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Volume LXX 

No. 1814 

April 1, 1974 

Statements by Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Eberle 321 


Address by Under Secretary Casey 339 



Statement by Assistant Secretary Ingersoll SUS 


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VOL. LXX, No. 1814 

April 1, 1974 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Omce of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and i 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected i 
press releases on foreign policy, issued i 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addressee, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases ot 
international affairs and the funetiont 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which tite 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department ol 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listeiii 

The Trade Reform Act 

Following is a staternent made before the 
Senate Committee on Finance on March 7 by 
Secretary Kissinger, together xvitli a state- 
ment made before the committee on March !+ 
by William D. Eberle, President Nixon's Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations.^ 


Press release 86 dated March 7 

With your permission I shall devote my 
opening remarks today primarily to the for- 
eign policy aspects of the Trade Reform Act 
which is now before your committee. This 
emphasis reflects not only a logical division 
of responsibilities among administration wit- 
nesses but, even more, my firm conviction 
that the world political order for years to 
come will be profoundly influenced by how 
we manage our trade and economic relations. 

This administration has, from its incep- 
tion, sought to create the conditions neces- 
sary to move us from an era of confrontation 
to a sustained period of peace and interna- 
tional stability. Detente between East and 
West has been part of a wider design : 

— A design which, because of the growing 
reality of interdependence, seeks to build a 
cooperative approach in the political-eco- 
nomic relationship among the industrialized 
democratic powers of North America, West- 
ern Europe, and Japan. 

— A design which confronts the issues in- 
volved in the relationship between the devel- 
oped and the developing countries and 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

encompasses the new challenges inherent in 
the energy crisis, the development of the 
resources of the oceans, and the preservation 
of the environment in an age of rapid indus- 

The key to our success will be the ability of 
governments to negotiate e.xpeditiously and 
to resolve issues in a firm and definitive way. 
The United States must pursue its national 
interests, as must others. But our national 
interest requires flexibility in negotiating 
agreements that provide benefits to all par- 
ties. To do otherwise is to return us to the 
days of unrestricted competition and unre- 
strained hostility — to the policies of the 
thirties which led to a collapse of world order. 

For almost three decades the major trad- 
ing nations, having learned the lessons of the 
past, have sought to open their markets to 
one another on a reciprocal basis. The nego- 
tiations have been difficult and time consum- 
ing, but the results have been important both 
in economic and in political terms. 

The benefits of a prosperous multilateral 
trading relationship constitute a cornerstone 
of the open and cooperative political ap- 
proach that has largely characterized our 
relationship with the advanced industrialized 
nations of the West since the end of the Sec- 
ond World War. Growing economic inter- 
dependence has been at the heart of the 
broader community of interest that we have 
committed ourselves to vindicate and pre- 
serve. A breakdown in trading relations and 
a drift into competing trade blocs would 
seriously jeopardize what both of our politi- 
cal parties have so long sought: a world 
that recognizes that it has an overwhelming 
stake in peace and that competition is prefer- 
able to conflagration. 

April 1, 1974 


Since the trade bill was introduced into 
the Congress some 11 months ago, the inter- 
national trading system has confronted its 
most severe challenge. As a consequence of 
the energy crisis, nations have been increas- 
ingly tempted to I'esolve their problems uni- 
laterally — to make bilateral deals and impose 
protectionist measures. 

This cannot be our preferred course. As 
the strongest nation in the non-Communist 
world, we have a duty to exercise responsible 
leadership; our aim must be concerted action 
by all major trading nations, acting in the 
common interest. I have every confidence 
that if we provide the leadership of which we 
are capable, we can reverse the tendencies 
toward bilateralism. A case in point is the 
recent Energy Conference, held in Washing- 
ton last month. At that conference 11 other 
countries, including our major trading part- 
ners, joined with us in charting a multilateral 
course of action — a course which we believe 
will meet both the immediate and the longer 
term challenges of the energy problem. 

The energy situation is an example of the 
more general need for a multilateral ap- 
proach to trade issues. While trade negotia- 
tions officially opened last September in 
Tokyo, they cannot be conducted seriously 
until the U.S. Government has authority to 
negotiate on the substantive issues. The 
actual and potential trade disturbances of the 
energy situation are urgent, and we need the 
authority contained in the trade bill if we 
are to achieve a negotiated, concerted re- 

The oil situation also raises the more gen- 
eral question of the relationship between raw 
material producers and consumers. Past 
trade negotiations have largely been con- 
cerned with access to export markets rather 
than access to vital raw materials. As a 
result, existing international trading rules 
deal inadequately with the conditions govern- 
ing such access. In the trade negotiations 
before us we intend to deal with the issue of 
bringing export restrictions, as well as im- 
port restrictions, under agreed forms of 
international discipline. 

We and other industrialized countries are 


growing increasingly dependent on the raw_ 
material resources of the developing coun- 
tries. At the same time, the developing coun- 
tries are heavily dependent on raw material 
and manufactured exports for the growth of 
their own economies. Their concerns were 
brought home to me with considerable force 
during my meeting last month in Mexico City 
with the Foreign Ministers of our Latin 
American neighbors. They believe that as- 
sured access to the markets of the industrial- 
ized countries is essential to the achievement 
of their economic goals. 

Because of the economic interdependence 
of the developed and developing countries we 
have placed heavy emphasis on the need to 
expand the North-South flow of trade. One 
such measure is the extension of a system 
of generalized tariff preferences to develop- 
ing countries. Although most other developed 
countries have already put such systems into 
effect, the United States does not yet havei 
the legal authority to do so. Hence I consider! 
the authority provided under title V essential.. 

To recapitulate, we would use the powerS' 
contained in the Trade Act to achieve the 

— A mutual reduction of trade barriers 
among industrialized countries. 

— A joint response by industrialized coun- 
tries to the aspirations of developing coun- 
tries which require the expansion of exports 
to sustain their development programs. 

— A normalization of trade relations be- 
tween the United States and the countries ofl 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 

— A new start on emerging trade issuesi 
that are not covered under the present tradei 
rules and procedures. 

— Finally, the preservation and enhance- 
ment of a global multilateral economic rela- 
tionship and the dampening of tendencies 
toward discriminatory arrangements among 
selected groups of countries. 

For six years the U.S. Government has 
been without authority to negotiate flexibly 
to avoid trade problems and to take advan- 
tage of new trade opportunities. The upcom- 
ing GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 

Department of State Bulletin 

and Trade] negotiations provide us with a 
framework for the resolution of bilateral 
disputes and tlie development of new oppor- 

Question of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R. 

Let me now turn to a more detailed dis- 
cussion of one particularly vexing aspect of 
our trade strategy : the normalization of com- 
mercial relations with the Soviet Union. 

The most painful aspect of this debate — 
for me personally and for many others in this 
administration — centers around the question 
of respect for human rights in the Soviet 

This is not a dispute between the morally 
sensitive and the morally obtuse. It is, rather, 
a problem of choosing between alternatives. 

I do not oppose the objective of those who 
wish to use trade policy to affect the evolu- 
tion of Soviet society; it does .seem to me, 
however, that they have chosen the wrong 
vehicle and the wrong context. We cannot 
accept the principle that our entire foreign 
policy — or even an essential component of 
that policy such as a normalization of our 
trade relations — should be made dependent 
on the transformation of the Soviet domestic 

I say this with some anguish, since both as 
a historian and as one whose own origins 
make him particularly conscious of the plight 
of minority groups, I would prefer that we 
could do otherwise. 

Let us remember that we seek detente with 
the Soviet Union for one overwhelming rea- 
son: Both countries have the capability to 
destroy each other — and most of the rest of 
the world in the process. Thus, both of us 
have an overriding obligation to do all in our 
power to prevent such a catastrophe. 

Detente is not rooted in agreement on 
values ; it becomes above all necessary be- 
cause each side recognizes that the other is 
a potential adversary in a nuclear war. To 
us, detente is a process of managing relations 
with a potentially hostile country in order to 
preserve peace while maintaining our vital 

interests. In a nuclear age, this is in itself an 
objective not without moral validity — it may 
indeed be the most profound imperative of 

Detente is founded on a frank recognition 
of basic differences and dangers. Precisely 
because we are conscious that these differ- 
ences exist, we have sought to channel our 
relations with the U.S.S.R. into a more stable 
framework — a structure of interrelated and 
interdependent agreements. Forward move- 
ment in our relations must be on a broad 
front, encompassing a wide range of mutual- 
ly reinforcing activities, so that groups and 
individuals in both countries will have a 
vested interest in the maintenance of peace 
and the growth of a stable international 

Since detente is rooted in a recognition of 
differences and based on the prevention of 
disaster, there are sharp limits to what we 
can insist upon as part of this relationship. 
We have a right to demand responsible inter- 
national behavior from the U.S.S.R. ; we did 
not hesitate to make this clear during the 
Middle East crisis. We also have a right to 
demand that agreements we sign are ob- 
served in good faith. 

But with respect to basic changes in the 
Soviet system, the issue is not whether we 
condone what the U.S.S.R. does internally; it 
is whether and to what extent we can risk 
other objectives — and especially the building 
of a structure for peace — for these domestic 
changes. I believe that we cannot and that to 
do so would obscure, and in the long run 
defeat, what must remain our overriding ob- 
jective: the pi-evention of nuclear war. 

Impact of Denial of MFN to the U.S.S.R. 

These considerations take on added force 
if we place trade and economic relations with 
the U.S.S.R. in the perspective of the past 
few years. When this administration as- 
sumed office it was under great pressure to 
relax restrictions upon East-West trade. 
Arguments at that time — when our trading 
position with other parts of the world was 

April 1, 1974 


deteriorating and our friends in otlier indus- 
trialized countries were moving energetically 
into Eastern markets — emphasized not only 
the economic benefits to us but also stressed 
that expanded trade would improve relations 
where diplomacy had failed to do so. 

The administration then took the view — 
which it has never abandoned — that intensi- 
fied trade should grow out of a generally 
improved relationship; in short, that our re- 
lations with the U.S.S.R. should proceed on 
a broad front. We were often criticized for 
failing to move fast enough on trade, for 
linking trade to other international develop- 
ments, and for depriving the U.S. business 
community of lucrative opportunities. Not 
once did anyone raise questions about the 
relationship of trade to the Soviet domestic 

The administration pursued its strategy 
with determination, despite the pressures to 
which it was subjected. It was only after the 
1972 summit that the President determined 
that trade could reasonably be expanded. By 
that time we were on the way to a Viet-Nam 
settlement, Berlin had been the subject of a 
major formal agreement, the first SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agree- 
ments had been completed, a set of principles 
setting standards for U.S. -Soviet relations 
had been signed at the summit, a series of 
bilateral cooperation agreements in a wide 
field of activities had been signed and were 
in process of implementation. In sum, both in 
substance and tone the U.S. -Soviet relation- 
ship had undergone significant change and a 
process of normalization committing the top 
leaders on both sides had been initiated. In 
this setting, the gradual transformation of 
trading relationships was a logical step that 
could serve to provide additional incentives 
for maintaining the course which both sides 
had set for themselves. 

The Moscow summit communique clearly 
indicated that the normalization of trading 
relationships would be an important task in 
the months ahead. When the President re- 
ported to the Congress immediately upon his 
return from Moscow, he explained his phi- 
losophy and purposes and discussed the ac- 
complishments of the visit. In none of the 

commentaries on the Moscow summit was 
there any significant opposition voice raised 
against the course we were pursuing in the i 
economic sphere. It seemed to command the 
most widespread understanding and ap- 
proval. Certainly the question of the Soviet 
domestic structure was not cited as an obsta- 
cle to the processes we had set in motion. 
Thus, to bring the issue to the fore now will 
involve profound questions of whether we 
negotiated in good faith. 

This explains the administration's concern 
with title IV of the trade bill as it now stands. 

Title IV will give the President authority 
to extend most-favored-nation (MFN) treat- 
ment; that is, nondiscriminatory tariff treat- 
ment, to countries not now enjoying that 
status. This is not a privilege; it is the re- 
moval of a discriminatory aspect of our policy 
without which we cannot claim to be moving 
toward more normal trading relations with 
these countries. The extension of nondiscrim- 
inatory tariflf treatment would, for some time 
to come, have only a modest impact on Soviet 
exports to the United States, which are large- 
ly raw materials not now subject to substan- 
tial tariffs. 

Thus, the major impact of the continued 
denial of MFN status to the Soviet Union 
would be political, not economic. MFN was 
withdrawn in 1951, largely as a political act. 
Our unwillingness to remove this discrimina- 
tion now would call into question our intent 
to move toward an improved relationship. It 
would jeopardize a moderate evolution in all 
areas, including the Middle East. It would 
prevent the implementation of the U.S.-Soviet 
Trade Agreement, as well as the lend-lease 
accord — involving repayment of over $700 
million to the United States. 

The Export-Import Bank now extends 
credits to U.S. businesses exporting to the 
Soviet Union and some Eastern European 
countries. These credits are granted under 
terms and conditions equally applicable to 
all countries. The amendment to title IV 
relating to emigration would effectively pre- 
clude further credits to the Soviet Union and 
most Eastern European countries. 

These credits are primarily for the benefit 
of the United States. Other industrialized 


Department of State Bulletin 

Western countries have been engaged in ag- 
gressively selling machinery and equipment 
to the Soviet Union for some years. They are 
able, through the support of their govern- 
ments, to offer attractive ci'edit terms as part 
of their sales effort. American business must 
have similar support from us if it is to cap- 
ture a growing portion of this expanding 

Concern has been expressed that Export- 
Import loans will be uncritically extended in 
massive amounts to the Soviet Union. This is 
not true. Each Soviet loan application is 
examined on its merits and receives the same 
detailed scrutiny as all other loans. Each 
must be judged to serve the purpose of 
promoting, in a legitimate way, American 
exports and to satisfy the assurances of 
repayment which the Bank requires. Credits 
approved by the Eximbank to date total some 
$450 million. Most of these are relatively 
modest in size, with the exception of the $154 
million in loans for the Kama River truck 
plant. We understand the legitimate concerns 
Congress would have about any lending pro- 
gram of a magnitude significantly larger 
than is customary for the Eximbank. We 
would therefore carefully examine projects of 
this size and give due attention to the se- 
curity, political, and economic factors in- 

We are aware, of course, that the intended 
purpose of this amendment is not to prevent 
the extension of nondiscriminatory status or 
to prohibit all credits to the U.S.S.R., but to 
assist those whose wish to emigrate from the 
Soviet Union has been frustrated. Yet, in 
practical terms, I believe the amendment 
would prevent the extension of nondiscrim- 
inatory tariff treatment to the Soviet Union 
and several other countries. For these rea- 
sons, we are opposed to this amendment and 
to title IV as it has emerged from the House. 

The amendment, if adopted, will almost 
certainly prove counterproductive: It will 
not enhance emigration but stop it altogether. 
The experience of the past five years demon- 
strates that as our relations with the Soviet 
Union improve, emigration rises as well. 
Over the past five years, there have been 
breakthroughs in Soviet emigration practices 

unimaginable during the years of confronta- 
tion. In March 1973 the President was as- 
sured by Soviet authorities that current 
emigration policy, which had brought about 
a significant increase in the rate of emigra- 
tion, would be continued indefinitely. The 
President was also assured that the "educa- 
tion tax" would be waived across the board. 
Despite complicating international develop- 
ments, both of these commitments have thus 
far been fully met. Some 33,500 Soviet Jews 
arrived in Israel during 1973, putting the 
total for 1969-73 over the 81,000 mark. 

The present emigration picture is not as 
bright as we would like; it has never been 
our view that the status quo is satisfactory. 
The administration of Soviet emigration poli- 
cy often seems arbitrary. Some 1,300 indi- 
viduals currently in the U.S.S.R. have been 
denied permission to emigrate to Israel. But 
the basic fact remains that as we have moved 
from confrontation to negotiation, emigra- 
tion has increased from the sporadic trickle 
of the 1960's to a relatively steady flow of 
some 2,500 a month in the 1970's. 

The issue before us is not adequately ex- 
pressed by setting "economic detente" 
against "moral detente." The basic issue is 
how best to move from our present situation 
to a safer, freer, and more humane world, 
while at the same time bringing important 
economic and political benefits to the United 

We ask the Congress for responsible con- 
sideration of how we can give substance to 
our ideals without jeopardizing other inter- 
ests in which human values — and, indeed, 
perhaps humanity itself — are also at stake. 
At this moment in the evolution of world 
affairs, a moment fraught with promise as 
well as danger, we ask the Congress for its 
support in building a progressive world and 
contributing toward a lasting peace. 


The need for improving and reshaping the 
world economic system has been evident for 
some time. The rapidity of change in world 
supply and demand circumstances for some 

April 1, 1974 


key products has recently dramatized the 
need for change. But the growth of world 
economic interdependence was already well 
underway long before the energy crisis broke 
upon us and long before problems of tight 
supply emerged in such variegated products 
as wheat and scrap metal. 

It was evident to this administration in the 
period from 1969 through the summer of 
1971 that drastic action was required to dis- 
lodge some of the fixed attitudes and prac- 
tices of the governments of the world. We 
believed then the time had come to start a 
major overhaul of the global economic system 
in all of its aspects. Beginning with the 
international economic measures taken on 
August 15, 1971, we did develop a new proc- 
ess of discussion internationally, while re- 
structuring our own competitive position and 
our relations with our major trade and pay- 
ments partners. 

Since then, much has been accomplished. 
On the monetary front, exchange rates, in- 
cluding the relative U.S. position among 
them, are now adapting to changing world 
market circumstances and no longer standing 
rigidly against the forces of history. New 
regularized procedures in the IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund] are being estab- 
lished to facilitate coordination of economic 
policies and especially harmonization of bal- 
ance of payments adjustments. 

In the trade field this administration has 
been hard at work with our trading partners 
to deal with troublesome problems. 

I know how strongly the Senate Finance 
Committee feels about trade problems, es- 
pecially where the actions of other nations 
have been inconsistent with their interna- 
tional obligations and with acceptable con- 
cepts of reasonableness and equity. Let me 
review for you the progress we have made 
in the last two years in solving some of the 
residual problems of the past and in moder- 
ating or preventing new problems from dam- 
aging our trade interests. 

Some of the restrictions which we have 
successfully eliminated are the most long- 
standing barriers against us, such as French, 
British, and Japanese restrictions existing 
in some cases for almost three decades. We 

have also succeeded in eliminating new re- 
strictions as they have come into effect, such 
as the European Community compensatory 
taxes on many agricultural products. Nego- 
tiations with Japan also have resulted in 
virtual elimination of that country's unfair 
incentives for exports. These administration 
efforts have demonstrated that the GATT can 
work if intense eft'orts are made and good 
political will is demonstrated among our 
trading partners. 

The positive results that we have achieved 
so far include, in the case of France, that the 
United States was able to negotiate in March 
and April of 1973 agreements that finally 
would eliminate the remaining quotas on all 
but one product. (That product remains 
under discussion.) Quotas to be eliminated 
under the agreement with France affected 
dried and dehydrated vegetables, canned to- 
matoes, tomato juice, and canned fruit, ex- 
cept canned pineapple (i.e., canned peaches, 
fruit cocktail, and other canned fruit). 

In the case of Great Britain, we recently 
concluded arduous negotiations on restric- 
tions which were designed to favor Carib- 
bean country exports to the United Kingdom 
and limit ours. These negotiations involved 
extensive consultations by our government 
with Caribbean countries in an effort to avoid 
actions which might damage their export 
opportunities. The result has been that 
quotas will soon be eliminated on exports to 
Great Britain of fresh grapefruit, single- \ 
strength orange and grapefruit juice, rum, 
cigars, and frozen or canned grapefruit seg- ( 
ments. j; 

Near the end of 1972, the European Com- : 
munity (EC), as a result of exchange rate 
changes, authorized the imposition of new 
compensatory taxes on agricultural products ll 
to assist the operations of the EC's common ' 
agricultural policy. The action affected some 
$40 million of U.S. exports. Vigorous efforts 
by the U.S. Govei-nment, both bilaterally and 
in the GATT, resulted in termination of this ;, 
barrier to our trade on at least 97 percent of 
the products about which the United States 

In the last two or three years, negotiations i 
with Japan have been intensified. The result 


Department of State Bulletin 

has been major quota and license liberaliza- 
tion by Japan. In early 1969, 119 products 
(Brussels Tariff Nomenclature categories) 
were under restriction. Since that time, most 
have been liberalized, leaving 32 items under 
restriction as of July 1973. However, among 
the most important items remaining under 
quota restrictions, digital computers and 
parts are now scheduled to be fully liberal- 
ized in 1975 and integrated circuits in 1974. 
Among the agricultural items remaining 
under quota restrictions, most of the quotas 
have been increased substantially in recent 
years. Japan has also eliminated other import 
restrictions, reduced tariffs, and has virtually 
eliminated its export incentives. These ac- 
tions, and others, by the end of 1973 made a 
major contribution to the reduction of the 
imbalance of trade from levels of over $4 
billion to about $1.5 billion. 

We believe this administration's record in 
pursuit of our legitimate trade interests is 
outstanding and proves that sound trade 
policy and vigorous trade negotiations can 
create new and better opportunities for 
American business, farms, and workers. 

At this moment, as you know, we are also 
intensively engaged in negotiations with 
the European Community concerning the 
changes in tariffs and nontariff measures 
resulting from the enlargement of the EC to 
include the United Kingdom, Ireland, and 
Denmark. The entry of these three countries 
into the EC resulted in changes in their 
tariffs and nontariff measures to bring them 
into line with the EC. For the United States 
there have been both pluses and minuses in- 
volved — .some British, Irish, and Danish 
tariffs have come down, while others have 

Taking all of this into account, however, 
we believe that adjustments have to be made 
in our favor to achieve a reasonable settle- 
ment. We have been negotiating with a view 
to obtaining significant trade concessions on 
selected items of particular value to the 
United States which might provide a more 
adequate counterbalance to the adjustments 
which the EC has already made. These 
trade talks between the United States and the 
EC have not been easy. Both sides have good 

arguments to put forward, and the GATT in 
this case only prescribes that a negotiated 
solution is needed. The talks have been going 
on for a year and a half already. However, 
at this moment the issue is under the most 
intense discussion within the EC and between 
the EC and the United States, and I am not 
able here to predict the particular form of 
the outcome. 

New Techniques of Negotiation 

But these kinds of efforts to deal with some 
residual problems of the past, and with par- 
ticular new problems, are not enough. We 
are now convinced that the problems of the 
future will grow in number and size unless 
we take major international steps to develop 
an improved trading system and lay the basis 
for further expansion of world trade. 

In the past, as this committee well knows, 
there have been only minor effoi'ts made to 
deal with nontariff barriers, export aids, 
agricultural measures which affect trade, and 
the general rules of the trading game. The 
problems which remain after several past 
negotiations are obviously the toughest prob- 
lems. They are the ones past negotiations 
could not resolve. We now propose to deal 
with them. In fact, we believe it is crucial 
to get at these difficult issues now to prevent 
growth in their number and effects in the 
next few years. In pursuing solutions to 
these complex problems, new techniques will 
be needed to insure improvement in the con- 
ditions of doing business in world markets. 

The problems of managing international 
economic adjustment, especially in view of 
recent supply and price problems and their 
monetary effects, will not be adequately dealt 
with by exchange rate adjustments alone. 
The temptation to other governments to in- 
tervene with specific trade measures to take 
care of this or that sector will be great. We set up a better mechanism for dealing 
with these problems as they arise, before 
crises are generated. 

Then, too, we have to face the problems 
generated by abrupt or severe adjustments 
in the level of supply in relation to world 
market demand. This is not only a question 

April 1, 1974 


of energy, although that has been foremost 
in the public mind. As we have seen over the 
last year, world demand changes combined 
with inflationary problems at home have put 
extreme pressure on supplies of some com- 
modities and raw materials, both agricultural 
and industrial. Such problems can be ex- 
pected to arise from time to time in an 
economically interdependent world charac- 
terized by rapid changes. It is part of the 
price of economic success that we must con- 
stantly alter our own circumstances and 
adapt to new opportunities. The energy ad- 
justment, in other words, has simply acceler- 
ated the forces of change that we were 
already facing anyway. 

We could fight these difficulties with uni- 
lateral measures to insulate our economy, 
but if everyone does this at the same time 
the collective effect will be severe damage 
to all of the free-world economies. The prob- 
lems cry out for negotiated, common solu- 

To deal with these old and new trade prob- 
lems we need new techniques of negotiation 
and new powers to manage our own national 
economic position better in relation to our 
national interests. This has been recognized 
by Senators Mondale and Ribicoff, of this 
committee, in their cosponsored proposed 
amendments to the Trade Reform Act con- 
cerning short supply problems. In this re- 
gard, I note that Senator Chiles has proposed 
an amendment to the Export Administration 
Act which bears a resemblance to your own 
proposals. We believe that these ideas are 
conceptually sound, and we join in the spirit 
of the proposals made — although in the 
course of the hearings and in our work with 
the committee on the bill we will have some 
detailed changes to suggest to improve the 
effectiveness of the amendments in the direc- 
tion of the objectives raised by Senator Mon- 
dale and Senator Ribicoff. 

In the same spirit we have in the executive 
branch made a number of suggestions for 
future authorities we believe we need to 
meet the problems of tomorrow. Many of 
these are embodied in the version of the 
Trade Reform Act as it has emerged from 

the House. We will have some modifications 
to suggest for your consideration, however. ' 
We believe, for example, that new tech- - 
niques of negotiation are needed and that 
one of these ought to be negotiation within 
key sectors. We need to insure that the over- 
all problems of certain key industries and 
agricultural sectors be covered in an integral 
manner, relating tariffs, nontariff barriers, 
government policies, future world supply, 
and pace of adjustment considerations. But 
on the other hand, we cannot conceivably do 
this for every sector of our economy, nor 
should we. 

So while we believe the sector approach 
may be desirable in some cases, there must 
be flexibility in the choice of sectors and in 
the methods used in each. This can best be 
resolved in consultations between industry, 
agriculture, and the Congress, and we would 
like to see more leeway written into the bill 
to achieve that end. Similarly, if we are to 
be effective in negotiating with our trading 
partners, we will need maximum leverage 
and a high degree of flexibility in applying 
that leverage. 

The countervailing duty statute, and regu- 
lations under it, have at least until recently 
proven a sound remedy for many unfair prac- 
tices. But that law, written in 1897, does not 
give us negotiating leverage, because the use 
of it is nonnegotiable. We need some degree 
of discretion in the application of the law if 
we are to find real, effective long-term solu- 
tions in changes of practice by other nations. 
We hope some further changes in the bill 
before you can be made to improve our man- 
agement of this area at home while giving us 
more bargaining flexibility abroad. 

These new techniques of negotiation I call 
for are necessary, but not enough. We also 
believe there is need for new techniques of 
consultation and new channels of informa- 
tion at home. We believe, above all else, that 
there must be a better and more intimate 
working arrangement with the Congress than 
has existed in the past in matters of trade 
and especially in trade negotiations. Funda- 
mental, of course, is your constitutional 
power to regulate commerce with foreign 


Department of State Bulletin 

nations. But also important, we have found 
that our legislation, our policy formulation, 
and our negotiations have all benefited when- 
ever the dialogue with Congress has been 
close. Accordingly, we have invited the Con- 
gress to devise a continuous role for its own 
participation in the trade negotiations. 

The industrial, agricultural, labor, and 
public intei-ests generally must also be 
weighed in a more direct manner. There has 
been repeated criticism that past efforts to 
use advice from these elements of our econo- 
my have been inadequate. We agree; on the 
other hand, the sheer enormity of the task of 
hearing and weighing advice from every 
quarter of American life must be recognized. 
We will need great ingenuity both in the 
government and in the private sector to de- 
velop a better apparatus for distilling the 
essence of advice from so many people and 
for filtering government ideas so they may 
be communicated to outside interests in 
timely fashion. We need this committee's 
understanding in our eff"orts to build a better 
consultative apparatus. Such a system is cru- 
cial to the results we can hope to achieve 
for our nation. The Trade Reform Act pro- 
vides a basis for a better system, although its 
provisions need to be adapted slightly to 
bring other elements of the American econ- 
omy, especially agriculture, into balance with 
the weight given industrial consultation. 

Momentum for Trade Talks 

I hope you recognize in our efforts to de- 
velop new mechanisms and new methods of 
dealing with our problems at home as well 
as abroad that we have a realistic, tough, 
yet sensible approach. We have also devel- 
oped momentum for trade talks with our 
trading partners. The ministers of some 105 
nations met in Tokyo in September to launch 
negotiations, on the basis of a unanimous 
declaration. This was not an effort by just 
a few industrialized countries. It involved 
most of the developing nations, too. And I 
can say in this connection that many of the 
developing nations now recognize that they, 
too, have a fundamental stake in working 

with us to build a better trading system. 

Since the Tokyo meeting, work has gotten 
underway in Geneva in preparation for the 
negotiations. The framework and procedures 
for negotiations are being developed which 
would enable us to focus on the many press- 
ing issues facing nations of the world today. 
The will to proceed is there. 

In the light of the energy crisis, some gov- 
ernments have reexamined whether or not 
trade negotiations should be pressed for- 
ward. Most of them have concluded that 
there is all the more urgency now. We our- 
selves agree with this greater sense of ur- 
gency. A rash of unilateral trade and mone- 
tary actions in reaction to energy problems 
could only make the problems of world ad- 
justment, and our own difficulties, much 
worse. Energy constrictions and price rises 
or alleged world food shortages do not argue 
less for multilateral effort but argue more 
strongly than ever for getting moving on 
the process of trade negotiations. 

The momentum thus has been generated 
internationally. Other governments now 
await action by the Senate Finance Commit- 
tee. We have put before you what we believe 
to be a sound set of proposals — proposals 
which will help us to manage our own do- 
mestic position better in relation to the world 
and which will help us to negotiate with our 
trading partners more effectively, with 
strength and with flexibility. We intend to 
devise and utilize new techniques of nego- 
tiations and new techniques of cooperation 
and consultation with Congress and with the 
various segments of the American economy. 
We hope you see our comprehensive approach 
as a sensible one, leading to greater equity 
for America in the world and greater eco- 
nomic opportunities for the American citizen. 

Provisions of the Trade Bill 

Let me now turn briefly to an overview 
of the trade bill prior to examining it in de- 
tail together. I believe you will find a high 
degree of logical consistency and interde- 
pendence within and among the various pro- 
visions of the bill. 

April 1, 1974 


The broad purpose of the trade bill is to 
enable the United States to participate effec- 
tively in the forthcoming^ multilaternl trade 
negotiations. We will seek agreements which 
will stimulate U.S. economic growth in the 
context of sti-engthening our global economic 
relations through fair and o(|uita))lc market 
opportunities and more open and nondiscrim- 
inatory world ti'adc. 

Title I of the bill contains authorities to 
conduct the new round of trade negotiations 
and procedui'es through which to implement 
the results. The primary negotiating author- 
ities would extend for a period of five years 
and include reduction or removal of tariffs 
and nontariff harriers to ti-ade, a mandate 
for reform of the international trading sys- 
tem, and provisions for increased participa- 
tion and ovei-sight by the Congress and the 
public. To enable us to more effectively 
manage the trade agreements progi-am, there 
are also authorities to make adjustments on 
the trade side to pui-ticular inflationai-y or 
balance of payments circumstances. As pres- 
ently drafted, these autho]'ities are the mini- 
mum needed to provide credibility for the 
U.S. negotiators in their attempt to bring 
about a common realization that interna- 
tional cooperation can work effectively to 
deal with new, as well as old, problems. 

Uiidci- title II temporary import relief and 
adjustment assistance is made more accessi- 
ble for industries, firms, and workers. Tests 
of injui-y for import relief are eased. Admin- 
istration of worker adjustment assistance is 
streamlined under the Labor Department, 
and its level and scope have been substanti- 
ally expanded. Under the import relief pro- 
visions an order of preference is expressed. 
Tariffs are prefen-ed to quotas and orderly 
marketing agreements, wliich are lowest in 
prefei-ence and are subject to congressional 

The provisions of title 111 generally im- 
prove existing authorities to deal with for- 
eign unfair trade practices. Authority is 
granted, subject to a number of limitations 
and procedures, to apply duty increases or 
(luantitative limitations in response to unjus- 

tifiable (illegal) or unreasonable trade prac- 
tices by foreign countries. The authority is 
extended .specifically to include export sub- 
sidies to third-country markets or to the 
United States. Any measure imposed under 
this authoi'ity is subject to congressional re- 
view. Concerning antidumping provisions, 
time limits and procedural and technical 
changes have been proposed. Time limits 
have also been established on countervailing 
duty procedures. In addition, the counter- 
vailing duty pi'ovisions would be extended to 
cover duty-free imports. During the next 
four years, the Secretary of the Treasury 
can refrain from countervailing if to do so 
would jeopardize the international negotia- 
tions. There are serious problems with this 
provision, which Secretary [of the Treasury 
Ceorge P.] Shultz has already spoken to. Fi- 
nally, I would note that changes in responses 
to unfair ti-ade practices involving patent in- 
fringement provide for fairer procedures, a 
greater role by the Tariff Commission, and 
judicial review. 

Title IV of the Trade Reform Act author- 
izes the President, subject to certain condi- 
tions, to extend nondiscriminatory tariff 
treatment to imports of certain Communist 
countries not currently granted it. This is 
seen as a key element in the development of 
orderly economic relations with the non- 
market-economy countries. As presently 
drafted, however, U.S. extension of nondis- 
criminatory tariff treatment, as well as cred- 
its and guarantees, may well be precluded. 
This, in turn, would prevent the October 
1972 U.S.-U.S.S.R. commercial agreement 
and the full settlement of lend-lease obliga- 
tions from taking effect. The administration 
is deeply concerned about these constraints, 
while fully sharing the humanitarian con- 
cerns which gave rise to them. We are hope- 
ful that an accommodation can be reached 
in the language of the statute, thus enabling 
us to continue building upon mutual East- 
West interests to achieve a stable and durable 

Title V of the bill grants authority to the 
President to join with other developed coun- 


Department of State Bulletin i 

tries in the extension of generalized tariff 
treatment, for a period of 10 years, to eli- 
gible imports of beneficiary developing coun- 
tries. By increasing their access to developed 
country markets, developing countries can 
expand export earnings — thus enhancing 
their economic growth. In addition, the 
United States can benefit as it is anticipated 
that a large share of their increased export 
earnings will return to the United States in 
the form of additional purchases here. Max- 
imum levels of allowable developing countiy 
exports are set under this provision, and of 
course it excludes articles subject to safe- 
guard procedures. 

Let me conclude with a fundamental 
theme of this administration, which is that 
international peace cannot be based on just 
one or another action or negotiation in inter- 
national relations. The political, security, and 
economic issues are all intertwined. Indeed, 
in the present state of a higher than ever 
degree of economic interdependence, this is 
more true than ever before. To insure a 
stable, prosperous world, we must develop 
an adaptable but orderly world economic sys- 
tem that minimizes frictions between nations 
and enhances their common interests. It is 
a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy 
that common problems in the world should 
be dealt with collectively, through negotiated 
solutions, rather than through escalating 
conflicts of unilaterally determined national 
policies and actions. The Trade Reform Act 
is essential to enable us to complete our ef- 
forts to build peace in this troubled world. 

I would like to close with the President's 
words from his message accompanying the 
trade bill when it was submitted last April. 
They are even more urgent today: 

"This structure of peace cannot be strong 
. . . unless it encompasses international eco- 
nomic affairs. Our progress toward world 
peace and stability can be significantly under- 
mined by economic conflicts which breed po- 
litical tensions and weaken security ties. It 
is imperative, therefore, that we promptly 
turn our negotiating efforts to the task of 
resolving problems in the economic arena." 

Secretary Kissinger Holds 
Informal News Briefing 

FoUowi)ig are )e»i(irks made by Secretary 
Kissinger at the opening of the Department's 
regular daily news briefing on March H. 

Prfss release 97 dated March 14 

Secretary Kissinger: I wanted to come in 
for a few minutes. I'm going to have a press 
conference next week. 

But I have the impression that during this 
week I have done more for European uni- 
fication than any man since Jean Monnet. 

And so I thought that it might be useful 
to put some matters into perspective — in 
particular, one remark of mine that has 
been widely reported that cast, or seemed 
to cast, reflection on the legitimacy of exist- 
ing European governments. Now, as you 
by now have all learned, I went into this 
meeting with the congressional wives [on 
March 11] not realizing that it was covered 
by the press — and all of my disasters seemed 
to have occurred when there was a combina- 
tion of press and ladies [laughter] — so I 
don't believe that the context in which this 
remark was made was properly explained. 

This remark was not made in the context 
of whatever difficulties exist at this moment 
between the United States and Europe. The 
remark was made in the context of explain- 
ing the imperative necessity of carrying out 
a policy of peaceful coexistence in the age 
of nuclear weapons. And the point that I 
attempted to make, before my exuberance 
carried me away, was that when there was 
a certain scale of devastation the distinction 
between victor and defeated would become 
meaningless and the shock to societies would 
be so great that no country that entered such 
a war would ever recover. And it is in this 
context that I attempted to say, anyway, 
that no government that entered World 
War I recovered its legitimacy, as a result of 
those devastations. 

It was not intended as a reflection on 
existing governments or a commentary on 

April 1, 1974 


the present state of U.S.-European relations; 
and it was said in a totally different part of 
the remark. 

In any event, I want to make clear that to 
the extent that the remarks lend themselves 
to the interpretation that was given, I re- 
gret them, and I feel they made no great 
contribution to the Atlantic dialogue. 

Now, we nevertheless believe that we must 
distinguish the issue of personalities from 
the issues that exist; there is no personal 
dispute between members of this adminis- 
tration and European leaders. The difficul- 
ties that have arisen have absolutely noth- 
ing to do with personal pique or bad personal 
relations between the American officials and 
individual European officials. 

The issue is whether Atlantic relations 
should be conceived cooperatively or com- 
petitively — whether a European identity can 
be developed in collaboration with the 
United States or must be developed inher- 
ently in opposition or separation from the 
United States. 

Those issues are important. 

On our side, we believe that the unity of 
the West has been the cornerstone of our 
foreign policy. It will remain the corner- 
stone of our foreign policy, and all our dis- 
putes will be conducted with the intention 
of resolving them — with that objective fore- 
most in our mind. 

So I just thought that it was important 
to separate the incidental from the funda- 
mental, and I will be having a press con- 
ference next week in which we can discuss 
these things more fully. 

Q. What day? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are aiming for 
Wednesday — but it might slip to Thursday. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you on the record 
right notv? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, looidd you care to take 
some questions on another issue, namely, 
the Middle East and the discussioiis that 
have taken place in Tripoli? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'll take that question 
because I have had many questions which 
were phoned into my office on it today. 

We actually know no more than you ladies 
and gentlemen here do. We have had no 
official reports or official notifications, and 
we have had the same conflicting reports 
that you have had, so we have really nothing 
to add — and your speculation will be as good 
as our speculation as of this moment. I 
don't know what we'll find dui-ing the course 
of the afternoon. 

Q. Do you know on what basis the Vice 
President made his remarks this morning? 

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't seen what 
he actually said, and I am certain that the 
information I gave you is the correct state 
of our information. 

Q. Well, he said — forgive me — he said it 
was his understanding that the oil embargo 
had been lifted, and he said that in the 
context of a conversation that he reportedly 
had with you last night. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we met at the 
Jordanian Embassy last night, and my lan- 
guage toward the end of the day gets more 
and more convoluted. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are things any more un- 
certain today than they were last night, or 
yesterday at this time? Has it been uncer- 
tain all tJris time since — 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we expected 
that some decision might be made yesterday, 
and the only news we have had is in fact 
the news from the tickers that some of our 
diplomats have reported the news which is 
on the tickers. [Laughter.] 

But we have nothing official. I think that 
there must have been a misunderstanding 
of some of my remarks. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the reports says 
that the embargo is beirig lifted "for a trial 
period," apparently giving you time to make 
a settlement. Is this a kind of sword over 
your Jiead to get things — to get something 
don e im m ediately ? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have seen 
that report. 

Q. Well, how ivoiild you look upon that — 
if true ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have to move at 
the pace that seems to us suitable for a 
settlement, and that cannot be affected by 

But I did not come here to hold a press 

Q. You came to make your announcement 
oil Europe, I think. 

Secretary Kissinger: I came to separate 
the truth from — 

Q. Well, may I ask a question about your 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Do you plan, ivhen you go to Mos- 
coiv, to stop on your ivay back, to try to 
have atiy discussions to repair whatever dam- 
age you may or may not have done, and what 
do you think of speculation that publicity 
given your speech may have delayed some 
of the developments which were in train? 

Secretary Kissinger: The fundamental dif- 
ficulties have not been caused by my com- 
ments. There has been some exacerbation 
of feelings. The fundamental problems are 
the ones that I have described, and those 
have been at the heart of the discussion for 
nearly a year. Those problems remain as 
problems. But they should be discussed in 
an atmosphere in which both sides recog- 
nize that the unity of the West has brought 

us to this point — as we said on Tuesday — 
and this is required even more for the future. 

As for plans for my trip to Moscow, we'll 
announce those as they develop. 

It's not a que.stion of repairing this or 
that situation, it's a question of seeing wheth- 
er the dialogue can go forward in a frame- 
work of some mutually acceptable principles. 

The press: Thank you very much, Mr. 

Secretary Emphasizes Importance 
of Preserving Western Unity 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ^ 

The overwhelming problem today is to 
construct a cooperative world order. The 
essential component of this is unity in the 
West. In the last year, in trying to inject 
a new vitality into the Atlantic relationship, 
we have encountered difficulty in working 
out consultative practices which would meet 
the needs of all. 

These difficulties are real and serious and 
will take some time to resolve. But we are 
determined to resolve them with patience 
and good will. Our overriding objective is 
to preserve the unity of the West which has 
brought us to this point and which is even 
more essential for our future. 

' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 12 by 
George Vest, Special Assistant to the Secretary for 
Press Relations. 

April 1, 1974 


Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Negotiating Process 
in the Middle East 

Folloivmg are transcripts of intervieivs 
with Under Secretary for Political Affairs 
Joseph J. Sisco on the CBS Morning News 
program b>j Richard C. Hottelet on February 
25 and by Barry Serafin on March 6. 


Mr. Hottelet: Kissinger's mission is to 
break another deadlock. On his last trip to 
the Middle East, five weeks ago, he brought 
Israel and Egypt to disengage their troops on 
the Suez Canal front. Now he will try to 
persuade Syria and Israel to start moving 
toivard disengagement on the Golan Heights. 
There is a lot riding on this effort — for one 
thing as long as both armies glare at each 
other across the barren plain, any one of the 
almost daily clashes ca7i flare up into major 
action. The second point is that stalemate 
on this front holds up all progi-ess toward 
peace — the Geneva Conference and the steps 
beyond disengagement on the Egyptian sec- 
tor. Thirdly, movement by Syria seems to be 
the key to lifting the Arab oil embargo. Get- 
ting Israel and Syria off dead center and 
moving in the right direction will not be easy, 
but it is logical to assume that if Kissinger 
saw no chance of success he ^couldn't be set- 
ting out this morning. 

The man who shares a good bit of the 
credit for the past remarkable success on the 
three previous trips to the Middle East is th e 
new Under Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco. 
What are the prospects this time, Mr. Sisco? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, Dick, I think we've got 
one very important purpose in mind as we 
undertake this trip. We would like to get a 
negotiating process started between Syria 


and Israel. I think it's important that we 
make progress to this end. I think there is 
hope. We'll be going on to Damascus in the 
first instance and then to Israel. And I think 
there is a reasonable prospect that as a result 
of this trip a negotiation can begin between 
the two sides. 

Mr. Hottelet: President Sadat of Egypt is 
quoted as saying that he expects a break- 
through — another Kissinger miracle — this 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I'd prefer at the moment 
to stay with my characterization. I think 
that if we can get a serious negotiating proc- 
ess started the trip will have been a success. 

Mr. Hottelet: What seems to be a key ele- 
ment in this deadlock is the Syrian refusal 
thus far to give the Israelis a list of the 
POW's that they hold and to allow access to 
them by the International Red Cross. The 
expectation is really that Mr. Kissinger 
n-ouldn't be going out if he felt that he would 
be coming back emptyhanded. Will he bring 
that list of prisoners from Damascus to Jeru- 
salem ? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think we will have to 
wait and see, Dick, but I would agree with 
you, certainly, the question of the POW's, 
question of a visit, this is obviously a signifi- 
cant element in this entire situation. It's an 
issue on which there is very deep feeling in 
Israel, and it's one, of course, Dr. Kissinger 
will have to cope with on his trip. 

Mr. Hottelet: Do you expect that he will 
get the list? 

Mr. Sisco: Again I say we will just have to 
wait and see, but it's a significant element 

Department of State Bulletin 

and that significant element has to be dealt 
with if progress is to be made. 

Mr. Hottelet: The Israelis are politically, 
domestically, not in very good shape. Mrs. 
Meir is still trying to get [Moshe] Dayan 
into her government; it looks as though there 
won't he really a cohesive, effective govern- 
ment to hold up the Israeli end in these very 
sensitive discussions. Hoiv much of a prob- 
lem unll this be? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, the Israelis, of course, 
have taken some time with respect to putting 
their government together. But regardless of 
that fact, even though a minority govern- 
ment may be put together, the fact of the 
matter is that there is a broad consensus, in 
my judgment, both among the leadership 
and among the Israeli people in favor of 
progress toward further disengagement. 
And regardless of what the constellation is, 
regardless of what the numbers may be in 
the Knesset, the fact of the matter is that 
even some of the members of the Knesset 
who may not serve in the government, for 
example, have never had any particular 
difficulty with any significant aspect of for- 
eign policy and in particular the question of 
trying to achieve some progress on the 
Syrian-Israeli disengagement. 

Mr. Hottelet: Do you see the process of 
contact, of communication, between Israel 
and Syria started the way you did it with 
Egypt and Israel? Will there be a U.N. tent 
somewhere on the Golan Heights, or trould 
yozi expect them to send their representatives 
to talk in Geneva? Will you serve as a inter- 
mediary? What are the options? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, Dick, I think that the first 
two that you mentioned certainly are possi- 
bilities. This is something really the parties 
themselves are going to have to decide. If 
they prefer to do further discussing some- 
where within the area, again that is a deci- 
sion for them to take. If the preference is to 
move on to Geneva, as you know there is a 
working military group that has been estab- 
lished and you have there a structure. I 
think that is basically a side issue. The 

important thing is to be able to develop the 
kind of negotiating framework between the 
two sides that will make further negotiations 

Mr. Hottelet: When the Secretary of State 
irent to Jerusalem the last time on the 20th 
of January, he brought ivith him from Da- 
mascus a set of Syrian suggestions about 
disengagement. Have the Israelis ever re- 

Mr. Sisco: The Israelis have had these 
under consideration for some time. We ex- 
pect to get some concrete views from the 
Israelis in the context of this trip, and I think 
then we will have to wait and see as to 
whether these ideas will offer the prospect 
for moving on or just what the situation will 
be. We are in a very delicate situation here, 
as you can appreciate, and I think it's impor- 
tant that the role that Dr. Kissinger will play, 
very much like the role that he played on the 
Egyptian side, will in some instances not 
only be as the message carrier. Many times 
the job involves interpreting one side to 
another, and we don't go there with any pre- 
packaged plan of our own, I might say. I 
think we are there in the first instance to 
listen to the parties, see what they can offer 
in a very concrete way, and then I think that 
we can determine how best to proceed. 

Mr. Hottelet: Do you think that the cli- 
mate, the general atmosphere, is more favor- 
able now to nen^ contact and fruitful contact 
on the Syrian-Israeli front than it has been, 
ivhat with the main leaders of the Arab world 
and even some radical leaders apparently en- 
dorsing President Asad's more moderate 
policy ? 

Mr. Sisco: I think the whole atmosphere is 
more favorable than it has been, and I think 
one has to look at this question in the broader 
context. I think in the aftermath of the Oc- 
tober war last year, the situation in the Mid- 
dle East has changed rather substantially. I 
think both sides are tired of war. I think 
there is an appreciation by each side that war 
is not the solution, that if there were a fur- 
ther renewal of hostilities the results would 

April 1, 1974 


be, apt to be, inconclusive and not particu- 
larly helpful to either side. So that I think 
that the atmosphere generally in the area is 
favorable. I think we have an unparalleled 
opportunity to make progress, and I think the 
atmosphere with respect to the Syrian-Israeli 
part of the problem offers some hope for 

M): Hottelet: Will the Secretary of State 
be going to Saudi Arabia, to Riyadh? 

Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think we will be stopping 

Mr. Hottelet: The question there is ivhat 
about the oil embargo? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think on that, as you 
know, we've had two important visitors in 
Washington this last week — the Foreign 
Minister of Saudi Arabia and the Foreign 
Minister of Egypt. There was a summit 
meeting just a little over a week ago, where 
the leadership of Saudi Arabia, Algeria, 
Egypt, and Syria met. I think the attitude 
reflected at that meeting represented a step 
forward, and I'm sure, as in past discussions, 
the discussions in Riyadh and elsewhere will 
afl'ord an opportunity to cover all aspects of 
the Middle Eastern situation. 

Mr. Hottelet: Is the Syrian problem the 
key to this? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I would say that all con- 
cerned would like to see progress on the 
Syrian-Israeli disengagement, and I think 
it's important that we make progress. 

Mr. Hottelet: President Sadat of Egypt 
has played a very active role in not only the 
Arab but the general diplomacy in the Middle 
East in the last few months. Will he, do you 
think, be able to contribute any initiative to 
get things moving? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, President Sadat's role has 
been a very positive one in the last three or 
four months. I think he has taken the lead in 
this regard. I think he faced up to some very 
hard decisions in negotiations with Israel 
which helped bring about the disengagement 

agreement, an agreement, by the way, which 
is being implemented in an impeccable ' 
fashion. Both sides, we know, are very '■ 
pleased as to the form and the manner in 
which implementation is taking place. And 
this is important because if you've got a test 
of peace on the ground, a test of peace that 
works on the ground, this will have a tre- 
mendous impact psychologically on both sides 
and in the area generally, and we feel, of 
course, that agreement was not possible un- 
less a constructive attitude was demon- 
strated by both Israel and Egypt. And we 
feel that both approached it flexibly from the 
point of view that they saw it to be in their 
mutual interest to achieve this separation of 
forces. ,| 

k I 

Mr. Hottelet: Very briefly, do you think 
the Syrians can be as flexible as the Egyp- 
tians were? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, one would hope that the 
Syrians can be flexible, can be constructive. 
I think that the Syrian, as well as the Israeli, 
Government has an interest in trying to 
achieve agreement, and I think there is a 
realization on both sides that if there is to be 
an agreement each is going to have to move 
a bit and there is going to have to be a little 


Mr. Sera fin: Mr. Secretary, I guess you 
have to be pleased with the trip; at least some 
indirect talks are going to be started noiv 
betiveen Israel and Syria. 

Mr. Sisco: Yes, Barry. When I was on last 
week, I said Dr. Kissinger's trip had a very 
limited objective in mind and that objective 
was to keep the negotiating process going. 
And as a result of this last week's trip, Israel 
has agreed to send a high-level representative 
to Washington to continue the discussions on 
the questions of disengagement of forces be- 
tween Syria and Israel. And after we hold 
these talks. President Asad of Syria has also 
agreed that he will send a high-level Syrian 
representative to Washington. So this will 


Department of State Bulletin 

afford opportunity for the Secretary of State 
to discuss the matter with both sides on a 
continuing basis. And that was the objective 
of the trip, and I think we achieved it. 

Mr. Sera fin : I know there icas considerable 
concern within the State Department about 
the confusion and uncertainty nnthin the 
Israeli Government — some concern about 
could it really make decisions till it got itself 
pulled together. Now Dayan says he will join 
the new Cabinet. Does that make things 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think the decision taken 
last night in Israel is a very hopeful one in- 
deed, because the Israeli Government has had 
to take some time in putting together a Cab- 
inet. The indications are now that a govern- 
ment will be formed. We always felt, how- 
ever, as difficult as that process has been, 
that there is a broad consensus in the Israeli 
body politic in favor of going ahead on these 
talks to try to achieve a separation of forces 
between Israel and Syria, and of course we 
are very glad that this decision last night was 
taken, and I am confident that the Israeli 
Government will be in a position to take the 
appropriate decisions. 

Mr. Sera fin: It is being reported by Israeli 
radio that one reason for Dayan's decision to 
join the Cabinet now, which is sort of an 
about-face for him, is because there is a 
Syrian military buildup going on on the Go- 
lan Heights. What do you know about that? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I am not aware of any 
buildup. Obviously the situation on the Golan 
Heights will continue to remain delicate. All 
of us have to watch that situation very care- 
fully. After all, the purpose of these discus- 
sions we are holding will be to try to achieve 
a separation of forces, and one of the results 
of such a separation would be to reduce the 
possibility of a renewal of hostilities. I have 
the distinct impression that both sides are 
interested in trying to achieve this kind of 
an agreement, and I hope, in time, we can be 
helpful in this regard. 

Mr. Serafin: There has been considerable 

speculation over the past couple of days that 
the Arab oil embargo is about to be lifted — 
is it? 

Mr. Sisco: The oil ministers are scheduled 
to meet on the 10th of March — I think it is 
next Sunday. We do not have any clear-cut 
indications as to what they will decide at this 
meeting. I continue to be hopeful, but I think 
we will just have to wait to see what occurs 
at that meeting. 

Mr. Serafin: You say that you hare no 
clear-cut indication. Do you have some kind 
of advance rumblings of what is in store? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think over the past weeks 
and months we certainly have had indications 
of individual attitudes of individual Arab 
states. This is a collective decision that was 
applied when the embargo decision was taken 
originally, and it has to be a collective de- 
cision in terms of rescinding the embargo. 
And therefore if this meeting will take place 
as it is scheduled to on the 10th of March, I 
think we will just have to wait and see what 
the collective decision is. 

Mr. Serafin: Are you optimistic about it? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, as I say, I continue to be 
hopeful, and I think that we will just have to 
see what the concrete decision is, if any. 

Mr. Serafin: The Common Market coun- 
tries are now talking about going ahead 
pretty much on their own in making some 
cooperative deals with the Arab countries. I 
gather there was no consultation ivith this 
government about that? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, first let me say with re- 
spect to the action taken by the European 
Community the other day, we certainly have 
no objections with respect to cooperation be- 
tween the European Community and the 
Arab world. On the contrary, we welcome 
such cooperation. We are pursuing this sort 
of a policy, and it is entirely understandable 
that the European countries will be pursuing 
this sort of a policy. The difficulty that we 
find in that action is that the consultation 

April 1, 1974 


process did not take place. We felt and feel 
that on this kind of a matter, where there is 
a mutual interest between Eui-ope and the 
United States, that there should l)e more con- 
sultation. I might add that Secretary Kis- 
singer went to Brussels, here at the end of 
this trip, and one of the purposes of that 
meeting in Brussels was to brief fully on the 
results of the trip — this is what Secretary 
Kissinger did at the end of his previous trip 
a month ago. 

Mr. Serafiv: Following the Common Mar- 
ket countries' action though, the Secretary 
said, in effect, ire reserve the right to do the 
same thing. It sounded like a threat. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think that there isn't 
any doubt with respect to the United States. 
We feel that the problems that confront both 
the United States and the European Commu- 
nity, particularly as they relate to energy, 
as they relate to the whole question of re- 
sources, and so on, that what is required is a 
cooperative approach, and that cooperative 
approach, we believe, was reflected in the 
Washington Energy Conference that took 
place here about two weeks ago. We are ready 
to join in these cooperative endeavors. We 
think that no one country can solve these 
problems. We think that it is in our mutual 
interest to concert together, and this is really 
what we are saying when we say that the 
consultation process was far from perfect in 
this particular instance, and as we look ahead 
to the future, it is important that that con- 
sultation process be improved. 

Mr. Serafin: We have about a half a minute 
left. There have been reports of an alleged 
assassination plot concerning Secretary Kis- 
singer. I wonder what you can tell us about 

Mr. Sisco: I have no specific comment on 
that particular report. I will say this — that 
the problem of security, obviously, on this 
kind of a trip is always one of concern and 
it is one that one has to take great care on. 
As far as this particular report, as I said, 
I don't believe it is wise to make any com- 

United States Announces Progress 
in Discussions in Syria and Israel 

Wliite House Announcement ' 

Secretary of State Kissinger has informed 
the President of the following: 

The Secretary of State is authorized by 
the Government of Syria to transmit to the 
Government of Israel a list of the total num- 
ber of Israeli prisoners of war now held by 
the Government of Syria. There are 65 
names on the list. 

Second, the Government of Syria has 
agreed that Red Cross visits to the Israeli 
prisoners of war it holds shall begin on the 
morning of March 1. 

The Government of Israel will give its 
ideas on disengagement of Syrian and Israeli 
forces to the Secretary of State on March 1 
for transmittal to the Government of Syria. 
The Secretary of State will personally take 
those ideas to Damascus. 

United States and Egypt Resume 
Diplomatic Relations 

Joint U.S.-Egypt Announcement^ 

The Governments of Egypt and the United 
States have agreed to resume diplomatic rela- 
tions on February 28, 1974. 

The two governments express the hope 
that this step will develop and strengthen re- 
lations between their countries and contrib- 
ute substantially to better mutual under- 
standing and cooperation. 

The Government of Egypt has named Dr. 
Ashraf Ghorbal as Ambassador to the United 
States. The President of the United States 
intends to nominate Mr. Hermann Eilts as 
Ambassador to Egypt. 

' Read to news correspondents on Feb. 27 by Gerald 
L. Warren, Deputy Press Secretary to President 
Nixon (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments dated Mar. 4). 

" Read to news correspondents on Feb. 28 by Gerald 
L. Warren, Deputy Press Secretary to President 
Nixon (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Docu- 
ments dated Mar. 4). Issued simultaneously at Cairo. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Reshaping of the World Economy 

Address by William J. Casey 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

A little more than a generation ago the 
first post-World War II reshaping of the 
world economy was launched, unpreten- 
tiously but di-amatically, in a simple and 
straightforward speech by a Seci-etary of 
State. The time was June 5, 1947. The occa- 
sion was commonplace — graduation exercises 
at Harvard. And the Secretary of State was 
a man of extraordinary qualities — George C. 

The American commitment that developed 
from this speech ultimately led to transfer of 
nearly $15 billion in U.S. resources to a group 
of countries consisting both of old friends 
and old foes. Their common characteristic 
then was that each of them had undergone a 
scientific, programed period of mutual de- 
struction which had left their economies in a 
state of paralysis. 

In subsequent years the Marshall plan was 
to be referred to as an act of generosity and 
magnanimity. But the act was no less im- 
pressive if we focus only on its pragmatic 
aspects. There is no doubt that a major pur- 
pose of the U.S. Government at the time was 
to combat "hunger, poverty, desperation, and 
chaos," to use Secretary Marshall's words. 
There is also no doubt that we were acutely 
aware of the dangerous strategic threat 
which could result from a perpetually weak- 
ened Europe. 

But it was also a fundamental basis of the 
Marshall plan that we could not prosper for 
long if Europe was permitted to stagnate. It 
is to this fundamental that we must look 

' Made at Adelphi University, Garden City, N.Y., 
on Mar. 3 (press release 80 dated Mar. 4). 

again today in reshaping the world economy. 
For the success of the Marshall plan brought 
far-reaching changes in the world that could 
not then be envisaged. It brought more than 
mere recovery of Europe. It set in train and 
provided fuel for a whole series of develop- 
ments, some of which had been initiated ear- 
lier, others to come later. These included the 
evolution of the world monetary system es- 
tablished at Bretton Woods, the world trad- 
ing system which evolved under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, known as 
the GATT, the lowering of trade restrictions 
among European countries which culminated 
in the European Common Market, a rising 
flow of development assistance to the poorer 
nations, and a worldwide flow of capital and 
technology on an unprecedented scale. 

World trade increased fivefold in the two 
decades from the beginning of 1951. And 
capital moved across national boundaries in 
ever-increasing volume. In the same two 
decades the volume of U.S. assets and invest- 
ments abroad increased more than sixfold — 
from just over $30 billion to nearly $200 bil- 
lion. Income from U.S. foreign investments 
increased more than eightfold in the same 
period. Often this American wealth put to 
work in other nations came back to the 
United States in the form of products, some- 
times outcompeting those that the same in- 
dustries produced domestically. Nonetheless 
the well-being of the citizens of all countries 
has been enhanced by this flow of investment 
and by the vigorous competition which has 
developed in international trade. 

Somewhere in the sixties there was a turn 
which eventually required a change in our 

April 1, 1974 


posture in world economic affairs and a new 
shakeup in the world economic oi-der. The 
United States sustained increasing; deficits in 
its balance of payments. We imposed controls 
to keep our dollars home. Nevertheless, ris- 
ing deficits and increasing activity by our 
companies in building and expanding plants 
abroad created a huge pool of expatriated 
dollars, or Eurodollars. In August 1971 this 
trend culminated in our slamming down the 
gold window, two subsequent devaluations in 
the dollar, and a further significant dollar 
devaluation as the world's currencies were 
permitted to float. 

All this produced a worldwide eff'ort in 
which most of the nations of the world are or 
will be engaged in reforming the rules under 
which the international economy operates. In 
the trade policy field, therefore, we are exam- 
ining the bases for legislative action and 
otherwise getting ourselves ready to nego- 
tiate tariff reductions and reductions of non- 
tariff barriers, to free up trade in agricul- 
ture, to assure that the less developed coun- 
tries get a reasonable opportunity to benefit 
fully from these negotiations, and to do all 
this in a way that provides reasonable bene- 
fits and safeguards for the American worker. 

Similarly, while a system of floating cur- 
rency values is working quite well, efforts are 
going on to build a new system of more 
flexible and more frequently adjusted fixed 
exchange rates. In other forums we are en- 
deavoring to establish a set of rules on in- 
vestment policy which will insure that unfair 
competition in the world economy — once cur- 
tailed in the trade and monetary areas — does 
not simply move to the investment field. It is 
to these three exercises — one in the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, one in the GATT, and 
one in the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] — that 
people, at least until the middle of 1973, 
usually referred when they talked about the 
reshaping of the world economy. They are 
indeed important. They are to be continued 
and energetically pursued. 

But to grasp the full dimension of how the 
world economy will be reshaped and reshape 
our lives and institutions, it is necessary to 
consider a whole range of new and develop- 


ing economic forces. These forces include: 
the scai'city of certain resources such as oil, ' 
food, and metals: the location and new direc- 
tions in the worldwide flow of skills, capital, 
and technology as well as resources; pres- 
sures to control pollution; and other social 
forces. The key to the current reshaping of 
the woi-ld economic order lies in how we re- 
spond to these forces. 

Concentration of Key Resources 

The most dramatic example today of a 
scarce resource and the role resources can 
play in the international economic order is, 
of course, oil. We have seen in a period of 
just a few months how an organization of 
oil-producing nations with a total population 
comprising only about 7 percent of the total 
population of the world was able to impose 
on all the oil-consuming nations of the world 
a foui-fold increase in price. 

This change in price means a massive shift 
in wealth and power and a massive change 
in the balance of payments structure of ma- 
jor trading nations of the w^orld. It has been 
estimated that as a consequence of the oil 
price increase the developed nations of the 
world, which in recent years have typically 
run current account surpluses on the order 
of $10 billion per year, will in 1974 sustain 
current account deficits of more than $30 bil- 
lion; at the same time the less developed 
countries will suffer an increase in their tra- 
ditional current account deficits of $10-$15 
billion — all of which means that these few 
oil-producing nations will in a single year 
have accumulated current account surpluses 
in the order of $55 billion. 

Aside from the problem of paying the addi- 
tional costs of energy imports, the world will 
be faced with the problem of dealing with the 
investment flows which these surplus earn- 
ings will eventually represent. We can as- 
sume safely, I believe, that the United States 
itself will attract a large share of these in- 
vestment funds either directly or indirectly. 
And this will occur because the most attrac- 
tive and most profitable area of investment 
today is in the field of energy, where the 
United States by all accounts must be con- 
Department of State Bulletin 

sidered a leader in terms of resources, in 
terms of skilled personnel, and in terms of 
technological know-how. We possess not only 
untapped resources in oil but also coal and 
shale, and we lead in ability to harness the 
energy of the sun, the atom, and hydrogen. 

Though we may be the principal benefi- 
ciaries of the oil producers' investments, we 
still have a responsibility to assure that the 
movement of these vast sums does not disrupt 
the international monetary system or stimu- 
late undue currency speculation. Moreover, 
there is a responsibility, which must be pri- 
marily that of the oil producers themselves, 
to finance the energy import needs of certain 
less developed countries on highly conces- 
sional terms lest this abrupt change in the 
cost of energy impoverish them even further. 

Food is another major resource distributed 
unevenly around the world and one which has 
become prone to production shortfalls and 
scarcity in recent years. In 1972 world out- 
put of wheat, for example, declined by 3 per- 
cent while rice production — another staple — 
was off by 5 percent. Exports of these two 
important grains dropped even further, 12 
percent for rice and 30 percent for wheat, 
making the effect on importing countries 
even more severe than the decline in produc- 
tion would otherwise indicate. 

If world living standards continue to rise 
— and it is our commitment to contribute 
toward sustaining this trend — the burden on 
food supply will grow. There is a correlation 
between rising incomes and rising meat con- 
sumption, while at the same time production 
of meat requii-es a far greater input of grains 
to achieve the same nutrition as direct con- 
sumption of grain itself. For example, it is 
estimated that cattle consume about seven 
pounds of grain to produce one pound of beef 
and hogs consume four pounds of grain to 
produce one pound of pork while the ratio for 
poultry is about three to one. 

Among the affluent countries, in the past 
two decades the Japanese have virtually 
tripled their consumption of meat, poultry, 
and fish per capita; the European countries 
have approximately doubled their consump- 
tion of these products; in the United States 
the consumption level of meat, fish, and poul- 

try has increased by 50 percent or more. 
One can imagine that as incomes rise in the 
less developed world and the same consump- 
tion pattern develops, the pressure on sup- 
plies of grains and soybeans required to pro- 
duce meat will become still more severe. 

It is true, however, that nations are not as 
limited in their ability to produce food as 
they are in their ability to produce oil. None- 
theless, technology which can determine the 
relative eflficiency of agricultural output is 
concentrated in a few nations. The United 
States, for example, employs only 5 percent 
of its labor force in agriculture and produces 
enough to feed its entire population while 
still being the world's largest agricultural 
exporter. By contrast, it is estimated that in 
the less developed world, 70 percent of the 
population resides in rural areas. Yet — be- 
cause of their ineflficient methods of produc- 
tion, the limited use of fertilizers, cultivation 
of farmlands of a size too small to permit eco- 
nomic use of modern machinery — many of 
these nations still find it necessary to be net 
importers of food even to maintain minimum 
subsistence levels. 

The concentration of essential resources in 
a few countries extends also to certain key 
metals. In 10 years, it is estimated, the 
United States will be primarily dependent on 
imports for 9 of 13 basic raw metals includ- 
ing bauxite, iron ore, and tin. Today four 
countries in the world supply most of the 
world's copper exports, three countries ac- 
count for 70 percent of the world's tin ex- 
ports, three countries for 60 percent of the 
world's lead exports, and over half the 
world's known nickel reserves are located in 
two countries. 

New Division of Labor 

The growing demand for key resources and 
their concentration in a few areas — drama- 
tized most vividly by the recent abrupt 
change in the world energy situation — testify 
to the interdependence of all nations of the 
world with each other if the dream of rising 
living standards and more equitable distribu- 
tion of the world's output is to be realized. 
Yet, while powerful economic forces push us 

April 1, 1974 


to greater interdependence, there is still the 
temptation on the part of nations to try to 
escape interdependence and avoid the con- 
stant threat of disruption to their national 
economic structures which can occur if sup- 
pliers in other nations fail to fulfill their com- 
mitments. This attitude carried to an ex- 
treme today can only be self-defeating. 

Yet one aspect of national behavior in this 
regard may in the end prove beneficial to 
achieving a new division of labor in the world 
and greater productive efliciency while fos- 
tering even more the interdependence it seeks 
to avoid. This aspect concerns the new and 
different national objective of trade policy, 
which is to protect resources rather than 
markets. In some cases this has taken the 
form of export controls, although experience 
has shown that such controls are not effective 
for any long period of time. It has also taken 
the form of conservation of nonrenewable re- 
sources such as oil and efforts to increase the 
share of local processing as a means of in- 
creasing opportunities for employment and 
foreign exchange earnings. 

But more important is the trend in ad- 
vanced nations to move capital and technol- 
ogy to where resources and labor are located 
rather than to bring the resources to their 
countries for production and processing. And 
this trend has been fortified by rising labor 
costs and by concern over the effects of indus- 
trial concentration on our environment. It 
has also been facilitated by a desire on the 
part of less developed nations to industrialize 
and by the realization in the Soviet Union 
that the best opportunities for accelerating 
their own economic development lie in im- 
porting the technology, capital, and manage- 
ment skills from the industrial nations to 
develop their great ore, gas, and forest re- 

Thus, we may note that Japan in its five- 
year plan has decided to encourage invest- 
ment in energy-intensive industries, those 
industries with high pollution fallout, and 
certain labor-intensive industries in other 
areas of Southeast Asia including the South- 
east Asian Peninsula. In the same manner 
Germany, which since World War II has built 

its industrial progress in large measure on 
the importation of cheap labor from Por- 
tugal, Spain, Turkey, and other southern 
European countries, is now seeking to bring 
its plants to the workers rather than workers 
to its plants. The recognition of less devel- 
oped countries that there are benefits in at- 
tracting the importation of manufacturing 
facilities has become an increasingly signifi- 
cant worldwide phenomenon and a key factor 
in the shifts taking place leading toward a 
new international division of labor. In less 
than two years over 50 electronics companies 
have been established in Malaysia, employing 
8,000 people. Brazil, which only a decade 
ago was an insignificant exporter of manu- 
factured products, now finds over a third of 
its burgeoning export income results from 
manufactured goods exports. 

For some years the United States has been 
a participant in this process and indeed a 
leader in shifting the emphasis from foreign 
trade to foreign investment. The sixfold in- 
crease in the volume of U.S. assets and in- 
vestment abroad over the last two decades 
represents in large measure an effort to com- 
bine our capital, our management skills, and 
our technological greatness with less costly 
labor resources and proximity to markets 
and natural resources in other countries in 
the quest of greater worldwide productive 
efficiency. This is a role which the multina- 
tional corporation is uniquely qualified to 
perform, and it has been American multina- 
tional corporations which have been in the 
vanguard of this movement. 

The export of high-technology equipment, 
an area where the United States is an un- 
challenged world leader, is part and parcel of 
the same phenomenon. In 1973, the value of 
U.S. exports of high-technology goods 
reached a level of $14.6 billion, contributing 
importantly to the dramatic turnaround in 
our trade balance on the one hand while, on 
the other, providing the rest of the world 
with the tools they need to improve their 
productive efficiency and contribute more to 
world economic progress. 

It has often been argued that an unfor- 
tunate consequence of this trend has been 


Department of State Bulletin 

the "export of U.S. jobs." If that is a correct 
statement, it is also correct to say that 
another major consequence has l)een the 
import of foreign jol)s. For the real effect of 
this trend of achieving a better division of 
labor on a worldwide basis is an improve- 
ment in efficiency and an increase in the well- 
being of all those who participate. True, it 
means a shift of jobs to those most capable 
of doing the task at the lowest cost, but for 
evei-y job extinguished in one area, new ones 
are created in others, bringing higher real in- 
comes. In the United States today, two out 
of three individuals in the labor force are 
already engaged in performing services 
rather than in the direct production of goods. 
The new division of labor we envisage 
means a continuation and perhaps accelera- 
tion of this trend toward greater emphasis on 
our service industries as a source of domestic 
employment and, for our foreign income, in- 
creased reliance on receipts from dividends, 
royalties, and services as well as the export 
of new investment opportunities such as the 
energy field may offer. It means that in our 
economic and commercial dealings with the 
rest of the world in the future we should look 
toward removing such obstacles as may exist 
to the development of our financial and man- 
agement services industries — in banking, in 
brokerage, and in insurance, among others. 
These are activities where the United States 
has clearly shown a superior skill and compe- 
tence but which have been offered heretofore 
to the rest of the world only on a limited 
scale. The vast increase in available inter- 
national investment funds which will stem 
from the surplus of the oil-producing coun- 
tries will enhance the opportunity for the 
United States to promote the export of these 

Growth Goals for the Developing Nations 

The new world economic order which we 
can see taking shape should likewise form the 
basis of a process by which we may see an 
acceleration in the development and growth 
of the less developed world. The short-term 
outlook for many of these nations, unfortu- 

nately, is less optimistic than it has been in 
recent years owing to the additional costs of 
energy imports. 

With the cooperation of the oil producers 
and if there is no slackening in the resolve of 
the developed nations to provide long-term 
development assistance on a concessional 
basis, these immediate problems could be 
(luickly overcome. It will continue to be 
important for the wealthier nations to step 
up their programs of technological assistance 
and to help improve the educational systems 
and agricultural productivity in the nations 
less well off. Official development assistance 
likewise will continue to be important, not 
because its volume contributes so signifi- 
cantly to total investment, but rather because 
its unique characteristics permit it to be 
used to overcome local resistance in making 
reforms necessary to overcome structural 

But the main source of savings (and in- 
vestment) must continue to be privately gen- 
erated, not alone from abroad but, in fact, 
principally from indigenous sources. The 
forces at work in bringing about a new divi- 
sion of labor in the world will likely increase 
the levels of investment from foreign sour- 
ces. But if the recipient countries themselves 
fail to follow the proper policies to induce a 
high rate of savings, the benefits of the for- 
eign investment and foreign official assist- 
ance will be greatly diluted. 

In the past, the less developed countries 
have themselves provided 80 percent of their 
new investment. With higher growth rates 
in the future, even higher shares may be re- 
quired. With even modest external support 
and appropriate domestic policies, developing 
nations can mobilize impressive savings 
levels largely from their own sources. Brazil, 
for example, has attained savings rates in 
the range of 17 to 20 percent of GNP in 
recent years with 84 to 94 percent of this 
amount generated at home. The Republic of 
China, with recent savings rates in the range 
of 18 to 22 percent of GNP, has generated 
upward of 90 percent at home. These two 
countries have been experiencing growth 
rates in the neighborhood of 10 percent per 

April 1, 1974 


annum in recent years on a sustained basis. 

We once spoke of growth rates of 5 percent 
as reasonable goals for the developing na- 
tions. Today we can see that at growth rates 
of 5 percent, the less developed become even 
poorer relative to the developed world. On 
the other hand, given the opportunities for 
rapid technological transfer, we know from 
the experience of several LDC's that growth 
rates of 10 percent or more are feasible and 
sustainable. The goal we should set for all 
the less developed countries should be no less. 

This, then, is my perception of the way in 
which the world economic order is shifting. 
It is a rapid shift and in some ways a drastic 
one. Man, in his insatiable drive for eco- 
nomic progress, has built a complex world 
where the market opportunities and the re- 
quirements of natural resources, technology, 
and labor have come to ignore national 
boundaries. From this pinnacle, there can be 
no turning back. 

Yearn though nations may for freedom 
from dependency on other nations, it is cer- 
tainly evident now that trying to achieve this 
freedom would involve a cost far greater 
than populations would be willing to pay. In 
the other direction, however, lies progress 
and efficiency, and even though the process of 
moving from the old economic order to the 
new one may be painful for some, it is a cost 
far less painful than the cost we would en- 
counter if we tried to resist an inevitable 

William J. Casey To Be President 
of the Export-Import Bank 

The Senate on March 5 confirmed the 
nomination of William J. Casey to be Presi- 
dent of the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Aus- 
tralia, Sir Patrick Shaw, presented his cre- 
dentials to President Nixon on March 13. For 
texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State 
press release dated March 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Hellenic Republic, Constantine P. Panayo- 
tacos, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on March 13. For texts of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
March 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Haiti, Gerard Salomon Bou- 
chette, presented his credentials to President 
Nixon on March 13. For texts of the Am- 
bassador's remarks and the President's reply, 
see Department of State press release dated 
March 13. 


The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Rwanda, Joseph Nizeyimana, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on March 13. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated March 

United Kingdom 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
United Kingdom, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, 
presented his credentials to President Nixon 
on March 13. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated March 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Discusses Continued Need for Manila Pact and SEATO 

Following is a statement by Robert S. 
IngersoH, Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, made before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on March 6.^ 

I welcome the invitation to be here today 
to discuss with you the Manila Treaty and its 
organization, the Southeast Asia Treaty 
Organization, as called for by Senator 
Church's resolution. This is a most timely 
resolution, giving the Congress and the 
executive branch an opportunity to review 
where we stand in Southeast Asia. And I am 
especially gratified as I just returned from a 
six-week visit to East Asia and the Pacific. 

What strikes the visitor to Asia most 
forcibly is the depth and extent of the 
changes that have occurred since 1954 when 
the Manila Pact was signed. That of course 
is obvious, but it is the first proposition that 
must be stated. It leads directly to the second 
proposition : To continue to play a role in this 
area, the United States must maintain under 
continuing critical review its general posture 
and policies and its specific undertakings and 
actions — and be prepared to make adjust- 
ments as may be necessary. That is why we 
have taken this review seriously. 

We began our own reappraisal of the Ma- 
nila Pact and SEATO last year in prepara- 
tion for the 1973 SEATO Council of Min- 
isters meeting, which was held September 28 
in New York. The major developments over 
the past few years which have in particular 
influenced this review included: (1) the 
detente between the United States and the 
People's Republic of China, which reduced 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

tensions throughout the area; (2) the peace 
agreements in Viet-Nam and Laos; (3) the 
coming to power in Australia and New Zea- 
land of Labor governments who ran on anti- 
SEATO platforms; and (4) the greater 
national confidence of almost all Asian coun- 
tries as their economies and security forces 
have developed in the intervening years since 
the Manila Pact was signed — and their more 
pronounced desire to determine their own 
future free of great-power rivalries. 

Let me now examine first the Southeast 
Asia Collective Security Treaty — called the 
Manila Pact in brief — and then the organi- 
zation, SEATO. There is a tendency in 
everyday usage to employ the word "SEATO" 
to mean the treaty as well as the organiza- 
tion. Since it is important to reappraise the 
Manila Pact and the SEATO organization 
separately, I will maintain this distinction 
throughout my statement. 

The Manila Pact, signed by eight nations 
in 1954, was part of the security system 
which the United States fostered in Asia. 
This system was intended both to contain 
the P.R.C. and — through the linkage of bi- 
lateral and multilateral defense arrange- 
ments, force deployments, and bases — to 
serve as a shield behind which the Asian 
countries, most of them recently independent, 
politically uncertain, and economically weak, 
could become strong and capable of resisting 
Communist aggressiveness. 

In addition to the broad purpose of con- 
taining what was then termed the Sino-Soviet 
bloc, it was also the particular hope of the 
SEATO framers that the Manila Pact would 
strengthen the 1954 Geneva settlement for 
Indochina. To carry out these purposes, they 
deliberately avoided duplicating the pattern 

April 1, 1974 


of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
The wording of the commitment in the Ma- 
nila Pact to act in cases of aggression uses 
Monroe Doctrine language rather than the 
NATO formula. Also unlike NATO, SEATO 
did not call for standing forces. Its strength 
was to be in the deterrent power of its mem- 
bers, of whom the United States was the 

Now, 20 years later, the most common 
criticism of the Manila Pact is that it has 
outlived its usefulness in the new era of 
detente and that its cold war origins may 
hinder the transition process to a peaceful 
region free of great-power rivalries. 

Our view is that the pact and SEATO 
have not outlived their usefulness in the 
present era of transition. We believe that in 
a period that has seen the withdrawal of half 
a million U.S. troops from the Asian main- 
land and a significant reduction in the U.S. 
military presence elsewhere in East Asia, it 
would create doubt and uncertainty were the 
United States to urge the dismantling of the 
Manila Pact and SEATO at this time. 

It is true that SEATO has never been a 
military command and is no longer a plan- 
ning organization. We do not speak of 
SEATO "divisions." No U.S. troops are dedi- 
cated to SEATO "missions." The members 
are committed to nothing more dramatic than 
to act in accordance with their constitutional 
processes to meet a threat of aggression. Yet, 
in a period when peace is in sight though 
not yet fully achieved, a period characterized 
by shifts in the balance of power and chang- 
ing relationships within the area, the pact 
and SEATO remain tangible indications of 
continuing U.S. concern in East Asia. They 
demonstrate that even as our perceptions 
change we are mindful that old associations 
cannot be shrugged off, that even as we seek 
better relations with powerful former adver- 
saries, we do not intend to abandon older 
and weaker friends. 

The Manila Pact and SEATO give evi- 
dence of our continuing interest, and in par- 
ticular they provide Thailand, a core country 
in Southeast Asia, with an undergirth of 
multinational support as it adjusts to an un- 
certain future. Abolishing the pact and 

SEATO would simply enforce a current 
opinion among Asian leaders that the United 
States is rapidly withdrawing from Asia and 
leaving them to fend for themselves. 

No serious alternative to the collective se- 
curity arrangements of the Manila Pact has 
yet developed, and none is in sight. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations — 
ASEAN — has provided the principal organi- 
zational impetus to regional collaboration to 
date, and we find this development highly 
encouraging, particularly since it is an in- 
digenous efl'ort. But ASEAN comprises only 
half of Southeast Asia, and there are as yet 
serious obstacles to any expansion of its 
membership and effective regional cohesion. 
Appreciating their difficulties in cooperating 
even in noncontroversial fields, the nations of 
Southeast Asia have evinced no interest in a 
formal security pact or organization of their 
own. Their future goal envisages neutraliza- 
tion of Southeast Asia, with regional cooper- 
ation limited to economic, social, and cultural 
aspects. But for the time being, all these 
nations continue to look to the established 
defense relationships with the United States 
for their security. 

We should not undermine the sense of con- 
fidence that has developed among the coun- 
tries of the area by prematurely dismantling 
an existing security arrangement. Such an 
action could well be misinterpreted as a U.S. 
withdrawal from Asia with all the unsettling 
effects that this would imply. In particular 
it might tempt the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. 
to intensify their rivalry into the region. 
Although both these powers have a greater 
reason than formerly in preventing Asian 
problems from straining their bilateral ties 
with the United States, the new equilibrium 
remains fragile. Our influence on these pow- 
ers to behave in a way that we view as 
constructive and responsible is very limited. 
And the Soviet concept of an Asian collective 
security system may not have been successful 
to date in attracting Asian governments, but 
it does reflect a strong Soviet desire to play a 
greater role in the whole region. 

We prefer, therefore, to steer a careful 
course of gradually shifting the burdens and 
responsibilities of security to the countries 


Department of State Bulletin 

of the area and maintaining the treaty as 
part of the equilibrium in the transition proc- 

With the exception of the special case of 
Pakistan, which withdrew from the treaty 
on November 8, 1973, no other signatory has 
indicated a desire to denounce the treaty or 
to seek changes in its terms. France will 
cease paying dues to the organization at the 
end of June this year but will maintain 
its obligations under the treaty. Australia 
and New Zealand, which have been highly 
critical of SEATO in recent months, have 
never attacked the treaty itself. The residual 
positive role of the treaty in today's transi- 
tion process in Southeast Asia is generally 
recognized by all members. 

The contention in the United States that 
the Manila Pact might involve us in another 
Southeast Asian war is exaggerated. There 
is at home an entirely different political 
climate — expressed, for in.stance, in legisla- 
tion limiting the use of American combat 
forces abroad — which quite alters the possi- 
bilities of military actions which might be 
taken in the seventies as contrasted to the 
sixties. The wording of the Manila Pact is 
sufficiently broad and flexible to fully take 
into account this new situation. It requires 
that action to meet overt aggression be taken 
according to the constitutional processes of 
each member and that only consultation be 
undertaken to consider insurgency and sub- 

When it comes to the organization, all 
members recognize that the cold war is over 
and that the treaty organization should be 
tailored to meet existing conditions. It was 
Thailand which introduced the resolution 
calling the Secretary General of SEATO to 
undertake a full study of SEATO before the 
1973 Council of Ministers meeting and to 
make recommendations for change. 

The Secretary General submitted his pro- 
posals to the Council Representatives in 
Bangkok for each country to review. In work- 
ing out the final proposals to be put before 
the Council of Ministers, our own role was 
to act as the honest broker between Thailand 
on the one hand, which recognized the need 
for change but of all members most desired 

to maintain SEATO in being, and New Zea- 
land and Australia on the other hand, which 
pressed for the most dramatic reductions. 
The consensus, reached by all members and 
formally approved by the Council of Min- 
isters on September 28, 1973, produced sub- 
stantial modifications to the organization : 

a. Military planning was suspended as of 
September 28, 1973. 

b. The Military Planning Office has been 
greatly reduced in number of personnel and 
integrated as of January 31, 1974, into the 
civil Secretariat. (The old head of the Mili- 
tary Planning Office became Deputy Secre- 
tary General). 

c. Military exercises have been reduced in 
frequency and extent. 

d. The Information Office has been elimi- 
nated along with its old strident anti-Commu- 
nist output. 

e. An overall reduction in staffing of the 
Secretariat is underway (from 88 to 34 pro- 

f. Cultural activities have been dropped, 
and all future economic and social projects 
will be concentrated on security /develop- 
ment-related projects in Thailand and the 

g. A number of economies are being ef- 
fected in the budget so that member country 
contributions will remain approximately the 
same in spite of French and Pakistani with- 
drawals from budgetary contributions. The 
U.S. share from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 
1975 has been only around $500,000 a year or 

The SEATO organization therefore has 
undertaken its own reappraisal and worked 
out changes that were satisfactory to all. 
Australia and New Zealand have indicated to 
us that they are pleased with these changes 
and that they intend to support the new 
lower profile organization. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we plan for the 
time being to maintain intact the Manila 
Pact and the organization as it was reformed 
in September 1973. A U.S. withdrawal from 
either the treaty or the organization would 
be given symbolic significance which might 
have consequences out of proportion to the 

April 1, 1974 


problem. The pact has a residual role to play 
in preserving equilibrium as Southeast Asia 
moves to a still-undetermined future by re- 
straining U.S.S.R.-P.R.C. rivalry in the area 
and providing international support for 
Thailand. The Thais continue to attach im- 
portance to the organization and its head- 
quarters in Bangkok. The annual price for 
maintaining the organization remains small. 
As we stand on the threshold of what is 
hoped will be a new era of developing peace 
and stability in Southeast Asia, we should 
do nothing to undermine that hope, and we 
should make reductions and alterations in 
old security arrangements to correspond real- 

istically with genuine reductions of tensions 
in the region and in keeping with the desires 
of the members of ASEAN. We look to the 
coming months and years as a period when it 
will be possible to weave a fabric of common 
interests with old enemies as well as strength- 
ening those already established with old 
friends. We must assure that the cooperative 
efforts achieved in the context of SEATO 
are woven into this endeavor. And we will 
keep the pact and the organization under con- 
tinuing review as trends become clearer, 
which we trust will be in the direction of 
peace and stability and increased cooperation 
among all the nations of Southeast Asia. 


Calendar of International Conferences ^ 

Scheduled April Through June 

OECD Working Group on Listing of Securities Paris 

IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 16th Session .... London . 

FAO/UNCTAD Consultations on Grains Rome . 

International Cotton Advisory Committee Washington 

WMO Tropical Experiment Board: 6th Session Geneva . 

UNICEF Council New York 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Scientific and New York 

Technical Subcommittee. 

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (resumed) .... Geneva . 

OAS Permanent Technical Committee on Ports: 8th Meeting . . . Asuncion 

Apr. 1-5 
Apr. 1-5 
Apr. 3-5 
Apr. 6-10 
Apr. 8-11 
Apr. 11-26 
Apr. 15-26 

April 16— 
Apr. 16-20 

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on March 15, lists inter- 
national conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April- 
June 1974. Nongovernmental conferences are not included. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; ECAFE, Economic Com- 
mission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission 
for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IBE, 
International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovern- 
mental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovern- 
mental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, 
International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization 
of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American 
Health Organization; SPC, South Pacific Commission; UCC, Universal Copyright Convention; UNCITRAL, 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; IJNESCO, United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDO, United Nations In- 
dustrial Development Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property 
Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Meeting: of OAS Foreign Ministers 

PAHO 7th Inter-American Meeting on Foot-and-Mouth Disease and 
Zoonoses Control. 

FAO Committee on Agriculture: 2d Session 

8th ICAO Air Navigation Conference 

OECD Economic Policy Committee Working Party III 

Economic Commission for Europe: 29th Plenary Session .... 

WMO Commission for Aeronautical Meteorology: Extraordinary' 

OAS General Assembly: 4th Regular Session 

SPC Planning Committee 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program: 
25th Session. 

CCC Working Party of Nomenclature Committee 

IMCO Subcommittee on Containers and Cargoes: 15th Session . . . 

ITU World Administrative Maritime Radio Conference 

WIPO Committee of Experts on Inventions Relating to Micro-orga- 

UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts To Finalize the Draft 
on the International Recommendations on the Status of Scientific 
Research Workers. 

OECD Environment Committee Urban Sector Group 

OECD Development Assistance Committee 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Cocoa Subgroup on Statistics . . 

IMCO Legal Committee: 23d Session 

UNESCO Meeting of Government Experts for the Preparation of an 
International Instrument on Education for Peace and International 

CCC Nomenclature Committee: 32d Session 

ECLA Regional Population Conference 

UNIDO Industrial Development Board and Permanent Committee . 

ICAO Committee on Aircraft Noise: 4th Meeting 

Inter-American Travel Congress 

U.N. Special General Assembly 

ICAO North Atlantic Systems Planning Group: 10th Meeting . . . 

OECD Consumer Policy Committee 

UNESCO/UCC Intergovernmental Copyright Committee Study 
Group on Photographic Reproduction of Copyrighted Works. 

U.N. Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: 1st Preparatory 
Committee Meeting. 

OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 32d Session . 

WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer Governing 
Council: loth Session. 

ECAFE Regional Preparatory Meeting for World Population Con- 

IMCO Facilitation Committee: 8th Session 

WIPO/UNESCO Diplomatic Conference on Space Communications . 

U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Legal Sub- 

NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society 

WHO: 27th World Health Assembly 

OECD Ministerial Council 

2d OAS Inter-American Conference on Cooperation 

CCC Finance Committee: 42d Session 

ICAO Meteorology Divisional Meeting 

UNESCO Special Committee of Government Experts To Prepare 
Draft Revised Recommendation Concerning Technical and Voca- 
tional Education. 

Economic Commission for Africa 

FAO/UNCTAD Consultations on Hard Fibers 

UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign to 
Save the Monuments of Nubia: 23d Session. 

FAO/UNCTAD Consultations on Bananas 

OAS Inter- American Committee on Culture: 8th Meeting .... 

IMCO Council: 32d Session 

Washington . 






Atlanta . 


London . 
Geneva . 
Geneva . 







Vienna . 
Lima . . 
New York 

Geneva . . 

Lyon . . 


London . 
Geneva . 

Turin . 

Geneva . 






New York 
Aswan . 













-May 1 









-May 18 



-May 1 















-June 7 


















-May 3 



-May 8 



-May 11 













May 6-9 

May 6-10 



May 6-31 


















May 13- 


















April 1, 1974 


UNESCO Executive Board: 94th Session 

FAO Committee on Forestry 

WMO Prejjaratory Committee of the Executive Committee .... 

ICEM Executive Committee: 45th Session 

ECE Group of Experts on Data Requirements and Documentation . 

WHO Executive Board: r)4th Session 

ILO Governing Body: 193d Session 

International Coffee Organization 

FAO Intergovernmental Group on Citrus Fruits 

International Olive Oil Council 

U.N. Trusteeship Council 

ECE Group of Experts on Automatic Data Processing and Coding . 
ECE Regional Preparatory Meeting for World Population Conference 
U.N. Preparatory Committee for World Food Conference: 2d Session 

UNCITRAL: 7th General Session 

UNCITRAL Diplomatic Conference on Prescriptions in International 

Sale of Goods. 
OAS Executive Committee of the Inter- American Commission of 

Women: .5th Session. 

OAS Working Group on Industrial Property 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Review and Appraisal 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group Standing Committee . . . 
Pan American Highway Congress Permanent Executive Committee . 
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 28th Session .... 

UNESCO/IBE Council: 11th Session 

FAO .'Vd Hoc Working Party on World Food Security 

F-AO Codex Alimentarius Commission Committee on Food Hygiene 

and Processed Fruits and Vegetables. 

ICAO Accident Investigation Divisional Meeting 

WMO Executive Committee: 26th Session 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries . . 

UNDP Governing Council: 18th Session 

ILO: 59th International Labor Conference 

IMCO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping: 

4th Session. 

Customs Cooperation Council: 43d-44th Sessions 

OAS Permanent Executive Committee of the Inter-.\merican Travel 

Congress: 13th Meeting. 

OECD Committee on Restrictive Business Practices 

International Seed Testing Association 

ITU Administrative Council 

FAO/UNCTAD Consultation on Tea 

IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods: 23d Session . 
UNESCO/IOC Executive Council of the Commission: 4th Session . 

CCC Chemists Committee: 22d Session 

FAO/UNCTAD Consultations on Tobacco 

International Wheat Council 

3d U.N. Law of the Sea Conference 

ECE Committee on Water Problems 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability: 16th Session . . 

OECD Working Group on Listing of Securities 

WIPO Coordination Committee Session on Program and Budget . . 
FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission Executive Committee: 20th 

OAS Directing Council of the Pan American Institute of Geography 

and History: 15th Meeting. 
UNCTAl) Working Group on Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 

of States. 

ICAO Passport Card Panel: 4th Meeting 

FAO Commission on Fertilizers 

UNESCO/IOC International Coordinating Group for the Southern 

Ocean: 2d Session. 
UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts to Review the Interna- 
tional Standard Classification of Education. 
6th Caribbean Health Ministers Conference 



20-June 25 

and Varna . 

. . June 


Rome . . . 

. . May 


Geneva . . . 

. . May 

23-June 1 

Geneva . . . 

. . May 


Geneva . . . 

. . May 


Geneva . . . 

. . May 


Geneva . . . 

. . May 

27-June 1 

London . . . 

. . May 

27-June 1 

Athens . . . 

. . May 

27-June 4 

Madrid . . . 

. . May 28-June 1 

New York . . 

. . May 

28-June 21 

Geneva . . . 

. . May 


Geneva . . . 

. . May 

29-June 1 

Geneva . . . 

. . May 

New York . 

. . May 

New York . . 

. . May 

Washington . 

. . May 

Washington . 

. . May 

Geneva . . . 

. . May 

New York . . 

. . May 


. . May 

Geneva . . . 

. . May 

Geneva . . . 

. . May-June 

Rome . . . 

. . June 


Washington . 

.. . June 


Montreal . . 

. . June 


Geneva . . . 

. . June 


Halifax . . . 

. . June 


Manila . . . 

. . June 


Geneva . . . 

. . June 


London . . . 

. . June 


Brussels . . 

. . June 


Buenos Aires . 

. . June 


Paris . . . 

. . June 


Warsaw . . 

. . June 


Geneva . . 

. . June 

15-July 5 

Rome . . . 

. . June 


London . . . 

. . June 


Ottawa . . . 

. . June 


Brussels . . 

. . June 


Rome . . . 

. . June 


London . . . 

. . June 


Caracas . . 

. . June 

20-Aug. 29 

Geneva . . . 

. . June 


London . . . 

. . June 


Paris . . . 

. . June 


Geneva . . . 

. . June 

25-July 1 

Rome . . . 

. . June 

28-July 3 

Mexico . . . 

. . June 

Geneva . . . 

. . June 

Montreal . . 

. . June 

Rome . . . 

. . June 

Buenos Aires . 

. . June 

Paris . . . 

. . June 

Bahamas . . 

. . June 



Department of State Bulletin 


Current Actions 



Measures relating to the furtherance of the princi- 
ples and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of De- 
cember 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Welling- 
ton November 10, 1972.' 

Notification of approval: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, March ,5, 1974. 


Convention on international civil aviation. Done at 
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. 
Adhe7-ence deposited: Maldives, March 12, 1974. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973.' 
Signatures : Australia, September 21, 1973; Khmer 
Republic, December 7, 1973; Nigeria, February 
11, 1974; Poland, October 8, 1973; Uruguay, Jan- 
uary 9, 1974. 


Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 

Signatures : Austria, May 22, 1973; Czechoslovakia 
(with declaration), December 27, 1973; Finland, 
December 26, 1973; Romania (with declaration), 
December 11, 1973. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, De- 
cember 7, 1973. 


