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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




'//<?? 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1788 



October 1, 1973 



PRESIDENT NIXON SENDS MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS 

ON LEGISLATIVE GOALS FOR 1973 

Excerpts From the Message A17 

DR. KISSINGER GIVES STATEMENT BEFORE SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON HIS NOMINATION TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE A25 

DEPARTMENT SUPPORTS REPEAL OF LEGISLATION 

PERMITTING IMPORTS OF RHODESIAN CHROME 

Statements by Ambassador Scali and Assistant Secretai-y Newsom USA 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FORKIGN P 

For index see inside back cover 



Xbnrr 
utnents 



i73 

V 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1789 
October 8, 1973 



For aiile by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
&2 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 66 centa 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI, 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
interested agencies of the governmei 
with information on developments 
the field of US. foreign relations 
on the work of the Department ai 
the Foreign Set vice. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addressen, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of Stale and other 
officers of the Department, as well oi 
special articles on various phases ot 
international affairs and the functiont 
of the Department. Information is i 
eluded concerning treaties and int 
national agreements to which t 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inti 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, a 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also list 



President Nixon Sends Message to the Congress 
on Legislative Goals for 1973 



Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from a message from President Nixon 
transmitted to the Congress on September 
10.' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

As the Congress reconvenes for the closing 
months of the 1973 legislative season, it re- 
turns to a critical challenge. 

Our country faces many pressing problems 
which must be solved with dispatch. 

Americans want and deserve decisive ac- 
tion to fight rising prices. And they want 
every possible step taken now — not a year 
from now or in the next session of the 
Congress. 

Americans want and deserve decisive ac- 
tion this year to ensure that we will have 
enough heat for our homes, enough power for 
our factories, and enough fuel for our trans- 
portation. 

They want and deserve decisive action this 
year to combat crime and drug abuse. The na- 
tional rate of serious crime is now heading 
down for the first time in 17 years, and they 
want that downward spiral to continue. 

There is also an immediate need to improve 
the quality of our schools, reform Federal 
programs for our cities and towns, provide 
better job training, revamp our housing pro- 
grams, institute lasting reforms in campaign 
practices, and strengthen our position in 
world markets. 

Of transcending importance is America's 
continuing commitment to building a lasting 
structure of world peace. Our people are now 
at peace for the first time in more than a dec- 
ade, and they expect their leaders to do all 



' For the complete text, see White House press 
release dated Sept. 10; also printed as H. Doc. 93-1. 



that is necessary to maintain the peace, in- 
cluding those actions which preserve the Na- 
tion's strong defense posture. 



The First Goal: A Balanced Budget 

No issue is of greater concern to the Amer- 
ican public than rising consumer prices. The 
battle against inflation must be our first pri- 
ority for the remainder of this year. 

The executive branch is ah*eady actively 
engaged in this fight : 

— We have imposed a strong, new set of 
economic controls which should help to bring 
a reduction in the rate of inflation by the end 
of this year. 

— We have taken a series of measures to 
expand food supplies, so that production will 
keep up with growing demands. The farm bill 
passed by the Congress and signed into law 
last month will make a significant contribu- 
tion to this effort. 

— Thirdly, the Federal Reserve System has 
been working to maintain reasonable con- 
trols on the flow of money within the econ- 
omy, which is essential to reducing inflation. 

We are moving in the right direction, but 
we must recognize that we can reach our 
goal only if we also apply the single most im- 
portant weapon in our arsenal: control of the 
Federal budget. Every dollar we cut from 
the Federal deficit is another blow against 
higher prices. And nothing we could do at 
this time would be more effective in beating 
inflation than to wipe out the deficit alto- 
gether and to balance the Federal budget. 

In our joint efforts, however, I continue to 
be adamantly opposed to attempts at bal- 



October 1, 1973 



417 



ancing the overall budget by slashing the de- 
fense budget. We are already at the razor's 
edge in defense spending. In constant dollars, 
our defense spending in this fiscal year will 
be $10 billion less than was spent in 1964, 
before the Vietnam war began. Our defense 
forces are at the lowest level since the days 
just before the Korean war, and a smaller 
part of our gross national product is being 
spent on defense than in any year since 1950. 
Further cuts would be dangerously irrespon- 
sible and I will veto any bill that includes cuts 
which would imperil our national security. 



Strengthening the Economy 

The fight against inflation must move 
ahead on many fronts. Even as we strive to 
hold the line on Fedei'al spending, we must 
also take a number of additional actions to 
strengthen the economy and curb rising 
prices. 

Trade Reform Act 

One of the most important of all the bills 
now before the Congress is my proposed 
Trade Reform Act of 1973. It is important 
that final action on this measure be taken in 
the next four months. 

This legislation represents the most signifi- 
cant reform of our approach to world trade 
in more than a decade. But it builds on a 
strong tradition, steadily maintained since 
the days of Franklin Roosevelt, of giving the 
executive branch the authority it needs to 
represent the Nation effectively in trade ne- 
gotiations with other countries. 

The weeks and months ahead are a particu- 
larly important time in international eco- 
nomic history. This month sees the formal 
opening of a new and highly important 
round of trade negotiations in Tokyo and the 
annual meeting of the International Mone- 
tary Fund and World Bank in Nairobi. The 
Nairobi meeting is highly important to inter- 
national monetary reform negotiations. Deci- 
sions which grow out of both of these meet- 
ings will shape the world's economy for many 
years to come. The United States can be a 
much more effective participant in such dis- 



M 



cussions if the Congress provides the tools' 
contained in my proposed trade reform legis 
lation. 

The United States continues to seek a 
more open trading world. We believe that 
artificial barriers against trade among na- 
tions are often barriers against prosperity 
within nations. But while the trading system 
should be more open, it should also be more 
fair. The trading game must be made equita- 
ble for all countries — giving our workers, 
farmers and businessmen the opportunity to 
sell to other countries goods which they pro- 
duce most competitively and, as consumers, 
to buy goods which their counterparts in 
other countries produce most competitively. 
In bargaining for a more open and more 
equitable trading system, our negotiators 
must be equipped with authorities compara- 
ble to those of their counterparts from other 
nations. 

My trade reform legislation would provide 
a number of such authorities and thus would 
strengthen our bargaining position. I empha- 
size again that the Congress should set up 
whatever mechanism it deems best for closer 
consultation and cooperation with the execu- 
tive branch to ensure that its views are prop- 
erly represented as trade negotiations go 
forward. 

At the same time, I have also requested ac- 
tions to ensure that the benefits of expanding 
international trade are fairly distributed 
among our own people and that no segment 
of our economy is asked to bear an unfair 
burden. My proposals would give us greater 
flexibility in providing appropriate relief 
from imports which cause severe domestic 
problems and would also liberalize our pro- 
grams of adjustment assistance and other 
forms of compensation to help workers who 
are displaced because of rising imports. They 
would also equip us to deal more adequately 
with the unfair trading practices of other 
countries, and through expanded trade, to 
"sop up" some of the excess dollar credits 
now held abroad which can play havoc with 
domestic markets. 

Other authorities contained in the bill 
would give us greater flexibility to use trade 



418 



Department of State Bulletin 



policy in fighting inflation, correcting our 
balance of payments, expanding our exports, 
and advancing our foreign policy goals. One 
provision of this bill, authoi'izing the Presi- 
dent to extend Most Favored Nation treat- 
ment to those countries which lack that 
status, would be particularly helpful in car- 
rying out our foreign policy and I continue 
to give it my strong support. 

Altogether, the proposed Trade Reform 
Act of 1973 repi-esents a critical building 
block as we seek to construct a durable struc- 
ture of peace in the world and a vibrant and 
stable economy at home. In the difficult nego- 
tiations which lie ahead, this legislation 
would enable us to assure more jobs for 
American workers, better markets for Amer- 
ican producers, wider opportunities for 
American investors and lower prices for 
American consumers. 

Export Administration Act 

The Export Administration Act amend- 
ment which my Administration proposed on 
June 13th is another weapon which could be 
helpful in the fight against rising prices. One 
of the most important causes of the recent 
inflationary surge has been the extraordinary 
boom abroad and the additional demand 
which it has generated for our products. On 
the whole, this boom should be seen as a 
healthy, long-range development for our 
economy as well as for other countries. But 
as I said last June, when we have pressing 
shortages in this country and when we must 
choose between meeting needs abroad or at 
home, then "we must put the American con- 
sumer first." - 

This is why I have asked for new and more 
flexible authority to establish certain controls 
on food and other exports when and where 
they are needed. I continue, however, to op- 
pose permanent controls because they can up- 
set and discourage our entire pattern of 
healthy trade relationships and thus compli- 
cate the fight against inflation. Our limited 
controls on sovbeans were changed last Fri- 



- For President Nixon's address to the Nation on 
June 13, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents dated June 18, 1973, p. 765. 



day to permit full exports on new contracts. 
This action was taken because we are con- 
vinced that stocks and new crop supplies are 
more than adequate to meet our own needs. 
Nevertheless, I still seek the authority I 
requested last June to be sure we will be able 
to respond rapidly, if necessary, to new cir- 
cumstances. I also emphasize that new con- 
trols will be imposed only if they are 
absolutely needed. 



Stockpile Disposal Act 

Another important action which the Con- 
gress can take in the battle against rising 
prices is to provide the necessary authority 
for selling part of our national strategic 
stockpile — materials which are no longer 
needed for national security. I requested such 
authority last April with regard to $4 billion 
worth of goods in our stockpile. Such sales, 
by allowing us to increase supplies in the 
marketplace of major commodities, could 
help provide important relief for hard- 
pressed American consumers. Further, this 
bill could help to maintain and provide em- 
ployment for workers whose jobs are de- 
pendent upon the availability of basic 
commodities such as aluminum, zinc and 
copper, all of which are in short supply. 

Our country's strategic stockpile still re- 
flects the economic and military realities of 
the 1950's — in fact, 95 percent of the current 
stockpile was acquired before 1959. In the 
1970's, however, our military requirements 
have changed — and so has our economic 
capacity to meet them. My proposed new 
guidelines for the stockpile would carefully 
protect our national security in the light of 
these changing realities, while substantially 
enhancing our economic health. 

I regret that this legislation has not moved 
forward more rapidly during the past few 
months. In the name of national efficiency, 
thrift, and price stability, I call again for its 
prompt and favorable consideration. 

Other Economic Legislation 

As I indicated in my message to Congress 
on August 3, I will shortly be submitting my 



October 1, 1973 



419 



legislation on the restructuring of financial 
institutions. This is a complex matter which 
requires thorough but prompt study by the 
Congress. 

I call, too, for speedy enactment of legis- 
lation which has now emerged from confer- 
ence which would establish the Council on 
International Economic Policy on a perma- 
nent basis. 

Meeting the Energy Challenge 

I have previously stated, and wish to re- 
state in the most emphatic terms, that the 
gap beween America's projected short-term 
energy needs and our available domestic en- 
ergy supplies is widening at a rate which de- 
mands our immediate attention. 

I am taking all appropriate measures with- 
in my authority to deal with this problem, 
seeking to increase our supplies and moderate 
our demands. Looking to the future, I have 
announced plans for a large scale increase 
in our research and development effort, and I 
have asked my top energy advisor. Governor 
John Love, to meet with State officials to seek 
temporary modifications of air quality stand- 
ards. Such modifications would help to mini- 
mize fuel shortages this winter. In addition, 
I will soon be meeting with members of the 
Atomic Energy Commission to determine 
whether we can bring nuclear power plants 
on line more quickly. But the energ>' problem 
requires more than Presidential action; it 
also requires action by the Congress. 

It is absolutely essential that the Congress 
not wait for the stimulation of energy short- 
age to provide the legislation necessary to 
meet our needs. Already we have seen some 
regional inconveniences this summer with 
respect to gasoline and this winter we may 
experience a similar problem with regard to 
heating fuels. 

Over the long term, the prospects for ade- 
quate energy for the United States are excel- 
lent. We have the resources and the tech- 
nology to meet our growing needs. But to 
meet those long-term needs and to avoid se- 
vere problems over the short term, we must 
launch a concentrated effort which mobilizes 



the Government, American industry and the 
American people. 

I have recently called for passage of seven 
major energy bills now before the Congress. 
Not all of those can be acted upon with equal 
speed, but four of these bills are of the high- 
est urgency and must be acted upon before 
the end of this year. These four would pro- 
vide for the construction of the Alaskan pipe- 
line, construction of deepwater ports, 
deregulation of natural gas and establish- 
ment of new standards for surface mining. 
All four of these bills are addressed to both 
our short-term and long-term needs. 

Alaskan Pipeline 

Our first legislative goal — and one that 
should be achieved this month — is the enact- 
ment of an Alaskan pipeline bill. Construc- 
tion of the pipeline would provide us with up 
to 2 million barrels of oil per day over which 
we would have full control and would simul- 
taneously reduce by more than $3 billion per 
year our need for oil imports. I have proposed 
legislation to avoid any further delay in the 
construction of the Alaskan pipeline and I am 
gratified that both Houses of the Congress 
have already passed variations of this pro- 
posal. I urge the earliest possible attention to 
these bills by the House-Senate Conference 
Committee, so that pipeline construction can 
begin. 

Deepwater Ports 

Until domestic resources are in full pro- 
duction and technological progress has 
reached a point where sufficient energy 
sources are within reach, we will have to 
rely upon imports of foreign oil. At the pres- 
ent time, however, continental port facilities 
are inadequate to handle our import require- 
ments. 

Because of our limited port capacity, the 
super-tankers presently used for petroleum 
transport cannot be off-loaded anywhere on 
our Atlantic coast. I have therefore proposed 
measures to authorize the construction and 
operation of deepwater facilities in a manner 
consistent with our environmental priorities 



420 



Department of State Bulletin 



and consonant with the rights and responsi- 
bilities of the States involved. 

We must not delay this important legisla- 
tion. To do so would further delay the eco- 
nomical import of petroleum and would mean 
inci-eased costs to the American consumer, 
unnecessary threats to our coastal environ- 
ment, and further loss of revenues to Cana- 
dian and Caribbean ports which are already 
capable of off-loading large super-tankers. 



Metric Conversion 

Americans cherish tradition and our own 
way of doing things. Having been accultur- 
ated from childhood to the concepts of an 
inch, a mile, or a pound, we are understand- 
ably nonplussed when we consider the notion 
of a centimeter, a kilometer, a gram or a 
kilo. However, when we realize that the rest 
of the world is equally confused by our sys- 
tem of measurement, we must conclude, how- 
ever sadly, that we are the ones who are out 
of step. 

In a world of integrated commerce and in- 
creasing personal exchange, it is only pru- 
dent for us to adjust our own conceptions 
and devices for measuring and delineating 
quantity. 

I have recommended to the Congress that 
it pass legislation to convert America to the 
metric system. This can be done in a reason- 
able manner, one which is not abrupt or dis- 
concerting. I am pleased to note that the 
Administration's proposal is presently before 
the appropriate House subcommittee. I ask 
that the Senate give equally expeditious con- 
sideration to effecting this necessary change. 



Keeping the Peace 

For the first time in more than a decade, 
America is at peace. Now we must learn how 
to keep that peace — a task that is at least as 
demanding and in many ways even more sub- 
tle than the struggle to end a war. 

There is always a temptation after war to 
enter into a period of withdrawal and isola- 



tion. But surely we have learned from past 
lessons of precipitate disarmament that this 
temptation must be resisted. And surely we 
have also learned that our progress in secur- 
ing peace is due in large measure to our con- 
tinued military strength and to the steadfast, 
responsible role we have played in the affairs 
of our world. 

Defense Spending 

In recent years, it has been fashionable to 
suggest that whatever we want in the way of 
extra programs at home could be painlessly 
financed by lopping 5 or 10 or 20 billion dol- 
lars off the defense budget. This approach 
is worse than foolhardy; it is suicidal. We 
could have the finest array of domestic pro- 
grams in the world, and they would mean 
nothing if we lost our freedom or if, because 
of our weakness, we were plunged into the 
abyss of nuclear war. 

The world's hope for peace depends on 
America's strength — it depends absolutely on 
our never falling into the position of being 
the world's second strongest nation in the 
world. 

For years now we have been engaged in a 
long, painstaking process of negotiating mu- 
tual limits on strategic nuclear arms. Historic 
agreements have already been reached and 
others are in prospect. Talks are also going 
forward this year aimed at a mutual and 
balanced reduction of forces in Europe. But 
the point of all these negotiations is this: if 
peace is to be preserved the limitations and 
the reductions must be mutual. What one side 
is willing to give up for free, the other side 
will not bargain for. 

If America's peace and America's free- 
dom are worth preserving, then they are 
woi'th the cost of whatever level of military 
strength it takes to preserve them. We must 
not yield to the folly of breaching that level 
and so undermining our hopes and the 
world's hopes for a peaceful future. 

Although my military budget — measured 
in constant dollars — is down by almost one- 
third since 1968, the Congress is now threat- 
ening further defense cuts which would be 



October 1, 1973 



421 



the largest since 1949. To take such uni- 
lateral action — without exacting similar con- 
cessions from our adversaries — could under- 
mine the chances for further mutual arms 
limitations or reductions. I will therefore ac- 
tively oppose these cuts. 

The arms limitations agreement signed 
with the Soviet Union last year has at last 
halted the rapid growth in the numbers of 
strategic weapons. Despite this concrete 
achievement, much needs to be done to ensure 
continued stability and to support our nego- 
tiation of a permanent strategic arms agree- 
ment. A vigorous research and development 
program is essential to provide vital insur- 
ance that no adversary will ever gain a deci- 
sive advantage through technological break- 
through and that massive deployment 
expenditures will therefore not become nec- 
essary. Yet the Congress is in the process of 
slashing research and development funding 
below minimum prudent levels, including 
elimination of our cruise missile and air de- 
fense programs. The Trident and B-1 pro- 
grams, which are critical to maintaining a 
reliable deterrent into the next decade, are 
also facing proposals to cut them to the bone. 

On top of this, the Senate has approved 
a staggering and unacceptable cut of 156,000 
men in our military manpower. Such action 
would force us to reduce the number of ships 
in our Navy while the Soviet Union continues 
an unprecedented naval buildup and to re- 
duce the size of our Army and Air Force 
while the Soviet Union and the Chinese con- 
tinue to maintain far larger forces. 

In addition to these cuts, there is also a 
major Senate proposal requiring substantial 
unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe, a 
mistake that could begin a serious unraveling 
of the NATO alliance. Negotiations for mu- 
tual and balanced force reductions begin on 
October 30. On the very eve of negotiations, 
the troop cuts in Europe and the reduction in 
military manpower would destroy our 
chances of reaching an agreement with the 
Warsaw Pact countries to reduce troop levels 
in Europe on a mutual basis. If the Congress 
were to succeed in making these proposed 



cuts, the United States would be making far- 
reaching concessions even before the talks 
begin. 

Cuts in other defense programs are 
equally unacceptable. It is illogical to cut 
America's capabilities at the very time the 
Soviet Union increases hers. And it would be 
difficult to stabilize delicate situations in the 
Middle East and Asia if the Congress re- 
moves the influential tools which have made 
stability possible. 

Foreign Assistance Act 

Another matter of prime concern to me is 
our commitment to a sound program of bi- 
lateral and multilateral foreign aid. Last 
spring I sent to the Congress reasonable re- 
quests for our economic and military assist- 
ance programs. These programs represent a 
central element in America's ability to work 
with her allies to maintain peace and stabil- 
ity in the world. Unfortunately, the Congress 
has not treated these requests favorably. 

The House has already cut about 25 per- 
cent from the military aid program and the 
Senate has cut it by one-half. Not only have 
extraordinary cuts been made in the funding, 
but restrictive amendments have been added 
in committee and others may be suggested on 
the floor. I cannot stand by while these cru- 
cial programs are gutted in haste and reac- 
tion. 

Current foreign aid programs are being 
funded through a continuing resolution 
which ends on September 30. This approach 
is unsatisfactory, especially in light of de- 
mands resulting from Noi'th Vietnamese 
truce violations in Cambodia. Yet the Con- 
gress continues not only to provide smaller 
dollar amounts but also to make unreasonable 
requests for access to sensitive information 
and impose counterproductive conditions on 
specific programs. Such demands are unac- 
ceptable; they would badly compromise our 
ability to maintain security around the world. 

I intend to make every effort to increase 
the funding for fiscal year 1974 security as- 
sistance requirements. I shall also strongly 
resist eflforts by the Congress to impose un- 



422 



Department of State Bulletin 



reasonable demands upon necessary foreign 
policy prerogatives of the executive branch. 
A spirit of bipartisan cooperation provided 
the steel which saw America through the 
Cold War and then through Vietnam. We 
must not jeopardize the great potential for 
peaceful progress in the post Vietnam era by 
losing that strong bipartisan spirit. 

To build a truly durable structure of peace, 
our progress in reforming the world's trade 
and monetary systems must be accompanied 
by efforts to help the poorer countries share 
more equitably in the world's growing pros- 
perity. To this end, I ask the Congress to sup- 
port our fair share of contributions to the 
multilateral development banks — both the 
proposed contributions now pending in the 
Congress and other proposals about which I 
am currently consulting with the Congress 
and which will be formally submitted in the 
near future. Our bilateral assistance pro- 
grams are also an essential part of our effort 
to stimulate world development and I urge 
the Congress to give them full support. 

All these efforts represent short-range in- 
vestments in peace and progress which are of 
enormous long-range importance. To try to 
save a few dollars on these programs today 
could cost us far more tomorrow. 

Conclusion 

With the Congress, the Administration and 
the people working together during the com- 
ing weeks, we can achieve many of the goals 
described in this message. And we will work 
together most effectively if we remember 
that our ultimate responsibility is not to one 
political party, nor to one philosophical posi- 
tion, nor even to one branch of the Govern- 
ment. Our ultimate responsibility is to the 
people — and our deliberations must always 
be guided by their best interests. 

Inevitably, we will have different opinions 
about what those interests demand. But if we 
proceed in a spirit of constructive partner- 
ship, our varying perspectives can be a 
source of greater creativity rather than a 
cause of deadlock. 

We already know that the year 1973 will 



be recalled in history books as the year in 
which we ended the longest war in American 
history. Let us conduct ourselves in the next 
four months so that 1973 will also be remem- 
bered as the time in which we began to turn 
the blessings of peace into a better life for 
all. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 10, 1973. 



U.S. Protests DRV Construction 
of Airfields in South Viet-Nam 

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the 
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on Sep- 
tejnber 10. 

Press release 325 dated September 11 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has 
the honor to refer to the Agreement on End- 
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
Nam of January 27, 1973. 

1. The United States calls the attention of 
the DRV to the fact that since January 28, 
when the Paris Agreement on Ending the 
War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam went 
into effect, the forces of its side have built or 
repaired at least 12 airfields in South Viet- 
Nam. It notes that North Vietnamese anti- 
aircraft units with weapons have been 
introduced into South Viet-Nam after Janu- 
ary 28 in violation of Article 7 of the Paris 
Agreement and emplaced at these fields. 

2. The DRV will recall that the United 
States on April 20, in its note to the other 
signatories of the Act of Paris, protested the 
illegal placing of SA-2 missiles at Khe Sanh 
airfield in Quang Tri Province.' Despite the 
U.S. protest, the DRV has continued to in- 
troduce SA-2 missiles and anti-aircraft units 
into South Viet-Nam. The U.S. calls upon 



' For text, see Bulletin of May 14, 1973, p. 599. 



October 1, 1973 



423 



the DRV side to remove to North Viet-Nam 
those missiles and anti-aircraft units which 
it has illegally introduced into South Viet- 
Nam since January 28. 

3. The United States notes that on June 
9 a press spokesman of the DRV side told the 
press in Saigon that the DRV side has the 
"right" to develop civil aviation in South 
Viet-Nam. A spokesman of the DRV side 
also told the press in Saigon on July 28 that 
its side would "not permit" the RVN [Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam] "exclusive control" of the 
airspace over South Viet-Nam. The above 
statements and the DRV side's repair and 
construction of 12 airfields in South Viet- 
Nam strongly suggest that the DRV intends 
to introduce aircraft into the airspace of 
South Viet-Nam in a way not authorized by 
the Agreement of January 27 or permitted 
under international law. 

4. The GVN [Government of Viet-Nam] 
in its September 10, 1973, note to the DRV 
has clearly indicated that it will not tolerate 
any unauthorized intrusion by the DRV into 
the airspace of South Viet-Nam. The United 
States thus wishes strongly to emphasize 
the grave risks which the DRV would run by 
violating the airspace sovereignty of the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. 



U.S. Responds to Pakistan's Need 
for Flood Relief Assistance 

Statement by President Nixon * 

The American people have the deepest 
concern and sympathy for the people of Pak- 
istan as they battle terrible floods, the most 
serious of this century, under the leadership 
of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Whole 



areas of Pakistan are being ravaged. Initial 
reports indicate that the number of people 
dead or missing is tragically large, that mil- 
lions of people are homeless, and that the ex- 
tent of property damage is mounting into 
hundreds of millions of dollars. The previ- 
ously bright prospects for Pakistan's devel- 
opment have been temporarily dimmed. 

In an immediate response to this situa- 
tion, U.S. helicopters and boats with their 
crews are already engaged in helping with 
immediate rescue work and with the move- 
ment of vital relief supplies. Medical and 
other urgent needs are being met. Pakistan 
needs help, and I know its friends in the in- 
ternational community will respond gen- 
erously. 

In response to longer term needs, I have 
directed that 100,000 metric tons of U.S. 
wheat be made available to the people of 
Pakistan to provide some immediate relief 
before their next harvest. 

Further, I am directing that the United 
States begin now in helping with the rehabil- 
itation and recovery of Pakistan to assure 
prompt and effective action for immediate 
relief and for our contribution to an early 
recovery. I have asked AID Deputy Adminis- 
trator Maurice J. Williams, my special relief 
coordinator for major disasters abroad, to go 
to Pakistan to review with the Pakistan Gov- 
ernment immediate relief and longer range 
reconstruction needs. He will report to me, 
and after appropriate consultation with the 
Congress, we will continue to assure that the 
Government of the United States, in coopera- 
tion with other countries, will do all that it 
can to help our Pakistani friends recover 
from this terrible devastation. 



' Issued at San Clemente, Calif., on Aug. 29 
(White House press release). 



424 



Department of State Bulletin 



Dr. Kissinger Gives Statement Before Senate Committee 
on His Nomination To Be Secretary of State 



Following is a statement made before the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
September 7 by Henry A. Kissinger, Assist- 
ant to the President for National Security 
Affairs and Secretary of State-designate.^ 

After talking to the chairman and most 
members of the committee, I have the im- 
pression that your purposes would best be 
served if we moved quickly to your questions. 
Therefore I shall confine my opening remarks 
to a statement outlining the attitude I pro- 
pose to bring to the office of Secretary of 
State if the committee and Senate should 
confirm my nomination. I take this approach, 
moreover, because the close and cooperative 
relationship that we shall seek between the 
executive and the legislative branches in for- 
eign aff"airs depends ultimately on the spirit 
! with which it is implemented. 

My first thought is of the past and the 
great Americans who have held the office to 
which the President has nominated me. I de- 
rive both inspiration and a sense of gravity 
from that impressive roster, whether at the 
dawn of this nation's history — Jefferson, 
Marshall, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay — 
or just since World War II — Byrnes, Mar- 
shall, Acheson, Dulles, Herter, Rusk, Rogers. 
These men, however different their styles and 
personalities, epitomized one fundamental 
reality : that the foreign policy of the United 
States transcends parties and administra- 
tions. It expresses our ideals, our purposes, 
and our hopes for the world. It must fulfill 
the best in America. 

If confirmed, I shall always be conscious 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



that I hold in trust the legacy of some of our 
greatest and noblest men. 

Let me pay tribute to my predecessor, who 
performed his duties with such dignity and 
decency for four and a half years. Secretary 
Rogers headed the Department of State dur- 
ing one of the most difficult periods in our 
history, when we had to adjust policies to 
new realities amid major domestic conten- 
tion. His calm judgment and his humanity 
helped steer us through this passage and 
win the respect even of those who disagreed 
with administration policies. The President 
and I will continue to look to him for counsel 
and support. 

Mr. Chairman, we have come to experience 
in recent years that peace at home and peace 
abroad are closely related. How well we per- 
form in foreign policy depends importantly 
on how purposeful we are at home. America 
has passed through a decade of domestic tur- 
bulence which has deepened divisions and 
even shaken our national self-confidence in 
some measure. At the same time, profound 
changes have occurred in the world around 
us a generation after World War II. Our era 
is marked by both the anxieties of a transi- 
tional period and the opportunities of fresh 
creation. 

These challenges, though they appear as 
practical issues, cannot be solved in technical 
terms; they closely reflect our view of our- 
selves. They require a sense of identity and 
purpose as much as a sense of policy. 
Throughout our history we have thought of 
what we did as growing out of deeper moral 
values. America was not true to itself unless 
it had a meaning beyond itself. In this spir- 
itual sense, America was never isolationist. 

This must remain our attitude. 

This is why our international policies must 



October 1, 1973 



425 



enlist the contributions of our best people, 
regardless of political persuasion. Our task is 
to define — together — the contours of a new 
world and to shape America's contribution 
to it. Our foreign policy cannot be effective 
if it reflects only the sporadic and esoteric 
initiatives of a small group of specialists. It 
must rest on a broad national base and reflect 
a shared community of values. 

With good will on all sides, I deeply be- 
lieve we can reach this goal. There is no dis- 
pute about many of the fundamental objec- 
tives of national policy. We are at a crucial 
point of transition in the international order, 
with major changes in the global structure 
promising a more peaceful world: 

—Successful postwar policies have helped 
our friends to new strength and responsibil- 
ities. We shall work constructively and openly 
with our partners in Europe and Japan to 
give new impetus to associations based on 
shared purposes and ideals. We shall always 
remember that the vitality of our friendships 
is the necessary condition for the lowering of 
tensions with our opponents. 

— We have developed fresh relationships 
with adversaries that can ease us away from 
confrontation toward cooperation. Tensions 
have been reduced in many areas. For the 
first time since the end of World War II, all 
great nations have become full participants 
in the international system. There is the hope 
that the arms race can be arrested and the 
burden of armaments reduced. 

— Our most anguishing and divisive prob- 
lem, the Viet-Nam war, is behind us. We 
achieved a negotiated settlement last Jan- 
uary. The Congress has since expressed its 
view on how to terminate our military par- 
ticipation in the last area of conflict — Cam- 
bodia. As you gentlemen know, the adminis- 
tration diff"ers with that view. But it will not 
attempt to circumvent it. 

— We face unprecedented issues which 
transcend borders and ideologies and beckon 
global cooperation. Many traditional assump- 
tions need adjustment. We have viewed our- 
selves as blessed with unlimited agricultural 
surpluses; today we must contemplate scar- 



city in relation to world needs. We have as- 
sumed self-sufficiency in energy ; now we face 
increasing needs for external supply at least 
for an interim period. Environmental prob- 
lems used to be considered national issues, 
if they were considered at all; now many 
must be met internationally if they are going 
to be met at all. We need to explore new con- 
ceptual frontiers to reflect the new reality 
produced by both technology and human as- 
pirations: that our planet has become a truly 
global society. 

This administration will continue to adapt 
America's role to these new conditions. But 
we cannot take for granted what has been 
begun. We cannot let irretrievable opportu- 
nities slip from our grasp. Just as we have 
benefited from the eff"orts of our predeces- 
sors, so must we build for our successors. 
What matters to other countries, and to the 
world, is not so much the work of one admin- 
istration as the steadiness of America. So the 
nation is challenged to render our purposes 
durable and our performance reliable. This 
we achieved during most of a generation 
after the Second World War. We need to con- 
tinue to do so. 

This will require mutual effort and mutual 
understanding. We will do our part. The 
President has charged me with helping him 
to shape a foreign policy that can endure be- 
cause it is carried in the hearts as well as 
the minds of Americans. 

The first necessity is a broader based par- 
ticipation within the executive branch. Dur- 
ing the last four years, there were many del- 
icate initiatives that required a high degree 
of secrecy and concentration of effort. Crucial 
foundations were laid. Now we need to build 
on these foundations a more permanent 
structure that we can pass on to succeeding 
administrations. Durability in foreign policy 
is achieved, in the final analysis, through the 
deep and continuing involvement of the dedi- 
cated professionals of the State Department 
and Foreign Service, who will manage our 
foreign affairs long after this administration 
has ended. Thus one of my principal responsi- 
bilities as Secretary of State will be to infuse 



426 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Department of State with a sense of 
participation, intellectual excitement, and 
mission. 

As you know, the President has asked me 
to retain my position as Assistant to the 
President if I am confirmed as Secretary of 
State. I believe this will benefit the coherence 
and eflTectiveness of our foreign policy. The 
Secretary of State will be clearly the prin- 
cipal foreign policy adviser to the President. 
The locus of authority and the chain of 
authority will be unambiguous. Bureaucratic 
friction will be minimized. As the President 
said in announcing my appointment, the 
unity of position will underline the tradi- 
tional principal role of the Department of 
State in the policymaking process. 

There must be, as well, a closer relation- 
ship between the executive and legislative 
branches. It is the President's objective to 
make policy more accessible to the scrutiny 
and the views of the Congress. This is the 
fundamental answer to the question of execu- 
tive privilege. As you gentlemen know, over 
an extended period of time when I was fully 
covered by this principle, I met regularly 
with the members of this committee, both in- 
dividually and as a group, and most fre- 
quently with the chairman. I did so partly 
because I valued this association on personal 
grounds but also because of my conviction 
that this nation faced no more urgent re- 
quirement than to promote mutual respect 
where a consensus was unattainable. 

In my new capacity, I shall be prepared to 
testify formally on all my activities. In other 
words, I shall testify with respect to all mat- 
ters traditionally covered by Secretaries of 
State and on my duties as Assistant to the 
President concerning interdepartmental is- 
sues. I will not claim executive privilege in 
either capacity except for the one area cus- 
tomarily invoked by Cabinet officers ; that is, 
direct communications with the President or 
the actual deliberations of the National Secu- 
rity Council. 

We will, of course, need to determine to- 
gether which subjects should be treated in 
public and which in executive session. 

In short, as a result of my combined posi- 



tion, the Committee should receive substan- 
tially more information than it has in the 
past. We will have acted positively on one of 
your most central concerns. 

This process of greater cooperation will 
not be confined to formal testimony. If con- 
firmed, I will propose to meet immediately 
with the chairman and the ranking member 
to work out procedures for enabling the com- 
mittee to share more fully in the design of 
our foreign policy. 

I will follow a similar approach with the 
House Foreign Aff"airs Committee and the 
leaders of both branches of Congress as well 
as with other congressional groupings of 
proper jurisdiction. 

This prompts the question: What do we 
mean by bipartisanship? We do not ask for 
rubberstamping, and we cannot expect una- 
nimity. Serious people obviously will con- 
tinue to have differences. Where profound 
disagreements exist, it would be self-defeat- 
ing to paper them over with empty formulae. 
We in tui'n cannot give up basic principles; 
nor can we promise to act only when there is 
bipartisan agreement, though this will be our 
preference. But we shall work to shape a 
broad consensus on our national goals and 
to confine diff'erences to tactical issues. When 
our views diff"er, we shall strive not to press 
the debate to a point that tears the overall 
fabric of the national consensus. We will seek 
to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that 
arguments can center on methods, not mo- 
tives. We hope that this restraint will be mu- 
tual. In this manner, our foreign policy 
debate can avoid the extremes of civil war 
and sterile accord for its own sake. 

If our foreign policy is to be truly national, 
we must deepen our partnership with the 
American people. This means an open articu- 
lation of our philosophy, our purposes, and 
our actions. We have sought to do this in the 
President's annual reports to the Congress 
on foreign policy. Equally, we must listen to 
the hopes and aspirations of our fellow coun- 
trymen. I plan therefore, on a regular basis, 
to elicit the views of America's opinion lead- 
ers and to share our perspectives freely. 

Mr. Chairman, I have sketched an agenda 



October 1, 1973 



427 



for seeking a more durable peace abroad and 
a cooperative climate at home. Both objec- 
tives point to the urgent need for reconcilia- 
tion. Americans have recently endured the 
turmoil of assassinations and riots, racial 
and generational confrontations, and a bit- 
ter, costly war. Just as we were emerging 
from that conflict, we were plunged into still 
another ordeal. 

These traumatic events have cast lengthen- 
ing shadows on our traditional optimism and 
self-esteem. A loss of confidence in our own 
country would inevitably be mirrored in our 
international relations. Where once we ran 
the risk of thinking we were too good for the 
world, we might now swing to believing we 
are not good enough. Where once a soaring 
optimism tempted us to dare too much, a 
shrinking spirit could lead us to attempt too 
little. Such an attitude — and the foreign pol- 
icy it would produce — would deal a savage 
blow to global stability. 

But I am hopeful about our prospects. 
America is resilient. The dynamism of this 
country is irrepressible. Whatever our divi- 
sions, we can rally to the prospects of build- 
ing a world at peace and responsive to 
humane aspirations. In so doing, we can 
replenish our reservoir of faith. 

This is our common challenge : 

— To distinguish the fundamental from the 
ephemeral. 

— To seek out what unites us, without sti- 
fling the healthy debate that is the lifeblood 
of democracy. 

— To promote the positive trends that are 
the achievements not just of this administra- 
tion but also of those who came before. 

— To shape new initiatives that will serve 
not just the next 40 months but also the 
decades to follow. 

A few years before he died, one of our 
most distinguished Secretaries of State, Dean 
Acheson, entitled his memoirs "Present at 
the Creation." He chose that title because he 
was one of the leading participants in the 
creation of the postwar international system. 
The challenge before our country now is 
whether our generation has the vision — as 
Dean Acheson's did more than two decades 



ago — to turn into dynamic reality the hopeful 
beginnings we have made toward a more 
durable peace and a more benevolent planet. 
Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the com- 
mittee, I am confident that working together 
we can speed the day when all of us will be 
able to say that we were "present at the cre- 
ation" of a new era of peace, justice, and 
humanity. 



Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra 
Visits People's Republic of China 

The Department of State announced on 
September 7 (press release 324) that the 
Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra was to 
depart September 10 to perform before audi- 
ences in Peking and Shanghai at the invita- 
tion of the Chinese People's Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries of the 
People's Republic of China. The invitation 
was announced last February at a news con- 
ference by Henry A. Kissinger, following his 
visit to the People's Republic of China. 

A joint U.S.-China communique issued at 
Shanghai on February 27, 1972, following 
President Nixon's visit, stated that the two 
countries agreed that it was desirable to 
broaden the understanding between the two 
peoples, specifically in such fields as science, 
technology, culture, sports, and journalism, 
"in which people-to-people contacts and ex- 
changes would be mutually beneficial." 

The 106-member orchestra arrived in 
Shanghai September 12. There were a total 
of 130 people in the party, including five 
media representatives invited by the orches- 
tra and two escort oflScers from the Depart- 
ment of State. Also accompanying the 
orchestra was a member of the National 
Committee on U.S.-China Relations, Inc., of 
New York City, a private, nonprofit organi- 
zation which has been assisting the orchestra 
in arrangements for the trip. 

The Department of State assisted with a 
grant to the Philadelphia Orchestra Associa- 
tion to help defray expenses and also facili- 
tated arrangements with the Government of 
the People's Republic of China. 



428 



Department of State Bulletin 



Department Discusses Proposed Fund To Assist Developing Countries 
and Promote U.S. Exports 



Statement by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 



I appreciate this opportunity to present the 
administration's view on the United States 
Export Development Credit Fund (EDCF) 
from the vantage of the Department of State. 
This proposed Fund would help to finance 
U.S. exports to the poorest of the developing 
nations, with the dual purpose of promoting 
present and future U.S. exports while mak- 
ing resources available to these countries to 
promote their economic development. 

I would like to discuss the EDCF in the 
context of our overall economic relations with 
the less developed countries (LDC's) . We are 
talking about an extremely diverse group 
of countries, varying in size, natural re- 
sources, economic organization, and degree of 
present development, as well as a host of 
political factors that affect their economic 
situation. The economic interests and goals 
of the United States with regard to these 
countries cover a range of trade, investment, 
and development issues, with the relative 
importance of issues differing from country 
to country. We therefore need to approach 
the less developed countries with a variety of 
policy tools which will be responsive to their 
varying needs and our specific interests. 

These countries differ fundamentally in 
their present degree of economic develop- 
ment. Some have achieved much economic 
development during the past decade and are 



' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Finance 
on Sept. 6. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. 



nearing or have attained a stage which will 
most likely carry them out of the ranks of the 
less developed countries within a few years. 

For these "emergent" countries, conces- 
sional development assistance is less impor- 
tant than trade, export credit, and private 
investment as a source of the resources 
needed to carry on the development process. 
The United States has tried to meet the needs 
of these countries by encouraging trade and 
by bringing them more fully into the world 
financial system. We have introduced as part 
of the administration's trade bill a general- 
ized system of prefei-ences which would open 
export markets so that these developing 
countries can earn through trade the re- 
sources needed to support their development. 

We have encouraged these countries to par- 
ticipate in multilateral trade negotiations. 
They and other developing countries partici- 
pate in negotiations to reform the world 
monetary system. We have supported the 
growth of the World Bank and the regional 
development banks through which the emer- 
gent developing countries can obtain develop- 
ment financing on moderate terms. 

While supporting the aspirations of these 
nations, we have also tried to encourage U.S. 
exports. The Export-Import Bank has been 
an important instrument for financing ex- 
ports to these countries, assuring the avail- 
ability of financing on terms commensurate 
with their ability to service external debts. 

While our relations with the emergent na- 
tions are increasingly centered on trade and 
investment, development assistance still plays 



October 1, 1973 



429 



a central role in relations with the large 
group of developing nations which remain 
desperately poor. Almost 70 developing coun- 
tries still have per capita gross national prod- 
ucts under $375 a year, and for 42 of them 
per capita GNP is under $200. Many of these 
countries are poor in natural resources and 
infrastructure and also lack the industrial 
base and skills necessary to take advantage 
of trade-promoting tools such as general 
preferences. 

These countries can only hope to acquire 
the external resources necessary for develop- 
ment with the aid of concessional financing. 
The extent to which this is true is shown by 
the fact that official U.S. Government com- 
mitments from all sources — AID, P.L. 480, 
Eximbank— amounted in 1972 to 82 percent 
of the total value of U.S. exports to the 
poorer (per capita GNP under $200) devel- 
oping countries. This percentage decreases 
as per capita income increases. The composi- 
tion of the official commitments also changes: 
In 1972 Eximbank commitments amounted 
to 57 percent of government-financed U.S. 
exports to countries with per capita GNP 
from $200 to $500, but only 9 percent of 
government-financed exports to countries un- 
der $200, with the balance coming from more 
concessional AID and P.L. 480 programs. 

The Export-Import Bank, as noted above, 
extends relatively little financing to most of 
the poorest developing countries. Eximbank 
authorized loans and guarantees of $1,258,- 
000,000 to countries with per capita gross 
national product under $375 during fiscal 
1973; but these authorizations were concen- 
trated in a small number of countries (75 
percent went to only five countries: Algeria, 
Indonesia, Turkey, Korea, Zaire) , and much 
of this financing was for special projects 
such as fuels development with a high short- 
term economic payout — not, unfortunately, 
typical of the poorest countries. 

Eximbank's strict credit standards, dic- 
tated by legislation and policy, rule out many 
developing country credits. Eximbank terms, 
while softer than commercial terms, still 
carry interest rates which developing coun- 



tries can ill afford and are for relatively short 
terms compared to concessional financing. 
Such near-commercial export credits impose 
a heavy debt-service burden on the importing 
country, and excessive use of export credits 
can easily carry a developing country into ' 
debt-service crises which require debt re- 
scheduling. 

Although the ability of the poorer devel- 
oping countries to buy the resources they 
need for development is limited by the avail- 
ability of concessional assistance, the flow of 
official development assistance from the 
United States actually decreased 7 percent 
from 1963 to 1971. Other major donor na- 
tions have been increasing their programs; 
official development assistance from all other 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
countries more than doubled over the same 
period, and most OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] 
countries now carry a higher assistance bur- 
den than the United States when assistance 
is compared to donor-country GNP. 

U.S. Exports to Poorest Developing Countries 

We welcome these contributions to the 
development of the poorer countries, but we 
are also concerned about the implications of 
this situation for the present and future 
trade position of the United States in devel- 
oping country markets. With concessional 
support too limited to support expanding ex- 
ports and Eximbank unsuited to the circum- 
stances of the poorest developing countries, 
the growth in U.S. exports to these countries 
has lagged. In 1972, they totaled only $4.8 
billion out of total U.S. exports of $49.7 bil- 
lion. The U.S. share of the import market in 
these countries was 17.3 percent, compared to 
28.6 percent in countries in the $375-$l,000 
GNP category. In 11 of the poorest LDC's, 
comprising 89 percent of the population of 
the non-Communist countries with per capita 
income below $200, U.S. exports fell from 
$1.7 billion in 1966 to $1.2 billion in 1972. At 
the same time, these same countries in- 
creased their imports from the other major 
DAC donors from $2.9 billion to $4.3 billion. 



430 



Department of State Bulletin 



This decline in U.S. exports contrasts sharply 
with an increase of 44 percent in U.S. exports 
to all LDC's over the 1966-72 period. 

This means that other developed countries 
are developing markets, distribution net- 
works, brand familiarity, and financial rela- 
tionships that will induce additional exports 
over a period of years. Since even the poorest 
(per capita GNP under $200) developing 
countries represent a market of 1 billion peo- 
ple, with average GNP increasing about 5 
percent annually, this represents a signifi- 
cant market. 

The EDCF is designed to remedy this lag 
in export growth. It will help U.S. exports 
by: 

— Permitting the poorest developing coun- 
tries to import more from the United States 
by increasing financing on terms they can 
afford to service. Since debt servicing is an 
increasingly important problem for the 
LDC's, their import capacity is severely con- 
strained under conventional harder term ex- 
port lending. It is this limitation on 
import-financing capacity which makes the 
new soft-term export credit fund an appro- 
priate vehicle for supporting U.S. exports to 
these countries. 

— Offering financing to many more poor 
developing countries. AID is restricted to 
just 20 countries outside Latin America un- 
der the Foreign Assistance Act. 

— Encouraging U.S. exporters to cultivate 
potential markets. 

—Facilitating U.S. entry into markets still 
dominated by traditional colonial trading 
patterns. 

— Giving priority to commodities with a 
follow-on export potential. 

—Expanding developing country markets 
through long-term economic growth. 

The dollars flowing out under this program 
are to be 100 percent tied to U.S. exports. To 
the extent that Fund dollars result in addi- 
tional U.S. exports — i.e., pui-chases from the 
United States the recipient nations would 
not otherwise have made — there is no addi- 
tion to free reserves that could be used to 
repay loans from other sources. On the other 



hand, if the Fund dollars were used to finance 
purchases from the United States that would 
have been made anyway, the dollars origi- 
nally intended for that purpose are thereby 
freed for other uses such as debt repayment, 
imports from third countries, or reserve ac- 
cumulation. It is highly likely that the activi- 
ties of the Fund will generate exports that 
are fully additional to the level of exports 
that would have otherwise occurred. 

Experience has indicated that in the case 
of AID commodity financing, additionality is 
on the order of 90 percent for all countries 
but is higher than this — approaching 100 
percent— in the poorest LDC's. This is due 
to the fact that in the lowest per capita in- 
come countries the U.S. share of the market 
tends to be smaller than in more developed 
countries. The opportunity for substitution 
is therefore much less. In view of the low and 
declining U.S. share of the imports of these 
countries, their continued growing need for 
goods in which the United States is otherwise 
competitive, and the heavy dependence of 
these sales on concessional credits, it is rea- 
sonable to expect that the leakage of Fund 
dollars to other uses would be minimal. 

New Development Resources 

Simultaneously with promoting U.S. ex- 
ports, the EDCF would make new develop- 
ment resources available to the developing 
countries. Over the initial life of the EDCF, 
the developing countries would receive a flow 
of developmentally oriented goods and serv- 
ices worth approximately $2.7 billion repay- 
able on soft terms over a long period of time. 
The importance of imported goods to the 
poorest developing countries cannot be over- 
emphasized. The majority of people in these 
countries are still engaged in agriculture, 
often subsistence agriculture. Most of these 
counti'ies have only a few established indus- 
tries, producing basic consumer goods such 
as cotton textiles, shoes, and some processed 
foods. Even such basic items as light bulbs 
must typically be imported. Virtually all de-. 
velopmental goods, such as machinery, 
trucks, construction equipment, and most 
spare parts, need to be imported. 



October 1, 1973 



431 



The availability of financing is at present 
the chief constraint on the level of imports 
and consequently on the size of development 
programs. The developing countries are look- 
ing desperately for financing, and a number 
of them — including some of the poorest, 
which can ill afford it — have had to resort 
to borrowing on the Eurodollar market. 

The initial lending volume for the Export 
Development Credit Fund would be well 
within the "import absorptive capacity" of 
the countries with per capita gross national 
product below $375. If the Fund were to com- 
mence operations January 1, 1974, as pro- 
posed by the administration, the approximate 
average annual lending volume over the four- 
year period would be $675 million. Although 
loans would probably not be extended to all 
of these countries by the Fund, data for 
these countries provide an illustrative basis 
for measuring absorptive capacity. The total 
merchandise imports of these 70 countries 
in 1972 were approximately $30 billion. If 
"import absorptive capacity" is defined as 
capacity to utilize increased imports produc- 
tively, there can be little doubt that the $675 
million average annual flow could be "ab- 
sorbed," since it would constitute less than 
3 percent of the existing import level. 

The EDCF would not only make resources 
available to the poorest countries, but it 
would do so in a way which would promote 
the mature partnership which the United 
States seeks with the developing countries. 
We recognize that the ultimate responsibility 
for development planning and financial man- 
agement rests with the developing countries. 
The United States cannot dictate priorities 
or oversee all aspects of development plan- 
ning and implementation. The EDCF would 
make resources available, but within reason- 
able guidelines to prevent abuse, the initia- 
tive would rest with the borrowing countries 
to decide which programs are most important 
and to allocate resources accordingly. The 
EDCF would be more flexible and less en- 
cumbered by redtape than traditional aid 
approaches. We would expect that it would 
also require less oversight, minimizing man- 
agement costs. 



Policy Coordination and Operation of Fund 

The Advisory Committee established by 
section 805 of S. 2335 — consisting of the Sec- 
retaries of State, Commerce, Treasury, and 
Agriculture, the President of the Export- 
Import Bank, and the head of the agency 
primarily responsible for administration of 
the Fund — will provide overall policy coor- 
dination. The presence of the President of 
the Export-Import Bank on the Committee 
will insure that the policies governing the 
operation of the Fund are consistent and 
compatible with the policies and activities of 
the Export-Import Bank. 

Specific policies governing loan criteria 
and Fund operations would be set forth 
through the Advisory Committee, and these 
policies would be designed to insure that 
loans made by the Fund not infringe upon or 
compete with credit financing oflFered by the 
Export-Import Bank. These procedures could 
include, for example, an administrative 
mechanism to avoid Fund financing in cases 
where Exim financing is appropriate. In 
practice, the activities of the Fund should 
not conflict with those of the Bank since the 
Fund would operate primarily in the poorest 
of the LDC's — where Exim exposure is lim- 
ited — and for the financing of development 
programs which do not obtain Exim 
financing. 

In regard to coordination with AID activi- 
ties, it is the current intention of the admin- 
istration to lodge operating responsibilities 
for the Fund in that Agency. Because the 
Fund is to serve important export promotion 
objectives requiring flexibility and a swift 
response capability, detailed advance pro- 
graming of Fund resources is not contem- 
plated. However, AID, in the context of its 
overall economic assistance activities, would 
include consideration of the Fund's actual 
and contemplated commercial credits to a 
particular country in order to take into ac- 
count the total flow of U.S. resources into 
that country. 

Lending is contemplated, depending on 
circumstances, through government-to-gov- 
ernment agreements, via intermediate credit 



432 



Department of State Bulletin 



institutions, or directly to private borrowers. 
Credit judgments will be made in terms of 
the ability of the borrowing country to serv- 
ice the additional debt and the economics of 
the particular project. Factors involved in 
evaluating debt-servicing ability of an LDC 
include current level of debt, future debt- 
servicing burden, potential for earning for- 
eign exchange, and possibility for economic 
growth and economic stability. 

It is presumed as an initial matter that 
EDCF financing would not be extended to 
Communist countries and countries with 
whom the United States has no diplomatic 
relations. Within the $375 category, general 
guidelines will be established to insure that 
the benefits of this program are not totally 
absorbed by a few countries and that special 
consideration will in fact be given to the very 
poor with per capita incomes under $200 who 
can least afford the harder Exim terms. Ex- 
ports financed by the Fund will be screened 
through simplified operational procedures to 
insure their consistency with developmental 
needs, promotion of U.S. markets, and U.S. 
employment objectives. The objective is to 
prevent abuse and misallocation of EDCF 
funds while at the same time avoiding the 
adoption of extensive and burdensome rules 
and requirements. 

With regard to development, goods will be 
selected with an eye toward increasing the 
production capacity of the recipient country. 
Luxury goods and frivolous items of course 
will be excluded. With regard to export pro- 
motion, the emphasis will be on goods which 
require follow-on procurement, which would 
not otherwise be purchased from the United 
States, and which establish new markets. 

The Congress will receive a detailed plan 
for the Fund before it begins operations. We 
would like to suggest a modification of the 
legislation in this regard, to permit the Fund 
to begin operations on January 1, 1974, or 
60 days after submission of a plan of im- 
plementation, whichever last occurs. The ad- 
ministration would submit the plan of 
implementation on or shortly after Novem- 
ber 1, 1973. We feel that it is important to 
establish the Fund and allow it to begin 



operations as soon as possible, since there 
will inevitably be a slow startup period. With 
an earlier beginning date, we would be better 
prepared to submit requests for any needed 
legislative changes with the submission for 
FY 1976 authorizing legislation. If the 
Fund's effective date is not advanced from 
July 1, 1974, the actual startup of the Fund 
may be further delayed until action is com- 
pleted on fiscal year 1975 budget requests, 
and the Fund would not be able to actually 
start lending operations until quite late in 
1974. We feel that the purposes of the Fund 
can be better achieved with an earlier start- 
ing date. 

If these principles are followed, and sound 
lending procedures with minimal essential 
controls are devised, the EDCF can simulta- 
neously achieve its twin goals of export pro- 
motion and development assistance. We feel 
sure these conditions can be met and the 
Export Development Credit Fund can become 
a valuable addition to our foreign policy 
instruments. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 1st Session 

Audit of the Export-Import Bank of the United 
States for Fiscal Year 1972. Communication from 
Comptroller General of the United States. H. Doc. 
93-94. May 1, 1973. 37 pp. 

Audit of the Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion for Fiscal Year 1972. Letter from Comptroller 
General of the United States. H. Doc. 93-115. 
June 14, 1973. 36 pp. 

Committee on Internal Security. Annual report for 
the year 1972, together with supplemental views. 
H. Rept. 93-301. June 21, 1973. 193 pp. 

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on Cer- 
tain Istle. Report to accompany H.R. 2261. H. 
Rept. 93-306. June 21, 1973. 3 pp. 

Suspension of Duties on Certain Forms of Copper. 
Reports to accompany H.R. 2323. H. Rept. 93-307; 
June 21, 1973; 5 pp. S. Rept. 93-313; July 13, 
1973; 5 pp. 

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on Metal 
Scrap. Reports to accompany H.R. 2324. H. Rept. 
93-308; June 21, 1973; 3 pp. S. Rept. 93-314; 
July 13, 1973; 3 pp. 

U.S. Oceans Policy. Report to accompany S. Res. 82. 
S. Rept. 93-296. June 29, 1973. 6 pp. 



October 1, 1973 



433 



Department Supports Repeal of Legislation 
Permitting Imports of Rhodesian Chrome 



Following are statements made on Septem- 
ber 6 before the Subcommittee on African 
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations by John Scali, U.S. Representative 
to the United Nations, and David D. Newsom, 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.^ 

AMBASSADOR SCALI 

USUN press release 76 dated September 6 

Mr. Chairman [Senator Hubert H. Hum- 
phrey], members of the committee: I would 
like to express my appreciation for the op- 
portunity you have afforded me to speak to 
you about a matter that has been of great 
concern to me practically since the day I was 
sworn in as the U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations. The decision to permit the 
importation of chrome and certain other ma- 
terials from Southern Rhodesia is a serious 
issue in our foreign relations. This is true 
not only as regards the United Nations. It 
affects our dealings with nearly all of Africa 
and the many other nations who feel strongly 
about the situation in Southern Rhodesia or, 
for that matter, about the rule of law in 
international affairs. 

In November of 1971, when the U.S. Con- 
gress considered and passed section 503 of 
the Military Procurement Act, the Depart- 
ment of State expressed its conviction that 
this step would seriously prejudice important 
U.S. foreign policy interests. Now, almost 
two years later, we have abundant evidence 
on which to evaluate this prediction. We also 
have considerable data on the results section 
503 has had in the economic and security 
areas which were of concern to its sponsors. 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 20402. 



I would suggest that the Congress is now in 
a good position to weigh the benefits and costs 
of section 503 and decide whether to keep this 
legislation. 

First, I would like to discuss the positive 
side, the benefits the United States has re- 
ceived as a result of section 503. It won't 
surprise you to learn that I believe these 
benefits to be limited, but it may surprise 
you to learn how limited they really have 
been. 

The principal commodity of concern to the 
sponsors of section 503 was chrome ore. The 
argument for the passage of this legislation 
was that the importation of Southern Rhode- 
sian chrome ore would reduce our dependence 
on Soviet sources for this strategic material 
and at the same time lower the price of that 
commodity to U.S. importers. 

Events since January 1973 demonstrate 
that these arguments, valid as they may have 
seemed in the abstract, have not stood up. 
Chrome is far from being a material in short 
supply; the U.S. Government now feels suf- 
ficiently confident as to the long-range avail- 
ability of chrome ore to propose to the 
Congress the disposition of over 80 percent 
of our present stockpile. In this regard, the 
defense-related need for chrome constitutes 
only about 10 percent of the chrome ore proc- 
essed in the United States each year. Further, 
adequate quantities to meet all of the U.S. 
defense needs are available from Turkey, 
Iran, and South Africa. 

Nor has access to Rhodesian chrome ore 
been a significant factor in the pricing of 
that commodity. A reduction in the price of 
Soviet chrome ore has been cited by some de- 
fenders of section 503 as a direct consequence 
of our imports of Rhodesian ore. In actuality, 
a drastic decrease in our total imports of 
chrome ore probably had more to do with the 



434 



Department of State Bulletin 



price cut. In any case, shipments from Rho- 
desia have only totaled 2,277 tons this year, 
and in 1972 constituted only 8.7 percent of 
our chrome ore imports. 

Direct Economic Costs 

So much for the benefits of section 503. 
Now with your permission I would like to 
discuss the costs the United States pays for 
keeping it on the books. 

First, there have been direct economic 
costs. For, oddly enough, despite the very 
limited amount of material we import from 
Southern Rhodesia, this trade has had an 
impact on certain sectors of the American 
economy. Under section 503, the United 
States is importing from Rhodesia not only 
raw materials but also certain semifinished 
products — ferrochrome, in particular — which 
are also processed in this country. Imports 
of this product into the United States are ris- 
ing rapidly. A large portion of this increase 
is coming from Southern Rhodesia, which 
accounted for 36 percent of our imports of 
ferrochrome so far this year. I understand 
that several U.S. firms, Foote Mineral of 
Steubenville, Ohio, Airco Alloys of Charles- 
ton, South Carolina, and Ohio Ferro Alloys 
of Brilliant, Ohio, now find that they are 
suffering serious losses as a result of the 
importation of Rhodesian products. Foote 
Mineral is having to close its plant, an in- 
stallation which now employs 307 workers. 
Ohio Ferro Alloys is being forced to cease 
the production of ferrochrome altogether, 
and Airco Alloys is concei'ned about the effect 
imports of Rhodesian chrome will have on 
its business. 

American labor generally and the United 
Steelworkers of America in particular op- 
posed the Byrd provision when originally 
introduced. Shipments of Rhodesian products 
under the provision have been picketed by 
the International Longshoremen's Associa- 
tion. Demonstrations and boycotts have ac- 
companied the arrival of ships carrying 
Rhodesian products. 

I can speak to you from personal experi- 
ence about the effect which section 503 of the 
1971 Military Procurement Act is having on 



our foreign relations. Unquestionably in the 
international arena we are paying a price 
far out of proportion to the benefits which 
section 503 has brought, or might ever bring, 
our country. 

The U.S. importation of Rhodesian goods 
under section 503 has become an extremely 
serious issue in our relations with African 
countries. Mr. Newsom will be able to pro- 
vide the committee with the benefit of his 
firsthand observations in this regard. I can 
state, however, that action has taken on a 
symbolic importance to the Africans far out 
of proportion to the minuscule amount of 
trade involved. We must recognize that the 
problem of the minority-dominated regimes 
of southern Africa is the number-one foreign 
policy concern of the rest of that continent. 

The United States shares this concern, but 
we also believe that the world community has 
a limited capacity to affect the situation in 
southern Africa and that it can best use its 
influence by promoting peaceful change. We 
have tried to persuade others to share this 
view. Unfortunately, however, the force of 
our arguments on this subject has been 
weakened considerably as a result of the 
passage of section 503. Our ability to counsel 
moderation in the pursuit of change in south- 
ern Africa has been severely hampered. 

I am well aware that one of the principal 
reasons why section 503 passed was concern 
on the part of many in both Houses of the 
Congress over what was seen as blatant 
hypocrisy in the application of sanctions by 
the world community. Rhodesian trade ap- 
peared to be proceeding normally except with 
a small number of nations like ourselves who 
followed through with laws and regulations 
to back up the U.N. resolution. Since passage 
of section 503, when criticized in the United 
Nations for our imports from Rhodesia we 
have repeatedly pointed out the injustice of 
the exaggerated attention given to our trade 
while the other 95 percent of Rhodesian trade 
was ignored. We have also called for practical 
steps to plug up the holes in the sanctions 
program. 

Some of our ai-gumentation seems to have 
actually convinced our fellow members of the 



October 1, 1973 



435 



need to tighten up the program. In response 
to a directive from the Security Council, the 
Council's Sanctions Committee on April 15, 
1973, produced an agreed report on new ways 
to improve sanctions. The Security Council 
later endorsed the report in a resolution for 
which I was unable to vote because it called 
upon us to repeal section 503.= 

One of the side effects of a better sanctions 
program will be to highlight our imports as 
others are seen to be moving finally to repair 
gaps in sanctions. Unless sanctions end or 
the effects of section 503 are removed, I can 
see ahead only a continuing cycle of difficul- 
ties for ourselves with the Security Council. 

Effect on Issues Before the U.N. 

The effects of section 503 extend well be- 
yond our relations with Africa. In issue after 
issue before the United Nations, we are find- 
ing it increasingly difficult to marshal the 
votes necessary to sustain our position. Quite 
frankly, if we are not to encounter major 
setbacks on items of much greater concern to 
our country than Rhodesian chrome, we must 
have many of those 41 African votes. At the 
moment, the feeling in many African govern- 
ments is that if the United States is going to 
take a position detrimental to their interests 
on an item of little concern to us but of great 
importance to them, they will do the same to 
us when they get the opportunity. Such an 
attitude is likely to result not only in block- 
ing constructive international action on such 
problems as terrorism or the environment. 
It may cause the United Nations to adopt 
measures positively prejudicial to our inter- 
ests. I am not speaking here about esoteric 
resolutions of only academic interest. I am 
talking about actions with effects in the real 
world. 

Only last week a committee of the United 
Nations passed a mischievous resolution on 
Puerto Rico. Several of the swing votes on 
this committee were those of African states, 
who were moved in part by their resentment 
against the United States. 



Tor background, see Bulletin of July 2, 1973, 
p. 40. 



A dramatic shift in voting patterns will 
not follow immediately upon passage of 
S. 1868. The situation is too complicated for 
that to happen. Nevertheless, passage of this 
bill will substantially clear the atmosphere 
in our dealings with many other U.N. mem- 
bers and give us a better chance for persuad- 
ing others to accept our point of view on 
many vital questions. 

The African states are not the only ones 
concerned about America's importation of 
Rhodesian goods. The British Government 
has impressed on us their conviction that the 
repeal of section 503 would help bring an 
acceptable negotiated solution to the Rhode- 
sian impasse. 

Other nations, regardless of their feelings 
as concerns southern Africa, can only be 
alarmed over the challenge to international 
law, to the sanctity of treaties, and to the 
concept of collective security offered by sec- 
tion 503 of the 1971 Military Procurement 
Act. 

International Legal Implications 

The United States signed, and this Senate 
consented to, the Charter of the United Na- 
tions. In doing so, we voluntarily and know- 
ingly undertook a commitment to comply 
with binding decisions of the Security Coun- 
cil. We did not reserve the right to comply 
only if everyone else did nor to review and 
reject Security Council decisions unilaterally. 
We could undertake this commitment in rela- 
tive confidence, secure in the knowledge that 
under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council 
could not make a binding decision without 
the compliance of the United States. 

We have not in this instance lived up to 
our commitment. The United States, rightly, 
I believe, voted for the Security Council reso- 
lution which imposed mandatory sanctions 
on Southern Rhodesia. In permitting the im- 
portation of certain categories of Rhodesian 
products, we have, for what at the time 
appeared to be overriding reasons of the na- 
tional interest, put ourselves in contradiction 
with the terms of that resolution, our treaty 
obligations, and our obligations under inter- 
national law. 



436 



Department of State Bulletin 



Gentlemen, I take no pleasure in calling 
into question any act of the U.S. Congress. 
On the contrary, I have always been the first 
to defend the policy of my government, no 
matter whether the policy may have origi- 
nated in the executive or tho legislative 
branch. I assure you I will continue to do so 
regardless of the decision the Congress 
makes in this matter. 

However, now is a time for stocktaking. 
In balancing the pros and cons of retaining 
section 503 in effect, I feel you should con- 
sider its impact on the U.S. image, at home 
and abroad. You should consider its impact 
on the general tenor of international rela- 
tions. I would be less than frank and less than 
responsive to your needs if I did not put be- 
fore you the conclusions that I and my ad- 
visers have reluctantly arrived at concerning 
the international legal implications of section 
503. 

I do not question the authority of Congress 
to act as it did. The administration has had 
its case sustained in the courts that the Con- 
gress has the authority bj^ subsequent legis- 
lation to modify or suspend treaties and that 
section 503 should be interpreted as such a 
modification. It is, however, a unilateral 
modification of a collective decision or agree- 
ment ; and we should consider very carefully 
whether this is a practice we would want, by 
our example, to encourage. 

The U.S. Government and the American 
people have long stood for the rule of law 
in international affairs. I believe that they 
continue to feel this commitment to inter- 
national law. I believe that our actions re- 
sulting from section 503 are a limited and 
temporary aberration. If it is not, if our con- 
duct represents a settled, confirmed U.S. pol- 
icy, then we are going to find it increasingly 
difficult to convince others to live up to 
their legal obligations, whether these obliga- 
tions be to compensate expropriated U.S. 
firms or to suppress international terrorism. 
We could find that America's friends begin 
to doubt the dependability of an ally that is 
willing to disregard its obligations under a 
treaty central to the whole concept of collec- 
tive security, as is the U.N. Charter. And 
we may find that other nations, many of 



which do not even have a vote in the Security 
Council, will be disinclined to obey its de- 
cisions when we, who have the veto, will not. 

I know it seems difficult to realize that an 
issue of such minor import in the United 
States, a piece of legislation so trivial in com- 
parison with the many generous actions this 
Congress has taken on behalf of nations in 
Africa and elsewhere, could assume so much 
significance in so many other countries. Even 
in terms of the Rhodesian economy, that 
country's exports to the United States are 
not large. However, the psychological boost 
given the [Ian] Smith regime by passage of 
section 503 should not be underestimated. 

Paradoxically, it is just the limited nature 
of U.S. interest in this matter that so frus- 
trates our friends abroad and leads them to 
misconstrue our motives. Many foreign dip- 
lomats and observers might be prepared to 
understand, if not to applaud, a U.S. viola- 
tion of the Rhodesian sanctions if in so doing 
we were securing important benefits for our 
economy or our security. The apparent fact 
that section 503 is of no great benefit to 
either leads these people to believe that the 
economic and security arguments under 
which this legislation is defended are spe- 
cious. The conclusion many reach is that the 
real intent of Congress in passing this legis- 
lation was to lend aid and assistance to the 
Smith regime and to help perpetuate minor- 
ity rule throughout southern Africa. 

We know that this is not the case. We 
know that section 503 was passed in the sin- 
cere belief that there were important eco- 
nomic and security issues at stake. We now 
also know that the economic and security im- 
pact of section 503 was greatly overesti- 
mated, that its repeal would cost the United 
States little and benefit it greatly. And, fi- 
nally, we know that the American people's 
commitment to international law, and to the 
orderly settlement of contentious issues 
through the United Nations and other inter- 
national forums, remains intact. In passing 
S. 1868 you will convince others of these 
facts. You will in doing so restore the ti-adi- 
tional image of the United States, an image 
in which the American people have always 
taken a just pride. 



October 1, 1973 



437 



ASSISTANT SECRETARY NEWSOM 

Mr. Chairman : I welcome this opportunity 
to follow my distinguished colleague Ambas- 
sador Scali and to speak on this very impor- 
tant measure introduced by you to place the 
United States once again in full compliance 
with its international obligations. 

As Ambassador Scali has indicated, we 
fully support S. 1868 to halt the import of 
Rhodesian chrome and other materials. We 
consider the sanctions program a legal com- 
mitment under the U.N. Charter and see it 
clearly as a measure necessary to bring about 
an equitable and peaceful solution to the 
Rhodesian problem. The Africans feel keenly 
about our lapses in observance of sanctions 
because they feel that our move has a par- 
ticularly strong influence since we, the 
United States, did it. Whatever may be the 
feelings of various segments of our popula- 
tion toward the regime in Rhodesia and to- 
ward the sanctions program, it should be 
recognized by all that a settlement is in 
everyone's interest. All Rhodesians would 
welcome a resolution of the problem, and 
all would benefit by it. We believe our com- 
pliance with sanctions is a vital element in 
contributing to pressure for a settlement. 
This is also the single most important cur- 
rent irritant in our relations with African 
countries. 

The African nations themselves often ob- 
serve sanctions in spite of real economic costs 
to them. Zambia recently discontinued use of 
the Rhodesian Railways and is involved in a 
costly rerouting of its trade. Other countries 
boycott Rhodesia entirely and forgo any 
trade. The net effect of sanctions in eight 
years has admittedly not forced the Smith 
regime to make a settlement, but economi- 
cally it has inhibited growth in an economy 
which was booming prior to UDI [unilateral 
declaration of independence]. 

But more importantly, not one country has 
formally recognized Rhodesia in those eight 
years. Neither Portugal nor South Africa 
has extended diplomatic recognition. 

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our economic 
interests in certain African countries have 
grown significantly in the past few years. 



A case in point is Nigeria, where direct 
American investment now approaches $!■ 
billion and which has become an important 
source of America's imported petroleum. Ni- 
geria, under General Gowon, is assuming an 
important role in Africa and feels particu- 
larly strongly about southern African issues. 
As economic interests expand, the frequency 
of our diplomatic contacts in these countries 
inevitably increases. More and more we are 
finding that as we approach them — even 
when our approaches are on strictly bilateral 
issues of mutual interest — we are being sub- 
jected to criticism for our failure to abide by 
our international obligations with regard to 
Rhodesia. 

We are told that our position on chrome 
is a deliberate political affront in disregard 
of African public opinion, a persuasive illus- 
tration of U.S. disinterest in Africa, and an 
obvious diminution of America's interest in 
the United Nations. One African leader has 
charged that the United States had opted 
for money, investment, and the will to save 
a white minority regime over simple morality 
and humanity and therefore that the United 
States cannot be trusted on southern African 
issues. There is no doubt that the chrome is- 
sue has affected the attitude toward us in 
many African countries. This can directly 
affect our economic and commercial interests. 

Over and above individual protests, the 
United States has been strongly condemned 
at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
summit meetings for our chrome imports 
under the Byrd provision. Resolutions called 
upon the United States in particular to end 
its "flagrant violation of sanctions" and ex- 
pressed concern for the deleterious effects 
our actions could have for the enforcement 
of sanctions on a worldwide basis. Speaking 
at the close of the 1972 meeting, the Presi- 
dent of the OAU, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, said 
the lesson to be drawn from this situation 
is that the great Western Powers seem to 
prefer to follow their immediate interests 
rather than long-term interests and inter- 
national conscience. These, of course, were 
in addition to the condemnations received in 
U.N. forums and in other international meet- 
ings and conferences. Our position makes us 



438 



Department of State Bulletin 



vulnerable to attack from all quarters. 

In Britain, where the responsibility for 
Rhodesia lies, we have also received wide- 
spread criticism for our breach of sanctions. 
In Parliament this spring the Foreign Min- 
ister reported that he had made representa- 
tions to the United States on our imports of 
goods under the Byrd provision. We are be- 
ing accused of contracting out of our obliga- 
tions in the United Nations. We have only 
been able to respond that we are unable to 
prohibit these importations. 

To appreciate the problem, we must try to 
understand how our actions on the Byrd pro- 
vision look historically to Africans. In 1971, 
U.K. efforts to reach a political settlement 
with the Rhodesian regime seemed on the 
verge of success. Rhodesia was suffering 
from the effect of sanctions and appeared 
ready to come to an agreement. At that point, 
the Byrd provision, although unrelated to 
these specific events, looked to the African 
like a deliberate attempt to frustrate a set- 
tlement. Again in 1972, when the attempt to 
repeal the Byrd provision was defeated, the 
Africans in Rhodesia were in the midst of 
their repudiation of the proposals agreed to 
by Smith and British Foreign and Common- 
wealth Minister [Sir Alec] Douglas-Home. 
Africans interpreted the failure of the repeal 
as U.S. indifference if not a direct slap to 
the African majority in Rhodesia. Now, un- 
der pressure of sanctions, there again ap- 
pears to be some stirring toward settlement, 
this time internally between the Smith re- 
gime and the African parties in Rhodesia. 
Repeal of the Byrd provision now could have 
critical influence on movement toward agree- 
ment by demonstrating U.S. interest, sym- 
pathy, and support for a fair solution. Con- 
versely, another defeat in the Congress of 
an effort to repeal could give heart to those 
in Rhodesia who want no accommodation of 
any sort with the African majority. 

Within Rhodesia and in the rest of the 
world, people are keenly aware of past at- 
tempts to repeal the Byrd provision. All will 
be watching closely the results of this effort. 
While we are not unmindful of the complex 
problems for all Rhodesians, we genuinely 
believe that unless a solution takes into ac- 



count the rights and aspirations of the Afri- 
can majority, the present situation in 
Rhodesia will continue as a festering inter- 
national problem. As the level of violence in 
Rhodesia and around its borders increases, 
it becomes ever more vital that the search 
for solution be fostered by steadfastness of 
the international community in enforcing 
sanctions. We would hope that the delibera- 
tions of this committee will result in passage 
of the proposed legislation and demonstrate 
our commitment to self-determination and 
racial equality in Africa and our readiness 
to fulfill our International obligations. 



Special Meeting Called To Discuss 
Fisheries Off U.S. Atlantic Coast 

Department Announcement ^ 

The United States has communicated its 
willingness to participate in a special meet- 
ing of the International Commission for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) to be 
held at Ottawa October 15-19. The special 
ICNAF meeting will deal with critical fish- 
eries conservation problems off the Atlantic 
coast of the United States, problems which 
were not resolved at the annual meeting of 
ICNAF which was held at Copenhagen in 
June. 

U.S. agreement to the special meeting was 
conveyed in personal letters in late August 
from then-Secretary of State William P. Rog- 
ers to the Foreign Ministers of the 15 other 
members of ICNAF. In doing so, Secretary 
Rogers expressed his deep concern over the 
special aspect of the current global imbalance 
in the demand for and supply of food com- 
modities, particularly protein, with respect 
to the substantial declines in the fisheries re- 
sources off our Atlantic coast. In 1972 the 
total fishing effort in this region was approx- 
imately 45 percent above the level permissible 
to assure maximum sustainable yields over 
the long run. Research vessel surveys indi- 
cate that since 1967 the finfish population in 
the region has declined by more than 65 per- 



' Issued on Sept. 13 (press release 329). 



October 1, 1973 



439 



cent. The popular haddock has been fished 
virtually to extinction, and the once very- 
abundant herring populations have been re- 
duced by some 95 percent. 

Secretary Rogers called the fisheries situ- 
ation in the Northwest Atlantic a "crisis" 
and expressed the hope that the relationship 
between this crisis and the importance of 
assuring an adequate and orderly global sup- 
ply of food commodities is taken fully into 
account at the special ICNAF meeting. 

At the same time, Secretary Rogers also 
expressed his full agreement with the expres- 
sions of concern conveyed to him by Secre- 
tary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent in a 
recent letter about the problems of conser- 
vation of our fish stocks in the face of failure 
of ICNAF to adopt adequate controls. The 
National Marine Fisheries Service is part 
of Commerce's National Oceanic and At- 
mospheric Administration. 

Ambassador Donald L. McKernan, Coordi- 
nator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant 
for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Secretary of 
State, recalled that the level of agreement 
which could have been reached at the June 
ICNAF meeting would not even halt the de- 
clines in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries 
which we have been experiencing since the 
midsixties. The United States had insisted 
that the declines be halted and that a resto- 
ration program be started. He emphasized 
that this remains the goal for the October 
special meeting. "Not only is this essential 
to insure a continuation of this important 
contribution to the global supply of protein," 
he said, "but it is essential to the restoration 
of economic stability to the hard-pressed 
American fishing industry and the well-being 
of the countless American sport fishermen." 
In the face of ever-increasing foreign fishing 
eff"ort, U.S. catches in the ICNAF area have 
fallen from over 500,000 metric tons of fish 
per year in the 1950's before the intensive 
foreign fisheries commenced in the region 
oflF the U.S. coast to less than half that 
amount in 1972. 

ICNAF members are Bulgaria, Canada, 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Po- 
land, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the Soviet 



Union, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. All significant fisheries in the region 
off" the U.S. coast are conducted by members 
of ICNAF except that of the German Demo- 
cratic Republic, which conducts a large fish- 
ery in the region. The GDR has not yet 
become a member of ICNAF, but the United 
States favors such membership. 



Senate Aslced To Approve Customs 
Convention on Transit of Goods 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice 
and consent of the Senate to ratification, the 
Customs Convention on the International 
Transit of Goods (ITI Convention) opened 
for signature at Vienna June 7, 1971. 

For the information of the Senate, I am 
also transmitting the report of the Depart- 
ment of State with respect to the Convention. 

The Convention is designed to meet the 
present need to facilitate international trans- 
port while, at the same time, providing the 
customs control arrangements necessary for 
such transport. The Convention provides for 
new, uniform control and documentation pro- 
cedures which carriers of Governments party ' 
to the Convention would be able to use at 
their option. 

The Convention would help open the way 
for United States exporters and carriers to 
benefit in Western Europe and other markets 
of the world from the simplified and uniform 
procedures for which it provides. 

I recommend that the Convention be given 
early and favorable consideration by the 
Senate. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, Juhj 23, 1973. 



' Transmitted on July 23 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. P, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 
which includes the text of the convention and the 
report of the Department of State. 



440 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



Geneva Oct. 10-11 

Geneva Oct. 10-12 



ILO International Conference of Labor Statisticians: 12th Geneva Oct. 10-16 

McGtinGT. 

FAO North and Latin American Regional Meeting Industry Washington . . . Oct. 12 

Cooperative Program. n t- ik 

GATT Budget Committee Geneva Oct. 1& 

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping: 6th Session 2.^^^^\/ ,' ' " " ?. ,' ;r,Q 

U.N. Economic and Social Council: Resumed 55th Session . . . New York . . . Oct. 15-18 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Air PoHution 

U.N. 



Geneva Oct. 15-19 



ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building, and Planning . Geneva Oct. 15-26 



Calendar of International Conferences' 

Scheduled October Through December 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris Oct. 1 

OECD Informal Meeting on Proteins Paris Oct. 1-3 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Grains: 16th Session .... Rome Oct. 1-5 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions . . . Rome Oct. 1-5 

CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 81st and 82d Sessions . Brussels .... Oct. 1-5 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 61st Statu- Lisbon Oct. 1-10 

tory Meeting. 

ECE/RID Joint Meeting of the Safety Committee and Group of Geneva Oct. 1-12 

Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 

NATO Group of Experts on the Middle East Brussels .... Oct. 2-5 

ICAO Review of General Concept of Separation Panel: 2d Meeting Montreal .... Oct. 2-19 

International Rubber Study Group London Oct. 3-5 

NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee Brussels .... Oct. 3-5 

FAO Advisory Committee of Experts on Statistics: 6th Session . Rome Oct. 3-11 

GATT Working Group on Quantitative Restrictions Geneva Oct. 4-5 

NATO Group of Experts on Maghreb Brussels .... Oct. 8 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Ad Hoc Group on Flags . Paris Oct. 8 

GATT Working Party on the Tariff Study Geneva Oct. 8-12 

UNHCR Executive Committee: 25th Session Geneva Oct. 8-16 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 48th Session .... Rome Oct. 8-19 

PAHO: 22d Meeting of the Directing Council of PAHO; 25th Washington . . . Oct. 8-19 

Meeting of the Regional Committee of WHO for the Americas. 

WMO Commission on Special Applications of Meteorology and Bad Hamburg . . Oct. 8-20 

Climatology: 6th Session. r> .. o m o 

IMCO International Conference on Marine Pollution London Oct. 8-JNov. Z 

NATO Disarmament Experts Brussels .... Oct. 9-10 

ISVS Council: 15th Session 

ECE Working Party on Rail Transport 



' This schedule which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on September 14, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October- 
December 1973. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. , ^„ „ 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; EC, European Community; 
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agree- 
nent on Tariffs and Trade; lATC, Inter-American Travel Congresses; ICAO, International Civil Aviation 
Organization- ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Or- 
ganization- IMCO Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Ocean- 
ographic Commission; ISVS, Internationa! Secretariat for Volunteer Service; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization; NEA, Nuclear Energy Agency; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- 
opment; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; RID, European Convention on Transport of Dangerous 
Goods by Rail; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Na- 
tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees; UNIDROIT, International Institute for Unification of Private Law; WHO, World Health Or- 
ganization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

October 1, 1973 441 



Calendar of International Conferences — Continiied 

Scheduled October Through . December — Continued 

U.N. Regional Cartographic Conference for Asia and the Far Tokyo Oct. 15-27 

East: 7th Meeting. 

OECD Environment Committee Paris Oct. 16-17 

CCC Valuation Committee: 62d Session Brussels .... Oct. 16-26 

UNIDROIT Diplomatic Conference on Uniform Law on the Form Washington . . . Oct. 16-27 

of Wills. 

OECD Development Assistance Committee Paris Oct. 18-19 

GATT Working Group on Export Subsidies Geneva Oct. 18-19 

Inter- American Travel Congresses: 12th Meeting Lima Oct. 18-25 

GATT Working Party on the India/Yugoslavia/Egypt Tripartite Geneva Oct. 22-24 

Agreement. 

WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty Interim Committee Tokyo Oct. 22-27 

ICAO All Weather Operations Panel: 5th Meeting Montreal .... Oct. 22-Nov. 2 

NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society .... Brussels .... Oct. 23-24 

OECD Ad Hoc Expert Group on Statistical and Methodological Paris Oct. 24-26 

Problems in the Public Sector. 

GATT Trade Negotiations Committee Geneva Oct. 25-26 

International Institute for Cotton New Delhi . . . Oct. 26-27 

GATT Trade and Development Committee Geneva Oct. 29-30 

OECD/NEA Governmental Experts on Third-Party Liability in Paris . . . . . Oct. 29-31 

the Nuclear Field. 

UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign Egypt Oct. 29-31 

To Save the Monuments of Nubia: 22d Session. 

UNCTAD Committee on Tungsten: 7th Session Geneva Oct. 29-Nov. 2 

UNCTAD Preparatory Committee on a Convention on Intermodal Geneva Oct. 29-Nov. 2 

Transport. 

International Cotton Advisory Council: 32d Plenary Meeting. . New Delhi . . . Oct. 29-Nov. 3 

ICAO North Atlantic Ocean Stations Committee: 8th Meeting . . Paris Oct. 30-Nov. 16 

NATO Civil Communications Planning Committees: 38th Plenary Rome October 

Session. 

OECD Consumer Policy Committee Paris October 

UNCTAD Working Group on Rules of Origin Geneva October 

UNESCO Directing Council/International Geological Correlation Paris October 

Program. 

PAHO Executive Committee: 71st Meeting Washington . . . October 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Cocoa Sub-Group on Statistics Rome October or 

November 

FAO Intergovernmental Group of the World Food Program . . Undetermined . . October or 

November 

WMO Tropical Experiment Board: 5th Session Geneva October or 

November 

GATT Working Group on Import Documentation and Consular Geneva Nov. 1-2 

Formalities. 

2d U.N. ECOSOC Asian Population Conference Tokyo Nov. 1-15 

UNESCO/IOC Executive Council: 3d Meeting Paris Nov. 2-3 

GATT Working Party on Packaging and Labeling Geneva Nov. 5-6 

ILO Governing Body: 191st Session Geneva Nov. 5-6 

FAO Council: 61st Session Rome Nov. 5-8 

ECE Inland Transport Committee Group of Experts on Road Geneva Nov. 5-9 

Traffic. 

GATT Textiles Committee Geneva Nov. 5-9 

2d Inter-American Conference on Cooperatives Santiago .... Nov. 5-9 

UNIDROIT Committee of Governmental Experts on Carriage of Rome Nov. 5-9 

Dangerous Goods by Inland Waterways. 

WIPO/Strasbourg Agreement Joint Ad Hoc Committee on Inter- Geneva Nov. 5-9 

national Patent Classification. 

UNESCO World Science Information System Steering Committee: Paris Nov. 5-9 

1st Session. 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group Geneva Nov. 5-14 

UNESCO/IOC: 8th Assembly Paris Nov. 5-17 

NATO Joint Communications/Electronics Committee Brussels .... Nov. 6-7 

NATO Nuclear Planning Group Ministerial Meeting Brussels .... Nov. 6-7 

442 Department of State Bulletin 



ICAO Automated Data Interchange Systems Panel 

GATT Council 

OECD Environment Committee Urban Environment Sector Group 

GATT Working Party on the EC/Norway Agreement 

OECD Executive Committee in Special Session 

International Committee of the Red Cross: 22d All State Meeting 

FAO Conference: 17th Session 

ECE Inland Transport Committee Group of Experts on Construc- 
tion of Vehicles. 

International Coffee Organization 

GATT Contracting Parties 

ICAO Assembly: 8th Session 

UNCTAD Conference on Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences . 

Conference on Conservation of Polar Bears 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 

ECE/RID Joint Meeting on Transport of Dangerous Goods . . . 

ECAFE Typhoon Committee 

WIPO and Paris Union Administrative Meetings 

WMO Commission for Atmospheric Sciences: 6th Session . . . 

International Wheat Council 

ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 27th Session (Re- 
sumed). 

ECE Working Group on Inland Transport 

2d UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education of European 
States. 

UNESCO Government Experts To Revievif the Applications of 
Agreements on Importation of Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Materials. 

ILO African Regional Conference: 4th Session 

ICAO Obstacle Clearance Panel: 4th Meeting 

Colombo Plan Consultative Committee 

ICEM Executive Committee: 44th Session 

WMO Regional Association IV: 6th Session 

FAO Council: 62d Session 

Inter-American Permanent Executive Committee of the Council 
for Education, Science, and Culture: 7th Meeting. 

UNESCO Government Experts on the International Recognition 
of Higher Education Studies and Diplomas in Latin America 
and the Caribbean. 

OECD Oil Committee 

U.N. Organizational Session of the Law of the Sea Conference: 
3d Session. 

OECD Consumer Policy Committee 

Hague Conference Commission on Bankruptcy 

Hague Conference Commission on Evidence in Criminal Matters . 

ICEM Council: 36th Session 

GATT Textiles Committee 

ECE Inland Transport Committee Working Party on Road Trans- 
port. 

IMCO Legal Committee: 21st Session 

Technical Conference on Fishery Products 

FAO Executive Committee of the Commission for Controlling the 
Desert Locust in the Eastern Region of Its Distribution Area 
in Southwest Asia: 8th Session. 

lATC Technical Committee on Travel Promotion: 6th Meeting . 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee: 12th Ordinary 
Session. 

NATO: 52d Council Meeting at Ministerial Level 

FAO Commission for Controlling the Desert Locust in the Eastern 
Region of Its Distribution Area in Southwest Asia: 9th Session. 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food Additives: 9th 
Session. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications 

ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Safety of Motor Coaches and 
Buses. 

UNESCO Regional Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural 
Policies in Asia. 



Montreal .... Nov. 6-23 

Geneva Nov. 7 

Paris Nov. 7-9 

Geneva Nov. 8-9 

Paris Nov. 8-9 

Tehran Nov. 8-15 

Rome Nov. 10-29 

Bangkok .... Nov. 12-16 

London Nov. 12-16 

Geneva Nov. 12-23 

London Nov. 12-25 

Geneva Nov. 12-Dec. 14 

Oslo Nov. 13-15 

Paris Nov. 19 

Geneva Nov. 19-23 

Bangkok .... Nov. 19-26 

Geneva Nov. 19-27 

Versailles .... Nov. 19-30 

London Nov. 23 

Geneva Nov. 26-27 

Geneva Nov. 26-30 

Bucharest .... Nov. 26-Dec. 1 

Geneva Nov. 26-Dec. 3 



Nairobi . . 


. Nov. 26-Dec. 7 


Montreal . . 


. Nov. 26-Dec. 7 


Wellington 


. Nov. 27-Dec. 6 


Geneva . . . 


. Nov. 29-30 


Guatemala 


. Nov. 29-Dec. 7 


Rome . . . 


. Nov. 30 


Washington . 


. November 


Santiago . . 


. November 


Paris . . . 


. November 


New York . 


. November 



Paris November 

The Hague . . . November 

The Hague . . . November 

Geneva Dec. 3-5 

Geneva Dec. 3-7 

Geneva Dec. 3-7 

London Dec. 3-7 

Tokyo Dec. 4-11 

Rome Dec. 5-7 



Argentina 
Paris . , 



Brussels 
Rome 



Netherlands 



London 
Geneva 



Jogjakarta 



Dec. 5-7 
Dec. 5-11 

Dec. 10-11 
Dec. 10-13 

Dec. 10-14 

Dec. 10-14 
Dec. 10-14 

Dec. 10-20 



October 1, 1973 



443 



Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 



Scheduled October Through December — Continued 

WIPO Technical Coordination Committee for International Co- 
operation in Information Retrieval Among Patent Offices. 

GATT Balance of Payments Committee 

ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians 

ECE Ad Hoc Meeting on Problems Relating to Transport by 
Ship Borne Barge. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Standards and Training of Watchkeep- 
ing: 3d Session. 

OECD Consumer Policy Committee 

UNCTAD/FAO Consultations on Hides and Skins 

UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for Cooperative 
Investigations in the Mediterranean. 

ICAO Facilitation Division Area Meeting 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Patent Licensing 

WIPO Committee of Experts on International Classification 
for Designs and Committee on Locarno Agreement. 

Inter- American Economic and Social Council: 9th Annual 
Meeting. 



Geneva Dec. 10-21 

Geneva Dec. 10-21 

New Delhi . . . Dec. 10-22 

Geneva Dec. 17-21 

London Dec. 17-21 

Paris Dec. 18-20 

Geneva December 

Monaco or Malta . December 

Rome December 

Geneva December 

Geneva December 



Undetermined 



December 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668. 
Acceptance deposited: Mali, September 7, 1973. 

Coffee 

Agreement amending and extending the interna- 
tional coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Ap- 
proved by the International Coffee Council at Lon- 
don April 14, 1973.' 
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, August 15, 1973. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done 
at Paris July 24, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 27, 1973. 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 



that convention to works of stateless persons 
and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 27, 1973. 
Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to the works of certain interna- 
tional organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Sweden, June 27, 1973. 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation 
Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Decem- 
ber 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 
1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. 
TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, August 6, 1973. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
4044. 

Acceptatices deposited: Kenya, August 22, 1973; 
Zaire, August 16, 1973. 

Wheat 

International wheat agreement, 1971. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington March 29 through May 3, 
1971. Entered into force June 18, 1971, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, July 1, 1971, with 
respect to other provisions; for the United States 
July 24, 1971. TIAS 7144. 
Accession deposited: Malta, September 11, 1973. 



■ Not in force. 



444 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 1,1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1788 



China. Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra Visits 
People's Republic of China 428 

Conftress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 433 

Department Discusses Proposed Fund To 
Assist Developing Countries and Promote 
U.S. Exports (Casey) 429 

Department Supports Repeal of Legislation 
Permitting Imports of Rhodesian Chrome 
(Newsom, Scali) 434 

Dr. Kissinger Gives Statement Before Senate 
Committee on His Nomination To Be Secre- 
tary of State 425 

President Nixon Sends Message to the Con- 
gress on Legislative Goals for 1973 (ex- 
cerpts) 417 

Senate Asked To Approve Customs Conven- 
tion on Transit of Goods (Nixon) .... 440 

Department and Foreign Service. Dr. Kissinger 
Gives Statement Before Senate Committee 
on His Nomination To Be Secretary of State 425 

Economic Affairs 

President Nixon Sends Message to the Con- 
gress on Legislative Goals for 1973 (ex- 
cerpts) 417 

.Senate Asked To Approve Customs Conven- 
tion on Transit of Goods (Nixon) .... 440 

Special Meeting Called To Discuss Fisheries 
Off U.S. Atlantic Coast (Department an- 
nouncement) 439 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Philadelphia 
Symphony Orchestra Visits People's Repub- 
lic of China 428 

Energy. President Nixon Sends Message to the 
Congress on Legislative Goals for 1973 
(excerpts) 417 

Foreign Aid 

Department Discusses Proposed Fund To 
Assist Developing Countries and Promote 
U.S. Exports (Casey) 429 

President Nixon Sends Message to the Con- 
gress on Legislative Goals for 1973 (ex- 
cerpts) 417 

U.S. Responds to Pakistan's Need for Flood 
Relief Assistance (Nixon) 424 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences . . . 441 
Special Meeting Called To Discuss Fisheries 
Off U.S. Atlantic Coast (Department an- 
nouncement) 439 

Military Affairs. President Nixon Sends Mes- 
sage to the Congress on Legislative Goals 
for 1973 (excerpts) 417 

Pakistan. U.S. Responds to Pakistan's Need 
for Flood Relief Assistance (Nixon) . . . 421 

Presidential Documents 

President Ni.xon Sends Message to the Con- 
gress on Legislative Goals for 1973 (ex- 
cerpts) 417 



Senate Asked To Approve Customs Conven- 
tion on Transit of Goods 440 

U.S. Responds to Pakistan's Need for Flood 
Relief Assistance 424 

Southern Rhodesia. Department Supports 
Repeal of Legislation Permitting Imports of 
Rhodesian Chrome (Newsom, Scali) . . . 4.34 

Trade. Department Discusses Proposed Fund 
To Assist Developing Countries and Promote 
U.S. Exports (Casey) 429 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 444 

Senate Asked To Approve Customs Conven- 
tion on Transit of (^oods (Nixon) .... 440 

United Nations. Department Supports Repeal 
of Legislation Permitting Imports of Rhode- 
sian Chrome (Newsom, Scali) 434 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Protests DRV Construction 
of Airfields in South Viet-Nam (U.S. note) 423 



Name Index 

Casey, William J 429 

Kissinger, Henry A 425 

Newsom, David D 434 

Nixon, President 417, 424, 440 

Scali, John 434 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 10—16 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to September 10 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
324 of September 7. 

No. Dat« Subject 

325 9/11 U.S. note to Democratic Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam, Sept. 10. 

*326 9/12 Law of the Sea Advisory Com- 
mittee, Sept. 21-22. 

*327 9/12 Advisory Committee to U.S. 
Section, International North 
Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
Sept. 24-25. 

*328 9/12 Study group 7 of U.S. National 
Committee for CCIR, Sept. 27. 
329 9/13 U.S. agrees to special ICNAF 
meeting, Oct. 15-19. 

*330 9/14 Program for official visit of 
Prime Minister Zulfikar AH 
Bhutto of Pakistan. 

t331 9/14 U.S. statement on signing of 
Lao protocols. 

•332 9/14 Regional Foreign Policy Con- 
ference, Kearney, Neb., Oct. 
11. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



\^olume LXIX 



No. 1789 



October 8, 1973 



MINISTERIAL MEETING OF GATT AGREES ON FRAMEWORK 

FOR MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 

Statement by Seci'etary of the Treasw-y Shultz 

and Text of Tokyo Declamtion 445 

COOPERATION TO MEET THE WORLD'S ENERGY NEEDS 
Addi-ess by Under Secretary Casey 454 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



0£POS»TOK.t 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



VOL. LXIX, No. 1789 
October 8. 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE : 

!>2 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign $36.25 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
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agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Xoie: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI, 
a loeekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau ol 
Public Affairs, provides tlte public an 
interested agencies of tfte government 
witfi information on developments in 
ttie field of U.S. foreign relations ani 
on tfie work of tfie Department ant 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selectet 
press releases on foreign policy, issuei 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses 
and news conferences of the Presidem 
and the Secretary of State and othei 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases oi 
international affairs and the functioru 
of the Department. Information is in 
eluded concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which ti 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intei 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, am 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also listet 



Ministerial Meeting of GATT Agrees on Framework 
for Multilateral Trade Negotiations 



The Contracting Parties to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
met at ministerial level at Tokyo September 
12-1 Jt. Following is a statement made before 
the Contracting Parties on September 12 by 
Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz, 
head of the U.S. delegation, together with 
the text of a declaration approved nnani- 
moiisly on September H. 

STATEMENT BY TREASURY SECRETARY SHULTZ 

Department of the Treasury press release 

This is a historic meeting, and I am hon- 
ored to participate in it. We join here in the 
first formal step toward a major expansion 
and improvement of global trading relation- 
ships. While these negotiations build upon 
what has been achieved in the past, in the 
Kennedy Round and earlier, they are also a 
bold step beyond our past. Our present un- 
dertaking is broader in scope, more ambi- 
tious in objective, and guided by a clearer 
view of economic and political realities. 

I was told before I came that Tokyo would 
be the occasion for many speeches on the 
benefits of open international trade. I expect 
that will be true. And I consider it entirely 
appropriate that it should be true. As we em- 
bark upon a course of negotiations to last 
for many months and involving details of 
endless complexity, we should remind our- 
selves of the principles that should underlie 
our efforts. However obvious these principles 
may seem to us, the process of putting them 
into practice has always been diflicult and is 
far from complete. 

The basic principle that brings us here is 
simple and needs no great elaboration. When 



there is voluntary exchange, both parties — 
the buyer and the seller — gain. If they did 
not, one party or the other would refuse to 
exchange. This principle is as valid when the 
parties are in different countries as when 
they are in the same country. Obstacles that 
governments place in the way of trade, in- 
ternally or externally, prevent people from 
doing business that would be beneficial to 
all participants. 

What is involved is more than one country 
trading what it produces most efficiently to- 
day for what another country produces most 
efliciently today. Open trade forces and stim- 
ulates all of us to become more efficient. The 
wind of foreign competition drives busi- 
nesses in all countries to more innovation, 
greater research and development eff'orts, 
and better adaptation to the wants of con- 
sumers. 

