationship among our peoples and
governments as we face together the prob-
lems— and the opportunities — of our time.

Richard Nixon.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY ROGERS, APRIL 6

Prms releue 102 dated April 6

This year marks the 25th anniversary of
the signing of the Charter of the Organiza-

Moy 28, 1973

675

tion of American States. Twenty-five years
is perhaps a short period in the life of na-
tions which have enjoyed over a century and
a half of productive relations.

We all are aware, nevertheless, how pro-
foundly the world has changed in those 25
years. The hostilities and rigidities that
characterized international relations then are
being left behind. This restructuring of
world politics has been accompanied by an
even more profound change in the world
economy. Europe and Japan have recovered
economically. Many nations in the devel-
oping world— including nations in Latm
America— have achieved both substantial
economic growth and self-confidence.

These are changes which have an effect
on all members of this organization. My na-
tion has been deeply involved in many of
them. The nations of Latin America have
broadened their global economic and political
involvement. Today more than ever, we are
all influenced by the broad currents of world
development.

It was in this context that in 1969 President
Nixon enunciated a new U.S. policy for Latin
America. That policy reflected the changes
in global and hemispheric relations which
had already begun. It anticipated other
changes in global economics and politics to
come. As the President described it in his
foreign policy report last year, the policy
reflected four positive themes : ^

A wider sharing of ideas and responsibility in

hemispheric collaboration;

—A mature U.S. response to political diversity
and nationalism;

—A practical and concrete U.S. contribution to
economic and social development;

— A humanitarian concern for the quality of life
in the hemisphere.

That policy is in keeping with our desire
for continued close association with the hem-
isphere and with the less intrusive interna-
tional role we have adopted and the people
of the United States have endorsed. It is a
policy which reflects Latin America's claim
and capacity to a greater voice in hem-

^ The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on Feb. 9, 1972, ap-
pears in the Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1972; the section
entitled "Latin America" begins on p. 358.

ispheric affairs. It is a policy which acknowl-
edges the diversity of the hemisphere even
as it provides a framework for hemispheric
collaboration. It is a policy which assumes
the interdependence of the Americas and the
involvement of the Americas in global
affairs.

It is a policy, we are convinced, that out-
lines a constructive approach to sound rela-
tions. With progress made toward a more
peaceful world generally, we are now in a
position to give our relations with you more
consistent attention. Over the next four
years :

We will continue to work closely with j

you on the many issues before the global j
community in which the United States and i
Latin America might develop convergent ,
interests. \

—We will concentrate within the hem- .
isphere on building upon areas of coopera- j

tion.

—We will maintain our support of your j

efforts to bring a better life to your citizens, j

channeling the bulk of our assistance !

through multilateral institutions while at the I
same time seeking to expand Latin America's

access to trade and investment opportunities, j

We will approach our bilateral dealings j

on the basis of how you conduct relations |
with us and not how you structure your so-
cieties internally. I

I
Trade and Monetary Matters

Close cooperation between us on global i
issues could be particularly constructive.
Many of the opportunities and challenges ,
before us can no longer be met in the hem- ,
isphere alone. Solutions must be found in i
the world community. On many such issues, j
U.S. and Latin American interests tend to ;
converge. On some they coincide.

Latin America and the United States can, |
in particular, be of assistance to each other
in improving the world monetary and train-
ing systems to assure that trade and capital
move with a minimum of restrictions and
that all nations share equitably in an expand- i
ing world economy.

President Nixon will shortly be proposing

676

Department of State Bulletin i

to Congress broad new trade legislation
which will include the authority we need to
carry out a policy of expanded and more
equitable world trade in the talks which start
this fail. During those talks we believe that
U.S. and Latin American delegations should
establish a system of liaison, for we believe
we share a number of common purposes
which we can promote together. We should,
for example, be able to cooperate on a num-
ber of concrete issues :

— We both will want to reduce barriers
to agricultural trade. Latin America relies
on agriculture for over half of its export
earnings. The United States, unique among
industrialized nations, exports 31 percent of
its crop. The removal of restrictive practices
against agricultural exports would benefit
us all.

— We share an interest in the elimination
of preferential arrangements which discrim-
inate against one group of developing coun-
tries in favor of another or in favor of a few
industrialized countries. Such exclusive ar-
rangements have already prejudiced some
exports from this hemisphere. Their exten-
sion will prejudice others. Neither Latin
America nor the United States wants a West-
ern Hemisphere trading bloc, nor have we
ever found any bloc system to be a beneficial
approach to our roles in international trade.

— We would all benefit from a reduction
or elimination of administrative barriers
which are used to artificially impede the
growth of imports.

I should add that it is important that the
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade] session be a time of serious negotia-
tions and not of confrontation. We will ap-
proach it this way and will seek to insure
that the needs of developing countries are
taken fully into account. We recognize of
course that the countries of Latin America
I will share many trade interests in these talks
with other developing nations. We also know
that the concerns of developed and develop-
ing nations — and of you and of us — will di-
verge at some points. But it is essential that
these differences not be allowed to deterio-
rate into the kind of sterile disputes that

characterized the last meeting of UNCTAD
[United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development]. Latin American countries
could provide leadership at the GATT session
by encouraging all states to concentrate upon
the achievement of concrete economic results
and to avoid political issues more appro-
priate to other forums.

The trade negotiations must, of course,
take place in a single forum, the GATT. But
we believe joint participation there could
be made more effective through further dis-
cussion among us on trade issues in the
Special Committee for Consultation and
Negotiations.

As the recent meeting of the Finance Min-
isters of the Committee of Twenty has
shown, the United States and the states of
Latin America also share a number of con-
vergent interests in world monetary talks.
We worked closely with Argentina, Brazil,
and Mexico in those talks and expect to con-
tinue to work with the nations of Latin
America to seek a monetary system that
will :

— Foster balance of payments adjustments
by all countries, surplus and deficit, large
and small ;

— Make special drawing rights the princi-
pal reserve instrument and the common
denominator in the system ; and

— Recognize the interdependence of do-
mestic and international economic policies,
including the critical role of inflation
control.

Law of the Sea

Law of the sea is another international
issue where we can cooperate to achieve
constructive results. Speaking in 1970 on the
the law of the sea. President Nixon said that
if it is not modernized by common action,
unilateral actions and international conflict
are inevitable. Three years have further con-
firmed that we must reach an international
agreement.

Nations in Latin America, as elsewhere in
the world, have adopted diverse stands on
many of the issues involved. This diversity
reflects such factors as whether or not they

May 28, 1 973

677

are coastal states, whether they have a large
or small continental shelf, whether they pos-
sess significant maritime interests, whether
they have extensive or limited resources
adjacent to their coasts. But while interests
are diverse we earnestly hope that all the
nations of the world, including most espe-
cially those of this hemisphere, can concur
that each nation's interests ultimately can
only be protected by international agreement.
And we hope that we all will be prepared
to make the accommodations necessary to
build a broadly based international agree-
ment.

In our opinion an international consensus
is emerging on many of the issues involved.
Certainly it is our hope that most states
would be able at an early date to agree on :

1. A broad coastal state economic juris-
diction, beyond a 12-mile territorial sea, in
which freedom of navigation and overflight
would continue;

2. The right of free transit through and
over international straits ;

3. An international agreement including
machinery for the deep seabed area and in-
ternational standards together with compul-
sory settlement of disputes for areas under
coastal state economic jurisdiction.

Some states of the hemisphere favor a
territorial sea broader than 12 miles. How-
ever, we hope that the common interest in
freedom of navigation and a common recog-
nition of the economic and security needs
of coastal states and the international com-
munity would lead all of us to agreement on
a 12-mile territorial sea. We then could con-
centrate on the extent and nature of a coastal
state economic jurisdiction which would ac-
commodate the interests of all states.

If this is the case, we believe that it should
be possible for the nations of this hemisphere
to make a major contribution to an agree-
ment which can be widely accepted, which
will benefit us all, and which will eliminate
present and potential conflicts. As we ap-
proach the Law of the Sea Conference we
would hope to intensify our consultations
with each of you to help advance the inter-
national consensus we believe is emerging.

Terrorism

The inter-American system has often led
the international community in devising
agreed approaches to common problems. The
OAS convention on acts of terrorism of in-
ternational significance was the first impor-
tant international effort to prevent and
punish crimes of violence against the repre-
sentatives of states and international organi-
zations. The U.S. Senate has approved the
convention, and we will be in a position to
deposit our instrument of ratification as soon
as implementing legislation is passed by our
Congress. We hope other signatory nations
will act promptly to ratify it and that the
OAS members who have not yet signed will
be able to lend their support.

Having led the way in arriving at an in-
ternational approach to confronting terror-
ism, the Americas, we hope, can now actively
cooperate in similar efforts to provide a
broader international consensus. We see three
areas where we can exert constructive lead-
ership together :

— By making civil aviation safer by agree-
ing at this summer's civil aviation conference
to deny refuge to those who commit terror-
ist acts against international civil aviation;

— By protecting diplomats through open-
ing for signature at the next U.N. General
Assembly a convention based on the draft
articles submitted by the International Law
Commission ; and

— By thwarting the spread of terrorism
through assuring that the ad hoc U.N. com-
mittee recommends to the next U.N. General
Assembly an international convention pro-
viding for extradition or punishment in cases
of international terrorism.

I hope our delegations could all be in-
structed to work together toward these aims.

Mr. President, I would like to turn now to
two areas in which cooperation within the
hemisphere itself remains important. I refer
to inter-American cooperation for develop-
ment and to the status of inter-American
institutions.

We are well aware how central economic
relationships are to the health of our cooper-

678

Department of State Bulletin

ation. In programs directed to the hemi-
spliere we will continue our support for
efforts to bring a better life to the citizens
of your countries.

Cooperation for Development

In recent years I believe we all have come
to the conclusion that development demands
a comprehensive approach which includes di-
mensions other than official assistance. We
now are specifically directing our own efforts
to insure that all aspects of the development
process are taken into account. Thus, I have
asked our new Under Secretary for Economic
Affairs to coordinate a comprehensive devel-
opment jiolicy — including development as-
sistance, international investment, debt
relief, trade expansion, and pojiulation
growth — so that the United States may bet-
ter support a more rapid per capita eco-
nomic growth in the developing world.

We concur in the view expressed in the
recent meeting of the Inter- American Eco-
nomic and Social Council that expanded
trade can be the mo.st important element in
this process. In fact, the document that
emerged from the Bogota meeting contained
many imi)ortant ideas which we support; we
regret that in the last day or two of its de-
velopment a number of contentious proposals
were added even though they would make
the result unacceptable to us.

Particularly because of our support for
accelerated development in Latin America,
we will also include in the trade bill we are
submitting to Congress next week a request
for authority to extend generalized tariff
preferences for develoiiing countries. It is
important to note that while it was necessary
for us to delay action on generalized tariff
preferences, our imports from Latin America
nevertheless have been growing substantially
for a number of years and last year rose by
18 percent.

I am not now in a i)osition to describe to
\'ou the details of the trade bill until it is
presented to our Congress next week. How-
ever, I will be pleased to make myself avail-
able, together with the Under Secretary for

Economic Affairs, to describe to you all
aspects of the legislative proposal.

Foreign private investment can also make
a major contribution to development. The
United States benefited from it during our
own development, and we expect increasing
Eurojjean and Japanese investment in our
economy over the next few years. Today, as
never before, other countries in this hemi-
sphere which seek such investment can also
draw it not only from the United States but
also from Europe and Japan,

Countries must of course decide for them-
selves whether they want to attract such
investment; and they will of course set for
themselves the rules under which the investor
operates. But foreign investors should be
able to rely on that determination. Because
we believe private capital can be a major
contribution to development and because we
know it will move freely only if there is con-
fidence that agreements will be observed, we
will continue to insist on just compensation
in cases of nationalization in accordance with
the policy announced last January. At the
same time, the U.S. Government is com-
mitted to the pacific settlement of disputes
by the procedures set forth in article 24 of
the charter and will cooperate fully with any
government that wishes to solve a problem
on fair terms that respect the interests of
both sides. In most cases, various i)rocedures
are possible, but the point of departure for
any solution is good-faith negotiation in a
spirit of compromise.

Grant and loan assistance also continues
to have an important role in development. We
intend to carry out our bilateral and multi-
lateral assistance commitments. Thus, we
are proceeding this spring with a request to
Congress for the next installment of $693
million in our contribution to the replenish-
ment of the Inter-American Development
Bank.

Though it is unrealistic to project in-
creases, we will make every effort to main-
tain our total a.ssistance flows to Latin
America at their present levels.

Perhaps the most easily controlled variable

■lAoy 28, 1973

679

in accelerating the growth of per capita in-
come is the rate of population increase.
Latin America's population is still expand-
ing at approximately 2.8 percent per year,
the highest rate in the world. Thus, despite
the fact that the area's gross product has
recently been expanding at over 6 percent a
year, increases in population have cut the
per capita gains to just over 3 percent. This
is an area where we believe more rapid prog-
ress can be made.

Not all nations of the hemisphere share
our deep concern for the effects of too rapid
population growth. But we can all be pleased
that the former Foreign Secretary of Mexico,
Dr. Carrillo Flores, will be the Executive Di-
rector of the United Nations World Popula-
tion Year in 1974. And we were encouraged
to see that at the recent meeting of Latin
American Ministers of Health agreement was
reached that governments should provide
family planning services and information
wherever national policies permit.

Inter-American Relations

The changes that have taken place in
global economics and politics have also
brought us to a new period in inter-American
relations. In the immediate future we will
all be reassessing the multilateral structures
through which they are conducted.

In this connection some of you see an
anomaly in the static nature of our relations
with Cuba at a time when we are moving in
such positive directions with Moscow and
Peking. There is an anomaly, but we believe
it lies in Cuba's attitudes, not in U.S. policy.
The dramatic progress in our relations with
China and the U.S.S.R. could not come about
except as a result of mutuality. Thus far, we
perceive no change in Cuba's basic position.
At a time when the world is putting enmity
behind it, Cuba continues to place an antag-
onistic and interventionist attitude at the
center of its policy. Its military ties remain.

Though there have been shifts in Cuba's
behavior in the hemisphere, the changes do
not seem to us to reflect a modification of its
basic policies toward other American states.
We are aware that while many in this Orga-

nization take a similar view others have a
different opinion. But we have so far seen no
evidence of change in Cuban policies suffi-
cient to convince us that the OAS economic
and diplomatic measures toward Cuba should
be altered.

For all these reasons our policies toward
Cuba remain unchanged, as does our com-
mitment to act only in concert with the
other members of the OAS.

Indeed, our intention is to work in concert
with the OAS wherever possible. That is why
we attach significance to the important items
9 and 10 on our agenda. Those items, pro-
posed by the Secretary General of this Or-
ganization and by the distinguished Foreign
Minister of Venezuela, reflect a desire to
move away from the unproductive atmos-
phere which has recently been too frequent
and to move toward means of working for
common purposes. This is also evident in the
mission undertaken by the Chairman of
CIAP [Inter-American Committee on the
Alliance for Progress].

As we seek together to expand our collab-
oration and minimize contention between us,
we are prepared to work with all member
states to improve the OAS. We will study
carefully any suggestions made here or in
the committee which may be established.
And we will have suggestions of our own.

But ultimately the success of this or any
other organization will be defined not by its
structure but by the attitudes brought to it
by its membership. Thus, in examining the
OAS we will in fact be studying the "spirit
of the hemisphere." The United States does
not believe that this spirit implies an obliga-
tion to agree on all issues. But it does be-
lieve that the spirit must take into account
certain realities: the reality that many issues
cannot be resolved within the inter-Ameri-
can framework; the reality that there are
practical limits to U.S. commitments; the
reality that most problems within a country
must be solved by the country itself; that a
beneficial, cooperative relationship among
nations requires mutual respect. The United
States respects every nation here repre-
sented. We will work cooperatively with each

II.

I lii

i !J

I ]

; 'III

680

Department of State Bulletin

nation in this Organization on the basis of
mutuality. The United States believes that
the spirit that bring:s us together in this
room must rest on the proposition that
honest differences can and should be nego-
tiated. It is the attitude of cooperation, ac-
commodation, and reciprocal adjustment
that has made our association fruitful in the
past; it is an attitude that can enable us to
reap new benefits in the future.

The I'nited States thus welcomes the op-
portunity to enter into a constructive review
of hemispheric relations. We see 1973 as a
year of building. Now that the world is a
safer place, there are energies, talents, and
resources that can now be turned to other
purposes. Latin America will have a high
place on our agenda. I will participate per-
sonally in this effort and expect in the next
few months to fulfill my longstanding desire
to visit Latin America to exchange points of
view with many of you in your own capitals.
In taking that trip I will be motivated by a
constructive desire to make our association
as firm, as realistic, and as equitable as
friends can make it.

This meeting of the OAS General Assem-
bly could have a decisive influence on the
future of our community. If that influence is
to be constructive, we should concentrate on
areas where our interests converge. If we
do, we will find it easier to resolve those
issues on which we have differences. Over the
years our community has shown both flexi-
bility and imagination in meeting the
changed demands of changing times. It is
the hope of my government that this meeting,
and what follows it, will reaffirm and
strengthen the ties between us so that we
can continue to realize the benefits that de-
rive from our association in this significant
Organization of American States.

STATEMENT BY MR. CRIMMINS, APRIL 11

I notice there are several other speakers
inscribed on the list, Mr. Chairman, so I will
try to be quite brief in my remarks. I have
listened with intense interest to this very
animated debate which has characterized the

sessions, particularly today — this morning
and this afternoon. I think it's an impressive
manifestation of the pluralism, or diversity,
that has been the center of some discussion.

With respect to the draft resolution before
us, revised, I would like to state at the out-
set, Mr. Chairman, that the delegation of
the United States finds the resolution a very
positive one. I think that all of us around
the table are indebted to the original spon-
sors of the resolution, the delegations of
Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, for their work in
synthesizing a very complex question. I think
that the thrust of the resolution is a very
positive one. It addresses in their entirety the
problems that face us, those which are the
center of our attention.

I myself, I repeat, have a completely open
mind about the results of the examination
which the Special Committee would give to
the problems which we are addressing in the
particular draft. The mandate provided the
Special Committee in the document before us
is, very appropriately, a very broad one. As
I indicated in an earlier intervention, the
view of my government is that a thorough-
going, open, no-holds-barred examination of
the problems that assail the Organization —
indeed the inter-American system — is by far
the most fruitful approach to take.

I was particularly gratified by the inclu-
sion of the amendments submitted this morn-
ing by the distinguished Foreign Minister
of Colombia, who has contributed so much
to the evolution of the inter-American sys-
tem and the Organization of American
States. In particular my delegation was
pleased to see the inclusion, in paragraph 2,
subparagraph (iii), of the resolutive part, of
the observations of the Secretary General
of the Organization, the Chairman of CIAP,
and the Chairman of CEPCIECC [Perma-
nent Executive Committee of the Inter-
American Council for Education, Science,
and Culture].

I think it appropriate to say, Mr. Presi-
dent, that my delegation attaches particular
importance to the mission undertaken at the
request of the CIES [Inter-American Eco-
nomic and Social Council] by the distin-

May 28, 1973

681

guished Chairman of CIAP. We believe that
the results of his mission, which will be pre-
sented to CIES in September, will be ex-
tremely valuable elements of judgment to the
committee.

There was one special point with respect
to the mandate given to the Chairman of
CIAP that I should like to single out, and'
that is the provision in his mandate for con-
tact with governments of developed coun-
tries in Europe and the Far East. This is not
provided for in the terms of reference laid
out in the resolution for the Special Com-
mittee. I think that the contributions, that
the report, the recommendations and sugges-
tions of the Chairman of CIAP will fill the
gap, this possible gap, in the studies carried
out by the Special Committee.

We believe, my government believes, it is
most important to examine the possibilities
of association in some form or another of the
European developed countries and of Japan.
I think that there sometimes arises in some
currents of opinion in Latin America a be-
lief that the United States has a certain re-
luctance to see this kind of approach. That is
a myth that is completely false. We consider
that the association of the countries, other
developed countries, that participate in de-
velopment assistance or in the general econ-
omy of Latin America can be a most useful
element in the reform of the structure of the
system. I have no idea how that association
might come about. I have no idea about the
receptivity of the European countries, Japan,
and of course, above all, Canada; but that
question, it seems to me, should be very
closely examined, and the mandate to Dr.
[Carlos] Sanz de Santamaria extends to
Canada, the European countries, and Japan.
We welcome that most firmly.

Touching on some other points that have
arisen in the debate today, I should like to
turn now to the question of the site of the
Special Committee. In the first place I want
to make absolutely clear that for the United
States there is no objection whatsoever in
principle or certainly not in policy to have
the committee have its seat in a Latin Ameri-

can country. I want to assure my distin-
guished colleague from Panama that we are
not in the least sensitive about this point.
I may open a parenthesis here, Mr. Chair-
man, to note that I was very pleased to have
the disclaimer of the distinguished repre-
sentative of Panama that with respect to
his references to the United States he dis-
avowed any intention to engage in dema-
goguery. I accept that of course. I welcome
it and I recognize it.

At the same time there are certain prac-
tical problems with respect to the question
of the site of the Special Committee that I
think must be faced. And these practical
problems of course are of two kinds, the mat-
ter of efficiency and the matter of cost.

The question of efficiency of course relates
to the availability in this seat of the Organi-
zation of services that are very hard to du-
plicate and very costly to duplicate elsewhere.
I don't think I have to belabor this point. I
don't think I have to belabor, either, the point
with respect to the cost. It has been touched
upon by several speakers and I think is self-
evident.

My own delegation's view is that the sug-
gestion, first by the delegate of Ecuador and
repeated just now by the delegate of Vene-
zuela, that the committee should have the
power to move to a capital in Latin America
is perhaps the best way of approaching it.
In other words, the committee, in our view,
should have flexibility with respect to meet-
ing in capitals of Latin America, taking ad-
vantage at the same time of the facilities, the
services, the technical attributes of the Secre-
tariat here at the site.

We also support the observations made
earlier today by the delegate of Brazil, more
recently by the delegate of Ecuador, on cer-
tain details of the text. Those observations
were extremely well founded, and we com-
mend them to the cosponsors of the resolu-
tion.

The final point that I should like to touch
upon is the controverted issue of political
pluralism or ideological pluralism that has
so much caught the attention of the General
Committee.

I ,f

iP

I- s

682

Department of State Bulletin i.

I think it should be very clear that the
United States accepts wholeheartedly the
principle of pluralism, or diversity, or what-
ever name one wishes to attach to the phe-
nomenon of different systems of government,
different economic and social organizations,
which certainly characterize the countries of
the Western Hemis])here, all the members of
the inter-American system. We are proud to
form part of that diversity, that pluralism.
We cherish veiy deeply the differences among
all of us in our forms of government and in
our styles of economic and social organiza-
tion. We cherish very deeply the rights and
the concerns about respect for our own sys-
tem of government and our own form of
economic and social organization that is en-
compassed in the terms "pluralism" or
"diversity."

I do believe that the term in the text as
we have it before us, "pluralismo politico''
is in some respects too narrow. The term
"ideological pluralism," which is used by
some speakers about it, in our view has a
broader implication, rather more vague than
precise.

In the first place the phrase "political
pluralism" to us is too confining. It does not
encompass the very critical areas of eco-
nomic and social organization, or it can be
interpreted to have an exclusionary sense.

The term "ideological pluralism," it seems
to me, is rather meaningless. The question of
ideology for us, for the United States, is not
the principal problem. To me the term
"ideology" tends to connote a closed system
organized on rigid lines. There are differ-
ences in view about that, but to me, and this
is my fundamental point, the central ele-
ment of diversity, of pluralism, is the great
differences among us in our systems of gov-
ernment and our forms of economic and so-
cial organization. So my observation with
respect to proper phrasing of this contro-
verted phrase would be to spell it out: plu-
ralism with respect to systems of government
and economic and social organization. I note,
without trespassing on another matter, Mr.
President, that indeed this is a definition used

in a document which we will be coming to
shortly, I assume.

I do want to reiterate in closing this point
that the declarations of the President of the
United States, the declarations of senior of-
ficers of the U.S. Government, are replete
with the position that for the United States
there is full acceptance of diversity or, if you
will, ])luraiism; that the internal organiza-
tion, the internal systems of government, or
the internal social and economic organiza-
tions of government are, rightfully, no con-
cern of the United States. I want to reiterate
that. It is a guidestar, a polestar for us in
the U.S. Government.

It would be regrettable if the certain re-
dundancy in the term "political pluralism"
or "ideological pluralism" were in any way to
vitiate the fundamental principles of non-
intervention and self-determination. As I be-
lieve the distinguished delegate of Venezuela
pointed out, pluralism, whether political or
ideological, whether it's called political di-
versity or ideological diversity — however one
wishes to cast it — is a corollary of these two
cardinal principles. It is a consequence, a
result, a fruit. And it would be important
that when we accept this term, when we ac-
cept the principle, we do nothing to impair
the greater good of which this is the child.

One very final point, Mr. Chairman: That
is that my delegation wishes to associate it-
self most enthusiastically, most warmly, with
the proposal first made by the delegate of
Mexico: that there be included in the docu-
ment at an appropriate place a reference to
the very valuable, very stimulating, very pro-
vocative— in the best sense of the word —
working document prepared by the delega-
tion of Venezuela. For us the document was
most useful. It was the point of reference, I
believe, for all of my delegation, and because
of its worth and because of the value of its
concepts, even though my delegation does not
associate itself with all the concepts laid out
in the document, it deserves, in my judgment,
a si)ecial reference in the resolution which
we are now discussing.

Moy 28, 1973

683

TEXT OF RESOLUTION =

Establishment of a Special Committee To Study
THE Inter-American System and To Propose
Measures for Restructuring It

Whereas :

At its third regular session the General Assembly
has studied the topics:

"Consideration of the ultimate purpose and the
mission of the Organization of American States and
ways of achieving that purpose and carrying out
that mission under the international circumstances
existing in the world today" and

"Review of the system of inter-American co-
operation for development, with a view to improving
it and bringing it up to date, and thereby strengthen-
ing the action of regional solidarity in that field
and avoiding acts or measures that serve unilateral
positions or interests, alien to the objectives of
cooperation" ;

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council
has presented to the General Assembly the declara-
tion adopted at its Eighth Annual Meeting (CIES/
RES. 50-VIII/73), in which it sets forth considera-
tions concerning subsequent formulation of future
action within the inter-American system of coopera-
tion for development (AG/doc.311/73) ;

There is general dissatisfaction with the func-
tioning and results of the inter-American system,
and several member states have stated that the
restructuring or general reform of the inter-Ameri-
can system is urgent and necessary and have pre-
sented proposals, suggestions and observations to
properly orient the political, economic, social and
cultural relations among the member states of the
inter-American system on the basis of respect for
the principles of juridical equality of states, self-
determination, nonintervention, and recognition of
the plurality of political, economic, and social
systems ;

The inter-American system must be equipped to
serve and cooperate with the member states to ef-
fect the changes they adopt, of their own sovereign
will, in their internal social and economic structures;

The inter-American system also must be organized
to facilitate and promote international social justice
as a necessary precondition to hemisphere peace and
security, taking suitable account of the differing
levels of development among nations;

The peoples of America demand respect for and
effective application of the fundamental principles
of the inter-American system, and condemn and re-
pudiate all actions tending to create or to consolidate
situations of dependency and subordination, or to
threaten their sovereign rights, and;

The General Assembly has among its principal

"OAS doc. AG/doc. 396/73 rev. 2; adopted by the
Assembly by consensus on Apr. 15.

powers that of considering any matter relating to
friendly relations among the American states;

The General Assembly
Resolves

1. To create a Special Committee composed of rep-
resentatives appointed by each member state; this
Special Committee, taking into account the principles
and purposes of the inter-American system and of
the Charter of the Organization, shall conduct a
comprehensive critical study, analysis, and evalua-
tion of the philosophy, instruments, structure, and
functioning of the inter-American system and pro-
pose its restructuring and the reforms and measures
necessary to enable it to respond adequately to the
new political, economic, social, and cultural situa-
tions in all the member states and to hemisphere
and world conditions. The Special Committee shall be
guided in its work by the need to secure just terms
and to provide security for the free and compre-
hensive development of each of the member states.

2. That, to carry out its work, the Special Com-
mittee shall take into account all elements that it
considers pertinent and, among others, the following:

i) the statements made by the heads of delegation
at the third regular session, the working document
presented by Venezuela (AG/doc.363/73) , and the
pertinent documentation of the General Assembly;

ii) the statements, observations, recommenda-
tions, and proposals that the governments of mem-
ber states have made or may make;

iii) the observations of the Permanent Council,
the Secretary General of the Organization, the
Chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the
Alliance for Progress (CIAP), and the Chairman
of the Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-
American Council for Education, Science, and Cul-
ture (CEPCIECC), as well as the observations,
statements, and proposals that have been or may be
made by other organs, agencies, and entities of the
inter-American system, especially the Declaration
of CIES concerning subsequent formulation of fu-
ture action within the inter-American system of
cooperation for development (CIES/RES. 50 (VIII-
73) and the recommendations that the Inter- Ameri-
can Economic and Social Council may adopt at its
meeting in September 1973, in accordance with
resolution CIES/51 (VIII-73) ;

iv) the studies, reports, resolutions, and recom-
mendations of organs and agencies of the United
Nations, CECLA [Special Latin American Coordi-
nating Committee], and the organizations for Latin
American integration, dealing with inter-American
political, economic, social, and cultural relations, es-
pecially as regards systems for financing, foreign
investment, trade, and transfer of technology.

3. That the organs, subsidiary agencies, and other
entities of the Organization shall provide any co-

684

Department of State Bulletin

operation requested by the Special Committee for
the better fulfillment of its purposes.

4. The Special Committee shall meet in a city of
any of the member states.

Considering all offers the member states may
make, the Preparatory Committee of the General
Assembly shall determine the place and date of the
first session of the Special Committee. If more than
one offer is made, the decision shall be made by lot.

If no offer is made within a reasonable time, or if
for any reason the Special Committee cannot meet in
the place selected, the headquarters of the Permanent
Council of the Organization shall be the meeting
place.

The Special Committee shall determine the place
or places of its future meetings.

Except as provided in the second paragraph of
this section, all decisions regarding the places of
the meetings of the Special Committee shall be
adopted by a two-thirds vote of the member states.

5. The Preparatory Committee of the General
Assembly shall prepare draft rules of procedure
for the Special Committee and take responsibility
for the available material referred to in paragraph
2, and for gathering and compiling all suggestions
and proposals that the governments of the member
states have presented or may present with regard to
topics 9 and 10 of the agenda of the third regular
session of the General Assembly, or to this reso-
lution.

6. The General Secretariat of the Organization
shall provide the Special Committee with any sec-
retariat services it may request and all necessary
help in performing its duties.

7. The Special Committee shall submit to the
governments of the member states periodic reports
on the progress of its work, and a general report
no later than November 30, 1973.

8. The Special Committee shall approve its own
rules of procedure, work methods, and schedule of
activities.

9. The Preparatory Committee of the General As-
sembly shall include on the draft agenda for the
fourth regular session a topic calling for considera-
tion of this matter.

10. In accordance with the standards in force,
the appropriate organs shall provide the funds
needed by the Special Committee to carry out its
functions.

TEXT OF DECLARATION^

Principles Governing Relations
Among the American States

Whereas:

At its third regular session the General Assembly
has considered topics 9 and 10 of the agenda, which
refer to the purpose and mission of the Organiza-

tion of American States and to revision of the sys-
tem of inter-American cooperation for development,
with a view to improving it, thereby strengthening
the action of regional solidarity in this field, among
other ways by preventing acts or measures that
serve unilateral positions or interests prejudicial
to the objectives of cooperation;

The member states of the Organization are al-
ways prepared to respect and to enforce respect for
the underlying principles of the regional system,
among which are the prohibition of direct or in-
direct intervention by a state or group of states in
the internal or external affairs of any other state,
the self-determination of peoples, and juridical
equality among states;

At its second regular session the General As-
sembly adopted Resolution AG/RES. 78 (II-0/72)
on "Strengthening of the principles of noninterven-
tion and the self-determination of peoples and meas-
ures to guarantee their observance," which solemnly
reiterates "the need for the member states of the
Organization to observe strictly the principles of
nonintervention and self-determination of peoples
as a means of ensuring peaceful coexistences among
them and to refrain from committing any direct or
indirect act that might constitute a violation of those
principles";

As laid down in Article 34 of the Charter, "The
Member States should make every effort to avoid
policies, actions, or measures that have serious ad-
verse effects on the economic or social development
of another Member State";

The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-opera-
tion among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the
United Nations General Assembly, included the
principles of nonintervention, self-determination,
equality of rights among states, abstention from
the use of force, and others intended to foster co-
operation among states;

In recent years profound changes have taken place
in international relations, in the direction of full
cooperation among states for the sake of peace,
and these relations should be strengthened within
the context of international law;

It is desirable that the Organization of American
States manifest the principles upon which relations
among the member states should be conducted ; and

It is therefore timely to make a declaration to
that end, but subject to the standards and obliga-
tions of the Charter and the special treaties enu-
merated therein.

The General Assembly

Declares

1. That in accordance with the principles of the

'OAS doc. AG/doc. 401/73 rev. 2; adopted by
the Assembly by consensus on Apr. IB.

May 28, 1973

685

Charter of the Organization, and especially with
those of mutual respect for sovereignty, the self-de-
termination of peoples, and the juridical equality of
respect the principles of nonintervention and self-
determination of peoples and the right to demand
compliance with these principles by the other states.

2. That, under the Charter, plurality of ideologies
is a presupposition of regional solidarity, which is
based on the concept of cooperation freely accepted
by sovereign states, to achieve common objectives
of maintenance of peace and understanding among
them for the sake of their vigorous and dynamic de-
velopment in the economic and social fields and in
those of education, science, and culture.

3. That plurality of ideologies in relations among
the member states implies the duty of each state to
respect the principles of nonintervention and self-
determination of peoples and the right to demand
compliance with those principles by the other states.

4. That this declaration is made without prejudice
to the standards and obligations of the Charter of
the Organization, the special treaties mentioned
therein, and Resolution 78 of the second regular ses-
sion of the General Assembly.

President Reaffirms Importance
of Inter-American System

Following are remarks made by President
Nixon on April 13 at a reception at the White
House in honor of chiefs of delegations to
the General Assembly of the Organization
of American States.

White House press release dated April 13

Mr. Secretary and ladies and gentlemen:
Mrs. Nixon and I are very honored to wel-
come those who are attending this historic
conference of the Organization of American
States.

I have followed your proceedings to date
with very great interest, and as one colum-
nist summed it up, the proceedings have
been characterized by a combination of frus-
tration and expectation. I hope that my brief
remarks tonight will not add to the frustra-
tion, but may perhaps give you reason for
more expectation.

Let me speak quite frankly to members of
the American family. During the year 1972,
when the journeys to Peking and Moscow

took place, and during the past four years
when we have had the great problems in-
volved in Southeast Asia, there has been a
tendency throughout this hemisphere to
think that the United States is so interested
in and so obsessed with other problems that
it is not concerned with the problems of our
closest friends and neighbors. If that impres-
sion was created, it certainly was not in-
tended on my part.

I am the first President of the United
States ever to have visited all of the nations
of the American Hemisphere before becom-
ing President, and I consider the policy of
my country insofar as it relates to the prob-
lems of this hemisphere to be of the highest
importance, not of the second level of im-
portance, and in this year 1973, I hope that
we can demonstrate effectively that that is
the case.

We shall continue progress in other areas
of the world, which is essential if we are to
have world peace, but we know that a sound
foreign policy can only be based on good re-
lations and better relations with our closest
friends and our closest neighbors in this
hemisphere.

We have made a beginning in one area.
You will recall that it was two years ago
that we spoke of the necessity of moving
forward with general tariff preferences, and
now in the trade legislation that we have
submitted to the Congress, we believe that
this year we have a very good chance to get
that through the Congress. And we welcome
the initiatives that this organization has un-
dertaken to develop new policies to suit the
times in which we live.

To demonstrate that we have an equal
interest, the Secretary of State, who has
traveled to all the continents of the world
in the past four years, will be making a jour-
ney to Latin America and will report, when
he returns, with recommendations for action
for better relations with our friends to the
south, and I ask all of the leaders of your
countries to speak to him very frankly about
what you feel our policies should be. He will
also speak frankly to you and, I can assure
you, will report very frankly to me.

686

Department of State Bulletin

Without getting into anything specific to-
day, let me give you my general attitude.

We live in a time in world history when
the old organizations and the old approaches
many times do not speak to the problems
that we face today. That is why we have
made historic breakthroughs in our trips to
Peking and Moscow in developing new re-
lationships to deal with the world as it is
today.

The OAS is a very proud organization. It
is also a very old organization. It began 83
years ago. The organization which later be-
came the OAS then began, and as my good
friend. Dr. Santamaria [Carlos Sanz de San-
tamaria, Chairman, Inter-American Com-
mittee on the Alliance for Progress] , said to
me on a visit to the White House just a few
days ago, the reasons that the organization
was set up 83 years ago, some of them have
changed, some of them are still relevant, and
that is why today I think it is important for
all of us in this year 1973 to look at the OAS
and make it relevant to the problems of to-
day and particularly to make it more rele-
vant to the economic problems which are a
major concern to all of the nations in this
hemisphere.

I pledge to you that in these next four
years in which I will be in this office that I
want to work with you, with all of you and
with all of your governments, toward the
goal that we all share of peace and justice
and progress for all of the members of the
American family.

And I want to thank my voice here for
getting every word right. [Laughter.] Al-

though my Spanish was not learned in school,
only picked up by my travels abroad, I will
simply say to you, as you have so often said
to me and my wife when we have visited
your country: Estdn ustedes en su casa.

United States and Uruguay Sign
New Extradition Treaty

Pres! release 103 dated April 6

On April 6 Secretaiy Rogers and the
Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Dr. Juan
Carlos Blanco Estrade, signed at Washing-
ton an extradition treaty between the United
States and Uruguay. The present treaty dates
from 1905.

The treaty will substantially modernize
extradition relations between the two coun-
tries, both in terms of extraditable offenses
and procedure. The treaty contains, among
others, provisions directed against aircraft
hijacking and narcotic offenses. It also
excludes from the category of political of-
fenses crimes committed on board com-
mercial aircraft and kidnaping and other
crimes against the life and physical security
of diplomats and other persons to whom
states have a special duty of protection in
accordance with international law.

The treaty will now be submitted to the
Uruguayan Parliament for its ratification
and to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent.
Approval by these bodies would permit it to
enter into effect.

May 28, 1973

687

Chancellor Brandt of the Federal Republic of Germany
Visits Washington

Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Federal
Republic of Germany met with President
Nixon and other government officials during
an official visit to Washington May 1-2.
Following arc an exchange of toasts between
President Nixon and Chancellor Brandt at a
dinner at the White House on May 1 and the
text of a joint statement issued on May 2
at the conchision of their meetings.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 7

President Nixon

Mr. Chancellor, Mr. Vice President, and
all of our very distinguished guests from
the Federal Republic and from the United
States: We hope that you agree with what
the Chancellor just said that he always hopes
that the Army will be used for playing
violins. [Laughter.]

In my brief remarks presenting our very
distinguished guests to this company, all of
whom respect him and most of whom have
met him, I have told him that they want to
hear from him and not from me, and so
therefore I will be quite personal and I hope
perhaps to the point.

I was thinking how much we have in com-
mon. I was thinking, for example, that my
wife's mother was born in Germany. I was
thinking, for example, her father is Irish. I
remember that another German Chancellor,
Chancellor Adenauer, once a rival of our
present guest, said to me that the most
beautiful combination of woman was Irish
and German, and I agree.

I was thinking, too, of how much my wife
and my very lovely dinner partner, Madame

von Staden — who is the wife of the German
Ambassador we have just received today
and his credentials — how much they have in
common. They attended the same school, of
course a few years apart — she in 1937, my
wife, and Madame von Staden in 1950 — but
the same man was president of the Univer-
sity of Southern California, Rufus Von
Kliensmid, and when I think of him and of
them, I think of what we owe to those of
German background, who have given so much
to America.

I think, too, of how much the Chancellor
and I have in common. We were remarking
that we were born in the same year. But
then they looked at him, how young he was —
[laughter] — and I said, "Mr. Chancellor,
what month were you born in?" [Laughter.]
I was born in January and he was born in
December, so he is much younger than I am.
[Laughter.]

I was thinking, too, that our political
careers have been somewhat the same. As a
matter of fact, on my first visit to the Federal
Republic as President, there was a small
dinner when a member of the other party
was then Chancellor and the present Chancel-
lor was present, and in a rather jocular
mood, looking across at the then leader of
the opposition, I said, "Well, Mr. Brandt,
don't give up. You know, you can come back.
I am the expert on coming back." [Laugh-
ter.]

So here we are. Chancellor of the Federal
Republic, President of the United States,
and each of us in office until 1976. And I
think of all that can happen in those 314
years. I think how much depends upon the
German-American alliance and on the dedica-
tion of the leaders of these two countries

688

Department of State Bulletin

..u

to the same goals — the goals of strength, of
maintaining the strength of this great alli-
ance that has brought us to where we are
now, where we can now discuss the i)ossibil-
ities of mutual balanced force reductions. I
think, too, of the fact that there have been
occasions in the past when our two nations —
and no blame is attached in this respect to
either side — were not friends. And I think
that together, as we are together and will
always be in the future, we can do every-
thing.

That is what the German alliance means;
and that is what this visit means because,
as the Chancellor and I in our long discus-
sions today, which will continue tomorrow,
agreed, we have domestic problems that we
will wrestle with — problems of inflation and
the economy and others — but his goal and
mine, above everything else, is to build a
world in which our children, our children's
children, can grow up in peace.

And the key to that peaceful world, if there
is a key, more than any place else in the
world, is for the strong, resilient, able people
that he represents and the strong, able,
dedicated people that I am proud to rep-
resent— for us to work together.

I can assure you — this company and all
the American people tonight — that the Chan-
cellor of the Federal Republic and the Presi-
dent of the United States have as their goal
for the year 1976 doing ever3i;hing that we
can to build a new structure of peace, not
just in Europe, not just in the Atlantic com-
munity, but in the Mideast, all over the
world. And these two great peoples — the
German people, the American people — we
can, we will do it together.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is in that spirit
that I know that all of you proudly will raise
your glasses to the Chancellor, Willy Brandt:
To Willy Brandt, Chancellor Brandt.

Chancellor Brandt

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, excellencies,
ladies and gentlemen: I thank you, Mr. Pres-
ident, for the cordial welcome you have ex-
tended to me and my delegation. We consider

the hospitality shown to us here tonight,
shown to us in these days, anything but an
act of routine, because we know that you,
Mr. President, had to settle, in addition to
receiving us here in Washington, problems of
a domestic nature, as we all have to deal
with from time to time.

By the way, the story about soldiers play-
ing violins was the President's and not mine.
[Laughter.]

Last year, you, Mr. President, were given
an impressive confirmation by your fellow
countrymen and you were able to exert par-
ticularly strong influence on international
affairs.

In the meantime, it may be said that the
cease-fire in Viet-Nam has brought the world
nearer to peace. We also share the joy over
the return of the prisoners of war, and we
join you in the hope that in the tormented
countries of Southeast Asia arms will at long
last become silent.

At the beginning of this year, Mr. Presi-
dent, you had thorough talks here with our
British friend, Edward Heath, and only two
weeks ago our Italian partner, Signor Andre-
otti was given a cordial reception in this
house. And not very long from now^ you will
be meeting President Pompidou. None of us
meets you any longer solely as the represen-
tative of his owm country, but at the same
time already to a certain degree as a repre-
sentative of the European Community as
well.

So I, too, am here not as the spokesman of
Europe, but definitely as a spokesman for
Europe.

I have spoken about a new feeling of Euro-
pean impatience among our nations; but I
think I can put this more aff'ectionately in the
words of the first President of the United
States, George Washington, who said, "We
have the surprising luck to discover that
apples will make pies." [Laughter.]

Seriously speaking, we do have the right
already today to speak of the personality of
Europe in about the same way that General
de Gaulle spoke of the personality of nations.

The declared aim on this and on the other

May 28, 1973

689

side of the Atlantic has been and, as I am
confident, is equal partnership. We realize
that this requires Europe to assume a larger
amount of responsibility as regards both re-
gional self-responsibility and the share in
world responsibility.

New problems have come to confront us.
the very products of a peace that is no longer
as much threatened as it used to be. In this
year of Europe, as you have called it, we
must begin to seek solutions based on prin-
ciples which will guide our Atlantic zone of
partnership for long periods to come. For
this, you, Mr. President, have had an orien-
tation indicated as the European summit con-
ference tried to do last fall.

Security, trade, monetary affairs, noneco-
nomic cooperation — there is certainly no lack
of common tasks. Helsinki and Vienna —
chances of the relations between East and
West begin to come clearer. But without the
American commitment, this will not become
a reality.

By means of the treaties of Moscow and
Warsaw and especially by means of our treaty
with East Germany, the Federal Republic of
Germany has played its part in order to open
the way for multilateral efforts toward de-
tente. The efforts of our so-called Ostpolitik
are indeed, as Secretary of State Mr. Rogers
and Dr. [Henry A.] Kissinger have under-
lined, in perfect harmony with your own
worldwide peace diplomacy, Mr. President.

We shall face all challenges in the spirit
of your own words, Mr. President: Courage,
you once said, or, putting it more accurately,
lack of fear is the result of discipline.

We are confident that we shall succeed in
organizing European peace in the course of
establishing the balance of world power
which you have described. And this is wh^re
words of an author may come true, who is
not entirely unknown to those present here
this evening, and who wrote power could be
transformed into "an instrument of self-
control."

Yet we should not deceive ourselves; or-
ganized peace will not be a period of social
immobility. This would be neither possible
nor desirable for our nations. European

Europe has begun the search for common
answers to these problems, too, conscious
that for our nations a good overall policy
can no longer be kept separate from the
dynamics of developments in the social field.

Though the process of European union is
by far not complete, you will, I am sure,
sense the reality of our desire that this
Europe be approached already now in such
a way that it will be the one big important
partner. I perceive of the courage to face the
reality of tomorrow the most dependable
guarantee for our belonging together.

I am most grateful for the talks today, Mr.
President, and also grateful that you have
given me the chance to say that it is not
only a great honor, but it is just as if a
soldier is put into the most important task,
that you ask me to join in this common fight
to make peace safer together, the two of us,
and together with our partners.

Thank you very much. I propose a toast,
ladies and gentlemen, to the health of the
President of the United States, to the health
of Mrs. Nixon, to the future of what ties
Europe and America together, and hence
to the happiness of our peoples: To the Pres-
ident of the United States.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT, MAY 2

The President of the United States of America
Richard M. Nixon and the Chancellor of the Federal
Republic of Germany Willy Brandt confirmed at
their meetings in Washington on May 1 and 2 the
relationship of trust and confidence between the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany,
and discussed the future relationship between the
United States and Western Europe, questions of
Alliance and Defense Policy, current and long-term
problems of West-East relations and other interna-
tional questions. Secretary of State William P.
Rogers and Foreign Minister Walter Scheel held
complementary talks and shared in part of the
discussions between the President and the Chancel-
lor. Federal Minister Egon Bahr discussed par-
ticular questions relating to Berlin.

There was full agreement that the relations
between the United States and Western Europe
will be governed in the future as in the past by
adherence to their common ideals of democratic
freedom, human rights and social justice.

690

Department of State Bulletin

The President and the Chancellor are convinced
that the peace and i)rosperity of their nations
depend on the preservation and consolidation of
Atlantic solidarity.

The Chancellor welcomed the assurance given
by President Nixon that the United States will
continue to support European unification and
affirmed the readiness of the Federal Republic of
Germany, together with the other members of the
European Community and its institutions, to par-
ticipate in an open and comprehensive discussion
concerning the nature of a balanced partnership
between the uniting Western Europe and the United
States. It was noted by the President and the
Chancellor that these discussions must deal with
common problems as well as common opportunities,
and should also consider arrangements in which
Japan and Canada could share. In this context
the constructive dialogue with the United States
envisaged by the Conference of Heads of State and
Government of the European Community last
October will be particularly useful. The Chancellor
welcomed President Nixon's intention to intensify
this dialogue by his visit to Western Europe later
this year, including the President's plan to meet
with N.ATO and the European Community.

The Chancellor recalled the decisions taken at the
Conference of Heads of State and Government in
Paris.

He expressed the conviction that the nine States
which aim at a comprehensive transformation of
their relations into a European Union by 1980, will,
acting in common, make a joint contribution in the
international field in line with Western Europe's
determination to follow an outward-looking policy,
toward social progress, peace and cooperation.
Europe's enlarged responsibility in international
politics will be evident in its loyalty to traditional
friendships and alliances.

The President and the Federal Chancellor were in
agreement that the new round of negotiations in
G.\TT [General .\greement on Tariffs and Trade],
which originated in the common initiative of the
United States, the European Community and Japan,
will have a decisive importance for the future
liberalization and development of international trade,
for the improvement of world living standards, and
for the maintenance of peace. The President and the
Chancellor consider the successful course of these
negotiations to be a political task of great signifi-
cance in the solution of which their governments
will constructively participate. They agreed on the
importance that all participants enter the GATT
negotiations, which they expect to start in the fall,
with a liberal negotiating concept.

There was agreement that the multilateral

r negotiations on the reform of world-wide monetary

; and trade relations must constitute another con-

:: tribution to a new phase of productive cooperation

between the United States and the European Com-

munity in the spirit of a comprehensive Atlantic
partnership among equals.

The President and the Chancellor noted that good
cooperation in the monetary field during the last
months facilitated the solution of the recent
monetary crisis. The initiative and determination
shown in this connection by the governments con-
cerned have strengthened the prospects of a com-
prehensive reform.

The President and the Chancellor underlined
the identity of interests in security and detente in
Europe and emphasized in this context the con-
tinued need of a balanced military power relation-
ship between West and East. The unity and
solidarity of the Alliance, an adequate presence of
US forces in Europe, and a credible deterrent are
indispensable for this purpose. Both sides agreed
that the negotiations on a mutual and balanced
reduction of forces and on the limitation of strategic
armaments must meet these requirements. The
President and the Chancellor shared the conviction
that while seeking to reduce the military confronta-
tion in Europe, the capacity of the Alliance to
assure the security of all of its partners at any
time must be preserved without qualification.

The President and the Chancellor, in discussing
the l)road nature of the Atlantic partnership during
the coming period, agreed that the relationship
must develop in a way to ensure that each partner
contributes appropriately toward the burden of the
common defense. Intensified cooperation among the
European Alliance partners in the defense field
will be of substantial assistance.

The results produced so far by the policy of
detente pursued by the United States and the coun-
tries of Western Europe on the one hand and the So-
viet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe on
the other encourage the governments of the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany to
continue along the road of negotiations and to
respond positively to a constructive policy on the
part of the East. This applies above all to the
preparations for a Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe. The two governments share
the hope that such a conference will soon come
about, that it will produce tangible humanitarian
improvements, promote mutual cooperation and
communication and thus help gradually to overcome
the division of Europe. The President and the
Chancellor expressed their satisfaction at the in-
tensive .Atlantic cooperation during the preparations
which should be continued in close consultation
within the Alliance.

They also reviewed the implementation of the
Berlin .Agreement of 1971 and noted the practical
improvements it has brought to the life of the city
and its inhabitants. They agreed that respect of
the letter and spirit of the Berlin Agreement by
all parties concerned is essential for a continuing
relaxation of tension in Europe.

May 28, 1973

691

T1

It was considered that expanded international air
traffic to the Western Sectors of Berlin would
constitute further progress.

The President and the Chancellor, in discussing
events in Southeast Asia, emphasized that it is now
imperative for the Paris Agreement to be fully
and scrupulously implemented. Until this is the case
the contributions which the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany desire to make to
the humanitarian relief and reconstruction of all
the states of Indochina cannot become fully effective.

The President and the Chancellor underlined the
interest of their governments in peace and stability
in the Middle East. They expressed their conviction
that steps to initiate negotiations between the
parties most directly concerned, based on the
November 1967 Security Council Resolution, are
essential to help bring about progress towards a
stable peace in the area.

World Trade Week, 1973

A PROCLAMATION^

We stand today on the threshold of a new era of
peace in the world — a time that opens new and
ever-widening opportunities for global cooperation
which can bring a greater measure of progress and
prosperity for the peoples of all nations. One of the
most powerful forces for such progress can be the
expansion of world trade.

Our advanced industrial technology, our highly
efficient agricultural system, and our increasingly
productive labor force have combined to make
America the world's largest exporter of all countries
in the world. In the process we have also become
the world's largest marketing country for the prod-
ucts of other countries.

History clearly demonstrates that trade creates

more and better-paying jobs for American workers,
a wider choice of products for American consumers,
enlianced opportunities for the creative and com-
petitive skills of American business, and a higher
standard of living for all Americans.

But we also know that expanded trade must be
achieved within the context of an international
economic system which is fair to all participants.
For this reason the United States proposed major
reforms in the international monetary field in 1972;
marked progress toward their adoption is presently
being made. For this same reason, I have recently
submitted to the Congress the Trade Reform Act of
1973. Its enactment will enable the United States
to enter the international trade negotiations later
this year with the tools we need to achieve fair
reductions in trade barriers, to help build a new
international economic order and to advance our
interests within it.

Under such legislation, the United States can
continue to work with other nations in building
a fair and open trading world.

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim
the week beginning May 20, 1973, as World Trade
Week, and I call upon all Americans to cooperate
in observing that week by participating with the
business community and all levels of Government in
activities that emphasize the importance of world
trade to the United States economy and to our
relations with other nations.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this fourth day of May in the year of our
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the :
Independence of the United States of America the
one hundred ninety-seventh.

IS
St

m

(^/2:jL^ <Kj/^

'No. 4214; 38 Fed. Reg. 11433.

«tl

Bil

•! Wic

iilli

692

Department of State Bulletin

THE CONGRESS

Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 Transmitted to the Congress

Message From President Nixo)t to the Congress^

To the Congress of the United St/ites:

One of the most important building blocks
in erecting a durable structure of peace is
the foreign assistance program of the United
States. Today, in submitting my proposed
Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, I urge the
Congress to act on it with a special sense
of urgency so that we may continue the
important progress we have made toward
achieving peace during the past year.

Perhaps the most persuasive reason for
a strong foreign assistance program was
set forth by President Roosevelt in the days
shortly before World War II, when Britain
needed help. "Suppose my neighbor's home
catches fire," he said, "and I have a length
of garden hose four or five hundred feet
away. If he can take my garden hose and
connect it up with his hydrant, I may help
him to put out his fire."

Implicit in Roosevelt's analogy was the
mutual benefit of giving assistance, for if
the fire in question spread, both neighbors
would be in danger. Those clear and simple
assumptions underlaid our wartime assist-
ance to our European allies and our post-war
policy toward the nations of the Western
Hemisphere.

Today, we see the wisdom of this policy
on every hand. Western Europe is now a
bulwark of freedom in the Atlantic Alliance.
In the Pacific, Japan has emerged as a major
economic power. The remarkable vigor and
talents of her people and the dynamic eflR-
ciency of her industry are making significant
and increasing contributions to other coun-
tries, so that Japan itself now plays an

' Transmitted on May 1 (White House press
release).

extremely important role in working toward
a lasting peace in the Pacific.

In recent years, as we have sought a new
definition of American leadership in the
world, assistance to other nations has re-
mained a key part of our foreign policy.
Under the Nixon Doctrine of shared respon-
sibilities, we have tried to stimulate greater
efforts by others. We want them to take on
an increasing commitment to provide for
their own defenses, their security and their
economic development. Most importantly, we
hope they will assume greater responsibility
for making the decisions which shape their
future.

We must not, however, try to shift the
full weight of these responsibilities too
quickly. A balance must be struck between
doing too much ourselves and thus dis-
couraging self-reliance, and doing too little
to help others make the most of their limited
resources. The latter course would spell
defeat for the promising progress of many
developing nations, destroy their growing
self-confidence, and increase the likelihood
of international instability. Thus it is critical
that we provide a level of foreign assistance
that will help to assure our friends safe
passage through this period of transition
and development.

The sums I am requesting in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1973 represent the abso-
lute minimum prudent investment which
the United States can afford to make if we
wish to help create a peaceful and pros-
perous world. Altogether, authorizations
under this bill amount to $2.9 billion for
economic and military assistance in the
coming fiscal year. During the current fiscal

May 28, 1973

693

year, some $2.6 billion has been appropriated
for such purposes under the strictures of a
continuing resolution passed by the Con-
gress.

This new Foreign Assistance Act has
several fundamental objectives:

— To help the developing countries achieve
a greater measure of self-reliance in their
struggle against hunger, disease and pov-
erty ;

— To respond swiftly to the ravages of
natural disasters;

— To assist friendly governments in build-
ing and maintaining the military capability
to protect their independence and security;

— And to help South Vietnam, Cambodia,
and Laos begin the task of rehabilitating
and reconstructing their war-torn countries.

Let us look more closely at each of these
objectives.

Development Assistance

Hunger, poverty and disease are still wide-
spread among developing countries, despite
their significant progress of recent years.
Their economic growth — averaging some
5.5 percent a year over the last decade — as
well as rapid improvements in agricultural
methods and in health care have not yet
overcome many deep-seated problems in
their societies. Their current needs represent
a moral challenge to all mankind.

In providing assistance, however, we
should not mislead ourselves into thinking
that we act out of pure altruism. Successful
development by friendly nations is important
to us both economically and politically. Eco-
nomically, many of the developing countries
have energy resources and raw materials
which the world will need to share in coming
years. They also could represent larger mar-
kets for our exports. Politically, we cannot
achieve some of our goals without their
support. Moreover, if essential needs of
any people go entirely unsatisfied, their
frustrations only breed violence and inter-
national instability. Thus we should recog-
nize that we assist them out of self-interest
as well as humanitarian motives.

While development progress as a result
of our aid has been less visible than some
would like, I believe it is essential for us to
persevere in this efl!"ort. I am therefore
asking the Congress to authorize some $1
billion for development assistance programs
during fiscal year 1974 and approximately
the same amount fo^; fiscal year 1975.

Emergency Aid

America's fund of goodwill in the world
is substantial, precisely because we have
traditionally given substance to our concern
and compassion for others. In times of major
disaster, American assistance has frequently
provided the margin of diff'erence between
life and death for thousands. Our aid to
victims of disasters — such as the earthquake
in Peru and floods in the Philippines — has
earned us a reputation for caring about our
fellowman.

No nation is more generous in such cir-
cumstances. And the American people re-
spond with open hearts to those who suffer
such hardship. I am therefore asking the
Congress to authorize such amounts as may
be needed to meet emergency requirements i
for relief assistance in the case of major
disasters. !

!

Security Assistance '

Security assistance has been a cornerstone ;
of U.S. foreign policy throughout the last
quarter century. Countries whose security
we consider important to our own national
interest frequently face military challenges,
often prompted by third countries. In order
to maintain a stable international order, it
is important that these threatened countries
not only be economically developed but also
be able to defend themselves, primarily
through their own resources.

The United States can rightly claim a
number of successes in this regard during
recent years. Our programs to help South
Vietnam and South Korea build capable
forces of their own, for instance, have per-
mitted us to withdraw all of our forces —
over 500,000 men — from South Vietnam and
20,000 men from South Korea.

694

Department of State Bulletir

It is unrealistic to think we can provide
ail of the money or manpower that might
he needed for the security of friendly
nations. Nor do our allies want such aid;
they ]irefer to rely on their own resources.

We can and should, however, share our
experience, counsel and technical resources
to help them develop adequate strength of
their own. It is for this reason that I ask
the Congress to authorize $652 million in
grant military assistance, $525 million in
foreign military sales credits, and $100
million in supporting assistance funds for
fiscal year 1974.

This year's foreign aid bill includes for
the first time separate authority for a for-
eign military education and training pro-
gram. We want to strengthen this program
so that we can help friendly governments
better understand our policies, while they
develop a greater sense of self-reliance and
professional capability in their own military
services.

Aid for Indochina

The signing of cease-fire agreements in
Vietnam and Laos marks the beginning of
a trend toward a peaceful environment in
Indochina. This change will permit us to
turn our attention to the considerable post-
war needs of Southeast Asia. To ignore these
needs would be to risk the enormous invest-
ment we have made in the freedom and
independence of the countries of Southeast
Asia.

The legislation I am presenting today
would authorize the continuation of our
economic assistance to South Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia and would provide for a sound
beginning in the process of rehabilitation
and reconstruction there. I anticipate other
nations will join in this effort, as they have
elsewhere, to solidify the foundations for a
new era of reconciliation and progress in
Southeast Asia.

Relief assistance for refugees of the war
in Southeast Asia is vital to this effort.
These refugees number in the hundreds of
thousands. In addition to their resettlement,
this Administration proposes a major effort

to help restore essential community services
in areas which have suffered because of the
war.

In this bill, I ask the Congress to authorize
$632 million for the reconstruction eflfort
in Indochina in fiscal year 1974.

My present request does not include any
assistance for North Vietnam. It is my hope
that all parties will soon adhere fully to
the Paris agreements. If and when that
occurs, I believe that American assistance
for reconstruction and development of both
South and North Vietnam would represent
a sound investment in confirming the peace.

Representatives of the United States have
recently been holding discussions with repre-
sentatives of the Government of North Viet-
nam to assess economic conditions there and
to consider possible forms of United States
economic assistance. This assessment has
now been suspended, pending clarification
of North Vietnam's intentions regarding
implementation of the cease-fire. Once Hanoi
abandons its military efforts and the assess-
ment is complete, the question of aid for
North Vietnam will receive my personal
review and will be a subject for Congres-
sional approval.

For a quarter century, America has borne
a great burden in the service of freedom
in the world. As a result of our efforts, in
which we have been joined by increasing
numbers of free world nations, the founda-
tion has been laid for a structure of world
peace. Our military forces have left Vietnam
with honor, our prisoners have returned
to their families, and there is a cease-fire
in Vietnam and Laos, although still imper-
fectly obseived.

Our foreign assistance program responds
to the needs of others as well as our own
national needs — neither of which we can
afford to ignore.

For our own sake — and for the sake of
world peace — I ask the Congress to give
these recommendations prompt and favor-
able consideration.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, May i, 1973.

May 28, 1973

695

Department Discusses Security Assistance Program
for Fiscal Year 1974

Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush^

Mr. Chairman [Senator J. W. Fulbright]
and members of the committee : I appreciate
this opportunity to appear today and to
discuss the administration's plans for the
fiscal year 1974 security assistance program.
As you know, the security assistance pro-
gram is only one of several tools available
for conducting our nation's foreign affairs;
other tools include development assistance,
an enlightened trade policy, active diplo-
macy, and a strong defense posture.

In his message to the Congress yesterday
transmitting the administration's foreign
assistance bill, President Nixon emphasized
that : -

In recent years, as we have sought a new defini-
tion of American leadership in the world, assistance
to other nations has remained a key part of our
foreign policy. Under the Nixon Doctrine of shared
responsibilities, we have tried to stimulate greater
efforts by others. We want them to take on an
increasing commitment to provide for their own
defenses, their security and their economic develop-
ment. Most importantly, we hope they will assume
greater responsibility for making the decisions
which shape their future.

The administration's assistance proposal
covers several different programs; namely,
development assistance, emergency aid, secu-
rity assistance, Indochina reconstruction and
rehabilitation, and military education and
training. I understand that your committee
would prefer that I not address myself this

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on May 2 (press release 128). The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published
by the committee and will be available from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

- See p. 69.3.

morning to development and emergency
assistance and Indochina reconstruction. I
assume that we will at a later time have the
opportunity to share with you the adminis-
tration's ideas concerning these important
programs.

The committee has before it legislation
tabled by the distinguished chairman that
would terminate the security assistance pro-
gram at an early date. The Congress also
has before it legislation transmitted by the
President yesterday which represents a bal-
anced approach to the needs of our friends
and allies. This legislation starts from the
assumption that to establish a basis for a
lasting peace our continued support for
the growing strength, security, and self-
confidence of our friends and allies is essen-
tial. I wish to discuss both bills and, with
your indulgence, to provide you with my
view as to their relative merits.

I believe that the two bills share a common
objective; that is, to phase out grant military
assi-stance as rapidly as possible. We agree
with the chairman on several approaches
to this phaseout. We agree on the need to
use foreign military sales concessional cred-
its as a vehicle to facilitate the transition
of other countries from grant assistance to
full self-reliance. We agree with the chair-
man on continuing education and training
as a program separate from materiel assist-
ance. However, we differ on the pace at
which the grant materiel assistance pro-
grams can be phased out, on the levels of
such assistance for fiscal year 1974, and on
several other matters.

This morning I wish to address each cate-

696

Department of State Bulletin

gory of assistance and the principal ques-
tions of policy that are at issue.

Grant Military Assistance

For more than a quarter of a century
successive Presidents have concluded that
the national interest of the United States
required us to help other countries enhance
their capability to protect their independence
and security. The administration believes
that the situation confronting us in the
1970's differs from that of the lOBO's. Never-
theless, we believe that strength through
security must remain an essential element
of our national policy. In this respect, we
are guided by the following major objec-
tives :

— To deter aggression and to reduce the
attractiveness of force as an instrument of
change.

— To use our security posture and rela-
tionships to provide positive incentives for
negotiation as a means of settling major
unresolved issues.

— To reassure allies and friends of our
continuing interest and determination to
play a major role in world affairs.

— To encourage our allies' self-help ef-
forts, efforts which over time will raise the
threshold and limit the scope of potential
U.S. involvement in any future conflict.

We are proposing a number of basic
changes in the structure and direction of
security assistance for FY 1974. For the
first time in the history of the grant military
assistance program (MAP), and in a way
similar to how the chairman views this, we
have not included training but have placed
it in a separate part of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act. This change should allow, during
consideration of MAP, a focusing on the
progress we are making in reducing the
number of claimants on U.S. resources. The
Republic of China, Greece, and Liberia are
but the most recent countries to have termi-
nated their dependence on grant military
aid.

S. 1443, the chairman's bill, proposed $250
million in new funds for grant military
assistance for FY 1974. We consider this

figure much too low to satisfy the significant
policy needs to be met by the MAP program.
Our bill requests an authorization of $652
million. Approximately 90 percent of this
money will be spent in only seven countries —
in Asia and the Middle East.

Republic of Korea. We propose to provide
$261 million in grant military assistance
for the Republic of Korea. This will go a
long way toward comj^letion of the program
for modernization of the Korean armed
forces and thus make possible the early at-
tainment of Korean self-reliance.

Philippines. We propose that the Philip-
pines receive $21 million in grant military
assistance during FY 74. Our program in
the Philippines is for the internal security
and stability of that country. As you are
aware, the United States maintains military
facilities in the Philippines, and stability in
that country is of particular importance to
us.

Indonesia. Since the departure of Presi-
dent Sukarno in 1965, the Government of
Indonesia has made strenuous efforts to put
its economic house in order." Our grant
military assistance program for Indonesia
is intended to provide the Indonesian armed
forces with the minimum capability to
maintain their equipment and their training
effort. We are proposing $23 million in
grant military assistance for FY 1974.

Cambodia. The administration proposes a
grant military assistance program of $180
million for Cambodia. We firmly believe that
this program is an important instrument
with respect to our efforts to produce an
effective cease-fire throughout Southeast
Asia.

Thailand. We are proposing a program
of $58 million to bolster Thailand's self-
defense capabilities and its ability to cope
with internal security problems. The exten-
sive military facilities that Thailand makes
available to the United States are of critical
importance in Southeast Asia.

Jordan. Our program for Jordan forms a
particularly significant element in our efforts
to insure a military balance and to produce
a settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. The

May 28, 1973

697

administration is proposing for Jordan a
grant military assistance program of ap-
proximately $40 million and economic sup-
porting assistance of $65 million. We will
need to continue assistance to this country
so long as the Middle East remains a
troubled area.

Turkey. We believe that Turkey's security
is of considerable importance and that we
should continue to provide grant military
assistance ($98 million) and FMS credits
($75 million) in FY 1974. Turkey is moving
toward self-reliance, but this cannot be
completely accomplished in the next two
years.

Besides these seven countries, we further
propose smaller military assistance pro-
grams to a few countries in Latin America.
The fundamental reason for continuing U.S.
military assistance to Latin America is to
respond to the valid expectations of Latin
American governments. As this committee
has urged upon us, we are reducing our
profile in Latin America, but the Latin
American countries do look to the United
States for military equipment, training, and
advice. The purpose of our program is not
to exercise direct influence on decisions in
the military and political arena. Rather, the
program relates to the total U.S. posture
with our fellow countries in this hemisphere,
specifically to avoid the kind of political
alienation that would occur if the Latin
American military perceived that we were
unwilling to be responsive to their desires
for these military relationships.

Mr. Chairman and members of the com-
mittee, I wish to make one final point on
grant military assistance. The administra-
tion bill does not include military assistance
for Laos and Viet-Nam. S. 1443 would, how-
ever, prohibit continued service funding for
military assistance for Viet-Nam and Laos
in FY 1974. The administration believes
that it is essential that service funding for
Viet-Nam and Laos be continued through
FY 1974 and has included funds for this
purpose in the Defense budget. Both coun-
tries are still facing an imminent threat. The
continuing serious violations of the cease-

fire by the North Vietnamese, including their
continuing buildup in South Viet-Nam, make
it imperative for us to help maintain the
strength of the armed forces of South Viet-
Nam and Laos. To do this, we must be able
to insure adequate, reliable, and responsive
procedures to replace military equipment in
accordance with the terms of the Paris
agreements. Military assistance procurement
procedures under the Foreign Assistance Act
are too slow and inflexible to serve this
purpose adequately. For these reasons, the
administration strongly supports the con-
tinuance of service funding for military
assistance to Laos and Viet-Nam.

Foreign Military Sales

The administration is requesting $525 mil-
lion in new obligational authority for a total
foreign military sales (FMS) credit pro-
gram of $760 million. Approximately $300
million will be made available for Israel.
Of the remainder, the largest programs are
for countries that are in the process of tran-
sitioning-out of grant military assistance or
for countries where such programs have re-
cently been terminated: Korea, $25 million;
Taiwan, $65 million; Greece, $65 million;
Turkey, $75 million.

The President is requesting that Latin
America be allocated $150 million in credits
and is proposing that the Latin American
ceiling be raised to $150 million. He also
requests that cash sales be deleted from the
computation of that ceiling.

Recent experience has demonstrated that
the Latin American ceiling has not restricted
arms spending but has simply diverted it
from the United States to Europe. As a re-
gion, Latin American nations still spend less
than 2 percent of gross national product on
their defense budgets. Since we cannot con-
trol even this limited spending, we believe
that it is to our mutual advantage for Latin
American countries to meet their equipment
needs through U.S. sources.

At this juncture, I would like to comment
on two aspects of the chairman's bill. S. 1443
would authorize highly concessional credits
to ease the transition from grant military as-

698

Department of State Bulletin

;

sistance, emphasize FMS guarantees rather
than direct y:overnnient-to-government cred-
its, authorize $200 million in new obliga-
tionai authority with a program ceiling of
$700 million, and prohibit FMS cash sales to
developed countries unless the articles to be
sold are not generally available from com-
mercial sources in the United States. The
administration favors the use of conces-
sional credit to ease the transition from
grant military assistance and has pro-
vided such credit to a very limited number
of countries in recent years. However, the
concessions that have been approved for
such credits have not been as great as those
tiiat would be authorized by S. 1443. We be-
lieve that recourse to concessional credits
must be carefully controlled to insure that
expenditures for military needs do not impact
adversely on the economic growth of less
developed countries. However, the adminis-
tration favors stressing the use of credit
guarantees to the maximum extent possible.
We do not believe, however, that $200 mil-
lion in new obligational authority is suffi-
cient to accomplish either the program
proposed in S. 1443 or that proposed in the
administration bill.

Finally, I wish to note that a prohibition
on FMS cash sales to economically developed
countries would not serve the best interests
of the U.S. Government. Most of the weap-
ons systems involved in such sales are a mix
of commercially produced and U.S. Govern-
ment-owned components. It is normally more
efficient and advantageous to the U.S. Gov-
ernment to make such sales on a government-
to-government basis. It enables us to monitor
such sales more closely and, when the U.S.
armed forces use the same weapons systems,
makes possible substantial savings for both
the United States and the foreign govern-
ments. In addition, most foreign governments
prefer to buy on a government-to-govern-
ment basis as it assures them of a follow-on
supply of end-items and spare paints and be-
cause they have confidence that modifications
in purchased systems will be kept up to date.

The restrictions contained in S. 1443 are
not likely to result in less spending on arms
by developed countries. But they would al-

most certainly result in less spending in the
United States. For that i-eason, the admin-
istration would oppose such restrictions.

Security Supporting Assistance

S. 1443 proposes an authorization of $80
million for security supporting assistance.
Tlie administration is requesting an author-
ization for $100 million which, together with
estimated de-obligations of $24.1 million,
would finance a program of $124.1 million in
supporting assistance for five countries in
FY 1974. The bulk of these funds are for
Israel ($25 million) and for Jordan ($65
million) and are an important aspect of our
continuing effort to help promote a more
enduring peace in the Middle East.

During FY 1973, $50 million was pro-
vided for Israel, as earmarked by the Con-
gress. Israel's fiscal and economic position
has steadily improved during the past two
years. Therefore we believe $25 million in
supporting assistance is appropriate for FY
1974.

Jordan is a moderating influence in the
Middle East. Its fiscal and economic situation
remains precarious due to the loss of the
West Bank and the need to maintain a sub-
stantial military establishment. Jordan will
need supporting assistance at a level of $65
million for FY 1974, of which $60 million
will be for budget support and $5 million
for rural development projects in the Jordan
Valley. Without an adequate level of U.S.
support, Jordan would have a budget deficit
which would threaten the country's economic
and political stability.

Thailand continues in its close cooperation
with the United States in Southeast Asia
and also faces a continuing insurgency. We
propose $15 million for Thailand in FY 1974
and believe it essential that the United
States continue this level of support for their
eff'orts. The $9.5 million for Malta is an in-
tegral part of a multilateral financial pack-
age which permits the United Kingdom to
maintain military forces, as part of NATO,
on Malta and precludes Warsaw Pact nations
from use of the naval facilities there.

Similarly, discontinuance of U.S. support

May 28, 1973

699

to the U.N. Force on Cyprus, for which $4.2
million is proposed, would likely erode this
U.N. effort which has preserved peace be-
tween the Turkish and Greek communities.
This could have serious consequences for the
NATO alliance. Finally, the $3 million for
Spain is for assistance in cultural, educa-
tional and scientific fields, as part of the
agreement on friendship and cooperation
with Spain.

Military Education

As noted earlier, the chairman has pro-
posed separate legislation for grant military
education and training programs. The ad-
ministration bill makes a similar proposal,
and we are therefore fully in agreement on
the desirability of this step. We are pleased
that the chairman, in much the same way as
he did 25 years ago, with his coauthorship of
the Fulbright-Hays program, is taking the
leadership in separating military education
and training programs from other aspects of
our security assistance program.

Since the inception of U.S. foreign assist-
ance, military training has been in the fore-
front of our support for the defense of other
nations. However, with the passage of time,
the scope and nature of this training has
changed significantly — a decreasing portion
of the training effort is directed toward
familiarization with equipment furnished by
the United States. Instead we are emphasiz-
ing professional education that is oriented
toward management of resources, financial
planning, and program evaluation and analy-
sis. These are fields in which the state of the
art is changing rapidly and frequent updat-
ing of knowledge is required.

At the same time, the professional train-
ing we provide serves as a useful foundation
for the promotion of understanding among
military personnel. Such understanding is
important for the establishment of an inter-
national environment in which peace can
prevail.

For these reasons, we propose that mili-
tary education and training be placed on a
permanent footing within the framework
of the Foreign Assistance Act. The legisla-
tion we have presented would authorize the

President to afford foreign military person-
nel an opportunity to attend U.S. schools, in-
cluding participation in special courses of
instruction in U.S. universities and other
institutions of learning.

We will propose a program of $33 million
for military education in FY 1974.

There are a number of other items on
which we disagree with the chairman's bill;
most of these are discussed in detail in the
Department's letter of comment on S. 1443
which was sent to you yesterday. I do wish,
however, to draw your attention to two
areas in which we are in basic disagreement
with the distinguished chairman.

The first is the requirement for local cur-
rency deposits. S. 1443 would increase the
present 10 percent to 50 percent for materiel
assistance and to 25 percent for training.
The administration bill proposes repeal of
the existing 10 percent requirement in sec-
tion 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act. The
deposit requirement is contrary to the basic
purpose of the military assistance program,
which is to assist countries whose security is
important to us and which are unable to
maintain an adequate defense posture. A
50 percent local currency deposit require-
ment would result in a substantial effective
reduction of our assistance and would re-
quire recipient nations to divert funds from
economic and social uses or from contribu-
tions to increasing military self-reliance, or
to increase inflationary pressures by in-
creasing their money supply. Further, the
sharp reductions in total assistance proposeS
in S. 1443 coupled with a 50 percent deposit
requirement would have a profound and
destabilizing effect on many recipients since
they would not have time to adjust their
budgets to meet these sharply changed cir-
cumstances. A 25 percent requirement for
the training program would tend strongly to
defeat the objectives of the program, which
are to foster long-term contacts and coopera-
tion with foreign military leaders. For us,
the amounts are small, but the effect on the
recipients can be great.

Our second disagreement relates to the
proposal in S. 1443 for authorizations on a
separate line item basis for both military
assistance and supporting assistance. This

700

Department of State Bulletin

practice would restrict the President's au-
thority to allocate funds to meet needs and
priorities during the fiscal year. This author-
ity has been critical to the management of
our programs in Southeast Asia in the last
couple of years. The administration believes
that the present legislation, section 653 of
the Foreign Assistance Act, which requires
the President to report to the Congress
within 30 days after appropriations his in-
tended allocations of foreign assistance and
contains restrictions on the President's au-
thority to transfer funds between country
programs, adequately serves the purposes of
both the Congress and the executive branch
and the interests of the U.S. Government
as a whole.

I firmly believe, gentlemen, that we cannot
eflfectively pursue our national objectives in
the 1970's without a commitment to the de-
velopment and security of other countries.
I ask you to support the President's foreign
assistance program for fiscal year 1974. This
committee will play a critical role in deter-
mining what resources will be available and,
in so doing, will strongly influence the course
the United States is to follow in interna-
tional affairs for the remainder of this dec-
ade. I urge your support in directing that
we play the role that our interest in stability
and peace in the international community
requires.

President Reports to Congress
on Arms Control Progress

Following is the text of President Nixon's
letter of April 9 transmitting to the Congress
the 12th anmial report of the United St<ites
Arms Control and Disaivnument Agency,
covering the period January 1-December 31,
1972.'

White House presa release dmted April 9

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Act as amended (P.L. 87-297),
I herewith transmit the Annual Report of
the United States Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency.

The year covered by this report has been
the most rewarding in the twelve-year his-
tory of the agency. Agreements reached with
the Soviet Union in the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks testif" to the determination
of this Administration to move away from
the dangers and l)urdens of unrestrained
arms competition and toward a stable and
constructive international relationship.

The negotiations have resulted not in con-
cessions by the two parties, one to the other,
but in mutual arrangements to insure mutual
security. For the first time, the United States
and the Soviet Union have taken substantial
steps in concert to reduce the threat of nu-
clear war. The current round of SALT ne-
gotiations will concentrate on achieving a
definitive treaty on the limitation of offen-
sive weapons systems.

The past year has also seen continued
progress in other areas of arms control.

Four years after the initial NATO pro-
posal, positive planning has begun for a
conference on Mutual and Balanced Force
Reductions in Central Europe. The Conven-
tion banning biological weapons and calling
for the destruction of existing stockpiles was
opened for signature on April 10, 1972. At
the Conference of the Committee on Dis-
armament in Geneva, the problems asso-
ciated with control of chemical warfare
through international law were subjected to
patient and careful examination. The num-
ber of nations adhering to the Nonprolif-
eration Treaty has now reached 76 and
successful negotiations on safeguard ar-
rangements have paved the way for ratifi-
cation by key European countries.

Much has been accomplished, but much
remains to be done. With the beginning of
my second term in ofllce, I rededicate my
Administration to the goal of bringing the
instruments of warfare under effective and
verifiable control.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, April 9, 1973.

' Single copies of the report, entitled "Arms Con-
trol Report: 12th Annual Report to the Congress,
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Jan-
uary 1 December 31, 1972," are available upon re-
quest from the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, Washington, D.C. 20451.

Moy 28, 1973

701

Department Discusses International Ramifications
of the Energy Situation

Statement by Willmm J. Casey

Under Secretary for Econo7nic Affairs^

I appreciate the opportunity to testify
today on this key question of our future en-
ergy supphes. The President's energy mes-
sage has set forward a comprehensive
program to deal with many problems stem-
ming from our increasing consumption at
home and increasing dependence on supplies
from abroad." This committee has also done
valuable work in studying the problem and
in recommending courses of action. In many
respects the conclusions you and the admin-
istration have reached are similar.

As the committee well knows, the inter-
national aspects of the problem are immense
and pose very difficult questions in political
relationships as well as in the economic area
of supply and price, balance of payments,
and trade relationships. The administration
is currently exploring the options available
for meeting these problems. It is my purpose
in my statement and in my responses to the
committee's questions to indicate some of the
issues confronting us in our consideration of
the international ramifications of our energy
situation.

We have to assess the likelihood of emer-
gencies and shortages of supply and what
should be done about them. We have to find
the most effective ways of cooperating with
other countries on research and development
to develop additional sources of energy.

^ Made before the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs on May 1. The complete tran-
script of the hearings will be published by the
committee and will be available from the Superin-
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

- For excerpts from the message, see Bulletin of
May 7, 1973, p. 561.

What is to be done? Several things are clear.
If the United States is to have the option
of limiting our future dependence on energy,
particularly oil, imported from overseas
sources, then we must first of all rebuild
our domestic capacity to supply the larger
share of our requirements. The President's
program has recommended actions — deregu-
lation of new gas, accelerated offshore ex-
ploration, development of our rich Alaskan
resource, greater reliance on coal, and tax
incentives for domestic exploration — which
should help us meet that goal if implemented
in a timely manner. Many of these steps
will require legislative action, which we
hope this committee will help be realized.
At the same time, major efforts must be
made to reduce the rate of growth in con-
sumption, which is basic to the problem, and
to develop new and cleaner sources of en-
ergy. The administration intends to develop
programs vigorously in these areas in a bal-
anced manner.

The steps we take in these fields cannot,
however, eliminate the necessity over the
shorter run to import increasingly signifi-
cant amounts of energy. Our oil imports
have already climbed to 30 percent of our
total oil consumption. They will continue to
increase at a rate of approximately 1 million
barrels per day, or over 5 percent of con-
sumption, each year until new domestic pro-
duction can be developed. With not much
new production expected from Canada and
Venezuela, the greater part of these neces-
sary imports will come from the countries of
Africa and the Middle East. I have attached
a table which shows the projected sources

702

Department of State Bulletin

I

and costs of our imports. We believe the
President's program has established the
ways in which these imports can be managed
with maximum possible security and with
minimum possible disruption to our domestic
market and cost to our consumers while still
giving encouragement to our domestic raw
material and refining industries.

The balance of payments cost of these im-
ports will be considerable. Even if our im-
ports stabilize in the latter part of this dec-
ade at a level which we find acceptable, the
annual cost may be as high as $20 billion.
It obviously will take a concei'ted effort to
expand our trade sufficiently to help meet
bills of this magnitude. On the opposite side
of this coin will be the growing revenues
of the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries] states, not all of which
can be invested profitably in their own econ-
omies. Their excess revenues and their mone-
tary reserves will be very large by 1980, not
necessarily a large quantity when viewed
against the lai-ger liquid reserves of the
world monetary system but nonetheless one
I which world institutions will have to ac-
commodate in a manner which provides
monetary stability and sound investment
opportunities.

U.S. Oil Import Program

1972 1980 1980 Cost (cif)

source (1,000 (1,000 (hilUons $J

barrel»/dat/) harreU / dan )

Case I Case II

1.5 1.8

Canada 1,200 1,000

Latin

America 2,300 3,000
Asia 200 500

West

Africa 300 1,000

North

Africa 200 500

Middle

East 500 3,000- 4.5-9.0 5.5^11.0

6,000 b

4.5 5.4

.7 .9

1.5 1.8

.7 .9

4,700 9,000- 13.4-17.9 16.3-21.8

12,000 b
Figures rounded

"Costs based on (I) present hiph range import
cost of $4/bbl, and (II) estimated $5/bbl.

•> Range of imports will depend on degrree to which
trends in rates of increase of imports are reduced.

Changes in Oil Supply Relationships

The relationships between suppliers and
consumers of energy — between oil exporters
and importers — are undergoing major and
rapid changes which our own increasing im-
ports are compounding. Our emergence as
the world's single most important importer
.of petroleum is destabilizing at this time of
transition, and our importing colleagues con-
sequently have every wish to see us take the
steps necessary to limit our growth in im-
ports. We alone among the major importing
nations have a number of options open to
us other than continued increases of imports.
Our options are not, however, true choices.
For if we do not accept them, if we simply
continue to let our imports grow, we will
only contribute to a further destabilization
in world energy supply relationships, to
greater increases in prices, and to the possi-
bility of damaging and cutthroat competition
with our friends and our allies for available
energj^ supplies. In this context, the Presi-
dent's recommendations for expanding the
production and variety of U.S. domestic
energy resources are deliberate, positive ef-
forts to ease the impact of the entry of our
burgeoning demand into the world oil
market.

The members of this committee are well
aware of the scope and importance of the
changes taking place in international oil sup-
ply relationships. The OPEC nations are
pursuing a course, in which they have been
very successful in recent years, designed to
increase their revenues and their control
over the oil-producing concessions and much
of the marketing. The international oil com-
panies, once so dominant in assuring a steady
flow of supplies and a flexibility capable of
meeting emergencies, have lost much of their
freedom of action and their ability to make
the important decisions on price and supply.
The importing governments have to face
higher costs, as well as a continued tightness
of supply due to the incremental rates of
growth in their demand.

OPEC nations, however, also have impor-
tant internal and external problems and a
real interest in cooperating with consuming

May 28, 1973

703

nations. All of these producers require the
technological, economic, and political coop-
eration of the developed consumer nations
if they are to develop lasting benefits for
their future generations during this favored
period in their histories. Excessive price rises
could, however, create instability which
would affect producers as well and bring
substitute fuels into the market quicker.

In these circumstances, it is hardly sur-
prising that the energy-importing nations
have become anxious over the security and
cost of their vital oil supplies. They are also
keenly interested in generating the necessary
exports to pay for their increasing imports
and have often sought to do so by means of
bilateral arrangements with the oil-export-
ing governments. The result has been an in-
creasing trend toward balkanization of the
oil market. While there may be advantages
to individual governments pursuing their
ends through bilateral agreements, and this
approach may even have some appeal in the
abstract, we are concerned that it can have
very harmful effects in a market so heavily
influenced by the decisions of a very small
number of suppliers. In short, each country
seems capable of obtaining its own supply
security only at the expense of its neighbor's
increased insecurity. The possibility of a
dangerous and divisive struggle among oil-
importing nations for oil supplies and export
markets is real and is made more so by the
degree to which we continue to increase our
own imports.

Steps taken now to increase our domestic
supplies, develop new ones, or use existing
supplies more efficiently will ease the
problem.

International Consultations

Equally important is the necessity for
the importing nations to take cooperative
steps which will help avoid the sort of cut-
throat competition among themselves which
could harm everyone's interests. In accord-
ance with the President's directive in the
energy message, the Department of State
intends to pursue this course vigorously in
the coming months, building on the numer-
ous exchanges we have already had with

major importing governments. All major
consumer nations now appear to favor some
form of increased cooperation. The nature
and limits of this generalized desire for co-
operation vary, however, when specific alter-
natives are considered.

A high degree of consensus exists for three
concepts: the necessity to avoid disruption
of relations with OPEC countries, cooperate
on development of new sources of energy,
and increase protective security measures,
which include import sharing with other
consumer nations. Most major consumers
favor expanding the range of energy sup-
plies through the development of alternative
sources, although some have a preference
for bilateral arrangements with us on re-
search and development rather than use of
a multilateral framework and some want to
focus primarily on longrun aspects of this
type of cooperation. Increased security meas-
ures, such as emergency oil-sharing ar-
rangements and enhanced storage capacity,
also have wide support. Discussions are now
underway to consider expanding, along the
lines of the existing OECD [Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment] European oil apportionment plan for
time of emergency, an apportionment plan
to include the United States and other non-
European members.

However, we should not minimize the is-
sues we face in considering cooperative
measures. Among the points on which we
will need to reach our own decisions and
then agreement with OECD members are
such questions as :

—Is the United States prepared to enter:
into binding arrangements for equitable im-
port sharing during emergencies?

—Is the United States prepared if neces-i
sary to undertake rationing or consider otherl
measures which could be taken to cope with
a supply emergency under a sharing agree-
ment?

—Is the United States prepared to share
proprietary or government technological in-,
formation in cooperative research projects?

—Is the United States prepared to estab-
lish a compulsory oil stockpile program?

litd

1(2

704

Department of State Bulletin

The U.S. Government through the Depart-
ment of State must continue to consult
closely at a high level with all major consum-
ing and producing nations to insure adequate
supplies of energy at reasonable prices. The
Department of State has been so proceeding
as the record will clearly show. I plan next
month to follow up the consultations initi-
ated last year by Mr. Irwin [John N. Irwin
II, then Deputy Secretary of State] with
the 23 OECD countries. Particular focus will
be devoted to emergency procedures in the
event of oil supply shortages and in the re-
search and development of new forms and
supplies of energy. An energy survey team
composed of Japanese Government officials
is in this country at the present time and has
consulted with both the executive and legis-
lative branches of government, as well as
with jn-ivate industry. We expect a visit
from Common Market energy officials late
next month. These consultations and this
coordination are not designed for confronta-
tion with producing countries, which would
only increase the instability of the energy
market. On the contrary, this government,
a.s do other consuming nations, seeks closest
consultation and cooperation with those na-
tions endowed with excess supplies of en-
ergy. Prince Saud and Minister of Petroleum
[Ahmad Zaki] Yamani of Saudi Arabia
were in \Va.shington last month discussing
these problems at the highest level of gov-
ernment, both executive and legislative, as
well as with industry. Deputy Secretary
Rush was in Tehran last week not only to
confer with the Shah on Middle East prob-
lems but also to meet with all our Chiefs of
Mission in the area.

Thanks to the remarkable efforts of pri-
vate industr\\ the United States survived the
oil crises which developed after World War
I and World War II, when shortages were
predicted by experts. Now the world is for-
tunate indeed to have available for develop-
ment and production more than adequate
petroleum reserves to last into the next cen-
tury. Global reserves of gas are also immense
and only await efficient development and
production ; for example approximately 10
billion cubic feet of gas is flared daily in

the Persian Gulf. The Department of State
will play its full role in seeking and develop-
ing the essential cooperation among nations
to make this energy available to the inter-
national market at reasonable cost.

Cooperation in Energy Technologies

I might point out that there is now a
reasonable amount of international coopera-
tion in energy technologies on which we can
build a more comprehensive R. & D. pro-
gram. For example, we have had longstand-
ing cooperative programs with a number of
countries in the nuclear reactor field. We
have been cooperating with Poland in coal
technology. We have programs with Japan
and Italy in geothermal energy and with Ger-
many in magnetohydrodynamics. In March
of this year we agreed to cooperate with
the Soviet Union in a number of energy tech-
nologies— thermal and hydro power stations,
power transmission technology, magnetohy-
drodynamics, and solar and geothermal en-
ergy. We have suggested that the NATO
Committee on the Challenges of Modern
Society undertake programs in solar and
geothermal energy.

Our task now is to enlarge and expand
the scope and scale of international R. & D.
cooperation. We intend to do so with a sharp
focus on our priorities. In weaving the exist-
ing programs into a broader fabric of co-
operation there are a number of factors we
will want to keep in mind. Cooperation im-
plies mutual interest, mutual needs, mutual
goals, and mutual benefits. Unless other
countries also benefit substantially through
cooperation with the United States, there
would be no incentive or advantage for them
to join forces with us. The reverse is, of
course, also true. We will also wish to pay
particular attention to international cooper-
ation at an industrial level. Experience has
shown that as technologies approach a com-
mercial stage, cooperation at a government-
to-government level becomes more difficult.
Cooperation at the industrial level is there-
fore especially pertinent to those tech-
nologies that might provide nearer term
solutions to the energy question, and we

May 28, 1973

705

will be exploring with industry possible
mechanisms for assuring and accelerating
such cooperation.

The principal foreign policy implication
of our becoming a major importer of oil and
gas is contained in the word "interdepend-
ence." Our natural resources, whether fossil
fuels or ores, however immense, are iinite.
We must learn to use them efficiently. We
must learn to consei^ve. But above all, we
must recognize that we live on an increas-
ingly interdependent planet and must work
in harmony and cooperation with all others,
regardless of political, economic, and cultural
differences. This calls for even greater atten-
tion to basic programs pursued by this gov-
ernment, such as the reduction of trade
barriers, the development of monetary sta-
bility, and above all, the generation of a
generation of peace, which not only would
conserve invaluable human resources but
also prevent the grossest waste of the irre-
placeable natural resources which have taken
eons to make.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, Isf Session

Implications of Multinational Firms for World
Trade and Investment and for U.S. Trade and
Labor. Report of the United States Tariff Commis-
sion to the Committee on Finance of the United
States Senate and its Subcommittee on Interna-
tional Trade on Investigation No. 332-69, under
Section 332 of the Tariff Act of 1930. February
1973. 930 pp. Multinational Corporations. A Com-
pendium of Papers submitted to the Subcommittee
on International Trade. February 21, 1973.
968 pp.

Canadian Automobile Agreement Sixth Annual Re-
port of the President to the Congress on the Oper-
ation of the Automotive Products Trade Act of
1965, together with statistical data supplied to
the Senate Committee on Finance by the U.S.
Tariff Commission. February 1, 1973. 139 pp.

Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1973.
Report, with supplemental views, to accompany
H.R. 3577. H. Rept. 93-7. February 5, 1973. 30 pp.

Forty-Fourth Annual Report of the Work and
Operations of the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory,
Fiscal Year 1972. Communication from President,
Gorgas Memorial Institute of Tropical and Pre-
ventive Medicine, Inc. H. Doc. 93-10. February
5, 1973. 37 pp.

State of the Union. Message from the President of
the United States transmitting the second of a
series of state of the Union reports, i-elating to
natural resources and the environment. S. Doc.
93-5. February 15, 1973. 10 pp.

Observations on East- West Economic Relations:
U.S.S.R. and Poland. A trip report, November-
December 1972, submitted to the Joint Economic
Committee by Senator Humphrey and Congress-
man Reuss. February 16, 1973. 67 pp.

Twenty-Sixth Report of the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission on Information. Communication from the
Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Infor-
mation, transmitting the Commission's 26th Re-
port of the information, educational, and cultural
programs administered by the United States
Information Agency. H. Doc. 93-50. February
27, 1973. 37 pp.

Census Programs of Several Countries in Europe
and the Middle East. H. Rept. 93-34. March 1,
1973. 18 pp.

International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Report to
accompany Ex. O, 81st Cong., first sess. S. Ex.
Rept. 93-5. March 6, 1973. 23 pp.

Modification in the Par Value of the Dollar. Report
to accompany S. 929, together with individual
views. S. Rept. 93-58. March 8, 1973. 10 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Report, together
with additional views, to accompany S. 837. S.
Rept. 93-62. March 14, 1973. 38 pp.

Consular Conventions with Poland, Romania, and
Hungary. Report to accompany Ex. U, 92-2;
Ex. V, 92-2; and Ex. W, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 93-6.
March 21, 1973. 6 pp.

Convention with Japan for the Protection of Birds
and Their Environment. Report to accompany Ex.
R, 92-2. S. Ex. Rept. 93-8. March 21, 1973. 6 pp.

The 1973 Joint Economic Report. Report of the Joint
Economic Committee, Congress of the United '
States, on the January 1973 Economic Report of
the President, together with statement of com-
mittee agreement, minority, and supplementary
views. H. Rept. 93-90. March 26, 1973. 140 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces
Treaty. Report of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, United States Senate, made by its Subcom-
mittee on the Operation of Article VII of the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement. S. Rept.
93-90. March 27, 1973. 12 pp.

706

Department of State Bulletin

THE UNITED NATIONS

United States Proposes Provisional Entry Into Force
of Future International Seabed Regime and Machinery

The United Nations Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Juris-
diction met at Neiv York March 5-April 6.
Following is a statement made in subcom-
mittee I on March 19 by U.S. Representative
John Norton Moore.

rsi'N press release 20 ilatcil March 19

Many of the members of the Seabed Com-
mittee have increasingly expressed their con-
cern that progress in the lavv-of-the-sea ne-
gotiations has not been adequate to keep
abreast of the rapid advances in technology
for ocean space. Indeed, my delegation has
repeatedly encouraged the committee to
hasten its progress lest while we debate,
events preempt our ability to negotiate a
treaty on the law of the sea. We believe
there is now a renewed sense of dedication
in the committee to produce a treaty on the
law of the sea on the time schedule fixed by
the 27th General Assembly. We are encour-
aged by this sense of purpose.

All delegations are no doubt aware that
seabed mining technology has now advanced
to a stage where commercial exploitation of
manganese nodules can, and no doubt will,
occur within the next three to five years.
In anticipation of commercial production,
U.S. companies and presumably the compa-
nies of other countries will shortly invest
large sums of money in order to continue
their developmental work and to begin con-
structing production facilities. We in this
committee .still have the opportunity to as-
sure that the new law of the sea and any
international institutions established for
deep seabed resource management are oper-
ational when such exploitation occurs.

On July 20, 1972, in subcommittee I, other
nations inquired as to the position of the
United States on draft legislation, called S.
2801, now designated H.R. 9 or S. 1134,
which has been pending in our Congress
for some time — draft legislation which has
been designed to provide to interested mem-
bers of our industrial community a variety
of assurances that these negotiations would
not ultimately cause them to lose the large
investments which they will shortly be mak-
ing and the large research and development
expenditures which they have already in-
curred. On May 19, 1972, we advised inter-
ested members of our Congress that we were
not prepared at that time to state a position
on S. 2801. We furnished copies of our re-
port to Congress to this committee last July.
On March 1, 1973, we did make our position
known to Congress. In response to this com-
mittee's continuing request to be kept in-
formed of the status of our position, we have
attached to this statement a copy of the
views of the executive branch of our govern-
ment on this "interim legislation." ' I would
like, however, Mr. Chairman, to briefly sum-
marize what we told our Congress.

— First, we pointed out that the General
Assembly had established a firm schedule for
the Law of the Sea Conference and that we
anticipated that the schedule would be met.

— Second, we stressed the fact that Presi-
dent Nixon's oceans policy statement of 1970
indicated that it was neither necessary nor
desirable to try to halt exploration and ex-
ploitation of the seabeds beyond the depth
of 200 meters during the negotiation process,
provided that such activities are subject to

' Not printed here.

May 28, 1973

707

the international regime to be agreed upon
and that the international regime include
due protection of the integrity of invest-
ments made in the interim period.

— Third, we stated that we wish to avoid
taking any action which might be construed
by others as the kind of unilateral action of
which the United States has been critical
and which does not enhance the prospects
for international agreement.

— Fourth, we indicated that it is our policy
that we wish to insure that technology to
mine the seabeds will continue to develop
and that seabed mineral resources will be
available to the United States and other coun-
tries as a new source of metals.

— Fifth, we said that under any new legal
regime a secure and stable investment cli-
mate is essential.

— Sixth, we stated that seabed mineral
resource development must be compatible
with sound environmental practices.

Mr. Chairman, my government is attempt-
ing in every possible way to assure that sea-
bed mining, when it occurs, will occur under
fully agreed international rules and regula-
tions and will be administered by interna-
tional machinery. For that reason, we
advised our Congress that we are opposed
at this time to the passage of legislation
such as H.R. 9. In doing so, however, we
were keenly aware of the lack of confidence
which many people have in the timely and
satisfactory progress of our work in the
U.N. Seabed Committee. To the extent that
H.R. 9 was devised to provide private com-
panies with a more secure basis for invest-
ment decisions, we could not rule out the
alternative of interim legislation if a Law
of the Sea Conference is not concluded as
scheduled and does not produce a treaty that
assures an accommodation of the basic ob-
jectives which all nations have in these ne-
gotiations. We stated our basic objectives
on August 10, 1972, in the main committee. -

We believe, Mr. Chairman, that both a
timely and successful Law of the Sea Con-
ference is possible. But even a treaty which

- For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 2, 1972,
p. 382.

is open for signature in 1974 or 1975 will not
be timely if several years elapse while the
treaty secures the necessary number of rati-
fications so as to come into force. Indeed, even
if only one or two years elapsed after signa-
ture, seabed exploitation would in all prob-
ability occur — and would not be subject to
the international regime and machinery.

Hence, Mr. Chairman, in order to meet
what I believe are the objectives of all na-
tions in this conference — a successful treaty
which, with respect to deep seabed resource
development, will come into force in advance
of actual commercial exploitation — my gov-
ernment is of the view that we must begin
at once to prepare for the provisional entry
into force of those portions of the perma-
nent regime and machinery which would be
applicable to deep seabed development. We
contemplate that such an approach would
only apply to the period after the law-of-the-
sea treaty is opened for signature and until
the permanent regime and machinery enter
into force. Alternatively, it might also be
possible to limit the provisional period to a
stated number of years. This approach, Mr.
Chairman, would make it certain that from
the very beginning seabed exploitation would
occur under an internationally agreed regime
and its benefits would accrue to the inter-
national community.

There are a number of instances in the
history of international negotiations in
which analogous steps have been taken for
similar reasons. To name only a few, the
Convention on International Civil Aviation
(the Chicago Convention) , one of the world's
most widely ratified conventions, entered
into force on a provisional basis shortly after
it was opened for signature; the machinery
which the Chicago Convention established,
the International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, came into being on a provisional basis
at the same time. Other examples of pro-
visional arrangements can be seen in the
World Health Organization, the Preparatory
Commission for the International Refugee
Organization, the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency, and Intelsat [International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization]
as well as a variety of others.

708

Department of State Bulletin

M.M

We are aware that a proposal such as the
one we are puttiny: forward today has many
ramifications and may have inherent in it
a variety of complex considerations which
require careful study. Later in my state-
ment, I will refer to some of these consider-
ations and attempt to elaborate on them.

What is important, Mr. Chairman, is that
delegations prive careful consideration to the
concept of provisional entry into force of
the international regime and machinery. It
should be made clear that this concept in-
volves bringing into force at the time the
final law-of-the-sea treaty is opened for sig-
nature, on a provisional basis, the permanent
regime and machinery for the deep seabeds.
This is not a proposal for an interim regime,
Mr. Chairman ; it is a means of assuring that
the permanent regime and machinery which
will have already been agreed to at the con-
ference take effect promptly on a provisional
basis so as to insure that all seabed exploita-
tion is covered from the beginning by the
treaty which we are here to negotiate and
so that states will not have to consider other
alternatives to resolve the problem.

We do not ask the committee to prejudge
in any way the content of the permanent
regime and machinery. This is what we are
all here to negotiate. At this time, we ask
instead the support of delegations only for
the concept of the provisional entry into
force of that regime and machinery.

For our part, we would hope to have at
least the tentative views of delegations dur-
ing the March meeting on this proposal in
order to be more fully responsive to our own
Congress before the committee's next meet-
ing this summer in Geneva. In the meantime,
Mr. Chairman, we believe the Secretary
General should prepare for our use in July
a study of the potential applicability to our
present work of the various ways in which
this type of problem has been dealt with in
the past. We propose that this study be com-
pleted before the July-August meeting and
that it be referred to subcommittee I and
possibly to the working group for discussion
after completion of its work in the middle
of August on the international regime and
machinery. If the members of the committee

view this proposal for provisional entry into
force of the international regime and ma-
chinery sympathetically, and if the Secretary
General's study is prepared in time for de-
bate in subcommittee I this summer, we
feel certain, Mr. Chairman, that the commit-
tee will be well on its way to solving some of
the difficult problems which have been caused
by this protracted negotiation.

The objectives of a provisional regime
and machinery should be to assure that when
deep ocean mining occurs, it occurs under
the internationally agreed system and under
the international rules which would be
agreed to as a part of the permanent regime.
This would assure that seabed mining activ-
ities would be conducted under the interna-
tional regime that the conference has agreed
upon to provide for the sound, orderly, and
economically efl^cient development of seabed
mineral resources for the benefit of mankind
and to assure safe and environmentally
sound operating practices. Like the perma-
nent machinery, the provisional machinery
should administer seabed resource activities
and assure compliance with the provisions
of the regime. Most importantly, the pro-
visional machinery would acquire substantial
experience with respect to the geology, tech-
nology, and economics of this new under-
taking so as better to enable the permanent
machinery to commence its work.

This provisional regime and machinery
could also assure that revenues from seabed
mining were collected and held in reserve by
the provisional machinery for the revenue
distribution system to be used by the per-
manent regime and machinery. It would also
need to establish some provisional dispute
settlement machinery of a simple character.
The provisional machinery should also pre-
pare preliminary drafts of annexes to the
final treaty which can then be promulgated
by the permanent machinery in accordance
with its powers as soon as it comes into
being. Finally, the provisional regime and
machinery should in every respect be estab-
lished in such a way as to encourage prompt
i-atification and entry into force of the per-
manent treaty.

In short, Mr. Chairman, we see as the

May 28, 1973

709

fundamental objective of a provisional re-
gime and machinery the protection of the
integrity of the permanent regime and ma-
chinery while at the same time providing a
sound legal basis for investment decisions
after the treaty is opened for signature and
before it comes into force. Investments made
under such a provisional arrangement would
be given the same protection as if they had
been made pursuant to the permanent
regime.

It may be argued by some delegations,
Mr. Chairman, that provisional entry into
force of the regime and machinery would
permit those nations which are now develop-
ing the technology to mine the seabeds to
quickly acquire exclusive rights to all of the
mineral deposits of the deep seabed which
are of any potential value. For a variety of
reasons, this could not be the case nor would
we want it to be.

First, the permanent regime will presum-
ably be designed to prevent this from
happening. The same provisions could be
applicable during the provisional period.

Second, the market opportunities for the
metals contained in manganese nodules are
limited. The projected growth of world de-
mand for the principal metals contained in
manganese nodules, particularly nickel, is
such that the rate of growth of productive
capacity will necessarily be relatively small.
I believe both of the economic implication
studies prepared by the Secretary General,^
with which, as you know, we have some
differences of opinion, would support the
conclusion that the markets are so limited
in relation to the availability of the resource
that it would be a very long time indeed be-
fore any but a tiny fraction of these ocean
resources could be exploited economically.
Our own estimates indicate that there are
more than 4 million square kilometers of
highly attractive manganese nodule deposits
potentially exploitable even for first-gener-
ation mining equipment, not to speak of the
number of deposits which would become
attractive as world technology improves. It
is thus apparent that, in the period to which

'U.N. docs. A/AC.138/36 and A/AC.138/173.

the provisional regime would apply, only a
handful of operations would occur.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation has given
some preliminary thought to the nature of
the provisional regime and machinery, and
I would at this point ask the committee's
indulgence while I share some of our tenta-
tive views with the members of the sub-
committee.

Since we have always divided our work in
this committee into the question of the
regime and the question of machinery, I will
address the remainder of my comments to
each of those subjects separately.

Our tentative view on the provisional
regime, Mr. Chairman, is that it should in-
clude all of the general provisions of the
law-of-the-sea treaty which would have ap-
plicability to the international seabed area.
In addition to the general principles, the
United States believes that the regime should
provide for the granting of rights under
general rules and conditions drawn from
those which would appear in the permanent
regime and machinery. In general, these
would relate to the duration of the rights
granted, the nature of the mineral deposit
which could be exploited, the boundaries of
the area which would be the subject of
rights, the economic burdens which would be
placed on the mining activity, and the stand-
ards necessary to insure safety and environ-
mentally sound practices. In addition, rules
would be necessary to assure that sufficient
information was turned over to the provi-
sional machinery so as to enable it to admin-
ister activities in the area.

With respect to the provisional machinery,
Mr. Chairman, it may on the one hand be
desirable to establish all or most of the per-
manent organs on a provisional basis, or
on the other hand it may not be necessary to
do more than establish a provisional assem-
bly, council, and secretariat.

The provisional machinery could inspect
and administer all of the seabed resource ac-
tivities; issue the necessary rights; collect
revenues and, after deducting the adminis-
trative expenses of the provisional machin-
ery, hold the balance in reserve for distribu-

710

Department of State Bulletin

tion by the iiermanent machinery: settle dis-
I)iites; and bej^in the laborious task of draft-
ing detailed rules and negotiating them with
states with a view toward their eventual pro-
mulgation by the permanent machinery.

Much thought needs to be given to the
question of how to establish the provisional
arrangements in such a way as to encourage
prompt ratification and entry into force of
the final law-of-the-sea treaty, which of
course would include the permanent regime
and machinei-y. We must not forget, Mr.
Chairman, the importance of fulfilling the
mandate of the General Assembly in Resolu-
tion 2749 to establish an "international
treaty of a universal character, generally
agreed upon." Such a treaty would have to
accommodate the basic interests of all na-
tions in this negotiation. If we fail to achieve
these objectives, our efforts will be for
naught.

It is possible to provide for the provisional
regime and machinery to cease after a stated
period of years or when the permanent re-
gime comes into force, whichever occurs first.
The fact that investments will be made, and
revenues collected, in contemplation of entry
into force should also act as an incentive to
early ratification of the peiTnanent law-of-
the-sea treaty. These, Mr. Chairman, are
only two possibilities. We are cei'tain that the
combined efforts of the members of the com-
mittee and the Secretary General would pro-
duce many interesting proposals in this re-
gard.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, my govern-
ment believes that the provisional entry into

force of the iiermanent regime and machinery
will be of substantial benefit to all of us. It
will enable nations to promptly gain benefits
from resource development; it will give us
the opportunity to collect and disseminate
information about the technology and im-
l)acts of resource development in its early
growth years; it will substantially expedite
the preparation of detailed annexes to the
treaty which will be promulgated by the per-
manent machinery. They can then be judged
against the background of a sound data base
acquired during the provisional period; it
will enable us to assure that the resources
are developed under international adminis-
tration from the start. Finally, Mr. Chair-
man, the i)rovisional entry into force of the
permanent regime and machinery will stimu-
late states to expedite the ratification
process, an objective all states share.

I should emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that
these are most tentative and preliminary
views put forward only to assist delegations
in evaluating the desirability of the overall
concept of a provisional regime and machin-
ery. We do not ask the committee to prejudge
the content of the permanent regime and
machinery. This will be the subject of our
negotiations during the next year. If this
concept finds wide support, we feel certain
that cur future negotiating efforts will be
both pi'oductive and timely. If they are, we
will have succeeded in developing new inter-
national law in advance of technology. If
they are not, we may lose the opportunity
to govern through international agreement
this last resource frontier on earth.

^ay 28, 1973

711

U.S. Introduces Draft Convention on Registration of Space Objects

The Legal Siib committee of the United
Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space met at New York March 26-
April 20. Following is a statement made in
the subcommittee on March 27 by U.S. Rep-
resentative Herbert Reis.

rsrx press rcloase 28 dnted March 27

Our delegation would like to explain to the
members of the Outer Space Legal Subcom-
mittee the reasons why the United States
is today tabling a draft Convention on the
Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space." We hope and believe that this pro-
posal will make possible the successful con-
clusion on a mutually acceptable basis of the
negotiations for an international registra-
tion agreement that were begun in 1972 with
consideration of the joint draft of Canada
and France. We appreciate the constructive
initiative of the cosponsors, but in our view,
their proposal in certain respects goes be-
yond what would be appropriate in accom-
plishing the central purjjose of a registration
agreement.

The United States considers that that pur-
pose should be to implement the Outer Space
Liability Convention of 1971." We under-
stand the concern that a state, although a
party to the Liability Convention, may be
unable to make use of the fair-compensation
provisions of that convention if a fragment
has landed on its territory and caused damage
but it cannot identify the state that launched
the object with which the fragment is associ-
ated. This concern does not seem unwar-
ranted, bearing in mind the relatively short

'U.N. doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.85.

■ For text of the Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, see
Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1972, p. 42.

time limits imposed by the convention in
filing a claim. It was against this background
that we were authorized to state on May 3
of last year that "the United States is able
to envisage a registration treaty as a step in
the development of a positive and orderly law
for the governance of man's activities in
space." We are now introducing a draft
treaty text which we believe should accom-
plish that step.

In our view, an international agreement on
registration should, first, create a cost-
effective and practicable international census
of vehicles in orbit and, second, offer a rea-
sonably reliable assurance that states pos-
sessing tracking and analytical facilities will
assist in identifying fragments in connection
with possible damage. I take up these aspects
in turn.

First, with regard to establishing of an
international census of orbiting vehicles, I
think it appropriate to recall that the idea of
a centralized international registry of such
vehicles came about as the result of a sug-
gestion of the United States some 10 years
ago. In fact, the United States proposed the
establishment of an international registry to
be maintained by the Secretary General of
the United Nations, and this was agreed in
General Assembly Resolution 1721B, adopted
unanimously in December 1961. The princi-
pal idea of that registry is that each launch-
ing state should voluntarily transmit to the
Secretary General information concerning
each of the vehicles it launches into orbit or
beyond so that, taken together, the informa-
tion submitted by the states members of the
international community would comprise an
orderly census of orbiting manmade objects.

We have now had 12 years of practice
under this resolution. A number of launch-

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712

Department of State Bulletin Jt

in Jt

•I

ing states — the United States, Australia,
France, Italy, Jajian, the Soviet Union, and
the Ignited Kingdom — have transmitted reg-
istration statements to the Secretary Gen-
eral.

The United States has reported fully to
the registry. Our i-eporting statements in fact
constitute a continuing and accurate census
of U.S. objects in orbit. Our practice has been
to report on a month-to-month basis on U.S.
objects launched into orbit or beyond during
the reporting period. To particularize, the
United States ti'ansmits information as to a

I U.S.-launched earth-orbiting object, the type
of launch vehicle, the purpose of the vehicle,
the date of launch, the nodal period, inclina-
tion, apogee, and perigee. We also report on
objects jireviously registered as being in or-

^bit which are no longer in orbit.

I These dozen years of experience have now

"led us to agree with others that the volun-
tary international registry has been useful
hut could be improved by the adoption of a
rnmmon or standardized rei)orting format to
be used by all reiwrting states. We have also
concluded, as I indicated above, that the im-
provement of the system through the means
of an international agreement is appropriate

! and desirable.

Second, I turn to the issue of assistance to
states to identify fragments of manmade ob-
jects that return to earth and cause damage.
Theoretically one could imagine the possibil-
ity of establishing an international center
that would have a capability of identifying
fragments. However, this would involve very

I large costs, and no one has proposed that
this would be a useful way for the members
of the international community to spend
money.

There is another reason why the establish-
ment of complex international identification
machinery would be inai)propriate, and that
because the occasion for its use would be
so small. Manmade fragments do not often
survive reentry of the earth's atmosphere,
and the likelihood of damage when they do

■ survive reentry is far smaller.

Consequently, along with other members

I

Moy 28, 1973

of the Outer Space Committee, we have
turned our attention to alternative possibil-
ities of providing assurance that states will
be able to request and receive identification
assistance from states and international or-
ganizations that have or may develop sig-
nificant capabilities in this field. In this
connection let me recall our delegation's offer
for the record at the last session of the sub-
committee. In a statement on May 3, 1972,
we drew attention to "the willingness of the
United States, on request, to assist any party
to the Outer Space Liability Convention in
identifying a fragment in connection with
possible damage. We are confident that our
investigative capability affords a high prob-
ability of accurate identification of origin of
any returning fragment." We also noted that
the United States is not alone in possessing
such a capability, and we expressed the hope
that other launching authorities and other
nonlaunching states possessing technical ca-
pacity would make offers parallel to ours.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, this kind of offer
of assistance represents perhaps the single
most important contribution to implementing
the Liability Convention where there is doubt
as to the identity of the launching authority.
Today the United States takes the additional
and significant step of offering to undertake
a treaty-based obligation to grant such as-
sistance in appropriate cases.

A note of caution is necessary, however.
Fulfilling a request for identification assist-
ance will involve the allocation of human,
technical, and economic resources on the part
of the state whose help has been requested.
While the United States would be ready to
offer assistance where damage has occurred,
we would not be prepared to do so without a
concrete indication of need. For this reason,
as you will see, our offer of assistance is lim-
ited to cases of damage.

Delegations will recall that the United
States did not participate in the initial dis-
cussion of the details of a possible registra-
tion treaty that began last year in the Regis-
tration Working Group established by the
Legal Subcommittee. The working group's

713

report ^ is extensively bracketed and reveals
a considerable lack of consensus on the part
of participating delegations, as is of course
natural in any new discussion. At the same
time, the working group's consideration of
registration was helpful. To give but one
example, discussions demonstrated a wide-
spread desire to create a so-called "juridical
link" between a state launching an object
into orbit and the object itself. Most delega-
tions considered that an international agree-
ment on registration could thus carry for-
ward the provision of article VIII of the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 which states
that "A State Party to the Treaty on whose
registry an object launched into outer space
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and con-
trol over such object, and over any personnel
thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial
body." You will see that our new proposal
incorporates this notion of juridical link.

Let me turn now to some of the details of
the new U.S. treaty proposal before you.
The preamble sounds the theme that the
principal purpose to be served by a manda-
tory international registration system and
procedures for identification assistance is to
contribute to identification in the case of a
space object which has caused damage. Ar-
ticle I contains definitions of the terms
"space object" and "launching State." We
have used the same definitions as are in the
Outer Space Liability Convention.

Article II, paragraph 1, concerns what
might be called the "national" aspects of
registration; following provisions concern
the centralized international registry. In
article II, paragraph 1, we have proposed
that every launching state maintain its own
national registry of objects it has launched
into earth orbit or beyond. Now, we have
not thought it appropriate to impose any
format on national registries. This would be
up to each country concerned; its registry
could be public or private, as it wishes, and
its contents could be brief or detailed as the
launching state considered appropriate. In
our view, what a launching state maintains

»U.N. doc. A/AC.105/101, par. 31.

in and on its own registry is up to it; this is
not a suitable matter for international regu-
lation. As I have said, the purpose of this
provision is to establish the "juridical link"
contemplated by the Outer Space Treaty.

The remainder of Article II and Articles
III and IV concern the international registry.
We have proposed that these articles accom-
plish the transformation of the existing vol-
untary registration system into a treaty-
based system which all launching authorities
would freely support because it would be in !
their interest to do so. In essence, we propose
to codify the 12-year practice of the registry
maintained in accordance with General As-
sembly Resolution 1721 B. Article IV sets
forth the types of information that should be
furnished with regard to each launching as
soon as practicable after launch. And we
have added at the end of article IV, in para-
graph 2, the requirement that a launching
state should likewise report as soon as prac-
ticable any space object it has launched
which no longer remains in orbit.

The U.S. draft provides that the central
or international register should be open,
rather than restricted to access by states that
accept the registration treaty. We think that
a rule of openness is the rule that is mostpj,
consistent with the general thrust of the
Outer Space Treaty and will best serve to
implement the Liability Convention.

Article V of the U.S. draft sets forth thej
offer on the part of states "possessing spacej
monitoring and tracking facilities" to "re-
spond to the greatest extent feasible to re-.
quests by any other State Party to this Con-
vention or to the Convention on International]
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Ob-j
jects . . . for assistance ... in the identi
fication of a particular space object which!
has caused damage ..." I note also the re-|
ciprocal obligation of the potential claimant]
state to assist in the identification process by
supplying specific information regarding th€
event giving rise to its request. We considei
this to be both a generous and an appropriate
offer.

The remainder of the U.S. draft is

A

m

r

ipril
:es
tt

?Jte
2rh'

714

Department of State Bulletir

straig:htfor\vard. Article VI contains a clause
applying: the provisions of the convention to
international organizations that conduct
space activities and accept similar obliga-
tions. The antecedents of this i)rovision lie
of course in the 1968 Astronaut Agreement
and the 1971 Liability Convention. Finally,
articles VII through X contain final clauses
similar to those of the other treaties con-
cerned with man's activities in outer space.
The United States expresses the hope that
the draft convention introduced by the
United States today will make possible the
completion at this session of a meaningful
and mutually accei^table international regis-
tration agi-eement. We thus look forward
with optimism to the early and successful
conclusion of this aspect of the work of the
Outer Space Committee and our Legal Sub-
committee.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Germany Sign Agreement
on "Advance Charter" Flights

The Department of State announced on
^nril 16 (press release 113) that the United

ites and the Federal Republic of Germany
had concluded on April 13 a memorandum of
understanding on travel group charters
(TGC's) and advance booking charters
I ABC's) under which each party will accept
as charterworthy transatlantic traffic orig-
inated in the territory of the other paily and
"iganized and operated pursuant to the "ad-
vance charter" (TGC or ABC) rules of that
larty. Other provisions deal with enfoi'ce-
nient and arrangements to minimize adminis-
trative burdens on carriers and organizers of
"advance charters." The understanding was
brought into force by an exchange of letters
in Bonn. While the understanding is not an
exchange of economic rights, it is expected

May 28, 1973

to facilitate the operation of "advance char-
ter" flights between the United States and
Germany by carriers of both countries. The
understanding with Germany is the second
of a series of such agreements the United
States hopes to conclude soon with other
countries to facilitate the operation of "ad-
vance charters." (For text of the memoran-
dum of understanding, see press release 113.)

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS
1591, 3756, 5170), with annex. Done at New York
March 12, 1971. Entered into force January 16,
197:^.
Proclaimed by the President: May 8, 1973.

Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, sci-
entific, and cultural materials, with protocol. Done
at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into
force May 21, 1952; for the United States Novem-
ber 2, 1966. TIAS 6129.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Bar-
bados, April 13, 1973.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En-
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Swaziland, April 16, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse
of opium and other drugs. Done at The Hague
January 23, 1912. Entered into force for the
United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.
Notification of succession: Zambia, April 9, 1973.

Convention for limiting the manufacture and reg-
ulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, as
amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success
on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at
Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9,
1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Notification of sticcession: Zambia, April 9, 1973.

Protocol bringing under international control drugs
outside the scope of the convention of July 13,
1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating
the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543),
as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success
on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done at
Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force De-
cember 1, 1949; for the United States September
11, 1950. TIAS 2308.
Notification of succession: Zambia, April 9, 1973.

715

North Atlantic Treaty — Status of Forces — Germany

Agreement to amend the agreement of August 3,
1959 (TIAS 5351), to supplement the agreement
between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty
regarding the status of their forces with respect
to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Done at Bonn October 21,
1971.'
Ratification deposited: France, May 10, 1973.

Property — Inciustrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 en-
tered into force May 19, 1970.- Articles 13 through
30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the
United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Ratified by the President: May 8, 1973, for Ar-
ticles 1 through 12.

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig-
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3,
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re-
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with
respect to other provisions; for the United States
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.

Accessioii of the Food Aid Convention deposited:
United Kingdom, May 9, 1973.

BILATERAL

Czechoslovakia

Agreement extending the agreement of August 29,
1969, as extended (TIAS 6754, 7103), relating to
trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange
of notes at Prague April 24 and 30, 1973. Entered
into force April 30, 1973.

Ethiopia

Agreement amending the treaty of amity and eco-
nomic relations of September 7, 1951 (TIAS
2864) , to terminate notes concerning administra-
tion of justice. Effected by exchange of notes at
Addis Ababa September 16, 1965, and October
20, 1972.
Entered into force: May 3, 1973.

France

Agreement relating to travel group charter flights
and advance booking charter flights, with memo-
randum of understanding. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington May 7, 1973. Entered into
force May 7, 1973.

Japan

Convention for the protection of migratory birds
and birds in danger of extinction, and their
environment, with annex. Signed at Tokyo March
4, 1972.1
Ratified by the President: May 8, 1973.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

Liberia

Agreement relating to the establishment, operation
and maintenance of an Omega navigational sta- |
tion. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia
April 10 and 18, 1973. Entered into force April
18, 1973.

Morocco

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re-
lating to the agreement of April 20, 1967 (TIAS
6256). Signed at Rabat April 19, 1973. Entered
into force April 19, 1973.

Vief-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 (TIAS
7464). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon
April 30, 1973. Entered into force April 30, 1973.

Zaire

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
relating to the agreement of March 15, 1967 (TIAS
6329). Signed at Kinshasa March 14, 1973. En-
tered into force March 14, 1973.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 7—13

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 7 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
102 and 103 of April 6, 113 of April 16, and
128 of May 2.

No. Date Subject

*132 5/7 U.S.-Czechoslovakia cotton textile
agreement extended through
April 30, 1977.

tl33 5/7 Casey: Society of American Busi-
ness Writers, New York.

tl34 5/7 U.S. and France reach under-
standing on air charters (re-
write) .

tl35 5/7 Siseo: Israel's 25th anniversary.

*136 5/9 Law of the Sea Advisory Com-
mittee meeting. May 18-19.

*137 5/9 Advisory Panel on International
Law meeting, May 21.

tl38 5/9 Rogers: House Committee on
Ways and Means.

tl39 5/9 Announcement of Secretary Rog-
er's visit to Latin America.

tl39A 5/9 Rogers: statement on Latin
American visit.

*140 5/10 Green sworn in as Ambassador to
Australia (biographic data).

tl41 5/10 Rogers: Senate Committee on Ap-
propriations, May 8.

*142 5/11 Program for official visit to
Washington of Emperor Haile
Selassie I of Ethiopia.

■143 5/11 Advisory Commission on Inter-
national Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs meeting, June 1.

*144 5/11 Fine Arts Committee meeting,
May 25.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

fi.V

716

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX May 28, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1770

Aviation. U.S. and Germany Sign Agreement
on "Advance Charter" Flights .... 716

China. 1972: A Year of Historic Negotiations
(Ni.xon) 673

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 706

Department Discusses International Ramifica-
tions of the Energy Situation (Casey) . . 702

Department Discusses Security Assistance Pro-
gram for Fiscal Year 1974 (Rush) ... 696

Foreign .Assistance Act of 1973 Transmitted to
the Congress (message from President
Nixon) 693

?resident Reports to Congress on Arms Con-
trol Progress (letter transmitting annual
report of ACDA) 701

disarmament. President Reports to Congress
. on .Arms Control Progress (letter transmit-
ting annual report of ACDA) 701

Dnomic Affairs

apartment Discusses International Ramifica-
tions of the Energy Situation (Casey) . . 702
1ot\A Trade Week, 1973 (proclamation) . . 692

Brope. 1972: A Year of Historic Negotiations
.(Nixon) 673

(tradition. United States and Uruguay Sign
New Extradition Treaty 687

foreign Aid

Bpartment Discusses Security Assistance Pro-
gram for Fiscal Year 1974 (Rush) ... 696
oreign Assistance .Act of 1973 Transmitted
fto the Congress (message from President
Nixon) 693

ermany

hancellor Brandt of the Federal Republic of
Germany Visits Washington (Brandt, Nix-
on, joint statement) 688

t.S. and Germany Sign Agreement on "Ad-
[.vance Charter" Flights 715

Itin America
JAS General Assembly Meets at Washington
(Nixon, Crimmins, Rogers, texts of resolu-
ftion and declaration) 675

resident Reaffirms Importance of Inter-

f American System (Nixon) 686

iw of the Sea. United States Proposes Pro-
visional Entry Into Force of Future Inter-
national Seabed Regime and Machinery
(Moore) 707

Organization of American States

OAS General Assembly Meets at Washington
(Nixon, Crimmins, Rogers, texts of resolu-
tion and declaration) 675

President Reaffirms Importance of Inter-
American System (Nixon) 686

Petroleum. Department Discusses International
Ramifications of the Energy Situation
(Casey) 702

Presidential Documents

Chancellor Brandt of the Federal Republic
of Germany Visits Washington 688

Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 Transmitted to
the Congress 693

1972: A Year of Historic Negotiations . . . 673

OAS General Assembly Meets at Washington . 675

President Reaffirms Importance of Inter-
American System 686

President Reports to Congress on Arms Con-
trol Progress 701

World Trade Week, 1973 (proclamation) ... 692

Space. U.S. Introduces Draft Convention on
Registration of Space Objects (Reis) . . . 712

Trade. World Trade Week, 1973 (proclamation) 692

Treaty Information

Current Actions 715

U.S. and Germany Sign Agreement on "Ad-
vance Charter" Flights 715

United States and Uruguay Sign New Extra-
dition Treaty 687

U.S.S.R. 1972: A Year of Historic Negotiations
(Nixon) 673

United Nations

U.S. Introduces Draft Convention on Registra-
tion of Space Objects (Reis) 712

United States Proposes Provisional Entry Into
Force of Future International Seabed Re-
gime and Machinery (Moore) 707

Uruguay. United States and Uruguay Sign
New Extradition Treaty 687

Name Index

Brandt, Willy 688

Casey, William J 702

Crimmins, John Hugh 675

.Moore, John Norton 707

Nixon, President 673, 675, 686, 688,

692, 693, 701

Reis, Herbert 712

Rogers, Secretary 675

Rush, Kenneth 696

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII • No. 1771 • June 4, 1973

U.S. FOREICxN POLICY FOR THE 1970's
SHAPING A DURABLE PEACE

A Report to the Congress

liy

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United states

May 3. 197.i

Fur rtintriit.i see inside hack cover

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETI

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1771
June 4, 1973

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The BULLETIN includes selec
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and the Secretary of State and otH
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Publications of the Department
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international relations are also lin

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's
SHAPING A DURABLE PEACE

A Report to the Congress

by

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States

May 3, 1973

As printed here the President's report foUojvs the text of
a 23Jt-page booklet issued by the White House.

Letter of Transmittal

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

This Administration attaches fundamental importance to the
articulation as well as the execution of foreij^n policy.

Public understanding is, of course, essential in a democracy.
It is all the more urgent in a fast changing world, which requires
continuing, though redefined, American leadenship. One of my
bjisic goals is to build a new consensus of support in the Congress
and among the American people for a responsible foreign policy
for the 1970's.

These were the reasons that I began the practice of annual
Presidential Reports to the Congress. This fourth Review, like
the previous ones, sets forth the philosophical framework of
our policy and discusses major trends and events in this context.
Two other important documents complement this one with the
more detailed record of current questions and policies. The Sec-
retary of State's third annual report of April 19, 1973, covers
our specific country, regional, and functional policies and pro-
vides basic documentation. The Secretary of Defense's yearly
report of April 3, 1973, presents a thorough accounting of our
policies and programs for national defense.

It is my hope that this Report will inform and lift the na-
tional dialogue on our purposes and our place in the world.

(^/ZjL^ ^■TC:,^.

The White House
May 3, 1973

jne 4, 1973

Introduction

In January 1969, America needed to change
the philosophy and practice of its foreign
policy.

Whoever took office four years ago would
have faced this challenge. After a generation,
the i)ostwar world had been transformed and
demanded a fresh approach. It was not a ques-
tion of our previous policies having failed;
indeed, in many areas they had been very suc-
cessful. It was rather that new conditions,
many of them achievements of our policies,
summoned new perspectives.

The World We Found

The international environment was dominated
by seeminfsly intractable confrontation between
the two major nuclear powers. Throughout the
nuclear age both the fears of war and hopes
for peace revolved around our relations with
the Soviet Union. Our growing nuclear arsenals
were largely directed at each other. We alone
had the capacity to wreak catastrophic damage
across the planet. Our ideologies clashed. We
both had global interests, and this produced
many friction points. We each led and domi-
nated a coalition of opposing states.

As a result, our relationship was generally
hostile. There were positive interludes, but
these were often atmospheric and did not get
at the roots of tension. Accords were reached
on particular questions, but there was no broad
momentum in our relationship. Improvements
in the climate were quickly replaced by con-
frontation and, occasionally, crisis. The basic
pattern was a tense jockeying for tactical ad-
vantage around the globe.

This was dangerous and unsatisfactory. The
threat of a major conflict between us hung over
the world. This in turn exacerbated local and
regional tensions. And our two countries not
only risked collision but were constrained from
working positively on common problems.