International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. 
Done at London November 2, 1973. Enters into 
force 12 months after date on which not less than 
15 states meeting certain requirements have be- 
come parties by signature without reservation as 
to ratification, acceptance, or approval; signature 

subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval, 
followed by ratification, acceptance, or approval; 
or accession. 
Signatures: Denmark, January 15, 1974;" United 

Kingdom, February 14, 1974;' United States, 

March 7, 1974.= 
Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in 
cases of marine pollution by substances other than 
oil. Done at London November 2, 1973. Enters 
into force on the 90th day following the date on 
which 15 states have deposited instruments of 
ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession, 
provided that the present protocol shall not enter 
into force before the international convention re- 
lating to intervention on the high seas in cases of 
oil pollution casualties, 1969, has entered into 
Signatures: Denmark, January 15, 1974 ;'^ United 

States, March 7, 1974.-' 

Postal Matters 

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Univer- 
sal Postal Union with final protocol signed at 
Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS ,5881), general regula- 
tions with final protocol and annex, and the univer- 
sal postal convention with final protocol and de- 
tailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 
1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for 
article V of the additional protocol, which entered 
into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Ratifications deposited: Central African Republic, 

July 9, 1973; Sierra Leone, January 18, 1974. 
Accession deposited: Republic of Viet-Nam, Janu- 
ary 21, 1974. 
Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed 
at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force 
July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 
1971. TIAS 7236. 
Ratification deposited: Central African Republic, 

July 9, 1973. 
Accession deposited: Republic of Viet-Nam, Janu- 
ary 21, 1974. 


Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at 
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967; for the United States November 
1, 1968. TIAS 6577. 

Accession deposited: Australia, excluding Papua 
New Guinea, December 13, 1973. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Botswana, March 11, 1974. 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332), relat- 

' Not in force. 

" Subject to ratification. 

April 1, 1974 


ing to maritime mobile service, with annexes and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva November 3, 1967. 
Entered into force April 1, 1969. TIAS 6590. 
Wotificatioii of approval: Greece, December 18, 


China, Republic of 

Amendment to the agreement of April 4, 1972 (TIAS 
7364), for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy. Signed at Washington March 15, 
1974. Enters into force on the date on which each 
government shall have received from the other 
written notification that it has complied with all 
statutory and constitutional requirements for 
entry into force. 


Publications Distributed 

by Bureau of Public Affairs 

Single copies of lepiints, Bureau of Public Affairs 
vcws releases, and other publications listed below 
are available free of charge as long as supplies last 
and man be ordered from the General Publications 
Division-B, Office of Media Services (PA/MS), De- 
partment of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Historical Chronology: U.S. Policy Toward Govern- 
ments of Brazil, 1821-Present. This chronology ex- 
amines changes of government in Brazil and inci- 
dents of serious friction involving the United States 
and Brazil which posed possible questions of recogni- 
tion or of changes in the status of diplomatic rela- 
tions. PA/MS news release. August 1973. 12 pp. 

Summary of Major Points-Third USC/FAR Consoli- 
dated Plan for Foreign Affairs Research, FY 1974- 

75. Like its predecessors, this plan presents a multi- 

faceted description of the foreign affairs external 
research plans projected by individual member 
agencies of the Under Secretaries Committee/For- 
eign Affairs Research. PA/MS news release. No- 
vember 1973. 3 pp. 

Special Report: World Strength of Communist Party 
Organizations. Text of a summary excerpted from 
"World Strength of Communist Party Organiza- 
tions," the 25th annual report prepared by the Bu- 
reau of Intelligence and Research of the Department 
of State. PA/MS news release. November 1973. 15 

The Planetary Product in 1972: Systems in Disar- 
ray. This report, prepared by the Department of 
State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, is the 
latest edition of an annual report that — growing out 
of U.S. -Soviet economic comparisons — made its ap- 
pearance in 1966. It assembles worldwide national 
product estimates, in toto and per capita, from 1950 
to the present and projects them to 1980. The figures 
are accompanied by a text commenting on trends 
over decades as well as on current conditions and 
preoccupations. PA/MS news release. December 
1973. 41 pp. 

Factors Influencing Private Foreign Investment 
Among LDCs. This study, prepared by the Depart- 
ment of State's Bureau ot Intelligence and Research, 
examines the magnitude and rate of change of total 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and FDI per capita 
flowing from Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) countries to 36 less devel- 
oped countries (LDCs) over the period 1968 to 1971. 
The 36 countries were selected from a list of all 
LDCs, excluding members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the 
nations of Indochina. The sample contained three 
regional subgroups of 12 countries each from Africa, 
Asia, and the Western Hemisphere. PA/MS news 
release. January 1974. 13 pp. 

LDC Export Instability and its Impact on Imports, 
Gross Reserves, and Capital Flows. This study, pre- 
pared by the Department of State's Bureau of Intelli- 
gence and Research, seeks to analyze the behavior of 
exports, imports, net capital flows, and reserves for 
a representative sample of LDCs and for subgroups 
distinguished by region and by least developed as 
against more developed countries. P.A./MS news 
release. January 1974. 40 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 1, 197J, Vol. LXX, No. 18H. 

Agriculture. The Reshaping of the World 
Economy (Casey) 339 

Asia. Department Discusses Continued Need 

for Manila Pact and SEATO (Ingersoll) . . 345 

Australia. Letters of Credence (Shaw) . . . 344 


Department Discusses Continued Need for 
Manila Pact and SEATO (Ingersoll) ... 345 

The Trade Reform Act (Eberle, Kissinger) . . 321 

William J. Casey To Be President of the Ex- 
port-Import Bank 344 

Developing Countries. The Reshaping of the 

World Economy (Casey) 339 

Economic Affairs 

The Reshaping of the World Economy 

(Casey) 339 

The Trade Reform Act (Eberle, Kissinger) . 321 

William J. Casey To Be President of the Ex- 
port-Import Bank 344 

Egypt. United States and Egypt Resume Dip- 
lomatic Relations (joint announcement) . . 338 

Energy. The Reshaping of the World Econ- 
omy (Casey) 339 


Secretary Emphasizes Importance of Preserv- 
ing Western Unity (statement) 333 

Secretary Kissinger Holds Informal News 
Briefing (transcript) 331 

Greece. Letters of Credence (Panayotacos) . 344 

Haiti. Letters of Credence (Bouchette) . . 344 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
Calendar of International Conferences . . 348 


Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Negotiating 
Process in the Middle East (television inter- 
views) 334 

United States Announces Progress in Discus- 
sions in Syria and Israel (White House 
announcement) 338 

Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger Holds Informal News 
Briefing (transcript) 331 

Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Negotiating 
Process in the Middle East (television inter- 
views) 334 

Publications. Publications Distributed by Bu- 
reau of Public Affairs 352 

Rwanda. Letters of Credence (Nizeyimana) . 344 


Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Negotiating 
Process in the Middle East (television inter- 
views) 334 

United States Announces Progress in Discus- 
sions in Syria and Israel (White House 
announcement) 338 


The Reshaping of the World Economy 

(Casey) 339 

The Trade Reform Act (Eberle, Kissinger) . 321 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 351 

U.S.S.R. The Trade Reform Act (Eberle, Kis- 
singer) 321 

United Kingdom. Letters of Credence (Rams- 

botham) 344 

Name Index 

Bouchette, Gerard Salomon 344 

Casey, William J 339,344 

Eberle, William D 321 

Ingersoll, Robert S 345 

Kissinger, Secretary 321, 331, 333 

Nizeyimana, Joseph 344 

Panayotacos. Constantine P 344 

Ramsbotham, Sir Peter 344 

Shaw, Sir Patrick 344 

Sisco, Joseph J 334 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 11 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 80 
of March 4 and 86 of March 7. 


















*99 3/15 





Sisco: Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations. 

Overseas Schools Advisory Coun- 
cil, New York, Mar. 27. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Honolulu, Mar. 

Herz sworn in as Ambassador to 
Bulgaria (biographic data). 

Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Apr. 4. 

Study Group 1 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the 
CCITT. Apr. 16. 

Bolen sworn in as Ambassador to 
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swazi- 
land (biographic data). 

Kissinger: press briefing. 

Osborn sworn in as Ambassador 
to Burma (biographic data). 

Study Group 8 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the CCIR, 
Mar. 28. 

U.S. note on DRV violations of 
cease-fire. Mar. 14. 

Jorden sworn in as Ambassador 
to Panama (biographic data). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




Spsciai Feurth-Cloit Rol* 


Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
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mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 




Volume LXX 

No. 1815 

April 8, 1974 

OF MARCH 21 353 


Executives' Club of Chicago 363 
National Association of Broadcasters at Houston 367 

Statement by Seymour Weiss 371 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXX, No. 1815 
April 8, 1974 

For aale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OfBce 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of March 21 

Press release 104 dated March 21 

Secretary Kissinger: We'll go straight to 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are soon departing 
for Moscow. Will the recent difficulties tvith 
the European Community on matters of con- 
sultation and the like affect or weaken your 
position when you talk with Soviet leaders, 
particularly on troop reduction matters'? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are certain that 
the Soviet Union fully understands that the 
Atlantic alliance remains the cornerstone 
of American foreign policy. Our differences 
with Europe concern the direction of what 
we consider to be a common effort. Under 
no circumstances will we sacrifice European 
interests in negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, no matter what our disagreements 
may be with the Europeans. 

With respect to troop reductions — with 
the negotiations of troop reductions — they 
are continuing on the course that has been 
agreed to in NATO. We have had a trilat- 
eral conversation that has been foreseen 
with the U.K. and the Federal Republic this 
week. These conversations went well, and 
there is an agreed allied position which we 
will continue to pursue. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is one more ele- 
ment, I think, in your Moscow talks which 
tvas mentioned by Mr. Vest [George S. Vest, 
Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press 
Relations], which was that you would talk 
about the progress in the SALT talks [Stra- 
tegic Arms Limitation Talks'] in preparation 
for the President's visit. Noiv, he has said 
that he expected to have an agreement in 
197 Jf. The ivay things are going, is this 
going to be a hard, specific agreement or 

just an agreement on generalities in the tvay 
of principles? 

Secretary Kissinger: We already have an 
agreement on generalities which we made 
last summer. All the SALT negotiations 
and, indeed, all the disarmament negotia- 
tions have gone through three phases. There 
is an initial phase of an exchange of techni- 
cal information which usually takes place 
during a stalemate in the negotiating proc- 
ess; that is to say, the negotiating positions 
do not approach each other, but the techni- 
cal comprehension of the issues is clarified. 

Then — this is essentially what has been 
going on in Geneva up to now — then a point 
is reached where there has to be a concep- 
tual breakthrough; that is to say, where the 
two sides have to agree on what it is they are 
trying to accomplish. And after that there 
has to be the hard negotiation on giving con- 
crete content to this conceptual break- 

We are now at the phase where I would 
say we are at the end of the phase of tech- 
nical exchanges and of elaboration of posi- 
tions, and we are at a point where we should 
be making, or should be attempting, a con- 
ceptual breakthrough. 

Therefore, I would expect that if there is 
a SALT agreement this year it will have an 
adequate concreteness and it will not be 
simply general principles. 

Now, how many areas it will cover and 
its relationship to a comprehensive perma- 
nent agreement — those are issues that have 
yet to be decided. 

Q. I suppose by generalities, ivhat I 
meant ivas an agreement, I think that you 
talked about as conceptual breakthroughs. 
In other words, you get an agreement on 

April 8, 1974 


just exactly ivhat you are going at and how 
you are going at it. Is that ivhat you mean 
by conceptual? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have had, 
really, three types of agreement in SALT. 

We have had the agreement, such as the 
one of last summer, which simply stated gen- 
eral principles and their route of march. 

Then we have had the agreement, like the 
one of May 20, 1971, which rather specifi- 
cally stated the limits of the negotiation; 
which is to say, from that occasion we 
decided on the relationship between an 
agreement on defensive weapons and an 
agreement on offensive weapons. 

Thirdly, there is the agreement such as 
was concluded in May 1972 in Moscow, which 
in very great detail worked out the limita- 
tions on defensive, and some interim limita- 
tions on offensive, weapons. 

My guess would be that we can attempt 
something between the May 20, 1971, and 
the May 1972 agreement, but I'll be able to 
give you a better estimate after my talks in 

Q. Mr. Secretary, just to follow tip on 
that, you just used the phrase "if there is 
going to be an agreement this year." Now, 
are you suggesting that there is a possibility 
now that there might not be? Because, as I 
understood it at least, the agreement that 
was signed last year at Sail Clemente stated 
that the two parties had agreed that there 
would be an agreement this year. Now, you 
have used the word "if," and I wonder if 
some doubts have developed in your mind. 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have the text 
of the agreement, of the statement of prin- 
ciples, of last year. I think the phrase was 
something like that they would aim for an 
agreement this year. But regardless of what 
the exact phraseology is, you cannot make 
that a binding commitment. This expresses 
an aspiration and, backed by the two heads 
of government, a rather firm desire. I hope, 
and we vdll work very hard, to have an 
agreement this year. 

I think the prospects are reasonably good, 
but I can make a better estimate after my 

visit to Moscow, because up to now we have 
been in the exploratory phase and neither 
side has up to now had to face the issue of a 
concrete agreement that might emerge this 
year. But it is clearly one of the principal 
topics for discussion in Moscow. 

The Atlantic Relationship 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you and President 
Nixo7i have spoken of hostility on the part 
of our European allies several times in the 
last few weeks. Could you tell us what you 
and the President mean by hostilities? Who 
is hostile, and when? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I've been 
speaking about it in a rather intimate circle. 
But I don't think that any great purpose is 
served by repeating the charges and counter- 
charges that have been made. Let me sum 
up our view on the situation on the Atlantic 

The United States last year proposed that 
the nations of the Atlantic take a look at 
their prospects for the next decade and try 
to define their common purposes and the 
framework in which they might wish to pro- 
ceed. We did so because we believed that an 
alliance that had been formed on the basis 
of the threat of an imminent attack needed 
new purposes when the military threat had 
changed its character and the political 
danger had become more differentiated. 

We thought, too, ironical as it may seem 
now, that precisely because Europe had 
gained an articulation as compared to the 
early phases of NATO and precisely be- 
cause Europe was inevitably — and with our 
assistance and according to our hopes — be- 
coming more autonomous and independent, 
a redefinition of the new relationship was in 
the interest of both sides. 

It seemed to us, also, that the generation 
that had formed the Atlantic relationship 
and had nourished it was passing from the 
scene and that in each country — as indeed I 
pointed out in my speech — a new generation 
had come into office and supported and was 
providing the intellectual background for 
policy that did not have the same commit- 



Department of State Bulletin Nj 

ment to the Atlantic relationship that the 
previous generation had. 

For all these reasons, we thought it was 
important that there be some symbolic ex- 
pression of the nature of the relationship. 
Any student of the American scene must 
know that domination of Europe by the 
United States was the furthest thing from 
anybody's mind. Anybody reading the 
President's annual reports knows that it has 
been the fixed principle of American foreign 
policy to encourage other centers of decision, 
precisely because one of our firmest convic- 
tions has been that for the United States to 
have to assume the responsibility for every 
decision, in every corner of the globe, at 
every moment of time, would in the long 
term be psychologically and politically dis- 
ruptive in the United States. 

We thought that this exercise — that later 
turned into these declarations — would be 
finished very quickly and that it would lead 
to a concrete examination of the specific 
issues that are before the Atlantic alliance. 

We have been confronted for a year with 
a negotiating process in which some of our 
partners acted as if we were trying to get a 
legal document which we would then wave 
at them a year later in the form of concrete 
obligations — as if we could take them to 
court with respect to this. 

And what was intended by us as a sym- 
bolic expression of a set of new purposes — as 
an attempt by which the peoples of the At- 
lantic countries could find satisfaction in a 
foreign policy that was related to friends 
and not only to adversaries — has turned into 
a jurisdictional, doctrinal, legalistic dispute. 
Our two objections in that dispute are: 

One, a definition of the consultative proc- 
ess which in fact is more suited to adversary 
procedures than the procedures among 
friends, in which consultation before a deci- 
sion is precluded by the definition of identity 
and consultation after a decision is drained 
of meaning because we are forced to deal 
with instructed delegates, or instructed rep- 
resentatives, who have no authority to talk 
at all. 

In terms of substance, there has been, in 

our judgment, too much of a tendency to seek 
European identity in opposition to the United 
States. And there again, let me make clear: 
We do not insist or, indeed, believe it desir- 
able that Europe agree with every American 
policy. We do not oppose — indeed, we think 
it is desirable that Europe can take, and does 
take, its own independent decisions, even if 
sometimes they disagree with us. 

But when the definition of European iden- 
tity, on the part of some countries, is the 
differentiation from and, in some cases, 
opposition to the United States — when that 
becomes the characteristic of identity, then 
the United States is concerned and then the 
tendencies that we have attempted to de- 
scribe become operative. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
we still believe that the nations of the Atlan- 
tic area must be able to find an expression 
of some of their common purposes. In this 
process, they of course will want to define 
how much unity they want and how much 
diversity they can stand. These are perfectly 
legitimate questions to be raised. But we 
have to overcome this legalistic, somewhat 
doctrinaire, jurisdictional dispute. 

And secondly, we believe that it is not con- 
ducive to healthy Atlantic relations to seek 
European identity essentially in opposition 
to the United States. 

In addition, we have been concerned by 
the deliberate policy of some individual 
countries that seemed to us to have taken a 
hostile turn in various areas — but no pur- 
pose would be served by going into those. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the mechan- 
ical difficulties the Europeans still face in 
arriving at a decision, how, practically, do 
you feel the United States could be invited 
to take part? 

Secretary Kissinger: The mechanical diffi- 
culties that the Europeans face in arriving 
at a decision do not necessarily mean that 
the decisions have always to be taken in the 
direction that I have attempted to describe. 

We have stated our view of what we think 
is needed. We would be very respectful of 
the European attempt to define their pur- 

April 8, 1974 


poses in forums in which we are not organi- 
cally included. 

We believe that it is quite possible to work 
out a procedure whereby the Europeans 
meet in forums appropriate for the Euro- 
pean evolution and which nevertheless gives 
us an opportunity to express our view. 

We believe also, that on most issues, this 
would not lead to a clash and would not in 
any way interfere with the decisions that 
the Europeans would want to take. 

If the Europeans nevertheless want to 
pursue a course with which we disagree, 
then we face the problem that is normal 
among countries — of either adjusting these 
differences or proceeding in the knowledge of 
these differences. But at least we avoid a 
situation such as with the recent decision 
where the Europeans believe they have in- 
formed us and yet no senior policymaker in 
the United States understood that we were 
being informed of an imminent decision. 

Now, that is something that we believe 
can be solved. 

We have now, for a year, attempted to 
state our view on this matter, and we believe 
that now it is up to the Europeans, either 
individually or as a group, to make a pro- 
posal to us. 

Peter [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily 
News] . 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a good 
deal of public concern expressed about the 
President's projected trip to both Europe 
and Moscow this year while the impeach- 
ment inquiry hangs over his head. I wonder 
if you could address yourself to the risk you 
see in such travel, if any. 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, my under- 
standing is that — from what I have read in 
the papers — that the impeachment inquiry is 
likely to be concluded before these trips. 

Secondly, until a determination is made, 
the President must conduct his office accord- 
ing to the best judgment of the national 

We are conducting foreign policy on the 
basis of our best judgment of what the peace 
of the world requires and the American na- 


tional interest requires — and it is not af- 
fected by the domestic debate that is now 
going on. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you used the phrase 
before, "ironical." In your view now, speak- 
ing of European unification — in your view, 
is the process of unification stalled? Is it in 
reverse? Or is it moving ahead? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our impression is 
that the process toward unification in Eu- 
rope is proceeding — in the face of inevitable 
difficulties when nine sovereign nations are 
attempting to harmonize their interests and 
their decisionmaking. 

We have welcomed European unity in 
three administrations. This administration 
continues to support European unity, and we 
believe that it will be in the mutual interest 
of both Europe and the United States that it 

Our concerns have been very specific, and 
they have not been directed toward the fact 
of European unity but toward some of its 
expressions which M'e do not believe are 
organic or inevitable, and therefore we be- 
lieve that we have a problem that is solvable 
and from which the two sides of the Atlantic 
can emerge strengthened. 

Danger of Isolationist Tendencies 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the Eu- 
ropean-Arab conference that is being dis- 
cussed for the future, have you detected any 
other evidence of deliberate policies of hos- 
tility that you've mentioned by any of the 
alliance members? 

Secretary Kissinger: The words of both 
the President and myself were carefully 
chosen. But I think no useful purpose is 
served by enumerating our concerns. We 
believe that some individual policies have 
been unfriendly. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the ivords of the Presi- 
dent on tiro occasions, even if carefully 
chosen, did seem to many of us to be mu- 
tually contradictory, in that last Friday in 
Chicago he seemed to be threatening — and I 


Department of State Bulletin 

use that word carefully, too — that if the 
Europeans did not cooperate, then they 
icould find themselves up against an isola- 
tionist pressure, against which he icould be 
powerless to resist, to force the withdraival 
of American forces from Europe. And is 
this consistent with your and the President' s 
definition of the structure of peace, if you 
are to stand aside and let the structtire be 
pulled down? 

Secretary Kissinger: In all the statements 
that we have made to Europe we have at- 
tempted to explain that the danger that con- 
cerned us was American isolation, not a 
quest for domination. The purposes, of 
which we were conscious, were to counteract 
what seemed to us an evolution in America 
toward shedding responsibility. In this 
sense, in my April 23 speech, in many Presi- 
dential statements, in many Presidential re- 
ports, we attempted to explain that political, 
economic, and security factors were linked 
not by an act of American policy, but by 

We attempted to point out in various for- 
mulations that it was unrealistic to assert 
that defense was indivisible but that foreign 
policies could be across-the-board contradic- 
tory. And in various formulations we at- 
tempted to explain that only by creating 
some purposes that the American people 
could believe in would it be possible also to 
create the conviction for an indefinite future 
that the structure of the defense should be 
maintained in substantially its present form. 

In this sense the personal convictions of 
the American leaders are not decisive. The 
President has repeatedly stated that he op- 
posed the Mansfield amendment. And the ad- 
ministration has always fought attempts to 
impose unilateral cuts on us. The fact nev- 
ertheless remains that it is our conviction 
that if the trends that concern us continue, 
the isolationist tendencies which we have 
described could become dominant. 

Now, whether that is perfectly compatible 
with a structure of peace, whether this will 
be helpful or harmful to the long-term evolu- 
tion, would at that point remain to be seen. 
Decisions are not always taken entirely on 

the basis of theoretical considerations, but on 
the basis of the pressures in each society 
that become unmanageable. 

So we were not proposing the linkage of 
these various issues as a form of blackmail. 
We were not trying to trade in one negotia- 
tion against another negotiation. We were 
trying to describe a situation in which, if 
common purposes are not achieved by the 
nations of the West, their divisions may run 
counter to their common interests. It was an 
appeal to common statesmanship, not an 
invitation to a barter. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the oil embargo has 
now been lifted, but ivith the apparent condi- 
tion that it's subject to review on June the 
first. Does this mean to you that the Arabs 
are determined to reimpose it, as well as the 
cuts in production, if you fail to achieve 
meaningful progress on the Syrian-Israeli 
front by that date? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it — 
and we have had many conflicting reports, 
but the consensus seems to be that what the 
Arabs will do on June the first is to review 
the decision and that it would require a new 
decision to reimpose the embargo and the 
cuts on production and presumably that deci- 
sion would have to be unanimous. So we do 
not believe that it is probable that the em- 
bargo will be reimposed. And we also be- 
lieve that progress will be made on Syrian- 
Israeli disengagement in the interval. At 
least we are very hopeful. 

Soviet-American Relations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your recent meet- 
ings with Congressmen and Senators have 
you made any progress toward a compromise 
agreement on ivorking out credit and equal 
trade treatment for the Soviet Union? And 
in that connection, on your upcoming trip to 
the Soviet Union have you been asked to do 
anything on behalf of Russian dancer Valery 
Panov? And could you do anything for a 
specific individual? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I've stated before 
the Senate Finance Committee, the adminis- 

Aprll 8, 1974 


tration is prepared to seek a compromise 
which protects the values of those that have 
sponsored the Jackson-Vanik amendment 
and at the same time enables the United 
States to achieve the political objectives of 
current Soviet-American relations. We have 
had only preliminary talks, and therefore I 
would not want to characterize what prog- 
ress has been made. 

The United States has always discussed 
both the various categories of problems and 
individual cases on a private basis and has 
not made public what representations it has 
made. But I think it is reasonable to assume 
that we do from time to time raise individ- 
ual cases. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have the feeling 
of some observers that the atmosphere in 
Soviet-American relations this time is much 
chillier than it was on your previous trips to 
the Soviet Union, that somehorv the move- 
ment toivard detente has sort of slowed down 
or even suffered setbacks as a result of 
friction over the Middle East and over the 
inability of the United States to get this 
most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment? 

Secretary Kissinger: The trip to the So- 
viet Union comes at a very important time. 
If one looks at the debate on detente in the 
United States, it is interesting how some of 
the terms of reference have changed. When 
there was a great deal of tension and con- 
stant confrontation, the end of tension and 
the diminishing of confrontation was in it- 
self considered an achievement. Today there 
is a tendency to take it for granted and to go 
beyond it to seek more ambitious objectives. 
The whole debate on the Soviet domestic 
structure would have been essentially in- 
conceivable five years ago, and it has added 
a new dimension to Soviet-American rela- 

It is also true that the difficulties in the 
passage of MFN legislation and the threats 
to the credits raise some questions about 
understandings — that the Soviet Union had 
every reason to believe were valid — of what 
our purposes were or what the United 
States would contribute for its side of the 

detente. And there are frictions in the Mid- 
dle East. And in SALT we have come up 
against the problems that have been de- 
scribed before — that qualitative change is 
much more difficult to control than quantita- 
tive change. 

All of this is true. At the same time, the 
necessities that produced the policy of relax- 
ation of tension remain. As I have often 
pointed out, any administration will sooner 
or later pursue them. Our attempt will be to 
work out with the Soviet Union the moderate 
course in foreign policy on which peace in 
the world depends and perhaps the survival 
of humanity will depend. I agree we are 
going there at a more difficult period than at 
some previous visits, but I'm going there 
with hope and with the confidence that the 
overriding reality that I have described will 
determine the decisions. 

Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on a related question, 
you were speaking a bit earlier about the 
pressures in each society on both sides of 
the Atlantic, and now we are talking here 
about, in effect, the pressures in each society 
in Sino-Soviet relations. I recognize that you 
remarked earlier that it is the U.S. — par- 

Secretary Kissinger: You said "Sino- 
Soviet relations"? 

Q. American-Soviet relations. I recog- 
nize your remark earlier that it is the U.S. 
position that domestic policy should be sep- 
arate from foreign policy. But in this com- 
plex here, with these pressures in the Atlan- 
tic alliance, in American-Soviet relatione, 
and in domestic pressures, doesn't this make 
an extraordinary complex of issues as you 
head into these talks in the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: It does make an ex- 
traordinary complex of issues, many of 
which inevitably had to arise. As Europe 
gained greater strength, greater identity, 
and therefore greater autonomy, it was in- 
evitable that the relationship with the 
United States had to be reexamined. As 


Department of State Bulletin 


weapons of ever-greater destructiveness 
spread to both sides, it was inevitable that 
the strategic relationship had to be studied 
and also that the security problems within 
the alliance were in need of reexamination. 

So, in part, the difficulties, which you have 
correctly listed, are the result partly of the 
success of previous policies, partly the result 
of technological evolution, and partly the 
result of domestic developments in all coun- 
tries. And they are the raw material from 
which decisions have to be made. 

I agree that we are in a complex period. 
Its complexity consists of the fact that a new 
international system is painfully being 
formed, that the system that was created in 
the fifties is in fundamental flux, and that 
the seventies will be seen in retrospect as a 
period of an emerging new relationship 
among most of the power centers. We've 
been trying to point this out for several 
years, and many of these tendencies are now 
coming to a head simultaneously. 

Middle East Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the existing frictions 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union and the Middle East — looidd you put 
that in the context of, first of all, the fighting 
that's been going on for the past eight or nine 
days on the Golan Heights and, also, your 
expectations of disengagement talks between 
the Is7-aelis and the Syrians? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is inevitable when 
countries of worldwide interest — such as the 
Soviet Union and the United States — are en- 
gaged in an area of such strategic importance 
as the Middle East that there will be some 
friction, especially when until recently each 
of the sides was essentially allied to one of 
the contenders in the area. 

At the same time, the Soviet Union and 
we have had a partly competitive, partly co- 
operative relationship in the Middle East. 

On October 22, or October 21, it was de- 
cided that the United States and the Soviet 
Union would provide the auspices for the 
Geneva Conference, and we maintain that 
understanding. So both of us have an obli- 

gation to contribute to peace in this area, and 
both of us are exchanging ideas on this sub- 

At the same time, on any individual nego- 
tiation, it is in the interest of everybody that 
they be conducted in the manner that is most 
conducive to rapid settlement. We do not hold 
the Soviet Union responsible, to be specific, 
for the artillery exchanges that are now 
going on on the Golan Heights. We believe 
that the negotiations, of course, would be 
furthered if both sides exercise military re- 

As we look back to the Egyptian negotia- 
tions we recognize, however, that some mili- 
tary clashes tend to occur prior to the final 

We will attempt to carry out the policy 
that a settlement in the Middle East cannot 
be achieved against the opposition of the So- 
viet Union. And we will try to work coop- 
eratively with the Soviet Union wherever 
that is possible. 

We also have to keep in mind, as I pointed 
out, that in any individual negotiation the 
method should be chosen that is most likely 
to bring success, because that is in the inter- 
est of both countries. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the empha- 
sis that yon have put in the past on unity in 
the Atlantic alliance before beginning nego- 
tiations with the Russians, ivould you con- 
sider it desirable at this point for the 
President to make his trip to Europe before 
the planned summit meeting in June? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that we 
should discuss Presidential trips in the ab- 
stract. The subjects that we are discussing 
in Moscow will have been the subject of full 
consultation with our European allies. The 
President has stated repeatedly that he would 
be prepared to meet with the European allies 
when the concrete progress in our discussions 
would warrant it. 

This remains our position, and we believe 
that it is now up to the European countries 
to respond to the many overtures we have 
made over the last year. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Arab oil embargo is 

April 8, 1974 


highlighted by the fact that the United States 
has a longstanding embargo of its oivn 
against Cuba. In view of your general poli- 
cies of rapprochement, expanded trade with 
the Soviets and the Chinese, do you think it's 
about time to reexamine that embargo of 
Cuba with an eye toward relaxing or amend- 
ing it? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated 
repeatedly that this depends, in the first 
instance, on some modification of Cuban poli- 
cies. And in that case, we would certainly 
look at our relationships with an open mind. 

Issues of Weapons Programs and Strategy 

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the relative deli- 
cate nature of the Soviet-U.S. relations at the 
momeyit, do you think that the discussion in 
Washington on the need for accelerating 
certain weapons programs, coupled tvith the 
discussion on possible coiinterforce targeting, 
contributes to the prospects for a SALT 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the press 
corps isn't satisfied when I'm embroiled only 
with allies. I have to be embroiled with col- 
leagues as well. [Laughter.] 

On the first of these questions — the accel- 
eration of our weapons programs — this has 
to be seen in the context of existing Soviet 
weapons programs; and at a time when the 
Soviet Union is developing four types of 
intercontinental weapons, it would be irre- 
sponsible for us not to continue with our own 
programs. We have, however, repeatedly 
stated that we are prepared and eager to sub- 
mit our programs to discussion as a part of 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. 

Now, with respect to the counterforce 
strategy that you mentioned, as I understood 
Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesin- 
ger's point of view and objective, he is seek- 
ing an ability to bring about discriminating 
targeting of the American nuclear forces. 
This in itself is a problem separate from 
counterforce strategy, which implies the 
ability to wipe out the Soviet retaliatory 
force in a first strike. The necessity for dis- 

criminating targeting is imposed on us by the 
enormous destructiveness of modern weap- 
ons, in which a spasm type of response in 
which all the forces are used more or less 
simultaneously would bring about casualties 
to all of mankind and especially to the Soviet 
and American societies, which neither of 
them could survive. 

Therefore it is a moral, political, and mili- 
tary obligation as long as these forces exist 
to use them in a manner — if they are to be 
used at all — or at least to have the ability to 
use them in the most discriminating manner 

This is my understanding of the retarget- 
ing capability. 

The problem of counterforce strategy is a 
diff"erent issue, which depends on the ability 
to launch a great many missiles simultane- 
ously, confidence in the ability to do this, and 
on the accuracy. And that is a separate issue, 
which I do not believe has been raised ex- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on that 
Cuban question? For a long time ive have 
been hearing that there will be a change in 
U.S. policy when there is a modification of 
Cuban policy toward the United States. In 
point of fact, sir, has there not been some 
kind of a modification in the Cuban policy, 
not even speaking of the hijacking agreement 
but a lessening of the vitriolic outpourings 
from Cuba? 

And, also, can we not consider this in a 
larger context, in view of the overall Latin 
American scene? Your recent trip to Mexico, 
I think, demonstrated that there was a con- 
siderable sentiment about a U.S. change in 
policy. And aren't we being counterproduc- 
tive when we maintain — counterproductive 
in our Latin America policy — ivhen tve main- 
tain the stance we do toward Cuba? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course my recent 
trip in Latin America — the impression that 
the press acquired from occasional individual 
briefings did not necessarily coincide with the 
impression that the delegates acquired inside 
the room. And I read about some dramatic 
confrontations on some particular issues 


Department of State Bulletin 

which I had great difficulty recollecting. 

Nevertheless I do not believe that the 
course on which we are embarked in Latin 
America has, up to now, been significantly 
affected by the Cuban question. We do place 
great stress on vitalizing the relationships 
among the nations in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. We think that the Mexico City Con- 
ference made a great contribution to this. 
We believe that the forthcoming meeting in 
Washington will, hopefully, continue this 

Up to now, the Cuban issue has not been a 
significant factor in these discussions. 

The press: Mr. Secretarij, thank you very 

United States Cites Major Violations 
of Peace Accords by North Viet-Nam 

Folloioing is a note transmitted to U.S. 
missions on March H for delivery to non- 
Vietnamese participants in the International 
Conference on Viet-Nam and to members of 
the International Commission of Control and 
Supervision (ICCS)."^ 

Press release 100 dated March 15 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to [recipient of this note] and has the honor 
to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War 
and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed 
at Paris January 27, 1973, and to the Act of 
the International Conference on Viet-Nam 
signed at Paris March 2, 1973.- 

The Department is informed that the Dem- 
ocratic Republic of Viet-Nam on March 1, 
1974, sent to the participants of the Inter- 
national Conference on Viet-Nam and to the 

' Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Re- 
public of China, United Kingdom, France, Canada, 
Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and U.N. Secre- 
tary General Kurt Waldheim. 

' For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 
12, 1973, p. 169; for text of the Act of the Interna- 
tional Conference, see BULLETIN of Mar. 26, 1973, p. 

members of the International Commission 
of Control and Supervision, a note marking 
the first anniversary of that Conference. In 
its note the DRV seeks to shift the blame for 
the lack of a true cease-fire in South Viet- 
Nam from its own aggressive policies to 
alleged truce violations by the United States 
and the Government of Viet-Nam. It is there- 
fore necessary once again to point out the 
clear fact that it is Hanoi which is prolonging 
the misery of South Viet-Nam's people and 
that the decision to end this suflfering can 
only be made in Hanoi. 

The LJnited States has implemented the 
Viet-Nam Peace Agreement in good faith. 
There are no U.S. military advisers, nor is 
there U.S. intervention in South Viet-Nam; 
our present activities there are in strict 
accord with the Agreement. Our assistance 
to the South Vietnamese has been open and 
in keeping with the provisions of the Agree- 
ment dealing with military resupply, in con- 
trast to the clandestine activities of the other 
side. Our inability to carry out Article 21 
regarding aid to North Viet-Nam follows 
from Hanoi's unwillingness to fulfill its 
cease-fire commitments. 

With regard to the true nature of the con- 
tinuing conflict in South Viet-Nam, it should 
be recalled that the DRV did not wait until 
the ink on the January 27 Peace Agreement 
was dry before undertaking major violations 
of that Agreement. On the first day of the 
cease-fire. North Vietnamese troops pressed 
heavy offensives to capture Government of 
Viet-Nam territory in wide-ranging parts of 
the country. Hanoi's cease-fire violations, 
resulting in tens of thousands of battlefield 
fatalities and the totally needless deaths of 
nearly three thousand innocent civilians, 
have continued from that day. Of the numer- 
ous cease-fire violations committed by Hanoi, 
the following are especially flagrant: 

(a) The DRV has infiltrated into South 
Viet-Nam over 100,000 troops since January 
27, 1973, through Laos and Cambodia and 
through the Demilitarized Zone, in contra- 
vention of Articles 7, 15 and 20. 

(b) Hanoi has shipped vast quantities of 
military equipment, including SA-2 missiles, 

April 8, 1974 


tanks and heavy artillery into the South, also 
in violation of Article 7. 

(c) In violation of Article 8(b), the DRV 
has refused to provide the United States with 
information on our missing in action. 

(d) The DRV has shown its disdain for 
international peacekeeping efforts by firing 
at ICCS aircraft, kidnapping ICCS personnel 
and blocking deployment of ICCS teams to 
areas under its control. The DRV seeks fur- 
ther to undermine the ICCS by refusing to 
pay its and the Provisional Revolutionary 
Government's legitimate share of Commis- 
sion expenses. 

(e) The DRV has continued its campaign 
of terrorism directed against the South Viet- 
namese people. A recent example of these 
wanton acts was the shelling of an elemen- 
tary school in Cai Lay on March 9 which 
brought death to 32 schoolchildren and in- 
juries to 55 more. 

The DRV has also followed its familiar 
course as chief spokesman for the so-called 
Provisional Revolutionary Government by 
seeking to claim governmental status for that 
party. The PRG was not, however, as Hanoi 
has asserted, one of "12 governments" to 
sign the Act of the International Conference 
since it is not and has never been a govern- 
ment. Article 9 of that Act expressly stated 
that signature did not constitute recognition 
of any party in any case in which it was not 
previously accorded. As is well known, the 
PRG controls but a small minority of the 
population of South Viet-Nam and has none 
of the inherent attributes of a government, 
such as a capital, a body of laws or juris- 
prudence, or any governmental institutions 
apart from some visible units of authority 
established to advance its international as- 
pirations. Through sheer propaganda and the 
trappings of diplomacy, Hanoi is attempting 

to place on the PRG the mantle of legitimacy 
which the people of South Viet-Nam have so 
emphatically denied it. 

The DRV continues to avow that its policy 
is to strictly respect and scrupulously imple- 
ment the Paris Agreement. Unfortunately, it 
is evident that this Hanoi policy is being 
honored in the breach. 

The Department hopes that [recipients of 
this note] will take the occasion of the anni- 
versary of the International Conference on 
Viet-Nam to urge the DRV to begin to comply 
seriously with the provisions of the Peace 
Agreement. Only then can the hopes of the 
world for peace in Viet-Nam be realized. 

Diplomatic Immunities Extended 
to P.R.C. Liaison Office and Staff 


Extending Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities 
TO THE Liaison Office of the People's Republic 
OF China in Washington, D.C, and to Members 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
act of April 20, 1973 (87 Stat. 24; Public Law 93- 
22), and as President of the United States, I extend 
to the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of 
China in Washington, D.C. and to its members who 
are duly notified to, and accepted by, the Secretary 
of State the same privileges and immunities, sub- 
ject to corresponding conditions and obligations, as 
are enjoyed by the diplomatic missions accredited 
to the United States and by members of the staffs 
thereof. This Executive Order shall be effective as 
of April 20, 1973. 

(^/2a^ ^■^K<:,c^ 

The White House, March 18, l97Jt. 

'No. 11771; 39 Fed. Reg. 10415. 


Department of State Bulletin 


President Nixon Appears Before Executives' Club of Chicago 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a question-and- 
ansiver session given by President Nixon at a 
luncheon meeting of the Executives' Club of 
Chicago on March 15.^ 

Q. . . . hi my Senate district in Will 
County, there are po7-tions of it that have had 
a tremendous difficidty in obtaining fuel, gas- 
oline, and I am ivondering, Mr. President, 
now that the Arab embargo seems as thoiigh 
it is about ready to be lifted, whether by sum- 
mer the people not only in my district but 
throughout the State of Illinois can look to 
having gasoline readily available? 

President Nixon: Well, first, with regard 
to the embargo, I think it is well for us to put 
that in perspective. We have had no official 
report from the meeting of Arab oil minis- 
ters with regard to what action is going to be 
taken with regard to lifting the embargo. 

There are, of course, sources that have in- 
dicated that some action will be taken per- 
haps this weekend. 

Second, there are also indications that that 
action might be conditional, that they may 
raise the embargo but on the condition that 
they might reimpose it unless the United 
States came through in terms of working out 
a settlement of the political problems, the 
very difficult ones, that exist in the Mideast: 
the disengagement on the Syrian front, the 
problem with Jerusalem, and all the others to 
which we are dedicated to working for a 
solution and where we are working for it. 

I want one thing very clearly understood, 
and then I will come to the key point about 
your district and its gasoline shortage. I 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 18. 

want it understood that we want the em- 
bargo lifted. I also want it understood that 
as far as the United States is concerned we 
want permanent peace in the Mideast. We 
will work toward that end whether the em- 
bargo is lifted or not. 

And we have made progress in that field, 
and as far as those who, incidentally, support 
the State of Israel, as I do, it is in Israel's 
interest to have the United States a friend of 
Israel's neighbors rather than an enemy of 
Israel's neighbors. And for that reason we 
believe that permanent peace in the Middle 
East and working toward the disengagement 
and resolving this long crisis is in the in- 
terest of world peace, because it also avoids 
that flashpoint of world conflict that might 
come where the two major powers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, happen 
to be involved. 

But the United States as far as the em- 
bargo is concerned is not going to be pres- 
sured by our friends in the Mideast or others 
who might be our opponents to doing some- 
thing before we are able to do it. And I 
would only suggest that insofar as any action 
on the embargo is taken, that if it has any 
implications of pressure on the United States, 
it would have a counter effect on our efforts 
to go forward on the peace front, the negotia- 
tion front, because it would simply slow 
down, in my opinion, our very real and ear- 
nest efforts to get the disengagement on the 
Syrian front and also to move toward a per- 
manent settlement. 

Looking toward the future, I would say 
first, we will be getting some more oil from 
the Mideast, we will be getting it probably 
because some action may be taken on the 
embargo. It eventually will come because it 
is in their interest to do so. But further, 
even if no action is taken or if the action 

April 8, 1974 


is conditional, it is our belief that at this 
time, having passed through the winter — and 
we were blessed by favorable weather in the 
winter except for the last two or three 
days during the month of March here in Chi- 
cago and other places which were a little 
cold — but in any event, having passed 
through this period, we believe that the gaso- 
line lines which have been very long have 
now shortened down. We have been able to 
make more allocations, move them from the 
distillates which were essential to keep our 
economy going so that we would not have 
increased unemployment, move those alloca- 
tions to more gasoline. 

Q. Mr. President, you have often stated 
and you have so this afternoon, that one of 
the objectives of your administration is to 
achieve world peace through pursuance of a 
policy of detente. Some of us are concerned 
that in our pursuit of detente America's 
domestic and foreign positions are being 
eroded. It seems apparent to some of 7is that 
our definition of that term and the definition 
of the term as given by the Russians seems 
to diverge, particularly when we seem to be 
making all the compromises and they seem to 
be participating in a policy of arousing ani- 
mosity and inciting nations. Could you com- 
ment on this? 

President Nixon : With regard to the policy 
of detente, let us first understand that 
whether it is with the Soviet Union or the 
People's Republic of China, neither side — 
and I have met the top leaders of both — has 
any illusions about our vast differences as far 
as philosophy is concerned. 

Second, the fact that we have negotiation 
rather than confrontation does not in any 
way imply that we approve of their internal 
policies or, for that matter, that they approve 
of ours. 

Third, when we say that the policy of de- 
tente has been two for them, in effect, and 
one for us — I think that is shorthanding 
what you said, but I think properly so — I 
think what we must understand first is what 
the policy of detente has accomplished. 


The war in Viet-Nam has been brought to 
a conclusion. It was not easy for the Soviet ^ 
Union and other powers concerned not to 
move in there in order to avoid that war 
being brought to a conclusion, which was hon- 
orable for our side, not only honorable but 
which kept for the people of South Viet-Nam, 
17 million, kept them from having a Com- 
munist government imposed upon them 
against their will. 

Second, the Mideast. The United States 
and the Soviet Union had great difl!"erences in 
the Mideast. It is far better that when those 
differences reached a climax in October that 
I was in direct communication with Mr. 
Brezhnev and that we did not alloM^ those 
diff'erences to bring us into what could have 
been a military confrontation disastrous for 
the whole world. 

Third, on the limitation of nuclear arms, 
we have had SALT One [Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks] and SALT Two, and we 
will have SALT Three in our meetings with 
the Soviet leaders this year. That is far 
better than to have a runaway nuclear arms 
race. That is in their interest, yes, but it is 
certainly in our interest. 

And finally, the alternative to detente — 
there are those who say because of the way 
the Russians treat their minorities we should 
break off our relations with them, we should 
not trade with them, we should deny them 
credits, and then maybe they will change. 
Well, first, they aren't going to change if we 
do that. It will have exactly the opposite 

But the second point is, if we go back to 
the old policy of confrontation, not negotiat- 
ing to limit nuclear arms and other arms 
possibly in the future, not negotiate Mith the 
hope of resolving differences at the confer- 
ence table rather than on the battlefield, then 
what you have to do is to face the necessity 
for the United States to enter an arms race, 
and instead of an $8 billion increase in the 
arms budget, you would have $100 billion 
increase in the arms budget, and eventually 
you would confront what would be a massive 
crisis between the Soviet Union and the 
United States in the Mideast, in Europe, and 

Department of State Bulletin 

possibly even in the Mediterranean, as well 
as in the Caribbean area, where our interests 
are in conflict. 

I would simply conclude my answer with 
this: Nobody, I know, will question my cre- 
dentials with regard to the Soviet system and 
my disagreements with it. I would also say, 
however, that I have learned that it is much 
better to have your voice heard within the 
Kremlin than outside. 

One of the problems that has concerned 
me, sir, has been the fact that many com- 
plaints, very properly, have been made with 
regard to the treatment of minorities in the 
Soviet Union and particularly those of the 
Jewish faith. 

Let me tell you the figures. Before we 
started talking to the Soviets in our period 
of negotiation, 400 Soviet Jews a year got 
out. In the first year of our talks, 17,000 got 
out. Last year 35,000 got out. 

Now, they still aren't doing what we would 
do or what we would want them to do, but it 
is far better to have the voice of the Presi- 
dent of the United States heard from within 
the Kremlin than the outside, because those 
walls are mighty thick, I can tell you. 

So therefore let us continue to talk to them 
so we won't have to fight them. 

Q. Mr. President, ive are hearing increas- 
ing and persistent objections to the Commu- 
nist influence on the United Nations and cer- 
tain of its agencies. My question relates to 
VNICEF [United Natioyis Children's Fund]. 
What are we doing to keep our contributions 
to UNICEF from Communist control, and by 
whose authority do branches of the U.S. Post 
Office assist in the sale and distribution of 
cards for UNICEF? 

President Nixon: Well, sir, that is a mat- 
ter I will have to look into. It is enough to 
have the problems of the United States to 
solve without looking into the United Na- 
tions, I can assure you. But speaking quite 
directly, it is quite true that the Soviet Union, 
being a major nation, has great influence in 
the United Nations, and it is quite true that 
it has great influence within certain bodies 

within the United Nations. 

And I think the only recourse for the 
United States, rather than getting out of the 
United Nations and leaving the whole game 
to them, is to stay in and attempt to see to it 
that our influence counterbalances theirs 
whenever we think theirs is wrong. That 
would be my response at this point. 

Q. Mr. President, regarding your comment 
that we must continue to move forward on 
the world front, the Wall Street Journal and 
the Chicago Sun-Times today both carry arti- 
cles about mounting evidence that our foreign 
policy position with the Soviets, the Arabs, 
and our former European partners is now 
deteriorating. They say the temporary sus- 
pension of the oil embargo is likely to be an 
on-again, off-again Soviet-Arab policy and 
that our declining influence abroad will lead 
to many problems at home and abroad, includ- 
ing continued rising prices for gasoline and 
many other basic necessities of life here at 
home. Would you please give us your com- 

President Nixon: Well, it is rather hard to 
respond to both of those publications in the 
small time that I have but let me say this 
first: Early this year predictions were made 
that there would be a worldwide recession, 
you recall, and that was one of the reasons 
that people projected an 8 to 10 percent un- 
employment in the United States at this time, 
which has not occurred. 

There will be apparently no worldwide re- 
cession, and, second, there will be no reces- 
sion in the United States. The difficulties are 
going to continue for a time, but in the second 
half of this year we expect to see the economy 
moving up, unemployment moving down, and 
inflation abating. As far as the entire situa- 
tion worldwide is concerned, however, your 
question allows me to make a statement with 
regard not only to the Soviet Union but also 
with regard to Europe, which should be more 
on the front burner than it is because of the 
enormous importance of the European- Amer- 
ican alliance to stability in the world. 

I have already responded with regard to 
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic 

April 8, 1974 


of China. We have difficulties, we have differ- 
ences, but it is far better to be talking about 
them rather than fighting about them, and 
we will continue that policy. 

Second, with regard to the Mideast, the 
Mideast has had four wars in a generation. 
That is four too many in an area that is very 
poor and one that needs peace and needs it 
desperately. At the present time, the influ- 
ence of the United States in the Mideast, the 
fact that we have restored relations with 
Egypt, that we are moving in all of the area 
of the Mideast toward creating a permanent 
peace, is going to be one of the major legacies 
of this administration, I would hope. 

Third, with regard to Europe, the problem 
there is complicated by the fact that our 
European friends and we had agreed some- 
what earlier that we would try on the 25th 
anniversary of NATO, which occurs in April, 
that we would try to reach common declara- 
tions on the security front with regard to the 
Atlantic alliance and also on the economic 
and political front where the United States 
has to deal with what is called the Nine, or 
the European Common Market countries. 

Now, the progress in developing declara- 
tions on the security front has gone forward 
on schedule. However, I regret to report, as 
I have written to Chancellor Brandt, the 
present Chairman of the Nine, that on the 
economic and political front the progress has 
not gone forward and we face the situation 
that, therefore, if the heads of government 
were to meet at this time, for example in the 
month of April, we would simply be papering 
over difficulties and not resolving them. 

But to just conclude the question with an 
observation for our European friends and for 
us, let me say, first, the European-American 
alliance is important to the peace of the world 
as well as to ourselves. The second point is, 
as far as security is concerned the United 
States is indispensable to the security of Eu- 
rope, not only our presence in Europe but 
also the fact of our nuclear strength. 

Now, the Europeans cannot have it both 
ways. They cannot have the U.S. participa- 
tion and cooperation on the security front 
and then proceed to have confrontation and 
even hostility on the economic and political 

front. And until the Europeans are willing to 
sit down and cooperate on the economic and 
political front as well as on the security 
front, no meeting of heads of government 
should be scheduled. 

I believe we will work out the cooperation, 
but I think it is very well for all nations in 
the world to understand that the day of the 
one-way street is gone. The United States has 
been very generous to its allies and friends 
and to its former enemies. We will continue 
to be as generous as we can. But whether it 
is in the field of trade or whether it is in any 
other field, it is essential that we get, what I 
would say, a fair break for our producers, 
just as we try to give a fair break to their 

We cannot have in Europe, for example, 
confrontation on the economic and political 
front and cooperation on the security front. 

I do not mean to leave this question with 
the impression that the European and Amer- 
ican alliance is shattered. It is not. I do indi- 
cate,, however, that it is a time when the 
Europeans as well as we must sit down and 
determine that we are either going to go 
along together on both the security and the 
economic and political fronts or we will go 

Because I can say one thing: I have had 
great difficulty in getting the Congress to 
continue to support American forces in Eu- 
rope at the level that we need to keep them 
there. In the event the Congress gets the idea 
that we are going to be faced with economic 
confrontation and hostility from the Nine, 
you will find it almost impossible to get con- 
gressional support for continued American 
presence at present levels on the security 

Now, we do not want this to happen. That 
is why I have urged my friends in Europe, 
our friends in Europe, to consider this propo- 
sition. It does not mean that we are not going 
to have competition, but it does mean that 
we are not going to be faced with a situation 
where the nine countries of Europe gang 
up against the United States — the United 
States which is their guarantee for their se- 
curity. That we cannot have. 

Q. Thank you, Mr. President. 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Nixon Appears Before Convention 
of National Association of Broadcasters 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a question-and- 
answcr session given by President Nixon be- 
fore the convention of the National Associa- 
tion of Broadcasters at Houston, Tex., on 
March 19.^ 

Q. Mr. President, Jay Solomon, WOOL 
Neivs, Columbus, Ohio. Our Middle East 
policy has seemed to point three ways — sup- 
port for Israel, keeping access to Arab oil, 
and containing the Soviet influence. It seems 
to be touchy at best. But noiv with the Arab 
oil embargo lifted and with Egypt seeming to 
lead the ivay in that regard, what does that 
do to U.S. Middle East policy, especially 
shoidd push come to shove as regarding 

President Nixon: I realize that many of 
those who support Israel and its independ- 
ence, as I have since that state came into 
existence, wonder about the policy of the 
United States, which is now one designed not 
only to be a friend of Israel but to be a friend 
of Israel's neighbors, and I would only sug- 
gest that in terms of the future of Israel it 
is much better to have the United States a 
friend of Israel's neighbors and thereby able 
to influence and perhaps restrain their poli- 
cies rather than an enemy or with no com- 

And so, therefore, our policy is designed to 
accomplish these things: 

One, we will continue to support the inde- 
pendence and the integrity of the State of 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 25. 

Two, we will continue to try to seek not 
only renewed relations with Egypt but with 
other countries, with which those relations 
have been broken, as you know, in the past, 
growing out of the June 1967 war. 

But let me make one thing very clear. 
Being a friend of one of Israel's neighbors 
does not make us an enemy of Israel. In the 
long-term interests of Israel, and in the long- 
term interests of all of the countries in the 
Mideast, it is vital that the United States play 
a constructive and positive role. 

For example, the progress on the Syrian 
disengagement, which will be even more diffi- 
cult than the disengagement on the Israeli- 
Egyptian front, is a news item which, I think, 
came over the ticker just a few moments ago. 
This is a positive move. 

We have a long way to go. But in the 
long term, we have to realize that a U.S. role 
in the Mideast must be one that works with 
all the countries in the area that are willing 
to work with us. 

The other point that I should make that I 
know perhaps is not included in your ques- 
tion, but is implicit in many questions that 
are asked in this field — Why is it that we 
follow this attitude in the Mideast and at a 
time when the Soviet Union seems to be fol- 
lowing, some claim or allege, an obstruction- 
ist attitude in the Mideast? 

Let me say, there cannot be permanent 
peace in the Mideast unless the United States 
is for it and plays a role to get it. But also, 
there cannot be permanent peace in the Mid- 
east if the Soviet Union is against it. As far 
as the Soviet Union and the United States 
are concerned, our interests are not always 
the same in the Mideast, but in my meetings 
with Mr. Brezhnev two years ago, also this 

April 8, 1974 


year (last year), and I trust also later in the 
year, the problem of peace in the Mideast will 
be high on the agenda. 

We will not always agree. But it is to the 
interest not only of the countries in the Mid- 
east, but of the Soviet Union and the United 
States, to work out a permanent settlement, 
because it is one of those flashpoints in the 
world far more important to the interest of 
the United States and the Soviet Union than 
a place like Viet-Nam, and we cannot again, 
if we can avoid it, run the risk of a confron- 
tation between the two superpowers in that 
area of the world. 

So, I believe our policy of working toward 
permanent peace with Israel, with her neigh- 
bors, and working with the Soviet Union, 
where the Soviet Union is willing to work 
with us, is in the interests of everybody 

Q. Mr. President. 

President Nixon: Mr. [Tom] Jarriel of 

Q. Thank you. I would like to follow up 
that question, Mr. President. In your Chicago 
meeting with reporters on the Middle East, 
you said that if the oil-embargo lifting liad 
indications that it might be conditional and 
they might reimpose it, the United States 
would not be pressured a)id a)nj implications 
of pressure ivould have a counter effect on 
the peace negotiations. My questio)i goes to 
the fact that according to the news reports 
the embargo is lifted on a conditional basis of 
a revieiv in June. Because of this, loill you 
recommend that Dr. Kissinger break off' his 
efforts in the negotiations between Syria and 
Israel until there is a firm a)>d final lifting 
of the embargo? 

President Nixon: No, I will not. And 1 
will not for this reason : that what the deci- 
sion was, as I understand, Mr. Jarriel, was 
that the Arab countries would meet again in 
June to review the situation. It was not a 
decision with a condition. 

Now, as far as our policy in the Mideast is 
concerned, we seek a permanent peace as an 
end in itself. Whatever happens to the oil 

embargo, peace in the Mideast would be in 
our interest and in the interests of the whole 

As far as the oil embargo is concerned, it 
is in the interest of those countries that im- 
posed it, as well as the United States, that it 
be lifted. The two should go parallel. Inevita- 
bly, what happens in one area affects the 
other, and I am confident that the progress 
we are going to continue to make on the 
peace front in the Mideast will be very help- 
ful in seeing to it that an oil embargo is not 

Q. Mr. President, Russ Thornton, WBAP 
in Fort Worth. Concerning those men still 
listed as missiiig in action in Southeast Asia, 
could you tell us what is being done to deter- 
mine their fate and do you think a complete 
accountability is possible? 

President Nixon: Well, to those who are 
listening — and there are perhaps, 1,500 is 
the number, I think, presently, MIA's who 
have not been acounted for — I can say that 
we have been working on this problem con- 
tinually since the peace agreement was 

We have had some success, but not enough. 
We are continuing to discuss it with the 
North Vietnamese. I do not want to hold out 
false hopes, but I can say that as long as I 
am in this office I am going to do everything 
that I can that they are all accounted for, 
because I know the pain and suffering that 
those wives and mothers and fathers go 
through. I have met them often in the White 
House. My heart goes out to them, as I know 
the hearts of all Americans do, and you can 
be sure that your administration and your 
President is going to do everything he can to 
see that we get an accounting. 

Q. Mr. President, Noimaii Wagy, Storer 
Broadcasting, Washington. Since your rather 
forceful comments last Friday about our re- 
lations with our European allies, both the 
French Foreign Minister and the French 
Ambassador to the United States have re- 


Department of State Bulletin 

sponded, apparently in a friendly manner. 
What is your reaction to their response, and 
have you had reaction from any other Euro- 
pean nations? 

President Nixon: I was of course happy to 
see the response — very, I thought, proper 
response — on the part of our French friends. 
As you know, when I came into office our 
relations with France were very poor. I met 
with General de Gaulle on two occasions, and 
I have since met with President Pompidou on 
two occasions. In addition to that, we have 
developed a much better relationship with the 
French than we had in the sixties, and I 
won't go into why that happened, but I think 
that much of the fault was ours rather than 
theirs at that time, although both must bear 
some of the blame. 

But coming to the heart of your question, 
which is with regard to the whole reaction of 
Europe, let me restate the policy of the 
United States with regard to Europe. 

This administration is well known for hav- 
ing started negotiations with those that we 
weren't talking to for 20 years — the People's 
Republic of China. Why? Because they are 
the leaders of one-fourth of all of the people 
on this earth, and it is far better to talk 
to them now than it is to wait until later 
when they would be a very, very great super- 
power with, of course, the ability to use that 
strength even against us or our allies. 

Second, we have started negotiations, some 
of them heavily criticized by members of the 
press and others, with the Soviet Union. 
Those negotiations have resulted in finally 
beginning to limit nuclear arms, avoiding a 
crisis or at least avoiding a confrontation in 
the Mideast developing into a crisis which 
could have been far worse, and also a number 
of other areas that we think are quite helpful. 

Now, at a time that we have begun to seek 
better relations with those who are our ad- 
versaries, it was my thought that this year, 
1974, should be a year in which we should 
shore up and develop a better relationship 
and a closer relationship and consultation 
with our friends. 

That is what the year of Europe was about. 

We have made considerable progress on it. 

As far as agreement with regard to se- 
curity — in other words, the NATO alliance — 
the declarations that were being prepared 
for a possible meeting at the summit by heads 
of government have gone very well. Now, in 
the political and economic field, in the deal- 
ings between the Nine — the European Com- 
munity — and the United States, those discus- 
sions have not gone well. They have not gone 
well due to the fact that the Nine at times 
have not consulted with us, we think, fully 
or in time and, second, in some areas, have 
actually taken a position which is hostile to 
the United States. 

Now, under the circumstances, therefore, 
the trip that we had thought I would take to 
Brussels, and other European leaders would 
take to Brussels, to sign a communique with 
regard to the new relationship, not only with 
regard to security but also in the economic 
and political field, I felt should be postponed. 
I felt it should be postponed for this reason : 
You must never go to the summit unless you 
know what is on the other side. And when 
you go to the summit, and summit leaders 
have broad diff"erences and paper them over 
with diplomatic doubletalk, that does not 
serve the cause of good relations. 

That is why some rather direct statement 
needed to be made from this side of the 
Atlantic with regard to our concern. And I 
would say, with regard to the nations of Eu- 
rope, that we have had communications from 
other European leaders. I believe that we 
are going to work out the differences that we 
have in the economic and political field. 

I do not mean by that that we are not going 
to continue to be competitors, because the 
free Europe, the European Community, will 
be a great economic unit. But I do mean 
that at a time that the United States fur- 
nishes the security shield for Europe that we 
can at least expect from our European allies 
and friends that they will consult with us 
and not work actively against us in the po- 
litical field or the economic field. 

It is that point I was trying to make. The 
other point that I made I would like to elab- 
orate on, too. Some have thought that as a 

April 8, 1974 


result of my statement in Chicago tliat I 
would go along with the Mansfield amend- 
ment, or others, to unilaterally reduce our 
forces, and I am sure that question was in 
your mind as well. 

I will not go along with that regardless of 
what happens in terms of the economic and 
political arrangements because it is in the 
vital interests of peace in the world and in 
the interests of the security of America as 
well as Europe that that alliance be con- 
tinued and that there be no reduction of 
American forces in Europe unless it is mu- 
tually agreed with the Warsaw Pact and of 
course with the Soviet Union. 

That of course will be one of the subjects 
we will discuss when I go to meet with Mr. 

So I will continue to work for a continua- 
tion of cooperation in that field. The point I 
was making in Chicago, and I must speak 
very bluntly, and everyone in this audience 
knows it, there is growing in America a new 
sense of isolationism. After Korea, after 
Viet-Nam, many Americans say, "Let us 
bring everybody home. We have carried the 
burden long enough. Bring them home from 
Europe, bring them home from Korea and 
other places in the world, and we will take 
care of ourselves." 

That is good short-i-ange politics. It is dis- 
astrous long-term statesmanship, because the 
United States must play, as the major free- 
world power, a positive role in Europe, and 
in Asia, if we are to be able to have a genera- 
tion of peace and perhaps an even longer 
period of peace. 

And so we will continue to work with our 
European friends even though we at times 
disagree. But they must understand that in 
the event that their policies in the political 

and economic fields appear to be hostile to us, 
it is going to be hard for any President, in- 
cluding this President, strong as I am for 
the alliance, to get through the Congress the 
necessary appropriations to continue doing 
what I think we have to do for their security 
and ours. 

That point needs to be made. I think they 
understand it. And as a result of their under- 
standing it, I believe we are going to make 
progress in the economic and political fields. 

ESRO Granted Immunities 
as International Organization 


Designating the European Space Research Or- 
ganization (ESRO) AS a Public International 
Organization Entitled To Enjoy Certain Priv- 
ileges, Exemptions, and Immunities 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by sec- 
tions 1 and 11 of the International Organizations 
Immunities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288) as 
amended by Public Law 89-353 (80 Stat. 5), it is 
ordered as follows: 

Section 1. I hereby designate the European Space 
Research Organization (ESRO) as a public interna- 
tional organization entitled to enjoy those privileges, 
exemptions, and immunities provided for by the In- 
ternational Organizations Immunities Act. 

Sec. 2. Executive Order No. 11318 of December 
5, 1966 and Executive Order No. 11351 of May 22, 
1967 are hereby superseded. 


The White House, January 17, 197i. 

' No. 11760; 39 Fed. Reg. 2343. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. Interests and Activities in the Indian Ocean Area 

Statement by Seymour Weiss 

Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs ' 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
discuss with you our national security policy 
as it relates to the Indian Ocean in general 
and to the proposed expansion of our fa- 
cilities at Diego Garcia in particular. I am 
well aware that this committee has had a 
continuing interest in this area, as reflected 
by the four series of hearings you have con- 
ducted in the last three years. Our hope today 
is to contribute, through continued dia- 
logue between the executive and legislative 
branches, to the committee's consideration of 
this important issue. 

Before moving into the substance of my 
statement, I would like to lay to rest some 
misconceptions — I am sure not shared by this 
committee — surrounding U.S. interests and 
activities in the Indian Ocean area. 

I know that you are aware of the conten- 
tion in some quarters that the United States 
is a "Johnny-come-lately" in the area and 
that our presence, as well as that of other 
"outside" powers, threatens the stability and 
territorial integrity of the littoral powers. 
This allegation is without substance. The 
United States has had a long association with 
the Indian Ocean that dates from the dawn 
of our domestic shipping in world commerce. 
Our New England whalers ventured through- 
out the Indian Ocean in the latter part of the 
18th century and well into the 19th century. 

'■ Made before the Subcommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on Mar. 6. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

Although our most important interests 
have traditionally centered in the Atlantic 
and Pacific Basins, we have also been active 
in the Indian Ocean and have maintained 
close ties on many levels with the countries 
that border it. It is a region of enormous va- 
riety, not unified by any common perspective 
or predominant interest. The littoral coun- 
tries seem only to have shared a common 
desire to tackle their postindependence prob- 
lems in a context of peace and stability, and 
our policies toward the region have been in- 
tended to foster and preserve such a context. 

The overriding external imprint in the 
area during the past two centuries has been 
British, and to a lesser extent, French, Portu- 
guese, and Dutch. 

British control and influence through 
World War II extended in a broad arc from 
Cape Town, up the east coast of Africa, 
through the Middle East to the Indian Sub- 
continent, and thence to Southeast Asia. By 
the early 1960's 12 newly independent states 
had emerged from territories formerly under 
British control. In 1968 the British Labor 
government, recognizing the limitations of 
the British economic position, announced 
their intention to substantially phase down 
their military presence east of Suez by the 
early 1970's, including phasing out their 
forces from the Persian Gulf by the end of 

The British have made it clear, however, 
that they continue to have significant inter- 
ests in the Indian Ocean area and will con- 
tinue to maintain residual military forces to 
underscore these interests. This is manifest 

April 8, 1974 


in Britain's continued military contribution 
to and support of CENTO [Central Treaty 
Organization], the development of expanded 
RAF facilities at Masirah Island off the coast 
of Oman, and its participation in the Five 
Power Defense Arrangement for Singapore 
and Malaysia. Above all, the British have 
been active partners in supporting an ex- 
panded U.S. military presence in the Indian 
Ocean, a fact attested to by their original 
agreement to our joint use of Diego Garcia 
and now to the proposed upgrading of these 

France still controls some territory in the 
Indian Ocean area and supports a significant 
naval presence there through their use of 
several islands in the Indian Ocean, including 
La Reunion and the strategic port of Dji- 
bouti in the Gulf of Aden. They also have 
access to the large naval base at Diego 
Suarez in the Malagasy Republic. 

Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean 
began in earnest in 1968 and has grown 
steadily since then as Soviet policy interests 
have expanded. As the figures on the chart 
show,- there has been a dramatic rise in the 
number of ship-days spent in the Indian 
Ocean, from just over 1,000 in 1968 to over 
6,500 in 1973. By comparison, U.S. ship-days 
remained relatively constant at about 1,150 
ship-days, with a modest increase to just 
over 2,000 last year. 

With the probable opening of the Suez 
Canal in the not too distant future, a still 
greater Soviet naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean will be possible and is likely. The 
Soviets have significant access to port facili- 
ties at Berbera in the Somali Republic and 
at Aden and anchorages that they use off 
Socotra Island. As their naval forces and air- 
lift capabilities have grown, they have dem- 
onstrated a complete willingness to project 
military power into more distant areas and 
to use military assistance and shows of force 
to influence events where their major inter- 
ests are at stake, as in the Middle East last 

Our first post-World War II military pres- 
ence was introduced into the area in 1948 

' Not printed here. 

with the establishment of our Middle East 
Force (MIDEASTFOR). This small force 
consisted of a flagship homeported at facili- 
ties made available by the British at Bahrain, 
with two destroyers periodically deployed on 
a rotational basis from the Atlantic Fleet. 
In 1951 a SAC [Strategic Air Command] re- 
covery base became operational at Dhahran. 
At Saudi request this base was terminated 
in the early 1960's, but by agreement with 
the Saudi Government, the Military Airlift 
Command continues to use Dhahran in its 
worldwide operations. 

The major thrust of our policies during the 
1950's and 1960's was represented by the 
substantial economic assistance we devoted 
to the area, supported by several bilateral 
security arrangements designed to assist the 
new states in the area to become strong 
enough to preserve their own independence. 

Such strife as has occurred in the littoral 
region has, in fact, come from historic ten- 
sions between the countries themselves. Al- 
though at various times the United States 
has been accused of dragging great-power 
rivalries into the region and attempting to 
meddle in the affairs of its countries, we 
have, in fact, tried to use our influence to 
urge restraint to contain or dampen intra- 
regional hostilities. 

For example, we embargoed most arms 
sales to India and Pakistan following the 
1965 war, a step in which we were not joined 
by other weapons-producing countries. Al- 
though we were not able to prevent another 
outbreak of war on the subcontinent in 1971, 
we made major diplomatic efforts to avert it 
and have worked since then to encourage full 
implementation of the Simla agreement and 
normalization of relations among the three 
countries involved. 

We have also from time to time used our 
influence to dampen rivalry between Kenya 
and Somalia and between Somalia and Ethi- 
opia. We have close ties to several of the 
newly independent states in the Persian Gulf 
area and have used our influence to counsel 
restraint against the latent rivalries of the 

But it was with the October 1973 hostilities 
in the Middle East that the vital necessity 


Department of State Bulletin 

of having a demonstrable U.S. capability in 
the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area was so 
sharply brought home. It was a classic case 
where the fact that the United States had a 
presence in the area, and was seen by all to 
have it there, made it highly unlikely that it 
would ever have to be used. 

In the first instance it was a reinforce- 
ment for the signally successful effoi-ts of 
Secretary Kissinger to bring the parties in 
the conflict to the peace table. It impressed 
upon both sides that the United States was 
interested in a resolution of the conflict. In 
short it played the traditional role which 
military power should play, that of support- 
ing diplomatic initiatives. By this, I do not 
mean to suggest that military power was 
used to lend coercive force to our diplomacy. 
Rather, our visible military presence in the 
area demonstrated the importance we at- 
tached to our diplomatic objective of bringing 
the parties together to seek a peaceful reso- 
lution of the issues that have produced so 
much discord and strife in the Middle East. 

It should be noted that we have been able 
to play a vital intermediary role precisely 
because we are a regional power with forces 
of our own in the Mediterranean as well as 
the Indian Ocean and maintain a continuing 
political and security dialogue with many of 
the parties involved. Indeed, in the Middle 
East crisis, as the Secretary of State has 
demonstrated, it is only the United States 
who has the confidence of all the contending 
parties and thus offers some hope of bringing 
peace to the area. 

Range of U.S. Interests 

While it is only natural to focus our atten- 
tion on the immediate events surrounding the 
recent Middle East war in considering how 
our military presence in the Mediterranean, 
Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean can contrib- 
ute to bringing peace to that area, we should 
not lose sight of the fact that we have a 
broad range of other interests which are 
highly important in their own right. 

The events of recent weeks do not require 
belaboring the fact that the oil resources of 
the area, primarily in the Persian Gulf, 

are vital to our allies and are of signifi- 
cant interest to us. Although only a rela- 
tively small proportion of U.S. oil comes 
from that area, a handful of percentage 
points makes a big difi'erence at the gas 
pumps, as we all know. The U.S. oil industry 
has substantial capital investments in the 
Persian Gulf region, valued at approximately 
$3.5 billion. 

In addition, Western Europe and Japan, 
the two areas of the free world of greatest 
importance to U.S. security, are absolutely 
dependent upon oil supplies from the Middle 
East, and that fact alone makes it of interest 
to us. The world economy is by now so inte- 
grated that freedom of navigation on the 
high seas and noninterference with sea lines 
of communication is a matter of vital impor- 
tance to all members of the world commu- 
nity — even those not directly involved. 

Aside from oil, we have other important 
commercial and economic interests in the 
area. We do a substantial trade with Iran 
and the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms, with In- 
dia and Pakistan, with Saudi Arabia, and 
African littoral states. The magnitude of 
trade opportunities and mineral exploitation 
has been growing significantly, and increased 
revenues will continue to make the area an 
important market for U.S. goods. 

Geographically, the Indian Ocean is a vi- 
tal international body of water which must 
remain available to U.S. surface traffic, com- 
mercial as well as military. Our airlines 
crisscross the region in routes the length and 
breadth of Africa as well as the vital round- 
the-world routes over the Middle East. Our 
presence on the Indian Ocean reinforces the 
proposition that the seas belong to everyone. 

And, not insignificantly, the Indian Ocean 
region comprises nearly one-fourth of the 
members of the United Nations and repre- 
sents about one-third of the world's popula- 
tion. A number of countries in the area play 
a significant international role or have the 
potential for doing so. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, the area is still adjusting in some cases 
to postcolonial independence, and some of its 
countries suffer extreme poverty. It is beset 
by internal tensions and by unresolved dif- 
ferences with neighbor states. 

April 8, 1974 


As I mentioned earlier, the United States 
has played an active diplomatic role in the 
area since World War II, exercising such 
varied tools of diplomacy as development 
assistance, military assistance, political me- 
diation, and U.N. initiatives in an effort to 
discourage conflict and contain it when it 
occurs. Obviously one of the diplomatic levers 
available to us is the deterrent effect of a 
military presence. We believe that the mod- 
est presence we have traditionally main- 
tained in the Persian Gulf, supplemented as 
necessary by more frequent deployments of 
additional naval ships, serves that purpose. 

U.S. Deployments and Diego Garcia 

In view of our broad interests, previously 
described, and of the uncertainties raised 
during the Middle East war last October, we 
increased the frequency of our naval deploy- 
ments to the Indian Ocean from the Pacific 
Fleet. On the basis of consultations with the 
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense 
Schlesinger announced on December 1 that 
we intended to reestablish the pattern of 
regular visits of U.S. Navy vessels into the 
Indian Ocean that had been disrupted by the 
Viet-Nam war and that "we expect that our 
presence there will be more frequent and 
more regular than in the past." 

Current U.S. naval deployments into the 
Indian Ocean are consistent with our policy 
of augmenting, from time to time, the mini- 
mal permanent presence represented by 
MIDEASTFOR that we have maintained 
in the area for over a quarter of a century. 
In our judgment, a U.S. presence in the 
Indian Ocean should contribute to a deter- 
rence against the likelihood that force or the 
threat of force might be employed by others. 
A military presence can support effective 
diplomacy without its ever having to be used. 
We are confident that the continued presence 
of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean will have 
a salutary effect by underscoring our stra- 
tegic mobility and thus give strength to our 
diplomatic efforts to further our national 

Maintaining forces in the Indian Ocean is 
not, however, without difficulty. The ships 

that have been recently deployed have come 
from the western Pacific. In view of the 
extended distances involved, it has been 
necessary to make temporary arrangements 
to provide for bunkering and limited facility 
support from friendly countries in the area. 

In looking ahead, if we wish to have the 
capability to move or maintain our ships in 
the area, development of more practical sup- 
port facilities seems essential. An obvious 
solution is Diego Garcia, with some bunker- 
ing and aircraft landing rights normally 
available elsewhere in the area. 

In the early 1960's, the Departments of 
State and Defense began thinking of the 
longer term strategic requirements of the 
United States in the Indian Ocean area. Our 
assessment of the potential significance of the 
region paralleled British thinking. In 1965 
the British constituted a number of Indian 
Ocean islands under their control into what 
is known as the British Indian Ocean Terri- 
tory, and by an exchange of notes on Decem- 
ber 30, 1966, the United States and the 
United Kingdom agreed that these islands 
would be available for the defense purposes 
of both governments for an initial period of 
50 years. 

In December of 1970 both governments 
agreed to the establishment of a communica- 
tions facility on Diego Garcia. The executive 
branch proposes to expand this presence to 
make it a useful and effective, although mini- 
mal, support facility for U.S. forces operat- 
ing in the Indian Ocean. This facility would 
be capable of providing support for a flexible 
range of activities including limited mainte- 
nance, bunkering, aircraft staging in support 
of naval patrols, logistics support, and en- 
hanced communications. 

The current supplemental military appro- 
priations budget that has been presented to 
Congress contains a request for $29 million 
to improve support facilities on Diego Gar- 
cia. Specific projects involved are an in- 
creased fuel storage capacity, deepening of 
the lagoon to provide an anchorage, length- 
ening the existing 8,000-foot runway, and ex- 
panding the airfield parking area, in addition 
to certain improvements to the existing com- 
munications facility. 


Department of State Bulletin III 

Although these would be important im- 
provements over the existing facilities, it 
should be emphasized that they would hardly 
constitute a major base. For example, the 
aircraft maintenance facility would consist 
of a single air-transportable hangar and 
would enable such repairs as an emergency 
engine change. The fuel storage capacity 
would be about that which would be carried 
by three Navy oilers, or only a modest frac- 
tion of the capacity of one of today's modern 

For all of this, I do not wish to understate 
the importance of the proposed expansion. It 
is vital if we are to operate efficiently in these 
waters. I merely wish to underscore that this 
does not represent the development of a 
major new base of unlimited capacity and, in 
fact, would emphasize that the very size of 
the Island of Diego Garcia precludes the 
development of an "Indian Ocean San 

In conclusion, let me emphasize that our 
deployments and support facilities in the 
Indian Ocean are not a threat to any nation 
or group of nations. It is a simple fact, how- 
ever, that powerful maritime nations are 
active in the Indian Ocean — including the 
Soviet Union, which had virtually no forces 
there at all prior to 1968 and which of late 
has maintained a presence approximately 
four times that of our own. We do not be- 
lieve that either our interests or those of the 
littoral states are served by our inability to 
operate effectively in the area. 

We are not in an arms race with the 
Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area, and 
our requirements for a facility at Diego Gar- 
cia are related to an entire spectrum of U.S. 
interests and considei-ations, only one of 
which bears on the level of Soviet deploy- 
ments there. Such arrangements as might be 
possible to agree to with the Soviet Union 
concerning the levels of our respective naval 
forces in the area are unlikely to be inhibited 
by our having a capability to deploy forces to 
the area ; in fact, precisely the contrary 
would be true. We seek nothing more than 
an ability to stage forces in the area similar 
to the ability the Soviet Union presently has 
using port facilities at Berbera in Somalia 

and at Aden plus the anchorages they rou- 
tinely use off the Island of Socotra. 

Our capacity to deploy in no way preju- 
dices future agreements on levels of forces 
to be deployed. Thus, while we remain open 
to constructive possibilities for an arms con- 
trol arrangement bearing on specific deploy- 
ment levels in the area, we see no reason to 
believe that such an agreement would pre- 
clude the need for the capability which Diego 
Garcia would provide. 

And finally, while we sympathize with the 
principles which motivate some of the na- 
tions in the area to promote concepts such as 
the "Indian Ocean Peace Zone," all major 
maritime powers, including the United States 
and Soviet Union, have been doubtful about 
this initiative because of its implication that 
littoral states somehow have a special right 
to limit or control the use of the high seas by 
others. The United States has long held the 
view that there must be unimpaired freedom 
of navigation on the high seas; this is a 
basic tenet of our position with respect to the 
forthcoming international Law of the Sea 

We believe, in sum, that our Indian Ocean 
deployment serves a variety of purposes — 
both our own national interests as well as 
broader international principles which we 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

After the War: European Security and the Middle 
East. Report of a study mission to Geneva, Tel 
Aviv, and Vienna from November 15 to 24, 1973, 
pursuant to H. Res. 267, authorizing the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs to conduct thorough 
studies and investigations of all matters coming 
within the jurisdiction of the committee. Decem- 
ber 1973. 37 pp. 

Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1973. Reports to 
accompany H.R. 8529. H. Rept. 93-687; December 
1, 1973; 42 pp. S. Rept. 93-633; December 14, 1973; 
18 pp. 

Delinquent Foreign Debts and Claims Owed to the 
United States (Selected Countries). Report by the 
Committee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 
93-696. December 5, 1973. 20 pp. 

April 8, 1974 



U.S. Supports Expansive Approach 
to Sharing Remote Sensing Data 

The U.N. Outer Space Committee's Work- 
ing Group on Remote Sensing met at Neiv 
York February 25-March 5. Following is a 
statement made before the working group on 
February 25 by U.S. Representative Leonard 
Juffe, ivho is NASA Deputy Associate Ad- 
ministrator for Applications. 

USUN press release 11 dated February 25 

I welcome the opportunity at the beginning 
of this session to address a few of the bi'oader 
issues which have been raised in connection 
with the working group's study of remote 
sensing. My delegation has attempted to 
share with the members of the task force 
and the working group as much of our own 
experience in this area as possible through 
our discussions in these bodies and through 
opening for visits the facilities we operate 
at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and Goddard 
Space Flight Center near Washington. We 
have appreciated the information so far sup- 
plied by other states, particularly those which 
are operating or planning space or ground 
segment remote sensing facilities, and look 
forward in the future to much greater shar- 
ing of the data and experience derived from 
remote sensing programs other than our own. 

The United States has conducted its earth 
resources and environmental remote sensing 
programs dui'ing the experimental phase in 
keeping with the policy of openness and 
benefit sharing which we have followed since 
the beginning of our space program. We in- 
corporated this approach in our National 
SiKK'c Act of 1958 and consider it fully con- 
sistent with the mandate of the Outer Space 
Treaty of 1967, which states that the explo- 
ration and use of outer space shall be carried 
out for the benefit and in the interest of all 

In our answer to the Secretariat's question- 
naire,' my government stated — and I wish to 
reiterate now— the view of the United States 
that the Outer Space Treaty clearly applies 
to activities such as those we and others have 
undertaken in the remote sensing area. 

The contrary suggestion has been heard 
that remote sensing of the earth's environ- 
ment and natural resources constitutes a 
space activity fundamentally diff'erent from 
any of those envisaged by the Outer Space 
Treaty because it is characterized as "earth- 
looking" rather than "outward-looking." We 
find no basis for such a distinction in the 
negotiating history of that treaty, and inso- 
far as there is any evidence of the drafters' 
intentions it leans quite in the other direction. 

Years before the negotiation of the Outer 
Space Treaty, the United States was engaged 
in well-publicized studies of the earth's 
weather from space, using a variety of me- 
teorological satellites which, by definition, 
were oriented toward the earth. In addition, 
numerous photographs of the earth and its 
resources were taken by the early U.S. 
manned space flights in the Mercury and 
Gemini programs, and planning for continu- 
ation of those activities in the Apollo pro- 
gram was well known at the time the treaty 
was agreed. Despite the self-evident earth- 
oriented aspects of these and our earth appli- 
cations satellite programs, no efl!'ort was 
made in the United Nations, and we find 
nothing in the treaty, to distinguish this kind 
of space activity from any other; Indeed, 
article I provides that outer space shall be 
free for exploration and use by all states 
without discrimination of any kind and urges 
that states facilitate and encourage interna- 
tional cooperation in such activities. 

The open data distribution policy followed 
by the United States, which even during our 
experimental programs would appear to have 

' U.N. doc. A/AC.105/C.l/WG.4/L.6/Add.5. 


Department of State Bulletin 

brought tangible benefits to people in many 
parts of tile world, lias recently been chal- 
lenged by some states for a variety of rea- 
sons. We recognize and appreciate that 
among those reasons is a concern relating to 
preserving the rights of states to maintain 
control over the development and use of 
resources within their respective territories. 
We acknowledge such rights. We assert them 
ourselves over natural resources found with- 
in the United States, and we respect such 
assertions by other nations. 

However, we see no justification for the 
newly suggested theory that a state's perma- 
nent sovereignty over natural resources in- 
cludes control over all information about 
those resources. The expansion of the world's 
knowledge about itself, knowledge about the 
physical and environmental relationships 
within and across national borders, cannot be 
equated with any reduction in the right or 
ability of any state to control the actual ex- 
ploration, extraction, or development of nat- 
ural resources found within its boundaries. 
Knowledge about a resource, regardless how 
reliable, cannot itself give access to that 
resource ; consent of the relevant sovereign . 
is essential for that. 

On the other hand, it should be understood 
that no vital interest of the United States 
itself is at stake in the open distribution to 
other countries of imagery collected by our 
earth resources satellites. If the international 
community in general should oppose these 
open dissemination practices, we would of 
course not wish to impose our data on other 
states. We would, however, deeply regret any 
setback to the principle of open and unim- 
peded exchange of information on an inter- 
national basis. 

It also should be noted that under our do- 
mestic law the U.S. Government would have 
no basis on which to deny remote sensing 
data to U.S. citizens. As a practical matter 
this almost certainly would mean that under 
any arrangement regarding international 
data dissemination, some data released to our 
own citizens would find its way abroad in an 
irregular and uncontrollable manner. The 
inevitable result would be that such data 

would become available to different countries 
on an unequal basis, with some finding means 
of obtaining more than others; in all likeli- 
hood some would obtain none at all. We 
believe it would be more equitable and bene- 
ficial to all users to continue providing equal 
opportunity for access to data to the entire 
international community. 

At this time it is the intention of the U.S. 
Government to continue to make the data it 
acquires fully available. As I have said, we 
believe this is consistent with the Outer Space 
Treaty. Further, it seems clear that a great 
many states are increasingly interested in 
using these data. Today some 40 countries 
and international organizations are partici- 
pating dii-ectly in our programs, and many 
more indirectly through independent pur- 
chase of data for their own satellite earth 
resources survey programs. This has been 
accomplished on the basis of an open data 
policy. The question should be raised whether 
this degree of international participation, 
which may be without precedent in an ad- 
vanced research program, would have been 
possible if a restrictive data policy had been 

What in fact would be the likely impact if 
we were to follow a restrictive policy on co- 
operation in the future? We believe that the 
rate of progress made to date would be seri- 
ously diminished. The consequences would 
fall especially on those states not having their 
own remote sensing systems. It would seem 
particularly harmful rather than beneficial if 
the developing states were cut off from satel- 
lite earth resources and environmental data. 
Such a cutoff could result for several rea- 

First, satellite sensors are not capable of 
distinguishing national boundaries. As far as 
I know no nations except island states are 
clearly demarcated by natural features 
around their entire perimeters. 

Second, as a technical matter we do not 
know how practically to disentangle images 
taken by a remote sensing satellite on the 
basis of political boundaries. If this were to 
become technically possible in the future, it 
would still be likely to pose a totally excessive 

April 8, 1974 


implementation problem, perhaps even to the 
point of making the techniques unusable 
because of prohibitive processing costs. At 
this point we are still learning how to deal 
efficiently with the inflow and processing of 
data. Such processing already constitutes a 
principal practical difficulty in remote sens- 
ing applications. We do not foresee the time 
when compartmentalizing of data processing 
on the basis of national boundaries would be 
either economically reasonable or technically 

Third, the wide scope of the area covered 
by the satellite will, in most instances, un- 
avoidably entail the sensing of at least parts 
of several countries. Technically we cannot 
now or in the foreseeable future limit or 
shape the reception capability so that the 
data derived would conform to political 

Furthermore, and this is particularly im- 
portant, limiting the data availability to con- 
form to national boundaries would destroy 
many of the most useful functions of a satel- 
lite remote sensing system, inasmuch as 
ecological systems, pollution, river valleys, 
soil moisture conditions, rift systems, vege- 
tation and soil patterns, and most other sens- 
ing objectives of satellites such as ERTS-1 
[Earth Resources Technology Satellite] 
must be studied on a regional or global basis 
if they are usefully to be understood. 

I stress this point because the most press- 
ing need for satellite observations now and 
in the future involves the acquisition of large- 
area and global data in order to understand 
and subsequently make it possible to deal 
with problems which are inherently regional 
or global in scope. It is the view of my dele- 
gation that this working group would con- 
tribute to the unnecessary and harmful 
restriction of a very important tool for future 
generations if it were to promote policies that 
would inhibit or impair wide access to re- 
gional and global data. 

Some additional practical considerations 
are worth weighing. In over a year and a half 
of open availability of imagery acquired by 
the U.S. earth resources satellite ERTS-1, all 

states have had the opportunity to share in 
the results and many have benefited signifi- 
cantly. During the same year and a half 
government agencies in about 40 countries 
have sponsored principal investigators in 
their use of ERTS-1 data. They have done 
so on the basis that they are participating in 
a program in which data and the results of 
their analysis are open to all. We do not know 
of a single case where a state has been dis- 
advantaged as a consequence. 

One final technical point is that tape re- 
corders on board satellites designed to study 
the earth's natural environment will be re- 
quired for the foreseeable future. These re- 
corders will serve the function of acquiring 
data over oceanic and other areas, such as 
those where no data-acquiring stations exist 
on the ground, and backing up ground fa- 
cilities from time to time. In the absence of 
a tape recorder it would be primarily the 
developing countries which would be deprived 
of satellite coverage. 

As a consequence of the technical factors 
I have indicated, if the United States were 
to accept a standard of restricting the dis- 
semination of data to that contained within 
specific national boundaries, we and all other 
data-generating states would in practice be 
compelled in most cases to deny the data 
received to other states. Countries without 
their own space systems would be deprived 
of data even about their own territory. Thus, 
what appears to us to be potentially one of 
the most important practical benefits for peo- 
ples all over the world so far derived from 
space activity — a benefit, I might add, of 
particular value to the large number of de- 
veloping countries — would simply be lost. 
The United States for its part would regard 
this as most regrettable. 

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude this state- 
ment with a general observation. Over and 
above its difl'erences regarding specific or- 
ganizational and legal issues, we have seen 
the working group this year and last divided 
over two broad approaches to the further 
development of remote sensing technology. 
One approach is restrictive. It would limit 



Department of State Bulletin 

the international availability of information 
of great prospective value, purportedly to 
protect sovereign rights which we believe are 
fully insured in other ways. The other ap- 
proach is expansive. It would proceed toward 
even broader cooperation in understanding 
and application of a technology which prom- 
ises to benefit not only those directly con- 
cerned with the production and use of the 
data but also millions of people who may now 
be unaware of its very existence. 

The United States continues strongly to 
support the expansive approach. I wish here 
to repeat our willingness, expressed in our 
response to the Secretariat's questionnaire, 
to enter into consideration of possible guide- 
lines or principles designed to facilitate the 
maximum international availability and ef- 
fective utilization of data derived from satel- 
lite remote sensing systems. We hope that 
upon reflection our colleagues will conclude 
that the expansive approach is the one by far 
most likely to produce the general benefits 
from remote sensing we all seek. 


Current Actions 



Amended constitution of the International Rice 
Commission. Approved at the 11th session of the 
FAO conference, Rome, November 23, 1961. En- 
tered into force November 23, 1961. TIAS 5204. 
Acceptance deposited: Upper Volta, November 19, 


Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 

Accessions deposited: Austria, February 7, 1974; 
Chile, January 24, 1974; Ghana, January 2, 
1974; New Zealand, February 12, 1974; Ro- 
mania, February 15, 1974. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 
1970. Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Pakistan, November 29, 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling- of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Panama, March 20, 1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcot- 
ic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Ratifications deposited: Egypt, January 14, 1974; 

Israel, February 1, 1974. 
Accessions deposited: Romania, January 14, 
1974;= Syria, February 1, 1974. 


International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. 
Done at London November 2, 1973.' 
Signature: Federal Republic of Germany (sub- 
ject to ratification), March 4, 1974. 
Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in 
cases of marine pollution by substances other than 
oil. Done at London November 2, 1973.' 
Signature: Federal Republic of Germany (sub- 
ject to ratification), March 4, 1974. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nu- 
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the 
subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and 
Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force 
May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Panama, Maixh 20, 1974. 


International wheat agreement, 1971. Entered into 
force June 18, 1971, with respect to certain pro- 
visions, July 1, 1971, with respect to other provi- 
sions; for the United States July 24, 1971. TIAS 
Accession deposited: Iraq, March 21, 1974. 



Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations for 
execution. Signed at Nicosia May 7 and Washing- 
ton June 8, 1973.' 

Approved and ratified by the President: March 12, 

' Not in force. 

' With reservation and declaration. 

April 8, 1974 



Agreement relating to the extension of the military 
mission agreement of November 27, 1943, as 
amended and extended (57 Stat. 1262; TIAS 1941, 
2946, 3207, 3519, 6594, 6742, 6970, 7069, 7235, 
7596). Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran 
February 7 and March 6, 1974. Entered into force 
March 6, 1974. 

New Zealand 

Agreement for scientific and technological coopera- 
tion. Signed at Wellington February 27, 1974. 
Entered into force February 27, 1974. 


Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy. Signed at Washington March 20, 
1974. Enters into force on the date on which 
each government shall have received from the 
other written notification that it has complied with 
all statutory and constitutional requirements for 
entry into force. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of January 21, 1974 
(TIAS 7784). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon February 28, 1974. Entered into force 
February 28, 1974. 




The Senate on March 1 confirmed the nomination 
of William S. Mailliard to be U.S. Permanent Repre- 
sentative to the Organization of American States, 
with the rank of Ambassador. 

The Senate on March 13 confirmed the following 

John Gunther Dean to be Ambassador to the 
Khmer Republic (Cambodia). 

Robert W. Dean to be Ambassador to Peru. 

Hermann F. Eilts to be Ambassador to the Arab 
Republic of Egypt. 

Leonard Unger to be Ambassador to the Republic 
of China. 

The Senate on March 20 confirmed the following 

Sumner Gerard to be Ambassador to Jamaica. 
L. Douglas Heck to be Ambassador to the Repub- 
lic of Niger. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock num- 
ber from the U.S. Government Printing Office Book- 
store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
arc subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each con- 
tains a map, a list of principal government officials 
and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a read- 
ing list. (A complete set of all Background Notes 
currently in stock — at least 140 — $16.35; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $14.50; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 25(' each. 

Malawi Cat. No. S1.123:M29 

Pub. 7790 4 pp. 

Togo Cat. No. S1.123:T57 

Pub. 8325 4 pp. 

Southern Rhodesia: The Question of Economic Sanc- 
tions. This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy 
series is based on the testimony on October 5, 1973, 
by Willis C. Armstrong, Assistant Secretary of State 
for Economic and Business Affairs, before the House 
Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on International Or- 
ganizations and Movements, and Africa. Pub. 8744. 
African Series 55. 4 pp. 25^ (Cat. No. SI. 116:55). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with the Phil- 
ippines amending the agreement of September 21, 
1967, as amended and extended. TIAS 7719. 2 pp. 
25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:7719). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica 
extending the agreement of September 29, 1967, as 
amended and extended. TIAS 7720. 2 pp. 25(' (Cat. 
No. S9.10:7720). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Colombia 
amending the agreement of June 25, 1971. TIAS M 
7723. 2 pp. 25^ (Cat. No. 89.10:7723). | 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreements with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of May 6, 1970, as amended 
and extended. TIAS 7724. 5 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9. 

Air Transport Service. Agreement with Spain. TIAS 
7725. 34 pp. 40C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7725). 

Protection of Industrial Property. TIAS 7727. 2 pp. 
25<-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7727). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 8, 197 Jt Vol. LXX, No. 1815 

Asia. U.S. Interests and Activities in the In- 
dian Ocean Area (Weiss) 371 

Cambodia. Dean confirmed as Ambassador . 380 


Diplomatic Immunities Extended to P.R.C. 