Our generation has more cause to recog- 
nize the force of these ideas than any before 
us. We have been living through the greatest 
and most widely .«hared economic advance in 
world history and the greatest expansion of 
international trade. This combination of de- 
velopments is of course no coincidence. 

The growth of world output has contrib- 
uted to the rise of trade, but the rise of trade 
has also contributed to the growth of world 
output. Greater access to markets has pro- 
moted specialization in production and there- 
by the better use of each country's resources. 
Competitive pressure from foreign firms has 
stimulated the grov.-th of technology and 
business acumen. 

As a result of greater openness in the 
world economy, economic opportunities have 
been substantially broadened for the citizens 



October 8, 1973 



445 



President Nixon Outlines U.S. Objectives in Trade Negotiations 



Following is a statement by President Nixon 
issued on September 8. 

White House press release dated September 8 

Today, at my request, an American delegation 
of 20 persons will leave for Tokyo for a major 
new round of multilateral trade negotiations. 

Later this month another delegation from the 
United States will leave for Nairobi for the an- 
nual meeting of the International Monetary Fund 
and World Bank, where we hope to build on re- 
cent progress toward fundamentally reforming 
the world's monetary system. 

The fact that the United States will be repre- 
sented by our highest ranking economic officials 
at these meetings is a demonstration of our com- 
mitment to these vital efforts to improve the 
international economic system. 

We have been working to reform that system 
since August of 1971. It is clear that some basic 
reforms are long overdue. It is equally clear that 
while substantial progress has been made, there 
is much still to be done. That is why we partic- 
ularly welcome these meetings in Tokyo and 
Nairobi. 

The United States has four basic objectives 
in trade negotiations: 

First, we desire to continue the 40-year move- 
ment toward freer trade, to achieve for Ameri- 
cans the benefits of expanding world commerce. 

Second, we seek to overcome problems in the 
trade field which have become a source of fric- 
tion between the United States and our major 



trading partners. In this sense, the trade nego- 
tiation is one part of a broader effort to build 
a stable and lasting peace. 

Third, we want to reform some of the present 
trading guidelines and practices which reduce 
trading opportunities for U.S. producers, as 
well as those of other countries, and which favor 
some at the expense of others. 

Fourth, and finally, we, along with other in- 
dustrialized nations, are seeking ways to im- 
prove trading relationships with the less 
developed countries and with countries with dif- 
fering economic and political systems. 

In order to attain these goals, we need the 
legislative authority contained in the trade bill 
which I proposed to the Congress last April. I 
am particularly pleased and encouraged by the 
progress which the House Ways and Means Com- 
mittee is now making on this legislation. 

I am confident that the major international 
effort which my delegation will help to launch 
can lay the foundation for an improved world 
economic order which can help increase the pros- 
perity of all Americans and of people throughout 
the world. I am heartened by the international 
consensus which has led to these negotiations. 
The way is now open for an historic effort of 
joint statesmanship. If we approach these nego- 
tiations in this spirit, there will be no losers — we 
can all benefit. And their success, by helping to 
create a more stable and more prosperous world, 
will be an essential ingredient in achieving our 
goal of world peace. 



of all nations and the standard of living has 
improved throughout the world. Freer trade 
has led to higher real wages for working men 
and women and a wide choice of goods to 
consumers. 

One recent development in economic policy 
holds a useful lesson for all of us. Govern- 
ments in many parts of the world, such as 
Australia, Japan, Canada, some European 
countries, and the United States, have been 
led by compelling domestic reasons to re- 
duce unilaterally their tariffs or quotas, with- 
out asking for reciprocal concessions from 
others. Although the circumstances in each 
case may have differed, this is a reminder 
that we should not think of every reduction 
of our own restrictions as a concession made 
for the benefit of others and worthwhile only 



if there is a greater or at least equal con- 
cession by others. The general principles that 
guide our work suggest that we gain from 
reduction of our own barriers as well as 
from reduction of the barriers of others. 

Of course, there are qualifications to the 
basic ideas of trade liberalization. The par- 
ticipants in this conference, who live in the 
governmental and political process, are es- 
pecially aware of these qualifications. Sub- 
stantial reduction of trade barriers may 
cause local and temporary diflJicuIties that 
cannot be ignored, however great the longer 
run and more general benefits may be. Tran- 
sitional protection may sometimes permit 
the achievement of eflticiencies that would 
not be possible without it. Other reservations 
can be thought of. 



446 



Department of State Bulletin 



These qualifications constitute the case for 
gradualism, selectivity, and mutuality. No 
doubt, much of the time in the negotiations 
now beginning will be devoted to these quali- 
fications. But let us, as we say in the United 
States, keep our eye on the ball — the liberal- 
ization and expansion of trade — and seek to 
deal with the problems in ways most consist- 
ent with that overall objective. 

I see a number of important challenges 
for these negotiations. In listing them, I do 
not mean to imply they encompass the full 
range of issues that we expect these nego- 
tiations to cover nor that they will necessar- 
ily appear as specific items on the agenda 
for the negotiations. 

Guidelines and Procedures 

The central challenge for these negotia- 
tions is, as I see it, to develop guidelines and 
procedures that will permit the elimination 
of barriers to trade while preserving the 
ability of governments to carry out their 
domestic responsibilities. Many of the im- 
portant barriers that still hamper interna- 
tional trade result from the efforts of indi- 
vidual governments to achieve a variety of 
domestic economic, social, and political ob- 
j jectives. We must develop the means whereby 
these barriers can be eliminated or mini- 
I mized. Because national needs and policy 
I preferences frequently differ, we need to 
develop rules that will give each govern- 
: ment considerable leeway in forming and 
I pursuing its own policies. At the same time, 
we need to encourage countries to devise 
policy measures that minimize disruption of 
the economic interests of other nations. 

In an interdependent world, the policies 
pursued by any one government in carrying 
out its domestic responsibilities are bound to 
conflict at one time or another with the poli- 
cies pursued by other governments. We 
therefore will have to focus on the proce- 
dures and arrangements that are designed to 
minimize these conflicts and effectively to 
resolve disputes that may arise. Our common 
institutions, such as the GATT, have per- 
formed this role well. These institutions are 
aging, however, and while they may be 



structurally sound, it is important that we 
look closely at our recent experiences in 
dealing with trade problems to see where 
the rules and procedures can be updated and 
improved. 

Safeguards Against Disruptive Imports 

Our recent experience would indicate that 
we need particularly to look at the rules and 
procedures that deal with problems of im- 
port disruption. Every country represented 
here has at one time or another found it 
necessary to limit imports temporarily in 
order to permit domestic industry enough 
time to adjust. Frequently the current rules 
and procedures covering such actions have 
proved unsuitable, and governments had to 
work out informal arrangements. While such 
arrangements have proved expedient, they 
have not been able to cope with all problems 
and have been accompanied by an unneces- 
sary degree of international friction. It is 
time that we face this issue squarely and 
together design a mutually acceptable safe- 
guard system. 

Agricultural Commodities 

Another area where common action would 
be desirable is the area of agriculture. The 
current shortage in agricultural supplies and 
the danger that it will be repeated in the 
future gives great urgency to the need to 
find a more rational pattern of production 
and trade in agricultural commodities. If we 
take advantage of this occasion to expand 
opportunities for world trade in this area, 
we will be able to make available more food 
at cheaper prices for everyone. A number of 
thoughts have been expressed on how this 
might be accomplished. We are willing to 
examine any serious proposal. 

In the past year, we have seen how inter- 
national trade in agricultural commodities 
can help to avoid what would otherwise have 
been critical food shortages. The decline in 
world grain production was alleviated for 
many countries by the ability to import, 
especially from the United States. Despite 
poor growing weather and poor harvests in 



October 8, 1973 



447 



our own country, we have supplied greatly 
enlarged quantities of goods and feeds to 
countries in every part of the world, partly 
at the expense of a substantial reduction in 
our own stocks. 

Our exports of wheat in fiscal year 1973 
reached 32 million metric tons, almost double 
the amount shipped in FY 1972, and equiva- 
lent to three-fourths of U.S. production. Ex- 
ports of feed grains jumped sharply from 
21 million tons to 35 million tons. And soy- 
bean exports rose to 14 million tons, an in- 
crease over the previous year of 2 million 
tons. More than half of our soybean crop 
went into export. Indeed, all of the increase 
in our soybean crop was exported last 
season. 

Although our stock position has been 
sharjily reduced, we anticipate that an ex- 
cellent feed grain and record soybean crop 
this season will permit us to meet foreign 
demand for these commodities in FY 1974 
with exports at levels higher than the record 
levels of last year and that our wheat ex- 
ports will be close to last season's very high 
level. To meet anticipated world needs this 
year, we have put millions of acres back into 
production, and for 1974 all our reserve acre- 
age has been removed from set-aside restric- 
tions. We have proved that in the pinch, the 
United States is, indeed, a dependable sup- 
plier — and that its market-oriented system 
can be relied upon. 

Regional Integration and the MFN Principle 

Now let me turn to a development that has 
been a source of increasing concern to the 
United States. Over the past few years we 
have seen a tendency to move away from 
the notion of a single world trading system 
in which all nations are treated equally. The 
most-favored-nation principle has been the 
cornerstone of our global system. Now we 
are seeing that principle increasingly disre- 
garded. At a time when the circle of nations 
participating in the world trading system 
is increasing, we need to rededicate our- 
selves to the ideals of a single nondiscrimina- 
tory trading order. 

I should say in this respect that we con- 



tinue to support the many efforts to achieve 
political and economic integration. This 
makes sense where neighboring countries, 
sharing common traditions, find their eco- 
nomic aff"airs increasingly linked. We feel 
compelled to insist, however, that such ef- 
forts not undermine the global system that 
we have built together and from which we 
have derived great benefit. It is thus impor- 
tant that countries in regional groupings 
organize themselves in such a way that they 
can effectively discharge as a unit the respon- 
sibilities to which they have committed them- 
selves individually as nations. 

Support for Less Developed Countries 

We support efforts to give the less devel- 
oped countries special access to foreign mar- 
kets. We believe that such arrangements will 
benefit the industrial nations as well as the 
developing nations. We also recognize that 
it would not be appropriate or desirable for 
us to insist that these countries assume the 
same responsibilities as we expect from those 
countries that have achieved a relatively 
high degree of economic development. At the 
same time, however, we do expect commit- 
ments appropriate to a nation's stage of 
development and to a sharing of the respon- 
sibility for the effective working of the global 
system. No international undertaking can 
succeed if those who derive a benefit from it 
do not contribute to it. And the system as 
a whole cannot work unless all nations con- 
tribute to its effective functioning. 

Monetary and Trade Interrelationships 

Lastly, let me say a word about the rela- 
tionship between our efforts here and those 
related to the reform of the world monetary 
system. We recognize the interrelationship 
between monetary affairs and trade matters. 
A primary goal of an international monetary 
system, on the one hand, is to facilitate trade; 
that objective is seriously jeopardized when 
monetary relations become unstable. On the 
other hand, the logic is equally strong that 
the adjustment process in the monetary sys- 
tem is less effective and less responsive when 



448 



Department of State Bulletin 



trade is restricted by direct measures and 
can respond only slowly, and in a partial and 
distorted way, to the forces of the monetary 
adjustment process. In short, actions in one 
field can, but should not be allowed to, frus- 
trate the solutions reached in other fields. 
There is thus a need for simultaneous im- 
provement in all elements of the interna- 
tional economic system. 

Although concrete progress in one area of 
negotiation should not be held hostage to 
specific negotiations in another, overall suc- 
cess in one area will ultimately be dependent 
on success in another. Where specific over- 
laps do occur, work in one area ought to 
supplement rather than frustrate work in 
other areas. 

Negotiating Mandate of the United States 

My government believes it is important to 
take advantage of the opportunity presented 
by these negotiations and is anxious to par- 
ticipate vigorously. In implementing nego- 
tiated changes and in strengthening our 
commitment to the basic objectives, of course 
we will need the support, advice, and con- 
currence of our Congress. President Nixon 
submitted his Trade Reform Act to the Con- 
gress in April of this year. That bill has re- 
ceived thoughtful and highly constructive 
cons'deration in the Ways and Means Com- 
mittee of the House of Representatives and 
will likely remain under consideration in the 
Congress for a few more months. The rank- 
ing Democratic and Republican members of 
that committee issued a statement last week 
expressing their "hope and belief that we 
will complete work on the bill by October 1." 
i They also said : 

We believe that the committee will report a bill 
that will provide sufficient scope for comprehensive 
negotiations aimed at removing trade barriers and 
substantially expanding world trade. It is our hope 
and purpose that the Congress will act on this 
legislation in ample time to facilitate these 
negotiations. 

The fact that our trade bill is still under 
congressional review does not impede our 
ability to participate actively and fully at 
this stage. The negotiations which begin at 



this conference will, at the outset, concen- 
trate on preparing the way for the detailed 
bargaining jjrocess to come. We remain com- 
mitted to the start of substantive work on 
these negotiations in late October of this 
year and to the pursuit of that work on an 
intensive and continuous basis without any 
interim delay. 

I must call to your attention the fact that 
the attitude of the Congress toward these 
negotiations — and therefore the mandate 
they will be willing to give our negotiators — 
will be influenced by the manner in which 
we are able to settle in coming months some 
outstanding issues with our trading partners. 
We have already reached satisfactory agree- 
ments recently with some of our major trad- 
ing partners to eliminate longstanding trade 
restrictions inconsistent with the GATT. 
This has been a very positive development 
and clearly demonstrates to domestic observ- 
ers that the GATT does work. There are, 
nonetheless, some other issues pending at this 
time. We view the settlement of these issues 
as an indication of the confidence we can have 
in the ability of the international community 
to reach an agreement on a more open and 
improved world trading order, and we know 
that it is essential to demonstrate the basis 
for this confidence to the Congress. 

U.S. Approach to the Negotiations 

In a few words, the U.S. approach to these 
negotiations will be based on the following 
ideas : 

1. We desire to expand the opportunities 
for international trade and are willing to 
participate fully in the common effort to 
eliminate or reduce barriers to all trade, 
agricultural or industrial. 

2. We seek an agreement that will l)e ben- 
eficial to all the participants and recognized 
as such by them. This will require that the 
agreement be balanced from the standpoint 
of each participant. However, we believe that 
to insist on a balance in every individual 
component of every agreement is unnecessary 
and would undesirably limit what can be 
achieved. 



October 8, 1973 



449 



3. We believe that there should be a sub- 
stantial expansion of duty-free trade as well 
as a substantial reduction in the average tar- 
iff on the remaining dutiable items. 

4. We consider it one of the main objec- 
tives of these negotiations to remove as many 
nontariif barriers as possible and to reduce 
as far as possible those that cannot be re- 
moved. 

5. Reduction of barriers to agricultural 
trade is a major goal, and negotiations to 
that end should move forward together with 
negotiations on industrial products. We 
should agree that where we find domestic 
actions necessary to assist our own farmers, 
those actions should not be of a kind that in- 
jure farmers in other countries. 

6. We believe that the maximum liberali- 
zation of trade will be achieved if we can 
agree on a multilateral safeguard system that 
will allow governments to take appropriate 
actions when a rapid rise of imports threat- 
ens to disrupt domestic production in a 
particular industry but at the same time will 
assure that such measures will not be any 
broader or continued any longer than neces- 
sary for the domestic adjustment process. 

7. We have an open mind about the spe- 
cific techniques or arrangements to be em- 
ployed in achieving the common goals of the 
negotiations. 

8. We are eager to see the negotiations 
begin promptly and proceed rapidly and 
pledge our maximum cooperation to that 
goal. 

We look to the Trade Negotiations Com- 
mittee (TNC) to play an important role in 
guiding these negotiations toward their de- 
sired ends. We hope that the TNC will be- 
gin its work as soon as possible, setting up 
procedures for subgroups, and moving them 
promptly toward continuous, effective work 
on the substance of the negotiations. We hope 
that the participating governments can focus 
on trade negotiating plans, undertake the 
basic analytical work which needs to be done 
at the earliest possible date, and begin this 
l)rocess in the TNC no later than Novem- 
ber 1. Once we have begun, we should work 



in earnest, continuously, so that the target of 
finishing in 1975 can be met. 

In our view, the declaration negotiated by 
the preparatory committee in July represents 
a sound basis for beginning these negotia- 
tions and provides useful political guidance 
for our negotiators to follow. While we rec- 
ognize that there are some disagreements 
with the declaration based on specific points 
of substance or emphasis, the declaration 
does provide a framework for achieving ends 
desirable to us all. To translate that declara- 
tion into change in our trade relations is the 
task which will be before us throughout these 
negotiations. 

The progress we all want in these nego- 
tiations can only be accomplished by a joint 
effort in which all of us make appropriate 
contributions and receive appropriate bene- 
fits. Let this Declaration of Tokyo serve as 
a starting point and a point of inspiration. 
Let the vision which has in the past inspired 
nations to achieve great goals guide us in a 
common effort to construct a durable order 
that will contribute to international harmony 
and prosperity for us and for future genera- 
tions. 



TEXT OF TOKYO DECLARATION 

1. The Ministers, having considered the report of 
the Preparatory Committee for the Trade Negotia- 
tions and having noted that a number of govern- 
ments have decided to enter into comprehensive 
multilateral trade negotiations in the framework of 
GATT and that other governments have indicated 
their intention to make a decision as soon as possi- 
ble, declare the negotiations officially open. Those 
governments which have decided to negotiate have 
notified the Director-General of GATT to this effect, 
and the Ministers agree that it will be open to any 
other government, through a notification to the 
Director-General, to participate in the negotiations. 
The Ministers hope that the negotiations will in- 
volve the active participation of as many countries 
as possible. They expect the negotiations to be en- 
gaged effectively as rapidly as possible, and that, 
to that end, the governments concerned will have 
such authority as may be required. 

2. The negotiations shall aim to: 

— achieve the expansion and ever-greater liberal- 
ization of world trade and improvement in the stand- 
ard of living and welfare of the people of the 



450 



Department of State Bulletin 



world, objectives which can be achieved, inter alia, 
through the progressive dismantling of obstacles to 
trade and the improvement of the international 
framework for the conduct of world trade. 

— secure additional benefits for the international 
trade of developing countries so as to achieve a sub- 
stantial increase in their foreign exchange earnings, 
the diversification of their exports, the acceleration 
of the rate of growth of their trade, taking into 
account their development needs, an improvement 
in the possibilities for these countries to partici- 
pate in the expansion of world trade and a better 
balance as between developed and developing coun- 
tries in the sharing of tlie advantages resulting from 
this expansion, through, in the largest possible 
measure, a substantial improvement in the condi- 
tions of access for the products of interest to the 
developing countries and, wherever appropriate, 
measures designed to attain stable, equitable and 
remunerative prices for primary products. 

To this end, co-ordinated efforts shall be made to 
solve in an equitable way the trade problems of all 
participating countries, taking into account the 
specific trade problems of the developing countries. 

3. To this end, the negotiations should aim, inter 
alia, to: 

(a) conduct negotiations on tariffs by employ- 
ment of appropriate formulae of as general appli- 
cation as possible; 

(b) reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, 
where this is not appropriate, to reduce or elimi- 
nate their trade restricting or distorting effects, and 
to bring such measures under more effective inter- 
national discipline; 

(c) include an examination of the possibilities 
for the co-ordinated reduction or elimination of all 
barriers to trade in selected sectors as a comple- 
mentary technique; 

(d) include an examination of the adequacy of 
the multilateral safeguard system, considering par- 
ticularly the modalities of application of Article 
XIX, with a view to furthering trade liberalization 
and preserving its results; 

(e) include, as regards agriculture, an approach 
to negotiations which, while in line with the general 
objectives of the negotiations, should take account 
of the special characteristics and problems in this 
sector ; 

(f) treat tropical products as a special and pri- 
ority sector. 

4. The negotiations shall cover tariflfs, non-tariff 
barriers and other measures which impede or dis- 
tort international trade in both industrial and agri- 
cultural products, including tropical products and 
raw materials, whether in primary form or at any 
stage of processing including in particular products 
of export interest to developing countries and meas- 
ures affecting their exports. 

5. The negotiations shall be conducted on the 



basis of the principles of mutual advantage, mutual 
commitment and overall reciprocity, while observ- 
ing the most-favourod-nation clause, and consistently 
with the provisions of the General Agreement re- 
lating to such negotiations. Participants shall jointly 
endeavour in the negotiations to achieve, by appro- 
priate methods, an overall balance of advantage at 
the highest possible level. The developed countries 
do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by 
them in the negotiations to reduce or remove tariff 
and other barriers to the trade of developing coun- 
tries, i.e., the developed countries do not expect the 
developing countries, in the course of the trade 
negotiations, to make contributions which are in- 
consistent with their individual development, finan- 
cial and trade needs. The Ministers recognize the 
need for special measures to be taken in the nego- 
tiations to assist the developing countries in their 
efforts to increase their export earnings and pro- 
mote their economic development and, where appro- 
priate, for priority attention to be given to products 
or areas of interest to developing countries. They 
also recognize the importance of maintaining and 
improving the Generalized System of Preferences. 
They further recognize the importance of the appli- 
cation of differential measures to developing coun- 
tries in ways which will provide special and more 
favourable treatment for them in areas of the ne- 
gotiation where this is feasible and appropriate. 

(5. The Ministers recognize that the particular sit- 
uation and problems of the least developed among 
the developing countries shall be given special atten- 
tion, and stress the need to ensure that these coun- 
tries receive special treatment in the context of any 
general or specific measures taken in favour of the 
developing countries during the negotiations. 

7. The policy of liberalizing world trade cannot 
be carried out successfully in the absence of parallel 
efforts to set up a monetary system which shields 
the world economy from the shocks and imbalances 
which have previously occurred. The Ministers will 
not lose sight of the fact that the efforts which are 
to be made in the trade field imply continuing efforts 
to maintain orderly conditions and to establish a 
durable and equitable monetary system. 

The Ministers recognize equally that the new 
phase in the liberalization of trade which it is their 
intention to undertake should facilitate the orderly 
functioning of the monetary system. 

The Ministers recognize that they should bear 
these considerations in mind both at the opening 
of and throughout the negotiations. Efforts in these 
two fields will thus be able to contribute effectively 
to an improvement of international economic rela- 
tions, taking into account the special characteristics 
of the economies of the developing countries and 
their problems. 

8. The negotiations shall be considered as one 
undertaking, the various elements of which shall 
move forward together. 



October 8, 1973 



451 



9. Support is reaffirmed for the principles, rules 
and disciplines provided for under the General 
Agreement." Consideration shall be given to im- 
provements in the international framework for the 
conduct of world trade which might be desirable 
in the light of progress in the negotiations and, in 
this endeavour, care shall be taken to ensure that 
any measures introduced as a result are consistent 
with the overall objectives and principles of the 
trade negotiations and particularly of trade liberali- 
zation. 

10. A Trade Negotiations Committee is estab- 
lished, with authority, taking into account the pres- 
ent Declaration, inter alia: 

(a) to elaborate and put into effect detailed trade 
negotiating plans and to establish appropriate nego- 
tiating procedures, including special procedures for 
the negotiations between developed and developing 
countries; 

(b) to supervise the progress of the negotiations. 

The Trade Negotiations Committee shall be open 
to participating governments.- The Trade Negotia- 
tions Committee shall hold its opening meeting not 
later than 1 November 1973. 

11. The Ministers intend that the trade negotia- 
tions be concluded in 1975. 



Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 28th U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the 
nominations of the following to be Repre- 
sentatives and Alternate Representatives of 
the United States to the 28th session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations: 
Repre.fentatii'es 
John A. Scali 
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 
William F. Buckley, Jr. 
John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Representative 

from the State of Alabama 
Robert N. C. Nix, U.S. Representative from 
the State of Pennsylvania 

Alternate Representatives 
Margaret B. Young 
Mark Evans 

William E. Schaufele, Jr. 
Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr. 
Richard M. Scammon 



' This does not necessarily represent the views 
of representatives of countries not now parties to 
the General Agreement. [Footnotes in original.] 

- Including the European Communities. 



U.S. Welcomes Signing of Protocols 
Implementing Lao Peace Agreement 

Folloioing is a U.S. statement issued at 
Washington and Vientiane on September H, 
together with the text of a message from 
President Nixon to Prince Souvanmi Phou- 
ma, Prime Minister of Laos. 

U.S. GOVERNMENT STATEMENT 

Press release 331 dated September 14 

The United States welcomes the successful 
completion of the negotiations on the imple- 
menting protocols to carry out the February 
21, 1973, Agreement on the Restoration of 
Peace and Reconciliation in Laos. 

We hope the agreement will secure the 
peace and freedom from aggression for which 
Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and Lao 
people have sacrificed so much in years past. 

The United States stands ready to continue 
cooperation and assistance to the new pro- 
visional government which is expected to 
be formed shortly in Laos. 

The United States will, of course, be guided 
by the provisions of the agreement and its 
implementing protocols and by the wishes 
of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and 
the new provisional government. We expect 
all other parties to do the same and to re- 
spect the sovereignty of Laos. 

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON 
TO PRINCE SOUVANNA PHOUMA 

Your Highness: On behalf of the American 
people, I am pleased to congratulate you on the 
successful completion of negotiations to carry out 
the February 21, 1973 Agreement on the Restora- 
tion of Peace and Reconciliation in Laos. On this 
historic occasion, allow me again to assure you that 
the United States will continue to support your 
efforts to perfect the neutrality, independence and 
unity of the Lao Kingdom. 

The protocol which has just been signed will, I 
earnestly hope, secure the peace and freedom from 
aggression for which you and your people have 
sacrificed so much in years past. For our part, the 
actions of the United States Government with re- 
spect to Laos will, of course, be guided by the pro- 



452 



Department of State Bulletin 



visions of the agreement and the wishes of the new 
provisional government under your leadership. We 
expect that others who have participated in this 
conflict similarly will keep faith with all aspects 
of the Lao Accords and we are resolved that hence- 
forth the sovereignty of your country shall be uni- 
versally respected. 

The path to peace and national reconciliation has, 
I know, not been easy. I am truly gratified that 
your steadfast pursuit of these goals has culmi- 
nated in the agreement just signed, and I am 
confident that with your persistent and vigilant 
leadership and the support of all true Lao national- 
ists, you will surely surmount whatever diflSculties 
may lie ahead. As you set about implementing this 
new agreement, you can be sure that the United 
States is as ready to support you in assuring peace 
and healing the wounds of war as we were in as- 
sisting with your self-defense. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon. 



United Nations Day, 1973 

A PROCLAMATION' 
Each year the peoples of the world celebrate Oc- 
tober 24 as United Nations Day, recalling the date 
in 1945 when the United Nations Charter came into 
force. This is an appropriate occasion for people 
everywhere to renew their adherence to the Charter 
ideals of peace and human rights, and their deter- 
mination to promote economic and social progress 
and a greater measure of justice and freedom for 
all. 

This year the anniversary occurs at a time of 
dramatic change in world afl^airs. We sense the 
promise of a more peaceful world and the oppor- 
tunity for new strides in international cooperation. 

As the world climate improves, the prospects will 
grow for using the United Nations to alleviate po- 
litical disputes and for broadening its constructive 
activity in the social, economic and technological 
fields. 

In some areas, international cooperation is already 
a longstanding tradition— moving the international 
mails, regulating international communications and 
transportation, preventing the worldwide spread of 
disease, developing international standards of prac- 
tice in labor, and many others. 



More recently, the United Nations and other in- 
ternational agencies have begun to work in other 
preas— devising safeguards, for example, for the 
production of nuclear energy and rules concerning 
man's use of cuter space; extending the rule of 
law over the exploitation of the oceans; protecting 
the environment; protecting the rights of i-pfugees 
and prisoners of war; and inhibiting the interna- 
tional traflnc in narcotic drugs. Efforts are also un- 
derway to cope with the problems of population 
growth and with the hijacking of aircraft and other 
forms of international terrorism. 

In the years ahead the growing interdependence 
of nations will inevitably require international in- 
stitutions to be even more effective in dealing with 
this new agenda. We need to create new arrange- 
ments to control new technologies for the common 
good. We must bridge the interests of rich and poor 
countries on matters of trade and aid. We must 
facilitate the exchange of technical and scientific 
knowledge and encourage modes of cooperative be- 
havior which will permit nations to live together 
in concord. 

Within this framework I hope all Americans will 
continue to appreciate and analyze, soberly and 
realistically, the benefits they and all peoples gain 
from international cooperation — within the United 
Nations and other institutions — to meet the chal- 
lenges of the modern world. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby designate 
Wednesday, October 24, 1973, as United Nations 
Day. I urge the citizens of this Nation to observe 
that day with community programs which will pro- 
mote understanding and support for the United 
Nations and its affiliated agencies. 

I have appointed Donald S. MacNaughton to be 
United States National Chairman for United Na- 
tions Day and, through him, I call upon State and 
local officials to encourage citizens' groups and agen- 
cies of communication— press, radio, television, and 
motion pictures— to engage in appropriate observ- 
ances of United Nations Day in cooperation with 
the United Nations Association of the United States 
of America and other interested organizations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this fourth day of September, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred and ninety-eighth. 



■No. 4240; 38 Fed. Reg. 24193. 



C/ZjL^'-TC:^ 



October 8, 1973 



453 



Cooperation To Meet the World's Energy Needs 



Address by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 



Last week in Tokyo 101 nations embarked 
on a broad cooperative effort to expand 
world trade by scaling down barriers. 

Next week at Nairobi 126 nations will re- 
view and set the future course of a broad 
cooperative effort to reform the world mon- 
etary system. 

Today, at international meetings of this 
type, a great deal of the discussion in the 
corridors and before and after plenary ses- 
sions turns to energy and how to assure an 
adequate supply to meet the world's grow- 
ing needs at prices which will not prove dam- 
aging to trade, monetary stability, and 
consumer living standards. 

In the discussion on all three of these 
vital subjects, trade, money, and energy, 
there is a common need to arrive at an 
agreed system which will distribute burdens 
among nations and avoid the kind of heavy 
pressure which can disrupt the system. 

In the trade negotiations, we look for a 
safeguard system to provide time for firms 
to adjust to sharp breakthroughs in tech- 
nology or other forces suddenly altering 
patterns of trade. 

In a monetary system, we need an adjust- 
ment process which will provide assurances 
that both surplus and deficit nations will al- 
ter either exchange rates or economic pol- 
icies promptly enough to bring their reserves 
and currencies into line and avoid distortions 
to trade. The adjustment process must also 
operate gradually enough and with enough 
predictability as to time and unpredictabil- 



' Made at Washington on Sept. 18 before the 
conference for corporation executives on "The 
Mounting Energy Crisis and the Middle East" 
sponsored by the Johns Hopkins University School 
of Advanced International Studies. 



ity as to method to make speculation on ex- 
change rate changes less attractive in the 
future than it has been in the past. 

The structure of international cooperation 
is not as well developed in energy matters 
as it is in trade and monetary matters. But 
the need has become manifest to most na- 
tions, both consumers and producers. Work 
has begun to define how international coop- 
eration can reduce the risk of disruption 
and provide the basis for diversifying and 
expanding our sources of energy. 

In energy, each nation has different as- 
sets. These assets will be natural, technolog- 
ical, financial, and managerial. The really 
important cooperation will be to determine 
together, frequently on an ad hoc basis, how 
those assets can most effectively be combined 
to meet specific and agreed-upon common 

needs. 

To provide a basis for this kind of coop- 
eration among governments, companies, and 
technologies, several types of broad coopera- 
tion can be useful. First, there is the sharing 
of oil in an emergency. This is something 
we and the European nations did on an ad 
hoc basis when the Suez Canal was closed 
in 1956 and for a while after the six-day 
Arab-Israeli war in 1967. The international 
oil companies which bring most of the oil 
out of the Middle East, Africa, and South 
America have an obligation to treat their 
customers equitably. The economies of the 
major energj' consumers — Europe, the 
United States, and Japan— have become so 
interdependent that a sharp reduction in 
energy supply inflicted on any one of them 
would automatically inflict damage by dis- 
rupting the trade, the supply sources, and 
the markets of the others. So we can view ' 



454 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



an equitable emergency sharing arrangement 
as a safeguard in the energy trade which can 
build confidence and lead to cooperation in 
other areas. 

An emergency oil-sharing plan has been 
in effect among European nations for 17 
years without being called upon. What we 
are now studying, along with the European 
nations and Japan, Canada, and Australia, 
is extending the existing emergency sharing 
plan to other members of the OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] . 

This broader emergency sharing plan can 
be viewed as a modest step toward dealing 
with the prospect of supply and price insta- 
bility in a world which finds its economic 
growth dependent on what appears to be a 
finite and dwindling reservoir of liquid and 
gaseous hydrocarbons. All consumers are 
deeply concerned about a tendency of some 
countries to take without adequate compen- 
sation, and contrary to commitments, the 
oil-producing properties which private oil 
companies discovered and developed and to 
sharply increase the price at which this oil 
can be marketed to consumers. 

These policies may bring shortrun ad- 
vantages but, as the more experienced lead- 
ers of the oil-producing governments see 
clearly, they are counterproductive and likely 
to undermine the ability of the oil-producing 
governments to build a diversified and sus- 
tainable economic future for their people. 

Filling U.S. Energy Requirements 

I Although the world will have to count 
I heavily on the rich oil reserves of the Per- 
' sian Gulf for the remainder of this century, 
it is clear that no time can be lost in supple- 
menting them. The United States has the 
ingredients to meet its own energy require- 
ments over time. As the oil-producing states 
, increase prices, alternative sources of energy 
li will become economic more swiftly, the 
search for oil and gas in the United States 
and offshore will be intensified, and wasteful 
uses of energy will be eliminated more vigor- 
ously. 



The United States sits in the same position 
in hard hydrocarbons as the Middle East 
does on oil. We have almost half the coal re- 
serves in the world. Of the almost 2 trillion 
barrels of oil locked up in shale deposits in 
Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming, a recent re- 
port of the National Petroleum Council in- 
dicates that over 100 billion barrels can 
produce crude oil at $6 a barrel. 

At that level, we can get synthetic natural 
gas and oil from coal by processes signifi- 
cantly advanced over those which converted 
coal into gas to fly Hitler's planes and roll 
his tanks a quarter of a century ago. 

That level would bring gas to the tanks 
of American motorists at lower prices than 
European and .Taiwanese motorists pay to- 
day. It would also generate design changes 
and habit changes which would slow down 
the rate at which our energy consumption 
is growing. 

Before we reach that level, the higher 
prices already being telegraphed from the oil- 
producing capitals, together with the tax and 
wellhead price incentives President Nixon 
has called for, will find us a lot of additional 
gas and oil offshore and onshore in the 
United States and elsewhere in the world. 

While this is going on, a $10 billion re- 
search and development program funded by 
the Federal Government, together with cor- 
porate laboratories and pilot plants, will be 
working to make energy from coal more 
economic, more efficient, and more environ- 
mentally acceptable and to aug nent and 
ultimately replace hydrocarbon ;nergy with 
the atom and the sun. In much of this, we 
will be improving and adapting known tech- 
nology'. As for the rest, we will be betting 
on the qualities that split the atom in four 
years, created synthetic rubber in less than 
that, and put a man on the moon in nine 
years. 

Much of the talk about the energy crisis, 
the wringing of hands about the shortages 
and the enormous balance of payments bur- 
dens ahead, has failed to recognize the de- 
gree to which we do have destiny in our 
hands. The National Petroleum Council last 
year took a look at our energy needs and the 



October 8, 1973 



455 



various ways to meet them between now 
and 1985. It assumed that there would be an 
average 4.2 percent increase in annual de- 
mand for energy in the United States. This 
is some 16 percent greater than the 3.6 per- 
cent actual growth rate which we experi- 
enced between 1955 and 1970. 

Projecting a continuation of present price 
and environmental restraints on the growth 
in output of all fuels, and no better than the 
recent level of activity and success in oil and 
gas exploratory efforts, indicates that 38 
percent of our energj- consumption would 
have to come from oil and gas imports by 
1985. But on a more optimistic outlook, over- 
coming environmental obstacles to bringing 
in Alaskan oil, nuclear power, and synthetic 
fuels, availability of more offshore sites and 
government land for exploration, better eco- 
nomic incentives, and success in locating un- 
discovered oil and gas, we would depend on 
imported gas and oil for only 11 percent of 
our energj' requirements for 1985. 

President Nixon has already taken or rec- 
ommended steps which go a long way to 
establish the conditions needed for a vigor- 
ous effort to get these results. The difference 
between the optimistic and the pessimistic 
projection is $24 billion in additional annual 
balance of payments outflow in 12 years. On 
the optimistic projection, our energy balance 
of payments deficit would be about $7 billion, 
not alarmingly more than it is running 
today. 

These National Petroleum Council projec- 
tions were based on prices for crude which 
have already been exceeded. This would in- 
crease the balance of payments outflow to 
meet our energy needs, but it can also bring 
out more production from new and existing 
domestic sources than they have projected. 

Possible Changes in Consumption Patterns 

To emphasize further that we do have con- 
trol over our energj' destiny in our own 
hands if we work at it, all we have to do to 
substantially eliminate the need for foreign 
oil and wipe out any balance of payments 
deficit and any supply dependency arising 
from our energy needs would be to bring our 



growth rate in use of energy down to 3.4 
percent, a shade below the 3.6 percent 
growth rate experienced between 1955 and 
1970. 

A report just issued by the California 
Institute of Technology indicates how this 
could be accomplished by a single shift in 
our energy-consuming habits. The automo- 
bile, considered as a total system all the way 
from raw materials through production, dis- 
tribution, roadbuilding, servicing, and re- 
pair, consumes 25 percent of all U.S. primary 
energ>% over 8 million barrels of oil a day, 
or about half of our total use of oil. Auto- 
mobiles consume more energj' than all other 
forms of transportation combined. With the 
addition of trucks and buses, the consump- 
tion of all road vehicles represents about 75 
percent of the overall energy needs for trans- 
portation purposes. Increasing by 10 percent 
a year the production of gas-efficient cars 
(20 miles per gallon or better) would mean 
that in 10 years these cars would represent 
50 percent of the vehicle population. This 
shift would reduce the projected national 
annual energy growth rate from 4.2 to 3.2 
percent over that 10-year period. 

If we do all the other things necessary 
to achieve the optimistic projection of the 
National Petroleum Council, this degi-ee of 
movement toward more gas -efficient cars 
would eliminate our need for oil and gas 
imports. Higher prices in the Middle East 
may already have provided enough impetus 
to bring on smaller and more efficient cars 
at this rate. 

Let's take another example of how we can 
change our energj' consumption pattern. It 
requires almost six times as much energy 
to transport a ton of freight by truck as it 
does by rail. If we convert half of the truck 
haulage to rail freight over the next 10 or 
12 years, the savings in oil would be about 
900,000 barrels per day by 1985. This as- 
sumes that the amount of truck freight will 
grow by some 40 percent during that period 
if not otherwise restrained. 

When I present figures like these, I fully 
appreciate that such major changes in our 
way of life cannot be brought about by ad- 



456 



Department of State Bulletin 



ministrative fiat in our society. The social, 
economic, and logistic alterations required 
would be serious and large. However, our 
situation demands that we examine alterna- 
tives such as these and take the initiatives 
or create the incentives to put some of them 
into effect to a greater or lesser degree. 

Domestic Sources and Substitution 

As I said earlier, there is plenty of oil, 
gas, and coal within our nation's boundaries 
to satisfy our immediate and even many of 
our long-term requirements. It has been 
estimated that 50 percent of the oil and two- 
thirds of the natural gas ultimately dis- 
coverable remain to be found. In addition, 
our domestic coal resources represent an 
asset of great potential value. 

Many variables influence the supplies of 
these domestic sources of energj' that can 
be developed. Some of the most probable 
areas for new reserves are located on Fed- 
eral land or controlled by the government. 
The administration has already initiated 
action to permit the eventual development 
of these resources. Another major deter- 
minant is the price level of alternative fuels 
required to make their development and pro- 
duction economically feasible. As I indicated 
earlier, the price constraint seems to be de- 
creasing in importance as the cost of im- 
ported oil continues to rise. This should 
stimulate a substantial increase in explora- 
tion for new gas and oil. 

I have mentioned the possibility of sub- 
stituting one primary energj^ source for 
another. One possibility would be to stream- 
line and accelerate the rate at which nuclear 
power plants could be brought on line. A 
look at this by the Atomic Energy- Commis- 
sion indicates that if the present projection 
of 300,000 megawatts of installed nuclear 
electric generating capacity by 1985 could 
be increased by 50 percent, annual oil im- 
ports by that year could be reduced by one- 
third. Oil and electricity are not completely 
interchangeable, so the substitution cannot 
be pushed too far, and it would have to ac- 
commodate public concerns about environ- 
mental and safetv risks. 



Alternatives to Conventional Gas and Oil 

I also want to say a few words about al- 
ternatives to conventional gas and oil. The 
recent sharp increase in the price of oil 
does have certain positive aspects. One of 
these is its eflfect as a stimulant to the de- 
velopment of domestic substitutes for con- 
ventional fuels. 

Much has been said recently about revert- 
ing to coal in place of oil for certain uses. 
This is certainly feasible, provided that our 
environmental concerns can be accommo- 
dated. We have several options available to 
us in this area which could, in the next 
few years, result in a significant shift back 
to the use of this, our most abundant fuel 
resource. It has been estimated that an ac- 
celeration in the current rate of mining 
would provide us with an additional 15 mil- 
lion tons of coal by 1975. Opening new mines 
in presently exploited areas and in the West 
could give us an additional 40 to 50 million 
tons in the next few years. Obviously, capital 
investment costs in this case would be sub- 
stantial, but current prices may now make 
this economically justifiable. We would also 
have serious environmental concerns at such 
a sharp increase in the use of this essentially 
"dirty" fuel, but recent technological ad- 
vances in the desulfurization of coal and the 
substantially increased research funds com- 
mitted to coal research should help us meet 
these legitimate concerns. 

In a somewhat longer time frame, the 
numerous research projects now underway 
for conversion of coal to pipeline gas or high- 
quality synthetic crude oil show great prom- 
ise of providing us with significant quantities 
of clean energy in the post-1977 period. 

An additional source, which has not been 
used commercially in the United States, is 
oil shale. Our deposits are mainly in the 
West and are estimated to contain the equiv- 
alent of 600 billion barrels of oil, of which 
80 billion barrels are fairly accessible. The 
technological development to produce oil 
from shale has reached the pilot plant stage. 
The Department of the Interior earlier this 
month announced the completion of a lengthy 
environmental impact study. Secretary 



October 8, 1973 



457 



[Rogers C. B.] Morton is now considering 
whether to permit the leasing of Federal 
lands for an experimental commercial pro- 
gram. It is estimated that if a favorable de- 
cision is made, the first commercial plant 
would be on stream by 1977 producing about 
250,000 barrels a day. If the environmental 
effects of this limited program indicate that 
full-scale production would not result in un- 
acceptable long-term damage to the ecology 
of the region, a full-scale oil shale production 
program could be providing us with as much 
as 2 million barrels a day by 1985. 

International Technology and Capital 

The major consuming nations have tech- 
nological and capital resources. The U.S. 
Government has inventoried the areas in 
which additional research and development 
effort seems capable of bringing on addi- 
tional sources of oil and gas and power, of 
making energy sources safer and more en- 
vironmentally acceptable, of conserving on 
the use of energy and making it more effi- 
cient. We are working with other nations 
in the OECD to develop a catalogue of such 
prospects to which other nations can con- 
tribute and which will help identify where 
contributions to the effective development of 
these projects are most likely to be found. 
We are preparing to review these prospects 
with other governments and consider coop- 
erative research and development projects 
where they seem promising. We already 
have a number of joint research and develop- 
ment projects underway. 

We encourage similar activities on the 
part of corporations involved in energy pro- 
duction and conservation and are interested 
in their views on how public policy can ac- 
celerate their progress. Similarly, we are 
encouraging, and where appropriate facili- 
tating, joint ventures between governments 
and companies to apply capital and know- 
how to exploration and transportation proj- 
ects which seem likely to find oil and gas 
onshore or offshore and bring it to markets. 

To meet our energj- needs and attain 
greater self-sufficiency will require enoi'mous 
amounts of capital, upward of $300 billion 



over the next 10 or 12 years. These efforts 
will be reflected in our capital markets, and 
one major task we face is to see that these 
projects and our capital markets are devel- 
oped in a way which makes them attractive 
to oil-producing states seeking long-term as- 
sets to replace the wealth they take out of 
the ground. They have farsighted leaders 
who see that their young people will live in 
a world in which oil will share the burden of 
meeting the world's needs with other sources 
of energ>^ They want to diversify their econ- 
omies and to endow their people with some 
participation in the broader world energy 
system which the future requires. 

This process is in progress right now. 
Many of the world's companies and entre- 
preneurs are busy analyzing the low-cost 
fuel gas and feedstocks available in the Mid- 
dle East to determine the feasibility of put- 
ting capital and know-how to work there to 
bring fertilizer, petrochemicals, and various 
energy-intensive products to world markets. 

It is our policy to encourage and facilitate 
this process as an essential element in a 
worldwide bargain in which all of us work 
for more and better energj' and move to- 
gether to a more diversified participation in 
a broadening and more satisfactory world 
economy. 

Obviously, the United States — given the 
sheer magnitude of our demand for energy, 
almost one-third of total world consump- 
tion — does not need nor want to be com- 
pletely without foreign oil. However, by 
focusing harder on domestic oil and gas pro- 
duction and accelerating the development of 
alternative or new sources of energy, our de- 
pendence on imports can be kept under con- 
trol. We need an aggressive attack on these 
problems now, integrating action by all sec- 
tors of our society — government, business, 
and the consumer. The President has indi- 
cated the direction this administration be- 
lieves we should take. The total cooperation 
of American industry is essential to the 
achievement of our objectives. I hope your 
discussions today and tomorrow contribute to 
an understanding of the role you must play 
and the urgency of our common task. 



458 



Department of State Bulletin 



Import Quotas for Nonfat Dry Milk 
Increased by President Nixon 

A PROCLAMATION' 
Amending Part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States With Respect 
TO the Importation of Agricultiiral Commod- 
ities 

Whereas, pursuant to section 22 of the Agricul- 
tural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), 
limitations have been imposed by Presidential proc- 
lamations on the quantities of certain dairy products 
which may be imported into the United States in 
any quota year; and 

Whereas, the import restrictions proclaimed pur- 
suant to said section 22 are set forth in part 3 of the 
Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United 
States; and 

Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture has re- 
ported to me that he believes that additional quan- 
tities of dried milk provided for in item 950.02 of 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States (here- 
inafter referred to as "nonfat dry milk") may be 
entered for a temporary period without rendering 
or tending to render ineffective or materially in- 
terfering with, the price support program now con- 
ducted by the Department of Agriculture for milk 
or reducing substantially the amount of products 
processed in the United States from domestic milk; 
and 

Whereas, under the authority of section 22, I 
have requested the United States Tariff Commis- 
sion to make an investigation with respect to this 
matter; and 

Whereas, the Secretary of Agriculture has de- 
termined and reported to me that a condition exists 
with respect to nonfat dry milk which requires 
emergency treatment and that the quantitative lim- 
itation imposed on nonfat di-y milk should be in- 
creased during the period ending October 31, 1973, 
without awaiting the recommendations of the United 
States Tariff Commission with respect to such ac- 
tion ; and 

WiH"r.i,«s, I find and declare that the entry during 
the period ending October 31, 1973, of an additional 
quantity of 100,000,000 pounds of nonfat dry milk 
will not render or tend to render ineffective, or ma- 
terially interfere with, the price support program 
which is being undertaken by the Department of 
Agriculture for milk and will not reduce substan- 
tially the amount of products processed in the 
United States from domestic milk; and that a con- 
dition exists which requires emergency treatment 
and that the quantitative limitation imposed on non- 
fat dry milk should be increased during such period 



without awaiting the recommendations of the United 
States Tariff Commission with respect to such 
action ; 

Now, TiiERfiFOiu-:, I, Richard Nixon, President 
of the United States of America, acting under and 
by virtue of the authority vested in me as President, 
and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, 
and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby 
proclaim that subdivision (vi) of headnote 3(a) of 
part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of 
the United States is amended to read as follows: 

(vi) Notwithstanding any other provision of 
this part, 25,000,000 pounds of dried milk de- 
scribed in item 115.50 may be entered during the 
period beginning December 30, 1972, and ending 
February 15, 1973, 60,000,000 pounds of such 
milk may be entered during the period begin- 
ning May 11, 1973, and ending June 30, 1973, 
80,000,000 pounds of such milk may be entered 
during the period beginning July 19, 1973, and 
ending August 31, 1973. and 100,000,000 pounds 
of such milk may be entered during the period 
beginning the day after the date of issuance of 
this proclamation and ending October 31, 1973, 
in addition to the annual quota quantity speci- 
fied for such article under item 950.02, and im- 
port licenses shall not be required for entering 
such additional quantities. No individual, part- 
nership, firm, corporation, association, or other 
legal entity (including its afl^liates or subsid- 
iaries) may during each such period enter pur- 
suant to this provision quantities of such addi- 
tional dried milk totaling in excess of 2.500,000 
pounds. The 100,000,000 pound additional quota 
quantity authorized to be entered during the 
period ending October 31, 1973, shall be allo- 
cated among supplying countries as follows: 
Siiiiiili/iiia Cuniitin Quantity in Pounds 

Australia 25,000,000 

New Zealand 25,000,000 

Canada 10,000,000 

Member States of the European 

Economic Community 40,000,000 

The 100,000,000 pound additional quota quantity 
provided for herein shall continue in effect pend- 
ing Presidential action upon receipt of the report 
and recommendations of the Tariff Commission with 
respect thereto. 

In Witness Whereof. I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-eighth day of August, in the year 
of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-three, and 
of the Independence of the United States of America 
the one hundred ninety-eighth. 



"No. 4238; 38 Fed. Reg. 23309. 



(^Zj^^Hjy^ 



October 8, 1973 



459 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses Legislation To Modify Antitrust Exemptions 
for Service Industries in Export Trade 



Statement by Willis C. Armstrong 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Btisiness Affairs ' 



I appreciate the opportunity to discuss 
with you Senate bills S. 1483 and S. 1774, 
which would amend the Export Trade Act 
of 1918 and the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. The former act is known as the Webb- 
Pomerene Act, and that is the designation 

I will use in my testimony. I will first deal 
with the substance of these bills and then 
proceed to a discussion of the operation of 
foreign export cartels, in which the commit- 
tee in its letter of July 19, 1973, has ex- 
pressed a particular interest. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand that this 
hearing is to be directed to S. 1483 and title 

II of S. 1774, as they generally pertain to 
antitrust exemptions of the Webb-Pomerene 
Act. The Department supports the concept 
behind these bills, which is to modernize our 
legislation concerning export a.ssociations. 

S. 1483 and title II of S. 1774 would ex- 
pand the scope of the antitrust exemptions 
of the Webb-Pomerene Act from the current 
coverage of the export trade in goods, wares, 
and merchandise by including what are gen- 
erally termed the service industries. S. 1483 
would also remove the criminal penalty and 
treble damage sections of the antitrust pro- 
visions as they relate to the export activities 
of as.sociations formed under the Webb-Pom- 
erene Act. Title II of S. 1774 would accom- 
plish the same purpose through the 



' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Com- 
meiTO on Sept. 0. The complete transcript of the 
hearinps will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20402. 



establishment of a registration procedure 
which would clearly define the operational 
limits of such associations. Associations 
meeting the definitional requirements would 
be exempted from our antitrust laws so long 
as they act within the scope of the registra- 
tion statement. This title also makes a slight 
change in the extent of antitrust exemptions 
for approved associations in export trade. 
Thus, the present act exempts Webb-Pomer- 
ene associations from antitrust action un- 
less their acts and practices are in restraint 
of trade within the United States or in re- 
straint of the export trade of U.S. nonmem- 
bers. Title II of S. 1774 would exempt 
associations unless their acts or practices 
were in "substantial" restraint of trade 
within the United States or in substantial 
restraint of the export trade of U.S. non- 
members. 

Clarification of Definitions and Jurisdiction 

The Department of State finds either the 
S. 1483 or S. 1774 aijproach acceptable but 
would prefer that taken in S. 1774 because 
it would provide a more uniform, clearly 
defined structure. The Department endorses 
the extension of Webb-Pomerene protection 
to the service industries listed in S. 1774. 
This bill would clearly permit firms in these 
industries to act jointly in such areas as pre- 
liminary studies, feasibility studies, and bid 
preparation, as do many of their foreigr 
competitors at the present time. 

Webb-Pomerene associations have not been! 
widely used in the past. Reasons given bj 



460 



Department of State Bulletir 



U.S. exporters for nonuse of this tool are 
that the parameters within which these as- 
sociations might act have not been as clearly 
defined as business firms would like. Further, 
our exporters say that Webb-Pomerene as- 
sociations have been subject to antitrust 
action by more than one U.S. agency and 
thus potentially subject to differing standards 
of enforcement. S. 1774 would serve to an- 
swer the first of these complaints by estab- 
lishing a uniform registration procedure and 
exempting association actions within the de- 
fined limits of the approved registration from 
antitrust enforcement actions. The second 
complaint is answered by granting exclusive 
jurisdiction to the Federal Trade Commis- 
sion for the first step in most antitrust 
actions again.st approved associations. 

As regards the clarification of jurisdiction, 
this matter is dealt with in section 4 of S. 
1774. Subsection (a) of section 4 grants the 
Federal Trade Commission exclusive juris- 
diction to determine whether export asso- 
ciation acts or practices are in conformance 
with its registration statement. There have 
been some changes in section 4 proposed in 
the revised administration bill to clarify fur- 
ther this question of jurisdiction, which the 
Department of State wishes to support. 

The Department of State would expect that 
several of the service industries will find the 
joint export approach useful and several 
other industries might find the more clearly 
defined structure now permits them to make 
use of the act. We do not, however, view the 
Webb-Pomerene concept as a major solution 
to our international trade problems. Most of 
our vital and competitive industrial sectors 
will continue to find this method of inter- 
national trade inappropriate because of 
product diflFerentiation, high-level specialized 
technology, and individualized sei'vices of- 
fered. The Department of State is convinced 
that competition and innovation in manage- 
ment and iH'oduct will continue to be more 
important factors in improving the U.S. in- 
ternational trade balance. 

Finally, in endorsing S. 1774, the Depart- 
ment of State wishes to emphasize that there 
has been no change in our traditional policy 



in favor of competition. Essentially the 
United States is a free enterprise economy 
in which competition has been a strong stim- 
ulus to productivity and innovation. We be- 
lieve that foreign, like domestic, trade should 
generally be conducted on a competitive 
basis in a free and open world trading sys- 
tem. Our foreign trade policy is consistent 
with U.S. antitrust laws. The intent of these 
laws is to prevent private restraints on our 
foreign commerce. These laws are a logical 
corollary to our foreign trade policy, which 
seeks to reduce both governmental and pri- 
vate restraints on commerce. 



OECD Country Approaches to Export Cartels 

While the Department has a good deal of 
economic and commercial information, un- 
fortunately there is little information on the 
"organization and activities of foreign ex- 
port cartels." In an effort to ascertain the 
reason for the dearth of information and 
source material, the Department commis- 
sioned a research study in 1964 which ex- 
amined all types of cartel activity in Western 
Europe, including domestic cartels, export 
cartels, and international cartels. The study, 
which was carried out by Professor Corwin 
D. Edwards of the University of Oregon, 
found that only a small number of countries 
require the registration of export cartels and 
an even smaller number make public the in- 
formation on these cartels. The United States 
is one of the few countries that does publish 
information on export cartels. As a matter 
of fact, we have found no detailed study of 
the subject comparable to the comprehensive 
report published in 1967 by the Federal 
Trade Commission, which I am sure the 
committee has in its files. 

Another source of information on export 
cartels is the annual reports on developments 
in the antitrust field of the Committee of 
Experts on Restrictive Business Practices 
of the Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development. An OECD "Guide to 
Legislation on Restrictive Business Prac- 
tices" also contains information on laws 
dealing with export cartels. In addition, this 



October 8, 1973 



461 



committee has established a working party 
to study export cartels. The program is rela- 
tively new and has not yet issued any final 
reports or findings. 

We believe the following general informa- 
tion on foreign export cartels and the ap- 
proach of various member states of the 
OECD toward such cartels may be of interest 
to the committee. 

Among the OECD member states, only the 
United States, the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, Japan, and the United Kingdom re- 
quire notification of export agreements or as- 
sociations which have no effect on domestic 
commerce; that is, so-called "pure" export 
cartels. Only the United States and Japan 
disclose this information. Germany does 
publish generalized empirical data. The 
Netherlands and Spain also publish some 
generalized data on certain types of ex- 
empted restrictive activity. 

As the committee knows, under the Webb- 
Pomerene Act, associations of American 
firms registered with the Federal Trade Com- 
mission may undertake cooperative activities 
"for the sole purpose of engaging in export 
trade." They may, for example, agree on 
export prices and terms of sale, act as ex- 
port sales agents, arrange transportation 
and distribution, and engage in joint pro- 
motional activities. On the other hand, Webb- 
Pomerene associations may not restrain 
trade within the United States, restrain the 
export trade of U.S. nonmembers, or "arti- 
ficially or intentionally enhance or depress" 
domestic prices. Further, court decisions 
have prohibited these associations from co- 
operating with foreign firms or cartels with 
respect to such restrictive practices as divi- 
sion of markets and price fixing. Currently 
there are 34 Webb-Pomerene associations. 

Under its Law Against Restraints of Com- 
petition, the Federal Republic of Germany 
approaches this problem very much as the 
United States does. Germany has a relatively 
comprehensive antitrust law which covers 
export activity but then specifically exempts 
much of this activity. "Pure" export associa- 
tions must register with the Federal Cartel 
Office, but these registrations are not made 



public. As of March 1973, the Federal Cartel 
Office reported 64 "pure" export cartels reg- 
istered. The very limited analysis of the Ger- 
man law, which has been in existence only 
since 1957, provides some interesting back- 
ground information on these export cartels. 
Thirty-one of the registered export cartels 
have domestic market shares of more than 
75 percent, thus indicating that the sectors 
utilizing the law might have enough strength 
to operate successfully w-ithout cartels. The 
Federal Cartel Oflice has also found that 
while these associations have engaged in 
the traditional restrictions on pricing, re- 
bates, quotas, and terms of sale, they have 
not made joint efforts to increase efficiency 
by adapting products and marketing to the 
requirements of export markets. 

Japan has also adopted an approach based 
on exemption for export associations. Their 
Anti-Monopoly Act prohibits generally "any 
unreasonable restraint of trade," but the 
Export and Import Trading Act of 1952 
provides an exemption for national export 
cartels. All these cartels must be notified 
to the Minister of International Trade and 
Industry. The Japanese law contains some 
interesting items which must be considei'ed 
in approving these associations in addition 
to the usual concerns over possible violations 
of international treaties and effects on the 
domestic market. The Minister is required to 
consider the interests of the importers or 
enterprises concerned in the country of des- 
tination, injury to international confidence 
in Japanese exporters, and the sound develop- 
ment of export trade. Details of the prod- 
ucts involved, export markets affected, types 
of restrictions agreed upon, and the reasons 
for the establishment of the cartels are pub- 
lished annually. At the end of 1972, Japan 
had 167 export cartels registered. 

The United Kingdom exempts export as- 
sociations in its Restrictive Trade Practices 
Act of 1956. The act states specifically that 
its provisions are not applicable to agree- 
ments which relate solely to exports. All re- 
strictive agreements in the United Kingdom 
must be notified to the government. How- 
ever, the "pure" export cartel notifications 



462 



Department of State Bulletin j 



remain confidential, and there are no legal 
sanctions for failure to register such agree- 
ments. As the United Kingdom does not re- 
quire notification of abandoned agreements 
and revisions may be notified as new agree- 
ments, there is no public measure of the 
number of export cartels currently in opera- 
tion. The only figure available is that there 
have been 288 notifications since the law 
came into effect in 1956. 

Most of the other OECD member countries 
that have antitrust laws exempt "pure" ex- 
port cartels from the application of these 
laws. These include Austria, Canada, Fin- 
land, the Netherlands, France, Norway, 
Spain, and Sweden. The laws of Belgium and 
Denmark provide that any abuses of cartels 
must take place on national territory to come 
under their laws. The laws of Ireland, Lux- 
embourg, and Switzerland are silent with 
regard to joint practices relating to exports. 

Regionally, the treaties of the European 
Communities — the treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community and the 
treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community— are applicable to cartels 
within the Common Market. They do not 
apply to export cartels whose activities re- 
late only to exports from the Common 
Market. 

Supervision of Export Cartels 

Interest has been expressed by the com- 
mittee in the relationship of foreign govern- 
ments to export cartels. This relationship is 
dependent in large part upon the nature of 
the legislation whereby governments super- 
vise or control export cartels. A few ex- 
amples will illustrate this point. 

As noted above, in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, "pure" export cartels are ex- 
emijted from the basic antitrust law. How- 
ever, they must be reported to the Federal 
Cartel Office, and they remain under the su- 
pervision of that Office even though no do- 
mestic restraints are involved. If the export 
cartel abuses the exemption granted to it, the 
Federal Cartel Office may direct the member 
firms of the export association to stop the 
restrictive practice or to amend the export 



agreement, or the Office may invalidate the 
entire association. The control and supervi- 
sion over export associations by the Federal 
Cartel Office is quite similar to that exercised 
by the Federal Trade Commission over Webb- 
Pomerene associations. 

In Japan, export associations come within 
the jurisdiction of the Anti-Monopoly Act 
and the Export and Import Trading Act. 
Since one of the objectives of the latter act 
is to avoid serious impact of Japanese ex- 
ports on the industries of other countries, 
these export associations are generally re- 
garded as playing an important role in Ja- 
pan's trade policy. These associations are 
closely supervised by the Fair Trade Com- 
mission and by the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry, both in terms of possi- 
ble abuses and their contribution to the sound 
development of exports. This contrasts with 
certain other countries where the sujiervision 
is largely in terms of dealing only with 
abuses of export cartels. 

For countries which do not have specific 
in-ovisions in their antitrust laws on export 
associations and do not require any notifica- 
tion of such associations, as for example, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, any 
relationship between governments and their 
export associations would be informal. 

On the matter of relationships between 
foreign cartels and U.S. firms or export as- 
sociations, I can be very brief. U.S. firms or 
Webb-Pomerene export associations are pro- 
hibited by our antitrust laws from establish- 
ing formal relationships with foreign cartels 
or from acting in concert with such cartels. 
In other words, the Webb-Pomerene exemp- 
tion does not apply to international export 
cartels ; that is, arrangements among the ex- 
porters of more than one country. The lead- 
ing case in this respect is the Alkali Case 
(1949), in which the Federal District Court 
said that agreements which divide world 
markets and fix international prices are not 
legitimate activities "in the course of export 
trade," as defined in the Webb-Pomerene 
Act. 

The lack of detailed information on the 
nature and activities of foreign export car- 



October 8, 1973 



463 



tels makes it very difficult to assess the com- 
petitive capabilities of foreign export cartels 
as compared with American export associa- 
tions and the impact of export cartels on the 
ability of the United States to compete in 
world markets. For example, the OECD 
Working Party on Export Cartels concluded 
after a survey of existing export cartels, 
which covered such items as the number of 
participating firms in the cartel, the products 
and markets covered by the cartel, and the 
types of restrictions agreed ui)on, that the 
data available in different OECD member 
countries proved to be either incomparable 
in too many respects or too fragmentary to 
allow the establishment of comparative 
tables. 

As for the competitive impact of export 
cartels on world markets, the data are so 
limited that it is impossible to draw any firm 
conclusions. For example, the Federal Trade 
Commission has estimated that the percent- 
age share of total U.S. exports accounted for 
by Webb-Pomerene associations averaged 
about 2.4 percent during the period 1958-62. 
Currently this percentage has declined to 
about 1-2 percent. In the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the value of exports under the 
German equivalent of the Webb-Pomerene 
Act in 196.5 was estimated at less than 3 per- 
cent of total German exports. A comparable 
estimate for the United Kingdom in 1968 
was 2-5 jiercent of total exiiorts. As far as 
the United States is concerned, even though 
the ratio of cartelized exports to total ex- 
ports is small, nevertheless the export as- 
sociations may have an impact on the 
world market with respect to particular prod- 
ucts. The Federal Trade Commission report 
(1967) does bring out the fact that export 
associations can play an important role as 
bargaining agents for U.S. products where 
there are only a few domestic producers, 
membership coverage by the association is 
high, and the U.S. position in world trade is 
large. Examiiles of such products cited in the 
report include sulfur and motion picture 
films. 

This completes my statement, Mr. Chair- 
man. 



Department Discusses Recent Events 
in Chile and U.S. Policy 

Following is the basic statement for intro- 
ductory remarks made before the Subcom- 
mittee on Inter-American. Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Sep- 
tember 20 by Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant Sec- 
retary for Inter-American Affairs.^ 

I am very happy to appear before this 
committee today and discuss recent events 
in Chile and U.S. policy. Although this is my 
first formal appearance before the committee 
since becoming Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs several months 
ago, I have maintained contact with the 
chairman and have had opportunities to meet 
informally from time to time with other 
members of the committee. 

I appreciate this opportunity to make a few 
opening remarks and will of course be glad 
to try and answer as many questions as you 
may care to ask. I will also be most inter- 
ested in any views you care to express and 
can assure you they will be carefully consid- 
ered. 

There may be some matters you will wish 
to cover that should not be taken up at this 
time in a public session because of the still- 
evolving situation in Chile. However, I want 
you to know that I am prepared to discuss as 
fully and as candidly as I can all pertinent 
issues and if it appears that some of these 
would be inappropriate for public session I 
would be more than willing to continue this 
hearing in executive session. Subsequently, 
of course, we could release publicly all of 
the testimony that did not need to be 
classified. 

If you wish, Mr. Chairman, I am prepared 
to give you a brief summary of the current 
situation in Chile as we understand it, al- 
though I assume that most of the members 
present have a good idea of the general con- 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



464 



Department of State Bulletin 



ditions in the country now and events leading 
up to the coup. 

However, perhaps I should take this op- 
portunity at the outset to comment on false 
charges from some quarters that the U.S. 
CJovernment had advance knowledge of or 
participated in some way in the overthrow 
and death of President Allende. 

Gentlemen, I wish to state as flatly and as 
categorically as I possibly can that we did 
not have advance knowledge of the couj) that 
took place on September 11. In the light of 
what I consider to be some rather imprecise 
rei)orting on the matter, I want to distinguish 
between our receiving reports about the pos- 
sibility of a coup in Chile and our having 
advance knowledge that a coup would take 
place. 

The facts are that we had received many 
reports over a long period of time about the 
possibility of a coup in Chile. Such reports 
and speculations were rife in Chile itself. 
Indeed, President Allende himself had com- 
mented publicly about them, and there was 
even a report in a Santiago daily newspaper 
on September 11 that a coup by the Chilean 
armed forces was scheduled for that very 
day. 

All of the earlier rejsorts that had specu- 
lated about or predicted coup attempts 
turned out to be false except the last one, 
• which was received in our offices Tuesday 
I morning, September 11, after the coup had 
I already begun. 

However, there was no contact w^hatsoever 
by the organizers and leaders of the coup 
directly with us, and we did not have def- 
inite knowledge of it in advance. 

In a similar vein, either explicitly or im- 
plicitly, the U.S. Government has been 
charged with involvement or complicity in 
tlie coup. This is absolutely false. As official 
; spokesmen of the U.S. Government have 
I stated repeatedly, we were not involved in 
the coup in any way. 

I would at this point like to comment also 
on the subject of U.S.-Chile economic rela- 
tions during the past several years. 

In my opinion, the position of the U.S. 
Government was quite correct and fully un- 



derstandable. The United States had no de- 
sire to provoke a confrontation with the 
Allende government. On the contrary, strong 
eff"orts were repeatedly made to seek ways to 
resolve our diff"erences, although there were 
expropriations without compensation by the 
Chilean Government of over $700 million of 
American jjrivate investment during this pe- 
riod. In addition, Chile defaulted on over 
$100 million in debt to the U.S. Government 
in the same period. 

The facts are that there were no embar- 
goes or restrictions placed on trade with 
Chile. U.S. firms continued to be major sup- 
pliers of food, parts, and equipment for the 
Chilean economy. Bilaterally, we continued a 
variety of programs, such as AID people-to- 
]:)eople activities. Food for Peace assistance, 
the Peace Corps, and scientific and cultural 
exchanges. We continued to disburse nor- 
mally on the remaining AID loans after Dr. 
Allende ascended to office. While there were 
no new bilateral development loans, it should 
be noted that we had cut back sharply on 
AID development lending in Latin America, 
including Chile, even before the Allende gov- 
ernment took office. In any case, the Chilean 
Government did not request any new develop- 
ment loans. 

In the international field, multilateral 
banks continued to disburse existing loans 
to Chile totaling $83 million from August 
1971 to August 1973, this sum representing 
an increase in annual disbursements as com- 
pared with the three years prior to Dr. 
Allende's coming to power. 

However, the economic policies themselves 
that were pursued by the Allende government 
resulted in the steadily deteriorating eco- 
nomic situation. The unwillingness of the 
government to modify its policies made it 
inevitable that international lending agen- 
cies would curtail their programs for Chile, 
and in any case, the United States could not 
have voted favorably for some of this assist- 
ance because of legal restrictions. 

The Paris Club, consisting of various cred- 
itor nations, concluded there was little that 
could be done for Chile unless the govern- 
ment adopted policies they could support. I 



October 8, 1973 



465 



repeat, however, that it was not the United 
States, but the institutions themselves, which 
made their decisions. 

In sum it is untrue to say that the U.S. 
Government was responsible — either directly 
or indirectly — for the overthrow of the 
Allende regime. 

Much concern has naturally been shown 
for the human tragedy that has resulted from 
recent events in Chile. The American people 
and their government have traditionally dem- 
onstrated such concern for the suffering of 
others throughout the world. The United 
States has given active support in numerous 
ways to alleviating suffering and furthering 
the respect of human rights. With regard to 
Chile, we have already expressed regret at 
the loss of human lives and at the death of 
President Allende. 

We have also been concerned with reports 
of violations of human rights in Chile. How- 
ever, to my knowledge, many of these reports 
are unsubstantiated and not necessarily in- 
dicative of the policies to be followed by the 
new Government of Chile once the situation 
there has fully stabilized. 

Moreover, I understand that the Chilean 
authorities have already given the U.N. Hu- 
man Rights Commission assurances with re- 
gard to the refugees in that country. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 
in closing I would like to emphasize once 
again that the situation in Chile is an evolv- 
ing one. As the new government begins to 
set out its economic, social, and other policies, 
we will endeavor to formulate our own poli- 
cies to respond to the realities of the new 
situation. 

We were not responsible for the difficulties 
in which Chile found itself, and it is not for 
us to judge what would have been best or will 
now be best for the Chilean people. 

That is for Chileans themselves to decide, 
and we respect their right to do this. If in the 
tasks that face them now, we can be of help, 
and if our help is wanted by Chile, I am sure 
we will do our best to provide it in the spirit 
of understanding and friendship that the 
American people have long felt for the people 
of Chile. 




United States and Hong Kong Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
September 19 (press release 336) that notes 
had been exchanged at Hong Kong on Sep- 
tember 18 which amended and extended the 
U.S.-Hong Kong bilateral cotton textile 
agreement. The term of the agreement is ex- 
tended by one year to September 30, 1974. 
The aggregate level specified for exports of 
cotton textiles from Hong Kong during this 
period will be 511,022,059 square yards 
equivalent as compared with 477,144,780 
square yards equivalent in the previous 12- 
month period. (For texts of the notes, see 
press release 336.) 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
with annex. Done at New York October 26, 1956, 
as amended. Entered into force July 29, 1957. 
TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668. 

Acceptances deposited: German Democratic Re- 
public, September 18, 1973; Mongolia, Septem- 
ber 20, 1973. 

Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170), with 
annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. 
Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, September 20, 1973. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, September 21, 
1973. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 



466 



Department of State Bulletin 



logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, September 19 
1973. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.' 
Ratified by the President: September 13, 1973. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, July 3, 1973. 

Cultural Property 

Statutes of the International Centre for the Study 
of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural 
Property. Adopted at New Delhi November-De- 
cember 1956; as amended. Entered into force 
May 10, 1958; for the United States January 20, 
1971. TIAS 7038. 
Acccssioti deposited: Paraguay, June 21, 1973. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at 
London October 12, 1971.' 
Accepted brj the President: September 13, 1972. 

Telecommunications 

f International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes. Done at Montreux November 12, 1965. 
Entered into force January 1, 1967; for the United 
States May 29, 1967. TIAS 6267. 
Accessions deposited: Bangladesh, El Salvador 
September 5, 1973. 

I United Nations 

Amendment to article 61 of the United Nations 
Charter, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857, 
6529), to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. 
Done at New York December 20, 1971.' 
Ratified by the Presidcyit : September 13, 1973. 



. BILATERAL 

■'Mexico 

Agreement relating to the provision by the United 
States of communications equipment to combat 
contraband and especially the illegal flow of nar- 
cotics across the border. Efl^'ected by exchange of 
notes at Mcxicj and Tlatelolco August 31, 1973. 
Entered into force August 31, 1973. 

Pakistan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of May 11, 1967 (TIAS 
6258). Signed at Islamabad September 10, 1973. 
Entered into force September 10, 1973. 

I ' Not in force. 



Viet-Nam 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 2, 1972 (TIAS 
7464). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon 
August 15, 1973. Entered into force August 15, 
1973. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on Germany and Austria Released 

Press release 312 dated August 28 (for release September 4) 

The Department of State released on September 4 
"Foreign Relations of the United States," 1948, 
volume II, "Germany and Austria." Two volumes, 
dealing with China and the Western Hemisphere, 
have already been published for the year 1948, and 
five more on other areas and subjects are in prepa- 
ration. "Foreign Relations" has been published an- 
nually since 1861 as the official record of American 
foreign policy. 

This volume of 1,575 pages presents previously 
unpublished documentation on the efl'orts of the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom to 
establish a viable and democratic German govern- 
ment in the portion of Germany under their control 
and to bring about the rehabilitation of German 
economic life. Much of the volume is devoted to the 
London Conference on Germany (March-June 1948) 
and to efforts to carry out the decisions reached 
there. The volume also includes documents on Amer- 
ican policy with regard to reparations, restitution, 
and controls on German industry. Of particular in- 
terest is the section on the Berlin crisis, including 
the breakdown of Four Power authority in Ger- 
many, the blockade, the airlift, and the discussion 
of the Berlin problem at the United Nations in New 
York. The concluding sections of the volume deal 
with the protracted negotiations to draw up a treaty 
on Austria and on .American policies aimed at 
achieving political stability and economic recovery 
in that country. 

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by 
the Historical Oflice, Bureau of Public AflFairs. Vol- 
ume II (listed as Department of State publication 
8660; GPO cat. no. Sl.l :948/v.II) may be pur- 
chased for $8.75 (domestic postpaid). Checks or 
money orders should be made out to "Superintend- 
ent of Documents" and sent to the U.S. Government 
Printing Office Bookstore, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



October 8, 1973 



467 



Recent Releases 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the sainc address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documerits, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock— at least 140— $16.35; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $14.50; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 20c each. 



New Zealand . 
Nigeria . . . 
Oman .... 
Rwanda . . . 
Saudi Arabia 
Seychelles . . 
Spain .... 
Sudan .... 
Trinidad & Tobago . 

U.S.S.R 

Upper Volta .... 
Venezuela .... 



Cat. No. S1.123:N42Z 
Pub. 8251 6 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:N56/2 
Pub. 7953 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:M97 
Pub. 8070 5 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:R94 
Pub. 7916 5 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:SA8 
Pub. 7835 8 pp. ■ 
Cat. No. S1.123:SE9 
Pub. 8246 4 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:SP2 
Pub. 7800 8 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:SU2 
Pub. 8022 6 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:T73 
Pub. 8306 4 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:UN33 
Pub. 7842 16 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:UP6V 
Pub. 8201 4 pp. 
Cat. No. S1.123:V55 
Pub. 7749 8 pp. 



1973: The Year of Europe. This pamphlet in the Cur- 
rent Foreign Policy series is the text of an address 
given by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the Pres- 
ident for National Security .A.ifairs, before the an- 
nual meeting of the Associated Press editors at New 
York, N.Y., on April 23, 1973. Pub. 8710. Euro- 
pean and British Commonwealth Series 78. 5 pp. 
20(*. (Cat. No. 81.74:78). 

The Necessity for Strength in an Era of Negotiation. 

This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series 
is based on the text of an address by Secretary of 
State William P. Rogers on April 23, 1973, on the 
occasion of the annual awards ceremonies of the 
Overseas Press Club at New Y'ork City. The jour- 
nalists paid special tribute to the activities of the 
U.S. Committee of the International Committee to 
Free Journalists in Southeast .A.sia. Pub. 8718. 
General Foreign Policy Series 278. 4 pp. 20('. 
(Cat. No. 81.71:278). 



Fisheries— King and Tanner Crab. Agreement with 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7571. 
15 pp. 306 (Cat. No. 89.10:7571) 

Fishing Operations— Northeastern Pacific Ocean. 

Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics. TIAS 7572. 14 pp. 30C. (Cat. No. 
89.10:7572) 

Fisheries— Northeastern Part of the Pacific Ocean off 
the United States Coast. Agreement with the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7573. 32 pp. 40c. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7573) 

Fisheries— Certain Fishery Problems on the High 
Seas in the Western .\reas of the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics extending the agreement of December 11, 
1970, and the protocol of February 2, 1971, as ex- 
tended. TIAS 7574. 5 pp. 15('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7574) 

Fisheries— Consideration of Claims Resulting from 
Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures to 
Prevent Fishing Conflicts, .\greement and annex and 
protocol, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics. TIAS 7575. 44 pp. 45f. (Cat. No. 
89.10:7575) 

Military Mission to Iran. Agreement with Iran ex- 
tending the agreement of October 6, 1947, as 
amended and extended. TIAS 7576. 3 pp. 15('. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:7576) 

.Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Korea amending the agreement of Febru- 
ary 14, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7578. 2 pp. lOc". 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7578) 




Confirmations 

The Senate on September 21 confirmed the nomi- 
nation of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of 
State. 

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the fol- 
lowing nominations: 

James E. Akins to be Ambassador to the King- 
dom of Saudi Arabia. 

Ellsworth Bunker to be .Ambassador at Large. 

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., to be Ambassador to 
Afghanistan. 

Roger Kirk to be Ambassador to the Somali 
Democratic Republic. 

Carol C. Laise to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State [for Public Affairs]. 

Robert G. Neumann to be .Ambassador to the 
Kingdom of Morocco. 



468 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October S, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1789 



Vf);hanistan. Eliot confirmed as Ambassador . 468 

'. -riculture. Import Quotas for Nonfat Dry 
Milk Increased liy President Nixon (proc- 
lamation) 459 

Chile. Department Discusses Recent Events in 
Chile and U.S. Policy (Kubisch) .... 464 

I onjjress 

nfirmations (Akins, Bunker, Eliot, Kirk, 

Ivissing-er, Laise, Neumann) 468 

partment Discusses Legislation To Modify 
.-Antitrust Exemptions for Service Industries 
in Export Trade (Armstrong) .... 460 

Tiopartment Discusses Recent Events in Chile 

and U.S. Policy (Kubisch) 464 

■nate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 28th U.N. 
General Assembly 452 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations 
(Akins, Bunker, Eliot, Kirk, Kissinger, 
Laise, Neumann^ 468 

Economic Affairs 

" operation To Meet the World's Energy 

Veeds (Casey) 454 

partment Discusses Legislation To Modify 
\ntitrust Exemptions for Service Industries 
in Export Trade (Armstrong) 460 

Import Quotas for Nonfat Dry Milk Increased 
by President Nixon (proclamation) . . . 459 

Ministerial Meeting of GATT Agrees on 
Framework for Multilateral Trade Negotia- 
tions (Shultz, text of Tokyo Declaration) . 445 

President Nixon Outlines U.S. Objectives in 
Trade Negotiations (statement) .... 446 

United States and Hong Kong Sign Cotton 
Textile Agreement 466 

Energy. Cooperation To Meet the World's En- 
ergy Needs (Casey) 454 

Hong Kong. United States and Hong Kong 
Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 466 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Ministerial Meeting of GATT Agrees on 
Framework for Multilateral Trade Negoti- 
itions (Shultz, text of Tokyo Declara- 
tion) 445 

President Nixon Outlines U.S. Objectives in 
Trade Negotiations (statement) .... 446 

Laos. U.S. Welcomes Signing of Protocols Im- 
plementing Lao Peace Agreement (U.S. 
statement, message from President Nixon to 
Prince Souvanna Phouma) 452 

Morocco. Neumann confirmed as Ambassador 468 

Presidential Documents 

Import Quotas for Nonfat Dry Milk Increased 
by President Nixon (proclamation) . . . 459 

President Nixon Outlines U.S. Objectives in 
Trade Negotiations 446 

United Nations Day, 197.3 (proclamation) . 453 

U.S. Welcomes Signing of Protocols Imple- 
menting Lao Peace Agreement 452 

Public Affairs. Laise confirmed as Assistant 
Secretary 468 

Publications 

1948 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Germany 

and Austria Released 467 

Recent Releases ... 468 



Saudi Arabia. Akins confirmed as Ambassador 468 
Somalia. Kirk confirmed as Ambassador . . . 468 

Trade 

Ministerial Meeting of GATT Agrees on 
Framework for Multilateral Trade Negoti- 
ations (Shultz, text of Tokyo Declaration) . 445 

President Nixon Outlines U.S. Objectives in 
Trade Negotiations (statement) .... 446 

Treaty Information 

Current -Actions 466 

United States and Hong Kong Sign Cotton 
Textile Agreement 466 

United Nations 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 28th U.N. 

General Assembly 452 

United Nations Day, 1973 (proclamation) . . 453 



Name Index 

Akins, James E 468 

Armstrong, Willis C 460 

Bunker, Ellsworth 468 

Casey, William J 454 

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr 468 

Kirk, Roger 468 

Kissinger, Secretary 468 

Kubisch, Jack B 464 

Laise, Carol C 468 

Neumann, Robert G 468 

Nixon, President 446, 452, 453, 459 

Shultz, George P 445 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 17—23 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to September 17 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
312 of August 28 and 331 of September 14. 



No. 
"333 



Date 

9/18 



t334 9/18 



Subject 

Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private Interna- 
tional Law, Oct. 5. 

Office established to coordinate 
law of the sea matters (re- 
write). 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee. Oct. 1. 

U.S. and Hong Kong sign cotton 
textile agreement, Sept. 18 (re- 
write). 

Jordan selects chancery site in 
International Center. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International and Cultural Af- 
fairs, Oct. 5. 

Law of the Sea Advisory Com- 
mittee, Sept. 21-22. 

Biography of Secretary Kissin- 
ger. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



*335 


9/18 


336 


9/19 


*337 


9/20 


'338 


9/20 


*339 


9/21 


♦340 


9/22 



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6hJ. 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1790 



October 15, 1973 



A JUST CONSENSUS, A STABLE ORDER, A DURABLE PEACE 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 

Before the U.N. General Assembly 469 

SECRETARY KISSINGER HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE 
AT NEW YORK A75 

PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO OF PAKISTAN VISITS THE UNITED STATES 

Remarks by President Nixon and Prime Minister Bhutto 

and Text of Joint Statement 482 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1790 
October 15, 1973 



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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BVLLETIl\ 
a weekly publication issued by thi 
Office of Media Services, Bureau ol| 
Public Affairs, provides tfte public i 
interested agencies of tfte governmeni 
with information on developments M 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ant! 
on the work of the Department ani, 
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The BULLETIN includes selected 
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by the Wfiite House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
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of the Department. Information is in^, 
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United States is or may become 4 
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Publications of the Department ot^ 
State, United Nations documents, and. 
legislative material in the field of, 
international relations are also listeit 



A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Durable Peace 



Address by Secretary Kissinger^ 



I come before you today — confirmed in of- 
fice but two days ago — as probably the 
world's most junior Foreign Minister. That 
President Nixon should ask me as my first 
official act to speak here for the United States 
reaffirms the importance that my country at- 
taches to the values and ideals of the United 
Nations. 

It would be idle to deny that the Ameri- 
can people, like many others, have sometimes 
been disappointed because this organization 
has not been more successful in translating 
the hopes for universal peace of its architects 
into concrete accomplishments. 

But despite our disappointments, my coun- 
try remains committed to the goal of a world 
community. We will continue to work in this 
Parliament of Man to make it a reality. 

Two centuries ago, the philosopher Kant 
predicted that perpetual peace would come 
eventually — either as the creation of man's 
moral aspirations or as the consequence of 
physical necessity. What seemed Utopian then 
looms as tomorrow's reality; soon there will 
be no alternative. Our only choice is whether 
the world envisaged in the charter will come 
about as the result of our vision or of a catas- 
trophe invited by our shortsightedness. 

The United States has made its choice. My 
country seeks true peace, not simply an 
armistice. We strive for a world in which the 
rule of law governs and fundamental human 
rights are the birthright of all. Beyond the bi- 
lateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements, 
and dramatic steps of recent years, we en- 



' Made before the 28th session of the United Na- 
tions General Assembly on Sept. 24 (press release 
343). 



visage a comprehensive, institutionalized 
peace — a peace which this organization is 
uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in 
the hearts of men. 

This will be the spirit of American foreign 
policy. 

This attitude will guide our work in this 
organization. 

We start from a bedrock of solid progress. 
Many of the crises that haunted past General 
Assemblies have been put behind us. Agree- 
ment has been reached on Berlin; there is a 
cease-fire in the Middle East; the Viet-Nam 
war has been ended. The rigid confrontation 
that has dominated international life and 
weakened this organization for a quarter of 
a century has been softened. 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
have perceived a commonality of interest in 
avoiding nuclear holocaust and in establish- 
ing a broad web of constructive relationships. 
Talks on strategic arms limitation have al- 
ready produced historic accords aimed at 
slowing the arms race and insuring strategic 
stability; we have, today, resumed negotia- 
tions on this subject. The positive results we 
hope for will enhance the security of all 
mankind. 

Two decades of estrangement between the 
United States and the People's Republic of 
China have given way to constructive dia- 
logue and productive exchanges. President 
Nixon has met with the leaders of that 
nation; we have agreed to a historic commu- 
nique that honestly sets forth both our differ- 
ences and our common principles; and we 
have each opened a Liaison Office in the 
capital of the other. 



Ocfober 15, 1973 



469 



Many other countries have seized the ini- 
tiative and contributed — in substance and 
spirit — to the relaxation of tensions. The na- 
tions of Europe and North America are en- 
gaged in a conference to further security 
and cooperation. The two German states have 
taken their place in this Assembly. India, 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh have begun to 
move toward a welcome reconciliation. North 
and South Korea are at last engaged in a 
dialogue which we hope will lead to a new era 
of peace and security. 

Yet these achievements, solid as they are, 
have only made less precarious the dangers 
and divisions inherited from the postwar era. 
We have ended many of the confrontations of 
the cold war; yet, even in this room, the vo- 
cabulary of suspicion persists. Relaxation of 
tensions is justified by some as merely a tac- 
tical interlude before renewed struggle. 
Others susiject the emergence of a two-power 
condominium. And as tension between the 
two original blocs has eased, a third grouping 
increasingly assumes the characteristics of a 
bloc of its own — the alignment of the non- 
aligned. 

So the world is uneasily suspended between 
old slogans and new realities, between a view 
of peace as but a pause in an unending 
struggle and a vision of peace as a promise 
of global cooperation. 

From Detente to Cooperation 

In 19 l(j .lames Byrnes, the first Secretary 
of State to address this Assembly, spoke of 
how the United Nations could help break 
down habits of thinking in national isolation 
and move toward universal understanding 
and tolerance among all peoples. 

The Ignited States will never be satisfied 
with a world of uneasy truces, of offsetting 
blocs, of accommodations of convenience. We 
know that jiower can enforce a resigned 
passivity, but only a sense of justice can 
enlist consensus. We strive for a peace whose 
stability rests not merely on a balance of 
forces, but on shared aspirations. We are 
convinced that a structure which ignores 
humane values will jirove cold and empty and 
unfulfilling to most of mankind. 



The United States deeply believes: 

— That justice cannot be confined by na- 
tional frontiers. 

— That truth is universal and not the pe- 
culiar possession of a single people or group 
or ideology. 

— That compassion and humanity must en- 
noble all our endeavors. 

In this spirit we ask the Assembly to move 
with us from detente to cooperation, from 
coexistence to community. 

Moving Toward Greater Stability 

Our journey must begin with the world 
as it is and with the issues now before us. 
The United States will spare no effort to 
ease tensions further and to move toward 
greater stability: 

— We shall continue, in the spirit of the 
Shanghai communique, our search for a new 
relationship with the People's Republic of 
China. 

— We shall work to promote positive 
trends elsewhere in Asia. The uncertain 
peace in Indochina must be strengthened; the 
world community cannot afford, or permit, a 
relapse into war in that region. 

— We shall continue to pursue vigorously 
the building of constructive relations with the 
Soviet Union. 

— We shall strive to promote conciliation 
in Europe. In the negotiations beginning 
next month we shall seek a reduction of the 
military forces that have faced each other 
for so long across that divided continent. 

— We shall give new vigor to our policy of 
partnership in the Western Hemisphere. 

— We shall honor our pledge to promote 
self-determination, economic development, 
and human dignity across the continent of 
Africa. 

— We shall in-ess on with strategic ai'ms 
limitation talks. We consider them crucial for 
security and stability in this period. 

— We shall search for solutions to the 
worldwide problem of conventional weap- 
ons, which drain our resources and fuel the 
fires of local conflict. 



470 



Department of State Bulletin 



In these efforts, the United States will be 
guided by fundamental principles: 

— We have no desire for domination. We 
will oppose — as we have consistently op- 
posed throughout this century — any nation 
that chooses this path. We have not been 
asked to participate in a condominium; we 
would reject such an appeal if it were made. 

— We will never abandon our allies or our 
friends. The strengthening of our traditional 
ties is the essential foundation for the devel- 
opment of new relationships with old adver- 
saries. 

— We will work for jjeace through the 
United Nations as well as through bilateral 
relationships. 

We recognize our special obligation, as a 
jiei-manent member of the Security Council, 
to assist in the search for just solutions in 
those parts of the world now torn by strife, 
such as the Middle East. While we cannot 
substitute for the efforts of those most di- 
rectly involved, we are i^repared to use our 
influence to generate a spirit of accommoda- 
tion and to encourage the parties toward 
practical jjrogress. 

The Quality of Life 

But progress on the traditional agenda is 
not enough. The more we succeed in solving 
political problems, the more other and per- 
ha]5s deeper challenges emerge. As the world 
grows more stable, we must confront the 
question of the ends of detente. As the threat 
of war recedes, the jiroblem of the quality of 
life takes on more urgent significance. 

We are, in fact, members of a community 
drawn by modern science, technology, and 
new forms of communication into a prox- 
imity for which we are still politically unpre- 
pared. Technology daily outstrips the ability 
of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our 
political imagination must catch up with our 
scientific vision. This is at the same time the 
greatest challenge and the greatest oppor- 
tunity of this organization: 

— The pollution of the skies, the seas, and 
the land is a global problem. 
— The increased consumption of cereals 



and protein has reduced world food reserves 
to dangerously low levels. 

— The demand for energy is outrunning 
supply, and the need for technological inno- 
vation is urgent. 

— The growth of the world's economy is in- 
hibited by restrictive trading blocs and an 
insufliciently flexible international monetary 
system. 

— The exploitation of the resources of the 
ocean beds, which is essential for the needs of 
burgeoning jjopulations, requires global co- 
operation lest it degenerate into global 
contention. 

Challenges of this magnitude cannot be 
solved by a w^orld fragmented into self- 
contained nation-states or rigid blocs. 

Areas of Common Action 

I do not intend today to cover the whole 
agenda of international cooperation. Rather, 
I shall speak briefly of some illustrative areas 
of common action. I pledge the readiness of 
the United States to solve these problems co- 
operatively and to submit proposals aimed at 
their resolution. 

1. A world community requires the curb- 
ing of conflict. 

The United Nations, in its 28-year history, 
has not always been idle in this sphere. In 
Indonesia, the Indian Subcontinent, the Mid- 
dle East, the Congo, and in Cyprus, it has 
shown its ability for effective factfinding, 
mediation, and peacekeeping missions. This 
central aspect of the U.N.'s work must be 
strengthened. On a small planet, so bound to- 
gether by technology and so interdependent 
economically, we can no longer afford the 
constant eruption of conflict and the danger 
of its spread. 

Yet, in recent years we have found our- 
selves locked in fruitless debates about the 
inauguration of peacekeeping operations and 
over the degree of control the Security Coun- 
cil would exercise over iieacekeeping machin- 
ery — an impasse which insured only that 
permanent peacekeeping machinery would 
not come into being. Each peacekeeping unit 
w-e have formed to cope with an emergency 



October 15, 1973 



471 



has been an improvisation growing out of 
argument and controversy. 

We should delay no longer. The time has 
come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so 
that this organization can act swiftly, con- 
fidently, and effectively in future crises. To 
break the deadlock, the United States is pre- 
pared to consider how the Security Council 
can play a more central role in the conduct of 
peacekeeping operations. If all countries con- 
cerned approach this problem with a desire to 
achieve a cooperative solution, the United 
Nations can achieve a major step forward 
during this session. 

2. A world community must have the tvid- 
est possible membership. 

The exclusion of any qualified state denies 
representation not only to governments but 
to peoples. Membership in this body should be 
a step toward reconciliation, not a source of 
conflict. The time has come for North and 
South Korea to be offered their rightful 
places here, without prejudice to a future 
evolution toward unification. 

In this spirit also, we support the perma- 
nent membership of Japan in the Security 
Council. 

3. A world comm,unity must assure that all 
its people are fed. 

The growing threat to the world's food 
supply deserves the urgent attention of this 
Assembly. Since 1969, global consumption of 
cereals has risen more rapidly than produc- 
tion ; stocks are at the lowest levels in years. 
We now face the prospect that — even with 
bumper crops — -the world may not rebuild its 
seriously depleted reserves in this decade. 

No one country can cope with this problem. 
The United States therefore proposes: 

— That a World Food Conference be or- 
ganized under United Nations auspices in 
1974 to discuss ways to maintain adequate 
food supi)lies, and to harness the efforts of 
all nations to meet the hunger and malnutri- 
tion resulting from natural disasters. 

— That nations in a position to do so offer 
technical assistance in the conservation of 
food. The United States is ready to join with 
others in providing such assistance. 



4. A ivorld community cannot remain di- 
vided between the permanently rich and the 
permanently poor. 

Let us therefore resolve that this Assem- 
bly, this year, initiate a search — drawing on 
the world's best minds — for new and imagi- 
native solutions to the problems of devel- 
opment. Our search must be candid and 
realistic, but it must also be free of pe- 
remptoi'y demands, antagonistic propositions, 
ideological confrontation, or propagandistic 
rhetoric — or we will surely fail. 

The United States is prepared to join in 
this new search, providing freely of the ex- 
perience gained over two decades. We have 
learned not to exaggerate our capacity to 
transform nations — but we have also learned 
much about what progress is possible. 

We will participate without preconditions, 
with a conciliatory attitude and a cooperative 
commitment. We ask only that others adopt 
the same approach. 

In this spirit the United States is willing 
to examine seriously the proposal by the dis- 
tinguished President of Mexico for a Charter 
of the Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
Such a document will make a significant and 
historic contribution if it reflects the true 
aspirations of all nations; if it is turned into 
an indictment of one group of countries by 
another, it will accomplish nothing. To com- 
mand general support — and to be imple- 
mented — the proposed rights and duties must 
be defined equitably and take into account the 
concerns of industrialized as well as of devel- 
oping countries. The United States stands 
ready to define its responsibilities in a hu- 
mane and cooperative spirit. 

5. Finally, a world community must har- 
ness science and technology for the benefit 
of all. 

We must begin to match our remarkable 
technological skills with our equally remark- 
able technological needs. We must find the 
means for the cooperative and judicious de- 
velopment of our energj' resources. We must 
responsibly confront the problems of popu- 
lation growth, which are fast pushing hu- 
manity toward the limits of what our earth 



472 



Department of State Bulletin 



can sustain. We must embark on a new scien- 
tific revolution to increase agricultural pro- 
ductivity in all lands. No field of human 
endeavor is so dependent upon an open world 
for its advancement; no field is so in need of 
international cooperation to cope with its po- 
tential dangers. 

Mr. President, fellow delegates: Are we 
prepared to accept the imperatives of a 
global society and infuse our labors with 
a new vision? Or shall we content ourselves 
with a temporary pause in the turmoil that 
has wracked our century? Shall we proceed 
with one-sided demands and sterile confron- 
tations? Or shall we proceed in a spirit of 
compromise produced by a sense of common 
destiny? We must move from hesitant co- 
operation born of necessity to genuine col- 
lective effort based on common purpose. 

It is a choice no country can make alone. 
We can repeat old slogans or strive for new 
hope. We can fill the record of our proceed- 
ings with acrimony, or we can dedicate our- 
selves to dealing with man's deepest needs. 
The ideal of a world community may be de- 
cried as unrealistic — but great constructions 
have always been ideals before they can be- 
come realities. Let us dedicate ourselves to 
this noblest of all possible goals and achieve 
at last what has so long eluded us: true un- 
derstanding and tolerance among mankind. 



President Calls for Maintenance 
of Strong Defense Posture 

Following is the text of a letter dated 
September 20 from President Nixon, to Sen- 
ate Minority Leader Hugh Scott. Similar let- 
ters vere sent to Senate Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield and Senator John C. Stennis, 
Chairman, Armed Services Committee. 

White House press release dated September 22 

September 20. 1973. 
Dear Senator Scott: I am enclosing a 
copy of a letter I have sent to Chairman 
Stennis indicating my specific concerns about 



the Defense Procurement Bill now on the 
the Senate floor. I thought it might be useful 
to explain to you the reasons for those con- 
cerns. 

Current efforts in the Congress to reduce 
the FY 74 Defense budget are deeply disturb- 
ing to me. Prior to submission in January, 
that budget was carefully reviewed, both 
within the Department of Defense and with- 
in the National Security Council system. Dur- 
ing this review, the strategic and diplomatic 
implications of lower budgets were thor- 
oughly assessed. Diflicult choices had to be 
made because we were mindful of the need 
to hold down spending in order to combat in- 
flation. Marginal defense programs were 
eliminated and other programs trimmed. I 
was convinced then, and I am convinced now, 
that the request I finally sent the Congress 
was the miniinum level consistent with the 
Nation's security interests and our foreign 
policy objectives. 

There is no doubt in my mind that a strong 
defense posture is closely linked to the past 
success and future development of our for- 
eign policies. A strong military posture was 
a key factor in our opening of contacts with 
the Chinese and eff'orts to improve our rela- 
tions with the Soviets — steps which were in 
the interest of the entire nation. A strong 
defense posture will continue to be a crucial 
ingredient as we try to maintain close rela- 
tions with our traditional allies and to pre- 
vent conflicts and crises that could under- 
mine efforts to continue to strengthen rela- 
tions with the potential adversaries. 

It is ironic that in this critical period in 
which the United States has so much at stake 
in the international arena, arguments to 
erode our military posture have gained such 
currency. We are now engaged in crucial 
efforts to improve our trade relationships, to 
reform the international monetary system, 
and to obtain oil supplies from parts of the 
world fraught with tension. Strong Ameri- 
can military forces, by making a vital con- 
tribution to international stability, provide 
us with the influence and leverage we need 
in negotiating with both our allies and our 



October 15, 1973 



473 



potential enemies. All of our efforts to secure 
a more peaceful and prosperous world will 
be endangered if we unilaterally erode our 
defense posture. 

