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Volume LXXII 

No. 1867 

April 7, 1975 

Address by President Ford k29 

Address by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll 4.36 



Statement by Ambassador Martin 454 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXII, No. 1867 
April 7, 1975 

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Washington, D.C. 20402 


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approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29. 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

International Partnership To Improve Tomorrow's World 

Address by President Ford ^ 

The Fighting Irish of Notre Dame have 
become a symbol of the tenacity and deter- 
mination of the American people. 

But Notre Dame believes not only in might 
on the football field or on the basketball 
court but in a spiritual response to human- 
ity's struggles for a decent life. 

I have been told that many of you chose 
to go without a normal meal, eating only a 
bowl of rice, to save money to help feed the 
world's hungi-y. It is heartwarming to know 
that students are concerned about others 
abroad at a time when many here at home 
are finding it difficult to afford an education 
or to get a job. 

Although life is hard for many Americans, 
I am proud that we continue to share 
with others. And that, in my opinion, is the 
measure of genuine compassion, and I con- 
gratulate you. 

I am especially proud to be on a campus 
that looks up to God and out to humanity at 
a time when some are tempted to turn in- 
ward and turn away from the problems of 
the world. Notre Dame's great spokesman. 
Father [Theodore M.] Hesburgh, is known 
in Washington as a nonconformist. I must 
admit that I do not share all of the father's 
views. But he is following one nonconform- 
ist viewpoint to which I fully subscribe, and 
I quote: 

Be not conformed to this world: but be ye trans- 
formed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may 

' Made at Notre Dame University, South Bend, 
Ind., on Mar. 17 (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Mar. 24; introductory 
paragraphs omitted). 

prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, 
will of God. 

To conform to apathy and pessimism is 
to drop out and to cop out. In that sense, 
I fully reject conformity. In that sense, I 
am a nonconformist who continues to be 
proud of America's partnership with other 
nations and who makes no apology for the 
United States of America. America's good- 
ness and America's greatness speak for 
themselves. I believe in this nation and in 
our capacity to resolve our difficulties at 
home without turning our back on the rest 
of the world. 

Let me share a personal experience. I was 
elected to the Congress in the aftermath of 
World War II. A nonpartisan foreign policy 
was emerging at that time. America realized 
that politics must stop at the water's edge. 
Our fate was linked to the well-being of 
other free nations. We became the first na- 
tion to provide others with economic assist- 
ance as a national policy. Foreign aid was 
an American invention, or an American 
project, of which we can be justifiably proud. 

Today, as I look back, I am grateful for 
the opportunity to serve in our government 
during the third quarter of the 20th century. 
These past 25 years, while not perfect, 
were incomparably better for humanity than 
either of the two previous quarters of this 
century. There was no world war nor global 
depression. Major nations achieved detente. 
Many new nations obtained independence. 
There has been an explosion of hope, free- 
dom, and human progress at home as well 
as abroad. 

April 7, 1975 


America's role, considered in fair context, 
was a catalyst for change, for growth, and 
for betterment. 

The Marshall Plan, unprecedented in world 
history, restored a war-ravaged Europe. 
Even earlier, U.S. relief and rehabilitation 
activities during World War II and assist- 
ance to Greece and to Turkey after the war 
had provided precedents and experience in 
America's overseas assistance. 

In the same year that I came to Con- 
gress, 1949, President Truman advanced 
Point 4, an innovative, remarkable concept 
providing technical assistance to developing 
nations. It brought new American ideas and 
technology to people hitherto unable to bene- 
fit from advances in health, agriculture, and 

The Food for Peace Act, designed to use 
America's agricultural abundance to assist 
others, was a product of the Eisenhower 
Administration. In the late fifties, we cre- 
ated the Development Loan program to help 
others help themselves. In 1961, the Con- 
gress established the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development to consolidate and to 
administer the various activities and agen- 
cies that were carrying out the will of the 
Congress and the President at that time. 

Foreign Assistance and World Peace 

Programs to help people in the developing 
countries are an expression of America's 
great compassion, and we should be proud 
of them. But such aid is also part of the 
continuing effort to achieve an enduring 
structure of world peace. 

It is no longer a question of just the Third 
World. I am deeply concerned by the prob- 
lems of the "fourth world" — the very poorest 
world — where from 400 million to 800 million 
people suffer from malnutrition, where aver- 
age per capita income is under $275 per 
year, where life expectancy is 20 years less 
than in the developed countries, where more 
than 40 percent of the children will never 
reach the age of five, where more than half 
of the population has never been to school. 

Despite these problems, the economies of 

the developing countries have grown at an 
encouraging rate in the past 10 years, thanks 
in part — I think substantial part — to Amer- 
ican assistance. Manufacturing output in- 
creased 100 percent, food production by over 
one-third. Enrollment in elementary schools 
doubled. Enrollment in secondary schools 
and colleges quadrupled. 

But population growth and increased de- 
mand collided with inflation and energy 
shortages. Gains, in many, many instances, 
have been wiped out. At the very time when 
our policy seeks to build peace with nations 
of different philosophies, there remains too 
much violence and too much threat to peace. 

The Congress defined the role of foreign 
aid this way, and I quote from the legisla- 
tion itself: 

The freedom, security, and prosperity of the 
United States are best sustained in a community of 
free, secure and prospering nations . . . Ignorance, 
want and despair breed the extremism and violence 
which lead to aggression and subversion. 

Those words, written by the Congress, I 
think are so accurate. If nations are to de- 
velop within this definition, they must be 
able to defend themselves. They must have 
assurances that America can be counted on 
to provide the means of security, their own 
security, as well as the means of sustenance. 

People with an affirmative vision of the 
future will not resort to violence. While we 
pursue a peaceful world in which there is 
unity in diversity, we must continue to sup- 
port security against aggression and sub- 
version. To do otherwise, in my judgment, 
would invite greater violence. 

The United States, in this day and age, 
cannot avoid partnership with nations try- 
ing to improve the kind of world the children 
of today will face tomorrow. Recent events 
have demonstrated the total interdependence 
of all people who live on this planet. 

The 1973 war in the Middle East showed 
that war confined to a limited region never- 
theless has an economic impact not only in 
South Bend but in every corner of the 
world. Developing and developed countries 
are all part of a single interdependent eco- 
nomic .system. 


Department of State Bulletin 

This audience, I am told, and this student 
body inckides many students from over 60 
foreign countries — and I congratulate you, 
Father Hesburgh. Let this demonstrate to 
all Americans that other people place a high 
valuation on what America has to offer. Let 
it demonstrate that the University of Notre 
Dame rejects vi'hat some call the new isola- 

The World Food Problem 

Let me share with you a specific problem 
that Father Hesburgh mentioned in his in- 
troduction. When the World Food Confer- 
ence met in Rome in the fall of 1974, I — as 
the newly chosen President — was faced with 
a very perplexing problem. 

Food prices in America were over one-fifth 
higher than in the previous year. Food re- 
serves, as reported by the Department of 
Agriculture, were dwindling. The corn crop 
and other commodities were disappointing 
in 1974. There were concerns about hunger 
among our own people. 

Against this background, I was presented 
with several alternative estimates on how 
much we should spend for Food for Peace 
for those in other lands. 

At the Rome Conference, American spokes- 
men pledged that we would try our utmost 
to increase our food contribution despite our 
own crop problems. As crop reports im- 
proved, I designated — as was mentioned by 
Father Hesburgh — a sum even higher than 
the highest option recommended to me at the 
time of the conference. 

A factor in my own decision was your 
fine president. Father Hesburgh, and you 
should be thankful that you have a person 
who has such broad interests as he as the 
president of your university. 

A factor also in my judgment was that 
the program provided, and properly so, a 
reminder of America's moral commitment. 

Food for Peace was increased from about 
$980 million to $1.6 billion. This will pro- 
vide about 5.5 million tons of commodities, 
up from 3.3 million tons last year. 

Most of the commodities will be wheat 

and rice. But also desperately required — 
and also increased — are blended foods used 
in nutritional programs for mothers and for 

The United States, fortunately, is no long- 
er the only country aiding others, but we 
continue to lead — and we will — in providing 
food assistance. In 20 years of Food for 
Peace, we shipped over 245 million tons of 
wheat, rice, and other grains, valued at 
roughly $23 billion. Every American should 
be proud of that record. It is an illustration 
of the humane feeling and the generosity 
of the American people. 

While food helps, only by technical assist- 
ance can emerging nations meet their needs. 
It has been often said, but I think it is ap- 
propriate at this time, that if a hungry man 
is given a fish he can eat for one day but if 
he is taught to fish he can eat every day. 

The greatest opportunity lies in expanding 
production in areas where production will 
be consumed. The world is farming only 
about one-half of the potential croplands; 
yet there are insufficient farmer incentives 
in many countries, shortages of fertilizer, 
high fuel costs, and inadequate storage and 
distribution systems. 

The answers to the world food problem 
are to be found in interdependence. We can 
and will help other nations, but simplistic 
paternalism may do more harm than good. 
Our help must take the form of helping 
every nation to help itself, and we will. 

Self-Help and Cooperation 

I am particularly concerned about the 
problem of fair distribution. America be- 
lieves in equality of opportunity. This nation 
provides a showcase of change in providing 
better nutrition, education, health, to more 
and more people, including those who can 
least afford it. Now, some nations have made 
excellent use of our assistance to develop 
their own capacities. Other governments are 
still struggling with the issue of equality of 
opportunity and fair distribution of life's 

Good world citizenship requires more than 

April 7, 1975 


moralizing about the role others should take. 
It requires each nation to put its own house 
in order. Good American citizenship re- 
quires more than moralizations about what 
is wrong with the United States. It requires 
personal involvement and action to bring 
about change. It requires voting and orga- 
nizing and challenging and changing with 
the flexible and dynamic American political 
process. Our system, by any standard, works, 
and will work better, and you can be a part 
of it. 

The developing nations of the world 
are increasingly successful in bringing pros- 
perity to larger numbers of their own people. 
In fact, the assistance we have provided 
these nations is not just a one-way street. 
Thirty percent of U.S. exports are purchased 
by these developing nations, thereby obvi- 
ously contributing to a better life for their 
people and jobs for ours. 

In cases where countries have the means, 
let them join in sharing with us, as they 
should. Some have helped; others have not. 
We led the way, and we will not shirk from 
future burdens; but all nations must co- 
operate in developing the world's resources. 
We extend the hand of partnership and 
friendship to make a better world. 

Another challenge facing the developing 
nations, as well as other nations, is to realize 
the need for peaceful accommodation with 
neighbors. An interdependent world cannot 
solve disputes by threat or by force. People 
now and in the future depend on each other 
more than they sometimes realize. For ex- 
ample, we in America import between 50 
and 100 percent of such essential minerals 
as cobalt, bauxite, nickel, manganese, and 

The challenge, as I see it, is for America 
and all other nations to take responsibility 
for themselves while building cooperation 
with each other. 

The challenge is also the preservation of 
the freedom and dignity of the human indi- 
vidual throughout the world. Just as the 
world's nations can no longer go it alone, 
neither can the American people. 

Woodrow Wilson said that "What we 
should seek to impart in our colleges is not 

so much learning itself as the spirit of 
learning." Great universities that pursue 
truth face the challenge that confronts the 
entire American people. It is whether we 
will learn nothing from the past and return 
to the introversion of the 1930's, to the dan- 
gerous notion that our fate is unrelated to 
the fate of others. 

I am convinced that Americans, however 
tempted to resign from the world, know deep 
in their heart that it cannot be done. The 
spirit of learning is too deeply ingrained. 
We know that wherever the bell tolls for 
freedom, it tolls for us. 

The American people have responded by 
supplying help to needy nations. Programs 
— both government and the voluntary agen- 
cies — could not have been and cannot be, 
reenacted without popular support. CARE 
and Catholic Relief Services, pioneers in 
Food for Peace programs, are feeding over 
28 million people around the world right 
today. Protestant, Jewish, and other groups 
are similarly involved. 

At universities throughout the nation, re- 
searchers seek answers to world prob- 
lems. Right here in Indiana, at Purdue 
University, scientists have made discoveries 
in high-protein aspects of sorghum, a basic 
food of more than 300 million people in Asia 
and in Africa. 

Not only the scientists at Purdue but 
people throughout America realize that no 
structure of world peace can endure unless 
the poverty question is answered. There is 
no safety for any nation in a hungry, ill- 
educated, and desperate world. 

In a time of recession, inflation, unemploy- 
ment at home, it is argued that we can no 
longer afford foreign assistance. In my judg- 
ment, there are two basic arguments to the 

— First, foreign aid is a part of the price 
we must pay to achieve the kind of a world 
in which we want to live. Let's be frank 
about it. Foreign aid bolsters our diplo- 
matic efforts for peace and for security. 

— But secondly, and perhaps just as im- 
portantly, even with a recession we remain 
the world's most affluent country, and the 


Department of State Bulletin 

sharing of our resources today is the right, 
the humane, and the decent thing to do. 
And we will. 

But just as we seek to build bridges to 
other nations, we must unite at home. This 
Administration wants better communication 
with the academic world, and I express again 
my appreciation for the warmth of this re- 

But this communication must not just be 
a search for new technology, but for the 
human and spiritual qualities that enrich 
American life. In the future, fewer people 
must produce more. We must therefore un- 
leash intellectual capacities to anticipate and 
solve our problems. 

The academic world must join in the re- 
vival of fundamental American values. Let 
us build a new sense of pride in being an 

Yes, you can make America what you want 
it to be. Think about that for just a mo- 
ment, if you would. Is it really true? Yes, 
in my judgment, it is. But there is a catch 
to it. You will never see it come true. Per- 
haps your children or your grandchildren 
will. What you can do is move America 
slowly, but surely, along the right direction. 

A Better Nation and a Better World 

Admittedly, today's America is far from 
perfect, but it is much closer to the America 
that my class of 1935 wanted than it was 
when I left the University of Michigan. 

Today's America is a far better place than 
it was 40 years ago when the lingering shad- 
ows of worldwide depression were being 
blotted out by the darker clouds of world- 
wide war. My generation did not wholly 
save the world, obviously. But we did, to 
a degree, help to move it along in the right 

We learned along the way that we are part 
of "one world." The author of that phrase 
was a Hoosier, the first political candidate 
about whom I got personally involved enough 
to volunteer as a campaign worker. His name 
was Wendell Willkie. Wendell Willkie, of 
Indiana, was never President, but he was 

right. He fought for what he believed in 
against almost impossible odds. In the last 
Presidential campaign before Pearl Harbor, 
he believed most deeply — too far ahead of his 
time, perhaps — that America must be part 
of one world. He lost the 1940 election but 
he helped unite America in support of the 
truth, which has been our nonpartisan na- 
tional policy since the Second World War, 
and I say with emphasis, there has been no 
third world war. 

On the contrary, the prospects for long- 
range peace have slowly but surely improved. 

Despite setbacks and current international 
problems, the standards of human life have 
been lifted almost everywhere. Yet today 
we hear another theme — that the tide of 
history is running against us, that America's 
example of American leadership is neither 
needed nor heeded at the present time, that 
we should take care of ourselves and let 
the rest of mankind do likewise, that our 
domestic difficulties dictate a splendid self- 
ishness that runs counter to all of our re- 
ligious roots as well as to all recent ex- 

We are counseled to withdraw from one 
world and go it alone. I have heard that 
song before. I am here to say I am not 
going to dance to it. Nor do I believe this 
generation of young Americans will desert 
their ideals for a better nation and a better 

You can and you will help to move Amer- 
ica along in the right direction. Hopefully, 
you can do a better job than the class of 
1935, but while the classes of 1975 and 1935 
are still around, we have much to learn from 
each other. 

We can renew the old American compact 
of respect for the conviction of others and 
faith in the decency of others. We can work 
to banish war and want wherever they exist. 
We can exalt the spirit of service and love 
that St. Patrick exemplified in his day. 

I am not alarmed when I hear warnings 
that the tide of history is running against 
us. I do not believe it for a minute because 
I know where the tide of history really is — 
on this campus and thousands and thousands 
of others in this great country and wherever 

April 7, 1975 


young men and women are preparing them- 
selves to serve God and their countries and 
to build a better world. 

You are a part of the tide of this history, 
and you will make it run strong and true. 
Of that I am sure. 

Thank you, and the top of the morning to 

President Ford's News Conference 
at South Bend March 17 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held by President Ford at South Bend, 
Ind., on March 17.^ 

Q. Mr. President, you have said that the 
question of personalities is really not vital 
to a settlement in Cambodia. My question is, 
is the survival of a non-Communist govern- 
ment in Cambodia vital to the U.S. security 
in Southeast Asia? 

President Ford: Miss Thomas [Helen 
Thomas, United Press International], I think 
it is. I cannot help but notice that since the 
military situation in Cambodia has become 
very serious and since the North Vietnamese 
have apparently launched a very substantial 
additional military effort against South Viet- 
Nam, against the Paris peace accords, there 
has been, as I understand it, in Thailand— ac- 
cording to the news announcements this 
morning — a potential request from Thailand 
that we withdraw our forces from that coun- 

I noticed in the morning news summary 
before I left Washington that the President 
of the Philippines, Mr. Marcos, is reviewing 
the Philippine relationship with the United 

I think these potential developments to 
some extent tend to validate the so-called 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 24. 

domino theory, and if we have one country 
after another — allies of the United States — 
losing faith in our word, losing faith in our 
agreements with them, yes, I think the first 
one to go could vitally affect the national se- 
curity of the United States. 

Q. May I ask you one more question that 
has been on my mind for a long time? Since 
you supported the invasion of Cambodia five 
years ago, wotdd you do the same today? 

President Ford: Well, that is a hypotheti- 
cal question. Miss Thomas, because under the 
law I have no such authority to do so. 

I did support the activities then, the so- 
called Cambodian incursion, because the 
North Vietnamese were using that area in 
Cambodia for many military strikes against 
U.S. military personnel in South Viet-Nam. 
It was a successful military operation. It 
saved many American lives because those 
sanctuaries were destroyed. 

Since I do not have the authority to under- 
take any such military obligation — we have 
no U.S. military forces in South Viet-Nam — 
I think it is a hypothetical question which 
really I cannot answer. 

Q. Mr. President, in your speech here at 
Notre Dame earlier today, you made a strong 
pitch for continued foreign aid despite the 
recession, and I was surprised that you failed 
to mention yotir proposal for more military 
aid to Cambodia and Soiith Viet-Nam. Noiv, 
I know military aid to Southeast Asia has 
been unpopular on many college campuses, 
and I wonder if your failure to mention that 
ivas because you feared you might be booed 
or there might be a walkout by students if 
you professed your policy on that issue. 

President Ford: The speech that I made 
this morning on the Notre Dame campus was 
aimed at the broad concept that the United 
States must participate in world affairs, that 
this was one world in which we all live. I 
pointed out I had always supported as a 
Member of Congress the mutual security and 


Department of State Bulletin 

the foreign aid programs, both economic, 
Point 4, Food for Peace, as well as the mili- 
tary assistance program. 

It seemed to me that we needed a restate- 
ment of the basic reason why foreign aid is 
important — that we live in an interdependent 
world and that the United States has to make 
its full contribution in that regard. 

The details can be discussed, the details 
can be argued; but we needed a restatement, 
a strong restatement of the broad general 
reasons why this country has to be a part of 
the one-world concept, working with our al- 
lies, trying to eliminate difficulties between 
ourselves and our adversaries, and it seemed 
to me if that could be restated we could work 
out the details within that concept and not 
reinflame the differences and difficulties that 
existed while U.S. troops were stationed and 
fighting in South Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. President, the State Department 
anyiounced today that it had found some over 
$20 billion [miUion'\ in 197Jf funds that had 
been voted for aid to Cambodia and had not 
been sent and that it was making that money 
available now. Is this an artifice to get 
around congressional appropriations, and 
are there other sources of such funds that 
could be found? 

Presideyit Ford: I was informed last Fri- 
day of what appears to be very sloppy book- 
keeping in the Department of Defense, and 
I condemn it, if it is, and I will not condone 
it in the future. 

I was surprised by these revelations. I 
don't think it was anything malicious. I 
don't think it was any purposeful action. 
But if the money is available and was appro- 
priated by the Congress for the purposes 
set forth, it will be used according to the law. 

Q. Have similar investigations of past 
Viet-Nam appropriations been made? 

President Ford: The Inspector General, 
as I understand it, found out the $21 million 
in Cambodian military aid that was revealed 

last week to me and publicly announced to- 
day. The Inspector General has a continu- 
ing responsibility to find out any and all 
circumstances such as the one that we are 

1974 Underdelivery of Ammunition 
to Cambodia Disclosed by Audit 

Department Announcement ' 

We have been advised by the Department 
of Defense that a Defense Department audit 
commenced in May 1974 has resulted in a 
finding by the Department of the Army that 
ammunition for Cambodia having a value of 
$21.5 million remains undelivered under the 
fiscal year 1974 military assistance program 
(MAP). This finding, which was made on 
March 10, 1975, resulted in a credit to the 
Cambodia MAP program on March 11, 1975, 
of the underdelivery under the fiscal year 
1974 program. 

The underdelivery resulted from a prac- 
tice by the Department of the Army of 
pricing ammunition on the basis of delivery 
notifications received some weeks after ac- 
tual delivery of the ammunition. Because 
the program was carried out during a period 
of rapidly rising prices, late pricing resulted 
in overcharges. 

The computation of the $21.5 million dif- 
ferential in the pricing dates was made at 
the request of the Inspector General for 
Foreign Assistance. The discrepancy in dat- 
ing was disclosed by a prior U.S. Defense 
Department audit which was examined by 
the Office of the Inspector General. Compu- 
tations were all made by the U.S. Army 
(U.S. Armaments Command). 

A comprehensive review of ammunition- 
pricing methods for foreign military assist- 
ance programs has been initiated. 

' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 17 by 
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Rela- 

April 7, 1975 


Foreign Investment and the Challenge of Interdependence 

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll 

I want to talk this afternoon about Inter- 
national Atlanta and your role in meeting 
a principal challenge of today's diplomacy — 
economic interdependence. I will keep my 
formal remarks short and leave ample time 
for your questions. 

In 1974 this nation paid $26 billion to 
other nations for oil imports. During the 
same year our exports increased to almost 
$100 billion and supported over 3 1/2 million 
American jobs. When we consider these 
figures, there can no longer be any doubt 
that the American economy is irrevocably 
linked to the world economy. The concept 
of fortress America has become an economic 
impossibility. Decisions taken in Brussels, 
Tokyo, and Saudi Arabia have a direct im- 
pact on the economic well-being of every 

"International Atlanta" is not simply a 
slogan ; it is a fact. Atlanta was host to the 
hemisphere at last year's meeting of the 
Organization of American States. Hartsfield 
International is the second busiest airport 
in the country and an important gateway to 
North America. The State of Georgia has 
opened permanent overseas offices in Brus- 
sels and Tokyo to expand international busi- 
ness and encourage investment. 

In recognition of the importance other na- 
tions attribute to the commercial significance 
of Atlanta and the Southeast, six foreign 
consular offices have been established here 
since 1960. We are currently negotiating with 

' Made at Atlanta, Ga., on Mar. 17 before a lunch- 
eon sponsored by the Southern Council on Interna- 
tional and Public Affairs (text from press release 

two other trading partners, Greece and Bra- 
zil, about opening consulates in your city. 

Atlanta in many respects is a microcosm 
of an American economy increasingly in- 
volved in worldwide commerce. Over 450 of 
the "Fortune 500" corporations maintain 
offices in Atlanta, and most of them are en- 
gaged in export activities. Georgia's exports 
to the world in 1974 are estimated to have 
been in excess of $1 billion. 

The international flow of goods and capital, 
so important to the economy of Georgia and 
the nation, is a two-way street. Just as the 
Southeast exports to the world, so the area 
has attracted the commerce and investment 
of other nations. 

Americans are accustomed to the concept 
and benefits of international trade. When 
Georgia was founded in 1733 the trustees 
envisioned an economy based on the pro- 
duction of silk and wine. They banned the 
importation of rum. This may have served 
the cause of sobriety among early Georgians, 
but it also precluded a prosperous trade in 
lumber with the West Indies. And since the 
ban on rum was an obstacle to trade, it did 
not last long. 

Today international investment in this 
country — especially investment by the oil- 
rich Arab countries — is the subject of in- 
tense debate in the nation and in Congress. 

Foreign investment is not new to America. 
Nor does it generally represent a threat to 
our security and integrity. Many of you are 
aware that capital from abroad, especially 
from England, was essential to the construc- 
tion of our transcontinental railroad systems 
in the 1880's. When foreign investment in 


Department of State Bulletin 

the United States becomes visible — such as 
substantial Kuwaiti equity in the new At- 
lanta Hilton or an Arab financial interest in 
a resort island off^ the coast of South Carolina 
— it becomes a public issue. 

But let us take a closer look at the situa- 
tion in Georgia. Japanese investment in this 
state amounts to over $250 million and could 
go higher as a result of the visit by a high- 
level Japanese economic delegation this 
month. Some 2,500 Georgians work for the 
25 Japanese firms doing business here. Dutch 
State Mines operates two fertilizer plants in 
Augusta. Over 100 foreign companies do 
business in Georgia ; 50 of them are engaged 
in manufacturing. More than 12,000 Georg- 
ians work for these companies. Total foreign 
investment in this state is over $665 million. 

These foreign investments are not a threat 
to Georgia or the nation. Foreign capital can 
sometimes be more effective than domestic 
investment : one example is the recent take- 
over of the troubled Franklin National Bank 
by a European consortium. The size of the 
transaction and our antitrust laws would 
have precluded an American bank from res- 
cuing Franklin National. 

Free Movement of Goods and Capital 

Investment from abroad is a source of 
capital, technology, management, and jobs — 
a welcome input to our economy. It is also 
a corollary to traditional American invest- 
ment abroad. 

In an era of economic interdependence we 
must be ready to receive, as well as to initi- 
ate, investment. If the Japanese can adjust to 
the Golden Arches of McDonald's in Tokyo, 
Americans should have no problems learning 
to live with Mitsubishi in Atlanta. 

Under the authority of the Foreign Invest- 
ment Study Act of 1974 the government is 
undertaking a comprehensive survey of for- 
eign investment in the United States. The 
data from this survey will show the amount 
of foreign investment in every U.S. company 
of significant size, broken down by type of 
investment, kind of investor, and country 
of residence. 

Data now available shows that at the end 

of 1973 direct long-term foreign investment 
in our private sector had a book value of $18 
billion, a 25 percent increase over the pre- 
vious year. Twelve billion dollars, or about 
two-thirds of this investment, comes from 
Europe. Canada accounts for an additional 
$4 billion. U.S. direct investment abroad in 
1974 had a book value of $107 billion, almost 
six times the figure invested in this country. 

Contrary to popular impression, America 
is not being inundated with investment 
money from oil-producing nations, although 
we must recognize the potential from this 
source. In the first nine months of 1974 the 
inflows of long-term investment as recorded 
in our balance of payments from all foreign 
investors was $4.2 billion, of which only $2.9 
billion was direct — as opposed to portfolio — 
investment. This figure is slightly below the 
rate of investment in 1973. 

We do not yet have an estimate of foreign 
direct investment in the United States dur- 
ing the fourth quarter of 1974, but we do 
know that foreign portfolio flows into U.S. 
private securities declined quarter by quarter 
last year and actually turned into an out- 
flow in the fourth quarter. Foreign investors 
apparently did not take advantage of the 
bargains available in our securities markets. 

For many years, U.S. policy has consis- 
tently been to reduce the barriers to inter- 
national trade and investment — to encourage 
the relatively free international movement of 
goods and capital. 

Our commitment to generally nonrestric- 
tive treatment of foreign investment is em- 
bodied in an extensive network of treaties 
of friendship, commerce, and navigation. An 
important incentive for negotiating many of 
these treaties is our desire to establish con- 
ditions favorable to private investment 

Under the terms of many of these treaties, 
the right to establish and, once established, 
operate majority interests in enterprises in 
the territory of the other party is governed 
by the national-treatment standard. This 
means that foreign investors should be 
treated generally on the same basis as do- 
mestic investors. Foreign control does not 
provide a basis for discrimination. 

April 7, 1975 


In the early sixties, the United States also 
played a major role in developing the Code 
of Liberalization of Capital Movements in 
the Paris-based Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development. This agree- 
ment has been a significant factor in per- 
suading governments — Japan is a good ex- 
ample — to relax restrictive investment pol- 

These treaties and codes are not intended, 
however, to throw our vital industries open 
to uncontrolled capital flows from abroad. 
There are Federal restrictions which limit 
the amount of foreign investment in areas 
such as atomic energy, radio and telegraph 
communications, shipping and domestic air 
transport, defense industries, and exploita- 
tion of government-owned natural resources. 
These restrictions are generally accepted in- 
ternationally and are incorporated into most 
of our bilateral treaties. 

Dealing With Potential Problems and Abuses 

Although major OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] investors 
have the capacity to make sizable investments 
in the United States and elsewhere, they have 
indicated that they do not desire to control 
large U.S. companies and, indeed, that they 
do not have the capabilities to manage such 
companies. They regard themselves as insti- 
tutional investors seeking a diverse portfolio 
which will give them security for their in- 
vestments and the best obtainable long-term 
return — certainly legitimate desires on the 
part of any investor. 

Our traditional support for freedom of in- 
ternational investment flows must be respon- 
sive to the new situation created by the large 
capital accumulations in the hands of a few 
oil-producing countries. We must improve our 
capacity to monitor capital flows, enforce 
laws designed to protect our vital national 
industries, and safeguard against abuses such 
as the use of investments for political pur- 
poses. A coherent, comprehensive policy on 
national investment must therefore contain 
the following elements : 

— An improved system for monitoring for- 
eign investment coming into this country; 

— Assurance that existing authority to 
deal with abuses by foreign investors is vig- 
orously enforced and that any gaps in such 
authority are promptly recognized and steps 
taken to close them; and 

— Finally, agreement with foreign govern- 
ments, particularly those with a substantial 
capacity to invest, to insure that they con- 
sult with us prior to making major official 
investments in U.S. firms. 

A recently completed extensive Adminis- 
tration review of government policy on pri- 
vate investment calls for prompt and effec- 
tive action in each of these areas. The basic 
conclusion of the study was to reaffirm our 
traditional policy on investment as stated by 
President Ford last October: - 

We continue to believe that the operation of free 
market forces will direct worldwide investment flows 
in the most productive way. Therefore my Adminis- 
tration will oppose any new restriction on foreign 
investment in the United States except where abso- 
lutely necessary on national security grounds or to 
protect an essential national interest. 

We have existing reporting requirements 
and procedures for dealing with foreign in- 
vestment abuses, but they are diffused 
throughout various departments and agen- 
cies. To remedy this situation the Adminis- 
tration will establish an office for gathering, 
consolidating, and reporting information on 
investments. An interagency board will also 
be set up to make policy recommendations 
to the President on inward-investment issues 
and to coordinate effective use of existing 
authority. Once established the interagency 
investment board would be the appropriate 
vehicle to insure that foreign investments 
in the United States are consistent with our 

Prompt agreement with the major oil- 
exporting countries to consult with us in ad- 
vance of any major investments in the United 
States is also an essential feature of our pro- 
posed policy. Agreement could be achieved 
either formally through an exchange of notes 
or informally through diplomatic contacts 

= For President Ford's statement upon signing the 
Foreign Investment Act of 1974, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 4, 
1974, p. 1375. 


Department of State Bulletin 

and oral commitments. The fact that Iran 
consulted informally with us on its negotia- 
tions with Pan American suggests that the oil 
producers acknowledge our legitimate con- 
cerns regarding investments of a controlling 
nature in important U.S. firms. 

The Joint Commissions we have established 
with various Middle East nations could prove 
to be a useful channel for exchanging infor- 
mation and consulting on contemplated major 
investments. A joint communique issued at 
the conclusion of the first Commission meet- 
ing with Saudi Arabia, for example, includes 
an understanding to consult on significant of- 
ficial investments. 

The Administration feels it now has the 
tools to deal with the potential problems and 
abuses of foreign investment. 

We are opposed to legislative initiatives 
that would make it more diflicult for other 
nations to invest responsibly in the United 
States. Most of the proposed legislation deal- 
ing with foreign investment goes beyond 
what is necessary to safeguard our national 
interests. Proposals, such as the Williams 
bill [S. 425], to grant the President authority 
to screen and block, at his discretion, any in- 
vestment leading to foreign control of more 
than 5 percent of a U.S. company could well 
discourage investments we would find desir- 

Legislation granting discretionary power 
to block foreign investments, or other uni- 
laterally imposed impediments to the flow of 
capital, would also be in violation of many of 
our existing treaties. Actions of this nature 
could call into question our longstanding 
commitment to a high degree of freedom in 
trade and investment flows. 

With the safeguards required to protect 
our national interests already in existence, 
our task is to utilize these measures more 
effectively, not to impede the flow of invest- 
ment. Restrictive policies discourage foreign 
investment in job-creating industries, and 
this is particularly inappropriate when the 
economy is in a recessionary phase. I believe 
this is a policy the Georgia business commu- 
nity supports. 

A basic concern of investment policy is not 
whether an investor is foreign, but whether 

he is prepared to abide by our laws and reg- 
ulations — to operate in the American context. 
This country is not prepared to pay a politi- 
cal — or economic — price for foreign invest- 
ment. Business and capital from abroad are 
welcome in the United States; but in deter- 
mining whether or not to place their assets 
in this country, foreign investors should be 
aware, in the President's words, that "dis- 
crimination is totally contrary to the Ameri- 
can tradition and repugnant to American 
principles." ^ 

Adjusting to the Reality of Interdependence 

Foreign investment, of course, is but one 
aspect of the challenge of interdependence ; 
our response to the energy crisis, our policies 
on food aid, our approach to law of the sea, 
and our policy on access to commodities are 
others. Our Trade Act of 1974 and the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations now underway in 
Geneva are foreign policy issues important 
both to Georgia and to a mutually dependent 
world economy. 

How familiar are Georgia's manufacturers 
with the safeguard provisions of the Trade 
Act? How will restrictions on granting trade 
preferences to OPEC nations affect our trade 
with Latin America? How do our trade pol- 
icies relate to detente with the Soviet Union, 
and what do these policies mean to you? In- 
ternational trade is an item of increasing 
importance to the economy of this nation, and 
you may wish to discuss our trade policies 
and opportunities during the question-and- 
answer period. 

Historically, Americans have tended to fo- 
cus on foreign affairs only when confronted 
with an immediate threat, when their sons 
are asked to put on uniforms and fight a war. 
In 1975 foreign policy extends to the gasoline 
pump, the price of bread, the cost of com- 
modities, and to the bustling port of Savan- 
nah. International Atlanta is irrevocably 
linked to the world community; what goes on 
in the world is of very real concern to every 
person in this room. 

" For excerpts from President Ford's news con- 
ference at Hollywood, Fla., on Feb. 26, see Bulletin 
of Mar. 17, 1975, p. 333. 

April 7, 1975 


Atlanta has a proud tradition of rising to 
challenges and meeting tough objectives — 
whether in the field of racial harmony, in- 
dustrialization, or urban revival. Your at- 
titude and your accomplishments have set 
an example to the nation. With the distinction 
between national and international problems 
becoming increasingly irrelevant, it is my 
sincere hope that the civic, academic, and 
business leaders of this community will de- 
vote more of their talents and creative ener- 
gies to the field of foreign affairs. We need 
your ideas and your support. 

The Southeast has a legacy of interna- 
tionalism, but the foreign policy establish- 
ment in this area of the nation could be 
strengthened. The Atlanta community, with 
its obvious stake in a stable, orderly, and 
peaceful world, has the responsibility to as- 
sume a leading role in helping this nation 
adjust to the reality of economic interdepend- 
ence. You can help to awaken all Americans 
to the importance of foreign affairs. 

Recent studies have shown declining busi- 
ness support for foreign policy institutions 
in this country. Less than 1 percent of all 
corporate donations are directed toward or- 
ganizations even remotely related to inter- 
national activities. 

Organizations such as the Southern Coun- 
cil on International and Public Affairs merit 
your attention and support. They play an 
essential role in forging a domestic con- 
sensus on national interests and international 
objectives, in strengthening the constituency 
for foreign policy. 

Secretary Rusk, who is with us this after- 
noon, identified this problem over a decade 
ago when he said : •* 

There are those who say the Department of State 
has no constituency, but I know better. How we 
dispose of our affairs at home can decide elections; 
but how we dispose of our relations with the rest 

of the world can decide the survival of mankind. 
So we have our constituency — every man, woman, 
and child across our great nation. 

Let us work together — government and the 
private sector — to develop this constituency 
and enlist its broad support for our efforts 
to come to terms with the challenge of an in- 
terdependent world economy. 

U.S. Responds to Ethiopian Request 
for Ammunition 

Department Statement ^ 

The U.S. Government has informed the 
Ethiopian Provisional Military Government 
that it is prepared to sell to Ethiopia for cash 
up to 7 million dollars' worth of ammunition. 
The United States took this decision, after 
detailed discussions with the Ethiopian au- 
thorities concerned, because it has been vir- 
tually the sole supplier of Ethiopia's military 
needs for over 20 years and it did not believe 
that it could be totally unresponsive to the 
most recent request. 

At the same time the United States ex- 
pi'essed to the Ethiopian Provisional Military 
Government its strong hope that the two sides 
in the Eritrean conflict would soon enter into 
negotiations in order to end the fighting in 
Eritrea and find an acceptable solution to 
that problem. In this respect, the United 
States notes some encouraging indications 
of progress toward meaningful negotiations 
between the Ethiopian authorities and the 
Eritrean Liberation Front and the Popular 
Liberation Forces. 

We also wish to note that the United States 
is working on a parallel diplomatic track with 
other states in that area in an effort to try 
to get negotiations started. 

* For an address by Secretary Rusk made at St. 
Paul, Minn., on Dec. 10, 1963, see Bulletin of Dec. 
30, 1963, p. 990. 

' Read to news con-espondents on Mar. 17 by 
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Rela- 


Department of State Bulletin 

'The Middle East: A Search for Peace" 

The folloiving interview is from "Bill 
Moyers' Journal: International Report," pro- 
duced by WNET-13, Neiv York, and broad- 
cast nationally by the Public Broadcasting 
Service on March 6. Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco and 
George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of 
State and U.S. Representative to the United 
Nations, were interviewed by Bill Moyers. 

Mr. Moyers: Mr. Sisco, before tve get to 
some specific details, a lot of people are ask- 
ing, ivhy does the Middle East preoccupy so 
much of the State Department's time? So 
much energy, so much effort, so much of the 
American treasury? What is our stake out 
there, as the government sees it today? 

Mr. Sisco: I think we've got very signifi- 
cant overall political, economic, and strate- 
gic interests in this area. And above all I 
think it's important to try to stabilize it in 
order to reduce the possible risk of confronta- 
tion between the major powers. I think it's 
the key hotspot in the world, and I think this 
helps to explain the active diplomacy of the 
past months and years. 

Mr. Moyers: You really actually believe 
that there is a significant possibility of a coiv- 
frontation between the two major powers if 
the Middle East remains a pressure point? 

Mr. Sisco: No, I don't feel by any manner 
of means that it's imminent. I think that ele- 
ment is always there because you've got a 
very complicated area where there are dif- 
ferences between the Arabs and the Israelis. 
These regional differences, you have super- 
imposed the major-power interests, and 
therefore this is the key area of possible con- 
flict. I don't say that this is going to occur, 
but I think it's important that it be a stable 

Mr. Moyers: George Ball, do you agree that 

the Middle East occupies that much center 

Mr. Ball: It's been a point of strategic 
significance from the earliest days, when 
Alexander the Great cast envious eyes on 
this area. It's the bridge between Europe and 
Africa. It's an area which dominates the 
whole southern littoral of the Mediterranean 
and therefore is key to the defense of West- 
ern Europe. It's an area in which the Soviet 
Union has had a long interest, ever since the 
days of the Czar. That's where — it also hap- 
pens to contain the greatest pool of energy 
in the world. So no one can question its vital 
strategic importance, not only to the United 
States but to practically every other 

Mr. Moyers: What does the Soviet Union, 
in particular, think of the Middle East in 
terms of their strategic interests ? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think if you want to 
look back, historically, of course, the desire 
for a warmwater port, the desire to become 
a Mediterranean power, the desire to have 
bases on the south coast of the Mediterra- 
nean, and an interest in oil — all of these 
things are vitally important. The Soviet 
Union is a Mediterranean power now, and it 
does have a potential very great stake in oil 
even though it may not need it immediately; 
but it has a stake also in the strategic, the 
geographical importance of the area. Let me 
just sum up the Middle East in two words — 
it's important geographically and geologi- 
cally, as far as the world is concerned. 

Mr. Moyers: Well, in that context, what are 
you trying to do — you and Secretary Kissin- 
ger — in the next phase of the step-by-step 
diplomacy as you return this week to the 
Middle East? What's your immediate goal? 

Mr. Sisco: Let me say, first of all, that the 

April 7, 1975 


basic step-by-step approach seeks to try to 
take this thing on a piecemeal basis, on the 
assumption that if you can get a practical 
step and then another one it'll help build 
the kind of confidence between the two sides 
that in time could break down the distrust 
which has been so characteristic of the area. 
In other words, we're looking for practical 
tests of peace on the ground. So the funda- 
mental assumption of the step-by-step ap- 
proach has been not only that the problem 
is so complicated on an overall basis and 
therefore very difficult to tackle on an over- 
all basis, but rather if one can develop such 
a step it will build and work toward the over- 
all settlement. 

Mr. Moyers: The focus right now is on 
Egypt and Israel. What does Egypt want? 

Mr. Sisco: Egypt wants a substantial with- 
drawal of Israeli forces in the Sinai. And 
Israel in return is on public record saying 
that if they're going to withdraw, there must 
be also a substantial step forward toward 
peace, and the particular focus has been on 
a formal declaration of nonbelligerency. 

Mr. Moyers: There have been some reports 
in the last few days that Secretai^y Kissinger 
ivould not go back to the Middle East if he 
didn't think some modest step is about to 
take place there between Israel and Egypt. 
Is that optimism realistic? 

Mr. Sisco: It's very hard to be either opti- 
mistic or pessimistic, because the fact of the 
matter is — and I think we've got a fairly 
clear notion of what the negotiating positions 
of each side are, and that's as a result of the 
mission that we took about two weeks ago — 
there is a gap and that gap has to be bridged 
in order to achieve a successful conclusion. 
We think the stakes are very high. We think 
there's a chance to achieve this, and for this 
reason the Secretary is going back. 

Mr. Moyers: How can Egypt give Israel 
the kind of assurance Israel wants without 
angering the Syrians, ivho fear a separate 
agreement by the Egyptians and the Israelis? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, actually, any agreement 
the Egyptians may enter into — not only will 

they have to justify it in terms of their own 
people, but in order for this kind of an in- 
terim step to be meaningful it really has to 
have the broad support of other elements in 
the Arab world, and this is a political fact of 
life. There are political realities, I might say, 
on both sides. 

Mr. Moyers: If the Secretary were to get 
some kind of even modest agreement, would 
he then go immediately to Syria to tvork on 
the question of the Golan Heights and the 
West Bank? 

Mr. Sisco: There are no definite decisions, 
Bill, that have been taken; but if a practical 
step can be achieved, certainly this will help 
establish the basis for further efforts, pos- 
sibly on a broader basis. In terms of where 
we go, in the circumstance that you've de- 
scribed, I think what we would do is to con- 
sult both sides once again at the end of the 
process. We would consult with the Soviet 
Union to see what the next step might be. 

Mr. Moyers: The Israelis say they need 
that oil that they're getting from the Sinai, 
which they occupied after the last war, and 
that unspokenly the word goes if they give 
up the claim on those oilfields there has to be 
some assurance from the United States that 
we will help them replace the oil. Is that a 

Mr. Sisco: We have not gotten into the de- 
tails of this in any discussion with the Is- 
raelis. But the fact of the matter is that 
if there were such a withdrawal, ways would 
have to be found to compensate. 

Mr. Moyers: What else ivould we have to 
give to the Israelis to make them ivilling to 
give up this land they ivon by war and hold 
by force? 

Mr. Sisco: It's not a question of what we 
would have to give. I think this is — you must 
remember. Bill, that this is a negotiation 
between the two sides, and the middleman 
role that we're playing has largely been to 
try to reconcile the views of the two sides, 
and we have not, for example, put forward 
a proposal of our own. We did, at the crucial 
point, in the two previous disengagement 


Department of State Bulletin 

agreements that were concluded this past 
year. And I don't preclude that at some 
given point that we'll develop some ideas of 
our own, but essentially the focus is on the 
substantive positions of the two sides and 
the negotiations between the two sides. 

Mr. Moyers: You talk about the middle- 
man role. There's been a good bit of criti- 
cism over the past year abotd our seemingly 
keeping the Soviets out, and Secretary Kis- 
singer on my program a feiv weeks ago ayid 
you on "Meet the Press" recently said that 
he is playing the middleman role by the re- 
quest of both sides. And the question arises, 
why do they want him to play that role? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think they have confi- 
dence — both sides have confidence in our 
Secretary of State and in the United States 
in particular. The United States has rela- 
tionships with both sides ; that's not the 
case with respect to the Soviet Union. And 
we could not have played, and could not 
presently play, the kind of role unless this 
was the strong desire of each side; and that 
continues to be the case today. 

Mr. Moyers: In the kind of discussions 
that he has been having, and will be having, 
are they formal? When he meets with Sadat 
[President Anwar al-Sadat of Egrjpt], when 
he meets ivith Rabin [Prime Minister Yitz- 
hak Rabin of Israel], when he meets with 
Asad [President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria], is 
it "Mr. Secretary" and "Mr. President"? 
Would you describe what happens? 

Mr. Sisco: Oh, it's very informal. Surpris- 
ingly informal. And this is one of the fac- 
tors, I think, of the personal rapport. Now, 
this personal diplomacy, of course, is very 
important and very significant simply be- 
cause each side has so much confidence in 
the man. However, one has to add very 
quickly the objective conditions of the situa- 
tion in the area — the objective conditions of 
the situation in the world are really the 
principal factors that really impinge on this 

Mr. Moyers: Don't we hostage, in a sense, 
on his personal relations and the success or 
failure of one man? 

Mr. Sisco: Not necessarily, Bill. I think 
this step-by-step approach, particularly if it 
should achieve a next step, I think will help 
provide a basis for moving on perhaps in a 
broader context. 

Mr. Moyers: George, you've been rather 
critical of the step-by-step process and wrote 
not too long ago that it was going to fail, 
or it had already come to a dead end. Was 
that a premature obituary? 

Mr. Ball: Well, let me say there's a differ- 
ence between saying something's going to 
fail, which I did not say, and saying that I 
thought that it had come to a dead end. Quite 
frankly, I've been surprised at the way in 
which the possibility seems to have opened 
up for another round, because it seemed to 
me that after the first two negotiations of 
disengagement on the Egyptian front, the 
disengagement on the Syrian front, that that 
was probably as far as bilateral diplomacy 
could go, because at some point the very 
tough substantive problems would have to be 
tackled. Those were the problems partic- 
ularly of the Palestinians, the problem of 
Jerusalem. Those problems were problems 
in which the interests of all of the Arabs 
were engaged and therefore they could only 
be dealt with in a multilateral setting. 