Liaison Office and Staff (Executive order) . 362 
Unger confirmed as Ambassador 380 


Confirmations (Dean, John Gunther; Dean, 
Robert W; Eilts; Gerard; Heck; Mailliard; 
Unger) 380 

Congressional Documents Relating to For- 
eign Policy 375 

U.S. Interests and Activities in the Indian 
Ocean Area (Weiss) 371 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Dean, John Gunther; Dean, Robert 
W; Eilts; Gerard; Heck; Mailliard; Unger) 380 

Disarmament. Secretary Kissinger's News 

Conference of March 21 353 

Egypt. Eilts confirmed as Ambassador . . . 380 


President Nixon Appears Before Convention 
of National Association of Broadcasters 
(excerpts from transcript of questions and 
answers) 367 

President Nixon Appears Before Executives' 
Club of Chicago (excerpts from transcript 
of questions and answers) 363 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
March 21 353 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

ESRO Granted Immunities as International 
Organization (Executive order) 370 

Jamaica. Gerard confirmed as Ambassador . 380 

Latin America. Mailliard confirmed as U.S. 
Representative to the OAS 380 

Middle East 

President Nixon Appears Before Convention 
of National Association of Broadcasters 
(excerpts from transcript of questions and 
answers) 367 

President Nixon Appears Before Executives' 
Club of Chicago (excerpts from transcript 
of questions and answers) 363 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
March 21 353 

U.S. Interests and Activities in the Indian 

Ocean Area (Weiss) 371 

Military Affairs. U.S. Interests and Activities 
in the Indian Ocean Area (Weiss) . .. . 371 

Niger. Heck confirmed as Ambassador . . . 380 

Peru. Dean confirmed as Ambassador . . . 380 

Presidential Documents 

Diplomatic Immunities Extended to P.R.C. 

Liaison Office and Staff (Executive order) . 362 
ESRO Granted Immunities as International 

Organization (Executive order) .... 370 
President Nixon Appears Before Convention 

of National Association of Broadcasters . 367 
President Nixon Appears Before Executives' 

Club of Chicago 363 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 380 

Space. U.S. Supports Expansive Approach to 

Sharing Remote Sensing Data (Jaffe) . . 376 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 379 


President Nixon Appears Before Convention 
of National Association of Broadcasters 
(excerpts from transcript of questions and 
answers) . 367 

President Nixon Appears Before Executives' 
Club of Chicago (excerpts from transcript 
of questions and answers) 363 

Secretarv Kissinger's News Conference of 
March 21 353 

U.S. Interests and Activities in the Indian 
Ocean Area (Weiss) 371 

United Kingdom. U.S. Interests and Activities 
in the Indian Ocean Area (Weiss) .... 371 

United Nations. U.S. Supports Expansive Ap- 
proach to Sharing Remote Sensing Data 
(Jaflfe) 376 


President Nixon Appears Before Convention 
of National Association of Broadcasters 
(excerpts from transcript of questions and 
answers) 367 

United States Cites Major Violations of Peace 
Accords by North Viet-Nam (note to par- 
ticipants in International Conference on 
Viet-Nam and members of IOCS) .... 361 

Name Index 

Dean, John Gunther 380 

Dean, Robert W 380 

Eilts, Hermann F 380 

Gerard, Sumner 380 

Heck, L. Douglas 380 

Jaflfe, Leonard 376 

Kissinger, Secretarv 353 

Mailliard, William S 380 

Nixon, President 362,363,367,370 

Unger, Leonard 380 

Weiss, Seymour 371 

Check List of Departmenf of State 
Press Releases: March 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to March 18 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
100 of March 15. 

No. Date Subject 

*102 3/18 Easum sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*103 3/19 Manhard sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Mauritius (biographic 
104 3/21 Kissinger: news conference. 

*105 3/21 Camplaell sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to El Salvador (biograph- 
ic data). 

*106 3/22 Rawls sworn in as Ambassador 
to Togo (biographic data). 

*107 3/22 Dean sworn in as Ambassador 
to Peru (biographic data). 

* Not printed. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 2o402 



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of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 






Volume LXX 

No. 1816 

April 15, 1974 

Statement by Under Secretary Sisco 381 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Ingersoll 393 

Statement by John Norton Moore 397 


For index tee intide back cover 



Vol. LXX, No. 1816 
April 15, 1974 

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approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Nott: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may b€ 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodica) Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETI] 
a loeekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart' 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases ct 
international affairs and ttie functions 
of the Department. Information II 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which ilte 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
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Publications of the Department of 
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legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listedt 

The U.S. Contribution to a Peaceful World Structure 

Statement by Joseph J. Sisco 
Under Secretary for Political Affairs 

I have been Under Secretary for Political 
Aifairs for only about two weeks. I have 
appeared on a number of occasions before 
this committee — as Assistant Secretary of 
International Organization Affairs and as 
Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern Affairs. 
I am pleased to be here in my new capacity. 

This morning I shall try to present my 
testimony on the basis of a broad overview. 
Three fundamental questions come to mind: 

— First, what kind of world structure can 
we realistically seek to create, and what are 
the major obstacles to its creation? 

— Second, what is the potential and what 
are the limits of America's contribution to a 
new global structure? 

— Third, what is the central foreign policy 
challenge facing the American people? 

We need a vision of the future — of the 
world in which we want to live — to give 
meaning, context, and direction to specific 
policies. We need a better understanding of 
the obstacles to peace and the realities of our 

We cannot determine the future unilater- 
ally. It is beyond the power of any one coun- 
try to create a new international order. 

But two major crises of 1973 — in the Mid- 

' Made on Mar. 11 before Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations hearings on proposed authoriza- 
tions for fiscal year 1975 for the Department of State 
(press release 90). The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

die East and in energy — demonstrated that 
the United States has a unique contribution 
to make to a peaceful world order. We have 
brought Arabs and Israelis from the battle- 
field to the negotiating table. We have 
launched the search for a global solution to 
the global problem of energy. These are facts 
of international life. 

Our interests, our strengths, and our re- 
sources compel an active and responsible 
American role in the world. This does not 
mean there is, or should be, a Washington 
blueprint for every international conflict — 
military or economic. It does mean a policy 
of selective engagement on the critical prob- 
lems of our time. 

Through most of my quarter century in 
the State Department, we have faced a rela- 
tively frozen international landscape. The 
challenge was to ease the cold war with the 
Soviet Union and China and to end hot wars 
in Korea and Viet-Nam. 

While we are no longer directly engaged 
in war and the landscape has begun to thaw, 
it would be a mistake for any of us to take 
for granted a future of peace. Each of the 
achievements of recent years is only partial — 
foreign policy is a process, not a final prod- 
uct. The danger of nuclear weapons is still 
self-evident. While our relations with Moscow 
and Peking are improved, they are still com- 
petitive. Peace in the Middle East and Indo- 
china is not yet secure. 

Therefore the central challenge before 
Americans today is not any particular issue 
but our willingness to persevere, to pursue a 

April 15, 1974 


consistent framework of policies over a sus- 
tained period of time. We falter or tire only 
at the risk of great peril to all of us. 

Let me devote the remainder of my re- 
marks to the four areas in which our willing- 
ness to pursue steady purposes can have the 
greatest impact on our future. 

Ties With Our Allies 

We are convinced that at the very heart of 
a stable world must be the community of na- 
tions sharing common goals, common ideals, 
and a common perspective of how to deal 
with the problems and threats confronting 
us. New relationships with countries with 
different systems and outlooks are only pos- 
sible if old relationships with allies remain 

Our alliances with Japan and Western 
Europe were attained as a result of a world 
war and have served successfully to deter 
major threats to global peace for more than 
a quarter century. Today we must not permit 
an improved climate in international rela- 
tions to weaken our strong ties with our 

The problem before us is whether the na- 
tions of the Atlantic area and Japan, faced 
with self-evident problems that affect them 
all, can develop a common approach or 
whether this relationship is dominated by 
nationalistic rivalries. 

The United States has made clear its 
choice. In speeches last April and December, 
Secretary Kissinger made a number of spe- 
cific proposals to revitalize our alliances. He 

— We have intensified all levels of consulta- 
tion with our allies, but consultation must be 
a two-way street. 

— We wish to make steady progress toward 
the issuance of joint declarations to define 
the future of our relationships. 

— We encourage the development of West- 
ern European unity, but not at the expense 
of the Atlantic unity that is essential to Euro- 
pean security and to the resolution of a grow- 
ing list of global issues. 

There can be no higher priority than to 

encourage Japan and Western Europe to join 
us in giving fresh creativity to our alliances, 
based on our common objectives. 

New Relationships 

Our debate about the future has centered 
principally on the kind of relationship we 
should seek with the Soviet Union and China. 
Today, I believe, we are freer of certain of the 
illusions of the past, and there is hope in the 
future. Relations once characterized simply 
by degrees of hostility are now defined by a 
complex mixture of competition and coopera- 

These relationships have been described as 
detente. We do not say that detente is based 
on the compatibility of domestic systems. We 
recognize, and we must remain fully aware, 
that some of the values and the ideology of 
both the Soviet Union and the People's Re- 
public of China are opposed and sometimes 
hostile to ours. 

In our relations with the Soviet Union, 
detente is rooted in the recognition that 
potential adversaries can bring damage to 
each other, mutual destruction in the case of 
the United States and U.S.S.R., and have a 
common interest and responsibility in struc- 
turing their relationships so as to prevent 
this risk — put another way, that the threat of 
nuclear war is not a rational policy. 

In this context, we have made a concerted 
effort to agree upon rules of conduct that will 
encourage mutual restraint. We have agreed 
on basic principles designed to minimize the 
use of conflict and to prevent nuclear war. 
We have established communications between 
the top leaders that make it possible in time 
of crisis to avoid the danger of accident or 
miscalculation. We have sought through an 
organic network of agreements to develop a 
framework for mutual interests that will give 
durability to an improvement in Soviet- 
American relations. It is within this context 
that we place such emphasis on normaliza- 
tion of the Soviet-American economic rela- 
tionship, which you will shortly be consider- 

If there is no rational alternative to the 


Department of State Bulletin 


pursuit of detente, what is the current state 
of detente? In 1973 our relationship with the 
Soviet Union was sorely tested by a war in 
the Middle East which neither of us sought. 
This tense period demonstrated once again 
that we cannot take our relationship for 
granted, that we must work to institution- 
alize the relationship we have forged. 

The realism of Soviet-Amei-ican relations 
in 1974 is demonstrated by the fact that we 
are engaged with one another in an unprece- 
dented range of negotiations which address 
the hard political and security issues con- 
fronting us and seek to build greater sta- 
bility. These include: 

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). 
Our objectives, to paraphrase the President, 
are to control military technology and mod- 
erate the process of strategic arms growth 
so that our political relationship with the 
U.S.S.R. — indeed, the basic issues of war and 
peace — will not be dominated by the compe- 
tition in this area. We seek an agreement 
that will enhance strategic stability and pre- 
serve essential equilibrium of the strategic 
forces of the two sides. 

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions 
(MBFR). Here we and our allies hope by 
patient negotiating effort to probe Soviet 
willingness to address the real issues of mili- 
tary security in Europe and negotiate an 
agreement that will maintain the security of 
both East and West at lower levels of con- 
frontation and cost. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE). Broadly stated, the Western 
objectives in this conference are to reach 
agreement on principles to guide interstate 
relations, enhance confidence in military in- 
tentions through such measures as advance 
notification of maneuvers, improve economic 
and other cooperation, and open the way to 
broader contacts among the people of the 35 
participating states. 

Obviously, all of these negotiating initia- 
tives touch on very impoi-tant political and 
military interests of the United States and its 
allies. It is for this reason that we work in 
concert with them in MBFR and CSCE, and 

consult closely on SALT. 

Our new relationship with the People's 
Republic of China is also contributing to a 
more hopeful environment for peace, particu- 
larly in Asia. In 1973 we strengthened our 
dialogue by establishing Liaison Offices in 
each other's capitals, by Secretary Kissin- 
ger's two visits to Peking, and by a substan- 
tial expansion of economic and other ex- 
changes. In 1974 we will strive to deepen our 
dialogue, to give durable form and content to 
our relationship. We have indeed come a 
long way since our first efforts in 1969 and 
since the President's trip to Peking in 1972. 
But we have a long way still to go. 

To build a more peaceful world, America 
requires the confidence of our allies and the 
respect of those with different social systems. 
A strong defense is an essential element as a 
means of accomplishing both. We will not 
allow the United States to be second to any 
nation in its conventional and nuclear forces. 
It is a fact that the Soviet Union is making 
a major military effort — improving its capa- 
bility in Europe, expanding its seapower, 
and pursuing major new strategic nuclear 
programs still permitted under the interim 

The task of maintaining an appropriate 
level of military strength is a complex one 
affected by the dynamics of technological 
progress, political power, and pressing do- 
mestic priorities. For a quarter century the 
Congress and five separate administrations 
have met this task together and provided 
America with an adequate defense. It is es- 
sential that cooperation continue to this end. 

The Middle East 

The recent Middle East and energy crises 
have clearly demonstrated that our efforts to 
achieve common international objectives are 
more than intellectual exercises. Our labor in 
this critical area demonstrates our willing- 
ness to persevere, to take bold diplomatic 
moves in the knowledge that the seeds of war 
remain and that there can be no lasting struc- 
ture of global peace without a durable peace 
in the Middle East. 

April 15, 1974 


The fourth war in a quarter century be- 
tween Arabs and Israelis has changed the 
objective conditions in the area. It has also 
changed the perception of each side toward 
the other. From four recent trips to the area, 
I have the impression that people there are 
weary and desirous of raising their sights. 

In these circumstances, there is hope in the 
step-by-step approach we have adopted. Both 
sides want the United States to play a con- 
structive role. Both Egypt and Israel have 
gained from the disengagement-of-forces 
agreement achieved this past January. This 
first step toward a final settlement has been 
implemented with impeccable good faith by 
both sides. The separation of forces has re- 
duced the likelihood of renewal of hostilities 
on this front. And above all, the Egyptian- 
Israeli disengagemient agreement could be- 
come, in time, the kind of practical test of 
peace on the ground which can build confi- 
dence between adversaries and help break the 
shackles of past suspicions. 

The task at hand now is to seek to achieve 
something similar on the Syrian-Israeli 
front. The Israeli Government is sending a 
high-level representative to Washington 
within two weeks, and Syria has agreed to do 
the same in the near future. This is no more 
than a beginning, but a significant beginning, 
in a slow and agonizing effort to reconcile 
objectives that in many respects seem con- 
tradictory. But for the first time in my years 
of work on this problem, it is possible to 
begin to perceive how the process toward 
peace can be carried forward. 

Emerging Issues 

Throughout history, the clash of economic 
interests has been an important cause of war 
and a major obstacle to peace. But following 
the Second World War we erected a monetary 
and trading system which channeled the pur- 
suit of economic gain into peaceful competi- 
tion. Now a whole set of emerging problems 
— energy and raw material shortages, food 
and population imbalance, rampant global 
inflation — threatens to overwhelm the system 
and return the world to the sort of economic 

conflict which traditionally has led to war. 
Just as we have begun to understand that 
the dangers of the arms race impose coopera- 
tion upon us, new races have begun: for the 
earth's limited resources, for the oceans, for 
technology, for capital. And just as we are 
striving to avert nuclear catastrophe, we 
must now work to deter new economic chaos. 
To overcome these potential obstacles to 
peace, we must assure that all nations — rich 
and poor, resource producing and consuming 
— have a stake in an expanding global econ- 
omy. Only then will all have a vested interest 
in the stability of the international order. 

As Secretary Kissinger made clear before 
the members of the Senate Committee on Fi- 
nance last week, we attach great importance 
to the foreign policy aspects of the trade bill 
which is presently being considered by Con- 
gress. There is no doubt in our mind that the 
international political situation will be deeply [ 
aff'ected by the way in which we carry out our ; 
trade and economic relations. It is in the U.S. 1 
national interest that we have the necessary 
flexibility to negotiate agreements that can 
be mutually beneficial and by so doing avoid 
returning to the days of unbridled competi- 
tion and hostility. 

A prosperous multilateral trading rela- 
tionship is one of the bases of the political 
approach that we have adopted in our 
relationship with the advanced industrialized 
nations of the West since World War II. A 
breakdown in this system would be contrary j 
to our interests. 

The recent energy crisis has demonstrated 
the risks inherent in nations trying to resolve 
their problems unilaterally. The recent Wash- 
ington Energy Conference was an initial step 
toward recognition of the necessity to deal 
with multilateral problems on a multilateral 

On the question of trade, our approach has 
been that all the major trading nations must 
act in concert and in the common interest. 
We have recognized the necessity of expand- 
ing the flow of trade between the industrial- 
ized and developing countries of the world. 
One way we seek to do this is by the exten- 


Department of State BulletinI 

sion of a system of generalized tariff prefer- 
ences to developing countries. 
In short, we seek: 

— To reduce trade barriers among the in- 
dustrialized countries and to help meet the 
demands of developing countries by the ex- 
pansion of their exports so that they can 
proceed with the tasks of economic and social 

— To normalize trade relations between 
the United States and the Soviet Union and 
the countries of Eastern Europe; and 

— To enhance global economic relation- 
ships on a multilateral basis, for the benefit 
of the world's peoples. 

And we are encouraged by the results of 
our meetings with the Latin American For- 
eign Ministers in Mexico to believe that the 
developing nations can participate more fully 
in the benefits of this kind of international 
order. We have initiated a new dialogue — 
brought a new spirit to our relationship — so 
that this hemisphere can make a decisive con- 
tribution to an interdependent world. We 
are developing an agenda of cooperation in 
such areas as science and technology, con- 
sultation on multilateral trade and monetary 
issues, the role of transnational corporations, 
the problems of development. 

And, of course, it is important that the 
United States do its share. We are deeply 
concerned that a congressional decision 
against IDA [International Development 
Association] replenishment would signal to 
the world that America has lost interest. The 
consequences would be serious not only for 
the survival of the poor but for the possi- 
bility of a cooperative world order. 

I began by noting that in both major crises 
of 1973 the United States made unique and 
substantial contributions — bringing the par- 
ties from the battlefield to the negotiating 
table in the Middle East and taking the first 
step toward international cooperation in 
energy. These achievements confirm both the 
necessity and the rewards of an outward- 
looking, internationalist America. The world 
continues to look to us for leadership. 

We have established a solid foundation on 

which to build a structure of peace. But the 
task we have set ourselves cannot be com- 
pleted in one administration or in one decade. 
It will require sustained and cooperative par- 
ticipation by the Congress and the executive 
branch, bulwarked and supported by the 
American people. I believe this can be 

Let me conclude with a brief mention of 
the resources required for an American for- 
eign policy which protects our interests and 
helps sustain our efforts toward peace. As you 
know, the Department of State has the small- 
est total budgetary requirements of any 
Cabinet-level department. For the next fiscal 
year we are requesting authorization for ap- 
propriations of $792.5 million — an increase 
of $1 10.7 million. Three-quarters of this sum 
is required to meet statutory or mandatory 
increases such as our assessed contributions 
to international organizations, contribution 
to the Foreign Service retirement fund, stat- 
utory salary increases, and overseas operat- 
ing expenses. Other significant increases ai'e 
requested for the international salinity 
project on the Colorado River and for the 
educational exchange program. Mr. Chair- 
man, as requested, I have a prepared state- 
ment for the Department's fiscal year 1974 
amendments which I am pleased to submit 
for the record. 

U.S. To Assist in Sweeping Mines 
From Suez Canal Waters 

Department Announcement ' 

At the request of the Egyptian Govern- 
ment, the U.S. Government has agreed to 
assist in sweeping mines in the waters of 
the Suez Canal. The U.S. Government has 
also agreed to provide technical advice and 
training to Egyptian personnel responsible 
for clearing unexploded ordnance in the canal 
and on its banks. 

' Issued to the press on Mar. 18. 

April 15, 1974 


The Fundamental Transition 
in U.S. Foreign Policy 

Address by Carol C. Laise 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs ' 

I know that you have spent the last sev- 
eral days considering some of the changes 
which are occurring in our American soci- 
ety and some of their implications for the fu- 
ture. Both personally and in my capacity as 
an officer of the State Department, I welcome 
the opportunity I have been given here today 
to discuss with this accomplished and cosmo- 
politan group what is surely one of the most 
significant and perhaps also one of the most 
difficult areas of change with which our so- 
ciety is grappling today; that is, the changes 
in the world environment in which we live 
and the changes in the foreign policy which 
we are working to develop and apply to guide 
our relations with the rest of the world com- 

I don't think we need spend much time 
defining the essential changes on the world 
scene since World War II which have led not 
only this government but governments the 
world over to reassess familiar and intellec- 
tually comfortable foreign policies in recent 
years and to ask whether they are not in- 
creasingly inadequate to the needs of their 

On a long list of striking phenomena, one 
has only to cite such items, among others, as 
the resurgence of a war-devastated Europe 
and Japan, the Soviet achievement of a stra- 
tegic balance with the United States, the 
emergence of the new nations, and the in- 
creasing assertion of political and economic 
vitality and personality in the developing 
world; and perhaps more significant in the 
long run than any of these, the awakening 
recognition around the globe — ignited in part 
by new and serious problems such as the ac- 
tual or potential shortages of food, fuel, and 
other essential resources — of the rapidly in- 

^ Made before the Washington Conference for 
Senior Fulbright-Hays Scholars From Abroad on 
Mar. 20. 

creasing extent to which all parts of the 
world, north and south, east and west, rich 
and poor alike, are becoming mutually de- 
pendent. These and other changes meant the 
ending of the bipolar era of cold war which 
followed World War II; and the continuing 
nuclear confrontation between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R., the isolation of Chi- 
na, the long war in Southeast Asia, and the 
intermittent war in the Middle East, plus a 
discouraging list of lesser conflicts of all 
kinds around the world, underlined the limi- 
tations of the United Nations and the inade- 
quacy of the system of international rela- 
tionships which had marked that unstable 

Against this background, the present ad- 
ministration in the United States came into 
office five years ago determined to set in mo- 
tion a fundamental transition in U.S. for- 
eign policy. Our goal was a transformation 
of the American role in the world and, more 
broadly, what Secretary Kissinger has re- 
peatedly called the design of a new "struc- 
ture of peace" — an international system 
which could endure and sustain the peace for 
a generation or as far ahead as anyone can 

By "structure" of peace, we mean not an 
organization or institution nor even an align- 
ment, but a process and a new character of 
international relationships. The process is 
one, first, of recognition — recognition that 
other countries as well as one's own have 
genuine and deep-rooted national interests 
and that these interests will at times and in 
varying degrees conflict with one's own coun- 
try's. Second, it means dialogue — a willing- 
ness to communicate about those conflicts 
with the other parties and to seek an ac- 
commodation, in a spirit of compromise, 
which will do justice to each party without 
challenge to the fundamental interests of any. 

It is this which we have sought in our open- 
ing to the People's Republic of China, in our 
eff'orts to negotiate on a wide range of serious 
issues with the Soviet Union, and in our ef- 
forts to reinvigorate our relations with allies, 
to start a new dialogue with our Latin Amer- 
ican neighbors, and to come to a reconcilia- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tion with Panama on the questions concern- 
ing the canal which is of such importance to 
us both. 

It is in this same spirit that we have sought 
to encourage dialogue and a recognition and 
accommodation of interests in the Middle 
East, not only with respect to the deep dif- 
ferences between the Arab world and Israel 
but also with respect to the relationships be- 
tween all the interested parties affected in 
one way or another by the scarcity and high 
cost of petroleum. It is this process which 
President Nixon had in mind when he urged 
that we substitute an era of negotiation for 
an era of confrontation. 

Such a structure or process can succeed 
only if it is based on a sense of justice and 
on the broadest possible participation of all 
the members of the world community; for 
only when nations have a stake in the sys- 
tem — when they feel their interests are 
served by it and their principles respected — 
will they work to maintain it. One nation 
which pursues its own national interest in 
disregard of the interests of others threatens 
them all. 

In this context, the need for change in the 
character of the U.S. role in the world is evi- 
dent. We need to lower our own profile 
abroad — not because we believe it can sub- 
stantially reduce our burdens in the years 
just ahead, but because it is indispensable to 
our hopes for peace and progress in the 
world that other countries share fully in 
bringing about the new international rela- 
tionships and feel an equal commitment to 
their continuation and success. This is the 
essential meaning of the Nixon doctrine of 
shared responsibility. It does not mean an 
American withdrawal from the world in any 
sense. Our impact on the world, whether by 
action or inaction, is simply too enormous, 
our concern for peace too deep, to forfeit the 
contribution to stability which we can make 
and have tried to make for 25 years. But a 
peace that rests too heavily on the exertions 
of one nation cannot last. In the 1970's, the 
United States must move from a paternal 
mission for others to a cooperative mission 
with others. 

Nothing in the new role which we envisage 
for America, nor in the changing character 
of relationships which we would like to see 
for all, implies any weakening of our par- 
ticipation in our traditional alliances. These 
ties remain major pillars of our foreign pol- 
icy, but we are working to make of each al- 
liance a more equal partnership in planning 
and in decisionmaking as well as in sharing 
of costs. Nor is there any threat to the world 
community in these alliances, nor any incon- 
sistency between their continuation and the 
ending of the old cold war era which I have 

At the heart of our dialogue with our po- 
tential adversaries is our deep desire to con- 
trol and eventually to end the nuclear arms 
race and to reduce and someday to end the 
confrontation of massive armed forces across 
frontiers. But the preservation of peace re- 
quires a certain balance of power, and any 
significant change in that balance around the 
globe or in a particular region contributes to 
instability and not to peace. While we and 
our allies do not require or seek supremacy 
— for total security for one party is inevita- 
bly a threat to another — we cannot, for the 
same reason, permit others to achieve it. A 
quarter century of peace and the progress of 
detente to date are based on the adequacy of 
our defenses, and we can expect no greater 
progress toward a better world community 
if we disarm unilaterally or fall behind. 

I know that the design for world peace I 
am suggesting here will seem to you — as it 
does to my own countrymen — imprecise and 
ambiguous. So it is. We are offering commu- 
nication instead of isolation, negotiation in- 
stead of declaration, accommodation instead 
of confrontation; in a word, we seek a mov- 
ing evolutionary process — not a new, but 
once again rigidly fixed, pattern of align- 

This will indeed require new levels of 
understanding on the part of the American 
people and of other peoples who seek similar 
change. It will require a new tolerance of 
ambiguity in place of slogans and outdated 
formulas. In this country, for one, developing 
that public understanding and support will 

April 15, 1974 


be one of the most difficult aspects of the 
change; and the task will far outlast this 
administration. But we have made a start on 
the job; and we are convinced that nothing 
less than our best efforts to carry it forward 
will meet the need not only of this nation but 
of all nations which wish to achieve a more 
peaceful and progressive international com- 
munity in our lifetime and that of our chil- 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space 
and Medicine Hailed by President 

Remarks by President Nixon (Excerpts)^ 

I would like to now add a word with regard 
to the joint expedition that will take place, 
I understand, in July of 1975 with the Soviet 
cosmonauts, and just to indicate that I know 
a little Russian — I understand that they are 
here — I will say, "ochen' priyatno poznako- 
mit'sya," which means "very happy to meet 
all of you." 

But referring to the cosmonauts, and the 
Americans, allows me to say something in 
the whole area of foreign policy which I think 
we in America need to understand, and that 
is why these joint projects with the Soviet 
Union are so important to America, to the 
Soviet Union, and to the whole cause of peace 
and progress in the world. 

Our systems of government are very dif- 
ferent. Mr. Brezhnev and I have had some 
very interesting debates about the value of 
their system and the values of ours. But as 
far as our great objectives are concerned, in 
many areas they are the same. The Russian 
people want peace, and we want peace. The 
Russian people want progress, and we want 
progress. The Russian people want to coop- 

' Made at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in 
Houston, Tex., Mar. 20; for the complete text, see 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 
dated Mar. 25. 

erate with the United States, and we want to 
cooperate with the Russian people and with 
all people on the earth in anything that will 
advance the cause of science, the cause of 
health, the cause of a better life for all of 
our children, as well, of course, as the cause 
of peace. 

I do not mean that simply because we are 
going to have this joint project with the So- 
viet Union in the field of space that the differ- 
ences between our two systems will change, 
or that the differences that we have in vari- 
ous parts of the world where our interests 
will evaporate. Mr. Brezhnev as a realist 
knows that, and I as a realist know that as 

But I do know that the Russian people are 
a great people, the American people are a 
great people, and we can be so much together, 
and when we can work together, let's work 
together. That is what this program is about. 

And now, finally, a word with regard to 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. I am not 
going to get into some of the political prob- 
lems and the other problems that are so 
difficult to solve that will be discussed again 
at the third summit, but cooperation with the 
Soviet Union in the field of space and in other 
areas that have received perhaps too little 

Did you know that we have a new program, 
which we developed at the first summit in 
Moscow in 1972, for cooperation between 
American doctors and people from the medi- 
cal profession in America with Soviet doctors 
and people from that profession in the Soviet 
Union? Think what that might mean. 

I know all of you have heard of the new 
program that I announced two years ago for 
$100 million that we are going to spend in 
order to find, if we can, an answer to the 
problem of cancer, and maybe, the doctors 
tell me, it is many answers — not like polio 
where one vaccine is the answer, but many 

The other day, perliaps three weeks ago, 
a month ago, I called a little eight-year-old 


Department of State Bulletin 

boy in Florida. His father had asked me to 
call. He had leukemia. They knew he wasn't 
going to live. I think he knew it, although 
they had not told him. And I remember that 
call, his voice, his spirit. We talked about the 
Dolphins. He guessed the score better than 
I did. 

Today that boy is dead. And thousands of 
other-s — here, in the Soviet Union, in Europe, 
Africa, Asia, Latin America — will die of can- 
cer and other diseases because we haven't 
found those answers. 

Now, where is the answer? It may be in 
America. We have, I believe, the best medical 
profession in the world. But it might be in 
the Soviet Union, or it might be, for exam- 
ple, in Africa, or Asia, or Latin America. 
But wherever it is, that spark of genius that 
could find an answer, or one of the answers, 
to any one of the diseases that devastate 
mankind, we must go forward together to 
see that we allow it to develop. 

And we also know this : I was not a Boy 
Scout, and I see one here, but I remember 
they used to tell me about the Scouts, that 
they had learned to rub sticks together, and 
when they rub them together they can create 
a spark. And so it might be that Soviet doc- 
tors working together with American doc- 
tors, rubbing together, may find that spark 
that each working separately might not ever 

And so I say to you, there are differences 
in the world in which we live. Thank God we 
are at peace for the first time in 12 years; 
all of our prisoners of war ai'e at home. We 
are negotiating with the Soviets, with the 
People's Republic of China — two systems 
with which we have broad ideological differ- 
ences. But wherever we can work together 
— whether it be exploration of space or in 
cleaning up the environment or in finding the 
answer to those diseases that plague man- 
kind — let us have the statesmanship to see 
that we work together rather than separate- 
ly, because all of mankind will benefit, not 
just America, and that is what we want. 

United States Security Relations 
With Turkey 

Following is an interview ivith Under 
Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. 
Sisco by Mehmet Ali Birand, correspondent 
for the Turkish neivspaper Milliyet, ivhich 
was published in Istanbul on March 8. The 
questions were submitted to Mr. Sisco, then 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs, in February for written 

Q. U.S. authorities are said to have com- 
plained about Turkey's stand in the Middle 
East war last October. The reasons alleged to 
have been given ivere the Soviet airlift over 
Turkish territory and that Turkey wo^dd not 
allow the use of Incirlik Base for the Amer- 
ican airlift. What is your opinion on this 
matter? Do you think that Turkey, as a 
"loyal ally," was justified in its position? 

Mr. Sisco: The United States recognizes 
that the Arab-Israeli issue poses problems 
for Turkey, which has tried to maintain a 
balanced approach to the Arabs and Israelis 
and has supported international efforts at 
finding a peaceful solution to the longstand- 
ing antagonisms in the Middle East. 

It is a fact that even warm friends and 
close allies like Turkey and the United States 
do not always perceive the details and impli- 
cations of a rapidly developing third-party 
crisis in exactly the same way. The United 
States believed last October that the massive 
Soviet infusion of military equipment into 
the Middle East was not conducive to an 
early end to hostilities, and we made our 
position known to the Soviets, our allies, and 
all interested governments. Since the United 
States accepted, even though it did not fully 
agree with, the position in which Turkey felt 
it was placed by the conflict and because, 
fortunately, other routes were available, the 
United States did not request the Turkish 
Government to permit use of the Common 
Defense Installation at Incirlik in the resup- 
ply of Israel which the United States under- 

April 15, 1974 


took as a result of Soviet shipments to the 
Middle East. 

Q. Has your appreciation of the bases in 
Turkey changed because of the Middle East 
ivar? How would you define Turkey's im- 
portance after the latest developments in the 
Middle East? Have these developments 
changed Turkey's strategic place in U.S. and 
NATO planning? 

Mr. Sisco: Base facilities used by the U.S. 
military in Turkey are Common Defense 
Installations under joint Turkish-U.S. con- 
trol. These installations were established by 
mutual agreement to enable our two countries 
to carry out effectively their common defense 
responsibilities arising under NATO and our 
bilateral defense relationship. Situated as it 
is on the southern flank of NATO and at 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Tur- 
key's continued ability to defend its inde- 
pendence and integrity are as important to 
the stability and peace of the region today 
as ever before. It is the West's strength, 
cohesion, and confidence which have helped 
make possible current moves toward East- 
West detente, and it is that strength which 
will buttress and underpin further such 
efforts. The United States thus regards 
Turkey's prominent role in the common de- 
fense to be as crucial as heretofore. 

Q. Unnamed American authorities were 
said to have affirmed that due to Turkey's 
stand in the Middle East war, the aid given 
to its defense will he reexamined. Is there 
any connection between defense aid and the 
issues of cooperation raised by the events at 
the time of the Mideast war? 

Mr. Sisco: No, there is no connection. U.S. 
military assistance to Turkey has not been 
reexamined in the wake of the Middle East 
war of last October. 

Q. Please give an appraisal of American 
military aid to Turkey from the origins iintil 
today and of what the Turkish military has 
gained from it. 

Mr. Sisco: Turkey and the United States 

have had a close security-defense relationship 
for more than two decades. As I pointed out 
earlier, these ties have served the common 
interest. Not just the military of our two 
countries, but the peoples whom it is their 
responsibility to protect, have benefited from 
this relationship, because it has enhanced 
their overall security. 

One important aspect of this defense link 
has been the substantial financial and ma- 
teriel assistance which the United States has 
provided to Turkey. While Turkey has ex- 
pressed its desire to be self-reliant ultimately 
in the matter of weapons procurement, it was 
understood on both sides that while Turkey 
was building its economy there would be 
many defense hardware needs it would not 
be able to meet from its own resources for 
some time. U.S. assistance to date has taken 
the form of annual financial grants with 
which the Government of Turkey purchases 
military equipment, low-interest loans for the 
same purpose, and excess equipment which 
the U.S. Department of Defense is able to 
make available on a grant basis or by sale at 
a nominal cost. 

To date U.S. military assistance to Turkey 
has totaled about $3 billion. In the late 1960's 
and early 1970's, the financial grant portion 
of U.S. aid, which has constituted the largest 
portion of the total assistance package, was 
running at about $100 million annually. 
Because of U.S. budgetary strictures which 
have reduced this country's worldwide mili- 
tary aid program, and also because the grow- 
ing Turkish economy is now able to sustain 
a larger proportion of Turkey's defense ex- 
penditures, U.S. grant assistance in fiscal 
year 1973 was $69 million, and the figure for 
fiscal year 1974 should be over $60 million. 

These are still substantial amounts and 
indicate the U.S. interest in Turkey's con- 
tinued ability to maintain an adequate de- 
fense posture. Meanwhile, the U.S. Govern- 
ment is making available to the Government 
of Turkey increased amounts of money in 
the form of low-interest loans, largely to 
assist it to fulfill its recent purchase agree- 
ment for 40 F-4 Phantom jet aircraft. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Even though an agreement has been 
signed, the Phantom jets have not been de- 
livered to Turkey. Is there any specific reason 
for the delay? 

Mr. Sisco: There has been no delay. The 
agreement signed in September 1972 calls for 
delivery to begin in the spring of 1974. We 
expect delivery to commence in March or 
April of this year and to continue monthly 

Q. The Tu)-kish Army ivas fully "Ameri- 
canized" i)i the past. Now, due to economic 
factors, it is turning more to Europe for its 
iveapons. Arc there any inconveniences for 
the United States? 

Mr. Sisco: I think the foregoing discussion 
suggests that the Government of Turkey, 
which evidently appreciates the quality, tech- 
nical features, and ready availability of spare 
parts for U.S. equipment, is still procuring 
much of its military hardware from the 
United States. 

Q. Wliat is your policy concerning Amer- 
ican soldiers and their withdrawal from 

Mr. Sisco: As you are aware, in the late 
1960's the United States reduced substantial- 
ly the number of U.S. sei'vicemen in Turkey 
as we found that increasing mechanization 
and, above all, the elimination of unnecessary 
duplication of task and effort made it possi- 
ble for us to reduce our numbers and still 
fulfill the U.S. defense commitment to Tur- 
key we have discussed at length above. 

The United States will continue to live up 
to its responsibilities under the NATO and 
bilateral agreements with Turkey. We gather 
that the Government of Turkey, like the U.S. 
Government, believes that this will continue 
to require the presence of U.S. servicemen 
in Turkey for the foreseeable future. 

Q. Which bases will be given to the Turk- 
ish Army and when? 

Mr. Sisco: As I have already pointed out, 
the facilities used by the U.S. military in 

Turkey are Common Defense Installations 
which are jointly controlled by Turkey and 
the United States. 

Q. The 6th Fleet still keeps its visits to 
Turkey to a minimum. Why? 

Mr. Sisco: Ships from the 6th Fleet regu- 
larly visit Turkish ports with the concur- 
rence of the Turkish Government. Opera- 
tional duties keep fleet units at sea in the 
broad expanse of the Mediterranean much of 
the time, but as elements of the fleet have 
time and opportunity they greatly enjoy the 
hospitality of Turkish ports. 

Q. Why doesn't the United States ivork out 
its relations with the nine EEC [European 
Economic Community] countries within the 
framework of NATO? Do you think it best 
to have a European policy conducted on two 
levels; i.e., ivithin NATO and with the EC? 

Mr. Sisco: NATO is the forum in which 
the United States and its European allies 
coordinate the multilateral aspects of their 
security and political-military relations. 
NATO has only limited economic responsi- 
bilities and no commercial policy role what- 
ever. The EC, on the other hand, is the supra- 
national grouping of nine European countries 
empowered by treaty to form an economic 
community and a common commercial policy 
toward third countries. Hence the United 
States, a major trading partner of most of 
the nine European nations, must necessarily 
carry on with the European Community a 
steady dialogue on matters falling within its 

Q. To what extent do you accept the idea 
of "defense of Europe by the Europeans," 
under the protection of American nuclear 
strength ? 

Mr. Sisco: The United States and its Euro- 
pean allies have agreed for the past 25 years 
on the basic proposition that their defense 
is interdependent and indivisible. There has 
been throughout that period, however, a con- 
stant dialogue on the best, most eflficient mix 
of national contributions to the common task, 

April 15, 1974 


since the world is dynamic and no circum- 
stance or situation ever stays quite the same 
from year to year. 

As the economies of America's European 
allies have grown, they have acquired the 
ability to bear increasing shares of the de- 
fense burden. Current discussions within 
NATO relate to the proper apportionment of 
the overall burden. The basics in the situa- 
tion remain the same, however. U.S. nuclear 
strength will continue to be one of the fore- 
most guarantees of European security as will 
the continued presence in Europe of substan- 
tial numbers of American troops. For their 
part, the European allies argue strongly that 
their security demands a major U.S. military 
presence in Europe. 

Q. What do you think will be NATO's role 
10 years from now? 

Mr. Sisco: NATO has helped keep the 
peace in Europe for a generation. As I 
pointed out earlier, its role is as crucial as 
ever and will remain so for as far into the 
future as anyone can see. To repeat an 
earlier point, even if East-West detente takes 
on new and deeper meaning in the years to 
come, as we all hope it will, this will be 
possible in large part because of the strength, 
cohesion, and resolve of the members of the 
NATO alliance. 

Q. Do you think Turkish-American rela- 
tions should be adapted to changing Atlantic 
relatioyis ? In what way's ? 

Mr. Sisco: There is no precise answer to 
this question. By definition, no worthwhile 
relationship is static but, rather, changes 
with the times. It is hard to predict all the 
specific outward manifestations of Turkish- 
American relations some years hence, since 
we cannot know in detail what the topical 
issues of the day will be or what our common 
interests will require. However, it seems safe 
to predict that the basic framework, the es- 
sential foundation of our relations, will re- 
main the same. 

Experience has demonstrated that there is 
between Turkey and the United States a 
fundamental commonality of interests and 

shared values spanning a wide spectrum. 
This should insure that our countries will 
continue to face the future with common i 
purpose marked by mutually beneficial en- 

United States Pays Assessment 

for U.N. Emergency Force \ 

USUN press release 15 dated March 4 

Ambassador John Scali on March 4 pre- 
sented a check to the United Nations in the 
amount of $8,668,100 for the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle 
East. This payment is for the full amount 
assessed on the United States by the General 
Assembly at its 28th session for the costs 
of UNEF for the initial six-month period. It 
represents 28.9 percent of the total amount 
assessed on all member states of the United 

In addition to its cash payment, the United 
States has provided services to the United 
Nations Emergency Force on a nonreimburs- 
able basis. These services, primarily airlift 
of UNEF troop contingents and equipment, 
have been provided by the U.S. Air Force and 
consisted of the movement of 1,844 Austrian, 
Finnish, Indonesian, Irish, Panamanian, and 
Peruvian troops and 1,382 tons of cargo from 
various points around the world as distant 
as Indonesia and Peru to Cairo and Tel Aviv. 
Involved were 76 missions by the U.S. Air 
Force using C-141, C-5, DC-8, and C-130 
aircraft and a sealift from Europe. 

The United States also has agreed to air- 
lift 600 Kenyan troops and the majority of 
their equipment, which will involve about 12 
more C-141 flights from Nairobi to Cairo. 
At the completion of this movement the total 
nonreimbursable services will have amounted 
to about $4 million. 

As a result of its cash contribution and the 
provision of services, the United States will 
have contributed approximately $12 million 
to the UNEF operation. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Stability and Change in East Asia 

Address by Robert S. Ingersoll 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^ 

Earlier this month, I returned from a six- 
week trip which took me to almost every 
country in East Asia and the Pacific. I am 
sure many of you have recently visited the 
area, and I suspect you would agree that — 
no matter how many times one has been in 
Asia — each new visit is a deeply impressive 
experience. Perhaps the most fascinating as- 
pect of Asia is the paradox it presents: On 
the one hand, its venerable cultural and his- 
torical heritage is everywhere felt and is a 
central element in Asian life, and on the 
other, change — political, economic, and so- 
cial — is the order of the day. I would like to 
focus today on the second half of that para- 
dox — the changes so discernible in Asia to- 
day and what they mean for Asia and for 
the United States. 

In the minds of many, if not most, Ameri- 
cans, Asia is associated with war — for we 
have been involved in three wars there in 
only two generations. We have learned in 
the most costly way that discord and tension 
in Asia inevitably affect the interests of the 
United States and the world as our relations 
with the area have become more numerous 
and complex. We can hope the converse is 
also true — that stability and peace in Asia 
will redound to the benefit not only of Asian 
peoples but of the United States and the 
world. There is evidence of this today — that 
Asian nations, large and small, see their 
interests best served by muting rivalry, set- 
tling differences through peaceful means. 

' Made before the Far East-America Council at 
New York, N.Y., on Mar. 27. 

and cooperating with former adversaries to 
solve common pi'oblems. 

Among the major powers involved in Asia 
— the People's Republic of China, Japan, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States — there 
is increasing recognition that each has legiti- 
mate interests in the area and a responsibil- 
ity commensurate with its strength to see 
that the quadrilateral relationship contrib- 
utes to stability rather than chaos. Despite 
a continuing potential for conflict on the 
Si no-Soviet frontier, the prospect of armed 
violence among the large powers of Asia 
seems more remote than at any time in the 
postwar period. It is our hope, and the aim 
of our policies, that this relatively stable 
equilibrium can be maintained and consoli- 
dated, so that each of the four major powers 
develops a growing stake in restrained and 
peaceful interaction. 

Thus, we have sought to enlarge our new 
relationship with the P.R.C., building on the 
initiatives President Nixon took in 1972. As 
you know, last year Liaison Offices were es- 
tablished in the two capitals, providing a 
facility for regularized contact, and trade 
has increased dramatically. Less tangible, 
but perhaps the most important benefit of 
this new relationship is enhanced mutual un- 
derstanding — for with understanding of 
each other's policies and intentions, the 
danger of miscalculation such as has often 
provoked conflict is much reduced. 

Detente with the Soviet Union represents 
another facet of this hopeful evolution in 
Asia. While we often think of ourselves and 

April 15, 1974 


the Soviet Union as coming into contact pri- 
marily in the West, we meet in the East as 
well, and the benefits of a more complete re- 
lationship with the Soviets will be felt there 
as well as in Europe. 

Japan has undertaken approaches toward 
the two Communist powers similar to our 
own. With the Soviet Union it is pursuing 
a number of potentially large economic de- 
velopment projects in Siberia, and the two 
nations have continued to discuss the conclu- 
sion of a formal peace treaty which would 
mark the resolution of a number of issues 
deriving from the Second World War. Japan 
and China, after establishing full diplomatic 
relations in 1972, have greatly increased 
their trade and their contacts. 

Durability of U.S. -Japan Bonds 

Having recently represented the United 
States in Japan, I take a special interest in 
this element of major-power interrelation- 
ships in East Asia. Clearly, our close ties 
with Japan are fundamental not only to the 
preservation of an equilibrium among the 
four powers, but for stability and economic 
advancement in all of Asia. Throughout the 
Pacific area, statesmen recognize our security 
relationship with the Japanese as an indis- 
pensable pillar of regional stability. 

Similarly, the economic well-being and 
growth of the region depend heavily on con- 
tinued American and Japanese economic 
assistance and investment and access to our 
respective markets. And politically, the 
thinking of regional leaders is premised to a 
considerable degree on the continuation of 
close Tokyo-Washington ties. Thus, I am 
convinced that wise management of our rela- 
tions with Japan will advance U.S. interests 
throughout Asia; conversely, mismanage- 
ment of those relations will cause us difficul- 
ties everywhere in the region. 

Despite a constant tendency in Washing- 
ton to, as a colleague put it, "take the tem- 
perature" of the U.S.-Japan relationship, I 
believe the patient is in vigorous good 
health. There have been periodic "crises" to 
be sure, and I would suggest that the resil- 
ience and durability of our bonds is well 


demonstrated by their survival of such 
events. But this is not to say that the rela- 
tionship can be taken for granted. The U.S. 
Government does not take it for granted, 
and the Japanese know that we do not. 

During the past year, we and the Japanese 
came a long way in developing a more equal 
and mature partnership. We were able, if 
not to solve, at least to ameliorate greatly a 
number of the bilateral issues between us — 
an example being our trade imbalance, re- 
duced from $4.2 billion to $1.3 billion. By so 
doing, it was possible for our two govern- 
ments to focus increasingly on the broader - 
multilateral and world issues — political, eco- 
nomic, and security related — which so vitally 
affect our interests. The growing interde- 
pendence of Japan and the United States dic- 
tates that cooperation and joint action 
toward such issues be continued; we recog- 
nize this and intend to act accordingly, as, 
we are confident, does Japan. 


U.S. Contribution to New Atmosphere 

How does reduced tension among the 
major powers in Asia affect the other na- 
tions of the region? Obviously, great-power 
relationships are not the sole determinant 
of the foreign policies of smaller states. And 
yet, while large nations cannot insure by 
their actions that conflict is removed from 
an area so vast as East Asia, they can con- 
tribute to a political and psychological at- 
mosphere in which confrontation is seen as 
anachronistic and cooperation is more widely 
accepted. I believe we are beginning to see 
the results of this in Asia today. 

Among the nations of Southeast Asia there 
is a growing tendency to seek common solu- 
tions to common problems. Those nations, 
historically divided despite their geographic 
proximity and cultural similarities, now per- 
ceive a need for regional approaches to many 
of the issues confronting them. In response 
to that need, they have established a number 
of regional institutions through which to 
channel their efforts. 

The most impressive example of this new 
regional cohesion is the Association of t 
Southeast Asian Nations, bringing together 

Department of State Bulletin 


Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philip- 
pines, and Indonesia. Begun in 1967 as a 
forum for informal consultation, ASEAN 
has become a central element of the foreign 
policies of the member nations and a mech- 
anism for developing joint positions on 
major political and economic questions. Ex- 
perience has shown that regional cooperation 
cannot develop without self-confidence on the 
part of individual nations, and the progress 
ASEAN has achieved indicates the consider- 
able degree to which its member states are 
confident of their political identities, their 
prospects for economic advancement, and 
their secure independence. 

In my opinion, American policy has con- 
tributed to the more hopeful condition which 
East Asian nations are now able to contem- 
plate — both through our efforts to reduce 
tensions among the major powers and the 
concomitant pressures which those tensions 
place on smaller nations and by the assist- 
ance we have given our friends and allies in 
the region in providing more fully for their 
own defense and their economic well-being. 

This latter element of American policy has 
sometimes been misinterpreted — though 
more often by Americans than by Asians. 
The Nixon doctrine precept of burden shar- 
ing — of our assuming a supportive rather 
than primary role in the defense of Asian 
nations — does not presage a U.S. withdrawal 
from the region. On the contrary, by adopt- 
ing a role more in keeping with our re- 
sources — and hence more broadly acceptable 
to the American people — we place our con- 
tinuing involvement in the region on a more 
viable footing. I found in my recent con- 
versations in the area that most Asian gov- 
ernments now understand this. 

Developments in Korea and Indochina 

I have not spoken of the two areas of Asia 
perhaps most indelibly ingrained in the 
American psyche — Korea and Indochina. 
Some might argue that experience there con- 
tradicts everything I have said before, prov- 
ing that confrontation continues to hold 
sway over accommodation in East Asia, un- 
affected by the winds of detente. But, in these 

areas also, we have recently seen important 

In Korea, the North-South talks continue, 
albeit fitfully. There appears to have been 
little substantive progress to date, and North 
Korea is still given to alarmist and provoc- 
ative pronouncements and, occasionally, ac- 
tions. The problems of security and unifica- 
tion in Korea are complex; they will not yield 
to hasty or facile solutions. Yet the talks 
themselves denote a fundamental change in 
the nature of the North-South relationship, 
and I believe continued efforts by both sides 
to keep open a line of communication can 
gradually dispel the tensions which have 
threatened peace on the peninsula. 

One year ago this week, the last American 
forces were withdrawn from Viet-Nam and 
our prisoners of war were returned. In the 
succeeding 12 months, we have been disap- 
pointed by Hanoi's failure to fulfill its obli- 
gations under the terms of the Paris agree- 
ment. Hanoi has continued to send troops 
into South Viet-Nam, along with massive 
amounts of arms and materiel — far in ex- 
cess of the one-for-one replacement provi- 
sions of the agreement — and the prospect 
there is for continued conflict. 

What then, did the Paris agreement 
achieve? In addition to ending our own com- 
bat involvement and providing for the return 
of our POW's, the agreement established a 
potentially workable framework for a politi- 
cal solution to the conflict. It allowed Amer- 
ican disengagement from Viet-Nam without 
forcing the dismantling of the legitimate 
government of the South — which every pre- 
vious Hanoi negotiating position had called 
for and which would have entailed dishonor 
for the United States. The South Vietnamese 
Government today is vigorous and, we be- 
lieve, viable. The United States will continue 
to provide it needed military and economic 
assistance, as the Paris agreement allows. 
Finally, the Act of the International Confer- 
ence on Viet-Nam obligated other major 
powers directly and indirectly involved in the 
conflict, notably the U.S.S.R. and China, to 
uphold the provisions of the agreement. 

We believe that the Soviets and Chinese 

April 15, 1974 


remain basically committed to the evolution 
of peace in Viet-Nam within the framework 
of the Paris agreement and have urged re- 
straint on the part of Hanoi. It seems clear 
that Hanoi's perception of the importance 
Moscow and Peking- attach to their relations 
with the United States inhibits renewed 
large-scale offensive action, just as it un- 
doubtedly provided an important incentive 
to Hanoi to negotiate in the fall of 1972. 
Thus, our disappointment at the pace of 
progress toward peace in Viet-Nam is tem- 
pered by hope. 

In Cambodia, the Communist insurgents 
have apparently not given up their aim of 
achieving a military victory, even though 
this seems increasingly beyond their reach. 
We expect that at some stage the insurgents 
will recognize the impossibility of military 
victory and conclude that negotiation, there- 
fore, is called for. The Cambodian Govern- 
ment has offered to negotiate, and we of 
course support that initiative. In the mean- 
time, we will continue to provide economic 
and military aid to the government within 
the limits imposed by congressional action. 

Laos presents a more encouraging picture. 
The cease-fire has been effective, and we ex- 
pect a coalition government to be formed 
in the near future. We will support the 
Laotian agreement and the government 
which results from it — under the able lead- 
ership of Prince Souvanna Phouma — and 
we expect the other powers involved in Laos 
to do likewise. With formation of the Provi- 
sional Government of National Union, the 
burden of proof will more than ever be on 
Hanoi to remove its forces from Laos and 
cease its long intervention in the internal 
affairs of that country. 

Economic Expansion and Economic Problems 

Perhaps the most visible evidences of 
change in Asia are the expanding economies 
of most nations of the region. While the 

economic prowess of Japan is known to all 
Americans, many are unaware of the eco- 
nomic accomplishments of other Asian 
states. In terms of growth rates, export 
volumes, and foreign exchange reserves, the 
economies of the region continue to perform 

However, Asian governments face the 
same problems confronting the United 
States and other countries in 1974, inflation 
and the economic dislocation caused by ris- 
ing oil prices. For the less developed nations 
of the region in particular, these problems 
are becoming acute. Thus, for Asia, no less 
than for any other region of the world, it is 
imperative that a solution be devised to the 
monetary and supply dysfunctions we are 
now witnessing. 

It is often said in criticism of our policies 
toward Asia, or toward any area of the 
world for that matter, that the United 
States places a high value on "stability" — 
presumably at the expense of other, more 
desirable, conditions. We do in fact seek 
stability in Asia, but we expect it to be 
characterized by change. Stability in the 
context of foreign affairs does not imply a 
static situation; on the contrary, instability 
is often bred by a failure of nations and in- 
stitutions to adapt to change. 

Thus, in our relations with East Asia, we 
have attempted to develop policies which are 
appropriate to the dynamism and diversity 
of the region and which, in fact, contribute 
to positive change. I would suggest that 
the two basic elements of our policy toward 
the area — to build a network of mutual un- 
derstanding and restraint among the major 
powers and to pursue with smaller nations 
the goal of shared responsibilities for de- 
velopment and defense — meet those criteria. 
Only through the continued application of 
such active and imaginative policies can the 
extraordinary breadth of American political, 
economic, and security interests in East 
Asia be advanced. 



Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Reviewed 

Following is a statement made by John 
Norton Moore, Chairman of the National Se- 
curity Council Interagency Task Force on the 
Laiv of the Sea and Deputy Special Repre- 
sentative of the President for the Law of the 
Sea Conference, before the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Citizenship, and International 
Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary 
on March H.^ 

I welcome the opportunity to meet with 
this subcommittee to review the U.S. position 
in the law of the sea negotiations. These 
negotiations are among the most significant 
in the Nation's history, and it is essential 
that Congress be fully informed. I am accom- 
panied this morning by representatives of the 
Commerce, Defense, Interior, Justice, and 
State Departments. 

For the past three years, the U.N. Com- 
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed 
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of 
National Jurisdiction, popularly known as 
the Seabed Committee, has been engaged in 
preparatory work for a comprehensive Con- 
ference on the Law of the Sea. This Third 
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea began 
with a two-week organizational session at 
U.N. Headquarters in New York December 
3-15 of last year. The conference will resume 
this summer with a 10-week substantive ses- 
sion to be held in Caracas, Venezuela, from 
June 20 to August 29. The U.N. General 
Assembly has indicated that any subsequent 
session or sessions which may be necessary 
should be held no later than 1975. 

The conference will be the largest pleni- 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

potentiary conference ever held, with 150 
nations invited. It will also be one of the most 
important. The choice is whether the inter- 
national community can agree on a compre- 
hensive legal regime for the world's oceans, 
ushering in an era of cooperation and 
development, or whether the oceans will serve 
instead as an increasing source of conflict 
among nations. 

In 1958 and again in 1960, at the First and 
Second U.N. Conferences on the Law of the 
Sea, the nations of the world attempted to 
resolve the problems associated with compet- 
ing uses of the oceans. The four Geneva 
conventions on the law of the sea that 
emerged from the first conference were par- 
tially successful in codifying the international 
law of the sea. These conventions were the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Con- 
tiguous Zone, the Convention on the High 
Seas, the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, and the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the 
High Seas. 

Neither in 1958 nor in 1960, however, were 
nations able to agree on the breadth of the 
territorial sea, the extent of fisheries juris- 
diction, or the outer limits of the coastal 
states' exclusive rights over continental shelf 
resources. These traditional problems were 
soon combined with new problems, such as 
the growing need for protection of the ma- 
rine environment, and with uncertainties 
resulting from advances in technology, such 
as the mining of manganese nodules from the 
deep seabed. 

With these unresolved problems as back- 
ground, in December 1970 the U.N. General 
Assembly scheduled a comprehensive Con- 
ference on the Law of the Sea to commence in 
1973. The U.N. Seabed Committee, which has 

April 15, 1974 


held six sessions since its formation, was 
charged with preparations for a conference 
to deal with a multilateral treaty regime for 
the breadth of the territorial seas, unimpsded 
transit through and over international 
straits, living resources, mineral resources of 
the continental shelf and margins, mineral 
resources of the deep seabed, protection of 
the marine environment, marine scientific re- 
search, and the settlement of disputes. 

Territorial Sea and International Straits 

The first of these categories is the breadth 
of the territorial sea and protection of transit 
through and over international straits. For 
nearly 200 years the United States has ad- 
hered to a territorial sea of three miles and 
has maintained that three miles is the maxi- 
mum breadth recognized under international 

In an attempt to develop worldwide consen- 
sus on the breadth of the territorial sea, the 
United States has proposed that, in the con- 
text of an overall satisfactory settlement, it 
would be willing to accept a 12-mile terri- 
torial sea. Such an extension of the territorial 
sea from 3 to 12 miles, however, would over- 
lap over 100 straits between 6 and 24 miles 
in width which, under a 3-mile territorial 
sea, now include high seas. 

Because of the importance of straits as 
avenues for international navigation, the 
United States has coupled its willingness to 
agree to a 12-mile territorial sea with recog- 
nition of a treaty right of unimpeded transit 
through and over straits used for interna- 
tional navigation. Without clear recognition 
of such a right of unimpeded transit, it might 
be possible to assert that only the right of 
innocent passage would apply even in such 
strategically important straits as Gibraltar. 

The traditional doctrine of innocent pas- 
sage evolved long before the advent of sub- 
marines, supertankers, and aircraft and was 
premised on a narrow territorial sea. Partly 
because of this historical beginning, the 
innocent passage regime does not permit sub- 
merged transit by submarines or overflight 
by aircraft. Moreover, there is an insuffi- 

ciently agreed international understanding of 
what passage is "innocent." As a result there 
is always a danger of subjective interpreta- 
tion of "innocence," which is defined as pas- 
sage that is not prejudicial to the "peace, 
good order or security" of the coastal state. 
Some strait states have asserted, for example, 
that large petroleum tankers or nuclear-pow- 
ered vessels are inherently noninnocent. 

It has never made sense to apply to straits 
used for international navigation a legal doc- 
trine developed to govern passage in the 
territorial sea. Unlike the territorial sea in 
general, international straits serve as access 
and connecting points for large areas of the 
oceans. As such, transit through straits is 
essential to meaningful exercise of the high 
seas rights of all states in these vast areas. 
Functionally, then, straits are quite distinct 
from other territorial sea areas. And because 
of their special prominence, the potential for 
conflict from an uncertain legal regime is 
greatly increased in straits. 

To avoid these and other difficulties, the 
United States has submitted a draft treaty 
article that would provide a right of unim- 
peded navigation through and over interna- 
tional straits. This right is less than that 
presently exercised under existing high seas 
principles and is limited to a right in inter- 
national straits to move through the strait 
in the normal mode for the vessel or aircraft. 

The United States has also made it clear 
that it recognizes the legitimate safety and 
pollution concerns of straits states. Accord- 
ingly, we have proposed that surface ships 
transiting straits observe IMCO [Intergov- 
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organiza- 
tion] traffic separation schemes and that 
state aircraft normally comply with ICAO 
[International Civil Aviation Organization] 
regulations and procedures. We have also 
proposed that strict liability apply for dam- i 
age caused by deviations from such IMCO 
or ICAO regulations. Our objective is to 
find a balance between the reasonable con- 
cerns of strait states and the need of the 
international community for guarantees of 
meaningful high seas usage. 

The U.S. straits proposal is not, of course. 


Department of State Bulletin 

limited to military vessels and aircraft. We 
are equally concerned about unimpeded 
transit for commercial vessels. The energy 
dilemma has brought widespread attention 
to the fact that a nation's well-being may be 
intimately linked to an adequate and secure 
supply of petroleum and other basic im- 
ports. All nations must have reliable inter- 
national legal rights to bring necessary re- 
sources through international straits. 

For these reasons, we have repeatedly 
stated that agreement on a 12-mile territo- 
rial sea must be coupled with agreement on 
unimpeded transit of international straits, 
which together constitute basic elements of 
our national policy. 

Management Jurisdiction Over Fish Stocks 

The second category of issues in the ne- 
gotiations is living resources. Once the vast 
fish stocks of the oceans were thought to be 
inexhaustible. The advent of more efficient 
fishing techniques and a growing demand for 
fisheries products, however, have led to seri- 
ous depletion of some stocks and have dem- 
onstrated that there is a pressing need for a 
rational conservation and allocation system 
for the living resources of the oceans. 

In fact, some estimates indicate that the 
world community is approaching the maxi- 
mum sustainable yield for many traditional 
species of fish within the decade. Against 
this background of increasing fishing pres- 
sure, it is of particular concern that a re- 
gime be established which will solve the 
"common pool" problem in fisheries and 
grant jurisdiction to manage fish stocks 
which is essentially coextensive with the 
range of those stocks. 

To meet these needs the United States has 
proposed broad coastal state control over 
coastal and anadromous stocks coextensive 
with the range of each species and interna- 
tional management of highly migratory spe- 
cies. Under this approach, coastal nations 
would have broad resource-management ju- 
risdiction over coastal stocks throughout 
their migratory range. The coastal nations 
would also have preferential harvesting 

rights to such coastal stocks within the al- 
lowable catch up to their fishing capacity; 
other nations would be entitled to harvest 
the remaining allowable catch. 

Under this approach coastal nations would 
also have management jurisdiction and pref- 
erential rights over anadromous stocks such 
as salmon throughout their range on the 
high seas. Such fish spawn in the fresh 
waters of coastal nations, and those nations 
must bear the expenses necessary to provide 
an environment in which the stock can flour- 
ish. Moreover, the concepts of conservation 
and full utilization are best served for these 
species by harvesting close to the coast as 
the fish return from their high seas journey. 
The coastal nation is clearly in the best po- 
sition to manage, conserve, and harvest these 
anadromous stocks. 

On the other hand, highly migratory spe- 
cies such as tuna cover vast distances 
through the waters off many nations. The 
only practicable way to manage and con- 
serve such highly migratory resources is 
through international or regional arrange- 
ments. Accordingly, our approach provides 
for international or regional management 
for such stocks. No single coastal state 
is in a position to conserve these stocks, and 
coastal state control would neither provide 
conservation protection nor assure coastal 
nations of an economically viable fishery for 
highly migratory species. 

Continental Margin Mineral Resources 

Turning to the mineral resources of the 
continental margins, the Continental Shelf 
Convention allows coastal states exclusive 
rights to explore and exploit these natural 
resources out to the 200-meter isobath, and 
beyond, to where the depth of the superja- 
cent waters admits of exploitation. 

Since World War II, there have been a 
number of technological improvements which 
have allowed offshore production to take 
place in increasingly deeper water. It is 
now clear that seabed resource jurisdiction 
could extend well beyond the 200-meter 
depth, though there is still uncertainty as 

April 15, 1974 


to the outer limit of such jurisdiction. 

To meet these present realities and to 
encourage a moi-e definite legal regime, the 
United States has stated that we are pre- 
pared to accept coastal state resource juris- 
diction in a broad coastal seabed economic 
area. It is also our position that in this 
area the coastal state would have exclusive 
rights over oflfshore installations affecting 
its economic interests. While we have not 
indicated a position on the limits of such an 
area, the area must be subject to appropri- 
ate international standards for: 

1. Protection of other uses of the area, 
particularly protection of navigation and 
other high seas freedoms; 

2. Preservation of the marine environ- 

3. Protection of the integrity of agree- 
ments and investments made in the area; 

4. Provision for compulsory dispute set- 
tlement; and 

5. Provision for revenue sharing for in- 
ternational community purposes. 

One potential danger in these negotiations, 
both with respect to living and nonliving 
resources, is that some coastal states may 
attempt to acquire exclusive rights to off- 
shore areas instead of claiming just the func- 
tional rights necessary for efficient develop- 
ment of the resources of these areas. One 
key to a successful conference will be to 
separate jurisdiction over resources from ju- 
risdiction over navigational freedoms and 
other nonresource uses and to carefully safe- 
guard the nonresource uses. 

History has demonstrated that nations 
making claims to jurisdiction over high seas 
areas for one purpose have a tendency to 
expand those claims to jurisdiction for other 
purposes. For example, the figure of 12 
miles was first used almost entirely in con- 
nection with claims for an exclusive fishing 
zone. Today, approximately half of the 
world's coastal nations claim a 12-mile terri- 
torial sea. Even the extreme 200-mile ter- 
ritorial sea claims seem to have their genesis 
largely in resource concerns. It is important, 
then, that the conference insure that coastal 

state rights adjacent to a 12-mile territorial 
sea are limited to those needed for resource 
development and that the residuum of high 
seas freedoms remains in the international 

Access to Resources of Deep Seabed 

Beyond the world's continental margins, 
a new ocean use is developing. New marine 
technology will shortly permit the commer- 
cial exploitation of manganese nodules from 
the deep ocean floor. The orderly develop- 
ment of this resource, however, is threatened 
by differing perceptions concerning the ap- 
plicable legal regime. We believe that timely 
international agreement on an effective in- 
ternational regime for the development of 
these deep seabed resources is the best way 
to assure the stable investment climate 
needed to encourage development and to in- 
sure adequate protection of the marine en- 

Such an approach could also provide for 
the sharing of revenues from deep seabed 
mining for international community pur- 
poses, particularly assistance to developing 
nations. We are mindful that for this ap- 
proach to be successful the international com- 
munity must conclude a timely agreement 
and one which will genuinely promote effi- 
cient development. In this connection we 
have indicated that we would not view agree- 
ment as timely unless it were reached in 
accordance with the General Assembly sched- 
ule calling for completion of the work of 
the conference in 1974 or 1975 at the latest. 

Similarly, for an international approach 
to be successful, the agreement must genu- 
inely promote efficient development. We be- 
lieve that such development will best be 
served by a legal order which permits access 
to the resources of the deep seabed under 
reasonable conditions that will facilitate in- 
vestment. For that reason, any machinery 
established could not have discretion to deny 
access to those resources or to alter the con- 
ditions upon which security of investment 


Department of State Bulletin 

Protection of the Marine Environment 

A fifth category of principal issues in the 
negotiations is protection of the marine en- 
vironment. The environment was one of 
the largely overlooked subjects at the 1958 
and 1960 conferences. In contrast, today we 
are acutely aware of the need for adequate 
protection of the marine environment. 

The Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment brought worldwide attention 
to the need for multilateral action on this 
subject. And it is widely understood that 
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea must establish an adequate juris- 
dictional basis for protection of the marine 
environment against threats from all sources. 

This very awareness of the need to pro- 
tect the marine environment, however, may 
hold a subtle danger for the law of the sea 
unless we are careful to functionally dis- 
tinguish the differing threats to the marine 
environment. Some coastal states have 
sought jurisdiction for protection of the ma- 
rine environment from all sources in an area 
coextensive with their resource claims. With 
respect to pollution from exploration and 
exploitation of seabed resources, coastal 
states should have this authority subject to 
an obligation to observe at least minimum 
international standards. 

But with respect to vessel-source pollution, 
to recognize coastal state jurisdiction to 
make and enforce pollution-prevention stand- 
ards such as construction standards for ves- 
sels could seriously endanger freedom of 
navigation. There are 119 coastal nations, 
and if each had jurisdiction to set construc- 
tion standards for vessels it could create a 
hodgepodge of conflicting standards. Such 
jurisdiction would also permit decisions on 
standards to be made solely by coastal na- 
tions without the careful balancing of mari- 
time and coastal interests which would re- 
sult from an international solution. 

Moreover, if coastal nations were to have 
jurisdiction capable of afl'ecting navigational 
freedom in an area as broad as 200 miles, a 
majority of all those coastal nations would 
be totally "zone locked" with no access to any 
ocean on which they face without being sub- 

jected to the jurisdiction of their neighbors. 
For these and other reasons we have strongly 
urged that standards for vessel-source pollu- 
tion should only be set internationally 
through IMCO, by flag .states for their own 
vessels, or by port states for vessels using 
their ports. 

Marine Scientific Research 

A sixth principal category of issues in the 
negotiations is marine scientific research. 
Marine research has benefited all mankind 
and will become even more important in the 
years ahead as we seek greater information 
needed for adequate protection and rational 
use of the marine environment. While inter- 
national law generally recognizes freedom of 
research beyond the territorial sea, the exist- 
ing Continental Shelf Convention subjects 
research concerning the continental shelf and 
undertaken there to the consent of the coastal 

The Shelf Convention, though, also creates 
an obligation normally not to withhold con- 
sent if the request is submitted by a qualified 
institution with a view to purely scientific re- 
search into the physical or biological charac- 
teristics of the continental shelf. There is a 
further proviso that the coastal state shall 
have the right, if it so desires, to participate 
or to be represented in the research and that 
in any event the results shall be published. 

Unfortunately, the experience with the 
Shelf Convention regime for scientific re- 
search has not been good. Some states have 
arbitrarily denied consent. Others have im- 
posed burdensome conditions on research or 
simply not replied to the request for permis- 
sion. On the basis of this experience, we feel 
that it is preferable to meet the legitimate 
concerns of coastal nations by creating a 
series of obligations binding on the research- 
ing nations rather than by giving coastal 
nations the right to withhold consent. 

Accordingly, we have proposed that a na- 
tion planning a research voyage in areas 
where the coastal state has resource juris- 
diction should be required to provide the 
concerned coastal nations with reasonable 

April 15, 1974 


advance notification of its intent to engage in 
research off their shores. Researching states 
would certify that the research will be con- 
ducted in accordance with the treaty by a 
qualified institution with a view to purely 
scientific research. 

They would also insure that the coastal 
state had all appropriate opportunities to 
participate or be represented in the research 
project directly or through an appropriate 
international institution, that all data and 
samples were shared with the coastal state, 
that significant research results were suitably 
published, that the coastal state was assisted 
in assessing the data and results, and that 
there was compliance with all applicable 
international environmental standards. 

We believe this approach achieves a better 
balance between the interests of coastal na- 
tions and the international community than a 
consent regime. Similarly, we are convinced 
that this approach is in the common interest 
of all nations in better promoting a free flow 
of scientific knowledge about the earth we 
share in common. 

Dispute Settlement and Entry Into Force 

Finally, it is important that any com- 
prehensive oceans law treaty also establish 
adequate machinery for the settlement of 
disputes. Machinery which would insure 
compulsory third-party settlement of disputes 
arising under the treaty would serve to mini- 
mize conflict as well as contribute to in- 
creased stability of expectations. As such, we 
have proposed the creation of a new oceans 
tribunal which would have broad jurisdiction 
to deal with such disputes. We particularly 
hope that this issue can be addressed early in 
the conference and that all nations will rec- 
ognize their strong interest in adequate dis- 
pute settlement procedures. 

To insure that advancing technology will 
not overtake the ability of the international 
community to achieve cooperative solutions, 

the United States has also proposed that 
portions of the new oceans law treaty, par- 
ticularly those relating to deep seabed mining 
and fisheries, should go into force on a pro- 
visional basis. Provisional application of 
those portions of the treaty would enable a 
timely solution to these problems without 
waiting for the process of international rati- 
fication to bring the new treaty into full 
force. The concept of provisional application 
is well respected in international law and 
would in no way prejudge the negotiation. 

The Third U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea is, in a very real sense, engaged in 
drafting a basic charter for over two-thirds 
of the earth's surface. In drafting that char- 
ter, the challenge is to strengthen shared 
community rights in the oceans, including 
navigational freedoms and marine scientific 
research, while building a more definite and 
rational regime for the use of the resources 
of the oceans, for the protection of the ma- 
rine environment, and for the resolution of 

In meeting that challenge, the best guide 
is a careful functional division of ocean uses. 
The nature of highly migratory species re- 
quires a difl'erent jursidictional regime than 
that appropriate for coastal and anadromous 
species. Similarly, the prevention of pollution 
from seabed exploration and exploitation 
requires a diff'erent regime than that for 
vessel-source pollution. Conceptualistic ap- 
proaches, such as those which seek to resolve 
the problem of international straits by as- 
similating them to national territory, or the 
problems of rational resource management 
by an extension of the territorial sea, have no 
place in a modern law of the sea. 

The United States will go to Caracas pre- 
pared to negotiate a comprehensive oceans 
law treaty. If the conference can keep before 
it the fundamental need to examine each 
issue on its merits, it will be well on the way 
to a new treaty that will serve the common 
interests of all nations. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Administration Urges Appropriations for International Financial Institutions 

Following are statements by John M. Hen- 
)iessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for International Affairs, and Sidney Wein- 
trauh, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Finance and Development, 
made before the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the House Committee on Ap- 
propriations on March 18.^ 


Depaitment of the Treasury press release dated March 18 

I am pleased to testify in favor of the ad- 
ministration's fiscal year 1975 appropriations 
request totaling $1,006,000,000 for the inter- 
national development lending institutions. I 
strongly urge that this committee and the 
Congress act favorably and appropriate the 
amounts which are being requested. 

Following the procedure that we used last 
year, Mr. Chairman, I propose to address 
the broader issues of U.S. participation in 
these development lending institutions. The 
U.S. Executive Directors of the Inter-Amer- 
ican Development Bank, the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, and the International Develop- 
ment Association will accompany me and are 
prepared to answer questions on the details 
of the operations of the banks. I will also be 
glad to answer any questions that you may 
have on the pending request for an appropri- 
ation to fund U.S. membership in the African 
Development Fund. In addition, I would pro- 
pose that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
Sidney Weintraub make a statement on the 
foreign policy implications of our participa- 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

tion in these institutions and answer any 
questions you may have on this subject. 

I welcome these annual opportunities for 
congressional review of the U.S. participa- 
tion in the international development lending 
institutions. They provide both the Congress 
and the executive branch with an opportunity 
to review the past, evaluate progress, order 
our priorities, and make plans for the future. 
This is the third time I have appeared be- 
fore this subcommittee to take part in this 
constructive process. These years have 
marked a special degree of congressional 
scrutiny over the workings of the develop- 
ment banks and into all foreign assistance 
programs, seeking full assurance that our 
funds have been well spent. This is essential. 
Our priorities must be set in the light of un- 
met needs at home. 

In the course of these reviews I believe 
we have met the stern tests that you have set 
for us. We have demonstrated the important 
role which the international development 
lending institutions play in our foreign eco- 
nomic policy. We have shown that these insti- 
tutions : 

— Permit the sharing of the burden of pro- 
viding development aid among many coun- 
tries instead of being concentrated on the 
United States ; 

— Are an indispensable part of our broader 
efforts toward international economic coop- 
eration in the areas of trade and monetary 
policies ; 

— Allow us to make use of their extremely 
high level of managerial expertise and de- 
velopment experience ; 

— Allow our capital contributions to be 
leveraged to a great extent by the banks' 
borrowing in the world's capital markets; 

April 15, 1974 


— Provide a vehicle for developing the 
economies of a large group of countries that 
produce raw materials as well as manufac- 
tured and semimanufactured goods which are 
essential to the vitality and noninflationary 
expansion of our economy. 

Moreover, I believe we have demonstrated 
our responsiveness to congressional concerns 
by improving the flow of information to Con- 
gress, assuring the improvement of audit 
procedures, emphasizing new areas of lend- 
ing, and expanding staff representation. We 
have also strengthened our own internal pro- 
cedures for managing our participation. 

Before turning to the specifics of these ap- 
propriation requests, I would like to turn to 
some arguments that have been raised re- 
cently concerning future contributions under 
new replenishment programs for these insti- 
tutions. While I do not think that these argu- 
ments are applicable to previously planned 
replenishment arrangements, in order to 
make the record clear I would like to discuss 
these issues with you today. 

Some have argued that recent rapid 
changes in the world economy — the energy 
crisis in particular — militate against our 
continued support of the international lend- 
ing institutions. I believe just the opposite 
is true. The arguments for continued U.S. 
leadership in this realm are strengthened by 
recent events. 

One of the fundamental conclusions of the 
Energy Conference held in Washington in 
February among 13 consumer nations was 
the need to approach oil problems coopera- 
tively and in a spirit of unity. To be effective 
not only in dealing with the energy problem 
but also in other areas, such as international 
monetary and trade matters, every nation 
needs the cooperation of others. 

As the richest nation in the world, the 
United States cannot effectively argue for an 
international approach to problems that are 
not susceptible of national solutions while 
shunning our responsibilities in the area of 
international economic development. To elim- 
inate or reduce our contributions to the in- 
ternational lending institutions would be per- 

ceived as a clear inward turning on our part, 
justifying similar measures by other coun- 
tries. It is crucial that we indicate to an 
anxious world that we are not drawing back 
from a position of international responsibil- 

Some have also argued that the oil crisis 
in particular has rendered our further par- 
ticipation in these international institutions 
unwise because the problem the developing 
countries face in paying for oil is so over- 
whelming or because the money would go 
through the borrowers' hands into oil pro- 
ducers' pockets or because the oil exporters 
would never assume responsibility for a fair 
share of the aid burden. These concerns are 
not well founded. 

The developing countries face two separate 
problems requiring two solutions: 

1. They need new concessional funding to 
help finance the monetary outflows caused by 
the oil price increases. The LDC's [less de- 
veloped countries] must properly call on the 
oil-exporting nations for this assistance. 

2. They also need continued long-range 
development assistance. It is this need that 
the international lending institutions serve. 

Furthermore, the international lending in- 
stitutions provide resources for specific proj- 
ects ; they do not provide general funds 
which could go to pay oil exporters. Their 
funds pay the suppliers of goods and services 
needed to build and carry out sound and ur- 
gent development projects. 

Finally, the oil-producing nations are be- 
ginning to recognize that their new affluence 
carries with it important responsibilities. 
Iran has already made some resources avail- 
able for lending at low interest rates to de- 
veloping countries and has entered into a 
program of World Bank bond purchases. 
Venezuela is taking steps to enter into a sim- 
ilar program and is considering using the 
Inter-American Development Bank as a ve- 
hicle for increased resource transfers. An 
Arab Fund for African Development is un- 
der discussion in African regional organiza- 
tions, and additional resources are appar- 
ently to be made available to Islamic nations 


Department of State Bulletin 

for long-term development. The oil-producing 
nations have begun the process of moving 
from the position of being recipients of as- 
sistance to being important providers of 
funds for concessional loans. 

Finally, the argument is made that the in- 
ternational development lending institutions 
do not help the poor of the developing coun- 
tries. This problem has been of particular 
concern to some of the members of this sub- 
committee. However, careful scrutiny of the 
record shows the innovative contributions 
that the international development institu- 
tions have made to lending to the poor. 

For example, the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank has led the way in lending to 
small farmers, to maternity clinics, and for 
water and sewerage projects. The World 
Bank has in recent years placed greater em- 
phasis on projects impacting directly on the 
rural and urban poor through such tech- 
niques as agricultural projects and site and 
services developments providing housing and 
jobs to the poorest one-third of the popula- 

Even large infrastructure loans have a di- 
rect impact on the poor. Farm-to-market 
roads, hydroelectric power plants, fertilizer 
facilities, and communications networks can 
make all the difference between a life of sur- 
vival and a life of productive enterprise. 
These projects mean jobs, an adequate stand- 
ard of living, health care, and a chance to 
make a meaningful contribution to a produc- 
tive society. These are the real and substan- 
tial contributions which development lending 
makes to the lives of the rural and urban 
poor. The Directors who will appear before 
you are prepared to give you the details of 
this contribution. 

With these more general thoughts in mind, 
I would now like to discuss briefly the pro- 
posed appropriations. The total request of 
$1,006,000,000 consists of a $500 million con- 
tribution to the Fund for Special Operations 
(FSO) of the Inter- American Development 
Bank (IDE), $320 million for the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA), $50 
million for the Consolidated Special Fund of 

the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and 
pending enactment of authorizing legisla- 
tion, $121 million for an increase in our or- 
dinary capital contribution to the ADB, and 
$15 million for the African Development 
Fund (AFDF). 

The Inter-American Development Bank 

The $500 million contribution to the Fund 
for Special Operations of the Inter-American 
Development Bank represents an amount 
necessary for us to fulfill our promise, made 
in April of 1970, to supply $1 billion to this 
Fund. It was our intention that the U.S. 
share in the Fund's increase would have 
been fully paid in by the end of fiscal year 

The Fund for Special Operations, as you 
know, constitutes a very important segment 
of the Inter-American Development Bank's 
structure. Its resources, which come entirely 
from member-country contributions, are 
used to support projects in the poorest Latin 
American countries. 

There already existed a compelling case in 
terms of development need alone for us to 
complete our planned contribution to the 
FSO this year. However, the proposed $500 
million installment takes on special meaning 
in the light of the stronger ties we are at- 
tempting to forge with the countries of the 
region. The meeting of Foreign Ministers in 
Mexico City, attended by Secretary Kissin- 
ger, was the beginning of a major new effort 
announced by President Nixon to increase 
the spirit and practice of collaboration in 
the hemisphere. For us to have a meaningful 
relationship with this area — which supplies 
20 percent of our oil and over 11 percent of 
our other raw materials — we must be pre- 
pared to make a meaningful contribution. In 
a declaration emanating from the Mexico 
City Conference, Secretary Kissinger stated 
the importance of maintaining our aid flows 
to Latin America. To provide leadership for 
this new cooperative relationship we should 
now fully implement our share of the re- 
plenishment of the FSO. 

April 15, 1974 


Contributions to IDA and ADB 

The $320 million we are seeking today for 
the International Development Association 
represents the final installment of our $960 
million contribution to the IDA third re- 
plenishment. Because of changes in the offi- 
cial value of the dollar, our final third re- 
plenishment contribution to IDA amounts to 
$386 million in current dollars, taking into 
account $66 million in maintenance-of-value 
payments. This $66 million has already been 
appropriated as part of the separate mainte- 
nance-of-value appropriations. It should be 
noted that in the fourth replenishment we 
have negotiated an annual contribution of 
$375 million — $13 million below our last 
third replenishment contribution. This con- 
tribution would not be aff"ected by changes in 
the value of the dollar, since maintenance-of- 
value provisions do not apply to the fourth 

As the members of this committee are 
aware, IDA is part of the World Bank Group 
which was established to make credits avail- 
able to the truly poor peoples of the globe. 
Lending is extended for vital development 
projects in countries with per capita in- 
comes under $375 per year. IDA's terms are 
50 years maturity, including 10 years grace 
and a service charge of three-fourths of 1 
percent per annum. Cumulative lending by 
IDA as of the end of fiscal year 1973 was 
$5.8 billion. 

The problems of the poorest countries have 
been multiplied by recent economic develop- 
ments. IDA is an institution that can make 
a real contribution to assuring economic 
growth for these countries in the years 

In its report of May 11, 1972, on supple- 
mental appropriations the conference com- 
mittee said : 

The managers agree that there is no intention of 
denying each of the three annual installments of 
$320 million in the next three fiscal years and that 
the first installment will be provided in the fiscal 
year beginning July 1, 1972. 

I again urge this subcommittee to act, as 
you did last year, in the spirit of that joint 
explanatory statement. 

For the Special Fund of the Asian Devel- 
opment Bank the administration is now re- 
questing $50 million. The committee is aware 
that this $50 million is part of a $100 mil- 
lion authorized contribution to the Special 
Fund of the Bank, of which $50 million was 
appropriated last year. The committee is 
also aware that since the U.S. contribution 
of $100 million was authorized, a multilat- 
eral effort has been made to establish an 
Asian Development Fund to which the United 
States would provide $150 million and other 
countries $375 million. The $100 million al- 
ready authorized would be counted toward 
the U.S. contribution. 

Last year when the Congress decided to 
reduce the administration's request for the 
first $100 million to $50 million, the Congress 
recognized the beneficial burden-sharing as- 
pects of the new Asian Development Fund 
proposal. The joint House-Senate conferees 
report stated : 

The conference managers are aware that the 
Administration's $100 million request for the Asian 
Bank is part of a broader program to replenish the 
Bank's soft loan resources, for which additional au- 
thorizing legislation is being sought. In reducing 
the request figure to $50 million, the conference 
managers understand that such a step would not be 
detrimental to the broader program designed to 
obtain substantial additional contributions from 
other nations, provided those other nations can feel 
reasonably sure the remaining $50 million will be 
forthcoming. The conference managers wish to note 
in this regard that they have no intention of deny- 
ing a fiscal year 1975 request for the balance of $50 
million when presented by the Administration. The 
conference managers support the favorable burden- 
sharing arrangements embodied in the proposal of 
which this $100 million is a part. 

We are making our contribution to the 
Bank's Special Fund of $50 million, appro- 
priated last year. It is our hope that the sec- 
ond $50 million that is now before you will 
be appropriated to take advantage of the 
benefits cited by the conference managers. 

In addition, the Congress has before it a 
proposal to authorize the remaining $50 mil- 
lion of the proposed U.S. contributions for 
the Asian Development Fund. If this legis- 
lation is enacted — and we support its enact- 
ment strongly — an appropriation request for 
this amount will come before you in fiscal 


Department of State Bulletin 

year 1976. However, I wish to assure you 
that appropriation of the $50 million now 
before you involves no commitment to pro- 
vide the remaining $50 million, which is yet 
to be authorized and appropriated. 

Later, pending enactment of a bill cur- 
rently before Congress, the President will 
transmit to you an appropriation request 
for an increase in our capital stock in the 
Asian Development Bank. The total amount 
of the U.S. share in this increase would be 
$362 million, of which $289 million would be 
callable guarantee capital and $73 million 
would represent our paid-in portion. These 
amounts would be provided over a three-year 
period, resulting in an anticipated appropri- 
ation request for fiscal year 1975 of $121 
million. Each installment would consist of 
$24 million in paid-in capital — $10 million 
in cash and $14 million in letter of credit — 
and $97 million in callable capital. 

We strongly support an increase in our or- 
dinary capital contribution to the ADB. Sub- 
scribing fully to this increase will allow the 
United States to regain its original equity 
and voting position in the Bank, which has 
now dropped to 7.6 percent from the original 
figure of 18 percent. This increase is not only 
important financially but is a vital symbol 
of our influence in the Bank and in Asia. 

The African Development Fund 

On Wednesday, I will discuss in detail a 
proposed U.S. contribution of $15 million to 
the African Development Fund. This fund, 
to which other donors have already contrib- 
uted over $90 million, was established on 
June 30, 1973. As with the special funds of 
other development banks, this is designed to 
finance projects in the poorest countries, in 
this case in Africa. The United States may 
become an "original" member if we join by 
the end of this year, thus assuring that we 
may rapidly assume full membership rights. 

An authorization bill providing for U.S. 
membership in the African Development 
Fund and a U.S. contribution of $15 million 
spread over a three-year period is pending 
in the Congress. What will be requested for 
appropriation in fiscal year 1975, subject to 

approval of this authorization, is an amount 
of $15 million. As indicated, this would be 
provided over a three-year period, with an 
expected U.S. budgetary outlay of $1 million 
in fiscal year 1975. 

The importance of this request is not at all 
diminished by its newness. The countries 
which will benefit from this appropriation 
are not only poor but have recently been 
especially hard hit by drought. Included are 
the countries of the Sahelian region and 
Ethiopia, where outright starvation has oc- 
curred in the recent past. Not to respond to 
these needs at this time would represent a 
failure on our part to assist the critically 
poor of the world. 

Having heard the programs and the 
amounts involved summarized, the question 
of the economic cost of all this may be upper- 
most in your minds. I think this is an im- 
portant point. While the amounts are large, 
the economic cost to the United States of 
supporting these institutions is much smaller 
than the aggregate figures indicate. This is 
because much of our contribution to these 
institutions returns to us in the form of pay- 
ment for the sale of goods and services. 
According to a very recent study prepared 
for the Committee on Foreign Aff'airs, the 
aggregate eff'ect of U.S. participation in 
these institutions has been overwhelmingly 
favorable to the United States. I would like 
to submit for the record two very instructive 
tables developed for this report by the Con- 
gressional Research Service of the Library of 
Congress, and I do want to highlight their 
conclusion: The cumulative balance of pay- 
ments results of U.S. involvement in the 
World Bank Group, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development 
Bank has been a net surplus of $2.7 billion 
for the United States. 

These contributions represent only eight 
one-hundredths of 1 percent of our total 
product and only one-third of 1 percent of 
our budget. The cost of maintaining an ap- 
propriate level of international responsibility 
in this area is, in my opinion, a most reason- 
able one. 

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we feel that this 

April 15, 1974 


Table 1 — Balance of Payments Between U.S. and 
Banks, Cumulative 

(Inception to 1973)' 

U.S. payments to banks: Millions 

World Bank Group subscriptions $1,460.2 

Inter-American Bank subscriptions 964.8 

Asian Bank subscriptions 55.3 

World Bank bond sales in United States 2,492.0 

Inter-American Bank bond sales in United 

States 423.2 

Asian Bank bond sales in United States 52.0 

WBG earnings on investments in United 

States 1,284.0 

IDB earnings on investments in United 

States 221.3 

ADB earnings on investments in United 

States 39-1 

Total U.S. payments to banks 6,991.9 

Bank payments to the United States: 

World Bank Group U.S. procurement $4,391.0 

Inter-American Bank U.S. procurement 733.0 

Asian Bank U.S. procurement 12.5 

WBG interest to U.S. bondholders 1,308.0 

IDB interest to U.S. bondholders 149.7 

ADB interest to U.S. bondholders 7.0 

WBG administrative expenses in United 

States 617.9 

IDB administrative expenses in United 

States 184.3 

ADB administrative expenses in United 

States 16-5 

WBG net long-term investments in United 

States 2,094.0 

IDB net long-term investments in United 

States 68.5 

ADB net long-term investments in United 

States 82.0 

Bank payments to the United States 9,664.4 

Net U.S. payments surplus 2,672.5 

' Data for World Bank Group by fiscal years (July 
1-June 30); IDB and ADB data by calendar years; 
tables exclude data on IFC and SPTF [International 
Finance Corporation; IDB Social Progress Trust 
Fund], to which the United States has contributed 
$35,000,000 and $525,000,000, respectively, but for 
which other data are unavailable. The full data for 
this table can be found in apps. I-l through 1-6. 

appropriations bill deserves your approval 
and support. It is of great importance to our 
overall international economic objectives. 
The institutions involved are run on a sound 
basis, providing development assistance com- 
petently and vi^ith enviable expertise. This 
assistance is of direct and lasting benefit to 
the developing countries and, because of our 


Table 2 — Annual Balance-of -Payments Effects | 

of the Banks, Aggregate 1965-72' 

(Dollars in millions) 

1965 225 1969 342 

1966 593 1970 453 

1967 361 1971 -228 

1968 87 1972= 471 

' Excludes FSO data, for which data are unavail- 
able on an annual basis. Except as discussed later in 
the text, FSO contributors are usually tied to pro- 
curement in the donor country. Years are by fiscal 
year for World Bank Group and calendar year for 
ADB and IDB. 

" Excludes ADB data, which are unavailable for 
1972. The 1971 ADB figure was -$34. 

Source: Foreign Affairs Division, Congressional 
Research Service, Library of Congress, "The United 
States and the Multilateral Development Banks"; 
prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
March 1974, pp. 148-9. 

worldwide interests, to the United States 
itself. The current international economic 
situation lends added importance to this re- 
quest. To withdraw our support from these 
institutions now would be shortsighted and 
particularly damaging to our broader in- 

It is the responsibility of the Congress 
to weigh this request against competing pri- 
orities. The thrust and weight of my testi- 
mony has been directed toward convincing 
you that this request deserves a very high 
priority ; its benefits are manifest, important, 
and affordable. I firmly believe it should 
receive your support. 


The current world political and economic 
situation lends added significance and rele- 
vance to the legislation under review by this 
committee. The events of recent months have 
brought home to us all the interdependence 
of nations and economies on what is becom- 
ing ever more obviously a planet of finite 
resources. For the United States, our size, 
our historical traditions of responsibility, our 
economic strength, and our economic needs 
— in short, our national interest — all dictate 
that we cannot remain aloof from the great 
currents of history. 

Department of State Bulletin 

At the Washington Energy Conference 
last month, Secretary Kissinger emphasized 
that "Developed countries should avoid cut- 
ting their concessional aid programs in re- 
sponse to balance of payments problems." 
Noting that the developing countries "face 
the threat of starvation and the tragedy 
of abandoned hopes for further economic de- 
velopment," Secretary Kissinger also stated 
that "In the name both of humanity and 
common sense we cannot permit this." 

The aspirations of roughly two-thirds of 
this planet's population to escape from lives 
of poverty, misery, malnutrition, sickness, 
and hopelessness cannot, therefore, be ig- 
nored by us now. The U.S. response to this 
condition has been, like that of the other 
relatively rich countries, in the form of both 
bilateral and multilateral development as- 
sistance programs. Each type of aid has 
certain advantages. We regard bilateral and 
multilateral assistance as complementary, 
not competitive. 

The fact is that the multilateral financial 
institutions represent a successful experi- 
ment in international economic cooperation 
in which industrialized and developing coun- 
tries have banded together in a nonpolitical 
framework to achieve a common goal: the 
mobilization and channeling of resources to 
assist the poor through application of ration- 
al and objective economic analysis. 

I won't claim that these institutions have 
been perfect or omniscient; like any human 
institution, they undoubtedly make errors. 
But we would be making a serious mistake 
to ignore the advantages and concentrate 
only on the flaws and conclude that these 
make them less worthy of our continued 

The international financial institutions 
have proven themselves on the international 
economic scene as they have gained in ex- 
perience and skills. They are a valuable 
forum for constructive dialogue between rich 
and poor countries in an atmosphere which 
is traditionally devoid of political stridency 
and nationalistic rancor. Their general ori- 
entation and approach to development proj- 
ects is Western and market oriented, and 

their successes serve as examples to all de- 
veloping countries of the benefits of this 
type of economic system. 

The U.S. relative financial share in these 
institutions has steadily declined, as other 
governments have been willing to contribute 
at a proportionately greater rate and as the 
institutions themselves in recent years have 
tapped private capital markets outside the 
United States. But the United States still 
plays a significant role, and our failure to 
meet our fair share in the multilateral de- 
velopment eff'ort will not only aff'ect the 
ability of these institutions to mobilize ad- 
ditional resources from other governments — 
it will also affect our ability to secure the 
cooperation of our fellow donor countries 
and of the developing countries in a whole 
series of international economic, trade, and 
monetary negotiations where we need the 
good will and cooperation of other nations. 

Finally, failure of the United States to 
act in favor of these institutions now would 
be a cruel signal to the rest of the world 
of the world's most powerful country being 
unable to play an appropriate role in help- 
ing the poorest countries at a time of great 
travail for them. 

Let me emphasize in this connection that 
the appropriations being requested in this 
legislation are not related to the energy 
crisis, in the sense that they are not designed 
to enable less developed countries to pay for 
higher oil prices. The United States believes 
that it is the primary responsibility of the 
oil-exporting countries to mitigate economic 
hardships imposed by their actions on the 
less developed countries. Rather, the U.S. 
contributions in question were planned to 
meet the needs of the poorer countries even 
before the energy crisis broke, needs which 
have added poignancy in light of the accel- 
erating pace of worldwide inflation in food- 
stuffs, fertilizers, and other products essen- 
tial to the development programs of the 
poor countries. 

In sum, it is most definitely in this nation's 
long-range enlightened self-interest, and in 
our foreign policy interest, to contribute our 
fair share to multilateral development efforts 

April 15, 1974 


through these viable and respected institu- 

With respect to the individual institutions 
being considered now by this committee, let 
me make just a few brief comments about 
each one from the standpoint of U.S. for- 
eign policy interests. 