Unilateral reductions would be particu- 
larly destructive for two sets of negotiations 
that will begin soon and will have a profound 
effect upon the future. Within a matter of 
about a month, we will be embarking on a 
new and extremely imijortant phase of the 
strategic arms limitation talks. The SALT 
talks will focus on ways of controlling the 
qualitative aspects of the arms race. This 
would be a most inopportune time to weaken 
our position unilaterally by cutting back on 
new U.S. weapons systems that demonstrate 
to the Soviets we will not stand aside while 
they continue to make qualitative improve- 
ments to their forces. 

The second set of negotiations — discus- 
sions with the Warsaw Pact regarding mu- 
tual troop reductions in Europe — should also 
begin shortly. A strong defense capability 
and a visible posture of unity on the part of 
the American public, its Congress and Execu- 
tive are an essential ingredient in the MBFR 
[mutual and balanced force reductions] ne- 
gotiations. We cannot expect the Soviet 
Union to negotiate seriously if they believe 
that by slowing negotiations they can get 
troop reductions at no cost to themselves. 

But the issue of national defense goes 
beyond issues of foreign policy. It goes to the 
heart of the question of our priorities as a 
Nation. My judgment is that in today's world 
this nation cannot afford less defense. We 
have in the past tried to shrug off the burden 
of defense only to find that conflict reached 
us nonetheless. We paid a tragic price for 
that unpreparedness. 

Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schles- 
inger, Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. 
Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] 
and many other military advisers can pro- 
vide you with all the necessary details on the 
specifics of the iirograms I have recom- 
mended and the particular reasons why the 
cuts the Congress is considering will be a se- 
rious blow to the national interest. While I 



will leave to them the discussion of the de- 
tails, I would like to mention several areas of 
particular concern: 

— A unilateral cut in our NATO troops 
would begin a serious unraveling of the 
fabric of NATO. It would completely disrupt 
our MBFR and burden-sharing negotiations. 

— A reduction in military assistance for 
South Vietnam and Laos would be unwise 
during this delicate period of transition to 
peace. Our request was the minimum funding 
necessary and I ask your support in restoring 
the cuts. 

— Failure to develop and produce new 
weapons would cripple our efforts to provide 
the forces and equipment we will need for 
our security five to ten and even fifteen years 
into the future. Our potential adversaries 
continue to press ahead with their weapons 
develo]iment programs. If we fail to do like- 
wise, our national security could be threat- 
ened at some point in the future. 

— Severe reductions in authorized man- 
jwwer, as proposed in the Senate bill, would 
gravely jeopardize our efforts to maintain 
adequate force levels for both present and 
future needs. Adequate manpower is the most 
critical input to our Defense posture and 
should not be reduced below current levels, 
which are already the lowest in 23 years. 

An adequate defense must not become a 
partisan issue. A strong and ready military 
force is an asset to all Americans and sup- 
l)orts all of their interests. Therefore, the 
Congress and the Executive Branch must 
work together to provide the funds, the man- 
jiower and the leadership needed to assure 
this capability. I ask for your support in this 
most critical effort. 

I am sending similar letters to Mike Mans- 
field and John Stennis. 

With best regards. 
Sincerely, 

Richard Nixon. 

The Honorable HUGH ScOTT 
Minority Leader, United States Senate, 
Washington, D.C. 



474 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at New York 



Folloin'ng is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at the 
U.S. Mission to the United Nations on Sep- 
tember 26. 

Pi-ess release 349 dated September 27 

Ladies and gentlemen: I wanted to give 
you a brief account of what I have been do- 
ing here and then answer your questions, 
hopefully relating jirimarily to my activities 
in Xew York. 

You know my schedule, so there is no point 
in repeating that. My activities consisted of 
the speech to the General Assembly, meetings 
with various Foreign Ministers, and meetings 
with my staff in ijreparation for entering the 
State Department on Thursday, where I still 
haven't been. 

Now, about my speech to the General 
Assembly, the intention was to convey the 
tone, philosophy, and the attitude of the ad- 
ministration in its conduct of foreign policy 
for the remainder of this term. 

We wanted to convey, beyond the specific 
initiatives that might be proposed, that the 
task which is before us now is to consolidate 
what has been achieved, to construct some- 
thing that can endure, both within our coun- 
try — because it has popular and governmen- 
tal support — and above all, something that 
can endure internationally — because it is 
seen to be in the common interest. 

This attitude and general philosophy, we 
felt, was more important at this stage than a 
list of specific proposals — although some 
were made — because you are familiar with 
the main outlines of many of our policies. 

So for the President's second term, our 
agenda is to try to create an international 
consensus to international order that is seen 
to be just by all or at least the greatest 
number — something that embodies humane 
and progressive ideas. 



In my conversations with the Foreign Min- 
isters, I obviously had to deal primarily with 
the current agenda. On my trip this week I 
saw a great many of our allies. I saw many of 
the Foreign Ministers from Europe. I saw, 
of course, the Foreign Minister of Japan. I 
silent some time with Foreign Minister Gro- 
myko and today with the Permanent Repre- 
sentative of the People's Republic of China. 
I had a long and fruitful talk with the For- 
eign Minister of Brazil to underline the great 
importance we attach to reinvigorating our 
relationships in that area. And I saw the For- 
eign Ministers of Thailand and Korea. 

Let me say a word about the conversations 
with our European friends and also the rela- 
tion of Japan to that process. 

There has been a great deal of speculation 
tied to a possible trip of the President to 
Europe. We still, of course, plan this trip, 
but its exact date will have to be determined 
by the pace of our preparation. 

Much of the speculation has been in terms 
of an adversary relationship between us and 
the Europeans and great diflRculty in coming 
to an agreement. I would like to correct this 
impression. What we are confronting in the 
dialogue with the Europeans is the merging 
of several processes. There is the process of 
European integration. There is the process of 
the debate on security within NATO. And 
there is the redefinition of the Atlantic rela- 
tionship, which covers all these areas. 

As you know, on behalf of the President, I 
proposed a new Atlantic Declaration of Prin- 
ciples in a speech I gave in April.' 

There was some uncertainty in Europe on 
how and in what forum to respond; several 
months were spent in internal discussions 
within Europe — whether the proper forum 



' For text of the address, see Bulletin of May 14, 
1973, p. 593. 



October 15, 1973 



475 



would be NATO, a series of bilateral nego- 
tiations with the Europeans, or a series of 
talks between the United States and the 
Common Market. 

The result has been that after some months 
of going all these routes European opinion 
crystallized. It was decided that those eco- 
nomic matters — and political considerations 
relevant to economic matters — relevant to Eu- 
rope as an entity should be discussed by the 
Nine, as a unit, with the United States. It 
was also decided that security issues — and 
those political issues relevant to security mat- 
ters — should be discussed in the NATO Coun- 
cil. And then of course bilateral channels 
have remained open throughout this process. 
With respect to the declaration that the 
European Nine have developed and that was 
presented to me yesterday on behalf of the 
Nine by Foreign Minister Andersen of Den- 
mark, let me say that the United States rec- 
ognizes that this first attempt by Europe to 
speak with one voice on a jjolitical matter of 
transatlantic relationships is an event of the 
greatest significance. 

The United States in the postw^ar period 
has constantly supported the emergence of a 
European identity, and we therefore welcome 
the fact that Europe has now organized 
itself well enough so that it can speak to us 
with one voice. It may be that in historical 
retrospect this meeting of the European Nine 
in Copenhagen will be seen as one of the 
decisive events of the postwar period. 

At the same time, the United States of 
course reserves the right to its own opinion 
with respect to the outcome of these deliber- 
ations. They were not presented to the United 
States on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. They 
were presented to us in a spirit of partner- 
ship as the opening of a dialogue. Therefore, 
this Saturday the Political Directors of the 
Nine and Assistant Secretary [of State for 
European Affairs Walter J.] Stoessel are 
going to meet for a discussion in which we 
will blend our ideas — or attempt to blend 
our ideas — with those of Europe in this 
declaration of economic and political prin- 
ciples. 



Secondly, as you know, there are discus- 
sions taking place right now in NATO 
dealing with the definition of future allied 
relationships. They concern security and the 
political aspects of security. There is general 
agreement that these discussions will be en- 
ergetically pursued within the context of the 
NATO Council. We expect to make a signifi- 
cant contribution to this. And so will other 
countries. 

What I want to underline here is that we 
are not engaged in an adversary procedure. 
We are engaged in a process in which we 
intend to give traditional friendship new 
vitality. 

The trip of the President is not an end in 
itself. The trip of the President will certain- 
ly take place in the near future, but our 
concern is to produce documents that will 
have some historic significance. We believe 
that we are now well on the way toward ac- 
complishing what we set out to do earlier 
this year. The discussions have been useful, 
and they will proceed in a constructive spirit. 

It was of course inevitable in the conver- 
sations with Japan that its relationship to 
these various efforts would be a subject of 
conversation. 

Since the Japanese Foreign Minister and 
Prime Minister are going to be visiting 
Europe in the next few weeks, it would not 
be appropriate for me to comment, except to 
say that in my speech of April 23 we outlined 
the American point of view. We believe that 
at some stage of this process, in some man- 
ner, it is important for Japan to participate. 

The manner and the kind of declaration 
remains to be discussed. I think it will con- 
tinue to be discussed between the Japanese 
and ourselves and between the Japanese and 
the Europeans on the trip of senior Japanese 
officials through Europe. 

I will make no comment about the con- 
versations we had with the Representative of 
the People's Republic of China and the For- 
eign Minister of the Soviet Union. As you 
know. Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet 
the President on Friday in Washington, and 
after that he and I will have a lunch. There- 
fore, we are still in the middle of our dis- 



476 



Department of State Bulletin 



cussions, which cover the entire agenda of 
U.S.-Soviet relationships. 

While I was here, I also met with the 
Representatives of African nations and with 
the Representatives of Arab states here at 
the United Nations. These meetings were not 
intended as pronouncements of new policy, 
but as expressions of our pi'ofound concern. 
We do not want to pretend to answers that 
have not yet been found. But we can pledge 
in both areas that we will make an effoi't at 
understanding and an attempt to find just 
solutions. 

I think now it would be best if I took your 
questions. 

Emigration Policy of the Soviet Union 

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is not patently your 
talk with Andrei Gromyko, which you ruled 
out, hut I would like to ask a question about 
his public speech in the Assembly, in tvhich 
he demands thut Western nations stop med- 
dling in the intenuil affairs of the Soviet 
Union — and I think something in connection 
principally u'ith the emigration policy of the 
Soviet Union. The manner in which he spoke 
of it left us uncertain as to whether this 
really meant any lessening of the spirit of 
detente or whether it was simply a public 
gesture in a private game. Could you — 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, during my confirmation hearings I was 
asked extensively about this issue. It is also 
an issue about which I plan to make a formal 
statement sometime in the next month or six 
weeks. But for now, let me reiterate what I 
said then. 

The United States of course has its own 
deeply held views about the human values at 
stake — both in emigration policies and in 
internal policies. 

The foreign policy question we face is: 
fir.st. the degree to which our foreign policy 
can directly affect others and, secondly, the 
alternatives we in fact confront if our direct 
actions are ineff'ective. 

There is a great tendency to assume that 
everything that has been achieved is now 
automatically permanent and can be drawn 



upon as if its capital were inexhaustible. 

We have taken the position that we would 
not, as a government, take a formal public 
position. But we have also taken the position 
that insofar as we have influence in other 
ways, we would use it to the limit of our 
capabilities. 

Now, you are all familiar with the fact 
that the emigration tax is not being enforced. 
On an unofficial basis we have brought many 
hardship cases that were submitted to us by 
various organizations here to the attention 
of various officials. Many of those have been 
permitted to emigrate. 

So the choice we have to make is between 
a public stance and the influence that our 
general relationship gives us. 

We believe that we have been quite effec- 
tive. But we should keep in mind that there 
is a point beyond which one cannot press a 
situation as it exists. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a sworn 
affid^tvit made public in Washington yester- 
day, your former National Security aide 
David Young cited your name as authority 
in requesting the Central Intelligence Agency 
to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel 
Ellsberg. Can you tell us tvhether you author- 
ized Young to use your name in such a man- 
ner? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, I do not know 
whether David Young used my name in such 
a manner, because all his affidavit said is: 
"This is the impression of the man making 
this affidavit." And I want to add that I have 
to choose my words here carefully, because 
you know David Young is under indictment 
and I do not want to complicate his case. 

In my confirmation hearings, both in public 
and in executive session, I stated my position 
very clearly. I did not know of any of the 
activities of David Young after he left my 
staff and joined Mr. [John D.] Ehrlichman's 
staff, except for one project on declassifica- 
tion which was publicly announced. 

I did not know about the request for a 
profile. I never saw this profile. I never dis- 
cussed this subject with David Young. And 
therefore, if my name was used, which I 



October 15, 1973 



477 



cannot confirm, it was used without 
authority. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, ivhat significance does 
your upcoming African trip have, specifi- 
cally for black Americans who identify them- 
selves very closely with Africa and its prob- 
lems? 

Secretary Kissinger: My upcoming African 
trip was promised for the year 1974 ; it is 
not a trip that I will take in the very im- 
mediate future. 

The significance is that, at the highest 
level in the State Department and in the 
administration, we are going to take a new 
look at our African policy. We want to see 
what useful role the United States can play 
in a continent which is undergoing very rapid 
change and which has many problems, some 
of which I mentioned yesterday. 

Q. You say there is a point beyond which 
the detente should not be pressed. I ivonder 
if you could outline what you think might 
happen if the Congress revokes or blocks 
the most-favored-nation status for the Soviet 
Union in the new trade bill. 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to spec- 
ulate about Soviet actions. I have stated 
previously that the most-favored-nation 
clause was part of a general arrangement 
with the Soviet Union in negotiations ex- 
tending over a period of many years. If now 
the most-favored-nation clause is blocked, 
then the most serious question has to be 
raised about the degree to which other 
countries — in this case the Soviet Union — 
can rely on a complex negotiation and about 
the performance of the United States, over 
a period of time, of its commitment. There 
was no reason to suppose at the time that 
this most-favored-nation issue was discussed 
with the Soviet Union that the type of prob- 
lem that is now blocking it could be the 
subject of conditions in Congress. It had 
never been so used in any previous case 
where most-favored-nation status was re- 
quested for a Communist country. There- 
fore it would certainly be a significant 
setback in the policy that we are pursuing. 



Q. Dr. Kissinger, there's been some talk 
about the convocation of a special conference 
cm the Middle East. I was wondering whether 
the United States favors such a conference 
in the near future. 

Secretary Kissinger: The U.S. position on 
the Middle East has been that we should 
avoid at this time any very dramatic moves 
until we have had an opportunity to discuss 
with the parties what the possibilities are 
and how far they are prepared to go in 
moving toward a just peace in the Middle 
East. I think the calling of a conference 
before one has determined the framework 
and has some understanding as to objectives 
would be putting the cart before the horse. 

U.N. Peacekeeping Operations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day in the 
General Assembly you said the United States 
is prepared to consider how the Security 
Council can play a more central role in the 
conduct of peacekeeping operations. Can you 
tell us more precisely what you meant by that 
"more central role"? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
the issue of peacekeeping has been dead- 
locked in these negotiations between the be- 
lief of some — that has included us — that the 
Secretary General should have very wide 
discretionary authority and the belief of 
others that the Security Council should con- 
trol even the day-to-day operations of such 
a force. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute; I'm 
not finished yet — or do you want to comment 
on my remarks? 

Q. No! [Laughter. 1 

Secretanj Kissinger: We are prepared now 
to take into account the view of those who 
want the Security Council to take a more 
active role, although we cannot go all the 
way with them into the detailed day-to-day 
supervision. So my speech was to signal to 
the other parties concerned — permanent 
members of the Security Council, countries 



478 



Department of State Bulletin 



that have traditionally supplied forces, and 
other interested parties — that if they are 
willing to meet us in a cooperative spirit, 
if they are willing to work for a force that 
can act expeditiously, they will make a major 
effort to meet their common concerns. We 
are prepared to give the Security Council 
a greater role, but not such a role that it can 
hamstring day-to-day operations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give 7is some 
of your views on the prospect of the Korean 
questiov debate this year at the United Na- 
tions, pai'ticularly if the question begins to 
fall into another long series of international 
delays? Then 7voidd you welcome any chance 
of a higher dialogue negotiation between the 
major nation cotintries — namely, among the 
Security Council members — to avoid con- 
frontntion at the United Nations of the 
problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our view' with re- 
spect to all issues is that there should be a 
great deal of private diplomacy — that the 
United Nations can be most effective if no 
side pushes its view to an absolute and pub- 
lic extreme. Then standard positions harden 
and compromises become extremely difficult. 

So, with respect to the Korean question, 
we believe that the South Korean Govern- 
ment, in its June 23 proposal, has made some 
very constructive initiatives ; it has advanced 
some very constructive initiatives. We believe 
they deserve the most serious consideration. 

On our part, we would welcome quiet dis- 
cussions — among the permanent members 
as well as among other interested parties — 
and we hope that everyone concerned will 
use this debate as a means of conciliation 
rather than of confrontation. 

New Atlantic Relationships 

Q. Mr. Secretary — Dr. Kissinger, you said 
the President's speech would take place in 
the very near future, and you say — 

Secretary Kissinger: The President's what? 

Q. Excuse me — the President's trip would 
take place in the very near future — and it 



was hoped that it would produce documents 
of very major significance. Should we link 
the two at the same time ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. Of course, a great 
deal depends on what you mean by "very 
near future." What I'm saying is we now 
have a process and we have the outline of the 
ideas that can form the outcome of that 
process. 

You should clearly link in your mind that 
the President's trip will have to result from 
progress in these talks. And again I want 
to stress: We're not looking for a publicity 
maneuver; we're not simply looking for a 
document that everyone can sign — because 
that's relatively easy to achieve and we're 
within sight of achieving this ali'eady. 

We have made a very serious proposal. 
It is based on our conviction that Atlantic 
relationships have basically changed in the 
last 25 years, partly as a result of the suc- 
cess of previous policies. We think that in 
order to give a new impetus to them — in 
order in a period of detente to reaffirm the 
significance of friends — we have to develop 
a new vision of the future. 

This is not done in the American interests ; 
it is done in the common interest. That is 
what we consider a "document of historic 
significance." 

We believe that it is achievable; we believe 
that some progress has been made; that 
process will now continue. As I think Mr. 
McCloskey [Ambassador Robert J. McClos- 
key] has already pointed out, I plan to be in 
England about October 15 to give a speech 
to the Pilgrims. On that occasion I plan to 
meet with several of my colleagues of the 
European Foreign Ministers. And we believe 
that we are now well underway, but we're 
not setting up any artificial deadlines. The 
outcome of the deliberations will determine 
the timing of the President's trip. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger — 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes ? 

Q. — if there is a delay in arriving at a 
consensus between, the United States and 
Europe on shared goals, are you concerned 
at all that this will have an effect in sloiving 



October 15, 1973 



479 



detente between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the sense that the subjects 
of detente are basically the question of Euro- 
pean security and mtitual and balanced force 
reductions, which are the matters being dis- 
cussed between the United States and 
Europe ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe, as detente 
progresses, that the redefinition of relation- 
ships with our friends in both Europe and 
Asia becomes very important, because so 
much of the original relationship was based 
on the fear of military aggression, which 
presumably would be lessened by the prog- 
ress of detente. 

Now, whether you can reverse this and 
say that if these negotiations slow down — 
that, I think, is much more problematical. 
Therefore I would rather phrase it posi- 
tively: that it is the duty of statesmanship 
in this period to see to it that relations among 
friends keep pace with relationships among 
former adversaries. And it does not make 
any sense that we should make slower prog- 
ress with our friends than we are making 
with our adversaries. We don't accept that 
proposition, and there's no reason for you 
to believe that that is what is going to hap- 
pen. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you envisage detente 
with Cuba as part of your definition of the 
policy force in Latin America? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I've stated our 
view with respect to Cuba before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. I think we 
will first have to discuss this question fully 
with our friends in Latin America before we 
can address this question. 

U.S. Role in the Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the average American 
regards the efforts of Dr. Henry Kissinger 
as being a prime motivation for working to- 
tvard a resolution of the Viet-Nam war. Now, 
as you become Secretary of State and you 
ttim your attempts to an area of the world 
like the Middle East, the average American 
might think tliat you could go in again and 



bnng about ivhat other people have not been 
able to accomplish. As you look toivard that 
troubled spot as you looked toivard Viet-Nam, 
hotv do you see your role and could you bring 
about something like that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, while I 
think it has been pointed out that humility 
is not my most distinctive trait [laughter], 
I do think it is important that foreign policy 
in this phase not be identified with one in- 
dividual or with virtuoso performances. 

When this administration came into office, 
we faced a series of emergency situations 
that had to be dealt with by emergency meas- 
ures. But if we are going to build truly, we 
have to construct a more permanent peace 
through more regular procedures and in a 
less personalized way. 

Now, with respect to the Middle East, it 
would be a great mistake to assume that any 
one man can pull a rabbit out of the hat. 
The difficulties in the Middle East occurred 
not because the parties don't understand each 
other but, in some respects, because they 
understand each other only too well. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

And we cannot substitute ourselves for the 
parties concerned. Even in Indochina — as our 
critics have often pointed out — it took four 
years to bring about a settlement, which also, 
incidentally, was the period of time that it 
took France to disengage in Algeria. 

In the Middle East, we are prepared to 
use our influence to urge the parties toward 
a spirit of compromise — to encourage them 
in the process of negotiation. But you can- 
not expect — and no one should ask us — to 
produce all the formulas and all the will as 
a substitute for that of the other parties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate voted today 
to reduce U.S. forces abroad hO percent in 
the next two years. Is that a good idea, and 
hotv will it affect the U.S. position and ne- 
gotiating capability in the talks on the mu- 
tual and balanced force reductions and the 
limiting of strategic weapons? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
the administration strongly opposes this type 
of resolution. It will be impossible to nego- 



480 



Department of State Bulletin 



tiate an agreement for the reduction of forces 
when the United States unilaterally accom- 
plishes what the negotiations are supposed 
to bring about. It will be vei-y difficult — if 
not impossible — to convince our alhes of the 
steadiness of American policy when the 
United States, again unilaterally, before our 
discussions have well advanced, reduces its 
forces in Europe. 

And I might point out that it is somewhat 
contradictory to be asked at one and the same 
time to conduct a foreign policy designed 
to bring about a transformation of the Soviet 
system and to cut one's forces for defense. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, 2jou mentioned — in your 
growing relationship with Europe, you men- 
tioned your concern tvith the countries of 
Japan and in Asia. Canada is one of the 
largest, if not the largest, trading partners 
tvith the United States today. Where do we 
fit in tvith your plans for Europe ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know — 
shall I repeat the question? As you know, 
I met with your Foreign Minister, and this 
obviously was a subject of conversation. 

Procedurally, Canada — as we are now en- 
visioning the procedure there will be at 
least two declarations : one between the 
United States and the Common Market and 
another dealing with the United States and 
NATO. Of course Canada is part of NATO 
and will be a full participant in the dis- 
cussions concerning NATO. 

With respect to the U.S. association with 
the Common Market, Canada is technically 
not part of it. We will proceed in closest 
consultation with Canada with respect to 
this, and we are openminded about an as- 
sociation that Canada may wish to make to 
such a declaration. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, now tvhat are your re- 
lations ivith Nigeria? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, it 
was impossible to cover every country in the 
world in the speech. I tried to convey that 
we will deal with Africa with understanding 
and with concern. Nigeria is, of course, one 
of the most important countries in Africa. 
It was visited by the Secretary of State two 
years ago. 

We understand that your President is 
visiting here, and we are hoping that he can 
also pay a call on us in Washington. 

So we consider Nigeria a very important, 
potentially decisive country in Africa. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 



Dr. Abshire Named Special Consultant 
on Congressional Affairs 

The Department of State announced on 
September 27 (press release 351) that Secre- 
tary Kissinger has asked David M. Abshire, 
chairman of the Georgetown University Cen- 
ter for Strategic and International Studies, 
to conduct a series of interviews with a broad 
and representative cross section of the Con- 
gress. (For biographic data, see press release 
351.) The purpose of the interviews is to ob- 
tain an authentic expression of congressional 
expectations and needs in connection with 
Secretary Kissinger's expressed intention to 
work very closely with the Congress on na- 
tional security and foreign relations problems. 
Dr. Abshire will seek the views of the Con- 
gress on the means by which a nonpartisan 
atmosphere and continuing program of close 
cooperation and broad understanding can be 
maintained between the executive and legis- 
lative branches. The interviews will take 
place over the next several weeks, after 
which Dr. Abshire will report to Secretary 
Kissinger his findings and recommendations. 



October 15, 1973 



481 



Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan Visits the United States 



Prime Minister Zidfikar AH Bhutto of Pak- 
istan made an official visit to the United 
States Seiitember 17-2i. He visited Wash- 
ington September 18-20, tvhere he met with 
President Nixon and other government offi- 
cials. Following are an exchange of greetings 
between President Nixon and Prime Minister 
Bhutto at a welcoming ceremony in the East 
Room of the White House on September 18, 
their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the 
White House that evening, and the text of a 
joint statement issued on September 20. 

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 24 

President Nixon 

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Bhutto, all of 
our distinguished guests from Pakistan, and 
all of our other distinguished guests from the 
United States: Mr. Prime Minister, you are 
no stranger to our country. You not only 
have made many visits here; we are very 
proud of the fact that in my native State of 
California you attended the great Univer- 
sity of California for three years. 

I am no stranger to your country. I have 
visited it with Mrs. Nixon when I was Vice 
President on two occasions, on two occasions 
or three occasions when I was out of office, 
and then again in 1969. 

As you come to our country today, how- 
ever, you come in a different capacity. For the 
first time, it is my honor on behalf of all our 
guests and the American people to welcome 
you as the head of your government. In wel- 
coming you, it gives me an opportunity to 
remind the American people and the people 
of Pakistan, and for that matter the people 
of the world, of the friendship that has 
bound our two countries together for over a 



generation. You, who have seen our country, 
know that friendship. I, who have visited 
your country, know it well. 

I can only say that it is a friendship that 
will continue in the years ahead. And I can 
add this: that the independence and the in- 
tegrity of Pakistan is a cornerstone of Amer- 
ican foreign policy. 

I can also add that our hearts have gone 
out to you in the difficult times through which 
Pakistan has passed over the past few 
months — and years, for that matter. And 
certainly you deserve the congratulations of 
the whole world for the way that you have 
guided your country in this era of trying to 
restore the nation after the ravages of war. 

And as if that were not enough, then to 
have come upon your country one of the 
worst floods in histoi-y would seem to have 
been too much for a brave people, as your 
people are brave, but also for a new leader. 

But even in that period, too, your people 
have shown that whether it is war or whether 
it happens to be the ravages of nature, you 
will survive and you will come through 
stronger in the end; and with your leader- 
ship, you have demonstrated that over and 
over again. 

In our meetings, we will of course discuss 
the bilateral issues which we have between 
us in which we find ourselves on basic agree- 
ment in so many areas. We will discuss what 
contribution we can make to an era of peace 
in the whole subcontinent, as well as in the 
balance of Asia. And I trust also we will have 
the opportunity to get your views on world 
problems generally, because no country in the 
world can any longer be apart from the rest 
of the world and what happens halfway 
around the world, in Pakistan, for example, 
affects us and what happens halfway around 



482 



Department of State Bulletin 



the world from you affects you. And so to- 
gether, I am sure that our talks will contrib- 
ute to not only better relations between our 
two countries but also a more peaceful world 
for our children in the years to come. 

And finally, on one, shall we say, symbolic 
note, as you know, we are having this cere- 
mony in the East Room and only a few of 
those who wanted to welcome you could be 
here. I woke quite early this morning, at 
7:30, and it was raining, and all of the 
splendid honor guard that had trained for 
weeks for your arrival were gone, and I 
thought of the fact that on your previously 
scheduled visit that I contracted pneumonia 
and you were unable to come at that time, 
and the rain was coming down and I re- 
luctantly gave the order, because we could 
not tell how long the rain would last, that we 
would move inside. 

But now as you arrive at 10:30 today, the 
skies have cleared. And so your country, 
which has had the ravages of floods, you now 
see clear skies — and I think these clear skies 
indicate that for the time ahead Pakistan 
and the United States can look forward to a 
better time, a time of peace and a time of 
progress. 

Prime Minister Bhutto 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, distinguished 
friends: Mr. President, your kind and gen- 
erous words of welcome are heartwarming, 
and I am overwhelmed by the sentiment you 
have expressed. 

As you have said, I have come to these 
shores before as a student and on many oc- 
casions as a representative of my country. I 
have seen the magnificent evolution of the 
relations between your great country and my 
country; vast oceans and continents separate 
our two peo])les, and yet there is an ease of 
communication and of understanding. 

Our relations are not burdened or encum- 
bered by modern postulations and sermoni- 
zations to each other. We share a host of 
common afl^inities despite the diversities and 
the distances that separate us. 

I can assure you, Mr. President, that the 



people of Pakistan warmly cherish their re- 
lationship with your country and your people. 

We are aware of the wholesome contribu- 
tion that your country and your government 
have made to the cause of peace and to the 
normalization of relations in the subconti- 
nent. We value your contribution, and as we 
admire the search you are making for a new 
international structure based on the concept 
of lasting peace which has eluded us so far, 
we feel confident that with the imagination 
you have demonstrated and the tenacity you 
have shown to evolve this structure of peace, 
that your eff"orts will succeed. And to what- 
ever extent Pakistan can travel with you on 
this magnificent search for a lasting peace, 
we will wholeheartedly offer that coopera- 
tion to the extent that our limited goal tra- 
verses with your worldwide responsibilities. 

The memories of the past are many, but 
I can assure you that these memories do not 
in any way displace or dispel the newness of 
this occasion when I come here to represent 
my country as its Prime Minister. 

I am looking forward to our discussions. 
We know that you are well acquainted with 
our problems. At one time it was said that 
in the recent past your administration tilted 
toward Pakistan. That, Mr. President, was 
a tilt for justice and a tilt for equity, which 
is chai'acteristic of your distinguished career 
as a statesman and a builder of peace. 

I am sorry that the ceremonies were some- 
what marred by the rains, but nothing can 
mar the eternal friendship and warmth be- 
tween our two peoples and that is more im- 
portant. It has augured well by the sudden 
reappearance of the blue skies, and I am glad 
that the blue skies are smiling at us. 

Thank you. 

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 24 

President Nixon 

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Bhutto and 
our distinguished guests from Pakistan and 
the United States: We are very honored, Mr. 
Prime Minister, to have you, Mrs. Bhutto, 



October 15, 1973 



483 



the members of your official party here in 
this room tonight, and we only regret that 
the room is so small that all of the friends 
that you have— and there are legions in this 
country— could not be here to honor you and 
to express their friendship for Pakistan and 
the people of Pakistan. 

On this occasion, I would like to speak in 
somewhat personal terms since this is essen- 
tially a dinner honoring you personally and 
your wife personally. I think of all of the 
leaders of great nations that have visited this 
country since I have had the privilege of be- 
ing here as President, and in a way I think I 
have known you longer — although we did not 
meet at the time — than any other, because in 
the year 1950, when I was a very young Con- 
gressman campaigning for the United States 
Senate, you were a very young student at the 
University of California. And so, while we 
did not meet, we knew each other, in a way. 
[Laughter.] 

Much has happened since then. Neither of 
us would have guessed that, in 1950, in 1953 
we would meet again in Pakistan, when you 
were still very young. You and Mrs. Bhutto 
had been married only two years, and Mrs. 
Nixon and I were so honored to meet you 
then at the residence of our Ambassador on 
our first trip around the world. 

In 1964 there was another meeting. I 
should not really disclose this to such a large 
group, but this is a group that is so small 
that a secret can be kept. [Laughter.] And 
in Washington that is saying a very great 
deal today. But in 1964, I met Mrs. Bhutto 
again, at a private party at which her hus- 
band was not present and my wife was not 
present. [Laughter.] I was traveling around 
the world by myself with a friend on a busi- 
ness trip, and the Prime Minister was on his 
official duties traveling abroad. 

And then, of course, again we have had the 
occasion of meeting, particularly just two 
days before the Prime Minister assumed his 
present duties. 

Now, what I have just referred to is not 
meant to be simply a personal recounting of 
our association but is to make a point. And 
it is this: Pakistan and the United States of 



America have been friends since the time 
that Pakistan became an independent nation. 
I, as an American, sometimes in office and 
sometimes out — out not at my own choice 
[laughter] — but nevertheless, I can assure 
you that Pakistan and the people of Pakistan 
have always been very close to my heart. I 
admire them, I respect them, as do all of the 
people, Mr. Prime Minister, in this room and 
many others across this nation. That friend- 
ship has lasted through a generation, and it 
will continue to last, and it will last for rea- 
sons that we do not need to go into now. But 
one of the reasons that appeals to me particu- 
larly to mention on this occasion relates to 
what could have been a total national dis- 
aster for your nation, a natural and national 
disaster of the past few months. I refer to 
the floods that have been ravaging your coun- 
try just at a time that with your leadership 
the nation was moving on after the very 
difficult and traumatic experience of war. 
I asked your wife, Mr. Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Bhutto, what was the spirit of the peo- 
ple. I said none of the leaders, none of the 
Members of Parliament, but the peasants, 
the others, the people that worked the land — 
were they discouraged, were they giving up 
after a war and after all of the bloodshed 
and the tragedy and now the flood. 

And her answer, it seems to me, tells us 
something about Pakistan and also some- 
thing about human nature generally that is 
quite profound. 

She said, no, as she visited the areas most 
ravaged by the floods and talked to the farm- 
ers and their wives, they did not talk about 
the past. They said, yes, the floods had de- 
stroyed their crops for this year, but the 
floods had brought new silt into the land and 
the land would be richer for the crops next 
year. 

And so, rather than looking backward, 
they were looking forward. Rather than 
letting adversity destroy them, they were 
proving the profound truth that from ad- 
versity grows strength. 

And this is the story of Pakistan and of 
many other countries, including our own, 



484 



Department of Sfate Bulletin 



from time to time. Pakistan has had more 
than its share of adversity in recent years, 
but out of that adversity has come a stronof 
l)eoi)ie, 65 million in numbers, and out of that 
adversity has come a strong- leader, our 
Prime Minister, who is our guest today, his 
wife, and tlie members of his official party. 

And in paying our respects to him, to his 
l)eoiile, we do so because we have an official 
obligation to do so which we welcome, but 
also because of a deep personal respect which 
I have tried to convey, because of a deep 
personal friendship which I have tried to 
convey. 

And so I know all of you in this room and 
many others who could not be here would like 
to join me in our toast to the friendship be- 
tween the people of Pakistan and the people 
of the United States and express that friend- 
ship by raising our glasses to the health of 
the Prime Minister. 

Prime Minister Bhutto 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, distinguished 
guests and friends: Mr. President, you have 
been most gracious in your remarks, and you 
have said that this is an intimate gathering 
of friends. I will proceed from that point. 

Since it is an intimate gathering of friends, 
with your permission I would like to tell 
them about our discussions, the inner truth 
of our talks. 

We discussed three matters: economic 
matters, cultural matters, and military mat- 
ters. I don't know how, but cultural and mili- 
tary matters got intertwined, perhaps be- 
cause Dr. Kissinger was there. [Laughter.] 
And we discussed these highly complicated 
liroblems. We were told that since military 
and cultural matters are interrelated, we 
must know that Jill St. John is booked for the 
Soviet Union [laughter] and Raquel Welch 
is earmarked for China [laughter] — as far 
as our old friend Pakistan is concerned, Tal- 
lulah Bankhead is there, available for Paki- 
stan. 

President Nixo^v What do we get? 
[Laughter.] 



Prime Minister Bhutto: So we said we are 
old friends, but not in that sense. [Laughter.] 
And then we were told that that is all we can 
do. And that also is true of either Saudi 
Arabia or Iran. So we told our friends can- 
didly that what we are interested in is not 
obsolete sjjare parts, but in red-hot weapons. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. President, I have been in your great 
country as a student. You have made men- 
tion of it, and my sojourn here was a warm 
one. It is here that I came to respect the 
vitality of the people, and I remember that 
on one occasion in 1949 I was standing out- 
side your White House — -this distinguished 
house, resplendent with history — and I was 
standing by the rails looking at it — its archi- 
tecture, its beauty. And a Negro friend, a 
gentleman passing by, stood by as well. And 
we both had our hands on the railing. He 
looked at me and asked me from which coun- 
try I came, and I told him from where I came, 
and he said that, "If you were an American, 
what would you like to be?" 

So I said, "If I were an American, I would 
like to be inside that house." [Laughter.] 

So he told me that, "You better get the hell 
out of this country because we are going 
crazy picking the man for the house itself in 
our own country." 

But that is how the past is, and it is re- 
membered vividly. We know that you have 
been a good friend of our country, not in the 
subjective sense, because you have known 
that Pakistan has been a good friend of the 
United States, and I don't use this word in its 
chauvinistic sense, in the sense of its past 
chivalry. 

The world has changed, and we must learn 
to adjust ourselves to the changes. 

If you ask me, sir, what we have to offer 
to your great country, I would tell you can- 
didly: nothing. We are not a nuclear power; 
we are not a technologically advanced country. 
There is nothing we can offer in that sense; 
but there is something which we can offer to 
you as your friends, and that is that our 
country stands by its i)ledges. Our country is 
dedicated to its principles according to its 



October 15, 1973 



485 



own light, and we have shown in the exist- 
ence of Pakistan that in the last 25 years no 
matter what the price — and sometimes we 
have had to pay a very heavy price — but we 
have stood by our principles and our pledges. 

And if there is any place for us in your 
big wide world, please do remember that, 
that although you might not need the friend- 
ship, or the assistance, or collaboration of my 
country far away from yours, it is a country 
which is allied to your country. It is a coun- 
try which has stood by its commitments and 
pledges with your country throughout the 
vicissitudes and buffets of life, and we have 
every intention of doing so in the future. 

This is our outlook, and this is our concep- 
tion of our relationship with the United 
States. We have admired, Mr. President, 
your own contribution to a new world order, 
and when the history of this country is writ- 
ten, and when the history of the great 
Presidents of the United States is penned, 
what will they say of President Nixon? 

As far as we are concerned, not only as a 
Pakistani but as an Asian coming from Asia, 
I can tell you that at least my history books, 
the history books of my country, will say here 
was a great and a lofty President who broke 
the barriers of prejudice and who chalked 
out a bold new policy according to the finest 
traditions of American history and brought 
lieace to a tormented part of the world. 

There will be a stamp on the Viet-Nam 
chapter; there will be your mark on your re- 
lations with the People's Republic of China; 
there will be your image and your sign on 
your relations witli the Soviet Union. 

To us in Asia, these are very important 
pillars, and we feel that the world would 
have been further tormented if you had not 
taken these sjilendid initiatives for peace in 
that part of the world where most of the 
humanity lives in. And this is not how we 
alone feel ; this is how many of the other 
countries in Asia feel. 

So history will pay rich and glowing 
tributes to your statesmanship, not only as 
an American President but as a world states- 
man. 



When we look on the future in this light, 
the present trivialities will be brushed aside 
and a more glorious people dedicated to the 
cause of eternal peace will emerge. And in 
that struggle and in that quest, you, Mr. 
President, will be in the forefront. 

This is how we see your role, as the leader 
of the free world — if that expression is used 
any more — as the leader of Western civiliza- 
peace and international tranquility. 

So, ladies and gentlemen, on behalf of my 
friends from Pakistan, let me salute the 
American people and their great President 
for their everlasting contribution to world 
peace and international tranquillity. 

Thank you. 



TEXT OF JOINT PAKISTAN-U.S. STATEMENT 

President Nixon and Prime Minister Bhutto of 
Pakistan have held two cordial and wide-ranging 
working discussions during the Prime Minister's 
visit to Washington September 18-20. The meetings 
gave the President and the Prime Minister an oppor- 
tunity to renew their personal friendship and to 
discuss matters of common interest to Pakistan and 
the United States. Both President Nixon and Prime 
Minister Bhutto reviewed and welcomed the progress 
made in the past eighteen months in enhancing 
peaceful relations throughout the world and in re- 
ducing tension between the major powers. The lead- 
ers pledged their continuing efforts to build a just 
and lasting peace, based on principles of national 
sovereignty and equality, respect for territorial in- 
tegrity, and non-interference in the internal affairs 
of any state. They also reaffirmed the close ties of 
friendship that have long characterized relations 
between the United States and Pakistan. President 
Nixon assured Prime Minister Bhutto of strong U.S. 
support for Pakistan's independence and territorial 
integrity, which he considered a guiding principle 
of American foreign policy. 

President Nixon took the opportunity to congrat- 
ulate Prime Minister Bhutto on the progress Pak- 
istan has made over the past twenty months. He 
noted the successes of the Prime Minister of Pak- 
istan in establishing representative government un- 
der a democratic constitution recently adopted by 
the National Assembly, and in restoring the war- 
shattered economy of Pakistan, which has unfor- 
tunately received a serious set-back in the recent 
unprecedented floods. 

Prime Minister Bhutto voiced his warm apprecia- 
tion for the generous American response to Paki- 



486 



Department of State Bulletin 



Stan's severe flood losses. The two leaders discussed 
additional needs and ways in which the United 
States and the international community might be 
responsive. President Nixon pledged additional as- 
sistance and vigorous support for international re- 
lief efforts. 

The two leaders also discussed Pakistan's long- 
term assistance needs. They reviewed the substan- 
tial assistance which the United States has extended 
to Pakistan. President Nixon noted the importance 
which the United States attaches to Pakistan's 
stable development and reviewed for the Prime Min- 
ister plans for future assistance. 

Prime Minister Bhutto reviewed for the President 
the Simla Agreement of July 1972, and the New 
Delhi Agreement of August 28, 1973, calling for 
repatriation of prisoners of war and other stranded 
persons from the 1971 war between India and Pak- 
istan. The President congratulated Prime Minister 
Bhutto on his statesmanship in reaching the agree- 
ments. President Nixon reiterated the United States' 
warm support for the process of reconciliation un- 
derway in South Asia, and expressed the United 
States' interest in expeditious implementation of the 
agreements and in the resolution of other outstand- 
ing issues in South Asia through peaceful means in 
accordance with internationally recognized prin- 
ciples. 

There was also a discussion of international nar- 
cotics problems. President Nixon welcomed Prime 
Minister Bhutto's recent statement pledging efforts 
to control narcotics traffic and progressively to elim- 
inate poppy cultivation. The President assured the 
Prime Minister of strong U.S. support for Pak- 
istan's efforts. 



U.S. Alternate Governors of IMF 
and International Banks Confirmed 

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the 
nomination of Arthur F. Burns to be U.S. 
Alternate Governor of the International 
Monetary Fund for a term of five years. 

The Senate on that day confirmed the nom- 
ination of William J. Casey to be U.S. Al- 
ternate Governor of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development for a 
term of five years; U.S. Alternate Governor 
of the Inter-American Development Bank for 
a term of five years and until his successor 
has been appointed; and U.S. Alternate Gov- 
ernor of the Asian Development Bank. 



U.S. and Europe To Cooperate 
in Space Shuttle Program 

Following is a Department antiouiicement 
issued September 2k, together with the text 
of a commimiqiie signed at Washington that 
day by Acting Secretary Rush and Charles 
Hanin, Chairman, European Space Confer- 
ence. 

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT 

Press release 342 dated September 24 

At a ceremony at the Dei)artment of State 
on September 24, Acting Secretary Rush and 
Charles Hanin, Belgian Science Minister and 
Chairman of the European Space Confer- 
ence, signed a communique noting the com- 
pletion of arrangements for European partic- 
ipation in the Space Shuttle program and 
marking the beginning of a new era in U.S.- 
European space cooperation. In the same 
ceremony Dr. James C. Fletcher, NASA Ad- 
ministrator, and Dr. Alexander Hocker, Di- 
rector General of the European Space 
Research Organization (ESRO), signed a 
memorandum of understanding to implement 
this unprecedented international cooperative 
project. 

Nine European countries, through ESRO, 
undertake to design, develop, manufacture, 
and deliver a "Spacelab" flight unit which 
will be an important element of the U.S. 
Space Shuttle system. The Spacelab will be 
carried in the Space Shuttle Orbiter, which 
will look like a delta-winged airplane about 
the size of a large jetliner. The Spacelab will 
have two elements : a pressurized manned 
laboratory module permitting scientists and 
engineers to work in a normal shirt-sleeve 
environment and an instrument platform, or 
pallet, to support telescopes, antennas, and 
other equipment requiring direct space 
exposure. 

The Spacelab module and pallet will be 
transported, either separately or together, to 
and from orbit in the orbiter payload bay 
and will be attached to and supported by the 



October 15, 1973 



487 



Space Shuttle Orbiter throughout missions 
lasting seven to thirty days. At the end of 
each flight the orbiter will make a runway 
landing, and the Spacelab will be removed 
and prepared for its next mission. 

The NASA-ESRO agreement represents a 
major step in the sharing of space costs 
between the United States and European 
countries participating in this cooperative 
project. The estimated cost of $300-$400 mil- 
lion for the Spacelab will be borne by the 
ESRO countries involved. 

The European Spacelab represents a sig- 
nificant contribution to the space transporta- 
tion system in an area not funded by the 
United States. It jn-ovides for the timely 
availability of a supporting system impor- 
tant to realizing the full potential of the 
shuttle; it will also facilitate joint use pro- 
grams, many entailing the activities of U.S. 
and European astronauts. 

Under the terms of the memorandum of 
understanding, NASA will procure from 
ESRO any additional Spacelab units of the 
same basic design which may be needed for 
U.S. programs. The United States will not 
develop any unit of its own which would 
substantially duplicate the design and capa- 
bilities of the first Spacelab. 

It is currently planned that the first oper- 
ational space flight of the shuttle will occur 
in late 1979. To permit adequate time for 
experiment integration, checkout, and com- 
patibility testing, the Spacelab unit will be 
delivered about one year earlier. 

Subsequent to the delivery of the Space- 
lab by ESRO, NASA will manage all opera- 
tional activities, including crew training and 
flight operations. Flight crew opportunities 
will be provided in conjunction with flight 
projects sponsored by ESRO or by govern- 
ments participating in the Spacelab iirogram 
and utilizing the Spacelab. It is contemplated 
that there will be a European member of the 
flight crew of the first Spacelab crew. 

While it is too early to define detailed 
terms and conditions for subsequent opera- 
tion and use of the shuttle with the Space- 



lab, the United States will make the shuttle 
available for Spacelab missions on either a 
cooperative (noncost) or a cost-reimbursable 
basis. In the latter case, the costs of the 
launching services provided would be 
charged as they are at present for reimburs- 
able launches of foreign satellites. 

The memorandum of understanding is sub- 
ject to and implements a government-level 
agreement between nine European nations 
and the United States which was opened for 
signature at Paris August 14. 

Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States have signed the intergov- 
ernmental agreement. The agreement makes 
provision for participation by additional 
nations. 



TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE 

Today marks the beginning of a new era in space 
cooperation between the United States of America 
and member nations of the European Space Con- 
ference as arrangements are completed for Euro- 
pean participation in the Space Shuttle Program. 

The extensive cooperation achieved in space ac- 
tivities in the past has already brought great sat- 
isfaction to the international community. The 
contributions to science and the welfare of man 
that have resulted are of considerable significance. It 
is our conviction that further cooperation will result 
not only in additional scientific, technical and eco- 
nomic benefits, but should further strengthen the 
ties of friendship between peoples. 

The Agreement between participating member na- 
tions of the European Space Conference and the 
United States of America signed in Paris August 
14, 1973, and the Memorandum of Understanding 
between the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration and the European Space Research Or- 
ganization signed this date in Washington, D.C. 
pertaining to the development, procurement and use 
of a space laboratory in conjunction with the Space 
Shuttle extend US/European space cooperation to 
the Post Apollo era in a closer and even more prom- 
ising form. 



Charles Hanin 

Chair7na7i, 
European Space 
Conference 



Kenneth Rush 
Acting Secretary of State 



488 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Reports to Congress on Visa Operations 

I 

Statement by Curtis W. Tarr 

Acting Deputy Under Secretary for Management ^ 



Mr. Chairman : I welcome this opportunity 
to meet with you and the other members of 
the committee to discuss the visa operations 
of the Department of State and its Foreign 
Service posts abroad, a subject that we in 
the Department of State consider of the ut- 
most importance. I might add that the Dep- 
uty Secretary is aware of this problem 
because I have talked with him about it 
numerous times in the past and he shares 
my concern. My colleagues and I will be 
happy to try to answer any questions the 
committee may have about our visa opera- 
tions. I believe, however, that it would be 
useful initially to describe some aspects of 
these operations, particularly as they relate 
to the illegal alien problem. I believe such a 
description may provide a better understand- 
ing of our role and our responsibilities in 
this matter as we see them. 

Under the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, U.S. consular officers abroad are re- 
sponsible for, among other things, the grant- 
ing or refusing of both immigrant and 
nonimmigrant visas to aliens seeking to come 
to the United States. The issuance of visas 
is a major consular function both in terms 
of importance to various U.S. interests and 
in terms of the allocation of resources for 
consular functions. I might add here that I 
attach great importance, as the members of 

'Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Citizenship, and International Law of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on Sept. 13. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



the committee do, to the image of the United 
States as presented by visa officers. When I 
was the Director of the Selective Service 
I felt the same way about our Selective Serv- 
ice local boards, who in their contact with 
young 18-year-old Americans made the first 
real relationship between the U.S. Govern- 
ment and the young Americans. 

I think it is critically important that we 
try to impress people with the kind of nation 
we are in the immediate contact that we 
have both with our own citizenry and those 
abroad who may become citizens or, hope- 
fully, friends of the United States for some 
time to come. 

Under the law, certain quantitative and 
qualitative restrictions are placed upon 
aliens seeking to become permanent residents 
of the United States. There is an annual 
numerical limitation of 120,000 on immigra- 
tion to the United States by natives of 
independent countries of the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Likewise, there is an annual numeri- 
cal limitation of 170,000 on immigration to 
the United States by natives of all other 
countries and areas of the world. The only 
aliens not subject to such numerical limita- 
tions are those who come within the defini- 
tion of "immediate relatives" in the law (for 
example, the spouse or child of a U.S. citi- 
zen) and certain other narrowly defined and 
numerically insignificant classes of aliens 
(for e-xample, returning resident aliens, min- 
isters of religion) . 

An alien who does not qualify as an im- 
mediate relative nor, in the case of Eastern 
Hemisphere natives, come within a pref- 



October 15, 1973 



489 



erence category for close relatives of U.S. 
citizens or permanent residents must obtain 
a certification from the Department of Labor 
that there is a shortage of qualified workers 
in the United States with the skills pos- 
sessed by him and that his employment will 
not adversely affect the wages and working 
conditions of workers in the United States 
similarly employed. Therefore the first step 
for a would-be immigrant is to establish his 
status in relation to these requirements. 

Some of these determinations are made by 
agencies other than the Department of State. 
For example, the Immigration and Natural- 
ization Service is normally responsible for 
determining the relationship of the applicant 
to a U.S. citizen or permanent resident that 
would entitle him to immediate relative or 
some preference status. The Department of 
Labor is responsible for determining whether 
there is a shortage of the applicant's skills 
in the United States. But ultimately all the 
documentation is submitted to a consular of- 
ficer at one of our 178 Foreign Service posts 
that issue immigrant visas. It is the consular 
oflficer who must pass on the validity of most 
of the documentation submitted and who 
must determine the numerical limitation to 
which the alien is subject as well as whether 
he comes within any of the 30-odd categories 
of ineligibility. These cover, for example, 
aliens who are insane, have been convicted 
of crimes involving moral turpitude, are or 
were members of a Communist organization, 
or are likely to become a public charge. 

Because of the numerical limitations on 
both Eastern and Western Hemisphere im- 
migration, the immigrant visa workload, 
in terms of numbers of immigrant visas 
issued, does not show wide annual variations. 
In recent years an average of some 300,000 
immigrant visas have been issued annually. 
However, this figure does not accurately re- 
flect the immigrant visa workload of our 
consular officers. In addition to cases in 
which the applicant is determined to be 
ineligilile for an immigrant visa, many more 
qualified immigrants apply than there are 
visa numbers immediately available. For ex- 
ample, a Western Hemisphere applicant now 



faces a waiting period of almost two years 
from the date he qualifies. Although immi- 
grant visas constitute about 10 percent of 
all visa issuances, because of extensive doc- 
umentary and other requirements the immi- 
grant visa function consumes more than half 
of the manpower resources allocated to the 
visa function. 

In contrast to the relatively stable immi- 
grant visa workload, the nonimmigrant visa 
workload has been increasing dramatically, 
particularly in the last decade. In fiscal year 
1963 some 800,000 nonimmigrant visas were 
issued to aliens to come to the United States 
temporarily for purposes such as business, 
pleasure, study, or temporary employment. 
In fiscal year 1973, 10 years later, this num- 
ber approached 3 million, an increase of 
some 275 percent. As with immigrant visas, 
the number of nonimmigrant visas issued 
does not necessarily give a true picture of 
nonimmigrant visa workload. While nonim- 
migrant visa issuance was increasing 275 
percent over this period, refusals of nonim- 
migrant visas rose some 400 percent. Indeed, 
more time normally is required to decide the 
case of the applicant ultimately determined 
to be ineligible for a nonimmigrant visa than 
that of the eligible applicant. 

The nonimmigrant visa application process 
itself is relatively simple. The alien com- 
pletes an application form and submits it, 
together with his valid passport and any ap- 
propriate supporting documents, to one of 
our 242 posts that issue nonimmigrant visas. 
After a name check is run, the application is 
submitted to the consular ofliicer for a deci- 
sion. In some cases, primarily those involving 
applicants for visitor visas, the personal ap- 
pearance requii-ement may be waived. But in 
such instances, the applicant must complete 
the application form which contains most of 
the questions that the consular officer would 
ask in an interview. The consular officer, 
after examining the application form and 
supporting papers, decides whether he should 
interview the applicant personally. 

Our visa procedures are intended to in- 
sure, so far as is possible, that only those 
aliens who intend to come to this country 



490 



Department of State Bulletin 



temporarily will receive a nonimmigrant 
visa. The problem faced by the consular of- 
ficer is to determine that these are indeed the 
intentions of the visa applicant. This is of 
course an extremely difficult task. In consid- 
ering' an application for a nonimmigrant 
visa, the consular officer must be satisfied by 
the evidence presented, including the ap- 
plicant's own statements, that the applicant 
is not someone who will need or is likely to 
seek employment while in this country and 
that he has a residence abroad to which he 
intends to return after completing his visit, 
his studies, or other purpose of his trip. The 
consular officer normally has only a short 
time to try to ascertain what is in the mind 
of a person he usually has never seen before. 
Moreover, even if the consular officer has 
judged correctly, the alien who applied in 
good faith as a visitor may later, at the urg- 
ing of relatives or friends, change his mind 
and decide to remain here. 

The kinds of misrepresentation encoun- 
tered by consular officers in visa work vary 
greatly. However, they usually consist of dif- 
ferent types of verbal misrepresentation and, 
as is also the case in connection with immi- 
grant visa applications, various kinds of 
fraudulent documentation. Some applicants 
may simply misrepresent or omit facts which 
would result in refusal of the visa. Others 
present false letters from employers, false 
bank statements, false birth or marriage 
certificates, or other false documents indicat- 
ing ties that would normally compel them to 
return to their home country. 

The instances of would-be immigrants 
seeking to enter the United States as tempo- 
rary visitors or in some other nonimmigrant 
status vary markedly from one foreign area 
to another, as do the instances of visa re- 
fusals. Many circumstances enter into this 
picture : local economic conditions, the length 
of waiting period for an immigrant visa, 
the cost of travel to the United States, the 
presence or absence in the United States of 
sizable numbers of fellow countrymen. Con- 
sequently the volume of visa refusals varies 
from country to country. For example, in 
fiscal year 1973 some 44 percent of all non- 



immigrant visa applications at Guadalajara 
were refused, as were 35 percent at Santo 
Domingo. However, the refusal rate was only 
1.5 percent at Brussels and 0.1 percent at 
Tokyo. These variances point up the fact 
that because of different economic, cultural, 
and other conditions in different countries it 
is not possible to judge the efficiency of dif- 
ferent Foreign Service posts merely by look- 
ing at the number of visas issued per officer 
assigned. 

Each time a visa is refused, a record of 
that refusal is made at the post where the 
alien applied. This information may also be 
disseminated immediately to other nearby 
posts in case the alien who has been refused 
seeks to apply for a visa elsewhere. To assist 
high-volume posts, the Department in 1966 
established an electronic name-check file in 
which refusal data is stored on a current 
basis in a computer and can be immediately 
retrieved by posts connected to the system. 
Thus far twelve posts in Europe, two in Can- 
ada, seven in Latin America, and three in 
East Asia are connected to the computer. 

We also work closely with the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service both in Washing- 
ton and in the field to insure that our re- 
spective efforts to deal with the illegal alien 
problem in its various aspects are mutually 
reinforcing. In the final analysis, however, 
it is undeniable, as stressed by one consular 
post after another, that the principal incen- 
tive for the illegal alien is the prospect of 
finding a comparatively high-paying job in 
the United States. We believe that H.R. 982, 
formulated by this committee and enacted by 
the House of Representatives, is an impor- 
tant first step in dealing with this aspect of 
the problem. But we also believe that we can 
and must do a better job on our part. 

It has been suggested by some that in our 
enthusiasm to facilitate travel to the United 
States for balance of payments reasons, we 
have put too much emphasis on the issuance 
of a high volume of nonimmigrant visas at 
the expense of the quality of decisions made 
by consular officers in individual cases. Some 
point to statistics showing that, as compared 



October 15, 1973 



491 



with 1963, our Foreign Service posts are now- 
issuing 275 percent more nonimmigrant 
visas with 8 percent fewer personnel. Of 
course some of this increased productivity is 
attributable to measures we have taken over 
the last decade to streamline visa procedures, 
such as the waiver of personal appearance in 
certain cases, the indefinite validity visa, 
and the automated visa name-check system. 
But it is still argued that the constantly in- 
creasing nonimmigrant visa workload simply 
requires more consular officers to perform 
the job in order to give each consular officer 
more time to consider each case. There is 
no question in my mind that more personnel 
are needed to perform the visa function, and 
we are seeking additional consular positions 
in our present fiscal 1974 budget and intend 
to do so for fiscal 1975 in our recommenda- 
tions to the Office of Management and 
Budget. 

In August of this year, we organized a 
special nonimmigrant visa survey team to 
visit selected posts abroad and to report to 
me on steps that might be taken to enhance 
our performance in this area. The team, 
under the direction of a senior State Depart- 
ment ofl^cer, has returned and is preparing 
a series of recommendations which would 
improve local management of the program, 
strengthen our capacity to meet increased 
visa workload requirements, and introduce 
new approaches to insure a high standard of 
professionalism among consular officers. 

Of course the visa function must compete 
in the resource allocation process not only 
with other parts of the Department but with 
other consular functions. In addition to the 
Visa Office, the Bureau of Security and Con- 
sular Affairs encompasses the Passport Of- 
fice and the Office of Special Consular 
Services. The Passport Ofl^ce is responsible 
for the issuance of passpoils to U.S. citizens, 
both in this country and abroad, and the de- 
termination of U.S. citizenship of persons 
outside the United States. The Ofl^ce of Spe- 
cial Consular Services is responsible for a 
wide range of services to Amei'ican citizens 
abroad including assistance to Americans 
under arrest, payment of Federal benefits 



such as social security, veterans pensions, 
et cetera, to Americans abroad, and the re- 
turn to the United States of remains of 
Americans who die abroad. As more Ameri- 
cans travel and live abroad and, unfor- 
tunately, are arrested or die abroad, the 
manpower requirements of these consular 
functions increase. And it is not a simple 
matter to separate these functions for pur- 
poses of workload measurement and resource 
allocation, because at some 65 percent of our 
posts the individual consular officer divides 
his time among the three consular functions 
depending on the demand for particular con- 
sular services. 

In the past two years we have sought to 
improve our workload measurements in or- 
der to provide as accurate a picture as pos- 
sible of resource requirements in the consular 
field. But no yardstick — such as visas or 
passports issued or refused or man-hours 
expended on a particular consular function — 
will accurately measure quality. Nor, I sub- 
mit, is quality to be insured merely by 
providing more consular officers. 

Prior to the Rogers Act of 1924 the con- 
sular service and the diplomatic service were 
separate entities. The Rogers Act combined 
the two into the Foi-eign Service, and this 
move toward unification was fully reafl^irmed 
in the Foreign Service Act of 1946. All of- 
ficers in the Foreign Service today are For- 
eign Service officers and assignable to any 
Foreign Service position. At the same time, 
we recognize that some degree of specializa- 
tion remains desirable if we are to achieve 
the high degree of professionalism we seek. 
To this end we have four major fields of 
specialization, or cones, as we call them: 
These are consular, administrative, economic, 
and political. We now recruit oflJicers specif- 
ically for one of these four fields. Entrance 
examinations vary somewhat depending on 
the field for which an applicant opts. The 
careers of successful candidates will be de- 
veloped primarily in the fields they have 
chosen, but they will also be given training 
and assignments designed to give them a 
broad exposure to other facets of Foreign 
Service work. 



492 



Department of State Bulletin 



We believe that we are much more likely 
to obtain high-quality personnel for the 
consular as well as other fields if officers are 
recruited on the basis of their interest in, 
and a commitment to pursue, a career pri- 
marily in the field of their choice. In addi- 
tion to this threshold step, we have taken 
other measures to enhance the consular 
career. We have designated a number of 
constituent posts — that is, consulates gen- 
eral, not Embassies — where the consular 
function is the most important of the post's 
responsibilities as posts which should be 
headed by consular specialists. We have al- 
ready filled a number of these with senior 
consular officers. We believe that reserving 
such positions for consular officers will in- 
sure high quality in the performance of con- 
sular functions at these posts. In doing this, 
we are also mindful of the frequent criticism 
that there are too few senior positions in the 
Foreign Service to which an officer special- 
izing in consular affairs can aspire. 

We plan to put added emphasis on pro- 
fessional enrichment for consular oflicers, 
including management and midcareer uni- 
versity training. We are considering reinsti- 
tuting the requirement that every new 
Foreign Service officer, whatever his in- 
tended specialty, take basic consular officer 
training. We are also considering increased 
language training for consular officers; for 
the consular officer, perhaps more than any 
other, needs and can utilize a host country 
language capability. 

In short, we believe that we not only need 
to increase the number of consular officers 
available to meet the rising demand for visas 
and other consular services but need to im- 
prove the quality of these services by improv- 
ing the quality of officers who perform them. 
Such improvement is inevitably a gradual 
process. But I am hopeful that we have taken 
the appropriate first steps to achieve it. 

Mr. Chairman, we are mindful of the com- 
mittee's concern with this aspect of the 
Department's operations not only in the 
context of the illegal alien problem but also 
in connection with the committee's other 
oversight responsibilities. I can assure you 



that we will be responsive to the committee's 
concern and receptive to any suggestions it 
may wish to make for improving the way in 
which we carry out our responsibilities under 
the law. 



U.S. Participation in the U.N. 
During 1972 

Folloiving is the text of a message from 
President Nixon dated September 6 trans- 
mitting to the Congress the annual report on 
U.S. ])articipation in the United Nations for 
calendar year 1972.^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress 
the 27th annual report on United States par- 
ticipation in the work of the United Nations 
during calendar year 1972. 

This report reflects the increasing range of 
global concerns with which United Nations 
agencies are dealing. It highlights not only 
the opportunities but also the limits of oper- 
ating through the United Nations system 
during an era of growing international in- 
terdependence. 

In recent years, United Nations agencies 
have come to deal increasingly with the eco- 
nomic and technical agenda of the world in 
addition to the long-standing agenda of peace 
and security questions. Indeed, as this ac- 
count makes clear, these agencies are now 
engaged in some manner in virtually every 
governmental activity that crosses national 
lines. 

The United States participated actively in 
these cooperative efforts to help safeguard 
peace and lessen world tensions, to foster 
economic and social progress, and to cope 
with a wide array of legal and technological 
problems. 



'"U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the 
President to the Congress for the Year 1972"; for 
sale by the U.S. Government Printing- Office Book- 
store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 
(Department of State publication 87.31, GPO cat. 
no. SI. 70:8731, 232 pp., $1.75). 



October 15, 1973 



493 



Three themes characterized our partici- 
pation during 1972: 

(1) Even though we recognized the limi- 
tations of the United Nations in solving or 
even abating many political disputes, we sup- 
ported its participation where appropriate to 
reconcile such disputes, to curb international 
terrorism and outbreaks of violence, and to 
devise workable arrangements for peacekeep- 
ing operations. In order to serve the long- 
term interest of the international community, 
we worked in the General Assembly, the Se- 
curity Council, and subsidiary bodies to have 
the United Nations deal evenhandedly and 
pragmatically with such politically-charged 
issues as the Middle East, decolonization, and 
human rights. 

(2) We took the lead in seeking new ar- 
rangements and institutions to deal with 
worldwide social and technological concerns. 
Although we encountered some resistance, we 
pressed forward toward the goals of assuring 
the safety of civil aviation, protecting the en- 
vironment, checking the illicit flow of nar- 
cotics, organizing relief for victims of 
disaster, strengthening the law of the sea, 
and slowing world population growth. 

(3) We stressed the importance of having 
the United Nations act responsibly, equita- 
bly, and efficiently in ordering its financial 
and administrative affairs so that it could 
carry out its tasks more effectively. Progress 
was made in holding down the budgets of 
some agencies, budgeting procedures were 
improved, and the principle of a lower maxi- 
mum ceiling for the United States assessment 
was endorsed. Nevertheless, the underlying 
financial problems were not solved and fur- 
ther administrative and procedural reforms 
are needed in the United Nations. 

This report shows that, despite political 
and administrative shortcomings, multilat- 
eral agencies connected with the United Na- 
tions offered practical responses to worldwide 
prol)lems of iiressing concern to the Ameri- 
can people. Given the fast pace of political, 
social, and technological change in recent 
years, it is not surprising that the record of 
accomplishments was uneven and there were 
setbacks as well as successes. 



During 1972 developments at the United 
Nations were affected by certain long-term 
trends which both hold promise and pose 
problems for effective United Nations action. 

— The loosening of old antagonisms, the 
entry of the People's Republic of China into 
the mainstream of United Nations work, and 
the growing importance of powers such as 
Japan could in the long run enable a near- 
universal United Nations to become a more 
effective instrument for dealing with serious 
world political and security problems. 

— However, we also have to recognize that 
the continuing tendency to use the United 
Nations for propaganda advantage and to 
pursue political rivalries makes accommo- 
dation more difficult. For the near term, 
where the interests of its strongest members 
are engaged, the organization can deal only 
in a limited way with highly contentious po- 
litical issues. 

— The emergence in United Nations bod- 
ies and conferences of an active majority 
led by a number of the developing nations 
continued to make for some distortions in 
determining the areas of greatest United 
Nations attention. While we fully recognize 
the inherent right of all member nations to 
be heard, the voting weight of this majority, 
with its sometimes narrowly defined preoc- 
cupations, has tended to create imbalance 
and to place strains on the effective function- 
ing of the organization. 

This report reflects the growing cohesion 
which has taken place among the third 
world countries, notably with respect to co- 
lonial issues and to demands that rules of in- 
ternational trade and aid be altered in their 
favor. We were particularly concerned when, 
under the pressure of bloc voting, the organi- 
zation adopted one-sided resolutions on cer- 
tain political issues or failed to take concrete 
action on such important matters as interna- 
tional terrorism. To call this trend disturbing 
is not to depreciate the value to the United 
States of multilateral institutions in which all 
nations can be heard on matters that affect 
their security and welfare, conciliation can 
be pursued, and vital public services can be 
provided for the international community. 



494 



Department of State Bulletin j 



We attempted to adjust our policy during 
1972 to take account of these changes. It be- 
came increasingly clear that for the present 
the most i)roductive possibilities for United 
Nations action are on global jn-oblems of an 
economic, social and technological nature. 
United Nations system exjienditures reflected 
this concentration, with some 95 percent of 
the resources in 1972 going for programs 
designed to transfer techniques and skills to 
less developed nations, set standards for in- 
ternational behavior, and provide public 
services of benefit to all nations. 

The following developments during the 
year were especially noteworthy: 

We were gratified by the General As- 
sembly's endorsement of the reduction of our 
United Nations budget assessment from 
31. .52 percent to 25 percent. We believe this 
to be a healthy development for the organi- 
zation, which should not be unduly dependent 
on the contributions of one member. The 
maximum assessment ceiling beginning next 
year is expected to fulfill the requirement 
enacted by the Congress that the United 
States should pay no more than 25 percent 
in the United Nations and in certain spe- 
cialized agencies after January 1, 1974. The 
vote of over two-thirds in favor of our posi- 
tion reflected a widespread recognition of the 
equities involved and of political reality as 
well as concern for the maintenance of gen- 
erous United States voluntary contributions 
to United Nations development programs. 

Following the landmark conference in 
Stockholm in June, the institutional founda- 
tion was laid for international action to pro- 
tect the environment and a work program 
was initiated for this purpose. Measures 
were taken to deal with environmental prob- 
lems such as pollution from ocean dumping 
and the preservation of natural, cultural, and 
historic heritage areas, and a United Nations 
fund for the environment, which I had rec- 
ommended earlier, brought pledges from a 
number of nations. 

On the other hand, a major setback was 
the United Nations failure to take strong 
and speedy international legal action to com- 
bat international terrorism and provide ade- 



quate protection for diplomats — measures 
advocated by the United States and other 
concerned nations. The Assembly did, how- 
ever, set up a committee to study the com- 
ments of governments on the problem of 
international terrorism and submit a report 
to the next session. While we regret the 
delay, we hope that the Assembly can make 
])rogress on this issue this fall. Progress was 
made in the International Civil Aviation Or- 
ganization on the matter of aircraft safety. 
The United Nations also advanced its pro- 
grams for delivering technical assistance to 
developing nations and setting standards for 
international behavior in specific fields. 

— Management reforms (notably adoption 
of a country programming system) were im- 
plemented which will enable the United Na- 
tions Development Program to handle an 
expanded program of technical assistance 
more efficiently. 

— The organization's capacity to respond 
to disaster situations was strengthened by 
the establishment of a United Nations Dis- 
aster Relief Office in Geneva, largely as the 
result of a United States initiative in 1971. 
The United Nations carried out an unprece- 
dented number of relief activities, notably 
in Bangladesh and the Sudan. 

— There was growing cooperation in outer 
space. A United Nations working group co- 
operated in making available to other nations 
data from our first experimental satellite 
designed to survey earth resources, and the 
Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects, which 
had been negotiated by a United Nations 
committee, entered into force on September 1. 

— The momentum of international action 
against drug abuse was furthered in several 
ways: with the drafting of an amending 
protocol to the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, through increased activity 
by and contributions to the United Nations 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and through 
a more active role by the International Nar- 
cotics Control Board. 

— The population program was placed on a 
sounder administrative footing by linking the 
United Nations Fund for Population Activi- 



Ocfober 15, 1973 



495 



ties to the United Nations Development Pro- 
gram. Preparations were continued for the 
World Population Conference in 1974, which 
is expected to be as important as the 1972 
environment conference. 

— Pei-haps of the greatest potential sig- 
nificance were the steps taken to accelerate 
preparations for the Law of the Sea Confer- 
ence, which will come to grips with such 
matters as the nature of the international 
regime for the deep seabed, the breadth of 
the territorial sea, free transit through inter- 
national straits, fisheries, marine pollution, 
and scientific research. A successful resolu- 
tion of these very difficult issues would help 
to prevent conflict and assure that the re- 
sources in and under the oceans will be equi- 
tably and rationally utilized. 

The "quiet side" of the United Nations 
also produced important accomplishments 
which are covered in this report. Especially 
noteworthy were the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's expanded "safeguards" 
program to prevent the diversion to weapons 
use of nuclear materials intended for peace- 
ful uses; the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization's efforts at spur- 
ring agreement to control pollution from 
ocean dumping; the International Civil Avi- 
ation Organization's efforts to devise effec- 
tive measures for safe and efficient air travel; 
the World Health Organization's continued 
campaign to suppress communicable diseases 
and raise the standards of health care; the 
Food and Agriculture Organization's work to 
expand agricultural production and improve 
nutrition; and the United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization's 
activities to expand scientific communication 
and protect the world's cultural heritage. 

All these activities clearly demonstrate the 
stake we have in United Nations efforts to 
control new technologies for the common 
good, to bridge the gap between developed 
and developing countries on matters of trade 
and aid, to facilitate the exchange of techni- 
cal and scientific knowledge, and to set stand- 
ards of behavior for international activity. 
To these concerns — and to the need to im- 
prove the functioning of all multilateral in- 



stitutions — our nation must give increasing 
attention in the coming years. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 6, 1973. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation 
Transmitted to the Senate 

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith the Convention between the 
United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Matters of Tax- 
ation, with related letters, signed at Wash- 
ington on .June 20, 1973. 

For the information of the Senate, I trans- 
mit also the report of the Department of 
State with respect to the Convention. 

The primary purpose of this Convention 
is to promote economic and cultural relations 
between the two countries by eliminating tax 
barriers to the extent possible. The general 
content of the Convention is similar to con- 
ventions between the United States and other 
countries on the avoidance of double taxa- 
tion on income. However, because of dissimi- 
larities between the tax systems of the two 
countries and the limited experience of each 
with the tax system of the other, in this Con- 
vention somewhat more emphasis than usual 
is given to tax exemptions. 

Through its system of exemptions, the 
Convention should largely insulate the en- 
tities and citizens of the respective parties 
from income tax in the other state. As with 
most tax conventions a principal benefit is to 
free to a great extent the companies and per- 
sons involved from the comi)liance and ad- 



' Transmitted on Sept. 19 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. T, 93d Cong., 1st sess. 
For text of the convention, see Bvlletin of July 23, 
1978, p. 169. 



496 



Department of State Bulletin 



niinistrative problems of dealing with a 
foreign tax system. This, in turn, can be ex- 
pected to contribute to the smooth develop- 
ment of United States-Soviet Union trade, 
cooperation, and exchanges. I recommend 
that the Senate give ])rompt consideration to 
the convention and consent to its ratification. 

Richard Nixon. 
The White House, September 19. 1973. 

REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE - 

Department of State, 
Washington, September 10, 197.J. 

The President, 
The White House. 

The President: I have the honor to submit to 
you, with a view to its transmission to the Senate 
for advice and consent to ratification, the Conven- 
tion between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Matters of 
Taxation, with related letters, signed at Washington 
on June 20, 1973. 

The Convention was formulated as a result of 
technical discussions between officials of this Gov- 
ernment and oflicials of the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Depart- 
ment of State and the Department of the Treasury 
cooperated in the negotiation of this Convention 
and it has the approval of both Departments. 

The primary purpose of this Convention is to 
promote economic and cultural relations between 
the two countries by eliminating tax barriers to 
the extent possible. The Convention deals primarily 
with taxes at the Federal level in the case of the 
United States and with All-Union taxes in the case 
of the Soviet Union. 

Because of limited contact in the past, the citizens 
and commercial enterprises of each country have 
had little exposure to the tax system of the other 
country. Taking into account the tax problems which 
are likely to arise in conjunction with less restricted 
intercourse between the two countries, the Conven- 
tion outlines the circumstances under which each 
country may tax the business firms of, and visitors 
from, the other country. 

The general content of the Convention is similar 
to conventions lietween the United States and other 
countries on the avoidance of double taxation on 
income. However, because of the dissimilarities be- 
tween the taxation systems of the two countries, in 
this Convention somewhat more emphasis than usual 
is given to tax exemptions. Examples of the types of 



■ S. Ex. T, 93d Cong., 1st sess. 



payments made between the two countries which will 
be exempt from taxation in the source country are: 
(a) rentals or royalties for the use of patents, copy- 
rights, equipment, and know-how; (b) payments for 
engineering, architectural, and other technical serv- 
ices; (c) interest on indebtedness in connection with 
the financing of trade between the two countries; 
(d) reinsurance premiums; and (e) income from the 
sale of goods efl"ected through a commission agent. 

The Convention provides reciprocal exemption 
from tax for shipping and aircraft operations. It 
also provides that an individual will be exempt from 
tax on income from personal services if he is present 
in the host State for six months or less, and will be 
exempt for longer periods if he falls into a specified 
category such as teacher or student. In the case of 
students, the exemption may be for as long as five 
years. 

The Convention departs from the pattern of the 
usual tax convention in its provisions relating to 
specified types of business income and to the earn- 
ings of newspaper, radio and TV correspondents. 
Ordinarily, United States treaties provide that a 
foreign firm having a place of business in the 
United States continues to be subject to tax on busi- 
ness profits "effectively connected" with the United 
States place of business; otherwise, the income is 
often exempt. The same principle applies in this 
Convention, but income from several types of activ- 
ity is exempt whether or not the Soviet or United 
States enterprise has a place of business in the other 
country. One such exemption is income from sales 
through a broker. Taking into account the Soviet 
system, income of United States companies from 
sales to Soviet Trading Organizations will be treated 
as tax exempt income from sales through a broker. 
The reciprocal two year income tax exemption 
granted journalists and correspondents in this Con- 
vention is a departure from prior practice made to 
accommodate one of the principal Soviet desiderata. 

.At present, the Soviet tax structure is less devel- 
oped in respect to foreign entities and persons than 
is the United States tax structure. United States 
tax rates on individual income, especially for em- 
ployed persons, are presently generally higher than 
those in the Soviet Union. Further, United States 
companies dealing with the Soviet Union, according 
to available information, have generally dealt ade- 
quately with potential taxation in their agreement.s 
with Soviet trading organizations. -As a result of 
these factors, the present tax benefits of this Con- 
vention will appear to be more in favor of the Soviet 
Union. However, the Convention provides a signifi- 
cant potential benefit for the United States and its 
citizens in limiting the tax impact of the expected 
development of the Soviet tax system, which is al- 
most certain to treat foreign persons and entities on 
the basis of reciprocity. Further, the Convention 
contains a non-discrimination clause which should 



October 15, 1973 



497 



provide sigrnificant protection to United States in- 
terests. Through its system of exemptions, the Con- 
vention should largely insulate the entities and 
citizens of the parties from income tax in the other 
state. As with most tax conventions, a principal 
benefit is to free to a great extent the companies and 
persons involved from the compliance and admin- 
istrative problems of dealing with a foreign tax 
system. This, in turn, can be expected to contribute 
to the smooth development of United States-Soviet 
Union trade, cooperation, and exchanges. 

This Convention enters into force thirty days after 
the exchange of instruments of ratification. The 
provisions of the Convention shall, however, have 
effect for income derived on or after January 1 of 
the year following the year in which the instruments 
of ratification are exchanged. The Convention will 
remain in effect for a minimum of three years after 
which it will continue in effect indefinitely, but may 
then be terminated by either country by notice given 
at least six months before the end of any calendar 

year. . . 

A technical memorandum explaining the prmcipal 
features of this Convention is being prepared by the 
Department of the Treasury for the use of the 
Senate. It is hoped that the Senate will consider and 
approve this Convention at an early date. 
Respectfully submitted. 

Kenneth Rush, 
Acting Secretary of State. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

Extension of Existing Suspension of Duty on Certain 
Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 
8215. H. Rept. 93-312. June 21, 1973. 3 pp. 
Amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 
To Protect tlie Domestic Economy from the Ex- 
cessive Drain of Scarce Materials and Commodities 
and To Reduce the Serious Inflationary Impact of 
Abnormal Foreign Demand. Report, together ^with 
supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 8547. H. 
Rept. 93-325. June 25, 1973. 17 pp. 

Prohibiting Environmental Modification as a Weapon 
of War. Report to accompany S. Res. 71. S. Rept. 
93-270. June 27, 1973. 7 pp. 

Extending Certain Privileges and Immunities to the 
Organization of .\frican Unity. Report to accom- 
pany H.R. 8219. H. Rept. 93-349. June 28, 1973. 
3 pp. 

East-West Trade Policy Resolution. Report to ac- 
company S.J. Res. 131. S. Rept. 93-282. June 29, 
1973. 2 pp. 

Endangered Species Act of 1973. Report to accom- 
pany S. 1983. S. Rept. 93-307. July 1, 1973. 42 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668. 

Acceptance deposited: Hungary, September 20, 
1973. 

Coffee 

Agreement amending and extending the international 
coffee agreement 1968. Approved by the Inter- 
national Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. 
Acceptance deposited: Colombia, September 4, 
1973. 

North Atlantic Treaty — Status of Forces — Germany 

Agreement to amend the agi-eement of August 3, 
1959 (TIAS 5351), to supplement the agreement 
between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty 
regarding the status of their forces with respect 
to foreign forces stationed in the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany. Done at Bonn October 21, 1971.' 
Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, September 27, 1973. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Washington December 29, 1972.' 
Ratified by the President: September 25, 1973. 

Postal Matters 

.Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 
14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971. except 
for article V of the additional protocol, which en- 
tered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratification deposited: Guyana, June 21, 1973. 
Accession deposited: Libyan .-Vrab Republic (with 
a declaration), .August 8, 1973. 

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 



Not in force. 



498 



Department of State Bulletin 



Accessioti deposited: Libyan Arab Republic (with 
a declaration), August 8, 1973. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at 
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967; for the United States November 
1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Austria, September 5, 1973. 

Space 

.Agreement for a cooperative program concerning 
the development, procurement, and use of a space 
laboratory in conjunction with the space shuttle 
system, with memorandum of understanding be- 
tween the National .Aeronautics and Space Ad- 
ministration and the European Space Research 
Organization. Done at Neuilly-sur-Seine August 
14, 1973. Entered into force .August 14, 1973. 
Si()n(itiires: Belgium, August 14, 1973;- Denmark, 
September 21, 1973 ;'^ France," Federal Republic 
of Germany, August 14, 1973; Italy, September 
20, 1973;- Netherlands, August 17, 1973;= Spain, 
September 18, 1973; Switzerland, United King- 
dom, United States, August 14, 1973. 

United Nations 

Amendment to article 61 of the United Nations 
Charter, as amended (59 Stat. 1031, TIAS 5857, 
6529), to enlarge the Economic and Social Council. 
Done at New York December 20, 1971. 
Ratificatioyi deposited: United States, September 

24, 1973. 
Entered into force: September 24, 1973. 



Jamaica 

.Agreement extending the agreement of September 
29, 1967, as amended and extended, relating to 
trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington September 26, 1973. Entered 
into force September 26, 1973. 

Japan 

Understanding modifying the arrangement of Jan- 
uary 3, 1972, concerning trade in wool and man- 
made fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Washington September 26, 1973. Entered into 
force September 26, 1973. 

Understanding extending the arrangement of Janu- 
ary 28, 1972, as amended, concerning trade in cot- 
ton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington September 26, 1973. Entered into 
force September 26, 1973. 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Agreement extending and amending the agreement 
of June 20, 1968, relating to a program of techni- 
cal assistance in the field of tax administration. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Port-of-Spain 
April 18 and August 30, 1973. Entered into force 
August 30, 1973. 

Viet-Nam 

.Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of .August 29, 1972 
(TI.AS 7452). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon September 5, 1973. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 5, 1973. 



BILATERAL 

Australia 

Agreement concerning the launching from the Aus- 
tralian Woomera Range of Aerobee sounding 
rockets for scientific investigations. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Canberra September 18, 1973. 
Entered into force September 18, 1973. 

Ethiopia 

Agreement amending the treaty of amity and eco- 
nomic relations of September 7, 1951 (TIAS 
2864), to terminate notes concerning administra- 
tion of justice. Effected by exchange of notes at 
-Addis -Ababa September 16, 1965, and October 20, 
1972. Entered into force May 3, 1973. 
Proclaimed by the President: September 21, 1973. 

Hong Kong 

Agreement extending and amending the agreement 
of December 17, 1970, as amended, relating to 
trade in cotton textiles, with related letter. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Hong Kong Sep- 
tember 18, 1973. Entered into force September 18, 
1973. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



= Subject to ratification or approval; however, pro- 
visionally applicable upon signature. 



Confirmations 

The Senate on September 26 confirmed the fol- 
lowing nominations: 

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to be U.S. Deputy Repre- 
sentative to the United Nations, with the rank 
and status of Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary. 

Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., to be U.S. Repre- 
sentative on the Economic and Social Council of 
the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador. 

Kingdon Gould, Jr., to be Ambassador to the King- 
dom of the Netherlands. 

William R. Kintner to be Ambassador to Thailand. 

William E. Schaufele, Jr., to be U.S. Representa- 
tive in the Security Council of the United Nations, 
with the rank of Ambassador. 

Barbara M. White to be U.S. -Alternate Repre- 
sentative for Special Political Affairs in the United 
Nations, with the rank of Ambassador. 



October 15, 1973 



499 



PUBLICATIONS 



Recent Releases 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
mimber from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one piiblication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage. 

Youth Travel Abroad— What to Know Before You 

Go. This booklet, which contains information useful 
to all Americans traveling overseas, is directed 
particularly to the interests of young travelers. In- 
cluded are tips on visas, charters, consular aid, and 
study abroad as well as suggestions for avoiding 
problems. Pub. 8656. General Foreign Policy Se- 
ries 263. 20 pp. 30('. (Cat. No. 81.71:263). 

U.S.-African Interests: A Frank Appraisal. This 
pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is 
based, with minor editorial revisions, on an address 
by David Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, made before the Royal Common- 
wealth Society at London, England, March 14, 1973. 
Pub. 8701. African Series 54. 6 pp. 20^ (Cat. 
No. 81.116:54). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement, with exchange 
of notes, with the Hungarian People's Republic. 
TIAS 7577. 20 pp. SOt*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7577) 

Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses. 

Agreement with Cuba. TIAS 7579. 13 pp. 20('. (Cat. 
No. 89.12:7579) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Colom- 
bia. TIAS 7580. 16 pp. ?,0<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:7580) 

Status, Privileges and Immunities of the Delegations 
to the US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission 
on Arms Limitation. Agreement with Switzerland. 
TIAS 7582. 3 pp. 15('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7582) 

Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7583. 54 pp. 
b5<^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7583) 

Earthquake Relief. Agreement with Nicaragua. TIAS 
7585. 13 pp. 20('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7585) 

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghanistan 
extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as ex- 
tended. TIAS 7587. 3 pp. 15('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7587) 

Peace Corps. Agreement with the Yemen Arab Re- 
public. TIAS 7588. 5 pp. 15('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7588) 

Agricultural Commodities. .Agreement with Indonesia. 
TIAS 7589. 5 pp. Ibi^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7589) 



Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
August 29, 1972. TIAS 7592. 2 pp. IOC (Cat. No. 
89.10:7592) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
October 2, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7593. 6 pp. IS*". 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7593) 

Air Charter Services. Agreement with the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
TIAS 7594. 5 pp. 15C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7594) 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 24-30 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 

*341 
.342 
343 

*344 

*345 

*346 
*.347 

1348 
349 

1350 
351 

t352 

*353 

t354 
*355 
1356 
*357 



Date 

9/24 
9/24 
9/24 
9/26 

9/26 

9/26 

9/26 

9/26 
9/27 
9/27 
9/27 

9/27 

9/28 

9/28 
9/28 
9/28 
9/28 



Subject 

Regional foreign policy confer- 
ence, Milwaukee, Oct. 27. 
Europe to build Spacelab for U.S. 

Space Shuttle. 
Kissinger: U.N. General Assem- 
bly. 

Eliot sworn in as Ambassador 
to Afghanistan (biographic 
data). 

Kirk sworn in as Ambassador to 
Somali Democratic Republic 
(biographic data). 

Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Oct. 25-26. 

Program for the official visit to 
Washington of Prime Minister 
Noi-man E. Kirk of New Zea- 
land. 

U.S. and Japan sign cotton tex- 
tile agreement (rewrite). 

Kissinger: news conference, New 
York, Sept. 26. 

U.S. and Jamaica sign cotton tex- 
tile agreement (rewrite). 

Abshire named as Special Con- 
sultant on Congressional Af- 
fairs (rewrite). 

U.S. and Yugoslavia sign non- 
scheduled air service agreement 
(rewrite). 

Advisory (Committee on the For- 
eign Service Institute, Oct. 29- 
30. 

Kissinger: remarks to Depart- 
ment employees. 

Arena Stage to tour U.S.S.R. 
Sept. 29-Oct. 17. 

U.S. and Indian scholars to meet 
at New Delhi. 

Ocean Affairs Advisory Commit- 
tee, Oct. 24-25. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



500 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 15, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1790 



Africa. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 
ference at New York 475 

Asia. A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Du- 
rable Peace (Kissinger) 4B9 

< 'ongress 

Mr. Abshire Named Special Consultant on 

Congressional Affairs 48i 

I 'onfirmations (Bennett, Ferguson, Gould^ 

Kintner, Schaufele, White) 499 

I ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 498 

Mepartment Reports on Congress Visa Opera- 
tions (Tarr) 439 

President Calls for Maintenance of Strong De- 
fense Posture (letter to Senate leaders) . 473 
S. Alternate Governors of IMF and Interna- 
tional Banks Confirmed 487 

I S. Participation in the U.N. During 1972 

(Nixon) 493 

I S.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon, Rush) ... 496 
Consular Affairs. Department Reports to Con- 
gress on Visa Operations (Tarr) .... 439 
Department and Foreign Service 
Hr. Abshire Named Special Consultant on Con- ' 

gressional Affairs 481 

Confirmations (Bennett, Ferguson, Gould, 

Kintner, Schaufele, White) 499 

partment Reports to Congress on Visa Oper- 
ations (Tarr) 439 

Economic Affairs 

T S. .A.lternate Governors of IMF and Inter- 
national Banks Confirmed 487 

"^.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon, Rush) ... 496 

Knvironment. A Just Consensus, A Stable Or- 
der, A Durable Peace (Kissinger) ... 469 

Rurope 

A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Durable 
Peace (Kissinger) 469 

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference 

at New York 475 

s. and Europe To Cooperate in Space Shuttle 
I'rogram (Department announcement, text 
i>f communique) 437 

international Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. -Alternate Governors of IMF and Inter- 
ternational Banks Confirmed 487 

Japan. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Con- 

erence at New York 475 

Middle East 

A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Du- 

'able Peace (Kissinger) 469 

letary Kissinger Holds News Conference at 

New York 475 

^niifary Affairs. President Calls for Mainte- 
ance of Strong Defense Posture (letter to 
■Senate leaders) 47,; 



Netherlands. Gould confirmed as Ambassador . 499 

Pakistan. Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan 
Visits the United States (Bhutto, Nixon, 
joint statement) 452 

Presidential Documents 

President Calls for Maintenance of Strong 
Defense Posture 473 

Prime .Minister Bhutto of Pakistan Visits the 
United States 482 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1972 . 493 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation Trans- 
mitted to the Senate 496 

Publications. Recent Releases 500 

Science. U.S. and Europe To Cooperate in 
Space Shuttle Program (Department an- 
nouncement, text of communique) .... 487 

Space. U.S. and Europe To Cooperate in Space 
Shuttle Program (Department announce- 
ment, text of communique) 487 

Thailand. Kinter confirmed as Ambassador . 499 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 498 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon, Rush) ... 496 

U.S.S.R. 

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at 
New York 475 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Convention on Taxation Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon, Rush) ... 496 

United Nations 

Confirmations (Bennett, Ferguson, Schaufele, 

White) 499 

A Just Consensus, A Stable Order, A Durable 

Peace (Kissinger) 469 

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference 

at New York 475 

U.S. Participation in the U.N. During 1972 

(Nixon) 493 

Visas. Department Reports to Congress on 
Visa Operations (Tarr) 489 

Name Index 

Abshire, David M 431 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 499 

Bhutto, Zulfikar AH ! 482 

Burns, Arthur F 437 

Casey, William J 487 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 499 

Gould, Kingdon, Jr 499 

Kintner, William R [ 499 

Kissinger, Secretary 459, 475 

Nixon, President 473, 432, 493,' 496 

Rush, Kenneth 495 

Schaufele, William E., Jr . . 499 

Tarr, Curtis W 489 

White, Barbara M ] 499 



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V7/7 




HE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

ULLETIN 



^ohime LXIX 



No. 1791 



Ocrnhrr 22 1078 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 3 
Excerpts From Transcript 501 

THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA: A COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS 
Address by Under Secretai'v Porter 508 

JENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
AGENCY HOLDS 17th SESSION AT VIENNA 
Statement by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray 513 



PHE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



„<.,;, !,„-[. 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1791 
October 22. 1973 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29. foreign $36.25 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
apprpoiated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI. 
a weekly publication issued by tk 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tlie public ai 
interested agencies of tfie governme 
witft information on developments I 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on t/te work of tlie Department an 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selecte 
press releases on foreign policy, issue 
by tlie Wliite House and tfie Depart 
ment, and statements, addressei 
and news conferences of tfie Presides 
and tfie Secretary of State and otfie^ 
officers of tlie Department, as well at 
special articles on various pfiases of 
international affairs and tfie functioi 
of tfie Department. Information is ii 
eluded concerning treaties and int 
national agreements to wfiicfi t 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general int 
national interest. 
Publications of tfie Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in tfie field of 
international relations are also listed. 



President Nixon's News Conference of October 3 



Folloxving are excei^ts relating to for- 
eign policy from the transcript of a netvs 
conference held by President Nixon in the 
press briefing room at the White Hotise on 
October 3. • 

The President: Won't you be seated, ladies 
and gentlemen. I goiess I should say all those 
who can find seats. 

Dr. Kissinger, as you know from an an- 
nouncement that I understand got out about 
30 minutes ago from Peking, will visit Pe- 
king on October 26 to 29. This is part of the 
continuing dialogue between the People's 
Republic of China and the United States 
which began with my visit to China last 
year. 

The subjects that will be discussed include 
those that have been discussed on previous 
occasions — trade, for example, where it is 
interesting to note that the amount of bi- 
lateral trade between the two countries, 
which was approximately $6 million in 1971, 
will be an estimated $800 million in 1973. 
Scientific and cultural exchanges will be a 
major subject for discussions and of course 
other matters of mutual concern to the two 
nations. 

In addition. Dr. Kissinger has been in- 
vited by the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. 
Ohira, to stop in Japan on his visit to the 
Far East. He will do so. The timing of that 
visit, however, has not yet been agreed upon 
and will be announced as soon as we hear 
from the Japanese. 

Incidentally, I learned that 12 to 15 mem- 
bers of the press will be invited, if they 
desire to go, to go on the trip with the Secre- 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 8. 



tary of State, and if you would put in your 
applications at the State Department in this 
instance, I think that they will be honored 
in the order in which they are received. 

Q. In vieiv of your sideivalk remark the 
other night about travel plans, can you pin- 
point for us any better yo2ir timing of your 
trip to Europe? 

The President: Mr. Theis [J. William 
Theis, Hearst Newspapers], it is diflficult to 
pinpoint the timing of a trip to Europe, but 
in order that all of you can make your plans 
a little better: The trip to Europe will be 
made within the next few months, and the 
timing will be based on these factors — first, 
the progress which is made on the discus- 
sions now going on with regard to a Decla- 
ration of Principles with regard to the 
alliance, and with regard to economic mat- 
ters as well. The latter, as you know, I 
discussed with Mr. Ortoli [Frangois-Xavier 
Ortoli, President of the Commission of the 
European Communities] when he was here. 
That progress is going on, incidentally, well 
ahead of schedule, according to Dr. Kis- 
singer. 

As soon as those preliminary negotiations 
are completed and as soon as it is clear on 
both sides of the Atlantic that this will be 
a trip not for protocol purposes but one that 
will have real substance in it, then we will 
work out a date. 

Now the second factor, however, which 
enters into this is the congressional schedule. 
I cannot take a trip to Europe or anyplace 
else at a time when there are matters before 
the Congress of very great significance. That 
is why I cannot pinpoint this in terms of 
saying that just as soon as the Europeans 



October 22, 1973 



501 



are ready we will go. If the Europeans are 
ready at a time that we have a heavy calen- 
dar in Congress, I shall have to postpone 
the trip until that. 

But I would say I am thinking- in terms 
of the next three or four months but it might 
be sooner than that, probably not much later. 

Now, with regard to Japan, I agreed with 
Mr. Tanaka when he was here that I would 
visit Japan before the end of 1974. We will 
of course make those plans again consistent 
with our developments on the bilateral side 
and at a time when we think that there is 
a matter of substance to be discussed, or mat- 
ters of substance to be discussed, and at a 
time which is consistent with my responsi- 
bilities on the domestic front. 

Q. Do you have any comment to make on 
the Austrian decision to close the Russian- 
emigrant facilities? 

The President: Yes, I have. The Austrians 
are in a very difficult position here. As you 
know, I stopped in Austria on my way to 
Moscow and for the first time — no, the sec- 
ond time — met the Prime Minister, Mr. 
Kreisky, and anybody who knows his back- 
ground knows that he is certainly not anti- 
Semitic. But Austria is in the eye of a 
hurricane, and Austria, therefore, being a 
relatively small country and relatively weak 
militarily, et cetera, is making a very — what 
I am sure for Mr. Kreisky — painful decision 
in this respect. 

I recall, for example, that at the time of 
the Hungarian revolution Austria opened its 
arms very generously to thousands of refu- 
gees, and I know that is the Austrian tradi- 
tion and custom. I would hope — and I would 
express this — I would hope that the Prime 
Minister would reconsider his decision, even 
though I know he has even lately reiterated 
it, reconsider it for this fundamental reason 
that goes far beyond his country and even 
ours, and that is that we simply cannot have 
governments — small or large — give in to 
international blackmail by terrorist groups. 
That is what is involved. 

Not to mention, of course, the fact that we 
all have a concern for the emigrees. They 



must have a place to come. So, on humani- 
tarian grounds and on geopolitical grounds 
of the highest order, I believe that that de- 
cision should be reconsidered, but naturally 
I am not going to put my friend Mr. Kreisky 
in the position of trying to dictate to him 
what it should be. 

Q. Mr. President, just a point of clarifica- 
tion. 

The President: Sure. 

Q. In your discussion of the Declaration 
of Principles, there was an intention to in- 
clude Japan as ivell as the European Com- 
munities. Is that still the case, or has that 
been changed? 

The President: Let me explain what we 
feel now with regard to including Japan. 

I have told all of our foreign visitors, 
Chancellor Brandt and of course Prime Min- 
ister Heath, President Pompidou, that it is 
vitally important that Japan — which is now 
the second major economic power in the 
world, and, of course, in the Pacific a poten- 
tial very great force for peace and stability 
— that Japan not be out of the club. 

Now, they all agree. The difficulty is in 
writing a declaration with regard to the 
Atlantic alliance which fits Japan; the diffi- 
culty is writing one with regard to the Euro- 
pean Economic Community which fits Japan. 

So what we are presently thinking of is 
three declarations, one for the Atlantic al- 
liance, one for the Economic Community, 
and then a more general declaration to which 
the Japanese might be willing to adhere. 

Now, I have gone beyond what we have 
worked out, but that is what we can expect. 

Let me say finally that in that respect, I 
know that these declarations may not seem 
too important when we consider the domestic 
problems that presently obsess us, but it is 
essential at a time that we are having ne- 
gotiations with the Soviets and with the 
People's Republic of China, it is essential 
that we breathe new life and new purpose 
and new spirit into the American Atlantic 
alliance and into the free world community. 