Now Secretary Kissinger has undertaken 
one third round of bilateral diplomacy, with 
some prospect that it may succeed. If it 
does succeed, it seems to me it imposes very 
great strains on the unity of the Arab world, 
because what it really means is almost a 
separate peace as far as Egypt is concerned, 
or at least a substantial progress toward a 
separate peace. I think this is creating very 
serious alarm on the part of the Syrians 
and the Syrians have a measure of support 
from some of the other more activist Arab 
states in the area — Algeria, for example, or 
even Kuwait. Now, I would suppose that a 
very important factor here is what the atti- 
tude of King Faisal [of Saudi Arabia] will 
be, because he controls the finances of Egypt 
in a fairly realistic sense today. And if he 
should shut that tap off as far as Egyptian 
finances are concerned, I would think it 
would have a very great effect. His interest 

April 7, 1975 


is fundamentally in Jerusalem, and I would 
think that unless he sees some sign that the 
negotiation will move toward a plank where 
Jerusalem can become one of the elements 
of discussion that he may become quite im- 
patient and this may make it very hard for 
this step to go forward. 

Mr. Moyers: How far, George, can the 
moderate Arab leaders, like King Faisal, go 
before they antagonize irrevocably the radi- 
cals in their midst who ivant to see Israel 

Mr. Ball: Well, I think this is a very big 
question. All right, we want to live within 
the dynamics of Arab politics. I mean this 
is a fact that can't be ignored. And I think 
that Sadat has gone surprisingly far, much 
farther — looking at it from the outside — I 
would have thought that he would go. Now, 
this is splendid if the momentum can be con- 
sidered or continued and it doesn't create too 
many serious repercussions in the Arab 
world which might actually interfere with 
further programs. What it would appear is 
that the United States, through the Secretary 
of State and the best offices that we've been 
providing — the good offices — may well be on 
the way to splitting the Arab world. Now, 
this may result in eliminating Egypt, which 
obviously — from potential hostility, which is 
obviously a big factor. But whether this can 
be done in such a way as not to create 
antagonisms throughout the Arab world that 
will build up trouble for the future, I don't 
know. And I think this is one of the doubt- 
ful elements here. 

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a word about that. 
Bill, because, as George knows, the step-by- 
step approach has never been conceived by 
us as an end in itself. It's always been seen as 
a contribution to the overall settlement. Cer- 
tainly we have no interest in dividing the 
Arab world. I don't think it's in the national 
interest of the United States. So that the 
point that I've been emphasizing all the way 
along is that if we can get this next step, I 
think it will make a contribution toward the 
process of an overall settlement. And I think 
this is — this is what I think is key at the 
moment. I would agree, basically, that there 

may very well come a point where the 
process has to be approached in a broader 
way. But I'm struck with the fact that I 
can recall the Rabat Conference a few months 
ago where that decision was taken and there 
were many predictions that this step-by-step 
approach had run out of gas. Well, it has 
not, and we're there doing what we're doing 
at the behest of the parties, and that's the 
important thing. 

Mr. Moyers: Let's go back to the step-by- 
step for a moment. Assuming the best possi- 
bilities, you ivoidd get an agreement betiveen 
Egypt and Israel for a disengagement in the 
Sinai. Is that right? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I wouldn't use the word 
"disengagement," Bill. This negotiation goes 
beyond the purely military elements as was 
the case with respect to the two agreements 
achieved last year. One of the delicacies of 
this negotiation is that, yes, it does involve 
withdrawal but it also involves political ele- 
ments or the Israeli view is that there must 
be political content in this next agreement. 

Mr. Moyers: What do you mean by politi- 
cal content? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, we've already discussed 
one element ; namely, the whole question of 
nonbelligerency. They want to view this 
agreement in terms of what it contributes to 
the political process — meaning in this par- 
ticular instance the process toward peace. 
In other words, they're feeling that they are 
not going to be vulnerable to an attack from 
Egypt if they are involved in a withdrawal. 
They're concerned over the security situation 
in Sinai, and in return they want certain 

Mr. Ball: Let me just raise a question with 
regard to the whole step-by-step approach. 
It seems to me that this is rather a com- 
pletely different tactic from the tactic that's 
been followed in trying to bring peace to 
the Arabs before — initiatives in which Sec- 
retary Sisco has been very much involved, as 
we all know, the initiatives in 1968, the 
initiatives under Secretary Rogers. In those 
cases the effort was made to try to work out 
the details of a complete settlement using 


Department of State Bulletin 

the — as a framework, Resolution 242 [No- 
vember 22, 1967], which was passed by the 
U.N. Security Council. This seems to me an 
approach where there is an effort, through 
bilateral diplomacy, to make a little prog- 
ress here, a little progress there, almost like 
following the stream of a river in an un- 
known terrain not knowing whether you're 
going to run into a cul de sac in the moun- 
tains or find another stream that takes you 
elsewhere — not being totally sure about 
where you come out at the end. 

Mr. Moyers: What would have been the 
alternative? Are you saying we should have 
gone to Geneva? 

Mr. Ball: Well, I'm not suggesting that 
going to Geneva would have — in those terms, 
would have meant anything. The one sugges- 
tion I did make was that it seemed to me that 
at some point in the process the Soviet 
Union had to be brought in and that there 
had to be a substantial agreement between 
the Soviet Union and the United States as 
to how Resolution 242 should be filled out, 
because that is the one document that repre- 
sents an agreement between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. 

Mr. Sisco: There's always been a funda- 
mental difference, however, George, in the 
interpretation of that resolution, you will 
recall. Because one interpretation, the Israeli 
interpretation, has been that it does contain 
the principle of withdrawal but the final 
so-called secure and recognized borders are 
a matter of negotiation between the two 
sides. The Arabs, on the other hand, have 
interpreted that resolution to mean total 
Israeli withdrawal to the '67 borders. And, 
candidly, we and the Soviets have never 
really seen eye-to-eye on what the substance 

Mr. Ball: It shows what you really accom- 
plished when you took that definite article 
out, doesn't it? 

Mr. Moyers: Do you disagree, at the mo- 
ment, loith the possibilities of the step-by- 
step ? 

Mr. Ball: No, I would like to see this stage 
played out, obviously, and of course I would 

like to see it succeed. I can see, however, 
implicit in this, the possibilities of conten- 
tion in the Arab world, which may or may 
not advance with the progress toward a final 
settlement. If, for example, the Syrians be- 
come completely disenchanted, FLO [Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization] feels that it's 
being so pushed out of the action that it 
starts another wave of terrorism — all of 
these things could, it seems to me, result, if 
the suspicion grows throughout the Arab 
world that what the Egyptians are basically 
up to is to making what amounts to a sep- 
arate peace and really withdrawing them- 
selves from — their military weight from the 
balance, because their military weight is 

Mr. Sisco: I can see this happening, 
George, if this next step were the end in 
itself, but as you know we as a government 
have by no manner of means precluded the 
renewal of the Geneva Conference. We have 
no objection to the renewal of the Geneva 
Conference as a matter of principle. So that 
I think this may very well be something that 
may, in time, be in the offing. You know we 
ourselves have not taken any definitive de- 
cisions. As I said. Bill, if we get to that 
particular point we'll want to consult with 
everyone concerned. But the important thing 
is that we see this thing as a preparatory 
step, perhaps moving toward the broader 
considerations in Geneva. 

Mr. Moyers: Including moving toward a 
fidl-scale Geneva Conference? 

Mr. Sisco: The possibility of the renewal 
of the Geneva Conference in the aftermath 
of this next step I think is there, and it will 
depend on what our consultations show. 

Mr. Moyers: How woidd we feel about the 
Palestinians, the PLO, attending that con- 
ference ? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, Bill, I think we're very 
clear in that regard. Our policy has been 
expressed by both the President as well as 
the Secretary, and that is that as long as 
the PLO is unwilling to recognize the State 
of Israel we don't see any possibility of ne- 
gotiation and neither are we pressing any- 

April 7, 1975 


one to negotiate on this basis. The key, I 
think, is at least a recognition of the exist- 
ence of the State of Israel. 

Mr. Ball: I would see a real possibility of 
problems with Syria, however, because of the 
fact that the Golan Heights is not a question 
that can be settled pre-final-settlement on a 
bilateral basis. There simply isn't enough 
wiggle room in the situation. The terrain is 
too narrow, and the high points are of such 
vital strategic importance to each side. So 
that I would assume that this is something 
that only can be done as part of a final 
settlement. I would not see very much chance 
of another stage of bilateral negotiations 
that could result in anything like the same 
result as occurred in the Sinai where you 
have very large areas in which you can 
negotiate. There isn't much room to nego- 
tiate there. 

Mr. Moyers: There's a third area, too, 
that's mvolved, if I understand step-by-step 
diplomacy and that ivould he the Gaza Strip 
to — from the Sinai to the Gaza Strip to the 
Golan Heights and into the question of the 
West Bank. Do you think the West Bank 
can he resolved in step-hy-step diplomacy? 

Mr. Ball: I think there's a very interest- 
ing development there. For example, there 
was an article by Marilyn Berger in the 
Washington Post this morning — a report 
from there that the Jordanians are pouring 
substantial funds into the area with the 
approval of the Israelis. And there seems to 
be a real effort on the part of King Hussein 
[of Jordan] to move back into the situation 
and to the point where conceivably the PLO 
would lose a good deal of their strength and 
status, because I don't think that they're 
very enthusiastically supported by many of 
the Arab leaders even though those Arab 
leaders feel a compulsion to support them 
because of past commitments and because of 
the general emotion throughout the area. 

Now, if this is the case, then conceivably, 
I suppose, one could even have a negotiation 
between Hussein and the Israelis down the 
road, in spite of the decision that was made 
in Rabat and in spite of Mr. Arafat's [Yasir 

Arafat, Chairman, PLO] appearance at the 
United Nations. Whether this, in fact, can 
occur or not, I think only time will tell. 

Mr. Sisco: In the aftermath of Rabat, Bill, 
King Hussein has busied himself in develop- 
ment in the East Bank and he's been vei'y 
careful, as George has indicated, in keeping 
open bridges to the west, that is, the West 
Bank, and maintaining his interest there. 

Mr. Moyers: What I can't see is the con- 
sideration that is or isn't being given to 
the political — to the human dynamic of the 
political situation. The Palestinians would 
appear to mayiy people to he in the same 
position that the Jeivs ivere back when the 
world was not paying any attention to their 
request for a homeland, and here the Pal- 
estinians, who probably don't feel they can 
trust the Israelis and they're not sure they 
can trust the United States, so their stake 
seems to me to be so enormous from their 
terms, from their standpoint, that they're 
williyig to take radical actions to keep on the 
agenda. What are tve doing about that? Have 
we moved the Arabs any closer to recognizing 
both the need of the Palestinians and the need 
of the Israelis to get together? 

Mr. Sisco: As I say, as long as the situa- 
tion is as it is, in terms of nonrecognition, 
you should not expect that the United States 
will take any step in this regard. 

I would say this. We've used here, rather 
loosely, the word "Palestinians," or even the 
PLO. The reality is that this is a rather 
divided group, and there are divisions in 
terms of what the solution might be, where 
it might be, and so on. I'm struck with the 
fact that Mr. Arafat, of course, made his 
statement at the General Assembly, and that 
basically is the view. But I would not ex- 
pect, in these circumstances, any negotiat- 
ing process to begin, for the reason that 
I've given. 

Mr. Moyers: Do you have any indication 
from any Israeli sotirces that they at least 
understand the problems of the Pales- 

Mr. Sisco: Israelis are very strongly op- 


Department of State Bulletin 

posed to any negotiations with the PLO at 
this time. They're pretty well convinced — or 
they are well convinced, I should say — that 
their posture is one of nonrecognition, and 
therefore they refuse to deal with them. 

Mr. Moyers: Does anyone have any indi- 
cation from the Palestinians that they under- 
stand xvhy the Israelis are so fearful of a 
Palestinian state? 

Mr. Ball: Well, I think that the declared 
position of the PLO in favor of a secular 
state, which would include Israel, obviously 
means that they would expect opposition 
from the Israelis. 

One of the interesting questions, it seems 
to me, is what the people who are now in 
West Bank really want, and I'm not at all 
sure that they're as enthusiastic for the PLO 
as the world might think. 

Mr. Moyers: Well, you've both been in- 
volved over the years in varions negotia- 
tions. What are the unexpected iyiterven- 
tions that can suddenly turn a negotiation 
around? Could something happen that none 
of us can foresee at the moment? 

Mr. Ball: We could have an unforeseen 
act of terrorism in the situation, obviously, 
which would be — it might have a brutal 
effect on the whole situation. Or you could 
have a position taken by Syria, for example, 
of total intransigence as far as this arrange- 
ment is concerned, which could lead to very 
serious problems. I don't know whether one 
— whether there is a serious possibility of 
the Soviet Union making a move. I really, 
at the moment, don't see what they can do 
very effectively. 

Mr. Sisco: The interesting thing, George, 
about the area in the last 18 months, I 
wonder whether you would agree, is the fact 
that the war in '73 actually altered the ob- 
jective conditions in the area. From the 
Arab point of view, you can recall after 
the 1967 war, this was defeat in their eyes, 
and the whole notion of going to the confer- 
ence table or the whole notion of negotia- 
tions was really not a reality; and yet in 
the immediate aftermath of the October '73 

war, negotiations became very respectable. 
In fact, the strategy pursued by Sadat in 

the '73 war, he announced ahead of time 

that the purpose of that military action was 
to get a political process started. And in 
fact it did start a political process. And we 
are where we are principally because that 
October war, I think, did change the objec- 
tive conditions in the area. 

Mr. Moyers: How does that apply to 
where we are noiv? 

Mr. Sisco: In this sense. Each side, in the 
aftermath of that war, concluded that the 
best route was the route of diplomacy and 
negotiations, and this is the reason why the 
United States was able to bring them togeth- 
er on these two disengagement agreements, 
and this is why this process is continuing to- 
day. And I think that if there is hope in the 
situation, it is that I have found — I've been 
to the Middle East now a little over three 
months over the last year — I really believe 
that each side is pretty sick and tired of 
war. I think the principal moderate leaders 
in the Arab world would like to find a way 
diplomatically. I think Israel would like to 
find an agreement on the basis of diplomacy. 

And I think that basically represents a 
change in the situation in the aftermath of 
the October '73 war from that which existed 

Mr. Ball: Could I ask you this? It seemed 
to me that what happened was that before 
the October '73 war there was a feeling on 
the part of a great many Israelis that time 
was really running on their side and if they 
simply sat on the occupied territory long 
enough the world would come to recognize 
this as an accomplished fact. 

On the part of the Arabs there was a 
feeling of considerable sense of failure or 
inferiority or frustration — the fact that they 
hadn't demonstrated the qualities that they 
knew they possessed. That the October '73 
war reestablished their own sense of self- 
confidence. That the change in the oil prices 
obviously showed them that they were no 
longer financially inferior, or wouldn't be 
over time. The oil embargo gave them an- 

April 7, 1975 


other feeling that they had an additional 

But instead of becoming then insistent on 
trying to press what was a new advantage 
to the conclusion they instead, it seems to me 
rather remarkably, have opted for trying to 
find a peaceful solution, which is something 
that I think is quite surprising and quite 

Whereas on the part of the Israelis, they 
also have recognized that now time probably 
isn't working on their side or at least they 
can't make that assumption that it is and 
that therefore they have a greater interest 
in a peaceful solution — in a negotiated solu- 
tion — than they have before. 

Mr. Sisco: I tend to agree that there has 
developed, I think, a more conscious mutual 
interest in the diplomatic process, George. 
As I say, I think it's in the aftermath of 
the October '73 war, and if one can express 
oneself in a guarded way — in an optimistic 
way, very guardedly — it's that psychological 
factor which I like to point to. 

Mr. Moyers: The sticky issue remains the 
Golan Heights, which George said a minute 
ago ivas really indispensable to both sides: 
The absolute demand by the Palestinians 
that they have a home finally and a state 
and the absolute demand by the Israelis that 
the Palestinians not contiyme their aim of 
destroying the State of Israel. 

Mr. Ball: Well, when I suggested that 
the Golan Heights was indispensable to both 
sides, that is, if that is the only basis for 
their security, it's a purely security interest 
that they each have in the Golan Heights. 
And if there is some way of assuring secu- 
rity, then obviously some settlement is possi- 
ble on the Golan Heights. 

But I indicated that in my view that prob- 
ably could only come about in terms of a 
final wrapping up of a great many of the 
difficult issues. 

Mr. Moyers: What do you see as the most 
desirable possibility for the kind of accord 
in the Middle East that would get this prob- 
lem off of the main agenda of the world into 

a back seat where there could he some lasting 
peace ? 

Mr. Ball: Well, I think there are certain 
indispensable conditions to a final settlement 
that would be a durable one. One of them 
is, I feel myself, that it must be a settlement 
in which the United States and the Soviet 
Union are in accord. I don't think we can 
have a settlement in which the Soviet Union 
is totally left out and frustrated because, 
with the beachhead they already have in the 
area, I think they would continue to be a 
source of disequilibrium. That is one ele- 

Another element is that there must be the 
buffer zones and the injection of some kind 
of neutral force, whether it should be a 
neutral force in the traditional kind which 
neither side has much enthusiasm for, or one 
that's set up — a purely neutral status such 
as the Scandinavian peoples or the Indians 
or something like that. 

However, there could be a force in which 
the United States and the Soviet Union 
would make a contribution — not necessarily 
being the exclusive elements in that force. 
It remains to be seen. 

There is considerable discussion, at least 
in the radio news these days, about Egypt — 
interest in Egypt in bringing the French and 
British back into some kind of a guarantee- 
ing role. 

Now this again seems to be an element 
that has to be worked out in some way. 

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a word about this. 
First, George, I obviously agree with you 
that you really can't have a durable peace 
in the Middle East unless the two major 
powers manifest that interest and support 
the peace. After all, I think, if anything, 
the discussion we've had here demonstrates 
that we all feel that the Soviet Union is a 
reality in the area; it has interests as we 
have interests. 

On this question of guarantee, we've not 
really drawn any definitive conclusions and 
obviously we're looking — and looking at it, 
I might say, George, only in the context of 
an overall settlement, not in relationship to 
any next interim step. My own feeling 


Deportment of State Bulletin 

is this: That the principal assurance of any 
agreement really has to be that peace agree- 
ment between the two sides in which each 
side exchanges obligations with each other 
that's going to build a kind of confidence 
on the ground that's going to be required. 
Because years of distrust really have to be 
dispelled. So the principal assurance is what- 
ever peace agreement Israel and the Arabs 
actually agree on. 

I can see all sorts of situations where an 
endorsement by the major powers or some 
support for this agreement will add political 
force to this kind of an agreement as a sup- 
plement, complementary to the agreement. 

I don't see it, however, as a substitute for 
the kinds of arrangements between the par- 
ties, the actual security arrangements on 
the ground, whatever peacekeeping forces 
may be decided upon, on the ground, and 
the obligations that they exchange with one 

Mr. Moyers: As yon speak, Joe, I see the 
forces that you're saying are bringing some 
equilihrium into the air with the exception 
of the Palestiyiians. We're there with the 
center of our gravity leaning toward Israel 
as has been the history of our involvement 
in the Middle East. The Arabs have the 
Soviets in the background. I don't see who 
is working in all of this complicated process 
to speak for the interest of the Palestinians. 

Mr. Sisco: Well, maybe, Bill, it's because 
basically in the first instance this is a prob- 
lem for the Arabs themselves to sort out. 
And I think we indicated there are different 
views on this in the area and it may very 
well be that it's really not the United States 
that can sort this out at a given time. 

Mr. Moyers: What might bring a break- 
doivn of this process and war? What do you 
fear most? 

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think it's important 
that we achieve this next step, and I think 
it's important that some diplomatic process 
continue because, if there is a diplomatic 
void, tensions are apt to increase. 

Mr. Ball: Yes, I would agree with this. I 

think that if there should be a breakdown 
and the whole process loses momentum, then 
I would think that out of frustration and 
fear that time was in fact running against 
them there might be a great temptation on 
the part of Israel to move, perhaps to strike 
at Syria or something. 

U.S. and India Sign Agreement 
on Wheat Sales Under P.L. 480 

A U.S.-India agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities was signed at Washing- 
ton on March 20 by G. V. Ramakrishna, Min- 
ister (Economic), Embassy of India, and 
Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. 
Following are remarks made by Mr. Sober 
at the signing ceremony. 

Prc:s release 158 dated March 20 

The agreement we are signing today is an 
important step by both of our governments 
in the development of a closer relationship, 
which we both seek. 

This agreement provides for the sale under 
title I of Public Law 480 of 800,000 tons of 
wheat — a good deal more than we had origi- 
nally expected to be able to supply to India 
this fiscal year. The sale is being financed by 
a long-term low-interest loan, and payment 
will be made in dollars. 

I want to ofl:er a special word of thanks 
to those people on both sides who worked 
so hard to bring these negotiations to a suc- 
cessful conclusion. 

In New Delhi last October, Secretary Kis- 
singer stated [upon signing the U.S.-India 
agreement to establish a Joint Commission 
on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Tech- 
nological, Educational and Cultural Coopera- 
tion] that "the interests of India and the 
United States are compatible and that we 
are only at the beginning of a period of co- 
operation whose possibilities have only begun 
to be exploited." Today's agreement should 
be seen in that context. I am honored to be 
able to play a part. 

April 7, 1975 



Compelling Need for Assistance 
to Cambodia Reemphasized 

Following is a statement made before the 
Hoiise Cortimittee on Foreign Affairs on 
March 13 by Deputy Secretary Robert S. 
Ingersoll, who was Acting Secretary during 
Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Middle 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
appear before the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee to address the urgent matter of 
assistance to Cambodia. 

Since January 28 when the President asked 
Congress to lift the ceiling on overall U.S. 
assistance to Cambodia and authorize a sup- 
plemental budget request of $222 million for 
military assistance, many witnesses have 
been heard. 

On Tuesday, the subcommittee on foreign 
relations of the Senate voted a compromise 
which will be voted on in the full committee 
next Monday. Briefly, this would provide 
$125 million more in drawdown authority 
for military aid to Cambodia, as well as an 
increase in the ceiling on economic assistance 
which will allow an additional $73 million 
for Public Law 480 and $15.5 million for 
other economic aid. 

Just yesterday, this committee's Subcom- 
mittee on Investigations recommended an 
alternative compromise formula whereby the 
ceiling on military assistance would be in- 
creased to permit an additional $20 million 
per month from available military assistance 
funds plus an additional $7.5 million per 
month under the drawdown authority. This 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

formula would also permit an increase of 
$17.7 million per month in food aid under 
Public Law 480. 

While the Administration's request for the 
full $222 million is based on our best estimate 
of the requirements of the situation, the Ad- 
ministration is prepared to accept a compro- 
mise in view of the urgency of the situation. 
The Senate approach comes closer to meet- 
ing what we consider to be the necessary 
levels of economic and military assistance. 
Nevertheless we hope both the Senate and 
the House will move expeditiously so that 
the necessary legislation can be enacted as 
quickly as possible. 

I am appearing today as Acting Secretary 
of State to stress once more the absolute 
necessity for urgent congressional action. 

The military situation in Cambodia has 
deteriorated since the President's January 
28 request. For the first time in five years 
of war, the Mekong River has been tempo- 
rarily closed to shipping. Munitions, food, 
and petroleum supplies must now be brought 
into Cambodia by airlift. Government forces, 
however, will be unable to continue their de- 
fense unless supplemental authority and 
funds are provided promptly for increased 
military assistance, 80 percent of which will 
be ammunition. 

Unless the ceiling of total Cambodian aid 
is lifted, we shall be unable to continue the 
purchase and delivery of adequate foodstuffs 
to Cambodia. A delay on food aid means 
malnutrition and starvation for increasing 
numbers of Cambodians, particularly the 
very young and very old. 

One of the most prevalent arguments 
against increased aid to Cambodia is that ad- 
ditional assistance may well prolong the kill- 
ing and agony but will not provide any guar- 
antee of negotiation and a compromise settle- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ment — policy objectives long sought by the 
Khmer Government and the United States. 

I contend that it is not up to the United 
States unilaterally to make that judgment 
for another sovereign government. 

Neither we nor the Cambodian Govern- 
ment seek a military solution. 

You will recall that last week the Adminis- 
tration provided a summary of our efforts — 
in support of and complementary to the 
efforts of the Cambodian Government — to 
find the way to a compromise, negotiated 
settlement to the Cambodian problem. 

Let me repeat a point made previously 
by the President and other Administration 
spokesman: We honestly believe — and be- 
lieve very strongly — that, with the provision 
of the additional assistance under discus- 
sion, there is a reasonable chance that the 
Khmer Government will survive the current 
crisis. This will permit the Cambodians and 
their friends, including the United States, to 
pursue vigorously their efforts to find a com- 
promise settlement. I want to stress this. 

Without the additional assistance there 
can be only one result to the situation in 
Cambodia: a military victory for the other 

In addressing the President's request for 
aid to Cambodia, I hope members of the com- 
mittee will not look at the country as an 
isolated area but as part of a mosaic which 
includes Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the 
whole world. 

We have no legal commitment to Cambodia. 
Nevertheless, we responded to Cambodia's 
request for help to defend itself and have 
continued this assistance for five years. Are 
we now simply to abandon a friend whose 
will is to continue defending itself but whose 
ability to do so depends on us? 

Our policy toward Cambodia is being 
watched with some concern by other nations, 
many of them our friends, as a possible in- 
dication of future U.S. policy. It will be so 
viewed, whether or not Congress intends this 
to be the case. 

In conclusion, let me stress once more the 

compelling need for the supplementary mili- 
tary aid request for Cambodia and the urgent 
requirement for congressional approval to 
lift the ceiling on overall aid to that country. 

Department Discusses Arab Boycott 
of Israel 

Folloiving is a statement by Sidney Sober, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near East- 
ern and South Asian Affairs, made before the 
Subcommittee on International Trade and 
Commerce of the House Committee on For- 
eign Affairs on March 13.^ 

I am sure the subcommittee will under- 
stand that while we are in the middle of deli- 
cate negotiations in the Middle East, this is 
a particularly difficult time to be discussing 
the subject before us today. I nevertheless 
wish to be responsive to the subcommittee's 
interest in discussing the policy of the De- 
partment of State toward the Arab boycott 
of Israel and actions by the Department in 
connection with the boycott. 

Let me begin by putting the boycott in its 
Middle East context. 

The Arab boycott of Israel is one mani- 
festation of the basic Arab-Israeli conflict 
and thus arises from deep-seated political 
and emotional factors. The initial boycott 
organization, which was set up as a com- 
mittee of the Arab League Council at the 
beginning of 1946, applied a primary boycott 
to prevent the entry of certain products into 
Arab countries from what is now the State 
of Israel. The secondary boycott, designed to 
inhibit third parties from assisting in Israel's 
development, was introduced in 1951, and it 
is this secondary boycott that affects Ameri- 
can economic relations with a number of 
Middle East countries. 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

April 7, 1975 


The scope of the boycott has been broad- 
ened through the years, and it applies to a 
variety of activities which are seen by the 
Arab countries as constituting a special eco- 
nomic relationship with Israel. An extension 
of the boycott has involved the blacklisting 
of foreign actors, artists, and other enter- 
tainment figures (and their films or record- 
ings) judged to have aided Israel, such as 
through fundraising. It is our understanding 
that, generally speaking, the act of trading 
with Israel — as such — does not violate any 
of the regulations of the boycott organiza- 
tion and does not of itself bring the boycott 
into effect. However, the Arab countries 
themselves reserve the power to interpret 
the boycott regulations and decisions, and 
our experience suggests that they are not 
uniformly applied. There are a number of 
firms which do business in Israel and Arab 

It is impossible to determine how much 
the boycott up to now has actually harmed 
Israel, whose economy has been growing at 
the rate of about 10 percent annually. We rec- 
ognize, however, that the rapidly increasing 
economic strength of certain Arab countries 
has enhanced the Arab boycott as a poten- 
tially effective weapon against Israel. There 
is a likelihood that the growing attractive- 
ness of commerce with Arab countries will 
place greater pressure on some foreign firms 
not to deal with Israel because of the boycott. 

Now I want to come to the position of the 
United States with regard to the boycott. As 
stated on numerous occasions, our position 
is clear and it can be summarized as follows : 
The United States opposes the boycott. We 
do not support or condone it in any way. The 
Department has emphasized our opposition 
to the boycott to the Arab governments on 
many occasions as it adversely affects U.S. 
firms, vessels, and individuals. Where the 
commercial interests of American firms or 
individuals have been injured or threatened 
with injury, we have made representations 
to appropriate Arab officials. 

Consistent with our policy of opposition 
to the boycott, as reflected in the Export Ad- 

ministration Act of 1969, the Department 
of State has refused hundreds of requests 
from U.S. companies for authentication of 
documents relating to the boycott as being 
contrai-y to public policy. 

A number of American firms with boycott 
problems have consulted with Department 
officials. These firms have been (a) reminded 
of their reporting responsibilities under the 
Export Administration Act and (b) en- 
couraged and requested to refuse to take any 
action in support of restrictive trade prac- 
tices or boycotts. 

A fundamental factor which has to be 
faced is that Arab governments regard the 
boycott as an important element in their 
position toward Israel and one of the basic 
issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict to be dealt 
with as progress is made toward resolving 
that conflict. Indeed, this is one of the issues 
which we have very much in mind as w'e con- 
tinue our diplomatic efforts to help the par- 
ties achieve a just and lasting peace. The 
problem has been how to change effectively 
the underlying conditions which led to im- 
position of the boycott. We believe we can 
best serve this objective not through confron- 
tation but by continuing to promote with the 
parties directly concerned a peaceful settle- 
ment of basic Middle East issues. We believe 
that our present diplomatic approach is the 
most effective way to proceed. 

Though the boycott emerged from the po- 
litical problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
we are also concerned by reports that it could 
be used for discrimination on outright reli- 
gious grounds. On this subject President 
Ford has recently said [in a news conference 
on February 26] : 

There have been reports in recent weeks of at- 
tempts in the international banking community to 
discriminate against certain institutions or indi- 
viduals on religious or ethnic grounds. 

There should be no doubt about the position of 
this Administration and the United States. Such 
discrimination is totally contrary to the American 
tradition and repugnant to -American principles. It 
has no place in the free practice of commerce as 
it has flourished in this country. 

Foreign businessmen and investors are most wel- 


Department of State Bulletin 

come in the United States when they are willing 
to conform to the principles of our society. How- 
ever, any allegations of discrimination will be fully 
investigated and appropriate action taken under the 
laws of the United States. 

In summing up, I want to reemphasize that 
we oppose the boycott and will continue to 
make our opposition to it known and that 
we will continue to oppose any efforts to 
discriminate against American firms or in- 
dividuals on the basis of religion or ethnic 

At the same time, we will continue to do 
our utmost to help the countries in the Middle 
East to find a basis for resolving the Arab- 
Israeli dispute and to arrive at a just and 
durable peace. It is our conviction that in the 
attainment of peace lies the fundamental 
basis for the resolution of the boycott issue, 
among others which we are discussing today. 

Fifth Report on NATO OfFset 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

In accordance with Section 812(d) of the 
Department of Defense Appropriation Au- 
thorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-155), 
I am pleased to submit a fifth report to the 
Congress on our progress toward offsetting 
the balance of payments deficit resulting 
from the deployment of U.S. forces in NATO 

As required by Section 812, the Depart- 
ment of Commerce has been working in con- 
sultation with the Department of Defense 
and the General Accounting Ofl^ce to define 
the U.S. balance of payments deficit on mili- 
tary transactions incurred in Fiscal Year 
1974 as a result of our NATO commitments. 
In my November report, I provided to the 
Congress tentative figures developed by the 
Commerce Department which estimated our 

' Transmitted on Feb. 20 (text from White House 
press release) . 

FY 74 expenditures at $1,983 billion. This has 
now been confirmed as the final FY 74 ex- 
penditure figure. 

The Commerce Department is now in the 
process of identifying U.S. FY 74 balance of 
payments receipts reflecting military-related 
sales and exports to our European NATO 
allies, through both official U.S. Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) and commercial chan- 
nels. Once total receipts have been identified, 
they will be subtracted from the $1,983 bil- 
lion in expenditures to establish the FY 74 
deficit. While the Department has been able 
to confirm Allied purchases through FMS 
channels, it has been unable to settle on a 
figure for commercial receipts. The Com- 
merce Department's balance of payments 
accounting procedures ai-e not in sufficient 
detail to permit it to isolate all of these pur- 
chases. Using information provided by our 
Allies through the NATO Economic Director- 
ate, the Commerce Department is making 
an effort to identify as many of these trans- 
actions as possible and to include them in its 
calculation of the balance of payments deficit. 

An interagency committee within the 
Executive Branch has been working to iden- 
tify other transactions which serve to offset 
this balance of payments deficit. Of major 
importance is the FY 74-75 US/FRG Offset 
Agreement, which was described in some de- 
tail in the May 1974 report. We have since 
been working in cooperation with our Allies 
to identify additional categories of offsets. 
These will include Allied purchases of U.S. 
military-related equipment which cannot be 
extracted from the U.S. balance of payments 
accounting system. I will provide details on 
these offset categories in my May 1975 re- 
port to the Congress. 

Once our analysis has been completed and 
the FY 74 military balance of payments 
deficit has been established, I am confident 
that this deficit will be offset by the items 
we have identified and that the requirements 
of Section 812 will be met. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, February 20, 1975. 

April 7, 1975 



U.S. Outlines Issues Before Resumed Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament 

Statement by Joseph Martin, Jr. 

U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament^ 

The President of the United States has 
directed me to convey to the CCD the follow- 
ing message, which I request be made a 
conference document: 

As the Conference of the Committee on Disarma- 
ment begins its 1975 deliberations, I would like to 
extend my best wishes and express my fervent hope 
that its work this year will add new achievements to 
the Committee's substantial record. 

The accomplishments of previous sessions have 
earned the respect of nations throughout the world. 
The General Assembly of the United Nations has 
entrusted to the Committee some of the most im- 
portant and complex problems of our time. The 
dedication and seriousness of purpose that have 
characterized the work of the CCD have made it a 
most effective multilateral forum for dealing with 
arms control and disarmament questions. 

The Committee's work resumes this year at a 
significant moment. One of its accomplishments, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio- 
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruc- 
tion, is about to enter into force. The Convention 
is a positive measure of the progress that can be 
made through responsible and constructive interna- 
tional negotiation. 

A great many tasks — some continuing, some new 
— face the CCD. Few have simple solutions. No one 
can guarantee that agreed solutions can be achieved 
for every issue. For its part, the United States will 
do all in its power to promote agreement wherever 
and whenever possible. 

I am confident that this Committee, through the 
constructive dialogue that is its hallmark, will con- 

' Made before the opening session of the resumed 
Conference of the Committee on Disai-mament 
(CCD) at Geneva on Mar. 4. 

tinue to make its valuable contribution to the pro- 
motion of peace and security through eflfective arms- 
control measures. 

Gerald R. Ford 

We are resuming our work at a time when 
disarmament efforts are receiving increasing 
attention in the search for a more stable 
and secure world. Convincing evidence of 
the growing interest in arms control solu- 
tions to national and international security 
problems can be found in the extensive treat- 
ment of disarmament questions at the 29th 
U.N. General Assembly. It is also reflected in 
the unprecedented number of international 
meetings which are currently dealing with 
the subject. 

Here in Geneva, Soviet and American ne- 
gotiators are working out the specific provi- 
sions of a second-stage SALT [Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks] agreement, the 
broad outlines of which were agreed at the 
Vladivostok summit. In Moscow, represent- 
atives of the United States and the Soviet 
Union are engaged in discussions aimed at 
reaching the agreement governing peaceful 
nuclear explosions that is called for in article 
III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In 
Washington, representatives of the two coun- 
tries have been considering the question 
of effective measures of restraint on environ- 
mental modification techniques. In Vienna, 
members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are 
continuing their efforts to reach agreement 
on mutual and balanced force reductions 


Department of State Bulletin 

in Central Europe. In addition, the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency is the focal 
point for international examination of safe- 
guards on the peaceful uses of nuclear tech- 
nology and of various aspects of peaceful 
nuclear explosions. Finally, two months from 
now the conference to review the operation of 
the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will 
begin in Geneva. 

The CCD occupies a unique and impor- 
tant position in this overall effort. In 1975 
our newly enlarged Committee can expect 
a heavier workload than it has had in several 
years. The 29th General Assembly of the 
United Nations, in addition to urging the 
CCD to continue its work on a comprehen- 
sive test ban and chemical weapons limita- 
tions, called on the Committee to examine 
questions that have so far received rela- 
tively little attention in this forum ; namely, 
environmental modification for military pur- 
poses, nuclear-free zones, and the arms con- 
trol implications of peaceful nuclear explo- 
sions (PNE's). My delegation welcomes 
these new responsibilities and is confident 
that the CCD can make a valuable contribu- 
tion in each of these fields. 

Among the large number of items on the 
international disarmament agenda, the most 
pressing, in our view, concern nonprolifera- 
tion and related nuclear issues. My govern- 
ment was gratified that at the 29th U.N. 
General Assembly many nations recognized 
that there is serious cause for concern in 
the prospect of the further spread of inde- 
pendent nuclear explosive capabilities. The 
United States feels that the wide support 
given to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the 
many calls for broader adherence to that 
treaty were constructive developments. 

At the same time, a large number of dele- 
gations recognized that the prevention of the 
further spread of nuclear-weapons capabili- 
ties cannot be taken for granted and that 
a broad and determined international effort 
is needed to strengthen the nonproliferation 

My government is urgently considering 
what courses of action would contribute 
most effectively to achieving a more uni- 

versal, reliable system of safeguards against 
diversion of nuclear materials and technol- 
ogy to military purposes. It is also consider- 
ing what would be the most promising steps 
to increase the political and economic incen- 
tives which could lead a country to forgo 
the nuclear explosive option. My government 
looks to the NPT Review Conference to 
assess how well the treaty has functioned 
in the first five years of its existence, to 
consider how the treaty can be more effec- 
tively implemented, and to provide an im- 
petus for the broadly based effort that will 
be essential if we are to avoid a proliferation 
of nuclear powers. 

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Steps To Curb Nuclear Arms Race 

The Review Conference will be concerned 
not only with the operation of those provi- 
sions of the NPT that deal directly with 
the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities 
but also with the implementation of those 
provisions that were designed to halt and 
reverse the nuclear arms race, notably article 
VI. In this connection I am pleased to note 
that, since the CCD last met, the United 
States and the Soviet Union have taken an- 
other major step to curb their competition 
in nuclear arms. At Vladivostok President 
Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev set 
firm and equal numerical limits on the stra- 
tegic forces of both sides. Specifically, they 
agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 on the total 
number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 
heavy bombers for each country. They also 
agreed on a maximum number of 1,320 
launchers for missiles that could be armed 
with multiple independently targeted reentry 
vehicles (MIRV's). With the agreement to 
place all these strategic delivery vehicles 
under the ceiling and to set an additional 
limit on MIRV's, this general framework for 
a new SALT accord goes well beyond the 
scope of the interim agreement concluded 
in 1972. 

Because of this breakthrough at Vladivo- 
stok, for the first time in the nuclear age each 
side's strategic calculations and force plan- 

April 7, 1975 


ning will not be motivated by fear and 
uncertainty about a possible open-ended stra- 
tegic buildup by the other side. Instead, 
they can be based with confidence on firm, 
established parameters. This can be ex- 
pected to make a valuable contribution to 
the stability of the strategic relationship. 

Of perhaps greater long-range importance, 
the ceilings worked out by the leaders of the 
two countries will provide a solid founda- 
tion for negotiating future arms reductions. 
While many details remain to be settled 
before this general framework can be trans- 
formed into a new agreement, the United 
States is confident that such an agreement 
can be concluded this year and that further 
negotiations on reducing the force ceilings 
can follow soon thereafter. 

My government is aware of the impor- 
tance attached internationally to a compre- 
hensive test ban as a means of curbing the 
nuclear arms race. The United States re- 
mains firmly committed to seeking an ade- 
quately verified comprehensive test ban. The 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in 
Moscow last summer, is not only a step 
toward that objective but will be in itself 
a significant constraint on the nuclear arms 
competition between the United States and 
the U.S.S.R. 

Question of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions 

The question of peaceful nuclear explo- 
sions has recently become a major topic in 
international disarmament discussions. We 
must start from the facts that a number 
of uncertainties about the feasibility and 
practicability of PNE's have yet to be re- 
solved and that the use of PNE's is a highly 
complicated matter both politically and legal- 
ly. Recognizing these facts, the U.S. delega- 
tion at the recent General Assembly called 
for thorough international consideration of 
the PNE question. We accordingly supported 
the Assembly's request in resolution 3261 D 
that the CCD consider the arms control im- 
plications of peaceful nuclear explosions. 

Those implications have two aspects: im- 
plications for the development and testing 
of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states 

and Implications for the spread of nuclear- 
weapons capabilities among non-nuclear- 
weapon states. 

With respect to the first of these cate- 
gories, it is clearly important to insure that 
nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for 
peaceful purposes are not used to gain 
weapons-related information in circumven- 
tion of agreed limitations on weapons test- 
ing. This is the central task of the bilateral 
negotiations now underway in Moscow, 
where the two sides are discussing criteria 
to insure that PNE's are consi-stent with the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty. An analogous 
question arises with respect to any form of 
international test ban agreement. Indeed, 
this question would be particularly crucial 
with a comprehensive test ban, since in the 
absence of any authorized weapons testing, 
there would be a greater incentive to seek 
weapons information in the course of a PNE 

With respect to PNE implications for the 
spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities, my 
government's firm conviction remains that 
it would be impossible for a non-nuclear- 
weapon state to develop a nuclear explosive 
device for peaceful purposes without in the 
process acquiring a device that could be used 
as a nuclear weapon. It has been argued 
that the critical factor is not the capability 
to produce nuclear devices but the intention 
of the country producing the device. How- 
ever, this is not the issue. The critical ques- 
tion is not whether we can accept the stated 
intentions of any country, but whether a 
world in which many states have the capa- 
bility to carry out nuclear explosions — and 
in which all therefore fear the nuclear- 
weapons capability of others — would not be 
vastly less secure than a world that has 
successfully contained the spread of nuclear 
explosive technology. 

Study of Nuclear-Free Zones 

A notable development at the last General 
Assembly was the heightened interest in 
nuclear-free zones. Resolutions were adopted 
dealing with nuclear-free-zone proposals for 
South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa 


Department of State Bulletin 

and with the Latin American Nuclear-Free- 
Zone Treaty. Reflecting this renewed in- 
terest, and motivated in part by the diversity 
of the regional initiatives and the complexity 
of some of the issues involved, the General 
Assembly requested that an ad hoc group of 
governmental experts, under CCD auspices, 
undertake a comprehensive study of the 
question of nuclear-free zones in all its 

My delegation welcomes this step and 
hopes it will contribute to a better under- 
standing of the wide range of issues relat- 
ing to nuclear-free zones. Given the differ- 
ences that exist from region to region, we 
think it would be unrealistic to expect the 
experts to reach agreement on requirements 
for nuclear-free-zone arrangements that 
could be applied universally. One useful 
purpose of the study might be to identify 
issues where standardized provisions could 
be feasible, and others where they would not. 

Unlike earlier studies undertaken under 
the auspices of the Secretary General, the 
study of nuclear-free zones will involve is- 
sues that are by nature primarily political 
rather than technical. This is the first such 
study to be carried out under the auspices 
of the CCD, and it was entrusted to this body 
with the understanding that a number of 
states not represented in the Committee 
would participate. My delegation has devel- 
oped a number of ideas on the organization 
of this project which we will be discussing 
with members of the Committee in the next 
few days. 

Restraints on Chemical and Biological Weapons 

Turning to the area of restraints on chem- 
ical and biological weapons, I am pleased to 
be able to report two important actions 
recently taken by the U.S. Government. On 
January 22 President Ford signed the U.S. 
instrument of ratification of the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925. I should point out that, 
although not party to the protocol in the 
past, my government has always observed its 
principles and objectives. 

The President also signed on January 22 
the U.S. instrument of ratification of the 

Biological Weapons Convention, a product 
of the expert and painstaking efi'orts of this 
Committee. As members of the CCD are 
aware, this convention is the first agreement 
since World War II to provide for the actual 
elimination of an entire class of weapons; 
namely, biological agents and toxins. With 
ratification procedures already completed by 
the three depositary governments and by 
many more than the required 19 additional 
governments, we expect the convention to 
enter into force in the very near future. It 
is our hope that this will prompt many other 
governments to adhere to the convention. 

As members of the Committee are aware, 
article II of the Biological Weapons Conven- 
tion requires parties to destroy or to divert 
to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but 
not later than nine months after entry into 
force, all agents, equipment, and means of 
delivery prohibited in article I. In this con- 
nection I would like to state that the entire 
U.S. stockpile of biological and toxin agents 
and weapons has already been destroyed and 
our former biological warfare facilities have 
been converted to peaceful uses. My delega- 
tion, and I am sure other members of the 
Committee, would welcome similar confirma- 
tions of implementation of article II from 
parties to the convention. 

The ratification of the Geneva Protocol 
and the ratification and entry into force of 
the Biological Weapons Convention are 
viewed by my government as significant 
steps toward our common objective of the 
efi'ective prohibition of chemical and biologi- 
cal weapons. 

My delegation is prepared at the current 
session to participate in the active examina- 
tion of possibilities for further effective re- 
straints on chemical weapons. An important 
element in this examination should continue 
to be a thorough analysis of the verification 
question in relation to the possible scope of 
any prohibition. 

The U.S. interest in overcoming the dan- 
gers of the use of environmental modification 
techniques for military purposes was re- 
flected in the U.S.-Soviet summit joint state- 
ment of July 3, 1974, in which both countries 
advocated the most effective measures pos- 

April 7, 1975 


sible to accomplish that objective. At the 
U.N. General Assembly last fall my govern- 
ment indicated that it would be ready at 
the CCD to consider this subject further. 
We pointed out that little is known about 
the scientific and technological aspects of en- 
vironmental modification and that many of 
the applications posed for discussion are at 
present only hypothetical. At the same time 
we stressed that we were prepared to partici- 
pate actively and positively in further dis- 
cussion of this matter. We would expect to 
contribute to the Committee's deliberations 
in that spirit. 

In my statement today I have discussed 
a number of new responsibilities to be as- 
sumed by the Committee. There is another 
issue I think should be added to the list: the 
question of restraints on conventional arms. 
This Committee has always given the highest 
priority to the control of weapons of mass 
destruction. While my delegation regards 
this as entirely appropriate, we see no reason 
why possible controls on conventional weap- 
ons, which account for the largest share of 
world military expenditures, cannot be con- 
sidered concurrently. I plan to return to 
this subject in a later intervention. 

United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica- 
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Economic ancJ Social Council 

Commission for Social Development: 

The welfare of migrant workers and their families. 
Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.5/515. 
October 14, 1974. 45 pp. 

Rehabilitation of disabled persons. Report of the 
Secretary General. E/CN.5/500. October 18, 
1974. 22 pp. 

Protection and welfare of children. Convening of a 
United Nations conference for an international 
convention on adoption law. Report of the Sec- 
retary General. E/CN.5/504. November 15, 1974. 


Current Actions 



Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 
14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. 
TIAS 6768. 
Accession deposited: Egypt, February 12, 1975. 

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 
1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 
1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974. 
Ratification deposited: Cuba, January 3, 1975. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972.' 