The International Development Associa- 
tion is designed to provide essential economic 
assistance — more than we could provide bi- 
laterally — to the world's poorest countries, 
those with per capita gross national product 
of less than $375 a year. In fact, more than 
70 percent of the credits from IDA this past 
year went to countries with a per capita 
GNP of $120 or less. It is truly in keeping 
with our image of the United States as a 
compassionate nation and a partner in the 
global development process for this com- 
mittee to approve the appropriation of the 
third and final $320 million tranche of the 
U.S. contribution to the third replenishment 
of this institution. 

The requested appropriation for the con- 
cessional lending facility of the Inter-Amer- 
ican Development Bank also represents a 
long-term U.S. commitment to helping poorer 
countries help themselves — one which takes 
on additional relevance in a year when Sec- 
retary Kissinger has called for a new spirit 
of community with our Latin American and 
Caribbean neighbors in the Declaration of 
Tlatelolco. The IDB has traditionally been 
regarded by Latin America as a major ele- 
ment of the inter-American system and a 
symbol of U.S. support for the development 
aspirations of that continent. Failure to 
support the IDB now will not only damage 
its ability to contribute to economic progress 
at a time when our bilateral economic aid 
to this region is falling, but it may also 
cause Latin America to question wherein 
lies the substance of the spirit of mutual 
cooperation invoked at Tlatelolco. 

The Asian Development Bank is primarily 
an Asian institution which has made an 
important contribution to the major U.S. 
policy goal of encouraging national and re- 
gional self-reliance for the states in the 
area. Given our political and economic in- 

tei'ests in Asia, and its immense population 
and potential, the United States must con- 
tinue to play an appropriate role in this 
regional institution which we helped to es- 

Unfortunately, our inability to contribute 
to the capital replenishment of the ADB 
ratified by other member governments over 
!'<> years ago has meant that the U.S. 
capital and voting share in the Bank has 
declined as other governments made their 
capital contributions. From an original po- 
sition of parity with Japan, the U.S. voting 
share has declined to 8 percent, while that 
of Japan has risen to 22 percent. This 
growing Japanese preponderance has become 
a source of concern to the Government of 
Japan as well as to our other Asian friends. 
Indeed, U.S. participation in the Bank has 
diminished to a level where it is affecting 
the willingness of other donors to contribute 
and thereby ill serves our political and eco- 
nomic objectives in Asia. 

The proposed $50 million LIS. contribu- 
tion to the new Asian Development Fund, 
the soft-lending facility of the Bank, is the 
second part of a $150 million package which 
will be matched by $375 million from other 
donors — surely not an unreasonable U.S. 
share in light of our stake in the region and 
the fact that this Fund aids the most needy 
countries, including many of our friends and 
allies in Asia. The ability of the Asian De- 
velopment Bank and Fund to play a mean- 
ingful role in Indochina reconstruction will 
be largely determined by congressional ac- 
tion in approving the appropriations requests 
now before it. 

Smallest in amount of appropriation re- 
quested is the $15 million three-year pro- 
posed U.S. contribution to the African De- 
velopment Fund. This represents a U.S. 
share of only 15 percent of the total capital 
of this new Fund. But this small amount 
has a large symbolic value in a continent 
of growing importance to us for strategic 
and raw material reasons, one where the 
United States is doing relatively little in the 
way of bilateral development programs. 

Fifteen other donor countries — from Bra- 


Department of State Bulletin 

zil to Finland to Japan — already have rati- 
fied the charter of this new development 
loan fund which is designed to help some of 
the poorest countries and peoples on this 
planet. Only the United States has not yet 
done so. If we turn our backs on this new 
multilateral effort, I fear it will be inter- 
preted in Africa as a major signal of U.S. 
lack of interest in the vital concerns of 
the nations of that continent. 

This completes my formal statement. I 
am grateful for the opportunity to appear 
before this committee to testify on this im- 
portant legislation and will be pleased to 
answer any questions from the committee 
to the best of my ability. 

To Restore Harmony: New Efforts in Transatlantic 
Cooperation. Report on the second official visit to 
Congress by a delegation of the European Parlia- 
ment, October 1973. December 26, 1973. 75 pp. 

Making Floating Part of a Reformed Monetary Sys- 
tem. Report of the Subcommittee on International 
Economics of the Joint Economic Committee. Jan- 
uary 9, 1974. 13 pp. 


Current Actions 


Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 1st Session 

High Seas Oil Port Act. Report to accompany H.R. 
5898. H. Rept. 93-692. December 3, 1973. 43 pp. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appro- 
priations Bill, 1974. Reports to accompany H.R. 
11771. H. Rept. 93-694; December 4, 1973; 75 pp. 

5. Rept. 93-620; December 13, 1973; 147 pp. Con- 
ference report: H. Doc. 93-742; December 19, 
1973; 13 pp. 

Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973. Report, 
together with minority and supplemental views, to 
accompany H.R. 11088. H. Rept. 93-702. December 

6, 1973. 16 pp. 

World Oil Developments and U.S. Oil Import Policies. 
Report prepared for the Senate Committee on Fi- 
nance by the U.S. Tariff Commission. December 
12, 1973. 147 pp. 

Amending Section 7305, Title 10, United States Code, 
Relating to the Sale of Naval Vessels Stricken 
from the Naval Vessel Register. Report to ac- 
company S. 1773. H. Rept. 93-726. December 12, 
1973. 7 pp. 

Emergency Military Assistance for Israel and Cam- 
bodia. Hearing before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. December 13, 1973. 175 pp. 

The Energy Outlook for the 1980's. A study pre- 
pared for the use of the Subcommittee on Econom- 
ic Progress of the Joint Economic Committee. 
December 17, 1973. 39 pp. 

Customs Convention on the International Transit of 
Goods. Report to accompany Ex. P, 93d Cong., 1st 
sess. S. E.\. Rept. 93-27. December 17, 1973. 5 pp. 

Endangered Species Act of 1973. Conference report 
to accompany S. 1983. H. Rept. 93-740. December 
19, 1973. 29 pp. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for tour- 
ing. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered 
into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Accession deposited: Greece, January 15, 1974. 


Agreement amending and extending the interna- 
tional coffee agreement 1968 (TIAS 6594). Ap- 
proved by the International Coffee Council at 
London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 
1, 1973. 

Notification that constitutional procedures com- 
pleted: Panama, January 21, 1974. 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 
29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. 
TIAS 5200. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, January 10, 1974. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 
1967. TIAS 6298. 

Accession deposited: Romania (with reserva- 
tions), January 14, 1974. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Niger, December 28, 1973. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at Lon- 
don May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 
1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. 
TIAS 4900, 6109. 

Acceptances deposited: India, March 4, 1974; Yu- 
goslavia, March 11, 1974. 

Not in force. 

April 15, 1974 


Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done 
at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.= 

Accessioii deposited: Spain (with reservations), 
January 14, 1974. 



Agreement relating to the closing of certain radar 
stations of the extension of the continental radar 
defense system (Pinetree line). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Washington March 22, 1974. 
Entered into force March 22, 1974. 


Treaty on extradition. Signed at Copenhagen June 
22, 1972.' 

Senate advice and coyisent to ratification: March 
29, 1974. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of May 20, 1973 (TIAS 
7716). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman 
March 12, 1974. Entered into force March 12, 


Agreement modifying the agreement of November 
17, 1970, as amended, concerning trade in cotton 
textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington March 21, 1974. Entered into force March 
21, 1974. 


Agreement extending the agreement of May 5, 1972, 
as amended (TIAS 7327, 7486), regarding an off- 
shore sales facility for property disposal. Signed 
at Singapore March 4, 1974. Entered into force 
March 4, 1974. 


' Not in force. 

■ Not in force for the United States. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications viay be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washingtoyi, D.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, ivhich include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock — at least 140 — $16.35; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes — $14.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 25f'- each. 

Bhutan Cat. No. S1.123:B46 

Pub. 8334. 4 pp. 

Guadeloupe Cat. No. SI. 123:093/2 

Pub. 8319 4 pp. 

The Organization of African Unity. Pamphlet in the 
International Organizations series which outlines the 
background, principles, organizational structure, ac- 
complishments, and the relations with other organi- 
zations of the OAU. Discusses U.S. policy with 
regard to the OAU. Contains a chronology of OAU 
events from May 1963 to the present and a map of 
Africa showing OAU members. Pub. 8444. 11 pp. 
25f'. (Cat. No. 81.70/5:2/2). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft. 

Agreement with France. TIAS 7728. 9 pp. 25('. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7728). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 15, 197^ Vol. LXX, No. 1816 

American Principles. The Fundamental Tran- 
sition in U.S. Foreign Policy (Laise) . . . 386 

Asia. Stability and Change in East Asia (In- 

g-ersoll) 393 

China. The U.S. Contribution to a Peaceful 

World Structure (Sisco) 381 


Administration Urges Appropriations for In- 
ternational Financial Institutions (Hen- 
nessy, Weintraub) 403 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 411 

The U.S. Contribution to a Peaceful World 
Structure (Sisco) 381 

U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Reviewed 

(Moore) 397 

Diplomacy. The Fundamental Transition in 
U.S. Foreign Policy (Laise) 386 

Economic Affairs. The U.S. Contribution to 
a Peaceful World Structure (Sisco) ... 381 

Egypt. U.S. To Assist in Sweeping Mines From 
Suez Canal Waters (Department announce- 
ment) 385 

Europe. The U.S. Contribution to a Peaceful 

World Structure (Sisco) 381 

Foreign Aid. Administration Urges Appropri- 
ations for International Financial Institu- 
tions (Hennessy, Weintraub) 403 

Health. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space 
and Medicine Hailed by President (excerpts 
from remarks) 388 

Japan. Stability and Change in East Asia 

(Ingersoll) 393 

Law of the Sea. U.S. Position on Law of the 
Sea Reviewed (Moore) 397 

Middle East 

The U.S. Contribution to a Peaceful World 
Structure (Sisco) 381 

United States Pays Assessment for U.N. 
Emergency Force 392 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. United 
States Security Relations With Turkey (in- 
terview with Mr. Sisco) 389 

Presidential Documents. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Coop- 
eration in Space and Medicine Hailed by 
President 388 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 412 

Space. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space and 
Medicine Hailed by President (excerpts 
from rem.arks) 388 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 411 

Turkey. United States Security Relations 

With Turkey (interview with Mr. Sisco) . . 389 


The U.S. Contribution to a Peaceful World 

Structure (Sisco) 381 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Cooperation in Space and Medi- 
cine Hailed by President (excerpts from re- 
marks) 388 

United Nations. United States Pays Assess- 
ment for U.N. Emergency Force .... 392 

Name Index 

Hennessy, John M 403 

Ingersoll, Robert S 393 

Laise. Carol C 386 

Moore, John Norton 397 

Nixon, President 388 

Sisco, Joseph J 381,389 

Weintraub, Sidney 403 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of 
State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to March 25 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 90 
of March 11. 





*109 3/25 


Dean sworn in as Ambassador to 
the Khmer Republic (bio- 
graphic data). 

Easum attends Sahel Chiefs of 
Mission conference at Abid- 
jan, Mar. 29-30. 

Kissinger: arrival statement, 
Moscow, Mar. 24. 

Kissinger, Scheel: remarks to 
the press. Mar. 24. 

Statement concerning Kissinger- 
Brezhnev conversations. Mar. 

Regional foreign policy confer- 
ence, Lexington, Ky., Apr. 26. 

Kissinger, Gromyko : exchange 
of toasts, Moscow, Mar. 25. 

Statement concerning Kissinger- 
Brezhnev conversations. Mar. 

Unger sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Republic of China (bio- 
graphic data). 

Secretary's Advisory Committee 
on Private International Law, 
Apr. 19. 

Jan Szczepanski, Polish sociolo- 
gist, to tour U.S. as Lincoln 
lecturer. Mar. 23-Apr. 12. 

Statement concerning Kissinger- 
Brezhnev conversations. Mar. 

Kissinger, Gromyko: exchange 
of toasts, Moscow, Mar. 27. 

Kissinger: news conference, 
London, Mar. 28. 

Study group 5 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the 
CCITT, Boulder. Colo.. Apr. 

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Volume LXX 

No. 1817 

April 22, 1974 





Text of Letter 1^25 


A Chronology U32 

,) Docutnetita 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXX, No. 1817 
April 22, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washingrton, D.C. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Office of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 


The Department of State BULLETi 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau «rf 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and int efr _ 
national agreements to which ^^H 
United States is or may becom^^ 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, end 
legislative material in the field el 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Officials at Moscow 

Secretary Kissinger visited Moscoio March 
24-28 and he met tvith General Secretary 
Leonid I. Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Andrei 
A. Gromyko, and other Soviet officials. Fol- 
lowing are texts of Secretary Kissinger's 
arrival statement, exchanges of toasts at 
luncheons on March 25 and March 27, state- 
ments concerning the conversations, and a 
joint communique issued at the conclusion of 
the visit. 


Press release 110 dated March 25 

I've come here at the request of President 
Nixon to prepare for his talks with General 
Secretary Brezhnev. We are convinced in 
the administration that the peace of the 
world depends importantly on the relations 
between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, and we will work constructively and 
seriously with the Soviet Union to make 
progress toward the goals which we all share, 
including limitation of armaments. We will 
do so with the attitude that none of our 
countries will take special advantage of sit- 
uations in any part of the world, that prog- 
ress toward peace between our countries is 
in the interest of all the peoples of the world. 

I expect we will make concrete progress 
on a number of outstanding issues and that 
we will agree all of us have an obligation to 
promote them in every part of the world. 


Foreign Minister Gromyko 

Honorable Mr. Secretary of State, honored 
American guests, comrades: It gives me 

pleasure to greet you, Mr. Secretary of State, 
and the persons accompanying you to Mos- 

It is far from the first time that you have 
been in our capital during the last two years. 
This fact in itself is significant. It means 
that our contacts have become constant and 
regular. They comprise a substantial part of 
the useful practice of exchange of opinions 
which has become established between our 

Quite recently we met with President 
Nixon and you in Washington. A wide range 
of questions of interest to both sides was 
discussed. Now the discussions are being 
held here in Moscow. They are of particular 
significance since they are connected with 
preparations for the forthcoming visit of 
President Nixon to the Soviet Union. 

As for the Soviet side, as L. I. Brezhnev 
noted, we would wish the forthcoming sum- 
mit meeting to be marked by new important 
steps on the path of development of peaceful 
relations between our states and improve- 
ment of the international atmosphere. I think 
that the American side also shares this ap- 

During the last two to three years the 
U.S.S.R. and the United States have traveled 
a long way in their relations. The essence of 
the favorable changes in Soviet-American 
relations is determined by the joint deter- 
mination of our countries to prevent the 
threat of war and to foster the strengthen- 
ing of international security and the devel- 
opment of broad mutually advantageous co- 

' Given at a luncheon hosted by Foreign Minister 
Gromyko (press release 114 dated Mar. 26). Foreigm 
Minister Gromyko spoke in Russian. 

April 22, 1974 


Much has already been done along this 
path. As a result of the two Soviet-American 
summit meetings, fundamentally important 
decisions and specific measures were taken 
which were the starting point for a cardinal 
reconstruction of relations between our 
countries. The agreement on the prevention 
of nuclear war concluded during the visit of 
L. I. Brezhnev and the SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] agreement signed 
during their earlier meeting with the Presi- 
dent are of particular significance in this 

I think it would be only fair to point out 
the noteworthy personal contribution of Sec- 
retary of State Kissinger in this whole mat- 

But much still remains to be done. To put 
it briefly, the basic task is to move ahead in 
the direction which has been set, guided by 
what has already been achieved, so that the 
process of improving Soviet-American rela- 
tions becomes a constant factor of interna- 
tional peace. 

As far as various specific issues are con- 
cerned, given the required consistency and a 
realistic and constructive approach by both 
sides, we are confident that mutually accepta- 
ble solutions can always be found. The main 
thing is to adhere to the central line, to ob- 
serve the agreements already achieved, and 
strictly to fulfill the obligations taken. 

The experience of previous meetings of 
this kind confirms their great importance for 
assuring successful results of summit nego- 
tiations. It appears that this will also be the 
case this time. 

I propose a toast to your health, Mr. Sec- 
retary of State, and to the health of the other 
American guests. 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished Soviet 
friends : As the Foreign Minister pointed out 
in his characteristically precise fashion, this 
is far from my first visit to the Soviet Union. 
In fact, it is my sixth visit. 

When I came here two years ago, to Lenin 
Hills, the beginning of relaxation of tension 

between the United States and the Soviet 
Union had just started. We had no experi- 
ence in dealing with global problems on a co- 
operative basis. On that occasion I had the 
privilege for the first time to meet General 
Secretary Brezhnev, whose name will forever 
be associated with bringing about a change 
in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. On that oc- 
casion we concluded agreement on basic prin- 
ciples to govern our relationship and we 
made major progress on limiting strategic 

In the two years past, many agreements 
have been signed between the United States 
and the Soviet Union — an agreement on the 
limitation of strategic arms, an agreement on 
the prevention of nuclear war, being the most 
significant. But more than these two agree- 
ments, what has happened over the last two 
years reflects the recognition that the United 
States and the Soviet Union, dealing with 
each other on a basis of strict equality, have 
a special obligation for the preservation of 
peace. If our two nations attempt to take ad- 
vantage of each other, if we attempt to black- 
mail each other or deal with each other from 
a strong position, then there can be no peace 
either among ourselves or in the world. But if 
we deal with each other cooperatively, if we 
recognize that neither of us can gain a per- 
manent strategic advantage either militarily 
or politically anywhere in the world, then we 
can bring about lasting peace and all man- 
kind will benefit. 

This spirit of cooperation, of dealing with 
each other cooperatively and fairly, which 
was started two years ago has gained in 
strength and will continue. Occasionally we 
encounter obstacles, but we are determined 
to remove them. Occasionally we find domes- 
tic criticism, but we are determined to over- 
come it. So this administration remains com- 
mitted to strengthen its relationship with the 
Soviet Union. We want to make the next sum- 
mit as significant as the preceding two. Our 
greatest goal is that over the next three years 
we can make the relationship that has grown 
up between our two peoples and our leaders 

We will conduct our conversations here in 


Department of State Bulletin 

that spirit and will carry out our policy in 
that attitude. We will never forget the spe- 
cial responsibility we, the United States and 
the Soviet Union, have for preserving peace 
for the benefit of mankind. 

It is in this spirit that I would like to pro- 
pose a toast to the Foreign Minister, with 
whom we have had so many useful conversa- 
tions, and to lasting friendship between the 
Soviet and American peoples. 


Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Foi'eign Minister, distinguished 
guests : On behalf of all of my colleagues, I 
would like to thank you for the extraordinary 
hospitality we have received here. 

The last time I was in this house was the 
evening on which the strategic arms agree- 
ment was signed. The Foreign Minister and 
I negotiated through the better part of the 
night, then we assembled again in the morn- 
ing and came to a conclusion, and by that eve- 
ning the agreement was signed. It was a very 
momentous occasion because it was the first 
time that the two greatest countries in the 
world, the two most powerful countries in the 
world, accepted voluntary restrictions. It was 
important also because it symbolized that the 
United States and the Soviet Union have 
great responsibility toward preserving the 
peace of the world. They exercise this re- 
sponsibility in what they do toward each 
other, and they exercise it in relation to other 
parts of the world as well. 

Since we have started on this course, it has 
been a fundamental principle of our foreign 
policy to bring about a situation in which the 
two countries can be more secure with each 
other and in which they can use their influ- 
ence to help bring peace to other parts of the 
world as well. This principle has again been 
confirmed in our meetings here; and as we 
prepare for the summit of this year, we hope 

' Given at a luncheon hosted by Secretary Kis- 
singer at Spaso House, the American Ambassador's 
residence (press release 120 dated Mar. 28). Foreign 
Minister Gromyko spoke in Russian. 

to make more significant progress by what- 
ever concrete agreements can be reached. 

The most fundamental agreement of all, 
which is not written down, is that the United 
States and the Soviet Union are committed to 
a constant improvement of their relations. 
They will strive to maintain in all parts of 
the world a policy of cooperation, even if tem- 
porary obstacles might arise. This will be the 
goal of American foreign policy, and the fre- 
quency of our meetings testifies to the fact 
it is also the goal of Soviet policy. 

So it is in this spirit that I would like to 
propose a toast to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, 
and all your associates, and to the strength- 
ening of friendship between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. 

Foreign Minister Gromyko 

Mr. Secretary of State, gentlemen, com- 
rades : We wish to thank you first of all for 
your hospitality. Many important things have 
indeed been achieved in Soviet-American re- 
lations. First and foremost, they have been 
achieved as a result of the two Soviet-Amer- 
ican summit meetings — during the visit to 
the capital of this country of U.S. President 
Nixon and during the visit of the General 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union Brezh- 
nev to the United States. The agreements 
then concluded are of paramount importance, 
both for our two countries and for the cause 
of world peace. Thus we can say that a truly 
solid foundation, a truly strong foundation, 
has been created for further movement ahead 
toward the deepening, the broadening, and 
the improvement of Soviet-American rela- 

The task now is — and I am happy to say 
that both you and we are in agreement on 
this — to use these achievements and this 
strong foundation for further steps toward 
the still greater improvement of those rela- 
tionships. This is the goal that must be served 
by the forthcoming Soviet-American summit 
meeting. It is this goal, too, that must be 
served by this present meeting during your 
visit to Moscow. 

What we wanted to see in results from this 

April 22, 1974 


meeting, insofar as the Soviet side is con- 
cerned, was clearly defined by General Secre- 
tary Brezhnev during his first meeting with 
you. And that is success — a success that will 
be of benefit to our two peoples and to world 

The problems facing the participants in 
these exchanges of views are important and, 
at the same time, complex. We can firmly say 
for ourselves — and this is something that you 
have heard uttered by General Secretary 
Brezhnev — we are in favor of that. We are 
in favor of such results. We value especially 
the words you uttered just now to the effect 
that you are firmly committed to that line. 
And that is our line, too, in Soviet-American 
relations. It is the line of our country, our 
people, our party, the Central Committee and 
its Politburo, and personally the line of Gen- 
eral Secretary Brezhnev. 

We feel that the further steps that we can 
take and the further efforts we can make will 
depend on that joint determination of both 
our sides, as has indeed been stated by both 
of us. For, indeed, a tunnel has to be built 
from both ends. And that is true not only in 
tunnel building; it is true in politics, too. It 
would be good, very good indeed, if this new 
meeting could culminate in good or, better 
still, in excellent results. We could then 
transfer all these results into guarantees of 
success for all subsequent meetings. 

May I propose a toast to our further good 
relations and their development, to the suc- 
cess and the good results of this meeting, and 
looking ahead, may I also drink to the results 
of the forthcoming summit meeting, because 
this is indeed what we want to see. 

To your health, Mr. Secretary of State, and 
to the health of the other Americans present. 


Statement of March 25 

Press release 112 dated March 26 

On March 25 talks took place in the Krem- 
lin between L. I. Brezhnev, the General Sec- 
retary of the Central Committee of the Com- 

munist Party of the Soviet Union and Mem- 
ber of the Politburo of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 
and A. A. Gromyko, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the USSR, and Henry A. Kissin- 
ger, the Secretary of State of the USA and 
Assistant to the President for National Se- 
curity Affairs. 

In the course of the discussions, which 
were of a businesslike and constructive char- 
acter, there was a review of the situation and 
perspectives of Soviet-American relations in 
the light of the forthcoming visit to the So- " 
viet Union of the President of the USA, 
Richard M. Nixon. In particular, questions 
were considered about a further limitation of 
strategic arms. There also took place an ex- 
change of views concerning the work of the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

The following assisted in the talks : 

On the Soviet side: M 

Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the 
USSR to the USA ; A. M. Aleksandrov, As- 
sistant to the General Secretary of the Cen- 
tral Committee of the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union; G. M. Korniyenko, Mem- 
ber of the Collegium of the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs of the USSR. 

On the American side: 

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the 
USA to the USSR ; H. Sonnenfeldt, A. Hart- 
man, and W. Hyland, responsible officials 
from the Department of State. 

Statement of March 26 

Press release 115 dated March 27 

On March 26 talks continued between L. I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo 
of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union; A. A. Gromyko, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; 
and Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State 
of the USA and Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. 

Special attention was given to a review of 


Department of State Bulletin 

the situation concerning a peaceful settle- 
ment in the Middle East and to questions of 
security and cooperation in Europe, includ- 
ing the question of limitation of armed forces 
and armaments in Central Europe. There was 
also a continuation of the consideration of 
questions concerning the further development 
of mutual relations between the USSR and 
the USA, in particular in the economic and 
trade field. The talks were businesslike and 
constructive in character. 

Taking part in the talks from the Soviet 
side were Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of 
the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, 
Assistant to the General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union ; G. M. Korniyenko and 
M. D. Sytenko, Members of the Collegium of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. 
Participating from the American side were 
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the 
USA to the USSR ; H. Sonnenfeldt, A. Hart- 
man, A. Atherton, C. Maw and W. Hyland, 
responsible officials from the Department of 

Statement of March 27 

Press release 119 dated March 28 

On March 27 talks continued between L. I. 
Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo 
of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union ; A. A. Gromyko, 
Minister of Foreign Aff"airs of the USSR ; 
and Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State 
of the USA and Assistant to the President 
for National Security Affairs. 

In the course of the talks which took place 
in a businesslike and constructive atmos- 
phere, there was a continuation of the con- 
sideration of a number of questions concern- 
ing mutual relations between the USSR and 
the USA, and also several international prob- 

Taking part in the talks from the Soviet 
side were Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of 
the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, 
Assistant to the General Secretary of the 

Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union ; G. M. Korniyenko and 
M. D. Sytenko, Members of the Collegium of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. 
Participating from the American side were 
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the 
USA to the USSR ; H. Sonnenfeldt, A. Hart- 
man, A. Atherton, C. Maw and W. Hyland, 
responsible officials from the Department of 


Visit in the USSR of U.S. Secretary of State 
Henry A. Kissinger 

In accordance with the previously reached 
understanding, Henry A. Kissinger, Secre- 
tary of State of the United States and As- 
sistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, visited Moscow from 24 to 28 March. 
He had discussions with Leonid I. Brezhnev, 
General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the CPSU, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Mem- 
ber of the Politburo of the Central Commit- 
tee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the USSR. 

Taking part in the discussions on the So- 
viet side were : The Ambassador of the USSR 
in the United States A. F. Dobrynin, Assist- 
ant to the General Secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union A. M. Alexandrov, members of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR 
G. M. Korniyenko and M. D. Sytenko. On the 
American side: the Ambassador of the 
United States to the USSR Walter J. Stoes- 
sel, Jr., officials of the Department of State 
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Arthur A. Hartman, Al- 
fred L. Atherton, Carlyle E. Maw, William G. 
Hyland, and Jan M. Lodal of the Staff of the 
National Security Council. 

An exchange of views was held on a broad 
range of questions of mutual interest in con- 
nection with the preparation for the visit to 
the Soviet Union of the President of the 
United States, Richard Nixon. 

The sides noted with satisfaction that the 

" Issued at Moscow and Washington on Mar. 28 
(White House press release). 

April 22, 1974 


course taken by the two countries toward a 
relaxation of tension and a major improve- 
ment of relations between them continues to 
be implemented successfully and brings tan- 
gible results. The exceptional importance of 
the fundamental decisions adopted at the two 
previous Soviet-American summit meetings, 
first of all the basic principles of relations be- 
tween the USSR and the United States, the 
agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, 
and the agreements on the limitation of stra- 
tegic arms, has been convincingly demon- 

The sides are determined to pursue, on the 
basis of strict observance of the obligations 
they have assumed, the established policy 
aimed at making the process of improving 
Soviet-American relations irreversible. 

In the course of the discussions, consider- 
able attention was given to the problem of the 
further limitation of strategic arms. The 
sides agree that, despite the complexity of 
this problem, there are possibilities for reach- 
ing mutually acceptable solutions. They are 
determined to continue to make energetic ef- 
forts to find such solutions. Certain other 
questions relative to the area of arms limita- 
tion and disarmament were also considered. 

Noting the favorable development of bi- 
lateral relations in a number of directions de- 
termined by the agreements signed by the 
USSR and the United States, the two sides 
intend to develop further mutually beneficial 
ties and businesslike cooperation in different 
areas, including trade, economic and scien- 
tific and technological areas on a long-term 

In discussing international problems, par- 
ticular attention was paid to the state of af- 
fairs regarding a peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East. It was agreed that, taking into 
account their special role at the Geneva Peace 
Conference on the Middle East, the sides 
would make efforts to promote the solution of 
the key questions of the Middle East settle- 

The questions pertaining to security and 
cooperation in Europe were also examined, 
first of all the progress of the conference on 
security and cooperation in Europe and the 

state of the talks on the reduction of armed 
forces and armaments in Central Europe. 

The exchange of views was held in a con- 
structive and businesslike atmosphere. The 
sides are convinced that it has been an impor- 
tant stage in the preparation for the success- 
ful holding of the forthcoming Soviet-Amer- 
ican summit meeting and for Soviet-Amer- 
ican relations in general. 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Bonn 

En route to Moscow, Secretary Kissinger 
visited Bonn on March 2U and he met with 
Chancellor Willy Brandt and Foreign Minis- 
ter Walter Scheel. Following is the transcript 
of a news conference held that day by Secre- 
tary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Scheel.^ 

Press release 111 dated March 25 

Secretary Kissinger: If you permit me, I 
will speak in English so that you don't think 
my German has an anti-European intention. 
The Foreign Minister and I had our charac- 
teristically friendly, constructive, and wide- 
ranging discussion. I briefed him about our 
plans for the visit to the Soviet Union, and 
we achieved complete agreement about the 
line that the United States will take in the 
talks in the Soviet Union. 

Of course, a good part of our conversation 
concerned European-American relations. As 
far as the United States is concerned, it has 
always favored, and it continues to favor, the 
development of European unity in all re- 
spects, political as well as economic. 

The United States has always believed and 
continues to believe that the interests of Eu- 
rope and the United States are closely inter- 
twined. And we therefore believe that any 
thoughtful, systematic consideration of our 
policies will lead to the conclusion that our 
policies can pursue a parallel course without 
prejudice to the right of the European coun- 

' Secretary Kissinger's opening remarks and the 
first question and answer were in English. The re- 
mainder of the transcript is a translation from Ger- 
man by the American Embassy at Bonn. 


Department of State Bulletin 

tries, either individually or as a unit, to take 
a different view if they disagree. 

We have welcomed some of the ideas — in 
fact, all of the ideas — developed by the Gov- 
ernment of the Federal Republic to strength- 
en the consultation between Europe and the 
United States, and we have encouraged the 
Foreign Minister and the Federal Republic 
to pursue some of these ideas with their col- 
leagues in the European Community. As far 
as the United States is concerned, we will ap- 
proach these discussions with the attitude 
that the Atlantic relationship has always 
been and will remain the cornerstone of 
American foreign policy and that the unity of 
the West which has brought us to this point is 
even more important for the future. 

So I'd like to thank my friend Walter for 
the very warm reception that we have had 
here and for what I consider a very useful 
and positive talk. 

Foreign Minister Scheel: I believe that the 
most significant declaration that Mr. Kissin- 
ger has made here is that Atlantic coopera- 
tion remains the most important point for 
American foreign policy and that the United 
States, as in the time after the last war, sup- 
ports the policy of European unity. 

The meeting that we have just had was a 
consultation not only on the bilateral level 
but also a consultation of the United States 
with the member states of the European 
Community. And it was the latter which is 
the center of interest. 

I think we must recognize that as far as 
the United States is concerned this is not 
only and not even primarily a problem of the 
mechanics of consultation but rather that the 
foreign policy of the United States and the 
foreign policy of Europe must be guided by 
common and overriding interests. And when 
we recognize that, and I believe that no one 
among us would disagree, then one can de- 
velop the methods which lead to a meaningful 
way to conduct such a common policy. 

The brief visit on the way from Washing- 
ton to Moscow shows that the United States 
is very serious about providing a framework 
and a basis for this policy and about the level 
of consultation which is required. I am con- 

vinced the European countries have the same 
intention and that we will in the near future 
also come to a sensible set of principles. 

Thank you for having come, Henry, and I 
wish you success not only in your current 
trip but also in the coming months, for we all 
know how much depends on it for us — that 
you achieve the peace that we all wish. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, were you surprised to 
see the Chancellor again? 

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, yes, and I 
was very pleased. We had a very good talk. 

Q. Secretary Kissinger, Helmut Schmidt's 
visit to Washington, your brief visit rioiv in 
Bonn — do they mean that the Gerynan-Amer- 
ican relations are getting better or that rather 
there are increasing difficulties? 

Secretary Kissinger: The German-Ameri- 
can relationship was always good and is be- 
coming still better. 

Q. Before Moscow you go to Bonn; after 
Moscow you go to London. Why don't you go 
to Paris? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because I can on this 
trip go to only two places. 

Q. Don't you think the French might be- 
come annoyed? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are always pre- 
pared to further our bilateral relationship 
with France. It is not in our interest to dis- 
turb the unity of Europe or to make politics 
between the European states. 

Q. Did you also speak about disarmament, 
or did you speak about troop withdrawals 
from Europe? 

Secretary Kissinger: Only in the context 
of the MBFR [mutual and balanced force re- 
ductions] negotiations, which are taking 
place in Vienna, not as a unilateral American 

Q. And you spoke about consultations. Does 
that mean that in the future the Americans 
will be represented in Brussels on important 
questions of interest to the Americans? 

April 22, 1974 


Secretary Kissinger: As the Foreign Min- 
ister said, it is a problem of procedure and a 
problem of substance. We have given the 
Federal Government the green light to speak 
further with its colleagues about its ideas. 
Until that has been done, I don't believe that 
it would be proper for me to give details 
about it. 

Q. A last question: The trip of President 
Nixon to Germany and to Europe — is that 
still a topic ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We should first see 
how the evaluation of the relationship pro- 
ceeds. In principle there is nothing against it, 
but we want to have a concrete basis for it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, was this an example of 
how you envisage considtations in the fu- 
ture ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It was an example of 
an informal but intimate style of consulta- 

Q. What happened the last time, when af- 
ter your talks misunderstandings emerged ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I must have spoken 
in German. 

25th Anniversary of NATO 


A quarter-century ago, on April 4, 1949, in Wash- 
ington, twelve nations, united in a determination to 
preserve their freedoms, integrity, and common heri- 
tage, signed the North Atlantic Treaty. In succeeding 
years Greece, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of 
Germany became parties to that accord and members 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — which 
was established to fulfill the Treaty's commitment 
to a joint defense. 

In those early years the military threat to the West 
was clear. Today, while collective defense remains 
the first task of the alliance, opportunities have 
arisen — resulting from more than two decades of 
Western cohesion — which have allowed the allies to 
engage in a broad new enterprise aimed at reducing 
tensions between East and West. 

The Atlantic alliance remains the cornerstone of 
United States foreign policy. In addition to advanc- 
ing the cause of peace, members can enlarge the pur- 
poses of our historic alliance by reinvigorating our 
association to meet the interrelated security, political, 
economic, and environmental problems that confront 
us in the complex world of this decade and beyond. 
Understanding, cooperation, and consultation must 
be the hallmark of our on-going relationship. The 
achievements of the past must not be sacrificed to 
the pursuit of national interests narrowly conceived. 
I rededicate the United States today to that course, 
for it is only in this way that the Atlantic nations 
can truly serve the cause of peace and prosperity 
for succeeding generations. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of .\merica, do hereby direct the 
attention of the Nation to this the twenty-fifth anni- 
versary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty; 
and I call upon all agencies and officials of the Fed- 
eral Government, upon the Governors of the States, 
and upon the officers of local governments to encour- 
age and facilitate the suitable observance of this 
event throughout this 25th anniversary year with 
particular attention to .^pril, the month which marks 
the historic signing of the treaty. 

I also urge all citizens to participate in appropriate 
activities and ceremonies in recognition of the 
achievement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion and its contribution to America's security and 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this third day of .\pril, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the one hundred 

' No. 4282; 39 fed. Reg. 12329. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at London 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger on March 
28 at London, ivhere he met with Prime Min- 
ister Harold Wilson and Foreign Secretary 
James Callaghan after visiting Moscow. 

Press release 121 dated March 29 

Secretary Kissinger: I have been here so 
many times, and I have never had an occa- 
sion to meet you, so I thought we might have 
a brief question-and-answer session. I don't 
have any statements. 

Q. Would you say, Mr. Secretary, that your 
relations with the new British Government 
will be better than your relations with the 
former British government? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, my mega- 
lomania has reached a point where I was not 
aware of the fact that my relations with the 
old British government were bad, but I had 
a very good talk with the Foreign Secretary 
and with the Prime Minister, and I expect 
that the relations with the new British gov- 
ernment will be excellent. 

Q. Would you tell us something about your 
talks regarding the Middle East and Russia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I, as you know, have 
not yet had an opportunity to report to the 
President, and therefore I would prefer not 
to talk — not to comment on my talks in the 
Soviet Union at a press conference until I 
have reported to the President. But I'll talk 
about any other subject. 

Q. You won't talk today? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not today. When I re- 
turn to Washington I will report to the Pres- 
ident, and then I will have a press confer- 

Q. Do you feel as a result of your talks 

with Mr. Callaghan that there ivill be a great- 
er sense of partnership in the transatlantic 
alliance now ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that all coun- 
tries, including the United States, have under- 
stood as the result of the events of recent 
months that the Atlantic relationship is 
really too valuable to have destroyed as a re- 
sult of misunderstandings and essentially 
procedural disputes. I am confident, based on 
my discussions with Mr. Callaghan, that the 
relations between the United Kingdom and 
the United States will be very close, that the 
consultation will be as intimate as it has al- 
ways been, and that as a result also the rela- 
tionship between Europe and the United 
States will be one of partnership. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have a clearer 
view of the German proposal and the likeli- 
hood of its successes after your talks with 
Mr. Callaghan? 

Secretary Kissinger: My purpose in com- 
ing here was not to urge any particular line 
of policy on the British Government. It was 
my first opportunity to exchange views with 
Mr. Callaghan in his present position, and I 
think that the subject of the German pro- 
posals would be more appropriately discussed 
between the Government of the Federal Re- 
public and that of the United Kingdom. We 
repeated the view which we had already pub- 
licly stated in Bonn ; namely, that we are pre- 
pared for this German proposal to go for- 
ward and we would certainly give it a trial. 
But the decision has to be made by the Nine 
and by the British Government. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you talk about the 
importance of the necessity of these declara- 
tions which have been worked on between 
the United States and Em-ope, whether they 

April 22, 1974 


are a necessity, ^vhether they aren't that im- 
portant — what is their position today in your 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain what 
we had in mind when we proposed these dec- 
larations to begin with, because there has 
been so much debate in the interval that the 
original purpose may have been lost sight of. 

Our view was that a generation after the 
formation of the Atlantic alliance it was im- 
portant for the countries of the North Atlan- 
tic to ask themselves where they were going 
— that they could not simply run on the pur- 
poses of previous decades. We were aware of 
the fact that a new generation was growing 
up on both sides of the Atlantic to which the 
experience of the 1950's was no longer so rel- 
evant. Our concern in the United States was 
to fight the tendency in the United States to- 
ward isolationism. Absolutely the last thing 
we thought of at that time was a drive to- 
ward hegemony in Europe or to gain control 
over European decisionmaking. 

The whole thrust of our foreign policy had 
been to encourage European centers of deci- 
sion, or other centers of decision — I don't 
want to say European centers of decision par- 
ticularly — and that was expressed in every 
Presidential foreign policy report. It was 
therefore, quite candidly, with some amaze- 
ment that we found ourselves involved in 
endless disputes as if we were trying to get 
a document by which we could take our Eu- 
ropean allies to court if they did not fulfill 
certain of the phrases which we in turn were 
looking for to give some emotional content to 
this relationship. 

Since we were not attempting to achieve a 
legal contract, it is really now up to the Eu- 
ropean nations to decide how they want to 
give expression to the Atlantic relationship. 
It would be an absurdity if the attempt to 
strengthen the Atlantic relationship led to 
endless disputes and if countries felt — if 
leaders felt obliged to look for particular 
phrases like this — famous phrase or [inaudi- 
ble] become famous — that we wanted to con- 
fine Europe to a regional role while we as- 
serted a global role — actually if you read the 
speech you will find that this is listed as one 

of the obstacles to cooperation, not as an 
American prescription and it was certainly 
not our intention. 

So our view with respect to the declara- 
tions is this : We think that some expression 
of what the relationship might be like over 
the next decade could still be useful. Whether 
that occurs, however, is no longer up to us. 
We have made our proposal. We have no in- 
terest in forcing it on our allies, and we now 
are waiting for some European initiative. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your view that the 
77usundersta7idings that you spoke about are 
the results of genuinely divergent views? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I must say the 
subtlety of the question eludes me. [Laugh- 
ter.] But the views seem divergent enough, 
although it took us a long time to accept that 
there was a serious argument going on, be- 
cause many of the arguments that were made 
were so contrary to our intention that it took 
some while to recognize it. On the other hand, 
if we look at the reality and not at the for- 
mality of the debate, the interests of Europe 
and the United States on most issues are 

It is not in the American interest — it is in- 
deed beyond America's capability — to exer- 
cise hegemony in Europe. It is in our inter- 
ests that there be other centers of decision as 
long as our purposes are roughly parallel, as 
I deeply believe, and all of us believe, that 
the interests of Europe and the United States 
are. Within this framework the difi^erences 
that have arisen in recent months have 
seemed divergent enough and real enough, 
but I think they should be seen in the proper 
context; that is, as a family quarrel and not 
a conflict of basically different interests or 
different philosophies. 

Q. Coidd you help us at all on the Presi- 
dent's plans to visit Europe or the Soviet Un- 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the President's 
plans to visit the Soviet Union have been an- 
nounced, and one of the reasons for my visit 
to Moscow was to. prepare for this trip. His 
visit to Europe has always been seen in the 
context of some concrete achievement or some 


Department of State Bulletin 

specific purpose, and therefore, until the cur- 
rent discussion between the United States 
and its European allies has been clarified, it 
is difficult for us to set a precise date. 

Q. With all respect, sir, toward the need 
for confidentiality in your reports to the 
President, perhaps you might consider re- 
sponding to a more general question on Amer- 
ican-Soviet relations. If detente has the im- 
portance that you have prescribed to it, why 
wasn't it in the interests of the Russians, as 
it ivas to the Americans, to have achieved 
some kind of breakthrough in the talks dur- 
ing the past few days in Moscow ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that prog- 
ress was made in the nuclear talks in the last 
few days in Moscow. It is a subject of enor- 
mous complexity when two countries for the 
first time are trying to bring the qualitative 
arms race under some sort of discipline, not 
only the quantitative arms race. They are 
subjects of such complexity that even with 
the best of intentions and even if there is per- 
fect understanding on both sides, it will take 
some time to mature. Moreover, the relation- 
ship between the Soviet Union and the United 
States is composed of both competition and 
cooperation ; it is composed of ideological 
conflict and a necessity of coexistence. So 
there are profound ambiguities at every stage 
of this relationship. 

It is our conviction that the arsenals of 
mass destruction that are now available, that 
the enormous power that these countries pos- 
sess — for the sake of mankind they must 
attempt a very serious and determined ef- 
fort to coexist. We made such an efi'ort 
with respect to the nuclear arms race over 
recent days, and we made some progress. 
We had serious talks. Now, how [do] you 
define a breakthrough? When it is recog- 
nized for that, you have to let some time 
elapse ; but it's much too early to form a de- 
finitive judgment. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few days ago there 
seemed to be some indication that a new con- 
ceptualization might lead to some rapid prog- 
ress in the SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] discussions. As a result of yotir 

recent trip to Moscow, do you feel that this 
might be the case? 

Secretary Kissinger: Now you are getting 
me into the Moscow talks. I will answer this 
question, but then I'd appreciate it if we 
would get to other subjects. 

We had, as I pointed out, very serious talks 
which represented an advance over what has 
gone before and in which the concepts that 
might form the basis for an agreement were 
very seriously discussed and explored. At the 
same time it is a subject of enormous com- 
plexity, partly because it involves qualitative 
changes, partly because the two sides have 
designed their forces according to diflferent 
principles, so that it is hard to compare or to 
establish standards by which comparisons 
should be made. And so I think we have made 
progress. The degree of it will have to be de- 
termined by the follow-on talks which will be 
going on in Washington and Moscow. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, has there been any evi- 
dent change in the French attitude toward 
the United States and toward its relations 
with Europe and with particular reference 
to President Pompidou' s speech of today? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not yet had a 
chance to read the full text of President Pom- 
pidou's statement or the French Cabinet's 
statement today, and I therefore can't com- 
ment on it. 

Q. Can you tell us to what extent Mr. Cal- 
laghan proposed consultations with the 
United States on items of U.S. interest in the 
Common Market? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is fair to 
say that both sides agreed that there should 
be full consultations between the United 
Kingdom and the United States. As far as 
what items are now subjects of consultations 
within the Common Market are concerned, 
the Foreign Secretary has already stated his 
view in public and I believe that insofar as it 
is within the British power there will be full 
and satisfactory consultations. 

Q. If the British press can put in a ivord 
edgeivays — [Laughter. ] Canyon explain — 

April 22, 1974 


Secretary Kissinger: I knew there was a 
strange accent in this room. [Laughter.] 

Q. Can you explain your attitude toward 
the possibilities of Britain leaving the Com- 
mon Market if the conditions set out in the 
manifesto are now being accepted by other 
parties ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a mat- 
ter to be decided by the British Government 
in their negotiations between Great Britain 
and the Common Market. Our position in the 
past has been to support the Common Market 
and to support British membership in the 
Common Market. On the other hand, this par- 
ticular decision is for the British Govern- 
ment to make. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your talks this after- 
noon, ivere U.S. plans for Diego Garcia or 
the status of U.S. submarine bases in Scot- 
land discussed? If so, with what result? 

Secretary Kissinger: They weren't dis- 

Q. I realize that I may be getting back to 
topics you don't ivish to discuss, but do you 
have any impression of the timetable for the 
European Security Conference and the possi- 
bility of having a summit meeting in Mos- 

Secretary Kissinger: The timetable on the 
European Security Conference depends on 
the solution of three or four major issues. 
The United States is prepared, together with 
its allies, to make a serious effort to resolve 

As for the summit, or the level at which it 
is to be signed, every government up to now 
has more or less taken the position that it 
would be prepared to let the level at which it 
would be signed depend on the results of the 
conference. But frankly there has not yet 
been an agreement as to what results would 
justify what level. In fact, to the best of my 
knowledge there hasn't been a full discussion 
of what results would justify a summit, and 
we think that this is a discussion that now 
should take place among the Western nations. 

Q. Sir, Mr. Callaghan said that Britain will 
participate in a dialogue between the Com- 
mon Market and the Arabs provided that, 
first of all, misunderstandings between Eio- 
rope and the United States on this issue have 
bee?} cleared away. Could you say whether, as 
a result of your talks with Mr. Callaghan, 
those misunderstandings are, if not cleared 
away, at least less difficult? j 

Secretary Kissinger: Our concern with the 
dialogue between the Community and the 
Arab nations concerned the procedure by 
which this decision was made so short a time 
after we had met all of our colleagues at the 
Washington Conference and, secondly, cer- 
tain substantive aspects, particularly relat- 
ing to the Foreign Ministers' conference. 

We understand very well the problem that 
is faced by the British Government with re- 
spect to a decision that its partners have al- 
ready made. We explained our view with re- 
spect to those items that give us concern, but 
we are convinced that whatever the decision 
of the British Government it will not be an 
obstacle in our relationships. 

The press: Thank you, Mr. Kissinger. 

U.S. To Reopen Consulate General 
in Alexandria, Egypt 

Department Announcement ^ 

In keeping with the resumption of full dip- 
lomatic relations with Egypt and in light of 
increasing economic, commercial, and other 
activities which flow from the resumption of 
relations, the United States has informed the 
Government of Egypt of its intention to re- 
open our consulate general in Alexandria. 

We are currently engaged here in the De- 
partment in planning and coordinating the 
administrative details involved in stafling 
and operating the consulate general in Alex- 
andria. We expect to name and have our 
consul general in Alexandria by mid-May. 

' Read to news correspondents on Apr. 1 by John 
King, Director, Office of Press Relations. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger Responds to Senator Kennedy 
on Indochina Policy Issues 

Following is the text of a letter dated 
March 25 from Secretary Kissinger to Sena- 
tor Edivard M. Kennedy, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Refugees of the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary. 


March 25, 1974. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your 
letter of March 13 on various aspects of 
United States policy toward Indochina, I am 
enclosing our comment on the nine specific 
items you have outlined. I hope this infor- 
mation will be useful to you. As to the rec- 
ommendations of the Subcommittee's Study 
Mission to Indochina last year, which were 
enclosed with your letter, I have asked Gov- 
ernor Holton [Linwood Holton, Assistant 
Secretary for Congressional Relations] to 
review these and to prepare our comments 
for submission to you as soon as possible. 

Your letter also expresses concern over a 
March 6 cable by Ambassador [Graham] 
Martin commenting on a recent press article 
on the United States role in Viet-Nam. I do 
not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a 
cause-and-effect relationship between deci- 
sions in Hanoi and the views of any indi- 
vidual Members of Congress or their staffs. 
What he is describing is a very real and 
sophisticated propaganda effort by North 
Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spec- 
trum of Americans its own special view of 
the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador 
believes, and in this he has our full confi- 
dence and support, that we must counter 
these distortions emanating from Hanoi and 

continue to provide the best answers to the 
concerned questions many Americans have 
about our Indochina policy. 
Warm regards, 

Henry A. Kissinger. 


Comment on Indochina Policy Issues. 

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary, United States 


1) "The general character and objectives 
of American policy toivards Indochina as a 
whole and toivards each government or po- 
litical authority in the area;" 

There are two basic themes in our policy 
toward Indochina. The first is our belief that 
a secure peace in Indochina is an important 
element in our efforts to achieve a worldwide 
structure of peace. Conversely, we believe 
that an evolution toward peace in other 
troubled areas helps bring about the stability 
for which we strive in Indochina. Conse- 
quently, our Indochina policy has been geared 
to bring about the conditions which will en- 
able the contending parties to find a peaceful 
resolution of their differences. 

A resolution of differences can, of course, 
be achieved by other than peaceful means. 
For example, North Viet-Nam might seek 
to conquer South Viet-Nam by force of arms. 
Such a resolution, however, would almost 
certainly be a temporary one and would not 
produce the long-term and stable peace which 

April 22, 1974 


is essential. Therefore, a corollary to our 
search for peace, and the second theme of our 
policy, is to discourage the takeover of the 
various parts of Indochina by force. Forcible 
conciuest is not only repugnant to American 
traditions but also has serious destabilizing 
effects which are not limited to the area 
under immediate threat. 

We would stress the point that the United 
States has no desire to see any particular 
form of government or social system in the 
Indochina countries. What we do hope to see 
is a free choice by the people of Indochina 
as to the governments and systems under 
which they will live. To that end we have 
devoted immense human and material re- 
sources to assist them in protecting this right 
of choice. 

Our objective with regard to the Govern- 
ment of Viet-Nam, the Government of the 
Khmer Republic and the Royal Lao Govern- 
ment is to provide them with the material 
assistance and political encouragement which 
they need in determining their own futures 
and in helping to create conditions which will 
permit free decisions. In Laos, happily, real 
progress has been made, partly because of 
our assistance. The Vientiane Agreement 
and Protocols give clear evidence of the pos- 
sibility for the peaceful settlement our poli- 
cies are designed to foster. We have sup- 
ported the Royal Lao Government and, when 
it is formed, we will look with great sympa- 
thy on the Government of National Union. 
We welcome a peaceful and neutral Laos and, 
where appropriate, we will continue to en- 
courage the parties to work out their remain- 
ing problems. 

In Cambodia we are convinced that 
long-term prospects for stability would be 
enhanced by a cease-fire and a negotiated 
settlement among the Khmer elements to the 
conflict. Because such stability is in our inter- 
ests we are providing diplomatic and material 
support to the legitimate government of the 
Khmer Republic, both in its self-defense ef- 
forts and in its search for a political solution 
to the war. 

Our objective in Viet-Nam continues to be 
to help strengthen the conditions which made 

possible the Paris Agreement on Ending the 
War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam. With 
this in mind we have supported the Republic 
of Viet-Nam with both military and economic 
assistance. We believe that by providing the 
Vietnamese Government the necessary means 
to defend itself and to develop a viable econo- 
my, the government in Hanoi will conclude 
that political solutions are much preferable 
to renewed use of major military force. The 
presence of large numbers of North Viet- 
namese troops in the South demonstrates 
that the military threat from Hanoi is still 
very much in evidence. Because of that threat 
we must still ensure that the Republic of 
Viet-Nam has the means to protect its inde- 
pendence. We note, however, that the level of 
violence is markedly less than it was prior 
to the cease-fire and believe that our policy 
of support for South Viet-Nam has been 
instrumental in deterring major North Viet- 
namese oflfensives. 

Our objective with regard to the Demo- 
cratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and its southern 
arm, the Provisional Revolutionary Govern- 
ment, is to encourage full compliance with 
the Paris Agreement. We have been disap- 
pointed by North Viet-Nam's serious viola- 
tions of important provisions of the Agree- 
ment. However, we still believe that the 
Agreement provides a workable framework 
for a peaceful and lasting settlement, and 
we will continue to use all means available to 
us to support the cease-fire and to encourage 
closer observance of it. Our future relations 
with Hanoi obviously depend in large part 
on how faithfully North Viet-Nam complies 
with the Agreement. 

2) "The general content and nature of 
existing obligations and commitments to the 
governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and 

The U.S. has no bilateral written commit- 
ment to the Government of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam. However, as a signator of the 
Paris Agreement on Ending the War and 
Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, the United 
States committed itself to strengthening the 
conditions which made the cease-fire possible 


Department of State Bulletin 

and to the goal of the South Vietnamese 
people's right to self-determination. With 
these commitments in mind, we continue to 
provide to the Republic of Viet-Nam the 
means necessary for its self-defense and for 
its economic viability. 

We also recognize that we have derived a 
certain obligation from our long and deep 
involvement in Viet-Nam. Perceiving our 
own interest in a stable Viet-Nam free to 
make its own political choices, we have en- 
couraged the Vietnamese people in their 
struggle for independence. We have invested 
great human and material resources to sup- 
port them in protecting their own as well as 
broader interests. We have thus committed 
ourselves very substantially, both politically 
and morally. While the South Vietnamese 
Government and people are demonstrating 
increasing self-reliance, we believe it is im- 
portant that we continue our support as long 
as it is needed. 

Our relations with the Government of the 
Khmer Republic also do not stem from a 
formal commitment but are based on our 
own national interests. Recognizing that 
events in Cambodia relate directly to the 
bitter hostilities in other parts of Indochina, 
we have sought to help create stability in 
that country as a part of our effort to en- 
courage the development of peace in the en- 
tire region. We, therefore, support the 
legitimate government of Cambodia, in the 
hope that its increasing strength will en- 
courage the Khmer Communists toward a 
political settlement rather than continued 

We have also undertaken our assistance to 
Laos and support for the Royal Lao Govern- 
ment because of our own broad national 
interests, not because of any formal commit- 
ment to that country. The most important 
and visible of our interests is our desire for 
a just settlement of the tragic war in Indo- 
china. Laos plays a key role in this effort to 
achieve the peace. Indeed, Laos is the bright 
spot in Indochina where the fruits of our 
efforts to assist and support the Royal Lao 
Government are most clearly seen. A cease- 
fire based on an agreement worked out by 

the two Lao parties has endured for more 
than a year. The two parties have together 
organized joint security forces in the two 
capital cities of Vientiane and Luang Pra- 
bang and a coalition government may not be 
far away. We feel that these large steps 
toward a lasting peace in Laos would prob- 
ably not have succeeeded but for our stead- 
fast support for the efforts of the Royal Lao 

3) "The kinds, categories and levels of 
support and assistance given or projected to 
the governments in Saigon, Phnom Penh and 
Vientiane for fiscal year 1973 through 1975 
— including (a) a breakdown of the number, 
distribution, activities and agency /depart- 
mental association of official American per- 
sonnel, as well as those associated with 
private business and other organizations 
under contract to the United States govern- 
ment; and (b) a breakdown from all sources 
of humanitarian assistance, police and public 
safety oriented assistance, general support- 
ing and economic development assistance, 
and military assistance;" 

(a) U.S. Economic Assistance 

Our annual Congressional Presentation 
books provide the data requested here in con- 
siderable detail. These Congressional Pres- 
entation books for FY 1975 will shortly be 
delivered to the Congress. We provide these 
first, as a matter of course, to the authorizing 
and appropriations Committees of the Senate 
and the House and then routinely make them 
available to all Members as well as the inter- 
ested public. We will be happy to provide 
your Subcommittee on Refugees with copies 
as soon as available. 

The Congressional Presentation books 
focus, of course, on our proposals for the 
coming year, FY 1975, but also contain data 
on both the current fiscal year, FY 1974, and 
the preceding, FY 1973. This year, as last, 
we are preparing a separate book providing 
the details of our economic assistance pro- 
grams for the Indochina countries. 

These Congressional Presentation books 
form a partial basis, of course, for extensive 

April 22, 1974 


Hearings held each year by the authorizing 
committees in the Senate and House, and 
then by the appropriations committees. We 
would expect the question you pose, as well 
as many others, to be further explored in 
considerable depth during the course of these 

(b) U.S. Military Assistance 

Our military assistance to South Viet-Nam 
and Laos is provided under MASF [military 
assistance service funded]. The breakdown 
of this assistance for the period you re- 
quested is as follows: 


FY 1973 
FY 1974 
FY 1975 


$2,735 Billion 
1.126 Billion 
1.6 Billion 

New Obligational 

$2,563 Billion 
907.5 Million 
1.450 Billion a 

The level of official U.S. military/civilian 
personnel in South Viet-Nam during the 
same period is as follows: 


23,516 (Assigned) 
221 (Authorized) 
221 (Authorized) 






January, 1973 
January, 1974 
June, 1974 

The number of U.S. civilian contractors 
has declined from 5,737 in January, 1973, 
to 2,736 in January, 1974. This number is 
expected to decrease further to 2,130 by 
June, 1974. We do not yet have a projected 
level of U.S. civilian contractors for FY 1975. 

Our military assistance to Cambodia is 
furnished under MAP [military assistance 
program]. This assistance totalled $148.6 
million in FY 1973 and $325 million in FY 
1974. The level of our military assistance for 
FY 1975 is now under review. The amount to 
be proposed will be included in the Congres- 
sional presentation documents on military 
assistance which we expect to submit to Con- 
gress shortly. 

U.S. military and civilian personnel in 
Cambodia during the period you requested is 
as follows: 


December, 1972 
December, 1973 
December, 1974 






U.S. military and civilian personnel in 
Laos during the period you requested is as 




December, 1972 



December, 1973 



December, 1974 



Jf) "The current status and problems of 
reported efforts to establish an intemxitional 
consortium for general reconstruction assist- 
ance to the area." 

In April 1973, President Thieu asked the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) to help form an aid 
group for the Republic of Viet-Nam. The 
IBRD agreed to make the effort, provided 
that this would be acceptable to the Bank 
membership and that the group could be 
organized in association with both the IBRD 
and the Asian Development Bank. In May 
the World Bank sent a study mission to Viet- 
Nam to review the situation. In August, 
Japan suggested that the Bank arrange a 
preliminary meeting to exchange views on 
aid to the countries of Indochina. The Japa- 
nese also proposed that the member countries 
discuss the formation of a loose Indochina 
consultative group for the areawide coordi- 
nation, with sub-groups for any of the four 
countries concerned which might request 
such a group and where conditions were 

An initial meeting was held at the Bank's 
Paris office in October. The United States 
supported the Bank's efforts as well as the 
Japanese proposal. The Bank sent a second 
mission to Viet-Nam in November and sub- 
sequently proposed that a follow-on meeting 
be held in February of this year to discuss 
the formation of the Indochina consultative 

a Viet-Nam only; Laos will be included under 
MAP for FY-75. 

* Data Not Available. 
** Based on the assumption that a coalition gov- 
ernment will be formed in Laos before the end of 
this year. 


Department of State Bulletin 

group. However, the reactions of participat- 
ing countries to the energy crisis and to the 
Congressional decision on IDA [Interna- 
tional Development Association] replenish- 
ment led the Bank to postpone the meeting, 
tentatively until late Spring. In February, 
at the request of the Lao Government, a 
World Bank team also visited Laos to assess 
the situation and to discuss a possible con- 
sultative group for that country. 

The United States continues to support 
efforts to form an Indochina consultative 
group. We also favor the proposal that there 
be sub-groups for each recipient country to 
which donors may contribute as they wish. 
The sub-groups would be formed when con- 
sidered appropriate by donors and at the 
request of the recipient. We remain in close 
consultation with the World Bank and other 
interested parties on this matter. We are 
hopeful that a second meeting of participants 
might be held in the near future and that 
such a meeting might lead to the establish- 
ment of the groups in question. A reversal 
of the negative Congressional action on IDA 
replenishment would clearly enhance the 
possibility of success in this regard. 

5) "The current status and problems of 
the Administration's stated intention to en- 
courage internationalizing humanitarian as- 
sistance to the area;" 

In addition to U.S. bilateral humanitarian 
assistance to the Indochina countries which 
totals $111.4 million for FY 1974, the De- 
partment and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) continue to encourage 
other donors, including international organi- 
zations, to provide such assistance. AID 
made a grant of $2 million on November 1, 
1973, to the Indochina Operations Group of 
the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and discussions are continuing about 
an additional grant to that organization. 
UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund] 
has recently completed its study of the prob- 
lems in the Indochina countries and has just 
submitted its proposed program to possible 
donor countries. We have encouraged UNI- 
CEF in its study and are pleased that it is 

now prepared to expand its activities in all 
three countries. 

The World Health Organization has had 
meaningful programs in Laos, Cambodia, 
and Viet-Nam which supplement and do 
not overlap with activities supported by the 
United States. We have encouraged that 
organization to play an even more important 
I'ole, particularly in the malaria control pro- 
gram, and we at the same time would phase 
out of our activities in that field. 

Our discussions with Indochina countries 
have stressed the desirability of establishing 
plans and priorities for programs and proj- 
ects which require assistance so that other 
donor countries and organizations can fit 
their assistance eff"orts into the host country 

6) "The current stat7is of negotiations be- 
tween Washington and Hanoi on American 
reconstruction assistance to North Viet- 

Following the conclusion of the Peace 
Agreement last year, preliminary discus- 
sions of post-war reconstruction were held 
in Paris between U.S. and North Vietnamese 
members of the Joint Economic Commission. 
These talks have been suspended since last 
July. The Administration's position, which 
we believe is shared by the great majority 
of members of Congress, is that the U.S. 
cannot at this time move forward with an 
assistance program for North Viet-Nam. To 
date. North Viet-Nam has failed substan- 
tially to live up to a number of the essential 
terms of the Agreement, including those re- 
lating to the introduction of troops and war 
materiel into South Viet-Nam, the cessation 
of military activities in Cambodia and Laos, 
and the accounting for our missing-in-action. 
Should Hanoi turn away from a military 
solution and demonstrate a serious compli- 
ance with the Agreement, then we would be 
prepared, with the approval of Congress, 
to proceed with our undertaking regard- 
ing reconstruction assistance to North Viet- 

7) "The Department's assessment on the 

April 22, 1974 


implementation of the ceasefire agreements 
for both Viet-Nam and Laos;" 

The cease-fire in Viet-Nam has resulted 
in a substantial decrease in the level of hos- 
tilities; for example, military casualties since 
the cease-fire have been about one-third the 
level of casualties suffered in the years pre- 
ceding the Paris Agreement. Nonetheless, it 
is unfortunately evident that significant vio- 
lence continues to occur and that the cease- 
fire is far from scrupulously observed. The 
fundamental problem is that the North Viet- 
namese are still determined to seize political 
power in the South, using military means if 
necessary. To this end they have maintained 
unrelenting military pressure against the 
South Vietnamese Government and have con- 
tinued widespread terrorism against the pop- 
ulation. In particularly flagrant violation of 
the Agreement North Viet-Nam has per- 
sisted in its infiltration of men and materiel 
into the South, bringing in more than one 
hundred thousand troops and large quantities 
of heavy equipment since the cease-fire be- 
gan. South Vietnamese forces have reacted 
against these attacks by North Vietnamese 
forces and several sizable engagements have 
taken place. 

Despite these serious violations, we con- 
tinue to believe that the Paris Agreement 
has already brought substantial benefits and 
continues to provide a workable framework 
for peace. After more than a quarter century 
of fighting it would have been unrealistic to 
expect that the Agreement would bring an 
instant and complete end to the conflict. What 
it has done, however, is to reduce the level 
of violence significantly and provide mech- 
anisms for discussion. The two Vietnamese 
parties are talking to each other and are 
achieving some results, even if these results 
are much less than we would like to see. The 
final exchange of prisoners which was com- 
pleted on March 7 is illustrative. 

We assess the cease-fire agreement in Laos 
as being so far largely successful. The level 
of combat was reduced substantially immedi- 
ately following the cease-fire and has since 
fallen to a handful of incidents per week. 

There is hope that if developments continue 
as they have, the Laos cease-fire will work 
and the Lao, through their own efforts, will 
be able to establish a coalition government 
and a stable peace in their country. 

8) "The Department's assessment of the 
overall situation in Cambodia and the possi- 
bility for a ceasefire agreement." 

Despite continued pressure by the Khmer 
insurgents, now generally under the control 
of the Khmer Communist Party, the Khmer 
armed forces have successfully repulsed two 
major insurgent operations, one against 
Kompong Cham and, more recently, against 
Phnom Penh, with no U.S. combat support. 
Serious military problems remain, and con- 
tinued hard fighting during the next few 
months is expected, both in the provinces and 
around the capital. 

A broadened political base, a new Prime 
Minister and a more effective cabinet offer 
signs of improvements in the civil adminis- 
tration. The enormous dislocation of war, 
destroying production, producing over a mil- 
lion refugees and encouraging spiralling 
inflation, face the leaders of the Khmer Re- 
public with serious problems. 

Nonetheless, we are convinced that with 
U.S. material and diplomatic support the 
Khmer Republic's demonstration of military 
and economic viability will persuade their 
now intransigent opponents to move to a 
political solution of the Cambodian conflict. 
The Khmer Republic's Foreign Minister on 
March 21 reiterated his government's posi- 
tion that a solution for Cambodia should be 
peaceful and not forced by arms or capitula- 
tion. Instead, his government will continue 
to seek talks with the other side. His govern- 
ment hopes their eflforts for peace will achieve 
some results after the current insurgent 

9) "Recent diplomatic initiatives, involv- 
ing the United States, aimed at a reduction 
of violence in Indochina and a greater meas- 
ure of normalization in the area." 

Since the signing of the Viet-Nam cease- 
fire agreement, the United States has been 


Department of State Bulletin 

in constant liaison with the interested 
parties, including those outside of the Indo- 
china area. While it would not be useful to 
provide details of all of these contacts, we 
can assure the Congress that we have used 
every means at our disposal to encourage a 
reduction in the level of violence and an 
orderly resolution of the conflict. We believe 
these measures have had some success. The 
level of fighting is down substantially from 
1972 and the Vietnamese parties have taken 
at least beginning steps toward a satisfac- 
tory accommodation. Further, the interested 
outside parties remain basically committed 
to building on the framework of the cease- 
fire agreement. 

When Hanoi established a pattern of seri- 
ous violations of the Agreement shortly after 
its conclusion. Dr. Kissinger met with Special 
Adviser Le Due Tho and negotiated the Paris 
communique of June 13, 1973, with a view 
to stabilizing the situation. Secretary Kissin- 
ger returned to Paris in December, 1973, to 
again discuss with Special Adviser Tho the 
status of the implementation of the Agree- 
ment. We will continue to maintain such 
contacts with Vietnamese and other parties 
in the hope that Hanoi will eventually be 
persuaded that its interests lie in peaceful 
development rather than in conflict. 

In Laos, we have oflTered every encourage- 
ment to an evolution toward peace. At this 
time the Laotian parties are making great 
progress in the formation of a government 
of national union. We can help in this regard 
with our sympathy and encouragement while 
properly leaving the issue in the hands of 
those most interested, the Lao people. 

The Government of the Khmer Republic, 
with our complete endorsement, has made 
notable eff'orts to terminate the hostilities in 
that country. Following the cease-fire in Viet- 
Nam, the Cambodian Government unilater- 
ally ceased hostile activity by its forces in 
the hope that the other side would respond. 
Unfortunately that striking gesture was re- 
buffed. On frequent occasions thereafter the 
Khmer Republic made proposals designed to 
move the conflict from the battlefield to po- 
litical fora, with our strong support in each 

instance. Although all of those proposals 
have been ignored by the Khmer Commu- 
nists, we continue to hope that the current 
relative military balance will make apparent 
to the other side what the Khmer Republic 
has already perceived, that peace is a far 
more hopeful prospect for Cambodia than 
incessant conflict. 

U.S. Representatives Named to Centre 
for Investment Dispute Settlement 

White House press release dated March 6 

President Nixon announced on March 6 
the appointments of Maxwell M. Rabb, of 
New York, N.Y., and Margaret Capobianco 
Scott, of Brighton, Mass., as Representative 
of the United States of America and Alter- 
nate Representative of the United States of 
America, respectively, on the Administrative 
Council of the International Centre for Set- 
tlement of Investment Disputes. Mr. Rabb is 
a partner in the New York law firm of 
Stroock, Stroock & Lavan. Mrs. Scott is a 
judge of the municipal court of the Dor- 
chester district, Dorchester, Mass. 

The President also announced the designa- 
tion of eight persons as members of the Panel 
of Conciliators and the Panel of Arbitrators 
of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment of Disputes for terms of six 
years. They are : 

Panel of Conciliators: 

Nathaniel J. Ely, of Bethesda, Md., attorney 
specializing in administrative law. 

William H. G. Fitzgerald, of Washington, D.C., 
first vice president, Hornblower and Weeks- 
Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., New York, N.Y. 

Gilbert L. Maton, of Falls Church, Va., president, 
John I. Thompson and Company, Rockville, Md. 

Betty Southard Murphy, of Annandale, Va., part- 
ner, law firm of Wilson, Woods & Villalon, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 

Panel of Arbitrators : 

Dixon R. Harwin, of Beverly Hills, Calif., pro- 
fessor of economics, Glendale College, Glendale, 

April 22, 1974 


John Finlay Hotchkis, of Pasadena, Calif., presi- 
dent, chief executive officer, and director, Trust 
Company of the West, Los Angeles, Calif. 

Henry Salvatori, of Los Angeles, Calif., president. 
Grant Oil Tool Company, Los Angeles. 

Henry E. Seyfarth, of Harrington Hills, HI., mem- 
ber of the law firm of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fair- 
weather and Geraldson, Chicago, 111. 

The International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes is an international or- 
ganization affiliated with the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and is headquartered in Washington, D.C. 
The Centre offers facilities for the arbitra- 
tion and conciliation of investment disputes 
between private investors of one country and 
the governments of other countries. The Cen- 
tre maintains panels of arbitrators and con- 
ciliators from which the parties to a dispute 
may choose persons to sit on an arbitration 
tribunal or a conciliation commission. 

International Women's Year 1975 


There is a growing awareness today of the signifi- 
cant contributions that American women have made 
to our country's development, its culture, and its 
social and economic life. Women have enriched our 
society as homemakers and mothers and our com- 
munity life through dedicated service as volunteers. 
Their entry into the labor force in increasing num- 
bers has strengthened and expanded our economy. 
Despite these important contributions, women con- 
tinue to face inequities as they seek a broader role in 
the life of our Nation. 

In recent years, we have made significant progress 
toward remedying this situation, not only by striking 
down barriers to the employment and advancement 
of women in Government, but by ending discrimina- 
tory practices in other fields through legislation. 
Executive order, and judicial decree. Even when 
legal equality is achieved, however, traditional dis- 
criminatory attitudes, beliefs and practices may per- 
sist, preventing women from enjoying the full and 
equal rights that they deserve. 

This Administration is committed to providing an 
opportunity for women to participate on an equal 
basis with men in our national life. We support the 
Equal Rights Amendment, we are moving vigorously 
to ensure full equal employment opportunity for 
women in the Federal service, and we are enforcing 
the law requiring similar eff'orts in business and 
institutions which receive Federal contracts or as- 

The United Nations General Assembly, by adop- 
tion of Resolution 3010 of December 18, 1972, desig- 
nated 1975 as International Women's Year. This 
resolution off'ers an exceptional opportunity to inten- 
sify the national effort already underway in the 
United States to further advance the status of 

In observing International Women's Year, we 
should emphasize the role of women in the economy, 
their accomplishments in the professions, in Govern- 
ment, in the arts and humanities, and in their roles 
as wives and mothers. 

The Congress approved the Equal Rights Amend- 
ment to the Constitution in 1972. It would be a 
fitting tribute to America's women to complete the 
ratification of this amendment by 1975. 

Let us begin now to work together, men and 
women, to make 1975 an outstanding year for 
women in the United States, and lend our support 
to the advancement of women around the world. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby designate 
the year 1975 as International Women's Year in the 
United States. I call upon the Congress and the 
people of the United States, interested groups and 
organizations, officials of the Federal Government 
and of State and local governments, educational in- 
stitutions, and all others who can be of help, to 
begin now to provide for the observance of Interna- 
tional Women's Year with practical and constructive 
measures for the advancement of the status of 
women, and also to cooperate with the activities and 
observances to be arranged under the auspices of the 
United Nations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this thirtieth day of January in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the In- 
dependence of the United States of America the one 
hundred ninety-eighth. 

' No. 4262; 39 Fed. Reg. 4061. 


Department of State Bulletin 


U.S. Policy Toward Panama, 1 903-Present: 

Questions of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations 

and Instances of U.S. Intervention 



This table is one of a series on U.S. policy toward various Latin American countries be- 
ing prepared at the request of the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Jack B. 
Kubisch. It briefly describes events pertaining to three aspects of U.S. policy toward Pan- 
ama: (1) questions of recognition arising from changes of government in Panama, (2) in- 
terruptions of diplomatic relations resulting from incidents of serious friction between the 
two countries or from changes of government in Panama, and (3) cases of U.S. supervision 
of Panamanian elections or actual U.S. military intervention under rights, accorded by the 
1903 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and the 1904 Panamanian Constitution, which the United 
States formally relinquished by a treaty signed in 1936. The table does not, however, cover 
those instances where the possibility of U.S. intervention was merely raised, nor does it deal 
with the issue of the Canal Zone as a perennial source of tension between the two countries. 

This project is based upon published and unpublished official documents and, especially 
in the description of developments in Panama, upon published secondary works. It represents 
a substantial revision and updating of this Office's Research Project No. 328, "United States 
Recognition of Latin American Governments: A Tabular Summary of United States Recog- 
nition Action on Changes and Attempted Changes of Government and of Chief Executives; 
Part 3, Panama, 1908-1952". 

The research and drafting for the revised table were done by Dr. Ronald D. Landa under 
the direction of Dr. Mary P. Chapman, Chief of the Area Studies Branch. 

The Historical Office would appreciate being informed of any inaccuracies. 

Edv^^in S. Costrell 

Chief, Historical Studies Division 

Historical Office 

Bureau of Public Affairs 

Research Project No. 1066C (Revised) 
March 1974 

April 22, 1974 433 

Developments U.S. Response 

Nov. 3, 1903. Panamanians, with the aid of the chief lobbyist in Wash- 
ington of a French canal company, Philippe Bunau-Varilla, revolted against 
the Colombian Government and declared Panama's independence. Several 
U.S. naval vessels, one of which arrived at Colon the day before, had been 
ordered to maintain "free and uninterrupted transit" in the Isthmus and 
to prevent the landing of Colombian forces called upon to quell the insur- 
rection. A provisional government junta was established. 

Nov. 6. The Consul in Colon, Oscar Malmros, belatedly arrived at a 
ceremony in that city proclaiming the Republic of Panama and told the 
Governor of Colon Province that his presence, as well as that of the British 
and French Consuls, "must not be looked upon as recognition of [the] 
revolutionary state by their respective Governments." 

Nov. 6. The United States extended de facto recognition to the Govern- 
ment of Panama when Secretary of State John Hay gave the following in- 
structions to the Vice-Consul-General in Panama City, Felix Ehrman : 
"When you are satisfied that a de facto government, republican in form, 
and without substantial opposition from its own people, has been estab- 
lished in the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the 
responsible Government of the territory and look to it for all due action 
to protect the persons and property of citizens of the United States and to 
keep open the issue of the isthmian transit in accordance with the obliga- 
tions of existing treaties governing the relation of the United States to 
that territory." The substance of this message was also sent to the U.S. 
Legation in Colombia and to the Colombian Legation in Washington. 

Nov. 7. Having received Hay's instructions and "being satisfied that 
there was a de facto government established," Ehrman wrote to the junta 
that it "would be held responsible for the protection of the persons and 
property of American citizens, as well as carrying out treaty obligations" 
with respect to the Isthmus. 

Nov. 7. The Minister in Bogota, Arthur M. Beaupre, informed the De- 
partment of State that Colombian General Rafael Reyes had urged the 
President of Mexico to ask the United States and all countries represented 
at a Pan-American Conference "to aid Colombia to preserve her integrity" 
and had expressed the hope that the United States would not recognize 
"the new government." 

Nov. 13. President Theodore Roosevelt formally accepted Bunau-Vari- 
lla's credentials as Panama's first Minister to the United States, thus grant- 
ing de jure recognition to the Government of Panama. 

Nov. 18. The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty was signed in Washington. 
Under Article I, the United States promised to guarantee and maintain 
the independence of Panama. Other articles granted the United States the 
right to build a canal across the Isthmus on a strip of land leased in perpe- 
tuity, and the right to intervene in the cities of Panama and Colon to 
maintain public order and adequate sanitation if Panama was unable to do 


434 Department of State Bulletin 

Developments U.S. Response 

Dec. 25. William I. Buchanan presented to the junta his credentials as 
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary on Special Mission to 

Jan. 4, 1904. President Roosevelt's lengthy message to Congress an- 
swering criticism of the prompt recognition of Panama by the United 
States included the following summation : "In view of the manifold con- 
siderations of treaty right and obligation, of national interest and safety, 
and of collective civilization, by which our Government was constrained to 
act, I am at a loss to comprehend the attitude of those who can discern in 
the recognition of the Republic of Panama only a general approval of the 
principle of revolution by which a given government is overturned or one 
portion of a country separated from another. Only the amplest justifica- 
tion can warrant a revolutionary movement of either kind. But there is 
no fixed rule which can be applied to all such movements. Each case must 
be judged on its own merits." 

Feb. 13. A Panamanian Constitutional Convention adopted a constitu- 
tion. Article 136, agreed upon only after stormy debate and at the urging 
of Minister Buchanan, permitted the United States to "intervene in any 
part of the Republic of Panama to reestablish public peace and constitu- 
tional order in the event of their being disturbed . . . ." 

Jan. 28, 1908. In an open letter, President Manuel Amador Guerrero 
announced that he would not be a candidate for re-election later in the year. 

Mar. 12. Secretary of War William Howard Taft wrote to Joseph 
C. S. Blackburn, the Governor of the Canal Zone, regarding his fear that 
President Amador was supporting Ricardo Arias' candidacy for President 
instead of that of Jose Domingo de Obaldia, whom Taft favored. Taft ad- 
vised Blackburn to try to strengthen Amador in support of Obaldia, be- 
cause his backing of Arias "will ultimately lead to corruption and great 
friction between the United States and Panama . . . ." 

May 12. After discussions with Blackburn and with U.S. Minister 
Herbert G. Squiers during a visit to Panama, Taft concluded that Amador's 
support would make Arias' election a certainty. Therefore, Taft called on 
Amador and gave him a formal letter, asking him to request U.S. super- 
vision of the election because of alleged irregularities. Taft indicated that 
President Roosevelt had authorized him to say that the United States 
Government would "consider any attempt at election of a successor by 
fraudulent method or methods ... a disturbance of public order which, 
under Panama's constitution, requires intervention, and this Government 
will not permit Panama to pass into the hands of anyone so elected." 

May 15. Amador officially requested the U.S. Government to name an 
electoral commission which would cooperate with a Panamanian commis- 
sion in the supervision of the Presidential election. 

April 22, 1974 435 

Developments U.S. Response 

May 15. The United States accepted the invitation to supervise the 
Presidential election and appointed fourteen commissioners who, along 
with the Panamanian commission, would visit the provinces and hear com- 
plaints during the election campaign. 

June 28. In municipal elections which the United States had refused 
to supervise with troops from the Canal Zone, despite requests to do so by 
Obaldia, Obaldia's slate carried both Colon and Panama City and did well 
throughout the country. 

July 4. Sensing U.S. support for Obaldia, Arias announced his with- 
drawal from the Presidential election. 

July 12. With Arias' supporters staying away from the polls, Obaldia 
won an easy victory in the election. 

Oct. 1. Obaldia was inaugurated President. Outgoing President Ama- 
dor, as well as Arias and important officials of his party, refused to at- 
tend the inauguration. 

Mar. 2, 1910. The second designate, Carlos A. Mendoza, became Act- 
ing President, succeeding to that office upon the death of President Obaldia. 
Mendoza succeeded because the first designate had died the previous year. 

Mar. 4. Charge d'Affaires George T. Weitzel informed the Depart- 
ment of State of his belief that Mendoza's induction as President was 
"irregular" because of an unexplained variation in the manner of his tak- 
ing the oath of office. 

Mar. 7. When Weitzel expressed some reluctance to recognize the Men- 
doza government, the Department of State informed him that it "has been 
our fixed rule to regard only de facto conditions attending the administra- 
tion and operation of foreign governments and that de jure considerations 
are never examined and do not influence our action." 

July 1. In the elections for delegates to the National Assembly, which 
in September would select new Presidential designates, one of whom would 
serve out the remainder of Obaldia's term, Mendoza's party won 20 of the 
28 seats. 

July 28. Charge Richard 0. Marsh informed the Department of State 
that the National Assembly, given its composition, would probably select 
Mendoza as first designate and Acting President. Marsh, along with what 
he termed "other impartial observers", believed that Mendoza's selection 
as first designate "would certainly be contrary to the spirit and intention 
of the Constitution of Panama", which prohibited a President from suc- 
ceeding himself. 

436 Department of State Bulletin 

Developments U.S. Response 

Aug. 15. Mendoza announced officially that he was a candidate for first 

Aug. 15. Marsh reiterated what he had already told the Department 
of State on several occasions, that Mendoza's election would be "detri- 
mental to the good interests of Panama, of the Canal Zone and of Amer- 
ican influence". The only way it could be prevented, Marsh contended, was 
for the United States Government to state that it would consider Men- 
doza's election unconstitutional. 

Aug. 20. When a representative of Mendoza approached Marsh and 
inquired about a rumor that the United States would oppose Mendoza's 
candidacy, Marsh personally advised him that Mendoza should withdraw 
from the election and thus avoid the constitutional question. 

Aug. 20. Mendoza agreed to Marsh's suggestion, on the condition that 
the United States would not oppose his taking a position in the Cabinet 
as Secretary of the Interior and of Finance. 

Aug. 22. Marsh was informed that "the arrangement suggested by 
President Mendoza would be entirely satisfactory to the Government of 
the United States . . . ." 

Aug. 29. Mendoza publicly withdrew his candidacy. 

Sept. 2. Responding to rumors that he had threatened U.S. military 
occupation and annexation if the National Assembly failed to select his 
favorite, Samuel Lewis, as first designate. Marsh told Washington that he 
did not think he had "unnecessarily mixed in local politics" and that he 
earnestly believed that unless Lewis were elected "trouble will follow." 

Sept. 8. Although it also favored the selection of Lewis, the Depart- 
ment of State, in order to dispel the rumors about Marsh's alleged state- 
ments, issued a public statement that "any candidate not otherwise legiti- 
mately objectionable and who has the necessary constitutional qualifica- 
tions and who is duly elected in legal form will be agreeable ... to this 
government." The Department informed Marsh that it had made such a 

Sept. 9. Marsh again denied that he had ever made any threats of in- 
tervention and complained that "the effect of the Department's open denial 
of the suppositious [sic] statement by me at this time has had the effect of 
preventing the election of Lewis which was otherwise assured today." 

Sept. 9. The National Assembly postponed the selection of Presidential 

Sept. 12. Having earlier expressed the belief that Marsh should be disci- 
plined and removed from Panama, President Taft told Acting Secretary 
of State Huntington Wilson that Marsh was "utterly unfit" to represent 
the United States in Panama. 

April 22, 1974 437 

Developments U.S. Response 

Sept. 14. The National Assembly elected Pablo Arosemena as first desig- 
nate and Federico Boyd as second designate. 

Sept. 26. Marsh left Panama after being officially recalled to Washington. 

Oct. 1. Federico Boyd became Acting President until Arosemena could 
return from his post as Minister to Chile. 

Apr. 25, 1912. Fearing that the party of President Pablo Arosemena 
would rig the Presidential election in favor of its candidate, Pedro A. Diaz, 
the supporters of Belisario Porras left a petition with the U.S. Minister, 
H. Percival Dodge, requesting U.S. supervision of the registration as well 
as of the municipal and Presidential elections that summer. 

May 6. The Panamanian Minister in Washington informed the Depart- 
ment of State that his government also was requesting U.S. supervision. 

May 10. Upon the suggestion of Minister Dodge, Acting Secretary of 
State Wilson advised President Taft that the U.S. should intervene in 
Panama and supervise the elections as "the only way of avoiding serious 
disturbances and securing fair elections." Taft agreed with Wilson's 

May 13. Wilson informed the Panamanian Minister of Taft's acceptance 
of the request to intervene and of his decision to appoint an electoral com- 
mittee headed by Dodge. 

June 30. Despite efforts, in Dodge's opinion, by Arosemena and the 
Government of Panama to restrict the powers of the U.S. supervisors, the 
municipal elections were held under U.S. supervision and resulted in sweep- 
ing victories for the Porras candidates. 

July 11. Secretary of State Philander Knox informed Dodge that the 
Panamanian Minister had asked President Taft to approve the postpone- 
ment of the Presidential election and had made several charges that the 
U.S. supervisors had been partial toward Porras, "none of which the 
Department considers well-founded." Knox stated that the U.S. would not 
take part in postponing the election. 

July 12. The supporters of Diaz issued a long manifesto announcing his 
withdrawal as a Presidential candidate and again charging that the U.S. 
supervisors were guilty of fraud and of partiality to Porras. 

July 14. Porras was easily elected President. Diaz's supporters did not 
take part in the voting. 

Oct. 1. Porras was inaugurated President. 

June 3, 1918. As first designate to the Presidency, Giro L. Urriola suc- 
ceeded to that office upon the death of President Ramon M. Valdes. 

438 Department of State Bulletin 

Developments U.S. Response 

June 21. In an atmosphere of increasing political strife, the Urriola 
government issued a decree postponing municipal and national elections. 

June 24. The Department of State instructed the U.S. Legation to inform 
the Government of Panama that it considered the decree unconstitutional. 

June 28. Without the request of the Government of Panama, U.S. troops 
marched into the cities of Panama and Colon and assumed control under 
the provisions of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty. These troops remained 
only until mid-July. 

June 28. Urriola publicly protested to President Woodrow Wilson what 
he termed "this interference, vi^hich violates the sovereignty of Panama 
without any justification." 

July 2. After the United States, at the request of different political 
factions, had agreed to supervise the national election, the Urriola govern- 
ment repealed the June 21 decree. 

July 7. The national election was held. In August, after the U.S. Elec- 
toral Committee had resolved a number of disputed elections, it was clear 
that the party of Urriola had retained control of the Assembly. 

July 8. Believing that U.S. property and lives were being threatened 
in Chiriqui province, the United States Government sent troops there. 

Sept. 11. The National Assembly chose Belisario Porras as first desig- 
nate to serve the remainder of Valdes' term. 

Oct. 1. Second designate Pedro Diaz became Acting President until 
Porras, then in Argentina, could return to Panama. 

Jan. 28, 1919. Bitterly protesting that the continued presence of U.S. 
troops in Chiriqui was a violation of its sovereignty, Panama asked the 
U.S. to remove the troops since the new Porras government had taken 
steps to protect foreigners. 

Feb. 18. The Department of State replied that a careful study had failed 
to demonstrate that the removal of the troops was warranted. Attention 
was called to Article I of the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty and Article 136 
of the Panamanian constitution to show that the occupation was legal. 

Nov. 12. After several more exchanges of notes in which Panama con- 
tended that the 1903 treaty permitted U.S. occupation only of Panama 
City and Colon and the United States argued that continued troop presence 
was necessary to protect U.S. citizens, Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
strongly re-emphasized the U.S. position that troops would be withdrawn 
only after adequate safeguards were provided. 

Mar. 3-24, 1920. Panama filed a series of protests with the United States 
over the alleged misbehavior of U.S. troops in Chiriqui. 

April 22, 1974 439 

Developments U.S. Response 

Aug. 16. After Panama had softened the wording of its protests and had 
made greater efforts to safeguard U.S. citizens, the United States withdrew 
its troops from Chiriqui. 

Feb. 28, 1921. Angered by a reported statement of President Porras 
that war with Costa Rica over disputed land on the Pacific would be absurd, 
a committee of citizens visited Porras and demanded his resignation. Later 
in the day a mob gathered before the Presidential palace. 

Feb. 28. As the mob gathered, Porras was in conference with Minister 
William Jennings Price. At Porras' request, Price called for U.S. troops 
from the Canal Zone who arrived shortly after the palace was attacked. 
They quickly restored order and guarded the President throughout the 
night. Within two weeks, the U.S. troops were withdrawn. 

Oct. 10-11, 1925. Bloody rioting broke out in Panama City when work- 
ers demonstrated and struck in favor of lower rents. 

Oct. 12. After a conference between President Rodolfo Chiari and U.S. 
officials, the Government of Panama formally requested the aid of U.S. 
troops from the Canal Zone. 

Oct. 12. About 600 soldiers with fixed bayonets marched into Panama 
City and quickly restored order. 

Oct. 15. Most of the soldiers were withdrawn, but a few remained until 
Oct. 23. 

Jan. 2, 1931. A left-wing group staged a revolution, capturing the Presi- 
dential palace and forcing President Florencio H. Arosemena to resign. 

Jan. 2. Minister Roy T. Davis reported to Washington that during the 
early stages of the fighting he had refused Arosemena's request that U.S. 
troops be sent in from the Canal Zone. Secretary of State Henry Stimson 
informed Davis that he approved of this decision and further advised that 
U.S. troops should be used "only for the maintenance of public order and 
not in any manner whatsoever in connection with the internal political 
affairs of Panama." 

Jan. 2. The Supreme Court ruled that the 1930 election of Presidential 
designates was unconstitutional. Therefore, Ricardo J. Alfaro, who had 
been the first designate from 1928 to 1930 and who was now Minister in 
Washington, was named to fill the unexpired term of Arosemena. The 
Minister of Government and Justice, Harmodio Arias, exercised executive 
power until Alfaro could return. 

440 Department of State Bulletin 

Developments U.S. Response 

Jan. 5. Stimson instructed Davis that urgent business which had to be 
taken up in writing should be conducted only "by memoranda from the 
Legation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and not addressed to any 
individual in an official capacity." Stimson said that the Department of 
State was delaying sending instructions concerning recognition, because 
there was doubt "the new regime will have sufficient stability and control 
of the country to remain in office." 

Jan. 15. After receiving assurances from Davis that the new government 
"has the support of the great majority of the residents of the capital and 
has been well received throughout the Republic," Stimson told Davis that 
Alfaro's coming into power was considered as constitutional devolution 
and that Davis should attend Alfaro's inauguration and should "carry on 
normal diplomatic relations thereafter with his Government." 

Jan. 16. Alfaro was inaugurated President. 

Oct. 9, 1941. Ernesto Jaen Guardia, second designate under the Constitu- 
tion, became Acting President when President Arnulfo Arias left the coun- 
try without the permission of the National Assembly or the Supreme Court. 
Having been sworn in and having appointed his cabinet, Jaen Guardia 
resigned as President. His cabinet, in accordance with the Constitution, 
then elected one of its members, Ricardo Adolfo de la Guardia, as President. 

Oct. 16. In a press release. Secretary of State Cordell Hull denied that 
the United States had played any part in the ouster of Arias. He also 
noted that, since "the procedure followed appeared at all stages to be in 
conformity with Panamanian constitutional requirements, our Embassy 
and the Department felt that the only proper position to take was that of 
merely continuing normal relations with the Government of Panama." 

Nov. 24, 1949. Several months of civil strife and legal disputes over the 
Presidential election the previous May culminated in the taking over of 
the Presidency by Arnulfo Arias with the help of Police Chief Jose Antpnio 

Nov. 25. At a press conference, a Department of State spokesman said 
that, in installing Arias as President, the "National Police had refused to 
abide by the decision of the duly constituted authorities" (the National 
Assembly and the Supreme Court). "In view of these circumstances," he 
declared, "diplomatic relations between the United States and the Arias 
regime in Panama do not exist." 

April 22, 1974 ^^ 

Developments U.S. Response 

Dec. 14. Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that the United 
States was renewing diplomatic relations with Panama by means of a note 
delivered by Ambassador Monnett B. Davis to the Government of Panama. 
Acheson said that this decision was reached after consultation with the 
other American Republics, after the Arias regime gave assurances that it 
would fulfill its international obligations, and after it had demonstrated 
that it had general popular support. Acheson stressed, however, that recog- 
nition did not constitute "approval of the manner in which the present 
government came into power." 

May 9, 1951. A revolution broke out after President Arias announced 
that he would suspend the 1946 Constitution and restore that of 1941. 
Arias was arrested by order of the National Assembly and later impeached. 
Alcibiades Arosemena, the first designate, was elevated to the Presidency, 
an action which the Supreme Court upheld. 

May 11. Secretary of State Acheson notified the Embassy that the De- 
partment considered that the question of recognition need not arise. 

Jan. 3, 1955. When President Jose Antonio Remon was assassinated, 
Vice President Jose Ramon Guizado succeeded to the Presidency. 

Jan. 15. Guizado, arrested on suspicion of involvement in Remon's 
murder, was impeached, and the second designate, Ricardo Arias, assumed 
the office of President. 

Jan. 15. The Department of State took the position that the question of 
recognition did not arise. 

Jan. 9, 1964. Rioting, which broke out in the Canal Zone between United 
States and Panamanian high school students over a flag-raising incident, 
spread throughout Panama and resulted in three days of violence, loss of 
life, property damage, and clashes between Panamanians and U.S. troops 
in the Canal Zone. 

Jan. 10. Accusing the U.S. of "unprovoked aggression". President Ro- 
berto F. Chiari broke oflf diplomatic relations with the United States. 

Jan. 10. At a meeting of the U.N. Security Council, which had been 
requested by Panama, the Panamanian representative declared that Pana- 
ma "is currently the victim of an unprovoked armed attack" committed by 
U.S. forces stationed in the Canal Zone. 

Jan. 10. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, the U.S. representative at the 
United Nations, categorically denied the allegations of U.S. aggression 
in Panama. 


442 Department of State Bulletin 

Developments U.S. Response 

Jan. 10. The Security Council adopted a proposal that the President of 
the Council should address an appeal to the Governments of the United 
States and of Panama to bring about a cease-fire and that bloodshed should 

Jan. 15. A communique issned by the five-nation Inter-American Peace 
Committee, which had decided on Jan. 10 to investigate the situation in 
Panama, indicated that Panama and the United States had agreed to 
begin discussions thirty days after diplomatic relations were re-estab- 
lished, "by means of representatives who will have sufficient powers to 
disctiss without limitations all existing matters of any nature ivhich may 
affect relations" between the two countries. 

Jan. 23. At a news conference President Lyndon B. Johnson said, 
"We have set no preconditions to the resumption of peaceful discussions. 
We are bound by no preconceptions of w^hat they vi'ill produce. And -we 
hope that Panama can take the same approach." 

Jan. 29. The Government of Panama requested the Council of the 
Organization of American States "to take cognizance of the acts of [U.S.] 
aggression against Panama." 

Feb. 4. The U.S. representative to the OAS, Ambassador Ellsvv^orth 
Bunker, reiterated the statement he had first made before the OAS on 
Jan. 31 that there was no basis to the charge of U.S. aggression. 