The weif!ht of China rested outside the inter-
national framework. This was due partly to its
own attitude and its preoccupation with inter-
nal problems, and partly to the policies of the

outside world, most importantly the United
States. In any event, this Administration in-
herited two decades of mutual estrangement
and hostility. Here the problem was not one of
a fluctuating relationship but rather of having
no relationship at all. The People's Republic
of China was separated not only from us but
essentially from the world as a whole.

China also exemplified the great changes that
had occurred in the Communist world. For
years our guiding principle was containment
of what we considered a monolithic challenge.
In the 1960's the forces of nationalism dissolved
Communist unity into divergent centers of
power and doctrine, and our foreign policy be-
gan to diff"erentiate among the Communist
capitals. But this process could not be truly
effective so long as we were cut ofl" from one-
quarter of the globe's people. China in turn
was emerging from its isolation and might be
more receptive to overtures from foreign
countries.

The gulf between China and the world dis-
torted the international landscape. We could
not effectively reduce tensions in Asia without
talking to Peking. China's isolation compounded
its own sense of insecurity. There could not be
a stable world order with a major power re-
maining outside and hostile to it.

Our principal alliances with Western Europe
and Japan needed adjustment. After the devas-
tation of the Second World War we had helped
allies and former adversaries alike. Fueled by
our assistance and secure behind our mili-
tary shield, they regained their economic vigor
and political confidence.

Throughout the postwar period our bonds
with Europe had rested on American prescrip-
tions as well as resources. We provided much
of the leadership and planning for common de-
fense. We took the diplomatic lead. The dollar
was unchallenged. But by the time this Admin-
istration took office, the tide was flowing to-
ward greater economic and political assertive-
ness by our allies. European unity, which we
had always encouraged, was raising new issues
in Atlantic relations. The economic revival of

718

Department of State Bulletin

Europe was straining tiie Atlantic monetary
and commercial framework. The relaxation of
tensions with the Communist world was gener-
ating new doctrines of defense and diplomacy.
The imperatives of change were equally evi-
dent in our Pacific partnership with Japan.
Its I'ecovery of strength and self-assurance
carried political and psychological implications
for our relationship. Its spectacular economic
jrrowth had made it the world's third industrial
power; our entire economic relationship was
undergoing transformation. The earlier pater-
nalism of U.S. -Japanese relations no longer
suited either partner.

The J'ielnam tear dominated our attention
and teas sappins: our self-confidence. Our role
and our costs had steadily grown without de-
cisive impact on the conflict. The outlook at
the conference table was bleak. The war was
inhibiting our policy abroad and fostering di.s-
.sent and self-doubt at home. There was no pros-
pect of either an end to the fighting or an end
to our involvement.

Although the historical imperatives for a
new international approach existed independ-
ently, the war made this challenge at once more
urgent and more diflicult. More than any other
factor, it threatened to exhaust the American
people's willingness to sustain a reliable foreign
policy. As much as any other factor, the way we
treated it would shape overseas attitudes and
American psychology.

The context for our national security policy
teas fundamentally altered. From the mid-1940's
to the late 1960's we had moved from America's
nuclear monopoly to superiority to rough stra-
tegic balance with the Soviet Union. This
created fresh challenges to our security and
introduced new calculations in our diplomacy.
The U.S. defense efi"ort remained dispropor-
tionate to that of our allies who had grown
much stronger. The threats from potential
enemies were more varied and less blatant than
during the more rigid bipolar era. These
changes, combined with spiraling military costs
and the demands of domestic programs, were
prompting reexamination of our defense doc-
trines and posture. They were underlining the
importance of arms control as an element in
national security. They were also leading some
in this country to call for policies that would
seriously jeopardize our safety and world
■stability.

Around the u-orld. friends were ready for a
sreater role in shaping their own security and
vell-beinp. In the 1950's and 1960's other na-

tions had looked to America for ideas and re-
sources, and they found us a willing provider
of both. Our motives were sound, the needs
were clear, and we had many successes. By
1969, scores of new nations, having emerged
from colonial status or dependency on major
powers, were asserting themselves with greater
assurance and autonomy.

Four years ago this growing capacity of
friends was not reflected in the balance of con-
tributions to security and development. This
meant that others could do more, and the
United States need do proportionately less, in
the provision of material resources. More fun-
damentally, it meant that increasingly the de-
vising of plans belonged outside of Washing-
ton. The sweeping American presence was
likely to strain our capabilities and to stifle the
initiative of others.

There were new issues that called for plohal
cooperation. These challenges were not suscep-
tible to national solutions or relevant to na-
tional ideologies. The vast frontiers of space
and the oceans beckoned international explora-
tion for humanity's gain. Pollution of air, sea,
and land could not be contained behind national
frontiers. The brutal tools of assassination,
kidnapping, and hijacking could be used to
further any cause in any countiy. No nation's
youth was immune from the scourge of inter-
national drug trafllc. The immediate tragedies
of national disasters and the longer-term threat
of overpopulation were humanitarian, not po-
litical, concerns.

At home we faced pressures that threatened to
swing America from over-extension in the world
to heedless withdrawal from it. The American
l^eople had supported the burdens of global
leadership with enthusiasm and generosity into
the 1960's. But after almost three decades, our
enthusiasm was waning and the results of our
generosity were being questioned. Our policies
needed change, not only to match new realities
in the world but also to meet a new mood in
America. Many Americans were no longer will-
ing to suppoi-t the sweeping range of our post-
war role. It had drained our financial, and
especially our psychological, reserves. Our
friends clearly were able to do more. The Viet-
nam experience was hastening our awareness
of change. Voices in this country were claiming
that we had to jettison global concerns and turn
inward in order to meet our domestic problems.

Therefore the whole underpinning of our
foreign policy was in jeopardy. The bipartisan
consensus that once existed for a vigorous

June 4, 1973

719

American internationalism was now being torn
apart. Some of the most active proponents of
America's commitment in the world in previous
decades were now pressing for indiscriminate
disengagement. What was once seen as Amer-
ica's overseas obligation was now seen as our
overseas preoccupation. What was once viewed
as America's unselfishness was now viewed as
our naivete. By 1969 we faced the danger that
public backing for a continuing world role
might be swept away by fatigue, frustration
and over-reaction.

This Administration's Approach

We were determined to shape new policies
to deal with each of these problems. But our
first requirement was philosophic. We needed
a fresh vision to inspire and to integrate our
efforts.

We began with the conviction that a major
American commitment to the world continued
to be indispensable. The many changes in the
postwar landscape did not alter this central
fact. America's strength was so vast, our in-
volvement so broad, and our concerns so deep,
that to remove our influence would set off
tremors around the globe. Friends would des-
pair, adversaries would be tempted, and our
own national security would soon be threatened.
There was no escaping the reality of our enor-
mous influence for peace.

But the new times demanded a new definition
of our involvement. For more than a score of
years our foreign policy had been driven by a
global mission that only America could fulfill —
to furnish political leadership, provide for the
common defense, and promote economic devel-
opment. Allies were weak and other nations
were young, threats were palpable and Ameri-
can power was dominant.

By 1969, a mission of this scale was no longer
valid abroad or supportable at home. Allies had
grown stronger and young nations were ma-
turing, threats were diversified and American
power was offset. It was time to move from a
paternal mission for others to a cooperative
mission with others. Convinced as we were that
a strong American role remained essential for
world stability, we knew, too, that a peace
that depends primarily on the exertions of one
nation is inherently fragile.

So we saw the potential and the imperative
of a pluralistic world. We believed we could
move from an environment of emergencies to
a more stable international system. We made
our new purpose a global structure of peace —
comprehensive because it would draw on the

efforts of other countries; durable because if
countries helped to build it, they would also
help to maintain it.

To pursue this fundamental vision, we had
to move across a wide and coordinated front,
with mutually reinforcing policies for each
challenge we faced.

Peace could not depend solely on the uneasy
equilibrium between two nuclear giants. We had

a responsibility to work for positive relations
with the Soviet Union. But there was ample
proof that assertions of good will or transitory
changes in climate would not erase the hard
realities of ideological opposition, geopolitical
rivalry, competing alliances, or military com-
petition. We were determined not to lurch
along — with isolated agreements vulnerable to
sudden shifts of course in political relations,
with peaks and valleys based on atmosphere,
with incessant tension and maneuvering. We
saw as well that there were certain mutual
interests that we could build upon. As the two
powers capable of global destruction, we had a
common stake in preserving peace.

Thus we decided to follow certain principles
in our policy toward the Soviet Union. We
would engage in concrete negotiations designed
to produce specific agreements, both where dif-
ferences existed and where cooperation was
possible. We would work with Moscow across
a broad front, believing that progress in one
area would induce progress in others. Through
the gathering momentum of individual accords
we would seek to create vested interests on
both sides in restraint and the strengthening
of peace. But this process would require a re-
duction in tactical maneuvering at each other's
expense in favor of our shared interest in
avoiding calamitous collision, in profiting from
cooperation, and in building a more stable
world.

Peace could not exclude a fourth of humanity.

The longer-term prospects for peace required
a new relationship with the People's Republic
of China. Only if China's weight was reflected
in the international system would it have the
incentive, and sense of .shared responsibility,
to maintain the peace. Furthermore, the time
was past when one nation could claim to speak
for a bloc of states ; we would deal with coun-
tries on the basis of their actions, not abstract
ideological formulas. Our own policies could be
more flexible if we did not assume the perma-
nent enmity of China. The United States had a
traditional interest in an independent and
peaceful China. We seemed to have no funda-

720

Department of State Bollefin

mental interests that need collide in the lonprer
swee]) of history. There was, indeed, rich po-
tential benefit for our two peoples in a more
normal relationship.

So we launched a careful process of private
diplomacy and public steps to engapro the Peo-
ple's Rei)ubiic of China with us and involve.it
more fully in the world. We did so, confident
that a strong, independent China was in our
national interest; resolved that such a process
need not — and would not — be aimed at any
other country; and looking for a reciprocal
attitude on the part of the Chinese.

Peace niusl drmv upon the vilnlily of our
friends. Our alliances with Western Europe and
Japan would continue as major pillars of our
foreign policy, but they had not kept pace with
the changed international environment. We
thus .sought to forge more equal partnerships
based on a more balanced contribution of both
resources and plans.

America had been the automatic source of
political leadership and economic power. Now
we needed new modes of action that would ac-
commodate our partners' new dynamism. The
challenge was to reconcile traditional unity
with new diversity. While complete integration
of policy was impossible, pure unilateralism
would be destructive.

Before, w^e were allied in containment of a
unified Communist danger. Now Communism
had taken various forms; our alliances had
stabilized the European and Northeast Asian
environments; and we had laid the founda-
tions for negotiation. We had to decide together
not only what we wei*e against, but what we
were for.

Peace required the endinp of an onpoinp ivar.

Our approach to the Vietnam conflict and our
.shaping of a new foreign policy were inextrica-
bly linked. Naturally, our most urgent concern
was to end the war. But we had to end it — or
at least our involvement — in a way that would
continue to make possible a responsible Ameri-
can role in the world.

We could not continue on the course we in-
herited, which promised neither an end to the
conflict nor to our involvement. At the same
time, we would not abandon our friends, for we
wanted to shape a structure of peace based in
large measure on American steadiness. So we
sought peace with honor — through negotiation
if possible, through Vietnamization if the en-
emy gave us no choice. The phased shifting of
defen.se responsibilities to the South Vietnam-
ese would give them the time and means to

adjust. It would assure the American people
that our own involvement was not open-ended.
It would preserve our credibility abroad and
our cohesion at home.

C.iven the enemy's attitude, peace was likely
to take time, and other pi'oblems in the world
could not wait. So we moved promptly to shape
a new approach to allies and adversaries. And
by painting on this larger canvas we sought
both to ])ut the Vietnam war in perspective and
to speed its conclusion by demonstrating to Ha-
noi that continued conflict did not frustrate our
global policies.

Peace needed America's strength. Modifica-
tions in our defense policy were required, but
one central truth persisted — neither our na-
tion nor peace in the world could be secure
without our military power. If superiority was
not longer practical, inferiority would be
unthinkable.

We were determined to maintain a national
defense second to none. This would be a force
for stability in a world of evolving partnerships
and changing doctrines. This was essential to
maintain the confidence of our friends and the
I'espect of oui" adversaries. At the same time,
we would seek energetically to promote national
and international security through arms con-
trol negotiations.

Peace involved a fresh dimension of interna-
tional cooperation. A new form of multilateral
diplomacy was i)rompted by a new set of issues.
These challenges covered a wide range — the
promise of exploration, the pollution of our
planet, the perils of crime — but they were alike
in going beyond the traditional considerations
of doctrine and geography. They required co-
operation that reached not only across bound-
aries but often around the globe. So we resolved
to work both with friends and adversaries, in
the United Nations and other forums, to prac-
tice partnership on a global scale.

Above all. pence demanded the responsible
participation of nil nations. \\'itli great efl"orts
during the postwar period we had promoted
the revitalization of foimer powers and the
growing assurance of new states. For this
changed world we needed a new philosophy
that would reflect and reconcile two basic prin-
ciples: A stnicture of peace requires the
f/rcater participation of other tuitions, but it
also requires the .'iustaived participation of the
United States.

To these ends, we developed the Nixon Doc-
trine of .shared responsibilities. This Doctrine
was central to our approach to maior allies in

June 4, 1973

721

the Atlantic and Pacific. But it also shaped our
attitude toward those in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa with whom we were working in
formal alliances or friendship.

Our primary purpose was to invoke greater
efforts by others — not so much to lighten our
burdens as to increase their commitment to a
new and peaceful structure. This would mean
that increasingly they would man their own
defenses and furnish more of the funds for
their security and economic development. The
corollary would be the reduction of the Ameri-
can share of defense or financial contributions.

More fundamental than this material redis-
tribution, however, was a psychological I'eori-
entation. Nations had habitually relied on us
for political leadership. Much time and energy
went into influencing decisions in Washington.
Our objective now was to encourage them to
play a greater role in formulating plans and
programs. For when others design their secu-
rity and their development, they make their
destiny truly their own. And when plans are
their plans, they are more motivated to make
them realities.

The lowering of our profile was not an end
in itself. Other countries needed to do more,
but they could not do .so without a concerned
America. Their role had to be increased, but
this would prove empty unless we did what we
must. We could not go from overinvolvement
to neglect. A changing world needed the con-
tinuity of America's .strength.

Thus we made clear that the Nixon Doctrine
represented a new definition of American lead-
ership, not abandonment of that leadership. In
my 1971 Report, I set forth the need for a re-
sponsible balance :

The Nixon Doctrine recognizes that we cannot aban-
don friends, and must not transfer burdens too swiftly.
We must strike a balance between doing too much and
thus preventing self-reliance, and doing too little and
thus undermining self-confidence.

The balance we seek abroad is crucial. We only com-
pound insecurity if we modify our protective or de-
velopment responsibilities without giving our friends
the time and the means to adjust, materially and
psychologically, to a new form of American participa-
tion in the world.

Precipitate shrinking of the American role would not
bring peace. It would not reduce America's stake in a
turbulent world. It would not solve our problems, either
abroad or at home.

Peace had a domestic dimension. Steadiness
abroad required steadiness at home. America
could continue to make its vital contribution
in the world only if Americans understood the
need and supported the effort to do so. But
understanding and support for a responsible
foreign policy were in serious jeopardy in 1969.

722

Years of burdens. Cold War tensions, and a
difficult war threatened to undermine our
constancy.

While new policies were required to meet
transformed conditions abroad, they were
equally imperative because of the changing
climate at home. Americans needed a new posi-
tive vision of the world and our place in it.
In order to continue to do what only America
could, we had to demonstrate that our friends
were doing more. While maintaining strong
defenses, we also had to seek national security
through negotiations with adversaries. And
where American families were most directly
affected, we had to gain a peace with honor to
win domestic support for our new foreign pol-
icy as well as to make it credible abroad.

We have thus paid great attention, as in
these Reports, to the articulation, as well as
the implementation, of our new role in the
world.

The Past Year

My previous Reports chronicled our progress
during the first three years of this Adminis-
tration. Despite shifting currents, and recog-
nizing that the calendar cannot draw neat di-
viding lines, there has been a positive evolution.

In 1969, we defined our basic approach,
drawing the blueprint of a new strategy for
peace.

In 1970, we implemented new policies, build-
ing toward peace.

In 1971, we made essential breakthroughs,:
and a global structure of peace emerged. !

This past year we realized major results'
from our previous efforts. Together they are
shaping a durable peace. i

— Three years of careful groundwork pro-
duced an historic turning point in our relations
with the People's Republic of China. My con-
versations with Chinese leaders in February- )
1972 reestablished contact between the world's;
most powerful and the world's most populous. ■
countries, thereby transforming the postwar i
landscape. The journey to Peking launched a '
process with immense potential for the better-
ment of our peoples and the building of peace '■
in Asia and the world. Since then we have (
moved to concrete measures which are improv- '■
ing relations and creating more positive con- i
ditions in the region. China is becoming fully' !
engaged with us and the world. The process t
is not inexorable, however. Both countries will *
have to continue to exercise restraint and con- ^
tribute to a more stable environment.

— The May 1972 summit meeting with thfi »

Department of State Bulletin

leadership of the Soviet Union achieved a broad
range of significant agreements. Negotiations
across a wide front, which set the stage for
the meeting, were successfully concluded in
Moscow. Progress in one area reinforced prog-
ress in others. For the first time two nations
agreed to limit the strategic weapons that are
the heart of their national survival. We
launched cooperative ventures in several fields.
We agreed on basic principles to govern our
relations. Future areas of cooperation and ne-
gotiation were opened up. There has been, in
sum, major movement toward a steadier and
more constructive relationship. On the other
J hand, areas of tension and potential conflict
remain, and certain patterns of Soviet behavior
continue to cause concern.

— The attainment of an honorable settlement
in Vietnam was the most satisfying develop-
ment of this past year. Successful Vietnamiza-
tion and intensive negotiations culminated in
the Agreement signed on January 27, 1973.
This was quickly followed by a settlement in
neighboring Laos in February. The steady cour-
age and patience of Americans who supported
our policy through the years were echoed in
the moving salutes of our returning men. But
the coals of war still glow in Vietnam and Laos,
and a ceasefire remains elusive altogether in
Cambodia. Much w-ork remains to consolidate
peace in Indochina.

— In Western Europe the inevitable strains
of readjustment persisted as we moved from
American predominance to balanced partner-
ships. Generally these were healthy manifesta-
tions of the growing strength of countries who
share common values and objectives. With less
fanfare, but no less dedication, than in our ne-
gotiations with adversaries, we consulted
closely with our friends. Such a process may
not be as susceptible to dramatic advances,
but we believe that we have paved the way for
substantial progress in Atlantic relations in
the coming months. Major political, security
and economic negotiations are on the agenda.
They will test the wisdom and adaptability of
our Alliance.

— There was continued evolution toward a
more mature and equitable partnership with
Japan. Confidence in our shared purposes,
which appeared shaken in 1971, has since been
reaflirmed. Nevertheless we have not yet fully
defined our new political relationship, and seri-
ous economic problems confront us. Our rela-
tions with Tokyo will be an area of prime
attention during the coming year.

— In the past year we advanced toward ma-
jor reform of the international economic sys-
tem. With others we have launched proposals

June 4, 1973

to create a more stable international monetary
system, and a more open world trading order
through new international trade negotiations.
This process of readjustment is not without
crises, however, and voices of narrow national-
ism are heard on both sides of the ocean. We
have a long and difl^cult way to go.

— The explosive Middle East continued in
the twilight zone between peace and open con-
flict. The ceasefire arranged at our initiative
lasted into its third year, but no genuine prog-
ress was made toward a permanent settlement.
Some foreign military forces were withdrawn
from the region, but the mix of local animos-
ities and external power still makes the Middle
East a most dangerous threat to world peace.
Efforts to find political solutions are menaced
by the upward spiral of terrorism and reprisal.

— For the South Asian Subcontinent it was
a year of rebuilding and readjustment after
the conflict in 1971. India, Pakistan, and the
new nation of Bangladesh made tentative
moves toward accommodation. But there is
still a long road to the stability and reconcilia-
tion that are required if the massive human
needs of one-fifth of mankind are to be met.

— In the Western Hemisphere the United
States followed its deliberate policy of restraint,
encouraging others to furnish concepts as well
as resources for Hemispheric development. A
healthy process of I'egional initiatives and self-
definition is now underway, and the founda-
tions have been established for a more mature
partnership with our Latin American friends.
The common task of redefining and imparting
fresh purpose to our community, however, is
far from completed.

— Asia has witnessed a settlement of the
Vietnam war and major developments in rela-
tions among the principal powers. It is there
that the Nixon Doctrine has been most exten-
sively applied. There has been positive growth
in self-help and regional cooperation. But these
nations are entering a period of delicate re-
adjustment and American steadiness will be
crucial.

— In Africa our goals remained economic de-
velopment, racial justice, and a stable peace
resting on independent states. We continue to
recognize, however, that these are largely the
tasks of the African nations themselves — and
there were both hopeful and discouraging
events this past year. Our policies of political
restraint and economic support are designed
to help Africa realize its rich potential.

— We moved down the interrelated paths of
national security, arms control, and a strong de-
fense. The strategic arms limitation pacts with
the Soviet Union were a milestone, but major

723

tasks remain — the extension of limitations on
strategic arms and then their reduction; the
mutual and balanced reduction of conventional
forces in Central Europe. In our defense pos-
ture we have maintained a clearly sufficient
power, and we reached an all-volunteer army.
But we are still searching for doctrines and
deployments fully adequate to changing times
and surging costs. Our fundamental principle
remains keeping America strong enough to
preserve our vital interests and promote the
prospects of peace.

— We paid increasing attention to global is-
sues that more and more demand international
solutions. Progress was encouraging in some
areas, such as reducing the flow of drugs. The
world community still refused to grapple effec-
tively, however, with other issues such as ter-
rorism. The global dimension of diplomacy has
been developing unevenly.

Since last year's Report, there has been his-

toric progress. A changed world has moved
closer to a lasting peace. Many events were
colorful, but their true drama is that they can
herald a new epoch, not fade as fleeting
episodes.

As in any year, however, there were disap-
pointments as well as successes. And wherever
there is progress, new challenges are added to
an always unfinished agenda.

Shaping a peaceful world requires, first of
all, an America that stays strong, an America
that stays involved.

But the United States alone cannot realize
this goal. Our friends and adversaries alike
must share in the enterprise of peace.

The President and the Administration alone
cannot pursue this goal. We need the cooper-
ation of the Congress and the support of the
American people.

It is to these audiences at home and abroad
that this Report is addressed.

Part I: Building New Relationships

CHINA

In this Administration we have begun a new
chapter in American-Chinese relations, and as
a result the international landscape has been
fundamentally changed.

For two decades our two countries stared at
each other icily across a gulf of hostility and
suspicion. Misunderstanding was assured. Mis-
calculation was a constant danger. And con-
structing a permanent peace was impossible.

This estrangement had global ramifications
that went far beyond our bilateral relationship.
So long as we were not dealing with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, our foreign policy
could not truly reflect the emerging multipolar
world. The isolation of one-fourth of the human
race, partly self-imposed and partly the result
of the policies of others, distorted the interna-
tional scene. It also tended to reinforce China's
own sense of insecurity. There could be no sta-
ble world order if one of the major powers
remained outside it and antagonistic toward it.

In the past four years this situation has
been transformed. Bilaterally, deep differences
in ideology and policy remain; neither we nor
the Chinese leaders have illusions that our dis-
cussions will convert each other. But extensive

and frank dialogue has greatly increased mu-
tual understanding. The risk of confrontation
therefore has been sharply reduced, and in any
event it should no longer flow from miscalcu-
lation. Without either side abandoning its prin-
ciples, we now have the potential for positive
enterprises.

There are concrete manifestations of this
new chapter in our relationship.

Before, there was no dialogue at all between
our governments, except for desultory meetings
in third countries. Now we have held hundreds '
of hours of direct talks at the highest levels.
Liaison Offices are being established in Peking
and Washington.

Before, there was virtually no contact be-'
tween a quarter of the world's population and
the American people. Now there is a significant i
exchange of groups and persons in a wide spec-'
trum of fields. This will increase substantially.

Before, our bilateral trade was miniscule.
Now it is reaching very substantial levels.
There will be further expansion.

This process in turn has helped to create new
possibilities on a global scale. Our own diplo-
macy has been broadened ; we can more effec-
tively promote an inclusive peace. The People's
Republic of China has become more fully en-j

724

Department of State Bulletin

y

jarred in the world scene; much more than be-
fore, it is making its contributions to shaping
he international order.

The turning point came at the summit in
February 1972 when the leadei-s of the People's
:tepublic of China and the United States met
ind put their personal imprint on a new direc-
:ion for our two nations, and with it new
•ontours for the world.

rhe Road to the Summit

Three years of meticulous preparation pre-
ceded my trip to Peking.

When I took office, I was determined to re-
•stal^lish contact between the most populous
ind most powerful countries in the world. The
"ollowing considerations prompted us and
'.erved as policy guidelines :

— We could not build toward a global struc-
ure of peace while excluding 800 million peo-
»le. A more stable international system had
0 reflect the massive weight and potential of
'hina.

— Changes in the world generally, and in
he Communist world particularly, called for a
•reader American approach. Having recovered
rom the ravages of World War II, our allies
•egan asserting their autonomy. Independent
oices began to be heard in the once solid So-
ialist community. The international environ-
nent had become multipolar; it was time our
iplomacy did too.

— The United States has had a traditional
iterest in a peaceful, independent, and self-
eliant China. This remained a more positive
rospect than a China that felt isolated or
hreatened.

— There were many potential areas where
ilateral contact could enrich the lives of our
wo peoples.

— There did not seem to be major clashes of
ational interest between our two countries
ver the longer term. Our policies could be less
igid if we and the Chinese did not treat each
ther as permanent adversaries.

— A new approach was not to be directed
gainst other countries. Indeed it could serve
> broaden the horizons of international dia-
>gue and accommodation.

— We believed that the People's Republic of
hina might be receptive to our approach.

So the times called for a fresh approach to
hina. But formidable obstacles, technical as
ell as political, lay in the way. In last year's
eport I described the problems and the poli-
es we employed to overcome them. Against

a twenty-year backdrop of non-communication
and sterile mutual recrimination, our task was
twofold: to convey privately our views to the
Chinese leadership and to indicate publicly the
direction of our policy.

We had to find discreet and reliable means to
transmit our views to Peking and get authori-
tative Chinese responses. We began this effort
during the first weeks of my Administration.
Up until the summer of 1971, we engaged in a
delicate diplomatic minuet during which mu-
tual confidence gradually increased and mutual
intentions became more concrete.

Meanwhile we cai-efully orchestrated a suc-
cession of unilateral initiatives and positive
statements. From mid-1969 onwards, we took
a series of steps to relax trade and travel re-
strictions. They did not require a response
from the Chinese; they were therefore neither
dependent on Chinese reciprocity nor vulner-
able to Chinese rejection. Individually these
were not major steps, but cumulatively they
etched the pattern more and more clearly. At
the same time in official speeches and state-
ments, such as my annual foreign policy re-
ports, we mapped in increasingly sharp i-elief
the road we were taking.

During the spring of 1971 the tempo acceler-
ated in public and in private, with greater
responsiveness from the Chinese. Peking's in-
vitation to an American table tennis team to
visit China in April was one among many pub-
lic signals. Privately during that period we
agreed that Dr. Kissinger should visit Peking
from July 9 to July 11.

On that trip we opened the door. Dr. Kissin-
ger held intensive discussions with Premier
Chou En-lai, and agreement was reached that
I would visit the People's Republic of China.
In the brief joint announcement that I read on
July 15 we stated that "the meeting between
the leaders of China and the United States is
to seek the normalization of relations between
the two countries and also to exchange views
on questions of concern to the two sides."

In October, Dr. Kissinger returned to Peking
to discuss the broad agenda for my visit and
settle on the other major arrangements. The
groundwork was thus laid for meetings at the
highest levels.

The Journey to Peking

My trip to the People's Republic of China
from February 21 to February 28, 1972 was
the watershed in reestablishing Sino-American
relations.

ne 4, 1973

725

The carefully nurtured preparation held out
the promise of a new direction; my meetings
with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and Premier
Chou En-lai firmly set our course. The Joint
Communique at the end of my visit established
the framework for progress; developments
since then have accelerated the process of
normalization.

Seldom have the leaders of two major coun-
tries met with such an opportunity to create
a totally new relationship. It had taken two
and a half years to cross the gulf of isolation
and reach the summit. At the same time, the
very factors which had made this journey so
complicated offered unusual opportunities. The
absence of communication, while making initial
contact complex to arrange, also gave us a clean
slate to write upon. Factors such as geography
and China's recent concentration on internal
matters meant that we had few bilateral mat-
ters of contention, though we lined up often on
different sides of third country or multilateral
problems.

Accordingly, the agenda for our discussions
could be general and our dialogue philosophical
to a much greater extent than is normally pos-
sible between nations. Indeed, it was this con-
text and these prospects that, in our view,
called for a summit meeting. With the Soviet
Union a meeting at the highest levels was re-
quired to give impetus to, and conclude, a broad
range of concrete negotiations. With the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, on the other hand, such
a meeting was needed to set an entirely new
course. Only through direct discussions at the
highest levels could we decisively bridge the
gulf that had divided us, conduct discussions
on a strategic plane, and launch a new process
with authority.

The primary objective, then, of my talks
with the Chinese leaders was not the reaching
of concrete agreements but a sharing of funda-
mental perspectives on the world. First, we
had to establish a joint perception of the shape
of our future relationship and its place in the
international order. We needed a mutual as-
sessment of what was involved in the new
process we were undertaking and of one an-
other's reliability in carrying the process for-
ward. If we could attain this type of mutual
comprehension, agreements could and would
flow naturally.

Last February I described our expectations
as I set out on my journey:

Both sides can be expected to state their principles
and their views with complete frankness. We will each
know clearly where the other stands on the issues that
divide us. We will look for ways to begin reducing our

726

differences. We will attempt to find some common
ground on which to build a more constructive relation-

^ If' we can accomplish these objectives, we will have
made a solid beginning.

Our discussions ranged broadly and freely.
Both sides set forth their views with candor,
neither evading nor downgrading differences.
We were able to fulfill the expectations I had
set forth earlier. ^ • ^ ^

On February 27, 1972 we issued a Joint Com-
munique in Shanghai that reflected this solid
beginning. This document purposely was very
unorthodox. Communiques often use general
lano-uage, stress agreements, gloss over dis-
putes, and use ambiguous formulas to bridge

The Chinese leaders and we thought that
such an approach would be unworthy of our
unique encounter and our discussions. To pre- ,
tend that two nations, with such a long separa- :
tion and such fundamental differences, sud-
denly were in harmony would have been neither
honest nor credible. The use of general or
compromise language to paper over disputes
would have been subject to misinterpretation
by others; and it ran the risk of subsequent
conflicting interpretations by the two sides.

We decided instead to speak plainly. We
echoed the frankness of our private talks m our
public announcement. Each side forthrightly
stated its world and regional views in the com-
munique, and the lines of our ideology and
foreign policy were clearly drawn.

Against this candid background, the areas
where we could find agreement emerged with
more authority. Our conversations made clear
that in addition to genuine differences there
were also broad principles of international re-
lations to which we both subscribed. There was
as well a joint determination to improve our
relations both by accommodating our dittei-
ences and developing concrete ties.

Accordingly, in the communique we agreea
that despite differences in social systems and
foreign policies, countries should conduct the"
relations on the basis of respect for sovereignty
and territorial integrity, non-aggression agams
other states, non-interference in the internal
affairs of others, equality and mutual beneM,
and peaceful coexistence. International disputes
should be settled on this basis without the use
or threat of force. We and the People s RepuD-
lic of China agreed to apply these principles
to our mutual relations. . . ,

With these international principles in mma

we stated that :

—progress toward the normalization of relations

Department of State Bulletin

tween China and the United States is in the interests
of all countries;

— both wish to reduce the danger of international
military conflict;

— neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific
regrion and each is opposed to efforts by any other
country or proup of countries to establish such hegem-
ony: and

— neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any
third party or to enter into agreements or understand-
ings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against
the interests of the peoples of the world for any major
country to collude with another against other countries,
or for major countries to divide up the world into
spheres of interest.

These principles were of major significance.
They demonstrated that despite our clear dis-
agreements and our long separation we shared
some fundamental attitudes toward interna-
tional relations. They provided both a frame-
work for our future relations and a yardstick
by which to measure each other's performance.

With respect to the relationship of Taiwan to
the mainland, the United States reaffirmed its
interest in a peaceful solution of this question
by the Chinese themselves. We based this view
on the fact that all Chinese on either side of
the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.

The communique then laid down the founda-
tions for tangible improvements in our rela-
tions. These would allow us to move from the
elimination of mistrust and the establishment
of broad understandings to more concrete
accomplishments :

— We agreed to facilitate bilateral exchanges
in order to broaden the understanding between
our peoples. Specific areas mentioned were sci-
ence, technology, culture, sports, and journal-
ism.

— We undertook to facilitate the progressive
growth of trade between our countries. Both
sides viewed economic relations based on equal-
ity and mutual benefit as being in the interests
of our peoples.

— We decided to maintain contact through
various channels, including sending a senior
U.S. representative to Peking periodically to ex-
change views directly. This reflected a mutual
Hesire to expand our communications.

— We also subsequently established a formal
channel through our two embassies in Paris.
This would institutionalize our contacts and
facilitate exchanges, trade, and travel.

Major Advances in the Past Year

Since my visit to Peking the momentum of
our relations has grown in all the fields covered

June 4, 1973

by the Shanghai Communique.

As foreseen in the communique, Dr. Kissinger
returned to Peking in June to review interna-
tional issues with the Chinese and to stimulate
progress in the various bilateral programs. Our
embassies in Paris also facilitated the flow of
groups and goods.

The growth of our bilateral trade has ex-
ceeded expectations. In 1971, U.S. imports from
China totalled $4.9 million, while our exports
were negligible. In 1972 we imported $32.3 mil-
lion worth of goods and exported $60.2 million,
an expansion of trade helped by the attendance
of more than 150 American businessmen at the
spring and fall sessions of the Canton Export
Commodities Fair. In 1973, two-way trade is
likely to show substantial additional growth,
and may well place the United States among
China's five largest trading partners. To en-
courage this expansion of commercial relations,
a National Council for U.S.-China Trade was
formed in early 1973 by a distinguished group
of private business executives. This organiza-
tion will seek to promote the orderly develop-
ment of bilateral trade through exchange of
information and facilitation of contacts be-
tween Chinese and American manufacturers,
exporters, and traders.

A substantial beginning was made in the
development of exchanges between our two
countries. A championship table tennis team
from the People's Republic toured the United
States in April 1972, in return for the visit of
the American team which had played in Peking
a year earlier. Croups of Chinese doctors and
scientists visited their counterparts in this
country during the fall, under the sponsorship
of the Committee on Scholarly Communication
with the People's Republic of China. And in
December, the Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe per-
formed in four major American cities in a visit
facilitated by the National Committee on U.S.-
China Relations.

In turn, increasing numbers of Americans
visited the People's Republic of China. The
Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate
were guests of the Chinese People's Institute
of Foreign Affairs in April 1972, as were the
House leaders in .June. A group of doctors from
the National Medical A.s.sociation and a delega-
tion of computer scientists visited their coun-
terparts in China in the summer and fall.
Among the journalists who toured the People's
Republic during the year was a delegation
from the American Society of Newspaper Edi-
tors. And in the scholarly areas, groups of
distinguished American economists and China

727

specialists toured the country, as well as sub-
stantial numbers of individual scientists and
scholars from various fields.

Thus there was a significant resumption of
cultural, scientific, and scholarly contacts, and
the public media began to inform our peoples
about one another. Chinese and Americans
were rebuilding historic bonds.

A solid foundation was therefore established
before Dr. Kissinger returned to Peking in
February of this year in the wake of the Viet-
nam peace settlement. The joint announcement
after that trip pointed to major progress in
our relations with the People's Republic of
China :

— There were "earnest, frank, and construc-
tive" talks in an "unconstrained atmosphere"
with Chairman Mao, Premier Chou, and other
Chinese officials.

— The two sides reafl^rmed the principles of
the Shanghai Communique and agreed to ac-
celerate the normalization of relations.

— We agreed to broaden contacts in all fields,
and establish a concrete program to expand
trade and exchanges still further.

— We decided to settle in a comprehensive
manner the long-standing issues of private U.S.
claims against the Chinese government and
blocked Chinese assets in the United States.
Secretary of State Rogers and Chinese Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fei reached agreement in
principle on this issue a week later in Paris.
Final settlement will open the way for further
expansion of our bilateral commercial relations.

— ^Most importantly, we agreed that each
country would establish a Liaison Office in the
capital of the other. They will be functioning
very shortly. Both sides have appointed senior
representatives with long diplomatic experi-
ence. This major step both reflects — and will
promote — the increase in our communications
and bilateral programs. Practically, the offices
will enable us to deal with each other directly
in Washington and Peking. Symbolically, they
underline the progress made to date and our
joint intention to proceed on the path we have
chosen. They represent a milestone in our de-
veloping relationship.

— The Chinese agreed to free the two Ameri-
can pilots captured during the Vietnam War.
They also promised to review later the already
shortened sentence of another American pris-
oner. The pilots were released March 15, 1973,
while the other American was released early on
March 10, 1973.

We thus moved decisively from the concep-
tual to the concrete. What was theoretically

desirable was increasingly being practiced.
What was still partly tentative and experimen-
tal would now be reinforced and expanded.
What was indirect could now be made direct.
Several factors contributed to this major
advance in our relationship :

— Eighteen months of authoritative and
wide-ranging discussions had made clear to
each side the other's philosophy and principles.
We both decided that our shared interests in
bettering relations outweighed our differences
on specific questions. Where differences existed,
we had found ways to accommodate them with-
out sacrificing principles.

— Since the initial openings, the two sides had
established considerable reliability in our deal-
ings, both bilateral and multilateral.

— Implementation of the Shanghai Communi-
que had proceeded satisfactorily, and it was
agreed that new steps were required to acceler-
ate progress. Both we and the Chinese believed
that it was important to institutionalize our
new relationship.

— Finally, while most of these factors had
been developing for many months, the Viet-
nam War had still inhibited our progress. With
the achievement of a negotiated settlement,
the major obstacle to improved relations was
removed.

Our Future Course

In my first term we moved a long way with
the People's Republic of China. Together we
have revived our historic association, set a new-
direction, and launched a purposeful process.

We are resolved to continue on this course.
We are under no illusions, however, that its de-
velopment is inexorable. There will be a con-
tinuing need for meticulousness and reliability,
for although we have come a remarkable dis-
tance, two decades of blanket hostility cannot
be erased completely in two years. In any event,
our ideologies and views of history will con-
tinue to differ profoundly. These differences,
in turn, will be translated into opposing policies
on some issues which will continue to require
mutual restraint and accommodation. And over
the longer term the inevitable changes in the
world environment will continually inject new-
factors that could test our relationship.

We nevertheless remain basically confident
that relations between the United States and
the People's Republic of China will contmue to
develop in a positive direction. The driving
force behind this process is not personalities,
or atmosphere, or a sense of adventure, oi

728

Department of State Bulletin

transitory tactical benefits. Our two nations
undertook this course in full knowledge of our
differences. We chose to change our relation-
ship because this served our fundamental na-
tional purposes.

America maintains its historic concern for
an independent and i)eaceful China. We see
in this prospect nothing inimical to our inter-
ests. Indeed, we consider it to be strongly in
the interest of regional and world stabilityt
China, in turn, has nothing to fear from Amer-
ica's strength. The broadening of diplomatic
horizons has already paid dividends for us both
and represents an enduring asset. Our past
differences notwithstanding, we have many
positive elements to draw upon — the traditional
friendship of our two peoples, the cultural and
scientific contributions we offer one another,
the lack of any directly conflicting interests,
and the commonly shared principles of inter-
national relations expressed in the Shanghai
Communique.

This Administration will pursue the further
improvement of relations with the People's
Republic of China with dedication and care.
The same considerations that prompted us to
begin this process four years ago motivate us
now to continue it. And our guidelines remain
constant :

— Our objective is to build a broader and
steadier structure of peace.

— We seek the tangible dividends of a flour-
ishing relationship between the Chinese and
American peoples.

— Our relations will be based on equality and
reciprocity.

— This process is not directed against any
other country.

— We shall pursue our policy in close consul-
tation with our friends.

Within this framework we will work increas-
ingly to realize the perspectives that we and the
Chinese envisioned at the close of the Shanghai
Communique :

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains
achieved during this visit would open up new prospects
for the relations between the two countries. They be-
lieve that the normalization of relations between the
two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese
and American peoples but also contributes to the re-
iuation of tension in Asia and the world.

THE SOVIET UNION

In the week of May 22-29, 1972, the United
States and the Soviet Union took a decisive
turn away from the confrontations of the past

quarter-century. We agreed to limit the growth
of strategic weaponry. We established a set of
basic principles to govern our relations. And
we constructed a framework of agreements
leading to more normal bilateral cooperation.

Each of the accords signed in Moscow was a
significant achievement in itself. Never before
have two adversaries, so deeply divided by con-
flicting ideologies and political rivalries, been
able to agree to limit the armaments on which
their survival depends. Nor has there been, at
any time in the postwar period, a code of con-
duct that both sides could accept as the basis
for regulating their competition and channel-
ing their efforts toward more constructive
endeavors.

But beyond their individual merits, the sum-
mit agreements taken together represent a
major advance toward a goal set forth at the
beginning of this Administration: to effect a
basic change in our relations with the Soviet
Union in the interest of a stable world peace
from which all countries would benefit.

In considering the course of Soviet-American
relations during the past year, it is important
to understand the nature of the specific agree-
ments, the conditions that have made these
achievements possible, and what the future
may hold.

The Initial Approach: 1969-70

Four years ago, our relations with the Soviet
Union and international relations generally
were still dominated by the fears, anxieties,
and atmosphere of the Cold War. The invasion
of Czechoslovakia had recently occurred. While
the Soviet Government made overtures for bet-
ter relations, its motives seemed largely tactical.
Yet, beneath the surface, it was apparent that
the pattern of world politics was in the process
of major transformation. The salient features
of this change have been described in my pre-
vious Reports. Certain elements had special
relevance for our relations with the Soviet
Union.

— Divisions within the Communist world had
deepened; state and national interests of the
major Communist powers were increasingly
reflected in their policies toward non-Commu-
nist countries.

— The realignment of political forces in the
Communist world coincided with the economic
revival of Western Europe and Japan, rein-
forcing the trend toward multipolarity.

— In particuiai-, the more nearly equal strate-
gic balance between the United States and the

June 4, 1973

729

Soviet Union suggested that conditions might
be optimal for reaching agreement to limit
strategic competition.

Recognizing these international trends, this
Administration began in 1969 to reassess our
relations with the Communist countries. Cer-
tain aspects of Soviet-American relations were
clear: the postwar rivalry with the Soviet
Union was not a result simply of misunder-
standing, or personal animosities, or a failure
to create a good atmosphere for negotiations.
The conflict was rooted in deeper differences:
irreconcilable ideologies, the inevitable geo-
political competition of great powers conduct-
ing global policies and, to a certain degree,
bureaucratic momentum and the disillusion-
ment created by decades of fluctuation between
hopes and tensions.

To break the pattern of the postwar period
required policies that distinguished between
the sources of conflict and their external or tem-
porary manifestations. We needed not merely a
better climate for our relations, but a new en-
vironment in which the United States and the
Soviet Union could exercise their special re-
sponsibilities for peace. Ultimately we hoped to
create mutual interests in maintaining and de-
veloping an international structure based on
self-restraint in the pursuit of national
interests.

The approach we adopted reflected certain
general concepts.

— It was no longer realistic to allow Soviet-
American relations to be predetermined by
ideology. We had to recognize, of course, that
many basic Soviet values would remain inimical
to ours. Both sides had to accept the fact that
neither was likely to persuade the other through
polemical debates. But ideological elements did
not preclude serious consideration of disputed
issues.

— Irrespective of ideology, any relationship
between two great powers would be highly
competitive. Both sides had to recognize, how-
ever, that in this continuing competition there
would be no permanent victor, and, equally im-
portant, that to focus one's own policy on at-
tempts to gain advantages at the other's
expense, could only aggravate tensions and
precipitate counteractions.

— Both sides had to accept the fact that our
differences could not be hidden merely by ex-
pressions of goodwill ; they could only be re-
solved by precise solutions of major issues.

— Both sides had to understand that issues
were interrelated ; we could not effectively re-
duce tensions through marginal agreements or

even an isolated agreement of importance. Ex- i
perience had shown that isolated accomplish- 1
ments were likely to fall victim to tensions
and crises in other aspects of the relationship.
Thus, if we were to achieve more than a super-
ficial change, we had to address a broad range
of issues.

— Finally, we would judge Soviet actions !
rather than words. The basic criterion would be
a willingness to act with restraint. We would I
respond constructively to Soviet initiatives; ;
progress in one area would help maintain
momentum in other negotiations. We would
also make it clear that aggressive behavior
could imperil our entire relationship. By linking
all aspects of Soviet-American relations, we
could hope that progress, if it came, could lead
to a broadly based understanding about inter-
national conduct.

These general principles were translated into
specific proposals during 1969 and 1970. i;

After a painstaking evaluation of all aspects ||
of limiting strategic arms, we agreed to begin Ij
negotiations in November 1969. On other dis-l^
armament matters, we revived negotiations on
prohibiting nuclear arms from the seabeds and •
took up the new challenge of limiting biological '
warfare. i

In Europe, we reconfirmed NATO proposals |j
to begin discussing mutual and balanced force '
reductions in Central Europe where the con- j
centrations of opposing forces were heaviest. ' '
We proposed to approach the issue of European ; »
security by negotiating, first of all, improve- <:
ments in the situation in Berlin. The Berlin ]
negotiations would be critical, not only because
that divided city had been the scene of tense
confrontations in the past, but because it was!
also the keystone in West Germany's effort to
create a more normal relationship with its East-
ern neighbors. That normalization would, in
turn, influence the new prospects for a wider
discussion of European security and coopera-!
tion, including a possible confei'ence of Euro-
pean governments, Canada, and the United;
States.

As for economic relations, I indicated that
the United States was prepared to have nor-
mal economic exchanges with any country that
was equally willing to move toward norma!
relations in both political and economic fields.
On the Middle East, we agreed to discussions
with the United Kingdom, France, and the
Soviet Union, and we encouraged the Arab gov-| i
ernments and Israel to undertake direct nego-
tiations.

In this initial period, we tried to create

I

730

Department of State Bulletii^ j^i

circumstances that would offer the Soviet lead-
ers an opportunity to move away from confron-
tation througii carefully prepared negotiations.
We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire
a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and
would become convinced that its interests, like
ours, would be best served if this process in-
volved most of our relations. We sought, above
all, to create a vested interest in mutual
restraint.

Our relations with the Soviet Union passed
through several tactical phases. It was apparent
that Soviet policy had contradictory tendencies.
Some factors pointed toward a more stable re-
lationship with the United States; others sug-
gested a continued probing for tactical gains.
I In this period, we dealt with these contradictory
manifestations by responding to positive ef-
forts and demonstrating firmness in the face of
pressures. I opened a direct channel to the
Soviet leaders so we could discuss the issues
; frankly and privately.

The first phase, lasting throughout 1969, was
marked by obvious caution, as we made only
i limited progress in engaging major issues but
achieved some improvement in the tone of ex-
changes. In the spring of 1970 we agreed to
negotiate on Berlin, and the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) moved from initial
explorations to concrete discussions.
' A period of tension, however, occurred in
1 1970 over the Soviet role in Egyptian ceasefire
'violations in the Middle East, the Syrian at-
'tack on Jordan, and Soviet naval activities in
Cuba. Similar tension arose from the crisis in
the Indian subcontinent for a period in late
1971. Such developments gave us grounds for
serious concern, and we reacted vigorously.

At the same time, the Soviet Union pursued
a policy of relaxing tensions in Europe, sug-
gesting that its strategy was to differentiate
between the United States and our allies. This
tactic, however, had limited potential since
European issues were inseparable from the
strategic framework of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Moreover, the Soviet emphasis on certain bi-
lateral relations lacked a general European
framework, which could not be developed
jWithout the United States or without con-
sidering the impact of a controlled relaxation
of tensions in East Europe.

The Road to fhe Summit

Thus we passed through a series of episodes
hat gave the Soviet Union no advantage and
ichieved no fundamental change. In each phase

we sought to demonstrate the wisdom of re-
straint and the dangers of its absence. At the
end of 1970, it appeared that the tensions in
U.S.-Soviet relations might lead the Soviet
leaders to reconsider their relations with the
United States. I felt that an opportune moment
had arrived for new initiatives to end tactical
maneuvering and to move toward accommo-
dation.

Despite the erratic developments of 1969 and
1970, some positive trends were evident. As I
said at the United Nations in the fall of 1970,
we shared certain compelling common interests,
above all an interest in reducing the dangers
of war. That the Soviet Union shared this con-
cern was reflected in the continuation of the
negotiations on strategic arms limitations, the
mutual willingness to pursue an agreement on
Berlin and the insulation of these serious issues
from developments in Southeast Asia.

In the winter of 1970-71 Soviet leaders were
looking toward their Party Congress, where
broad policy guidelines are usually enunciated.
It appeared at the time, and even more clearly
in retrospect, that the broad changes in the
nature of international relations, as well as
their experience of the previous two years in
relations with us, were having an impact on
theii' preparations. It was thus a promising
moment to delineate the progress that could be
made if certain decisions were taken.

— SALT negotiations were temporarily dead-
locked over whether to negotiate an agreement
limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) alone,
as the Soviets insisted, or an agreement em-
bracing both defensive and offensive limits. For
the United States, it was essential that an
initial SALT agreement should begin to break
the momentum in the growth of offensive
forces. If the buildup continued unchecked, it
would almost certainly produce dangerous stra-
tegic instabilities — especially if limitations on
missile defense created a premium on striking
first. This was not a tactical dispute, but a
major substantive issue that could only be re-
solved by high-level political decisions.

— The treaty reached between West Germany
and the Soviet Union in August 1970 had
changed the character and significance of the
Berlin negotiations among the Four Powers.
Ratification of this treaty depended on the out-
come of the negotiations over Berlin. And it
was general Western policy that the prospect
for a wider European dialogue on security was
similarly conditioned on a Berlin agreement
that would safeguard access to the city and its
links to the Federal Republic. Thus, progress

une 4, 1973

731

on Berlin would also involve basic decisions in
Moscow.

Through intense and private exchanges with
the Soviet leaders, a breakthrough was made,
first in SALT, then in the Berlin negotiations.

— A new framework was created for SALT
in May 1971, maintaining the link between of-
fensive and defensive limitations, as the United
States believed essential. At the same time, we
agreed to concentrate our efforts on ABM
limitations. Since these systems were not ex-
tensively deployed, we envisaged a permanent
treaty. We also agreed to work out an interim
accord limiting certain offensive weapons. Both
agreements would be completed simultaneously.

— The Berlin agreements were blocked by
conflicting legal positions on the status of the
city and on West Berlin's ties to the Federal
Republic of Germany. Progress became possible
in July and August 1971 when all concerned
agreed to seek an agreement that dealt con-
cretely with the practical question of how to
maintain West Berlin's many links to the Fed-
eral Republic, including unimpeded access to
West Berlin by road and rail.

These breakthroughs on major substantive
issues made it possible to look toward a summit
meeting.

The SALT discussion resumed in July 1971,
building on the political framework agreed
upon with the Soviet leaders. Two agreements
were signed in September — one to improve
the "hot line" between Washington and Mos-
cow, and the other to reduce the likelihood of
an accidental nuclear war by exchanging in-
formation on certain missile testing activities.
The breakthrough on Berlin led to the signing
in September of 1971 of the first part of the
Four Power Agreement, which in turn opened
the way for further negotiations between East
and West Germany on the technical questions
of access to the city.

My private communications with the Soviet
leaders had included the possibility of a meeting
at the highest level. My views on this question
of a meeting had been stated in the first weeks
of my Administration : a meeting at the summit
would only be justified if it were carefully pre-
pared and if there were sufficient reasons to
believe that it would be the most effective way
of proceeding toward solutions of major ques-
tions. By the fall of 1971, it appeared we could
meet these conditions. Thus, when Foreign
Minister Gromyko visited Washington in Octo-
ber 1971, we agreed that a summit meeting
would be held, not for its own sake, but as a

culmination of concrete progress and as a
means of stimulating further advances. It was
agreed the meeting should be held in May 1972.
I envisaged this meeting as having four
aspects :

f

— As political relations improved, it became
possible to initiate discussions on a wide range
of projects for bilateral cooperation. In them-
selves, these projects were not crucial to our
relationship. But cumulatively, as cooperation
in such fields widened and deepened, they would
reinforce the trend toward more constructive
political relations. In the pre-summit period we
discussed cooperation in science, technology,
health, the environment, outer space, and mari-
time activities. The prospect of a summit meet-
ing gave these discussions a special impetus
and high-level attention. At the summit, these
discussions could culminate in a series of agree-
ments.

— Advances in political relations had by that
time made it possible to address economic re-
lations. The starting point was the removal of
long-standing obstacles to closer commercial
contacts — such as the unsettled World War II
lend-lease debt. Then we could go on to establish
longer-term arrangements for expanding trade
and other types of economic cooperation on a
scale appropriate to the size of our two
economies.

— The summit could complete the first phase
of the SALT negotiations and provide impetus
for the next, even more far-reaching phase.

— Finally, on the basis of all of these specific
achievements, carefully prepared in the pre-
vious months of painstaking negotiations, the
summit would afford an opportunity to review
the whole range of international issues and to
delineate certain fundamental principles to
govern U.S.-Soviet relations in the future.

Thus, the summit could redirect the momen-
tum of the past and chart a new direction in
our relations with the Soviet Union, creating
in the process a vested interest in restraint
and in the preservation of peace.

The Moscow Summit

We prepared for and conducted the summit
on this basis. We sought to establish not a su-
perficial "spirit of Moscow" but a record of
solid progress. The number and scope of the
agreements that emerged make it clear we ac-
complished that goal.

Bilateral Cooperation. The prospect of a
meeting at the highest level accelerated the
negotiations on bilateral matters. At the sum-

J

732

Department of State Bolletir

mit it was thus possible to conclude agreement
on significant cooperative projects.

— Cooperation in the exploration of outer
space, includinji- a joint experiment in rendez-
vous and docking of Apollo and Soyuz space
vehicles during 1975.

— Cooperation in solving the most important
of the problems of the environment.

— Joint efforts in the field of medical science,
and public health.

— Expanded cooperation in many areas of
science and technology and establishment of a
Joint Commission for this purpose.

— Cooperation between the American and
Soviet navies to reduce the chalices of dan-
gerous incidents between ships and aircraft at
sea.

Since the summit, all of the agreements have
been carried out as expected. Our space agencies
have conducted preliminary tests of models of
the spacecraft docking system and crew train-
ing will begin this summer. The Joint Commit-
tee on Environmental Protection met in Moscow
in September 1972 and planned 30 collaborative
; projects on a variety of subjects, including air
and water pollution. Programs for cooperative
research on cancer and heart disease were de-
veloped by our public health authorities in
October and November 1972. The Joint Com-
mission on Science and Technology met in
Washington in March 1973 and agreed to carry
out some 25 projects in such fields as energy,
chemistry, biology, and agricultural research.
American and Soviet naval officers will meet
this year to review the agreement on reducing
incidents between ships and aircraft.

This process of cooperation has begun to
engage an ever widening circle of people in
various professions and government bureaus in
both countries. Direct contact, exchanges of in-
formation and experience, and joint participa-
tion in specific projects will develop a fabric
of relationships supplementing those at the
higher levels of political leadership. Both sides
have incentives to find additional areas for con-
tact and cooperation, and I anticipate further
agreements patterned on those already con-
cluded.

'! Econotnir Relations. In the past, many in the
United States believed trade could open the
way to improved political relations. Others
argued that increased economic relations would
"inly strengthen the power of a potential ad-
v'ersary. In fact, trade and other asi)ects of eco-
lomic relations could never flourish if political
•elations remained largely hostile. Occasional

i)usiness transactions might be worked out on
an individual basis. But without some reason-
able certainty that political relations would be
stable and free from periodic turbulence, both
sides would be reluctant to enter into long-term
commercial relations. Nor would the Congress
support an expanding economic relationship
while our basic relations with the Soviet Union
were antagonistic. With these considerations
in mind, in the earlier years of this Administra-
tion I linked the expansion of economic rela-
tions with improved political relations.

Since progress was being made in the pre-
summit period in removing sources of political
tension, I authorized explorations in the eco-
nomic sphere. I sent the Secretaries of Com-
merce and Agriculture to the Soviet Union for
discussions. The Soviet Ministers of Foreign
Trade and Agriculture came to the United
States for the same purpose. We began nego-
tiations on a maritime agreement to make con-
crete arrangements for orderly transport of
goods between the two countries.

By the time of the summit, sufficient progress
had been made so that in my discussion with
the Soviet leaders we were able to agree on a
general plan for moving toward a more normal
economic relationship. W^e agreed it was es-
sential to clear away the long-standing Soviet
lend-lease debt to the United States. We also
decided that a formal trade agreement was
needed to provide the basis for resolving the
many technical problems resulting from the
long absence of economic intercourse. We
agreed to act in accord with generally estab-
lished international practice as regards: arbi-
tration of disputes, establishment of commercial
facilities in each country, procedures to prevent
market disruption, reciprocal extension of Most
Favored Nation (MFN) treatment, reciprocal
extension of commercial credits, and determina-
tion of the general level of trade. We estab-
lished a Joint Commercial Commission to
maintain contacts, to resolve issues that might
arise, and to be responsible for carrying out
the general agreement woi-ked out with the
Soviet leaders.

Following the summit, intensive negotiations
began under the leadership of U.S. Secretary of
Commerce Peterson and Soviet Minister of
Foreign Trade Patolichev. In July 1972, a
three-year agreement for the export of United
States agricultural products and for the ex-
tension of credits to finance these sales was
concluded. By October, the principal agreements
were completed : a settlement of the lend-lease
question, a formal trade agreement, and a mari-
time agreement.

lone 4, 1973

733

— We had tried to work out a lend-lease set-
tlement immediately after World War II, again
in 1951 and in 1960, but had failed on each
occasion. The main issues were the amount of
settlement, whether interest payments should
be included, and the length of time for repay-
ment. The settlement reached in October 1972
provides for a total repayment of approximately
$722 million, to be paid over a period of about
30 years. This compares favorably with other
settlements of wartime obligations.

— The trade agreement anticipates a total
exchange over the next three years of goods
worth about $1.5 billion; it also provides for
expanded business facilities for American firms
in the Soviet Union, a large trade center com-
plex in Moscow, provisions for third-party arbi-
tration of disputes, and procedures to prevent
market disruptions.

— Each country will reduce tariffs on the
other's imports, so that the level of tariff
charges is about the same as that charged
against the products of any other country
(MFN treatment). This had been the practice
in Soviet-American relations from 1935 to
1951, when it was terminated during the
Korean War. Extension of Most Favored Na-
tion treatment is consistent with the principles
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT).

— The October agreement also provides for
the reciprocal extension of credit arrangements,
customary in financing an expansion of exports.
I authorized the Export-Import Bank to en-
gage in credit transactions with the Soviet
Union, and the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank and
other Soviet organizations will provide credits
to American businesses.

— An agreement on maritime relations signed
on October 14, 1972, was another essential ele-
ment to the orderly expansion of commerce.
We agreed to ease procedures for access of
Soviet and American ships to each other's ports.
The agreement also provides that the ships of
each side will carry equal and substantial shares
of future oceanborne commerce. And it provides
for a system of equitable freight rates.

These agreements open the way not only for
a prompt invigoration of trade but also for de-
veloping these relations into a permanent com-
ponent of the overall relationship projected
at the summit. It is not a question of whether
certain elements should be separable, or con-
ditional, but whether we wish the entire process
of a broadly based new relationship with the
Soviet Union to unfold.

The next step is to end discrimination against

imports of Soviet goods into this country so
that the Soviet Union can earn the dollars to
help it pay for imports from the United States.
This step will require action by the Congress
to provide the President with authority to nego-
tiate the reciprocal extension of Most Favored
Nation treatment. I have submitted legislation
to the Congress in this regard, as I am com-
mitted to do under the agreements reached with
the Soviet Union. Extension of MFN is a
logical and natural step in the emerging rela-
tionship ; it is not a unilateral concession but a
means to expand commerce in the context of
broadly improved relations.

We are also prepared to consider possible
longer-term cooperative ventures. The Soviet
Union has vast natural resources, such as na-
tural gas, that can be developed with the help of
American capital and technology. These re-
sources would then be available for export to
the United States, thus enabling the Soviet
Union to repay our credits and pay for im-
ports from the United States. The role of our
government should be to establish a framework
within which private firms might work out
specific contracts. Since the Soviet Union plans
its economic program for five-year periods, its
willingness to enter into long-term ventures
of this kind suggests an expectation of coopera-
tive relations and imports requiring dollar
payments well into the future. Such ventures
do not create a one-sided dependence by the
United States upon Soviet resources; they es-
tablish an interdependence between our econ-
omies which provides a continuing incentive
to maintain a constructive relationship.

The SALT Ajjreenients. Of historic signi-
ficance were the two agreements which General
Secretary Brezhnev and I reached limiting stra-
tegic arms : a treaty limiting anti-ballistic J
missile systems, and an interim agreement I
limiting certain strategic offensive weapons. I
These agreements are discussed in detail in the'
Arms Control section of this Report. Technical!
aspects of arms control were at the core of the;
negotiations, but the significance of the agree-!
ments transcends specific provisions and goes;
to the heart of the postwar competition between'
us. ,

Some years ago, when the United States was|
strategically predominant, an agreement freez-|
ing the strategic balance was unrealistic. It'
was highly improbable that the Soviet Union
would resign itself to permanent inferiority.
Indeed, after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, thej
Soviet Union began a major expansion in its
strategic weaponry. Had this expansion con-

734

Department of State Bulletirj

tinned unabated through the 1970's. the United
States would have had no choice but to launch
a massive new strategic armament iirogram.
The present moment thus offered a unique op-
portunity to strike a reasonable balance in
strategic capabilities and to break with the
pattern of unlimited competition.

Such an ojipoi'tunity posed a fundamental
question: could both sides accept the risks of
restraint explicit in arms limitations? In the
defensive field, new programs offered some
element of protection but beckoned a new round
of competition. Offensive systems were re-
quired to guarantee security, but their steady
accumulation created a momentum toward cap-
abilities that threatened strategic equilibrium.
Each of us had the power singlehandedly to
destroy most of mankind. Paradoxically, this
very fact, and the global interests of both sides,
created a certain common outlook, a kind of in-
terdependence for survival. Although we com-
peted, our conflict did not admit of resolution
by victory in the classical sense. We seemed
compelled to coexist. We had an inescapable
joint obligation to build a structure for peace.
Recognition of this reality has been the key-
stone of United States policy since 1969.

Obviously, no agreement could be reached
involving weapons that guaranteed national
survival if both sides did not believe their in-

i terests were served despite the risks. No de-
cision of this magnitude could have been taken
unless it was part of a broader commitment to
place relations on a new foundation of restraint,
cooperation, and steadily evolving confidence.

,! Even agreements of such overriding importance
cannot stand alone, vulnerable to the next
crisis. Their tremendous historical and political
significance is guaranteed, in part, by the fact
that they are woven into the fabric of an emerg-
ing new relationship that makes crises less

, likely.

I There is reason to hope that these accords
I represent a major break in the pattern of sus-
picion, hostility, and confrontation that has
dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a gen-
< eration.

Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations. The

fourth area of major progress at the summit
was the agreement of tw-elve Basic Principles
signed on May 29, 1972. This far-reaching step
placed all our other efforts on a broader foun-
dation. A new relationship w-ould require new
attitudes and aspirations. It was appropriate
that this change be reflected in a formal state-
ment. These principles codify goals that the

United States had long advocated, as I did
for example, in my address to the United Na-
tions in October 1970. The main provisions
state that both sides will :

— do their utmost to avoid military confron-
tations and to in-event the outbreak of nuclear
war ;

— always exercise restraint in their mutual
relations and will be prepared to negotiate and
settle difl!"erences by peaceful means. Discus-
sions and negotiations on outstanding issues
will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mu-
tual accommodation, and mutual benefit.

— recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral
advantage at the expense of the other, directly
or indirectly, are inconsistent with these ob-
jectives ;

— make no claim for themselves, and not
recognize the claims of anyone else, to any
special rights or advantages in world affairs.

These are specific obligations. They meet
some of our fundamental concerns of the post-
war period. They are the elements that made
it possible to summarize one general principle
governing Soviet-American relations:

They will proceed from the common determination
that in the nuclear ape there is no alternative to con-
ducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful
coexistence. Differences in ideolopry and in the social
systems of the United States and the Soviet Union are
not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal
relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equal-
ity, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual
advantage.

What we have agreed upon is not a vain
attempt to bridge ideological differences, or a
condominium of the two strongest powers, or
a division of spheres of influence. What we have
agreed upon are principles that acknowledge
differences, but express a code of conduct which,
if observed, can only contrilnite to world peace
and to an international system based on mu-
tual respect and self-restraint.

These principles are a guide for future ac-
tion, not a commentary on the past. In them-
selves, they will have no meaning if they are
not reflected in action. The leaders of the
Soviet Union are serious men. Their willing-
ne.ss to commit themselves to certain principles
for the future must be taken as a solemn obli-
gation. For our part we are prepared to ad-
here to these principles, and hope that the
Soviet leaders have the same serious intention.

The Road Ahead

In i-eporting last year to the Congress on
prospects for a summit meeting, I noted that

June 4, 1973

735

we could not expect to solve the accumulated
problems of two decades in one meeting, but
that we did have the opportunity to open a
new era in international relations. If we were
successful, I said, the transformation of Soviet-
American relations could become one of the
most significant achievements of our time.

I believe we have now taken that essential
first step in freeing both of our countries from
perpetual confrontation. From confrontation
we have moved to negotiation and then to a
broadening range of fields. The promise of this
beginning obliges us to see it through.

The tasks ahead reflect the successes of this
past year as well as the disappointments :

— We are now in the second phase of our ef-
fort to limit strategic arms. We can build on
what has been achieved. We understand each
other's concerns better now than four years
ago. We have established a common vocabulary
and a technical framework in which to ex-
amine issues. And we have developed a measure
of respect and confidence in each other's seri-
ousness of purpose.

— But we face a severe challenge: each side
is called on to make commitments, limiting its
strategic offensive weapons for this decade and
beyond. This will require political decisions to
respect each other's basic security requirements
and a willingness to balance each other's legi-
timate interests in an equitable and mutually
satisfactory settlement.

— In Europe, the progress in Soviet-Ameri-
can relations has been a catalyst for further
change. Whereas East- West relations in Europe
were confined to bilateral relations in the past
few years, we are now entering negotiations
that involve fuller participation by our allies.
The issues of European security and coopera-
tion or reciprocal and balanced force reductions
cannot be settled by the United States and the
Soviet Union alone. We and the Soviet Union,
however, can make a significant contribution to
progress on these issues — and that progress,
in turn, will reinforce the favorable momentum
in our bilateral relations by demonstrating that
detente is broadly based and serves the interest
of all European countries.

— In the Middle East, the United States and
the Soviet Union, separately and perhaps to-

gether, can also make a contribution to peace.
Each of us plays a different role and has dif-
ferent interests and conceptions. But we have
a common interest in averting confrontation.
Proceeding from this principle, we can both
exert our influence in the direction of a peaceful
settlement among the parties directly concerned.

— In bilateral relations we can build on the
progress already achieved at the summit.
Though less dramatic than the larger political
issues, harnessing our technological expertise
and creativity in the service of both our peoples
can produce lasting benefits for all.

— We have an opportunity and obligation to
convert the promise of our agreements on eco-
nomic relations into reality. We are discover-
ing areas where the American and Soviet
economies are complementary. The Soviet
Union has certain resources that meet our
needs, while we can export commodities and
products which the Soviet Union wishes to
import.

A year ago, I reported that a new momentum
had been given to efforts for achieving a more
constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.
I believe that this momentum has carried us
across a new threshold.

We are now in a new period, but we have
only witnessed its initial phase. It is only realis-
tic to recognize that there have been periods
of relaxed tensions before, and earlier hopes for
a permanent end to the hostilities of the Cold
War. Present trends of course can be reversed;
new factors will appear; attitudes can shift.
This may be particularly true in a period of
transition.

In the past, changes in our relations with
the Soviet Union proved episodic, in part be-
cause they reflected tactical motives or were
limited to changes in climate rather than sub-
stance. What we created at the summit last
year is more durable. It rests on solid, specific
achievements that engage the interests of both
sides. But it will take patience, hard work,
and perseverance to translate our broad un-
derstandings into concrete results. If we can
do this, the United States and the Soviet Union
can move from coexistence to broad cooperation
and make an unparalleled contribution to world
peace.

736

Department of State Bulletin j ^

Part II: Ending Conflict

VIETNAM

On January 27, 1973, when the United States
and the three Vietnamese parties signed "The
Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring
Peace In Vietnam," we completed one of the
most difficult chapters in our history. It was
an honorable ending to a long and costly effort.

Peace in Indochina is not yet solid or com-
prehensive. But four years of intensive negotia-
tions and the steady transfer of responsibilities
to our friends achieved the fundamental goals
we had set. As a result of the Agreement:

— Our military forces have left South Viet-
nam with honor.

— Our prisoners have returned to their homes
and families. A full accounting for all those
missing in action is stipulated.

— There is a ceasefire, though still imper-
fectly observed, in Vietnam and Laos.

— The South Vietnamese people have the op-
portunity to determine their own political
future.

The settlement is a tribute to the brave peo-
ple of South Vietnam. It is also a monument
to the valor of American fighting men and the
steadfastness of the American people who sup-
ported an unselfish but extremely difficult mis-
sion until that mission was accomplished.

What We Found

From the moment I took office, my highest
priority was to bring an honorable end to the
war in Vietnam, America had been involved
for eight years in a well-motivated but costly
and seemingly endless effort. Every year we
had sent more men to Vietnam. Our casualties,
draft calls, and financial costs had risen stead-
ily. The war dominated our national attention.
Abroad it complicated our efforts to adjust
to changing conditions. At home it fostered
growing dissent.

Clearly we needed to end the war, or at least
our involvement in it. But if this was our mo.st
urgent task, it was also our mo.st difficult. For
the way we went about it would have much to
do with the future of American foreign policy
and the future of our own society.

The costs and frustrations of our involve-
ment had led an increasing number of Ameri-
cans to urge extreme solutions — either massive
military escalation or immediate retreat. We
rejected both options. Trying to win the con-
flict by all-out military measures would have
deepened the divisions in our society, and risked
drawing other nations into the war. It would
not have addressed the complex nature of the
struggle and thei-efore was likely to be in-
decisive.

Immediate withdrawal from Vietnam might
have brought a sense of temporary relief in
this country. But soon this mood would have
turned to regret and recrimination. We coulid
not suddenly abandon allies with whom we had
stood for so many years. We could not mock
the sacrifices of Americans who had given their
lives. We could not set out to shape a responsi-
ble American foreign policy with a first step
of heedless abdication. Reckless withdrawal cer-
tainly would have brought neither peace to
South Vietnam nor honor to America. It might
have led to the collapse of Southeast Asia, and
it would have crippled our efforts to build peace
in the world.

But neither could we continue on the path we
found. Our troop levels had risen .steadily for
five years and had reached an authorized level
of 549,500. Our combat deaths had mounted
to an average of 278 weekly during 1968. We
were spending an additional $22 billion each
year on the war. Draft calls had risen to a
monthly average of .30,000. And despite this in-
vestment, there was no decisive outcome on the
battlefield.

The picture was similarly bleak at the con-
ference table. As a result of our bombing halt,
I)ublic negotiations had been launched in Paris,
but they had proved sterile. Only procedural
matters had been settled. No comprehensive
plans for a settlement lay on the table. No
prospects for a bieakthrough existed.

The Basic Foundation: Viefnamization

Faced with this situation, we chose what we
believed to be the only responsible course — to
follow the parallel tracks of negotiation and

June 4, 1973

737

Vietnamization. Our first preference was a
negotiated settlement, and we undertook both
public and private diplomacy to this end. Our
irreducible conditions were that the people of
South Vietnam be allowed to determine their
own future and that all our prisoners be re-
turned. We also looked toward a ceasefire to end
the war for all participants.

But one side cannot negotiate a peace, and
the North Vietnamese constantly made two un-
acceptable demands. First, they insisted we
withdraw totally from South Vietnam before
any other conditions were even discussed. Sec-
ondly, they demanded we overthrow the exist-
ing governinent in South Vietnam and replace
it with a Communist-dominated structure. This
was the only way, they said, to get our pris-
oners back or obtain an overall settlement.
Unless we were prepared to hand South Viet-
nam over to the enemy, there was no prospect
of an early breakthrough at the conference
table.

Therefore, even while we sought peace
through negotiations, we needed an alternative
course of action. We wanted to ensure that:

— Our withdrawal would not depend on the
enemy's reasonableness at the conference table.
We wanted to reduce our involvement to demon-
strate that it was not open-ended.

— The act of our withdrawal would not over-
throw the non-Communist forces. We were de-
termined to disengage responsibly.

We thus developed the Vietnamization pro-
gram in close cooperation with the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) . This policy
was designed to strengthen the armed forces
and the people of South Vietnam so that they
could defend themselves. As their forces in-
creased in numbers, equipment, combat skills,
and leadership, they progressively assumed
responsibility for their own defense. The proc-
ess also involved the extension of governmental
authority in the countryside through the pacifi-
cation ])rogram, the growth of economic capac-
ities, the development of political in.stitutions
— all the elements that would allow South Viet-
nam to stand on its own.

While negotiations foundered on Communist
intransigence, Vietnamization was an honorable
and convincing alternative. We had the follow-
ing considei'ations in mind :

— Vietnamization allowed us unilaterally to
achieve our objective of winding down our in-
volvement.

— We had to ensure that our friends over the
longer term could take over their self-defense

completely, since we could not stay there in-
definitely.

— Our policy reflected our overall approach
to friends and allies around the world — we
would continue to play a strong supporting
role, but we would increasingly look to our
partners to assume greater responsibilities for
their security and development.

— ^We needed to demonstrate to Hanoi and
its allies that we had an option so long as they
blocked progress at the conference table — one
that enabled our allies to stand on their own and
could gain the support of the American people
for a continuing role until our allies were ready.

The tangible progress of Vietnamization was
reflected in the statistics. In four years, we
progressively reduced our presence from more
than half a million men to 27,000, a 95 percent
cut, by December 1, 1972. Other allied forces
from Korea, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand,
and the Philippines were withdrawn or phased
down during the period. American casualties
in South Vietnam fell from almost 300 a week
when we took oflfice to 26 a week in 1971, and
to four a week during the final six months of
our involvement. Over 60 percent of the cas-
ualties under this Administration occurred in
1969 before our policies could take hold. We
reduced the cost of the war by billions of dol-
lars each year.

During this period, the South Vietnamese
progressively took over the battle. Our ground
combat role was steadily reduced and oflRcially
ended on June 30, 1972. Our friends also as-
sumed all naval missions and an increasing
share of direct air support. The South Viet-
namese armed forces and people shouldered the
burdens with courage and skill. And all the
other crucial indicators of the struggle stayed
promising also — the security situation in the
countryside, the performance of the economy,
and the cohesiveness of the political fabric.

The Need for Decisive Action

During this process, firm but measured mili-
tary actions were also required :

— To protect our men in Vietnam as their
numbers declined. .'

— To assure the continued success of Viet- !
namization and thus reduce our presence, our
casualties, and our costs. I

— To demonstrate that the enemy could not
wage war on South Vietnam with impunity
while using the rest of Indochina as a base
area and stalling us at the conference table.

The North Vietnamese stepped up their pres-

738

Department of State Bulletin

sure during tlie first months of eacli year, after
building up their potential during the dry sea-
son. In 1969 shortly after we took oflice, they
increased tiieir attacks in South \'ietnam. In
1970, they launched major attacks in Cambodia,
attempting to link up their base areas into one
continuous band. In 1971 they staged a major
buildup in southern Laos.

These operations thi'eatened American and
allied forces. Beyond that, they challenged the
whole Vietnamization program. The Commu-
nists were intent on expanding their base areas
bordering South Vietnam, strengthening their
logistics network, and linking up conventional
and guerrilla forces for future assaults.

Our basic strategy was to blunt the threat to
our men, meet the challenge to our program,
and buy the time needed to make our ally self-
sufficient. Our actions were defensive and
limited in both duration and scope. In 1970
there were joint U.S.-South Vietnamese opera-
tions against the North Vietnamese base areas
in Cambodia. In 1971 the South Vietnamese,
with our support, attacked the enemy base
areas in Laos.

These actions achieved the objectives we set.
In the months following each action, our troop
levels and casualties showed a marked decline
while South Vietnam's security situation and
self-confidence improved.

Each of these phases in turn demonstrated
the continuing success of Vietnamization. The
1969 Communist attacks made little headway
because the enemy had suff"ered heavy losses in
their Tet Offensive the year before and our own
forces were still at a peak level. In the 1970
Cambodia operation, the South Vietnamese
conducted large scale military operations of
their own alongside U.S. forces. In 1971 in Laos
our allies carried on all of the ground combat
while our role was limited to air and logistic
support. At each .stage the South Vietnamese
did more and we did less ; and after each stage
we were able to accelerate the shifting of re-
sponsibilities. In 1972, when the most severe
test of all came, the South Vietnamese were
ready.

By early 1972, South Vietnam had made im-
pressive progress across the board. Militarily,
its forces had taken over virtually all of the
ground fighting and much of the close air
support mission. Over one million civilians had
joined the People's Self-Defen.se Forces. The
government had the confidence to supply this
local militia with weapons. The pacification
program was succeeding. Eighty percent of the
population lived in areas under government

control. Nearly all of South Vietnam's 2,200
villages had elected their own local leaders.
Comprehensive economic reforms had cut the
rate of inflation and stabilized South Vietnam's
economy. Industrial output, exports, and tax
revenues had reached their highest point in
many years. A vigorous land reform program
had transferred nearly one million acres of
farm land to former tenants, and the govern-
ment had established a widespread system of
low interest agricultural loans. The rice har-
vest promised a bumper crop, thanks in part
to high yield grains introduced with our assist-
ance. School attendance and classroom construc-
tion had reached new high levels. Nearly one
million refugees — most of them displaced by
the Communists' Tet Offensive in 1968 — had
resettled or were being cared for.

In the spring of 1972, faced with South
Vietnam's growing military, economic, and
political strength, North Vietnam launched its
most massive challenge. On March 30, its
troops poured through the Demilitarized Zone
separating North and South Vietnam which the
1954 Geneva Agreements had established. In
so doing, Hanoi abandoned its previous tactics
and fundamentally changed the nature of the
fighting, for it employed almost its entire army
in an all-out frontal assault.

This challenge came just as we w^ere trying
to revive private negotiations in Paris to get
a response to a comprehensive U.S.-OVN peace
proposal that had been tabled on January 27,
1972. While Hanoi was preparing its major
military assault — and even after it was under-
wa.v — we tried every route of restraint. After
months of effort, we finally arranged a secret
meeting in Paris on May 2 with the North
Vietnamese. This proved abortive as they re-
jected all possibilities for de-escalation or for
settlement. They were obviously determined to
settle matters through military action.

South Vietnamese valor and America's force-
ful support blunted the Communist offensive.
On May 8, faced with aggression in Vietnam
and intransigence in Paris, I announced that
we were mining all major North Vietnamese
ports and were resuming air and naval attacks
in North Vietnam to interdict the flow of troops
and supplies into the South. At the same time,
I held out the alternative of a peaceful settle-
ment along lines that eventually began to
emerge five months later to the day.

I took these actions only after all other op-
tions had been exhausted and the imperatives
were clear. We could not passively acquiesce
in all-out aggression, fueled by the arms of out-

June 4, 1973

M

739

side powers and conducted in total disregard of
international agreements and understandings.
Most immediately, the enemy attacks threatened
our remaining forces in South Vietnam as well
as regional stability. Beyond that, it challenged
America's credibility and thus the chances for
stability around the world. Finally, it was the
eve of my journey to Moscow : how could the
President of the United States go to a sum-
mit meeting while our ally was being overrun
with the help of arms supplied by the country
he was visiting?

The South Vietnamese stood up well under
the massive attack, which was designed to in-
flict political, psychological, and economic dam-
age as well as to gain territory. Enemy guns
pounded civilian centers, such as Quang Tri
City and An Loc, into rubble, but the Commu-
nists kept little territory, and they failed to
crack the spirit of the South Vietnamese.
Buoyed by our actions, our allies rolled back
most Communist territorial gains and liberated
Quang Tri City, the only provincial capital the
Communists had been able to take. More than
one million South Vietnamese "voted with their
feet" by moving into areas controlled by their
government rather than staying with the
enemy. Local leaders performed well under
pressure. Even opposition groups closed ranks
with the government against the common
enemy. The inevitable economic dislocations
were slight. The land reform program con-
tinued and, by March 1973, two and a half mil-
lion acres had been distributed by the
government, virtually eliminating land tenancy
in South Vietnam.

Thus, the North Vietnamese offensive had
failed. The steady development of Vietnamiza-
tion and the allied military reactions of 1970
and 1971 had made possible the defense of
South Vietnam in 1972. The climactic military
phase gradually underlined to all parties the
futility of continued conflict and the need for
genuine negotiations.

In sum, the military measures we took in
Indochina were a difficult but essential aspect
of our peace-making efforts. In each case we
made clear our limited objectives. Throughout
we emphasized the alternative route of a nego-
tiated end to the conflict. Reinforcing the tracks
of Vietnamization and negotiations, these de-
cisive actions made an indispensable contribu-
tion to the peace that was finally achieved.

Negotiating the Peace

The Agreement which was signed in Paris on
January 27, 1973, culminated four years of in-

tensive negotiating effort. Throughout this
process, our fundamental attitude was as I de-
scribed it on November 2, 1972 :

We ai-e going to sign the agreement when the agree-
ment is right, not one day before. And when the agree-
ment is right, we are going to sign without one day's
delay.

In Vietnamization the guiding principle was
to give the South Vietnamese the chance to de-
fend themselves ; in negotiations it was to give
the South Vietnamese the chance to choose for
themselves.

In reviewing the long negotiating record, cer-
tain basic elements should be kept in mind.

Our preference was always to solve military
questions alone. The best way to ensure that .
the South Vietnamese could determine their j
own political future was to leave political ques- >
tions to them. We believed that we should not I
negotiate a political settlement for South Viet- ■
nam. Furthermore, we knew that military is- (
sues would be easier to resolve than political j
issues that would be extremely difficult given j
Vietnam's long and bitter history. We were i
neither qualified, nor justified, in detailing i
specific political formulas such as governmental j
bodies or electoral processes for the Vietnamese !
people. Nor did we wish to be directly involved i
in — or responsible for — the functioning of the |
political machinery. |

We preferred to concentrate on those aspects j
of a settlement that directly involved us — the ■
military activity, withdrawals, and prisoners.!
We felt the political future should be negotiated
by the South Vietnamese themselves, hopefully
in a calmer atmosphere. We did not seek to im- ^
pose a political victory, any more than a mili-;
tary victory, but we were not prepared to :
impose a political defeat. i

Until the final stage the North Vietnamese\
and their allies insisted on a settlement that,
would effectively guarantee that the future of
South Vietnam would be Communist. Public'
speculation and commentary to the contrary,-
they never agreed to separate military from;
political issues until the end of 1972. And when,,
in light of this position, we presented compre-
hensive proposals, including political elements,
they never wavered from their basic goals.

However they packaged their proposals, the
fundamental provisions were a fixed date for,
our total and unconditional withdrawal; the
removal of the leadership of the Government
of South Vietnam ; and the installation of Com-i
munist rule disguised as a so-called coalition
government.

This basic philosophic clash, not the failure

740

Department of State Bulletin

to find precise formulfis, delaijcd a settlement,
for four years. So long as the Communists in-
sisted on their basic demands, we were faced
at the conference table with one overriding is-
sue. I addressed this question in last year's
Report :

Will we collude with our enemies to overturn our
friends? Will we impose a future on the Vietnamese
people that the other side has been unable to gain"
militarily or politically? This we shall never do.

The only solution offered by our domestic
critics was to turn our ally over to the Commu-
nists, either through accepting their terms in
Paris or removing all our support from South
Vietnam. And neitlier course provided any
guarantee that we would obtain the release of
our prisoners.

Instead — as we pursued fruitless negotiations
in Paris — we wound down our presence in
South Vietnam responsibly. Vietnamization re-
assured our allies and spurred their initiative.
South Vietnam's steady advance toward self-
reliance was certainly a factor in the enemy's
ultimate decision to negotiate seriously.
; In the end we emerged with a settlement
that met our basic principles and gave the
South Vietnamese people a chance to determine
their owti future.

The First Three Years. In last year's Report
I detailed our public initiatives and secret
diplomacy for peace during the first three
years of this Administration. Briefly, the rec-
ord was as follows:

— At the outset we took unilateral steps to
induce nef/otiations, such as the progressive
withdrawal of our troops and reduction in air
sorties in Vietnam. Each of our measures was
met by fresh and more stringent demands by
the enemy.

— We also moved publicly to define the frame-
work for a negotiated settlement, emphasizing
he withdrawal of foreign troops and general
principles to allow the South Vietnamese to
letermine their own political future. On May
14, 1969, we proposed a settlement that would
•emove all outside forces from South Vietnam
ind establish internationally supervised elec-
ions. On July 11, 1969, the Republic of Viet-
>am offered free elections to be run by a mixed
•lectoral commission, in which all parties could
•articipate. On April 20, 1970, I spelled out
he principles of a political solution that would
eflect the choice of the South Vietnamese peo-
ple and the existing relationship of political
orces within the country. I pledged that the
'nited States would abide by the outcome of

any political process chosen by the South Viet-
namese.

— On October 7, 1970, we presented an over-
all proposal for a settlement that looked to the
resolution of military questions and free polit-
ical choice for the South Vietnamese. We pro-
posed an internationally supervised ceasefire;
an Indochina Peace Conference; the with-
drawal of all American forces from South
Vietnam ; a political solution based on the prin-
ciples of April 20; and the immediate uncon-
ditional release of all prisoners of war.

— Throughout this period we intensively
pursued secret diplomacy in the hopes that a
private forum might produce genuine negoti-
ations. Dr. Kissinger went to Paris regularly
to meet with the North Vietnamese Special Ad-
visor Le Due Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy.

— In these secret sessions we spelled out posi-
tions that were more detailed and forthcoming
than our public stance, as we made maximum
efforts to make a breakthrough toward peace.
On May 31, 1971, we offered a special settle-
ment of military issues alone — the withdrawal
of all U.S. forces in exchange only for an Indo-
china ceasefire and release of all prisoners. All
other questions would be left to the South
Vietnamese.

— The North Vietnamese continued to in-
sist that political questions also be included,
specifically that a coalition government domi-
nated by their side be installed. During the
following months the Communists followed a
particularly cynical negotiating procedure de-
signed to mislead public opinion. On June 26,
they tabled a secret nine-point proposal ; five
days later, on July 1, the South Vietnamese
Communists made a public seven-point pro-
posal. Our own subsequent secret positions
responded to both plans. Meanwhile the North
Vietnamese castigated us publicly for not re-
sponding to the seven-point proposal even
though privately they said we should respond
to their nine-point proposal, and we had done
so.

— In view of Hanoi's insistence that political
issues be addressed, we presented during the
summer a series of increasingly generous and
comprehensive peace plans which were de-
signed to frame a political process as well as
.settle the military questions. By August we of-
fered our total withdrawal in nine months; a
political process which included elections and
our pledge to neutrality and acceptance of the
outcome; limitations on military aid to South
Vietnam providing there were limits on aid to
North Vietnam as well; non-alignment for

jne 4, 1973

741

!

South Vietnam and all of Indochina; and re-
unification to be worked out between North
and South Vietnam.

— On October 11, in response to North Viet-
namese comments, we conveyed still another
comprehensive plan to Hanoi and proposed
another secret meeting in November to con-
sider it. They agreed to meet on November 20,
but abruptly cancelled the session just three
days before, on November 17.

— On January 25, 1972, after waiting in vain
for more than three months for the North
Vietnamese to answer our proposal to meet, we
were compelled to explain the situation to the
American people and try to elicit Hanoi's re-
action to our offers. We revealed the scope of
our private diplomacy, and President Thieu
and I offered a new comprehensive plan for
peace. Once again we sought to make the polit-
ical process as free and open to all parties as
possible while resolving the military conflict.

— Our proposal provided that within six
months of a settlement all U.S. and allied forces
would withdraw from South Vietnam ; all pris-
oners throughout Indochina would be released ;
there would be a ceasefire throughout the re-
gion; and a new Presidential election would
take place in South Vietnam. In addition,
President Thieu offered to resign one month
before the elections. We spelled out these pro-
visions and others in considerable detail. We
also made clear, as we had proposed in May

1971, that we were prepared to settle only
the military issues and to leave political mat-
ters for later resolution by the South Viet-
namese.

January-October 1972. The North Viet-
namese response to our comprehensive offer
was to continue their massive military buildup
in South Vietnam and to launch their Easter
invasion. They never replied to our negotiat-
ing proposal ; they refused to meet us privately ;
and they repeated their same negotiating de-
mands publicly.

The North Vietnamese finally agreed to meet
again in Paris privately on May 2. We made
every effort to find a way to end or scale down
military conflict. We proposed a variety of ap-
proaches: mutual de-escalation; a de facto cease-
fire; a partial withdrawal of the invading
forces; an overall military settlement; or more
comprehensive solutions. All of our proposals
were rejected.

Accordingly, we had little choice but to
respond with the decisive measures of May 8,

1972. At the same time we proposed a fair
settlement, one that would prove eventually to
be the framework for peace : the cessation of

742

all our military activities and the withdrawal of :
all our forces within the same period, and a ''
ceasefire. We told Hanoi that we would resume i
private negotiations at any time.

The North Vietnamese eventually decided to
resume talks in Paris on July 19, 1972. As i
these discussions went on throughout the sum-
mer, the enemy continued to insist on a com-
prehensive political and military solution along i
familiar lines. While there were marginal
changes in their approach, enough to justify
continuing the negotiations, there was no real
progress toward a solution. In the July, August, |
and September sessions, their positions, how- \
ever modified around the edges, contained the !
unacceptable core — imposition of a coalition
government that the Communists would
control.

Until October 1972, therefore, the basic
stumbling block remained North Vietnam's de-
mand that political victory be handed to them
as a pre-condition for settling all military ques- ji
tions. In that case, of course, the latter would j,
become totally irrelevant since the very issue ji
that the struggle was all about would have !'
been settled. i

i'
The October Breakthrough {;

On October 8, 1972, the North Vietnamese!'
presented a new plan in Paris accepting the j
basic principles of our position. It was the es-j
sential breakthrough toward a negotiated set- i
tlement. For the first time, Hanoi agreed, in i
effect, to separate military questions from the '
principal political issues. They spelled out spe- \
cific solutions to the former while the latter I
were to follow later and were left basically up '
to the South Vietnamese. Moreover, they drop- <
ped their insistent demand for President ,
Thieu's resignation and formation of a coali-
tion government.

To be sure, there were major problems in
their plan, and tough negotiations lay ahead.
But, in their own words, the North Vietnamese'
had essentially accepted the approach that I
had outlined in my May 8th speech. We could
see that, given a constructive attitude on their
part, there was, at long last, the genuine pros-
pect of a negotiated peace. •■

Once this breakthrough was achieved, W(
moved decisively and quickly toward a fina;
settlement. The North Vietnamese negotiatec'
seriously as well. In areas where there had;
never been significant movement, there waa
now rapid progress. Through intensive negotiai
tions from October 8-12 and on October 17
and diplomatic communications, we hammerec "
out a basic draft agreement. ''

Department of State Bulletir 4

Perhaps to catch the South Vietnamese off
balance, perliaps to pin us down to a settle-
ment before our own elections, the North Viet-
namese insisted on a very short timetable, with
October 31, 1972, the date for final signature.
After refusing to negotiate seriously for three
years, the enemy now demanded that we com-
plete the negotiations within three weeks of
their proposal. We promised to make a maxi-
mum effort to meet the deadline, subject to
discussions with Saigon and a final negotiating
round to complete the draft.

To prove our serious intentions and to re-
flect the progress tliat was being made, I
ordered suspension of all bombing above the
20th parallel in North Vietnam on October 23,
1972. During this period, as a result of several
developments since the October 17 meetings in
Paris, we told the North Vietnamese privately
that, while we stood by the basic draft agree-
! ment, we could not meet the October 31 target
date.

There were three main reasons yve could not
do so:

— During the last half of October, we re-
ceived mounting evidence that the Communists
were planning to take advantage of the cease-
fire with military offensives. This threw a dif-
I ferent light on their eagerness to complete the
I agreement rapidly. Our South Vietnamese
friends would have minimum time to prepare
for the new situation. It also made more im-
perative the need to tighten up certain aspects
of the agreement, including the supervisory
mechanisms. Failure to settle on international
machinery would mean that any violations
, would occur in an unsupervised context.
I — At the very time we were conducting del-
I icate consultations with our ally, Hanoi's lead-
.ership made public comments suggesting the
possibility of a coalition government, which
both sides had firmly agreed was not envisaged
in the settlement. These and other ambiguities
j had to be put to rest.

— We ran into opposition in Saigon. Our
I South Vietnamese ally wanted many changes in
the agreement, and they wanted more time for
consultations. We were not prepared to accept
all their proposals, but their deep concerns and
the other factors made it essential to take a
little more time. We believed a country that
had suffered so much was entitled to have its
views fully considered. We made clear, how-
ever, that we would maintain the integrity of
ithe draft settlement.

I On October 26, Hanoi publicly revealed the
outline.s of the agreement we were negotiating

June 4, 1973

and repeated its insistence that we sign by the
end of the month. We had agreed to keep the
content of the negotiations private so as not to
jeopardize their outcome. The North Viet-
namese disclosures, however, gave us the choice
of either breaking off negotiations or affirming
our commitment to the framework of the set-
tlement while describing the types of changes
still needed. We chose the latter course and
publicly outlined our position in response to
North Vietnam's propaganda offensive.

Our primary audiences were Hanoi and Sai-
gon. We believed that peace was very near,
and we wanted to underline the message to
both capitals. To our adversary, we committed
ourselves publicly to the essence of the draft
agreement. To our friends, we emphasized that
we would take their concerns very seriously
into account, but w'e left no doubt that we con-
sidered the basic settlement fair to all parties.
We sympathized with Saigon's perspective. The
war, after all, was on their soil ; they would
have to live with any agreement after we de-
parted. But we were determined to conclude a
settlement as soon as we were satisfied it was
-sound.

We emphasized our conviction that the re-
maining problems could be solved in one more
negotiating round of three or four days, as had
been foreseen earlier in October, if Hanoi con-
tinued to share our serious attitude. We did not
wish to release the full text of the draft agree-
ment or to get into specifics. To do so would
only give observers a scoreboard on which to
register points won by each side in subsequent
liargaining. It would hurt the chances for a
final settlement by making the outstanding
pi'oblems matters of prestige for the parties.

Therefore, we indicated the general nature of
the issues that still needed resolution in order
to solidify the settlement:

— We wished to elaborate the details of the
control and supei'visory machinery which was
established in principle.

— We wanted to speed up ceasefires in neigh-
boring Laos and Cambodia, for the conflict af-
fected all of Indochina.

— We needed clarification of certain ambi-
guities. For example, the North Vietnamese and
we clearly agreed that no coalition govern-
ment was contemplated in the settlement, but
the Vietnamese text of the agreement could be
read to suggest a new governmental organ.

— We needed to work out the signing proce-
dure for the four parties.

— We wished to clarify a few- other techni-
cal problems in the text.

743

These matters were important in order to
solidify the agreement, but they were minor
compared to the hurdles that had already been
surmounted. We would not be stampeded into
an agreement by an arbitrary deadline. We
would negotiate until it was right. And once
we believed it was right, we would not be
deflected from signing it. Only the terms of the
settlement would determine the date of our sig-
nature— not enemy pressures, nor excessive re-
quests from our friends, nor an electoral
deadline.

The Final Stages

In retrospect, peace certainly was near in
late October — the ending of a twelve-year con-
flict was reached twelve weeks later. But the
record of those twelve weeks makes it equally
clear that peace could have come even sooner
if it were not for a cynical North Vietnamese
approach at the end of 1972.

On November 20, negotiations resumed and
lasted five days. We took up the remaining prob-
lems in the agreement and presented draft
protocols designed to supplement it. These were
technical documents. They introduced no new
issues but spelled out in neutral detail the im-
plementation of such aspects as ceasefire su-
pervision and prisoner release. At first the
North Vietnamese remained serious. We made
sigTiificant progress in the agreement itself,
although we received no responses on the proto-
cols. A stalemate developed over the few resid-
ual issues, however, and both sides agreed to
recess until December 4 to reconsider their
positions.

Throughout this period we continued our in-
tensive discussions with the Republic of Viet-
nam. We consulted through our Ambassador in
Saigon, with South Vietnamese representa-
tives in Paris, and through high level emis-
saries to each other's capital. We listened closely
to South Vietnam's concerns and presented
many of them forcefully in Paris. We did not
adopt all of them as our own, however. We de-
termined what we thought would make a fair
agreement, and we stayed within the frame-
work of the October draft.

On December i. when we resumed the talks,
the North Vietnamese attitude had changed
fundamentally. The final issues could have
been resolved in a few days given a serious at-
titude on both sides. The North Vietnamese
began this round, however, by withdrawing all
the changes they accepted in November. We
spent the next few days working arduously
back to where we had been two weeks pre-
viously. Then we reached a total impasse.

Throughout the last several days of the nego-
tiations in December it became very clear that
Hanoi had no intention of settling at that time.
We therefore recessed on December 13 after
several fruitless and exasperating sessions.

Many of the problems we had pointed to
on October 26 had been settled: the prospects
for an early ceasefire in Laos at least were
firmer, and various technical improvements
had been made in the agreement. But other
problems remained and, because of the North
Vietnamese approach, they were growing,
rather than shrinking.

On December 16, we explained the reasons
for the stalemate. Although many ambiguities
in the provisions had been clarified, a few re-
mained. We still had to work out a signing
procedure for the agreement that would accom-
modate the sensibilities of the various partici-
pants. We were still far apart on the concepts
of supervisory machinery for the ceasefire,
and the North Vietnamese had allowed no
serious discussions of any of the protocols.

The impasse was created both by North
Vietnamese rigidity on these specific issues and
by their whole negotiating approach. They
kept a settlement continuously out of reach
by injecting new issues whenever current ones
neared solution. At technical level meetings,
scheduled only to conform the English and Viet-
namese texts, they raised fresh substantive
problems. Questions already resolved in the
agreement were revived by the North Viet-
namese in the protocols. Instead of the con-
structive approach of October, there were now
determined, often frivolous, tactics designed to
frustrate the negotiations.

In mid-December, therefore, we had little
choice. Hanoi obviously was stalling for time,
hoping that pressures would force us to make
an unsatisfactory agreement. Our South Viet-
namese friends, in turn, still had some strong
reservations about the settlement. The more
diflicult Hanoi became, the more rigid Saigon ,
grew. There was a danger that the settlement
which was so close might be pulled apart by
conflicting pressures. We decided to bring home '
to both Vietnamese parties that there was a
price for continuing the conflict.

Oyi December 18, we moved strongly in both
directions. We resumed bombing north of the
20th parallel in North Vietnam, which we had ,
suspended while serious negotiations were un-
derway. We had to make clear that Hanoi could
not continue to wage war in the South while ,
its territory was immune, and that we would [
not tolerate an indefinite delay in the nego-
tiations.

744

Department of State Bulletin

At the same time, we talked sternly with our
friends in Soutli Vietnam. In our view they
were holding out for terms that were impos-
sible to achieve without several more years of
warfare — if then. We therefore reemphasized
our determination to conclude the agreement if
the North Vietnamese should once again prove
reasonable in Pai'is.

During this time we maintained direct pri-
vate conmuinications with Hanoi. Once we had
been assured that serious talks could again be
undertaken, we suspended our bombing of
North Vietnam above the 20th parallel on
December 31, 1972.

On January 2, 1973, the technical talks on
the protocols to the agreement resumed in
Paris and serious drafting began. From Janu-
anj S to 13, Dr. Kissinger and Le Due Tho
met. The serious approach of October reap-
peared. There was rapid progress on the
remaining issues in the agreement on the proto-
cols. The residual ambiguities in the te.xt were
resolved. We agreed on a procedure for sign-
ing the agreement that satisfied all parties.
Four protocols were elaborated into final,
agreed form, detailing such key military pro-
visions as ceasefire supervision and release of
prisoners. In short, we had achieved essentially
all that we had set out to do on October 26.

Simultaneously, we continued consultations
with the South Vietnamese Government, and
these moved to a successful conclusion. On
many questions we had improved the agree-
ment to our ally's satisfaction; on others, the
South Vietnamese changed their positions for
the sake of concluding the settlement.

On Jannnrij 23, 1973, Dr. Kissinger returned
to Paris for a final meeting. On that date the
United States and North Vietnam, with the
concurrence of their allies, initialled the agree-
ment.

That evening in announcing the settlement,
I said :

We must recopnize that endinp the war is only the
first step toward building- the peace. All parties must
now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a
peace that heals, and a peace that not only ends the
war in Southeast Asia, but contributes to the prospects
of peace in the whole world.

In Paris, on January 27, 1973 — the first an-
niversary of the comprehensive U.S.-OVN
peace plan — Secretary of State Rogers signed
the agreement for the United States.

The Agreement

This Agreement met the essential conditions
that we had laid down on January 27, and on
May 8. 1972 : a ceasefire, return of all prisoners,

the withdrawal of American forces, and the
political future of the South Vietnamese to be
determined by the people themselves. The ma-
jor elements were:

— An internationally-supervised ceasefire
throughout Vietnam, effective at 7:00 p.m.,
Eastern Standard Time, Saturday, January 27,
1973.

— The release within 60 days of all captured
Americans held throughout Indochina, and the
fullest possible accounting for those missing
in action.

— The parallel withdrawal of all United
States and allied forces and military personnel
from South Vietnam.

— A ban on infiltration of personnel into
South Vietnam.

— A ban on the introduction of war material
into South Vietnam except one-for-one replace-
ment of military equipment worn out, dam-
aged, destroyed, or used up after the ceasefire.

— The reduction and demobilization of both
sides' forces in South Vietnam.

— The withdrawal of all foreign troops from
Laos and Cambodia.

— A ban on the use of Laotian or Cambodian
base areas to encroach on the sovereignty and
security of South Vietnam.

— The determination of the political future
of South Vietnam by the South Vietnamese
themselves.

— Formation of a non-governmental Na-
tional Council of National Reconciliation and
Concord operating by unanimity, to organize
elections as agreed by the parties and to pro-
mote conciliation between the parties and im-
plementation of the Agreement.

— Respect for the Demilitarized Zone divid-
ing South and North Vietnam.

— The eventual reunification of North and
South Vietnam through peaceful means, step
by step, through direct negotiations.

— Respect for the independence, sovereignty,
unity, territorial integrity, and neutrality of
Laos and Cambodia.

— In accordance with traditional United
States policy, U.S. participation in postwar re-
construction efforts throughout Indochina.

— An International Commission of Control
and Supervision (ICCS) compo.sed of Canada,
Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland to control and
supervise the elections and various military pro-
visions of the Agreement.

— Joint Military Commissions of the parties
to implement appropriate provisions of the
Agreement.

— An International Conference with thirty

June 4, 1973

745

days to guarantee the Agreement and the end-
ing of the war.

There were also four protocols which spelled
out the implementation of the Agreement in
the following areas : the ceasefire and the Joint
Military Commission ; the ICCS ; the release of
prisoners; and mine clearance in North Viet-
nam.

These then are the principal provisions of
the Agreement and the negotiating history
that produced it. The following points emerge.
The Agreement corresponded to our overall
approach. We consistently held the view that
a settlement should involve specific resolution
of military questions alone. This was, we be-
lieved, the most feasible and rapid route to
peace. The final settlement embodied this prin-
ciple. The military issues— such as the ceasefire,
prisoner release, withdrawals, and supervision
—were spelled out in detail in the Agreement
and accompanying protocols. On the political
side, the provisions were general, leaving those
matters to be negotiated between the two South
Vietnamese parties.

The Agreement included the basic features
of our earlier peace plans. An internationally
supervised ceasefire, return of all prisoners, the
withdrawal of Americans and allied forces,
and an international conference were basic
provisions of all our plans since October 1970.
Internationallv supervised elections were al-
ways the centerpiece of the U.S.-GVN political
approach. And the National Council corres-
ponded in many respects to the mixed electoral
commission of our January 1972 plan.

The settlement represents a compromise by
both sides. While our essential principles were
met, we and the Communists had to make com-
promises. Many of these were more significant
for our ally than for us. For example, we did
not insist on the withdrawal of North Viet-
namese forces from South Vietnam. On the
other hand, this had not been part of our nego-
tiating position since our October 7, 1970, plan.
There were other mutual compromises. But the
fact these were made reflected the de facto sit-
uation and represented an outcome fair to all
parties. Neither side could expect to impose at
the conference table what it had not gained
on the battlefield. The military outcome was not
clear-cut and therefore the political future was
yet to be determined. For us the important
principle is that the Agreement does not hand
over this political future to the Communists.
Our friends have every opportunity to demon-
strate their inherent strength.

746

It was not possible to reach this Agreement
any sooner than we did. Some observers have
asked why we did not negotiate this settlement
four years ago. The answer is simply that it
was impossible to do so at any time before
October 1972. As the record makes clear, the
North Vietnamese from the very outset al-
ways insisted on linking political and military
issues. They always demanded removal of the
government in South Vietnam and the installa-
tion of a Communist-dominated structure. They
never varied from that basic approach until
the final months of this Administration's first
term. Once we had achieved this breakthrough,
we moved as rapidly as possible to complete
the settlement.

Peace in Vietnam will depend not only on
the provisions of the Agreement but on the
spirit in which it is implemented. It was vital
to reach a settlement that would provide a
framework for South Vietnamese self-deter-
mination and for our honorable disengagement.
We have never been under the illusion, how-
ever that any single document would instantly
move the people of the region from a genera-
tion of war and hatred to peace and recon-
ciliation. , , ^ , , .

We have laid the best obtainable foundation
for the beginning of this process. We hope
that the contending factions will now prefer to
pursue their objectives through peaceful means
and political competition rather than through
the brutal and costly methods of the past. This
choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant con-
cerning violations of the Agreement. We are
always readv to encourage accommodation
among the South Vietnamese. But the peace
and progress of South Vietnam and its polit-
ical future depend on the people themselves.

'

:|

Ongoing Efforts To Maintain the Peace i

In the period immediately following the sign- \
ing of the Agreement, we moved on several
fronts to promote its implementation. We,
talked to our adversaries, to our friends, and
to other countries principally involved m
guaranteeing the peace. \

Prisoners of War aiid Missing in Action. The
Four Party Joint Military Commission started i
immediatelv to make the arrangements for
release of our prisoners of war. The two sides |
exchanged lists of prisoners of war on January
27, the date of the signing. The list of prisoners,
captured in Laos was furnished by North Viet-
nam on February 1. A U.S. team from the

Department of State Bulletin

state and Defense Departments flew to Hanoi
on February 12 to pick up the first group of
returnees; anotiier y:roup was freed in South
Vietnam the same day, and furtlier releases
were due at 15 day intervals. When there ap-
peared to be stalling, we immediately held u]i
U.S. force withdrawals to emphasize the im-
portance we attached to prompt and full com-
pliance with the Agreement and Protocols.
Releases then continued on schedule. A final dis-
pute over the release of the U.S. prisoners of
war captured in Laos was resolved when the
Communist side agreed to release them in
Hanoi on March 28. In the meanwhile, the Re-
public of Vietnam, with our support, released
the more than 26,000 prisoners of war in its
custody.

With the return of our prisoners, our efforts
turned to the missing in action. More than
1300 U.S. military personnel and civilians re-
main in this category. The Vietnam Agreement
contained unprecedentedly specific language on
this issue — with similar provisions in the Laos
ceasefire agreement — and we made clear to the
Communist side our determination to secure
the fullest possible accounting for each of our
men. As stipulated in the protocol, a Four
Party Joint Military Team is being maintained
to gather information about the missing in
action. We also established a Joint Casualty
Resolution Center (JCRC) in Thailand — near
the Laos and Vietnam border.s — to search for
the missing. These efforts will continue until
we have exhausted all possible means to find
information on each of our men.

North Viptnam. Dr. Kissinger visited Hanoi
from February 10 to 13, for direct conversa-
tions with Prime Mini.ster Pham Van Dong
and other North Vietnamese leaders. As stated
in the Joint Communique after the visit, the
two sides carefully reviewed implementation of
the Agreement, problems in Laos and Cam-
bodia, postwar economic reconstruction, and the
International Conference on Vietnam that was
held .shortly afterwards. They also considered
the bilateral relationship between our two
countries and concrete steps to normalize our
relations.

A significant result of this trip was an agree-
ment to establish a Joint Economic Commission
to develop economic relations between the
United States and the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. This Commission began its work in
Paris on March 1.5, 1973. Its agenda includes
not only economic assistance but the whole
range of economic matters. And it could be-
come not only a technical group but a forum

for a more constructive dialogue between our
two nations.

The essential message we have for North
Vietnam's leaders, and which was conveyed
during this trip, is as follows.

We do not assume Hanoi will give up its
long-range goals. We do expect it to pursue
those goals without using force. Hanoi has two
basic choices. The first is to exploit the Viet-
nam Agreement and press its objectives in
Indochina. In this case it would continue to in-
filtrate men and materiel into South Vietnam,
keep its forces in Laos and Cambodia, and
through pressures or outright attack renew its
aggression against our friends. Such a course
would endanger the hard won gains for peace
in Indochina. It would risk revived confronta-
tion with us. It would, of course, destroy the
chances for a new and constructive bilateral
relationship with the United States, including
economic assistance.

The second course is for North Vietnam to
pursue its objectives peacefully, allowing the
historical trends of the region to assert them-
selves. This would mean observance of the
Vietnam settlement and the removal of foreign
forces on both sides from Laos and Cambodia.
It would transform years of military conflict in
Indochina into political struggle. It would en-
able the United States and the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam to normalize relations. If
Hanoi follows this path, the United States will
abide by whatever the historical process pro-
duces in Indochina.

If North Vietnam chooses the peaceful op-
tion, the United States remains committed to
better relations. We are convinced, as stated
in the Joint Communique at the conclusion of
Dr. Kissinger's visit to Hanoi, that this process
would "help to ensure stable peace in Vietnam
and contribute to the cause of peace in Indo-
china and Southeast Asia."

Indorhina Reconslriiotion. Thus the basic
challenge in Indochina is to move from two dec-
ades of violent struggle to peaceful evolution.
It will not be easy to make this transition after
a generation of conflict, to discard familiar
techniques and join in constructive enterprises,
and to rely on political competition and the
forces of history for the achievement of goals.

The economic assistance we propose in con-
cert with others, for the reconstruction and de-
velopment of the entire region would help
make this transition a reality. To be efi'ective
it must include the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam. The rebuilding of war-torn economies
of former enemies is a traditional policy of this

June 4, 1973

747

country and served the goal of reconciliation
in the period after World War II. This con-
cept was first proposed for Indochina by the
previous Administration in 1965. We have re-
affirmed it on many occasions during this Ad-
ministration, including last year's Report. It
would be a sound investment in peace, provid-
ing avenues and incentives for an insulated and
suspicious country to engage in peaceful and
cooperative pursuits. It responds to humani-
tarian needs as well as to political and psycho-
logical necessities.

We will pursue this program with determina-
tion. The funds required will not be drawn
from any domestic programs. As we proceed,
however, we will be guided by two fundamental
principles :

— We will observe Constitutional require-
ments both in letter and spirit and consult
closely with the Congress at every step of the
way.

— We will not provide aid to the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam if it violates the Agree-
ment. Hanoi cannot expect to receive our eco-
nomic assistance while pursuing its goals
through military pressure.

We believe that the American people and the
Congress will agree to provide the relatively
modest amounts to keep the peace that ended
such a long and costly war.

South Vietnam. The Republic of Vietnam and
the United States fought and suff'ered together
many years. We supported that government
and its people in their valiant efforts against
aggression. And we consulted closely with them
throughout the long, torturous road of negotia-
tions. We now look forward to working to-
gether in peace as we did on the battlefield
and at the conference table.

The Republic of Vietnam will find us a steady
friend. We will continue to deal with its gov-
ernment as the legitimate representative of the
South Vietnamese people, while supporting
eff"orts by the South Vietnamese parties to
achieve reconciliation and shape their political
future. We will provide replacement military
assistance within the terms of the Agreement.
We expect our friends to observe the Agree-
ment just as we will not tolerate violations by
the North Vietnamese or its allies.

We will also continue to contribute gener-
ously to South Vietnam's economic rehabilita-
tion and development. That country is making
a major effort to make its economy self-suf-
ficient, but the peace agreement does not lessen
its need for substantial outside assistance.

South Vietnamese requirements will, in fact, in-
crease in the short term. The government's
heavy military budget will decline only slowly,
for it must maintain a vigilant defense and sup-
port the total military responsibility created
by the withdrawal of the American and allied
forces. Simultaneously, South Vietnam will
bear the double burden of creating new jobs
for demobilized personnel and of meeting mas-
sive expenditures for relief of refugees and
war victims. Finally, the country faces other
heavy financial drains as it reconstructs the
many destroyed towns, repairs the country's
transportation and irrigation systems, and
brings back into production large arable re-
gions abandoned during twenty years of fight-
ing.

None of the country's major economic tasks
can be accomplished without substantial eco-
nomic assistance. With such aid, none of these
problems is insuperable. South Vietnam has
the natural and human resources to be eco-
nomically independent and viable. What is
needed is time for these resources, diverted or
idled by the war, to be put back to productive
use.

The Republic of South Vietnam now seeks
the economic counterpart to Vietnamization.
As we helped them take over their own defense
in conflict, we will help them now become eco-
nomically self-sustaining in peace.

These were the principles I expressed to
President Thieu when we met at San Clemente
a few weeks ago. His visit to the United States
symbolized both our common struggle in past
years and our common endeavors in the years
to come. As we said in our joint communique:

. . . both Presidents agreed that through the
harsh experience of a tragic war and the sacrifices
of their two peoples a close and constructive re-
lationship between the American and the South
Vietnamese people has been developed and strength-
ened. They affirmed their full confidence that this
association would be preserved as the foundation of
an honorable and lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

The International Conference. From Febru-
ary 26, 1973, to March 2, 1973, the Interna-
tional Conference on Vietnam met in Paris.
Twelve nations — the four parties to the Agree-
ment, the four ICCS countries, and the perma-
nent members of the United Nations Security
Council — plus the Secretary General of the
United Nations, attended. The Final Act signed
on March 2, 1973, endorsed the Vietnam Agree-
ment; called for its strict observance by the
four parties; pledged respect for the Accord
by members of the Conference ; urged all other
countries to do so as well ; set up procedures

748

Department of State Bulletin i<

for reportinp violations of the Ajri'ecment and
reconvening of the Conference; and called for
countries to respect the independence, sovei"-
eigrnty, unity, territorial integ^rity, and neu-
trality of Caml)odia and Laos, as stipulated
in the Agreement.

A single meeting lasting several days cannot
guarantee the peace. But the gathering and
the statements of the nations involved under-
lined the reality that all countries, not just
those directly concerned, have a stake in peace
in Indochina. We expect the nations that signed
the Act of the Conference to live up to their
obligations. We will take their performance
into account in the conduct of our bilateral
relations.

Future Tasks

Achieving an end to the war was exception-
ally difficult, but keeping the peace will be no
less challenging. It involves not just Vietnam
but all of Indochina, and not just the Indo-
chinese countries but outside nations as well.
The following are the major tasks :

— Strengthening the peace in Vietnam.

— Implementing the agreement on Laos.

— Achieving a ceasefire and beginning nego-
tiations on Cambodia.

— Ensuring restraint toward the region by
outside powers.

The peace in Vietnam itself remains fragile.
A period of misunderstandings and ambiguities
was to be expected in the first months of peace
after so many years of war. The process of rec-
onciliation and mutual accommodation is bound
to take time. Nevertheless the overall record
so far has been less positive than we had hoped.

The United States has scrupulously carried
out its obligations, and we have urged all
others to do likewise. On those military ele-
ments of the agreement directly affecting us
the record has been generally good. Our listed
prisoners have returned from Indochina. There
remains, however, the difficult task of account-
ing for all those mi-ssing in action throughout
the region, and we will not rest until this task
is completed. All American and allied military
forces and advisors have been withdrawn from
South Vietnam. We have strictly ob.served the
ceasefire and have given full cooperation and
support to the supervisory organization. And
we began to clear the mines from all North
Vietnamese ports and waterways, a complicated
and time-consuming job.

Observance of the ceasefire is now, of course,
in the hands of the Vietnamese. Compliance

has been spotty, and substantial fighting con-
tinues. While violations and casualties have
diminished from the first weeks, much greater
efforts are needed to stop the conflict com-
pletely and fully stabilize the situation.

The most ominous aspect of the situation to
date has been the continued infiltration of
North Vietnamese troops in violation of the
Agreement. In blatant disregaid of Articles
7, 15, and 20, Hanoi has continued to send
troops and military supplies into South Viet-
nam. It has also continued its military activi-
ties in Laos and Cambodia in violation of
Article 20. In so doing, it has built up the
military potential of the Communist forces in
South Vietnam. Whether this is a prelude to
another offensive is not clear. What is clear
is that it must cease. We have told Hanoi, pri-
vately and publicly, that we will not tolerate
violations of the Agreement.

On the political front, the two South Viet-
namese parties are now negotiating in Paris
on such subjects as the functioning of the Na-
tional Council of National Reconciliation, the
elections, the issues of civilian prisoners held
l)y both sides, and the reduction and demobili-
zation of both sides' armed forces. We hope
that the South Vietnamese parties make prog-
ress on these issues and settle their differences.

Laos and Cambodia will be treated in more
detail later in this Report. It is important to
]ioint out here that the Vietnam settlement ob-
ligates all foreign countries to withdraw their
forces from these two countries, cease sending
military personnel and equipment into the two
countries, and stop using their territories to
encroach on other countries. These obligations
are clear and unconditional. Here, too, Hanoi
has not yet carried out the terms of the Agree-
ment. We expect North Vietnam to withdraw
its forces from Laos and Cambodia in the near
future, and to comply with the other provisions
regarding those countries. As I have stated re-
peatedly, there cannot be stable peace in Viet-
nam until its neighbors are also at peace. The
conflict has been indivisible. The peace must be
too.

Countries outside the region have a strong
interest in the maintenance of peace in Indo-
china. If the flames of conflict flare up again,
there will be renewed suffering for the peoples
of the area, the danger of another war, and a
threat to the improvement of relations among
the major world powers.

Accordingly, we look to outside powers to
lend a moderating influence to the affairs of In-
dochina. This means, first of all, that there

June 4, 1973

749

can be no reasonable justification for sending
Hanoi large arms shipments now that there is
a negotiated settlement. North Vietnam cer-
tainly is not threatened by its neighbors. A
military buildup would raise questions not only
about its intentions, but also about the motiva-
tions of the suppliers. Restraint in the North
on this matter will be matched by restraint
in the South.

Beyond that, we believe that friends of the
Vietnamese belligerents can helpfully under-
line to them the advantages of maintaining the
peace instead of rekindling the war. This will
be our approach. For there cannot be a global
structure of peace while conflict persists in
Indochina.

This is a complex and difficult agenda. Unlike
that of the last dozen years, our role will not
be dominant. But it will remain substantial and
important. And it will require both generosity
and firmness, both patience and vigilance.

America has those qualities and will exercise
them in the interest of peace in the region.

LAOS AND CAMBODIA

There cannot be lasting peace in Vietnam
until its neighbors are at peace.

As of this writing, the situation in both Laos
and Cambodia remains fluid. In Laos, the
parties reached a ceasefire settlement in Feb-
ruary 1973, but the framework is fragile, and
the Communists have delayed negotiations
which were stipulated in the Agreement to
reach a definitive settlement. In Cambodia, the
Communists have stepped up their military
attacks since the Vietnam and Laos ceasefires,
rejecting both the Governinent's unilateral mili-
tary restraint and its call for negotiations. In
both countries, North Vietnam continues to vio-
late the past international agreements to which
it was a party. And in both countries it is now
violating the Vietnam Agreement it signed in
January 1973.

North Vietnam, as well as the other parties
to the Vietnam Agreement, has unambiguous
obligations with respect to Laos and Cambodia.
Article 20 of that Agreement stipulates that:

— The parties participating in the Paris Con-
ference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the
1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the
1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, and shall
respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

— They will undertake to refrain from using
the territory of Cambodia and the territory of

Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and secu-
rity of one another and of other countries.

— Foreign countries shall put an end to all
military activities in Cambodia and Laos,
totally withdraw from and refrain from rein-
troducing into these two countries troops,
military advisers and military personnel, arma-
ments, munitions, and war materiel.

— The internal afi'airs of Cambodia and Laos
shall be settled by the people of each of these
countries without foreign interference.

— The problems existing between the Indo-
chinese countries shall be settled by the Indo-
chinese parties on the basis of respect for each
other's independence, sovereignty, and terri-
torial integrity, and non-interference in each
other's internal affairs.

These provisions are clear. They are not
tied to any other conditions. To date they have
been ignored by Hanoi. Although fighting has
subsided in Laos, attacks there by the North
Vietnamese and their allies continue. In Cam-
bodia, Communist forces have increased their
attacks in a major effort to isolate Phnom Penh
and other population centers. Hanoi has con-
tinued to infiltrate men and supplies into and
through Laos and Cambodia. It gives no sign
of ending this flow or withdrawing its forces
from either country.

The U.S. position is clear. We will not tol-
erate violations of the Vietnam Agreement.
We have every interest in seeing peace ob-
served in Laos and peace attained in Cam-
bodia. The legitimate governments of the two
countries are working toward this end. In both
countries we will honor whatever agreements
are worked out by the peoples themselves.
We firmly intend to implement all the provi-
sions of the Vietnam Agreement, and we insist
that all other parties do so as well.

The Setting and U.S. Policy

Hanoi has always exploited Laos and Cam-
bodia in its conduct of the Vietnam War. It
has etched a similar, distressing pattern in
both of South Vietnam's neighbors in recent
years :

— Neither Laos nor Cambodia has ever
threatened North Vietnam, nor could they
threaten it.

— The neutrality, independence, sovereignty,
and territorial integrity of both countries were
established by international agreements signed
by Hanoi and its allies.

— The North Vietnamese have continually
violated all these principles for years by send-

750

Department of State Bulletin

m\

ing tens of thousands of their troops into both
countries and organizing insurgent forces.

— Hanoi's primary target has been South
Vietnam. It lias used Laos and Cambodia for
infiltration corridors for its troops and sup-
plies, for base areas for launching attacks on
South Vietnam, and for sanctuaries.

— In the process, North Vietnam has also
threatened the neutral governments in Vien-
tiane and Phnom Penh.

— The helpless people of both nations, want-
ing nothing but to be left alone, have been sub-
jected for years to outside aggression and
exploitation.

Given the indivisibility of the Indochina
conflict, our policy toward Laos and Cambodia
has always been closely I'elated to our policy
in Vietnam. A fundamental concern has been
with the Communist use of Laos and Cam-
bodia in pursuit of their main objectives in
South Vietnam. We also have been concerned
with Hanoi's breaking of international agree-
ments on these countries, and we have an
interest in the independence and neutrality of
the states in Southeast Asia.
j Diplomatically, all our negotiating proposals

I on Vietnam have included Laos and Cambodia
as well. The basic elements of our plans, such
as ceasefire, release of American prisoners,
the ban on infiltration and base areas, and the
holding of an international conference con-
cerned all of Indochina. Militarily, we have
provided air and logistic support to the in-
ternationally recognized governments in Vien-
tiane and Phnom Penh. This policy has been
essential to protect the independence of South
Vietnam and to enforce the Indochina aspects
of the Vietnam peace settlement.

In Laos and Cambodia we have never under-
taken the primary role but have confined our
efforts to supporting those of the indigenous
governments. This is tiaie both at the confer-
ence table and on the battlefield :

— We have supported the attempts of the
Laotian and Cambodian Governments to nego-
tiate peace either on their own or as part of
an overall Indochina settlement. In these ef-
forts they have taken the lead and shaped the
nature of the settlements they were seeking.

— While negotiations have been blocked by
Hanoi's intransigence, the Lao and Cambodians
have carried the ground combat responsibility
while we provided military and economic assist-
ance and, at their request, air and logi-stic sup-
port. We also supported South Vietnamese

defensive strikes into North Vietnamese base
areas in these two countries.

— Our role has been, and will continue to be,
strictly limited: no U.S. ground combat per-
sonnel, a minimum American presence overall,
and military support strictly tailoi-ed to the
pressures of the North Vietnamese, the situa-
tion in South Vietnam, and the requests of the
threatened governments.

— Our help has nevertheless been crucial for
the independence of these countries and the

pursuit of our objectives in Vietnam.

I

LAOS I

The United States Government has always
favored a stable peace in Laos and the genuine
independence and neutrality of that nation. Our
objective has been a Laos free of conflict, free
of outside forces, and free to determine its own
future.

We therefore welcome the Agreement on
Laos negotiated and concluded by the Laotian
parties themselves on February 21, 1973. We
hope that this Agreement, coupled with the re-
lated provisions of the Vietnam settlement, will
secure a lasting peace in Laos and finally per-
mit that country to devote itself to the tasks of
reconstruction and development.

.\ Frafiile Peace. In the negotiations on Viet-
nam we took the consistent position that there
should be an early ceasefire in Laos as well as
Vietnam. The shaping of a settlement there
was, of course, up to the parties themselves.
Our friends needed no encouragement from us
to negotiate the end of the conflict, so we
l)ressed in Paris for Hanoi to ensure Pathet
Lao readiness to conclude a settlement.

Negotiations between the Laotian parties be-
gan on September 18, 1972, and ran parallel
to our talks with the North Vietnamese. One
of the issues still not resolved to our satisfac- j
tion in late October in Paris was the prospect I
for early peace in Laos. As we moved toward '
a final settlement for Vietnam, the Laotian |
parties made progress in their talks. By the
time we signed the Vietnam Agreement on
January 27, 1973, we were confident that a
ceasefire in Laos would be achieved within
a matter of weeks, and we knew that our
prisoners captured in Laos would be released
within sixty days. Final obstacles to a Laos
settlement remained, however, when Dr.
Kissinger visited Vientiane, Bangkok, Hanoi,
and Peking in mid-February and accordingly
the Laos situation was a major topic on the
agenda for those visits.

June 4, 1973

751

During this period, the final issues were set-
tled by the Laotian parties and the Agreement
was signed on February 21, 1973. It has the
following main provisions :

— Affirmation of respect for the Geneva Ac-
cords of 1954 and 1962.

—An immediate in-place ceasefire super-
vised by a Joint Military Commission with the
assistance of the current International Con-
trol Commission (ICC), composed of India,
Canada, and Poland.

The formation of a new bipartite coalition

government (the Provisional Government of
National Union) and a consultative political
council within 30 days of the ceasefire. The
two Laotian parties were to negotiate and
agree on the modalities and the exact member-
ship in these bodies during the interim.

—The withdrawal of all foreign forces
within 60 days after the installation of the new
political bodies.

—The release of all POWs within the same
60-day period, except for Americans captured
in Laos who were released within the 60 days
provided for prisoner release under the Viet-
nam Agreement.

—The eventual holding of legislative elec-
tions to be organized by laws adopted by the
new Consultative Council and Provisional Gov-
ernment.

Pending these elections and the formation

of a permanent government of national union,
the separate administration by the two sides
of the areas under their respective control.

Following signature of the Agreement, the
Royal Laotian Government made a maximum
effort to reach final agreement on the protocols
implementing its political and military pro-
visions. The government presented concrete
proposals to the Pathet Lao in order to obtain
agreements on these matters necessary to form
the Provisional Government within the spe-
cified 30-day period and thus speed the with-
drawal of North Vietnamese and other foreign
forces. However, the Laotian Communists
adopted obvious delaying tactics in the imple-
menting talks, including keeping their senior
negotiator away from the conference table for
weeks on end. As a result, the 30-day period
for the establishment of a new government
and a Consultative Council passed without
agreement.

The same pattern persisted on other related
questions such as the talks concerning a Joint
Military Commission and a revitalized ICC.
Meanwhile, in blatant violation of its interna-
tional obligations, North Vietnam has con-

752

tinned its military activities in Laos and
expanded its logistics and base network there,
threatening South Vietnam.

U.S. Support. We have consistently main-
tained the supporting role that the previous
Administrations inaugurated. On the diploma-
tic plane, as already indicated, we have con-
tinually backed Prime Minister Souvanna
Phouma's efforts to negotiate a peace.

In the face of enemy aggression, and in light
of the threats to South Vietnam, we have also
responded to the Laotian government's request
for military and economic assistance. By Con-
gressional action, our total assistance expendi-
tures in Laos were limited to $375 million in
fiscal year 1973. Our economic aid efforts were
devoted primarily to programs for the care of
refugees and the stabilization of the heavily
burdened Laotian economy. Military assistance
involved primarily the delivery of supplies
and equipment to the Laotian forces. These
forces carried the ground combat role and,
even in the air war, the Laotian Air Force
provided much of the air support.

With the conclusion of a ceasefire in Laos,
we look forward toward reductions in U.S. op-
erations and expenditures there. Since the
ceasefire, limited U.S. military activities m
Laos have been conducted at the request of
the government. They were necessitated by
and taken in direct response to North Viet-
namese and Pathet Lao violations of the Laos
ceasefire agreement. Considerable financial
assistance will continue to be needed.

—When requested, and within the provi-
sions of the Agreement, we will provide mili-
tary supplies so that Laotian forces can
maintain a high level of readiness in the

future.

—We will continue an adequate economic
aid program to help the Lao move ahead to
better their conditions and their lives.

—We will include Laos in the overall recon-
struction effort in Indochina which we con-
sider to be an important investment in peace.

Hanoi will largely determine whether the
peaceful people of Laos will at long last gain a
respite from conflict and enjoy a period ot
tranquility and progress. If North Vietnam
and its allies observe the ceasefire in Laos,
move toward completion of a definitive settle-
ment and honor the obligations of both the
Vietnam and Laos settlements, they will find
a forthcoming response from the Royal Laotian
Government and its friends. If they choose in-
stead to maintain an aggressive course, the

Department of State Bulletin

whole fabric of regional peace will be jeo-
pardized.

CAMBODIA

Our objectives and our policies in Cam-
bodia run parallel to those in Laos.

We aim for an independent, neutral and
stable country. We do not insist on any partic-
ular i)olitical orientation, but we believe any
course should be the free choice of the people
themselves, not one imposed by North Viet-
namese arms. Nor should Cambodia be used
as a sanctuary or staging area for Vietnamese
Communist assaults on South Vietnam.

In light of these objectives, we have sup-
ported the Cambodian government. That gov-
ernment favors independence, neutrality, and
stability. It is willing to deal with its indigenous
opponents at the conference table. It is fighting
North Vietnamese aggression not only against
Cambodia but also against South Vietnam.

The Cambodians, like the Lao, are clearly
innocent victims who wish only to live in peace.
Like the Lao they are carrying the brunt of the
battle for their self-defense, while we supply
military and economic assistance and, when
specifically requested, air support.

The Past Year. Since last year's Re))ort.
there has been little progress in Cambodia.
The military picture has remained spotty and
at times precarious. The Khmer armed forces
have managed to contain most enemy thrusts
and maintain control of the major population
centers. How'ever, Communist forces have often
temporarily interdicted key routes and lines
of communication in an attempt to isolate the
urban areas. This has on occasion generated
short-term needs for airlift or special land
and water convoys to bring supplies to the
capital and other cities.