Ratification deposited: San Marino, March 17, 


Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved 
by the International Coffee Council at London 
September 26, 1974. Open for signature November 
1, 1974, through March 31, 1975.' 
Siffnatures: Finland, February 24, 1975;" Guinea, 
February 21, 1975. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Accessions deposited: Chile, February 14, 1975; 
Syria, February 6, 1975. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 

Accession deposited: Western Samoa, March 18, 


Seals — Antarctic 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, 
with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 
Acceptance deposited: France, February 19, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

- Subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance. 


Department of State Bulletin 


International telecommunication convention, with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 

Ratifications deposited: Netherlands,' United King- 
dom,^ December 31, 1974. 
Accession deposited: South Africa, December 23. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Ratification deposited: Ecuador, March 12, 1975. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris No- 
vember 16, 1972.' 
Acceptance deposited: Niger, December 23, 1974. 



Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 
7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca 
February 28, 1975. Entered into force February 
28, 1975. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement on cooperation in environmental affairs. 
Signed at Bonn May 9, 1974. 
Entered into force: March 26, 1975. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Washington March 20, 1975. Entered 
into force March 20, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of November 23, 1974 
(TIAS 7971). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Islamabad March 3, 1975. Entered into force March 
3, 1975. 


' Not in force. 

" Not in force for the United States. 

* Extended to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles. 

= Extended to Antigua, British Solomon Islands 
Protectorate, Brunei, Condominium of the New 
Hebrides, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and territories under the terri- 
torial sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Not ap- 
plicable to Southern Rhodesia until the United King- 
dom informs the Secretary General of the Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union that it is in a 
position to insure that the obligations imposed by the 
convention in respect of that territory can be fully 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Priyiting Office, Washington, D.C. 
20i02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Second 
certification of changes to certain schedules. TIAS 
7911. 546 pp. $5.40. (Cat. No. 89.10:7911). 

Suez Canal Clearance — Status of United States 
Forces Using British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus. 

Arrangement with the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 7917. 4 pp. 25^ 
(Cat. No. S9.10:7917). 

Air Transport Services. Interim Agreement with 
the Philippines. TIAS 7919. 6 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Jordan. TIAS 
7921. 4 pp. 25^ (Cat. No. 89.10:7921). 

Refugee Relief — Education for Palestinian Refugees. 

Agreement with the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency. TIAS 7922. 4 pp. 25«'. (Cat. No. 

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos 
and the Khmer Republic. Agreement with the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross amending 
the agreement of November 1, 1973, as amended. 
TIAS 7923. 3 pp. 25«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7923). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Domini- 
can Republic. TIAS 7924. 7 pp. 30(f. (Cat. No. 

Drug Enforcement Administration Regional Office. 

Agreement with Venezuela. TIAS 7925. 5 pp. 25<f. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7925). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft, 
Appliances and Components. Agreement with Israel 
amending the agreement of July 23, 1968. TIAS 
7926. 5 pp. 25«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7926). 

Weather Stations. Agreement with Mexico amend- 
ing and extending the agreement of July 31, 1970. 
TIAS 7927. 20 pp. AO4. (Cat. No. 89.10:7927). 

Telecommunication — Pre-sunrise Operation of Cer- 
tain Standard Radio Broadcasting Stations. Agree- 
ment with the Bahamas. TIAS 7929. 4 pp. 25(f. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7929). 

April 7, 1975 


Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egypt 
amending the agreement of June 7, 1974. TIAS 7930. 
4 pp. 25<f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7930). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Haiti 
modifying the agreement of October 19 and No- 
vember 3, 1971, as amended and modified. TIAS 
7931. 3 pp. 30(*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7931). 

Military Assistance— Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Guatemala. 
TIAS 7932. 5 pp. 25<*. (Cat. No. 89.10:7932). 

Military Assistance— Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Turkey. TIAS 
7933. 4 pp. 25<''. (Cat. No. 89.10:7933). 

Funding of Cooperation in Science and Technology. 

Agreement with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 
7935. 19 pp. 40«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7935). 

Whaling — Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter- 
national Whaling Convention of 1946. TIAS 7936. 6 
pp. 25f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7936). 

Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. Agreed min- 
ute with the German Democratic Republic. TIAS 
7937. 12 pp. 30C. (Cat. No. 89.10:7937). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Indonesia. 
TIAS 7938. 4 pp. 25('-. (Cat. No. 89.10:7938). 

Finance— Consolidation and Rescheduling of Certain 
Debts. Memorandum of Understanding with Chile. 
TIAS 7940. 32 pp. 45<'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7940). 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries — Facilitation of Entry 
Into Force of Amendments. TIAS 7941. 14 pp. 30(,'. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7941). 

Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 — Amend- 
ments and Additions to the Schedules. Notifications 
by the United Nations dated April 19, 1973. TIAS 
7945. 3 pp. 25<f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7945). 

Editor's Note 

The Schedule of International Conferences, 
which is published quarterly by the Office of 
International Conferences, will no longer ap- 
pear in the Bulletin. Interested individuals 
and organizations may arrange to receive the 
list on a regular basis. Requests should be 
addressed to: Director, Office of International 
Conferences, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 20520. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 17-23 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

tl43 3/17 Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem, 
Mar. 14. 

tl44 3/17 Kissinger: departure, Damascus, 
Mar. 15. 

tl45 3/17 Kissinger: arrival, Amman, Mar. 

tl46 3/17 Kissinger: departure, Amman, 
Mar. 16. 

tl47 3/17 Kissinger, Allon: remarks, Jeru- 
salem, Mar. 16. 
148 3/17 IngersoU: Southern Council, At- 

*149 3/17 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs meets Apr. 11. 

tl50 3/17 Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem. 

tl51 3/17 Kissinger: arrival, Aswan. 

tl52 3/17 Foreign Service examination. 

tl53 3/18 U.S. Governors to visit U.S.8.R. 

'154 3/18 Program for visit of Dzemal Bi- 
jedic. President of the Federal 
Executive Council of the Social- 
ist Federal Republic of Yugo- 
slavia, Mar. 18-21. 

tl55 3/18 Kissinger, Sadat: remarks, Aswan. 

tl56 3/19 Kissinger: remarks, Jerusalem, 
Mar. 18. 

tl57 3/19 Kissinger, Yamani: departure, 
158 3/20 Sober: remarks at signing of U.S.- 
India P.L.-480 agreement. 

'■159 3/20 Ryan, Luers, and Fishlow desig- 
nated Deputy Assistant Secre- 
taries, Bureau of Inter-American 

*160 3/20 Safety of Life at Sea Subcommit- 
tee of Shipping Coordinating 
Committee, Apr. 15. 

tl61 3/20 Kissinger, Peres: remarks, Jeru- 

tl62 3/21 Kissinger, Peres: remarks, Mar. 

*163 3/21 Foreign basketball coaches to at- 
tend San Diego convention, Mar. 

tl64 3/23 Kissinger, Peres: remarks, Mar. 

tl65 3/23 Kissinger, Rabin: remarks, Mar. 

tl66 3/23 Kissinger, Rabin: departure, Jeru- 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 7, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1867 


Compelling Need for Assistance to Cambodia 

Reemphasized (IngersoU) 450 

Department Discusses Arab Boycott of Israel 
(Sober) 451 

Fifth Report on NATO Offset Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 453 

Disarmament. U.S. Outlines Issues Before 
Resumed Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament (Martin) 454 

Economic Affairs 

Department Discusses Arab Boycott of Israel 

(Sober) 451 

Fifth Report on NATO Offset Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 45.3 

Foreign Investment and the Challenge of 
Interdependence (IngersoU) 436 

Ethiopia. U.S. Responds to Ethiopian Request 
for Ammunition (Department statement) . 440 

Foreign Aid 

Compelling Need for Assistance to Cambodia 
Reemphasized (IngersoU) 450 

International Partnership To Improve To- 
morrow's World (Ford) 429 

1974 Underdelivery of Ammunition to Cam- 
bodia Disclosed by Audit (Department an- 
nouncement) 435 

President Ford's News Conference at South 

Bend March 17 (excerpts) 434 

U.S. and India Sign Agreement on Wheat 

Sales Under P.L. 480 (Sober) 449 

India. U.S. and India Sign Agreement on 

Wheat Sales Under P.L. 480 (Sober) ... 449 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

U.S. Outlines Issues Before Resumed Con- 
ference of the Committee on Disarmament 
(Martin) 454 

Israel. Department Discusses Arab Boycott 
of Israel (Sober) 451 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia) 

Compelling Need for Assistance to Cam- 
bodia Reemphasized (IngersoU) .... 450 

1974 Underdelivery of Ammunition to Cam- 
bodia Disclosed by Audit (Department an- 
nouncement) 435 

President Ford's News Conference at South 

Bend March 17 (excerpts) 434 

Middle East 

Department Discusses Arab Boycott of Israel 

(Sober) 451 

"The Middle East: A Search for Peace" (in- 
terview with Under Secretary Sisco and 
George W. Ball for "Bill Moyers' Journal: 
International Report") 441 

Military Affairs. U.S. Responds to Ethiopian 
Request for Ammunition (Department 
statement) 440 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Fifth 
Report on NATO Offset Transmitted to the 
Congress (message from President Ford) 453 

Presidential Documents 

Fifth Report on NATO Offset Transmitted to 

the Congress 453 

International Partnership To Improve Tomor- 
row's World 429 

President Ford's News Conference at South 

Bend March 17 (excerpts) 434 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 459 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 458 

U.S. and India Sign Agreement on Wheat 

Sales Under P.L. 480 (Sober) 449 

United Nations. U.N. Documents 458 

Viet-Nam. President Ford's News Conference 

at South Bend March 17 (excerpts) . . . 434 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 441 

Ford, President 429, 434, 453 

IngersoU, Robert S 436, 450 

Martin, Joseph, Jr 454 

Sisco, Joseph J 441 

Sober, Sidney 449 45^ 

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Volume LXXII • No. 1868 • April 14, 1975 




Remarks and News Conferences A71 


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Vol. LXXII, No. 1868 
April 14, 1975 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and^ 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of tfve Department of 
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international relations are also listei 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of March 26 

Press release 172 dated March 26 

I would like to begin with a brief state- 
ment concerning the suspension of the Mid- 
dle East peace talks. 

The step-by-step approach pursued by the 
United States attempted to separate the 
Middle East problem into individual and 
therefore manageable segments. Now that 
approach has suffered a setback, and the Mid- 
dle East issues have to be dealt with com- 
prehensively, under more difficult circum- 

A moment of potentially great danger is 
not the time to assess blame between the par- 
ties or to indulge in recrimination. We need a 
calm appraisal of the situation and the U.S. 
policy best suited to the new conditions. Let 
me sum up the U.S. position : 

— With the end of the step-by-step ap- 
proach, the United States faces a period of 
more complicated international diplomacy. 
Consequently, a reassessment of policy is 
essential. This reassessment has been ordered 
by the President. 

— The dangers which produced the need 
for progress toward peace are still with us. 
The United States therefore is determined to 
continue the search for peace in the Middle 
East. It is prepared to go to Geneva and will 
be in touch with the cochairman of the con- 
ference, the U.S.S.R., in the near future. 

— The United States is prepared to con- 
sider any other approach acceptable to the 

— The United States remains fully com- 
mitted to the survival of Israel. 

— The search for peace can be nurtured 
only in an atmosphere of calm. The parties 
involved in the Middle East conflict thus 

have a responsibility to moderate words and 
deeds and to refrain from threatening acts. 
— All outside powers have a responsibility 
to exercise restraint and to follow a course 
of moderation. 

We face a difficult situation in the Middle 
East and throughout the world. The times 
demand a renewed sense of national purpose. 

We must understand that peace is indi- 
visible. The United States cannot pursue a 
policy of selective reliability. We cannot 
abandon friends in one part of the world 
without jeopardizing the security of friends 

We cannot master our future except as a 
united people. Our energies should be di- 
rected, not at recriminations about the past, 
but toward a vigorous and constructive 
search for a lasting peace. And to this, the 
Administration is dedicated. 

Now I'll take questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to Ameri- 
can policy and what you have just said re- 
garding selective reliability — in 1965 the 
Uriited States equated the defense of South 
Viet-Nayn with the commitment to NATO; 
now it appears to be equating the additional 
aid to Soitth Viet-Nam with regard to the 
Middle East and so forth. 

Do you feel that during the past five years, 
the policy and the techniques of diplomacy 
ivhich we have pursued have been wrong? 
Have the conditions been wrong? Or what 
has happened? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, 
you are asking two separate questions. One 
is the policy, the relationship between Indo- 
china and other parts of the world ; and the 

April 14, 1975 


second is whether the policies pursued in the 
last five years have been wrong. 
First, let me talk — 

Q. I didn't mean "policies"; I meant "strat- 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that's a dis- 
tinction without much difference. 

Q. In what way? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if the strategy 
is wrong — I don't see how you can have the 
right strategy and the wrong policy — or the 
wrong strategy and the right policy. 

So let me answer your question. 

With respect to Indochina, we are not 
equating the intrinsic importance of each 
part of the world, and we are not saying that 
every part of the world is strategically as 
important to the United States as any other 
part of the world. The problem we face in 
Indochina today is an elementary question 
of what kind of a people we are. 

For 15 years, we have been involved in 
encouraging the people of Viet-Nam to de- 
fend themselves against what we conceived 
as external danger. 

In 1973, we negotiated a settlement in 
which we withdrew our forces and, in re- 
turn, achieved the release of our prisoners. 
This settlement, it is well to recall now, was 
— while we were negotiating it — generally 
criticized for our holding out for stronger 

The fact of the matter is that now that we 
have withdrawn our forces and have ob- 
tained the release of our prisoners, there 
was never any question that the United 
States would continue to give economic and 
military aid to Viet-Nam. And what we face 
now is whether the United States — not just 
"will withdraw its forces," which we 
achieved — and not just "will stop the, or end 
the, loss of American lives" — but whether it 
will deliberately destroy an ally by with- 
holding aid from it in its moment of ex- 

This is a fundamental question of how 
we are viewed by all other people, and it 
has nothing to do with the question of 

whether we should ever have gotten involved 
there in the first place. 

Now, with respect to whether the basic 
policies have been correct in the last five 
years, that, of course, is a rather sweeping 
question which would require an answer that 
could easily occupy the better part of this 
press conference. 

With respect to Indochina, I would urge 
people to look at the newspapers and the 
public debate during the period that these 
agreements were being negotiated to see what 
the imperatives were on the Administration 
in negotiating these settlements. 

And the general conviction was that the 
United States had done enough in expend- 
ing American lives and that the people of 
Viet-Nam should have an opportunity to de- 
fend themselves without American support. 
There was never any proposition that the 
United States should withdraw and cut off 

And these agreements were negotiated on 
the assumption that there would be — that 
the United States would continue economic 
and military aid to South Viet-Nam and also 
that there would be some possibility of en- 
forcing the agreements. 

And this is the basic problem with the 
policy in Viet-Nam. 

With respect to other policies, I would 
rather answer specific questions. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up on 
that question, it appears that the Congress, 
at least, has felt that the Nixon doctrine 
has outlived itself and that noio supplies 
will not he provided as have been committed 
by the United States in the past. Do you 
plan to reassess the alternatives as a result 
of the demise of the Nixon doctrine, partic- 
ularly in reference to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, 
and Thailand? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the 
fact that there are many countries in the 
world which have no conceivable oppor- 
tunity to defend themselves without Amer- 
ican economic or military assistance. And 
therefore, if it becomes our national policy 


Department of State Bulletin 

that countries must at some point be able 
to rely entirely on their resources, we will 
have brought about a massive change in the 
international environment that in time will 
fundamentally threaten the security of the 
United States as well as the security of 
many of our friends. 

The so-called Nixon doctrine was based 
on the assumption that the United States 
would help those countries that were pre- 
pared to help themselves. If this is no 
longer true, then we are likely to find a 
massive shift in the foreign policies of many 
countries and a fundamental threat over a 
period of time to the security of the United 

Q. Mr. Secretary, hoiv serious did yon 
find in your Middle East negotiations the 
concern on the Arab — on the Egyptian — and 
the Israeli sides, the problems you are fac- 
ing in getting aid for Indochina? Was this 
a factor in the breakdown of the talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot assign any 
particular cause for the breakdown of the 
talks. There is no question that events in 
Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indochina 
had an effect on the conduct of the negotia- 
tions. On the part of our friends, it raised 
the question of the durability of our assur- 
ances. And since one of our problems was 
to substitute American assurances for some 
physical terrain features, this was a factor. 
On the part of those who were threaten- 
ing our friends, there was the feeling that 
perhaps concessions were less necessary be- 
cause the drift of events was in any case 

Nevertheless I think that the major reason 
for the breakdown of the negotiations was 
intrinsic to the negotiations themselves. But 
the surrounding circumstances were certain- 
ly not favorable. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to pursue the question 
of the interrelationship of Indochina and 
other portions of the world, where does the 
Administration go from here? It is clearly 
at loggerheads with the Congress on this 
fundamental question. The U.S. policy, ac- 

cording to the Administration apparently is 
immobilized diplomatically on Indochina. Is 
there any ivay over this barrier except a 
constant head-on clash with Congress? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't agree that 
U.S. policy is immobilized over Indochina. 
There is a philosophical disagreement which 
I have attempted to explain earlier. 

I have believed ever since I came to Wash- 
ington that it is overwhelmingly in our na- 
tional interest to put the debate on Indo- 
china behind us. 

The Administration has proposed to the 
Congress a three-year program for phasing 
out American military aid to Viet-Nam, 
which would, if the Congress and the Ad- 
ministration can agree, remove this issue 
from the yearly congressional-executive 

I believe, as I pointed out, that we face 
a grave situation. The Administration can- 
not give up its convictions simply for the 
sake of a technical compromise. But we be- 
lieve that this three-year program, if the 
levels are adequate, might provide an oppor- 
tunity to get the debate behind us. 

Reassessment of Middle East Policy 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the reassessment of 
U.S. policy toward the whole Middle East 
primarily aimed at prompting Israel to 
adopt a more relaxed or less intransigent 
negotiating posture? 

Secretary Kissinger: At this moment, 
there are no negotiations going on, and 
therefore we would have no concrete pro- 
posals to make to Israel, even if Israel asked 
us what negotiating posture it should adopt. 

The assessment of our policy that is now 
going on is made necessary by the new 
circumstances. Our policy had been de- 
signed, as I pointed out in this statement, 
to segment the issues into individual ele- 
ments, to negotiate each element separately, 
and therefore to permit each party to adjust 
itself domestically and internationally to a 
process of a gradual approach toward peace. 

Now that this approach has to be aban- 

April 14, 1975 


doned, we face an entirely new situation 
in which, in all probability, all problems will 
have to be negotiated simultaneously, and in 
which, instead of a forum in which Israel 
deals with one Arab country through the 
mediation of the United States, the strong 
probability is that Israel will have to deal 
with all Arab countries in a multilateral 

The assessment of our policy is not di- 
rected against Israel. It is not designed to 
induce Israel to alter any particular policy. 
It is designed to develop a position that 
the United States can take in order to pre- 
vent an increasing radicalization in the area 
and an increasing tension and, above all, in 
order to avoid a war in which inevitably 
the United States would be involved at least 
indirectly, given the international circum- 

Q. A very quick followup. You and your 
spokesmen have denied that this reassess- 
ment contemplates a cutoff, but I don't think 
anybody has denied that it might contem- 
plate a reduction. Can you respond to that? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no level of 
aid right now that has been set for next 
year's — for the next year. And therefore 
the question of a reduction is an entirely 
academic one. 

We have before us an Israeli request of 
rather large size which at this moment is 
being staffed on the entirely technical level 
and has been staffed on the entirely technical 
level for weeks. It has not yet reached either 
my desk or the President's desk. 

We will make our decisions on aid to 
Israel on the basis of our national objectives 
and on the basis of the statement that I 
made here, that we remain committed to the 
survival of Israel. 

Of course whatever conclusions we come 
to will be submitted to the Congress, and 
the Congress can make its independent 

We are not approaching the reassessment 
with an attitude of cutting aid. And we 
are approaching it with the attitude of look- 

ing at the overall situation in the Middle 
East to determine what the best course 
might be. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have writ- 
ten an obituary on step-by-step negotiating, 
does that mean that you are ivriting off the 
possibility of unilateral American action in 
the Middle East? Are you noiv going to be 
walking step-by-step with the Soviet Union? 
What ivill be your approach? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our approach will 
be whatever is most likely to lessen the 
dangers of war and to produce steps toward 

As I pointed out in our statement, the 
United States is prepared to go to Geneva. 
The United States is prepared also to go 
along with any other approach that the 
parties may request of it. So, we are not 
insistent on any particular approach. We 
will follow whatever approach is most likely 
to be effective and is requested by the par- 
ties. The obvious forum that is now open 
is Geneva, but we are prepared to look at 
other approaches. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follotv that up, could 
you say when you go to Geneva, ivould it 
not be likely that the talks would themselves 
become segmented into the various prob- 
lems and that would provide an opportunity 
for the United States or other parties to 
play a role in each individual problem — 
Israel-Egypt, Israel-Syria, Israel- J or dan? 

Secretary Kissinger: If that is the turn 
that the negotiations take, the United States 
will be prepared to participate in it. The 
United States has no fixed idea on which 
course to pursue. 

At this moment, we have to consult with 
the other parties, and we of course also have 
to consult now with the cochairman of the 
Geneva Conference. 

The United States will do what is most 
likely to reduce the danger of war and to 
promote peace, and if it should turn out that 
separate negotiations develop at Geneva, the 
United States will certainly support them. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Reliability of U.S. Commitments 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems that — 

Secretary Kissinger: Go ahead, and then 

Q. You adverted to difficulties iyi Portugal, 
Greece, Turkey, and Indochina. One coidd add 
the dismemberment of Ethiopia by an Arab 
coalition, the sellout of the Kurds, and so on. 
To ivhat extent do you consider that this — 

Secretary Kissinger: An objective ques- 
tion. What do you want me to say — "yes"? 

Q. Would this reflect ivhat Dr. Schlesinger 
[Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] 
has described as a ivorldwide perception of 
American impotence? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have pointed out 
at many press conferences over the years that 
the central authority of a major country 
cannot be under persistent attack without 
ultimately paying a price in foreign policy. 

We have gone through the experience of 
Viet-Nam, through the anguish of Watergate. 
And I think the cumulative effect of nearly a 
decade of domestic upheaval is beginning 
to pay — to take its toll. 

Foreign governments, when they deal with 
the United States, make a bet in their deal- 
ings on the constancy of American policy 
and on the ability of the United States to 
carry through on whatever it is we promise, 
or fail to promise, or threaten. And this is 
one of the big problems in foreign policy to- 
day. It is not a problem of the Congress at 
this particular moment, because the executive 
also shares a responsibility for it over a 
period of a decade. 

At this moment, it is senseless to try to 
assess the blame. At this moment, the great 
need is to pull together and to see whether 
we can restore a sense of national purpose. 
And as far as the Administration is con- 
cerned, we will do our utmost to do this in 
a cooperative spirit. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that part 
of the national debate over Viet-Nam has 

come about because of what might be called 
the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel syndrome. 
And 710W you are suggesting that possibly 
with three more years of aid the Indochina, 
question coidd be more satisfactorily resolved. 
Isn't this just another way of buyiyig yet 
another slice of time? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. Koppel 
[Ted Koppel, ABC News], my own personal 
conviction, about which I have left no ques- 
tion, is that the right way to do it is to vote 
annually what is necessary. There are some 
problems in the world that simply have no 
terminal date. And in Indochina, as long as 
the North Vietnamese are determined to 
attack, it is not responsible to say that there 
is an absolute date in which an end can be 

On the other hand — given the very strong 
feelings in the Congress, given the cataclys- 
mic, or the very dangerous, impact on the 
U.S. position in the world, of destroying a 
country where we have lost 50,000 men, 
where we have fought for 10 years, and 
which we, as a country, projected into this 
conflict — we are prepared to go to a three- 
year program in which, with adequate aid, 
we believe that there is at least a chance 
that then, with the development of oil re- 
sources and other factors, that this country 
could be put on a more self-sustaining basis. 

It is our offer, in order to take Viet-Nam 
out of the national debate for this period and 
in order to avoid what we think would be a 
very grievous blow to the United States. 

Visit to Latin America 

Q. Sir, in another part of the world, this 
is a question about your projected trip to 
Latiyi Atnerica. Is it still on, and what is the 
main purpose of the trip? And whom do you 
expect to see there? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have planned 
a trip to Latin America for the last six 
months. And as I pointed out in the speech 
in Houston a few weeks ago, the United 
States attaches great importance to its re- 

April 14, 1975 


lationships with Latin America, with which 
we have had the longest uninterrupted tra- 
dition of foreign policy in our history, which 
is a part of the world which is in a position 
somewhere between the less developed na- 
tions and the advanced nations, and with 
which we share many cultural and political 
traditions. And therefore we believe that 
Western Hemisphere policy is a central part 
of our overall policy and a test of our re- 
lationship to many of the less developed 

Now, I am planning to go to — I will 
definitely go to Latin America before the 
meeting of the OAS here in May. So I will 
definitely go in April. Given the various 
pressures that exist right now in Washington, 
I am not in a position to announce the exact 
date. But we will determine that within the 
next few days. But it is definite that I will 
go in April. I am planning to visit Argen- 
tina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Venezuela. And 
I plan to visit other Latin American countries 
later this year. 

Reducing the Danger of War in Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Geneva Peace 
Conference ends in a stalemate, as every- 
body seems to think it will, how great will 
the danger of another ivar in the Middle 
East be? Arid in that connection, do you 
expect Egypt and Syria to alloiv U.N. troops 
to remain in the buffer zone between them 
and Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me take this in 
two parts. The longer there is a stalemate 
in the Middle East, the greater the danger 
of war becomes. The danger of war can 
best be reduced in the Middle East if all of 
the parties see a prospect of peace some- 
where down the road and some plausible 
means of attaining it. And this is why we 
pursued the previous approach. 

When the United States goes to Geneva, it 
will not go there with the attitude that it 
will end in a stalemate, but rather with the 
attitude of seeing whether this forum can 
now be turned into an arena for construc- 
tive progress. And therefore the United 

States will go there with a positive attitude, 
and it will ask all parties concerned to go 
there with a similar attitude, keeping in 
mind the needs and requirements of every- 

Was there another part to your question? 

Q. What do you expect Egypt and Syria 
to do about the U.N. troops in the buffer 
zone betiveen them and Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we believe that 
the U.N. Emergency Foi'ce in Egypt and 
the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in 
Syria were essential components of the dis- 
engagement agreements. We hope that the 
mandates of both of these will be renewed 
as a contribution to peace and stability in 
the Middle East and to permit the process 
of negotiations to go forward in a tranquil 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Lisagor [Peter 
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News]. 

Q. Inasmuch as ive deal ivith every Com- 
munist country in the loorld ivith the ex- 
ception of Cuba today, why would we, to 
use your ivords, be "destroying" South Viet- 
Nam if it became Communist? 

Secretary Kissi)iger: Well, on that theory 
we can give up all of our alliances, because 
we would not be destroying any ally if it 
were overrun by a Communist country. It 
is not a question of our not dealing with 
Communist countries. It is a question of 
countries that obviously have a desire to 
defend themselves being prevented from de- 
fending themselves by an American decision 
to withhold supplies. And therefore we 
would be destroying those people who have 
resisted, whom we have encouraged to re- 
sist, by such an action. 

Now, I think it is interesting also to point 
out that, after all, the flood of refugees in 
Viet-Nam is going away from the Commu- 
nist area of control. And even in Cambodia, 
under conditions that one would have to say 
are extraordinarily discouraging, somebody 
is still fighting around Phnom Penh. So that 


Department of State Bulletin 

we are here in a position where the United 
States is forcing people to surrender by 
withholding supplies. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Egypt, according to a 
senior American official, tvas ivilling to sign 
a pledge not to have recourse to force in 
the Middle East, that force was not the way 
to resolve the conflict in the Middle East, 
to refrain from military and paramilitary 
activities, and to allotv Israel the light to 
reneiv any agreement at the expiration of its 
one-year term. In your vieiv, did those con- 
cessions by Egypt satisfy the military side of 
nonhelligereyicy ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the issue of non- 
belligerency is a complicated legal position, 
because nonbelligerency is an international 
status which you cannot approach simply in 
components. I don't think any useful purpose 
is served for me to give an assessment of 
the various negotiating positions. Both sides 
made a serious effort, and they did not suc- 
ceed in bridging their differences. 

Middle East Developments and Oil Situation 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivhat is the impact on 
the ivorld oil situation, and is the Uiiited 
States prepared to go ahead ivith the con- 
sumer-producer conference? Is that about to 
take place? Would you discuss also the impact 
of King Faisal's assassination on that situ- 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, it is com- 
monly believed that tensions in the Middle 
East do not particularly help the world oil 
situation. The United States has taken the 
position that it would conduct its negotiations 
in the Middle East independent of any oil 
pressures. And American policy will not let 
itself be affected by oil pressures. We do not 
see any developing at this moment. 

We believe that the consumer-producer 
conference is being conducted in the in- 
terests of both sides for the common bene- 
fit, for the interest, of a developing and 
thriving world economy, which is in the in- 
terest of producers as well as consumers and 
should not be tied to the situation in the 

Middle East. Therefore we are proceeding 
with our preparations for the consumer-pro- 
ducer conference, and progress is being made 
in that direction, and we find it essentially 
on schedule. 

King Faisal ruled a country of extraor- 
dinary importance to the energy picture of 
the world. And also, due to his extraordinary 
personality, he had a major influence on all 
of the Arab countries, being one of the few 
Arab leaders with a major influence on both 
the moderates and the radical elements in the 
Arab world. King Faisal was an element for 
moderation in the negotiations between 
Israel and the Arab countries. And he was 
a friend of the United States. His great per- 
sonal prestige will be missed, even though 
we are convinced that the basic policies of 
Saudi Arabia are going to continue. 

Consequences of Cutting Off Assistance 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I ivould like to follow up 
on that question about the "light at the end 
of the tunnel" that was raised here earlier 
by Mr. Koppel. It seemed to me that your 
answer to that question really was that you 
did, given a three-year program in South 
Viet-Nam, see another light at the end of 
that timnel. And I think the real question 
that is iyivolved here is ivhether the Admin- 
istration is perceiving reality. I think you 
have a problem with the public in this coun- 
try. We have given 50,000 men. We have 
given $150 billion. And it has not saved 
South Viet-Nam. You are asking people now 
to believe that if you get three more years 
of help, you, Henry Kissinger, believe it can 
be saved. Now, I woidd like to know if that 
is not telling people that you see a light at 
the end of the tunnel. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying that if 
you do not give enough, then you are bring- 
ing about consequences very similar to what 
we are now seeing. Since May last year. South 
Viet-Nam has received only ammunition and 
fuel. It has received almost no spare parts 
and no modern equipment. Under those con- 
ditions, the demoralization of an army is 
inevitable. And therefore some of the con- 

April 14, 1975 


sequences we now see are not surprising. 

I am saying that, as a people, we should 
not destroy our allies and that, once we start 
on that course, it will have very serious 
consequences for us in the world. 

I have stated that it would be better if 
we did it on an annual basis. Given the enor- 
mous divisions that have arisen in this coun- 
try, for the sake of avoiding these divisions 
we are prepared to go the other route. It is 
not our first choice. The better course is to 
do it by determining each year what is 

And in the nature of things, there are 
many situations around the world in which 
the necessity of assistance depends on the 
degree of outside pressure. And if we can- 
not control the outside pressure, then our 
cutting off assistance means turning these 
countries over to their enemies. 

Mr. Binder [David Binder, New York 

Developments in Portugal 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your 
assessment of the events in Portugal, what 
U.S. policy is toivard Portugal, and ivhether 
it might have to change? 

Secretary Kissinger: Portugal, of course, 
is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and has had close and friendly 
relationships with the United States. 

What seems to be happening in Portugal 
now is that the Armed Forces Movement, 
which is substantially dominated by officers 
of leftist tendencies, has now appointed a 
new Cabinet in which Communists and par- 
ties closely associated with the Communists 
have many of the chief portfolios. This was 
an evolution that was not unforeseeable 
over recent months, and it will, of course, 
raise questions for the United States in re- 
lationship to its NATO policy and to its 
policy with Portugal. 

With respect to NATO, this is a matter 
to be discussed with all of our allies, and we 
are in close contact with them. 

With respect to Portugal, the United States 
has a tradition of friendly relations with Por- 

tugal, and it does not intend to take the ini- 
tiative in breaking these friendly relations. 
However, we are disquieted by an evolution 
in which there is a danger that the demo- 
cratic process may become a sham and in 
which parties are getting into a dominant 
position whose interests we would not have 
thought were necessarily friendly to the 
United States. 

Aid to Viet-Nam After Peace Agreement 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that 
in 1973, when the Viet-Nam peace accords 
were negotiated, there ivas no doubt about 
contitruing U.S. military and economic as- 
sistance. What assurances did you have then, 
in '73, that the Congress would continue this 

Secretary Kissinger: We had no assur- 
ances. If you review now the nature of our 
domestic debate — say, from 1969 to 1973 — 
it was essentially that American involve- 
ment in Viet-Nam should be terminated but 
that the Vietnamese should be given an op- 
portunity to defend themselves; and the 
entire pressure of the domestic debate was 
on the withdrawal — at least, insofar as I 
became conscious of it — was on the with- 
drawal of American participation. 

We stated, on the date that the agree- 
ment was signed, if you read my press con- 
ference of that day, that economic and 
military aid would continue. And none of 
this was ever challenged in '73 and '74. 

In fact, the debate started this year over 
appropriating a sum of money that had 
already been authorized by the Congress; so 
a question of principle could not possibly 
have been involved, because the authoriza- 
tion was approved last year with very little 
division. There were no assurances, but it 
seemed to us inherent in the whole posture 
that we had taken that this would continue. 

Q. If I could follow up on that, did you 
give at that time the South Vietnamese Gov- 
ernment assurances that this aid ivotdd 

Secretary Kissinger: We told the South 
Vietnamese Government — not a commitment 


Department of State Bulletin 

of the United States that aid would con- 
tinue — but that, in our judgment, if the 
South Vietnamese cooperated in permitting 
us to withdraw our forces and, therefore, to 
reclaim our prisoners, that in our judgment 
the Congress would then vote the aid that 
would be necessary to sustain Viet-Nam 
economically and militarily. It was not given 
as an American commitment. 

We're not talking here of a legal Amer- 
ican commitment; we are talking here of a 
moral commitment. 

End of Step-by-Step Approach in Middle East 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think there will 
be another Middle East ivar? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is al- 
ways a danger of a Middle East war, as long 
as the parties have such irreconcilable dif- 
ferences. We do not believe a Middle East 
war is inevitable. We believe a Middle East 
war would involve the greatest dangers to 
all of the countries concerned, as well as 
serious dangers of great-power involvement. 
And therefore the United States will work 
with determination and with confidence to 
avoid a war and to use its influence to 
promote a movement toward peace. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, did you look at the 
record of the assassin of King Faisal? I'm 
sure you must have. And did you find, when 
he was in the United States, any input or 
anything that might have contributed to this 

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I have not 
looked at the detailed — I have just seen a 
brief summary of the record of the assassin, 
but I'm absolutely confident that nobody in 
the United States had anything to do with 
such an action, because we considered King 
Faisal a good friend of the United States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can ive ask another 
question on the step-by-step — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is there such a 
presumption in this country at this moment, 
in newspaper articles, in the meaning — in 
the interpretation — of the reassessment of 
Mideast policy, that Israel somehow was at 

fault for the breakdown of the talks and 
should somehow be punished by reduction, in 
aid or some other manner? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I cannot an- 
swer why people make certain assumptions. 
Many of you were on the plane with me, 
and you know how I attempted to explain 
the situation. We — the Administration has 
made no assessment of blame, nor will it 
serve any useful purpose to engage in that 

Secondly, punishment of a friend cannot 
be the purpose of a national policy. We now 
face a new situation. No useful purpose is 
served by conducting it in a fit of pique or 
by encouraging even greater tensions in the 
area. We will make an assessment of the 
American national interest in relation to 
our long-term commitments, as well as the 
necessity of preserving the peace; and our 
policy will be based entirely on this. And 
in no sense is any consideration given to 
punishing any particular country. 

Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS]. 

Q. Mr. Sec7-etary, in that connection, go- 
ing back to the step-by-step approach once 
again, since you started this approach, there 
was an agreement between Egypt and Israel 
in January of '74, an agreemeyit between 
Syria and Israel in May of '7U, an enhance- 
ment of the American diplomatic position in 
the Middle East, and oyie setback. In light 
of the balance on the pluses and minuses, 
why so radical and dramatic a change, a 
need for a major reassessment of policy? 
Why not continue along the old way, recog- 
nizing that there was one setback but a lot 
of pluses? 

Secretary Kissinger: We obviously believe 
that there were large pluses. As I made clear 
before we went on this trip, it seemed to us 
that in any event, even if another step had 
succeeded, a reassembling of the Geneva 
Conference was the most likely next step, be- 
cause we believed that the Geneva Confer- 
ence would then have taken place under 
easier circumstances than will now be the 

We have made the assessment that the 

April 14, 1975 


step-by-step approach, as it has been con- 
ducted up to now, is not likely to be able to 
be continued. And therefore we have to 
assess where we go from here, under condi- 
tions in which some of the presuppositions 
are no longer valid. And I don't consider 
anything particularly dramatic about assess- 
ing American policy when it finds itself in 
a new situation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have used the word 
"suspension" to describe the talks, and yet 
you said that the step-by-step approach is 
ended. Now, you just said it's yiot likely to 
be able to continue. Is there any chance 
whatsoever that the negotiations between 
Israel and Egypt on an interim settlement — 
that is, another step — can be revived? 

Secretary Kissinger: My impression, from 
Egyptian public statements, is that this is 
extremely unlikely. Should, however, the 
parties request us, against our expectations, 
to undertake it, we would be prepared to do 
it. But we are making no effort to urge the 
parties to do so. We stand ready, if there 
should be any such request. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the question was being 
raised after your briefing on the Hill — 

Secretary Kissinger: Miss Berger [Mari- 
lyn Berger, Washington Post], and then you. 

Q. A question was being raised yesterday 
after your briefing to Congressmen an the 
Hill as to ivho made that decision that the 
step-by-step approach is now fiiiished. Was 

it your personal decision? Was it a decision 
of the parties? Cauld you tell us about hoiv 
that decision was reached? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptian For- 
eign Minister announced, on the evening that 
he announced the suspension of the talks, that 
the step-by-step approach was now finished 
and that Egypt would return to Geneva. 
This is how the decision was reached. 

The United States will do whatever it 
can — and whatever the parties agree to — to 
promote peace in the Middle East, and if the 
parties should request us to do it, we would 
be willing to entertain it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it, in your view, 
enhance the prospects to go to Geneva if 
the United States would move beyond the 
role of intermediary and take a publicly 
stated position on the substantive issues 
being negotiated there? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have gen- 
erally refrained from taking a position of 
our own because we felt that when the peace 
and security of countries is concerned that 
they have to make their fundamental deci- 
sions. On the few occasions when the issues 
between them had narrowed suflficiently, the 
United States took a position. 

Now, whether in the evolution of the nego- 
tiations — at Geneva or elsewhere — a mo- 
ment will come when the United States 
should take a position of its own, that re- 
mains to be determined. We have not yet 
made this decision. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day Visit to the Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger visited the United 
Kingdom, Belgium, Egypt, Syria, Israel, 
Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia March 
6-23. Folloxving are remarks made by Secre- 
tary Kissinger and foreign leaders on vari- 
ous occasions during the trip, together with 
remarks made by President Ford and 
Secretary Kissinger on March 23 upon the 
Secretary's return to Washington. 


Coming here from overseas we realize 
that we stand at the center of a historic 
civilization. Cardiff and Wales have made 
seminal contributions to the life of Great 
Britain and the wider culture of the Western 
world. This is a land of great poetry and 
song, of economic leadership from the be- 
ginning of the indu-strial age, of social and 
political idealism. Wales looks out upon the 
ocean that touches all the Western nations. 
Your ideals and your spirit, which gleam far 
beyond your shores, have been among the 
beacons which join those nations into a 
single civilization. 

I have been asked to speak for the assem- 
bled guests in extending our congratulations 
to the two men who have been honored to- 
day, James Callaghan and George Thomas. 
It is difficult to speak for so many and even 
more difficult to do justice to the achieve- 
ments of our Right Honorable friends. To- 
day, you have honored them for three dec- 
ades of distinguished service to you in the 
House of Commons and as Ministers of the 

^ Made at a banquet given by the Lord Mayor of 
Cardiff in honor of British Foreign Secretary James 
Callaghan and George Thomas, Deputy Speaker 
of the House of Commons (text from press release 

I confess that I view their achievements, 
particularly those of my friend Jim Cal- 
laghan, from a perspective different than 
your own. By conferring the Freedom of 
the City upon him, you have symbolically 
welcomed him as a citizen of Cardiff and 
Wales. But I know him as a citizen of the 
world, as a statesman who has been my 
valued colleague in our common search for 
a more secure peace, a friend on whose word 
one can always rely and whose steadiness is 
a constant source of strength. By support- 
ing Jim Callaghan during his long career 
in Parliament, Cardiff has given him the 
opportunity for the broad experience, at 
home and abroad, that now allows him to 
speak so effectively for Britain in the world 
community. Not only Britain but America 
must be grateful for your trust. 

Over the past year, Jim Callaghan and I 
have been close partners in the effort to 
cope together with the serious new chal- 
lenges that face us in the contemporary 
world. Jim Callaghan's wisdom has invari- 
ably been hardheaded and practical. But he 
has never forgotten that immediate solutions 
must prove barren unless they serve some 
larger conception and relate to some deeper 
human value. Our time needs strength and 
realism, but we must never forget that only 
idealists can have the strength to prevail and 
only men of vision can transform reality. 

The cornerstone of all our efforts must be 
cooperation between Europe and the United 
States. For more than a generation, this 
transatlantic relationship has sustained our 
mutual safety and prosperity. And within 
that relationship the close tie of Britain and 
the United States has had a special place. 
Statesmen of both parties in both of our 
countries have contributed to its construc- 
tion and have built on it in successive ad- 

April 14, 1975 


It was Winston Churchill who foresaw, 
in the darkest hour of World War II, that 
the alliance of our nations could be a basis 
for the deliverance of the West from the 
dangers of tyranny, hardship, and war: 

If we are together (he said) nothing is impossible. 
If we are divided all will fail. I therefore preach 
continually the doctrine of the fraternal associa- 
tion of our two peoples, not for any purpose of 
gaining . . . advantages for either of them . but 
for the sake of service to mankind and for the 
honor that comes to those who faithfully ser^'e great 

It was Ernest Bevin, one of the greatest 
British Foreign Secretaries, who joined, fol- 
lowing the war, with the leaders of the 
United States to forge the system of collec- 
tive security under which we still live. 

Today, James Callaghan carries on that 
proud tradition. Under his guidance, we 
may be sure that the association between 
our peoples will, as Churchill happily put it, 
"just keep rolling along," as inexorable as 
ever. On a broad range of issues vital to 
our common security and progress— which 
means in effect the whole spectrum of inter- 
national affairs— our intimate consultation, 
advice, and mutual assistance have become 
second nature. And the strength of our 
association has lent stability to the growing 
relationship between America and Europe 
as a whole. 

And so as I leave tomorrow for the Middle 
East to seek progress toward a peace we all 
seek, I go reinforced by the opportunity to 
exchange views over many weeks with the 
British Government and especially extensive 
discussions with the Foreign Secretary. I 
also go saddened by the knowledge that 
innocent lives have again been sacrificed in 
the conflict between Arab and Israeli which 
has claimed so many lives over the decades. 
The terrorist incident in Tel Aviv last night 
and this morning— a random and senseless 
act — reminds us once more of the tragic di- 
mensions of this conflict. Violence does not 
forward the cause of peace. It leads to 
counteractions in which more lives are lost, 
the tragedy is compounded, and the cause of 

justice which both sides seek is made more 
difficult to achieve. 

The peoples of the Middle East have suf- 
fered enough. They have earned a surcease 
from their agony. We shall therefore con- 
tinue our efforts to promote negotiations 
and further steps toward peace in the Middle 
East, because we must, and because the 
alternative is more travail and tragedy, not 
only for the peoples concerned but ulti- 
mately for the world. 

In the world at large much has changed 
in the last 35 years. Europe has gained new 
economic strength. Old reasons for economic 
solidarity, such as the cold war, have di- 
minished in urgency. New motives, such as 
economic interdependence, have appeared. 
New powers, notably Japan, have joined 
the industrialized world; and new centers 
of influence, such as the oil producers, have 
arisen within the developing world. As we 
seek a new basis for Atlantic relations, we 
must be more aware of relations with the 
rest of the world than ever before. 

But at a time of change, let us also re- 
affirm the enduring principles that have 
guided, and still guide, relations between 
America and Europe. 

—Our association is based upon a deep 
community of values and interests. Our stra- 
tegic interests closely coincide. Our economies 
are interdependent. Americans, most of 
whom are the descendants of Europeans, 
share Europe's commitment to the ideals of 
freedom, democracy, and a life of opportu- 
nity for all our peoples. 

A major common purpose of our pol- 
icies is to preserve our civilization from 
pressures of insecurity or scarcity, to realize 
the opportunity for freedom and progress, 
and to achieve together a world at peace. 

Our relationship is based on partner- 
ship and friendship. Our inspiration is the 
need to vindicate man in an age of prolifer- 
ating technology and to give hope to a world 
capable of self-destruction. 

Jim Callaghan and I have the privilege of 
serving two nations whose historic partner- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ship has been central to the unity and the 
progress of the West. Our nations have com- 
mon purposes that transcend the interests 
of Britain or America or Europe. We are 
the inheritors of a vision of what the unity 
of the West can mean for the future of all 

Jim Callaghan and I are friends, as our 
two peoples are friends, and we are partners 
as our two peoples are partners. I repeat to 
you my thanks for the opportunity to be here 
today. One understands a man better for see- 
ing what shaped him. I want to extend my 
deep gratitude to Cardiff and to Wales for 
having helped make Jim Callaghan the man 
and the statesman he is. And I join my voice 
to yours in commemorating the great honor 
you have bestowed upon both our Right Hon- 
orable friends. 


Press release 121 dated March 10 

Secretary Kissinger 

Foreign Minister Bitsios and I have had 
another one of our series of friendly meet- 
ings to discuss the range of economic, mili- 
tary, and political matters concerning the 
Governments of Greece and the United 

We paid particular attention to the urgent 
need of finding a solution to the problem of 
Cyprus. Foreign Minister Bitsios explained 
to me in detail the point of view of his 
government with respect to the full range of 
issues on Cyprus. I, in turn, explained to 
the Foreign Minister the readiness of the 
U.S. Government and my own personal readi- 
ness to do everything within my power to 
speed up a solution to this difficult and tragic 
problem. The Foreign Minister and I agreed 
to meet again in the near future at a time 
and place yet to be determined in order to re- 
view the progress that may have been made 
and that, we hope, will have been made on 
the issues that we discussed today. 

Greek Foreign Minister Dimitrios Bitsios 

Secretary Kissinger and myself felt that 
there was an accumulation of problems 
serious enough to make necessary another of 
our periodical friendly meetings. The subjects 
which we have discussed are difficult matters, 
so no spectacular results could be expected, 
but our discussion was to place in the spirit 
of mutual understanding and our determi- 
nation and willingness to see progress made 
in all fields. We shall meet again, and I ex- 
pect that by that time we shall have to report 
some further progress. 