502 



Department of State Bulletin 



which includes Japan, and unless we do so, 
unless, for example, the Atlantic alliance 
speaks to our times rather than to the times 
25 years ago, it is going to fragment. Our 
European friends realize this, and I am glad 
to note that even the economic experts like 
Ortoli recognize it, too. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. President. 



Prime Minister Kirk of New Zealand 
Visits the United States 

Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk of New 
Zealand made an official visit to Washington 
September 26-29, during which he met with 
President Nixon and other government offi- 
cials. Following is an exchange of toasts be- 
ttveen Presideyit Nixon and Prime Minister 
Kirk at a dinner at the White House on Sep- 
tember 27. 



Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 1 

PRESIDENT NIXON 

Mr. Prime Minister and our distinguished 
guests: Mr. Prime Minister, you are no 
stranger to our country; this is your fifth 
visit. But we are very honored and very 
proud that this is the first time we have had 
the opportunity to welcome you as the head 
of government of your country. 

We say that because New Zealand and the 
United States have been allies in war as we 
are now allies in peace. And I say it, too, 
from a personal sense, because as I have 
often pointed out to many visitors from New^ 
Zealand and to you this morning, I have very 
pleasant memories of serving with New Zea- 
land forces in the Solomons, your Third New 
Zealand Division. And then also Mrs. Nixon 
and I have the most pleasant memories of the 
year 1953 — it was 20 years ago — when on a 
trip around the world the first country we 
visited, as Vice President of the United 
States, was New Zealand. 

We shall never forget the warmth of the 



welcome we received, not only in Auckland 
but in the South Island as well. And we 
brought back from that trip an affection for 
not only your country but your people which 
has never left us. 

To our distinguished guests tonight, I have 
had an opportunity that most of you have 
not had, and that is to talk to the Prime 
Minister at some length this morning about 
some of our mutual problems and our con- 
cerns in the world. 

Most of you probably read of his speech in 
the United Nations yesterday when he said 
that he spoke for the little countries of the 
world. When he rises to respond to my re- 
marks, you will see that the man who repre- 
sents the little countries of the world is a big 
man. [Laughter.] 

Prime Minister Kirk, however, is not only 
a big man physically, as he is, but I can tell 
you from our rather brief acquaintance that 
he is also a big man in terms of his love of 
his country, his pride in his background in 
that country, and also in the idealism with 
which he approaches the problems of build- 
ing a structure of peace in the Pacific, in 
Asia, and in the world. And the world is 
fortunate that a man with his background, 
with his idealism, with his strength, with his 
concern for little countries, as well as little 
people, is leading this nation which is in a 
way, we think, so far away from us. 

And I would simply say, Mr. Prime Minis- 
ter, that perhaps it would be hard to find any 
two countries in the world that are further 
apart geographically than New Zealand and 
the United States. But it would be hard to 
find, also, any two countries in the world that 
in terms of what we seek in the world, in 
terms of our common ideals, in terms of what 
we believe, are closer together, because we 
both seek a world of peace, we both seek a 
world in which not only great powers but 
small powers and small nations are safe, in- 
dependent, and respected. 

And we both seek a world in which all 
people in the world— all people in the world, 
wherever they may be, not only in our coun- 
tries, which are fortunate to be far above 



October 22, 1973 



503 



the average in terms of our income — shall 
have the opportunity to move forward to- 
ward a better life. 

In this room in which for over 150 years 
leaders from other governments have spoken, 
these words, I know, may sound now almost 
trite. But I would say that we are entering 
an era when the opportunity not only to 
build a structure of peace which will last for 
l)erhaps the balance of the century and be- 
yond but also to build a new world in which 
all nations and all people go forward to- 
gether to a better life, where that opportu- 
nity is better than it has ever been, and we 
are very proud that we have the opportunity, 
Mr. Prime Minister, to work with you, your 
people, your government, toward that great 
end. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I know you will 
want to rise and drink to the health of the 
Prime Minister: To the Prime Minister. 

PRIME MINISTER KIRK 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, Mr. Vice Pres- 
ident, Mrs. Agnew, ladies and gentlemen: I 
feel a little out of place. Though I come from 
a small country, I have to confess that we 
produce the most excellent food anywhere in 
the world, and that is what I am advertising 
by my presence. If you want to live in a 
small country but be big, there is a very sim- 
ple trade solution to it. 

But, Mr. President, I want first to thank 
you for the consideration and for the kindness 
and cordiality that you have shown to me 
during this visit to Washington, and I want 
to assure you that that is greatly appreciated. 

And I want to say that it has been a very 
fine tribute, and one that I appreciate very 
much, that among those who were invited 
here tonight are special personal friends in 
the United States of America, and I want to 
thank you very much for that consideration. 

And I want to say how moved I was, know- 
ing how difficult it is for a European to speak 
good Maori, to hear someone singing flawless 
Maori and without an accent of any sort. 
That really was a very nice touch. 



Our country, of course, is called New Zea- 
land. It is also called "Aotearoa," the Maori 
name for the country, "The Land of the Long 
White Cloud," and it conjures up a vision of 
peace, blue skies, pleasant living, and indeed 
that is true of the country. 

We are a long way from any other part of 
the world, and even our nearest neighbors 
are quite some distance from New Zealand 
shores. We would be, I think, the most re- 
mote country in the world. We are also on the 
bottom of the world. 

And Mr. President, if I talk about what 
small countries can do and should do in the 
world, you should remember that we help 
hold it up. [Laughter.] 

But for me it is a great privilege to be 
here, and it is a considerable honor to our 
country to be received in the way that I have 
been received here today. And I am mindful 
that it is now 20 years since you visited New 
Zealand and longer since you helped defend 
it. And the relationship between our country 
and the United States of America is based on 
some very important considerations. 

And we remember, all of us, the part, the 
work, the sacrifices made by U.S. servicemen 
that enabled us to have the future we have. 
And in those days and in those years, a spe- 
cial partnership was forged out of a common 
concern and a common danger, and we have 
great pleasure each year in welcoming back 
to New Zealand people who were stationed 
there during that time, who come with their 
New Zealand wives, their children, and now 
their grandchildren. But it reminds us that 
the relationships between countries are not 
just matters of treaty or of political relation- 
ship; the relationship between the peoples of 
the countries helps build a bond that enables 
us to work on the things we see differently 
and to develop those that we see the same. 

And our objectives are precisely those that 
have been pursued in this country. We be- 
lieve in freedom; we believe in democracy; 
we believe that each person should have an 
equal opportunity to develop themselves, to 
]iarticipate in society, to take their place and 
to take it on their own initiative and on their 
own contribution. And so, we both work for 



504 



Department of State Bulletin 



the common goal of extending the quality of 
life and the quality of the societies in which 
we live. 

And we see perhaps a little more clearly, 
because in a small country there is no ques- 
tion of imposing your will or dominating or 
of seeking anything other than a political 
solution. More and more we see that while 
there are many nations, there is in fact just 
one human family, and more and more we are 
compelled to consider the fact that though 
we are one human family, we work as though 
we are several. 

And now the opportunities are extended in 
the new atmosphere that is being created for 
all countries to pursue those avenues and 
opportunities with the objective of uniting 
the human family in common concern for 
peace, for prosperity, and for the develop- 
ment of their peoples. 

So, since we share these objectives, it is not 
surprising that we have welcomed the new 
op]:)ortunities that a more relaxed interna- 
tional atmosphere has brought. And, Mr. 
President, the opportunities that your work 
has helped to create in Asia and in South- 
east Asia is at once a challenge and a chance, 
a real chance, to improve relationships to the 
point where we can look forward to a long 
period of stability and peace in that region. 

And for our part we want to play an effec- 
tive role, and we want to develop as an inde- 
pendent country the initiatives that we be- 
lieve are right and proper. 

So, sir, to come today and to have the 
opportunity to talk with you about these 
objectives, about the changing scene in Asia, 
and about those things which we can do 
which help ])ull us together in a spirit of co- 
operation and mutual respect, has been in- 
deed a very important opportunity so far 
as I am concerned. And I am pleased that one 
result of the discussions today was that we 
were able to meet a very large measure of 
agreement about cooperation in science and 
technology-. 

Our problem has been that we have pro- 
duced a number of people who have been 
talented but when they reached their matu- 



rity they go off to work for others. When we 
see Americans on the moon, we know that 
in New Zealand they helped put them there — 
Dr. William Pickering — and what we are 
talking about is a basis of cooperation that 
allows scientists and technologists to stimu- 
late each other with their ideas, to develop 
new fields, to bring new benefits that can be 
employed usefully for the benefit of our 
countries and for the benefit of other peoples. 
And sir, we welcome very much this op])or- 
tunity to share, to cooperate, and indeed, in 
the case of our skilled people, retain their 
skills in our service as well as in the service 
of the people. 

I don't want to say any more except what 
a great honoi- it has been to be received here, 
the opportunity to talk with you, to discuss 
the matters that are so important to the 
South Pacific and to Southeast Asia at the 
present time. And I want to remark that 20 
years is a long time. We have changed a lot in 
20 years. The fish are bigger and the horses 
a little faster [laughter] , and the country has 
changed and developed. 

And I want to take this oi)portunity of 
saying that the President of the United 
States will always be a welcome visitor to 
New Zealand, and if the President of the 
United States brings the graceful First Lady 
with him, then, sir, you will be doubly w^el- 
come. 

And I know that there are some things you 
must attend to that do not permit endless 
travels, but I hope you will consider an invi- 
tation to the President of the United States 
that remains open for exercise at his con- 
venience. 

Sir, thank you very much for the recep- 
tion, thank you very much for the cordiality 
with which I and my party have been re- 
ceived. We do hope as a continuant to this 
brief visit, with the understanding we have 
achieved, that it will be possible to go on and 
develop the pursuit of peace and prosperity 
for all people. 

Ladies and gentlemen, can I ask you to 
join me in a toast to the President of the 
United States of America: To the President. 



October 22, 1973 



505 



Secretary Kissinger Addresses 
Department Employees 

Folloiving are remarks made by Secretary 
Kissinger on September 28 before employees 
of the Department of State. William J. Por- 
ter, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 
introduced Secretary Kissinger. 

Press release 354 dated September 28 

UNDER SECRETARY PORTER 

The distinguished public servant who has 
come here to meet you today needs no intro- 
duction. He comes to State with unprece- 
dented credentials for achievement in foreign 
affairs. Those achievements, as you know, 
have received worldwide acclaim, and they 
have placed our country in the forefront of 
the effort to bring about a global peace. We 
have truly acquired an extraordinary leader. 

Without further ado, therefore, on behalf 
of the 22,000 of us here and around the 
world I extend a warm welcome to Secretary 
of State Henry A. Kissinger. [Applause.] 



SECRETARY KISSINGER 

Mr. Porter, ladies and gentlemen: When 
it was suggested that I meet so large a group, 
some of my colleagues advanced the argu- 
ment that this would make me feel at home. 
I've been puzzling about this remark, and I 
have concluded that based on the newspaper 
accounts of how I am supposed to have 
treated my staff at the White House, my new 
colleagues here had thought that this was the 
closest thing to a Nuremberg party rally 
that they could organize. [Laughter.] 

In convincing me of the wisdom of doing 
this, they also pointed out that Secretary 
Dulles met a similar group. They forgot to 
mention that this was the last time anybody 
in the Department saw Secretary Dulles. 
[Laughter.] 

I wanted to talk to you briefly about what 
I think we can do together. 



When I was appointed, I mentioned that 
there was a need for the institutionaliza- 
tion of foreign policy, and this is true in 
many respects. 

First of all, the whole nature of our for- 
eign policy has changed. For the greater part 
of our history we really did not participate 
on a day-to-day basis in foreign affairs, and 
therefore more emphasis was placed in our 
diplomacy on reporting than on policymak- 
ing. 

And when at the end of World War II we 
did conduct foreign policy on a global scale, 
the disproportion between our resources and 
those of most of the rest of the world was so 
great we could overwhelm every problem and 
we could always substitute resources for 
thought. 

But now we are in a situation where we 
have to conduct foreign policy the way many 
other nations have had to conduct it through- 
out their history. We no longer have over- 
whelming margins of safety, and we no 
longer have overwhelming margins of re- 
sources. Therefore we have to be good, and 
we have to be thoughtful. I think this is the 
most important aspect of the institutionali- 
zation of foreign policy. 

In the making of foreign policy, we have 
a number of tasks: We have reporting, 
analysis, policymaking, and education. And I 
think it is safe to say that in the past we may 
have been better at the reporting functions 
than at anything else. 

When I met yesterday with my colleagues 
on the seventh floor, I told them that it was 
essential in the months and years ahead that 
we ask ourselves not only where we are but 
where we want to go. In discussing the policy 
issues and in reporting events around the 
world, you help us on the seventh floor not 
only by reporting what is happening but by 
telling us what it means. 

A great deal of time in this building and in 
Washington is spent on clearing cables and 
in working out understandings between vari- 
ous groups concerned with policy. I would 
like to have the opportunity to work out these 
understandings on the seventh floor, and not 



506 



Department of State Bulletin 



throughout this building. We are much better 
off being told clear choices — to be told what 
the alternatives are, to be told what choices 
we confront. I have asked every Assistant 
Secretary, when making his recommenda- 
tions to us, to tell us both his recommenda- 
tions and the alternatives that have been 
rejected. We would much rather see a clear- 
cut statement of choices than a negotiated 
document from which we cannot tell what the 
real arguments were that went into it. 

In other words, as we try to restore the 
Department of State to its principal role of 
advising the President and future adminis- 
trations on the making of foreign policy, the 
way to achieve that preeminent position is 
not to debate in the abstract or to determine 
where in the bureaucratic hierarchy one 
should be placed, but to do the best work in 
town. 

And having worked with many of you, I 
know that there is no reason in the world 
why this building and this organization 
should not produce the best and most 
thoughtful work in town. And indeed, if we 
are going to have a long-term foreign policy, 
it must produce the best work in town — and 
not just for this administration, but for the 
administrations to come. 

I have talked to some of the officers in the 
Foreign Service Association, and I take their 
concerns extremely seriously. 

What we will try to do in addition to the 
normal administrative concerns which you 
must have, however, is to make sure that the 
ablest people get put into the key positions 
as rapidly as possible. 

And in writing your memoranda, you 
should consider that successful foreign policy 
depends not only on difficulties avoided but 
on opportunities seized. 

I asked every Bureau yesterday to let us 
have by the end of next week a statement of 
all the problems that they perceive over the 
next year as well as a statement of those 



things we ought to do — even if they are not 
problems. That is to say, we should know 
where we want to go if we want to do the 
right thing. 

And this gets me to my final point. In 
working out policies at the various levels, at 
some point it is inevitable that some compro- 
mises will have to be made. But in thinking 
about policy it is not necessary to make those 
compromises as the papers are being written. 
In this current state of America and of 
America's relations to the world, we have an 
unparalleled opportunity to help bring about 
a peaceful international structure, a world 
which the major participants feel that they 
have had a share in creating and which 
therefore they have an interest in maintain- 
ing. 

It is an opportunity that comes not often 
in a century and then through a combination 
of historical events that cannot inevitably 
be repeated. 

At this state in America's relations with 
the world and in this stage of America's 
concern with itself, our primary concern 
ought to be to ask ourselves what is right, 
and not to worry about political pressure, 
about bureaucratic expediency, or the short- 
term considerations. 

I think with this attitude, and with your 
help, we can do great things together with 
some joy and some enthusiasm and some 
hope. 

Thank you very much. 



Senate Confirms Mr. Mays 
as President of OPIC 

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the 
nomination of Marshall Trammell Mays to 
be President of the Overseas Private In- 
vestment Corporation. 



October 22, 1973 



507 



The United States and Korea: A Community of interests 



Address by William J. Porter 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs'^ 



It is an honor to meet with you tonight 
and to be able to observe on this side of the 
Pacific Ocean the close economic cooperation 
between the United States and Korea that 
I used to see in Seoul. It is especially gratify- 
ing that the "Sell to Korea" mission is able 
to be with us this evening. 

This a momentous time in international 
life— for the Republic of Korea, for the 
United States, and for the world community. 
In his address to the General Assembly on 
September 24, Secretary Kissinger expressed 
our confidence that the rigid confrontation 
which has dominated international life for 
a quarter of a century has been softened.- 
He outlined a program by which the nations 
of the world can start to move from co- 
existence to community. 

The ending of the war in Viet-Nam, in 
which both of us were deeply engaged, is 
the most dramatic example of a world crisis 
surmounted. The settlement in Berlin and 
the cease-fire in the Middle East also provide 
concrete evidence that the era of confronta- 
tion is passing. 

The changing climate of relations between 
the United States and the two major Com- 
munist powers — the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China — has made an 
important contribution to this evolution. 
The United States and the Soviet Union are 
finding a common interest in avoiding nu- 
clear war and in carefully and pragmatically 
establishing a broad range of constructive 
relations. The United States and China have 



ended two decades of estrangement and 
begun— again slowly, realistically — a dia- 
logue and a productive exchange of Liaison 
Offices, visitors, and trade. 

The United States seeks to build with 
each of our adversaries a framework of 
mutually beneficial relationships. By this 
process we hope to create what President 
Nixon has called a structure of peace. The 
President has defined this as a "network of 
relationships and of interdependencies that 
restrain aggression and that take the profit 
out of war." 3 We are seeking to bring about 
a vested interest in mutual restraint and in 
mutual cooperation. The agreements we have 
made with Moscow and Peking are part of 
this effort. 

Our security commitments in Europe and 
in Asia have contributed significantly to the 
progress we have been able to make with 
Moscow and Peking. These commitments, 
and the conviction of both our allies and our 
adversaries that we have both the will and 
the ability to honor them, encourage the 
pattern of restraint upon which true detente 
must rely. We believe that all parties benefit 
from these arrangements and that the inter- 
action of restraint and cooperation can con- 
tribute to a reliable detente and eventually 
to a sound peace. 

The evolving situation in the Korean Pe- 
ninsula provides another dramatic example 
of the relaxation of international tensions. 
The Republic of Korea came into existence 
at a time of rigid confrontation between the 



' Made before the U.S.-Korea Economic Council at 
New York on Oct. 3. 
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 15, 1973, p. 469. 



' For an excerpt from President Nixon's address to 
the Nation on Nov. 2, 1972, see Bulletin of Nov. 20, 
1972, p. 605. 



508 



Department of State Bulletin 



Soviet Union and the United States. It was 
the Second World War and its aftermath, 
the North Korean invasion of 1950, which 
forged today's solid links between our two 
nations and peoples, even though the roots 
of our relations go back to the very begin- 
ning of Korea's emergence as a modern 
state. 

The United States led the United Nations 
resistance to aggression in 1950. We are still 
committed to the 1953 armistice agreement 
through the United Nations Command, which 
is a signatory to the armistice agreement 
and which an American officer commands. 
In 1954 our governments concluded a mutual 
defense treaty to assure the Republic of 
Korea of United States readiness to render 
assistance, in conformity with our constitu- 
tional process, in the event of armed attack. 
Pursuant to this treaty, the United States 
maintains ground and air forces in the 
Republic. 

Dialogue Between North and South Korea 

It is against this background of conflict, 
of collective response by the international 
community, and of U.S. assistance and sup- 
port for the resolute Government and people 
of Korea, that the prospects have gradually 
emerged for a lessening of tensions on the 
Korean Peninsula. The Republic of Korea 
has taken momentous steps toward peace 
and stability, first, by initiating the Red 
Cross talks in mid-1971 to reunite families 
divided by the Korean conflict and, second, 
by opening the secret talks with the North 
in early 1972. These culminated in the joint 
announcement on July 4, 1972, by which 
both parties agreed to work for the ultimate 
reunification of the Korean Peninsula by 
peaceful means and to establish a joint co- 
ordinating committee. 

The United States has welcomed these 
steps toward stability and peace and, indeed, 
in the Shanghai communique concluding 
President Ni.xon's historic visit to China in 
February 1972, affirmed that "the United 
States will support efforts of the Repub- 
lic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension 



and increased communication in the Korean 
peninsula." •» The dialogue between South 
and North has proceeded cautiously. At the 
moment it is in a state of abeyance. We 
think, however, that the patient step-by-step 
process of establishing contacts and building 
mutual confidence will continue. 

Proposed U.N. General Assembly Resolution 

In June of this year President Park took 
another major conciliatoiy step by present- 
ing a seven-point proposal designed to 
enhance the prospects of peace in the penin- 
sula and contribute to the achievement of 
eventual unification of the nation. 

We support these Korean proposals. In 
order to help translate them into concrete 
action we and other friends of the Republic 
of Korea have joined in sponsoring a reso- 
lution at the U.N. General Assembly this fall 
which we believe will make a constructive 
contribution to the debate on the Korean 
question. Our aims are to avoid contentious 
discussion, to promote peace and stability, 
and to facilitate the talks going on between 
South and North Korea. Let me summarize 
this proposal : 

— First, we recommend acceptance of the 
report by the United Nations Commission 
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Ko- 
rea, which proposes its own termination. The 
Commission has performed valuable and 
honorable service in attempting to carry out 
its mandate and has concluded that its useful 
life has been completed. 

— Second, we and our friends propose that 
the two parts of Korea consider membership 
in the United Nations as a means of further- 
ing peace and eventual reunification. The 
resolution does not insist upon membership 
but, as Secretary Kissinger said in his ad- 
dress to the U.N. General Assembly: 

Membership in this body should be a step toward 
reconciliation, not a source of conflict. The time has 
come for North and South Korea to be offered their 
rightful places here, without prejudice to a future 
evolution toward unification. 



' For text of the communique, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435. 



October 22, 1973 



509 



Unfortunately, it appears at this point 
that North Korea is not yet ready to partici- 
pate in the debates and challenges that would 
result from full membership in the United 
Nations. 

— Third, we believe that it is necessary to 
maintain the armistice agreement and its 
supporting arrangements for peace and se- 
curity in the area, but we are willing that 
the parties concerned explore and agree 
upon satisfactory alternate arrangements. 

We shall work closely with the Republic 
of Korea and its other friends and allies for 
the adoption of this resolution. 

Given the close ties between them, it is 
only natural that the United States have 
a keen interest in the Republic of Korea. 
It would do a disservice to both our countries 
and to the solid relationship between us to 
ignore or gloss over differences when they 
occur. We recognize that the Korean Gov- 
ernment and people must make their choices 
and that the political processes of a nation 
are essentially an internal matter. As with 
any close ally, we do consider it appropriate 
to make known our views on such subjects 
when it seems warranted. And we do so, 
quietly but frankly. 

We have had occasion to do this recently 
in the case of an event that threatened the 
good relations between Japan and Korea. 
We hope such incidents can be speedily re- 
solved and that individual rights will be 
respected. 

Korea in the World Economy 

Let me turn to the economy of Korea. 
This, too, is a subject of great interest to 
the United States, as it is to all of us here 
tonight. 

For the past decade the economy of the 
Republic of Korea has made a remarkable 
upsurge. There has been talk of an "eco- 
nomic miracle" in several countries since 
World War II. Korea merits that description 
as justly as any. Real growth in gross na- 
tional product since 1962 has been at the 
remarkable annual rate of 9.5 percent. 
Growth in earnings from commodity exports 



in that decade has been even more impres- 
sive, reflecting annual increases at the rate 
of 40.3 percent. 

More particularly, Korea's commodity ex- 
ports to the United States in the past decade 
have increased by over 5 percent annually. 
And in recent years, one-half of all Korea's 
exports have gone to the U.S. market. This 
was possible because of the relatively free 
market and low-tarifi" philosophy of the 
United States. Unfortunately, certain im- 
ports from Korea, as well as from some 
other countries, have competed with our 
domestic production to such an extent as 
to cause injury to our domestic producers 
and manufacturers. Textiles are an out- 
standing illustration of this problem. Be- 
cause of high tariff and nontariff barriers, 
this situation could not happen to a country 
such as Korea. For example, U.S. exporters 
cannot even sell a man's shirt to Korea, 
though textile sales are the principal export 
earner and the greatest single income gen- 
erator in Korean exports to the United 
States. We look for improvement in this 
area. 

In fairness, I must add a word of appre- 
ciation for the understanding and consider- 
ation of our situation which led Korea 
voluntarily to restrain the growth of its 
textile exports to the United States. 

Korea has reached the stage of economic 
development where it no longer has to rely 
on a few favored exports that compete with 
local production in the importing country. 
Instead, it successfully competes with other 
exporting countries in foreign markets. This 
means that Korea is becoming a major ele- 
ment in world trade. It has set an export 
target of $4.4 billion for 1976 and $11 billion 
for 1981. Trade at this level is dependent 
on an increased volume of world trade and 
a more competitive position for Korean 
products. 

But if Korea is to achieve the supply 
position targeted for the next eight years, 
it must comply with the recommendations 
of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] 
for liberalization of its import restrictions. 



510 



Department of State Bulletin 



It must permit greater foreign access to its 
own domestic market if it wants foreign 
markets for Korean products. 

For these reasons, we are especially 
pleased that the Republic of Korea has sent 
a "Sell to Korea" mission to the United 
States. I am sure that the mission members 
will find — if they have not already — that 
products of U.S. firms are competitive with, 
and in most cases superior to, the products 
of other suppliers, in price as well as in 
quality. Only by obtaining the best equip- 
ment can Korea hope to maintain its quality 
of product; only by purchasing the longest 
lasting and most productive equipment can 
Korea maintain the competitive price of its 
manufactured products. I know that Korea 
has these considerations in mind, and I am 
gratified that the Korean Government has 
taken the initiative in having its industri- 
alists investigate the U.S. market as a source 
for the equipment needed to achieve Korea's 
ambitious development program. 

There is a small number of observers who 
feel that Korea's ambitious export targets 
are overly optimistic. We have seen Korea 
launch ambitious targets in two previous 
five-year plans, however, and exceed them 
in spite of disbelievers and doubters. We 
firmly believe that the ambitious targets of 
the third five-year plan are attainable; we 
want Korea to achieve and surpass them 
again. 

Korea is making such remarkable prog- 
ress that it will not be able to qualify much 
longer for economic assistance. Korea is al- 
ready a donor, extending some assistance to 
other less developed countries and has thus 
begun to play an even more important role 
in the world economy. It is, of course, also 
contributing to international lending and 
developmental institutions. 

This is an appropriate occasion for me 
to express our nation's gratification that 
Korea has made such commendable progress 
in development. We like to think that this 
is in part due to the almost $6 billion in 
economic assistance which we have extended 
to Korea over the 27 years of our close co- 



operation. Korea's performance is all the 
more remarkable in view of a lack of natural 
resources. Thanks to the hard-working Ko- 
rean people and the skill of her businessmen, 
Korea has become an important producing 
and trading nation. 

I am proud that I was privileged to repre- 
sent my country in Korea during a large 
part of the eminently successful second 
five-year plan. I know from personal ex- 
perience the high caliber of Korea's busi- 
ness, industry, and government leaders. I can 
foresee the time when Korea will become 
one of the outstanding trading nations in the 
world. When this occurs it will be due in no 
small part to the farsighted initiatives of 
those who are represented here tonight on 
this Council. 

The United States and Korea together 
have lived through many crises and faced 
many dangers. Now perhaps we can hope 
for a less turbulent world. 

We can hope that confrontation will be re- 
placed by cooperation ; combativeness by 
competition. We can hope that trade, in- 
vestment, and peaceful progress will ease 
old hostilities and open new doors. 

The U.S.-Korea Economic Council is a 
sign of our many shared experiences. In 
promoting trade and commerce it will be 
contributing to the new era we are all trying 
very hard to build. I am therefore pleased 
to salute you this evening and, in the pres- 
ence of these our distinguished visitors, to 
wish you every success. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 1st Session 

Department of State Appropriations Authorization 
Act of 1973. Conference report to accompany H.R. 
7645. H. Rept. 93-367. July 10, 1973. 16 pp. 

Suspension of Duty on Manganese Ore. Report to 
accompany H.R. 6676. S. Rept. 93-316. July 13, 
1973. 3 pp. 

Amendment to Section 5 of the EURATOM Coopera- 
tion Act of 1958, as Amended. Report to accompany 
H.R. 8867. H. Rept. 93-385. July 19, 1973. 10 pp. 



October 22, 1973 



511 



Annual Meeting of SEATO Council 
Held at New York 

Deputy Secretary Rush was the chief U.S. 
delegate at the annual meeting of the SEATO 
Council held at New York September 28. 
Following is a press statement issued at the 
conclusion of the meeting. 

Council members of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization from Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom and the United States held 
their 18th annual meeting in New York 
today. 

At the conclusion of the meeting, SEATO 
Secretary General H. E. Sunthorn Honglada- 
rom announced that the Council upheld the 
objectives of the Manila Pact and its basic 
purpose of peace in Southeast Asia. They dis- 
cussed and agreed on measures to ensure that 
SEATO's future activities are relevant to the 
situation in the treaty area brought about by 
recent international development, notably the 
movement towards a peaceful and viable set- 
tlement of the Indochina conflict. 

In the light of major changes which have 
occurred in Southeast Asia since the last 
Council meeting, the Council agreed to a re- 
duction of SEATO's traditional military ac- 
tivities, with increased emphasis on support- 
ing the national programs of the two regional 
members, the Philippines and Thailand, in 
promoting stability and development. 

The Council also agreed with the Secretary 
General's proposal calling for a complete in- 
tegration of the military into the civilian 
staff at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok 
which would facilitate the organization's in- 
creased focus on cooperating in the support 
of the internal stability and development 
measures of the regional members. 

Council members believed that these 
changes would result in SEATO's activities 
being more relevant to the situation in the 



treaty area today, noting that the Manila 
Pact calls for cooperation among member na- 
tions to promote peace, economic progress 
and social well-being. 



World Tourism Organization Statutes 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, the 
Statutes of the World Tourism Organization 
done at Mexico City on September 27, 1970. 
The report of the Department of State is en- 
closed for the information of the Senate. 

The Statutes establish the World Tourism 
Organization as an international organiza- 
tion of intergovernmental character re- 
placing the International Union of Official 
Travel Organizations, a non-governmental 
organization. 

The World Tourism Organization will con- 
tinue the activities of the International 
Union of Official Travel Organizations in 
promoting and facilitating international 
tourism. Additionally, because of the World 
Tourism Organization's intergovernmental 
character and close association with the 
United Nations system, it is anticipated that 
it will become an even more effective organi- 
zation. I recommend that the Senate give 
early and favorable consideration to the 
Statutes and give its advice and consent to 
ratification. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 12, 1973. 



^Transmitted on Sept. 12 (White House press 
release) ; also printed as S. Ex. R, 93d Cong., 
1st sess., which includes the texts of the statutes and 
the report of the Department of State. 



512 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
Holds 17th Session at Vienna 



The 17th session of the General Confer- 
ence of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) ivas held at Vienna Septem- 
ber 18-24. Following is a, statement made 
before the conference on September 18 by 
Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chaii'man of the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission, who was chair- 
man of the U.S. delegation. 

It is an honor for me to represent the 
United States at this important meeting. 
This is my first IAEA General Conference, 
and I'm happy to have this opportunity to 
meet our many colleagues who have come to 
Vienna this week from all parts of the world. 

I would like to commend Director General 
[A. Sigvard] Eklund for the outstanding 
leadership he has provided to the Inter- 
national Agency over the past 12 years. His 
is a truly remarkable record of devotion to 
the Agency's programs. We were delighted to 
join with the other delegates today in the 
unanimous reappointment of Dr. Eklund to a 
fourth term in office. We wish also to pay 
tribute to members of the Agency staff, who 
have served with such diligence and dis- 
tinction. 

Next month the United Nations Associa- 
tion of the United States plans to salute the 
IAEA as part of its annual celebi'ation of the 
U.N.'s anniversary. As a contribution to 
these festivities the U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission will open an exhibit in Washing- 
ton. We are honored that Dr. Eklund is 
planning to participate in both of these 
events and to visit a number of our nuclear 
installations. The Agency has significant pro- 
grams in the environmental, waste manage- 
ment, and nuclear safety fields, among others, 



and we look forward to this opportunity to 
exchange ideas in these important areas. 

The President of the United States has 
asked me to extend to you his best wishes 
for a most productive and rewarding meet- 
ing. I need not remind this conference that 
the activities of the IAEA relate directly 
and importantly to President Nixon's con- 
cerns for world peace and his detennination 
to meet urgent energy needs without endan- 
gering our environment. 

In the United States, President Nixon has 
taken decisive action to meet the energy 
challenge. He recently requested an exten- 
sive reorganization of the government agen- 
cies dealing with energy policy, natural re- 
sources, and research and development. The 
President has established an Energy Policy 
Office in the White House and has proposed 
to the Congress the creation of three Federal 
agencies : a Department of Energy and Nat- 
ural Resources, which would be responsible 
for the balanced utilization and conservation 
of our resources; an Energy Research and 
Development Administration, which would 
use the present research and development 
structure of the Atomic Energy Commission; 
and a Nuclear Energy Commission, which 
would have the regulatory responsibilities 
for nuclear health and safety. 

In his message to Congress in June setting 
forth these proposals, the President also 
announced that he was initiating a Federal 
energy research and development effort of 
$10 billion over a five-year period beginning 
next year. To give impetus to this drive, he 
has directed that an additional $100 million 
be authorized in the current year to acceler- 
ate existing projects and undertake new ini- 



October 22, 1973 



513 



tiatives in a number of research and 
development areas. 

While the energy problems facing the 
United States have variously been described 
as a crisis or a dilemma, we prefer to view 
them as a challenge. We welcome this oppor- 
tunity to apply to the whole field of energy 
the research and development techniques 
which have been successful in our atomic 
energy programs and in other large, compli- 
cated technological projects. 

In the United States we are just beginning 
to achieve the promise of nuclear energy as 
a civilian power resource. The commercial 
operation of nuclear power plants reflects al- 
most .30 years of discussion and development, 
during which the light water reactor has 
established itself as a major new source of 
electrical energy that is both economical and 
safe. The development of a liquid-metal fast- 
breeder reactor is now our highest national 
priority for nuclear power production, and 
we expect this reactor to become available in 
the mid-1980's. The development of fusion 
power should present a new option, perhaps 
by the year 2000. By that time nuclear power 
may account for about half of the world's 
electric generating capacity. 

Vital as these efforts in nuclear technology 
are, we in the United States recognize that 
we must meet the energy challenge on a broad 
front that goes far beyond the nuclear sci- 
ences. In America, the scarcity of oil and gas 
supplies has forced us to give increasing 
attention to other sources of energy which we 
had not fully developed in the era of rela- 
tively cheap domestic petroleum products. 
Both the Federal Government and American 
industry are now studying ways of better 
utilizing our substantial coal reserves. There 
is also renewed interest in developing geo- 
thermal energy, and some advanced research 
has already started on harnessing solar en- 
ergy and other natural sources of power. 

One of the key features of the proposed 
Energy Research and Development Admin- 
istration is that the new agency would have 
authority to conduct research and develop- 
ment on all these potential energy sources 



as well as atomic energy. We hope that these 
efforts, together with vigorous programs to 
conserve energy, will provide the fuels 
needed for our growing economy. 

We in the United States look forward with 
confidence to rapid growth in the use of 
nuclear power, but we are determined that 
this development shall not result in gi-eater 
risks to man and his environment. The U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission is now devoting 
a substantial portion of its research and de- 
velopment resources to evaluating and re- 
ducing potential hazards of nuclear power 
plants. We are further reducing the already 
minuscule impact of radioactivity emanating 
from nuclear power plant operation, and we 
are giving greater attention to the thermal 
effects of cooling water used in these plants. 

The proliferation of nuclear power plants 
also places in a new perspective the trans- 
portation, management, and ultimate dis- 
posal of radioactive wastes. We have imposed 
stricter regulations on the shipment of these 
materials, and we are accelerating the intro- 
duction of new methods of solidifying and 
storing radioactive waste materials. I am 
pleased to note that the Thursday afternoon 
science section will be devoted to the impor- 
tant subject of radioactive waste manage- 
ment. 

Assistance to Developing Countries 

Many of the concerns I have mentioned 
involving nuclear energy represent issues 
which are dominant in the IAEA as well as in 
my own country. These are in fact worldwide 
problems which we must face in developing 
new energy sources. They offer a unique op- 
portunity for research by member states. 

The Agency has already taken a significant 
step with its recently completed in-depth 
market survey of the power requirements of 
14 developing countries in Asia, Southeast 
Europe, and Latin America. The report of 
this market survey is, in our view, an out- 
standing piece of work and an excellent ex- 
ample of the contribution the Agency can 
make to world energy efforts. We are pleased 
that the conference will consider this report. 



514 



Department of State Bulletin 



We commend not only the Agency but those 
many people in the governments and utility 
companies of the developing countries who 
furnished this information. We also apiireci- 
ate the work of the experts from a number 
of industrialized countries who developed 
and adapted the methodology required to pro- 
duce this study. 

We are convinced that this study will be 
useful both to the developing countries in 
assessing their power needs and to the nu- 
clear industry. We believe that open compe- 
tition in the market will determine which 
types of power reactors can help developing 
countries meet their growing power needs in 
the most economical way. 

In conducting this survey, the Agency has 
acquired both the manpower and the support- 
ing elements, such as specialized computer 
programs, which will enable it to evaluate 
the possible role of nuclear power in the 
developing countries. It would be a waste of 
valuable resources if these resources should 
now be dissipated. Moreover, the study 
makes it clear that in the years ahead nu- 
clear power will become a very real option 
for a number of developing countries. 

As they weigh the possibilities and prob- 
lems of nuclear power, those countries will 
need assistance in a variety of ways — in the 
training of personnel, detailed planning of 
network expansion, drafting of legislation 
and regulations, and evaluation of environ- 
mental impact, for example. Surely the 
Agency could jilay a major role in helping to 
supply or secure such assistance. 

In short, the completed survey should not 
be regarded as the end of the Agency's in- 
volvement with the potential foi- nuclear 
power in developing countries. The report 
will be considered in detail in committee later 
during this session. 

Nuclear Safety and Environmental Integrity 

In the years ahead, as nuclear power plants 
become a familiar part of the life and land- 
scape of developing and industrial nations 
alike, the Agency will have increasingly im- 
portant contributions to make in helping to 



insure both human health and safety and 
environmental integrity. 

Since its very inception, the Agency has 
regarded nuclear safety as among the most 
urgent and important items on its agenda. 
The United States has supported and encour- 
aged every improvement in IAEA programs 
in nuclear safety for member nations. Re- 
cently we proposed a modest augmentation 
of the Agency staff and some revisions in 
procedures which would strengthen the 
Agency's ability to conduct safety reviews 
requested by member nations on projects 
proposed or being built in their countries. 
This kind of advice is essential for countries 
just getting started in the nuclear energy 
business. Since the IAEA is the only interna- 
tional agency that can give this advice, I am 
happy to note that the Director General has 
appointed an internal task force to develop 
recommendations as to how the Agency's 
program can be modified to provide such 
assistance. 

The United States has devoted major ef- 
forts to the development of standards, re- 
actor designs, construction practices, and op- 
erational techniques to assure that safety is 
maintained at a high level. Later this month 
we will be host to a workshop on regulatory 
principles and perspectives for representa- 
tives of a number of countries who are inter- 
ested in learning about some of these tech- 
niques. We are glad to share this information, 
because we believe that any increment of 
safety achieved anywhere is of benefit every- 
where. I understand that representatives of 
the IAEA will attend this workshop. 

Members of our regulatory staff are also 
working in other ways to help improve 
Agency programs so that they can better 
meet the needs of the member countries now 
entering the nuclear power field. Our staff 
will continue to assist the Agency as much as 
possible in this effort. 

The United States recognizes that the 
Agency has a highly significant role to play 
in taking actions designed to protect the en- 
vironment. Those of us who work in the nu- 
clear field are fully aware of inescapable en- 



October 22, 1973 



515 



vironmental problems associated with the 
development of new energy resources in any 
form, be it nuclear fission or fusion, geo- 
thermal, solar, or whatever. We are con- 
vinced, however, that nuclear energy is the 
only presently available alternative to fossil 
fuel as a source of significant increments of 
power during coming decades and that its 
environmental effects can be properly con- 
trolled. We are equally convinced that any 
successful effort to attack the environmental 
]Droblems associated with nuclear power will 
require not only energetic and imaginative 
work but also close international cooperation. 
By their nature, these problems are interna- 
tional in scope, and many of the Agency's 
services in this field are of direct value to all 
the member states. 

We recognize with gratification that the 
Agency already has a strong program in the 
area of nuclear environmental protection. 
This program began almost as soon as the 
Agency came into existence and has steadily 
expanded. My government has supported all 
aspects of this program, and during recent 
years we have taken part in other efforts by 
the Agency to help deal with concerns about 
the environmental impact of nuclear energy. 

The United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment at Stockholm in June 
1972 and the London Convention on the Pre- 
vention of Marine Pollution last December 
gave further impetus to the Agency's envi- 
ronmental programs. We support the envi- 
ronmental program recommended by the 
Board of Governors in the budget for 1974, 
which we anticipate will be supplemented in 
future years by financial support from the 
U.N. Environment Fund. We strongly urge 
all member states to support adequate budg- 
etary provision for this program when we 
consider the 1974 budget later in this con- 
ference. 

Let me note at this point our view of the 
Agency as offering a unique multinational 
focus for research in problem areas which 
may ultimately be capable only of interna- 
tional solution. Consequently, we support the 
emphasis being placed by the Agency on sup- 



porting and coordinating research in radio- 
logical safety and waste management, espe- 
cially in view of the need for continuous 
attention to changing national and interna- 
tional requirements. We support the program 
of the Monaco Laboratory, to which we have 
made special contributions of equipment 
worth about $100,000 during the last four 
years. We are very pleased that the Board of 
Governors has endorsed the Director Gen- 
eral's proposal, developed by the IAEA and 
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entific and Cultural Organization], that the 
Monaco Laboratory's program be expanded 
to include the use of nuclear and other tech- 
niques to monitor specified nonradioactive 
marine pollutants. We will encourage financ- 
ing of this program by the U.N. Environ- 
ment Fund. 

Safeguards Under Nonproliferation Treaty 

The objectives of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), including the Agency's re- 
sponsibility for administering the treaty's 
safeguards provisions, continue to have our 
strongest support. I understand that of the 
78 non-nuclear-weapons states that are par- 
ties to the NPT, 26 now have NPT safe- 
guards agreements in force and 17 have 
agreements signed or approved. We are 
happy that the European Community and its 
members have signed a safeguards agree- 
ment with the Agency, and we hope that all 
of the countries involved will promptly 
ratify the agreement and the NPT. 

Although the United States is not required 
by the treaty to accept international safe- 
guards in the United States, negotiations are 
now actively in progress on our offer to per- 
mit the Agency to apply its safeguards to 
U.S. nuclear activities, excluding those with 
direct national security significance. The 
United States offered to permit safeguards 
to be applied in the United States, when they 
are being applied broadly in highly industri- 
alized non-nuclear-weapons countries, in or- 
der to demonstrate our belief that there is no 
risk to proprietary information by the appli- 
cation of IAEA safeguards and to meet the 



516 



Department of State Bulletin 



concern by some that they might suffer com- 
mercial disadvantage from the Nonprolifera- 
tion Treaty. 

We will continue to support the Agency's 
efforts to develop technically meaningful and 
widely acceptable procedures to meet its safe- 
guards responsibilities. We urge other mem- 
ber states to do the same. As the use of nu- 
clear power becomes more widespread the 
Agency's safeguards responsibilities will in- 
crease and the safeguards program will need 
our continued support, both through insuring 
an adequate budget and in making available 
our best people and most advanced safe- 
guards research results. 

I am aware that there are a great many 
extremely worthwhile activities in the Agen- 
cy's program that I have not touched on to- 
day. The U.S. delegation will suppoi't the 
1974 budget as recommended by the Board 
of Governors, believing it to represent a well- 
balanced use of the resources that are ex- 
pected to be available. 

We fully su])port the Agency's technical 
assistance program. The Director General 
has called our attention to the rising costs 
involved in the provision of technical assist- 
ance. We hope that the $3 million target for 
voluntary contributions toward the opera- 
tional budget for 1974 will be fully met by 
our respective governments, at least at the 
level recommended by the General Confer- 
ence and if possible above that. For our part, 
subject to congressional appropriations, we 
plan to continue to contribute generously to 
the target and to make additional in-kind 
grants for study in the United States, for the 
services of our experts, and for equipment 
to approved technical assistance projects. We 
also look forward to discussion next year of 
an increase in the target for 1975. In addi- 
tion, my government is pleased to renew its 
pledge, for the 15th consecutive year, to 
donate up to 50,000 dollars' worth of special 
nuclear materials for use in Agency projects 
in research and for medical therapy. 

With regard to our materials supply policy, 
the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's ura- 
nium enrichment facilities, which currently 



supply a large share of the world's needs, 
will be able to meet anticipated requirements 
for enrichment services only through the 
early 1980's, despite a current improvement 
program representing an investment of al- 
most $1 billion. We, as well as other nations 
which will increasingly rely on nuclear 
power, want to make certain that there will 
be no need to curtail these nuclear power pro- 
grams because enrichment services are not 
fully available. The United States, through 
one or more of several alternatives available 
to us, will move in ample time to assure that 
such services will be available to meet both 
our own needs and the rapidly expanding re- 
quirements of the international market. 

The safeguard of nuclear materials, the 
formulation and application of environ- 
mental and health and safety measures, the 
exchange of scientific information, and the 
development of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy — these are four broad areas of nu- 
clear activity in which the Agency performs 
services which are always useful and at times 
vital to every one of its member states. In 
most instances these are services which the 
Agency can undertake more effectively and 
more economically than could any nation 
operating unilaterally. 

Thus let me close my remarks as I began, 
by underscoring the high esteem in which my 
government holds the Agency and all who 
contribute to its activities. 



Members of U.S. Delegation 
to IAEA Conference Confirmed 

The Senate on September 19 confirmed the 
nomination of Dixy Lee Ray to be the Rep- 
resentative of the United States to the 17th 
session of the General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 

The nominations of William A. Anders, 
Clarence E. Larson, Dwight J. Porter, and 
Gerald F. Tape to be Alternate Representa- 
tives were also confirmed that day. 



October 22, 1973 



517 



United States Welcomes Admission 
of Three New Members to the U.N. 

Statement by John Scali 

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly^ 

Mr. President [Leopoldo Benites, of Ecua- 
dor] : May I offer my warm congratulations 
and those of the United States as you, the 
distinguished representative of a respected 
neighbor, assume the Presidency of this 28th 
General Assembly. 

It is a special honor for me to speak as the 
representative of the host country at this 
moment in history. Three new members have 
taken their places today in the supreme par- 
liament of mankind. One of them is a small 
country, particularly meaningful to us be- 
cause it is a neighbor and a good neighbor. 
The entry of the two German states is the 
culmination of a generation of diplomacy, 
both inside and outside the United Nations, a 
process in which all parties have come to rec- 
ognize the realities of today's world. It has 
been a process in which step by step the world 
has recognized that neither ideological con- 
flicts, bitter memories, nor war-bred jealous- 
ies can be allowed to obstruct the building of 
a better future. 

By welcoming new members, we have 
moved only part way on the road to endur- 
ing peace, but accompanied as it is by other 
moves toward international harmony, it is a 
move that should cause mankind to take 
heart and satisfaction. 

We welcome the independent Bahamas to 
the United Nations with particular affection. 
This newest American republic is a close 
neighbor with whom we have much history 
in common. Like us, the Bahamas have a 
freely elected and representative government, 
the head of which, in the person of Prime 
Minister Pindling, is here among us today. 
We have been friends many years. The Amer- 



' Made in the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 18 
(USUN press release 83). 



ican Government has been represented in 
Nassau since 1821. We look forward to con- 
tinuing these close ties with the Bahamas 
bilaterally and within this organization. 

The entry of the two Gennan states into 
the United Nations is a great symbolic act. 
The United Nations has grown over the years 
from its original 51 members to 135. But it 
was not until today that it could be said to 
even approach its goal of universality. 

The entry of the two German states moves 
the United Nations much nearer to this goal, 
enhancing its ability to function in the real 
woi-ld where real decisions are made and 
executed. 

The United States is proud of the role 
which it has played in making this event a 
reality. Beginning in 1969, President Nixon 
laid out a new blueprint for peace designed 
to replace conflict and confrontation with 
negotiation. His program was far more than 
atmospherics. He has since 1969 amply dem- 
onstrated his resolution to deal vigorously 
and forthrightly with the most difficult issues 
of our time and to lessen the threat of nu- 
clear arms in a historic agreement with the 
Soviet Union. In Europe, the seai'ch for peace 
has meant seeking improvements in the Ber- 
lin situation, altering the nature of relations 
between East and West, reducing the mili- 
tary confrontation of opposing coalitions, 
and lowering the barriers to travel, cultural, 
and intellectual intercourse. It has also 
meant moving with careful steps toward noi'- 
malizing diplomatic relations with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China and other nations. 

But progress through careful negotiation 
is not and cannot be the work of one country 
or even a small group of countries. We are 
working with the Soviet Union in full con- 
cert with our allies to settle the differences 
of decades and reduce tensions in central 
Europe. 

A cornerstone of these efforts has been the 
Quadripartite Berlin Agreement, a document 
which shows what can be accomplished when 
there is readiness to reject the outworn ideo- 



518 



Department of State Bulletin 



logical positions and search for ways to solve 
the stubborn problems. The Berlin agreement 
demonstrates anew that even the most rigid 
deadlock can be resolved through patient 
negotiations and mutual accommodation. 

This agreement in turn was followed by 
the quadripartite declaration of November 
1972 in which all four powers agreed to sup- 
port U.N. membership for the two German 
states. Today, we have witnessed one of the 
fruits of those agreements. 

Throughout this process, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany has played a major and 
constructive role. Its policies have helped lay 
the groundwork for today's events. It has 
taken and is continuing to take imaginative 
and forward-looking steps to place this rela- 
tionship with the Soviet Union, other East- 
ern European countries, and the German 
Democratic Republic on a sound and stable 
basis. The Federal Republic is, moreover, 
taking these steps in full consonance with its 
responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, 
stability, and security in the European Con- 
tinent. 

The Federal Republic of Germany is no 
stranger to the United Nations. It has played 
a substantial, indeed, often leading, role in 
the specialized agencies of this body. Its con- 
tributions have already brought great benefit 
to mankind. Now with its full participation, 
the entire world community stands to benefit. 

We have also noted with appreciation the 
declaration of the German Democratic Re- 
public of its intention to abide by the prin- 
ciples of the United Nations Charter and to 
make its full contribution toward alleviating 
the world's economic, social, and humani- 
tarian ills. 

In this connection, it is the particular hope 
of the United States that the German Demo- 
cratic Republic, which occupies part of the 
territory of the former German Reich, will 
also recognize the just claims of those who 
suffered as a result of the actions of the Nazi 
government. The Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, for its part, took exemplary and com- 



mendable measures in this regard many 
years ago. 

The economic, technical, scientific, cultural, 
and spiritual contributions of the German 
people have justly attracted wide admira- 
tion and greatly enriched the world. Today 
we look forward to their full and eflfective 
participation in the immense international 
economic and social tasks facing the United 
Nations. The effort to improve the condition 
of man is not a task for only a few. It is a 
burden all nations must bear. Disease, 
hunger, human misery, pollution, and natural 
catastrophe oppress us all. The earth, air, 
and sea are a common heritage and a com- 
mon concern. The tools of science, technol- 
ogy, and education, which the Gei-man people 
are so eminently qualified to provide, will be 
used to benefit every nation. With the help 
of the two German states, this world body 
will be better able to meet mankind's press- 
ing problems. This is a day of great pride for 
the peoples of the world. 

The generation which fought World War 
II is reassured by the entry of the two Ger- 
man states into the United Nations. Those 
who have lived through the strife of the post- 
war years can take heart. We learn from the 
past. For only with such a perspective can we 
grasp the full meaning of this solemn mo- 
ment. But I would suggest that the larger 
meaning is found not by looking behind, but 
by looking ahead. The most serious differ- 
ences among nations can and must be re- 
solved diplomatically. There is no other way 
short of catastrophe. Ideological differences 
remain and are immense. But here in the 
United Nations the principles of universality 
and cooperation are, and must be, demon- 
strated once more for all to see. Is it too 
much to hope that today will also mark the 
beginning of a new realism for this body as it 
goes about its noble task on behalf of the 
peoples of all the world? As I welcome the 
two German states on behalf of the United 
States, I express this fervent hope: May 
peace, may justice, be with us all. 



October 22, 1973 



519 



Agenda of the 28th Regular Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly ^ 

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the 
delegation of Poland. 

2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 

3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty- 
eighth session of the General Assembly: 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Commit- 
tee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 
Election of the President. 

Constitution of the Main Committees and elec- 
tion of officers. 

Election of the Vice-Presidents. 
Notification by the Secretary-General under 
Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Adoption of the agenda. 
General debate. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the work 
of the Organization. 
Report of the Security Council. 
Report of the Economic and Social Council. 
Report of the Trusteeship Council. 
Report of the International Court of Justice. 
Report of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

Election of five non-permanent members of the 
Security Council. 

Election of members of the Economic and Social 
Council. 

Election of fifteen members of the Industrial 
Development Board. 

Election of nineteen members of the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Environment 
Programme. 

Election of fifteen members of the United Na- 
tions Commission on International Trade Law. 
Election of the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees. 
The situation in the Middle East. 
Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 
24. Scientific work on peace research : report of the 

Secretary-General. 



9. 
10. 

11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 
23. 



■ Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 21 (U.N. doc. 
A/9201). 



25. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations 
with regard to the maintenance and consolida- 
tion of international peace and security, the 
development of co-operation among all nations 
and the promotion of the rules of international 
law in relations between States: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

26. Co-operation between the United Nations and 
the Organization of African Unity: report of 
the Secretarj'-General. 

27. Admission of new Members to the United Na- 
tions. 

28. Appointment of the members of the Peace Ob- 
servation Commission. 

29. Economic and social consequences of the arma- 
ments race and its extremely harmful effects 
on world peace and security. 

30. International co-operation in the peaceful uses 
of outer space : report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

31. Preparation of an international convention on 
principles governing the use by States of arti- 
ficial earth satellites for direct television broad- 
casting: report of the Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space. 

32. World Disarmament Conference: report of the 
Special Committee on the World Disarmament 
Conference. 

33. General and complete disarmament: report of 
the Conference of the Committee on Disarma- 
ment. 

34. Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all 
aspects of their possible use: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

35. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weap- 
ons: report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament. 

36. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and 
thermonuclear tests: 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

37. Implementation of General Assembly resolu- 
tion 2935 (XXVII) concerning the signature 
and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) : report 
of the Secretary-General. 

Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of 
peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Indian Ocean. 

Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Strengthening of International Security: re- 
port of the Secretary-General. 
Reser\-ation exclusively for peaceful purposes 
of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the sub- 
soil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond 
the limits of present national jurisdiction and 



38. 



39. 



40. 



520 



Department of State Bulletin 



use of their resources in the interests of man- 
kind, and convening of a conference on the law 
of the sea: report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdic- 
tion. 

41. Question of Korea: 

(a) Report of the United Nations Commission 
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of 
Korea; 

(b) Creation of favourable conditions to ac- 
celerate the independent and peaceful re- 
unification of Korea. 

42. Policies of apartheid of the Government of 
South Africa: 

(a) Reports of the Special Committee on 
Apartheid; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

43. United Nations Relief and Works Apency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 

(a) Report of the Commissioner-General; 

(b) Report of the Working Group on the Fi- 
nancing of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East; 

(c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine; 

(d) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

44. Comprehensive review of the whole question 
of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects : 
report of the Special Committee on Peace-keep- 
ing Operations. 

45. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights 
of the Population of the Occupied Territories. 

46. Review and appraisal of the objectives and 
policies of the International Development Strat- 
egy for the Second United Nations Develop- 
ment Decade. 

47. United Nations Institute for Training and Re- 
search: report of the Executive Director. 

48. United Nations Industrial Development Orga- 
nization : 

(a) Report of the Industrial Development 
Board ; 

(b) Second General Conference of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organi- 
zation : report of the Executive Director. 

49. Operational activities for development: 

(a) United Nations Development Programme; 

(b) United Nations Capital Development 
Fund; 

(c) Technical co-operation activities under- 
taken by the Secretary-General; 

(d) United Nations Volunteers programme; 

(e) United Nations Fund for Population Ac- 
tivities ; 

(f) United Nations Children's Fund; 

(g) World Food Programme. 



50. United Nations Environment Programme: 

(a) Report of the Governing Council; 

(b) Criteria governing multilateral financing 
of housing and human settlements: report 
of the Secretary-General. 

51. United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment: 

(a) Report of the Trade and Development 
Board; 

(b) Confirmation of the appointment of the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. 

52. United Nations University: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

53. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimina- 
tion: 

(a) Decade for Action to Combat Racism and 
Racial Discrimination ; 

(b) Draft Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; 

(c) Report of the Committee on the Elimina- 
tion of Racial Discrimination; 

(d) Status of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

54. Human rights in armed conflicts: protection 
of journalists engaged in dangerous missions in 
areas of armed conflict: report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

55. Elimination of all forms of religious intoler- 
ance: 

(a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Religious Intolerance: re- 
port of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Draft International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance 
and of Discrimination Based on Religion 
or Belief. 

56. Observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

57. Creation of the post of United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. 

58. Question of the elderly and the aged: report of 
the Secretary-General. 

59. Importance of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and of 
the speedy granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples for the effective guaran- 
tee and observance of human rights: report of 
the Secretary-General. 

60. Principles of international co-operation in the 
detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of 
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 

61. Crime prevention and control. 

62. World social situation of youth : report of the 
Secretary-General. 



October 22, 1973 



521 



63. Human rights and scientific and technological 
developments: report of the Secretary-General. 

64. Freedom of information: 

(a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Informa- 
tion; 

(b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Informa- 
tion. 

65. Status of the International Covenant of Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Interna- 
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report 
of the Secretary-General. 

66. Measures to be taken against ideologies and 
practices based on terror or on incitement to 
racial discrimination or any other form of 
group hatred. 

67. Report of the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees. 

68. Assistance in cases of natural disaster and 
other disaster situations: report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

69. Information from Non-Self-Governing Terri- 
tories transmitted under Article 73 e of the 
Charter of the United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples. 

70. Question of Namibia: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples; 

(b) Report of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia; 

(c) Report of the Secretary-General under Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution 3031 (XXVII); 

(d) United Nations Fund for Namibia: report 
of the Secretary-General ; 

(e) Appointment of the United Nations Com- 
missioner for Namibia. 

71. Question of Territories under Portuguese ad- 
ministration : 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

72. Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the 
Special Committee on the Situation with re- 
gard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 

73. Activities of foreign economic and other inter- 
ests which are impeding the implementation of 



the Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 
Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and Territories 
under Portuguese domination and in all other 
Territories under colonial domination and ef- 
forts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and 
racial discrimination in southern Africa: report 
of the Special Committee on the Situation with 
regard to the Implementation of the Declara- 
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colo- 
nial Countries and Peoples. 

74. Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples by the specialized agencies and 
the international institutions associated veith 
the United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples ; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

75. United Nations Educational and Training Pro- 
gramme for Southern Africa: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

76. Offers by Member States of study and training 
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories : report of the Secretary-General. 

77. Financial reports and accounts for the year 
1972 and reports of the Board of .\uditors: 

(a) United Nations; 

(b) United Nations Development Programme; 

(c) United Nations Children's Fund; 

(d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 

(e) United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research; 

(f) Voluntary funds administered by the 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. 

78. Supplementary estimates for the financial year 
1973. 

79. Proposed programme budget for the biennium 
1974-1975 and medium-term plan for the period 
1974-1977. 

80. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of 
the United Nations with the specialized agen- 
cies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 

81. Joint Inspection Unit: 

(a) Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

82. Pattern of conferences: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

83. Publications and documentation of the United 
Nations: report of the Secretary-General. 

84. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of 
the expenses of the United Nations: report of 
the Committee on Contributions. 



522 



Department of State Bulletin 



85. Appointments to fill vacancies in the member- 
ship of subsidiary organs of the General 
Assembly: 

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions; 

(b) Committee on Contributions; 

(c) Board of Auditors; 

(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of 
the appointments made by the Secretary- 
General ; 

(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal; 

(f) United Nations Staff Pension Committee. 

86. Personnel questions: 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of 
the Secretary-General ; 

(b) Other personnel questions: reports of the 
Secretary-General. 

87. United Nations salary system: 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Advisory Committee on Ad- 
ministrative and Budgetary Questions. 

88. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pen- 
sion Board. 

89. Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its t^venty-fifth session. 

90. Draft convention on the prevention and pun- 
ishment of crimes against diplomatic agents 
and other internationally protected persons. 

91. International conference of plenipotentiaries on 
the representation of States in their relations 
with international organizations. 

92. Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on the work of its 
sixth session. 

93. United Nations Conference on Prescription 
(Limitation) in the International Sale of 
Goods. 

94. Measures to prevent international terrorism 
which endangers or takes innocent human 
lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and 
study of the underlying causes of those forms 
of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in 
misery, frustration, grievance and despair and 
which cause some people to sacrifice human 
lives, including their own, in an attempt to 
effect radical changes: report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on International Terrorism. 

95. Report of the Special Committee on the Ques- 
tion of Defining Aggression. 

96. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: 
report of the Secretary-General. 

97. Review of the role of the International Court 
of Justice. 

98. United Nations Programme of Assistance in 
the Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider 
Appreciation of International Law: report of 
the Secretary-General. 

99. Report of the Committee on Relations with the 
Host Country. 



100. Inclusion of Chinese among the working lan- 
guages of the General Assembly and the Se- 
curity Council. 

101. Consideration of the economic and social situ- 
ation in the Sudano-Sahelian region stricken by 
drought and measures to be taken for the bene- 
fit of that region. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Coffee 

Agreement amending and extending the international 
coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Approved by 
the International Coffee Council at London April 
14, 1973. 

Notification of acceptance deposited subject to 
completion of appi-opriate constitutional pro- 
cedures: United States, September 28, 1973. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
1, 1973. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Iraq (with a declaration), 
August 28, 1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971." 
Accession deposited: Ecuador, September 7, 1973. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, September 11, 
1973. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 12, 1971.' 

Acceptances! deposited: Philippines, May 16, 1973 
(with a declaration) ; Tunisia, September 11, 
1973. 



' Not in force. 



October 22, 1973 



523 



Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971." 

Acceptance deposited: Tunisia, September 11, 
1973. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of pho- 
nograms against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Entered into force April 18, 1973.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
1, 1963. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 

sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into 

force May 26, 1965. TLAS 5780. 

Acceptance deposited: Gabon, September 3, 1973. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 12, 1971.' 

Accepted by the President: September 26, 1973. 



Uruguay 

Treaty on extradition and cooperation in penal mat- 
ters. Signed at Washington April 6, 1973.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
1, 1973. 

Yugoslavia 

Nonscheduled air service agreement, with annexes, 
protocol, and memorandum of implementation. 
Signed at Belgrade September 27, 1973. Entered 
into force provisionally September 27, 1973; de- 
finitively, on date of exchange of notes indicating 
agreement has been approved by the respective 
parties in accordance with their constitutional 
requirements. 



PUBLICATIONS 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 6, 1973 (TIAS 
7711). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca 
August 28 and September 19, 1973. Entered into 
force September 19, 1973. 

Canada 

Agreement for promotion of safety on the Great 

Lakes by means of radio, 1973, with technical 

regulations. Signed at Ottawa February 26, 1973.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification : October 

1, 1973. 

Italy 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 
1973.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification : October 
1, 1973. 

Paraguay 

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Asuncion May 24, 
1973.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
1, 1973. 

Philippines 

Agreement amending the agreement of September 
21, 1967, as amended and extended, concerning 
trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington September 27 and October 
3, 1973. Entered into force October 3, 1973. 



' Not in force. 

" Not in force for the United States. 



Recent Releases 



Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, B.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Super- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below include domestic postage. 

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States 1973. 
This publication contains a complete and official list- 
ing of the foreign consular offices in the United 
States together with their jurisdiction and recog- 
nized personnel. Pub. 7846. Department and For- 
eign Service Series 128. 100 pp. 45('. (Cat. No. 
81.69:128) 

.Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of September 21, 1972, as 
amended. TIAS 7595. 3 pp. ISf'. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:7595) 

Military Mission. Agreement with Iran extending the 
agreement of November 27, 1943, as amended and 
extended. TIAS 7596. 3 pp. 15<'. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:7596) 

Trade in Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textile Products. 

Agreement with Malaysia amending the agreement 
of September 8, 1970. TIAS 7597. 3 pp. 15^ 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7597) 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan 
relating to the agreement of May 6, 1970, as amended 
and extended. TIAS 7598. 4 pp. 15('. (Cat. No. 
89.10:7598). 



524 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 22, 1973 Vol LXIX, No. 1791 



Asia. Annual Meeting of SEATO Council Held 
at New York (press statement) 512 

Atomic Energy 

General Conference of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Holds 17th Session at 
Vienna (Ray) 513 

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Con- 
ference Confirmed 517 

Austria. President Nixon's News Conference 
of October 3 (excerpts) 501 

Bahamas. United States Welcomes Admission 
of Three New Members to the U.N. (Scali) . 518 

China. President Nixon's News Conference of 
October 3 (excerpts) 501 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 511 

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Confer- 
ence Confirmed 517 

Senate Confirms Mr. Mays as President of 
OPIC 507 

World Tourism Organization Statutes Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon) 512 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 
Kissinger Addresses Department Employees 506 

Economic Affairs. The United States and 
Korea: A Community of Interests (Porter) . 508 

Europe. President Nixon's News Conference 
of October 3 (excerpts) 501 

Foreign Aid. Senate Confirms Mr. Mays as 
President of OPIC 507 

Germany. United States Welcomes Admission 
of Three New Members to the U.N. (Scali) 518 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Annual Meeting of SEATO Council Held at 
New York (press statement) 512 

General Conference of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency Holds 17th Session 
at Vienna (Ray) 513 

Members of U.S. Delegation to I^EA Confer- 
ence Confirmed 517 

World Tourism Organization Statutes Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Nixon) 512 

Japan. President Nixon's News Conference of 
October 3 (excerpts) 501 

Korea. The United States and Korea: A Com- 
munity of Interests (Porter) 508 

New Zealand. Prime Minister Kirk of New 
Zealand Visits the United States (exchange 
of toasts with President Nixon) 503 

Presidential Documents 

President Nixon's News Conference of October 
3 (excerpts) 501 



Prime Minister Kirk of New Zealand Visits 
the United States 503 

World Tourism Organization Statutes Trans- 
mitted to the Senate 512 

Publications. Recent Releases 524 

Terrorism. President Nixon's News Confex- 
ence of October 3 (excerpts) 501 

Trade. The United States and Korea: A Com- 
munity of Interests (Porter) 508 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 523 

World Tourism Organization Statutes Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (Ni.xon) 512 

United Nations 

Agenda of the 28th Regular Session of the 

U.N. General Assembly 520 

United States Welcomes Admission of Three 

New Members to the U.N. (Scali) .... 518 



Naine Index 

Kirk, Norman E 503 

Kissinger, Secretary 506 

Mays, Marshall Trammell 507 

Nixon, President 501, 503, 512 

Porter, William J 506, 508 

Ray, Dixy Lee 513 

Scali, John 518 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 1-7 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to October 1 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 354 
of September 28. 



No. 

'358 



Date Snbjcet 

10/1 Akins sworn in as Ambassador 
to Saudi Arabia (biographic 
data). 

♦359 10/5 Program for state visit of Presi- 
dent Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
of the Republic of Ivory Coast. 

•360 10/5 Neumann sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Morocco (biographic 
data). 

t361 10/5 U.S. and Philippines sign cotton 
textile agreement (rewrite). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1792 



October 29, 1973 



MORAL PURPOSES AND POLICY CHOICES 
Address by Secretavii Kiaaivopr 525 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONP^ERENCE OF OCTOBER 12 532 

ANNUAL MEETING OF IMF AND IBRD BOARD OF GOVERNORS 

HELD AT NAIROBI 
Statement by Secretary of the Treasury Shultz 5UU 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1792 
October 29. 1978 



For sale by the ;>iiperintendeMt of Documents 
U.S. Government Printing Office 
W.nshinKtou. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
.'>2 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $29, foreign S36.2.'> 
Sinele copy €5 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
aecmcnt and Budget (January 29. 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETl 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public and 
interested agencies of tfie government 
witit information on developments in 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on tfie work of tfie Department and 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tlie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depart- 
ment, and statements, addressei, 
and news conferences of tfie President 
and tfie Secretary of State and otiier 
officers of tfie Department, as well a$ 
special articles on various pftases of 
international affairs and tfie functions 
of tfie Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to wfiich tlie 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of tfie Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in tfie field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Moral Purposes and Policy Choices 



Address by Secretary Kissinger 



This is an important anniversary. A year 
ago today, on October 8, came the break- 
through in the Paris negotiations which led 
soon afterward to the end of American 
military involvement in Viet-Nam. It is 
strangely difficult now to recapture the emo- 
tion of that moment of hope and uncertainty 
when suddenly years of suffering and divi- 
sion were giving way to new possibilities for 
reconciliation. 

We meet, too, at a time when renewed con- 
flict in the Middle East reminds us that 
international stability is always precarious 
and never to be taken for granted. Pacem in 
Terris remains regrettably elusive. However 
well we contain this crisis, as we have con- 
tained others, we must still ask ourselves 
what we seek beyond the management of 
conflict. 

The need for a dialogue about national 
purposes has never been more urgent, and 
no assembly is better suited for such a dis- 
cussion than those gathered here tonight. 

Dramatic changes in recent years have 
transformed America's position and role in 
the world : 

— For most of the postwar period America 
enjoyed predominance in physical resources 
and political power. Now, like most other 
nations in history, we find that our most 
difficult task is how to apply limited means 
to the accomplishment of carefully defined 
ends. We can no longer overwhelm our prob- 



' Made at Washington on Oct. 8 before the Third 
Pacem in Tei'ris Conference sponsored by the Center 
for the Study of Democratic Institutions (press 
release 362). 



lems; we must master them with imagina- 
tion, understanding, and patience. 

— For a generation our preoccupation was 
to prevent the cold war from degenerating 
into a hot war. Today, when the danger of 
global conflict has diminished, we face the 
more profound problem of defining what we 
mean by peace and determining the ultimate 
purpose of improved international relations. 

— For two decades the solidarity of our 
alliances seemed as constant as the threats 
to our security. Now our allies have regained 
strength and self-confidence, and relations 
with adversaries have improved. All this has 
given rise to uncertainties over the sharing 
of burdens with friends and the impact of 
reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances. 

— Thus, even as we have mastered the art 
of containing crises, our concern with the 
nature of a more permanent international 
order has grown. Questions once obscured 
by more insistent needs now demand our 
attention: What is true national interest? 
To what end stability? What is the relation- 
ship of peace to justice? 

It is characteristic of periods of upheaval 
that to those who live through them they 
appear as a series of haphazard events. 
Symptoms obscure basic issues and his- 
torical trends. The urgent tends to dominate 
the important. Too often goals are presented 
as abstract Utopias, safe havens from press- 
ing events. 

But a debate, to be fruitful, must define 
what can reasonably be asked of foreign 
policy and at what pace progress can be 
achieved. Otherwise it turns into competing 



October 29, 1973 



525 



catalogues of the desirable rather than in- 
formed comparisons of the possible. Dialogue 
degenerates into tactical skirmishing. 

The current public discussion reflects 
some interesting and significant shifts in 
perspective : 

— A foreign policy once considered ex- 
cessively moralistic is now looked upon by 
some as excessively pragmatic. 

— The government was criticized in 1969 
for holding back East-West trade with cer- 
tain countries until there was progress in 
their foreign policies. Now we are criticized 
for not holding back East-West trade until 
there are changes in those same countries' 
domestic policies. 

— The administration's foreign policy, once 
decried as too cold war oriented, is now at- 
tacked as too insensitive to the profound 
moral antagonism between communism and 
freedom. 

One consequence of this intellectual shift 
is a gap between conception and performance 
on some major issues of policy : 

— The desirability of peace and detente 
is affirmed, but both the inducements to 
progress and the penalties to confrontation 
are restricted by legislation. 

— Expressions of concern for human val- 
ues in other countries are coupled with fail- 
ure to support the very programs designed 
to help developing areas improve their eco- 
nomic and social conditions. 

— The declared objective of maintaining 
a responsible American international role 
clashes with nationalistic pressures in trade 
and monetary negotiations and with calls 
for unilateral withdrawal from alliance 
obligations. 

It is clear that we face genuine moral 
dilemmas and important policy choices. But 
it is also clear that we need to define the 
framework of our dialogue more perceptively 
and understandingly. 

The Competing Elements of Foreign Policy 

Foreign policy must begin with the under- 
standing that it involves relationships be- 
tween sovereign countries. Sovereignty has 



been defined as a will uncontrolled by others ; 
that is what gives foreign policy its con- 
tingent and ever-incomplete character. 

For disagreements among sovereign states 
can be settled only by negotiation or by 
power, by compromise or by imposition. 
Which of these methods prevails depends on 
the values, the strengths, and the domestic 
systems of the countries involved. A nation's 
values define what is just; its strength deter- 
mines what is possible; its domestic struc- 
ture decides what policies can in fact be 
implemented and sustained. 

Thus foreign policy involves two partially 
conflicting endeavors : defining the interests, 
purposes, and values of a society and relat- 
ing them to the interests, purposes, and 
values of others. 

The policymaker therefore must strike a 
balance between what is desirable and what 
is possible. Progress will always be measured 
in partial steps and in the relative satis- 
faction of alternative goals. Tension is 
unavoidable between values, which are in- 
variably cast in maximum terms, and efforts 
to promote them, which of necessity involve 
compromise. Foreign policy is explained do- 
mestically in terms of justice. But what is 
defined as justice at home becomes the sub- 
ject of negotiation abroad. It is thus no acci- 
dent that many nations, including our own, 
view the international arena as a forum in 
which virtue is thwarted by the clever prac- 
tice of foreigners. 

In a community of sovereign states, the 
quest for peace involves a paradox : The at- 
tempt to impose absolute justice by one side 
will be seen as absolute injustice by all oth- 
ers; the quest for total security for some 
turns into total insecurity for the remainder. 
Stability depends on the relative satisfac- 
tion and therefore also the relative dissatis- 
faction of the various states. The pursuit of 
peace must therefore begin with the prag- 
matic concept of coexistence— especially in a 
period of ideological conflict. 

We must, of course, avoid becoming ob- 
sessed with stability. An excessively prag- 
matic policy will be empty of vision and 
humanitv. It will lack not only direction but 



526 



Department of State Bulletin' 



also roots and heart. General de Gaulle 
wrote in his memoirs that "France cannot 
be France without greatness." By the same 
token, America cannot be true to itself with- 
out moral purpose. This country has always 
had a sense of mission. Americans have al- 
ways held the view that America stood foi- 
something above and beyond its material 
achievements. A purely pragmatic policy 
provides no criteria for other nations to 
assess our performance and no standards to 
which the American people can rally. 

But when policy becomes excessively mor- 
alistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous. 
A presumed monopoly on truth obstructs ne- 
gotiation and accommodation. Good results 
may be given up in the quest for ever-elusive 
ideal solutions. Policy may fall prey to inef- 
fectual posturing or adventuristic crusades. 

The prerequisite for a fruitful national 
debate is that the policymakers and critics 
appreciate each other's perspectives and 
respect each other's purposes. The policy- 
maker must understand that the critic is 
obliged to stress imperfections in order to 
challenge assumptions and to goad actions. 
But equally the critic should acknowledge 
the complexity and inherent ambiguity of 
the policymaker's choices. The policymaker 
must be concerned with the best that can be 
achieved, not just the best that can be imag- 
ined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete 
knowledge without the information that will 
be available later to the analyst. He knows — 
or should know — that he is responsible for 
the consequences of disaster as well as for 
the benefits of success. He may have to qual- 
ify some goals, not because they would be 
undesirable if reached but because the risks 
of failure outweigh potential gains. He must 
often settle for the gradual, much as he 
might prefer the immediate. He must com- 
promise with others, and this means to 
some e.xtent compromising with himself. 

The outsider demonstrates his morality 
by the precision of his perceptions and the 
loftiness of his ideals. The policymaker ex- 
presses his morality by implementing a se- 
quence of imperfections and partial solutions 
in pursuit of his ideals. 



There must be understanding, as well, of 
the crucial importance of timing. Oppor- 
tunities cannot be hoarded ; once past, they 
are usually irretrievable. New relationships 
in a fluid transitional period — such as to- 
day — are delicate and vulnerable; they must 
be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot 
pull up young shoots periodically to see 
whether the roots are still there or whether 
there is some marginally better location for 
them. 

We are now at such a time of tenuous be- 
ginnings. Western Europe and Japan have 
joined us in an efl!"ort to reinvigorate our 
relationships. The Soviet Union has begun 
to practice foreign policy, at least partially, 
as a relationship between states rather than 
as international civil war. The People's Re- 
public of China has emerged from two dec- 
ades of isolation. The developing countries 
are impatient for economic and social change. 
A new dimension of unprecedented chal- 
lenges — in food, oceans, energy, environ- 
ment — demands global cooperation. 

We are at one of those rare moments 
where through a combination of fortuitous 
circumstances and design man seems in a 
position to shape his future. What we need 
is the confidence to discuss issues without 
bitter strife, the wisdom to define together 
the nature of our world, as well as the vision 
to chart together a more just future. 

Detente With the Soviet Union 

Nothing demonstrates this need more ur- 
gently than our relationship with the Soviet 
Union. 

This administration has never had any 
illusions about the Soviet system. We have 
always insisted that progress in technical 
fields, such as trade, had to follow — and re- 
flect — progress toward more stable inter- 
national relations. We have maintained a 
strong military balance and a flexible de- 
fense posture as a buttress to stability. We 
have insisted that disarmament had to be 
mutual. We have judged movement in our 
relations with the Soviet Union not by 
atmospherics but by how well concrete prob- 



October 29, 1973 



527 



lems are resolved and by whether there is 
responsible international conduct. 

Coexistence, to us, continues to have a 
very precise meaning: 

— We will oppose the attempt by any coun- 
try to achieve a position of predominance 
either globally or regionally. 

— We will resist any attempt to exploit a 
poHcy of detente to weaken our alliances. 

— We will react if relaxation of tensions is 
used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in 
international trouble spots. 

The Soviet Union cannot disregard these 
principles in any area of the world without 
imperiling its entire relationship with the 
United States. 

On this basis we have succeeded in trans- 
forming U.S. -Soviet relations in many im- 
portant ways. Our two countries have 
concluded a historic accord to limit strategic 
arms. We have substantially reduced the risk 
of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in crisis 
areas. The problem of Berlin has been re- 
solved by negotiation. We and our allies have 
engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on 
major issues of European security, includ- 
ing a reduction of military forces in central 
Europe. We have reached a series of bilateral 
agreements on cooperation — health, environ- 
ment, space, scienc J and technology, as well 
as trade. These accords are designed to 
create a vested interest in cooperation and 
restraint. 

Until recently the goals of detente were 
not an issue. The necessity of shifting from 
confrontation toward negotiation seemed so 
overwhelming that goals beyond the settle- 
ment of international disputes were never 
raised. But now progress has been made — 
and already taken for granted. We are en- 
gaged in an intense debate on whether we 
should make changes in Soviet society a pre- 
condition for further progress or indeed for 
following through on commitments already 
made. The cutting edge of this problem is 
the congressional effort to condition most- 
favored-nation (MFN) trade status for other 
countries on changes in their domestic 
systems. 



This is a genuine moral dilemma. There 
are genuine moral concerns on both sides 
of the argument. So let us not address this 
as a debate between those who are morally 
sensitive and those who are not, between 
those who care for justice and those who 
are oblivious to humane values. The attitude 
of the American people and government has 
been made emphatically clear on countless 
occasions in ways that have produced effec- 
tive results. The exit tax on emigration is 
not being collected, and we have received 
assurances that it will not be reapplied ; hard- 
ship cases submitted to the Soviet Govern- 
ment are being given specific attention; the 
rate of Jewish emigration has been in the 
tens of thousands, where it was once a 
trickle. We will continue our vigorous efforts 
on these matters. 

But the real debate goes far beyond this: 
Should we now tie demands which were 
never raised during negotiations to agree- 
ments that have already been concluded? 
Should we require as a formal condition 
internal changes that we heretofore sought 
to foster in an evolutionary manner? 

Let us remember what the MFN question 
specifically involves. The very term "most 
favored nation" is misleading in its implica- 
tion of preferential treatment. What we are 
talking about is whether to allow normal 
economic relations to develop — of the kind 
we now have with over 100 other countries 
and which the Soviet Union enjoyed until 
1951. The issue is whether to abolish dis- 
criminatory trade restrictions that were 
imposed at the height of the cold war. In- 
deed, at that time the Soviet Government 
discouraged commerce because it feared the 
domestic impact of normal trading relations 
with the West on its society. 

The demand that Moscow modify its do- 
mestic policy as a precondition for MFN or 
detente was never made while we were nego- 
tiating; now it is inserted after both sides 
have carefully shaped an overall mosaic. 
Thus it raises questions about our entire bi- 
lateral relationship. 

Finally, the issue affects not only our rela- 



528 



Department of State Bulletin 



tionship with the Soviet Union but also with 
many other countries whose internal struc- 
tures we find incompatible with our own. 
Conditions imposed on one country could 
inhibit expanding relations with others, 
such as the People's Republic of China. 

We shall never condone the suppression of 
fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane 
principles and use our influence to promote 
justice. But the issue comes down to the 
limits of such efforts. How hard can we 
press without provoking the Soviet leader- 
ship into returning to practices in its for- 
eign policy that increase international 
tensions? Are we ready to face the crises 
and increased defense budgets that a return 
to cold war conditions would spawn? And 
will this encourage full emigration or en- 
hance the well-being or nourish the hope 
for liberty of the peoples of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union? Is it detente that has 
prompted repression — or is it detente that 
has generated the ferment and the demand 
for openness which we are now witnessing? 

For half a century we have objected to 
Communist efforts to alter the domestic 
structures of other countries. For a genera- 
tion of cold war we sought to ease the risks 
produced by competing ideologies. Are we 
now to come full circle and insist on domestic 
compatibility as a condition of progress? 

These questions have no easy answers. 
The government may underestimate the mar- 
gin of concessions available to us. But a fair 
debate must admit that they are genuine 
questions, the answers to which could affect 
the fate of all of us. 

Our policy with respect to detente is clear: 
We shall resist aggressive foreign policies. 
Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in 
any area, including the Middle East. As for 
the internal policies of closed systems, the 
United States will never forget that the 
antagonism between freedom and its enemies 
is part of the reality of the modern age. 
We are not neutral in that struggle. As long 
as we remain powerful, we will use our in- 
fluence to promote freedom, as we always 
have. But in the nuclear age we are obliged 



to recognize that the issue of war and peace 
also involves human lives and that the at- 
tainment of peace is a profound moral 
concern. 

The World as It Is and the World We Seek 

Addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly two weeks ago, I described our 
goal as a world where power blocs and bal- 
ances are no longer relevant; where justice, 
not stability, can be our overriding preoccu- 
pation ; where countries consider cooperation 
in the world interest to be in their national 
interest. 

But we cannot move toward the world of 
the future without first maintaining peace 
in the world as it is. These very days we are 
vividly reminded that this requires vigilance 
and a continuing commitment. 

So our journey must start from where 
we are now. This is a time of lessened ten- 
sion, of greater equilibrium, of diffused 
power. But if the world is better than our 
earlier fears, it still falls far short of our 
hopes. To deal with the present does not 
mean that we are content with it. 

The most striking feature of the con- 
temporary period, the feature that gives 
complexity as well as hope, is the radical 
transformation in the nature of power. 
Throughout history power has generally 
been homogeneous. Military, economic, and 
political potential were closely related. To 
be powerful, a nation had to be strong in all 
categories. Today the vocabulary of strength 
is more complex. Military muscle does not 
guarantee political influence. Economic 
giants can be militarily weak, and military 
strength may not be able to obscure economic 
weakness. Countries can exert political in- 
fluence even when they have neither military 
nor economic strength. 

It is wrong to speak of only one balance 
of power, for there are several, which have 
to be related to each other. In the military 
sphere, there are two superpowers. In eco- 
nomic terms, there are at least five major 
groupings. Politically, many more centei's 
of influence have emerged ; some 80 new na- 



Oetober 29, 1973 



529 



tions have come into being since the end of 
World War II, and regional groups are as- 
suming ever-increasing importance. 

Above all, whatever the measure of power, 
its political utility has changed. Throughout 
history increases in military power, however 
slight, could be turned into specific political 
advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals 
of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of 
marginal advantage is both pointless and 
potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is 
reached, additional increments of power do 
not translate into usable political strength, 
and attempts to achieve tactical gains can 
lead to cataclysm. 

This environment both puts a premium on 
stability and makes it difficult to maintain. 
Today's striving for equilibrium should not 
be compared to the balance of power of 
previous periods. The very notion of "operat- 
ing" a classical balance of power disinte- 
grates when the change required to upset 
the balance is so large that it cannot be 
achieved by limited means. 

More specifically, there is no parallel with 
the 19th century. Then the principal coun- 
tries shared essentially similar concepts of 
legitimacy and accepted the basic structure 
of the existing international order. Small 
adjustments in strength were significant. 
The "balance" operated in a relatively con- 
fined geographic area. None of these factors 
obtain today. 

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we 
mean a simplistic mechanical model devoid 
of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances 
that maintained equilibrium in previous cen- 
turies are neither appropriate nor possible 
in our time. In an age of ideological schism 
the distinction between friends and adver- 
saries is an objective reality. We share ideals 
as well as interests with our friends, and we 
know that the strength of our friendship.'; 
is crucial to the lowering of tensions with 
our opponents. 

When we refer to five or six or seven 
major centers of power, the point being 
made is not that others are excluded but 
that a few short years ago everyone agreed 



that there were only two. The diminishing 
tensions and the emergence of new centers 
of power have meant greater freedom of 
action and greater importance for all other 
nations. 

In this setting, our immediate aim has 
been to build a stable network of relation- 
ships that offers hope of sparing mankind 
the scourges of war. An interdependent 
world community cannot tolerate either big- 
power confrontations or recurrent regional 
crises. 

But peace must be more than the absence 
of conflict. We perceive stability as the 
bridge to the realization of human aspira- 
tions, not an end in itself. We have learned 
much about containing crises, but we have 
not removed their roots. We have begun to 
accommodate our differences, but we have 
not affirmed our commonality. We may 
have improved the mastery of equilibrium, 
but we have not yet attained justice. 

In the encyclical for which this confei-ence 
is named. Pope John sketched a greater 
vision. He foresaw "that no political com- 
munity is able to pursue its own interests 
and develop itself in isolation" for "there 
is a growing awareness of all human 
beings that they are members of a world 
community." 

The opportunities of mankind now tran- 
scend nationalism and can only be dealt with 
by nations acting in concert: 

— For the first time in generations man- 
kind is in a position to shape a new and 
peaceful international order. But do we 
have the imagination and determination to 
carry forward this still-fragile task of 
creation ? 

— For the first time in history we may 
have the technical knowledge to satisfy 
man's basic needs. The imperatives of the 
modei-n world respect no national borders 
and must inevitably open all societies to the 
world around them. But do we have the 
political will to join together to accomplish 
this great end? 

If this vision is to be realized, America's 
active involvement is inescapable. History 



530 



Department of State Bulletin 



will judge us by our deeds, not by our good 
intentions. 

But it cannot be the work of any one 
country. And it cannot be the undertaking 
of any one administration or one branch of 
government or one party. To build truly is 
to chart a course that will be carried on by 
future leaders because it has the enduring 
support of the American people. 

So let ui search for a fresh consensus. 
Let us restore a spirit of understanding be- 
tween the legislative and the executive, be- 
tween the government and the press, 
between the people and their public servants. 
Let us learn once again to debate our meth- 
ods and not our motives, to focus on our 
destiny and not on our divisions. Let us all 
contribute our different views and perspec- 
tives, but let us once again see ourselves as 
engaged in a common enterprise. If we are 
to shape a world community we must first 
restore community at home. 

With Americans working together, Amer- 
ica can work with others toward man's eter- 
nal goal of a Pacem in Terris — peace abroad, 
peace at home, and peace within ourselves. 

President Comments on Trade Bill 
as Reported by House Committee 

Statement by President Nixon'' 

Over the past several months, the House 
Ways and Means Committee has held ex- 
haustive hearings and made a number of 
changes in the Trade Reform Act which I 
proposed last April. Its work was completed 
yesterday, and the trade bill will soon be 
considered by the House of Representatives. 

Many of the committee's changes were 
made over the strong objections of the admin- 
istration. Many others were accepted as sig- 
nificant improvements. In assessing the im- 
pact of the committee's changes, I have tried 
to determine how they would affect the pur- 
poses for which this legislation was origi- 
nally designed. 



'Issued on Oct. 4 (White House press release). 



In most respects the bill submitted to the 
House by the Ways and Means Committee is 
a highly responsible piece of legislation. 

— It would permit the United States to en- 
ter major trade negotiations with the author- 
ities needed to achieve broad gains in trade 
liberalization with a strong and proper em- 
phasis both on equity and reciprocity. 

— It would significantly ease access to 
escape clause relief and adjustment assist- 
ance for American workers and firms suffer- 
ing injury or threat of injury from growing 
import competition. 

— It would broaden the range of actions 
the United States can take in responding to 
unfair international trade practices. 

— It would introduce several new authori- 
ties which can be used to manage domestic 
and international economic policies more 
effectively. 

— It would allow the United States to ful- 
fill its international pledge to establish a plan 
of generalized tariff preferences for the less 
developed countries of the world. 

In short, the Trade Reform Act as reported 
to the House holds out the promise of more 
and better jobs for American workers, of 
more products at lower prices for the Amer- 
ican consumer, of expanding exports for the 
United States and other nations, and most 
importantly, of reduced international ten- 
sions and a strengthened structure of peace. 

In one important area, however, the com- 
mittee bill is clearly inadequate. I am deeply 
concerned about the bill's failure to provide 
the tools we need to expand healthy commer- 
cial relationships with the Soviet Union and 
other Communist countries. This administra- 
tion is committed to seeking most-favored- 
nation treatment for the Soviet Union. In- 
deed, the United States has made a formal 
commitment to the Soviet Union to seek the 
necessary legislative approval for such treat- 
ment in the firm belief that this is in the best 
interests of both our countries. Therefore, 
once again I strongly urge the Congress to 
restore the authority to grant nondiscrimi- 
natory tariff treatment to all countries. 



October 29, 1973 



531 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of October 12 



Press release 380 dated October 12 

Secretary Kissinger: I suggest that we do 
this press conference in two parts. I will be- 
gin with a few personnel announcements, 
and I'll take some questions on those. And 
then I'll make a few comments to introduce 
the substantive part, and we'll have a ques- 
tion-and-answer period on that. 

Now, with respect to personnel appoint- 
ments, I would like to mention a number of 
Presidential appointments, all of which are 
subject to confirmation by the Senate. I have 
recommended to the President, and he in- 
tends to nominate, the following individuals 
for the positions stated: 

As Under Secretary for Security Assist- 
ance, William Donaldson. Mr. Donaldson is 
currently chairman and chief executive offi- 
cer of the investment banking firm of Don- 
aldson, Lufkin & Jenrette. He was named 
businessman of the year by the Associated 
Press for 1969 and 1970. He's a member of 
the board of trustees for the Ford Founda- 
tion and member of the Yale Corporation 
and to show the ecumenical spirit in which 
we proceed. In addition to his duties as Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, Mr. Don- 
aldson will be responsible for the energy 
aspects of foreign policy, and he will also 
have general supervision over those Bureaus 
in the Department that have not had a nor- 
mal home on the seventh floor — Cultural 
Affairs, and Science and Technology — and 
he will also do other special assignments. 

As Deputy Under Secretary for Manage- 
ment, Ambassador Dean Brown, who is now 
in Jordan. He is one of the most energetic 
younger Foreign Service officers. It will be 
his job, together with the new Director Gen- 
eral of the Foreign Service, whom I will men- 



tion later, to look at the whole personnel 
structure of the Foreign Service, to make 
sure that the ablest, most energetic people 
get into the key positions as rapidly as possi- 
ble. 

As Legal Adviser of the Department, the 
President has nominated Mr. Carlyle Maw. 
Mr. Maw is a senior partner in the law firm 
of Cravath, Swaine and Moore. He has been 
chairman of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York; the International Law 
Association, the American Society for Inter- 
national Law. One of his primary tasks will 
be to work on the creative relationships of 
international law and the conduct of our for- 
eign policy. 

The Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, Ambassador Robert 
Ingersoll, currently our Ambassador in Ja- 
pan. Ambassador Ingersoll has performed 
with great distinction as our Ambassador to 
Japan since 1972, following a long and dis- 
tinguished career in business. He emphasizes 
the importance we attach, in our Asian pol- 
icy, to the special role of Japan. Also, by pick- 
ing a man of his distinction, the intention is 
to emphasize that the Assistant Secretaries 
will henceforth play a very crucial role in 
the formulation and conduct of our foreign 
policy and will have greater discretion and 
greater responsibility. 

As Assistant Secretary for Administra- 
tion, John Thomas. Mr. Thomas is a career 
Foreign Service officer with extensive ex- 
perience in the Department of State in the 
administrative field. 

With respect to Ambassador Brown, I 
would like to emphasize that he will stay in 
his present post for the duration of the cur- 
rent crisis in the Middle East. 



532 



Department of State Bulletin 



In addition, I wish to announce that I in- 
tend to appoint the following, who do not 
require senatorial confirmation: 

As Director General of the Foreign Serv- 
ice, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, our cur- 
rent Ambassador in Chile. As you know, 
Ambassador Davis has held three ambassa- 
dorships: to Bulgaria, to Guatemala, and to 
Chile, where he is presently serving. He is a 
career Foreign Service officer. I believe he's 
the youngest Career Minister in the Service, 
and he and Ambassador Brown will have the 
primary responsibility for vitalizing the 
Foreign Service and for making certain, as 
I pointed out previously, that the able and 
energetic individuals get promoted rapidly 
to key positions. 

As Director of the Planning and Coordi- 
nating Staff. Mr. Winston Lord. Mr. Lord has 
been my Special Assistant at the National 
Security Council staff for three years. He 
was closely associated with the overtures to- 
ward the People's Republic of China. He has 
been one of my closest associates in the White 
House. He served before that in the Depart- 
ment of State and the Department of De- 
fense. He has been told that the policy 
planning staff has top priority on the ablest 
young people in the Foreign Service, and the 
policy planning staff is going to be given a 
major role, I would say almost a principal 
role, in developing the choices for the Secre- 
tary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Under 
Secretaries — to make certain that we do not 
spend all our time on dealing with current 
crises but that we have a sense of direction. 

As Inspector General of the Foreign Serv- 
ice, .James Sutterlin. Mr. Sutterlin will be 
moving to the Inspector General post from 
his current assignment as Director of the 
Planning and Coordinating Staff. He is, as 
you know, a career officer with a distin- 
guished record. 

As a Special Assistant to the Secretary 
for Press Relations, Mr. George Vest. Mr. 
Vest is presently in charge of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. He 
is returning and will be available in the De- 
partment on Monday to begin his duties un- 



der the stern supervision of the incumbent, 
Ambassador [Robert J.] McCloskey. 

The officers who have held the positions 
for which new personnel have been an- 
nounced today have given this government 
long and faithful service. They have my 
gratitude as well as that of the President for 
a job well done. I want to express my regret 
that Under Secretary Curtis Tarr has de- 
cided to return to private life, and he has all 
our good wishes. 

Now I'll be glad to answer some questions 
on this, and then I'll get to others. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will George Vest have 
the title of Deputy Assistant Secretary also? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet de- 
cided what title he should have at present. It 
will be Special Assistant until we have con- 
sidered it further. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the successor to Am- 
bassador Ingersoll in Japan — what is the 
statics of that? 

Secretary Kissinger: It will be announced 
within three weeks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we assume that the 
other Assistant Secretaries rvill noiv stay in 
place for the near future, or will there be 
other changes? 

Secretani Kissinger: No, I would not as- 
sume that these are the last changes that will 
be made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the 
appointment of an Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have told the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee that all vacant 
ambassadorships will be filled within two 
months of my swearing-in. I expect to hold 
to this schedule, and we expect to announce 
an Ambassador to the Soviet Union by the 
middle of November, after my return from 
China. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have dis- 
cussed your emploijment questions, can we 
go to more substantive things? 



October 29, 1973 



533 



Secretary Kissinger: If there are no more 
questions on personnel, yes. Maybe it would 
help if I made a few observations first on the 
Middle East, and then I'll take your ques- 
tions. 

Q. Right. 

Summary of Situation in the Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger: I thought it might 
focus our discussion if I began by giving you 
a brief summary of the situation in the Mid- 
dle East as we see it. 

You ladies and gentlemen will understand 
that we are, at this moment, in a delicate 
phase in which our principal objective has 
to be to bring about a cessation of hostilities 
and to lay the basis for a more permanent 
peace in the Middle East and that therefore 
I will have to be somewhat guarded in some 
of the observations I make and in some of 
the answers I give to your questions. But I 
expect that after the conclusion of this phase 
to have another press conference in which I 
will give a fuller account than may be pos- 
sible today. 

Now let me talk about the situation in the 
Middle East in the following parts: First, 
the situation prior to the outbreak of hostil- 
ities. Secondly, the American efforts after 
hostilities started to bring about a cessation 
of hostilities. Third, a very brief observa- 
tion on the military situation as we see it 
today. And, finally, where we hope to go from 
here. 

First, with respect to what we knew prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities: In the week 
prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the United 
States was aware that there were additional 
concentrations of Syrian forces and also that 
the Egyptian forces were engaged on what 
was interpreted both by our intelligence as 
well as by Israeli intelligence as their regular 
fall maneuvers. 

We asked our own intelligence, as well as 
Israeli intelligence, on three separate occa- 
sions during- the week prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities to give us their assessment of 
what might happen. There was the unani- 



mous view that hostilities were unlikely to 
the point of there being no chance of it hap- 
pening. Nor was the possibility of hostilities 
raised in any of the discussions with either 
of the parties that took place at the United 
Nations during the last week. 

In these circumstances, the United States 
had no occasion to warn any country against 
engaging in preemptive action. The United 
States, therefore, in the week prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities, gave no advice with 
respect to a contingency that we had been 
unanimously assured was not likely to hap- 
pen — in fact was certain not to happen. 

The first time the U.S. Government was 
informed that hostilities might be imminent 
was at 6 o'clock Saturday morning, when I 
was awakened and immediately contacted 
the President. From then until the time that 
we were informed that hostilities had in fact 
begun — which was around 9 o'clock on Sat- 
urday morning — we did make intensive ef- 
forts with the parties, as well as with the 
Soviet Union and the Secretary General of 
the United Nations, to attempt to prevent the 
outbreak of hostilities. 

Obviously, given the scale of preparation 
that must have been made prior to the out- 
break of hostilities, these efforts were un- 
availing. 

After hostilities broke out, the United 
States set itself two principal objectives. 
One, to end the hostilities as quickly as pos- 
sible. Secondly, to end the hostilities in such 
a manner that they would contribute to the 
maximum extent possible to the promotion 
of a more permanent, more lasting solution 
in the Middle East. 

Therefore, the United States has sought 
during this period — first in the United Na- 
tions and, secondly, through a series of bilat- 
eral contacts — to create a framework in 
which both of these objectives could be real- 
ized. We have explored the possibilities of 
crystallizing a consensus within the United 
Nations. We have also been in touch with the 
parties, as well as with the permanent mem- 
bers of the Security Council, in order to see 
what bilateral efforts might bring. 