The mixed security situation in Cambodia
should be kept in perspective. Three years ago
many observers thought that it would only be
a matter of months, if not weeks, before the
Communists would topple the Lon Nol govern-
ment. Since then the Cambodian people have
shown courage and resilience against repeated
pressures. The Cambodian army has grown
from a largely ceremonial force of 35,000 in
1970 to some 200,000. most of whom are volun-
teers. It has undertaken an internal reorgani-
zation, further training, and important reforms
to develop its full potential for future self-
defense. Progress in self-defense efforts,
however, has been uneven and needs to be
accelerated.

The crucial ingredient in Cambodia remains
political stability. Since 1970 most of the popu-
lation and opposition leaders have rallied in
opposition to Communist aggression. Politi-
cally, there were both positive and negative
developments during 1972. In the past year,
the Khmer Republic adopted a Constitution,
elected a president and a bicameral legislature,
and put into operation various organs of gov-
ernment provided by the new Constitution.
The government also initiated programs to
improve community self-defense and to encour-
age the return of Khmer who have taken up
arms against it. On the other hand, the lead-
ing non-Communist groups and personalities
have not always worked effectively together
and, at times, they have been openly at odds.
This only serves to undercut morale, jeopardize
the security situation, and prevent the estab-
lishment of an effective base from which to
negotiate with the enemy if the enemy ever
chooses to do so. Greater efforts for a unified
front against the Communists are clearly
needed. Recently, the Lon Nol government
moved to broaden its political base by includ-
ing more of the non-Communist opposition.

The Conlimiing Conflict. In the Vietnam nego-
tiations we pressed very hard for an early
peace in Cambodia to accompany the ceasefires
in Vietnam and Laos. We succeeded in getting
the clearcut provisions for both Laos and Cam-
bodia of Article 20 included in the Vietnam
Agreement. In response to our insistence that
all American prisoners throughout Indochina
be released within sixty days of that Agree-
ment, we were assured that there were no
Americans held captive in Cambodia. But while
we signed the Agreement with the expectation
that there would be an early cessation of hos-
tilities in that country, we did not have the
firm confidence in this prospect that we held
for Laos.

During the final stage of the Paris negotia-
tions, the other side repeatedly pointed out
that the situation in Cambodia was more com-
plex than in Laos because of the many factors
involved and the lack of an established frame-
work for negotiations. However, Communist
actions in the Khmer Republic since the Viet-
nam and Laos Agreements raise serious ques-
tions about Hanoi's professed desire for early
peace in that country.

The signing of the Vietnam Agreement
brought a brief ray of hope to Cambodia. On
.January 28, 1973, the day the Vietnam cease-
fire went into effect, President Lon Nol ordered

June 4, 1973

753

his forces to cease all offensive activities and
urged the enemy to follow suit. He repeated
his willingness to enter into direct negotiations
to turn a de facto ceasefire into a more defini-
tive settlement.

We welcomed these measures, suspended our
own combat air operations in support of the
Khmer forces, and hoped that the North Viet-
namese and the Khmer insurgents would re-
spond favorably. Unfortunately, then — and
since — the Communist side rebufl^ed this ges-
ture and all other efforts by the government to
inaugurate contacts with a view to ending the
fighting.

Instead, Hanoi to date has chosen to pursue
its aggression in Cambodia. Indeed, since the
Vietnam and Laos settlements, Communist
military operations in Cambodia have reached
new levels. Widespread attacks have contin-
ued, chiefly against the important lines of
communications and the population centers. In
light of this situation and at the request of the
Khmer Government, the United States re-
sumed the air operations in Cambodia which
we had suspended in an effort to promote a

ceasefire. The objective of our assistance to
Cambodia is the full implementation of the
Vietnam Accords and an end to the fighting
in Cambodia which threatens the peace in
Vietnam.

The Cambodian Government has repeatedly
declared its desire for a ceasefire and prompt
political negotiations. We are prepared to halt
our military activity in Cambodia as soon as
there is a ceasefire. On the other hand, if Hanoi
still pursues aggression in Cambodia, we will
continue to provide the Khmer Republic with
U.S. air support and appropriate military as-
sistance. We will not introduce U.S. ground
forces into Cambodia.

The Cambodian situation is a serious threat
to the hard-won peace in Vietnam. The only
feasible solution is an end to the conflict and
direct negotiations among the Cambodians
themselves. We fully support the efforts of the
present government to launch this process.

We call on North Vietnam to observe its
solemn pledges in the Vietnam Agreement and
to give the people of both Laos and Cambodia
the chance to live their own lives.

Part III: Strengthening Partnerships

EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The United States has regularly renewed its
commitment to the flourishing of trans-
Atlantic unity with our oldest and closest allies.
I carried this message to Europe immediately
after taking oflfice in 1969. It is a central ele-
ment of this Report to the Congress, for no
aspect of U.S. foreign policy commands greater
attention and care than our relations with
Western Europe.

I have referred to 1973 as the year of Eu-
rope, not because we regarded Europe as less
important in the past or because we expect to
overcome the problems of the Atlantic Com-
munity in any single year. This will be a year
of Europe because changes in the international
environment, and particularly in Europe, pose
new problems and new opportunities.

The alliance between the United States and
Western Europe has been a fundamental factor
in the postwar era. It provided the essential
security framework for American engagement
in Europe and for Western defense. It cre-
ated the political confidence that allowed the

countries of Europe to recover from the dev-
astation of the war. It helped to reconcile
former enemies, a prerequisite for European
unity. And it was the principal means of forg-
ing the common policies that were the source
of Western strength in an era of tension and
confrontation.

When the alliance was created, power rela-
tions, economic factors, and political conditions
were far different than today: traditional
power centers in both Europe and Asia were
greatly weakened, and the United States and
the Soviet Union had emerged with vastly en-
hanced strength and influence as leaders of
hostile coalitions in Europe. Western Eui'ope
looked to America for protection and for lead-
ership. The alliance came to rely on American
prescriptions and became accustomed to ratify-
ing American solutions to the major military,
political, and economic problems.

When this Administration took office, a pe-
riod of transition had begun; new trends af-
fecting America's relations with Europe were
already evident:

754

Department of State Bulletin

— Western Europe's economic and political
revival coincided with deepening divisions in
the Communist world. The bipolar confronta-
tion of the postwar period no longer dominated
international relations. Alliance relationships
in Europe coexisted with increasingly fluid in-
ternational relationships. Both sides of the At-
lantic had to recognize that a new balance of
power in the world would challenge our unity.

— In Europe, as the military vacuum was
filled l)y the strength of the Atlantic coalition,
the danger of war receded. But the altered stra-
tegic environment created totally new problems
of deterrence and defense.

— The European unity forged by the original
six members of the Common Market made
Europe a formidable economic power. Expan-
sion of the European Community to include
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland
added a new political dimension to economic
integration.

In these conditions, America's relations with
the new Europe were bound to change. In the
three fundamental aspects — economic, military,
and political — trans-Atlantic relations had
come to be based on different principles that
led to different modes of action :

— In economics, members of the European
Community, individually and collectively,
stressed regional autonomy, while the United
States remained dedicated to the integrity of an
open international system.

— Militarily unity was the predominant fac-
tor : the NATO allies operated on the principle
of integrated forces and common strategic
planning. But forces designed when the United
States enjoyed an unqualified strategic advan-
tage had not been fully adjusted to the reality
of a more nearly equal strategic balance with
the Soviet Union.

— Politically, the Western Allies shared ab-
stract goals of detente, but we had not devel-
oped new principles to reconcile national
objectives with demands for a unified Western
policy.

Now, America and Europe are challenged to
forge a more mature and viable partnership
in which we cooperate:

— in developing a new and more equitable
international economic system that enables the
Europeans to reinforce their unity, yet pro-
vides equitable terms for the United States to
compete in world markets ;

— in providing a strong defense with the
forces necessary to carry out a realistic strat-

egy in light of the nuclear balance of the
1970's while meeting our mutual defense com-
mitments with an equitable sharing of the
burdens ;

— in building a common framework for di-
plomacy to deal with fundamental security is-
sues— such as mutual and balanced force
reductions — in the new international environ-
ment, reconciling the requirements of unity
with those of national interest.

In the past four years we have progressed
toward these goals. The advances have been
more pronounced in diplomacy and defense
because habits of consultation were long-
standing in these areas and common interests
were easier to define. Fundamental problems
persist in economic relations with the Euro-
pean Community. Though Europeans have be-
gun to pursue a collective economic policy,
their lack of a comparable degree of political
unity handicaps the resolution of economic
issues with the United States.

Atlantic Partnership and European Unity

Throughout the postwar period, the United
States has supported the concept of a unified
Western Europe. We recognized that such a
Europe might be more difficult to deal with,
but we foresaw manifold advantages. Unity
would replace the devastating nationalist ri-
valries of the past. It would strengthen Eu-
rope's economic recovery and expand Europe's
potential contributions to the free world. We
believed that ultimately a highly cohesive
Western Europe would relieve the United
States of many burdens. We expected that
unity would not be limited to economic integra-
tion, but would include a significant political
dimension. We assumed, perhaps too uncrit-
ically, that our basic interests would be assured
by our long history of cooperation, by our
common cultures and our political similarities.

The Economic Dimension. The advance to-
ward the goal we supported for so long has,
in fact, created a new dimension in European-
American relations. Mutual prosperity devel-
oped on the principle of relatively free trade.
As the European Community progressed, how-
ever, it designed policies to protect its ow^n
special interests. Moreover, its growing eco-
nomic weight stimulated other states to protect
their access to that thriving market of more
than 250 million per.sons. The prospect of rela-
tively closed trading systems within Europe,
notably in agriculture, and in preferential

June 4, 1973

755

arrangements with third countries, was pro-
ceeding as the United States was suffering an
increasingly unfavorable balance of payments.

In the area of monetary policy, the Euro-
pean Community has to a large degree been
preoccupied with the search for a reasonable
path toward internal monetary unity. At the
same time, the growing strengths of some of
its national economies — and relative weakness,
of others — have both impeded that progress
and limited the will and ability of Europe to
deal effectively and expeditiously with funda-
mental reform of the international monetary
system.

The Europeans have thus been pursuing eco-
nomic regionalism ; but they want to preserve
American protection in defense and an undi-
minished American political commitment. This
raises a fundamental question : can the princi-
ple of Atlantic unity in defense and security
be reconciled with the European Community's
increasingly regional economic policies?

We have also faced challenges in redefining
our relationships with the other North Ameri-
can member of the Atlantic Alliance — Canada.
Our northern neighbor has been reassessing
its position in the world just as we have been
establishing a new view of our own. Frank
reappraisals of our respective interests have
brought some new problems to the fore, par-
ticularly in economic relations between the two
countries. When I visited Ottawa in April
1972, I reaffirmed with Prime Minister Trudeau
our common belief that mature partners must
have autonomous, independent policies and
explored with him how we might work to-
gether while respecting Canada's right to en-
sure its own identity and to chart its own
economic course.

A Comprehensive Approach. We thus face a
new situation. There are elements of economic
conflict, and there has been a lack of direction.
Concrete economic issues, not abstract princi-
ples, must be addressed. But if economic issues
are confronted in isolation, or from purely
technical perspectives, each party will try to
protect its own narrow commercial interests.
The outcome will be a deadlock, with the pros-
pect of constant conflict.

The overriding task is to develop a broader
political perspective from which we can ad-
dress these economic questions, one that en-
courages reconciliation of differences for the
sake of larger goals. Each partner will have to
subordinate a degree of individual or regional
autonomy to the pursuit of common objectives.
Only by appealing to interests that transcend

regional economic considerations can inevita-
ble deadlocks be broken.

We have begun to move toward a compre-
hensive European-American dialogue. An es-
sential first step was the European decision
on the nature and scope of the relations with
the United States. Last October, the leaders
of the European Community met to chart their
long-term course. The keynote was sounded by
President Pompidou :

Our links with this great country, the world's fore-
most economic power, with which eight of our coun-
tries are united within the Atlantic Alliance, are so
close that it would be absurd to conceive of a Europe
constructed in opposition to it. But the very closeness
of these links requires that Europe affirm its indi-
vidual personality with regard to the United States.
Western Europe, liberated from armies thanks to the
essential contribution of American soldiers, recon-
structed with American aid, having looked for its
security in alliance with America, having hitherto
accepted American currency as the main element of
its monetary reserves, must not and cannot sever its
links with the United States. But neither must it
refrain from affirming its existence as a new reality.

This was an invitation to begin the complex
process of redefining our basic partnership, a
goal we had set in 1969. Accordingly, on Octo-
ber 27, I strongly endorsed the European Com-
munity declaration:

It is, and has always been my own deeply held vfew
that progress toward a unified Europe enhances world
peace, security, and prosperity.

It is also of the highest importance that the United
States and Europe work closely together. For this
reason I particularly welcome the Community's de-
clared intent to maintain a constructive, forthcoming
dialogue with us ... I wish to reaffirm our commit-
ment to work with the members of the European Com-
munity for reform of the international economic system
in a way which will bring about a new freedom of
world trade, new equity in international economic
conduct and effective solutions to the problems of the
developing world.

These are the objectives with which the United
States will approach forthcoming negotiations on mon-
etary and trade reform. We will be prepared to take
bold action with our European partners for a more
equitable and open world economic order.

The stage is now set for comprehensive ne-
gotiations with our European partners. In
effect, these negotiations began in my meetings
with Prime Minister Heath, NATO Secretary
General Luns, Premier Andreotti, and Chan-
cellor Brandt. They will continue when I meet
with President Pompidou and when I visit Eu-
rope later this year.

The issues we face are not abstract. Euro-
pean unity is not at issue. Nor are the require-
ments for common internal and external poli-
cies which reinforce that unity. Our aim is to
examine concrete problems that impinge on the

756

Department of State Bulletin

specific interests of the United States and to
agree on a comprehensive way to resolve these
issues.

Major negotiations will begin next fall on
international trade. Our basic objectives are
to restore the integrity of a more open trading
system that was the underlying principle of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), and to halt the drift toward eco-
nomic protectionism on both sides of the At-
lantic. We believe there should be a gradual
reduction in tariffs and other barriers to trade
in both industrial and agricultural products.
We believe also that the adverse effects of pref-
erential trading arrangements between Europe
and less developed countries should be elimi-
nated. Such arrangements should not work
against the ability of the United States or
others to compete in European markets or
those of the countries with which it has special
trade arrangements.

These, and many broader problems discussed
in the chapter on international economic policy
in this Report, require major reforms. The ne-
gotiations will be protracted and difficult. If,
however, we can confront our economic differ-
ences in the same spirit of partnership devel-
oped in defense, we can reinforce Atlantic
unity.

Alliance Defense

In April 1969 the North Atlantic Alliance
completed its twentieth year. For two decades
the nations of the Atlantic community had been
united in a formidable coalition. No militaiy
alliance in modern times has so successfully
maintained the peace. Unity had come natur-
ally in military affairs because the threats to
Europe were unambiguous, the requirements
to meet them were generally agreed upon, and
the basic strategy of nuclear retaliation was
credible and effective.

By the mid-1 960's, however, it was increas-
ingly clear that military conditions had
changed and that earlier strategic assumptions
were no longer realistic. At the meeting of
NATO foreign ministers in April 1969, I
.stressed the need to reexamine the Alliance's
military position in light of the strategic and
political environment of the 1970's. Certain
factors were of overriding concern:

— The West no longer enjoyed the nuclear
predominance it once posses.sed. The Soviet
Union was greatly expanding its strategic
forces; the United States had ended its build-
ing programs in favor of qualitative improve-
ments. Strategic arms talks, if they succeeded,

would almost certainly codify a balance that
was roughly equal.

— Anticipating this new strategic balance, the
allies had quite correctly developed a new
doctrine of flexible response to meet threats
with means other than immediate and massive
nuclear retaliation.

— In conditions of near strategic parity, the
ability to defend Western Europe with con-
ventional forces assumed far greater signifi-
cance than in the 1950's, when the West could
afford temporary weaknesses because of the
American nuclear guarantee.

In these circumstances, actual alliance per-
formance was inconsistent with the implica-
tions of the strategic balance :

— Despite adoption of a new doctrine, the
composition, levels, and armaments of NATO
forces remained virtually unchanged. Indeed,
with U.S. redeployments in 1968, as well as
previous reductions, the level of NATO forces
had declined.

— Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, on the
other hand, were being reequipped and mod-
ernized. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
the forward deployment of Soviet forces in-
creased by several divisions. Meanwhile, the
United States had withdrawn one and one-
third divisions.

— Spending for defense in the NATO area,
measured in real purchasing power, declined
steadily from 1964 through 1969.

— The distribution of defense costs had
shifted. Manpower absorbed an increasingly
larger share of expenditures while equipment
purchases declined.

— There was no agreement among the allies
on a common level of supplies in critical muni-
tions. Yet, obviously, if certain countries could
sustain combat for only a few days, it was ir-
relevant that others had stocks for much
longer periods.

— There was agreement on the importance
of conventional defense, but a reluctance, es-
pecially in Europe, to give priority to non-
nuclear capabilities. Europe feared that doing
so might imply a weakening of the credibility
of the nuclear deterrent.

In addition, there was concern in the United
States about our heavy commitments to the
Alliance in manpower and expenditure. Critics
persistently asked why the United States could
not reduce its forces in Europe. Moreover,
there was a growing opinion that our Euro-
pean deployments only further aggravated an
already adverse balance of payments.

June 4, 1973

757

This environment of 1969-70 led me to in-
sist on a full-scale review, not only of the
American commitment but also of the Alli-
ance's policies. It was futile to simply debate
whether the United States should cut its forces
by this or that number. The real issues were
whether those forces were the instruments of
an agreed and rational strategy, whether their
presence m»ade an essential difference, and
whether the burdens of commitment were
shared equitably.

Throughout 1969 and 1970 the United States
and its allies engaged in a searching reexami-
nation of defense policy. The principal results,
announced in December 1970, were significant:

— All agreed it was essential to reverse the
trend of declining capabilities and adopt a con-
certed, long-term program to improve existing
conventional forces.

— The European allies agreed to a specific
five-year program to improve and modernize
their own forces by spending more for equip-
ment.

— The Alliance concluded that a commitment
of substantial U.S. forces was indispensable
to Western Europe's defense.

— We, in turn, reaffirmed our commitment
to maintain and improve our own forces in
Europe, given a similar effort by the allies.

Force Improvements. Our European allies in-
creased defense expenditures in both 1971 and
1972. Even allowing for inflation, the net in-
crease was three to four percent. In each year
since 1970, they have committed an additional
$1 billion through the European Defense Im-
provement Program. Their defense budget in-
creases in 1972 were more than $1 billion, and
last December the European Defense Ministers
announced that in 1973 their additional con-
tributions would total $1.5 billion. Since 1970,
the European allies have increased equipment
expenditures by $1.4 billion. During 1971 and
1972 they bought 1,100 main battle tanks, 700
antitank weapons, and 400 modern combat
aircraft, as well as other equipment. This has
been an impressive response in a period of
rising costs and of growing demands of domes-
tic programs.

Sharing the Defense Burden. Improvements
in European forces are the most important
aspect of sharing the defense burden. As al-
most all European defense expenditures are
directly related to NATO, increased European
effort means in practice that the U.S. share is
less. This is an appropriate solution, since the
United States maintains forces to meet global
commitments and therefore devotes a much

higher share of its economic product to defense
than do the Europeans.

There is another aspect of the defense bur-
den, however, that has not been satisfactorily
resolved. Our position is unique in that our
deployments in Europe add significantly to our
general balance of payments deficit. In 1972
the United States spent about $2.1 billion in
other NATO countries to support our NATO
deployments. Allowing for NATO military
spending in the United States, mainly for
equipment and training, our net military defi-
cit was about $1.5 billion. This net deficit has
risen since 1970 and for a variety of reasons,
including the devaluation of the dollar, will
continue to rise.

In previous years, the Federal Republic of
Germany offset a large part of this deficit,
primarily by purchases of military equipment
in the United States. In the current agreement
for 1972-73, the German government also con-
tributed to the costs of rehabilitating the bar-
racks for U.S. forces in Germany.

Nevertheless, the Alliance as a whole should
examine this problem. As a general principle,
we should move toward a lasting solution un-
der which balance of payments consequences
from stationing U.S. forces in Europe will not
be substantially different from those of main-
taining the same forces in the United States.
It is reasonable to expect the Alliance to ex-
amine this problem this year. Eliminating the
periodic requirement to renegotiate a tempo-
rary arrangement with only one ally would
strengthen the solidarity of the Alliance as a
whole.

The Role of United States Forces. The efforts
undertaken by our allies since 1970 are the
basis for my pledge to maintain our NATO
commitments. At the NATO Council meeting
last December, I reaffirmed my position:

In light of the present strategic balance and of sim-
ilar efforts by our allies, we will not only maintain but
improve our forces in Europe and will not reduce them
unless there is reciprocal action by our adversaries.

This pledge rests on a fundamental view, as
valid today as it has been since World War 11,
that the security of Western Europe is in-
separable from our own.

The conditions of this decade require the i
United States to maintain substantial forces
in Europe. In conditions of near strategic \
parity, a strong capability to defend with non-
nuclear forces becomes increasingly impor-
tant; the United States contributes about one-
quarter of NATO's forces in Europe's vital
central region, though our allies' proportionate

758

Department of State Bulletin

share of forces in the entire European NATO
area is far higher.

The balance of conventional forces in the
center of Europe would be seriously upset by
the unilateral withdrawal of a substantial num-
ber of U.S. forces. Unless our reductions were
completely replaced by European forces, de-
terrence would be weakened. In the event of
hostilities, a weaker conventional defense could
confront the Alliance with the choice of either
capitulating or using nuclear weapons imme-
diately.

Defense cooperation within Europe may be
a long-term alternative to the American troop
contribution. But the prerequisite for such an
alternative is a far greater degree of European
political unity. Yet even if such unity develops,
it is unlikely that the Europeans alone could
maintain a strategic balance against the enor-
mous nuclear power of the Soviet Union.

In short, disengaging our forces would risk
serious instability in Europe, the consequences
of greatly enhanced Soviet influence, and the
dangerous implications of a greater reliance
on nuclear weapons. If, on the other hand, we
and our allies maintain our strength, we can
contribute to political stability, reduce the like-
lihood of war, and conduct a credible diplomacy
to negotiate a mutual reduction of forces.

We cannot enter serious negotiations if, at
the outset, we or our allies allow our positions
to weaken. I intend to maintain an effective
American military contribution to the alliance
and to pursue negotiations for a mutual force
reduction that will create a viable balance in
which the incentives for attack are effectively
eliminated.

Unfinished Tasks. In the past four years the
Alliance has diagnosed some fundamental
weaknesses and agreed on remedies. In 1971
and 1972 we embarked on a concerted effort
to improve our forces. The immediate and,
in many ways, the most urgent problem has
been faced. We are now in a position to ex-
amine more systematically some of the longer-
term issues :

—In the later 1970's, all allies will face the
enormous expense of maintaining more sophis-
ticated equipment, paying larger costs for
personnel, and maintaining a high degree of
combat readiness while national conscription
may be eliminated or the terms of service
reduced.

— In these circumstances, it is essential to
define more precisely what we mean by an
adequate NATO defense. Specifically, what do
we mean by forward defense? Should we plan

for maximum effort during some initial period
of combat? Should we plan for a sustained
effort over a longer period? If so, for what
purpose? Can we maintain the logistical sup-
port for a sustained defense?

— If we can maintain the high level of conven-
tional defense that is our goal, we still must
examine our nuclear doctrines. When, in what
way, and for what objective should we use
tactical nuclear weapons? How do independent
national nuclear forces affect Alliance deci-
sions? Do we require different institutions to
examine such overriding issues within the
Alliance?

— What is the relationship between existing
and planned defense programs and the diplo-
matic effort to reduce forces?

The answers to these questions are vital to
Alliance policy in the 1970's. They require
urgent but careful consideration. The United
States believes that a strong conventional de-
fense is essential to credible deterrence and
that the Alliance must also possess a credible
nuclear deterrent. But in the strategic condi-
tions of this decade these issues must be re-
examined, and the contribution of each ally
determined for the long term.

In particular, the prospect of mutual and
balanced force reductions in Central Europe
raises some immediate questions for the Alli-
ance. Mutual force reductions are first of all
a military problem ; specific reductions must
be measured against their effect on our defense
capabilities. We therefore need a common se-
curity concept within which we can contem-
plate some reductions. If we justify force re-
ductions as part of a political accommodation,
or as a means to promote detente, the Alliance
will be involved in endless debate over what
level of reductions will produce what degree
of political relaxation. In such a debate, it
would be almost impossible to find an answer
that would satisfy everyone and that would
not undermine security.

Our objective should be to create a military
balance that is more viable because it deals
with the concerns of both sides and is seen by
all to be in the common interest. We want a
greater degree of stability, in which neither
side gains an advantage because of lower force
levels.

The Alliance should thus proceed on three
parallel courses : first, to continue the effort to
bring our forces to the level and quality re-
quired by the doctrine of flexible response;
second, to review the strategic options involved
in conducting a nuclear defense if necessary;

June 4, 1973

759

and third, to prepare within the Alliance a
military-political framework that integrates
defense planning with the diplomacy of nego-
tiating mutual and balanced force reductions.

Alliance Diplomacy. Through most of the
1960's, the problem of reconciling allied unity
with national diplomacy was not critical. East-
West relations were virtually frozen. Confron-
tation required less in the way of creative
initiative, but put a premium on allied unity.

This broad cohesion and strength of the
Alliance contributed to the changing interna-
tional conditions that in turn offered a new
opportunity for Alliance diplomacy in 1969.
But important political problems also emerged.

— International diplomacy is still conducted
by nation states. The European members of
NATO have regional security interests, which
they must accord priority, and each ally has a
national stake in European security. Increas-
ingly in recent years, however, individual Euro-
pean states have pursued their bilateral rela-
tions with the Soviet Union as well as with
other members of the Warsaw Pact.

— The United States has vital interests out-
side of Europe, and must deal bilaterally with
the Soviet Union on strategic matters and on
many global issues. Each member of NATO,
however, has an interest in, and is affected by,
the development of U.S.-Soviet relations; our
allies wish to influence our relations with the
Soviet Union to strengthen their own security.
At times our allies have urged the United
States to be more flexible in approaches to the
Soviet Union; in other periods, they have
criticized us for moving too fast or too far in
relations with Moscow.

In 1969, the NATO allies were persuaded
that new initiatives were required but, in the
wake of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, were
uncertain whether to renew contacts with the
East. Some allies regarded a European Secu-
rity Conference as a possible starting point;
others urged negotiations on force reductions.
The United States was preparing for strategic
arms limitation talks. Unless we would agree
on a common strategy, no substantial progress
could be expected that did not strain our unity.
Accordingly, in April 1969, I urged the Alliance
to revive the process of close consultations and
committed the United States to continuing
Alliance review of SALT. Consultations would
address certain general tasks.

First, we needed to identify the specific sour-
ces of tensions that might be resolved.

Second, we had to agree on how to manage

the priorities and interrelationship among ma-
jor issues: those of primary concern to one
country, for example West Germany's Eastern
policy; those of regional concern, such as mu-
tual force reductions and a European security
conference; and those of international concern,
such as SALT.

Third, we had to recognize that issues would
be dealt with by different countries in different
forums. Such diversity required an essential
harmonization of purposes as well as a degree
of national autonomy.

Initial Progress. The United States urged
that the Alliance take the initiative in propos-
ing negotiations on Berlin as an essential first
step. Berlin was a natural starting point for
several reasons. It was a source of recurrent
confrontations. If the Soviet Union chose, it
could continue exploiting the vulnerability of
West Berlin's access routes across East Ger-
many to exert pressure against West Germany
and the three Western Powers. On the other
hand, there was no objective reason why the
Soviet Union could not permit practical im-
provements in travel to Berlin if, as it claimed,
it had a serious interest in a relaxation of Euro-
pean tensions. If we could not resolve this one
specific issue, there was little prospect of re-
solving broader security questions.

Thus, the negotiations over Berlin were an
initial opportunity to explore whether East-
West relations could move away from the rigid-
ities of the Cold War. Moreover, the Federal
Republic of Germany had embarked on an
Eastern policy to normalize its relations with
the Soviet Union. Ultimately, the Federal Re-
public's ratification of its August 1970 treaty
with the Soviet Union became dependent on the
success of the Berlin negotiations being con-
ducted by the United States, the United King-
dom, France, and the Soviet Union.

In September 1971, the first part of a Berlin
agreement was reached. Unimpeded access be-
tween West Germany and West Berlin was
guaranteed by the Soviet Union, without affect-
ing the rights and resi^onsibilities of the three
Western powers in Berlin. The Agreement pro-
vided for subsequent negotiations between the
Federal Republic, the West Berlin government,
and East Germany over the modalities of ac-
cess to Berlin and travel from West Berlin to
East Berlin and East Germany. During my
meeting with the Soviet leaders in May 1972, it
was agreed that the final Protocol, bringing all
parts of the Berlin agreements into effect,

760

Department of State Bulletin

would be signed on June 3, 1972. The West
German government, following iiarliamentary
ajiproval of the treaties with the Soviet Ihiion
and Poland, proceeded to bring them into force,
opening the way for it to negotiate a general
treaty regulating relations with East Germany.

These iiast four years have been a period of
active European and international diplomacy.
In addition to the Berlin agreement and the
German treaties, France agreed on a set of
principles for political consultations with the
Soviet Union. Canada agreed on a somewhat
similar arrangement during Premier Kosygin's
visit. West Germany and Italy negotiated long-
term economic agreements with the Soviet
Union. There have been several summit meet-
ings between Soviet and West European
leaders. And the United States agreed with the
Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations,
measures of bilateral cooperation, and some
basic principles governing our relations.

In sum, the allies have intensified their na-
tional diplomacy within a framework of unity.
But the very success of the past four years has
created some new problems. Each of the Euro-
pean countries will want to continue the devel-
oi)ment of its own bilateral economic and
political relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. The United States also wishes
to pursue the favorable trends that have devel-
oped in our relations with the Soviet Union.
Each of our allies naturally wants a major
voice in negotiations affecting Europe as a
whole, and in those aspects of Soviet-American
relations that affect international stability.

Two specific issues will test the ability of the
Western coalition to reconcile its unity with its
diversity: the Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe and the negotiations on
mutual and balanced force reductions.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. In March 1969, the Warsaw Pact
revived its j^roposal to convene a European Se-
curity Conference. Such a conference would be
largely symbolic; its purpose would be to con-
firm the territorial and political status quo in
Europe. There was some feeling in the West
that this proposal should be accepted ; it was
thought that it might be a way to dissipate the
tensions over the invasion of Czechoslovakia in
August 1968 and to test Soviet policy. Some
viewed it as a way of creating a better atmos-
phere for subsequent talks, while others saw it
as a link to more specific issues, such as force
reductions.

We were skeptical about symbolic acts that
failed to deal with the substance of East-West
tensions. The urgent issues of European se-
curity were the tensions over Berlin and Ger-
many and the military confrontation in Central
Europe. We could not hand over our responsi-
bilities in Berlin to a European conference. If
we could not make progress on a central issue
such as Berlin, the results of a broad conference
w^ould be illusory. To stimulate an atmosphere
of detente through symbolic gestures could only
lead to disillusionment and insecurity.

The United States, therefore, took the posi-
tion that a European conference would only be
acceptable if there was progress on specific
issues, including the Berlin negotiations. A con-
ference might be appropriate if individual
countries succeeded in regulating their rela-
tions and resolving some of their territorial and
political issues.

This was accomplished by West Germany's
treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland, the
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the
SALT agreements. At my summit meeting with
the Soviet leaders in May 1972, I agreed that
we now could begin preparing for a European
Conference with the aim of broadening Euro-
pean cooperation.

Preparatory talks began last November to
find out whether there was sufficient common
ground to justify a conference of Foreign Min-
isters. A provisional agenda is being developed,
which the Foreign Ministers could consider.
Progress thus far suggests that the conference
can be convened this year and that it may be
possible to move forward on several important
questions.

— The i)articipants will address certain prin-
ciples of security and cooperation. If all Euro-
pean countries subscribe to common principles
of conduct, and carry them out in practice, there
could be a further relaxation of tensions. Cer-
tain military security matters designed to im-
prove confidence will also be considered.

— The conference would be an appropriate
forum to discuss practical cooperation in eco-
nomics, cultural exchange, science, and technol-
ogy, on which there has already been progress
in bilateral relations.

— The conference can consider how to facili-
tate contacts among the peoples of Europe and
how to encourage countries to exchange ideas
and information.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation

June 4, 1973

761

in Europe thus can set a new tone for European
relations and establish new modes of conduct
and means of cooperation. These would be prac-
tical steps toward normal relations.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, The
exchanges leading up to the conference also
acted as a bridge to negotiations on a more
specific and central security issue — mutual and
balanced force reductions in Central Europe.
The prospects for arms control in Europe are
obviously linked to political improvements be-
tween East and West. Throughout the 1950's
and 1960's there were proposals for arms con-
trol in Europe. But it was unrealistic to expect
to negotiate a reduction of forces — for example,
in Germany, where there were almost contin-
uous crises over Berlin. Moreover, the reduction
of military forces in Central Europe was related
to the strategic balance between the United
States and Soviet Union and to the political
situation within the Warsaw Pact.

For these reasons, the NATO proposals of
June 1968 to begin negotiations on force reduc-
tions were received coolly by the Warsaw Pact.
Not until the Berlin and SALT agreements
were concluded in 1972 was it possible to work
out a sequence for beginning negotiations in
separate forums on a Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe and on mutual and
balanced force reductions.

The initial talks on mutual and balanced
force reductions, now underway in Vienna, will
lay the groundwork for more formal negotia-
tions next fall. The military and arms control
aspects of force reductions are treated in other
sections of this Report. Certain points that af-
fect Atlantic political unity should be sum-
marized.

Perhaps more than any other single issue,
the problem of force reductions crystallizes the
basic issue of reconciling Alliance unity and
national diversity. We will need an unprece-
dented degree of unity on fundamental military
and political security questions. The outcome
of the negotiations will affect the entire Alli-
ance, regardless of who sits at the table or
which forces are reduced. Indeed, the very
process of negotiating will test our common
purposes.

Each member brings to this issue strongly
held national viewpoints. We must avoid efforts
to protect national interests by procedural de-
vices or tactical solutions. That approach would
merely defer or avoid the hard questions. Ul-
timately it will be disruptive and open the Alli-

ance to exploitation by the other side. Our goal
must be agreement on basic security principles.
We must meet individual national concerns
within a common concept of security, and forth-
rightly address the question of how to maintain
our security at reduced force levels. The issues
are highly sensitive, and Alliance discussions
will be painstaking and difficult.

The United States is engaged in the most
serious consultations with our allies to prepare
for negotiations later this year. Force reduc-
tions in Central Europe are, of course, an ele-
ment of the complex of U.S.-Soviet relations.
The U.S. and Soviet forces are comparable in
that they are not indigenous to Central Europe
and might be candidates for reduction.

The United States will not subordinate the
security of the Alliance to Soviet-American re-
lations. We are aware of European concerns
in this regard. Repeated American reassur-
ances, however, have not alleviated these con-
cerns. Mutual confidence within the Alliance
will develop only through an agreement on the
basic security framework for the negotiations.

Relations With Eastern Europe

The improvement in our relations with the
Soviet Union during 1972 has created a better
atmosphere for our relations with the countries
of Eastern Europe. But we do not regard our
relations with any East European countries as
a function of our relations with Moscow. We
reject the idea of special rights or advantages
for outside powers in the region. We welcomed
and responded to opportunities to develop our re-
lations with the East European countries long
before the Moscow Summit. And we shall con-
tinue to seek ways to expand our economic,
scientific, technological, and cultural contacts
with them. Mutual benefit and reciprocity are
governing principles.

As the postwar rigidity between Eastern and
Western Europe eases, peoples in both areas ex-
pect to see the benefits of relaxation in their
daily lives. These aspirations are fully justified.
An era of cooperation in Europe should produce
a variety of new relationships not just between
governments but between organizations, insti-
tutions, business firms, and people in all walks
of life. If peace in Europe is to be durable, its
foundation must be broad.

My visits to Romania in 1969, Yugoslavia in
1970, and Poland in 1972 were designed to help
open the door to these broader relationships.

762

Department of State Bulletin 1

Durinp my visit to Warsaw last June, I
agrreed witli the Polish leaders to increased U.S.-
Polish trade and exchanges in science, technol-
ogy, culture, tourism, and transportation. A
joint American-Polish trade commission has
been established. After our governments had
reciprocally agreed to export financing arrange-
ments, I determined that Export-Imi)ort Bank
credits should be made available for trans-
actions with Poland. Other agreements to facil-
itate trade, increase exchanges in science and
technology', and improve consular facilities also
have been signed.

Secretary of State Rogers' visit in July to
Yugoslavia reaffirmed our long-standing and
cordial relationship with that important non-
aligned country. Its independence, political sta-
bility, and economic well-being are key factors
for continuing peace in Europe.

Romania's desire for close and mutually bene-
ficial relations has led during the past three
years to ])ractical cooperation and to helpful
consultations, including my visit to Bucharest
and President Ceausescu's trip to Washington.
Last year we approved the extending of guaran-
tees to private investment in Romania, and I
continue to hope that the Congress will provide
authority to extend Most Favored Nation tariff
treatment to that country. In December we
signed the most comprehensive cultural and
scientific exchange agreement in the history of
our relations with Romania.

Last summer Secretary Rogers signed consul-
ar conventions with both Romania and Hun-
gary. His visit to Budapest and the subsequent
settlement of the long-standing United States
claims against Hungary have improved pros-
pects for more normal relations.

We remain ready to establish constructive
relationships on a reciprocal basis with all
countries in Eastern Europe. Differences in
I' social, economic, and political systems exist, and
must be acknowledged frankly. But they will
not bar our cooperation with any country that
seeks it.

The Outlook

In 1972, the face of world politics changed
dramatically. But one constant factor in this
changing pattern has been the close relation-
ship among the Atlantic allies. It has been true,
however, that as the relaxation of East-West
tensions became more pronounced, some of our
allies questioned whether the United States

June 4, 1973

would remain committed to Europe or would
instead i)ursue a new balance of power in which
the older alignments would be diluted and dis-
tinctions between allies and adversaries would
disapi)ear. Ai)])rehensions may be inevitable in
a period of great international change after a
long period of confrontation. As relations be-
tween adversaries are ameliorated, those not
directly involved tend to worry that their own
interests are somehow subordinate to new re-
lationships.

But the United States will never compromise
the security of Europe or the interests of our
allies. The best reassurance of our unity, how-
ever, lies not in verbal pledges but in the knowl-
edge of agreed purposes and common policies.
For almost a decade the Alliance has debated
questions of defense and detente — some urging
one course, others a difl!"erent priority. Now the
debates should end. We must close ranks and
chart our course together for the decade ahead.
There is an obvious agenda for Alliance action.

— The United States supports European
unity, as we always have. But now we need to
define together the basis of cooperative eco-
nomic relations between the United States and
the European Community in this decade. To do
this, we need a new affirmation of our common
goals, to give political direction to our economic
negotiations and promote cooperative solutions.

— The United States will maintain its forces
in Europe. We will not withdraw unilaterally.
But together we need to agree on our common
defense requirements and on the contributions
each ally and the Alliance collectively must
make to preserve our security in new conditions.

— We need a concerted strategy for dealing
with security and diplomatic issues of common
concern, in whatever forum these are pursued.

— In the 1970's we face new common issues,
such as ensuring the supply of energy resources
for industrialized nations. This must be a new
area of our cooperation.

1973 is the year of Europe because of the
historic opportunities we face together. The
United States, Canada, and Western Europe
have a decisive contribution to make to a heal-
thy world economy and to a new peaceful in-
ternational order. These are new creative tasks
for our partnership.

JAPAN

Today we see a new Japan. Her emergence

763

is one of the most striking new features of the
international landscape of the 1970's and one
of the most dramatic transformations since the
period following the Second World War. To
speak of Japan's phenomenal economic per-
formance has long been commonplace. Less
noted, more recent — and of fundamental im-
portance— is the impact of this power on the
international political order. This is a challenge
for Japanese policy, for American policy, and
for the alliance that binds us together.

— In the economic dimension, Japan is a su-
perpower. By 1968 she was the world's third
greatest industrial nation, and she may become
the second greatest within a decade's time. Her
rate of real growth annually in the 1960's was
11.3 percent, the fastest of any industrial nation.
She impacts upon the world as a trading power
of enormous strength: over the period 1968-
1971 her exports grew faster than 20 percent
per year. In 1971, she ran an extraordinary
trade surplus of $4.1 billion with the United
States, $1 billion with the European Commu-
nity, and $9 billion with the world as a whole.
A chronic imbalance of such scale could not
fail to have implications for the stability and
equity of the international economic system.

— In her foreign economic policy, while not
in her diplomacy and security policy, Japan be-
gan as early as the mid-19.50's to move out in-
dependently. Her economic assistance to the de-
veloping world is second only to that of the
United States, and more than a third of it is in
the form of credits tied to Japanese exports.
Japan has long had trade relations with the
major Communist powers. Unofficial Japanese
trading relationships existed with the People's
Republic of China as early as 19.52, and Japan
had an unofficial trade office in Peking by 1964;
by 1971, when American trade with the Peo-
ple's Republic was still negligible, Sino-Japa-
nese trade was $900 million. Japan signed a
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the
Soviet Union in 1957, which has been the basis
for a series of subsequent trade agreements; in
recent years they have begun cooperation in
the development of Siberian resources — an eco-
nomic relationship of great potential. While the
United States held back from East- West trade,
Japan staked out for herself a role in bridging
the gap between East and West with her eco-
nomic ties.

— It was inevitable that these economic rela-
tions would develop into political ties, particu-
larly in the new atmosphere of detente. Japan
has moved actively in this direction in the past

two years. Prime Minister Tanaka's historic
visit to Peking in September 1972 led to the
establishment of full diplomatic relations, again
putting formal Sino-Japanese ties at a more ad-
vanced stage than Sino-American relations,
while she still maintains her extensive economic
ties with Taiwan. Japan and the Soviet Union
reopened discussions in 1972 of a possible final
peace treaty and territorial settlement, in the
interest of normalization of their political re-
lations. Prime Minister Tanaka will shortly
match his visit to Peking with a visit to Mos-
cow. Japan has now moved out in many direc-
tions into the arena of complex geopolitical
relationships among the major powers.

— Japan has accelerated and broadened her
political involvement in Asia in particular. She
extended recognition to Mongolia and Bangla-
desh in advance of the United States, as did a
number of other nations. She has taken a spe-
cial interest in the security and diplomacy of
the Korean peninsula, and in postwar recon-
struction in Indochina, opening in the process a
dialogue with North Vietnam. She takes a
greater part today in regional institutions. Asia
is the focus of her economic assistance to the
developing world. It is an active diplomacy of
Asian involvement, after a generation.

— Japan has now come into increasing inter-
change with the world beyond Asia and the
Pacific, both as a participant and as a com-
petitor. The communiques of my summit meet-
ings with Prime Ministers Sato and Tanaka
reflected our review of global problems, includ-
ing ai-ms control and East-West diplomacy.
Japan's economic expansion has brought her
increasingly into the markets of Europe and
Latin America. Her political contacts with Eu-
I'ope are steadily expanding; in September, for
example, Prime Minister Heath became the first
British Prime Minister to visit Japan, and
Prime Minister Tanaka plans a return visit
this fall. Japan's dependence on Middle East oil
has given her a special interest in the energy
problem. Her participation in United Nations
diplomacy has grown more active, and she has
shown interest in claiming a permanent seat on
the Security Council as a major power.

— In the security field, Japan has for years
relied on her Treaty with the United States and
on the American nuclear deterrent, which freed
resources and energies that would otherwise
have been required for defense. But she has
steadily improved her own conventional de-
fenses, emphasizing modernization rather than
size, upgrading her forces in firepower, mo-

764

Department of State Bulletin

bility, and anti-submarine warfare and air
defense capability. Her Fourth Defense Plan,
for 1972-197(i, doubles the expenditure of her
Third Plan. This still rei)resents less than one
percent annually of her Gross National Product,
while this Gross National Product has been
growing at over ten percent a year. With the
reversion of Okinawa, Japanese forces have
now moved southward to take over its defense.
These are important steps toward self-reliance
and improved capacity for conventional de-
fense of all Jai)anese territory.

This was an inevitable evolution.

There was no way that Japan and Japan's
role in the world could go unaffected by the
profound transformation of the international
order over the last 25 years. All our alliances
have been affected. The recovery and rejuve-
nation of allies has eroded the rigid bipolar sys-
tem and given all our allies greater room for in-
dependent action. The easing of the Cold War
military confrontation has brought other as-
pects of power — economic, in particular — to
the forefront of the international political stage.
U.S. military protection no longer suffices as
the principal rationale for close partnership
and cooperation. In every allied country, leader-
ship has begun to ijass to a new generation
eager to assert a new national identity at home
and abroad.

Japan's emergence is a political fact of enor-
mous importance. Japan is now a major factor
in the international system, and her conduct
is a major determinant of its stability.

As I have indicated in each of my previous
Foreign Policy Reports, ■? have been concerned
since the beginning of this Administration that
our alliance relations with Japan had to keep
in step with these new conditions. We are
faced with new responsibilities toward each
other and toward the world. We are challenged
to respond to this evolution creatively and to-
gether, to keep our alliance on a firm basis in
a new era.

For the U.S.-Japanese alliance remains cen-
tral to the foreign policies of both countries.
We are two major jiowers of the free world,
interdependent to an extraordinary degree for
our prosperity and our security. The United
States therefore places the highest possible
value upon this partnership, as it has for more
than two decades.

In this year of new commitment to strength-
ening our ties with Western Europe, I am

June 4, 1973

determined no less to strengthen our alliance
with Japan.

Our Alliance and Its Evolution

In 1969, when I came into office, the challenge
of new conditions presented itself concretely in
the issue of Okinawa. For 25 years since the
war, the United States had retained the ad-
ministrative rights to Okinawa to protect mili-
tary installations there which were, and still
are, vitally important to the defense of East
and Southeast Asia. By the mid-1960's, how-
ever, the Japanese had come to feel strongly
that our continued administration of Okinawa
was inconsistent with Japan's national dignity
and sovereignty. We risked a crisis in our re-
lations if we did not respond.

Therefore, I made the basic choice: our long-
term relationship with Japan was clearly our
fundamental interest. Accordingly, at my sum-
mit meeting with Prime Minister Sato in No-
vember 1969, we announced our agreement on
the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese adminis-
tration by 1972. The United States could con-
tinue to use such facilities there as the two
countries agi'eed were required for mutual se-
curity, but subject to the same terms as facil-
ities elsewhere in Japan. At the same time, in
the communique of that summit meeting, Japan
and the United States declared more explicitly
than ever before our joint commitment to ac-
tive cooperation in diplomacy and security in
the Far East, and in economic relations bi-
laterally and worldwide.

Thus in 1969 the United States acknowledged
the new Japan. Our two governments addressed
an outstanding problem, treated it as a common
problem, and solved it. We reaffirmed our es-
sential unity of purpose. In 1970, when the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
became technically subject to review, neither
government raised any doubt about its con-
tinuing validity and importance.

But the adjustment we made in 1969 proved
to be only the beginning of a complex process
of transition in our relations.

For twenty years we had achieved common
policies in the areas of East-West diplomacy,
economics, and mutual security with relative
ease. It is clear today that this was in part the
product of unique conditions in the postwar
period that are no longer with us. An adjust-
ment in all our alliance relationships was in-
evitable. Today, the harmony of our policies is
far from automatic. We and all our allies have
a heavy resi)onsibility to proceed from an un-

765

derstanding of both the positive and the nega-
tive possibilities of our independent action.

It was also inevitable that this transition into
a new political environment would pose a par-
ticular challenge for Japan.

The character of our alliance had been shaped
in the period of Japanese dependence. Defeat
in war had shattered her economy, political sys-
tem, and national confidence. Occupation, the
Cold War, and Japan's own renunciation of of-
fensive military capability put her in the po-
sition of almost total reliance on our military
protection. Japan accepted American leader-
ship and only gradually came to take part in
international diplomacy.

This was not an uncomfortable arrangement
then for either the United States or Japan. The
United States in the postwar period assumed
the role and bore the responsibilities which our
preponderant power gave us. We acted as the
protector and champion of a network of allian-
ces locked in rigid confrontation with the Com-
munist world — as the leader, senior partner,
and chief actor. Japan found this arrangement
consistent with her own objectives — not only
in the conditions of her postwar weakness but
even for a time as she recovered her political
and economic vitality. By geography and his-
tory, unlike most of our European allies, Japan
was a late-comer to global multilateral diplo-
macy. Even in the twentieth century, her focus
has been in the Pacific. The conditions she faced
after World War II inevitably caused her to
gear her policy and policy making structure to
the needs of economic recovery and expansion.

By the time I came into ofiice, an alliance re-
lationship of this character — which was suited
to postwar conditions and had served us both
well — needed adjustment.

Japan's resurgence from a recipient of Amer-
ican aid into a major economic power and com-
petitor was bound to aflfect the external political
framework which had helped make it possible.
In her dealings with the United States, in par-
ticular, Japan no longer needed or could afford
an almost exclusive concentration on her eco-
nomic advancement or a habit of acting as a
junior partner. She still enjoyed the special
advantage that her reliance on the United
States for her security freed resources for her
economic expansion. The political relationships
which continued to safeguard her would re-
quire greater reciprocity in her economic re-
lations.

Moreover, Japan was no longer just a re-

766

gional Pacific power dependent on the United
States in the broader diplomatic field. Europe,
Asia, North and South America, and Africa
were now part of one vast arena of multilateral
diplomacy in which Japan was a major factor.
Japan was already acting autonomously in an
expanding sphere. Her power now brought her
new responsibilities. The weight of her eco-
nomic involvement in the world — her stake in
the free world's economic system, her extensive
aid programs, and her growing economic ties
with Communist powers — would require that
she make her decisions on broader policy
grounds than economic calculations. We and
Japan, as allies, would have to face up to the
problem of keeping our independent policies
directed at common objectives.

These are the fundamental developments I
have sought to address over the last four years.
I have sought to adapt our partnership to these
transformed conditions of greater equality and
multipolar dijjlomacy. My three meetings with
Japanese Prime Ministers, my decision on Oki-
nawa, our discussions of new cooperation in the
Far East and in bilateral and multilateral eco-
nomic areas, and our policies toward China
— were all part of this.

The intimacy of the postwar U.S.-Japanese
alliance, however, inevitably gave Japan a spe-
cial sensitivity to the evolution of United States
foreign policy. We thus found the paradox that
Japan seemed to feel that her reliance on us
should limit change or initiatives in American
policy, even while she was actively seeking new
directions in many dimensions of her own pol-
icy. But our abandoning our paternalistic style
of alliance leadership meant not that we were
casting Japan or any ally adrift, but that we took
our allies more seriously, as full partners. Our
recognizing the new multipolarity of the world
meant not a loss of interest in our alliances,
but the contrary — an acknowledgement of the
new importance of our allies. American initia-
tives, such as in China policy or economic pol-
icy, were not directed against Japan, but were
taken in a common interest or in a much
broader context — and in some cases in response
to Japanese policies.

The underlying basis of our unity endured.
The very centrality of the alliance in Japanese
policy was at the heart of the problem. But
Japan had to face the implications of her new
independence and strength just as the United
States was seeking to do. And until this psycho-
logical adjustment was fully made by both
sides, anomalies in our relations were bound

Department of State Bulletin

to persist.

This is the background to the events of the
I)ast two years and the current i)ublic issues
facing the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

The Issues on Our Common Agenda

The Economic Dimension. The most urgent
issue in U.S.-Japanese relations today is eco-
nomic— the enormous imbalance in our bilateral
trade. We must reduce this imbalance to man-
ageable size in the earliest possible timeframe.

' As Prime IMinister Tanaka has recognized,

this is not merely an American problem; it is
also a Japanese problem. This is not only be-
cause persistent disputes over these economic
issues threaten to disrupt the political relations
that hold our alliance together; the imbalance
is a threat to a stable international system in
which Japan herself has a major stake. In
1972, Japan's trade was in surplus with all the
major industrial nations of the world. As long
as the United States remains the largest single
factor in international trade and the dollar is

1 still the principal factor in the monetary struc-
ture, the disequilibrium of the American posi-
tion, in i)articular, is a chronic problem of the
world system. The United States therefore
seeks cooperative solutions, bilaterally and mul-
tilaterally, to build a new stable and open sys-
tem of world monetary and trade relations.

The responsibility that falls on Japan as the
free world nation with the strongest trading
position is necessarily heavy.

The challenge to leadership on all sides is to
give firm political direction to our economic re-
lations because of the broader objectives that
are at stake. Organizationally, on all sides,
there is a tendency for actions to be taken or
policies to be established from the viewpoint of
a purely economic national interest or under
pressure from particular domestic economic in-
terests. This has only resulted in destabilizing
both our economic and our political relations,
and we can no longer afford it.

■I The U.S.-Japanese bilateral economic rela-

'' tionship is at the heart of the issue, it is extraor-
dinary in its scale, importance, and interde-
pendence. The Gross National Product of the
United States and Japan together is 40 percent
of the total Gross National Product of the world.
Trade between us totalled $12.-5 billion in 1972.
Japan is our most important trading partner
in the world aside from Canada. Our economic
policies, internal and global, necessarily affect
each other bilaterally to a profound degree.
On August 15, 19*71, the United States took

a number of unilateral economic steps which
inevitably had a particular impact on Japan.
They were emergency measures, forced upon
us by a monetary crisis ; for their focus was on
putting our own house in order and in setting
the stage for international reform. The meas-
ures which ai)plied to our external relations
were nondiscriminatory, affecting all our trad-
ing partners. The resolution of the crisis could
only be achieved multilaterally, by cooperation
among all the major economic nations, as was
accomplished at the Smithsonian in December
1971. Coming a month after the China an-
nouncement, however, these measures intensi-
fied the fears of many on both sides of the Pa-
cific that our relations with Japan were in
danger. Unlike the case of China policy, where
the divergence of interest between the United
States and Japan was largely illusory, the
strain in our economic relations was clearly
real. It was a deep-seated and growing difficulty
to which the United States had long been call-
ing attention. The economic events of August
1971 had the salutary effect of finally bringing
attention to this problem and bringing political
urgency to its solution.

Japan's trade surplus with the United States
reflects to a certain extent the competitiveness
and productivity of the Japanese economy, as
well as the slowness of American exporters to
exploit potential markets in Japan. But to a
significant degree it has been promoted by
anachronistic exchange rates and an elaborate
Japanese system of government assistance,
complex pricing policies, and restrictions on
imports and foreign investment in Japan — ves-
tiges of an earlier period when Japan was still
struggling to become competitive with the
West. Japan's interest in protecting weaker sec-
tors in her home market is now no different
from that of every other nation. The require-
ment today is a fair system of mutual access
to expand trade in a balanced way in both
directions. Continued cooperation in dealing
with this problem positively is crucial to the
ability to fend off growing protectionist pres-
sures and to ensure that the United States is
able to address the issues of international trade
positively as well. This is a political imperative
for both sides.

We believe we have made some progress in
the past year.

In January 1972 we concluded an agreement
moderating the growth of Japanese synthetic
textiles sales in the U.S. market, mitigating
what had become a major irritant. Voluntary

June 4, 1973

767

quota arrangements have been reached govern-
ing steel. Last July, in preparation for my sum-
mit meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka, high-
level bilateral negotiations at Hakone, Japan,
produced important measures of liberalization
of access to the Japanese market and commit-
ments to increase Japanese purchases of agri-
cultural products, civil aircraft, uranium en-
richment services, and military items from the
United States. At our meeting in Hawaii, Prime
Minister Tanaka committed his government to
promote imports from the United States and
to reduce the imbalance to a more manageable
size. The Japanese government has publicly
pledged to reduce Japan's global surplus in for-
eign trade and other current transactions to
one percent of Japan's Gross National Product
in two or three years. A further step was taken
at the end of April 1973 to liberalize restric-
tions on foreign investment in Japan.

Two major currency revaluations have raised
the value of the yen by over 35 percent with re-
spect to the dollar, and there are indications
that these are beginning to have an effect on
our trade. For the future there is interest on
both sides of the Pacific in creating regular
mechanisms of monitoring and adjustment, to
anticipate trade imbalances in particular sectors
and head them off before they generate protec-
tionist pressures and political crises. This is a
constructive approach, and we should pursue it.

The United States can only place the highest
importance on the carrying out of these pol-
icies.

The problem, of course, is an international
one. The multilateral realignments of curren-
cies in December 1971 and February 1973 were
important steps toward a solution, and Japan's
participation in these was constructive and
crucial. But the basic problem is structural, and
the solution is a thoroughgoing multilateral re-
form of the system. Japan's active contribution
to this process is indispensable, because no
system is achievable or workable unless the
most powerful economic nations are engaged
in it and help actively to make it work.

It is no accident that the U.S.-Japan Security
Treaty commits our two nations to "seek to
eliminate conflict in their international eco-
nomic policies and . . . encourage economic
collaboration between them." Without conscious
effort of political will, our economic disputes
could tear the fabric of our alliance.

Japan's New Diplomacy. As Japan today
moves out in many directions over the terrain

of multipolar diplomacy, it will be another test
of statesmanship on both sides to ensure that
our policies are not divergent. Japan's foreign
policy will continue to be shaped by her unique
perspectives, purposes, and style. Japan has in-
terests of her own, of which she herself will be
the ultimate judge. Our foreign policies will
not be identical or inevitably in step. What will
preserve our alliance in the new era is not
rigidity of policy but a continuing conscious-
ness of the basic interest in stability which we
have in common. We must work to maintain a
consensus in our policies.

Our respective approaches toward China in
1972 reflected the opportunities and complexi-
ties we face, as allies, in the common endeavor
of reducing tensions with adversaries.

Japan had for many years been developing
economic and cultural contacts with the Peo-
ple's Republic of China when the United States
had virtually none. Geography, culture, history,
and trade potential have always made China a
powerful natural attraction for Japan. Some
Japanese criticized the United States for the
mutual isolation between the United States and
the People's Republic of China, and offered
Japan as a natural bridge between the two
countries. Today, Japan has full diplomatic re-
lations with the People's Republic, while the
United States has not, and Japan's trade with
China continues to exceed our own by a wide
margin.

I have never believed, however, that Ameri-
can and Japanese interests in our China policies
were in conflict.

On July 15, 1971, when I announced my
forthcoming visit to Peking, Japan — because of
her special closeness to the United States
— feared that our independent action foreshad-
owed a divergence or conflict with Japan's in-
terest, or a loss of American interest in the
U.S.-Japanese alliance. It is obvious now that
our China policy involved no inconsistency with
our Japan policy. As I explained in last
year's Report, I made a conscious decision to
preserve the secrecy of Dr. Kissinger's explor-
atory trip to Peking until its outcome was clear.
It was then announced immediately, and the
announcement was followed up by a process of
intensive substantive consultation with Japan,
culminating in my meeting with Prime Min-
ister Sato in San Clemente in January 1972,
in advance of my Peking trip. Prime Minister
Sato and I found that we were in substantial
agreement on the major issues of peace in the
Far East; the lessening of tensions in Asia was

768

Department of State Bulletin

the goal both allies soupht. There was no dim-
inution of our overriding commitment to our
alliance.

In Peking a month later, when the People's
Republic of China expressed its reservations
about the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty and its
fears of so-called Japanese "militarism," the
United States declared categorically in the
Shanghai Communique itself that "the United
States places the highest value on its friendly
relations with Japan" and "will continue to
develop the existing close bonds."

At my summit meeting in Hawaii with Ja-
pan's new Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, we
addressed our common diplomacy as well as
our economic problems. We discussed global is-
sues, Asian issues, and bilateral issues, and
strongly reaffirmed the commitment of both
countries to our political alliance. It was
quickly evident that our China policies, while
not identical, were still in basic harmony. Prime
Minister Tanaka's own historic journey to Pe-
king was proof of this. Overcoming a legacy of
bitterness and mistrust far deeper than that
between the United States and the People's Re-
public of China, these two great Asian nations
pledged themselves to the same goals as the
Shanghai Communique, and went beyond it to
the establishment of full diplomatic relations.

Thus, there is no inconsistency in principle
between our alliance and the new hopeful pros-
pects of relaxation of tension multilaterally. No
third country need fear our alliance. Neither
Japan nor the United States need fear that our
unity precludes a broader community of nor-
malized relations, or independent approaches.

In the years ahead, the kind of close consul-
tation between the United States and Japan
which accompanied our respective Peking Sum-
mits in 1972 will be critically important to all
our diplomatic endeavors. More than our al-
liance is at stake. Japan has always been con-
scious of the external global framework within
which she was pursuing her own objectives.
What is new in the 1970's is her sharing in
increased responsibility for it. This responsi-
bility is now implied inescapably in her eco-
nomic power and her engagement in many di-
rections in global diplomacy.

The complexity of today's geopolitical en-
vironment, even in the Asian context alone, is
a challenge to a nation of Japan's energy and
national spirit undertaking a more active polit-
ical role. Jajian now has the obligations of a
major power — restraint, reciprocity, reliability,
and sensitivity to her overriding intere.st in a

stable pattern of global relationships.

Today's multilateralism does not diminish the
importance of the U.S. -Japanese alliance. On
the contrary, our alliance, which has ensured
stability in Asia for 20 years, still does, and
serves an essential mutual interest in the new
conditions. Secured by her alliance with the
United States, Japan can engage herself eco-
nomically and diplomatically in many directions
independently, without fearing for her security
or being feared by others. It provides a stable
framework for the evolution of Japanese policy.
This is a general interest.

The U.S. -Japanese alliance in the new era is
thus presented with the same challenge as the
Atlantic Alliance. We cannot conduct our indi-
vidual policies on the basis of self-interest alone,
taking our alliance for granted. We have an
obligation not to allow our short-term policies
to jeopardize our long-term unity, or to allow
competitive objectives to threaten the common
goals of our political association.

Challenges for the Future

Mature countries do not expect to avoid dis-
putes or conflicts of interest. A mature alliance
relationship, however, means facing up to them
on the basis of mutuality. It means seriously
addre55sing the underlying causes, not the su-
perficial public events. We are now moving in
this direction. We must carry it forward.

This means certain obligations on both sides.

In the economic area, the most urgent and
divisive area, we both have an obligation to
address and solve the common problem of our
trade imbalance. We have a responsibility to the
international system to normalize the bilateral
economic relationship that bulks so large in the
international economy. We have an obligation
to keep the specific commitments made to each
other. We have an opportunity to explore posi-
tive api)roaches to averting clashes in the fu-
ture. We have a responsibility to provide posi-
tive leadership in the urgent efforts at multi-
lateral reform.

In both the i)olitical and the economic dimen-
sions, we have an obligation as allies to pursue
our individual objectives in ways that serve al-
so our common purposes. Whether the issue
be the worldwide energy problem, or economic
or political relations with Communist countries,
or the jirovision of resources to develoi)ing
countries, there are competitive interests neces-
sarily involved, but also an overriding collective
interest in a stable global environment. It will
require a conscious effort of political will not

June 4, 1973

769

to make the key decisions according to short-
term economic or political advantage. This is
more than a problem of bureaucratic manage-
ment; it is a test of statesmanship.

The United States will be sensitive to Japan's
unique perspective on the w^orld and Japan's
special relationship vi^ith the United States.
To this end, we have redoubled our efforts at
consultation. This consultation is institutional-
ized at several levels and in several channels —
through our able Ambassadors; through high-
level political consultations such as Dr. Kissin-
ger's three visits to Tokyo in 1972 and 1973;
through meetings at the Foreign Minister level
such as Mr. Ohira's discussions with Secretary
Rogers in Washington in October; through reg-
ular Cabinet-level meetings of the Japan-U.S.
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs;
and through the three meetings I have had with
Japanese Prime Ministers since taking office
and the fourth I expect to have this year.

This interchange has a symbolic value in re-
affirming a political commitment and also a
tangible value in giving it substance.

The same dedication to mutual confidence and
close consultation on the part of Japan will be
essential as she marks out her independent
paths. The complexity of the new diplomacy
puts a premium on our steadiness and relia-
bility in all our relationships, particularly with
each other.

Japan's foreign policy is for Japan to decide.
Both her security and her economic interests,
however, link her destiny firmly to that of the
free world. I am confident that the political
leaders on both sides of the Pacific are deeply
conscious of the common interest that our alli-
ance has served, and deeply committed to pre-
serving it.

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Since V-E Day in 1945, nearly every Ameri-
can killed in war has died in Asia. That fact
alone compels our attention and our concern.
But there are other vital facts as well which
dictate that the vast, changing, throbbing
world of Asia will figure importantly in our
thoughts and policy calculations as far ahead
as any of us can see. Asia is where half of
mankind lives and works and dies. What hap-
pens to that half of the human race will have
a profound impact on the other half. Asia is
also that part of the world where developed
and developing nations alike have achieved
the greatest levels of economic growth in the
past decade. That growing economic power is

having a profound influence on the lives of the
people involved, their neighbors, and the rest
of the world.

The United States has been part of the Asian
world since we became involved in the China
trade in the early 19th Century, and especially
after the Spanish-American War made the
Philippines an American responsibility. But
after the Pacific phase of World War II, our
involvement in Asia deepened enormously.
Through bilateral and multilateral arrange-
ments, we became the guarantor of the security
of many Asian nations — from Japan and Korea
around the rim of Asia to Thailand and on
southward to Australia and New Zealand. We
also became the principal source of economic
and military assistance for many countries in
the region. It is against the background of this
deep and broad involvement that Asia today
has special meaning for most Americans.

But beyond this elaborate record, there are
other overriding reasons for our present day
concerns about Asia and its future. We con-
tinue to have treaty obligations to many Asian
allies — promises to help as much as we can to
preserve their independence and their right
to live their own lives in peace.

That network of alliances takes on special
meaning in light of Asia's special significance
on the world scene today. Asia, and particu-
larly Northeast Asia, is the locus of interaction
among four of the five great power centers in
our world. China is the heartland of this vast
region. Siberia and the Far Eastern territories
of the Soviet Union spread across the north of
Asia from China to the Arctic, from Europe
to the Bering Strait. The islands of Japan
form a 2,000-mile crescent just off the main-
land, running from the frigid waters of the
North Pacific to semi-tropical Okinawa. The
fourth major power of the Pacific area is, of
course, the United States. The ways in which
these powers act and interact will, to a signifi-
cant degree, shape the future and determine
the stability of Asia. At the same time, issues
and developments within Asia will play an
important part in shaping overall relationships
among the major powers.

Failure to achieve the kind of reconciliation
toward which we have moved so far in the past
year could prove a mortal blow to the structure
of peace. That stark reality is what makes the
political evolution of Asia critically important
to us and to the world.

Asia: Area of Change

Last year I went to Peking, the first Ameri-

770

Department of State Bulletin

an President to visit the People's Republic of

^ China. That visit began the process of over-
coming long years of antagonism, suspicion,

^ and o|)en rivalry. Only a few weeks ago, Amer-
ican prisoners of war and the last American
troops returned from Vietnam, marking an
end to our direct involvement in our longest
and most misunderstood war. These develop-
ments remind us that change is the immutable
law of international life.

Nowhere has the fact of change been more
dramatically evident than in Asia over the past
generation. Only 25 years ago, Japan was an
occupied country and its people were only
beginning to dig themselves out of the rubble
of war and to rebuild a shattered society. Ko-

li rea, too, was occupied but also divided at the
38th parallel where a new war was about to
explode. China, the most populous nation on
earth, was torn by a bloody civil war that would

j soon turn it into a Communist state. In the
Philippines, the United States had carried out
its pledge to grant full independence to a proud
people. But elsewhere in Asia, colonialism had

I not yet run its course. The French were trying
to restore their control over Indochina. The
Dutch were contending with the forces of In-
donesian revolution. Malaya was not yet fully
independent, and British control over Burma
had only just ended.

The scars and trauma of war were every-
where evident. Economies had been badly
shattered. Hunger and hopelessness were wide-
spread. A mood of revolution was palpable in
the atmosphere of most Asian capitals.

Asia today is a very different region. Former
colonial territories have long since achieved in-
dependence. Japan has revived to become the
third industrial power in the world. Other
countries have also enjoyed economic "mir-
acles" of their own, smaller quantitatively than
Japan's to be sure, but hardly less impressive
in terms of rates of growth. The Republic of
Korea is a good example. After the Korean
War, many forecasters were predicting that
South Korea could survive for decades to come
only as a beneficiary of the international dole.
But South Korea has proved the prophets
wrong, achieving annual rates of economic
growth of as much as ten percent, and becom-
ing an important exporter of manufactured
goods.

Despite international political fluctuations,
the skill and energ>' of the people of Taiwan
have produced remarkable increases in per
capita income (more than 13 percent last year)
and made Taiwan a leading trading nation.
While simultaneously moving toward the goal

of normal relations with Peking, the United
States has maintained a policy of friendship
for the 15 million people of Taiwan. We retain
diplomatic ties, commitments under the Mu-
tual Defense Treaty of 1954, and close eco-
nomic contacts with them.

Thailand, despite the pressures of externally
supported insurgency, has continued to make
steady economic progress. It has also made an
important contribution to regional economic de-
velopment as well as to the security of the area.
Malaysia and Singapore, with imagination and
hard work, have raised living standards and
maintained stable political systems. The Philip-
pines have had a worldwide impact through
their innovative role in introducing high-yield
rice strains as part of the Green Revolution.
Indonesia, Southeast Asia's most populous
country, is forging ahead under able national
leadership. Overall, the non-Communist nations
of Asia have achieved a remarkable rate of
economic growth averaging close to seven per-
cent a year.

Change in Asia has not been confined to
achieving independence and making economic
progress. South and North Korea, for example,
have begun a dialogue to explore the possibility
of settling major differences and have agreed
that the ultimate unification of their country
must be reached by peaceful means. Only a dec-
ade ago, Malaysia and Indonesia were virtually
at war ; today they are cooperative partners in
regional organizations.

Japan has also been engaged in difficult ad-
justments. A generation ago, there was deep
suspicion and bitterness between Japan and
Korea. Today, though past scars of a painful
history have not entirely healed, the two coun-
tries have moved toward a closer and mutually
beneficial relationship. Japan and the People's
Republic of China had for some time been
engaged in commercial and cultural exchanges.
Last year they agreed to resume full diplo-
matic relations. Despite the lack of a formal
peace treaty, Japan and the Soviet Union are
discussing projects for cooperative develop-
ment of Siberian natural resources and increas-
ing trade. If successful, these steps could help
promote better political and economic relations
between them.

The most obvious area of unresolved antag-
onism in Asia is in Indochina — between North
Vietnam and its local followers on the one
hand, and the legal governments of South Viet-
nam, Laos, and Cambodia on the other. Cease-
fire agreements were reached in January in
Vietnam and in February in Laos. These were
important and hopeful steps toward ending

June 4, 1973

771

the conflict in Indochina. At this writing, some
fighting continues. It is our deepest hope that
this continuing violence will soon end and that
lasting peace will be achieved.

The U.S. Response to Asia

When this Administration took office, we de-
termined that a reordering of our relationships
with Asia and with other parts of the world
was needed. It seemed to many Americans, as
it did to me, that our role was too dominant,
our presence too pervasive in the changed cir-
cumstances of the 1970's. It was time for others
— especially those who had achieved new
strength and prosperity — to do more for them-
selves and for others. The sacrifices of Vietnam
and the internal strains it had created played
an important part in shaping this outlook.
Another determinant was the continuing def-
icit in our balance of payments and the pres-
sures this put on the dollar and our economic
health. These and other factors were even push-
ing some Americans into a mood of growing
isolationism.

We recognized this as the gravest kind of
threat. Heedless American abdication of its
responsibilities to the world would destroy the
global balance and the fabric of peace we had
worked so hard and long to develop. Those who
relied on us to help assure their security would
be gravely concerned. Adversaries who had
shown a willingness to reconcile long-standing
differences would promptly revise their cal-
culations and alter their actions. It was a
prescription for chaos.

And so we charted our course between over-
extension and withdrawal. We would continue
to play a major and active role in world af-
fairs, but we would ask our allies to draw in-
creasingly on their new strength and on their
own determination to be more self-reliant. The
immediate context for this definition of policy
was the defense of Asia. In July 1969, I out-
lined at Guam the main elements of this new
United States approach.

First, the United States will keep all of its
treaty commitments. We will adjust the manner
of our support for our allies to new conditions,
and we will base our actions on a realistic
assessment of our interests. But as a matter
of principle, and as a matter of preserving the
stability of Asia, we made it clear that the
United States would never repudiate its pledged
word nor betray an ally.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear

power threatens the freedom of a nation allied
with us or of a nation whose survival we consider
vital to our security. Maintaining a balance of de-
terrence among the major powers is the most
critical responsibility we bear. We have a spe-
cial obligation to protect non-nuclear countries
against nuclear blackmail and to minimize their
incentive to develop nuclear weapons of their
own. Only the United States can provide this
shield in Asia.

Third, in cases involving other types of ag-
gression we shall furnish military and economic
assistance ivhen requested in accordance with
our treaty commitments. But we shall look to
the nation directly threatened to assume the
primary responsibility for providing the man-
power for its defense. No nation, large or
small, can have any reasonable security unless
it is able to mobilize its people and resources for
its own defense. Without that kind of national
effort, external help cannot fill the vacuum of
local indifference against any significant and
prolonged threat. Moreover, without a deter-
mined local effort, it would be impossible to
achieve the kind of broad political support
needed in the United States to back another
country in any sustained way.

The most important and most obvious appli-
cation of this new approach to security coop-
eration was the Vietnamization program which
enabled the South Vietnamese to assume the
full burden of their own defense. But the Nixon
Doctrine has been applied in other countries
as well. Japan is gradually expanding its capa-
bility for conventional defense of its own ter-
ritory within its constitutional prohibition
against developing offensive forces. There has
been expanded joint use of military base areas
in Japan, and we are in the process of con-
solidating many of our base areas, particularly
in and around metropolitan Tokyo.

In 1971, we reached an agreement with the
Republic of Korea to assist in modernizing its
armed forces. At the same time, we reduced
U.S. forces stationed in Korea by one-third,
bringing home more than 20,000 men. Reduced
Congressional appropriations for military as-
sistance in the past two years have forced a
slowdown in this program.

The Philippines have become increasingly
self-reliant. We have reduced the number of
facilities we maintain there and reduced our
forces by almost 13,000 men.

In all, in addition to the 550,000 men who
have returned from Vietnam, nearly 100,000
American military personnel and dependents

772

Department of State Bulletin

iiave come home from other parts of Asia dur-
I ing this Administration.

The economic dimension of the Nixon Doc-
trine recognizes that growing self-reliance and
confidence must rest on a secure base of eco-
nomic stability and growth. We are providing
technical and financial resources to help
friendly nations cope with problems of security
and economic development without putting un-
due strain on their fragile economic base. Other
industrial countries are increasing their share
of such help. Multilateral participation has in-
creased through cooperation among interna-
tional developmental institutions, the Asian
Development Bank, and the developed countries.
The authority to extend generalized tariff pref-
erences which I have requested in my new
Trade Reform Bill, would help the developing
countries of the region by increasing the poten-
tial for their exports and thus expanding their
capacity to increase imports and speed their
development.

This evolving process has brought us close
to our goals — a more balanced American role
I in security arrangements in Asia, an increase
in the capacity and willingness of our alliance
partners to carry heavier burdens of responsi-
[ bility for their own protection, and a more
equitable sharing of the material and personal
costs of security.

Translation of this doctrine into deeds has
made it unmistakably clear to all that we are,
and will remain, a Pacific power, maintaining
balanced forces in the region. It has also made
clear that, while adjusting our role in defensive
alliances, we are supporting a compensating
increase in the ability of Asians to defend
themselves.

These decisions and actions had important
consequences. I have no doubt that they in-
fluenced Hanoi's decision at long last to nego-
■ tiate seriou.sly and reach an agreement to end
the fighting and return our prisoners. I am con-
vinced that never would have happened if we
had decided to end our involvement unilaterally,
or if we had not helped South Vietnam to
strengthen and improve its own military forces.

Our firmne-ss in Southeast Asia and the
maintenance of durable partnerships with our
other Asian allies made it possible for us to
reach out to other adversaries. And recognizing
our determination to i-emain a power in the
Pacific encouraged them to respond positively.
The most dramatic example was, of course, my
visit to Peking in February 1972 and my meet-
ings there with the leaders of the People's Re-
public of China.

Looking Ahead

The rapidly changing face of Asia presents
those who live there, and others who are deeply
involved, with vast opportunities and chal-
lenges. The transition from war to peace, the
movement from rigid confrontation to gradual
accommodation, are heartening signs of what
may lie ahead. But nothing is assured in this
world, and the promise of progress will be ful-
filled only by determination and positive ac-
tions on the part of all concerned.

If peace is to be made secure, if men and
nations are to be able to continue to advance
in reasonable safety, the largest responsibility
must be borne by the major powers. It is of
critical importance that they continue to move
down the path of reconciliation, working to-
gether to overcome old bitterness, to settle dif-
ferences amicably, and to broaden and deepen
their efforts to develop new forms of coopera-
tion. Similarly, they must act with the greatest
restraint in dealing with each other and with
smaller nations. The alternative is renewed con-
frontation which carries with it the threat of
disaster — for those directly involved and for
the world.

The smaller nations of Asia will also have
to carry heavy responsibilities. The key ingre-
dient of sustained economic progress will con-
tinue to be what they do for themselves. The
key ingredient of their safety will continue to
be the manpower and resources they are will-
ing and able to invest. And their peace will
depend heavily on their ability and readiness
to overcome historic rivalries, old territorial
disputes, and religious and political differences
with their neighbors.

A new spirit of cooperation has developed
among many of the countries of Asia in recent
years. Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo-
nesia, and the Philippines are joined in the
A.s.sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (AS
EAN) to grapple with common concerns of
many kinds. The Asian Development Bank and
the Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East (ECAFE) have proved successful
instruments for promoting economic progress,
and have become outstanding examples of what
developed and developing nations can accom-
plish by working together.

Economic progress and heightened coopera-
tion among Asian nations cannot obscure the
many problems facing those nations, or the
several dangers shared by them and their
friends, including the United States. We have
noted many of the promising developments in

June 4, 1973

773

present day Asia. But it is not foreordained
that all or any of them will finally succeed.
There are huge obstacles to be overcome — dis-
trust, deep differences of ideology and social
systems, political and economic rivalries. Im-
provements in atmosphere could easily prove
ephemeral, especially if many outstanding is-
sues prove too difficult to settle in a reasonable
period of time.

Moreover, some long-standing rivalries may
prove intractable and dangers will doubtless
continue. North Vietnam's ambition to dom-
inate all of Indochina has not diminished,
though it may resort to different tactics or alter
the time frame for attaining that goal. There
is continuing fighting in South Vietnam and a
residue of hatred that will persist for a long
time. South and North Korea have been talking
to each other, but no one who knows the recent
history of that troubled peninsula believes that
reconciliation will be easy or will come early.
There are other disputes and differences be-
tween other Asian nations, and none of them
will be resolved quickly.

There is promise, however, in the evolving
pattern of efforts by most of those concerned
with Asia to limit the dangers of military con-
flicts flowing from political differences. We can
hope that all concerned will come to recognize
the high stake they have in the process of
normalizing relations. Stable balances, local
and multilateral, may ultimately turn into a
stable system of peace.

The United States has a deep interest in
that outcome and responsibilities to help
achieve it. One of those responsibilities is to
make sure that our strength and will are not
undermined to the point where our presence
in Asia has lost most of its relevance. For if
our friends conclude that they can no longer
depend on the United States for at least the
critical margin of assistance in protecting them-
selves, they may feel compelled to compromise
with those who threaten them, including the
forces of subversion and revolution in their
midst. Equally important, if adversaries con-
clude that we no longer intend to maintain a
significant presence, or that our willingness to
take stern measures when pushed too far has
disappeared, then the importance of reaching
balanced agreements with us will have largely
evaporated.

The end result could be an abrupt and deeply
dangerous upsetting of the balance that has
been created — and a disintegration of the
bridges to reconciliation whose construction
has been so effectively begun.

We shall continue to work closely with the
governments and peoples of Asia in their efforts
to improve the quality of their lives and raise
their standards of living. Obviously, what we
do in this area can only supplement the central
efforts that they make themselves. But that sup-
plement can be of great importance — both to
their progress and to the quality of the political
relations we enjoy with those concerned.

The United States will continue to be a
major power in Asia and to make its essential
contribution to the creation of a stable frame-
work of peace. To that end, we give our pledge :

— to be steadfast and dependable in support
of our friends ;

— to continue to bear our fair share of the
responsibility for the security of our allies;

— to develop, with realism and imagination,
new and mutually beneficial relations with
former adversaries in Asia ;

— to help, within our limitations, the con-
tinued impressive economic progress of one of
the world's most vital regions ; and

— above all, to take every step within our
power to prevent the recurrence of conflict in
an area that has known so much suffering and
sacrifice for so many centuries.

We can do no more. We would not be true
to ourselves or to our deepest interests if we
did less.

LATIN AMERICA

Over the past four years, our interest has
been focused on, and our energies dedicated
to, a number of supremely important tasks in
the world arena : ending a war in an honorable
way; putting our relations with long-standing
antagonists on a more rational and workable
basis; correcting major imbalances in our trade
and monetary relationships ; and. above all,
creating the foundations for a durable struc-
ture of peace.

The time and concentration that have gone
into these complicated but absolutely crucial
efforts have produced allegations that we were
neglecting other problems, other areas, and es-
pecially other friendly nations. In Latin
America this feeling has been particularly wide-
spread, and it is quite understandable. Most
Latin Americans, their governments and in-
stitutions have become accustomed to dealing
with us on the most intimate basis. The flow of
people, information, ideas, capital, and goods
between the United States and Latin America
has increased greatly, particularly since World

774

Department of State Bulletin

War II. In some ways, this created a sense of
psychological and economic dependence on the
United States.

Meanwhile, U.S. attention to Latin America
has seemed to wax and wane. At times we ap-
peared to take Latin America for granted. At
other times, our zeal and our sense of "mission"
led us to take a tutelary role with our neigh-
bors. When we raised the banner of reform,
as in the Alliance for Progress, we sometimes
tried to tell our neighbors what they really
needed and wanted. While all this was done
with good intentions and humanitarian con-
cern, and while our efforts had many positive
results, they raised expectations to a level that
simply was not realizable. Moreover, our ap-
proach tended to increase dependence on the
United States — for ideas, for direction, and for
money.

At the outset of this Administration, we sur-
veyed the world problems that confronted us,
and we made several deliberate decisions re-
garding our posture toward Latin America.
First, we resolved to avoid what we saw as the
two basic flaws of past performance: taking
our Latin neighbors for granted, assuming that
they were irrevocably linked to us by commerce
and friendship; and launching a crusade in
which we would promise to lead the peoples of
the hemisphere to prosperity and happiness
under our guidance and our formulas.

Our second decision was that, if we were
to have a strong and prospering community of
nations in this part of the world, we would have
to help develop a new, more healthy relation-
ship among the United States and its neighbors
in Latin America and the Caribbean. The kind
of mature partnership we envisaged was one
in which Latin America would assume increas-
ing responsibility for ideas, for initiatives,
and for actions. While the United States would
continue to be an active partner, there would be
a lessening of the dominant role the United
States had previously played.

Thus, we deliberately reduced our visibility
on the hemispheric stage, hoping that our
neighbors would play more active roles. And
they have — not always in perfect harmony, it
j is true, and sometimes looking more to short-
range national advantage than to the possibly
greater long-range rewards of cooperation.
, Still, an open dialogue has begun in the family
of the Americas and a more balanced and
healthy relationship may be taking shape.

We knew that this course would be criticized
by some old friends. There would be those who
had become accustomed to old forms and old

ways of conducting our common business and
who might, therefore, feel we were abandon-
ing them. Others would continue to say "If the
Americans aren't in the lead, it won't work"
or "If Washington doesn't finance this project,
nothing will happen." Others would complain
that the United States was concerned mainly
with Europe and Asia and was losing interest
in Latin America.

These voices have indeed been heard. On the
other hand, many leaders and governments
have used these years to take a more searching
look at their own problems and to develop their
own solutions. Some have moved imaginatively
to increase their industrial production and for-
eign trade. A few have taken courageous ac-
tions, sometimes putting themselves in political
peril, to correct their worst internal economic
and social problems. Some have taken effective
steps to eliminate teri'orism. Of course, not all
countries have been willing or able to do these
things, and some have failed to provide real
benefits for their peoples.

The Political Climate

All the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean share the need for economic and
social progress. Most have to deal with high
rates of unemployment among the unskilled
and even the educated youth and severe in-
equities in the distribution of the wealth
produced.

These problems place heavy burdens on the
political apparatus of these countries. In addi-
tion, many have other strictly political prob-
lems. Some nations have only the most fragile
tradition of democratic ways. Often, local con-
ditions provide opportunities for political ex-
tremists and revolutionaries. Political violence
and terrorism continue in some capitals. In
others, military forces provide the most stable
and disciplined group.

Most governments in the hemisphere recog-
nize these problems and are trying to find solu-
tions— with varying degrees of success. There
is an eager striving for both economic progress
and social justice. Yet that striving is taking
place against heavy odds, and setbacks and dis-
couragement are common.

The upsurge of national efforts to meet press-
ing internal problems is in part a direct result
of rising nationalism. An increasing sense of
national identity characterizes every one of
the American states. But it is only part of the
explanation for their strong desire to overcome
internal weakness.

Another component is the fact that pres-

June 4, 1973

775

sures for economic development have become
so urgent that governments cannot long sur-
vive if they ignore the plight of their people.
Modern communications have brought the
outside world into the most remote areas and
made apparent to millions the vast gulf that
separates their way of life from that of even
an average family in industrially advanced
countries. Those millions are no longer content
to accept hunger and poverty and injustice as
their preordained lot. They are increasingly
less patient with governments that fail to
produce results quickly. Any government that
ignores this broadening demand for progress
does so at its own jeopardy.

As a result, new governments have arrived
on the scene in many countries with leaders
promising to do more for their people. Some
have achieved power through the electoral
process ; others have seized power. Many mem-
bers of these governments are from the mili-
tary services. Styles of operation vary from
capital to capital. In some cases, there is a
tendency to seek support by appealing to
xenophobic attitudes and adopting anti-
American themes. In the long run, however,
performance will count the most in shaping
the judgments of the people.

The U.S. Response

It would be an error to ignore the role the
United States has played in helping to encour-
age Latin America's move toward greater self-
reliance. For from the Rio Grande to Tierra
del Fuego, governments and peoples have come
to recognize that the days of relying principally
on North America to solve their problems have
ended. We and others can help, of course.
Indeed, some problems can only be solved
with the understanding and cooperation of
others. But the solutions will require each
country's own initiative and imagination and
energy. I am convinced that the low-keyed
course we have followed over the past four
years — the avoidance of slogans and gim-
mickry, the emphasis on Latin initiatives —
has helped in an important way to provide the
basis for a stronger, healthier, and more realis-
tic relationship among the members of our
hemispheric community.

Accommodation to the diversity of the world
community is the keystone of our current
policy. That does not diminish our clearly
stated preference for free and democratic proc-
esses and for governments based thereon. Nor
does it weaken our firmly-held conviction that
an open economic system and the operation of

the market economy are the engines that best
generate economic advance. But it does mean
that we must be prepared to deal realistically
with governments as they are, provided, of
course, that they do not endanger security or
the general peace of the area.

In Latin America, as in other parts of the
world, most of the day-to-day relations of the
United States are handed through the bilateral
channels of traditional diplomacy. Most of us
cannot know how extensive this effort is, how
varied, and how time consuming. Cables flow
in and out around the clock. A Congressional
delegation is visiting here; an American stu-
dent has been thrown in jail there; a fishing
boat has been seized; an investment contract
has been signed ; an earthquake has leveled
half a city. Many of these events never come
to the attention of the American public. But
our bilateral relations — and the continuing,
intensive contacts, consultations and communi-
cations they require — provide the foundation
and the framework of our foreign relations.

Because of the important role they play in
so many countries of Latin America, a special
word should be devoted to our I'elations with the
military forces of the hemisphere. Those forces
represent a key element in almost all Latin
American societies, and in many they have
assumed national leadership. Because we have
recognized their various roles and because of
our mutual security interests, we have devel-
oped over the years close ties of cooperation
and friendship with many of the military
leaders of Latin America. We work coopera-
tively with them in a variety of ways — com-
bined exercises, conferences, joint mapping
ventures. Many of these leaders have attended
our advanced training and technical schools.
Because of the nature of military organiza-
tions, these ties have largely been handled
through professional channels.

At one time, the United States was by far
the principal source of military equipment
for Latin American governments. After World
War II, and again after the Korean War,
surplus military supplies enabled us to fill most
of the hemisphere's needs. But that picture has
changed remarkably. We estimate that the
governments of Latin America have ordered
in the last four years more than $1.2 billion
worth of military equipment from third coun-
tries, principally from Britain, France, West
Germany, Canada, Italy, and the Netherlands.
That is about six times more than they bought
from the United States.

There are several possible reasons for this

776

Deparlment of State iulletin

dramatic shift. In some cases, European sellers
have provided iiiphly attractive terms of sale.
In other cases, the precise equipment wanted
was not immediately available from the United
States but was from Europe. Some countries
may have wished to reduce their dependence
on the United States and to develop other
sources of military supplies. But one important
reason for Europe's ascendancy in this field
has been the limitations we have imposed on
ourselves — for example, by fixing: annual ceil-
ings on sales of military equipment worldwide
and in this hemisphere, and by restricting
credit for such sales.

What is involved in the requisition by Latin
American countries of relatively modest
amounts of equipment for replacement of
materiel and for modernization. Our hopes that
by unilaterally restricting sales we could dis-
courage our Latin neighbors from diverting
money to military equipment and away from
development needs have proved unrealistic.
And the cost to us has been considerable: in
friction with Latin American governments
because of our paternalism, and in valuable
military relationships which, in turn, provide
an important channel for communication across
a wide spectrum and influence our total rela-
tionships. The domestic costs are also high :
in lost emplojTTient for our workers, lost profits
for business, and loss of balance of payments
advantages for our nation.

The Infer-American System

Beyond our purely bilateral relations, there
are important institutions and forums in which
several or all of the states of the Americas are
associated. And for some of these institutions,
a moment of truth has arrived.

In 1822, the United States established dip-
lomatic relations with Colombia. We thus be-
came the first nation outside Latin America
to recognize the independence and sovereignty
of a Latin American state. Over the ensuing
150 years, formal and informal bonds linking
the nations of the Western Hemisphere have
expanded and grown strong. Gradually, ma-
chinery was developed to provide for increasing
cooperation and consultation in this family
of nations. It makes up what is called the inter-
American system. It has been said that if this
machinery had not existed, we would have been
forced to invent it. But it does exist — in the
Rio Treaty ; in the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank ; in the Organization of American
States and its associated bodies, including the
Economic and Social Council, the Council for

Science, Education and Culture; and in the j
many other groups and organizations through
which we work together.

The question now facing us is not whether
these organizations have served useful pur-
poses in the past, but whether they are orga- |
nized to best serve the current interests of the
Americas.

In a thoughtful discussion I had not long |
ago with Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaria, the
distinguished Latin American diplomat and
economist, he argued that, "The time is ripe
to begin developing new forms of hemispheric
cooperation." He suggested: "We should
identify the many areas in which the best
interests of Latin America and the United
States converge. Our joint interests in improv- ,
ing the quality of life everywhere in this '
hemisphere are overriding. They far surpass
the issues that have brought about confronta-
tion in recent years or have led many to focus !
on the divergent interests of Latin America and 1
the United States."

I agree. There has been an unfortunate ten-
dency among some governments, in some or-
ganizations, to make forums for cooperation
into arenas of confrontation. This phenomenon I
was evident at the recent meeting of the UN
Security Council in Panama. There has also
been a tendency to develop Latin American |
positions — often on a lowest-common-denomi-
nator basis — which fail to take realistic account
of viewpoints strongly held by the United
States. These eflforts tend to provoke reactions
conti-ary to those sought. We must recognize the
dangers inherent in such an approach.

We should not deal with important questions
in an emotional mood or react out of pique or
frustration. The kind of mature partnership we
all seek calls for calm reflection and a reason-
able exchange of views. In my message to the
recent OAS General Assembly, I noted: "That
kind of partnership implies that there are com-
mon goals to which we aspire. It implies a trust
and confidence in one another. It implies that
we can attain our goals more eflfectively by pur-
suing them more cooperatively. Above all, it im- j
plies that we consider interdependence an es-
sential ingredient in the life of our hemi-
sphere."

For our part, we shall actively support and
participate in the review of ways in which we
can most effectively achieve political coopera-
tion and economic and social development in
this hemisphere. This process has begun — at
the meeting of the Inter-American Economic

June 4, 1973

777

and Social Council in Bogota in February 1973
and, most importantly, at the General Assembly
of the OAS in April. It is our hope that this
process of careful review will produce stronger
and more effective ways to identify and advance
our common interests in the final quarter of
the 20th Century.

Any discussion of the inter-American system
raises the question of Cuba. We are asked: if it
is desirable to seek reconciliation with countries
like the People's Republic of China and the
Soviet Union, why do we not seek the same
with Cuba? In fact, the situations are quite
difl^erent. I have dealt with our relations with
Peking and Moscow elsewhere in this Report.
As for Cuba, our policy strongly supports
decisions taken after careful study by the over-
whelming majority of members of the Organi-
zation of American States. Those decisions
were based on the conclusion that Cuba's active
encouragement and support for the subversion
of legitimate governments in the hemisphere
represented a threat to peace and security in
this part of the world.

Havana's rhetoric in support of violent rev-
olution has diminished somewhat, and it is se-
lecting its targets for subversion with greater
care. But extremists and revolutionaries from
many Latin American countries are still being
trained in Cuba today in the techniques of
guerrilla war, in sabotage, and subversion.
Those trained agents and saboteurs are then
returned to their home countries, or to neigh-
boring countries, to carry out violence against
established governments. Money and arms flow
from Cuba to underground groups in some
countries. This activity continues to threaten
the stability of our hemisphere.

A second reason for concern is that Cuba be-
came the first member of the American family
to welcome into the hemisphere the armed
power of a non-American state. That action
created, among other things, the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962. And there is no evidence that
Havana's military ties with Moscow have mark-
edly changed.

One final consideration: one obvious way to
undercut the prestige and effectiveness of any
international body is for individual members to
act alone contrary to joint decisions. We have
assured fellow members of the OAS that the
United States will not act unilaterally in this
matter. We will consider a change in policy
toward Cuba when Cuba changes its policy
toward the other countries of the hemisphere.

But in considering any change, we shall act in
concert with our fellow members of the OAS.

The Economic Climate

We have considered some of the political for-
ces at work in the hemisphere. It is equally
important to look at economic developments.
These underscore both the progress that has
been made as well as the profound problems
that beg for early solution.

Economic growth in Latin America as a
whole continued at a healthy pace last year,
possibly exceeding the 6.3 percent rate achieved
in 1971. On the other side of the ledger, the
area's high rate of population increase — nearly
three percent overall — added millions of new
mouths to feed and cut per capita income
growth to less than four percent. Nevertheless,
this was still well above the 2.5 percent set as
a goal for the hemisphere in the early 1960's.

The most impressive economic growth was
achieved in the largest country of the area,
Brazil, where the GNP is estimated to be more
than 10 percent above the 1971 level. Mexico's
economy advanced substantially, with exports
reaching $1.8 billion last year, up almost 23
percent over 1971. Argentina's trade also grew
after a disastrous trade deficit in 1971. Colom-
bia cut its trade deficit in half and exports
were at record high levels. Venezuela enjoyed
its usual healthy trade surplus.

In most of the countries of the hemisphere,
however, inflation continued to eat away at the
fruits of economic growth. Some governments
were willing to take the stern financial and
economic measures needed to bring it under
control. Those that did not — or that were
guided by political rather than economic mo-
tives— watched prices and wages spiral upward
and living standards decline. Once-prosperous
Chile saw its inflation rate reach an estimated
180 percent, accompanied by shortages of food
and consumer goods.

Foreign trade, an essential ingredient of eco-
nomic development, enjoyed a healthy expan-
sion in Latin America as a whole. In 1972,
Latin American exports to the United States
rose to $6.2 billion, 18 percent more than in
1971. Trade with Europe and Asia also ex-
panded. Over the past two years, Latin Amer-
ica's foreign exchange reserves have increased
by more than $2 billion, to $8.9 billion by the
end of 1972.

The United States remains determined to im-
prove our own trading relations with Latin

778

Department of State Bulletin

America because we recojrnize that growing
trade is pood for all concerned. As Latin Amer-
ican economies develop, they become an increas-
ingly imjiortant market for U.S. goods — for
everything from wheat to tractors to compu-
ters. And a steadily expanding U.S. economy
can absorb a growing volume of Latin Ameri-
ca's products, not only of raw materials but
increasingly of component parts, semiprocessed
goods, and finished manufactured products. To
encourage this trade, we have introduced legis-
lation to provide preferential access to the U.S.
market for products of developing countries.
Surely this most prosperous of all nations
should do no less in extending the hand of co-
operation to our neighbors in this hemisphere
and to others in the developing world.

Meanwhile, approaching worldwide trade ne-
gotiations place our bilateral and regional trad-
ing problems in the Western Hemisphere in a
larger context. Our initiatives in pressing for
these new negotiations received welcome sup-
port from most of our Latin American trading
partners. Members of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, at their meetings in Ge-
neva in late 1972, paid considerable attention
to the concerns of developing countries. To deal
with these and other matters, the members or-
ganized a Preparatory Committee to develop
procedures for the coming negotiations. Mem-
bership in that committee is open, not only to
GATT Contracting Parties, but to all develop-
ing countries who want to take part.

Major steps are also being taken in the
monetary and financial areas that will alter
greatly the international economic system. The
annual meetings of the World Bank and Inter-
national Monetary Fund last September were
landmark events in the world of international
finance. The Committee of Twenty has been es-
tablished under the IMF, with three of its
members from Latin America, to develop new
and more workable mechanisms for the world's
monetary relationships.

While production, trade, and foreign exchange
reserves have increased substantially, serious
economic and social problems continue to beset
many of the nearly 300 million inhabitants of
Central and South America and the Caribbean.
The gross national product of the region aver-
aged close to $600 per person over the last two
years. But about one-half of the people have a
per capita income of less than $250, and for
one-fifth of the people the figure is less than
$150. In most countries there is only one doctor

for every 2,000 or 3,000 people and life expec-
tancy is 50 years or less in half a dozen coun-
tries. High rates of illiteracy in much of Latin
America represent a huge social deficit, vir-
tually eliminating all hope for progress among
millions of people.

The U.S. Response

The United States cannot solve these great
social and economic problems, nor can the world
community. The initiative must come from the
peoples and governments concerned. But we
are helping, and we will continue to do so. In
fiscal year 1972, United States bilateral as-
sistance to Latin America and the Caribbean
amounted to $338 million. We provided an ad-
ditional $103 million under the Food for Peace
program. Our Export-Import Bank extended
long-term loans of more than $500 million to
help fund im])ortant development programs.

This direct assistance is designed to meet
specific needs that can best be handled on a
bilateral basis. Nevertheless, we have long
realized that bilateral aid is often a cause of
friction between governments and the target of
local criticism, however biased and unfair. Ex-
treme leftist critics regularly attack their gov-
ernments for accepting U.S. aid and thereby
becoming "puppets." Obviously, no country is
obliged to accept aid. But in an atmosphere of
increasing nationalism, we recognize that such
allegations, however unfounded, have political
and emotional impact.

To meet this problem, we have deliberately
worked to balance our economic assistance ef-
forts between bilateral programs and coopera-
tive efi'orts through multinational organizations.
In the mid-1960's, roughly two-thirds of our
aid to Latin America was bilateral. Today, the
proportion has been reversed and two-thirds of
our aid flows through multinational organiza-
tions such as the Inter-American Development
Bank, the World Bank, and the United Nations
Development Program.

These multinational programs have several
advantages. It is politically easier for a country
to accept assistance from an international bank
or other organization than from one country.
And international organizations can impose
strict conditions for loans on economic grounds
without opening the door to charges of political
"meddling."

It is regrettable that L^S. contributions to
the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
have lagged in the past year. The Administra-

June 4, 1973

779

tion will make a strong effort to persuade the
Congress to correct this deficiency and provide
the necessary appropriations to meet our
pledge. The continued effective functioning of
the IDB vv^ill hinge in large part on the full co-
operation of the United States.

Our firm support for economic development
in the Western Hemisphere is good politics and
good economics. We live w^ith other nations
of the hemisphere in one neighborhood. And
no neighborhood is a very healthy place if many
of its people are living daily v^^ith poverty, dis-
ease, and frustration. People forced to live at
the fringe of survival cannot produce the goods
the human family needs, master the technology
that makes progress achievable, or buy the
products of other people's labor. They cannot
become full partners in the 20th Century.

Economic development is a product of many
forces. The most critical factor is the most
obvious — what a people and their government
are prepared and able to do for themselves.
Trade is another essential element for healthy
growth. Beyond that, direct bilateral assistance
and multilateral funding can provide the capital
and technological expertise for success. But
there is a fourth element in successful develop-
ment, often underestimated and more often
misunderstood, and that is private investment.

Foreign investment can provide a highly
efficient and effective channel for the flow of
modern technology, which is so sorely needed
by developing countries. It can broaden produc-
tion and employment. More than that, inflows
of foreign capital help to stimulate the mobil-
ization of local capital for development tasks.
As one looks at the record of economic growth
among developed and developing countries alike
over the past two or three decades, it is not
accidental that the most rapid growth has oc-
curred in countries that provided a healthy
climate for private investment.

There is, of course, a legitimate concern
about specific forms of foreign investment and
the terms under which foreign businesses oper-
ate. Every country, whether underdeveloped or
advanced, imposes restrictions on types and
levels of external involvement in its economy.
These restrictions can and should be worked out
in ways that protect the legitimate interests of
both investors and recipients.

The evident economic advantages of sound
foreign investment responsibly adapted to the
needs of developing countries have not been
effectively explained to most local publics. In-
creasingly, foreign investment has become the

780

special target of extreme nationalists and leftist
politicians. In some cases, governments have
tried to use foreign companies as political light-
ning rods or as scapegoats for their own short-
comings.

These factors — nationalism, ideological hos-
tility, and the search for scapegoats — have led
some governments to seize foreign assets and
to cancel the contracts under which foreign
companies were operating. Under international
law, any sovereign government has a right to
expropriate property for public purposes. But
that same international law requires adequate
and prompt compensation for the investors or
owners.

Moreover, one can fairly question, on eco-
nomic grounds alone, the wisdom of many such
seizures. It is not uncommon for a foreign com-
pany, although it is providing considerable local
employment and paying sizable taxes, to be
seized, only to have the successor enterprise
run by the government, provide less production
and smaller income for the state. Financial
resources often required to subsidize the opera-
tion of seized properties and to maintain
inflated payrolls could be used much more bene-
ficially for other, badly needed local investment.

Expropriations, even when there is fair com-
pensation, can create deep concern among those
whose resources developing countries wish to
attract — commercial banks, international lend-
ing institutions, private investors. Such actions
tend to dry up sources of investment for other
purposes.

All these factors — the legitimate protection
of American businesses abroad, the require-
ments of international law, the preservation of
a reasonable and mutually beneficial atmos-
phere for foreign investment — led us in early
1972 to define our policy toward expropriations.
We have made it clear that if an American firm
were seized without reasonable efforts to make
effective payment, we would provide no new
bilateral economic assistance to the expropriat-
ing country. We would consider exceptions only
if there were overriding humanitarian concerns
or other major factors involving our larger
interests. Nor would we support applications
for loans by such countries in international de-
velopment institutions.

The book value of U.S. investments in Latin
America has risen to more than $16 billion.
But our Latin American friends point out that
the rate of growth of U.S. investment has been
less in their countries than in Europe and Asia.
The difference is accounted for in part, perhaps

Department of State Bulletin i

decisively, by the judgment investors make
regarding the relative welcome their invest-
ments will receive.

Changes in attitudes toward investment will
take time. But we believe these changes are
underway in most parts of the hemisphere, in
the private as well as the public sector. We are
moving toward a better understanding that
private investments, ]iroperly managed, oper-
ating under reasonable conditions, and sensitive
to the needs and aspirations of the societies in
which they function, can be mutually advan-
tageous to investors and recipients.

Current Problems

In October 19()9, I said that our policy toward
Latin America would be based on five princi-
ples:

— firm commitment to the inter-American
system :

— respect for national identity and national
dignity;

— continued U.S. assistance to economic de-
velopment;

— belief that this assistance should take the
form of U.S. support for Latin American initia-
tives and should be extended primarily on a
multilateral basis;

— dedication to improving the quality of life
in the New World.

Those principles remain as valid today as
when I first stated them. In candor, however,
we must admit that our performance has not
always been fully what we and our friends
may have wished. I believe we can do better in
our second term. I am determined that we shall
do better. We owe it to those who created and
passed along the unique inter-American system.
We should leave to those who will inherit our
works a structure of peaceful cooperation more
effective than the one we found.

A number of bilateral and multilateral prob-
lems call for urgent attention. If we can solve
them, or at least move toward their solution,
we can create a new and positive atmosphere
in our hemisphere.

The single most important irritant in rela-
tions with our nearest Latin neighbor, Mexico,
is the high salinity of the waters of the Colo-
rado River diverted to Mexico under our 1944
Water Treaty. I discussed this matter with
President Echeverria last .Tune. My personal
representative, former Attorney General Herb-
ert Brownell, has been working intensively on
this problem and has made his recommenda-

tions to me. We shall soon be presenting our
Mexican neighbors with what I hope will be a
jiermanent, definitive, and just solution. With
mutual understanding and common efforts, I
believe this problem can be removed from the
agenda of outstanding issues.

Another serious problem, of deep concern to
every responsible government, is the illegal flotv
of narcotics across national boundaries. Some
of these drugs are produced in the Western
Hemisphere. And some Latin American coun-
tries have been used by international drug traf-
fickers as a channel for drugs from Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia into this hemisphere and
on to the Ignited States.

Over the past year, we and many Latin
American governments have made intensive
efforts to restrict this dangerous flow. Our com-
mon effort has taken a variety of forms: special
training for customs and immigration agents;
improved equipment ranging from two-way
radios to helicopters; exchanges of intelligence
data; tightened anti-drug laws; extradition
treaties, and others. It is vitally important that
we press forward with the campaign to destroy
this dangerous traffic which menaces us all,
especially our young.

Another international issue that confronts
the Americas, as well as the rest of the world
community, concerns the laiv of the sea. Every
country, whether or not it touches on an inter-
national body of water, is affected. The problems
include: the extent to which any nation can
claim adjoining waters as its territorial sea;
the proper limit on each nation's control over
the resources in and under the sea; guarantees
of the rights of free passage through interna-
tional straits and other navigational freedoms;
the preservation of the marine environment;
and the status of traditional high seas free-
doms. Re.solution of these and many related
questions are of profound importance to all
nations. Political, economic, and security inter-
ests of the highest sensitivity will have to be
considered.

An international conference on the law of
the sea will soon be convened to consider and
solve these complicated problems. We know it
will not be easy. But we know, too, that an
effective agreement that deals equitably with
the vital concerns of all nations would be a land-
mark in international affairs.

In the Americas, maritime disputes have
centered on the question of fishing rights in
waters that we consider to be beyond the limits

June 4, 1973

781

of national jurisdiction which a state may claim
under international law, but that some of our
neighbors claim as their territorial seas or ex-
clusive resource zones. These differences have
sometimes led to confrontations, including the
seizure of U.S. fishing boats and the imposition
of heavy fines. Neither party to this kind of
dispute enjoys any real benefit. Indeed, both
suffer because of the resulting exacerbation of
political, economic, and security relations.

The real point is not fishing rights or retali-
ation. Rather it is: what rules shall govern the
use of the oceans? If countries make unilateral
claims over ocean space without international
agreement, conflict over uses of the area and
its resources are inevitable. We believe that
the Law of the Sea Conference provides the
appropriate forum for resolving outstanding
law of the sea problems. We intend to work
with the Latin Americans and all other nations
toward achieving a timely and successful con-
ference.

Another important unresolved problem con-
cerns the Panama Canal and the surrounding
Zone. U.S. operation of the Canal and our
presence in Panama are governed by the terms
of a treaty drafted in 1903. The world has
changed radically during the 70 years this
treaty has been in effect. Latin America has
changed. Panama has changed. And the terms
of our relationship should reflect those changes
in a reasonable way.

For the past nine years, efforts to work out
a new treaty acceptable to both parties have
failed. That failure has put considerable strain
on our relations with Panama. It is time for
both parties to take a fresh look at this problem
and to develop a new relationship between us
— one that will guarantee continued effective
operation of the Canal while meeting Panama's
legitimate aspirations.

Looking to the Future

I intend to underscore our deep interest in
Latin America through expanded personal in-
volvement. Last year, I emphasized my concern
by sending two personal representatives, for-
mer Secretary of the Treasury Connally and
Federal Reserve Chairman Burns, to a number
of countries in Latin America. The detailed
and perceptive reports I received from these
special envoys helped to keep me abreast of
current problems and developments. This year,
I will be consulting with my fellow presidents
in the hemisphere and with other knowledge-

able Latin Americans on our future course. I
have asked Secretary of State Rogers to visit
Latin America to convey our intention to con-
tinue to work closely with our neighbors. And
I plan to make at least one visit to Latin Amer-
ica this year.

At the same time, I hope Members of the Con-
gress will travel to the area and see what is
happening in this part of the world. Such visits
could produce new insights into the complex
problems we and our neighbors confront. They
would provide an awareness of what able and
dedicated Americans are doing in those coun-
tries. And it would create a base of knowledge
from which understanding legislative action
might come.

I urge the Congress to take a new and thor-
ough look at existing legislation that affects our
relations with Latin America. We need to study,
for example, whether various legislative re-
strictions serve the purposes for which they
were designed. Do they deter other govern-
ments from various actions, such as seizing
fishing boats? Or do they merely make the solu-
tion of such problems more difficult? I believe
some current restrictions are entirely too rigid
and deprive us of the flexibility we need to
work out mutually beneficial solutions.

Similarly, we should inquire whether current
limitations on military equipment sales serve
our interests and whether they promote or
weaken our cooperation with Latin America.
I believe our unilateral efforts to restrict arms
sales have helped contribute to the rise of na-
tionalist feelings and to the growing resent-
ment against remnants of U.S. paternalism.
The irritation thus aroused helps explain at
least some of our problems in other matters. I
urge the Congress to take a hard look at this
problem and to take steps to rectify past errors.
For I think we have been hurting ourselves
more than anyone else by insisting on such lim-
itations, and harming our relations with Latin
America in the process.

I noted earlier the problem of modernizing
the machinery of cooperation and consultation
in the inter-American system. This process has
now begun. We look forward to working with
Latin America to make the inter-American
system more responsive to modern needs. This '
will require imagination and initiative from all
concerned. It also calls for a hard-headed as-
sessment of existing institutions. Are they ef-
fective? Are they doing what is most needed?
Are they accurately defining the most urgent

782

Department of State Bulletin

needs? In prescribing actions, do they take into
full account the material, political, and psycho-
logical limitations under which all governments
must function? I have instructed my advisors
to give this matter close attention in the months
ahead, and I feel confident that other heads of
government will do the same. By focusing on
the many areas in which the best interests of
Latin America and the United States converge,
we can begin a new and promising phase of
hemispheric cooperation.

Over the next four years, the United States
will be heavily engaged in giving substance to
the new world order that now is taking shape.
High on the agenda will be problems of world
trade and of strengthening the international
monetary system. These matters will be of
special concern to Latin America as it continues
to expand its exports outside the hemisphere.
Because we recognized this interest, we
strongly supported the inclusion of three Latin
American governments in the Committee of
Twenty that is considering monetary reform.
As we move into this period of intensive trade
and monetary negotiations, it will be to our
mutual advantage if the United States and
neighboring governments work closely together

on these issues. We have many shared interests
in assuring an expansion of world trade and in
preventing the rise of restrictive trading blocs
which would inhibit the growth of U.S. and
Latin American commerce. We therefore plan
to undertake intensive consultation with Latin
American governments and representatives — in
the OAS and its organs, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the International Monetary
Fund, GATT, and other appropriate bodies. The
process of hemispheric cooperation can be
strengthened as we confront these difficult is-
sues together.

Over the next four years, we will also con-
tinue our assistance efforts — through bilateral
and multilateral channels — to help improve the
quality of life of all the people of this hemi-
sphere.

As we move toward the end of our first 200
years as a nation — and toward the end of a
troubled century — we face many exciting chal-
lenges. They will require the best that is in us.
But we now have a framework for peaceful
cooperation on which to build. And as we build,
the lives and health and happiness of the hun-
dreds of millions of people living in Latin
America will be in the forefront of our concern.

Part IV: Regions of Tension and Opportunity

THE MIDDLE EAST

Peace in the Middle East is central to the
global structure of peace. Strategically, the
Middle East is a point where interests of the
major powers converge. It is a reservoir of
energy- resources on which much of the world
depends. Politically, it is a region of diversity,
dynamism, and turmoil, rent by national, social,
and ideological division — and of course by the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Two world wars and the
rising tide of nationalism have broken down
the pre-1911 order, but new patterns of sta-
bility have not yet been established. Modern
quarrels have compounded long-standing ones.
Because of the area's strategic importance, out-
side powers have continued to involve them-
selves, often competitively. Several times since
World War II, the Middle East has been an
arena of major crisis.

The irony is that the Middle East also has
such great potential for progress and peaceful
development. Of all the regions of the develop-
ing world, the Middle East, because of its
wealth, is uniquely not dependent on the heavy
infusion of capital resources from outside. Its
wealthier nations have been willing and able to
provide the capital for their own development
and have begun to assist their neighbors' de-
velopment. Mechanisms of regional self-reliance
and cooperation are already functioning. The
yearning for unity is strong within the Arab
world; it has deep historical and cultural roots
and its positive thrust has found new expres-
sion in these cooperative enterprises.

The region's drive for self-reliance matches
the philosophy of United States foreign policy
in a new era. Technical assistance and the pro-
vision of skills, now the most relevant forms of
external aid in much of the Middle East, are

June 4, 1973

783

forms of aid which the United States is uniquely
capable of providing and can sustain over
a long term. The United States has long been
a champion of the region's independence from
colonial or other external domination. In con-
ditions of peace, there is a natural community
of interest between the United States and all
the nations of the Middle East — an interest in
the region's progress, stability, and independ-
ence.

The requirements of peace in the Middle East
are not hard to define in principle. It requires
basic decisions by the countries of the Middle
East to pursue political solutions and coexist
with one another. Outside powers with inter-
ests in the area must accept their responsibility
for restraint and for helping to mitigate ten-
sions rather than exploiting them for their
own advantage.

These are principles which the United States
has sought to engage the other great powers in
observing. Coexistence, negotiated solutions,
avoiding the use or threat of force, great power
restraint, noninterference, respect for the sov-
ereignty and territorial integrity of states, re-
nunciation of hegemony or unilateral advantage
— these are the principles of the Shanghai Com-
munique of February 1972 and the Basic Prin-
ciples of U.S.-Soviet Relations of May 1972.
They are not new principles; every member
state of the United Nations has subscribed to
their essential elements. The UN Security
Council in passing Resolution 242 on Novem-
ber 22, 1967, envisioned a settlement of the
Arab-Israeli dispute that would be consistent
with them — a settlement which would include
"withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from ter-
ritories occupied in the recent conflict; termina-
tion of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sov-
ereignty, territorial integrity and political in-
dependence of every state in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recog-
nized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force."

A commitment to such principles by the out-
side powers is itself a contribution to the
framework for peace in the Middle East. A
similar commitment by the principal countries
directly involved, concretely expressed in proc-
esses of negotiation, is essential.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

The focus of attention in the Middle East has
been the prolonged crisis of the Arab-Israeli

conflict and the persistent efforts to resolve it.

In my first Foreign Policy Report three years
ago, I pointed out the serious elements of in-
tractability that marked this conflict. It was a
dispute in which each side saw vital interests
at stake that could not be compromised. To
Israel, the issue was survival. The physical se-
curity provided by the territories it occupied in
1967 seemed a better safeguard than Arab com-
mitments to live in peace in exchange for re-
turn of all those territories — commitments
whose reliability could be fully tested only
after Israel had withdrawn. To the Arabs, ne-
gotiating new borders directly with Israel, as
the latter wished, while Israel occupied Arab
lands and while Palestinian aspirations went
unfulfilled, seemed incompatible with justice
and with the sovereignty of Arab nations. A
powerful legacy of mutual fear and mistrust
had to be overcome. Until that was done no
compromise formula for settlement was accept-
able to either side. To the major powers out-
side, important interests and relationships
were at stake which drew them into positions of
confrontation.

The problem remains. For this very reason,
I have said that no other crisis area of the
world has greater importance or higher prior-
ity for the United States in the second term of
my Administration. At the beginning of this
year I met personally with Jordan's King Hus-
sein, Egyptian Presidential Adviser Hafiz Is-
mail, and Israeli Prime Minister Meir to renew
explorations for a solution.

The United States has no illusions. Instant
peace in the Middle East is a dream — yet the
absence of progress toward a settlement means
an ever-present risk of wider war, and a steady
deterioration of the prospects for regional sta-
bility and for constructive relations between
the countries of the area and the world outside.
Arab-Israeli reconciliation may seem impos-
sible— but in many areas of the world, accom-
modations not fully satisfactory to either side
have eased the intensity of conflict and provided
an additional measure of security to both sides.
Peace cannot be imposed from outside — but
I am convinced that a settlement in the Middle
East is in the national interest of the United
States and that for us to abandon the quest for
a settlement would be inconsistent with our re-
sponsibility as a great power.

The issue for the United States, therefore, is
not the desirability of an Arab-Israeli settle-
ment, but how it can be achieved. The issue is

784

Department of State Bulletin

not whether the United States will be involved
in the effort to achieve it, but how the United
States can be involved usefully and effectively.

The Last Four Years. Over the last four
years, the United States has taken a series of
initiatives and explored a variety of approaches
to i)romoting a negotiating process. The effort
has resulted in restoration of the ceasefire along
the Suez Canal. It has also provided sharp defi-
nition of the issues and basic negotiating posi-
tions of the parties and a measure of realism
on all sides. However, we have not succeeded in
establishing a negotiating process between the
parties or in achieving any substantive agree-
ment concrete enough to break the impasse.

In 1969, starting from Resolution 242, four
permanent members of the Security Council,
and the United States and Soviet Union in par-
ticular, began to discuss a framework for an
Arab-Israeli settlement in order to explore how
the outside powers might usefully relate to the
process of settlement. Their approaches dif-
fered, but the discussions illuminated the issues
that divided them. By late 1969 and early 1970,
significant further progress seemed unlikely for
the time being.

In the summer of 1970, with the Four Power
discussions stalemated and the military conflict
along the Suez Canal escalating sharply with
the active participation of Soviet air and air
defense units, the United States launched a
major initiative to reestablish the ceasefire and
to start negotiations. The firing stopped on
August 7, but the start of negotiations was de-
layed by the violation in Egypt of a related
military standstill agreement. A month later
the authority of the Government of Jordan was
challenged by the Palestinian guerrillas and an
invasion from Syria. The challenge was put
down, and the return of stability enhanced the
ability of the Jordanian government to address
the question of peace.

Early in 1971, Ambassador Jarring, the spe-
cial representative of the UN Secretary Gen-
eral, began discussions with Israel and Egypt
to try to promote agreement between the par-
ties in accordance with his mandate under
Resolution 212. When this effort lost momen-
tum by the end of February 1971, attention
shifted to the possibility of a .step-by-step ap-
proach to peace, beginning with a limited pull-
back of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal and
the Oldening of the Canal. At the request of Egypt
and Israel, Secretary Rogers explored this ap-
proach. Talks to this end, which occupied most

of the summer and fall, tried to grapple with
these basic issues: the relationship of such an
interim agreement to an overall i^eace agree-
ment; the distance of the limited Israeli with-
drawal; the nature of the Egyptian presence
in the evacuated territory; the timing of Israel's
use of the Canal; and the duration of the cease-
fire. In late 1971 and early 1972, the United
States sought, again without success, to initiate
indirect negotiations under its aegis between
Egypt and Israel on an interim agreement.

In 1972, attention again focused on the re-
lationship of the United States and the Soviet
Union to the Middle East problem. At the Mos-
cow Summit in May both sides reviewed their
positions and reafllrmed their readiness to play
a part in bringing about a settlement based on
Resolution 242. The United States emphasized
that a genuine negotiating process between the
nations in the area was essential. The danger
of inadvertent great power confrontation over
the Middle East was reduced by the Moscow
Summit, and also by a decision by the Govern-
ment of Egypt in July to request the with-
drawal of most Soviet military personnel from
Egypt.

American policy has sought in other ways to
promote stability in the Middle East and to
preserve the possibility of solution by negotia-
tion rather than by force of arms. During the
September 1970 crisis in Jordan, the United
States acted firmly to deter a wider war and
dampen a dangerous situation. Throughout the
period, this Administration continued its estab-
lished policy of maintaining a military balance
in the Middle East. I have said many times that
an arms balance is essential to stability in that
area — but that it alone cannot bring peace. The
search for a negotiated settlement must con-
tinue.

The ceasefire reestablished in 1970 at Amer-
ican initiative continues to this day, and re-
mains e.ssential to any hope for a peaceful set-
tlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The ces-
sation of organized fighting has not only saved
hundreds and perhai^s thousands of lives; it
has also i)reserved a climate that would permit
negotiation. But the ceasefire will necessarily
remain uneasy unless the hope for peace can be
sustained by active negotiations.

A serious threat to the ceasefire and to the
prospects for any political solution is the bit-
terness engendered by the mounting spiral of
terrorism and reprisal. Terrorist acts took on
a new and horrible dimension last year with

June 4, 1973

785

the shootings at Israel's Lod Airport in the
spring, where a number of Americans lost their
lives, and the murder of Israeli athletes at the
Munich Olympics in September. This was fol-
lowed during the fall by a series of Israeli
attacks on Lebanese and Syrian military in-
stallations as well as on Palestinian guerrilla
bases in Lebanon and Syria. A Libyan civilian
airliner was downed by Israeli aircraft while
straying over the Sinai in February 1973. The
following month, terrorists murdered two
American diplomats and a Belgian diplomat
held hostage in Khartoum. In April 1973, ter-
rorists attacked Israeli targets in Cyprus, and
Israel attacked headquarters and installations
of fedayeen organizations in and around Beirut,
killing three prominent Palestinian militants.

International terrorism is not exclusively an
Arab-Israeli problem; it is an international
problem, which the United States has made a
major international effort to combat. But a gen-
eration of frustration among displaced Pales-
tinians has made the Middle East a particular
focal point for such violence.

The Situation Today. America's objective in
the Middle East is still to help move the Arab-
Israeli dispute from confrontation to negotia-
tion and then toward conditions of peace as en-
visioned in UN Security Council Resolution 242.

But a solution cannot be imposed by the out-
side powers on unwilling governments. If we
tried, the parties would feel no stake in observ-
ing its terms, and the outside powers would be
engaged indefinitely in enforcing them. A solu-
tion can last only if the parties commit them-
selves to it directly. Serious negotiation will be
possible, however, only if a decision is made on
each side that the issues must be finally resolved
by a negotiated settlement rather than by the
weight or threat of force. This is more than a
decision on the mechanics of negotiation; it is
a decision that peace is worth compromise. It
should be possible to enter such negotiations
without expecting to settle all differences at
once, without preconditions, and without con-
ceding principles of honor or justice.

Two negotiating tracks have been discussed.
One is Ambassador Jarring's eflPort to help the
parties reach agreement on an overall peace
settlement. The second is the offer of the United
States to help get talks started on an interim
agreement as a first step to facilitate negotia-
tions on an overall settlement.

A persistent impasse, which is substantive as
well as procedural, has blocked both of these

approaches. It is rooted primarily in the oppos-
ing positions of the two sides on the issue of
the territories. Israel has insisted that its bor-
ders should be the subject of negotiations and
that substantial changes in the pre-1967 lines
are necessary. Egypt, while stating its readi-
ness to enter into a peace agreement with Is-
rael, has insisted that before it could enter
negotiations, even on an interim agreement,
Israel must commit itself to withdraw to the
pre-1967 lines. Jordan has also made clear its
commitment to a peaceful settlement with Is-
rael, but insists on the return of the occupied
West Bank without substantial border changes
and on restoration of a sovereign position in
the Arab part of Jerusalem.

Recognizing the difficulty of breaking the im-
passe in one negotiating step — of reconciling
Arab concern for sovereignty with Israeli con-
cern for security — the United States has fa-
vored trying to achieve agreement first on an
interim step. Since both Egypt and Israel asked
us in 1971 to help them negotiate such an in-
terim agreement, we proposed indirect talks be-
tween representatives of the two sides brought
together at the same location. In February
1972, Israel agreed to enter talks on this basis;
Egypt has expressed reservations about any ne-
gotiations in the absence of prior Israeli com-
mitment to total withdrawal from Sinai in an
overall settlement.

The dilemmas are evident. Egypt's willing-
ness to take new steps, for example, is inhibited
by the fear that further concessions could erode
the principle of sovereignty without assuring
that Israel is interested in reaching agreement
or will make appropriate concessions in return.
Israel's incentive to be forthcoming depends on
a difficult basic judgment whether its giving up
the physical buffer of territory would be com-
pensated by less tangible assurances of its se-
curity— such as Arab peace commitments, de-
militarization and other security arrangements,
external guarantees, and a transformed and
hopefully more secure political environment in
the Middle East. Urging flexibility on both
parties in the abstract seems futile. Neither ap-
pears willing, without assurance of a satis-
factory quid pro quo, to offer specific modifica-
tions of basic positions sufficient to get a
concrete negotiating process started.

A step-by-step approach still seems most
practical, but we fully recognize that one step
by itself cannot bring peace. First, there is a
relationship between any initial step toward

786

Department of State Bulletin

peace and steps which are to follow toward a
broader settlement. We are oi)en-minded on
how that relationship niipht be established in
a negotiating i)rocess. and on what role the
United States mipht play. But the relationship
cannot be ijrnored. Second, all important as-
pects of the Arab-Israeli conflict must be ad-
dressed at some stag:e, including the legitimate
interests of the Palestinians. Implementation
can occur in stages, and it should not be pre-
cluded that some issues and disputes could be
resolved on a priority basis. But a comprehen-
sive settlement must cover all the parties and
all the major issues.

The issues are formidable, interlinked, and
laden with emotion. The solutions cannot be
found in general i)rinciples alone, but must be
embodied in concrete negotiated arrangements.
The parties will not be tricked into compromise
positions by artful procedures. But there is
room for accommodation and an overwhelming
necessity to seek it.

The Interests and Responsibilities of the Major Powers

Too often in recent history, Middle East tur-
bulence has been compounded by the involve-
ment of outside powers. This is an ever-present
danger. Our eflforts with other major powders
to move from an era of confrontation to an era
of negotiation have addressed this problem
directly.

The nations of the Middle East have the
right to determine their own relationships with
the major powers. They will do so according to
their own judgment of their own requirements.
The United States has no desire to block or in-
terfere with political ties freely developed be-
tween Middle East countries and other major
nations in the world. We have our close ties with
Israel, which we value, and we also have a
strong interest in preserving and developing
our ties with the Arab world. Other powers
have the same right. But attempts at exclusion
or predominance are an invitation to conflict,
either local or global.

The first dimension of the problem is, of
course, the direct involvement of the great pow-
ers in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A significant
Soviet presence and substantial Soviet military
aid continue in the area. The Soviet Union
signed a friendship treaty with Iraq in April
1972. New shipments of Soviet military equip-
ment have now been concentrated in Syria,
Iraq, and the People's Democratic Republic of

Yemen. The significant factor is whether the
Soviet presence is paralleled by a Soviet in-
terest in promoting peaceful solutions. The ma-
jor powers have a continuing obligation to
refrain from steps which will raise again the
danger of their direct engagement in military
conflict.

The danger of immediate U.S.-Soviet con-
frontation, a source of grave concern in 1970
and 1971, is at the moment reduced. The Mos-
cow Summit and the agreement on the Basic
Principles of our relations contributed to this,
not only for the present but also for the longer
term. Neither side at the summit had any il-
lusions that we could resolve the Arab-Israeli
conflict, but there was agreement that we could
keep it from becoming a source of conflict be-
tween us. The United States has no interest in
excluding the Soviet Union from contributing
to a Middle East settlement or from playing a
significant role there. In fact, at the summit we
agreed that we each had an obligation to help
promote a settlement in accordance with Res-
olution 242.

The responsibilities and interests of the major
powers in the Middle East go beyond the Arab-
Israeli dispute. There are extensive political
and economic ties between the countries of the
region and the outside world. Here, too, there is
a world interest in not allowing comi)etitive in-
terests to interfere with a stable evolution.

The United States considers it a principal
objective to rebuild its political relations with
those Arab states with whom w^e enjoyed good
relations for most of the postwar period but
which broke relations with us in 1967. We were
able to restore diplomatic relations with the
Yemen Arab Republic at the time of Secretary
of State Rogers' visit there in July 1972; re-
establishment of ties with Sudan followed
shortly thereafter. We assigned two American
diplomats to the interests section in Baghdad,
Iraq, in 1972. We have just concluded an agree-
ment with Algeria on a major project for the
import of Algerian liquified natural gas. The
United States is prepared for normal bilateral
relations with all the nations of the Middle
East.

The European Community is also expanding
and consolidating direct ties with many nations
of the Middle East and North Africa. This is
a natural development; it builds on historical
relationships and the economic advantages of
geography. It gives these nations a greater
stake in relations with the West. It gives the

June 4, 1973

787

Western European countries an important role
in maintaining the structure of peace beyond
Europe. We are concerned, however, that as
these relations evolve they not embody dis-
criminatory arrangements vi^hich adversely af-
fect our trade and that of other countries.

Economic competition in the Middle East be-
tween the United States and other free world
nations could be particularly damaging in the
critical area of energy. The traditional relation-
ship between suppliers and consumers of energy
has radically, and probably irrevocably,
changed. In the Persian Gulf, where about two-
thirds of the world's known oil reserves are lo-
cated, Arab oil-producing countries have joined
to reorder the relations with the international
oil industry and the consumer countries. Iran
has taken over operation of the companies
working there. Our own requirements for Per-
sian Gulf oil have been small — about ten per-
cent of our total oil imports — but they will rise
as U.S. energy demand expands. Assurance of
the continuing flow of Middle East energy re-
sources is increasingly important for the United
States, Western Europe, and Japan. This should
be addressed as a common interest.

As for the relations between producer and
consumer nations, here too we believe there is
a shared interest. We both stand to gain from a
stable and reliable economic relationship, en-
suring revenues for them and energy resources
for us. Oil revenues paid to Persian Gulf states
have trebled in the last five years, financing
their economic development and providing an
expanding market for us. Their rapidly grow-
ing foreign exchange reserves give them in-
creasing weight — and an increasing stake — in
the international monetary system. We share
these countries' desire to find arrangements
which enhance the region's prosperity while
assuring an effective means for meeting the
world's demand for energy.

The Regional Framework

Stability in the Middle East does not depend
only on Arab-Israeli peace and stable relation-
ships with and among the great powers. Per-
sonal rivalries, ideological conflict, territorial
disputes, economic competition, religious and
ethnic divisions are indigenous sources of tur-
moil which exacerbate — and are in turn exacer-
bated by — these other tensions. Stability there-
fore depends also on strengthening regional
forces for cooperation and collaboration.

At the end of 1971, the nations of the Per-
sian Gulf passed through a critical transition,
with the termination of the century-old protec-
torate relationship between Great Britain and
the nine Arab Emirates of the lower Gulf. Con-
sidering the number of states involved and the
diversity of political and economic conditions,
the transition of this area to independence has
been remarkably smooth. The Emirates have
developed new political ties among themselves
and assumed responsibility for their own secur-
ity and destiny. Some territorial disputes and
rivalries remain, but these have not been al-
lowed to undermine their perceived common
interest in unity and stability. Two of the
largest Gulf states, Iran and Saudi Arabia,
have undertaken greater responsibility for
helping to enhance the area's stability and for
ensuring that the destiny of the Gulf will be
determined by the nations of the Gulf without
interference from outside.