Thank you. 

Questions and Answers 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will that meeting take 
place jointhj with the Turkish Foreign Min- 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not made 
any plans. I would expect that this will be 
a separate meeting between Foreign Minis- 
ter Bitsios and myself. But we are of course 
in favor of anything that would facilitate 

Q. Mr. Foreign Minister, are you hopeful 
of early resumption of the negotiations with 

Foreign Minister Bitsios: The situation is 
such that I hope that there will be a break- 

Q. Is there now a new approach that you 
have agreed on that could be presented to 
the Turks, hopefully, to lead to Turkish 
agreement to begin negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: This was not a ques- 
tion today of discovering new approaches. 
I am sending Assistant Secretary Hartman 
[Assistant Secretary for European Affairs 
Arthur A. Hartman] to Ankara to report on 
the discussions. We hope that a framework 
can be found, both procedural and substan- 
tive, that will permit the progress of which 
Foreign Minister Bitsios and I have spoken. 

April 14, 1975 


Q. Have you proposed a solution to the 
Cyprus problem? [Summary of a question 
in Greek.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not proposed 
any solution. The United States will do its 
best to facilitate a solution, but of course 
the basic positions will have to be taken by 
the parties concerned and it would not be 
proper for the United States to impose its 
own views on the parties. What the United 
States does do is to indicate its support for 
a speedy solution. The talks this afternoon 
in which Foreign Minister Bitsios explained, 
as I said, the full range of the Greek point 
of view will be studied with sympathy and 
will be dealt with in a manner that we hope 
will facilitate a settlement. 

Q. Hoiv soon can a solution be found? 
[Summary of a question in Greek.} 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is prema- 
ture to speculate as to time. I agree with 
Foreign Minister Bitsios that by the time 
we meet again, it may be possible to indi- 
cate a time frame and to report some specific 
steps that could be taken. 

Q. Will you meet Foreign Minister 

Secretary Kissinger: I am prepared to 
meet with the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
and I expect to meet with him within the 
next few weeks. We have not set a date. 

Q. What is the status of the negotiations 
on U.S. bases in Greece? 

Secretary Kissinger: That would be the 
last question, at least as far as I am con- 
cerned. Yes, we reviewed the negotiations 
that were started. They will be resumed 
in a few weeks after we have studied the 
Greek position that was submitted to us. 
These negotiations, too, are, in our judg- 
ment, being conducted in a constructive 

Q. Are you now more optimistic? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is prema- 
ture to make any predictions. We are seri- 
ously trying to help toward a solution, and 

again I think that after the Foreign Minister 
and I meet the next time, we may be able 
to hazard some predictions. 


Press release 122 dated March 10 

I came to Egypt because I believe that 
progress toward peace is possible. I will do 
my very best, and I plan to stay in the area 
until we have achieved some definite prog- 

Thank you. 


Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the 
President and I have had extensive talks 
today, partly alone and partly together with 
our associates, to review all the elements 
that are involved in making another step 
toward peace in the Middle East. I will now 
go first to Syria and then to Israel, and I 
will discuss there a similar range of issues 
regarding the elements of another step. I 
will then return for further discussions with 
the President on Tuesday or Wednesday. 

I am here because the United States be- 
lieves very strongly that another step 
toward peace in the Middle East is in the 
interest of all of the peoples of the Middle 
East and of the world, and we are dedicated 
to making a major effort in this direction. 
I believe, based on the discussions that I 
have had, progress is possible. 

Q. Have you discussed, Mr. Secretary, any 
possibility of another disengagement on the 
Syrian front? 

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the 
whole range of problems involved with peace 
in the Middle East, and of course that in- 
cludes all fronts. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you bringing con- 

- Held at Aswan following their second meeting 
(text from press release 123 dated Mar. 10). 


Department of State Bulletin 

Crete ideas to Israel that you have picked 
up here from President Sadat? 

Secretary Kissinger: Obviously, in discus- 
sions with the Israelis we will be discussing 
ideas and elements of a possible step. I 
don't think the origin of these ideas and 
elements is of decisive importance. 

Q. Mr. President, do you think enough 
progress has been made to make you opti- 
mistic about a settlemoit? 

President Sadat: Well, as I said before, I 
am always optimistic, but I think we shall 
be having a very hard round this time. 

Q. Did you discuss the Palestinian ques- 
tion, Mr. Kissinger? 

Secretary Kissinger: I said we discussed 
the whole range of issues in the Middle East. 

Q. Mr. President, ivhen you said a "hard 
round," do you think it ivill take a long time ? 
Do you think it might take three or four 

President Sadat: Well, I shall be very 
happy to have Dr. Kissinger as long as he 
can afford to stay with me, but it is not a 
matter of weeks or so. As I said before, the 
mission of my friend Dr. Kissinger is very 
important this time because we are working 
on two very important points. The first 
point is the defusion of the explosive situa- 
tion ; the second is pushing the process of 
peace. For that I am saying it is the hardest. 

Q. Mr. President, you said recently that 
you think noiv, for the first tiyne, peace is 
possible. Can you please say ivhat changed 
to make it such at this time? What elements 
have changed? 

President Sadat: Well, I did not say this 
yesterday, or a week before. I said it a year 
before, when I met Dr. Kissinger, when we 
fulfilled the first disengagement agreement. 
My theory is this : For 26 years we have 
never enjoyed any confidence in Israel ; and 
the same thing happened, that Israel never 
enjoyed any confidence in us. The moment 
came when Dr. Kissinger appeared on the 
stage, and he enjoyed my full confidence. 

I think it must be mentioned also that he 
should enjoy the full confidence of Israel 
after all that he has done for Israel, and all 
that the United States has done. So I am 
saying, for the first time in 26 years peace 
is possible. 

Q. Mr. President, do you think that no 
form of ivarfare is useful in the Arab-Israeli 

President Sadat: This is quite true from 
my point of view, and I think the October 
war has proved that whatever power any 
party has, it cannot impose conditions on 
the other. 

Q. What about other forryis of warfare, 
Mr. President? 

President Sadat: Well, do you have in 
mind what you call preventive war? 

Q. Economic warfare. 

President Sadat: When we discuss peace, 
we shall be discussing peace in all its dimen- 
sions. But let us first defuse the explosive 
situation ; then after that we can discuss it. 

Q. Mr. President, could you say that after 
your talks today you feel things look harder 
than they did before your talks today? 

President Sadat: Well, my friend, it is 
true that I feel that this time it is harder. 
It is true. 

Q. Is it hai-der, Mr. President, because 
you want to go further this time than you 
did last time in the range of what you are 
trying to achieve? 

President Sadat: Well, as I told you, what 
we want to achieve this time is keeping the 
momentum of the peace cause and defusing 
the explosive situation. 

Q. Are the prospects better or worse after 
today's talks? 

President Sadat: I cannot tell until Dr. 
Kissinger returns. 

Q. Mr. President, is the question of a 
written nonwar pledge by Egypt a negoti- 
able issue as far as you are concerned? 

April 14, 1975 


President Sadat: We have not discussed 
this yet. We have not reached it. But do you 
mean nonbelligerency? As I told you, if I 
am going to agree to nonbelligerency while 
there is one Israeli soldier occupying my 
land, this would mean an official invitation 
to continue occupying my land, and I am 
not going to extend this invitation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the 
Geneva Conference to meet soon? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have always 
stated our readiness to go to Geneva. When 
I met Foreign Minister Gromyko [Soviet 
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] in 
Geneva last month, we indicated that we were 
prepared for an early resumption at an 
early date. 

Q. Have you discussed the visit of Presi- 
dent Sadat to the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: President Sadat 
knows that he is always welcome, and I hope 
that after we conclude these negotiations 
we will be able to arrange some firm date. 


Press release 124 dated March 10 

I can really add very little to what has 
been said. The President and I had a very 
good talk, and I am now going to Syria and 
Israel. We will try to formulate some ideas, 
and I will return here on Tuesday night or 


Press release 125 dated March 10 

I just want to say that, as always, I'm 
glad to be in Syria, and I'll review steps that 
can be made toward peace, together with 
the President and the Foreign Minister; and 
of course we recognize that peace in the 
Middle East requires the participation of 
all countries. 

Thank you. 


Press release 126 dated March 10 

Secretary Kissinger 

I would like to express the great pleasure 
we have in welcoming the Foreign Minister, 
Mrs. Khaddam, and all our other Syrian 
friends to the American Embassy. I had the 
pleasure of first meeting the Foreign Minis- 
ter in December 1973. Since then I have 
been in Damascus about 30 times. I am one 
of the world's great experts on the route 
from the airport to the guesthouse, and on 
the tactics of the Foreign Minister, which 
consist of going on the attack immediately 
upon my arrival. In fact, I want to compli- 
ment him. He has compressed the time 
schedule now, and he can get into a full 
attack from a standing start in 10 seconds. 
[Laughter.] I can say with assurance that 
whatever else may happen in Syrian-Ameri- 
can relations, it will not be due to the in- 
adequate defense of Syrian interest by the 
Syrian officials that I have encountered. 

In the year and a half that we have had 
the privilege of meeting, I have learned to 
understand the Syrian point of view, the 
Syrian pride, the Syrian dedication to its 
principles. We have worked together on one 
agreement, and while it was a difficult ne- 
gotiation, I think it brought our two coun- 
tries closer together. As I continue the Ameri- 
can eff'orts in this area, it is based on the 
conviction that a lasting peace in the Middle 
East must include all of the concerned coun- 
tries. This is our basic attitude in whatever 
contribution we can make to lasting peace. 
In the process, I believe that Syrian-Ameri- 
can relations have dramatically improved, 
and we will do whatever is in our power so 
they will continue to improve. As we have 
learned to work together in mutual respect 
and growing understanding, I am confident 
we can surmount whatever difficulties exist 
from time to time. I have greatly appreciated 
the opportunity of working with the Foreign 
Minister, General Shihabi [Brig. Gen. Hik- 


Department of State Bulletin 

mat Khalil Shihabi, Chief of Staff for In- 
telligence], and of course with President 
Asad and others here. I would like to propose 
a toast to the friendship between the Syrian 
and American people. 

Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam 

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen : From 
the bottom of my heart I thank you on be- 
half of myself and my colleagues and friends 
of the Syrian side for this gracious invita- 
tion to the residence of the American Em- 
bassy. And I also thank you for the gracious 
words you have uttered in appreciation of 
the good relations between the United States 
and Syria. You have referred to your re- 
peated visits to our country, and I believe 
that during this period and through these 
visits you have come to appreciate and under- 
stand what we feel and how we feel about 
certain things. 

As President Asad said ever since the 
first meeting, I would like to reiterate that 
our country wants and strives for peace. We 
have worked, we are still working, and we 
will continue to work toward the realization 
of a just peace. We were very clear when we 
said that peace means to us, first, the pres- 
ervation for the Palestinian people of their 
legitimate rights; secondly, the complete 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from our oc- 
cupied lands. And it is from this angle that 
we view efforts in this direction toward a 
just solution, and from this angle appears 
the comprehensive look at a just peace. That 
is why we in Syria and the rest of the Arab 
countries want just and permanent peace. 
And it was on this basis that we welcomed 
all the efforts that were spent within this 
framework and in this direction. 

I wish you, Mr. Secretary, and you, Mrs. 
Kissinger, a very good sojourn in our coun- 
try. And I would like to emphasize and assure 
you that our country stretches out the arm 
of friendship to meet the arm of friendship 
extended by any other country in the same 
spirit. We stretch out this arm of friendship 
toward any country which shares with us 

mutual respect and which has mutual in- 
terests with us. In this connection, refer- 
ence must be made to the efforts made by 
Dr. Kissinger to return to normalcy the re- 
lations between Syria and the United States 
of America. 

Finally, I raise my glass in a toast to Sec- 
retary Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger, and to all 
our other American guests here. 


Press release 127 dated March 10 

The President and I and our colleagues 
had a very extensive discussion of all the 
elements involved in the progress toward 
peace in the Middle East. The talks were 
frank and friendly. We agreed that while I 
am in the area I would return to Damascus 
to continue this exchange of views. 

We also talked about bilateral relations 
between the United States and Syria; we 
agreed that they are excellent and that they 
will be fostered. 

Thank you. 


Press release 128 dated March 10 

Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon 

I would like to welcome Secretary of State 
Kissinger and Mrs. Kissinger and their col- 
leagues on this visit of theirs which is al- 
ready part of the great effort for achieving 
political progress in the area. It is quite 
natural that my colleagues and myself are 
very much interested to hear what Dr. Kis- 
singer has to tell us about his impressions 
from his visits and talks in the neighboring 
Arab capitals. 

I only hope that what he has to tell us 
would be more constructive and more hope- 
ful than what the Arab media has to tell 
us from across the lines. Because, as you 
know, we are people who will never give up 
the idea of peace and would like to see prog- 
ress taking place as soon as possible. 

April 14, 1975 


Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is a great pleas- 
ure to be back in Israel again. We are here 
to see whether together we can make some 
progress toward peace. I will report to the 
Israeli Cabinet about my discussions in 
Egypt, also my discussions in Syria, and we 
will then see whether we can develop jointly 
some ideas that might provide the basis for 
further discussions. 

Thank you. 


As you know, we are at the beginning of 
the process of negotiations which are com- 
plicated and which will take some time. We 
are engaged here in analyzing all the ideas 
and elements that might be part of a possible 
agreement, and we are doing so with great 
care. We have done so in a very friendly, 
very comradely, and very positive atmos- 
phere. I am going to Ankara this afternoon, 
and I am returning tomorrow evening — 
back to meet again tomorrow evening to 
continue this examination of the ideas and 
the elements of the possible agreement. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said the chances 
were 50-50 before you started out. Would 
you say they are better now or worse now? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to be 
in a position in which every day I have to 
give an assessment and a percentage figure, 
because we will be in a hopeless trap after 
a while. I came here because I believed that 
an agreement is possible. I have no i*eason 
to change my mind. 

Q. Do you have any assessment of how 
long this mission will last? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to put 
myself into any particular time frame, be- 
cause it is an agreement of some impor- 
tance; if it is achieved, it has to be done 
with great care. 


Press release 130 dated March 11 

I would like to express our pleasure at 
visiting our old and trusted ally Turkey and 
our appreciation for the invitation on such 
short notice and in the face of many com- 
plexities. I look forward to an opportunity 
to exchange views with my old friend the 
Foreign Minister, with the Prime Minister, 
with your President, and with leading politi- 
cal personalities of Turkish political life. Our 
relationship with Turkey, which goes back 30 
years, is based on mutual intere.st and a long 
tradition. It is a relationship which we value 
and which I have come here to strengthen. 
And we will do our best to settle together 
and to discuss together all the complex issues 
that confront both of our nations. 

Thank you. 


Mr. Egevit and I had a very good and com- 
plete talk. As you know, we are old friends, 
and we reviewed all the relations between 
the United States and Turkey and other 
problems of mutual interest, such as Cyprus. 


Press release 133 dated March 11 

Ladies and gentlemen : I came here to 
strengthen the old friendship between Tur- 
key and the United States. This friendship, 
as the United States has repeatedly affirmed, 
is in the mutual interest of both countries, 
and it is not extended as a favor by one 
country to another country, and it is in 
that context that the Administration views 
the entire relationship between Turkey and 
the United States. 

We are doing our best to overcome what- 
ever difficulties exist in that relationship, and 

'' Made following a meeting with Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin (text from press release 129). 

' Made following a meeting with Bulent Ec'evit, 
Republican People's Party leader (text from press 
release 133 dated Mar. 11). 


Department of State Bulletin 

we are confident that we will emerge from 
these difficulties with an even stronger ap- 
preciation of each other's needs and with an 
even stronger commitment to the mutual 
friendship than before. 

With respect to Cyprus, we reviewed the 
situation in a friendly spirit. The United 
States believes that the quickest possible 
solution is in the interest of all parties and 
of all of the countries. The problem is to be- 
gin the negotiations and to find a framework 
for the negotiations. And I believe that prog- 
ress has been made in that direction during 
my visit. 

Now I will be glad to take two or three 
questions [inaudible] from those who are 
not traveling with me. [Laughter.] 

Q. llnaudible] have you reached mutual 
grounds for discussions? [Par-aphrased.] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, the 
negotiations will have to be conducted, in 
our view, between Greek and Turkish com- 
munities. And we are trying to be helpful 
in finding a general framework. But the de- 
tailed plans and the detailed bases will have 
to be developed by the negotiators themselves. 

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, do you think 
that in order to have further developments 
on the Cyprus issue it is likely you will re- 
turn to Ankara or to Atheyis in the near fu- 
ture ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Assistant Sec- 
retary Hartman is going to visit Athens, and 
I don't anticipate returning to Ankara be- 
fore the end of May, when I will be coming 
here for a CENTO [Central Treaty Orga- 
nization] meeting; and I look forward to 
that visit. 

Q. Did you bring any specific concessions 
from Mr. Bitsios tvhen you arrived in An- 
kara [i7iaudible] to Mr. Esenbel [inaudible'] 
in any ivay instrumeyital in the progress you 
have made ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I did not come here 
with specific plans, and my purpose was in 
trying to interpret the ideas, as I had under- 
stood them, of the Greek side and to see 

whether one could find a possible frame- 
work for the negotiations once the forum 
has been determined. 
Thank you. 


Secretary Kissinger: We continued our 
very detailed examination of elements of a 
possible agreement. In the nature of such an 
examination we cannot make a progress re- 
port every day, but the talks are being con- 
ducted in very friendly, very positive spirit, 
and nothing has changed in my estimate 
of the situation. 

Q. Are you beginning to see the shape of 
an agreement even though it is kind of early? 

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want to 
give any estimates. I'll be back here in a 
couple of days. I'm going to Aswan — 

Q. There are reports that you will be here 
another two weeks longer. What do you say? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have absolutely no 
estimate of how long it could take, but I 
have some other duties in Washington, too. 

Q. Have you found any areas of agreement 
between Israel and Egypt? 

Secretary Kissinger: I just won't go into 

Q. Does that mean you might break off 
the talks and go back to Washington and 
then return? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think that we 
will know within a reasonable time frame 
what is achievable, and I don't believe it 
will be necessary for me to go back and then 
return here. 


Press release 137 dated March 12 

I am coming back to continue the dis- 
cussion with President Sadat and Foreign 

'" Made following a meeting with Prime Minister 
Rabin (text from press release 136). 

April 14, 1975 


Minister Fahmy, and I look forward to mak- 
ing further progress. 
TJiank you. 


Press release I'll dated March 14 

Secretary Kissinger: The President and I 
have had a very constructive and fruitful 
meeting. We have examined a number of 
principles and some concrete ideas, and I'll 
be taking some of these concrete ideas with 
me to Israel tomorrow. 

Q. Mr. President, do you have anything to 

President Sadat: I confirm Dr. Kissinger's 

Q. I ivonld like to ask Dr. Kissinger 
ivhether he thinks that on the basis of the 
concrete ideas he is taking back to Israel the 
Israeli Cabinet irill be in a position to make 
concrete ideas of its own on Saturday. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am of course in no 
position to speak for the Israeli Cabinet, but 
I expect there will be some concrete Israeli 
ideas when I return. 

Q. Mr. President, there have been reports 
this evening of troop movements on the 
Egyptian front. Can you tell us if these re- 
ports are based on anything substantial? 

President Sadat: Not at all. The Egyptian 
side not at all. 

Q. There has been no concentration of 
Egyptian forces along the Sinai front? 

President Sadat: Not at all. We are honor- 
ing our signature on the disengagement 
agreement. We have with us General Gamassi 
[Gen. Mohamed Adbel Ghani el-Gamassi, 
Minister of War and Commander in Chief 
of the Armed Forces]. 

Q. [Garbled.] 

President Sadat: [Translation from Ara- 
bic] In my talks with Dr. Kissinger, we have 

moved from generalities to specifics, which 
Dr. Kissinger will take with him to Israel, 
after which he will return to us. At this 
stage there is no room for guesswork. We 
await Dr. Kissinger's return. 

Q. Mr. President, you told us last time that 
you expected this to be a hard round. Do you 
still feel that way, or do you think it ivill be 
any easier? 

President Sadat: I expect it to be diflficult 
and hard. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have a better 
estimate now of how long the shuttle might 

Secreta)y Kissingo': I don't want to make 
any estimates as to the length of time. Of 
course, I think all parties have an interest in 
moving it as rapidly as possible. 

Q. Mr. President, is Egypt now prepared 
to give ivritten assurances to refrain from 
beginning hostilities against Israel? 

President Sadat: Well, maybe you remem- 
ber the statement I made in Paris. We are 
not aiming at all to start any hostilities, but 
assurance must be on a reciprocal basis, and 
it is premature now to speak about specifics. 

Q. Mr. President, on the basis of the prog- 
ress that has been made so far, do you be- 
lieve that an agreement is now likely? 

President Sadat: I hope so, but I can't con- 
firm it until after Dr. Kissinger returns. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you carrying any- 
thing on paper to show anything at all in the 
form of maps, drawings? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not reached 
that point yet. I have had long discussions 
with the President and his associates on two 
successive evenings, and I think I can reflect 
their thinking in a rather precise fashion 
without the help of maps. 

Q. [Inaudible.'] 

President Sadat: Well, as I have said be- 
fore, I think the mission of Dr. Kissinger 
has two main aims. The first is to defuse the 


Department of State Bulletin 

explosive situation that exists in the area 
now, and the second, to push the peace proc- 
ess. I have stated also that the defusion of 
the explosive situation means that there 
must be some Israeli gesture of peace on the 
three fronts. 

Q. Mr. President, could you give lis some 
hint what your ideas are about? 

President Sadat: It is premature, still pre- 

Q. Mr. President, is it possible that the 
agreement ivill be in some sort of phased 
format; in other words, a series of stages of 
action by Israel and by Egypt? Is it possible 
it ivill be more along those lines? 

President Sadat: Why don't you wait until 
it is achieved? 

Q. Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger has said 
that he believes that both sides in these nego- 
tiations want peace. Do you believe that Is- 
rael wants peace? 

President Sadat: Well, I shall be waiting 
the return of Dr. Kissinger here. Dr. Kissin- 
ger can see both sides, but I can't see the 
other side myself. I shall be awaiting the re- 
turn of Dr. Kissinger. 

Q. Mr. President, are you more optimistic 
nozv than you tvere before you heard the 
latest Is7'aeli response through Dr. Kissin- 
ger? What is your feeling noiv? 

President Sadat: I am still optimistic, yes. 

Q. More than before? 

President Sadat: Still optimistic, because it 
is my mood. I am optimistic always. 

Q. Mr. President, could you describe or 
ivould you define for us what is the most 
difficult area of the talks? Do you have any 
specifics about what has been the most diffi- 
cidt area of negotiations? 

President Sadat: I think you should ask 
Dr. Kissinger this question. 

Secretary Kissinger: At this point it is not 
possible to make a judgment on which is the 
most difficult point. 

Q. Mr. President, have you considered hav- 
ing joint patrols instead of a U.N. force to 
police the area that would be demilitarized? 

Secretary Kissinger: Remember our agree- 
ment, Mr. President. [Laughter.] 

President Sadat: As I said, in all these de- 
tails it is premature to say anything now. 

Q. You do not ride it out, exclude it? 

President Sadat: Certainly, certainly. But 
as I said, it is premature. 


Press release 142 dated March 14 

I expect to be back, probably on Monday, 
to continue our talks on that occasion. Every- 
thing of substance was already given to you 


We are moving from a discussion of gen- 
eral principles to the examination of concrete 
ideas. I brought the Egyptian considerations 
in this regard to the Israeli negotiating team, 
and we reviewed these as well as other as- 
pects of the problem in great detail and in a 
very comradely, constructive, and positive 
spirit. Tomorrow I am going to Damascus 
and Amman. Then I will return here Sunday 
afternoon, and we will continue our delibera- 
tions, and based on those, I will return to 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you see any very big 
obstacles that anight prevent an agreement 
from taking place now? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is prema- 
ture to predict an agreement. As I said, we 
are moving from general principles to con- 
crete ideas. So there is some progress being 
made, but it is premature to predict an agree- 

° Made following a meeting with the Israeli nego- 
tiating team (text from press release 143 dated 
Mar. 17). 

April 14, 1975 


Q. Are you planning to stay in the area 
until you do get an agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am planning to stay 
in the area until it is known either whether 
it is possible to get an agreement or whether 
it is not. 

Q. Is the problem of nonbelligerency still 
the big sticking point? 

Secretary Kissijiger: Well, I do not want 
to talk about any of the specific issues. 
Thank you. 


Press leleaFe 144 dated March 17 

First of all I would like to thank the For- 
eign Minister for having delayed his depar- 
ture so that he could receive me and partici- 
pate in the talks. President Asad and I had 
a very full and detailed review of the pros- 
pects of peace in the Middle East, and we 
agreed that before I complete my stay in this 
area I would return to Damascus to continue 
those discussions. 

Thank you. 

Secretary Kissinger: I will repeat what I 
said in Damascus. I am returning to Damas- 


Press release 146 dated March 17 

On behalf of my colleagues, I would like 
to thank His Majesty and the Prime Minister 
for the characteristically warm and friendly 
reception we have had here. We have had 
very extended discussions, and I gave His 
Majesty a very full and detailed report about 
the state of the negotiations in which I am 
engaged, and we exchanged ideas about fu- 
ture progress toward peace in the area. We 
also discu.ssed bilateral relations, which are 

On behalf of President Ford, I invited His 
Majesty to pay a visit to the United States 
toward the end of April, and His Majesty 
has accepted. I will stay in the closest touch 
with His Majesty as these negotiations con- 
tinue and will keep him informed of all de- 



Press release 146 dated March 17 

As always, it is a pleasure to visit our 
friends in Jordan. I will report to His Majes- 
ty and the Prime Minister on the American 
initiative in the Middle East and the pros- 
pects of peace as we see them. We will also 
discuss our bilateral relations, which are ex- 
cellent. And it is a pleasure to be with friends. 

Thank you. 

Q. Could I assume from your frequent 
visits to Jordan that you are trying to con- 
vince the Jordanians to go to Geneva? 

Secretary Kissinger: The decision to go to 
Geneva is entirely up to Jordan. We are not 
trying to influence anyone. 

Q. Arriving late, is it a good sign of your 
talks in Damascus? 

Foreign Minister Allon 

The Secretary of State and myself divided 
labor among ourselves. I'll speak in Hebrew 
for the Israeli press, and the Secretary will 
say the same things, I hope, in English. 

[Translated from Hebrew.] We held a de- 
tailed conversation for a number of hours 
with Dr. Kissinger and his group on the 
Egyptian proposals he brought, and we have 
conveyed to our guest our proposals and 
evaluation of the proposals he brought to us 
in accordance with the spirit of government 
policy from previous sessions and today's 
session. I say with satisfaction that these 
talks were held in good spirits and with a 
positive trend on the part of both parties. 
But because of the importance of the subject 
and the great amount of detail, we could not 

" Made following a meeting with the Israeli nego- 
tiating team (text from press release 147 dated 
Mar. 17). 


Department of State Bulletin 

complete the discussion this evening, and we 
will continue tomorrow morning. 

Secretary Kissinger 

The Israeli negotiating team and we re- 
viewed all the elements of the negotiations 
in very great detail, in a very constructive 
spirit, based on the discussions that took 
place in the Israeli Cabinet today. The Israeli 
side presented the Israeli ideas in response 
to the Egyptian ideas that I brought here 
from Aswan, and I plan to go to Egypt to- 
morrow to present them. The Israeli and 
American negotiating team will meet again 
tomorrow morning. 

Q. Did you introduce any ideas of your 
oivn ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. 


We reviewed once again the ideas which I 
brought from Ejgypt and the Israeli reactions 
to those ideas as well as the considerations 
that the Israeli Cabinet and negotiating team 
are asking me to take to Egypt, and I will 
now go to Egypt this afternoon. I plan to be 
back by tomorrow evening, and we will meet 
again then. We had a very good and construc- 
tive meeting this morning in reviewing the 
Israeli ideas. 

Q. How do you rate your chances for a 
settlement now, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to 
make any guesses. 


Press release 151 dated March 17 

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports here indicate that 
you have run into serious trouble in the talks 
with Israel. Is that true? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am here to 

bring some Israeli considerations and ideas, 
and I look forward to discussing them with 
the President and the Foreign Minister. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say ivhether 
those ideas are concrete ideas as you men- 
tioned here on Thursday? 

Secretary Kissinger: 

They are specific 

' Made following a meeting with the Israeli nego- 
tiating team (text from pi'ess release 150). 


Press release 155 dated March 18 

Secretary Kissinger: The President and I 
reviewed in the usual friendly atmosphere 
the ideas which I brought from Israel. The 
President has given me some additional con- 
siderations and ideas to take back to Israel. 
I am returning there this afternoon, and I 
expect to continue the negotiations there. 
This is all I have to say. 

Q. Can you see a breakthrough, Dr. Kis- 

Secretary Kissinger: One can't, in nego- 
tiations, speak of any particular point at 
which there is a breakthrough. I am trying 
to narrow the gap between the two sides by 
explaining the ideas as carefully as I can. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you already nar- 
roived the gap between the two sides? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I have said on 
several occasions, the gap has narrowed, but 
it always remains to be seen whether it can 
finally be closed. 

Q. Mr. President, hoiv would you charac- 
terize the progress, if any, in this specific 
session ? 

President Sadat: Well, as Secretary Kis- 
singer has stated, we had a fruitful talk, and 
I have given him some new considerations as 
an answer to what he has brought here, and 
I think it is premature now to say more. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you determined to 
stay in the region? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I have said on 

April 14, 1975 


many occasions, I am determined to stay 
until we either reach an agreement or it is 
clear that we cannot reach an agreement, so 
I am determined to stay here. 

Q. Mr. President, in view of the viexvs 
brought from Israel by Secretary Kissinger, 
do you believe that an agreement that wotdd 
involve an Israeli withdrawal from the passes 
and from the oilfields woidd be ivithin the 
realm of possibdity? 

President Sadat: I can answer your ques- 
tion on Thursday, let us hope, when Dr. Kis- 
singer returns. 

Q. Mr. President, are there some substa7i- 
tial areas on which yon and the Israelis do 

President Sadat: Well, I think you should 
ask the Secretary this question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are 
some areas of agreement, and there are sev- 
eral substantial areas of disagreement. 

Q. Mr. President, do you get the feeling 
that there has been progress in the last ses- 
sion here, in the last round of exchange? 

President Sadat: I have the impression 
that, as I told you at the beginning, it is a 
very hard, difficult, and complicated round. 

Q. Mr. President, the Israelis appear to be 
talking about a demand for the elements or 
the principles of nonbelligerency from Egypt. 
Is this any more acceptable to you than the 
per se demand for nonbelligerency? 

President Sadat: I have stated our posi- 
tion, and it is quite clear. We shall not agree 
to nonbelligerency as long as there is any 
foreign soldier on our land, and I said that 
doing so means that I am inviting them to 
stay, so I think that this is quite clear. 

Q. The idea of joint patrols with Israel, Dr. 
Kissinger, has been dropped completely? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Foreign 
Minister has put out a statement on the 
Egyptian position which is clear and fully 
understood and has been fully communicated. 

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that there 
should be a buffer zone in which there would 
be a strengthened U.N. Force between the 
Israeli and the Egyptian forces, if an agree- 
ment coidd be reached? 

President Sadat: I think this is quite nat- 
ural, because it is already there. There is a 
buffer zone between us in which the United 
Nations operates; it is already there. 

Q. So that any area that will be evacuated 
by the Is)aelis as a part of a neiv agreement, 
could be replaced or could be soldiered by 
U.N. troops? Is that correct? 

President Sadat: Well, you are driving 
again to try to find some of the details of 
what we are discussing. 

Q. That's true, sir. [Laiighter.'] 
Q. Mr. Secretary, the ideas you'll be carry- 
itig back to Israel now, are they a refinement 
or are they substantially different from the 
ideas you carried back last Friday? 

Secretary Kissinger: In each round the 
ideas, of course, advance and sometimes 
cover collateral areas. But I don't want to 
get drawn into a discussion of whether they 
are entirely new or a refinement, but I think 
they represent, as I have said, additional in- 
put for the Israeli side. 

Q. Do you think. Dr. Kissinger, that you 
can reach an agreement before the time of 
the renewal of the U.N. Forces? 

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly, yes. 

Q. Mr. President, do you have any time 
idea how long an agreement might take to 

President Sadat: We have not yet reached 
this point. 

Q. But irouldn't time be a crucial element, 
some idea of how long it would take, would 
that not be a crucial element? 

President Sadat: You were speaking of 
the implementation, and you are asking now 
about reaching an agreement. 

Q. My point, Mr. President, is there has to 
be some understanding of how long it ivould 


Department of State Bulletin 

take to implement the agreement before an 
agreement could be signed. 

President Sadat: When we agree first on 
the principles, I think the period of imple- 
mentation can be discussed after that, but we 
have not yet agreed upon the principles. 

Q. Do you think, Dr. Kissinger, you can 
reach the same kind of agreement? 

President Sadat: We have not yet agreed 
upon the principles. 

Q. Do you think there can be at the same 
time an agreement on the Syrian front? 

Secretary Kissinger: The conditions in the 
different areas vary, so I do not want to say 
that principles can necessarily be automati- 
cally applied. But I have stated repeatedly 
and publicly that the process of peace applies 
to the whole area, that the United States will 
do its utmost to promote peace in the entire 

Q. Have you discussed bilateral relations 
between Egypt -and the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: We always discuss 
our bilateral relations, which we think are 
excellent. [The President nodded.] 

Q. Do you think the idea of a single Arab 
delegation might be a ivay around the U.S. 
and Israeli objections to dealing with the 
PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization'] in 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not had an 
opportunity to discuss this sort of idea, and 
when it comes time to organize the Geneva 
Conference, we can address specific issues of 
this nature. 

Q. Mr. President, do you see any possibility 
of opening indirect trade to Israel, or indirect 
tourism, folloiving a icithdrawal from part 
of the Sinai? 

President Sadat: I'll tell you, up to this 
moment we didn't agree on the principles of 
this very limited withdrawal, and you are 
raising issues that should be discussed there 
in Geneva after the final solution. You can't 
raise issues like this now. 

Q. Mr. President, you must have an idea, 
though, what the final solution woidd look 
like. Can you give us in general terms what 
you would like to see so far as a final solu- 
tion? Where ivoidd Israel exist? Where would 
its boundaries in general lay? 

President Sadat: I have already stated this 
before — the borders of 1967. And if we can 
succeed in Geneva to end the state of bel- 
ligerency, I think we would make a very big 
achievement for this generation. Sure, as I 
told you before and so I have stated before 
also, the core of the whole problem is the 
Palestinian problem. So if we can achieve in 
our generation the end of the state of bel- 
ligerency between the Arabs and Israel and 
solve the Palestinian question, it will be a 
great achievement. 

Q. With your foresight, sir — you always 
say "this generation" — can you look to the 
next generation perhaps tvith your foresight 
and tell us tvhat situation you envision be- 
tween the Arabs and Israelis in the next 
generation ? 

President Sadat: I have said before, it de- 
pends upon their conduct, and I can't speak 
for the next generation. 

Q. Mr. President, clarification — do you 
mean to leave the impression in this current 
disengagement that you don't think it should 
include such things as improved commerce 
between Israel and Egypt or improved trans- 
portation between Egypt and Israel. There 
have been some proposals made in Israel that 
part of the agreement can be steps such as 
improving transportation from Cairo to Tel 
Aviv, or something like that. 

President Sadat: Are you asking me? 

Q. In answer to a previous question you 
said you thought that such matters should be 
taken up in Geneva and tiot within this dis- 
engagement agreement. 

President Sadat: It is still premature, and 
it is really absurd to discuss such matters as 
this. As I said, if we had reached a state of 
ending the state of belligerency between the 
Arabs and Israel, this would be a great 

April 14, 1975 


achievement for our generation. There is no 
point at all in discussing these relations when 
we can't agree upon ending the state of bel- 

Q. Mr. President, just how serious will it 
be if these negotiations fail? 

President Sadat: Well, I have told my 
press that there is a possibility that we may 
not reach any agreement, and we are ready 
to face whatever comes. 

Q. What woidd be the consequences, sir? 

President Sadat: Well, as the British say, 
we can't cross that bridge until we reach it. 

Q. And if an agreement is reached, is it a 
big push for peace? 

President Sadat: Sure, it will be a turning 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe it is at 
this stage the Palestinians ivould participate 
in these talks concerning their future? 

Secretary Kissiyiger: I think the two press 
corps are competing in asking provocative 

Q. Mr. President, why do you think it 
would be a turning point? You said it would 
be a turning point if it succeeds. Could you 

President Sadat: The next time, the ne.xt 
visit of Dr. Kissinger, then I can elaborate. 

Q. Thank you. 


Press release 156 dated March 19 

The Israeli negotiating team and my col- 
leagues and I reviewed the considerations 
and ideas that I brought from Aswan in 
reply to the Israeli considerations that I had 
put before the Egyptians. In the process, we 
have also reviewed the entire status of the 
negotiation, and the meeting was conducted 
in the characteristic friendly, comradely, and 

positive spirit. We will meet again tomorrow 
morning, before I go to Saudi Arabia, and I 
will be back again in the evening for further 
Thank you. 

Q. Have you made any headway in these 
recent talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are examin- 
ing the ways by which each side is trying to 
meet, or take into account, the considerations 
of the other, and in that sense we are making 

Q. There are reports, sir, that these talks 
have reached a dead end. Would you say this 

is justified? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is not my view. 


Press release 157 dated March 19 

Secretary Kissinger 

First of all, I would like to thank His 
Majesty and his advisers for the very warm 
hospitality that has been extended to us and 
for the very useful talks that we have had, 
I reviewed with His Majesty the state of the 
negotiations in which I am engaged, and in 
which I am acting as a go-between, and the 
prospects of peace in the area in general. 
We also discussed with general agreement 
certain other issues in which the United 
States and Saudi Arabia have common inter- 

In my conversations with Minister Ya- 
mani, the Acting Foreign Minister, and 
Prince Fahd, as well as with His Majesty, 
my attention was called to recent newspaper 
articles speculating on the military inten- 
tions of the United States in the area. I 
would like to state categorically here that 
our relation with Saudi Arabia is based on 
friendship and cooperation in which threats, 
military or otherwise, play no part and we 
base our relationship on cooperation and not 
on confrontation. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Petroleum Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani 

Mr. Secretary, this visit is a very construc- 
tive and fruitful one. We had a chance to dis- 
cuss with you the future relationship be- 
tween the United States of America and 
Saudi Arabia. We listened carefully to your 
report, and that strengthened our belief in 
the good intention and the good will of the 
United States in its efforts to bring peace to 
this area based on the implementation of the 
various resolutions by the United Nations. 
We just heard the official views about the 
fantasies of the newspapers, the articles 
written by certain groups of writers, and we 
are pleased that is now in public. We thank 
you for your efforts and wish you the best 
of luck. 


Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres 

As you know, the Cabinet yesterday empow- 
ered the team of Ministers that is negotiating 
with the Secretary of State to continue the 
negotiations. And in order to do so we had 
to clarify some points. This was done at the 
morning meeting, which was, as usual, con- 
ducted in a very friendly and serious air. 
Once we have the clarifications we are now 
returning to the Cabinet to report. That is 
the best news I can give you for the time 

Secretary Kissinger 

I can add nothing to the statement that the 
Minister of Defense has made. We had a 
good, constructive, and friendly meeting, and 
I will stay in Jerusalem until after the Cab- 
inet meeting and meet again with our col- 
leagues before I return to Egypt this evening. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you more confident 
now that you received the assessment of the 

Israeli Cabinet that an agreement can take 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have told you 
all along that I wasn't going to give you esti- 
mates. I do feel that each side is making a 
very serious effort to try to take into account 
the considerations of the other, and this is 
certainly true of the Israeli side. 

Q. Sir, do you have plans to see Mr. 
Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
A. Gromyko] in the next few days? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not have any 
firm plans at this moment. 


Secretary Kissinger 

We have had another meeting with the 
Israeli negotiating team, and they presented 
to us the ideas and proposals of the Israeli 
Government in response to the proposals and 
ideas of the Egyptian side that I brought 
here. I am now leaving immediately for the 
airport and will go to Aswan and will be dis- 
cussing these Israeli proposals with Presi- 
dent Sadat and his advisers. 

Thank you. 

Q. New proposals? Are they new pro- 
posals ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are 
some new ideas, yes. 

Q. Is an agreement close, sir? Would you 
say that it was closer? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to 
speculate. I will be back, I hope tomorrow, 
and I will be able to give a better assessment 

Defense Minister Peres 

We gave the complete proposal of the Is- 
raeli Cabinet to Dr. Kissinger. 

° Made following a meeting of the U.S. and Israeli 
negotiating teams (text from press release 161). 

"' Made following the evening meeting of the U.S. 
and Israeli negotiating teams (text from press re- 
lease 162 dated Mar. 21). 

April 14, 1975 


Q. Were there amendments to the original 
Israeli guidelines for a settlement? 

Defense Minister Peres: We have con- 
cluded our proposals this afternoon. 

Q. Is the gap closing? Is the gap very wide? 
Has it narrowed somewhat? 

Defense Minister Peres: Can I see from 
here up to Cairo how many gaps are there 
on the way? I wouldn't guess. 

Q. Did Dr. Kissinger raise any of his own 
ideas ? 

Defense Minister Peres: Well, it is a dia- 
logue, and both sides are suggesting and 
questioning and answering, as the nature of 
things are. 

Q. Has he introduced American ideas? 

Defense Minister Peres: Well, how can I 
speak for the United States? But, usually it 
is a negotiation, a clarification, and it works 
in a way of conversations, you know. 

Q. When do you expect him back tomor- 
roiv ? 

Defense Minister Peres: I hope as early as 
possible. Before Shabbat comes in. 
Thank vou verv much. 


I am running out of variations of these 
formulations, but I have brought the Egyp- 
tian countersuggestions to the Israeli pro- 
posals of yesterday to the Israeli negotiating 
team. It is my understanding that there will 
be a Cabinet meeting in a little while at 
which these Egyptian ideas will be discussed, 
and after that I will meet with the negotiat- 
ing team again. 

Q. Are you prepared to say noic that an 
agreement is close? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not prepared to 
say that, no. 

Q. Has the gap been significantly narrowed 
in the last 24 hours? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I have 
pointed out before, gaps can narrow and still 
remain, and there is still a gap. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are ma)iy reports 
that you are planning to leave the area in 
a day or two. Woidd you care to comment 
on that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Why don't we wait 
until the Cabinet meets? 



Piess release 165 Hated March 22 

Defense Minister Peres: Well, as you 
know, we had an important and long Cabinet 
meeting this afternoon. Afterward we have 
reported to Dr. Kissinger about the delibera- 
tions in our Cabinet session, and we went 
into great details about the many and com- 
plicated problems ahead of us, and since to- 
day is Friday night we have decided to 
continue tomorrow. I hope the Secretary will 
remain so we shall be able to deal with the 
very serious matter in a relaxed and thought- 
ful way tomorrow night. 

Q. Mr. Peres, are the talks deadlocked? 
Have you hit a really serious snag? 

Defense Minister Peres: I would not like 
to conclude the negotiations as long as they 
go on. Let us be a little bit patient and not 
run ahead of time, neither with guesses nor 
with conclusions. 

Q. Why the special sessio7i tonight, on Fri- 
day night? 

Defense Minister Peres: Basically, I be- 
lieve because we are a democratic country 
and decisions are being taken by the Cabinet. 

Q. Could we get Dr. Kissinger's assess- 

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with what the 

" Made following a meeting of the U.S. and Israeli 
negotiating teams (text from press release 164). 

^ Made following a meeting of the U.S. and Israeli 
negotiating teams (text from press release 165). 


Department of State Bulletin 

Defense Minister has said. We reviewed in 
great detail all the points that are involved 
in a potential agreement. We thought that 
both sides would benefit from a day of think- 
ing over where we stand, and we are going 
to meet again tomorrow evening and con- 
tinue our discussions. 

Q. Secretary Kissinger, hotv do you react 
to these tales of deadlock? Hoiv ivoidd you 
characterize ivhere it stands? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that over 
the recent week the positions of the two 
sides have come closer to each other. Both 
sides have made a serious effort to take into 
account the considerations of the other, but 
a gap remains and, of course, as long as a 
gap remains there remains a lot of work to 
be done. 

Q. Are you going to continue ivith the 
work? Do you plan to keep going, keep going 
to Aswan, keep up the shuttle? 

Secretary Kissinger: I plan to continue 
the shuttle as long as I think there is a possi- 
bility of bridging the gap. 

Q. And do you think so now, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think so now, and 
we will continue our discussions tomorrow. 

Defense Minister Peres: Good night, gen- 
tlemen. Go and have a rest. 


Press release Ififi dated March 23 

Prime Minister Rabin 

Mr. Secretary, I have come to see you off 
on your way back to Washington as an ex- 
pression on behalf of the Government of 
Israel and the people of Israel for the spe- 
cial, unique relations that have existed and 
will continue to exist between our two coun- 
tries. I believe that the relations between 
your country and our counti-y have been 
based on many common concepts and inter- 
ests, and I am sure that what has been done 
in 26 years will continue to be developed. 

I have come here, Mr. Secretary, to express 
our deep appreciation to you. I know you, 
for many years, from my term as Ambassa- 
dor of Israel to the United States. I know 
you as Secretary of State and especially in 
the last efforts to move this area from war 
toward peace. I know that you have done 
more than a human being can do in the ef- 
forts to move from war toward peace. I am 
sorry that the present efforts to bring about 
an interim agreement between Egypt and 
Israel have been suspended. I am sure that 
the United States and you will continue to 
find every possible option, every avenue, to 
move, or to help the parties to move, from 
war to peace. 

Please accept our great respect, apprecia- 
tion, and admiration for what you have done. 

Secretary Kissinger 

Thank you. Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf 
of my colleagues, let me express our appre- 
ciation for your consideration in coming to 
the airport to see us off. We have worked 
together for two weeks in the traditional 
spirit of friendship to move this area toward 
a peace that no people needs more than the 
people of Israel, gathered here after 2,000 
years of dispersion and a generation of 
struggle. This is a sad day for America, 
which has invested much hope and faith, and 
we know it is a sad day also for Israel, which 
needs and wants peace so badly. 

But the necessities that brought about this 
effort continue and the need to move toward 
peace cannot be abandoned. We will now 
have to look for different methods and new 
forums, but in any event the United States 
will do its utmost to contribute to a just and 
lasting peace in this area. We have had no 
other goal except to enable the young people 
in this area to grow up without the fear of 
war. And, as we leave, we wish the people 
of Israel all the best. And I want to thank, 
particularly, my old friend the Prime Min- 
ister for the wisdom with which he has con- 
ducted himself, for the friendship he has 
shown to us, and for the dedication that has 
animated all his action. 

April 14, 1975 



President Ford 

Mr. Secretary: It is a great privilege for 
me to welcome you back on an extraordi- 
narily difficult mission on behalf of the 
United States and the problems that are in 
the Middle East. 

I know that you made a maximum effort. 
Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our con- 
trol, it did not turn out the way we wanted it. 