Feb. 29. In response to Panama's insistence that the 1903 treaty be 
renegotiated as a condition of resuming diplomatic relations, President 
Johnson stated at a news conference that "we are not going to make any 
precommitments, before we sit down, on what we are going to do in the 
way of rewriting new treaties with a nation that we do not have diplo- 
matic relations with." The President again emphasized the willingness 
of the United States, once relations were restored, "to discuss anything, 
any time, anywhere." 

Mar. 15. In reply to a question asked during a radio and television 
interview^ President Johnson said that the impasse in U.S.-Panamanian 
relations was "largely a matter of trying to agree on the kind of language 
that will meet [Panama's] problems, and that we can honestly, sincerely 
agree to." 

Apr. 3. An announcement was made by the Chairman of the General 
Committee of the Council of the OAS that U.S. and Panamanian repre- 
sentatives had agreed to a Joint Declaration that diplomatic relatione 
would be re-established and that Special Ambassadors ivould be imme- 
diately appointed "with sufficient powers to seek the prompt elimination 
of the causes of conflict between the two countries, without limitations 
or preconditions of any kind." 

Apr. 4. President Johnson stated that the National Security Council 
had approved the agreement and that the United States was already 
implementing its provisions and would "immediately renew relations" 
with Panama. 

April 22, 1974 443 

Developments U.S. Response 

June 9. An International Commission of Jurists, after meeting at the 
request of the National Bar Association of Panama, issued a report in 
Geneva which tended to exonerate the U.S. of charges of aggression in 
Panama, although the Commission was critical of certain U.S. actions 
during the affair. 

Dec. 18. President Johnson announced that the United States was 
willing to negotiate "an entirely new treaty on the existing Panama 
Canal" but that "plans and preparations" should also be made for a 
new canal. 

Oct. 11, 1968. President Arnulfo Arias, only eleven days after his 
inauguration, was deposed in a National Guard coup led by Colonel Omar 
Torrijos. Arias fled to the Canal Zone after Guard units had surrounded 
the Presidential palace and had seized the airport and radio and tele- 
vision stations. A governing junta, under Colonel Jose Maria Pinilla, 
dissolved the National Assembly and suspended some articles of the Con- 

Oct. 13. A "Provisional Junta of Government" was established with 
Colonel Pinilla as President and Colonel Bolivar Urrutia as Vice-President. 
However, Torrijos, as Commander of the National Guard, exercised real 

Oct. 15. A Department of State spokesman announced that diplomatic 
relations were suspended as a result of events in Panama "and not be- 
cause of any action by the United States to sever relations." 

Nov. 13. The United States resumed diplomatic relations with Panama 
after consulting with the members of the Organization of American 
States and after receiving assurances from the Panamanian Government 
"to hold elections, to return to constitutional government, to respect hu- 
man rights, and to observe Panama's international obligations." (The 
United States aid program to Panama, which had been suspended when 
relations were broken, was not resumed at this time but was gradually 
reinstated beginning early in 1969.) 

Oct. 11, 1972. Following national elections in August, the first since 
his seizure of power in 1968, Torrijos legally assumed full military and 
civil power as "maximum revolutionary leader". Torrijos still did not 
assume the office of President, which had been filled by Demetrio Lakas 
Bahas since 1969 when Torrijos removed Pinilla following an unsuccess- 
ful coup in which Pinilla was implicated. 

Oct. 11. Diplomatic relations remained unchanged. 

Editor's Note: An address by Ambassador at Larga Ellsworth Bunker, chief U.S. negotiator for the Pan. 
ama Canal treaty, concerning current relations with Panama will appear in the April 29 issue of the Bulle- S 

TIN. ^ 

444 Department of State Bulletin 


United States Proposes Voluntary Principles 
on Direct Broadcasting by Satellite 

The U.N. Outer Space Committee's Work- 
ing Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites met 
at Geneva March 11-22. Follotving is a state- 
merit made before the working group on 
March l.i by U.S. Representative Lee T. 
Stidl, who is Director of the Department's 
Office of U.N. Political Affairs, together with 
the text of a U.S. ivorking paper submitted 
on March 11. 


The General Assembly has directed the 
working group at this session to focus on 
the question of principles governing the use 
of satellites for direct broadcasting. The 
United States continues to have serious res- 
ervations about the advisability of adopting 
binding principles governing such broad- 
casting. Those reservations rest on factors 
such as national and international lack of 
experience with the contemplated space 
broadcasting technology, risk of inhibiting 
the further development of such technology 
and its beneficial potential, possible threats 
to the free exchange of ideas and informa- 
tion, and the absence of any known plans to 
develop the capability for international di- 
rect television broadcasting into individual 

We recognize the wide differences of opin- 
ion on these and a number of other basic 
questions. Some, including my delegation, 
believe that considerably more analysis and 
experimentation are needed before we car. 
begin to arrive at a consensus on an interna- 
tional approach to such broadcasting. At the 
same time, we are well aware that many 

members of the working group are persuaded 
that, insofar as possible, it is desirable to 
begin now to work out guidelines for the use 
of such technology if and when it develops. 

In light of those differences of approach, 
we have proceeded along three interrelated 
lines of action since the last meeting of the 
working group in June 1973 : 

— First, we have attempted to identify to 
the greatest extent possible common inter- 
ests and areas of understanding which we 
believe all members of the working group 
could share. We have tried to reflect these 
interests and areas of understanding in the 
U.S. working paper submitted in document 
A/AC.105/WG.3 (V) CRP.2. 

— Secondly, we have continued with a 
range of experimental programs we share 
with several other countries including, for 
example, the SITE [Satellite Instructional 
Television Experiment] project in associa- 
tion with India and the CTS [Communica- 
tions Technology Satellite] project with Can- 
ada. I will touch on these later. 

— Thirdly, we have attempted to explore 
in some depth various areas of relative ig- 
norance and uncertainty, particularly with 
regard to legal, cultural, and political impli- 
cations of direct broadcasting by satellites. 
In this connection, just last month the De- 
partment of State assembled a group of 50 
government officials, academicians, and other 
professionals from the private sector for a 
conference on "Free Exchange of Informa- 
tion and Ideas and the Integrity of National 
Cultures." A primary purpose of this meet- 
ing was to examine the real concerns of 
states regarding the impact of advanced 

April 22, 1974 


technology, including communications tech- 
nology. The symposium yielded no "elixir" 
formula to solve all difficulties, but it was 
notably successful in broadening perceptions 
of the many complicated problems associated 
with the development of advanced satellite 
communications. This was a mutual educa- 
tional process between governmental and 
nongovernmental groups and within each 
group. For those who participated, the con- 
ference helped to identify the complexities 
of the interests we are attempting to deal 
with and to identify some of the variables 
which need to be considered before we can 
evolve a reliable international approach to 
utilizing this technology. In that symposium, 
as here in the working group, widely di- 
vergent and sometimes mutually exclusive 
views were advanced regarding the partic- 
ular nature of any future international ap- 
proach. But we found there, as we do here, 
that areas of common interest and general 
understanding also seem to exist. The United 
States is prepared to explore these in an ef- 
fort to determine where the limits of such in- 
terests and understandings may lie. 

We believe the working group would find 
its efforts most fruitful if it moved along 
positive lines. We are suggesting that if we 
wish to make progress rather than merely 
highlight serious differences — which prob- 
ably cannot be reconciled in the near fu- 
ture — we should attempt to put together a 
composite of the areas on which we can all 
agree. Then, as experience and knowledge 
expand, we could all build on that basis of 
common agreement. To assist the working 
group in this process, we have developed the 
draft principles contained in our working 
paper. We look forward to further discus- 
sion of this approach. 

Experimental Programs 

With regard to experimental programs in 
this area, you recall, Mr. Chairman, that at 
the fourth session of the working group my 
delegation reported on the progress to date 
concerning the U.S. ATS-F satellite [Appli- 
cations Technology Satellite] program. As 

you have noted in your opening comments, 
we expect the satellite to be launched within 
the year. During the initial period of opera- 
tion, ATS-F will be employed in a program 
to evaluate the use of satellites for educa- 
tional and community service applications 
in the Rocky Mountain area, Alaska, and the 
Appalachian area of the United States. Sub- 
sequently, as you have noted, the satellite is 
planned to be repositioned in the equatorial 
orbit above the Indian Ocean, where it will 
be employed by the Government of India dur- 
ing a year of cooperative experiments. 

Should the ATS-F satellite continue to op- 
erate satisfactorily beyond the one-year In- 
dian experiment, other national or regional 
experimental or demonstrational programs 
could be contemplated. The United States 
would be pleased to have an expression of in- 
terest by any government in exploring the 
possibility of such a subsequent program. 

We feel that the international cooperative 
approach being demonstrated in this experi- 
ment offers a promising precedent for fur- 
ther steps to maximize the beneficial use of 
this new technology. For us, such interna- 
tional sharing is central to the overall ap- 
proach of our space program. 

You also noted earlier, Mr. Chairman, that 
the United States and Canada are planning 
to launch an experimental communications 
satellite in a cooperative program in 1975. 
In addition, a number of U.S. companies are 
in the process of developing operational do- 
mestic satellite service capabilities within 
the United States. It is important to note, 
however, that none of these proposed and 
emerging domestic systems involves a direct 
broadcast satellite. In this connection, satel- 
lite broadcasting developments in other coun- 
tries are highly relevant to the work and con- 
cerns of the working group, and we hope that 
information concerning those developments 
may be available to us at this session. 

Barring some change as a result of such 
new information, my government has con- 
cluded that the original estimate in 1969 by 
the working group as to the timing of the 
emergence of direct broadcast satellite sys- 
tems remains accurate and valid; namely, 


Department of State Bulletin 

that satellites for broadcasting directly to 
unaugmented or augmented individual re- 
ceivers are not likely to be operational prior 
to 1985. Significant economic and technical 
considerations continue to militate against 
the emergence of a direct broadcast satellite 
capability with the power to broadcast pro- 
grams to individual receivers. The United 
States, at least, has no such capability under 
development, on the drawing boards, or in- 

In this connection, my delegation considers 
it necessary to take into account some prob- 
lems of definition. Neither the General As- 
sembly nor this working group has defined 
for political and legal purposes the term 
"direct broadcast satellite." Definitions 
adopted by the 1971 WARC-ST [World Ad- 
ministrative Radio Conference-Space Tele- 
communications] do not resolve this matter, 
since they draw a clear distinction between 
broadcasting satellite services for commu- 
nity reception and for individual reception. 
We believe it is desirable to recognize the 
diff"erences identified and codified by the In- 
ternational Telecommunication Union. This 
point is especially important in assessing the 
"imminence" of problems anticipated by 
some countries in connection with satellite 

Moreover, in the past this working group 
has further divided the category of individ- 
ual reception into consideration of broad- 
casting to augmented and to unaugmented 
individual receivers. We do not accept the 
premise that any principles which may evolve 
would necessarily be applicable to all poten- 
tial modes of satellite broadcasting. On this 
unresolved question it may be desirable to 
seek the views of the Legal Subcommittee 
of our parent committee. 

In any case, the prospects for developing 
satellite television broadcasting for commu- 
nity reception, as opposed to broadcasting to 
individual receivers, are highly promising. 
Our delegation sees much potential for de- 
veloping an information network which 
would utilize existing community satellite 

To this end, the United States Agency for 

Internationa] Development has recently is- 
sued invitations to representatives of various 
countries engaged in ongoing satellite dem- 
onstrations and feasibility studies to partici- 
pate in a satellite working conference. Den- 
ver, Colorado, the center for the Rocky 
Mountain component of the U.S. ATS-F ex- 
periment, will serve as the conference site. 
The purpose of this meeting will be to share 
plans and experience. 

Discussion topics will include satellite 
planning management systems, research de- 
sign, program development, and evaluation. 
Most important, the conference is intended 
to provide an open international forum to 
enable the participants to learn from both 
the successes and failures to date of the 
American experiment and to share informa- 
tion which can contribute to problem solv- 

We note with satisfaction that fellow mem- 
bers of this working group are also contrib- 
uting to this process. Japan has just been 
host to a U.N. panel on educational applica- 
tions of space technology, which proved a 
highly successful information exchange. The 
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entific and Cultural Organization] regional 
satellite conferences make a substantial con- 
tribution in an analogous field. We would 
hope that these efforts could be the begin- 
ning of an international information net- 
work and that other nations might consider 
such forms of cooperation as they proceed 
with their projects. 

In addition to the planned forum in Den- 
ver, the United States has engaged in a num- 
ber of activities designed to advance the 
common learning process in this new field. 
The Rocky Mountain project has been host to 
bilateral visits of representatives from Ar- 
gentina, Australia, Brazil, France, India, Ja- 
pan, and the United Kingdom. 

In these two-way exchanges, the U.S. ex- 
perimenters have acted as joint researchers 
with their international colleagues working 
toward common development objectives. The 
Rocky Mountain project, serving among oth- 
ers an American Indian population, may 
offer some particular insight on the difficulty 

April 22, 1974 


of dealing with the cultural concerns of a 
variety of ethnic groups and the problems of 
multiple-language programing. 

Private companies in the United States 
have also contributed to the process. Amer- 
ican aerospace firms have participated in in- 
ternational technical forums and provided 
onsite training programs for technicians 
from other countries. 

A communications satellite, of course, rep- 
resents a technical delivery system. The most 
important elements are the substance of what 
is delivered and the broad area which can be 
covered. For example, such satellites poten- 
tially could reach vast geographic areas and 
isolated populations with information on 
health, nutrition, and medical and agricul- 
tural practices, significantly improving the 
quality of life. 

Some of the fears expressed about the po- 
tential application of satellite broadcasting 
apparently stem from concern that some in- 
terested states may have neither the oppor- 
tunity nor the expertise to make use of it. 
However, as indicated in our working paper, 
we would envisage increasing possibilities 
for widespread international access to the 
use of this technology resulting at least in 
part from increased training and exchange 
programs, as well as other information shar- 
ing along the lines I have mentioned earlier. 

In view of these promising trends in the 
use of existing technology, it would seem es- 
pecially desirable to avoid moving toward re- 
strictive rules that could inhibit its further 
development. This brings us to the area of 
the greatest diff"erences expressed within 
this working group as well as in other U.N. 
bodies which have considered the subject. 

U.S. Position on Prior Consent 

It is clear, Mr. Chairman, from previous 
sessions of the working group and from the 
proposals before it, that the central issue 
concerning international direct satellite 
broadcasting is that of prior consent — the 
concept that no such broadcasting from any 
state should be allowed without the express 

consent of the state which may be the inten- 
tional or unintentional recipient. 

You will have noted that prior consent is 
not among the principles tabled by my dele- 
gation. It is a principle which the United 
States continues to reject for reasons which 
we have previously explained at length be- 
fore this group and which we believe remain 
valid. I should, however, like to suggest that 
the working group, which has gone so ex- 
haustively and constructively into many 
other aspects, might usefully and intensively 
examine the implications of the various con- 
sent proposals. Specifically we think the 
members of the group could consider the fol- 
lowing questions : 

— First, the proposals for prior consent 
apparently envisage granting the govern- 
ment of any state the power of absolute veto 
over reception of any TV broadcasting what- 
soever from another state. How can support 
for such total veto power, which could be ex- 
ercised arbitrarily, be consistent with sup- 
port for the expansion of the exchange of 
information and ideas and with article 19 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which asserts the right to "receive and im- 
part information and ideas through any me- 
dia and regardless of frontiers"? 

— Secondly, even where governments did 
not choose to exercise a total veto power to 
prohibit all broadcasting to their territory, 
they could invoke the consent principle to im- 
pose selective censorship or to prohibit entire 
categories of program material as a price for 
giving consent or as a pretext for not doing 
so. Is this envisaged by countries supporting 
a broad consent principle? What effect would 
restrictions varying widely in scope and im- 
pact have on an expanding use of satellite 

— Thirdly, what problems would arise from 
any sudden arbitrary withdrawal of consent, 
perhaps as the result of a change in govern- 
ment in a receiving country? This would 
seem particularly hazardous for regional ar- 

— Fourthly, let us consider the questions 


Department of State Bulletin 

of the consent principle in relation to broad- 
cast spillover. If spillover also were subject 
to a regime of prior consent, how would a 
country deal with a challenge to its own 
domestic direct broadcast satellite system by 
a neighboring country objecting to some un- 
desired spillover? Could one country in a 
specific geographic area veto the operation 
of a regional system by refusing to consent 
to the arrangement because of spillover? 
Do countries supporting the prior-consent 
principle assume they can make convenient 
exceptions to exclude some countries in a 
region? Furthermore, if the countries in a 
particular region decide they do not wish 
to have a prior-consent restriction on re- 
gional broadcasting, would it be possible sim- 
ply to make an exception to a global prin- 
ciple? Have countries which may desire 
domestic or regional systems weighed the 
viability of relying on such exceptions based 
on subjective distinctions between unavoid- 
able or unintentional spillover on the one 
hand and intentional broadcasts on the 

— Finally, what are the implications for 
other communications media of introducing 
a consent principle in the case of direct 
broadcast satellites? Do we really want to 
open up the use of such a principle as a 
precedent that could be invoked to stem the 
free flow of information and ideas? 

Mr. Chairman, my delegation urges the 
working group to join in considering these 
questions most carefully. It should be under- 
stood that objections to prior consent in no 
way signify any desire on the part of the 
United States to abuse direct broadcasting 
in the unlikely event we were ever to move 
toward this technology ourselves. 

We have indicated in the past our consti- 
tutional as well as philosophical difficulties 
with any proposals involving a commitment 
to censor private broadcasting organizations, 
should they ever decide that international 
direct satellite broadcasting interests them. 
As a practical matter, any such broadcasting 
entities would be well aware that their in- 

terests would not be served by the trans- 
mission of material objectionable to audi- 
ences in receiving countries. 

In this sense it is clearly to the advantage 
of the broadcasting organizations themselves 
to accommodate to the attitudes and cultural 
values of those with whom they wish to 
communicate. It is with this in mind that 
U.S. draft principle no. IX looks to "inter- 
national co-operation among broadcasters 
and regional broadcast associations as an 
effective means of advancing the objec- 
tives" of the advantageous use of this tech- 
nology for the benefit of all the peoples of 
the world. 

Sharing Possible Benefits 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, my delegation 
believes that this working group, and the 
other U.N. bodies concerned with interna- 
tional direct broadcasting by satellite, should 
seek to insure on behalf of the international 
community that if the technology is ever 
developed into an operational system, all 
peoples will have the opportunity to benefit 
from its use. 

The United States and many other coun- 
tries have stated the belief that such broad- 
casting should promote cooperation and un- 
derstanding among states and peoples. Dif- 
ferences among societies and cultures clearly 
must be taken into account. It is precisely 
by better understanding these diff'erences 
that we can hope to contribute to the 
strengthening of international peace and se- 

The open exchange of ideas and informa- 
tion, to which we continue to attach the 
highest importance, must of course be a 
true exchange if it is to be balanced and 
eff'ective. We have proposed that sharing in 
possible benefits from international direct 
broadcasting by satellite should increasingly 
include opportunities for access to the use 
of this technology for the purpose of sending 
as well as receiving broadcasts. The even- 
tual realization of any such objective will re- 

April 22, 1974 


quire much further discussion and effort by 
the international community. 

We cannot foresee the future evolution of 
international direct broadcasting-. However, 
the United States is strongly convinced that 
if this technology is developed to a useful 
stage by any country, the goal of the inter- 
national community should be to elicit from 
it the greatest possible benefits for all and 
not to risk discouraging or distorting its po- 
tential for good. We would value the com- 
ments of other members of the working 
group on this approach. 


Direct Broadcast Satellites 

Working Paper Presented by the 
United States of America 

Different views have emerged in the Working 
Group relating to the question of principles on 
the potential use of satellites for direct broadcast- 
ing. These divergencies have concerned, inter alia, 
the suitability, timeliness and scope of any prin- 
ciples which might evolve. Nevertheless, it appears 
that numerous common interests in connexion with 
the possible future application of the technology 
can be broadly identified. 

To assist in expressing such common interests 
and areas of general understanding to the greatest 
extent possible, the delegation of the United States 
has developed the following draft principles which 
it submits for consideration by the Working Group. 

Draft Principles on Direct Broadcast 

The use of outer space for international direct 
television broadcasting by satellites should be con- 
ducted in accordance with international law, includ- 
ing in particular the Charter of the United Nations, 
the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and 
in the light of relevant provisions of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States. 


International direct television broadcasting should 
be conducted within the technical parameters and 
procedures established by the International Tele- 

'U.N. doc. A/AC.105/WG.3(V)CRP.2. 

communications Convention and its Radio Regula- 


Such activity should be carried out in a manner 
compatible with the maintenance of international 
peace and security with a view to enhancing co- 
operation, mutual understanding and friendly rela- 
tions among all States and peoples. 


Such activity should also be conducted in a man- 
ner which will encourage and expand the free and 
open exchange of information and ideas while taking 
into account differences among cultures and maxi- 
mizing the beneficial use of new space communica- 
tions technologies. 


Every State is entitled to carry out international 
direct television broadcasting by satellites and to 
share in benefits derived from this activity. Such 
sharing should increasingly include, as practical dif- 
ficulties are overcome, opportunities for access to 
the use of this technology for the purpose of send- 
ing as well as receiving broadcasts. 


States and international and regional organiza- 
tions, particularly the United Nations, and other 
entities where appropriate, should co-operate in ef- 
forts to strengthen the capability of interested 
States, including in particular developing countries, 
to make use of international direct television broad- 
casting by satellites as the technology may become 
available. Such efforts should include increased 
training in technical and programme production 
fields, in which connexion consideration should be 
given to the establishment of regional centres, and 
the expanded exchange of programmes and person- 


Practical approaches to the use of this technology 
on a regional or other international co-operative 
basis should be given particular consideration by 
States having shared needs and mutual interests. 


States should encourage the potential contribu- 
tions of international professional associations, in 
fields such as medicine, engineering, education and 
the arts, in solving social development problems and 
in enhancing the quality of life through the effec- 
tive use of this technology. 


States should recognize the desirability of creat- 
ing conditions favourable to the promotion of in- 
ternational co-operation among broadcasters and 

Department of State Bulletin 


regional broadcast associations as an effective means 
of advancing the objectives of these principles. 


States should seek to resolve any disagreements 
which may arise concerning the carrying out of 
international direct television broadcasting by satel- 
lites through consultation and, as may be necessary, 
through established procedures for the settlement 
of disputes. 


The United Nations and Member States should 
undertake to review the questions of the use of 
satellites for international direct television broad- 
casting if practical experience indicates the need 
for such a review. 

second session, held at U.N. Headquarters May 14- 
23, 1973. E/CN.5/494. October 22, 1973. 25 pp. 

Convocation of a world food conference under the 
auspices of the United Nations. Report of the 
Secretary General. E/5443. December 5, 1973. 4 

Statistical Commission. RejMrt of the fifth session 
of the Working Group on International Statistical 
Programs and Coordination, held at Geneva July 
2-4, 1973. E/CN.3/442. December 19, 1973. 21 


United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017. 

Security Council 

Letter dated December 7, 1973, from the Representa- 
tives of France, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States to the Secretary General concerning 
assumption by the Federal Republic of Germany 
of the rights and obligations of the Charter of the 
United Nations with respect to the western sec- 
tors of Berlin. S/11150. December 10, 1973. 2 pp. 

Letter dated December 18, 1973, from the Secretary 
General to the President of the Security Council 
transmitting letters from the Representatives of 
the U.S.S.R. and the United States concerning con- 
vening of the Middle East Peace Conference at 
Geneva. S/11161. December 18, 1973. 3 pp. 

Sixth report of the Security Council committee estab- 
lished in pursuant of Resolution 253 (1968) con- 
cerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. 
S/11178. January 3, 1974. 36 pp. 

Letter dated January 18, 1974, from the Secretary 
General to the President of the Security Council 
transmitting the text of the agreement on the 
disengagement of forces in pursuance of the 
Geneva Peace Conference signed that day by the 
Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces and 
the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. 
S/11198. January 18, 1974. 3 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Commission for Social Development. Report of the 
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control on its 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the U.S. Government Printing Office 
Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Sxiper- 
intendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shoivn below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Our International Visitors. Discusses the U.S. Inter- 
national Visitor Program: how it works and how 
effective it has been in the past in introducing foreign 
visitors to the United States. Pub. 8734. Interna- 
tional Information and Cultural Series 104. 31 np 
50('. (Cat. No. 81.67:104). 

The United Nations: Achievements and Problems. 

This pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy series 
includes part of an address by Ambassador John 
Scali, U.S. Representative to the United Nations on 
November 13, 1973, in New York. Pub. 8746. Inter- 
national Organization and Conference Series 109. 
4 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S1.70:109). 

The United States and Canada: Facing the Energy 
Crisis. Pamphlet in the Current Foreign Policy 
series based on a statement November 15, 1973, by 
Julius L. Katz, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State 
for International Resources and Food Policy, before 
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Inter- 
American Affairs. Pub. 8747. Economic Foreign 
Policy Series 4. 4 pp. 25<*. (Cat. No. S1.65:4). 

World Population Conference— World Population 
Year, August 1974. The U.N. General Assembly has 
designated 1974 as World Population Year. This 
booklet briefly discusses the population problem and 
what is being done around the world to solve it. Pub. 
8749. International Organization and Conference 
Series 110. 18 pp. Free of charge. (Cat. No. S1.70- 

Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations— Termina- 
tion of Exchange of Notes Concerning Administra- 

April 22, 1974 


lion of Justice. Agreement with Ethiopia. TIAS 7726. 
3 pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7726). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Hong 
Kong amending and extending the agreement of De- 
cember 17, 1970, as amended. TIAS 7729. 5 pp. 25(f. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7729). 

Agreement with 
(Cat. No. 89.10: 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. 

Denmark. TIA8 7730. 3 pp. 25('. 

Economic Assistance — Construction of Telephone 
Lines. Agreement with the Malagasy Republic. TIA8 

7731. 34 pp. $1.15. (Cat. No. 89.10:7731). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Mexico 
amending the agreement of June 29, 1971. TIAS 

7732. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7732). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of Oc- 
tober 2, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7733. 6 pp. 25«' 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7733). 

Social Security. Agreement with Ghana. 
4 pp. 25(''. (Cat. No. 89.10:7734). 

TIAS 7734. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. 

Agreement with Germany supplementing the agree- 
ment of November 20, 1962, as supplemented. TIAS 

7735. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7735). 

Military Assistance — Deposits Under Foreign As9ist- 
tance Act of 1971. Agreement with Nepal. TIAS 

7736. 2 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7736). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jamaica. 
TIAS 7737. 11 pp. 25^ (Cat. No. 89.10:7737). 

Commercial Facilities. Protocol with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 7738. 3 pp. 25^. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7738). 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Norway 
amending annex C to the agreement of January 27, 
1950. TIAS 7740. 3 pp. 25«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7740). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of September 10, 1973. 
TIAS 7741. 3 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 89.10:7741). 

Epidemiological Study of Narcotics Abuse. Agree- 
ment with Mexico. TIAS 7742. 4 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. 

Maritime Matters — Port Access Procedures. Agree- 
ment with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 7748. 
3 pp. 25(*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7748). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Morocco. 
TIAS 7749. 6 pp. 25('. Cat. No. 89.10:7749). 

Current Actions 


Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972." 
Ratification deposited: Norway, April 4, 1974. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 21, 1969.' 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, March 15, 1974. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, March 15, 1974. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). .Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, March 15, 1974. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
Accession deposited: Botswana, February 20, 1974. 



Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 6, 1973 (TIAS 
7711). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca 
March 23 and 25, 1974. Entered into force March 
25, 1972. 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 22, 197 A Vol. LXX, No. 1817 

Cambodia. Secretary Kissinger Responds to 
Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues 
(text of letter) 425 

Congress. Secretary Kissinger Responds to 
Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues 
(text of letter) 425 

Department and Foreign Service. U.S. To Re- 
open Consulate General in Alexandria, 
Egypt (Department announcement) . . . 424 

Economic Affairs. U.S. Representatives Named 
to Centre for Investment Dispute Settle- 
ment 431 

Egypt. U.S. To Reopen Consulate General in 
Alexandria, Egypt (Department announce- 
ment) 424 


Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference 
at London 421 

Secretary Kissinger Visits Bonn (news con- 
ference with Foreign Minister Scheel) . . 418 

Germany. Secretary Kissinger Visits Bonn 
(news conference with Foreign Minister 
Scheel) 418 

Historical Studies. U.S. Policy Toward Pan- 
ama, 1903-Present: Questions of Recogni- 
tion and Diplomatic Relations and Instances 
of U.S. Intervention (tabular summary) . . 433 

Human Rights. International Women's Year 
1975 (proclamation) 432 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. Representatives Named to Centre for 
Investment Dispute Settlement 431 

Laos. Secretary Kissinger Responds to Sena- 
tor Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues 
(text of letter) 425 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 25th An- 
niversary of NATO (proclamation) . . . 420 

Panama. U.S. Policy Toward Panama, 1903- 
Present: Questions of Recognition and 
Diplomatic Relations and Instances of U.S. 
Intervention (tabular summary) .... 433 

Presidential Documents 

International Women's Year 1975 (proclama- 
tion) 432 

25th Anniversary of NATO (proclamation) . 420 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 451 

Space. United States Propose Voluntary 
Principles on Direct Broadcasting by Satel- 
lite (Stull, text of U.S. working paper) . . 445 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 452 


Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference 
at London 421 

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Offi- 
cials at Moscow (Gromyko, Kissinger, state- 
ments, communique) 413 

United Kingdom. Secretary Kissinger Holds 
News Conference at London 421 

United Nations 

United Nations Documents 4 

United States Proposes Voluntary Principles 
on Direct Broadcasting by Satellite (Stull, 
text of U.S. working paper) 445 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Kissinger Responds to 
Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Is- 
sues (text of letter) 425 

Name Index 

Gromyko, Andrei A 413 

Kissinger, Secretary .... 413, 418, 421, 425 

Nixon, President 420, 432 

Scheel, Walter 418 

Stull, Lee T 445 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 1—7 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 1 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 110 
and 111 of March 25, 112 and 114 of March 26, 
115 of March 27, 119 and 120 of March 28, and 
121 of March 29. 

No. Date Subject 

*123 4/1 Vance named Senior Adviser to the 
Secretary and Coordinator for 
International Narcotics Matters 
(biographic data). 

*124 4/1 Maillard sworn in as U.S. Perma- 
nent Representative to the OAS, 
Mar. 5. 

*125 4/2 Secretary's Advisory Committee on 
Private International Law Study 
Group on Maritime Bills of Lad- 
ing, Apr. 26. 

*126 4/2 Studv Group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the CCITT, May 1. 

tl27 4/3 U.S. assistance for Soviet migrants 
to Israel. 

*128 4/3 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, Apr. 30. 

tl29 4/3 Kissinger: statement on death of 
President Pompidou of France. 

*130 4/3 Catto sworn in as Chief of Protocol 
(biographic data). 

*131 4/4 Heck sworn in as Ambassador to 
Niger (biographic data). 

*132 4/4 Vest named l3irector of the Bureau 
of Political-Military Affairs; An- 
derson named Special Assistant 
for Press Relations and Depart- 
ment spokesman (biographic 

tl33 4/5 Joint U.S.-Saudi Arabian state- 
ment on cooperation. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 






Special Fourth-Clait Rale 


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Volume LXX 

No. 1818 

April 29, 1974 

Address by Ambassador Bunker i53 


Statement by Assistant Secretary Ingersoll 470 


For index see inside back cover 


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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

VOL. LXX, No. 1818 

April 29, 1974 

The Department of State BVLLETI, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the governmetA 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department ai4 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well a* 
special articles on various phases cf 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information U 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become « 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of' 
State, United Nations documents, anii 
legislative material in the field ofi 
international relations are also liatei.) 

Panama and the United States: A Design for Partnership 

Address by Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker 
Chief U.S. Negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaty ■ 

The reason that I am particularly pleased 
to be with you is that I could hardly hope 
for a better audience before which to ven- 
ture my first public thoughts on the matter 
of a new treaty relationship between the 
United States of America and the Republic 
of Panama. This audience will understand 
that because the new relationship is a mat- 
ter of transcendence for the two countries — 
and, in some measure, for the whole hemi- 
sphere and the world community- — it is one 
which demands the constant application by 
both governments of: 

— Reason rather than emotion; 

— New ideas rather than old memories; 

— The will to accommodate rather than 
the wish to confront. 

All that makes it quite a difficult matter, 
possibly the most difficult I have yet ad- 
dressed as a negotiator. 

I should like you to have the background 
of it, then the foreground as I can perceive 

We start from a treaty that is 70 years 
old. In 1903 the newly independent Republic 
of Panama granted to the United States — 
in perpetuity — the use of a strip of land 
10 miles wide and 50 miles long for the 
construction, maintenance, operation, and 
protection of a canal between the Atlantic 
and the Pacific. 

Panama also granted to the United States 
all the rights, power, and authority to act 

' Made before the Center for Inter-American Re- 
lations at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 19. 

within that strip of land as "if it were the 

That the treaty favored the United States 
was acknowledged promptly. John Hay, then 
Secretary of State, told the Senate, in sub- 
mitting it for ratification: ". . . we shall 
have a treaty very satisfactory, vastly ad- 
vantageous to the United States and, we 
must confess . . . not so advantageous to 

To be sure, had the United States not 
been offered so advantageous a treaty by 
Panama, it might well have built the canal 

Unmistakably, the construction of that 
waterway was an astounding achievement. 
Consider the triumph over tropical diseases, 
the gigantic engineering effort, the partici- 
pation of people of many races and lands — 
these are sources of extraordinary pride to 
our people. 

Incalculable Benefits of the Panama Canal 

We are no less proud of what the canal 
has represented since it opened. It has 
spurred the creation of major new interna- 
tional markets. It has caused the creation 
of entirely new sea routes. It has saved 
seafaring nations countless sums in terms 
of time, energy, and money. These — together 
with the safe, efficient, and inexpensive op- 
eration of the waterway- — have provided 
Panama, the United States, and the entire 
world with benefits which obviously have 
been of incalculable value. 

Let me illustrate some of the benefits to 

April 29, 1974 


— One-fourth of that country's gross na- 
tional product in recent years has been di- 
rectly or indirectly attributable to the op- 
eration of the canal and the military bases 
within the Canal Zone. 

— More than one-third of Panama's total 
foreign exchange eai-nings in recent years 
has derived from U.S. payments for Pana- 
manian goods and services used in the zone. 

— Perhaps as much as one-fifth of Pana- 
ma's employment nationwide is directly or 
indirectly attributable to the presence of 
the canal. 

— Panama has become a crossroads of the 
hemisphere and a center for banking, ship- 
ping, transport, and communications; and 
it has prospects for accelerated development 
in the years to come. 

Today that country's per capita income 
is the highest in Central America, the fourth 
highest in Latin America as a whole, ex- 
ceeded only by that of Argentina, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. 

For the United States, the benefits have 
been military as well as economic. It was 
the 7,000-mile, 66-day voyage of the U.S. 
battleship Oregon around Cape Horn during 
the Spanish-American War that led us to 
build a trans-isthmian waterway. And its 
military value to the United States has not 
diminished, although it has changed. 

Its strategic importance was demon- 

— When the Japanese attack on Pearl Har- 
bor left the United States without significant 
naval strength in the Pacific. Redeployment 
of elements of the Atlantic Fleet through 
the canal saved more than two weeks' steam- 
ing time around the cape. 

— When during the Cuban missile crisis 
of 1962 mobilization orders found nearly all 
landing craft concentrated on the west coast. 
More than 60 military vessels were rede- 
ployed to gulf and east coast ports in less 
than 10 days. 

Even today, when major elements of our 
defense system are intercontinental bombers 
and missiles, the canal remains a vital line 
of communication. Despite limitations on 


the size of vessels which can pass through it, 
it permits the majority of U.S. Navy ships 
to move expeditiously between oceans. Per- 
haps more important, it shortens supply 
lines from the United States to potential 
trouble spots around the world. 

The Viet-Nam conflict, necessitating a 
rapid buildup of men and material in South- 
east Asia during the midsixties, is the most 
recent example of the logistical role the canal 
plays for the United States. Because our 
production capacity is located mostly east 
of the Mississippi River and our internal 
transportation was insufficient, we were 
forced to depend heavily on the canal to 
transport equipment and supplies to our 

As for economic benefits to this country, 
they have unquestionably been great in the 
past. But how great they are today is rela- 
tive. For example, it is true that 16 percent 
of the U.S. oceanborne trade passes through 
the canal. It is also true, however, that our 
total foreign trade accounts for something 
less than 10 percent of this country's gross 
national product. 

Indeed, there are those who argue that 
the value of the United States to the Panama 
Canal far exceeds the value of the Panama 
Canal to the United States. The argument 
derives from the fact that some 70 percent 
of the traffic through the canal is either 
bound for, or coming from, this country. 
Whatever the statistics, however, we know 
intuitively that the waterway contributes 
importantly to the economic well-being of 
our people. 

U.S. Presence in the Canal Zone 

Where do the critical interests of our 
country now lie, and how may they best 
be served? I suggest that they lie in the 
continued operation and defense of the canal 
by the United States for a further and rea- 
sonably extended period of time. 

May I also suggest, however, that we can 
serve those interests adequately only if we 
move to change — to modernize — the nature 
of the presence of the United States in the 
Canal Zone. It is a quite uncommon pres- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ence. Some 40,000 American citizens live 
and work in a 500-sqiiare-mile area very 
much as they might live and work in any 
area of 500 square miles in the continental 
United States. 

When all is said and done, however, that 
presence rests upon the consent of the Pan- 
amanian people. That is so because, were 
the level of consent to decline to zero but 
our presence remain, we would find ourselves 
in the position of engaging in hostilities 
with the people of an otherwise friendly 
American state, on its soil. If I do not mis- 
read the temper of the American people and 
the times, that position would be unaccept- 

So long as the consent of Panama to our 
presence remains at a high level, the United 
States can devote all its energies there to the 
functions required for the efficient operation 
of the waterway. But in proportion as the 
consent level declines, in that proportion we 
must divert some of our energies to functions 
not related directly to the waterway's opera- 
tion. And in that proportion the efficiency 
of the operation declines — to the detriment 
of our critical interests. 

For many years the level of Panama's con- 
sent has persistently declined. And by Pana- 
ma, I mean the Panamanian people of all 
strata, not simply their government. Govern- 
ments in Panama may change. But I am 
persuaded that governmental change will 
never again divert the Panamanian people 
from the course of legitimate nationalism 
they are now pursuing. 

Unfortunately, I must say that I consider 
the current level of consent to be unaccept- 
ably low. It began to be so 10 years ago, when 
events in the Canal Zone led to rioting that 
occasioned 24 American and Panamanian 

Why has it declined? The Panamanians 
cite the following: 

— The United States occupies a 10-mile- 
wide strip across the heartland of Panama's 
territory, cutting the nation in two, curbing 
the natural growth of its urban areas. 

— The United States rules as sovereign 
over this piece of Panama's territory. It 

maintains a police force, courts, and jails to 
enforce U.S. laws, not only upon American 
but also upon Panamanian citizens. 

— The U.S. Government operates virtually 
all commercial enterprises within the zone, 
denying to Panama the jursidictional rights 
which would enable its private enterprise to 

— The United States controls virtually all 
of the deep water port facilities serving 

— The United States holds, unused, large 
areas of land within the zone. 

— The United States pays Panama but $2 
million annually for the immensely valuable 
rights it enjoys on Panamanian territory. 

— The United States operates, on Pana- 
manian territory, a full-fledged government 
that has no reference to the Government of 
Panama, which is its host. 

— And the United States can do all these 
things, the treaty states, forever. 

To these things the Panamanians object, 
saying that they deprive their country of 
dignity, of the ability to develop naturally, 
and, indeed, of full independence. 

One could disagree. One could ask that 
Panama relax in the tropics and enjoy, per- 
petually, the enormous direct and indirect 
benefits which the operation of the canal in 
its territory by the United States has brought 
to it. Yet the level of consent would not there- 
by be raised. 

One can more usefully ask: What is the 
nature of these things to which Panama 
objects? Close scrutiny indicates, I suggest, 
that they resemble the appurtenances of 
power rather than power itself — that it is 
the manner of the U.S. presence in Panama, 
not the presence itself, which is at the heart 
of our problem with that country and, I must 
add, with the world community. 

My impression is that the United States 
would do well to examine what there is about 
our presence in the Canal Zone that is essen- 
tial to our critical interests and what is not, 
and then proceed to modify the latter so that 
we may protect the former. 

The process will not be easy for either 
country. On one hand, the physical, legal, 

April 29, 1974 


and psychological architecture which the 
United States has erected in this 500 square 
miles over many years is enormous and very 
solid. On the other, Panama's capacity to 
absorb, to rebuild, to redesign, is limited. But 
there really is no rational alternative. 

New Climate of Accommodation 

For more than 10 years we have been en- 
gaged with Panama, determined to arrive at 
a new and modernized relationship which 
would cause Panamanians to be fully content 
that the United States remain in Panama — 
and Americans to be fully content to remain 
there. Successive American Presidents since 
Dwight Eisenhower have pressed that nego- 

If our negotiations have not prospered over 
so many years, it is not for lack of distin- 
guished and dedicated Panamanians and 
Americans negotiating. Rather, it is because 
the times have simply not been right. In any 
case, what is negotiating past is not negotiat- 
ing prologue. 

When the Secretary of State and I had the 
pleasure of meeting for the first time with 
the Foreign Minister of Panama in New 
York last October, the Secretary suggested 
that henceforth in this negotiation the United 
States should not attempt to impose its will 
on Panama nor Panama attempt to impose 
its will on the United States. 

And I am able to say, after four months of 
the new negotiation, that the negotiators on 
both sides have accepted that counsel. Politi- 
cal decisions have been taken to make accom- 
modation a way of negotiating life. We shall 
not, I think, be easily distracted from it. 

The world has already observed that ac- 
commodation. Last month the Secretary of 
State journeyed to Panama to initial with the 
Panamanian Foreign Minister a set of eight 
principles.- They are to serve as guidelines 
for the negotiators in working out the details 
of a new treaty. Perhaps the Chief of Gov- 
ernment of Panama best characterized these 

' For text of the joint statement of principles 
initialed on Feb. 7, see Bulletin of Feb. 25, 1974, 
p. 184. 

principles when he said they constituted a 
"philosophy of understanding." Their essence 
is that : 

— Panama will grant the United States the 
rights and facilities and lands necessary to 
continue operating and defending the canal. 

— The United States will agree to return 
to Panama jurisdiction over its territory, 
to recompense Panama fairly for the use of 
its territory, and to arrange for the partici- 
pation by Panama, over time, in the canal's 
operation and defense. 

It has also been agreed in the principles 
that the new treaty shall not be in perpetuity, 
but rather for a fixed period, and that the 
parties will provide for any expansion of 
canal capacity in Panama that may eventu- 
ally be needed. 

Still another form of accommodation will, 
I trust, be visible shortly. Following my first 
visit to Panama, I recommended to the Presi- 
dent that the United States should not await 
the successful conclusion of treaty negotia- 
tions to begin modernizing its presence in the 
Canal Zone, to the benefit of both countries. 
He agreed and is now forwarding to the 
Congress legislation which would return to 
Panama two World War II airfields now 
within the Canal Zone, which Panama could 
put to very good use for economic develop- 
ment. I am hopeful the Congress will agree 
that this is only right for the United States 
to do. 

It escapes neither of the two negotiating 
parties that these accommodations are but a 
good beginning. A treaty arrangement which 
has evolved over 70 years, and evolved too 
often in acrimony rather than harmony, will 
not yield readily to the skills of negotiators 
nor even to the political dictates of heads of 

Nor does it escape the parties that there 
is opposition in both their lands. In this coun- 
try there are those who hold that it is folly 
for the United States to alter the nature of 
its presence in the Canal Zone by making 
any concessions to Panama and that our 
power must reside there, undiluted, forever. 
In Panama there are those who hold that it is 
folly to make a single concession to the 


Department of State Bulletin 

United States and that its presence must be 
eliminated forthwith. 

We can acknowledge the profound patriot- 
ism of those views. Were the executive au- 
thorities of the two countries to share them, 
however, they would be squarely on a collision 

The plain fact of the matter is that geog- 
raphy, history, and the economic and political 
imperatives of our times compel the United 
States and Panama to have a joint stake in 
the Panama Canal enterprise. It follows that 
with respect to that enterprise they should 
comport themselves as partners and friends 
— preserving what is essential to each, pro- 
tecting and making ever more efficient a vital 
international line of communication and, I 
suggest to you, creating a model for the 
world to admire of how a small nation and a 
large one can work peacefully and profitably 

I think that is not too grand a design. 

Secretary Holds News Conference 
at the White House 

President Nixon, Secretary Kissinger, and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko 
met at the White House on Api'il 12. Follow- 
ing is the transcript of a news conference 
held by Secretary Kissinger after the meet- 
ing. Ronald L. Ziegler, Press Secretary to 
President Nixon, introduced the Secretary. 

Press release 141 dated April 12 

Mr. Ziegler: Secretary Kissinger, as you 
know, participated in the meeting this morn- 
ing, and we thought he could give you a 
briefing on the session. So he is here to do 
that. Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Kissinger: The President con- 
tinued the discussions here he had with Mr. 
Podgorny [Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman, 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet] in Paris ; 
and they reviewed — Foreign Minister Gro- 
myko and the President reviewed the entire 
range of U.S. -Soviet relations, with particu- 

lar attention to the issues that will come up 
at the summit. 

Now, in terms of the summit preparation, 
I think it is fair to say that we are about at 
the same level, if not somewhat ahead, of the 
discussions that preceded the previous sum- 
mit — that is, we are reviewing the whole 
range of U.S. -Soviet bilateral arrangements 
to see which of them will lend themselves to 
conclusion at the time of the summit and to 
use the summit to expedite some technical 
issues that have been under discussion for a 
while and to make agreements in a variety of 
areas of some significance. 

The one outstanding issue that still re- 
quires solution is the issue of SALT. And so 
much has been said about this that it is 
increasingly difficult to put it into a reason- 
able perspective. 

The issue of SALT, as I have explained on 
many occasions, is an inherently very com- 
plicated one. It is complicated because we 
are now dealing with qualitative restrictions 
rather than quantitative restrictions ; that is 
to say, we are dealing with the change in 
technology rather than mere numbers. It is 
complicated also because the Soviet Union 
and the United States, for their own reasons, 
have designed their weapons in different 
ways. The Soviet Union has emphasized large 
land-based weapons. The United States has 
emphasized smaller and presumably more 
flexible land-based weapons. This was done 
by our free decision — not at the request of 
the Soviet Union. But the result is that it 
makes the weapons systems of the two sides 
difficult to compare, and therefore the defini- 
tion of equivalence is objectively difficult. 

Therefore, when we talk about complexi- 
ties in negotiations in SALT, this does not 
mean that detente is in any difficulty, nor 
does it mean that progress is unreasonably 
slow. It does mean that the subject is difficult 
and that the President is determined to deal 
with it in the confidence that the decisions 
that are made will affect the security of the 
United States for a period of time much 
longer than his term in office, but for decades 

Now, the status of the SALT negotiation 

April 29, 1974 


is this. As I pointed out in a press conference 
I held at the State Department some weeks 
ago, it is unlikely that we can achieve a com- 
prehensive agreement of a permanent nature 
certainly by the time of the summit meeting. 
There remains a possibility of a substantial 
agreement of a more limited sphere. As we 
have pointed out, the Soviet Union has made 
a proposal to us on the occasion of my visit 
to Moscow. We are now developing a counter- 
proposal, which we will submit to the Soviet 
Union within the next few weeks. And then 
we will see what the prospects are. 

But as was said after the President met 
Chairman Podgorny in Paris, there is prog- 
ress in the SALT negotiations. We will not 
hurry them as a result of an artificial dead- 
line. But we do believe that there is a possi- 
bility of making substantial progress in 
certain areas this year, in the area of SALT, 
and there is a certainty that substantial 
agreements will be achieved in other areas 
during the course of the President's visit to 
Moscow. ' 

I will be glad to take a few questions about 
this meeting today. 

Q. Is there a date set? 

Secretary Kissi)ige)': We have talked about 
a date, and it will be announced, we think, 
within the next few weeks. It has not been 
absolutely put into final shape. But I think 
there is a substantial agreement on that. 

Q. Can you give vs some definition of the 
area in ivhich you migltt have a limited agree- 
ment ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have indi- 
cated that we consider the area of multiple 
warheads one in which there is the greatest 
urgency for progress, because of the rapid 
advance in technology. And this is the area 
to which we have paid the greatest attention. 

I might add that we have also reviewed the 
whole field of arms control negotiations to 
see whether progress can be made in any 
other area and we believe that there are pos- 
sibilities in other areas as well. 

Q. Is MIRV [midtiple independently tar- 


getable reentiy vehicle] the high priority, 
though? Do you think you will he able to 
achieve some ki)id of limited agreement on 

Secretary Kissi))ger: Well, that is the issue 
that we have tried to explain, that progress 
has been made. We are not yet sure that an 
agreement can be made by the time of the 
summit. But we are making progress, and 
we will have to see where we stand as the 
summit approaches. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are the President's 
feelings ivhen it is suggested that he may 
have to negotiate from a position of weakness 
in the summit meeting because of his dotnes- 
tic problems? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, having sat in on 
all of the meetings that the President has 
had this week with President [of Algeria 
Houari] Boumediene, and again this morning 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko, he does not 
conduct himself as if he were in a position of 
weakness, nor do foreign leaders treat him 
as if he were in a position of weakness. The 
President represents the United States and is 
the elected official of the entire country. And 
he is conducting foreign policy the way he 
has always conducted it, with concern for 
the national interest. 

Mr. Ziegler: Because of the Secretary's 
schedule, I should have said in the beginning 
we only have time for a couple of more ques- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see the possibility 
of the June summit not being held because 
of some lack of progress in SALT? 

Secretary Kissinger: The summit has 
never been geared to any one negotiation. 
Every previous summit has had three major 
areas of negotiation and then one general ne- 

The three areas of negotiation have been 
to see whether technical negotiations that 
were going on in the bureaucracy and that 
were going on independent of the summit 
could be expedited by the concern that the 
leaders show for progress in their relations; j 
and there have been a number of agreements 

Department of State Bulletin 

made at the summit which it would be idle 
to pretend were directly negotiated at the 
summit, which nevertheless would not have 
happened without the summit or at least 
would not have happened so rapidly without 
the summit — last year, one on aviation; the 
year before on shipping. So we have this 
category of problem. 

The second is to make significant agree- 
ments in major fields such as economics and 
other cooperative ventures that are negoti- 
ated at a high level and that are concluded 
at the summit. 

The third is to make progress in the field 
of the control of arms. That may or may not 
include a SALT agreement because, as I 
have pointed out, the limitation of strategic 
weapons concerns the most basic security of 
both sides and must not be rushed for a par- 
ticular negotiation. And we, quite candidly, 
cannot tell you now more than that progress 
is being made. How far it will have gone by 
June, we will have to leave to the future. 

Fourthly, there is the necessity that the 
leaders of the two countries who have it in 
their hands to, on the one hand, produce a 
cataclysm and, on the other, benefit hu- 
manity should meet regularly to review the 
whole range of their relationship and possi- 
ble areas of tension, as well as possible areas 
of cooperation. This is independent of any 
agreement that they might make, and it is 
in itself an important utility of the summit. 

So whether or not there will be a SALT 
agreement, the summit will take place. 

Q. Mr. Secretanj, have you noticed that 
marriage has in any ivay affected your out- 
look toward life in general or foreign policy 
in particidar? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have to give 
the answer that Ziegler recommends for this 
particular thing. 

Q. What does he recommend? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, he recommends 
that I say it hasn't aff"ected mine but it has 
affected my wife's. [Laughter]. 

United States and Saudi Arabia 
To Expand Cooperation 

Joi)it Statement ' 

Following discussions between the Govern- 
ment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and 
the United States of America, the two coun- 
tries are prepared to expand and give more 
concrete expression to cooperation in the field 
of economics, technology and industry, and in 
the supply of the Kingdom's requirements 
for defensive purposes. 

His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd 
al-'Aziz al Sa'ud has accepted an invitation 
to visit the United States in the near future 
to discuss these matters with President 
Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger. 

In moving to strengthen their relations, 
both governments reaffirm their hope that a 
just and durable peace will be realized in the 
Middle East so that all its peoples may enjoy 
stability and work for the development and 
prosperity of the region. 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 

to 6th Special U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on April 10 confirmed the nom- 
inations of the following-named persons to 
be Representatives of the United States to 
the sixth special session of the U.N. General 
Assembly: John A. Scali ; William E. Schauf- 
ele, Jr. ; John H. Buchanan, Jr., U.S. Repre- 
sentative from the State of Alabama; Robert 
N. C. Nix, U.S. Representative from the 
State of Pennsylvania; and Clarence Clyde 
Ferguson, Jr. The Senate also confirmed the 
nomination of Barbara M. White to be the 
Alternate Representative of the United 
States to the special session. 

' Issued at Washington and Riyadh on Apr. 5 
(press release 133). 

April 29, 1974 


International Understanding Through Sports 

Address by Alan A. Reich 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ' 

It is a privilege to speak before the Inter- 
national Studies Association on furthering 
understanding through sports. This meeting 
will be, I am sure, a significant landmark in 
the process of more fully engaging Amer- 
ican social scientists in exploring ways of 
enhancing the contribution of sports to in- 
ternational mutual understanding. 

Diplomacy has gone public. Many foreign 
offices no longer confine themselves to speak- 
ing with other foreign offices for peoples; 
they help and encourage peoples to speak 
for themselves across national boundaries. 
People-to-people communication has become 
a dominant force in international relations 
throughout the world. 

Technological advances have made nuclear 
war a threat to mankind's existence. Fortu- 
nately, new initiatives and agreements in 
the disarmament field off'er hope that the 
deadly cycle of weapons buildup will be 
broken. Prospects for increased government- 
to-government cooperation look better today 
than at any time since World War II. The 
great powers are focusing on areas of com- 
mon concern and not only on their differ- 
ences. The results appear promising. 

In the past few years, social scientists in- 
creasingly have studied the relevance of in- 
formal nongovernmental communications ac- 
tivities to matters of war and peace. As you 
know, research scholars are developing a 
more scientific base for these transnational 
cross-cultural communications activities. 
Their research suggests that the existence 

' Made before the International Studies Associa- 
tion at St. Louis, Mo., on Mar. 23. 

of informal communications tends to reduce 
the level of tension when conflicts of interest 
occur and contributes to a climate of opinion 
in which conflicts may be negotiated more 
effectively. Second, their research indicates 
that informal relationships create a greater 
openness in individual attitudes toward other 
nations, peoples, and cultures ; these predis- 
positions also lead to greater readiness to 
communicate and to resolve differences peace- 
ably. Third, social scientists tell us that in- 
ternational cooperation and two-way ex- 
change contribute to world-mindedness and 
to an internationalist perspective on what 
otherwise might be viewed as purely na- 
tional problems. Finally, international peo- 
ple-to-people relationships help develop en- 
during networks of communication which 
cut across boundaries and reduce the likeli- 
hood of polarization along political or na- 
tionalist lines. 

The Department's Cultural Relations Program 

When you think of the State Department's 
conduct of our international aft'airs, people- 
to-people diplomacy and exchange-of-persons 
programs may not come immediately to mind. 
It is nonetheless a significant Department 
activity, carried out with 126 nations of the 

I would like to elaborate on the rationale 
for the State Department's cultural relations 

Recently, as some of you know, the Bu- 
reau of Educational and Cultural Aft'airs 
(CU) has set this forth in a few paragraphs 
called the "CU Program Concept." Because 


Department of State Bulletin 

it is so relevant to our topic today, I would 
like to acquaint you with it. 

Purpose. Pursuant to the Mutual Educational and 
Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, CU-sponsored pro- 
grams are designed to strengthen patterns of infor- 
mal two-way coninuinication in ways which will 
favorably influence relations between the United 
States and other countries and help build the human 
foundations of the structure of peace. 

Objectives. More concretely, we seek to increase 
mutual understanding, cooperation and community 
between the people of the United States and other 
peoples by direct and indirect efforts to: 

1. Enlarge the circle to titose able fn serve as in- 
tiiiential interpreters bettveen this and other nations. 

We enable current and potential opinion leaders 
and decision makers to gain through first-hand ex- 
perience more accurate perceptions and a deeper un- 
derstanding of those realities in each others' socie- 
ties which ultimately tend to affect international re- 

2. Stimulate institutional development in direc- 
tions u'hich favorably affect mutual comprehension 
and confidence. 

Encourage a wide variety of key institutions, such 
as education systems and the mass and specialized 
media, to strengthen their capacity to increase un- 
derstanding of cultural, social, economic and ideo- 
logical differences, similarities and interdependen- 

3. Reduce structural and technical impediments 
to the exchange of ideas and information. 

We promote responsible leadership dialogue, rele- 
vant interest group interaction, and significant insti- 
tutional linkages; in this context, we encourage fur- 
ther extension of English as an international lan- 

Program Criteria. To gain the greatest return 
from available resources, all of the following criteria 
are considered in deciding whether to undertake, fa- 
cilitate or endorse particular programs or projects: 

1. They should be multi-purpose — improving the 
process of intercultural communication while fur- 
thering U.S. and shared international goals of other 
kinds as well. 

2. They should be designed to achieve substantial 
multiplier and side effects through such means as 
stimulating and reinforcing other constructive pro- 
grams and mechanisms, private and governmental. 

3. They should engage the energies of influential 
or potentially influential individuals of exceptional 
talent, achievement or promise and offer them face- 
to-face cross-cultural experiences of lasting value. 

4. They should reflect the two-way character of 
effective communication by emphasizing mutuality 
in planning, participation, support and benefit. (This 
recognizes the reality that Americans, like others, 

harbor myths and misconceptions which impair un- 

.5. They should take full advantage of American 
strengths which facilitate intercultural communica- 
tion, including individual freedom, pluralism, open- 
ness and hospitality, in addition to the many fields 
of special American competence. 

The exciting, challenging job of the Bu- 
reau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is 
to use its resources to reinforce the work of 
American individuals and organizations who 
want to help construct the foundation of 
better relationships with the rest of the 
world. The Bureau also coordinates, as neces- 
sary, the activities of other government 
agencies with international exchange pro- 
grams in such fields as health, education, 
social welfare, transportation, agriculture, 
military training, and urban planning. 

There are several major elements in the 
Department's cultural relations program. 
Annually, some 5,000 professors, lecturers, 
and scholars are exchanged to and from the 
United States. The international visitor pro- 
gram brings to this country about 1,500 
foreign leaders and potential leaders annu- 
ally for orientation tours of four to six 
w-eeks' duration. Each year we send abroad 
several leading performing arts groups and 
athletic stars. For example, recently we sent 
the New York City Ballet to the Soviet Union 
and the Philadelphia Orchestra to the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China; this month, in re- 
sponse to requests from .several countries, 
we sent a tennis-teaching team to the Near 
East. We also send some 150 U.S. lecturers 
abroad annually for brief lecture tours. 

Private Exchange Programs 

We in the Department of State are aware 
our programs represent only a portion of the 
total private-public participation of Amer- 
icans in exchanges aimed at furthering inter- 
national mutual understanding. Service 
organizations, professional associations of 
doctors, lawyers, journalists, municipal ad- 
ministrators, and others link their members 
with counterparts throughout the world. 

More than 40 national sports organizations 
carry on international programs involving 

April 29, 1974 


their athletes in competition, demonstrations, 
and coaching clinics here and abroad. Several 
youth organizations conduct international 
exchanges with nearly 5,000 American and 
foreign teenage participants each year. 

Numerous foundations, businesses, and 
institutions throughout America facilitate 
the private studies of many of the nearly 
150,000 foreign students who come to the 
United States annually and approximately 
half that number of Americans who study 
abroad each year. Private American per- 
forming arts groups tour other countries; 
reciprocal opportunities are offered to coun- 
terpart groups from abroad. 

Many people-to-people organizations ac- 
tively promote and carry out meaningful 
exchanges; 480 American cities are linked 
through the sister city program with com- 
munities in 68 countries of the world. 

Communicating Through Sports 

So much for people-to-people relations and 
international communication in general. 
What about sports in particular? In this 
decade we have witnessed some of the most 
significant international sports events in 
history; some have made history. Although 
the Munich Olympic disaster, the Central 
America soccer war, and other occasional un- 
toward events have tested our convictions 
about sports and international understand- 
ing, research suggests sports work against 
stereotypes and misconceptions in general. 
Lasting impressions reinforce the common 
humanity of sports over the long term. Our 
term is the long term in creating a favorable 
climate for international cooperation. I 
should like to comment on the ways in which 
sports, as a universal language, can further 
international understanding. 

Sports open doors to societies and key 
leaders. They pave the way for expanded 
contact — cultural, economic, and political. 
The table tennis exchanges with the People's 
Republic of China are outstanding examples 
in which U.S. athletes have been involved. 

Sports provide an example of friendly com- 
petition and two-way interchange which, 


hopefully, will characterize and lead to other 
types of friendly relationships between na- 
tions. Even when competition becomes in- 
tense, the fact that the activity continues 
within the context of rules and controls can 
demonstrate the capacity for endurance of 
our ideals. I think more research is needed 
on this subject. 

Sports convey on a person-to-person basis 
and through the media to the broader public 
a sense of commonness of interest shared 
with other peoples across political boundaries. 

Sports enhance understanding of another 
nation's values and culture, so important but 
often absent in many forms of international 
communication. These qualities include deter- 
mination and self-sacrifice, individual eflf'ort 
as well as teamwork, wholesomeness, empa- 
thy, good sportsmanship, and a sense of fair 
play. Sports thus can help to improve per- 
ceptions of other peoples and to close the gap 
between myth and reality. 

In many countries, and especially the less 
developed ones, sports serve as a unifying 
force in helping overcome traditional tribal 
and linguistic pluralism. Heads of state in 
Africa, for example, have encouraged sports 
development for this reason. They also have 
promoted sports as a cohesive force for unity 
in the continent as a whole. 

Sports organizations, in administering in- 
ternational sports activities, develop the 
bases for ongoing communication and coop- 
eration. In this work, the numerous sports 
associations, as nongovernmental groups, are 
symbols of the freedom of peoples to organize 
themselves, to travel and communicate across 
national boundaries, and to work together to 
carry forward freely their own interests. 
They further the ideals of freedom. They 
also help develop leadership, which is needed 
especially by the developing nations as they 
struggle to reduce the gap between the 
"have" and "have-not" peoples of the world. 

I could illustrate each of these values of 
international sports with many examples, as 
I am sure you could. We also could cite cases 
in which negative results were realized. But 
on balance, the many thousands of ongoing 
interactions in sports annually are a tremen- 

Department of State Bulletin i< 

dous force for good in the world. For all these 
reasons, the U.S. State Department has a 
serious commitment to international sports. 

The Role of the Department in Sports 

Since sports in the United States is a non- 
governmental activity, the State Depart- 
ment's role reflects this basic concept in in- 
ternational sports. As I mentioned earlier, 
our interest is in furthering international 
mutual understanding and communication 
over the long term. As part of the official 
U.S. cultural relations, our sports office in 
the Department carries out, in cooperation 
with the USIA and cultural officers in our 
embassies, a small, high-quality, and we hope 
catalytic, program. We provide policy guid- 
ance as necessary to the other Federal agen- 
cies carrying out international sports pro- 
grams. The Peace Corps currently has more 
than 100 U.S. coaches serving abroad on re- 
quest of host nations. The Department of 
Defense carries out a worldwide military 
sports program with foreign military coun- 
terparts of 52 countries. 

On request of other nations, each year we 
send a small number of teaching teams of 
outstanding athletes and coaches abroad to 
conduct demonstrations and clinics and teach 
sports administration. We bring several 
sports administrators annually to the United 
States for orientation programs as recom- 
mended by our embassies. Occasionally we 
arrange to "pick up" a U.S. group partici- 
pating in a sports event abroad and send 
them on a goodwill tour into additional coun- 
tries. When, for example, the Coca Cola 
Company sponsored an AAU international 
swimming meet in London, after the meet 
we sent four small teams of U.S. partici- 
pants into Eastern Europe and North Af- 
rica. Our sports office, in cooperation with 
the embassies concerned, evaluates Depart- 
ment-sponsored tours to improve planning 
for future activities. 

The Department also makes a few small 
seed-money grants each year as an induce- 
ment to selected organizations in raising pri- 
vate funds to carry out their programs more 
effectively. Reflecting our interest in two- 

way interchange, we recently assisted the 
Partners of the Americas to develop a pro- 
gram of sending a group of basketball 
coaches to Latin America and bringing soc- 
cer coaches to their partner U.S. states. 

In addition to these programs, we facili- 
tate private efforts, when possible, by provid- 
ing briefings on the cultural and political 
situation in countries to be visited, by offer- 
ing suggestions for cooperative programing, 
by assisting with overseas communications, 
or by furnishing guidance on international 
affairs. In response to requests for guidance 
from private organizations, our sports office 
has contracted for preparation of a manual 
on "how to conduct a successful interna- 
tional sports tour." We hope it will be helpful 
to private groups requesting it. Our con- 
sulate general in Munich furnished consid- 
erable planning assistance to the U.S. Olym- 
pic Committee over a period of months. 
Thousands of Americans will be involved in 
the Olympic development program as well as 
in the 1976 Olympic games, when 7,000 ath- 
letes from 122 nations will participate. We 
may be called upon to provide facilitative as- 

There are thousands of privately spon- 
sored international sports activities annually 
involving trips to and from the United States 
of athletes, coaches, and administrators. It 
is in our national interest — in the U.S. tax- 
payers' interest — to help insure that these ac- 
tivities do in fact contribute to the maximum 
extent possible to better international mu- 
tual understanding. 

I frequently have been asked by leaders of 
private U.S. sports organizations what more 
they might do, beyond what they already 
are doing, to further international under- 
standing. You might be interested in 12 sug- 
gestions I offer to them for their considera- 
tion and action : 

1. Help strengthen the Olympic movement, 
including the Olympic development program. 

2. Strengthen the ties which bind us with 
other peoples by actively participating in 
international sports associations. 

3. Encourage excellence in all aspects of 
international interchange. 

April 29, 1974 


4. Insure that participants conduct them- 
selves as representatives of their country. 

5. Develop cooperative programing with 
other private organizations such as People- 
to-People Sports Committee, Partners of the 
Americas, Operation Crossroads Africa, Sis- 
ter Cities International and youth and com- 
munity service organizations. 

6. Seek greater public visibility through 
the media to expose the maximum number 
of people here and abroad to the interna- 
tional good will generated. 

7. Help insure that U.S. participants in 
international sports interchange gain ad- 
vance understanding of important cultural 
differences and political realities. 

8. Seek facilitative and financial assistance 
of U.S. companies operating internationally, 
since they have an interest in carrying out 
public service activities abroad as they do 
in the United States. 

9. Develop and carry out international 
sports events in support of disaster relief, 
which also serve to dramatize the humanity 
of sports. 

10. Encourage and publicize the par- 
ticipation of international federation rep- 
resentatives at sports events to dramatize the 
universality of sports and their contribution 
to international understanding. 

11. Assist other nations as requested in 
building their counterpart sports organiza- 
tions to insure ongoing interchange. 

12. Provide home hospitality, in coopera- 
tion with community organizations, for 
international sports visitors to the United 

We receive inquiries occasionally about 
State Department policies or guidelines con- 
cerning sports. One of our most important 
policies with respect to international sports 
is to encourage and assist while at the same 
time seeking to preserve and encourage the 
private sector initiative, vigor, diversity, and 
dynamism which are America's strengths. 
Sports in the United States are best handled 
and managed by the private sector — not the 
government. Therefore, our facilitative role 
in helping U.S. sports organizations carry 
on their own international programs effec- 

tively is our most important one. Aside from 
encouraging but not controlling effective 
international communication through sports, 
we have very few policies. I would mention, 
however, the following : 

— The Department of State supports the 
Olympic movement and encourages the pur- 
suit of Olympic ideals. We hold with the 
Olympic precept that it is not winning, but 
participating well, that over the long term 
will contribute most to enhancing interna- 
tional understanding and cooperation. We 
cooperate with the U.S. Olympic development 

— The United States supports the United 
Nations Declaration of Human Rights and 
the principle of opposing discrimination. 
Sports should advance the ideals of individual 
dignity and human rights without regard to 
race, sex, color, or creed. In late 1972, the 
United States voted with the majority of 
nations in the General Assembly to uphold 
this principle in sports. On that occasion we 
noted with regret that some national and 
international sports organizations continued 
sports interchange with South Africa involv- 
ing teams closed to otherwise qualified ath- 
letes because of their race and color. At that 
time we urged U.S. sports organizations to 
follow this principle. 

— We encourage increased participation by 
women athletes in international sports. 

— We encourage and facilitate actions 
which will result in the greatest possible 
contribution to international mutual under- 
standing and which will minimize possible 
misunderstanding. We urge American sports- 
men going abroad to view themselves as 
representatives of their country, to act ac- 
cordingly, and to avoid poor sportsmanship, 
which can reflect adversely on themselves 
and all Americans. 

— We assist, on request, private organiza- 
tions and groups in understanding the po- 
litical realities which may be important to 
them and to the United States in their inter- 
national activities. We encourage private 
U.S. organizations in their dealings with 
sports organizations of other nations, and 
particularly those with highly centralized 


Department of State Bulletin 

governments and sports ministries, to become 
acquainted with relevant international rules 
and with negotiating techniques employed by 
their international counterparts so as to not 
put American sportsmen and organizers at a 

— In our own international sports pro- 
graming, we attempt to be responsive to 
requests of other nations seeking American 
athletes, administrators, and coaches, rather 
than forcing our expertise and experts on 

— In the few international sports tours we 
sponsor, we concentrate on geographic areas 
of the world where communication is limited 
and where privately sponsored programs are 
less likely to go. 

— We prefer to sponsor teaching teams of 
coaches and athletes who can work together 
with their international counterparts rather 
than competitions which can create aggres- 
sive or hostile feelings. To the extent we 
sponsor international competitive activities, 
we prefer to do so in those sports less likely 
to produce confrontation. We prefer to en- 
courage and carry out programs which i-esult 
in two-way interchange and dialogue. 

— We endeavor to carry out an evenhanded 
policy with respect to the private sports 
organizations in the United States. We 
cooperate appropriately with all groups con- 
tributing to international mutual understand- 
ing. The interorganizational jurisdictional 
disputes on occasion create difficulty for the 
Department of State and embarrassment to 
all Americans ; we take pains not to exacer- 
bate or become involved in their problems 
and to take into account the rules of the many 
U.S. and international sports organizations. 
At the same time, we do not hesitate to ask 
them to cooperate with each other and with 
us in the national interest. 

— As with people in other sectors of Amer- 
ican life whom we seek to bring into contact 
with international counterparts to further 
mutual understanding, we sponsor and en- 
courage excellence. To do otherwise can be 
insulting to hosts abroad and demeaning to 

I am grateful to the International Studies 

Association and the International Society for 
Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Inter- 
changes for taking the leadership in expand- 
ing the scholarly interest in this key inter- 
national activity. There is certain to be a 
radiating impact from this conference lead- 
ing to greater cooperative efforts of the U.S. 
academic and sports communities to increase 
international mutual understanding. I would 
only urge full speed ahead as you address 
these issues so important to all of us. 

Thank you for your continuing work to 
further the ideals of sports worldwide and in 
the process for helping to build the human 
foundations for the structure of peace. 

Eximbank Resumes Granting Credits 
to Eastern European Countries 

Export-Import Bank press release dated March 22 

William J. Casey, Chairman and President 
of the Export-Import Bank of the United 
States, announced on March 22 that the 
Bank's Board of Directors has resumed its 
normal processing of credits to Poland, Ro- 
mania, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. Exim- 
bank had suspended action on credits to these 
countries on March 11 in order to study and 
receive advice on an opinion of the Comp- 
troller General of the United States to the 
effect that each individual transaction involv- 
ing these countries had to be the subject of a 
finding by the President that such trans- 
action was in the national interest. Since 
1964, Eximbank has been making loans and 
issuing guarantees and insurance to these 
countries pursuant to determinations made at 
various times by Presidents Johnson and 
Nixon that it would be in the national inter- 
est for Eximbank to facilitate exports to 
these particular countries. 

In resuming action on transactions involv- 
ing these four countries, the Bank acted on 
the opinion of its General Counsel and a 
concurring opinion which the Attorney Gen- 
eral submitted to the President on March 21. 

Mr. Casey also announced that he had 
signed two agreements that had been delayed 

April 29, 1974 


for Eximbank credits to Yugoslavia in sup- 
port of sales of jet aircraft to J AT, the 
Yugoslav airline. 

In addition, authorizations for two credits 
to Romania, four credits to Poland, four 
credits to the U.S.S.R., and one credit to 
Yugoslavia have been approved by the Bank's 
Board of Directors. 

Eximbank's credits total $74,928,750, in 
support of sales of U.S. goods and services 
totaling $166,508,333. 

The first of four credits extended to Poland 
was in support of a $43,759,000 sale of U.S. 
goods and services required for establishing 
a copper and brass processing facility in Po- 
land. Direct credit of $19,691,550 will finance 
45 percent of the total U.S. purchases. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, New York, will also extend 
financing of $19,691,550 to finance another 
45 percent of the U.S. costs. The obligor. 
Bank Handlowy w Warszawie, S.A. (Handlo- 
bank) , will make cash payment of the balance 
of the U.S. costs of 10 percent, or $4,375,900. 

The project is for design, construction, and 
equipping of a new copper and brass facility 
to be located in Katowice about 175 miles 
south-southwest of Warsaw. Centrozap, a 
Polish foreign trading organization, has a 
contract with Waterbury Farrel of Cheshire, 
Conn., a division of Textron, for engineering, 
technical assistance and furnishing equip- 
ment for the new plant. Chase Brass & 
Copper Co. of Shaker Heights, Ohio, will pro- 
vide technology and technical services rela- 
tive to the project. 

The loans are to be repaid in 20 semi- 
annual installments beginning February 20, 
1977, with Eximbank's direct loan of 
$19,691,550 to be repaid out of the last 10 
in.stallments with interest at an annual rate 
of 6 percent on outstanding balances. Repay- 
ment of Eximbank's loan is to be guaranteed 
by the Government of the Polish People's 

A second credit will help finance a $1,725,- 
000 sale of U.S. goods and services required 
for a tire plant in Poland. The Board of Di- 
rectors of the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States has authorized a direct credit 


of $776,250 to finance 45 percent of the U.S. 
costs. A loan of $776,250 from Manufactur- ' 
ers Hanover Trust Company, New York, will 
also finance 45 percent of the total U.S. costs. 
The borrower, Bank Handlowy w Warszawie, 
S.A. (Handlobank), will make cash pay- 
ment of the balance of the U.S. costs of 10 
percent, or $172,500. 

The project is for the construction of a new 
tire plant alongside of an existing one. The 
new plant is expected to have an initial an- 
nual capacity of nearly 2 million radial-ply 
steel-belted passenger car tires. 

Uniroyal S.A. of France, a subsidiary of 
Uniroyal U.S.A., will be the prime contractor 
to provide the plant layout, engineering, man- 
ufacturing technology, and most of the ma- 

The loans are to be repaid in 10 semiannual 
installments beginning July 15, 1976, with 
Eximbank's direct loan of $776,250 to be 
repaid out of the last five installments with 
interest at an annual rate of 7 percent on 
outstanding balances. Repayment of Exim- 
bank's loans is to be guaranteed by the Gov- 
ernment of the Polish People's Republic. 

Eximbank's third direct credit to Poland 
of $879,420 will finance 45 percent of the 
total U.S. costs of $1,954,266 for textile 
equipment to Poland. A credit of $879,420 
from private sources not yet designated will 
finance another 45 percent of the U.S. costs. 
The obligor. Bank Handlowy w Warszawie, 
S.A. (Handlobank), will make cash payment 
of the balance of 10 percent, or $195,426. 

The textile equipment, to be purchased in 
the United States from Leesona Corp. of 
Warwick, R.I., is Uniconers, which are used 
for rewinding and cleaning different kinds of 
cotton yarns. Varimex of Poland will be the 
end user. 

The loans are to be repaid in 10 semi- 
annual installments beginning January 5, 
1975, with Eximbank's direct credit of $879,- 
420 to be repaid out of the last five install- 
ments with interest at an annual rate of 6 
percent on outstanding balances. Repayment 
of Eximbank's loan is to be guaranteed by the 
Polish People's Republic. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Eximbank's fourth credit of $1,236,585 
will finance 45 percent of the total U.S. costs 
of one Cyber 72-16 computer system costing 
$2,747,967 to Poland. Bankers Trust Com- 
pany, New York, will also provide a credit 
of $1,236,585 to finance another 45 percent. 
The obligor. Bank Handlowy w Warszawie, 
S.A. (Handlobank), will make cash payment 
of the balance of 10 percent, or $274,797. 

The computer equipment, to be supplied by 
Control Data Corp., Minneapolis, Minn., will 
be for the use of the Krakow High Schools 
and Scientific In.stitutes. 

The loans are to be repaid in 10 semi- 
annual installments beginning May 5, 1975, 
with Eximbank's direct loan of $1,236,585 to 
be repaid out of the last five installments 
with interest at an annual rate of 6 percent 
on outstanding balances. Repayment of Ex- 
imbank's loan is to be guaranteed by the 
Polish People's Republic. 

To help finance a $1,746,000 sale of U.S. 
equipment, spare parts and services for an 
engine bearing and bushing production line 
in Romania, Eximbank's Board authorized 
a direct loan of $785,700 to finance 45 per- 
cent of the total U.S. costs. Irving Trust 
Company of New York will provide a credit 
of $785,700 to finance another 45 percent of 
the costs. The obligor, Uzinexportimport of 
Romania, will make payment of 10 per- 
cent of the U.S. costs, or $174,600. 

The project is for an engine components 
unit designed and equipped to produce 8.7 
million engine bearings and bushings per 
year for use in tractors, trucks, and indus- 
trial machinery. 

DAB Industries Inc. of Detroit, Mich., the 
largest independent engine bearing manu- 
facturer in the United States, was chosen to 
provide proprietary high-production machin- 
ery, plant design and layout, advanced bime- 
tallic bearing technology, certain ancillary 
tooling, and spare parts for the project. This 
award was a culmination of negotiations 
started in May 1971. Deliveries are expected 
to begin in August 1974 and be completed in 

Eximbank's direct loan of $785,700 is to be 

repaid in five semiannual installments begin- 
ning October 15, 1978, with interest at an 
annual rate of 6 percent on outstanding bal- 
ances. Repayment of the loan is to be guaran- 
teed by the Romanian Bank for Foreign 

Eximbank's second direct loan of $368,100 
to Romania will finance 45 percent of the 
total U.S. costs of $818,000 for welding ma- 
chines, spare and wear parts, and technical 
assistance to Romania. Manufacturers Han- 
over Trust Company, New York, will also 
provide a credit of $368,100 to finance an- 
other 45 percent. The obligor, METAROM, 
the Romanian State Company for Foreign 
Trade, will make cash payment of the balance 
of the U.S. costs of 10 percent, or $81,800. 

The machines are for welding silicon steel 
strips. Wean United of Pittsburgh, Pa., is 
the supplier for the welding units which are 
scheduled for delivery by March 1975. 

Repayment of the loans is to be made in 
10 semiannual installments beginning Octo- 
ber 5, 1975, with Eximbank's direct loan of 
$368,100 to be repaid out of the last five in- 
stallments with interest at an annual rate of 
6 percent on outstanding balances and re- 
payment to be guaranteed by the Romanian 
Bank for Foreign Trade. 

The first of four credits for the U.S.S.R. 
authorized by Eximbank's Board of Direc- 
tors on March 22 was to finance 45 percent 
of the total U.S. costs of $7,458,100 for 
equipment required for a transfer line for 
machine flywheels in the U.S.S.R. A credit 
of $3,356,145 from private sources not yet 
designated will finance another 45 percent of 
the total U.S. costs. The obligor, the Bank for 
Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R., will make 
cash payment of the balance of the U.S. costs 
of 10 percent, or $745,810. 

The project is for the establishment and 
equipping of a transfer line for machine fly- 
wheels for use in the Ufa Motor Works, Ufa, 
Bashkirskoy. The flywheels will eventually 
go into the Moskvitch 412 passenger cars. 
The flywheel line will be provided by Gid- 
dings & Lewis, Fond du Lac, Wis. 

The loans are to be repaid in 14 semian- 

April 29, 1974 


nual installments beginning August 20, 1976, 
with Eximbank's direct loan of $3,356,145 to 
be repaid out of the last seven installments 
with interest at an annual rate of 6 percent 
on outstanding balances. Repayment of all 
loans is to be guaranteed by the Government 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

The second U.S.S.R. credit of $2,970,000 
will finance 45 percent of the total U.S. costs 
of $6.6 million for equipment to be used in 
canal-lining construction in the U.S.S.R. A 
credit of $2,970,000 from private sources 
not yet designated will finance another 45 
percent of the U.S. costs. The Bank for For- 
eign Trade of the U.S.S.R. will make cash 
payment of the balance of 10 percent, or 

Proceeds of the loans will be used by Trak- 
toroexport to purchase canal-lining machin- 
ery for the Ministry of Irrigation of the 
U.S.S.R. The prime suppliers of the equip- 
ment will be R. A. Hanson Disc Ltd., of 
Spokane, Wash., and International Harvester 
Export Co., Chicago, 111. 

The loans are to be repaid in 10 semian- 
nual installments beginning December 15, 
1975, with Eximbank's direct loan of $2,970,- 
000 to be repaid out of the last five install- 
ments, with interest at an annual rate of 6 
percent on outstanding balances and repay- 
ment to be guaranteed by the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

Another Eximbank credit for $2,115,000 
will finance 45 percent of the total U.S. costs 
of $4.7 million for valve-making machinery 
and equipment for the petrochemical indus- 
try. A credit of $2,115,000 from private 
sources not yet designated will finance an- 
other 45 percent of the U.S. costs. The Bank 
for Foreign Trade of the U.S.S.R. will make 
cash payment of the balance of the U.S. costs 
of 10 percent, or $470,000. 

Kingsbury Machine Tool Corp. of Keene, 
N.H., will enter into a contract with Stanko- 
import to provide these machines, together 
with appropriate sets of cutting tools for use 
by Kroveletsky and Zaporojske Valve Works 
in the U.S.S.R. 

The loans are to be repaid in 10 semian- 

nual installments beginning December 15, 
1976, with Eximbank's direct loan of $2,115,- 
000 to be repaid out of the last five install- 
ments, with interest at an annual rate of 6 
percent on outstanding balances and repay- 
ment to be guaranteed by the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

The fourth Eximbank authorization to the 
U.S.S.R. was for $36 million which will fi- 
nance 45 percent of the U.S. costs of $80 mil- 
lion for goods and services required for the 
construction and equipping of a center for 
international trade in Moscow. A credit of 
$36 million from Chase Manhattan Bank, 
New York, will finance another 45 percent of 
the U.S. costs and the Bank for Foreign 
Trade of the U.S.S.R. will make cash pay- 
ment of the balance of 10 percent, or $8 mil- 

Current plans for the center include offices 
to house some 1,200 employees, a 600-room 
hotel with restaurants and entertainment 
rooms, 625 residential quarters with from 
one- to four-room flats, conference halls, ex- 
hibition pavilion, a garage, and athletic and 
recreational facilities. The center will be 
equipped with technological and communica- 
tion equipment required for the processing 
of trade, economic, and scientific informa- 
tion. Total cost of the center is estimated at 
$110 million. 

The loans are to be repaid in 20 semian- 
nual installments beginning July 10, 1970, 
with Eximbank's direct credit of $36 million 
to be repaid out of the last 10 installments, 
with interest at an annual rate of 6 percent 
on outstanding balances and repayment to be 
guaranteed by the Government of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 

A direct credit of $6,750,000 was author- 
ized to finance 45 percent of a $15 million 
sale of two used Boeing 707 jet aircraft with 
related goods and services to Yugoslavia. 
Eximbank also guaranteed a loan of $6,750,- 
000 from United California Bank Interna- 
tional to finance another 45 percent of the 
total U.S. costs. The borrower, Jugoslovenski 
Aerotransport (JAT) of Yugoslavia, will 
make cash payment of the balance of $1.5 


Department of State Bulletin 

million. The agreement for this credit was 
one of those signed for the Bank on March 
22 by Chairman Casey. 

JAT will purchase the aircraft from North- 
west Airlines and delivery is expected in 
April 1974. 

The loans are to be repaid in 14 semian- 
nual installments beginning October 10, 
1974, with Eximbank's direct loan of $6,750,- 
000 to be repaid out of the last seven install- 
ments with interest at an annual rate of 7 
percent on outstanding balances. Repayment 
of all loans is to be guaranteed by the Yugo- 
slav Investment Bank and The National 
Bank of Yugoslavia. 

U.S. Makes Voluntary Contribution 
to U.N. Fund for Namibia 

USUN press relcHsc 23 ilated Mart-h 21 

At a U.N. ceremony on March 21 marking 
the International Day for the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, Ambassador William 
E. Schaufele, Jr., U.S. Deputy Representa- 
tive to the Security Council, presented a 
pledge for $50,000 to Secretary General 
Waldheim for the Fund for Namibia. 

The Permanent Representative of the 
United States, Ambassador John Scali, in a 
letter on March 11, 1974, informing the 
Secretary General of the U.S. intention to 
make the donation, said that the United 
States fully recognizes the U.N.'s unique re- 
sponsibility for Namibia and considers the 
Fund a necessary and appropriate effort to 
aid some of the territory's people. He also 
said the United States believes the United 
Nations Fund for Namibia should be sup- 
ported solely by voluntary contributions and 
not funded from the regular U.N. budget. 
Therefore the United States does not plan to 
make further contributions to the Fund until 
it ceases to receive allocations from the regu- 
lar U.N. budget. The Ambassador further 

said that the United States makes its pledge 
subject to the condition that its contribution 
shall not exceed one-third of the total volun- 
tary contributions to the Fund. 

World Trade Week, 1974 

A P R O C L .\ M A T 1 N ■ 

As we approach the midpoint of the nineteen sev- 
enties there are many problems which command the 
attention of the world's peoples. 

Large and small, nations around the globe seek 
solutions to unprecedented problems of energy. How 
we and they react could have a lasting impact on 
international commercial relations. Moreover, the 
need for thoroughgoing reform of the international 
economic system has never been more acute. 

The challenges are thus great, but the opportuni- 
ties are even greater. 

To meet those challenges and realize these oppor- 
tunities, we need to move rapidly and confidently 
forward with a series of interrelated negotiations, 
of which those on trade reform are of vital impor- 

World trade is important not only to the United 
States but to all nations. Fair open trade can con- 
tribute importantly to stability and harmony in the 
world, reducing the causes of international friction. 

World Trade Week is an opportunity to recall this 
importance to all Americans and to renew our sense 
of national dedication to the success of this effort. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
the week beginning May 19, 1974, as World Trade 
Week, and I call upon all Americans to cooperate in 
observing that week by participating with the busi- 
ness community and all levels of government in 
activities that emphasize the importance of world 
trade to the United States economy and to our rela- 
tions with other nations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-fifth day of March, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-eighth. 


No. 4278; 39 Fed. Reg. 11171. 

April 29, 1974 



United States Defense Commitments in Asia 

Statement by Robert S. Ingersoll 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs ^ 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
meet with this subcommittee. Shortly after 
I was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at 
the beginning of January, I left for a six- 
week visit to my "parish," as some of my 
irreverent colleagues call the area. While 
I have had occasion to meet some of you 
and particularly your distinguished chair- 
man, this is my first appearance at formal 
hearings before this committee. I therefore 
wish to take this occasion to say, as I have 
said privately, that I hope to work closely 
and cooperatively with you and I will make 
every eflfort to keep you informed on impor- 
tant developments and will be as responsive 
as I can to your requests. 

While we may reach different conclusions 
on given issues, this will be the result of 
honest differences of view rather than lack 
of consultation or misunderstanding. I deeply 
believe that a meaningful foreign policy can 
be conducted by a democracy such as ours 
only if it is understood and supported by its 
people, which means, in the first instance, 
the Congress. 

It is altogether fitting then, in light of its 
responsibilities, that this committee should 
inquire into U.S. defense commitments in 
Asia. Those commitments are an important 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pa- 
cific Aff"airs of the House Committee on Foreign Af- 
fairs on Apr. 3. The complete transcript of the hear- 
ings will be published by the committee and will be 
available from the Superintendent of Documente, 
U.S. Government Printing Oflfice, Washington, D.C. 

element of our policy toward the area, and 
it is essential that there be a full under- 
standing of their scope and their implica- 

Since the word "commitment" has been 
bandied about a good deal, I propose for 
the sake of clarity to limit the sense of that 
word to the obligations we have undertaken 
in defense treaties. 

In Asia, we have signed six such treaties: 
four bilateral, with the Philippines, the Re- 
public of China, the Republic of Korea, and 
Japan; and two multilateral, ANZUS with 
Australia and New Zealand, and the South- 
east Asia Collective Defense Treaty and its 
organization, SEATO, with Thailand, the 
Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, France, 
and the United Kingdom. (Pakistan was 
a member but, after formally terminating 
its part in the treaty, withdrew last year.) 
This treaty is the only formal defense link 
between Thailand and the United States; 
all other members have other security agree- 
ments with us. A protocol to this treaty 
also extends its protection to so-called pro- 
tocol states, with their consent, in the event 
of armed attack. South Viet-Nam, Laos, 
and Cambodia were originally designated 
"protocol states," but both Cambodia and 
Laos have renounced the protection of the 

The wording of these agreements varies, 
but in general they provide for consultation 
whenever a party considers that the terri- 
torial integrity, political independence, or 
security of any party is threatened. These 


Department of State Bulletin Jtpi 

agreements further state that each party 
recognizes that an armed attack on any party 
would endanger its own peace and safety 
and that it would act to meet the common 
danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. In the case of the Southeast Asia 
Collective Defense Treaty, the commitment 
to act on the part of the United States is 
limited to instances of Communist aggres- 

It should be noted that these treaties do 
not attempt to define the specific action to 
be taken in the event of external armed at- 
tack. Thus, these commitments do not bind 
us to any particular course of action — de- 
pending on the facts of the situation, our 
options might range from merely undertak- 
ing diplomatic activity, to the provision of 
assistance, to the extreme of taking action 
involving the use of armed force. Our ob- 
ligation would be to act in good faith to 
meet the common danger in accordance with 
our constitutional processes. 

Defense Treaties as Stabilizing Elements 

Commitments in the form of defense 
treaties express a country's perception of 
its deepest national security interests. A 
defense treaty is, in effect, a formal recog- 
nition of the commonality of security inter- 
ests between two countries, a recognition 
that the security of one country is important 
to the security of another. It is a public 
manifestation of this fact and has a dual 
consequence — it provides the interested par- 
ties a degree of mutual reassurance regard- 
ing their security, and it puts all other 
countries on notice that these parties stand 

When one of the parties is the United 
States, the treaties become an enormously 
important factor — a given, fixed, stabilizing 
element in an often fluid international situ- 
ation. Taken together, the defense treaties 
signed by the United States in Asia reflect 
with utmost clarity the historical American 
position in this area: While the United 
States does not seek hegemony in the region, 
neither can it accept the domination of Asia 

and the Pacific l)y any other nation or com- 
tiination of nations. 

This position formed the basis of Amer- 
ican policy in Asia in the 1930's when we 
opposed Japanese expansion and in the quar- 
ter century following World War II when 
we assisted Asian countries to resist ag- 
gression or pressure by Asian Communists. 

We fought World War II e\'en though we 
had no treaty commitments in either Europe 
or Asia: we fought in Korea in 1950-54 
even though we had no treaty commitment 
at that time with the Republic of Korea. 
Plainly, the absence of commitments does 
not shield us from becoming involved in 
major conflicts and may even lead to con- 
flict when it otherwise might not occur. 
It was perhaps a recognition of this possi- 
bility as much as any other fact that led 
the United States in the last 25 years to 
enter into more treaty arrangements than 
ever before in its history. 

The generation which fought World War 
II returned determined that major war 
should not happen through inadvertence and 
that to secure peace the United States would 
have to play an active role in the world 
and to commit itself in advance to the de- 
fense of the interests it deemed vital. This 
generation believed that only by committing 
ourselves would we prevent other countries 
from again miscalculating American secu- 
rity interests and risking another catastro- 
phe. Underlying this view was the judgment 
that World War I and World War II would 
not have happened had the United States 
played a more responsible role in interna- 
tional afi'airs and had it defined, clearly and 
in time, the nature of its national interests. 

Our defense treaties have been major sta- 
bilizing elements in the world and have 
largely achieved their main objective — to 
prevent war through miscalculation. There 
has been peace in Europe since World War 
II; generally there has been peace in East 
Asia and the Pacific since 1954 — with the 
single tragic exception of Indochina. The 
experience of this century seems to me quite 
conclusive: We have gone to war even with- 
out any treaty commitments; we have avoided 

April 29, 1974 


wars in part by the structure of defense 
treaties which we have signed. 

Changes in Deployment of U.S. Forces 

Treaties reflect a country's security inter- 
ests, but they must be credible to be efi'ective 
deterrents. The parties to a treaty must be 
perceived by other countries to have not 
only the will to fulfill their obligations but 
also the means to do so. For the United States 
in Asia, this has meant the creation of a net- 
work of bases and facilities and the deploy- 
ment of forces. 

But these have been the subject of con- 
stant change and adaptation : 

—In December 1969, there were 764,000 
U.S. forces deployed in Asia, including forces 
afloat; excluding our troops in Viet-Nam, 
there were approximately 290,000 forces in 
the region at that time. Today, that number 
is under 180,000, including some 21,000 
afloat, a drawdown of some 110,000 in addi- 
tion to withdrawals from Viet-Nam. 

— Of this number, some 38,000 are in 
Korea, where they continue to contribute to 
the peace and stability of this ci'itical i-egion ; 
this compares with 64,000 at the end of 1969. 

— About 16,000 are stationed in the Philip- 
pines, where U.S. bases historically have been 
key links in our strategic posture in the 
Western Pacific ; this compares with 25,000 
in December 1969. 

— Some 6,000 are on Taiwan, where our 
presence is related to the U.S. security com- 
mitment to the Republic of China itself under 
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. This 
represents a reduction of over 3,000 since 
1969. Our deployments on Taiwan will con- 
tinue to be reviewed, and we anticipate that 
further reductions will occur consistent with 
the Nixon doctrine and an improvement in 
security conditions. 

—There were, in December 1969, 89,000 
troops stationed in Japan (including Okina- 
wa). There are now approximately 55,000 
giving substance to the security treaty which 
is at the heart of our close bilateral relation- 

— And 36,000 are in Thailand, where they 
add weight to our efl'ort to bring about a 

peaceful settlement in Indochina, down some 
12,000 from the high point of 48,000 in 1969. 
Reflective of the improved situation in Indo- 
china, we and the Royal Thai Government 
have just announced our intention to further 
reduce the U.S. military presence in Thai- 
land by approximately 10,000 authorized 
positions by the end of 1974. 

Benefits of Security Arrangements 

I believe, on the basis of my recent travels, 
that the countries of the region fully appre- 
ciate the importance of this .security system 
(in which others such as Australia, New 
Zealand, and the U.K. also participate) to 
peace and stability in Asia. Even though the 
proposal of ASEAN — Association of South- 
east Asian Nations — for the neutralization 
of Southeast Asia contemplates the eventual 
termination of security ties with nations out- 
side the region, four ASEAN members par- 
ticipate either in SEATO or the Five Power 
Defense Arrangement between the U.K., 
Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Ma- 
laysia. The fifth ASEAN member, Indonesia, 
tacitly approves of their participation. 

These multilateral and bilateral treaty 
arrangements have provided an underpinning 
of continuity and assurance that has facili- 
tated, not impeded, cooperation among these 
nations and an adjustment of relations with 
former adversaries. We should not under- 
mine the sense of confidence that has de- 
veloped among the nations of the region by 
prematurely dismantling these security ar- 
rangements. Uncertainty and doubt would 
result from such unilateral U.S. action, which 
could well be misinterpreted as a U.S. with- 
drawal from Asia and could also affect the 
willingness of others to do their share in con- 
tributing to development and security in the 

Since I served as Ambassador to Japan, let 
me say just a word about our relationship 
with this great country which is the keystone 
of our Asian security system. Japan is the 
third economic power in the world; yet it 
continues to maintain only limited military 
forces and remains deeply committed to the 
provision of its Constitution renouncing war. 


Department of State Bulletin 


It has also shown no interest in becoming a 
nuclear power. This imbalance between eco- 
nomic and military power is made possible 
and acceptable by Japan's security relation- 
ship with the United States. I believe our 
interests are well served by this situation. 