Mutual assistance among Middle East nations
has an important economic dimension. The
wealthier nations of the area have — in their
own interest and in the general interest — taken
on the responsibility of assisting economic and
social development. On the occasion of my visit
to Tehran last May, I joined with His Imperial
Majesty the Shah of Iran in aflirming that "the
economic development and welfare of the bor-
dering states of the Persian Gulf are of im-
portance to the stability of the region." The
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development
has worked effectively in this area for some
time. The Government of Saudi Arabia is pro-
viding significant support to its neighbors. Iran
and other Middle East nations are adding to
the flow of financial and technical help within
the region.

These are positive developments. They
strengthen the forces of moderation. There is
reason for hope that these trends of collabora-
tion will survive, gather strength over time, and
contribute in turn to a favorable political evo-
lution.

Agendo for the Future

Looking ahead several years, what does the
United States hope to see in the Middle East?
We hope to see, first of all, a region at peace
— with a number of strong, healthy, and inde-
pendent political units cooperating among
themselves, free of external interference, and
welcoming the constructive participation of
outside powers. I have no doubt that this is also

788

Department of State Bulletin

the objective of the peoples and governments
of all the countries in the Middle East.

The United States will therefore address
itself to these specific tasks:

— Fii-st is the settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict through a process of negotiation. There
must be a realism on all sides about what is
achievable. Neither side will attain its maxi-
mum demands, but an accomodation is possi-
ble that jireserves the honor and security of
both sides. The absence of peace is a threat to
both sides, which will increase, not diminish,
over time.

— Second, the world and the region have an
intei'est in turning great-power relationships
with the Middle East into a force for stability.
This means that the principles of restraint,
peaceful settlement, and avoidance of confron-
tation that are set forth in the Basic Principles
of U.S.-Soviet Relations must become enduring
realities. It will require outward-looking eco-
nomic relations among the Middle East, North
Africa, the European Community, and the
United States. It will require stable and de-
pendable relations between suppliers and con-
sumers of energy.

— Third, the United States will seek to
strengthen its ties with all its traditional
friends in the Middle East and restore bilateral
relations where they have been severed. In
conditions of security and peace, there are
prospects for new forms of cooperation, in the
interest of enhancing the independence of the
area's nations.

— In the economic dimension particularly,
the United States can make a unique contribu-
tion to progress and stability. Where capital
assistance is not the greatest need, American
technical and managerial skills can be a major
spur to modernization. Where promising new
development programs are being undertaken,
the United States can contribute resources
productively. If the peoples of the area are to
realize their aspirations for a better future
in conditions of peace, economic rehabilitation
and development will be essential, and the
United States will do its share.

The United States is committed to helping
achieve these objectives.

SOUTH ASIA

The American interest in South Asia is clear-
Jone 4, 1973

cut: we want the region to be a contributor
to global peace, not a threat to it. We want
the region to be an example to the world of
peaceful progress.

Last year in South Asia was a year of re-
building. Societies torn by political upheaval,
war, and natural disaster took up the tasks of
reconstruction. The nations of the subcontinent
began reshaping the relations among them-
selves. They began rebuilding their relations
with the world outside. This is an arduous
process, but the United States has an impor-
tant stake in its success.

I have always believed that the United
States, uniquely among the major powers,
shared a common interest with the nations of
the subcontinent in their peace, independence,
and stability. Today this is more true than
ever. The United States has no economic or
strategic interest in a privileged position, nor
in forming ties directed again.st any country
inside the region or outside the region, nor in
altering the basic political framework on the
subcontinent. We have an interest in seeing
that no other great power attempts this
either — and we believe the best insurance
against this is a stable regional system founded
on the secure independence of each nation in it.
The destiny of each nation of South Asia should
be for it to determine. The United States serves
its own interest by respecting that right and
helping them preserve it.

As I wrote last October to my Advisory
Panel on South Asian Relief Assistance after
it reported to me on its visit to Bangladesh,
"The United States could not and cannot ignore
the needs and the aspirations of the more than
700 million South Asians. Our effort to join
other nations in meeting the most urgent needs
of those who live in this area has reflected not
only our compassion for them in their distress
but also our recognition that an orderly society
depends on the capacity of governments to
'pi-omote the general welfare.' "

We therefore want to see Pakistan consoli-
date its integrity as a nation, restore its eco-
nomic vitality, and take its place among the
proud democratic nations of the world. We
want to see the new People's Republic of
Bangladesh flourish as a non-aligned and eco-
nomically viable democratic state. We want to
join with India in a mature relationship
founded on equality, reciprocity, and mutual
interests, reflecting India's stature as a great
free nation. We want to see all the small coun-
tries of South Asia live in stability and secure
in their independence.

789

The Structure of Peace in South Asia

In 1971 the breakdown of peace in South
Asia not only brought war and suffering to the
millions of people directly affected. It raised
concern about stability for the whole region
from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia. It
involved the great powers in a potentially
dangerous confrontation whose significance
went far beyond the immediate South Asian
conflict.

Today we can hope that the subcontinent has
found a new foundation for stability.

This will depend first and foremost on the
normalization of relations between India, Pak-
istan, and Bangladesh. This means, to begin
with, resolving the issues left by the events of
1971 : repatriation of prisoners of war and
other personnel detained ; recognition and
establishment of diplomatic relations ; and re-
sumption of trade and equitable division of
assets and liabilities between Pakistan and
Bangladesh. Beyond this, it means consolidat-
ing a new stability on the subcontinent: an
end to the arms race; an end to territorial
disputes; expanded economic cooperation; and
creation of a climate of security and, ultimately,
reconciliation.

The primary responsibility for this process
rests necessarily on the region's nations. The
Simla Conference in June-July 1972 between
President Bhutto and Prime Minister Gandhi,
which produced agreement on the outline of a
settlement between Pakistan and India, was a
dramatic and promising step. Progress since
then has been slow, as the relationship between
India and Pakistan has become intertwined
with the resolution of the unsettled issues
between Pakistan and Bangladesh. President
Bhutto has been understandably insistent on
the return of the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners
of war detained in India. India has been un-
willing to release them without Bangladesh's
concurrence. Prime Minister Mujib, until
recently, insisted that Pakistani recognition of
Bangladesh must precede any other steps
toward reconciliation, and he has sought the
return of Bengalees detained in Pakistan. Just
this past month, however, new efforts have
been made to break the impasse.

The United States, from its Vietnam experi-
ence, has a natural sympathy for Pakistan's
desire for the return of its prisoners of war,
and for the repatriation of all detainees. It is
a basic humanitarian concern and also a way
of liquidating one of the vestiges of the war
and beginning a process of reconciliation. At
the same time, recognition of Bangladesh as a

new reality in the subcontinent is a key step
toward stabilization of relations in South Asia.

As a general matter, reconciliation on the
subcontinent is not a process the United States
can directly affect, except to give encourage-
ment and support to constructive actions. We
have sought, on the other hand, through our
bilateral relations with the nations of the area,
to address the fundamental problems of re-
covery and stability.

Pakistan. As I stated in my Report last year,
"Our concern for the well-being and security
of the people of Pakistan does not end with
the end of a crisis." The United States has
always had a close and warm relationship with
Pakistan, and we have a strong interest today
in seeing it build a new future.

Pakistan entered 1972 a deeply troubled and
demoralized nation. Crisis and defeat in 1971
had torn apart its political structure, halved
its population, and shattered the established
patterns of its economy. Yet the events of 1971
also brought to power the first civilian adminis-
tration Pakistan has had since 1958 and pro-
duced a new and determined effort to develop
institutions of representative government. The
National Assembly in April 1973 has just
adopted a new democratic federal constitution.
President Bhutto has taken many courageous
steps of political, economic, and social reform.
He has restored much of the self-confidence
of his countrymen.

The cohesion and stability of Pakistan are
of critical importance to the structure of peace
in South Asia. Encouragement of turmoil
within nations on the subcontinent can bring
not only the devastation of civil and interna-
tional war, but the involvement of outside
powers. This is the basis of America's interest
in helping Pakistan now consolidate its in-
tegrity as a nation.

To this end, since January 1972 we have
provided over $300 million to assist Pakistan's
program of economic recovery. Our assistance
in the form of new loans to facilitate imports
essential to Pakistan's industrial and agricul-
tural growth totaled $120 million. We worked
with Pakistani and United Nations authorities
to channel $14 million in food and commodity
emergency relief to the roughly 1.2 million
Pakistanis displaced from their homes by the
1971 war. We have committed $124 million in
Title I PL-480 foodstuffs (including 1.3 million
tons of wheat) to meet shortages resulting
from inadequate rainfall and the dislocations
of the war. We provided $5 million in technical
assistance. We made about $45 million in aid

790

Department of State Bulletin

available to support the multilateral Indus
Basin development pro^rani. In addition, we
joined with other members of the Pakistan
Consortium, led by the World Bank, to provide
emergency debt relief, the U.S. share totaling
$50 million over 1972 and 1973.

As Pakistan now turns its efforts again to
long term economic and social development,
the United States once again stands ready to as-
sist in collaboration with the Consortium and
the World Bank. The prospects are encourag-
ing, particularly because of the success Pakistan
has had through its own efforts in the past
year to reorient its economy after the loss of
the eastern wing. Pakistan has already man-
aged to expand its international markets for
its cotton and rice to more than offset the loss
of the east as a market and as an exporter. Its
export earnings this year may even surpass
the combined export earnings of East and West
Pakistan in 1970, the last pre-war year.

The United States believes that Pakistan,
like any other nation, has a right to its inde-
pendence and security. Peace and stability on

i the subcontinent cannot be founded on any

I other basis. I made a decision in March 1973
to fulfill outstanding contractual obligations to
Pakistan and India for limited quantities of
military equipment whose delivery had been

I suspended in 1971. Our policy now, as before
1971, is to permit the export of non-lethal
equipment and of spare parts for equipment
previously supplied by the United States. There
is no change in our purpose. We are not par-

, ticipating in an arms race in the subcontinent.
Banprladesh. Bangladesh emerged from the
1971 crisis with a surge of enthusiasm, an
unpredictable political situation, and a shat-
tered economy. Its leaders faced the formidable

• tasks of restoring civil peace and harnessing
national energies for building the political and
administrative organization for a new state,
while meeting the emergency and long-term
human and development needs of what is now
one of the world's most populous — and poor-
est— nations.

While the United States deplored the fact
that military solutions were resorted to in
1971, we did not dispute the aspirations of the
people of East Bengal for autonomy. My
Foreign Policy Report last year described our
efforts in 1971 to promote a peaceful political
resolution of the crisis. We opposed not inde-
pendence, but the outbreak of international
war. Throughout the crisis year of 1971, the
United States provided two-thirds of the
world's relief to East Bengal, and supported

the administration of that relief effort by inter-
national authorities. Once the issue was settled
by the fact of independence, our principal
intere.st was in the rehabilitation and stability
of the new state. Our relief effort continued
even in the absence of diplomatic relations. The
United States formally recognized Bangladesh
in April 1972, and established diplomatic rela-
tions in May.

Since January 1972, first under United Na-
tions auspices and since May also bilaterally,
the United States has contributed over a third
of a billion dollars to relief and rehabilitation
in Bangladesh. The mobilized efforts and re-
sources of the world forestalled a major
famine, and the United States provided more
than any other nation. We provided $144
million in PL-480 food and grants for food
distribution; $21 million in grants to American
voluntary agencies to aid in the resettlement
of thousands of Bengalee families; a $35
million grant to the UN Relief Operation
Dacca, mainly for food distribution; and $145
million in bilateral grants to the Bangladesh
Government for essential commodities and to
restore transportation services, power stations,
hospitals, and schools, for the rehabilitation of
the economy.

The political and economic progress of the
new nation is an enormous challenge to its
leaders. Unemployment, inflation, and com-
modity shortages remained serious in 1972.
Civil disorders continued. The Bangladesh Gov-
ernment in 1972 was able to begin effective
rehabilitation programs and to begin consider-
ing its pressing longer term development needs
in cooperation with friendly nations and inter-
national lending institutions. We are particu-
larly encouraged by its achievement of a new
constitution, a new parliament, and a strong
electoral mandate for the leadership of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman. Our interest in Banglade.sh
is in its stability — lest turmoil there affect
other nations — and in its genuine non-align-
ment and peaceful policies. Instability any-
where in the subcontinent is an invitation to j
interference from outside.

Bangladesh's success in meeting this chal-
lenge will be a most important determinant of
the future of peace in South Asia in the years
to come.

India. India emerged from the 1971 crisis
with new confidence, power, and responsi-
bilities. This fact in itself was a new political
reality for the subcontinent and for all nations
concerned with South Asia's future. For the
nations of that region, the question was how

June 4, 1973

791

India would use its power. For the nations
outside the region, the question was what the
relationship of this power would be to that of
other powers in the world.

Last year I explained that the United States
was prepared for a serious dialogue with India
on the future of our relations. We have taken
steps in that direction in 1972. The United
States respects India as a major country. We
are prepared to treat India in accordance with
its new stature and responsibilities, on the
basis of reciprocity.

Because India is a major country, her actions
on the world stage necessarily affect us and our
interests.

— India's relationships with the major
powers are for it to decide, and we have no
interest in inhibiting their growth. However,
we have a natural concern that India not be
locked into exclusive ties with major countries
directed against us or against other countries
with whom we have relationships which we
value.

— There have been serious differences over
U.S. policy in Indochina. With the ending of
the war, that problem is reduced, and we feel
that India, as a chairman of the International
Control Commission for Laos and Cambodia
and a country with a stake in Asian peace, has
an opportunity to play an important positive
role in consolidating a just peace in Indochina.

— India's policy toward its neighbors on the
subcontinent and other countries in nearby
parts of Asia is now an important determinant
of regional stability, which is of interest to us.

— Other aspects of Indian policy affect us,
and we have had our natural concerns. We have
expressed unhappiness when Indian leaders
have used the United States as a scapegoat in
domestic disputes, which does not serve our
common objective of improved relations.

Fundamentally, I believe that the United
States and a non-aligned India have no signi-
ficant conflicting interests. The United States
has an interest in India's independence, and a
natural preference to see democratic institu-
tions flourish. We share an interest in the
success and stability of Bangladesh. And as
India and Pakistan move toward more normal
relations, external military supply loses its
relevance to the politics of the subcontinent.
In short, the United States wants to see a sub-
continent that is independent, progressive, and
peaceful. We believe India shares these objec-
tives— and this can be the firm basis of a con-
structive relationship.

792

— The United States will not join in any
groupings or pursue any policies directed
against India. Our normalization of relations
with the People's Republic of China is not
directed against India or inconsistent with our
desire to enjoy good relations with India. The
United States and China declared in the Shang-
hai Communique that we both saw attempts
at collusion, hegemony, or spheres of interest
as inconsistent with peace in Asia. I believe
that on this principle a constructive pattern
of relations is possible among all the major
countries of Asia, and this is the objective of
United States policy.

— Both the United States and India are
interested in defining a new basis for a mature
economic relationship between us over the
longer term. In October 1972, the United States
joined in a program to reschedule the Indian
debt under the aegis of the World Bank, and
in March 1973 we lifted the suspension im-
posed in December 1971 on the flow of $87.6
million in past development loans. For the
future, both sides are now interested in how
to move toward Indian self-reliance. This raises
the issues of the role of U.S. development
assistance, our trade relations, our consulta-
tion on world trade and monetary issues that
affect Indian interests, and our common in-
terest in promoting economic development on
the subcontinent and elsewhere in Asia. A new
framework for this economic relationship is a
fruitful topic for our dialogue.

Our dialogue has now begun. Secretary Con-
nally, on his visit to New Delhi, Dacca, and
Islamabad last July, had frank and important
talks on my behalf with Prime Minister Gandhi
and her government's leaders. Indian Finance
Minister Chavan consulted with Secretary
Shultz in Washington in March 1973 on trade
and monetary issues. Ambassador Moynihan's
cordial reception in India was a sign that the
passage of time and constructive attitudes on
both sides have laid a foundation for a serious
improvement in our relations. The recent dis-
cussions which Deputy Secretary of State Rush
had in New Delhi on his trip to South Asia
confirmed this.

We both understand, of course, that the issue
is not one of communication or atmosphere.
Our differences in 1971 injected a healthy
realism and maturity into the U.S. -Indian
relationship. We can deal with each other now
without sentimentality and without the illusion
that because we are both great democracies
our foreign policies must be the same. Nor
do great nations decide their policies on the

Department of State Bulletin jl^

I

ephemeral criterion of popularity. We have
our interests and responsibilities; India's policy
choices are for India to make. Good relations
will come not from an identity of policies, but
from respect for each other's concerns and a
consciousness of the basic interest we share in
global peace.

The Smaller Nations of South Asia. The
smaller nations of South Asia are part of the
regional system, and their well-being and inde-
pendence are important to it. We do not view
them as part of any country's sphere of
influence. They have a right to their independ-
ence and non-alignment and a right to remain
neutral with respect to the problems of their
larger neighbors. Each has its own character,
aspirations, and problems, and we seek relation-
ships with each one on the basis of mutual
lespect.

We welcome the improvement in our rela-
tions with Sri Lanka in the past few years. Sri
Lanka has strengthened its internal stability,
and we hope to maintain and expand our co-
njieration and to assist Sri Lanka's progress.
The LTnited States joined with many other na-
tions to assist Afghanistan in its recovery from
a two-year drought and we will continue our
( ooperation in its economic development. We
have assisted Nepal in its efforts to modernize
its agriculture and transport, and we will wel-
come the opportunity to continue this relation-
ship as our help is wanted. We value our
contacts with all the small countries of the
I region — from Bhutan to the Maldives.

Every country on the subcontinent has a
basic right to determine its own destiny with-
out interference or dominance by any other.
The United States places a high value on this
right, out of conviction and out of our interest
in a peaceful regional system. Every major
power — now including India, with its new
power in the region — has a basic responsibility
I toward the international system to exercise its
' power with restraint, so that these smaller
nations may look to the future confident of their
security and independence.

Agenda for the Future

When I visited South Asia in 1969, I said,
"I wish to communicate my government's con-
viction that Asian hands must shape the Asian
future." This was not a statement of lack of
interest in South Asia; it was, on the contrary,
a recognition that America's relationship with
Asia would change and that our involvement
would require the increasing assumption of

responsibility for the Asian future by the
people of Asia. The United States role would
be one of assistance; w^e would cooperate, but
would not prescribe.

That was a time of significant progress and
hope in South Asia. In conditions of peace,
the gains from major economic policy decisions
and reforms during the 1960's in both India
and Pakistan were being consolidated. The full
potential of the Green Revolution was begin-
ning to be recognized and in some areas
realized. The concepts and practices of eco-
nomic development and population planning
were maturing.

Along with this progress, enormous prob-
lems remained on the agenda, and we discussed
these at length in both India and Pakistan
during my visits: the need for peace and
normalization of relations between India and
Pakistan ; the future direction of Asia, of South
Asian nations in relation to the rest of Asia,
and of the United States, the Soviet Union,
and the People's Republic of China in relation
to them ; the need for a new relationsliip be-
tween aid donor and aid recipient; and the
continuing efforts of governments to meet the
demands and aspirations of their people for
economic and social development.

The crisis of 1971 interrupted and enor-
mously complicated these tasks — and under-
lined their urgency. For the United States the
crisis of 1971 illustrated again that we did not
control the destiny of South Asia — but that
we had an important stake in it. The agenda
for the future is both the natural outgrowth
of the agenda we faced in 1969 and the legacy
of the upheaval of 1971.

The first responsibility for building the
future of South Asia rests on the leaders and
peoples of South Asian nations themselves.

— To a unique degree, the political future of
the subcontinent depends on the ability of
institutions to meet basic human needs — the
needs of the victims of drought, cyclone, flood,
war, disease, hunger, and unemployment. No
particular political form guarantees that these
needs will be met. What is important is the
determination to build institutions that can
respond to human needs and give diverse
elements a stake in a larger community.

— A precondition for the fulfillment of these
aspirations is a sense of security and a lessen-
ing of tensions between nations on the sub-
continent. Each nation must respect the
integrity of the other, and each must have the
confidence that it can maintain its integrity
and choose its future without fear of pressure

June 4, 1973

793

K

or dominance from outside.

— The relations between the countries of
South Asia and countries outside the region
must be consistent with the peace and inde-
pendence of the subcontinent and the peace
of the world. If any outside power acquires an
exclusive position in an area of this mass and
potential, others will be forced to respond. The
major powers all have important relationships
there. No South Asian interest is served if
those relationships are embroiled in local
tensions.

The United States will support, as we can,
South Asian efforts to address this agenda.

First, the United States will contribute,
where asked and where possible, to meeting
human needs and to the process of develop-
ment. We do this out of the traditional human-
itarian concern of the American people, and
out of a common interest in supporting the
effectiveness and stability of institutions.
Where our economic assistance does not serve
mutual interests, it should not be provided.
Where it does, ways must be found to assure
that the form of aid is consistent with the dig-
nity of both the donor and the recipient. The
donor must not expect special influence in
return; the recipient must acknowledge a
mutuality of interest, for only in a relationship
of acknowledged common purpose are assist-
ance programs sustainable.

Second, United States policies globally and
regionally will support the independence of
South Asian nations. Within the region, we
shall encourage accommodation and help to
promote conditions of security and stability.
We see no reason why we cannot have bilateral
ties with each country in South Asia consistent
with its own aspirations and ours, and not
directed against any other nation. We shall
gear our relations with other major powers
outside the region to encourage policies of
restraint and noninterference. This is our re-
sponsibility as a great power, and should be
theirs.

Third, we shall seek to assure that the con-
cerns of all South Asians are heard in world
councils on the issues of global peace and on
all issues that affect them. This is not only
for their benefit; it is for the general interest
in building economic and political relations
globally that all have a stake in preserving. As
I wrote in my Foreign Policy Report in 1971 :
"More than ever before in the period since
World War 11, foreign policy must become the
concern of many rather than few. There can-
not be a structure of peace unless other nations

help to fashion it." It is in the world interest
that South Asia make a positive contribution.

I hope to see South Asia become a region of
peace instead of crisis, and a force for peace
in the world.

AFRICA

The birth of Africa's new nations was one
of the dramatic features of the postwar period.
The assertion of black nationhood in Africa
coincided with a new affirmation of black dig-
nity in America, creating a special bond of sym-
pathy between the United States and the new
Africa. But in the conditions of the time, the
United States was preoccupied with African
crises. We assumed we would be drawn into
assertive involvement on the continent eco-
nomically and politically, both because of
endemic instability and poverty and the threat
of aggressive competition from Communist
powers. In an exuberant phase of our own for-
eign policy, the United States exaggerated its
ability to help solve many of Africa's problems.

Conditions had changed by the time I came
into office. The United States clearly needed a
more coherent philosophy for a long-term, posi-
tive role in Africa's future. There was no ques-
tion about America's continuing commitment
to the goals of regional peace, economic develop-
ment, self-determination, and racial justice in
Africa. The issue was to focus seriously on ef-
fective ways America could contribute to them
in new conditions.

— The stark, long-term problems which
Africa faced had not disappeared. But in many
countries a new generation of leaders had
come into power who knew that rhetoric was
no substitute for determined effort to govern
effectively and mobilize their peoples to meet
the tasks ahead. Given underdevelopment,
ethnic rivalries, and the ai'bitrary boundaries
left by the colonial powers, the political co-
hesion and stability achieved by Africa's 41
nations was a testimony to African statesman-
ship. Moreover, African nations had proven to
be the best guarantors of their own sovereignty.
The continent was not divided into great power
spheres of influence nor did it become an arena i
of great power confrontation. ;

— In the economic sphere, while the United j
States was able to maintain the level of its
governmental assistance, the most promising'
sources of capital to finance African develop-*
ment were now trade and private investment.
The means of American support for African

)

794

Department of State Bulletin ,^

I development wouUl thus necessarily be more
' diverse, and the first responsibility for mobiliz-
ing energies and resources would clearly rest
on the Africans themselves.

— The yearning for racial justice in the south-
ern half of the continent continued unfulfilled
after more than a decade of violence and ex-
cessive rhetoric. The task now was to devise
new and practical steps toward beneficial
change.

Our policy goals in Africa are unchanged:
political stability, freedom from great power
intervention, and peaceful economic and social
development. We seek positive bilateral rela-
tions with African nations founded on their
self-reliance and independence, and on forms of
supiiort which we can sustain over the long
term.

Economic Progress in Africa

The principal role America can play in the
continent's future is that of support for eco-
nomic development — one of the primary objec-
tives of all African countries. This is what
Africa's leaders have told me they need — and
this is the field in which the United States can
contribute most effectively.

Our common objective is Africa's self-reli-
ance. African efforts, national and regional,
are the key to this accomplishment. We are en-
couraged by the growth and success of African
institutions of regional cooperation. The recent
creation of the African Development Fund is a
promising example of such African initiatives.

Our interest in supporting Africa's develop-
ment efforts rests on many bases. A central
motive is our humanitarian concern. We also be-
lieve that as the quality of life improves on
the continent, so will the prospects for regional
peace. In addition a developing African econ-
omy will mean expanding potential markets for
American goods. Moreover, Africa is becoming
a major source of energy for the United States
and Western Europe. Libya is one of the
world's important producers of oil ; Nigeria's
oil production is increasing; Algerian natural
gas is a rapidly growing source of world energy.
One fourth of the world's known uranium ore
reserves are in Africa. As the West seeks new
and alternative sources of energy, African de-
velopment becomes increasingly important.

There should be no illusions about the bar-
riers to economic progress in Africa. The aver-
age per capita Gross National Product of most
•African nations ranges between $100 and $200
I year. Subsistence agriculture is the principal

means of livelihood for mucii of their popula-
tion. Malnutrition and disease are widespread.
Africa still needs to build its social infrastruc-
ture— education and technical skills, public
health, new methods of agricultural production,
and improved transport links within nations
and on a regional scale.

The United States can be proud of its rec-
ord of direct development assistance to Africa.
We have assisted Africa both through bilateral
aid and by contributing over 30 percent of the
funds provided to Africa by international agen-
cies. In this Administration, in spite of limited
resources available for our total foreign aid
program, we have increased our assistance to
Africa in each of the la.st three years. In 1972
our bilateral and multilateral aid was $600
million — up from $550 million in 1971 and $450
million in 1970. Our programs have reflected
an increasing emphasis on areas of technical
assistance that are relevant to broad regional
needs, such as food and livestock production
and regional transportation systems. Two
thousand four hundred Peace Corps volunteers
are currently serving in Africa, bringing needed
skills and demonstrating America's commit-
ment to helping others.

American direct private investment in Africa
has almost doubled in the last four years, reach-
ing a total of $4 billion, and 75 percent of that
total is in Africa's developing countries. We
have promoted trade and development in Africa
through our Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC), which promotes the flow of
American capital to the developing world, and
through the guarantee and other facilities of
the Export-Import Bank, whose long-term loans
for African trade reached a record total of
$113 million in 1972.

American firms can be a conduit for the
transfer of skills, resources, and technology.
The productive impact of these enterprises
may be the most direct as well as the most
reliable outside stimulus to the raising of living
standards in developing Africa.

Obviously such private activity must be un-
dertaken in ways consistent with the sover-
eignty and policies of African governments. We
accept the basic principle of the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity that the
natural and human resources of Africa must
be harnessed for the total advancement of Afri-
can peoples. The specific conditions for private
outside investment, and the degree of local
participation in control and in profits, should
be determined on a fair basis reflecting the in-
terdependence of the relationship. American

June 4, 1973

795

companies seek no special privileges, and the
United States seeks no special advantage.
Where investment has been allowed to take
root and flourish, economic performance has
been impressive. This is the clearest demonstra-
tion of a shared interest.

Trade expansion is important to both Africa
and the United States. Our two-way trade has
grown 30 percent in the last three years, but
it is still modest in scale— only about $3.1 billion
in 1972. The U.S.- sponsored African Trade and
Development Conference in Washington last
October brought together representatives of
African Governments, our Government, and the
American business community to promote trade
with developing Africa. We have an interest
in seeing U.S.-African trade expand m a bal-
anced way. Such trade reflects a healthy inter-
dependence which serves the needs both of
African progress and of the American economy.
Our imports from Africa in 1972 rose to $1.6
billion, a 33 percent increase over the previous
year. U.S. exports to Africa, however, declined
slightly in 1972.

The future of our trade with Africa and our
hopes for its expansion will be affected by still-
unresolved problems concerning the interna-
tional terms of trade. One issue is that of com-
modity agreements. Understandably, African
nations heavily dependent on a single crop
like cocoa or coffee are interested in agreements
stabilizing the prices of these commodities. The
United States as a consuming nation, on the
other hand, seeking to control inflation at home,
tends to favor free-market determination of
price. This is a difficult problem involving di-
vergent interests, and we recognize its vital
importance to many African countries. We are
committed to addressing the problem coopera-
tively and are prepared for regular consulta-
tion and exchanges of information on market
conditions.

Another important issue for the United
States is the evolving economic relationship
between African nations and the European
Community. The growth of preferential ar-
rangements discriminating against competing
American products in both European and Afri-
can markets is naturally of concern to the
United States. In this year of important multi-
lateral trade negotiations, the United States will
work for solutions that serve the long-term
general interest in an open global system of
expanding trade.

The United States has continued to respond
to many of Africa's needs with humanitarian
assistance. This is a reflection of the traditional

796

concern of the American people. For decades,
dedicated Americans have worked— through
private and voluntary agencies and public pro-
grams—to help Africans combat illiteracy, star-
vation, disease, and the effects of natural dis-
asters. We can take particular pride m our
contribution to a major seven-year campaign
to control smallpox throughout Central and
West Africa. Working with the World Health
"Organization and twenty African Governments,
we helped virtually to eliminate the disease
from the area. We are continuing efforts to re-
duce the prevalence of measles in the area. In
the semi-arid states south of the Sahara, where
another year of inadequate rainfall threatened
large-scale starvation, the United States pro-
vided emergency grain above and beyond the
quantities already being provided. ]

Where civil strife has occurred, the United !
States has responded with generosity and im- i
partiality to the basic human needs of the vie- j
tims of conflict. In the last year, even before ,
the resumption of diplomatic ties with Sudan,
we provided humanitarian aid to the Sudanese j
Government for the resettlement of refugees !
in the southern part of that country. The United ]
States contributed to international programs ,
to relieve the suffering of refugees who had !
fled from Burundi to neighboring countries. |
When Asians were expelled from Uganda, this !
country opened its doors to 1,500 of their I
number. \

Stability in Africa

There is no area of the world where states
are more assertive of their national independ- ;
ence and sovereignty than in Africa. This is
understandable because of still fresh memories ,
of colonial experiences and because so many
of these states continue to feel vulnerable to i
outside intervention and internal subversion.!
In each of mv Foreign Policy Reports to Con-;
gress I have affirmed that non-interference ml
African internal affairs is a cardinal principle
of United States policy. I reaffirm that principle,
and pledge that we shall respect it. The same^
obligation rests on other outside powers. We
believe that restraint should characterize great-
power conduct. This is in the interest of;
Africa's secure place in the international sys-
tem, and in the interest of Africa's stability.,

Africa's nations themselves have proven toj
be the best champions of their right to deter-
mine their own future. African leadership has
accomplished impressive examples of nation-
building.

—Ethiopia, under the Emperor's leader-

, j
Department of Stote Bullelir

ship, has for decades been a symbol of African
independence and a leader of institutions of
African unity.

— Nigeria has not only survived a bitter civil
war; it has pone far toward national reconcilia-
tion. Today it is a united, confident nation.

— Strife-torn Congo (Kinshasa) has trans-
formed itself into the new and stable Zaire,
with promising prospects for development.

— In Sudan, years of warfare between north
and south were ended in 1972 and the nation
embarked on a new era of unity and recon-
struction.

These achievements by four of Africa's larg-
est and most important states are grounds for
confidence in Africa's future.

African nations have also shown their de-
termination to safeguard the peace of their
own continent. Out of their great diversity,
they have fashioned institutions which have
dampened political conflicts and provided mu-
tual support for common purposes. The Organi-
zation of African Unity, celebrating its tenth
anniversary this year, deserves special note.
African states also have worked out bilateral
solutions to serious problems. The accord
reached in 1972 between Sudan and Ethiopia,
which helped settle Sudan's internal conflict,
and the understanding reached last year between
Morocco and Algeria over their border dispute
were two noteworthy achievements.

There also were serious disappointments in
1972. It would be less than candid not to men-
tion them, for I am sure they were disappoint-
ment.'', too. to Africans who are working for
peace and justice on the continent.

The situation in Burundi po.sed a genuine
dilemma for us and for .African countries. Non-
interference in the internal political aff"airs of
other countries is a paramount and indispensa-
ble principle of international relations. But
countries have a right to take positions of con-
science. We would have expected that the first
responsibility for taking such positions rested
upon the African nations, either individually
or collectively. The United States urged African
leaders to addre.ss the problem of the killings
in Burundi. We provided humanitarian assist-
ance, impartially, to those who needed it in
Burundi or who fled. All of the African leaders
we spoke to voiced their concern to us; .some
raised it with Burundi's leaders. But ultimately
none spoke out when these diplomatic efforts
failed.

In Uganda, the attacks on that country's in-
tellectual class, as well as the expulsion of
Asians, were deplorable tragedies. The United

States has provided refuge for some of the
Asians, whose exi)ulsion, whatever the ration-
ale, had racial implications which do no credit
or service to Africa.

While events in these two countries were
tragic in comparison with the continent's other
achievements, the ability of African leaders
to maintain independence and territorial integ-
rity while welding ethnic diversity into nation-
hood remains an undeniable source of real hope
for the future.

Southern Africa

The denial of basic rights to southern
Africa's black majorities continues to be a
concern for the American people because of our
belief in self-determination and racial equality.

Our views about South Africa's dehumaniz-
ing system of apai'theid have been expressed
repeatedly by this Administration in the United
Nations, in other international forums, and
in public statements. As I said in my Foreign
Policy Report two years ago, however, "just
as w'e will not condone the violence to human
dignity implicit in apartheid, we cannot asso-
ciate our.selves with those who call for a violent
solution to the.se problems."

We should also recognize that South Africa
is a dynamic society with an advanced economy,
whose continued growth requires raising the
.skills and participation of its non-white major-
ity. It is particularly gratifying that some
American companies have taken the lead in
encouraging this. They recognized that they
were in a unique position to upgrade conditions
and opportunities for all their employees re-
gardless of race, to the fullest extent possible
under South African laws.

In addition, we have sought to maintain con-
tact with all segments of South African .society.
We do not endorse the racial policies of South
Africa's leaders. But we do not believe that
isolating them from the influence of the rest of
the world is an effective way of encouraging
them to follow a course of moderation and to
accommodate change.

In the Portuguese territories, we favor self-
determination. We have clearly expressed this
position in the United Nations, and we shall
continue to do so.

The United States continues to enforce —
more strictly than many other countries — an
embargo on .sales of arms to all sides in South
Africa and in the Portuguese territories. While
we favor change, we do not regard violence
as an acceptable formula for human progress.

lune 4, 1973

797

We do not recognize the regime in power in
Riiodesia; as far as permitted by domestic leg-
islation exempting strategic materials, the
United States adheres strictly to the United
Nations program of economic sanctions. In
Namibia, we recognize United Nations juris-
diction and discourage United States private
investment.

No one who understands the complex human
problems of Southern Africa believes that solu-
tions will come soon or easily. Nor should there
be any illusion that the United States can trans-
form the situation, or indeed, that the United
States should take upon itself that responsi-
bility. This is the responsibility of the people
who live there, not of any outside power.

It is important that all who seek a resolution
of these problems address them with serious-
ness, honesty, and compassion.

The Future of U.S.-African Relations

It is important to us that we have been able
to preserve our political ties with this important
sector of the Third World in this new period.
My fourteen personal meetings with African
leaders during my first term in office were an
opportunity to further this process, as were
the extensive visits to Africa by the Vice Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State — the first visit
by an American Secretary of State to black
Africa. A very special event occurred in Janu-
ary 1972 — an official trip to Africa by Mrs.
Nixon. Her warm reception in Ghana, the Ivory
Coast, and Liberia was a symbol of the friend-
ship of Africans toward Americans and was
particularly gratifying for that reason. I will
have further meetings with African leaders this

year. I traveled to Africa four times before
becoming President, and I hope to become the
first American President to visit black Africa
while in office. I intend as President to demon-
strate my concern for Africa — as a matter both
of personal conviction and of national policy.

American policy toward Africa in the 1970's
will reflect not only our friendship but a mature
political relationship. The United States and
African nations can deal with each other with
frankness and mutual understanding. There
will be difl'erences of view, and there should
be no illusions about this on either side. But
the United States will seek bilateral relations
with African countries on the basis of sovereign
equality and mutual respect.

We have an interest in the independence and
nonalignment of African countries. We ask
only that they take truly nonaligned positions
on world issues and on the roles of the major
powers.

Our most tangible contribution to Africa's
future is our support for its economic progress.
We will continue to emphasize our aid, trade,
and investment efforts.

We will continue to encourage evolutionary
change in Southern Africa through communica-
tion with the peoples of the area and through
encouragement of economic progress.

These are practical measures of support.
They reflect our conviction that Africa needs
concrete measures that have a real impact on its
problems. Our approach represents a positive i
and constructive role for America to play over |
the long term. It sets goals we can meet. In a
new period, this philosophy suits the new ma- j
turity of American policy, of African policy, j
and of our relationship. j

Part V: Designing a New Economic System

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY

International economic forces have a direct
bearing on the lives of people in all countries.
The monetary, trade, and investment jiolicies of
any government strongly affect the jobs, prices,
and incomes of its people. They influence con-
ditions in many other countries as well. Inevit-
ably, they have a major impact on international
relations.

We have moved far toward resolving political
differences through negotiation in recent years.

798

But the peace and stability we seek could be|
jeopardized by economic conflicts. Such conflicts
breed political tensions, weaken security ties,,
undermine confidence in currencies, disruptj
trade, and otherwise rend the fabric of coopera-'
tion on which world order depends.

It is imperative therefore that our efforts in'
the international economic arena be no less
energetic, no less imaginative, and no less de-'
termined than our efforts to settle other com-
]ilicated and vitally important problems.

In the past two years we have begun a major;

Department of State Bulletin

effort to reform the international monetary sys-
tem, improve the meclianisms of world trade,
and normalize our commercial relations with
the People's Republic of China, the Soviet
Union, and the nations of Eastern Europe. We
have moved closer to new agreements that will
provide jrreater prosperity for us and for other
nations while ensuring- that economic relations
reinforce traditional ties and contribute to the
development of new ones. We have the chance
to make economic relations a strong- force for
strengthening the structure of peace.

The International Economic System

The economic arrangements and institutions
created following World War II served well un-
til recent years. But as nations gained sti-ength,
points of economic contact between them mul-
tiplied and relative positions shifted, their pol-
icies had a deeper and broader effect on one
another. International institutions and arrange-
ments proved incapable of coping with the
major problems that arose. Conflicts, imbal-
ances, divisions, and protectionist tendencies
threatened political, security, and economic co-
operation. Nations were forced to meet repeated
crises but did not get at their causes. In August
1971 we decided to take strong action toward
fundamental reform of the world economic sys-
tem. Our initiatives and proposals in 1972
moved the international community further to-
wards that needed reform.

Our goal is to work with other nations to
build a new economic order to meet the world's
needs in the last quarter of this century. We
believe these new arrangements should achieve
six major objectives:

— continued economic progress from which
all nations benefit;

— a broader sharing of responsibility com-
mensurate with new economic power relation-
ships and the potential benefits to be gained;

— rules that reflect an equitable balance
among the interests of all nations;

— the widest possible consensus for principles
of open economic intercourse, orderlv economic
behavior, and effective economic adjustment;

— improved methods for assuring that those
principles are adhered to; and

— sufficient flexibility to allow each nation to
operate within agreed standards in ways best
suited to its iiolitical character, its stage of
development, and its economic structure.

'The achievement of these objectives can create

a new balance between diverse national eco-
nomic needs and a greater international unity
of purpose. Economic relations can become a
source of strength and harmony among coun-
tries rather than a source of friction.

But these objectives can be achieved only if
nations make a .strong commitment to them.
Close and constructive cooperation among the
European Community, Japan, and the United
States — the thi-ee pillars of the Free World
economy — will be essential. Other nations, in-
cluding the developing countries, Canada, and
Australia must iilay a major role. All have an
important stake in an improved economic sys-
tem. Our country, for example, will import
increasing amounts of energy fuels and raw ma-
terials and therefore will have to sell more
abroad to pay for them. But the stakes go be-
yond the problems of individual nations. Na-
tions must be determined to channel potential
conflict into constructive competition to
strengthen their mutual prosperity and the
prospects for a more peaceful world order.

International Monetary Policy

In the late 1960's, the monetary system cre-
ated at Bretton Woods a quarter of a century
before was beset by crisis. By mid-1971 it had
given rise to serious imbalance and instability
which placed intolerable pressures on the
Ignited States. My decision of August 15 — to
suspend dollar convertibility and to impose a
ten percent surcharge on imports — set the stage
for thoroughgoing reform.

The Smithsonian Agreement of December
1971 moved toward more realistic exchange
rates. By making both surplus and deficit na-
tions responsible for balance of payments ad-
justment, it had imiiortant implications for the
future. But its greatest significance was as the
essential prologue to full reappraisal and re-
form of the system.

The Agreement was not designed to resolve
all the problems. Heavy speculative pressures
developed periodically; the substantial deficit
continued in America's balance of payments, and
many countries reinforced exchange controls.

Proposals for Reform. Early in 1972 we
sought to establish a new forum to examine the
problem. The members of the International
Monetary Fund established the Committee of
Twenty with representatives of both developed
and developing nations for this purpose.

After consultations with other governments
we took advantage of the annual meeting of the

June 4, 1973

799

International Monetary Fund/World Bank in
September 1972 to put forward our views on
needed reform in specific and comprehensive
terms.

Of the proposals we put forward at the Sep-
tember meeting, one in particular — improve-
ment of the balance of payments adjustment
process — has important foreign policy implica-
tions. Because it deals with trade, investment,
and monetary flows affecting- the lives of people
in all nations, balance of payments adjustment
is an extremely sensitive issue. Relative com-
petitive positions are particularly vital to the
economic well-being of those living in nations
that depend substantially on foreign trade. Ex-
change rates have a major impact on the inter-
national competitiveness of nations and thus
affect the jobs and incomes of their people.
When exchange rates are seriously out of line,
the prospect of abrupt change in currency mar-
kets creates uncertainty, disrupts trade, and ad-
versely affects the domestic economies of all na-
tions. When one nation believes that another's
adjustment or failure to adjust damages its in-
terests, serious international friction can result.

Too little attention was paid to adjustment
under the Bretton Woods System. Nations put
a high premium on holding their exchange rates
fixed. Remembering the dollar shortage of the
early postwar period, many countries came to
feel more secure with substantial surpluses and
were reluctant to undertake adjustments to re-
duce them. Even after they had achieved large
l)ayments surpluses and growing reserves, some
governments continued to help certain export
industries and ineflicient domestic industries.
Yet precisely because of their large surpluses
and reserves, balance of payments adjustments
should have been made. Once the psychology
of building surpluses and emphasizing exports
had taken firm root, countries were concerned
with the domestic repercussions of changing
course.

There were other deficiencies in the system:

— there was no agreed way to determine
when an imbalance should be corrected;

— there were too few means to induce surplus
nations to reduce imbalances;

— there were too few methods used to adjust
imbalances. In the industrialized countries, do-
mestic fiscal and monetary policies were con-
sidered the most appropriate methods, but we
and others have learned that such measures are
not always adequate or feasible.

Eventually these deficiencies produced intoler-

able pressures. For a time after World War II
the world benefited from American deficits.
Others needed our dollars to restore their liquid-
ity, to buy our goods, and to finance expand-
ing trade. When our deficits grew large, other
countries urged us to bring our balance of pay-
ments into equilibrium and to stop using what
they saw as the "special privilege" of having
our trading partners hold dollars indefinitely.
But our ability to adjust unilaterally was se-
verely limited. Moreover, the effects of doing
so by a change in exchange rates, when most
transactions were valued in dollars and most re-
serves were held in dollars, were almost certain
to be disruptive. Ironically, countries accumu-
lating dollars they did not want were reluctant
to revalue their own currencies for fear of los-
ing their competitive advantage.

By August 1971 dollars held abroad far ex-
ceeded U.S. reserve assets. Some countries with
large dollar reserves continued to maintain sub-
stantial balance of payments surpluses. The
world became increasingly skeptical of the abil-
ity of the United States to convert outstanding
dollars into other reserve assets and doubted
the ability of other countries to maintain the
exchange value of the dollar at its then current
rate. As confidence waned, the rush to sell dol-
lars and buy other currencies accelerated. The
stability of the world's economic system was at
stake and the need for reform was clear.

The history of the adjustment problem dem-
onstrates the need for more effective and bal-
anced adjustment machinery. Obviously no na-
tion can fully control its balance of payments.
The action or inaction of one country affects the
domestic and international economic situations
of others. Nations naturally want as much con-
trol as possible over their economic policy to i
meet the .social and economic needs of their
citizens. But failure to accommodate the in-
terests of others weakens the world economy,
to the disadvantage of all. Our proposals would j
give each nation maximum discretion in choos-:
ing ways to adjust its payments imbalance, but^
would give the international community the]
means to ensure effective adjustment. j

We believe governments should employ a var-(
iety of methods to achieve balance of payments
adjustment. They should continue to use fiscal
and monetary policy that fits their circum-
stances. Beyond this, they should have morei
latitude to adjust the international price of
their currency when they face a payments im-
balance. For countries choosing to maintain

800

Department of State Bulletin

! L

set par values for their currencies, greater
flexibility could be achieved by allowing a
"band" of permissible exchange rate fluctuation
around parity wider than that under Bretton
Woods. I'nder agreed conditions, countries
might sometimes seek adjustment by a transi-
tional float to a new par value, by a float on an
indefinite basis, or by a move directly to a new
set rate. All three techniques have been used in
recent realignments.

Countries in surplus should also use trade and
investment liberalization to contribute to adjust-
ment. In exceptional circumstances, temporary
trade restrictions may be an appropriate sup-
plementary adjustment action for deficit coun-
tries. If imports are to be restrained for this
purpose, it should be by barriers such as a sur-
charge rather than by quotas. Surplus countries
also can contribute importantly to adjustment
by increasing the amount of foreign aid which
they give without requiring purchases from
them.

We believe that criteria should be established
which will identify when an adjustment is
needed. The need should be demonstrated be-
fore an imbalance becomes so great that the
adjustment to correct it would pose serious dif-
ficulties either dome.stically or internationally
for the nation involved. These criteria should
api)ly even-handedly to surplus and deficit na-
tions alike. In our view the disproportionate
gain or loss in a country's reserves should be
the primary indicator that balance of payments
adjustment is needed. If in a particular case a
country believed the reserve indicator to be
misleading and the adjustment inappropriate,
a multilateral review could help determine the
proper action. But if that review did not over-
ride the indicator and if the country did not
take action, the international community should
apply pressures and inducements to bring it
about.

Recent Events. Repeated crises over recent
years have clearly demonstrated that need for
closer international cooperation to speed prog-
ress toward monetary reform and improved
payments equilibrium. In February and March
of 1973, the United States and several other
countries jointly acted to deal with the latest in
a series of major crises. The high degree of in-
ternational cooperation that marked the han-
dling of these critical monetary issues can pro-
duce the fundamental reforms the system re-
' quires. We hope the outlines of a new approach
can be agreed upon at the International Mone-

tary Fund meeting in Nairobi this September,
and we will work closely with others to attain
that objective.

Foreign Trade

In determining their trade policies, govern-
ments must balance the desires of all their peo-
ple. Some workers, farmers, and businessmen
want greater access to foreign markets; others
want to limit imports; and consumers want the
widest variety of goods at the lowest possible
prices.

Recent problems in the international trading
system reflect in part the high priority some
countries place on promoting certain exports
and protecting favored producers. Over-empha-
sis by some countries on jn-omoting certain
exports has forced their own consumers to pay
more for these products by reducing their avail-
ability at home and has sometimes led to dis-
ruptive increases in imports in the markets of
other nations. Over-emphasis by countries on
protection has penalized their domestic con-
sumers and limited exports of other nations.

When such excesses by one nation occur, ad-
versely affected groups in other countries de-
mand retaliation or protection. These demands
are particularly hard for governments to deal
with in the present climate. International rules
adopted in the 1940's to prevent or solve these
and other problems have often been ignored. In
some cases they do not meet contemporary
needs. Nations on occasion have felt they had
no choice but to accommodate particular do-
mestic interests in ways that not only further
complicate the international problem but also
damage other domestic interests. The result has
been an erosion of confidence in the trading sys-
tem, and economic and political friction.

The U.S. Response. Balancing domestic and
foreign interests in this environment has been
one of the most diflncult jiroblems faced by the
United States. Early in 1972 the United States
secured agreement from Japan to reduce trade
barriers on a variety of industrial and farm
products. At our meeting in Honolulu later that
year and in subsequent talks as well, Japan
agreed to take additional steps to boost imports
of American products and to liberalize its inter-
nal distribution system. Although these activ-
ities have benefited American exporters, they
have not been adequate and we are seeking
further progress in these areas. In talks with
our trading partners and in the forum provided

June 4, 1973

801

under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade we are pressing for solutions to other
problems including compensation for the im-
pairment of our trade interests as a result of
enlargement of the European Community and
its new arrangements with other European
countries.

Special problems caused by rapidly rising
steel and textile imports into the United States
have been eased by export restraint agreements
reached with major foreign producers. Enforce-
ment of anti-dumping and countervailing duty
laws, which protect American workers and in-
dustry from injury due to unfair import com-
petition, has improved markedly.

We have also taken steps to cut inflation and
to benefit American consumers. We suspended
import quotas on meats and relaxed them on
certain dairy products. The entire oil import
program was recently restructured to help en-
sure adequate supplies for the domestic market.
The measures also have helped foreign export-
ers. Moreover, we have eliminated export sub-
sidies on farm products, contributing to a
sounder balance between exports and home
supplies and to a better world agricultural
trading order.

But despite the actions we and other nations
have taken to meet domestic needs and to help
establish more sustainable trade arrangements,
problems and grievances remain. Although
farmers, workers, businessmen, and consumers
together benefit overwhelmingly from foreign
trade, trade issues continue to be the subject
of intense debate. In some cases, pressures such
issues generate prevent nations from reducing
trade barriers even though to do so would be in
their overall interest. In other cases, they pro-
duce pressures for new barriers that adversely
affect both their own domestic consumers and
other nations.

In the United States, these pressures— mag-
nified by a period of high unemployment and a
large payments deficit— have created demands
for erecting high barriers against foreign com-
petition. For both domestic and international
reasons I do not favor this course. This ap-
proach might ease a few problems, but it would
cause many more of a serious and permanent
nature. Our consumers would have to pay
higher prices. The many American industries
that depend on imported materials and com-
ponents would be seriously hurt and their prod-
ucts would become less competitive. This course
could also trigger an escalation of international
trade barriers which would cut American in-

802

l|

l!

dustrial and agricultural exports and strike at
the roots of international cooperation and pros-
perity. The collective result would be highly
damaging to our domestic well-being and to our
foreign policy interests. We have agreed with
our trading partners to pursue a wiser and bet-
ter alternative.

The Need for a Multilateral Response. The
solution to the problems we face lies in a major
international effort to develop an improved
world trading system. We must build a system
which allows nations to satisfy their domestic
needs while participating fully in mutual gains
from trade. Such a system should expand ex-
port opportunities and give consumers the bene-
fit of less expensive and more varied goods. It
should establish a set of rules under which a
country could limit imports temporarily where
necessary to give workers and industries time
to adjust smoothly to sudden disruptive in-
creases in foreign competition. And it should
bring about an improvement in international ,
trading rules and arrangements. Together these j
will enable us to better meet the needs of Amer- ,
ican agriculture, labor, business, and consum- j

GTS.

The international commitment to multilateral j
trade negotiations provides the opportunity to j
achieve these goals. In February 1972, the j
United States, the European Community, and j
Japan agreed to "initiate and actively support '
multilateral and comprehensive negotiations m
the framework of GATT beginning in 1973 . . .
with a view to the expansion and greater lib-
eralization of world trade ... on the basis of
mutual advantage and mutual commitment with
overall reciprocity." At Honolulu, Prime Min-
ister Tanaka and I reaffirmed that commitment.
In October leaders of the enlarged European
Community reemphasized their pledge to work
toward a reduction of tariff and non-tariff
barriers, expressing the hope that the negotia-
tions could be concluded in 1975. Responding to
these expressions, I sent new trade legislation
to the Congress and announced my intention to
work toward the timetable suggested by the
European leaders.

The Task of Negotiations. We now have the
chance to move from confrontation to negotia-
tion in the field of trade. The negotiating proc-
ess holds the greatest hope for reducing bar-
riers to our exports, for resolving trade differ-
ences with friends, and for developing the im
proved trading system the world needs.

The impending negotiations can substantially i

Department of State Bulletin

lower world tariff barriers. But we do not look
upon this effort merely as another round of
tariff reductions — an area in which much prog-
ress has already been made. They also provide
a major opi)ortuiiity to settle a variety of other
trade issues. Most nations emi)loy a variety of
non-tariff trade barriers. A number of these
are erected for social, political, and security
reasons. Others e.xist because of government
l)rocurement, health, and safety standards. It
\\\\\ be hard to eliminate these barriers oi- re-
duce their trade distorting- effects without af-
fecting the domestic interests that fostered
them. But minimizing their adverse trade ef-
fects will open broad new areas for interna-
tional commerce.

The majority of the world's people, in all na-
tions, will benefit from more open agricultural
trade and the resulting lower cost and in-
creased availability of farm products. It is
particularly important to the United States to
remove the barriers which stand in the way of
expanded agricultural trade. We are efficient
producers of many farm commodities, and our
farm policies are predicated on a more open,
more market-oriented agricultural trading sys-
tem.

Preferential trading arrangements, which
discriminate against the trade of those who do
not participate in them, cannot be reconciled
with the Most Favored Nation principle, the
basic tenet of world trade. In certain cases we
have actively encouraged closer regional politi-
cal and economic relations. But close relations,
where the objective is not a fuller economic and
political union, need not include discriminatory
trade arrangements. Where they do, we believe
steps should be taken to reduce or eliminate
their adverse trade effects. Regional arrange-
ments that are i^art of a broader economic or
political unity must be distinguished from pref-
erential arrangements that primarily divert
trade from other countries.

We also need a multilateral agreement on
safeguards that nations can apply for a limited
time to permit smooth adjustment to rapid in-
creases in imports. As we pursue a more open
trading world for the benefit of all, it is self-
defeating to ignore the fact that adjustment to
more open competition may be difficult for
some. Effective procedures to ease this process
are the most realistic way to ensure that open
trade will bring the benefits we expect.

We also need better means to avoid trade
conflicts and to settle them in an orderly way

when they develop. One nation's efforts to pro-
mote some segment of its economy or to pro-
tect it against external competition can sig-
nificantly damage other countries. One way to
avoid the resulting frictions is to agree on more
effective rules for trade. Another is frequent
consultations so that nations consider the views
of their trading jiartners before making de-
cisions and assure that problems are faced
in-omptly and candidly. At a time when we are
moving from confrontation to negotiation in
other areas, we need new trading arrange-
ments and rules to solve trade problems in the
same spirit.

Principles for Success. The coming trade
negotiations will have the best chance of achiev-
ing their major objectives if they are based on
sound political and economic principles:

— Negotiations should seek maximum feasi-
ble reliance on market forces as a means of
guiding trade. Such arrangements will allow
us to sell the goods we jjroduce most competi-
tively and to buy goods others produce most
competitively, increasing the earnings of work-
ers and farmers and giving the consumer more
for his money. This is the most efficient way
of using each nation's resources; it avoids the
vicious circle of protection and counterprotec-
tion. The temptation to dwell on the "cost" of
particular concessions must be avoided in favor
of the overall objective of lessening trade bar-
riers and improving the world trading system.
The benefits that will accrue to all nations —
not only economically but also in their broader
relationships — should be the guiding objective.

— Negotiations should significantly reduce
barriers in all trade sectors. Only all-inclusive
negotiations permit a full weighing of broader
national interests of participating countries.
From our point of view, it is especially impor-
tant that the negotiations reduce barriers in
certain areas of agricultural trade. Other na-
tions have areas in which they want similar
results. To pay less attention to one nation's
priorities will make that nation less inclined to
meet the priority needs of others.

Prospects for the Future. Over the past year
this Administration has stressed the impor-
tance of creating a more open and equitable
trading order. We have worked to get other
nations to pledge full cooperation in this effort.
We do not expect the coming negotiations to
solve all trade problems, but they can success-
fully launch us toward that goal. Last October's

June 4, 1973

803

declaration by leaders of the European Com-
munity and similar statements by Japanese
leaders demonstrated their dedication to this
effort. Other nations are similarly committed.
But we must seize the moment, or the mo-
mentum that has developed could be lost.

I recently sent the Congress my proposed
Trade Reform Act of 1973. This legislation
would give the President authority to negotiate
a system that will increase world trade, give
the United States an opportunity to share fairly
in that increase, and insure that trade becomes
a source of stability and cooperation among
nations. Meanwhile we are dealing with indi-
vidual trade problems using, where available,
the procedures of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Effective action on such mat-
ters could clear up some existing differences
and improve the climate for broader negotia-
tions. We look to other nations to work with
us in forthcoming negotiations in a test of joint
statesmanship to bring about a world trading
order which serves the needs of all.

The Developing Nations

Despite a record of significant accomplish-
ment— including an average annual increase in
economic growth of more than 5.5 percent in
the last decade, the success of the Green Revo-
lution, and rapid advances in health and edu-
cation— hundreds of millions of people in the
developing countries still exist in conditions of
extreme hunger, poverty, and disease. Basic hu-
manitarian considerations call on us to assist
these countries in improving the lives of their
people. But we also have a major economic and
political interest in the growth and stability of
these countries and in their active cooperation.

Many of these countries have energy re-
sources and raw materials that we will need in
significantly increasing amounts. Some of them
have become fast-growing markets for our ex-
ports. Almost one-third of U.S. exports went to
developing countries in 1972 and the future
growth of these countries will expand our
markets.

But an increased pace of development is es-
sential. Unless substantial progress occurs —
through efforts by developed and developing na-
tions alike — the stability of many countries and
regions can be jeopardized as essential needs of
people go unsatisfied.

There has been a growing tendency to ques-
tion our commitment to help developing na-
tions. Attracted to rapid solutions and under-

estimating the time and effort needed to stimu-
late development, Americans are frustrated by
the slow pace of visible progress. But, our fu-
ture economic and political needs will be far
better served by actively cooperating with the
developing countries for our mutual benefit
than by negotiating their needs. We must pur-
sue a realistic policy of development assistance
and find better ways of dealing with the trade
and monetary interests of developing nations.

Foreign Assistance. I have long been con-
vinced that we needed major improvements in
our foreign assistance program. Numerous
statements in committees responsible for aid
legislation and by individual Congressmen sug-
gest that broad support exists for the modified
approach to aid.

We have already improved our aid system in
several ways. Bilateral aid is now focused on a
few key areas — such as population planning,
agriculture, health, and education — in which
the Agency for International Development
(AID) has a high degree of experience and
expertise. Development assistance has been
separated organizationally from assistance
given for security reasons. A new International
Narcotics Control Assistance Program is help-
ing developing countries improve their ability
to control the production and flow of illicit nar-
cotics. And we have strengthened our capacity
to provide urgently needed emergency assist-
ance to countries that have suffered disasters.

Effective coordination of aid has increased
its efficiency and benefits for recipients. AID
is increasingly coordinating its programs with
those of other nations and international bodies.
In cooperation with other nations, we have pro-
vided short-term relief to countries whose debt
burden was so overwhelming that it threatened
their growth and stability.

We deal with recipient countries as partners
recognizing their growing expertise and their
ability to determine their own development
needs. While we help in the planning, funding,
and monitoring of development programs, we
no longer take the lead in setting priorities or
in detailed execution.

We have made substantial contributions to
development assistance through international
institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, and the United Nations Develop-
ment Program. Because of their multilateral
and non-political character, these institutions
frequently can be more rigorous and frank on

804

Department of State Bulletin

issues of development policy with reciiiient
states. They have done an outstanding job in
l)roviding: the framework for coordinating
donor contributions and in assuming their ap-
projiriate role of leadership in the development
assistance effort. The funds I have requested
for these institutions and for our bilateral pro-
grams are essential to the peoples of the devel-
oping countries and to the structure of our re-
lationship with the developing: world.

Dfvelopment Tliroufih Trade. While foreign
assistance is important, developing nations
have to earn by far the largest part of their
foreign exchange through trade. Traditionally,
they have exported mainly raw materials,
though manufactured goods have increasing
potential for expansion. They must export these
goods in increasing amounts in order to buy the
machinery and other products necessary for
their future develojiment. Recognizing this fact,
we have included in our proposed trade legisla-
tion a provision for generalized tariff prefer-
ences which would allow many jiroducts of the
developing countries to enter the U.S., as they
already enter Europe and Japan, without duty.

In the 19th and early 20th Centuries there
was considerable friction among developed na-
tions as a i-esult of their discriminatory com-
mercial arrangements with the poorer areas
of the world. Today's special preferential ar-
rangements are also a source of such friction.
And they run counter to the interests of many
develoi)ing countries. We seek a system that
improves developing country access to the mar-
kets of the developed countries without discrim-
ination and without restricted preferential
arrangements. Our legislation reflects this
approach.

In the forthcoming trade negotiations, de-
veloping countries have an opportunity to help
create a general imi)rovement of trade condi-
tions. Most of them want greater freedom in
agricultural trade and increased exports to de-
veloped countries of their manufactured and
semi-manufactured goods. We and the develop-
ing countries which share these objectives have
an interest in working together to achieve them.
And, reductions in the import barriers of
developing countries could benefit their econ-
omies and help make the system work more
effectively.

Monelary Policy and the Devel«piii{» Nations.

The developing countries have a major interest
in the reform of the world's monetary system.

Their trade, exchange reserves, and debt posi-
tions are directly affected by monetary events.
Yet in the past they have had little voice in
monetary negotiations. The inclusion of nine
representatives of the develoi)ing nations on
the Committee of Twenty on international mon-
etary reform is a significant and positive step.
We are working closely with these nations to
achieve reforms that serve our mutual interests.

Future Issues

1972 began an era of negotiation and reform
in international economic policy. We laid the
groundwork for a thorough restructuring of the
international economy and opened doors to new
commercial relations with the Communist
world. The critical task facing us now is to
carry forward the work of reordering the world
economy to make it more responsible to the
needs and realities of our time. We must de-
velop new rules for international economic ac-
tivity that reflect changing circumstances. Na-
tions must share the responsibility for making
the system work so that all can benefit from a
more oi)en and equitable world economy. All na-
tions must work together cooperatively so that
we can move into a new era of broadly shared
prosperity.

Our goals will be to:

— carry forward negotiations in the Commit-
tee of Twenty to devise a monetary system that
meets the needs of all nations;

— begin multilateral negotiations aimed at
substantial reduction of barriers to oi)en trade
and imjn'ovement of the trading system;

— widen public understanding of our inter-
national economic goals and obtain necessary
legislative authority for our active i)articipa-
tion in building a stronger world economy;

— expand cooperation with the lower income
countries to help their development efforts
through improved aid i)olicies and by opening
the international system to their more effec-
tive participation;

— continue to broaden economic exchanges
with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of
China, and the nations of Eastern Europe.

We must take advantage of the foundation
laid in 1972 to build an international economic
structure that will promote healthy competi-
tion, enhance i)rosperity for us and other coun-
tries, and contribute to a peaceful world order
in the decades to come.

June 4, 1973

805

Part VI: Maintaining Security

DEFENSE POLICY

Of all the changes in the international situa-
tion over the postwar period discussed in this
Report, one of the most fundamental has been
the shift in our strategic position.

The Challenge We Faced

When I entered office we faced a situation
unique in American postwar experience. An
era was behind us. In the immediate aftermath
of World War II challenges to our security
could be met with the assurance that our
strategic nuclear position was overwhelmingly
superior. By January 1969, the United States
no longer enjoyed this strategic preponder-

The Soviet Union had embarked on a for-
midable expansion of its nuclear arsenal. We
could chart with some certainty when the
Soviet Union would surpass us in numbers ot
intercontinental and submarine launched bal-
listic missiles ; we could also project when they
could close the technological gap in strategic
weapons. Our own offensive building program
had virtually ceased, as we had shifted our
effort to qualitative improvements. We had
developed a concept for ballistic missile de-
fense of our territory, but had no active
deployment. We faced a negotiation on stra-
tegic'arms controls, but had only begun to
analyze the relationship to strategic weapons

decisions.

At the same time, our spending for defense
had grown substantially. Almost all the in-
creases, however, had been absorbed by the
war in Vietnam. The costs of new weapons
were escalating, as were the expenses of main-
taining the men of our armed forces. In addi-
tion, we were bearing burdens abroad for the
common defense that seemed out of proportion
to those borne by our allies. More than a
million Americans were stationed overseas,
and our reserves at home were minimal.

Yet, I found that our strategic doctrine
called' for an American capability to fight
in two major theaters simultaneously. The
confrontation atmosphere of the Cold War per-
sisted in both Europe and Asia. But the mter-

806

national environment after 25 years suggested
new opportunities for diplomacy and, accord-
ingly for adjustments in military planning.
The rigidity of the confrontation between East
and West was easing, and the conduct of
nations could no longer be viewed in the simple
bipolar context of military blocs.

The need for an urgent reexamination ot our
national security policy and programs was
obvious. There were four overriding questions:
—What doctrine was appropriate for our
strategic forces in an era when the threat of
massive retaliation alone was no longer cred-
ible in all circumstances and decisive nuclear
superiority was probably unattainable?

—What should the interrelationship be be-
tween the programs required for maintamnig
our strength and our proposals for limiting
strategic arms through negotiations?

—How could we simultaneously satisfy
pressing domestic needs, meet our responsi-
bilities in Vietnam, and maintain the capa-
bilities of our other forces in a period when
non-nuclear challenges were an important
dimension of the security problem?

—How could we, in coordination with our
allies, strengthen our mutual defense m a
manner that retained their confidence in our
reliability but permitted them to play a more
prominent role?

Early in my first term, I made a series of
decisions that resulted in a new concept of , i
national security, reflected in the Nixon ;

Doctrine. 4. j +i,o ;

In strategic nuclear policy, we adopted the
doctrine of sufficiency. We could no longer be , 1
complacent about the strategic status quo ;j
merely because we could cause a certain level 1 1
of destruction in response to an attack. We .,
therefore began to develop a sounder and more i i
flexible doctrine for our forces that would 1 !
provide other retaliatory options besides a ^
direct attack on millions of people. i

Concurrently, in order to reduce our vulner- ; i
ability and to compensate for the Soviet j
buildup, we launched a program to modernize 1 1
our strategic forces. We continued to convert ■
our land and sea-based missiles to multiple j 1
independently targetable warheads (MIRVs). jj

Department of State Bulletin . |

Thus, our missiles which would survive an
attack would be able in retaliation to strike
their targets with greater assurance of eluding
defenses. We laid plans for a new long-range
missile and submarine that would reduce
vulnerability by allowing operation in a larger
ocean area while still in range of targets. In
addition, to increase the survivability of our
retaliatory forces, we began planning a new
strategic bomber to replace the aging B-52
force. We also initiated the Safeguard anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) program to protect
our land-based retaliatory forces.

Each of these decisions was taken, however,
with the full understanding that, as an integral
part of our national security policy, we also
would seriously pursue negotiations for arms
limitations. We would offer the Soviet Union
the opportunity to reach agreement on
measures that would enhance the security of
both sides.

Finally, we began to assess our security
obligations to determine how our alliance
defense posture might be strengthened through
mutual effort. We examined whether U.S.
forces in some forward areas might be re-
duced ; in those regions where security required
a strong and continuing American presence, as
in Europe, we and our allies initiated new
programs for sharing the defense burden.

In the past four years we have laid a solid
foundation for safeguarding American security
for the remainder of this decade. We are now
entering a period of promising prospects for
increasing international stability. But the
outcome is by no means guaranteed. We are
still in a challenging period of transition. We
still face difficult decisions.

There have been a number of positive
developments since 1969. ITnprecedented prog-
ress has been made in strategic ai'ms controls.
For the first time in two decades there is a
genuine possibility of mutual and balanced
force reductions in Eui-ope. Our allies in
Western Europe and Asia have become
stronger, both economically and militarily, and
are contributing more to mutual defense.
Tensions in these two regions have been
easing. A Vietnam Peace Agreement has been
signed and our force of a half million men
has returned home.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the
negative trends that persist. Even though
Vietnam is entering a new phase, conflict
remains in Indochina and ferment persi.sts in
other key areas of the world such as the Middle
East where the interests of major powers

are involved. Modern weapons are still being
delivered to areas of great instability. The
Soviet Union is strengthening its armed forces
in every major category, including those in
which the United States traditionally has had
a substantial margin of superiority. A Soviet
military presence now has been established in
many strategic areas of the world.

As we determine the requirements for our
defense in these circumstances and approach
ongoing arms control negotiations, five factors
of the current situation are of particular
importance :

— There is approximate parity between the
strategic forces of the United States and the
Soviet Union. Soviet numerical advantages are
offset by superior American technology.

— In such an era greater reliance must be
placed on non-nuclear forces.

— Technological change while creating new
opportunities also poses a potential threat to
existing strategic stability.

— -Manpower costs have increased substan-
tially. They now absorb more than 56 percent
of our entire defense budget, compared with
42 percent a decade ago. Now that we have
chosen to rely on all-volunteer forces, the pro-
portion devoted to manpower is not likely to
decrease.

— The costs of increasingly complex modern
weapons are also spiraling, further constrain-
ing our ability to maintain conventional force
levels.

At the same time, the political climate at
home has changed. In spite of the adjustments
we have already made to new conditions, we
face intensified pressures for further with-
drawals of our deployed forces and for greater
reductions. In the post-Vietnam environment,
some Americans seem eager to return to the
prevalent philosophy of the 1930's, and resist
U.S. involvement in world affairs. The con-
sensus which su.stained our national commit-
ment to a strong American military posture
over the postwar period is no longer unchal-
lenged.

The emerging global order, however, has
neither exact historical parallels nor a pre-
destined outcome. American actions will be
a decisive determinant of its shape. In a period
of developing detente, it is easy to be lulled
into a false sense of security. Threats are less
blatant; the temptation is greater to make
unilateral reductions and neglect the realities
of existing forces of potential adver.saries.

In such a fluid period we have no responsible

June 4, 1973

807

choice but to remain alert to the possibility
that the current trend toward detente with
the Soviet Union and China may not prove
durable. We have only begun an era of
negotiations. We must not now ignore funda-
mental changes in the balance of forces or in
the potential strength of our adversaries in
an era of rapid change. To do so would only
tempt challenges to our security interests and
jeopardize chances for achieving greater
stability through further agreements.

Military adequacy is never permanently
guaranteed. To maintain security requires a
continuing effort. But faced with escalating
costs of manpower and weapons and competing
domestic demands, we must insure that
defense spending is based on a realistic assess-
ment of our security requirements, and we
must endeavor to reduce expenditures through
more effective management.

There is, however, an irreducible minimum
below which we cannot go without jeopardiz-
ing the very foundations of our diplomacy,
our interests, and our national security. This
Nation cannot afford the cost of weakness.
Our strength is an essential stabilizing element
in a world of turmoil and change. Our friends
rely on it; our adversaries respect it. It is the
essential underpinning for our diplomacy, de-
signed to increase international understanding
and to lessen the risks of war.

While taking the necessary steps to maintain
the sufficiency of our strength, we are seeking
a sound basis for limiting arms competition.
Both elements are fundamental to a national
defense that insures a more stable structure
of peace.

Strategic Policy

Deterrence of war is the primary goal of
our strategic policy and the principal function
of our nuclear forces. Thus, our objectives
continue to be:

— to deter all-out attack on the United
States or its allies ;

— to face any potential aggressor contem-
plating less than all-out attack with unaccept-
able risks; and

— to maintain a stable political environment
within which the threat of aggression or coer-
cion against the United States or its allies is
minimized.

Strategic forces are the central component
of our military posture. It is on them that our
security and that of our allies is most heavily
dependent.

While our goals are unchanged, there have
been fundamental changes in the strategic
military environment. Approximate nuclear
parity between the United States and the
Soviet Union is now a strategic reality and has
been confirmed in strategic arms control agree-
ments. Certain technological advances, how-
ever, could become destabilizing. So it is, there-
fore, imperative that we continue to assess the
adequacy of our strategic policy and programs
in light of advances made by potential adver-
saries.

The task is greatly complicated by the long
lead time required to make significant changes
in these forces. Because of the extended de-
velopment phase for new systems, a lengthy
period could pass before a nation perceived
that it was falling dangerously behind. From
that point, it would require another consider-
able period before the imbalance could be
corrected.

We must plan now to have a strategic force
that will be adequate to meet potential threats
of the next decade. We must develop our pro-
grams in the context of an uncertain world
situation and accelerating technological pos-
sibilities.

During the 1960's missiles were relatively
inaccurate and single warheads were the rule.
Today, accuracies have improved significantly
and missiles carry multiple warheads that can
be independently targeted. In the present en-
vironment it would be misleading to measure
sufficiency only by calculating destructive
power in megatonnage. The quality of weapons
systems, and their survivability, are vital
determinants of sufficiency.

The SALT Agreement of May 1972 halted
the rapid numerical growth of Soviet strategic
offensive systems. Within the limits of the
current SALT Agreement, however, strategic
modernization programs may continue. We
must, therefore, carefully assess the efforts
the Soviets are making to improve their
capabilities and must pace our programs
accordingly.

— At least three new Soviet Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are being de-
veloped : a new, very large missile which could
have greater capability than the SS-9, which
is now the largest operational Soviet missile; a
smaller ICBM, possibly intended as a follow-
on to the SS-11 missile; and a solid propellant
ICBM, probably designed to replace the SS-13
or possibly to provide a mobile capability.

— These new missiles may well carry MIRVs

808

Department of State Bulletin

with accuracies which would increase the
vulnerability of our land-based missiles, thus
jeopardizing the current strategic stability.

— The Soviet Ihiion has begun deployment
of a new submarine capable of submerged
launch of a 4,000-mile-range missile.

— The Soviet ABM research and develop-
ment program continues unabated.

If present trends continue and we do not
take remedial steps, the forces which we cur-
rently rely upon to survive an attack and to
retaliate could be more vulnerable. At some
time in the future we could face a situation
in which during a crisis there could be a
premium to the side that initiated nuclear
war. This would be an unstable and dangerous
strategic relationship. Such a strategic en-
vironment is unacceptable.

In the late 1960's the effectiveness of Amer-
ican strategic nuclear forces was measured
by a criterion known as "assured destruction."
This concept assumed that deterrence could
be maintained if it were clear that following
a large-scale nuclear strike the United States
could retaliate and inflict an unacceptable level
of damage on the population and industry of
the attacker.

In the 1970's strategic doctrine must meet
different criteria. While the specter of an un-
acceptable response is fundamental to deter-
rence, the ability to kill tens of millions of
people is not the only or necessarily the most
effective deterrent to every challenge. Such a
drastic course can be credibly reserved only
for the most overwhelming threats to national
survival. Moreover, the measurement of the
effectiveness of our strategic forces in terms
of numbers of dead is inconsistent with
American values.

A different .strategic doctrine is required in
this decade when potential adversaries possess
large and more flexible nuclear forces. The
threat of an all-out nuclear response involving
the cities of both sides might not be as credible
a deterrent as it was in the 1960's. An aggres-
sor, in the unlikely event of nuclear war, might
choose to employ nuclear weapons selectively
and in limited numbers for limited objectives.
Xo President should ever be in the position
where his only option in meeting such ag-
gression is an all-out nuclear response. To
deal with a wide range of possible hostile
actions, the President must maintain a broad
choice of options.

Credible deterrence in the 1970's requires
greater flexibility:

— Lack of flexibility on our part could tempt
an aggressor to use nuclear weapons in a
limited way in a crisis. If the United States
has the ability to use its forces in a controlled
way, the likelihood of nuclear response would
be more credible, thereby making deterrence
more effective and the initial use of nuclear
weapons by an opponent less likely.

— Therefore, to extend deterrence over a
wider spectrum of possible contingencies we
should ensure that our forces are capable of
executing a range of options.

— -If war occurs — and there is no way we
can absolutely guarantee that it will not — we
should have means of preventing escalation
while convincing an opponent of the futility of
continued aggression.

Greater flexibility in the employment of our
forces does not necessitate any drastic change
in our nuclear programs. The fundamental
objective of military forces remains deter-
rence. Potential aggressors must be aware that
the United States will continue to have both
the resolve and the capacity to act in the face
of aggression in all circumstances.

Strategic Programs

Our weapons programs are planned within
the framework of this strategic policy. We
must also consider Soviet strategic develop-
ments, arms limitations, and the potential for
technological change. In light of the current
strategic situation, I have determined that the
U.S. must continue its modernization programs
to ensure the future sufficiency of our nuclear
forces.

— We are therefore improving our ICBM
force. Silos for Minuteman missiles are being
hardened, and 550 Minuteman III missiles
with multiple indei)endently targeted warheads
will be deployed by the mid-1970's.

— Development of a new strategic sub-
marine, the Trident, has been undertaken to
provide a highly survivable replacement for
our current ballistic mi.ssile submarines.

— We are developing a generation of sub-
marine launched missiles with substantially
greater range. With these new missiles our
Trident and Poseidon submarines will be able
to operate in a much larger ocean area while
still within range of targets, and thus will be
less vulnerable.

— The survivability of B-52 bombers has
been increased by decreasing the time required
for take-off on warning of an attack and by
developing new basing concepts. This will

June 4, 1973

809

reduce the threat from the growing force of
Soviet ballistic missile submarines.

— We have also begun engineering develop-
ment of the B-1 bomber as a potential replace-
ment for the aging B-52s. The B-1 would
maintain our bomber force as an important
element in our mix of retaliatory forces, pro-
viding assurance against technological break-
throughs, complicating an enemy's offensive
and defensive planning, and ensuring flexi-
bility of response.

— The ABM facility at Grand Forks, North
Dakota, is being completed. This installation
will give us operational ABM experience while
directly enhancing the survivability of Minute-
man ICBMs. We will also continue our plan-
ning for the Washington, D.C. ABM site in
order to provide additional security for the
major control center of our forces.

— Similarly, we are improving facilities for
command and communications to control our
responses in crisis situations.

We cannot prudently ignore the long-term
strategic requirements of our security. But at
the same time we are conscious of a serious
responsibility — to preserve an environment
which enhances stability and encourages fur-
ther efforts to limit nuclear arms. Our forces,
therefore, are not designed to provide a capa-
bility for a disarming first strike. Moreover,
our programs are not so substantial that our
objectives could be misunderstood, conceivably
spurring a Soviet building cycle. There is not
necessarily a direct relationship between every
change in the strategic forces of the two sides.
Some changes reflect an action-reaction cycle
in the strategic arms programs of the two
nations. In other cases, the similarity between
American and Soviet forces results simply from
the fact that roughly the same technologies are
employed.

This year we will continue to assess how to
deal more effectively with the implications of
parity and to guard against unanticipated
technological breakthroughs. At the same time,
our efforts will reflect the essential defensive
and deterrent purposes of our doctrine and
forces.

General Purpose Forces

In a strategic environment of approximate
parity, nuclear weapons alone are less likely
to deter the full range of possible conflicts. Our
success in negotiating strategic limitations has
thus increased the importance of maintaining

other deterrent forces capable of coping with a
variety of challenges.

In recent years conventional forces have
played a critical role in numerous conflicts
involving great power interests, including
Arab-Israeli and Jordanian-Syrian fighting in
the Middle East; the India-Pakistan war; and
the North Vietnamese invasion of Laos, Cam-
bodia, and South Vietnam.

The United States cannot protect its national
interests, or support those of its allies, or meet
its responsibilities for helping safeguard inter-
national peace, without the ability to deploy
forces abroad. In the Jordan crisis of 1970,
for example, our forces helped stabilize an
explosive situation. When warnings went un-
heeded and the North Vietnamese launched an
all-out invasion of the South in the spring of
1972, our determination to act decisively with
conventional forces was tested. The bombing
and mining of North Vietnam complemented
the defensive action of our South Vietnamese
allies on the battlefield and provided a con-
vincing incentive for serious negotiations. In
both instances the combination of local superi-
ority and a strong U.S. defense posture de-
creased the likelihood of challenge to these
forces.

When I came into office, I ordered a reas-
sessment of the rationale upon which our con-
ventional force planning was based. Our
analysis concluded that a coordinated attack
by the major Communist powers simultane-
ously in both Europe and Asia was unlikely.
We determined, however, that our forces
should still be adequate to meet a major threat
in either Europe or Asia and to cope simul-
taneously with a lesser contingency elsewhere.

The specific potential threats we face in Asia
or Europe continue to be the primary deter-
minants of the size, composition, and disposi-
tion of our general purpose forces. Our
principal forward deployments are in these
areas where, supplementing the forces of our
allies, they help counterbalance the strong
forces of potential adversaries. The strength
of the defenses of Western Europe remains
the cornerstone of our own security posture.
The American presence in Europe and Asia
is essential to the sense of security and con-
fidence of our friends which underpins all our
common endeavors — including our joint efforts
in the common defense. Our forces are
deployed to provide a responsive and efficient
posture against likely threats.

But planning based on the threats in these
two areas alone is not sufficient. We also need

810

Department of State Bulletin

J

forces to deal with lesser contingencies that
pose a threat to our interests — a capability not
necessarily provided by units positioned for a
major conflict overseas.

Moreover, even in a period of developing
detente, we cannot ignore the reality of a
modern Soviet navy operating increasingly in
the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, the Mediter-
ranean and along the coasts of Africa; newly
established Soviet security commitments, sup-
port facilities, and communications networks
in key areas of the Third World; or increasing
Soviet arms programs in these areas.

The credibility of our force posture has two
basic determinants; overall size and the level
of forward deployments. Our general purpose
forces are now substantially below the peak
levels of the Vietnam builduji and well below
even the levels maintained prior to the Viet-
nam war. This is the result of changing assess-
ments of security requirements, our success
in developing allied capabilities, and the in-
creasing costs of replacing obsolescent systems
and maintaining existing forces.

Our ground, naval, and air forces have now
reached the absolute minimum necessary to
meet our commitments and provide a credible

Pre and Post Vietnam Force Levels

Pre- Peak

Vietnam Vietnam Current
June June June
196i 1968 197S

Skips:

Attack carriers . . . .

Anti-submarine, in-
cluding attack sub-
marines

Fleet air defense . . .

Amphibious assault .

15

381

53

134

15

379

75

148

14

252
73
65

583

Attack and Fighter Air-
craft Squadrotts :

Air Force 90

Navy 85

Marine 28

203

Ground Force Divisions:
A rmy :

Airborne 2%

Airmobile

Infantry 6

Mechanized 4

Armored 4

Marines:
Amphibious 3

617

103
80
27

404

71
70
25

210

166

2%
1

7
4
4

1
1

2%
4%
3

19%

22%

'16

* 1 division not shown consists of armored, air
cavalry, and airmobile units.

conventional deterrent in an age of strategic
parity. Compared to levels in June 1964, we
have a third fewer combat shii^s, 37 fewer
aircraft squadrons and 3 and i/j fewer ground
divisions.

Manpower has been cut to a comparable
degree. In the last four years we have reduced
our forces by more than a million men. They
are now one-third smaller. They are at the
lowest level since the Korean War, and are
nearly half a million below levels prior to the
\'ietnam War.

About one-third of our general purpose
forces are necessarily deployed abroad to pro-
vide a capability for responding rapidly to
threats to American and allied interests, for
guaranteeing the credibility of our joint de-
fense, and for underpinning our diplomacy.
The forces remaining in the United States
serve as a ready reserve for reinforcing our
forward deployments, and for protecting our
interests in other parts of the world. The
largest portion of our overseas forces is sta-
tioned in Western Europe; a smaller increment
is stationed in the Mediterranean and Asia.

— Our NATO force in Europe consists of
41/;! Army Divisions, 21 Air Force attack and
fighter squadrons, and naval units in the North
Atlantic.

— In the Mediterranean we maintain two
attack carrier task forces and a Marine am-
phibious group which help protect NATO's
southern flank as well as meet non-NATO
challenges in this volatile area.

— United States forces in Asia consist of
those still supporting operations in Indochina
and normal forward deployments not directly
related to Vietnam needs. The basic forces
include: one Army division stationed in Korea
and two-thirds of a Marine division located in
Okinawa; ten Air Force and five Marine
fighter /attack squadrons distributed in Korea,
•Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, Okinawa, and the
Philippines; and three attack carrier forces
and two Marine amphibious groups operating
in the We.stern Pacific.

Although NATO deployments have been rela-
tively constant in recent years, Asian force
levels are now substantially below those main-
tained prior to the Vietnam War.

Given our broad requirements, the uncer-
tainty of the current international situation,
and the jiost-Vietnam contraction of our armed
forces, it would be unwise to make further
unilateral cuts in deployments or significant re-
ductions in overall force levels in the foresee-

June 4, 1973

811

able future. To do so would raise questions
about the adequacy of our force posture to
safeguard our interests. The limitations of our
current force levels were illustrated by the
strain placed on our forces as a whole by our
effort last year to help counter the invasion of
South Vietnam by a small nation with practi-
cally no navy or air force.

Obviously, American forces alone cannot bal-
ance the strong capabilities of potential ad-
versaries. For this reason our planning under
the Nixon Doctrine has emphasized the
strengthening of mutual defense by bolstering
allied capabilities.

In NATO, it is often forgotten that our allies
provide nearly 90 percent of ground forces and
the majority of alliance air and naval craft.
American ground forces are concentrated in
Germany where they constitute over one-fourth
of the forces in this vital area. Along with our
allies we are taking additional measures to
strengthen NATO forces. Expenditures by in-
dividual members for force modernization have
increased for the third consecutive year, and
under the billion dollar five-year European
Defense Improvement Program, NATO commu-
nications, anti-armor and air defense capa-
bilities continue to improve. United States
capabilities are also being improved, and our
ground forces are being strengthened by selec-
tively transferring men from support to combat
units.

Programs in Ash too have achieved remark-
able success in strengthening allied capabilities.
In Southeast Asia, progress in Vietnamization
was demonstrated by the effective Vietnamese
defense on the ground against all-out invasion.
In Northeast Asia, South Korean forces are
growing in effectiveness as a result of our joint
program for modernization, and the Korean
economy is now able to support more of the
recurring costs of maintaining these forces
without hampering normal economic growth.

Our Asian allies are also becoming more self-
sufficient in dealing with subversion and guer-
rilla warfare, which remain a potent threat. As
our friends develop greater local and regional
military sufficiency under the Nixon Doctrine
the need for our direct involvement diminishes.
In the meantime, the stabilizing presence of our
forces in the area enhances the wider frame-
work of security and gives encouragement to
further allied efforts to develop their capacity
for self-defense.

In the current delicate international balance
of forces, I believe our general purpose forces
are now at the minimum level consistent with

812

our safety and our interests. However, as w(
assess our requirements for the late 1970's anc
beyond, we will not let the perceptions and ex
periences of the past drive our planning foil
deterrence of wars of the future. We will en]
sure that our planning and doctrine are attuneci
to the evolving international situation and t(|
our strategic needs in a new era.

Security Assistance

Many nations in the world whose security
we consider important to our own face military
challenges, often instigated or supplied by thir(|
countries. A stable international system re;
quires that small countries be secure and ini
dependent, and that they be able to protecj
their security and independence mainly by theiij
own efforts. '■

For this reason, American support of othe:
nations' defense efforts has always been a vitai
component of our .security policy and an essen;
tial element in maintaining international sta:
bility. In today's multipolar world, and as thii
United States adjusts its role from one of pre
ponderance to one of sharing responsibilitiei
more widely, this supportive role becomes alj
the more central to our policy. ;

As great as our resources are, it is neitheij
possible nor desirable for the United States t(
pay most of the costs, provide most of the man,
power, or make most of the decisions concern'i
ing the defense of our allies. Nor, is ii
necessary. Our allies are determined to mee'
the threats they face as effectively as possibl*
within the limits of their resources. Under th(
Nixon Doctrine, our role in our Security As
sistance programs is to share our experience
counsel, and technical resources to help then
develop adequate strength of their own. ;

We provide this support through various pro'
grams of Security Assistance: grant militarj,
assistance to friendly countries unable to afforcf
equipment which is essential to their selfi
defense; foreign military sales for cash oi
credit; and supporting a.ssistance, which prO'
vides budgetary support to a few key coun
tries to enable them to sustain their economies
in spite of unusually heavy defense require
ments.

These programs have been a part of oui
policy for more than 25 years. They have mef
specific needs in a wide variety of cases. Oui
programs and means have reflected a carefu
and continuing assessment of our interests anc
needs in changing conditions.

The success of these programs is strikinglj;

Department of State Bulletir ^

evidenced by the changes over time in the com-
position of the program. The growing self-
sufficiency and self-reliance of our friends —
which our assistance is designed to promote —
are reflected in the declining necessity for gi-ant
aid and the dramatic increase in their ability
to take financial responsibility for their de-
fense needs. Our grant militaiy assistance has
dropped from over $4 billion twenty years ago
to less than $1 billion today, exclusive of South
Vietnam. Where once our program was almost
entirely on a grant basis, today sales make up
by far the major portion of the program.

In 1966 the largest military assistance grants
went to the Republic of Korea, Turkey, the Re-
public of Vietnam, the Republic of China,
Greece, and Iran. In 1974, in contrast, Iran will
purchase all military equipment, paying fully for
everrthing received. Greece and the Republic of
China will receive no grant materiel, and both
are turning increasingly to cash and credit
sales. The security requirements of South Korea
and Turkey continue to require grant assist-
ance, but both are moving toward increased
use of credits as their economies continue to
e.xpand. The success of our programs in helping
South Vietnam and South Korea build capable
forces of their own has permitted us to with-
draw all our forces from South Vietnam and
20,000 men from South Korea. These are two
of the most significant demonstrations of how
Security Assistance is precisely what enables
allies to take up more of the responsibility for
their own defense.

The assistance of the United States cannot
he effective unless an ally is willing and able
to mobilize its own people and resources for
its national defense. No country can escape
responsibility for its own future. None of our
friends would wish to do so. The encourage-
ment, counsel, and assistance we provide can
make a crucial difference to their success.

Resources for National Defense

Manapiiif; Moderni/ation. In today's condi-
tions, maintaining modern forces at adequate
levels is a major challenge. General purpose
forces now take three times as much of the de-
fense budget as strategic forces. Yet the Soviet
Union has made significant qualitative im-
provements in conventional forces, while many
of our e.ssential i)rograms have been deferred
because of more pressing Vietnam require-
ments.

A major modernization effort is underway to
provide our forces with adequate weai)ons for

the decade ahead. Our national technological
base is one of the foundations of our national
security. But the continual escalation of weap-
ons costs and complexity limits our ability to
exploit all the latest technical advances. Even
with adjustments for inflation, weapons today
cost, on the average, two to three times more
than those ones they replace. Sophisticated
equipment is often more difficult to repair.
Complexity frequently results in higher oper-
ating costs and lower reliability. These trends
make it difficult to replace older weapons on a
one-for-one basis. But the higher performance
of new systems does not always compensate for
the severe reduction of flexibility caused by
fewer numbers.

This cost problem is most acute with respect
to tactical aircraft. New first-line aircraft are
four to five times more costly than the older
planes being replaced, primarily because of
their sophisticated electronics and fire control
systems. The same problem arises in modern
ship and ground force systems.

The long lead time for new weapons devel-
opment has far-reaching implications. It is
therefore imperative that proposed programs
provide sufficient improvements to justify their
expense, and that once adopted they do not
exceed planned costs or fail to perform as in-
tended. Unless we improve management per-
formance in this area, we simply will not be
able to maintain the minimum force levels nec-
essary to meet the needs of our security without
drawing increasingly on funds required for
such essential intangibles as force manning,
training, and readiness.

We are taking a number of innovative steps
to grapple with this problem. In evaluating pro-
])osals for increased technical sophistication,
more weight is now being given to cost, and
greater care is being devoted to assessing the
real gain in terms of mission relevance and mil-
itary eflfectiveness. In addition, combinations of
high and low cost weapons are being developed
for major missions. For example, a less costly
light-weight fighter is being developed at the
same time as the highly sophisticated F-15
fighter. This approach also has been used in
meeting diverse ship requirements. Low-cost
l)atrol frigates are being purchased for convoy
duties while more expensive nuclear-powered
guided missile frigates are being constructed
to escort nuclear carriers as part of a rapid
reaction task force.

We also are improving techniques for closer

June 4, 1973

813

monitoring of the development process. Bench-
marks have been established for more frequent
checking of compliance with cost and perform-
ance standards. Operational testing is being
emphasized to ensure that new equipment is
reliable and effective under combat conditions.
Manpower. Rising manpower costs are one
of the most significant factors limiting overall
force levels and the resources available for mod-
ernization. Even after the large personnel re-
ductions we have made, manpower today takes
more than half the defense budget. These rising
costs result principally from the effort to make
military pay competitive with that of other
professions. While the program to attract vol-
unteers and correct past financial inequities is
expensive, it is also essential to manning our
armed forces at adequate levels.

Our success in attracting volunteers into the
services gives us confidence that manpower con-
straints will not seriously limit the manning of
our forces in peacetime. We are now able to
support our military strategy without a draft.
When I first announced my intention to end the
draft, many feared we would not be able to
maintain the force levels, readiness, and morale
needed to support defense needs in an increas-
ingly technical environment. But initial exper-
ience under this program suggests these fears
were unwarranted. The quality of volunteers
has fully met the service needs and compares
favorably with the quality in the past.

Current projections indicate that the portion
of the defense budget devoted to manpower
should stabilize, but the expense of personnel
programs will require continuing attention.

Defense Spending. Allocation of resources be-
tween security needs and domestic require-
ments is one of the most difficult tasks of the
budgetary process. Though the upward pres-
sures of manpower and weapons costs have
complicated the problem, defense spending has
leveled off in real terms. As a result, we have
been able to shift Federal budgetary priorities
markedly from security toward domestic needs.
Defense today takes only six percent of our
total national output, compared to eight to nine
percent in the 1960's. National security once
took nearly half of every budget dollar; now it
requires less than one-third.

Nevertheless, unless we aggressively meet the
management challenge of spiraling weapons
and manpower costs, it will be nearly impossi-
ble to maintain modern forces at the levels nec-

814

essary for national security. I have directed the'.
Secretary of Defense to give these matters the |
most urgent attention. ,

In the next four years, we will continue to be ;
faced with important choices concerning na-l
tional priorities. But I am determined that our,
military power will remain second to none. The
experiences of the past four years have con-|
firmed the wisdom and absolute necessity of a!
strong and committed America in the world.
It is the only sound foundation on which peace
can be built.

ARMS CONTROL

The progress recorded in arms control overi
the past four years has been unprecedented.
Four major agreements have been achieved: j

In February 1971, an international treaty!

was signed that bans the emplacement of nu-i
clear weapons on the seabed or ocean floor. i

—In September 1971, the United States and]
the Soviet Union agreed on a series of measures
to reduce the danger of accidental war.

—In April 1972, an international treaty was!
signed that bans the development, production,^^
and stockpiling of biological weapons and|

toxins. '

—On May 26, 1972, I signed for the United
States two agreements with the Soviet Uniori
limiting strategic offensive and defensiv(|
armaments. i

These accomplishments represent the initial
fulfillment of my commitment to limit the mos1j
dangerous forms of weaponry as part of oui^
broader objective of moving from confrontatior
to negotiation. Each of these agreements is im-
portant. But their cumulative impact is evei,
greater than their specific merits. They reflect i
new political attitude toward arms limitatioi
by the United States and the Soviet Union anc,
within the international community generally

Arms control has taken on new significance
in the nuclear age and represents an importan
component of national security policy. Whei
this Administration took office there were sev
eral factors that suggested an agreement t(
limit strategic weapons might be attainable: :

—In the classical balance of power system
most national leaders were concerned with ac
cumulating geopolitical and military power tha
could be translated into immediate advantage
In the nuclear era, both the United States am
the Soviet Union have found that an incremen

I
Department of State Bulleti

lii

of military power does not necessarily repre-
sent an increment of usable political strength,
because of the excessive destructiveness of nu-
clear weapons in relation to the objective.

— The accumulation of strategic power of-
fered no guarantee of achieving a decisive mili-
tary advantage, since neither the United States
nor the Soviet l^nion would passively accept a
change in the overall balance. Moreover, with
modern weapons, a potentially decisive advan-
tage requires a change of such magnitude that
the mere effort to obtain it could produce a
disaster.

— Modern technology, however, offered an ap-
parently endless opportunity for the further
sophistication of both offensive and defensive
weaponry. In particular, a nation might be able
simultaneously to develop offensive weapons
that could destroy a substantial number of an
opponent's retaliatory forces and a defense that
could blunt a retaliatory strike. In such circum-
stances a high premium would be placed on
:striking first.

— Neither side could afford to concede an ad-
vantage in strategic defense. The gap between
the ra])id advances in offensive technology and
the embryonic state of defense systems was
gi'owing. For a considerable period, therefore,
both the United States and the Soviet Union
would be vulnerable to devastating attacks. Yet,
inherent in new technology is the prospect of
enhanced first strike capabilities.

These were the strategic circumstances fac-
ing the United States in 1969. They suggested
certain principles for our approach to arms con-
trol negotiations as an instrument of national
security.

— As President, my overriding responsibility
is to protect the security of the United States.
We had to maintain our strategic weapons pro-
grams and develop new ones as appropriate.
Unilateral restraint in anticipation of the nego-
tiations would not advance the chances for an
agreement; weakness has been the incentive for
aggression much more frequently than the arms
race.

— Our objective in negotiations would be to
reduce the gap between the capability for a first
strike and the capability to retaliate. An agree-
ment should help ensure that a first strike could
aot disarm either side.

— We would seek to gain some control over
military technology so that the basic political
relationships with the Soviet Union would not

be dominated by competition in this ax'ea.

— Our objective would be to break the mo-
mentum and moderate the process of strategic
competition. The basic decisions of war and
peace would then remain in the hands of the
political leaders and not be dictated by the
balance of weapons.

— Finally, we recognized that any agreement
would have to provide equal security to both
sides. No agreement was even conceivable if
its purpose was to ratify a clear advantage for
one side.

These were the principles that evolved in the
course of our preparation for negotiation in
1969. They were our basic criteria throughout
the talks.

The advances in other areas of arms control
have reflected a similar approach. We concen-
trated on those specific issues where it was
possible to make immediate progress so that
agreements would contribute to a broader im-
provement of relations. We looked for areas
where we could strengthen the principle of mu-
tual restraint. We decided that progress should
not be tied solely to the state of technical or pro-
cedural discussions but should take into account
the political relationships, especially with the
Soviet Union, that would ultimately determine
the success or failure of the agreements.

— In 1969-70 we concentrated on banning nu-
clear weapons from the seabeds, because this
was an area where the nuclear powers and the
non-nuclear countries had clear common inter-
ests and where the political, environmental, and
strategic policies offered a chance for early
progress. Moreover, by separating nuclear
weapons from all other military activities af-
fecting the seabeds, we could crystallize agree-
ment on the aspect most important to control.

— The questions of control over biological
weapons and chemical weapons had been linked,
although there was no objective reason to do
so. We first took a unilateral step by renouncing
the use and possession of biological weapons.
Then we moved to eliminate procedural ques-
tions by proposing the separation of biological
and chemical issues, with priority for biologi-
cal controls. This cour.se ultimately produced a
treaty prohibiting biological weaponry.

— The progress in arms control from 1969 to
1972 added to the general improvement in
Soviet-American relations and helped to break
the deadlock over opening negotiations on the
reduction of military forces in Central Europe.

June 4, 1973

815

Preliminary talks began in Vienna in January
1973 to prepare for formal negotiations this
fall.

In preparing for the negotiations on mutual
and balanced force reductions in Central Eu-
rope we are following much the same pattern as
in SALT. We have concentrated initially on a
complex technical analysis to illuminate all the
individual issues and on that basis to develop
basic concepts of reductions.

We can be proud of the accomplishments of
the past four years:

— In an area of overriding importance, we
have limited the strategic arsenals of the United
States and the Soviet Union and created the
conditions for further progress.

— There is now momentum on a broad inter-
national front that enhances the prospects for
additional agreements.

— In the region of major confrontation in
Central Europe the foundations have been laid
for serious negotiations to begin this year.

Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT)

On November 17, 1969, representatives of the
United States and the Soviet Union met in Hel-
sinki to begin the first discussions on the limi-
tation of strategic armaments. At that time, I
characterized the meetings as the "most mo-
mentous negotiations ever entrusted to an
American delegation." I repeated my pledge,
made at the United Nations in September 1969,
that the United States would deal with the
issues "seriously, carefully, and purposefully"
to achieve the goal of "equitable accommoda-
tion." We were embarked on a "sustained effort
not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces
but to reverse it."

The agreements I signed on May 26, 1972, in
St. Catherine's Hall in the Kremlin were a ma-
jor step toward fulfilling this commitment. We
had not only succeeded in resolving extraordi-
narily complex technical issues, but had also
raised Soviet-American relations to a new level
of mutual understanding. The political commit-
ment reflected in these agreements was a vital
element in the broader effort we were engaged
in, one that culminated in the Basic Principles
of U.S.-Soviet relations agreed upon in Moscow.

Since last May, Government officials have
testified before the Congress at length on all
aspects of these agreements, and I have dis-
cussed them with Congressional leaders. We

have fully described what we believe they ac-
complished and their significance for Soviet-
American relations and international security.
In this Report certain points are emphasized so
that future prospects can be related to the per-
spective of these past four years.

The Negotiating History. In 1969 there was
no dearth of ideas, suggestions, and jn-oposals
on how to limit strategic arms and conduct the
talks. There was never any question that we
would agree to negotiate. The task was to be
sure that we had a well-defined position for a
negotiation of this magnitude. We had to an-
alyze all conceivable limitations for each of the
major weapons systems to understand how they
would affect our own and Soviet i)rograms. We
also had to determine whether we could verify
compliance with the limitations and by what
means. These building blocks enabled us to ex-
amine the strategic interrelationship caused by
various combinations of limitations. Then we
could go on to identify realistic alternatives and
compare them with likely developments should
no agreements be reached.

Our aim was to be in a position to sustain
momentum in the negotiations. Meticulous
preparations for the negotiations gave us the
best chance of moving from general principles
through specific proposals to concrete agree-
ments. The fact that the agreements on such
complex and vital issues were signed only two
years after the first specific proposals were
introduced by the United States testifies to the
value of that approach.

We recognize that there would be deadlocks
and that, with national security at stake, fre-^
quent high level political decisions would be re-
quired. But we wanted to ensure that when'
deadlocks did occur, they would not be over'
technical issues, and carefully analyzed alter-
natives would be ready for my immediate
decision.

Certain fundamental strategic factors in-!
fluenced our preparations and our initial ap-
proach to the talks:

—By 1969 the United States had stopped :
building major new offensive systems in favor
of making qualitative improvements in existing
systems. We had no current plan to deploy
additional Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
(ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Mis-
siles (SLBMs), or heavy bombers. The Soviet
Union, on the other hand, was engaged in a
dynamic buildup of both ICBMs and SLBMs.

1

! fi

= 11

816

Department of State Bulletin

— At the same time, both sides were only in
the initial stages of Anti-Rallistic Missile
(ABM) deployment. The Soviet Union had al-
ready deployed a small system to jirotect its
:apital, while most of the U.S. program was
designed to protect our retaliatory forces.

— The United States had aircraft deployed at
DHses abroad and on carriers, while the Soviet
Union had medium and intermediate range
•nissiles and bombers capable of attacking our
jases and the territory of our allies.

— There was a vast difference in the compo-
iition of the forces on each side. The Soviet
Union had several tjiies of ICBMs and was de-
veloping two classes of ballistic missile launch-
ng submarines. The United States had one basic
!lass of ICBMs, a modern and more effective
submarine force, and a substantial advantage in
ieav>' bombers.

These asymmetries meant that defining stra-
•egic equivalence in individual categories or in
I general sense would be technically compli-
cated and involve significant political judg-
nents.

. The initial exploratory phase in November-
Oecember 1969 produced a general work pro-
Tram. Full negotiations began in the spring of
'970, and both sides outlined comi^rehensive
urograms to control a wide spectrum of arma-
nents.

This parallel effort, however, gradually be-
ame deadlocked over two major issues. First,
hould both offensive and defensive limitations
le included from the outset? The Soviet Union
)roi)osed that the deadlock be resolved by limit-
ng AB^^I systems only. The United States
hought it essential to maintain a link between
iffensive and defensive limits; we believed that
.n initial agreement that permitted unre-
trained growth in offensive forces would defeat
he basic purpose of SALT.

Second, what offensive forces should be de-
ined as "strategic"? The Soviet Union wanted
0 include all nuclear delivery systems capable
f reaching Soviet territory. The United States
aaintained that major intercontinental systems
hould have priority in negotiating limitations.

By late 1970 these two issues had blocked
urther progress. I decided to take the initia-
ive in direct contacts with the Soviet leaders
0 find a solution. The result of our exchanges
.•as an agreement on May 20. 1971, that we

■Quid concentrate the negotiations on a perma-

ent treaty limiting ABM systems, while work-

ig out an Interim Agreement freezing only

certain strategic offensive systems and leaving
aside other systems for consideration in a
further agreement.

This left for resolution the precise level of
ABMs and the scope of those offensive weapons
to be included in an initial agreement. Progress
was made during the next year on these matters
and on technical questions so that by the time of
the summit meeting in Moscow only a few key
issues remained.

The ABM solution was to limit both sides to
two sites. The United States would continue
construction of an ABM site in Grand Forks,
North Dakota, for the protection of an ICBM
field, while the Soviet Union would have the
right to deploy a similar site. The Soviet Union
would retain the ABM site already deployed
around Moscow, and we would have the right to
build a similar site around Washington. Both
sides would have essentially the same systems
and would be limited to an ABM level low
enough to preclude a heavy defense of national
territory — the mode of ABM deployment that
could be most strategically destabilizing.

Defining which offensive systems would be
frozen in an interim agreement proved more
difficult. The Soviet Union wished to include
ICBMs only. We pressed for the inclusion of
both ICBMs and SLBMs. These were active
Soviet programs; the purpose of SALT, in our
view, was to break the momentum of uncon-
strained growth in strategic systems. Further-
more, since we had no active building programs
in these categories, the numerical gap would
widen without an agreement.

A freeze on ICBM and sea-based ballistic
missile systems was clearly in the United States
interest. I used my direct channel to the Soviet
leaders to urge the inclusion of SLBMs in the
Interim Agreement. We finally reached agree-
ment in late April 1972 when the Soviet leaders
accepted a proposal to place a ceiling on their
SLBM force. The final details were negotiated
at the summit the following month.

The Provisions of the Apreemenls. The high-
lights of the two agreements are as follows:

The ABM treaty allows each side to have 100
ABM interceptors at each of its two sites. The
two sites must be at least 800 miles apart in
order to prevent the development of a terri-
torial defense. The treaty contains additional
provisions which effectively prohibit the estab-
lishment of a radar base for the defense of pop-
ulated areas as well as the attainment of capa-
bilities to intercept ballistic missiles by

jne 4, 1973

817

conversion of air defense missiles to anti-
ballistic missiles.

The InteriTn Agreement on offensive arms is
to run for five years, unless replaced earlier by
a permanent agreement v^hich is the subject of
the current negotiations. This agreement froze
the number of strategic offensive missiles on
both sides at approximately the levels opera-
tional and under construction at the time of
signing. For ICBMs, this is 1,054 for the United
States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. Within
this overall ceiling, there is a freeze on the
Soviet Union's heavy ICBM launchers, the weap-
ons most threatening to our strategic forces.
There is also a prohibition on conversion of
light ICBMs into heavy missiles. These provi-
sions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and
agreed criteria; of particular importance is the
prohibition against any significant enlargement
of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more compli-
cated. The Soviet Union is restricted to a level
of 740 submarine ballistic missile launchers,
some of them on an old type of nuclear sub-
marine. However, they are permitted to build
as many as 62 modern nuclear submarines and
950 SLBM launchers if — and only if — they dis-
mantle an equal number of older ICBMs or
older submarine-launched ballistic missiles to
offset the new construction. This would mean
dismantling 210 older ICBM launchers if the
Soviet Union chooses to build up to the SLBM
ceiling. The United States gave up no active
offensive program.

The Significance of the Agreements. Two
questions have been asked concerning these
accords.

Do the agreements perpetuate a U.S. stra-
tegic disadvantage? Clearly they do not. The
present situation is, on balance, advantageous
to the United States. The Interim Agreement
perpetuates nothing that did not already exist
and that could only have grown worse without
an agreement. Considering the momentum of
the Soviet ICBM and SLBM programs, the ceil-
ings in the Interim Agreement will make major
contributions to our national security, while we
proceed with negotiations for a permanent
agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is
sound. The United States is not prohibited from
continuing current and planned strategic mod-
ei'nization and replacement programs for of-
fensive systems. The imbalance in the number
of missiles between the United States and the

Soviet Union is only one aspect. There are other
relevant factors such as deployment character-
istics and qualitative differences between their
system and ours. For example, the Soviet Union
requires three submarines for every two of ours
in order to keep an equal number on station,
though they are testing longer range missiles
that would ultimately change this ratio.

The quality of the weapons must also be
weighed. We have a major advantage in nuclear
weapons technology and in warhead accuracy.
And with our Multiple Independently Targetted
Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) we have a 2 to 1
lead in numbers of warheads. Because of our
continuing programs we will maintain this lead
during the period of the agreement, even if the
Soviets develop and deploy MIRVs of their own.

Moreover, to assess the overall balance it is
also necessary to consider those forces not in
the agreement; our bomber force, for instance,
is substantially larger and more effective than ■
the Soviet bomber force.

Thus, when the total picture is viewed, our i
strategic forces are seen to be completely I
sufficient.

Will the agreements jeopardize our security\
in the future? The Soviet Union has proved that j
it can best compete in sheer numbers. This isj
the area limited by the agreements. The agree- i
ments thus confine competition with the Soviets i
to the area of technology where, heretofore, wej
have had a significant advantage.

Clearly, the agreements enhance the security,
of both sides. No agreement that failed to do soj
could have been signed or would have stood any |
chance of lasting. As I told the Congressional
leaders last June, I am convinced that these <
agreements fully protect our national security,
and our vital interests. The Congress accepted;
this judgment and gave the agreements over-
whelming approval.

I am determined that our security and vital
interests shall remain fully protected. We are;
therefore pursuing two parallel courses:

— We have entered the current phase of the;
strategic arms limitation talks with the samej
energy and conviction that produced the initial |
agreements. Until these negotiations succeed'
we must take care not to anticipate their out-j
come through unilateral decisions.

— We shall continue our research and devel-
opmental programs and establish the production
capacity to sustain a sufficient strategic posture
should new agreements prove unattainable.

818

Department of State Bulletin |

1 his effort also dissuades the other side from
breaking the agreements.

These agreements are not isolated events.
They are embedded in tlie fabric of an emerg-
ing new relationship, and can be of great polit-
ical and historical significance. For the first
time, two great ]iower.'?, deeply divided by their
values, phiioso]ihies, and social systems, have
agreed to restrain the very armaments on which
their national survival depends. A decision of
this magnitude could only have been taken by
tvvo countries which had chosen to place their
relations on a new foundation of restraint, co-
operation, and steadily growing confidence.

The possibility always exists that the agree-
ments will not be respected. We concluded them
not on the basis of trust, but rather on the
enlightened self-interest of both sides. They
contain extensive and carefully negotiated pro-
> visions for verification. Beyond the legal obli-
gations, both sides have a stake in all of the
agreements that have been signed and the broad
process of improvement in relations that has
begun.

We are confident that the Soviet leaders will
not lightly abandon the course that led to the
summit meeting and the initial agreements. For
our own part, we will not change direction
'Without major ])rovocation, because we believe
' our present course is in the interest of this
countrj- and of mankind. We will remain fully
protected as long as we maintain our research
and development effort and the strategic iiro-
grams for modernization and re])lacement that
I have recommended to the Congress.

Future Prospects. In November 1972 the sec-
ond stage of SALT began. In this new phase we
are dealing with those new issues inherent in
working out permanent, rather than temporary,
arrangements and with some of the problems
set aside in SALT I.

There is mutual agreement that permanent
limitations must meet the basic security inter-
ests of both sides equitably if they are to endure
in an era of great technological change and in
a fluid international environment. There ob-
viously can be no agreement that creates or
preserves strategic advantages. But each side
perceives the strategic balance differently and
therefore holds differing concepts of an equit-
able framework for a permanent agreement.

The problem of defining a balance that estab-
lishes and preserves an essential equivalency in
strategic forces is no less complicated than it

was four years ago. It involves the numerical
levels of major systems, the capabilities of in-
dividual systems, and the overall potential oif
the entire strategic arsenal that each side can
develoii.

The impact of unconstrained technological
developments in particular mu.st be considered.
On the one hand, both sides will want to ensure
that their forces can be modernized. They will
want confidence in the reliability of their forces
and their survivability in foreseeable strategic
circumstances. On the other hand, if competi-
tion in technology proceeds without restraint,
forces capable of destroying the retaliatory
forces of the other side could be developed; or
the thru.st of technology could i^roduce such a
result without deliberate decisions. Competition
could inexorably intensify to the point that
there could be a high premium on striking first.

Thus a major challenge is to determine where
a balance of capabilities enhances stability and
where it could generate severe competition for
advantage in first strike capabilities.

Given the different roads we and the Soviet
Union have followed in developing our respec-
tive forces, perfect symmetry is not possible.
To the extent that one side retains certain tech-
nological capacities, the other side must be
conceded similar rights or some form of com-
pensation in other areas of technology.

The Soviet LTnion has dejiloyed a very large
and heavy ICBM. The weight this missile can
deliver to its target is several times greater
than that of our Minuteman ICBM. The entire
Soviet ICBM foi'ce, therefore, has a "throw
weight" approximately four times greater than
ours.

On the other hand, the United States is de-
ploying MIRVs on our Minuteman ICBM and
Poseidon while the Soviet L^nion thus far has
not begun such a deployment.

Once MIRVs are developed and tested, how-
ever, the greater throw weight capacity of So-
viet ICBMs will allow the Soviet Union to
deploy a larger number of MIRVs than the
United States.

These are the types of extremely complicated
issues that arise in defining an essential equiva-
lency. Moreover, verification of limitations on
technological capabilities will be extraordinarily
more difficult than monitoring limitations on
the numbers of weapons.

Nevertheless, there are a number of factors
which give us reason to hope for continuing
progress:

June 4, 1973

819

— The initial agreement provides a founda-
tion of confidence.

— For the past four years both sides have
engaged in a dialogue on strategic matters that
was inconceivable in 1969. We now understand
each other's concerns better than we did then.
We have a common language for discussion.

— The limits of ABM systems should provide
an incentive for limiting further growth in of-
fensive capabilities.

— At the present levels of strategic forces,
small differences in numbers assume less im-
portance.

A further question is the impact of future
agreements on other states. We will not make
agreements that reduce the security of other
countries. Nor can we permit threats to our
allies to develop unchecked because of SALT
agreements. Such factors do not limit the pros-
pects for further U.S.-Soviet limitation on of-
fensive systems, but they do delimit the area
for negotiation.

In sum, a future agreement should:

— establish an essential equivalence in stra-
tegic capabilities among systems common to
both sides;

— maintain the survivability of strategic
forces in light of known and potential techno-
logical capabilities;

— provide for the replacement and moderni-
zation of older systems without upsetting the
strategic balance;

— be subject to adequate verification;

— leave the security of third parties undi-
minished.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

Preparations. In .June 1968, before this Ad-
ministration took office, the North Atlantic Al-
liance made a proposal to begin discussions with
the Warsaw Pact on a mutual reduction of
forces in Central Europe. Although this over-
ture had met with no positive response, we re-
affirmed the Alliance proposal in April 1969.
Troop reduction was a concrete security issue,
rather than an exercise in atmospherics, and
was thus consistent with the general effort to
move from confrontation toward negotiations.
At the same time, we found that the idea of
mutual reductions had not been systematically
analyzed before 1969. The general theories were
that it would be possible to maintain security
at lower force levels and that force reductions

in themselves would enhance the relaxation of
political tension.

We decided to follow an analytical approach
similar to the one we used for SALT. We inves-
tigated the feasible reductions of all the forces
that might be involved, analyzed the effect of
reductions on the capabilities of each side, and
examined the changing balance of forces should
the agreements be violated and both sides begin
reinforcing. We also studied the verification re-
quirements and how they might affect the possi-
ble kinds of reductions.

The following considerations illustrate the
complexities of the MBFR process:

— Reductions provide an inherent advantage
for the side that has postured its forces along
offensive lines: offensive forces would retain
the initiative to concentrate and attack, while
the defense must continue to defend the same
geographical front with fewer forces.

— Major deployments of equipment, espe-
cially those with offensive caijabilities, are
therefore an important element in the reduction
process.

— How can equivalence be established be-
tween different categories of equipment? What
ratios would be equitable?

— Manpower, of course, is a common denom-
inator to all the forces in Central Europe. In
large forces however, reducing manpower may
not necessarily be the only important aspect.
If manpower is reduced, what becomes of the
equipment? Should it be destroyed or reassem-
bled in depots for continuing surveillance?

— Small reductions of manpower cannot be
verified except under well-defined and strin-
gent circumstances ; demobilization of national
forces on their own territory is particularly
difl[icult to monitor except in very large
numbers.

— The forces in Central Europe are both in-
digenous and "foreign" but this is a political as
well as a military distinction. Should all forces j
be treated equally? If so, what compensation is
necessary for the fact that the United States
would withdraw its forces across the Atlantic,
while the Soviet Union would withdraw only
several hundred miles?

— Following actual reductions, control on the
reintroduction of forces into the area for
maneuvers or for replacements needs to be'
considered along with related verification re-
quirements.

— How quickly each side could restore its

I i

820

Department of State Bulletin tf

I'orces to a pre-reductioii level through mobili-
zation and reinforcement becomes a significant
factor. Compensation for advantages that one
side may have should be considered.

As in SALT, the analysis of such questions
provides us with the building blocks which can
be init together in different ways to help us un-
derstand the imiilications of different reduction
processes:

— Proportionately equal reductions. Each side
would apjily a common percentage to reduce its
forces. This appears to be a simple but equitable
approach. If ajiplied to all forces, however, it
could create an imbalance because it would
favor the offense and because of the geographi-
cal advantages of the Warsaw Pact.

— Reductions to equal levels. This would in
effect i)roduce a common ceiling for Central Eu-
rope. There would be some unequal cuts in
absolute numbers, but the residual capabilities
would be more balanced and offensive potential
would thereby be reduced.

— Mixed, asymmetrical I'eductions. This
means reductions would be made by different
amounts in various categories of weapons or
manpower. It could prove extremely complex
to define equivalence between different weapons
systems.

We have now completed our technical eval-
uation. We understand the major issues related
to actual reductions and which approaches are
realistic. We have shared the results of our
studies with our NATO allies and have con-
tributed to studies within the Alliance.

.Allied Consiiliation>. We now enter the final
and most important stage in building an Alli-
ance position. In addition to the completion of
technical studies and diplomatic plans, we face
one basic question: w'hat security concept will
the Alliance follow in developing its position
for the negotiations next fall?

The Alliance is committed to "undimini.shed
secui-ity" in the MBFR process, but we must
agree on what this means in concrete terms.
Different political viewpoints shape the atti-
tudes of each ally, especially if its forces or
territory may be involved. Issues of this magni-
tude could become divisive if there were no
common concept. The Alliance must approach
force reductions from the standpoint of their
effect on military .security in a jieriod that may
be marked by a further amelioration of ten-
sions. Some of the key questions are:

— How do we reconcile reductions in roughly
balanced conventional forces with the fact that
the strategic balance is no longer clearly favor-
able to the Alliance?

— What are the capabilities to sustain a con-
ventional defense of NATO territory with re-
duced forces?

— Could a substantial reduction in conven-
tional defense lead to a greater or earlier re-
liance on nuclear weapons?

— Can reduced forces be maintained and im-
proved in the present jiolitical environment?

— What would be the net effect of a new
balance in Central Europe on the flanks of
NATO?

— How would reductions affect the relative
burdens of American and European forces?

To deal with these kinds of issues effectively,
the Alliance must first set its security goals and
relate them to technical MBFR analysis. Then,
however the negotiations may unfold, the Alli-
ance position throughout will be determined by
a common concept of security rather than by
negotiating tactics or abstract political formu-
las. We can then rationally address the ques-
tions of which forces and equipment should be
reduced and by what amounts. We can translate
our technical analysis into detailed proposals
that both protect our interests and offer the
other side a proi)osal for reductions that will
enhance military stability in the heart of
Europe.

Our security and that of the Alliance is in-
extricably linked. We will pursue these nego-
tiations in full agreement with our allies. We
will negotiate with the same dedication we dis-
])layed in SALT. We will also observe a funda-
mental principle of those talks; we will not
enter into agreements that undermine interna-
tional equilibrium or create threats to other
countries.

Other Arms Control Issues

During the past year we have pursued arms
control on several multilateral fronts.

UioloRital Anns Control. On April 10, 1972,
the United States, the Soviet Union, and over
70 other nations signed an international treaty
banning the develojjment, production, and
stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons and
requiring destruction of existing stocks. The
treaty has now been signed by more than 100
nations. I submitted it to the Senate on August

June 4, 1973

821

10, 1972, for advice and consent. Meanwhile,
we are taking- steps to implement some provi-
sions.

The facilities that once produced these weap-
ons are now doing research for peaceful pur-
poses. The former biologfical warfare facility
at Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas has become
a center for research on the adverse effects of
chemical substances in man's environment. The
former military biological research facility at
Fort Detrick, Maryland, now houses a national
center for cancer research. Scientists from all
nations are being invited to share in the hu-
manitarian work of these centers.

Chemical Arms Control. This Administra-
tion remains firmly committed to achieving ef-
fective international restraints on chemical
weapons.

During the past year the United States
played a leading role in the discussion of chem-
ical weapons controls at the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. We pre-
sented a comprehensive work program on the
prohibition of chemical weapons and several
technical studies of this subject.

The basic problem is that several nations
may have these weapons and the capacity to
produce them is widespread. It is exceedingly
difficult to verify existing stocks, let alone their
reduction, or to distinguish between civilian
and military production. Furthermore, however
remote the threat may be that any nation would
use chemical weapons offensively, that threat
must be countered with certain defensive capa-
bilities.

The major issue is whether competition will
continue or whether, as in SALT, some partial
measures can be adopted to facilitate more com-
prehensive measures.

Comprehensive Test Ban. The United States
has continued to support the objective of an
adequately verified agreement to ban all nu-
clear weapons testing.

Some countries maintain that national means
of verification would be sufficient to monitor
such a ban with confidence. We disagree. De-
spite substantial progress in detecting and iden-
tifying seismic events, including underground
nuclear tests, we believe that national means of
verification still should be supplemented by
some on-site inspection.

The United States shares the view of many
other nations that an adequately verified com-
prehensive test ban would be a positive contri-
bution to moderating the arms race. For this
reason we are giving high priority to the prob-
lem of verification. We will continue to cooper-
ate with other nations in working toward
eventual agreement on this important issue.

The responsibility for controlling arms does
not rest with the great powers alone. As the
United States and the Soviet Union seek to
curb the nuclear arms race, and the nations
with forces in Central Europe seek to reduce
conventional forces, other countries should de-
velop regional arms control arrangements
which will enhance mutual security and reduce
the danger of local conflicts. External powers
should respect such arrangements by restrict-
ing the flow of weapons into such areas. The
United States is prepared to do so.

i

I 3
• i

i

Part VII: New International Challenges

i ,2rt

THE UNITED NATIONS

In this increasingly interdependent world, a
more effective United Nations continues to be
an important goal of our diplomacy. There is
no inconsistency between our search for a better
equilibrium among the major powers and our
commitment to global cooperation through
worldwide institutions. Success in adjusting
and improving big power relationships should
reinforce the multilateral framework in which
all nations can work together in dealing with
worldwide problems.

We should not exaggerate the present capac- :
ity of the United Nations for strong action,
particularly in the field of peace and security. ,
But neither can we discount or ignore the
significant and constructive role that multi-
lateral organizations can and do play in coping
with matters of world interest. What is essen-
tial is to discern how and when the United
Nations can act effectively for the benefit of
mankind. This Administration, like its prede-
cessors since the founding of the United Na-
tions in 1945, is committed to strengthening

822

Department of State Bulletin

the world organization as a dynamic instrument
for constructive international action.

Maintaining the Peace

The capacity of the United Nations to recon-
cile political disputes and curb outbreaks of
violence is limited, depending as it does on the
willingness of members to utilize its machinery
and, in particular, on the attitudes of the per-
manent members of the Security Council. This
was starkly illustrated by the inability of the
Security Council to act in the India-Pakistan
conflict in December 1971, when Soviet vetoes
frustrated ceasefire resolutions which had the
support of an overwhelming majority of mem-
bers. Difl"erences among the major powers on
the authorization, conduct, and financing of
peace-keeping missions have yet to be resolved,
but improvement of relations among these
powers may enable the United Nations to act
more effectively in the future. In view of
America's objective that responsibilities for
maintaining peace be widely shared, the
strengthening of the United Nations peace-
keeping role is an important goal of American
policy.

A way must also be found to assure the con-
tinuous representation on the Security Council
of those states whose resources and influence
could facilitate the Council's action. Any for-
^ mula for such a restructuring of the Council,
however, should not result in an unwieldy body
whose operations would be slower and more
uncertain than they now are.

We believe that Security Council procedures
must be improved. A far greater effort must
be made to base decisions on impartial fact-
finding. It is also imperative that the Council
not allow itself to be used for the blatant pro-
motion of the views of one party while that
party is in negotiations with another, as hap-
pened during the meetings in Panama in March
1973. At the time, we said that this was an un-
wise and improper use of the Council ; the at-
mosphere of the meeting and its outcome
showed that our misgivings were justified.

The Human Rights Dimension

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
guides our actions in the United Nations to
ease the plight of those whose basic rights have
been denied. Our stand against apartheid and
other forms of racism has been clearly artic-
ulated in many United Nations forums. Our
commitments to the basic rights of freedom of
movement has caused us to speak out in the

United Nations against restrictions on the right
to emigrate.

In other areas of human rights concern, our
United Nations representatives have played a
leading role in promoting the development of
new rules for the observance of rights in
armed conflicts. Responding in part to initia-
tives taken in the United Nations, the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
held a series of consultations of experts to
frame proposals for enlarging the protections
now provided in the four Geneva Conventions
on war victims, including prisoners of war.
The ICRC's proposals will be submitted to an
international conference for the adoption of
new protocols to the Geneva Conventions.

Decolonization

Much attention in the United Nations con-
tinues to be focused on colonial issues. We sup-
port self-determination for all peoples. But we
have made clear that in supporting this ob-
jective we cannot condone recourse to violence
or interference across established frontiers.
We do support proposals which encourage com-
munication and peaceful change. But we view
with concern the efforts to give formal inter-
national status to insurgent movements that
are still contesting for territorial control. The
United Nations is an organization of established
governments founded to bring parties together
and to work for peace. We cannot accept its
use as an arena for sanctifying the use of force.
It is not in the spirit of the United Nations
Charter.

International Order

The rule of law in a world beset by global
problems must of necessity be a matter of
priority for the United Nations. We cannot
limit armaments, exploit the seas' riches, travel
through the skies and the seas, control nar-
cotics traflicking, or combat terrorism unless
international legal norms are created and uni-
versally respected.

Despite the obvious urgency of many of
these problems, the United Nations has failed
to address some of them seriously. On hijack-
ing, members of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization continue to balk at the
prospect of the tough measures needed to curb
air piracy. The failure of the 27th General
Assembly to take effective action to combat in-
ternational terrorism was a major disappoint-
ment.

The world community suffers when its most
respected international institution fails to deal

June 4, 1973

823

with elementary questions of international
order Even so, those who wish an orderly
world must persevere in their efforts to achieve
United Nations action to these ends United
Nations conventions on narcotics and earlier
hijacking conventions are examples of what can
be done by a united world community.

The United Nations System

Controversies in the United Nations over
questions of peace and security have often over-
shadowed other ongoing activities ot the
organization. The United Nations plays an im-
portant, if less dramatic, role in transferring
skills to the developing nations and in dealing
with a variety of worldwide problems brought
on by the quickening pace of social and tech-
nological change. It is well to recognize that
the United Nations is a system of interlocking
organizations and that more than nine-tenths
of its resources are devoted to activities in the
economic, social, technical, and scientific fields
These functions, which we have encouraged
and continue to support, encompass virtually
every transnational government activity. They
include promoting disarmament, assuring the
safety of civil aviation, combating epidemics,
protecting the environment, checking the illicit
flow of narcotics, setting guidelines for the
orderlv exploitation of seabed resources, pro-
viding technical assistance to developing coun-
tries, and organizing relief for victims ot

About one-fourth of the United Nations sys-
tem's expenditures for these purposes are
devoted to activities of a regulatory, standard-
setting, or exchange-of-information character.
They are, in effect, global public services man-
aged by the United Nations system for the
world community. The remaining three-fourths
finance economic, social, and technical activities
to assist the less developed areas of the world.
In an interdependent world these activities are
inseparable from more traditional actions to
promote peace and security.

Within the United Nations system, a dozen
bodies are involved in the effort to reduce the
gap between the rich and poor nations. The
most important of these is the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), the worlds
largest technical assistance program. This vital
and successful activity of the United Nations
merits our continued and substantial support.
The world community's development efforts
cannot make major headway unless the present
rate of population growth is slowed. We will
continue to support the United Nations Fund

824

for Population Activities and other UN agen-
cies in addressing this critical world problem,
while also maintaining our bilateral programs.
We particularly welcome the UN decision to
designate 1974 as World Population Year and to
convene a World Population Conference.

United Nations specialized agencies are play-
ing an important role in the multilateral re-
sponse to the challenges of protec mg the
environment. The World Meteorological Organi-
zation (WMO) is helping to monitor the earth s
atmosphere; the UN Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) is conduct-
ing basic environmental research ; the Intergov-
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
aMCO) is implementing rules governing the
Ischarge of oil at sea; and the Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) is conducting
programs dealing with soil salinity and soi
erosion At United States initiative the General
Assemblv created a United Nations Environ-
ment Fund and institutional arrangements to
direct and coordinate global action to lend
further impetus to these environmental ac-
tivities. . , .J.

The United Nations is increasingly providing
the means for a truly international i-esponse to
tracredies and disasters around the world. This
relatively new and very important activity ot
the UN system deserves the fulle.st support.

The role of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in administering the program
of safeouards on the use of nuclear materials
under the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty is an
essential contribution to international security.
The world values and needs these many serv-
ices of the United Nations system. But all of
them are increasingly costly. It is essentia
that thev be performed— and it is also essential
that they be performed in the most efficient
and economical manner possible. The ongoing
improvement of UN management practices will
continue to receive priority support and em-
phasis from the United States.

Our Participation in the United Nations

The United States played a leading role in
the founding of the United Nations m 1945 ,
and has been a leader in providing political
and financial support. Many Americans may
have thought of the United Nations as an in-
stant world government" that could somehow
attack and solve all the problems and i^s of the
world. But it must be recognized that the United
Nations is a body of 132 member states, each
maintaining its sovereignty and pursuing its
own national interests. Only when there is a

Department of State Bulletin

broad consensus does United Nations action
become possible.

The United States takes seriously its obli-
gations under the United Nations Charter.
Except for imports of small (luantities of cer-
tain strategic materials exempted by U.S. pub-
lic law — accounting- for no more than a minute
percentage of Rhodesia's exports — the United
States, unlike many others, adheres strictly to
the UN program of sanctions against Rhodesia.
Many in the United Nations challenged our
observance of sanctions. But there should not
be a double standai'd which ignores the wide-
spread, substantial — but unavowed — non-ob-
servance of sanctions by others.