But let me say, the United States will con- 
tinue to emphasize our desire to achieve a 
lasting peace in the Middle East by working 
with one country, other countries, and all 

It is in the national as well as in the inter- 
national interest that we do everything we 
can with the emphasis on peace. Although we 
have, on a temporary basis hopefully, not 
achieved all that we had desired, I continue 
to be an optimist that the good judgment and 
the wise decisions of all parties will result 
in the ultimate objective of peace in the 
Middle East and its ramifications on a world- 
wide basis. 

Henry, would you like to add anything? 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. President: I very much appreciate 
your greeting me here as you sent me off 
from here. 

The necessities that produced the mission 
continue and the need for a lasting peace in 
the Middle East remains. 

As the President pointed out, the United 
States remains ready to work with the 
parties and other interested countries to pro- 
mote a peace of justice in the Middle East. 

Thank you. 

"Made on the South Lawn of the White House 
(text from White House press release). 

U.S. Mourns Death of King Faisal 
of Saudi Arabia 

His Majesty King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz 
Al Sand of Saudi Arabia icas assassinated at 
Riyadh March 25. Following is a statement 
by President Ford issued that day, together 
with a statement read to neivs correspondents 
by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the 
Secretary of State for Press Relations. 


White House press release dated March 25 

It was with the deepest sorrow that I 
learned of the tragic death of His Majesty 
King Faisal, a close friend of the United 
States and a leader who achieved so much for 
his people and those of the Arab world and 
Islam, and whose wisdom and stature earned 
the respect of the entire world. On behalf of 
the American people I wish to extend my 
deepest sympathy to the royal family and to 
the people of Saudi Arabia, whose grief we 


It was with the greatest sorrow that the 
Secretary of State learned of the death of 
His Majesty King Faisal. As you know, the 
Secretary had the honor of an audience with 
the King only last Wednesday. It was the last 
of many meetings during which the Secre- 
tary had come to rely on His Majesty's wise 
counsels in the pursuit of peace in the Middle 
East. He will be greatly missed. The Secre- 
tary feels that this personal bond will form 
the basis for continuing close relations be- 
tween Saudi Arabia and the United States. 
He has sent messages expressing his deepest 
sympathy to the royal family and the people 
of Saudi Arabia. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Prime Minister Dzemal Bijedic of Yugoslavia 
Visits the United States 

Dzemal Bijedic, President of the Federal 
Executive Council of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, visited the United 
States March 18-21. Following is an ex- 
change of toasts between President Ford and 
Prime Minister Bijedic at a luncheon at the 
White House on March 19, together ivith the 
text of a joint statement issued that day. 


Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 24 

President Ford 

Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests: 
It is a pleasure to welcome you to Washing- 
ton and to this historic house. I understand 
that in your birthplace of Mostar in Yugo- 
slavia, there is a famous stone bridge which 
has been standing for a very long time. I 
hope, Mr. Prime Minister, the relationship 
between Yugoslavia and the United States 
will be as long as the history of that famous 

The foundation, Mr. Prime Minister, as 
you well know, is the cooperative relation- 
ship between the United States and the 
People's Republic of Yugoslavia. It was built 
more than a quarter of a century ago — as a 
matter of fact, I was in the Congress of the 
United States at the time that this new rela- 
tionship began and developed — and is now 

This relationship, Mr. Prime Minister, is 
anchored, as I see it, in a strong mutual 
interest in Yugoslavia's independence, its in- 
tegrity, and its unity, as well as a mutual 
desire, Mr. Prime Minister, to maintain peace 
in Europe as well as in the rest of the world. 

I think it symbolizes the cooperation be- 

tween two countries with entirely different 
social and political systems. 

Like the bridge in Mostar, Mr. Prime Min- 
ister, the one between our nations and our 
peoples has withstood the test of time. It 
has facilitated an impressive growth in trade, 
in business, in scientific and cultural coopera- 
tion, as well as tourism. 

While the currents sometimes passing, Mr. 
Prime Minister, beneath this bridge, have 
ebbed and flowed, its basic structure has 
remained intact. The principles upon which 
it rests remain as sound today as two decades 

I look forward, Mr. Prime Minister, to the 
further strengthening of American-Yugoslav 
cooperation, and I know we are both aware 
that this will require a continuing commit- 
ment from both governments. 

Bearing in mind our common interest in 
continued peace and security in the world, 
I think we must strive to eliminate misunder- 
standings and any narrow differences which 
sometimes unfortunately arise between us. 

The history of this relationship indicates 
that we have made an excellent start. I am 
sure — it is my conviction — that it will be 
successful in the future. 

I raise my glass to your health, Mr. Prime 
Minister, and to the bridge between our two 
countries. May it continue to facilitate co- 
operation, understanding and friendship be- 
tween our two peoples. 

Prime Minister Bijedic ' 

Mr. President, gentlemen: Allow me to 
thank you for the words of welcome and 
friendship addressed to me and my asso- 

' Prime Minister Bijedic spoke in Serbo-Croatian. 

April 14, 1975 


dates. Our visit to the United States of 
America constitutes a further expression of 
mutual desire for the promotion of friend- 
ship and cooperation between our two coun- 
tries, a friendship estabhshed upon long- 
standing tradition and alliance during two 
World Wars. 

Our visit to your country is taking place 
at the moment when you have started prepa- 
rations for the Bicentennial of the United 
States, the anniversary of the day on which, 
as the result of the struggle of American 
people against colonialism and foreign domi- 
nation, the Declaration of Independence was 

Many years later my country, too, went 
through the liberation war and revolution. I 
accentuate this because both of our peoples 
aspired toward the same objective — to live 
in freedom and independence, to freely deter- 
mine their destiny and vigilantly guard it. 

I shall call forth, Mr. President, another 
date in the history of the relations between 
our two countries. That is the year 1881, the 
year in which the first interstate agreement 
was concluded — the trade agreement between 
the United States of America and Serbia 
signed at Belgrade in October 1881, which is 
still in force. 

Rare are today bilateral agreements which 
have stood a test of time. Our two countries 
have experienced together the most severe 
historic tests of this century, fighting as 
allies against the joint enemies. 

Over the whole period following the Second 
World War, they have continually voiced 
their determination to promote all-round 
equitable cooperation and mutual relations, 
for their own benefit and in the broader 

Particularly important for the develop- 
ment of relations between Yugoslavia and 
the United States was the exchange of visits 
between the two Presidents in 1970 and 1971 
and the visit of Secretary of State Dr. Kis- 
singer to Belgrade a few months ago. 

We are highly appreciative, Mr. President, 
of the message you have addressed to Presi- 
dent Tito and in which you have clearly set 
forth the desire of the United States to con- 

tinue the policy of good relations with Yugo- 

Likewise, we highly appreciate your ac- 
ceptance of the invitation extended by Presi- 
dent Tito to visit Yugoslavia in the course 
of this year. We are confident that this con- 
firms once again the preparedness of your 
government and your own, Mr. President, 
for the continuation and promotion of mu- 
tual friendly relations. We will welcome you 
in Yugoslavia as a dear guest. 

I share, Mr. President, your view and that 
of your government that relations between 
the United States and Yugoslavia have been 
developing successfully, regardless of the 
difl'erences of stances and views in respect 
to some international issues. 

It is our sincere desire that these differ- 
ences, wherever it is possible, be reduced 
through mutual efforts, more frequent con- 
tacts, mutual understanding and respect for 
the positions of the other side. 

Yugoslavia, as an independent. Socialist, 
and nonaligned country, has a constant inter- 
est in developing relations with the United 
States based on principles of the respect for 
sovereignty, equality, and noninterference; 
that is, the principles that are outlined in the 
joint statement of the Presidents of Yugo- 
slavia and the United States signed at Wash- 
ington in 1971. 

Yugoslavia is particularly concerned that 
the solutions for the existing hotbeds of 
military conflicts, which at any moment may 
become sources of new and even more diflfi- 
cult large-scale international crises, be 
sought through negotiation and full respect 
for the Charter and resolutions of the United 
Nations, as well as through agreements 
reached between the parties concerned. 

Mr. President, in expressing my thanks 
for the invitation extended to me to visit 
your beautiful country, the country of the 
people whose working energies and techno- 
logical advances are admired throughout the 
world, I wish to emphasize our great satis- 
faction that we are coming here at a time 
when, in the relations between our two 
countries in many fields — particularly the 
economic, scientific, and cultural fields — a 


Department of State Bulletin 

significant upward trend has been registered. 

The trade between the two countries — and 
I mention this as an example — has increased 
by almost 60 percent in the course of one 
year. Significant banking and credit arrange- 
ments have been concluded. Joint ventures 
and the volume of industrial cooperation 
have been stepped up. 

The same applies to the scientific and tech- 
nological cooperation, the cooperation among 
universities, and the cultural exchange. 

The celebration of the 200th anniversary 
of the United States, in respect of which 
preparations are in progress in Yugoslavia 
for participation in this historic jubilee, con- 
stitutes one more opportunity to display our 
constant concern for the continuation of our 
traditional cooperation and friendship with 
your country. 

More than a million Americans of Yugo- 
slav descent, loyal citizens of the United 
States, live here today. We feel proud that 
in the history of the United States, in its 
struggle for independence and the building 
up of its constitutionality, the names of 
many individuals of Yugoslav extraction 
have been inscribed, people who spared no 
effort and sacrificed their lives to contribute 
to the well-being of this country. 

Allow me, esteemed Mr. President, to pro- 
pose this toast to your health, to the health 
of your associates, for the progress and pros- 
perity of the United States of America, for 
the strengthening and promotion of friendly 
relations and cooperation between our two 
countries, for peace and progress in the 
world, and for the same bridge that you have 
toasted for, which has already lived there 
for 410 years. 


At the invitation of the United States Government, 
the President of the Federal Executive Council of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dzemal 
Bijedic, accompanied by his wife, is visiting Wash- 
ington, D.C., from March 19 to 21, 1975. 

The President of the United States of America, 
Gerald R. Ford, gave a luncheon in honor of the 
President of the Federal Executive Council at the 
White House March 19. During their talks, the 

President of the Federal Executive Council conveyed 
to the President of the United States a message 
from the President of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. The talks took place 
in an atmosphere of cordiality and openness. 

The President of the Federal Executive Council 
will hold talks on bilateral relations and interna- 
tional questions of interest to the two countries with 
the Acting Secretary of State, Robert S. Ingersoll, 
who together with Mrs. Ingersoll, is giving a dinner 
on behalf of the United States Government in honor 
of the President of the Federal Executive Council 
and Mrs. Bijedic March 19. The President of the 
Federal Executive Council will meet with the Secre- 
tary of Commerce, Frederick B. Dent, the President 
of the Export-Import Bank, William C. Casey, and 
the President of the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation, Marshall T. Mays. These meetings will 
focus on trade and other foi-ms of economic coopera- 
tion between Yugoslavia and the United States. 

The two sides devoted particular attention to 
areas of continuing crisis such as the Middle East 
and Cyprus. In setting forth their views concerning 
the paths to be followed in attempting to resolve 
these and other outstanding world problems, the two 
sides emphasized the benefit of regular contacts and 
consultation at all levels to heighten understanding 
and mutual respect for one another's views and 

Reaffirming their mutual interest in the preserva- 
tion and consolidation of peace in Europe and the 
further advancement of constructive cooperation 
among European states in a wide variety of fields, 
the two sides emphasized their determination and 
mutual interest in the continued coordination of 
efforts to attain acceptance of basic principles of 
inter-European cooperation and security, and an 
early, successful conclusion of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Both sides expressed continued determination to 
strive for effective disarmament measures which 
would strengthen the peace and security of all 

The two sides affirmed that solutions to the prob- 
lems which presently face mankind must be sought 
by peaceful means on the basis of respect for the 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
the sovereign equality of all states irrespective of 
size or social, political and economic system. In this 
regard, it was recognized that Yugoslavia's policy 
of non-alignment contributes actively to greater 
understanding among peoples and the pursuit of 
peaceful resolution of international problems and 

Economic problems currently facing the world 
were discussed in the context of growing interna- 
tional interdependence. The two sides stressed the 
importance of finding solutions to such problems as 
energy and other raw materials, food, population, 

April 14, 1975 


the environment, and economic development. They 
agreed that genuine peace and stability in the world 
depend on the achievement of significant progress 
toward the resolution of these problems, and that 
such progress can best be achieved by cooperative 
efforts and agreements which take into account the 
rights and interests of all countries, and not by con- 

The two sides expressed satisfaction that continued 
progress has been registered in bilateral cooperation 
between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
and the United States of America. They noted par- 
ticularly the substantial and continuing growth of 
trade between the two countries in recent years and 
agreed to act to promote continued economic and 
financial cooperation, including joint investments. 
Both sides also expressed a desire to maintain a high 
level of joint scientific research between institutions 
and individual scientists of the two countries. 

They also reaffirmed their intention to encourage 
the further expansion of cultural cooperation, reiter- 
ating their expectation that the participation of the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the forth- 
coming bicentennial of the United States of America 
will serve to deepen understanding between the 
peoples of the two countries. They also affirmed the 
importance to the development of the United States 
of America of American citizens of Yugoslav ex- 
traction who constitute an important link of friend- 
ship and communication between the peoples of the 
two countries. 

The two sides underscored once again the continu- 
ing validity of the principles set forth in the Joint 
Statement of October 30, 1971, which constitutes a 
solid basis for stable, friendly relations and a broad 
spectrum of mutually beneficial cooperation between 
the two countries. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 2d Session 

Conservation and Efficient Use of Energy. Report of 
the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. 
H. Rept. 93-1634. December 18, 1974. 272 pp. 

Trade Act of 1974. Summary of the provisions of 
H.R. 10710. Prepared by the staffs of the Senate 
Committee on Finance and House Committee on 
Ways and Means. December 30, 1974. 25 pp. 

Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign 
Policy. Report, together with individual views, to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by 
the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. 
January 2, 1975. 172 pp. 

Foreign Diplomat Travel Program 
Praised by President Ford 

Remarks by President Ford^ 

It is really a great privilege and a very 
high honor to have the opportunity of being 
here again and participating in this sort of 
culmination of the program on a once-a-year 
basis. I was here once as a Congressman and 
last year as Vice President, and now I am 
equally honored to be here as President. 

It has been said that in diplomacy there 
are no true friendships — only temporary alli- 
ances of convenience. In looking back on 
history and studying some of the things that 
have happened over the last two centuries, 
I think there is some truth to that. I think 
we have to recognize as well, this is not the 
whole picture, and the world would be a 
pretty grim place if it were. 

There are many in this audience who are 
professional diplomats, and all of those who 
are know firsthand what it means to defend 
your country's interests and to negotiate on 
its behalf. 

As participants and supporters of the 
Travel Program for Foreign Diplomats, you 
also know that human understanding, com- 
munication, and friendship between people 
and nations is also very real and a very vital 
force, an essential force, for peace in the 
world today. 

In the past 12 years, this very worthwhile 
program has made it possible, as has been 
said on many occasions, for more than 4,000 
diplomats to know the United States, to 
know America, our people, in a way that 
they never could have through official chan- 

Cooperation of countless individuals, as 
well as individual families in the private sec- 
tor, have supported this program and made 
it successful. I am delighted once again to 

' Made on Mar. 20 at a luncheon at the Department 
of State for participants in Travel Program for 
Foreign Diplomats, Inc. (text from Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 24). 


Department of State Bulletin 

say a word of strong, strong endorsement of 
the program. This year, as it carries forward 
again, I hope and trust that its past progress 
will be multiplied. You are doing a fine job, 
and I thank each and every one of you — the 
sponsors, the participants, as well as others. 

To see firsthand the beauty and the ex- 
panse of this great country, to get to know 
the day-to-day joys and frustrations of an 
average working family in one of our great 
cities, to experience the immense diversity 
of regional tastes and traditions that we call 
America— all of this is perhaps the only way 
to really comprehend our ideals, our aspira- 
tions, and great strengths underlying our 
national policies. 

You cannot understand a nation without 
knowing its people. And only by getting to 
know individuals can you begin to know the 
people as a whole. By introducing foreign 
visitors to such a wide, wide range of Amer- 
icans, the travel program performs a great 
service to our nation. 

I hasten to add, however, that I do not see 
the travel program as a one-way street. 
It is just as necessary for the U.S. dip- 
lomats to get to know the people of their 
host nations and to appreciate fully the tradi- 
tions and cultural achievements of the coun- 
tries where they are posted. The friendships 
that you forge today will pay dividends in 
peaceful understanding for the years to come. 

I have often said that the keystone of this 
Administration is openness. But when you 
get right down to it, the keystone of our 
American way of life is openness. We do not 
believe in hiding the truth, whether it is 
flattering or unflattering. 

We recognize, of course, we know full well, 
that we have our faults, and we certainly 
have our problems, but we want our friends 
from abroad to see the truth, to see how we 
solve our problems openly, and to judge for 
themselves the success of our democratic 

We live in a time unique for both its peril 
as well as its promise. The potential conse- 
quences of war today are more terrible than 

they have ever been in human history. But 
at the same time, the possibility of lasting 
global peace and prosperity is closer than 
ever before. 

The road to such a peace is bound to be 
long and very difficult, but I firmly believe 
that we are making headway. We will have 
our disappointments. And one of the things 
that makes that road a little smoother and 
the trip far more rewarding is a program 
like this and the true spirit that it represents. 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Second Round 
of Environmental Modification Talks 

Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Release^ 

The second meeting of representatives of 
the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the question 
of measures to overcome the dangers of the 
use of environmental modification techniques 
for military purposes was held in Washing- 
ton from February 24 to March 5. The 
American delegation was headed by Thomas 
D. Davies, Assistant Director, U.S. Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. Acade- 
mician Y. K. Fedorov headed the Soviet 

The first meeting of representatives of the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow 
in November 1974. 

The discussions are being conducted in 
accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint 
Statement signed on July 3, 1974, at the 
Moscow summit meeting, and also on the 
basis of the understanding to continue an 
active search for a mutually acceptable solu- 
tion to this question established in the joint 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique of November 24, 
1974, on the results of the Vladivostok sum- 
mit meeting. 

In the course of the discussions conducted 
in the United States, the exchange of opin- 

' Issued on Mar. 7 (text from ACDA press release 

April 14, 1975 


ions on the most effective measures possible 
which could be undertaken to overcome the 
dangers of the use of environmental modifi- 
cation techniques for military purposes was 
continued. The examination of scientific and 
technical questions related to environmental 
modification and the familiarization with 
laboratories working in this area, which 
were begun in Moscow, were also continued. 

The representatives of the U.S.A. and the 
U.S.S.R. consider that these meetings facili- 
tate better understanding of the points of 
view of the sides on the questions discussed. 

The sides intend to participate actively in 
the discussion of this question in the Con- 
ference of the Committee on Disarmament, 
which reconvened in Geneva this week, with 
the aim of achieving positive results. 


Current Actions 



International air services transit agreement. Signed 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptayice deposited: Malawi, March 27, 1975. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 

logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Mo.scow 
April 10, 1972. 
Ratifications deposited: Senegal, Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics, United Kingdom,' United 

States, March 26, 1975. 
Entered into force: March 26, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Enters into force May 6, 1975. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 19, 1975. 



Loan agreement for the foreign exchange costs of 
commodities and commodity-related services. 
Signed at Cairo February 13, 1975. Entered into 
force February 13, 1975. 

Organization of American States 

Agreement relating to privileges and immunities. 

Signed at Washington March 20, 1975. Entered 

into force March 20, 1975. 
Agreement relating to privileges and immunities. 

Signed at Washington July 22, 1952. Entered into 

force July 22, 1952. TIAS 2676. 

Terminated: March 20, 1975. 


Gi'ant agreement for technical consultations and 

training. Signed at Lisbon February 28, 1975. 

Entered into force February 28, 1975. 
Loan agreement for consulting services. Signed at 

Lisbon February 28, 1975. Entered into force 

February 28, 1975. 

' Extended to British Solomon Islands Protectorate, 
Brunei, Condominium of the New Hebrides, Dominica, 
and territories under the territorial sovereignty of 
the United Kingdom. Not applicable to Southern 
Rhodesia until the United Kingdom informs the 
other depositary governments that it is in a position 
to insure that the obligations imposed by the con- 
vention in respect of that territory can be fully 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April U, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 11 

American Principles. Foreign Diplomat Travel 
Program Praised by President Ford (re- 
marks) 494 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 
to Foreign Policy 494 

Disarmament. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Second 
Round of Environmental Modification Talks 
(joint release) 495 

Egypt. Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day 
Visit to the Middle East (remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

Greece. Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day 
Visit to the Middle East (remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

Israel. Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day 
Visit to the Middle East (remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

Jordan. Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day 
Visit to the Middle East (remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

Latin America. Secretary Kissinger's News 

Conference of March 26 461 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of March 26 461 

Portugal. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of March 26 461 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Diplomat Travel Prog^ram Praised 
by President Ford 494 

Prime Minister Dzemal Bijedic of Yugoslavia 
Visits the United States 491 

Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day Visit to 
the Middle East 471 

U.S. Mourns Death of King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia 490 

Saudi Arabia 

Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day Visit to 
the Middle East (remarks by President 
Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
March 26 461 

U.S. Mourns Death of King Faisal of Saudi 
Arabia (Ford, Department statement) . . 490 

Syria. Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day 
Visit to the Middle East (remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 496 

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day 
Visit to the Middle East (remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and foreign 
leaders) 471 

U.S.S.R. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Second 
Round of Environmental Modification Talks 
(joint release) 495 

United Kingdom. Secretary Kissinger Makes 
16-Day Visit to the Middle East (remarks 
by President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and 
foreign leaders) 471 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of March 26 461 

Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Dzemal Bijedic 
of Yugoslavia Visits the United States (Bi- 
jedic, Ford, joint statement) 491 

Name Index 

Allon, Yigal 477, 482 

Bijedic, Dzemal 491 

Bitsios, Dimitrios 473 

Ford, President 490, 491, 494 

Khaddam, Abd al-Halim 477 

Kissinger, Secretary 461, 471 

Peres, Shimon 487, 488 

Rabin, Yitzhak 489 

Sadat, Anwar al- 474, 480, 488 

Yamani, Ahmad Zaki 487 

n67 3/24 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 24-30 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 24 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
116 of March 6; 121-129 of March 10; 130, 
133, and 135 of March 11; 136 and 137 of 
March 12; 141 and 142 of March 14; 143-147 
and 150-151 of March 17; 155 of March 18; 
156 and 157 of March 19; 161 of March 20; 
162 of March 21; and 164-166 of March 23. 

No. Date Subject 

U.S.-Canada International Joint 
Commission report on Lake 
Champlain regulation. 

U.S. -Brazil shrimp fisheries agree- 

Executive order issued desig:nat- 
ing developing countries for 
generalized trade preferences. 

Conference of educators on popu- 
lation. Mar. 27. 

U.S. and Indonesia exchange notes 
on reimbursable satellite 

Kissinger: news conference. 

Study Group 5 of National Com- 
mittee for CCITT, Apr. 28. 

U.S. designates EPA as U.N. En- 
vironment Program information 

Buchanan sworn in as Ambassador 
to Austria (biographic data). 

Canadian Environment Minister 
to visit U.S. 












tl74 3/27 



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Volume LXXn 

No. 1869 

April 21, 1975 




Statement by Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 518 



Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 523 



by Deputy Assistant Secretary Reich 513 


For index see inside back cover 


For sale by the Supei-intendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

■Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic S42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source wiU be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

Vol. LXXII, No. 1869 
April 21, 1975 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- ^ 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

U.S. Discusses Trade Act, CommocJities, and Food Problems 
in Inter-American Economic and Social Council 

The 10th annual meeting of the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council (lA- 
ECOSOC) at nmiisterial level was held at 
Washington March 10-17. Following are 
texts of a statement by Deputy Secretary 
Robert S. Ingersoll, head of the U.S. delega- 
tion, made in the inaugural plenary session 
on March 10; a statement by Maynard W. 
Glitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
International Trade Policy, made in Commit- 
tee I on March 11; and a statement by Dep- 
uty Secretary Ingersoll made in plenary on 
March 12. 


I am honored to have the opportunity to 
head the U.S. delegation to the Inter-Ameri- 
can Economic and Social Council. I am fur- 
ther honored by your kind designation of me 
as third vice president of this meeting. 

All of us are aware of the important role 
of the Economic and Social Council in the 
OAS framework. We also appreciate the com- 
plexity — and sometimes controversial nature 
— of the economic and social development 
problems confronting this hemisphere. 

We are meeting in the context of new 
economic realities generally referred to as 
interdependence. Economic malaise in the 
developed states is felt in the developing 
world through a reduced demand for raw 
materials and manufactured goods. The 
higher prices of commodities and fuel con- 
tribute to economic stagnation in the more 
industrialized nations. 

A successful approach to the problems and 
opportunities of interdependence will require 

the closest possible cooperation between all 
nations — producer and consumer, developed 
and less developed, industrialized and agrar- 
ian. Equally important will be a willingness 
to understand each other's problems and con- 
cerns, a realization that we must work to- 
gether to create a new international eco- 
nomic system acceptable to all nations. 

It is in this spirit that the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council meets today to 
address the problems of our hemisphere. The 
cooperative approaches to common problems 
we are able to fashion during this meeting 
may well serve as an example for what can 
be achieved on a global basis. 

I recognize, of course, that one of the 
major items of interest to the Council will 
be international trade. I hope to return later 
in the week to address this subject; we ac- 
knowledge your concern and your right to 
understand precisely how our Trade Act of 
1974 relates to your national interests. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I also want to 
call attention to two areas critical to our 
future dialogue: hemispheric development 
and food. I hope that in our discussions we 
can get useful exchanges of points of view. 


President Ford signed into law on January 
3 what he described as the most significant 
trade legislation passed by the Congress 
since the beginning of the trade agreements 
program some four decades ago. Passage of 
the Trade Act of 1974, in and of itself a com- 
mitment to trade expansion and liberaliza- 
tion and a recognition of the increasing inter- 
dependence of nations, was no small accom- 

April 21, 1975 


plishment in the midst of one of the most 
serious domestic and international economic 
crises since World War II. 

Many, following the arguments of the 
1930's, would argue that trade liberalization 
is inappropriate in times of economic dis- 
tress. As the Trade Act signifies, however, 
we have learned the lesson of history. We see 
trade negotiations, improvement of the trad- 
ing system, and better relations as more 
essential than ever. 

A central U.S. policy objective, now achiev- 
able as a result of the passage of the Trade 
Act, is to improve U.S.-Latin American trade 
relations. Many of the provisions of the 
Trade Act, particularly those of title V as 
developed by the Administration, were shaped 
with that in mind. As the President noted 
when he signed the Trade Act, we regret the 
rigidities contained in some of the provisions 
of title V. We have noted that many Latin 
American nations have indeed criticized the 
mandatory restrictions on countries which 
may benefit from our system of generalized 
tariff preferences. 

While we thus recognize the concerns 
which led to such criticisms, we do not be- 
lieve it is accurate to generalize from these 
particular concerns to conclude that the 
overall thrust of the Trade Act is coercive 
or protectionist. 

The Trade Act is a complex and long docu- 
ment, and it is not surprising that different 
countries focus on different aspects of it. 
However, when one sees the act as a com- 
mitment to a more open trading system and 
another sees it as a protectionist tool, we 
have a pi'oblem. I hope this meeting can con- 
tribute to a better understanding on our part 
of your concerns and a better understanding 
on your part of our intentions. 

An issue of concern to many delegations 
here, and particularly to the delegations of 
Venezuela and Ecuador, is the provision 
which appears to exclude all members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC) from the benefits of a U.S. 
system of generalized tariff preferences. 
President Ford, in an address made on Feb- 

ruary 13, and Secretary Kissinger, in his 
March 1 speech at Houston, have recently 
expressed publicly the Administration's con- 
tinued objection to this provision of the 
Trade Act and supported its modification. 

Moreover, bills introduced into Congress 
by Senators [Lloyd M.] Bentsen and [Ed- 
ward M.] Kennedy and Representative 
[Michael J.] Harrington which would modify 
the OPEC provision in such a way as to per- 
mit both Venezuela and Ecuador to benefit 
are indications that Congress recognizes the 

Our consultations with Members of Con- 
gress on this matter — which are actively 
proceeding — reflect a willingness to consider 
modifications of this provision of the Trade 
Act in keeping with the President's state- 
ment of January 3. The President said: "In 
the spirit of cooperation with the Congress, 
I will do my best to work out any necessary 

Moreover, there is time in a practical sense 
to work out this problem. Generalized prefer- 
ences cannot be implemented for at least sev- 
eral more months because of the procedural 
requirements of the legislation. Thus there 
is good reason to hope that all developing 
countries in this hemisphere will be able to 
benefit from our system of generalized tariff 
preferences when it actually comes into 

Implementation of Preference System 

Let me turn now to the technical imple- 
mentation of our preference system. Despite 
the complexity of the legislation we are mov- 
ing promptly to put it into effect. I had hoped 
to be able to present to you today a list of 
beneficiaries and a list of products to be con- 
sidered for preferential treatment. We may 
still be able to do so before the week is out. 

We fully expect that all countries repre- 
sented here, with the exception of Venezuela 
and Ecuador, are likely to be designated in 
the initial listing as beneficiaries. 

Apart from the apparent exclusion of 
OPEC members, we have perceived a wide- 


Department of State Bulletin 

siiread apprehension that the cartel provi- 
sion of the Trade Act may be applied to 
Latin American countries which are mem- 
bers of or are contemplating membership in 
other producer organizations. The legislative 
history of the Trade Act makes it clear that 
this provision applies only to countries which 
participate in actions involving vital mate- 
rials which cause serious disruption of the 
world economy. We do not consider this pro- 
vision to be an impediment to legitimate eco- 
nomic action by raw-material-producing 

I should caution delegates here, however, 
that a determination that an action by a pro- 
ducer association is not disruptive of the 
world economy and does not therefore re- 
quire a withdrawal of GSP [generalized sys- 
tem of preferences] beneficiary status should 
not be interpreted as a U.S. endorsement of 
such an action. We reserve the right to: 

— Press our legitimate concerns through 
normal diplomatic channels; 

— Defend oui-selves against such egregious 
actions as politically motivated embargoes ; 

— Argue for and seek cooperative nego- 
tiated bilateral or multilateral solutions to 
mutual problems, as opposed to unilateral 

As a brief statement of the U.S. position 
on commodity policy, I can do no better than 
quote Secretary Kissinger. He said in Hous- 
ton on March 1: 

We strongly favor a world trading system which 
meets the economic needs of both consumers and 
producers. Unilateral producer or unilateral con- 
sumer actions must not determine the equilibrium. 
A dialogue between them on commodity issues is 
therefore essential. 

The nationalization provision of the Trade 
Act, which parallels such acts as the Hicken- 
looper and Gonzalez amendments which cut 
off aid in the event of nationalization with- 
out adequate and timely compensation, has 
also been a source of concern in Latin Amer- 
ica. This provision provides that in the case 
of a nationalization, a written determination 

must be furnished to Congress that the dis- 
pute has been resolved, that good-faith nego- 
tiations are in progress or that the country 
in question is otherwise taking steps to com- 
ply with international law, or that the mat- 
ter has been submitted to arbitration. Since 
the passage of the Trade Act, the Admin- 
istration has examined all outstanding in- 
vestment disputes in the light of this provi- 
sion. In all cases considered to date involving 
countries of this hemisphere, we were able 
to make the required determinations which 
permit the designation of these countries as 

Very shortly we will be sending a list of 
products proposed for preferential tariff 
treatment to the International Trade Com- 
mission. This list reflects a thorough and 
sympathetic consideration of the suggestions 
and requests made by a number of Latin 
American countries both bilaterally and 
through the Special Committee for Con- 
sultation and Negotiation. The list includes 
a broad range of manufactures and semi- 
manufactures and selected lists of agricul- 
tural and primary industrial products. These 
selected lists are expected to be significantly 
larger both in terms of the number of items 
and trade coverage than the illustrative list 
which the United States prepared in 1970. 
The studies of the OAS Secretariat on the 
probable impact of our preference system on 
Latin America are based on these 1970 lists 
and consequently may not fully reflect the 
potential benefits to be derived from our 
preference system. 

Import-Sensitive Items 

A major concern of governments repre- 
sented here is the exclusion of import-sensi- 
tive items. Some are explicitly excluded by the 
act; others would be excluded only upon a 
determination by the President that they are 
import sensitive. It is our intention to refer 
all manufactures and semimanufactures to 
the International Trade Commission for con- 
sideration except textiles, footwear, watches, 
import-sensitive steel, and articles subject to 

April 21, 1975 


import relief and national security actions. 
Presidential determinations as to what addi- 
tional items are import sensitive — import- 
sensitive glass and electronics items are ex- 
plicitly excluded from GSP — will be made 
only after the advice on the economic impact 
on domestic producers given by the Inter- 
national Trade Commission is reviewed. 

The Trade Act provides that the President 
should bear in mind three broad considera- 
tions when deciding to use the authority to 
implement GSP. These considerations are: 

— The impact on the economic develop- 
ment of developing countries ; 

— Action being taken by other major de- 
veloped countries; and 

— The impact on domestic producers. 

The United States elected not to apply a 
system of global ceilings or quotas which 
limit the overall amount of preferential im- 
ports of any product. Furthermore, our GSP 
will in every case result in duty-free entry 
for the designated products of beneficiary 
countries. However, no one can realistically 
expect that U.S. producers should be required 
to renounce their economic interests and 
those of their employees by unconditional 
inclusion of truly import-sensitive products 
in our preference system. Tariff reductions 
on most of the items excluded from prefer- 
ences will, however, be considered in the con- 
text of the multilateral trade negotiations, a 
subject to which I will turn very shortly. 

Mr. Chairman, we realize that the concerns 
of many delegations here extend beyond 
whether or not their countries are initially 
designated as beneficiaries of our preference 
system. I have heard the beneficiary provi- 
sions described as a sword of Damocles which 
may drop at any moment. I have heard com- 
plaints that these provisions constitute a 
demand for reciprocal treatment whereas 
GSP is supposed to be nonreciprocal. 

We do not see these provisions as a request 
for reciprocity in the sense which that word 
conveys in trade negotiations. What they 
reflect is a natural belief that countries 
which receive special advantages in the U.S. 

market should recognize a certain minimum 
degree of mutuality in their economic rela- 
tions with the United States. In the absence 
of such mutuality, international economic 
problems in this age of interdependence can- 
not be resolved. 

We have attempted to deal with the con- 
cerns noted above in a pragmatic manner 
taking into account our legal requirements. 
I can only urge the other countries repre- 
sented here to respond in a similar way. 

Simplicity and Flexibility of System 

I have until now concentrated on the more 
troublesome of the GSP provisions because 
these are your primary concerns and they 
should be addressed. My own concern, how- 
ever, is that preoccupations with the country 
and product restrictions of GSP have ob- 
scured the truly positive features of the 
legislation as a whole and the GSP provisions 
in particular. I will comment on only two of 
the latter: the simplicity of our preference 
system once in operation and the special fea- 
tures which promote export growth and 

The legislative process has been lengthy 
and complex, and the implementation proce- 
dures are also very time consuming and 
complicated. Only in this way, however, is it 
possible for all interests to be taken into 
account. Once operating, however, our GSP 
will be quite simple. The virtue of this sim- 
plicity is that it is more easily understood 
by exporters in your countries. The prefer- 
ence system is likely, therefore, to be more 
effectively utilized. For example : 

— All preferential treatment will be duty 

— A single list of beneficiaries will apply 
to all categories of products ; in other words, 
there are no special regimes for certain prod- 
ucts or countries; 

— Instead of global ceilings which vary 
from product to product, there will be uni- 
form ceilings on the amount of preferential 
imports of any one item from any one coun- 
try; and 


Department of State Bulletin 

— A single, quite reasonable, value-added 
criterion will apply in almost all cases. 

Second, we believe that our system is well 
designed to promote export growth and 
diversification in the developing countries. 
The competitive-need ceilings are quite high, 
when compared with the tariff quotas of the 
European Community and Japanese systems. 
Moreover, the ceilings were modified in the 
Senate, in part in response to requests from 
Latin American countries, to make them 
more flexible. Imports of a single article 
from a single developing country now exceed 
$25 million in only a handful of cases. Where 
the ceilings do operate they encourage not 
only a sharing of benefits among developing 
countries but export diversification within 
any one country. 

Benefits of Overall Trade Liberalization 

A fundamental objective of the Trade Act 
is to use trade to promote the economic 
growth of developing countries and to ex- 
pand mutual market opportunities between 
the United States and the developing coun- 
tries. Latin American countries in general 
have concentrated their attention on the 
legislative authority for generalized prefer- 
ences. This is understandable since the bene- 
fits of preferences will begin to flow rela- 
tively quickly while the results of the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations still seem distant 
and uncertain. 

Nevertheless we have stressed the impor- 
tance of the authority contained in the act 
for the United States to enter into the cui-- 
rent round of multilateral trade negotiations. 
We consider this authority to be of greater 
significance over the longer term than that 
of GSP. We are concerned that these other 
provisions, which can be expected to yield 
significant benefits for the trade of Latin 
American countries, have been overlooked. 
Even more disturbing are indications we 
have received from some countries that they 
consider these provisions will be applied in 
a protectionist way. 

Behind the diff"erence in emphasis lies a 

fundamental difference in perception. Our 
law represents, in essence, a grant of author- 
ity by the Congress, in which the authority 
rests under the Constitution, to the Presi- 
dent. If I may speak very frankly, Mr. Chair- 
man, I feel sure that if my colleagues here 
will really ponder this important fact in the 
context of the U.S. constitutional system 
they will recognize why it is essential that 
the Congress, in giving such vast powers to 
the President to negotiate tariff reductions, 
must also assure itself that the President is 
not required to exercise those powers to the 
detriment of the congressional constitu- 
encies. We believe that the trade-negotiating 
authority should be looked upon in this way. 

We consider generalized preferences a 
temporary measure designed to facilitate 
more active participation by developing coun- 
tries in all sectors of international trade. 
Many developing countries believe that gen- 
eralized preferences should be a more perma- 
nent institution. As a consequence of that 
interpretation, many developing countries 
tend to consider overall trade liberalization 
as a threat to the benefits which they enjoy 
or expect to enjoy under GSP. 

I can only reiterate our view that general- 
ized preferences are temporary and non- 
binding. Moreover, we believe that develop- 
ing as well as developed countries have more 
to gain from the continued movement toward 
a more open international trading system 
than from a slide backward into protection- 
ism, which would, especially in these difficult 
times, attend even a standstill in that move- 
ment. In addition, it is noteworthy that all 
the major preference systems have quantita- 
tive ceilings which trigger a return to ordi- 
nary duty rates and that many sensitive 
items are now and may well continue to be 
excluded from preferences. We therefore be- 
lieve it is in the interest of developing coun- 
tries to seek binding concessions in the trade 
negotiations on all items of interest to them, 
including items subject to preferences. 

Many of your governments have brought 
to our attention the fact that the Trade Act 
makes no reference to the Tokyo Declara- 

April 21, 1975 


tion.' The Trade Act does nevertheless recog- 
nize as one of its specific objectives the need 
to enter into trade agreements which pro- 
mote, inter aha, the economic growth of de- 
veloping countries. The Trade Act does give 
us the authority to carry out the commit- 
ments made to the developing countries in 
the Tokyo Declaration, to which we continue 
to adhere. 

Negotiating Authorities Under the Trade Act 

I would in this connection like to outline 
briefly what I consider to be the most impor- 
tant negotiating authorities. I hope there 
will be time to go into as much detail as you 
may wish during the working groups. 

The Ti-ade Act authorizes the reduction to 
zero of duties now at 5 percent ad valorem 
or less and permits cuts of up to 60 percent 
on rates above the 5 percent level. This man- 
date is the largest in percentage terms that 
has ever been delegated to U.S. negotiators, 
and it puts the United States in a position 
to participate with other countries in a sub- 
stantial reduction of high and moderate 
duties and complete elimination of low duties. 
As the United States indicated at the Febru- 
ary 11 meeting of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee in Geneva, we intend to make 
maximum possible use of our tarifl^-negotiat- 
ing authority to grant concessions on prod- 
ucts of special interest to the developing 

The Trade Act also contains unprecedented 
authority to enter into agreements on non- 
tariff barriers (NTB's), subject to expe- 
ditious approval by Congress. U.S. negoti- 
ators have already indicated that the United 
States would like to give priority attention 
to liberalization of trade barriers resulting 
from standards, subsidies, and countervail- 
ing duties and government procurement 
practices, all of which can adversely affect 

' For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo 
on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the 
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see Bulletin of Oct. 8, 
1973, p. 450. 

the trade of the United States and Latin 
American countries. 

The potential benefit to developing coun- 
tries of removal of these barriers is clear. 
Of particular interest in connection with 
these nontariff -barrier negotiations is the 
provision which permits the President to 
differentiate between countries and cate- 
gories of countries, such as developing and 
industrialized, for the purpose of determin- 
ing benefits and obligations under NTB 
agreements. We must all recognize of course 
that working out such arrangements will not 
be simple and will require close cooperation. 

Easing Adjustment to Import Competition 

A liberalized international trading system 
— including provision for greater access by 
developing countries to the markets of in- 
dustrialized countries — must go hand in hand 
with provision for effective domestic adjust- 
ment to new competitive conditions. Both 
tariff preferences and negotiated tariff re- 
ductions have less value if safeguards, by 
which I mean escape clause actions such as 
quotas or tariff increases in relief of a par- 
ticular domestic industry, are repeatedly in- 
voked. Title II of the Trade Act establishes 
an improved program of adjustment assist- 
ance for U.S. workers, firms, and commu- 
nities affected by imports. These improved 
adjustment measures provide the necessary 
domestic underpinning for our being able to 
enter into negotiations leading to the reduc- 
tion of trade barriers. 

In addition, however, the development of 
an effective multilateral safeguard system 
to ease the impact of adjustment to import 
competition should be an essential element 
of the multilateral trade negotiations. Ad- 
justment assistance is designed to permit 
longrun structural changes. Also needed as a 
precondition to serious attempts to reduce 
or dismantle trade barriers are effective 
temporary measures to prevent immediate 
and serious injury caused by imports. 

The Trade Act revises the import relief 
provisions of the 1962 act, which were found 


Department of State Bulletin 

in practice to be too stringent. This should 
not be interpreted as protectionist but, 
lather, as providing the basis for far-reach- 
ing trade expansion. Import relief is to be 
given only temporarily in cases where there 
is serious injury for which imports are 
deemed to be a substantial cause. At the 
same time we recognize the need for enough 
multilateral discipline to prevent unwar- 
ranted action which negates benefits achieved 
in the negotiations. 

Export Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 

The Trade Act incorporates significant 
changes in the U.S. countervailing-duty law. 
These reflect the desire of Congress to re- 
solve cases more expeditiously, recognize the 
potentially adverse effect that countervail- 
ing-duty actions could have on the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations, and underscore 
our desire to develop clearer agreed inter- 
national rules concerning the use of export 

In the interest of negotiating successful 
NTB agreements, the act gives the Secretary 
of the Treasury limited discretion to refrain 
— until early 1979 — from imposing counter- 
vailing duties provided certain specific con- 
ditions are met in each case. While we an- 
ticipate that this authority will be used only 
in a limited number of cases, we believe it 
can be useful in facilitating international 
agreement on the dual problem of subsidies 
and countervailing duties. 

We are hopeful that an international code 
of conduct can be negotiated on this issue in 
the multilateral trade negotiations. We rec- 
ognize the desire of many developing coun- 
tries that such a code provide for differential 
treatment for them. 

The Trade Act directs the President to 
take action to strengthen the principles of a 
fair and nondiscriminatory trading system 
including those embodied in the GATT [Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. Latin 
American countries share with the United 
States a common interest in negotiating re- 
visions of goals and procedures embodied in 
the GATT to take account of current eco- 

nomic realities. We look forward to improv- 
ing the trading system in a way which will 
provide for the constructive and permanent 
involvement of the Latin American coun- 

The trade negotiations will help countries 
to review their own trade barriers which can 
constitute formidable obstacles to the na- 
tional development of their own human and 
natural resources. I urge you both in this 
spirit and in keeping with the give-and-take 
of the bargaining process to come to these 
negotiations with some idea of contributions 
which your countries can make consistent 
with the Tokyo Declaration. 

The Trade Act is only a structure of au- 
thorities and objectives, a structure which 
paves the way for action. The structure is 
important, but the intentions of the govern- 
ment which utilizes those authorities and 
works for the objectives is more important. 

The United States is strongly committed 
to an open world trading system. We firmly 
believe that a libei-al and nondiscriminatory 
world trading system is in all our interests. 
Passage of the Trade Act at this time of 
serious international economic difficulties for 
all countries should be convincing evidence 
of these commitments and beliefs. 

We also are convinced that economic inter- 
dependence is a central fact of international 
and hemispheric relations. However meri- 
torious our intentions, we cannot succeed 
without the cooperation of our trading part- 

Over the past years we have stressed time 
and time again the U.S. desire to work 
closely with the Latin American countries 
during the trade negotiations. We are ready 
to coordinate our positions with you in the 
trade negotiations and to work with your 
representatives in Geneva on as formal or as 
informal a basis as you wish. 

We intend to be responsive to your needs 
and objectives. In return we ask that you 
consider our interests. A careful reading 
of the Trade Act should convince you that 
we are both willing and able to meet you 
more than halfway. 

April 21, 1975 



I am honored to head the U.S. delegation 
to this major meeting of the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council. It has been a 
pleasure to renew acquaintances made in 
Quito last November and meet for the first 
time other distinguished delegates to this 

Our purpose in gathering is timely and 
serious. Today the world confronts an un- 
precedented challenge as it seeks to define 
new economic relationships. Governments 
are searching for cooperative solutions to 
such acute problems as food, population, 
trade, energy, law of the sea, and industrial 
development. Within our own hemisphere, 
we are attempting to fashion new working 
relationships reflecting the growing inter- 
dependence among ourselves and with other 
nations of the world. 

This meeting is an integral part of the 
regional and world dialogue. Our task is to 
use this forum to achieve a more equitable, 
progressive, and stable economic and social 

At Houston on March 1, Secretary of State 
Kissinger set forth three objectives of U.S. 
policy toward Latin America, which guide 
our delegation: 

— To promote with our friends a new spirit of 
communication tempered by realism, elevated by 
hope, and free of distrust, despair, or resentment; 

— To find new ways to combine our efforts in the 
political, economic, and social development of the 
hemisphere; and 

— To recognize that the global dialogue between 
the developed and less developed nations requires 
answers that will be difficult to find anywhere if we 
do not find them in the Western Hemisphere". 

Interdependence — or mutual dependence — 
is especially pronounced in this hemisphere. 
Each of our countries is interlocked in the 
world economy. We have seen how the shock 
waves of inflation and recession have spread 
through the world and have affected all of us. 

The Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council provides a unique opportunity for a 
high-level examination of some of the key 
issues of interdependence which we confront 

today. We have a common responsibility to 
ascertain the facts and clarify the issues as 
we deal with the important items on the 

Trade Policy Objectives 

Let me begin with the Trade Act, which I 
believe to be a much misunderstood issue. 

We all recognize that the Geneva multi- 
lateral trade negotiations are vital to the 
health of the international economy. A more 
open trading system will allow our economies 
to maximize their productive potential and 
share equitably in the growth of the world 
economy. Without serious and productive 
global trade negotiations, the temptation for 
each country to seek a unilateral solution to 
its economic and trading problems may be- 
come irresistible. Without a strong and viable 
world economy, none of us will be able to 
meet our trade and development objectives. 