534 



Department of State Bulletin 



We have not gratuitously sought oppor- 
tunities for confrontations in public forums 
which miofht harden dividing lines and which 
might make it more difficult to move toward 
a settlement. 

When this phase is over, we will give an 
accounting of the efforts we have undertaken, 
and then a judgment can be made with re- 
spect to them. For now, our objective is to 
bring about an end of hostilities in such a 
manner that we will be in contact with all of 
the parties, as well as with the permanent 
members of the Security Council, after hos- 
tilities are ended, because we believe that in 
this manner we can make a maximum con- 
tribution to a just and lasting peace in the 
Middle East. 

Our assessment of the military situation 
as we see it this morning is that Israeli 
forces seem to have advanced some distance 
into Syria. Egyptian forces are holding the 
east side of the Suez Canal to a distance of 
about 6 to 10 miles. The Egyptian front — 
the Suez front — is reasonably stable, and 
the Syrian front is somewhat fluid. 

As for the future, the United States will 
continue to make, and is now engaged in 
making, efforts to bring about an end to 
hostilities in a manner that contributes to 
long-term peace in the area — and I may say 
to long-term peace in the entire world. This 
is the framework of our discussions. 

And now, Stewart [Stewart Hensley, 
United Press International], if you would 
like to ask the first question. 

Middle East Crisis and U.S.-Soviet Relations 

Q. What I would like to a^k is in connec- 
tion with hringing about a framework of 
stability and so forth. You said Monday that 
the detente between the Soviet Union and the 
United States could not withstand, or could 
not survive, irresponsibility in any area, in- 
cluding the Middle East.^ And I am wonder- 
ing tvhether in that connection you feel that 
the Russian statement urging other Arab 



See p. 525. 



states to join Egypt and Syria in the fight 
against Israel constitutes the sort of irre- 
sponsibility which jeopardizes the detente 
and, if it does so, whether you intend to 
match from the American side the war sup- 
plies which are said to be coming in to the 
others from the Soviet side. 

Secretary Kissinger: That's at least two 
questions. 

With respect to the first question: the be- 
havior of the Soviet Union in the Middle 
East crisis and the effect of the Middle East 
crisis on U.S.-Soviet relations. Any assess- 
ment has to recognize that both the United 
States and the Soviet Union confront, each 
from their own perspective, a very complex 
situation in the current crisis. 

Indeed, the reason why -we believe that a 
long-term settlement in the Middle East is 
so important is the danger that the Middle 
East may become in time what the Balkans 
were in Europe before 1914, that is to say, 
an area where local rivalries that have their 
own momentum that will draw in the great 
nuclear powers into a confrontation that 
they did not necessarily seek or even neces- 
sarily start. 

It is obvious that the United States has a 
traditional friendship with Israel, which it 
will maintain in this crisis. It is also clear 
that the Soviet Union has a relationship go- 
ing back some years with some of the Arab 
states, which it also will not rupture during 
this crisis. The difficulty both of us face is 
whether, while remaining true to our prin- 
ciples, we can nevertheless conduct the re- 
lationships in such a manner that the larger 
interests of peace are served. 

We did not consider the Soviet statement 
to the President of Algeria helpful. We did 
not consider the airlift of military equipment 
helpful. We also do not consider that Soviet 
actions as of now constitute the irresponsi- 
bility that on Monday evening I pointed out 
would threaten detente. When that point is 
reached, we will in this crisis, as we have in 
other crises, not hesitate to take a firm stand. 
But at this moment we are still attempting 



October 29, 1973 



535 



to moderate the conflict. As of this moment 
we have to weigh against the actions of 
which we disapprove — and quite strongly — 
the relative restraint that has been shown in 
public media in the Soviet Union and in the 
conduct of their representatives at the Se- 
curity Council. 

And as of this moment, our objective is, as 
I stated, to end hostilities on terms that are 
just to all without exacei'bating relations to 
an unbearable point. 

I want to repeat: When we make the 
judgment that actions have reached the point 
of irresponsibility, we will be very firm in 
making this clear. 

Ongoing Discussions With Europe 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may change the sub- 
ject for a minute, was the dialogue with 
Europe slowed down by the cancellation of 
your trip? And could you help us to guess 
when the Declarations of Principles xvill be 
ready for signature ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The dialogue with 
Europe was not significantly slowed down, 
although my vanity will not permit me to 
admit that my inability to conduct conversa- 
tions will have no effect on ongoing diplo- 
macy. [Laughter.] 

Basically, the discussions that are now go- 
ing on between us and the Europeans concern 
two declarations and the general structure of 
our relationship. The two declarations are be- 
tween the United States and the Common 
Market about economic relationships and 
those political relationships impinging on 
economic relationships, and between the 
United States and all its other 14 partners 
in NATO in a multilateral forum about the 
future direction of NATO policy. And the 
third effort is to go beyond these declara- 
tions, to use them as a starting point to 
take a look at the future and to consider how 
the Western nations envisage the world in 
which they may want to live, or may have to 
live, over the next 25 years. 

Now, with respect to the dialogue with the 
Common Market, that, too, has two aspects: 



first, the internal cohesion of Eui'ope, which 
has been, I believe, fostered, and strongly 
fostered, by our initiative; and secondly, the 
relationship of this united Europe with the 
United States. 

On October 18, the Political Directors of 
the Nine European nations and Assistant 
Secretary of State [for European Affairs 
Walter J.] Stoessel will meet in Copenhagen 
to continue the discussions conducted by me 
with the Foreign Ministers and conducted 
subsequently by them in New York. There- 
fore that process will continue. 

As you all know, I met with French For- 
eign Minister Jobert yesterday, and we had 
an opportunity to discuss both of these 
efforts. 

Last week France submitted a proposal 
for a NATO declaration. I want to take this 
opportunity to emphasize that the declaration 
submitted by the French representative in 
the NATO Council is considered extremely 
constructive by the United States. And even 
though we have some additions that we may 
wish to discuss, we believe it represents a 
very major advance in the NATO discussions. 

I think it is important to point out that it 
is not without significance that it is France 
which would have made this major contri- 
bution to the NATO dialogue. 

So we believe that our discussions with 
Europe are now on course and that they will 
lead to a successful conclusion within a rea- 
sonable time span. And I want to emphasize 
again: We are not interested in time but in 
substance. And we're not concerned with just 
a headline, but we're concerned with getting 
our relationships defined in a manner that 
can stand the test of time. 

Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS News]. 

Situation Prior to Middle East Hostilities 

Q. Mr, Secretary, back on the Middle East, 
do you believe, in light of the Soviet cvactM- 
tion of dependents from Syria and Egxjpt last 
Thursday and Friday, that (1) they knew 
in advance of the plans for the attack? Do 
you feel that they should have informed the 



536 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States of those plans? And (2) do you 
feel that the Soviet Union, to any degree, 
encouiuged the attacks? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is too early to make 
a final judgment on all of these matters. 

If the Soviet Union encouraged these at- 
tacks — which we have, as of now, have no 
evidence of — that would have to be treated 
by us as a very serious matter. 

Now, if the Soviet Union learned of these 
attacks through its own intelligence or in 
some other manner and did not inform us, 
then this is a different problem. 

In an ideal world, one would expect closer 
consultation, but given the particular vola- 
tility of the Middle East, it would have been 
a heavy responsibility to make known certain 
advance information. Nevertheless, we would 
like to stress that if either side in this rela- 
tionship has certain knowledge of imminent 
military operations in any explosive part of 
the world, we would consider it consistent 
and indeed required — by the principles that 
have been signed between the United States 
and the Soviet Union — that an opportunity 
be given to both sides to calm the situation. 

Q. In view of the reputation of Israeli in- 
telligence, to what do you attnbute the fail- 
ure of both their and our intelligeyxce to spot 
what was about to take place? 

Secretary Kissinger: Nobody made any 
mistakes about the facts. There are always 
two aspects to intelligence. One is a determi- 
nation of the facts; the other is the interpre- 
tation of these facts. And there is the 
tendency of most intelligence services — and 
indeed of most senior officials and indeed of 
some newspapermen^to fit the facts into 
existing preconceptions and to make them 
consistent with what is anticipated. And if 
you start from the assumption that a war is 
probably unlikely — if you know that there 
have been Egyptian maneuvers every Sep- 
tember over the last 10 years — then there is 
probably a tendency to make observed facts 
fit your preconceived theories. This is one of 
the gravest dangers of all intelligence assess- 



ments. And facts are much easier to come by 
than intentions. 

Over the years that I have been in this 
position, the possibility of a massive Arab 
attack was not considered among the most 
likely by any of the evaluators that I've 
talked to. 

Q. May I folloiv that? Mrs. Meir said that 
she had advised other governments — / think 
she used the expression "a reaso-nable time 
in advance" — so that they could attempt to 
prevent it. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends on 
your definition of a reasonable time. We were 
informed at 6 o'clock on Saturday morning 
that a war might be imminent. We were in- 
formed somewhat earlier that Israel did not 
intend to attack herself, but that did not in- 
dicate to us necessarily that an Arab attack 
was imminent. 

Soviet Airlift 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what kind of help are 
the Soviets giving Egypt and Syria? What 
kind of help are we now, or will %ve later, give 
to Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: Herb [Herbert Kap- 
low, ABC News] , at this time I would like to 
stress again that our principal problem in 
responding to questions like this is to keep in 
mind that we are in a very delicate situation 
which can be easily inflamed by rash state- 
ments or by responding to very immediate 
pressures. 

The Soviet airlift, at this moment, is mod- 
erate. It's more than light. It's a fairly sub- 
stantial airlift. And it has to be addressed 
in relation to the possibility of influencing 
immediate military operations. 

As far as we are concerned, you all know 
that we do have an ongoing military relation- 
ship with Israel, which we are continuing. 
And we are having discussions with Israel 
about the special situation created by recent 
events, but I don't think any useful purpose 
would be served by going into detail. 

Q. In that connection, Mr. Secretary, some 



October 29, 1973 



537 



Arab countries are threatening to cut off 
Western oil supplies if the United States 
continues this ongoing relationship and re- 
supplies Israel. How heavily do those threats 
2veigh in the determimition of the policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have made a very 
serious effort, in this crisis, to take seriously 
into account Arab concerns and Arab views. 
On the other hand, we have to pursue what 
we consider to be the right course; we will 
take the consequences in pursuing- what we 
consider to be the right course. 



Attempts To Crystalize a Consensus in the U.N. 

Q. Can you give us any idea, Dr. Kissinger, 
of the kinds of obstacles that you're running 
into now in this quest for ending hostilities? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have seen a 
fair amount of discussion about the desirabil- 
ity of some United Nations action. Now, the 
difficulty has been that our almost daily can- 
vass of the consensus in New York is that the 
opinions are so divided and the willingness to 
take a position on the part of the major — or 
on the part of all — the members of the Secu- 
rity Council is so low that our judgment that 
to force a formal vote on any proposition that 
we might put forward would only harden the 
dividing lines and would only serve to under- 
line the inability to achieve a consensus. 

We have therefore placed more stress on 
attempting to crystallize a consensus than 
we have in going through a battle of resolu- 
tions and counterresolutions. 

Beyond this I cannot go, except to make 
clear that we are in touch with the parties 
and with the major — with the permanent 
members of the Security Council — as well as, 
on a daily basis, with the Secretary General 
of the United Nations. 

Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington 
Post]. Let Murrey; Murrey has been over- 
ridden twice! 

Q. Ttvo questions, if I may. 

Secretary Kissinger: I probably will regret 
recognizing him in a minute. [Laughter.] 



Importance of Restraint by Great Powers 

Q. Would you give us, sir, your overall 
assessment of the state of attitude by the 
superpowers — by the three major powers, 
the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
China — in respect to the danger of any 
spread of these hostilities? Secondly, if I 
may, as Presidential Natio-nal Security Ad- 
viser hoio do you evaluate the handling of 
this crisis by the State Department? 
[Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first with re- 
spect to the second question, we are very 
impressed, in the White House, by the lead- 
ership that the State Department has re- 
ceived. [Laughter.] But, on a serious level, 
I think that — for crisis situations, cer- 
tainly — the combination of these two posi- 
tions enables a more coherent policy. And 
with the operation of my associates in the 
State Department, the conduct has been out- 
standing and has contributed to keeping the 
crisis, so far, contained within its present 
framework. 

Now, with respect to the first question, the 
danger of escalation as it is evaluated by, 
may I say, the permanent members of the 
Security Council, so that I am not making 
distinctions here: 

I think everybody is aware that a war of 
this nature has a possibility of escalating. 
I think that up to now both sides, the two 
countries that are most capable of producing 
a confrontation, that is, the United States 
and the Soviet Union, have attempted to 
behave within limits that would prevent an 
escalation into such a war. If you compare 
their conduct in this crisis to their conduct in 
1967, one has to say that Soviet behavior has 
been less provocative, less incendiary, and 
less geared to military threats than in the 
previous crisis. 

It is of course an extremely volatile situa- 
tion which has potentialities for getting out 
of hand. And I can only emphasize once again 
the great importance of restraint by all of 
those countries who have it in their capacity 
to bring about an escalation and an expan- 
sion of hostilities and the expectation of the 



538 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States that all countries that have a 
capacity to influence events influence them 
on the side of restraint and moderation, as 
we are attempting to do. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection, have 
yoti tried to reach an agreement ivith the 
Soviets on suspending the deliveries of arms 
to the parties? 

Secretai-y Kissinger: I don't think I should 
go into any of — into the details of any ex- 
changes with the Soviet Union at this time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about 
firmness if the thing should get that far, are 
you thinking of the kind of firmness that the 
United States demonstrated in 1970 at the 
time of the Syrian crisis ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The question is 
whether, if the situation reached the point, 
the United States would act with the same 
firmness as in 1970. Situations are never 
comparable, but the basic principles that 
governed our policies throughout this admin- 
istration remain constant, and I don't think 
I should speculate on the particular methods 
we would use. But we would be guided by 
the same principles. 

But let me repeat: We do not want this to 
happen, we don't expect it to happen, and 
we think that with restraint by all sides 
there is no need whatever for it to happen. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you assess thr 
superpower or the large poivers — could you 
assess what you consider the Arab strategy 
in launching these attacks? I mean, you have 
talks with the Arab Foreign Ministers at 
the United Nations. There has been some talk 
that they had a limited psychological-political 
objective — in vieiv of the talk about the so- 
called peace initiative that you were about to 
launch. 

Secretary Kissinger: The Arab objective, 
of course, has not been fully shared with us. 
And so we are here in the realm of specula- 
tion. And the Arab objective will also become 
clearer as the days go on. 

If the Arab objective was, as is sometimes 
stated, to emphasize the fact that the Middle 
East is — that permanent stability cannot be 



assumed in the Middle East and that there is 
an urgency in achieving a negotiated settle- 
ment or that it is important to achieve a 
negotiated settlement, then it would be our 
judgment that that point has been made. 
The United States stands ready now, as it 
stood ready before the beginning of hostil- 
ities, to help the parties if they want to pur- 
sue a negotiated solution. We believe that it 
would be useful, and we would be prepared, 
as I pointed out to both sides in New York, 
to be helpful in that. 

If that is the Arab strategy, then we are at 
a point where perhaps we can turn, after the 
end of hostilities, to that search for peace, 
which the United States would support. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, obviously you can't 
ask the Russians to not send any more arms 
to these people if you are sending arms to 
Israel. Why don't you tell the Soviets that 
we will stop sending arms to Israel if they 
tvill stop sending them to the Arabs? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I said, this is not 
the time to discuss what exchanges are going 
on between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, except to emphasize again that our 
primary objective is to bring about restraint 
and to bring about as rapid a solution as is 
possible. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you stressed in your 
speech on Monday night at the Pacem in 
Terris Conference the need to move from 
preventive diplomacy to more creative diplo- 
macy. Does this crisis present an oppor- 
tunity, do you believe, for the United States, 
particularly in cooperation ivith the Soviet 
Union, to stress a new urgency to move to 
direct or indirect Arab-Israeli negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: We would hope that 
after the completion — after the conclusion of 
hostilities that all — that, first, the parties 
directly involved and, secondly, the countries 
indirectly involved would recognize the fra- 
gility of the situation that erupts so periodi- 
cally into conflict. And if that conclusion 
should be reached, as we believe it should be 
reached, the United States stands ready to 
help the parties in reaching a just settlement. 

And we have also urged, and I want to use 



October 29, 1973 



539 



this occasion to urge, all the parties in the 
conduct of their diplomacy now to keep in 
mind that whatever momentary advantages 
might be achieved in this or that forum, our 
principal objective should be to maintain 
relationships that can move both the area 
and the world toward a more lasting peace. 
We will conduct our foreign policy and our 
diplomacy in that manner, and we hope all 
other countries will also conduct themselves 
in that manner. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is an Arab vietv 
that it would be easier to reach a permanent 
settlement if the Egyptians maintain a cer- 
tain foothold on the Sinai Peninsula. What 
kind of map at the end of hostilities do you 
think would contribute most to a settle- 
ment—a permanent settlement? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is not an Ameri- 
can determination to make. We stated some 
general propositions at the Security Council 
on Monday, and we will be prepared to par- 
ticipate in any other exchange and discus- 
sion. But I don't think any useful purpose 
would be served now — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are planning a trip 
to China at the end of this month. Has that 
trip been jeopardized in any way by these 
developments? And ivould you expect Chi- 
nese cooperation in the restraints that you 
are advocating? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our call for restraint 
is addressed to all nations with a capacity to 
influence events. Of course the Chinese ca- 
pacity to influence events, given the geo- 
graphic distance, is not as great as that of 
other countries, and that must be weighed. 
But our appeal for restraint is addressed to 
all countries. 

I do not foresee that my trip to China will 
be jeopardized by the situation as it now 
exists. But of course this depends on how 
long it will go on. 

Q. In pursuit of an end to hostilities, would 
ive be willing to support a cease-fire-in-place 
now in the Mideast, or do we want with- 
drauml to the '67 line? 

Secretary Kissinger: At this moment, this 



is not the occasion to discuss any specific 
formula that may be advanced, because the 
attitude to a specific formula will depend on 
conditions which exist when it is advanced. 
And there are so many approaches that have 
been canvassed that it would serve no pur- 
pose to review now. 

Q. Mr. Secretai~y, in the light of what was 
apparently a failure to gauge intentions on 
the facts prior to the outbreak of hostilities, 
what steps do you think this country can take 
to improve its capability to gauge intentions 
in a situation like this ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The judgment of the 
intentions of other countries is always an 
extremely difficult matter. And it isn't some- 
thing that can be solved by improving any 
particular capabilities. 

Surprise would never be possible if there 
were not mis judgments of intentions. And 
obviously the people most concerned, with 
the reputation of the best intelligence service 
in that area, were also surprised, and they 
have the principal problem of answering the 
question which you put to me. 

To the degree that one can improve one's 
understanding of the mentality of other 
countries, to the degree that one undei-stands 
their decisionmaking process, to that degree 
one can reduce the dangers of being taken 
by surprise. But the element of surprise can 
never be totally eliminated. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, before in assessing pos- 
sible Arab objectives, you gave us one pos- 
sibility, which broadly translated means 
making a political point. What other possible 
Arab objectives are there beyo-nd that, and 
if there are, tvhat could be the expected U.S. 
response ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I can't speculate on 
what conceivable objectives there might be- 
which could range from the one I gave 
to a total military victory, which could be 
from a short campaign to a war of attrition. 
The United States would believe that a pro- 
longed war of attrition in the Middle East 
would have such a high possibility of great- 
power involvement — at least great-power 
involvement in the sense of increasing the 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



tensions to a point which would affect the 
entire international atmosphere and raise 
issues of supplies to both sides in such a 
manner — that we believe it is in the interest 
of all countries, including also, and above all, 
the participants, to bring the war to a rea- 
sonable and honorable conclusion as soon as 
that can be accomplished. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much 
for spending this hour with ms. We hope to 
see you again soon. 



The Journey Toward 
a World Community 

Toast by Secretary Kissinger ' 

Mr. President [Leopoldo Benites, Presi- 
dent of the 28th U.N. General Assembly], 
Mr. Secretary General [Kurt Waldheim, Sec- 
retary General of the United Nations], dis- 
tinguished representatives of the world's 
nations, ladies and gentlemen : As I welcome 
you to this hall, let me also issue a word of 
warning. To those of you who are diplomats, 
be mindful of what you say, for you are sur- 
rounded by members of the press. And to 
those of you who are members of the press, 
be careful not to take too seriously every- 
thing you hear, for you are surrounded by 
diplomats. 

But let me ha.sten to add that I mean no 
offense to the honored profession of diplo- 
macy. I am now, by nomination of the Presi- 
dent and confirmation of the Senate, a diplo- 
mat myself. 

And as a former historian I know that 
16th-century scholars believed that the 
world's first ambassadors were angels — mes- 
sengers from heaven to earth. 

There may have been one or two foreign 
ministers who have spoken before this As- 
sembly during its 28-year history who ap- 
peared to claim a special relationship with 



' Given at a dinner hosted by Secretary Kissinger 
at the Metropolitan Museum of Art at New York 
on Oct. 4 honoring delegations to the U.N. General 
Assembly. 



the Almighty. But that is a view not many of 
us here tonight would fully support — given 
the humility so characteristic of our 
profession. 

The ancient Greeks — men with a perhaps 
less poetic eye than their medieval suc- 
cessors — also linked deity and diplomacy by 
naming Hermes the god of diplomats. 
Hermes, as you may recall, was the symbol 
of charm, but also of cunning. It is said that 
on the day of his birth he robbed a neighbor 
of 50 cows and then sneaked back to his 
cradle. Having managed to get through a 
whole week without a major diplomatic inci- 
dent, I will draw no morals from this story. 

Mr. President, before I run the risk of 
dealing U.S. foreign policy a fatal blow, 
let me turn to more serious thoughts. 

Present on this occasion is a glorious mix 
of tongues, creeds, and races. 

Here also are the leaders of an institution 
designed to serve all peoples of the world, not 
a particular people or culture or national 
pohcy. 

And here are leaders of the U.S. Congress, 
men who remind us that, from the days of 
Warren Austin and Arthur Vandenberg, 
Americans — no matter what their party — 
have always supported the United Nations. 

Finally, we are honored by the artists, 
academics, and journalists who are with us 
tonight, for they are all guarantors of our 
diversity and trustees of our common 
humanity. 

Thus, this assemblage symbolizes the 
world as it is. But more, it symbolizes the 
world as it can be. For here in the United 
Nations, and at these tables tonight, we 
have come together across the boundaries 
of our differences, because of our common 
goal : our hope for peace and a better world 
for all mankind. 

Ralph Waldo Emerson once cited a fable 
from an unknown antiquity : 

The Gods, in the beginning, divided Man into men, 
that he might be more helpful to himself; just as 
the hand was divided into fingers, the better to 
answer its end. 

This is a wisdom that neither men nor na- 
tions have yet understood or practiced. Over 



October 29, 1973 



541 



the centuries we have emphasized our phil- 
osophic and political varieties rather than 
our common destiny; we have been more 
given to conflict than cooperation. Of the 
species on this planet, man alone has inflicted 
upon himself most of his own suffering. 

In an age of potential nuclear cataclysm, 
in an age of instant communication amidst 
ideological conflict, our most urgent task is 
to overcome these apparently iron laws of 
history. The vision of a world community 
based on justice, not power, is the necessity 
of our age. 

So let us hold to values worthy of our 
goals, remembering that great works are not 
possible without deep commitment. 

Where there is oppression, let us seek 
justice. 

Where there is hunger, let us seek 
abundance. 

Where there is inhumanity, let us have 
compassion. 

Where there is distrust, let us strive for 
good faith. 

Let us learn, as well, the difference be- 
tween truth and self-righteousness. Let us 
recognize that no nation or group of nations 
can demand understanding for its own prob- 
lems alone. Let us make sure that the best 
does not become the enemy of the good. Let 
us recall that the ideal can be reached only 
by stages that define the attainable. We will 
be judged finally by our deeds, not our 
proclamations. 

I pledge you that the United States is 
ready to begin the journey toward a world 
community. Our sights will be raised even 
when our tread must be measured. We will 
make no excessive promises, but we will keep 
every promise we shall make. We look upon 
stability as a bridge to the realization of 
human dreams, not as an end in itself. We 
know that peace will come when all — the 
small as well as the large — have a share in 
its shaping and that it will endure when all — 
the weak as well as the strong — have a stake 
in its lasting. 

Hope has been likened to a road in the 



country : It is not there to begin with ; but as 
it is traveled more and more, it comes into 
existence. 

So let us work together to change our 
practices, not our ideals. In our daily labors 
let us travel the road of our hopes until what 
is now unfamiliar becomes natural and what 
is now our vision becomes our reality. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join me 
in a toast to the United Nations — the treas- 
ury of man's noblest aspirations. 



A Western Hemisphere Relationship 
of Cooperation 

Toast by Secretary Kissinger ^ 

President Benites [Leopoldo Benites, of 
Ecuador, President of the 28th U.N. General 
Assembly], Excellencies, ladies and gentle- 
men : There is a story of an Englishman who 
visited Sweden, and when he was going 
through passport control, he was confronted 
with two lines. One was marked for Swedes ; 
the other one was marked for foreigners. 
After a while an official came by and found 
him sitting between these two lines. And the 
oflicial said, "Sir, will you please go into one 
line or the other?" And he said, "That's just 
my problem. I am not a Swede, and I am ob- 
viously not a foreigner." [Laughter.] 

I think that story is symbolic of our meet- 
ing today. We obviously do not belong all to 
one country, but we obviously are also not 
foreigners in this room. 

I am grateful that you came and for this 
opportunity to tell you that we are serious 
about starting a new dialogue with our 
friends in the Americas. 

As we look back at the history of the rela- 
tionships of the United States to its neigh- 
bors to the south, it has been characterized 



' Given at a luncheon hosted by Secretary Kis- 
singer at the Center for Inter-American Relations 
at New York on Oct. 5 honoring Latin American 
delegations to the U.N. General Assembly. 



542 



Department of State Bulletin 



by alternating periods of what some of you 
have considered intervention with periods of 
neglect. 

We are proposing to you a friendship based 
on equality and on respect for mutual 
dignity. 

And such a relationship is needed for all 
of us, and I believe it is needed also for the 
rest of the world. 

In the United States in the last decade, 
we have experienced many dramatic changes. 
Throughout most of our history we could 
overpower most of our foreign policy prob- 
lems, and we could also substitute resources 
for thought. Today, without understanding, 
we can do very little. 

Throughout much of our history, indeed 
throughout much of this administration, we 
used to believe with respect to agriculture, 
for example, that our primary problem was 
how to get rid of seemingly inexhaustible 
surpluses. We have now learned that we 
share the world's problem : how to allocate 
scarce food resources in relation to world 
needs. 

When I came to Washington, the discus- 
sions with respect to energy concerned means 
of restricting production and allocating it 
among various allies. Today the problem is 
to find energy sources around the world that 
can meet world needs. 

So we in this country are going through a 
revolution of sorts, and the whole world is 
undergoing a revolution in its patterns. 
And the basic problem we face is whether 
we will choose the road of nationalism or the 
road of cooperation, whether we will ap- 
proach it from the perspective of each party 
trying to get the maximum benefit for itself, 
or whether we can take a common view based 
on our common needs. And this is why oui- 
relations in this hemisphei'e are so crucial 
for all of us in this room and for all the rest 
of the world as well. We in this room, with 
all the ups and downs in our relationships, 
share a common history and similar values 
and many similar experiences. The value of 
human dignity is nowhere better understood 



than in the countries of our friends to the 
south of us. 

So if the technically advanced nations can 
ever cooperate with the developing nations, 
if people with similar aspirations can ever 
achieve common goals, then it must start here 
in the Western Hemisphere. 

We in the United States will approach this 
dialogue with an open mind. We do not be- 
lieve that any institution or any treaty ar- 
rangement is beyond examination. We want 
to see whether free peoples, emphasizing and 
respecting their diversity but united by sim- 
ilar aspirations and values, can achieve great 
goals on the basis of equality. 

So we are starting an urgent examination 
of our Western Hemisphere policy within our 
government. But such a policy makes no 
sense if it is a U.S. prescription handed over 
to Latin Americans for your acceptance or 
rejection. It shouldn't be a policy designed 
in Washington for Latin America. It should 
be a policy designed by all of Latin America 
for the Americas. 

And so as we examine our own policy, 
we must also ask for your help. We know 
that there isn't one Latin America, but many 
different countries. We know also that there 
are certain subregional groupings. But it 
isn't for us to say with whom to conduct the 
dialogue. That has to come from our guests 
here in this room. 

And so as we form our policy, I would 
like to invite your suggestions, whatever 
form you think appropriate, as groups or 
subgroups or individual nations. 

And when our final policy emerges, we will 
all have a sense that we all had a share in 
its making, and we will all have a stake in 
maintaining it. 

So, President Benites and Excellencies, 
I would like to propose a toast to what can 
be an adventure of free peoples working to- 
gether to establish a new relationship that 
can be an example to many other nations. 
I would like to propose a toast to Western 
Hemisphere relationships, to our distin- 
guished guest of honor, President Benites. 



October 29, 1973 



543 



Annual Meeting of IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors 
Held at Nairobi 



The Boards of Governors of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) and its affiliates held 
their regular anmial meetings at Nairobi 
September 2U-28. Follmving i3 a statement 
made before the Boards of Governors on 
September 25 by Secretary of the Treasury 
George P. Shultz, U.S. Governor of the Fund 
and Bank. 

Department of the Treasury press release dated September 25 

Nairobi has been a happy choice for this 
annual meeting. For many of us, the pros- 
pect of visiting Kenya and seeing some of 
its natural splendor provided a special sense 
of anticipation. Upon arrival, we found these 
striking and efficient facilities in the setting 
of a city that epitomizes the rapid progress 
that independent, self-reliant, and energetic 
people can make when they have the tools 
with which to work. I particularly appre- 
ciate President Kenyatta's warm words of 
welcome and his challenge to us all. 

Less than two weeks ago in Tokyo, most 
of the nations here represented ])ledged 
themselves to a thorough review of our trad- 
ing practices and rules. This week we can 
provide the necessary impetus to complete 
our work in reshaping our international 
monetary arrangements. Here in Nairobi — 
on a continent where vast potential often 
contrasts starkly with human poverty — we 
also come face to face with the challenge of 
economic development. 

Trade, money, development — each of these 
is a large task. Any one of them, it might be 
said, would be enough for us to deal with 
alone. Yet, in a larger sense, we are foi'- 
tunate that the pressure of events forces 



us to deal with them together. They are 
related, not by any artificial or self-imposed 
negotiating calendar, but by reality. It is 
right to keep in mind that delay in one area 
could undermine progress in another. It is 
equally right — and a better omen — that suc- 
cess in one area will support and encourage 
good results in the others. 

These fundamental interrelationships were 
plainly recognized in the mandate given the 
Committee of Twenty on monetary reform 
a year ago. They were recognized in the 
Tokyo Declaration on trade adopted by 
GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade] earlier this month. Let us keep them 
in mind in all our work in Nairobi and 
beyond and emphasize the mutually reinforc- 
ing benefits of success in each field. 



Monetary Reform 

Our monetary discussions are now well 
advanced, owing in no small part to the 
patient and effective efforts of Mr. Wardhana 
and Mr. Morse [Ali Wardhana, Chairman of 
the Committee of Twenty; Jeremy Morse, 
Chairman of the Deputies of the Committee 
of Twenty]. We take satisfaction in the 
extent to which a basic convergence of views 
on the broad framework of a new system has 
emerged. 

— We all seek a substantial strengthening 
of the processes of international adjustment 
through a blending of objective criteria and 
international judgment, with the recogni- 
tion of the need for symmetrical and even- 
handed pressures on both surplus and deficit 
countries. 

— There is full acceptance of the idea that 



544 



Department of State Bulletin 



the center of gravity of the exchange rate 
system will be a regime of "stable but ad- 
justable par values," with adequately wide 
margins and with floating "in particular 
situations." ' 

— We anticipate a general system of con- 
vertibility to support the regime of par 
values, with a modified SDR [special draw- 
ing rights] as the central reserve asset and 
deemphasis of the roles of gold and reserve 
currencies. 

— There is a common will to explore the 
complex technical requirements for multi- 
currency intervention and to find mutually 
satisfactory terms for consolidating or 
funding outstanding balances of reserve 
currencies. 

At the same time, my sense of satisfaction 
is tempered. Issues of critical importance — 
carefully outlined in the report submitted 
to us by Mr. Wardhana — remain unresolved. 
No doubt we could each expound at length 
views on particular aspects of these issues. 
However, I believe those issues will be re- 
solved as national governments are able to 
appraise more thoroughly the operational 
aspects of different approaches toward ad- 
justment pressures, toward convertibility, 
and toward the definition and valuation of 
reserve assets. Moreover, we need to con- 
sider answers to each of those questions in 
the full context of answers to the others. 

In constructing a world monetary system 
we cannot act, as I see it, like merchants 
in a bazaar bargaining for selfish advantage. 
Nor should we be concerned out of pride or 
politics with patching together and com- 
pi'omising components from every national 
position. All our success depends upon 
achieving a coherent, workable whole that 
fairly serves the common interests. 

With good will and intensive technical 
work, the ground can be fully prepared for 
a comprehensive agreement as soon as next 
spring. That agreement will then need to 
be translated into an extensive and detailed 



' For the text of a communique issued on Mar. 27 
at the conclusion of a meeting of the Committee of 
Twenty at Washington, see Bulletin of May 7, 
1973, p. 587. 



rewriting of the IMF Articles of Agreement. 
Is it wrong to aim to approve those new 
articles, for submissions to our legislatures, 
at our next annual meeting? 



The Transitional Period 

We are all conscious of the stresses in 
exchange markets arising from time to time 
during this transitional period. Yet, in broad 
terms, the substantial exchange rate changes 
of the past two years — although in some 
instances clearly exaggerated by speculation 
and uncertainty — have provided powerful 
and needed impetus toward correcting per- 
sistent structural imbalances. 

In the case of the United States, the 
alarming erosion in our trade position has 
by now been decisively reversed. In con- 
trast to a deficit of more than $614 billion 
in 1972, we should be close to balance in 
1973. While an extraordinary surge in agri- 
cultural exports has greatly speeded the 
turnaround, our trade position in manufac- 
tured goods has also been improving, even 
in the face of high domestic demand. 

We are also beginning to see welcome 
evidence that both American and foreign 
firms are reappraising their investment pro- 
grams, with more emphasis on U.S. pro- 
duction. Thus, shifts in capital flows should 
reinforce the favorable effects on our pay- 
ments of the swing in our trade position. 
In these circumstances, surpluses in both 
our tiade and basic payments position now 
appear in sight for next year. Such sur- 
pluses for a period seem to me indispensable 
for full restoration of confidence, for en- 
couraging a reflow of dollars to the United 
States, and for implementing any lasting 
monetary reform. 

Our contacts with traders, investors, and 
businessmen suggest they have acclimated 
themselves reasonably well to the present 
monetary environment, despite more insta- 
bility in exchange markets from day to day 
than they or we like to see. Propelled by 
boom conditions, world trade is, if anything, 
expanding even faster than in most earlier 
years. 



October 29, 1973 



545 



It would be a fundamental error, how- 
ever, to mistake present arrangements for 
monetary reform. Habits of cooperation and 
the exercise of good sense have carried us 
over the rough spots. But what is lacking — 
and what I believe to be the essence of any 
lasting monetary system — is a deep sense 
of commitment to an agreed code of inter- 
national conduct to help guide us when the 
actions of one nation impinge on those of 
another. 

Issues Left Open 

In one way or another, most of the issues 
left open in Chairman Wardhana's report 
deal with delicate and sensitive questions 
arising out of the inherent tensions between 
the responsibilities of national governments 
to meet their domestic priorities and our com- 
mon commitment to a mutually beneficial 
international order. We firmly believe these 
tensions can be constructively resolved, for 
in the end a well-functioning international 
system should contribute to the growth and 
stability of the individual countries operat- 
ing within that system. 

The challenge is to translate that concept 
into operating reality. To do so will require 
a commitment to some basic rules established 
in advance and seen as equitable to all. We 
must provide for necessary international 
review and surveillance. Not least, we must 
permit necessary scope for national decision- 
making. 

In seeking an appropriate balance among 
these components of a new system, we have 
emphasized the role that quantitative indi- 
cators — and in particular reserve indicators 
— could play in helping discipline the ad- 
justment process in an evenhanded, effec- 
tive, and politically acceptable manner. I 
therefore welcome the prospect that in the 
months immediately ahead a common effort 
will be made to appraise and test the oper- 
ational feasibility of that approach, along- 
side related questions of the operation of 
the convertibility provisions in the new 
system. 

At the same time, I believe it is common 



ground among us that effective processes of 
international consultation and decisionmak- 
ing are critical to the operation of the new 
system. I have been encouraged by the wide- 
spread recognition of the need to equip 
the IMF to play its full role at the center 
of the system. The logic is strong that, for 
the Fund to act effectively, member govern- 
ments should have available a forum of 
workable size within the organization at 
which responsible national officials can speak 
and negotiate with both flexibility and au- 
thority. Conversely, we should be sure that 
the deliberations and concerns of the inter- 
national community are fully and directly 
reflected in the internal councils of member 
governments. 

These objectives could be fostered by keep- 
ing in being a streamlined Committee of 
Twenty able to review periodically or in 
emergencies larger issues with a significant 
impact on the monetary situation as a whole. 
Plainly, there will also be a need to retain 
a body along the lines of the present and 
highly competent Executive Board, with 
resident members and the knowledge and in- 
sight that come only with intimate day-to- 
day contact with operations and emerging 
problems. 

In the effort to resolve finally these dif- 
ficult substantive and organizational ques- 
tions, I particularly look forward to the 
participation and fresh insights of our new 
Managing Director, Mr. [H. Johannes] 
Witteveen. He brings to us rich and varied 
experience as a professional economist and 
a practicing politician — precisely the disci- 
plines that must be blended in all our work. 

Interests of Developing Countries 

The day has long passed — and rightly so — 
when discussions of trade and monetary 
issues could take place primarily in a rela- 
tively closed circle of industrialized coun- 
tries. We must consider with great care what 
special arrangements within the trading and 
monetary systems may be appropriate to 
help meet development needs more effec- 
tively. 



546 



Department of State Bulletin 



In presenting broad trade legislation to 
our Congress, we incorporated the concept 
of assisting development by means of gener- 
alized preferences, to be granted on a non- 
reciprocal basis. This approach, undertaken 
in concert with comparable efforts by other 
industrialized countries, is consistent with 
the broad thrust of our mutual effort to re- 
duce barriers to trade and to encourage 
economic development. We look forward to 
early passage of this legislation. 

We support the idea of freeing flows of 
capital to developing countries and exempt- 
ing where possible those countries from 
controls imposed for balance of payments 
purposes. 

Closer examination should be given to 
methods of providing credit through our 
international institutions better tailored to 
the needs of developing countries experienc- 
ing extended periods of difficulty. 

Our judgment concerning the value of 
another proposal has, as is well known, been 
different. We feel the so-called SDR-aid link 
would in practice serve well neither mone- 
tary stability nor economic development. 
Experience strongly demonstrates the wis- 
dom of keeping separate the function of 
money creation — which is what the SDR is 
all about — and the essentially political de- 
cision of resource transfer and redistribu- 
tion. 

As we deal with these specific issues, let 
us never lose sight of the much larger stake 
that developing countries — as all of us — 
have in a well-functioning, stable monetary 
system and an open trading order. Mr. 
McNamara [Robert S. McNamara, Presi- 
dent, IBRD] has already pointed to the 
cost to poorer countries of burdens on their 
exports in the markets of industrialized 
nations. Long delays and sharp exchange 
rate adjustments among their more affluent 
trading partners, responding to imbalances 
that were permitted to build up over a period 
of years, have complicated the financial 
management of developing countries. 

At the same time, a number of countries 
still classified as developing are reaching a 
stage of industrialization where they can. 



in the mutual interest, accept their fair 
share of the responsibilities for a world 
order. Controls, subsidies, and other impedi- 
ments to open trade that might have been 
justified in an earlier stage of development 
need to be reviewed and eliminated. The 
disciplines of balance of payments adjust- 
ment — whether to correct deficits or sur- 
pluses — need to be observed, and this can 
be done without sacrificing developmental 
objectives. Indeed, I believe there are longer 
term dangers to the kind of open, one-world 
economy we would like to see in casually 
proliferating arrangements that would di- 
vide the world sharply into distinct group- 
ings of "have" and "have-not" nations. 

In the short run, the prosperity of de- 
veloping countries is tied to the prosperity 
of the industrialized world. In the past two 
years, relatively high prices for agricultural 
products and raw materials have directly 
benefited many. When the labor forces of 
industrialized economies are fully employed, 
resistance to imports of labor-intensive 
products declines, to the benefit of producer 
and consumer alike. 

While uneven country by country, the 
overall results are apparent in the recent 
growth of production and monetary reserves 
of the developing world. Excluding the main 
oil producers, developing countries had a 
surplus of over $41/0 billion in 1972, and 
their surpluses appear to have been well 
maintained this year. 

Long-Term Development and Official Assistance 

A cyclical surge is of course no substitute 
for sustained development over a long period 
of years. In the end, develoj^ment will suc- 
ceed or fail as the result of the efforts of 
the millions of people in the developing 
countries themselves, working under the 
direction and leadership of their own gov- 
ernments. Compared to the human and 
material resources of even the poorest 
country, the effects of external assistance 
are bound to be modest. Indeed, all the 
official assistance of all the donor countries 
of the Western World amounts to less than 



October 29, 1973 



547 



2 percent of the GNP of developing coun- 
tries. 

Effectively used, however, the margin of 
resources from abroad can be a catalyst — 
in some instances an essential catalyst — to 
the development process. I speak of this 
potential as seen from the particular vantage 
point of a country whose people and govern- 
ment have had experience in the provision 
of assistance in amounts, and over a period 
of time, without parallel in history. Even 
today, when others have moved to help pick 
up the burden, the United States provides 
almost 40 percent of official development 
assistance from the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment] countries, and it is by far the largest 
source of private capital as well. 

This commitment has been a natural one, 
for we are a large and relatively rich 
country, unusually blessed with resources, 
political stability, and a productive popula- 
tion. We accept today, as we have in the 
past, the simple premise that no nation — 
whether the motives are properly considered 
those of common humanity or enlightened 
self-interest — can be oblivious to the condi- 
tions in which other men and women are 
living. 

Out of this long experience, we have 
reached certain conclusions and raised 
certain questions that I want to convey to 
you today. The questions are no doubt 
sharpened by the searching look at priori- 
ties evoked by long years of an agonizing 
war and by the evident strains on our ex- 
ternal position. Like every other country 
represented in this room, we face hard 
decisions about economic and social priorities 
in many areas. 

The strongest of our convictions is that 
aid stimulates development only where there 
exists the will and competence to utilize it 
effectively. This implies a responsibility 
upon the donor as well as the recipient to 
identify, develop, and carry through projects 
of strategic developmental importance. The 
World Bank Group and its regional financing 
institutions rightly pride themselves as 



leaders in efficient project planning and 
execution and in assessment of those projects 
as part of a larger development effort. This 
is not a matter of dramatic new initiatives, 
but hard persistent effort. We are pai'ticu- 
larly gratified that the World Bank Group 
is moving to reinforce its effectiveness by 
further strengthening postaudit perform- 
ance evaluation independent of those re- 
sponsible for project execution. 

Second, there is a growing need to place 
more emphasis on what might be called 
"people-oriented" projects rather than large- 
scale civil engineering. We have redirected 
the emphasis in our own bilateral assistance 
in support of imaginative new programs in 
education, agriculture, and population plan- 
ning. We warmly support the initiatives the 
World Bank has taken in these same areas. 
The fresh emphasis that Mr. McNamara 
placed on rural development in his remarks 
to us yesterday seems to us entirely appro- 
priate. 

Third, and most broadly, a genuine com- 
mitment on the part of recipient countries 
to the idea of development in their own 
policies is a key ingredient. Experience 
shows time and again that "growth- 
oriented" countries rapidly become less 
dependent on official assistance once internal 
conditions are right. 

There is one aspect of "growth orienta- 
tion" — the part played by private invest- 
ment — that I wish to emphasize, sensitive 
though it may be. In sheer quantitative 
terms, the potential is clear enough: Net 
flows of medium- and long-term private 
capital to developing countries are now as 
large as official assistance. Moreover, the 
private investor can bring benefits in skills 
and experience that simply have no counter- 
part in governmental aid. 

Every sovereign nation has, of course, the 
right to regulate terms and conditions under 
which private investment is admitted or to 
reject it entirely. However, when such 
capital is rejected, we find it difficult to 
understand that official donors should be 
asked to fill the gap. Moreover, we do not 



548 



Departmenf of State Bulletin 



I 



find it reasonable that a nation taking con- 
fiscatory steps toward investment that it 
has already accepted from abroad should 
anticipate official assistance, bilateral or 
multilateral. 

Mr. McNamara has outlined an ambitious 
program for the next five years. We are in 
a large measure of agreement with the 
objectives of that program, and we give 
them our support. We also appreciate that 
a consensus has been reached that the tradi- 
tional share of the United States in IDA 
[International Development Association] 
financing should be dropped from 40 percent 
to one-third, and the shares of Japan, 
Germany, and others increased, to more 
accurately reflect the present distribution of 
economic strength. 

On this basis, the U.S. administration will 
consult with, and strongly recommend to, 
the Congress our participation in a total 
fourth replenishment for IDA of $4i/j 
billion. In doing so, I must emphasize that 
many questions about this program, includ- 
ing those I have discussed with you, are on 
the minds of the Members of Congress. The 
large and distinguished delegation from the 
Congress that has accompanied me to Nai- 
robi and visited a variety of World Bank 
projects in Africa is evidence that they are 
interested in finding constructive answers to 
these questions. 

I cannot say with any certainty how long 
our consultative and legislative process will 
take or certify its outcome. We do fully 
recognize that necessary legislative proce- 
dures diff"er among countries and that time- 
tables are pressing. We will therefore remain 
in close touch with the management and the 
Executive Board of the Bank during this 
process. 

Worldwide Surge of Inflation 

Before concluding, I must underscore the 
threat to all our constructive labor from the 
storm of worldwide inflation. 

Unfortunately, inflation is no new phe- 
nomenon. What is new is that it is now 
infecting more countries, in a greater degree, 



than at any time in memory. Speculation 
in commodities is fed by fear about cur- 
rencies. Inflation is becoming imbedded in 
the expectations of too many people. Long 
maintained, this will break down the 
processes of orderly development. It is 
simply incompatible with the stability of 
any international monetary and trading 
system. 

I am familiar with analyses that trace 
world inflation to defects in the international 
monetary system. The Bretton Woods system 
has itself been criticized as an engine of 
inflation, and floating rates praised as per- 
mitting the restoration of internal monetary 
discipline. Equally forcibly, we are urged — 
especially by those who have seen their own 
exchange rates depreciate and their import 
bill rise — that floating rates are themselves 
an inflationary force. 

Whatever the technical merits of these 
analyses in particular circumstances, I sub- 
mit they place the responsibility for inflation 
and its correction in the wrong place. Let us 
not neglect the causes and cures that lie 
closer to our national actions and powers. 

Two factors, mainly unforeseen a year 
ago, have been at work in the recent surge 
of inflation. The first is that strong expan- 
sionary forces have coincided among virtu- 
ally all industrialized and developing 
countries. As a result, increases in cyclical 
demand have put pressures on supply, ex- 
posed unforeseen shortages of capacity, and 
driven up prices of raw materials. Second, 
the pressures on prices in two key areas — 
agriculture and energy — have been greatly 
aggravated by crop failures and weather 
and by shifts in production patterns and 
marketing policies. 

In the United States, we have long been 
accustomed to relatively low prices of basic 
agricultural commodities. For many years, 
without adequate markets abroad, we kept 
a sizable margin of farm resources idle. But 
in the past crop year, the volume of our 
wheat exports nearly doubled, feed grain 
exports rose by two-thirds, and soybeans by 
one-sixth. And now, with our markets fully 



October 29, 1973 



549 



open to the surge in world demand, looked 
to as a residual supplier when other coun- 
tries are short, and without the price pro- 
tection afforded those whose exchange rates 
have appreciated, we have felt the full brunt 
of the rise in world agricultural prices. 

At the same time, our needs for energj' 
imports are rising rapidly. Obviously these 
commodity flows in both directions have 
responded to pressing needs. But the price 
impact is measured by the fact that, taken 
together, prices of food and energy account 
for 82 percent of the rise in our wholesale 
price index and 66 percent of the rise in our 
consumer price index in the past year. 

We believe a market-oriented system will 
respond flexibly and eff'ectively to changing 
needs. We are making great efforts to deal 
with the high price of food by bringing idle 
acreage back into production. Normal 
market processes are at work. The prices 
of soybeans are 50 percent below their 
speculative peak, feed grains have fallen 
back by a quarter, and wheat prices — where 
the worldwide supply situation is most 
tenuous — have at least stopped rising. 

We cannot speed the natural cycle of 
planting and harvesting and of animal 
growth. We face for a considerable period 
ahead a tight situation in agricultural 
markets. But we have every intention of 
keeping our markets open, for we are and 
intend to be a dependable supplier. 

Meanwhile, this experience will ultimately 
redound to our common advantage if we 
attack with fresh urgency the problem of 
finding more effective patterns of produc- 
tion and trade to serve our mutual interests 
in more food at cheaper prices. 

Let us work in similar spirit to deal with 
the problem of developing and distributing 
energy resources. 

We, for our side, have now embarked upon 
a massive effort to develop the bountiful 
energy sources within our own country now 
made economic by higher prices. We look to 
others to help maintain the flow of energy 
so long as their own legitimate needs and 
aspirations are fairly recognized. 



A vigorous attack on the special problems 
of food and energy is not a cure-all for in- 
flation. A number of countries, as ourselves, 
have resorted to, and even intensified, direct 
price and wage controls. But we remain con- 
vinced that our success will hinge mainly on 
the firm and persistent application of the 
traditional tools of fiscal and monetary re- 
straint. I need not belabor, to an audience of 
Finance Ministers and central bankers, that 
expenditure and monetary restraints are 
never popular. Nevertheless, I believe, in the 
face of the evident need, these policies are 
broadly accepted by the American people. 
We mean to see it through. We hope and 
expect our efforts will be mutually reinforc- 
ing with those of others. 



U.S. Pledges Continued Efforts 
for Aviation Security 

An International Conference on Air Law 
and an Extraordinary Assembly of the 
Intematiotial Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) met at Rome Angiist 28-September 
21. Folloiving is a statement by Ambassador 
William M. Rountree, head of the U.S. dele- 
gation, a^ issued to the press at Rome 
on September 21. 

The Diplomatic Conference and Extraor- 
dinary Assembly are rapidly drawing to 
a close. 

In my opening statement I noted that we 
here were faced with a task of monumental 
complexity but equally of monumental im- 
portance. In retrospect one must conclude 
that the complexity has overshadowed the 
importance. We have been unable to agree 
upon any of the proposals which have been 
put before us designed to enhance the 
security of civil aviation. The great efforts 
which have gone into these proposals, par- 
ticularly the eflforts of their respective 
authors and sponsors, are deeply appre- 
ciated; and it is sad indeed that we have 



550 



Department of State Bulletin 



been unable to find a sufficient area of agree- 
ment to adopt any of them. 

In particular, my delegation strongly sup- 
ported an independent convention which 
would have enabled international scrutiny 
and moral pressure to be brought to bear 
upon states acting contrary to the principles 
of the Hague and Montreal Conventions. 
This proposal never reached the stage of 
consideration in plenary session. 

The independent convention concept and 
the other concepts for improved interna- 
tional measures were born during a time 
of great violence in international civil avia- 
tion. Unhappily, this violence has not notice- 
ably diminished, and thus the largely 
negative results of our meetings here are 
even more regrettable. 

Even, and more ironically, as our meetings 
here have taken place, dramatic new inci- 
dents have occurred to demonstrate again 
the need for heightened vigilance on the part 
of the international community. 

Although my delegation's general assess- 
ment of our work here is not encouraging, I 
wish to observe that the international con- 
cern which brought about these meetings 
may ultimately have secondary consequences 
which are beneficial. For example, we have 
heard numerous distinguished delegates 
affirm that their governments have ratified 
or are in the process of ratifying the Hague 
and Montreal Conventions. If this in fact 
occurs rapidly and on a broad scale, then we 
might one day be able to conclude that the 
secondary consequences of this conference 
and Assembly were greatly beneficial. 

However, I fear that despite the hopeful 
aspects which I have mentioned, we have 
done too little here to relieve this pressure 
on civil aviation. 

When we return from Rome one message 
is clear, in the view of my delegation : States 
must expend even greater efforts to insure 
the safety of civil aviation against threats 
and dangers from any quarter. 

Equally importantly, the existing ICAO 
machinery must play a vigorous and asser- 
tive role in assisting in this battle to elimi- 



nate threats to civil aviation. We are 
confident that the Secretary General of 
ICAO, his staff, the Council of ICAO, and 
the representatives of states working in 
Montreal recognize that their role is now 
even more important. However, they cannot 
succeed alone. States, working individually 
and collectively, must also take up the task. 
Although we could not agree here upon a 
new treaty to establish machinery to do the 
job, no delegation can deny the gravity of 
the continuing threat to international civil 
aviation. 

My delegation renews its pledge to try to 
respond adequately to this threat, and we are 
confident that others here sharing our grave 
concern will do likewise. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agreement 
on Nonscheduled Air Services 

The Department of State announced on 
September 27 (press release 352) that the 
United States and Yugoslavia had that day 
signed at Belgrade a Nonscheduled Air Serv- 
ice Agreement between the two governments. 
Ambassador Malcolm Toon signed for the 
United States and Milovan Djokanovic, Di- 
rector General, Directorate General for Civil 
Aeronautics, signed for the Government of 
Yugoslavia. Simultaneously with the signa- 
ture of the agreement, the two governments 
signed a protocol on commercial activities by 
carriers and two technical documents relat- 
ing to the implementation of two aspects of 
the agreement. (For texts of the agreement 
and protocol, see press release 352.) 

This agreement on nonscheduled (i.e., 
charter) air services includes many elements 
not contained in other charter arrangements 
and marks a significant step in the develop- 



October 29, 1973 



551 



ment of the United States international civil 
aviation relations. It is anticipated that other 
agreements of this type will be negotiated 
in the future as we are able to work out with 
other countries the framework and detailed 
exchange of rights necessary to help regular- 
ize and promote the operation of this im- 
portant aspect of international air travel. 

The agreement with Yugoslavia sets forth 
in considerable detail the rights the two 
countries have exchanged in the field of non- 
scheduled air services. U.S. airlines will have 
the right to conduct a broad range of charter 
operations to and from Yugoslavia, including 
the relatively new type of charter called the 
Travel Group Charter. Yugoslav airlines will 
have equally comprehensive rights to conduct 
charters to the United States. Rights to con- 
duct charters originating in the United 
States are considerably broader than those at 
present available to the Yugoslav airline and 
reflect the fact that residents of the United 
States constitute the large bulk of the air 
travelers between the two countries. 



United States and Japan Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
September 26 (press release 348) that the 
arrangement between the United States and 
Japan concerning exports of Japanese cotton 
textiles to the United States had been ex- 
tended that day for one year from October 1, 
1973, by exchange of notes at Washington. 
The level specified in the exchange of notes 
to which Japan will restrain its cotton tex- 
tile exports to the United States during this 
period is 510,935, .550 square yards equiva- 
lent. Proportionately, this is a 5 percent in- 
crease over the level specified for the pre- 
vious arrangement period. (For texts of the 
U.S. and Japanese notes, see press release 
348.) 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. 
TIAS 7465. 
Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, July 23, 1973. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency of October 
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668. 

Acceptances deposited: Bulgaria, October 5, 1973; 
Costa Rica, October 11, 1973. 

Protocol suspending the application of safeguards 
under the agreement of May 4, 1967, as amended 
(TIAS 6260, 6849), for cooperation concerning 
civil uses of atomic energy and providing for the 
application of safeguards by the International 
.■\tomic Energy Agency pursuant to the nonpro- 
liferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). 
Done at Vienna September 25, 1973. Entered in- 
to force September 25, 1973. 

Sigyiatiires : International Atomic Energy Agency, 
Norway, and the United States. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Washington December 29, 1972.* 
Signature: Australia (with a statement), October 
10, 1973. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972. 

Ratifications deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, United Kingdom, United States, 
October 9, 1973. 
Entered into force for the United States: Octo- 
ber 9, 1973. 



BILATERAL 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Protocol relating to a Trade Representation of the 
U.S.S.R. in Washington and a Commercial Office 
of the U.S.A. in Moscow. Signed at Moscow Octo- 
ber 3, 1973. Entered into force October 3, 1973. 



Not in force. 



552 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 29, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1792 



American Principles. Moral Purposes and Pol- 
icy Choices (Kissinger) 525 

Aviation 

U.S. Pledges Continued Efforts for Aviation 
Security (Rountree) 550 

U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign Agreement on Non- 
scheduled Air Services 551 

China. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of October 12 532 

Department and Foreign Service. Secretary 
Kissinger's News Conference of October 12 532 

Developing Countries. .Annual Meeting of IMF 
and IBRD Boards of Governors Held at 
Nairobi (Shultz) 544 

Economic Affairs 

Annual Meeting of IMF and IBRD Boards of 

Governors Held at Nairobi (Shultz) . . . 544 
President Comments on Trade Bill as Reported 

by House Committee (statement) .... 531 
United States and Japan Sign Cotton Textile 

Agreement 552 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of October 12 532 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Annual -Meeting of IMF and IBRD Boards of 
Governors Held at Naii'obi (Shultz) . . . 544 

U.S. Pledges Continued Efforts for Aviation 
Security (Rountree) 550 

Japan. United States and Japan Sign Cotton 
Textile -Agreement 552 

Latin .\merica. A Western Hemisphere Rela- 
tionship of Cooperation (Kissinger) . . . 542 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of October 12 532 

Presidential Documents. President Comments 
on Trade Bill as Reported by House Com- 
mittee 531 

Trade. President Comments on Trade Bill as 
Reported by House Committee (statement) 531 

Treaty Information 

Current -Actions 552 

United States and Japan Sign Cotton Textile 
.Agreement 552 

U.S. and Yugoslavia Sigrn .Agreement on Non- 
scheduled -Air Services 551 

U.S.S.H. 

Moral Purposes and Policy Choices (Kissinger) 525 
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
October 12 532 

United Nations. The Journey Toward a World 
Community (Kissinger) 541 

Yugoslavia. U.S. and Yugoslavia Sign .Agree- 
ment on Nonscheduled Air Services .... 551 



.\ame Index 

Nixon, President 531 

Kissinger, Secretary b-->, .•).j.i, .jil, 542 

Rountree, William M 550 

Shultz, George P 544 



No. 


Date 


362 


10/8 


■■363 


10/9 


*364 


10/10 



*365 10/10 



*366 
*367 
*368 



10/10 
10/10 
10/10 



-369 10/10 



Check List of Department of Stale 
Press Releases: October 8-1 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 8 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
S48 of September 26 and 352 of September 27. 

Subject 

Kissinger: Pacem in Terris 
Conference. 

Gould sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Netherlands (biograph- 
ic data). 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee Subcommittee on Code of 
Conduct for Liner Confer- 
ences, Oct. 23. 

Laise sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for Public Affairs (bio- 
graphic data). 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Nov. 6. 

Study group 5 of U.S. National 
Committee for CCITT, Dec. 4. 

Advisory Committee on Inter- 
national Intellectual Property, 
Oct. 30. 

-Advisory Committee on "For- 
eign Relations of the United 
States," Nov. 9. 

Rush : President's Conference 
on Export Expansion. 

Maw to be nominated to be Le- 
gal Adviser (biographic data) . 

Brown to be nominated to 
be Deputy Under Secretary 
for Management (biographic 
data). 

Sutterlin appointed Inspector 
General of the Foreign Serv- 
ice (biographic data). 

Davis appointed Director Gen- 
eral of the Foreign Service 
(biographic data). 

Lord appointed Director of 
Planning and Coordination 
(biographic data). 

Vest appointed Special Assist- 
ant for Press Relations (bio- 
graphic data). 

Thomas to be nominated to 
be Assistant Secretary for 
-Administration (biographic 
data). 

Ingersoll to be nominated to be 
Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs 
(biographic data). 

Donaldson to be nominated to 
be Under Secretary for Se- 
curity Assistance (biographic 
data). 

Kissinger: news conference. 

U.S.- Yugoslav cultural talks. 



+370 


10/11 


*371 


10/12 


«372 


10/12 


*373 


10/12 


*374 


10/12 


*375 


10/12 


*376 


10/12 


-'377 


10/12 



*378 10/12 



379 10/12 



380 
*381 



10/12 
10/12 



" Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
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Washington, D.C. 20520. 



s 

/J: 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1793 



November 5, 1973 



PRESIDENT NIXON ADDRESSES CONFERENCE 
ON EXPORT EXPANSION 553 

THE DEPARTMENT'S STRENGTHENED EXPORT EXPANSION SERVICES 
Address by Deputy Secretary Rush 557 

COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH STATE-CONTROLLED ECONOMIES 
Address by Under Secretary Casey 567 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1793 
November 5, 1973 



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U.S. Government Printing Office 
WashinKton. D.C. 20402 
PRICE: 
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domestic $29. forcien S36.2o 
Single copy 65 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication ap- 
proved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
.STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is inde.xed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



d 

I 



The Department of State BVLLETli 
a weekly publication issued by i 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfte public am 
interested agencies of tfie governmei 
with information on developments t 
the field of US. foreign relations am 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selectei 
press releases on foreign policy, issuei 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is in- 
cluded concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State. United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



President Nixon Addresses Conference 
on Export Expansion 



Following are remarks nvade by President 
Nixon in the East Room at the White House 
on October 11 before the President's Con- 
ference on. Export Expansion. 

White House press release dated October II 

Members of the Cabinet and ladies and 
gentlemen : When I saw the guest list for 
this conference, I realized that probably 
never before have so many presidents been 
gathered in the East Room of the White 
House. [Laughter.] And we welcome you all, 
whatever your position in business or in 
government, to this Conference on Export 
Expansion. 

i realize that you have been exposed for 
the past two or three hours to all the ex- 
perts, and I will not take more of your time 
to go into some of the decisions on technical 
matters that we have made to work with you 
toward expanding exports. 

On the other hand, I thought it might be 
useful at the conclusion of the conference, 
and before I have the chance to meet each 
of you personally at its end, for me to put 
the whole problem of trade, export expan- 
sion, in the larger context of foreign policy 
of the United States and the desire that all 
of us share as Americans to build a more 
peaceful world. 

Now, first, I think it is well for us to un- 
derstand what the limitations of trade are 
in building of our peaceful world. I noticed 
in my talking points it was indicated that if 
we have trade that automatically will lead 
to peace. Of course that isn't true at all. As 
a matter of fact, if we look at World War I 
and World War II, we will find that nations 



that traded with each other fought each 
other. Japan and the United States in World 
War II are good examples, and of course 
Britain and France and Germany in World 
War I and World War II are examples of 
that. So trade between nations, no matter 
how great it is, does not necessarily lead to 
peace. 

But having stated the negative proposi- 
tion, let's also understand some of the posi- 
tive points that can be made about trade and 
how it can help in building a structure of 
peace. 

The first is that trade leads to communi- 
cation between peoples, not just governments 
l)ut peoples. And communication between 
peoples I very sincerely believe — having 
taken some role in opening communications 
with other nations in the world over the 
past 4'/2 years, opening communications with 
nations with which we had not had com- 
munications before — I believe that as we 
increase communication between peoples at 
all levels, the opportunity of discussing dif- 
ferences rather than fighting about diff'er- 
ences is greatly increased. 

And so as American businessmen and 
businesswomen travel throughout the world, 
as you meet your counterparts in business 
and, in the totalitarian countries, in gov- 
ernment, you will help to create those chan- 
nels of communication which are so essential 
if in times of crisis we are to avoid those 
explosions that could lead to war. 

And then, of course, there is another 
broader point that should be made. As the 
nations of the world have a greater stake 
in peace, they have a less incentive to wage 



November 5, 1973 



553 



war. And as we have more expanded world 
trade, trade with all nations, it means that 
nations which otherwise might be tempted 
to wage war because of their concerns about 
inability to move up their standard of living 
at home could develop a stake in peace. I 
firmly believe that. 

I know that that is not easy to accom- 
plish, and you know it as well. But I am 
sure that as we look toward the years ahead, 
that as the United States, along with other 
nations, whether they be in the more ad- 
vanced industrial nations in Europe or in 
Asia or in the less developed countries, as 
the United States increases its trade with 
those nation?, it inevitably will mean that 
their standard of living will rise as will ours, 
and as theirs rises their people and their 
governments will have a stake in peace. They 
will have a stake also in good relations with 
the United States. 

So I have stated both ends of the proposi- 
tion. On the one hand, that trade by itself 
does not lead to peace— it does not, and that 
is a grave illusion ever to think that it would. 
But the fact that if we have trade combined 
with an intelligent and pragmatic foreign 
policy, we can build a structure of jieace 
which it would be much more difficult to 
build if we did not have the communications 
which trade brings and also the raising of the 
standard of living which inevitably will come 
as we trade with other nations. 

So what I am saying to all of you here 
today is that this trip to Washington, I hope, 
will be useful to you in the years ahead in 
terms of bringing more business to the con- 
cerns that you represent. That is good for 
your various corporations or companies as 
the case may be; it is good for the United 
States, for labor, for business; and it is good 
for the nations abroad. But also it serves 
a much larger purpose. 

You are part of, you are playing a very 
important role in, what I consider to be the 
great adventure of the last third of this 
century; and that is the adventure of build- 
ing for the first time in this century a 
structure of peace for the whole world that 
will last. 



I suppose it is rather ironic for me to 
speak of a structure of peace at a time when 
we have a very difficult war going on in the 
Mideast. I say "we," even though the United 
States is not involved, because when war 
hits that part of the world, it inevitably 
leads to repercussions throughout Europe 
and Asia and of course the Americas as 
well. 

And so we are concerned about that war. 
We are trying to play a responsible role in 
helping to bring the fighting to an end and 
then beyond that to build a structure of 
l^eace that will be permanent and not tem- 
porary. 

That is all that I can say on that subject 
at this time, but let me first say, in addition 
to that, that while we have the truce in the 
Mideast broken at this time, we find that 
the United States is at peace with every 
nation in the woiid, and this is the first time 
that a President of the United States could 
say that for 12 years. And that of course 
is a hopeful development, but that also is 
not something that we can stand by and 
simply rest on our laurels, because we have 
ended wars before and yet in every genera- 
tion we follow with another war. 

World War I was ended, and then came 
World War II, and after it was ended came 
Korea, and after it was ended came Viet- 
Nam. That is why I have always spoken of 
the need not just to end the war which we 
were in, the longest in America's history, 
but to look far beyond and to build a struc- 
ture of peace in the world that would last. 

That is what the initiatives toward the 
People's Republic of China and the initia- 
tives toward the Soviet Union and the initia- 
tives toward the other Communist countries i 
in Europe were all about. They had nothing 
to do with our deciding that our system of 
government now was closer in philosophy 
to theirs. We are still as far apart as we ever 
were. 

But what it has to do with is that unless 
we do develop communications with, includ- 
ing trade, with those people who live in ap- 
proximately one-half the world — or half the 
people of the world live in the nations that 



554 



Department of State Bulletin 



I have referred to — unless we have those 
channels of communications open, the inevi- 
tability of a confrontation somewhere down 
the line is almost inescapable. 

It is our chance, our opportunity, to help 
avoid that inevitable conflict. And you, each 
in your way, wherever you move in the 
world, I think, are contributing to the pos- 
sibility of building that structure of peace 
that will last not just for a generation but 
beyond. 

I should also add that I don't need to tell 
a group of American businessmen that the 
competitive situation in the world is a lot 
diff"erent from what it was immediately after 
World War II. It is hard to realize that there 
aie times we talked about the dollar gap. 
It is hard to realize that there were times 
when we could talk about reciprocal trade 
when it was all, "What is the United States 
going to do in terms of opening its mar- 
kets?" It is hard to realize that there was a 
time — as a matter of fact, not too long ago 
when I was Vice President of the United 
States, in 1958, talking to the President of 
Colombia in South America, when he told 
me, he said, "The trouble in the world today 
is that what we have in terms of world 
trade can be compared with a great poker 
game. The United States has all the chips 
and consequently nobody else can play. And 
so what you must do is to pass out some 
of the chips so the rest of us can play." 

Of course, he was speaking of foreign aid, 
and he was also speaking of trade ; but now 
we realize that not only must the United 
States play a responsible role in seeing that 
trade barriers against goods from abroad 
which are unfair are reduced but we must 
also play, as a government, a very strong 
role in seeing that American goods get a 
fair competitive position all over the world. 

We can't have the one-way-street situation 
which presently exists in our relations with 
some countries. They know that, and we in 
our government understand it very thor- 
oughly. 

You know, you sometimes wonder about 
these government people, people like Mr. 
Eberle [William D. Eberle, President Nixon's 



Special Representative for Trade Negotia- 
tions] and the Secretary of the Treasury 
and the people in the State Department, and 
I have often heard businessmen say, "Who 
do they represent? Do they represent us, or 
do they I'epresent the foreign countries?" 

Let me tell you this: These men in this 
government represent the United States of 
America. They are going to speak up for 
American businessmen. They are going to 
represent our interests and represent them 
aggressively, but in representing them ag- 
gressively, they also are going to recognize 
that it can't be a one-way street either way. 
We can't sell without buying. 

And that is why we see some of the short- 
sighted talk to the effect that we should have 
legislation which will close American mar- 
kets or raise barriers to goods abroad in 
order to save jobs here, that that is terribly 
shortsighted, because when we see it, we 
find that if we close our markets in order to 
save jobs here, we are going to lose jobs 
for those products that otherwise would be 
sold abroad. 

And so the question is : How can we have 
a policy in which we buy and sell and have 
the right kind of a position in which we 
have more jobs at home, a better standard 
of living at home, and also a better oppor- 
tunity for others abroad to participate in 
that development of prosperity? 

So I would conclude my remarks, ladies 
and gentlemen, simply with this general 
proposition. We live in a far more competi- 
tive world. We find that the new Europe is 
going to give us very tough competition. 
Japan already is giving us very hard compe- 
tition. Further down the road, even the 
totalitarian powers, the Soviet Union, the 
People's Republic of China — not because they 
are Communist, but because they are Chinese 
and because they are Russians and have drive 
— they are going to give us some competition 
in the world. 

So when we finally come down to the bot- 
tom line, it is this: Government has got to 
see to it that American goods get a fair shake 
all over the world, and we will meet that 
responsibility. And we have to do everything 



November 5, 1973 



555 



we can to expand our exports, and that is 
something that you can do, because we are 
a free enterprise country. Government cannot 
do it, and you have to do it. 

But we also must recognize that if Ameri- 
can goods are to be sold abroad, American 
business and American labor must be com- 
petitive, and the name of that game, as 
everybody in this room knows, is produc- 
tivity. 

That is why, in this period of time, to 
think in terms simply of building a great wall 
around this Nation so that noncompetitive 
industries can survive, that is good short- 
term politics — it is disastrous long-term 
statesmanship in terms of business, in terms 
of jobs, and in terms of the peace of America 
in the world. 

And so, to all of you I say, thank you for 
coming to this conference. I know that many 
of you come to Washington many times for 
conferences and wonder if that trip was 
worthwhile. I can only say I believe yours 
is, because as we enter this new era of peace 
for America with all nations in the world, 
we must build on it, we must build a new 
structure. There must be new diplomacy, 
there must be the necessary military strength 
so that we can be the peacemakers in the 
world. 

But we also need those communications, 
channels of communications which the busi- 
nessmen, the businesswomen, of America 
open through the areas of trade, and we also 
need that kind of communication between 
nations in the trading area which will raise 
the standard of living throughout the world 
so that all peoples and all nations will have 
a stake in the peace of the world. 

That is a great goal. You are all working 
for it, and speaking for all of the American 
people, we thank American business and 
American labor for the role you have played 
and for the greater role I am sure you will 
play after this conference is concluded. 



President Establishes Committees 
on Export Expansion 

President Nixon announced on October 11 
(White House press release) that he would , 
create the President's Export Council, an 
organization of leading American business- 
men to advise him on ways to increase U.S. 
overseas sales. The President announced that 
he would appoint Fletcher L. Byrom, chair- 
man of the board and chief executive officer 
of the Koppers Co., Pittsburgh, Pa., to be 
Chairman of the new Council, and F. Perry 
Wilson, chairman of the board and chief 
executive officer of the Union Carbide Corp., 
New York, N.Y., to be Vice Chairman. (For 
biographic data, see White House press re- 
lease dated October 11.) 

The President also announced that he 
would establish a new President's Inter- 
agency Committee on Export Expansion, 
representing 13 government departments and 
agencies, to initiate and coordinate govern- 
ment programs and policies affecting the 
U.S. export performance. The President an- 
nounced that he would designate Secretary 
of Commerce Frederick B. Dent to be Chair- 
man of the Committee. 

The President's Export Council and the 
President's Interagency Committee on Ex- 
port Expansion, working through the Council 
on International Economic Policy as estab- 
lished by the International Economic Policy 
Act of 1972, will recommend short-term ac- 
tion to achieve material improvement in the 
U.S. trade account, long-term programs to 
achieve equilibrium in the U.S. balance of 
payments, and action to remove domestic 
impediments to U.S. exports and improve 
or supplement existing export incentives. 

The President's Export Council will suc- 
ceed the National Export Expansion Council, 
which was created in 1960 to advise the 
Secretary of Commerce on matters of U.S. 
world trade. 



556 



Department of State Bulletin 



The Department's Strengthened Export Expansion Services 



Address by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush ' 



It is H particular pleasure to discuss with 
you this afternoon the role of the State De- 
partment and the Foreign Service in export 
expansion. As a fellow businessman for more 
than 30 years and with the past four years 
with the government in international affairs, 
I've developed some appreciation of what 
governmental support you want in your in- 
ternational dealings. I would therefore like 
to discuss with you how the Department of 
State and other agencies can be responsive to 
your needs and those of smaller, new-to- 
export firms. 

We in the State Department share with 
our business colleagues the basic assumption 
that economic strength is one of the primary 
foundations of national power. A sound dol- 
lar, a vigorous export trade, and a healthy 
climate for international investment are pre- 
requisites for the fullest realization of all 
our foreign policy goals. Without our solid 
industrial base, our stability, and our com- 
petitiveness in world markets, we would 
never have been able to shoulder the tasks 
we have undertaken since World War II. 
Without our great economic strength, the 
United States simply could not have provided 
aid to war-ravaged nations, developed col- 
lective security arrangements, extended a 
helping hand to the developing world, and 
waged two major conflicts. 

In recognition of the close relationship 
between our economic strength, our export 
performance, and our ability to sustain basic 
political and strategic policies. State and 
Commerce introduced an export promotion 



' Made before the President's Conference on Ex- 
port Expansion at the White House on Oct. ^1 
(press release 370). 



program almost 15 years ago. We were con- 
vinced that such an effort could serve as a 
powerful adjunct to a sound monetary and 
trade policy. That conviction is even stronger 
today. 

Our export expansion program has come 
a long way since its inception. Over the years 
we have developed and introduced a number 
of major improvements. Moreover, in recent 
months we have thoroughly reviewed every 
aspect of our commercial program, including 
our Embassies' execution of these programs 
and the Washington backup provided by the 
Departments of State and Commerce. 

We approach the basic task of export ex- 
pansion programs on two mutually reinforc- 
ing fronts. Not only do we address the ques- 
tion of program content and methodology, 
but we also face the equally important issues 
of personnel resources and priorities. We 
fully appreciate that these two approaches 
must be coordinated. 

Let me review with you some of the 
changes that State and Commerce have in- 
stituted in recent months. 

On the program side we have concentrated 
our efforts in sharpening the focus of our 
promotional activities, in expanding our in- 
depth knowledge of foreign market potential, 
and in speeding the flow of information from 
our Foreign Service posts to American 
business. 

Our most important accomplishment has 
been to develop a clearer set of program 
priorities. Frankly, we have been inclined in 
the past to commit our limited export pro- 
motion resources in a random, shotgun 
approach and to be reactive rather than 
innovative. Now, however, we target our 



November 5, 1973 



557 



export drive in support of those industries 
which a special Commerce Department study 
has determined to be the most competitive 
and to offer the best prospects for future 
growth. 

We have also tailored this global target- 
ing concept to our programs in major over- 
seas markets. This fiscal year our 35 most 
commercially significant missions have for 
the first time explicitly defined a set of an- 
nual objectives and the means they propose 
to fulfill them. These are specific goals to 
improve our export performance in the tar- 
get industries, goals which the Embassy 
believes attainable within the 12-month pe- 
riod. Our Embassy in Brasilia, for example, 
established seven goals to increase U.S. ex- 
ports to Brazil. One of these was to increase 
our share of the Brazilian market for air- 
craft, aircraft parts, and airport equipment. 
In ijursuit of that objective the mission un- 
dertook to suijport a U.S. exhibition at the 
Sao Paulo Aeros]3ace Show — a very success- 
ful venture which was just concluded. The 
Embassy also intends to push the sale of 
large commercial aircraft to the Brazilian 
national airline, assist our small-plane manu- 
facturers to arrange joint ventures, and pro- 
mote U.S. equijiment and services for the 
new Sao Paulo International Airport. 

For fiscal year 1975 we are already hard at 
work with our colleagues in Commerce on 
comprehensive country programs in these 
same markets. These programs will again 
focus on precise, attainable goals and will 
integrate State and Commerce resources in 
Washington and at the post to imple- 
ment them. Five pilot programs, one in 
each of our geographic regions, are being 
implemented. 

To maximize the effectiveness of this 
target-industry approach, we are substan- 
tially increasing our market research capa- 
bilities. Contracted market research, con- 
ducted by qualified foreign firms under the 
careful supervision of our missions, has 
been significantly expanded. And as re- 
sources are freed from lower priority activ- 
ities, our Embassies and consulates are 



devoting more of their own efforts to analysis 
of the markets for U.S. products. 

The third major area of improvement 
has been in communications — the increased 
transmission speed and the enhanced utility 
of the information we are providing you. 
Our vital commercial reporting on firms and 
on trade opportunities is now done exclu- 
sively by cable. Trade leads which formerly 
took an average of 26 days between trans- 
mission from our posts abroad and publica- 
tion can now, with the aid of our computer- 
ized subscription mailing, be on a supplier's 
desk in less than a week. Reporting on major 
projects often requires even less time, since 
Commerce telephones the data transmitted 
by the Foreign Service to potentially inter- 
ested firms. Our commercial officers have 
also been able to identify more exploitable 
leads. In the first six months of this year, 
the posts overseas submitted 5,987 specific 
trade leads, 80 percent higher than in the 
same period of 1972. Almost 400 of these en- 
tailed potential exports of at least $5 million 
each. Moreover, the quality of these leads 
has been improved by more precise identifi- 
cation of product categories, thereby increas- 
ing the i)robability of locating an American 
supplier. 

As I mentioned, we are stressing both 
program content and the quality of our per- 
formance in the commercial field. Foremost 
among our performance goals has been to 
involve the entire overseas mission in the 
task of export promotion. We have instructed 
our Ambassadors to insure that they have 
an integrated team effort. I have personally 
conveyed this message to all Assistant Sec- 
retaries, to all Country Directors, and to 
every Embassy I have visited, and I have 
been gratified with the response. 

In our Embassies around the world, we are 
l)ringing to bear a team spirit on our export 
expansion drive. All of the elements of the 
mission are being harnessed in this effort: 

— We are sensitizing our political and eco- 
nomic reporting officers to be alert to major 
projects which have export potential. 

—We are obtaining through our AID mis- 



558 



Deparltnent of State Bulletin 



sions more information about internationally 
financed projects and technical services 
which offer opportunities for U.S. business. 

— We are seeking, with the full coopera- 
tion of our military attaches, to identify 
commercial trade leads flowing from military 
sales. 

— We are publicizing through the United 
States Information Service our superior tech- 
nology and the ability of American export- 
ers to satisfy many local development needs. 

The important thing is that today our 
Ambassadors can integrate overseas activ- 
ity so that political as well as economic- 
commercial officers are involved. Recent com- 
ments we have received from a number of 
you also suggest that the deepened commit- 
ment of our Ambassadors and their staffs is 
having a favorable impact. As the president 
of a large western corporation wrote : 

On behalf of all our officers, I want to express 
our appreciation for the efforts you expended in 
helping us secure the transmission line contract. 
Without your aggressive support, I seriously doubt 
that we could have been successful. 

We are not only working harder, but we 
are putting more of our personnel and funds 
into the effort. At a time when our existing 
statutory activities and new programs are 
imposing substantial strains on our re- 
sources, we have actually reprogramed per- 
sonnel from other functions into economic 
and commercial work. It may surprise you 
to know that we now have more economic 
and commercial officer positions overseas 
than we have political officer positions. And 
if the budgetary situation permits, we plan 
to increase further the amount of staff en- 
gaged in export promotion. 

One of our central objectives is to enhance 
the skills of our economic and commercial 
officers. We have augmented our training 
programs to provide special emphasis on in- 
ternational business practices. In addition, 
we have achieved major strides in fulfilling 
our future needs for qualified economic and 
commercial officers through a vigorous re- 
cruitment drive. 

Finally, we are trying to insure that the 



staffing of our management positions prop- 
erly reflects the priority we are according to 
our economic and commercial interests. We 
have designated 28 of our consulates in im- 
portant commercial centers — 14 of them in 
Europe — as "commercial interest posts" to 
be headed by officers with significant com- 
mercial experience. Relatedly we are filling 
roughly one-fourth of our positions of Deputy 
Chief of Mission, the Ambassador's second- 
in-command, with officers who likewise have 
significant commercial experience. 

What kind of support can you expect from 
your government representatives abroad? 
Most of you direct extensive international 
operations and are well established in all 
your major markets. The most important 
service we can perform for you is effective 
participation in the IMF [International Mon- 
etary Fund] and GATT [General Agreement 
on TariflFs and Trade] negotiations over the 
coming months and years. I want to assure 
you that in our reporting and government-to- 
government contacts we will do our utmost 
to insure the success of these negotiations. 

We will also assist you in your day-to-day 
competition with foreign firms. We will be 
ready to lend that needed additional boost 
in your bidding on major contracts and in 
your investment applications. You can count 
on us as well to work assiduously for the 
removal of any discriminatory obstacles that 
you may face. Also, when you encounter 
arbitrary and unreasonable actions by for- 
eign governments, we will help you seek an 
amicable resolution of the problem. 

Apart from our representational activities, 
we invite you to avail yourselves of the whole 
range of export promotion services we 
perform : 

— We will give you timely notice of export 
opportunities. 

— We will, with adequate advance warn- 
ing, provide your representatives with brief- 
ings on political and economic trends in the 
countries they visit and arrange for them to 
meet foreign buyers. 

— We will provide you with background 
information on foreign firms. 



November 5, 1973 



559 



— We will provide government-supported 
exposure of your products in 14 trade center 
facilities and in U.S. exhibitions. 

— We will identify potential agents, dis- 
tributors, and licensees for your products. 

I hope that every company throughout the 
country — large or small — will make use of 
our strengthened export promotion machin- 
ery. All of us in this government are striving 
to promote the closest possible government- 
business cooperation in support of U.S. ex- 
ports. In today's international environment 
I am confident that partnership will improve 
our export performance. 



Secretary Kissinger To Receive 
1973 Nobel Peace Prize 

On October 76' the Norwegian Parlia- 
ment's five-member Nobel Committee an- 
nounced the joint selection of Secretary 
Kissinger and Le Due Tho, member of the 
Politburo of the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam, as recipients of the Nobel Peace 
Prize for 1973. Following are a statement 
issued by President Nixon and remarks made 
to the pi'ess by Secretary Kissinger that day. 



PRESIDENT NIXON 

White House press release dated October 16 

I am sure that all Americans will join me 
in extending congratulations to Secretary of 
State Henry A. Kissinger upon his richly 
deserved selection as co-recipient of the No- 
bel Peace Prize for 1973. 

By jointly citing Dr. Kissinger and Le Due 
Tho, the Nobel Committee has also given 
deserved recognition to the art of negotiation 
itself in the process of ending a war and 
laying the groundwork for peace — an art 
that will be more essential than ever as we 
seek to build and maintain a structure of 
peace in the world. 

It is my most fervent hope that the era of 
negotiation of the 1970's and the negotiation 



this award recognizes will be capped by a 
just and lasting peace in Southeast Asia, in 
the Mideast, and throughout the world. 



SECRETARY KISSINGER 

Press release 384 dated October 16 

Ladies and gentlemen: I don't have a 
formal statement. I thought I would make a 
few informal observations. 

Nothing that has happened to me in public 
life has moved me more than this award, 
which represents a recognition of the central 
liurpose of the President's foreign policy, 
which is the achievement of a lasting peace. 

I am grateful to the President for having 
given me this opportunity and also for 
creating the conditions which made it pos- 
sible to bring the negotiations on Viet-Nam 
to a successful conclusion. 

Wlien I shall receive the award, together 
with my old colleague in the search for peace 
in Viet-Nam, Le Due Tho, I hope that that 
occasion will at last mark the end, or sym- 
bolize the end, of the anguish and the suffei'- 
ing that Viet-Nam has meant for so many 
millions of people around the world and that 
both at home and abroad it will mark the 
beginning of a period of reconciliation. 

The news of this award reached me while 
I was chairing a meeting at the White House 
in which we were discussing means to speed 
peace in the Middle East. Nothing could 
underline so much that the search for peace 
is never ended. And nothing could have given 
us a greater impetus to work with even more 
energy and more dedication to end the 
hostilities that are now going on in the 
Middlf^ East and to move from there rapidly 
to bringing about a just and decent and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. 

But beyond all these immediate crises, 
lierhaps the most important goal any ad- 
ministration can set itself is to work for a 
world in which the award will become ir- 
I'eievant because peace will have become so 
normal and so much taken for granted that 
no awards for it will have to be given. 

Thank you very much. 



560 



Department of State Bulletin 



President Houphouet-Boigny of the Republic of Ivory Coast 
Visits the United States 



President Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the 
Republic of Ivory Coast mxide a state visit 
to the United States October S-15. He visited 
Washington October 9-11 , where he met with 
President Nixoi and other government 
officials. Following are an exchange of greet- 
ings between President Nixo)i and President 
Houphouet-Boigny at a welcoming ceremony 
on the South Laii-n of the White House on 
October 9 and their exchange of toasts at a 
dinner at the White House that evening. 

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 15 

President Nixon 

Mr. President, and all of our friends from 
the Ivory Coast, and all of our friends here 
in Washington, D.C., from the United States: 
Mr. President, I am honored to be the fourth 
American President to welcome you to Wash- 
ington, D.C., and as you come on this oc- 
casion, I am also proud of the fact that both 
Mrs. Nixon and I have had the opportunity 
to visit and to know your country and to 
know what an exciting country it is from 
the standpoint of its prospects for the future. 

For those in America who do not know 
Ivory Coast, we can report that you have the 
highest per capita income in black Africa, 
you have the highest rate of sustainable 
growth in that part of the world, and you 
have established a i-ecord for leadership that 
is known throughout the world. We know 
that this could not have happened without 
that leadership. Because as we look to the 
secret of progress for Ivory Coast, we find 
it first in its wealth, the wealth in its re- 
sources. We find it second in its wealth in its 
l)eo])le, a hard-working devoted people who 
are determined to move forward in the areas 



of i)rogress. And we find it third in leader- 
ship, leadership which you have provided 
since Ivory Coast became a nation and leader- 
ship which has meant stability, which has 
meant private and free enterprise coming 
into your country, not to exploit but to 
develop for the good of all of the people, and 
leadership which, above all, has meant peace. 

And Mr. President, on this occasion when 
we meet, the last i)oint is most important. We 
realize that fighting has again broken out in 
the northern part of your continent and in 
the Mideast, and I think all of our fellow 
Americans will be interested to note that our 
distinguished and honored guest today, just 
this year, received the Peace Award, the first 
Peace Award ever given by the organization 
which was set up for world peace through 
law. And that is why, Mr. President, in 
addition to talking to our bilateral prob- 
lems — which, incidentally, are not very con- 
troversial, because our relations are excellent 
and have been for many years — we will today 
be talking about the problems of how we can 
create that same period of peace and stability 
for all of Africa that you have in your 
country and how, also, working together with 
other nations who want peace for the whole 
world, we can contribute to an end to the 
fighting which is now going on at such 
terrible cost to both sides in the Mideast. 

We look forward to our talks, to get your 
judgment as to how all nations can contribute 
to the goal of not simply an end to the fight- 
ing which is going on now but to building a 
new stiucture of peace in the Mideast which 
will give a better hope for avoiding war 
breaking out as it has over and over again 
for the past 25 years. 

I do not mean that today we will find the 
answer to that problem that has plagued 
many administrations here and abroad for a 



November 5, 1973 



561 



quarter of a century, but I do know that 
uppermost in our agenda today will be a dis- 
cussion of those problems with the hope that 
we can find those common principles which 
will move toward not only an end to the 
fighting but building a permanent structure 
of peace in the Mideast and eventually, of 
course, throughout the world. 

So, Mr. President, I say that we give you 
a very special welcome today to our country 
because of your official position and also 
because both Mrs. Nixon and I have had the 
privilege of being welcomed so warmly in 
your country. And we hope that you %vill 
enjoy your stay here, your visit to the West 
Coast, and will go back with as pleasant 
memories of the United States as Mrs. Nixon 
and I have very pleasant and warm memories 
of Ivory Coast. 

President Houphouet-Boigny ' 

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: 
Allow me first of all to express to you in my 
own name, in the name of my wife, and of 
my delegation, my deep appreciation for your 
kind invitation and for the words full of 
praise you have just had for myself and my 
delegation. At this privileged moment I feel 
deep pride and joy, first of all, because my 
new visit in your great and beautiful country 
will permit me to acquaint myself more 
deeply with one of the more astonishing ad- 
ventures of modern times, an adventure with- 
out which our world of today would be deeply 
different from what it is with its fascinating 
diverseness and its bounties. 

In the second place it is because I am about 
to meet with you for the very first time about 
problems which matter to both of us, and 
such exchanges with the prestigious Presi- 
dent of the most powerful of all nations 
cannot fail to show and illustrate our common 
will, as you have yourself just stressed a 
moment ago, to foster dialogue in peace. And 
finally, I am deeply convinced that my visit 



' President Houphouet-Boigny spoke in French 
on both occasions. 



will very happily contribute to a cause dear 
to us, that of cooperation and friendship 
between the United States and the Ivory 
Coast. This cooperation and friendship, 
which in their traditional cordiality and very 
large permanence are to us essential features 
in our foreign relations, can only benefit from 
the conversations and the meetings — loyal, 
candid, and frank — that we shall have with 
you and with the figures that we shall meet 
here. 

I come to you, Mr. President, simply and 
as a friend, to thank you with all my heart 
in my own name and in that of my wife and 
express to you the feelings of admiration and 
confidence placed in you by the people of the 
Ivory Coast and w^hich, through you, are 
addressed to the entire American Nation. 
Long live the United States of America, long 
live the friendship between our tw'o peoples. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 15 

President Nixon 

Mr. President: It is a very great pleasure 
to welcome you and your very lovely First 
Lady at the White House on this occasion. 
And because I know that this company and 
all of those who will be listening in the press 
room below are more interested in what you 
will be saying than what I will be saying, my 
remarks will be brief. 

But first let me say that perhaps my 
greatest expert on foreign affairs is not 
really Dr. Kissinger, but my wife. [Laugh- 
ter.] And after she was able to take a trip 
to Africa, which I have been wanting to 
take — and I, incidentally, Dr. Kissinger, 
intend to take before my term of office is 
finished, the first American President ever 
to visit Africa — Mrs. Nixon came back with 
very warm feelings for all the countries she 
had visited, but she had a very special feeling 
about Ivory Coast and its President and its 
First Lady. 

She said that the President was a man 



562 



Department of State Bulletin 



who not only was handling the affairs of his 
country well but who had a great grasp of 
the problems of the world. And she said that 
his First Lady was, among all the first ladies 
she had met in the world, one of the most 
gracious, the most beautiful, and — to a 
woman this is important and to a man also — 
the best dressed. 

Now, to be very serious for a moment 
before introducing the President to this as- 
semblage, people wonder w-hat happens wiien 
the President of Ivory Coast and the Presi- 
dent of the I'nited States sit down for an 
hour and a half and talk. Now, we both 
agree that we talked about cocoa and coffee 
and reverse preferences, and international 
trade problems, and other bilateral matters — 
like whether Kaiser should or should not 
invest in Ivory Coast, and they should — but 
what, it seems to me, is particularly impor- 
tant about this visit is that while we covered 
all the bilateral problems very thoroughly 
and found that we had very little to disagree 
about, that the President was able to convey 
to me an understanding of not only the prob- 
lems of his own country and the problems 
of the new African states but an understand- 
ing of his view of the world. 

In other words, we have in our company 
tonight — and I wish all of you could know 
him as I have known him, as my wife has 
known him — a world statesman of the first 
rank, a man who has demonstrated by his 
leadei'shi]! capabilities that he knows what 
it takes to take a new country and to give 
it the stability, the drive, and the spirit that 
will make it a major force in that area of 
the world, but also a man who does not think 
of his own country as just an island, who is 
not parochial, as are too many of the leaders 
in the world today, but one who sees the 
whole world, as one who realizes that what 
ha])pens .5.000 miles away in India and Paki- 
stan affects him, as one who sees that what 
happens in the Mideast affects him and his 
people, as one who sees that what happens 
in any part of the world affects his country — 
although it is very easy to become obsessed 
with your own problems. 



And for that reason tonight I know that 
all of you, not only because we admire our 
distinguished guest for his leadership of his 
own country, with the best record of national 
growth and per capita income of any of the 
nations of black Africa, but also because he 
has demonstrated that he has that rare 
ability to see beyond the problems of the 
moment and look to the problems of the 
future, to see beyond the geographical prob- 
lems that involve only his own island as it 
e.xists in the West Coast of Africa and see 
beyond and see the whole world, because he 
is truly one whose views on the world scene 
can affect the woi-ld — it is for this reason 
that this house is honored for the third time 
to have him as our guest. 

And so in presenting him to you, I present 
a man who represents his own country with 
great distinction, a man who is also one who 
understands and is a great advocate of the 
problems of the new Africa and where it 
must go but also one who when he comes to 
America is able to s]jeak with great under- 
standing and great wisdom about those prob- 
lems that, wherever they exist in this world, 
will affect the future of his country and the 
future of ours. 

To a world statesman of the first rank, the 
President of the Ivory Coast, President 
Houphouet-Boigny. 

President Houphouet-Boigny 

Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, Excellencies, 
ladies and gentlemen: In few w'ords, Mr. 
President, but in particularly sensitive and 
well-chosen words, you have said much about 
my country and my people, about our achieve- 
ments and our ex]iectations, which is both 
friendly and profound. I am deeply touched, 
and I do thank you in my own name, on 
behalf of my wife, and on behalf of the dele- 
gation with me here today. We all share in 
my very sincere joy and feelings. 

It will soon be two years that we had the 
honoi- and the great pride to welcome Mrs. 
Richard Nixon to our capital city. This daz- 
zling visit, which we shall always remember. 



November 5, 1973 



563 



attested, if need be, of the quality of the 
relations between our two countries and of 
the concern which you feel, Mr. President, 
to show your interest and your friendship to 
us. 

Today, in spite of your heavy responsi- 
bilities, you have received us here, and you 
are sharing with your representatives of the 
Government and the people of the Ivory 
Coast some of your very valuable time, and 
this indeed is again a very rare treat for all 
of us. 

I shall deliberately not mention here the 
international problems and the African prob- 
lems which with you we have surveyed in 
such a rewarding manner earlier today. I 
should like to dwell specifically upon the rela- 
tions between the United States and the Ivory 
Coast because I am indeed convinced that my 
third visit in the United States will, as much 
as my preceding and memorable visits, be a 
milestone along the comforting path of the 
relations between our two countries. 

These relations to which the establishment 
of diplomatic links came very early and very 
spontaneously to give formal official nature 
are, I am happy to stress, without any clouds. 
The cordiality, the diverseness, and the 
frankness of our relations are the dominant 
themes. And the reasons that we have to 
eternalize the excellence of these relations 
and enhance their effects are tied directly to 
the convergence of our interests as well as 
to the commonality of our feelings. 

It is, Mr. President, in the first place in the 
area of business that we see the thrust of this 
convergence. Recipient of 14 percent of our 
exports, mainly coffee and cocoa, the United 
States has become the second customer of the 
Ivory Coast. It is also one of our privileged 
suppliers. This is all the more significant that 
the natural and traditional framework of our 
trade relations with Europe was not a 
natural incentive to a development of your 
exports toward our i^art of the world. 

As to industrial investments, which now 
remain very scant in our country, they should 
become in the very near future, with a textile 
plant near Abidjan, and as the more remote 



future, for the two projects of rubber tires 
and the operation of iron ore, they should 
really take off in a much more significant 
manner. 

In very general terms we note with deep 
satisfaction the new interest that your busi- 
nessmen are taking in our country. At the 
same time, we appreciate the action and the 
diverse forms of the technological and 
financial aid of the United States in the Ivory 
Coast over the last several years. The Exim- 
bank has particularly been active to support 
two of our regional development programs: 
two of the most essential ones, one in the 
central with the Kossou Dam and the other 
in the north for a huge sugar industry 
complex. 

As to the valuable assistance of your Peace 
Corps volunteers, it is the extension of the 
AID program, and it illustrates our common 
lireoccupation to give our cooperation the 
irreplaceable human dimension, its need to 
bring peojile together and to bring for better 
understanding nations and races; and this is 
a very happy plea and testimonial for this 
community of feelings between us that I 
referred to a minute ago. 

To come to meet you, Mr. President, is not 
simply for the people of the Ivory Coast the 
opportunity to dwell upon the favorable 
course of our relations, to set forth its spirit 
and stress its thrust, it is also a way for us 
to satisfy a portion of the curiosity and ad- 
miration which has always led us to take 
an interest in your amazing nation. 

I do not know which of your history — the 
virtue of your people or your phenomenal 
development in the scientific and economic 
area — is the most noteworthy. I am con- 
vinced that the lessons and the examples upon 
which we can jionder here are particularly 
rewarding and numerous. 

What is first of all remarkable, I believe, 
is the aptitude of American society to merge 
into a single unit the most diverse contribu- 
tions come from afar and particularly from 
the banks of the old Europe. Your history is 
like no other in that respect, to have trans- 
planted so many human contributions, lin- 



564 



Department of Slate Bulletin 



Kuistic and religious contributions — so 
dissimilar — into a community which is so 
extraordinarily original, without precedent, 
without equivalent in any other part of the 
world. 

The American adventure is also a way to 
define new relationships between man and 
nature. From the scouts and the pioneers 
who went West, to the conquerors of the 
moon, it is always the same challenge cast 
by every succeeding generation. It is also the 
birth of a new system of relationships be- 
tween man and the coming into being of a 
genuine democracy which regardless of the 
scoi^e of its contradictions and its problems 
have always jn-eserved its main balance and 
has always offered to the world as a mirror, 
sometimes casting a deformed picture, but 
always an enlightening one, of trans-inten- 
tions which come to be such a course of up- 
heaval as we near the end of the century 
throughout all our societies. 