In last year's Report, I stated that "prudence
and political realism dictate that no one coun-
try should be assessed a disproportionate share
of the expenses of an organization approaching
universality in which each member, large or
small, has but one vote. That is particularly
true when experience has shown that the major
contributing countries are unable to exercise
effective control over the UN budget." I there-
fore announced that it would he our goal to ne-
i^otiate a reduction in our United Nations
assessment from 31.5 percent to 25 percent of
the organization's budget. This idea was not at
all new; in fact, in 1946 Senator Arthur Van-
denberg argued in favor of a U.S. assessment of
25 percent. This figure was also cited as desira-
ble by the Lodge Commission on the United
N'ations in 1971. and it was endorsed by the
L'nited States Congress in 1972.

On December 13, 1972, by an overwhelming
najority vote, the United Nations initiated
iction to reduce our assessment to 25 percent
IS soon as practicable. This step, which i-e-
luired the agreement of other members, can
)nly result in a strengthened United Nations,
n which the costs of membership are more
venly distributed.

We have continued to be generous in volun-
aiy contributions to a variety of programs,
ncluding the United Nations Development Pro-
■ram. UNICEF. and the United Nations' funds
n population activities, the environment, and
arcotics control.

iving Together

Unable to retreat into isolation in a world
lade small by technology and .shared aspira-
ions, man has no choice but to reach out to his
ellow man. Together we must build a world
rder in which we can work together to resolve
,. ur common problems. That is what the United

Nations is all about. If we sometimes appear
to be criticizing rather than praising the United
Nations, it is because we need it and want to
make it a dynamic instruniont for promoting a
lasting peace.

The commitment of this Administration to
the strengthening of international institutions
remains firm. We stand ready to cooperate
with all United Nations members, large and
small, in enhancing the capacity of the United
Nations to deal as effectively with problems
of peace and security as it does with economic
and technical questions.

THE GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF PEACE

Our purpose in building a structure of peace
is not sim])ly to prevent the outbreak of war.
We also seek to foster a new spirit of coopera-
tion among nations in meeting urgent problems
that face the whole human family. Some of
these can be welcomed as opportunities, such
as the use of the oceans and the exploration
of space. Others are vexing problems, including
pollution, international terrorism, and drug
abuse. But all transcend ideology and parochial
conceptions of national self-interest. They in-
volve the world's interests and the entire world
community must work together on them.

Since taking ofl^ce, this Administration has
sought ways to focus world attention on these
issues and to propose measures for resolving
them. Substantial progress has been made in
a number of areas, but in all areas much more
remains to be done before we can feel we have
effectively met the global challenges of peace.

The Oceans

As man's activities in the oceans intensify,
the need for international accommodation is
clear. Serious efforts are now being made in
the United Nations to work out new rules and
develop in.stitutions to ensure the rational fu-
ture u.se of the marine environment. If these
efforts are successful, mankind's development
of the sea frontier can proceed without the
destructive national rivalries that characterized
the earlier race for land empires. But if the ef-
fort fails, conflicting claims and bitter interna-
tional disputes are inevitable.

As a major maritime power and a leader
in ocean technology, the United States has a
special responsibility for this international ef-
fort to reach agreement on the peaceful use
of the world's oceans. Together with more
than 90 other nations, we are making intensive

une 4, 1973

825

preparations for a comprehensive Law of tiie
Sea Conference called for by a resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly. We have
introduced detailed proposals, relating to the
seabed and seabed resources, living marine re-
sources, the breadth of the territorial sea, and
freedom of transit through and over interna-
tional straits. These proposals are designed to
accommodate the diverse interests of many na-
tions and to permit all to use the seas more ef-
fectively and harmoniously.

An early and successful Law of the Sea Con-
ference is essential. The demands on such a
Conference will be intense if an effective new
law of the sea treaty is to be realized. Each
nation will have to identify with care its vital
intei'ests in the use of the world's oceans and
their resources, and to enter the negotiations
ready to seek accommodation of potentially con-
flicting national interests.

The United States shares, to a greater or
lesser degree, all the fundamental interests
being weighed in these negotiations. We have a
crucial stake in ensuring that essential high
seas freedoms are maintained. We also have im-
portant interests in the areas off our coasts.
Some 80 percent of all U.S. fishing is conducted
in adjacent coastal waters, and offshore oil
production is nearly 20 percent of the U.S. total.
We are also concerned with protecting our
coastline and coastal waters from pollution
and otherwise preserving the marine environ-
ment.

Territorial Seas and Straits. The United
States has presented to the UN Seabed Com-
mittee draft treaty articles providing for:

— a territorial sea with a maximum breadth
of 12 nautical miles, together with and condi-
tional on

— a right of free transit through and over
straits used for international navigation.

We firmly believe that 12 miles represents the
only figure on which general agreement among
nations is possible, and there has been growing
consensus on this view in the international
community.

Many straits used for international naviga-
tion are less than 24 miles wide. Twelve-mile
territorial seas might thus overlap. Accord-
ingly, the United States has made a provision
for a specific right of "free transit" a condition
to our agreement to a 12-mile territorial sea.
This would preserve the right of transit
through and over international straits for ships
and aircraft. The U.S. proposal is designed to
accommodate the concerns of nations bordering

826

such straits with respect to traffic arrangeil :!
ments and pollution control. j

Until the right of free transit is established! i
the prevailing law in international straits sijj i
miles wide or less will continue to be that oi|
"innocent passage." In straits wider than siji ;
miles, the United States' position continues t(| i
be that high seas freedoms exist. Under th(| '
1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial i
Sea and Contiguous Zone, aircraft do not havd
a right of overflight and submarines exercisinji |
innocent passage must navigate on the surfacel
Moreover, coastal states may give their owi'
interpretation to "innocent" passage. In thes(] ,
circumstances, the right of innocent passag^j i
is no longer adequate to ensure free transii i
through and over international straits. I

Marine Resources. All coastal states hav|
strong interests in the living and non-living rej
sources off their coast. Accordingly, any nevj '
law of the sea convention should provide foi ■
certain coastal state economic rights beyond !
the territorial sea. But the nature and extenj ;
of those rights is fundamental and must hi i
carefully defined. I

The regime for the deep seabed area beyoni; '
national jurisdiction, which is the commoi' |
heritage of all mankind, should provide develop! i
ing as well as other countries with the opporj ■
tunity to take part in and benefit from deeji
seabed exploitation. It should also provide rea i
sonable and secure investment conditions fol j
countries whose capital and technology mak'
such exploitation possible. |

With respect to marine resources generally
the United States is willing to agree to broa^
coastal state economic jurisdiction beyond thi ■
territorial sea as part of a satisfactory overal
law of the sea settlement. But this manage
ment jurisdiction over mineral resources an
fisheries should be tempered by internatiom
standards that respect the interests of othe|
states and the international community.

Internationally-agreed limitations on seabe,
resources should include :

— Standards to prevent unreasonable inter

ference with other uses of the ocean, to prci \

tect the oceans from pollution, and to safeguarj j

the integrity of investment ; j i

— Sharing of revenues for international coirj ^

munity purposes ; and j \

— Compulsory third-party settlement of dijj j

putes to help reduce the potential for conflicli k

Effective ha-vestin. of the oceans' fishe-ie! «
resources, consistent with sound conservatioi
will be required if the nations of the world ari

Department of State Bulletii

II realize the potential of fish as a majoi- source
of protein-rich food. With both a coastal and
' distant water fishing industry, the United
States has incentives to work toward a multi-
lateral fisheries agreement that takes into ac-
count the world's supply of fisheries resources
as well as the differing interests of coastal and
distant water fishing nations.

We believe coastal states should have special
management authority and preferential rights
with regard to fisheries stocks in their coastal
. waters or those that spawn in their rivers. We
have proposed to make these rights correspond
, to the biological characteristics of the fish in-
I ,volved. Our proposal provides for broad coastal
state jurisdiction and preferences over coastal
and anadromous fisheries, such as salmon, be-
yond the territorial sea, with international
, standards for conservation, maximum utiliza-
tion, equitable allocation, and compulsory third-
party settlement of disputes. On the other hand,
our proposal provides that highly migratory
. fish, such as tuna, would be regulated by inter-
national organizations in which all interested
fishing and coastal states could participate. We
. have suggested that during the law of the sea
, pegotiations a formula be devised to determine
', iwhat part of the allowable catch is to be left to
', traditional distant water fisheries.

If nations are to continue to gain the knowl-

, edge required for fuller, wiser use of the

:' oceans, maximum freedom of scientific research

. must be maintained, and developing countries

should participate. The United States has also

. proposed that the Law of the Sea Conference

J develop draft treaty articles on marine pollu-

. tion to ensure that man's uses of the oceans

• pose minimal risks to the marine environment.

The past year saw encouraging signs that

. the international community as a whole is be-

' ?inning to understand the pressing need to ac-

.' :ommodate these diverse interests. This process

must continue and the United States will con-

^ ,;inue to work w-ith other concerned nations to

meet this challenge.

Outer Space

: Man's ventures into outer space provide a

i: latural arena for international cooperation.

Such cooperation is not merely helpful; in some

: -'ases it constitutes the only practical means of

-ealizing the potential of space.

This Administration has worked through
>oth governmental and non-governmental or-
ranizations to realize the technical, economic,
ind other benefits off'ered by space activities.
>Ve are also trying through both bilateral and

international channels to develop sound and
equitable legal arrangements to govern such
activities.

Our dramatic moon expeditions were almost
exclusively national ventures, but they provided
opportunities for significant international in-
volvement. Many experiments developed in for-
eign laboratories were carried to the moon by
our Apollo spacecraft and more than a hundred
foreign scientists shared in the analysis of the
lunar samples our Astronauts brought back.
We are now discussing international participa-
tion in our post-Apoilo space program, includ-
ing plans for a possible joint aeronautical satel-
lite experiment.

The American capability for launching pay-
loads into orbit has also made possible a wide
range of joint space eflforts. To date, we have
launched sixteen satellites developed by other
countries or by international organizations. I
announced last October that the United States
would provide launch assistance on a non-dis-
criminatory, reimbursable basis to foreign coun-
tries and international organizations for any
space project undertaken for peaceful purposes
and consistent with relevant international ar-
rangements. This policy extended to other na-
tions the assurances we had given earlier to
member states of the European Space Con-
ference.

The Earth Resource Technology Satellite
(ERTS) program of the United States is a
])articularly significant example of interna-
tional cooperation in space. The program is de-
signed to develop ways to use satellites in
geological, hydrological, agricultural, and ocean-
ographic surveys, in pollution monitoring, and
in other types of resource utilization planning.
Ninety projects from 37 nations and two in-
ternational organizations are included in the
])resent research program. The first ERTS
satellite was launched in July 1972. Several
earth resource survey experiments, including
some proposed by other countries, will be con-
ducted by the manned Skylab spacecraft. An
additional unmanned experimental satellite is
also planned.

After years of intensive negotiations, an in-
ternational satellite telecommunications con-
sortium of 83 nations, known as Intelsat, has
come into existence. Intelsat is a unique multi-
national venture responsible for a worldwide
network of satellite telecommunications.

The United States continues to play an
active role in United Nations space affairs,
particularly the Outer Space Committee. Inter-
national acceptance has been secured for the

une 4, 1973

827

1968 Astronaut Rescue and Return Agreement
and for the 1972 Space Liability Convention.
Work is also going forward on treaties covering
the moon and other celestial bodies, and on
registration of space objects.

The past year also marked a significant mile-
stone in U.S.-Soviet space cooperation. The
Space Cooperation Agreement which I signed
in Moscow on May 24, 1972, provides for a
variety of cooperative activities, including a
joint docking mission of Soviet and American
spacecraft in 1975.

Further opportunities lie ahead, including
possible international cooperation in the use of
a space shuttle and the development of basic
international understandings regarding earth
resource surveys. We will shape our response
to these and other challenges in ways that en-
hance the prospects for the peaceful use of
outer space in the interest of all mankind.

International Exchanges

Political relations among nations are in-
creasingly influenced by the growing range of
unofficial contacts between individuals and
groups in the modern world. The increase in
economic and scientific interdependence, the
growth of new transnational communities based
on common interests and concerns, the global
reach of communications, and the upsurge in
travel have all radically altered the environ-
ment in which national governments develop
and pursue their policies.

U.S. foreign policy has kept pace with these
changes. Our policies and programs have been
responsive to the opportunities. For example,
as a result of agreements made last year in
connection with my visit to the Soviet Union,
the American and Soviet peoples are now work-
ing more closely in a host of areas — exchanging
reactor scientists, sharing research findings in
heart disease, cancer, and environmental health,
cooperating in nearly 30 environmental proj-
ects, collaborating in the use of computers in
management, and planning joint probes into
space. Cultural groups and performing artists
ply between the two countries in increasing
numbers. Similar exchanges are occurring with
the People's Republic of China. In the past
year, Chinese table tennis players, physicians,
scientists, and acrobats have visited the United
States, and businessmen, doctors, journalists,
educators, scientists, and scholars from this
country have gone to China.

Scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges
between the United States and scores of other
countries are also steadily increasing, under

both official and unofl^cial auspices. These have,
helped open up new levels of dialogue with
present and prospective leaders in much of the
world.

These expanding contacts of millions of
American citizens and hundreds of American
organizations with their counterparts abroad !
must increasingly influence the way others!
see us and the way all societies see themselves. I
These trends are not a panacea but they are!
contributing to a climate of understanding in'
which governments can pursue the adjustment'
of official relationships. They also afford thej
individual citizen meaningful ways to help buildj
the structure of peace which is America's goal.i

International Hijacking and Terrorism

Just when prospects for peace among na-
tions are stronger than at any other time in
recent decades, a new form of lawless violencel lii
is spreading like a cancer through the interna-' »
tional community. Acts of politically-in-j ^
spired terrorism against innocent persons andl i
against commercial aircraft and other targets k
have increased sharply in recent years. The 1
means chosen by these terrorists are ofteni i
completely unscrupulous and their destructive! ??
effects indiscriminate. Terrorism threatens notj liti
only the safety and well-being of individualsj in
around the globe but even the stability of some il
societies. < Ki

Crimes against civil aviation continue to be iter
a major threat. The number of aircraft hi-J m
jackings has grown throughout the world sincej it
the flrst such incident, the diversion of aB ii
American plan to Cuba in May 1961. Aircraft! Stii
of nations representing the full range of thej ie
political spectrum have been affected, including fei;
Soviet, Israeli, German, Belgian, British, MexiJ iiiii
can, and American planes. iti

Terrorists have also struck in many othef :*
ways. More than 100 letter bombs have been i
sent through the international mails. A wav< !(|j
of diplomatic abductions began in August 196J flei
when terrorists tried to kidnap the U.S. Ambasf ife
sador to Guatemala, and killed him in th« Sij
process. Since then, 17 diplomatic kidnappinj iftji
attempts have occurred in the Western Hemii
sphere alone. The recent murders of one Belgiai
and two American diplomats in Khartoum un
derscore the global dimension of the terroris
problem. • '^ (,

The United States, in consultation with othe' ;„
governments, has tried to curb this rising tidi| i:t,j,
of international crime and gangsterism. Ove :«• ^
the last ten years we have pressed for adoptiol ^^^^
of international conventions to deal with sky' !' .j

*ral

828

Department of State Bulletin ^{

jacking. Three multilateral agreements are now
in force:

— The 1963 Tokyo Convention, which re-
quires states to return hijacked aircraft to the
control of their lawful commanders and to
facilitate continuation of air journeys inter-
rupted by violence ;

— The 1970 Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, which obli-
gates states either to prosecute or extradite
suspected air hijackers found in their territory;
and

— A companion convention, the 1971 Con-
vention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
'Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which
deals with sabotage and other terrorist attacks
against civil aircraft.

i We are working for the adoption of another

nnternational convention which would establish

^procedures for possible sanctions, including

suspension of air service, against countries

which fail to punish or extradite hijackers or

saboteurs of civil aircraft.

We took an important bilateral action on
■'February 15. 1973, when we entered into an
::greement with Cuba whereby each agreed to
extradite, if it did not punish, individuals in-
volved in hijacking.

I The United States has also pressed for con-
crete results in the United Nations to deal with
nternational terrorism generally. We welcomed
secretary General Waldheim's proposal that
he UN General A.ssembly consider this subject,
ubmitted a draft convention, and called for
liscussion. Some UN members, while sym-
lathetic to the need for quick actions, em-
ihasized the difficulty of defining terrorism and
evising international arrangements to deal
ffectively with it. Some sought to sidetrack the
ebate. The General Assembly set up an in-
erim working group to study the question in
epth.

The Assembly also considered draft articles
n the protection of diplomats and agreed to
:)licit member states' comments with a view
> completing action on a convention at its
^'73 session. We will do our utmost to secure
eneral Assembly acceptance of this conven-
on this year.

In INTERPOL, the mechanism for interna-
onal cooperation in criminal police work, we
ive .sought the maximum exchange of intelli-
;nce among participating countries with re-
tect to cases of hijacking and acts of
rrorism.
We have addressed these problems at home as

well. The Cabinet Committee to Combat Ter-
rorism, which I established last September,
reviewed existing procedures and adopted new
measures where necessary to ensure that our
Government could take swift and effective ac-
tion in diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforce-
ment channels. We have already improved our
methods for screening aliens entering or tran-
siting the United States and have taken addi-
tional precautions for the protection of foreign
diplomatic missions and personnel in the United
States.

The international community should examine
the political causes of terrorism and seek to
remedy any legitimate injustices. But political
passion, however deeply held, cannot be per-
mitted to wreak criminal violence on innocent
persons. As I have made clear in the past, the
United States Government will not submit to
terrorist blackmail. We will continue to work
vigorously to deter and prevent terrorist acts
and to punish those who perpetrate them.

Control of Drug Abuse

As part of our drive to meet the deadly men-
ace of narcotics abuse, this Administi'ation re-
mains committed to an unrelenting global
struggle against illicit drug traffic.

The Cabinet Committee on International
Narcotics Control, which spearheads U.S. drug
control efforts overseas, requested our ambas-
sadors in each of 59 countries to prepare nar-
cotics control action plans. These were reviewed
early in 1972 in Washington and returned to
our embassies to serve as the basis for ne-
gotiating bilateral narcotics control programs.

By letter of February 16, 1972. I advised the
appropriate Chiefs of Mission that the most
essential element in such programs was to con-
vince leaders of countries where drug produc-
tion and trafficking occur to commit their
governments to attacking the narcotics problem
with urgency and determination. Last Septem-
ber, at a special Washington conference of
senior U.S. narcotics control officers from
around the world, I emphasized my readiness
under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance
Act both to assist cooperating countries and
to suspend economic and military assistance to
any country which fails to take adequate steps
again.st illicit drug traffic. By mid-year, our
emba.ssies had initiated discussions with all
target countries, and since then they have con-
centrated on the implementation of coopera-
tive action progi-ams.

The results of our international anti-drug ef-

ne 4, 1973

829

fort have been most encouraging. Worldwide
seizures of heroin and morphine base tripled in
1971 and nearly doubled again in 1972. In 1972
some of the most important figures in the world
drug traffic were arrested, and a number of high
level traffickers were extradited to the United
States from other countries. Five heroin labora-
tories in the Marseilles area were shut down
by the French authorities during the year.
Steps have been taken, particularly in Laos
and Thailand, to tighten controls on drug smug-
gling from Southeast Asia. We have cooperated
with other countries in drug treatment, re-
habilitation, and education efforts, and in crop
substitution and eradication measures. The
Turkish ban on opium cultivation, for example,
has been implemented resolutely. Multilateral
efforts to fight illicit narcotics production and
trafficking have also received full U.S. support.
This country has been the chief contributor to
the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Con-
trol, which has started narcotics control pro-
grams in Thailand and Afghanistan. And we
have initiated proposals to amend and
strengthen the Single Convention on Narcotics
Drugs.

With more and more countries now working
to stop drug trafficking, seizures and arrests
are up dramatically both here and abroad. This
progress has helped to reduce the illicit drug
supply in the United States. During 1972 the
price of street level heroin in the eastern half
of the country rose sharply, the quality declined,
and new users had difficulty locating sources
of supply.

These gains notwithstanding, a sustained
vigorous campaign is still required against what
has become one of the most serious of the
vvorld's social ills. The United States will con-
tinue to provide leadership in that worldwide
campaign.

Population

Twenty years ago the world's population was
less than 2,600,000,000. Today it is more than
3,800,000,000. In just these two decades, the
human family has increased by nearly half the
total population attained in all the millennia
before. In most of the developing countries,
populations will double in the next 20 to 28
years.

Rapid population growth burdens and retards
development, accentuates malnutrition and un-
employment, and crowds cities with slums
These effects are felt particularly in developino-
countries. For developed and developing nations

830

alike, population pressure constitutes one of the
principal threats to the environment. Too many
people scrambling for cultivable land and re-
sources are a danger to international peace, and
this danger may sharply increase as popula-
tions double and treble in coming decades.

Efforts to moderate population growth are
having important, if limited, success around
the world. Many countries have already under-
taken measures to bring rapid increase under
control ; others have national programs to pro-
vide family planning services to their people.
The United States now provides bilateral assist-
ance for such activities in 36 countries. We also
contribute to the United Nations Fund for
Population Activities, which supports programs
in 76 countries, and to the International
Planned Parenthood Federation, with programs
in over 40 countries.

At the Second Asian Population Conference
in Tokyo last November, the United States
joined 22 other countries in calling on gov-
ernments to establish goals and programs for
effectively controlling population growth, and
to provide family planning information, edu-
cation, and services to all their citizens as
soon as possible.

In order to focus international attention on
the vital problem of world population growth, I
the United Nations has designated next year
as World Population Year. A World Popula-
tion Conference has been called for August
1974. I believe information and action programs ;
undertaken as part of the observance can be a ;
valuable means of furthering appreciation of ,
population problems and of generating more '
resolute action by nations to solve them. The ;
United States will cooperate fully with the
United Nations in observing the year and '
working to make the World Population Confer-
ence a success.

It is imperative that the nations of the world
reach agreement on means for dealing effec-
tively with this global problem.

ii

Energy

Satisfying the world's energy requirements
over the next several decades is a matter of
urgent concern to the United States and other
nations. Important factors include a rapidly
increasing demand for energy, the need to
choose among alternative new sources, the
costs of developing these sources, and the strong
emphasis on environmental protection which
limits the use of many energy forms.

One major problem that will face us during
the next two decades will be ensuring an ade- i

Department of State Bulletin

quate supply of energy from secure sources at
reasonable prices. This task will require broad
cooperation between consumer and producer
nations. It will have a major impact on inter-
national trade and finance.

This Administration has recognized the need
for adjustment in our policies to meet the de-
mands of the changing energy scene. Domes-
tically, we plan to accelerate the development
of our own oil and gas resources, including
those on the Outer Continental Shelf and in
Alaska, in a manner consistent with national
interest and conservation. We have worked,
as appropriate, with U.S. private enterprise
in its efforts to develop new foreign sources of
oil and natural gas, including Soviet and Al-
gerian sources. We have been kept informed by
our petroleum industry concerning its negotia-
tions to develop new relationships with the
world's major oil producing countries. Finally,
we are investigating ways in which closer co-
operation among producers and consumers
could result in an adequate supply of oil and
natural gas throughout the world — with due
regard for the interests of consumers and
producers alike.

We are maintaining our support for the de-
velopment of nuclear energy, which has proven
to be an economically viable alternative to
more traditional fuels for the generation of
electric power. In all aspects of U.S. coopera-
tion with other nations in the nuclear energy
field, however, we continue to insist on satis-
factory safeguards against the diversion of nu-
clear materials from civilian use to the
production of weapons.

We are also considering the feasibility of de-
veloping other alternative sources of energy —
the gasification of coal, recovery of oil from
shale, and the utilization of solar and geother-
mal resources.

In my recent energy policy statement, I an-
nounced several modifications in our domestic
policies, and a major increase in funding and
renewed emphasis on research and development
programs aimed at creating alternative sources
of energy. I am confident these programs will
make possible the rapid expansion of domestic
energy supplies that may be needed in the
future.

The energy problem will also have major
impact on our national security and foreign
policy planning. Potential vulnerabilities could
be created for the United States and our allies
as we increase our energy imports in coming
years. We will continue to consider these prob-
lems and design programs to alleviate them.

The shifting energy scene is a major chal-
lenge for international coopei'ation. These new
common problems could introduce strains into
our relations with other countries. But they
also create new opportunities for cooperation
that could ultimately bring countries closer
together.

Cooperative research eff'orts with other na-
tions can do much to speed the development
of new forms of energy. Such cooperation in
this diflicult and expensive process is of mu-
tual advantage to all nations. And while we
search for new sources, we must move with
others — producers and consumers alike — to-
ward wider measures of cooperation to ensure
that the world's remaining fossil fuels are used
most eff'ectively.

Pollution and the Environment

Global environmental concerns transcend
national boundaries, economic systems, and
ideologies. They demand a truly global response.
During the past year, we made progress on a
number of fronts toward developing sucji a
response.

Multilateral Actions. The most notable success
was the first UN Conference on the Human
Environment. Held in Stockholm in June 1972,
with 113 countries participating, the Confer-
ence agreed on a far reaching program for in-
ternational action on the earth's environmental
ills. Specific aspects of the program include a
global system to monitor the environment; in-
ternational conventions to control ocean dump-
ing of shore-generated wastes and to preserve
plants and animals threatened with extinction ;
and creation of a World Heritage Trust to pro-
tect unique natural, historical, or cultural areas.
The Conference also decided to set up an En-
vironmental Secretariat to coordinate UN pro-
grams in this field and to establish a UN
Environmental Fund, which I had proposed in
February 1972, with an initial goal of $100
million for the first five years to finance en-
vironmental activities.

At the same time, we recognize the concerns
of developing countries that steps to preserve
the environment must enhance, not hinder, the
development process. During the Stockholm
meeting we made clear that in carrying out
environmental programs we will take all prac-
tical steps to prevent reduced access to our
markets; we will not use environmental con-
cerns as a pretext for discriminatory trade
policies.

The success of the Stockholm Conference of-
fers considerable promise for more eff^ective

June 4, 1973

831

international cooperation on the environment.
It is only a first step, however. Now we must
work to translate the Conference recommen-
dations into actions.

NATO's Committee on the Challenges of
Modern Society (CCMS) also made progress in
1972. Committee projects on air and water pol-
lution are providing valuable information and
recommendations to member countries in the
Atlantic Alliance, and a project in the field of
urban transportation is now being developed.
An inland water project is yielding important
guidelines for dealing with the pollution of
rivers that cross jurisdictional boundaries, and
has already led to the formation of a U.S.-
Canadian Joint Committee on Water Quality
for the St. John's River Basin on our common
border. As part of a CCMS pilot study, the
United States last November signed an agree-
ment with the principal European auto manu-
facturing nations to exchange information on
technology for low pollution power systems.

At its May 1972 ministerial meeting, the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) adopted guidelines de-
signed to avoid possible trade distortions
arising from diff'erences in the environmental
policies of member countries. The United States
is now working with other OECD members to
develop procedures for effective implementa-
tion of these guidelines, which should permit
countries to strengthen their environmental
protection programs without upsetting interna-
tional trade relationships.

Marine mammals, including whales, dolphins,
seals, and polar bears, are increasingly endan-
gered by man's onslaughts. Whales are prob-
ably in the greatest jeopardy, with some species
on the edge of extinction. The United States
advocated a ten-year moratorium on all whal-
ing, both to permit presently depleted stocks
to recover and to generate needed scientific
data on whales. The UN Conference on the
Human Environment endorsed this proposal,
calling upon the International Whaling Com-
mission to adopt it. While the Commission re-
jected the proposed moratorium at its meeting
in June 1972, it did agree to significant reduc-
tions in the 1973 quotas for catches of certain
whales, and it extended the current ban on
hunting other varieties.

The United States joined with 91 other na-
tions in adopting a Convention on the Preven-
tion of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter at a conference in London
last November. The parties to the convention

agreed to institute national systems for regulat-
ing ocean dumping similar to the comprehensive
program we now have in the United States.

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consulta-
tive Organization (IMCO) has continued its ef-
forts to prevent and reduce oil pollution from
tanker collisions, groundings, and intentional
discharges of oil ballast and bilge water. In
May 1972, I submitted to the Senate for its ji
advice and consent provisions to implement (;
standards adopted by IMCO to reduce oil out- |i
flow from tanks ruptured in vessel casualties, ji
IMCO's 1973 Conference on Marine Pollution, ji
to be held in October in London, will focus on i<
measures for the complete elimination of inten- !i
tional pollution from oil and noxious substances
and for the minimization of accidental spills.
The United States is helping to develop a new ii
international convention to eliminate inten- |ij
tional discharges of oil and hazardous sub- j3
stances from ships by 1975, if possible, or at !|
the latest by the end of this decade. |;

Bilateral Actions. International progress on j|
the environment in 1972 included significant 14
bilateral developments. i'

Last May in Moscow I signed the U.S.-Soviet ||
Agreement of Cooperation in the Field of En-j
vironmental Protection, which calls for mutual j
cooperation and exchange of information inj
eleven specific areas. The Joint Commission toj
implement this agreement met in Moscow last
September, and agreed on a number of concrete '
projects, including a comparative investiga-;
tion of air pollution in St. Louis and Leningrad; ;ii'
joint studies of water pollution problems at, ',|
Lake Baikal in the Soviet Union and Lake jj
Tahoe and one of the Great Lakes in the United: jj
States; exchange of information on environ-Jj
mental planning in urban areas, with emphasis; ^
on Leningrad in the Soviet Union and Atlanta ,,
and San Francisco in the United States ; and a jj
range of cooperative ventures in areas such as^ i'
earthquake prediction, wildlife protection, ef- „
fects of environmental change on climate, and
marine pollution.

In April 1972 in Ottawa, Prime Minister
Trudeau and I signed the U.S. -Canadian Great
Lakes Water Quality Agreement to clean up
and p)'event further pollution in the Great
Lakes. This agreement establishes an important
international precedent for cooperation be-
tween neighboring nations to protect vital
shared resources. It specified both general and
specific water quality objectives and set a De-
cember 1975 deadline for various programs toi
be completed or underway.

!(J

832

Department of State Bulletir

In a joint communique issued last June with
President Echeverria of Mexico, I announced
that the United States would take immediate
measures to reduce the salinity level of the
Colorado River, a problem which Mexico has
indicated damages agriculture in the Mexicali
Valley. The communique also contained an
agreement that policy-level officials from our
two nations would meet regularly to discuss
other mutual environmental concerns and to

develop methods for dealing with them more
systematically.

These, then, are the challenges which con-
front the entire world community. The inter-
national response during the past year to these
issues has been encouraging. These efforts are
providing institutional foundations for effec-
tive future action. While many problems still
remain unresolved, the world has moved closer
to the global solutions that are required.

Conclusion

In the past four years, there have been fun-
damental changes and signal successes. We have
cleared away vestiges of the past. We have
erased or moderated hostilities. And we are
strengthening partnerships.

The specific events or policies, however im-
portant, reflect a more profound enterprise.
We are seeking the philosophical, as well as the
practical, reorientation of our foreign policy.
This is the primary challenge of a radically
different world. If America is to provide the
leadership that only it can, Americans must
identify with new visions and purposes.

As we look toward this nation's two hun-
dredth bii'thday, we shall continue our efforts
— with the people and the Congress — to create
this new consensus.

' In the transition from the bipolar world of
American predominance to the multipolar world
of shared responsibilities, certain themes need
emphasis. They indicate not only what our ap-
'proach is, but what it is not.

We seek a stable structure, not a classical bal-
ance of power. Undeniably, national security
must re.st upon a certain equilibrium between
potential adversaries. The United States can-
not entrust its destiny entirely, or even largely,
'to the goodwill of others. Neither can we expect
)ther countries so to mortgage their future.
Solid security involves external restraints on
potential opponents as well as self-restraint.

Thus a certain balance of power is inherent
n any international system and has its place in
he one we envision. But it is not the overriding
•oncept of our foreign policy. First of all, our
ipproach reflects the realities of the nuclear
ige. The classical concept of lialance of power
ncluded continual maneuvering for marginal

advantages over others. In the nuclear era this
is both unrealistic and dangerous. It is un-
realistic because when both sides possess such
enormous power, small additional increments
cannot be translated into tangible advantage
or even usable political strength. And it is
dangerous because attempts to seek tactical
gains might lead to confrontation which could
be catastrophic.

Secondly, our approach includes the element
of consensus. All nations, adversaries and
friends alike, must have a stake in preserving
the international system. They must feel that
their principles are being respected and their
national interests secured. They must, in short,
see positive incentive for keeping the peace, not
just the dangers of breaking it. If countries be-
lieve global arrangements threaten their vital
concerns, they will challenge them. If the inter-
national environment meets their vital con-
cerns, they will work to maintain it. Peace
requires mutual accommodation as well as mu-
tual restraint.

Negotiation ivith adversaries does not alter
our more fundamental ties with friends. We
have made a concerted effort to move from con-
frontation to negotiation. We have done well.
At the same time, our determination to reduce
divisions has not eroded distinctions between
friends and adversaries. Our alliances remain
the cornerstones of our foreign policy. They I'e-
flect shared values and purposes. They involve
major economic interests. They provide the
secure foundation on which to base negotiations.

Although their forms must be adapted to
new conditions, these ties are enduring. We
have no intention of sacrificing them in efforts
to engage adversaries in the shaping of peace.

une 4, 1973

833

Indeed such efforts cannot succeed, nor can
they have lasting meaning, without the bonds of
traditional friendships. There is no higher ob-
jective than the strengthening of our partner-
ships.

Detente does not mean the end of danger.
Improvements in both the tone and substance
of our relations have indeed reduced tensions
and heightened the prospects for peace. But
these processes are not automatic or easy. They
require vigilance and firmness and exertion.
Nothing would be more dangerous than to as-
sume prematurely that dangers have dis-
appeared.

Thus we maintain strong military power even
as we seek mutual limitation and reduction of
arms. We do not mistake climate for substance.
We base our policies on the actions and capa-
bilities of others, not just on estimates of their
intentions.

Detente is not the same as lasting peace. And
peace does not gaarantee tranquility or mean
the end of contention. The world will hold perils
for as far ahead as we can see.

We intend to share responsibilities, not abdi-
cate them. We have emphasized the need for
other countries to take on more responsibilities
for their security and development. The tangi-
ble result has often been a reduction in our
overseas presence or our share of contribu-
tions. But our purpose is to continue our com-
mitment to the world in ways we can sustain,
not to camouflage a retreat. We took these steps
only when our friends were prepared for them.
They have been successfully carried out be-

cause American backing remained steady. They'
have helped to maintain support in this country [
for a responsible foreign policy.

I underlined the vital importance of the rede-|
fined American role two years ago :

Our participation remains crucial. Because of the I
abundance of our resources and the stretch of our I
technology, America's impact on the world remains!
enormous, whether by our action or by our inaction.!
Our awareness of the world is too keen, and our con- 1
cern for peace too deep, for us to remove the measure I
of stability which we have provided for the past 25|
years.

Measured against the challenges we faced andl
the goals we set, we can take satisfaction inl
the record of the past four years. Our progress!
has been more marked in reducing tensions!
than in restructuring partnerships. We havel
negotiated an end to a war and made future!
wars less likely by improving relations with!
major adversaries. Our bonds with old friends|
have proved durable during these years of pro-
found change. But we are still searching fori
more balanced relationships. This will be ourj
most immediate concern, even as we pursue our|
other goals.

Where peace is newly planted, we shall workj
to make it thrive.

Where bridges have been built, we shall work|
to make them stronger.

Where friendships have endured, we shalll
work to make them grow.

During the next four years — with the help of|
others — we shall continue building an interna-
tional structure which could silence the soundsl
of war for the remainder of this century.

834

Department of State Bulletin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IiUruduction 718

Part I: Buildin<; New Relationships

China 724

The Soviet Union 729

Part II: Endin<r Conflict

Vietnam 737

Laos and Cambodia 750

Part III: Strengthening Partnerships

Europe and the Atlantic Alliance 754

Japan 763

Asia and the Pacific 770

Latin America 774

Part IV: Regions of Tension and Opportunity

The Middle East 783

South Asia 789

Africa 794

Part V: Designing a New Economic System

International Economic Policy 798

Part VI: Maintaining Security

Defense Policy 806

Arms Control 814

Part VII: iV'ew International Challenges

The United Nations 822

The Global Challenges of Peace 825

Conclusion 833

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^

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1772

June 11, 1973

THE ESSENTIAL PURPOSES OF THE TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973
Statement by Secretary Rogers 835

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
Statement by Deputy Secretary Rush 85A

ENCOURAGING A NEGOTIATING PROCESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Address by Assistant Secretary Sisco 8M

USING U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE
Excerpt From Remarks by President Nixon -838

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1772
June 11, 1973

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The Department of State BULLET,
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The BULLETIN includes selei
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eluded concerning treaties and in]
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i

rhe Essential Purposes of the Trade Reform Act of 1973

Statement by Secretary Rogers

The Trade Reform Act which you are now
:'onsidering has two essential purposes : first,

0 insure the continued prosperity of the
\merican people and, second, to help build

1 more stable and secure world by develop-
ng closer economic ties among all nations.

Some seem to believe that these two pur-
aoses are mutually inconsistent, that we
Tiust choose one or the other. We hear it
,;aid that America's prosperity is threatened
Dy our growing economic ties with other
lations and by the cost of our involvement
;n building a more secure world.

The bill before you is based upon just the
apposite view. We believe that our prosperity
s increasingly dependent upon closer eco-
lomic ties with other nations. And we be-
ieve that the United States can only remain
prosperous in a more secure, interdependent,
ind peaceful world.

By pursuing these objectives we will
reate more rather than less jobs for Ameri-
:an workers. And by working to improve
relations with our adversaries and to share
more equally the common burden with our
lilies, we hope to lighten the burden on
the American taxpayer of our engagement
abroad. This will be possible because the
lature of our economy and of our inter-
national role is changing.

Following World War II the United States
accepted a major share of the responsibility
for the economic recovery of our friends and

' Made before the House Committee on Ways and
Weans on May 9 (press release 138). The complete
ranscript of the hearings will be published by the
■ommittee and will be available from the Superin-
endent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
)ffice, Washington, D.C. 20402.

the common defense against our adversaries.
At that time we had an enormous competitive
edge in trade, with one of the world's few
sound economies, an economy which was
very largely self-sufficient.

The situation today is substantially dif-
ferent. First, the possibilities of peaceful and
mutually beneficial coexistence with the Com-
munist countries have improved. The old
image of a bipolar world, with the free and
Communist worlds confronting each other
as antagonists across every frontier, is no
longer real. Second, other countries have
grown into economic powers somewhat more
comparable to the United States. The com-
bined gross national product of the nine-
member European Community was 70
percent that of the United States in 1972.
Similarly, Japan's output as recently as 1967
was one-seventh that of the United States,
but in 1972 it was one-fourth.

The United States has also grown im-
mensely more prosperous. In fact, over the
past decade the absolute growth in our per
capita income exceed^ed that of Japan and
the other developed countries. But we can no
longer take for granted our competitive edge
in trade. Our businesses and our government
policies must now become more export-
minded to keep pace with the greater import
needs of our industries and consumers.

To many these may seem unfortunate de-
velopments, but not if they ai'e put in the
proper perspective. For many decades our
best trading partners and main competitors
— Canada, Japan, and western Europe — have
been neither economically self-sufllicient nor
complacent about their ability to compete.
They have prospered by exporting those

lune n, 1973

835

goods which they produce most efficiently and
importing from others goods produced more
efficiently elsewhere.

Almost without noticing it, we have also
begun to benefit from a greater involvement
in international trade. The proportion of our
total production sold abroad is steadily in-
creasing. Today about 14 percent of our in-
dustrial production and 31 percent of our
agricultural crops are exported, creating mil-
lions of jobs and supporting major sectors
of our economy. The increasing significance
of imports is evident to everyone. Without
growing imports of petroleum and raw ma-
terial resources our economy cannot expand.
As consumers all Americans benefit from
the savings and variety provided by imports.
Increased imports dampen rather than in-
crease domestic inflation.

This process of mutual growth and greater
interdependence with our major allies has
brought with it problems as well as benefits.

A monetary and trading system founded
on American economic predominance ob-
viously requires adjustment in a more bal-
anced and integrated world economy. A
quarter century of American balance of pay-
ments deficits fueled the world's economic
growth. But these deficits combined with an
overly rigid monetary system to finally cause
heavy demands upon the dollar, erosion of
our competitive position, and for the first
time in this century a deficit in our trade
balance.

We are determined to correct this situa-
tion. We have already taken dramatic action
to revalue the dollar, making our exports
substantially more competitive. We are mak-
ing significant progress toward a more equi-
table, flexible, and stable monetary system.

Trade Negotiations With Our Allies

We have also begun to make progress in
trade. Japan, the European Community, and
other industrialized countries have agreed to
join with us in far-reaching multilateral
trade negotiations this September. Prime
Minister Tanaka and President Nixon
pledged in their communique last September
to actively support trade negotiations cover-

ing both industry and agriculture. Prime
Minister Tanaka agreed to work vigorously
for a better equilibrium in the trade balance
with the United States. And the heads of
government of the Eui'opean Community
stated last October that they attach major
importance to the upcoming trade negotia-
tions. Sir Christopher Soames, the European
Community's "Foreign Minister," has made
clear that trade negotiations will be at the
center of the Community's future relations
with the United States.

We want to make the next round of trade
negotiations as significant as the last. Since
the Kennedy Round concluded in 1967 after
reducing trade barriers an average of 35 per-
cent, world trade has nearly doubled. To
defend and further America's economic in-
terests in these trade talks our negotiators
must have the same authority as their Euro-
pean and Japanese counterparts. This is one
of the major reasons why trade legislation is
required at the earliest possible date.

Nothing is more important to the overall
success of our foreign policy than for us to
receive a mandate now to further our inter-
national economic interests. For these eco-
nomic interests are intimately related to our
political and security concerns throughout
the world.

With our allies in Europe and Japan eco-
nomic tensions could develop in a way which
could affect the entire fabric of our political
and defense relationship. Properly managed,
economic negotiations should lead to the
greater willingness and ability of our allies
to shoulder a more equal share of the com-
mon burden. Left to smolder or fed by a
spirit of confrontation, these tensions could
weaken the alliance, which is such an impor-
tant factor in our national security.

We will not allow this to happen. With
American encouragement, our allies have
begun to shoulder a larger portion of the de-
fense burden. Since 1970 our NATO allies
have increased their defense expenditures by
30 percent. They now provide 90 percent
of NATO's ground forces, 80 percent of its
seapower, and 75 percent of its air forces.
Our joint success in moving from confronta-
tion to an era of negotiations with our ad-

836

Department of State Bulletin

versaries has allowed the United States to
devote a substantially greater share of its
resources to domestic concerns. Since 1968
we have reduced the portion of our GNP de-
voted to defense from 9 to 6 percent.

As we negotiate differences with our allies,
we must not forjret that our economic inter-
ests coincide far more than they diverge. All
of our countries have problems adjusting to
the growing impact on domestic economies
of rapid shifts in trade, shifts largely created
by greater global economic integration.
While some have lost faith in our ability to
compete, the Japanese and Europeans are
constantly concerned that the United States
will flood their markets with our more ef-
ficiently produced goods.

Thus we have a common interest in agree-
ing on the safeguards proposed by this bill,
safeguards which would assist workers and
industries to adjust to sudden, massive, or
unfair disruption by foreign goods. And in
other areas of trade as well we must all
devise and accept new rules and obligations.
For none of us can afford a trade war any
more than a military conflict.

We should approach the challenges pre-
sented by our new economic situation with
confidence and traditional American enthusi-
asm for competition. Our businessmen,
workers, and farmers should seize the great
opportunities which are being opened by
revaluation of the dollar and the prospect of
more equitable trade relations with Japan,
Canada, and the European Community.

Building East-West Economic Ties

This bill is equally important for our re-
lations with the Communist nations. While
extensive East-West economic ties are not
by themselves sufficient to create a more
peaceful relationship, they are an indispen-
sable ingredient. Without normalizing our
economic relations, normal political relations
are clearly impossible. During 1972 we took
dramatic initiatives toward China and the
Soviet Union. To build these initiatives into
a permanent structure of peace, we must now
begin to weave a network of mutual interests
in trade, technology, and resource develop-
ment.

Hardly anyone questions the political ad-
vantages of building closer economic ties with
the Communist nations. However, we must
keep in mind that our economic relations
with the non-Communist developed and de-
veloping nations are much more substantial
than our economic ties with the Communists.
This will remain true for the foreseeable
future.

We have a balance of trade surplus with
the Communist nations and expect that this
will continue indefinitely, easing our overall
trade deficit. We want to place our business-
men in the same competitive position in these
growing markets as the Europeans and
Japanese. Today western Europe has 10
times as much trade with eastern Europe as
we do. Japan is in substantially the same
position with both the Soviet Union and
China.

Extension of MEN [most favored nation]
status to the Communist nations as pro-
posed by this bill would be a major step to-
ward political and economic normalization.
It would not grant them exceptionally favor-
able treatment, for we extend MEN status
to all of the countries with whom we have
substantial trade.

I am aware of the continued active in-
terest by the Congress in Soviet emigration
practices. I share your deep concern about
this matter both officially and personally.
But I believe the best hope for a satisfactory
resolution of this issue will come not from
the confrontation formal legislation would
now bring about, but from a steady improve-
ment in our overall relations with the Soviet
Union.

As these relations have improved in re-
cent years, w^e have witnessed a significant
and favorable evolution in Soviet emigration
policy. An unprecedented 60,000 Soviet Jews
have been able to emigrate. For over a year
the average monthly level has exceeded
2,500. I know some of you are genuinely ap-
prehensive over the firmness of present So-
viet emigration policy, particularly in regard
to the decision to waive totally collection of
the education tax. However, as you already
know, the President has been assured by the
Soviet Government that the policy on total

June 11, 1973

837

waivers is to be continued indefinitely. He
has also been assured that present Soviet
emigration policy, which has permitted the
current level of emigration, will also be con-
tinued indefinitely. I am not in a position to
place into the public record the texts of con-
fidential communications on this subject, but
those assurances are firm.

Failure to grant MFN status would seri-
ously jeopardize our relations with the So-
viet Union. It would impede the gradual
evolution of the Soviet Union into a more
open member of the world community— an
evolution which is the best long-term hope for
all of us, including those Soviet Jews who
wish to emigrate.

Generalized Tariff Preferences

I am departing in the next few days on an
extensive trip through Latin America. I will
be taking with me Bill Casey, our Under
Secretary for Economic Aflfairs, because I
know that economic issues are high on the
agenda of our neighbors in this hemisphere.
In fact, for almost all of the countries in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America economic de-
velopment is the number-one priority. And
generalized tariff preferences, as proposed
by this act, have become both symbolically
and substantively their number-one request
of the United States. This is so because these
countries no longer want to be dependent
upon aid — they want to earn the foreign ex-
change required for development through
expanded trade.

But why are generalized preferences in the
American interest? They are in our interest
because most of our increasingly important
energy and raw material imports, 30 percent
of our total trade, and over half of our in-
vestment income come from the developing
nations. If we want these nations to take into

account our interests, not only in economic i
but in political fields as well, we must take i
into account their interests. Other industrial j
nations have already extended such prefer-
ences. And preferences are an important
stimulus to steady economic development,
which will ultimately create markets for us,
decrease the military and economic assistance
burden on the United States, and lead to a
more stable world.

Passage of the Trade Reform Act of 1973
will allow us to pursue these major ob-
jectives:

We will strengthen the productive an|

competitive qualities of the American econ-
omy, increase jobs, raise incomes, and devise
safeguards to assist workers and industries
to adjust to rapid shifts in trade.

We will press the European Community,

Canada, and Japan to assure fairer treatment
for our exports.

—We will continue our strong offensive
to create a more equitable and smoothly func-
tioning monetary system.

We will vigorously pursue both trade]

expansion and trade reform. \

We will join with the less developed na-j I

tions to accelerate mutually beneficial trade;

With the Communist nations, we wil i

construct a network of mutually advantai i
geous economic ties to strengthen the fabric i
of peace. We want to reduce our mutual ex; i
penditures on arms as we increase our com; i
mitment to trade.

What we are seeking in this bill is ai, :
economic policy which will accelerate rathe:| I
than impede recent progress toward a mon I
peaceful and prosperous world. I am coni ,
fident that by working together the Congres.'H
and this administration can shape such i |
policy.

838

I

Department of State Bulleti

I

Using U.S. Military Strength as an Instrument for Peace

Remarks by President Nixon (Excerpt)

Over the past several years, the chances
for peace have grown immeasurably stronger,
not only in Southeast Asia but all over the
world. We have brought this long -war in
Viet-Nam to an end. After a generation of
hostility, the United States has opened a
new relationship with the leaders of one-
fourth of all the people who live in the world,
the People's Republic of China. We have
negotiated far-reaching agreements with our
longtime adversary, the Soviet Union, in-
cluding the first limitation of strategic nu-
clear arms. We have begun revitalizing our
Atlantic partnership with western Europe
and our Pacific partnership with Japan.

In the explosive Middle East, we averted
a major crisis in 1970. We have helped to
establish a cease-fire which is now well into
its third year.

There are still enormously difl^cult prob-
lems there and in other parts of the world,
but we have come a long way over these
past five years toward building a structure of
peace in the world — much fui-ther simply
than ending a long war, but building a
structure that will avoid other wars, and
that is what every American wants and
that is what we are working toward today.

I know that some might interpret the
achievements I have just mentioned as the

'Made on May 19, Armed Forces Day, at pier
12, Naval Station, Norfolk, Va. For the complete
text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Doc-
uments dated May 28, p. 685.

result of diplomacy, diplomacy from the
President and the Secretary of State and
others who have responsibility. But that in-
terpretation would be incomplete.

The positions that a head of state or a
diplomat puts forward at the conference
table are only as good as the national
strength that stands behind those positions.

So it has been the respect of other coun-
tries for our military strength that has been
vital to our many negotiating successes dur-
ing the past four years. And that same mili-
tary strength helps secure our own security
and that of our friends as we go forward
with them in building new partnerships.

What I am saying to you today is that a
large share of the credit for America's prog-
ress toward building a structure of peace in
the world goes to you, the men and women
in uniform. You are the peace forces of the
United States, because without you we
couldn't have made the progress we have
made. They would not have respected us,
and without strength, we would not have the
respect which leads to progress. Let's keep
that strength and never let it down, because
our further hopes for peace also rely on you.

This year, the year 1973, we face a series
of negotiations even more significant than
those of the year 1972, negotiations that will
help to determine the future of international
peace and cooperation for the rest of this
century and beyond.

Every time I see an audience like this, I
look at everybody — the older people, partic-

*] June 11, 1973

839

ularly the people that I see over here in
wheelchairs ; and also the young people, those
that are so young, with all of their years
ahead — and my greatest hope is, make this
country a better country for them in the fu-
ture, make this world a more peaceful world
for them.

That is what leadership is all about. That
is what we are dedicated to here today.

In just a few weeks, as you know. General
Secretary Brezhnev of the Soviet Union will
be in this country for a summit conference
to build on the new negotiations that we
have made in U.S.-Soviet relations in Moscow
one year ago. We are ready to join with
the Soviet leaders in efforts to seek addi-
tional ways to limit strategic nuclear arms,
to expand mutually advantageous trade, and
together with our allies, to work toward mu-
tual and balanced reductions of the level of
armed forces in central Europe.

We are moving, as I have already indi-
cated, toward normalization of our relations
with the People's Republic of China, now
that our two nations are opening permanent
Liaison Offices in Peking and in Washington.

We are committed to wide-ranging talks
with our friends in Europe and in Japan,
with particular emphasis on placing the in-
ternational economy on a more secure and
equitable footing.

Because all of that is at stake in the crit-
ical period ahead, we must reject the well-
intentioned but misguided suggestions that
because of the progress we have made to-
ward peace, this is the time to slash Amer-
ica's defenses by billions of dollars.

There could be no more certain formula
for failure in the negotiations that I have
just talked about, no more dangerous invita-
tion for other powers to break the peace,
than for us to send the President of the
United States to the conference table as the
head of the second strongest nation in the
world. Let that never happen in the United
States of America.

Let me put it quite bluntly, particularly in
the presence of my colleagues from the House
and the Senate, those distinguished Vir-
ginians who presently serve there and who
happen to be also on the Armed Services

Committees: Often when votes come up as
to whether America will be strong enough to
keep its commitments or be so weak that
it will not command respect in the world,
those who vote to cut our arms are said to
be for peace and those who vote for strength
are said to be for war.

I want to put it right on the line today,
bluntly: A vote for a weak America is a
vote against peace. A vote for a strong
America is a vote for peace, because a
strong America will always keep the peace.

If the United States were to cut back uni-
laterally in the strength of our Armed
Forces without obtaining reciprocal actions
or commitments in return, that action — and I
speak with measured tones — that action of
unilaterally cutting our strength before we
have a mutual agreement with the other side
to cut theirs as well will completely torpedo
the chances for any successful negotiations,
and those who vote to cut that strength will
be destroying the chances, the best chance
we have had since World War II, to build
an era of peace. And so, support those men
and women who have the courage in the
Congress to vote for a strong America
rather than to vote for a weak America. We
need a strong America if we are going to
have peace.

Let me turn to that area of the world in | *'
which we need that strength so much — j<I
Southeast Asia. ' '"'

After the long ordeal we have been "■■
through, I can realize how so many Ameri- i -ti
cans say, "We want to do no more" — just '< «
100 days after the cease-fire agreements were; *'
signed in Paris. These agreements which Tii
preserve both the honor of the United States i
and the freedom of South Viet-Nam werej
achieved in principle through a combination J
of diplomacy and strength. They can only be'
maintained and upheld through that samei
combination — diplomacy and strength. i

Now, so far there has been considerable;
progress in carrying out the provisions of j
the peace agreement that we signed just 100
days ago in Paris. Our troops, our prisonersj
are home; violence in South Viet-Nam isj
declining; the cease-fire has been extended| ^^
to Laos.

s

ii

ill

{»

M

840

Department of State Bulletin

But compliance with the agreement is
still gravely deficient in many respects. The
cooperation which North Viet-Nam promised
to give us in making a full accounting for
Americans listed as missing in action has
not been satisfactory. And I can assure you
that we must and will insist that this
promise, this pledge, this solemn agreement,
be kept, because just as America never broke
faith with our prisoners of war, I can assure
you today we will not break faith with those
who are reported missing in action. They
must all be accounted for by the North Viet-
namese.

North Viet-Nam, as you have probably
read, has also persisted in violations of the
Paris agreements. They have, for example,
refused to withdraw thousands of troops
from Cambodia and Laos. They have poured
huge amounts of military equipment into
these areas and into South Viet-Nam. And I
say to you, my friends, today, it would be
X crime against the memory of those Ameri-
cans who made the ultimate sacrifice for
peace in Indochina, a serious blow to this
country's ability to lead constructively else-
vvhere in the world, for us to stand by and
oermit the peace settlement that we reached
n Paris to be systematically destroyed by
violations such as this.

That is why we are continuing to take the
accessary measures to insist that all parties
;o the agreement keep their word, live up to
heir obligations. A peace agreement that is
mly a piece of paper is something that we
ire not interested in.

; We want a peace agreement that is ad-
lered to. We are adhering to the agreement.
Ve expect the other side to adhere to that
.greement.

It should be clearly understood by every-
ne concerned in this country and abroad
hat our policy is not aimed at continuing the
'&r in Viet-Nam Or renewing the war that
as been ended. Rather, the aim of our policy
1 to preserve and strengthen the peace, a
eace which we achieved at great cost in
le past, which holds such promise in the
iture.

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia
Visits Washington

His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I of
Ethiopia met ivith President Nixon and other
government officials during an official visit
to Washington May 14-15. Follotcing are an
exchange of toasts between President Nixon
and the Emperor at a dinner at the White
House May 15 and remarks by Deputy Secre-
tary Rush at a reception at the Department
of State earlier that evening.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 21

President Nixon

Your Imperial Majesty and our very dis-
tinguished guests: As I sat here in this room
tonight thinking of this very distinguished
comi^any, I thought how fortunate all of us
are. This Nation is 195 years old, this house
is about 185 years old, and in the whole long
history of this Nation, no chief of state, no
head of government has been received more
often, honored more often, than is the man
we honor tonight.

Many of us remember him, of course, from
those days when he stood at the old League
of Nations as the Lion of Judah 37 years
ago and captured the imagination of every-
body who loved freedom and independence
all over the world.

But through the years, those of us who
have followed him since know that this man,
the man we receive again in this house to-
night, stands for far more than his own
country, great as that country is, and long
as its proud history is, because His Imperial
Majesty, who for 57 years has been the head
of state — 57 years — His Imperial Majesty is
not only the revered leader of Ethiopia, as
anyone who has visited that country knows —
and I have visited it twice — he is the acknowl-
edged leader of Africa, and the organiza-
tion of African states, of course, is located
in his capital.

And so tonight, I could propose a toast to

•ne n, 1973

841

him as the leader of Ethiopia, a country that
the United States is proud to have a long and
very, very friendly relationship with over
the years. I could propose a toast to him as a
great leader of Africa, that continent with all
of the promise that it holds for the future.
But tonight we are privileged even beyond
that, because in our midst, here again in this
house, being honored more than any man who
has ever been in this house, is the senior
statesman of the world, and how privileged
we are to raise our glasses to the senior
statesman of the world, His Imperial Maj-
esty Haile Selassie.

Emperor Haile Selassie '

Mr. President and Mrs. Nixon: I wish to
express very sincerely my appreciation for
the generous hospitality you have accorded
us since our arrival in Washington and for
this most enjoyable evening you have ar-
ranged in our honor tonight.

I also wish to express my appreciation for
the very kind words you have said about the
leadershii) we have provided for our people
and the role we have iilayed in the com-
munity of African nations. Those sentiments,
I must add, reflect the generosity of the spirit
that has always characterized your disposi-
tion toward us.

Having had the privilege to visit the
United States early in your first administra-
tion, we find this particularly gratifying that
we should have this opportunity once more
to meet with you and exchange views on
matters of common interest at the beginning
of your second administration.

The four years since we last met have
seen profound changes in international rela-
tions, especially in relations between the big
powers. True to the promise that you have
given to your country and the world at the
onset of your first administration, you have
helped launch an era of negotiation replacing
the dangerous threats of confrontation of
yesteryears.

Believing that the big powers should set an
example to the rest of the world, you have

' The Emperor spoke in Amharic.

traveled far and wide, to Peking, Moscow,
and the capitals of eastern Europe in search
of new direction in international relations.

In renouncing the victory of arms for ne-
gotiated settlement, you have, Mr. President,
led your Nation away from war and on to
negotiation and peace.

Thanks to the wisdom of your leadership
and the persistence of your effort, there is
today a fresh breeze in the relations of the
big powers. This breeze has spread to all
corners of the world, carrying the message
of realism and common interest.

Mr. President, your kind invitation has
enabled us to share your views on recent de-
velopments in international relations. We
have valued today's exchange of views as we
have on several occasions in the past.

Because of the mutually beneficial cooper-
ation of long standing that has existed be-
tween our two countries, we have also had
ample opportunity to review matters of bi-
lateral interest. These relations, covering a
wide front of our mutual interests, required
that they be sustained at increasing levels.
Ethiopia has always appreciated the assist-
ance she continues to receive from the
United States in many spheres of national
endeavors. Ethiopia is gratified to know that
she can always count on the continuation of
this assistance.

Distinguished guests, may I at this point
ask you to kindly join us in a toast to the
health and well-being of the President of the ,
United States, Richard Nixon, and Mrs.
Nixon, and of the continued prosperity of
the great American people.

REMARKS BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH,
RECEPTION AT DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Press release 151 dated May 16

Your Imperial Majesty, Excellencies, dis-
tinguished guests: We are privileged this
evening to welcome the senior statesman of
the world, a redoubtable leader who has sym-
bolized for almost half a century the fierce
independence of his own ancient land and
the determination of Africa to be its own

842

Department of State Bulletin

master. This is not the first time we have
welcomed His Imperial iMajesty, who is an
old and honored friend of the United States.
Tliis is an especially appropriate occasion,
however, for he is one of the founding
fathers as well as one of the most distin-
guislied representatives of the Organization
that has contributed so much to unifying all
the iieoples and governments of independent
Africa — the Organization of African Unity.

His Imperial Majesty will depart later to-
night to return to his own capital, Addis
Ababa — the birthplace of the OAU. There,
10 days hence, Africa's chiefs of state and
heads of government will assemble to com-
memorate the 10th anniversary of the found-
ing of the Organization. His visit here gives
us the opportunity to extend to him person-
ally, and to the Ambassadors of the OAU
countries assembled here, both our personal
felicitations and those of the government and
people of the United States — albeit a few
days in advance of the memorable occasion.

We have welcomed the privilege of con-
tinuing contacts with His Imperial Majesty,
other African leaders, and officials of the
OAU, for they add greatly to our knowledge
of African preoccupations and aspirations.
Although our approaches to problems may
occasionally differ, we nevertheless have al-
ways found a common interest in the quest
for justice, dignity, and progress in Africa,
as expressed through the OAU.

Let us, then, raise our glasses to our illus-
trious guest — a good friend, a great African,
an outstanding world statesman, and a
founder and guiding spirit of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity, which represents the
hopes and aspirations of a great continent:
To His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I.

ICCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC in Laos
Eligible To Receive Defense Articles

Presidential Determination No. 73-12 '

Eligibility To Receive Defense Articles
AND Services

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

The White House
Washington, April 26, 1973.
Subject: Eligibility of the International Commis-
sion of Control and Supervision in Viet-
nam and the International Commission
for Supervision and Control in Laos to
Receive Defense Articles and Defense
Services Under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as Amended, and Under the
Foreign Military Sales Act, as Amended.

In accordance with the recommendation contained
in your memorandum of March 26, and pursuant to
the provisions of section 503(a) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961, as amended, and section 3(a)
(1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended,
I hereby find that the furnishing of defense articles
and defense services, by loan, grant and sale, to the
International Commission of Control and Supervi-
sion in Vietnam and to the International Commis-
sion for Supervision and Control in Laos will
strengthen the security of the United States and
promote world peace.

So that the Congress will be informed concerning
the implementation of the Foreign Assistance Act
and the Foreign Military Sales Act, you are re-
quested on my behalf to report this finding to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

This finding shall be published in the Federal
Register.

(^ZjL^<I<J^

' 38 Fed. Reg. 12799.

June 11, 1973

843

Encouraging a Negotiating Process in the Middle East

Address by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretanj for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^

In this 25th year of Israel's independence,
much is being said — and rightly so — about
the accomplishments of this remarkable state
and its remarkable people. The Second World
War accelerated the striving of many peo-
ple for national independence and changed
the map of our world in ways few could
have imagined when that war began. In one
sense, Israel is simply one of the many young
states that have swelled the membership of
the United Nations from 51 when it was
originally founded to 132 today.

But in another sense, Israel is unique
among the new states of the world. There
were many, well before the beginning of this
century, who did envisage its creation; and
for millennia, before the phenomenon of the
modern nation-state appeared on the histori-
cal scene, Jews everywhere kept alive the
vision of their nationhood.

In our century, out of the horrors of the
holocaust, the vision of those generations of
men and women was transformed into the
reality of the State of Israel. Israel could
not have come into being and survived had
it not been for the indomitable will of its peo-
ple for existence and independence. At the
same time, on this 25th anniversary, it is
fitting to recall also the role of others. First,
the partition decision and subsequent ad-
mission of Israel to United Nations member-
ship were an important part of the juridical
foundations of the state. The United Nations

' Made at Washington on May 7 at a celebration
of the 25th anniversary of Israel sponsored by the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the
Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington
(press release 135).

itself is only three years older than the State
of Israel, and their histories have been inter-
twined for the past quarter of a century —
occasionally for better and, particularly in
recent years, too often for worse. Secondly,
while Israel with some justification has often
felt it stood alone, the support of other na-
tions— above all, the United States — has been
indispensable at critical moments to Israel's
creation, growth, and survival. That support
draws in the first instance on the help and
faith of the Diaspora, but its base is far
broader than that.

As these opening remarks suggest, I be-
lieve this is an occasion for standing back
from the preoccupations of the moment, from
the crises and headlines and tragedies and
hopes of today — a time for a sober look at
the past 25 years to see what lessons they
teach us for the next 25.

First, Israel had to feel strong and secure
and confident of its survival before it could
think about tomorrow and the day after to-
morrow. Israel lived so many of its first 25
years with an abiding sense of insecurity
that some have not yet become accustomed to
the fact that Israel today is strong, is secure,
and is confident of its survival. Moreover,
there is no doubt that the support of the
United States, both material and moral, has
made a major contribution to the strength of
Israel. That support and that strength have
been a principal deterrent to renewed hostil-
ities in the area. I am confident that the
United States will remain steadfast in its
support for Israel's security.

Foreign Minister Eban has recently al-
luded to Israel's strength in this way:

844

Department of State Bulletin

It is of course a fact that we are still the target
of perils and threats, but it is also a fact that Is-
rael is, in the last resort, a strong and solid reality.
Strong and solid in its capacities of defense; strong
in the inspiration of its heritage and faith; strong
in its economic resources; strong in the support
that it receives from the Jewish people; strong in
its science and learning; strong in the overall bal-
ance of its links with governments and peoples
across the world. True, all these elements of strength
and solidity are relative and not absolute, but they
are impressive in relation to the resources and
capacity of all our adversaries.

At the same time, I believe it is appropri-
ate here to express a few words of caution to
our Israeli friends — words expressed in the
spirit of friendship and mutual confidence
between us which permits us to speak frankly
and without suspicions of ulterior motives.
I would suggest that while Israel's strength
must be maintained, the next 25 years pre-
sent a corollary challenge. Again, I want to
borrow the words of Israel's Foreign Min-
ister:

... A confident and balanced national style is
perfectly reconcilable with an alert security con-
sciousness and a rational and firm political line.
The problem is how to put the emphasis on free-
dom, tolerance, equality, social justice, spiritual
and intellectual creativity and human brotherhood,
as the salient characteristics of a strong and con-
fident Israeli society . . .

There is a second point regarding the past
25 years which I believe is worth making,
and this relates to both Israel and its Arab
neighbors. For most of the past 25 years,
both have held seemingly irreconcilable per-
ceptions of what their respective national in-
terests required with respect to the other.
Before 1967 the Arab world, with few excep-
tions, was unanimous in believing that its
national interest required the elimination of
the State of Israel. Before 1967 Israel be-
lieved its national interest required, above
all, Arab recognition of its sovereignty and
its right to exist in peace and was prepared
to accept something like the armistice lines
of 1949 as its recognized international bound-
aries. Since 1967, while there are still Arab
voices calling for the disappearance of Israel,
there are many others in the Arab world
who now perceive their national interest as

compatible with the existence of a sovereign
Israel, though within the former armistice
lines. I believe that for most Arabs, Israel's
existence is no longer the principal issue;
and this is a major positive element in the
Middle East today. Unfortunately, while the
gap on the question of existence and coex-
istence of Israel has narrowed, the gap on
the question of borders has widened. Since
1967, while Israelis have not agreed among
themselves on what the boundaries of the
state should be, they are generally agreed
that those boundaries should be substantially
different from the armistice lines. Sadat, in
turn, insists that there can be no changes in
his borders. "Not an inch of territory," he
repeats time and again.

Myths Which Obscure the Realities

Third, the vision of both sides has often
been clouded by myths of the past which have
persisted in obscuring the realities of the
present:

— Before 1967 each side's perception of
the other was compounded, in part at least,
of myth. To the Arabs, Israel did not exist
as a dynamic evolving reality. It was "oc-
cupied Palestine" and referred to as such.
Arabs tended to think of Israel and its so-
ciety as frozen in the patterns of 1947, as a
state which would be made to disappear
someday, leaving no trace on the land. Israel
was seen as on the verge of collapse from in-
ternal decay, an artificial entity propped up
by others which would not withstand the tide
of history.

— The Israeli counterpart of this myth
before 1967 was its perception of a mono-
lithic Arab world, strife torn and backward.
All Arabs were perceived as essentially the
same, and there was little understanding of
the sense of a Palestine-Arab identity in the
Middle East which distinguished the Pales-
tinian Arabs from the Arabs of Lebanon or
Syria or Transjordan or the peninsula.

— In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the
increasing interaction of Arabs and Israelis
in Gaza, in the occupied West Bank, and
across the Jordan River began a process of

June 11, 1973

845

breaking down these myths which each had
held of the other. This is an essentially
healthy process and one of the positive by-
products of that war.

But other myths have arisen and persist:

There is the myth, now accepted as re-
ality in much of the Arab world, that the six-
day war was the result of unprovoked Israeli
aggression.

—There is the myth, believed still by many
even though now discounted by some Arab
leaders, that units of the U.S. Air Force par-
ticipated on Israel's side in the six-day war.
This myth has recently arisen in a new form
in the "big lie" charging that the CIA and
the American Embassy in Beirut were par-
ties to the recent Israeli raid in Lebanon.

—On the Israeli side, there is the myth
that the six-day war was the result of a cal-
culated Arab plan to launch a war of destruc-
tion against Israel. In my view, the most
plausible explanation is that the six-day war
resulted from improvised actions and reac-
tions by each side. Combined with each side's
perception and suspicion of the other's in-
tentions, the cumulative weight of these ac-
tions and reactions made inevitable a war
neither side deliberately sought at that time.
—Next, there is the myth that security is
solely a function of the physical location of
territorial boundaries. As Foreign Minister
Eban said recently, much more eloquently
than I can:

The question of boundaries is one of the compo-
nents of peace and not its sole condition. The bal-
ance of forces, the spirit and resourcefulness of our
defenders, the application of science to the rein-
forcement of the economy, the strength of our inter-
national ties, these are all factors of equal weight.
Without them our security would be undermined,
no matter what boundaries we were to establish.
The problem is not merely how to define our own
historic rights, but how to bring them into harmony
with the rights of others and with our own right
to peace.

— Another myth, of which we have heard
much lately in the Arab world, is that peace
can be achieved by going to war. Certainly
the lessons of the last three wars between
Arabs and Israelis prove just the opposite.

—Finally, there is the myth that peace
can be made by proxy; that powers not party
to the conflict, acting independently or
through the United Nations, can somehow
substitute for negotiations between the par-
ties themselves. This has not been the case in
any of the successful negotiations of inter-
national disputes in recent history, and the
Middle East is no exception. The United Na-
tions and outside powers can play a responsi-
ble role in encouraging the parties to get a
negotiating process started, but they cannot
be part of the process itself. When they seek
to substitute their views for the positions of
the parties directly concerned or openly ad-
vocate the positions of one party, they do not
further progress, they inhibit it.

A History of Lost Opportunities

All of this suggests a fourth lesson, and I
believe it is the principal lesson to be learned
from the past. The history of the Arab-
Israeli problem is a history of lost opportu-
nities. So often opportunities have slipped
through the fingers of those concerned-
slipped through their fingers just when they
thought they could grasp them. At such mo-
ments, the opportunities were all the more
precious because they seemed near enough to
be seen but too far off to be tasted.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity came
after the six-day war in 1967. In November
of that year the United Nations Security
Council was able to agree unanimously on a
set of principles, embodied in its Resolution
242 and accepted by the principal parties to
the conflict, which laid a new foundation for
a peaceful settlement : -

—First, the Security Council did not label
one side or the other as an aggressor in the
1967 war. Rather than looking backward and
seeking to apportion blame, it looked forward
and sought to build a better future.

—Second, the Security Council did not call
for unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the
armistice lines as had been the case at the

- For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Dec.
18, 1967, p. 843.

846

Department of State Bulletin

time of the 1956 war in Sinai. Rather, it
called for "withdrawal . . . from territories
occupied" in the 19(57 war as part of a pack-
age settlement in which the parties would
agree to respect each other's right to live in
peace within secure and recognized bound-
aries. The Security Council resolution estab-
lished principles. It did not establish borders
or define precisely the obligations of peace
and security.

— Third, the United Nations recognized
that a settlement could not be imposed from
outside. Instead, it established the principle
that peace should be based upon agreement
between the parties to the conflict.

These were principles for which the United
States fought hard and successfully in the
deliberations of the United Nations. They
remain the essential framework for peace in
the area, and if the Security Council departs
from these principles any future prospects
for negotiation between the parties will have
been seriously jeopardized.

Why have so many opportunities been
missed, at great costs in lives and resources,
since the adoption of the November 1967 Se-
curity Council resolution? If we had the com-
plete answer to that question, perhaps our
efforts in the cause of Middle East peace
would have been more successful over the
years. But I do believe I know part of tbe
answer, and it is this: Neither side, Arab or
Israeli, has collectively defined its goals in
terms of what economists like to call the
"opportunity costs" of achieving those goals;
in other words, in terms of what it is willing
to forgo in the process. To be sure, there are
.'^rabs who still say today: We want peace
but only when Israel as a Jewish state is no
more. There are Israelis who say: We want
peace but only if we can also keep the oc-
cupied territories.

But these are statements of individuals or
political groupings, not the positions of gov-
ernments. There is no broadly agreed
consensus on either side as to what the ac-
ceptable tradeoffs might be. States seem to
follow the patterns of human nature — the de-
sire to have it both ways, to have their cake
and eat it too, to keep their options open.

In this sixth year since 1967 of no war and
no peace, I believe it is time for the parties to
begin to choose options, to establish prior-
ities, to decide what is most important and
what it will cost, and to decide whether it is
worth the price. I do not say that this or
any other opportunity that may come along
is the last one in history, but I do believe that
the cost of each missed opportunity in the
Middle East is becoming progressively higher
than the previous one.

Complexities in the Pursuit of Peace

As we stand back and view the Middle
East in the perspective of time, what do we
see today? We see a situation that every
rational person knows in his innermost
thoughts is not normal, not stable, and not
durable. True, the world has lived with many
such situations, and when the balance of
150wer is properly maintained, such situa-
tions can last for a surprisingly long time.
But need they? And isn't the cost in the end
often greater than it would have been if both
sides had seized the opportunities and taken
the risks necessary to resolve conflicts
sooner ?

We have a 33-month-old cease-fire in the
context of the reduced likelihood of a Soviet-
American confrontation. However, the cycle
of violence continues and has taken an ap-
palling toll of life. The victims have included
many innocent and uninvolved civilians —
Olympic athletes, airline passengers, dedi-
cated diplomats, recently a foreign national
in Beirut, and countless others in Israel, in
the Arab world, and elsewhere.

The Security Council on April 21 took a
small step forward in facing up to this press-
ing problem. The resolution which was
passed, while very far from the balanced
outcome we sought, condemned terrorist vio-
lence for the first time. For the first time, the
Security Council has recognized that terror-
ism is part of the problem and not simply an
irrelevant byproduct. The question now is:
Where do we go from here? How do we at
long last begin to build on the framework
for peace contained in Security Council Reso-
lution 242, on the cease-fire along the Suez

June n, 1973

847

Canal negotiated by the United States, on the
stability in Jordan and the efforts to find a
new stability in Lebanon, on the widely
shared desire to develop further the mutually
beneficial relations between high-energy-
consuming countries and the oil-producing
nations of the Middle East?

In this connection, there has been much
speculation of late as to whether the so-called
energy crisis is going to lead to changes in
our Middle East policy. In my view, this is
the wrong way to pose the question. The
question is whether our policy of seeking to
promote a peaceful settlement is going to suc-
ceed, so that there will be no temptation for
some to seek to politicize the energy problem,
to their own detriment as much as to the
detriment of others.

For its part, the United States is continu-
ing to press the search for answers. The pres-
ent "no war, no peace" situation is unstable
and unsatisfactory. As a beginning, it would
be well to build on the present cease-fire.
There should be a cease-fire on inflammatory
rhetoric; a cease-fire on public statements of
ultimate and rigid positions; a cease-fire on
violence of all kinds from whatever source.
Just as we called on the parties in 1970, on
the eve of the U.S.-initiated cease-fire, to stop
shooting and start talking, today we urge
they stop shouting and start listening.

We need — the world badly needs — a period
of calm and quiet diplomacy in the Middle
East. For our part, we began that process
during what President Nixon has described
as his Middle East month. We had useful dis-
cussions with the leaders of Jordan and
Israel and with a senior adviser to the Presi-
dent of Egypt. That continuing process has
been complicated by the recent kaleidoscope
of violent events, but it has not been stopped.
We intend to carry it forward through diplo-
matic channels. We intend to continue urging
on the parties the need for getting negotia-
tions started and to continue exploring with
them ways to do this. The principal parties
concerned have said they want to keep the
doors of diplomacy open. We intend to take
them at their word.

848

It would not be realistic to think, after so
many years of effort, that there lurks some-
where, waiting to be discovered, a magic
formula which would suddenly solve the
Arab-Israeli problem in a single dramatic
stroke. A way must be found in the first in-
stance to reconcile Egyptian sovereignty and
Israeli security needs. In our judgment, the
chasm on an overall settlement is too broad
to bridge in one jump. But practical step-by-
step progress is feasible, beginning with ne-
gotiations on an agreement for some Israeli
withdrawal in Sinai, the reopening of the
Suez Canal, and an extended cease-fire. I am
convinced an interim Suez Canal agreement
would not and should not become an end in
itself, but would lead to increasingly produc-
tive negotiations on the larger issues. These
also include the Jordanian-Israeli aspects of
the settlement and the need to meet the legiti-
mate concerns of the Palestinians. It is in the
context of such active negotiations between
the parties that the United States can be
most helpful.

The President has said we will give high
priority to moving the Middle East situation
toward a settlement. Since we set that course
four years ago, we have had some notable
successes as well as some temporary setbacks.
We see no reason to change course or dimin-
ish our efforts. I can assure you we do not
intend to do so. Opportunities for diplomacy
still prevail in 1973. Israel needs peace, its
neighbors need peace, and the world needs
peace. I would hope that we will not look
back several years hence and conclude that
the present period was another in the tragic
catalogue of lost opportunities.

Senate Confirms Mr. Porges

as IDB Executive Director ^

The Senate on May 17 confirmed the nomi-
nation of John M. Porges to be Executive
Director of the Inter-American Development
Bank for a term of three years.

II

Department of State Bulletin

i

i

The Economic Role of the State Department

Address by William J. Casey

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs '

It is a particular pleasure for me to be
here today with the Society of American
Business Writers. I remember very well
that a little over two years ago you afforded
me the first opportunity to discuss publicly
my plans and hopes for my chairmanship at
the SEC.

Today, in much the same way, I would
like to discuss with you the economic role of
'■-.he State Department. To start off, let me
quickly sketch as background the state of the
'.viiiid economy, the economic posture of our
-niintry, and the state of the economic and
commercial function of State.

Fast communication and transport, a vast
expansion in world trade, and the great
mobility of capital and technology have made
the world economy increasingly interde-
pendent.

Our situation in this world economy is not
a comfortable one. We have a $10 billion
balance of payments deficit and a $6 billion
trade deficit. Outstanding dollar claims float
around the world far in excess of our re-
serves. But new monetary alignments have
improved our position, and the political will
among the nations of the world to make
necessary reforms in the monetary and
trading systems promises further stability
and improvement. To achieve the return to a
surplus in payments and trade, all we have
to do is satisfy the need the world has for our
food, our technology, our capital markets,
and our manufacturing, construction, and
management skills.

Made before the Society of American Business
Writers at New York, N.Y., on May 7 (press re-
ease 133).

When I changed hats three months ago, I
found a State Department primed to help
American business meet these needs. On this,
let me rely on the authority of someone who
has had a good observation post for the last
four years. Henry Kearns, the distinguished
Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, re-
cently put it this way :

A dramatic transformation has taken place in
our country's Forei^ Service. Business transac-
tions, especially exports, now have the highest
priority for action. Trade centers, marketing- assist-
ance, guidance, and personal help are available in
nearly every diplomatic post, and this ranges from
the Ambassador to the messenger boys.

As the United States formulates and im-
plements foreign economic policy, our aims
go beyond trade and money. We see economic
interdependence as a great force for peace.
We seek rising economic collaboration to
scale down militaiy competition. We see the
building of living standards bringing into
play an economic equation which will require
scaling down the commitment to arms as it
becomes necessary to expand the commit-
ment to trade and development. We see trade
and all the other strands of economic rela-
tionships as threads with which a structure
of peace can be woven.

Changes in Economic Relationships

Political and economic relations are inex-
tricably intertwined. Recognizing this basic
fact eai'ly in his administration. President
Nixon set out first to assure a substantial de-
gree of stability in political affairs. To illus-
trate, the guiding principle behind the
normalization of economic relations with

June 11, 1973

849

Communist countries has been that economic
normalization is linked with progress toward
the improvement of political relations. The
pace of advancement in the economic sphere
thus has been regulated by the pace of ad-
vancement in the political sphere.

An important aspect of our search for
peace is to change the world view o^ Commu
nist nations from one of conflicting forces
hopelessly locked into a struggle for survival
to one of competing forces compromising
where interests conflict and cooperating
where they coincide. The economic arena is
where interests are most sharply perceived
as being mutually beneficial by niany Com-
munist leaders at this point in time It is
Tthe economic arena that by tradition,
practice, and their very nature, interests are
most readily and necessarily compromised
out and adapted to each other.

To implement this vital aspect of our
overall foreign policy, our Ambassadors to
Communist nations have been instructed to
put trade promotion at the top of their list
of priorities. Shortly we will have doubled
the number of State Department employees
serving in commercial positions m the
USSR., eastern Europe, and China. The De-
partment of Commerce in Washington has
increased its East-West trade support staff
in the past year by several multiples, and
the State Department is also undergoing re-
organization at home to simultaneously meet
the needs of a substantial negotiating load
and business assistance. In order to antici-
pate and more efficiently deal with policy
questions as they arise, President Nixon has
created an East-West Trade Policy Commit-
tee under the chairmanship of his principal
economic adviser, George Shultz.

Let me turn to the broader world, in which
we must relate not only to the Communist
superpowers and their satellites but also to
the economic superpowers, Japan and the
European Community, to some 20 other ad-
vanced countries, to half a dozen oil-rich
countries, and to the new and old nations of
the underdeveloped world. In this vast and
complicated arena, economic relationships are
changing, economic opportunities and eco-

850

nomic needs abound, and economic interests |
must be properly interrelated with political ,
and security interests. ;

To overcome our deficit position and gen- .
erate our full contribution to world economic ,
development and progress, we must assess ,
ourselves and our partners. On last years ,
figures we had huge deficits with Japan and ,
Canada, a small deficit with Europe, a grow- .
ing deficit with the oil world, and were in ,
surplus only with the Communist and less i
developed nations. As we look at ourselves, 1
we find only three out of ten of us producing ,
sjoods, with over twice as many (65 percent) ,
engaged in services, and less than 5 percent 1
generating our food from the land and the ;
sea As a service-oriented economy short on |
energy and raw materials, we will increas-
ingly have to pay our way in the world with
invisible income from investment, financial
and transport services, engineering and con-
struction projects, and with high-technology'
exports, including the great flow of agncul- ^
tural goods which come from a modern tech-,
nology applied to good and abundant land. ,
This is not to minimize the vital importance,
of enhancing our competitiveness and world
market position in steel, textiles, chemicals ,
and other basic manufactures, but we will
have to look more to high-technology exports
and invisibles for the growth needed to over-
come our deficit and pay for our growing
energy and raw material needs. We will have,
to look to generating raw material and,
energy sources and creating better markets
in underdeveloped countries and the Com-
munist world, which account together for
three out of four of us now in the world.

t::eri
li

:::et

New Ways of Doing Business

To do this we will have to redirect to
some extent our economic efforts, vary our
ways of doing business, reshape our policies,
and become more alert and vigorous m im-j
plementing them. ,

To illustrate redirection of economic el-,
fort, while working toward greater self -sut-
flciencv along the lines indicated m the
President's recent energy message, we will
have to help the oil-rich nations use their

Department of State Bulletin

mm

money and access to raw materials and cheap
energ>' to diversify their economies.

To illustrate new ways of doing business,
we will have to develop possibilities outside
the traditional patterns of trade. The Soviets
take the view that buyinp and selling-, the
traditional forms of trade, are becoming in-
creasingly less important. They point out that
textiles, clothing, and other consumer goods
make up a smaller percentage of trade and
that price and other advantages which one
country or another may have in these con-
sumer goods are fleeting in character. All de-
veloped countries have quick access to new
manufacturing techniques, while different
countries have different needs and different
types of natural resources to develop. This
presents the opportunity for development
projects along cooperative lines. Examples
are gas companies going in to build pipe-
lines and liquefaction and shipping facilities.
We see French and Italian companies operat-
ing a production line, chemical companies
going in with technology and equipment to
utilize local resources in the production of
fertilizer for U.S. and world markets out-
side the Soviet Union as well as inside the
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union points to its
natural resources and large cadres of sci-
entific workers. U.S. firms with technology,
equipment, and markets have the opportunity
to work on large aggi-egations of ores, oil and
gas deposits, and great forest resources.
Projects of this kind can contribute 'to So-
viet needs and bring out products that satisfy
outside energy and raw material require-
ments to the extent necessary to pay Ameri-
can firms for the equipment, the technology,
the managerial skills, and the risks.

Or there is the noncapitali.st joint venture
in which the American company puts in some
product or investment or know-how. The
other side puts in some raw materials or
other resources including people. Out of this
arrangement would come a manufactured
product or processed material. The Ameri-
can business is compensated by a long-term
contract for that particular product at a cer-
tain pricing arrangement. We will see more
and more transactions like this with coun-
tries short of foreign exchange.

Reassessment of Policies

The range of policies to be reassessed is a
large one. We need new authority and new
agreements to expand world trade and
achieve monetary reform. We may need new
incentives, tax and financial policies to re-
store our primacy in the international capital
market, work toward energy self-sufficiency,
and maintain competitiveness of our industry
in world markets. We may need new promo-
tion and new types of financing and other
business aids to bring thousands of smaller
corporations into export activity and to pro-
vide them with the marketing and servicing
backup necessary to be effective in foreign
markets. We may need the American coun-
terpart of the Japanese trading corporation.

We need the amplification of the Webb-
Pomerene Act which President Nixon has
requested and broader and possibly more
flexible export loans and investment guaran-
tees geared to long-term contracts in order
to bring in another billion or two from con-
tracting and engineering projects abroad.

We are reviewing our development policies,
and one significant issue is whether some ef-
fort should be shifted from building infra-
structure for long-term progress to building
economic institutions and sponsoring proj-
ects which can bring countries already close
to the takeoff stage over the top, where they
become self-sustaining, good markets and
ultimately aid donors themselves.

We must constantly assess policies af-
fecting transportation rates, containeriza-
tion, harbors, and transportation technology
to protect our exports from freight handi-
caps and disci'imination and to look for ways
to increase our earnings abroad.

We must seek understandings on industrial
and government procui'ement policies to pro-
tect our vital high-technology industries from
unfair competition from subsidized indus-
tries abroad.

All of the great departments of govern-
ment are involved in some or all of these
policy areas. There is what I find to be an
effective machinery for collecting and recon-
ciling their viewpoints and formulating
policy through a committee system cleared
by George Shultz and leading up to the

June n, 1973

851

President for ultimate decision and policy-
formulation.

These issues have to be dealt with bi-
laterally with many countries and in many
different international bodies. On an ad hoc
basis, any organization or individual may be
charged with handling a negotiation or deal-
ing with an issue. Like the other foreign of-
fices of the world, the State Department
undertakes to monitor and keep the full range
of these relationships coordinated.

The State Department's contribution to
economic policy formulation is supported by
economic officers in its Economic and Busi-
ness Affairs Bureau, its other functional bu-
reaus, and five geographic bureaus — as well
as its economic, commercial, and political
officers in missions around the world.

Trade Promotion Activities Abroad

Out on the firing line, in Embassies and
consulates around the world. Ambassadors
and consuls general have as a top-priority
mission working for economic policies that
are fair to American business, searching out
and reporting on export and investment op-
portunities, and providing commercial assist-
ance to American firms. Trade leads,
company reports, agents, and distributors
are identified and assessed, and cabled back
home, where the Commerce Department is
charged with getting them to American firms
which can use the information. By fall, this
process will be fully automated from Em-
bassy abroad to subscribers in the United
States.

The important thing is that today an Am-
bassador can integrate overseas activity on
behalf of American business so that political
as well as economic-commercial officers are
involved. After all, assessing economic policy,
spotting commercial opportunity, and report-
ing on economic developments are frequently
different aspects of the same thing. By com-
mercially sensitizing all the officers in an
Embassy, we can make them more effective
in influencing, assessing, and reporting on
economic policy. Work in any of the policy
areas I listed earlier can lead an officer to
the larger contracts and projects on which
prime attention should be concentrated. The

support American business needs to over-
come our trade deficit must be broad. To il-
lustrate, our Embassy in the Netherlands
carries on a comprehensive balance of pay-
ments program. Under the Ambassador's ac-
tive leadership all elements in the Embassy
are engaged in promoting industrial exports,
agricultural exports, contract and other serv-
ice income, tourism to America, and
portfolio investment— all are under the Am-
bassador's leadership.

Embassies serve as overseas agencies for
the Export-Import Bank and other U.S. Gov-
ernment agencies in seeking necessary com-
mercial information and evaluating the
quality of potential purchasers.

We seek to keep our Embassies in a state
of alert regarding contract opportunities for
major projects in other countries, sometimes
funded by international financial institu-
tions, or by AID, or by the foreign govern-
ments.

We have a program for encouraging the
sale of military goods, in cooperation with
the Defense Department, and the sale of
such goods has been a major source of for-
eign exchange revenue in recent years.

Embassies line up appropriate contacts
for trade shows, exhibit catalogues, and make
arrangements for missions from localities
and industries visiting from the United
States to seek foreign customers and firms
who may locate branches back home.

The United States Information Service
can publicize American technology and goods
and their capacity to meet the local needs.

These are only some of the opportunities'
to promote American trade abroad. The im-
portant thing is -the will; the team spirit
among those representing the United States
abroad ; training and preparation for the
work, which has been intensified in the For-
eign Service Institute; and the leadership
of the Ambassador. It is equally vital that all
of these activities be integrated so that all
the influence and talent the Embassy can
mobilize can be put behind American eco-
nomic interests to give them the same co-
ordinated support that other Embassies give
their businesses in every foreign market. I
believe solid progress is being made today
on all these fronts.

852

Department of State Bulletin

President Increases Import Quotas
for Nonfat Dry Milk

A PROCLAMATION'

Proclamation Amending Part 3 of the Appendix
TO THE Tariff Schedules of the United States
With Respect to the Importation of Agricul-
tural Commodities

Wherjus, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624),
limitations have been imposed by Presidential proc-
lamations on the quantities of certain dairy products
which may be imported into the United States in
any quota year; and

Whereas the import restrictions proclaimed pur-
suant to said section 22 are set forth in part 3 of
the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United
States; and

Whereas the Secretary of Agriculture has re-
ported to me that he believes that additional quan-
tities of dried milk provided for in item 950.02 of
the Tariff Schedules of the United States (herein-
after referred to as "nonfat dry milk") may be
entered for a temporary period without rendering
or tending to render ineffective, or materially inter-
fering with, the price support program now con-
ducted by the Department of Agriculture for milk
or reducing substantially the amount of products
processed in the United States from domestic milk;
and

Whereas, under the authority of section 22, I
have requested the United States Tariff Commis-
sion to make an investigation with respect to this
matter; and

Whereas the Secretary of Agriculture has deter-
mined and reported to me that a condition exists
with respect to nonfat dry milk which requires
emergency treatment and that the quantitative lim-
itation imposed on nonfat dry milk should be in-
creased during the period ending June 30, 1973,
without awaiting the recommendations of the United
States Tariff Commission with respect to such ac-
tion; and

Whereas I find and declare that the entry during
the period ending June 30, 1973, of an additional
quantity of 60,000,000 pounds of nonfat dry milk
will not render or tend to render ineffective, or ma-

terially interfere with, the price support program
which is being undertaken by the Department of
Agriculture for milk and will not reduce substan-
tially the amount of products processed in the
United States from domestic milk; and that a con-
dition exists which requires emergency treatment
and that the quantitative limitation imposed on
nonfat dry milk should be increased during such
period without awaiting the recommendations of the
United States Tariff Commission with respect to
such action;

Now, therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of
the United States of America, acting under and by
virtue of the authority vested in mc as President,
and in conformity with the provisions of section 22
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended,
and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby
proclaim that subdivision (vi) of headnote 3(a) of
Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of
the United States is amended to read as follows:

(vi) Notwithstanding any other provision of this
part, 25,000,000 pounds of dried milk described in
item 115.50 may be entered during the period be-
ginning December 30, 1972, and ending February
15, 1973, and 60,000,000 pounds of such milk may
be entered during the period beginning the day
after the date of issuance of this proclamation and
ending June 30, 1973, in addition to the annual quota
quantity specified for such article under item 950.02,
and import licenses shall not be required for enter-
ing such additional quantities. No individual, part-
nership, firm, corporation, association, or other legal
entity (including its affiliates or subsidiaries) may
during such period enter pursuant to this provision
quantities of such additional dried milk totaling in
excess of 2,500,000 pounds.

The 60,000,000 pound additional quota quantity
provided for herein shall continue in effect pending
Presidential action upon receipt of the report and
recommendations of the Tariff Commission with
respect thereto.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand this tenth day of May, in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America, the one
hundred and ninety-seventh.

' No. 4216; 38 Fed. Reg. 12313.

(fijU ^^^}C:,c^

I

June 11, 1973

853

THE CONGRESS

The Foreign Assistance Program and Foreign Policy Goals

Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
today in support of the President's request
for authorization for the fiscal year 1974 for-
eign assistance program. In his message to
Congress of May 1, 1973, President Nixon
underscored the need to renew and to revital-
ize the commitment of this nation to coun-
tries engaged in the struggle for security
and development.- He stated :

One of the most important building blocks in
erecting a durable structure of peace is tlie foreign
assistance program of the United States. Today, in
submitting my proposed Foreign Assistance Act of
1973, I urge the Congress to act on it with a special
sense of urgency so that we may continue the im-
portant progress we have made toward achieving
peace during the past year.

Gentlemen, I recognize that, after more
than two decades of effort, many Americans
wish to shift the burden of development and
security to other nations. I am also aware
that this year, for the first time in the his-
tory of the foreign aid program. Congress
concluded its deliberations without formal
authorization for the foreign assistance pro-
gram.

We are all heartened, of course, by the
changed climate in our relations with the So-
viet Union and the People's Republic of
China. We hope that this encouraging trend
will continue and that it will lead to a cur-
tailment of the international turmoil of the
past two decades. Through the process of

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on May 15 (press release 148). The com-
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by
the committee and will be available from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402.

' For text, see Bulletin of May 28, 1973, p. 693.

negotiations, our hope is that the spirit of
detente -will be deepened. But this will not
be easy. We cannot assume that the current
critical period will pass without stress or
crisis. This is not the time to retreat into a
spirit of parochialism or to begin to pursue
narrow national interests.

A most urgent need exists for the United
States to continue to generate a sense of con-
tinuity in its foreign policy and, in particu-
lar, to sustain its efforts in the field of
foreign assistance. If we agree that the world
we would like to see is one in which all na-
tions seek peaceful development and inter-
national cooperation, then the foreign
assistance program can serve as an impor-
tant vehicle for the attainment of our goals.
The President underscored this imperative
in the following words : ^

Despite a record of significant accomplishment —
including an average annual increase in economic
growth of more than 5.5 percent in the last decade,
the success of the Green Revolution, and rapid ad-
vances in health and education — hundreds of mil-
lions of people in the developing countries still exist
in conditions of extreme hunger, poverty, and dis-
ease. Basic humanitarian considerations call on us :
to assist these countries in improving the lives of '
their people. But we also have a major economic
and political interest in the growth and stability of
these countries and in their active cooperation.

Our economic interdependence is increas-
ing. Just as the economic growth of de-
veloping countries is accelerated by the
availability of our capital and technology, our
economy benefits from access to their raw

' The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on May 3 appears in
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled
"The Developing Nations" begins on p. 804.

854

Department of State Bulletin >

materials and energy sources. U.S. assistance
can help create a climate conducive to mineral
investment by stimulating broad-based eco-
nomic growth, which also expands important
U.S. export markets.

Almost one-third of U.S. exports went to
developing countries in 1972. The success of
the multilateral trade negotiations and efforts
toward whole monetary reform can be en-
hanced by developing country cooperation.
Problems such as pollution of the sea and
air and inequities in international travel
cannot be dealt with by the United States
alone. The willingness of many less devel-
. oped countries with quite different and varied
forms of government to join us in seeking
i global solutions to these problems will de-
I pend in large measure on our support for
I their efforts to improve the lives of their
■ people.

The Development Assistance Program

During the 1960's the international de-
velopment effort recorded a number of signif-
icant achievements. Many of the developing
countries now present a record of solid prog-
ress. While serious problems remain to be
solved, these nations increasingly face their
problems with a greater sense of confidence
and independence. The international devel-
opment assistance system now in place — both
bilateral and multilateral — is functioning
more effectively each year. However, bilateral
assistance, which served as the primary
catalyst in the achievements of the First De-
- velopment Decade, is as essential today as
• i it was in 1960.

As evidenced by the Green Revolution, a
promising start has been made in the devel-
,j lopment of technologies specifically related to
( the economic needs of the developing coun-
:! tries. In the field of international trade, the
industrialized countries have undertaken spe-
cial obligations in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade to afford greater access to
■their markets for low-income countries.
Although progress has been uneven, a num-
ber of developing countries have achieved
very substantial economic growth, with GNP
expanding by as much as 10 percent a year
and sometimes by more.

Working from this base, a great deal re-
mains to be done to solve the problems aris-
ing from overpopulation, poor health
conditions, low agricultural productivity, and
limited educational opportunities. These are
problems which affect most directly the lives
of the majority of the developing world's
population. Our bilateral programs continue
to play an essential role in the international
development effort. By our example, we have
encouraged other bilateral donors to play a
more active role. Bilateral aid helps recipient
nations become familiar with American busi-
ness practices and encourages continuing
contact with U.S. commercial suppliers. Bi-
lateral assistance also provides an opportu-
nity to draw upon the talents and experience
of American universities and to utilize the
American capacity for innovation and experi-
mentation.

We are requesting $1 billion in new obli-
gational authority for development assistance
in FY 1974. This will permit us to implement
a total program of $1.3 billion and to stress
assistance to the primary problems of food
production, population planning, and edu-
cation. This program will also provide sup-
port through our voluntary contributions to
U.N. -related programs such as the U.N. De-
velopment Program and U.N. Environment
Fund. Dr. Hannah [John A. Hannah, Ad-
ministrator, Agency for International Devel-
opment], who is with me today, will discuss
our program in greater detail on Thursday.

Indochina Reconstruction

The second major task that confronts us is
reconstruction and rehabilitation in Indo-
china. With the signing of cease-fire agree-
ments in Viet-Nam and Laos earlier this year,
and with the hope that an effective cease-
fire will soon prevail throughout Indochina,
we must turn our attention to postwar needs
of the area. Our representatives there are
currently engaged in an assessment of over-
all needs. However, the primary requirement
today is to facilitate the transition from war
to peace.

Our desire for peace is not yet realized, and
the intentions of North Viet-Nam remain

jll«* •

June n, 1973

855

unclear We have therefore withheld a re-
quest for assistance to North Viet-Nam until
such time as she demonstrates her resolve to
meet her commitments under the peace agree-
ment Our request is thus confined to Laos,
Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam at this time.
It is important during this uncertain pe-
riod to provide economic support to maintain
a level of imports sufficient to sustain the
confidence of the business communities in
recipient countries if private enterprise is to
make those investments which self-sufficiency
requires; to meet immediate humanitarian
needs; to help restore agricultural produc-
tivity; and to undertake development ac-
tivities to assist Indochina to become
self-sufficient economically.

The most urgent requirements are to main-
tain functioning economies, to provide sus-
tenance and shelter for refugees and to assist
them to reestablish themselves, and to re-
build hospitals, schools, public utilities, and
other facilities damaged by the conflict.

For these purposes, we are requesting $632
million in new funds for FY 1974.

The Security Assistonce Program

The security assistance program we are
presenting to you takes cognizance of the
fact that the situation confronting us in the
1970's differs from the 1950's. Our relations
with the Soviet Union have improved over
the past year, and we currently are engaged
in a major effort to develop productive ties
with the People's Republic of China. As Sec-
retary Rogers has indicated, our goal is not
merely to move from hostility to detente but,
rather, to move from detente to cooperation.
However, we must keep in mind that im-
portant differences remain. We continue to
be separated from Moscow and Peking by
differing perspectives on man's role in so-
ciety, international as well as domestic. Im-
portant differences continue to mark the
strategic relationship between the Soviet
Union and the United States. For these rea-
sons, we believe that strength through secu-
rity must remain an important element of
our national policy.

The program that this administration has

formulated for FY 1974 represents a bal-
anced approach, one which will permit us to
continue grant military and supporting as-
sistance to a decreasing number of countries.
We also propose to establish a more realistic
division of roles and responsibilities between
ourselves and countries that count us as
friend and ally. We believe that the United
States cannot, and should not, attempt to do
all that it has in the past. We expect other
countries to do more in their own behalf. The
foreign military sales program is an impor-
tant vehicle for promoting such efforts. We
are confident that in the years ahead allied
and friendly nations wishing to carry a
greater share of their defense burden in-
creasingly will turn to foreign military sales
to meet their needs.

Grant Military Assistance

We are proposing a number of basic
changes in the structure and direction of
security assistance for FY 1974. For the first .
time in the history of the grant military \
assistance program (MAP), training is not i
included but is placed in a separate part of i
the Foreign Assistance Act. This change !
should facilitate consideration of MAP, par-
ticularly progress we are making in reducing
the number of countries receiving U.S. as-
sistance. The Republic of China, Greece, and
Liberia are but the most recent countries to
have terminated their dependence on grant
military aid. Of those that we propose to
continue to support in the coming year, we
believe that MAP will help to contribute to
international peace and security in the fol-
lowing ways.

It will : )

—Reinforce efforts to secure an effective
cease-fire throughout Indochina and thus en-
hance prospects for a lasting peace in South-
east Asia.

—Provide the Republic of Korea with the .
means to defend itself and to negotiate with|
North Korea from a position of strength.

—Assist Turkey in its efforts to modernize
its forces and thereby provide a credible de-
terrent on the southern flank of NATO.

—Strengthen Jordan's capacity to cope

:«ope

a hi

•Ml
I

'liloi

856

Department of State Bulletin;

^1

with pressing external and internal security
problems.

— Sustain in Latin America the spirit of
cooperation in military matters that has been
the hallmark of U.S. relations in that region
since World War II.

We are requesting authorization for $652
I million in new funds for grant military as-
sistance in FY 1974.

Military Education and Training

Since the inception of U.S. foreign assist-
ance, military training has been in the fore-
front of our support for the defense of other
nations. However, with the passage of time,
the scope and nature of this training has
changed significantly — a decreasing portion
of the training effort is directed toward
familiarization with equipment furnished by
the United States. Instead we are emphasiz-
ing professional education oriented toward
management of resources, financial planning,
and program evaluation. These are fields in
which the state of the art is changing rapidly
and frequent updating of knowledge is re-
quired.

At the same time, the professional training
we provide serves to promote communica-
tion and understanding between our military
and the military of the nations we are assist-
ing. This professional interchange contrib-
utes importantly to an international
environment in which peace can prevail.

For these reasons, we propose that military
education and training be placed on a per-
manent footing within the framework of the
Foreign Assistance Act. The legislation we
have presented would authorize the President
to arrange for foreign militaiy personnel to
»ttend U.S. schools, including participation
n special courses of instruction at U.S. uni-
versities and other institutions of learning.

We will request $33 million in funds to
nitiate this program in FY 1974.

iecurity Supporting Assistance

I also request your endorsement today for
he security supporting assistance component
f our foreign aid program. Supporting as-
istance has been an important instrument

of our foreign policy over the past two
decades. Although the international situation
has significantly improved over the past sev-
eral years, the need for supporting assistance
continues to exist. However, the program
that the President proposes for FY 1974 re-
flects the improved international climate both
by reducing the number of recipient coun-
tries and the level of funds requested.

We are requesting authorization for $100
million in security supporting assistance for
five countries in FY 1974. These are Israel,
Jordan, Thailand, Malta, and Spain. In addi-
tion, the program will provide for the U.S.
contribution to U.N. forces stationed in
Cyprus.

South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia are
no longer included under security supporting
assistance. With the signing of cease-fire
agreements in the first two of these countries
earlier this year, it seems appropriate that
economic assistance for these countries —
jn'incipally for relief, reconstruction, and re-
habilitation— be presented separately, as a
new chapter V within the Foreign Assistance
Act.

Foreign Military Sales

In 1965, foreign military sales, that is, the
outright purchase by others of U.S. defense
equipment, exceeded military grant aid for
the first time since the inception of the pro-
gram in 1950. Today, sales run at about eight
times the level of grant military aid. During
fiscal year 1972, for example, almost $3.5
billion of U.S. defense equipment and articles
were sold to our friends and allies around the
world, improving their defense posture and
helping to relieve some of the pressure on
our own balance of payments.

The importance of the credit and guarantee
portion of our sales program should be
clearly understood. Through these instru-
ments we are able to establish a more realis-
tic division of responsibilities between our
friends and our allies. Credit and guarantee
arrangements encourage self-reliance and a
more mature relationship with the United
States.

Gentlemen, many of our allies and friends

Jne n, 1973

857

are ready to assume primary responsibility
for their own defense and to commit to it a
significant share of their manpower and
economic resources. To help them, we are pro-
posing a foreign militaiy credit sales pro-
gram of $525 million in new obligational
authority. These credits are planned for 25
nations in four regions. Of a total program
of $760 million, almost two-thirds of that
amount is projected for four nations — Israel,
Turkey, Greece, and the Republic of China.
I also must point out that of the 20 coun-
tries that are to be recipients of grant mili-
tary assistance in FY 1974, 12 plan to secure
additional equipment through foreign mili-
tary sales credit or cash sales agreements —
clear evidence of the growing capacity of
these nations to determine their own needs
and to mobilize their own resources to ful-
fill them.

Structuring of Aid Programs

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to make a
few observations on the structuring of our
aid to developing countries.

Bilateral aid must serve the specific in-
terests of the United States over and above
those generalized interests which we sup-
port through our contributions to interna-
tional agencies and financial institutions.

Our programs must be focused on the
recipient country. They must be designed
to lend maximum support to our foreign
policy interests in a given country.

This necessarily requires a flexible ap-
proach. It is appropriate that we stress ac-
tivities that share our technical expertise
and the products of our farms and factories
with the other people of the world. But it is
also important that we avoid rejecting other
approaches that can be more effective in cer-
tain instances in attaining our foreign policy
objectives.

It is eflicient and makes good sense for us
to target our efforts on a limited number
of activities to provide maximum benefit to
the recipient country through programs such
as agricultural development or education.

But we must avoid the pitfall of assuming
that recipient countries invariably assign
the same values to their problems as we do.

Our assistance should be responsive to the
needs of the recipient country as perceived
by the government to which we are ac-
credited, provided, of course, there is no in-
herent conflict over program goals between
ourselves and the recipient.

Indeed, the type of program we undertake
should be determined by interaction between
ourselves and the recipient. Our role in the
planning process should be minimized — con-
ditioned by the needs and capacities of the
recipient to develop mutually acceptable pro-
grams. I

In general it is desirable to extend the '
benefits of our assistance to as many people '
as possible. Yet we should not confuse num-
bers of persons affected with the successful
furtherance of U.S. interests, or for that
matter, the economic development of the
recipient country.

The use and development of the private '
sector, both in the United States and the re- 1
cipient country, is an important ingredient i
of our assistance policy. Our programs must
be designed with that in mind. It is unfortu-
nate that some technical assistance programs
such as health, education, or public adminis-
tration are less amenable to private sector
involvement and development than others.
This problem will require substantial and
imaginative attention in the future. j

The development and execution of foreign
policy, as the members of this distinguished
committee are so well aware, is a complex
and many-faceted endeavor. The development
of bilateral assistance programs to further
that policy is likewise complicated and if done
well is a process resistant to dogma.

There is a need for constant flexibility and
interaction between those developing policy
and those designing programs to support
policy. I do not share the view of those whc
would narrowly define development assist-
ance and create yet another independent
agency to carry it out. One must after all ask
independent of what — foreign policy?

858

Department of State Bulletir

In the national interest, responsibility for
policy development and program design and
implementation cannot be separated. It must
reside in the Department of State.

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that
within the existing relationships in the De-
partment of State and AID, further efforts
will be made to focus and coordinate more
completely all U.S. development activities
abroad to assure that they are as effective
as possible in promoting the totality of U.S.
interests.

Finally, gentlemen, I ask you to support
the President's foreign assistance program
for fl.scal year 1974. This committee will play
a critical role in determining what resources
will be available and, in so doing, will
strongly influence the course the United
States is to follow in international affairs for
the remainder of this decade.

I

iSecretary Rogers Discusses
U.S. Objective in Cambodia

Statement by Secretary Rogers '

I appreciate this opportunity to appear
before you in support of the administration's
request to transfer already appropriated
funds within the Defense budget. Yesterday
Secretary [of Defense Elliot L.] Richardson
'discussed with you the specific need for trans-
fer authority for these funds. This morning
I would like to talk with you about the
broader issue: How do we end this war?

One invitingly simple answer that is being
offered to us is that the United States can
oring about peace unilaterally by just stop-
ping the bombing in Cambodia. But it is not
that simple.

Just 10 weeks ago we did unilaterally stop

' Made before the Senate Comniittee on Appro-
)riations on May 8 (press release 141 dated May
0). The complete transcript of the hearings will be
)ublished by the committee and will be available
rom the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
•rnment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

bombing in Cambodia. And we all know
what hapjiened. The North Vietnamese and
the Cambodian insurgents took advantage of
this opportunity for peace by launching a
major military offensive. They responded to
the Cambodian Government's unilateral
cease-fire and call for negotiations with a
demand for "total victory" and a refusal to
negotiate. The choice they posed then, and
the choice before us today, is whether to
allow a military takeover of Cambodia by
North Viet-Nam and its allies or insist upon
observation of a negotiated peace.

When we analyze these two options, I be-
lieve the choice is clear. Just three months
ago we signed an agreement in Paris with the
North Vietnamese.^ Article 20 of that agree-
ment stipulated :

Foreign countries shall put an end to all military
activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw
from and refrain from reintroducing into these
two countries troops, military advisers and military
personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

The United States did cease its only mili-
tary activity — the bombing. We had no
troops in Cambodia. By contrast, about half
the estimated 70,000 to 75,000 enemy forces
in Cambodia are North Vietnamese. To the
best of our knowledge, none have been with-
drawn. In fact the sustained offensive which
began when we stopped bombing was insti-
gated, led, and supported by North Viet-
namese troops.

Is this a civil war when half of one side's
armed forces are foreign?

What should U.S. policy be under such
circumstances? First, our actions will be
strictly limited to our limited objective.

— We will not slide into another Viet-Nam.

— We will not introduce American ground
forces.

— We are not committed to any particular
Cambodian government.

Our only purpose is to insure that the
Paris peace agreement is observed. We have

' For text of the Agreement on Ending the War
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, see Bulletin of
Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.

une n, 1973

859

no other objective. The reason we are bomb-
ing in Cambodia is to bring about the im-
plementation of this agreement. We are just
as eager to stop the bombing as it is possible
to be. And of course we will do so just as soon
as there is a cease-fire. This is in accord
with our mutual agreement with North Viet-
Nam. This is our only condition.

It is clear to everyone that the fighting in
Cambodia would stop if North Vietnamese
forces were withdrawn. I understand that a
recent Senate report came to just this con-
clusion. For the war in Cambodia has always
been a product of the struggle in Viet-Nam.
In fact the fighting first erupted in Cam-
bodia when the Cambodians ordered the
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong to leave
their country. The aggressors in 1970 and
the aggressors today are the North Viet-
namese.

Peace must come to all of the nations of
Indochina or it will not come permanently to
any of them. The fall of Cambodia into North
Vietnamese hands would endanger the frame-
work of both the Viet-Nam cease-fire and
the entire Indochina situation.

Cambodia is a small country involved in a
conflict not of its own making, which only
wants to be left alone. We are perfectly will-
ing to allow the Cambodians to determine
their own political future. Now the North
Vietnamese must demonstrate the same ap-
proach by observing the peace agreement.

The appropriations bill which you are con-
sidering today is not an open-ended commit-
ment to prolong this war. It simply requests
funds until the end of this fiscal year. We
all understand that it takes time to finally
bring to an end a war which has lasted for
over a quarter of a century. We are greatly
concerned over the repeated and serious vio-
lations by the Communist side. But we should
not lose hope that the Paris peace agreement
will be carried out.

Fortunately there are positive signs as well
as continuing problems. Fighting in Viet-
Nam recently has been at a low level. In Laos,
fighting has markedly declined and the two
sides are discussing implementation of their

agreement. And in Cambodia the govern-
ment has formed a new leadership council
to achieve more broadly based public sup-
port. We believe that cease-fire negotiations
in Cambodia are still possible. With our sup-
port the Cambodian Government is continu-
ing attempts to initiate direct negotiations
with its opponents.

We all want to see the bombing stop, but
our broader objective is a lasting peace
throughout Indochina. A halt in one kind of
fighting, a cease-fire by only one side, is
clearly not enough.

By remaining firm with the North Viet-
namese, we have come a long way toward
peace. The Paris agreement provides a mu-
tually acceptable framework upon which a
lasting peace can be accomplished. For the
United States, it has freed our prisoners of
war and allowed us to withdraw all of our
forces from Viet-Nam. For the people of In-
dochina it has brought the first hope of genu-
ine peace for over a quarter century. Surely
this is an agreement worth defending.

A period of adjustment is required to over-
come the tensions and distrust which have
accumulated during this long war. But our
objective is to help Indochina and all of Asia
turn away from confrontation and toward
the common tasks of economic development
and political cooperation.

New relationships are developing in Asia
which could provide the basis for long-term
stability. These relationships are still fragile,
and transition to stability is a delicate proc-
ess. A sudden reduction in the American com-
mitment to this process could sacrifice the
progress already achieved. Lack of concern
over implementation of the Paris agreement
would certainly be interpreted as just such
an act.

We have been able to make concrete prog-
ress toward a more stable world in recent
years not by wishful thinking about our
adversaries nor by abandoning our friends
and allies. We have done it by demonstrating
strength, perseverance, and a willingness to
negotiate. It is this approach which can still
bring the peace to Indochina we all want.

860

Deparfment of State Bulletin

Department Reports to Congress
on Soviet Exit Fee Policy

Statement by Walter J. Stoessel, J):
Assistayit Secretanj for European Affairs^

The Subcommittee on Europe has invited
the Department of State to testify on .the
change in Soviet exit fee policy and its effects
on Soviet Jews.

I I am very pleased to be able to appear be-
fore the subcommittee this afternoon, and I
shall be glad to shed whatever light I am
able upon this very important problem. As
you know, the President has followed this
matter personally for a number of years. He
i is committed to progress, and there has been
I remarkable progress. This has come about
through delicate negotiations pursued at the
highest level and through traditional diplo-
matic channels as well. The President recog-
nizes, as we all do, that not all of the prob-
lems have been resolved, and he wants to see
further progress. He has been in touch with
the leadership of both the House and Senate
on the latest developments. The President
also has kept in personal touch with Ameri-
can .Jewish leaders, reviewing the situation
with them most recently on April 19. I would
like to acquaint you with the situation as we
now see it.

Soviet understanding of the importance to
Americans of Soviet emigration policy — par-
ticularly as applied to Soviet Jews — is evi-
dent, I believe, in the recent evolution of
Soviet emigration practices. Emigration of
Soviet Jews, the Soviet ethnic group evincing
the most interest in emigration, averaged not
more than a few hundred annually through-

- out most of the 1960's. In 1969, the number
jumped to 3,000, and although it fell to 1,000
the following year, it went much higher in
1971— to 14,000. This level of emigration was

' Made before the Subcoininittee on Europe of the
House Committee on Foreign .Affairs on May 1.
The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

unprecedented. In 1972 the level rose fur-
ther— to over 31,000. An average monthly
rate in excess of 2,500 was attained, and that
level is holding for 1973. We are gratified by
these developments.

At the same time we are aware that prob-
lems remain. It has been called to our atten-
tion in particular that harassment of persons
applying to emigrate is still taking place in
many instances. We are constantly looking at
this aspect of the problem, and the President
has agreed to a continuing discussion of it
with American Jewish leaders.

As you are perhaps aware, emigi-ation has
not been a right traditionally exercised under
the Soviet system. The Soviets have, how-
ever, permitted some 60,000 Jews to leave
over the last four years. This was a period
during which U.S.-Soviet relations, including
trade, significantly improved. The concur-
rence of these two developments — the im-
provement in our relations and the favorable
evolution of Soviet emigration policy — is
important.

It seems reasonable to me to speculate that
as long as there is a Soviet desire to see U.S.-
Soviet relations continue to improve and
U.S.-Soviet trade continue to expand, the
Soviet leadership will see that it is in its own
best interest to pursue an emigration policy
which will not arouse public and con-
gressional hostility in this country. They are
deeply committed to expanding economic ties
with this country, and there can be no doubt
that they know of the deep American com-
mitment to continued progress in the area of
emigration. It would seem fair to conclude
that they know that favorable developments
in the field of trade must be accompanied by
a reasonable policy in regard to emigration.

Some believe that the best way to influence
the Soviets in this matter is to tie the issues
of emigration and trade together legislatively
and to place restrictions on trade in the hope
of achieving our goals on emigration. The
administration is persuaded that this is not
the best way to go about it. Principally, we
have no way of predicting with any certainty
how the Soviets would react to a legal U.S.

June 11, 1973

861

proscription on a matter affecting their in-
ternal jurisdiction. On the other hand, we
have the experience of recent years in which
improved relations and expanded trade have
coincided with significant and favorable
changes in Soviet emigration policy. It seems
reasonable then, to postulate that a more
effective way of fostering the evolution we
favor is to continue in a positive rather than
a punitive vein. An essential step in this
direction, I believe, would be congressional
approval of title V of the Trade Reform
Act of 1973, which would facilitate expand-
ing U.S.-Soviet trade in the years ahead.

I am well aware of the apprehension in the
Congress that the incentive for trade and for
generally improved bilateral relations may
not be enough, once MFN [most-favored-
nation] is voted, to persuade the Soviets to
continue their present more liberal emigra-
tion policy. It was precisely because of our
concern on this point that the President ob-
tained the assurances of the Soviet Union
reported to the Senate and House leaders on
April 18.

Specifically, the President was assured by
the Soviet Government that it was completely
waiving the education tax and that it would
continue to do so. Since these waivers of the
education tax are within the terms of the
implementing decree of August 1972 and
since the policy on total waivers is without
a time limit, the Soviets feel that this obvi-
ates any need to suspend or rescind the de-
cree itself. According to the Soviets, the only
exit fees which are charged are the ones in
effect prior to August 1972.

The President was assured that applica-
tions to emigrate were considered on an indi-
vidual basis and as a rule were approved.
Exceptions to this rule were cases where
permission to go abroad had been denied for
reasons of state security. The President has
received firm assurances that the present
Soviet emigration policy, which has per-
mitted the current level of emigration, will
also be continued indefinitely. This certainly
does not mean that we are satisfied that
Soviet emigration policy has reached accept-

able world standards. We know there are
hardships and bitter disappointments which
can be relieved given the good will to do so.
I would reiterate that the President hopes
that progress will continue to be made, and
he follows the matter carefully.

I must say nonetheless that the Soviet
assurances which were given the President
are a very significant development. While
they are general in character, I believe that
they are firmly given. In the light of these
important modifications of Soviet policy, we
believe that the justification for enactment
of rigid legislative conditions to the granting
of MFN to the Soviet has been removed. We
are therefore hopeful that the Congress will
enact the Trade Reform Act of 1973 and title
V authorizing MFN for the Soviet Union
without such conditions.

President Proposes New Guidelines
on Strategic Stockpiles

Message to the Congress ^

To the Congress of the United States:

In our current fight against rising prices,
one weapon which has not yet been effec-
tively employed is our national strategic
stockpile. Today I am asking for authority
from the Congress to sell those items in the
stockpile which we no longer need to keep
in reserve in order to protect our national
security.

Because the world economy has grown
so rapidly, short term demand for many in-
dustrial commodities has outpaced short term
supplies. As a result, prices for industrial
commodities have recently been increasing at
unacceptably high rates — in some cases by
more than 30 percent in the past 12 months
alone.

These increases will eventually be felt

'■ Transmitted on Apr. 16 (White House press
release).

862

Department of State Bulletin

m

in higher prices for the American consumer
if we do not act decisively now.

By disposing- of unneeded items in the
strategic stockpile, we can strike a critical
blow for the American consumer.

The purpose of the American strategic
stockpile is to ensure an adequate reserve of
vital materials in time of war without im-
posing undue hardships on our civilian popu-
lation. The basic concept is an old one, dating
back to the Strategic and Critical Materials
Stock Piling Act of 1946. Ninety-five percent
of the current stockpile was acquired before
1959 — the bulk of it during the Korean War.
The present strategic stockpile totals $6.7
billion worth of material, ranging from
metals, minerals, rubber and industrial
diamonds to unusual items such as iodine.

Because our economy and technology are
dynamic, our capability to find substitutes
for scarce materials is far greater today than
in the past. We are now able to meet defense
requirements for materials during possible
major conflicts without imposing an exces-
sive burden on the economy or relying on an
enormous stockpile, as was once necessaiy.
After a careful and searching review of
the current stockpile, I have approved new
guidelines that would tailor the kind and
quantity of materials in the stockpile to the
national security needs of the 1970's. The
new stockpile would be substantially reduced,
but it would contain the critical materials
that we need in quantities fully adequate for
our national security requirements.

Our new guidelines would provide the
needed commodities to cover our material
requirements for the first year of a major
conflict in Europe and Asia. In the event of
a longer conflict, these 12 months would give
us sufficient time to mobilize so that we could
' sustain our defense efi"ort as long as neces-
sary without placing an intolerable burden on
the economy or the civilian population.

Under existing law, the Administration
has the authority to sell approximately $1.9
billion worth of stockpile material, including
substantial amounts of zinc, aluminum and
lead. However, to dispose of the remaining

$4.1 billion in unnecessary items, Congres-
sional authorization is needed.

Historically, the sale of each commodity
has been subject to individual legislation,
but this procedure is time-consuming and
redundant. To improve on it, the authorizing
legislation I am recommending to the Con-
gress takes the form of a single omnibus bill
for all excess stockpile commodities; it in-
cludes individual authorizations for 16 major
commodities.

At the same time that they fully provide
for our national security and economic health
in the event of an emergency, our new stock-
pile guidelines also enhance national effi-
ciency and thrift. Specifically, they would
permit us to sell $6 billion in no longer
needed stockpile material over the next sev-
eral years.

I urge the Congress to take prompt and
favorable action on the stockpile legislation
I am submitting. By doing so, the Congress
will demonstrate its willingness to act in
positive cooperation with the executive
branch in a way that is in the best interests
of all Americans.

Richard Nixon.

The White House, April 16, 1973.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Twenty-second Annual Report of the Activities of
the Joint Committee on Defense Production, with
material on mobilization from departments and
agencies, together with supplemental views. Part
1 of 2 volumes. H. Rept. 93-5. February 5, 1973.
538 pp.

Briefing on Major Foreign Policy Questions. Hear-
ing before the Senate Committee on ForeigTi Re-
lations, with Secretary of State Rogers. February

21, 1973. 52 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Hearing before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February

22, 1973. 88 pp.

United States-Chilean Relations. Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March
6, 1973. 97 pp.

June 11, 1973

863

A New Initiative To Liberalize International Trade.
Report of the Subcommittee on International Ec-
onomics of the Joint Economic Committee, to-
gether with additional views. March 8, 1973. 24
pp.

National Science Foundation Annual Report 1972.
Message from the President of the United States
transmitting the 22d Annual Report of the Na-
tional Science Foundation, covering fiscal year
1972. H. Doc. 93-58. March 12, 1973. 102 pp.

Report on Aeronautics and Space Activities During
1972. Message from the President of the United
States transmitting the report of the National
Aeronautics and Space Council. H. Doc. 93-63.
March 19, 1973. 99 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and France Sign Agreement
on "Advance Charter" Flights

The Department of State announced on
May 7 (press release 134) that the United
States and France had that day concluded a
memorandum of understanding on travel
group charters (TGC's) and advance book-
ing charters (ABC's) under which each
party will accept as charterworthy trans-
atlantic traffic originated in the territory of
the other party and organized and operated
pursuant to the "advance charter" (TGC or
ABC) rules of that party. Other provisions
deal with enforcement and arrangements to
minimize administrative burdens on carriers
and organizers of "advance charters." The
understanding was brought into force by an
exchange of notes at Washington. While the
understanding is not an exchange of eco-
nomic rights, it is expected to facilitate the
operation of "advance charter" flights be-
tween the United States and France by car-
riers of both countries. The understanding
with France is the third of a series of such
agreements the United States hopes to con-
clude soon with other countries to facilitate
the operation of "advance charters." (For
text of the memorandum of understanding,
see press release 134.)

U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agreement
on Science and Technology

Press release 159 dated May 18

The United States and Yugoslavia on May
18 signed an agreement providing for joint
financing of cooperation in science and tech-
nology. This agreement represents a new ap-
proach to cooperation which has been
successfully carried out for the last decade
with mutual benefit and satisfaction to both
sides. Under the agreement both govern-
ments will undertake to encourage research
organizations and institutions not only to
continue with present forms of cooperative
projects but also to develop new means and
sources of financing.

As a part of the agreement, there will be
established the U.S.-Yugoslav Board on Sci-
entific and Technological Cooperation to ap-
prove new projects, allocate funds, and give
appropriate guidance to the cooperative pro-
gram.

Both sides are convinced that the agree-
ment represents true progress toward equal
partnership in science and technology.

The agreement was signed on behalf of
the United States by Herman Pollack, Direc-
tor, Bureau of International Scientific and
Technological Affairs, Department of State,
and on behalf of Yugoslavia by Krsto Bula-
jic, Director General, Federal Administra-
tion for International Scientific, Educational,
Cultural and Technical Cooperation.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty.
Adopted at Wellington November 10, 1972, at the
Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.'
Notifications of approval: France, April 11, 1973;
South Africa, May 22, 1973.

' Not in force.

864

Department of State Bulletin

ii

I Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon-
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet So-
cialist Republic (with a reservation), January
31, 1973; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
(with a reservation), February 26, 1973.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development,
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc-
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow
April 10, 1972."

Ratifications deposited: Philippines, May 21,
L 1973; Tunisia, May 18, 1973.

" Fisheries

Convention for the establishment of an Inter-Amer-
ican Tropical Tuna Commission. Done at Wash-
ington May 31, 1949. Entered into force March 3,
1950. TIAS 2044.
Adherence deposited: France, May 22, 1973.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En-
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance depoxited: German Democratic Re-
public, May 8, 1973.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at
London October 12, 1971.
Acceptance deposited: Greece, April 13, 1973.

Meteorology

± Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza-
I tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En-
tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic, May 23, 1973.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at
Vienna February 21, 1971.'
Accession deposited: Mauritius, May 8, 1973.

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1,
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS
6839.
Ratification deposited: Honduras, May 16, 1973.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow,
and Washington December 29, 1972.'
Signatures: Argentina, May 15, 1973; France
(with statements). May 22, 1973; Spain, April
27, 1973.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London
October 21, 1969.'
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, April 27, 1973.

Postal Matters

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni-
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu-
lations with final protocol and annex, and the
universal postal convention with final protocol
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo No-
vember 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1,
1971, except for article V of the additional pro-
tocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971.
TIAS 7150.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, January 25, 1973;
Kenya, February 26, 1973; Norway, March 29,
1973.

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree-
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31,
1971.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, January 25,
1973; Norway, March 29, 1973.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January
4, 1969."
Signature: Bhutan, March 26, 1973.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, May 23,
1973.'

Sea, Exploration of

Convention for the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen
September 12, 1964. Entered into force July 22,
1968.
i4 cce88ion deposited: United States, April 18,

1973.
Entered into force for the United States: April
18, 1973.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused by space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into
force September 1, 1972.'

Ratifications deposited: Cyprus, May 23, 1973;
Tunisia, May 18, 1973.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

' Extended to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles.

June 11, 1973

865

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the
United States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267.
Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub-
lic, April 3, 1973.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of May 12,
1958, as extended (TIAS 4031, 6467), relating to
the organization and operation of the North
American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Washington May
10, 1973. Entered into force May 10, 1973.

Italy

Agreement on the matter of social security. Signed
at Washington May 23, 1973. Enters into force
on the first day of the month following the month
in which ratifications are exchanged.

Mexico

Agreement extending the provisions of minute 241

dated July 14, 1972, as extended (TIAS 7404,
7561 ) , of the International Boundary and Water
Commission (United States and Mexico) con-
cerning the Colorado River salinity problem. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Mexico April 30,
1973. Entered into force April 30, 1973.

Romania

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Bucharest April
28, 1973. Entered into force April 28, 1973.

Saudi Arabia

Memorandum of understanding concerning the
Saudi Arabian National Guard modernization
program. Signed at Jidda March 19, 1973. En-
tered into force March 19, 1973.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol to the agreement of May 25, 1972, on the
prevention of incidents on and over the high
seas (TIAS 7379). Signed at Washington May
22, 1973. Entered into force May 22, 1973.

Yugoslavia

Agreement on scientific and technological coopera-
tion. Signed at Washington May 18, 1973. En-
tered into force May 18, 1973.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 14—27

Press releases may be obtained from the Ofliice
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 14 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 133, 134,
and 135 of May 7, 138 of May 9, and 141 of
May 10.

No. Date Subject

+145 5/14 Rogers: arrival statement, Mexico,

May 12.
*145A 5/14 Rogers: news conference. May 12.
+146 5/14 Rogers: Colorado River salinity

proposal. May 13.
*146A5/14 Rogers: departure statement and

news conference, Mexico, May 14.
+147 5/15 Rogers: arrival statement, Mana-
gua, May 14.
148 5/15 Rush: House Committee on Foreign

Affairs.
*149 5/15 Rogers: news conference, Mexico

May 13.
+150 5/15 Rogers: arrival statement, Caracas

May 14.
151 5/16 Rush: reception in honor of Em-

*ico c/1/. c,J'^^°^ ^^''^ Selassie I.
16^ 5/16 Shippmg Coordinating Committee

subcommittee meeting. May 30.
153 5/16 Secretary's Advisory Committee on
Private International Law study
group meeting. May 24.
*154 5/16 Study Groups 10 and 11 of U.S. Na-
tional Committee for CCIR meet-
ing, May 31.

* Not printed.

+ Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

*155

5/16

n56

5/16

+156A 5/16

*157

5/17

+158

5/17

159

5/18

+160

5/18

+161

5/18

+162
*163

5/18
5/21

*164

5/21

+165

5/22

+166

5/23

+167

5/23

*169

5/23

+170

5/24

+171

5/24

*172

5/24

*173

5/25

+ 174

5/25

+175

5/25

Rogers: luncheon remarks, Caracas,
May 15.

Rogers: departure statement and
news conference, Caracas, May
15.

Rogers : arrival statement, Lima,
May 15.

Rogers: Andean Pact junta, Lima,
May 16.

Rogers: statement and news con-
ference, Lima, May 16.

U.S. and Yugoslavia sign science
and technology agreement.

Rogers: arrival statement, Bogota,
May 17.

U.S. swimming and diving team to
tour P.R.C. (rewrite).

Rogers: Casa Bolivar, Bogota.

Rogers: dinner remarks, Bogota,
May 17.

Rogers: news conference, Bogota,
May 18.

Rush : Southern Council for Inter-
national and Public Affairs, At-
lanta, Ga.

Award for Valor to State-AID-
USIA returned POW's.

Rogers: arrival statement, Brasilia,
May 22.

Rogers heads U.S. delegation to
Argentine inauguration, May 25.

Tarr: House Committee on Foreign
Afl'airs.

Rogers : statement and news con-
ference, Brasilia, May 23.

Juilliard String Quartet tours
Southeast Asia.

Foreign policy conference for edu-
cators, June 28-29.

U.S. -Swiss Treaty on Mutual As-
sistance in Criminal Matters.

Rogers: arrival statement, Buenos
Aires, May 23.