With these factors in mind, the Admin- 
istration sought legislation from our Con- 
gress enabling us to enter into a new round 
of trade negotiations. President Ford signed 
the Trade Act of 1974 on January 3 of this 
year. We can now begin to work construc- 
tively and positively toward an increasingly 
just and open world trading system. 

I am keenly aware of the concern that cer- 
tain sections of the Trade Act have caused 
in some Latin American countries. This is 
one reason my delegation welcomes this 
meeting and the coming meeting of the Gen- 
eral Assembly of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States. 

We believe that a review of our trade ob- 
jectives and a thorough examination of the 
act will lead to a realization that at least 
some of your concerns are unwarranted. 

First, let me reassure you that we are 
firm in our resolve to implement the Tokyo 
Declaration with its special consideration for 
the needs of the developing countries. There 
is a specific mandate in the Trade Act giving 
special consideration to developing country 
interests. We do not expect full reciprocity 
from the developing countries for conces- 
sions we make in the course of the negotia- 
tions. We do expect, however, that all coun- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tries will contribute to building a new world 
trading system in proportion to their levels 
of development. 

We hope the Geneva negotiations will re- 
solve some of the outstanding problems in 
international trade. For example, if the nego- 
tiations produce an effective international 
code on export subsidies, problems that your 
countries might have with countervailing 
duties will become more manageable. We are 
willing to work together with you, both in 
Geneva and in the OAS Special Committee 
for Consultation and Negotiation, to find a 
satisfactory solution on this and other trade 

The Trade Act also gives us the authority 
to implement a generalized system of tariff 
preferences for our imports from developing 
countries. President Ford will soon issue an 
Executive order designating beneficiary 
countries. He will then send a proposed list 
of products for duty-free treatment to the 
International Trade Commission for public 
hearings and recommendations. As you 
know, this proposed list of products was de- 
veloped in close consultation with your coun- 
tries. It is a good list which contains a broad 
range of manufactures as well as some agri- 
cultural and primary industrial products. 

We are keenly aware of another aspect 
which has drawn your criticism. President 
Ford and Secretary Kissinger have person- 
ally expressed concern over the rigidities in 
our Trade Act which would exclude Ven- 
ezuela and Ecuador from participation in our 
system of preferences. As Secretary Kissin- 
ger said in Houston: 

The Administration supports the purpose of ths 
various bills which have been introduced into the 
Congress .... to modify the provisions of the Trade 
Act which involve Venezuela and Ecuador. 

We have now completed a series of con- 
sultations with the key members of the 
Senate Finance and House Ways and Means 
Committees to seek an equitable solution to 
this problem. Based on these consultations, 
we expect an early decision on further ac- 
tions to solve this problem. In any event, we 
hope to resolve the question well before our 
system of preferences goes into effect this 

U.S. Approach to Commodity Problems 

Let me now turn to another important 
concern of economic interdependence; name- 
ly, price and supply of the basic commodities 
so important to hemispheric trade. Increased 
pressures on raw material supplies over the 
past several years ultimately led to shortages 
and to prices that were not sustainable. Now, 
with a downturn in the world economy, we 
are experiencing a sharp fall in demand and 
prices, with consequent balance-of-payments 
problems for those countries most dependent 
on commodity exports other than petroleum 

Recent events in commodity availabilities 
and prices have not altered the basic U.S. 
belief that market forces of supply and de- 
mand, when allowed to operate freely, are 
the best allocator of resources. 

This is not to say we aproach commodity 
problems with a closed mind. There may be 
flaws in the operation of the market system 
for a particular commodity, or the market 
may not be allowed to work at all in some 
instances. We believe, however, that we 
should attempt to create an atmosphere in 
which the free market forces can operate 
effectively, to the greatest extent possible. 

We share a common goal in seeking new 
approaches serving the long-term interests 
of both producers and consumers. The limits 
in our Trade Act on who receives the benefits 
of the U.S. system of tariff preferences are 
directed only against those groups of coun- 
tries which act in ways disruptive of the 
world economy. 

We can benefit from earlier cooperative 
efforts to identify areas in which the self- 
interest of commodity producer and con- 
sumer must, in the longer term, become mu- 
tual interest. The London working sessions 
on drafting a new international coffee agree- 
ment demonstrate a real awareness of the 
need for shared interests in any effort at 
commodity stabilization. 

The Promise of More Abundant Food 

The third major subject on which I wish 
to comment this afternoon is food. This 
hemisphere can make a far greater contri- 

Aprll 21, 1975 


bution to solving the worldwide food crisis. 
The United States has long been a major 
food exporter, but Latin America clearly 
possesses enormous and undeveloped agri- 
cultural potential. Developing this potential 
would mean for your countries higher farm 
incomes, slowing the population shift to the 
hard-pressed cities, and improved nutrition 
for all. 

With effective use of new technology, 
Latin America could play a major role in 
meeting the food deficits of Africa, Asia, and 

Some of this technology is already avail- 
able but is not reaching the people who need 
it. It must be spread throughout the hem- 
isphere. More research is necessary, not only 
to develop improved methods of cultivation 
and food varieties but also to increase the 
efficiency of the distribution system and re- 
duce waste. 

The challenge of food cannot be overcome 
by any nation in isolation. 

Secretary Kissinger recently proposed new 
cooperative efforts to increase food produc- 
tion in the hemisphere, in a complementary 
effort to the global undertaking begun at the 
World Food Conference in Rome. 

Our suggestion that an agricultural con- 
sultative group be established under the aus- 
pices of the Inter-American Development 
Bank could be a key element in this effort. 
The United States also supports the proposal 
on the agenda of this meeting for a special- 
ized conference on food with the Inter-Amer- 
ican Institute of Agricultural Sciences. 

In each of the areas I have indicated — 
trade, commodities, and food — the United 
States is taking action or is prepared to take 
action in cooperation with you to meet the 
challenge of interdependence. The United 
States recognizes that its economic capacity 
gives it special responsibilities. We are will- 
ing to walk the extra mile to make inter- 
dependence a source of peace and prosperity 
rather than a cause of weakness and strife. 
We expect that other nations are also pre- 
pared to take our concerns into account. 

We have come to an important point in 
our labors. The initial exchange of views and 
study of documentation is drawing to an end. 

We have the responsibility, in drawing con- 
clusions and in framing policy recommenda- 
tions, to base them on a balanced and care- 
ful consideration of the issues. 

I urge you, in considering the Trade Act, 
to take into account the benefits and the 
long-range significance of this legislation to 
the development process and to the future 
of the world economy. 

We hope that this conference will make a 
constructive step foi^ward in realizing the 
potential for hemispheric cooperation in 
trade and other fields. Secretary Kissinger 
will continue discussion of these issues on 
his South American trip. When the OAS 
General Assembly meets in May, we hope all 
of us will be in a strengthened position to 
address our mutual problems of interdepend- 

President Ford Designates Countries 
for Generalized Tariff Preferences 

Following are texts of a Department state- 
ment issued on March 24 and an Executive 
order signed by President Ford that day. 


Press release 169 dated March 24 

President Ford on March 24 signed an 
Executive order designating 89 countries and 
43 dependent territories as beneficiary de- 
veloping countries for the purpose of partici- 
pating in the new U.S. system of generalized 
tariff preferences. Issuance of this Executive 
order will permit the publication in the Fed- 
eral Register and the transmittal to the Inter- 
national Trade Commission of a list of arti- 
cles to be considered for preferential tariff 
treatment in the U.S. market. 

The Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the 
President to join with 18 other developed 
countries in implementing a generalized sys- 
tem of preferences (GSP). The U.S. system 
will provide duty-free treatment, within cer- 
tain specified limits, for imports of a broad 
range of manufactures and semimanufac- 
tures and of selected agricultural and pri- 


Department of State Bulletin 

mary industrial products from developing 
countries for a period of up to 10 years, for 
the purpose of stimulating their economic 
development and improving U.S. economic 
relationships with them. 

An important U.S. foreign policy objective 
is to facilitate the economic development of 
less developed nations. Tariff preferences 
will provide additional export opportunities 
to these countries and encourage them to 
shift from reliance on production and export 
of agricultural and primary industrial prod- 
ucts to more broadly based industrial growth. 
Implementation of a system of tariff prefer- 
ences is particularly important to the U.S. 
policy of expanded trade relations with the 
developing countries in this hemisphere as 
well as those in other parts of the world. 
Also, two-way trade tends to expand as na- 
tions move up the ladder of production and 
strengthen their economies. U.S. trade should 
therefore also benefit. 

The designation of beneficiary countries 
and the publication of potentially eligible 
articles are required procedural steps in 
implementing the preference system. During 
the next several months, the International 
Trade Commission (ITC, formerly the Tariff 
Commission) will hold public hearings and 
advise the President with respect to the prob- 
able domestic economic impact of granting 
preferences for the articles under considera- 
tion. The Administration also will hold pub- 
lic hearings concerning the product coverage 
of the preference system. 

The Trade Act prohibits the granting of 
preferences to articles which the President 
determines to be import sensitive, as well as 
several defined categories of import-sensitive 
articles. The list now to be published contains 
all manufactures and semimanufactures ex- 
cept textiles, footwear, watches, import-sen- 
sitive steel, and articles subject to import 
relief and national security actions. In addi- 
tion to the products listed above, import- 
sensitive glass and electronics items are ex- 
plicitly excluded by law from GSP. Admin- 
istration decisions as to what products, in 
addition to those now excluded from the list, 
may be import sensitive will be made follow- 
ing the public hearings and receipt of advice 

from the International Trade Commission. 
Any article on the list may be removed by 
the Administration at that time. 

In addition to designating beneficiary 
countries, the Executive order lists 24 other 
countries whose eligibility is under active 
consideration and requests ITC considera- 
tion of the impact of duty-free import of arti- 
cles under consideration from those countries 
as well. This list includes all members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC) and several other countries 
which may be affected by the eligibility pro- 
visions of the Trade Act which deny partici- 
pation in the U.S. preference system to coun- 
tries which engage in such actions as expro- 
priation of U.S. property in violation of 
international law or which grant more favor- 
able treatment to imports from other de- 
veloped countries. Communist countries are 
ineligible for preferences unless they receive 
most-favored-nation tariff treatment in the 
U.S. market, are members of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the 
International Monetary Fund, and are not 
"dominated or controlled by international 

The President and Secretary Kissinger 
have expressed concern regarding certain 
provisions of the GSP authority contained in 
the Trade Act, particularly those which re- 
late to oil-producing countries. The President 
announced when signing the Trade Act that : 
"In the spirit of cooperation with the Con- 
gress, I will do my best to work out any 
necessary accommodations." Consultations 
between the Administration and the Con- 
gress on possible ways to work out such 
accommodation are making good progress. 


Designation of Beneficiary Developing Countries 
FOR THE Generalized System op Preferences 
Under the Trade Act of 197-1 

Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as the Act (Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 
1978), provides for a Generalized System of Prefer- 
ences by which eligible articles from a beneficiary 
developing country may be provided duty-free treat- 

' 40 Fed. Reg. 13295. 

April 21, 1975 


The Act authorizes the President to designate a 
country as a beneficiary developing country if such 
country meets the qualifications of the Act. Prior 
thereto, the President is to notify the House of Rep- 
resentatives and the Senate of his intention to make 
such designations and of the considerations enter- 
ing into such decisions. I have so notified the House 
of Representatives and the Senate with respect to 
the countries listed in this Executive order. 

In order to implement the Generalized System of 
Preferences, the Trade Act requires (1) designation 
of beneficiary developing countries, (2) publication 
and transmission to the International Trade Com- 
mission of the lists of articles which will be con- 
sidered for designation as eligible articles for pur- 
poses of generalized preferences, and (3) submis- 
sion by the International Trade Commission -of its 
advice to the President within six months as to the 
probable economic effect on domestic producers and 
consumers of implementing generalized preferences 
for those listed articles. 

Concurrently with publication of those listed arti- 
cles and transmission thereof to the International 
Trade Commission for its advice as required by the 
Act, I also intend to ask the Commission to provide 
its advice, pursuant to Section 332(g) of the Tariff 
Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1332), with 
respect to articles of those countries designated and 
those which are still under consideration for desig- 
nation as beneficiary developing countries. 

The President is authorized to modify at any time 
the list of beneficiary developing countries desig- 
nated herein, and for that purpose there shall be a 
continuing review of the eligibility of countries to 
be so designated under the provisions of the Act. 

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested 
in me by the Trade Act of 1974, and as President 
of the United States of America, it is hereby or- 
dered as follows: 

Section 1. The following named countries are 
designated as beneficiary developing countries for 
purposes of the Generalized System of Preferences 
authorized by Title V of the Act: 

(a) Those Respoyisible for Their Own External 

Central African 




Congo (Brazzaville) 

Costa Rica 


Dominican Republic 


El Salvador 

Equatorial Guinea 








Guinea Bissau 





Ivory Coast 




Khmer Republic 

Korea, Republic of 





Malagasy Republic 



Maldive Islands 



















Sierra Leone 


Sri Lanka 









Trinidad and Tobago 


Upper Volta 


Vietnam (South) 

Western Samoa 

Yemen Arab Republic 




(b) Those for Whotn Another Country Is Respon- 
sible for Their External Relations. 

Afars and Issas, French 

Territory of the 
British Indian Ocean 

British Solomon Islands 
Cape Verde 
Cayman Islands 
Comoro Islands 
Cook Islands 
Falkland Islands 

(Malvinas) and 

French Polynesia 
Gilbert and Ellice 

Heard Island and 

McDonald Island 

Netherlands Antilles 
New Caledonia 
New Hebrides 


Norfolk Island 
Papua New Guinea 
Pitcairn Island 
Portuguese Timor 
Saint Christopher-Nevis- 

Saint Helena 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Spanish Sahara 
Tokelau Islands 
Trust Territory of the 

Pacific Islands 
Turks and Caicos 

Virgin Islands, British 
Wallis and Futuna 



Department of State Bulletin 

Sec. 2. The following named countries are identi- 
fied as under consideration for designation as bene- 
ficiary developing countries in accordance with the 
criteria set forth in Title V of the Act: 


Yemen, Peoples' Demo- 


cratic Republic of 







Hong Kong 

Saudi Arabia 










United Arab Emirates 




The White House, March 2U, 1975. 

Administration of the Trade 
Agreements Program 


By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Trade Act of 1974, hereinafter referred to as the 
Act (Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978), the Trade 
Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1801), 
Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 
(19 U.S.C. 1351), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the 
United States Code, and as President of the United 
States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. The Trade Agreements Program. The 
"trade agreements program" includes all activities 
consisting of, or related to, the negotiation or 
administration of international agreements which 
primarily concern trade and which are concluded 
pursuant to the authority vested in the President 
by the Constitution, Section 350 of the Tariff Act 
of 1930, as amended, the Trade Expansion -Act of 
1962, as amended, or the Act. 

Sec. 2. The Special Represeyitative for Trade 

(a) The Special Representative for Trade Nego- 
tiations, hereinafter referred to as the Special Rep- 
resentative, in addition to the functions conferred 
upon him by the Act, including Section 141 thereof, 
and in addition to the functions and responsibilities 
set forth in this Order, shall be responsible for such 
other functions as the President may direct. 

'No. 11846; 40 Fed. Reg. 14291. 

(b) The Special Representative, except where 
otherwise expressly provided by statute. Executive 
order, or instructions of the President, shall be the 
chief representative of the United States for each 
negotiation under the trade agreements program 
and shall participate in other negotiations which 
may have a direct and significant impact on trade. 

(c) The Special Representative shall prepare, for 
the President's transmission to Congress, the annual 
report on the trade agreements program required by 
Section 163(a) of the Act. At the request of the 
Special Representative, other agencies shall assist 
in the preparation of that report. 

(d) The Special Representative, except where ex- 
pressly otherwise provided or prohibited by statute, 
Executive order, or instructions of the President, 
shall be responsible for the proper administration 
of the trade agreements program, and may, as he 
deems necessary, assign to the head of any Execu- 
tive agency or body the performance of his duties 
which are incidental to the administration of the 
trade agreements program. 

(e) The Special Representative shall consult with 
the Trade Policy Committee in connection with the 
performance of his functions, including those estab- 
lished or delegated by this Order, and shall, as 
appropriate, consult with other Federal agencies or 
bodies. With respect to the performance of his 
functions under Title IV of the Act, including those 
established or delegated by this Order, the Special 
Representative shall also consult with the East- 
West Foreign Trade Board. 

(f) The Special Representative shall be responsi- 
ble for the preparation and submission of any 
Proclamation which relates wholly or primarily to 
the trade agreements program. Any such Proclama- 
tion shall be subject to all the provisions of Execu- 
tive Order No. 11030, as amended, except that such 
Proclamation need not be submitted to the Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget. 

(g) The Secretary of State shall advise the Spe- 
cial Representative, and the Committee, on the 
foreign policy implications of any action under the 
trade agreements program. The Special Representa- 
tive shall invite appropriate departments to partici- 
pate in trade negotiations of particular interest to 
such departments, and the Department of State shall 
participate in trade negotiations which have a direct 
and significant impact on foreign policy. 

Sec. 3. The Trade Policy Committee, (a) As 
provided by Section 242 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1872), as amended by Sec- 
tion 602(b) of the Act, there is established the 
Trade Policy Committee, hereinafter referred to as 
the Committee. The Committee shall be composed 

(1) The Special Representative, who shall be 

April 21, 1975 


(2) The Secretary of State. 

(3) The Secretary of the Treasury. 

(4) The Secretary of Defense. 

(5) The Attorney General. 

(6) The Secretary of the Interior. 

(7) The Secretary of Agriculture. 

(8) The Secretary of Commerce. 

(9) The Secretary of Labor. 

(10) The Assistant to the President for Economic 

(11) The Executive Director of the Council on 
International Economic Policy. 

Each member of the Committee may designate an 
officer of his agency, whose status is not below that 
of an Assistant Secretary, to serve in his stead, 
when he is unable to attend any meetings of the 
Committee. The Chairman, as he deems appropri- 
ate, may invite representatives from other agencies 
to attend the meetings of the Committee. 

(b) The Committee shall have the functions con- 
ferred by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as 
amended, upon the inter-agency organization re- 
ferred to in Section 242 thereof, as amended, the 
functions delegated to it by the provisions of this 
Order, and such other functions as the President 
may from time to time direct. Recommendations 
and advice of the Committee shall be submitted to 
the President by the Chairman. 

(c) The recommendations made by the Committee 
under Section 242(b)(1) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, as amended, with respect to basic policy 
issues arising in the administration of the trade 
agreements program, as approved or modified by 
the President, shall guide the administration of the 
trade agreements program. The Special Representa- 
tive or any other officer who is chief representative 
of the United States in a negotiation in connection 
with the trade agreements program shall keep the 
Committee informed with respect to the status 
and conduct of negotiations and shall consult with 
the Committee regarding the basic policy issues 
arising in the course of negotiations. 

(d) Before making recommendations to the Presi- 
dent under Section 242(b)(2) of the Trade Expan- 
sion Act of 1962, as amended, the Committee shall, 
through the Special Representative, request the ad- 
vice of the Adjustment Assistance Coordinating 
Committee, established by Section 281 of the Act. 

(e) The Committee shall advise the President as 
to what action, if any, he should take under Section 
337(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by 
Section 341 of the Act, relating to unfair practices 
in import trade. 

(f) The Trade Expansion Act Advisory Commit- 
tee established by Section 4 of Executive Order No. 
11075 of January 15, 1963, is abolished and all of 
its records are transferred to the Trade Policy 

Sec. 4. Trade Negotiations Under Title I of the 

(a) The functions of the President under Section 
102 of the Act concerning notice to, and consultation 
with. Congress, in connection with agreements on 
nontariff barriers to, and other distortions of, trade, 
are hereby delegated to the Special Representative. 

(b) The Special Representative, after consulta- 
tion with the Committee, shall prepare, for the 
President's transmission to Congress, all proposed 
legislation and other documents necessary or appro- 
priate for the implementation of, or otherwise 
required in connection with, trade agreements; pro- 
vided, however, that where implementation of an 
agreement on nontariff barriers to, and other dis- 
tortions of, trade requires a change in a domestic 
law, the department or agency having the primary 
interest in the administration of such domestic law 
shall prepare and transmit to the Special Repre- 
sentative the proposed legislation necessary or ap- 
propriate for such implementation. 

(c) The functions of the President under Section 
131(c) of the Act with respect to advice of the 
International Trade Commission and under Section 
132 of the Act with respect to advice of the depart- 
ments of the Federal Government and other sources, 
are delegated to the Special Representative. The 
functions of the President under Section 133 of the 
Act with respect to public hearings in connection 
with certain trade negotiations are delegated to 
the Special Representative, who shall designate an 
interagency committee to hold and conduct any such 

(d) The functions of the President under Section 
135 of the Act with respect to advisory committees 
and, notwithstanding the provisions of any other 
Executive order, the functions of the President 
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (86 
Stat. 770, 5 U.S.C. App. I), except that of reporting 
annually to Congress, which are applicable to ad- 
visory committees under the Act are delegated to 
the Special Representative. In establishing and 
organizing general policy advisory committees or 
sector advisory committees under Section 135(c) of 
the Act, the Special Representative shall act through 
the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor and Agricul- 
ture, as appropriate. 

(e) The functions of the President with respect 
to determining ad valorem amounts and equivalents 
pursuant to Sections 601 (3) and (4) of the Act are 
hereby delegated to the Special Representative. The 
International Trade Commission is requested to ad- 
vise the Special Representative with respect to 
determining such ad valorem amounts and equiva- 
lents. The Special Representative shall seek the 
advice of the Commission and consult with the 
Committee with respect to the determination of such 
ad valorem amounts and equivalents. 


Department of State Bulletin 

(f ) Advice of the International Trade Commission 
under Section 131 of the Act, and other advice or 
reports by the International Trade Commission to 
the President or the Special Representative, the 
release or disclosure of which is not specifically 
authorized or required by law, shall not be released 
or disclosed in any manner or to any extent not 
specifically authorized by the President or by the 
Special Representative. 

Sec. 5. Import Relief and Market Disruption. 

(a) The Special Representative is authorized to 
request from the International Trade Commission 
the information specified in Sections 202(d) and 
203(i) (1) and (2) of the Act. 

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consulta- 
tion with the Secretary of Commerce or the Secre- 
tary of Agriculture, as appropriate, is authorized 
to issue, under Section 203(g) of the Act, regula- 
tions governing the administration of any quantita- 
tive restrictions proclaimed in order to provide im- 
port relief and is authorized to issue, under Section 
203(g) of the Act or 352(b) of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, regulations governing the entry, or 
withdrawal from warehouses for consumption, of 
articles pursuant to any orderly marketing agree- 

(c) The Secretary of Commerce shall exercise 
primary responsibility for monitoring imports under 
any orderly marketing agreement. 

Sec. 6. Unfair Trade Practices. 

(a) The Special Representative, acting through 
an interagency committee which he shall designate 
for such purpose, shall provide the opportunity for 
the presentation of views, under Sections 301(d)(1) 
and 301(e)(1) of the Act, with respect to unfair 
or unreasonable foreign trade practices and with 
respect to the United States response thereto. 

(b) The Special Representative shall provide for 
appropriate public hearings under Section 301(e)(2) 
of the Act; and, shall issue regulations concerning 
the filing of requests for, and the conduct of, such 

(c) The Special Representative is authorized to 
request, pursuant to Section 301(e)(3) of the Act, 
from the International Trade Commission, its views 
as to the probable impact on the economy of the 
United States of any action under Section 301(a) 
of the Act. 

Sec. 7. East-West Foreign Trade Board, (a) 
In accordance with Section 411 of the Act, there is 
hereby established the East-West Foreign Trade 
Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. The 
Board shall be composed of the following members 
and such additional members of the Executive 
branch as the President may designate: 

(1) The Secretary of State. 

(2) The Secretary of the Treasury. 

(3) The Secretary of Agriculture. 

(4) The Secretary of Commerce. 

(5) The Special Representative for Trade Nego- 

(6) The Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget. 

(7) The Executive Director of the Council on 
International Economic Policy. 

(8) The President of the Export-Import Bank of 
the United States. 

(9) The Assistant to the President for Economic 

The President shall designate the Chairman and the 
Deputy Chairman of the Board. The President 
may designate an Executive Secretary, who shall 
be Chairman of a working group which will include 
membership from the agencies represented on the 

(b) The Board shall perform such functions as 
are required by Section 411 of the Act and such 
other functions as the President may direct. 

(c) The Board is authorized to promulgate such 
rules and regulations as are necessary or appropri- 
ate to carry out its responsibilities under the Act 
and this Order. 

(d) The Secretary of State shall advise the Presi- 
dent with respect to determinations required to be 
made in connection with Sections 402 and 409 of 
the Act (dealing with freedom of emigration) and 
Section 403 (dealing with United States personnel 
missing in action in Southeast Asia), and shall pre- 
pare, for the President's transmission to Congress, 
the reports and other documents required by Sec- 
tions 402 and 409 of the Act. 

(e) The President's Committee on East-West 
Trade Policy, established by Executive Order No. 
11789 of June 25, 1974, as amended by Section 
6(d) of Executive Order No. 11808 of September 30, 
1974, is abolished and all of its records are trans- 
ferred to the Board. 

Sec. 8. Generalized System of Preferences. 

(a) The Special Representative, in consultation 
with the Secretary of State, shall be responsible 
for the administration of the generalized system of 
preferences under Title V of the Act. 

(b) The Committee, through the Special Repre- 
sentative, shall advise the President as to which 
countries should be designated as beneficiary devel- 
oping countries, and as to which articles should be 
designated as eligible articles for the purposes of 
the system of generalized preferences. 

Sec. 9. Prior Executive Orders, (a) Executive 
Order No. 11789 of June 25, 1974, and Section 6(d) 
of Executive Order No. 11808 of September 30, 1974, 
relating to the President's Committee on East- West 
Trade Policy are hereby revoked. 

April 21, 1975 


(b) (1) Sections 5(b), 7, and 8 of Executive Order 
No. 11075 of January 15, 1963, are hereby revoked 
effective April 3, 1975; (2) the remainder of Execu- 
tive Order No. 11075, and Executive Order No. 
11106 of April 18, 1963 and Executive Order No. 
11113 of June 13, 1963, are hereby revoked. 

The White House, March 27, 1975. 

Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act 
of 1975 Signed Into Law 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I have signed H.R. 4592 (the Foreign As- 
sistance and Related Programs Appropriation 
Act of 1975) [P.L. 94-11, approved Mar. 26] 
with considerable misgivings. The consider- 
able reductions in overseas assistance pro- 
grams — which the Congress authorized only 
three months ago — could prove detrimental 
to American interests at home and abroad. 

The Administration sought appropriations 
that would reflect the same spirit of con- 
structive compromise that characterized our 
cooperative efforts in December. I continue 
to believe that the interests of the United 
States in an increasingly interdependent 
community of nations require our purposeful 
and responsible participation. Such partici- 
pation is impossible if the Administration's 
best estimates of a balanced foreign assist- 
ance program are subjected to reductions of 
these drastic dimensions. 

I am disappointed that harmful cuts were 
inflicted in both the development and secu- 
rity assistance sectors. Interdependence ap- 
plies not only to the present political and 
economic realities of America's role in the 
global community but also to the various 
modes of foreign assistance which we employ 
in our foreign policy. Programs of a humani- 
tarian or developmental nature cannot be 
productive if our friends and allies are un- 
able to defend themselves. 

In the areas of humanitarian and develop- 
ment assistance, the $200 million reduction 

'Issued on Mar. 27 (White House press release). 

in food and nutrition funds renders our ef- 
forts to alleviate world hunger all the more 
difficult. The significant reduction in popu- 
lation planning funds will hamper initiatives 
related to this important factor in the long- 
term global food and health situation. I 
deeply regret the action of the Congress in 
reducing the request for Indochina postwar 
reconstruction funds by over one-half — from 
$939 million to $440 million. At this crucial 
time, our friends in Viet-Nam and Cambodia 
are under heavy attack on the battlefield and 
must cope with enormous refugee problems. 

I am also disappointed that the request 
for our voluntary contribution to interna- 
tional organizations and programs has been 
severely reduced. The impact of this reduc- 
tion will be felt in the lessening of our finan- 
cial support to the United Nations Develop- 
ment Program. Our deep involvement in the 
UNDP over the years has been seen by many 
nations as symbolic of our commitment to 
work through multilateral as well as bilateral 
channels to assist the developing world. 

In the area of security assistance, I am 
disappointed in the massive reduction in 
funding for the military assistance pro- 
gram. The program funds authorized by the 
Congress would have been barely adequate 
in terms of supplying needed military mate- 
riel to a small group of friendly countries 
unable to assume a greater financial share of 
their security burden through credit or cash 
purchases. However, the appropriation of 
less than half of this sum has jeopardized 
these critical programs. Simultaneously cut- 
ting its appropriations for foreign military 
sales credits accentuates the difficulties cre- 
ated by the deep cuts in the military assist- 
ance program. 

Finally, I am troubled because reductions 
in the overall quantity and quality of our 
development and security assistance pro- 
grams will occur at precisely the time when 
America's assistance is vitally needed. I fer- 
vently hope that the Congress will give ur- 
gent attention to the interlocking relation- 
ship of America's present problems at home 
and abroad and provide future funding that 
will be commensurate with our stated prin- 
ciples and national self-interest. 


Department of State Bulletin 

In this article based on an address he ynade on February 19 before 
the Rockland County Rotary Clubs at Bear Mountain, N.Y., Mr. 
Reich discusses the international dimensions of the Bicentennial 
commemoration and the importance of people-to-people diplo- 
macy. He also gives suggestions on how community organizations 
can further international understanding during the Bicentennial. 

From Independence to Interdependence— A Bicentennial Challenge 

by Alan A. Reich 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs 

America's Bicentennial commemoration 
provides a unique opportunity to strengthen 
ties with other peoples of the world and thus 
contribute to international mutual under- 

The Bicentennial commemoration has three 
major themes — Heritage '76, Festival USA, 
and Horizons '76. Each has important inter- 
national implications. 

The first, Heritage '76, recalls the ethnic 
origins and diversity of America. Our way 
of life owes much to other peoples of the 
world. Their contributions find rich expres- 
sion throughout our country. Many ethnic 
organizations are planning Bicentennial pro- 
grams linking the United States and their 
home countries. Reflecting together on our 
heritage and its meaning will result in sig- 
nificant and constructive international dia- 

The second theme. Festival USA, suggests 
the opportunities international visitors have 
to discover and understand America and our 
people. The Festival theme is far broader 
and more meaningful than the view ex- 
pressed by one foreign visitor on the occasion 
of our Centennial celebration in 1876. He 
observed : 

The crowds come like sheep, run here, run there, 
run everywhere. One man start, thousand follow. 
Nobody see anything, nobody do anything. All rush, 
tear, push, shout, make plenty noise, say "damn" 
great many times, get very tired, and go home. 

The President, through the Department of 
State and our embassies, has officially invited 
other nations to participate in the Bicenten- 
nial. There will be cultural, sports, arts, and 
other attractions both in the United States 
and abroad which should enhance the appre- 
ciation of our respective achievements and 

Recently I referred to "our Bicentennial" 
in a conversation with a Cabinet minister of 
a nation making plans for the commemora- 
tion. He interrupted and noted politely, "The 
Spirit of '76 belongs to us, too, you know!" 
His remark made me realize other peoples 
around the world share with us and hold 
dear the ideals and values we associate with 
our Revolutionary period. Other nations have 
been guided by the American model in es- 
tablishing their governments. They see the 
United States as the custodian of democracy. 
George Washington's words, "The basis of 
our political system is the right of people to 
make and to alter their constitutions of gov- 
ernment," have had and continue to have 
worldwide meaning. 

Horizons '76, the third theme, is perhaps 
the most important. It looks to the future. 
John Adams put it succinctly when he said, 
"I like the dreams of the future better than 
the history of the past." The notion of the 
continuing revolution and all it stands for 
is captured in the growing awareness that 
we are interdependent. 

April 21, 1975 


If mankind is to survive, we must cooper- 
ate. Problems that were national a few years 
ago are now global. Our neighbors' problems 
are ours, and vice versa. Improving the qual- 
ity of life is a worldwide challenge. Problems 
of population, inflation, food, and the use of 
resources require cooperative action. Neither 
we nor our children will have the luxury of 
working on our domestic problems if we do 
not succeed in bringing about peaceful coop- 
eration throughout the world during the next 
few years. Whether we cooperate with our 
international neighbors because it is good, 
right, or necessary, we must get on with it 
while we are improving the quality of life 
at home. 

President Ford stated in an address at 
Detroit last September: 

... a theme of the foreign policy of this Admin- 
istration is international cooperation in an inter- 
dependent world, stressing interdependence. 

Secretary Kissinger said last fall at New 
Delhi : 

Our goal is to move toward a world where power 
blocs and balances are not dominant . . . where 
countries consider cooperation in the global interest 
to be in their national interest. 

The strengthening of informal relation- 
ships on a people-to-people basis helps im- 
prove the climate for cooperation in solving 
these problems which have no national 
boundaries. The Bicentennial commemoration 
is relevant not only to the American future 
but also to the goals and aspirations of man- 

People-to-People Diplomacy 

In a world of constant change, from the 
diplomat's point of view one of the most 
profound — and perhaps least understood — 
changes has been the increasing involvement 
of individuals everywhere in public afi'airs. 
More and more people every day become in- 
volved in local and national affairs and also, 
to an extraordinary degree, in world affairs. 
We live in an era of people-to-people diplo- 
macy. Concerned citizens and private orga- 
nizations the world over play key roles in 
influencing international relations. 

Why are people-to-people relations and in- 
formal communications activities of concern 
to the U.S. Department of State? Formal 
diplomatic channels, of course, are crucial 
for official business and the resolution of dif- 
ferences between nations. To an unprece- 
dented degree, however, the problems nations 
confront, the means they choose to solve 
them, and even the perceptions people of one 
country have of another, evolve outside of- 
ficial channels. Diplomacy has gone public. 
Foreign affairs is no longer the exclusive 
domain of the professional diplomat. Many 
foreign offices no longer confine themselves 
to speaking with other foreign offices for 
peoples; they help and encourage their 
peoples to speak for themselves across na- 
tional boundaries. The tone and content of 
our international relations are set increas- 
ingly by the vastly expanded contacts be- 
tween Americans and other peoples of the 

This geometric increase in citizen involve- 
ment in world affairs has special significance 
for the diplomat. When people-to-people 
bonds and networks for two-way communica- 
tion are fully developed, there will be a 
greater readiness to seek accommodation and 
to negotiate. When people know and under- 
stand each other and appreciate their differ- 
ences, likelihood of confrontation diminishes. 
Prospects for peaceful solutions are en- 
hanced. As Woodrow Wilson said, "When we 
truly know one another, we can have differ- 
ences without hating one another." This ra- 
tionale governs the State Department's in- 
terest in the furtherance of meaningful 
people-to-people interchange. 

When you think of the Department's con- 
duct of our international affairs, people-to- 
people diplomacy and exchange-of-persons 
programs may not come immediately to mind. 
It is nonetheless a significant Department 
activity carried out with 126 nations. The 
job of the Bureau of Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs is to use its resources to rein- 
force the work of American individuals and 
organizations who want to help construct 
the foundation of better relationships with 
the rest of the world. The Bureau also coor- 


Department of State Bulletin 

dinates, as necessary, the activities of other 
government agencies with international ex- 
change programs in such fields as health, 
education, social welfare, transportation, ag- 
riculture, military training, and urban plan- 

There are several major elements in this 
government-sponsored cultural relations pro- 
gram. Annually, some 5,000 professors, lec- 
turers, and scholars are exchanged to and 
from the United States. The international 
visitor program brings to this country about 
1,500 foreign leaders and potential leaders 
annually for orientation tours of 4-6 weeks' 
duration. We send abroad several leading 
performing arts and sports groups as well 
as some 150 U.S. lecturers annually for brief 
lecture tours. 

International Dimensions of the Bicentennial 

The three Bicentennial themes were se- 
lected to provide for involvement of all our 
states, communities, and people. There will 
be no single national focus in one city. In 
addition to the American Revolution Bicen- 
tennial Administration in Washington and 
the 10 regional offices, each state has its own 
commission. Many cities and communities, 
too, have commissions and active programs. 

A number of governments of the world, as 
well as private individuals and organizations 
of other nations, have asked the Department 
of State and the American Revolution Bi- 
centennial Administration for suggestions 
on how to commemorate the Bicentennial and 
simultaneously to strengthen ties with the 
American people. Here are a few examples 
of Bicentennial projects planned by govern- 
ments and peoples of other nations: 

— Establishment of chairs in American 
studies in foreign universities. 

— Establishment of chairs for studies about 
other nations in American universities. 

— Symphony orchestra tours to the United 

— National folk group participation in the 
Smithsonian Folklife Festival and in com- 
munity festivals throughout the United 

— Endowment of library collections of 
Americana, both in the United States and 

— Commissioning of historical books, stud- 
ies, and films about the American experience. 

— Historical and philosophical conferences 
on American civilization to be held abroad. 

— Theater and opera groups, museum col- 
lections, and exhibits to tour the United 

As other nations develop their Bicenten- 
nial programs, Americans, too, are incorpo- 
rating an international dimension in their 
planning. Many local activities planned by 
state and community Bicentennial groups in- 
volve people of other nations. For instance: 

— Operation Sail '76 is a visit of tall- 
masted sailing vessels from around the world 
to New York City on July 4, 1976, and to 
other world ports. 

— The World Theatre Festival, a non- 
profit foundation based in New York, will 
sponsor appearances of distinguished theatre 
companies from around the world. 

— Utica, N.Y., will hold an ethnic arts 
festival celebrating America as a conglom- 
erate of peoples. Fourteen nationality groups 
are expected to participate. 

— Numerous international conferences are 
being planned, such as the world food con- 
ference to be held at Iowa University. 

— Binational, international exchange, and 
ethnic organizations are developing new 
exchange-of-persons programs, such as the 
Polk County, Nebr., Bicentennial exchange 
with Japan. 

— The American Council of Polish Cultural 
Clubs is conducting a poster contest on Polish 
immigration to the United States. 

— The American Medical Association is in- 
viting counterpart associations of other coun- 
tries to attend its 1976 annual convention to 
review medical contributions to man's well- 
being over the past 200 years. 

— The American Association of Museums 
is organizing a program for American mu- 
seums to exhibit foreign contributions to 
America's development. 

— Sister Cities International plans to in- 

April 21, 1975 


crease the number of U.S. and foreign cities 
affiliated in sister city relationships from 
1,100 at present to 1,976. 

— The American Historical Association is 
offering a prize to the author of the best his- 
torical work on the American Revolution 
written in a language other than English. 

The Bicentennial Challenge 

Service clubs and other private organiza- 
tions are making a significant contribution to 
international mutual understanding through 
their people-to-people programs. For exam- 
ple, Rotary's international youth exchange 
program, its world community service pro- 
gram, and its small-business clinic program 
have had considerable impact. 

Service clubs also contribute to the fur- 
therance of international person-to-person 
relationships by others in their communities. 
In visits throughout the United States, I 
have been impressed with the extent to which 
service clubs have initiated and developed 
sister city affiliations, people-to-people ex- 
changes, international hospitality programs, 
and international activities of local perform- 
ing arts and sports groups. 

I hope community organizations will do 
more of the same — demonstrating the capac- 
ity for commitment of the American people 
in solving that most important of all human 
problems, the achievement of a sustained 
world peace, by sponsoring exchanges, pro- 
viding community leadership in international 
programing, helping peoples of other nations 
become less dependent, and strengthening 
international ties among key individuals and 
groups. Specifically, I urge community 
organizations to undertake in whole or in 
part the following 12-point program: 

1. Expand home hospitality and community 
orientation programs for international visi- 
tors, including professional, business, diplo- 
matic, military, and government leaders. 

2. Expand and strengthen exchange pro- 
grams of youth, cultural, and ethnic organi- 

3. Develop and improve community pro- 

grams for foreign students in the United 

4. Internationalize community involvement 
by affiliating with an appropriate interna- 
tional organization in cooperation with the 
U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. 

5. Participate directly in and support the 
international exchange programs of the 
People-to-People International and of the 
People-to-People sports, music, handicapped, 
and other exchange committees. 

6. Strengthen or initiate a sister city pro- 
gram or affiliate with a new sister city. 

7. Develop programs for strengthening ties 
with international alumni of area universities 
and colleges. 

8. Invite foreign professional counterparts 
and students to conferences and seminars. 

9. Help expand the international public 
service activities of U.S. corporations operat- 
ing internationally. 

10. Form international institutional link- 
ages affiliating U.S. and counterpart uni- 
versities, colleges, hospitals, rehabilitation 
centers, schools, libraries, and museums for 
exchange relationships. 

11. Establish university chairs of inter- 
national studies. 

12. Maximize the good will generated by 
insuring public visibility for these activities 
both here and abroad. 

Secretary Kissinger, speaking before the 
U.N. General Assembly last September, posed 
the question: "Will our age of interdepend- 
ence spur joint progress or common dis- 
aster?" In our 200 years as a nation we have 
matured from independence to interdepend- 
ence. The challenge, the Bicentennial chal- 
lenge of interdependence, is to increase in- 
ternational mutual understanding. These ties 
of interdependence should contribute in ways 
which will not sacrifice private sector initia- 
tive, dynamism, and diversity. They will 
indeed spur joint progress. 

Such a Bicentennial program will be in 
the U.S. national interest and in mankind's 
interest, too, in providing an improved cli- 
mate for solving our global problems and in 
helping to build the human foundations of 
the structure of peace. 


Department of State Bulletin 

EPA To Be U.S. Information Center 
for U.N. Environment Program 

Department Announcement ' 

The Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) has been designated as the U.S. in- 
formation center in the global system estab- 
lished by the United Nations for speedy 
distribution of environmental data. 

Selection of the EPA was made at the sug- 
gestion of Dixy Lee Ray, Assistant Secretary 
of State for Oceans and International En- 
vironmental and Scientific Affairs. 

"I welcome the opportunity for EPA to 
play a leadership role in the development of 
an international environmental information 
system which will serve the needs of this 
country as well as provide assistance to other 
nations within the U.N.," EPA Administra- 
tor Russell E. Train said in acknowledging 
the designation. 

The U.N.'s International Referral Service 
for Sources of Environmental Information, 
conceived at the 1972 Stockholm Conference 
on the Environment, has a central office at 
the headquarters of the United Nations En- 
vironment Program (UNEP) in Nairobi. 
The worldwide network operates through 
national focal points in each participating 
country which coordinate efforts for identi- 
fying sources of environmental information. 
They will contribute these sources to a com- 
puterized international directory UNEP is 
compiling. Pertinent sources from this data 
bank will be supplied upon request to re- 
searchers, scholars, managers, technicians, 
and others who need them. 

A committee established by the Depart- 
ment of State provides policy guidance for 
the service. In addition to EPA, Federal 
agencies represented on the committee are 
the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, 
Health, Education, and Welfare, Housing 
and Urban Development, Interior, and State ; 

Issued on Mar. 27 (text from press release 174). 

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad- 
ministration; the Council on Environmental 
Quality; the National Science Foundation; 
and the Library of Congress. 

Delegation of State Governors 
To Visit U.S.S.R. 

Press release 1B3 dated March 18 

A delegation of Governors representing the 
U.S. National Governors' Conference and 
headed by Governor Calvin L. Rampton of 
Utah, chairman of the conference, will visit 
the Soviet Union for 12 days in May of this 

The visit, to be made under the U.S.- 
U.S.S.R General Agreement on Contacts, Ex- 
changes, and Cooperation, is similar to one 
made to the U.S.S.R. by another group of 
Governors in October of 1971. The program 
is reciprocal. The 1971 trip was followed 
in May 1974 by a visit to the United States 
of a group of regional Soviet officials. 

Soviet authorities are planning an itin- 
erary which includes trips to Moscow, Lenin- 
grad, Kiev, and Tashkent. It is expected that 
during their stay the Governors will be given 
an opportunity to discuss with their Soviet 
counterparts matters of common concern, 
such as urban development, transportation, 
environmental control, and agriculture. 

This visit is funded by the Department of 
State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural 
Affairs, which seeks to promote understand- 
ing and strengthened ties between the peoples 
of the United States and other nations 
through international exchange programs. 

The delegation, in addition to Governor 
Rampton, will consist of Arch A. Moore, Jr., 
of West Virginia, Robert D. Ray of Iowa, 
William L. Waller of Mississippi, Thomas P. 
Salmon of Vermont, Marvin Mandel of Mary- 
land, Wendell R. Anderson of Minnesota, and 
Richard F. Kneip of South Dakota. 

April 21, 1975 



United States Discusses Role of Industrialization 
in the Developing Countries 

The Second General Conference of the 
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UN WO) tvas held at Lima 
March 12-26. Following is a statonent made 
before the conference on March 18 by W. 
Tapleij Bennett, Jr., Deputy U.S. Represent- 
ative to the United Nations, who ivas chair- 
man of the U.S. delegation. 

USUN pr 

2e dated March 28 

We meet in the historic and dynamic city 
of Lima at a time of unprecedented chal- 
lenge for the international community. Let 
us also regard it as a time of opportunity. 
The familiar patterns of international eco- 
nomic relations are changing. Old attitudes 
seem no longer wholly relevant to our pres- 
ent problems. Although blueprints for the 
replacement of the international economic 
system have been offered, the new com- 
munity remains to be revealed. Only our 
growing interdependence is certain. 

Let me at the outset of my remarks quote 
a statement made by Secretary of State 
Kissinger at the beginning of this month 
which I think is importantly relevant to the 
work of this conference. He said, on 
March 1: 

The foreign policy of the United States has one 
overriding goal: to help shape a new structure of 
international relations which promotes cooperation 
rather than force; negotiation rather than con- 
frontation; and the positive aspirations of peoples 
rather than the accumulation of arms by nations. 

These are the concerns — the guidelines — 
of U.S. foreign policy today. We believe 
these are common concerns shared by us all. 
We have come to Lima to participate in a 
constructive dialogue. If this dialogue can 

lead to a common resolve, this conference 
can contribute to the formulation of inter- 
national policies and can agree on actions 
that are essential to encourage and support 
the efforts of the peoples of the developing 
countries for industrial development. 

International economic activities are in- 
finitely more diverse than was the case 30 
years ago when the United Nations organi- 
zation was created. Many of the older indus- 
trialized countries account for important 
new segments of world industrial produc- 
tion and world trade. Many other countries, 
including many developing countries, have 
established significant new industrial sec- 
tors. The result of this diversification is that 
nations are today subject to a degree of 
interdependence in their economic relation- 
ships unprecedented in world history. Any 
new international economic arrangements 
must take this growing interdependence into 
account. It requires a new approach to the 
problems that face us and a new sharing 
of responsibilities for decisions. 

In the past, trade relationships between 
developed and developing countries were 
largely based on the exchange of raw ma- 
terials for finished goods. We have the 
impression that, in some quarters, the belief 
exists that the relationship must therefore 
be an adversary one and that there is reluc- 
tance to help the developing countries indus- 
trialize because of a desire to maintain the 
old arrangements. 