The history of the United States is uni- 
versal sco]ie, jMr. President, and it has been 
very aptly said that it is the common prop- 
erty of any man who wishes to be contempor- 
aneous with his own time and who questions 
himself about the future of mankind. The 
United States has also shown man in a most 
fruitful way — the entire scope of his creative 
genius and his faculty to transform and 
enrich the natural bounties of the soil and 
the subsoil. Few countries, without any 
doubt, have as much and as many different 
resources as your country, Mr. President, 
l)ut it still needs to develop these phenomenal 
resources in the most rational way i)ossible, 
to put them at the service of the community. 
The fact that today the United States is the 
fii'st industrial iiower in the world — at the 
same time from the standard of value and 
quantity as technological perfection, individ- 
ual productivity, and invested capital — this 
fact is not due to chance. 

Nowhere has the faculty to develop, pro- 
duce, invent, and multiply been so effective, 
so rapid; and this variety is present nowhere 
else in the world. No other country has pro- 
duced more business leaders; no country has 



obtained such a standard of living. 

To have been the first to conquer the atom 
and then space shows very eloquently the 
high degree and the capacity for renewal of 
American science, technology, and economy. 
This phenomenal progression does not go 
without its equilibriums and constraints. And 
this is not specifically part of your history 
alone; you are not the only ones today to 
attempt to resolve the delicate problem of 
equilibrium within growth, but perhaps — and 
this is also one of your main strengths — you 
are the first to have confronted with so much 
rigor and lucidity problems as essential and 
timely as those of pollution, the quality of 
life, urbanization, and the preparation of 
your own future. 

It would be a simplistic and an unfair view 
to limit your innovative caiiability — your 
capacity to go beyond your own efforts and 
to stimulate creative competitiveness — to 
reduce it only to material dimensions. One 
tends to forget too often that your thinkers, 
your writers, your filmmakers, your archi- 
tects, have brought much to the world. New 
forms of expression in thought and sensitive- 
ness, a nation which gave to our movements 
of contemporaneous expression such key and 
diverse men as Mark Twain, Ernest Heming- 
way, John Ford, and Frank Lloyd Wright. 
That displays an intellectual vitality and a 
creative maturity which stand as an example. 

As an examjile indeed is your entire 
history, which has also avoided the traps of 
solitude to seek an opening toward the world. 
Its main thrust is generous passions and deep 
love of freedom. 

Your country, Mr. President, remains in 
this connection, for all men who love justice, 
the country which during a darker period of 
mankind's history did not hesitate to throw 
its phenomenal resources into a battle which 
on other continents sought to reestablish a 
more effective order of dignity for man's 
earth and to establish civilization, relation- 
ships no longer seeking as a justification 
racism and brute foi'ce. 

And so you will understand why we feel 
.so iiroud, Mr. President, to be again in your 



November 5, 1973 



565 



country today and to pursue our quest, our 
fascinating quest, after your realities and 
your people. 

There is a last reason which alone would 
be sufficient to give our meeting a great deal 
of significance and I will say this very 
simply: It is the assurance that I feel as I 
come to meet you that I discover one of the 
most significant figures of our time. Few 
statesmen have exerted such a deep and re- 
markable influence as you have, Mr. Presi- 
dent, at this latter part of our century, on 
the disconcerting and tumultuous course of 
our history. 

Having inherited a situation which the 
aftermath of the last war or ideological op- 
position had frozen in a balance of terror or 
an imi)lacable conflict, you have in a fev: 
short years contributed in a decisive manner 
to rearrange the framework of international 
relations which have become accustomed to 
following exclusively a relationship based 
upon force and intolerances. Through specific 
measures, consistent and concrete, which 
display your courage, your realism, and your 
clear vision, you have enabled our world to 
regain part of the serenity it had lost, and 
you have enhanced the policy of comprehen- 
sion, dialogue, and peace to which, as you 
know, we are so passionately attached. 

Even more than the respected President of 
the most powerful nation, you are in the eyes 
of the ])eople of the Ivory Coast, the shaper 
of a more harmonious world, the indefatiga- 
ble apostle of the genuine consultations, and 
the generous initiator of peaceful confronta- 
tion. 

To know tills and to be aware of it matters 
to us, but to be able to say so in your own 



Capital is a great and new comfort to us, 
Mr. President. If the Ivory Coast rejoices 
today so sincerely over our meeting, it is 
because it is aware that as a response to 
your friendly invitation it gives a very 
privileged character to moments that we 
should like to stretch in time the already 
beautiful and long history of our very cordial 
relations, receives a contribution, and also we 
bring a modest contribution to strengthening 
a climate of international concord, without 
which no undertaking of progress and justice 
appears possible. 

As we begin a visit which will be impor- 
tant and fruitful for our common future, I 
should like to re-create our fruitful friend- 
ship and our very deep esteem. But it would 
be a betrayal of this friendship, esteem, and 
confidence, Mr. President, if before I con- 
clude I did not share with you the very deep 
preoccui)ation I feel as a man, as a leader, 
as an African, in one word about the very 
serious problem in the Mideast. 

Your action on behalf of peace, which is 
already so remarkable — and history will note 
your capital role — would I'emain incomplete 
if you did not succeed, acting with the leaders 
of the Soviet Union, not to impose, but to 
create and foster conditions for a just and 
durable peace in that part of the world where 
one should speak only of peace, love, and 
brotherhood. 

I raise my glass to you, Mr. President, to 
you, Mrs. Nixon, and to the greatness and 
the prosperity of the American Nation, 
strengthening of the friendship between the 
United States and the Ivory Coast, interna- 
tional cooperation and brotherhood among 
man. 



566 



Department of State Bulletin 



Commercial Relations With State-Controlled Economies 



Addfess by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 



I was very pleased to accept David Pack- 
ard's invitation to talk to you this morning 
about cur commercial relations with the So- 
viet Union, the People's Republic of China, 
and the other state-controlled economies. 

The most striking thing about our trade 
with Communist countries is the sizable trade 
surplus w'e ai'e running and can expect to 
maintain. By the end of 1973, U.S. trade with 
these countries will approach $3.5 billion, 
compared with last year's $1.2 billion. The 
trade balance will be about 4 to 1 in our 
favor, giving us a surplus of $2 billion. This 
has made a major contribution to working 
our way out of the enormous trade and pay- 
ments deficit we sustained last year. 

I hope that what I have to say will help 
all of us meet the challenge of keeping this 
trade expanding. It may be of even greater 
fundamental importance to think hard about 
how we should adapt our economic policies 
and your business planning to the fact that 
these two huge markets, with their cheap 
energy, rich resources, and intelligent work 
forces, may be ready to take full participat- 
ing membershiip in the world economic com- 
munity. 

Trade with the People's Republic of China 
is moving very much more rapidly than any 
of us expected. At the beginning of the year 
we were predicting that we would export 
between $250 million and $300 million this 
year. It is more likely to turn out to be $800 
million. 



' Made before the Business Council at Hot Springs, 
Va., on Oct. 13. 



The previous attitudes of the People's Re- 
public had led us to believe that they would 
try to keep their imports reasonably in line 
with their exports on a bilateral basis. It now 
looks as though our favorable trade balance 
with the P.R.C. will be somewhere in the 
area of 14 to 1. 

When you analyze our exports, you find 
that $650 million is in grain, cotton, and soy- 
beans. The large grain figure arises from a 
poor harvest, and it is not likely to hold. 
China had previously been an exporter of 
soybeans and with good weather is likely to 
restore itself to that position. Their interest 
in cotton, on the other hand, is likely to grow, 
and some analj'sts see them absorbing as 
much as a quarter of the U.S. cotton crop. 

Apart from agricultural products, half of 
the balance will be in large passenger air- 
craft and parts. Other significant items will 
be in artificial fibers, communications equip- 
ment, scientific testing equipment, and chem- 
ical fertilizer i^urchases. 

Looking at the next two years, it seems 
likely that their reduced grain purchases will 
be more than offset by a series of whole-plant 
turnkey contracts. They just signed the first 
of these with an American company for three 
ammonia plants, running to $70 million. 
They are big importers of fertilizer and have 
apparently made a decision to meet their 
own requirements as far as possible and in 
general to expand their chemical and petro- 
chemical capacity. Turnkey plant contracts 
made with off'shore subsidiaries of U.S. com- 
panies and foreign companies, buying much 



November 5, 1973 



567 



of the plant equipment and other components 
in the United States, now approach $1 billion. 
As we appraise their economic develop- 
ment plans, there will be major opportunities 
to sell roadbuilding, construction, and mining 
equipment and some petroleum equipment. 
They are engaged in an active geological 
program, but they do not yet appear to be 
willing to buy exploration services or to go 
into joint ventui'es with foreign companies. 

Further Expansion of Trade With China 

It is imi)ortant to understand the great 
differences between the Peoi)]e's Republic and 
the Soviet Union in the structure of their 
economies and in their trade practices. Buy- 
ing in the Soviet Union is highly centralized. 
The People's ReiJublic is highly decentralized. 
There are really three economies in mainland 
China. There is a heavy industrial segment, 
primarily defense, which is centrally man- 
aged. There is a larger segment made up of 
other sectors of the economy which is planned 
and managed by the Provincial governments. 
Then there is the agricultural sector where 
decisions are made by 74,000 communes. 
The state trading cori)orations which do all 
the buying are themselves decentralized in 
their operation, and they bring in local com- 
munes or cooperatives and Provincial gov- 
ernments on buying decisions i-elevant to 
them. 

For our trade with the People's Republic 
to expand further, it will in the long run be 
necessary for us to buy more from them. 
Tariff discrimination against exports from 
the People's Re|)ublic is more severe than in 
the case of the Soviet Union because of the 
way the character of their export jjotential 
meshes with our tariff structure. On top of 
this they are handicapped by lack of famili- 
arity with our market. For example, they do 
not want to give wholesale discounts, and we 
have to educate them about labeling, FDA 
[Food and Drug Administration], and in- 
spection requirements as well as the struc- 
ture of our distribution apparatus. This is 
the task to which the U.S.-China Business 



Council, which Don Burnham chairs, can 
contribute substantially. 

Opportunities in Eastern Europe 

Secretary [of Commerce Frederick B.] 
Dent has just returned from an official visit 
to Poland, Hungary, and, together with Sec- 
retary [of the Treasury George P.] Shultz 
and myself, to Yugoslavia. These countries 
have an avid desire for American machinery 
and technology. They have ambitious devel- 
ojiment programs and are counting heavily 
on American equipment. 

I was particularly impressed with the op- 
portunities offered by the "creeping capital- 
ism" which characterizes the Yugoslav econ- 
omy. Their state and cooperative entities now 
have some 80 joint ventures with Western 
firms. Of these, seven are American firms, 
the latest one involving a $17 million invest- 
ment. In our discussions there we were told 
that restrictions on the repatriation of earn- 
ings, which have made joint ventures there 
of limited attraction to American firms, are 
about to be liberalized. We were also told that 
they would hope to eliminate 60 percent of 
their imi)ort controls before the end of 1974. 

Yugoslav exports to the United States have 
been growing much more rapidly than their 
purchases from the United States. We are 
hoping that one contract involving over $100 
million is about to break our way. They are 
aware of this and seem ready to encourage 
expansion of their imports from the United 
States. 

We have made a lot of i)rogress in im- 
jiroving our share of the Soviet market. 
Prior to 1972 the U.S. share of Soviet con- 
tracts for Western plant and equipment was 
5 percent or less. U.S. firms are now getting 
20 percent of Soviet contracts for plant and 
equipment. Of total foreign purchases of 
about $3 billion the Soviet Union has placed 
$600 million in contracts with the United 
States since the beginning of 1972. This 
makes the United States second only to Ger- 
many among the major Western sources of 
technology and equipment. 

I think this is a remarkable achievement 



568 



Department of State Bulletin 



when we stop to think that Germany, France, 
Britain, and Japan have been working in- 
tensively on the Soviet market for almost 10 
years and have the advantages of geographic 
proximity, a longer record of previous deal- 
ings, frequently a greater flexibility in being 
able to accei)t barter deals, and so on. We are 
now on reasonably even terms in credit and 
have the advantage of Soviet respect for U.S. 
technology and know-how. Competition in 
prices of course is important, but United 
States firms have won Soviet contracts at 
higher prices on the basis of their willing- 
ness to compete on a turnkey basis including 
performance guarantees, which seem to be 
particularly important to Soviet bureaucracy. 

Cooperative Ventures in the U.S.S.R. 

When General Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezh- 
nev was in Washington a few months ago and 
when he talked to our U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commer- 
cial Commission in Moscow last week, he 
stated there were virtually unlimited possi- 
bilities for economic cooperation but empha- 
sized that the major possibilities will be 
outside the traditional patterns of trade. The 
Soviets take the view that buying and selling, 
the traditional forms of trade, are becoming 
increasingly less important. They point out 
that textiles, clothing, and other consumer 
goods make up a smaller percentage of trade 
and that price and other advantages which 
one country or another may have in these 
consumer goods is fleeting in character. All 
developed countries have some access to new- 
techniques. DilTerent countries have different 
needs and different types of natural resources 
to develop. This presents the opportunity for 
development projects along cooperative lines. 

It is clear that the Soviets have decided 
that the way to accelerate their economic 
development is to acquire technology, capi- 
tal, and management skills from American, 
European, and Japanese corporations by 
giving them the opportunity to work on the 
large ore and gas deposits and great forest 
resources which exist within the Soviet 
Union. 

Beyond that, they seem prepared to offer 



opportunities to build production facilities 
which have high energy needs near their 
hydroelectric plants, which can provide cheap 
energy and to which accessible and cheap raw 
material can be easily brought. Our com- 
panies are there and, with the Japanese, are 
looking into huge oil and gas pipeline proj- 
ects. The Japanese are there looking at large 
timber, coal, and ore prospects. 

Soviet economic planning, their internal 
needs, and their export aspirations seem 
likely to provide opportunities to participate 
in new aluminum, ferroalloy, and petrochem- 
ical facilities in Siberia. In these operations 
electric power can run from 10 percent to 
as high as 20 percent, in the case of alumi- 
num, of total production costs. As energy 
costs elsewhere in the world rise, the huge 
hydroelectric plants in east Siberia with 
large amounts of unused capacity for produc- 
ing low-cost power can provide a critical com- 
petitive edge in manufacturing operations 
which are energy intensive. This advantage 
can be compounded where manufacturing fa- 
cilities in other countries have to rely on im- 
ports of raw materials which are readily 
available in the Soviet Union. 

Obviously, there are competitive consider- 
ations here which need very careful study 
and thought. Particularly in the energy field, 
the ijrice, supply, and other advantages to 
our economy should be such that the capital 
could not be more advantageously used in 
developing our own energy sources. The So- 
viets seem likely to be influenced to provide 
attractive economic terms by their desire to 
acquire technology and to develop a foreign 
exchange earning capacity to permit contin- 
ued purchases from the West. 

These projects can have several advan- 
tages from our viewpoint. They could provide 
us with long-term supplies of energy and 
raw materials to replace depleted domestic 
sources. They would require massive exports 
of American capital equipment. The product 
which would constitute repayment for that 
equipment would on the whole compete with 
imports from other sources more than with 
domestic production. And the close involve- 



November 5, 1973 



569 



ment of American industry would provide 
some assurance of compatibility with domes- 
tic economic interests. 

It is entirely reasonable to contemplate the 
possibility of an important commercial and 
economic relationship between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R. These are, after all, 
the world's two principal national economic 
entities. While there are differences in our 
economic systems, the direction of our mu- 
tual efforts for the last year and a half 
has been to develop a substantial economic 
relationship. 

It is particularly important, however, that 
we, both government and business, under- 
stand the essential role of credit in our de- 
veloping economic relations with the U.S.S.R. 
Sales of capital equipment to any country, 
East, West, or South, are conducted on the 
basis of medium- and long-term credits. 

The President's decision last year to make 
normal export financing facilities of the 
Eximbank available in our trade with the 
U.S.S.R. has made our exports in this sector 
reasonably competitive with those of other 
Western supjiliers. 

These emerging economic relationships are 
inextricably intertwined with satisfactory 
political relationships. Recognizing this basic 
fact early in his administration. President 
Nixon set out first to assure a substantial 
degree of stability in political affairs. The 
guiding principle behind the normalization of 
economic relations with Communist countries 
has been that economic normalization is 
linked with progress toward the improve- 
ment of political relations. The pace of 
advancement in the economic sphere thus has 
been regulated by the pace of advancement 
in the political sphere. 

Transnational Investment 

We must recognize that to the extent these 
development ojijiortunities in Siberia are eco- 
nomically sound, .JajDanese and European 
companies will be ready to take them on if 
we do not. 

Indeed, to fully grasp the implications of 
the Soviet determination to seek partnership 



with the West in developing its resources and 
exploiting its cheap energy and other eco- 
nomic advantages we must examine it in a 
broader context. Japan, in its five-year plan, 
has made a decision to encourage energy- 
intensive industries, polluting industries, and 
labor-intensive industries to move down 
south to other offshore islands and the South- 
east Asian Peninsula. Germany recognizes 
that it has been able to increase its produc- 
tion sufficiently to pass the United States as 
the world's largest exporter of manufactured 
goods only by bringing in very large numbers 
of foreign workers from Portugal, Spain, 
Turkey, and other countries in southern Eu- 
rope. They now i-ecognize that they have gone 
about as far as they can in that direction and 
are beginning to seek further economic ex- 
]:)ansion by bringing jilants to the workers 
rather than workers to their plants. As part 
of this, there is an intensified interest in di- 
rect investment in the United States. 

The speed with which assembly lines and 
other manufacturing facilities can be picked 
up and moved today and the recognition by 
less developed countries that they can solve 
their job problems by attracting factories 
make the bringing of plants to workers an 
increasingly significant worldwide phenome- 
non. Over 50 electronic companies have been 
set up in less than two years in Malaysia, 
with employment going from zero to 8,000. 

All this makes the role of the multinational 
corporations increasingly important to our 
economic balance and our political purposes 
in expanding channels of communications be- 
tween nations and i)romoting the economic 
development of the iioorer parts of the world. 
It makes more urgent our common task of 
expanding public understanding that block- 
ing companies from operating offshore when 
and where they have to in order to compete 
will lose jobs and increase the cost of living. 
It also places an obligation on the leaders of 
those corporations to see that their commit- 
ment of capital, technology, and skills abroad 
does not shortchange the economic interests 
of the United States. It is, I believe, true that 
for the most part the economic interests of 



570 



Department of State Bulletin 



companies and their stockholders in getting 
the maximum return for these assets parallel 
the Nation's interests and that proposals here 
and abroad to establish machinery to regu- 
late multinational corporations, other than, 
of course, to require them to adhere to the 
laws of their domicile and of host countries, 
would be counterproductive. The United Na- 
tions, the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development], the Euro- 
pean Community, and the Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee are all studying the need 
to establish greater controls over the multi- 
national corporations, and there is a continu- 
ing need to correctly analyze and explain 
how these transnational carriers of training 
and education, of capital and technology, of 
experience and skill, contribute to peace and 
prosperity on a worldwide basis. 



Department Establishes Office 
for Law of the Sea Negotiations 

The Dej^artment of State announced on 
September 18 (press release 334) that under 
the direction of the Deputy Secretary in his 
capacity as Chairman of the National Secu- 
rity Council Under Secretaries Committee, 
an office (D/LOS) has been established to 
supervise and coordinate matters relating to 
the law of the sea negotiations. D/LOS has 
action responsibility within the Department 
for matters relating to the law of the sea 
negotiations. It will also coordinate these 
matters within the executive branch and will 
have interagency participation. In conjunc- 
tion with the Bureaus of Congressional Rela- 
tions and Public Affairs, D/LOS will be 
responsible for liaison with the Congress and 
interested public. D/LOS will act as the in- 
teragency backstopping mechanism for the 
law of the sea negotiations. 

D/LOS accommodates the Special Repre- 
isentative of the President for the Law of the 
jSea Conference, John R. Stevenson, and the 
Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task 
Force on Law of the Sea and its Executive 



Group, John Norton Moore. Both Ambassa- 
dor Stevenson and Mr. Moore report directly 
to the Deputy Secretary in his capacity as 
Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries 
Committee. 



U.S. Passports Remain Invalid 
for Travel to Certain Areas 

Following are the texts of three public 
notices which ivere vuhlished in the Federal 
Register on September 14. 

Public Notice 398 < 

TitAVEL Into or Through Cuba 
Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use 
of U.S. passports for travel into or through Cuba 
remains restricted. To permit unrestricted travel 
would be incompatible with the resolutions adopted 
at the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American 
States, of which the United States is a member. At 
this meeting, held in Washington from July 21 to 26, 
1964, it was resolved that the governments of the 
American States not maintain diplomatic, consular, 
trade or shipping relations with Cuba under its pres- 
ent government. This resolution was reaffirmed in 
the Twelfth Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of the OAS held in September 1967, which adopted 
resolutions calling upon Member States to apply 
strictly the recommendations pertaining to the 
movement of funds and arms from Cuba to other 
.■American nations. Among other things, this policy 
of isolating Cuba was intended to minimize the 
capability of the Castro government to carry out 
its openly proclaimed programs of subversive activi- 
ties in the Hemisphere. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into 
or through Cuba unless specifically validated for 
such travel under the authority of the Secretary 
of State. 

This public notice shall expire on September 14, 
1974 unless extended or sooner revoked by public 
notice. 

Effective date. — This notice becomes effective on 
September 14, 1973. 



Dated .August 31, 1973 
[seal] 



Kenneth Rush, 
Acting Secretary of State. 



' 38 Fed. Reg. 25705. 



November 5, 1973 



571 



Public Notice 399 ' 

Travel Into or Through North Korea 
Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), use 
of U.S. passports for travel into or through North 
Korea remains restricted. In view of the continued 
hostility of the North Korean regime toward the 
United States, the unsettled situation along the 
Military Demarcation Line, and the special position 
of the Government of the Republic of Korea which 
is recognized by the U.S. as well as by U.N. resolu- 
tion as the only lawful government in Korea, the 
Department of State believes that wholly unre- 
stricted travel by American citizens to North Korea 
would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign 
affairs. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into 
or through North Korea unless specifically validated 
for such travel under the authority of the Secretary 
of State. 

This public notice shall expire on September 13, 
1974, unless extended or sooner revoked by public 
notice. 

Effective date. — This notice becomes effective on 
September 14, 1973. 



Dated August 31, 1973. 
[seal] 



Kenneth Rush, 
Acting Secretary of State. 



Public Notice 400 > 

Travel Into or Through North Vietnam 

Restriction on Use of U.S. Passports 

Pursuant to the authority of Executive Order 
11295 and in accordance with 22 CFR 51.72(c), the 
use of U.S. passports for travel into or through 
North Vietnam remains restricted. In the aftermath 
of the signing on January 27, 1973, of the Agree- 
ment on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Vietnam, tensions continue to be high and conditions 
unsettled in the Indo-China area. The Peace Agree- 
ment envisages that the implementation of the 
Agreement will create conditions for establishing 
a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship 
between the United States and North Vietnam. 
However, the development of such a new relationship 



is still in its earliest stages. In these circumstances 
the Department of State believes that unrestricted 
travel by American citizens to North Vietnam would 
seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs. 

U.S. passports shall not be valid for travel into 
or through North Vietnam unless specifically vali- 
dated for such travel under the authority of the 
Secretary of State. 

This public notice shall expire on September 14, 
1974, unless extended or sooner revoked by public 
notice. 

Effective date. — This notice becomes effective on 
September 13, 1973. 



Dated August 31, 1973. 
[seal] 



Kenneth Rush, 
Acting Secretary of State. 



Military Sales Credit Authorized 
for Peru 

Presidential Determination No. 74-4 ' 

Presidential Determination — Peru 
Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, September 20, 197S. 

In accordance with the recommendation in the 
Acting Secretary's memorandum of July 20, 1973, 
I hereby determine, pursuant to Section 4 of the 
Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, that the 
extension of credit to the Government of Peru, in 
connection with the sale of F-5 military aircraft, is 
important to the national security of the United 
States. 

You are hereby requested on my behalf to report 
this determination to the Congress as required by 
law. 

This determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 



' 38 Fed Reg. 25705. 



'38 Fed. Reg. 27811. 



572 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



A Comprehensive Approach to Worldwide Problems 
of Food Shortages and Malnutrition 



Folloiving is u statement submitted to the 
Subcommittees on African Affairs and South 
Asian Affairs of the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations on October 5 by Maurice 
J. WilUums, Acting Administrator of the 
Agenc]) for International Development and 
the President's Special Relief Coordinator 
for Major Disasters Abroad.^ 

AID press release 73—73 dated October 5 

Events of the last several months have 
brought home more sharply than ever before 
one simple central fact. All of us in the world 
live out of the same food basket. A major 
drought in Asia affects supplies throughout 
the world. Rising prices make it difficult for 
poor countries to import essential food. All 
countries must work to meet the hunger and 
malnutrition resulting from natural disas- 
ters. A bad harvest of Peruvian anchovies 
can tip the balance between a healthy ex- 
port market for U.S. soybeans and a neces- 
sity to disappoint our best overseas customers 
for our farm products. We all have good 
reason to be concerned about the future of 
this world food basket. 

World cereal and protein consumption has 
been running slightly ahead of food produc- 
tion in recent years. Our food reserve mar- 
gins now are close — too close for comfort or 
complacency. 

In this period of reduced food supply and 
rapidly rising demand, the United States has 
held open the door of its granary. Commer- 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



cial exports of grains are at record level, 
and Public Law 480 programs are continu- 
ing, although on a drastically reduced scale. 
In a situation of short supply and high 
prices, the less developed countries (LDC's) 
who must import grain for essential needs 
are at a particular disadvantage. In some 
cases, because of natural disaster or eco- 
nomic difficulties of long standing, they are 
dei)endent on donations or concessional sales 
from the United States and other food- 
exporting nations. For others, even though 
able to purchase grains commercially, the 
present high prices constitute a significant 
drain on foreign exchange and budget re- 
sources. For them grain supplies for their 
people at basic sustenance levels are a politi- 
cal and economic necessity. 

U.S. Food Assistance 

The current Food for Peace legislation 
requires that commodities shipped under the 
concessional sales and donation programs be 
in excess of the amounts required for domes- 
tic consumption, adequate carryover of 
stocks, and anticipated sales for dollars, as 
determined by the Secretary of Agriculture. 
For these reasons, the amount of commodities 
made available for Food for Peace in fiscal 
year 1974 is likely to be only half of the 
amount shipped in FY 1973. We have had 
to drastically curtail P.L. 480 programs in 
many other developing countries. 

Even with a cut of this magnitude, the 
importance of continuing humanitarian food 
programs is fully recognized. The United 
States continues to be the principal contribu- 



November 5, 1973 



573 



tor to the World Food Program, sponsored 
jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation (FAO) and the United Nations. The 
U.S. pledge for the 1973-74 biennium is $136 
million — in commodities and freight, cash 
contribution, and shipping costs. The com- 
modity portion is charged to title II of P.L. 
480. We expect to fulfill the present pledge. 

The United States is also signatory to the 
Food Aid Convention of 1971. By that con- 
vention it is committed to donate or sell 
concessionally a minimum of 1,890,000 met- 
ric tons of wheat and coarse grains in fiscal 
years 1972, 1973, and 1974. We have met 
and will continue meeting that commitment. 

Donations of food to U.S. voluntary agen- 
cies for their overseas distribution programs 
to the needy are also continuing. While some 
reductions in the volume of food donations 
must be made, the voluntary agencies are 
cooperating in focusing the use of available 
supplies to help the most nutritionally vul- 
nerable groups — in maternal /child health 
programs, preschool and primary school feed- 
ing. And to upgrade the nutritional quality 
of the food, we are continuing to put strong 
emphasis on the use of high-protein blended 
and fortified foods, such as corn-soya blend, 
wheat-soya blend, and soy-fortified flour and 
buigur. 

Food for Peace commodities will continue 
to be made available for drought relief in 
the Sahelian zone of Africa. The United 
States has been by far the largest single 
donor of food to the Sahel — about 40 percent 
of the amount pledged so far. Under the 
leadership of the FAO, a survey of food needs 
for the months ahead is nearing completion. 
The United States will continue to partici- 
pate in the international effort to help the 
drought victims. 

In the case of Pakistan, the President 
recently announced that 100,000 tons of 
wheat would be made available as part of 
our assistance following the disastrous 
floods. We cannot, however, meet all of 
Pakistan's needs for grain on concessional 
terms. In response to U.N. requests, the 
United States has contributed about half of 



all the grain which will be supplied to 
Bangladesh during this calendar year. We 
are also meeting the minimum essential food 
requirements of south Indochina. 

The situation we face this year points up 
the great importance of the Food for Peace 
program in our relations with developing 
countries. Food for Peace enables the United 
States to carry out its longstanding tradition 
of humanitarian assistance to the needy, 
to provide help in time of disaster, and to 
boost the eff'orts of less developed countries 
to help themselves. I fervently hope that 
Secretary [of Agriculture Earl L.] Butz' 
drive to maximize U.S. farm production next 
year is so successful that Food for Peace 
can be fully restored. It is of utmost im- 
portance that the continuing need for food 
aid be fully a part of our agricultural policy. 

Joint International Action Required 

The current situation also points up the 
need for a coordinated approach with other 
donors and major food producers. In 1972 
the United States provided 75 percent of all 
liilatera! and multilateral food aid. The world 
food problem requires a joint review with 
other donors, both major cereal and non- 
cereal producers, to analyze (a) world food 
demands, (b) the overall supply situation, 
and (c) the need and provision of conces- 
sional food aid and other means to address 
the food problem, including more assistance 
to agricultural production. 

As a first step in achieving joint action, 
the Secretary of State has proposed that the 
United Nations call a Woi'ld Food Confer- 
ence in 1974 to consider ways to maintain 
adequate food supplies and harness the ef- 
forts of all nations to meet hunger. 

The less developed nations have made 
rapid progress in agricultural production, 
but more needs to be done in relation to 
their needs. Since 1955 agricultural produc- 
tion in the LDC's has increased some 62 
percent. This is in fact a more rapid rate 
of growth than tiie developed countries, 
which increased production 51 percent. 



574 



Department of State Bulletin 



achieved during the same period. However, 
per capita agricultural output in the LDC's 
only increased 3 percent during the same 
period. Hence, food production in these 
countries is just holding its own against 
poi)u]ation growth. These countries remain, 
therefore, close to the edge of malnutrition 
and hunger — dependent increasingly on im- 
ports and on the world's stocks when an 
emergency arises. 

In the years ahead appropriately directed 
economic and technical assistance for agri- 
culture in the developing countries will be 
the difference between adequate food and 
nutrition or mass starvation in many areas. 
U.S. economic assistance is primarily di- 
rected to agricultural and family planning 
problems. 

Research To Increase Crop Yields 

With very little new land to develop, food 
production increases must come from higher 
yields of land already in farming. This re- 
quires new farming technologies, new farm- 
ing methods, new institutional capabilities, 
and usually new governmental policy ap- 
proaches. 

We all know of the new wheat, rice, and 
corn varieties that scientists have developed 
in the last several years. Led largely by 
American scientists and supported by work 
in our universities and Department of Agri- 
culture, an International Research Center in 
Mexico has made basic genetic improvements 
in the spring wheats of the type grown 
widely in the tropics. These varieties have 
been adapted to local conditions by addi- 
tional work done locally in several Asian 
countries, often with American scientific 
help and in research institutions we helped 
to build. The same thing has been done with 
rice through an International Research 
Center located in the Philippines. Other in- 
ternational centers are working on other 
crops and livestock. American universities 
are collaborating with these centers and are 
themselves taking the lead on similar efforts 
with sorghum, winter wheat, soybeans, and 



livestock, as well as basic research on soil 
and water management. The United States 
contributes to all phases of these research 
efforts through the foreign aid program. 

Of the 12 less developed Asian countries 
for which comparable data are available, 
the six which led the way in the shift to 
new varieties increased total rice production 
almost 40 percent in the last six years. The 
six which made the least such changes in- 
creased total rice production only about 11 
percent — nearly a 4 to 1 difference. 

For wheat the difference was even more 
dramatic. The top four countries in the rate 
of adoption of new wheat varieties more than 
doubled total wheat production in six years. 
This is an astounding accomplishment. The 
remaining 10 countries, which made only 
minor shifts toward the new technologies, in- 
creased their total production only some 12 
percent. In other words, countries which 
shifted heavily to new varieties and the nec- 
essary related technological improvements 
increased their total wheat production some 
nine times as much as did those which did 
not make these changes. 

Benefits of Collaborative Research 

Important total production increases have 
been limited essentially to those crops on 
which substantial scientific research and de- 
velopment have taken place on an organized 
worldwide basis and to those countries where 
the results of this research have been vigor- 
ously incorporated into public and private 
action. 

This progress is due in large part to the 
fact that we, other donor countries, and the 
developing countries have really begun to 
learn how to work together under close col- 
laborative research and development ar- 
rangements to tackle the central problems 
of food production, nutrition, and human 
reproduction. We have learned that unor- 
ganized bits and pieces of effort carried out 
in many places seldom carry us far. But the 
same effort, when put to work in a systematic 
mutually supporting way, gets results. The 



November 5, 1973 



575 



arrangements are supported by the self- 
interest of the participating countries, who 
are learning that this is the only way to solve 
their own problems. The United States fi- 
nances only a small fraction of the cost, 
but it provides the impetus and often the 
central scientific skill essential to the suc- 
cess of the entire enterprise. 

As with the other jjarticipants, we are di- 
rect beneficiaries of these organized research 
and development efforts. Often the feedback 
of this research to American agriculture far 
exceeds its cost. Plant and animal disease 
resistance factors discovered overseas are 
priceless to us when the disease breaks out 
here. High-protein cereals developed through 
these efforts can contribute importantly to 
the diets of our poorest people and should 
bring down the cost of animal feed rations 
— a great need at the present time, as we all 
know. 

Immediately before us is the task of broad- 
ening the base of agricultural production 
increases, both in the number of crops and 
of countries making rapid production in- 
creases. Fortunately, the background work 
for much of this is well underway. You may 
have read in last weekend's press of a plant- 
breeding "breakthrough" by Purdue Uni- 
versity in radically increasing, by at least 
300 percent, the human nutritional value of 
sorghum. We are at almost this same point 
of accomplishment in improving nutritional 
values of wheat, through a research project 
led by the University of Nebraska, collab- 
orating with the U.S. Department of Agri- 
culture, the International Research Center 
in Mexico, and some 35 or more LDC's. 

The Canadians are taking the lead, under 
similar collaborative arrangements, in work 
on the root crop "manioc" — often called 
cassava or a half-dozen other names — a crop 
grown largely, also, by very poor people on 
over-poor lands. 

All this means, to me, that we are on the 
right track and that there is much reason 
for optimism regarding the medium and 
long term, if we persevere in our economic 
assistance efforts. 

The availability of a scientific and techno- 



logical base for rapid agricultural production 
increases by no means assures that individual 
farmers, or countries, will have the insti- 
tutions and resources to translate these 
technical possibilities into production per- 
formance. 

New technological potentialities do not 
take root unless certain requisite institu- 
tional capabilities exist in the country, unless 
adequate numbers of skilled personnel are 
available to guide the process and a compe- 
tent citizenry exists to put it to work on 
the farms and throughout the distributional 
system, and unless the capital is available so 
the farmer can buy fertilizer and other es- 
sential production inputs. 

The congressional initiatives to focus the 
bilateral economic aid program more directly 
on the problems of foo dproduction, rural de- 
velopment, and population are an important 
step in the right direction, but the resources 
must be adequate to the task before us. We 
need the economic assistance tools if research 
is to continue and the needed production 
increases in the poor countries are to be 
realized. 

Additionally, the extraordinary disasters 
of the Sahel and Pakistan have put large 
demands on economic assistance resources 
which had not been foreseen. 

In closing I want to emphasize the im- 
portance of moving on all these fronts : 

— We need adequate concessional food sup- 
plies to meet the immediate needs of the 
developing world which press against basic 
subsistence levels ; 

— We need better mechanisms for inter- 
national cooperation to assure adequate 
world stocks and to harness the efforts of 
all nations to meet the problems of hunger 
and malnutrition ; and 

— We need to expand our research and 
development efl!"orts in agriculture and re- ! 
lated areas to accelerate production in- 
creases in the less developed countries. 

Only with a comprehensive approach to 
these problems can we stave off continuing 
hunger and malnutrition and recurring food 
crises in the world. 



576 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S.-Paraguay Extradition Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith the Treaty on Extradition be- 
tween the United States of America and the 
Republic of Paraguay, signed at Asuncion on 
May 24, 1973. I also transmit, for the infor- 
mation of the Senate, the report of the De- 
partment of State with respect to the Treaty. 
The Treaty significantly updates the extra- 
dition relations between the United States 
and Paraguay and adds to the list of extra- 
ditable offenses narcotics offenses, including 
those involving psychotropic drugs, and air- 
craft hijacking. 

This Treaty will make a significant contri- 
bution to the international eflfort to control 
narcotics trafiic. I recommend that the Senate 
give early and favorable consideration to 
the Treaty and give its advice and consent to 
ratification. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, September 12, 1973. 



Amending the International Economic Policy Act 
of 1972. Conference report to accompany S. 1636. 
H. Rept. 93-389. July 23, 1973. 4 pp. 

Prohibition of Intervention in Foreign Political Af- 
fairs. Report to accompany S. 2239. S. Rept. 
93 343. July 24, 1973. 3 pp. 

Amendment to Article 61 of the Charter of the 
United Nations. Report to accompany Ex. L, 93-1. 
S. Ex. Rept. 93-9. July 26, 1973. 4 pp. 

Providing for the Appointment of Alternates for the 
Governors of the International Monetary Fund 
and of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Report to accompany S. 1887. 
S. Rept. 93-350. July 26, 1973. 3 pp. 




1972 Report of Advisory Committee 
on the "Foreign Relations" Series 

The Advisory Committee on "Foreign Re- 
lations of the United States" is to meet 
November 9. Folloicing is the text of the 
report of the Advisory Committee on its 
meeting held at the Department on November 
3, 1972. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

Authorizing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1974, for 
Military Procurement, Research and Development, 
Active-Duty and Reserve Strength, Military Train- 
ing Student Loads, and for Other Purposes. Re- 
port, together with additional views, to accompany 
H.R. 9286. H. Rept. 93-383. July 18, 1973. 150 pp. 

Mutual Development and Cooperation Act of 1973. 
Report, together with minority and additional 
views, to accompany H.R. 9360. H. Rept. 93-388. 
July 20, 1973. 106 pp. 



' Transmitted on Sept. 12; for texts of the treaty 
and the report of the Department of State, see S. 
Ex. S, 93d Cong., 1st sess. 



In 1972, publication of volumes of Foreign Rela- 
tions of the United States reached an all-time high 
since founding of the series in 1861. A total of 
eleven volumes appeared, virtually completing the 
series through the year 1947. Moreover, plans for 
1973 call for continuance of this phenomenal rate. 
The scheduled publication of eleven more volumes 
in 1973 would bring the series through 1948 and 
into 1949. The Advisory Committee is most gratified 
at this development, for in its last several reports 
the Committee had called attention to the increasing 
slippage, the widening time gap, between the occur- 
rence of diplomatic events and the appearance of 
the corresponding volume of Foreign Relations. In- 
deed, the gap had cracked the 25-year mark. The 
Committee realizes that the reversal of this trend 
required broad concurrence in assigning a higher 
priority and increased funds to the Foreign Rela- 
tions series. The Committee wishes therefore to 
express commendation to all concerned, officials 
within the Department of State, the President's 
Office, and the Congress, for their recognition of 
the need for greater support of "Foreign Relations" 



November 5, 1973 



577 



and to the Historical Office of the Department of 
State for demonstrating in convincing -manner that 
increased support was amply justified. 

II 

On March 8, 1972, the President in a memorandum 
to the Secretary of State called for acceleration of 
publication of Foreign Relations so as to reduce the 
time-span lag to 20 years within a 3-year period.' 
Or, phrased somewhat differently, to publish '56 in 
'76. From the materials presented by the Historical 
Office to the Committee it emerged that the Histori- 
cal Office might be able to complete the compila- 
tion of '56 by '76 but that the present schedule does 
not provide for the publication of the volumes for 
1956 by 1976. The Committee would be less than can- 
did if it suppressed its feeling of dismay at this de- 
velopment. To play catch-up in anything is difficult, 
so the Committee understands. But once momentum 
in that direction is gained, it would be most unwise, 
the Committee believes, to allow it to dissipate. The 
Committee therefore urges that the publication 
schedule for "Foreign Relations" be reviewed so as 
to achieve the goal of '56 in '76, and that every 
effort within the Historical Office and full assistance 
from without be dedicated to this end. Return to 
the 20-year rule for Foreign Relations would be a 
fitting accomplishment to record in the Bicentennial 
Year of this Nation. 

Ill 

Essential to timely publication of Foreign Rela- 
tions is a speedy and effective documentary de- 
classification process. Declassification has always 
presented many problems, but these have become 
vastly complicated since World War II. The process 
has taken on multilateral dimensions, involving not 
only the Department of State, but also the Depart- 
ment of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, 
and the National Security Council among others. The 
President in his memorandum of March 8, 1972 
recognized the complex and multilateral nature of 
declassification when he instructed the above- 
mentioned agencies to cooperate fully with the 
Secretary of State in collecting and declassifying 
materials. As Foreign Relations moves into the 
1950s, it is unlikely that the cooperative process will 
resolve all problems of declassification. It is also 
imperative that acceleration of the publication of 
Foreign Relations continue, "without impairing," as 
the President has stated, "the quality and compre- 
hensive nature of the series." The Committee there- 
fore suggests that on occasions when cooperation 
fails to resolve matters of declassification, the 
Secretary of State be empowered to frame specific 
recommendations and that his recommendations be 
given substantial weight in the resolution of the 



' For text of the memorandum, see Bulletin of 
Apr. 3, 1972, p. 519. 



■matter. Many signs point to significant changes of 
direction in the course of this Nation's foreign 
affairs from that set by events of the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. A new generation of Americans 
will be called upon to live with these new directions, 
to understand and to guide them. For these tasks, 
the record of the immediate post-World War II 
decade is essential. 

IV 
In its past several reports, the Committee has 
voiced concern over discontinuance of the series 
American Foreign Policy: Current Docianents. And 
in its report for 1971, the Committee endorsed a 
suggestion emanating from the President's Office 
that "crisis volumes" might be prepared and issued 
well before those "crisis" events would be covered 
in Foreign Relations in the normal course. The 
Committee expresses its disappointment that little 
progress along either line is evident. Obstacles ap- 
pear to be of different orders, however. In the case 
of Current Documents, lack of funding seems the 
main problem. In this respect, the Committee 
observes that the additional funding required is 
most modest indeed, given the current scale of 
public spending generally. In the case of "crisis 
volumes," it appears that compilation within the 
Historical Office of a pilot volume proved possible, 
but clearance did not. Obviously, declassification (a 
matter spoken to in Section III of this report) was 
involved, as was also general governmental docu- 
mentary and informational policy (matters to be 
spoken to in Sections V and VI below). The Com- 
mittee repeats its recommendation that the pro- 
gram to publish "crisis volumes" be effectively 
carried out. 



On March 8, 1972, the President signed an Execu- 
tive Order relating to declassification of and access 
to government documents. The Committee took note 
of the possibility that the limitations of this Execu- 
tive Order might not be widely understood, and 
expectations might be raised, especially within the 
scholarly community, that could not be fulfilled. The 
Committee therefore suggests that wide publicity 
be given to the limitations and other features (such 
as the 30-year rule) of the Executive Order. 

VI 

During and since World War II, the amount of 
documentation produced in the course of conduct 
of this Nation's foreign relations has increased by 
astronomical leaps. This vast body of recent diplo- 
matic documents together with archives from the 
Nation's beginnings constitutes a true national 
heritage. It behooves all concerned to treat this 
archival resource as a national trust, insuring to the 
citizenry for their enlightenment adequate preserva- 
tion of and ready access to this national treasure. 
As to ready access, we are past the threshold of 
electronic developments whereby a document prop- 



578 



Department of State Bulletin 



erly housed in Washington could be made instantly 
available to the researcher or concerned citizen in 
virtually any part of these United States. The Com- 
mittee therefore recommends that immediate con- 
sideration he focused on the development of plans 
onrf systems whereby diplomatic documents Tnay 
become available through electronic vieans in all 
regions of the country. The costs of a national 
electronic retrieval system would undoubtedly be 
high. But the Committee is convinced that they 
would pale in the light of the benefits to be obtained. 
Perhaps the greatest catastrophe of our civilization, 
so it is sometimes said, was the burning of the 
library at Alexandria. The burial of this Nation's 
documentary archives could produce a creeping 
catastrophe of much the same scale. Let us not 
repeat the intellectual vandalism of an earlier 
millennium by substituting the tomb for the torch. 



David R. Deener, 

Chairman 
Alwyn V. Freeman 

Walter LaFeber 
Armin H. Rappaport 
Paul A. Varg 

Richard C. Snyder 

H. Bradford Westerfield 



American Society of 
International Law 

American Historical 
Association 

American Political 
Science Association 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Jamaica Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Dei)artment of State announced on 
September 27 (press release 350) that the 
arrangement between the United States and 
Jamaica concerning exports of Jamaican cot- 
ton textiles to the United States had been 
extended September 26 for one year from 
October 1, 1973, by exchange of notes at 
Washington. The level specified in the ex- 
change of notes to which Jamaica will restrain 
its cotton textile exports to the United States 
during this period is 30,134,550 square yards 
equivalent. This represents a 5 percent in- 
crease over the level specified for the pre- 
vious arrangement year. (For texts of the 
U.S. and Jamaican notes, see press release 
350.) 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency of October 
26, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668. 

Acceptance deposited: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, October 18, 1973. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 
7192. 
Accession deposited: Lebanon, August 10, 1973. 

Coffee 

Agreement amending and extending the interna- 
tional coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Ap- 
proved by the International Coffee Council at 
London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 
1, 1973. 

Acceptances deposited: Ecuador, Uganda, Septem- 
ber 13, 1973; Sweden, September 17, 1973; 
Guatemala, September 20, 1973; Brazil, Sep- 
tember 21, 1973; Rwanda, September 22, 1973; 
Indonesia, Nicaragua, September 25, 1973; 
Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, September 26, 
1973; Bolivia, El Salvador, Madagascar, Peru, 
Portugal, September 27, 1973; Australia, 
Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Do- 
minican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, 
Federal Republic of Geraiany, Ghana, India, 
Japan, Mexico, Norway, Netherlands, Spain, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, United Kingdom, 
Venezuela, September 28, 1973; Zaire, Septem- 
ber 29, 197:!; Burundi, Congo, Dahomey, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Liberia, New Zealand, 
Panama, Paraguay, Sierra Leone, September 
30, 1973. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 
1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Guyana, September 13, 1973. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 
6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Thailand, September 20, 
1973. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol bringing under international control drugs 
outside the scope of the convention of July 13, 
1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating 
the distribution of narcotic drugs (48 Stat. 1543), 



November 5, 1973 



579 



as amended by the protocol signed at Lake Success 
on December 11, 1946 (TIAS 1671, 1859). Done 
at Paris November 19, 1948. Entered into force 
December 1, 1949; for the United States Septem- 
ber 11, 1950. TIAS 2308. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Tonga, 
September 5, 1973. 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 
24, 1967. TIAS 6298. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Tonga, 
September 5, 1973. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Accession deposited: Tonga, September 5, 1973. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Entered into force April 18, 1973.= 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, September 11, 
1973. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done 
at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into 
force October 4, 1967; for the United States 
November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Gabon, August 28, 1973. 



25 and 26, 1973. Entered into force September 26, 
1973. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 6, 1970, 
as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
October 12, 1973. Entered into force October 12, 
1973. 

Agreement amending the agreement of May 6, 1970, 
as amended, relating to trade in cotton textiles 
to exempt hand-loom products of the cottage 
industry. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington October 12, 1973. Entered into force 
October 12, 1973. 

Poland 

Agreement relating to port access procedures. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Warsaw September 
27, 1973. Entered into force September 27, 1973. 



DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE 



Confirmations 



BILATERAL 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of June 29, 
1971, concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Washington September 



' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 



The Senate on October 12 confirmed the following 

nominations: 

Henry A. Byroade to be Ambassador to Pakistan. 

Daniel Parker to be Administrator of the Agency 
for International Development. 

Stanley R. Resor, U.S. Representative for Mutual 
and Balanced Force Reductions Negotiations, for 
the rank of Ambassador. 



580 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 5, 1973 Vol. LXIX, No. 1793 



Advisory Committees. 1972 Report of Advisory 
Committee on the "Foreign Relations" Series 577 

Agriculture. A Comprehensive Approach to 
Workiwide Problems of Food Shortages and 
.Malnutrition (Williams) 573 

American Principles. Secretary Kissinger To 
Receive 197-i Nobel Pface Prize (Nixon, 
Kissinger) rifU) 

i hina. Commercial Relations With State-Con- 
trolled Economies (Casey) 567 

( oiigress 

\ Comprehensive Approach to Worldwide 
Problems of Food Shortages and Malnutri- 

'ion (Williams) 573 

nfirmations (Byroade, Parker, Resor) . . . 580 
ngressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 577 

S. -Paraguay Extradition Treaty Transmit- 
ted to the Senate (Nixon) 577 

Department and Foreign Service 

nfirmations (Byroade, Parker, Resor) . . . 580 
partment Establishes Office for Law of the 

.Sea Negotiations 571 

The Department's Strengthened Export Ex- 
pansion Services (Rush) 557 

72 Report of Advisory Committee on the 
Foreign Relations" Series 577 

Economic Affairs 

'^immercial Relations With State-Controlled 
[economies (Casey) 567 

. I.e Department's Strengthened Export Ex- 
pansion Services (Rush) 557 

President Establishes Committees on Export 
Expansion 556 

President Nixon Addresses Conference on Ex- 
port Expansion (Nixon) 553 

loreign Aid 

Comprehensive Approach to Worldwide 
I'roblems of Food Shortages and Malnutri- 
tion (Williams) 573 

Military Sales Credit Authorized for Peru 
(Presidential determination) 572 

Parker confirmed as Administrator, Agency for 
International Development 580 

Ivory Coast. President Houphouet-Boigny of 
the Republic of Ivory Coast Visits the 
United States (Houphouet-Boigny, Nixon) . 561 

Jamaica. United States and Jamaica Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 579 

Law of the Sea. Department Establishes Office 
for Law of the Sea Negotiations 571 

Pakistan. Byroade confirmed as Ambassador . 580 

Paraguay. U.S. -Paraguay Extradition Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate (Nixon) . . . . 6'i T 

Passports. U.S. Passports Remain Invalid for 
Travel to Certain Areas (texts of public 
notices) 571 

Peru. .Military Sales Credit Authorized for 
Peru (Presidential determination) .... 572 

Presidential Documents 

.Military Sales Credit Authorized for Peru 
(Presidential determination) 572 



President Houphouet-Boigny of the Republic 
of Ivory Coast Visits the United States . . 561 

President Nixon Addresses Conference on Ex- 
port Expansion 553 

Secretary Kissinger To Receive 1973 Nobel 
Peace Prize 560 

U.S.-Paraguay Extradition Treaty Transmitted 
to the Senate 577 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 579 

United States and Jamaica Sign Cotton Tex- 
tile .Agreement 579 

U.S.-Paraguay Extradition Treaty Transmitted 
to the Senate (Nixon) 577 

U.S.S.R. Commercial Relations With State- 
Controlled Economies (Casey) 567 

Yugoslavia. Commercial Relations With State- 
Controlled Economies (Casey) 567 

Name Index 

Bvroade, Henry A 580 

Casey, William J 567 

Houphouet-Boigny, Felix 561 

Kissinger, Secretary 560 

Nixon, President .... 553, 560, ooi, .ml, 577 

Parker, Daniel 580 

Resor, Stanley R 580 

Rush, Kenneth 557 

Williams, Maurice J 573 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 15 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
334 of September 18, 350 of September 27, and 
370 of October 11. 

No. Date Subject 

*382 10/15 Study group 1 of U.S. National 
Committee for CCITT, Nov. 1. 

*383 10/16 Overseas Schools Advisory Coun- 
cil, Oct. 24. 
384 10/16 Kissinger: remarks upon selec- 
tion for Nobel Peace Prize. 

'385 10/17 U.S. track and field teams to 
tour Turkey. 

t386 10/18 Kissinger: remarks upon receipt 
of George C. Marshall medal, 
Oct. 17. 

'387 10/18 U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural .\ffairs, Nov. 2. 
388 10/18 U.S. National Committee for 
CCIR, Nov. 20. 

'389 10/19 Advisory Panel on International 
Law, Oct. 26. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 






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of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



CrCn.' 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1794 



November 12, 1973 



PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 26 
Excerpts From Transcript 581 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 25 585 

U.N. CALLS FOR MIDDLE EAST CEASE-FIRE AND NEGOTIATIONS 
AND ESTABLISHES EMERGENCY FORCE 

Statements by Ambassador Scali and Texts of Resolutions 
and Report of the U.N. Secretai~y General 598 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside hark cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETI 



Vol. LXIX, No. 1794 
November 12, 1973 



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Note: Contents of this publication arc not 
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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETI, 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public am 
interested agencies of tfie governmen 
witfi information on developments ti 
tite field of U.S. foreign relations ant 
on tfie work of tlie Department am 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tlie BULLETIN includes selectei 
press releases on foreign policy, issuei 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresset 
and news conferences of the Presiden 
and the Secretary of State and othei 
officers of the Department, as well ai 
special articles on various phases o 
international affairs and the functiom 
of the Department. Information is in 
eluded concerning treaties and inter- 
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United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, am 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also listei 



President Nixon's News Conference of October 26 



Folloiving are excei-pts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Nixon in the East 
Room at the White Hoxtse on October 26.^ 

Ladies and gentlemen : Before going to 
your questions, I have a statement with re- 
gard to the Mideast which I think will an- 
ticipate some of the questions because this 
will update the information which is break- 
ing rather fast in that area, as you know, 
for the past two days. 

The cease-fire is holding. There have been 
some violations, but generally speaking, it 
can be said that it is holding at this time. 
As you know, as a result of the U.N. resolu- 
tion which was agreed to yesterday by a vote 
of 14 to 0, a peacekeeping force will go to 
the Mideast; and this force, however, will 
not include any forces from the major pow- 
ers, including, of course, the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

The question, however, has arisen as to 
whether observers from major powers could 
go to the Mideast. My up-to-the-minute re- 
port on that — and I just talked to Dr. Kis- 
singer five minutes before coming down — is 
this: We will send observers to the Mideast 
if requested by the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, and we have reason to ex- 
pect that we will receive such a request. 

With regard to the peacekeeping force, I 
think it is important for all of you ladies 
and gentlemen, and particularly for those 
listening on radio and television, to know 
why the United States has insisted that 
major powers not be part of the peacekeep- 
ing force and that major powers not intro- 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 29. 



duce military forces into the Mideast. A very 
significant and potentially explosive crisis 
developed on Wednesday of this week. We 
obtained information which led us to believe 
that the Soviet Union was planning to send 
a very substantial force into the Mideast, a 
military force. 

When I received that information, I or- 
dered, shortly after midnight on Thursday 
morning, an alert for all American forces 
around the world. This was a precautionary 
alert. The purpose of that was to indicate to 
the Soviet Union that we could not accept 
any unilateral move on their part to move 
military forces into the Mideast. 

At the same time, in the early morning 
hours, I also proceeded on the diplomatic 
front. In a message to Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid 
L Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party] , an urgent message, I in- 
dicated to him our reasoning and I urged 
that we not proceed along that course and 
that, instead, that we join in the United Na- 
tions in supporting a resolution which would 
exclude any major powers from participat- 
ing in a peacekeeping force. 

As a result of that communication and 
the return that I received from Mr. Brezh- 
nev — we had several exchanges, I should 
say — we reached the conclusion that we 
would jointly support the resolution which 
was adopted in the United Nations. 

We now come, of course, to the critical 
time in terms of the future of the Mideast. 
And here the outlook is far more hopeful 
than what we have been through this past 
week. I think I could safely say that the 
chances for not just a cease-fire, which we 
presently have and which, of course, we 
have had in the Mideast for some time, but 



November 12, 1973 



581 



the outlook for a permanent peace is the 
best that it has been in 20 years. 

The reason for this is that the two major 
powers, the Soviet Union and the United 
States, have agreed — this was one of the 
results of Dr. Kissinger's trip to Moscow — 
have agreed that we would participate in 
trying to expedite the talks between the 
parties involved. That does not mean that 
the two major powers will impose a settle- 
ment. It does mean, however, that we will 
use our influence with the nations in the 
area to expedite a settlement. 

The reason we feel this is important is 
that first, from the standpoint of the nations 
in the Mideast, none of them — Israel, Egypt, 
Syria — none of them can or should go 
through the agony of another war. 

The losses in this war on both sides have 
been very, very high. And the tragedy must 
not occur again. There have been four of 
these wars, as you ladies and gentlemen 
know, over the past 20 years. But beyond 
that, it is vitally important to the peace of 
the world that this potential trouble spot, 
which is really one of the most potentially 
explosive areas in the world, that it not be- 
come an area in which the major powers 
come together in confrontation. 

What the developments of this week should 
indicate to all of us is that the United States 
and the Soviet Union, who admittedly have 
very different objectives in the Mideast, have 
now agreed that it is not in their interest to 
have a confrontation there, a confrontation 
which might lead to a nuclear confronta- 
tion — and neither of the two major powers 
wants that. 

We have agreed also that if we are to 
avoid that, it is necessary for us to use our 
influence more than we have in the past to 
get the negotiating track moving again, but 
this time moving to a conclusion, not simply 
a temporary truce but a permanent peace. 

I do not mean to suggest that it is going 
to come quickly, because the parties involved 
are still rather far apart. But I do say that 
now there are greater incentives within the 
area to find a peaceful solution and there are 



enormous incentives as far as the United 
States is concerned, and the Soviet Union 
and other major powers, to find such a 
solution. 

Q. Mr. President, I wonder if you could 
share toith iis your thoughts, tell xis what 
goes through your mind trhen you hear 
people, people ivho love this country, and 
people who believe in you, say reluctantly 
that perhaps you should resign or be im- 
peached. 

The President: Well, I am glad we don't 
take the vote of this room, let me say. And 
I understand the feelings of people with re- 
gard to impeachment and resignation. As a 
matter of fact, Mr. Rather [Dan Rather, 
CBS News], you may remember that when I 
made the rather difficult decision — I thought 
the most difficult decision of my first term — 
on December 18, [1972], the bombing by 
B-52's of North Viet-Nam, that exactly the 
same words were used on the networks — I 
don't mean by you, but they were quoted on 
the networks — that were used now: tyrant, 
dictator, he has lost his senses, he should, 
resign, he should be impeached. 

But I stuck it out, and as a result of that 
we not only got our prisoners of war home, 
as I have often said, on their feet rather 
than on their knees, but we brought peace to 
Viet-Nam, something we haven't had and 
didn't for over 12 years. 

It was a hard decision, and it was one 
that many of my friends in the press who 
had consistently supported me on the war up 
to that time disagreed with. 

Now, in this instance I realize there are 
people who feel that the actions that I have 
taken with regard to the dismissal of Mr. 
[Archibald] Cox are grounds for impeach- 
ment. I would respectfully suggest that even 
Mr. Cox and Mr. [Elliot L.] Richardson have 
agreed that the President had the right, con- 
stitutional right, to dismiss anybody in the 
Federal Government; and second, I should 
also point out that as far as the tapes are 
concerned, rather than being in defiance of 



582 



Department of State Bulletin 



the law I am in compliance with the law. 

As far as what goes throuofh my mind, I 
would simply say that I intend to continue to 
carry out to the best of my ability the re- 
sponsibilities I was elected to carry out last 
November. 

The events of this past week — I know, for 
example, in your head office in New York, 
some thought that it was simply a blown-up 
exercise, there wasn't a real crisis. I wish 
it had been that. It was a real crisis. It was 
the most difficult crisis we have had since the 
Cuban confrontation of 1962. 

But because we had had our initiative with 
the Soviet Union, because I had a basis of 
communication with Mr. Brezhnev, we not 
only avoided a confrontation, but we moved 
a great stej) forward toward real peace in 
the Mideast. 

Now, as long as I can carry out that kind 
of responsibility, I am going to continue to 
do this job. 

Q. Mr. President, getting back to the Mid- 
dle East cnsis for a moment, do yon consider 
that the crisis is over now, and how much 
longer 7vill the American forces be kept on 
alert arotind the ivorld? 

The President: With regard to the alert, 
the alert has already been discontinued with 
regard to NORAD, that is, the North Amer- 
ican Command, and with regard to SAC. As 
far as other forces are concerned, they are 
being maintained in a state of readiness, and 
obviously, Soviet Union forces are being 
maintained in a state of readiness. 

Now, as far as the crisis in the Mideast 
is concerned, I don't want to leave any im- 
pression that we aren't going to continue to 
have problems with regard to the cease-fire. 
There will be outbreaks because of the prox- 
imity of the antagonistic forces, and there 
will be some very, very tough negotiating in 
attempting to reach a diplomatic settlement. 
But I think now that all parties are going 
to approach this problem of trying to reach 
a settlement with a more sober and a more 
determined attitude than ever before, be- 



cause the Mideast can't afford — Israel can't 
afford, Egypt can't afford, Syria can't af- 
ford — another war. The world cannot afford 
a war in that part of the world. And because 
the Soviet I^nion and the United States have 
potentially conflicting interests there, we 
both now realize that we cannot allow our 
differences in the Mideast to jeopardize even 
greater interests that we have, for example, 
in continuing a detente in Europe, in con- 
tinuing the negotiations which can lead to 
a limitation of nuclear arms and eventually 
reducing the burden of nuclear arms, and 
in continuing in other ways that can contrib- 
ute to the peace of the world. 

As a matter of fact, I would suggest that 
with all of the criticism of detente, that with- 
out detente, we might have had a major con- 
flict in the Middle East. With detente, we 
avoided it. 

Q. Mr. President, a question from the 
electronic media, related to the Middle East — 

The President: Radio. 

Q. Radio. I have heard that there was a 
meeting dt the State Department this after- 
noon of major oil comjxiny executives on the 
fuel shortage. Whether or not you confirm 
that, has this confrontation in the Middle 
East caused a still more severe oil problem, 
and is there any thinking yiou' of gasoline 
rationing ? 

The President: Well, we have contingency 
plans for gasoline rationing and so foi'th, 
which I hope never have to be put into place. 

But with regard to the oil shortage, which 
you referred to, one of the major factors 
which gave enormous urgency to our efforts 
to settle this particular crisis was the poten- 
tial of an oil cutoff. 

Let me say that I have also noted that in 
the State Department or from the State De- 
partment today a statement raised a little 
difficulty in Europe, to the effect that our 
European friends hadn't been as cooperative 
as they might have been in attempting to 
help us work out the Middle East settlement 



November 12, 1973 



583 



or at least the settlement to the extent that 
we have worked it out as of the resolution of 
yesterday. 

I can only say on that score that Europe, 
which gets 80 percent of its oil from the 
Mideast, would have frozen to death this 
winter unless there had been a settlement 
and Japan, of course, is in that same posi- 
tion. The United States, of course, gets only 
approximately 10 percent of its oil from the 
Mideast. 

What I am simply suggesting is this: that 
with regard to the fuel shortage potentially 
in the United States and in the world, it is 
indispensable at this time that we avoid any 
further Mideast crisis so that the flow of oil 
to Europe, to Japan, and to the United States 
can continue. 

Q. Mr. President, against this background 
of detente, Mr. Brezhnev's note to you has 
been described as rough or perhaps brutal 
by one Senator. Can you characterize it for 
us and for history in any ivay? 

The President: Yes, I could characterize it, 
but, Mr. Theis [J. William Theis, Hearst 
Newspapers], it wouldn't be in the national 
interest to do so. My notes to him he might 
characterize as being rather rough. How- 
ever, I would rather — perhaps it would be 
best to characterize it. Rather than saying, 
Mr. Theis, that his note to me was rough 
and brutal, I would say that it was very firm 
and it left very little to the imagination as 
to what he intended. 

And my response was also very firm and 
left little to the imagination of how we would 
react. And it is because he and I know each 
other and it is because we have had this 
personal contact that notes exchanged in that 



way result in a settlement rather than a 
confrontation. 

Q. Mr. Prrsidetit, I iroiild like to ask you 
a question about the Mideast. To what ex- 
tent do you think your Watergate troubles 
influenced Soviet thinking about your ability 
to respond in the Mideast, and did your 
Watergate problems convince you that the 
United States needed a strong response in 
the Mideast to convince other nations that 
you have not been weakened? 

The President: Well, I have noted specula- 
tion to the effect that the Watergate prob- 
lems may have led the Soviet Union to mis- 
calculate. I tend to disagree with that, how- 
ever. I think Mr. Brezhnev probably can't 
quite understand how the President of the 
United States wouldn't be able to handle the 
Watergate problems. He would be able to 
handle it all right, if he had them. [Laugh- 
ter.] 

But I think what happens is that what 
Mr. Brezhnev does understand is the power 
of the United States. What he does know is 
the President of the United States. What he 
also knows is that the President of the 
United States, when he was under unmerci- 
ful assault at the time of Cambodia, at the 
time of May 8, [1972], when I ordered the 
bombing and the mining of North Viet-Nam, 
at the time of December 18, still went ahead 
and did what he thought was right; the fact 
that Mr. Brezhnev knew that regardless of 
the pressures at home, regardless of what 
people see and hear on television night after 
night, he would do what was right. That is 
what made Mr. Brezhnev act as he did. 



584 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of October 25 



Press release 390 dated October 25 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, I thought the most useful introduction 
to your questions would be a summary of 
events between October 6 and today so that 
you can evaluate our actions, the situation 
in which we find ourselves, and our future 
course. 

The crisis for us started at 6 a.m. on Octo- 
ber 6, when I was awakened with the infor- 
mation that another Arab-Israeli war was 
in progress. I mention this personal detail 
because it answers the question that the 
United States intervention prevented Israel 
from taking preemptive action. The United 
States made no demarche to either side before 
October 6, because all the intelligence at our 
disposal and all the intelligence given to us 
by foreign countries suggested that there 
was no possibility of the outbreak of a war. 
We had no reason to give any advice to any 
of the participants, because we did not be- 
lieve — nor, may I say, did the Israeli Govern- 
ment — that an attack was imminent. 

In the three hours between 6 a.m. and 9 
a.m., we made major efforts to prevent the 
outbreak of the war by acting as an inter- 
mediary between the parties, of assuring each 
of them that the other one was — attempting 
to obtain the assurance of each side that the 
other one had no aggressive intention. 

Before this process could be completed, 
however, war had broken out. And it started 
the process in which we are still engaged. 

I do not think any useful purpose is served 
in reviewing every individual diplomatic 
move, but I thought it would be useful to 
indicate some of the basic principles we at- 
tempted to follow. 

Throughout the crisis the President was 
convinced that we had two major problems : 



first, to end hostilities as quickly as possible — 
but, secondly, to end hostilities in a manner 
that would enable us to make a major con- 
tribution to removing the conditions that 
have produced four wars between Arabs and 
Israelis in the last 25 years. 

We were aware that there were many in- 
terested parties. There were, of course, the 
participants in the conflict — Egypt and Syria 
on the Arab side, aided by many other Arab 
countries ; Israel on the other. There was the 
Soviet Union. There were the other perma- 
nent members of the Security Council. And, 
of course, there was the United States. 

It was our view that the United States 
could be most efi'ective in both the tasks out- 
lined by the President — that is, of ending 
hostilities, as well as of making a contribu- 
tion to a permanent peace in the Middle 
East — if we conducted ourselves so that we 
could remain in permanent contact with all 
of these elements in the equation. 

Throughout the first week, we attempted 
to crystallize a consensus in the Security 
Council which would bring about a cease-fire 
on terms that the world community could 
support. We stated our basic principles on 
October 8. We did not submit them to a 
formal vote, because we realized that no 
majority was available and we did not want 
sides to be chosen prematui-ely. On October 
10 the Soviet Union began an airlift, which 
began fairly moderately but which by Octo- 
ber 12 had achieved fairly substantial levels. 

Let me say a word here about our relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union throughout this 
crisis and what we have attempted to achieve. 
The United States and the Soviet Union are, 
of course, ideological and, to some extent, 
political adversaries. But the United States 
and the Soviet Union also have a very special 



November 12, 1973 



585 



responsibility. We possess— each of us— nu- 
clear arsenals capable of annihilating human- 
ity. We — both of us— have a special duty to 
see to it that confrontations are kept within 
bounds that do not threaten civilized life. 
Both of us, sooner or later, will have to come 
to realize that the issues that divide the 
world today, and foreseeable issues, do not 
justify the unparalleled catastrophe that a 
nuclear war would represent. And therefore, 
in all our dealings with the Soviet Union, we 
have attempted to keep in mind and we 
have attempted to move them to a position 
in which this overriding interest that hu- 
manity shares with us is never lo.st sight of. 
In a speech — Pacem in Terris — I pointed 
out that there are limits beyond which we 
cannot go. I stated that we will oppose the 
attempt by any country to achieve a position 
of predominance, either globally or region- 
ally; that we would resist any attempt to 
exploit a policy of detente to weaken our 
alliances ; and that we would react if the re- 
laxations of tensions were used as a cover to 
exacerbate conflicts in international trouble 
spots. We have followed these principles in 
the current situation. 

It is easy to start confrontations, but in 
this age we have to know where we will be 
at the end and not only what pose to strike 
at the beginning. 

Throughout the first week we attempted 
to bring about a moderation in the level of 
outside supplies that were introduced into 
the area and we attempted to work with the 
Soviet Union on a cease-fire resolution which 
would bring an end to the conflict. 

This first attempt failed, on Saturday, Oc- 
tober 13, for a variety of reasons— including, 
perhaps, a misassessment of the military sit- 
uation by some of the participants. We were 
then faced with the inability to produce a 
Security Council resolution that would com- 
mand a consensus, and the substantial intro- 
duction of arms by an outside power into the 
area. At this point, on Saturday, October 13, 
the President decided that the United States 
would have to start a resupply effort of its 
own. And the United States, from that time 
on, has engaged in maintaining the military 



balance in the Middle East in order to bring 
about a negotiated settlement that we had 
sought. 

Concurrently with this, we informed the 
Soviet Union that our interest in working out 
an acceptable solution still remained very 
strong and that as part of this solution we 
were prepared to discuss a mutual limitation 
of arms supply into the area. 

In the days that followed, the Soviet Union 
and we discussed various approaches to this 
question, the basic difficulty being how to 
reconcile the Arab insistence on an imme- 
diate commitment to a return to the 1967 
borders with Israeli insistence on secure 
boundaries and a negotiated outcome. 

As you all know, on October 16, Prime 
Minister Kosygin went to Cairo to work on 
this problem with the leaders of Egypt. He 
returned to the Soviet Union on October 19. 
We began exploring a new formula for 
ending the war that evening, though it was 
still unacceptable to us. And while we were 
still considering that formula. General Secre- 
tary Bvezhnev sent an urgent request to 
President Nixon that I be sent to Moscow to 
conduct the negotiations in order to speed an 
end to hostilities that might be difl^cult to 
contain were they to continue. 

The President agreed to Mr. Brezhnev's 
request, and as all of you know, I left for 
Moscow in the early morning of October 20. 
We spent two days of very intense negotia- 
tions, and we developed a formula which we 
believe was acceptable to all of the parties 
and which we continue to believe represented 
a just solution to this tragic conflict. 

The Security Council resolution had, as 
you all know, three parts. It called for an 
immediate cease-fire-in-place. It called for 
the immediate implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 242, which was adopted in 
November 1967 and which states certain gen- 
eral principles on the basis of which peace 
should be achieved in the Middle East. And, 
thirdly, it called for negotiations between the 
parties concerned under appropriate auspices 
to bring about a just and durable peace in 
the Middle East. 

This third point was the first international 



586 



Department of State Bulletin 



commitment to negotiations between the 
parties in the Middle East conflict. The 
United States and the Soviet Union were 
prepared to offer their auspices, if this proved 
to be acceptable to the parties, to bring- 
about and then to speed the process of nego- 
tiations. The United States continues to be 
ready to carry out this understanding. This, 
then, was the situation when I returned 
from Moscow and Tel Aviv on Monday 
evening. 

Since then, events have taken the follow- 
ing turn. On the first day — that is, Tuesday 
—of the implementation of the cease-fire, 
there was a breakdown of the cease-fire which 
led to certain Israeli territorial gains. The 
United States supported a resolution which 
called on the participants to observe the 
cease-fire, to return to the places from which 
the fighting started, and to invite United 
Nations observers to observe the implementa- 
tion of the cease-fire. This seemed to us a 
fair resolution. 

In the last two days, the discussion in the 
Security Council and the communications 
that have been associated with it have taken 
a turn that seemed to us worrisome. We were 
increasingly confronted with a cascade of 
charges which were diflScult to verify in the 
absence of United Nations observers and a 
demand for action that it was not within 
our power to take. There was a proposal, for 
example, that joint U.S. and Soviet military 
forces be introduced into the Middle East to 
bring about an observance of the cease-fire. 

I would like to state on behalf of the Presi- 
dent the United States position on this mat- 
ter very clearly. The United States does not 
favor and will not approve the sending of a 
joint Soviet-United States force into the 
Middle East. The United States believes that 
what is needed in the Middle East above all 
is a determination of the facts, a determina- 
tion where the lines are, and a determina- 
tion of who is doing the shooting, so that 
the Security Council can take appropriate 
action. It is inconceivable that the forces of 
the great powers should be introduced in 
the numbers that would be necessary to 
overpower both of the participants. It is in- 



conceivable that we should transplant the 
great-power rivalry into the Middle East or, 
alternatively, that we should impose a mili- 
tary condominium by the United States and 
the Soviet Union. The United States is even 
more opposed to the unilateral introduction 
by any great power, especially by any nu- 
clear power, of military forces into the Mid- 
dle East in whatever guise those forces 
should be introduced. And it is the ambiguity 
of some of the actions and communications 
and certain readiness measures that were 
observed that caused the President at a 
special meeting of the National Security 
Council last night, at 3 a.m., to order cer- 
tain precautionary measures to be taken by 
the United States. 

The United States position with respect to 
peace in the Middle East is as follows : The 
United States stands for a strict observance 
of the cease-fire as defined in the United Na- 
tions Security Council Resolution 338, adop- 
ted on October 22. The United States will 
support and give all assistance and is willing 
to supply some personnel to a United Na- 
tions observer force whose responsibility it 
is to report to the Security Council about 
the violations of the cease-fire and which 
would have the responsibility, in addition, 
of aiding the parties in taking care of human- 
itarian and other concerns that are produced 
by the fact that on the Egyptian-Israeli front 
a series of enclaves exist in which demarca- 
tion is extremely difficult. 

If the Security Council wishes, the United 
States is prepared to agree to an interna- 
tional force, provided it does not include any 
participants from the permanent members 
of the Security Council, to be introduced into 
the area as an additional guarantee of the 
cease-fire. 

The United States is prepared to make a 
major eflfort to help speed a political solution 
which is just to all sides. 

The United States recognizes that the con- 
ditions that produced the war on October 6 
cannot be permitted to continue, and the 
United States, both bilaterally and unilater- 
ally, is prepared to lend its diplomatic weight 
to a serious effort in the negotiating process 



November 12, 1973 



587 



foreseen by paragraph 3 of Security Council 
Resolution 338. 

We are therefore at a rather crucial point. 

From many points of view, the chances 
for peace in the Middle East are quite 
promising. 

Israel has experienced once more the 
trauma of war and has been given an op- 
portunity for the negotiations it has sought 
for all of its existence, and it must be ready 
for the just and durable peace that the 
Security Council asks for. 

The Arab nations have demonstrated their 
concern and have received international as- 
surances that other countries will take an 
interest in these negotiations. 

The Soviet Union is not threatened in any 
of its legitimate positions in the Middle East. 
The principles I mentioned earlier of the 
special responsibility of the great nuclear 
powers to strike a balance between their local 
interests and their global interest and their 
humane obligations remain. 

And, seen in this perspective, none of the 
issues that are involved in the observance of 
the cease-fire would warrant unilateral 
action. 

As for the United States, the President has 
stated repeatedly that this administration 
has no higher goal than to leave to its suc- 
cessors a world that is safer and more secure 
than the one we found. It is an obligation 
that any President, of whatever party, will 
have to discharge, and it is a responsibility 
which must be solved — if mankind is to 
survive — by the great nuclear countries at 
some point, before it is too late. 

But we have always stated that it must be 
a peace with justice. The terms that have 
been agreed to in the United Nations provide 
an opportunity for the peoples of the Middle 
East to determine their own fate in consulta- 
tion and negotiation — for the first time in 25 
years. 

This is an opportunity we are prepared to 
foster. It is an opportunity which is essen- 
tial for this ravaged area and which is 
equally essential for the peace of the world. 
And it is an opportunity that the great 



588 



powers have no right to be permitted to 
miss. 

Now I'll be glad to answer questions. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you go into a little 
more detail on the Soviet threat that caused 
the alerting of U.S. military elements last 
night? And also, if you could tell us if Am- 
bassador Dobrynin [Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 
Soviet Ambassador to the United States] 
delivered you a brutal note, as described by 
Servator Jackson, on the Middle East sitiv- 
ation? 

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Jackson is a 
good friend of mine, but he does not partici- 
pate in our deliberations. 

I will not discuss the details of individual 
communications. 

We became aware of the alerting of certain 
Soviet units, and we were puzzled by the 
behavior of some Soviet representatives in 
the discussions that took place. 

We do not consider ourselves in a con- 
frontation with the Soviet Union. We do not 
believe it is necessary, at this moment, to 
have a confrontation. In fact, we are pre- 
pared to work cooperatively toward the real- 
ization of the objectives which we have set 
ourselves. 

But cooperative action precludes unilateral 
action, and the President decided that it was 
essential that we make clear our attitude 
toward unilateral steps. 



J^ 



Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhen you were, early 
talking about the special responsibility of the 
two nuclear superpowers to avoid anything 
ivhich would eliminate or incinerate human- 
ity, you ivent on to say that there are limits 
beyond which we can't go. And among those, 
you said ive would resist any attempt to ex- 
ploit the detente in a manner to weaken 
others or weaken our allies— I didn't get th/ii 
exactly, but you will recall what you said. 

And what I want to know — ivhat I tvanted 
to ask you is whether you believe that th( 
action of the Russians so far, particular! 
in departing from what you thought was u 
agreement, has gone to the point where it 
threatens exploitation of the detente to at 
adverse extent. 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: We are not yet pre- 
pared to make this judgment. We have to 
realize, of course, as I pointed out in my 
remarks, that the Soviet Union and we are 
in a very unique relationship. We are at one 
and the same time adversaries and partners 
in the preservation of peace. 

As adversaries, we often find ourselves 
drawn into potential confrontations and each 
of us has friends that let themselves pursue 
objectives that may not be sought fully by 
either of us. 

When we took the precautionary steps of 
which you are all aware, we did so because 
we thought there might be a possibility that 
matters might go beyond the limits which 
I have described. But we are not yet prepared 
to say that they have gone beyond these 
limits, and we believe that the possibility of 
moving in the direction that the Security 
Council had established earlier this week is 
still very real. And if the Security Council 
today were to pass a resolution that permit- 
ted the introduction of United Nations forces 
except those of the permanent members, the 
United States would feel that we are back 
on the road that had been charted earlier 
this week. 

Q. Mr. Secretai-y, could you tell us whether 
the United States received a specific warning 
from the Soviet Union that it would send its 
forces unilaterally into the Middle East? Do 
you have intelligence that the Riissians are 
Wearing for such an action? The reason I 
raise these questions — as you knoiv, there has 
been some line of speculation this morning 
that the American alert might have been 
prompted as much perhaps by American do- 
mestic requirements as by the real require- 
ments of diplomacy in the Middle East. And 
I wonder if you could provide some additional 
info)'mation on tliat. 

Secretary Kissinger: Marvin [Marvin 
Kalb, CBS News], we are attempting to con- 
duct the foreign policy of the United States 
«-ith regard for what we owe not just to the 
electorate but to future generations. And it 
's a symptom of what is happening to our 
country that it could even be suggested that 



the United States would alert its forces for 
domestic reasons. 

We do not think it is wise at this moment 
to go into the details of the diplomatic ex- 
changes that prompted this decision. Upon 
the conclusion of the present diplomatic ef- 
forts, one way or the other, we will make 
the record available, and we will be able to 
go into greater detail. And I am absolutely 
confident that it will be seen that the Presi- 
dent had no other choice as a responsible 
national leader. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, tvould you say, sir, why 
the United States feels that the pei-manent 
members of the Security Council should not 
send forces, although there is a chapter in the 
U.N. Charter, I believe, that calls upon all 
members of the U.N. to provide forces if 
called upon to do so. 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that the 
particular provision of the charter which 
you mentioned should be seen in the light of 
the particular circumstances. When you have 
a situation in which several of the permanent 
members may have conflicting interests, and 
when the presence of the forces of the perma- 
nent members may themselves contribute to 
the tension in the area, it seems to us the 
only possible course is to exclude the mem- 
bers — the forces of all permanent members. 

It would be a disaster if the Middle East, 
already so torn by local rivalries, would now 
become, as a result of a U.N. decision, a 
legitimized theater for the competition of 
the military forces of the great nuclear 
powers. 

And therefore it seemed to us that the po- 
litical purposes would be best served if any 
international force that were introduced were 
composed of countries that have no possibil- 
ity of themselves being drawn into rivalry 
as a result of being — 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, it may seem obvious, but 
I would just like to ask ymi — is the purpose 
of the alert which is noiv going on to tell 
the Soviet Union that if they send forces 
into the Middle East we will do the same? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to specu- 



November 12, 1973 



589 



late about what the President may decide 
to do in circumstances which we fervently 
hope will not arise. It would seem to us that 
to threaten all that has been achieved in the 
search for peace by unilateral action would 
be a step of irresponsibility that we do not 
believe is likely. And therefore I do not want 
to speculate what the United States would 
do if it should appear that instead of begin- 
ning an era of cooperation we were thrown 
back to the confrontations which sooner or 
later will have to be surmounted — because 
humanity cannnot stand the eternal conflict 
of those who have the capacity to destroy it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Cairo Radio said that 
such an offer of Soviet troops for enforcing 
the cease-fire has been received from Mos- 
cow. Has such an offer been made, and if so, 
have the Soviet troops indeed been alerted 
and are they on the move ? 

Secretanj Kissinger: We are not, of course, 
aware of the diplomatic exchanges that may 
go on between the Government of Egypt and 
the Government of the Soviet Union. We are 
also not aware of any Soviet forces that may 
have been introduced into Egypt. And we 
believe, and we will bend every effort in that 
direction, that any actions that are taken by 
any country in the Middle East will be within 
the framework of the Security Council and 
of United Nations decisions. 

I want to repeat again: We do not now 
consider ourselves in a confrontation with 
the Soviet Union. We continue to be pre- 
pared, and we believe it is entirely possible 
to maintain the direction that has brought 
us to this point and on which the peace of 
the world depends. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do ijou believe that the 
Soviet Union has threatened unilateral action 
and pushed this circumstance to the bnnk of 
confrontation? Do you see it qwssible that 
they saiv the events of last weekend as hav- 
ing so iveakened the President — he tvas 
threatened with impeachment — that they saw 
a target of opportunity and decided to move ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Speculation about 
motives is always dangerous. But one cannot 



have crisis of authority in a society for a 
period of months without paying a price 
somewhere along the line. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, from a public standpoint, 
until this morning the public ivould have had 
the belief and the view that this crisis was in 
Mnd, that the cease-fire was taking hold. 
You }Mve declined to discuss the diplomatic 
context of the specific communications. But 
was there prior to this latest sudden develop- 
ment any indication that this situation might 
go into such a direction? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, there was not. 
Until yesterday afternoon we had every 
reason to believe that the basic direction that 
had been established, and to which all par- 
ties had agreed, would in fact be imple- 
mented. And I repeat: We still believe that 
it is possible to continue in this direction. 
Nobody can gain from introducing great- 
power rivalry or from compounding — by 
compounding great-power rivalry. The over- 
riding goal in the Middle East must be a 
just and durable peace between the Arab 
nations and Israel. That, the United States 
is prepared and, indeed, determined to pro- 
mote. And that is the issue to which we 
should address ourselves. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, to follow that up, please, 
Senator Jackson, among others, lias said that 
this government has been operating under 
tvhat he called an illusion of detente from 
the very beginning. Can you be a little more 
precise noiv under these circumstances about 
the status of the detente with the Soviet 
Union ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Lisagor [Peter 
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News] , we have, from 
the beginning of this administration, recog- 
nized that there is a— that we are dealing 
with an ideological and political adversary. 
We have also believed that we had a historic 
obligation, precisely in these conditions of 
being in opposition, to attempt to remove the 
dangers of war. We have always made clear, 
and we have always practiced, that we would 
resist any foreign policy adventures throug'h 
the many crises in the early parts of this 
administration. 



590 



Department of State Bulletin 



Where we have differed with some of our 
critics, it was in our conviction that it was 
dangerous to attempt to interfere in the 
domestic affairs of a country with such a 
different domestic structure and such a dif- 
ferent ideological orientation. 

We have maintained the integrity of our 
allies and the security of the United States 
while reducing the danger of war. 

As I said in my remarks, this is a historic 
task that somebody will have to solve and 
that it is in the interests of all Americans 
and all of mankind that it be solved as 
quickly as possible. 

As for the status of the detente, I think 
we can make a better judgment when we 
know whether peace has taken hold. If the 
Soviet Union and we can work cooperatively, 
first toward establishing the cease-fire, and 
then toward promoting a durable settlement 
in the Middle East, then the detente will 
have proved itself. If this does not happen, 
then we have made an effort — for which 
we have paid no price — that had to be made. 
And then one has to wait for another mo- 
ment when the task of insuring or of bring- 
ing peace to mankind can be attempted. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the reports of this 
joint — the Soviet plan for a joint Soviet-U.S. 
force were rather widespread before you 
tvent to Moscow, especially in Eastern 
Europe. Did Mr. Brezhnev discuss this idea 
with you in any uKiy? And if not, ivhy do 
you think he kept quiet about it then only to 
appear to activate it a few days later? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what 
plans were widespread in Eastern Europe. 
I can only deal with plans which reach us 
in some official manner. The plan for a joint 
U.S.-Soviet military force in the Middle 
East was never broached to us, either pub- 
licly or privately, until yesterday. And we 
immediately made clear that we would not 
participate in such a force and also that we 
would oppose any unilateral moves. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have said that U.S.- 
Soviet auspices might be useful in moving 
this along diplomatically. Are you prepared 
personally to play a role in getting these 



talks started? And secondly, have all the 
parties accepted the necessity for direct 
Arab-Israeli talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not been in 
equally close contact with all of the parties. 
And we have reason to believe that a suf- 
ficient number of the parties have accepted 
these talks for them to start. And indeed, 
as late as yesterday afternoon, preliminary 
conversations took place between Ambas- 
sador Dobrynin and me about the site, the 
participation, and the procedures for these 
talks. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, earlier you referred to 
legitimate Soviet interests in the Middle East 
and indicated that ive felt they were not 
threatened there. Have the Soviets indi- 
cated they agree ivith your assessment? 

Secretary Kissinger: On the basis of the 
conversations that I had with General Sec- 
retary Brezhnev as late as last Sunday and 
the communications that were exchanged 
afterward between the President and Gen- 
eral Secretary Brezhnev, there was every 
reason to expect that while of course our 
interests were not congruent, and while of 
course there were differences in approach, 
that a certain parallelism could develop in 
the direction of producing a permanent 
peace. And therefore I would have to say 
that we had reason to believe, and we have 
no reason yet to alter our estimate, that the 
joint auspices of which the Security Council 
resolution speaks can yet be implemented. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, between the two cease- 
fire resolutions in the United Natioiis, in that 
period the Israeli forces have made sub- 
stantial military gains on the ground. Is the 
United States prepared to urge Israel to com- 
ply with the resolution which calls for all 
parties to ivithdraw to the lines at the time 
of the first cease-fire? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
supported both resolutions and is today sup- 
porting another resolution containing similar 
provisions as well as a provision for an inter- 
national force drawn from all member states 
of the United Nations — for which all mem- 



November 12, 1973 



591 



ber states of the United Nations would be 
eligible except the permanent members of 
the Security Council. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I notice that you said 
the President decided on the military alert 
and that you said the President had no other 
choice. Did you recommend this, or did the 
President initiate the military alert matter, 
and do you feel that it is a totally rational 
decision? 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Mollenhoff [Clark 
R. Mollenhoff, Des Moines Register and Trib- 
une], I have a general rule not to provide a 
checklist of what advice I give to the Pres- 
ident. But due to the particular implications 
of your remark, I may say that all of the 
President's senior advisers — all the members 
of the National Security Council — were unan- 
imous in their recommendation, as a result 
of a deliberation in which the President did 
not himself participate, and which he joined 
only after they had formed their judgment, 
that the measures taken — that he in fact 
ordered — were in the essential national 
interest. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, tvould you say ivhat, in 
your judgment, changed from the period 
yesterday when you and Ambassador Dobry- 
nin were talking about participation and 
site and so on for talks and the period last 
night tvhich led the Soviets to take the action 
that they took? What, in your estimxition, 
changed ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would like to make 
clear that as of now the Soviet Union has 
not yet taken any irrevocable action. It is 
our hope that such an action will not be 
taken. 

I repeat again what I have said on many 
occasions in this press conference. We are 
not seeking an opportunity to confront the 
Soviet Union. We are not asking the Soviet 
Union to pull back from anything that it has 
done. 

The opportunity for pursuing the joint 
course in the Security Council and in the 
diplomacy afterward is open. The measures 
we took and which the President ordered 



were precautionary in nature. They were 
not directed at any actions that had already 
been taken. And therefore there is no reason 
for any country to back off anything that it 
has not yet done. 

As to the motives, I think we should assess 
that after the current situation is over. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger — 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me get this 
question, and then you. 

Q. Sir, in the reasons that prompted the 
President to make his decision, did any of 
those reasons include a threat aimed against 
this country as opposed to a threat in the 
Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: I really do not think 
it is appropriate for me to go into the details 
of the diplomatic exchanges. We are not talk- 
ing of threats that have been made against 
one another. We are not talking of a missile- 
crisis-type situation. We are talking of a 
situation where 72 hours ago we still intro- 
duced joint resolutions, where the necessity 
for a joint movement toward peace is as real 
now as it was then, where the participants 
in the Middle East have everj'thing to gain 
from a period of quiet and from at least 
watching or attempting to see what an Amer- 
ican diplomatic effort can produce. And 
therefore we are talking about a precaution- 
ary situation and not an actual one. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that yw 
are asking the American people — you and 
the President — who are already badly shaken 
by the events of the last week, to accept a 
very dramatic military alert involving nu- 
clear forces, on the basis of a kind of hand- 
ful of smoke without telling them or us 
exactly why. If I understood ijou earlier, 
you said that ice had discovered the alert of 
.some Soviet forces, and we were disturbed 
by the behavior apparently of some people 
that American officials were dealing with. 
And that is all we really have to justify this 
alert. 

Now, this country is pretty badly shaken 
right now. And I wonder if you can give us 



592 



Deparfment of State Bulletin 



any more information that ivill help convince 
people that there is some solid basis for the 
actions that have been taken. 

Secretanj Kissinger: We are attemptinp to 
preserve the peace in very difficult circum- 
stances. It is up to you ladies and gentlemen 
to determine whether this is the moment to 
try to create a crisis of confidence in the field 
of foreign policy as well. We have tried to 
give you as much information as we decently 
and safely and properly can under these 
conditions. As soon as there is a clear out- 
come we will give you the full information. 
And after that you will be able to .judge 
whether the decisions were taken hastily or 
improperly. 

The alert that has been ordered is of a 
precautionary nature and is not of any 
major and irrevocable — it is not in any sense 
irrevocable. It is what seemed to be indi- 
cated by the situation. 

We will be prepared, however, and I am 
certain within a week, to put the facts before 
you. 

But there has to be a minimum of con- 
fidence that the senior officials of the Amer- 
ican government are not playing with the 
lives of the American people. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the chief problem in the 
Middle East at the moment seems to be the 
concern by the Egyptians for the safety of 
its 3d A7-my on the east bank of the canal. 
Are there any steps being taken to possibly 
ameliorate their situation? And secondly, 
could you give us some more details about the 
results of your conversation as to forthcom- 
ing talks? About 12 hours ago everybody urns 
xvaiting for talks to begin. Can you tell us in 
which direction ive can anticipate that ivill 
go? 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that the 
particular problems that are raised by a 
cease-fire in which the forces are deployed 
in such a curious fashion — each army having 
units behind the lines of the other — that 
these conditions first of all produce, especially 
in the initial phases, many diflJiculties. We 
also are absolutely convinced that with the 
presence of observers, with good will on all 
sides, and with the active participation of 



the United States and the Soviet Union, that 
the difficulties can be substantially eased and 
eventually removed. 

It is my understanding, for example, that 
some humanitarian supplies reached the 3d 
Army today. 

And we would certainly be prepared to 
lend our good ofl^ces to an effort in which 
neither side gained a decisive advantage as 
a result of the deployment of their forces. 

I therefore am convinced that the partic- 
ular conditions of the cease-fire, difl^cult as 
they are, can be dealt with and can be 
ameliorated with statesmanship on all sides. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have surely told 
Dobrynin and others what you have told us 
and perhaps even more. Can you give us 
any indication of tvhat effect this had on 
these people? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are at this mo- 
ment in the Security Council debating the 
resolution that we are supporting. If that 
resolution is accepted and carried out, we 
believe that it will lead to an immediate eas- 
ing of the situation and to a restoration of 
the conditions as we observed them at noon 
yesterday. 

May I sav also that this press conference 
was scheduled at a time before this latest 
event was known or suspected. And I went 
through with it in order to be able to put into 
perspective the evolution that brought us 
here and as much of the reasoning as I 
could, given the delicacy of the situation. 

Q. You didn't answer the second half of 
my question, Dr. Kissinger — 

Secretary Kissinger: What was the second 
half? 

Q. About negotiations, where they were 
going to go. 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that nego- 
tiations can and should begin in a matter of 
a verj' few weeks. 

Q.How? 

Secretary Kissinger: How ? 

Q. Yes. You said tve were discussing par- 
ticipation and forum. I ivondered if you could 
give us more details. 



November 12, 1973 



593 



Secretai-y Kissinger: I think we should 
wait until the parties are prepared to an- 
nounce this. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have yoti any indication 
of hoiv the Soviet Union will vote on the 
resolution today? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the debate is 
still in process. And once we know the result 
of that vote — 

Q. Is there any indication of how they 
might vote? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are hopeful that 
the Soviet Union will vote for the resolution. 
Q. If the resolution is passed, Dr. Kis- 
singer, do you expect the alert would he 
taken off? 

Secretary Kissinger: The alert will not last 
one minute longer than we believe is 
necessary. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger — 

Secretary Kissinger: And it would be 
taken off as soon as any danger of unilateral 
action is removed. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, concerning the role that 
the United States may play in obtaining 
conditions for an enduring peace, several 
montfis ago you were reported as saying that 
you were supportive of an American policy 
that supports Israel hut not Israeli conquests. 
What is your view on that now? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think I was quoted 

to that effect four and a half years ago 

before I understood the special nomenclature 

that is attached to the various ground rules. 

Our position is, as I have stated publicly, 

that the conditions that produced this war 

were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations 

and that in a process of negotiations it will 

be necessary to make substantial concessions. 

The problem will be to relate the Arab 

concern for the sovereignty over territories 

to the Israeli concern for secure boundaries. 

We believe that the process of negotiations 

between the parties is an essential component 

of this. And as the President has stated to 

the four Arab Foreign Ministers, and as we 

have stated repeatedly, we will make a major 



effort to bring about a solution that is con- 
sidered just by all parties. But I think no 
purpose would be served by my trying to 
delimit the exact nature of all of these 
provisions. 

The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very 
mtich. 



President Nixon Presents 
Nine Medals of Honor 

Remarks by President Nixon ^ 

Ladies and gentlemen: As all of you know, 
this is a Medal of Honor presentation. As I 
was looking over the record of the last four 
years, I found that 143 Medals of Honor 
have been presented during those four years. 
There will be nine presented today, and the 
difference is that this is the first time that 
a Medal of Honor presentation will be made 
in peacetime, when the United States is at 
peace not only in Viet-Nam but is at peace 
with every nation throughout the world. 

Now, when we speak of the Medal of 
Honor, I would say first that those who re- 
ceive that medal in this room honor this 
great house and this historic room. When 
we speak of the Medal of Honor in relation- 
ship to the war, the long and difficult war in 
which so many Americans participated, we 
realize how these men who receive this 
medal today and their colleagues— how what 
they did has made it possible for the United 
States to end this war and finally to have 
peace with honor. 

As one of our prisoners of war said when 
he returned from Viet-Nam, you, you and 
your colleagues in the Armed Forces of the 
United States, made it possible for our pris-j 
oners of war to return to the United States > 
on their feet rather than on their knees. And 
so you receive a Medal of Honor today be- 



' Made in the East Room at the White House on 
Oct. 15 (White House press release). 



594 



Department of State Bulletin 



cause what you have done is to help the 
United States maintain its honor. 

Now, I suppose that talking about honor, 
as far as a great nation is concerned, would 
sound somewhat jingoistic, but I would re- 
mind everybody in this audience, particu- 
larly at a time when there is another war in 
the Mideast, that a strong United States, a 
United States that is respected, is essential if 
we are to have a chance to have a lasting 
peace in the world. Because with all of our 
strength and with all of the sacrifices that 
Americans have made in four wars in this 
century, the United States policy is not one 
of aggression, it is not one to dominate any 
other country, it is one that seeks peace for 
ourselves and for other nations, and of 
course seeks, in addition to that, a world in 
which all nations have the right to be inde- 
pendent of foreign domination. 

One word, finally, with regard to the cur- 
rent war which is going on in the Mideast. 
If I were to describe our policy, I would say 
that it is like the policy that we followed in 
1958 when Lebanon was involved, it is like 
the policy we followed in 1970 when Jordan 
was involved. The policy of the United States 
in the Mideast, very simply stated, is this: 
We stand for the right of every nation in 
the Mideast to maintain its independence and 
security. We want this fighting to end. We 
want the fighting to end on a basis where we 
can build a lasting peace. 

But the policy of the United States is that 
of peacemaker in the area, and I would con- 
clude by saying that the men honored today 
and the thousands of other Americans who 
also should be honored, who served their 
country in Viet-Nam, make it possible for 
the United States to play the honored role of 
peacemaker in the world. And now we will 
go forward with the citations. 

[The presentations were made.] 
Ladies and gentlemen, that completes the 
ceremony, and we want all of you to enjoy 
this White House. It belongs to you, and to- 
day it is your home. You can spend your 
time on this first floor in the historic Red 
Room and the Green Room and the Blue 



Room. In the dining room there are refresh- 
ments which will be there for you and your 
friends to enjoy. 

We congratulate you all again, and we 
thank you from our hearts for your service 
to the Nation. 



President Nixon Holds Meeting 
With Arab Foreign Ministers 

President Nixon met on October 17 with 
Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika of 
Algeria, Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad 
al-Jabir al-Sabah of Kuwait, Foreign Min- 
ister Ahmed Taibi Benhima of Morocco, and 
Foreign Minister Sayyid Unuir al-Saqqaf of 
Saudi Arabia. Following are remarks made 
to the press by President Nixon and Foreign 
Minister al-Saqqaf after the meeting. 