866

Department of State Bulletin

k

INDEX June 11, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1772

KgncMUnre. President Increases Import Quotas
for Nonfat Dry Milk (proclamation) . . . 853

Iviation. U.S. and France Sign Agreement on
"Advance Charter" Flights 864

ambodia. Secretary Rogers Discusses U.S.
Objective in Cambodia (Rogers) 859

ongress

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 863

epartment Reports to Congress on Soviet

Exit Fee Policy (Stoessel) 861

lie Essential Purposes of the Trade Reform

Act of 1973 (Rogers) 835

he Foreign Assistance Program and Foreign

Policy Goals (Rush) 854

resident Proposes New Guidelines on Stra-
tegic Stockpiles (message to the Congress) . 862
cretarj' Rogers Discusses U.S. Objective in

Cambodia (Rogers) 859

enate Confirms John M. Porges as IDB
Executive Director 848

department and Foreign Service. The Economic
Role of the State Department (Casey) . . 849

eonomic .Affairs

The Economic Role of the State Department
(Casey) 849

The Essential Purposes of the Trade Reform

Act of 1973 (Rogers) 835

resident Increases Import Quotas for Nonfat

Dry Milk (proclamation) 853

resident Proposes New Guidelines on Stra-
tegic Stockpiles (message to the Congress) . 862

thiopia. Emperor Halle Selassie of Ethiopia
Visits Washington (Haile Selassie, Nixon,
Rush) 841

foreign Aid

be Foreign Assistance Prog^ram and Foreign

Policy Goals (Rush) 854

|CCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC in Laos Eligible
To Receive Defense Articles (Presidential
determination) 843

ranee. U.S. and France Sigrn Agreement on
"Advance Charter" Flights 864

nternational Organizations and Conferences.

Senate Confirms John M. Porges as IDB
Executive Director 848

■rael. Encouraging a Negotiating Process in
the Middle East (Sisco) 844

BOS. ICCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC in Laos
Eligible To Receive Defense Articles (Presi-
dential determination) 843

ktin America. Senate Confirms John M.
Porges as IDB Executive Director .... 848

fiddle East. Encouraging a Negotiating
Process in the Middle East (Sisco) ... 844

Military Affairs

ICCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC in Laos Eligible
To Receive Defense Articles (Presidential
determination) 843

Using U.S. Military Strength as an Instrument
of Peace (Nixon) 839

Presidential Documents

Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia Visits
Washington 841

ICCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC in Laos Eligible
To Receive Defense Articles (Presidential
determination) 843

President Increases Import Quotas for Nonfat
Dry Milk (proclamation) 853

President Proposes New Guidelines on Stra-
tegic Stockpiles 862

Using U.S. Military Strength as an Instrument
of Peace 839

Science. U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agreement
on Science and Technology 864

Trade

The Economic Role of the State Department
(Casey) 849

The Essential Purposes of the Trade Reform
Act of 1973 (Rogers) 835

Treaty Information

Current Actions 864

U.S. and France Sign Agreement on "Advance

Charter" Flights 864

U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agreement on

Science and Technology 864

U.S.S.R. Department Reports to Congress on
Soviet Exit Fee Policy (Stoessel) .... 861

Viet-Nam

ICCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC in Laos Eligible

To Receive Defense Articles (Presidential

determination) 843

Secretary Rogers Discusses U.S. Objective in

Cambodia (Rogers) 859

Using U.S. Military Strength as an Instrument

of Peace (Nixon) 839

Yugoslavia. U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agree-
ment on Science and Technology .... 864

Name Index

Casey, William J 849

Emperor Haile Selassie I 841

Nixon, President .... 839, 841, 843, 853, 862

Porges, John M 848

Rogers, Secretary 835, 859

Rush, Kenneth 841, 854

Sisco, Joseph J 844

Stoessel, Walter J., Jr 861

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^//773

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1773

June 18, 1973

THE NATO ALLIANCE : THE BASIS FOR AN ERA OF NEGOTIATION
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 867

AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE: INITIATIVE OR INERTIA?
Address by Acting Legal Adviser Brower 872

HUMAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CONFLICT: DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
Address by Deputy Legal Adviser Aldrich 876

PRIORITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Statement by AID Administrator John A. Hannah 883

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index gee inside back cover

■

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETI

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1773
June 18, 1973

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international relations are also liste

The NATO Alliance: The Basis for an Era of Negotiation

Address bij Deputy Secretai'y Kenneth Rtisk ^

Nineteen seventy-three promises to open
a new era in our relations with western
Europe. At the same time the United States
iiid western Europe are working together
) transform relations with eastern Europe
md the Soviet Union. In a period of such
profound change it is easy to neglect cen-
tral elements of continuity. It is easy to allow
existing institutions to become outmoded, to
be overtaken by the pace of change.

The central element of continuity in our
relations with Europe is the Atlantic alli-
ance. The existing institution which embodies
this alliance is NATO. We are determined
that 1973 will see not an erosion of this alli-

, ance and this institution, but rather their
strengthening and adaptation to meet cur-
rent realities.

We are embarked upon a far-reaching re-
orientation of our entire postwar foreign
policy. We are seeking to lower the burden
of our international responsibilities and mili-
tary spending while maintaining the present
military balance and increasing the stability
of that balance. NATO is an essential ele-

I ment of this evolving global policy.

Looking to the future we perceive two

I major roles for NATO. First, in this era of
negotiations between East and West, NATO
is assuming a role of "detente management."
Once considered primarily a military alli-
ance designed to control East- West tensions,
NATO must increasingly assume the respon-

|sibility for reducing these tensions.

Without attracting a great deal of atten-

Ition, the alliance has already come a long

' Made before the Southern Council for Interna-
Itional and Public Affairs at Atlanta, Ga., on May
'TJ22 (press release 165 ;•

way in this direction. NATO is playing a
central role in the formulation of Western
positions for both of this year's major multi-
lateral negotiations with the East — the talks
on mutual and balanced force reductions
(MBFR) and the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Both of these negotiations treat a variety
of highly sensitive issues. Each of the allies
feels that its national interests are directly
involved. These negotiations come at a time
of unprecedented testing of the overall At-
lantic relationship — in monetary, trade, and
investment matters, in far-reaching changes
with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe,
and in the attitude toward NATO of a
younger generation with no recollection of
the early days of the cold war. These confer-
ences might have been enormously divisive
for the alliance.

In fact, when the alliance began to pre-
pare for these conferences several years ago,
there were disagreements on a number of
important issues. Starting from this point,
NATO is moving toward agreement on basic
issues and is strengthening itself consider-
ably in the process. At no time in its history
has political consultation been more success-
ful nor more important. The alliance has
grown as it faced new challenges.

For both of these conferences, overall alli-
ance policy is being established in NATO's
North Atlantic Council. After intensive
study of the issues within NATO, our rep-
re.sentatives in the Council reach coordinated
positions which .serve as general guidelines
for negotiators from allied countries in
Helsinki and Vienna, where initial talks are
underway. This consultation, both in NATO

June 18, 1973

867

and at the talks themselves, demonstrates the
allies' willingness and ability to compromise
and reach consensus on specific issues in
the interest of continuing allied unity.

Aims of Security Conference

Let me just say a few words about each
of these conferences. In the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe we will
be seeking with our NATO allies to lower
the political barriers that divide Europe.
While it would be unrealistic to expect a
dramatic transformation of East-West rela-
tions as a result of a single conference, we
are encouraged by the positive atmosphere
of the preparatory talks in Helsinki. All of
the states concerned are prepared to think
in terms of a conference in three stages — an
initial meeting this summer of Foreign
Ministers, detailed negotiation and drafting
of texts in committees, and a concluding
meeting.

The subject matter for the conference is
being discussed under four major headings:

— First, questions of security. We believe
that a major political act by the conference
should be to make clear the unacceptability of
interference by one state in the affairs of
another, whether or not they are in the same
political, economic, or social system. We also
support the establishment of military con-
fidence-building measures such as the ex-
change of observers at maneuvers.

— Second, the human contacts field. It is
of particular importance that the conference
achieve objectives shared not only among
the NATO allies but generally among West-
ern states participating in CSCE : closer,
more open, and freer relationships among all
peoples in Europe and a wider flow of infor-
mation and ideas.

— Third, cooperation in economic, scien-
tific, and environmental fields. We firmly be-
lieve that such cooperation will not only
bring mutual benefits in each of these fields
but, perhaps more importantly, will provide
the Soviet Union with concrete incentives
for a more peaceful relationship in Europe.
This is at the heart of President Nixon's

f

plan to build a structure of peace in which
all nations have a stake.

— Fourth, permanent machinery. The So-
viets have proposed the creation of a commit-
tee to carry on the work initiated by the
CSCE after the conference is over. This pro-
posal will be considered by the conference.

Whether or not this conference establishes
permanent East-West machinery, it is clear
that NATO will have a considerable role to
play after the conference. NATO logically
should be the forum for allied consultations
on East-West military security issues. As
there will be a continuing need to coordinate
allied positions on freer movement of peo-
ple, a NATO role in this area would also be
appropriate, particularly if there are pros-
pects for further liberalization through East-
West negotiation. And there undoubtedly will
need to be a framework for coordinating
allied views in connection with other East-
West initiatives.

Development of Allied Approach to MBFR

There is a fundamental difference between
the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe and the talks on mutual and bal-
anced force reductions. CSCE is general and
broad in scope ; MBFR addresses the specific
issue of reducing forces in central Europe.
But while the issue is specific, troop reduc-
tions are as complex and difficult an issue
as NATO has ever addressed. Such reduc-;
tions are even more complex than the strate-
gic arms negotiations the United States is,
conducting with the Soviet Union. We know
of the difficulty in deciding upon an approach:
on sensitive issues within just one govern-;
ment. The problem of reaching agreement!
among many countries is obviously greater.

Mutual confidence within the alliance will:
develop only through an agreement on the
basic security framework for the negotia-^
tions. That NATO is working toward con-
sensus on such a framework is the best pos-i
sible proof of its continuing vitality and>
ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

We have recently submitted to our allies'
a study setting forth some alternative ap-
proaches to MBFR. In considering these ap-

(a

868

Department of State Bulletin

liroaches we believe the allies might be
jriiided by some of the following concerns.
We believe that the allied position on MBFR
sliould be aimed at "undiminished securi-
ty"— by which we mean an outcome that will
maintain and if possible enhance the secu-
rity posture of the alliance by lowering the
level of confrontation.

While the allied approach could entail pro-
portionately equal reductions, this could re-
sult in an imbalance unfavorable to the West
because of existing factors favoring the
Warsaw Pact. These include differences in
the size, composition, and offensive orienta-
tion of Warsaw Pact forces and the geo-
graphic advantages of the Soviet Union over
the United States in reinforcement. To re-
duce these advantages the allied objectives
in MBFR could include achieving approxi-
mate parity in ground forces and reducing
elements in the Warsaw Pact threatening to
NATO security. The American and Soviet
forces are comparable in that they are not
indigenous to central Europe and might be
candidates for reduction.

It should be an important goal of the allied
approach to insure that the provisions of any
MBFR agreement will not be circumvented
or undermined. The allied position should
' provide for verification of both sides' mili-
tary activity to increase political confidence.
Reductions on the allied side should not
impair the ability of the allies to take the
■i necessary military steps to fulfill NATO
' strategy : forward defense, flexible response,
■ and nuclear deterrence.
' Development of an approach to MBFR
which takes these factors into account, and
is still negotiable with the other side, will
not be a simple matter. But we are confident
. that such an approach will emerge before the
negotiations themselves begin this fall.

By working together in CSCE and MBFR,
' e are now giving the alliance a new sense of
.ummon purpose, a new set of objectives.
* This is vitally important at a time when our
■^ relationship is being challenged by economic
=* strains and suspicions of unilateral dealings
^ with the Soviet Union. Allied unity in these
'^ two negotiations sti'engthens the overall At-
^ lantic relationship and enhances its ability

to deal with other economic and political
strains.

Continuing Need for Strong Common Defense

Let me turn now to the second major role
we believe NATO can and must play in the
future. Success in this era of negotiation
I'equires allied agreement on goals and the
ability to act in concert which I have already
discussed. But it also requires that we be
able to negotiate with confidence in our
strength. For it is in the very nature of nego-
tiations that relative weakness invites pres-
sure tactics and an outcome satisfactory to
only one side. This is a prescription for in-
stability.

There is in Europe today an approximate
balance of forces. But there is no guarantee
this balance will continue. Over the past
decade the Soviet Union increased its mili-
tary manpower by 30 percent, doubled its
published military budget, and vastly in-
creased its nuclear forces. There are approx-
imately 400,000 Soviet ground forces in
central Europe as compared with just
191,000 American forces. During the same
period, pressures to spend more on domestic
needs in both the United States and western
Europe have led to a decline in the share
of allied GNP devoted to defense — in the
United States by one-third, from 9.3 to 6.2
percent, and a much less sharp decline in
western Europe by one-fifth, from 5 to 4.2
percent.

As President Nixon stated last month,
". . . we are seeking to negotiate a mutual
and balanced reduction of armed forces in
Europe which will reduce our defense budget
and allow us to have funds for other pur-
poses at home so des])erately needed." - But
the Soviet Union will clearly not negotiate
seriously with us if we unilaterally reduce
our own forces.

There are political as well as economic
pressures to reduce our common defense. As
a more peaceful atmosphere emerges, many

■ For President Nixon's television and radio ad-
dress to the Nation on Apr. 30, see Weekly Com-
pilation of Presidential Documents dated May 7,
p. 433.

*«'June 18, 1973

869

in both Europe and the United States believe
a strong defense is no longer necessary. This
attitude disturbs me for two reasons. First,
it is premature. We must wait for concrete
and reciprocal results from this year's many
negotiations— SALT [Strategic Arms Limi-
tation Talks], MBFR, CSCE— before we
should seriously contemplate force reduc-
tions in Europe. Second, this attitude fails to
take into account historical realities.

In the early part of this century, Europe
was an area typified by continuing instabil-
ity. This instability proved to be the incu-
bator for two massively destructive wars
within a generation. The United States
learned to its sorrow that, however much we
said and acted otherwise, we could not re-
main aloof from those wars. As a result,
following World War H we were the lead-
ers in constructing a peacetime structure in
which our voice and our interests would be
permanently represented.

Toward this end we led in the establish-
ment of NATO, in signing a treaty which
provides that an attack on any of the mem-
bers shall be deemed an attack on all. Our
European allies continue to base their for-
eign policies upon the security provided by
this treaty and the American presence in
Europe. All of them want us to maintain
this presence and to maintain NATO. To risk
the dismantling of this accomplishment of
wise diplomacy, to risk a return to instabil-
ity in Europe, is both unnecessary and dan-
gerous.

There are sound military as well as politi-
cal reasons for maintaining our forces in
Europe. In the 1950's American superiority
in strategic weapons was so substantial that
it not only served to prevent a strategic at-
tack on the United States but was also suf-
ficient to deter aggressive behavior against
western Europe, even in relatively minor
crises.

By the 1960's the United States recognized
that reliance on "massive retaliation" was
not a viable strategy and began to press for
a doctrine of flexible response, a doctrine
ultimately accepted by NATO as a whole.

870

But during this past decade our strategic su-
periority was still sufficient to provide stra-
tegic deterrence and to support broader po-
litical goals. Viewed from this perspective,
flexible response was somewhat ahead of its
time.

That time has now come. The United
States has entered an era of rough parity in
central strategic systems with the Soviet
Union. The strategic forces on both sides are
suflUcient to make immediately devastating
any direct attack. Accepting such a parity
situation not only makes sense in terms of
deterrence but is probably the only long-run
alternative to a debilitating arms race.

However, a byproduct has been that the
United States can no longer be assured of
deterring aggressive behavior below the stra-
tegic level. Both conventional and tactical
nuclear capabilities have gained very sub-
stantially in importance as strategic parity
has developed. It is no longer possible to
think of conventional forces serving only to
prevent or deal with minor skirmishes. They
have become a very significant factor in de-
terrence and in considering a conventional
response to a conventional thrust by the
other side.

Thus a major issue facing the alliance in
the coming decade will be how to maintain
and improve its conventional forces in the
face of these economic, political, and military
challenges.

Our western European allies already do
far more for their own defense than is
generally recognized. They maintain approxi-
mately 3 million men under arms, or 25 per-
cent more than the United States. For every
American soldier in Europe, there are 10
allied soldiers. And they maintain almost
precisely the same percentage of their popu-
lation in the military. Quantitative improve-
ments by either the United States or western
Europe appear unlikely.

Therefore, to assure that allied conven-
tional capabilities keep pace with growing
Warsaw Pact capabilities, qualitative im-
provements and improved reserve forces take
on new importance. Making these qualitative

itt'J

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Department of State Bulletin;

1

i

iiprovements will not be easy. All of us will
face the enormous expense of more sophisti-
cated equipment and sharply rising person-
nel costs.

Better utilization of resources may thus be
the most promising route by which NATO's
conventional capabilities can be improved.
The European members of the NATO alli-
ance have formed the Eurogroup, an organi-
zation of European Defense Ministers which
already has made significant progress in
more cost-effective utilization of resources.
We must all concert to define more precisely
uhat we really need for an adequate NATO
defense.

Some have suggested that defense coopera-
tion within the European Community could
diminish or remove the need for American

ices in Europe. This is a longer term devel-

ment which must be accompanied by a
ieater degree of west European political
.mity. The United States firmly supports
<uch an evolution.

But in the interim, the present alliance
relationship is necessary to keep open that
desirable option for alliance development.
The substantial presence of U.S. forces in
Europe and the availability to NATO of U.S.
nuclear power will remain essential to an
East-West political equilibrium. Neither the
likely results of current U.S. -Soviet and
East- West negotiations, nor any early broad-
ening of European Community functions to
defense, will permit an end to the U.S. mili-
tary commitment in Europe.

Strengthening detente and a strong de-
fense, making progress with our adversaries
and maintaining close relations with our
allies — these are not contradictoiy concepts.
In fact they are essential to one another. I
hope that my brief remarks this afternoon
have convinced you of this point. For we
believe that a strong NATO is essential to
; make this era of negotiation a success. Thus
we believe that our commitment to the At-
lantic alliance will be just as important over
the next quarter centuiy as it has been over
the past quarter century.

June 18, 1973

International Organization Immunities
Granted to Intelsat

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'

Designating the International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) as
AN International Organization Entitled To
Enjoy Certain Privileges, Exemptions, and
Immunities

The International Telecommunications Satellite
Organization (INTELSAT) was established pur-
suant to the .Agreement Relating to the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT), which entered into force February
12, 1973, and the Operating Agreement signed pur-
suant thereto, TIAS 7532. The United States
participates in the Organization pursuant to the
authority of the Communications Satellite Act of
1962 (76 Stat. 419; 47 U.S.C. 701-744).

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority
vested in me by section 1 of the International Or-
ganizations Immunities Act (59 Stat. 699; 22 U.S.C.
288), it is ordered as follows:

Section 1. (a) I hereby designate the Interna-
tional Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(INTELSAT) as an international organization, as
that term is defined in section 4(i) of the Interna-
tional Organizations Immunities Act, entitled to
enjoy, on and after February 12, 1973, all of the
privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided
by section 2 (a) and (d) and section 4 (a), (c),
(d), (e), and (f) of that act.

(b) The foregoing designation is not intended to
abridge in any respect any privileges, exemptions,
or immunities which such organization may have
acquired or may hereafter acquire by treaty. Con-
gressional action, or other Executive order.

Sec. 2. The representatives to the Board of Gov-
ernors of INTELSAT and their alternates shall
tnjoy the same privileges, exemptions, and im-
munities that the representatives to the Interim
Communications Satellite Committee and their al-
ternates enjoyed pursuant to Executive Order No.
11227 of June 2, 1965.

Sec. 3. Executive Order No. 11227 of June 2,
1965 (except for the purpose referred to in section
2 hereof), and Executive Order No. 11277 of April
30, 1966, are hereby revoked.

(^2jJL^ ^-^K<:,^

The White House, May li, 1973.

■ No. 11718; 38 Fed. Reg. 12797.

871

Aircraft Hijacking and Sabotage: Initiative or Inertia?

Address by Acting Legal Adviser Charles N. Brower'^

I propose to advance the proposition this
afternoon that international law efforts to
combat hijacking and sabotage of civil air-
craft, which achieved such stunning suc-
cesses in the past, may be deteriorating from
the initiatives of recent years to near-inertia
and to suggest precisely how this incipient
inertia can be overcome and the initiative
regained.

Repeated hijackings in the decade of the
sixties, culminating in the events of Labor
Day 1970, galvanized the international com-
munity into fast and effective action. Operat-
ing through the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), concerned nations
concluded the Hague Hijacking and Montreal
Sabotage Conventions in 1970 and 1971, re-
spectively, and each of them achieved the
requisite number of ratifications during the
year following conclusion. The speedy draft-
ing and conclusion of these independent sub-
stantive conventions, in a manner permitting
their early entry into force, provided a
timely and firm response to the scourge of
aerial piracy and sabotage.

The international aviation community de-
cided to proceed through means of independ-
ent conventions requiring a limited number
of ratifications, as contrasted with revision or
expansion of the 1944 Chicago Convention.
An amendment to the Chicago Convention
could never provide a timely and effective
response to a pressing threat; it requires the
convocation of an Extraordinary Assembly
of the entire ICAO membership, approval by
two-thirds of the nations attending the As-

' Made before the International Aviation Club at
Washington on May ?A (press release 187).

sembly, and subsequent ratification by two-
thirds of the members of ICAO, meaning 85
countries. A quick look at the history of
amendments to the Chicago Convention con-
firms the wisdom of the decision to proceed
by means of independent conventions. In the
nearly 30-year history of the convention, only
seven amendments have been approved by an
Assembly, and only one of them was of a
])olitically substantive nature. It provides
that states expelled or suspended from the
United Nations shall be automatically ex-
pelled or suspended from ICAO. It was
adopted May 27, 1947, and entered into force
March 20, 1961, nearly 14 years later. Of the
other six amendments, all fundamentally
technical in nature, neither the proposal
adopted in 1971 to increase the number of
members in the ICAO Air Navigation Com-
mission nor the amendment adopted in 1962
increasing the number of states required in
order to call an Extraordinary Assembly of
ICAO has yet entered into force. The
remaining noncontroversial amendments
moving ICAO headquarters, establishing tri-
ennial Assemblies, and increasing the size of
the ICAO Council have required as much as
four years to enter into force, and only one
has taken as little as just over a year.

These historical realities provide persua-,
sive proof of the fact that important issues
of substance touching on what could be de-
scribed as political matters cannot effectively
be handled in timely fashion by the proce-|
dure for amending the Chicago Convention.'
By contrast, the speed with which the inter-
national community was able to move,
through development of independent treaties
requiring fewer ratifications was almost elec-

( :ro

! iste

.•,is

;-to

872

Department of State Bulletin

trifying. The Hague Hijacking Convention
was signed December 16, 1970, and entered
into force not quite 10 months later, on Oc-
tober 14, 1971. The Montreal Sabotage Con-
vention required only a few months longer ;
it was signed September 28, 1971, and en-
tered into force January 26, 1973. This ex-
perience proved that the development of
independent conventions could provide a
rapid response which the process of amend-
ing the Chicago Convention historically
proved incapable of producing.

I have imposed on your patience in re-
counting this history at some length because
I believe it makes a very important point;
namely, that timely new action to combat hi-
jacking and sabotage necessarily must be
taken by means of an independent conven-
tion. The history of Chicago Convention
amendments by itself shows that while .such
an amendment might be regarded as offering
a remedy for hijacking in the distant future
it cannot seriously be regarded as an effec-
;tive current measure against the threat we
all know.

I am certain that no one interested in the
safety of international civil aviation would
^contend that the recent reduction in hijack-
ings and related events renders unnecessary
further new international legal measures in
this area. The history of crimes of this na-
ture should be ample proof of the fact that
major incidents in this area have a way of
materializing when lea.st expected. It would
clearly be a great tragedy if the current rela-
tive calm were to result in international com-
placency— a tragedy imperiling passengers
and crews and touching all those in govern-
ments around the world responsible for their
welfare. Having produced important new in-
ternational legal instruments in 1970 and
1971. it is high time that the international
community overcome two years' inertia and
once more pursue new legal initiatives in this
irea.

Against this background let me now turn
o concrete proposals. You are all aware that
he latest legal projects to be considered by
CAO relate to measures which might be
aken with respect to states which act con-
:rary to the principles recorded in the Tokyo

[Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, 1963],
Hague, and Montreal Conventions. For over
two years the United States and Canada
spearheaded efforts in ICAO to develop an
independent convention which would have
provided for the imposition of sanctions in
such cases. These efforts were sidetracked by
the Vienna Assembly in the summer of 1971
but were recommenced when the ICAO
Council on June 19, 1972, called for a special
subcommittee to meet on the question in
Washington. This meeting took place last
September and ultimately led to a meeting
of the full ICAO Legal Committee last Janu-
ary in Montreal. While the Legal Committee
ultimately failed to accept the strong meas-
ures which the United States and Canada
proposed, it approved for submission to a
diplomatic conference an independent con-
vention sponsored by several Nordic coun-
tries which if suitably modified could be a
useful additional weapon in the fight against
aerial crime.

The draft convention would provide for a
two-phase response to state conduct contrary
to the principles reflected in the Tokyo,
Hague, and Montreal Conventions: first,
factfinding designed to produce full dis-
closure of the situation and, subsequently,
recommendations by the states parties to the
convention designed to remedy the situation.
The U.S. Government believes strongly that
the factfinding .should be conducted by an
independent commission of experts and that
the .states parties should have broad latitude
in their recommendations. We believe that
the potential benefits of factfinding can be
seen in the investigation of the Sinai air
disaster by a team of experts impaneled by
the ICAO Council pursuant to a resolution
of the 19th ICAO Extraordinary Assembly.
The draft convention will be the subject of a
diplomatic conference meeting in Rome be-
ginning August 28, and the United States
will continue to urge that it be strengthened
and adopted as the only available new and
immediate response to the continuing threat
of hijacking and sabotage.

Most of you know that there will at the
same time be an Extraordinary Assembly

Wune 18, 1973

873

rl

of ICAO which will consider three proposed
substantive amendments to the Chicago Con-
vention, one of which has been proposed by-
France, another of which is sponsored by
the United Kingdom and Switzerland, and
the third of which has recently been spon-
sored by all three. All have been promoted
by their supporters as preferable alterna-
tives to the independent-convention proposal,
but we are not aware that any of their pro-
ponents have currently taken a position of
rigid opposition to the concept of an inde-
pendent convention. In this regard, the pro-
ponents of the amendments have in the past
indicated a general concern about the possi-
bility of actions against any state by a group
of states which might be unrepresentative of
the entire international community. What-
ever merit these concerns might have had
with regard to a mandatory-sanctions con-
vention certainly is dissipated in the case of
an independent convention limited to fact-
finding and recommendations. We doubt that
the sponsors of the proposed amendments
would seriously assert that all further legal
initiatives after the Tokyo, Hague, and Mon-
treal Conventions must carry an arbitrary
requirement of 85 ratifications in order to
be internationally acceptable. We are confi-
dent that careful study of the independent-
convention proposal will reveal to any
doubtex-s its moderate nature and will resolve
the apparent concerns which have been
mentioned.

Concerning the various proposals to amend
the Chicago Convention, the French propo-
sal would incorporate the Hague Convention
into the Chicago Convention verbatim, would
omit mention of the Montreal Convention,
and would apply article 94 (b) of the Chicago
Convention to expel from ICAO all states
failing to ratify the amendment after its en-
try into force. The U.K.-Swiss proposal would
incorporate by reference into the Chicago
Convention the substantive provisions of the
Hague and Montreal Conventions. It would
also amend article 85 (b) of the Chicago Con-
vention to require states to bar use of their
airspace by states acting contrary to the
amendment. Finally, the French-U.K. -Swiss
proposal would incorporate by reference into

the Chicago Convention the substantive pro-
visions of both Hague and Montreal but only
as and if the amendment and each of the two
conventions received the 85 ratifications rep-
resenting two-thirds of the membership of
ICAO. The three nations appear to have
agreed to permit their competing "sanctions"
proposals to remain on the table.

We believe that the practical realities of
amending the Chicago Convention make it
unlikely in the extreme that any early meas-
ure against hijacking will ever be adopted
through this procedure. This seems particu-
larly so regarding the latest French-U.K.-
Swiss proposal, which to be fully operative
would require approval of at least 85 coun-
tries four different times : approval of the
amendment by the Extraordinary Assembly,
ratification by that number of countries of
both the Hague and Montreal Conventions
themselves, and, finally, ratification of the
amendment by the same number.

I do not wish to be misunderstood as nec-
essarily rejecting the substance of the
amendment proposals. The sponsors of the
proposals, I know, sincerely condemn aircraft
hijacking and sabotage. It is conceivable that
one of the proposed amendments could, with
a certain amount of modification, be accept-
able to the United States. In that case, it is
possible that it would be deserving of sup-
port as a long-term measure which could be
of utility in this struggle, if and when it en-
ters into force some years hence. I do say,
however, that any proposal requiring ratifica-
tion by 85 states is not an effective current
answer to a very real and pressing problem.

I believe it is worthwhile to have ex-
pounded on these problems to the extent I
have because I feel there has been some con-
fusion on the subject. The tendency has been
to regard the Nordic proposal for an inde-
pendent convention, on the one hand, and the
Chicago Convention amendments proposed
by France, the United Kingdom, and Swit-
zerland, on the other hand, as competing pro-
posals. While a suitably modified Nordic
independent convention could well meet the
same needs to which the proposed Chicago
Convention amendments are addressed, the
reverse clearly is not true. If an acceptable

874

Department of State Bulletin

amendment to the Chicago Convention were
e\er to receive the necessary 85 ratifications,
an independent convention conceivably might
in time become obsolete. Unless an independ-
ent convention is adopted, however, which in
itself might provide an incentive to rati-
fication of an eventual amendment to the
Chicago Convention, there will be no new
international law measures to combat hijack-
ing and sabotage for a period of five or ten
years, if ever.

I therefore leave you today with a simple
message : Nations seriously interested in the
adoption of new international law measures
to combat aircraft hijacking and sabotage
which can be effective in less than five or ten
years must, regardless of their attitude to-
ward the proposed amendments to the Chi-
cago Convention, support the conclusion of
an independent convention at the diplomatic
conference in Rome this summer. To do
iherwise would lead to inaction and inertia
and would abdicate present responsibility in
favor of a highly uncertain future possibil-
ity. Sole reliance upon an amendment to the
Chicago Convention would clearly constitute
a prescription for procrastination.

{

President Receives Report on Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty

Statement by President Nixon '

For millions of listeners on the European
Continent, Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty are sources of reliable, comprehen-
sive information. They make available a
I broad range of news and news analysis which
\ we in the West take so much for granted that
'we sometimes forget that such information
is denied to others.
Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are

not spokesmen for American official policy —
a broadcasting job that belongs to the Voice
of America. Rather, they are highly profes-
sional media of news and news analysis,
functioning as a kind of substitute free press
for a crucial part of the world.

Today I am making public the report of
the Presidential Study Commission on Inter-
national Radio Broadcasting.- It is a
thorough and thoughtful statement concern-
ing the need to maintain and strengthen the
free flow of information among nations and
the unique role that Radio Free Europe and
Radio Liberty play in that process. It also
contains constructive and detailed recom-
mendations on ways that support for the
radio stations should be organized and fi-
nanced for the future.

I shall soon send to the Congress legisla-
tive proposals for continuing Federal finan-
cial support for the two stations.

I endorse wholeheartedly the conclusion of
the Commission that these voices of free in-
formation and ideas serve our national inter-
est and merit the full support of the Congress
and the American people. As I have said be-
fore, the free flow of information and of
ideas among nations is a vital element in
normal relations between East and West and
contributes to an enduring structure of peace.

To the Chairman of the Commission, Dr.
Milton Eisenhower, and to the other mem-
bers— Mr. Edward Ware Barrett, Ambassa-
dor John A. Gronouski, Ambassador Ed-
mund A. Gullion, and Dr. John P. Roche — I
express my deep appreciation for their
report.

'Issued on May 7 (White House press release,
Key Biscayne, Fla.).

' Copies of the 91-page report entitled "The Right
to Know: Report of the Presidential Study Com-
mission on International Radio Broadcasting" are
available from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
20402 (stock no. 4000-00289; 70 cents postpaid).

June 18, 1973

875

r

Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Development of the Law

Address by Deputy Legal Adviser George H. Aldrich^

It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to
speak to you this evening on the prospects
for development of the laws of war and to
share the platform with Hans Blix, the dis-
tinguished Legal Adviser of the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I note that the
program is entitled "Conflicting Views," and
it is likely that Hans and I shall not say en-
tirely the same things, but I think it only
fair to warn those of you who are hoping to
see a fierce combat that you are liable to be
disappointed. Although Hans and I differ in
our judgments of how far and how fast it
is possible to go in the development of the
law at this time, we share a common dedica-
tion to that development and a common con-
viction that the time has arrived for major
improvements in the law to make it a more
effective protection for the victims of war.

It is apparent that the laws of war (by
which I mean both the law protecting pris-
oners, sick and wounded, and civilians under
the control of a belligerent on the one hand
and the law governing the conduct of hostil-
ities on the other) are in large part old and
in considerable part obsolete. The Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the most recent major
international instruments in this field, cover
the protection of prisoners of war, the sick
and wounded, and civilians in occupied terri-
tory. But they reflect the experience of World
War II, and their applicability to more re-
cent types of warfare is not always easy.
Civil wars, mixed civil and international
conflicts, and guerrilla warfare in general
all raise problems under those conventions.
Moreover, all too often nations refuse to ap-

' Made before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law at Washington on Apr. 13.

ply the conventions in situations where they
clearly should be applied. Attempts to justify
such refusals are often based on differences
between the conflicts presently encountered
and those for which the conventions were
supposedly adopted. Other aspects of the laws
of war — except for the use of poison gas and
bacteriological weapons (which were the
subjects of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol)
and the protection of cultural property (the
subject of a 1954 convention) — have been
left untouched since the Hague Conventions
of 1907. The expansion of military objectives
and changes in weaponry and firepower have
increased manifold the vulnerability of non-
combatants. The law has not developed
apace.

The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) has taken the lead in reexam-
ining those laws of war specifically applica-
ble to the protection of war victims. Acting
under a mandate given by the 21st Interna-
tional Conference of the Red Cross in 1969,
the ICRC sponsored conferences of govern-
ment experts in both 1971 and 1972 to con-
sider where progress may be possible. Those
conferences, the second, and broader, of
which was attended by experts from 77 gov-
ernments including the United States, con-
sidered ways in which the international
humanitarian law applicable in armed con-
flict can be further developed. Preliminary
drafts were discussed with a view to advis-
ing the ICRC in its further drafting efforts.
The ICRC intends to produce drafts to serve
as the basis for negotiations at a diplomatic
conference to be convened by the Swiss Gov- j
ernment in Geneva in February of next year.
Probably these drafts will take the form of
two protocols to the Geneva Conventions of

876

Department of State Bulletin

1 949. one dealing with international armed
conflicts and the other with noninternational
armed conflicts.

The United States has welcomed this ini-
tiative by the ICRC and its careful prepara-
tory work. The forthcoming diplomatic con-
ference will be a major step in the process
of bringing the law up to date, and I can
assure you that we shall participate fully
and enthusiastically.

I should note that there has also been some
lielpful activity in the United Nations with
regard to human rights in armed conflict, in
articular several extensive reports by the
Secretary General and a number of resolu-
tions ajjproved by the last few General As-
semblies. While appreciative of these contri-
liutions, I believe the drafting and consulta-
tive eflForts by the ICRC and the conference
ti> be convened by the Swiss Government will
be moi-e directly productive of new interna-
tional law.

Problems in Implementation of Existing Law

Permit me to turn now to some of the de-
ficiencies in the existing law and our hopes
for improvement. Deficiencies are found in
both the substance of the existing law and
in its application and enforcement. Of the
two, the latter is, in our view, the more im-
liortant and probably the more difl^cult to
correct. If we cannot induce compliance with
the broadly accepted Geneva Conventions
of 1949, it will be of little value to have new
conventions for states to disregard at will.

Naturally, the example of most recent and
direct concern to those of us in the U.S.
< lovernment is that of Viet-Nam. By mid-
1965 it had become apparent to the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross that the
conflict in Viet-Nam had become an "inter-
national armed conflict" requiring application
of the Geneva Conventions in their entirety.
The committee so informed the parties to the
conflict. The United States and the Republic
of Viet-Nam agreed and stated that they
would apply the conventions. The Demo-
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the Na-
tional Liberation Front, on the other hand,
responded negatively and have refused on

various grounds to apply the conventions.

North Viet-Nam denied the applicability
of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention
on the ground that our men were "war crim-
inals" who were not entitled to benefit from
the protection of the convention. In support
of that contention, North Viet-Nam referred
to its reservation to article 85 of the con-
vention (which parallels that of other Com-
munist governments) exempting convicted
war criminals from its protection. That ar-
gument is specious for several reasons —
most fundamentally because to deny the pro-
tection of the convention to all captured
military personnel on the basis of a unilat-
eral assertion that they are all war criminals
is to make a mockery of both the convention
and the customary law upon which it rests.
Beyond that, the reservation was distorted
by North Viet-Nam to make it applicable
even before trial and conviction.

The ICRC stated, first privately to Hanoi
and finally publicly, that this position was
unacceptable. This could not have surprised
the North Vietnamese leaders, as they must
have known that the argument had no merit.
It is obvious that for various reasons they
decided in 1965 to isolate and mistreat the
prisoners they were taking, to prohibit or se-
verely restrict their contact with the exterior,
and to refuse to acknowledge which men
were prisoners. Since the Geneva Convention
inconveniently proscribed each of these
measures, some excuse had to be found to
ignore it. Although their excuse was untena-
ble, neither the convention nor general in-
ternational law has provided any effective
remedy for this flagrant disregard of inter-
national obligations, and our persistent ef-
forts to bring about some type of impartial
inspection of detention conditions continued
to be rebuffed.

However much our preoccupation with it,
Viet-Nam is not the only example of inade-
quate compliance with the law. The conflict
in the Middle East has also produced some
more limited refusals to apply the Geneva
Conventions. In 1967, at the time of the six-
day war, arrangements were made quickly,
with assistance fi'om the ICRC, for the re-
lease and repatriation of prisoners of war.

June 18, 1973

877

However, in subsequent years there have
been instances in which Egypt has refused
to return several seriously sick or wounded
Israeli pilots. Israel, as occupant of the ter-
ritory seized during the fighting in 1967, is
bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention —
that for the protection of civilians — but Is-
rael refuses to apply the convention. Israel
maintains that it treats the inhabitants of
the occupied areas better than the convention
requires, and that may well be in many re-
spects, but there are a number of Israeli
actions that seem inconsistent with the con-
vention. For example, the convention forbids
collective punishments; yet private homes
have been destroyed without the require-
ments of proof or a trial when the owners
are suspected of having knowledge of Arab
terrorists and not reporting that knowledge.
Also, despite the prohibition in the conven-
tion on the forced relocation of persons, there
have been cases in which Arab residents
were deported, rather than fined or impris-
oned, for criminal offenses. Again, judicial
safeguards are often unavailable.

Other examples can be cited. I would note
that Pakistan in Bangladesh and the United
Kingdom in Northern Ireland have refused
to acknowledge the applicability of article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions
concerning noninternational armed conflicts.
India and Bangladesh, while acknowledging
applicability of the Prisoner of War Con-
vention to Pakistani prisoners, have thus
far refused to repatriate them until Pakistan
recognizes Bangladesh.

One very clear lesson from these experi-
ences, particularly from Viet-Nam, is that
the conventions provide inadequate mecha-
nisms to establish and carry out independent
observation of performance. The conventions
assume the establishment of protecting pow-
ers; they do not explicitly require the ap-
pointment of either a protecting power or
a substitute for a protecting power. The
ICRC, whose traditional humanitarian func-
tions are recognized by the conventions, is
given no treaty right to operate on the terri-
tory of a party unless that party decides to
authorize it in a specific case.

As we made clear in the recent confer-

ences of government experts in Geneva, we
believe first priority must be given to im-
proving the application and enforcement of
the existing law. The United States pre-
sented certain proposals to the conference to
establish procedures for the appointment of
a protecting power and to commit states to
accept the ICRC as a substitute therefor in
the absence of a protecting power. We intend
to pursue this question at the diplomatic
conference. Our basic aim, of course, is to
make it more likely that there will in fact
be some external observation of compliance.
We recognize there can be no guarantee that
a nation will not flout its international obli-
gations, but the law should be so framed as
to increase the costs of such conduct and
thereby make it less likely.

Turning now from the implementation of
the existing law to its substantive inade-
quacies, there are three which I would like
to discuss this evening. Many others could be
added, and they are important, but time does
not permit. Present law seems clearly inade-
quate to (1) prevent unnecessary sufi'ering
in civil wars or mixed international and non-
international conflicts, (2) deal realistically
with the treatment of guerrillas, and (3) pro-
tect the civilian population from combat
operations.

Noninternational Armed Conflicts

It is not really surprising that interna-
tional law, which is principally concerned
with the relations between nations, should
deal very gingerly with civil wars, for I
think we can all agree that the international
protection of human rights has developed
only slowly and within a very limited scope.
International humanitarian law, as it applies
to civil wars, is found in a single article
common to all four Geneva Conventions.
That article, article 3, establishes certain
minimum humanitarian standards which are
applicable to government and rebels alike.
It provides for humane treatment of non-
combatants including prisoners and the sick
and wounded and forbids murder, torture,
the taking of hostages, humiliating and de-
grading treatment, and the passing of sen-

878

Department of State Bulletin

lences without benefit of fair judicial process.
Although limited in scope and precision,
that article, if consistently applied in practice,
would go far to reduce the suffering caused
by civil wars. Perhaps its most significant
omission is any requirement for independent
external observation of compliance.

Any effort to expand these protections
must take into account the very real difficul-
ties. In the first place there is a general
concern of governments that the acceptance
of international standards for a civil war
connotes international recognition of the in-
surgents. This concern results from the his-
torical development of the law ; in customary
law the international laws of war become
applicable to a civil war upon international
recognition of the rebels as belligerents. This
concern persists despite an explicit provision
in common article 3 that its application shall
not affect the legal status of the parties to
the conflict. Personally, I deplore the fact
that this concern so often effectively pre-
vents ofl^cial admission that an internal
armed conflict is one to which article 3 ap-
plies, but we cannot ignore that political
reality. Governments will predictably remain
unwilling to do anything that could enhance
the perceived status of rebels or give any
appearance of legitimacy to their actions.

Despite these difficulties, there are a num-
ber of important advances in the law that
should be attainable, and it would be inex-
cusable if we made less than a maximum
effort to achieve them. For example, it should
be possible to add considerably to the specific
requirements for humane treatment con-
!1 tained in common article 3 by referring to
1 1! the types of outrages that have become all
too common, particularly the taking of
hostages, terroristic violence, and cruel treat-
ment of all sorts. Moreover, special protec-
tions should be accorded women and children,
medical units and pei-sonnel, and all per-
.sons captured or detained. It should be

t possible to prohibit attacks on noncombat-
■ ants and on the civilian population as such
and also certain types of forced movements
of civilians. I hope that it may prove feasi-
ble to include meaningful obligations to per-
mit the passage of food and relief supplies

for noncombatants. Perhaps the most im-
portant improvement that could be made
would be a clear statement that the protocol
on noninternational armed conflicts comes
into force at such a low level of conflict as
to make it more difficult than at present to
deny its applicability.

Treatment of Guerrillas

With respect to the treatment of guerrillas
— combatants who are not members of regu-
lar armed forces — the experience of the
Second World War resulted in a provision
in article 4 of the Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention which accords to certain guerril-
las involved in international conflicts the
right to be treated as prisoners of war.
Previously, as unprivileged belligerents,
guerrillas enjoyed no protected status and
could legally be executed. However, this
entitlement to POW treatment in the con-
vention is limited to guerrilla groups which
meet the following five criteria: (1) they
belong to a party to the conflict; (2) they
are commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates; (3) they have a fixed sign
recognizable at a distance; (4) they carry
arms openly; and (5) they conduct their
operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war. When viewed in the light
of guerrilla war as we have known it in
recent years, some of these criteria seem
a bit quaint. In Viet-Nam, for example,
thousands of the Viet Cong troops had no
fixed sign, did not carry arms openly, and
frequently did not abide by the laws of war.
Nevertheless, except for terrorists, spies, and
saboteurs, the United States and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet-Nam have
treated them as prisoners of war. We took
the position that any member of the North
Vietnamese armed forces and any member
of a main-force Viet Cong unit should be
treated as a POW. In addition, we treated
other guerrillas as POW's whenever they
were captured with weapons in battle.

If our experience in Viet-Nam could be
applied generally, it would be a relatively
simple matter to liberalize the strict stand-
ards of the convention. However, it is not

June 18, 1973

879

yet clear that it can be easily applied to
different situations. Much depends on the
circumstances of each conflict. In the Middle
East, for example, a serious problem has
been the independence of guerrilla groups
that are often not subject to control by any
government. What means are there to induce
groups such as these to abstain from the use
of terrorism against civilians, which they
may see as their only effective weapon? And
if they will not abstain, government forces
that take them into custody can scarcely be
expected to regard them as prisoners of war.
On the other hand, we should not overlook
the possibility that, within limits, the pros-
pect of POW treatment can be used as an
incentive. In other words, guerrilla groups
might be induced to conduct their operations
in accordance with law if they knew that
doing so would result in their being treated
as POW's if captured and provided that
doing so would not make it impossible for
them to fight effectively. I think it likely,
for example, that states may be able to
agree to drop the requirement of having a
fixed sign recognizable at a distance and to
limit the requirement of carrying arms
openly to such times as the guerrillas are
engaged in their military operations. This
subject is full of difficulties, but a workable
compromise should not be beyond our reach.

Protection of the Civilian Population

Issues of a totally different — and I fear
much more formidable — sort are presented
by our efforts to develop law that will give
meaningful protection to civilians. The his-
tory of the 20th century should quickly dispel
any notion that the rise of humanitarianism
and the protection of human rights, which
have strongly influenced modern develop-
ments in international law, are effective
pressures for the protection of noncombat-
ants from the effects of war. What we have
seen is all too clearly a general acceptance
of the view that modern war is aimed not
merely at the enemy's military forces but
at the enemy's willingness and ability to
pursue its war aims. Thus, in the Second
World War the enemy's will to fight and his

capacity to produce weapons were primary
targets ; and saturation bombing, blockade
of food supplies, and indiscriminate terror
weapons such as the German V-bombs were
all brought to bear on those targets. In
Viet-Nam political, rather than military,
objectives were even more dominant. Both
sides had as their goal not the destruction
of the other's military forces but the destruc-
tion of the will to continue the struggle. To
that end the United States bombed and
mined ports, rivers, and other lines of com-
munication without invading North Viet-
Nam, and our enemies launched rockets
against cities, assassinated government of-
ficials and other influential civilians, and
tortured prisoners to obtain propaganda
statements, without any hope of destroying
American military strength.

Given the nature and goals of contempo-
rary warfare, quick and easy answers will
not solve the problem of protecting civilians
— at least not in the context of a negotiation
on the laws of war. One could imagine pro-
hibiting attacks on urban areas except by
weapons so controlled and so discriminate
that only military installations would be
damaged. I believe we would all agree that
this would be an excellent rule, but we have
to accept the fact that it would fundamen-
tally change the nature of modern conven-
tional war and would preclude nuclear war
almost completely. This is why we cannot
seriously expect such dramatic results from
the 1974 diplomatic conference. Proposals
along these lines are, in reality, proposals
for revolutionary change which would re-
quire a fundamental reordering of national
security planning. However desirable they
may be, I submit that they demand more
than the lawyers and diplomats who attend
the conference to supplement the Geneva
Conventions can be expected to produce, and
we must see them as longer range objectives.

I do not want to suggest that additional
protections for civilians are not essential
results of the 1974 conference. On the con-
trary, I believe significant and worthwhile
improvements in civilian protection can be
achieved if we concentrate on proposals that
are more limited. For example, I believe

880

Department of State Bulletin

we can and should devise rules to promote
care by armed forces in avoiding unneces-
sary injury to civilians and damage to civil-
ian i)roperty and to make safety zones a
workable concept in the real world. While
1 believe it unrealistic to prohibit all attacks
on hydroelectric dams and power stations as
some have suggested, we should try to clarify
the rule of proportionality and particularly
its applicability to such situations. We need
rules as concrete as possible so as to be
conducive to application by the troops in
the field as well as by governments in their
national security planning.

One example of a specific rule that may
be feasible is one prohibiting the use of
starvation as a weapon of war. This is, of
course, one of the oldest weapons, and it
tends to be one of the least discriminate
since civilians are more likely to go hungry
than are soldiers. The generally accepted
rule today is that crops and food supplies
may be destroyed if they are intended solely
for the use of armed forces or if their
destruction is required by military necessity
and is not disproportionate to the military
advantage gained. As you know, in Indo-
china we tried a limited program of crop
destruction in isolated areas where the evi-
dence was strong that the crops were in-
tended for enemy troops. Although this
program was legal, President Nixon ended
it several yeai's ago, and I believe that we
should give serious consideration to agreeing
to prohil)it deliberate crop destruction in the
future. I would hope that new rules can also
be developed to reduce or eliminate the possi-
bility that starvation will result from block-
ade, perhaps by requiring the passage of
food supplies provided only that distribution
is made solely to civilians and is supervised

'by the ICRC or some other appropriate ex-
ternal body.
With respect to prohibitions of specific

I weapons on the ground that they cause un-
necessary suffering or are inherently indis-
criminate, I believe most efforts in this
direction are misconceived. Virtually any
weapon can be used indiscriminately, and
even weapons of mass destruction can be

I used discriminately in certain circumstances.

It is obviously much more diflncult to avoid
indiscriminate use within a populated city
than in a desert or at sea. Whether the
suffering a weapon causes is "unnecessary"
in the sense required to make it unlawful
requires a balancing of this suffering against
the military necessity for its use. Thus,
napalm, which certainly causes terrible suf-
fering, is generally viewed as lawful, l)ecause
it is uniquely effective for certain military
purposes, particularly against underground
fortifications and against armor. Perhaps
the development of laser-guided weapons or
other new weapons will reduce the necessity
for napalm to the point where it can be pro-
hibited, but it seems doubtful that we have
yet reached that point.

International law can and should compel
governments to refrain from developing
w^eapons that cause unnecessary suffering
and to renounce the use of such weapons.
It does not follow, however, that negotiating
through general international conferences is
a satisfactory way of doing this. States which,
for whatever reason, do not possess or use cei'-
tain weapons will doubtless be more willing
to prohibit them than states that rely on
them. Similarly, states which rely more on
massed manpower for military strength than
on firepower and mobility would be likely to
see security advantages in prohibiting many
weapons. There should be little wonder that
many governments — and particularly those
of the technologically most advanced states
— hesitate to submit questions of importance
to their national security to such procedures.
I suggest that there will probably be greater
prospect of success in efforts to devise pro-
cedural rules that require governments to
justify thoroughly and carefully the legality
of weapons they develop and retain than in
attempting to negotiate an agreed list of
prohibited weapons. I am afraid that either
any such list, or the parties to it, or both,
would be embarrassingly brief.

In this, as in any survey of the laws of
war, the deficiencies are writ large for all
to see. Given the stakes, progress is impera-
tive. An attitude of mere openmindedness
and detachment will not sufl^ce. There must
be added a sense of commitment to the goal

June 18, 1973

881

of reducing by means of law the human
suffering that always accompanies resort to
armed force. The United States has that
sense of commitment. If anything, it has been
sharpened by our grim experience with
guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency in
Indochina. In cooperation with others who
share that commitment, we shall do our best
to forge a better law and promote respect
for human values. That is a worthy task,
and one for which I believe the time is right.

Prayer for Peace — Memorial Day,
May 28, 1973

A PROCLAMATION'

This day of memorial to those who have given
their lives to preserve America's freedom over the
centuries has special meaning for us in 1973. The
longest and most difficult war in our history is over.
The brave men who served so well in that conflict ai'e
home again; our valiant prisoners are free at last
and I'eunited with their loved ones — all made possible
by the firm resolve of the American people. Thus
our prayers for peace this day are also prayers of
thanksgiving.

Through our history we have seen despotisms and
ideologies come and declare themselves the wave of
the future, crushing freedom under foot — but each
has passed, and freedom, sure as spring, has pushed
up through the ruins again to reaffirm the essential
dignity of man.

Americans have been on the side of that dignity
in every war we have fought. Today, freedom sur-
vives in South Vietnam, and generations hence, the
literature of liberty will tell that America demon-
strated fully and finally its great commitment to its
founding principles by fighting on behalf of just
eighteen million people half a world away — and by
achieving at last what we fought for.

Those who stood at Hue and Khe Sanh were the
spiritual descendants of the heroes of Chosin, Bas-
togne, Gettysburg, and Lexington. The patriotic line
continues unbroken. America called, and the answer
came back yes.

Now those soldiers and sailors and airmen who
have kept freedom's faith look to America — not for

-

ji

N

'No. 4218; 38 Fed. Reg. 14151.

thanks, but to know if we have marked their deeds
and if, in the way we live our freedom, we are de-
termined to be worthy of those deeds.

Only by working to make war obsolete in the
future can we truly redeem the sacrifices of patriots
who fell in the wars of the past. The tensions which
still exist among nations will yield to negotiation if
we are steadfast in our purpose and patient in our
endeavor. New relationships are already taking
shape, pointing to the creation of a more stable
and open world, a world in which hatred and dis-
crimination are replaced by brotherhood and under- j
standing — above all, a world free forever of feari
and want and war. I

This is the dream for which generations of Amer- 1
ican fighting men have made the ultimate sacrifice, i
from the bridge at Concord to the jungles of Viet-
nam. It can be achieved. Their sacrifices havej
moved us ever closer to it. I

The Congress, by a joint resolution approved May,
11, 1950, has requested the President to issue a
proclamation calling upon the people of the United j
States to observe each Memorial Day as a day of|
prayer for permanent peace. |

Now, THEREFORE, I, RiCHARD NixoN, President of!
the United States of America, do hereby designate: j
Memorial Day, Monday, May 28, 1973, as a day of |
prayer for permanent peace, and I designate thej I
hour beginning in each locality at 11 o'clock in thej
morning of that day as a time to unite in prayer. j

I urge the press, radio, television, and all otherj
information media to cooperate in this observance.|

As a special mark of respect for those Americansi
who have given their lives in the war in Vietnam,,
I direct that the flag of the United States be fiown'
at half-staff all day on Memorial Day on all build-'
ings, grounds, and naval vessels of the Federal Gov-,
ernment throughout the United States and all areas!
under its jurisdiction and control. ■

I also request the Governors of the United StateEJ
and of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the I "
appropriate officials of all local units of governmenii i4
to direct that the flag be flown at half-staff on all| la;
public buildings during that entire day, and request ■>}
the people of the United States to display the flag' ; ,
at half-staff from their homes for the same period, j

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my ■■''
hand this twenty-fifth day of May, in the year oi -It
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of th(' [j
Independence of the United States of America th< ?:j
one hundred ninety-seventh. i ,,,.

(^/ZjL^ ^"K:,^

p!

St

a

Re

882

Department of State Bulletii

I'

THE CONGRESS

Priorities in the Development Assistance Program

Statement by John A. Hannah

Administrator, Agency for Inte)'national Development^

I welcome this opportunity to appear be-
fore this committee to discuss the programs
of the Agency for International Development
and to answer your questions.

The two-year authorization we are re-
questing for development assistance will en-
able us to move forward effectively with the
new directions AID has been pursuing for
the past 15 months.

I will cover the entire AID program this
morning, leaving the specifics of particular
programs and geographic areas to those who
will appear before you over the next several
days to go into the specific details.

Since we last discussed these matters, im-
portant progress has been made toward our
fundamental goal of a durable structure of
ace. A settlement of the Viet-Nam conflict
i>! been negotiated, and American troops
:ive returned home. Relations have turned
from confrontation to negotiation as our
iitacts with the U.S.S.R. and the People's
•public of China have entered a new, less
■rile phase. Steps are underway to reduce
>■ threat of nuclear war. Association with
. aditional allies and trading partners is be-
ing reinvigorated.

Encouraging as these developments with

the indu.strialized nations are, they do not

obscure the condition or importance of the

or nations. The developing countries —

I

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign
'Tair.s on May 17. The complete transcript of the

arinps will he published by the committee and will
available from the Superintendent of Documents,

S. Government Printing- Office, Washington, D.C.
.|'102.

often referred to as the LDC's [less devel-
oped countries] — occupy two-thirds of the
earth's land area and control vast amounts
of its natural resources. They contain 74
percent of the world's total population.

Some of the developing countries have
made significant economic progress in recent
years. These gains have been unevenly real-
ized and too often overwhelmed by unchecked
population growth. The enormous gap be-
tween small groups of citizens who have
benefited from modernization and the much
larger groups who remain trapped in condi-
tions of severe deprivation continues to
grow. Serious social and political problems
result. Mass unemployment faces the flood
of young workers entering the job markets.
Up to two-thirds of the people in some of the
developing countries suff'er from malnutri-
tion. For one-half of all mankind there is no
health care. Unless further substantial and
more equally distributed progress takes
place — through efforts by developed and de-
veloping nations alike — such grinding depri-
vation in the lives of hundreds of millions
will continue.

This situation appeals to American sympa-
thies. But it is more than a moral dilemma.
It is an increasingly dominant factor in
determining the kind of world in which we
and our children will live. Peace cannot be
sustained in conditions of social upheaval or
a growing confrontation between rich and
poor.

Equally important from the perspective of
our own interests, the United States and the

June 18, 1973

883

other industrial countries are linked to the
developing countries by considerations of
trade, investment, and critical resource
needs. We share with them a common inter-
est in an open international economic system
in vi^hich all nations benefit from an in-
creased flow of goods and services.

With 6 percent of the world's population,
the United States consumes nearly 40 per-
cent of the world's annual output of raw
materials and energy. Increasingly, we de-
pend on other countries for these supplies.
U.S. imports of energy fuels and minerals
are expected to increase from $8 billion in
1970 to more than $31 billion by 1985. By
then, half or more of our petroleum imports
may need to come from a dozen traditionally
underdeveloped countries. The known re-
serves of many minerals are largely located
in the developing countries. A comprehen-
sive study of U.S. mineral use and resources
released by the U.S. Geological Survey last
week sets forth in sobering terms the impli-
cations for the U.S. economy of any failure
to continue to obtain adequate raw materials.

On the other side of the trade ledger, the
developing countries are becoming increas-
ingly important as markets for U.S. goods.
In 1970, they accounted for 30 percent of all
U.S. exports. The investments of U.S. cor-
porations in the developing countries pres-
ently total some $30 billion and are growing
at about 10 percent a year.

The solution of such world problems as
environmental pollution, narcotics control,
and security of travel requires broad inter-
national cooperation with the developing
countries. The development of a satisfactory
international monetary system requires the
pai'ticipation of the developing countries.

For all of these economic, political, and
moral reasons, a sustained U.S. response to
the challenge of underdevelopment is as much
in our interest as it is in that of the devel-
oping nations.

Bilateral Development Assistance

The United States has a variety of means —
within the general categories of aid, trade,
and investment — by which it can express na-

tional purpose and policies in international
economic development. The instrument which
is most responsive to national guidance is
bilateral aid.

We have carefully redesigned the bilateral
aid program to focus on applying the scien-
tific and technological resources of this coun-
try to a few of the major human problems
which are common to the developing coun-
tries.

The program emphasizes greater use of
the U.S. private sector, coordination with
other donors, a collaborative style which
recognizes the responsibility of the develop-
ing countries for their own development, and
a smaller AID staff" organized for more ef-
fective performance.

The new AID program is people-oriented.
We believe that the fundamental purpose of
all AID projects and programs must be to
help the governments and peoples of the de-
veloping countries move in the direction of
providing lives of better quality for all of
their people.

aid's priorities for the next two years
and beyond are:

Specific problems common to the LDC's
— Food production and human nutrition
— Population growth and health
— Education and human resource develop-
ment

Indochina reconstruction

Development assistance for selected coun-
tries of major U.S. interest in Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, and Asia

Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

Food and Nutrition: At present population
growth rates, the food production of the
world will have to double by the end of this
century just to maintain current inadequate
levels of diet, and increase by 2Vo times to
provide adequate diets. Since there is little
arable land not already in use, this increase
must be achieved by breakthroughs in agri-
cultural productivity and technology.

Providing adequate food is the first step \
toward meeting the needs of people and for
energizing the whole pi'ocess of development.

Our food production and nutrition pro-

884

Department of State Bulletin

!

jjranis emphasize the application of the
United States unparalleled scientific and
technological resources in agriculture to the
particular problems of agricultural produc-
tion and nutrition in the poor countries. The
program — undertaken in collaboration with
U.S. and international institutions — includes
assistance to help countries train agricultural
technicians, build irrigation systems and fer-
tilizer factories, develop effective marketing
and extension services, develop agro-indus-
tries and other institutions needed to support
effective agricultural iiroduction, marketing,
and distribution.

We propose $299.6 million for food pro-
duction, nutrition, and rural development in
FY 1974. In addition, $1,028 million of Food
for Peace commodities will be provided under
P.L. 480 in FY 1974. This includes $830
million of title I sales and $198 million in
title II grants to improve nutrition and pro-
mote development through Food for Work
projects.

Our agriculture development and P.L. 480
programs not only reduce poverty in develop-
ing countries and close the world food gap;
they also increase U.S. exports and improve
the U.S. economy. U.S. agricultural exports
to the developing countries have increased
sharply since 1955, while concessional sales
have dropped since their 1965 peak. Time
and again we have found that as countries
develop they become better commercial
customers.

Family Plaruiiyig and Health: The develop-
ing countries account for about 85 percent
of the annual world population growth. Fam-
ily size in the developing countries now
averages about six children per family. At
this fertility level, world population will
grow from today's 3.7 billion to about 6.8
billion by the end of this century. If it con-
tinues at this rate thereafter, total world
population could reach 10 to 12 billion peo-
ple in the next 50 years.

The population boom is perhaps the most
intractable problem facing the developing
countries today. Curbing it is only partly a
matter of increasing the availability of con-
traceptives and family planning information.

High birth rates are inextricably linked to
the problem of health and the problem of
poverty generally. Low income and poor
health do not act as incentives to limit fam-
ilies. This is particularly true where the only
security for old age is the hope of having
two sons to share the responsibility for car-
ing foi- the aged parents.

Half of all the deaths in the developing
world are accounted for by children under
the age of five. The population progi'am must
be concerned with the health and welfare
of the whole family — children and parents
and particularly the mothers.

Some 50 developing countries have family
planning programs, and there has been a
rapid worldwide spread of population activ-
ities in the past decade. The United States,
through its aid programs, will continue to
give high priority to cooperating with other
nations to curb the massive, unmanageable
increases in world population which are now
before us.

We propose $152.8 million for population
and health in FY 1974. $74.6 million is to
help developing countries extend family
lilanning and health services to rural and
urban couples. Family planning services now
are available to less than 15 percent of all of
the people in the developing countries. We
propose $11.2 million for research into better
contraceptives and finding out more about
what motivates families in poor countries to
accept family planning. Funds are included
for programs to develop low-cost health care
systems and combined family planning and
health jirograms. Contributions are proposed
for the U.N. Fund for Population Activities,
the Planned Parenthood Federation, and
other international organizations.

Erhicatiov and Human Resource Develop-
ment: Although developing countries have
doubled and tripled the size of their school
systems in the past 1 0 yeai's, there are more
children out of school than there were 10
years ago. There are no schools at all for
more than 300 million of their children. The
developing countries cannot afford to copy
the high-cost school systems of the West.
They require new low-cost systems within

June 18, 1973

885

their ability to pay for if they are to roll
back the tide of illiteracy.

aid's education program is concentrating
on helping to develop such new means of low-
cost education. It emphasizes training for the
management skills needed to deal with the
basic problems of development.

We continue to provide training oppor-
tunities in this country for advanced train-
ing and practical experience for technicians
in many areas of development and govern-
ment service.

The AID participant training program has
helped to identify and finance the training of
technicians and administrators who are today
the backbone of trained personnel in most of
the LDC's. More than 160,000 of these former
trainees are now working in their own coun-
tries. Among them are cabinet ministers,
members of the legislative bodies, university
presidents, and deans and faculty members,
rural health officers, agriculture technicians,
engineers, teachers, government officials, and
all the rest.

We propose $113.8 million for education
and human resource development in FY
1974.

Application of New Technology: In concen-
trating on these priority development prob-
lems, we are moving beyond the traditional
concept of transferring existing technology
and resources from rich to poor countries.
We are seeking to link educational and tech-
nological institutions in the less developed
world with developed country institutions in
a common, systematic problem-solving effort.
This approach is already beginning to pay
dividends.

— AID-financed researchers at the Univer-
sity of Nebraska, working with local re-
search stations in 27 countries, have more
than doubled the protein values of wheat
and obtained new scientific understanding of
the physiological process by which plants
make protein. This brings us closer to the
day when we will be able to reduce worldwide
malnutrition by building protein-rich plants
"by prescription" to meet human needs.

— AID and Rockefeller Foundation-fi-
nanced researchers at the University of Illi-
nois are in the final stages of developing
a biodegradable DDT, a development which,
when completed, will have major ecological
benefits for both rich and poor countries.

— AID is supporting promising research
to develop a malaria vaccine which, if suc-
cessful, will be the first vaccine ever for a
blood parasite disease and could represent
a breakthrough of major importance for
control of malaria and similar diseases
worldwide.

These advances underline the truism that
joint work on the human problems of devel-
oping countries can benefit the citizens of
all nations.

The redesigned AID program moves be-
yond the traditional approach of concentrat-
ing on rapid GNP growth under the assump-
tion that the benefits of growth will trickle
down to all people. Up to 40 percent of the
total population in all the developing coun-
tries are trapped in conditions of poverty
beyond the reach of market forces and with-
out minimal levels of food, health services,
and literacy. Rapid aggregate economic
growth is still the prime requisite of develop-
ment, but our development program seeks
to find means of achieving rapid economic
growth which will also provide improve-
ments in employment opportunities.

Indochina Reconstruction

A successful transition from war to peace
in Indochina requires more than the cease-
fire agreement.

Special attention is being given to recon-
struction assistance for Viet-Nam, Laos, and
Cambodia, in an international context de-
signed to maximize contributions from other
countries and reinforce the peace.

It also requires a major reconstruction and
development effort to overcome the effects
of the war. In our proposals for economic
a.ssistance in FY 1974 we have requested $632
million for reconstruction, rehabilitation,
and humanitarian programs in Indochina for

886

Department of State Bulletin

the three nations — South Viet-Nam, Cam-
bodia, and Laos. At thi.s time there is no re-
quest for aid to North Viet-Nam.

The reconstruction programs which we
have proposed are in four categories. First
priority is humanitarian programs, primarily
involving refugees. There are large costs in-
herent in the resettlement process, whether
it be for new settlement or return to old
homes, as well as the maintenance of those
refugees who cannot yet be resettled. Much
of this effort is in South Viet-Nam, but it in-
cludes Laos and Cambodia.

A second major component is the recon-
struction of facilities physically damaged
during the war, including transportation
systems, communications, and irrigation
structures.

A necessary condition for peaceful recon-
struction is the maintenance of economic sta-
bility in each of the nations concerned. In
the first instance this requires coherent eco-
nomic, fiscal, and monetary policies on the
part of the individual nation, but it also re-
quires a continuing flow of external re-
sources. In the case of South Viet-Nam, the
foreign exchange problems of the nation are
at the moment overwhelming, inasmuch as
export levels have been at extraordinarily
low levels because of the war. Now, with the
departure of U.S. troops, South Viet-Nam's
earnings from troop and related expendi-
tures have been reduced to a low level. Con-
sequently the need for import financing will
continue at high levels for at least the next
tsvo years.

Finally, longer term economic development
is essential if these countries are to achieve
eventual economic self-sufficiency. In South
Viet-Nam the primary effort will be to in-
sure that the private sector receives the cap-
ital financing necessary to move ahead
rapidly with new investment. Beyond this,
we are working closely with the South Viet-
namese in the design of new peacetime de-
velopment institutions and the improving of
existing ones in the agricultural, industrial,
and educational sectors.

The economic aid budget for part V of this
bill was prepared before the cease-fire, and
we have not yet completed our reexamination
of these requirements. It is possible that ad-
ditional resources will be necessary to sup-
port the reconstruction program in South
Viet-Nam. When these studies are completed
and the President has had an opportunity to
consider the conclusions thereof together
with the budgetary consequences, there may
well be a supplementary request. We are now
seeking only that level of funding proposed
in the original budget presentation.

The international lending organizations
and all other donors ai"e being encouraged to
participate fully in the financing of Indo-
china's reconstruction. The World Bank,
working with the Asian Development Bank,
has started its exploratory efforts with other
donors on the establishment of a consultative
group to deal with the complex problems
of reconstruction, and we are working very
closely with them in this undertaking.

Aid for Selected Countries and Programs

Transportation, Power, and Urban Devel-
opment: In addition to loans and technical
assistance in the priority sectors of food,
population, and education, we propose $177.6
million in FY 1974 for transportation,
power, and urban development. $103.7 mil-
lion will be for development infrastructure,
which is a prerequisite to further develop-
ment in many countries. For illustrative pur-
poses, these include such projects as assisting
the Government of Mali in a multidonor pro-
gram to improve trunk roads and participat-
ing with other donors in assisting Indonesia
build modern power and road systems. We
also propose $50.5 million for urban develop-
ment, primarily in Latin America.

General Economic Loans: AID proposes
loans for general economic growth in five
key developing countries in FY 1974: Indo-
nesia, Pakistan, India, Ghana, and Sudan.

These loans are undertaken to alleviate
shortages of foreign exchange, which have
been identified as key impediments to growth

June 18, 1973

887

in these countries. The loans stimulate de-
velopment by providing needed imports of
industrial equipment, raw materials, and
agricultural inputs from the United States.
They are generally undertaken as part of a
consortium of donors led by the World Bank.
They encourage and are conditioned on sub-
stantial self-help measures by the recipients.
We propose $185 million for this purpose in
FY 1974.

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

Humanitarian Assistance: Among the steps
we have taken to focus our assistance pro-
grams more effectively on the basic needs of
people is the creation of a new Bureau for
Population and Humanitarian Assistance.
In addition to its work in population, this
Bureau is in charge of AID's expanding rela-
tionships with U.S. private voluntary agen-
cies and AID'S disaster relief program.

The energy of private and voluntary
groups is a familiar and creative resource in
many aspects of our life. Perhaps more than
any other of our national institutions, they
represent the individual conscience and the
special concerns of the citizens in our open
society. Some 800 voluntary agencies have
programs related to the needs of people in
the poor countries. About 80 of these, of-
ficially registered with AID, raised nearly
half a billion dollars in private contributions
of cash and supplies in 1972 to support their
own programs overseas.

AID is encouraging further involvement
of these private groups in bettering the lives
of people of the poor countries. Many of the
voluntary agencies are complementing their
normal child feeding and welfare programs
with development programs. In addition to
the traditional voluntary groups, a number
of other private and nonprofit groups with
special technical skills Kave begun overseas
development programs in recent years. AID
is supporting this effort with grants and is
seeking ways in which private agencies can
participate in AID-financed development
programs abroad. In FY 1974, we propose
$33.4 million in assistance to U.S. and inter-
national private groups.

Disaster Relief: AID continues to provide
relief and reconstruction to areas torn by
manmade or natural disasters: typhoons,
earthquakes, floods, famines, and civil dis-
turbances. As population grows, people are
moving into ever more marginal areas — low-
lands, dry lands, mountain regions — land in-
creasingly susceptible to drought and flood
and earthquake. This has made the probabil-
ity of major disasters greater today than in
the past.

In the last two years, AID has responded
to mammoth disasters in Bangladesh, the
Philippines, and Nicaragua, plus 47 smaller
disasters in 39 other countries. U.S. disaster
relief administered by AID during this pe-
riod has totaled more than $483 million (in-
cluding food aid) in disasters affecting some
52 million people. Funding for AID's dis-
aster relief is handled initially under the
contingency fund, for which we are request-
ing $30 million in FY 1974. If there are
large-scale disasters needing sustained relief
and rehabilitation assistance in FY 1974, we
will need to request additional funding from
the Congress. The legislation before you re-
quests permanent authorization for appro-
priations for disaster relief assistance in
case of extraordinary disasters of large
magnitude.

Immediate relief is only the first step in
AID'S response to disaster. It is followed
usually by rehabilitation and longer term
reconstruction assistance. Further, a disaster
may set back development efforts underway,
requiring reprograming of all aspects of eco-
nomic development. Disasters may alterna-
tively open possibilities for expediting
development because of the need to establish
new or strengthened planning and adminis-
trative mechanisms and to increase attention
to human and economic priorities. AID or-
ganization and procedures are designed for
maximum operational coordination of all
these aspects.

A coordinated U.S. response is enhanced
by the management of all these phases by a
single agency.

Least Developed Coxmtries: At the 1972
UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on

888

Department of State Bulletin

Trade and Development] meetings in San-
tiajro, all multinational and bilateral aid
donors agreed to increase their emphasis on
assistance to the world's poorest 25 coun-
tries. These are the countries whose income
and natural endowments are so low that
very little of the basic prerequisites for
growth exist. These countries contain 150
million people — about 10 percent of the total
population of the developing countries (ex-
cluding People's Republic of China).

AID has pledged its support for this spe-
cial effort. Initially, we are concentrating on
least developed countries which have long es-
tablished AID programs, such as Afghani-
stan, Nepal. Haiti, Tanzania, Lesotho, Bot-
swana, and Ethiopia. The special measures
for these countries include more liberal use
of grant funding, simplified contracting pro-
cedures, and encouraging U.S. private and
voluntary agencies to expand their pro-
grams in these countries.

Public Law 480: The Food for Peace Act,
which expires in December, has become an
increasingly important part of the develop-
ment and disaster relief activities carried
out by AID in cooperation with other U.S.
Government agencies. The need for U.S.
agricultural commodities is considered in the
context of overall development in various
countries and is tied directly to their efforts
to increase their own food production. The
Food for Peace program also jn'ovides im-
portant support for the programs of many
American voluntary agencies which are ac-
tively engaged in the development process
and in assistance in natural disasters and
resettlement of refugees.

The P.L. 480 program should continue
at present levels — about $1 billion an-
nually— to helji meet the food gap projected
into the 1980's. We should take this require-
ment into account in domestic agricultural
planning in the United States. The very
heartening increases in U.S. agricultural
exports over the pa.st few years need not

'- have the effect of diminishing P.L. 480 avail-

i abilities. The productive capacity of our U.S.
agi-icultural system can accommodate ex-

;; panding commercial exports and a sensible

13 concessional program.

Management of Bilateral Aid

We are improving the efficiency of AID's
program by consolidating administrative
functions and reducing .staff. The manage-
ment profile we have in mind is for small
field missions and a reduced Washington
.staff".

At the height of the Indochina involvement
in 1968 the total direct hive AID staff world-
wide reached a high of almost 18,000 per-
sons. This level had been reduced to 14,486
at the end of fiscal 1970, to 13,477 at the end
of FY 1971, to 11,719 at the end of FY 1972,
to 10,800 now, and is scheduled to decrease
to 9,900 in FY 1974, an overall reduction of
almost 50 percent.

Substantial additional reductions can be
accomplished through the approval of the
recommendations in the legislation before
you to include AID career Foreign Service
employees under the terms of the Foreign
Service retirement provisions that now cover
State and USIA personnel. This would en-
courage AID employees who are eligible to
retire to do so and would move the manda-
tory retirement age from the present 70
years with 15 years of service to normal re-
tirement at age 60 with possible extension
to age 65. The authorization act voted by
the House last year included a similar
provision.

Multilateral Assistance, Trade, and Investment

Multilateral assistance is the other major
channel through which U.S. economic aid
is made available for development purposes.
U.S. participation in the multilateral in-
stitutions— World Bank, the regional devel-
opment banks, and the United Nations
.system — has been instrumental in creating a
network of international development agen-
cies in which both conti'ibuting and recipient
nations participate and in stimulating in-
creasing contributions from other donor
counti-ies. In recent years, 20 to 25 percent
of U.S. development assistance, other than
food aid and Southeast Asia assistance, has
been pi'ovided through multilateral in.stitu-
tions.

\Miile total worldwide ofiRcial development

June 18, 1973

889

assistance from all donors increased from
$4.7 billion in 1960 to $6.8 billion in 1970, the
U.S. share decreased from 60 percent of the
total to 45 percent, reflecting substantial in-
creases in the levels of assistance from other
bilateral donors, particularly West Germany,
Canada, and Japan. The World Bank group
has become the primary source of capital
development funds. Loans from the World
Bank, IDA [International Development As-
sociation] , and the regional banks grew from
$1.2 billion in 1962 to $4.0 billion in 1972.

Multilateral and bilateral aid are comple-
mentary, not substitutes for one another.
Both are needed now and will continue to
be needed for the foreseeable future.

We should continue to provide our fair
share of the support costs of the multilateral
institutions. The authorization request be-
fore you proposes $134.8 million for the
U.N. programs, including the UNDP [United
Nations Development Program], the U.N.
Children's Fund, the FAO [Food and Agri-
culture Organization] World Food Program,
and the U.N. Environment Fund.

The international economic system con-
sists of interrelated elements : foreign trade,
investment, and other capital flows, of which
development assistance is one part. In this
perspective, the most important element in
relations with developing countries is the
structure of world trade and investment. Ex-
port earnings account for four-fifths of the
total foreign exchange available to the devel-
oping countries.

The United States has committed itself in
conjunction with other developed countries
to seek specific tariff preferences for the de-
veloping countries. The tariff' legislation
now before the Congress proposes tariff"
preferences for certain manufactured prod-
ucts from developing countries. These pref-
erences would allow developing countries to
better compete in the developed world's
markets.

The U.S. stake in foreign trade, invest-
ment, and access to critical resources under-
scores the essentiality of maintaining
mutually advantageous economic relation-
ships with the less developed countries.

Progress on proposals such as tariff prefer-
ences can be an important stimulus to gain
LDC support for an open international eco-
nomic system with a minimum of restrictive
regional trading arrangements and discrim-
inatory practices.

Security Supporting Assistance

Another category of assistance in our
legislation for FY 1974 is supporting as-
sistance— aid designed to provide economic
support for those countries which are experi-
encing economic problems as a consequence
of extraordinary political, military, or secu-
rity events. You will note that in the proposals
now before you aid to the Indochina nations
has been separated from supporting assist-
ance. The problems of post-hostilities recon-
struction and development have a different
character from those of supporting assist-
ance. For the next year we are requesting
$100 million in new obligational authority
for supporting assistance to assist Israel,
Jordan, Malta, Spain, and Thailand. Support-
ing assistance is under the overall policy di-
rection of the Under Secretary of State for
Security Assistance. Under Secretary Tarr
will be testifying before the committee next
week. '

Narcotics Control: The FY 1974 legislation -
contains a request for $42.5 million for the
President's international narcotics control
program. This program is designed to help
foreign countries control drug abuse and im-i
p^de international drug trafl^c. It operates un-
der the policy guidance of the Cabinet^
Committee for International Narcotics Con-j
trol chaired by Secretary Rogers. Requests'
for assistance are considered by interagency,
committees which include State, BNDD
[Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs],
the Bureau of Customs, as well as AID. We'
urge authorization of the requested $42.5
million as a separate line item apart from
our regular development program.

The FY 1974 budget request for economic!
assistance activities totals $1,743,850,000. Oii
that amount, $1,011,850,000 is for develop-
ment assistance programs. The remaininj^

i

I

890

Department of State Bulletir

I

$732 million is allocated for reconstruction
activities in South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia and the security supporting assistance
programs carried out in Thailand and the
Middle East.

This is a reduction of over 20 percent from
the AID request for economic assistance in
FY 1973. The development assistance request
is almost one-third below that of FY 1973
and some $50 million below what we actually
received under the terms of the current con-
tinuing resolution. We do not believe that
this level of funding responds adequately to
the needs of the less developed world, but it
represents the administration's judgment as
tn what we should provide in light of the
Federal Government's overriding need to

>nomize its operations.

Together with other availabilities, the de-
velopment assistance request would fund a
total program of $1,338,314,000. Of this
amount, $645,550,000 is for development
loans in Latin America, Asia, and Africa,
and $394,467,000 is for development grants,
including population programs totaling $125
million, in those same regions. Other pro-
grams totaling $298,297,000 would provide
isuppoi-t for international organizations such
I as the UNDP, the U.N. Environment Fund,
the Indus Basin Development Fund, the
'American Schools and Hospitals Abroad
program, the contingency fund, interna-
tional narcotics control, and administrative
expenses for AID and the Department of
•State.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
'make one final comment.

What life in the United States will be like

for our children and grandchildren depends
largely on what the world will be like in the
decades ahead. Human problems do not stay
bottled up behind national borders. Uncon-
trolled human reproduction vitally affects the
well-being of all nations. Diseases ignore na-
tional boundaries. Polluted air and polluted
waters flow freely between countries.

My children and grandchildren, like yours,
must live in the same world with the children
and grandchildren of the peoples of all con-
tinents, all colors, and all religions. That is
why I believe with deep conviction that we
owe it to our own interest in the future of
our own country to shape with utmost care
the role our country is going to play in de-
termining the kind of world it is going to be.

That is what AID's development assistance
program is all about.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 1st Session

Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926. Report to ac-
company H.R. 5610. H. Doc. 93-82. March 20,
1973. 10 pp.

Creating an Atlantic Union Delegation. Report to
accompany S.J. Res. 21. S. Rept. 93-79. March
21, 1973. 4 pp.

Peace Corps Act Amendments of 1973. Report to
accompany H.R. 5293. H. Rept. 93-89. March 21,
1973. 12 pp.

Creating an Atlantic Union Delegation. Hearing
before the Subcommittee on International Organi-
zations and Movements of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs. March 26, 1973. 61 pp.

;

ihi'

une 18, 1973

891

New Directions for the Security Assistance Program

Statement by Curtis W. TatT

Under Secretary for Security Assistance ^

I appreciate this opportunity to testify
today in support of the President's request
for authorization for the fiscal year 1974
security assistance program. As Under
Secretary of State for Security Assistance,
a position that the committee was instru-
mental in creating, I have responsibility to
coordinate the program, both in the formu-
lation of policy and in realizing the Presi-
dent's policy objectives.

With your indulgence, I should like to
outline these objectives and to present a
general overview of the new directions we
have planned for the security assistance
program.

This administration has recognized the
need to adopt a different approach in the
area of foreign assistance, one that takes
into account the changes that have occurred
in the international community over the
past two decades. We make no claim to have
evolved solutions to all of the problems that
change and new circumstances have pro-
duced. But I have been struck, as a relative
newcomer, by the attention this administra-
tion has devoted to the program. It has
developed both a new set of goals and a
way of evaluating security requirements
that, hopefully, will better meet the needs
of this nation and the nations we assist in
the years immediately ahead.

The President has set forth our new per-
spective in the following terms : -

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on May 24 (press release 170).

-The complete text of President Nixon's foreign
policy report to the Congress on May .3 appears in
the Bulletin of June 4, 1973; the section entitled
"Security Assistance" begins on p. 812.

As great as our resources are, it is neither
possible nor desirable for the United States to pay
most of the costs, provide most of the manpower,
or make most of the decisions concerning the defense
of our allies. Nor, is it necessary. Our allies are
determined to meet the threats they face as effec-
tively as possible within the limits of their resources.
Under the Nixon Doctrine, our role in our Security
Assistance programs is to share our experience,
counsel, and technical resources to help them develop
adequate strength of their own.

It is evident that the situation in the
1970's differs markedly from that in the
1940's when our foreign military assistance
programs first were conceived. The Presi-
dent's initiatives are moving us away from
the locked-in hostility of the last two decades.
This administration's withdrawal of more
than 600,000 troops from East Asia under-
lines our belief that the defense of our allies
is primarily their responsibility. The Pres-
ident's visit to China accentuates our convic-
tion that an improved bilateral relationship
will serve peace in the Pacific. His visit to
Moscow, the strategic arms limitation agree-
ment, and other actions underscore our
desire further to improve our relations with
the Soviet Union.

However, these dramatic changes since
the early days of the Marshall plan have by
no means provided an international environ- ,
ment in which all nations and peoples are
determined to resolve their disagreements
through peaceful means. Recent events in
Lebanon, Khartoum, and Munich suggest
that recourse to armed conflict and acts of
terrorism could become the norm rather than
the exception in some areas. Elsewhere,
particularly in Asia, problems of insurgency

892

Department of State Bulletin

, persist — most notably in the Philippines and
Thailand.

I can well understand how, after a long
and frequently frustrating military struggle,
a desire to withdraw fvom the burdens of
an active role in world affairs can exist.
However, I believe we can all ajjree that
the security and well-being of the United
States does not begin at its shores but,
rather, depends on peace, stability, and an
environment in which sustained economic
growth is possible throughout the world.
The importance of security assistance lies
in its contribution to the achievement of
such an environment.

The security assistance program that we
propose for FY 1974 rests upon a view of
the world as it is today — not a perception
of what the best of all worlds might be.
Indeed, a serious danger lies in confusing
the aspirations for peace shared by the
vast majority of Americans with the reali-
ties that confront our friends and allies —
be they Israel and Jordan, South Korea,
Turkey, or others. For this reason the ad-
ministration's security assistance program
has been shaped with the following major
objectives in mind :

— To deter aggression and to reduce the
attractiveness of force as an instrument of
change.

— To use our security posture and rela-
tionships to provide positive incentives for
negotiation as a means of settling major
unresolved issues.

— To reassure allies and friends of our
continuing interest and determination to
play a major role in world affairs.

— To encourage our allies' self-help efforts,
efforts which over time will raise the thresh-
old and limit the scope of potential U.S.
involvement in any future conflict.

Changing Criteria for Assistance

As the Department of State's coordinator
for the program, I have been struck by the
many and complex factors that must be
taken into account before providing security

distance — whether in the form of economic
iielp, training, military equipment, or credit

.

for sales. I also am awai'e of the distress
that exists in some quarters with respect
to the need to make arms and other forms
of military materiel available to allied and
friendly nations. I understand the desire
to dispense with instruments of war, but it
is the attainment of this goal that has proved
elusive throughout history.

I suspect that part of the problem lies in
man's genius for developing new technolo-
gies. For example, the most deadly medieval
weapon, called Greek fire, was invented by
an architect named Callinicus. It was made
of pitch, gum, and sulfur and, because it
could be squirted, served as the forerunner
of napalm. The French historian, Joinville,
complained that the "Turke" had engines
which flung "such quantities of Greek fire
that it was the most horrible sight ever wit-
nessed." Various unsuccessful attempts were
made to ban its use. Pope Innocent II, at
the Lateran Council (1139), also sought
agreement to outlaw arbalests, crossbows,
arrows, and poisoned darts, which violated
the laws of chivalry demanding hand-to-hand
combat. I mention this not in a capricious
vein, but merely to illustrate the point that
security has been one of the overriding
imperatives of man for a period far back
into history before the cold war.

We of course have sought to establish
stringent criteria for the provision of mili-
tary aid, both within the grant and the credit
sales programs. In doing so, we try to take
into account the complex Intel-relationship
among economic, military, political, and
arms limitation factors, and the dilemmas
they pose. These dilemmas are illustrated
by the existing situation in the developing
countries. Contrary to appearances, most of
these countries do not allocate large sums
to a military establishment. In general, their
military imports are relatively small. In
1971, for example, the value of arms imports
for the developing countries was approx-
imately 15 percent of the value of military
expenditures and less than 1 percent of the
value of total developing world GNP. In
the case of Latin America, the ratio of
defense expenditures to gross national prod-
uct was about 2 pei'cent.

June 18, 1973

893

For many years the United States has
encouraged the developing countries to con-
tinue to devote their resources to economic
and social development. We have also sought
to discourage them from buying advanced
weapons systems, which are expensive and,
in many instances, not required for their
defense. The record of our success in this
area has been good on the whole. However,
changing circumstances compel us to modify
this policy. The circumstances in question
are the following:

— The United States has begun to alter
its international security role, a change that
lays greater stress than heretofore on the
principle of shared responsibility.

— Within this framework, we are reducing
the number of countries under our grant
military materiel assistance program. (The
number has declined from more than 40
five years ago to 20 in FY 1974.) At the
same time, to ease the strain of transition,
we have placed increased emphasis on for-
eign military sales (FMS) credits and guar-
antees, as well as commercial arrangements
for deferred payment.

— As our friends and allies assume respon-
sibility for their own defense, they expect to
make the basic decisions with respect to
security needs. This includes the type, num-
ber, and mix of equipment required to update
their military forces.

— Continued imposition of restrictions on
the type of equipment that can be sold by
the U.S. Government merely feeds local frus-
tration and undermines the credibility of our
policy which stresses self-reliance.

To avoid both an unnecessary arms esca-
lation and a waste of needed resources for
development, it is U.S. policy to discourage
where possible the purchase of advanced
weapons systems. However, as the Presi-
dent's task force on international develop-
ment has pointed out, legislative restrictions
on the use of U.S. military and economic
assistance have not proved effective. In many
cases, the military equipment is purchased
elsewhere, while the restrictions leave a
residue of ill-feeling toward the United
States. Removing them would put the United

States in a better position to work out with
these countries, on a mature partnership
basis, military equipment expenditure poli-
cies that are consistent with their means.

Thrust of the FY 1974 Program

I should now like to turn to the proposed
FY 1974 security assistance program and to
outline for you some of the approaches that
we have in mind.

You are aware, of course, of shifts in
emphasis that have been taking place in
recent years. Since 1969, we have been mov-
ing actively to terminate the client-state
relationships of the past. Most of our eco-
nomic and military missions are no longer
intimately involved in the internal planning
and decisionmaking processes of aid recip-
ients. Recipient countries are assuming full
responsibility for their defense planning,
as well as the allocation of local resources
among competing claims. This approach also
commands adjustments in the size and
structure of U.S. missions abroad — these
currently are taking place in Korea, in
Turkey, in Thailand, and elsewhere. For
example, in Latin America alone, we have
reduced the number of U.S. military advisory
personnel from 1,000 in 1968 to somewhat
less than 300 as of May 1, 1973.

We are now proposing a number of basic
changes in the structure and direction of
security assistance for FY 1974. For the
first time in the history of the grant military
assistance program (MAP), we have not
included training, but have placed it in a
separate part of the Foreign Assistance Act.
This change should allow this committee,
during consideration of MAP, to focus on
the progress we are making in reducing the
number of countries dependent on grant
military aid. The Republic of China, Greece,
and Liberia are but the most recent countries
to have shifted to reliance on military credit
sales and commercial arrangements. I might
mention that we also propose supporting
assistance for only five countries in FY 1974
— our request for supporting assistance
funds is $100 million for the upcoming fiscal

894

Department of Stale Bulletin

1 «i

I

^.,oar. as against $844 million for FY 1973,
when the Indochina countries were included.

I can assure you, grentlonien, that we expect
*^^ make additional reductions in our grant

urity assistance program over the next
few years. However, we must make every
effort to plan these changes in as orderly
a way as is possible. As the President has
n"ted. we must not try to shift the full
weight of responsibility too quickly: ''

A balance must be struck between doing too much

(uirselves and thus discouraging self-reliance, and

' rig too little to help others make the most of

;r limited resources. The latter course would

II defeat for the promising progress of many
eloping nations, destroy their growing self-
tidence, and increase the likelihood of interna-

, i.v.ual instability. Thus it is critical that we provide
la level of foreig:n assistance that will help to assure
our friends safe passage through this period of
transition and development.

Finally, I want to draw your attention to
several areas in which the administration
expects to register very real progress in the
period immediately ahead. We are:

— Planning further reductions in the size
of advisory missions abi-oad, as well as a
realignment of assigned missions and roles.

— Laying increased emphasis on the sale
of ships from the U.S. Navy register in an
effort to phase out the existing loan program.

— Moving grant military assistance re-
cipient countries toward self-dependence in
meeting operational and maintenance costs
of the program.

— Exploring ways to strengthen the ca-
pacity of the private U.S. sector to carry a
p-eater share of the load with respect to
export effort and financing of contractual
agreements.

— Refining our excess defense article pro-
gram to develop a better correlation of effort
with the security assistance program.

—Integrating military assistance and eco-
nomic planning within the U.S. Government
to insure that our programs do not distort
the development efforts and budgetary pri-
orities of aid recipient countries.

' For President Nixon's message to Congress on
May 1, see Bulletin of May 28, 1973, p. 693.

I would be happy to elaborate on our ef-
forts in these areas if the committee so
desires.

Program Requests

We are requesting authorization for $1.28
billion in new obligational authority for the
FY 1974 security assistance program. Of
this total, $652 million is for grant military
assistance, $525 million for foreign military
sales credits and guarantees, and $100 mil-
lion for security supporting assistance. In
addition, we are requesting $33 million for
the separate international military education
and training program. I believe it important
to note that almost all of the funds involved
in this request will be spent in the United
States for U.S. products.

Grant Military Assistance: As in the past,
the major portion of MAP would be directed
to : East Asia — $550.5 million for the Repub-
lic of Korea, the Khmer Republic, Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand. (Military
assistance for Viet- Nam and Laos are to be
funded in the Defense Department budget
in FY 1974) ; Near East— to support U.S.
interests in this area, we are requesting
$137.5 million for Turkey and Jordan. Other
recipients of grant military aid include:
Ethiopia and Tunisia, $14.2 million; nine
countries in Latin America, $10.7 million;
Spain and Portugal, $5.5 million.

Foreign Military Credit Sales: The bulk
of these funds would be allocated to the Near
East : $465 million for Israel, Greece, Turkey,
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. The remainder
would be apportioned as follows: $150
million for 12 countries in Latin America ;
$127 million for five countries in East Asia;
$18 million for four countries in Africa —
Morocco, Tunisia, Zaire, and Ethiopia. The
overall FY 1974 credit sales program would
be $760 million.

Seciirity Supporting Assistance: We pro-
pose to allocate $65 million to Jordan, $25
million to Israel, $15 million to Thailand,
$9.5 million to Malta, $3 million to Spain,
and $4.2 million for the United Nations
Force in Cyprus.

June 18, 1973

895

A brief comment on the administration's
recommended reduction in supporting assist-
ance for Israel is warranted. This assistance
serves primarily to bolster Israel's balance
of payments position, which situation has
improved quite markedly. From a low point
of $400 million in 1970, Israel's foreign
exchange reserves have risen to over $1.2
billion. AID provided $50 million in support-
ing assistance both in FY 1972 and in
FY 1973. The amount proposed for FY 1974
— $25 million — reflects Israeli progress and
represents a small reduction in terms of
the total assistance program we plan to pro-
vide. Jordan, by comparison, remains in a
precarious financial and economic position.
The Jordanian economy is extremely fragile,
and the country is poor. It cannot meet its
economic needs without outside support.
Economic stability is essential for political
stability, and if the present moderate regime
were replaced by a radical one, it could be
a substantial threat to Israel. Thus an ade-
quate level of aid for Jordan is as important
to Israel's security as aid to Israel itself.

With respect to grant military assistance,
approximately 90 percent of the requested
funds will be spent in only seven countries.

—Republic of Korea: The $261 million we
propose for the Republic of Korea will go
a long way toward completion of the program
for modernization of Korean armed forces
and thus make possible the early attainment
of Korean self-reliance.

— Philippines: Our program in the Phil-
ippines is for the internal security and stabil-
ity of that country. As you are aware, the
United States maintains military facilities
in the Philippines, and stability in that
country is of particular importance to us.

— Indonesia: Since the departure of Pres-
ident Sukarno in 1965, the Government of
Indonesia has made strenuous efl!"orts to put

its economic house in order. Our grant mili-
tary assistance program for Indonesia is
intended to provide the Indonesian armed
forces with a bare minimum capability to
maintain their equipment and their training
effort.

— Cambodia: The administration proposes
a grant military assistance program of $180
million for Cambodia. We firmly believe
that this program is an important instru-
ment in our efforts to produce an effective
cease-fire throughout Southeast Asia.

— Thailand: We are proposing a program
to bolster Thailand's self-defense capabilities
and its ability to cope with internal security
problems. The extensive military facilities
that Thailand makes available to the United
States are of critical importance in South-
east Asia.

— Jordan: Our program for Jordan forms
a particularly significant element in our
efforts to insure a military balance and to
produce a settlement of Arab-Israeli differ-
ences. We will need to continue assistance
to this country so long as the Middle East
remains a troubled area.

— Turkeij: We also believe that Turkey's
security is of considerable importance to
NATO and to our own interests in the area
and that we should continue to provide
grant military assistance ($98 million) and
FMS credits ($75 million) in FY 1974.

I firmly believe, gentlemen, that we cannot
effectively pursue our national objectives
in the 1970's without a commitment to the
development and security of other countries.
Foreign policy, as the President has ob-
served, is not a one-way street. We should
not expect understanding of our needs if
we are not prepared to make an effort to
meet the requirements of other people. Thus,
I urge you to support the President's secu-
rity assistance program for fiscal year 1974.

I.

i

it

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896

Department of State Bulletin

THE UNITED NATIONS

United States Notes Progress and Expectations
for U.N. Drug Abuse Control Program.

Stctement hy Harvey R. Wellman '

The United States has long subscribed to
the importance and necessity of international
cooperation for the prevention of drug abuse
and the elimination of the illicit traffic in
narcotics and other dangerous drugs of
abuse. Our commitment in recent years to
intensified cooperation in order to deal ef-
fectively with a spreading world epidemic
of drug abuse is a matter of record in this
Council. President Ni.xon has made clear
that the United States will continue to pur-
sue such cooperation as a priority objective
of our foreign policy.

It is increasingly clear that most, if not
all, governments share the conviction that
drug abuse is a serious danger and must
be brought under control through coopera-
tive efforts. Thus, the Convention on Psycho-
tropic Substances has been negotiated, and
an amending protocol to strengthen the
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs has
been adopted. Throughout the world, govern-
ments are cooperating bilaterally to an un-
precedented extent. The United States alone
has cooperative arrangements with .58 coun-
' tries. In addition governments are taking
I the initiative in regional organizations in
i Asia, in Europe, and in the Americas to

' Made in the Social Committee of the U.N.
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) May 2-3
fUSUN prpss release 42). Mr. Wellman, who was
t'.S. Representative in the committee, was .Acting'
.Senior .Adviser to the Secretary of State for Inter-
national Narcotics Matters.

work together in programs of drug abuse
control, prevention and education, and treat-
ment and rehabilitation. Globally, the United
Nations has assumed the leadership which
the world expects through an expanded
Commission on Narcotic Drugs, a strength-
ened Division of Narcotic Drugs, and a con-
certed action program of both short and
longer term measures drawing upon the
special resources of the new Fund for Drug
Abuse Control and the experience and ex-
pertise of the specialized agencies.

All governments can take pride in the
progress that has been made until now.
International efforts against the illicit traf-
fic and traffickers have become increasingly
effective. To take an example, law enforce-
ment agencies of the United States and
other cooperating governments together
seized in 1972 more than 800 tons of nar-
cotic drugs, more than twice the amount
seized in 1971. Even more important, cooper-
ating agencies of the United States and other
governments arrested 19,000 trafl^ckers, al-
most twice as many as in 1971. Through
joint action, involving where necessary the
extradition of traffickers apprehended, the
United States and other governments have
prosecuted and convicted prominent traffick-
ers, broken up international trafficking rings,
and generally made the illicit trade as dan-
gerous for the traffickers as the merchandise
is for the drug users. We all owe a debt to
these cooperating governments for reducing
by this extent the capacity of the illicit traf-

June 18, 1973

897

fie to continue to injure and to destroy for
profit.

Like many other countries the United
States has pursued a balanced, comprehen-
sive approach to drug abuse. Increased law
enforcement eff'orts have been coupled with
expanded treatment programs. More Fed-
eral funds are being spent on treatment,
rehabilitation, prevention, and research in
drug abuse than are budgeted for drug law
enforcement. Federally funded treatment
programs have been increased from 16 to 400
since 1969. Federally funded treatment is
now available for 100,000 addicts per year,
and funds are available to expand facilities
to treat 25,000 addicts if required. In the
United States the rate of new addiction to
heroin has registered its first decline since
1964, and the trend in narcotic-related
deaths is also on its way down.

In the research area there have been im-
portant new developments. One federally
funded research program in the United
States, for example, has discovered new
substances which show potential to block
the effects of narcotic drugs in the human
body. This enormously increases treatment
possibilities.

The United Nations can also take pride in
what it has accomplished during the past
two years. Two years ago the action program
was only a piece of paper; now it is begin-
ning to take form in the shape of facilities
and projects under the leadership of the
United Nations Fund and with the special
resources the Fund provides in this period
of crisis. This has been a joint effort of the
family of United Nations agencies. The
Division of Narcotic Drugs has contributed
its expertise in the field of enforcement and
legislation ; a central training unit in Geneva
is already providing instruction to drug
control officers of many countries. The World
Health Organization has contributed its ex-
pertise and experience in treatment and re-
habilitation, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization in pre-
ventive education, the Food and Agriculture
Organization in the development of substi-
tute crops, the International Labor Organi-

zation and other agencies in their special
fields.

As a result the United Nations and Thai-
land have together launched a comprehensive
program in that country. If it can be demon-
strated on a pilot basis that there are viable
economic alternatives to the growing of
opium for the illicit traffic, it can be a pro-
totype for programs in other countries.
More recently, the United Nations and the
Food and Agriculture Organization have
been developing with Afghanistan a program
to assist that country in improving law en-
forcement and in rural development in the
main opium-growing areas. A cannabis
replacement program in Lebanon is under
active consideration. Assistance can be made
available to other countries which need and
request it provided the members of the
United Nations make the necessary resources
available.

These programs of assistance which many
countries need and from which all benefit
can only be continued if governments in-
crease and maintain their financial support
for the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control. We must all be sustaining members ;
one-time contributions, no matter how gen-
erous, are not adequate. Over two years after
the Fund's establishment less than $6 million
has been contributed. And only one govern-
ment has availed itself of the opportunity
to make contributions in kind. We hope that
all governments will find it possible to con-
tribute in some way to the general fund,
including contributions of services or in kind.

The United Nations itself must increase
its capacity to respond promptly to requests
for assistance.

It was to be expected that the United
Nations would have financial and organiza-
tional problems in organizing itself to parti-
cipate and, indeed, to take the lead in this
important area. The search for qualified
individuals to supplement the existing pro-
fessional staff goes on. Facilities for ac-
quainting governments with the resources
available to assist them are far from ade-
quate. The appointment of regional drug
advisers to the Fund could help to meet this
need.

f

'1 Hi

898

Department of State Bulletin

Coordination anionjr the involved members
of the United Nations family is a recurring
problem which must be worked out. Juris-
dictional disputes between various agencies
of the United Nations system must not be
permitted to slow down this important en-
deavor. The relationship of the United
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control to
the United Nations Development Program
should be worked out. The cooperation be-
tween the United Nations Fund and the Food
and Agriculture Organization in Thailand
is an example which could well be emulated
elsewhere. The competent specialized agen-
cies must be made to feel that they are active
participants in the United Nations program.
We look forward, therefore, as one example,
to early approval by the United Nations
Fund of the World Health Organization
project for an epidemiological survey and
study.

The time is also approaching for an evalu-
ation of the programs and projects which
the United Nations is conducting under the
leadership of the Fund and mainly with its
resources. We would hope that the next
meeting, in 1974, of the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs would provide an opportu-
nity for the Acting Executive Director to
report in as specific terms as possible on
the progress of the program in Thailand
as well as the many other programs and
projects undertaken or supported by the
United Nations since the establishment of
the Fund.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation extends its
best wishes to Dr. Sten Martens upon his
appointment as Acting Executive Director
of the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control. We assure him of our full and con-
tinuing support.

We also wish to express our appreciation
for the outstanding contribution of Ambas-

idor Carl Schurmann to the organization

■f the Fund and to its administration during

its first two years. We are very happy that

'r. Martens has asked him to coordinate

e arrangements for international assist-
ance to Afghanistan in narcotics control.

As an active member and strong supporter
of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the

United States is gratified at the manner in
which the Commission has discharged its
responsibilities to this Council. The Com-
mission, the principal intergovei'nmental
organ for drug abuse control and the only
one concerned with the drug traflfic, also has
significant obligations under existing treaties
and will have new ones under the new con-
vention and protocol when they become
effective. We particularly welcome the man-
ner in which the 25th session has focused its
report to the Council upon those actions
which seem to be requii-ed by I'ecommending
a series of resolutions for adoption by the
Council.- We hope that the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs will continue to present
action-oriented reports and that it can ab-
breviate future reports in the process.

My delegation strongly supports the reso-
lution calling for a special session of the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 1974. In
this period of expanding drug abuse and
uncontrolled traffic and production of drugs
for purposes of abuse, there are urgent
matters which require the Commission's
attention in 1974. It is hoped this special
session could so schedule its work so as to
complete it within a two-week period. The
Commission would at the session give further
study to the questions of the frequency of
regular meetings and make appropriate
recommendations to the Council. As noted
by the 25th session, the Commission meeting
should not be scheduled before March, in
order to give adequate time for governments
to receive and consider the International
Narcotics Control Board's report for the
previous year.

The Commission recommends that the
Economic and Social Council authorize a
Subcommission on Illicit Traffic for the Near
and Middle East. By accepting this proposal,
the Council will endorse an important initia-
tive by the countries in that area to improve
regional cooperation against the illicit traf-
fic and will facilitate foUowup action on the
useful recommendations of the ad hoc com-
mittee, which met with general approval at

'U.N. doc. E/5248.

1

June 18, 1973

899

the 25th session. We urge adoption of this
recommendation.

The Commission established an Ad Hoc
Committee for the Far East to explore the
possibilities of more effective cooperation
and mutual assistance in the suppression of
the illicit traffic in that region. We believe
the Council should support this initiative
by endorsing this decision. A draft resolu-
tion to this end stands before the Council
in the names of the United States and other
delegations. My delegation views with satis-
faction the activity already underway in
South America to develop regional arrange-
ments for better coordination of national
efforts to suppress the drug traffic and to
prevent drug abuse.

I would like to call attention to one other
resolution, adopted by the Commission,
which requests the World Health Organi-
zation to prepare timely reports on the
epidemiological patterns of drug abuse in
order to help the Commission develop a
more comprehensive view of that problem.
In my delegation's view it would be appro-
priate for ECOSOC to endorse that request
to the World Health Organization. The
World Health Organization is uniquely quali-
fied to evaluate and to advise in this area.
We would hope that additional resources for
this purpose could be made available within
the current limits of the World Health Or-
ganization's resources. If supplementary
funds should be needed, we would hope that
the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse
Control could provide them.

We wish to congratulate the International
Narcotics Control Board on its report for
1972. ^ It is a most knowledgeable review
of the world drug abuse situation, the prin-
cipal problem areas, and the principal pro-
grams which are in progress.

The report confirms there are no grounds
for complacency. Abuse of narcotics and
other dangerous substances is still increasing
in volume and in geographical extent. The
growing prevalence of multidrug abuse
creates additional hazards.

It is gratifying to note the Board's com-

U.N. doc. E/INCB/17.

900

ments that there is steady improvement in
cooperation from governments. Visits of
Board missions to countries at the invitation
of governments provide it opportunity to
gain information at first hand and to discuss
control matters with national authorities.

The report is particularly valuable in
describing situations in individual countries
and in suggesting remedial action. We urge
governments concerned to give particular
attention to these comments.

The United States believes the Board is
faithfully discharging its functions in an
independent manner as envisaged by the
treaties. In no small measure this is due to
the outstanding competence of the Interna-
tional Narcotics Control Board Secretariat
under the leadership of Mr. Joseph Dittert.
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs has
recommended the Council adopt a resolution
requesting the Secretary General to continue
the existing administrative arrangements to
insure the full technical independence of the
Board. We urge unanimous support for this
resolution.

It is of the greatest importance that the
Board have a secretariat adequate in size and
function to perform its obligations under
the treaties. We urge the Secretary General
to give early and favorable attention to
justifications presented by the Board for
additional staff.

Mr. Chairman, no discussion of the work
of the International Narcotics Control Board
would be complete without taking note of
the important contribution made by its
members. In particular we pay tribute to
the distinguished service of Sir Harry Green-
field (U.K.) and Dr. Leon Steinig (U.S.),
who are retiring in 1974. Both have made
unique and enduring contributions to the
work of the Board and to international nar-
cotics control.

Mr. Chairman, the United States delega-
tion along with several other delegations
has introduced a resolution which endorses
the work of the Board and commends it for
its report for 1972. I hope this resolution
will be adopted unanimously.

Mr. Chairman, the United Nations organi-
zation for drug abuse control is in place.

Department of State Bulletin

i

»

iiidelines for the coordination of the con-
tributions of the various international agen-
cies liave been established. A plan extending
thnuigh 1976 has been drawn up. Useful
programs have been identified; priorities
have been established. Some projects are in
operation, and others are being launched.

The international legal organization based
on treaties is ready to be utilized and further
extended in support of the international
effort. The Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs, with almost a hundred parties, has
lipconie practically universal in its applica-

• n and represents an international consen-

-. Through the convention of 1971 means
...ive been established for bringing psycho-
tropic substances also under international
control. The 1972 protocol will supplement
and reinforce the controls over narcotic
drugs. The Council by approving two resolu-
tions recommended by the Commission on
Narcotic Drugs can help to hasten the day
when both instruments will enter into effect
iiid the international control system will be
complete. The United States has ratified
the 1972 protocol, and the 1971 convention
is before the U.S. Senate with an urgent
recommendation from the President for its
advice and consent to ratification.

The resources, technical and financial, can
be made available to achieve the interna-
tional objectives. It depends on all of us,
upon our governments and our citizens,
whether these resources will be committed
in sufficient amounts and in timely fashion.
The channels for contributions have been
established and are open to both govern-
ments and private organizations to use.

The organizational phase, then, is over.
The United Nations is now at the critical
stage of execution and operation of programs
and concrete projects. It is up to the United
Nations to demonstrate that it can respond
to the needs of countries for international
assistance — for the assistance which they
may require to comply with their interna-
tional obligations to limit the production
and use of drugs to medical and other legiti-
mate purposes.

The next step will be that of evaluation
of the results. The United Nations, the

Council, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs,
will soon be at the point where an accounting
will be expected of what has been accom-
plished with the organization and resources
available to bring drugs of abuse under the
effective control which the interests and the
welfare of humanity require.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969.
TIAS 6820.
Accession deposited: Viet-Nam, May 10, 1973.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on
consular relations concerning the acquisition of
nationality. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. En-
tered into force March 19, 1967.'
Accession deposited: Viet-Nam, May 10, 1973.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.
Accessio7i deposited: Viet-Nam, May 10, 1973.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972.
TIAS 7502.
Accession deposited: Viet-Nam, May 10, 1973.

Finance

.■\rticles of agreement establishing the Asian Devel-
opment Bank, with annexes. Done at Manila De-
cember 4, 1965. Entered into force August 22,
1966. TIAS 6103.

Admission of members: Bangladesh, March 14,
1973; British Solomon Islands Protectorate,
April 30, 1973; Burma, April 26, 197S; Tonga,
March 29, 1972.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by
dumping of wastes and other matter, with an-
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and
Washington December 29, 1972. -
Signature: New Zealand (with a statement).
May 30, 1973.

' Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.

June 18, 1973

901

Wheat

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for
signature at Washington March 29 through
May 3, 1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971,
with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971,
with respect to other provisions; for the United
States July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144.
Accession to the Wheat Trade Convention de-
posited: Algeria, May 23, 1973; Venezuela,
May 24, 1973.

BILATERAL

Guinea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of March 1.5, 197.3. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Conakry March 30
and April 11, 1973. Entered into force April 11,
1973.

Korea

Agreement amending annex B of the agreement of
January 4, 1972 (TIAS 7499), concerning trade
in wool and man-made fiber textile products.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 14 and 23, 1973. Entered into force May 23,
197.3.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of
agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Washing-
ton May 29, 1973. Entered into force May 29,
1973.

Paraguay

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Asuncion May 24,
1973. Enters into force upon the exchange of
ratifications.

Agreement relating to establishing and maintaining
monitoring premises and installations of the For-
eign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Asuncion May 24,
1973. Entered into force May 24, 1973.

Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement of December
22, 1972 (TIAS 7539), concerning trade in
wool and man-made fiber textiles with Macao.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 14 and 18, 1973. Entered into force May 18,
1973.

Switzerland

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters
with related notes. Signed at Bern May 25, 1973.
Enters into force 180 days after exchange of
ratifications.

Yugoslavia

Agreement amending the agreement of Decem-
ber 31, 1970 (TIAS 7032), relating to trade in
cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington May 23, 1973. Entered into force
May 23, 1973.

Agreement relating to investment guaranties with
aide memoire. Effected by exchange of notes at
Belgrade January 18, 1973.
Entered into force: May 30, 1973.

Agreement relating to guaranties authorized by sec-
tion 111(b)(3) of the Economic Cooperation Act
of 1948, as amended. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington August 15, 1952 (TIAS
2688).
Terminated: May 30, 1973.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Government Bookstore, Department
of State, Washington, B.C. 20520. A 25-percent dis-
count is made on orders for 100 or more copies of
any one publication tnailed to the same address.
Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, must acco7npany orders.

The Availability of Department of State Records. This
article, based on an address by Dr. William M.
Franklin, Director of the Historical Office, describes
in historical context the three principal methods of
making Department of State documents available
to the public : by publication, by granting access to
files, and by providing copies on I'equest. Reprinted
from Department of State Bulletin of January 29,
197.3. Pub. 8694. General Foreign Policy Series 273.
8 pp. 20(' postpaid.

Taking of Evidence Abroad. TIAS 7444. 23 pp. SO?*.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel.
TIAS 7472. 4 pp. 150.

Social Security Pensions. Agreement with Poland. |
TIAS 7473. 5 pp. 150.

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income and Property. |

Convention with Norway. TIAS 7474. 62 pp. 45^

Status of United States Navy Personnel. Agreement |
with Greece. TIAS 7475. 3 pp. 150.

902

Department of State Bulletin j

INDEX June 18, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1773

Aviation. Aircraft Hijaci<inK and SabotaRe:
Initiative or Inertia? (Brower) 872

Congress

Conpressional Documents Relating: to Foreign
Policy 891

New Directions for the Security Assistance

Propram (Tarr) 892

riorities in the Development Assistance Pro-
Igram (Hannah) 883

irope

he NATO Alliance: The Basis for an Era of

Negotiation (Rush) 867

resident Receives Report on Radio Free Eu-
rope and Radio Liberty (Nixon) 875

foreign Aid

(ew Directions for the Security Assistance

Proisrram (Tarr) 892

riorities in the Development Assistance Pro-
gram (Hannah) 883

nternational Law

|ircraft Hijacking and Sabotage: Initiative or

Inertia? (Brower) 872

luman Rights in Armed Conflict: Development

{of the Law (Aldrich) 876

nternational Organizations and Conferences.

International Organization Immunities
Granted to Intelsat (Executive order) . . . 871

|arcotics Control. United States Notes Prog-
: ress and Expectations for U.N. Drug Abuse
Control Program (Wellman) 897

Brth Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO
I Alliance: The Basis for an Era of Negotia-
Ition (Rush) 867

residential Documents

nternational Organization Immunities Granted
^ to Intelsat (Executive order) 871

eiyer for Peace — Memorial Day, May 28,
J1973 (proclamation) 882

esident Receives Report on Radio Free Eu-
R, rope and Radio Liberty 875

nblications. Recent Releases 902

eaty Information. Current Actions .... 901

■ited Nations. United States Notes Progress
iand Expectations for U.N. Drug Abuse Con-
ftrol Program (Wellman) 897

Xrtme Index

Idrich, George H 876

k-ower, Charles N 872

lannah, John A 883

lixon, President 871,875,882

ash, Kenneth 867

»rr. Curtis W 892

itellman, Harvey R 897

Check List

of Department of State

Press

Releases: May 28-June 3

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office

of

Press Relations, Department of

State

Washington, D.C. 20520. |

Rel

eases

ssued prior to May 28 which ap-

pear

in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. |

165 0

f Maj

' 22, 170 of May 24, and 174 of

May 25.

No.

Dat«

Subject

*168

5/30

1973-74 Fulbright-Hays awards.

tl76

5/29

Casey: Getulio Vargas Foun-
dation, Rio de Janeiro, May 21.

*177

5/29

Kubisch sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs (biographic data).

*178

5/29

McCloskey sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Cyprus (biographic
data).

*179

5/29

Wright sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for Congre-ssional
Relations (biographic data).

tl80

5/29

Rogers: statement and news con-
ference, Buenos Aires, May 26.

tl81

5/29

Rogers: arrival statement, King-
ston, May 27.

*182

5/30

Southern University jazz ensem-
ble to tour Africa.

*183

5/30

Sanchez sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Honduras (biographic
data).

tl84

5/30

U.S. and El Salvador sign cot-
ton textile agreement (re-
write).

tl85

5/30

Rogers: proposed USIA budget
cuts.

tl86

5/30

Rogers: swearing in of Assist-
ant Secretary Kubisch, May 29.

187

5/31

Brower: International Aviation
Club, Washington.

tl88

5/31

Casey: U.S.-China Business Coun-
cil.
Casey: CIAP review of U.S. eco-

tl89

5/31

nomic policies.

*190

6/1

U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade
and Economic Affairs, Tokyo,
July 16-17.

ted.

"Not prin

tHeld for

a later issue of the Bulletin.

Superintendent of Documents

u.s. government printing office

washington. o.c. 20402

official business

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/• J> .

^o^/zypy-

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII

No. 1774

June 25, 1973

SECRETARY ROGERS MAKES 17-DAY VISIT TO LATIN AMERICA
Statements and News Conferences 903

UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Address by Under Secretary Casey 937

PRESIDENT NIXON ADDRESSES RETURNED PRISONERS OF WAR 930

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

Pnr inrlrr Hi'r insiljr hnrk rnver

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I

Vol. LXVIII, No. 1774
June 25, 1973

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington. D.C. 20402

PRICE:

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Single copy 65 cents
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Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may be
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF
STATF. BULLETIN as the source will be
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in
au- Re.iders' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BVLLETlt
a weekly publication issued by th
Office of Media Services, Bureau <
Public Affairs, provides tfie public an
interested agencies of tfie governmer
witfi information on developments '
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations -
on ttie work of tfie Department
tfie Foreign Service.
Tfie BULLETIN includes selecti
press releases on foreign policy, issui
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depat\
ment, and statements, addressi
and news conferences of tfie Presidei^
and tfie Secretary of State and otit
officers of tfie Department, as well
special articles on various pfiases
international affairs and tfie functioi _
of tfie Department. Information is in-]^
eluded concerning treaties and inter-^\
national agreements to wtiicft tfif
United States is or may become^
party and on treaties of general inti
national interest.

Publications of tfie Department
State, United Nations documents, anm^
legislative material in ttie field of>
international relations are also listed.

■

jlSecretary Rogers Makes 17-Day Visit to Latin America

Secretanj Rogeis visited eight Latin Amer-
can countries May 12-28. Folloiving are a
statement by Secretary Rogers issued May 9,
statements and neivs conferences dunng the
trip, and remarks by Secretary Rogers made
on May 29 at the swearing-in of Jack B.
Kubisch as Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs.

STATEMENT ISSUED AT WASHINGTON MAY 9

Press release 139A dated May 9

I will be departing; at the President's re-
quest on May 12 for a 17-day visit to eight
Latin American countries: Mexico, Nicara-

ua, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Ar-

entina, and Jamaica. I will be holding

usiness talks in each capital on bilateral,
hemispheric, and worldwide issues in which
we are mutually involved, and I will be rep-
resenting the President at the Argentine in-

uguration. I hope that the visit will
contribute to making our evolving inter-
American partnership as firm, as realistic,

nd as equitable as friends can make it.

President Nixon's decision four years ago
to pursue a less intrusive role in the hemi-
sphere has been erroneously perceived in some
quarters as an attempt to disengage from

ur close association with the hemisphere.
The fact is that the United States has not

he slightest interest in diminishing its close
issociation with the hemisphere. We want to
strengthen and perpetuate it by placing it
3n a sounder basis of equality.

We believe that we and the other nations
)f this hemisphere ha\'e overcome past re-
ation.ships colored by U.S. paternalism. What
we are seeking instead is an association based
an trust, confidence, and a firm commitment
to mutual accommodation. It is my hope that

this trip will contribute substantially to
building such a relationship. I hope, in fact,
that it will help establish the same sort of
atmosphere of cooperation, equality, and
pragmatism that characterizes our relations
with the other community we are so inti-
mately associated with — western Europe.

As in any community, differences are to be
expected. On occasion, U.S. interests and
those of particular Latin American nations
diverge. More general differences of perspec-
tive also sometimes arise, particularly in the
context of differences in our economic de-
velopment. And there are many divergencies
among the policies of Latin American nations
themselves. Our intention is that when such
differences do emerge they can be dealt with
in a manner which will promote accommoda-
tion and resolution rather than contention
and confrontation. That is the way in which
we will continue to deal with those differences
that currently exist. It is the way in which
I will be dealing with them on this trip.

More importantly, we are convinced that
along with diversity the community of inter-
ests in the Western Hemisphere remains a
wide and deep one. I will be seeking to build
upon that community of interests and upon
the interdependence of the hemisphere.

If our common interests are to reach their
true potential, we must take into account
changes that are taking place in global eco-
nomics and politics. These changes compel us
all to confront many issues and challenges in
concert with the world community. Thus I
would expect a substantial part of the trip to
deal not only with bilateral and hemispheric
issues but also with how we and Latin Amer-
ica can together make a contribution in the
global community.

Economic growth naturally continues to

June 25, 1973

903

be a preoccupation in most of the countries
of the hemisphere. We remain committed to
continued support of Latin America's efforts
to bring a better life to its citizens. But pro-
moting satisfactory rates of development re-
quires a comprehensive economic approach —
one covering not just grant and loan assist-
ance but also such other factors as trade,
debt relief, foreign investment, monetary
matters, and population restraints.

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Wil-
liam J. Casey, who is coordinating such a
comprehensive development policy for us,
will accordingly be accompanying me, as will,
of course, our new Assistant Secretary-
designate for Inter-American Affairs, Jack
Kubisch, and the Counselor of the Depart-
ment, Dick Pedersen.

I am pleased, in connection with our eco-
nomic relations, that we have now been able
to proceed with a request to Congress for
authorization to grant generalized prefer-
ences and to be able to confirm that we in-
tend to meet our bilateral and multilateral
assistance commitments. I hope this visit
will contribute to closer economic, develop-
mental, and commercial relations among us.

Finally, we recognize that the inter-Amer-
ican system and, in a broader sense, inter-
American relations, are currently undergoing
intensive scrutiny by all members of the in-
ter-American community. My trip will pro-
vide an opportunity to consult on what
should be done to best shape the system's
present and future needs.

I intend that our discussions on all these
matters will be candid. Only through frank
exchanges will I be able to fulfill President
Nixon's request that I return with recom-
mendations for action for better relations
with our friends to the South.

I have long wanted to visit Latin Amer-
ica. The time is now especially opportune.
The substantial progress we have made to-
ward peace elsewhere in the world is freeing
our energies for constructive advances with
our friends. Europe, of course, rates high in
this endeavor. So does Latin America. My
visit now and the visit that the President sub-
sequently plans are intended to insure that
it will.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MEXICO CITY, MAY 12

Press release 145 dated May 14

My visit to Mexico, Central America, South
America, and the Caribbean at this time will
be concerned with a new relationship of
realism, equality, and equity between the
United States and the other members of the
American community.

The United States recently has been pre-
occupied with problems throughout the world
dealing with matters of war and peace, and
consequently the world is a more peaceful
place than it was four years ago. Now we can
direct more of our efforts toward our tradi-
tional friends. The United States is entering ii
a new era of interest and cooperation with
Latin America. That is what my trip signifies.
That is what President Nixon's visit to Latin
America will demonstrate.

It is particularly appropriate that I begin j
a journey in Mexico, because Mexican- Amer-
ican relations are founded upon the elements
which form the basis of a firm, productive
American community :

— They are as pragmatic as friends canj f
make them ;

— They are conducted in an atmosphere
of mutual respect ; and

— They are directed toward deepening! '
and broadening our cooperative endeavors.lfj

My visit to Mexico also is opportune in thei
context of the growing contribution of the,
states throughout this hemisphere to inter-i
national affairs. For example, it comes at a,
time when President Echeverria has just
completed an extensive visit to many worldi
capitals. Mexico is actively involved in efforts^
to restructure the world's trade and mone-
tary systems so that they will contribute tc
an expanded and equitable global economy;
There are many such issues before the work'
community in which we and Mexico sharf 'Of
common interests.

We also look forward to consultations oi i
how we and our hemispheric partners cai!|, '
make the inter- American system responsivi 1 ''
to the realities of the present and to ou: ''
future needs.

Geographic proximity contributes a speciSi ;^
element to Mexican-American relations :

Lei

il«I

904

Department of State Bulleti|

— Mexico is our fifth largest trading
partner, ranking ahead of such close Euro-
pean associates of ours as France and Italy;
and we absorb approximately two-thirds of
Mexico's exports.

— Last year, over 3 million Americans
visited Mexico, and Mexican airlines carry
more passengers to and from the United
States than those of any other country except
Canada.

But this relationship also produces chal-
lenges that arise uniquely among nations
which are neighbors. I hope that this visit
will contribute to the resolution of such
issues in a spirit of justice and good will.

President Echeverria has said that there
can be no friendship without frankness. We
share this belief. I know that during my
talks here we will speak with the candor that
befits two important sovereign nations.

I also do not wish to let this opportunity
pass without expressing publicly my appre-
ciation to the Mexican Government for its
concern and successful efforts to obtain the
safe return of Consul General [Terrence G.]
Leonhardy in Guadalajara earlier this week.
I convey the thanks of President Nixon and
the thanks of the people of the United States
to President Echeverria and to the Mexican
people.

Let me express a personal note in closing.
Mrs. Rogers and I spent two weeks in Mexico
City as private citizens during the Olympic
games in 1968. We will never forget the
warmth and the friendship of the people
of Mexico. We hope that the spirit of Mexico,
so convincingly demonstrated during those
Olympics, will always prevail in the relations
between our two countries.

ISTATEMENT ON COLORADO RIVER SALINITY
PROPOSAL '

I'r ,< release UG dated May U

I am most pleased to deliver to President
Echeverria this moi-ning, at the request of
President Nixon, my government's proposal

' ' Issued at Mexico City on May 13 foUowinfr pres-
entation of the proposal to President Echeverria.

to resolve the Colorado River salinity prob-
lem.

Pursuant to the joint Presidential com-
munique issued with President Echeverria
last June, President Nixon took immediate
steps to improve the quality of water de-
livered to Mexico. He also appointed Mr.
Herbert Brownell, former Attorney General
of the United States, as his special represen-
tative to find a permanent solution to the
salinity problem.

The salinity of the water made available
to Mexico at the boundary has already been
reduced by the average of more than 100
parts per million called for in the com-
munique.

Mr. Brownell made an on-the-spot inves-
tigation and subsequently submitted concrete
recommendations to the President on Decem-
ber 29. After careful study of his report
within the U.S. Government, President
Nixon approved those recommendations early
this week.

We believe that the U.S. proposal, with
accompanying related understandings, can
constitute the basis for an agreement pro-
viding a permanent, definitive, and just solu-
tion to the Colorado River salinity problem.

I understand that President Echeverria
now wants to study the proposal. Mr.
Brownell would be glad to come to Mexico
City to discuss and explain the proposal if
that should be President Echeverria's wish.

I am hopeful that this proposal will now
make it possible for the two governments to
reach the kind of agreement which would
make yet another contribution to our already
excellent relations.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MANAGUA, MAY 14

Press release 147 dated May 15

President Nixon asked that I make this
trip to Latin America because of his desire
to make U.S. relations with the nations of
the hemisphere as realistic, as productive,
and as cooperative as possible. Such a rela-
tionship requires a respect not only for what
links the Americas but also a deep apprecia-
tion of what makes each nation and each
area distinct from the rest.

June 25, 1973

905

Thus I am pleased that my second visit
to Central America should bring me to
Nicaragua. The people of this country and
the people of mine have a long history of
friendship and cooperation. We expect them
to have a long future as well. Because of
those bonds, let me express to you once again
our deepest sympathy and concern at the
dreadful human and material destruction
caused by last December's earthquake. You
are the ones who are shouldering the burden
of recovering from that national disaster.
We respect you for your courage and your
determination.

We are pleased that together with other
nations we were able to contribute quickly
and responsively to the amelioration of the
immediate suffering.

Now the task is to rebuild. We want our
support of your efforts to restore your nation
to be as effective as possible. During my visit
here, I will accordingly be primarily con-
cerned with finding ways to fulfill President
Nixon's intention that "the United States
will do everything possible to be of further
assistance" in meeting this challenge.

Let me express the hope of Mrs. Rogers
and myself that our presence here now will
be taken as a visible expression of the
sympathy and support of the American
people for the people of Nicaragua.

ARRIVAL STATEAf\ENT, CARACAS, MAY 14

Press release 160 dated May 15

It is a special pleasure and honor for me
as I set foot on the continent of South Amer-
ica for the first time to touch it to the soil
of Venezuela.

The early leaders of our nations were
linked by common ideals, common interests,
and mutual purposes. These factors still exist
today. We have faith in our democratic
institutions. We are engaged in a mutually
productive economic relationship. And our
joint purpose is to build a more just, more
cooperative, more prosperous world.

These are the considerations which Presi-
dent Nixon had in mind when he asked me
to undertake this trip. The age of paternal-

ism is behind the Americas. Today the United
States seeks a new relationship based on
political equality and close economic and
commercial cooperation. This relationship
requires a modern spirit of mutual accom-
modation and understanding. To achieve
these objectives, we must embark upon a new
era of interest and cooperation in the hemi-
sphere. But this is not to suggest hemispheric
separateness.

The days when the hemispheric community
could isolate itself are gone. Instead, the
Americas must seek to identify common
global concerns so as to pursue them more
effectively in concert with the world com-
munity. For it is in the world community
that we all must seek the answers to many
of the challenges that confront us. Venezuela
and the United States share many common
interests in the global monetary and trade
talks and in the pending world Law of the
Sea Conference. I hope my visit here will
make a contribution to developing close col-
laboration among us on these and other
matters based on realism, candor, and
seriousness of purpose.

In addition to global matters, our two
nations both feel that a healthy hemispheric
community is essential to human welfare.
Venezuela has taken the lead in seeking to '
improve our inter-American system. The ''
United States is prepared to give full support '
to this important initiative. We recognize
the importance of the many elements that
link the nations of Latin America. A true ;
partnership in the Americas, of course, must
be built on the realistic acknowledgment of
our diversity, but we believe that the differ-
ences that exist are relatively minor com-
pared to the links that bind the nations of
this hemisphere. I

So I am looking forward to useful and
frank discussions with President Caldera,
Foreign Minister Calvani, and other oflficials
dealing with matters of interest to our two
countries, dealing with world affairs, and
dealing with matters of common interest in
the hemisphere that can benefit all people
who are fortunate enough to live in the
Americas.

906

Department of State Bulletin

REMARKS AT LUNCHEON AT CARACAS MAY 15
HOSTED BY FOREIGN MINISTER CALVANI

Press release 155 dated Mny 16

Mr. Minister, distinguished members of
the government, distinguished members of
the diplomatic corps, distinguished members
nf the business community: Let me tell you
how pleased I am to be here today, and I
know I express the views of my colleagues,
Mr. Minister. I want to begin by saying that
sometimes when I hear a speaker express
iiis views frankly and directly and elo-
(juently. as you did, I am fearful that some-
how the audience may think that we disagree
with those views. I want to say that the
views that you express are the views of my
iritvernment. We support very strongly the
feeling of nationalism. We totally support
the concepts of sovereignty. That is how our
nation was built, and we respect nations who
iiinduct their domestic affairs and their
foreign policies in that spirit.

I hasten to say, however, that we don't feel
at all that that is contradictory to very active
involvement in world affairs, a very active
involvement in regional affairs. In fact, we
til ink it is necessary for a constructive
involvement in world affairs to be strong
and sovereign. And our policy that you refer
t(i .so kindly is based on that premise. I was
interested in a question I had from a news-
paperman in Mexico who asked me if we
were opposed to nations developing strong
economies to gain strength, and I said, of
course not, that is what we hope happens in
the world, because it is quite clear that if
there is a great division in the world between
rich nations and poor nations it creates in-
stability.