That is certainly not the position of the 
United States, and we do not believe it is the 
position of any country represented at this 
conference. The United States fully accepts 
the proposition that industrial development 


Department of State Bulletin 

■has a fundamental role to play in improvin.Li; 
the quality of life of the peoples of the de- 
veloping countries. We have not assembled 
here to debate whether the developing coun- 
tries should industrialize. The question be- 
fore us is how they can most effectively 
and quickly expand the contribution of in- 
dustry to their economic and social develop- 
ment. The United States is fully committed 
to assisting in this effort. 

Our national experience reinforces the 
general view that agricultural and indus- 
trial development go hand in hand. It is 
sometimes overlooked that the industrial 
strength of the United States rests on a 
powerful agricultural base. The develop- 
ment of these two sectors of industry and 
agriculture, both nationally and globally, is 
a forceful expression of interdependence. 
Agriculture and agro-industrial develop- 
ment cannot be ignored or given second pri- 
ority without impairing general economic 
development goals, including industrializa- 
tion. Quite clearly, agricultural production 
can increase significantly only with the as- 
sistance of many industrial goods. 

Agricultural production in the United 
States has for decades provided a welcome 
reservoir of foodstuffs available to all the 
world. Indeed, large areas of the world have 
been too dependent on the United States for 
food grains. The World Food Conference 
at Rome put emphasis on the urgent need 
for expanding world food production and 
stressed the interrelationship of agriculture 
and industry. We hope that the Lima Con- 
ference will be similarly successful in setting 
general guidelines for future development in 
the industrial field. 

To help developing countries find new 
markets for the products of their industry 
in the United States, we are in the process 
of implementing our system of generalized 
tariff preferences. In the next few days, 
President Ford will issue an Executive order 
designating beneficiary countries. At the 
same time he will announce the list of prod- 
ucts on which the U.S. Administration pro- 
poses, subject to public hearings and Inter- 
national Trade Commission advice, to elim- 
inate import duties for developing countries 

for 10 years. The system is expected to 
benefit over $2 billion in existing developing 
countries' exports and to stimulate a sub- 
stantial amount of new exports from these 
countries. President Ford and Secretary 
Kissinger have expressed concern with re- 
spect to certain provisions of the Trade Act, 
including those which relate to the eligibility 
of oil-producing countries. Consultations be- 
tween the Administration and Congress on 
this issue are making good progress. 

The long-awaited generalized system of 
preferences has not met, nor can it be ex- 
pected to meet, all of the expectations of 
developing countries. We are nevertheless 
of the view that the U.S. system of general- 
ized preferences is significant. It not only 
will provide additional trade opportunities 
in the short term, but it is also a substantive 
expression of our recognition of the need 
of developing countries for special treat- 
ment. It also demonstrates that we do not 
require or expect precise reciprocity in every 
case in cur trade relations with developing 

However, the major significance of the 
Trade Act of 1974 — its overwhelming im- 
portance — lies in the fact that it permits the 
U.S. Government to participate fully in the 
multilateral trade negotiations. It is our 
hope that those negotiations will result in 
substantially larger and permanent trade 
oppoi'tunities and consequently in improved 
standards of living for all through a more 
just division of labor. In accordance with 
the Tokyo Declaration,' the trade negotia- 
tions are intended not only further to lib- 
eralize general world trade but also to obtain 
additional benefits for the international 
trade of developing countries in the form of 
increased foreign exchange earnings. 

No issue is more critical today in economic 
relations between developed and developing 
countries than that of commodities. With 
respect to trade in raw materials, the United 
States, as a principal exporter as well as 

' For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo 
on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the 
Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see Bulletin of Oct. 
8, 1973, p. 450. 

April 21, 1975 


importer of raw materials, is especially sen- 
sitive to the aspirations of both producers 
and consumers. 

Abrupt swings in the prices for raw 
materials are harmful to all. We recognize 
that developing countries, regardless of their 
stage of development, have been especially- 
vulnerable to these price fluctuations. We 
strongly favor a world trading system which 
meets the needs of both producers and con- 
sumers, which provides reliable and ade- 
quate export earnings for producers and at 
the same time assures adequate supplies at 
reasonable cost for the consumers. Uni- 
lateral actions by producers or unilateral 
actions by consumers will not result in a 
stable equilibrium. The time has come to 
consider together how these issues should 
be resolved, and we are ready to join in a 
serious effort to find a constructive solution 
which does justice to the concerns of all 

We appreciate that one of the fundamental 
desires of the developing countries is to 
develop the capacity to transform an increas- 
ing proportion of their own natural re- 
sources into finished or semifinished prod- 
ucts. We agree with the logic of such a 
development, and we support it. Indeed, the 
economics of the situation may well point 
in this direction more and more frequently 
in the future. In this context, we would 
view this as a natural step in the achieve- 
ment of a mutually beneficial division of 

General expansion of economic activity is 
to be expected in the very near future, fol- 
lowing some 18 months of declining pro- 
duction. The production capacity of all na- 
tions will be strained by the upcoming recov- 
ery. In the short run, therefore, there will 
be fresh opportunities for industrial produc- 
tion in the developing countries. Beyond 
that, it is projected that over the next 25 
years world population will double. Increases 
in consumption over that same period must 
at least keep up with the increase of popula- 
tion. Over the longer period ahead, there 
is no natural competition between developed 
and developing countries in meeting the 
challenges that will be presented by this 

vast expansion in demand for goods. 

Mr. President, the United States is com- 
mitted to narrowing the gap between the 
standards of living of the peoples of the 
developed and the developing countries. It 
is our view that the best way to remedy 
existing inequalities is to increase the wealth 
and standard of living of the developing 
countries. Real improvement of living stand- 
ards can only occur through increases in pro- 
ductivity and expanded opportunities for 
gainful employment. 

The proposal that we work to increase 
over the next 25 years the proportion of the 
the world's industrialized goods which are 
produced by developing countries is com- 
pletely uncontroversial. It represents the 
very essence of our task. We are all agreed 
on it. The present share of 7 percent is ob- 
viously distressingly low. 

However, I must say in all frankness I 
am skeptical as to the utility of setting a for- 
mal target of this kind. There is no reliable, 
scientific basis upon which any particular 
figure could be set. The setting of such a 
target will neither add to nor subtract from 
the eff"orts required on the national, regional, 
and global levels. 

If individual governments wish to indulge 
in indicative planning, including the setting 
of targets, that of course is their preroga- 
tive. And it can be useful. Today, half of the 
industrial production of the developing coun- 
tries comes from five of its members. There 
is a danger, moreover, that the setting of a 
global target will obscure the special needs 
of the most seriously aff'ected countries, the 
landlocked, and other special categories of 
developing countries. 

For nations such as mine, global economic 
targets pose particular problems with respect 
to our participation. The U.S. Government 
is not in a position to guarantee that its pri- 
vate sector will perform in a way to meet 
any particular target. Our government does 
not have — nor does it wish to have — that 
type of control over our private sector. 
Neither will many other governments of the 
more successfully industrialized countries 
represented here. 

The dynamic forces of industrial develop- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ment in the United States have always been 
largely in our people, or what we call our pri- 
vate sector. Decisions have not been central- 
ized in our government. The overall success 
of our private industry, which operates un- 
der orderly government regulations, in pro- 
ducing more goods for more people has long 
stood in favorable contrast to other systems. 
Similarly our major contributions to indus- 
trialization of the developing countries have 
come through transfers of technology, man- 
agement know-how, and capital by our pri- 
vate enterprises. These resources continue to 
be available, and the U.S. Government stands 
ready to facilitate access to them. 

At the same time, the participation of our 
private enterprises in the industrialization 
of developing countries, whether through di- 
rect investment, loans, agreements for the 
transfer of technology, or management con- 
tracts, depends upon their reasonable expec- 
tations for the safety of the capital and effort 
they have invested. Actions by receiving 
countries, both individually and in interna- 
tional forums, will largely create the climate 
for the participation of the private sector in 
the industrialization process. This is a matter 
with respect to which each country will of 
course make its own choice, depending on 
whether it wishes to encourage private en- 
terprise to participate in its industrial de- 
velopment or to discourage it from doing so. 
While we naturally believe that our own ex- 
perience in achieving a highly industrialized 
society has relevance for many developing 
countries, we fully recognize that each na- 
tion must decide on its own path to indus- 
trial development in the light of the histor- 
ical experience of its people, the natural and 
human resources available to it, and the op- 
portunities or constraints of its geography. 

One feature of 20th-century economic de- 
velopments has been the growth of enter- 
prises known as multinational corporations. 
Although the activities of multinationals, or 
transnationals, represent only one feature of 
a complicated set of transactions which link 
the economies of nations, it is one which has 
attracted passionate attention in my country 
as well as in many other countries repre- 
sented here. 

The effect of the multinational corporation 
on development and on international relations 
is not yet fully understood, and it is only 
natural that a study of this important sub- 
ject is now underway elsewhere in the U.N. 
system. One thing is clear — the transnation- 
als have proved themselves effective and 
rapid conveyors of capital and technical 

At this point I find it interesting to note 
that today's controversy surrounding multi- 
national corporations has much of the same 
ring as did the earlier controversy over the 
process of industrialization itself. I am sure 
we are all familiar with the literature of the 
19th century which pictured industrializa- 
tion as a threat to traditional values, a de- 
spoiler of the countryside, and an affront to 
the dignity of man. Today the general view 
of the desirability of industrialization has 
changed. I believe that we will in time come 
around to the view that multinational cor- 
porations, too, are instruments of produc- 
tion and, like any other instrument, are 
neither inherently good nor bad. I agree with 
the statement of the President of our con- 
ference. Minister Jimenez de Lucio [Rear 
Adm. Alberto Jimenez de Lucio, Minister of 
Industry and Tourism of Peru], in his per- 
ceptive and thoughtful address, when he said 
that foreign investment is neither all good 
nor all bad. The answer lies in orderly regu- 

The United States fully supports the view 
that national and international private and 
public development resources can and should 
be more fully mobilized and expanded to help 
the developing countries. Our bilateral and 
multilateral economic assistance will go for- 
ward. In short, my country is prepared to 
make continuing efforts to assist developing 
nations to achieve rapid economic develop- 
ment for the benefit of their peoples, despite 
some serious economic problems at home. All 
we ask is that the program we support be 
effective in achieving their development ob- 

Some of the most serious obstacles to de- 
velopment, however, are not international 
and do not arise from financial need. As many 
speakers have said here, there are problems 

April 21, 1975 


of internal structure and institutional short- 
comings. These must be overcome by nations 
themselves if they are to absorb industrial 
development expenditures efficiently. Clearly, 
local entrepreneurs must be given proper in- 
centives. Markets must be increased in size 
and depth — and here regional agreements 
can help — but more importantly by national 
efforts to draw more of the rural and urban 
population into the market. 

One of the important subjects that this 
conference is called upon to consider is the 
future role of UNIDO — hovi^ it should be or- 
ganized and what resources should be made 
available to it. 

The question of UNIDO's long-term strat- 
egy has occupied our attention since the 
special international conference of June 1971. 
The United States continues to support the 
view of the ad hoc committee that the areas 
of first-priority attention by UNIDO should 
be the expansion and improvement of its 
operational activities. Its program of studies 
and research should support and reinforce 
the UNDP [United Nations Development 
Program] country programing process, as 
well as improve UNIDO's capability for ad- 
vising countries on industrial development 
policies and strategy. 

We have noted the suggestions which are 
before the conference looking to broadening 
UNIDO's mandate into the field of consulta- 
tions on world industrial developments, and 
we are prepared to discuss these ideas during 
this conference. 

We see serious difficulties, however, in the 
proposal that UNIDO be converted into a 
specialized agency of the United Nations. 
We believe that it could be seriously counter- 
productive to undertake such a major change 
in the organization's status at this time. It 
would inherently entail a long and costly 

period of transition and uncertainty. The 
energies of the organization would be ab- 
sorbed in that process rather than in its 
primary task of helping the developing coun- 

We are now engaged in the task which the 
General Assembly set for this conference — 
the drawing up of a declaration on industrial 
development and a plan of action by member 
states to advance the industrialization of the 
developing countries. For this purpose, we 
have before us draft texts presented by the 
Group of 77.- We have been closely examin- 
ing those proposals. We would hope that 
similar close study will be given by the con- 
ference to the paper prepared by Group B, 
a paper which represents very careful con- 
sideration by my country and other members 
of the developed group. 

Mr. President, over the past year the in- 
dustrialized nations and the Third World have 
seemed more often in confrontation than in 
harmony. This, I believe, has often been more 
apparent than real. The purposes we have 
in common are far more important than the 
issues on which we may differ. Extreme 
rhetorical demands and petulant exchanges 
in U.N. debates get us nowhere. They impede 
a true consensus, and they depreciate the val- 
ue of re.solutions. They reduce popular sup- 
port or the work of the United Nations in my 
country and elsewhere. Let us try in UNIDO 
to reduce the gap between language and per- 
formance, between doctrine and reality. Let 
us intensify the process of consultation, coop- 
eration, and negotiation. Our growing inter- 
dependence leaves us no choice. 

■ The conference on Mar. 27 adopted the Lima 
Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial De- 
velopment and Cooperation by a vote of 82 to 1 
(U.S.), with 7 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, U.K.). 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Testifies on Preliminary lEA Agreement 
on Accelerated Development of New Energy Sources 

Statement by Thomas 0. Enders 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs 

You have asked me to discuss the latest 
developments in our efforts to develop a com- 
prehensive framevi^ork of consumer country 
cooperation in energy. 

In testimony before this committee last 
December, we described the International 
Energy Program (lEP) and the creation of 
the International Energy Agency. The lEA 
then consisted of 16 countries; New Zealand 
has since become a member and Norway an 
associate member. 

As we emphasized during those earlier 
hearings, the International Energy Program 
represented a commitment by the participat- 
ing countries to deal with the problems of 
economic and political vulnerability which 
have resulted from our excessive dependence 
on imported oil. The arrangement established 
under the lEP was designed to bring a 
prompt reduction in our vulnerability. 
Through a series of integrated commitments 
on emergency stockpiles, emergency demand 
restraint, and the sharing of available oil, 
it provides : 

— A deterrent against future supply inter- 
ruptions ; 

— A substantial improvement in our ability 

' Presented to a joint hearing of the Subcommit- 
tees on International Organizations and on Inter- 
national Resources, Food, and Energy of the House 
Committee on International Relations on Mar. 26. 
The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

to withstand the economic impact of an em- 
bargo, should one occur; and 

— Assurance that all member countries will 
come to the assistance of any partner which 
might be the target of a selective embargo. 

However, the emergency program is basic- 
ally a short-term insurance policy. It does 
not in itself deal with the problem of ex- 
cessive dependence on imported oil. There- 
fore the International Energy Program also 
provided for the establishment of a long-term 
cooperative program of energy conservation 
and the development of new energy sources. 

During the past four months we have pro- 
ceeded to develop within the lEA the basic 
elements of this long-term program of coop- 
eration. We have also agreed with the other 
members of the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] to 
establish a $25 billion financial safety net to 
assure that the accumulation of petrodollars 
does not become an element of financial in- 
stability in Western economies. This fund is 
not an aid mechanism ; rather, it will serve 
as a lender of last resort. 

The Governing Board of the lEA agreed in 
February on the objective of reducing oil 
imports for the group as a whole by 2 million 
barrels a day by the end of 1975 below the 
level we would otherwise have reached. We 
also agreed to fix similar conservation ob- 
jectives for the years beyond 1975. The U.S. 
share of this objective would be 1 million 
barrels a day, an amount proportionate with 

April 21, 1975 


our share of total lEA oil consumption. This 
is of course contingent upon the others doing 
their part. The U.S. contribution will of 
course be dependent on congressional action 
on the President's energy program. 

In addition, we have established in the 
lEA a formal procedure for review of our 
individual national conservation programs 
and an assessment of their effectiveness. 
Through this cooperative approach, we can 
reinforce each other's national conservation 
programs. In addition, we will obtain assur- 
ance that the conservation efforts of one 
country are not offset by the laxness of other 
consuming countries. 

Alternative Energy Development 

On March 20, 1975, the lEA Governing 
Board confirmed a preliminary understand- 
ing of the major elements and basic prin- 
ciples of a coordinated system of cooperation 
in the accelerated development of new sources 
of energy. This is an essential part of our 
overall cooperative effort. Energy conserva- 
tion can play a critical role in limiting our 
dependence on imported oil, especially over 
the next few years. But over the longer 
term, we must develop new sources of energy 
if we are both to achieve our reduced import 
dependence objectives and also to sustain a 
satisfactory rate of economic growth. In 
addition, the development of new sources of 
energy is essential to the creation of supply- 
and-demand conditions which will eventually 
force a reduction in the world oil price. 

Higher oil prices will by themselves bring 
about important investments in new energy 
supplies. But the magnitude of the problem 
is so great that we cannot rely on market 
forces alone. Governments must act to rein- 
force and stimulate these market forces if 
we are to reduce our import dependence and 
our vulnerability to embargoes and arbitrary 
price increases. 

The preliminary agreement reached in the 
lEA on a coordinated system of cooperation 
in the accelerated development of new energy 
is explicit recognition of this need for govern- 
mental action. The coordinated system would 
consist of three interlinked elements : 

— An agreement to encourage and safe- 
guard investment in the bulk of conventional 
energy sources through the establishment of 
a common minimum price below which we 
would not allow imported oil to be sold 
within our economies; 

— A framework of cooperation to provide 
specific incentives to investment in higher 
cost energy on a project-by-project basis ; and 

— Cooperation in energy research and de- 
velopment, including the pooling of national 
programs in selected projects. 

Common Minimum Price for Imported Oil 

The first element of this system, agreement 
on a minimum safeguarded price, is designed 
to resolve the critical dilemma which we face 
in the development of new energy sources. 
As I mentioned previously, the lEA countries 
have substantial new energy sources which 
can be developed. However, most of these, 
such as outer continental shelf oil, Alaskan 
oil, coal, et cetera, are relatively high cost. 
Moreover, their development will require 
enormous capital investments. The OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] cartel, with production costs averag- 
ing some 25 cents per barrel, would clearly 
have the capability to undercut the develop- 
ment of these alternative sources at will. 
Thus, unless we provide some level of pro- 
tection to domestic investors against possible 
competition from very low-cost imported oil, 
we risk a shortfall in the investment needed 
to meet our reduced dependence objectives. 
Further analysis will be required before this 
minimum level of price is set. It would be 
substantially below current world oil prices, 
although higher than prices prevailing be- 
fore October 1973. 

It is equally important to underline what 
this minimum import-price agreement will 
not provide. It will not be a price guarantee 
for OPEC; rather, it would be a guarantee 
of minimum protection for domestic investors 
in lEA countries. Also, it will not provide a 
floor price for all energy sold domestically; 
it would apply only to imported oil. 

Why is this proposed commitment to a 
common minimum price for imported oil in 


Department of State Bulletin 

the U.S. interest? First, as I have explained, 
it will help to assure that we get the invest- 
ment needed in new energy to bring about 
over the medium term a sharp shift in the 
world supply-and-demand balance for oil. 
Only by making an unequivocal commitment 
to the accelerated development of alterna- 
tive sources can we gain sufficient power in 
the marketplace to assure that OPEC will 
not be able to arbitrarily manipulate oil 
prices in the future. 

At the same time it will help to equalize 
energy costs among the industrialized coun- 
tries. Without an agreement of this type, the 
United States, which will make a major com- 
mitment to the development of relatively ex- 
pensive energy, would find itself at a com- 
petitive disadvantage when the world oil 
price breaks and the other industrialized 
countries have the opportunity to import 
very low-cost oil. 

This system of a minimum import price 
has several advantages over possible alter- 
native schemes to encourage and protect in- 
vestment in conventional energy sources such 
as a deficiency-payments mechanism. A de- 
ficiency-payments system would impose a 
massive financial burden on the taxpayer 
when world oil prices dropped and, by allow- 
ing lower prices, would stimulate consump- 
tion and imports. In contrast, the minimum 
safeguarded price mechanism would not only 
provide protection for new investment and a 
check on consumption but would also gener- 
ate additional tax revenues when the world 
oil price declined. 

At this point we are not inclined to try to 
dictate the policy mechanism which lEA 
countries might use to fulfill this commit- 
ment. We would propose that countries be 
left free to use a variable levy, import quotas, 
or other appropriate mechanisms. 

Joint Undertakings and R. & D. Projects 

The second basic element of the accelerated 
development system would promote, on a 
project-by-project basis, joint undertakings 
in higher cost energy projects. The develop- 
ment of synthetic fuels and other major 
energy projects, perhaps including some of a 

conventional nature, would be fostered under 
this program. This measure would deal with 
projects involving large capital and develop- 
mental expenditures and would provide lEA 
countries with the opportunity to partici- 
pate in each other's programs under agreed 
rules covering investment, access to technol- 
ogy, and access to production. 

The third tier of the system is designed 
to encourage cooperative projects in research 
and development on energy. The lEA would 
assist in identifying and establishing joint 
R. & D. projects on which countries would 
pool national efforts. By definition, projf •■ 
in this third tier would involve expenditu 
which are not likely to yield immediate r 
turns but which offer significant potentit 
for longrun cost savings or energy break- 
throughs. Under this approach we can avoid 
duplication of effort and rationalize our 

Mr. Chairman, the coordinated system for 
accelerated development should be viewed in 
its entirety. It is designed to provide a bal- 
ance of advantage between those countries 
with huge potential to develop indigenous en- 
ergy supplies and those which will continue 
to have to rely on imported oil to meet a 
substantial portion of their energy require- 

All consuming countries stand to benefit 
directly from the development of new energy 
in other consuming countries. These new 
energy supplies will impact directly on world 
supply and demand for OPEC oil and will 
contribute to the eventual decline in world 
oil prices. Thus we all have much to gain 
from cooperation which stimulates the devel- 
opment of new energy. 

We will continue to consult closely with 
the Congress over the coming months on the 
elaboration of this preliminary understand- 
ing. Its implementation would of course re- 
quire legislative authority in each country. 
The Administration has already requested 
legislation, title IX of the Energy Independ- 
ence Act of 1975, which would provide such 
implementing authority. We will seek fur- 
ther consultations with the Congress on the 
manner in which such authority could be 
granted and used. 

April 21, 1975 


Mr. Chairman, we have had many oppor- 
tunities for false comfort since the oil crisis 
began: A surplus of oil in the international 
market last summer because of seasonal fac- 
tors and price resistance, some signs of un- 
dercover price cutting, and pronouncements 
that the oil cartel was about to break. 

But, Mr. Chairman, the oil crisis will not 
simply go away. We must act to defuse it by 
bringing our own consumption of oil under 
control, by developing our own energy sup- 
plies, and by encouraging other consuming 
countries go do likewise. Only in this way 
can we achieve our two essential objectives : 
A significant decrease in the international 
price of oil and substantial U.S. self-suffi- 
ciency in energy. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

93d Congress, 2d Session 

Improving the Quality of Filberts. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 2933. S. Rept. 93-1414. December 
19, 1974. 6 pp. . , r^ ■ 

Minimum Rate Provisions by Nonnational Carriers 
in tlie Foreign Commerce of the United States. 
Report to accompany S. 2576. S. Rept. 93-1426. 
December 20, 1974. 12 pp. 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Notice of Actions Proposed to be Tal<en Under the 
Trade Act of 1974. Communication from the 
President of the United States. January 14, 1975. 
H. Doc. 94-8. 5 pp. . 

Proposing a Supplemental Appropriation for Mili- 
tary Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces. Com- 
munication from the President of the United 
States transmitting a proposed supplemental ap- 
propriation for military assistance. South Viet- 
namese forces, and a budget amendment for 
military assistance for Cambodia in fiscal year 
1975. H. Doc. 94-38. January 29, 1975. 2 pp. 
Proposed Increase in the Amount of Enriched 
Uranium Which May Be Distributed to the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Report 
by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to ac- 
company S. Con. Res. 13. S. Rept. 94-8. February 
13, 1975. 4 pp. 
Proposed Increase in the Amount of Enriched 
Uranium Which May Be Distributed to the Euro- 
pean Energy Community (EURATOM). Report 
by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to ac- 
company S. Con. Res. 14. February 13, 1975. S. 
Rept. 94-9. 6 pp. 


Proposed Extension of Existing Research Agree- 
ment for Cooperation Between the United States 
and Israel Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic 
Energy. Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy to accompany H. Con. Res. 114. H. Rept. 
94-8. February 13, 1975. 9 pp. 

U.S. To Launch Satellites 
for Indonesia 

The Department of State announced on 
March 26 (press release 171) that the United 
States and the Republic of Indonesia had that 
day entered into an agreement under which 
NASA will launch satellites on a reimburs- 
able basis for the Indonesian Government's 
Directorate General of Posts and Telecom- 
munications. (For text of the agreement, see 
press release 171.) The notes concluding the 
agreement were signed by Dixy Lee Ray, As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs, and Roesmin Nurjadin, Ambassador 
of the Republic of Indonesia. This agreement 
was concluded pursuant to the launch policy 
announced by the President on October 9, 
1972, which was developed for the purpose 
of promoting international cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of outer space and to make the 
capabilities of space available for all man- 

The initial effort under this agreement will 
be the launch of a communications satellite 
for domestic use. The satellite is being built 
in the United States and will be launched by 
NASA in 1976 by a Delta launch vehicle. It 
will be placed in geostationary orbit near 
Indonesia. NASA and the Directorate Gen- 
eral of Posts and Telecommunications of the 
Republic of Indonesia signed a memorandum 
of understanding which establishes the ar- 
rangements under which all launches to be 
conducted are to be coordinated. The com- 
munications satellite launch is the only one 
presently planned, and the launch contract is 

Department of State Bulletin 

being negotiated and will be signed shortly. 
Previous reimbursable launches have been 
conducted for Canada, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, and the European Space 
Research Organization. Launches are planned 
for Japan, Canada, Italy, and ESRO, as well 
as Indonesia. 

Current Actions 



Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 
10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the 
United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Accession deposited: Australia, March 26, 1975. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Ratification deposited: Lebanon, March 20, 1975. 


Articles of agreement of International Cotton Insti- 
tute. Done at Washington January 17, 1966. 
Entered into force February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964. 
Ratification deposited: Spain, March 31, 1975. 

Cultural Relations 

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entific and Cultural Organization. Done at London 
November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 
4, 1946. TIAS 1580. 

Signatures: Grenada, February 17, 1975; Guinea- 
Bissau, November 1, 1974; Korea, People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of, October 18, 1974; San Marino, 
November 12, 1974. 

Acceptances deposited: Grenada, November 29, 
1974; Guinea-Bissau, November 1, 1974; Korea, 
People's Democratic Republic of, October 18, 1974; 
San Marino, November 12, 1974. 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Signature: Australia, March 24, 1975. 

Program-Carrying Signals — Distribution by 


Convention relating to the distribution of programme- 
carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at 
Brussels May 21, 1974.' 
Signatures : Argentina, Austria, March 26, 1975. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Senegal, March 26, 1975. 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 

Signatia-es : Argentina, March 26, 1975; Belgium, 
March 19, 1975. 


Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terror- 
ism taking the form of crimes against persons and 
related extortion that are of international signifi- 
cance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. 
Entered into force October 16, 1973." 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, March 17, 1975. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Ratification deposited: Hungary, March 26, 1975. 


Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade 
convention (part of the international wheat agree- 
ment) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington 
April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, 
with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, 
with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7988. 
Accession deposited: El Salvador, March 27, 1975. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 
7, 1954.^ 
Signature: Guinea, March 19, 1975. 



Loan agreement for the Ashuganj fertilizer project, 
with annex. Signed at Dacca February 12, 1975. 
Entered into force February 12, 1975. 


Agreement relating to the exchange of information 
on weather modification activities. Signed at Wash- 
ington March 26, 1975. Entered into force March 
26, 1975. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Port-au-Prince March 20, 1975. Entered 
into force March 20, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 

April 21, 1975 



Agreement concerning the furnishing of launching 
and associated services by NASA for Indonesian 
satellites, with annexes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington March 26, 1975. Entered into 
force March 26, 1975. 


Agreement extending the agreement of October 6, 
1947 (TIAS 1666), as amended and extended, re- 
lating to a military mission. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Tehran July 16, 1974, and March 16, 
1975. Entered into force March 16, 1975. 


Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man- 
made fiber textiles and textile products between 
Macau and the United States, with annex. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 3, 1975. 
Entered into force March 3, 1975; effective Janu- 
ary 1, 1975. 


GPO Sales Publications 

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postage, are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 30^ each. 


Algeria . 










7 pp. 






7 pp. 






4 pp. 






5 pp. 






8 pp. 






4 pp. 

Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Agreement 
with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
TIAS 7914. 15 pp. 40<'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7914). 

Space Research Program. Agreement with Aus- 
tralia. TIAS 7928. 8 pp. SO<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:7928). 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Tex- 
tiles. Arrangement with Japan. TIAS 7934. 73 pp. 
85<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:7934). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea. 
TIAS 7942. 21 pp. 40(f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7942). 

Cooperation in the Field of Health. Agreement with 
the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 7943. 13 pp. 30?'. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7943). 

Development of Agricultural Trade. Joint statement 
with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 7944. 9 pp. 
30(j'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7944). 

Second Nam Ngum Development Fund. TIAS 7946. 
32 pp. 50(f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7946). 

Joint Commission on liconomic. Commercial, Scien- 
tific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Coop- 
eration. Agreement with India. TIAS 7947. 10 pp. 
30<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:7947). 

Economic Assistance — Manufacture and Acquisition 
of Agricultural Inputs. Agreement with Bangladesh. 
TIAS 7948. 17 pp. S5t (Cat. No. 89.10:7948). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangla- 
desh. TIAS 7949. 21 pp. 40<f. (Cat. No. 89.10:7949). 

Onchocerciasis 1974 Fund. TIAS 7950. 31 pp. 45«'. 
CCat. No. 89.10:7950). 

Defense — Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station at 
Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire. Agreement with the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 
land amending the agreement of February 15, 1960, 
as amended. TIAS 7951. 5 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. S9.10: 



The Senate on March 21 confirmed the following 

Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., to be Ambassador to 

Donald B. Easum to be Ambassador to the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria. 

Eugene V. McAuliffe to be Ambassador to Hun- 

John E. Reinhardt to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State [for Public Affairs]. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 21, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1869 

Austria. Buchanan confirmed as Ambassador 528 


Confirmations (Buchanan, Easum, McAuliffe, 

Reinhardt) 528 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 526 

Department Testifies on Preliminary lEA 
Agreement on Accelerated Development of 
New Energy Sources (Enders) 523 

Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1975 

Signed Into Law (Ford) 512 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Buchanan, Easum, McAulifFe, Rein- 
hardt) 528 

Developing Countries. United States Dis- 
cusses Role of Industrialization in the De- 
veloping Countries (Bennett) 518 

Economic Affairs. President Ford Designates 
Countries for Generalized Tariff Prefer- 
ences (Department statement. Executive 
order) 506 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. From Inde- 
pendence to Interdependence — A Bicenten- 
nial Challenge (Reich) 513 

Energy. Department Testifies on Preliminary 
lEA Agreement on Accelerated Develop- 
ment of New Energy Sources (Enders) . . 523 

Environment. EPA To Be U.S. Information 
Center for U.N. Environment Program . . 517 

Food. U.S. Discusses Trade Act, Commodities, 
and Food Problems in Inter-American Eco- 
nomic and Social Council (Glitman, Inger- 
soll) 497 

Foreign Aid. Foreign Assistance Appropria- 
tion Act of 1975 Signed Into Law (P'ord) . 512 

Hungary. McAuliffe confirmed as Ambassador 528 

Indonesia. U.S. To Launch Satellites for Indo- 
nesia 526 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
U.S. Discusses Trade Act, Commodities, and 
Food Problems in Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council (Glitman, IngersoU) . . 497 

Latin America. U.S. Discusses Trade Act, 
Commodities, and Food Problems in Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council 
(Glitman, IngersoU) 497 

Nigeria. Easum confirmed as Ambassador . . 528 

Presidential Documents 

Administration of the Trade Agreements Pro- 
gram (Executive order) 509 

Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1975 

Signed Into Law 512 

President Ford Designates Countries for Gen- 
eralized Tariff Preferences (Department 
statement, Executive order) 506 

Public Affairs. Reinhardt confirmed as Assist- 
ant Secretary 528 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 528 

Space. U.S. To Launch Satellites for Indo- 
nesia 526 


Administration of the Trade Agreements 
Program (Executive order) 509 

President Ford Designates Countries for Gen- 
eralized Tariff Preferences (Department 
statement. Executive order) 506 

U.S. Discusses Trade Act, Commodities, and 
Food Problems in Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council (Glitman, IngersoU) . . 497 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 527 

U.S. To Launch Satellites for Indonesia . . . 526 

U.S.S.R. Delegation of State Governors To 
Visit U.S.S.R 517 

United Nations 

EPA To Be U.S. Information Center for U.N. 

Environment Program 517 

United States Discusses Role of Industrializa- 
tion in the Developing Countries (Bennett) 518 

Name Index- 
Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 518 

Buchanan, Wiley T., Jr 528 

Easum, Donald B 528 

Enders, Thomas 523 

Ford, President 506, 509, 512 

Glitman, Maynard W 497 

IngersoU, Robert S 497 

McAuliffe, Eugene V 528 

Reich, Alan A 513 

Reinhardt, John E 528 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 31-April 6 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 31 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
153 of March 18, 169 of March 25, 171 of 
March 26, and 174 of March 27. 

No. Date Subject 

*177 3/31 McAuliffe sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Hungary (biographic 

*178 4/1 Memorial service for Steven A. 

*179 4/2 Davis sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Affairs (bio- 
graphic data). 

^•180 4/2 Study Groups 10 and 11 of the 
U.S. National Committee for the 
CCITT, May 1. 

*181 4/3 Cleveland Orchestra tour of Latin 
America Apr. 13-29. 

tl82 4/3 U.S.-Romania trade agreement 

tl83 4/5 Kissinger: News Conference. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 

official business 


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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 


/ J; 





Volume LXXII 

No. 1870 

April 28, 1975 

Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 529 

Excerpts From Transcript 54-2 



For index see inside back cover 

jjosiui' 1 'a;iiie Li.;r.Ti\ 

Supermtendent of Documents 


Vol. LXXII, No. 1870 
April 28, 1975 

For sale, by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washineton, D.C. 20402 


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Note: Contents of this publication ara not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN Is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical LiUratare. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
OfRee of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
uith information on developments in 
the field of 17.5. foreign relations and 
on the work of tfte Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White Bouse and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
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international relations are also list*d. 

President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations With the Rest of the World 

Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress ' 

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, distinguished 
guests, my very good friends in the Con- 
gress, and fellow Americans: I stand before 
you tonight after many agonizing hours and 
very solemn prayers for guidance by the 

In my report on the state of the Union 
in January, I concentrated on two subjects 
which were uppermost in the minds of the 
American people — urgent actions for the re- 
covery of our economy and a comprehensive 
program to make the United States inde- 
pendent of foreign sources of energy. I 
thank the Congress for the action that it 
has taken thus far in my response for eco- 
nomic recommendations. I look forward to 
early approval of a national energy program 
to meet our country's long-range and emer- 
gency needs in the field of energy. 

Tonight it is my purpose to review our 
relations with the rest of the world in the 
spirit of candor and consultation which I 
have sought to maintain with my former 
colleagues and with our countrymen from 
the time that I took office. 

It is the first priority of my Presidency 
to sustain and strengthen the mutual trust 
and respect which must exist among Ameri- 
cans and their government if we are to deal 
successfully with the challenges confronting 
us both at home and abroad. 

The leadership of the United States of 
America since the end of World War II has 
sustained and advanced the security, well- 
being, and freedom of millions of human 
beings besides ourselves. 

Despite some setbacks, despite some mis- 

Made on Apr. 10 (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 14). 

takes, the United States has made peace a 
real prospect for us and for all nations. I 
know firsthand that the Congress has been 
a partner in the development and in the sup- 
port of American foreign policy which five 
Presidents before me have carried forward, 
with changes of course but not of destina- 

The course which our country chooses in 
the world today has never been of greater 
significance for ourselves as a nation and for 
all mankind. 

We build from a solid foundation. 

Our alliances with great industrial democ- 
racies in Europe, North America, and Japan 
remain strong, with a greater degree of 
consultation and equity than ever before. 

With the Soviet Union we have moved 
across a broad front toward a more stable, 
if still competitive, relationship. We have 
begun to control the spiral of strategic nu- 
clear armaments. 

After two decades of mutual estrange- 
ment, we have achieved an historic opening 
with the People's Republic of China. 

In the best American tradition, we have 
committed, often with striking success, our 
influence and good offices to help contain 
conflicts and settle disputes in many, many 
regions of the wdrld. We have, for example, 
helped the parties of the Middle East take 
the first steps toward living with one an- 
other in peace. 

We have opened a new dialogue with 
Latin America, looking toward a healthier 
hemispheric partnership. 

We are developing closer relations with 
the nations of Africa. 

We have exercised international leader- 

April 28, 1975 


ship on the great new issues of our inter- 
dependent world, such as energy, food, en- 
vironment, and the law of the sea. 

The American people can be proud of what 
their nation has achieved and helped others 
to accomplish, but we have from time to 
time suffered setbacks and disappointments 
in foreign policy. Some were events over 
which we had no control ; some were difficul- 
ties we imposed upon ourselves. 

We live in a time of testing and of a time 
of change. Our world, a world of economic 
uncertainty, political unrest, and threats to 
the peace, does not allow us the luxury of 
abdication or domestic discord. 

I recall quite vividly the words of Presi- 
dent Truman to the Congress when the 
United States faced a far greater challenge 
at the end of the Second World War. If I 
might quote: "If we falter in our leadership, 
we may endanger the peace of the world — 
and we shall surely endanger the welfare 
of our own Nation." - 

President Truman's resolution must guide 
us today. Our purpose is not to point the 
finger of blame, but to build upon our many 
successes, to repair damage where we find it, 
to recover our balance, to move ahead as a 
united people. Tonight is a time for straight 
talk among friends about where we stand 
and where we are going. 

Human Tragedy in Viet-Nam and Cambodia 

A vast human tragedy has befallen our 
friends in Viet-Nam and Cambodia. 

Tonight I shall not talk only of obligations 
arising from legal documents. Who can for- 
get the enormous sacrifices of blood, dedica- 
tion, and treasure that we made in Viet- 

Under five Presidents and 12 Congresses, 
the United States was engaged in Indochina. 
Millions of Americans served, thousands 
died, and many more were wounded, im- 
prisoned, or lost. Over $150 billion have 
been appropriated for that war by the Con- 
gress of the United States. 

' For President Truman's address before a joint 
session of the Congress on Mar. 12, 1947, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 543. 

And after years of effort, we negotiated, 
under the most difficult circumstances, a 
settlement which made it possible for us to 
remove our military forces and bring home 
with pride our American prisoners. This 
settlement, if its terms had been adhered to, 
would have permitted our South Vietnamese 
ally, with our material and moral support, to 
maintain its security and rebuild after two 
decades of war. 

The chances for an enduring peace after 
the last American fighting man left Viet- 
Nam in 1973 rested on two publicly stated 
premises: First, that if necessary the United 
States would help sustain the terms of the 
Paris accords it signed two years ago; sec- 
ond, that the United States would provide 
adequate economic and military assistance to 
South Viet-Nam. 

Let us refresh our memories for just a 
moment. The universal consensus in the 
United States at that time, late 1972, was 
that if we could end our own involvement 
and obtain the release of our prisoners, we 
would provide adequate material support to 
South Viet-Nam. 

The North Vietnamese, from the moment 
they signed the Paris accords, systematically 
violated the cease-fire and other provisions 
of that agreement. Flagrantly disregarding 
the ban on the infiltration of troops, the 
North Vietnamese illegally introduced over 
350,000 men into the South. In direct viola- 
tion of the agreement, they sent in the most 
modern equipment in massive amounts. 
Meanwhile, they continued to receive large 
quantities of supplies and arms from their 

In the face of this situation, the United 
States — torn as it was by the emotions of a 
decade of war — was unable to respond. We 
deprived ourselves by law of the ability to 
enforce the agreement, thus giving North 
Viet-Nam assurance that it could violate 
that agreement with impunity. Next, we 
reduced our economic and arms aid to South 
Viet-Nam. Finally, we signaled our increas- 
ing reluctance to give any support to that 
nation struggling for its survival. 

Encouraged by these developments, the 
North Vietnamese, in recent months, began 


Department of State Bulletin 

sending even their reserve divisions into 
South Viet-Nam. Some 20 divisions, virtual- 
ly their entire army, are now in South Viet- 

The Government of South Viet-Nam, un- 
certain of further American assistance, 
hastily ordered a strategic withdrawal to 
more defensible positions. This extremely 
difficult maneuver, decided upon without 
consultations, was poorly executed, ham- 
pered by floods of refugees, and thus led to 
panic. The results are painfully obvious and 
profoundly moving. 

Military and Humanitarian Assistance 

In my first public comment on this tragic 
development, I called for a new sense of 
national unity and purpose. I said I would 
not engage in recriminations or attempts to 
assess the blame. 

I reiterate that tonight. In the same 
spirit, I welcome the statement of the dis- 
tinguished majority leader of the U.S. Sen- 
ate earlier this week, and I quote: "It is 
time for the Congress and the President to 
work together in the area of foreign as well 
as domestic policy." 

So, let us start afresh. I am here to work 

jjjfcWi the Congress. In the conduct of foreign 

Affairs, Presidential initiative and ability to 

act swiftly in emergencies are essential to 

our national interest. 

With respect to North Viet-Nam, I call 
upon Hanoi — and ask the Congress to join 
with me in this call — to cease military opera- 
tions immediately and to honor the terms 
of the Paris agreement. 

The United States is urgently requesting 
the signatories of the Paris Conference to 
meet their obligations to use their influence 
to halt the fighting and to enforce the 1973 
accords. Diplomatic notes to this effect have 
been sent to all members of the Paris Con- 
ference, including the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China. 

The situation in South Viet-Nam and 
Cambodia has reached a critical phase re- 
quiring immediate and positive decisions by 
this government. The options before us are 
few, and the time is very short: 

— On the one hand, the United States 
could do nothing more; let the Government 
of South Viet-Nam save itself and what is 
left of its territory, if it can ; let those South 
Vietnamese civilians who have worked with 
us for a decade or more save their lives and 
their families, if they can; in short, shut 
our eyes and wash our hands of the whole 
affair, if we can. 

— Or, on the other hand, I could ask the 
Congress for authority to enforce the Paris 
accords with our troops and our tanks and 
our aircraft and our artillery and carry the 
war to the enemy. 

There are two narrower options: 

— First, stick with my January request 
that Congress appropriate $300 million for 
military assistance for South Viet-Nam and 
seek additional funds for economic and hu- 
manitarian purposes ; or 

— Increase my requests for both emer- 
gency military and humanitarian assistance 
to levels which, by best estimates, might en- 
able the South Vietnamese to stem the on- 
rushing aggression, to stabilize the military 
situation, permit the chance of a negotiated 
political settlement between the North and 
South Vietnamese, and if the very worst 
were to happen, at least allow the orderly 
evacuation of Americans and endangered 
South Vietnamese to places of safety. 

Let me now state my considerations and 
my conclusions. 

I have received a full report from General 
Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief 
of Staff, United States Army] , whom I sent 
to Viet-Nam to assess the situation. He ad- 
vises that the current military situation is 
very critical but that South Viet-Nam is 
continuing to defend itself with the re- 
sources available. However, he feels that if 
there is to be any chance of success for their 
defense plan, South Viet-Nam needs urgent- 
ly an additional $722 million in very specific 
military supplies from the United States. 

In my judgment, a stabilization of the 
military situation offers the best opportunity 
for a political solution. 

I must, of course, as I think each of you 

April 28, 1975 


would, consider the safety of nearly 6,000 
Americans who remain in South Viet-Nam 
and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese 
employees of the U.S. Government, of news 
agencies, of contractors and businesses, for 
many years whose lives, with their depend- 
ents', are in very grave peril. There are tens 
of thousands of other South Vietnamese in- 
tellectuals, professors, teachers, editors, and 
opinion leaders who have supported the 
South Vietnamese cause and the alliance 
with the United States to whom we have a 
profound moral obligation. 

I am also mindful of our posture toward 
the rest of the world and particularly of our 
future relations with the free nations of 
Asia. These nations must not think for a 
minute that the United States is pulling out 
on them or intends to abandon them to 

I have therefore concluded that the na- 
tional interests of the United States and the 
cause of world stability require that we con- 
tinue to give both military and humanitarian 
assistance to the South Vietnamese. 

Assistance to South Viet-Nam at this 
stage must be swift and adequate. Drift 
and indecision invite far deeper disaster. 
The sums I had requested before the major 
North Vietnamese offensive and the sudden 
South Vietnamese retreat are obviously in- 
adequate. Halfhearted action would be worse 
than none. We must act together and act 

I am therefore asking the Congress to 
appropriate without delay $722 million for 
emergency military assistance and an initial 
sum of $250 million for economic and hu- 
manitarian aid for South Viet-Nam. 

The situation in South Viet-Nam is chang- 
ing very rapidly, and the need for emer- 
gency food, medicine, and refugee relief is 
growing by the hour. I will work with the 
Congress in the days ahead to develop hu- 
manitarian assistance to meet these very 
pressing needs. 

Fundamental decency requires that we do 
everything in our power to ease the misery 
and the pain of the monumental human crisis 
which has befallen the people of Viet-Nam. 

Millions have fled in the face of the Com- 
munist onslaught and are now homeless and 
are now destitute. 

I hereby pledge in the name of the Amer- 
ican people that the United States will make 
a maximum humanitarian effort to help care 
for and feed these hopeless victims. 

And now I ask the Congress to clarify 
immediately its restrictions on the use of 
U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for 
the limited purposes of protecting American 
lives by insuring their evacuation, if this 
should be necessary. And I also ask promnt 
revision of the law to cover those Vietnam- 
ese to whom we have a very special obliga- 
tion and whose lives may be endangered 
should the worst come to pass. 

I hope that this authority will never have 
to be used, but if it is needed, there will be 
no time for congressional debate. 

Because of the gravity of the situation, I 
ask the Congress to complete action on all 
of these measures not later than April 19. 

In Cambodia, the situation is tragic. The 
United States and the Cambodian Govern- 
ment have each made major efforts over a 
long period and through many channels to 
end that conflict; but because of their mili- 
tary successes, steady external support, and 
their awareness of American legal restric- 
tions, the Communist side has shown no 
interest in negotiation, compromise, or a 
political solution. 

And yet, for the past three months, the 
beleaguered people of Phnom Penh have 
fought on, hoping against hope that the 
United States would not desert them but 
instead provide the arms and ammunition 
they so badly needed. 

I have received a moving letter from the 
new Acting President of Cambodia, Sauk- 
ham Khoy, and let me quote it for you: 

Dear Mr. President (he wrote), As the American 
Congress reconvenes to reconsider your urgent re- 
quest for supplemental assistance for the Khmer 
Republic, I appeal to you to convey to the American 
legislators our plea not to deny these vital resources 
to us, if a nonmilitary solution is to emerge from 
this tragric five-year-old conflict. 

To find a peaceful end to the conflict we need 
time. I do not know how much time, but we all fully 


Department of State Bulletin 

realize that the agony of the Khmer people cannot 
and must not go on much longer. However, for the 
immediate future, we need the rice to feed the 
hungry and the ammunition and the weapons to 
defend ourselves against those who want to impose 
their will by force [of arms]. A denial by the 
American people of the means for us to carry on will 
leave us no alternative but inevitably abandoning 
our search for a solution which will give our citizens 
some freedom of choice as to their future. For a 
number of years now, the Cambodian people have 
placed their trust in America. I cannot believe that 
this confidence was misplaced and that suddenly 
America will deny us the means which might give 
us a chance to find an acceptable solution to our 

This letter speaks for itself. In January, 
I requested food and ammunition for the 
brave Cambodians, and I regret to say that, 
as of this evening, it may be soon too late. 