White House press release dated October 17 

President Nixon: Ladies and gentlemen, 
the Foreign Ministers and I have had a very 
good talk discussing all of the aspects of the 
current situation in the Mideast. I will not 
go further than that e.xcept to say the con- 
versations will continue over at the State 
Department with Dr. Kissinger, and any 
statement with regard to the nature of the 
conversation will be made from Dr. Kis- 
singer. 

Question: Will he tell us what was dis- 
cussed? 

President Nixon: I doubt if there will be 
a statement, but what I mean is if you have 
any further questions, you should address 
them to him. 

Question: Will you tell us what general 
areas were covered? 

Foreign Minister al-Saqqaf: If I have to 
say something, we four Foreign Ministers 
from the Arab world, representing 18 Arab 
countries, have been received well, and we 
had a very good exchange of views and dis- 
cussions with His E.xcellency Mr. President 
Nixon. The meeting and discussions were 
fruitful, and we think the man who could 
solve the Viet-Nam war, the man who could 



November 12, 1973 



595 



have settled the peace all over the world, can 
easily play a good role in settling and having 
peace in our area of the Middle East. 

Question: Did you discuss oil, Mr. Min- 
ister? 

President Nixon: It wouldn't be fair to 
ask him questions, because he speaks for 18; 
and I will simply say this in conclusion— that 
His Excellency the Foreign Minister of 
Saudi Arabia has been very generous in his 
comments with regard to our peace mission. 
I explained to the Foreign Ministers in our 
first four years we had the opening to China, 
we had a new relationship with the Soviet 
Union, and of course, we brought an end to 
the war in Viet-Nam. 

I told them that a major goal and an ur- 
gent goal at this time which we believe can, 
will, and must be achieved is a fair and just 
and peaceful settlement in the Mideast and 
we are all dedicated to that goal. Whatever 
differences we have are with regard to the 
means, with regard to, of course, certain 
ends as well, but the goal of a fair and just 
and equitable peace we all are dedicated to. 
Thank you. 



Emergency Security Assistance 
Requested for Israel and Cambodia 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am today requesting that the Congress 
authorize emergency security assistance of 
$2.2 billion for Israel and $200 million for 
Cambodia. This request is necessary to per- 
mit the United States to follow a responsible 
course of action in two areas where stability 
is vital if we are to build a global structure 
of peace. 

For more than a quarter of a century, as 
strategic interests of the major powers have 
converged there, the Middle East has been 



» Transmitted to the Congress on Oct. 19 (White 
House press release). 



a flashpoint for potential world conflict. 
Since war broke out again on October 6, 
bringing tragedy to the people of Israel and 
the Arab nations alike, the United States has 
been actively engaged in efforts to con- 
tribute to a settlement. Our actions there 
have reflected my belief that we must take 
those steps which are necessary for main- 
taining a balance of military capabilities and 
achieving stability in the area. The request 
I am submitting today would give us the 
essential flexibility to continue meeting those 
responsibilities. 

To maintain a balance of forces and thus 
achieve stability, the United States Govern- 
ment is currently providing military mate- 
rial to Israel to replace combat losses. This 
is necessary to prevent the emergence of a 
substantial imbalance resulting from a large- 
scale resupply of Syria and Egypt by the 
Soviet Union. 

The costs of replacing consumables and 
lost equipment for the Israeli Armed Forces 
have been extremely high. Combat activity 
has been intense, and losses on both sides 
have been large. During the first 12 days of 
the conflict, the United States has authorized 
shipments to Israel of material costing $825 
million, including transportation. 

Major items now being furnished by the 
United States to the Israeli forces include 
conventional munitions of many types, air- 
to-air and air-to-ground missiles, artillery, 
crew-served and individual weapons, and a 
standard range of fighter aircraft ordnance. 
Additionally, the United States is providing 
replacements for tanks, aircraft, radios, and 
other military equipment which have been 
lost in action. 

Thus far, Israel has attempted to obtain 
the necessary equipment through the use of 
cash and credit purchases. However, the 
magnitude of the current conflict coupled 
with the scale of Soviet supply activities has 
created needs which exceed Israel's capacity 
to continue with cash and credit purchases. 
The alternative to cash and credit sales of 
United States military materials is for us 



596 



Department of State Bulletin 



to provide Israel with grant military assist- 
ance as well. 

The United States is making every effort 
to bring this conflict to a very swift and 
honorable conclusion, measured in days not 
weeks. But prudent planning also requires 
us to prepare for a longer struggle. I am 
therefore requesting that the Congress ap- 
prove emergency assistance to Israel in the 
amount of $2.2 billion. If the conflict mod- 
erates, or as we fervently hope, is brought 
to an end very quickly, funds not absolutely 
required would of course not be expended. 

I am also requesting $200 million emer- 
gency assistance for Cambodia. As in the 
case of Israel, additional funds are urgently 
needed for ammunition and consumable mil- 
itary supplies. The increased requirement 
results from the larger scale of hostilities 
and the higher levels of ordnance required 
by the Cambodian Army and Air Force to 
defend themselves without American air 
support. 

The end of United States bombing on 
August 15 was followed by increased com- 
munist activity in Cambodia. In the ensuing 
fight, the Cambodian forces acquitted them- 
elves well. They successfully defended the 
capital of Phnom Penh and the provincial 
center of Kampong Cham, as well as the 
principal supply routes. Although this more 
intense level of fighting has tapered off some- 
what during the current rainy season, it is 



virtually certain to resume when the dry 
season begins about the end of the year. 

During the period of heaviest fighting in 
August and September, ammunition costs 
foi- the Cambodian foi'ces were running al- 
most $1 million per day. We anticipate 
similar average costs for the remainder of 
this fiscal year. These ammunition require- 
ments, plus minimum equipment replace- 
ment, will result in a total funding require- 
ment of $380 million for the current fiscal 
year, rather than the $180 million previously 
requested. To fail to provide the $200 million 
for additional ammunition would deny the 
Cambodian Armed Forces the ability to de- 
fend themselves and their country. 

We remain hopeful that the conflict in 
Cambodia be resolved by a negotiated settle- 
ment. A communist military victory and the 
installation of a government in Phnom Penh 
which is controlled by Hanoi would gravely 
threaten the fragile structure of peace es- 
tablished in the Paris agreements. 

I am confident that the Congress and the 
American people will support this request 
for emergency assistance for these two be- 
leaguered friends. To do less would not only 
create a dangerous imbalance in these par- 
ticular arenas but would also endanger the 
entire structure of peace in the world. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, October 19, 1973. 



November 12, 1973 



597 



U.N. Calls for Middle East Cease-Fire and Negotiations 
and Establishes Emergency Force 



Following are statements made in the 
United Nations Security Cottncil October 
8-27 by U.S. Representative John Scali dur- 
ing the debate on the situation in the Middle 
East, together with the texts of resolutions 
adopted by the Council on October 21, 23, 
25 and 27 and a report of the U.N. Secretary 
General. 

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI 
Statement of October 8 

USUN press release 91 dated October 8 

The United States has requested that the 
Security Council be convened today in order 
that it might deal urgently with the current 
situation in the Middle East. 

For the first time in more than three years, 
armed hostilities have broken out on a mas- 
sive scale in the Middle East. The cease-fire 
we have sought to maintain has been broken. 
The recourse to tragic violence we have 
sought to avoid is upon us. 

Reports based on U.N. sources appear to 
indicate that the air attacks in the Golan 
Heights were initiated by Syrian MIG air- 
craft and that the first firing on the Suez 
front, which took place at the same time as 
the Syrian attack, was from west to east. The 
subsequent development of the fighting has 
been fully covered in the press. 

In the days before fighting broke out, we 
received reports of intensified military activ- 
ities in the Middle Eastern area. We watched 
these developments closely, but until a few 
hours before military operations started we 
were unable to conclude that these activities 
were a prelude to actual fighting. This is a 
region in which alarms and alerts are fairly 
frequent. In themselves, military movements 



would not necessarily indicate that combat 
was about to begin. When, very shortly be- 
fore the initial attacks took place, we re- 
ceived indications that this was the fact, we 
immediately undertook intensive diplomatic 
eiTorts in hopes that the outbreak of hostil- 
ities might be prevented. We discussed the 
situation directly with Israel and Egypt. We 
consulted other permanent members and ex- 
changed views with many governments rep- 
resented on this Council. Others in and 
outside of the area pursued parallel efforts. 
We kept in close touch with Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim, who also lent his great 
weight and prestige to the efforts. Unfor- 
tunately these efforts did not prevent the 
outbreak, and intense fighting continues. 

In so serious a situation we felt that we 
could not fail to exercise our responsibility, 
as a pennanent member of the Security 
Council, to request a meeting of the Council 
in order that it might be seized of the grave 
situation which had arisen. Not to have done 
this would have been to fail in our obliga- 
tions under the charter. We hope that in the 
days ahead the Council by its deliberations 
can restore in some measure its historic role 
of constructive ameliorator in the most crit- 
ical and explosive area in the world. 

Definitive judgments as to constructive 
action are difficult in view of the fluidity of 
the situation. My government has itself made 
no such judgments. Nor have we felt it would 
be constructive to divert the Council's ener- 
gies and attention to the question of assess- 
ing blame. 

Our purpose today is not to sift conflict- 
ing reports or to assess responsibility for 
what has occurred. Our purpose is to help 
promote a solution for the tense and dan- 
gerous situation confronting us. 



598 



Department of State Bulletin 



We recognize that it is difficult to separate 
proximate from underlying causes. The 
former may be clear-cut, but the latter are 
complex, and perceptions of right and wrong 
inevitably vary. It has been over six years 
since the present abnormal situation was 
created in the wake of the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
war. That war in turn followed 18 years of 
abnormal armistice. For the failure to move 
from abnormal armistice and cease-fire to 
political accommodation and peace, there is 
more than enough blame to go around. All 
concerned have missed opportunities to make 
the transition over the past 25 years. 

We have given preliminary thought to the 
direction in which this Council might move 
in dealing with this problem so that new 
opportunities to make practical progress 
toward peace can be created and the present 
tragedy can be made a new beginning rather 
than simply another lost opportunity. As we 
see it, there are a number of principles 
which the Council must seek to apply: 

— First, in a situation where fighting is 
raging unchecked, the most appropriate 
means must be found for bringing the hos- 
tilities to an end. Military operations must 
be halted. The guns must fall silent so that 
additional human suffering may be avoided 
and the search for peace may proceed. 

— Second, conditions must be restored in 
the area that would be conducive to a settle- 
ment of the longstanding differences in the 
Middle East. There must be respect for the 
rights and positions of all the states in the 
region. A beginning must be made toward 
converting the sharp confrontation of vio- 
lently opposing claims and counterclaims, 
which for over a quarter of a century has 
made true stability impossible, to a more 
reasoned discourse aimed at genuine recon- 
ciliation. The least damaging way to bring 
this about is to have the parties concerned 
return to the positions before hostilities 
broke out. 

— Third, in all its efforts the Council must 
be mindful of the need for universal respect 
for the integrity of those instruments and 
principles of settlement for the Middle East- 
ern dispute which have received the adher- 
ence of the interested parties and the support 



of the Council's authority. The foundations so 
laboriously achieved in the past for nego- 
tiations looking toward a Middle Eastern 
peace must not be destroyed under the stress 
of a military emergency. 

These principles, in the opinion of my 
government, constitute the framework within 
which we can act in this Council to reduce 
the prevailing tension in the Middle East 
and to prepare for a reinvigoration of the 
process of peacemaking. We ai'e prepared 
to discuss these principles, and any others 
which other members may put forward, as 
a basis for our further action. 

What we seek in this Council is not a war 
of words, but a broad consensus which will 
enable the Council to put the full weight of 
its influence behind the task of restoring 
peace so that the Middle East can be set on 
a new course pointing toward a better era in 
the region. 

Let us then renounce the sterile gains of 
propaganda and turn to serious discussion. 
The situation is urgent; the need is great; 
and time presses. 

Statement of October 21 

USUN press release 96 dated October 21 

The United States, together with the 
U.S.S.R., has called for this meeting of the 
Security Council with one purpose in mind : 
to take joint action and to present a joint 
proposition to the Council whose aim is to 
bring an immediate cease-fire-in-place and to 
begin promptly negotiations between the 
parties under appropriate auspices looking 
toward a just and durable peace based on the 
November 1967 Security Council resolution.^ 

As the members of this Council know, the 
tragic fighting over the past 17 days has 
been both furious and costly. We believe that 
the prolongation of the war is not in the 
interests of the parties or the peoples in the 
area and that its continuance carries grave 
risks for the peace of the world. Because of 
this, President Nixon agreed that Secretary 



' For text of Security Council Resolution 242 
adopted on Nov. 22, 1967, see Bulletin of Dec. 18, 
1967, p. 843. 



November 12, 1973 



599 



of state Kissinger should fly to Moscow in 
response to an invitation of General Secre- 
tary Brezhnev. As a result of these discus- 
sions the Council has before it the resolution 
agreed jointly by the United States and the 
Soviet Governments on which both our gov- 
ernments request immediate action on the 
part of the Security Council. The resolution 
has already been circulated to the members 
of the Council. 

Let me make a few brief remarks regard- 
ing the three short paragraphs of the reso- 
lution, for they all stand clearly on their own 
words and speak for themselves. 

The first paragraph calls for an immediate 
cease-fire. In our view as well as that of the 
Soviet Union, this applies not only to the 
parties directly concerned but also to those 
who have joined in the fighting by sending 
units. This paragraph calls for the stopping 
of fighting in the positions presently occu- 
pied by the two sides. We believe that 12 
hours should allow ample time to achieve the 
practical implementation of this paragraph. 

The second paragraph calls for the im- 
plementation of the Security Council i-esolu- 
tion in all of its parts after the cease-fire. 
The members of this Council, as well as the 
parties concerned, are fully familiar with 
Security Council Resolution 242, and it needs 
no elaboration here. The paragraph is linked 
to paragraph 3, which calls for the imme- 
diate beginning of negotiations between the 
parties concerned under appropriate aus- 
pices aimed at establishing a just and durable 
peace in the Middle East. We believe that 
from the tragic events of the past 17 days 
there must be a new resolve, a new attempt 
to remove the fundamental causes that have 
brought war to the Middle East so fre- 
quently and so tragically. Another respite 
between two wars is just not good enough. 
And for our part, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union are ready to make our 
joint good offices available to the parties as 
a means to facilitate the negotiating process. 

Finally, I want to report to the Council 
that both the Soviet Union and the United 
States believe that there should be an im- 
mediate exchange of prisoners of war. 



Mr. President, we believe this is a historic- 
moment for the Council. We believe that this 
Council, in exercising its primary responsi- 
bility in the field of peace and security, can 
make a major contribution to this end by 
adopting this resolution promptly. 

Statement of October 23 

USUN press release 98 dated October 23 

I should like to put on record my delega- 
tion's deep regret that our proceedings had 
been interrupted by unfortunate disorder. 
I wish also to compliment our distin- 
guished President, Ambassador Mclntyre 
[Sir Laurence Mclntyre, of Australia], for 
his patient efforts to maintain and restore 
order in the chamber. This wrangle was par- 
ticularly regrettable because of the ui-gency 
of the issue before us. The issue is peace, 
and while we speak men are dying. 

My delegation, for its part, was prepared 
to allow the distinguished Representative of 
China to speak. We did not believe he would 
speak an unreasonable period of time. The 
issue has been resolved, and we fervently 
hope that we may be spared further inter- 
ruptions in the future. 

Mr. President, the United States has 
joined with the Soviet Union in introducing 
this draft resolution before the Council be- 
cause of its concern that the cease-fire or- 
dered by the Council on October 22 be made 
fully effective at the earliest possible 
moment. 

There have been charges from each side 
of violations allegedly committed by the 
other. It is obviously impossible at this 
moment to determine the accuracy of these 
charges. No third-party evidence from an 
objective source is available to us. 

The resolution before us confirms the 
Council's decision of October 22 on an im- 
mediate cessation of all kinds of firing and 
of all military action and urges that the 
forces of the two sides be returned to the 
positions they occupied at the moment the 
cease-fire became effective. The resolution 
also suggests that the Secretary General 
take measures to dispatch United Nations 



600 



Department of State Bulletin 



observers immediately to supervise the ob- 
servance of the cease-fire, including personnel 
of the United Nations now in the Middle 
East and first of all those in Cairo. 

We consider the central features of the 
resolution to be those in which the Council 
confirms its position for a cease-fire and in 
which it provides for the stationing of ob- 
servers between the forces of Israel and the 
Arab Republic of Egypt. The former pro- 
vision will put an end to bloodshed ; the latter 
will result in the creation of a clear line of 
demarcation separating the forces of the 
two sides. 

We have agreed, for reasons of principle, 
with the provision of the resolution urging 
the forces to return to the positions they oc- 
cupied when the cease-fire became effective. 
We put forward that principle of return to 
positions occupied before hostilities broke out 
in a statement I made in this chamber on 
October 8. At that time the principles did 
not receive the support from the Council. 
Consistent with our argument at that time, 
we agree today that forces should return to 
the positions occupied at the time the cease- 
fire became effective. But we must point out 
that there will be great difficulty in estab- 
lishing actual cease-fire lines and in fixing 
the positions of forces which have been 
maneuvering in the desert. I hope that this 
will not become our central preoccupation as 
we search for a just and durable peace. 

It is important that the United Nations 
resume at once the function of observation of 
the forces of the parties. Fortunately the 
United Nations has in the area officers of the 
United Nations Truce Supervision Organiza- 
tion, who can proceed quickly to the cease- 
fire area. On the passage of this resolution, 
we would expect the Secretary General, 
through the Chief of Staff of the Truce 
Supervision Organization, to put observers 
in place at once and to receive immediately 
reports from them on events in the areas of 
contact between the two sides. These reports 
would of course be transmitted to the Secu- 
rity Council forthwith. 

Finally, Mr. President, we must look to the 
future. Our paramount task is to bring about 



a cease-fire and to halt the bloodshed. We 
hope, therefore, that the Security Council can 
give prompt consideration to the U.S. -Soviet 
resolution, as it has, so that the fighting may 
be stopped and negotiations begin, looking 
toward a just and lasting peace. 

Statement of October 24 

USUN press release 99 dated October 24 

The Security Council meets tonight, for 
the third time in four days, on a note of 
increasing urgency. In spite of two Security 
Council resolutions adopted without a dis- 
senting vote, calling upon the parties in the 
strongest terms to cease all fighting and to 
terminate all military activity, military op- 
erations have recurred in the zones of com- 
bat. As long as the fighting goes on, even 
intermittently, the parties incur increasing 
losses; the forces of hate and fear are 
strengthened; the difficulty of attaining a 
lasting peace deepens; and the task of recon- 
ciliation becomes more difficult. 

Tonight this Council is convened at the 
request of the delegation of Egypt. The dis- 
tinguished Foreign Minister of Egypt has 
suggested the Security Council invite the 
Soviet Union and the United States to send 
forces to the area to supervise the imple- 
mentation of the cease-fire on the part of 
Israel and to insure its effectiveness. 

At the same time the Council is confronted 
by claims from the Israeli side that Egyptian 
forces failed to abide by the cease-fire and 
are accordingly responsible for the fact that 
hostilities have recurred. 

Let me say again, as I said yesterday, that 
it remains impossible to determine the ac- 
curacy of these contradictory charges. Un- 
til the impartial observers of the United Na- 
tions Truce Supervision Organization can 
reach their posts in the areas of contact and 
can report to the Chief of Staff of the Or- 
ganization, we will be unable to assess with 
certainty these conflicting claims. 

Accordingly, the United States believes 
that the Council has before it two urgent 
tasks. First, it must impress upon the par- 



November 12, 1973 



601 



ties with renewed vigor that each of them 
must comply immediately and fully with the 
cease-fire resolutions we have adopted. Sec- 
ond, it should urge and encourage the Secre- 
tary General and the Chief of Staff of the 
U.N. Truce Supervision Organization to 
move as promptly as possible to place addi- 
tional observers on the spot. 

Mr. President, the distinguished Foreign 
Minister of Egypt has suggested that the 
United States send armed forces to the area 
of fighting in order to supervise implementa- 
tion of the cease-fire. In the view of the 
United States, this is not a time in which 
involvement by the great powers through the 
dispatch of their armed forces could be help- 
ful in creating conditions of peace. Our ob- 
jective in the Middle East has not been to 
produce a military confrontation but rather 
to encourage restraint and caution on both 
sides. 

The United States remains committed to 
Resolution 338 and Resolution 339 of this 
Council, in all their parts. We believe that 
the parties, with the assistance of the United 
Nations observers, can and will bring the 
fighting to an end. For our part, I can state 
that we have been in active and serious con- 
sultation with the Government of Israel to 
impress upon it the urgency of absolute 
adherence to the Security Council's cease- 
fire resolutions. We will continue to make 
these representations as required. 

We also agree, as I said yesterday, that the 
forces of the parties should return to the 
positions they occupied when the cease-fire 
became eflfective. Mr. Malik [Yakov Malik, 
Soviet Representative to the U.N.], I believe, 
knows that we have exerted all of our efforts 
to put the cease-fire into effect, to translate 
it from a careful, balanced appeal to a reality 
which will end the killing. In keeping with 
the understanding that Secretary Kissinger 
negotiated with the Soviet leaders in Mos- 
cow, in a spirit of friendship, as part of our 
efforts to improve relations on a broad front 
with the Soviet Union, we have done our 



part to carry out this agreement — calmly 
and without seeking to extract propaganda 
advantage. But this, Mr. President, cannot 
be done merely by snapping our fingers. In 
a highly emotional state of affairs, in time 
of war, it is not easy. As a matter of princi- 
ple, the United States believes today, as it 
made clear in my statement of October 8, 
that return to positions held before hostili- 
ties broke out is the preferred means of 
opening the way to genuine reconciliation. 
We will continue to support this principle. 
But it can only be applied in the context of 
agreement as to the geographical and physi- 
cal facts. Until actual cease-fire lines are 
demarcated and it becomes clear where the 
opposing forces were stationed at a given 
moment in time, there can be no agreed 
basis for firm truce lines. This emphasizes 
still further the need for completing the 
organization and placement of the Truce 
Supervision force and for insuring that the 
Council and the parties are fully informed 
of developments and the military command- 
ers of the two sides instructed in compelling 
terms to stop the fighting. 

Statement of October 25 

USUN press release 101 dated October 26 

The United States supports the eight- 
power resolution presented to this Council 
last night as amended this morning. 

We have from the first advocated an im- 
mediate cease-fire at the positions occupied 
when Security Council Resolution 338 came 
into effect at 1650 GMT on October 22. 

We agi-ee on the need to increase the num- 
ber of observers of the United Nations Truce 
Supervision Organization immediately. 

We approve of the establishment of a new 
United Nations Emergency Force to be com- 
posed of personnel from member states ex- 
cept those of the permanent members of the 
Security Council. We will seek to be helpful 
in facilitating the transportation of this 
Force to the area. 

We trust that the Secretary General will 



602 



Department of State Bulletin 



proceed with the utmost despatch to carry 
out the functions entrusted to him under the 
resolution. 

Mr. President, we believe that the resolu- 
tion now before us will, if faithfully imple- 
mented by all concerned, result in the 
prompt and effective establishment of a 
true cease-fire in the Middle East. Nothing: 
could be more important as a step toward 
peace. We urge the Security Council to adopt 
this resolution as a matter of highest pri- 
ority. 

Statement of October 26 

USUN press release 103 dated October 26 

Let me reaffirm once again what I have 
said repeatedly here before. In word and 
deed the United States stands for strict ob- 
servance of the cease-fire. 

Mr. President, in the view of my delega- 
tion, the most constructive contribution we 
in this chamber could make at this stage is 
to proceed systematically as quickly as pos- 
sible on our mission of ending the fighting 
and beginning peace negotiations. We cannot 
accomplish anything by repeatedly resorting 
in this chamber to exchanges of unverifiable 
charges and countercharges when objective, 
unchallengeable facts are needed. We do not 
need more reckless accusations. We need re- 
sponsible action. We can proceed to imple- 
ment Resolution 340, which was sponsored 
by eight nonaligned members of the Security 
Council and which, if carried out, can put 
us on the road to real peace. 

I have heard Ambassador Malik's one- 
sided version of history before and I will not 
reply in kind, because our two governments 
have a special responsibility to lead the way 
to peace and the moment is too grave for 
that kind of talk. 

I must take exception, however, to Ambas- 
sador Malik's resort to the habit of selecting 
a phrase from the Secretary of State's press 
conference and reading it out of context. I 
should perhaps express resentment over such 
a debater's trick, but instead I will thank 



the Ambassador for advertising Dr. Kissin- 
ger's statements. 

I have sent a complete text of Dr. Kis- 
singer's news conference remai'ks to each of 
the United Nations Missions in New York 
because I thought objective readers would 
be more impressed with the Secretary's fair- 
minded description of events and American 
policy at this period of history. If you have 
found Ambassador Malik's sample titillating, 
dear colleagues, let me suggest that you will 
find Dr. Kissinger's statements taken in their 
entirety even more interesting and far more 
balanced than some of the remarks that you 
have heard this evening. 

Statement of October 27 

USUN press release 104 date<l October 27 

The United States welcomes with great 
satisfaction the action of the Council in ap- 
proving the Secretary General's report. We 
have demonstrated that indeed this organ 
can act effectively to fulfill its responsibilities 
for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. 

But even as we rejoice in our agreement it 
is important to recognize the difficult task con- 
fronting the Emergency Force. Supervising 
cease-fire lines in an area in the wake of 
war will not be easy. The Force from its 
inception will require the full cooperation of 
the parties concerned — as the Secretary Gen- 
eral's report states. In addition, it must 
operate as an integrated military unit with 
efficiency and with special privileges for 
none. 

We consider the language of the report 
carefully drawn. For instance, the statement 
"All matters which may affect the nature or 
the continued effective functioning of the 
Force will be referred to the Council for its 
decision" assures an orderly, agreed with- 
drawal of the Force, but only when the 
Council so decides. We are also satisfied that 
the phrase "bearing in mind the accepted 
principle of equitable geographic distribu- 
tion" is consistent with article 101 of the 



November 12, 1973 



603 



charter and assures that all of the obvious 
and necessary criteria will be given appro- 
priate consideration in the composition of 
the Force. 

Looking to the future, we hope that the 
Secretary General can move as swiftly as 
possible to implement the resolution we have 
just approved. The United States, as I said 
in my statement of October 25, is prepared 
to consider requests for assistance to this 
end. 

Finally, Mr. President, I would like to ex- 
press my personal satisfaction that my gov- 
ernment has helped to arrange for a meeting 
on the ground of Egyptian and Israeli mili- 
tary representatives under U.N. auspices to 
discuss the practical application of the cease- 
fire. This is a significant practical result of 
the thorough deliberations in this chamber. I 
regard it as especially noteworthy that ar- 
rangements are now being made to provide 
nonmilitary supplies for the 3d Army area. 
For us the humanitarian aspect of the U.N. 
effort is a critically important element in 
this peacekeeping mission. 

Mr. President, may I once again express 
my delegation's firm support for this con- 
structive action of the Council. The future 
will record this as a historic moment in the 
annals of the United Nations if we can main- 
tain the momentum generated here and move 
on to a peaceful, durable settlement. 

TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS 

Security Council Resolution 338- 

The Security Council 

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting 
to cease all firing and terminate all military ac- 
tivity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the 
moment of the adoption of this decision, in the 
positions they now occupy; 

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start im- 
mediately after the cease-fire the implementation of 
Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its 
parts; 



" Adopted on Oct. 22 at 12:50 a.m. by a vote of 14 
to (China did not participate in the voting). 



604 



3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently 
with the cease-fire, negotiations stai't between the 
parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed 
at establishing a just and durable peace in the 
Middle East. 



Security Council Resolution 339^ 

The Security Council, 

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 Oc- 
tober 1973, 

1. Confirms its decision on an immediate cessa- 
tion of all kinds of firing and of all military action, 
and urges that the forces of the two sides be re- 
turned to the positions they occupied at the moment 
the cease-fire became effective; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to take meas- 
ures for immediate dispatch of United Nations 
observers to supervise the observance of the cease- 
fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Re- 
public of Egypt, using for this purpose the person- 
nel of the United Nations now in the Middle East 
and first of all the personnel now in Cairo. 



Security Council Resolution 340 * 

The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October 
and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973, 

Xoting with regret the reported repeated viola- 
tions of the cease-fire in non-compliance with reso- 
lutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973), 

Wotitig with concern from the Secretary-General's 
report that the United Nations military observers 
have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both 
sides of the cease-fire line, 

1. Demands that immediate and complete cease- 
fire be observed and that the parties return to the 
positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 
22 October 1973; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General, as an imme- 
diate step, to increase the number of United Na- 
tions militarj' observers on both sides; 

3. Decides to set up immediately under its author- 
ity a United Nations Emergency Force to be com- 
posed of personnel drawn from States Members of 
the United Nations except the permanent members 
of the Security Council, and requests the Secretary- 
General to report within 24 hours on the steps 
taken to this effect; 

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the 
Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the 



"Adopted on Oct. 23 by a vote of 14 to (China 
did not participate in the voting). 

' Adopted on Oct. 25 by a vote of 14 to (China 
did not participate in the voting) . 



Department of State Bulletin 






state of implementation of the present resolution, as 
well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973); 

5. Requests all Member States to extend their 
full co-operation to the United Nations in the im- 
plementation of the present resolution, as well as 
resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973). 

Security Council Resolution 341 ' 

The Security Council, 

1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General 
on the implementation of Security Council resolu- 
tion 340 (1973) contained in document S/11052/ 
Rev. 1 dated 27 October 1973; 

2. Decides that the Force shall be established in 
accordance with the above-mentioned report for an 
initial period of six months, and that it shall con- 
tinue in operation thereafter, if required, provided 
the Security Council so decides. 



REPORT OF THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL 
IN PURSUANCE OF RESOLUTION 340« 

Report of the Secretary-General on the Implemen- 
tation of Security Council resolution SW (1973) 

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance 
of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 Oc- 
tober 1973 in which the Council, among other things, 
decided to set up immediately a United Nations 
Emergency Force under its authority and requested 
the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on 
the steps taken to this effect. 

Terms of reference 

2. (a) The Force will supervise the implementa- 
tion of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 
(1973), which reads as follows: 

"1. Demands that immediate and complete cease- 
fire be observed and that the parties return to the 
positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 
22 October 1973;". 

(b) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent 
a recurrence of the fighting, and co-operate with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in its 
humanitarian endeavours in the area. 

(c) In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force will 
have the co-operation of the military observers of 
UNTSO. 

General considerations 

3. Three essential conditions must be met for the 
Force to be effective. Firstly, it must have at all 



= Adopted on Oct. 27 by a vote of 14 to (China 
did not participate in the voting). 
•U.N. doc. S/11052/Rev. 1. 



times the full confidence and backing of the Security 
Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co- 
operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must 
be able to function as an integrated and efficient 
military unit. 

4. Having in mind past experience, I would sug- 
gest the following guidelines for the proposed 
Force : 

(a) The Force will be under the command of the 
United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, 
under the authority of the Security Council. The 
command in the field will be exercised by a Force 
Commander appointed by the Secretary-General 
with the consent of the Security Council. The Com- 
mander will be responsible to the Secretary-General. 
The Secretary-General shall keep the Security 
Council fully informed of developments relating to 
the functioning of the Force. All matters which may 
affect the nature or the continued effective func- 
tioning of the Force will be referred to the Council 
for its decision. 

(b)The Force must enjoy the freedom of move- 
ment and communication and other facilities that 
are necessary for the performance of its tasks. The 
Force and its personnel should be granted all rele- 
vant privileges and immunities provided for by the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations. The Force should operate at all 
times separately from the armed forces of the par- 
ties concerned. Consequently separate quarters and, 
wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones will 
have to be arranged with the co-operation of the 
parties. Appropriate agreements on the Status of 
the Force will have to be concluded with the par- 
ties to cover the above requirements. 

(c) The Force will be composed of a number of 
contingents to be provided by selected countries, 
upon the request of the Secretary-General. The 
contingents will be selected in consultation with the 
Security Council and with the parties concerned, 
bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable 
geographic representation. 

(d) The Force will be provided with weapons of 
a defensive character only. It shall not use force 
except in self-defence. Self-defence would include 
resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent 
it from discharging its duties under the mandate of 
the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the 
assumption that the parties to the confiict will take 
all the necessary steps for compliance with the 
decisions of the Security Council. 

(e) In performing its functions, the Force will 
act with complete impartiality and will avoid actions 
which could prejudice the rights, claims or posi- 
tions of the parties concerned which in no way 
affect the implementation of operative paragraph 1 
of resolution 340 (1973) and operative paragraph 1 
of resolution 339 (1973). 



November 12, 1973 



605 



(f) The supporting- personnel of the Force will 
be provided as a rule by the Secretary-General from 
among existing United Nations staff. Those per- 
sonnel will, of course, follow the rules and regula- 
tions of the United Nations Secretariat. 

Proposed plan of action 

5. If the Security Council is in agreement with 
the principles outlined above, I intend to take the 
following urgent steps: 

(a) I propose, with the consent of the Security 
Council, to appoint the Commander of the Emer- 
gency Force as soon as possible. Pending the Com- 
mander's arrival in the mission area, with the 
consent of the Council given at its meeting of 25 
October 1973, I have appointed the Chief of Staff 
of UNTSO, Major-General E. Siilasvuo, as interim 
Commander of the Emergency Force, and have 
asked him to set up a provisional headquarters 
staff consisting of personnel from UNTSO. 

(b) In order that the Force may fulfill the re- 
sponsibilities entrusted to it, it is considered neces- 
sary that it have a total strength in the order of 
7,000. 

(c) The Force would initially be stationed in the 
area for a period of six months. 

(d) In my letter of 25 October to the President 
of the Security Council, I proposed, as an urgent 
interim measure and in order that the Emergency 
Force may reach the area as soon as possible, to 
arrange for the contingents of Austria, Finland and 
Sweden now serving with the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to proceed 
immediately to Egypt. I am at present actively en- 
gaged in the necessary consultations, beai-ing in 
mind the considerations in paragraph 4 (c) above, 
with a view to making requests to a number of 
other Governments to provide contingents of suit- 
able size for the Force at the earliest possible time. 
As the Members of the Council are aware, this is a 
complex matter in which a number of factors have 
to be taken into account. I shall report further to 
the Council as soon as possible. 

(e) In addition to the countries requested to 
pi-ovide contingents for the Force, I propose to 
request logistic support as necessary from a num- 
ber of other countries, which may include the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council. 

Estimated cof:t and method of financing 

6. At the present time there are many unknown 
factors. The best possible preliminary estimate 
based upon past experience and practice is approx- 
imately $.30,000,000 for a Force of 7,000, all ranks, 
for a period of six months. 

7. The costs of the Force shall be considered as 
expenses of the Organization to be borne by the 
Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 
2, of the Charter. 



Annual Report on Trade Agreements 
Program Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

In accordance with section 402(a) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA), I 
transmit herewith the Seventeenth Annual 
Report of the President on the Trade Agree- 
ments Program. This report covers develop- 
ments in the year ending December 31, 1972. 

In the period since I last reported to the 
Congress on our trade agreements program, 
we have taken major new initiatives to give 
strong momentum to closer multilateral co- 
operation and to develop a fairer and more 
efficient framework for the conduct of inter- 
national economic relations. As a result of 
intense preparatory work throughout 1972, 
nations accounting for the bulk of world 
trade, meeting in Tokyo last month, opened 
a major round of new negotiations to reduce 
tariff and nontariff barriers to trade and to 
reform the rules by which all can gain from 
expanded trade. In the related field of mon- 
etary affairs, encouraging progress has been 
achieved on reform of the international mon- 
etary system to provide sound underpinnings 
for a fairer, more open trading system. 

Concurrently with work on these basic 
longer term objectives, U.S. negotiators also 
pressed actively in bilateral consultations for 
the early removal of foreign nontariff bar- 
riers which have distorted normal trade pat- 
terns and restricted U.S. exports. The suc- 
cess of these efforts has, in some cases, 
opened markets where U.S. exporters have 
competed at a disadvantage for over two 
decades. In other instances, prompt U.S. as- 
sertion of our rights under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has either 
deterred the institution of proposed restric- 
tions or resulted in their early termination. 

As a result of U.S. representations, our 
traders are already realizing tangible ben- 
efits from the major liberalization of quotas 



'Transmitted on Oct. 17 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as H. Doc. 93-166, 93d Cong., 
1st sess., which includes the te.\t of the report. 



606 



Department of State Bulletin 



and licensing by Japan and the virtual elim- 
ination of Japanese export incentives. Com- 
pensatory taxes affecting some $40 million 
of U.S. agricultural exports were terminated 
on 98 percent of the products involved. The 
reduction or removal of these and other 
trade distortions demonstrates that sound 
trade policy and vigorous negotiation can 
create new and better opportunities for 
American businesses, farms, and workers. 

Consistent with our efforts to strengthen 
the fabric of common interests between this 
country and the Soviet Union, we concluded 
a major agreement last year which lays the 
basis for the normalization of relations in 
the trade field. Important initial steps also 
have been taken to reduce barriers to com- 
mercial relations with the People's Republic 
of China. These developments open vast 
opportunities for long-term mutual economic 
benefit and for the advancement of world 
peace through the reduction of political ten- 
sions. I again urge the Congress, in consider- 
ing my request for authority to grant normal 
tariff treatment to these countries, to work 
with me in framing an authority which pre- 
serves these gains. 

While we may justifiably be encouraged by 
our achievements in trade and monetary ne- 
gotiations since 1971 and by the reversal of 
the downward trend in our merchandise 
trade balance, we must not underestimate 
the magnitude and complexity of the tasks 
ahead. The multilateral trade negotiations 
which have just been opened are a funda- 
mental building block in the foundation of a 



new world politico-economic structure. The 
stakes are thus high and the bargaining will 
be intense. 

To realize our objectives in the trade field, 
I sent to the Congress last April proposals 
for new legislation entitled the Trade Reform 
Act of 1973. In my statement of October 4, 
I expressed my views on the bill which was 
approved by the House Ways and Means 
Committee.- As legislative deliberation con- 
tinues, I look forward to working with the 
Congress on this bill in a spirit of construc- 
tive partnership. 

The profound changes which have taken 
place in the world economy and the impact 
of growing economic interdependence on 
political relations among nations is now 
clearly recognized. While formidable prob- 
lems exist in the trade area and while 
countries still differ widely on some of the 
important issues, the will now exists to ne- 
gotiate the necessary far-reaching changes 
instead of resorting to confrontation or re- 
taliatory measures which generate political 
frictions. We, like other nations, will be hard 
bargainers, but with a shared spirit of mu- 
tual commitment to a more open and equi- 
table trading system, the entire world can 
progress toward a new era of economic well- 
being and peaceful international relations. 

Richard Nixon. 
The White House, October 17, 1973. 



- For text of the statement, see Bulletin of Oct. 
29, 1973, p. 531. 



November 12, 1973 



607 



The Conceptual Framework for the Inter-American System 



Address by Jack B. Kubisch 

Assistant Secretary for Inter- American Affairs ' 



As I stand here, I am very conscious of 
my predecessors at this podium. This dis- 
tinguished association has been the forum 
in years past for important pronouncements 
or discussions by U.S. officials regarding our 
policy toward the countries of Latin America. 

Indeed, four years ago the President of 
the United States appeared before you to 
propose new goals for the relations between 
the United States and the rest of the hemi- 
sphere. Because I am aware of these prece- 
dents, I wish to make clear at the outset 
that I will not be making any new or dra- 
matic declarations today regarding U.S. 
policies or programs. 

Rather, I would like to share with you 
some thoughts and observations regarding 
the future course of relationships between 
this country and the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 

Two weeks ago in New York our new 
Secretary of State, addressing Latin Ameri- 
can Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors, 
called for "a new dialogue with our friends 
in the Americas." - He said that if the tech- 
nically advanced nations can ever cooperate 
effectively with the developing nations, and 
if people with similar aspirations can ever 
achieve common goals, then it must begin 
in the Western Hemisphere. 

Secretary Kissinger said that the United 
States would approach such a dialogue with 
an open mind and that from our point of 



'■ Made before the Inter American Press Associa- 
tion at Boston, Mass., on Oct. 19. 

' For a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon 
at New York on Oct. 5, see Bulletin of Oct. 29, 
1973, p. 542. 



view no institution or treaty arrangement 
would be beyond examination. 

So my purpose here is in part to salute 
you and indicate the very deep respect with 
which I and the U.S. Government regard 
the Inter American Press Association, its 
purposes, and its distinguished membership, 
and in part to make some contribution to the 
new dialogue which Secretary Kissinger has 
proposed. I do this in the hope of stimulating 
constructive responses from others who, like 
the distinguished members of this audience, 
are interested in the future well-being of the 
peoples of this hemisphere. 

The Search for a New Relationship 

In his address to this organization four 
years ago, President Nixon proposed new 
goals for the Americas. He urged a reshap- 
ing and reinvigorating of our relationships. 
In effect, the President called for an end to 
the preponderant position of the United 
States within the inter-American system — 
an end to what some have called U.S. hegem- 
ony, along with its customary companion, 
paternalism. 

With the President's words in mind, the 
past four years can be seen as a kind of 
search — a quest by the United States and 
the other countries of the hemisphere toward 
a substitute for the old and perhaps out- 
worn pattern of inter- American relations. 

It should not be surprising that the search 
has not yet finally ended nor that the effort 
to define a new set of relationships has been 
accompanied by strain. The old relation- 
ships were, after all, almost a century — and 



608 



Department of State Bulletin 



in some respects even longer — in the making. 
Major changes in international relationships 
are in any case complex, hazardous, and 
uncertain undertakings. 

There were no magic formulas four years 
ago, nor do any appear to be available today. 
What is quite apparent, however, is that for 
some time there has been widespread agree- 
ment among the members of the inter- 
American system — and by that I mean all 
the organizations, treaties, charters, and 
entities that comprise it— that the princi- 
ples and modalities of cooperation and inter- 
action among the countries of this hemi- 
sphere need to be rethought and reformulated. 
There is strong and generalized feeling that 
present modes of our relations do not reflect 
the realities of a rapidly changing world and 
the needs of the hemisphere today. There is 
a widely held belief that the inter-American 
system itself is not working well, that it 
contains anachronistic elements and vestiges 
of the past. 

This general dissatisfaction with the 
status quo was at least partially expressed 
in the unanimous agreement at the OAS Gen- 
eral Assembly last April to undertake a 
process of consultation among our govern- 
ments to try to reach agreement on a re- 
structured inter-American system. As a 
result of that decision, a Special Committee 
of the OAS has been meeting regularly since 
June in an effort to rethink and rework the 
fundamental relationships among countries 
of the hemisphere. 

The U.S. participation in the Special Com- 
mittee has been attentive and deliberately 
restrained. We have wished to hear the ideas 
of others. We have attempted to avoid even 
the appearance of trying to play too promi- 
nent a role in these proceedings. A number 
of delegations have put forth new, interest- 
ing, and imaginative ideas for change, and 
we are in agreement with many of them. It 
is still too early, however, for a broad and 
final consensus to have emerged from the 
deliberations of the Special Committee. 

More recently another significant dimen- 
sion has been added to these efforts at re- 



forming and restructuring inter-American 
relations. I refer to the personal commit- 
ment of our new Secretary of State to bring 
to bear his extraordinary intellect, talents, 
and prestige to the process of finding new- 
policies to govern inter-American relations. 
I can tell you that the Secretary has ini- 
tiated an urgent reexamination within the 
U.S. Government of our Western Hemi- 
sphere ])olicies. I know he is also looking 
forward to learning the considered views of 
his Latin American colleagues on this sub- 
ject. He is not seeking to develop a U.S. 
prescription to be handed over to Latin 
America for its acceptance or rejection. By 
the same token, he hopes that his colleagues 
to the south will also not think in terms of 
prescriptions for the United States. Rather, 
the objective should be full, frank, and in- 
formed dialogue from which would emerge 
a policy framework designed together by the 
United States and the countries of Latin 
America for the common good of all the 
Americas. 

Obviously changes in the inter-American 
system and U.S. policy toward the hemi- 
sphere are not one and the same thing. Just 
as obviously, however, the two are closely 
related. We understand that a number of 
Latin American Foreign Ministers have re- 
sponded to the Secretary's initiative and that 
there will be an exchange of views among 
Latin American officials as to how, when, 
and in what form to respond to this high- 
level dialogue proposed by Secretary Kis- 
singer. 

It should be obvious from what I have 
been saying that the U.S. Government has 
not reached any firm and irrevocable deci- 
sions as to the future of the inter-American 
system. We do believe, however, that the new 
set of inter-American relationships must 
take account of the profound changes in the 
world that have occurred in recent years. 
We also believe that a reformed inter- 
American system must reflect the needs and 
aspirations of all the peoples and nations 
that participate in it— and that includes the 
United States of America. 



November 12, 1973 



609 



It seems to me that what may be required 
is a new conceptual framework for relations 
between the United States and the other 
countries of the hemisphere. I would there- 
fore like to comment on some of the broad 
possibilities which suggest themselves as we 
search for such a new conceptual framework. 

Perspectives of the Inter-American System 

First, however, I would like to say a few 
words about how the inter-American system 
has evolved over the years and what it is 
today. 

From one point of view the inter-Ameri- 
can system is a set of rules, procedures, and 
practices that regulate the behavior of its 23 
members — including the United States — 
among themselves. 

From another perspective, however, the 
inter-American system is a body of rules, 
procedures, and practices that has as one of 
its principal purposes the shaping of the re- 
lationships between one member of the hem- 
ispheric community- — the United States — 
and all of the other members of that com- 
munity. For we must frankly recognize that 
the United States, perhaps by virtue of the 
accidents of history, has a special, almost 
unique, impact on all the other countries of 
the region. As one of my Latin American 
friends once remarked to me: "We nations 
of Latin America have many differences, 
but one of the things we have in common 
is the United States." 

The inter-American system that has re- 
sulted, therefore, has been, at least in part, 
an attempt by the members of the Western 
Hemisphere community to cope with the fact 
that one member — the United States — has 
had economic, political, and military power 
to a much greater degree than that possessed 
by the other members. 

The system, in my view, has been for most 
of its history rather successful in dealing 
with that fact of international life. 

It has also provided an alliance in which 
the strength of the United States could to a 



large extent be used to shield the countries 
of this hemisphere from external threat. 

It has done more than that, however. The 
system, by consecrating in solemn interna- 
tional agreements the juridical equality of 
the United States with the other nations of 
the region, has also assisted the nations of 
Latin America in constraining and even 
regulating to some extent the international 
behavior of the United States. 

At the same time, the system has also de- 
veloped certain principles by which the 
United States has committed itself to use its 
greater resources to assist the other nations 
of the hemisphere in advancing their own 
economic and social development. The point 
4 program, the International Cooperation 
Administration, the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank, the Alliance for Progress, 
and the Agency for International Develop- 
ment are but a few of the better known 
organizational examples of how U.S. eco- 
nomic resources have been marshaled for the 
benefit of Latin America. 

Nor were the benefits of this arrangement 
one-sided, for the system has also afforded 
the United States an opportunity to further 
its own national interests by collective agree- 
ment and negotiation, rather than solely 
by unilateral action. The United States has 
long recognized that its own present and 
long-range interests are best served by the 
security and well-being of the other nations 
of the hemisphere. 

Thus, the inter-American system that has 
evolved over the course of a centuiy has 
been by and large — and with all its imper- 
fections and shortcomings — a notably suc- 
cessful effort in adaptation by the nations 
of this hemisphere to the circumstances of 
international life. However, human life on 
this planet has always outdistanced the 
structures devised by men to regulate their 
relations with one another. And probably 
in no other era have changes in international 
relationships been as rapid and as far- 
I'eaching as in recent years. 



610 



Department of State Bulletin 



What are these changed circumstances, 
and how liave they affected the nations of 
this hemisphere? 

Changes on the International Scene 

One of the most profound changes that 
has occurred in the recent past is the end 
of the position of overwhelming economic 
superiority enjoyed by the United States for 
many decades. 

We have seen the rise of Europe and 
Japan to the status of economic superpowers. 
We have seen the decline of the dollar as the 
basis for the international monetary and 
trading system developed after World War 
II. We have seen the U.S. economy moving 
from abundance — even overabundance — of 
energy resources, foodstuffs, and other com- 
modities, to shortages and deficits. 

These changes in the economic situation 
of the United States are bound to have pro- 
found consequences for Latin America. They 
mean that Latin America must look, not just 
to one developed country, but to all developed 
countries to share in the responsibility of 
providing that extra margin of resources 
from abroad that the region needs for its 
development. They mean that Latin Amer- 
ica's relations with the European Economic 
Community and with Japan have taken on 
new importance — that Latin America is 
looking outward beyond the hemisphere for 
new opportunities in trade and investment. 
We regard this as healthy, as part of the 
broad movement toward a truly global sys- 
tem of trade and commerce. 

This shift in the economic position of the 
United States also implies that this country 
must seek greater reciprocity in its economic 
relations with the rest of the world. By this 
I do not mean, of course, complete and full 
reciprocity in our economic intercourse with 
Latin America. It does seem to me, however, 
that we can no longer in-esume that, because 
of its greater relative wealth, the economic 
obligations between the United States and 
the other nations of the hemisphere all run 
one way. 



Not only has there been a change in rela- 
tive ]30wer relationships in recent years but 
there has been to some extent a redefinition 
of power itself. In large part, this redefini- 
tion has been brought about by the recogni- 
tion of the unthinkability of nuclear war. 

Whatever the reason, we now see the rise 
of states and of groups of states whose power 
is not measured by military capabilities 
alone but also by their economic dynamism 
and command of vital resources, not to men- 
tion their moral and intellectual force in the 
world. 

This redefinition of power has opened up 
the prospects of a different kind of world 
from the one we have become accustomed to. 
It is, to use a familiar phrase, a multipolar 
world in which individual countries, sub- 
regional and regional blocs, can take their 
place alongside the military superpowers and 
play vigorous world roles. 

The movement toward greater strength by 
regional cooperation is probably farthest ad- 
vanced in Western Europe. Regional unity 
would seem to me, however, to offer highly 
important opportunities for other areas of 
the world as well, and especially Latin 
America. 

There are already several efforts within 
Latin America toward subregional and re- 
gional cooperation which show great promise. 
In addition to the subregional efforts at 
economic integration, such as the Andean 
Pact, the Caribbean Free Trade Association, 
and the Central American Common Market, 
for example, we see an impressive capabil- 
ity among the Latin American and also the 
Caribbean states to formulate common posi- 
tions on world and regional issues. It is 
quite easy to envisage a point between now 
and the end of this century when Latin 
America, or major parts of it, will have 
reached a degree of political cooperation and 
economic integration comparable to or sur- 
passing that now enjoyed by the European 
Community. 

In my opinion, greater cohesion and coop- 
eration among Latin American states either 



November 12, 1973 



611 



at the regional or subreg-ional level should 
be regarded by the United States as a highly 
favorable development. If some of the prob- 
lems in our relationships in the past have 
been due to a too dominant U.S. role in the 
hemisphere, then a sti-onger and more united 
Latin America will serve the best interests 
of all. 

One of the most important and obvious 
changes on the international scene has been 
the replacement of the cold war by a move- 
ment toward detente between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and the People's 
Republic of China. The accompanying re- 
laxation of international tension — only tem- 
porarily threatened, I hope, by recent devel- 
opments in the Middle East — has favorable 
implications for the entire world, Latin 
America not excepted. 

Finally, there have been significant 
changes within the countries of Latin Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean themselves. National- 
ism, which has always been a dynamic force 
in Latin America, as elsewhere in the world, 
is in our day assuming new and potentially 
much more constructive and farther reach- 
ing dimensions. Many nations of Latin 
America have also broadened the concept of 
national security — quite rightly, in my 
view — to embrace overall economic develop- 
ment and social justice. They are also seek- 
ing better ways to express their national 
identities and personalities and to increase 
control of their own destinies. 

The new openness and more forward- 
looking spirit in the world, the vastly in- 
creased opportunities for interaction be- 
tween nations and groups of nations on a 
global scale through the movement of peo- 
ples, goods, and ideas, will certainly help 
the nations of Latin America in their quest 
for a fuller, richer, and more satisfying na- 
tional life. 

The changes in the international environ- 
ment which I have attempted to describe 
mean that the inter-American community is 
at a truly historic crossroads. 



Looking Ahead 

In my opinion, the challenges which face 
the inter-American system require bold and 
imaginative solutions if our regional rela- 
tionships are to reflect the new realities. It 
seems that we must devise new principles 
and procedures which reconcile the differing 
imperatives of our respective national cir- 
cumstances with the growing interdepend- 
ence among nations. Such an effort offers us 
both the possibility and the challenge of 
writing a major new chapter in the history 
of the Western Hemisphere. 

Many of the ideas which have been put 
forward during the current deliberations of 
the OAS Special Committee, on which sit 
many distinguished and thoughtful mem- 
bers, have been inspired by just such a goal. 
Progress in the Special Committee has not 
been easy, but this should not surprise us. As 
the Secretary of State recently reminded us 
in his address to the Pacem in Terris Con- 
ference, international life consists of rela- 
tions among sovereign countries, and to 
attempt to construct a body of principles 
that will regulate the behavior of such proud, 
independent, and quite different states — to 
attempt to legislate such behavior and to do 
so in a way that will stand the test of time — 
is an enormously difficult task, as history so 
amply demonstrates. 

Let me assure you that the U.S. Govern- 
ment has reached no hard-and-fast conclu- 
sions regarding the future of its relation- 
ships in this hemisphere, except that they 
should evolve in a way that reflects the 
realities in the world and best serves the 
national interests of all our countries. 

We look forward eagerly to the new, 
closer, high-level dialogue with our neigh- 
bors in this hemisphere. We shall listen to 
their views closely and carefully as we re- 
formulate and develop our own policies. We 
do not wish to — nor could we — make any 
decisions unilaterally about the future course 
of this hemisphere to which we belong and 
which we cherish so deeply. 

If we in the Western Hemisphere are to 



612 



Department of State Bulletin 



break out into new ground in international 
relations, we must once again become 
pioneers. 

We must embark on what Secretary Kis- 
singer has characterized as a new adventure 
of free peoples, working together to establish 
a new set of relationships that will be an 
example to the other nations of the world — 
to find a new way of reconciling our differ- 
ences and our inequalities so as to insure 
peace, progress, prosperity, and justice for 
all. 



Secretary Kissinger Receives 
George Catlett Marshall MecJal 

Follon-mg are informal remarks Tnade by 
Secretary Kissinger at Washington on Octo- 
ber 17 upon receiving the George Catlett 
Marshall Medal of the Association of the 
United States Army. 

Press release 386 dated October 18 

We are now engaged in very serious, very 
openminded consultations with many coun- 
tries, trying to bring about an end to the 
hostilities in the Middle East. So that this 
crisis through which we are now living is a 
test of the possibilities of diplomacy and of 
the real meaning of detente. Because it must 
be clear that while the United States is try- 
ing to make our nation safe from war, we 
will not do so at the price of making the rest 
of the world safe for war. 

We believe that there exists an opportunity 
for a decent and just settlement, fair to all 
the parties, which must be reached first by 
bringing about an end to hostilities and then 
by a dedicated effort that will end the condi- 
tions that produced this current conflict. 

This is our policy, which we will pursue 
with conviction and which we believe and 
hope will succeed. 

No one would understand these purposes 
better than the man in whose honor this 
award was named. He was a master in the 
art of war, and he won equal acclaim for his 



dedication in building peace. He demon- 
strated that one of the quotes of De Tocque- 
ville, who was one of the keenest observers 
of the American scene, about the dilemmas 
of democracies in the conduct of foreign 
policy was wrong. De Tocqueville wrote that: 

It is especially in the conduct of their foreign 
relations that democracies appear to me decidedly 
inferior .... There is (he said) a propensity that 
induces democracies to obey impulse rather than 
prudence and to abandon a mature design for the 
gratification of a momentary passion. 

This is indeed a great danger in democracies. 
But General Marshall, as Secretary of State, 
faced a nation tired of the sacrifices of war 
and reluctant to sacrifice for the maintenance 
of peace. With no clear vision of America's 
role in the world, i^artisan political consid- 
erations had begun to dominate postwar for- 
eign as well as domestic affairs. But General 
Marshall's great contribution was to prove 
that democracies can conduct an effective 
foreign policy. He provided a new vision, 
making foreign policy an expression of na- 
tional rather than partisan purpose. He in- 
duced Congress to share in its design, and he 
established the closest relations with Senator 
Vandenberg and other congressional leaders. 

While every moment in history is unique, 
a few moments are similar in their openness 
to fundamental choice. 

George Marshall faced the danger of a 
world descending into chaos, and he had the 
opportunity to build a new international 
order. The reconstruction of Europe, the 
creation of NATO, the rebuilding of Japan, 
the beginning of point 4, were major acts of 
statesmanship and substantially determined 
the course of the past quarter century. 

Now we face another open moment in 
history, when once again we must clearly 
perceive the shape of the world and purpose- 
fully seek to shape it. And this moment in- 
deed has come about because much of the 
vision that General Marshall represented has 
been fulfilled. It is due to the success of the 
policy he inspired. 

In our relationship, particularly to Europe, 
which was shaped by a plan that bore his 



November 12, 1973 



613 



name, we now must redesign that relation- 
ship in the face of new conditions. 

Western Europe is no longer as weak as 
it was in the immediate postwar period and 
is able to assume a much greater political 
resj^onsibility. The military vacuum that 
existed at the time has been filled to a con- 
siderable extent by the Atlantic coalition. 
The relationship with the Soviet Union, de- 
spite difficulties that exist at this moment, 
nevertheless gives hope that the danger of 
war has receded. 

The unity of Europe, which they have 
forged and which we have supported, creates 
the need for a new set of economic relation- 
ships. 

This is why we are now in the process of 
developing a new set of patterns and strategy 
in political relationship and economics in 
which we hope to be worthy of the vision 
that inspired General Marshall. Because if 
the nations of the Atlantic area, sharing 
similar traditions, having experienced many 
of the same agonies, and combining the same 
or very similar purposes, cannot work to- 
gether, it is difficult to see how we can 
achieve cooperative relationships in a dy- 
namic situation in other parts of the world. 

And so it is around the globe. 

Japan has recovered. In Southeast Asia, a 
new relationship has to be developed. 

China, with which General Marshall's 
name was associated, has gone through a 
dramatic period and has reentered the inter- 
national scene. 

We have the opportunity to repeat his 
great tasks of construction. But we face it in 
a different environment. 

At the time that General Mai'shall was 
Secretary of State, his wisdom was a bonus 
because the United States was physically so 
preponderant that we could overwhelm every 
problem with resources. We could always 
substitute our resources for thought. We 
were not in a position where we faced the 
danger of irretrievable error. 

But today we face the problem of applying 
scarce resources to limited objectives. We 
require intelligence and vision and fore- 



sight — not just as an accident of history but 
as a necessity for all times. 

We also confront choices that are clouded 
by ambiguity. 

A generation ago the challenges were clear, 
the alternatives were naked. Today the dan- 
gers appear less immediate, the choices less 
clear-cut. 

We are therefore required to summon an 
unaccustomed ability to deal with nuance, to 
strive for what is good while never forgetting 
what is best. The America of De Tocqueville 
faced no such challenge. Even the America 
of General Marshall knew no such over- 
whelming need. 

Now we have to decide: Were the achieve- 
ments of General Marshall an interlude or an 
introduction, a passing moment of American 
maturity or the beginning of an era of great 
achievement? 

Will we follow President Truman's wise 
advice, that peace is not a reward that comes 
automatically to those who cherish it; it must 
be pursued, increasingly and unswervingly, 
by every means at our command. This is the 
challenge that General Marshall summoned 
America to meet, and this is the summons 
we must once again answer. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 1st Session 

Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Report, to- 
gether with supplemental views, to accompany 
S. 1914. S. Rept. 93-356. July 27, 1973. 9 pp. 

Endangered and Threatened Species Conservation 
Act of 1973. Report to accompany H.R. 37. H. Rept. 
93-412. July 27, 1973. 40 pp. 

Amending Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 
1920, and Authorizing a Trans-.A.laska Oil and 
Gas Pipeline, and for Other Purposes. Report, 
together with dissenting, separate, and additional 
views, to accompany H.R. 9130. H. Rept. 93-414. 
July 28, 1973. 87 pp. 

Six Amendments to the Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea, 1960. Report to accompany Ex. 1, 93-1. 
S. Ex. Rept. 93-12. August 1, 1973. 3 pp. 



614 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



United States and Philippines 
Sign Cotton Textile Agreement 

The Department of State announced on 
October 5 (press release 361) that notes had 
been exchanged at Washington on September 
27 and October 3 extending through Decem- 
ber 31, 1976, the bilateral agreement con- 
cerning trade in cotton textiles between the 
United States and the Philippines. Willis C. 
Armstrong, Assistant Secretary for Econom- 
ic and Business Affairs, and Mario C. Beli- 
sario, Philippine Embassy Charge d' Affaires, 
signed the respective notes. ( For texts of the 
notes, see press release 361.) 

The aggregate level to which the Philip- 
pines will restrain exports of cotton textiles 
to the United States for the 12-month period 
beginning January 1, 1974, is 66,331,913 
square yards equivalent. This level is 5 per- 
cent greater than the level for the preceding 
12-month period. 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Astronauts 

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return 
of astronauts, and the return of objects launched 
into outer space. Opened for signature at Wash- 
ington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. En- 
tered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599. 
Accession deposited: Pakistan, October 18, 197.3. 

Atomic Energy 

Amendment of article VI of the statute of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energ>' Agency of October 26, 
1956, as amended (TIAS 3873, 5284). Done at 
Vienna September 28, 1970. Entered into force 
June 1, 1973. TIAS 7668. 
Acceptance deposited: Poland, October 23, 1973. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 



treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 

Ratificatio7t deposited: United Kingdom, October 
25, 1973.' 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.= 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 25, 
1973. 

Coffee 

-Agreement amending and extending the international 
coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6584). Approved by 
the International Coffee Council at London April 
14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. 
Accepted by the President: October 9, 1973. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 21, 1969r 

Acceptance deposited: United States, October 17, 
1973. 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Uni- 
versal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regu- 
lations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol 
and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo No- 
vember 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, 
except for article V of the additional pi'otocol, 
which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 
7150. 

Ratification deposited: Burma, September 12, 1973. 
Accession deposited: Mauritius, September 10, 
1973. 

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Accession deposited: Sri Lanka, July 6, 1973. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Proclaimed by the President: October 13, 1973, for 
articles 1 through 12. 



' Applicable to the territories under the territorial 
sovereignty of the United Kingdom, as well as the 
British Solomon Islands Protectorate. 

■ Not in force. 



November 12, 1973 



615 



Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de- 
struction on the seabed and the ocean floor and 
in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into 
force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, October 25, 
1973. 



BILATERAL 

Khmer Republic 

Agri'eement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 
7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom 
Penh October 8, 1973. Entered into force October 
8, 1973. 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 
7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom 
Penh October 18, 1973. Entered into force October 
18, 1973. 



PUBLICATIONS 



Department Issues Reference Volume 
on U.S. Diplomatic Representatives 

The Department has issued a publication entitled 
"United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973," by 
Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Chapman, 
both officers of the Historical Office in the Bureau 
of Public Affairs. This 239-page paperbound book 
includes a tabular listing of American diplomatic 
representatives abroad from 1778 through March 31, 
1973, arranged by country to which accredited. Rep- 
resentatives serving as chiefs of mission to interna- 
tional organizations, Ambassadors at Large, and 
Presidential appointees in the Department of State 
are also included. The publication includes an alpha- 
betical listing of all persons included in the tables 
or in explanatory footnotes, giving for each officer 
full name, years of birth and death, and a chrono- 
logical listing of posts mentioned in the volume. 

Copies may be ordered from the U.S. Government 
Printing Office Bookstore, Depai-tment of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520, at $2.70 per copy (Depart- 
ment of State publication 8738; GPO cat. no. 
81.69:147). 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed 
to the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below include domestic postage. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each con- 
tains a map, a list of principal government officials 
and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a 
reading list. (A complete set of all Background 
Notes currently in stock — at least 140 — $16.35; 1- 
year subscription service for approximately 77 up- 
dated or new Notes — $14.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) 
Single copies of those listed below are available at 
20<' each. 

Central African Republic Cat. No. S1.123:C33AF 

Pub. 7970 5 pp. 
Congo (Brazzaville) . . . Cat. No. S1.123:C76/2 

Pub. 7896 4 pp. 
Cyprus Cat. No. S1.123:C99/2 

Pub. 7932 7 pp. 
Malagasy Republic Cat. No. S1.123:M29/3 

Pub. 8015 4 pp. 
Portuguese Guinea Cat No. S1.123:P83 

Pub. 7966 4 pp. 
Singapore Cat. No. S1.123:SI6 

Pub. 8240 8 pp. 
Tonga Cat. No. S1.123:T61 

Pub. 8594 4 pp. 

The Realities of the Western Hemisphere. This 
pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series is 
based on a statement made by Secretary of State 
William P. Rogers before the General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States at Washington, 
D.C, April 6, 1973. Pub. 8727. Inter-American 
Series 104. 5 pp. 20('. (Cat. No. 81.26:104). 

Claims— Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Agree- 
ment with Japan implementing article I, paragraph 
3, of the agreement of April 18, 1969. TIAS 7581. 
5 pp. 15(*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7581). 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Republic of Korea Co- 
operation Agreement. Agreement with the Republic 
of Korea and the International Atomic Energy 
Agencv amending the agreement of January 5, 1968. 
TIAS "7584. 3 pp. 15C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7584). 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Yemen 
Arab Republic. TIAS 7586. 5 pp. 15^ (Cat. No. 
89.10:7586). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Re- 
public of China amending the agreement of December 
30, 1971, as corrected. TIAS 7590. 3 pp. 15('. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:7590). 



616 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 12, 197 J Vol. LXIX. No. 179 Jt 



\merican Principles. Secretary Kissinger Re- 
ceives George Catlett Marshall ^Io<1nl iK\^. 
singer) '■• 

ambodia. Emergency Security Assistance Re- 
quested for Israel and Cambodia (message 
from President Nixon to the Congress) . . 596 

(>ngre«s 

nnual Report on Trade Agreements Program 
Transmitted to the Congress (message from 
President Nixon) 606 

ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 614 

Kmergency Security Assistance Requested for 
Israel and Cambodia (message from Presi- 
dent Nixon to the Congress) 59H 

Kconomic Aifairs 

• iinual Report on Trade Agreements Program 
Transmitted to the Congress (message from 
President Nixon) 606 

Tnited States and Philippines Sig^n Cotton 
Textile Agreement 615 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Receives George 
Catlett Marshall Medal (Kissinger) ... 613 

Israel. Emergency Security Assistance Re- 
quested for Israel and Cambodia (message 
from President Nixon to the Congress) . . 596 

Latin America. The Conceptual Framework of 
the Inter-American System (Kubisch) . . 608 

Middle East 

['resident Nixon Holds Meeting With Arab 
Foreign Ministers (Nixon, al-Saqqaf) . . . 595 

President Nixon Presents Nine Medals of 
Honor (remarks) 594 

''resident Nixon's News Conference of October 
26 (excerpts) 581 

<.>cretary Kissinger Receives George Catlett 

Marshall Medal (Kissinger) 613 

■ecretary Kissinger's News Conference of Oc- 
tober 25 585 

L.N. Calls for Middle East Cease-Fire and 
Negotiations and Establishes Emergency 
Force (Scali, texts of resolutions and report 
of U.N. Secretary General) 598 

Philippines. United States and Philippines Sign 
Cotton Textile Agreement 615 

Presidential Documents 

Annual Report on Trade Agreements Program 

Transmitted to the Congress 606 

Emergency Security Assistance Requested for 

Israel and Cambodia 596 

President Nixon Holds Meeting With Arab 

Foreign Ministers 595 

President Nixon Presents Nine Medals of 

Honor 594 



President Nixon's News Conference of October 
26 (excerpts) 581 

Publications 

Department Issues Reference Volutnc on U.S. 

Diplomatic Representatives 616 

GPO Sales Publications 616 

Trade. Annual Report on Trade Agreements 
Program Transmitted to the Congress 
(message from President Nixon) .... 606 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 615 

United States and Philippines Sign Cotton 

Textile Agreement 615 

U.S.S.R. 

President Nixon's News Conference of October 
26 (excerpts) 581 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of Oc- 
tober 25 585 

United Nations. U.N. Calls for Middle East 
Cease-Fire and Negotiations and Establishes 
Emergency Force (Scali, texts of resolutions 
and report of U.N. Secretary General) . . 598 

Vief-Nam. President Nixon Presents Nine 
Medals of Honor (remarks) 594 

Name Index 

al-Saqqaf, Umar 595 

Kissinger, Secretary 585, 613 

Kubisch, Jack B 608 

Nixon, President .... 581, 594, 595, 596, 606 
Scali, John 598 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 22-28 

Px-ess releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 22 which 
appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 
361 of October 5 and 386 of October 18. 



No. 



Date 



Subject 

390 10/25 Kissinger: news conference. 

♦391 10/26 Byroade sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Pakistan (biographic 
data). 

t392 10/26 Multilateral agreement reached 
on Atlantic fisheries. 

■^393 10/26 Duke Ellington and B.B. King 
to tour Africa. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



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U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON, DC. 2O402 
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of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXIX 



No. 1795 



November 19, 1973 



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SCHLESINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE 

OF OCTOBER 26 617 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND WORLD ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
Address by Under Secretary Casey 630 

TFQSAOES EXCHANGED BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV 
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962 
Documents Recently Declassified 635 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



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Vol. LXIX, No. 1795 
November 19. 1973 



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Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's News Conference of October 26 



Secretary Schlesinger: I thought that it 
was possible that you might have some ques- 
tions that you would like to raise this morn- 
ing, and I'm prepared to take them. 

Q. Most of our NATO allies fiave appar- 
ently taken the position that they're not 
going to allow the United States to use their 
airspaces or their facilities for our effort to 
resupply Israel, and lue can understand the 
individual reasons for doing that — it's not a 
NATO operation. Can you comment on re- 
ports that some of our NATO allies, partic- 
ularly Turkey, have allowed overflights of 
Soviet aircraft to resupply the Arabs? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I won't comment 
on the particular issue that you indicate. 

Q. Can you repeat that. There is micro- 
phone trouble. 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think we have had 
a demonstration in recent days of the im- 
portance of readiness. I wish that it were 
reflected better in this room. 

The question referred to the suggestion 
that Turkey had permitted overflights by the 
Soviet Union. My response was that I would 
not comment on that particular allegation, 
but we will investigate all aspects of the 
responsiveness of various countries in this 
crisis and will take them into consideration 
in the future. 

Q. Can you tell us n-hat steps the Soviet 
Union was taking that led us to a 7nilitary 
alert? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I'll mention a num- 
ber of them, but there were a plethora of 
indicators. We were aware that the Soviets 
had alerted comprehensively their airborne 
forces. In addition, the Soviet air was stood 



down, I believe, starting on Monday, and 
diminished to zero flights on Tuesday. The 
standing down, along with the alerting of 
airborne units, plus certain ambiguous de- 
velopments to which Dr. Kissinger referred 
yesterday, suggested the possibility of a 
movement that was unilateral on the part 
of the Soviet Union, and we took the normal 
precautions under those circumstances, ad- 
justing our DEFCON [defense condition] 
status. 

Q. You said that we took the normal cir- 
cumstances — normal adjustments. It ha.^ 
been suggested, and I wonder if you'd com- 
ment, that in fact we took extra-firm, 
extra-quick reaction in order to leave no 
misunderstanding or no possibility of misun- 
derstanding on the part of the Soviets that 
the President is still able to act despite his 
domestic difficidties. Would you coynment on 
that? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I would say that 
our reaction was timely; that it was not 
extra-quick. Given the indicators that ex- 
isted, the reaction was taken at the 
appropriate time. On the question of com- 
prehensiveness or firmness, opinions may 
differ with regard to that. I think that it's 
quibbling about details, however. I think 
that it was imjaortant in view of the circum- 
stances that have raised a question or may 
have raised a question about the ability of 
the United States to react appropriately, 
firmly, and quickly, that this certainly 
scotched whatever myths may have developed 
with regard to that possibility. 

Q. Can you tell us how long the alert is 
going to go on — U.S. alert? 



November 19, 1973 



617 



Secretary Schlesinger: We have begun to 
phase down the alert. CINCSOUTH— the 
Southern Command — and the Alaskan Com- 
mand went back to normal DEFCON status 
at 12 o'clock midniofht last night. We will 
be making other adjustments as the circum- 
stances warrant, as the President directs. 
I would expect that there may be some ad- 
justments in the near term, but it will de- 
pend on the circumstances and the views 
of the President. 

Q. Are there any other adjustments today, 
sir? 

Secretary Schlesinger: It is certainly pos- 
sible that there will be other adjustments 
made. 

Q. Secretary General Brezhnev [Leonid I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet 
Communist Party] has said that Soviet rep- 
reseyitatives have already gone into the tvar 
zone. Do ive have any indications of what 
they are — the numbers, types, et cetera? 

Secretaiy Schlesinger: The Soviet repre- 
sentatives, I assume, would be associated 
with the observation teams to which Dr. Kis- 
singer referred yesterday. They would not 
be Soviet combat forces. The need [is] for 
small numbers of people and any indications 
we have suggest that they would be in small 
numbers. 

Q. Wasn't he talki)ig about observers un- 
der the U.N. auspices, where the Russians 
evidently are talking about sending repre- 
sentatives to Egypt on request of [President 
Anwar] Sadat? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure just 
what the Russian suggestion is. In the judg- 
ment of the U.S. Government, there should 
be no combat forces, major combat forces, 
introduced by any of the permanent mem- 
bers of the Security Council. Now, there may 
be small numbers of forces, of individuals 
rather than forces, who would be moving 
into the combat area — or recently the com- 
bat area, since at the present time all is 
quiet out there — and, hopefully, they would 
be associated with the U.N.-controlled ob- 
servation teams. 



Q. Has the airlift been resumed by the 
Soviet Union? , 

Secretary Schlesinger: The airlift of the 
Soviet Union is going on at the present 
time, much diminished from the prior level. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, being an expert in the 
iyitelligence field, coidd you comment on the 
fact that we are spending $3 billion a year 
on this and ive come up ivith a big fat zero. 
Mr. Kissinger has to be waked out of a sound 
sleep to find out that this happened. He said 
that the other countries tvere caught flat- 
footed also. Could you comment on the ef- 
ficacy of our intelligence effort in this area? 

Secretary Schlesinger: As a general com- 
ment, intelligence with regard to the in- 
tentions as opposed to capabilities is a very 
difficult task, and one cannot expect to have 
to bat 1,000 in that area. The purpose of 
our intelligence expenditures is to improve, 
and substantially — and we believe it has 
substantially improved — the intelligence 
available to the United States. We had indi- 
cations of the movements of forces. In the 
estimating process, of course, one must make 
that decision or come to a conclusion whether 
or not the forces will be utilized. I think that 
the technical performance — the technical 
performance of the intelligence agencies- 
cannot be criticized ; in fact, it must be highly 
commended. There are always limitations, 
in the performance, in the estimating proc- 
ess. I think that the technical performance 
of the intelligence community with regard 
to the indicators of the possibility of Soviet 
movement, rather than being a flat zero as 
your question implied, was extraordinarily 
good. 

Q. Is it the administration view now that 
because the admitiistration took a strong 
stand by declaring this alert it turned the 
Russians around? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that I 
would refrain from making so generalized a 
comment. I think that what we would say 
is that it was necessary to go on alert be- 
cause of the possibility, the possibility of the 



618 



Department of State Bulletin 



movement of forces in a certain region of 
the world, tliat the alert was necessitated 
by that movement of forces. The alert also 
had the function of demonstrating the strong 
belief of the U.S. Government that the 
movement that was being speculated on 
would be disadvantageous to the world's 
peace. Consequently, to the extent that that 
message was conveyed, I think that this has 
been a success. But I should stress that the 
selection of DEFCON III was a normal 
procedure under those circumstances. 

Q. I would like to go into that a little bit. 
When you used the phrase earlier that the 
Soviet air was stood down — / don't under- 
stand what that means — / guess it's a tech- 
nical military term. What does that mean, 
the Soviet air teas stood doivn, and what 
are the implications of that^ 

Secretary Schlesinger: The implications 
of any standing down are that one must 
consider the possibility that those equip- 
ments are being mobilized for a new pur- 
pose. 

Q. So the reading here ivas that the Soviets 
might be jndting themselves in a position 
to move troops into the Middle East and you 
ivanted to warn them not to do it. Is that 
correct ? 

Secretary Schlesinger: 1 think the first 
part of it is the correct reading. The second 
part is your inference, and you're welcome 
to it. I wouldn't confirm that. 

Q. They wouldn't move a lot of airborne 
troops icithout some kind of air cover — 
fighter planes and things like that. Were 
there indications of that kind of alert as 
well? Did that tend to soften the concern 
any, or was it just felt that they didn't need 
that? 

Secretary Schlesinger: As one will recog- 
nize, there has been major air transportation 
into the Middle East during the last three 
weeks. All of it has gone through unimpeded, 
so it was not judged that fighter cover would 
be a necessity. 

Q. Once more, for the fourth time. Is there 



anything that the Russians are rvow doing 
that prevents us from calling off the alert 
now? Why do we have to space out this call- 
up or alert or stage it out? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the 
answer to that is that we do not know at this 
stage whether the Soviets have reduced their 
alert status, we are carefully watching the 
circumstances, and that we are adjusting 
downward as the circumstances permit. Is 
that a complete answer to that question? 

Q. You say we are carefidly watching their 
alert status. Have they begun to adjust 
downward? 

Secretary Schlesinger: As I indicated a 
moment ago, it is easier to determine when 
forces have been put on the alert than when 
that alert status has been terminated. 

Q. What's the status of the American air- 
lift to Israel right now? 

Secretary Schlesinger: The American air- 
lift is continuing. 

Q. At what stage? Are we still at 20 flights 
a day? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Approximately 20 
flights a day. There has been no adjustment 
of the American airlift. It will continue un- 
til such time as sea transportation permits 
the discontinuation of the airlift. Because 
of the geographic proximity, Soviet sealift, 
which is now in high gear, has taken over 
in large measure from the airlift. 

Q. Nothing that you have said, or Mr. 
Kissinger said yesterday, has indicated that 
Soviet nuclear or strategic forces were 
alerted. Why was it necessary to alert our 
SAC [Strategic Air Command'] forces in 
connection with this Mideast crisis, given the 
yuiture of the fighting that has gone on in 
recent days and the type of troops — airborne 
troops — that were alerted by the Soviets? 
Why did we have to apparently, from what 
we can tell, escalate it into terms of nuclear 
forces? 

Secretary Schlesinger: That is a precau- 
tionary measure, as I indicated. We chose 



November 19, 1973 



619 



a DEFCON status that is an intermediate 
status. Under circumstances that existed at 
that time one wishes to have one's forces in 
enhanced i-eadiness posture. This was, of 
course, not the highest readiness posture. 
We have had circumstances in the last 15 
years in which we have gone into a higher 
readiness posture than was decided upon the 
other evening. The Soviet buildup of naval 
forces in the Mediterranean, associated with 
the possibility — the possibility of actions 
taking place that might have involved U.S. 
naval forces, leads one to take precautionary 
steps involved in putting all U.S. forces that 
could be involved in a higher state of readi- 
ness. 

Q. Certain moves ivere t^iken during this 
alert which gave the implication that we 
icere prepared to move paratroopers on our 
oivn side to the Middle East. This woidd 
indicate also a possible confrontation with 
jxiratroopers coming from Russia. Dr. 
Kissinger indicated that he tvas not ever 
thinking of such a confrontation. Why would 
you then alert the 82d Airborne for that 
purpose ? 

Secretary Schlesinger: A lot is tied up in 
your word "prepared." The increase in the 
readiness condition of U.S. forces may have 
been misunderstood by some in recent days. 
To increase the readiness condition does not 
mean that one is prepared to move those 
forces or, even more strongly, commit them 
to battle. We were, of course, in a position 
in which, if the circumstances required, we 
would have been prepared to move the 82d 
Airborne, but we were only putting our- 
selves in a readiness posture. And it is im- 
portant to be in a readiness posture because 
frequently that removes the necessity of 
taking actions that might have to be con- 
sidered if one were not in a readiness pos- 
ture. 

Q. [Inaudible] raise the possibility for the 
point, that you know of, that prior to their 
alert we had sent an additional helicopter 
carrier with marines into the Mediterranean 
and that you had attended a maneuver of 



the H2d Airborne dotcn in Fort Bragg. Did 
they say that those actions by the United 
States precipitated their alei't? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Not to my knowl- 
edge, but I would indicate that I would not 
care to comment upon the extent of diplo- 
matic communications. That is a prerogative 
of Dr. Kissinger. The movement of the 
marines was a normal replacement of the 
marines in the Mediterranean. It was acceler- 
ated by a few days — I don't remember 
whether it was five days or so. There is a 
long voyage between here and the Mediter- 
ranean. One might regard that as a pre- 
cautionary measure, but the basic answer to 
that, I think, is that this was part of a 
normal replacement. Similar activities have 
gone on with regard to the Soviet fleet. My 
visit to Brass Key II to which you referred 
had been laid on for some months. 

Q. Can you give hs to some degree thi 
scenario leading up to this alert? The groiiji 
here says that it was started at 12 o'clock 
(midnight) ; Dr. Kissinger said J o'clock 
(a.m.). I realize that there's a three-hour 
housekeeping maneuver, but did you make 
the decision by yourself or were you acting 
on the orders of the President or what? 

Secretary Schlesinger: The meeting, and 
one is a little vague on times, started about 
11 o'clock (ii.m.). It may have been a little 
bit later than that. 

Q. What meeting is this you are referring 
to? 

Secretary Schlesinger: This was the meet- 
ing of the abbreviated National Security 
Council. 

Q. Could you start by telling us who was 
there? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think most of 
the people who were there have been men- 
tioned in their normal statutory capacities. 
Dr. Kissinger was there, Mr. Colby [Wil- 
liam E. Colby, Director of Central Intelli- 
gence], Admiral Moorer [Adm. Thomas H. 
Moorer, Chairman, .loint Chiefs of Staff], 



620 



Department of State Bulletin 



and myself. The meeting started at approxi- 
mately 11 o'clock (p.m.) as I recall it. The de- 
cision to notify the commands of an en- 
hanced readiness status was taken at approx- 
imately 11:30 (p.m.). There's a whole series 
of decisions that went on between approxi- 
mately 11:30 (p.m.) and about 3:30 in the 
morning; somewhere around 2 o'clock 
(a.m.) — I don't remember the precise time — 
Admiral Moorer and I returned to the Pen- 
tagon in which further action was taken to 
complete the iiackage of measures that were 
undertaken at that time. The initial decision 
was made by myself, however, at approxi- 
mately 11:30 (p.m.), and I instructed Ad- 
miral Moorer to go ahead with the enhanced 
readiness condition. 

Q. Had you talked irith the President at 
th is time ? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I had not talked 
with the President at that moment. Dr. Kis- 
singer had, I believe, just spoken with the 
President. The President was in complete 
command at all times during the course of 
that evening. 

Q. Was he airare that yon had alerted the 
troops^ 

Secretary Schlesi)iyer: Yes, sir. 

Q. Did he apjirore that? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, indeed. As Dr. 
Kissinger indicated, he approved the entire 
package about 3 o'clock in the morning. 

Q. Could you tell us what it was, accord- 
inij to our assessment, that led the Riissiaiis 
to make a move toward moving troops into 
the Middle East? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I would be inclined 
not to speculate on motives regarding events 
that did not take place. The Soviets did not 
move any forces. There were, as I indicated, 
some actions that increased our wariness 
and some ambiguous diplomatic signals to 
which Dr. Kissinger referred, but those 
events did not take place. You can speculate 
for yourself with regard to the kinds of dis- 



cussions that might have been ongoing in the 
Kremlin during that period of time. 

Q. Would you tell iis how many Soviet 
troops were alerted and characterize their 
state of alert? Also, outside of those troops 
and the potential for a Soviet airlift of 
troops, were there any other indicators thai 
caused us to go on our ou-n alert? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, sir, there were 
additional indicators — some of them, as I 
have indicated, in the diplomatic area, but 
there were also additional military indi- 
cators in this area. 

Q. What were they? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I believe I men- 
tioned the enhancement of the Soviet naval 
forces. They are now up to about 85 ships in 
the Mediterranean, which is ajiproximately 
double the normal level of the Soviet Medi- 
terranean fleet. In addition, there were a 
number of other indicators of military intel- 
ligence nature into which I shan't go. 

Q. What about the number of men in- 
volved? 

Q. And troops in state of readiness? 

Secretary Schlesinger: It was a compre- 
hensive alerting of the Soviet airborne. 

Q. Where? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I will refrain from 
answering that at the present time. 

Q. How many divisions? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not going to go 
into the Soviet force structure. 

Q. It wasn't a comprehensive alert of all 
their forces — 

Secretary Schlesinger: No, the airborne. 

Q. There are some reports that roughly 
50,000 airborne were alerted — the Soviets. 
Is that a rough approximation? 

Secretary Schlesinger: As a matter of fact, 
I'm not sure of the precise number, but that 
number is in about the right ball park. 

Q. One other question: Their (Soviet) tioo 



November 19, 1973 



621 



helicopter carriers — did they go into the 
Mediterranean? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't believe so; 
I can check on that. 

Q. Are they still moving around the Black 
Sea? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I've indicated, I 
think, the full extent of the activities. 

Q. Could you tell ns why the U.S. Govern- 
ment viewed the apparent decision, or ten- 
tative decision, of the Soviets to send forces 
in as a peacekeeping measure when they 
combined that unth an appeal to ns to send 
troops in — / mean, why did we think this 
was such a dangerous thing? They've had 
15,000 troops there before, and they said 
they were going just to secure peace. 

Secretary Schlesinger: You are dealing 
with a hypothetical question, once agfain. I 
think that the movement of Soviet forces, 
the postulated movement of Soviet forces, 
which is designed, ostensibly designed, to re- 
strain the behavior of one of the nations en- 
gaged in military hostilities, with the possi- 
ble longrun implications of such stationing 
of forces, is not something that would be 
conducive to the development of what is the 
fundamental objective of U.S. foreign pol- 
icy — which is a stable and permanent settle- 
ment in the Middle East. 

Q. If you could just clarify, earlier you 
said, I think, that the CINCSOUTH was 
making adjustment. Now, irhy would a 
NATO command be involved in this type of 
thing? Did you misspeak? 

Secretary Schlesinger: SOUTHCOM. 

Q. Both yon and Secretary Kissinger have 
gone to great lengths to indicate that we 
were not at the brink of u-ar at any time. 
There are many questions still left unan- 
sivered regarding your intelligence estimates 
as to Russian moves. Is there any tvay you 
could help us clear some of this up? It's still 
ambiguous. I myself am not clear how close 
we were to actually coming to a confronta- 
tion. 



Secretary Schlesinger: I think we wei"e 
very far away from a confrontation — 

Q. I couldn't hear the question. 

Secretai-y Schlesinger: The questioner 
wished to obtain some assurance with regard 
to the issue of how close we were to a con- 
frontation, and I indicated that we were 
very far away from a confrontation. If the 
question refers to a military confrontation, 
under the circumstances I think that we 
were taking the actions that were necessary 
to preclude the development of a military 
confrontation. Xow, there were, of course, 
some elements of confrontation in the sense 
of political adversaries. They were, I think, 
as Dr. Kissinger indicated the other day, a 
normal development that occurs between 
great powers which have considerations in 
which they are in conflict and also consider- 
ations which force them toward a common 
approach to jn'oblems. 

I think that this whole ei^isode indicates 
the limitations, in a sense, of detente, but it 
also indicates the strength of detente. The 
fact that Dr. Kissinger, with considerable 
skill, I must say, a great deal of energy, was 
able to work out in collaboration with the 
Soviets the arrangement for two cease-fires, 
is, I think, a tribute to the strength of 
detente — the communications that existed 
between the two so-called superpowers. How- 
ever, of course, there were some elements 
of conflict but the overall episode did indicate 
some of the strengths of detente and some of 
the advantages to both sides — and to the 
world at large — in this relaxation of tension. 
I should underscore that detente refers to 
mutual relaxation of tension and that detente 
must be a two-way street, as in the close of 
this episode it turned out to be. 

Q. Was part of the formida, as it ex- 
isted around 11 to 11:30 (p.m.), that there 
ivere Soviet transports en route and we 
didn't knou- whether they had troops but 
given all the other circumstances ice felt ive 
couldn't take the chance that there were 
troops aboard those planes? 



622 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Schlesinger: I think that there 
were mixed reactions and different assess- 
ments of the probability. I think that the 
probability of Soviet forces being en route 
was considered by some to be quite low but 
that the probability might rise was a matter 
of concern universally. 

Q. [Inmidible] thought those planes were 
oi route might have troops on them? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Yes, indeed, as I 
indicated that there is a different assess- 
ment of probabilities by different individ- 
uals. So that when you say that they might 
have troops aboard, nobody under those cir- 
cumstances could dismiss that as a possibility 
no matter how low- he placed the probability. 

Q. Could you tell us token exactly you 
first learned that the seven Soviet airborne 
divisions, or ivhatever the force may have 
been, had been placed in an alert status? 
Wasn't that some time back, about the time 
Kosygin [Aleksei N. Kosygin, Chairman of 
the Soviet Council of Ministers] tvas in 
Cairo — quite a way back? 

Secretary Schlesinger: It was in an earlier 
point; I don't remember the precise day. 
I think that one must recognize that in these 
assessments it's a pulling together of a 
number of strands. While the airlift is fully 
preoccupied, quite obviously that is of lesser 
importance than when there is a standdown. 
Simultaneously, if there are diplomatic sig- 
nals that cause wariness, that adds to the 
total picture. But you are quite right. 

Q. Is he right, ivas it several days before 
that when you first learned about it? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I don't remember 
precisely the number of days or even whether 
it was days rather than a day. But it had 
occurred earlier. 

Q. Let me jog your memory on that. Our 
colleague Joe Alsop reported that on either 
the 19th or 20th of this month that an air- 
borne division ivas alerted. 

Secretary Schlesinger: I would not raise 
any question about the authenticity of the 
comments of any of your colleagues. I don't 



remember the precise day. I think that the 
statement is correct. We can probably check 
on that for you. 

Q. We've had a situation over the past 
two weeks where our client state got into 
trouble. We sent in nearly a billion dollars' 
worth of military equipment to help it out. 
We then got a cease-fire; our client state 
took advantage of the cease-fire to strengthen 
its position on the west bank, to encircle the 
3d Army. It plunged us into a one-day crisis 
with our major adversary. What does this 
all say about our future relations with 
Israel, and specifically, what are we telling 
Israel now as to ivhat it should do on that 
3d Army? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the 
answer to your final question will be emi- 
nently satisfactory, but I cannot give it to 
you now. With regard to our posture in gen- 
eral, I would not use the term "client state," 
particularly in an exclusive sense. Our pur- 
pose has been to restore peace to the area 
and to maintain a balance so that there can 
be some stabilization in an area which over 
the past 25 years has had a notably tragic 
history. I think that it is evident that in 
order to have a long-term settlement, the 
relationship between Israel and her neigh- 
bors must be based on something far broader 
than a military preponderance by the State 
of Israel. In the working out of that rela- 
tionship, which we hope has been fostered 
by the total resolution of the United Nations, 
the agreement of the parties to negotiate one 
with another for the first time in many 
years— for the first time since 1948 in ef- 
fect—will be instrumental in bringing about 
the kinds of stable relationships, or increased 
stability in those relationships. The United 
States desires stability in the area, equity 
for all parties in the area, protection of the 
security of all parties; and consequently, I 
would tend to adapt the assumptions that 
underlay your question. The United States 
has sought to achieve a degree of bal- 
ance — sometimes the phrase "evenhanded- 
ness" is employed — with regard to the 
countries in the area. 



November 19, 1973 



623 



Longrun stability, however, would not 
have been achieved if Israel had been inun- 
dated after the war started on October 6. 
The United States delayed, deliberately de- 
layed, the start of its resupply operations 
hoping that a cease-fire could be imple- 
mented quickly. Soviet resupply operations 
started on the 10th of October, if I remem- 
ber correctly. We hoped that we could dis- 
courage that activity on the part of tho 
Soviets and that once again we could bring 
an immediate cease-fire. By the morning of 
the 13th, it was evident, I think, that without 
resupply there would be extreme difficulty in 
maintaining a balance. There were some 
who believed that the existence of the State 
of Israel was seriously compromised and 
therefore in order to achieve what is our 
objective — a longrun settlement with equity 
for all parties — that that action was neces- 
sitated on the part of the United States. 
But the United States, I think, seeks to have 
in the Middle East a condition of stability 
and a condition in which the rights of all 
parties are respected. I hope that many of 
the nations in the Middle East, without 
regarding themselves as our clients, regard 
themselves to a high degree friends and 
partners of the United States. 

Q. Hoiv viuch eqtiipment Juive we sent to 
Israel and how much tvill we send? 

Secretary Schlesinger: At the present 
time, I think we have delivered approxi- 
mately 10,000 tons directly. 

Q. What is that in terms of dollars? 

Secretary Schlesinger: About $850 million 
at this stage. 

Q. You mean ive stopped since last Fri- 
day? The White House said it tvas $825 mil- 
lion then. 

Secretary Schlesinger: You can get the 
precise number; I think it's about $850 
million. 

Q. How much will ive deliver in terms of 
dollars before ive stop the resupply? 

Secretary Schlesinger: There is a ten- 
dency in these kinds of deliveries for high- 



value items to be delivered at an earlier point 
in time so that the value per ton tends to 
decline with the passage of time. I'm sorry 
I did not answer your full question. What 
was the rest of the question? 

Q. What tvill be the total value? 

Secretary Schlesinger: The President has 
asked for a supplemental of $2.2 billion. We 
do not know whether that is the precise 
i-equirement. 

Q. Does your remark just now indicate 
that ire have completed delivery of expen- 
sive items such as planes, tanks? There'll be 
no more? 

Secretari/ Schlesinger: No, what my re- 
mark suggested was that in the immediate 
environment after the 13th of October, that 
certain high-value consumables and sub- 
sequently certain replacement items were 
delivered. For the time being there is a 
reduction in the flow of such items and 
there is more of a flow of consumables. 

Q. Is there a tentative cutoff date for 
the American airlift? Do you have a date 
in mind by which you can complete it? 

Secretary Schlesinger: For the airlift? I 
can't give you a precise date, but it could 
go on. I gave you an imprecise date — at the 
point that the sealift begins to take over 
which should be in about two to three weeks' 
time. 

Q. Hoiv are ice going to create this condi- 
tion of stability that you talked about in that 
area if ive pump in 2 billion dollars' worth 
of arms and rearm the Israelis and Russia 
primps in numbers of rubles of arms and re- 
arms the Egyptians and Syrians and equip'>s 
them to fight all over again? What kind of a 
fruitftd policy is that? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that it's 
quite obvious from your question that if 
that were the sole basis of policy on our part 
or on the part of the recipient states or the 
supplier states, that it would be difficult to 
obtain the kind of longrun settlement to 
which we have both referred. The settle- 
ment must be based upon restraint and 



624 



Department of State Bulletin 



balance on the part of the supplier nations, 
but most fundamentally on the development 
of a political relationship that can only come 
from direct negotiations and from the be- 
ginning of the appreciation of both parties 
in the conflict of the requirements that the 
other party sees which are fundamental and 
those that can be compromised. 

Q. Mr. Secretanj, one point about the tim- 
ing, I hadn't knoivn before our meeting here 
that you had known for some time about 
the Soviet alert of its airborne forces. In the 
light of that, what specific thing caused this 
11 o'clock meeting of the National Security 
Council; what was the immediate precipitat- 
ing factor; what had been learned that led to 
that late night meeting? 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that the 
direct precipitating cause falls in that area 
that we have not discussed and I do not wish 
to go into, which relates to ambiguous sig- 
nals that caused increased wariness. These 
were not of a military nature. 

Q. Are our deliveries by sea and air going 
to proceed more or less ivith those of the 
Russians? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Our deliveries are 
based upon our assessment of what the 
requirements are to maintain a balance in 
the area. As you are aware, the American 
airlift was based upon that premise as was 
the provision of certain equipments. In ton- 
nage, this is less than the tonnage that was 
carried initially by the Soviet airlift. In addi- 
tion, the Soviets are moving about 60,000 
tons at the present time by sea. We have 
moved little by sea ourselves at this stage. 
There have been a number of Israeli vessels 
that have begun to move certain equipments 
by sea, but I believe that the total movement 
is about 10,000 tons. So, once again it's much 
smaller. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivith respect to Southern 
and Alaskan Commands, can you say what 
portion of U.S. forces they represent; does 
that mean nuclear forces are still on alert? 

Secretary Schlesinger: Nuclear forces; let 
me underscore once again that we have a 



scaled set of postures ranging from DEF- 
CON V to DEFCON I. We have chosen an 
intermediate readiness posture. As a matter 
of fact, for most of the forces concerned, we 
regard it as a minimum or the lowest degree 
of readiness that was required by those 
circumstances. So when you use the phrase 
"alert," all we are referring to is enhanced 
readiness of a moderate degree. That has 
not as yet been changed. As I indicated 
earlier, we will begin, I think, to make se- 
lective adjustments in the readiness posture 
of all of our forces, including the Strategic 
Air Command, as the circumstances warrant 
and in response to the directives of the 
President. 

Q. You've gone through an elaborate dis- 
cussion of all the military reasons for the 
alert and then you say, however, none of 
these reasons was the precipitating cause of 
the alert and you're not going to tell lis what 
that reason was. I think you otve us an obli- 
gation to give us some idea about those 
ambiguous statements that the other — 

Secretary Schlesinger: I do not think that 
that would be in the interest of the American 
public at that time or the question of world 
peace. As my response to an earlier question 
indicated, the episode has underscored the 
strengths of detente, it has also under- 
scored its limitations, and consequently in 
a matter so delicate it would seem to me to 
be inappropriate at this time to go any 
further into the kinds of matters to which 
you refer. I indicated that it was of a non- 
military nature. 

Q. I gather from what you said in answer 
to your first question that we are disap- 
pointed ivith the behavior or the actions of 
most of our NATO alllies ayid that this may 
influence us in things like military aid, et 
cetera, in the future. Is tJiat a correct inter- 
pretation? You said we would take this into 
account in planning our future actions. 

Secretary Schlesinger: I think that ob- 
viously that the circumstances force 
one — any new set of circumstances forces 
one — to consider established notions, estab- 



November 19, 1973 



625 



lished doctrine. We maintain our forces in 
Germany, to cite one example, because it 
provides us with enhanced readiness. The 
reactions of the Foreign Ministry of Ger- 
many raised some questions about whether 
they view readiness in the same way that 
we view readiness, and consequently we 
will have to reflect on that matter. 



U.S. Urges North Viet-Nam To End 
Violations of Paris Agreement 

Following is a U.S. note delivered to the 
E7yibassij of the Democratic Rejniblic of 
Viet-Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on 
October 26. The note was also delivered to 
other participants in the International Con- 
ference on Viet-Nam. 

Press release 394 dated October 30 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has 
the honor to refer to the Agreement on End- 
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
Nam of January 27, 1973. 