And I suppose that the mo.st dominant
part of our policies, the thing that occupies
us most, is the issue of war and peace, as I
said to you this morning and to your col-
leagues. We have been put in a position in
the world where war and peace is of great
importance not only to the United States
hut to other nations in the world and they
look to us for their security. Japan, for
example, is a case in point. So it is true that
, we have been very much concerned about

t

June 25, 1973

issues of war and peace. But the world is a
much safer place than it was four years ago,
and one of the ways we think we can build
a structure for peace is to see that other
nations have an opportunity to make prog-
ress and that they develop strong econ-
omies.

That is the second part of our foreign
policy. The fir.st part is to do everything we
can to develop conditions of peace in the
world. And, as you know, we have treaty
obligations with 43 nations which say, in
effect, that the United States will come to
their assistance in the event of an attack by
a foreign power. So a good deal of the
stability in the world, we believe, is a result
of those alliances. But we recognize this, as
you pointed out — that it is important for
the future to have social international jus-
tice, if you will. We recognize the moral
obligation on the part of the United States
to help. And that is one of the reasons why
I am particularly pleased to be here and say
that to you and your colleagues and to the
people in Venezuela. I regret very much that
I don't have more time to stay hei-e, but I
hope that in a short time I can make it clear
to you and your colleagues that this is the
attitude of the United States. As you pointed
out, we have a long relationship and friend-
ship, and you mentioned some of the history
of that relationship. We have solid bonds
that continue today.

We are linked by common democratic
institutions. We believe democratic freedoms
enrich the life of those who are privileged
to enjoy them, that pluralism enables man
to reach his fullest potential.

We are linked in mutually productive
economic relationships — Venezuela is one of
the United States largest trading partners;
we rely on Venezuela for about one-third of
our oil imports and consider your country a
.secure source of supply.

The mutually beneficial nature of our rela-
tion.ship is also evidenced by the fact that
roughly 40 percent of your total trade is
with the United States — a trade in which
you enjoy a $350 million surplus. Your oil
and iron exports have earned income for

907

your purchase of the sophisticated machin-
ery and transportation equipment that are
helping you forge such a powerful and
rapidly developing country and economy.
And we applaud that.

And we have a third mutually beneficial
tie in a national passion for baseball. Vene-
zuela, after importing baseball from us, now
supplies us with many of our most out-
standing baseball players, an import that
those of us who are more idealistic than
materialistic would rank close to petroleum
in significance.

Petroleum, of course, dominates our eco-
nomic relationships. President Caldera spoke
to President Nixon when he was in Wash-
ington in 1970 of Venezuela's interest in
maintaining and expanding its substantial
share of the U.S. petroleum market.

The prospects for that are good. Demand
for petroleum in the United States has been
rising rapidly for many years. We expect it
to increase even more rapidly in the near
future. Our petroleum imports, which totaled
$4.7 billion in 1972, are likely to reach $6
billion this year and may rise as high as $12
billion in 1980. Thus there is no doubt that
over the next few years there will be ample
room for Venezuelan petroleum exports to
the United States to increase substantially
from the present level of 1.6 million barrels
a day.

There seems to be little doubt that the
United States will be able to buy all the
oil that you want to export to us so long as
that oil meets our environmental standards
and is competitive in price.

Venezuela's interest in its position in the
American market and our interest in in-
suring continued petroleum ties with Vene-
zuela were taken into careful consideration
in the oil import program which President
Nixon announced just a month ago.

— There are, as you know, no longer any
quota limitations on petroleum imports to
the United States. Thus Venezuela need not
be concerned about the effects of quotas on
its ability to enter the U.S. market.

— Tariffs have been eliminated on petro-
leum imports up to the amount that Vene-

zuelan exports to the United States will enter
free to the extent that Venezuela is able to
maintain its historical level of exports.

— License fees on higher quantities, ap-
plying evenly to all oil producers, are set at
existing levels and pose no present barrier
to increased exports from Venezuela.

— We are in a position to take all the
No. 2 fuel oil Venezuela can provide at a
competitive price and quality suitable for the
independent deep water terminal operators
who are entitled to import it.

The world's demand for energy, and par-
ticularly fossil energy from petroleum, is
growing. The problem for the international
community is to find ways to assure that
there will be an adequate, secure worldwide
supply at prices beneficial both to consumer
and supplier. Neither petroleum reserves nor
the resources and technology needed to
develop them are evenly distributed among
nations. Close cooperation of nations in this
continually expanding industry is therefore
essential. That is one of the reasons we
especially value the good relations we have
with Venezuela, and that is one of the
reasons I am particularly pleased to have
these very constructive thoughts with you
this morning and with your President this
afternoon. We hope we can continue them
on a regular basis in the months and years
ahead.

Venezuela has vast deposits of heavy oil,
whose development would double the ex-
ploitable reserves of the Western Hemi-
sphere. When or how you intend to develop
those resources and who should participate
in it, of course, is for Venezuela to decide.
But their development will require a massive
application of advanced technology not yet
in general use and very large infusions of
capital, running into many billions of dollars.
The cooperation of many is likely to be re-
quired to bring to fruition the potential of
the Orinoco Zone.

The United States would welcome the
development of the Orinoco heavy oils.

Last September the United States and
Venezuela initiated conversations on the
eventual negotiation of a long-term energy

908

Department of State Bulletin

agreement providing for the development
of Venezuela's future petroleum potential.
Should you wish to enter into a long-term ar-
rangement that would facilitate the mobiliza-
tion of the necessary capital and technology
and establish stable trading arrangements,
the United States is prepared to cooperate.

Minister Calvani, it is at your initiative
that the nations of the hemisphere are now
undertaking a review of the purpose and
mission of the Organization of American
States. It is just this sort of enlightened and
fdrward-looking initiative that is turning
this hemisphere toward the relationship of
eiiuality, realism, and equity to which the
U.S. policy is now committed.

The United States concurs in the view of
many nations of the hemisphere that our
regional cooperation can and must be mod-
ernized. We share the views you expressed
at the OAS General Assembly both that this
regional organization is necessary and that
it must be constantly revised.

And we endorse the concept that the na-
tions of the hemisphere cannot be separate
from the world community — certainly that
concept is not inconsistent with a strong and
vigorous OAS.

The United States will pai-ticipate actively
and constructively in the deliberations of the
special study commission established by the
recent General Assembly to make recom-
mendations on making the OAS a better
instrument for our collective needs. I will be
seeking the views of Latin American leaders
on this trip on how they believe we can ac-
complish this purpose.

Here again I would like to underscore that
in addition to improving our bilateral rela-
tions with the countries in Latin America,
which is one of the reasons President Nixon
asked me to take this trip, we also encourage
regional development. Somehow I get ques-
tions from the press which suggest that
maybe we favor bilateral relations because
we want to divide the hemisphere. Nothing
could be further from the truth — utter non-
sense. We favor regional development. We
favor cooperative efforts in any region of the
world that can provide better opportunities

for the people who live in those regions. And
that is one of the reasons, Mr. Minister, that
I particularly applaud the initiative that you
are taking in the OAS.

We have also been pleased to see Vene-
zuela sharing increasing leadership in mat-
ters of concern to the global community, as
well as in the hemisphere. The contribution
you and like-minded Latin American states
are making to efforts to evolve a new inter-
national regime for the oceans can be of
particular significance. The success of this
international effort, focused on the coming
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference,
will determine whether the sea's resources
become a source of conflict or of cooperation
among nations.

Together the nations of this hemisphere
could exert leadership on this issue. Views
in the continent continue to be diverse, but
we would hope we will be able to draw
closer together.

Venezuela and the United States both
believe a solution could be found that would
include a broad economic jurisdiction beyond
a 12-mile limit of national sovereignty. We
are convinced that if all the nations of the
hemisphere concentrate on (a) reaching a
mutually acceptable definition of the nature
and extent of the economic jurisdiction
beyond a 12-mile territorial sea and (b)
maintaining the right of free transit through
and over international straits, we will be in
a position to make a decisive contribution
to the Law of the Sea Conference.

I might say, in that connection, gentlemen,
that there are great resources beyond the 12-
mile limit. And the United States favors a
forward-looking program which would pro-
vide an opportunity for developing nations
to share in those resources. It is an opportu-
nity. The resources that are untapped are for
all nations to benefit from on a fair and just
basis. Here again we applaud you for the
leadership role you have taken in this regard.

As we seek a new partnership in the Amer-
icas, we believe the more prosperous states
of Latin America can make increasingly
larger contributions to the development ef-
forts of the less prosperous. Regional ap-

iJune 25, 1973

909

proaches such as the Andean Group can be
particularly helpful.

The Caribbean basin, of mutual great
concern to the United States and Venezuela,
is also an area where regional cooperation
can be especially meaningful. The United
States and Venezuela have a common interest
in a stable, more prosperous, more coopera-
tive relationship among the nations of the
Caribbean. And Venezuela, with the ad-
vanced technology and the second highest
per capita income in Latin America, will be
an important factor in the efforts of Carib-
bean states to bring a better life to their
citizens.

Thus we welcome the recent Venezuelan
decision to seek a.ssociation with the Carib-
bean Development Bank, an institution that
the United States is sup])orting with a $32
million loan. And your efforts to promote
joint ventures between Venezuelan firms and
those in various Caribbean states will also
make a contribution. As we each seek to
encourage and support modernization else-
where, we make a substantial contribution
both to the countries that receive our assist-
ance and to our mutual interests. This sort
of cooperation is the substance of true part-
nership.

Mr. Foreign Minister, the United States
and Venezuela have a relationship of equal-
ity. We are able together to identify and
seek our common interests. We discuss our
differences with realism and candor and seek
to resolve them through mutual accommoda-
tion. The hemisphere seeks such a relation-
ship of equity, equality, and cooperation. I
know that the United States and Venezuela
will contribute to the achievement of this
goal of true partnership.

I look forward, Mr. Minister, to working
very closely with you and your colleagues
in the years ahead. I know I speak for all
Americans when I say that they feel a special
bond of friendship with your country. All of
the Americans that I know, those who have
lived here or who have had association with
your country, are great boosters, and there
is no reason at all why the relationship that
exists between us will not continue to be
friendly and productive, but also there is no

910

reason why we can't together work to con-
tribute to the common good throughout the
hemisphere.

I want to thank you and all the gentlemen
who are here today, and to express the ap-
preciation of President Nixon, my colleagues,
and myself for the very warm reception we j
have received in Venezuela. We look forward
to long years of constructive friendship and
cooperation.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, LIMA, MAY 15

Press release 156A dated May 16

I want to first say how pleased Mrs.
Rogers and I, and all the members of my
party, are to be in Peru, to be here in Lima.
It's an occasion that we've looked forward
to for a long time.

I am pleased to be welcomed by the
Foreign Minister and his wife and Ambas-
sador Berckemeyer [Fernando Berckemeyer,
Ambassador to the United States] and many
of my friends here tonight. I want to tell
them how pleased we are that we are going
to have the opportunity to discuss matters
of common interest during the next day and
a half.

This is the first opportunity Mrs. Rogers
and I have had to be in Peru, and we're
especially pleased because we've heard so
many wonderful things about your country
from President Nixon and Mrs. Nixon and
from many other Americans who have had
the opportunity to visit your country.

I want to take the opportunity, in behalf
of my government while I'm here, to express
to your leaders and to the people of Peru
that we have great respect for your govern-
ment and what your government is trying
to do to improve the conditions of living in
the country. We respect your nationalism,
we respect your sovereignty and independ-
ence, and I want to make that perfectly
clear while I am here at every opportunity.

As I have said before, we do not consider
that the United States should follow a policy
of paternalism. We think every nation in this
hemisphere is sovereign and politically
equal, and I hope that I can make it clear
that that is our policy on this visit. We also

Department of State BulleHn

want to say that we think that nations which
;ire nationalistic and sovereign and inde-
pendent can work together in the common
interest and for the common good, and that
is what we hope we can do with Peru. We
have a long period of friendship between our
two countries and we want that to continue.

We have some differences, as most nations
of the world have. We want to talk with your
government officials about those; we want
to discuss them in terms of friendship and
as mature partners.

I hope I'll have the opportunity, ladies and
gentlemen, to meet with you again before
1 leave. In order not to keep you up any
longer — I realize it is getting late — I'll stop
talking and just again express to the Foreign
Minister and all the officials who have come
out to the airport to greet us how pleased I
am to be here and how much I am looking
fonvard to the discussions. I am sure they
will be very constructive and beneficial to
our two countries. Your Foreign Minister
and I are good friends, and I look forward
to renewing our friendship while I am here.

STATEMENT TO ANDEAN PACT JUNTA,
LIMA, MAY 16

Prew release 157 dated May 17

I welcome this opportunity to stop here
briefly today and pay my respect to the
Andean Group, to the members of the Junta,
and to the members of the technical staff.
You know that the United States very much
favors regional groupings. We think it is
a very sensible way to make progress, and
that is why we are happy to have made a
small contribution to your efforts. We will
continue to watch with interest and hopefully
)dve support in the days ahead.

Because I am a lawyer by profession, I
have had a lot of experience with joint ven-
tures and I have seen a lot of organizations
that are regional in character. Because of
this I would like to say that I think it pre-
sents a great challenge for all of you because
if it is successful it can provide tremendous
tienefits for the people of the countries rep-
resented here.

On the other hand, regional organizations

can bog down in questions of justice, fair-
ness, sovereignty, and the like. It is not easy,
of course. As you gentlemen know, in our
own experience as a nation, we have had
tremendous problems — when you are only 13
States and you try to figure out how to adjust
between the conflicting interests of the States
and so forth. So in a very large measure, it
seems to me that what you are faced with
is how you can approach the problem — is
it possible to really be successful pragmat-
ically? We think it is, and as I say, it is a
challenge but also it is a great opportunity.

It is in that spirit that I am here today
to tell you that we wish you well and we
think that one of the best ways to make
progress is to cooperate and particularly to
have cooperation among the nations. I think
it is really much preferable to competition
in the usual sense because you can put your
expertise together ; you can figure out which
nations are best qualified to do certain things.
But that is not an easy process, as you know.

As I say, we will watch with great interest
because this kind of an organization holds
out tremendous hope for the Latin American
countries. I can see in the Organization of
American States a great many conflicts
among Latin American countries. Sometimes
these problems are below^ the surface and
sometimes on the surface; and yet, since
you have such great problems in terms of
providing a better life for the people, it is
a great challenge. So I tell you again how
pleased we are at the Andean Group as a
group and that we wish you the veiy best
of success. We hope as a nation that we can
be helpful and cooperative as you proceed
into the future.

On behalf of my colleagues I want to thank
you very much for i)roviding this brief op-
portunity to stop and pay our respects and
to wish you our best of everything in the
future.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, BOGOTA, MAY 17

Press release 160 dated May IS

Mr. Minister [Foreign Minister Alfredo
Vazquez] : I want to tell you how j^Ieased I
am to be in Colombia, hnw pleased Mrs.

June 25, 1973

911

Rogers and all of our party are to have this
opportunity to visit Colombia. You and I
have had many very useful and friendly dis-
cussions in other forums, but I am par-
ticularly pleased to be here today and to have
the opportunity of discussing subjects of
great interest vi^ith your President, w^ith you,
and with members of your government.

As you said, Mr. Minister, we do have
many things in common. We believe in de-
mocracy, we have a long history of friend-
ship, and we have worked very well together
in international meetings and in interna-
tional groupings. It is true that the world
is a more peaceful place than it was four
years ago; and the United States plans to
devote more attention, more interest, to the
problems of the hemisphere.

It is in the spirit of mature partnership
that President Nixon has asked me to make
this visit to your country.

Fortunately there are no fundamental
problems that exist between our two coun-
trie.s. We do have some matters to discuss
about how we can cooperate together to
improve conditions of life in the hemisphere
and to deal with some problems of improve-
ment of the structure of the OAS — an initia-
tive you are very interested in, and an
initiative for which you provided the leader-
ship.

I am looking forward very much to our
discussions in the next couple of days and
to renew my friendship with President
Pastrana, whom I much enjoyed knowing
when he was in Washington.

Now I must thank you, Mr. Minister, for
this very warm welcome that you have given
us, for these very impressive men that I
have had the chance to see. I want to tell
you again how pleased we are to be here
today.

ADDRESS MADE AT CASA BOLIVAR,
BOGOTA, MAY 18

Press release 1G2 dated May 18

Mr. President, Mr. Foreign Minister, dis-
tinguished members of the government, gen-
tlemen : It is with great satisfaction, Presi-
dent Pastrana, that I have come to Colombia

at the midpoint of my visit to Central and
South America and the Carribbean. There is a
special feeling of warmth and friendship be-
tween the countries which are dedicated to
the free election of their leaders. I appreciate
your generous remarks about the close co-
operation that prevails between our two
countries.

It is because this house — this Casa Boli-
var— was the home of a great patriot not
only of Colombia but of all of South America
that I am especially pleased to be speaking
here about our relations with the hemisphere.

When President Nixon came to office four
years ago, he set as a goal of his Presidency
the building of a stable structure of world
peace. It was essential to begin by transform-
ing relations with adversaries. It was the |
tense nature of those relations that most im-
mediately affected prospects for peace — for ;
us and for others. Those relations, I believe, ;
have now been transformed. I

Today the world is more secure than it
was four years ago. Secure enough that we
may with some confidence increase our atten-
tion to our closest associates, Latin America,
western Europe, and Japan. Secure enough
so we can now concentrate on cooperation
among friends to build a better and healthier
world.

The states of Latin America of course will
be close collaborators in such an effort.

The President asked me to take this trip]
to convey that U.S. policy toward the Ameri-
cas is a modern policy of mature partnership..
What we want to achieve is a relationship'
characterized by a realism, frankness, and
mutual respect that distinguishes productive
collaboration among states.

First, our policy is based on respect for the]
sovereignty and independence of each nation]
in Latin America. In our bilateral relations]
the reality is that there are 23 nations, each]
with its own policies, each different from the]
other, and each expecting the United StatesJ
to deal with it separately. The United States
with its long tradition of extensive and
unique ties with each of the countries ol
the hemisphere, respects that wish to b(
dealt with separately.

It has been asserted bv some that because

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iwe deal witli selected problems bilaterally in
»*iLiatin America the United States seeks to
'divide and conquer" the region. Nothing
'oiild be further from the truth. We deal
lilaterally with each nation in the hemi-
qihere because of the reality of the hemi-
sphere. Latin America is not homogenous.
Latin America consists of 23 independent,
ii verse, proud nations. We respect that
diversity.

Second, it is our policy to make our rela-
[tions with each Latin American state as
ual as friends can make them. Obvious dis-
rities exist in size, wealth, and economic
!velopment among the nations of the hemi-
here. But speaking in terms of political
equality and need for a better life for your
jpeople, the nations of Latin America are
equal.

Long ago the nations of this hemisphere
established a relationship of juridical equal-
;ity. But in practice that equality was often
jmarred. Early in the century the United
States pursued a policy in some parts of the
hemisphere that has been described as he-
^"f^jemony. And even after the reversal of that
liolicy many years ago it is claimed that a
paternalistic attitude has persisted.

But today the nations of this hemisphere
have self-confidence, strength, and a surging
^ense of nationalism. And so in the reality
■ <{ today's world it may be said that the pa-
ternalism of the past has been replaced by
nationalism and a growing sense of frater-
nalism. The United States strongly supports
this change.

Third, our policy is to encourage regional
cooperation. Individuality — nationalism, if
ou will — does not contradict this. In some
cases, such as the OAS, regional coopera-
tion involves the United States. But we also
favor regional cooperation not involving par-
ticipation by the United States. Thus we wel-
come growing regional efforts as in the
Central American Common Market, the An-
dean Pact, and the Caribbean.

Fourth, our policy will be to resolve differ-
ences among us with mutual good will,
'""l: In our relations with Latin America, the
*" ^United States intends, of course, to uphold
its interests and we expect the other nations

of the area to do likewise. But we do not seek
to impose our views on others. Rather, when
differences do arise, our policy will be pa-
tiently and thoughtfully to resolve them
through negotiation and reciprocal adjust-
ment. We know of no dispute in the hemi-
sphere which will not yield to the mutual
application of these principles if we work
together for the common good.

Certainly on this trip I am seeking to ap-
ply those qualities — in the proposals I pre-
sented to President Echeverria on a solution
to the problem of salinity in the Colorado
River, in the conversations I had with Pres-
ident Caldera about our future in petroleum
relationships, and in the productive discus-
sions I had with President Velasco about re-
lations between Peru and the United States.

Fifth, it will be our policy to work out
with the states of Latin America compre-
hensive economic policies which will bring
a better life to your citizens.

From 1960 to 1971, overall economic
growth in Latin America averaged 5.6 per-
cent per year, higher than the goal set in the
U.N.'s first decade of development and about
the avei-age of all developing areas. The re-
sult of that progress is clearly evident. The
dynamism of Caracas and Mexico City are un-
mistakable. The performance of the Brazilian
economy has been impressive. Colombia's re-
cent achievements have been substantial. Ar-
gentina enjoys a high per capita production.
And there is much progress throughout Latin
America. Such progress has not been easy.
The difficulties encountered have been for-
midable. Progress has not been uniform, and
rapid population increase has reduced the
overall 5.6 percent growth rate to a more
modest 2.8 percent per capita.

The United States intends to give substan-
tial support to Latin American efforts to
assure a decent life to all the citizens of this
hemisphere. We want to assist because it is
i-ight that we do so. And we want to assist
because it is in our political and economic in-
terest that Latin America become more pros-
perous. A Latin America locked in poverty
serves no one's interest and would be a per-
petual source of tension and conflict.

We would both like to see a higher per

June 25, 1973

913

capita rate of increase in the gross product
of Latin America. That goal must be ap-
proached through comprehensive economic
measures. Official grants and loans can only
supplement fundamental measures of trade
expansion, increased investment, and a popu-
lation growth that the economy can reason-
ably support, and only a truly cooperative
effort involving close coordination between
developed and developing countries can make
any substantial difference.

That is why last month President Nixon
included generalized tariff preferences for
developing nations in his trade bill. And it
is why we attach such importance to close
cooperation among the American states in
the forthcoming world trade talks.

External financing certainly closely fol-
lows trade as an essential element of the
development efforts of most countries. It has
been a critical element in the development of
the United States. It is important elsewhere
in the hemisphere now. For the past few
years the rate of capital investment in Cen-
tral and South America has remained steady
at about 19 percent of gross domestic prod-
uct. Most of that investment naturally came
from domestic savings, but a critical tenth
of it came from external sources.

Official assistance can provide only a part
of that external flow. We will fulfill our bi-
lateral grant and loan assistance commit-
ments to the hemisphere. We are requesting
Congress to approve the next $693 million
installment of our contribution to the Inter-
American Development Bank. And we will
make every effort in the years ahead to
maintain a high level of assistance.

But private flows, now twice as large as
official flows, can become even larger. Each
Latin American country must decide for it-
self whether it wants to and how to attract
private investment. And it has the sovereign
right to determine the rules under which such
investment operates. Foreign investors must,
however, be able to depend on the reliability
of that determination, just as they must have
confidence in the rules under which they are
welcomed. If investors do not have confi-
dence, the flow that is now supporting the
hemisphere's 19 percent capital development

rate would certainly decline. Two-thirds of I
our private foreign investment already goes |
into the developed world. With the further !
strengthening of the economic position of [
Europe and Japan and with new prospects [
of long-term ventures elsewhere, the compe- ;
tition for available funds can only increase. ;

Sixth, it is our policy to strengthen the I
OAS. It was clear at the recent session of the j
OAS General Assembly that there is concern I
in the continent about the ability of our ;
inter- American system to serve the changing j
requirements of the hemisphere. We share i
that concern and want to examine together |
with you and others such matters as how the i
OAS can be an improved instrument for |
peaceful settlement of disputes, what role i
the nations of western Europe and Japan I
can usefully play in the hemisphere, and how '
we can improve our consultation on matters
before the global community. But as we look
at such issues, we should also consider how
we can increase the realism and candor of
hemispheric relations, how we can enhance
a sense of collaboration in achieving progress
through consultation rather than contention.
The attitudes we bring to bear on the task |
may be as important as the task itself.

Seventh, our policy is to encourage in-j
creased hemispheric leadership in building
a more peaceful and cooperative world. When
Manuel Torres helped establish the first offi-
cial ties between Latin America and the!
United States, leaders on both our continents!
sought to protect our fragile independence
from the pressures of contemporary Europe.]
In the United States that policy was em-
bodied in the Monroe Doctrine. The ability
of the Americas to emerge without inter-
ference from outside contributed to the se-
curity and the development of the two
continents. But as time progressed, an over-
lay of hemispheric separateness from the
rest of the world also developed.

Today the security of the continent is in-,
corporated in collective undertakings in inter-
American treaties. It is augmented by the
generally improving international situation.1
So today a concept of separateness is giving,
way to a policy of hemispheric contributionj
to a world at peace. We are convinced, too,';

(If 11

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914

Department of State Bulletint ^ 2j

that an outward-looking American commu-
nity can make a decisive contribution in the
constructive tasks that now occupy so much
of global diplomacy: In the world of mone-
tary and trade talks Latin America and the
United States have common interests ; in the
U.N. Law of the Sea Conference the nations
of this hemisphere could together make the
critical contribution to the benefit of all
people ; in the continuing battle against inter-
national terrorism the nations of the hemi-
sphere should work closely together in the
U.N. and in the International Civil Aviation
Organization ; and we can work even more
intensively in our common endeavor to de-
stroy the international traffic in narcotic
drugs which is becoming increasingly a
worldwide problem.

The task of adjusting inter-American re-
lations to the challenges of today's world will
not be an easy one. It will not be accom-
plished by rhetoric or recriminations. It will
not come about merely by restating general
principles. We can accomplish the task only
by realistically and practically working to-
gether. It will reciuire concentration on those
things that unite us. It will require careful
planning and determined implementation.
Above all, it will require understanding and
mutual trust.

I pledge to you, Mr. President, and to the
other leaders of Latin American nations, that
the United States is prepared to do its part
in this spirit.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, BRASILIA, MAY 22

Press release 167 dated May 23

I am most pleased to begin my official visit
in Brasilia after a very pleasant rest in Rio
de Janeiro.

President Nixon asked that I undertake
this trip because he wants to build a new re-
lationship of partnership and understanding
in the hemisphere. I have found our new ap-
proach well received wherever I have gone,
and I am confident that we are entering a
new era of cooperation among the states of
the Americas. Certainly bilateral relations
between Brazil and the United States are
excellent.

I will be discussing with the President and
the Foreign Minister ways in which the
inter-American system can be modernized.
I want to exchange views on the rapidly
evolving global environment, and I hope to
discuss our common interests in restructur-
ing the world's monetary and trading sys-
tems to support an expanding and more
equitable world economy.

Brazil's rapid development has been most
impressive, and I hope to learn more about
your future plans while I am here. Above
all, I want to insure that my visit further
strengthens the close ties that have long
characterized our relationship.

NEWS CONFERENCE, BRASILIA, MAY 23

Press release 171 dated May 24

As you know, I have had meetings with
several members of the government. I spent
a considerable amount of time yesterday with
the Foreign Minister, both in a fairly long
meeting and then we had a private lunch
together at his Ministry. And I spent about
one hour and a half with President Medici
this morning. I am not at liberty to go into
details of the discussions that I had with
President Medici, but I will tell you some of
the subjects we covered.

We talked to a large extent about global
matters. We discussed the situation in Eu-
i-ope, particularly the upcoming security con-
ference involving all the European nations.
We talked .some about the Middle East and
the problems of oil shortage that exist in the
world and the shortage that is p)'obably going
to be more aggravated as time goes on. We
talked about the situation in the Pacific, the
conditions that pre.sently exi.st in Indochina,
our relations — when I say ours, I mean re-
lations of the United States^with the Peo-
ple's Rei)ublic of China, and covered the
whole globe in a fairly broad basis. We also
talked about bilateral matters; and as we
said yesterday, the matters we discussed are
really matters of interest that we will de-
velop in the future. We don't have any prob-
lems really, at the moment, at all between
Brazil and the United States. But I think
we did have a very useful discussion about

June 25, 1973

915

the participation of Latin American coun-
tries in global affairs. Especially, we talked
about the leadership that could be provided
by this hemisphere, particularly by Latin
American countries, in the Law of the Sea
Conference, which is a matter of real impor-
tance to all of us and to the world community.
We talked about problems of pollution that
are going to face all of us — face some of us
now in serious ways — but are going to be-
come aggravated in the future. We talked
in particular about monetary problems, and
Brazil, as you know, is participating as one
of the group of 20 in the monetary talks
which are going to assume greater impor-
tance in the days ahead. We discussed prob-
lems of trade and trade negotiations that will
be undertaken this fall and the attitude of
the United States toward an active partici-
pation by Latin American countries in those
talks and particularly Brazil because of its
position in trade.

I think that the visit here has been a very
useful one, as it is being conducted exactly
in the climate I had hoped it would be —
serious discussions, thoughtful discussions,
between good friends. And I will leave Brazil
with the firm conviction that this has been
a useful visit, a visit that is important not
only bilaterally but in the hemisphere itself.
Of course I talked with President Medici
about the upcoming trip of President Nixon
to Latin America.

I will take some questions now. My com-
ments were not intended to include every-
thing we spoke about, but to give you some
ideas.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to knoiv
ivhy on this trip you have chosen to bypass
Chile and if you have any intention to visit
with President Allende in Buenos Aires.

Secretary Rogers: As to the meeting with
President Allende, no meeting has been
scheduled. He is attending the inauguration
in Argentina, and undoubtedly I will meet
him. Whether we will have a formal meeting,
scheduled meeting, or not has to be deter-
mined. As to the first question, why didn't
I visit Chile, Pil tell you that it is a problem
to .work out a schedule when there are 23 na-

tions that you would like to visit and you
don't have time to visit them all. There is
always the question, "Why the selection?"
The reason for us is that we were only able
to visit eight countries. I will tell you the story
of the man who had an unpleasant wife ; no
matter what he did, she didn't like it. She
gave him two neckties for his birthday in
order to please him. He put one on and came
down to dinner. She looked at him and said,
"That's what I thought. You don't like the
other one." I think we all have that problem.
If we go to one country, the suspicion is
that we are not having good relations with
another one. As you know, we have diplo-
matic relations with Chile, and we are in
communication with it. Just before I left
I met with the Foreign Minister, or rather
the Ambassador, who is now becoming the
Foreign Minister, and had him in my house
for a drink for about an hour. We have diplo-
matic relations in a very normal way with
Chile.

Q. Your reference to a more aggravated
oil shortage in the Middle East — shotdd ive
infer from that that you didn't do as well
in Venezuela as yoii had hoped to do?

Secretary Rogers: No. I just discussed the
oil situation generally with President Medici
because it is a worldwide problem and there
is going to be an energy crisis unless we find
new sources of supply. But there was nothing
immediate, and it has no relationship at all
to my discussions in Venezuela. Brazil and
Venezuela are both oil-consuming countries,
and as Brazil's economy develops there will
be greater need for oil; and certainly we are
going to have much greater need for oil in
the years ahead.

Q. Would the United States be ivilling to p^'
cooperate with Brazil in. offshore oil re- ! '
search ?

Secretary Rogers: We didn't really discuss i
this, and I don't want my answer to suggest ' ■
that there is any program on the way. But ,
certainly we would be willing to cooperate if i
that is the desire of Brazil.

Q. The trade bill that is being discussed f ",

916

Department of State Bulletin

now that President Nixon has introduced
seems to have tiro principal aspects. One is
that the President will be in a position to take
measures ivith the purpose of reducing duties
and customs tariffs to benefit developing
countries, but on the other hand he tvill be
in a position to take measures, to take re-
strictive measures, as icell. Noiv, to lohat
extent can this legislation be used to help
further the economies of underdeveloped
countries and to what extent may it be 7ised
to hold hack the developmental efforts of
these countries?

Secretary Rogers: As you know, it is a
fairly complicated piece of legislation. Its
purpose is to provide President Nixon with
the negotiating tools that he will need in
the upcoming negotiations on trade. It is not
intended in any way to be an instrument of
restrictions insofar as developing nations
are concerned. On the contrary, it provides,
as you know, generalized pi'eferences for the
developing countries. So I have on several
occasions on this visit explained that there
is no reason for any concern on the part of
the developing nations, that this legislation
is not intended to be used to restrict imports
to the United States. I should add that prob-
ably it does not provide any greater author-
ity for the President of the United States
than other developed nations have at the
present time. In other words, it puts him on
an equal footing with the other developed
nations as we enter negotiations.

Q. Of course we could imagine that in the
case of Brazil there may not be any intent
of restrictive use of this type of legislation
inasmuch as last year Brazil had a trade
deficit of $300 million ivith the United States.
But in the case of other countries which have
a trade surplus?

Secretary Rogers: I don't think so. I
wouldn't want to suggest that if some pro-
vision of the act is applied worldwide that it
might not have some indirect effect on the
developing nations, but that certainly is not
the intention. As you know, our trade deficit
is not a result of any trade we have with
developing countries. On the contrary, our

trade deficit results from our trade with
Japan and Canada and to some extent with
the Common Market. So I don't really think
that developing countries need have any
concern about this legislation. The whole
point of the legislation, as far as the United
States is concerned, is to open our markets
to the developing countries to a greater ex-
tent than they are now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what effect rvill Water-
gate have on the American image in Latin
America?

Secretary Rogers: The matter has never
been raised with me in any official talks. The
only time is with you ladies and gentlemen
of the press. I don't detect that it will have
any effect at all. And I think that is con-
firmed by the reports from other parts of the
world. I notice that the press is reporting
that from Europe. So I don't think it will
have any effect.

Q. Why does President Nixon want to
change his policy of sales of arms to Latin
America? Do you think that this will lead
to increased sales of M-5 and other sophisti-
cated weapons?

Secretary Rogers: The U.S. policy related
to arms sales to Latin America is to do what
we can to pi'event arms races from develop-
ing in the hemisphere. That has been a con-
stant policy of the United States, and we
will continue to pursue that policy. On the
other hand, we do recognize that eveiy gov-
ernment desires to have a defense capability,
a defense establishment, and I think that is
probably without exception in the world.
Governments will get equipment from some
sources, and therefore we think that we
should not be excluded in that regard. So we
will continue to provide for sale to Latin
American countries, in accordance with their
wishes, a restrained flow which will not
stimulate an arms race. But it is important
for reasons of sovereignty and prestige for
countries to have a defense establishment;
and the United States just has to recognize
that as a fact, and we do recognize that as
a fact. We want to have good relations with
Latin American countries, and within those

June 25, 1973

917

limitations, within those restrictions, we will
pursue that policy.

Q. And about the sales of the M-5?
Secretary Rogers: Well, that depends on
who wants planes and how many they want
and other materiel. But each one of these
decisions will be based on reasonable calcu-
lation as to whether it stimulates an arms
race and whether it seems to be something
that the nation concerned will be able to get
anyway. We want to cooperate with Latm
American countries, recognizing their sov-
ereignty, recognizing they have the same
rights to a defense capability as any other
nation.

Q. Was the topic of sales of additional
armaments part of your conversations in
Brazil?

Secretary Rogers: No, and I want you to
know, and I want to be sure that there is no
misunderstanding. It may be that some of
the subjects that didn't come up in my talks
are being discussed on another level. The
fact that we did not discuss it does not mean
that there are no discussions on the way, but
that there were no discussions in our meet-
ings.

Q. How about coffee and the soluble coffee
agreement?

Secretary Rogers: It may seem difficult to
believe, but we did not talk about it. I think
it is a tribute to our Ambassador that such
good relations exist.

Q. Will you have any formal meetings
with President Campora, and how do you
view the relations between Washington and
the new Argentine Government?

Secretary Rogers: We have none scheduled
yet. I don't believe the government there has
decided on a schedule yet for any of the
delegations or members of the delegations.
That will be decided a little later on. It is a
little early to predict, but I hope that I can
have some discussions while I am in Buenos
Aires and we would hope very much to have
good relations with Argentina.

Q. When talking about President Nixon's

trip to Brazil, was it decided luhen he ivill
come?

Secretary Rogers: Well, as I say, we don't
know. We hope it will be this year but it is
possible that it will be the first couple of
months of next year.

Q. About President Nixon's visit, is there
any idea of how many countries he might
visit ?

Secretary Rogers: No, that hasn't been
decided.

Q. Do you have any comments with re-
gard to the external debt of Brazil?

Secretary Rogers: No. Fortunately they
did not make any comments about our debt
either.

Q. Do you think that the decision of the
U.S. Government to dispose of strategic
stockpile materials will ivorsen or have un-
due effects on the economies of the Latin
American countries?

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so. We
are going to consult very closely with Latin
American countries which would be affected
by the disposition of the stockpiles. And we
are going to try to do it in a way which is
not too disruptive to the market, as we do
realize the imiiortance that some of these
metals have in terms of the economy of
some Latin American nations.

Q. Pd like to have your opinion — does the
United States see in Brazil any attitude of
exercising hegemony ivithin the continent?
Secretary Rogers: No, we don't. But we
do recognize the influence of Brazil because
of its size, because of its economic growth,
its very surprising progress. Brazil is a very
important country, but we don't think of it
as having any hegemony. And in our rela-
tions with Brazil, we try to conduct them
on the same basis that we conduct our re-
lations with other countries in the hemispere.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, BUENOS AIRES, MAY 23

Press lelease 175 dated May 25

I am most pleased to be in Buenos Aires
as a representative of President Nixon to

918

Department of State Bulletin

tlie inauguration of President-elect Campora
and to convey to him and to the people of
Argentina the best wishes of President
Nixon and the people of the United States
of America.

The United States wants to cooperate with
the nations of this hemisphere to build a new
and strong relationship based on realism,
equality, and mutual respect. Such a new re-
lationship requires contributions from all
American states. Strong bonds between na-
tions of the hemisphere are essential. Such
bonds will enable us to improve the intei'-
American system and to exert productive
leadership on global issues of common
interest.

The ITnited States and Argentina share
many political and economic ties, and we are
linked by a common faith in democracy as
this inaugural occasion so well demonstrates.
We look forward to working cooperatively,
frankly, and on a basis of equality with your
new government, both with respect to our
bilateral relations and on many global issues
where we have similar interests.

Ai'gontina is a country with cultural, intel-
lectual, and economic achievements so well
known throughout the world. It is also a
country with a strong sense of national iden-
tity. So is the United States.

In enunciating our new policy in the hemi-
sphere last week in Bogota, I said that we
hope a new partnership can be forged in the
Americas, rooted in constructive nationalism
and in fraternalism. Those concepts should
provide a firm foundation for future rela-
tions between the United States and Argen-
tina, relations which we very much hope will
be cordial, productive, and in the best possi-
ble interest of the hemisphere and of the
world.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to close
on a personal note to express the great pleas-
ure that Mrs. Rogers and I have, and all
the members of my party have, in being here
and having this opportunity to be here on
this important occasion. As you may know,
it is the first opportunity we've had to visit
your country, and we have heard so much
about it. We heard so much about the friend-
liness of your people and the achievements

that you have made over the years, that we
express from the bottom of our hearts our
genuine pleasure at being here.

Q. When you began your trip, Mr. Secre-
tary, you said that 7ve must put an end to
paternalism on the part of the United States
vis-a-vis the Latin American countries. Could
}ve ask you what you mean by paternalism?

Secretary Rogers: There has been criticism
of the U.S. policy in the past based on the
fact that we were too intrusive and that we
attempted to interfere in the internal affairs
of Latin American countries. So what we
are trying to do is to take into consideration
those views of Latin American countries, to
make it clear that we respect the sovereignty
of every nation in Latin America, that we
want to work cooperatively with the nations
in Latin America, but only to the extent that
they want us to.

Secondly, we recognize that every nation
has a right to determine its own system of
government, and we respect that right. We
feel that there is no reason why we can't
make that clear to Latin American countries.
We certainly have been able to do it in other
parts of the world. So we feel that the better
definition of our policy is one of mature
l)artnership. You, the nations in Latin Amer-
ica, are sovereign, important nations that we
respect, and we will deal with you as mature
partners — cooperatively, in the hope that
we can contribute to progress in the hemi-
sphere, but with full respect for your sover-
eign rights.

In order that I am not accused of favorit-
ism, I shall take one question from a man.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I iconder if the U.S.
Government is aware that Argentina is go-
ing to have to bring about certain changes,
particularly within the economic framework
of the conduct of this international relation.
Could ii-e ask you ivhat the expectations are
on the part of your government ivith regard
to its relations with the Argentine Govern-
ment after the 2.')th of May. based on equita-
ble dealings in the area of international
relations ?

Secretary Rogers: Well, we have a long

June 25, 1973

919

history of friendship with Argentina and
we expect that to continue, and we certainly
will respect changes of policy that your gov-
ernment may put into effect. I am looking
forward to having discussions here, if it
could be worked out, in order to have some
better idea of the policies that you may pur-
sue. But we don't expect to have any diffi-
culties with your country; we expect that
we will continue to have very good, friendly
relations.

NEWS CONFERENCE, BUENOS AIRES, MAY 26

Press release 180 dated May 29

I want to begin by apologizing for being
late, but I had a meeting with President
Campora and just completed it. That is the
reason I am late.

I want to express my thanks and apprecia-
tion to the Government of Argentina and
to the people of Argentina for the privilege
of attending the inauguration. I was able
to deliver a letter from President Nixon to
your President today at my meeting, express-
ing the hope and desire on the part of the
United States that we continue to have very
good relations with the new government.
Traditionally we have had good relations
with Argentina and hope to work very
closely together in the months and years
ahead.

The meeting I had with the President was
also attended by the new Foreign Minister,
Juan Carlos Puig, and Assistant Secretary
of State Jack Kubisch, who is also new in
that job. We agree to continue to have very
close consultations, very active consultations,
in the months ahead to be sure that no mis-
understandings develop between us and that
we will be able in private discussions to
consider the policy of the new government
and to express the policy of the Government
of the United States and work out any prob-
lems that might arise. I don't expect that
we will have any serious problems, and
certainly that is our hope.

This inauguration also provided an oppor-
tunity for me to meet with others from other
countries, particularly the Latin American
countries, and I was able to meet with rep-

resentatives of almost all of the Latin Ameri-
can countries while I was here, except for
those nations I visited. I think that the policy
of the United States that I have been referring
to and talking about, answering questions
about, since I have been in the hemisphere
has been very well received. I think that it
has served a very useful purpose and the
misunderstandings that we had have been
cleared up. We have made plans to have very
active discussions about some of the areas
where there are differences. I am very pleased
about the success of the trip I have made
here, and I am particularly pleased that I
was able to meet with the President at such
a busy time and had the opportunity to
spend an hour with him.

Now I'll be happy to take a few questions,
if I may.

Q. I would like to know to what extent
these mis understandings that you mention
may be the result of a change in -policy in
Latin America on the part of the Latin
Aynerican countries.

Secretary Rogers: Well, I am not sure that
I can answer that specifically. I think that it
has been clear to me that there is a growing
sense of nationalism in every country in
Latin America, and I think there is a feel-
ing somehow that that is not acceptable to
the United States or that we are opposed to
a growth of nationalism. That is not true.
We think that it is vitally important that
each nation feel a strong urge, inner urge,
to improve itself, and in fact that is the only
way that improvement can come about — it
can't come about by what some other nation
does. I think by expressing that, as I have
been able to do, it has helped a lot. Now we
also hope and express the hope that the na-
tionalism does not appear to be antithetical,
is not opposed to somebody else, that it is
nationalism in a constructive sense. By that
I mean that each nation feels that it has a
strong drive to improve. As far as the United
States is concerned, we are happy to co-
operate with each nation as much as we can,
as much as it is practical for us to do, in a
way that the nation wants us to. We have
no intention of interfering or intruding, but

Irs

k-

920

Department of State Bulletin

we are glad to cooperate if that is what is
desired: if that is not desired, that is OK
with us.

Just to add a word, we believe that con-
structive nationalism means a strong feel-
ing of national pride and a desire of a
nation to improve, but we also believe that in
today's world cooperation among nations is
necessary, and we don't think that national-
ism necessarily suggests opposition to some
other nation's policies. I will try to make
my answers shorter. I agree with what the
gentleman says.

Q. Following your meeting with President
Camporn. u-hat chances do you think exist
for the stepping-up of the trade and political
relationships for the tivo countries, and also
irhat are the prospects for the neiv govern-
ment as you see it?

Secretary Rogers: ^^'ell, 1 wouldn't want
to answer the last part of the question, be-
cause that is not appropriate for me to
comment about in this country. As to the
first i)art of your question, let me say that
I think the prospects are good, and we cer-
tainly hope that our trade legislation which
provides for general preferences will be
enacted by our Congress and that that will
serve to improve the trade deficit that Ar-
gentina had over a long period of time.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in three of the seven
countries that you visited, there tvere anti-
American demonstrations; that is, Colombia.
Venezuela, and Argentina. Were these dem-
onstrations what you expected, or were they
less?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I didn't see any
anti-American demonstrations; most of it
was manufactured by the press. I read one
account to the effect that there was a large
demonstration — I think it was in Venezuela.
I read of another one in Colombia. I haven't
seen a hostile demonstration of any kind
since I've been in Latin America. I even read
that my car was stopped in Argentina and
I was not able to go to the meeting yesterday,
and that wasn't true.

There hasn't been anything that has been
obvious to me. I guess that in some of the

countries there was an attempt to organize
a student demonstration, but it certainly
was not reflected in what I saw in the street
or heard.

Q. You don't think there is such a thing
as anti-Americanism in Latin America?

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say that.
You asked me what I thought of the three
demonstrations, and I said I didn't see any
of them.

Q. Then I wonder if I can modify my
question.

Secretary Rogers: Sure.

Q. Hoiv do you feel about anti-American-
ism ?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't know be-
cause I didn't have any way of judging it.

1 am sure that there is a feeling, because
of our size and position in the world, that
the United States is to blame for a lot of
problems that exist in the world, and I sup-
pose that is to be expected. But as far as I
am concerned, based on my experience in
eight countries, or seven countries so far,
and seeing a good many people in the
streets — and they knew who I was because
I had the American flag — I didn't see a hos-
tile gesture, and there was a lot of applause
and friendly gestures. Now, I heard a couple
of women say as I went into the last meet-
ing, "Yankee, go home." That's the first
time I heard something, and I was able to
say, "I am going." [Laughter.]

Q. I rvould like to pose two questions in
one, and I believe they are interrelated. Gen-
eral Peron has expressed — and he is trying
to carry it into practice — to head or lead a
Latin American movement that seeks a basic
understanding in the economic field and aims
at what is called the Third World. I would
like to know, how does the United States
feel — and Mr. William Rogers — about this
movement of Latin American unity closely
related to the Third World?

Secretary Rogers: The United States fa-
vors regional cooperation and regional de-
velopment. Whatever nations feel will be

June 25, 1973

921

constructive in an area by way of regional
cooperation is certainly something we would
favor, not only in Latin America but all over
the world. And the form that regional co-
operation takes really depends on the region,
what they want.

Q. // Latin America would follow the
world tendency totvard socialism, tvould that
worry the United States?

Secretary Rogers: I don't want to suggest
that we think that socialism — communism,
if you will, however you describe it — that
we favor it, because we think that the system
we have is successful and we like it. But we
also recognize that a nation has a right to
decide what it wants to do. And obviously
there are very few nations that are alike;
governments are different all over the world,
and that is just a fact. We recognize that.

Q. This nationalism that you describe as
constructive has manifested itself in a num-
ber of countries in the form of adoption of
policies which the United States has found
completely unacceptable in the past — seizure
of hundreds of millions worth of U.S. prop-
erty tvithout compensation and adoption of
the 200-mile fishing limit being only two ex-
amples. NouK are yoti saying that the na-
tionalism that has manifested itself in that
form in the past is now acceptable to the
United States?

Secretary Rogers: No, I didn't say that.

Q. OK then, if it is not, would you clarify
please, sir, by explaining how you feel that
those differences —

Secretary Rogers: Well, yes. I don't want
to take too much time on the questions be-
cause there are a lot of other questions. But
let me explain. Nationalism, when I refer
to it, means the right of a country to decide
what it wants to do and a strong urge and
drive to improve the working conditions m
the life of the people in the country. Now,
on the question of expropriations without
compensation, that is a violation of interna-
tional law. Nationalism doesn't mean that you
can violate international law ; and if we are
going to have a world community that can

live together in peace and stability, we have
to recognize some rules of conduct, just as
we do in our domestic life. So the fact that
I speak about nationalism, which really is
the essence of our own success in the United
States — we are very nationalistic; we have
great pride in our country — that is what I
am speaking about.

So that there is no misunderstanding:
Expropriation with compensation does not
violate international law ; expropriation
without compensation or without fair com-
pensation violates international law. Now, we
don't happen to favor expropriation; we
think it discourages foreign investment, and
therefore I would not like my answer to
suggest expropriation is a good policy. But
it is a sovereign right of a nation, if it wants
to do it, as long as compensation is made
fairly to the expropriated company.

Q. Hov) would you characterize or describe
your meetings with Presidents Campora, and
Allende?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I thought the meet-
ing with President Campora went very well.
I think it was a very good beginning of the
relationship between the new government in
Argentina and the government in the United
States. We discussed matters very frankly,
and I was very satisfied with the meeting.
In the case of President Allende, we dis-
cussed matters for more than an hour. They
were very active discussions. We just have
to wait to see what the result of the discus-
sion with President Allende will be.

Q. In general, the Secretary of State is
the man ivho formulates and orients and
carries out foreign policy. The question is,
has the Secretary's role not been preempted
by the role of and by the activities of Mr.
[Henry /I.] Kissinger?

Secretary Rogers: No. Actually the prem-
ise is wrong. In our country the man that
formulates foreign policies is the President
of the United States. As far as the coopera-
tion between Dr. Kissinger and myself in
the Department of State is concerned, it's
good, and I think it has been very successful
and think most people in the world think

922

Department of State Bulletin

i so. Don't believe everythinj? you read in the
newspapers. [Laughter.]

Q. Would you recommend that President
Nixon contimie his plans to lusit Latin Amer-
ica this year?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I certainly will.

I think that I will only be able to take a
few more questions. As that lady said, the
Yankee has to go home.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how long were you with
1. 1 Dr. Campora ?

Secretai-y Rogers: About an hour.

Q. You said that expropriation without
compensation violates international law. Do
you consider, then, that the countries which
expropriate have the right, as in Chile and
Peru, to charge for alleged excess profits?

Secretary Rogers: I don't want to get into
any specific cases.

Q. And are there any countries that you
irould recommend that President Nixon not
visit in Latin America at this moment? Can
he visit all of them safely?

Secretary Rogers: Oh, yes, I think so.

Q. With regard to what yon said about
nationalism, )rhat are the precise limits of
irhat you call constructive nationalism in the
difference in its manifestations in various
Latin American countries from the stand-
point of the United States?

Secretary Rogers: Well, as a philosophical
■ question it would take a long time to answer.
Let me try to make it brief.

It seems to me that every nation can per-
ceive its national policy to invigorate the
people, to make the people in the country
realize to a very considerable extent that
the future of that country depends on what
they do and not on what someone else does,
but at the same time not necessarily make it
appear that the policy is based on opposition
to some other country. It seems to me that
the kind of nationalism I am talking about
does not exclude close cooperation with other
nations, cooperation based on the rules that
the country wants to establish, but still be
active in the international community.

Let me give you an example. Canada is a
very important sovereign nation. It has its
ow^n foreign policy and is not affected or
controlled by anybody else's foreign policy.
Canada has a great deal of trade with us,
more than any two nations in the world have
ever had. It used to be a favorable balance
to us ; now it is favorable to Canada. We have
large capital investment in Canada, but
interestingly enough, Canada has more cap-
ital investment in the United States per
capita than we have in Canada. We are both
strongly nationalistic. We have tremendous
investment in each other's country; we have
strong trade, a lot of trade with each other.
And it is to our mutual benefit.

Q. What do you think about the Itaipit
Dam conflict?

Secretary Rogers: That is a regional mat-
ter. We have enough problems of our own.
[Laughter.] I wouldn't want to express a
view on that. I don't mean to be sarcastic,
but it is something that we wouldn't want
to express our view on. It is a Latin Amer-
ican matter.

Q. But after all, it is an international
issue, and it has come to the attention of
the different countries, and there should
be some sort of an expression on the part
of an important country such as the United
States.

Secretary Rogers: Well, that illustrates
the difi'iculty we have. If we don't say any-
thing, we are criticized. If we do say some-
thing about it, then everybody will say, Why
don't you stay out of that? [Laughter.] All
I can say is that I hope it can be worked out
satisfactorily, because wo are very friendly
with all the nations involved in the problem.

This is the last question. I really have to
go.

Q. Will your trip and the experience that
you have had on your trip influence the U.S.
position in the OAS?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I have done a
good deal of listening [laughter], and I think
I have some new insights. I think I have
benefited by the visit, and I have had dis-

June 25, 1973

923

cussions with Foreign Ministers, not only
in the countries that I have been in but sev-
eral others. I think that it probably will have
some influence on my thinking, yes.

Q. Concerning kidnaping, did yoii discuss
the subject with President Campora?

Secretary Rogers: I did not.

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle-
men. I want to tell you how much I have
appreciated being here in Argentina, and I
hope that I will have the chance to come
back soon. I hope you will all have the chance
to visit the United States one of these days.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, KINGSTON, MAY 27

Press i-elease 181 dated May 29

I just want to say to the Minister and the
Ambassador and all the representatives of
the Government of Jamaica and you ladies
and gentlemen how pleased Mrs. Rogers
and I, and ail the members of my party, are
to be in Jamaica again. We had the privilege
of being in Jamaica when I was in private
life, but this is the first chance I have had
to be here since I have been Secretary of
State, and I'm very honored indeed.

At the request of your government, and
because I wanted to very much, I am pleased
to be here to pay full recognition to the
importance that Jamaica plays in the think-
ing of the United States. We attach great
importance to our relations with Jamaica,
and we also recognize that although my visit
is still a Latin American visit it is more
than that — it is a visit to Central Amei'ica,
South America, and to the Caribbean area.
The stop here in Jamaica gives recognition
to the fact that the Caribbean area has suf-
fered and it is important — and that is why
we are here.

I am looking forward very much to the
talks that I will have with the Prime Min-
ister and with you, Mr. Minister, and other
representatives of the government. Relations
between Jamaica and the United States are
particularly warm, and we recognize the
importance that Jamaica plays in the Carib-
bean area and also the growing activity of
Jamaica in the Organization of American

924

States. We think that is the way it should
be — that as we consider ways to improve
the Organization, we look to Jamaica to
play a very important leading role in repre-
senting the views of this area, this region.

So I am anxious to talk to your officials
about how they see the future of the OAS
and the part the Caribbean countries can
play in that Organization. I am also anxious
to talk about global matters because, al-
though your country is not a large country,
it is an important country and you will play
an increasingly important role in interna-
tional matters. For all of these reasons I
am glad to be here, and I appreciate you
ladies and gentlemen, and members of the
press who are here, coming out to greet me.
We look forward very much to a short stay
but a very important stay.

REMARKS AT SWEARING-IN OF MR. KUBISCH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MAY 29

Press release I8G dated May 30

Distinguished members of the diplomatic
corps, ladies and gentlemen : As you know,
the occasion is to swear in the new Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American af-
fairs. Jack Kubisch. But befoi'e doing so,
I want to take this opportunity to thank all
the nations represented here for their cour-
tesy and for the way I was received in the
countries that I visited in Latin America.
And I might say that I also saw, in Buenos
Aires, representatives from almost every
country in Latin America. I am deeply ap-
preciative of the courtesies that were shown
to me.

This morning I had the opportunity to
report to President Nixon on the success
of our visit to Latin America, the first visit
of that magnitude. Certainly no previous
visit over the last 40 years has been as ex-
tensive as this one. I had the opportunity to
tell President Nixon about the visit in some
detail. He was of course very pleased and is
looking forward to his visit to Latin Amer-
ica.

I also had the opportunity to talk to legis-
lative leaders about it, and they reacted very
well to the report I made. They reacted

Department of State Bulletin

h

i «

']
[}\

Lit

I'i

equally well to the thought which I expressed
that it was necessary for us to take an in-
creasingly active interest in Latin American
a (fairs.

Now, as you know, I was able to visit not

'Illy South America but Central America

and the Caribbean area as well. The trip

was a very active one, and I think it worked

out well.

Let me say that the objective which I had
in mind was to have quiet and serious dis-
cussions with the leaders and officials of
each of the nations that I visited. As much
as possible, I minimized social engagements
and tried to maximize serious discussions.
This approach was. I think, well received
and reciprocated by all of the nations that
1 visited. Officials seemed to welcome this
general approach.

I was particularly pleased at the news-
paper reporting and editorial comment in the
Latin American press. It was extensive and
I thought fair, and I think will contribute
to good relations in the hemisphere.

I think that the most significant impres-
sion that one gets, and this was my first
visit to Latin America, is the growing feeling
of nationalism in every country — which in-
cluded a great drive to see that conditions
in that country are improved, to see that
the average man and woman have the better
things in life, that they have better living
conditions and working conditions. Now, I
did not find that this growing sense of na-
tionalism was in any way antagonistic to
the United States or antagonistic to other
nations in the hemisphere. Rather, I found
that it was a serious, determined drive to
make things better in each country. Of
course the United States welcomes this na-
tionalism ; we strongly supijort it. And I
was pleased to be able to talk to the leaders
of each nation about it.

Second, I found a clear awareness that
the future requires sensible economic devel-
opment— that you can't feed people and
house people and employ people with
rhetoric ; that speeches and politics are not
enough. There must be thoughtful planning,
consideration of what it is that makes eco-
nomic systems work, a desire to work to-

gether with other nations, in some instances
in regional development — overall, recogni-
tion that economic planning and thoughtful
consideration of economic laws is essential
to the hemisi)here.

Now, these things — and nothing I saw
on my visit gave me any reason to think
differently — cause no difficulty for the
United States. We support them. We think
that they are desirable. We see no reason
why we cannot cooperate fully with this new
sense of nationalism — spirit of nationalism.
We want to cooperate with each nation in
a way that is consistent with its policies.
If cooperation is sought and assistance of
some kind seems to be desired, we want to
consider that. If it is not, we understand
that, too.

With regard to capital investment, if the
nations of the hemisiihere want Americans
to invest in their countries, we will seek to
encourage that investment. On the other
hand, if such investment is not desired,
we will understand that. We have had good
discussions in many countries about the fact
that capital is going to flow to the nations
which provide the best opportunities. It is
going to require stability of governments.
Capital is going to i*equire some assurance
that the rules that are laid down by each
nation will be lived up to. But the final judg-
ment has to be made by the investor. The
Government of the United States is in a
position to encourage flow of capital — not
direct it, but encourage it. And we want to
do that in countries where such investment
is desired. We think the nationalism which
I spoke about is totally consistent with coop-
erative efforts on our part.

Third, we find there is a desire for more
regional cooperation. In some of my dis-
cussions I was given the impression that
maybe the United States was against re-
gional cooperation unless we were in charge
of it. That is not the case. We support any
regional groupings that make sense, whether
the United States participates or not. Recent
developments in some regions have been
very constructive. Some of them are going
to pre.sent the United States with problems.
We don't necessarily agree with everything

June 25, 1973

925

that is being proposed. We believe cooper-
ating on a regional basis is a very good idea.

Fourth, as far as the hemisphere as a
whole is concerned, the United States is pre-
pared to consider fully the future of the OAS.
We think the OAS is a good organization. We
think the Secretary General has given great
leadership to that Organization. We realize
that it has to be modernized; that some
changes have to be made. We are not sure
there is anything wrong with the structure
of the Organization — I am inclined to think
the structure is all right — but we are pre-
pared to consider with the other members
any suggestions that may be made. I was
encouraged by the fact that most of the lead-
ers I talked to seemed to think that the struc-
ture of the OAS was a good one, although
some improvements in the Organization were
in order. For example, we might find better
ways to implement some of the principles we
have agreed on. The United States is fully
prepared to play a role, a continuing role in
the OAS, consistent with the desires of other
member nations.

With regard to discussions with individual
nations, there are some irritants between
us — some problems between ourselves and
various countries in Latin America. We are
going to do everything we can to negotiate
solutions to those problems. However, we
hope to be able to do this in an atmosphere
of negotiation, not confrontation. There is
no reason why we should be confronting each
other publicly over some of these problems,
which are not very significant individually
but assume a great significance because of
the public debate about them. As I pointed
out in talks during the trip, we have been
able to negotiate with our adversaries. There
is no reason we can't negotiate solutions to
some of these problems with our closest
friends. So we are going to undertake to iso-
late these areas of friction and to negotiate
solutions.

It is quite clear that when we talked in the
past about a Latin American policy, we cre-
ated the impression in the public mind that
there should be one policy toward Latin

America. Of course that is fallacious, as you
all know. There are 23 nations in Latin
America, and as far as the United States is
concerned, we must have 23 policies because
each nation expects to be treated differently.
Each nation is different. Each nation has its
own sovereign interests. And we must re-
spect those.

On the other hand, we do have a policy for
the hemisphere as a whole, and that policy
is to focus on our common interests. We have
many common interests, and we are going to
do what we can to focus on those common in-
terests, particularly in the field of trade. That
is why in my discussions in Latin America
I emphasized our strong desire to have the
Trade Reform Act passed. That is why we
are going to do everything we can to get
Congress to enact that legislation — because it
is so vitally important to Latin America.

Latin America has had a trade deficit with
the United States for a long time, and this
has to be changed. We must be sure that we
open our markets to Latin America to a
greater extent than we have in the past.
They should have a preference. They are en-
titled to a preference. And it is time, I think,
that the United States recognized that and
provided for it.

With these general thoughts in mind, let
me just say that, as I look to the future, I
want to assure all of the Latin American
representatives here that, first, we are going
to deal with each country separately, as a
sovereign nation, on equal terms. We are go-
ing to respect your nationality. We are going
to respect your nationalism, your new drive
of nationalism.

Second, we are going to encourage regional
development, whether the United States par-
ticipates in any particular regional grouping
or not. This does not mean we are always
going to have smooth sailing, because we may
have some diff'erences. But we are going to
be respectful and appreciative of regional
groupings.

Third, we are going to do what we can to
strengthen the OAS, to take a leading role in
that Organization, if that is what is desired, ;

926

Department of State Bulletin

or to make any other adjustments in rela-
tions with the OAS that seem to be called
for.

And fourth, we are goinp to work with the
Latin American countries on global matters,
because Latin American countries have as-
sumed a new importance in the world. These
countries are takino; an active interest in
global affairs. And you don't have to be the
largest nation in the world to be active in in-
ternational forums. There is the Law of the
Sea Conference coming u]i, there are to be
trade discussions, negotiations, and we have
monetary discussions. And Latin American
countries are going to play an important role
in those global mattei-s. We are going to do
what we can to encourage and to support
such participation just as we have done in
the monetary field.

Finally, let me say that the future of
Latin America is one of opportunity. I hope
we can quit talking about the problems. We
have some differences; we all recognize that.
But they are minor differences. Fundamen-
tally we agree on most things. We have the
most secure area in the world. We are for-
tunate to live in this hemisphere. We have
worked together well. We have great friend-
ship. I was particularly pleased that I saw
not one hostile act in Latin America. I read
some accounts in the press which would give
the impression that I was subject to demon-
strations and riots and that my car was
stopped. And all of that is false. I didn't see
any hostility at all. And I saw a lot of people
in the street, a lot of i)eople who had an op-
portunity to be hostile, but there wasn't one.
Well, there was one woman on the last night
who said, "Yankee, go home," and I told her
that I was going to. [Laughter.] Except for
that, I didn't see one hostile gesture.

I thank all of the governments for making
the trip so useful and satisfactory from our
standpoint.

So we look to the future as a time of ma-
turity, of opportunity rather than of prob-
lems, a time for discussing our problems
quietly to see what we can do to help each
other. And I assure you, in behalf of Presi-

dent Nixon and our government, that the
United States is going to do everj'thing it
can to cooperate fully with the countries of
Latin America. We are going to take a very
active interest in Latin American affairs, and
we want to work very, very closely with all
of you. I think that is why this occasion is
significant. We have a new Assistant Secre-
tary of State who has great personal interest
in Latin America, who has served there with
distinction, who feels as the President does
and as I do about Latin American affairs.
For that reason, I am very pleased that so
many of you have turned out today. I thank
you very much for being here.

Tenth Anniversary, Organization
of African Unity

The 10th Assembly of Heads of State and
Government of the Organization of African
Unity met at Addis Ababa May 25-29. Fol-
loiving is a message dated May 25 from Pres-
ident Nixon to King Hassan II of Morocco,
outgoing President of the Organization, to-
gether with remarks made by Deputy Secre-
tary Kenneth Rush at a reception at the
Embassy of Morocco in Washington that
evening.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON

White House press release dated May 2.'>

Your Majesty: To the distinguished lead-
ers of Africa assembling in Addis Ababa to
observe the Tenth Anniversary of the Orga-
nization of African Unity, I extend my warm
personal greetings and best wishes of the
American peo])le on this occasion. The United
States has followed clo.sely and with deep
admiration the accomplishments of the Or-
ganization of African Unity in i)romoting
l^eace and i)rogress on that continent. We
share your aspirations for the progress and
development of Africa and for the dignity
and well-being of all African peoples. We look
forward to a continuing close relationship

June 25, 1973

927

between the United States and the countries
of your continent. To all member nations
and their leaders, we extend our warm con-
gratulations on past accomplishments and
our very best wishes for the future.
Sincerely,

Richard Nixon.

REMARKS BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH

Ambassador [Badreddine] Senoussi, Your
Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: The first
10 years for any organization with aims as
ambitious as those of the Organization of
African Unity are bound to be years of chal-
lenge. Tonight, on the 10th anniversary of
the OAU, we pay a fitting tribute to a major
regional organization which, in dealing ef-
fectively with diverse problems and proving
its capacity to act as arbiter and spokesman
for the African Continent, has risen to the
challenge. In adhering steadfastly to the
principles of its charter — territorial integ-
rity, national sovereignty, peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, and economic and social
progress — the OAU has become the focal
point for Africa's collective endeavors to
satisfy the just aspirations of its peoples.
For its accomplishments, the member .states
can be justly proud of their Organization and
enter upon its second decade with growing
confidence in achieving the worthy ideals and
goals that inspired them at its founding.

We share with the nations of Africa a com-
mon hope for justice, dignity, and progress.
In the short but eventful decade since they
created the Organization of African Unity
as their common instrument to give greater
substance to these hopes, we in the United
States have come to place increasing value
on our relations with the OAU and its mem-
bers— both collectively and individually. The
OAU has laid foundations for cooperative en-
deavors in a growing number of scientific,
technical, economic, and social fields. The
United States particularly welcomes the op-
portunity of contributing to economic devel-
opment through close ties with its members
in the fields of aid, trade, and investment.

We are ready to share with you the benefits
of technology and to assist, on mutually
agreed terms, in realizing the vast potential
of your rich continent. Together we can con-
tinue to work for an international climate in
which the world's energies and resources are
mobilized for peaceful and productive pur-
suits. The United States will remain respon-
sive, in a spirit of mutual cooperation, to all
who seek with us a more secure and reward-
ing future.

Department Honors Returned
Civilian Prisoners of War

Followmg is the text of a citation read by
Deputy Secretary Rush upon presenting the
Department's Award for Valor to the six re-
turned Viet-Nam prisoners of war from the
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, and the U.S. In-
formation Agency at a ceremony at the De-
partment of State on May 2U. In his informal
remarks the Deputy Secretary paid tribute
to Steven Miller and Steven Haukness of the
Department, killed or missing during the Tet
offensive, 1968, and Tho7nas Ragsdale of the
Department of Agriculttire, captured at the
same time, n^ho died during the march north.

AWARD FOR VALOR

To

Michael D. Benge— USAID
Norman J. Brookens— USAID
Philip W. Manhard— State
Douglas K. Ramsey — State
Richard W. Utecht— USAID
Charles E. Willis— USIA

For exceptional courage and stamina while
held as prisoners of war in Viet-Nam.

These six men were each captured by Com-
munist forces in South Viet-Nam. Douglas
Ramsey was captured January 5, 1966 — the
other five during the Tet offensive, 1968.
All were captured on duty for the U.S. Gov-
ernment in South Viet-Nam. They were held

928

Department of State Bulletin

by enemy forces for over five years — Mr.
Ramsey over seven years — under arduous
and primitive conditions, experiencing hard-
ship and physical mistreatment so severe that
it caused the deaths of many of their fellow
prisoners. For long i)eriods they were denied
adequate medical treatment, food, and
shelter. They were forced to travel many
miles on foot while suffering from malnutri-
tion and disease.

Each of these men was held in isolation
and solitary confinement, cut off from the
human comfort of contact with fellow prison-
ers. They were denied the right to communi-
cate with their families and loved ones, who
waited for years with no word from them.
Even the fact of their captivity was con-
cealed by the Communist authorities. In these
and countless other ways their treatment was
in serious violation of the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War.

Each of them demonstrated exceptional
valor in helping care for fellow prisoners,
in resisting efforts of their captors to break
their spirits, and in preserving their own
mental and physical strength. Their very
survival under the grim conditions of their
captivity — conditions which took each of
them to the brink of human endurance —
fully merits official recognition by bestowal
of the Award for Valor.

U.S. Seeks Constructive Outcome
of U.N. Review of Middle East

FoUoiving is a statement of John Scali,
U.S. Representative to the United Nations,
after a meeting at the White House on May
29.

USUN press release 50 dated May 29

I was i^leased to have had this opportunity
to discuss with the President a number of
matters currently before the United Nations,
including the upcoming meetings of the Se-
curity Council to review the Middle Eastern
situation.

In his discussions with me today, the Pres-

I June 25, 1973

ident made clear he is continuing to give
high priority to the situation in the Middle
East. We believe that the key to a settlement
is the start of a serious negotiating process,
whether direct or indirect, between the par-
ties. In this way, i)ractical step-by-step prog-
ress can be made as soon as possible toward
a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-
Israeli dispute based on the November 1967
Security Council resolution. As you know, the
Security Council is about to undertake on
June the 4th or thei'eabouts a sweeping re-
view of the Middle East problem, a review
which may be the most searching since 1967.

Our attitude in the Security Council will
be influenced by two main considerations.
The principal parties to the dispute have
each accepted the November 1967 Security
Council resolution as a basis for a settlement.
While we recognize that each side has long
held different interpretations of this resolu-
tion, we continue to feel that it is a funda-
mental framework whose continuing exist-
ence is essential to the future resolution of
the problem. Accordingly, we believe that the
Council must avoid any action which would
have the effect of altering its substance and
delicate balance.

Equally important, we have noted in this
regard that whenever United Nations bodies
have attempted to reinterpret Security Coun-
cil Resolution 242 or have suggested proce-
dures not accei)table to both sides, they have
impeded rather than promoted negotiating
between the parties. We believe, therefore,
that the Council must avoid any action which
would make more difficult the achievement of
a meaningful dialogue between the i^arties.

Too many opportunities have already been
missed, and no one's interest is served by
resort to recriminations or unworkable pro-
cedures. In the coming Security Council
discussion we will work for a constructive
outcome that will enhance and not impede
the jirospects for a just and equitable negoti-
ated agreement between the parties. We shall
be guided by our friendship and esteem for
both sides and the conviction that peace in
the area is essential for both, as it is for the
international community.

929

President Nixon Addresses Returned Prisoners of War

Following are excerpts from an address
by President Nixon made before returned
prisoners of rvar on May 2h in the West
Auditorium of the Department of State."^

Gentlemen: As you can imagine, during
my term as President of the United States
and also before that as Vice President and in
other offices, I have spoken to many distin-
guished audiences. I can say to you today
that this is the most distinguished group I
have ever addressed and I have never been
prouder than I am at this moment to address
this group.

I say that not simply because you are here
and because the whole Nation shares those
views — as you know, some of you, I am sure,
who have traveled a bit around the Nation
since you have returned home — but I say
it because I feel very deeply at this moment,
when we have a culmination of the program
which finally has all of you returned to the
United States, that this is one of those criti-
cal moments in history that can change the
world and we need your help.

We do not talk to you today, and I do not
talk to you today, simply in terms of thank-
ing you as I do for what you have gone
through for your country, but I think all of
you would prefer to think of what you can do
now, how more you can serve. We need you.
The Nation needs you. I w^ant to tell you why.

Before doing so, I want to fill you in for
just a moment about the program for the
balance of this afternoon and this evening.

Now let me come to the briefing and why
I decided to have a briefing. Incidentally, we
had first thought it would be a classified

' For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents dated May 28, p. 702.

briefing, but while we knew there was no
problem insofar as leaks as far as this group
was concerned, our friends in the press have
vigorously objected and they said, "Look,
with 600 there, let us come, too." So welcome.
We are glad to have our members of the
press here. This will be on the record.

I will, however, speak quite bluntly about
our foreign policy and our defense policy. I
will try to tell you as much as I can, without
divulging any classified information, and I
hope that you will take to heart some of the
things that I say and particularly pick up the
challenge that I am going to give you at the
conclusion of my remarks today.

I begin with the question: Was it worth it?
And I look over this group, and I remember
having talked to a half dozen of you in my
office. I think of what you went through, and
I think of what you have come back to. And
when you ask that question, was it worth it,
you can think in personal terms, or you can
think in much broader terms.

You could say, oh, yes, it was worth it be-
cause we proved that we could tough it
through. And thank God you did, because
your faith meant a good deal to us.

But I would like to put it in the larger
sense. Your sacrifice and the sacrifice of all
of your colleagues and comrades who died in
Viet-Nam and the sacrifice of all who have
served in Viet-Nam will have been worth it
only if we build a world of peace now. That
is what it was all about.

We didn't go to Viet-Nam for the purpose
of conquering North Viet-Nam. We didn't
begin this war. We haven't begun any war in
this century, as you know. That is the great-
ness of U.S. foreign policy. We make our
mistakes, but we always have as our motives
defending peace, not breaking it, defending
freedom, not destroying it.

930

Department of State Bulletin

But when we think in terms of whether
your sacrifice tiien was wortii it, we liave to
think then about the broader aspects of
peace, whether or not tlie world you come
back to, the America you come back to, is a
better world or is it, shall we say, a world
that is not as safe as when you went to Hanoi
or whatever area you were kept in captivity.

I cannot put it in the context of 6 1/2 or 7
years, which some of you, of course, have
been away. But I can put it in the context of
the years I have been in this office. And per-
haps we can see in persi)ective where we
have been and where we are, but more im-
portant, where we are j^oing' to go.

First, when I came into this office 41/2
, years ago, 300 a week were being killed in
action in Viet-Nam. There was no plan to
end the war, no hope that it was going to be
ended. Many of you were already prisoners
of war. You had no hope.

Looking at the world scene, the United
States had no communication whatever, in
any meaningful sense, with the leaders of
one-fourth of all the peoiile in the world,
those who govern the People's Republic of
China. We were in constant confrontation
with the Soviet Union, the other superpower
on the earth, with no thought or even hope
that there was a chance for arms control or
trade or a lessening of tension between these
two great superpowers.

There were other troubled areas in the
world. Some of them .still are troubled. But
looking at those three areas and seeing what
has happened since, and then looking at the
United States, we see some progress has
l)een made.

Also 4 1/2 years ago, this Nation was torn

by riots. Hundreds of campuses were in

flames. The American people seemed to have

lost their way. There was a desire to move

away from responsibilities in the world.

^ I There was a lack of national pride, a lack of

"^■patriotism. I don't mean among all the peo-

*'lple, not even among a majority, but it was

*-|;there. There was a crisis in terms of whether

America, the greatest hoi)e for peace in the

world today, would dash that hope or

whether it would be worthy of that hope.
That was the situation 4'/> yeai's ago.

Now, in describing that situation, I do not
speak critically of those who preceded me in
this office. President Eisenhower, John Ken-
nedy, Lyndon Johnson, loved this country.
They worked for peace as I have tried to
work for peace. They felt for you as I feel
for you.

What I am simply saying is that in Janu-
ary of 1969 we did have a critical situation
and we started to move on it. And how I wish
we could have moved faster. I remember that
first Christmas in '69. I met with a group of
the repre-sentatives of the League of Families
down in the library, and I talked to these won-
derful, remarkable women, and I saw their
faith and their courage and their love of
country, and I heard them tell me that their
husbands had not gone to Viet-Nam simply
for the purpose of getting back. In other
words, they rejected totally the idea of "Get
out, if you will give us our prisoners." They
said, in effect, and they didn't put it this way,
but one of you put it very well, "Bring our
men home, but bring them home on their
feet and not on their knees." And that is
what we have done.

And so that was our goal over those four
years. That is why we couldn't achieve it
perhaps quite as fast as we would have liked.

Progress Toward World Peace

But the year 1972 saw remarkable prog-
ress, as you know. The year 1972, moving
into 1973, in January, saw the return of all
Americans from Viet-Nam, all of our com-
bat forces, the return of all of our prisoners
of war, the end of the American involvement
in Viet-Nam, a i)eace agreement, which, if
adhered to, will mean peace for Viet-Nam
and Southeast Asia.

That was one accomplishment. That is the
one that most peo])le talk about. They say,
"Thank God that war is over. Thank God we
have got |)eace." But in a broader sense,
other events took place that will have even
more meaning to the world and to peace than

June 25, 1973

931

your return and the end of the war in
Viet-Nam.

China, for example. That initiative, which
was undertaken in early 1972, began in '71,
the negotiations, has finally started commu-
nication between the leaders of the People's
Republic of China and the leaders of the
United States of America. Oh, it doesn't
mean they aren't still Communists and that
we are not still people who love freedom,
but it does mean that instead of having hang-
ing over us, looking down the road 10, 15, 20
years from now, a possible confrontation
with a nation of the most able peo])le in the
world, armed with nuclear weapons equal
to our own, instead of having that, there is a
chance, a very good chance now, that we will
have negotiations with them rather than con-
frontation, and that is the key to peace in the
Pacific.

And then the second development was the
meetings with Soviet leaders. This did not
happen just over a period of 1972. We worked
for the whole four years. But it culminated
in the summit in Moscow. You perhaps heard
something about it since your return. But
looking at that summit agreement, a great
deal of emphasis can be placed on the aspects
of trade and our cooperation in space and
other areas which are important, but the
most significant development undoubtedly
was the first step, and a very important step,
in limiting the arms race in the nuclear field.
We have, therefore, an agreement with the
Soviet Union on defensive nuclear weapons,
where we are both limited, and we are mov-
ing now toward getting a limitation in the
off'ensive field.

And so those were the develojiments that
occurred in the year 1972.

Military Strength and Diplomacy

The other day I was talking to a Congress-
man. He is a Congressman who has always
voted for strong national defense. He said,
"Mr. President, give me an answer to my
constituents to this question. They say, 'Since
we have made such great progress toward
lieace, we have ended the war in Viet-Nam,

we have had this initiative with China and
this initiative with the Soviet Union, why
can't we now reduce our defenses regardless
of what the other side does and turn that
money that we take away from defense to
the very urgent problems at home?' "

Let me tell you, gentlemen, there is nothing
I would like to do more. A President never
likes to veto a bill when it is going to help
somebody anyplace in this country — our
schools or our hospitals or anything that you
say.

But, on the other hand, when we talk now
about national defense, let me tell you what
the challenge is — and you can help in this
respect — and what the danger is, a mortal
danger that we face insofar as reduction of
our defenses is concerned.

First, our defense budget has been re-
duced. With a new volunteer armed force,
considering the increased costs and the like,
we find that it is approximately a third re-
duction of what it was in 1968.

But second, we must also look at this situ-
ation: When they say, "Now that we have
made all this progress in 1972 toward peace,
let's reduce our defenses regardless of what
the other side does," what you are doing, in
effect, is advocating changing a game plan
that has worked.

Let me put it this way: We wouldn't have
ended the war in Viet-Nam with honor, we
wouldn't have had the initiative with China,
and we would not have had, without question,
the arms control and other agreements with
the Soviet Union, had the United States not
been strong and respected.

Strength without respect is meaningless.
That was another reason why this war had to
be ended on an honorable basis — because
otherwise we would have lost respect, not
only of our allies and the neutrals but also;
of our potential adversaries in the world.

But when we see what has happened then,!
we find that the Soviet Union, at the present
time, is preparing to come to the United]
States for a return summit visit in just a
few weeks. We are going to have some veryj
intensive negotiations. They are even more!

>»

let'
m
m

932

Department of State BulletirVS,

important than the negotiations we had last
year — although those were the first and
therefore the most newsworthy — because
they will move in arms control and other
fields of enormous importance to the future
of the world.

But, gentlemen, let me tell you, in the event
that the President of the I'nited States goes
into meetings with the Soviet leaders with
the Congress of the United States having uni-
laterally cut our defenses, then all hope for
an arms control agreement is completely
destroyed. Because when you really get down
to it in the field of international diplomacy —
and this is true of all fields in life — you can't
get something from anybody else unless you
have something to give.

And I say to you, we must never send the
President of the United States into any nego-
tiation with anybody as the head of the sec-
ond strongest nation of the world.

Xow, gentlemen, if you should go out and
make that kind of a statement, you some-
times may find jjeojile say to you what they
say to me: "Those who are for a strong de-
fense are for war, and those who are for
disarmament are for peace." It is just the
other way around. Disarmament can lead to
peace only if it is mutual. But let the day
never come when we disarm and the other
side arms, because that will enormously in-
crease the danger of war.

Let me describe it in more specific terms.
For example, in the field of offensive nuclear
weapons, we are ready, and we believe they
are ready, for an agreement in which we will
mutually agree that we will have a limita-
tion on the development of offensive nuclear
weapons.

But in the event, before we go into the
negotiations, we already have reduced our
own strength in that area, then their incen-
tive for making a deal is completely out the
window and we are second and they are first.

Let's go further. Many of you have served
in Europe, I know, and you know one of the
points that is going to come up in this Con-
gress will be the iwoblem with regai-d to what
we do about our forces in Europe. And Amer-

icans, 25 years after World War II, justifi-
ably are concerned about the fact that we
carry such a heavy load in Europe.

Very well-intentioned men in the House
and the Senate therefore say it is time for us
to bring our men home — half of them or a
third of them or a fourth of them, or what
have you — regardless of what the other side
does.

But here again, let's look at what would
happen. In the fall we are going to have very
significant negotiations with the Warsaw
Pact countries for a mutual reduction of
forces in Europe, a reduction on our side and
on theirs. As long as it is a mutual reduction,
the stability which is essential for peace in
that critical area of the world will be
maintained.

But if, on the other hand, before we go
into those negotiations this fall, the United
States unilaterally reduces its forces, all in-
centive that the Warsaw Pact forces and
that the Soviet Union would have to reduce
theirs is gone, and you would create that im-
balance which would enormously increase in-
stability and the chances for war.

So what I am saying to you is this: I am
for limitation of armaments, and I know
every one of you is. I am for, certainly in the
nuclear field, doing everything that we can
to reduce that danger that is hanging over
the world today.

But I also know that it is vitally important
that in this field of limitation of armaments
that we remember that the United States of
America is not a threat to the peace of the
world.

I have traveled in most of the countries of
the world. I have been to the Communist
countries and to the free countries. I have
yet to talk to a world leader who believes that
the United States of America threatens his
peace or his freedom. A strong United States
is a force for jieace; a weak United States
means that the peace will be threatened.

And so that is why I say at this point, not
that we want to be strong in order to domi-
nate anybody else. That period is long gone, if
it ever did exist in our own minds. But what

June 25, 1973

933

we need to recognize is that we now have a
balance in the world. We must maintain that
balance. And that is why, let us keep our
defenses up. Oh, take the fat off, wherever we
possibly can, but keep them up and be sure
in negotiations we go down only if the other
side goes down, and if we do that, then we
contribute to the peace of the world in which
we are all so very much interested.

Confidentiality of Negotiations

One other subject that is somewhat sensi-
tive that I will touch upon only briefly, that
I would like to ask for your support on, is
with regard to the security of the kind of
negotiations that we have.

I want to be quite blunt. Had we not had
secrecy, had we not had secret negotiations
with the North Vietnamese, had we not had
secret negotiations prior to the Soviet sum-
mit, had we not had secret negotiations over
a period of time with the Chinese leaders, let
me say quite bluntly, there would have been
no China initiative, there would have been
no limitation of arms for the Soviet Union
and no summit, and had we not had that
kind of security, and that kind of secrecy
that allowed for the kind of exchange that is
essential, you men would still be in Hanoi
rather than Washington today.

And let me say I think it is time in this
country to quit making national heroes out of
those who steal secrets and publish them in
the newspapers.

Because, gentlemen, you see, in order to
continue these great initiatives for peace, we
must have confidentiality, we must have se-
cret communications. It isn't that we are try-
ing to keep anything from the American
people that the American people should know.
It isn't that we are trying to keep something
from the press that the press should print.
But it is that what we are trying to do is to
accomplish our goal, make a deal. And when
we are dealing with potential adversaries,
those negotiations must have the highest de-
gree of confidentiality.

And I can assure you that in my term of
office as President in the first four years, and

also in this second four years, I am going to
meet my responsibility to protect the national
security of the United States of America
insofar as our secrets are concerned.

And by our secrets, what I am saying here
is not that we are concerned about every
little driblet here and there, but what I am
concerned about is the highest classified docu-
ments in our National Security Council files,
in the State Department, in the Defense De-
partment, which if they get out, for example,
in our arms control negotiations with the
Soviets, would let them know our position
before we ever got to the table. They don't
tell us theirs. They have no problem keep-
ing their secrets.

I don't want, and you don't want, their
system and that kind of control, but I say it
is time for a new sense of responsibility in
this country and a new sense of dedication
of everybody in the bureaucracy that if a
document is classified, keep it classified.

The World Role of the United States

Now, gentlemen, I turn to the challenge for
the future. I have talked about the need for
strength if we are going to have a mutual
reduction of armaments in the world, and
therefore of the threat to peace in the world.
I have talked about the need for national
security where our highly classified docu-
ments are concerned, so we can continue
these enormously important initiatives for ^
peace.

I now want to talk about why the United
States, after all that it has done for the
world in World War II, after the billions that
it has poured out since World War II, its sac-
rifices in Korea, its sacrifices in Viet-Nam, •
why we, the American people, have to con-
tinue to carry this load.

As I said earlier, believe me, as President,
what a relief it would be to say, "Now that
we have peace in Viet-Nam, we have a new
relationship with China and Russia, we can,
simply turn away from the problems of the!
world and turn to the jiroblems at home."

I can assure you gentlemen that if we werei
to follow that course, we would find very soon

934

Department of State Bulletin !S,

that we would he livinjr in a terribly danger-
ous world. The world is safer today than it
was 41/4 years ago. It can be more safe in
the years aliead. But that will only happen
pro\ided we follow the course that I have
tried to lay out to you here today.

As I look to that future, therefore, it is
vitally important that the United States con-
tinue to play the world role.

Let's look at just this century. We don't
need to go back any further than that. I
can imagine some of you in those long hours
of captivity were thinking back over several
centuries. But in any event, looking back just
over this century, World War I, the United
States could stand aside. After all, there was
Britain, there was France, two great powers
who thought as we did about the world, and
they could carry the load. And then we came
in toward the end in World War II. The
United States, for a time, could stand aside
because Britain was still strong, and France
at the begining had some strength, but even-
tually we had to come in.

But today, look at the world. Among the
free nations of the world there is no one else,
not the -Japanese, as you well know, even
though they have the economic strength, they
do not have the military strength and cannot

I be allowed to acquire it under their consti-
tution; and not one nation in Europe by
itself, or Europe collectively, has the strength

I to be the peacemaker in the world.

' So it is all right here. It is in America. It
is in that Oval Office, whoever is there, and
it is there for the foreseeable future. In other
words, the United States must maintain its
strength in order to play a role between the
great powers of the world and among the
irreat joowers of the world of reducing the
danger of war, because our ideals and our
goals — subject as they can be to much criti-
cism as far as tactics are concerned in the
world scene — our ideals and our goals are
for a world of peace. Our ideals and our goals
are for a world in which we reduce the bur-
den of arms, and therefore it is vitally im-
portant that this Xation that has that kind
of ideals and that kind of goals maintains its

t strength so that we can play that role.

But maintaining the strength alone is not
enough. It must be respected. And that means
that we must continue to have a policy which
commands respect throughout the world. We
must continue to insist on adherence to
agreements that are made. We must continue
to let the world know that while we have no
aggressive intentions anyplace in the world,
we will stand by our treaty commitments
wherever they are in the world.

That, you see, is the language of peace
rather than the language of bugging out of
the world and turning to what people wist-
fully might think to be a fortress America.
But let me tell you, fortress America might
have been before World War II a concept
that was viable. Today it is ridiculous. We
cannot be apart from the world, not when
weapons that can destroy us are 30 minutes
away.

And so we must i)lay this role. And rather
than playing it in terms of whining about it
and com])laining about it, let us do it proudly,
because what greater mission could a people
have than to say that in these years — the
seventies — of 1971-2-3-4-5 and 6, when we
reach our 200th birthday, the United States
of America played a great role in the world
and made the world safer not only for our-
selves but for everybody in the world. That
is the stake, that is the challenge we must
meet.

Today then, I ask for your support, obvi-
ously, for a strong national defense. That
is like the preacher talking to the choir.
But I know as far as you are concerned, you
will be for that, and I hope so many of you
will stay in our Armed Forces. We need you.

But also, beyond that, I ask for your sup-
port in heli)ing to develop the national spirit,
the faith that we need in order to meet our
responsibilities in the world. You have al-
)'eady contributed enoi-mously to that by your
statements on your return, by what you have
said, what you have done, and I am sure you
can contribute more to it in the future.

But the young peojile of America need to
hear the trutli. They will believe you. They
will believe you because you have suffered
so much for this country and have jiroved

June 25, 1973

935

that you will do anything that you can to do
what is best for America, not just for your-
selves.

Because at this particular point America
is the richest country in the world; militarily,
it is the strongest, and will always have that
potential because of its wealth. The only
question is whether we face up to our world
responsibilities, whether we have the faith,
the patriotism, the willingness to lead in this
critical period.

Gentlemen, by what you did and what you
said on your return, you have helped turn
this country around. You have helped rein-
still faith where there was doubt before.
And for what you have done by your faith,
you have built up America's faith. This Na-
tion and the world will always be in your
debt.

Those first four years in the office were not
easy ones for me in the international front,
fighting for an adequate defense budget,
fighting for a responsible foreign jiolicy, but
looking toward the balance of the second four
years, let me say I feel better because out in
this room I think I have some allies and I
will appreciate your help.

Secretary Rogers Opposes Cuts
in USIA Funds

Statement by Secretary Rogers ^

I am deeply disturbed to find that for the
second year in a row the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee is recommending crippling
cuts in the budget of the U.S. Information
Agency.

My concern arises from the fact that I
regard the overseas information and cultural
programs of USIA to be an important and
necessary part of our overall efforts to
achieve the goals of our foreign policy. In-
deed, my views have been strengthened by

' Issued at Washington on May .30 (press release
185)

my observations on the trip to Latin Amer-
ica from which I returned Monday night.
USIA officers and programs work in close
support of our diplomatic missions abroad,
and they are an integral part of the func-
tionings of modern diplomacy.

This year particularly, as we enter a pe-
riod of lessened tensions and increased nego-
tiations, it is vitally important that people
abroad understand fully and accurately what
our policy positions are — and what they are
not. In a period of detente, the relations
among nations tend to become more complex
and the issues more complicated. Now more
than ever we need to assure that USIA is
operating eff'ectively in support of the many
new diplomatic initiatives we are taking.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
has recommended an overall cut of more than
$31 million in the USIA budget for the
coming fiscal year. About half of this reduc-
tion would apply to USIA operations in the
foreign television, motion picture, press, and
publications fields and to the support funds
needed to keep all of USIA's information and
cultural programs functioning abroad and in
Washington.

These reductions in real terms would mean
closing of 28 posts abroad, including the
complete shutdown of USIA programs in
six countries. These represent assets which
have taken many years to develop and, once
lost, could not be replaced easily or quickly.

In addition, the committee has rejected the
request for $16 million needed to replace
the Voice of America transmitter we are
closing as a result of the reversion of Oki-
nawa to Japan. The loss of that transmitter,
without a replacement, would seriously limit
the ability of the U.S. Government to speak
via radio to the people of East Asia.

I confirm again the view I expressed last
year that the value of our international in-
formation and cultural programs in support-
ing and promoting our foreign policy should
not be debilitated, and I reiterate my strong
opposition to the proposed cuts in USIA
funds.

936

Department of State Bulletin 2;

United States-Latin American Economic Relations

Address by William J. Casey

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

I am grateful to the Getulio Vargas Foun-
dation for affording me tiiis opportunity to
discuss the foreign economic policy of the
United States with special emphasis on its
relationship to our close neighbors in this
hemisphere. In 1971, as Chairman of our
Securities and Exchange Commission, I vis-
ited Brazil and had talks with officials of
your Finance Ministry, your Central Bank,
and the stock exchanges in Rio and Sao
Paulo. I am looking forward to learning more
in these few days about the forces behind the
great economic dynamism which impressed
me so much on that occasion.

That impression has been strengthened as
I have observed and admired the i)erform-
ance of your economy since my last visit here.
With a growth rate of 10 percent a year, with
your annual rate of inflation so drastically re-
duced over the last decade from almost 100
percent to about 12 jjercent, with your ex-
ports rising 12 ])ercent a year and your man-
ufactured exports 20 percent, with the
I ability to increase your monetary reserves
. from $2.-5 billion to a little over $4 billion in
the last six months of 1972, with the infusion
last year of $3-^0 million in new private in-
vestments and almost a billion dollars in new
credits from the World Bank, the Inter-
; American Bank, and the Export-Import
Bank — with this record this nation of yours
ubviously has an enormous contribution to
make as well as a large stake in the world
economy.

Last week Secretary Rogers, in the most
extensive visit to Latin America made by a

' Made before the Getulio Vargas Foundation at
Rio de Janeiro on May 21 (press release 176 dated
May 29)

Secretary of State of the Ilnited States in
almost 40 years, spelled out a new policy of
seeking a mature partnership with the other
nations of this hemisphere. We see this as a
I'elationshii) between equals, characterized by
candor, by realism, and by mutual respect, in
which each of us works to achieve a produc-
tive collaboration which will make all of us
stronger and better partners in building a
better life for all the people of the Americas
and of the world.

With this purpose and in this spirit, we
can have before us a great adventure which
is worthy of the best that is in us for the
remainder of this century. But we must un-
dertake it with a realistic perception of the
world about us and with our feet on the
ground.

We stand today at a time when the inter-
national economy is undergoing fundamental
change. Fast communication and transport,
a vast expansion in world trade, and the
gi'eat mobility of capital and technology have
made the world economy increasingly one
and increasingly interdejjendent.

We have immediately ahead of us a major
multilateral effort to modernize the world
monetary system and the rules of interna-
tional trade.

After World War II the great economic
strength of the United States allowed us to
make international economic commitments
with little concern for their effect on our own
economy. Today the situation of the United
States in the world is not a comfortable one.
We have a $10 billion annual deficit in pay-
ments and a $6 billion trade deficit. Out-
standing dollar claims float around the world

1

June 25, 1973

937

far in excess of our reserves. New monetary
alignments have improved tliis position, and
tiie political will among the nations of the
world to make necessary reforms in the mon-
etary and trading systems promises further
stability and improvement. But it is never-
theless now clear that there has been a
fundamental change in the economic relation-
ships between the United States and the rest
of the world. Economic strength has become
more widely distributed among nations.
Many industrial nations have per capita in-
comes aiiproaching that of the United States.
Many of the develojiing countries have
broken out of their ])overty cycles and made
rapid strides in improving their standards of
living.

The reform of the international economic
system in which we are now all engaged
must reflect these changes in underlying
economic realities.

It is essential in this ])rocess for developed
and developing nations to work together, foi'
economic reform must benefit all our nations
and provide the framework in which the de-
velopment aspirations of the Latin American
people can be most readily fulfilled. That is
why the United States has welcomed the par-
ticipation of the developing countries of
Latin America as well as the other conti-
nents in the work of the Committee of
Twenty on monetary reform. That is why, on
this visit to Latin America, Secretary Rogers
has urged the nations of Latin America to
participate in the multilateral trade negotia-
tions to be launched at the September meet-
ing of the GATT [General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade] in Tokyo. We desire full
consultations on both monetary and trade
negotiations with the nations of Latin Amer-
ica, and Treasury Under Secretary Paul
Volcker and the President's Deputy Special
Trade Representative Ambassador [Harald
B.] Malmgren will be visiting Latin America
for that purpose.

After all, this is vitally important to the
nations of Latin America. They have a great
stake in a more realistic and a more open
world economy. As the most industrialized of
the developing regions of the world, this re-

938

gion's competitive position in world trade has
already been improved considerably by the
more realistic exchange rates which prevail
today, and its development can be enhanced
by reforms which keep exchange rates at
realistic levels and reduce barriers to trade.
The challenge of monetary reform is one
both developed and developing countries must
meet quickly and decisively. Latin America
and the United States share a common
objective in successful reform. It is an op-
portunity and important challenge for us, for
if the system does not permit all nations to
reach and stay in general equilibrium, re-
strictions on the flows of development assist-
ance, private capital, and trade will become
inevitable.

Reform of the World Trading System

To be fully effective, refoi'm of the mone-
tary system must be accomjianied by reform
of the trading system. There is now a great
opjiortunity for progress in the reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to international
trade. The great changes which have occurred
in the structure of world economic and
financial ]30wer require changes in trading
rules which strike a fair balance between the
legitimate interests of individual nations —
including the developing nations. This re-
quires a cooperative worldwide approach.

This is the spirit in which President Nixon
has proposed broad new legislative authority
for trade negotiations. The legislation has as
its fundamental premise that every nation
can and should benefit from expanding trade
and open trading practices, within the basic
framework of a competitive market system.
That openness must also be combined with
fairness for all nations.

It is in the elimination of nontariff barriers
that the mutuality of objectives between the
United States and Latin American nations
is perhaps greatest. A reduction in the
barriers to agricultural imports worldwide
would bring major benefits to your economy
and to ours.

In some instances, open markets and free
trade can bring change with disruptive speed.

jl'spo

Department of State Bulletin

Our proposed Ie8:islation recognizes this. Like
other nations, we need effective safesruards
when excessive hardshii)s are imposed on
domestic workers and business by sudden
surges and rapid changes in the pattern of
trade. The aim of such safeguards is not to
avoid adjustment but to ease the burdens of
adjustment for a transitional i)eriod and
thereby facilitate the process. Safeguards
which afford time to shift resources or meet
competition without protecting inefficiency
indefinitely are a force for liberalizing trade.
They should be worked out on an agreed and
consistent multilateral basis.

The United States realizes that developing
countries face special difliculties in entering
world markets, particularly when first at-
tempting to diversify into nontraditional ex-
ports. For that reason the trade bill would
permit the United States to join with other
industrialized countries in providing develop-
ing countries access to the markets of the
industrialized nations. A broad range of
manufactured products now regulated by
tariffs would be accorded duty-free treatment
in instances where countries in the early
stages of industrialization are beginning to
enter world markets.

This hemisphere's ability to compete in
the markets of Europe and Africa is being
imjiaired today by the Common Market's
system of special preferences accompanied
by reverse preferences for the developed
nations of Europe. This could lead to a huge
North-South trading bloc in the Eastern
Hemisphere. It is important to all the nations
of this Western Hemisphere that this system
of regional preferences be broadened out
into a generalized preference scheme afford-
ing all the developing countries the same
opportunity in the mai'kets of the industrial-
ized countries and affording no disadvantage
to industrialized countries in the markets of
other developing countries.

Regional and Bilateral Cooperation

Within this world economic .system, while
it is being modernized and after that has
been achieved, the nations of the Americas

have much to do both on a regional basis
and on a bilateral basis. In his Bogota speech,
Secretary Rogers stressed our policy of re-
gional cooperation and our desire to deal
directly as equal partners with each of the
sovereign nations of the hemisphere in re-
solving conflicts and furthering specific goals
and interests which we share with these
nations. -

Regional economic integration is one of
the major forces reshaping the world econ-
omy. The United States supported the forma-
tion and the enlargement of the European
Common Market, and we are now working
as diligently as we can in every available
forum on the mutual adjustments in both
policy and i)rocedure made necessary by the
fundamental fact that in our trade and eco-
nomic relationship we are dealing with the
world's largest trading economy rather than
as in the past with nine smaller nations.
In the same way, we continue to support
economic integration in the Latin American
Free Trade Area, the Andean Pact, the
Central American Common Market, and the
Caribbean Free Trade Area, and we are here
today on this trij) to explore how we can
work more effectively with these enlarged
economic structures as they take more con-
crete form and substance.

Similarly, the United States is prepared
to work with each nation of Latin America
on a one-to-one basis to improve the flow
of trade and technology and capital, both
private and public, to accelerate your devel-
opment and enhance the contribution which
your markets and your products make to the
world's progress and prosperity.

We will pursue a comprehensive policy de-
signed to help stimulate .social and economic
progress, particularly higher rates of per
capita economic growth, in the developing
world — a policy not of aid alone but employ-
ing a wide variety of economic relationships,
a policy involving coordination with other
developed countries and requiring serious ef-
forts from the developing countries them-
selves.

= See p. 912.

June 25, 1973

939

We will pursue it in recognition of the
fact that just as the developing nations need
access to the capital and cooperation of the
developed countries, so will we increasingly
need their cooperation and access to what
they can produce. The rapidly burgeoning
needs of the industrialized world for energy
and raw material resources offer new trade
possibilities that will both augment produc-
tion and foreign exchange earnings in the
developing world.

We are reviewing our development policies
to make them more effective by the fullest
coordinated use of international investment,
trade expansion, preferences, financing pro-
vided by multilateral institutions, bilateral
grant and loan assistance, technical assist-
ance and training, debt relief, and collabora-
tion in social and economic institution
building. You in this country and in this
institute have studied economic development
in great depth and practiced it with great
success. You know that the art of stimulat-
ing and engineering economic development
is not a static one. Depending on the stage of
development, we must call into play new
approaches, new techniques, new blends of
internal and external financing, of technical
assistance and capital infusion. We invite you
and your colleagues throughout the hemi-
sphere to a dialogue on the relationship of
development policy and development assist-
ance to such self-interest considerations as
our balance of payments, foreign investment
atmosphere, raw material needs, and world
trade and monetary relationships. In our dis-
cussions together and in our membership
in international financial institutions we
should weigh the value and availability of
multilateral and bilateral support, of the
relative value of high-leverage hard loans
against low-leverage soft loans, of financial
and technical assi-stance. Where should de-
velopment effort be focused? Should some
effort be shifted to building economic institu-
tions and sponsoring projects which can
bring countries already close to the takeoff
stage ovei' the top, where they become self-
sustaining, good markets and ultimately aid
donors themselves?

Investment and Ownership

Certainly, we all know that as development
progresses, the costs of continued social serv-
ices will have to be carried by tax revenues,
and economic expansion should attract ex-
ternal financing generated from public sav-
ings and the international capital markets.
As Secretary Rogers said last week in his
Bogota speech, "Each Latin American coun-
try must decide for itself whether it wants
to and how to attract private investment.
And it has the sovereign right to determine
the rules under which such investment op-
erates." But to attract private capital and the
technology and the managerial skills that
can accompany it, investors must know what
the rules are. They must know that they will
be able to repatriate earnings or sell their
investment at fair value if it is successfully
developed. We know and recognize and re-
spect the strong desire in some nations on
this continent for business to be locally
owned and controlled. Our businessmen
know this, too. It is up to them whether they
come here (Latin America, not Brazil) or
stay home. If another country wants them
and they come, we will encourage and facili-
tate the relationship, we will expect them to
adhere strictly to local law, and we will sup-
port them as we have been doing in their
rights to fair compensation for their prop-
erty if local public policy changes require
them to divest or broaden their ownership.
If the country wants broad local ownership,
we think we understand that. After all, we
think we invented the process of dispersing
ownership. In the United States our corpora-
tions are owned by thousands of individuals,
and no one is likely to own more than small
percentage points of our 10,000 publicly
traded enterprises. We are ready to share
our experience in creating broad public
ownership with the nations of Latin Amer-
ica as we have already done in Brazil and
several other nations. We have provided $5
million to the Organization of American
States for this purpose and have recently
loaned $15 million to the Andean Develop-
ment Corporation to encourage the develop-
ment of locally owned enterprises.

!

940

Department of State Bulletin

Jl

I cite this area of investment and owner-
ship to illustrate that in similar fashion, with
the kind of research and analysis which you
epitomize in the Vargas Foundation, we can
find ways to match our interests and resolve
the conflicts that will develop as both Latin
America and the United States continue to
build their industries and expand their trade
and as artificial methods such as special sub-
sidies are used to expand exports and pro-
voke the countervailing demand to protect
local industries.

President Nixon hopes to cooperate with
our American associates in the construction
of a new era of cooperation and understand-
ing in this hemisphere. A truly vital inter-
American community will not only meet the
challenges of this hemisphere but also reach
beyond it to supply constructive leadership
on global issues of common interest. These
goals will only be achieved if we reinforce
sound hemispheric economic relation.ships.
On this trip Secretary Rogers and those of
us who are accompanying him are motivated
by that purjjose.

I hope that what I have said here today
indicates some of the areas where all the
nations of this hemisphere can work to-
gether to enlarge and make more produc-
tive our mutually beneficial economic ties.

President Nixon Appoints Members
of Marine Mammal Commission

white House press release dated May 14

The President announced on May 14 the
apiiointment of three persons as members of
the Marine Mammal Commission for the
terms indicated. They are:

For a term of three years:

Victor B. Scheffer, of Bellevue, Wash.; retired
biologist with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
and author of several books on marine mammals.

For fi term of two years:

A. Starker Leopold, of Berkeley, Calif.; professor
of zoology, University of California at Berkeley.

For a tci'in of one year:

John Ryther, of Falmouth, Mass.; Chairman, De-
partment of Biology, Woods Hole Oeeanographic
Institution, Falmouth, Mass.

The President also announced the desig-
nation of Mr. Scheffer as Chairman of the
Marine Mammal Commission.

The three-member Marine Mammal Com-
mission was established by the Marine Mam-
mal Protection Act of 1972 (Public Law
92-522). Following the completion of the
staggered terms of the initial appointees,
members of the Commission will serve three-
year tei'ms. The President appoints members
from a list submitted to him by the Chair-
man of the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, the Secretary of the Smithsonian
Institution, the Diiector of the National Sci-
ence Foundation, and the Chairman of the
National Academy of Sciences.

The purposes of the Marine Mammal Com-
mission are: to undertake a review and study
of activities of the ITnited States pursuant to
existing laws and international conventions
relating to marine mammals; to conduct a
continuing review of the condition of stocks
of marine mammals, of methods for their
protection and conservation, of humane
means of taking marine mammals, of re-
search programs to be conducted, and of all
applications for permits for scientific re-
search ; to recommend to the Secretary of the
Interior revisions, as appro])riate, of the En-
dangered Species List with regard to marine
mammals ; to recommend to the Secretary of
State appropriate policies regarding exist-
ing or i)roposed international arrangements
for the protection and conservation of marine
mammals; and to undertake other studies and
make other recommendations it deems neces-
sary to further the protection and conserva-
tion of marine mammals.

June 25, 1973

941

THE CONGRESS

Department Discusses Return of Prisoners of War
and Efforts To Account for Missing in Action

Following is a statement made before the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy
and Scientific Developments of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 31 by
Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to the
Deputy Secretary of State for Prisoner of
War/Missing in Action Matters^

I appreciate the opportunity to report to
this subcommittee on the return of our pris-
oners of war and on our efforts to obtain the
fullest possible accounting for our missing-
in-action personnel in Indochina. These sub-
jects are not new to this subcommittee. Your
hearings on them in the past five years have
contributed greatly to public understanding
of the POW/MIA problem ; they constitute a
significant public record that will be of per-
manent value.

The return of prisoners on both sides,
with accounting for the missing and dead,
is covered in article 8 of the Viet-Nam agree-
ment signed January 27 in Paris. This ar-
ticle, also designated as chapter III of the
agreement, reads as follows: -

(a) The return of captured military personnel
and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried
out simultaneously with and completed not later
than the same day as the troop withdrawal men-
tioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange
complete lists of the above-mentioned captured
military personnel and foreign civilians on the day
of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get
information about those military personnel and
foreign civilians of the parties missing in action,
to determine the location and take care of the graves

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be
published by the committee and will be available
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

' For texts of the agreement and protocols, see
Bulletin of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.

of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and
repatriation of the remains, and to take any such
other measures as may be required to get informa-
tion about those still considered missing in action,
(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese
civilian personnel captured and detained in South
Viet-Nam will be resolved by the two South Viet-
namese parties on the basis of the principles of
Article 21(b) of the Agreement on the Cessation
of Hostilities in Viet-Nam of July 20, 1954. The
two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit
of national reconciliation and concord, with a view
to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease
suffering and to reunite families. The two South
Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve
this question within ninety days after the cease-fire
comes into effect.

Additional provisions are contained in a
separate protocol on captured persons. These
documents were signed by representatives of
the four parties to the Viet-Nam conflict: the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (North
Viet-Nam), the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of the Republic of South Viet-
Nam (the Viet Cong) , the Republic of Viet-
Nam, and the United States. Secretary
Rogers signed on behalf of the United States.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I
submit the Viet-Nam agreement and the pro-
tocol on captured persons for the record of
this hearing.

As is clear from the provisions quoted
above, and from the captu red-persons proto-
col, the return of prisoners on both sides,
with accounting for the dead and missing,
formed a key part of the Viet-Nam settle-
ment. Our government had emphasized to
the Communist side the importance we at-
tached to securing the expeditious release of
prisoners of war, with the fullest possible
accounting for the dead and missing. The
quoted sentences embody the essential pro-
visions on these subjects.

942

Department of State Bulletin

As specified in article 8(a), lists of "cap-
tured military personnel and foreign civil-
ians" were exchangfed on January 27, the
date of the sisninjr. North Viet-Nam listed
457 U.S. personnel and the Provisional Rev-
olutionary Government (PRG) listed 121, for
a total of 578, of whom 55(3 were U.S. mili-
tary iiersonnel and 22 were U.S. civilians.
These lists did not cover those cajitured in
Laos; and on February 1, in response to our
urgent request, a further list of nine Ameri-
cans, described as prisoners of the "Lao
Patriotic Front," was handed to U.S. officials
by Xorth Vietnamese officials in Paris. Those
nine included seven l\S. military i)ersonnel
and two civilians. The PRG subsequently in-
formed us they held one additional U.S.
prisoner, bringing the overall total of U.S.
personnel released from Indochina to 588.
The Communist side listed nine non-U. S. per-
sonnel on these lists: two West Germans, two
Canadians, two Philippine nationals, two
Thai, and one South Vietnamese.

To round out the figures, it should be noted
that two U.S. military personnel and one
American civilian who had been detained in
the People's Republic of China were released
during the same period and flown home un-
der Operation Homecoming. Thus the total
number of Americans returning home was
591.

Under article 8(a), the release of captured
military personnel (POW's) was to be carried
out "simultaneously" with the withdrawal of
U.S. troops, at apjiroximately 15-day inter-
vals. The first release took place close to that
schedule and was followed by a "good will"
release a few days later. When further re-
leases failed to keej^ to schedule, the President
ordered a halt in U.S. force withdrawals to
make clear the imi^ortance we attached to
prompt and full compliance with the agree-
ment. A final impasse over the relea.se of
prisoners caiitured in Laos was resolved
when North Viet-Nam arranged their re-
lease March 28 in Hanoi. The final prisoners
captured in Noith Viet-Nam were released
March 29.

It should 1)0 noted that the majority of
prisoners captured in South Viet-Nam, as

June 25, 1973

well as all those captured in Laos, were in
fact moved to and held in North Viet-Nam,
in most cases soon after their capture. Com-
munist authorities went to considerable
lengths to conceal this from the rest of the
world, presumably in furtherance of their
refusal to acknowledge North Viet-Nam's
responsibility for Communist forces in South
Viet-Nam. The U.S. prisoners from the
South were held separately from those cap-
tured in the North until shortly before their
release. Throughout the conflict. Communist
officials maintained the position that they
could not provide information or mail for
prisoners captured in South Viet-Nam be-
cause they were held in the "war zone"; i.e.,
South Viet-Nam. We have confirmation now
that the great majority were in fact iield in
North Viet-Nam, in many cases no farther
from the Hanoi post office than those cap-
tured in the North.

During the same 60-day period, the Re-
public of Viet-Nam, with our support,
released more than 26,000 Communist pris-
oners of war. Another 10,000 Viet Cong
POW's who had entered the "New Life" pro-
gram and made clear their desire to remain in
the Republic of Viet-Nam had been released
prior to the agreement. We were aware of the
problems attached to the release of prison-
ers of war in the Korean conflict, when a
settlement was delayed more than a year
largely over the question of nonforcible re-
patriation, and were determined that the
release of enemy prisoners of war in this
conflict should not become an obstacle to a
.settlement. Altogether, a total of 26,508
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong POW's
were released in comi)liance with the Viet-
Nam agreement and protocols. The Com-
munist side during the same i)eriod released
approximately 5,000 South Vietnamese
POW's.

From its past hearings this subcommittee
has fii'sthand testimony on the consequences
for our men of North Viet-Nam's refusal to
treat them in accordance with the Geneva
Convention. The Communist side never j^er-
mitted impartial inspection of POW camps;
mail and packages were sporadic and lim-

943

ited — virtually nonexistent for our men cap-
tured in South Viet-Nam and Laos (even
though they were held in the North).

The following information for the Repub-
lic of Viet-Nam thus provides an interesting
contrast. From 1966 through the end of 1972,
there were a total of 475 separate inspections
of POW facilities in South Viet-Nam by the
International Committee of the Red Cross,
carried out by 60 different ICRC delegates.
Reports on these visits were provided to the
Government of Viet-Nam, who shared them
with us because of our responsibility for
U.S.-captured POW's under article 12 of the
Geneva Convention.

During the three years 1970-72, Commu-
nist POW's received over 510,000 letters and
over 115,000 parcels, while sending over
280,000 pieces of mail. With rare exceptions
North Vietnamese POW's did not avail them-
selves of the opportunity to send mail to
their families in the North. The small num-
ber of letters sent by those men were for-
warded through the ICRC, but it is not
known what happened to them after they
reached North Viet-Nam.

It is a matter of continuing regret to us
that the Communist side persisted to the end
in its refusal to accept the ICRC in its hu-
manitarian role on behalf of prisoners of
war. Our negotiators sought to have the
ICRC designated to observe and assist in the
release and return home of POW's on both
sides under the Viet-Nam agreement. When
this was rejected, agreement was reached to
designate two or more "national" Red Cross
societies for this purpo.se (article 9 of the
captured-persons protocol). The Red Cross
societies of Canada and Poland wei'e nomi-
nated for this purpose, and the National Com-
missioner of the Canadian Red Cross went
personally to Viet-Nam to head his society's
team. The Communist side refused, however,
to cooperate in arrangements for even this
final effort at Red Cross inspection, and the
POW's were released without benefit of Red
Cross observation.

Article 8(b) of the Viet-Nam agreement
quoted above contains far-reaching jn-ovi-

944

sions for exchange of information on the
missing and on the dead. Although this sub-
ject has been covered in past war-ending
agreements, to my knowledge this is the most
specific such provision ever agreed to by the
two sides in an armed conflict. This section
is important in light of our experience fol-
lowing the Korean war, when North Korea
failed to provide information or accounting
for a large number of American and other
U.N. Command personnel known or believed
to have been in their hands.

It was also important in view of the Com-
munist side's poor record during this conflict
in identifying prisoners of war as required
by the Geneva Convention. Although we had
been able to accumulate information on many
of our men, especially on those captured in
North Viet-Nam, there was always uncer-
tainty as to the accuracy and completeness of
this knowledge. Until the day of the cease-
fire, we had received no lists or other direct
word on the majority of our prisoners cap-
tured in South Viet-Nam and Laos. There
had been no communication from these men
to their families, in some cases during pe-
riods of captivity extending up to nine years.

Thus we have long been aware of the im-
jiortance of obtaining the fullest possible ac-
counting for all our personnel. Through the
years, our dijilomatic efforts were part of a
wide-ranging effort to gather information
about our missing men. Family members and
others traveled throughout the world in pri-
vate efforts to seek word of loved ones. In
Indochina, our Embassies and U.S. forces in
the field carried out continuing efforts in this
area. The Joint Personnel Recovery Center
was the main repository for information on
the missing as well as on those listed as dead,
body not recovered.

At the time of the cease-fire, more than
1,400 U.S. personnel, including civilians,
were listed as missing in Indochina. They
come from all the military services and are
of high rank as well as low. They include
over 20 American civilians, among them con-
ti-act workers, merchant seamen, and a State
Department officer missing since the Tet of-

Department of State Bulletin

nsive in 19(i8. Three missionaries of the

ristian and Missionary Alliance have been

•^nne since May 30, 1962 — the longest time

for any Americans missinp or captured in

liulochina.

dur efforts to obtain information on these
people are goincr forward on three fronts:

1. .Is each POW returned, he was care-
Ihj debriefed for any information he might

)i(ire on anij others knoini to him — U.S. mili-
tary personnel, civilians, foreign nationals.
it might be no more than a nickname or a
ulimjise of someone across a prison com-
|Hiund. No matter how small the bit of infor-
mation, it was logged into our system and
carefully analyzed. Thus a stockpile of in-
fnrmation was acquired which has already
iit'lped resolve the cases of some of our miss-
ing men.

It should he noted that there is no indi-
cation from these debriefings that any Amer-
ican personnel continue to be held in
Indochina. All American prisoners known to
any of our returned POW's have either been
uleased or been listed by the Communist
authorities as having died in captivity. Re-
turnees with whom I have talked, including
tlinse who appeared before this subcommit-
iie May 23, are clear in their belief that no
U.S. prisoners continue to be held.

The present situation thus differs from

that following the return of our POW's in

Korea. You, Mr. Chairman [Representative

Clement -J. Zablocki], conducted hearings on

that subject and heard testimony about the

large number of Americans reported by re-

tuined POW's who were neither returned nor

accounted for. Despite persistent efforts by

■ U.N. Command and U.S. Government, the

ilier side in that conflict failed to provide

additional information, and our missing men

were eventually presumed dead. As stated,

. there are no reports from our returned men

in this conflict that other Americans are held

in captivity.

2. We are in direct contact irith officials of
"•r Communist side. In Saigon, we are pro-

I'ding through the Four-Party Joint Mili-

iiy Team established under the Viet-Nam

agreement. The team has already made two

trips to North Viet-Nam to visit cemeteries
where Americans who died in cajjtivity are
buried. Communist officials have also ac-
knowledged the existence of additional graves
of Americans who died in aircraft crashes or
of other causes. Our aim is to arrange the
early rejiatriation of the remains of as many
of these persons as possible.

At the same time, we have made clear our
urgent interest in receiving information on
the missing. Complete lists of our missing
personnel have been provided to the Four-
Party Team for this purpose.

In Laos, U.S. officials have been in direct
contact with representatives of the Lao Pa-
triotic Front (the Pathet Lao) to press for
additional information on Americans missing
or captured in Laos. We have told the Com-
munist side of our concern at the small num-
ber of Americans listed as captured in Laos,
in view of past hints that a lai'ger number
were held by Pathet Lao forces, and in view
of evidence that at least two others had been
captured in Laos. The Communist side has
repeatedly told us and has recently stated
publicly that there are no more Americans
captured or held in Laos. They have also said
that further accounting for the missing must
await the formation of a coalition govern-
ment, as specified in the February 21 Laos
cease-fire agreement. Our efforts to convince
the Communist side to proceed with this ac-
counting without waiting for a new govern-
ment to be formed have thus far been in vain.

There is little to say at this point regard-
ing missing or captured personnel in Cam-
bodia. In his press briefing January 24, Dr.
[Henry A.] Kissinger said, "We have been
told that no American prisoners are held in
Cambodia." We are aware of reports gath-
ered by journalists and others that there con-
tinue to be prisoners detained in Cambodia,
jiossibly including some of the 20 interna-
tional journalists missing in that area. Al-
though there has been no confirmation of
the.se reports from the Communist side, they
sugge.st the i)ossibility that some Western
I)ersonnel continue to be held in the country.
Journalists in a number of countries have
formed International Committees to Free

4 June 25, 1973

945

Journalists Held in Southeast Asia, the U.S.
committee of which is chaired by Walter
Cronkite of CBS News. We have maintained
close touch with this group and share their
hope for favorable word on the missing
newsmen.

3. We are carrying out our oivn efforts to
search for iyi formation on our missing and
dead. Specific responsibility for this has been
assigned to the Joint Casualty Resolution
Center, located in Thailand at Nakhon Pha-
nom near the Lao border. The JCRC is
manned by American military personnel and
functions with the close assistance of our
Embassies and consulates in the area. We
have told the Communist side about the
JCRC, making clear its peaceful, open, and
humanitarian purpose. The JCRC already
has carried out a number of searches, so far
in South Viet-Nam. We plan to work in har-
mony with local iieople wherever Americans
may be missing or dead, and we hope to have
the cooperation of the Communist authori-
ties. Our aim is to find the fullest possible in-
formation on each missing man. We recog-
nize this is an enormous undertaking and
that we cannot succeed in every case, or even
in a majority of cases. But we intend to try.

We want to do the job thoroughly, but we
also recognize an obligation to move quickly.
Many of our men have been missing for up
to eight years, some even longer. During that
time wives and families have lived with the
anguish — and the legal complications — of not
knowing the fate of their men. Speed is also
essential because information about the miss-
ing becomes more elusive with passage of
time.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I ex-
press my own sense of joy at the return of
our men. Seeing them last week when they
were here for the President's May 24 dinner,
I was reminded of the first group I saw ar-
riving at Gia Lam Airport in Hanoi last
February 12. The guards ordered the men
off the bus. Suddenly, the senior American
officer of the group took command away from
the guards and gave the orders for the men
to march in formation to the release point.

946

The guards tried to intervene but fell back.
It was clear then that, despite the grim ex-
perience of their captivity, our men had en-
dured and prevailed. They deserve our
thanks and commendation, as do their j
families. |

And they would be the first, I know, to }
join in expressing our sense of obligation to |
the missing and to their families. I can assure |
you this subject will continue to have our
most serious attention.

U.S.-Uruguay Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate

Message From President Nixon ^

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans-
mit herewith the Treaty on Extradition and
Cooperation in Penal Matters Between the
United States of America and the Oriental
Republic of Uruguay, signed at Washington
on April 6, 1973. I transmit also, for the in-
formation of the Senate, the Report of the
Secretary of State with respect to the Treaty.
The Treaty significantly updates the pres-
ent extradition relations between the United
States and Uruguay and adds to the list of
extraditable off^enses both narcotic offenses,
including- those involving psychotropic drugs,
and aircraft hijacking. Provision is also made
for extradition for conspiracy to commit the
listed extraditable offenses.

The Treaty will make a significant contri-
bution to the international effort to control
narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Sen-
ate give early and favorable consideration to
the Treaty and give its advice and consent to
ratification.

Richard Nixon.
The White House, May 18, 1973.

'Transmitted on May 18 (White House press re-
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. K, 93d Cong., 1st sess.,
which includes the text of the treaty and the report \ ivj
of the Secretary of State.

\

Department of State Bulletin y

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

93rd Congress, 1st Session

Tension and Detente: Congressional Perspectives on
Soviet-American Relations. Report of a study
mission to the Soviet Union by Representatives
Donald M. Fraser, Benjamin S. Rosenthal, and
John H. Buchanan, Jr. April 1973. 36 pp.

Convention for the Protection of Producers of
Phonoprams. Messape from the President of the
United States transmitting the Convention for
the Protection of Producers of Phonograms
.Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phono-
grams, done at Geneva October 29, 1971. S. Ex.
G. April 11, 1973. 5 pp.

The United Nations Environment Program Par-
ticipation Act of 1973. Report to accompany H.R.
6768. H. Rept. 93-124. April 11, 1973. 3 pp.

Providing for the Immediate Disposal of Certain
Abaca and Sisal Cordage Fiber Now Held in the
National Stockpile. Report to accompany H.R.
4682. H. Rept. 93-130. April 12, 1973. 9 pp.

Oil Pollution Act Amendments of 1973. Report to
accompany H.R. 5451. H. Rept. 93-137. April 13,
1973. 18 pp.

U.S. and Switzerland Sign Treaty
on Assistance in Criminal Matters

Following is a Department announcement
issued May 25, together with a summary of
the U.S.-Siriss Treaty on Mutiuil Assistance
in Criminal Matters which was made avail-
fihle to the press by the Department that day.

I
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

F'tes.s release 174 liatcrl May 2.1

A U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters was signed at Bern on
May 25 by .Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs Walter J. Stoessel. Jr., and U.S. Am-
bassador to Switzerland Shelby Cullom Davis

June 25, 1973

for the United States and by Ambassador
Albert Weitnauer for Switzerland.

The treaty, which will be presented to the
U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, pro-
vides for broad assistance in the investiga-
tion and prosecution of criminal matters. The
treaty also provides for s])ecial assistance
where organized crime is involved.

The treaty was negotiated over a period of
four years with the United States being rep-
resented by rei)resentatives of the Depart-
ment of State, the Department of Justice, the
Department of the Treasury, and the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission.

The treaty is a pioneering effort of the
two governments. It represents the first ma-
jor agreement for the United States in the
area of mutual assi.stance in criminal mat-
ters. For Switzerland, it represents the first
agi-eement of this tyi^e with a country having
an Anglo-Saxon system of law.

The treaty should contribute to a further
strengthening of U.S.-Swiss cooperation in
combating crime, and in particular organized
crime. It expands on current close, effective
U.S.-Swiss cooperation in the illegal nar-
cotics trade and Interpol activities.

SUMMARY OF THE TREATY

The United States and Switzerland signed a
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
at Bern on May 25. The ti-eaty contains 41 articles,
grouped in nine chapters, and a schedule listing 35
categories of offenses to which the treaty is appli-
cable. The treaty is supplemented by si.\ exchanges
of letters interpreting certain language used in the
provisions of the treaty.

The treaty was negotiated over a period of four
years with the United States being represented by
representatives of the Department of State, the De-
partment of Justice, the Department of the Treas-
ury, and the .Securities and Exchange Commission.
The extended discussions were prompted by the
need to better understand the respective American
and Swiss legal systems and devise ways in which
the two countries could work together in providing
assistance to each other in connection with criminal
matters.

The treaty is a pioneering effort. It represents
the first major agreement for the United States with
any country in the area of mutual assistance in

947

criminal matters. For Switzerland, it represents the
first agreement of this type with a country having
an Anglo-Saxon system of law. A number of the pro-
visions of the treaty are based on provisions m the
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters, to which Switzerland is a party.

In general, the treaty provides for broad assistance
between the United States and Switzerland in crim-
inal matters. This includes assistance in locating
witnesses, the obtaining of statements and testimony
of witnesses, production and authentication of busi-
ness records, and service of judicial or administra-
tive documents. The treaty also provides for special
assistance where organized crime is involved. It was
felt that organized crime with its widespread dan-
gers to society and its international scope of opera-
tions justifies the needs for special legal assistance.
The treaty establishes an obligation to furnish
assistance in connection with investigations or court
proceedings involving certain types of offenses. Com-
pulsory measures are generally required to be used
only in connection with matters which are considered
to "be criminal offenses in both countries and are
listed in the schedule to the treaty. One exception
to the foregoing applies to organized crime cases
which are covered by special provisions.

Tax crimes are excluded from the treaty and are
governed exclusively by the convention of May 24,
1951, between the United States and Switzerland on
the avoidance of double taxation except in certain
organized-crime situations.

Several provisions of the treaty deal with the
Swiss concept of banking secrecy. This is a com-
plicated subject involving provisions of Swiss law
and practice. The treaty overcomes bank secrecy un-
der certain conditions in specifically delineated cases.
Careful attention was paid as to how Swiss bank
information could be made available to, and used by,
the United States in connection with serious crimes
in the United States.

The treaty does not create any new crimes in
either country. It is limited to providing to each
country additional evidence and information for
use by it in investigating or prosecuting the crimes
established by its domestic law. It is intended to
allow each of the countries to overcome some of the
problems presented in obtaining information or evi-
dence concerning activities taking place outside of
that country in furtherance of crimes committed
in that country.

It is expected that most requests for assistance
under the treaty will be executed by appropriate
authorities in the two countries at the request of
their respective Departments of Justice.

The signing of this treaty by the United States
and Switzerland is another example of close and
effective cooperation between the two countries in
matters of mutual interest. Other noteworthy related
areas of close U.S. -Swiss bilateral cooperation con-
cern the illegal narcotics trade and Interpol
activities.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the
principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty
of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at
Wellington November 10, 1972, at the Seventh
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.'
Notification of approval: Chile, June 1, 1973, for

recommendations VII-1 through VII-3, VII-5,

VII-7, and VII-8.

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency of October 26,
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at
Vienna September 28, 1970.
Acceptances deposited: Ethiopia, May 24, 197 .i;

Paraguay, Peru, June 1, 1973.
Entered into force: June 1, 197-3.

Aviation

Amendment of article V of the agreement of
September 25, 1956 (TIAS 4048), for the joint
financing of certain air navigation services in
Iceland by increasing the financial limit for
services. Adopted at Montreal March 29, 1973.
Entered into force March 29, 1973.
Deposit of consents: Australia, March 1, 1973;
Belgium, February 6, 1973; Canada, January
26, 1973; Cuba, March 12, 1973; Czechoslovakia,
February 15, 1973; Denmark, January 17, 1973;
Finland, March 9, 1973; France, February 19,
1973; Federal Republic of Germany, February
13 1973; Greece, February 20, 1973; Ireland,
February 15, 1973; Italy, February 12, 1973;
Japan, February 20, 1973; Netherlands, Febru-
ary 15, 1973; Norway, March 9, 1973; Pakistan,
February 15, 1973; Sweden, February 2, 1973;
Switzerland, February 19, 1973; United King-
dom, January 29, 1973; United States, February

15, 1973. ^„ ,

Amendment of article V of the agreement of Septem-
ber 25, 1956 (TIAS 4049), on the joint financing
of certain air navigation services in Greenland
and the Faroe Islands by increasing the financial
limit for services. Adopted at Montreal March 29,
1973. Entered into force March 29, 1973.
Deposit of consents: Australia, March 1, 1973;
Belgium, February 6, 1973; Canada, January
26 1973- Cuba, March 12, 1973; Czechoslovakia,
March 14, 1973; Finland, March 9, 1973;
France, February 19, 1973; Federal Republic
of Germany, February 13, 1973; Greece, Febru-
ary 20 1973; Iceland, Ireland, February 15,
1973; Italy, February 12, 1973; Japan, Febru-
ary 20, 1973; Netherlands, February 15, 1973;
Norway, March 9, 1973; Pakistan, February 15,
1973; Sweden, February 2, 1973; Switzerland,

!

1

Not in force.

948

Department of State Bulletin;

February 19, 1973; United Kingdom, January
29, 1973; United States, February 15, 1973.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow,
and Washington December 29, 1972.'
Sigttatiire: Somalia, April 16, 1973.

Property — Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12
entered into force May 19, 1970.- Articles 13
through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for
the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.
Ratification deposited: United States, May 22,
1973, for ai-ticles 1 through 12.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecom-
munications Satellite Organization (Intelsat),
with annexes. Done at Washington August 20,
1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS
7532.

Accessioit deposited: Iraq, June 6, 1973.
Ratification deposited: Italy, June 4, 1973.

Operating agreement relating to the International
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (In-
telsat), with annex. Done at Washington .August
20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973.
TIAS 7532.
■^ Signature: Iraq, June 6, 1973.

Sea, Exploration of

Convention for the International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen
September 12, 1964. Entered into force July 22,
1968; for the United States April 18, 1973.
Proclaimed by the President: June 7, 1973.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage
caused l)y space objects. Done at Washington,
London, and .Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into
force September 1, 1972.-
Ratiftcd by the President: May 18, 1973.

, Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965.
Entered into force Januai-j- 1, 1967; for the United
States .May 29, 1967. TI.AS 6267.
Territorial application: Australia for the Terri-
tories of Australia and the Trust Territory
administered by .Australia, February 27, 1973.
Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space
telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva
July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973.
TIAS 7435.