We have excellent and cooperative rela- 
tions with this creative and dynamic country. 
At the same time, today's Japan is accepted 
by all the countries of the area, including 
China. If ever Japan were judged to be re- 
turning to an earlier militarism, tensions 
would rise throughout Asia, countries would 
arm, and China in particular would react 
strongly. The situation would be thrown into 
even more serious relief were Japan to ac- 
quire a nuclear capability. Thus, I believe the 
confident alliance between Japan and the 
United States, the key to which is our se- 
curity treaty, serves the interests of our- 
selves, of Asia, and of the world. 

In examining our defense arrangements, I 
believe it becomes quite clear that they are 
beneficial to this nation. Too often there is 
a tendency to view our efforts abroad as acts 
of generosity, to consider only the benefits 
enjoyed by other countries, as if our defense 
ties were a protective shield thrown over 
weaker countries by a generous America 
whose sole interest was the welfare and peace 
of others. 

Although I recognize and value America's 
generous motivations in foreign affairs, I 
strongly believe that a viable policy must be 
firmly rooted in the native soil of national 
interests. Our defense treaties are so rooted. 
They have helped to create a climate in Asia 
which has advanced those interests and has 
permitted the United States to have more 
extensive and deeper relations with the coun- 
tries of the area than any other nation. 

In many ways, the United States, not geog- 
raphy, is the unifying factor in that part of 
the world. The benefits we derive are : 

Political. We are able to work cooperative- 
ly with Asian countries toward many ends 
we favor. 

Economic. The stability fostered by our 
defense ties has contributed to Asia's eco- 
nomic growth ; a quarter of our trade is now 

with Asia, and that proportion is rising. 

And perhaps most important, we derive 
benefits related to our security. Despite all 
the tensions and dangers of these years, 
peace has been preserved in Northeast Asia; 
we are on the road to normalizing our rela- 
tions with China ; we have helped avoid wars 
among countries of the region. 

One last point. It is said that all this se- 
curity system costs money which we need 
very badly at home. It is true — defense today 
is expensive. Unfortunately, there is no way 
of measuring the point at which allies and 
would-be adversaries conclude that the 
United States is no longer a meaningful mili- 
tary power. Judgment on that point is psy- 
chological and political and therefore not 

Defense expenditures must be viewed as 
an insurance policy. You must pay for the 
maintenance of peace. Part of this cost is 
the maintenance of adequate, not excessive, 
numbers of troops abroad. You may be pay- 
ing far too much, but you will only know 
this conclusively when you have begun to 
pay too little and the situation shifts against 
you, with friend and foe readjusting their 
positions according to a new perception of 
American will. 

No treaty, no commitment, no alliance, is 
immutable. Times and circumstances change. 
Thus, while maintaining our commitments, 
we have sought to adjust our responsibilities 
and our role in keeping with changing con- 
ditions in the region. In the past four years 
we have drawn down our forces in East Asia 
from a level of 764,000, including 474,000 in 
Viet-Nam, to under 180,000 today. 

Leaving aside the troop withdrawals from 
Viet-Nam, this represents a reduction of 
110,000 in our military forces in the region. 
We have steered a careful course of gradually 
shifting the burdens of defense to the coun- 
tries of the region, while providing, through 
our continued presence and the affirmation of 
our commitments, an element of stability 
during this transition process. 

Gentlemen, none of us need be reminded 
that the United States has been involved in 
three wars in Asia in only two generations. 

April 29, 1974 


We have learned, in the most costly way, that 
discord and tension in that vast region in- 
evitably affect the interests of the United 
States and the world as our interrelation- 
ships with Asia have become more numerous 
and complex. 

We can hope the converse will also prove 
true — that stability and peace in Asia will 
redound to the benefit not only of Asian 
peoples but of the United States and the 
world. The structure of alliances we have 
established and maintained over the last 
quarter century has contributed significantly 
to that end. I am convinced that it continues 
to be of inestimable value to our most basic 
national interests and should be preserved. 

United States-Czechoslovak Consular 
Convention Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting for the Senate's advice 
and consent to ratification the Consular Con- 
vention between the United States of Amer- 
ica and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, 
along with the Agreed Memorandum and re- 
lated exchange of notes, signed at Prague on 
July 9, 1973. I also am transmitting, for the 
information of the Senate, the report of the 
Department of State with respect to the Con- 

The signing of this Convention is a signifi- 
cant step in the gradual process of improving 
and broadening the relationship between the 
United States and Czechoslovakia. Consular 
relations between the two countries have not 
previously been the subject of a formal agree- 
ment. This Convention will establish firm 
obligations on such important matters as free 
communication between a citizen and his 

'Transmitted on Feb. 21 (White House press re- 
lease); also printed as S. Ex. A, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 
which includes the texts of the convention, agreed 
memorandum, and related exchange of notes, and the 
report of the Department of State. 

consul, notification of consular ofl^ces of the 
arrest and detention of their citizens, and 
permission for visits by consuls to citizens 
who are under detention. 

The people of the United States and Czech- 
oslovakia enjoy a long tradition of friend- 
ship. I welcome the opportunity through this 
Consular Convention to improve the relations 
between our two countries. I urge the Senate 
to give the convention its prompt and favor- 
able consideration. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, February 21, 1974. 

United States Supports Extension 
of United Nations Emergency Force 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative John 
Scali on April 8, together with the text of a 
resolution adopted by the Council tfiat day. 



Press release 29 dated April 8 1 

The United States welcomes the extension 
of the mandate of the United Nations Emer- 
gency Force for another six months. This 
resolution assures the continued operation 
of UNEF under its original mandate as ap- 
proved by Security Council Resolution 341. 
In paragraphs 68 and 69 of his most recent 
report on the United Nations Emergency 
Force,' the Secretary General supported and 
recommended the reaffirmation of the man- 
date. The United States shall continue to ex- 
tend its full support to the efforts of the I 
United Nations Emergency Force to imple- 

' U.N. doc. S/11248. 





Department of State Bulletin ! Vi 

ment its mandate and the relevant Security 
Council resolutions. 

We are pleased that the performance of 
the United Nations and the Emergency Force 
has added new luster to the United Nations 
as an organization vital to the promotion 
of international peace. The Force has played 
an indispensable role in reestablishing peace 
in the Middle East. It has made possible the 
implementation of the cease-fire ordered by 
the Security Council last October and the 
subsequent Egyptian-Israeli agreement on 
disengagement of forces. Indeed, it is diffi- 
cult to exaggerate the constructive part 
played by the United Nations Emergency 
Force in these important first steps toward 
achieving the just and durable peace en- 
visaged in Security Council Resolutions 338 
and 242. 

On this occasion, therefore, it gives me 
particular pleasure to extend our highest 
appreciation and commendation to the Sec- 
retary General and his Headquarters staff, 
to the Commander of UNEF, Lt. Gen. Ensio 
Siilasvuo, to the civilian staff, to the UNTSO 
[United Nations Truce Supervision Organi- 
zation] observers in the field, and particu- 
larly to the UNEF troops, all of whom risk, 
and some of whom have paid, the ultimate 
price to preserve world peace. The United 
Nations and the world community owe these 
brave men a debt of gratitude which only 
our best eft'orts to bring peace to the Middle 
East can repay. 

The United States will continue to en- 
courage a negotiating process looking to- 
ward a permanent and equitable settlement 
of the Middle East dispute. In this connec- 
tion, we believe that paragraph 68 of the 
Secretary General's report on UNEF use- 
fully emphasizes that : 

The continued operation of UNEF is essentia] 
not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in 
the Egypt-Israel sector but also to assist, if required, 
in further efforts for the establishment of a just and 
durable peace in the Middle East. 

We would like to take this opportunity to 
commend the efforts of the Secretary Gen- 
eral, as described in part V of his report, to 

deal with the complex problems of maintain- 
ing a peacekeeping force in the Middle East 
in accordance with the mandate approved by 
the Security Council. We believe that the 
contribution of UNEF to peace in the Mid- 
dle East far outweighs any diflnculties caused 
by differences of opinion regarding questions 
of financing and operations. The United 
States fully supports the Secretary General's 
eflforts to solve these problems on an equita- 
ble and practical basis and without impair- 
ing the efficiency of the United Nations 
Emergency Force. 


The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions 340 (1973) of 25 October 
1973 and 341 (1973) of 27 October 1973 and the 
agreement reached by members of the Security 
Council on 2 November 1973 (S/11072), 

Having reviewed the functioning of the United 
Nations Emergency Force set up under these resolu- 
tions as reported by the Secretary-General, 

Noting from the report of the Secretary-General 
of 1 April 1974 (S/11248) that in the present cir- 
cumstances the operation of the United Nations 
Emergency Force is still required, 

1. Expresses its appreciation to the States which 
have contributed troops to the United Nations Emer- 
gency Force and to those which have made volun- 
tary financial and material contributions for the 
support of the Force; 

2. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary- 
General for his efforts in implementing the decisions 
of the Security Council regarding the establishment 
and functioning of the United Nations Emergency 

3. Commends the United Nations Emergency 
Force for its contribution to efforts to achieve a 
just and durable peace in the Middle East; 

4. Notes the Secretary-General's view that the 
disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces is 
only a first step towards the settlement of the Mid- 
dle East problem and that the continued operation 
of the United Nations Emergency Force is essential 
not only for the maintenance of the present quiet in 
the Egypt-Israel sector but also to assist, if re- 
quired, in further efforts for the establishment of a 
just and durable peace in the Middle East and ac- 

= U.N. doc. S/RES/346 (1974); adopted by the 
Council on Apr. 8 by a vote of 13 to (the People's 
Republic of China and Iraq did not participate in 
the vote) . 

April 29, 1974 


cordiriKly decides that, in accordance with the rec- 
ommendation in paragraph 68 of the Secretary- 
General's report of 1 April 1974 (S/11248), the 
mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force, 
approved by the Security Council in its resolution 
341 (1973) of 27 October 1973, shall be extended 
for a furthei- period of six months, that is, until 24 
October 1974; 

5. Notes with satisfaction that the Secretary-Gen- 
eral is exerting every effort to solve in a satisfactory 
way the problems of the United Nations Emergency 
Force, including the urgent ones referred to in para- 
graph 71 of his report of 1 April 1974 (S/11248); 

6. Fio-ther notes with satiKfaction the Secretary- 
General's intention to keep under constant review 
the required strength of the Force with a view to 
making reductions and economies when the situation 

7. Calls upon all Member States, particularly the 
parties concerned, to extend their full support to the 
United Nations in the implementation of the present 

8. Requests the Secretary-General to report to 
the Security Council on a continuing basis as re- 
quested in resolution 340 (1973). 

Coffee , 

Agreement amending and extending the interna- 
tional coffee agreement 19fi8 (TIAS 6594). Ap- ^ 
proved by the International Coffee Council at 
London April 14, 1973. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 1, 1973. 
Proclaimed hy the Presidevt: April 8, 1974. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 8, 1974. 


Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which en- 
tered into force April 1, 1974. 

Acceptance deposited: European Economic Com- 
munity, March 21, 1974. 
Accessions deposited: Colombia, February 28, 
1974; El Salvador, February 25, 1974 ;-' Guate- 
mala, March 28, 1974;- Mexico, March 15, 


Current Actions 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972." 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 8, 1974. 



Agreement amending the agreement of May 9, 1963, 
as amended (TIAS 5377, 6527), relating to the 
establishment of a U.S. naval communications sta- 
tion in Australia. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Canberra March 21, 1974. Enters into force on 
the date of exchange of instruments notifying ap- 

Germany, Federal Republic of 

Agi-eement amending the agreement of April 13, 
1973 (TI.\S 7605), relating to travel group char- 
ters and advance booking charters. Effected by 
exchange of letters at Bonn and Bonn-Bad Godes- 
berg March 12, 1974. Entered into force March 
12, 1974. 

' Not in force. 

- Subject to ratification. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 29, 197 U Vol. LXX, No. 1S18 

Asia. United States Defense Commitments in 
Asia (Ingersoll) 470 


Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 6th Special 
U.N. General Assembly 459 

United States-Czechoslovak Consular Conven- 
tion Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Nixon) 474 

United States Defense Commitments in Asia 

(Ingersoll) 470 

Consular Affairs. United States-Czechoslovak 
Consular Convention Transmitted to the 
Senate (message from President Nixon) _. 474 

Czechoslovakia. United States-Czechoslovakia 
Consular Convention Transmitted to the 
Senate (message from President Nixon) . 474 

Disarmament. Secretary Holds News Confer- 
ence at the White House 457 

Economic Affairs. Eximbank Resumes Grant- 
ing Credits to Eastern European Countries 465 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. International 

Understanding Through Sports (Reich) . 460 

Middle East. United States Supports Exten- 
sion of United Nations Emergency Force 
(Scali, text of resolution) 474 

Namibia. U.S. Makes Voluntary Contribution 
to U.N. Fund for Namibia 469 

Panama. Panama and the United States: A 
Design for Partnership (Bunker) .... 453 

Poland. Eximbank Resumes Granting Credits 
to Eastern European Countries 465 

Presidential Documents 

United States-Czechoslovak Consular Conven- 
tion Transmitted to the Senate 474 

World Trade Week, 1974 (proclamation) . . 469 

Romania. Eximbank Resumes Granting Credits 
to Eastern European Countries 465 

Saudi Arabia. United States and Saudi Arabia 
To Expand Cooperation (joint statement) . 459 

Trade. World Trade Week, 1974 (proclama- 
tion) 469 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 476 

United States-Czechoslovak Consular Conven- 
tion Transmitted to the Senate (message 
from President Nixon) 474 


Eximbank Resumes Granting Credits to East- 
ern European Countries 465 

Secretary Holds News Conference at the White 
House 457 

United Nations 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 6th Special 
U.N, General Assembly 459 

U.S. Makes Voluntary Contribution to U.N. 

Fund for Namibia 469 

United States Supports Extension of United 
Nations Emergency Force (Scali, text of 
resolution) 474 

Yugoslavia. Eximbank Re.sumes Granting 

Credits to Eastern European Countries . . 465 

Name Index 

Buchanan, John H., Jr 459 

Bunker, Ellsworth 453 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 459 

Ingersoll, Robert S 470 

Kissinger, Secretary 457 

Nix, Robert N. C 459 

Nixon, President 469 

Reich, Alan A 460 

Scali, John A 459, 474 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 459 

White, Barbara M 459 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 8-14 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to April 8 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 127 
of April 3. 

No. Date Subject 

*134 4/8 Advisory Committee on Interna- 
tional Intellectual Property, 
May 6-12. 

*135 4/8 Study Group 1 of U.S. National 
Committee for CCITT, May 8. 

tl36 4/10 Vol. 11 of Bevans treaty series 

*137 4/10 U.N. conference adopts code of 
conduct for liner conferences. 

*138 4/11 Regional foreign policy confer- 
ence, Seattle, May 9. 

*139 4/11 Cancellation of Apr. 30 meeting 
of U.S. Advisory Commission 
on International Educational 
and Cultural Affairs. 

*140 4/12 Roger Wagner Los Angeles Mas- 
ter Chorale to tour U.S.S.R., 
May 10-June 2. 
141 4/12 Kissinger : news conference at the 
White House. 

* Not printed. 

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Volume LXX 

No. 1819 

May 6, 1974 


Statement by Secretary Kissinger Before the Sixth Special Session 

of the United Nations General Assembly h77 

Statement by Ambassador Ferguson U8h- 

Address by Assistant Secretary Richardson U89 



For index see ineide back cover 


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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

Vol. LXX, No. 1819 
May 6, 1974 

The Department of State BULLETIi 
a weekly publication issued by tl 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public ani 
interested agencies of tfte government 
witfi information on developments in 
tfie field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on tfte uork of tite Department and 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by tfie Wtiite House and tfie Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of tfie President 
and tfie Secretary of State and otiier 
officers of tfie Department, as well a$ 
special articles on various pfiases of 
international affairs and tfie functions 
of tfie Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter' 
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United States is or may become c 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
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Publications of tfie Department « 
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international relations are also listed. 



The Challenge of Interdependence 


We are gathered here in a continuing ven- 
ture to realize mankind's hopes for a more 
prosperous, humane, just, and cooperative 

As members of this organization, we are 
pledged not only to free the world from the 
scourge of war but to free mankind from 
the fear of hunger, poverty, and disease. The 
quest for justice and dignity — which finds 
expression in the economic and social articles 
of the United Nations Charter — has global 
meaning in an age of instantaneous commu- 
nication. Improving the quality of human life 
has become a universal political demand, a 
technical possibility, and a moral imperative. 

We meet here at a moment when the world 
economy is under severe stress. The energy 
crisis first dramatized its fragility. But the 
issues transcend that particular crisis. Each 
of the problems we face — of combating infla- 
tion and stimulating growth, of feeding the 
hungry and lifting the impoverished, of the 
scarcity of physical resources and the sur- 
plus of despair — is part of an interrelated 
global problem. 

Let us begin by discarding outdated gen- 
eralities and sterile slogans we have — all of 
us — lived with for so long. The great issues 
of development can no longer realistically be 
perceived in terms of confrontation between 
the "haves" and "have-nots" or as a struggle 
over the distribution of static wealth. What- 
ever our ideological belief or social structure, 
we are part of a single international eco- 
nomic system on which all of our national 

'Made on Apr. 15 (as-delivered text). 

economic objectives depend. No nation or 
bloc of nations can unilaterally determine the 
shape of the future. 

If the strong attempt to impose their 
views, they will do so at the cost of justice 
and thus provoke upheaval. If the weak re- 
sort to pressure, they will do so at the risk of 
world prosperity and thus provoke despair. 

The organization of one group of countries 
as a bloc will, sooner or later, produce the 
organization of potential victims into a coun- 
terbloc. The transfer of resources from the 
developed to the developing nations — essen- 
tial to all hopes for progress — can only take 
place with the support of the technologically 
advanced countries. Politics of pressure and 
threats will undermine the domestic base of 
this support. The danger of economic stag- 
nation stimulates new barriers to trade and 
to the transfer of resources. 

We in this Assembly must come to grips 
with the fact of our interdependence. 

The contemporary world can no longer be 
encompassed in traditional stereotypes. The 
notion of the northern rich and the southern 
poor has been shattered. The world is com- 
posed not of two sets of interests but many: 
developed nations which are energy sup- 
pliers and developing nations which are 
energy consumers, market economies and 
nonmarket economies, capital providers and 
capital recipients. 

The world economy is a sensitive set of re- 
lationships in which actions can easily set off 
a vicious spiral of counteractions deeply af- 
fecting all countries, developing as well as 
technologically advanced. Global inflation 

May 6, 1974 


erodes the capacity to import. A reduction 
in the rate of world growth reduces export 
prospects. Exorbitantly high prices lower 
consumption, spur alternative production, 
and foster development of substitutes. 

We are all engaged in a common enter- 
prise. No nation or group of nations can gain 
by pushing its claims beyond the limits that 
sustain world economic growth. No one bene- 
fits from basing progress on tests of strength. 

For the first time in history, mankind 
has the technical possibility to escape the 
scourges that used to be considered inevita- 
ble. Global communication insures that the 
thrust of human aspirations becomes univer- 
sal. Mankind insistently identifies justice 
with the betterment of the human condition. 
Thus economics, technology, and the sweep 
of human values impose a recognition of our 
interdependence and of the necessity of our 

Let us therefore resolve to act with both 
realism and compassion to reach a new un- 
derstanding of the human condition. On that 
understanding, let us base a new relation- 
ship which evokes the commitment of all na- 
tions because it serves the interests of all 
peoples. We can build a just world only if 
we work together. 

The Global Agenda 

The fundamental challenge before this ses- 
sion is to translate the acknowledgment of 
our common destiny into a commitment to 
common action, to inspire developed and de- 
veloping nations alike to perceive and pursue 
their national interest by contributing to the 
global interest. The developing nations can 
meet the aspirations of their peoples only in 
an open, expanding world economy where 
they can expect to find larger markets, capi- 
tal resources, and support for official assist- 
ance. The developed nations can convince 
their people to contribute to that goal only in 
an environment of political cooperation. 

On behalf of President Nixon, I pledge the 
United States to a major effort in support of 
development. My country dedicates itself to 
this enterprise because our children — yours 

and ours — must not live in a world of brutal 
inequality, because peace cannot be main- 
tained unless all share in its benefits, and be- 
cause America has never believed that the 
values of justice, well-being, and human dig- 
nity could be realized by one nation alone. 

We begin with the imperative of peace. 
The hopes of development will be mocked if 
resources continue to be consumed by an 
ever-increasing spiral of armaments. The re- 
laxation of tensions is thus in the world in- 
terest. No nation can profit from confronta- 
tions that could culminate in nuclear war. 
At the same time, the United States will 
never seek stability at the expense of others. 
It strives for the peace of cooperation, not 
the illusory tranquility of condominium. 

But peace is more than the absence of war. 
It is ennobled by making possible the realiza- 
tion of humane aspirations. To this purpose 
this Assembly is dedicated. 

Our goal cannot be reached by resolutions 
alone. It must remain the subject of con- 
stant, unremitting efforts over the years and 
decades ahead. 

In this spirit of describing the world as it 
is, I would like to identify for this Assembly 
six problem areas which, in the view of the 
U.S. delegation, must be solved to spur both 
the world economy and world development. 
I do so not with the attitude of presenting 
blueprints but of defining common tasks to 
whose solution the United States herewith 
offers its wholehearted cooperation. 

Expanding the Supply of Energy 

Fiist, a global economy requires an ex- 
panding supply of energy at an equitable 

No subject illustrates global interdepend- 
ence more emphatically than the field of 
energy. No nation has an interest in prices 
that can set off an inflationary spiral which 
in time reduces income for all. For example, 
the price of fertilizer has risen in direct pro- 
portion to the price of oil, putting it beyond 
the reach of many of the poorest nations and 
thus contributing to worldwide food short- 
ages. A comprehension by both producers 


Department of State Bulletin 

and consumers of each other's needs is there- 
fore essential: 

— Consumers must understand the desires 
of the producers for higher levels of income 
over the long-term future. 

— Producers must understand that the re- 
cent rise in energy prices has placed a great 
burden on all consumers, one virtually im- 
possible for some to bear. 

All nations share an interest in agreeing 
on a level of prices which contributes to an 
expanding world economy and which can be 
sustained over the long term. 

The United States called the Washington 
Energy Conference for one central purpose — 
to move urgently to resolve the energy prob- 
lem on the basis of cooperation among all 
nations. The tasks we defined there can be- 
come a global agenda: 

— Nations, particularly developed nations, 
waste vast amounts of existing energy sup- 
plies. We need a new commitment to global 
conservation and to more efficient use of 
existing supplies. 

— The oil producers themselves have noted 
that the demands of this decade cannot be 
met unless we expand available supplies. We 
need a massive and cooperative effort to de- 
velop alternative sources of fuels. 

— The needs of future generations require 
that we develop new and renewable sources 
of supply. In this field, the developed nations 
can make a particularly valuable contribu- 
tion to our common goal of abundant energy 
at reasonable cost. 

Such a program cannot be achieved by any 
one group of countries. It must draw on the 
strength and meet the needs of all nations 
in a new dialogue among producers and con- 

In such a dialogue, the United States will 
take account of — and take seriously — the 
concern of the producing countries that the 
future of their peoples not depend on oil 
alone. The United States is willing to help 
broaden the base of their economies and to 
develop secure and diversified sources of in- 
come. We are prepared to facilitate the 

transfer of technology and to assist indus- 
trialization. We will accept substantial in- 
vestment of the capital of oil-producing 
countries in the United States. We will sup- 
port a greater role for oil producers in inter- 
national financial organizations as well as an 
increase in their voting power. 

Avoiding Imbalances in Raw Materials 

Second, a healthy global economy requires 
that both consumers and producers escape 
from the cycle of raw material surplus and 
shortage which threatens all our economies. 

The principles which apply to energy 
apply as well to the general problem of raw 
materials. It is tempting to think of cartels 
of raw material producers to negotiate for 
higher prices. But such a course could have 
serious consequences for all countries. Large 
price increases coupled with production re- 
strictions involve potential disaster: global 
inflation followed by global recession from 
which no nation could escape. 

Moreover, resources are spread unevenly 
across the globe. Some of the poorest nations 
have few natural resources to export, and 
some of the richest nations are major com- 
modity producers. 

Commodity producers will discover that 
they are by no means insulated from the 
consequences of restrictions on supply or the 
escalation of prices. A recession in the in- 
dustrial countries sharply reduces demand. 
Uneconomical prices for raw materials ac- 
celerate the transition to alternatives. And 
as they pursue industrialization, raw mate- 
rial producers will ultimately pay for exor- 
bitant commodity prices by the increased 
costs of the goods they must import. 

Thus the optimum price is one that can 
be maintained over the longest period at the 
level that assures the highest real income. 
Only through cooperation between consum- 
ers and producers can such a price be deter- 
mined. Such a cooperative effort must in- 
clude urgent international consideration of 
restrictions on incentives for the trade in 
commodities. This issue — dealing with ac- 
cess to supply as well as access to markets — 

May 6, 1974 


must receive high priority in GATT [Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] as we 
seek to revise and modernize the rules and 
conditions of international trade. 

In the long term, our hopes for world pros- 
perity will depend on our ability to discern 
the long-range patterns of supply and de- 
mand and to forecast future imbalances so as 
to avert dangerous cycles of surplus and 

For the first time in history, it is techni- 
cally within our grasp to relate the resources 
of this planet to man's needs. The United 
States therefore urges that an international 
group of experts, working closely ^\ith the 
United Nations Division on Resources, be 
asked to undertake immediately a compre- 
hensive survey of the earth's nonrenewable 
and renewable resources. This should in- 
clude the development of a global early warn- 
ing system to foreshadow impending sur- 
pluses and scarcities. 

Crisis in Food Production 

Third, the global economy must achieve a 
balance between food production and popula- 
tion grovd;h and must restore the capacity to 
meet food emergencies. A condition in which 
1 billion people suffer from malnutrition is 
consistent with no concept of justice. 

Since 1969, global production of cereals 
has not kept pace with world demand. As a 
result, current reserves are at their lowest 
level in 20 years. A significant crop failure 
today is likely to produce a major disaster. 
A protracted imbalance in food and popula- 
tion growth will guarantee massive starva- 
tion — a moral catastrophe the world com- 
munity cannot tolerate. 

No nation can deal with this problem alone. 
The developed nations must commit them- 
selves to significant assistance for food and 
population programs. The developed nations 
must reduce the imbalance between popula- 
tion and food which could jeopardize not 
only their own progress but the stability of 
the world. 

The United States recognizes the respon- 
sibility of leadership it bears by virtue of its 

extraordinary agricultural productivity. We 
strongly support a global cooperative effort 
to increase food production. This is why we 
proposed a World Food Conference at last 
year's session of the General Assembly. 

Looking toward that conference, we have 
removed all domestic restrictions on produc- 
tion. Our farmers have vastly increased the 
acreage under cultivation and gathered 
record har\^ests in 1973. 1974 promises to be 
even better. If all nations make a similar 
effort, we believe the recent rise in food 
prices will abate this year, as it has in re- 
cent weeks. 

The United States is determined to take 
additional steps. Specifically: 

— We are prepared to join with other gov- 
ernments in a major worldwide effort to re- 
build food reserves. A central objective of 
the World Food Conference must be to re- 
store the world's capacity to deal with fam- 

— We shall assign priority in our aid pro- 
gram to help developing nations substan- 
tially raise their agricultural production. We 
hope to increase our assistance to such pro- 
grams from $258 million to $675 million this 

— We shall make a major effort to increase 
the quantity of food aid over the level we 
pi'ovided last year. 

For countries living near the margin of 
starvation, even a small reduction in yields 
can produce intolerable consequences. Thus, 
the shortage of fertilizer and the steep rise 
in its price is a problem of particular ur- 
gency — above all for countries dependent on 
the new high-yield varieties of grain. The 
first critical step is for all nations to utilize 
fully existing capabilities. The United 
States is now operating its fertilizer indus- 
try at near capacity. The United States is 
ready to provide assistance to other nations 
in improving the operation of plants and to 
make more effective use of fertilizers. 

But this will not be enough. Existing 
worldwide capacity is clearly inadequate. 
The United States would be prepared to offer 
its technological skills to developing a new 


Department of State Bulletin 


fertilizer industry in developing- countries 
and especially in oil-producing countries, us- 
ing the raw materials and capital they 
uniquely possess. 

We also urge the establishment of an in- 
ternational fertilizer institute as part of a 
larger effort to focus international action on 
two specific areas of research: improving 
the effectiveness of chemical fertilizers, es- 
pecially in tropical agriculture, and new 
methods to produce fertilizers from non- 
petroleum resources. The United States will 
contribute facilities, technology, and exper- 
tise to such an undertaking. 

Nations at the Margin of Existence 

Fourth, a global economy under stress can- 
not allow the poorest nations to be over- 

The debate between raw material produc- 
ers and consumers must not overlook that 
substantial part of humanity which does not 
produce raw materials, grows insufficient 
food for its needs, and has not adequately in- 
dustrialized. This group of nations, already 
at the margin of existence, has no recourse 
to pay the higher prices for the fuel, food, 
and fertilizer imports on which their sur- 
vival depends. 

Thus, the people least able to afford it — a 
third of mankind — are the most profoundly 
threatened by an inflationary world economy. 
They face the despair of abandoned hopes 
for development and the threat of starva- 
tion. Their needs require our most urgent 
attention. The nations assembled here in the 
name of justice cannot stand idly by in the 
face of tragic consequences for which many 
of them are partially responsible. 

We welcome the steps the oil producers 
have already taken toward applying their 
new surplus revenues to these needs. The 
magnitude of the problem requires, and the 
magnitude of their resources permits, a 
truly massive effort. 

The developed nations, too, have an obli- 
gation to help. Despite the prospect of un- 
precedented payment difficulties, they must 
maintain their traditional programs of as- 

sistance and expand them if possible. Fail- 
ure to do so would penalize the lower income 
countries twice. The United States is com- 
mitted to continue its program and pledges 
its support for an early replenishment of the 
International Development Association. In 
addition, we are prepared to consider with 
others what additional measures are re- 
quired to mitigate the effects of commodity 
price rises on low-income countries least able 
to bear the burden. 

Applying Science to the World's Problems 

Fifth, in a global economy of physical 
scarcity, science and technology are becom- 
ing our most precious resource. 

No human activity is less national in char- 
acter than the field of science. No develop- 
ment eflfort ofl'ers more hope than joint tech- 
nical and scientific cooperation. 

Man's technical genius has given us labor- 
saving technology, healthier populations, and 
the Green Revolution. But it has also pro- 
duced a technology that consumes resources 
at an ever-expanding rate, a population ex- 
plosion which presses against the earth's 
finite living space, and an agriculture in- 
creasingly dependent on the products of in- 
dustry. Let us now apply science to the prob- 
lems which science has helped to create: 

— To meet the developing nations' two 
most fundamental problems, unemployment 
and hunger, there is an urgent need for 
farming technologies that are both produc- 
tive and labor intensive. The United States 
is prepared to contribute to international 
programs to develop and apply this technol- 

— The technology of birth control should 
be improved. 

— At current rates of growth, the world's 
need for energy will more than triple by the 
end of this century. To meet this challenge, 
the U.S. Government is allocating $12 billion 
for energy research and development over 
the next five years, and American private 
industry will spend over $200 billion to in- 
crease energy supplies. We are prepared to 

May 6, 1974 


apply the results of our massive effort to the 
massive needs of other nations. 

— The poorest nations, ah'eady beset by 
manmade disasters, have been threatened by 
a natural one: the possibility of climatic 
changes in the monsoon belt and perhaps 
throug-hout the world. The implications for 
global food and population policies are omi- 
nous. The United States proposes that the 
International Council of Scientific Unions 
and the World Meteorological Organization 
urgently investigate this problem and offer 
guidelines for immediate international 

An Open Trade and Finance System 

Sixth, the global economy requires a trade, 
monetary, and investment system that sus- 
tains industrial civilization and stimulates 

Not since the 1930's has the economic sys- 
tem of the world faced such a test. The dis- 
ruption of the oil price rises, the threat of 
global inflation, the cycle of contraction of 
exports and protectionist restrictions, the 
massive shift in the world's financial flows, 
and the likely concentration of invested sur- 
plus oil revenue in a few countries — all 
threaten to smother the dreams of universal 
progress with stagnation and despair. 

A new commitment is required by both 
developed and developing countries to an 
open trading system, a flexible but stable 
monetary system, and a positive climate for 
the free flow of resources, both public and 

To this end the United States proposes 
that all nations here pledge themselves to 
avoid trade and payment restrictions in an 
eflFort to adjust to higher commodity prices. 

The United States is prepared to keep open 
its capital markets so that capital can be re- 
cycled to developing countries hardest hit by 
the current crisis. 

In the essential struggle to regain control 
over global inflation, the United States is 
willing to join in an international commit- 
ment to pursue responsible fiscal and mone- 
tary policies. 

To foster an open trading world the 
United States, already the largest importer 
of the manufacturers of developing nations, 
is prepared to open its markets further to 
these products. We shall work in the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations to reduce tariff and 
nontariff barriers on as wide a front as 
possible. In line with this approach we are 
urging our Congress to authorize the gen- 
eralized tariff preferences which are of such 
significance to developing countries. 

Matching Physical Needs With Political Vision 

All too often, international gatherings end 
with speeches filed away and with resolutions 
passed and forgotten. We must not let this 
happen to the problem of development. The 
complex and urgent issues at hand will not 
yield to rhetorical flourishes. Their resolu- 
tion requires a sustained and determined 
pursuit in the great family of United Nations 
and other international organizations that 
have the broad competence to deal with them. 

As President Nixon stated to this Assem- 
bly in 1969: 

Surely if one lesson above all rings resoundingly 
among the many shattered hopes in this world, it is 
that good words are not a substitute for hard deeds 
and noble rhetoric is no guarantee of noble results. 

This Assembly should strengthen our com- 
mitment to find cooperative solutions within 
the appropriate forums such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
GATT, and the World Food and Population 
Conferences. The United States commits 
itself to a wide-ranging multilateral effort. 

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, we 
gather here today because our economic and 
moral challenges have become political chal- 
lenges. Our unprecedented agenda for global 
consultations in 1974 already implies a col- 
lective decision to elevate our concern for 
man's elementary well-being to the highest 
political level. Our presence implies our rec- 
ognition that a challenge of this magnitude 
cannot be solved by a world fragmented into ' 
self-contained states or competing blocs. 

Our task now is to match our physical 
needs with our political vision. Jt 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Boumediene cited the Marshall 
plan of a quarter century ago as an example 
of the possibility of mobilizing resources for 
development ends. But then the driving 
force was a shared sense of purpose, of 
values, and of destination. As yet, we lack a 
comparable sense of purpose with respect 
to development. This is our first require- 
ment. Development requires, above all, a 
spirit of cooperation, a belief that with all 
our differences we are part of a larger com- 
munity in which wealth is an obligation, re- 
sources are a trust, and joint action is a 

We need mutual respect for the aspira- 
tions of the developing as well as the con- 
cerns of the developed nations. This is why 
the United States has supported the concept 
of a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties 
of States put forward by President Eche- 
verria of Mexico. 

The late President Radhakrishnan of 
India once wrote: 

We are not the helpless tools of determinism. 
Though humanity renews itself from its past, it is 
also developing- something new and unforeseen. 
Today we have to make a new start with our minds 
and hearts. 

The effort we make in the years to come is 
thus a test of the freedom of the human 

Let us afl^irm today that we are faced with 
a common challenge and can only meet it 
jointly. Let us candidly acknowledge our 
different perspectives and then proceed to 
build on what unites us. Let us transform 
the concept of world community from a slo- 
gan into an attitude. 

In this spirit let us be the masters of our 
common fate so that history will record that 
this was the year that mankind at last began 
to conquer its noblest and most humane 

Contract Signed for Assistance 
to Soviet Migrants to Israel 

Press release 127 dated April 3. 

A Department of State contract providing 
$30.5 million in additional assistance to So- 
viet Jews migrating to Israel was signed on 
April 3 with United Israel Appeal, Inc. 
(UIA), an accredited American voluntary 
agency with headquarters in New York. 

The funds come from an appropriation by 
the Congress of $36.5 million for fiscal year 
1974, following an initial $50 million appro- 
priation for FY 1973. The new UIA contract, 
together with previous and planned alloca- 
tions, will obligate the full $86.5 million by 
June 30, with all expenditures to be com- 
pleted by December 31. 

Frank L. Kellogg, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs, 
signed the contract for the Department. Gott- 
lieb Hammer, executive vice chairman, and 
Harold Goldberg, comptroller, signed for 

The funds are to be used in Israel for con- 
struction or acquisition of immigrant absorp- 
tion centers, housing, a medical training 
facility, and for vocational, university, and 
graduate study grants to individual immi- 

Including contracts concluded last April 6 
($31 million) and June 27 ($13 million), 
assistance to the immigrants through UIA 
now totals $74.5 million. Another expendi- 
ture under the total program is $7.5 million 
to the loan fund of the Intergovernmental 
Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 
for air transportation for the migrants. Also 
provided is $4.5 million for care and mainte- 
nance en route and initial resettlement of 
Jewish and non-Jewish Soviet emigrants to 
countries other than Israel, including the 
United States. 

May 6, 1974 


Energy, Food, and Economic and Social Development 


The 30th session of the U.N. Economic 
Commission, for Asia and the Far East 
(ECAFE) was held at Colombo March 27- 
April 8. Following is a statement made be- 
fore the Commissio7i on March 29 by U.S. 
Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, 
Jr., ivho is U.S. Representative to the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council. 

One year ago my predecessor Ambassador 
[Bernard] Zagorin, in reviewing the state 
of the economy in the ECAFE region, drew 
attention to the fact that that review was 
taking place against a background of both 
rapid and fundamental change. That change 
was then affecting economic relations on a 
global scale. Indeed, not since the end of 
World War II had there been changes in the 
world economy commensurate with those 
witnessed at last year's meeting. 

Today the order and magnitude and ra- 
pidity of evolution — indeed, almost revolu- 
tion — in the world economy far exceed that 
of just last year. In reflecting upon the 
events of this year, we must admit to 
having underestimated the intensity of the 
structural changes thrust upon the global 

Last year we looked to the process of in- 
ternational monetary reforms and the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations and the interna- 
tional development strategy as vehicles to 
adapt the world economy to the changed eco- 
nomic conditions. Today we must make sure 
— we must take all necessary measures to 
assure that the goals and objectives we set 
for ourselves in these undertakings encom- 
pass our most recent experiences. 

We have witnessed the development of 
major crises in two sectors of basic, funda- 
mental importance to the global economy. 
These sectors are, of course, energy and food. 


Moreover, these two sectors are intricately 
interlinked. The breakdown of some of these 
links between food and energy are, in fact, 
of such compelling urgency as to threaten 
the very lives of large numbers of the world's 

Needless to say, one such link between 
energy and food — fertilizer — requires the 
most urgent attention at this very moment. 
While in my country the petrol queue, or as 
we call it, "gasoline line," represents an in- 
convenience of affluence, in many countries 
the bread line will be the true measure of 
the global economic crisis. 

In light of these crises, developing from a 
number of factors — explosive demand 
growth, supply limitations, and natural dis- 
asters — it is indeed not surprising that the 
U.S. Government felt compelled to call for a 
World Food Conference in 1974. It is not 
surprising that our government launched an 
urgent initiative for a concerted interna- 
tional action to deal with energy. And it is 
not surprising that, at the initiative of other 
governments, we will soon meet at a special 
session of the U.N. General Assembly to 
consider the problem of raw materials and 

I should therefore like to review with you 
the major developments, as we see them, in 
matters of energy and food and of inter- 
linkages between the two and some of the 
implications which arise not only for eco- 
nomic, but also for social, development. 

Energy is a key factor in economic activ- 
ity. The major chapters of the history of 
mankind relate principally to changes in the 
technology of harnessing and applying en- 
ergy. The whole sweep of history, from the 
use of man's own energy to that of literally 
harnessing the sun, bears out this assertion. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Over the last several decades, and particu- 
larly since World War II, there has been a 
generally successful record of world eco- 
nomic expansion. This expansion has been 
marked by such recurrent phenomena as the 
reduction of trade barriers, the growth of 
gross national products, albeit at uneven 
rates, around the world, and the explosive 
growth in trade and communications. In our 
view, economic historians looking back on the 
quarter century since World War II will un- 
doubtedly conclude that the abundance of a 
relatively cheap, convenient, and flexible 
source of energy — oil — was the most signifi- 
cant hallmark of the period. 

Implications of the Energy Crisis 

We can now see that the oil crisis has re- 
sulted from a confluence of three essential 
attributes of the global economic system. 

First, reliance on petroleum has been a 
central factor in both developed and devel- 
oping economies. This reliance has been on 
petroleum not simply as a fuel but also as a 
commodity producing other essentials such 
as fertilizer, insecticides, plastics, and syn- 
thetics ranging from textiles to rubber. 

Second, the relatively high concentration, 
in terms of location and the concentrated 
loci of production facilities, has strengthened 
the hand of a relatively few countries of the 
world who have been fortunate enough to be 
blessed by nature with large deposits of fos- 
sil fuel. 

Third, the explosive growth in the demand 
for energy in the last decade has created se- 
vere imbalances between supply and demand. 
These imbalances affect the availability of 
other goods and commodities and their 
prices. We would suggest, however, that the 
pricing pattern of other commodities and 
goods plays a less key role in total economic 
activity than does that of the price of pe- 
troleum. Because the use of these other com- 
modities is less extensive or their production 
is less concentrated, their scarcity and the oc- 
casional imbalances in their supply and de- 
mand have posed a less pervasive economic 

Just to cite one aspect of our energy 
crisis, we might examine the magnitude of 
the payments problem. We cannot ignore the 
dire consequences to many national econ- 
omies of a 300-percent-plus increase in oil 
import bills. While conservative projections 
indicate an increase of $25 to $30 billion in 
the oil import bills for the developed econ- 
omies, these same projections forecast an 
increased cost this year of more than $10 
billion for the less developed. I would dare- 
say no other single economic development is 
likely to induce or indeed is capable of in- 
ducing changes of this magnitude in the in- 
ternational monetary system. 

My government believes that through in- 
ternational cooperation we must and will 
find solutions. We fully anticipate that the 
solutions will be equitable and satisfactory 
to both consumer and producer countries. In 
this connection, my government believes that 
the United States is in a unique position to 
make a contribution to the resolution of 
these economic problems. The United States 
is an importer and consumer of a large por- 
tion of the world's commodities — but we are 
also a substantial producer and exporter of 
a major proportion of commodities and ma- 
terials. We are both a major producer and 
consumer of petroleum and other fossil fuels. 

Taking into account this uniqueness, and 
in the spirit of international cooperation, we 
launched a major initiative to come to grips 
with the crisis in energy. The international 
action program which we envisage encom- 
passes the following major elements : 

— Conservation measures to improve effi- 
ciency in energy use; 

— Demand restraint; 

— Accelerated development of conventional 
energy resources ; 

— Economic and monetary measures, in- 
cluding pricing, aid, trade, and investment; 

— International cooperation on energy re- 
search and development. 

We believe that several aspects of the en- 
ergy-related problems are of particular in- 
terest to developing countries in the ECAFE 

May 6, 1974 


region. Among these, in summary form, are 
the development of new sources of energy 
and the sharing of technology in those fields 
related to energy development and energy 
utilization. And we all, producer and con- 
sumer countries alike, have a major stake in 
resolving issues which have arisen as a re- 
sult of the most recent increase in the price 
of oil. 

The United States welcomes the opportu- 
nity to cooperate with countries in the 
ECAFE region on these matters. We also 
welcome the constructive initiatives of in- 
ternational financial institutions in the fields 
of monetary policy, balance of payments 
problems, and development aid. 

We are, in this regard, encouraged by some 
of the recent responses from major oil-pro- 
ducing countries which serve to indicate 
their recognition of the need for shared re- 
sponses and shared responsibility to alleviate 
the plight of all developing countries. We 
note that a major oil producer has recently 
become the second largest contributor to the 
World Food Program. 

We fully recognize that energy and oil 
prices are not the only problems afflicting 
the economies of developing countries. We 
must face the fact, however, that most other 
ills in the economic systems of the developing 
countries bear a relation to the problems of 

Inflation, Energy, and Food 

Inflation has become a major problem of 
the world economy. This is obviously due 
partly to growing demand pressures on lim- 
ited resources. It is also partly due to the fact 
that few governments have the political will 
and political resources to forgo the social 
and economic objectives inherent in economic 
growth and thus contribute to the increase 
of demand pressure. 

And candor compels us to draw attention 
to the fact that in all economic systems there 
is increasingly a demand from those at the 
lower end of the economic order for a fairer 
and larger share of the wealth produced by 
our various economies. For example, most of 

the developing countries in the ECAFE re- 
gion face major difficulties in maintaining 
stable prices for daily staples of even the 
traditional diets. There are obviously ad- 
verse consequences flowing from this situa- 
tion for political and economic stability. 

In this context we must note that provi- 
sion of food for the world's population is a 
major problem. We must note that demand 
multiplies at an explosive rate. Population 
growth, rising incomes, heightened expecta- 
tions — all contribute to the demand explo- 

We in the United States are keenly aware 
of the consequences of failure to deal with 
the food crisis. Here again a worldwide ef- 
fort on a cooperative basis is required for 
resolution. It is a recognition of this unde- 
niable fact that last September Secretary 
Kissinger called for a World Food Confer- 
ence as one way of focusing on the problem 
of energizing the world community into ac- 

One of the major issues which must be 
dealt with is that of a dramatic increase in 
production of food — and not just production 
in the United States or other traditional pro- 
ducers of surpluses but production in the 
developing world. One obvious key to in- 
creasing food production is the increase in 
fertilizer production. Of course, like so many 
other problems of integral economic analysis, 
we are aware that systemic difficulty in in- 
creasing fertilizer production lies in the 
shortfall of refinery capacity. Nevertheless, 
some alleviation would stem from an in- 
creased availability of petroleum at reason- 
able prices. 

The U.S. Government will intensely study 
Mme. Bandaranaike's [Sirimavo Bandara- 
naike. Prime Minister of Sri Lanka] initia- 
tive to resolve the fertilizer problem. We 
fully share her view that this is a major 
problem of particularly severe impact on 
Asian economies. 

We also agree with her that it is an acute 
problem now. In fact, we are reasonably op- 
timistic of a satisfactory solution to the prob- 
lem of supply of fertilizer in the long run. 
The problem is what can be done in the 


Department of State Bulletin 

short run, given the supply bottleneck which 
is the immediate cause of the shortages and 
the major cause of rising prices. The fact 
is that limitation of supply is the short-range 

We share the Prime Minister's objectives 
of doing everything that we can to provide 
an adequate supply of fertilizer available at 
reasonable prices. I can assure her and this 
distinguished assembly that my government 
is studying intensely the problem and all 
suggested solutions, including her most re- 
cent initiative. 

My government, the United States, will do 
everything in its power, and in collaboration 
with all other countries, to find the best and 
speediest solution to this pressing issue. To- 
ward this end, Secretary Kissinger has al- 
ready announced — this last month — the will- 
ingness of the United States to share its 
technology in this field with all others striv- 
ing for solutions to this most urgent prob- 
lem. It is urgent because we can literally 
compute the lives lost to starvation and mal- 
nutrition in terms of the number of tons 
shortfall in petroleum-based fertilizer. 

In the last decade, U.S. scientists, in coop- 
eration with scientists of many other nations, 
developed and developing alike, have created 
the so-called Green Revolution through the 
development of hybrid seeds and strains of 
cereal grains. We must remind ourselves, 
however, that the increased yield for these 
new strains rests upon the input of enormous 
amounts of petroleum-based fertilizers and 
the availability of water. Unless this inter- 
linked problem of petroleum and fertilizers 
is resolved, most of the world's population 
will indeed stand on the brink of disaster. 

Human Participation in Development 

In turning now to the major economic and 
social problems of the region, I should like 
to make a few observations about the multi- 
tude of complex and interrelated issues which 
we generally refer to as development prob- 
lems. I wish to congratulate the Secretariat 
for its thoughtful and penetrating survey of 
the social and economic problems in the re- 

gion. My government deems it particularly 
appropriate that this document emphasizes 
this year some of the problems of social de- 
velopment. This is World Population Year, 
and during this year the universal problem 
of population will be considered at the World 
Population Conference in Bucharest. 

Beyond that, 1975 will be International 
Women's Year, an extended occasion upon 
which we hope the role of women in the con- 
text of the total society will be considered. 
Again let me repeat that we think it particu- 
larly appropriate that the Secretariat has 
addressed itself to the problem of social de- 
velopment in the region. 

In this connection, we should like to note 
our accord with many of the observations 
and findings in the Secretariat's study. In 
particular, we agree with the conclusion that 
development is an extremely complex process 
dependent on the proper interrelationship of 
economic, social, political, cultural, and psy- 
chological factors. Further, we must con- 
sider what is styled the "environment for 
development" in each country as a special 

Finally, we particularly endorse the con- 
clusion that a key ingredient in each of these 
special cases is "participation," participation 
of the individual in the process of national 
economic and social development in the 
broadest context. We know that participa- 
tion enhances human dignity, and indeed it 
may well be that the enhancement of dignity 
ultimately is what development is all about. 

In my own country we have learned of 
the enormous importance of participation 
and dignity. We have learned — sometimes 
through costly failures — that it was not 
enough to provide adequate housing to the 
poor in a physical sense, i.e., "decent, safe 
and sanitary," in the words of our housing 
legislation. We have learned that it is neces- 
sary to provide the community with a wide 
range of social services. We have also learned 
that it is insufficient merely to offer these 
services from the outside but that it is es- 
sential that the entire community be in- 
volved — participating in the management of 
its own affairs. Otherwise, we have found 

May 6, 1974 


that the best designed and best constructed 
housing projects soon deteriorated into slum 
areas filled with humans shorn of human 

Unfortunately, it is easy to build houses 
and it is relatively easy to build dams, roads, 
schools, and cement plants. It is much more 
difficult to plan and implement the process 
of effective human participation in develop- 
ment. We have to be grateful, therefore, to 
organizations like ECAFE vi'hich so effec- 
tively contribute to our knowledge of these 
difficult and seemingly intractable problems. 
We are grateful, too, for the provision of 
opportunities such as this to exchange views 
to our mutual benefit. 

Naturally, it is not enough to learn ; our 
knowledge has to be translated into action. 
And at that stage we encounter the problem 
of resources, which remains a problem even 
after recognition that development is more 
complex than savings-consumption, invest- 
ment-output ratios of gross national product 

In fact, the realization of the complexity 
of the problem means that we face a much 
more difficult problem in allocating resources. 
Again, the impact of the energy crisis aggra- 
vates the problems of resource allocation 
both within the developing countries and 
worldwide. There is no way of getting 
around the fact that the tripling of oil prices 
means a reduction of resources available to 
those who have to pay the bill. This poten- 
tially leads to a reduction of demand, a con- 
traction of world trade, and to the onset of 
a cumulative recessionary cycle. 

We need farsighted economic policies and 
major efforts to guard against such an even- 
tuality. Unfortunately, in times of economic 

stress, it is easier to find agreement among 
economic experts on the right remedies than 
it is to persuade public opinion and our re- 
spective parliaments of the necessity for 
their application. For that, we must be able 
to show that there is a perception of the 
common danger and a willingness on the 
part of all to work toward an equitable solu- 

Finally, while I am on the subject of 
resources, I would like to note briefly my 
government's interest in the special session 
of the U.N. General Assembly which will 
begin on April 9 to study the problems of 
raw materials and development. I am sure 
this interest is shared by the other govern- 
ments at this meeting. 

The United States appreciates that the 
range of issues to be considered in connec- 
tion with the topic "Raw Materials and De- 
velopment" is broad. We believe a discussion 
of the problems facing the world economic 
system in this area of raw material supplies 
and prices can be both healthy and helpful. 

We will listen attentively to the views of 
other governments as to the nature of their 
economic problems and their potential for 
solution. And we are hopeful that, moved by 
a recognition of the interdependence of 
states and by a spirit of international coop- 
eration rather than confrontation, the Gen- 
eral Assembly will produce constructive re- 
sults. We can demand no more and expect 
no less of the international community. 

I appreciate this opportunity to express 
some of the views of my government and look 
forward to more detailed discussions of 
these and other matters during the coming 


Department of State Bulletin 

Transnational Communications— What's Happening? 

Address by John Richardson, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ^ 

The international dimensions of the life of 
your city and state are apparent in your in- 
dustries, your professions, your educational 
institutions, your service organizations — 
and in the origins of your citizens. This in- 
ternational facet of your community is evi- 
denced by the outstanding work done here by 
the Institute of International Education and 
by your International Hospitality Center. It 
is further shown by Denver's sister city affil- 
iation with a worldwide range of communi- 
ties — with Brest, France, with Takayama, 
Japan, with Merida, Mexico. And, under the 
Partners of the Americas program, the State 
of Colorado is affiliated with the State of 
Minas Gerais, Brazil. 

Intei'ested as you are in world affairs, you 
are as aware as I am of the growing stream 
of news reports from beyond our borders 
which reflect a common theme: reports on 
Arab oil summits; reports on European soli- 
darity (or lack of it) ; reports on detente, 
floating currencies, worldwide inflation, fam- 
ine and threats of famine, soaring popula- 
tion rates, worldwide pollution; and on and 
on over the horizon. These news stories teach 
the same lesson. I don't think there could 
possibly be a human being who glances at a 
newspaper or television screen — much less 
one who actively tries to keep up with the 
world — who is not aware of the irreversible 
interdependence of all nations and all peoples 
on this tiny globe of ours. 

You know much better than I about the 
great Pike's Peak or Bust gold rush that led 
to the founding of Denver in 1859. Many a 

' Made before the Institute of International Educa- 
tion at Denver, Colo, on Apr. 3. 

fortune hunter went "bust" and returned to 
the East. I'm told these men were known as 
"go-backs." Well, in today's interdependent 
world, there are no "go-backs." None of us 
has any place to go back to, even if we 
wanted to. 

You don't need to be lectured at by me 
about economic interdependence. Anyone 
who has had to inch his way to a gasoline 
pump, as we all have in recent weeks, has had 
a basic lesson in international economics. 
And you are also as aware as I am of the 
strategic interdependence of nations like 
ours whose security depends on mutual 
deterrence — a system uncomfortably like 
wary scorpions in a bottle. But our interde- 
pendence goes beyond economics and beyond 
security. It has become a matter of simple 
human survival on Planet Earth as we ap- 
proach the outer limits of world resources 
and the carrying capacity of the biosphere. 

The foreign policy of your government 
today is aimed at achieving a world order 
sufficiently workable to prevent catastrophe, 
military or ecological, and sufficiently coop- 
erative so that the quality of life in our own 
country may be enhanced in harmony with 
the aspirations of others. In pledging the 
readiness of the United States to work 
toward the achievement of such a world 
community. Secretary Kissinger summed up 
— at the United Nations a few months ago — 
by asking: 

Are we prepared to accept the imperatives of a 
global society and infuse our labors with a new 
vision ? Or shall we content ourselves with a tem- 
porary pause in the turmoil that has wracked our 
century ? Shall we proceed with one-sided demands 
and sterile confrontations? Or shall we proceed in 

May 6, 1974 


a spirit of compromise produced by a sense of com- 
mon destiny? We must move from hesitant coop- 
eration born of necessity to genuine collective effort 
based on common purpose. 

It is a choice no country can make alone. We can 
repeat old slogans or strive for new hope. We can 
fill the record of our proceedings with acrimony, or 
we can dedicate ourselves to dealing with man's 
deepest needs. The ideal of a world community may 
be decried as unrealistic— but great constructions 
have always been ideals before they can become 
realities. Let us dedicate ourselves to this noblest 
of all possible goals and achieve at last what has so 
long eluded us: true understanding and tolerance 
among mankind. 

Conscious of our economic, as well as se- 
curity, as well as ecological interdependence, 
most intelligent people the world over, I 
think, are becoming increasingly sensitive to 
the urgency of the problem of how to effec- 
tively communicate with peoples of other 
nations and other cultures, of how to relate 
to others so as to engender cooperation in 
place of conflict. Knowing we can't return 
to the days of national self-sufficiency — if, 
indeed, those days really ever existed — we 
can appreciate not just the value but the 
necessity of learning to cope with the va- 
riety of social, cultural, and ideological per- 
spectives that directly condition human 
thought processes and human behavior. 

Increase in Transnational Contacts 

It is about this quality of communication 
between peoples and how we can improve it 
through human interchange that I want to 
talk with you today, because that's what's 
really happening in transnational communi- 
cations — we're beginning to understand 
what it's all about ! 

Simply increasing the number of ex- 
changes of television programs or paintings, 
teachers or technicians, gadgets or gurus, 
across boundaries does not guarantee im- 
proved communication or understanding. On 
the contrary, pushing communications to 
speed-of-light limits, bringing jet travel to 
within reach of millions, immensely speeding 
up the print media, bouncing television pro- 
grams off satellites — all these technological 
advances have had, and are still having. 

shattering effects on many cultures around 
the world. Increased numbers of contacts, 
while they broaden horizons, can also rein- 
force old myths and engender new anxieties 
and frustrations resulting from the techno- 
logical disruption of traditional patterns of 
belief, community, and expectation. 

In thinking about the title of my talk, 
"Transnational Communications — What's 
Happening?," I have to admit that the first 
thought that came into my mind was "Too 
much!" Because the technological means of 
communication have improved much faster 
than the ability of many cultures — I should 
say, most cultures — to assimilate the con- 

Looking at the globe the other day, it oc- 
curred to me that the diplomatic post most 
distant from Washington was Perth, Aus- 
tralia, where we have a consulate. Perth 
is almost exactly halfway around the globe 
and far south of the Equator. When we 
were children we always believed that if we 
dug a hole straight through the earth we 
would come out in China. In fact, such a 
hole drilled from Washington would come 
out in the Indian Ocean just south and west 
of Perth. I picked up the telephone and 
called a colleague in the Department of State 
on the Australian desk and asked him how 
long it would take to get a telephone call 
through to Australia on regular commercial 
lines. He said usually it took only slightly 
longer than it did to make a local call from 
my Department to the Pentagon. Even if 
the circuits were busy, a call to Australia 
usually went through in a matter of a few 
minutes, never as much as an hour, he said. 

Just a little over a century ago it took 
four days for the news of President Lincoln's 
election to reach Denver by pony express 
from St. Joseph, Missouri, 600 miles away. 
Even after telegraph lines reached the city 
in 1863, the wires were often severed by 
buffalo herds on the Great Plains when they 
weren't by storms. 

In the history of mankind, a hundred years 
is hardly more than the tick of the clock. 
But in the last century, physical distance be- 
tween peoples has decreased so much faster 


Department of State Bulletin 

than psychic distance as to threaten cultural 
confrontations — and that may mean political 
and military confrontations — of potentially 
disastrous proportions. 

If you were to plot a graph of the cur- 
rent increase in all kinds of transnational 
contacts — that is, the increase in the number 
of overseas telephone calls, the number of 
pieces of overseas mail, the number of for- 
eign travelers, the showings of foreign films, 
the translations of foreign books, the number 
of students, executives, and technicians liv- 
ing abroad — you would find the curve going 
straight up off the graph and through the 
ceiling. The percentage increase in overseas 
telephone calls alone is around 25 percent 
annually, I am told. 

Some of these contacts are of direct, im- 
mediate concern to many governments. For 
instance, it is technically possible today to 
beam television programs by satellite directly 
from one country to home television receivers 
in nations on the other side of the globe. 
Many governments concerned about main- 
taining the cultural integrity of their na- 
tions, as well as others committed to walling 
out uncensored information and ideas, are 
fearful about the prospect of such direct 
media contact. (I must say when I think of 
much of our own television diet in this coun- 
try, I can appreciate their feeling. So far 
as international understanding is concerned, 
unlimited reruns of "I Love Lucy," "Hogan's 
Heroes," and "Peyton Place," whether de- 
livered by satellite or by carrier pigeon, may 
be something less than an unmixed blessing.) 

Constructive Interactions 

The point I want to make is this: Those 
of us who value the contribution of educa- 
tional and cultural interchange to our foreign 
relations are not mesmerized by the probable 
very long-term net advantages of an in- 
creased quantity of contacts. What we do 
assert is that if inevitably increasing inter- 
change of all kinds among nations is to re- 
sult in more cooperation than conflict, more 
collaboration than chaos, more conciliation 
than confrontation, in our own and our chil- 

dren's lifetimes, purposeful efl'ort is urgently 
required : We must seek to influence the 
quality of some of the most crucial among 
those contacts. Our increasingly complicated 
task, therefore, is to find ways to encourage 
the most highly constructive interactions we 
can envisage between the American people 
and the peoples of other nations. We must, 
to repeat, focus on quality, not quantity. 

I use the word "constructive" to charac- 
terize contacts which involve influential or 
potentially influential human beings with 
each other in ways likely to stimulate their 
minds and engage their positive emotions 
to the ultimate benefit of relations among na- 
tions. We are not fundamentally interested 
in more efficient communication between 
peoples, even more eflScient two-way com- 
munication, as such. The messages currently 
being sent back and forth by patriotic, civic- 
minded, conscientious citizens of two neigh- 
boring nations — Syria and Israel — across the 
Golan Heights are received on both sides loud 
and clear — and the feedback is usually im- 
mediate and to the point — but while this is 
efficient communication, it is hardly what we 
want to encourage. 

How do you go about encouraging con- 
structive human interactions? In this welter 
of willy-nilly people-to-people contacts and 
this constant bombardment by the media, 
how can we help ourselves and others to fil- 
ter out the noise — the distractions — and en- 
courage mutual learning under suflficiently 
favorable circumstances to engender both re- 
alistic appreciation and mutual respect? 

It seems to me there are two essential 
elements in bringing about more cross- 
cultural human communication of the kind 
capable, ultimately, of favorably influencing 
international relations. 

First, we should try to bring together 
people on both sides who are either already 
favorably inclined toward learning about 
each other or are sufficiently openminded 
to make getting to know each other an easy 
byproduct of activities satisfying other needs, 
personal or professional. 

Note that I said "on both sides." I doubt 
that a visitor to Denver from another coun- 

May 6, 1974 


try will have a truly rewarding experience 
in human terms here unless those he comes 
in contact with also are interested in him 
and his country— or at least have sufficiently 
open minds to make learning about him and 
his country a natural consequence of pursu- 
ing some common interest here together. 

Indeed, any visit, here or abroad, if it is 
going to mean something, must offer the 
visitor opportunities for human encounters 
satisfying substantial emotional as well as 
professional needs. Whether a foreign stu- 
dent goes home from Denver to become a 
lifelong interpreter between his culture and 
ours — or merely with an adequate tech- 
nical education — depends on whether he 
has had and used opportunities to become 
actively involved as a person in various as- 
pects of American life. Whether an Ameri- 
can Fulbright professor comes back to the 
University of Colorado with plans for a con- 
tinuing interchange of visits, periodicals, and 
correspondence with his host university — 
which can produce lifelong linkages and 
therefore continuing constructive communi- 
cation involving many people and organiza- 
tions — depends on the friendships estab- 
lished and the mutual interests identified as 
well as his scholarly accomplishment during 
his year abroad. 

And whether a future prime minister or 
business leader or TV commentator returns 
from a visit to Denver convinced that Amer- 
icans are not only energetic, technically ad- 
vanced, efficient, and rich but also straight- 
forward, open, cooperative, sensitive to the 
needs of others, and easy to get along with — 
that of course depends on just what his ex- 
perience was here, as well as on his ability 
to learn from it. 

My second criterion for a really useful 
visit is this: The visitor must be someone 
whose personal, professional, or power po- 
tential is such that he can make a difference 
in his own country. Therefore, overall plan- 
ning of cultural exchange, governmental or 
private, should, I believe, be based on seri- 
ous analysis of actual and prospective pat- 
terns of interaction, both healthy and un- 
healthy, between the two societies. Without 

such an analysis, including the role of mass 
media, education systems, and other critical 
institutions within each society, miscellane- 
ous cultui-al exchange activity will be just 
that — miscellaneous— with no assurance of 
significant favorable effect on our interna- 
tional relations. 

Purpose and Utility of Cultural Exchange 

Underlying these questions of how-to-do-it 
are the broader issues of purpose and util- 
ity. What do we really hope to achieve? 
Can more and better relationships among 
individuals, groups, and institutions in dif- 
ferent countries really be expected to affect 
the way their governments ultimately behave 
toward each other? 

One major study of this quite cosmic 
issue has been made by a group of 16 emi- 
nent scholars and statesmen from Japan, Af- 
rica, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, 
and the United States. This initiative is 
part of a continuing project entitled "Cul- 
tural Relations for the Future" sponsored 
by the Hazen Foundation of New Haven, 
Connecticut, a small private organization. 

What the foundation did, through a series 
of meetings in out-of-the-way places, was to 
create a sort of mental spaceship where the 
16 participants in the two-year study could 
develop a common wide-angle and long-range 
perspective on current world conditions. The 
title of their report, which I urge you to 
read, is "Reconstituting the Human Com- 
munity." Any one of them, when they started 
out, would have rejected such a title as 
pretentious and absurd. But that is the title 
they wound up with — "Reconstituting the 
Human Community." 

After two years of study, thought, and 
discussion, they agreed on that title, and the 
following quotation will, I hope, provide at 
least a glimmer of the level of conviction 
they came to share and which animates 
every page of their report : 

If men want to move in new directions, they will 
have to broaden the range of their potentialities and 
capabilities. They have to be able to manipulate and 
manage larger political, economic and business units 


Department of State Bulletin 

at the same time as they learn to build and preserve 
smaller communities. Against the depersonalized 
impact of the laws of science, technology and the 
larger bureaucracies, men must find and fathom new 
religious and spiritual depths. There is a need for 
a new humanism beyond the superficial unity that is 
imposed upon men by the global communications 
system. We cannot be kept together to build a new 
future unless we are linked to our fellowmen by more 
than sur\'ival instincts. What each of us needs is a 
new moral vision or a new philosophy of history 
capable of giving us at least some notion of where 
we may be going and some sense of the value of our 
place in the changing world in which we live. 

In thinking about what I've just quoted, 
it's important to keep one point in mind : 
These thoughtful leaders from many coun- 
tries started out to make a study of cul- 
tural relations for the future ; what they 
ultimately produced was a study on how cul- 
tural relations could be used to help accom- 
plish what they came to conclude was the 
really essential task, namely, reconstituting 
the human community. 

They take what may sound at first blush 
like a wildly optimistic view despite this 
sentence at the very beginning of the re- 
port : 

It is no exaggeration to say that all systems on 
the basis of which the world is organized are facing 
a dead end, at least if present trends are allowed to 

Whether or not you accept this bleak 
premise, I think you will find three points 
the report makes — and its conclusion — 

The first point: Perhaps our greatest con- 
tribution to developing nations, many of 
which have only recently emerged from co- 
lonial domination, would be to rid ourselves 
of the so-called European point of view — 
the idea that Asians, Africans, and other 
non-Western peoples are or ought to be "con- 
sumers" of Western culture. Can we in- 
stead learn to look upon other peoples as 
cultural equals with as much to contribute 
out of their heritage as we out of ours, and 
not in terms of strong versus weak, big 
versus small, developed versus developing? 
With our myriad social, moral, and spiritual 
problems in the Western world, can we learn 

to look upon cultural e.xchange as a possible 
means of bringing useful new insights into 
our own culture? 

The second point: We tend to speak of 
"youth" as though young people were a 
minority, a problem apart. The opposite is 
true. We over 30 are the minority. The 
World Bank reports the median age world- 
wide is 17 years. And the world population 
is steadily growing younger. In the United 
States some 30 million people are between 
18 and 25 years of age. What can we in 
the educational and cultural exchange busi- 
ness do to help young people, the vast ma- 
jority of the human race today, create a 
new and better life? If indeed a way must 
be found to reconstitute the human com- 
munity, is not the youth of the world our 
greatest resource — and must we not encour- 
age thoughtful young people to build more 
networks of relationships across boundaries 
of all kinds? 

The third point: "Of primary importance 
in future cultural relations," the report says, 
"will be a growing network of . . . private 
organizations, each existing independently 
and acting autonomously. The present dom- 
ination of (what we call) cultural relations 
by nation-states reflects the fact that they are 
the most powerful components of interna- 
tional society; it does not prove that they 
are the most effective agencies for the con- 
duct of such relations. We do not suggest 
replacement of governmental and intergov- 
ernmental activities, but the creation of sup- 
plementary channels based on particular 
areas of competence and concern." I couldn't 
agree more. And those private organizations 
include universities, businesses, professional 
associations, and service clubs, among others. 

Now the conclusion from the Hazen Foun- 
dation report: Cultural relations "are the 
chief means to shape the future of men 
and nations, to change their directions 
through creative mutual borrowing and to 
strengthen an awareness of shared values 
.... Mankind is faced with problems 
which, if not dealt with, could in a very 
few years develop into crises world-wide 
in scope. (This was written before the oil 

May 6, 1974 


embargo.) Interdependence is the reality; 
world-wide problems the prospect; and 
world-wide cooperation the only solution. As 
a tool for sensitizing people to the reality 
and the prospect, stimulating them to at- 
tempt the solution, . . . cultural relations 
are, and will increasingly become, a decisive 
aspect of international affairs." 

Requirements of Interdependence 

As I personally see it, we have no choice 
but to work in practical ways toward the 
development of a functioning human com- 
munity, quite apart from the question of 
whether we will ever have a world govern- 
ment, if we are to survive as civilized hu- 
man beings. Yet we need much more than 
any such easy generalization. In order for 
the world to become a fit place to live, a 
place where all may have some prospect of 
enjoying the fruits of civilization, then we 
must face up to the first imperative of inter- 
dependence : to strengthen habits of con- 
structive communication and cooperation 
across national, cultural, and ideological bor- 

We must, in the first place, move urgently 
to strengthen understanding of that trans- 
national economic interdependence I spoke 
of at the beginning at the same time we im- 
prove the efficiency of multinational business 
organizations in meeting human needs. 
Otherwise the holders of economic power, 
whether government or p>'ivate, both here 
and abroad, will be tempted to exploit their 
shortrun interest, at the cost of our longrun 
advantage. Please note that awareness of 
economic interdependence, and the commit- 
ment to long-range thinking it entails — as 
well as understanding of how different it 
looks, depending on where you are — can 
readily be increased by planned cultural ex- 

We need also to increase understanding of 
the indivisibility of peace and the interde- 
pendence of each nation's security, which, 
again, I mentioned at the outset. In a world 
neighborhood, armed conflicts are increas- 

ingly difficult to isolate. Both knowledge and 
understanding of these life-or-death matters 
can be increased through planned cultural 
exchange. Indeed, it is arguable that with- 
out extensive, informal, and mostly unofficial 
personal contacts among Soviet and Ameri- 
can scientists and strategists over many 
years, there might have been no test ban 
treaty, no SALT negotiations, no detente. 

Another requirement of interdependence: 
We need to increase the degree of overlap 
between what decisionmakers in some na- 
tions believe to be overriding truths about 
the ecological dilemma and what is be- 
lieved by others in other nations. The human 
race can perhaps physically survive disasters 
of unprecedented magnitude in particular re- 
gions arising from a failure of governments 
to collaborate to close the gap between popu- 
lation and resources, to overcome the con- 
tradiction between pollution and production. 
It seems to me doubtful that our collective 
sanity could survive a series of such dis- 
asters, all watched in living color by the 
fortunate few in the richest nations as we 
eat our meals with our children in front of 
the family TV set. Here again, cultural 
exchange can help directly, to accommodate 
differing perceptions and expectations, facil- 
itate cooperation in devising common strate- 
gies — above all, to increase respect and ap- 
preciation for differing values, by far the 
healthiest approach toward reconciliation 
and convergence of values. 

We need also, if we are to meet the chal- 
lenge of interdependence, to improve the 
capacity of educational systems, media sys- 
tems, and communities of faith to strengthen 
in every nation, beginning with our own, a 
more sensitive awareness of the human con- 
dition as we approach the 21st century. The 
accelerating velocity of technological change 
has already torn apart much of the fabric 
of loyalties, beliefs, and expectations on 
which societies generally had come to de- 
pend. What is to take their place? What 
will be the patterns of belief and commit- 
ment which will motivate world leaders in 
2076? Once again, cultural relations can 


Department of State Bulletin 

make a difference — perhaps, as the authors 
of the Hazen Foundation report thought, a 
lot of the difference. 

Such considerations affecting the vaUie we 
place on cultural exchange may seem to you 
a long way from the province of conventional 
diplomacy. If they once were, they are no 
longer, as the words of Secretary Kissinger 
quoted earlier suggest. 

Furthermore, cultural exchanges play a 
direct and growing role as well in the day- 
to-day business of diplomacy, in the day-to- 
day work of the State Department in pursu- 
ing U.S. interests in bilateral relations with 
130-odd other governments around the world. 

This is no minor asset when diplomacy 
must struggle with increa.singly complex con- 
flicts of interest complicated by ever broader 
public pressures impinging more and more 
on traditional diplomatic prerogatives. 
Whether a U.S. negotiation is with Japan 
or the U.S.S.R., Panama or South Africa, 
Iran or Germany, our Ambassadors are 
greatly aided if two conditions obtain : 

— First, they will be greatly helped if 
there is a substantial proportion of the lead- 
ership of the other country made up of 
individuals with understanding of our soci- 
ety, of our ways of thinking and behaving, 
derived from compelling firsthand experi- 

— Second, our Ambassadors will be in a 
far stronger position, also, if there is a 
substantial number of those in our own coun- 
try interested in the particular issue to be 
negotiated who can understand the way the 
other country sees it. Believe me, both ad- 
vantages are exceedingly important. And 
cultural exchange, carefully planned and well 
executed, can provide both. 

Here we in America have a resource of 
incalculable, indeed unique, value: the com- 
mitment and skills of some 800 voluntary 
organizations and of perhaps 100,000 indi- 
vidual volunteers throughout the country. 
Many of you in this room can testify both 
to what is given and what is received through 
cultural exchange in both directions. Many 

of you have worked and contributed and 
shared so that Very Important Persons in- 
vited by your government, or very important 
future leaders here to study in our univer- 
sities, could have an optimum learning op- 
portunity. And each of you who has done 
so knows, better than I, about the reality 
of learning from as well as showing to, 
about the special satisfaction of mutual shar- 
ing, mutual enrichment, mutual benefit. 

On behalf of our Ambassadors, who are 
the first to see and feel the benefit of your 
efforts at the ofl^cial diplomatic level, as well 
as on behalf of the Secretary of State, let 
me thank you for all you have already done 
and will do. 

Of course, it will never be enough. There 
really is no end to the useful effort which 
the imagination and energy of concerned cit- 
izens can contribute to the achievement of 
our national goals in world affairs. 

Every one of the 150,000 foreign students 
who come here with curiosity and hope and 
return home with a sense both of achieve- 
ment and comprehension, social as well as 
intellectual satisfaction — every such student 
will provide initial impetus toward a new 
and positive dynamic in American relations 
with his country. So does every visiting 
scholar, every business trainee, every pro- 
fessional person, and of course every visit- 
ing journalist, educator, artist, and per- 
former—all, that is, who have come to know 
Americans as individuals and our institu- 
tions as they really are and who go home 
feeling that not only do they know, but 
they are known by, those they encountered 

That is the challenge of cultural relations 
to citizens here in Denver. You really can do 
something about the peace of the world. The 
successful operation and growth of both pri- 
vate and governmental educational and cul- 
tural exchange programs over the past 35 
years would have been impossible without 
the diplomatic skill, the patience, the count- 
less hours, the plain hard work — in short, 
the commitment — of volunteers such as 

May 6, 1974 


I hope, in addition, that you are concerned 
about intercultural and international educa- 
tion — let's call it world education — in your 
elementary and secondary school systems. I 
believe our children — and our country — will 
be more secure if they grow up knowing 
from the start that ours is not the only 
workable system of government, that other 
peoples are also committed to their own 
ways and their own systems just as we are 
to the American way and our system, that 
we in this country have a monopoly neither 
on truth nor on resources. Foreign students 
right here in your colleges and universities 
can help our children learn this and thereby 
start them on the road to a true appreciation 
of our own magnificent heritage, an appre- 
ciation gained with the help of an external 

In closing I should like to point out an- 
other exceptional opportunity for Americans 
everywhere to create new linkages with other 
peoples and to strengthen old ones. That op- 
portunity is the coming bicentennial cele- 

The challenge to us is how we can take 
advantage of the impetus of the bicentennial 
toward both reflection and renewed commit- 
ment. It seems to me eminently appropriate 
to focus especially on the chance to build new 
foundations of mutual understanding on 
which the human structure of peace can and 
must be built in the third century of our na- 
tional life. 

I'm confident that you who are gathered 
here by the International Institute of Educa- 
tion will be in the forefront among those 
across the country who know that we are 
still young enough as a nation to dream 
dreams, still vigorous enough as a people to 
contribute to great causes, still strong enough 
as a country to be a leader in world affairs. 

I do not exaggerate when I say you can 
exert far-reaching influence. Success on the 
road to a more peaceful and just world order 
depends increasingly, and in no small part, 
on people and groups outside official foreign 
affairs establishments. 

Progress depends increasingly on people 
like you and me — as individuals and as mem- 

bers of private organizations — sitting down 
with our counterparts from other countries, 
exchanging experience and perspectives, 
working on common problems, opening new 
lines of communication, developing vested 
interests in good relations, strengthening ha- 
bitual patterns of effective cooperation. 

I am convinced, finally, that success in 
moderating conflict and promoting a more 
humane and cooperative international sys- 
tem depends more than ever in history upon 
intelligent men and women of good will here 
and abroad who are committed to work for 
it, a hardheaded commitment for the sake of 
our continued existence, a moral commitment 
for the sake of our humanity. You — and I — 
share the opportunity for effective contribu- 
tion to that end. 

U.S. Mourns President Pompidou 
of France 

Georqes Pompidou, President of the 
French Republic, died at Paris on April 2. 
FoUoici)ici are texts of a statement by Presi- 
dent issued that day, a statement by 
Secretary Kissinger issued on April 3, and 
remarks made by President Nixon at Orly 
Airport on April 5 upon his arrival to attend 
memorial services for President Pompidou, 


white House press release dated April 2 

In the death of President Georges Pompi- 
dou, France has lost one of her great leaders, 
and the world has lost a great statesman. 

My profound personal regret is deepened 
by the fact that President Pompidou's 
oflicial visit upon acceding to office was to 
the United States. On that occasion and in 
my other meetings with him, I found him to 
be a man of vision, constraint, consistency, 
and enormous strength of character. He 
came from the Auvergne, the heart of 
France, and he reflected all the spirit and 
strength of the French people. 


Department of State Bulletin 

It was characteristic of his courage that 
despite his illness, he did not falter in his 
service to his people nor to the purposes of 
world peace. 

The people of America join me in extend- 
ing our deepest sympathy to the people of 


Press release 129 dated April 3 

France has lost a great and respected 
leader and the United States an ally and 
friend. I extend to the people of France and 
to Madame Pompidou my deepest sympathy 
in their time of sorrow. 

And never was that courage displayed more 
than during the last months of his life. 

I met him in Iceland about 10 months ago. 
I knew then, or felt then, although he did not 
tell me, that he was nearing the end of his 
life, but his last months were a period of 
true greatness because despite the adversity 
he rose above it and served to the last with 
all of the courage and all the distinction that 
had been the mark of his life of service to 
his country. 

President Pompidou came from the heart 
of France, and I bring from the hearts of all 
Americans our deepest sympathy to Madame 
Pompidou, his family, and to his countrymen 
on the occasion of their very great loss. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 15 

Mr. Foreign Minister, all of the distin- 
guished ladies and gentlemen who are pres- 
ent on this occasion : I have come from Wash- 
ington today to Paris to bring from all of the 
American people the heartfelt sympathy to 
the people of France on the occasion of the 
loss of a great leader. It was just five (three) 
years ago that I stood in this place when I 
attended the ceremonies on the occasion of 
the death of General de Gaulle. And at that 
time I recall there were many in the world 
who wondered if there was one who could 
follow a man who was truly one of the great 
statesmen of the 20th century. 

France found such a man — President 
Pompidou. I have had the privilege to work 
with him, to know him, for these past five 
years. He was a man of extraordinary intel- 
ligence, of superb devotion and dedication to 
duty, and above all, of indomitable courage. 

OAU Granted Immunities 
as International Organization 


Designating the Organization of African Unity 
AS A Public International Organization En- 
titled To Enjoy Certain Privileges, Exemp- 
tions, AND Immunities 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by sec- 
tions 1 and 12 of the International Organizations Im- 
munities Act (59 Stat. 669; 22 U.S.C. 288), as 
amended by Public Law 93-161 (87 Stat. 635), I 
hereby designate the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) as a public international organization en- 
titled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and im- 
munities provided by the International Organiza- 
tions Immunities Act. 


The White House, Febniary 19, I97i. 

' No. 11767; 39 Fed. Reg. 6603. 

May 6, 1974 


U.N. Special Committee Approves Draft Definition of Aggression 

Following is a statement made on Ap^il 12 
in the U.N. Special Committee on the Ques- 
tion of Defining Aggression by U.S. Repre- 
sentative Robert Rosenstock, 2vho is Legal 
Affairs Adviser to the U.S. Missioyi to the 
United Nations, together rvith the text of a 
draft definition of aggression approved by 
the committee that day. 


USUN press release 32 dated April 12 

My delegation believes this committee may 
take pride in arriving at a formulation on the 
question of aggression. This has been a 
task on which international lawyers have 
labored for over half a century. The text 
we have forwarded to the General Assembly 
is not perfect; that would be impossible if 
the views of 35 states are to be harmonized. 
It is with this understanding that my dele- 
gation raised no objection to this text being 
forwarded to the General Assembly for final 

We should, of course, not allow our suc- 
cess to lead us to place too great an empha- 
sis on what we have accomplished. Even 
a legally perfect definition of aggression 
could do more harm than good if it were 
given too great an emphasis. Whether inter- 
national law provides the framework of pe- 
remptory norms from which states derive 
their sovereignty or whether it provides the 
framework for reasoned discourse among 
states or decisionmakers is not an issue we 
must decide here. What we have produced 
is a document for use by the Security Coun- 
cil. The law concerning the use of force is 

found in the charter and in the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law Concern- 
ing Friendly Relations. The preambular re- 
affirmation of the Friendly Relations Decla- 
ration underlines this point. 

The text we have sent to the General As- 
sembly is a draft recommendation by the 
General Assembly designed to provide guid- 
ance for the Security Council in the exercise 
of its primary responsibility under the char- 
ter to maintain and, where necessary, restore 
international peace and security. While it 
does not and cannot limit the discretion of 
the Security Council, it is to be hoped this 
recommendation will facilitate consideration 
by the Security Council of the complex issues 
involved in the question of aggression. It 
would, however, be to misconstrue the func- 
tion of chapter VII of the charter if the 
Council were led by this text to delay urgent 
action under chapter VII in order first to 
settle the question of whether an act of 
aggression had taken place when a finding 
of a "threat to the peace" or a "breach of 
the peace" would more expeditiously and pro- 
ductively activate the collective security 
mechanism of the charter. 

It remains now to analyze the text itself. 
The preambular paragraphs contain a series 
of propositions relating to the framework in 
which the definition has been developed and 
express the hope that the text will make a 
useful contribution to the achievement of 
the first purpose of the United Nations, to 
keep the peace. 

The second and fourth paragraphs of the 
preamble remind that the term "act of ag- 
gression" with which we are dealing is con- 
tained in article 39 of the charter and that 


Department of State Bulletin 

this is a matter of the primary responsibility 
of the Security Council. 

The third preambular paragraph empha- 
sizes the importance of preventing interstate 
relations from deteriorating to the point 
where there is no relevance to the question 
as to whether aggression has taken place. 
The most certain way to avoid the escalation 
of differences between states is by greater 
use of peaceful methods of dispute settle- 
ment. In the first instance this would nor- 
mally involve negotiation, inquiry, and con- 
ciliation, but if these methods are to be ef- 
fective and if the principle of the sovereign 
equality of states is to be maintained, resid- 
ual reference of disputes to binding third- 
party dispute settlement must be an available 
option for every state as against every other 

The fifth preambular paragraph correctly 
states the view that not every act of force 
in violation of the charter constitutes ag- 
gression. At the same time it recognizes the 
dangers that would flow from an illegal use 
of force which amounts to aggression. 

The sixth preambular paragraph reaffirms 
the long-accepted corollary of the right of 
all peoples to equal rights and self-determi- 
nation. The final clause of the paragraph 
contains a reaflirmation of the safeguard 
principle that the right of self-determination 
does not imply legitimization of "any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally 
or in part, the territorial integrity or politi- 
cal unity of sovereign and independent States 
conducting themselves in compliance with 
the principle of equal rights and self-deter- 
mination of peoples . . . and thus possessed 
of a government representing the whole peo- 
ple belonging to the territory without dis- 
tinction as to race, creed or colour." ' 

The remaining preambular paragraphs are 
sufficiently direct as to require no comment. 

Article 1 of the operative portion of the 

' For text of the Declaration on Principles of Inter- 
national Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among 
States in Accordance With the Charter of the United 
Nations, see Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 627. 

te.xt constitutes a general statement which 
must be understood in the light of the other 
articles. The article properly makes no dis- 
tinction on the basis of the means of armed 
force used and, by means of the phrase "as 
set out in this definition," indicates that not 
all illegal uses of armed force should be 
regarded as capable of denomination as acts 
of aggression. 

Article 2 of the text represents an efi'ort 
to suggest the considerations the Security 
Council should bear in mind in analyzing a 
particular situation which may be brought 
before it. The article recognizes that, in 
considering whether an act of aggression has 
taken place, the Security Council will be 
well advised to take account of which state 
first used force in contravention of the char- 
ter and to give due weight to all the relevant 
circumstances. In this latter connection it 
was agreed that it was not necessary to make 
special reference to the intent or purposes 
of the states involved since aiiimiis aggres- 
sioiiis is universally understood to be an 
essential element and the notion of purposes 
is fully covered by the phrase "other rele- 
vant circumstances." 

The United States understands this article 
to mean that the first use of armed force 
by a state in contravention of the charter 
is only evidence, though prima facie evidence, 
of an act of aggression ; the Security Coun- 
cil may or may not in the particular case 
find that there has actually been an act of 
aggression, in contrast with mere evidence 
of an act of aggression. If the Security Coun- 
cil considers a case where there has been 
first use of armed force and does not make 
a finding of an act of aggression, then it 
must be presumed not to have found the 
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression 
to be persuasive. This interpretation clearly 
conforms to the traditional and characteris- 
tic manner in which the Security Council 
works, for the Council does not find that a 
determination under article 39 would not 
be justified but rather considers whether a 
finding would be justified. This definition 

May 6, 1974 


accordingly can only be reasonably inter- 
preted in the light of the whole history of 
the Council's method of operation and of 
course in any event could not alter the in- 
tent of article 39 of the charter. 

Article 3 of the text represents an effort 
to set forth certain familiar examples of 
the use of force which the Security Council 
could reasonably consider, in the manner 
suggested by article 2, to qualify as potential 
acts of aggression. The scope of the list 
of acts set forth in the article makes clear 
that no distinction is made in terms of the 
means employed or the directness or indi- 
rectness of their use. 

Since this e.xercise is not for the purpose 
of defining illegal as opposed to legal uses 
of force, there is no suggestion that article 
3 is intended to constitute an exhaustive list 
of all illicit means by which force may be 
used nor a comprehensive list of all of the 
illegal uses of force which may be regarded 
as constituting acts of aggression. Indeed, 
article 4 expressly states the nonexhaustive 
nature of the list of acts set forth in article 3. 

Articles 5, 6, and 7 are not, strictly speak- 
ing, part of the definition of aggression. 
Rather, they set forth some of the legal 
consequences which flow from a finding by 
the Security Council that an act of aggres- 
sion has occurred and contain certain savings 
clauses explicitly indicating that which is 
not affected by the first four articles. 

The first paragraph of article 5 states the 
truism that illicit activities are those for 
which there is no justification. To the extent 
the phrase may be regarded as an added safe- 
guard to insure this text is not used as a trap 
for the unwary or a signpost for the ag- 
gressor, it is a useful addition. 

The second paragraph of article 5 notes 
the continued validity of the principles which 
formed the basis for the post-World War 11 
trials and which were enunciated in the 
Moscow Declaration of 1943, the London 
Agreement of 1945, and the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far 

East. The second sentence of the paragraph 
notes the doctrine that states are responsible 
for any wrongful acts they may commit. 

The third paragraph of this article repre- 
sents a formulation of the Stimson doctrine 
and the relevant portions of the Friendly 
Relations Declaration in the context of ag- 
gression. The article does not attempt to al- 
ter or add to existing international law with 
regard to the consequences for states or in- 
dividuals involved in acts of aggression. 

Articles 6 and 7 are classic .savings clauses. 
A savings clause by its very nature does not 
function to create new rights but merely 
adds express assurance that a legal state- 
ment or series of rules is not intended to and 
does not cut across existing rights and obli- 

Article 6 merely reminds the reader that 
the function and scope of this exercise has 
been to elucidate the means by which certain 
types of illicit state conduct may be deter- 
mined to constitute aggression, rather than 
to examine those situations under interna- 
tional law in which the uses of force may be 
lawful. This is already clear from the text of 
article 2 and is only made more explicitly so 
by this article. 

Article 7 expressly affirms the fact that 
the purpose of this exercise is to define ag- 
gression and not the right of self-determina- 
tion. My delegation is always prepared to 
support any text which reasonably reaflfirms 
the right of all peoples to self-determination. 
We are able to accept the formulation con- 
tained in this article because it is fully con- 
sistent with our support of this principle. In 
particular, the article does not speak of the 
use of force, but of actions conducted in ac- 
cordance with the principles of the charter 
and the Declaration on Friendly Relations; 
therefore it is clear that the article in no 
way legitimizes acts of armed force by a 
state which would otherwise constitute ag- 
gression. Even had it spoken of the use of 
force, which it does not, this article would 
not constitute an assertion that the use of 
force by a state in these cii'cumstances is 


Department of State Bulletin 

legal. Rather, it would amount to a recom- 
mendation to the Security Council, were the 
Council asked to consider a particular case, 
to bear in mind the purposes of the states 
involved in considering whether a particular 
illegal activity should be denominated an act 
of aggression within the meaning of article 
39 of the charter. 

Article 8 is a reaffirmation of the necessity 
to construe each part of the definition in the 
context of all other relevant parts. This is 
particularly significant in connection with 
the central articles of the definition, articles 
1 through 4, which form an integrated whole. 

In conclusion one can but associate one's 
delegation with the hope expressed in the 
preamble of the text that this labor will con- 
tribute to the more effective functioning of 
the collective security system of the United 
Nations and consequently to the central pur- 
pose of our organization : "To maintain in- 
ternational peace and security." 


The General Assembly, 

Basing itself, on the fact that one of the funda- 
mental purposes of the United Nations is to main- 
tain international peace and security and to take 
effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppres- 
sion of acts of aggression or other breaches of the 

Reealling that the Security Council, in accordance 
with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and 
shall make recommendations, or decide what meas- 
ures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 

Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter 
to settle their international disputes by peaceful 
means in order not to endanger international peace, 
security and justice, 

Bearing in mind that nothing in this definition 
shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the 
scope of the provisions of the Charter with respect 

to the functions and powers of the organs of the 
United Nations, 

Considering also that since aggression is the most 
serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of 
force, being fraught, in the conditions created by the 
existence of all types of weapons of mass destruction, 
with the possible threat of a world conflict and all its 
catastrophic consequences, aggression should bo 
defined at the present stage. 

Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed 
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-deter- 
mination, freedom and independence, or to disrupt 
territorial integrity, 

Reaffirming also that the territory of a State shall 
not be violated by being the object, even temporarily, 
of military occupation or of other measures of force 
taken by another State in contravention of the 
Charter, and that it shall not be the object of acqui- 
sition by another State resulting from such meas- 
ures or the threat thereof, 

Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Na- 

Convinced that the adoption of a definition of ag- 
gression ought to have the effect of deterring a po- 
tential aggressor, would simplify the determination 
of acts of aggression and the implementation of 
measures to suppress them and would also facilitate 
the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, 
and the rendering of assistance to, the victim. 

Believing that, although the question whether an 
act of aggression has been committed must be con- 
sidered in the light of all the circumstances of each 
particular case, it is, nevertheless, desirable to 
formulate basic principles as guidance for such de- 

Adopts the following definition: 

Article 1 ^ 

Aggression is the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, as set out in this definition. 

Article 2 
The first use of armed force by a State in contra- 

- Approved by the committee by consensus on Apr. 
12 (United Nations press release L/2092). 

^Explanatory note: In this definition the term 

(a) is used without prejudice to questions of rec- 
ognition or to whether a State is a Member of the 
United Nations, and 

(b) includes the concept of a "group of States" 
where appropriate. 

May 6, 1974 


vention of the Charter shall constitute pritna facie 
evidence of an act of aggression although the Secu- 
rity Council may in conformity with the Charter con- 
clude that a determination that an act of aggres- 
sion has been committed would not be justified in the 
light of other relevant circumstances including the 
fact that the acts concerned or their consequences 
are not of sufficient gravity. 

Article 3 ' 

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declara- 
tion of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with 
the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of 

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of 
a State of the territory of another State, or any 
military occuiiation, however temporary, resulting 
from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by 
the use of force of the territory of another State or 
part thereof; 

(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State 
against the territory of another State or the use of 
any weapons by a State against the territory of 
another State; 

(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State 
by the armed forces of another State; 

(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on 
the land, sea or air forces, marine and air fleets of 
another State; 

(e) The use of armed forces of one State, which 
are within the territory of another State with the 
agreement of the receiving State, in contravention 
of the conditions provided for in the agreement or 
any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement; 

(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, 
which it has placed at the disposal of another State, 
to be used by that other State for perpetrating an 
act of aggression against a third State; 

(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of 
armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, 
which carry out acts of armed force against another 
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein. 

Article 4 

The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive 
and the Security Council may determine that other 
acts constitute aggression under the provisions of 
the Charter. 

Article 5 ' 

No consideration of whatever nature, whether po- 
litical, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as 
a justification for aggression. 

A war of aggression is a crime against interna- 

tional peace. Aggression gives rise to international 

No territorial acquisition or special advantage 
resulting from aggression are or shall be recognized 
as lawful. 

Article 6 

Nothing in this definition shall be construed as in 
any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the 
Charter including its provisions concerning cases in 
which the use of force is lawful. 

Article 7 

Nothing in this definition, and in particular article 
3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-deter- 
mination, freedom and independence, as derived 
from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of 
that right and referred to in the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accord- 
ance with the Charter of the United Nations, par- 
ticularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes 
or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of 
these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek 
and receive support, in accordance with the principles 
of the Charter and in conformity with the above- 
mentioned Declaration. 

Article 8 

In their interpretation and application the above 
provisions are interrelated and each provision should 
be construed in the context of the other provisions. 

' On the recommendation of its working group, the 
committee agreed on Apr. 12 to include in its report 
to the General Assembly the following explanatory 
notes on articles 3 and 5: 

1. With reference to article 3, paragraph (b), the 
Special Committee agreed that the expression "any 
weapons" is used without making a distinction be- 
tween conventional weapons, weapons of mass de- 
struction and any other kind of weapon. 

2. With reference to article 5, paragraph 1, the 
Committee had in mind, in particular, the principle 
contained in the Declaration on Principles of Inter- 
national Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States in accordance with the Char- 
ter of the United Nations according to which "No 
State or group of States has the right to intervene, 
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external aff'airs of any other State". 

3. With reference to article 5, paragraph 2, the 
words "international responsibility" are used without 
prejudice to the scope of this term. 

4. With reference to article 5, paragraph 3, the 
Committee states that this paragraph should not be 
construed so as to prejudice the established princi- 
ples of international law relating to the inadmissa- 
bility of territorial acquisition resulting from the 
threat or use of force. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Discusses Initiatives 
In U.S. International Energy Policy 

Following is a statement by George M. 
Bennsky, Director, Office of Fuels and Ener- 
gy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 
made before the Subcommittee on the Near 
East and South Asia of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs on April 9.^ 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
appear once again before your subcommittee 
and exchange views on our international 
energy policy. Events since my appearance 
in November have opened the way to new 
approaches to our energy problems. As a con- 
sequence, we are pursuing efforts to find 
common ground between the needs of energy 
consumers and the aspirations of energy 
producers. Inasmuch as Mr. Wakefield's 
[Stephen A. Wakefield, Assistant Adminis- 
trator for International Policy and Programs, 
Federal Energy Office] statement will cover 
the points you raised in your letter concern- 
ing the supply and price effects of the Arab 
oil embargo and its lifting, I will concentrate 
on the evolving U.S. international policy on 
energy matters. 