The United States refers to recent state- 
ments by the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam that the United States is illegally pro- 
viding military assistance to the Republic of 
Viet-Nam and states that these charges are 
without any foundation and intended to 
mask the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's 
own continuing violations of the Paris 
Agreement. The United States draws the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's attention 
to the fact that, as set forth in the United 
States note of April 20, 1973, to the signa- 
tories of the March 2, 1973, Act of the Inter- 
national Conference on Viet-Nam and in the 
United States note to the Democratic Repub- 
lic of Viet-Nam dated September 10, 1973, 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam side 
has shipped vast quantities of war material 
into South Viet-Nam since January 28 in 



violation of Article 7 of the Paris Agree- 
ment.' 

The United States notes that also in con- 
travention of Article 7 of the Paris Agree- 
ment the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam 
side has dispatched large numbers of North 
Vietnamese troops into South Viet-Nam 
since January 28, 1973. Some of these troops 
entered South Viet-Nam by crossing the De- 
militarized Zone in violation of Article 15(b) 
of the Agreement, while others entered 
through Laos and Cambodia, violating Ar- 
ticle 20(a). 

The United States further notes that the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has failed 
to honor its commitment in the Joint Com- 
munique of June 13 to designate three addi- 
tional points of entry and to discuss in the 
Two-Party Joint Military Commission mo- 
dalities for the supervision of the replace- 
ment of armaments, munitions, and war ma- 
terial permitted under Article 7 of the Paris 
Agreement. 

In addition, because of the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam side's failure to co- 
operate with the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and to 
])rovide it assistance and protection as re- 
quired by Article 10 of the ICCS Protocol, 
the ICCS has been unable to station and 
maintain teams at certain locations where 
Article 4(d) of the ICCS Protocol requires 
that such teams be stationed: Gio Linh, Lao 
Bao, Due Co and Xa Mat. In consequence of 
these failures by the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam to honor its commitments under 
the Paris Agreement and its Protocols, the 
machinery provided for in the Agreement to 
supervise replacement of war materials by 
the two South Vietnamese parties has never 
been established. Responsibility for the lack 
of supervision of, and control over, import 
of war materials into South Viet-Nam lies 
entirely with the Democratic Republic of 
Viet-Nam. 

The United States urges the Democratic 



' For texts of the notes, see Bulletin of May 14, 
1973, p. 599, and Oct. 1, 1973, p. 423. 



626 



Department of State Bulletin 



Republic of Viet-Nam side to remedy this 
dangerous situation by ceasing all violations 
of Article 7 of the Paris Agreement; by at 
once formally designating three additional 
points of entry; by at once beginning dis- 
cussions in the Two-Party Joint Military 
Commission regarding the modalities for the 
sui^ervision of the rejilacement of war mate- 
rials permitted under Article 7; and by im- 
mediately inviting the ICCS to send its teams 
to Gio Linh, Lao Bao, Due Co, and Xa Mat, 
providing them with suitable quarters and 
other amenities. Only in this way can Article 
7 of the Paris Agreement be implemented 
and violations by either side be prevented. 
The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam 
will recognize that it has a grave responsi- 
bility in this matter and that on the course 
it elects to follow the prospects for lasting 
peace in Viet-Nam will depend. 



Funds Requested for U.S. Contribution 
to Multilateral Lending Institutions 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

As their role in conveying financial as- 
sistance to developing countries has steadily 
enlarged in recent years, multilateral lending 
institutions have become vital to our hopes 
for constructing a new international eco- 
nomic order. 

One of the most important of these insti- 
tutions is the International Development 
Association, a subsidiary of the World Bank 
that provides long-term loans at low interest 
rates to the world's poorest nations. During 
the 13 years of its operation. IDA has pro- 
vided over $6.1 billion of development credits 
to nearly 70 of the least developed countries 
of the world. Two dozen countries have con- 
tributed funds for this effort. 

By next June, however, the International 



' Transmitted to the Congress on Oct. 31 (White 
House press release). 



Development Association will be out of funds 
unless it is replenished. As a result of an 
understanding reached in recent interna- 
tional negotiations, I am today proposing 
to the Congress that the United States join 
with other major industrialized nations in 
pledging significant new funds to this orga- 
nization. Specifically, I am requesting that 
the Congress authorize for future appropria- 
tion the sum of $1.5 billion for the fourth 
replenishment of IDA. Initial payments 
would be made in fiscal year 1976 and the 
full amount would be paid out over a period 
of years. 

I am also requesting that the Congress 
authorize an additional $50 million for the 
Special Funds of the Asian Development 
Bank. The bank is one of the major regional 
banks in the world that complements the 
work of the International Development As- 
sociation and the World Bank. 

Legislation for both of these authorities is 
being submitted to the Congress today by 
the Secretary of the Treasury. 

Strengthening the International 
Economic System 

Just over a year ago, in September 1972 
at the annual meeting in Washington of the 
International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, I stressed the urgent need to build a 
secure structure of peace, not only in the 
political realm but in the economic realm as 
well. I stated then that the time had come 
for action across the entire front of inter- 
national economic problems, and I empha- 
sized that recurring monetary crises, 
incorrect alignments, distorted trading ar- 
rangements, and great disparities in devel- 
opment not only injured our economies, but 
also created political tensions that subvert 
the cause of peace. I urged that all nations 
come together to deal promptly with these 
fundamental problems. 

I am happy to be able to report that since 
that 1972 meeting, we have made encourag- 
ing jn-ogress toward updating and revising 
the basic rules for the conduct of interna- 
tional financial and trade affairs that have 
guided us since the end of World War II. 



November 19, 1973 



627 



Monetary reform negotiations, begun last 
year, are now well advanced toward forging 
a new and stronger international monetary 
system. A date of July 31, 1974, has been set 
as a realistic deadline for completing a basic 
agreement among nations on the new- 
system. 

Concurrently, we are taking the funda- 
mental steps at home and abroad that will 
lead to needed improvement in the inter- 
national trading system. On September 14, 
while meeting in Tokyo, the world's major 
trading nations launched new multilateral 
trade negotiations which could lead to a 
significant reduction of world trade barriers 
and reform of our rules for trade. The 
Congress is now considering trade reform 
legislation that is essential to allow the 
United States to participate effectively in 
these negotiations. 

Essential Role of Development 
Assistance 

While there is great promise in both the 
trade and monetary negotiations, it is im- 
portant that strong efforts also be made in 
the international effort to support economic 
development — particularly in providing rea- 
sonable amounts of new funds for interna- 
tional lending institutions. 

A stable and flexible monetary system, 
a fairer and more efficient system of trade 
and investment, and a solid structure of 
cooperation in economic development are the 
essential components of international eco- 
nomic relations. We must act in each of these 
interdependent areas. If we fail or fall be- 
hind in one, we weaken the entire effort. 
We need an economic system that is bal- 
anced and responsive in all its parts, along 
with international institutions that reinforce 
the principles and rules we negotiate. 

We cannot expect other nations — devel- 
oped or developing — to respond fully to our 
call for stronger and more efficient trading 
and monetary systems, if at the same time 
we are not willing to assume our share of 
the effort to ensure that the interests of 
the poorer nations are taken into account. 
Our position as a leader in promoting a more 



reasonable world order and our credibility as 
a negotiator would be seriously weakened if 
we do not take decisive and responsible ac- 
tion to assist those nations to achieve their 
aspirations toward economic development. 

There ai-e some two dozen non-communist 
countries which provide assistance to de- 
veloping countries. About 20 percent of 
the total aid flow from these countries is 
now channeled through multilateral lend- 
ing institutions such as the World Bank 
group — which includes IDA — and the re- 
gional development banks. 

These multilateral lending institutions 
play an important role in American foreign 
policy. By encouraging developing countries 
to participate in a joint effort to raise their 
living standards, they help to make those 
countries more self reliant. They provide a 
pool of unmatched technical expertise. And 
they provide a useful vehicle for encourag- 
ing other industrialized countries to take a 
larger responsibility for the future of the 
developing world, which in turn enables us 
to reduce our direct assistance. 

The American economy also benefits from 
our support of international development. 
Developing countries today provide one-third 
of our raw material imports, and we will 
increasingly rely upon them in the future for 
essential materials. These developing coun- 
tries are also good customers, buying more 
from us than we do from them. 

New Proposals for Multilateral 
Assistance 

Because multilateral lending institutions 
make such a substantial contribution to 
world peace, it must be a matter of concern 
for the United States that the International 
Development Association will be out of funds 
by June 30, 1974, if its resources are not 
replenished. 

The developing world now looks to the 
replenishment of IDA's resources as a key 
test of the willingness of industrialized, de- 
veloped nations to cooperate in assuring the 
fuller participation of developing countries 
in the international economy. At the Nairobi 
meeting of the World Bank last month, it 



628 



Department of State Bulletin 



was agreed by 25 donor countries to submit 
for approval of their legislatures a proposal 
to authorize $4.5 billion of new resources to 
IDA. Under this proposal, the share of the 
United States in the replenishment would 
drop from 40 percent to 33 percent. This 
represents a significant accomplishment in 
distributing responsibility for development 
more equitably. Other countries would put up 
$3 billion, twice the proposed United States 
contribution of $1.5 billion. Furthermore, to 
reduce annual appropriations requirements, 
our payments can be made in installments 
at the rate of $375 million a year for four 
years, beginning in fiscal year 1976. 

We have also been negotiating with other 
participating nations to increase funds for 
the long-term, low-interest operation of the 
Asian Development Bank. As a result of 
these negotiations, I am requesting the 
Congress to authorize $50 million of addi- 
tional contributions to the ADB by the 
United States — beyond a $100 million con- 
tribution already approved. These new funds 
would be associated with additional con- 
tributions of about $350 million from other 
nations. 

Meeting Our Responsibilities 

In addition to these proposals for pledging 
future funds, I would point out that the 
Congress also has before it appropriations 
requests for fiscal year 1974 — a year that is 
already one-third completed — for bilateral 
and multilateral assistance to suppoi't our 
role in international cooperation. It is my 
profound conviction that it is in our own 
best interest that the Congress move quickly 
to enact these pending appropriations re- 
quests. We are now behind schedule in 
providing our contributions to the Inter- 
national Development Association, the Inter- 
American Development Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, so that we are not 
keeping our part of the bargain. We must 
show other nations that the United States 
will continue to meet its international 
responsibilities. 

All nations which enjoy advanced stages 



of industrial development have a grave re- 
sponsibility to assist those countries whose 
major development lies ahead. By providing 
support for international economic assistance 
on an equitable basis, we are helping others 
to help themselves and at the same time 
building effective institutions for interna- 
tional cooperation in the critical years 
ahead. I urge the Congress to act promptly 
on these proposals. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, October 31, 1973. 



U.S.-Denmark Extradition Treaty 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
mit herewith the Treaty on Extradition be- 
tween the United States of America and the 
Kingdom of Denmark, signed at Copen- 
hagen on June 22, 1972. I transmit also, for 
the information of the Senate, the report of 
the Department of State w-ith respect to the 
Treaty. 

The Treaty is one of a new series of extra- 
dition treaties being negotiated by the United 
States and contains provisions for offenses 
of aircraft hijacking, narcotics, and con- 
spiracy to commit listed offenses. 

The Treaty will make a significant contri- 
bution to the international effort to control 
narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Sen- 
ate give early and favorable consideration 
to the Treaty and give its advice and con- 
sent to ratification. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, October 30, 1973. 



' Transmitted on Oct. 30 (White House press re- 
lease) ; also printed as S. Ex. U, 93d Cong., 1st 
sess., which included the text of the treaty and the 
report of the Department of State. 



November 19, 1973 



629 



Science and Technology and World Economic Affairs 



Address by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 



In my remarks today I would like to con- 
sider with you the national stake in tech- 
nological innovation and in the strengthen- 
ing of our country's scientific and techno- 
logical position and their close connection 
with our international relations and our 
economic strength and posture in the world. 

Until recently our research funding and 
the level of our scientific education were 
taken as insuring for the future the techno- 
logical and industrial leadership we had en- 
joyed in the jiast. In the private sector, the 
remarkable American record of technological 
innovation in the past seemed to offer as- 
surance of our future competitiveness. 

Then, toward the end of the 1960's, the 
downward trend of our balance of trade 
called into question many assumptions we 
had been making — including our assump- 
tions about technology. It became clear that 
we had relied too heavily on a long lead 
and heavy funding in a few conspicuous 
areas and forgotten that commercial com- 
petition is waged in terms of thousands of 
items in many markets. 

Our balance of trade involves more, of 
course, than the state of our technology. 
Productivity, quality, and price were — and 
remain — important factors. Successive de- 
valuations of the dollar are serving as an 
important corrective, and our efforts to re- 
duce trade barriers can also play a signifi- 
cant role. 

But today we consider none of these more 
important than supporting science to nourish 



' Made before the Industrial Research Institute 
at Chicago, 111., on Oct. 17. 



technology and enlisting our technology to 
pay our way in the world and to meet the 
world's development and environmental 
needs. No traces of overconfidence or com- 
placency are to be found in government to- 
day. And I trust that none is to be found in 
the iirivate sector; for although the gov- 
ernment's view and efforts have broadened, 
it is to the private sector that we must look 
to reinvigorate our competitiveness in these 
"thousands of items in many markets" that 
have a marked effect on our balance of trade 
and to produce the energy, the environ- 
mental progress, and the development of 
l)oor nations which are fundamental to peace 
and iirosperity in the world. 

While our position has weakened on many 
fronts of the trade competition, we liave re- 
mained strong in the export of "technology- 
intensive" products. Sophisticated products, 
including components and equipment, con- 
tinue to contribute importantly to our bal- 
ance of trade in manufactures : Some $8 
billion in 1972 came from nonelectric ma- 
chinery, machine tools, farm machinei'y, 
printing and reproduction equipment, air- 
craft and aircraft parts, and computers and 
parts. 

If we look beyond the balance of trade to 
receipts from royalties and fees, we find an 
additional benefit from technology. In 1972 
our royalty and fee earnings from foreign 
subsidiaries and licensees were in net surplus 
by $2.8 billion. Whether the technology in- 
volved should all be counted as "advanced" 
is perhaps open to question, given the in- 
adequacy of data. Nonetheless, these earn- 
ings clearly accrued from technology that 



630 



Department of State Bulletin 



has not been made obsolete in the market in 
which it is employed. 

Looking to the future, there is another 
way in which advanced technology will have 
an important bearing on our international 
economic situation: through assisting in 
meeting the mounting demand for energy 
and raw materials, and accomplishing this 
in ways which will not further despoil the 
environment. 

The United States has an enonnous eco- 
nomic stake in science and technology. As we 
look ahead, we can see that the outflow of 
dollars necessary to bring in from abroad the 
fuel and the raw materials needed to keep 
our plants and households going and to 
maintain our living standards will grow 
sharply. 

Looking at our own economy and at the 
policies of other nations, we see forces and 
programs which will put still heavier respon- 
sibilities on our high-technology industries 
and our engineering and managerial skills. 
Our economy is increasingly a service econ- 
omy. Two out of three of us work in service 
industries. Only one out of three of us work 
in producing the goods which are the main 
substance of world trade. 

We find our chief competitors, Japan and 
the European Community, with more or less 
conscious plans to shift labor-intensive, 
energy-intensive, and fuel-intensive indus- 
tries beyond their boundaries — to Taiwan, 
Korea, Southeast Asia, Latin America, and 
Africa. At the same time we see them devel- 
oping policies to subsidize and otherwise 
promote the development of high-technology 
industries at home — aircraft, computers, nu- 
clear power, communications equipment, 
and so on. 

Many of our own corporations find it 
necessary to shift labor-intensive industries 
to Latin America and Asia in order to meet 
world competition. At the same time, the 
Soviet Union and the oil-rich Persian Gulf 
states are seeking to attract industries which 
find a significant economic advantage in 
cheap power and proximity to raw materials 
which they have to impoi't in order to manu- 



facture in the United States. These are 
fundamental economic forces which are loose 
in the world. We will have to adjust to them, 
and we will have to look to science and tech- 
nology to fill the gap in our employment and 
national earning power which seems likely 
to arise from these forces. 

As this implies, our position in the world 
economy hinges on: 

— The export of products incorporating 
advanced technology; 

— The international diffusion of advanced 
technology; and 

— The introduction within the United 
States of technological advances whose ef- 
fects will reach beyond the domestic 
economy. 

International Transfer of Technology 

What is the government doing to promote 
continuing technological innovation? Dr. 
Stever [H. Guyford Stever. Science Adviser 
to President Nixon] has dealt with funding 
basic and applied science and programs to 
stimulate innovation. Let me discuss the 
State Department activities in developing a 
worldwide climate making for a satisfactory 
flow of technology and for international co- 
operation in science and its application. 

Most of our specific concerns with tech- 
nology arise from its proposed or ongoing 
transfer to foreign countries or foreign in- 
dustry. In an open society and close-knit 
world, it's neither desirable nor possible to 
completely shut off' the flow and diffusion of 
technology, nor can the flow always be com- 
pletely turned on. Whether across divisional 
boundaries in your own company or across 
national boundaries, the management of 
technology transfer is an elusive, complex 
process. It challenges the best talent avail- 
able in your organizations even under favor- 
able circumstances. 

Our mutual objectives are to assure the 
adequacy of controls and mechanisms for the 
protection of private and government tech- 
nology, the appropriate payment for private 
and government technology, and the develop- 



November 19, 1973 



631 



ment of guidelines that represent U.S. na- 
tional interests, short-term and long-term. 
This requires attention to questions of na- 
tional security, economics, domestic employ- 
ment, and business interests. Doing this in a 
dynamic environment of international rela- 
tions and commitments is an extremely dif- 
ficult and complex task. There is now a broad 
effort in several government agencies to 
evolve such an understanding, with a vigor- 
ous level of discussion indicative of the im- 
portance of the ijroblem. 

To protect our technology and enhance its 
application and value, we work: 

— To secure patent protection abroad; 

— To secure fair treatment of foi'eign 
branches and affiliates of U.S. corporations; 

—To preclude the emergence abroad of in- 
dustrial standards which could serve as non- 
tariff barriers or lead to a mismatch of 
different segments of global systems (such 
as those in the telecommunications field) ; 
and 

— To obtain fair value for our technology. 

U.S. Private Industry and the U.S.S.R. 

Now let me quickly, by way of an example 
or two, deal with both government and 
business cooperation and international co- 
operation. An exceptional recent instance of 
vital cooperation between government and 
your organization occurred in the evolving 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade relationships, stemming 
from the 1972 summit agreements on trade, 
science and technology, environment, and 
space. Since 1972 the U.S. Government and 
private industry have increasingly explored 
useful and profitable ways of doing business 
with the Soviet Union. There is no question 
but that the Soviets are intensely interested 
in American technology. In the agreements 
with the U.S.S.R., both governments pledged 
to find ways for establishing mutually bene- 
ficial relationships in science and technology. 
Such cooperation can be governmental or 
private and commercial. 

The Soviet Union fully recognized the im- 
portance of American industry in this proc- 



ess. The State Committee for Science and 
Technology (SCST) in recent months has 
signed agreements with 13 American com- 
panies, all of which make reference to the 
May 24, 1972, science and technologj' agree- 
ment. 

While this is a matter primarily between 
I'.S. ])rivate industry and the Soviet State 
Committee for Science and Technology, the 
U.S. Government also has a major interest 
in seeing that the relationships between the 
l)owerful and well-coordinated SCST and in- 
dividual companies are carried out in con- 
formance with U.S. national interests. 

We discussed this matter with the officials 
of the Industrial Research Institute, and the 
suggestion was made that a letter be sent 
to some 220 member firms of IRI which rep- 
resent 90 ijercent of the research conducted 
by medium- and high-technology companies 
in the United States. The letter was sent by 
the Pi'esident's Science Adviser, Dr. Stever, 
and was accompanied by a letter from the 
l^resident of IRI urging cooperation with the 
government in providing on a strictly volun- 
tary basis information on their relationships 
with the SCST. The U.S. Government of- 
fered to make information obtained from 
these replies available to the companies and 
offered assistance to American companies 
dealing with the SCST. The responses to Dr. 
Stever's and Dr. [Herbert I.] Fusfeld's let- 
ters have been most gratifying, and we want 
to esijecially thank IRI for its fine part in 
this cooperative effort. 

We have received about 125 replies, and 
we can expect that others will continue to 
come in. The Department of State, Dr. Stev- 
er's office, and the Bureau of East-West 
Trade of the Department of Commerce have 
carefully analyzed these replies and in addi- 
tion have interviewed in depth senior execu- 
tives of about 10 companies. From these 
analyses we have drawn some tentative 
conclusions: 

1. Thirteen firms have signed agreements 
with the SCST. About 20 additional firms are 
engaged in exchanges of visiting groups 



632 



Department of State Bulletin 



from which additional agreements may 
emerge. 

2. Eighty percent of those responding 
have stated they have no present negotia- 
tions or discussions. 

3. None of the responses showed any re- 
luctance to respond to the government's re- 
quest for information. Rather, there has 
been often expressed appreciation for in- 
formation and a desire to continue to cooper- 
ate. 

■1. Further tentative conclusions might be 
cited: 

a. Clearly, the Soviets have been active, 
but apparently the SCST is highly selective 
as to with whom they finally sign agree- 
ments. U.S. firms for the most part find that 
negotiations and arrangements for visits are 
lengthy and tedious. 

b. The Soviets are not concentrating (with 
the possible exception of the computer in- 
dustry) on any particular industrial sector. 
The Soviets seem to be interested in research- 
intensive industry and prefer large firms, 
especially multinationals and conglomerates. 

c. The SCST, in the eyes of American 
companies, appears to become increasingly 
powerful and a principal means through 
which business with the Soviets must be 
carried out in high-technology areas. 

d. With few exceptions, the Soviets have 
shown interest in buying American high 
technology but have been less than forth- 
coming in making reciprocal offers. 

As you explore further business oppor- 
tunities with the Soviet Union, we w'ould ap- 
preciate your continuing to keep us informed 
so that we in turn may be of greater assist- 
ance to you in your dealings with the 
U.S.S.R. 

Energy Research and Development 

Another area I would like to touch on, in 
which international cooperation can be vital, 
is energy R. & D. Within the U.S. Govern- 
ment we have completed a first pass at eval- 
uating the projects and the capabilities of 
the major industrial governments in work- 



ing on new sources, reduced environmental 
impact, and more efllicient use and trans- 
mission of energj'. This is the basis for our 
bilaterally sitting down with these nations 
and determining if and where we can de- 
velop joint R. & D. projects which can con- 
tribute to the solution of our energy prob- 
lems. At the same time we are working with 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development] to develop on an 
urgent basis an evaluation of the status and 
relative priorities of energy research in the 
OECD member countries. This report, which 
will identify gaps in research or areas of 
insufficient coverage, should provide a basis 
for and encourage increased cooperation be- 
tween countries — at both governmental and 
industrial levels — on the research and de- 
velopment asijects of energy problems. 

Two findings in this work will be of spe- 
cial significance to you: 

1. The U.S. Government doesn't know all 
that it should about domestic energy R. & D. 
in the private sector and the extent of com- 
munication and cooperation in this field be- 
tween U.S. industry and its counterparts 
abroad. 

2. If an expanded program of interna- 
tional cooperation is to succeed, private in- 
dustry — with its technological skills and 
great experience — must be brought in to 
play a major role. 

The questions that need to be addressed 
are: 

1. What, if anything, should the U.S. Gov- 
ernment do to encourage and facilitate the 
U.S. industry efforts to support the govern- 
ment objective of increasing international 
cooperation in energy R. & D.? 

2. What are the barriers, if any, to effec- 
tive industrial international cooperation? 
Are there restrictions or impediments by 
legislation, taxation, or antitrust that affect 
the role of industry? 

The Industrial Research Institute's Fed- 
eral Science and Technology' Committee 
has already had initial conversations with 
JMr. [Nelson F.] Sievering, Deputy Director 



November 19, 1973 



633 



of the Department of State's Bureau of In- 
ternational Scientific and Technological Af- 
fairs, and his staff in an effort to assist us 
in assessing the role of private industry in 
international cooperation in energy R. & D. 

One of the difficulties we face in the broad 
ai'ea of attitudes and policies regarding the 
international transfer of technology is speci- 
fying the national interests involved — which 
are frequently conflicting — and establishing 
their appropriate priorities. We must, of 
course, protect our national security. Where 
our proper course lies as regards our indus- 
trial competitiveness in the world market 
has been widely debated. We do not believe 
in protectionism as the basis for continued 
U.S. leadership in advanced technology. You 
know, better than most, that continued tech- 
nological leadership in a dynamic economy 
rests on our own innovative capabilities and 
not on attempts to weaken or limit the tech- 
nological enterprise of other nations. When 
the benefits of our own enterprise are made 
available to others, we do ask that the quid 
pro quo include an appropriate financial 
recompense for the R. & D. investments, 
public and private, which we have made. 
This is essential to our continued innovative 
efforts. 

As we develop appropriate precepts for 
assessing the diffusion of our technology 
abroad, we should not forget that the na- 
tional technological reservoir must be kept 
full by the energy, initiative, imagination, 
and risk-taking ability of our R. & D. com- 
munity in industry and in government. I 
emphasize that the continued strength of 
industrial R. & D. is essential if we are to 
maintain an advantageous technological po- 
sition in the international arena. 

At the same time, neither the United 
States nor other industrialized countries can 
depend wholly on indigenous efforts. We can 
benefit from advances originating abroad 



just as others will benefit from advances 
originating here. Advanced technology is 
thus a dynamic force in world economic 
affairs. 

The United States enjoys a strong posi- 
tion. We intend to maintain a strong posi- 
tion, and we rely heavily on you. 



United States Offers Increases 
of Cotton Textile Imports 

Press release 396 dated October 30 

The United States is offering all of its bi- 
lateral cotton textile agreement partners the 
opportunity to export to the United States ad- 
ditional amounts of cotton fabric and cotton 
yarn, the Committee for the Implementation 
of Textile Agreements announced on Octo- 
ber 30. 

Twenty-eight countries have been told that 
the current market situation with respect to 
cotton fabric and cotton yarn will permit the 
United States to offer on a one-time basis 
additional imports of cotton fabric and yarn 
up to an amount equal to 5 percent of the 
aggregate ceiling of each bilateral agree- 
ment. 

Each country with which the United 
States has a bilateral cotton textile agree- 
ment is being asked to inform the United 
States by November 1.5, 1973, as to the addi- 
tional amounts and categories which it may 
wish to export to the United States under 
this arrangement. The added amounts will 
not become part of the base of each country's 
bilateral agreement. 

The Committee for the Implementation of 
Textile Agreements, chaired by the Depart- 
ment of Commerce, includes representatives 
of the Departments of State, the Treasury, 
and Labor. 



634 



Department of State Bulletin 



SIGNIFICANT DOCUMENTS DECLASSIFIED UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 



Messages Exchanged by President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev 
During the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 



In response to requests from the -public under Executive Order 
11652, the Interagency Classification Review Committee has re- 
cently taken declassification action on a series of messages ex- 
changed between President Kennedy and Nikita S. Khrushchev, 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., during the 
C^iban missile crisis of 1962. Dtiring October 1962 President Ken- 
nedy and Chairman Khrushchev exchanged a total of 10 messages 
about Cuba, only the last four of which were made public at the 
time. All 10 messages, with annotations supplied by the Historical 
Office of the Department of State, are printed here as a matter of 
general public interest. For each of the five messages from Chair- 
man Khrushchev there are included both the informal translation 
which was made immediately available to President Kennedy and 
the official t)xinslation prepared later. Related documentation was 
published in the Department of State Btdletin of November 12, 1962, 
and in "Am,erican Foreign Policy: Cwrent Documents, 1962." 



PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 22, 1962' 

[Washington,] October 22, 1962. 

Dear Mr. Chairman : A copy of the state- 
ment I am making tonight concerning devel- 
opments in Cuba and the reaction of my 
Government thereto has been handed to 
your Ambassador in Washington.- In view of 
the gravity of the developments to which 
I refer, I want you to know immediately and 
accurately the position of my Government in 
this matter. 

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin 
and other international questions, the one 



' Text communicated to the Soviet Ambassador 
at Washington at 6 p.m. on Oct. 22, 1962; text had 
previously been telegraphed to the American Em- 
bassy at Moscow for simultaneous delivery there. 

" For President Kennedy's television and radio 
address on Oct. 22, 1962, see Bulletin of Nov. 12, 
1962, p. 715. 



thing that has most concerned me has been 
the possibility that your Government would 
not correctly understand the will and deter- 
mination of the United States in any given 
situation, since I have not assumed that you 
or any other sane man would, in this nuclear 
age, deliberately plunge the world into war 
which it is crystal clear no country could win 
and which could only result in catastrophic 
consequences to the whole world, including 
the aggressor. 

At our meeting in Vienna and subse- 
quently, I expressed our readiness and desire 
to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solu- 
tion to any and all problems that divide us. 
At the same time, I made clear that in view 
of the objectives of the ideology to which 
you adhere, the United States could not tol- 
erate any action on your part which in a 
major way disturbed the existing over-all 
balance of power in the world. I stated that 



November 19, 1973 



635 



an attempt to force abandonment of our 
responsibilities and commitments in Berlin 
would constitute such an action and that the 
United States would resist with all the power 
at its command. 

It was in order to avoid any incorrect as- 
sessment on the part of your Government 
with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated 
that if certain developments in Cuba took 
place, the United States would do whatever 
must be done to protect its own security and 
that of its allies. 

Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolu- 
tion expressing its support of this declared 
policy. Despite this, the rapid development 
of long-range missile bases and other offen- 
sive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. 
I must tell you that the United States is de- 
termined that this threat to the security of 
this hemisphere be removed. At the same 
time, I wish to point out that the action we 
are taking is the minimum necessary to 
remove the threat to the security of the 
nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this 
minimum response should not be taken as a 
basis, however, for any misjudgment on your 
part. 

I hope that your Government will refrain 
from any action which would widen or 
deepen this already grave crisis and that we 
can agree to resume the path of peaceful 
negotiation. 

Sincerely, 

John F. Kennedy. 



CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 23, 1962 

Informal Translation ^ 

Mr. Presidknt: I have just received your letter, 
and have also acquainted myself with text of your 
speech of October 22 regarding Cuba. 

I should say frankly that measures outlined in 



"Informal translation by the American Embassy 
at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry at 3 p.m. Moscow time on 
Oct. 23, 1962, and transmitted to the Department of 
State by telegram at 5 p.m. Moscow time (received 
at 11:56 a.m., Oct. 23, Washington time). 



your statement represent serious threat to peace 
and security of peoples. United States has openly 
taken path of gross violation of Charter of United 
Nations, path of violation of international norms 
of freedom of navigation on high seas, path of ag- 
gressive actions both against Cuba and against 
Soviet Union. 

Statement of Government of United States Amer- 
ica cannot be evaluated in any other way than as 
naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban 
Republic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charter 
of United Nations and international norms do not 
give right to any state whatsoever to establish in 
international waters control of vessels bound for 
shores of Cuban Republic. 

It is self-understood that we also cannot rec- 
ognize right of United States to establish control 
over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for 
strengthening of its defensive capacity. 

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, re- 
gardless of classification to which they belong, are 
destined exclusively for defensive purposes, in 
order to secure Cuban Republic from attack of 
aggressor. 

I hope that Government of United States will 
show prudence and renounce actions pursued by 
you, which could lead to catastrophic consequences 
for peace throughout world. 

Viewpoint of Soviet Government with regard to 
your statement of October 22 is set forth in state- 
ment of Soviet Government,' which is being con- 
veyed to you through your ambassador in Moscow. 

N. Khrushchev. 

Official Translation ■' 

Moscow, October 2.3, 1962. 

Mr. President: I have just received your letter, 
and have also acquainted myself with the text of 
your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba. 

I must say frankly that the measures indicated 
in your statement constitute a serious threat to peace 
and to the seci;rity of nations. The United States has 
openly taken the path of grossly violating the United 
Nations Charter, the path of violating international 
norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas, 
the path of aggi-essive actions both against Cuba 
and against the Soviet Union. 

The statement by the Government of the United 
States of America can only be regarded as undis- 
guised interference in the internal affairs of the 
Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Union and other states. 
The United Nations Charter and international norms 
give no i-ight to any state to institute in interna- 



* For text, see New York Times of Oct. 24, 1962. 
'■ Prepared subsequently by the Department of 
State. 



636 



Department of State Bulletin 



tional waters the inspection of vessels bound for the 
shores of the Republic of Cuba. 

And naturally, neither can we recognize the right 
of the United States to establish control over ar- 
maments which are necessary for the Republic of 
Cuba to strengthen its defense capability. 

We reaffirm that the ai'maments which are in 
Cuba, regardless of the classification to which they 
may belong, are intended solely for defensive pur- 
poses in order to secure the Republic of Cuba against 
the attack of an aggressor. 

I hope that the United States Government will 
display wisdom and renounce the actions pursued 
by you, which may lead to catastrophic consequences 
for world peace. 

The viewpoint of the Soviet Government with re- 
gard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in 
a Statement of the So^^et Government, which is be- 
ing transmitted to you through your Ambassador at 
Moscow. 

N. Khrushchev. 



PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 23, 1962 « 

[Washington, October 23, 1962]. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received 
your letter of October twenty-third. I think 
you will recognize that the steps" which 
started the current chain of events was the 
action of your Government in secretly fur- 
nishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will 
be discussing this matter in the Security 
Council. In the meantime, I am concerned 
that we both show prudence and do nothing 
to allow events to make the situation more 
difficult to control than it already is. 

I hope that you will issue immediately the 
necessary instructions to your ships to ob- 
serve the terms of the quarantine, the basis 
of which was established by the vote of the 
Organization of American States this after- 
noon, and which will go into effect at 1400 
hours Greenwich time October twenty-four. 
Sincerely, 

John F. Kennedy. 



CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 24, 1962 

Informal Translation " 

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter 
of October. 23, familiarized myself with it and am 
answering you. 

Imagine, Mr. President, that we had posed to you 
those ultimative conditions which you have posed to 
us by your action. How would you have reacted to 
this? I think that you would have been indignant at 
such a step on our part. And that would have been 
comprehensible to us. 

Having posed these conditions to us, you, Mr. 
President, have challenged us. Who asked you to do 
this? By what right have you done this? Our rela- 
tions with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations 
with other states, regardless of what sort of state 
it may be, concern only the two countries between 
which those relations exist. And if one is really 
going to talk about a quarantine, referred to in your 
letter, it can be established, according to accepted 
international practice, only by the agreement of 
states between themselves, and not by any sort of 
third party. There exist, for example, quarantines 
on agricultural goods and products. But in the case 
at hand, the question is in no way one of quaran- 
tine, but rather of far more serious things, and you 
yourself understand this. 

You, Mr. President, are not declaring quarantines, 
but advancing an ultimatum and threatening that 
unless we subordinate ourselves to your demands, 
you will use force. Consider what you are saying! 
And you wish to convince me to agree to this ! What 
does agreement with such demands mean? This 
would mean to guide oneself in one's relations with 
other countries not by reason but to indulge arbi- 
trariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, 
but wish to intimidate us. 

And, Mr. President, I cannot agree with this and 
think that in your heart you recognize that I am 
correct. I am convinced that in my place you would 
act the same way. 

Reference to the decision of the Organization of 
American States cannot in any way substantiate 
the demands now advanced by the United States. 
This organization has absolutely no authority or 
basis to make decisions like that of which you speak 
in your letter." 



" Text transmitted by the Department of State to 
the American Embassy at Moscow at 6:51 p.m. 
Washington time on Oct. 23, 1962, and delivered in 
Moscow at 7 a.m., Oct. 24, Moscow time. 

' So transmitted to the American Embassy at 
Moscow, but corrected there to read "step". 



' Informal translation by the American Embassy 
at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry at 11:30 p.m. Moscow time 
on Oct. 24, 1962, and transmitted to the Department 
of State by telegram at 2 a.m., Oct. 25, Moscow time 
(received at 9:24 p.m., Oct. 24, Washington time). 

" In the Russian original the four sentences which 
follow form part of this paragraph. See the official 
translation below. 



November 19, 1973 



637 



Consequently, we do not reco^ize these decisions. 
International law exists, generally recognized norms 
of conduct exist. We firmly support the principles 
of international law, strictly observe the norms reg- 
ulating navigation on the high seas and in interna- 
tional waters. We observe these norms and enjoy 
the rights recognized by all states. 

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights 
that every sovereign state enjoys, you are attempt- 
ing to legislate in questions of international law, you 
are trampling upon the generally accepted norms of 
this law. And all this not only out of hatred for the 
Cuban people and its Government, but also as a re- 
sult of considerations of the election campaign in 
the USA. What morality, what law can justify such 
an approach by the American Government to inter- 
national affairs? You cannot find such a morality 
and such a law, because the actions of the USA with 
regard to Cuba are outright banditry, or, if you like, 
the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, 
the peoples of all countries, and at least of all the 
American people,'" can suffer gravely from such 
folly, since the USA has fully lost its fonrier inac- 
cessibility with the advent of contemporary types of 
armament. 

Consequently, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh 
the situation which has developed, not giving way 
to passions, then you will understand that the Soviet 
Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands 
of the USA. When you confront us with such condi- 
tions, try to put yourself in our situation and think 
how the USA would react to these conditions. I do 
not doubt that if someone had attempted to dictate 
conditions of this sort to you, the USA, you would 
have rejected such an attempt. And we also say — 
No. 

The Soviet Government considers that violation of 
freedom of the use of international waters and in- 
ternational air space is an act of aggression, push- 
ing mankind towards the abyss of a world missile- 
nuclear war. Consequently, the Soviet Government 
cannot give instructions to the captains of Soviet 
vessels bound for Cuba to observe the instructions of 
the American naval forces blockading that island. 
Your instructions " to Soviet mariners are strictly 
to observe the generally recognized norms of navi- 
gation in international waters and not to retreat from 
them by even one step. And if the American side 
violates these rules, it must realize what sort of 
responsibility will rest on it in that case. Of course, 
we shall not be simply observers of piratical actions 
of American ships on the high seas. We will then be 



'° As received by telegram in Washington. The 
passage should read "and not least of all the .Amer- 
ican people". Compare the official translation below. 

" As received by telegram in Washington. The 
Russian text, however, read "Our instructions". See 
the official translation below. 



forced for our part to take the measures which we 
deem necessary and adequate in order to protect our 
rights. For this we have all that is necessary. 
Respectfully yours, 

N. Khrushchev. 



Official Translation '- 

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter 
of October 23, have studied it, and am answering 
you. 

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had pre- 
sented you with the conditions of an ultimatum 
which you have presented us by your action. How 
would you have reacted to this? I think that you 
would have been indignant at such a step on our 
part. And this would have been understandable to 
us. 

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. 
President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked 
you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our 
ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations 
with other states, regardless of what kind of states 
they may be, concern only the t\vo countries between 
which these relations exist. And if we now speak 
of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a 
quarantine may be established, according to accepted 
international practice, only by agreement of states 
between themselves, and not by some third party. 
Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural 
goods and products. But in this case the question is 
in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more 
serious things, and you yourself understand this. 

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quaran- 
tine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and 
threatening that if we do not give in to your de- 
mands you will use force. Consider what you are 
saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to 
this! What would it mean to agree to these de- 
mands? It would mean guiding oneself in one's rela- 
tions with other countries not by reason, but by 
submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer ap- 
pealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us. 

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I 
think that in your own heart you recognize that I 
am correct. I am convinced that in my place you 
would act the same way. 

Reference to the decision of the Organization of 
-American States cannot in any way substantiate the 
demands now advanced by the United States. This 
Organization has absolutely no authority or basis 
for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of 
in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these 
decisions. International law exists and universally 



" Prepared subsequently by the Department of 
State. 



638 



Department of State Bulletin 



recofrnized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere 
to the principles of international law and observe 
strictly the norms which regulate navigration on the 
high seas, in international waters. We observe these 
norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states. 

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that 
every sovereigri state enjoys, you are trying to legis- 
late in questions of international law, and you are 
violating the universally accepted norms of that law. 
And you are doing all this not only out of hatred 
for the Cuban people and its government, but also 
because of considerations of the election campaign 
in the United States. What morality, what law can 
justify such an approach by the .American Govern- 
ment to international affairs? No such morality or 
law can be found, because the actions of the United 
States with regard to Cuba constitute outright 
banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate im- 
perialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave 
suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no 
lesser degree to the American people themselves, 
since the United States has completely lost its for- 
mer isolation with the advent of modern types of 
armament. 

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the 
situation which has developed, not giving way to 
passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union 
cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the 
United States. When you confront us with such con- 
ditions, try to put yourself in our place and con- 
sider how the United States would react to these 
conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted 
to dictate similar conditions to you — the United 
States — you would reject such an attempt. And we 
also say — no. 

The Soviet government considers that the viola- 
tion of the freedom to use international waters and 
international air space is an act of aggression which 
pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world 
nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Govern- 
ment cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels 
bound for Cuba to obseiwe the orders of American 
naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions 
to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the uni- 
versally accepted norms of navigation in interna- 
tional waters and not to retreat one step from them. 
And if the .American side violates these rules, it 
must realize what responsibility will rest upon 
it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be by- 
standers with regai-d to piratical acts by American 
ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on 
our part to take the measures we consider necessary 
and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have 
everything necessary to do so. 
Respectfully, 



PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 25, 1962 '^ 

[Washington,] October 25, 1962. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have received your 
letter of October 24, and I regret very much 
that you still do not appear to understand 
what it is that has moved us in this matter. 

The sequence of events is clear. In August 
there were reports of important shipments of 
military equipment and technicians from the 
Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I 
indicated very plainly that the United States 
would regard any shipment of oifensive 
weapons as presenting the gravest issues. 
After that time, this Government received 
the most explicit assurances from your Gov- 
ernment and its representatives, both pub- 
licly and privately, that no offensive weap- 
ons were being sent to Cuba. If you will 
review the statement issued bj- Tass in Sep- 
tember, you will see how clearly this as- 
surance was given. 

In reliance on these solemn assurances I 
urged restraint upon those in this country 
who were urging action in this matter at 
that time. And then I learned beyond doubt 
what you have not denied — namely, that all 
these public assurances were false and that 
your military people had set out recently to 
establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask 
you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that 
it was not I who issued the first challenge 
in this case, and that in the light of this rec- 
ord these activities in Cuba required the 
responses I have announced. 

I repeat my regret that these events should 
cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope 
that your Government will take the necessary 
action to permit a restoration of the earlier 
situation. 

Sincerely yours, 

John F. Kennedy. 



N. Khrushchev. 



Moscow, October 2i, 1962. 



" Text communicated to the Soviet Embassy at 
Washington at 1:45 a.m. Washington time on Oct. 
25, 1962; transmitted to the American Embassy at 
Moscow at 1:59 a.m., Oct. 25, Washington time for 
delivery also in Moscow. 



November 19, 1973 



639 



CHAIRMAN KHRUSCHEV'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 26, 1962 

Informal Translation ^* 

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter 
of October 25. From your letter, I got the feeling 
that you have some understanding of the situation 
which has developed and (some) '" sense of respon- 
sibility. I value this. 

Now we have already publicly exchanged our 
evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of 
us has set forth his explanation and his under- 
standing of these events. Consequently, I would 
judge that, apparently, a continuation of an ex- 
change of opinions at such a distance, even in the 
form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to 
that which one side has already said to the other. 

I think you will understand me correctly if you 
are really concerned about the welfare of the world. 
Everyone needs peace : both capitalists, if they have 
not lost their reason, and, still more, communists, 
people who know how to value not only their own 
lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peo- 
ples. We, communists, are against all wars between 
states in general and have been defending the cause 
of peace since we came into the world. We have 
always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a 
game nor as a means of the attainment of definite 
goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals 
are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. 
War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples. 

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together 
with us, other peoples as well, understand the ques- 
tions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly 
say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as 
well as for all progressive people who want peace, 
happiness, and friendship among peoples. 

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid 
of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, of 
understanding, and of what war entails.'* What 
would a war give you? You are threatening us with 
war. But you well know that the very least which 
you would receive in reply would be that you would 



" Informal translation by the American Embassy 
at Moscow of text received by the Embassy from the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry at 4:43 p.m. Moscow time 
on Oct. 26, 1962, and transmitted to the Department 
of State at 7 p.m. Moscow time (received in four 
sections between 6 and 9 p.m., Oct. 26, Washington 
time). 

'■' The parentheses are in the source text. 

'" On Oct. 27, 1962, the Department of State sent 
to the White House the following corrected version 
of this sentence: "I see, Mr. President, that you too 
are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of 
the world, of understanding and a proper evalua- 
tion of the character of contemporary war and of 
what war entails." 



experience the same consequences as those which 
you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people 
invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. 
We must not succumb to intoxication and petty 
passions, regardless of whether elections are impend- 
ing in this or that country, or not impending. These 
are all transient things, but if indeed war should 
break out, then it would not be in our power to stop 
it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated 
in two wars and know that war ends when it has 
rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing 
death and destruction. 

In the name of the Soviet Government and the 
Soviet people, I assure you that your conclusions re- 
garding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. 
It is apparent from what you have written me that 
our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, 
we have different estimates of these or those mili- 
tar>' means. Indeed, in reality, the same forms of 
weapons can have different interpretations. 

You are a military man and, I hope, will under- 
stand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. 
What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? 
A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to 
defend boundaries or a fortified ai'ea. But if one 
concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary 
number of troops, then the same cannons do become 
an offensive means, because they prepare and clear 
the way for infantry to attack. The same happens 
with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type 
of this weapon. 

You are mistaken if you think that any of our 
means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not 
quarrel now. It is apparent that I will not be able 
to convince you of this. But I say to you: you, Mr. 
President, are a military man and should under- 
stand: can one attack, if one has on one's territory 
even an enormous quantity of missiles of various 
effective radiuses and various power, but using only 
these means. These missiles are a means of ex- 
termination and destruction. But one cannot attack 
with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power 
of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can 
attack. Without people, any means however power- 
ful cannot be offensive. 

How can one, consequently, give such a completely 
incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the 
effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. 
All the means located there, and I assure you of 
this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely 
for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them 
to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. 
You, however, say that these are offensive means. 

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think 
that Cuba can attack the United States and that 
even we together with Cuba can attack you from the 
territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? 
How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has 
something so new appeared in military strategy that 



640 



Department of State Bulletin 



one can think that it is possible to attack thus. I 
say precisely attack, and not destroy, since barbari- 
ans, people who have lost their sense, destroy. 

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. 
You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, 
you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound 
mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack 
you, you will respond the same way. But you too 
will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I 
think that you also understand this. My conversa- 
tion with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to 
you this way. 

This indicates that we are normal people, that we 
correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situ- 
ation. Consequently, how can we permit the incor- 
rect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics 
or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to 
destroy the whole world before they die, could do 
this. We, however, want to live and do not at all 
want to destroy your country. We want something 
quite different: to compete with your country on a 
peaceful basis. We quarrel with you, we have dif- 
ferences on ideological questions. But our view of 
the world consists in this, that ideological questions, 
as well as economic problems, should be solved not 
by military means, they must be solved on the basis 
of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in 
capitalist society, on the basis of competition. Wc 
have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact 
that the peaceful coexistence of the two cHfferent 
social-political systems, now existing in the world, is 
necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable 
peace. That is the sort of principle we hold. 

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, 
which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships 
proceeding in international waters were attacked, 
and you have called this "a quarantine" around 
Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the 
zone which your Na\'>' is patrolling. I assure you 
that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying 
the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really 
think that we only occupy ourselves with the car- 
riage of .so-called offensive weapons, atomic and 
hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your militai'y 
people imagine that these (cargoes)" are some sort 
of special type of weapon, I assure you that they 
are the most ordinary peaceful products. 

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good 
sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are 
bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The 
weapons which were necessary for the defense of 
Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that 
there were not any shipments of weapons at all. 
No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has 
already received the necessary means of defense. 

I don't know whether you can understand me and 



believe me. But I should like to have you believe 
in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way 
to passions; it is necessary to control them. And 
in what direction are events now developing? If you 
stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that 
would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard 
to your ships, then you would also be as indignant 
as we and the whole world now are. One cannot 
give another interpretation to such actions, because 
one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were per- 
mitted, then there would be no peace, there would 
also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be 
forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a 
defensive character to protect our interests in ac- 
cordance with international law. Why should this be 
done? To what would all this lead? 

Let us normalize relations. We have received an 
appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the 
UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already 
answered him. His proposals come to this, that our 
side should not transport armaments of any kind 
to Cuba during a certain period of time, while 
negotiations are being conducted — and we are ready 
to enter such negotiations — and the other side should 
not undertake any sort of piratical actions against 
vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I 
consider these proposals reasonable. This would be 
a way out of the situation which has been created, 
which would give the peoples the possibility of 
breathing calmly." You have asked what happened, 
what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You 
have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what 
evoked it. 

We were very grieved by the fact — I spoke about it 
in Vienna — that a landing took place, that an attack 
on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many 
Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that 
this had been a mistake. I respected that explana- 
tion. You repeated it to me several times, pointing 
out that not everybody occupying a high position 
would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. 
I value such frankness. For my part, I told you 
that we too possess no less courage; we also ac- 
knowledged those mistakes which had been com- 
mitted during the history of our state, and not only 
acknowledged, but sharply condemned them. 

If you are really concerned about the peace and 
welfare of your people, and this is your responsi- 
bility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. 
Moreover, the preservation of world peace should 
be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary 
conditions, war should break out, it would be a war 



The parentheses are in the source text. 



'" In the corrections to this message which the 
Department of State sent to the White House on 
Oct. 27, 1962, it was indicated that a new paragraph 
should start at this point. 



November 19, 1973 



641 



not only between the reciprocal claims, but a world- 
wide cruel and destructive war." 

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with 
military and economic aid? The answer is: we have 
proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarian- 
ism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, 
when Russia was still a backward country. We were 
attacked then. We were the target of attack by 
many countries. The USA participated in that 
adventure. This has been recorded by participants 
in the aggression against our country. A whole 
book has been written about this by General 
[William Sidney] Graves, who, at that time, com- 
manded the US expeditionary corps. Graves called 
it "The American Adventure in Siberia". 

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a 
revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a 
country on new foundations. We sincerely sympa- 
thize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are 
not interfering in questions of domestic structure, 
we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet 
Union desires to help the Cubans build their life 
as they themselves wish and that others should not 
hinder them. 

You once said that the United States was not pre- 
paring an invasion. But you also declared that you 
sympathized with the Cuban counterrevolutionary 
emigrants, that you support them and would help 
them to realize their plans against the present 
government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to 
anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, 
has constantly hung, and continues to hang over 
Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond 
to the request of the Cuban government to furnish 
it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity 
of this country. 

If assurances were given by the President and the 
government of the United States that the USA 
itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba 
and would restrain others from actions of this sort, 
if you would recall your fleet, this would immedi- 
ately change everything. I am not speaking for 
Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the govern- 
ment of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobiliza- 
tion and would appeal to the people to get down to 
peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments 
would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then 
armaments are a burden for every people. Then, 
too, the question of the destruction, not only of the 



'" On Oct. 27, 1962, the Department of State sent 
to the White House the following corrected version 
of this sentence: "Moreover the preservation of 
world peace should be our joint concern, since if, 
under contemporary conditions, war should break 
out, it would he a war not only between the Soviet 
Union and the USA, between whom, strictly speak- 
ing, are no reciprocal claims, but a worldwide cruel 
and destructive war." 



armaments which you call offensive, but of all 
other armaments as well, would look different. 

I spoke in the name of the Soviet government in 
the United Nations and introduced a proposal for 
the disbandment of all armies and for the destruc- 
tion of all armaments. How then can I now count 
on those armaments? 

Armaments bring only disasters. When one ac- 
cumulates them, this damages the economy, and if 
one puts them to use, then they destroy people on 
both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe 
that ai-maments are the principal means in the life 
of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human 
energ>', and what is more are for the destruction 
of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then 
in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like 
blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will 

begin. 

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I 
propose: we, for our part, will declare that our 
ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of 
armaments. You would declare that the United 
States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will 
not support any sort of forces which might intend 
tc carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity 
for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba 
would disappear. 

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well 
what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you 
have declared the USA intends to carry out in 
international waters, would lead to. You yourself 
know that any sensible man simply cannot agree 
with this, cannot recognize your right to such 
actions. 

If you did this as the first step towards the 
unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that 
nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge 
of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self- 
control and sensibly conceive what this might lead 
to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now 
to' pull on the ends of the rope in which you have 
tied the knot of war, because the more the two of 
us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a 
moment may come when that knot will be tied so 
tight that even he who tied it will not have the 
strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary 
to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not 
for me to explain to you, because you yourself 
understand perfectly of what terrible forces our 
countries dispose. 

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten 
that knot and thereby to doom the world to the 
catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not 
only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the 
rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We 
are ready for this. 

We welcome all forces which stand on positions 
of peace. Consequently, I expressed gratitude to Mr. 
Bertrand Russell, too, who manifests alarm and 



642 



Department of State Bulletin 



concern for the fate of the world, and 1 readily 
responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary- 
General of the UN, U Thant. 

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, 
if you agreed with them, could put an end to that 
tense situation which is disturbing all peoples. 

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire 
to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war. 
Respectfully yours, 

N. Khrushchev. 

Official Translation -'" 

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter 
of October 25. From your letter I got the feeling 
that you have some understanding of the situation 
which has developed and a sense of responsibility. 
I appreciate this. 

By now we have already publicly exchanged our 
assessments of the events around Cuba and each of 
us has set forth his explanation and his interpreta- 
tion of these events. Therefore, I would think that, 
evidently, continuing to exchange opinions at such 
a distance, even in the form of secret letters, would 
probably not add anything to what one side has 
already said to the other. 

I think you will understand me correctly if you 
are really concerned for the welfare of the world. 
Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have 
not lost their reason, and all the more, communists — 
people who know how to value not only their own 
lives but, above all else, the life of nations. We 
communists are against any wars between states at 
all, and have been defending the cause of peace 
ever since we came into the world. We have always 
regarded war as a calamity, not as a game or a 
means for achieving particular purposes, much less 
as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the 
means of achieving them is work. War is our 
enemy and a calamity for all nations. 

This is how we Soviet people, and together with 
us, other peoples as well, interpret questions of war 
and peace. I can say this with assurance at least 
for the peoples of the Socialist countries, as well 
as for all progressive people who want peace, happi- 
ness, and friendship among nations. 

I can see, Mr. President, that you also are not 
without a sense of anxiety for the fate of the world, 
not without an understanding and correct assess- 
ment of the nature of modem warfare and what 
war entails. What good would a war do you? You 
threaten us with war. But you well know that the 
very least you would get in response would be what 
you had given us; you would suffer the same con- 
sequences. And that must be clear to us — people 
invested with authority, trust and responsibility. 



" Prepared subsequently by the Department of 
State. 



We must not succumb to light-headedness and petty 
passions, regardless of whether elections are forth- 
coming in one country or another. These are all 
transitory things, but should war indeed break out, 
it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, 
for such is the logic of war. I have taken part in 
two wars, and I know that war ends only when it 
has rolled through cities and villages, sowing death 
and destniction everywhere. 

I assure you on behalf of the Soviet Government 
and the Soviet people that your arguments regard- 
ing offensive weapons in Cuba are utterly un- 
founded. From what you have written me it is 
obvious that our interpretations on this point are 
different, or rather that we have different definitions 
for one type of military means or another. And 
indeed, the same types of armaments may in 
actuality have different interpretations. 

You are a military man, and I hope you will 
understand me. Let us take a simple cannon for 
instance. What kind of a weapon is it — offensive 
or defensive? A cannon is a defensive weapon if it 
is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. 
But when artillery is concentrated and supplemented 
by an appropriate number of troops, then the same 
cannon will have become an offensive weapon, since 
they prepare and clear the way for infantry to 
advance. The same is true for nuclear missile 
weapons, for any type of these weapons. 

You are mistaken if you think that any of our 
armaments in Cuba are offensive. However, let us 
not argue at this point. Evidently, I shall not be 
able to convince you. But I tell you: You, Mr. 
President, are a military man and you must under- 
stand : How can you possibly launch an offensive 
even if you have an enormous number of missiles 
of various ranges and power on your territory, 
using these weapons alone? These missiles are a 
means of annihilation and destruction. But it is 
impossible to launch an offensive by means of these 
missiles, even nuclear missiles of 100 megaton yield, 
because it is only people — troops — who can advance. 
Without people any weapons, whatever their power, 
cannot be offensive. 

How can you, therefore, give this completely 
wrong interpretation, which you are now giving, 
that some weapons in Cuba are offensive, as you 
say? All weapons there — and I assure you of this — 
are of a defensive nature; they are in Cuba solely 
for purposes of defense, and we have sent them to 
Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. 
And you say that they are offensive weapons. 

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think 
that Cuba could launch an offensive upon the 
United States and that even we, together with Cuba, 
could advance against you from Cuban territory? 
Do you really think so? How can that be? We do 
not understand. Surely, there has not been any 
such new development in military strategy' that 



November 19, 1973 



643 



would lead one to believe that it is possible to 
advance that way. And I mean advance, not destroy; 
for those who destroy are barbarians, people who 
have lost their sanity. 

I hold that you have no pounds to think so. 
You may regard us with distrust, but you can at 
any rate rest assured that We are of sound mind 
and understand perfectly well that if we launch 
an offensive against you, you will respond in kind. 
But you too will get in response whatever you 
throw at us. And I think you understand that too. 
It is our discussion in Vienna that gives me the 
right to speak this way. 

This indicates that we are sane people, fhat we 
understand and assess the situation correctly. How 
could we, then, allow [ourselves] " the wrong 
actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or 
suicides, who themselves want to perish and before 
they die destroy the world, could do this. But we 
want to live and by no means do we want to destroy 
your country. We want something quite different: 
to compete with your country in a peaceful endeavor. 
We argue with you; we have differences on ideo- 
logical questions. But our concept of the world is 
that questions of ideology, as well as economic 
problems, should be settled by other than military 
means; they must be solved in peaceful contest, or 
as this is interpreted in capitalist society— by 
competition. Our premise has been and remains 
that peaceful coexistence of two different socio- 
political systems — a reality of our world — is es- 
sential, and that it is essential to ensure lasting 
peace. These are the principles to which we adhere. 
You have now declared piratical measures, the 
kind that were practiced in the Middle Ages when 
ships passing through international waters were 
attacked, and you have called this a "quarantine" 
around Cuba. Our vessels will probably soon enter 
the zone patrolled by your Navy. I assure you that 
the vessels which are now headed for Cuba are 
carrying the most innocuous peaceful cargoes. Do 
you "really think that all we spend our time on is 
transporting so-called offensive weapons, atomic 
and hydrogen bombs? Even though your military 
people may possibly imagine that these are some 
special kind of weapons, I assure you that they are 
the most ordinary kind of peaceful goods. 

Therefore, Mr. President, let us show good sense. 
I assure you that the ships bound for Cuba are 
carrying no armaments at all. The armaments 
needed for the defense of Cuba are already there. 
I do not mean to say that there have been no 
shipments of armaments at all. No, there were 
such shipments. But now Cuba has already obtained 
the necessary weapons for defense. 

I do not know whether you can understand me 



-'' The brackets are in the source text. 



and believe me. But I wish you would believe 
yourself and agree that one should not give way 
to one's passions; that one should be master of 
them. And what direction are events taking now? 
If you begin stopping vessels it would be piracy, 
as you yourself know. If we should start doing 
this to your ships you would be just as indignant 
as we and the whole world are now indignant. Such 
actions cannot be interpreted otherwise, because 
lawlessness cannot be legalized. Were this allowed 
to happen then there would be no peace; nor would 
there be peaceful coexistence. Then we would be 
forced to take the necessary measures of a de- 
fensive nature which would protect our interests 
in accordance with international law. Why do this? 
What would it all lead to? 

Let us normalize relations. We have received an 
appeal from U Thant, Acting Secretary General 
of the U.N., containing his proposals. I have already 
answered him. His proposals are to the effect that 
our side not ship any armaments to Cuba for a 
certain period of time while negotiations are being 
conducted — and we are prepared to enter into such 
negotiations — and the other side not undertake any 
piratical action against vessels navigating on the 
high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. 
This would be a way out of the situation which has 
evolved that would give nations a chance to breathe 
easily. 

Y'ou asked what happened, what prompted 
weapons to be supplied to Cuba? You spoke of this 
to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you 
frankly, Mr. President, what prompted it. 

We were very grieved by the fact — I spoke of 
this in Vienna— that a landing was effected and 
an attack made on Cuba, as a result of which many 
Cubans were killed. Y'ou yourself told me then that 
this had been a mistake. I regarded that explana- 
tion with respect. Y'ou repeated it to me several 
times, hinting that not everyone occupying a high 
position would acknowledge his mistakes as you 
did. I appreciate such frankness. For my part I 
told you that we too possess no less courage; we 
have also acknowledged the mistakes which have 
been made in the history of our state, and have not 
only acknowledged them but have sharply con- 
demned them. 

While you really are concerned for peace and 
for the welfare of your people— and this is your 
duty as President— I, as Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Further- 
more, the presei-vation of universal peace should be 
our joint concern, since if war broke out under 
modern conditions, it would not be just a war 
between the Soviet Union and the United States, 
which actually have no contentions between them, 
but a world-wide war, cruel and destructive. 



644 



Department of State Bulletin 



Why have we undertaken to render such military 
and economic aid to Cuba? The answer is: we have 
done so only out of humanitarian considerations. 
At one time our people accomplished its own 
revolution, when Russia was still a backward coun- 
try. Then we were attacked. We were the target 
of attack by many countries. The United States took 
part in that affair. This has been documented by 
the participants in aggrression against our country. 
An entire book has been written on this by General 
Graves, who commanded the American Expedition- 
ary Force at that time. Graves entitled it American 
Adi'enture in Siberia. 

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a 
revolution and how difficult it is to rebuild a country 
on new principles. We sincerely sympathize with 
Cuba and the Cuban people. But we do not interfere 
in questions of internal organization; we are not 
interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union wants 
to help the Cubans build their life, as they them- 
selves desire, so that others would leave them alone. 

You said once that the United States is not 
preparing an invasion. But you have also declared 
that you sympathize with the Cuban counterrevolu- 
tionary emigrants, support them, and will help them 
in carrying out their plans against the present 
government of Cuba. Nor is it any secret to anyone 
that the constant threat of armed attack and ag- 
gression has hung and continues to hang over Cuba. 
It is only this that has prompted us to respond to 
the request of the Cuban Government to extend it 
our aid in strengthening the defense capability of 
that country. 

If the President and Government of the United 
States would give their assurances that the United 
States would itself not take part in an attack upon 
Cuba and would restrain others from such action; 
if you recall your Na^'J' — this would immediately 
change everything. I do not speak for Fidel Castro, 
but I think that he and the Government of Cuba 
would, probably, announce a demobilization and 
would call upon the people to commence peaceful 
work. Then the question of armaments would also 
be obviated, because when there is no threat, arma- 
ments are only a burden for any people. This would 
also change the approach to the question of destroy- 
ing not only the armaments which you call offensive, 
but of every other kind of armament. 

I have spoken on behalf of the Soviet Government 
at the United Nations and introduced a proposal 
to disband all armies and to destroy all weapons. 
How then can I stake my claims on these weapons 
now? 

Armaments bring only disasters. Accumulating 
them damages the economy, and putting them to 
use would destroy people on both sides. Therefore, 
only a madman can believe that armaments are 
the principal means in the life of society. No, they 



are a forced waste of human energy, spent, more- 
over, on the destruction of man himself. If people 
do not display wisdom, they will eventually reach 
the point where they will clash, like blind moles, 
and then mutual annihilation will commence. 

Let us therefore display statesmanlike wisdom. I 
propose: we, for our part, will declare that our 
ships bound for Cuba are not carrying any arma- 
ments. You will declare that the United States 
will not invade Cuba with its troops and will not 
support any other forces which might intend to 
invade Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence 
of our military specialists in Cuba will be obviated. 

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh carefully 
what the aggressive, piratical actions which you 
have announced the United States intends to carry 
out in international waters would lead to. You 
yourself know that a sensible person simply cannot 
agree to this, cannot recognize your right to such 
action. 

If you have done this as the first step towards 
unleashing war — well then — evidently nothing re- 
mains for us to do but to accept this challenge of 
yours. If you have not lost command of yourself 
and realize clearly what this could lead to, then, 
Mr. President, you and I should not now pull on 
the ends of the rope in which you have tied a knot 
of war, because the harder you and I pull, the 
tighter this knot will become. .A.nd a time may come 
when this knot is tied so tight that the person who 
tied it is no longer capable of untying it, and then 
the knot will have to be cut. What that would 
mean I need not explain to you, because you your- 
self understand perfectly what dread forces our 
two countries possess. 

Therefore, if there is no intention of tightening 
this knot, thereby dooming the world to the catas- 
trophe of thermonuclear war, let us not only relax 
the forces straining on the ends of the rope, let us 
take measures for untying this knot. We are agree- 
able to this. 

We welcome all forces which take the position 
of peace. Therefore, I both expressed gratitude to 
Mr. Bertrand Russell, who shows alarm and concern 
for the fate of the world, and readily responded to 
the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the 
U.N., U Thant. 

These, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, 
if you should agree with them, could put an end 
to the tense situation which is disturbing all peoples. 

These thoughts are governed by a sincere desire 
to alleviate the situation and remove the threat of 
war. 

Respectfully, 



N. Khrushchev. 



[Moscow,] October 2ii, 1962. 



November 19, 1973 



645 



CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 27, 1962 - 

Informal Translation -^ 

Dear Mr. President: It is with great satisfaction 
that I studied your reply to Mr. U Thant on the 
adoption of measures in order to avoid contact by 
our ships and thus avoid irreparable fatal con- 
sequences. This reasonable step on your part per- 
suades me that you are showing solicitude for the 
preservation of peace, and I note this with satisfac- 
tion. 

I have already said that the only concern of our 
people and government and myself personally as 
chairman of the Council of Ministers is to develop 
our country and have it hold a worthy place among 
all people of the world in economic competition, 
advance of culture and arts, and the rise in people's 
living standards. This is the loftiest and most 
necessary field for competition which will only 
benefit both the winner and loser, because this 
benefit is peace and an increase in the facilities by 
means of which man lives and obtains pleasure. 

In your statement, you said that the main aim 
lies not only in reaching agreement and adopting 
measures to avert contact of our ships, and, conse- 
quently, a deepening of the crisis, which because 
of this contact can spark off the fire of military 
conflict after which any talks would be superfluous 
because other forces and other laws would begin to 
operate — the laws of war. I agree with you that 
this is only a first step. The main thing is to 
normalize and stabilize the situation in the world 
between states and between people. 

I understand your concern for the security of the 
United States, Mr. President, because this is the 
first duty of the president. However, these questions 
are also uppermost in our minds. The same duties 
rest with me as chairman of the USSR Council of 
Ministers. You have been worried over our assisting 
Cuba with arms designed to strengthen its defensive 
potential — precisely defensive potential — because 
Cuba, no matter what weapons it had, could not 
compare with you since these are difl'erent dimen- 
sions, the more so given up-to-date means of exter- 
mination. Our purpose has been and is to help 
Cuba, and no one can challenge the humanity of 
our motives aimed at allowing Cuba to live peace- 
fully and develop as its people desire. 

You want to relieve your country from danger 
and this is understandable. However, Cuba also 
wants this. All countries want to relieve themselves 



" Broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. Moscow 
time, Oct. 27, 1962; Russian text delivered to the 
American Embassy at Moscow at the same hour. 

" Reprinted with corrected paragraphing from 
Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 741-743. 



from danger. But how can we, the Soviet Union 
and our government, assess your actions which, in 
effect, mean that yov. have surrounded the Soviet 
Union with military bases, surrounded our allies 
with military bases, set up military bases literally 
around our country, and stationed your rocket 
weapons at them? This is no secret. High-placed 
.American oflScials demonstratively declare this. Your 
rockets are stationed in Britain and in Italy and 
point at us. Your rockets are stationed in Turkey. 

You are worried over Cuba. You say that it 
worries you because it lies at a distance of 90 miles 
across the sea from the shores of the United States. 
However, Turkey lies next to us. Our sentinels are 
pacing up and down and watching each other. Do 
you believe that you have the right to demand 
security for your country and the removal of such 
weapons that you qualify as offensive, while not 
recognizing this right for us? You have stationed 
devastating rocket weapons, which you call offensive, 
in Turkey literally right next to us. How then does 
recognition of our equal military possibilities tally 
with such unequal relations between our great 
states? This does not tally at all. 

It is good, Mr. President, that you agreed for our 
representatives to meet and begin talks, apparently 
with the participation of U.N. Acting Secretary 
General U Thant. Consequently, to some extent, he 
assumes the role of intermediary, and we believe 
that he can cope with the responsible mission if, of 
course, every side that is drawn into this conflict 
shows good will. 

I think that one could rapidly eliminate the conflict 
and normalize the situation. Then people would 
heave a sigh of relief, considering that the states- 
men who bear the responsibility have sober minds, 
an awareness of their responsibility, and an ability 
to solve complicated problems and not allow matters 
to slide to the disaster of war. 

This is why I make this proposal : We agree to 
remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard 
as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to 
state this commitment in the United Nations. Your 
representatives will make a statement to the effect 
that the United States, on its part, bearing in mind 
the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will 
evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let 
us reach an understanding on what time you and 
we need to put this into effect. After this, repre- 
sentatives of the U.N. Security Council could control 
on-the-spot the fulfillment of these commitments. 
Of course, it is necessary that the Governments of 
Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives 
to come to their countries and check fulfillment of 
this commitment, which each side undertakes. Ap- 
parently, it would be better if these representatives 
enjoyed the trust of the Security Council and ours — 
the United States and the Soviet Union — as well 
as of Turkey and Cuba. I think that it will not 



646 



Department of State Bulletin 



be difficult to find such people who enjoy the trust 
and respect of all interested sides. 

We, having assumed this commitment in order 
to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of 
I Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence 
1 in their security, will make a statement in the 
' Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Gov- 
ernment gives a solemn pledge to respect the 
integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of 
Turkey, not to interv'ene in its domestic affairs, not 
to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory 
as a place d'armes for such invasion, and also will 
restrain those who would think of launching an 
aggression against Turkey either from Soviet terri- 
tory or from the territory of other states bordering 
on Turkey. 

The U.S. Government will make the same state- 
ment in the Security Council with regard to Cuba. 
It will declare that the United States will respect 
the integrity of the frontiers of Cuba, its sover- 
eignty, undertakes not to intervene in its domestic 
affairs, not to invade and not to make its territory 
available as place d'armes for the invasion of Cuba, 
and also will restrain those who would think of 
launching an aggression against Cuba either from 
U.S. territory or from the territory of other states 
bordering on Cuba. 

Of course, for this we would have to reach agree- 
ment with you and to arrange for some deadline. 
Let us agree to give some time, but not to delay, 
two or three weeks, not more than a month. 

The weapons on Cuba, that you have mentioned 
and which, as you say, alarm you, are in the hands 
of Soviet officers. Therefore any accidental use of 
them whatsoever to the detriment of the United 
States of America is excluded. These means are 
stationed in Cuba at the request of the Cuban 
Government and only in defensive aims. Therefore, 
if there is no invasion of Cuba, or an attack on the 
Soviet Union, or other of our allies then, of course, 
these means do not threaten anyone and will not 
threaten. For they do not pursue offensive aims. 

If you accept my proposal, Mr. President, we 
would send our representatives to New York, to the 
United Nations, and would give them exhaustive 
instructions to order to come to terms sooner. If 
you would also appoint your men and grive them 
appropriate instructions, this problem could be 
solved soon. 

Why would I like to achieve this? Because the 
entire world is now agitated and expects reasonable 
actions from us. The greatest pleasure for all the 
peoples would be an announcement on our agree- 
ment, on nipping in the bud the conflict that has 
arisen. I attach a great importance to such under- 
standing because it might be a good beginning and, 
specifically, facilitate a nuclear test ban agreement. 
The problem of tests could be solved simultaneously, 
not linking one with the other, because they are 



different problems. However, it is important to 
reach an understanding to both these problems in 
order to make a good gift to the people, to let them 
rejoice in the news that a nuclear test ban agree- 
ment has also been reached and thus there will 
be no further contamination of the atmosphere. 
Your and our positions on this issue are very close. 

All this, possibly, would serve as a good impetus 
to searching for mutually acceptable agreements on 
other disputed issues, too, on which there is an 
exchange of opinion between us. These problems 
have not yet been solved but they wait for an 
urgent solution which would clear the international 
atmosphere. We are ready for this. 

These are my proposals, Mr. President. 
Respectfully yours, 



NiKiTA Khrushchev. 



[Moscow,] October 27, 1962. 



Official Translation -'' 

Dear Mr. President, I have studied with great 
satisfaction your reply to Mr. Thant concerning 
measures that should be taken to avoid contact 
between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable 
and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on 
your part strengthens my belief that you are show- 
ing concern for the preservation of peace, which I 
note with satisfaction. 

I have already said that our people, our Govern- 
ment, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council 
of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our 
country develop and occupy a worthy place among 
all peoples of the world in economic competition, 
in the development of culture and the arts, and in 
raising the living standard of the people. This is 
the most noble and necessary field for competition, 
and both the victor and the vanquished will derive 
only benefit from it, because it means peace and 
an increase in the means by which man lives and 
finds enjoyment. 

In your statement you expressed the opinion that 
the main aim was not simply to come to an agree- 
ment and take measures to prevent contact between 
our vessels and consequently a deepening of the 
crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, 
spark a military conflict, after which all negotia- 
tions would be superfluous because other forces and 
other laws would then come into play — the laws of 
war. I agree with you that this is only the first 
step. The main thing that must be done is to 
normalize and stabilize the state of peace among 
states and among peoples. 

I understand your concern for the security of 
the United States, Mr. President, because this is the 



■' Prepared subsequently by the Department of 
State. 



November 19, 1973 



647 



primary duty of a President. But we too are 
disturbed about these same questions; I bear these 
same obligations as Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed 
by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, 
in order to strengthen its defense capability — pre- 
cisely defense capability — because whatever weapons 
it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you 
since the difference in magnitude is so great, 
particularly in view of modern means of destruction. 
Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one 
can dispute the humanity of our motives, which 
are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peace- 
fully and develop in the way its people desire. 

You wish to ensure the security of your country, 
and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants 
the same thing; all countries want to maintain 
their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, 
our Government, to assess your actions which are 
expressed in the fact that you have surrounded 
the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded 
our allies with military bases; placed military bases 
literally around our country; and stationed your 
missile armaments there? This is no secret. Re- 
sponsible American personages openly declare that 
it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are 
located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your 
missiles are located in Turkey. 

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this 
disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the 
coast of the United States of America. But Turkey 
adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and 
see each other. Do you consider, then, that you 
have the right to demand security for your own 
country and the removal of the weapons you call 
offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? 
You have placed destructive missile weapons, which 
you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. 
How then can recognition of our equal military 
capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations 
between our great states? This is irreconcilable. 

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed 
to have our representatives meet and begin talks, 
apparently through the mediation of U Thant, 
Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. 
Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the 
role of a mediator and we consider that he will 
be able to cope with this responsible mission, pro- 
vided, of course, that each party drawn into this 
controversy displays good will. 

I think it would be possible to end the controversy 
quickly and normalize the situation, and then the 
people could breathe more easily, considering that 
statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober 
mind and have an awareness of their responsibility 
combined with the ability to solve complex questions 
and not bring things to a military catastrophe. 

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing 
to remove from Cuba the means which you regard 
as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and 



to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your 
representatives will make a declaration to the effect 
that the United States, for its part, considering 
the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, 
will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let 
us reach agrreement as to the period of time needed 
by you and by us to bring this about. And, after 
that, persons entrusted by the United Nations 
Security Council could inspect on the spot the ful- 
fillment of the pledges made. Of course, the per- 
mission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey 
is necessary for the entry into those countries of 
these representatives and for the inspection of the 
fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of 
course it would be best if these representatives 
enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as 
well as yours and mine — both the United States 
and the Soviet Union — and also that of Turkey and 
Cuba. I do not think it would be diflficult to select 
people who would enjoy the trust and respect of 
all parties concerned. 

We, in making this pledge, in order to give 
satisfaction and hope of [to] the peoples of Cuba and 
Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their 
security, will make a statement within the frame- 
work of the Security Council to the effect that the 
Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to re- 
spect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty 
of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not 
to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory 
as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it 
would also restrain those who contemplate commit- 
ting aggression against Turkey, either from the ter- 
ritory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of 
Turkey's other neighboring states. 

The United States Government will make a 
similar statement within the framework of the 
Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare 
that the United States will respect the inviolability 
of Cuba's borders and its sovereignty, will pledge 
not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade 
Cuba itself or make its territory available as a 
bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also 
restrain those who might contemplate committing 
aggression against Cuba, either from the territory 
of the United States or from the territory of Cuba's 
other neighboring states. 

Of course, for this we would have to come to 
an agreement with you and specify a certain time 
limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but 
without unnecessary delay — say within two or three 
weeks, not longer than a month. 

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak 
and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in 
the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any ac- 
cidental use of them to the detriment of the United 
States is excluded. These means are situated in 
Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and 
are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there 
is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet 



648 



Department of State Bulletin 



Union or any of our other allies, then of course 
these means are not and will not be a threat to 
anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack. 

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. Presi- 
dent, then we would send our representatives to 
New York, to the United Nations, and would give 
them comprehensive instructions in order that an 
agreement may be reached more quickly. If you 
also select your people and give them the corre- 
sponding instructions, then this question can be 
quickly resolved. 

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole 
world is now apprehensive and expects sensible 
actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would 
be the announcement of our agreement and of the 
eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I 
attach great importance to this agreement in so 
far as it could serve as a good beginning and could 
in particular make it easier to reach agreement 
on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of 
the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, with- 
out connecting one with the other, because these are 
different issues. However, it is important that 
agreement be reached on both these issues so as to 
present' humanity with a fine gift, and also to 
gladden it with the news that agreement has been 
reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that 
consequently the atmosphere will no longer be 
poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are 
very close together. 

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus 
toward the finding of mutually acceptable agree- 
ments on other controversial issues on which you 
and I have been exchanging views. These issues 
have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting 
urgent solution, which would clear up the interna- 
tional atmosphere. We are prepared for this. 

These are my proposals, Mr. President. 
Respectfully yours, 



N. Khrushchev. 



[Moscow,] October 27, 1962. 



PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 27, 1962-' 

[Washington,] October 27, 1962. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: I have read your 
letter of October 26th with great care and 
welcomed the statement of your desire to seek 



-■ Reprinted from Bulletin of Nov. 12, 1962, p. 
743. This message was transmitted by the Depart- 
ment of State to the American Embassy at Moscow 
at 8:05 p.m. Washington time, Oct. 27, 1962; deliv- 
ered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 10:. 30 a.m. 
Moscow time, Oct. 28. Text also delivered to the 
Soviet Embassy at Washington during the evening 
of Oct. 27 and released to the press. 



a prompt solution to the problem. The first 
thing that needs to be done, however, is for 
work to cease on offensive missile bases in 
Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba 
capable of offensive use to be rendered in- 
operable, under effective United Nations 
arrangements. 

Assuming this is done promptly, I have 
given my representatives in New York in- 
structions that will permit them to work 
out this weekend -" — in cooperation with the 
Acting Secretary General and your repre- 
sentative — an arrangement for a permanent 
solution to the Cuban problem along the lines 
suggested in your letter of October 26th. As 
I read your letter, the key elements of your 
proposals — which seem generally acceptable 
as I understand them — are as follows : 

1) You would agree to remove these 
weapons systems from Cuba under appropri- 
ate United Nations observation and super- 
vision; and undertake, with suitable safe- 
guards, to halt the further introduction of 
such weapons systems into Cuba. 

2) We, on our part, would agree — upon 
the establishment of adequate arrangements 
through the United Nations to ensure the 
carrying out and continuation of these com- 
mitments — (a) to remove promptly the 
quarantine measures now in effect and (b) 
to give assurances against an invasion of 
Cuba.-" I am confident that other nations of 
the Western Hemisphere would be prepared 
to do likewise. 

If you will give your representative similar 
instructions, there is no reason why we 
should not be able to complete these arrange- 
ments and announce them to the world with- 
in a couple of days. The effect of such a 
settlement on easing world tensions would 
enable us to work toward a more general 
arrangement regarding "other armaments", 
as proposed in your second letter which you 
made public. I would like to say again that 
the United States is very much interested 
in reducing tensions and halting the arms 



-■" As transmitted to Moscow, this passage read 
"week and". 

■' As transmitted to Moscow, this sentence was 
joined with the following sentence with the word 
"and." 



November 19, 1973 



649 



race ; and if your letter signifies that you are 
prepared to discuss a detente affecting 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite 
prepared to consider with our allies any 
useful proposals. 

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, 
is the cessation of work on missile sites in 
Cuba and measures to render such weapons 
inoperable, under effective international 
guarantees. The continuation of this threat, 
or a prolonging of this discussion concerning 
Cuba by linking these problems to the 
broader questions of European and world 
security, would surely lead to an intensifica- 
tion of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to 
the peace of the world. For this reason I 
hope we can quickly agree along the lines 
outlined in this letter and in your letter of 
October 26th. 

John F. Kennedy. 

CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 28, 1962 -« 

Informal Translation -" 

Dear Mr. President: I have received your mes- 
sage of October 27. I express my satisfaction and 
thank you for the sense of proportion you have 
displayed and for realization of the responsibility 
which now devolves on you for the preservation of 
the peace of the world. 

I regard with great understanding your concern 
and the concern of the United States people in 
connection with the fact that the weapons you 
describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. 

Both you and we understand what kind of 
weapons these are. 

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the 
conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give 
an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to 
reassure the American people, who, I am certain, 
also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier 
instructions on the discontinuation of further work 
on weapons constructions sites, has given a new 
order to dismantle the arms which you described 
as offensive, and to crate and return them to the 
Soviet Union. 



^ Broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. Moscow 
time, Oct. 28, 1962; Russian text delivered to the 
American Embassy at Moscow at .5:10 p.m. on the 
same date. 

'■" Text of a Moscow broadcast in English ; re- 
printed with corrections from Bulletin of Nov. 12, 
19f)2, pp. 743-745. 



Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had 
already written to you in my earlier messages — 
that the Soviet Government has given economic 
assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, 
because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly 
under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba. 
A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say 
that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban 
emigres. Perhaps so; however, the question is from 
where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans 
have no territory, they are fugitives from their 
country, and they have no means to conduct military 
operations. 

This means that someone put into their hands 
these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy 
in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is 
impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, 
considering the concentration in the Caribbean of 
American ships from which everything can be seen 
and observed. In these conditions, pirate ships freely 
roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic 
attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that 
they even shelled a British cargo ship. 

In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat 
of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their 
intention to invade its territory. 

The Cuban people want to build their life in their 
own interests without external interference. This 
is their right, and they cannot be blamed for 
wanting to be masters of their own country and 
disposing of the fruits of their own labor. The threat 
of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for 
creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike 
the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intim- 
idate them, and prevent them from peacefully build- 
ing their new life. 

Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once 
more that we could not remain indifferent to this. 
The Soviet Government decided to render assistance 
to Cuba with the means of defense against aggres- 
sion — only with means for defense purposes. We 
have supplied the defense means which you describe 
as offensive means. We have supplied them to 
prevent an attack on Cuba — to prevent rash acts. 

I regard with respect and trust the statement you 
made in your message of October 27, 1962, that 
there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and 
not only on the part of the United States, but also 
on the part of other nations of the Western Hemi- 
sphere, as you said in your same message. Then 
the motives which induced us to render assistance 
of such a kind to Cuba disappear. It is for this 
reason that we instructed our officers — these means 
as I had already informed you earlier are in the 
hands of the Soviet officers— to take appropriate 
measures to discontinue construction of the afore- 
mentioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to 
return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed 
you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared 
to reach agreement to enable United Nations Rep- 



650 



Department of State Bulletin 



resentatives to verify the dismantling of these 
means. 

Thus in view of the assurances you have given 
and our instructions on dismantling, there is every 
condition for eliminating the present conflict. 

I note with satisfaction that you have responded 
to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination 
of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as 
with regard to providing conditions for a more 
thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, 
fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of 
thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global 
rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are 
interested in insuring peace. 

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsi- 
bility, we must not allow the situation to become 
aggravated and must stamp out the centers where 
a dangerous situation fraught with grave con- 
sequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, 
together with you, and with the assistance of other 
people of good will, succeed in eliminating this 
tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that 
no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a 
world nuclear catastrophe would arise. 

In conclusion, I should like to say something 
about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw 
Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have 
spoken about this long since and are prepared to 
continue to exchange views on this question with 
you and to find a reasonable solution. We should 
like to continue the exchange of views on the pro- 
hibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, 
general disarmament, and other problems relating 
to the relaxation of international tension. 

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, 
there are irresponsible people who would like to 
invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we 
do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling 
and evacuation of the means in question from 
Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the 
Cuban people to be certain that we are with them 
and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility 
for rendering assistance to the Cuban people. 

We are confident that the people of all countries, 
like you, Mr. President, will understand me cor- 
rectly. We are not threatening. We want nothing 
but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge. Our 
people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful 
labor. They have achieved tremendous successes 
since the October Revolution, and created the 
greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. 
Our people are enjoying these values; they want 
to continue developing their achievements and insure 
their further development on the way of peace and 
social progress by their persistent labor. 

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that 
military reconnaissance planes have violated the 
borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this 
there have been conflicts between us and notes 
exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, 



whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked 
the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you 
took a correct position and denounced that criminal 
act of the former U.S. Administration. 

But during your term of ofllce as President 
another violation of our border has occurred, by an 
American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote 
you about that violation on 30 August. At that time 
you replied that that violation had occurred as a 
result of poor weather, and gave assurances that 
this would not be repeated. We trusted your assur- 
ance, because the weather was indeed poor in that 
area at that time. 

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about 
our territory, even poor weather could not have 
brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, 
the conclusion that this is being done with the 
knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on 
international norms and violates the borders of 
other states. 

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 
October, when one of your reconnaissance planes 
intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Penin- 
sula area in the north and flew over our territory. 
The question is, Mr. President: How should we 
regard this. What is this: A provocation? One of 
your planes violates our frontier during this anxious 
time we are both experiencing, when everything 
has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact 
that an intruding American plane could be easily 
taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to 
a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. 
Government and Pentagon long ago declared that 
you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber 
patrol. Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility 
you are assuming, especially now, when we are 
living through such anxious times.*' 

I should like to express the following wish; it 
concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplo- 
matic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, 
I have reports that American planes are making 
flights over Cuba. 

We are interested that there should be no war 
in the world, and that the Cuban people should live 
in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret 
that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a 
treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent 
there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: 
specialists, agronomists, zootechnicians, irrigators, 
land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor 
drivers, and others. We are concerned about them. 

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that 
violation of Cuban airspace by American planes 
could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if 
you do not want this to happen, it would better if 
no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise. 
We must be careful now and refrain from any 
steps which would not be useful to the defense of 



"^ See the official translation below for a paragraph 
omitted here. 



November 19, 1973 



651 



the states involved in the conflict, which could only 
cause irritation and even serve as a provocation 
for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display 
sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps. 

We value peace perhaps even more than other 
peoples because we went through a terrible war 
with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the 
face of any test. Our people trust their Government, 
and we assure our people and world public opinion 
that the Soviet Government will not allow itself 
to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a 
war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave 
consequences a war would bring upon them. But 
we are confident that reason will triumph, that war 
will not be unleashed and peace and the security of 
the peoples will be insured. 

In connection with the current negotiations be- 
tween Acting Secretary General U Thant and rep- 
resentatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, 
and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government 
has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. 
Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his 
noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present 
dangerous situation. 

Respectfully yours, 

N. Khri'shchev. 
[Moscow,] October 28, 1902. 



Official Translation " 

Dear Mr. President: I have received your mes- 
sage of October 27, 1962. I express my satisfaction 
and appreciation for the sense of proportion you 
have displayed, and for your understanding of the 
responsibility you now bear for the preservation of 
peace throughout the world. 

I regard with great understanding your appre- 
hension and the apprehension of the people of the 
United States of America over the fact that the 
weapons which you describe as offensive are indeed 
terrible weapons. 

Both you and we understand what kind of weapons 
they are. 

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible a 
conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give 
confidence to all peoples longing for peace, and to 
reassure the people of America, who, I am sure, 
want peace as much as the peoples of the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to 
previously issued instructions for the cessation of 
further work at the weapons construction sites, has 
issued a new order to dismantle the weapons, which 
you describe as offensive, and to crate and return 
them to the Soviet Union. 

Mr. President, I would like to repeat, as 1 have 
already stated in my previous letters, that the 



■'" Prepared subsequently by the Department of 
State. 



Soviet Government has extended economic aid as 
well as arms to the Government of Cuba, since 
Cuba and the Cuban people have constantly been 
under the continual threat of an invasion of Cuba. 
A piratical vessel has shelled Havana. It is said 
that irresponsible Cuban emigres did the shooting. 
This is possibly the case. But the question arises: 
from where did they shoot? After all, these Cubans 
have no territory; they are fugitives from their 
homeland; they have no funds for conducting mili- 
tary actions. 

This means that someone put into their hands 
the weapons for shelling Havana and for piratical 
acts in the Caribbean, in Cuban territorial waters. 
It is unthinkable in our time that a pirate ship 
could pass unnoticed, particularly considering the 
saturation of the Caribbean with American ships 
from which literally all of this is seen and observed. 
And in such circumstances pirate ships freely roam 
about Cuba, shell Cuba, and carry out piratical 
attacks upon peaceful cargo ships. It is, after all, 
known that they even shelled a British freighter. 

In short, Cuba has been under a continual threat 
from aggressive forces that have not concealed 
their intention to invade Cuba's territory. 

The Cuban people wish to build their life in 
their own interests without external interference. 
This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for 
wanting to be masters of their own country and to 
enjoy the fruits of their labor. The threat of a 
Cuban invasion and all the other designs aimed at 
surrounding Cuba with tension are designed to 
engender uncertainty in the Cuban people, to intim- 
idate them, and to hinder them in freely building 
their new life. 

Mr. President, I want to say clearly once again 
that we could not be indiflFerent to this, and so the 
Soviet Government decided to help Cuba with means 
of defense against aggression — means only for 
purposes of defense. We placed means of defense 
there, means which you call offensive. We placed 
them there in order that no attack might be made 
against Cuba and that no rash acts might be per- 
mitted. 

I regard with respect and trust the statement 
you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that 
no attack would be made on Cuba and that no 
invasion would take place — not only on the part 
of the United States, but also on the part of other 
countries of the Western Hemisphere, as your same 
message pointed out. In view of this, the motives 
which prompted us to give aid of this nature to 
Cuba no longer prevail. Hence, we have instructed 
our oflicers (these means, as I have already reported 
to you, are in the hands of Soviet officers) to take 
the necessary measures to stop the construction of 
the facilities indicated, and to dismantle and return 
them to the Soviet Union. As T have already in- 
formed you in my letter of October 27, we are 
prepared to come to an agreement with you to 



652 



Department of State Bulletin 



enable representatives of the U.N. to verify the 
dismantling of these means. 

In this way, on the basis of the assurances you 
have made and of our orders to dismantle, there 
appear to exist all the necessary conditions for the 
elimination of the conflict which has arisen. 

I note with satisfaction that you have echoed my 
desire that this dangerous situation be eliminated 
and also that conditions be created for a more 
thorough appraisal of the international situation, 
which is fraught with great dangers in our age 
of thermonuclear weapons, rocket technology, space 
ships, global rockets, and other lethal weapons. All 
mankind is interested in ensuring peace. 

Therefore, we who bear great trust and responsi- 
bility must not permit the situation to become 
aggravated but must eliminate breeding grounds 
where dangerous situations are created, fraught 
with serious consequences for the cause of peace. 
And if we, together with you and other people of 
good will, succeed in eliminating this tense situation, 
we must also concern ourselves with seeing that 
other dangerous conflicts do not arise which might 
lead to a world thermonuclear catastrophe. 

In conclusion, I should like to say something 
about the improvement of relations between NATO 
and the states of the Warsaw Pact, which you 
mention. We spoke of this a long time ago, and are 
ready to continue exchanging opinions with you on 
this question and to find a reasonable solution. We 
also wish to continue to exchange opinions on the 
prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, 
on general disarmament, and on other questions 
relating to relaxation of international tensions. 

Mr. President, I place belief in your statement. 
On the other hand there are irresponsible people 
who would like to carry out an invasion of Cuba 
at this time and thereby unleash a war. If we take 
practical steps and announce the dismantling and 
evacuation of the above-mentioned means from Cuba, 
in doing so we at the same time want the Cuban 
people to be sure that we are with them and are 
not relieving ourselves of the responsibility of 
granting aid to the Cuban people. 

We are convinced that the peoples of all countries 
will, like yourself, Mr. President, understand me 
correctly. We do not threaten. We desire only 
peace. Our country is now on the upswing. Our 
people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful 
labor. They have achieved tremendous successes 
since the October Revolution, and have created the 
greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. 
Our people are making use of these values and want 
to develop their achievements further and by their 
steadfast labor to ensure even greater growth along 
the path of peace and social progress. 

I should like, Mr. President, to remind you that 
military aircraft of a reconnaissance nature have 
violated the frontiers of the Soviet Union — over 
which matter we had a controversy with you, and 



an exchange of notes took place. In 1960 we shot 
down your U-2 aircraft, whose reconnaissance flight 
over the U.S.S.R. led to the disruption of the summit 
meeting in Paris. You took a correct position at 
the time in condemning that criminal action on the 
part of the previous Administration of the United 
States. 

But during your term of office as President, a 
second case of violation of our frontier by an Ameri- 
can U-2 aircraft has taken place in the Sakhalin 
area. We informed you of this violation on Augu.st 
30. You then replied that this violation had occurred 
as a result of bad weather and gave assurances 
that it would not be repeated. We accepted your 
assurances because there was, indeed, bad weather 
in that area at the time. 

However, if your aircraft had not been given a 
mission to fly near our territory, then even bad 
weather could not have led an American aircraft 
into our air space. The conclusion follows that this 
is done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which 
tramples on international norms and violates the 
frontiers of other states. 

An even more dangerous case occurred on October 
28, when your reconnaissance aircraft invaded the 
northern area of the Soviet Union, in the area of 
the Chukotski Peninsula, and flew over our territory. 
One asks, Mr. President, how we should regard 
this. What is this — a provocation? Your aircraft 
violates our frontier, and this happens at a time as 
troubled as the one through which we are now 
passing, when everything has been put in battle 
readiness. For an intruding U.S. aircraft can easily 
be taken for a bomber with nuclear weapons, and 
that can push us toward a fatal step. All the more 
so, because the U.S. Government and the Pentagon 
have long been saying that you continually maintain 
bombers with atomic bombs in the air. Therefore, 
you can imagine what kind of responsibility you 
assume, especially during such an anxious time as 
the pi'esent. 

I should like to ask you to assess this correctly 
and to take steps accordingly, to prevent it from 
serving as a provocation to touch off a war. 

I should also like to express to you the following 
wish. Of course, this is the Cuban people's afi'air — 
you do not at present maintain diplomatic relations, 
but through my officers in Cuba I have reports that 
American planes are conducting flights over Cuba. 

We are interested in not having any war at all 
in the world and in the Cuban people's being able 
to live in peace. But, in addition to this, Mr. Presi- 
dent, it is no secret that we have our people in 
Cuba. By agreement with the Cuban Government, 
we have there officers and instructors who are 
training the Cubans; they are mainly ordinary 
people, including specialists, agronomists, animal 
husbandry technicians, irrigation and reclamation 
experts, common laborers, tractor drivers, and 
others. We have concern for them. 



November 19, 1973 



653 



I should like to ask you, Mr. President, to bear 
in mind that a violation of Cuban air space by 
American aircraft may also have dangerous conse- 
quences. And if you do not want that, no cause 
should be given for the creation of a dangerous 
situation. 

We must now be very cautious and refrain from 
any acts that would not help in the defense of the 
states involved in the controversy, but which could 
arouse only irritation, and even prove to be a pro- 
vocation for a fatal step. We must therefore display 
sense and wisdom, and refrain from acts of that 
kind. 

We value peace, perhaps even more than other 
peoples, because we experienced a terrible war 
against Hitler. But our people will not flinch in the 
face of any ordeal ; our people trust their own 
government, and we assure our own people and 
world public opinion that the Soviet Government 
will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the 
provocateurs unleash a war, they will not escape 
the responsibility and the grave consequences that 
war will bring to them. We are confident, however, 
that reason will prevail, that war will not be un- 
leashed, and that the peace and security of peoples 
will be ensured. 

In regard to the current negotiations of Acting 
Secretary General U Thant, with representatives of 
the Soviet Union, the United States of America 
and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government 
has sent to New York V. V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., with 
a view to assisting Mr. Thant in his noblo efforts 
aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situa- 
tion. 

Respectfully yours, 

N. Khrushchev. 
[Moscow,] October 28, 19r,2. 



PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S MESSAGE 
OF OCTOBER 28, 1962-'- 

[Washington,] October 28, 1962. 
Dear Mr. Chairman: I am replying at 
once to your broadcast message of October 
twenty-eight, even though the official text has 
not yet reached me, because of the great im- 
portance I attach to moving forward prompt- 
ly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I 
think that you and I, with our heavy respon- 
sibilities for the maintenance of peace, were 
aware that developments were approaching 
a point where events could have become un- 
manageable. So I welcome this message and 
consider it an important contribution to 
peace. 



The distinguished efforts of Acting Secre- 
tary General U Thant have greatly facili- 
tated both our tasks. I consider my letter to 
you of October twenty-seventh and your 
reply of today as firm undertakings on the 
part of both our governments which should 
be promptly carried out. I hope that the 
necessary measui-es can at once be taken 
through the United Nations, as your message 
says, so that the United States in turn will 
be able to remove '" the quarantine measures 
now in effect. I have already made arrange- 
ments to report all these matters to the 
Organization of American States, whose 
members share a deep interest in a genuine 
peace in the Caribbean area. 

You referred in your letter to a violation 
of your frontier by an American aircraft in 
the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have 
learned that this plane, without arms or 
photographic equipment, was engaged in an 
air sampling mission in connection with your 
nuclear tests. Its course was direct from 
Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the 
North Pole and return. In turning south, the 
pilot made a serious navigational error which 
carried him over Soviet territory. He im- 
mediately made an emergency call on open 
radio for navigational assistance and was 
guided back to his home base by the most 
direct route. I regret this incident and will 
see to it that every precaution is taken to 
prevent recurrence. 

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have 
great unfinished tasks and I know that your 
people as well as those of the United States 
can ask for nothing better than to pursue 
them free from the fear of war. Modern 
science and technologj^ have given us the 
possibility of making labor fruitful beyond 
anything that could have been dreamed of 
a few decades ago. 



'= Reprinted from Btlletin of Nov. 12, 1962, pp. 
745-746. This message was transmitted by the De- 
partment of State to the American Embassy at 
Mo-scow at 5:0:^ p.m. Washington time, Oct. 28, 1962; 
delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 6:08 a.m. 
Moscow time, Oct. 29. Text also delivered to the 
Soviet Embassy at Washington on Oct. 28 and re- 
leased to the press at 4:35 p.m. on that date. 

^' As transmitted to Moscow, the text read "in 
turn can remove". 



654 



Department of State Bulletin 



I agree with you that we must devote 
urgent attention to the problem of disarma- 
ment, as it relates to th