Xotifications of approval: Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, March 16, 1973; Ireland,
March 15, 1973; Singapore, (with reservation),
March 19, 1973.

, June 25, 1973

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

-Agreement amending the grant agreement of May
.30, 1972, as amended (TI.AS 7443), for relief and
rehabilitation. Signed at Dacca April 10, 1973.
Entered into force April 10, 1973.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of May
30, 1972 (TIAS 7443), as amended, for relief anil
rehabilitation. Signed at Dacca May 29, 1973.
Entered into force May 29, 1973.

El Salvador

Agreement amending the agreement of April 19,
1972 (TIAS 7284), relating to trade in cotton
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington April 10 and May 16, 1973. Entered into
force May 16, 1973.

Hungary

Consular convention. Signed at Budapest July 7,
1972.

Ratifications exchanged: June 6, 1973.
Enters into force: July 6, 1973.

Jordan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities,
relating to the agreement of April 4, 1968 (TIAS
6475). Signed at -Amman May 20, 1973. Entered
into force May 20, 1973.

Pakistan

-Arrangement concerning the agreement of May 6,
1970, as amended and extended (TIAS 6882, 7369,
7598), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected
by exchange of notes at Washington May 22,
1973. Entered into force May 22, 1973.

Poland

Consular convention, with protocols and exchanges
of notes. Signed at Warsaw May 31, 1972.
Ratifications exchanged: June 6, 1973.
Enters into force: July 6, 1973.

Portugal

-Agreement amending the agreement of December
22, 1972 (TIAS 7539), relating to exports of wool
and man-made fiber textile products from Macao.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon May 30,
1973. Entered into force May 30, 1973.

Agreement amending the agreement of December 22,
1972 (TIAS 7540), relating to trade in cotton
textiles between Macao and the United States.
Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon May 30,
1973. Entered into force May 30, 1973.

Romania

Consular convention, with protocol. Signed at Bucha-
rest July 5, 1972.

Ratifications exchanged: June 6, 1973.
Enters into force : July 6, 1973.

' Not in force.

- Not in force for the United States.

949

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement foi' sales of
agricultural commodities of March 17, 1972 (TIAS
73,30). Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok
May 11, 1973. Entered into force May 11, 1973.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Protocol establishing and approving regulations
governing procedures and other matters of the
Standing Consultative Commission,' with regula-
tions. Signed at Geneva May 30, 1973. Entered
into force May 30, 1973.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 17 confirmed the following
nominations:

Jack B. Kubisch to be an Assistant Secretary of
State [for Inter-American Affairs].

Robert J. McCloskey to be Ambassador to the
Republic of Cyprus.

Phillip V. Sanchez to be Ambassador to Honduras.

Marshall Wright to be an Assistant Secretary of
State [for Congressional Relations].

'^ This Commission shall promote the objectives and
implementation of the provisions of the strategic
arms limitation agreements.

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of Press Relations, Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 4 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 139A
of May 9, 145 and 146 of May 14, 147 and 150
of May 15, 155 and 156A of May 16, 157 of
May 17, 160, and 162 of May 18, 167 of May
23, 171 of Mav 24, 174 and 175 of May 25, 176
of May 31, 180 and 181 of May 29, and 185
and 186 of May 30.

No. Date Subject

*191 6/4 Study Group 3, U.S. National Com-
mittee for CCIR, to meet July
10.

tl92 6/5 Rogers: House Committee on
Foreign Affairs.

tl93 6/5 Rush: Industrial College of the
Armed Forces, Washington.

*194 6/6 Rogers to visit Denmark and at-
tend CENTO and NATO meet-
ings.

*195 6/6 San Francisco Symphony Orches-
tra tours U.S.S.R.

tl96 6/6 Kubisch: Council of the Americas,
Washington.

tl97 6/6 Sisco: House Subcommittee on the
Near East and South Asia.

"198 6/7 Rush: Senate Subcommittee on
Foreign Commerce and Tourism
(summary).

*199 6/8 Bray named Deputy Assistant
Secretary and Special Assistant
to the Secretary for Press Re-
lations (biographic data).

1200 6/8 Pedersen: Commonwealth Club of
San Francisco.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

950

Department of State Bulletin

INDEX June 25, 1973 Vol. LXVIII, No. 1774

Africa. Tenth Anniversary, Organizntinn nf
African Unity (Nixon, Rush) . 927

Argentina. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-L)ay
Visit to Latin .\merica (statements and
news conferences) 90.3

Brazil. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-Day Visit
to Latin America (statements and news
conferences) 90.3

mbodia. Department Discusses Return of
Prisoners of War and Efforts To .\ccount
for Missing in Action (Sieverts) .... 942

ilombia. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-Day
Visit to Latin .America (statements and
news conferences) on:i

ingress

infirmations (Kubisch, McCloskev, Sanchez,

Wright) 950

ingressional Documents Relating to Foreig^n

Policy 947

ipartment Discusses Return of Prisoners of
War and Efforts To Account for Missing

in .\ction (Sieverts) 942

'right confirmed as .Assistant Secretary for
iCongressional Relations 950

prus. McCloskev confirmed as Ambassador . 950

partment and Foreign Service
infirmations (Kubisch, McCloskey, Sanchez,
Wright) 950

partment Honors Returned Civilian Pris-
oners of War (citation) 928

:onomic Affairs. United States-Latin Ameri-
can Economic Relations (Casey) .... 937

ivironment. President Ni.xon .Appoints Mem-
bers of Marine Mammal Commission . . . 941

tradition. U.S.-Uruguay Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon) . . . 94(5

londuras. Sanchez confirmed as .Ambassador . 950

iformation Policy. Secretary Rogers Opposes
Cuts in USIA Funds (Rogers) 936

imaica. Secretary Rogers .Makes 17-L)ay Visit
to Latin .America (statements and news con-
ferences) 'Mr.',

los. Department Ui.scus.ses Return of Pri.s-
oners of War and Efforts To -Account for
Mi.ssing in .Action (Sieverts) ;Ml'

[tin .America

^ubisch confirmed as .Assistant Secretary for
Inter- .American .Affairs 950

retary Rogers Makes 17-Day Visit to Latin
America (statements and news confei-ences) 903

ited States-Latin .American Economic Re-
lations (Casey) 937

Mexico. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-Day Visit
to Latin America (statements and news
conferences) 903

Middle East. U.S. Seeks Constructive Outcome
of U.N. Review of Middle East (Scali) . . 929

Military Affairs. President Nixon Addresses
Returned Prisoners of War (Nixon) . . . 930

Nicaragua. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-Day
Visit to Latin America (statements and news
conferences) 903

Peru. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-Day Visit
to Latin America (statements and news
conferences) 903

Presidential Documents

President Nixon .Addresses Returned Prisoners
of War 930

Tenth .Anniversary, Organization of .African
Unity 927

Switzerland. U.S. and Switzerland Sign Treaty
on .Assistance in Criminal Matters (Depart-
ment announcement, summary of treaty) . . 947

Treaty Information

Cun-ent .Actions 948

U.S. and Switzerland Sign Treaty on Assist-
ance in Criminal .Matters (Department an-
nouncement, summary of treaty) .... 947

U.S.-Uruguay Extradition Treaty Transmitted
to the Senate (Nixon) 946

United Nations. U.S. Seeks Constructive Out-
come of U.N. Review of Middle East (Scali) 929

Uruguay. U.S.-Uruguay Extradition Treaty
Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon) . . . 946

Venezuela. Secretary Rogers Makes 17-Day
Visit to Latin America (statements and
news conferences) 903

Viet-Nam

Department Discusses Return of Prisoners of
War and Efforts To .Account for Missing in
.Action (Sieverts) 942

Department Honors Returned Civilian Pris-
oners of War (citation) 928

President Nixon .Addresses Retumed Prisoners
of War (Nixon) •. . . 930

Nnme Index

Casey, William .J 937

Kubi.sch, Jack R 950

.McCloskey, Rol)ert J 950

Nixon, President 927, 930, 941, 946

Rogers, Secretar.\ 903, 936

Rush, Kenneth 927

Sanchez, Phillip V 950

Scali, John A 929

Sieverts, Frank .A 942

Wright, Marshall 950

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/■ 3

iS'//7^9-/7?^/ J

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Volume LXVIII, Nos. 1749-1774
January l-June 25, 1973

INDEX

Numbei

■ Date of Isstce

Pages

Number

Date of Issue

Pages

1749

Jan.

1,

1973

1-32

1762

Apr. 2,

1973

373-412

1750

Jan.

8.

1973

33-52

1763

Apr. 9,

1973

413-440

1751

Jan.

15,

1973

53-80

1764

Apr. 16,

1973

441-472

1752

Jan.

22,

1973

81-100

1765

Apr. 23,

1973

473-508

1753

Jan.

29,

1973

101-124

1766

Apr. 30,

1973

509-544

1754

Feb.

5,

1973

125-152

1767

May 7,

1973

545-588

1755

Feb.

12,

1973

153-192

1768

May 14,

1973

589-632

1756

Feb.

19,

1973

193-216

1769

May 21,

1973

633-672

1757

Feb.

26,

1973

217-248

1770

May 28,

1973

673-716

1758

Mar.

5,

1973

249-280

1771

June 4,

1973

717-834

1759

Mar.

12,

1973

281-312

1772

June 11,

1973

835-866

1760

Mar.

19,

1973

313-336

1773

June 18,

1973

867-902

1761

Mar.

2fi,

1973

337-372

1774

June 25,

1973

903-950

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

OfipOJUlUKt

Corrections for Volume LXVIII

The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call attention to the following
errors in volume LXVIII:

March 5, p. 261, col. 1: Line 16 should read "craft or vessel itself
with all goods carried".

April 30, p 523, col. 1: The last two lines of the introductory para-
gi-aph should read "William D. Eberle, President Nixon's Special Rep-
resentative for Trade Negotiations."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Publication 8736

Released September 1973

For sale by trie Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402
Price 30 cents (sinsle eojly). Subscription price $16 per year; »7 additional for foreign mailing

INDEX

Volume LXVIII, Numbers 1749-1774, January 1-June 25, 1973

Abjibade, Tiamiou, 577
Abshire, David M., 425
Adjustment assistance: 587; Eb-

erie, 531; Rogers, 517
Afghanistan: Nixon, 793; Sisco,
405
Treaties, agreements, etc., 336,
440, 471, 472
Africa {see also names of individ-
ual countries) :
Economic Community, relation-
ship (Nixon), 796
Southern: Bennett, 90; Newsom
460, 578, 581; Nixon, 797
U.S. policy, relations, and role:
Newsom, 456; Nixon, 723,
794; Rogers, 551
Visit of Mr. Updike, 205
Visit of President Nixon, ques-
tion of (Nixon), 416
Agency for International Devel-
opment (see also Development
assistance), returned POW's,
citation (Rush), 928
Agnew, Spiro, 294
Agricultural surpluses, U.S., use
in overseas programs, agree-
ments:
Consolidation and rescheduling
of payments under P.L.
480, titlfe 1, agreement with
India, 508
Current actions: Afghanistan,
336; Bolivia, 124; Colom-
bia, 671; Ecuador, 216;
Guinea, 472; Iceland, 32;
Indonesia, 152, 312, 440;
Jordan, 949; Khmer Repub-
lic, 280; Korea, 100, 411,
632, 902; Morocco, 716;
Pakistan, 312, 508; Philip-
pines, 508; Sudan, 472;
Thailand, 950; Viet-Nam,
216, 411, 508, 716; Zaire,
716
Dollar exchange for zlotys
accrued under certain agri-
cultural commodities agree-
ments, agreement with
Poland deferring purchase
by U.S., 247
Settlement of, understanding
with Japan, 671

Agriculture (see also Agricultural
surpluses and name of prod-
uct) :
Agricultural development and
P.L. 480 programs, author-
ization requested (Hannah),
885
Agricultural research develop-
ment and training center,
agreement with Bahamas,
216
Foot-and-mouth disease and
rinderpest, agreements re
prevention of: El Salvador,
440, 508; Honduras, 372
Air Force mission agreement with

Argentina, suspension, 52
Albania (Rush), 536
Aldrich, George H., 876
-Algeria (Rogers), 255

Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,

865, 902
U.S. liquified natural gas im-
ports (Nixon), 787
Ali, M. Hossain, 402
.\llison. Royal, 60
Americanism (Nixon), 127
Amity and economic relations,
agreement with Ethiopia, 472,
671, 716
Amnesty: Nixon, 473; Rogers, 259
Andean Development Corporation :
Casey, 940; Rogers, 910, 911
Andreotti, Giulio, 603, 604 605
Antarctic seals, conservation, con-
vention with annex and final
act (1972) : Chile, France,
Japan, 215

.Antarctic Treaty, principles and
objectives, recommendations:
Chile, 948; France, South Af-
rica, 864; U.S., for recommen-
dations VII-1 through VII-4
and VII-6 through VII-9,
VII-5 accepted as interim
gfuideline, 246

.Arab-Israeli conflict: 692; Bush,
25; Kissinger, 432; Nixon,
723, 736, 839; Rogers, 129;
Rush, 421
Geneva conventions (1949), lim-
ited applicability of (Aid-
rich), 877, 880

Arab-Israeli conflict — Continued

Interim Suez settlement,
proposed: Bush, 26; Rogers,
9, 130, 550; Sisco, 326, 486

Israeli-Jordan settlement, ques-
tion of (Rogers), 250

Israeli raid on Lebanon: Nixon,
786; Scali, 656, 657, 659

Libyan plane shot down by Is-
rael: Dillon, 369; Nixon,
786; Sisco, 322, 325

Mediterranean conference, ques-
tion of (Rogers) , 9

Military balance (Rush), 697

Security Council review, pro-
posed (Scali), 929

Situation report: Nixon, 786;
Rogers, 634; Rush, 476;
Sisco, 327

U.S. peace efforts: Nixon, 783;
Rogers, 250, 285, 379, 549,
589, 590; Rush, 482; Sisco,

322, 484, 844

U.S. policy, U.S. oil needs, ques-
tion of effect on: Nixon,
787; Rogers, 635; Sisco,
848

U.S. -Soviet interests: Nixon,
787; Rogers, 250; Sisco,

323, 327

Arbitral awards, foreign, conven-
tion (1958) on recognition and
enforcement of: Denmark,
280; Korea, 410
Argentina:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,
52, 192, 216, 247, 335, 371,
411. 670, 865
U.S. relations (Rogers), 918,

919, 922
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 903, 918
Armacost, Michael H., 64
Armaments (see also Arms con-
trol. Defense, Military as-
sistance, and Nuclear en-
tries) :
Foreign Military Sales Act,
finding of eligibility for
purchases under, Presiden-
tial determination (Nixon),
483 ^

Sales, U.S. policy: Newsom,
583; Nixon, 782, 797;

Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

951

Armaments — Continued
Sales — Continued

Rogers, 917; Rush, 698, 857;
Tarr, 894
U.S. -Chinese-Soviet compara-
tive strength: Nixon, 807;
Rush, 479
Armed conflict, human rights

(Aldrich), 876
Armed forces, U.S.:

General purpose forces (Nixon),

810
Military strength: Nixon, 473;

Rogers, 590; Rush, 478
Pacific (Sullivan), 199
Reduction, U.S. policy: Bray,
426; Nixon, 206, 840; Rog-
ers, 590
Arms control and disarmament
(see also Nuclear entries) :
Bush, 73; NAC, 3; Nixon, 814
Chemical arms control (Nixon),

822
World disarmament conference,
proposed (Bush), 77
Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, U.N., 12th annual re-
port, transmittal (Nixon), 701
Armstrong, Anne L., 425
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish (Wein-

traub), 133
Armstrong, Willis C, 203, 529
Arnold, Hans, 297
Ascension Island, agreement with
U.K. re expanded use of, 632
Asia, South Asia, and Southeast
Asia (see also Asian Develop-
ment Bank and names of
individual countries) :
Second Asian Population Con-
ference: Clayton, 12, 15;
Costa, 12; text of declara-
tion, 19
U.S. policy, relations and role:
Green, 503; Nixon, 404
(quoted), 723, 770, 772, 789,
812; Porter, 445; Rogers,
548, 591; Rush, 421; Sisco,
403
Visit of Dr. Kissinger (Ziegler),
313

Asian Development Bank:

Articles of agreement: Bangla-
desh, British Solomon Is-
lands Protectorate, Burma
Tonga, 901
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 213
Assistance in criminal matters,
treaty with Switzerland, an-
nouncement and summary of
treaty, 947

Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (Agnew), 297
Asylum, right of (Rogers), 251

952

Atomic energy, civil uses of, agree-
ments: EURATOM, 336; Ja-
pan, 472; Korea, 440

Atomic Energy Agency, Interna-
tional (Nixon), 824
Safeguards:

Application to existing bi-
lateral agreement with
Korea, 471
Application under nonprolif-
eration treaty and suspen-
sion of existing safeguards
agreement: Philippines,
U.S., 335
Negotiations with EURATOM
(Bush), 76
Statute, amendment of article
VI: Cyprus, 123; El Salva-
dor, 631; Ethiopia, 948;
Finland, 543; Holy See,
280; India, 371; Indonesia,
507; Ivory Coast, 371; Ja-
maica, 123; Mexico, 79; Par-
aguay, Peru, 948; Sweden,
246; Zambia, 507
Australia:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 191,

246, 543, 948, 949
U.S. Ambassador (Green), con-
firmation, 472
Austria:

East-West Institute, proposed

(McGee), 54
Intelsat agreement (1971), with

annexes, ratification, 80
U.S. consulate in Salzburg re-
opened, 247

Automotive traffic. See Road traf-
fic
Aviation:

Hijacking (see also Terrorism) :
Bennett, 81; Brower, 647,
872; Nixon, 828; Rogers,
556
Extradition provisions (see
also Hijacking agreement
with Cuba, infra), 687
International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO), Extra-
ordinary Assembly, proposed
(Brower), 873-874
Mozambique, question of sale of
U.S. light aircraft (New-
som), 582
North Atlantic charter flights,
U.S. acceptance of agreed
principles: Rein, 23; an-
nouncement, 20; text of dec-
laration of agreed principles,
22
Treaties, agreements, etc.:

Advance charter flights agree-
ments: France, 716, 864;
Germany, Federal Repub-
lic of, 715; U.K., 508, 669

Aviation^Continued
Treaties — Continued

Air navigation services in
Greenland and the Faroe
Islands, joint financing
agreement (1956), Fin-
land, 471
Amendment of article V:
Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Cuba, Czech-
oslovakia, Finland,
France, Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Pakistan, Swe-
den, Switzerland, 948;
U.K., U.S., 949
Air navigation services in Ice-
land, joint financing agree-
ment (1956), Finland,
471
Amendment of article V:
Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Cuba, Czecho-
slovakia, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany,
Federal Republic of,
Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, Pakistan, Swe-
den, Switzerland, U.K.,
U.S., 948
Air transport agreements il
with: Hungary, 411; Iran,
216, 245; Poland, 152;
Spain, 310, 312
Certificates of airworthiness,
agreements: Sweden, 671;
U.K., 124

Civil air transport agreement
with Soviet Union, 544

Hijacking agreement with
Cuba: 280; Brower, 647;
Nixon, 828; Rogers, 249,
251, 254, 255, 258; text
of notes, 260, 372c

International a i r services
transit agreement (1944) :
Fiji, 410; Hungary, 151;
Oman, 215; Swaziland,
670

International civil aviation
convention (1944) : Bang-
ladesh, 79; Fiji, 371 j
Oman, 215; Swaziland,
310
Amendment, question of

(Brower), 872, 874
Protocol on authentic tri-
lingual text: Cuba, 410;
Tunisia, 507
Protocols r e amendmeni
(1962): 439, 715
(1971): 215

Department of State BulletirlMex,

Ml

Aviation — Continued
Treaties^ — Continued

Offenses and certain other acts
committed on board air-
craft (19G3), Malawi, 246
Suppression of unlawful acts
against the safety of civil
aviation (1971):
Current actions: Bulpraria
(with reservation) , 471 ;
Byelorussian S.S.R.
(with reservation) , 8G4;
China. Republic of, 79;
Denmark 151; Egypt,
123; Fiji, 371; Guyana,
52; Hungary (with res-
ervation), 79; India, 32;
Ivory Coast, 123; Jor-
dan, 543; Malawi (with
reservation), 52; Mex-
ico, 191; Nicaragua, 52;
Paraguay, 191; Philip-
pines, 471; Portugal,
543; Soviet Union
(with reservation) , 310;
Ukrainian S.S.R. (with
reservation), 865
Entrv into force: 79, 215;
U.S., 335
Suppression of unla^vful seiz-
ure of aircraft (1970):
El Salvador, 151; Guyana,
52; Ivory Coast, 123; Ko-
rea, 151; Malawi (with
reservation), 52; Philip-
pines, 471; Portugal, 246
Unification of certain rules re
international transporta-
tion by air (1929), Iraq,
79
Protocol to amend: Costa
Rica, 471 ; Luxembourg,
246
U.S., inspection of passengers
(Rogers), 256

B

Bahamas, agricultural research de-
velopment and training cen-
ter, agreement, 216
Balance of payments (Wientraub),
138
U.S.: 226; Casey. 448, 539, 849;
Flanigan, 361, 363; Hillen-
brand, 463; Nixon, 225, 321,
329,800; Rogers, 552; Rush,
381, 422-423; Shultz, 298
Oil imports (Casey), 703
Presidential authority re im-
port restrictions, pro-
posed: Katz, 528; Nixon,
519; Rogers, 524
Bangladesh: Nixon, 789; Rogers,
549

Bangladcsh^Continued

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

402
Treaties, agreements, etc., 79, 80,

152, 311, 901, 949
U.S. aid: 24; Nixon, 289, 791;
Sisco, 405
Barbados, treaties, agreements,

etc., 99, 152, 280, 715
Belgium, treaties, agreements, etc.,
80, 335, 471, 507, 632, 865, 948
Benge, Michael, 928
Bennett, Jack F. (Shultz), 301
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr., 81, 87, 89,

116
Berger, Marilyn, 251, 322
Berlin (Rush), 386, 476
Berlin agreement: 691; Nixon,
731, 760; Rogers, 546; Rush,
384, 420, 477
Bhutan, treaties, agreements, etc.,

191, 865
Big-power responsibility (Nixon),

126, 475, 720, 934
Bill of Rights Day and Human
Rights Day and Week, procla-
mation, 11
Biological and toxin weapons
(Nixon), 821
Convention (1972): Bush, 76
Current actions: Barbados,
280; Brazil, 336; China,
Republic of, 280; Czech-
oslovakia, 670; Denmark,
335; Dominican Republic,
311; Guyana, 99; Hun-
gary, 79; Iceland, 280;
India, 151; Laos, 439;
New Zealand, 32; Philip-
pines, 865; Poland, 191;
Thailand, 151; Tunisia,
865
Blake, Robert (Heath), 273
Bolivia, ocean dumping convention

(1972), signature, 124
Brandt, Willy, 688, 689
Branscomb, Lewis, 650
Bray, Charles W., Ill, 426, 447
Brazil :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,
192, 280, 335, 371, 507, 544,
670
Visit of President Nixon, pro-
posed (Rogers), 918
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 915
Brezhnev, Leonid (Kissinger), 397
British Solomon Islands Protecto-
rate, admission to Asian De-
velopment Bank, 901
British Virgin Islands, agreement
with U.K. OP lease of certain
land on Island of Anegada,
372
Brookens, Norman J., 928

Brewer, Charles N., 264, 434, 644,

872
Brown, Harold, 60, 447
Brownell, Herbert (Rogers), 905
Bruce, David K. E.: 313, 414;

Nixon, 413
Budget of United States Govern-
ment— FY 1974 (excerpts),
206
Bulgaria: Rogers, 286, 547; Rush,
536
Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

128
Treaties, agreements, etc., 410,
471
Burma, admission to Asian Devel-
opment Bank, 901
Burns, Arthur F. (Shultz), 301
Burundi (Nixon), 797
Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

637
Treaties, agreements, etc., 440
Bush, George, addresses and state-
ments :
Arab-Israeli conflict, 25, 27
Arms control, 73
Security Council meetings in
Panama, U.S. position, 242
Terrorism, 92
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Re-
public, treaties, agreements,
etc., 124, 471, 865, 949

Calendar of international confer-
ences, 29, 406
Cambodia. See Khmer Republic
Cameroon, treaties, agreements,

etc., 246, 544
Canada:

Exchange rates, question of

(Shultz), 305
Fishery discussions with U.S.,

606
Former Prime Minister Pearson,
death of: Nixon, 108; Rog-
ers, 108
ICCS membership:

Conditions for participation

(Rogers), 6
Continuance, question of (Rog-
ers), 344, 373
North Atlantic charter flights,
U.S. acceptance of agreed
principles: Rein, 23; an-
nouncement, 20; text of
declaration of agreed prin-
ciples, 22
Telecommunications satellites
agreement clarified, texts of
letters, 145
Treaties, agreements, etc., 79, 80,
124, 336, 371, 372, 471, 588,
866, 948
U.S.-Canada Interparliamentary
Conference (Rush), 586

*

Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

953

Canada — Continued

U.S. relations: Nixon, 756; Rog-
ers, 555, 923
Capital markets (Casey), 448
Caribbean Development Bank

(Rogers), 910
Casey, William J.: 216, 425, 448,
525, 530, 539, 638, 702, 849,
937; Rogers, 553, 838, 904
Central African Republic, treaties,

agreements, etc., 411, 631
Cereals, trade in, termination of

agreement with U.K., 80
Chad, ocean dumping convention

(1972), signature, 80
Chang Ying-wu, 132
Cheese, import quotas increased,

651
Chemical weapons (see also Bio-
logical and toxin weapons) :
Bush, 74
Chile:

Debt rescheduling discussions

(Crimmins) , 366
President AUende, meeting with
Secretary Rogers ( Rogers),
916, 922
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,

215, 948
U.S. assistance. Secretarial de-
termination to permit con-
tinued assistance, 11
U.S. relations (Rogers), 916
China, People's Republic of: Green,
504; Nixon, 718; Rush, 418
Arms limitation talks, question
of participation (Kissin-
ger), 431
Chairman Mao, question of talks

with (Kissinger), 316
Indochina, international confer-
ence on, question of partici-
pation (Kissinger), 166
Leaders of (Kissinger), 397
Restrictions eased on visits by
U.S. aircraft and ships, an-
nouncement, 4
Shenyang Acrobatic Troupe,
U.S. visit: Chang, 132;
Green, 308; Nixon, 131
Trade (Casey), 638
Treaties, agreements, etc., 100,

371, 410, 440
U.S., Chinese liaison offices, es-
tablishment: 313; Bray, 447;
Kissinger, 314, 316, 317;
Nixon, 413, 673, 728; Rog-
ers, 378; Rush, 482; an-
nouncement, 414
U.S. -Chinese cultural and sci-
entific enchanges: Kissin-
ger, 315, 316, Nixon, 727,
828; Rush, 421
U.S. prisoners, release of: Kis-
singer, 314, 315; Nixon, 195,
728; Rush, 387

China, People's Republic of — Con.

U.S. private claims and P.R.C.

blocked assets, discussions:

Kissinger, 315, 316, 317;

Rogers, 344, 548

U.S. relations: Bush 26; Green,

306; Kissinger, 318, 395,

431, 674; Nixon, 206, 292,

474, 720, 724, 727, 839, 840,

932; Rogers, 129, 257, 546,

548, 589; Rush, 421, 854;

Scali, 491

India, question of effect on

(Nixon), 792
Soviet position (Rogers), 378
Trade: 241; Green, 308; Kis-
singer, 316, 317; Nixon,
514, 727; Rogers, 130
Viet-Nam peace settlement, atti-
tude on (Sullivan), 202
Visit of Dr. Kissinger: Kis-
singer, 314; Nixon, 728;
Rogers, 257; Ziegler, 313;
announcement, 224 ; text of
joint communique, 313
Visit of President Nixon: Arma-
cost, 70; Nixon, 722, 724
China, Republic of (Kissinger),
431
Treaties, agreements, etc., 79,
80, 280, 508, 631
Chou En-lai (see also China, Peo-
ple's Republic of) : Kissinger,
397
Civil Aviation Organization, In-
ternational, Libyan aircraft
shot down by Israel, text of
resolution calling for investi-
gation: 370; Dillon, 369
Civilian population, protection of
in armed conflict (Aldrich),
880
Hungary, agreement with, 370,

372
Nigerian civil war losses, ex
gratia payments, announce-
ment, 329
U.S. private claims and Peo-
ple's Republic of China
blocked assets, discussions:
Kissinger, 315, 316, 317;
Rogers, 344, 548
Classification Review Committee:
Acting Chairman, designation,

650
Progress report, 649
Classified information (Nixon),

934
Claxtbn, Philander P., 12, 15
Coffee, international agreement

(1968), Italy, 631
Colombia:

Quita Sueno treaty (Nixon), 144
Treaties, agreements, etc., 124,

215, 631, 670
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 911, 912

'f
Colorado River salinity problems:

Nixon, 781, 833; Rogers, 905
International Boundary and
Water Commission, provi-
sions of minute 241, agree-
ment with Mexico, 866

Communications (see also Radio
and Telecommunications) :
Omega navigational station,
agreement with Liberia, 716

Satellites:

Earth resources surveys, co-
operative research in re-
mote sensing, agreement
with Brazil, 192, 544
Earthwatch (McGee), 54
ERTS (Earth Resource Tech-
nology Satellite) program
(Nixon), 827
Global commercial communi-
cation satellite system,
agreement and special
agreement (1964), termi-
nation, 99
International Telecommunica-
tions Satellite Organiza-
tion (INTELSAT) :
Nixon, 827
Agreement (1971) : Afghan-
istan, 471; Algeria, 52;
Argentina, 32; Austria,
80; Barbados, 152; Bel-
gium, 80; Brazil, 52;
Cameroon, 246; Central
African Republic, 411;
Colombia, 215; Egypt,
99; Finland, 152; Ger-
many, Federal Republic i
of, 191; Guatemala, 52;
Iran, 32; Iraq, Italy,
949; Ivory Coast, Ja-
maica, Korea, 32; Mad-
agascar, 246; Mexico,
52; Netherlands, 865;
Peru, 52; Philippines,
32, Tanzania, 124; Tu-
nisia, 215; Turkey, Ven-
ezuela, 191; Viet-Nam,
99
Agreement and operating
agreement, entry into
force (Nixon), 42
International organization im-
munities granted. Execu-
tive order, 871
Operating agreement (1971):
Afghanistan, 472; Argen-
tina, 411; Barbados, 152;
Central African Republic,
411; Finland, 52; Iraq,
949; Jamaica, 32; Mada-
gascar, Sri Lanka, 246
Launching and associated serv-
ices by NASA, agreement
with U.K., 152, 190

954

Department of State Bulletin

r

Communications — Continued
Telecommunications satellites,
Canada-U.S. agreement clar-
ified, 145
Conferences, international, calen-
dar of, 29, 406
' >>ngo (Brazzaville), World
Intellectual Property Organi-
zation, convention (1967), no-
tification of application of
transitional provisions, 311
Congo (Kinshasa) : Nixon, 797
Congress, U.S.:

Executive and legislative pow-
ers, balance of : (Rush), 424
Foreign policy, documents re-
lating to, lists, 24, 72, 151,
214, 289, 335, 439, 506, 655,
706, 863, 891, 947
Kissinger, relations (Kissinger),

396
Latin America military equip-
ment sales, position on
(Nixon), 782
Legislation, proposed:

Anti-inflation trade bill

(Nixon), 532
Deep seabed resource manage-
ment (Moore), 707
Development assistance pro-
gram (Hannah), 883
Energy policy: Nixon, 561;

Shultz, 571
Export Trade Act amendment

(Nixon), 521
Foreign Assistance Act:
Amendment (Nixon), 289
1973: 693; Nixon, 174
FY 1974, authorization re-
quest: Hannah, 883;
Rush, 854
Generalized trade preferences
(see also Trade Reform
Act under Trade) : Rog-
ers, 904, 914, 921
Indochina, reconstruction, bud-
get request FY 1974:
Hannah, 886; Rush, 856
Inter-American Development
Bank, U.S. appropriation
(Rogers), 679, 914
Pension reform (Nixon), 518
Realignment of currency rates

(Shultz), 299, 303
S. 1443 (concessional credits) :

Rush, 698
Security Assistance Act FY
1974: Rush, 696, 856;
Tarr, 892
Trade Reform Act of 1973:
Casey, 936; Nixon, 321,
513, 674, 686, 734, 804;
Rogers, 285, 523. 551, 552,
590, 677, 679, 835, 926;
Shultz, 300, 302
Unemployment insurance and

Congress — Continued

Legislation, proposed — Con.

compensation (Nixon),
517
USIA budget cuts opposed

(Rogers), 936
War powers legislation
(Brower), 434
North Viet-Nam and Indochina
reconstruction program, po-
sition on: Kissinger, 319,
427; Nixon, 194, 349; Rog-
ers, 253, 258, 284, 376
Senate:

Advice and consent:

Endangered species conven-
tion, ratification urged:
Nixon, 628; State De-
partment, 628
Loadline convention amend-
ments, ratification urged
(Nixon), 470
Most-favored-nation status
for Soviet Union, effect
of Soviet emigration
policy: Nixon, 519; Rog-
ers, 378, 547, 636, 837;
Rush, 480; Stoessel,
861
OAS convention on acts of
terrorism, U.S. ratifi-
cation (Rogers), 678
Ocean dumping convention,
ratification urged
(Nixon), 369
Patent classification agree-
ment, ratification urged,
506
Uruguay extradition treaty

(Nixon), 946
U.S.-Colombia treaty on
Quita Sueno (Nixon),
144
World Heritage convention,
ratification urged:
Nixon, 629; State De-
partment, 630
Confirmations, 216, 247, 472,
848, 950
U.S. armed forces in Europe,
position on: Bray, 426; Rog-
ers, 5, 591, 592
Use of armed forces abroad
(Cambodia), position on
(Rogers), 654
Conservation :

Antarctic seals, convention

(1972) with annex and final

act: Chile, France, Japan,

215

Endangered species (Nixon),

832
Endangered species of wild
fauna and flora, interna-
tional trade, convention
(1973):
Current actions: Argentina,

Conservation — Continued

Endangered species of wild
fauna and flora — Continued
Belgium, Brazil, Costa
Rica, 335; China, Repub-
lic of, 631; Cyprus, Den-
mark, France, Germany,
Federal Republic of, Gua-
temala, Iran, 335; Israel,
371; Italy, 335; Japan,
Kenya, 670; Luxembourg,
335; Malagasy, 507; Mau-
ritius, 335; Morocco, Ni-
ger, 371; Panama, 335;
Paraguay, 670; Philip-
pines, South Africa, 335;
Sudan, 631 ; Sweden, Swit-
zerland, 507; Tanzania,
670; Thailand, 335; Togo,
371; Tunisia, 439; U.K.,
U.S., Venezuela, Viet-
Nam, 335
International Conference to
conclude: 628; Morton,
608; Nixon, 609; Train,
609, 612
Final Act (excerpts), 618
Report of U.S. delegation,

text, 613
Text of convention, 619
U.S. ratification urged: Nixon,
628; report of Depart-
ment of State, 628
Migratory birds and birds in
danger of extinction, con-
vention for protection of,
Japan, 472, 716
Wildlife conservation conference,
announcement, 23
Consular relations:

Bilateral agreements with: Fiji
(continuance in force of
U.S. convention with U.K.),
52; Hungary, 472, 671, 949;
Poland, 32, 472, 671, 949;
Romania, 472, 671, 949
U.S. consulate in Salzburg, Aus-
tria, reopened, 247
Vienna convention (1963), cur-
rent actions: Australia, 543;
Denmark (with reserva-
tion ) , 336 ; El Salvador, 371 ;
Guatemala, 543; Jordan,
507; Viet-Nam, 901
Acquisition of nationality,
optional protocol: Aus-
tralia, 543; Denmark,
336; Viet-Nam, 901
Optional protocols: Australia,
543; Denmark, 336; Viet-
Nam, 901
Containers, safe (CSC), interna-
tional convention (1972) with
annexes: Bulgaria, 410; Can-
ada, Germany, Federal Re-
public of, 79; Hungary, Ko-
rea, Poland, 410; Switzerland,

Ijlndex, January 1-June 25, 1973

955

Containers, safe — Continued

Turkey (with reservation),
U.K., U.S., 79; Yugoslavia,
543

Continental shelf, convention
(1958), Greece (with reserva-
tion), 124

Copyright convention, universal
(1952), Soviet Union, 336

Costa, Marjorie A., 12

Costa Rica:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

577
Treaties, agreements, etc., 124,
335, 410, 471

Cotton textiles. See Textiles

Crimmins, John Hugh, 366, 681

Criminal matters, mutual assist-
ance agreement with Switzer-
land: 902; announcement and
summary of treaty, 947

Cromer, Earl (quoted), 191

Cuba:

Hijacking agreement with U.S.:
Rogers, 249, 251, 254, 255,
258, 556; text of note, 260,
372c

Treaties, agreements, etc., 280,
410, 439, 948

U.S. passports, restrictions, 488

U.S. policy: Hurwitch, 468;
Nixon, 778; Rogers, 255,
258, 680
Cultural relations and programs:

Cultural property, convention
(1970) re prohibiting and
preventing illicit import, ex-
port, and transfer of own-
ership: Argentina, 3 71;
Kuwait, 439; Niger, 79

Educational, cultural, scientific,
technical and other fields,
agreement with Romania on
exchanges and cooperation,
32

Educational, scientific, and cul-
tural materials, agreement
on importation of (1950):
Barbados, 715; Fiji, 311;
Libya, 410

German-U.S. cultural talks, 297

Historic German manuscripts
recovered (Sutterlin), 432

International Centre for Study
of Preservation and Resto-
ration of Cultural Property,
Statutes of (1956): Den-
mark, Iran, 439

International expositions, con-
vention (1928), protocol of
amendment: Belgium, Bul-
garia, Byelorussian S.S.R.,
(with reservation), Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Hungary, Israel,

956

Cultural relations and programs —
Continued

International expositions — Con.
Italy, Monaco, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Soviet
Union, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Tunisia, Ukrainian
S.S.R., U.K., U.S., 471

Romania-U.S. exchanges agree-
ment for 1973-1974, an-
nouncement and text, 119

Visual and auditory materials
of educational, scientific,
and cultural character,
agreement for facilitation
of international circulation
(1954), Libya, 410
Customs:

Commercial samples and adver-
tising materials, interna-
tional convention (1952),
Fiji, 311

Containers, customs convention
(1972) : Bulgaria, 410; Can-
ada, 80; Greece, Hungary,
Korea, Poland, 410; Swit-
zerland, Turkey (with res-
ervation), U.K., U.S., 80

Customs Cooperation Council,
convention (1950) establish-
ing, Mauritius, 670

Customs facilities for touring,
convention (1954), Fiji, 310

Temporary importation of pri-
vate road vehicles, customs
convention (1954), Fiji, 310

Temporary importaion of pro-
fessional equipment, cus-
toms convention (1962), and
annexes, Cyprus, 280
Cyprus (Bush), 26

Treaties, agreements, etc., 123,
280, 335, 865

U.S. Ambassador (McCloskey),
confirmation, 950
Czechoslovakia:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 631,
632, 670, 716, 948

U.S. relations: Rogers 286, 547;
Rush, 535

Dahomey, Ambassador to U.S.,

credentials, 577
Daughtrey, Robert N., 293 (quot-
ed)
Davies, Richard T., 51, 247
Davis, W. Kenneth, 650
Debt rescheduling:

Chile (Crimmins), 366
India, agreement with, 508
Defense, national: Nixon, 473, 719,
721, 723, 806, 839, 932; Porter,
442; Rogers, 637
Budget FY 1974: Nixon, 206,
474; Rogers, 591

Defense — Continued

Strategic policy (Nixon), 808
Strategic stockpiles, guidelines:
Nixon, 862; Rogers, 918
Democracy (Nixon), 292
Denmark:

NATO forces, question of reduc-
tion (Rogers), 5
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,
151, 280, 335, 336, 371, 439,
471, 948
Dent, Frederick B., 380
Development assistance: Nixon,
212, 213, 694, 804; Rogers, 855
Authorization request FY 1974:
Hannah, 833; Rush, 855
Dillon, Betty C, 369
Dinitz, Simcha, 577
Diplomatic relations, Vienna con-
vention (1961): Bhutan, 191;
Central African Republic, Co-
lombia, 631 ; Germany, East,
410; Guyana, 246; Tonga,
371; Viet-Nam, 901
Optional protocol re compulsory)
settlement of disputes. Cen-
tral African Republic, 631
Diplomatic representatives in U.S.,
credentials: Bangladesh, 402;
Bulgaria, 128; Burundi, 637;
Costa Rica, Dahomey, 577;
Ecuador, 128; Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, 637; Greece,i
128; Guyana, Iceland, 402;!
Iran, Israel, 577; Laos, 128;
Malaysia, Mauritania, 402;1
Panama 128; Paraguay, 402 ;1
Sudan, 128 ;i

Disaster relief: *

Budget FY 1974: Hannah, 888;

Nixon, 214
Nicaragua (Williams), 141
Emergency shelter for earth-
quake victims, grant
agreement, 247
U.S. legislation, propose di
(Nixon), 289, 694
Disputes, compulsory settlement
of, optional protocol to Vienna
consular relations conventior
(1963): Australia, 543; Den-
mark, 336; Viet-Nam, 901
Disraeli, Benjamin (Heath), 275j
Dominican Republic, treaties I
agreements, etc., 124, 311, 31!
Downey, John T. : Kissinger, 315;

Nixon, 195; Rush, 387

Drugs, narcotic: Brower, 645

Nixon, 719, 724, 781, 829; Rok

ers, 556; Unger, 333; Well

man, 897

Convention (1931) limiting an(

regulating distribution o

narcotic drugs, as amended

and protocol, successior

Zambia, 715

Eti

G

Department of State Bulletii

ii

Drugs — Continued

Extradition treaty provisions:

687; Nixon, 946
Federal drug law enforcement ac-
tivities, reorganization pro-
posed (Nixon), 498
International Narcotics Control
Assistance Program (Nix-
on), 804
Opium, convention re suppres-
sion of (1912), Zambia, 715
Psychotropic substances conven-
tion (1971): Lafontant, 111
Current actions: Brazil 507;
Finland, 280; Mauritius,
865; Sweden, 280
Single convention on narcotic
drugs (1961): Lafontant,
111
Current actions: Australia,
246; Finland, 371; Haiti,
410; Honduras 670; Ja-
pan, Korea, 246; Luxem-
bourg, 52; Morocco, New
Zealand, 246; Niger, 99;
Pakistan, 246; Singapore,
543; Sweden, Tunisia,
246
Protocol amending : Costa
Rica, Haiti, 410; Ivory
Coast, Jordan, 507; Ken-
ya, 507; Korea, 410
U.N. Narcotics Control Board,
U.S. candidate (PoUner),
nomination, 607
U.N. programs: Lafontant, 110;
Wellman, 897

East-West relations (see also Eu-
rope) : 690; Kissinger, 597;
NAC, 1; Nixon, 1, 736, 761;
Rogers, 286, 546; Rush, 476,
533, 868; Scali, 491
Committee for furtherance of,

proposed (Rush), 868
Trade: Casey, 638, 849; Rogers,
837
Strategic trade controls
(Casey), 642
Eban, Abba (quoted), 844
Eberle, William D., 380, 530
Economic and Social Council, U.N.,

documents, list, 310
Economic assistance, post-war, and
agricultural commodities
agreements, understanding
with Japan re settlement of,
671

Economic policy and relations,
U.S.:
Council of Economic Advisers
annual report (excerpts),
226

llndex, January 1-June 25, 1973

Economic policy and relations,
U.S. — Continued
Domestic: Nixon, 218, 321, 328,
351, 503; Shultz, 301
Food price controls (Nixon),
416
Economic Report of the Presi-
dent (Nixon), 225
Foreign: Flanigan, 359; Nixon,
225, 328, 798; Rogers, 551,
554, 590; Weintraub, 133
Capital controls, phasing out

of (Shultz), 302
International economic report
(Nixon), 502
State Department role (Casey),
849
Economic programs and coopera-
tion, Asia (Nixon), 773
Ecuador:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

128
Treaties, agreements, etc., 216,
280
Education:

Education and human resource
development, authorization
request (Hannah), 885
Educational, cultural, scientific,
technical and other fields,
agreement with Romania on
exchanges and cooperation,
32
Educational, scientific, and cul-
tural materials, agreement
on importation of (1950) :
Barbados, 715; Fiji, 311;
Libya, 410
Romania-U.S. exchanges agree-
ment for 1973-1974, an-
nouncement and text, 119
Educational, Scientific and Cul-
tural Organization, U.N.
(Nixon), 824
Constitution (1945): Bangla-
desh, East Germany, 80
Educational exchange programs:
Germany-U.S., 544
Japan-U.S. (Armacost), 71
Lincoln Lectures, 205, 487, 598
Egypt:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 99,

123
U.S. relations: Rogers, 257;
Sisco, 328
El Salvador, treaties, agreements,
etc., 151, 371, 440, 508, 631,
949
Energy sources and problems:
Casey, 542; Nixon, 719, 795,
830; Rogers, 256, 551, 916;
Sisco, .327, 486, 848
Algerian liquified natural gas
exports to U.S. (Nixon),
787
Atlantic coast lease sale, ques-
tion of date (Shultz), 570

Energy sources and problems —

Continued
Brazilian offshore oil research,
question of U.S. cooperation
(Rogers), 916
International ramifications (Cas-
ey), 702
Oil import policy and national
energy requirements: Arm-
strong, 203; Nixon, 563;
Shultz, 566
Soviet liquified natural gas, ques-
tion of U.S. imports: Nixon,
734; Shultz, 571
U.S. energy policy: Nixon, 561;
Shultz, 566
Executive order, text, 573
U.S. gasoline shortage (Shultz),

569, 570, 571, 572
Venezuelan oil (Rogers), 908
Environmental problems and con-
trol (see also Conservation) :
Brower, 646; NAC, 3; Nixon,
719, 831; Unger, 333
Conference on the Human En-
vironment: 56; McGee, 53;
Nixon, 832
Energy needs, question of effect

on (Shultz), 570
General Assembly international
environmental cooperation
machinery, establishment
(McGee), 53
U.N. Environment Fund

(Nixon), 824, 831
U.S. programs (Nixon), 219
U.S.-Soviet cooperation: McGee,

55; Nixon, 733, 832
World Heritage convention, rat-
ification urged: Nixon, 629;
State Department, 630
Ethiopia (Nixon), 796

Treaties, agreements, etc., 472,

671, 716, 948
U.S. visit of Emperor Haile
Selassie, 841
Euratom (European Atomic En-
ergy Community) : 336; Bush,
76
Europe (see also names of ind'vid-
ual countries) : Rush, 418
Conference on security and co-
operation: 691; Nixon, 1,
195, 674, 730, 736, 761; Rog-
ers, 5, 130, 286, 547, 589,
591; Rush, 537
Linkage with MBFR, question

of (Rogers), 7
Location, question of (Rog-
ers), 8
NATO role: NAC, 2; Rush,

867

Subject matter (Rush), 868

Eastern. See East- West relations

Mutual balanced force reductions

(MBFR): Kissinger, 597;

NAC, 2; Nixon, 1, 195, 474,

957

Europe — Continued
MBFR— Continued

674, 701, 724, 730, 736, 759,
762, 820, 840, 933; Rogers,
5, 8, 130, 286, 547, 591;
Rush, 422, 537
NATO role (Rush), 867
SALT, question of linkage
(Rogers), 9
Radio Free Europe and Radio

Liberty (Nixon), 875
Soviet forces in (Rush), 869
Western, 190
U.S. relations: Brandt, 689;
Casey, 539; Hillenbrand,
462; Kissinger, 593;
Nixon, 674, 718, 723, 754,
839; Rogers, 6, 258, 903;
Rush, 381, 421, 422
Viet-Nam bombing, question
of effect of (Rush),
383
Visit of President Nixon,
question of (Nixon), 195,
416
European Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (Bush), 76
Peaceful uses of atomic energy,
agreement with U.S., amend-
ment, 336
European Communities, diplomatic
privileges extended to Mis-
sion of, Executive order, 197
European Economic Community
(see also Trade): 237; Casey,
850; Heath, 270; Kissinger,
594; Nixon, 514, 565, 755, 763;
Rush, 386, 422
Currencies of, 229
Middle East and North Africa,
interests in (Nixon), 787,
796
Preferential trade arrangements.

See under Trade
Retaliatory tariffs against U.S.

eliminated, 139
U.S. problems: Casey, 539, 542;
Hillenbrand, 463; Rogers,
7, 258, 286, 552, 554

European Monetary Agreement,
termination, 62

Evidence abroad on civil or com-
mercial matters, taking of,
convention (1972) :

Extension to Guam, Puerto Rico
and Virgin Islands, 410

Implementation, Executive or-
der, 305
Executive orders:

Diplomatic privileges extended
to Mission of European
Communities (lir,89), 197

International organization im-
munities granted to Intelsat
{11718), 871

958

Executive orders — Continued
Special Committee on Energy
and National Energy Office
(11712), 573
Taking of evidence abroad in
civil or commercial matters,
implementation of conven-
tion on (11G98), 305
Executive privilege (Kissinger),

396, 427
Export-Import Bank (Newsom),
578
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 212
Exports, U.S. (see also Imports
and Trade) : Rush, 384
EEC retaliatory tariffs elimi-
nated, 139
Export Expansion Act, amend-
ment: Eber'e, 531; Nixon,
520
Extradition, bilateral treaties with :
Italy, 216; Paraguay, 902;
Uruguay, 508, 687, 946

Farkas, Ruth Lewis, 472
Farley, Philip J., 60
Fiji, treaties, agreements, etc.,
52, 310, 311, 336, 371, 410,
507
Finland:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,
52, 80, 152, 280, 311, 336,
371, 440, 471, 543, 948
U.S. Ambassador (Krehbiel),
confirmation, 472
Fish and fisheries:

Fishing zones limitations prob-
lems (Nixon), 781, 826
International Whaling Commis-
sion, U.S. Commissioner
(White), appointment, 433
Marine Mammal Commission,

membership, 941
Pacific salmon fisheries discus-
sions with Canada, 606
Treaties, agreements, etc.:
Coasts of U.S. and Canada,
agreement with Canada
re reciprocal fishing priv-
ileges, 588
Conservation of Atlantic tu-
nas, international con-
vention (1966), Ivory
Coast, 246
Cooperation in, agreement

with Korea, 32
Damage to fishing vessels or
gear, agreement re claims
with Soviet Union, 336
Fisheries off coast of U.S.,
agreement with Japan, 52
Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, convention
for establishment, France,
865

Fish and fisheries — Continued
Treaties, etc., — Continued
King and tanner crab fishing —
Japan, 52
Soviet Union, 152, 336
Middle Atlantic Ocean, bilat-
eral agreement with Soviet
Union, 152, 336
Northeastern Pacific Ocean,
bilateral agreement with
Soviet Union, 152, 336
Northwest Atlantic fisheries,
international convention i
(1970), protocol: Portu-
gal, 246; Spain, 588; U.S.,
280
Salmon fishing in waters con-
tiguous to the U.S. terri-
torial sea, agreement with
Japan, 52
Shrimp, agreement with Bra-
zil, 280, 670
Flanigan, Peter M.: 359, 380;

Shultz, 301
Flynn, Robert J.: Kissinger, 314;

Rush, 387
Food Aid Convention (1971): BeK
gium, 632; France, 312; Lux-i
embourg, 632; Netherlands
80; U.K., 716
Food and Agricultural Organiza-i
tion: Nixon, 824; Wellman, 898i
Convention placing International-
Poplar Commission within
framework of (1959), Ko-
rea, 311
Food and nutrition programs, FY
1974 authorization request
(Hannah), 884
Food for Peace program :
Bangladesh, 24

Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 212;
214
Ford, Gerald: 347; Porter, 441
Foreign aid programs, U.S. (see
also Development assistance) ;
Kitchen, 667; Nixon, 208, 719
804
Budget FY 1974: Nixon, 212

Rush, 854
Chile, Secretarial determinatior
to permit continued assist
ance, 11
Foreign Assistance Act, amend

ment (Nixon), 289
Foreign Assistance Act of 197:

(Ni.xon), 674, 693
Percent of interest on loans

question of (Nixon), 195

Spain, funds for educational

cultural aid. Presidential de

termination (Nixon), 352

Foreign policy, U.S.:

Commission on Conduct of For|"A
eign Policy, appointment, 42i

ri

Fi

Department of State Bulletii

ti,

I oreipn policy, U.S. — Continued

Confitlentiality of negotiations
(Nixon), 934

Congress, role in (Rush), 424

Congressional documents relat-
ing to, lists, 24, 72, 151, 214,
289, 335, 439, 506, 655, TOff,
SfiS, 891. 947

Foreign aid role: Nixon, 289;
Rush, 854

1972: .-X year of historic negotia-
tions (Nixon), 673

Nixon doctrine: Casey, 539;
Nixon, 721, 723, 772, 806,
812; Rush, 480

Political and defense commit-
ments: Kissinger, 598; Rog-
ers, 589

Principles, objectives, and pur-
pose: Kissinger, 397; Nixon,
196, 208. 292; Porter, 441:
Rogers, 281, 286, 633, 907;
Rush, 418, 476

Responsibility for: Armacost,
69; Rogers, 922

Summitry (Kissinger), 398

U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970's: Shaping a Durable
Peace (Nixon), 717

U.S. Foreign Policy 1972: A Re-
port of the Secretary of
State (Rogers), 545

U.S. public opinion (Nixon), 719,
722

Viet-Nam, effect of (Kissinger),
393, 395
Foreign Relations of the United
States, vol. IX, The Western
Hcnnisplicre, released, 248
Foreig^n scholarships, Lincoln Lec-
turer, Updike, 205
Foreign Service, appointments, 51
France:

-Advance charter flights agree-
ment, signature, 864

N.\TO, question of change of
position on (Rush), 382

Treaties, agreements, etc., 99,
215, 312, .335, 371, 471, 716,
864, 865, 948

U.S. .Ambassador (Irwin) : con-
firmation, 216; nomination
(Rogers), 63
Franklin, .John Hope, 205, 487
Franklin, William M., 101
Freed, Kenneth J., .344

Gabon, money orders and postal
travellers' cheques agreement
(1969), ratification, 124

Gasoline, U.S. shortage (Shultz),
.569, 570, 571, 572

G.ATT. Sec Tariffs and trade, gen-
eral agreement on

Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

General Assembly, U.N.:
Documents, list, 118
Environmental cooperation ma-
chinerv established (McGee),
53
Resolutions, texts:

Chemical weapons, prohibition

of, 78
Human environment:
Cooperation in, 56, 57
U.N. Conference on, 56
Law of the sea conference

schedule, 115
Middle East, 27
Narcotics control, 112
Scale of assessments, 51
Terrorism, study of, 93
U.N. Charter review, 118
U.N. programme for drug
abuse control, 112
Geneva conventions (1949) re
treatment of armed forces,
civilians, and prisoners of
war in time of war, nonappli-
cation examples (Aldrich),
877
Genocide convention (1948) : Fiji,
336; Germany, East (with
reservation), 670
German manuscripts recovered

(Sutterlin), 432
Germany, East:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,

410, 670, 865, 866
U.N. membership, proposed

(NAC), 2
U.S. embassies, question of lo-
cation of (Rogers), 6
Germany, Federal Republic of:
-Advance charter flights agree-
ment with U.S., 715
Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

637
Cultural talks held with U.S.,

297
East Germany, relations: Bush,

26; NAC, 2
Offset cost of U.S. forces

(Rush), 382
Treaties, agreements, etc., 79,
191, 335, 471, 508, 544, 632,
948
U.N. membership, question of

(NAC), 2
U.S. relations: Hillenbrand, 462;
Rush. 385
Ghana, international telecommu-
nications convention (1965)
with annexes, 508
Gilmore, Harry (Rush), 535
Gonzalez Revilla, Nicolas, 128
Great Lakes, promotion of safety
by means of radio, agreement
with Canada, 372
Greece, 328

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,
128

Greece — Continued

Treaties, agreements, etc., 124,
247, 410, 865, 948
Green, Marshall, 306, 334 (quoted),

472, 503
Gromyko, Andrei (Rogers), 344
Guatemala, treaties, agreements,
etc., 52, 100, 311, 335, 543, 671
Guinea, treaties agreements, etc.,

472. 902
Gundersheimer, Werner L. (Sut-
terlin), 433
Guyana:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

402
Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,
99, 215, 246
Gwertzman, Bernard, 198, 255,
342

H

Haig, Alexander M., Jr. (Kissin-
ger), 36
Haile Selassie I, Emperor: 841,

842; Rush, 842
Haiti, treaties, agreements, etc.,

124, 191, 410
Hamilton, Alexander (quoted),

435, 436
Hamza, .Abdel Aziz Al Nasri, 128
Hannah, John A., 883
Haukness, Steven, 928
Health programs, authorization re-
quest (Hannah), 885
Heath, Edward, 269, 271
Helms, Richard, 247
Hensley, Stewart, 249
Herbicides, U.S. exports: Aldrich,

881; Newsom, 582
Herman, George, 322, 373
High seas, prevention of incidents
on or over, agreement with
Soviet Union, 866
Hightower, John, 650
Hillenbrand, Martin J., 462
Holdridge, John H.: 313, 414;

Nixon, 413
Holy See, IAEA statute, accept-
ance of amendment of Article
VI, 280
Honduras:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 124,

372, 670, 865
U.S. Ambassador (Sanchez),
confirmation, 950
Homer, Garnett D., 165
Howe. Jonathan T., 313
Human rights (Nixon), 823
Armed conflict, development of

law (Aldrich), 876
Bill of rights day and Human
Rights Day and Week, proc-
lamation, 11
Family planning (Claxton), 18
Humanitarian assistance. See Dis-
aster relief

959

Humes, John P., 247
Hungary:

Claims agreement, signature,

370
Treaties, agreements, etc., 79,
80, 151, 371, 372, 410, 411,
471, 472, 671, 949
U.S. relations: Nixon, 763;
Rush, 534
Hurwitch, Robert A., 468
Hussein, King: 288; Nixon, 287
Hydrographic Organization, Inter-
national, convention (1967) :
Ecuador, 280; Philippines, 80

I

Iceland :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

402
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,
152, 191, 280, 948
Imports:

Commercial samples and adver-
tising materials, interna-
tional convention (1952),
Fiji, 311
Customs convention on tempo-
rary importation of private
road vehicles (1954), Fiji,
310
Educational, scientific, and cul-
tural materials, agreement
on importation of (1950) :
Barbados, 715; Fiji, 311;
Libya, 410
U.S.:

Certain meat imports limita-
tion suspended for 1973,
proclamation, 309
Cheese quotas increased, 651
Import relief. Trade Reform
Act of 1973 proposals
(Nixon), 517
Meats, U.S. policy (Nixon),

416
Nonfat dry milk quotas, in-
creases, proclamation, 108,
853
Oil:

Elimination of quantitative
restrictions and initia-
tion of license-fee sys-
tem (Shultz), 567, 570
Import policy: Armstrong,
203; Nixon, 563; Shultz,
566
Import program (chart),
703
India:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,

124, 151, 371, 508
U.S. Ambassador (Moynihan),

confirmation, 247
U.S. economic assistance (Nix-
on), 417
U.S. relations: Nixon, 789, 791;

India — Continued

U.S. relations — Continued

Rogers, 259, 549; Sisco, 327,
403
U.S.-Chinese relations, ques-
tion of eff'ect (Nixon),
792
Indian-Pakistan relations: Bush,

26; Nixon, 790
Indochina: 263; Kissinger, 316,
317; Nixon, 193, 749, 771;
Rogers, 283, 286, 337, 546, 548,
589; Sullivan, 200
Peace settlement, principles:

Isham, 42; Kissinger, 33
POW's and MIA's, question of
accounting for: Nixon, 749;
Sieverts, 944
Reconstruction program, pro-
posed: 512, 692; Kissinger,
166, 320, 390; Nixon, 193,
194, 747; Porter, 444; Rog-
ers, 253, 254, 284, 339, 341,
344, 376, 548; Sullivan, 198,
203
U.S. authorization request:
Hannah, 886; Nixon, 695;
Rush, 855
Indonesia:

Economic progress (Nixon),

771
Treaties, agreements, etc., 152,

312, 371, 440, 507
U.S. grant military assistance,
authorization request: Rush,
697; Tarr, 896
Visit of Vice President Agnew,
294, 296
Industrial property:

International patent classifica-
tion, Strasbourg agreement
(1971): Denmark, 280;
France, 99; Norway, 311;
Switzerland, 246
U.S. ratification urged (Nix-
on), 506
Protection of (Paris, 1883, as
revised) : Congo (Brazza-
ville), 311; U.S. (Articles 1
through 12), 716, 949
Inflation: Flanigan, 361; Katz,

529; Nixon, 351, 519, 532
Information activities and pro-
grams (see also United States
Information Agency) :
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 212,

214
U.S. infoiTnation center in
Skopje, agreement with Yu-
goslavia, 3.36
Inter-American Development
Bank: Nixon, 779; Scali, 492
Executive Director (Porges),

nomination confirmed, 848
U.S. financial support: Nixon,
213; Rogers, 679, 914

Interdependence of modern world:
Nixon, 828; Rogers, 557; Rush,
419, 854
Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization :
Convention (1948) : China, Peo-
ple's Republic of, 410;
Sierra Leone, 471
Convention (1965), amendment
to Article 28, Cuba, 439
International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development:
Articles of agreement (1945), as

amended, Romania, 32
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 213
International Centre for Study of
Preservation and Restoration
of Cultural Property, Statutes
of (1956) : Denmark, Iran, 439
International Committee of the
Red Cross:
Geneva conventions protocols

proposed (Aldrich), 876
Grant agreement to refugees and
displaced persons in Khmer
Republic, 247
International conferences, calendar

of, 29, 406
International Court of Justice:

Bennett, 117; Brower, 645
International Development Asso-
ciation, budget FY 1974
(Nixon), 213
International expositions, conven-
tion (1928), protocol of
amendment: Belgium, Bul-
garia, Byelorussian S.S.R.
(with reservation), Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Germany,
Hungary, Israel, Italy, Mon-
aco, Netherlands, Norway, Po-
land, Soviet Union, Spain, ,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tunisia, I '•
Ukrainian S.S.R., U.K., U.S.,!
471 j: 'i

International law: Aldrich, 876;!

Brower, 644 ; ^

iJIi
International monetary system: 1.

Nixon, 208; Weintraub, 136 l]"

Capital markets (Casey), 448 I '»

Exchange rates, realignment: '

228; Flanigan, 362; Hillen-j

brand, 463; Nixon, 321, 329, i

351, 768; Rogers, 285, 552; |

Rush, 381, 422; Shultz, 302;

Weintraub, 134, 136

Effect on U.S. living costs,

question of (Shultz), 302

U.S. announcement (Shultz),

298 j

New monetary measures, com-j S

munique, 454

Reform, need for: 230, 691;Cas-,, I

ey, 541, 640, 849, 851;n

5

960

Department of State Bulletiny^'^e

International monetary system —
Continued
Reform — Continued

Hillenbrand, 465; Kissinger,
595; Nixon, 225, 321, 329,
351, 502, 514, 674, 798; Rog-
ers, 282, 552, 676, 836, 938;
Rush, 423; Shultz, 298, 304;
Unger, 331
IMF Committee of Twenty,
text of communique, 587
Investment disputes between states
and nationals of other states,
convention (1965) on settle-
ment of, Sudan, 588
Investment guaranties agreements
with: Romania, 866; Yemen,
216; Yugoslavia, 902
Investment of private capital
abroad: 239, 558 (chart);
Casey, 448; Kitchen, 668;
Meyer, 278; Nixon, 521; Rog-
ers, 679; Rush, 423; Wein-
traub, 137
Africa: Newsom, 459, 578;

Nixon, 795
Expropriation, effect on (Rog-
ers), 922, 923
Latin America: Casey, 940;
Nixon, 780; Rogers, 914, 925
Multinational corporations

(Flanigan), 359
Tax changes, proposed: Eberle,
530; Shultz, 567, 568
Iran:

Air transport agreement with

U.S., 245
Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

577
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,

216, 335, 411, 439, 508
U.S. Ambassador (Helms), con-
firmation, 247
Iraq, treaties, agreements, etc., 79,

191, 949
Ireland, treaties, agreements, etc.,

191, 948, 949
Irwin, John N., II, 63, 216
Isham, Hey%vard, 10, 41, 101, 127
Ismail, Hafez (Sisco), 485
Isolationism: Flanigan, 361; Por-
ter, 441, 442; Rogers, 281;
Rush, 383
Israel :

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

577
Military credit sales. Budget FY
1974: Nixon, 213; Rush,
698, 699, 857; Tarr, 895
Soviet Jews migrating to Israel,

U.S. assistance, 532
State of: Eban (quoted), 844;

Sisco, 844
Treaties, ag^-eements, etc., 371,
410, 471

Israel — Continued

U.S.-Israel Binational Science
Foundation, U.S. members,
402
Italy:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 52, 80,
216, 335, 471, 631, 866, 948,
949
U.S. Ambassador (Volpe), con-
firmation, 216
U.S. visit of Prime Minister
Andreotti, 603
Ivory Coast, treaties, agreements,
etc., 32, 123, 246, 336, 371, 507

Jamaica:

Treaties, agreements, etc., .32,

123
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 924
Japan: Kissinger, 593; Nixon, 772;
Rush, 418
Advisory Council on Japan-U.S.
Economic Relations (Arma-
cost), 71
Asia, role in: Kissinger, 319;
Nixon, 693, 764; Rogers,
259
People's Republic of China, re-
lations (Nixon), 768
Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,
152, 215, 246, 247, 411, 472,
670, 671, 716, 948
U.S.-Japan Cooperative Medical
Science Program, 6th annual
report, transmittal, 334
U.S. relations: Armacost, 64;
Green, 504; Nixon, 674, 719,
723, 763, 839; Rogers, 591;
Rush, 422
Economic: Armacost, 67; Cas-
ey, 850; Nixon, 767;
Rogers, 258, 552, 555
U.S.-Chinese relations, ques-
tion of effect on (Kissin-
ger), 318
Visit of President Nixon, ques-
tion of (Nixon), 416
Yen value (Shultz), 299, 302,
303
Jefferson, Thomas (quoted), 605
Jenkins, Alfred Le S.: 313, 414,

447; Nixon, 413
Johnson, Lyndon B. (quoted), 13
Death of: Heath, 270; Nixon,
154; Rogers, 190
Johnson, U. Alexis, 96, 190

(quoted), 216, 446, 447
Jordan :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 99,

124, 507, 543, 544, 949
U.S. grant military assistance,
authorization request : Rush,
697, 699, 856, 857; Tarr,
895, 896

Jordan — Continued

U.S. visit of King Hussein, 287
Jurisdictional immunities, draft
bill, announcement, 148

Kalb, Marvin: 388; Kissinger, 164

Katz, Julius L., 527

Kearns, Henry (quoted), 849

Keat, James, 373

Kennedy, Richard T., 313

Kenya, treaties, agreements, etc.,

507, 670, 865
Khir Johari, Mohamed, 402
Khmer Republic: Kissinger, 320;
Nixon, 753; Rogers, 341, 548
Cease-fire, proposed: Kissinger,
162, 389; Nixon, 673; Rog-
ers, 223
POW's (Rogers), 282

Question of accounting for:
Kissinger (quoted), 945;
Sieverts, 945
Rice, offshore procurement au-
thorized. Presidential deter-
mination, 140
Situation in: Nixon, 348, 750;
Porter, 444; Rogers, 223,
283, 339, 376; Rush, 479;
Sullivan, 199
Treaties, agreements, etc., 191,

247, 280
U.S. air combat support (Rog-
ers), 223, 859
Presidential authority (Rog-
ers), 634, 652
U.S. economic aid, appropriation

request (Nixon), 695
U.S. grant military assistance,
authorization request: Rush,
697; Tarr, 896
Viet-Nam peace agreement, pro-
visions: 173; Kissinger,
157; Nixon, 749, 750; Rog-
ers, 652, 859
Visit of Vice President Agnew,
294, 295
Kissinger, Henry A., 33, 155, 388,
427, 593, 945 (quoted) ;
Armacost, 69; Heath, 272
East-West Trade Policy Com-
mittee, appointment to, 380
Relationship with President

Nixon, question of, 430
State Department relations

(Rogers), 922
Visit to China: Green, 306; Kis-
singer, 314; Nixon, 728;
Ziegler, 313; announcement,
224; text of joint communi-
que, 313
Visit to North Viet-Nam: 262;
Nixon, 747
Kitamura, Hiroshi (quoted), 66
Kitchen, Robert W., 665

I Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

961

Klein, Herbert G., 313
Kleindienst, Richard G., 148
Korea, North, U.S. passport re-
strictions, 488
Korea, Republic of (Nixon), 812
North Korea, talks with: Bush,

26; Nixon. 771
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,
100, 124, 151, 246, 247, 311,
410, 411, 440, 471, 632, 902
U.S. military assistance: Nixon,
772; Tarr, 894, 896
Authorization request (Rush),
697, 856
Krehbiel, V. John, 472
Kroyer, Haraldur, 402
Kubisch, Jack B.: 950; Rogers,

904, 920, 924
Kuwait, treaties, agreements, etc.,
192, 371, 439

Lafontant, Jewel, 110

Land-locked states, convention on
transit trade of (1965), Chile
(with reservation), 80

Laos: Nixon, 348; Rogers, 341,
375, 548

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,
128

Cease-fire: 263; Agnew, 295;
Kissinger, 162, 320, 389;
Nixon, 737, 752, 771, 840;
Rogers, 223, 257, 282, 283,
339, 633; Sullivan, 199

Communist allegations of U.S.
military activities, 602

International Commission for
Supervision and Control,
eligibility to receive de-
fense articles and services,
Presidential determination,
843

International Control Commis-
sion (Kissinger), 164

POW's in: Kissinger, 389;
Sieverts, 945

Rice, offshore procurement au-
thorized, Presidential de-
tennination, 140

Situation in: Nixon, 750, 751;
Porter, 443; Rogers, 634;
Sullivan, 199

Treaties, agreements, etc., 439,
440

U.S. economic and military aid:
Nixon, 695, 752; Sullivan,
199

Viet-Nam peace agreement, pro-
visions: 173; Kissinger, 157;
Nixon, 749, 750; Rogers,
339, 652

Visit of Vice President Agnew,
294, 295

962

Latin America (see also names
of individual countries) :
Brazil, influence of (Rogers),

918
Drug control problems (Nixon),

781
Economic growth: Nixon, 778;

Rogers, 903, 913
Inter-American Economic and
Social Council, 8th annua!
meeting: Meyer, 276; Nixon,
275
Inter-American Foundation, bud-
get FY 1974 (Nixon), 213,
214
Inter-American system: Nixon,

686, 777; Scali, 491
Itaipu Dam conflict (Rogers),

923
Nationalism (Rogers), 907, 913,

920, 922, 923, 925
Political or ideological plural-
ism (Crimmins), 682
Regionalism: Casey, 939; Rog-
ers, 911, 913, 921, 925
U.S. grant military assistance,
authorization request: Rush,
698, 857; Tarr, 895
U.S. military equipment sales,
position on: Nixon, 782;
Rogers, 917
U.S. military sales authorization

(Rush), 698
U.S. paternalism, question of

(Rogers), 919
U.S. policy, relations, and role:
Casey, 937; Nixon, 675, 723,
774; Rogers, 550, 636, 676,
903, 906, 912, 919, 926
Visit of President Nixon, ques-
tion of: Nixon, 416; Rogers,
918, 923
Visit of Secretary Rogers:
Casey, 937; Nixon, 674, 686,
782; Rogers, 551, 903
Anti-American demonstra-
tions, question of (Rog-
ers), 921
Latin American nuclear-free zone

(Scali), 492
Law of the sea: Moore, 707;
Nixon, 781, 825; Rogers, 677
Conference, proposed : Brower,
647; Moore, 708; Nixon, 781,
826; Rogers, 555, 909
Schedule (Stevenson), 112
Le Due Tho (Kissinger), 161, 393
Lebanon :

Israeli raid (Scali), 656, 657,

659
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,
507
Leddy, John, 650
Lee Kuan Yew, 575, 576
Legal Metrology, International Or-
ganization, convention (1955),
as amended, U.S., 32

Leonhardy, Terrence G. (Rogers),

905
Leopold, A. Starker, 941
Lesotho, treaties, agreements, etc.,

124, 507
Less developed countries (see also
names of individual coun-
tries) : Rush, 419, 423
Development assistance. See

Development assistance
Economic and social develop-
ment: 558 (chart); Rog-
ers, 553, 677, 679; Wein-
traub, 138
Science and technology, applica-
tion to: Kitchen, 665; Seitz,
661
Trade. See under Trade
Levelton, C. R., 606
Liberia:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,

716
U.S. Ambassador (Manfull) :
appointment, 51; confirma-
tion, 247
Libya :

Passport requirements, 72 {

Treaties, agreements, etc., 280, ]
410 I

U.S. relations (Rush), 481 I
Lisagor, Peter, 165, 200, 315, 348 !
Leadlines, international convention ij
(1966), Fiji, 52
Amendments: |

Current actions: Greece, 865 ;'j
Norway, 507; Tunisia, 631;|
U.S. ratification urged (Nix-'
on), 470 I

Lopez Aguero, Mario Antonio, 577 I
Lord, Winston, 313
Luce, Clare Booth (Andreotti), 606
Luns, Joseph (quoted), 540 ,

Luxembourg:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,.
191, 246, 335, 632 '

U.S. Ambassador (Farkas), con-
firmation, 472 !

M

MacDonald, Gordon, 650
Macomber, William B., Jr.: 399

472; Nixon, 350
Malagasy Republic, treaties, agree

ments, etc., 215, 246, 507
Malawi, treaties, agreements, etc.

52, 246
Malaysia :

Agreement re trade in wool am'
man-made fiber textile prod
ucts, entry into force, 588
Ambassador to U.S., credentials

402
Visit of Vice President Agnew
294, 296 I

Deparlmenf of State Bulleliij

Mali, treaties, agreements, etc.,

507, 544
Malta:

Requests for additional NATO

payments (Rogers), 10
U.S. security assistance, authori-
zation request: Rush, 6D9,
857; Tarr, 895
Manful!, Melvin L., 51, 247
Manhard, Philip \V., 928
Mansfield, Mike, 'Ml
Mao Tse-tung (Kissinger), 397
Marine Mammal Commission, mem-
bership, 941
Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, Intergovernmental (Nix-
on), 824, 832
Maritime traffic, international con-
vention (1965), on facilitation
of, Fiji, 52
Martin, Joseph (quoted), 76
Mauritania, Ambassador to U.S.,

credentials, 402
Mauritius, treaties, agreements,

etc., 335, 411, 670, 865
McClendon, Sarah, 417
McCloskey, Robert: 6, 950; Rog-
ers, 5
McFall, John J., 347
McGee, Gale W., 43, 48, 50, 53
McGrory, Mary, 257
McKernan, Donald L., 606
McKnight, George G. (Nixon), 474
Meats, certain, U.S. imports limita-
tion suspended for 1973, proc-
lamation, 309
Meir, Golda, 355, 356
Memorial Day, 1973, Pray for

Peace, proclamation, 882
Mexico :

Colorado River salinity prob-
lems: Nixon, 781, 833; Rog-
ers, 905
Treaties, agreements, etc., 52, 79,

80. 191, 866
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers) , 904
Meyer, Charles: 276; Nixon, 275
Military assistance:

Budget FY 1974: Nixon, 209,

211, 213; Tarr, 895
Grant military assistance, au-
thorization request: Rush,
697, 856; Tarr, 894
Grants, agreements re deposit
of 10 percent of value of:
Greece, 247; Guatemala, 671
Viet-Nam, agreement re transfer
of scrap, 124
Military education and training,
authorization request FY 1974
(Rush), 857
Military mission agreement with

Iran, 411, .508
Miller, Steven, 928

Monaco, international expositions
convention (1928), pi'otocol of
amendment, 471
Monetary Fund, International (see
also International monetary
system) :
Articles of agreement (1945), as

amended, Romania, 32
Bretton Woods system, 231
Committee of Twenty, text of

communique, 587
Reform, need for (Weintraub),

133
Special Drawing Rights, 230, 235
Moore, George Curtis: Macomber,
399; Nixon, 353, 354; Rogers,
353; Scali, 353
Moore, John Norton, 707
Morocco, treaties, agreements, etc.,

246, 371, 716
Morton, Rogers C. B., 608
Mossier, John, 387
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick: 247;

Sisco, 327; Weintraub, 133
Multinational corporations: Flan-

igan, 359; Scali, 493
Murphy, Robert D., 425

N

NASA (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration) agree-
ment with Brazil re remote
sensing for earth surveys, 544

National Prayer Breakfast, 21st
annual (Nixon;, 196

Nationality, acquisition of, optional
protocol to Vienna convention
on consular relations: Aus-
tralia, 543; Denmark, 336;
Viet-Nam, 901

Natural resources, permanent sov-
ereignty (Scali), 493

Ndabaniwe, Joseph, 637

Near and Middle East (see aho
Arab-Israeli conflict and names
of individual countries) : Nix-
on, 785
U.N. ad hoc committee on illicit
drug traffic (Lafontant),
111
U.S. relations: Rogers, 256;
Sisco, 327

Nepal: Nixon, 793; Sisco, 405
Ocean dumping convention
(1972), signature, 124

Netherlands, treaties, agreements,
etc., 80, 191, 471, 507, 508, 543,
865, 948

Neustadt, Richard (quoted), 68

New Zealand, treaties, agreements,
etc., 32, 99, 246, 901

Newsom, David D., 367, 456, 578,
581

Nguyen Co Thach (Kissinger), 161

Niagara River, uses of, interpreta-
tion of Article IV, agreement
with Canada, 588
Nicaragua:

Earthquake relief: Meyer, 276;

Williams, 141
Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,

247, 371, 440
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 905
Niger, treaties, agreements, etc.,

80, 99, 371
Nigeria: Nixon, 797; Rogers, 551
Civil war claims, ex gratia pay-
ment, announcement, 329
Nitzen, Paul, 60, 447
Nixon, Richard:
Addresses, remarks, and state-
ments:
Adjustment assistance, 517
Africa, 416, 723, 794
Arab-Israeli conflict, 723, 736,

783, 785, 839
Arms control, 701, 814
Asia, 404 (quoted), 723, 770,

772, 789, 812
Cambodia, 348, 673, 749, 750,

753
Canada, 756

Former Prime Minister
Pearson, regrets at
death of, 108
China, People's Republic of:
Relations, 131, 196, 206,
292, 474, 674, 718, 720,
722, 724, 727, 792, 828,
839, 840, 932
Trade relations, 514, 727
U.S. liaison office, 413, 673,

728
U.S. prisoners, release of,
195, 728
Colorado River salinity prob-
lems, 781, 833
Confidentiality of negotiations,

934
Dollar valuation, 321, 329,

351, 768
Drug problems, 498, 719, 724,

781, 804, 829
East- West relations, 1, 730,

760, 761
Energy problems, 561, 719,

734, 787, 795, 830
Environmental problems, 219,

719, 733, 824, 831
Europe, 195, 674, 718, 721,
723, 754, 839, 840
Conference on Security and
Cooperation, 1, 195,
674, 730, 736, 761
Mutual and balanced force
reductions, 1, 195, 474,
674, 701, 724, 730, 759,
762, 820, 840, 933
European Community, 514,
565, 755, 763, 787, 796 '

Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

963

Nixon, Richard — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued

Foreign aid, 195, 212, 289, 719,

804
Foreign Assistance Act of

1973, 674, 693
Foreign policy, 196, 292, 474,
718
Confidentiality of negotia-
tions, 934
1972: A Year of Historic

Negotiations, 673
Nixon doctrine, 721, 723,
772, 806, 812
Former President Johnson,

death of, 154
Former President Truman,

death of, 97
Inaugural address, second, 125
India, 417, 789, 791
Indochina, 193, 749, 771

Reconstruction of, proposed,
193, 194, 747
Intelsat agreements, entry in-
to force, 42
International monetary sys-
tem, 208, 225, 502, 514,

674, 723, 798
Exchange rates, realign-
ment, 228, 321, 329,
351, 768

Japan, 674, 693, 719, 723, 763,

839
Laos, 348, 695, 737, 749, 750,

751, 771, 840
Latin America, 213, 214, 275,

675, 723, 774, 781
Inter-American system, 686,

777
Visit of Secretary Rogers,
674, 686, 782
Law of the sea, 781, 825
Meat price controls, 416
Monetary affairs, 321
National defense and secu-
rity, 473, 719, 721, 723,
806, 839, 932
Budget FY 197i, 206, 474
Strategic stockpiles, guide-
lines, 862
National Prayer Breakfast,

21st annual, 196
NATO, 721, 754, 757

U.S. forces, 758, 763, 811,
933
OAU, 10th anniversary, 927
Outer space, 827
Pakistan, 417, 789, 790
Panama Canal, 782
Population, 824, 830
President Thieu, meeting with,

193, 195
Radio Free Europe and Radio

Liberty, 875
SALT, 210, 474, 673, 674 701,
723, 731, 734, 736,' 760,
808, 816, 839, 932

964

Nixon, Richard — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
South Asia, 417, 789, 791
Soviet Union:

Relations, 196, 207, 292,

673, 718, 720, 723, 729,
735, 832, 840, 932

Trade relations, 514, 518-

519, 733
Visit of Secretary Brezhnev,
proposed, 840, 932
Strategic stockpiles, question

on sales of, 415
Terrorism, 719, 724, 786, 828
Kidnapping and murder of
U.S. diplomats in Su-
dan, 350, 353, 354
Trade, 321, 503, 516, 519, 757,
773, 800, 803
Trade Reform Act of 1973,

674, 686, 734, 773, 804
Travel plans, 415

U.N., 822

U.S. domestic problems, 197

U.S. military strength, 206,

473, 839, 840
Viet-Nam, North: 154, 695,
747, 748
Reconstruction programs,
proposed, 193, 194, 348,
695, 747
U.S. December bombing re-
sumed, 474, 744
U.S. missing in action, 474,

744, 841
Visit of Dr. Kissinger, 193,
194, 747
Viet-Nam, Republic of (for
details, see Viet-Nam),
153, 473, 719, 737, 748,
771, 931
Ceasefire violations, 350,

414, 673, 749, 841
ICCS, 415

"Land to the Tiller" pro-
gram, 574
Peace agreement, 196, 218,
290, 673, 721, 740, 745,
840, 931
Announcement, 153
POW's, 194, 291, 475, 747
Address, 930
Release of, 153, 349, 737,

746
Return of, 930
World role, 126, 475, 720, 935
Correspondence and messages:
Endangered species confer-
ence, 609
Inter-American Economic and
Social Council, 8th an-
nual meeting, 275
NAC ministerial meeting, 1
OAS General Assembly, 3rd

regular session, 675
OAU, 10th anniversary, 927

t

Nixon, Richard — Continued ( |

Correspondence and messages —
Continued
Viet-Nam "Land to the Tiller"
program, 574
Meetings with Heads of State
and officials of, remarks
and joint communiques:
Ethiopia, 841; Federal Re-
public of Germany 688;
Israel, 355; Italy, 603; Jor-
dan, 287; Singapore, 575;
U.K., 269; Viet-Nam, 509
(Nixon), 348

Messages and reports to Con-
gress :

Anti-inflation trade bill, trans-
mittal, 532

Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency, 12th annual
report, 701

Budget of the United States
Government — Fiscal Year
1974 (excerpts), 206

Economic Report of the Presi-
dent and Annual Report
of the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers (ex-
cerpts), 225

Economy, report on (ex-
cerpts), 328

Endangered species conven-
tion, ratification urged,!
628

Energy policy, national, 561

Federal drug law enforce-;
ment activities, reorgani-i
zation proposed, 498

Foreign Assistance Act,;
amendment, 289

Foreign Assistance Act of
1973, transmittal, 693

International economic report,
transmittal, 502

Japan-U.S. Cooperative Med-
ical Science Program, 6th
annual report, transmit-!
tal, 334

Loadline convention amend-
ments, ratification urgedy
470

Ocean dumping convention^
transmittal, 369

Patent classification agree-i
ment, ratification urged'
506

16th Annual Report of the! t
President on the Trade |
Agreements Programi F
transmittal, 274

State of the Union, 217

Strategic stockpiles, new

guidelines, 862
Trade Reform Act of 1973

513, 531 (quoted)

I
Department of State Bulletirflnde)

Nixon, Richard — Continued

Messages and reports to Con-
gress— Conti nued
Uruguay extradition treaty,

transmittal, 9-16
U.S.-Colombia treaty on Quita

Sueno, transmittal, 144
U.S. Foreign Policy for the
1970's: Shaping a Dur-
able Peace, report, 717
World Heritage convention,
ratification urged, 629
News conferences, transcripts,

193, 348, 413
Presidential authority, requests

for, 516
Presidential determinations:
Foreign Military Sales Act,
finding of eligibility for
purchases under {7S-10),
483
ICCS in Viet-Nam and ICSC
in Laos eligible to receive
defense articles (73-12),
843
Offshore procurement author-
ized of rice for Cambodia
and Laos (7.S-S), 140
Portugal, authorization of
funds for defense articles
and services (73-9), 109
Spain, authorization of funds
for defense articles and
services (73-7), 63
Spain, authorization of funds
for educational and cul-
tural articles and services
(73-11), 352
Recess appointments, 51
Noel, Cleo A., Jr., 51, 247; Macom-
ber, 399; Nixon, -353, 354;
Rogers, 353; Scali, 353
Nonfat dry milk, increases of im-
port quotas, proclamation, 108,
853
North American Air Defense Com-
mand (NORAD), agreement
with Canada, 866
North Atlantic Council, ministerial
meeting, Brussels: Nixon, 1;
Rogers, 5 ; text of final com-
munique, 1
North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion: Kissinger, 594, 596; Nix-
on, 721, 754, 757; Rogers, 546,
636
Defense expenditures: Nixon,
758; Rogers, 836; Rush, 422
French position, question of

change in (Rush), 382
Malta, requests for additional

payments (Rogers), 10
Role in East-West relations

(Rush), 867
Status of forces in Germany,
agreement, France, 716

Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion— Continued
U.S. forces (see also Europe,
mutual balanced force re-
ductions) : Nixon, 758, 811
Reduction, question of: Kis-
singer, 596; Nixon, 763,
933; Rogers, 286; Rush,
382, 478, 870
Congressional position (Rog-
ers), 252, 591
U.S. Permanent Representative
on Council (Rumsfeld), con-
firmation, 216
Norway, treaties, agreements, etc.,
80, 152, 191, 311, 471, 507, 865,
948
Noyes, Crosby S., 199
Nuclear weapons:

Comprehensive test ban treaty,
proposed: Rush, 75; Nixon,
822

Nuclear nonproliferation treaty
(1968) : Bush, 76
Current actions: Australia,
191; Honduras, 865; Ivory
Coast, Nicaragua, 371

Ocean dumping (Nixon), 832
Convention (1972) :

Current actions: Argentina,
865; Bolivia, Byelorussian
S.S.R., Canada, 124; Chad,
China, Republic of, 80;
Colombia, Costa Rica, 124;
Denmark, 80; Dominican
Republic, 311; Finland,
80; France, 865; Ger-
many, Federal Republic
of, 191; Guatemala, 311;
Haiti, Honduras, 124; Ice-
land, 191; Italy, 80; Jor-
dan, 99; Khmer Republic,
191; Kuwait, 371; Leba-
non, 80; Lesotho, 124; Li-
beria, 80; Luxembourg,
191; Mexico, 80; Nepal,
124; Netherlands, 543;
New Zealand, 901; Nor-
way, Panama, 80; Phil-
ippines, 191 ; Portugal,
Senegal, 80; Somalia, 949;
Soviet Union, 80; Spain,
865; Sweden, 80; Tunisia,
371; Ukrainian S.S.R.,
124; U.K., U.S., 80; Uru-
guay, 124

Ratification urged (Nixon),
369

Signature: announcement, 95;
Johnson, 96
Ocean resources (see also Law of

the sea) : Nixon, 825

Oil:
Imports, 98: Nixon, 563; procla-
mations, 147, 489
Pollution :

International fund for compen-
sation for oil pollution
damage, international con-
vention (1971): Finland,
32; Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, 191
Intervention on high seas in
cases of oil pollution cas-
ualties, international con-
vention (1969), Sweden,
410
Prevention of pollution of sea
by oil, international con-
vention (1954), amend-
ments: Belgium, 865; Jor-
dan, 124; Lebanon, 507
Okinawa: Armacost, 68, Nixon, 765
Oman, treaties, agreements, etc.,

152, 215
Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development: 239;
Nixon, 565; Rogers, 554, 635
Committee for Monetary and
Foreign Exchange Matters:
61; Casey, 540

Exchange Guarantee Agreement,
61

Monetary cooperation arrange-
ments, announcement, 61
Organization of African Unity
(Rush), 843
10th anniversary: Nixon, 927;
Rush, 928
Organization of American States:
Casey, 540; Rogers, 909, 911,
914, 923, 924, 926; Scali, 493
General Assembly, 3rd regular
session: Crimmins, 681;
Nixon, 675, 686; Rogers, 675
Special Committee, establish-
ment: Crimmins, 681; Rog-
ers, 907; text of resolution,
684

Ould Abdallah, Ahmedou, 402
Outer space:

Exploration and use, treaty on

principles (1967), Belgium,

507

International liability for dam-
age caused by space objects,
convention (1972): Brazil,
371; China, Republic of,
280; Cyprus, 865; Dominican
Republic, 311; Fiji, 507;
Hungary, 80; Iraq, 191;
Laos, 440; Pakistan, 507;
Sri Lanka, 544; Tunisia,
865; U.S., 949

Registration of space objects,
draft convention (Reis), 712

965

Outer space — Continued

Rescue and return of astro-
nauts, agreement (1968),
Brazil, 335

Space telecommunications, par-
tial revision of 1959 radio
regulations as amended:
Argentina, 247; Byelorus-
sian S.S.R., 949; Canada,
Finland, 336; Germany,
Federal Republic of, 508;
Ireland, 949; Japan, Korea,
247; Netherlands, 508; Sing-
apore (with reservation),
949; Soviet Union, 508;
U.K., 100; U.K. overseas
territories, 336; Ukrainian
S.S.R., 670

U.S. space programs (Nixon),
827
Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration: Casey, 643; New-
som, 579

Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 213,
214

Pacific Islands Trust Territory,
agreement with Japan, entry
into force, 411
Pakistan: Nixon, 789, 790; Rogers,
549; Sisco, 403
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,
246, 312, 507, 508, 588, 948,
949
U.S. military assistance (Nixon),
417
Pan American Day and Pan Amer-
ican Week, proclamation, 538
Panama :

Security Council meetings sched-
uled: Bush, 242; Phillips,
244; Rogers, 257
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,
335
Panama Canal (Nixon), 782
Treaty negotiations:
U.N. resolution, 497
U.S. position (Scali), 490, 493,
495
Paraguay:

Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

402
Treaties, agreements, etc., 191,
670, 902, 948
Patent cooperation treaty (1970),

Cameroon, 544
Peace Corps programs:

Agreements with : Oman, 152 ;

Yemen, 440
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 212,
214
Pearson, Lester B.: Nixon, 108;

Rogers, 108
Pedersen, Dick (Rogers), 904

Peru:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 52,

948
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 910
Peterson, Peter G.: 331, 569

(quoted) ; Casey, 540
Petroleum. See Oil
Pheng Norindr, 128
Philippines:

Disaster relief (Nixon), 289
Economic progress (Nixon), 771
Operation Homecoming (Ag-

new), 297
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,
80, 100, 191, 247, 335, 471,
508, 865
U.S. military assistance
(Nixon), 772
Authorization request:
Rush, 697; Tarr, 896
Visit of Vice President Agnew,
294, 297
Phillips, Christopher H., 244
Phonograms, protection of pro-
ducers of phonograms against
unauthorized duplication of
their phonograms, convention
(1971): Argentina, 670; Fin-
land, Sweden, U.K., 311
Pierpont, Robert, 323
Poland:

Treaties, 32, 152, 191, 192, 247,
371, 410, 471, 472, 671, 949
U.S. Ambassador (Davies) : ap-
pointment, 51 ; confirmation,
247
U.S. relations: Nixon, 763;
Rush, 534
Pollack, Herman, 650
Polner, Martin R., 607
Pompidou, Georges (quoted), 756
Poplar Commission, International,
within framework of FAO,
convention (1959), Korea, 311
Population: Johnson (quoted), 13;
Nixon, 824, 830; Rogers, 680
Charts, 558, 559

Family planning programs, au-
thorization request (Han-
nah), 885
Second Asian Population Con-
ference: Clayton, 12, 15;
Costa, 12; text of declara-
tion, 19
U.S. programs: Claxton, 15;
Costa, 12
Porges, John M., 848
Porter, William J., 94, 441

Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, appoint-
ment: 216; Rogers, 5
Portugal :

Defense articles and services,
U.S. authorization of funds
(Nixon), 109

Portugal — Continued

Herbicides, use of in military op-
erations, question of (New-
som), 582
Macao textile exports to U.S.,

agreement, 99
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,
152, 246, 543, 902, 949
Portuguese overseas territories:
Newsom, 580, 581; Nixon, 797
Postal matters:

Money orders and postal travel-
lers' cheques agreement
(1969): Algeria, 865; Bu-
rundi, 440; Gabon, 124;
Kenya, Norway, 865
Universal Postal Union, Consti-
tution (1964), with final
protocol: Bangladesh, 311;
United Arab Emirates, 544
Additional protocol : Algeria,
865; Brazil, 544; Burun-
di, China, People's Repub-
lic of, 439; Gabon, India,
124; Jordan, 544; Kenya,
Norway, 865
Prisoners of war, civilian, citation

(Rush), 928
Proclamations by the President:
Bill of Rights Day and Human
Rights Day and Week
{il73), 11
Certain meat imports limitation
suspended for 1973 (ilSS),
309
National Moment of Prayer and

Thanksgiving (A181), 189
Nonfat dry milk quotas, in-
creases (4177, i216), 108,
853
Oil import levels increased

U17S), 147
Oil import program modified

(4175, 4202), 98, 489
Pan American Day and Pan
American Week (4205), 538
Prayer for Peace — Memorial
Day, May 28, 1973 (4218),
882
World Trade Week, 1973 (4214),
692
Public Law 480 (Hannah), 885,

889
Publications : i

Congressional documents relat-
ing to foreign policy, lists,
24, 72, 151, 214, 289, 335,
439, 506, 655, 706, 863, 891,
947
State Department:
Foreign Relations of the
United States: Vohime
IX, The Western Hemi-
spliere, released 248

M

966

Department of State Bulletin

ii;

Publications — Continued

State Department — Continued
Recent releases, 80, 100,
192, 248, 312, 372, 412,
544, 671, 902
Treaties in Force: A List of
Treaties and Otiier Inter-
national Agreements of
the United States in Force
on January 1, 197.1, re-
leased, 411
U.N. documents, lists, 118, 310,
669

Qatar, international telecommuni-
cation convention (1965), ac-
cession, 588
Quevedo Toro, Alberto, 128
Quita Sueno treaty with Colombia,
(Nixon), 144

Racial discrimination, interna-
tional convention on elimina-
tion of (1965): Barbados
(with reservation), 99; Bhu-
tan, 865; Fiji, 410; Germany,
East (with reservation), 670;
Haiti, 191; Ivory Coast, 336;
New Zealand, 99
Radio:
Aeronautical mobile (R) serv-
ice revised frequency allot-
ment plan, with annexes,
partial revision of radio reg-
ulations (1959), Finland,
336
Foreign Broadcast Information
Service (FBIS), agreement
re, Paraguay, 902
Radio communications between
amateur stations on behalf
of third parties, agreement
with Guatemala, 671
Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty (Nixon), 875
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 212
Romania-U.S. exchange, agree-
ment, 122
Ragsdale, Thomas, 928
Ramo, Simon, 650
Ramsey, Douglas K., 928
Refugees :

Financing emergency relief and
assistance, grant agreement
with International Commit-
tee of Red Cross and Khmer
Republic, 247
Status of, protocol (1967), Mali,
544
Rein, Bert W., 23
Reis, Herbert, 712
Relief and rehabilitation grant
agreements with Bangladesh,
949

Reston, James (quoted), 69
Rhoads, James B., 650
Rhodesia :
Closure of Zambian border

(Newsom), 367
Sanctions, U.S. position: New-
som, 368, 461; Nixon, 824
Richardson, John, Jr., 297
Risner, Robinson (Nixon), 475
Road traffic:
Customs conventions. See Cus-
toms
Road traffic convention (1949) :
Fiji (with reservation),
Singapore, 310
Rodman, Peter W., 313
Rogers, William P.: (Shultz), 301
Addresses, remarks, and state-
ments :
Africa, 551

Aircraft, inspection of passen-
gers, 25S
Ambassador Porter, nomina-
tion for Under Secretary
of State for Political Af-
fairs, 6
Amnesty, 259

Arab-Israeli conflict, 9, 129,

250, 284, 379, 549, 589, 634

Argentina, U.S. relations, 903,

918, 919, 922
Arms sales, question of, 917,

918
Asia, 548, 549, 591
Brazil, 915

Cambodia, 223, 283, 339, 341,
376, 548
POW's in, question of, 282
U.S. air support. Presiden-
tial authority, 634, 652
U.S. objectives, 859
Canada, 555, 923

Former Prime Minister

Pearson, regrets at

death of, 108

ICCS membership, problems

in, 6, 344, 373

Caribbean Development Bank,

910
Chile, 916, 922
China, People's Republic of:
Liaison offices, opening of,

378
U.S. relations, 129, 257, 378,
.546, 548, 589
Colombia, 911

Colorado salinity problem, 905
Cuba:

Hijacking agreement, 249,

251, 2.54, 255, 258, 556
U.S. relations, 255, 258, 680
Defense, 636
Budget, 591

Strategic stockpiles, 918
Denmark, question of reduc-
tion of NATO forces, 5

Rogers, William P. — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
East-West relations, 286, 547,

837
Economic policy, 551, 554, 590
Egypt, U.S. relations, 257
Energy crisis, 256, 551

Petroleum sources, 908, 916
Europe, 6, 252, 258, 903
Conference on Security and
Cooperation, 5, 7, 130,
286, 547, 589, 591
Mutual and balanced force
reductions, 5, 8, 130,
286, 547, 591
European Economic Commu-
nity, 7, 258, 286, 552, 554
Expropriation, 922, 923
Foreign aid policy, 286
Foreign policy, 281, 286, 545,

589, 6,33, 907, 922
Former President Johnson,

death of, 190
Former President Truman,

death of, 97
GATT trade negotiations, pro-
posed, 552, 677, 836
India, 259, 549

Indochina, 283, 286, 337, 546,

548, 589

Reconstruction, proposed,

253, 254, 284, 339, 341,

344, 376, 548

Inter-American Development

Bank, 679, 914
International monetary sys-
tem, 285, 552, 676, 836, 938
Investment of private capital
abroad, 679, 914, 922 923,
925
Itaipu Dam, 923
Jamaica, 924

Japan, 259, 552, 555, 591
Kidnapping and murder of
U.S. diplomats in Sudan,
342, 353, 549
Kissinger, State Department

relations, 922
Kubish, Jack, 904, 920, 924
Laos, 223, 257, 282, 283, 339,
341, 375, 548, 634, 652
Latin America (for detaiLs,
see Latin America), 550,
636, 676
Visit to, 903
Law of the sea, 555, 677, 909
Less developed countries, 553,

677, 679
Malta, 10
Mexico, 904
Narcotics, 556
NATO, 5, 10, 286, 546, 591,

636, 836
Nigeria, 551

OAS, 907, 909, 911, 914, 923^
924, 926

I Index, Jonuary 1-June 25, 1973

967

Rogers, William P. — Continued
Addresses, etc. — Continued
OECD, 554, 635
Peru, 910

SALT talks, 8, 130, 286, 546
SEATO, 254

Soviet Union, 129, 546, 589
Trade relations, 378, 547,
636, 837
State Department budget, 633
State of the world, 557
Taiwan, 257

Terrorism, 82 (quoted), 380,
549, 556, 678, 724
U.S. diplomats, murder of
in Sudan, 342, 353, 549
Trade, 7, 286, 384, 547, 552,
553, 677
Generalized trade prefer-
ences, 524, 551, 679, 838,
904, 914, 917, 921
Mexico, 905

Trade Reform Act of 1973,

255, 285, 523, 552, 590,

636, 677, 679, 835, 837,

917, 926

U.N., U.S. representative

(Scali), nomination, 59
U.S. Ambassador to France

(Irwin) , 63
U.S. arms sales to Latin Amer-
ica, policy, 917
U.S. Information Agency, bud-
get cuts opposed, 936
U.S. military forces, policy on

reduction, 590
Venezuela, 906, 907
Viet-Nam, North, 130, 221, 254,
345
Reconstruction, proposed,
253, 258, 284, 377, 549,
634
Viet-Nam, Republic of, 5, 130,
188, 283, 373
Cease-fire, 220

Violations, 259, 342, 373,
375, 633
ICCS, 6, 221, 259, 282, 283,

338, 340, 343, 373, 374
International Conference on,
222, 249, 252, 256, 282,
337, 340, 346, 548
Joint Military Commissions,
220, 259, 282, 284, 343,
375
National Council of Recon-
ciliation, 221
Peace agreement, 220, 337,
373, 374, 546, 548, 634
POW's, 223, 282, 342, 343,
376
Watergate, 917
Correspondence, messages, and
reports :
Jurisdictional immunities.
draft bill, 148

Rogers, William P. — Continued
Correspondence, etc. — Continued
OAS General Assembly, 3rd

regular session, 675
U.S. Foreign Policy 1972, Re-
port, 545
East-West Trade Policy Com-
mittee, appointment to, 380
News conferences, ti'anscripts,
5, 249, 339, 373, 915, 920
Secretarial determination to pro-
vide continued assistance, 11
Visit to Latin America: 551,
674, 903; Casey, 937; Nixon,
686, 782
Romania :

Exchanges agreement for 1973-
1974, announcement and
text, 119
Treaties, agreements, etc., 32,

472, 671, 866, 949
U.S. relations: Nixon, 763;
Rush, 534
Roosevelt, Franklin D. (quoted),

693
Rosenfeld, Alvin, 198
Rumsfeld, Donald, 216
Rush, Kenneth, 216, 381, 418, 473,
533, 586, 696, 842, 854, 867,
928
Rusk, Dean, 650
Ryther, John, 941

Safety of life at sea:

International convention (1960),
Libya, 280
Amendments (1967, 1968,
19 6 9) : Czechoslovakia,
631, 632; Greece, 124;
Israel, 410; Netherlands,
507; Yugoslavia, 311
Prevention of collisions at sea,
international regulations
(1960), Tunisia, 32
Prevention of collisions at sea,
international regulations
(1972), Switzerland, 336
SALT. See Strategic arms limita-
tion talks
Samuelson, Paul A., 205, 598
Sanchez, Phillip V., 950
Sanz de Santamaria, Carlos:

quoted, 777; Meyer, 279
Saudi Arabia, National Guard
modernization program agree-
ment, 866
Scali, John A.: 216; Rogers, 59
Statements :

Israeli raid on Lebanon, 656,

657, 659
Kidnapping and murder of
U.S. diplomats in Sudan,
353
Panama Canal treaty nego-
tiations, 490, 495

Scali, John A. — Continued
Statements — Continued

Security Council review of
Middle East problem, 929
Scheffer, Victor B., 941
Science and foreign affairs, ad-
visory committee, member-
ship, 650
Science and technology: Hannah,
886; Kitchen, 665; Seitz, 661
Cooperative programs, bilateral
agreements with: Italy, 52;
Yugoslavia, 864, 866
Educational, cultural, scientific,
technical and other fields,
agreement with Romania on
exchanges and cooperation,
32
Educational, scientific, and cul-
tural materials, agreement
on importation of (1950) :
Barbados, 715; Fiji, 311;
Libya, 410
Romania-U.S. exchanges agree-
ment for 1973-1974, an-
nouncement and text, 119
Technology transfer (Flani-

gan), 364
U.S.-Israel Binational Science
Foundation, U.S. members,
402
U.S. research and development

activities (Kitchen), 666
U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission
on Scientific and Technical
Cooperation (Nixon), 733
Meeting, 584
Scott, Hugh, 347
Sea, Exploration of. Interna-
tional Council for, convention
(1964), U.S., 865, 949
Seabed disarmament treaty
(1972): Bush, 76
Current actions: Australia, 191;
Lesotho, 507 ; Nicaragua,
246
Seabed resources (see also Law of
the sea): Moore, 707; Nixon,
826; Rogers, 678
Searby, Daniel M., 508
SEATO (South East Asia Treaty

Organization) : Rogers, 254
Security assistance: Hannah, 890;
Nixon, 694, 812; Rogers, 591
Program FY 1974: Nixon, 212;
Rush, 696, 699, 856, 957;
Tarr, 892
Security Council, U.N.:
Documents, list, 669
Meetings in Panama: Bush, 242;
Phillips, 244; Rogers, 257
Middle East problem, proposed

review (Scali), 929
Resolution, draft, Panama Canal

treaty negotiations, 497
Resolutions, texts:
Israeli raid on Lebanon, 660

968

Department of State Bulletin {„j

Security Council, U.N.— Continued
Resolutions — Continued

Meetings in Panama City, 2-15
U.S. representative (Scali), con-
firmation, 21G
Security leakage and communica-
tions leakage (Armacost), 69
Seitz, Frederick, GGl
Self-determination: Nixon, 125,

823; Rogers, 919, 922
Senegal, ocean dumping conven-
tion (1972), signature, 80
Serafin. Barry, 374
Sheldon, Courtney R., 348
Sherman, George, 261
Ships and shipping:

Tonnage measurement of ships,
international convention
(1969): Fiji, 52; Finland,
440
U.S. vessels, agreements re
loans of: Argentina, 192;
Korea, 124; Turkey (ter-
mination), 372, 411
Shultz, George P.: 298, 380, 566;

Casey, 540
Sierra Leone, Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Orga-
nization, convention (1948),
471
Sieverts, Frank A., 942
Simon, William E. (Shultz), 301
Singapore:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 310,

543, 949
Visit of Vice President Agnew,
294, 296
Sino-Soviet relations: Kissinger,

395; Rogers, 378
Sisco, Joseph J., 322, 403, 484, 844
Skolnikoff, Eugene, 650
Slavery :

Supplementary convention
(1956) on abolition of:
Greece, 247; Mali, 507;
Zambia, 670
Suppression of, convention
(1926), and protocol: Mali,
507; Zambia, 632
White slave traffic, suppression
of, agreement (1904) : Mali,
544; Zambia, 670
Smith, Gerard, 60
Smith, Kingsbury, 345
Smith, Philip E.: Kissinger, 314;

Rush, 387
Soames, Sir Christopher: quoted,

541; Rush, 386
Social security, agreement with

Italy, 866
Solano Lopez, Miguel, 402
Solomon, Richard, 313
Somalia, ocean dumping conven-
tion (1972), signature, 949
Sorokos, John A., 128
South Africa:
Treaties, agreements, etc., 335,
864

South Africa — Continued
U.S. arms embargo (Newsom),
581

South East Asia Treaty Organi-
zation (Rogers), 25-1
Soviet Jews immigrating to Is-
rael, U.S. assistance, 532
Soviet Union (Rush), 418

Emigration policy: Nixon, 518-

519; Rogers, 378, 636, 837;

Rush, 480; Stoessel, 861

Europe, forces in (Rush), 869

Foreign policy objective.'!

(Rush), 477
Indochina, international confer-
ence on, question of partic-
ipation (Kissinger), 166
Magnetohydrodynamics, U.S.-
Soviet joint research (Nix-
on), 565
Military strength: Rogers, 591;

Rush, 479
Naval activities (NAC), 3
Treaties, agreements, etc., 80.
100, 152, 311, 336, 371, 471,
508, 544, 866, 950
U.S. imports of liquefied natural
gas, question of: Nixon,
734; Shultz, 571
U.S. relations: Kissinger, 395,
398; Nixon, 196, 207, 292,
673, 718, 720, 723, 732, 735,
832, 932; Rogers, 129, 546,
589; Rush, 420, 854; Scali,
491
Trade relations: 241; Brower,
264; Casey, 638, 851;
Nixon, 514, 733; Rogers,
547; Rush, 477
Soviet emigration policy,
effect on: Nixon, 518-
519; Rogers, 378, 547,
636, 837; Rush, 480;
Stoessel, 861
Strategic materials, ques-
tion of: Casey, 642;
Rush, 483
U.S.-Soviet Joint Commislion on
Scientific and Technical Co-
operation (Nixon), 733
Meeting, 584
U.S.-Soviet Standing Consulta-
tive Commission, agreement,
entry into force, 411, 950
U.S. visit of Secretary Brezh-
nev: Nixon, 840, 932; Rog-
ers, 254
Visit of President Nixon, 1972,
preparation of and results
(Nixon), 729
Spain:

Air transport agreement with
U.S., signature, 310

Educational-cultural component
of U.S. agreement, funds
for, Presidential determina-
tion (Nixon), 352

Spain — Continued

Treaties, agreements, etc., 152,

312, 471, 588, 865
U.S. defense articles and serv-
ices, authorization of funds,
63
U.S. security supporting assist-
ance, authorization urged:
Rush, 857; Tarr, 895
Spivak, Lawrence E., 198
Sri Lanka (Ceylon): Nixon, 793;
Sisco, 405
Treaties, agreements, etc., 246,
371, 544
State Department:

.Appointments, 440, 508
Assistant Secretary for Congres-
sional Relations (Wright),
confirmation, 950
Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (Ku-
bisch) : 950; Rogers, 924
Budget FY 1974: Nixon, 212;

Rogers, 633
Economic role (Casey), 849
Publications. See Publications
Records, availability of (Frank-
lin), 101

Returned POW's honored

(Rush), 928
Senate confirmations, 216, 247,

472, 848, 950
Under Secretary of State for

Economic Affairs (Casey),

confirmation, 216

Under Secretary of State for Po-
litical Affairs (Porter) :
Rogers, 6; confirmation, 216
State of the Union (Nixon), 217
State of the world (tables and

charts), 557, 558, 559, 560
Stein, Herbert (Shultz), 301
Stevenson, John R., 113
Stever, H. Guyford, 402, 584
Strategic arms limitation talks:
Bush, 26; NAC, 3; Nixon, 474,
674, 731, 736, 760; Rogers, 286;
Rush 421
Agreements: Bush, 73; Nixon,
210, 474, 673, 701, 723, 734,
808, 816, 839, 932; Rogers,
130, 546; Rush, 477
Geneva talks resumed (Johnson)
446
U.S. delegation, 447
Mutual balanced force reduc-
tions, question of linkage
(Rogers), 9
Standing Consultative Commit-
tee:
Memorandum of understand-
ing, 60, 100
Protocol re regulations gov-
erning procedures, 950

Index, January 1-June 25, 1973

969

strategic arms limitation talks
— Continued
U.S. chief of delegation (John-
son), confirmation, 216
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., 861
Straits, international, rights of
transit (Rogers), 556, 678, 907
Strong, Maurice (McGee), 53
Sudan (Nixon), 797
Ambassador to U.S., credentials,

128
Kidnapping and murder of U.S.
diplomats by Black Septem-
ber terrorists : Macomber,
399; Nixon, 350, 353; Rog-
ers, 342, 353, 549; Scali, 353
Treaties, agreements, etc., 472,

588, 631
U.S. Ambassador (Noel) : ap-
pointment, 51 ; confirmation,
247
Sullivan, William H.: 198, 262;

Kissinger, 161 ; Rogers, 634
Sutterlin, James S., 432

Swaziland, treaties, agreements,

etc., 310, 670, 715
Sweden (Rogers), 259

Treaties, agreements, etc., 80,
246, 280, 311, 410, 471, 507,
671, 948

Switzerland :
Assistance in criminal matters,
treaty with U.S., announce-
ment and summary of
treaty, 947

Treaties, agreements, etc., 79, 80,
246, 336, 411, 471, 507, 902,
948
Syvrud, Donald E., 387

Taiwan: Kissinger, 315; Rogers,

257; Rush, 480
Talbot, Frederick Hilborn, 402
Tanaka, Kakuei, 71k

Tanzania, treaties, agreements, etc.
124, 670

Tariffs and trade, general agree-
ment on: 238; Weintraub, 133
Agreements and protocols, acces-
sions to, current actions on:
Accession of Bangladesh, pro-
tocol : Denmark, France,
India, 371; Japan, Nor-
way, 152; Sri Lanka, 371;
U.S., 152
Article VI, implementation,
Spain, 152
Multilateral trade negotiation,
proposed: 236, 691; Casey,
541; Hillenbrand, 465; Mey-
er, 278; Nixon, 757, 802;
Rogers; 552, 677, 836; Rush,
423; Unger, 333

Tariffs and trade, general agree-
ment on — Continued

U.S. appropriation, proposed
authority (Katz), 529

U.S. reserves right to renego-
tiate trade concessions, an-
nouncement, 139
Tarr, Curtis W., 892
Technical cooperation agreement

with Afghanistan, 440
Telecommunications :

International telecommunication
convention (1965), with an-
nexes: Australia (territorial
application), 949; China,
People's Republic of, 100;
German Democratic Repub-
lic, 866; Ghana, 508; Guate-
mala, Philippines, 100; Qa-
tar, 588

Space telecommunications, par-
tial revision of 1959 radio
regulations as amended : Ar-
gentina, 247; Byelorussian
S.S.R., 949; Canada, Fin-
land, 336; German Federal
Republic, 508; Ireland, 949;
Japan, Korea, 247; Nether-
lands, 508; Singapore ( with
reservation), 949; Soviet
Union, 508; U.K., 100, over-
seas territories, 336; Uk-
rainian S.S.R., 670
Territorial sea, limits (Rogers),

556, 678, 909
Terrorism: Nixon, 719, 786, 823,
828; Rogers, 380, 549, 556, 678,
724; Scali, 847

Israeli Embassy in Thailand,
seizure by Palestine ter-
rorists (Unger), 332

Israeli raid on Lebanon (Scali),
656, 657, 659

Prevention and punishment, con-
vention (1971), Nicaragua,
440

Sudan, murder of U.S. diplomats
by Black September terror-
ists: Macomber, 399; Nixon,
350, 353, 354; Rogers, 342,
353, 549; Scali, 353

Suspension of waiver of transit
visas extended, 97

U.N. study of, U.S. position:
Bennett, 81, 87, 89; Bush, 92
Textiles :

Cotton, agreements re trade:
China, Republic of, 508;
Czechoslovakia, 716; El Sal-
vador, 949; Pakistan, 588,
949; Portugal, 152, 949;
Yugoslavia, 902

Macao textile exports to U.S.,
agreement with Portugal, 99

U.S.-Japan negotiations (Arma-
cost>, 69

1

Textiles — Continued i.

Wool and man-made fiber textile i
products, agreements with: j
China, Republic of, 508; Ko- !
rea, 902; Malaysia, 588;
Portugal, 152, 902, 949
Thailand (Unger), 330 j

Drug control program (Agnew), |
295 i

Economic progress (Nixon), 771 j
Joint Casualty Resolution Cen- |
ter: Porter, 444; Rogers, 282 i
Seizure of Israeli Embassy by |
Palestine terrorists (Un- t
ger),332
Treaties, agreements, etc., 151, !
335, 950 I

U.S. forces in: Kissinger, 169; 'j
Sullivan, 199 ij

U.S. grant military assistance, i
authorization request: Rush, !l
697, 699, 857; Tarr, 894, 896 Ij
Visit of Vice President Agnew, !|
294, 295
Theis, J. William, 194, 349, 415
Thieu, Nguyen Van, 509, 510, 574
Thomas, Helen, 193
Togo, treaties, agreements, etc.,

215, 371
Tonga, treaties, agreements, etc.,.

371, 901
Tonnage measurement of ships, in-i
ternational convention (1969) :
Fiji, 52; Finland, 440
Touring and tourism, customs fa-i
cilities for touring, convention)
(1954), Fiji, 310
Townes, Charles H., 205
Trade: 236; Hillenbrand, 462
Africa (Newsom),459
Agricultural: Hillenbrand, 446;'

Nixon, 516; Rogers, 7
Capital markets, internationali-
zation (Casey), 448
East-West. See East-West rela^

tions
Land-locked states, convention or
transit trade of (1965)
Chile (with reservation), 8(-
Less developed countries: 240
Hannah, 884; Rogers, 286
553; Weintraub, 135

Generalized trade preferences
proposed: Armstrong, 529i ^i
Casey, 525, 542-543; Nix
on, 519, 773; Rogers, 524|jj,
551, 679, 838, 904, 914
917, 921
Nontariff barriers: Casey, 526
938; Hillenbrand, 466; Nix
on, 516; Rogers, 523
Preferential trade: 237; Casej
542, 939; Kissinger, 595
Meyer, 278; Nixon, 515, 75'
803; Rogers, 552, 677; Rusl
423; Weintraub, 135

:ra|

Gi

C«!

970

Department of State Bulletin

'

Trade — -Continued

Reverse preferences (Rogers), 7,

552
Strategic trade controls (Ca-
sey), 642
U.S.:

.\frica (Nixon), 796
.Antidumping (Katz), 527
China, People's Republic of

(Rogers), 257
East-West Trade Policy Com-
mittee, establishment, 380
Eastern Europe (see also
East-West relations) :
Rogers, 547; Rush, 536
Europe, problems (see also
European Economic Com-
munity) : Rush, 384
G.ATT trade concessions, right
to renegotiate reserved,
139
Latin .America (see also Gen-
eralized trade preferences,
supra) : Meyer, 278; Rog-
ers, 677, 907, 914, 918, 921,
926
-Mexico (Rogers), 905
Most-favored-nation treatment,
Trade Reform Act of 1973
proposals : .Armstrong,
529; Ni.xon, 518; Rogers,
837; Rush, 536
Protectionism (Rush), 385
Soviet Union. See Soviet Union
Trade -Agreements Program,
16th -Annual Report of the
President, transmittal, 274
Trade Reform Act of 1973:
-Armstrong, 523; Casey,
525, 851; Eberle, 530;
Katz, 527; Nixon, 513, 531
(quoted), 674, 686, 734,
773, 804 ; Rogers, 255, 285,
523, 551, 552, 590, 636, 677,
835, 917, 926; Shultz, 300,
302
U.S. policy: Nixon, 503, 801;
Porter, 442; Weintraub,
134
Venezuela (Rogers), 907
World Trade Week, 1973, procla-
mation, 692
rain, Russell E., 609, 612
Vlil'rapeznikov, V. A., 584
ravel :

Group charters and advance
booking charters, agreement
with Federal Republic of
Germany, 632
U.S. passport restrictions, 488
World (chart), 558
'reaties, agreements, etc.:
Current actions, 32, 52, 79, 99,
123, 151, 191, 215, 246, 280,
310, 335, 371, 410, 439, 471,

yi, idex, January 1-June 25, 1973

Treat ies — Continued
Current actions — Continued

507, 543, 588, 631, 670, 715.
864, 901, 948
Vienna convention (1969), with
annex: Argentina (with res-
ervation), 216; Mauritius.
411; Philippines, 247
Trent, Darrell, 572
Truman, Harry S., death of:
Heath, 270; Nixon, 97; Rog-
ers, 97
Tunisia, treaties, agreements, etc.,
32, 215, 246, 371, 439, 471, 507,
631, 865
Turkey :

Treaties, agreements, etc., 79, 80,

191, 372, 411
U.S. -Ambassador (Macomber),

confirmation, 472
U.S. grant military assistance,
authorization request: Rush,
698, 856; Tarr, 895, 896

U

Uganda (Nixon), 797

Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Repub-
lic, treaties, agrreements, etc.,
124, 471, 670, 865

UNFICYP. See United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Unger, Leonard, 330

United -Arab Emirates, Universal
Postal Union Constitution with
final protocol (1964), 544
United Kingdom :

Access to U.S. space launch cap-
abilities, agreement, 190
Advance charter flights agree-
ment with U.S., 669
Treaties, agreements, etc., 79, 80,
100, 124, 152, 311, 336, 371,
372, 471, 508, 632, 716, 948,
949
U.S. visit of Prime Minister
Heath: 269; Nixon, 195
United Nations:
Accomplishments and role (Nix-
on), 822
Charter review, U.S. position

(Bennett), 116
Disarmament programs (Bush),

73
Environment secretariat, pro-
posed: 58; McGee, 55
Financing, U.S. scale of assess-
ments adjusted : McGee, 43,
48, 50; text of resolution, 51
Human rights in armed conflict,

role (Aldrich), 877
Membership (McGee), 45
Associate (Bennett), 116
Germanys, question of (NAC),
2

United Nations — Continued

Observer office of Provisional
Revolutionary Government
(Viet-Nam), question of
(Rogers), .341
Privileges and immunities, con-
vention (1946), Guyana, 215
U.S. representative (Scali) :
Rogers, 59; confirmation,
216
Viet-Nam:

International conference, par-
ticipation of Secretary-
General (Rogers), 341
Act of conference, question
of U.N. jurisdiction
(Rogers), 345
Role in (Rogers), 254
United Nations Development Pro-
gram: Ni.xon, 824; Seitz, 664
United Nations Environment Fund,

proposed: 58; McGee, 55
United Nations Fund for Drug
Abuse Control (Lafontant),
110
United Nations Fund for Popula-
tion Activities (Claxton), 16
United Nations Peacekeeping Force
in Cyprus (Rush), 700
U.S. contribution, proposed:
Rush, 857; Tarr, 895
United States domestic problems

(Nixon), 197, 218, 225
United States Information Agency:
Budget FY 1974 (Nixon), 212

Cuts opposed (Rogers), 936
Returned POW's honored
(Rush), 928
Updike, John, 205
Urban development, transportation
and power, authorization re-
quest FY 1974 (Hannah), 887
Uruguay :

Extradition treaty with U.S.:

687; Nixon, 946
Treaties, agreements, etc., 124,
508
Utecht, Richard W., 928

Vandenberg, Arthur (McGee), 43
Venezuela:

Treaties, agreements, etc., 191,

335, 902
Visit of Secretary Rogers (Rog-
ers), 906, 907
Viet-Nam, North:
Joint Economic Commission:
263; Kissinger, 318, 320;
Nixon, 747; Rogers, 254
Announcement, 387
Mine clearing: 187, 192; Rogers,
221
Communist allegations of de-
lays in, and U.S. suspen-
sion of operations, 602

971

Viet-Nam, North — Continued
POW's (see also under Viet-
Nam, Republic of), Geneva
conventions, nonapplication
by North Viet-Nam: Al-
drich, 877; Sieverts, 943
Reconstruction program, pro-
posed: 263; Kissinger, 166,
318, 319, 427; Nixon, 193,
194, 348; Rogers, 253, 258,
284, 377, 549, 634; Rush, 481
Cease fire violations, effect:
Nixon, 695, 747, 748;
Rush, 856
Secret understanding, question
of (Sullivan), 203
South Viet-Nam, policy on (Kis-
singer), 428
Soviet and Chinese supply of
arms, question of (Rogers),
-345
Treaties, agreements, etc., 191,

192, 371
U.S. December bombing: Kissin-
ger, 391, 430; Nixon, 474,
744
U.S. military activities, suspen-
sion: Isham, 127; Rogers,
130
U.S. passports, restrictions, 488
U.S. relationship: 174, 263; Kis-
singer, 158, 320, 390; Nixon,
154, 747
Visits of Dr. Kissinger: Kissin-
ger, 318, 390; Nixon, 193,
194, 747; Ziegler, 193n
Text of communique, 262
Viet-Nam, Republic of: Nixon, 473,
719; Porter, 442; Rogers, 188;
Rush, 418, 476; Scali, 491
Cease-fire: 169, 182, 191, 192;
Agnew, 294; Kissinger, 155,
165; Nixon, 153, 737, 771;
Rogers, 220
U.S. replies to North Viet-
nam violation charges, 599
Violations: Nixon, 350, 414,
673, 749, 841; Rogers,
259, 342, 373, 375, 633;
Sullivan, 198
China, role in (Kissinger), 388
Civil war, considered as (Sulli-
van), 200
Coalition government, question of

(Kissinger), 156, 163
Elections, proposed: 171; Kis-
singer, 156
Resignation of President Thieu
prior to, question of (Kis-
singer) , 167
Foreign troops in (Agnew), 294
Guerrillas, treatment of (Al-

drich), 879
Ho Chi Minh Trail (Kissinger),
164

Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
International Commission of
Control and Supervision :
172, 346; Kissinger, .34, 35,
41, 159; Nixon, 415; Porter,
443; Rogers, 221, 259, 282,
283, 338, 340, 343, 373, 374
Canada, problems of member-
ship (Rogers), 6, 340, 344,
373
Eligibility to receive defense
articles and services. Pres-
idential determination, 843
Protocol on, 177, 191, 192
International conference: 173,
263; Kissinger, 166; Nixoii,
748; Rogers, 222, 249, 252,
256, 282, 548
Act of Conference, text of, 345
Invitations to, 262
Japan, question of participa-
tion of (Kissinger), 319
Reconvening, provisions for:
346; Rogers, 338, 340, 343
U.N. Secretary-General, par-
ticipation (Rogers), 341
U.S. congressional delegation,

347
U.S. objectives (Rogers), 337,
340
Joint Military Commissions: 170,
172, 176, 177, 182, 600; Kis-
singer, 160; Porter, 444;
Rogers, 220, 259, 282, 284,
343, 375; Rush, 480
"Land to the Tiller" program:

Nixon, 574; Thieu, 574
MIA's, efforts to account for:
170; Kissinger, 428; Nixon,
153, 737, 746, 749, 841; Por-
ter, 444; Rogers, 223, 282;
Sievert, 942; Sullivan 203
National Council for National
Reconciliation and Concord :
171; Kissinger, 156, 163;
Rogers, 221
North Viet-Nam, relationship :

171; Kissinger, 165
North Vietnamese troops, pres-
ence of (Kissinger), 164
Paris peace talks: Isham, 10, 107,
127; Kissinger, 40; Porter,
94
Review of (Isham), 41
Peace agreement: 192, 511, 692;
Brandt, 689; Heath, 269,
272; Kissinger, 155, 388;
Nixon, 196, 218, 290, 673,
721, 740, 745, 931; Rogers,
220, 337; Rush, 421; Sul-
livan, 190, 200
Announcement (Nixon), 153
Background: Kissinger, 33,
161, 168; Nixon, 737, 740,
840; Sullivan, 202

1

Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued
Peace agreement — Continued
Cease-fire provisions. See un- 1
der Cease-fire, supra •

China, attitude of (Sullivan), |

202
Efi"ectiveness : Nixon, 473, 746, j
841 ; Rogers, 373, 374, ,
548; Sullivan, 201 |

Guaranties, provisions: 346;

Rogers, 338
Meetings for review of imple-
mentation (Rogers), 684
Protocols: 191, 192; Kis- i
singer, 35, 40, 158; Sie- i
verts, 942 I

Texts of, 174 I

Secret protocols, question of:
Kissinger, 165; Sullivan,
203
Signature: 191; Nixon, 153
Procedure for (Kissinger),
160
Text of, 169
Peace settlement: Bush, 26; Kis-t
singer, 431; Nixon, 127, 723 J
Rogers, 5
Principles: Isham, 42; Kis-i

singer, 33
Saigon objections (Kissinger)

38
Summary (Porter), 444
"Peace with honor": Kissinger;

398; Nixon, 473, 737
Political evolution of (Kissini

ger), 167
Political settlement: 511; Suli

livan, 200
Prisoners of war (Nixon), 291!
475

Meeting with President Nixon

question of (Nixon), 19t

Ransom, question of (Sul

livan), 203
Release of: 170, 174, 191, 192i
Kissinger, 155, 159, Wi
Nixon, 153, 737, 746; Rogi
ers, 223, 282, 376
Address (Nixon), 930
Cease-fire in Laos, question
of effect (Kissinger;
389
Operation Homecoming: A(
new, 297; Rogers, 2S:
Problems and delays: 603
Nixon, 349; Rogers, 34
343; Sieverts, 942; Zi*
gler, 351
Wives and families (Nixon
154
Reunification, proposed: 17:

Kissinger, 157, 429
Self-determination : 170, 263, 34i
Kissinger, 156, 163, 16
166; Nixon, 153, 737; Bo
ers, 340, 374

972

Department of State Bullet ««

Viet-Nam, Republic of — Continued

Situation report (Kissinger),
429

Sole legitimate government in
South Viet-Nam: Agnew,
294; Nixon, 154; Sullivan,
203

Soviet Union, role in (Kissin-
ger), 388

Treaties, agreements, etc., 99,
124, 191, 216, 335, 371, 411,
508, 632, 716, 901

U.S. armed forces:

Return of, question (Kissin-
ger), 166, 391
Tribute to (Nixon), 154, 473
Withdrawals: 169, 601; Kis-
singer, 155; Nixon, 153

U.S. bombing, question of re-
sumption (Rogers), 343,
373

U.S. commitments and objec-
tives: Kissinger, 390; Nixon.
748, 772; Rush, 480

U.S. economic and military aid:
Kissinger, 168, 391; Nixon,
154, 193, 695, 748; Rogers,
374; Sullivan, 198

(U.S.) National Moment of
Prayer and Thanksgiving,
proclamation (Nixon), 189

U.S. naval forces, question of de-
ployment (Kissinger), 169

U.S. strategic stockpiles, ques-
tion of sale of (Nixon), 415

U.S. visit of President Thieu :
509; Nixon, 193, 195; text
of joint communique, 511

Vietnamization: Kissinger, 429;
Nixon, 737, 772, 812

Visit of Vice President Agnew,
294

Withdrawal of North Viet-Nam
troops, question of (Kissin-
ger) , 39

'isas :

Libyan requirements, 72

Visas — Continued
Nonimmigrant documentary
waiver, extension of suspen-
sion of, 97

Volcker. Paul (Shultz), 301

Volpc, John A., 216

von Staden, Bemdt, 637

W

Waldmann, Raymond J., 440

Walters, Barbara, 427

Washington, George (quoted), 689

Watergate (Rogers), 917

Watkins, Kennedy C. (Sutterlin).
433

Weather stations, North Atlantic
Ocean, protocol to amend 1954
agreement, U.S., 192

Weights and measures. Legal Me-
trology, International Organi-
zation, convention (1955) as
amended, U.S., 32

Weintraub, Sidney, 133

Wellman, Harvey R., 897

Wheat Trade Convention (1971)
Algeria, 902; Belgium, 632
Dominican Republic, 124
France, 312; Luxembourg, 632
Netherlands, 80; Venezuela,
902

White, Robert M., 433

Wiggins, James Russell (McGee),
53

Williams, Maurice J., 141, 387

Willis, Charles E., 928

Women, political rights of, conven-
tion (1953), German Demo-
cratic Republic (with reserva-
tion), 670

World Environment Day, proposed
(McGee), 55

World Health Organization (Well-
man), 899
Constitution (1946): German
Democratic Republic, 865;
Swaziland, 715

World Heritage Convention, ratifi-
cation urged: Nixon, 629;
State Department, 630

World Intellectual Property Or-
ganization, convention (1967),
Congo (Brazzaville), 311

World Meteorological Organization
(Nixon), 824
Convention (1950), German Dem-
ocratic Republic, 865

World order: Kissinger, 394;
Nixon, 935; Rogers, 281; Rush,
418; Unger, 332

World peace: Nixon, 125, 207; Rog-
ers, 130

World Trade Week, 1973, procla-
mation, 692

Wright, Marshall, 950

Yemen Arab Republic, treaties,

agreements, etc., 216, 440
Yugoslavia:

Scientific and technical agree-
ment with U.S., signature,
864
Treaties, agreements, etc., 311,

336, 543, 866, 902
U.S. relations: Nixon, 763; Rush,
534

Zahedi, Ardeshir, 577
Zaire (Nixon), 797
Agricultural commodities agree-
ment with U.S., 716
Zambia:

Rhodesian closure of border

(Newsom), 367
Treaties, agreements, etc., 507,
632, 670, 715
Zdravchev, Christo Delchev, 128
Ziegler, Ronald L.: 193ji, 313, 351,
387, 566; Kissinger, 430

ndex, January 1-June 25, 1973

973

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