The goal of U.S. international policy on 
energy matters is to insure adequate and 
secure supplies at prices that contribute to 
stable growth and improving environments 
in all the nations of our interdependent 

In pursuit of this goal, we are now engaged 
in three initiatives. In the international 
arena, we are making a major effort to gain 
the multilateral appreciation of the implica- 
tions and opportunities of the world energy 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

problem required to encourage and sustain 
cooperative solutions. Simultaneously, we are 
focusing on the maintenance and improve- 
ment of our bilateral relations with key 
energy producers and consumers. Here at 
home, we are engaged in developing the idea 
of Project Independence into specific, bal- 
anced, sustainable programs. These three 
endeavors are interrelated and important to 
the achievement of our international energy 

Our assessment of the international chal- 
lenges posed by the energy problem has led 
us to the conclusion that it can be met suc- 
cessfully only through concerted international 
action. Reliance on seemingly-easier-to-real- 
ize unilateral and bilateral deals would 
threaten the world with a vicious cycle of 
competition, autarky, rivalry, and depres- 

Prior to the recent Arab oil embargo, and 
shortly thereafter, our greatest concerns 
were about insufficient oil supplies with 
which to meet our own and the world's oil 
requirements. While these concerns remain 
with us in the short and medium term, they 
have been pushed out of first place by the 
abrupt, almost fourfold increase in crude oil 
prices during the final quarter of last year. 
The resulting adjustment process faces all 
nations with difficult choices and conse- 

Developed consuming states, including this 
country, cannot escape adverse impacts on 
their price structures, balances of payments, 
and industrial output and employment levels. 
The damage to the LDC [less developed coun- 
tries] consumers, particularly the poorer 
ones, will be much more serious and lasting. 
Their additional energy costs, which will 
exceed the official development assistance 
they are now receiving, threaten not only a 
reversal of their economic development but 
the lives of their citizens. 

Even the oil-exporting states will find their 
new-found wealth and development aspira- 
tions seriously eroded to the extent that the 
high oil prices generate substantial addi- 

May 6, 1974 


tional global inflation and instability in the 
international financial marketplace and lend 
themselves to competitive trade practices 
designed to avoid adverse balance of pay- 
ments consequences. Thei-e are no financial 
gimmicks or shortcuts to redressing these 
severe imbalances. Nor would confrontation 
between consumers and producers do more 
than worsen the already very serious situa- 
tion. All nations have legitimate interests 
that must be sorted out. 

It is on the conviction that this assess- 
ment is valid and that the problem is still 
manageable multilaterally that we launched 
our international cooperative initiative, be- 
ginning first with Secretary Kissinger's ad- 
dress in London in December, followed by 
the Washington Energy Conference in Feb- 
ruary. A reading of the communique shows 
that the world's 13 largest consumers of 
energy agreed with this analysis of the sit- 
uation. Twelve of them agreed that to 
achieve the required cooperative understand- 
ings it was necessary to proceed in an or- 
derly step-by-step manner. Thus we find 
ourselves engaged, along with Japan, Cana- 
da, Norway, and the European Economic 
Community nations less France, in intense 
work at the Under Secretary level in fur- 
thering the purposes of the conference. This 
work is, as you know, centered in a body 
called the Energy Coordinating Group, or 
ECG for short. 

Despite some real differences in perspec- 
tives and circumstances between its mem- 
bers, the ECG is proceeding in a very mean- 
ingful and purposeful manner. It has met 
three times within little over one month. 
Making use of the expertise and ongoing 
work of the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development (OECD), it has 
arranged for three working groups to pro- 
duce proposals on the possibilities for co- 
operation in the related areas of energy con- 
servation and demand restraint, accelerated 
development of conventional energy re- 
sources, and sharing of oil in times of short- 
age. These, and a special working group 
outside the OECD looking into research and 
development prospects, have already gotten 

Other subjects are being handled by the 
ECG as a whole, with lead responsibilities 
divided among its members. These include 
monitoring and encouraging the work on 
the financial implications of the energy prob- 
lem underway in the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund], IBRD [International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development], and 
OECD, among other multinational institu- 
tions; looking into the role of the interna- 
tional oil companies; and preparing for 
wider consultations with other consumers 
and the producers and for an early producer- 
consumer conference to seek new arrange- 
ments and understandings. 

The organizational phase is over and sub- 
stantive work and discussion is underway, 
with reports and proposals due toward the 
end of May. While much of the substan- 
tive work is yet to be completed, we are 
pleased with the sustained sense of urgency 
and dedication displayed by the other mem- 
ber governments. We remain dedicated to 
a major effort to bring the ECG's work to 
a successful conclusion. 

The U.N. General Assembly special ses- 
sion on raw materials and development, 
which begins today, provides another inter- 
national arena for discussion of the world 
energy problem. However, energy resources 
will be included among a great number of 
other raw materials and problems of trade 
and economic development. We will take a 
forthcoming, cooperative, nonconfronting 
stance dui-ing the session. 

We do think it important, however, that 
nations not lose sight of the fact that oil 
and its price comprise the number-one com- 
modity problem facing the world today. No 
other commodity has comparable impact on 
the economies of both the industrialized and 
the less developed. We think a number of 
other governments are of the same mind. 
We hope that the U.N. General Assembly 
special session will be constructive in pro- 
viding useful insights into the world's chang- 
ing raw materials situation and not become 
an occasion for sterile recriminations be- 
tween the developing and industrialized na- 
tions. We do not see any forum of this size 
as likely to produce the specific results we 


Department of State Bulletin 

envisage from the work of the ECG. 

Let me make a passing- comment about 
U.S. actions in other international fora. Sec- 
retary Kissinger carried our message of in- 
ternational cooperation on energy matters 
to Latin American Foreign Ministei's in 
Mexico City in late February. Secretary of 
the Treasury Shultz has expounded the same 
views during his recent trip to Caracas, 
Brasilia, and Santiago. In late February I 
traveled to Bangkok to make the same points 
to an energy conference of the U.N. Eco- 
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East. The world recognizes the U.S. com- 
mitment to international cooperation on en- 
ergy. The responses we have been receiving 
are generally positive and encourage us to 
press ahead. 

Our quest for multinational solutions to 
the energy problem has not caused us to 
ignore, or even minimize, the necessity for 
maintaining and improving our bilateral re- 
lations with all countries, including, of 
course, the OPEC [Organization of Petrole- 
um Exporting Countries] oil exporters. De- 
spite all that has occurred, including 
embargoes, production cutbacks, and dis- 
agreements over oil price levels, we ought 
to remember that we have had, most of the 
time, very good long-term political-economic 
relations with almost all OPEC members. 
We definitely want to retain and in fact re- 
inforce these friendships, and I would hope 
that our relations with OPEC members will 
improve significantly in the years ahead. 

A prime example is that of Saudi Arabia. 
Last Friday our two governments announced 
that we were prepared to expand and give 
more concrete expression to cooperation in 
the fields of economics, technology, and in- 
dustry, and in the supply of the Kingdom's 
requirements for defensive purposes. We are 
pleased with this development and look for- 
ward to building on our solid friendship of 
many years' standing. 

I would like to make clear that this is not 
a bilateral oil agreement. It is an expression 
of determination to increase cooperation 
across a broad spectrum of relations in the 
belief that, in doing so, our mutual interests 
and those of the rest of the world will be 

well served. Integral parts of these interests 
are .solid incentives for Saudi Arabia, the 
world's major source of oil, to produce at 
levels consistent with the world's economic 

The United States has long had a close 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, based in 
large part on our mutual interest in peace 
and stability in that part of the world, the 
significance of American oil companies to the 
Saudi economy, and our support for Saudi 
Arabia's eff'orts to develop its economy and 
modernize its defense and security forces. I 
will emphasize again that we are not dis- 
cussing with the Saudis an "oil for indus- 
trialization and trade" bilateral arrange- 
ment, such as some countries have sought 
in the recent past. We remain committed to 
the program of multilateral cooperation 
agreed to at the Washington Energy Confer- 
ence and now being implemented by the ECG. 

The questions raised by the changing 
world energy situation, as I have already in- 
dicated, are simply too complex and vast to 
be resolved by any one or two governments 
acting alone. We continue to question the 
advisability and viability of bilateral ar- 
rangements to tie up specified amounts of oil 
in exchange for specific goods and projects. 
These will tend to sustain higher prices, to 
inci-ease national frictions in the economic 
and political arenas, and to reduce and 
threaten the multilateralism on which our 
world trade and monetary systems are based 
and have flourished. 

Finally, a few words about the importance 
of a functioning Project Independence to our 
international oil policy. Successful implemen- 
tation of a balanced program of greater self- 
suflficiency would of course confer on us very 
substantial national security and economic 
benefits that could be matched by no other 
major industrial power. This is because our 
opportunities and abilities to both conserve 
and develop energy are quite substantial in 
comparison to other countries. 

Such an achievement would effectively 
eliminate the threat of oil as a political weap- 
on against us and, to an extent, insulate us 
from externally imposed oil price conditions. 
Project Independence also meshes well with 

May 6, 1974 


our international cooperative efforts, since it 
would relieve pressures that burgeoning- U.S. 
imports have placed on the world's limited 
oil supplies, thus benefiting the economies of 
other consumei-.s, and of the producers as 
well, who profess concern at the rapid de- 
pletion of their key resource. 

In conclusion, let me thank you again for 
the opportunity to appear and testify. The 
search for viable solutions to the complex of 
problems we face in the energy field requires 
close cooperation between the executive and 
legislative branches, just as it does between 

Our multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral 
efforts will continue to be difficult and ardu- 
ous, but I believe we are moving down the 
right road. We do not know exactly how it 
all will turn out. We have some way to travel 
yet. But our vision and goal remain as I 
stated at the beginning — to insure adequate 
and secure supplies at prices that contribute 
to stable growth and improving environments 
in all the nations of our interdependent 


Background Notes on the Countries 
of the World 

Background Notes are short pamphlets which in- 
clude information on a country's land, people, his- 
tory, g-overnment, political conditions, economy, and 
foreign relations and U.S. policy toward that coun- 

The Department of State has published more than 
160 Background Notes, which are written by officers 
in the geographic bureaus and edited and published 
by the General Publications Division, Office of Media 
Services, Bureau of Public Affairs. 

Background Notes, available in a complete set, on 
a subscription basis, or individually, may be ordered 
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One-year subscription for approximately 77 re- 
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Individual Background Notes — 25''- each, plus 5(- 
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25-percent discount. 

Catalopr No. 

Afars and Issas (see French Territory of) 
Afghanistan S 1.123:AF 

Albania S 

Algeria S 

Andorra S 

Angola S 

Antilles (see Netherlands Antilles) 
Arabia (see Saudi Arabia) 



r Republ 


Bahamas . 

Bahrain . 



Belgium . 





Brazil . . 

Britain (see United Kingdom 

British Honduras 

Bulgaria . . . 

Burma . . . 

Burundi . . . 

Cambodia (see Khme 



Central African Republic 

Cevlon (see Sri Lanka) 



China, People's Republic 
China, Republic of . . 


Congo, Brazzaville . . 

Congo, Kinshasa (see Zaire) 

Costa Rica . 

Cuba . . . 

Cyprus . . 




Dominican Republic 

East Germany (see German Democratic Republic) 

Egypt . . 
El Salvador 





1.123 :B 





1.123:B 45 

1.123:B 46 









1.123 :B 


















1.123:EC 9 
1.123:EG 9 
1.123:EL 7 


Department of State Bulletin 

Catalog No. 

Afars and 

England (see United Kingdom) 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia .... 


Finland .... 
France .... 
French Guiana 
French Territory of 

Issas .... 
Gabon .... 
The Gambia . . 
German Democratic Republic 
Germany, Federal Republic of 


Great Britain (see United Kingdom) 

Greece S 

Guadeloupe S 

Guatemala S 

Guiana, French (see French Guiana) 

Guinea S 1.123:G 94 

Guinea, Equatorial (see Equatorial Guinea) 
Guinea, Portuguese (see Portug\aese Guinea) 
Guyana S 1.123:G 99 

1.123:EQ 2 
1.12.S:ET 3 
1.123:F 47 
1.123:F 49 
1.123:F 84 
1.123:F 88 

1.123:F 88AF 
1.123:G 11 
1.123:G 14 
1.123:G 31/2 
1.123:G 31 
1.123:G 34 

1.123:G 81 
1.123:G 93/2 
1.123:G 93 

Haiti .... 
Honduras . . 
Honduras, British 
Hong Kong . . 
Hungary . . . 
Iceland . . . 
India .... 
Indonesia . . 
Iran .... 
Iraq .... 
Ireland . . . 
Ireland, Northern 
Israel .... 

. S 1.123:H 12 

. S 1.123:H 75/2 
(see British Honduras) 

. S 1.123:H 75 

. S 

. s 

. s 

. s 

. s 

. s 

. s 

(see United 

Issas (see French Territory of Afars and Issas) 


Ivory Coast . . 
Jamaica . . . 
Japan .... 
Jordan . . . 
Kenya . . . 
Khmer Republic 
Korea, Democratic 

People's Republic of 
Korea, Republic of . 
Libya . 
Macao . . 
Madagascar (see Malagasy) 
Malagasy Republic . . . 
Malaysia . 
Maldives . 
Mali . . 
Malta . . 

1.123:H 89 
1.123:IC 2 
1.123:IN 2/2 
1.123:IN 2 
1.123:IR 1 
1.123:IR 1/2 
1.123:IR 2 
. S 1.123:IS 7 

1.123:IT 1 
1.123:IV 7 
1.123:J 22 
1.123:J 27 
1.123:J 76 
1.123:K 42 
1.123:C 14 

1.123:N 81K 
1.123 :K 84 
1.123:K 96 
1.123:L 29 
1.123:L 49 
1.123:L 56 
1.123:L 61/2 
1.123:L 61 
1.123:L 62 
1.123:L 97 
1.123:M 11 

1.123 :M 29/3 
1.123:M 29/2 
1.123:M 29 
1.123:M 29/4 
1.123:M 29/5 
1.123 :M 29/6 
1.123:M 36 
1.123:M 44/2 
1.123:M 44 
1.123:M 57 

Catalog No. 

1.123:M 74/2 
1.123:M 74 
1.123 :M 82 
1.123:M 87 

Monaco S 

Mongolia S 

Morocco S 

Mozambique S 

Muscat (see Oman) 

Namibia (see South West Africa) 



Netherlands . . . 
Netherlands Antilles 
New Zealand . . . 
Nicaragua .... 



North Korea (see Korea, 

public of) 
North Viet-Nam (see Viet-Nam, Democratic Repub 

lie of) 
Northern Ireland (see United Kingdom) 

Norway S 1.123:N 83 

Oman S 

Pakistan S 

Panama S 

1.123:N 22 
1.123:N 35 
1.123:N 38 
1.123:N 38/2 
1.123:N 42Z 
S 1.123 :N 51 
S 1.123:N 56 
S 1.123:N 56/2 
Democratic People's Re- 

Peru . . 
Poland . 
Qatar . . 


1.123:M 97 
1.123:P 17 
1.123:P 19 
1.123:P 21 
1.123:P 43 
1.123:P 53 
1.123:P 75 
1.123:P 83/2 
1.123 :P 83 
1.123:Q 1 

Rhodesia (see Southern Rhodesia) 

Romania S 1.123:R 66 

Russia (see U.S.S.R.) 

Rwanda S 1.123:R 94 

Samoa (see Western Samoa) 

San Marino S 1.123 :SA 5 

Saudi Arabia S 1.123 :SA 8 

Scotland (see United Kingdom) 

Senegal S 1.123:SE 5 

Seychelles S 1.123:SE 9 

Sierra Leone S 1.123:SI 1 

Singapore S 1.123:SI 6 

Somali Republic S 1.123 :S0 5 

South Africa S 1.123:SO 8AF 

South Korea (see Korea, Republic of) 

South Viet-Nam (see Viet-Nam, Republic of) 

South West Africa S 1.123:SO 8W 

Southern Rhodesia S 1.123:SO 8R 

Southern Yemen (see Yemen, People's Democratic 

Republic of) 
Soviet Union (see U.S.S.R.) 

Spanish Sahara 

Sri Lanka 

Sudan . . 

Surinam . 




Syria . . 

Tanzania . 

Thailand . 

Tobago (see 

Togo . . 

Tonga . . 

Trinidad and Tobago 

Trinidad and 

. . S 

. . S 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 

. . s 


. . S 

. . s 

. . s 

1.123:SP 2 
1.123:SP 1 
1.123:C 33 
1.123:SU 2 
1.123:SU 7 
1.123:SW 2 
1.123:SW 3 
1.123:SW 6 
1.123:SY 8 
1.123:T 15 
1.123:T 32 

1.123:T 57 
1.123:T 61 
1.123:T 73 

Trucial Shaikhdoms (see United Arab Emirates) 

May 6, 1974 


CataloK No. 

Tunisia S 1.123 :T 83 

Turkey S 1.123:T 84 

Uganda S 1.123:UG 1 

U.S.S.R S 1.123:UN .33 

United Arab Emirates . . . . S 1.123 :EM 4 
United Arab Republic (see Egypt) 

United Kingdom S 1.123:UN 34K 

Upper Volta S 1.123:UP 6V 

Uruguay S 1.123 :UR 8 

Vatican" City S 1.123:V 45 

Venezuela S 1.123 :V b5 

Viet-Nam, Democratic 

Republic of S 1.123:N 81V 

Viet-Nam, Republic of .... S 1.123 :V 67 

Wales (see United Kingdom) 

West Germany (see Germany, Federal Republic of) 

Western Samoa S 1.123:W 52S 

Yemen Arab Republic . . . . S 1.123:Y 3 
Yemen, People's 

Democratic Republic of ... S 1.123:.'308Y 

Yugoslavia S 1.123:Y 9 

ZaVre S 1.123:Z 1/2 

Zambia S 1.123:Z 1 

Zanzibar (see Tanzania) 

Nice agreement concerning the international classi- 
fication of goods and services for the purposes of 
the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as re- 
vised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into 
force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 
25, 1972. TIAS 7419. 
Ratification deposited: Norway, March 8, 1974. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Oi'ganization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratification deposited: Norway, March 8, 1974. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
Accession deposited: Laos, February 22, 1974. 


Protocol of provisional application of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at 
Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force Jan- 
uary 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 
De facto application: Grenada, February 7, 1974. 


Current Actions 



Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United 
States March 10, 1974. 

Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratification deposited: Panama, 
March 29, 1974. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that accession deposited: Australia, 
March 22, 1974. 
Proclaimed by the President: April 17, 1974. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727. 
Ratification deposited: Norway, March 8, 1974. 



Consular convention. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974. 
Enters into force 30 days following the date of 
exchange of ratifications. 


Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income and capital. SigTied at Nicosia 
April 19, 1974. Enters into force one month after 
the exchange of the instruments of ratification. 


Treaty on extradition. Signed at Copenhagen June 
22, 1972.= 
Ratified by the President: April 17, 1974. 


Agreement relating to the location and operation of 
a temporary Japanese down-range station on 
Kwajalein Island. Eflfected by exchange of notes 
at Tokyo March 27, 1974. Entered into force 
March 27, 1974. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 30, 
1973 (TIAS 7594), relating to implementation and 
enforcement of civil aviation advance charter 
rules, with related letter. Effected by exchange of 
notes at London March 29, 1974. Entered into 
force March 29, 1974. 

Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 6, 197 Jt. Vol. LXX, No. 1819 

Africa. OAU Granted Immunities as Inter- 
national Organization (Executive order) . 497 

Asia. Energy, Food, and Economic and Social 
Development (Ferguson) 484 

Congress. Department Discusses Initiatives in 
U.S. International Energy Policy (Benn- 
sky) 503 

Developing Countries 

The Challenge of Interdependence (Kissinger) 477 
Energy, Food, and Economic and Social De- 
velopment (Ferguson) 484 

Economic Affairs 

The Challenge of Interdependence (Kissinger) 477 
Energy, Food, and Economic and Social De- 
velopment (Ferguson) 484 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Transna- 
tional Communications — What's Happen- 
ing? (Richardson) 489 


The Challenge of Interdependence (Kissinger) 477 
Department Discusses Initiatives in U.S. In- 
ternational Energy Policy (Bennsky) . . . 503 

France. U.S. Mourns President Pompidou of 

France (Nixon, Kissinger) 496 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

OAU Granted Immunities as International 
Organization (Executive order) 497 

Israel. Contract Signed for Assistance to 
Soviet Migrants to Israel 483 

Presidential Documents 

OAU Granted Immunities as International 

Organization (Executive order) 497 

U.S. Mourns President Pompidou of France . 496 

Publications. Background Notes on the Coun- 
tries of the World 506 

Saudi Arabia. Department Discusses Initia- 
tives in U.S. International Energy Policy 
(Bennsky) 503 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 508 

U.S.S.R. Contract Signed for Assistance to 
Soviet Migrants to Israel 483 

United Nations 

The Challenge of Interdependence (Kissinger) 477 
Energy, Food, and Economic and Social De- 
velopment (Ferguson) 484 

U.N. Special Committee Approves Draft 
Definition of Aggression (Rosenstock, text 
of draft definition) 498 

Name Index 

Bennsky, George M 503 

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 484 

Kissinger, Secretary 477, 496 

Nixon, President 496,497 

Richardson, John, Jr ■ ■ • 489 

Rosenstock, Robert 498 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 15 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 127 
and 129 of April 3. 


Rev. Walter Ong, S. J., profes- 
sor, St. Louis University, to 
visit Africa as Lincoln lec- 

Kissinger: sixth special session 
of the U.N. General Assem- 

Subcommittee on Code of Con- 
duct for Liner Conferences, 
Shipping Coordinating Com- 
mittee, Apr. 24. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, May 10. 

U.S. delegation to OAS General 
Assembly, Atlanta, Apr. 19- 
May 1. 

Secretary of State's Advisory 
Committee on Private Inter- 
national Law, Study Group on 
International Sale of Goods, 
New York, Apr. 18. 

U.S. delegation to ITU World 
Maritime Administrative Ra- 
dio Conference, Geneva, open- 
ing Apr. 22. 

Communique, meeting of Latin 
American Foreign Ministers, 

Kissinger: welcoming remarks, 
OAS General Assembly, At- 

Kissinger: OAS General Assem- 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 













*147 4/18 

*148 4/18 







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of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
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Volume LXX 

No. 1820 

May 13, 1974 



Message to the Congress 526 



Exchange of Toasts With Foreign Minister of Paraguay 520 


For index see inside back cover 




Vol. LXX, No. 1820 
May 13, 1974 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. CiUtlon of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN Is Indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical LiUrature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
OMce of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments im 
the field of V.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart' 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information Is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general Utter' 
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Publications of the Department et 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field at 
international relations are also Usted. 

Secretary Kissinger Outlines Good-Partner Policy 
Before the OAS General Assembly 

The fourth regular General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States (OAS), 
hosted by the United States, opened at At- 
lanta, Ga., on April 19. Following are state- 
ments made before the Assembly on April 19 
and 20 by Secretary Kissinger, who was 
chairman of the U.S. delegation. 


Press release 150 dated April 19 

This meeting is the first General Assembly 
of the OAS to be held in the United States 
outside Washington. It is no accident that 
we are meeting in the southern part of our 
country, a region renowned for its warmth, 
its spaciousness, and its hospitality. 

On behalf of all my colleagues I want to 
thank Governor [Jimmy] Carter and Mayor 
[Maynard] Jackson and all the people of 
Atlanta for the warmth of their reception to 
me and all of my colleagues. The arrange- 
ments could not have been done more beau- 
tifully and more warmly. 

To our friends from Latin America and 
the Caribbean, I offer the welcome of Presi- 
dent Nixon and of the people of the United 

As we meet here outside the governmental 
atmosphere of Washington, the Americas 
can broaden their understanding of each 
other and of each other's people. 

Governor Carter and those of you who have 
not attended our meetings previously, you 
will hear a great deal at these meetings about 
something called the spirit of Tlatelolco, and 
it is important that we say a few words 
about this. 

Last year some of my friends, the Foreign 
Ministers from Latin America, suggested 
that there had been too many proclamations 
and too few policies, that the peoples of the 
Western Hemisphere needed a new approach 
to their relationship. Picking up this idea, 
very insistently urged upon me by the dis- 
tinguished Foreign Minister from Mexico, I 
invited the Foreign Ministers from Latin 
America who were at the General Assembly 
in New York to a lunch. I proposed to them 
a new dialogue among equals. This led the 
distinguished Foreign Minister of Colombia 
to call a meeting in Bogota which outlined 
an agenda for common action. And this in 
turn led to a meeting in Mexico at the For- 
eign Ministry, located in Tlatelolco — a part 
of Mexico City — in which the nations as- 
sembled here and two others that are not 
part of the OAS dedicated themselves to a 
new dialogue among equals. 

This dialogue has been continued this week 
in Washington, and we can say with confi- 
dence that we are making progress in under- 
standing, progress in dedication, and above 
all, progress in concrete programs that will 
realize the aspirations of the Americas. In 
our meeting in Atlanta we can discuss the 
institutions that can give effect to these as- 
pirations, and we can discuss the elements of 
our common progress. 

At Tlatelolco all our countries agreed to 
dedicate ourselves to new horizons of under- 
standing and cooperation. We saw that we 
had reached a time of unprecedented oppor- 
tunity for achieving the goals of justice, 
peace, and human dignity which have for so 
long been the essential promise of the New 
World. In the spring of Atlanta let us take 

May 13, 1974 


new, confident steps toward these new hori- 

I also have the great honor of reading to 
you a message from President Nixon: 

"On behalf of the people of the United 
States I send greetings to the Foreign Min- 
isters of the Americas on the occasion of 
the annual General Assembly of the Organi- 
zation of American States. 

"The Organization of American States has 
long been a symbol and expression of our 
Hemispheric cooperation and partnership, 
and it is indeed a profound pleasure and 
honor for the United States to host this dis- 
tinguished gathering. It is my sincere hope 
that this meeting will result in further con- 
tributions to the improving atmosphere of 
relations in the Americas." 

Richard Nixon. 


Office of Media Services release: as delivered 

As this General Assembly of the Organi- 
zation of American States convenes, a spe- 
cial session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations is underway in New York. 

This is more than a coincidence. In this 
continent as in the world, our nations face 
together a broad agenda of interdependence. 
Instantaneous communications, global eco- 
nomics, and weapons of vast destructiveness 
have thrust mankind into a proximity which 
transforms world community from a slogan 
into a necessity. Our problems are unprece- 
dented in type and scale. But our purpose is 
age-old: to realize man's eternal aspiration 
for a life of peace, well-being, dignity, and 

The challenge before the Americas is to 
define our place in this global quest. What 
should be this hemisphere's purposes in the 
modern world? How can the distinctive and 
special bonds that have united us, and that 
are reflected in this organization, foster co- 
operation among the nations assembled here 
and among all of the nations of the world? 

Montaigne once wrote: 

The archer must first know what he is aiming at 
and then set his hand, his bow, his strength, his 
arrow and his movements for that goal. Our plans 
go astray because they have no direction. 

The Americas have identified their target: 
to make our mutual dependence define a pro- 
gram for effective cooperation. 

We have come a long way together in the 
past six months. When we began our dia- 
logue in New York last October, many 
feared that we might repeat the familiar 
cycle of new slogans followed by renewed 
neglect. We asked of each other: Could we 
make our diversity a source of strength, 
drawing on the richness of our material and 
spiritual heritage? Could we define together 
a concrete and realistic role for the United 
States to support the development efforts of 
our Latin American neighbors? Could the 
nations of the hemisphere fashion a vision 
of the world as it is so that we could move 
together toward the achievement of common 
goals while retaining individual dignity and 
uniqueness ? 

In Bogota last November, the nations of 
Latin America took the initiative in provid- 
ing an answer and proposed an agenda for 
action. In Mexico City in February, we came 
together again and launched a new process 
of collaboration based on this agenda and in- 
spired by a new attitude — the spirit of Tlate- 
lolco. This week in Washington, we reaf- 
firmed our mutual commitment and moved 
toward concrete achievements. 

What is the spirit of Tlatelolco that has 
given such impetus to our current efforts? 

On one level, it is the enduring recognition 
that our nations are joined by unique and 
special bonds — of geography, tradition, self- 
interest, and common values. For all our 
differences, the nations of the Americas 
share a common origin, a history of mutual 
support, and a common devotion to national 
independence, social progress, and human 
dignity. For centuries we have seen our- 
selves as a beacon to the world, offering man- 
kind the hope of leaving behind its eternal 
tragedies and achieving its enduring dreams. 
For decades we have been linked in an inter- 
American system that has been a vehicle for 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

joint action. But on a deeper level, the spirit 
of Tlatelolco defines something new and vital, 
of importance not only in the hemisphere but 
across the oceans. For most of our shared 
history, the United States alone determined 
the pattern and set the pace of our coop- 
eration. We were often tempted to do for 
others what we thought was best for them. 
That attitude no longer shapes our relation- 

New Dialogue a Necessity For All 

We in the United States have come to rec- 
ognize that a revolution has taken place in 
Latin America. Industrialization and mod- 
ern communications have transformed eco- 
nomic and social life. A new generation is 
molding strengthened institutions. A sense 
of regional and national identity has ac- 
quired new force. The commitment to mod- 
ernization has become fundamental. Brazil's 
gross national product approaches that of 
Japan less than two decades ago. The coun- 
tries of the Andean Group have begun a 
major collaborative effort to hasten develop- 
ment. Argentina and Mexico are industrial- 
izing rapidly. And the newly independent 
countries of the English-speaking Caribbean 
have brought different perspectives and tra- 
ditions, a fresh vitality, and if I may say so, 
a new charm to hemispheric relations. 

The United States, too, has changed enor- 
mously in the last decade. We have learned 
that peace cannot be achieved by our efforts 
alone and that development is far more than 
simply an economic problem. Through years 
of anguish and trial, we have found that the 
United States cannot remake the world and 
that neither peace nor development is achiev- 
able unless it engages the effort and the 
commitment of other nations. 

This is why our new dialogue is not a con- 
cession by the United States, but a necessity 
for us all. We convene as equals, on the basis 
of mutual respect — each recognizing that our 
special relationship can be preserved only if 
we transform it to meet the new conditions 
of our time and the new aspirations of our 

In the 19th century, the United States de- 
clared what those outside the hemisphere 
should not do within it. In the 1930's, the 
United States proclaimed what we would no 
longer do within it — the policy of the Good 
Neighbor. In 1974 in Mexico City, in Wash- 
ington, and now in Atlanta, we of the 
Americas jointly proclaim our cooperative 
actions — the policy of the Good Partner. 

Our new dialogue has already been marked 
by substantial progress: 

— We have committed ourselves to a co- 
operative development effort and to the crea- 
tion of a system of collective economic se- 

— We have agreed to devote special atten- 
tion to the needs of the poorest countries of 
the hemisphere. 

— We have agreed to consult in order to 
develop common positions, so far as possible, 
in major international negotiations, espe- 
cially on economic issues. 

— We have established a working group to 
develop principles for the conduct of trans- 
national enterprises. 

— We have set up a Working Group on 
Science and the Transfer of Technology to 
strengthen our cooperation in the process of 

— We have decided on multilateral finan- 
cial institutions to deal with those natural 
disasters and economic crises that our coun- 
tries cannot deal with alone. 

— Above all, we agreed in the Declaration 
of Tlatelolco that "interdependence has be- 
come a physical and moral imperative, and 
that a new, vigorous spirit of inter-American 
solidarity is therefore essential." 

For its part, the United States knows that 
if the answers to the great dialogue between 
the developed and the developing countries 
cannot be found in the Western Hemisphere 
they may not be found at all. We seek a hem- 
isphere lifted by progress, not torn by divi- 
sions. We are committed to shaping our ac- 
tion to accelerate Latin America's efforts to 
fulfill the aspirations of its peoples. 

We will do our utmost to expand Latin 
American access to U.S. markets, to main- 

May 13, 1974 


tain our assistance levels, and to consult on 
political and economic issues of common 
concern. We have moved to resolve old dis- 
putes with Peru, Panama, and Mexico that 
have blocked progress along our common 

Together, we must now ask ourselves: 
What are our ultimate goals? We in the 
Americas have always believed that our 
efforts and our achievements had relevance 
beyond our shores. Thus it is clear that our 
special relationship cannot mean the forma- 
tion of an exclusive bloc. The world has 
already seen enough of pressure groups, ex- 
clusive spheres, and discriminatory arrange- 

A bloc implies a rigidity that would deny 
our different perspectives and constrain our 
reach in different directions. Some of us 
have global responsibilities; some of us feel 
affinities with the Third World; developing 
ties with many regions attract us all. We 
seek not a common front against others but, 
rather, a common effort with others toward 
the global cooperation which is dictated by 
political and economic realities. 

A healthy special relationship is not a bloc. 
Working together, the Western Hemisphere 
can lead the world toward solutions to those 
basic problems of the contemporary period 
that are now being discussed in New York. 
Rejecting autarky, respecting diversity, but 
in a spirit of solidarity, we in the Americas 
can both promote our common objectives and 
strengthen the fabric of global cooperation. 

The Inter-American Agenda 

In this context of our wider purposes, let 
me outline for your consideration some prin- 
ciples and tasks to guide our common efforts. 

Inter-American solidarity must he rooted 
in a free association of independent peoples. 
The spirit of dialogue, of give-and-take, that 
has so enriched our meetings in Mexico and 
Washington must be perpetuated. For its 
part, the United States pledges that it will 
not seek to impose its political preferences 
and that it will not intervene in the domestic 
affairs of its Western Hemisphere neighbors. 

Effective collaboration requires continuing ^ 
and close consultation. The United States 
understands that its global policies and ac- 
tions can have a major impact upon the other 
nations of this hemisphere. Therefore we 
have pledged ourselves to a constant and in- 
timate process of consultation. 

We look forward to periodic meetings of 
America's Foreign Ministers to discuss is- 
sues of mutual concern in the Americas and 
in the world. We will consult closely in the 
global monetary and trade talks and in other 
international negotiations. We do not expect 
an identity of views. We do believe that 
better comprehension and sensitivity to one 
another's positions will benefit us all. 

Our relationship must assure progress and 
a decent life for all our peoples. The ultimate 
test of our relations will be to translate our 
aspirations into concrete programs, espe- 
cially in the decisive field of development. 

Earlier this week, before the special ses- 
sion of the United Nations, I listed six 
principles which economic reality and our 
common humanity dictate should be the guid- 
ing principles for international action to 
spur development: 

— We need to expand the supply of energy 
at an equitable price. 

— We need to free the world from the 
cycle of raw material shortages and sur- 

— We need to achieve a balance between 
food production and food demand. 

— We need to extend special consideration 
to the poorest nations. 

— We need to accelerate the transfer of 
science and technology from developed to 
developing nations. 

— We need to preserve and enlarge a glo- 
bal trade, monetary, and investment system 
which will sustain industrial civilization and 
stimulate its growth. 

This hemisphere has a vital stake in the 
world community's response to these chal- 
lenges. Some of these problems, such as the 
inventory of raw material resources in rela- 
tion to needs, are best carried out on a global 
basis. But on many of the items of this 


Department of State Bulletin 

agenda the nations of this hemisphere can 
provide leadership and inspiration and ad- 
vance the welfare of their peoples through 
joint actions. 

In the field of energy, the hemisphere 
uniquely encompasses both producers and 
consumers. The United States is ready to 
collaborate with its hemisphere partners in 
a major way both bilaterally and multilat- 

The Working Group on Science and the 
Transfer of Technology established by the 
Foreign Ministers two days ago in Washing- 
ton can be charged with setting up programs 
for sharing information on energy conserva- 
tion and for pooling our efforts to expand 
available supplies, to develop alternative 
sources of conventional fuels, and to encour- 
age the discovery of new and renewable 
energy sources. The Latin American Energy 
Organization and the United Nations Eco- 
nomic Commission for Latin America pro- 
vide additional mechanisms for cooperation. 

The United States is prepared to link its 
technology with the resources and capital of 
the hemisphere's oil producers to help them 
expand their production and diversify their 

The Western Hemisphere has a special role 
to play in overcoming the world food short- 
age. This continent, even as it is scarred by 
malnutrition and hunger, has a vast agricul- 
tural potential. President Nixon is asking 
the Congress to raise our assistance to food 
production programs in the Americas by 50 
percent. We have, as well, lifted our own 
domestic production restrictions. 

The shortage of fertilizer and the steep 
rise in its price are a problem of particular 
urgency. The United States will give high 
priority to linking our technological skills 
with the raw material and capital of oil- 
producing countries to encourage the devel- 
opment of new fertilizer capacity. 

In a collective effort, I propose that we 
cooperate in a program to increase food pro- 
duction in this hemisphere substantially by 
the end of this decade. This program should 
encompass research, the application of sci- 
ence and technology, and the intensified ap- 

plication of foreign and domestic resources: 

— As an initial step, we should ask the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Coun- 
cil to help focus our efforts to increase pro- 
duction and productivity. The Working 
Group on Science and the Transfer of Tech- 
nology should explore new ways to in- 
crease agricultural productivity, especially 
in the continent's vast tropical zones. 

— A comprehensive hemispheric agricul- 
tural survey would be an important contri- 
bution to the success of the World Food 

— Food processing is another high-priority 
field for cooperation and innovation. 

Only this week, the Foreign Ministers of 
the Americas pledged to give special atten- 
tion to the problems of the least developed 
among us. To this end, the Inter-American 
Development Bank should adapt its lending 
policies to ease the shock of rising energy 
prices on the poorest nations in the hemi- 
sphere. We welcome the decision of Vene- 
zuela to assist the Bank in this task, includ- 
ing concessional lending assistance to those 
who require it most. 

The United States, as the hemisphere's 
richest nation, has a particular obligation. 
We will urge our Congress to maintain our 
assistance levels to the hemisphere. It is an 
expression of our special relationship that 
U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid to the 
hemisphere is larger, on a per capita basis, 
than to any other region of the globe. In ac- 
cordance with the recommendations of the 
recent Washington Conference, we are now 
urgently examining whether Latin Amer- 
ica's share can be further increased. 

The transfer of science and technology 
may be an even more important bottleneck 
in the development effort than capital. The 
United States, as a technologically advanced 
nation, recognizes a special responsibility in 
this regard. We believe that normally private 
investment is the most efliicient vehicle for 
the transfer of these resources, but govern- 
ments can facilitate the transfer of advanced 
technology to stimulate balanced develop- 

May 13, 1974 


The Working Group on Science and the 
Transfer of Technology can seek to overcome 
obstacles to the flow and use of productive 
technology. In addition to those I have al- 
ready mentioned relating to energy and ag- 
riculture, its tasks should encompass: 

— Improving the dissemination of infor- 
mation on available technologies, including 
managerial and engineering skills; 

— Spurring the search for new technolo- 
gies in such areas as marine sciences and la- 
bor-intensive industry; and 

— Identifying how to adapt technology 
most effectively to different national circum- 
stances and industries. 

In addition to these projects, all of which 
require improved cooperation among govern- 
ments, current OAS programs aimed at 
strengthening university and basic research 
and training institutions in Latin America 
should continue to receive the wholehearted 
support of this Assembly. 

The Americas are in a position to partici- 
pate effectively and to make an important 
contribution to the reform of the interna- 
tional systems that govern trade, monetary, 
and investment relations. The United States 
will support such efforts. 

Trade is critical in the development proc- 
ess. The United States is strongly committed 
to a system of generalized tariff preferences, 
and once this legislation is enacted, we will 
consult closely with our partners in this 
hemisphere on how it can be made most bene- 
ficial to your needs. Despite the uncertainties 
arising from the energy crisis, we will do our 
utmost to avoid new restrictions on Latin 
America's access to our markets. 

The United States recognizes that trade 
within this hemisphere depends significantly 
on global patterns. Trade expansion world- 
wide is one of our longstanding objectives. 
Mutual support in the forthcoming multi- 
lateral trade negotiations can help us over- 
come many bilateral trade problems within 
the hemisphere. 

In the spirit of Tlatelolco, the United 
States is prepared to adjust its position on 
specific issues in these negotiations to take 

account of Latin American objectives. As 
a first step, the President's Special Trade 
Representative, Ambassador Eberle, departs 
today to begin bilateral consultations with 
many of your governments. Similar efforts 
are planned through organs of the OAS and 
in Geneva. 

Private investment is crucial to develop- ; 
ment. At times, it has also been a source of 
friction. At the Washington Foreign Minis- 
ters Conference, we agreed to join with you 
in a study commission which would prepare 
guidelines applicable to the conduct of trans- 
national corporations. We cannot afford to 
let our political relations and our economic 
cooperation be distorted by commercial 

A modern inter-American system requires 
that the Treaty of Rio and the OAS he ad- 
justed to new conditions. The inter-American 
system is the oldest major association of na- 
tion-states. It has pioneered the concept of 
international organization and collective se- 
curity. It has been in the forefront of the de- 
velopment of international law. It has cham- 
pioned the principles of self-determination 
and nonintervention. It has functioned pro- 
ductively for more than 70 years because it 
has been adaptable. Today, as we contemplate 
past experience and future needs, we see that 
further modification is necessary. 

First, development is impossible without 
security. The Rio Treaty has helped keep 
this hemisphere largely free of turmoil and 
conflict. We should modernize it, in keeping 
with our times, but we should preserve its 

Second, we need to reform the OAS so that 
it becomes a more effective instrument for 
hemispheric cooperation. It is overly rigid in 
its structures, unnecessarily formal in its 
procedures, and insufficiently broad in its 
membership. To remedy these weaknesses : 

— All major OAS meetings, including the , 
General Assembly, should be made less for- ' 
mal. j 

— The Permanent Council should be recog- | 
nized as the central executive body of the 


Department of State Bulletin 

— OAS membership should be open to all 
the nations who have attended the recent 
Foreign Ministers conferences. 

— The OAS should be restructured to be- 
come a more effective instrument for our 
economic consultations. 

One of our principal tasks should be to 
create institutions to implement the deci- 
sions of the new dialogue. 

Broadening the Dialogue 

Our dialogue will remain formal if con- 
fined to diplomats or oflRcials. It must in- 
volve our peoples, catching their imagination 
and liberating their abilities. The efforts on 
which we are embarked require all the hu- 
man and intellectual resources of our con- 

To this end, the United States will see to it 
that its cultural and educational exchange 
programs make a more important contribu- 
tion to cooperation as well as to mutual un- 
derstanding. We will: 

— Increase our emphasis on professional 
exchanges designed to link comparable insti- 
tutions in the United States and Latin Amer- 

— Encourage seminars and joint research 
on such topics as urbanization, protection of 
the environment, and other problems com- 
mon to all our countries ; and 

— Stimulate awareness of the extraordi- 
nary cultural richness of the Americas by 
promoting tourism, exhibitions, and other 
activities to expand our awareness of each 

other and our appreciation of our common 

Distinguished Ministers and friends, dele- 
gates, Mr. Secretary General : The warmth 
of the welcome you have received here testi- 
fies to the friendship of the American people 
for our neighbors to the south. The ultimate 
hemispheric solidarity comes from the heart, 
not from the mind. It is rooted in history and 
inspired by common traditions. 

As our Mexican colleague said at Tlatelol- 
co, we of the Americas have advanced from 
political speeches to political dialogue and 
now to political consultation. This must be 
the design for our new purpose, for great 
challenges lie before us. We hear the de- 
mand of our peoples for justice and dignity; 
we know their yearning for security and 
progress; we cannot give them less, for it is 
their birthright. 

In 1900 Jose Enrique Rodo wrote his 
classic "Ariel." He viewed the two Amer- 
icas at the turn of the century as in funda- 
mental opposition. Yet he foresaw that an- 
other kind of relationship could eventually 
emerge. He wrote : 

To the extent that we can already distingruish a 
higher form of cooperation as the basis of a distant 
future, we can see that it will come not as a result 
of unilateral formulas, but through the reciprocal 
influence and skillful harmonization of those attri- 
butes which give our different peoples their glory. 

Let us here choose such a future now, and 
not in the distance. Let us realize the glory 
of our peoples by working together for a 
better life for our children. In so doing, we 
shall realize the final glory and common 
destiny of the New World. 

May 13, 1974 


Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Ministers 
Meet at Washington 

Twenty-five Western Hemisphere Foreign 
Ministers met at Washington April 17-18. 
Following are opening remarks made by Jack 
B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary for Inter- 
American Affairs, at a news conference on 
April 18 at the conclusion of the meeting, to- 
gether with the text of a communique ap- 
proved by the meeting of Foreign Ministers 
that day. 


Ladies and gentlemen: I understand you 
do have a copy of the communique that was 
approved by the Foreign Ministers this af- 
ternoon. I would just like to say a few words 
about this meeting that has taken place here 
in Washington yesterday and today, discuss 
a few of the highlights and the main points 
covered in the communique, and make an 
announcement or two, following which I 
would be glad to take your questions. 

First, as you know, this meeting here in 
Washington, which began yesterday and took 
place among the 25 Foreign Ministers, in- 
cluding Secretary of State Kissinger, was 
really the second phase of the new dialogue 
and the new fresh approach to multilateral 
diplomacy in this hemisphere that began 
with Secretary Kissinger's invitation to the 
Foreign Ministers to a new dialogue last Oc- 
tober shortly after he became Secretary of 
State. They accepted his invitation to this 
new dialogue. They established an agenda. 
They met with him just eight weeks ago in 
Mexico City for their first consideration of 
the topics on that agenda, which was fol- 
lowed by the Declaration of Tlatelolco, the 
suburb of Mexico City where the conference 
took place. 

It was decided as that conference was con- 
cluded in Mexico City that it would be worth- 
while for them to meet again soon, to con- 
tinue their discussions in a frank and cor- 
dial and open manner, to address problems 
of great interest to all of them. 

It was decided, since of the 25, 23 would 
be coming to the United States in any case 
in April to attend the annual General As- 
sembly of the Organization of American 
States, Secretary Kissinger would have them 
come here and they would have these meet- 

They continued to address the agenda 
items that were agreed upon before — those 
are set forth in the communique. And as you 
will note from the communique, the Minis- 
ters reaffirmed the atmosphere and construc- 
tive spirit which characterized these discus- 

The meetings were private. There will not 
be, by me at least, any identification of who 
said what at the meetings. There was com- 
plete freedom for all Foreign Ministers to 
speak on any topic as they saw fit and to 
make any observations they wanted to make. 
They presented their views on some very 
important questions in the economic, trade, 
commercial, financial fields, and other aspects 
of inter-American relationships. Secretary 
Kissinger responded stating the U.S. policy. 
He expressed the intention and desire of the 
United States to cooperate eifectively with 
the countries of Latin America in an effort 
to revitalize our relationships in this region. 

They considered a number of specific top- 
ics, which are summarized in the communi- 
que, and it was decided that they would meet 
again. They considered just when the next 
meeting should take place and decided that 
since the Foreign Ministers would be return- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ing to the United States this fall for a meet- 
ing of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, Secretary Kissinger extended an in- 
vitation to them to meet with him in New 
York for a luncheon of the type they had last 
October when they were present in New 

They agreed that it was not possible in the 
short time available to them really to ana- 
lyze in depth and reach important decisions 
on some of the very complex issues that they 
were addressing, and therefore they decided 
to set up several working groups and study 
groups and preparatory groups to prepare 
for their next meeting, and those are sum- 
marized in the communique as well. They 
specifically wished to have a working group 
study the question of multinational corpo- 
rations and to develop recommendations as 
to principles applicable to the operations of 
those companies. 

There also was considerable interest in the 
whole question of science and the transfer of 
technology, and they decided to set up a 
working group also of governmental repre- 
sentatives to study this subject and to make 
recommendations to them. 

And finally, they concluded that it would 
be desirable for them to have their next 
meeting, to continue this in this framework, 
in Buenos Aires in March 1975 and to make 
the preparations between now and then for 
that meeting. 

Most of the Foreign Ministers, not all — 
the Foreign Ministers of Guyana and Ba- 
hamas, two of the 25 who were present in 
Washington, are not members of the Orga- 
nization of American States — but the other 
23, including Secretary Kissinger, are pro- 
ceeding now to Atlanta — Secretary Kissinger 
will go tomorrow — which will be the site 
this year of the annual General Assembly of 
the Organization of American States. And 
they will continue there their formal discus- 
sions and consideration of some of these top- 

I would just say that Secretary Kissinger, 
I believe, was particularly gratified at the 
manner in which he and his colleagues were 
able to meet here in Washington and to con- 

tinue in the open, candid, and useful kinds 
of exchanges that they first had in Mexico 
just eight weeks ago. From his point of view, 
and I think from the standpoint of the other 
Ministers as well, although of course they 
will speak for themselves, it was a meeting 
of great value for all concerned. And they do 
want to continue. 

I know there are some questions on your 
minds on matters pertaining to the agenda 
and to the communique, and I will be glad to 
address those in just a moment. 

There has been considerable interest on 
one other subject that I would like to make 
a statement on before we proceed to the 

As you know, there have been pending be- 
fore the Treasury Department of the United 
States applications by certain North Amer- 
ican companies for licenses having to do with 
trade and export sales from Argentina to 
Cuba. And the statement that I would like to 
read to you is as follows. I should say at the 
outset that this subject was not discussed as 
such in these meetings that took place in the 
Foreign Ministers meetings yesterday and 
today. The statement is as follows : 

"The Department of State announced to- 
day that the Argentine subsidiaries of Amer- 
ican companies had been advised that licenses 
will be issued for the export of goods from 
Argentina as required by that country. The 
issuance of these licenses is an exception to 
the United States regulations concerning 
foreign assets controls, which will continue 
to be maintained." 


Press release 149 dated April 18 

1. Accepting the invitation of the United States 
Secretary of State, the Foreign Ministers of Latin 
America met April 17-18 in Washington to resume 
the dialogue begun at the Conference of Tlatelolco 
in Mexico eight weeks ago. Attending this meeting 
were the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, the Ba- 
hamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mex- 
ico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad 

May 13, 1974 


and Tobago, the United States of America, Uruguay 
and Venezuela, and the representative of the Foreign 
Minister of Guatemala. 

2. The meeting of Foreign Ministers continued in 
the atmosphere of cordiality and openness which 
characterized the Conference of Tlatelolco. The For- 
eign Ministers reiterated their conviction that these 
meetings contribute to greater inter-American coop- 
eration and solidarity. The topics discussed were: 
Structure of International Trade and the Monetary 
System; Cooperation for Development; Transna- 
tional Enterprises; Solution of the Question of the 
Panama Canal; Coercive Measures of an Economic 
Nature; and Transfers of Technology. 

3. The Foreign Ministers of the Latin American 
countries presented their views and positions on the 
several topics covered by the agenda. The Secretary 
of State of the United States responded, stating 
United States policy on the respective subjects and 
expressing the intention and desire of the United 
States to cooperate effectively in the integral devel- 
opment of the Latin American countries. 

4. On the subject of trade, the Foreign Ministers 
of Latin America attached special importance to the 
standstill commitment made by the United States in 
Caracas in February 1970 and reaffirmed by Secre- 
tary Kissinger at Tlatelolco, and to the urgency of 
eliminating restrictions on access to the United 
States market for products of special interest to 
Latin America. They stressed that, in order to 
improve trade relations and promote new flows of 
trade from Latin America to the United States, as a 
minimum, no new import restrictions should be ap- 
plied and existing import restrictions should not be 

5. The Secretary of State recognized the impor- 
tance of the United States market for the economies 
of Latin America. In the new spirit growing out of 
the Conference of Tlatelolco, he expressed his sup- 
port of Latin America's aspirations in the trade 
field. In particular, he stressed the intention of his 
Government to refrain to the extent possible from 
establishing new trade restrictions. He reiterated the 
interest of his Government in achieving enactment 
of the proposed Trade Reform Act which would 
authorize generalized preferences, including in them 
the products of interest to Latin America, and in 
further liberalizing the access of Latin American 
products to the United States market. Similarly, he 
reaffirmed the commitments of his Government under 
resolution REM l/70,i and especially stated his 
agreement to hold consultations with Latin America 
on the inclusion in the GSP [Generalized System of 

^Adopted at the Eighth Special Meeting of the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council at 
Caracas in February 1970. 

Preferences] of products of special interest for the 
area before making final decisions. Secretary Kis- 
singer also expressed his Government's intention to 
support the effective participation of Latin America 
in reform of the international monetary system. 

6. The Secretary of State of the United States 
considered favorably the views held by Latin 
America in the matter of Multilateral Trade Nego- 
tiations as regards nonreciprocity, differentiated and 
most favored treatment of the Generalized System 
of Preferences toward the developing countries and 
indicated his agreement to hold consultations with a 
view to the harmonization of positions on this sub- 

The Foreign Ministers of the Latin American 
countries noted with satisfaction the fact that the 
Special Representative of the President of the 
United States for Trade Negotiations is initiating 
extensive bilateral consultations with the countries 
of Latin America to promote the achievement of 
these objectives. 

7. The Foreign Ministers emphasized the impor- 
tance of hemispheric cooperation in the field of eco- 
nomic development and the establishment of an 
international system of collective economic security 
for development. They stressed the importance of 
increasing the volume of real resource transfers to 
Latin America. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
recognize the importance of the policy of export 
diversification for the developing countries of the 
region and believe that this policy should be sup- 
ported as an essential aspect of the progress of 
Latin America. 

8. The Foreign Ministers stressed the need to 
provide preferential attention to the less developed 
countries of the region, especially the land-locked 
countries and those of insufficient internal market. 
They expressed their conviction concerning the 
importance of concessionary loans for the financing 
of enterprises and projects that are fundamental to 
the economic and social development process in those 
countries. They furthermore agreed on the useful- 
ness of multilateral financial mechanisms to provide 
help in cases of emergency with which they are un- 
able to cope by themselves. 

9. The Foreign Ministers discussed the problem of 
economic coercion and the desirability of their elim- 
ination from relations among the countries of the 
Americas which would contribute in a positive man- 
ner to a more authentic spirit of cooperation. The 
Foreign Ministers of Latin America also expressed 
concern over proposals that would tend to restrict 
the access of products of developing countries to the 
United States market. 

10. The Foreign Ministers of Latin America reit- 
erated in its entirety the Declaration adopted in 
Bogota at the "Conference of Chancellors of Latin 



Department of State Bulletin 

America for Continental Cooperation" as regards the 
solution of the Panama Canal question and re- 
affirmed it without change during the course of the 
new dialogue begun at the Conference of Tlatelolco. 
The Foreign Ministers reiterated their confidence 
that the bilateral negotiations presently in progress 
between the governments of Panama and the United 
States would continue in a positive tone and con- 
clude as soon as possible with satisfactory results in 
conformity with the spirit of the new dialogue. 

11. The Foreign Ministers decided to establish a 
Working Group, consisting of governmental repre- 
sentatives from all of the participating states, with 
the mandate to prepare for submission to the con- 
sideration of the next meeting, a document that 
would contain principles to be applicable to trans- 
national enterprises. The Working Group will meet 
at least two months prior to the date on which the 
Conference of Buenos Aires will convene. In the 
preparation of the document, the Working Group 
should bear in mind the Report that the United 
Nations Organization has prepared on the subject, 
as well as those that are emanating from other inter- 
national forums. 

12. The Foreign Ministers, recognizing the im- 
portance of technology in social and economic de- 
velopment, agreed to convene a Working Group of 
Governmental representatives to study the possi- 
bility of creating a Committee on Science and the 
Transfer of Technology, that would have as its ob- 
jective matching scientific capability with practical 
needs, and overcoming obstacles to the flow and use 
of technology in the industrialization process. For 
this purpose, and at the earliest possible moment, 
the members of that Working Group will be desig- 
nated and requested to submit their report within a 
period of not more than six months. Without preju- 
dice to the foregoing, the United States and Latin 
America will continue supporting and encouraging 
the existing technological development programs, 
especially the OAS Inter-American Committee on 
Science and Technology. Their efforts must be coor- 
dinated in order to avoid duplication of programs. 

13. In approving this communique, the Foreign 
Ministers reaffirmed the value and promise of the 
new dialogue in inter-American relations. They be- 
lieve that their meeting just concluded in Washing- 
ton has given additional impulse to achievement of 
progress on matters of common concern. 

14. The Foreign Ministers agreed to meet again 
in Buenos Aires in March 1975. 

Pan American Day 

and Pan American Week 


On April 14, the United States will join in com- 
memorating the establishment of the International 
Union of American Republics. The 84th anniversary 
of that event finds the United States and other mem- 
bers of the Organization of American States, the 
descendant of the International Union of American 
Republics, actively working together to fashion the 
Inter-American System into a constructive, coopera- 
tive force which will bring mutual understanding 
and mutual assistance. 

We are moving toward this goal despite the di- 
versity of our cultural heritages and national charac- 
teristics and despite tensions and differences which 
have occurred from time to time. We do this, know- 
ing, as a former Secretary of State of the United 
States, Elihu Root, once said: 

"There is not one of all our countries that cannot 
benefit the others; there is not one that will not 
gain by the prosperity, the peace and the happiness 
of all." 

The Americas of today are joined in the common 
effort to bring about progress and well-being for 
all so that those who follow us will enjoy the fruits 
of a new inter-American order based on justice, 
security, and peace. 

Now, Therefore, I, Richard Nixon, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
Sunday, April 14, 1974, as Pan American Day, and 
the week beginning April 14 and ending April 20 
as Pan American Week, and I call upon the Gov- 
ernors of the fifty States, the Governor of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and appropriate of- 
ficials of all other areas under the flag of the United 
States to issue similar proclamations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this thirteenth day of April, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the In- 
dependence of the United States of America the 
one hundred ninety-eighth. 


' No. 4284; 39 Fed. Reg. 13623. 

May 13, 1974 


President Nixon Honors Foreign Ministers 
of Latin America and the Caribbean 

FoUoiving is an exchange of toasts be- 
tween President Nixon and Foreign Minister 
Raul Sapena Pastor of Paraguay at a dinner 
at the White House on April 17. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 22 


Your Excellencies the Foreign Ministers 
and the Ambassadors from the Latin Amer- 
ican countries and the Caribbean countries : 
I wish I could address you in the language 
which most of you understand and speak so 
well, but I would not presume to do so. Con- 
sequently, tonight I will have Mr. [Donald 
F.] Barnes, who speaks English better than 
he speaks Spanish and Spanish better than 
he speaks English, translate for me. 

I will simply open this comment with re- 
gard to our relations with one of the few 
Spanish phrases I think I know reasonably 
well. Mrs. Nixon and I say : Estdn ustedes en 
su casa. 

As you went through the receiving line 
tonight, my wife and I shared many mem- 
ories with you. It was 34 years ago that we 
had our wedding trip in Mexico. Obviously, 
she was much younger than I was at that 
time. [Laughter.] And our distinguished 
Secretary of State followed our example be- 
cause he just had his honeymoon in Mexico, 
too, and we welcome Mrs. Nancy Kissinger 
on her first visit as the wife of the Secretary 
of State tonight. She is a little liberal, but 
otherwise she is all right. [Laughter.] Don't 
interpret the word "liberal" literally, please. 

After that first trip 34 years ago, we re- 
turned again to the Caribbean and to Central 

America for a trip which took us to eight 
countries in that area in 1941. The other 
events come tumbling over: the attendance 
at the inauguration of Ruiz Cortines in Mex- 
ico in 1953, a trip to Mexico and all the Cen- 
tral American countries in 1955, and then a 
trip through all the South American coun- 
tries in 1958, and then as private citizens re- 
turning to Mexico on our 25th wedding an- 
niversary in 1965, and in 1967 a tour which 
took me to virtually all the countries of South 

Now, my only regret is that in this travel- 
ogue that I have just gone over, I have not 
had the opportunity, except for Mexico, our 
great friends and neighbors to the south, to 
visit the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean. But I believe I have sent our 
best ambassador there in my stead. Mrs. 
Nixon's visit to Peru at the time of the 
earthquake and then her recent visit to Ca- 
racas and to Brasilia for the inaugurations, 
I think, indicated that the one who was 
closest to my heart could win the hearts of 
the people of Latin America. 

As you can tell, I probably, as a result of 
this, am the first President of the United 
States ever to have visited all the nations of 
Latin America before entering this oflice. 
And while traveling alone is not significant, 
these travels do indicate, it seems to me, the 
measure of the affection and esteem which 
not only my wife and I, but all Americans, 
continue to have for our neighbors in the 

Let me speak very frankly about the rela- 
tions between the United States and our 
friends to the south. During these past 30 
years we have heard an enormous amount of 
rhetoric about the relationships between our 


Department of State Bulletin 

countries. There have been almost as many 
slogans as conferences, and too often, both 
have been quickly filed avi^ay and forgotten. 

Now, in the past six months, the United 
States has proposed a new approach, what 
we call a new dialogue. It was discussed in 
New York, again in Bogota, then in Mexico 
City, now in Washington. Now, after so 
many trial runs, we think this one is here 
to stay. But you could very well ask: Why 
will our new dialogue be any better than the 
old ones? Why will the future be any dif- 
ferent from the past, when the United States 
so often seemed to ignore its friends to the 
south ? 

Let me answer that very directly. Over 
the past five years, I have seen that the 
winds of change are blowing strongly across 
the entire world today. In fact, initiatives 
undertaken by the United States have helped 
those winds along their way. 

There is one great lesson that all of us, 
large and small, whatever our nations may 
be, must learn. The nations of the world can 
no longer ignore each other, whether we 
like it or not. A decision by an oil producer 
in the Middle East has a direct impact upon 
the supplies of gasoline and fertilizer in the 
West. A decision by a wheat grower in the 
great northern plains of North America can 
make the difference between full and empty 
stomachs, not only in the south of the world 
but also in the east and west. 

Independence, a proud concept, has given a 
way to interdependence. The past has given 
a way to a new way of life. And the critical 
question now is whether we return to the 
past — it is too late for that — but how we 
shape the future. 

Now, there are some that argue that every 
nation must now fend for itself in a narrow 
struggle for survival, setting man against 
man, nation against nation, bloc against bloc. 
That, in my opinion, would lead to the even- 
tual collapse of Western civilization as we 
have known it. 

We propose instead that we meet the re- 
ality of interdependence by following a dif- 
ferent path — a higher road of cooperation 
and of collaboration. It will be more stren- 
uous; it will require more patience; it may 

even be more expensive in the short run. But 
eventually we believe it will lead to a better 
life for all of our people in every nation. 

Now, this, in essence, is the meaning of 
the new dialogue we are calling for. It is 
more than a slogan; it is more than just 
more talk ; it signifies a new attitude, a new 
desire to join with you in seeking out that 
high road of cooperation and growth for all 
of the nations in the Americas. 

And going now from words to actions, let 
me be more concrete about what you may 
expect from the United States in this new en- 

Speaking personally, and speaking also 
about the world in which we live, the great- 
est gift I hope to leave to my countrymen 
and to the world is a legacy of peace. It is 
our desire for peace that has been the foun- 
dation for our new relationships with the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China and which shapes our relationships 
with other nations. 

And our relationships with Latin Amer- 
ica are a central pillar in the structure of 
peace we are trying to build for the whole 
world. And it would be our hope that we 
could work more closely with you in main- 
taining peace beyond our hemisphere and 
that we could continue to work with you in 
keeping the peace in our hemisphere. 

On the political side, you can expect that 
the United States will not seek to impose its 
political preferences on your countries. That 
is your decision. We will not intervene in 
the domestic affairs of others in this hemi- 

And finally, and of keen interest tonight, 
we have a mutual interest in economic 
growth and prosperity for all the nations in 
this hemisphere. There is just as much at 
stake for the United States as for the na- 
tions of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
and I reaffirm my pledge to work directly 
with you in the areas of greatest concern. 
Let me enumerate them. 

We will continue to seek trade legislation 
which will permit generalized trade prefer- 
ences, a concept that I have supported for 

We will seek cooperative solutions to our 

May 13, 1974 


energy problems, and we shall share our re- 
sources and our research with you. 

We will seek better ways to pool our 
knowledge of science and technology. 

We will seek to maintain our level of aid. 

We will seek to consult more closely with 
you on international trade and monetary af- 

And we will continue to encourage the 
growth of private capital in ways that are 
mutually acceptable. 

We recognize that each government in 
this hemisphere has the sovereign right to 
determine the rules for investors in its coun- 

But speaking from experience, we also be- 
lieve that private investment is the richest 
potential source of the technology, the capi- 
tal, the organizational skills, that the devel- 
oping world needs. 

For example, the amount of private capital 
that flows to Latin America today is over 
twice as much as the amount of public capi- 
tal. We must recognize that many of the na- 
tions which enjoyed the fastest rates of eco- 
nomic expansion have had the benefit of in- 
tensive infusions of private capital as well as 

This, then, is a summary of the new dia- 
logue — peace, political freedom, economic 
growth. The road ahead will not be easy. It 
has never been traveled before, and it is only 
dimly perceived. The pessimists predict we 
will lose our way because, they say, our civ- 
ilization is entering a new age of darkness. 

Let us prove to them, all of us, what we 
know in our hearts : We are indeed entering 
a new age, but what we see is not a setting 
but a rising sun, a new dawn for the Amer- 

I have often been asked, after my trips to 
Peking and to Moscow, to Europe, to South- 
east Asia, whether this means a downgrading 
of our interest in our friends in the Amer- 
ican hemisphere. 

Let me assure you tonight, nothing could 
be further from the truth, because the new 
initiatives we have undertaken in these past 
five years are essential if we are to have 


world peace. If we have world peace, all of 
the people in the Americas will benefit. And 
if we have world war, all of the peoples in 
the Americas will suffer. 

And that is why I say tonight, let us join 
together in these initiatives to seek to build 
a new structure of peace, not only for our- 
selves but the whole world. And whatever 
success we have in this direction will benefit 
us all. 

And now tonight in proposing a toast, I 
cannot propose it to any individual because 
all are of equal rank, but I remember that 
when I visited my friend Galo Plaza [Secre- 
tary General, Organization of American 
States] at his farm he used a wonderful ex- 
pression that I think is the proper expres- 
sion I should use in proposing the toast to- 

This man, that I have just made an ail- 
American football player 30 years after he 
played football at the University of Cali- 
fornia, which will put him in the Hall of 
Fame — [laughter] — spoke very feelingly 
about California, the state in which he got 
his higher education, and his own country. 

And he said what we must all understand 
is that despite our differences in background, 
despite our differences in language, despite 
our differences in culture, and despite our 
difference in political ideology, we are all 
one family, we are all proud members of the 
American family. 

So, it is in that spirit that I propose the 
toast : La familia Americana. 

And now to our very special guests, if you 
will be seated again, it was very difficult to 
select the individual from this distinguished 
group who would respond to the toast. We 
did not flip coins, so we went to seniority. 
That does not mean that seniority means 
senility, but one thing I learned and Mrs. 
Nixon learned in our travels through the 
countries to the south is that while there are 
very many, and most speak the same lan- 
guage, each has its own character, each is 
quite different, and each is very proud of its 
own background, and that diversity must 
never change. 

Department of State Bulletin 


And so we call upon not the largest coun- 
try here, we call upon one that is one of the 
smaller countries, but it is a country we re- 
member well, not that it is not and should 
not be known for other things. I refer to 
that nation where the lovely ladies do the 
bottle dance. 

Our distinguished guest, the Foreign Min- 
ister of Paraguay. 


Your Excellency Richard Nixon, President 
of the United States of America, Your Ex- 
cellency Mrs. Nixon, Your Excellencies ladies 
and gentlemen: The Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of the nations of Latin America and 
the Caribbean have conferred upon me the 
extraordinary honor of replying to your 
words. Aware of this great responsibility, I 
assume this mandate, shielded by the magni- 
tude of what I represent. 

The history of inter-American relations 
will record as a very fortunate initiative of 
yours. Your Excellency President Richard 
Nixon, to have instructed the Secretary of 
State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, to invite the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and representa- 
tives of the countries of Latin America and 
of the Caribbean that were attending the 
28th period of regular sessions of the Gen- 
eral Assembly of the United Nations to a 
meeting which was held on October 5, 1973, 
and to there suggest the initiation of a new 
dialogue to deal with matters of interest for 
the American continent. 

It is true that as close as we were and as 
united by common bonds and interests in the 
destiny of the continent and of the world, 
however, we lived at a distance in the con- 
sideration and the treatment of those things 
which are basic and vital to our civilization. 

And for one part there was a United States 
of America, the leading world power, which 
had achieved the highest levels of standards 
of living for its people while at the same 
time having to be concerned and to take care 

' Foreign Minister Sapena spoke in Spanish. 

of problems and situations scattered through- 
out the globe, situations of every order and 
nature, at every distance, and of the most 
varied degrees of seriousness, and on the 
other hand, all of the nations of Latin Amer- 
ica and the Caribbean with different de- 
grees of development, deprived to larger or 
lesser degree of the financial and technologi- 
cal means necessary to increase their eco- 
nomic, social, educational, cultural, scientific, 
health, and technological conditions. 

The idea of this new dialogue was immedi- 
ately taken up by all of the American nations 
and the distinguished Foreign Minister of 
Colombia, Alfredo Vazquez Carrizosa, on 
behalf of his government issued an invita- 
tion to the meeting of Bogota held in No- 
vember of 1973, where there was an exhaus- 
tive debate before establishment of the items 
on which the usefulness of a dialogue was 

Thus came about the Conference of Tlate- 
lolco held in February of 1974, where under 
the skillful and enlightened leadership of the 
Foreign Minister of Mexico, Don Emilio Ra- 
basa, and this time with the presence of 
the Secretary of State of the United States 
of America, the dynamic and clearly suc- 
cessful international negotiator, Dr. Henry 
A. Kissinger, there was an advanced con- 
sensus achieved on the solutions to the sub- 
jects brought up at Bogota. 

Among the positive results of Tlatelolco, 
there are two that are very important but 
that were not even included in the agenda. 
The first is having converted this new dia- 
logue offered in October of 1973 into a con- 
tinuous process of consultation. The second, 
which is the birth of what we have come 
to call the spirit of Tlatelolco, which is a 
new state of feeling among all of the nations 
of the Americas who commit themselves to 
work with faith and will in a coordinated 
and joint action in order to achieve the 
harmonious development of all the nations. 

Development in all its aspects has to be 
the basic theme of the process of consultation 
that we have established. It has been said 
that the new name for peace is development. 

May 13, 1974 


In reality, there is so much overlapping be- 
tween both terms that just as we cannot have 
development without peace, we also cannot 
conceive of peace without development. 

Mr. President, this splendid setting that 
you are offering to the Foreign Ministers of 
the nations of Latin America and the Carib- 
bean undoubtedly is not the propitious time 
to refer to generalized preferred tariffs, to 
financial assistance, to the transference of 
technology, to monetary reform, to tariff and 
nontariff barriers, to the net transfer of real 
resources, and to many other items which 
will appear in the agendas in this continued 
process of consultation until they are defi- 
nitely resolved. 

But if what separates us is not geographic 
distance, but rather the differences in the 
degree of development, necessarily we must 
agree that our main fundamental concern 
should concentrate and give priority to the 
structure of international trade and the 
monetary system. 

And so the present and unfair terms of 
trade dealing with our raw materials vis-a- 
vis manufactured products, a trade that 
takes place not only with the United States 
of America but with the entire industrialized 
world, this is what generates the differences 
in development that create artificial distances 
and obstacles of all kinds in the relations be- 
tween our peoples. 

I have the conviction that the day that 
our nations of Latin America and the Carib- 
bean receive fair and equitable prices for 
their labor and their products there will be 
a reduction in the clamor for financial loans 
and technology will be just another product 
that we can purchase and pay for and not 
assistance or a favor that we want to re- 

In this task, the nations of Latin America 
and of the Caribbean expect to continue 
counting on the firm cooperation of the U.S. 
Government, a cooperation that we have seen 
already in the dialogue and in the consulta- 
tions with Secretary of State Kissinger. 

Mr. President, even though the meeting of 
Foreign Ministers that we are holding here 

in Washington is in appearance unrelated to 
the fourth period of sessions of the General 
Assembly of the Organization of American 
States, which will begin on April 19 in 
Atlanta, although this first meeting is in- 
formal and noninstitutionalized and the sec- 
ond one will be formal and will follow 
treaties and instruments that are in effect, it 
is obvious that we cannot separate one from 
another and even more obvious that the sub- 
ject of the restructuring of the inter-Amer- 
ican system will appear on both agendas. 

I have the honor to express to you, Mr. 
President, that the nations of Latin Amer- 
ica and of the Caribbean harbor the hope 
that as a result of the restructuring of the 
inter-American system that more dynamic 
instruments may come into being that will 
permit a better and faster achievement of 
development of all nations, that will embody 
all of the rights, assurances, and protection 
deserved by persons and states, that will 
stimulate what Secretary of State Kissinger 
has called a friendship based on equality and 
respect for the dignity of each one and a 
new inter-American system, in short, that 
will be able to be imbued with and which 
we will decide to translate into this symbol 
of faith which we have come to call the spirit 
of Tlatelolco. 

Your Excellency President Richard Nixon, 
I interpret the sentiments of all my col- 
leagues, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
in expressing to you the deepest appreciation 
and esteem with which we have followed 
your admirable and tenacious efforts in favor 
of a world peace and for the reduction of 
international tensions. 

In thanking you on behalf of all the Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs of the nations of 
Latin America and of the Caribbean for the 
many and very fine attentions which we 
have been receiving from your government, 
I would like to express our best wishes for 
the ever-increasing greatness and prosperity 
of the United States of America, for the 
personal good fortune of yourself and of 
Mrs. Nixon, and to the fact that the happi- 
ness of all of our peoples be achieved by 


Department of State Bulletin 

means of a global development which will 
make possible dignified international rela- 
tions based on respect and equality. To your 
health, Mr. President. 


To all of our distinguished guests: We 
realize that you have come a long way, most 
of you, and that tomorrow you will be going 
to Atlanta, and I would simply like to bring 
this historic occasion — historic at least for 
us who are honored to be your host — to a 
conclusion with these words. 

This house is not an old house when you 
compare it with the great houses of Europe, 
of Asia, of the Mideast, even of Latin Amer- 
ica. It was planned by George Washington, 
and every President since Washington has 
lived here. 

And I think it is fair to say that every 
President of the United States has had a 
dream about his own country and about the 
world. Some have been more successful in 
interpreting that dream than others. But 
all have tried because they know that that 
dream represents what the American people, 
the people of this country, of the United 
States, feel in their hearts. 

It was summarized perhaps best by 
Thomas Jefferson when at the time of the 
signing of the Declaration of Independence 
he said, we act not just for ourselves but 
for the whole human race. 

Now, to some contemporary observers at 
that time and some at this time, that would 
seem in retrospect to have been a very arro- 
gant statement. But speaking for all of 
the people of the United States of America, 
let me say to you that I know our people; 
I know how they feel. 

We are strong now; whereas compared 

with at the beginning, we were very weak. 
We are rich now; when compared with at 
the very beginning, we were very poor. But 
it is our great desire to share whatever we 
have in terms of development with all the 
peoples of the world and particularly with 
our closest friends and neighbors. And to 
use whatever our strength is, and whatever 
our wealth is, not only to build a world of 
peace, peace in the sense of absence of 
war, but peace in terms of progress and de- 
velopment for all people wherever they may 

That was the dream of those who founded 
this country. That was the dream of those 
who founded your countries. We are all 
part — as old as we are — we are all part of 
a new world, and together we can build a 
new world for all people who live on this 

And in this room that has seen the great 
leaders of the world pass through it over 
175 years, it is well to conclude by saying 
that the hopes of all the people of the world — 
not just the Americas but all the people of 
the world — for peace, for progress, for op- 
portunity, lie with our solidarity, with our 
unity, and with our vision. And may the his- 
torians one day record that we, the inheri- 
tors of the new world, helped to build not 
only for ourselves, but for the whole world, 
a structure of peace and progress for all. 

And it is in that spirit that I respond to 
the very eloquent remarks of the Foreign 
Minister from Paraguay. 

And with those words, Mrs. Nixon and I 
will now, according to protocol, leave the 
room. We understand that refreshments are 
still available, and for those who like to, even 
dancing. And for those who haven't airplane 
reservations for Atlanta, we can provide a 
bus. [Laughter.] 

Mqy 13, 1974 



President Nixon Requests Funds for Foreign Assistance 
for Fiscal Year 1975 

Message to the Congress ^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

For more than twenty five years, America 
has generously provided foreign assistance 
to other nations, helping them to develop 
their economies, to meet the humanitarian 
needs of their people and to provide for their 
own defense. 

During this era foreign aid has become 
an indispensable element of our foreign pol- 
icy. Without it, America would risk isolating 
herself from responsible involvement in an 
international community upon which the sur- 
vival of our own economic, social and po- 
litical institutions rests. With the continua- 
tion of a healthy foreign aid program, this 
Nation can continue to lead world progress 
toward building a lasting structure of peace. 

Now that we have ended the longest war in 
our history and no American troops are serv- 
ing in combat for the first time in more than 
a decade, there is a temptation to turn in- 
ward, abandoning our aid programs and the 
critical needs facing many of our friends in 
the process. 

We must not succumb to that temptation. 
If we lay down the burden now, we will fore- 
close the peaceful development of many of 
the nations of the world and leave them at 
the mercy of powerful forces, both economic 
and political. Moreover, we will deny our- 
selves one of the most useful tools we have 
for helping to shape peaceful relationships 
in the most turbulent areas of the world. 

' Transmitted on Apr. 24 (White House press re- 

Many of the nations which were once de- 
pendent upon our direct assistance for their 
survival are now managing their own eco- 
nomic and defense needs without our aid. 
Those nations which still need our aid will 
not need it indefinitely. We expect those na- 
tions we help to help themselves. We have 
made it clear that we do not intend to be the 
world's policeman, that our aid is not a sub- 
stitute for their self-reliance, and that we do 
not intend to do for others what they should 
be expected to do for themselves. 

But as long as there are governments 
which seek to change the frontiers and in- 
stitutions of other nations by force, the pos- 
sibility of international conflict will con- 
tinue to exist. And as long as millions of 
people lack food, housing, and jobs; starva- 
tion, social unrest and economic turmoil 
will threaten our common future. 

Our long-range goal is to create an inter- 
national environment in which tolerance and 
negotiation can replace aggression and sub- 
version as preferred methods of settling in- 
ternational disputes. While this goal is not 
as distant as it once was, present circum- 
stances do not now permit reduction in for- 
eign assistance. We must not only maintain 
our efforts, but also make special efforts in 
two critical areas of the world — the Middle 
East and Indochina. 

In the Middle East, we have an opportu- 
nity to achieve a significant breakthrough 
for world peace. Increased foreign aid will 
be a vital complement to our diplomacy in 


Department of State Bulletin 

maintaining the momentum toward a nego- 
tiated settlement which will serve the inter- 
ests of both Israel and the Arab nations. 

In Indochina our assistance is no less 
critical. South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos 
are trying to make the difficult transition 
from war to peace. Their ability to meet 
their defense needs while laying the founda- 
tions for self-sustaining social and economic 
progress requires continued and substantial 
amounts of American aid. 

To meet these continuing and special 
needs, I am proposing to the Congress a to- 
tal foreign aid budget of $5.18 billion for fis- 
cal year 1975. In my judgment, these amounts 
represent the minimum which the United 
States can prudently afford to invest if we 
are to maintain the present degree of in- 
ternational equilibrium and advance our ef- 
forts to construct a durable peace with pros- 

Toward Peace in the Middle East 

The hope for a lasting solution to the 
Arab-Israeli dispute is stronger today than 
at any time in the previous quarter century. 
American diplomatic initiatives have helped 
create the conditions necessary for an end to 
conflict and violence. While our diplomatic 
efforts must and will continue, there is al- 
ready much that can be done to supplement 
and consolidate what has been achieved so 
far. I am therefore requesting a Special As- 
sistance program for the Middle East, and 
have asked the Congress to provide the fol- 
lowing : 

— For Israel : $50 million in security sup- 
porting assistance and $300 million in mili- 
tary credit sales. Israel's continued ability to 
defend herself reduces the prospect of new 
conflict in the Middle East, and we must con- 
tinue to assist her in maintaining that abil- 

— For Egypt: $250 million in supporting 
assistance. These funds would be used for the 
tasks which come with peace: clearing the 
Suez Canal, repairing the damage in ad- 
jacent areas, and restoring Egyptian trade. 

— For Jordan: $100 million in military 

Foreign Assistance — 1974 and 1975 
Budget Authority 










Military Assistance 




Military Assistance 





Foreign Military 





Emergency Security 

Assistance for 




Economic Assistance 





Assistance ' 




Indochina Post- 

war Recon- 





Supporting Assist- 





Middle East Special 

Requirements Fund 

• ■ • 


International Finan- 

cial Institutions 


909 = 




' Includes Overseas Private Investment Corpora- 
tion and narcotics control programs. Also includes 
$150 million disaster relief supplemental currently 
awaiting congressional authorization. 

' Includes $54 million budget amendment currently 
before the Congress. 

'' Excludes maintenance-of -value payment. 

Source: Agency for International Development, 
April 25, 1974. 

assistance grants, $77.5 million in security 
supporting assistance, and $30 million in 
military credit sales. Jordan has been a mod- 
erating force in the Arab world and these 
funds will enable her to maintain a position 
of moderation and independence which will 
be crucial to a permanent settlement in the 

— For a Special Requirements Fund : $100 
million. This fund will be used for new 
needs that may arise as the outlines of a 
peaceful settlement take shape, including 
provision for peacekeeping forces, refugee 
aid or settlement, and development projects. 

May 13, 1974 


All of this aid will contribute to the con- 
fidence these nations must have in the United 
States and in their own security if they 
are to have the base from which to negoti- 
ate a lasting settlement. It will strengthen 
moderate forces in an area where only mod- 
eration can form the basis for a settlement 
acceptable to all. 

Toward Reconstruction of Indochina 

Another area of acute and continuing con- 
cern to this Government is Southeast Asia. 
Our aid in Indochina is no less crucial than 
our aid in the Middle East in achieving a 
peaceful outcome which protects our inter- 
ests and reflects our past involvement in 
these two areas. I am asking the Congress 
to authorize the appropriation of $939.8 mil- 
lion to assist South Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos in their efforts to shift their economies 
from war to peace and to accelerate the 
reconstitution of their societies. 

We have already invested heavily in these 
countries. Progress has been significant, and 
we are nearing success in our efforts to as- 
sist them in becoming self-sufl[icient. Al- 
though our total request is higher than last 
year, the budget I am proposing is actually 
austere. We must recognize that a modest 
increase in economic assistance now will per- 
mit the development of viable, self-support- 
ing economies with lower requirements for 
assistance within a few years. 

The South Vietnamese face an unusually 
difficult task in reconstructing their econ- 
omy and caring for their war-torn population 
even as the effort to end hostilities goes for- 
ward. Progress in reconstruction, economic 
development and humanitarian programs, 
which offer the hope of a better life for 
the people there, should make it clear that 
a peaceful settlement of political disputes 
is in the interest of all. 

This year and next the South Vietnamese 
face several related challenges which make 
increased U.S. economic assistance essential : 

— They must resettle more than a million 
refugees and displaced persons. 

— They must provide the investments 

Foreign Assistance — 1974 and 1975 
Program by Region 

(Program consists of budget authority plus available 
funding such as loan repayments) 



Request ^ 











444 = 









Latin America 








Middle East 






Special Requirements 








Economic ' 


553 = 






Economic ° 




International Finan- 



cial Institutions 










' Operating expenses for economic development 
assistance included in area totals. 

" Includes request of $75 million loan for India. 

"For Viet-Nam includes $530 million in 1974 re- 
quest, $411 million in 1974 actual, and $751 million 
in 1975 request. 

' Includes $54 million supplemental request for 

'' Excludes $54 million supplemental request for 

' United Nations Development Progi-am : 1974 ac- 
tual, $90 million; 1975 request, $110 million. 

Source: Agency for International Development, 
April 25, 1974. 

needed to create productive jobs for the sev- 
eral hundred thousand who have lost jobs 
with the withdrawal of U.S. forces. 


Department of State Bulletin 

— They must meet the much higher costs 
of such essential imports as fertilizer and 
other critical resources caused by worldwide 

— They must provide for the orphans, the 
disabled, and for widows who can never 
recover their wartime losses. 

— They must continue to support the mili- 
tary forces needed to preserve movement 
toward peace so long as hostile forces con- 
tinue to be deployed within South Vietnam 
and supported from outside. 

The South Vietnamese have made laudable 
efforts to solve their own problems. They 
have increased their taxes — a 40 percent in- 
crease in real terms in 1973. They have 
expanded their exports, which were virtually 
eliminated by the war — doubling exports in 
1972 and again in 1973. They have sharply 
reduced the consumption of imported goods, 
including a notable reduction in petroleum. 
But after more than a decade of war, they 
cannot reconstruct their economy and their 
society alone. Increased U.S. assistance is 
needed now to support the increasing efforts 
of the Vietnamese to achieve peace and self- 
sufficiency as soon as possible. 

In Laos, a peaceful political solution to 
the conflict is in motion and the people there 
can finally look forward to a secure and 
stable environment. The problems of reset- 
tling refugees and establishing a viable 
economy, however, will provide a major test 
of the Laotian government's ability to work 
in the interests of all. Our continued assist- 
ance is essential to permit this underdevel- 
oped, land-locked country to reconstruct its 
economy after so many years of war. 

Continued U.S. assistance is also essential 
to alleviate the hardships facing the Cam- 
bodian people, many of them refugees with 
little opportunity to support themselves until 
hostilities subside. 

The investment I am now seeking — an in- 
vestment to sustain the peace, to overcome 
the human suffering resulting from the war, 
and to give the people of Indochina a chance 
to stand on their own feet — is small in 
comparison with what we have committed 
over the years in Indochina. But the poten- 

tial return on this investment is large in 
enhancing the prospect of peace both in In- 
dochina and around the world. 

Developmenf Assistance 

U.S. assistance programs — both bilateral 
and multilateral — have made a very substan- 
tial contribution to the economic growth of 
the developing nations over the past decade. 

In spite of encouraging progress, it is 
estimated that 40 percent of the total popu- 
lation in all the developing countries still 
remain trapped in conditions of poverty be- 
yond the reach of the market economy. These 
people continue to exist below minimal levels 
of nutrition, literacy, and health. 

It is clear that in the modern world, peace 
and poverty cannot easily endure side by 
side. In the long term, we must have peace 
without privation, or we may not have a 
durable peace at all. All that we have worked, 
and fought, and sacrificed to achieve will be 
in jeopardy as long as hunger, illiteracy, dis- 
ease, and poverty are the permanent condi- 
tion of 40 percent of the populace in devel- 
oping nations of the world. But the progress 
which we have been able to help bring about 
thus far demonstrates that this need not 
be a permanent condition. Our developmental 
assistance continues to be needed to maintain 
and expand this record of progress. 

To provide this needed assistance I am 
asking the Congress to authorize for fiscal 
year 1975 the appropriation of $255.3 million 
for functional development assistance pro- 
grams in addition to the $618 million already 
authorized by last year's Foreign Assistance 

These additional funds will permit the 
Agency for International Development to 
assist developing nations in increasing food 
production. The widespread hardship caused 
by recent pressures on world food supplies 
calls for greater efforts by all to raise agri- 
cultural productivity. Population growth 
combined with recent crop failures in many 
parts of the world have led to the lowest 
grain stock levels in many years as well as 
high prices. In some cases, famine is threat- 

May 13, 1974 


ening entire populations, and the world 
shortage of food makes it difficult to provide 
the assistance needed to avert tragedy. But 
food aid alone does not provide a solution. 
Developing nations must increase their own 
agricultural productivity, and almost 60 per- 
cent of aid's development assistance pro- 
grams will be aimed at achieving this goal. 

We will continue to reorient our develop- 
ment assistance programs, as jointly en- 
dorsed by the Congress and the Administra- 
tion, to concentrate more directly on acute 
human problems in poor countries. AID will 
thus focus on providing family planning and 
basic health services, strengthening educa- 
tion and other human resource programs, 
increasing food production, and improving 

A strong bilateral U.S. foreign aid pro- 
gram can be fully effective, however, only if 
it is complemented by continued, active mul- 
tilateral assistance efforts. Pending before 
the Congress is legislation to authorize 
United States contributions of $1.5 billion 
to the International Development Association 
(IDA). Appropriations for those contribu- 
tions will be spread over a number of years 
beginning in 1976. 

The International Development Associa- 
tion has a 14-year history of excellence in 
providing development loans to the poorest 
nations. We have negotiated a reduction in 
the United States' share of the total con- 
tributions to IDA from 40 percent to 33 
percent, thereby shifting additional respon- 
sibility for international lending to other na- 
tions. It is inconceivable that the United 
States should abandon such a successful in- 
ternational activity, and I urge the House 
of Representatives to reconsider its recent 
vote denying the IDA authorization. Such 
a step would constitute a false economy in 
violation of the very principles toward which 
we would hope to move in providing foreign 
development assistance. 

Also pending is legislation to authorize 
contributions of $362 million for the ordi- 
nary capital and $50 million for the special 
resources of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). The performance of the IDA is 

being matched today by the newer Asian 
Development Bank. The African Develop- 
ment Fund of the African Development Bank 
has excellent prospects of playing an in- 
creasingly critical role in a continent whose 
need has been most recently highlighted by 
severe drought. 

It is imperative that these authorizations 
as well as those for our bilateral programs 
be enacted. It is equally imperative that 
appropriations be enacted in the full amount 
necessary to fulfill our responsibilities in 
these institutions and in the Inter-American 
Development Bank, for which authorizing 
legislation has been enacted. 

The United States is currently engaged 
in negotiations relating to international 
monetary and trade reform. It should be 
recognized that less developed nations will 
play an important role in the success of 
these important initiatives. These nations 
will look to the United States to continue 
our leadership in the development assistance 
field as well as in trade and monetary reform. 

Security Assistance 

The security of our allies and of nations 
friendly to us is an essential consideration 
in the foreign and national security policies 
of the United States. Not all are capable 
of providing for their security, and our 
assistance enables those countries to assume 
primary responsibility for their own defense. 
It gives them the confidence to negotiate 
with potential adversaries from a position 
of strength and to resist subversion and in- 
timidation. The effectiveness and wisdom 
of these policies is being proven today in 
the Middle East and Southeast Asia. 

There can be no real peace in the world 
so long as some governments believe that 
they can successfully obtain by force or 
threat of force what they cannot obtain by 
peaceful competition or negotiation. Our se- 
curity assistance programs reduce the likeli- 
hood that such calculations will be made and 
thereby increase the incentives to resolve in- 
ternational disputes by peaceful means. 

Just as security assistance can ease the 


Department of State Bulletin 

impact of large and unexpected defense bur- 
dens on the economies of friendly nations, it 
can also strengthen their economies and 
thereby allow a greater use of military sales 
credits as opposed to grants. We need a flex- 
ible military credit sales program to encour- 
age and facilitate the self-reliance of friendly 
states and to help gradually reduce the cost 
to the United States of providing security 

I am asking the Congress to authorize the 
appropriations for fiscal year 1975 of $985 
million for grant military assistance, $555 
million for foreign military sales credits to 
finance an $872.5 million program, and 
$385.5 million for security supporting as- 


The United States has only recently 
emerged from more than a decade of direct 
involvement in a long, bitter, and costly 
vi^ar. It is not remarkable that -we should see 
a strong sentiment in the land for giving up 
the difficult duties of world leadership. But 
temporary sentiment must not obscure the 
long-range interest of our Nation. 

The percentage of America's gross na- 
tional product dedicated to foreign assist- 
ance is small. It is less, indeed, than that of 
some other nations. But it is a wise invest- 
ment, undertaken with bipartisan support 
in the interest of our own Nation, in the in- 
terests of our historical role as a generous 
and courageous defender of freedom and hu- 
man rights, and in the interests of world 

With our assistance, other nations have 
reached a point where they can share this 
burden. But we have not yet reached the 
point where we can safely lay it down. 

The amounts I am requesting for fiscal 
year 1975 are the minimum essential to sup- 
port the responsible and constructive Amer- 
ican role of international leadership and co- 
operation, a role which it is in our national 
interest to continue and strengthen. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, April 2U, 197 h- 

President Nixon Increases Tariffs 
on Certain Ball Bearings 

Folloiving is the text of a letter dated 
March 29 froin President Nixon to Carl Al- 
bert, Speaker of the House. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 1 

March 29, 1974. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: On July 30, 1973, the 
Tariff Commission reported to me the results 
of its investigation under section 301(b) (1) 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA) 
on Antifriction Balls and Ball Bearings, In- 
cluding Ball Bearings with Integral Shafts, 
and Parts Thereof. The Commission made 
an afl^rmative determination with regard to 
serious injury from increased imports of 
certain ball bearings entering the United 
States under two tariff items and found that 
the present rates of duty on such bearings 
should be doubled. 

While I concur with the Tariff Commission 
that an increase in tariffs is warranted, I 
have determined after a comprehensive re- 
view of all aspects of this case, that in cer- 
tain regards the remedy found by the Com- 
mission is not adequate while in other re- 
gards, it goes beyond the relief required to 
maintain a sound domestic industry. Ac- 
cordingly, I have today proclaimed increases 
in the rate of duty on imports of certain ra- 
dial ball bearings, these increases only to be 
applicable when such bearings enter the 
United States at values per unit which are 
injurious to the U.S. industry.' For the bulk 
of the trade covered, these increases are 
greater than proposed by the Tariff Commis- 

U.S. producers' shipments of bearings in 
the tariff categories receiving relief under 
my proclamation accounted for about three- 
quarters of the industry's aggregate 1973 
shipments of bearings covered by the Com- 
mission's affirmative finding. In the case of 
three categories of bearings on which the 
Tariff Commission proposed an increase in 

" For text of Proclamation 4279, see 39 Fed. Reg. 
11861, Apr. 1, 1974. 

May 13, 1974 


the rate of duty, I have determined that the 
present statutory criteria for serious injury 
or threat thereof are not satisfied and that 
reHef therefore would not be justified. 

In addition to higher tariff protection, I 
consider that adjustment assistance offers a 
useful means for strengthening the competi- 
tive position of some domestic producers and 
for helping those workers who have suffered 
unemployment. My proclamation, therefore, 
provides that firms and workers in the do- 
mestic industry may request certifications 
of eligibility to apply for adjustment assist- 

It is my considered judgment that the rem- 
edies I have provided will amply meet the 
needs of the industry and its workers and 
will better serve the national interest than 
other alternative measures. However, if de- 
velopments presently unforeseen should pre- 
vent the satisfactory adjustment of the in- 
dustry to meet import competition under the 
tariff rates just proclaimed, the case can be 
reopened, with a new investigation instituted 
by the Tariff Commission any time after 
July 30, i.e. one year after the original Tariff 
Commission report. 

This report is submitted pursuant to the 
requirements of section 351 (a) (2) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 

Richard Nixon. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 2d Session 

Increased U.S. Participation in the International 
Development Association. Report to accompany 
H.R. 11354. H. Kept. 93-749. January 21, 1974. 
14 pp. 

Increased U.S. Participation in the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank. Report to accompany H.R. 11666. H. 
Rept. 93-750. January 21, 1974. 13 pp. 

Contiguous Fisheries Zone. Report to accompany 
H.R. 11809. H. Rept. 93-755. January 21, 1974. 
10 pp. 


U.N. Condemns Acts of Violence 
in Middle East 

Following are texts of a statement made 
in the U.N. Security Council on April 2U by 
U.S. Representative John Scali, a Department 
statement read to news correspondents on 
April 25 by John King, Director, Office of 
Press Relations, and a resolutioyi adopted by 
the Council on April 2i. 


USUN press release 41 dated April 24 

The situation in the Middle East presents 
grave risks and great opportunities. During 
the last few months the first concrete steps 
toward peace were taken, after decades of 
strife between Arab and Israeli. 

All principal parties to the conflict have ac- 
cepted this Council's Resolutions 242 and 
338 as a basis for peace. A framework for 
negotiations, the Geneva Peace Conference, 
has been established. New foundations of 
stability required for further progress have 
been created. These include the dispatch of 
the U.N. Emergency Force, the implementa- 
tion of the cease-fire on the Israeli-Egyptian 
front, and the Egyptian-Israeli agreement 
on the disengagement of forces. 

Despite this promising diplomatic prog- 
ress, however, acts of violence and terrorism 
threaten to undermine prospects of perma- 
nent peace. Clashes between Israeli and Syr- 
ian military forces on the cease-fire line 
increase in intensity. We must most emphat- 
ically deplore such resorts to force in viola- 
tion of the cease-fire demanded by the Se- 
curity Council and in contradiction to the 
disengagement being actively pursued. 

Once again we meet here to consider the 
massacre of innocent men, women, and chil- 


Department of State Bulletin 

dren. On April 11 three terrorists brutally 
killed 16 civilians in Qiryat Shemona. Alleg- 
ing that the terrorists came from Lebanon, 
Israel launched a reprisal raid two days later 
against several villages in southern Lebanon, 
which reportedly resulted in civilian casual- 
ties as well. 

We do not presume to make a judgment 
about the respective claims as to whether or 
not the terrorists came from Lebanon. The 
fact is, however, that innocent people were 
brutally murdered and spokesmen for the 
murderers held a press conference in Beirut 
to boast of their callous act. Once more we 
have been faced with mounting violence, 
ugly language, and harsh retribution. 

This is a familiar tale but with a signifi- 
cant difference. This time the cancer of ter- 
rorism not only takes innocent lives; it 
threatens the new and more promising 
trends toward peace in the area. This, in- 
deed, may have been the principal motive of 
the attackers. 

Despite these difficulties, the United 
States pledges to continue its efforts to move 
the parties toward peace. Simply put, my 
country seeks through discussion, negotia- 
tion, and accommodation to move, on the ba- 
sis of Security Council Resolution 242, to- 
ward a just and durable peace, a peace 
which will transform the atmosphere, the 
relations, and attitudes in the Middle East 
for the benefit of all concerned. This is a 
goal to which the vast majority of the U.N. 
membership subscribes and to which the 
United Nations itself is making a key con- 

Sadly, this objective is still repudiated by 
groups of terrorists uninhibited by law and 
unrestrained by common standards of human 
decency. The group which claims responsibil- 
ity for the murders at Qiryat Shemona is 
categorically opposed to the process of nego- 
tiation through the peace conference at which 
the Soviet Union and the United States are 
cochairmen. Indeed, one spokesman who 
claims to speak for that group has reportedly 
claimed that Qiryat Shemona was just the 
beginning of revolutionary violence aimed at 

preventing a permanent Arab-Israeli settle- 

We in the Security Council have invested 
much of our labors, resources, and good will 
during the past months in an attempt to 
turn the Middle East away from a cycle of 
violence and retaliation. We cannot allow 
recent achievements to be destroyed by the 
mindless terrorism of a small band who seek 
to destroy the fragile peace we are seeking 
so arduously to construct. 

Neither should this Council jeopardize its 
constructive work of recent months by re- 
sort to worn and one-sided rhetoric devoid 
of practical effect or reality. It is of course 
natural and right that we voice here our 
condemnation of senseless acts of terror such 
as occurred at Qiryat Shemona, just as we 
condemn the violence undertaken in retalia- 
tion in southern Lebanon by Israeli forces. 

We regret that our amendment to refer 
specifically to Qiryat Shemona did not re- 
ceive the necessary support in this Council. 
We believe, however, that the resolution be- 
fore us did condemn all violence, whatever 
its origin, including the tragedy at Qiryat 

But we must move forward from con- 
demnations of violations to encouraging 
moves toward a just and durable peace. 
Above all, our efforts in this Council must 
contribute to the climate of peace and mu- 
tual good will which is indispensable if ne- 
gotiations are to succeed. 


I have been asked why the United States 
voted for the resolution in the Security Coun- 
cil last night which condemned Israel but 
which did not explicitly condemn Lebanon 
or the Arab terrorists for the Qiryat She- 
mona massacre. 

We would have preferred explicit refer- 
ence to Qiryat Shemona, which is the reason 
Ambassador Scali introduced an amendment 
which would have such a reference. How- 
ever, even without it, we concluded that the 

May 13, 1974 


resolution was acceptable because it con- 
demns equally the Israeli reprisal and all 
acts of violence, especially those resulting 
in the loss of innocent civilian lives, which 
covers the wanton and criminal Qiryat She- 
mona massacre. Moreover, this resolution 
explicitly calls for all governments to respect 
their obligations under the charter and inter- 
national law — and the organization of attacks 
on the territory of one country against an- 
other is contrary to international law and 
the charter. 

Finally, the U.S. Government attached par- 
ticular importance to getting Council ap- 
proval of the last paragraph of the resolu- 
tion, which called on all parties to avoid any 
actions which might endanger negotiations 
aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East. We believe that in 
view of the Secretary's imminent trip to the 
area this is a useful reminder to all con- 
cerned about the need to avoid violence or 
military action of any kind that might jeop- 
ardize our peace efforts. 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the agenda contained in docu- 
ment S/Agenda/1769/Rev.l, 

Having noted the contents of the letters dated 
12 and 13 April from the Permanent Representative 
of Lebanon (S/11263, S/11264) and that dated 11 
April 1974 from the Permanent Representative of 
Israel (S/11259), 

Having heard the statements of the Foreign Min- 
ister of Lebanon and of the representative of Israel, 

Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, 

Deeply disturbed at the continuation of acts of 

Gravely concerned that such acts might endanger 
efforts now taking place to bring about a just and 
lasting peace in the Middle East. 

1. Condemns Israel's violation of Lebanon's ter- 
ritorial integrity and sovereignty and calls once 
more on the Government of Israel to refrain from 
further military actions and threats against Leba- 

2. Condemns all acts of violence, especially those 
Vifhich result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian 
life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any 
further acts of violence; 

3. Calls on all Governments concerned to respect 
their obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations and international law; 

4. Calls on Israel forthwith to release and return 
to Lebanon the abducted Lebanese civilians; 

5. Calls upon all parties to refrain from any ac- 
tion which might endanger negotiations aimed at 
achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle 

'U.N. doc. S/RES/347 (1974); adopted by the 
Council on Apr. 24 by a vote of 13 (U.S.) to (the 
People's Republic of China and Iraq did not par- 
ticipate in the vote). 

Current Actions 



International air services transit agreement. Done 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Chile, April 24, 1974. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil pol- 
lution damage. Done at Bnassels November 29, 
Accession deposited: Lebanon, April 9, 1974. 

South Pacific Commission 

Memorandum of understanding modifying proce- 
dures under the agreement of February 6, 1947, 
as amended, establishing the South Pacific Com- 
mission (TIAS 2317, 2458, 2952, 5845). Done at 
Wellington March 8, 1974. Enters into force when 
signed by all participating governments. 


Protocol for the accession of the Democratic Repub- 
lic of the Congo (Kinshasa) to the general agree- 
ment on tariffs and trade. Done at Geneva August 
11, 1971. Entered into force September 11, 1971. 
TIAS 7224. 
Acceptance deposited : Belgium, December 14, 1973. 

Protocol for the accession of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh to the general agreement on tariffs 
and trade, with annex. Done at Geneva Novem- 
ber 7, 1972. Entered into force December 16, 
1972. TIAS 7552. 
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, December 14, 1973. 

' Not in force. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Declaration on the provisional accession of the Phil- 
ippines to the general agreement on tariffs and 
trade. Done at Geneva August 9, 1973. Entered 
into force September 9, 1973. 

Acceptances deposited: Austria, February 15, 
1974;' Belgium, December 14, 1973;= France, 
December 21, 1973; India, February 19, 1974; 
Korea, February 5, 1974; Norway, January 24, 
1974; Turkey, February 14, 1974; United King- 
dom, January 22, 1974. 

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for Article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which en- 
tered into force April 1, 1974. 
Acceptances deposited: Canada, March 14, 1974; 
Egypt, February 18, 1974;= Finland, January 
21, 1974;= Hong Kong, February 25, 1974; 
Hungary, March 26, 1974; Israel, March 14, 
1974; Japan, March 19, 1974; Korea, March 18, 
1974; Norway, February 28, 1974; Pakistan, 
March 5, 1974; Sri Lanka, January 17, 1974; 
Sweden, March 15, 1974. 


Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Open for signature at Washington 
April 2 through 22, 1974. Enters into force on 
June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Mauritius, April 8, 1974; Sweden, 
April 9, 1974; Finland, India, Pakistan, April 
17, 1974; Australia, Austria, Portugal, Trinidad 
and Tobago, April 18, 1974; Argentina," Canada, 
Cuba,' Israel, Japan, Kenya, South Africa, 
Tunisia, April 19, 1974; Belgium,' Brazil, Den- 
mark," Ecuador, European Communities,' Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany,' France,' Greece, 
Iraq, Ireland,' Italy,' Korea, Luxembourg,' 
Netherlands,' Norway, Spain, Switzerland, 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,' United 
Kingdom,' United States, Vatican City State, 
Venezuela, April 22, 1974. 

Declarations of provisional application deposited: 
Argentina,' Cuba,' April 19, 1974; Belgium,' 
Denmark,' European Communities,' Federal Re- 
public of Germany,' France,' Ireland,' Italy,' 
Luxembourg,' United Kingdom,' April 22, 1974. 
Protocol modifying and extending the food aid 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971. Open for signature at Washington 
April 2 through 22, 1974. Enters into force on 
June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Finland, Sweden, April 17, 1974; 
Australia, April 19, 1974; Switzerland,' United 
States,' April 22, 1974; Argentina,* Canada, 
Japan,' April 19, 1974. 


Khmer Republic 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of July 25, 1973 (TIAS 
7703). Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom 
Penh April 8, 1974. Entered into force April 8, 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of November 9, 1973 
(TIAS 7768). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon April 3, 1974. Entered into force April 
3, 1974. 


Nonscheduled air services agreement, with annexes, 
and protocol. Signed at Belgrade September 27, 
Entered into force definitively: April 16, 1974. 


= Subject to ratification. 
' With statement. 
' With reservation. 

Department Releases 11 th Volume 
of Compilation of Treaties 

Press release 136 dated April 10 

The Department of State released on April 10 vol- 
ume 11 of its series "Treaties and Other International 
Agreements of the United States of America 1776- 
1949." The series is compiled under the direction of 
Assistant Legal Adviser Charles I. Bevans. 

Volume 11 contains the texts of bilateral agree- 
ments concluded prior to 1950 with the Philippines, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Sar- 
dinia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, 
Syria, the Republic of Texas, Thailand, Tonga, the 
Free Territory of Trieste, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tripoli, Tunis, Turkey, the Two Sicilies, the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Egypt (formerly 
the United Arab Republic). 

The volume contains over 300 treaties and other 
agreements, beginning with the 1946 agreements 
recognizing Philippine independence and establish- 
ing general relations with the Philippines. It includes 
the 1933 agreements establishing diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union and the World War II lend- 
lease agreements with Poland, Turkey, South Africa, 
and the Soviet Union. 

The first four volumes in the Bevans series, re- 
leased in 1969 and 1970, contain the multilateral 

May 13, 1974 


treaties and other international agreements entered 
into by the United States from 1776 to 1950. The 
subsequent volumes contain bilateral agreements of 
the period, grouped alphabetically. Each volume in- 
cludes an index. Volume 13 will contain a compre- 
hensive index. 

Copies of volumes 1 through 11 of the Bevans 
series are for sale by the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 
D.C. 20402 (price: vol. 1, $8.50; vol. 2, $10.25; vol. 3, 
$11.75; vol. 4, $8.25; vol. 5, $9.75; vol. 6, $11.00; vol. 
7, $11.00; vol. 8, $11.00; vol. 9, $11.00; vol. 10, $11.00; 
vol. 11, $14.35). 

GPO Sales Publications 

Charter of the United Nations — Amendment to Ar- 
ticle 61. TIAS 7739. 14 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of September 10, 1973, as 
amended. TIAS 7743. 3 pp. 25?'. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Egypt ex- 
tending the agreement of September 30 and October 
5, 1970. TIAS 7744. 3 pp. 25(*. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel 
amending the agreement of October 13, 1972. TIAS 
7745. 2 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10:7745). 

Air Charter Services. Interim agreement with Aus- 
tria. TIAS 7751. 2 pp. 25<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:7751). 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20i02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreigrn relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock — at least 140 — $16.35; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes — $14.50; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 25«( each. 

Brazil . . . 
Ghana . . . 

Cat. No. S1.123:B73 
Pub. 7756 6 pp. 

Cat. No. S1.123:G34 
Pub. 8089 4 pp. 

The Strategic Balance. Pamphlet in the Current 
Foreign Policy series based on a statement by 
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs 
of Staff; "NATO Facts, Figures, 1971"; and the 
annual report of the International Institute for Stra- 
tegic Studies, London, "The Military Balance 1973- 
1974." Pub. 8751. General Foreign Policy Series 
284. 10 pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. S1.71:284). 

U.S. Positions Stated at 28th U.N. General Assembly. 

This Current Foreign Policy series pamphlet con- 
tains excerpts of U.S. positions on significant issues 
stated primarily in explanations of vote, press con- 
ferences, and public addresses of U.S. officials. Pub. 
8753. International Organizations and Conference 
Series 111. 18 pp. 35^ (Cat. No. 81.70:111). 



The Senate on April 25 confirmed the following 

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., to be an Assistant Secre- 
tary of State [for Near Eastern and South Asian 

Henry E. Catto, Jr., Chief of Protocol for the 
White House, for the rank of Ambassador. 

Leonard Kimball Firestone to be Ambassador to 

Robert Strausz-Hupe to be Ambassador to Sweden. 

Webster B. Todd, Jr., to be Inspector General, 
Foreign Assistance. 


Sheldon B. Vance as Senior Adviser to the Sec- 
retary of State and Coordinator for International 
Narcotics Matters, effective April 1. 

Robert Anderson as Special Assistant to the Sec- 
retary of State for Press Relations and Department 
spokesman, effective April 29. 

George S. Vest as Director, Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs, effective May 15. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 13, 19U Vol. LXX, No. 1820 


Confirmations (Atherton, Catto, Firestone, 
Strausz-Hupe, Todd) 536 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 532 

President Nixon Increases Tariffs on Certain 
Ball Bearings (text of letter to the Speaker 
of the House) 531 

President Nixon Requests Funds for Foreign 
Assistance for Fiscal Year 1975 (message 
to the Congress) 526 

Department and Foreign Service 
Confirmations (Atherton, Catto, Firestone, 

Strausz-Hupe, Todd) 536 

Designations (Anderson, Vance, Vest) . . . 536 

Economic Affairs. President Nixon Increases 
Tariffs on Certain Ball Bearings (text of 
letter to the Speaker of the House) ... 531 

Foreign Aid. President Nixon Requests Funds 
for Foreign Assistance for Fiscal Year 1975 
(message to the Congress) 526 

Israel. U.N. Condemns Acts of Violence in 
Middle East (Scali, Department statement, 
Security Council resolution) 532 

Latin America 

Latin American and Caribbean Foreign Minis- 
ters Meet at Washington (Kubisch, com- 
munique) 516 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week 

(proclamation) 519 

President Nixon Honors Foreign Ministers of 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ex- 
change of toasts with Foreign Minister of 
Paraguay) 520 

Secretary Kissinger Outlines Good-Partner 
Policy Before the OAS General Assembly . 509 

Lebanon. U.N. Condemns Acts of Violence in 
Middle East (Scali, Department statement. 
Security Council resolution) 532 

Narcotics Control. Vance designated Senior 
Adviser and Coordinator for International 
Narcotics Matters 536 

Organization of American States. Secretary 
Kissinger Outlines Good-Partner Policy 
Before the OAS General Assembly .... 509 

Presidential Documents 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week 

(proclamation) 519 

resident Nixon Honors Foreign Ministers of 
Latin America and the Caribbean . . . _ . 520 
resident Nixon Increases Tariffs on Certain 

Ball Bearings . 531 

resident Nixon Requests Funds for Foreign 
Assistance for Fiscal Year 1975 526 


Jepartment Releases 11th Volume of Compi- 
lation of Treaties 535 

xPO Sales Publications 536 

reaty Information. Current Actions . . . 534 

United Nations. U.N. Condemns Acts of Vio- 
lence in Middle East (Scali, Department 
statement. Security Council resolution) . . 


Name Index 

Anderson, Robert 536 

Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 536 

Catto, Henry E., Jr 536 

Firestone, Leonard Kimball 536 

Kissinger, Secretary 509 

Kubisch, Jack B 516 

Nixon. President 519,520,526,531 

Sapena Pastor, Raul 520 

Scali, John 532 

Strausz-Hupe, Robert 536 

Todd, Webster B., Jr 536 

Vance, Sheldon B 536 

Vest, George S 536 

Check List of Department of Stale 
Press Releases: April 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 22 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
136 of April 10, 149 of April 19, and 150 of 
April 20. 

No. Date Subject 

*152 4/22 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad- 
visory Committee, Boston, May 

*153 4/22 National Review Board for the 
Center for Cultural and Tech- 
nical Interchange Between East 
and West, San Francisco, May 

*154 4/22 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, May 16. 

*155 4/24 Study Group 5 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the 
CCITT, May 23. 

*156 4/25 U.S.-Bahamas agreement on pre- 
clearance of air travelers, Apr. 

tl57 4/25 U.S.-Federal Republic of Ger- 
many offset agreement. 

*158 4/26 Gerard sworn in as Ambassador 
to Jamaica (biographic data). 

tl59 4/26 Kissinger: news conference. 

*161 4/27 Atherton sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs (biographic 

* Not printed. 

+ Held for a later issue of the BuLLKTrN. 

Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 




Special Fourth-Class Rate 

Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Director, Office 
of Media Services (PA/MS), Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Volume LXX 

No. 1821 

May 20, 1974 

OF APRIL 26 537 


Address by Ambassador Hillenbrand 548 


Statement by Deputy Secretary Rush 555 


For index sea inside back cover 


Vol. LXX, No. 1821 
May 20, 1974 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washineton, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $29.80, foreign $37.25 

Single copy 60 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note; Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department ani 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well a$ 
special articles on various phases ot 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information i$ 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field ot 
international relations are also Itstet 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 26 

Press release 159 dated April 26 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I'd like 
to introduce a new victim for your tor- 
ments, Ambassador [Robert] Anderson, who 
has taken over as spokesman for the Depart- 
ment and whom I know you will treat with 
the gentleness, generosity, and warmth that 
is characteristic of the State Department 
press corps. 

I also want to take this opportunity to ex- 
press my profound appreciation to George 
Vest, a fine man, distinguished Foreign Serv- 
ice officer, and a good friend. I know he will 
do a distinguished job in his new position, 
where I expect to work closely with him, and 
I also want to express my appreciation for 
what he did during a difficult period in his 
position as spokesman. 

Before I go to your questions, I would like 
to make some brief observations about the 
foreign assistance package which the Presi- 
dent has submitted to the Congress. 

We have been, in the administration, 
speaking in recent months in various inter- 
national forums about the fact that we live 
in an interdependent world. We believe very 
strongly that the big issue of our time is 
whether the economic problems and the po- 
litical problems are going to be solved with 
a cooperative attitude or through a process 
of confrontation. 

If we believe this, as we do, then obviously 
programs of foreign assistance are not hand- 
outs. They are not do-good programs. But 
they are done on behalf of an international 
order and on behalf of an approach to the 
solution of problems that is in all of our in- 
terests and very much in the American in- 

There are three parts, three essential parts, 
to the program : development assistance, 
Middle East, and Indochina. 

With respect to development assistance, it 
is our purpose to give effect to the principles 
we have enunciated at the Energy Confer- 
ence, at the special session of the General 
Assembly, and at the recent meeting of the 
Organization of American States in Atlanta. 

We believe that if we are to avoid the 
world being divided into confronting groups 
the United States must have the ability to 
give effect to its conviction that the im- 
provement of conditions around the world 
and the constructive use of resources require 
the joint effort of all nations. 

Our development assistance program has 
been deliberately shaped to take account of 
the priority areas that we have put before 
the special session of the General Assembly 
and before the Organization of American 
States, and we hope that during the year we 
can further refine these programs. 

The portion dealing with the Middle East 
reflects one of the most difficult, but also one 
of the most hopeful, developments of the 
past year. It is an attempt to take account 
of the fact that for the first time in decades 
we can address the question of the peaceful 
evolution and the peaceful construction of 
the Middle East. It is the American contribu- 
tion to creating incentives for all of the peo- 
ples in the area to turn from war toward 
peace and to change their priorities from 
conflict to construction. 

The progress that has been made in the 
disengagement between Egypt and Israel has 
permitted us to propose to the Congress an 
item for the reconstruction of the canal zone. 
And we have also requested a special fund 
for what we hope will be the contingencies 
that might arise if this process of peace con- 
tinues, so that we can encourage it and can 
contribute to it. 

May 20, 1974 


And, finally, there is Indochina. We have a 
history in Indochina in which many Amer- 
ican lives were lost and much American 
treasure was spent. We are now in a posi- 
tion where in that area, too, there are hope- 
ful prospects of a transition from war to 
peace and where all the efforts of recent 
years may hinge on sums that are relatively 
small in proportion to the total effort that 
has been made. 

We have told the Congress, and we will 
reiterate this in our testimony, that we will 
respond to their suggestion of putting be- 
fore the Congress our expectations of the 
assistance that will be required over a pe- 
riod of time, with a clear indication that 
this assistance can be progressively reduced 
if the level is adequate in any one year. 

Altogether, the burden that the American 
people are asked to bear is three-tenths of 1 
percent of our national product. It is very 
small in proportion to the objective that we 
are attempting to achieve. The evolution of 
a peaceful world and an American role in the 
task of construction urgently awaits us. And 
therefore the administration strongly urges 
the Congress to enact the program that we 
have proposed. This Department will be 
available for testimony and will give its full 
support to this program which it hopes to 
work out cooperatively with the appropriate 
committees and the entire membership of 
both Houses of the Congress. 

Now I will take your questions. 

Soviet Role in Middle East Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the Mid- 
dle East, the Soviet Union, which is one of 
the cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Con- 
ference, has appeared somewhat critical of 
the U.S. role in working on the disengage- 
ment between Israeli and Syrian forces — / 
refer particularly to the joint communique 
in Moscow last April 16 with Syna, the Asad 
communique — and also they are reportedly 
urging continuing military assistance and 
shipping more military aid in there. I don't 
know whether all of that is true, but it leads 
me to ask you the question as to whether the 


Soviet Union is helping you or hindering you 
in your efforts ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not interpret 
the Asad-Brezhnev communique as criticiz- 
ing the disengagement effort. The Soviet Un- 
ion has expressed, in view of its history of 
close association with several of the Arab 
countries, an interest in participating at 
various stages of the negotiating process. 

The U.S. attitude is that, first, the basic 
framework of the negotiations — when we 
turn toward a peace settlement — will be the 
framework of the Geneva Conference, of 
which, of course, the Soviet Union is a co- 

Secondly, in the disengagement phase, we 
seek no exclusive role for ourselves. We want 
to do whatever is desired by the parties and 
what most contributes toward the objective 
of bringing about a separation of the forces. 

Thirdly, we are prepared to talk with the 
Soviet Union in various forums to take full 
account of Soviet views, and this is the rea- 
son why I am meeting with Foreign Minister 
Gromyko in Geneva on Monday. 

Fourthly, in the particular negotiations on 
disengagement with Syria, the Soviet role 
has not been unhelpful, and I am hopeful 
that as we embark on our negotiation the 
Soviet Union will play a constructive role in 
bringing about the separation of forces which 
is in the interest of all of the countries con- 

Mr. Freed [Kenneth J. Freed, Associated 
Press] . 

Q. Mr. Secretary, $250 million set out in 
the aid program for Egypt — what commit- 
ments has Egypt given us? And in a hundred 
million dollar contingency fund — is there 
anything there for Syria if they go along 
with disengagement with the Israelis? 

Secretary Kissinger: The $250 million that 
has been requested for Egypt represents the 
assessment of this administration that Egypt 
is sincerely attempting to bring about a con- 
structive and peaceful solution to the prob- 
lems of the Middle East. We believe also that | 
the reconstruction of the canal zone is in the 
common interest of all of the countries in 

Department of State Bulletin 

the Middle East. And indeed, it was one of 
the concerns frequently expressed during the 
disengagement negotiations by the Israelis, 
who told us then that they would consider 
the reconstruction of the canal zone an indi- 
cation of a long-term intent to move forward 
on the basis of negotiations. 

So we strongly urge the $250 million for 
Egypt in order to continue the process that 
has been started. 

With respect to the $100 million for con- 
tingencies, there have been no discussions 
with Syria about a similar program. How- 
ever, if there is an agreement on the sepa- 
ration of forces between Syria and Israel, it 
is not impossible that a similar discussion 
might take place. And we wanted to be in a 
position to make our contribution if that 

Conduct of Foreign Policy 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have consulted with 
some Members of Congress about the prob- 
lems of conducting foreign policy in the light 
of the Watergate proceedings. And one Sen- 
ator quoted you as saying it ivould be impos- 
sible to conduct foreign policy effectively if 
the House votes impeachment; and your only 
reported comment was "Nonsense." Yet the 
issue is a real one, and I would like to have 
on the record your estimate of how the con^ 
duct of foreign policy is affected by the 
President's present position and whether 
there is any perceptible ccbse of a foreign 
power exploiting what it may regard as a 
crisis of leadership in the United States. 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not discussed 
with Members of Congress the conduct of 
foreign policy under conditions of impeach- 
ment. The conversation you refer to took 
place on a trip back from Panama, was en- 
tirely social in character, and was described 
by the Senator who reported it as not having 
given the full flavor of what actually took 
place. I have said on the record that the prob- 
lem of authority is always essential to the 
conduct of foreign policy and therefore over 
a period of time it is bound to affect the con- 
duct — or the ability to conduct foreign policy. 

With respect to your major question, 
whether I have noticed up to now any area 
in which the conduct of our foreign policy 
has been affected by the Watergate discus- 
sion, I have not noticed this. I have not no- 
ticed that proposals have been made that 
seem exorbitant and, therefore, perhaps trig- 
gered by our domestic difficulties. And we 
are conducting our foreign policy on the ba- 
sis, as I have said before, of the national in- 
terest — not geared to any deadlines and not 
geared to the present domestic difficulties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there not a risk, how- 
ever, that in a period of very intensive for- 
eign travel, which we seem to be embarking 
on right now, as well as summitry over the 
next couple of months, coinciding with the 
impeachment process, that the President 
might be perceived to be in a somewhat 
weakened position by foreign leaders and 
therefore this is not really the time for such 
active summitry and travel? 

Secretary Kissinger: The solution of 
many of the current international problems 
cannot be geared to our domestic timetable. 
Any agreement that is made with any coun- 
try will of course have to stand the test of 
public debate and, where appropriate, of 
congressional scrutiny. It will also have to 
stand the test of the fact that any President 
in any administration lives in history a lot 
longer than he lives in headlines, which im- 
poses a sense of responsibility. And we will 
submit any agreements that may be made 
and any discussions that take place to the 
fullest public scrutiny. 

The measures that are being negotiated 
have all been under negotiation for a long 
time, many of them antedating the present 
domestic problems. Many of them have their 
own time urgency, in the Middle East and 
also in the evolution of technology with re- 
spect to strategic weapons. And we will con- 
duct our foreign policy, as I have said be- 
fore, on the basis of our responsibility to 
preserve the peace and to build as lasting a 
structure of peace as it is in our power to do. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I 
may, sir, could you discuss more specifically 

May 20, 1974 


the particular heads-of -government confer- 
ences which might take place over this pe- 
riod? There does seem to be an accelerated 
schedide of possibilities for a series of high- 
level meetings during the summer. 

Secretary Kissinger: May I express my 
gratification at the end of the strike of th°e 
Washington Post. 

Q. We ended it — 

Secretary Kissinger: If I had had a vote, 
I might have extended it 48 more hours. 

Q. We ended it in order to cover your trip. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware of 
any accelerated schedule of Presidential 
trips. The meetings with foreign heads of 
state that are being considered have all been 
on the calendar for a long time as possibili- 
ties. The summit meeting with the Soviet 
leaders has been under discussion — was 
scheduled over a year ago. No other firm de- 
cisions have been made. Meetings with Euro- 
pean leaders have always been related to 
concrete accomplishments. And if we had 
wanted a summit meeting simply for show, 
it was easy enough to arrange during March 
and April, and we deliberately did not do so, 
since we did not think that the conditions at 
the time warranted it. What else may happen 
depends on the outcome of other negotia- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been about a 
month since you returned from Moscow. 
When you see Mr. Gromyko on Monday, will 
you be able to present to him American 
counterproposals to their SALT proposals? 

Secretary Kissinger: SALT will be one of 
the subjects discussed in Geneva with For- 
eign Minister Gromyko. Though I despair of 
saying anything on SALT that does not 
make huge headlines slightly different from 
what I intended, it will undoubtedly be dis- 
cussed. I will not present to the Foreign 
Minister a detailed American counterpro- 
posal, but I will present to him various con- 
siderations that, if he considers them worthy 
of discussions, could lead to an American 

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to the for 
eign aid subject, the request for the Far 
East was larger rather than smaller than in 
previous years. And I wondered how you as- 
sociate this with the detente with China and 
with the Soviet Union and ivhether in par- 
ticular the $165 million for Korea reflects 
danger there, or does it reflect an upset in 
the internal situation in Korea that needs to 
be corrected? 

Secretary Kissinger: The increase in 
funds for Asia is largely due to the increased 
cost of imports into, particularly. South- 
east Asia for fuel, fertilizer, and similar ma- 

The program for Korea is not related in 
any sense to the domestic conditions that 
have developed there. 

In terms of detente with the Soviet Union 
or the People's Republic of China, it is of 
course clearly understood that neither of 
these countries has a veto over policies that 
we consider necessary for a stable interna- 
tional order. But we have no reason to be- 
lieve that any part of this foreign assist- 
ance program, certainly not any part for 
Asia, will have a bad eflfect on our detente 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on the 
question of SALT, there has been a report 
that the United States plans unilaterally to 
reduce the number of tactical nuclear weap- 
ons in Europe. I wonder if you could say, 
first of all, if these reports are true, and if 
so, by how much — and if they are true, 
whether there is any relationship, or might 
be any relationship, bettveen this kind of 
move on the part of the United States and 
an attempt to break the deadlock in the SALT 
negotiations involving forward-based sys- 

Secretary Kissinger: To take your last 
point first, the present discussions in SALT 
are not deadlocked in any sense on the is- 
sue of forward-based systems, and the range 
of issues that are being discussed now does 
not have forward-based systems as one prin- 
cipal element. So whatever is being done 
with respect to tactical nuclear weapons, it 



Department of State Bulletin 

is unrelated to the issue of the forward- 
based systems in SALT and indeed is unre- 
lated to the SALT negotiations altogether. 

Secondly, it is our policy not to reduce 
these tactical nuclear weapons, except either 
in fullest consultation with our allies or in a 
negotiation with the Soviet Union in which, 
again, there would be the fullest consulta- 
tion with our allies. We do not have a pro- 
gram now for the reduction of our tactical 
nuclear forces in Europe. We have attempted 
— and I think this is what these reports re- 
fer to — to develop a rational policy for the 
stockpiles and for the possible use of the 
stockpiles. But we are not planning any uni- 
lateral steps. And the reports must have re- 
ferred to internal studies that are being 
conducted on a planning basis. 

Purposes of Summit Talks 

Q. Mr. Secretary, because of the public 
confidence you have talked about that is 
necessary for the conduct of foreign policy, 
and the public support for it, and because of 
the almost inevitable probability that — or 
inevitability that — any agreements that are 
negotiated at the sumrnit will be questioned 
as to political motivation, and because ap- 
parently we are not ready for a major SALT 
agreement anyway, why wouldn't it be a 
wise move simply to postpone the summit 
until impeachment is out of the way ? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it is a 
mistake to consider the summit as being re- 
lated entirely to SALT. There are many rea- 
sons for the summit. And there are many 
types of agreements that can be made at the 

One is to use the summit for an accelera- 
tion of agreements that would probably be 
made anyway but which, if they take their 
bureaucratic course, could be delayed for 
many months and sometimes years; sec- 
ondly, to develop agreements in various 
areas of cooperation unrelated to arms con- 
trol ; thirdly, to develop arms control agree- 
ments not necessarily in the field of strategic 
arms limitations; and fourthly, to give an 
opportunity to the leaders of the two most 
powerful countries in the world — and the 

two countries that have the capability of de- 
stroying each other and humanity in the 
process — to exchange views on the evolution 
of their policies and particularly exchange 
views on the best steps to preserve the peace. 

In all of these categories, incidentally, we 
expect that progress will be made at the 

Now, with respect to SALT, whether or 
not a significant agreement can be reached 
by the time of the summit is not yet clear. 
It is a mistake to assume that the only sig- 
nificant agreement is a comprehensive per- 
manent agreement that settles all issues for 
all time. There are many major agreements 
that could be made of very great significance 
that would fall short of a comprehensive 
permanent agreement. Whether or not those 
agreements can be reached at the time of 
the summit, I repeat, depends on the dis- 
cussions that will take place between now 
and the summit. In any event, the summit 
could give an impetus to those negotiations. 

Our attitude is that we will not rush an 
agreement in order to complete it by the 
summit but we will not fail to conclude an 
agreement simply because the summit coin- 
cides with an intense domestic debate which 
is totally unrelated to our foreign policy and 
in which our foreign policy has not been the 
subject of any significant challenge. 

Again, with respect to the issues that may 
be raised on any agreement in the strategic 
arms field that may be reached, I am confi- 
dent that we will be able to defend it on its 
merits. And when you deal with the issue of 
nuclear strategy, you are dealing with the 
survival of the United States and the sur- 
vival of many other countries that depend 
on us. And the United States will not play 
with this or deal with it in an irresponsible 

Q. Are you foreseeing, Mr. Secretary, a 
constructive round of negotiations — of dis- 
engagement negotiations — while the shooting 
goes on in the Golan Heights, or if you want 
it the other way around, do you foresee a 
shooting process while you are shuttling be- 
tween Damascus and Jerusalem? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have the im- 

May 20, 1974 


pression that the intensity of the fighting 
has diminished in the last week, and I would 
hope that both sides will exercise great re- 
straint while the negotiations are in process. 

I do not forecast that this next round will 
necessarily bring a solution to the negotia- 
tions. But we do hope that we will make 
some progress. 

Les [Leslie Gelb, New York Times]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us your 
position on the proposed level of American 
defense spending, whether you think it is 
appropriate, whether a reduction coidd he 
made, and whether it is consistent with your 
foreign policy aims? 

Secretary Kissinger: I support the present 
level of defense spending, and I believe it is 
consistent with our foreign policy aims. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Chancellor [0/ the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany Willyl Brandt, 
speaking on behalf of the European Commu- 
nity, has offered political guarantees for a 
peace settlement in the Mideast. One such 
settlement has been reached by you. Do you 
consider this offer to be a help f id component 
in your Mideast strategy? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have been in very 
close contact with Chancellor Brandt, both 
during the planning of his trip and while he 
was on the trip. We believe that the policy 
of the Federal Republic in the Middle East 
has been constructive and consistent with 
close Atlantic relationships, and we believe 
that he has made a helpful contribution on 
his visits. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports 
that representatives of the Egyptian Gov- 
ernment have made private contacts with 
Aynerican arms manufacturers. What is the 
attitude of the U.S. Government toward cash 
sales by American manufacturers to Egypt? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have heard rumors 
that American arms manufacturers have 
made contact with the Egyptian authorities, 
rather than the other way around. 

On the issue of military assistance to 
Egypt, whether sale or credit, this has not 

been formally raised by the Egyptian Gov- 
ernment. We don't expect it to be raised in 
the near future. It would have to be consid- 
ered in the light of the circumstances that 
exist when it is raised. But it is not now be- 
fore us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the State Depart- 
ment's oft-stated policy of balance of power 
in the Middle East still the policy of the 
United States? Is the Rogers fonmda re- 
garding the — or the view of the United Na- 
tions resolution — still the policy of the United 
States? And what do you consider insubstan- 
tial changes in the territorial limits for Is- 

Secretary Kissinger: The present condi- 
tions are not the conditions in which the 
previous incumbent conducted his foreign 
policy, and therefore I see no point in my 
commenting on proposals that he may have 
made four years previously. 

The United States is committed to the se- 
curity and survival of Israel, and this com- 
mitment has not changed. 

Complex Arms Control Issues 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson has 
contended, or maybe "charged" is a better 
word, that the administration is interested 
in a "quick fix" in this Moscow summit, pri- | 
marily because of domestic considerations, 1 
and that all you are likely to seek is only an 
extension of the present interim agreement 
on arms control. What is your response to ■ 
that? I 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I had a long 
session with Senator Jackson this morning 
on several topics. I have great respect for 
the views of Senator Jackson. At the same • 
time, I agree very much with a column that 
I read this morning which emphasized the 
need not to conduct this debate by means of 
slogans and in terms of casting doubts on 
the motives of the participants in this de- 

The issues are extremely serious and ex- ■ 
tremely complicated. And if one uses charged 


Department of State Bulletin 

words like "quick fix," then one really pre- 
judges the answer. 

The issue is whether, in the light of an 
evolving technology, one can break out of a 
comprehensive agreement those items that, 
if they are not dealt with now or in the very 
near future, will not be able to be dealt with 
at all — not because the summit is imminent, 
but because the technology will have ad- 
vanced to a point after which control will 
become impossible or deployment will have 
reached a point after which verification will 
become meaningless. This is the overriding 

Second, the implication is always left 
that there is something about the interim 
agreement that is disadvantageous to the 
United States. 

And I think it is about time that we rec- 
ognize the fact, first, that at the time the in- 
terim agreement was made, the United 
States had no program for land-based mis- 
siles. The United States had no program — 
was not building any sea-based missiles. The 
Soviet Union was building 90 land-based 
missiles a year and 144 sea-based missiles. 
The United States stopped no program as a 
result of the interim agreement. The Soviet 
Union stopped several programs and on top 
of it had to remove 209 older missiles from 
its force. 

Secondly, it is not true that the interim 
agreement leaves the United States at a nu- 
merical disadvantage. This numerical disad- 
vantage can be computed only if one omits 
from the calculation the 630 B-52's that 
were in our force in 1972 and the 452 B-52's 
that are in our force today. And the fact 
that there are 180 less in our force today is 
not a decision of the Soviet Union; it is a 
unilateral decision of our administration, 
proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

Thirdly, if one looks not at launchers, but 
at deliverable warheads, the gap between the 
United States and the Soviet Union has in- 
creased during the period of the interim 
agreement and will continue to increase dur- 
ing the whole period of the interim agree- 
ment. And one is hit by warheads — not by 

Therefore, it is not helpful to us to talk 

ourselves into a state of mind in which we 
are strategically inferior. 

Therefore, whether or not the interim 
agreement should be extended depends on an 
analysis of where the interim agreement 
leads us and what the projections are. And 
it depends further on an analysis of what we 
get in return for it. 

The overwhelming issue, as we see it, is 
the issue of multiple independent warheads 
whose deployment on the Soviet side is im- 
minent. Once these multiple warheads are 
fully deployed on both sides, and one has 
then warheads upward of 10,000 on both 
sides, or any number that technology can 
make possible, then we face a situation of 
unprecedented nuclear plenty and a poten- 
tially enormous gap between first- and sec- 
ond-strike capabilities. That is what we are 
attempting to reduce in these negotiations. 

Any analysis of our domestic situation 
should make clear that there is very little to 
be gained domestically by making a SALT 
agreement this year. We are concerned with 
the evolution of the arms race, with peace 
in the world, and with security. 

Now, our judgment may or may not be 
correct. But that is what the debate should 
be and not whether it is a "quick fix" against 
a long-term agreement. 

Q. Could you tell lis what Senator Jack- 
son's reaction to this argument was? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we did not have 
time to get into that argument in as much 
detail as we got into some other arguments 
we're having [laughter] , but it is one that I 
intend to discuss with him at greater length 
when I return from our trip. 

As long as we're talking about this, let me 
emphasize also that we are not opposed to 
reductions. We do believe, however, that re- 
ductions in the absence of some control over 
the multiple warheads will magnify the prob- 
lem that we have described. Reductions will 
be in the hundreds. The growth in warheads 
will be in the thousands. And there will be a 
total disparity between the capabilities that 
develop if reduction becomes our only objec- 
tive. But we do agree with Senator Jackson 
that reductions can be and should be one of 

May 20, 1974 


the objectives of SALT negotiations. They 
are not as time urgent as the other one. 

Mr. Binder [David Binder, New York 
Times] . 

Cuban Participation in Inter-American Talks 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, several Latin American 
countnes have proposed the participation of 
the Cuban Foreign Minister at the next 
round of informal meetings of hemisphere 
Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires. And ])oxi 
have apparently said they tvotdd be willing 
to participate in such informal meetings in 
a constructive manner. I'm asking whether 
you see an evolution of inter-American rela- 
tions that coidd allow the American Secre- 
tary of State to seek informal meetings 
scheduled with other Latin American Minis- 
ters and the Cuban Foreign Minister. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, it 
has happened before. But the decision at 
present — if we had to vote on it today — our 
vote would be negative. We left it that the 
Argentine Government, as the host govern- 
ment, would consult with all other govern- 
ments to see what the consensus is as this 
conference approaches. 

We of course will also consult with the 
governments as the time for this conference 
approaches. But as of now, our position is 
as I have described. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it more hopefid to- 
day that a compromise formula coidd be 
found to resolve the dispute over the Jack- 
son-Vanik amendment? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I met this 
morning with Senators Jackson, Ribicoff, 
and Javits, and we agreed that we would 
continue our discussions after my return. 
And I don't think it would be helpful for me 
to try to anticipate what the outcome would 
be. But I think we all approached the dis- 
cussions with the attitude that it was a se- 
rious problem for which we would try to 
find a constructive solution. 

Q. On this forthcoming trip, do you ex- 
pect to get involved in any other phase of 

the Mideast problem, for example, the West 
Bank, or do you plan to meet with any of 
the oil-producing nations? 

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly I would ex- 
pect to visit Jordan, and obviously that 
would involve there a discussion of the is- 
sues that Jordan is primarily interested in. 
And there is a possibility of visiting one or 
two of the oil-producing nations. But the 
shape of this trip beyond the first stop is not 
fully clear yet, and a great deal will depend 
on the evolution of the negotiation and how 
many trips may have to be taken between 
Damascus and Jerusalem and where one will 
leave the negotiation when I leave the area. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, having been granted 
export licenses to Argentina to send cars to 
Cuba, is the economic-denial program still 
viable, and what are you going to do about 
the Canadian locomotive companies which 
have already started shipping and are under 
the same obligation? 

Secretary Kissinger: The decision with re- 
spect to Argentina was to permit American 
companies that are chartered in foreign 
countries to comply with the laws of the 
countries in which they are located — to deal 
with an anomaly of our legislation which 
makes American companies that are incor- 
porated in foreign countries subject to U.S. 
law rather than to the law of the country in 
which they are domiciled in case there's a 
conflict. It was not based on considerations 
of Cuba policy. 

Therefore the behavior of American com- 
panies in those countries will depend on the 
policies the countries pursue vis-a-vis Cuba. 
And our own view on that has not changed. 

Q. But the policy is still viable? 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe it is. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you ascertain as yet 
whether it will or will not be necessary for 
you to make a second preparatory trip to 
Moscow before the summit? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that will be- 
come clearer after I have talked to Foreign 
Minister Gromyko, and that would be re- 


Department of State Bulletin 

lated largely to SALT issues if it became nec- 

Q. If you decided such a trip was neces- 
sary, is it unlikely that it would be at the 
end of this current trip? Woidd you pre- 
sumably return to Washington before going 
to Moscow ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Are you afraid that 
Marilyn [Marilyn Berger, Washington Post] 
will come to Moscow with me? [Laughter.] 

Q. I just want to make sure you have am- 
ple time to rest before you go to Moscow. 

Secretary Kissinger: My intention is to re- 
turn to Washington to restore my emotional 
equilibrium. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you still believe that 
a disengagement agreement with Syria is 
necessary in order to continue progress in 
the Middle East, or could developments be- 
tween Israel and Egypt continue even with- 
out disengagement? 

Secretary Kis'singer: Well, of course, this 
would depend on decisions made by Egypt 
and Israel. I have been given to understand 
that progress between Egypt and Israel re- 
quires progress between Syria and Israel, 
and I have had no reason to doubt that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible that you 
would return to Geneva on this trip to com- 
plete the disengagement negotiation? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am not sure 
— as I pointed out — that we can complete 
the negotiation on this trip. There are many 
more uncertain factors in this negotiation 
than there were in the Egyptian-Israeli ne- 

If the negotiation seems to be progressing, 
it is not excluded that this could happen. 
But we have really not considered it yet. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson was 
a little worried when he talked to a reporter 
this week about the possibility of secret un- 
derstandings and commitments that involve 
this foreign aid package. Did he raise that 
question, and what did you tell him if he 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want 
to comment on my discussions with Senator 
Jackson. I can answer your question : There 
are no secret commitments with respect to 
the foreign aid program. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up on that 
further, do you have anything specific to 
present to Mr. Gromyko beyond what you've 
already said, when you get to Geneva, rela- 
tive to SALT? And how can you expect the 
Soviet Union to restrain itself from deploy- 
ing MIRV's [multiple independently target- 
able reeyitry vehicles] when we are, as you 
just said, continuing to deploy them our- 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, re- 
straints on the deployment of MIRV's would 
have to be reciprocal. The Soviet Union, 
when I was in Moscow last time, presented 
to us its consideration on how MIRV's could 
be limited and what other steps could be 
taken. As I pointed out, but not very lucidly 
at the time, this represented an advance in 
the Soviet position, though not yet sufficient 
for us to find it acceptable. 

If I had not already used the word, I would 
say that what we need is a "conceptual 
breakthrough." [Laughter.] But what is 
necessary now is to see whether some of 
the Soviet ideas that were presented in Mos- 
cow could be adapted to our requirements 
in terms of numbers and in terms of general 

We can discuss this with the Foreign Min- 
ister. If it seems that then an American 
proposal embodying numbers, time frames, 
and so forth, would be useful, then we can 
make it. But obviously any proposal on 
any limitations will have to be reciprocal — 
which does not mean it has to be exactly 
numerically equivalent. 

Q. Well, does that mean that we're willing 
to stop deploying the MIRV's? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are willing to ac- 
cept limitations on our MIRV deployment 
in return for limitations on their MIRV 
deployment, but the issue is at what level. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you doing anything 

May 20, 1974 


to ptirsue, or at least consider, Senator 
Jackson's proposal that a reopened Suez has 
to be demilitarized? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the shipping 
through the Suez Canal is governed by the 
Constantinople Convention of 1888, and 
therefore it is not a bilateral matter to dis- 
cuss between us and Egypt. The Constanti- 
nople Convention was precisely designed to 
prevent the host country from unilaterally 
regulating the traffic through the canal. We 
are openminded on this suggestion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 

Egyptian Ambassador Presents 
Credentials to President Nixon 

Following are remarks made by President 
Nixon and Ashraf 'Abd al-Latif Ghorbal, 
neivly appointed Ambassador of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, on April 19 upon the 
Ambassador's presentation of his letter of 
credence to President Nixon. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 22 

President Nixon: These are your creden- 
tials, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador Ghorbal: These are my cre- 
dentials, Mr. President, and it is a great 
honor for my country to present them to 
you today. 

President Nixoyi: Here is my response, 
Mr. Ambassador. And I want you to know, 
and I want you to inform President Sadat, 
that this is a day I have looked forward to 
from the time I entered this office. 

I have felt that it was a great tragedy 
for both our countries that our relations did 
not exist, due to events that we are all aware 
of in the sixties. I realize, too, that we are 
entering a period that is vitally important in 
terms of building not just a temporary but 
a permanent peace in the Middle East, which 
will mean that your people will move for- 
ward in peace rather than to have the plague 

of war, which has plagued so many of the 
countries there over and over again. 

And I want to say personally that one of 
the reasons I have welcomed the opportu- 
nity to receive your credentials is that in 
1963, at a time when we did have relations, 
which was before the June war, my wife and 
I visited Egypt with our two daughters, and 
we shall never forget not only the great his- 
torical monuments which go back further 
than any in the world, but we will never 
forget the friendship. We look forward some- 
day to coming again. 

Ambassador Ghorbal: Mr. President, I am 
overwhelmed. I am deeply honored. I am 
sure I grace everyone in Egypt when I say 
this is equally a great day for each of us, 
for we are today ending the estrangement 
and looking ahead to a rapprochement of 
cooperation and good friendship. 

The people of Egypt remembered very well, 
and remember very well, the visit of you, 
Mr. President, and Mrs. Nixon. Sixty-three 
has been long back. It is high time we wel- 
come you back, Mr. President, and we look 
forward to your visiting Egypt very soon. 
I know that President Sadat and Mrs. Sadat 
are anxious — so are the people of Egypt — 
to welcome you back. 

You have done admirably in bringing 
about the beginning, and we hope the con- 
tinuing process, of establishing permanent 
peace in the Middle East. We salute your ef- 
forts. We want this cooperation continu- 
ously, not only after peace is achieved but 
even beyond. 

You have done tremendously. We look for- 
ward to your doing tremendously, and I 
want to thank you, Mr. President. 

President Nixon: Mr. Ambassador, in con- 
clusion, you have spoken of what we have 
done. Let me say that I should put it in the 
plural, together our two nations have worked 
out difficult problems in these past months 
involving, of course, the disengagement. 

And it is together, economic ways and 
other ways, that we can move forward for 
not only progress for your country but for all 
of your neighbors, which I know President 
Sadat wants. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. and Federal Republic of Germany 
Sign New Offset Agreement 

Folloiving is the text of a joint U.S.- 
Federal Republic of Germany announcement 
issued at Washington and Bonn on April 25, 
together tvith an explanatonj note issued that 
day by the Department of State and the 
U.S. Embassy at Bonn. 


Press release 157 dated April 25 

The Governments of the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the United States of Amer- 
ica, represented by Ministerial Direktor Dr. 
Peter Hermes and Ambassador Martin Hil- 
lenbrand, today [April 25] signed an agree- 
ment which provides for offsetting the bal- 
ance-of-payments costs of stationing US 
forces in the Federal Republic. The Agree- 
ment resulted from several months of negoti- 
ation and from informal talks held on March 
19, 1974, between the Federal Minister of Fi- 
nance, Herr Helmut Schmidt, and the Sec- 
retary of the Treasury of the United States 
of America, Mr. George Shultz. Remaining 
details were subsequently agreed between the 
negotiating delegations. 

The new agreement covers the period from 
July 1, 1973, to June 30, 1975. It involves 
a total value of 5,920 million DM (about 
2.2 billion dollars at a conversion rate of 
$1 = 2.669 DM). As previously, military pro- 
curement is the largest element (2,750 mil- 
lion DM). Similar to the 1970/71 agree- 
ment, the present agreement includes pro- 
curement of uranium separation work for 
civilian purposes and, for the first time, bi- 
lateral projects in the field of scientific and 
technological cooperation (300 million DM). 
The program for modernization of barracks 
and other facilities used by United States 
forces in Germany, included in the previous 
agreement, will be continued (600 million 
DM). In addition, the United States forces 
will be exempt from landing charges in 

German civilian airfields and from certain 
real estate taxes (20 million DM). As pre- 
viously, provision has been made for the ac- 
quisition of low-interest United States Treas- 
ury securities by the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(2,250 million DM). 

The agreement is based on the strength 
of the United States forces in the Federal 
Republic of Germany as of July 1, 1973. 
Both Governments are informing their 
NATO Allies about this agreement, which 
will form an integral part of the NATO 
burdensharing program currently under dis- 

Both sides welcome the agreement as a 
visible and convincing example of excellent 
German-American cooperation within the 


In conjunction with the press release is- 
sued today [April 25] by the Federal Repub- 
lic of Germany and the United States fol- 
lowing signature of our new offset agree- 
ment, the U.S. Government wishes to add 
the following points : 

The offset to be provided during fiscal 
years 1974-75 is larger in dollar terms and 
contains more substantial economic benefits 
to us than was the case in previous offset 
agreements. Cognizant of the requirements 
of the Jackson-Nunn amendment, the Amer- 
ican side views the agreement as a major 
component of the NATO-wide effort to share 
more equitably the common burden of alli- 
ance defense. We anticipate sufficient mili- 
tary procurement from our other European 
allies so that, together with the German off- 
set, we expect to meet the requirements of 
this amendment and to maintain our forces 
in NATO Europe at present levels. We be- 
lieve, therefore, that what we have accom- 
plished in this agreement, together with 
foreseeable action by our other allies, re- 
sponds to congressional intent and that our 
primary objective has been achieved. 

May 20, 1974 


U.S.-German-European Community Economic Relations: 
The Need for Common Approaches to Common Problems 

Address by Martin J. Hillenbrand 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^ 

It is a pleasure for me to be here in Kas- 
sel today. I appreciate your invitation and 
this opportunity to talk about some of the 
common problems we face. It is especially re- 
warding to be able to discuss these issues 
with a group with direct and practical expe- 
rience in the day-to-day problems of inter- 
national commerce and cooperation. 

The focus of my remarks today is the eco- 
nomic relationships linking the United 
States, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
and the European Economic Community. 
However, it is important to note that eco- 
nomic matters cannot be viewed in isolation 
from other aspects of our total relationship. 
We live in an interdependent world in which 
all things seem to impact on one another, in 
which issues of economics and politics are in- 
terwoven to form the fabric of our relation- 

I would like first to say a few words 
about the American economy. It is — like that 
of the Federal Republic — at present slowing 
down. Forecasters expect real gross national 
product in the United States to rise by about 
1 percent in 1974 — also similar to predic- 
tions for the Federal Republic. We expect 
recovery from the current period of slow 
growth to be underway in the second half of 
1974. We expect that 1975 will be a very 
good year in terms of real growth. 

At the same time, we — again like you — 
are experiencing the greatest increases in 

'■ Made before the Industrie- und Handelkammer 
at Kassel on Apr. 5. 

the rate of inflation since the Korean war. 
Nevertheless, in this area we both are among 
the best performers in the industrialized 
world. We now expect price performance in 
the United States to improve in the second 
half of the year because a high portion of 
the recent price increases has been due to 
rising food prices. That should abate when 
this year's anticipated good crops begin to 
have their effect in the marketplace. 

Our economies also are alike in counting 
on strong performance in the export field. 
In the United States, we are counting on 
further improvement in our balance of trade 
to help improve our overall international 
payments balance. 

Despite the overall rise in the value of the 
mark relative to the dollar over the past 
year, the trade balance between our two 
countries continues to remain strongly in fa- 
vor of the Federal Republic of Germany. To 
reduce this gap, the U.S. Government has 
sought in recent years to encourage exports 
to Germany. More recently, there has been 
in the Federal Republic a growing interest 
in assisting us to narrow this gap as a 
means of stabilizing the international mone- 
tary situation, helping to control inflation in 
Germany, and improving trade relations be- 
tween our two countries. 

One manifestation of this cooperation has 
been the efl'orts of the German-American 
Chamber of Commerce in the United States 
to obtain the participation of American firms 
in some of the major German international 
fairs and to group them into distinctive "U.S. 



Department of State Bulletin 

pavilions." This will be the case at the Han- 
nover Air Show later this month. 

In addition, we have been looking very 
closely at the German market to see where 
the devaluation of the dollar has opened new 
export opportunities. One area that we be- 
lieve offers American exporters some inter- 
esting opportunities is that of consumer 
goods. We hope that American firms will be 
able to contribute to the high German stand- 
ard of living and increased leisure time by 
providing more of the products that have 
made life in America more pleasant and 

To increase our exports of consumer goods 
to this market, however, it is important that 
something be done about price inflexibilities 
in this sector. Up to the present, these gener- 
ally have meant that the lower prices result- 
ing from dollar devaluation have not been 
passed on to the consumer. We also believe 
that the U.S. lead in the development of pol- 
lution-control equipment may result in ex- 
panding sales here as Germany focuses on the 
problems of improving the quality of its en- 

Finally, I believe that the United States 
can offer Germany substantial benefits by 
making available its technology and experi- 
ence in the construction of nuclear power 
generating plants to help the German econ- 
omy cope with the energy shortage over the 
long run. 

In the field of investment, we are also 
seeing some new currents. In 1968, Servan- 
Schreiber's book "The American Challenge" 
crystallized the thinking of many Europeans 
who were becoming concerned at what they 
considered an excessive level of American in- 
vestment in European business. Time has a 
way of correcting imbalance. As foreign in- 
vestment in the United States continues to 
grow, some Americans are beginning to ask 
the same question that preoccupied Servan- 
Schreiber: "Are we getting too much for- 
eign investment?" 

Most Americans continue to believe the 
answer should come from the marketplace 
itself. We believe that a free and open inter- 
national economy which relies on free market 

forces is the most efficient way to allocate 
the world's capital, raw materials, technol- 
ogy, and labor force with the greatest bene- 
fit to all. Although both the executive and 
legislative branches of our government are 
analyzing the nature and effect of foreign 
direct investment in the United States, we 
have no intention of changing the general 
outline of our investment policy, which has 
traditionally been to extend a warm wel- 
come to foreign investment. 

U.S. Dialogue With the European Community 

Apart from bilateral trade and investment 
issues, the focus of our economic relations 
has gradually shifted over the years. The 
European Economic Community has assumed 
greater responsibility not only for coordinat- 
ing policies among the member countries but 
also for the conduct of foreign economic pol- 
icy with third countries. Thus, when eco- 
nomic policy differences do arise, they tend 
to be centered in our relations with the Com- 
munity rather than in our bilateral economic 
relations. Nor will it come as any surprise 
to you that I say that there have been dif- 
ferences recently between the United States 
and the Community. 

Some of them result from the normal give- 
and-take between major trading partners. 
One expects such problems to arise from time 
to time and, I suppose, it is even healthy 
that they do. But it is not healthy if these 
problems are allowed to fester and decay, 
with the risk they may spill over into other 

The United States has been negotiating 
for well over a year now on issues arising out 
of the enlargement of the Community to in- 
clude the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Den- 
mark. In the process of expansion the three 
new member countries raised their duties on 
a number of products of special interest to 
the United States — duties which had been 
bound at lower levels as a result of previous 
trade concessions on our part. We believe 
that the United States was disadvantaged by 
this move, and we would welcome a rapid 
conclusion to our negotiations. 

May 20, 1974 


Another problem relating to the expansion 
of the Community is the new rule for deter- 
mining the origin of products as far as their 
tariff treatment is concerned. These rules ap- 
pear to discriminate unfairly against Amer- 
ican producers. Here, too, attempts to re- 
solve the dispute have been long and arduous. 

Some of the differences transcend the level 
of economic disputes, hovi^ever, and go to the 
heart of the U.S. -European relationship built 
over the past 25 years. A central element of 
it has been the partnership between us, and 
yet there are those who now eschew the use 
of this word to characterize the nature of 
our future relationship. Another element has 
been consultation. Clearly the keystone of a 
successful relationship is a continuous give- 
and-take and adjustment of views — in other 
words, consultation. Yet there are those who 
view continued consultation with the United 
States as undesirable. 

While we have differences with the Euro- 
pean Community, I would emphasize that 
this in no way detracts from our longstand- 
ing commitment to European economic and 
political integration. Nor should these differ- 
ences obscure the central importance which 
we attach to the Atlantic relationship. It re- 
mains the pivot of our foreign policy. Our 
efforts over the past year have been directed 
to revitalizing that relationship. We welcome 
the continuing dialogue with the Community. 
We trust that through frank and open dis- 
cussion of our differences — rather than pa- 
pering them over — our relations may be 
strengthened, to our mutual benefit. 

We recognize that these are troubled times 
for the Community — that it faces many dif- 
ficulties in moving toward the unity which 
its members have established as their goal. 
We are confident that the Community will 
be successful in surmounting the difficulties 
of this transitory phase in its development. 
And we are confident that the cooperation be- 
tween us will continue. 

Indeed, the alternative to a continuing co- 
operative relationship would be very grave. 
Secretary Kissinger said recently that for 
the Community and the United States to 
split apart would be a disaster for all of the 

nations of the West and for free peoples 
everywhere. Such a development would have 
the gravest consequences for our security ef- 
forts and for the stability of the world's eco- 
nomic system. 

I should like to address this latter point in 
the balance of my remarks today, for in the 
economic area we face serious and growing 

Problems of Inflation, Food, and Energy 

One is inflation. In 1973 we saw the most 
severe international inflation in over 20 
years. Some of the price increases were the 
result of worldwide economic booms in which 
demand often outpaced supply. Shortfalls in 
farm output and increasingly expensive raw 
materials — particularly oil — added fuel to 
the increased pressure on prices. Consumer 
prices in the United States increased by 
about 9 percent. Those in Japan went up 
over 19 percent. 

We have learned some lessons from our ex- 
perience in combating inflation. 

One is the importance of patience. An 
overhasty reaction to long-term inflationary 
pressures could lead to a serious counterreac- 
tion. A sharp squeeze on the economy, for 
example, would lead to sudden increases in 
unemployment and give rise to pressures for 
countervailing policies. Steering an economy 
among the rocks of inflation and unemploy- 
ment requires steady policies with no sharp, 
sudden movements. 

Another lesson is the importance of pro- 
duction. A great deal of inflationary pressure 
is the result of supply shortages in the food 
sector, in the raw material sector, and in the 
industrial sector. The best way to deal with 
them is by increasing production. 

A third lesson is the importance of free 
markets. No matter how we experiment, 
either because of ideology or under pressure 
of emergency, our experiences confirm the 
view that the free market is, in general, our 
most efficient form of economic organization. 
Departures from the guidance of the free 
market for any length of time will not solve 
our inflation problems. 


Department of State Bulletin 

And, finally, we have been provided with 
dramatic evidence of the economic interde- 
pendence of the world. Today it is a pipe- 
dream to assume that one country can achieve 
economic stability in an unstable world. 

A second area of common concern to us is 
that of the world food supply. In 1973 there 
were startling changes in the international 
agricultural situation. Major weather prob- 
lems and crop reversals in several important 
producing areas occurred in unusual coinci- 
dence. Rapid economic growth led to in- 
creased demand for grain-fed livestock prod- 
ucts. The result was a dramatic increase in 
world grain imports of over 20 percent in 
one year. Because 1972/1973 crop-year pro- 
duction in major exporting countries was be- 
low normal, it was only by a sharp stock 
drawdown, mainly by the United States, that 
this import demand could be met. 

Achieving world food security will require 
large-scale cooperation between food export- 
ing and importing countries. Broad exchange 
of information as well as technical assist- 
ance will be essential elements. In order to 
support the creation and maintenance of ade- 
quate food supplies internationally, the 
United States in September proposed the 
convening of a World Food Conference under 
U.N. auspices. This proposal closely paral- 
leled that of Chancellor Brandt in his speech 
before the United Nations. He said, and I 
quote : 

The depressing food situation in many parts of 
the world requires us to draft a world food plan 
so that, if in any way possible, catastrophes can 
be prevented by means of our integrating strategy 
for the production of food and its distribution. 

These proposals were accepted, and the 
conference is scheduled for November of 
this year. 

A third area in which international co- 
operation is essential is that of energy, as 
the experience of the past six months has 
made clear. 

During the past decade oil has become the 
principal source of energy for the industrial 
countries of the world. In 1960 oil supplied 
approximately one-third of Western Eu- 

rope's energy requirements; present needs 
are almost 80 percent. Japan currently de- 
pends on oil for more than 75 percent of its 
energy. In the United States, we are almost 
85 percent self-sufficient in energy. But we 
rely on oil for about 45 percent of our total 
energy needs, and about 40 percent of that 
oil is imported. 

Our present emergency, as Secretary Kis- 
singer said in his address to the Pilgrims So- 
ciety of London, "is not simply a product of 
the Arab-Israeli war ; it is the inevitable con- 
sequence of the explosive growth of world- 
wide demand outrunning the incentives for 

Impact of Drastic Increases in Oil Prices 

While the supply situation is serious, the 
implications of price increases may well be 
a greater danger to the world economy. Ex- 
port prices have now been divorced from 
factors such as costs and returns on capital 
and are largely determined by the producer 
governments, working through the Organiza- 
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 

The drastic increases in oil prices will have 
a significant short-term impact on both the 
domestic economies of all nations and on in- 
ternational economic relationships. However, 
because a price change of this magnitude for 
a basic industrial product has no modern 
precedent, the extent of the impact is uncer- 

Even before the recent price hikes, many 
of the world's economies were already de- 
celerating. The higher oil prices will accentu- 
ate this slowdown by reducing consumer 
purchasing power, slowing demand for pe- 
troleum-based products, and causing deferral 
of some business investment as well as con- 
sumer purchases. The result will be a reduc- 
tion in economic growth, somewhat higher 
unemployment than expected, and of course 
a continuing high rate of inflation with in- 
creased oil costs adding to other price pres- 

The price increases will also affect bal- 
ance of payments accounts and international 
financial markets. The oil import bills of 

May 20, 1974 


consumer countries will increase dramatic- 
ally this year. At present consumption and 
price levels, they will go up to about $115 
billion in 1974, an increase of about $70 bil- 
lion over 1973. Exporting countries' reve- 
nues will increase in 1974 to nearly $100 bil- 
lion, 31/2 times the 1973 level. 

As these figures demonstrate, the energy 
situation poses severe economic and political 
problems for all nations. Isolated solutions 
are impossible. Even those countries such as 
the United States and Canada which may be 
able to meet their energy needs by largely 
national means would suffer because of the 
impact on them of a world economic crisis. 
Consumers, producers, industrial giants, poor 
developing countries — all have a stake in the 
prosperity and stability of the international 
economic system. 

Cooperative Approach to Energy Crisis 

The United States recognizes its own na- 
tional responsibility to contribute signifi- 
cantly to a collective solution. We have un- 
dertaken a program which would, by 1980, 
take us to a point where we would no longer 
be dependent to any significant extent upon 
potentially insecure foreign supplies of en- 

President Nixon has named this program 
"Project Independence." Some have misin- 
terpreted it as a return to isolationism or as 
a sign of a "fortress America" mentality. 
Actually, it is exactly the opposite. Should 
the United States be able to reduce its de- 
pendence on imported oil through develop- 
ment of internal resources and by decreas- 
ing the rate of energy growth, competition 
among Western European consumers, Japan, 
and the United States for Middle Eastern 
oil could be reduced. The success of "Proj- 
ect Independence" in reducing U.S. demand 
for imported oil will serve the interests of 
other oil-consuming industrial countries. 

We have also taken an initiative to get un- 
derway a worldwide cooperative effort to 
deal with the energy crisis in the long run — 
the Washington Energy Conference, which 

was held in February. The conference com- 
munique stated the proposition clearly : ^ 

Concerted international cooperation between all 
the countries concerned including oil producing coun- 
tries could help to accelerate an improvement in the 
supply and demand situation, ameliorate the adverse 
economic consequences of the existing situation and 
lay the groundwork for a more equitable and stable 
international energy relationship. 

The conference also recognized that global 
problems cannot be resolved through exclu- | 
sively bilateral arrangements. No one dis- 
putes the right of sovereign nations to make 
individual arrangements. But in the absence 
of agreed rules of conduct over such arrange- 
ments, unreasonable bilateralism can pro- 
duce disastrous political and economic conse- 

The Washington Energy Conference estab- 
lished an Energy Coordinating Group which 
was charged with detailed implementation of 
the principles of international cooperation 
agreed to during the conference. This coor- 
dinating group, which just completed its 
third session earlier this week, is laying the 
groundwork for a coordinated approach to 
our common energy problems. 

These food and petroleum problems are 
symptomatic of the changing relationships 
between consumers and suppliers of raw ma- 
terials. The developed nations' needs for im- 
ported raw materials have grown rapidly 
during the past decade, both because of eco- 
nomic expansion and because their remain- 
ing domestic mineral resources cannot be 
profitably exploited at current prices. 

As the industrial nations have increasingly 
competed for raw material supplies, the pro- 
ducing nations have found that they can uti- 
lize their resources to achieve economic and 
sometimes political gains. Some producers 
have sought higher prices for their products, 
some have demanded increased or full do- 
mestic ownership of production facilities, and 
some have pressed for having the raw prod- 
uct processed further at home rather than 

Restriction of commodity supply has, how- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ever, many repercussions. In the longer run, 
major restrictions imposed by producer na- 
tions on the supply of any commodity — or 
large price increases — will tend to prove 
counterproductive. Consumers will undoubt- 
edly find it in their best interest, for both 
economic and national security reasons, to 
further exploit their own domestic sources 
of raw materials, develop synthetics, or find 
substitute products. 

International Trade and Monetary Reform 

As 1974 opened, it was becoming increas- 
ingly clear that confrontations between pro- 
ducer and consumer nations over the supply 
of commodities can eventually be costly to 
all economies. The efforts which are under- 
way to reform the international trade and 
monetary system may provide also an insti- 
tutional framework for dealing with these 

The energy crisis came on us as we were 
in the midst of efforts to reorder the world's 
trading and monetary systems. The contin- 
ued expansion of trade in a more open and 
equitable world economic system continues 
to be a basic goal of American international 
economic policy. Similarly, we remain com- 
mitted to achieving a new and more effective 
international monetary system to replace that 
of the Bretton Woods era. 

The price increases for oil have lent ur- 
gency to our need for cooperating in this 
field. Treasury Secretary Shultz recently 
pointed out three basic implications of the 
present problems for our efforts on mone- 
tary reform : 

— First, we must demonstrate that we can 
achieve international economic cooperative 
agreements in a timely fashion. 

— Second, in doing so, we must reorder 
our thinking to take fully into account the 
new conditions and the new uncertainties in 
international affairs. Our monetary reform 
agreements must not attempt to impose upon 
the system a rigidity which hampers response 
to future developments, including, for ex- 

ample, the possibility of a surfeit of energy 
supplies in a few years' time. Rather, we 
must agree on rules and procedures to in- 
sure there will be prompt adjustment in re- 
sponse to developing international monetary 

— Third, we must design financial mech- 
anisms and arrangements to deal with the 
present problem. But we must be realistic 
and recognize that the present problem is 
literally unmanageable for many countries. 
The oil-producing countries have to recog- 
nize this simple fact and cooperate in scaling 
down the financial problem to manageable 
proportions. Once that is accomplished, we 
must still bring together the countries that 
have investment opportunities with oil-pro- 
ducing countries that have investable funds, 
so that major destabilizing forces in the 
world economy are avoided. 

In the area of multilateral trade negotia- 
tions, a timetable was established at the 
Tokyo ministerial meeting last September. 
It called for the preparatory work to be com- 
pleted in Geneva this spring. The hard proc- 
ess of negotiation would then begin in Sep- 
tember and continue through 1975. We think 
this timetable can still be met. We continue to 
be optimistic that the Congress will pass the 
legislation providing our side with the nec- 
essary trade-negotiating authority before 
the end of the summer. 

Our recent problems in the agricultural 
and energy fields also have implications for 
our effort to reform the international trading 
system. The oil situation has given us cause 
to consider the larger problem of assuring 
adequate access to the world's supply of pri- 
mary raw materials. We think it would be 
appropriate to reflect this new focus in the 
trade negotiations. 

The agricultural problems of last year 
were aggravated by the misallocation of ag- 
ricultural resources which has developed 
over the past decades. For too long some of 
the special problems associated with agri- 
culture have been used as an excuse to ex- 
empt agricultural trade from trade rules. As 

May 20, 1974 


a result, trade in agriculture has not fol- 
lowed a pattern that would have been dic- 
tated by comparative advantage in agricul- 
tural production. We believe that a primary 
objective of the planned multilateral trade 
negotiations should be to reduce barriers to 
agricultural trade. 

Some voices have argued that the trade 
talks have become irrelevant because of the 
energy situation. We believe that the opposite 
is true. Individual nations may feel impelled, 
for example, to take unilateral actions to 
deal with the short-term effects of crisis. To 
the extent that other countries are affected 
by these actions they may take countermeas- 
ures out of self-protection. This process could 
lead to a vicious circle of action and reaction 
which could stifle world trade and threaten a 
worldwide recession. The trade negotiations 
provide a negotiating process which can act 
as a control and a moderating influence on 
national actions. 

Indeed, the problems we have been discuss- 
ing pose for us in America and for you in 
the Community basic questions as to how we 
are to proceed in dealing with them. The 
question is whether we can develop common 
approaches to common problems, whether we 
will recognize the growing reality of inter- 
dependence and work for a cooperative 
relationship among the industrialized de- 
mocracies. Failure to face the reality of our 
interdependence would have as a likely con- 
sequence the eventual breakdown of the po- 
litical and economic systems which we have 
developed over the past 25 years. Such a 
breakdown could scarcely be in the interest 
of the Community or of the United States. 

Ladies and gentlemen, whether we speak 
of food or fuel, of trade, or of monetary pol- 

icy and inflation, we are metaphorically in 
the same boat. None of us is in a position to 
say to the others: Your end is sinking. That 
is the meaning of interdependence, and that 
is the reason we had better man the pumps 

Senate Confirms Members of Board 
of the Inter-American Foundation 

The Senate on April 25 confirmed the fol- 
lowing-named persons to be members of the 
Board of Directors of the Inter-American 
Foundation : Jack B. Kubisch, for the re- 
mainder of the term expiring September 20, 
1976; John Michael Hennessey, for a term 
expiring September 20, 1978; Charles A. 
Meyer, for a term expiring October 6, 1978. 

The Board consists of seven members, four 
from private life and three from among 
officers or employees of agencies of the 
United States concerned with inter-American 
affairs. Augustin S. Hart, Jr., is Chairman 
and George Cabot Lodge is Vice Chairman 
of the Board. 

The Inter-American Foundation was es- 
tablished by Public Law 91-175 of December 
30, 1969, as the Inter-American Social De- 
velopment Institute, and the name was 
changed by a 1972 amendment to this law. 
It was formed to cooperate with private, re- 
gional, and international organizations to 
strengthen bonds of friendship among the 
peoples of this hemisphere. Its objective is 
to encourage the growth of democratic insti- 
tutions by supporting self-help efforts and 
focusing on wider participation of the people 
in the development process. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Opposes Unilateral Extension 
of U.S. Fisheries Jurisdiction 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush 

It gives me special pleasure to appear be- 
fore you this morning to testify for the ex- 
ecutive branch on an important piece of 
legislation in an area I have been following 

We are all aware, Mr. Chairman [Senator 
Warren G. Magnuson of Washington], of the 
close personal attention which you and other 
members of your committee have given to 
possible solutions for U.S. coastal fisheries 
problems, both in the context of the Law of 
the Sea Conference and in the interim period 
before the conference. We share a common 
interest in effectively resolving these prob- 
lems. And they are real problems which af- 
fect two critical ocean areas. 

The first is the region off the Atlantic 
coast and New England. We went to great 
lengths to call special meetings of the Inter- 
national Commission for the Northwest At- 
lantic Fisheries (ICNAF) last October and 
January and sent our best experts to at- 
tend. I believe the concessions we obtained 
from the member countries of ICNAF are 
substantial from our point of view. They go 
a long way toward providing the interim 
safeguards we need. We must now see 
whether these measures are effective. 

The second region is that off the Pacific 
Northwest and Alaska — your home area, 
Mr. Chairman, and that of your distin- 
guished colleague. Senator Stevens [Senator 
Ted Stevens of Alaska]. 

' Made before the Senate Committee on Commerce 
on May 3. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

This is a region in which both Japan and 
the Soviet Union have very large fisheries. 
We have tried in bilateral efforts with these 
countries to reduce the impact of their fish- 
ing. Our experts believe we are making prog- 
ress. There are of course special problems in 
this area concerning salmon and halibut. We 
are working to reduce the impact of Jap- 
anese fishing on salmon and of the fisheries of 
both countries on halibut. The Japanese, as 
this committee is aware, recently made sig- 
nificant concessions on halibut. 

What I am saying, Mr. Chairman, is that 
we are actively seeking to obtain the coop- 
eration we will need to protect our fisheries 
during the interim period before conclusion 
of an agreement on law of the sea. 

These efforts on our part have by no 
means eliminated the problems I have re- 
ferred to. More work is needed. I do believe, 
however, that more time is also needed to 
test the effectiveness of the agreements we 
have reached and to permit us to build upon 
these agreements in furthering our interests. 
This is a continuing process. 

In the Department of State, for example, 
we are establishing a new Bureau of Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scien- 
tific Affairs headed by an Assistant Secretary 
of State. Within this new bureau we plan to 
designate one Deputy Assistant Secretary to 
concentrate exclusively on fisheries and 
oceans matters. 

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, as you and 
many of your congressional colleagues have 
urged, it is our intention, with the concur- 
rence of the appropriate Senate authorities, 
to grant this ofl!icial the personal rank of 

May 20, 1974 


Ambassador because of the significance of 
U.S. interests in oceans and fisheries as well 
as his international negotiating responsibili- 
ties. We believe that these efforts will con- 
siderably strengthen the Department's ability 
to coordinate foreign policy in this field and 
to give the area of fisheries the attention it 
must have. 

Our negotiating efforts and the creation of 
a new bureau, Mr. Chairman, demonstrate 
our deep concern for the interests of our 
fishermen. Nevertheless, after the most care- 
ful consideration of S. 1988, and in full rec- 
ognition of the gravity of the issues we are 
addressing this morning, I must inform this 
committee that the executive branch is op- 
posed to the enactment of this bill. 

The unilateral extension of jurisdiction re- 
quired by this bill would have serious for- 
eign policy implications which could create 
political tensions internationally. Such exten- 
sion could seriously prejudice the achieve- 
ment of satisfactory resolution of the fish- 
eries and other issues at the Law of the Sea 
Conference; it would be harmful, on a long- 
term basis, to all U.S. fishing interests ; and 
it would be a violation of international law. 

The enforcement problems inherent in the 
unilateral extension of jurisdiction must be 
considered. The potential for international 
incidents, particularly with such nations as 
Japan and the Soviet Union, would be grave. 
In short, passage of this bill could create 
some serious international problems. 

Mr. Chairman, we fully recognize that 
overfishing has caused depletion of some of 
our coastal stocks, a problem quite properly 
emphasized in S. 1988. We share your con- 
cern for the many U.S. coastal fishermen who 
are facing severe economic problems. 

In view of the Law of the Sea Conference 
which will begin its substantive work in 
Caracas on June 20, we believe these prob- 
lems are interim in nature. We expect the 
conference to produce satisfactory solu- 
tions. We believe that truly satisfactory so- 
lutions can best be achieved not by unilateral 
action, but by broad multilateral agreement. 

At preparatory sessions for the Law of the 
Sea Conference, the United States intro- 
duced a fisheries proposal designed to give 

coastal states extensive jurisdiction over 
coastal stocks to the limits of their range 
and to promote effective conservation and 
management of fisheries. Under our proposal 
the coastal state would have a preferential 
right to that portion of the allowable catch 
it could harvest. The remaining portion 
would be open to harvest by fishermen of 
other nations, subject to nondiscriminatory 
coastal state conservation measures and rea- 
sonable management fees. 

Anadromous species would also be sub- 
ject to extensive host state control to the 
limit of their migratory range. On the other 
hand, highly migratory stocks such as tuna 
would be managed by international organi- 
zations in which all fishing and interested 
coastal states could participate. 

In the context of the conference, a large 
majority of nations has supported broad 
coastal state controls over coastal fisheries. 
It is clear that the outcome of successful ne- 
gotiations will almost certainly involve sub- 
stantial enhancement of coastal state control 
over coastal stocks, and we strongly support 
this outcome. 

Moreover, we believe the conference should 
also achieve a rational and effective manage- 
ment system for highly migratory species as 
well as host state management jurisdiction 
and preferential rights for anadromous spe- 
cies. A unilateral extension of fisheries ju- 
risdiction at this time, however, could se- 
riously hamper the chances for a satisfactory 
settlement of all aspects of the fisheries 
question at the Law of the Sea Conference. 

The United States has consistently op- 
posed unilateral claims by other countries. 
Moreover, because we view a proliferation 
of unilateral claims at this time as being se- 
riously detrimental to a successful Law of 
the Sea Conference, we have urged other na- 
tions to hold back on unilateral claims. In- 
deed, we have even indicated to nations with 
interim problems that we will be glad to 
help them resolve these problems on a bi- 
lateral or multilateral basis. 

For the United States to extend its fish- 
eries jurisdiction unilaterally at this time 
would seriously impair our credibility inter- 
nationally. It would also weaken the hand of 


Department of State Bulletin 

our negotiators and reduce our ability to ne- 
gotiate a law of the sea treaty which meets 
our objectives. 

Mr. Chairman, we believe that unilateral 
extension of our fisheries jurisdiction would 
prejudice both the short- and long-term in- 
terests of our distant-water fishermen. Sub- 
sequent to our unilateral claim, the United 
States would be compelled, in effect, to rec- 
ognize extended fisheries zones of other 
coastal states, at least to the extent of our 
own unilateral claim. 

This would have a direct and immediate 
adverse effect on our distant-water shrimp- 
fishing industry and on the tuna industry, 
with concomitant detrimental implications 
for the coverage of the Fishermen's Protec- 
tive Act of 1967. 

It is evident to us that the interests of our 
distant-water fisheries will be immediately 
prejudiced. Further, the chances of achieving 
any satisfactory resolution of our distant- 
water fisheries problems in the Law of the 
Sea Conference will have been gravely im- 

Similarly, the long-term interests of all of 
our fishermen may actually be prejudiced. A 
unilateral extension of our contiguous fisher- 
ies zone to 200 miles as outlined in this bill 
would undercut our position on coastal fish- 
eries; namely, that the most effective man- 
agement can be achieved by exercising con- 
trol over the stocks as far offshore as they 
range, even if in certain areas that includes 
jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. 

It is also our opinion, and the opinion of 
other states interested in coastal fisheries, 
that unilateral action will actually make it 
more difficult to extend coastal state fisheries 
jurisdiction at the conference itself, since 
the position of distant-water fishing states 
would be prejudiced. If the consent of those 
states to a comprehensive treaty is to be 
obtained specifically including a new regime 
for fisheries, coastal state regulatory author- 
ity and enforcement powers over coastal 
fisheries must be made subject to interna- 
tional safeguards and provisions regarding 

Mr. Chairman, implementation of S. 1988 
would affect more than our fisheries interests 

alone. Unilateral action of the sort contem- 
plated by this bill is, in our opinion, contrary 
to established principles of international law. 

It is our view that under existing interna- 
tional law no state has the right unilaterally 
to extend its fisheries jurisdiction more than 
12 miles from its coast. We do not recognize 
foreign claims to greater distances, and we 
have repeatedly protested such claims made 
by other states. 

Unilateral action under S. 1988 might also 
be considered a violation of the 1958 Geneva 
Conventions on the Law of the Sea. The prin- 
ciple that international law is to be observed 
applies at all times, and the United States 
has persistently maintained a policy in ac- 
cordance with that principle. To change that 
policy could have ramifications far beyond 
the fisheries question, or even all of our 
oceans interests. 

A violation of international law on our 
part would no doubt encourage similar claims 
by other states. The nature of such foreign 
claims, however, would not necessarily be 
limited by the nature of our own claims. As 
such, unilateral action in this area by the 
United States could trigger damaging uni- 
lateral claims by other nations, thereby af- 
fecting U.S. national interests in navigation 
and overflight, protection of the marine en- 
vironment, and marine scientific research. 

Mr. Chairman, in view of the serious prej- 
udicial impact this bill could have on the Law 
of the Sea Conference as a whole, it cannot 
be deemed an interim measure. All too eas- 
ily, it could destroy the conference and have 
a permanent effect on fishing and other in- 

Despite our belief that passage of this bill 
would be a serious mistake, I wish to empha- 
size again that the interim fishing problem 
cannot be ignored. We are sensitive to the 
difficulties of our coastal fishermen and 
aware of the need to resolve them. 

Recognizing that the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference will take time to complete its work, 
and that there will be additional delays pend- 
ing entry into force of the finalized agree- 
ments, we understand the need and desire 
for interim measures to enhance the protec- 
tion of our coastal stocks. 

May 20, 1974 


As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, we have 
taken steps over the past several years to 
help our coastal fishermen. We are, however, 
the first to admit that these steps have not 
been fully satisfactory to all segments of our 
fishing industry. 

When the new international legal system 
for fisheries management is established by 
the Law of the Sea Conference, we can ex- 
pect the full protection required. During the 
interim period, we will continue to try to 
find ways to cope with the problems. Let me 
touch briefly on two of the measures which 
we have undertaken; 

— First, we have proposed that the fish- 
eries regime agreed to by the Law of the 
Sea Conference come into effect on a provi- 
sional basis pending the actual entry into 
force of the treaty. 

— Second, we have strengthened both bi- 
lateral and multilateral agreements with na- 
tions whose nationals conduct fishing opera- 
tions off our coast. 

Mr. Chairman, while a bill such as S. 1988 
could provide added protection during this 
period, we believe, as I have testified, that 
the legislation could have serious harmful 
consequences for the foreign relations inter- 
ests of the United States, our wide-ranging 
law of the sea policies, and our fishing in- 
terests. In our opinion, the harm done to our 
fishing and other national interests by this 
type of unilateral action would far outweigh 
any short-term interim benefits from this 

Mr. Chairman, although we strongly op- 
pose S. 1988, we appreciate and wish to sup- 
port your strong leadership in protecting 
U.S. fishing interests. That leadership has 
repeatedly been demonstrated over many 
years. We look forward to continuing our co- 
operation with you and your committee in 
these vital matters. 

I am accompanied by Mr. John Norton 
Moore, Chairman of the Interagency Task 
Force on the Law of the Sea and Deputy Spe- 
cial Representative of the President for the 
Law of the Sea Conference; by Ambassador 
Donald McKernan, now a consultant to the 

Department of State; and by Mr. Howard 
Pollock, Deputy Administrator, National ( 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
Department of Commerce. Mr. Pollock will 
be presenting supplementary testimony on 
behalf of the administration. 

Thirteenth Report of ACDA 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Nixon ^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Technology in the Nuclear Age has be- 
come capable of virtually global devastation. 
We are thus called upon as never before in 
the history of American diplomacy — both 
by our traditions and by unprecedented re- 
sponsibilities — to assume a role of leadership 
in seeking international arms restraints. This 
is a most important element of that structure 
of peace which is the broader goal of our for- 
eign policy. 

The coordinating instrument for this ef- 
fort within our Government is the U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, now en- 
tering its fourteenth year. It has been the 
policy of my Administration to strengthen 
this Agency and to equip it for the essential 
role it must play in promoting our national 

The year 1973 was a time of sustained ef- 
fort and continued progress in arms control, 
building upon earlier achievements and lay- 
ing the ground for future agreements which 
will be of utmost importance for our security 
and well-being. 

It is with deep satisfaction in our continu- 
ing progress that I transmit to the Congress 
this thirteenth annual report of the U.S. 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, March 13, 197 Jt. 

' Transmitted on Mar. 13 (Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Mar. 18) ; also printed 
as H. Doe. 93-239, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which in- 
cludes the complete text of the report. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. -Romania Income Tax Convention 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Nixon ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and 
consent to ratification, the Convention be- 
tween the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the So- 
cialist Republic of Romania with Respect to 
Taxes on Income, signed at Washington on 
December 4, 1973. 

The Convention was signed during the 
visit to the United States of the Romanian 
President, Nicolae Ceausescu. It is evidence 
of the continued improvement and expansion 
of United States-Romanian relations. 

The primary purpose of this Convention 
is to promote economic and cultural relations 
between the two countries by removing many 
tax barriers. The convention follows gener- 
ally the form and content of conventions re- 
cently concluded between this government 
and Western European countries. 

I hope that the Senate will act favorably 
on this Convention at an early date. 

Richard Nixon. 

The White House, March 28, 197^. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 2d Session 

Forty-fifth Annual Report of the Work and Opera- 
tions of the Gorgas Memorial Laboratory, Fiscal 
Year 1973. Communication from President, Gorgas 
Memorial Institute of Tropical and Preventive 
Medicine, Inc., transmitting the report. H. Doc. 
93-260. January 22, 1974. 60 pp. 

Intervention on the High Seas Act. Report to accom- 
pany H.R. 5975. H. Rept. 93-760. January 22, 
1974. 9 pp. 

' Transmitted on Mar. 28 (Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Apr. 1); also printed 
as S. Ex. B, 93d Cong., 2d sess., vifhich includes the 
text of the convention and the report of the De- 
partment of State. 

Committee on Internal Security. Annual report for 
the year 1973, together with additional views. H. 
Rept. 93-771. January 29, 1974. 149 pp. 

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
Amendments Act. Report to accompany S. 2957, 
together with minority and additional views. S. 
Rept. 93-676. February 5, 1974. 69 pp. 

Supplemental Authorization of Appropriations for 
Department of State for Fiscal Year 1974. Report 
to accompany H.R. 12466. H. Rept. 93-812. Feb- 
ruary 26, 1974. 7 pp. 

U.S. Participation in the International Ocean Expo- 
sition '75. Report to accompany S. 2662. S. Rept. 
93-700. February 28, 1974. 11 pp. 

Foreign Disaster Assistance Act of 1974. Report, 
together with minority and additional views, to 
accompany H.R. 12412. H. Rept. 93-816. February 
28, 1974. 9 pp. 

Report on the Examination of the Financial State- 
ments of the Panama Canal Company and the 
Canal Zone Government for Fiscal Year 1973. H. 
Doc. 93-226. March 5, 1974. 44 pp. 

Ocean Dumping Convention Implementation. Report 
to accompany H.R. 5450. S. Rept. 93-726. March 
6, 1974. 21 pp. 

Antihijacking Act of 1974. Report to accompany 
H.R. 3858. H. Rept. 93-885. March 7, 1974. 53 pp. 

Amending the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. 
Report, together with additional views, to accom- 
pany H.R. 12799. H. Rept. 93-904. March 13, 1974. 
11 pp. 

Twenty-Third Annual Report of the National Sci- 
ence Foundation. Message from the President of 
the United States transmitting the report. H. Doc. 
93-242. March 18, 1974. 122 pp. 

Treaty on Extradition With Denmark. Report to 
accompany Ex. U, 93-1. S. Ex. Rept. 93-28. March 
21, 1974. 3 pp. 

Migratory Bird Convention with Japan. Report to 
accompany H.R. 10942. H. Rept. 93-936. March 
26, 1974. 22 pp. 

Foreign Sale of SS "Independence." Report, to- 
gether with dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 
8586. H. Rept. 93-947. March 26, 1974. 8 pp. 

Supplemental Authorization of Appropriations for 
Department of State for Fiscal Year 1974. Report 
to accompany H.R. 12466. S. 93-754. March 27, 
1974. 8 pp. 

Inquiring Into the Military Alert Invoked on October 
24, 1973. Adverse report, together with supple- 
mental views, to accompany H. Res. 1002. H. Rept. 
93-970. April 4, 1974. 5 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Synthetic Rutile. 
Report to accompany H.R. 11830. H. Rept. 93-973. 
April 4, 1974. 3 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Horses. 
Report to accompany H.R. 13631. H. Rept. 93-974. 
April 4, 1974. 4 pp. 

Americans Missing in Southeast Asia. Report to 
accompany S. Con. Res. 81. S. Rept. 93-779. April 
9, 1974. 6 pp. 

Examination of the Financial Statements of the 
Inter-American Foundation as of June 30, 1973. 
Communication from the Comptroller General of 
the United States. H. Doc. No. 93-287. April 11, 
1974. 7 pp. 

May 20, 1974 



Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank 
Meets at Santiago 

Statement by Secretary of the Treasury George P. Shultz ^ 

My thanks, Mr. Chairman, to the Chilean 
Government for the warm welcome which 
has been extended to me and the entire U.S. 
delegation. For many years — going back to 
my days as a professor at the University of 
Chicago, where we were privileged to see 
a number of able Chilean students — I have 
heard much of this country, its people, its 
rich culture, and its high aspirations. As 
we meet here today, we are all conscious of 
the large challenges before you and wish you 
Godspeed in your vigorous efforts to meet 

These are times when economic and politi- 
cal relationships are changing rapidly and 
on a global scale. Our hemisphere is not 
isolated from the tides of change. Old as- 
sumptions have been called into question, and 
old ways of doing things no longer seem 
adequate. None of us is wise enough to know 
all the implications of the changes we see. 
But we all recognize the need to move ahead, 
to fashion new principles where necessary, 
to work together cooperatively on the prob- 
lems at hand. We Finance Ministers of the 
Americas have in this common effort a spe- 
cial responsibility to participate, for many 
of our problems are economic in nature. 
Fortunately, we have a foundation upon 
which to build. Here in Santiago and in 
other forums, we can sit down and carry 
forward frank dialogue in a spirit of friend- 

'■ Submitted to the Board of Governors of the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on Apr. 2 
(Department of the Treasury press release). Secre- 
tary Shultz was U.S. Governor of the Bank. 

ship and good will to assess the needs and 
our capabilities. Through this dialogue, it 
will be possible to reach mutually advanta- 
geous decisions. 

In the Inter-American Development Bank, 
we have an institution in being that has been 
a source of increasing strength and a focus 
for cooperation for 14 years. It has at its 
head a man of large vision — Antonio Ortiz- 

A new record was achieved in 1973 in the 
volume of Bank lending commitments, and I 
am even more impressed by the evidence that 
its procedures for the selection and develop- 
ment of sound projects have been further 
strengthened. The problems of the poorest 
nations, and of the poorest sectors in each 
country, are properly receiving more concen- 
trated attention. The work of the group of 
controllers and the increased attention given 
internal evaluation add to our confidence for 
the future. 

Indeed, after 14 years, I believe it is fair 
to say that the Bank is more than ever ready 
to assume a broader role in promoting hemi- 
spheric cooperation. 

Today — when development is threatened 
by shortages of energy, food, and fertilizer, 
when monetary relationships are in a state 
of flux, when new trade and investment is- 
sues are thrust upon us — I want to range 
widely in my remarks. I shall address areas 
not traditionally identified with the work of 
the Bank but which are inevitably of great 
importance to this work. I do so in full con- 
sciousness of the studies and progress the 


Department of State Bulletin 

Bank has made in assessing and in helping 
to meet the needs of the Americas. 

First, I am aware that for many years nu- 
merous Latin American friends have thought 
and stated openly that the United States — 
preoccupied with problems elsewhere- — paid 
inadequate attention to the problems of the 
Americas. We do believe that many of our 
efforts in other parts of the world spared the 
Americas serious problems. Nevertheless, 
last year at Jamaica I attempted to make a 
simple point : We do care. 

I believe that fundamental point was the 
message that Secretary Kissinger brought to 
the meeting of Foreign Ministers of our na- 
tions convened in Mexico City just over a 
month ago. Out of their discussions ranging 
widely over political and economic matters, a 
new understanding and a new spirit have 
begun to emerge. 

We can sense the challenge. Approaching 
it with realism, with candor, and with a new 
solidarity, we can meet that challenge. That 
is the aim of the United States. 

As Finance Ministers, dealing every day 
with hard facts and pressing problems cry- 
ing out for decision and resolution, we know 
that hortatory statements and vague princi- 
ples are not enough. 

We must be able to do tangible things. 
We must realistically appraise our capacity 
to act — to deliver what we promise. 

Not least, we in the executive branch of 
the United States can never forget that 
we cannot act alone, without the broad sup- 
port of the public expressed through its 
representatives in the Congress. For that 
reason, I am particularly pleased that we 
have with us a distinguished delegation from 
the Congress whose interest in the hemi- 
sphere is equal to mine. Their voices raised 
in support of the IDB, as they become con- 
vinced of its real significance, will have a 
definite and favorable effect in our Congress. 

World Monetary and Trade Negotiations 

Permit me to review briefly some of the 
areas in which I believe we can work more 
effectively toward our common objectives. 

First, we have supported a strong voice 

for Latin America in the ongoing process of 
monetary reform and in the management of 
the monetary system. In the proposed new 
Council of the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund], I believe we have found a promising 
approach toward strengthening monetary co- 
operation and the role of the Fund. The 
success of the Council will, in the end, rest 
on the ability of responsible national officials 
to work together in confidence and good will. 
Let us resolve that our dialogue in the Amer- 
icas, a dialogue responsive to the needs of 
nations in all stages of development, will 
contribute eff'ectively to that larger under- 

Second, in trade we are also approaching 
new negotiations on a world scale. Every 
country represented here can benefit from 
reduced barriers to trade, and there are 
large strands of common interest among us 
to be pursued in these negotiations. In our 
preparatory work, we want to be alert to 
your problems, and we also want you to be 
aware of ours. 

More specifically, I am hopeful that our 
proposed domestic legislation, which contains 
a provision for preferential entry into the 
U.S. market of products from developing 
countries, will be passed in this session of 
Congress. Before implementing that provi- 
sion, we would welcome further analysis of 
your interests and needs. 

For these reasons, we need to reinforce 
our consultative processes, and I am glad 
to be able to say that our chief trade negotia- 
tor. Ambassador Eberle, plans on visiting 
Latin America for that purpose later this 

Third, as we work toward more open mar- 
kets, we must be conscious of a new threat 
to free trade from action to restrict supplies. 
We favor free trade, but it must be on a 
fair basis.