Members of the Congress, my fellow 
Americans, this moment of tragedy for Indo- 
china is a time of trial for us. It is a time 
for national resolve. 

It has been said that the United States 
is overextended, that we have too many com- 
mitments too far from home, that we must 
reexamine what our truly vital interests are 
and shape our strategy to conform to them. 
I find no fault with this as a theory, but in 
the real world, such a course must be pur- 
sued carefully and in close coordination with 
solid progress toward overall reduction in 
worldwide tensions. 

We cannot in the meantime abandon our 
friends while our adversaries support and 
encourage theirs. We cannot dismantle our 
defenses, our diplomacy, or our intelli- 
gence capability while others increase and 
strengthen theirs. 

Let us put an end to self-inflicted wounds. 
Let us remember that our national unity is 
a most priceless asset. Let us deny our adver- 
saries the satisfaction of using Viet-Nam to 
pit Americans against Americans. 

At this moment, the United States must 
present to the world a united front. 

Above all, let's keep events in Southeast 
Asia in their proper perspective. The secu- 
rity and the progress of hundreds of millions 
of people everywhere depend importantly on 

Let no potential adversary believe that our 
difficulties or our debates mean a slacken- 
ing of our national will. We will stand by 
our friends, we will honor our commitments, 
and we will uphold our country's principles. 

The American people know that our 
strength, our authority, and our leadership 
have helped prevent a third world war for 
more than a generation. We will not shrink 
from this duty in the decades ahead. 

Let me now review with you the basic 
elements of our foreign policy, speaking can- 
didly about our strengths and some of our 

Relations With Friends in Asia and Europe 

We must, first of all, face the fact that 
what has happened in Indochina has dis- 
quieted many of our friends, especially in 
Asia. We must deal with this situation 
promptly and firmly. To this end, I have 
already scheduled meetings with the leaders 
of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and 
Indonesia, and I expect to meet with the 
leaders of other Asian countries as well. 

A key country in this respect is Japan. 
The warm welcome I received in Japan last 
November vividly symbolized for both our 
peoples the friendship and the solidarity 
of this extraordinary partnership. I look 
forward, as I am sure all of you do, with 
very special pleasure to welcoming the Em- 
peror when he visits the United States later 
this year. We consider our security treaty 
with Japan the cornerstone of stability in the 
vast reaches of Asia and the Pacific. Our rela- 
tions are crucial to our mutual well-being. 
Together, we are working energetically on 
the international multilateral agenda — in 
trade, energy, and food. We will continue 
the process of strengthening our friendship, 
mutual security, and prosperity. 

Also, of course, of fundamental impor- 
tance is our mutual security relationship 
with the Republic of Korea, which I re- 
affirmed on my recent visit. 

Our relations with Europe have never 
been stronger. There are no peoples with 
whom America's destiny has been more 

April 28, 1975 


closely linked. There are no peoples whose 
friendship and cooperation are more needed 
for the future; for none of the members of 
the Atlantic community can be secure, none 
can prosper, none can advance unless we all 
do so together. More than ever, these times 
demand our close collaboration in order: 

— To maintain the secure anchor of our 
common security in this time of interna- 
tional riptides. 

— To work together on the promising ne- 
gotiations with our potential adversaries. 

— To pool our energies on the great new 
economic challenge that faces us. 

In addition to this traditional agenda, 
there are new problems involving energy, 
raw materials, and the environment. The 
Atlantic nations face many and complex 
negotiations and decisions. It is time to take 
stock, to consult on our future, to affirm 
once again our cohesion and our common 
destiny. I therefore expect to join with the 
other leaders of the Atlantic alliance at a 
Western summit in the very near future. 

Complex Greek-Turkish Dispute Over Cyprus 

Before this NATO meeting, I earnestly 
ask the Congress to weigh the broader con- 
siderations and consequences of its past ac- 
tions on the complex Greek-Turkish dispute 
over Cyprus. Our foreign policy cannot be 
simply a collection of special economic or 
ethnic or ideological interests. There must 
be a deep concern for the overall design of 
our international actions. To achieve this 
design for peace and to assure that our in- 
dividual acts have some coherence, the exec- 
utive must have some flexibility in the con- 
duct of foreign policy. 

U.S. military assistance to an old and 
faithful ally, Turkey, has been cut off by 
action of the Congress. This has imposed 
an embargo on military purchases by Tur- 
key, extending even to items already paid 
for — an unprecedented act against a friend. 

These moves, I know, were sincerely in- 
tended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus 
negotiations. I deeply share the concern of 
many citizens for the immense human suf- 

fering on Cyprus. I sympathize with the 
new democratic government in Greece. We 
are continuing our earnest efforts to find 
equitable solutions to the problems which 
exist between Greece and Turkey. But the 
result of the congressional action has been: 

— To block progress toward reconcilation, 
thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus. 

— To complicate our ability to promote 
successful negotiations. 

— To increase the danger of a broader 

Our longstanding relationship with Tur- 
key is not simply a favor to Turkey; it is 
a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey 
lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at 
the gates of the Middle East. It is vital 
to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, 
the southern flank of Western Europe, and 
the collective security of the Western alli- 
ance. Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are 
as critical to our own security as they are 
to the defense of NATO. 

I therefore call upon the Congress to lift 
the American arms embargo against our 
Turkish ally by passing the bipartisan 
Mansfield-Scott bill now before the Senate. 
Only this will enable us to work with Greece 
and Turkey to resolve the differences be- 
tween our allies. I accept and indeed wel- 
come the bill's requirement for monthly re- 
ports to the Congress on progress toward a 
Cyprus settlement. But unless this is done 
with dispatch, forces may be set in motion 
within and between the two nations which 
could not be reversed. 

At the same time, in order to strengthen 
the democratic government of Greece and 
to reaffirm our traditional ties with the 
people of Greece, we are actively discussing 
a program of economic and military assist- 
ance with them. We will shortly be sub- 
mitting specific requests to the Congress in 
this regard. 

Proposed Amendments to Trade Act 

A vital element of our foreign policy is 
our relationship with the developing coun- 
tries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 


Department of State Bulletin 

These countries must know that America is 
a true, that America is a concerned, friend 
reliable both in word and deed. 

As evidence of this friendship, I urge the 
Congress to reconsider one provision of the 
1974 Trade Act which has had an unfortu- 
nate and unintended impact on our relations 
with Latin America, where we have such a 
long tie of friendship and cooperation. Under 
this legislation, all members of OPEC [Or- 
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] were excluded from our generalized 
system of trade preferences. This, unfortu- 
nately, punished two South American 
friends, Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as 
other OPEC nations such as Nigeria and 
Indonesia, none of which participated in last 
year's oil embargo. This exclusion has seri- 
ously complicated our new dialogue with our 
friends in this hemisphere. 

I therefore endorse the amendments which 
have been introduced in the Congress to 
provide executive authority to waive those 
restrictions of the Trade Act that are in- 
compatible with our national intei'est. 

Peacemaking Efforts in the Middle East 

The interests of America, as well as our 
allies, are vitally affected by what happens 
in the Middle East. So long as the state of 
tension continues, it threatens military 
crisis, the weakening of our alliances, the 
stability of the world economy, and con- 
frontation with the nuclear superpowers. 
These are intolerable risks. 

Because we are in the unique position of 
being able to deal with all the parties, we 
have, at their request, been engaged for the 
past year and a half in the peacemaking 
effort unparalleled in the history of the re- 

Our policy has brought remarkable suc- 
cesses on the road to peace. Last year, two 
major disengagement agreements were nego- 
tiated and implemented with our help. For 
the first time in 30 years, a process of nego- 
tiation on the basic political issues was be- 
gun — and is continuing. 

Unfortunately, the latest efforts to reach 
a further interim agreement between Israel 

and Egypt have been suspended. The issues 
dividing the parties are vital to them and 
not amenable to easy and to quick solutions. 

However, the United States will not be 
discouraged. The momentum toward peace 
that has been achieved over the last 18 
months must and will be maintained. 

The active role of the United States must 
and will be continued. The drift toward war 
must and will be prevented. 

I pledge the United States to a major ef- 
fort for peace in the Middle East, an effort 
which I know has the solid support of the 
American people and their Congress. 

We are now examining how best to pro- 
ceed. We have agreed in principle to recon- 
vene the Geneva Conference. We are pre- 
pared as well to explore other forums. 

The United States will move ahead on 
whatever course looks most promising, 
either toward an overall settlement or in- 
terim agreements should the parties them- 
selves desire them. We will not accept stag- 
nation or stalemate with all its attendant 
risks to peace and prosperity and to our rela- 
tions in and outside of the region. 

Relations With Potential Adversaries 

The national interest and national secu- 
rity require as well that we reduce the dan- 
gers of war. We shall strive to do so by 
continuing to improve our relations with 
potential adversaries. 

The United States and the Soviet Union 
share an interest in lessening tensions and 
building a more stable relationship. During 
this process we have never had any illusions. 
We know that we are dealing with a nation 
that reflects different principles and is our 
competitor in many parts of the globe. 

Through a combination of firmness and 
flexibility, the United States, in recent years, 
laid the basis of a more reliable relationship, 
founded on mutual interest and mutual re- 

But we cannot expect the Soviet Union to 
show restraint in the face of the U.S. weak- 
ness or irresolution. As long as I am Presi- 
dent, America will maintain its strength, its 
alliances, and its principles as a prerequisite 

April 28, 1975 


to a more peaceful planet. As long as I am 
President, we will not permit detente to be- 
come a license to fish in troubled waters. 
Detente must be — and I trust will be — n 
two-way relationship. 

Central to U.S.-Soviet relations today is 
the critical negotiation to control strategic 
nuclear weapons. We hope to turn the Vladi- 
vostok agreements into a final agreement 
this year at the time of General Secretary 
Brezhnev's visit to the United States. Such 
an agreement would, for the first time, put 
a ceiling on the strategic arms race. It would 
mark a turning point in postwar history and 
would be a crucial step in lifting from mari- 
kind the threat of nuclear war. 

Our use of trade and economic sanctions 
as weapons to alter the internal conduct of 
other nations must also be seriously reexam- 
ined. However well-intentioned the goals, the 
fact is that some of our recent actions in the 
economic field have been self-defeating. They 
are not achieving the objectives intended 
by the Congress. And they have damaged 
our foreign policy. 

The Trade Act of 1974 prohibits most- 
favored-nation treatment, credit and invest- 
ment guarantees, and commercial agree- 
ments with the Soviet Union so long as their 
emigration policies fail to meet our criteria. 
The Soviet Union has therefore refused to 
put into efl'ect the important 1972 trade 
agreement between our two countries. 

As a result. Western Europe and Japan 
have stepped into the breach. Those coun- 
tries have extended credits to the Soviet 
Union exceeding $8 billion in the last six 
months. These are economic opportunities — 
jobs and business— which could have gone 
to Americans. 

There should be no illusions about the na- 
ture of the Soviet system, but there should 
be no illusions about how to deal with it. 
Our belief in the right of peoples of the 
world freely to emigrate has been well dem- 
onstrated. This legislation, however, not only 
harmed our relations with the Soviet Union 
but seriously complicated the prospects of 
those seeking to emigrate. The favorable 
trend, aided by quiet diplomacy, by whicli 

emigration increased from 400 in 1968 to 
over 33,000 in 1973 has been seriously set 
back. Remedial legislation is urgently needed 
in our national interest. 

With the People's Republic of China, we 
are firmly fixed on the course set forth in 
the Shanghai communique. Stability in Asia 
and the world requires our constructive rela- 
tions with one-fourth of the human race. 
After two decades of mutual isolation and 
hostility, we have, in recent years, built a 
promising foundation. Deep differences in 
our philosophy and social systems will en- 
dure, but so should our mutual long-term 
interests and the goals to which our coun- 
tries have jointly subscribed in Shanghai. 

I will visit China later this year to re- 
affirm these interests and to accelerate the 
improvement in our relations, and I was glad 
to welcome the distinguished Speaker and 
the distinguished minority leader of the 
House back today from their constructive 
visit to the People's Republic of China. 

New Economic and Technological Issues 

Let me talk about new challenges. The 
issues I have discussed are the most press- 
ing of the traditional agenda on foreign pol- 
icy, but ahead of us also is a vast new 
agenda of issues in an interdependent world. 

The United States — with its economic 
power, its technology, its zest for new hori- 
zons — is the acknowledged world leader in 
dealing with many of these challenges. If 
this is a moment of uncertainty in the 
world, it is even more a moment of rare 
opportunity : 

— We are summoned to meet one of man's 
most basic challenges: hunger. At the World 
Food Conference last November in Rome, 
the United States outlined a comprehensive 
program to close the ominous gap between 
population growth and food production 
over the long term. Our technological skill 
and our enormous productive capacity are 
crucial to accomplishing this task. 

— The old order — in trade, finance, and 
raw materials— is changing, and American 
leadership is needed in the creation of new 


Department of State Bulletin 

institutions and practices for worldwide 
prosperity and progress. 

— ^The world's oceans, with their immense 
resources and strategic importance, must 
become areas of cooperation rather than con- 
flict. American policy is directed to that end. 

— Technology must be harnessed to the 
service of mankind while protecting the en- 
vironment. This, too, is an arena for Amer- 
ican leadership. 

— The interests and the aspirations of the 
developed and developing nations must be 
reconciled in a manner that is both realistic 
and humane. This is our goal in this new era. 

One of the finest success stories in our 
foreign policy is our cooperative effort with 
other major energy-consuming nations. In 
little more than a year, together with our 
partners : 

— We have created the International En- 
ergy Agency. 

— We have negotiated an emergency shar- 
ing arrangement which helps to reduce the 
dangers of an embargo. 

— We have launched major international 
conservation efforts. 

— We have developed a massive program 
for the development of alternative sources 
of energy. 

But the fate of all of these programs de- 
pends crucially on what we do at home. 
Every month that passes brings us closer to 
the day when we will be dependent on im- 
ported energy for 50 pei'cent of our require- 
ments. A new embargo under these condi- 
tions could have a devastating impact on 
jobs, industrial expansion, and inflation at 
home. Our economy cannot be left to the 
mercy of decisions over which we have no 
control. And I call upon the Congress to act 

Essential Elements of National Security 

In a world where information is power, a 
vital element of our national security lies in 
our intelligence services. They are essential 
to our nation's security in peace as in war. 
Americans can be grateful for the impor- 

tant, but largely unsung, contributions and 
achievements of the intelligence services of 
this nation. 

It is entirely proper that this system be 
subject to congressional review. But a sensa- 
tionalized public debate over legitimate in- 
telligence activities is a disservice to this 
nation and a threat to our intelligence sys- 
tem. It ties our hands while our potential 
enemies operate with secrecy, with skill, and 
with vast resources. Any investigation must 
be conducted with maximum discretion and 
dispatch, to avoid crippling a vital national 

Let me speak quite frankly to some in this 
Chamber, and perhaps to some not in this 
Chamber. The Central Intelligence Agency 
has been of maximum importance to Presi- 
dents before me. The Central Intelligence 
Agency has been of maximum importance 
to me. The Central Intelligence Agency, and 
its associated intelligence organizations, 
could be of maximum importance to some of 
you in this audience who might be President 
at some later date. 

I think it would be catastrophic for the 
Congress, or anyone else, to destroy the use- 
fulness by dismantling, in effect, our intelli- 
gence systems, upon which we rest so heav- 


Now, as Congress oversees intelligence 
activities it must, of course, organize itself 
to do so in a responsible way. It has been 
traditional for the executive to consult with 
the Congress through specially protected 
procedures that safeguard essential secrets, 
but recently some of those procedures have 
been altered in a way that makes the protec- 
tion of vital information very, very difficult. 

I will say to the leaders of the Congress, 
the House and the Senate, that I will work 
with them to devise procedures which will 
meet the needs of the Congress for review 
of intelligence agency activities and the 
needs of the nation for an effective intelli- 
gence service. 

Underlying any successful foreign policy 
is the strength and the credibility of our de- 
fense posture. We are strong and we are 
ready, and we intend to remain so. 

April 28, 1975 


Improvement of relations with adversaries 
does not mean any relaxation of our national 
vigilance. On the contrary, it is the firm 
maintenance of both strength and vigilance 
that makes possible steady progress toward 
a safer and a more peaceful world. 

The national security budget that I have 
submitted is the minimum the United States 
needs in this critical hour. The Congress 
should review it carefully, and I know it will. 
But it is my considered judgment that any 
significant reduction, revision, would endan- 
ger our national security and thus jeopardize 
the peace. 

Let no ally doubt our determination to 
maintain a defense second to none, and let 
no adversary be tempted to test our readi- 
ness or our resolve. 

History is testing us today. We cannot 
afford indecision, disunity, or disarray in the 
conduct of our foreign affairs. You and I 
can resolve here and now that this nation 
shall move ahead with wisdom, with assur- 
ance, and with national unity. 

The world looks to us for the vigor and 
for the vision that we have demonstrated 
so often in the past in great moments of our 
national history. 

And as I look down the road, I see a con- 
fident America, secure in its strengths, se- 
cure in its values — and determined to main- 
tain both. 

I see a conciliatory America, extending 
its hand to allies and adversaries alike, form- 
ing bonds of cooperation to deal with the 
vast problems facing us all. 

I see a compassionate America, its heart 
reaching out to orphans, to refugees, and to 
our fellow human beings afflicted by war, by 
tyranny, and by hunger. 

As President, entrusted by the Constitu- 
tion with primary responsibility for the con- 
duct of our foreign affairs, I renew the 
pledge I made last August: to work cooper- 
atively with the Congress. 

I ask that the Congress help to keep 
America's word good throughout the world. 
We are one nation, one government, and we 
must have one foreign policy. 

In an hour far darker than this, Abraham 
Lincoln told his fellow citizens, and I quote: 

... we cannot escape history. We of this Congress 
and this administration will be remembered in spite 
of ourselves. No personal significance or insignifi- 
cance can spare one or another of us. 

We who are entrusted by the people with 
the great decisions that fashion their future 
can escape neither responsibilities nor our 

By what we do now, the world will know 
our courage, our constancy, and our com- 

The spirit of America is good, and the 
heart of America is strong. Let us be proud 
of what we have done and confident of what 
we can do. And may God ever guide us to do 
what is right. 

President Ford Reiterates Request 
for Assistance to Cambodia 

Following is a statement read to neivs 
correspo7idents on April 12 by Ronald H. 
Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford. 

White House press release dated April 12 

The President has asked me to express his 
concern over some reports that his speech 
on Thursday night, April 10, indicated that 
he was withdrawing or otherwise not re- 
newing his request for urgent assistance to 

The President's proposal for aid to Cam- 
bodia is still before the Congress. We main- 
tain the request we have consistently and 
emphatically urged upon the Congress for 
three months. 

The letter from Cambodian leader Sauk- 
ham Khoy, cited by the President, reempha- 
sized that request. The President's state- 
ment that it might soon be too late pointed 
out the urgency of the need. 

The President still hopes that the Con- 
gress will act quickly to approve assistance 
to Cambodia. 


Department of State Bulletin 

U.S. Calls on North Viet-Nam 
To End Military Offensive 

Folloiving are texts of a note delivered by 
U.S. Missions on April 10 to non-Vietnamese 
participants in the International Conference 
on Viet-Nam and memhers of the Interna- 
tional Commission of Control and Super- 
vision (ICCS) and of a note delivered to the 
Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on 
April 11. 


Press release 193 dated April 11 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compHments 
to [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry 
of External Affairs of the Union of Soviet 
SociaUst Republics, People's Republic of 
China, Great Britain, France, Hungary, 
Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and Secretary Gen- 
eral of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has 
the honor to refer to the Agreement on End- 
ing the War and Restoring Peace in Viet- 
Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; to 
the Act of the International Conference on 
Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973; 
and to the Department's Diplomatic Note of 
January 11, 1975, on the situation in Viet- 

More than two years ago, the signatories 
of the Paris Agreement accepted a solemn 
obligation to end the fighting in Viet-Nam 
and to shift the conflict there from the 
battlefield to the negotiating table. All na- 
tions and peoples who love peace had the 
right to expect from that Agreement that 
the South Vietnamese people would be able 
to peacefully determine their own future 
and their own political institutions after the 
Paris Agreement was signed. The parties to 
the International Conference on Viet-Nam 
undertook a responsibility to support and 
uphold the settlement which the Agreement 

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has 
undertaken a massive, all-out offensive 
against South Viet-Nam in total contempt 
of the Paris Agreement. Their forces, which 
were built up over the past two years in 
violation of the Agreement, are more numer- 
ous and better equipped with modern weap- 
onry than ever before during the course of 
the war. A human flight of historic propor- 
tions has taken place before the advancing 
North Vietnamese armies, and untold misery 
has been inflicted on the land which has 
already seen more than its share of misery. 

We believe the suffering of the South 
Vietnamese people must be ended. It must 
be ended now. We therefore call upon the 
[addressee] to join the Government of the 
United States of America in calling upon 
Hanoi to cease its military operations imme- 
diately and to honor the terms of the Paris 
Agreement. The United States is requesting 
all the parties to the Act of the International 
Conference to meet their obligations to use 
their influence to halt the fighting and en- 
force the Paris Agreement. 

The United States Government looks for- 
ward to prompt and constructive responses 
to this Note from all the parties. 


Press release 193A dated April 11 

The Department of State of the United 
States of America presents its compliments 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has 
the honor to refer to the Agreement on 
Ending the War and Restoring Peace in 
Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; 
and to the Act of the International Confer- 
ence on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 

More than two years ago, the Democratic 
Republic of Viet-Nam, as a signatory of the 
Paris Agreement and the Act of the Inter- 
national Conference on Viet-Nam, accepted 
a solemn obligation to end the fighting in 
Viet-Nam and to shift the conflict there 

April 28, 1975 


from the battlefield to the negotiating table. 
All nations and peoples who love peace hoped 
and expected from these Agreements that 
the South Vietnamese people would be able 
to peacefully determine their own future. 
Tragically, these hopes and expectations 
have been shattered by the Democratic Re- 
public of Viet-Nam's total violation of these 

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has 
now undertaken a massive, all-out offensive 
against South Viet-Nam in total contempt 
of these Agreements. DRV forces in South 
Viet-Nam, which have been built up over the 
past two years in contravention of the Paris 
Agreement, are more numerous and better 
equipped than ever before during the course 
of the entire war. This North Vietnamese 
invasion has produced a human flight of 
refugees which is of historic proportions. By 
this calculated use of immense force North 
Viet-Nam has inflicted untold misery on a 
land which has already seen its share of 

We believe the sufl'ering of the South 
Vietnamese people must be ended and must 
be ended now. We therefore advise the Gov- 
ernment of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam to cease immediately its military ofl!"en- 
sive against South Viet-Nam and to honor 
the terms of the Paris Agreement. If the 
DRV does not reverse its present military 
course, it should have no doubt that it will 
be held responsible for the consequences. 

Assistance in Evacuating Refugees 
From South Vietnamese Seaports 

Statement by President Ford ' 

A severe emergency exists in the coastal 
communities of South Viet-Nam which are 
swollen with helpless civilian refugees who 
have fled the North Viet-Nam ofl'ensive. 
They are desperately in need of any assist- 
ance we and other nations can provide. 

To help the refugees reach safe haven 

' I.ssued on Mar. 29 (text from Wliite House press 

further south, I have ordered American 
naval transports and contract vessels to as- 
sist in the evacuation of refugees from the 
coastal seaports. 

I also call upon, all nations and corpora- 
tions that have ships in the vicinity of the 
South Vietnamese coast to help evacuate 
refugees to safety in the south. 

I have directed that U.S. Government re- 
sources be made available to meet immediate 
humanitarian needs, and I have appointed 
Mr. Daniel Parker, Administrator of the 
Agency of International Development, as my 
Special Coordinator for Disaster Relief. 

U.S. Personnel Evacuated 
From Phnom Penh 

Following is a statement by President 
Ford issued on April 12, together with a 
statement issued on April 11 by Robert 
Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
of State for Press Relations. 


white House press release dated April 12 

In view of the seriously deteriorating mili- 
tary situation around the Cambodian Capital 
of Phnom Penh, and on the basis of the 
recommendations of the American Ambassa- 
dor to the Khmer Republic, I have instructed 
the personnel of the U.S. Mission to leave 
Phnom Penh. 

In accordance with those instructions, 
American personnel have been evacuated. I 
also authorized that a number of Cam- 
bodians whose lives would have been jeop- 
ardized if they had remained in Cambodia 
be evacuated with the American Mission. 

I sincerely I'egret that there was not 
timely action on my request to the Congress 
to enable the United States to continue to 
provide the assistance necessary to the sur- 
vival of the Government of the Khmer Re- 
public. That government had asked for this 
assistance and had clearly proven itself 
worthy of our help. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The United States wishes Cambodia to find 
its place in the world as an independent, 
neutral, and united country, living in peace. 
Our assistance was sought for that purpose. 
We also made numerous and vigorous diplo- 
matic efforts, from the first to the last, to 
find a compromise settlement. 

I decided with a heavy heart on the evac- 
uation of American personnel from Cam- 
bodia because of my responsibility for the 
safety of the Americans who have served 
there so valiantly. Despite that evacuation 
we will continue to do whatever possible to 
support an independent, peaceful, neutral, 
and unified Cambodia. 

We can all take deep pride in the U.S. 
armed forces that were engaged in this 
evacuation operation. It was carried out with 
great skill and in a manner that reflects the 
highest credit on all of those American 
servicemen who participated. I am deeply 
grateful to them for a job well done. 


In view of the seriously deteriorating mili- 
tary situation around Phnom Penh, the evac- 
uation of all U.S. Mission personnel is taking 
place. We regret this development because 
of its obvious implications for the Govern- 
ment of the Khmer Republic. 

This evacuation is taking place in an ef- 
fort to insure the safety of U.S. citizens in 
Cambodia. To the extent we have the capa- 
bility in the airlift we are also undertaking 
to evacuate third-country nationals working 
for the U.S. Government, U.S. press services, 
voluntary agencies, et cetera, as well as 
Cambodian employees of the U.S. Mission 
and their families and as many other Cam- 
bodians who have been associated with us 
as circumstances permit. 

Because of the effective interdiction of 
Phnom Penh airport now by Khmer Com- 
munists' rockets, artillery, and mortars, this 
evacuation is being carried out by U.S. mili- 
tary helicopters from landing zones near the 

American Mission in Phnom Penh. The evac- 
uation operation is being protected as neces- 
sary by a security force of U.S. marines. 
Tactical aircraft are in the vicinity in the 
event they are needed. There is no intention 
to use force, but if necessary it will be ap- 
plied only to protect the lives of evacuees. 

The evacuees will be taken temporarily to 
Thailand before being moved onward to 
their destination of choice. 

Because of the U.S. Ambassador's efforts 
in the past few weeks to reduce the number 
of potential evacuees to the barest minimum, 
we are not certain that we have up-to-date 
figures on the numbers likely to be involved. 
However, we anticipate that there will be 
several hundred people involved, including 
some 150 Americans. 

President Ford Saddened by Deaths 
in Viet-Nam Orphan Airlift Crash 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I am deeply saddened at the loss of so 
many lives in the crash of the U.S. C-5A 
mercy flight today near Saigon. 

I wish to convey my heartfelt condolences 
to the families and friends of the victims, 
many of whom were coming to new homes 
in the United States, and to the volunteers 
who were caring for them on the flight. 

Our mission of mercy will continue. The 
survivors will be flown here when they are 
physically able. Other waiting orphans will 
make the journey. 

This tragedy must not deter us from offer- 
ing new hope for the living. The government 
and people of the United States offer this 
hope in our rededication to assisting the 
Vietnamese orphans as best and as quickly 
as we can. 

'Issued at Palm Springs, Calif., on Apr. 4 (text 
from White House press release). 

April 28, 1975 


President Ford's News Conference at San Diego April 3 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by President Ford at San Diego, 
Calif., April 3.^ 

I have a short opening statement: 

We are seeing a great human tragedy as 
untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North 
Vietnamese onslaught. The United States 
has been doing, and will continue to do, its 
utmost to assist these people. 

I have directed all available naval ships to 
stand off Indochina to do whatever is neces- 
sary to assist. We have appealed to the 
United Nations to use its moral influence 
to permit these innocent people to leave, and 
we call on North Viet-Nam to permit the 
movement of refugees to the area of their 

While I have been in California, I have 
been spending many hours on the refugee 
problem and our humanitarian efforts. I 
have directed that money from a $2 million 
special foreign aid children's fund be made 
available to fly 2,000 South Vietnamese 
orphans to the United States as soon as 
possible. I have also directed American offi- 
cials in Saigon to act immediately to cut 
red tape and other bureaucratic obstacles 
preventing these children from coming to 
the United States. 

I have directed that C-5A aircraft and 
other aircraft especially equipped to care for 
these orphans during the flight be sent to 
Saigon. I expect these flights to begin within 
the next 36 to 48 hours. These orphans will 
be flown to Travis Air Force Base in Cali- 
fornia and other bases on the west coast and 
cared for in those locations. These 2,000 
Vietnamese orphans are all in the process 

' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 7. 

of being adopted by American families. 

This is the least we can do, and we will do 
much, much more. 

The first question is from Mr. George 
Dlssinger of the San Diego Tribune. 

Q.'Mr. President, are you ready to accept 
a Commnnist takeover of South Viet-Nam 
and Cambodia? 

President Ford: I would hope that that 
would not take place in either case. My 
whole congressional life in recent years was 
aimed at avoiding it. My complete efforts 
as President of the United States were aimed 
at avoiding that. 

I am an optimist, despite the sad and 
tragic events that we see unfolding. I will 
do my utmost in the future — as I have in 
the past — to avoid that result. 

Q. Mr. President, I understand you are 
soon going to ask Congress for neiv author- 
ity to extend humanitarian aid in Southeast 
Asia. I woyidered if you stand by your 
request, though, for more military aid for 
South Viet-Nam. 

President Ford: We do intend to ask for 
more humanitarian aid. I should point out 
that the Administration's request for $135 
million for humanitarian aid in South Viet- 
Nam was unfortunately reduced to $55 mil- 
lion by congressional action. Obviously, we 
will ask for more; the precise amount we 
have not yet determined. 

We will continue to push for the $300 
million that we have asked for and Congress 
had authorized for military assistance to 
South Viet-Nam, and the possibility exists 
that we may ask for more. 

Q. Mr. President, how and ivhy did the 
United States miscalculate the intentioyis of 
the tvill of the South Vietnamese to 7-esist? 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Ford: I don't believe that we 
miscalculated the will of the South Vietnam- 
ese to carry on their fight for their own 

There were several situations that devel- 
oped that I think got beyond the control of 
the Vietnamese people. The unilateral mili- 
tary decision to withdraw created a chaotic 
situation in Viet-Nam that appears to have 
brought about tremendous disorganization. 

I believe that the will of the South Viet- 
namese people to fight for their freedom is 
best evidenced by the fact that they are flee- 
ing from the North Vietnamese, and that 
clearly is an indication they don't want to 
live under the kind of government that exists 
in North Viet-Nam. 

The will of the South Vietnamese people, 
I think, still exists. They want freedom 
under a different kind of government than 
has existed in North Viet-Nam. The prob- 
lem is how to organize that will under the 
traumatic experiences of the present. 

Q. Unilateral decision by whom? 

President Ford: It was a unilateral deci- 
sion by President Thieu to order a with- 
drawal from the broad, exposed areas that 
were under the control of the South Viet- 
namese military. 

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United 
Press International]. 

Q. Mr. President, what is your respoyise 
to the So7ith Vietnamese Ambassador to 
Washington's statement that we had not 
lived up to the Paris peace accords and that 
the Communists are safer allies? 

President Ford: I won't comment on his 
statement. I will say this: that the North 
Vietnamese repeatedly and in massive 
efforts violated the Paris peace accords. 
They sent North Vietnamese regular forces 
into South Viet-Nam in massive numbers — 
I think around 150,000 to 175,000 well- 
trained North Vietnamese regular forces — 
in violation of the Paris peace accords, 
moved into South Viet-Nam. We have ob- 
jected to that violation. 

I still believe that the United States, in 
this case and in other cases, is a reliable 
ally. And although I am saddened by the 

events that we have read about and seen, 
it is a tragedy unbelievable in its ramifica- 

I must say that I am frustrated by the 
action of the Congress in not responding to 
some of the requests for both economic and 
humanitarian and military assistance in 
South Viet-Nam. And I am frustrated by 
the limitations that were placed on the 
Chief Executive over the last two years. 

But let me add very strongly: I am con- 
vinced that this country is going to continue 
its leadership. We will stand by our allies, 
and I specifically warn any adversaries they 
should not, under any circumstances, feel 
that the tragedy of Viet-Nam is an indica- 
tion that the American people have lost 
their will or their desire to stand up for 
freedom anyplace in the world. 

Q. Well, Mr. President, can you explain 
why President Thieu, with our close mili- 
tary ties as allies, did not tell you what he 
was going to do in terms of the retreat ? 

President Ford: I think the only answer 
to that can come from President Thieu. 

Q. Mr. Ford, recently you said the fall of 
Cambodia coidd threaten the national secu- 
rity of this country. Now, considering the 
probable fall of South Viet-Nam to Com- 
munist forces, do you feel that will threaten 
our national security, and if so, hoiv? 

President Ford: At the moment, I do not 
anticipate the fall of South Viet-Nam, and 
I greatly respect and admire the tremendous 
fight that the Government and the people 
of Cambodia are putting up against the 
insurgents who are trying to take over 

I believe that in any case where the 
United States does not live up to its moral 
or treaty obligations, it can't help but have 
an adverse impact on other allies we have 
around the world. 

We read in European papers to the effect 
that Western Europe ought to have some 
questions. Let me say to our Western Euro- 
pean allies: We are going to stand behind 
our commitments to NATO, and we are 
going to stand behind our commitments to 
other allies around the world. 

April 28, 1975 


But there has to be in the minds of some 
people a feeling that maybe the tragedy of 
Indochina might affect our relations with 
their country. I repeat, the United States 
is going to continue its leadership and stand 
by its allies. 

Q. Are you, in fact, a believer of the 
domino theory — if Southeast Asia falls, then 
perhaps some of the other countries in the 
Pacific are next? 

President Ford: I believe there is a great 
deal of credibility to the domino theory. I 
hope it does not happen. I hope that other 
countries in Southeast Asia — Thailand, the 
Philippines — don't misread the will of the 
American people and the leadership of this 
country to believing that we are going to 
abandon our position in Southeast Asia. We 
are not. But I do know from the things I read 
and the messages that I hear that some of 
them do get uneasy. I hope and trust they be- 
lieve me when I say we are going to stand 
by our allies. 

Q. Mr. President, as you are well aware, 
there are abmit 7,000 Americans still in 
Saigo7i. They are in danger not only from 
Communist atack but from South Vietnam- 
ese reprisals. There are reports that the 
South Vietnatnese are in a bad temper 
toward Am,ericans. Do you feel that under 
the War Powers Act and also under the lim- 
itatio7is voted by Congress in 1973 on com- 
bat by Americans in Indochina that you 
could send troops in to protect those Amer- 
icans, and would you, if it came to that? 

President Ford: I can assure you that I 
will abide totally with the War Powers Act 
that was enacted by the Congress several 
years ago. At the same time, I likewise 
assure you that we have contingency plans 
to meet all problems involving evacuation, 
if that should become necessary. At this 
point, I do not believe that I should answer 
specifically how those contingency plans 
might be carried out. 

Q. Sir, you don't want to talk specifically. 
Can you tell us, however, if you do believe 
that you do have the authority to send in 
troops? You are not saying, I understand, 

whether you ivoiild, but do you have the 

President Ford: It is my interpretation 
of that legislation that a President has cer- 
tain limited authority to protect American 
lives. And to that extent, I will use that law. 

Q. Mr. President, despite your statement 
here this morning about ivar orphans, there 
apparently is a lot of red tape in Washing- 
ton. A San Diego man who is trying to get 
four Vietnamese children out of that coun- 
try has received hundreds of calls from 
people all over the Western United States 
wanting to help, even adopt children. But 
despite this oiitpouring of compassioti by 
the American people, all he gets in Washing- 
ton is, "No tvay. There is nothing that can 
be done." Why is he running into this prob- 
lem, if ive are trying to help? 

President Ford: Well, having had some 
experience in the past with the Federal 
bureaucracy when we had a similar problem 
involving Korean orphans, I understand the 
frustration and the problem. 

But I am assured that all bureaucratic 
red taps is being eliminated to the maximum 
degree and that we will make a total effort, 
as I indicated in my opening statement, to 
see to it that South Vietnamese war orphans 
are brought to the United States. 

Q. Do you think something can be done 
before it is too late for many of them? 

President F&rd: I can only say we will do 
what has to be done, what can be done as 
a practical matter. I cannot guarantee that 
every single South Vietnamese war orphan 
will get here, but I can assure you that we 
intend to do everything possible in that 
humanitarian effort. 

Q. Mr. President, if it would alleviate the 
refugee problem in South Viet-Nam and 
bring about something of a temporary cease- 
fire, would you urge President Thieu to 
resign ? 

President Ford: I don't believe that it is 
my prerogative to tell the head of state 
elected by the people to leave office. I don't 


Department of State Bulletin 

believe whether it is one head of state or 
another makes any difference in our efforts 
to help in the humanitarian program. 

We are going to carry it on, I hope, with 
the full cooperation of the South Vietnamese 
Government. And I don't think it is appro- 
priate for me to ask him, under these cir- 
cumstances, to resign. And I don't think his 
resignation would have any significance on 
our humanitarian efforts. 

Q. In that regard, are there any plans 
underivay by the U.S. Government to accept 
large numbers of Vietnamese refugees in 
this country other than the 2,000 orphans 
that you have talked about? 

President Ford: Under existing law, ac- 
tion by the Attorney General can permit 
refugees who are fleeing problems in their 
own country to come to the United States. 
This authority was used after World War 
II. This authority was used after the Hun- 
garian invasion by the Soviet Union. 

This authority has been used on a number 
of other occasions. I can assure you that 
that authority is being examined, and if it 
will be helpful, I certainly will approve it. 

Q. Mr. President, you spoke a few min- 
utes ago about being frustrated by the limi- 
tations of the War Poivers Act. If it were 
not forbidden now, ivould you like to send 
American planes and naval forces and pos- 
sibly ground forces into Viet-Nam to try 
to turn the situation around? 

President Ford: I have said that there are 
no plans whatsoever for U.S. military in- 
volvement in Viet-Nam. On the other hand, 
I think history does prove that if a Chief 
Executive has a potential, it to some extent 
is a deterrent against aggressors. 

Q. So, that is your frustration, because 
you do not have that power to at least 
threaten the possibility? 

President Ford: I did not use the word 
"threat." I said the potential for power, I 
think, over the years has indicated that po- 
tential is a deterrent against aggression by 
one country against another. 

Q. Mr. President, some people are saying 
this week that despite all our massive aid in 
Viet-Nam and all the lives that were lost 
there, that the ivhole thing has come to 
nothing. Nou>, how do you feel about this, 
and do you think there is any lesson to be 
learned in ivhat has been happening over 

President Ford: I believe that the pro- 
gram of the previous four or five Presidents 
— President Kennedy, President Johnson, 
President Nixon, and myself — were aimed at 
the — in the right direction, that we should 
help those people who are willing to fight 
for freedom for themselves. 

That was a sound policy. Unfortunately, 
events that were beyond our control as a 
country have made it appear that that policy 
was wrong. I still believe that policy was 
riglit if the United States had carried it 
out as we promised to do at the time of the 
Paris peace accords, where we promised, 
with the signing of the Paris peace accords, 
that we would make military hardware 
available to the South Vietnamese Govern- 
ment on a replacement, one-for-one basis. 
Unfortunately, we did not carry out that 

Q. Well, are you blaming Congress for 
this, then? 

President Ford: I am not assessing blame 
on anyone. The facts are that in fiscal year 
1974 there was a substantial reduction made 
by the Congress in the amount of military 
equipment requested for South Viet-Nam. 

In fiscal year 1975, the current fiscal year, 
the Administration asked for $1.4 billion in 
military assistance for South Viet-Nam. 
Congress put a ceiling of $1 billion on it 
and actually appropriated only $700 million. 

Those are the facts. I think it is up to the 
American people to pass judgment on who 
was at fault or where the blame may rest. 
That is a current judgment. 

I think historians in the future will write 
who was to blame in this tragic situation. 
But the American people ought to know the 
facts. And the facts are as I have indicated. 

April 28, 1975 


I think it is a great tragedy, what we are 
seeing in Viet-Nam today. I think it could 
have been avoided. But I am not going to 
point a finger. The American people will 
make that judgment. I think it is more 
important for me and the American people 
and the Congress, in the weeks and months 
ahead, to do what we can to work together 
to meet the problems of the future. 

That is what I intend to do, and I will go 
more than halfway with the Congress in 
seeking to achieve that result. I think we 
have the capability in America. I think we 
have the will to overcome what appears to 
be a disaster in Southeast Asia. To the ex- 
tent that I can, I hope to give that leader- 

Q. Mr. President, regardless of ivhat 
caused it, it seems apparent that for the first 
time in our nation's history, the enemy is 
about to win a war where Americans fought 
and died. Do you think those 55,000 lives 
were wasted? 

President Ford: I do not think they were 
wasted, providing the United States had 
carried out the solemn commitments that 
were made in Paris, at the time American 
fighting was stopped in South Viet-Nam — at 
a time when the agreement provided that 
all of our troops should be withdrawn, that 
all of our POW's should be returned. If we 
had carried out the commitments that were 
made at that time, the tragic sacrifices that 
were made by many — those who were killed, 
those who were wounded — would not have 
been in vain. But when I see us not carry- 
ing through, then it raises a quite different 

Q. Is that a yes, then, sir? 

President Ford: I still think there is an 
opportunity to salvage the situation in Viet- 
Nam, and if we salvage it, giving the South 
Vietnamese an opportunity to fight for their 
freedom, which I think they are anxious to 
do if given an honest opportunity, then there 
was not a sacrifice that was inappropriate 
or unwise. 

Q. In a speech you are going to deliver 
here in San' Diego this afternoon, you warn 

against fatalism, despair, and the prophets 
of doom. And yet, as I look hack over the 
past eight months or a year — and I don't 
mean to suggest that these are iyi any way 
your responsibility or fault — I have a laun- 
dry list which cites Portugal as having a 
leftist government raising serious questions 
about its future in NATO; Greece and 
Turkey are at each other's throats, threat- 
ening the southern flanks of that alliance; 
tve are familiar that Secretary Kissinger's 
mission failed in his peace talks with Egypt 
and Israel; and ive don't need to rehash the 
situation in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. 
That being the case, sir, how can. you say 
that the ivorld outlook — aiid particidarly as 
you address it in your speech next tveek on 
the state of the world — is anything but bleak 
for the United States, when many of the 
minuses which I cited are actually pluses 
for the Soviets? 

President Ford: Well, the speech that I am 
giving to Congress and to the American 
people next week will deal with many of the 
problems that you have raised. I think we do 
face a crisis. But I am optimistic that if the 
Congress joins with me and the American 
people support the Congress and me, as 
President, we can overcome those diflficulties. 

We can play a constructive role in Portu- 
gal, not interfering with their internal deci- 
sions, but Portugal is an important ally in 
Western Europe. 

We can find ways to solve the problem in 
Cyprus and, hopefully, keep both Greece 
and Turkey strong and viable members of 

We can, despite the difficulties that trans- 
pired in the Middle East in the last several 
weeks, find a way to keep a peace movement 
moving in that very volatile area. It may 
mean — and probably does — that we will have 
to take the problem to Geneva. I would 
have preferred it otherwise. 

But the facts are that if Congress and the 
American people and the President work 
together — as I expect they will — then in my 
judgment, those disappointments can become 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Palm Springs April 5 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at Palm 
Springs, Calif., on April 5. 

Press release 183 dated April 5 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentle- 
men, I just want to bring you up to date on 
the discussions that have been taking place. 
The President, General Weyand [Gen. Fred- 
erick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United 
States Army], and I met for about an hour 
and one-half this morning. General Weyand 
gave us a report about the military situa- 
tion in South Viet-Nam as he sees it and 
some of the options which he believes should 
be considered. 

The President invited General Weyand to 
return this afternoon, and on that occasion 
he will bring along with him two intelli- 
gence experts, as well as the Defense Depart- 
ment expert who has been handling military 
supplies. We will then go into the question 
of the political situation and the long-term 
supply situation in detail. 

The President has also ordered an NSC 
[National Security Council] meeting for 
probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip 
until Wednesday morning to permit General 
Weyand and his team to report to the entire 
NSC. In the meantime, he has ordered that 
the NSC staff, in close cooperation with the 
other agencies, develop for their NSC meet- 
ing a statement of the various options before 

These are the procedures that are going 
to be followed. I make these points in order 
to indicate that we are at the very early 
stages of considering the report of General 
Weyand. No decisions will be taken while 
the President is in Palm Springs. Rather, 
we will use this opportunity for the fullest 
possible briefing of the President, and then 

the staffs in Washington are going to ana- 
lyze the reports, prepare the options, and 
then the entire NSC will consider the matter. 
I might also point out that we are con- 
sidering releasing the report of General 
Weyand after the President has had an op- 
portunity to study it, with just some minor 
deletions, by the middle of the week so the 
public can have the general appreciation. 
This is where we stand, and I will be glad to 
answer questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the enor- 
inous amount of military equipment that has 
been lost in South Viet-Nam by the deteri- 
oration of the South Vietnamese Army, do 
you see any conceivable way that you can 
justify sending additional military equip- 
ment to South Viet-Nam until at least the 
South Vietnamese Army shows it can stand 
and hold its own territory? 

Secretary Kissinger: The determination 
that has to be made is with respect to the 
military capacity of the South Vietnamese 
Army to defend the remaining territories. 
We have received another detailed analysis 
from General Weyand as to some estimates 
of what would be required to effect this. 

The loss of territory in the north — I think 
it is important to understand what the mili- 
tary situation was. In flagrant violation of 
article 7 of the Paris accords, the North 
Vietnamese have introduced almost their en- 
tire army into South Viet-Nam, so that 
there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in 
South Viet-Nam at this moment, leaving 
only two or three divisions in North Viet- 
Nam; and this is in flagrant, total violation 
of solemn agreements which were endorsed 
by the international community. 

That created an unbalanced military sit- 
uation in the north in which whatever the 

\pril 28, 1975 


South Vietnamese did it would be wrong. 
If they stood, they were going to be defeated 
piecemeal. If they retreated, they ran the 
risk of disintegration of the units that were 
retreating, which is in fact what happened. 

But one of the aspects of our examina- 
tion is of course what the military situation 
is and what degree of American help can be 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnam.' 
ese Army defend the remaining territory, 
and what are the requirements of their army 
now to defend that territory? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, this 
is of course one of the issues that has to be 
looked at. There is a possibility for the 
South Vietnamese military forces to stabilize 
the situation. The next question is for what 
length of time and against what level of 

Then there is also the moral question for 
the United States— whether when an ally 
with which it has been associated for 10 
years wishes to defend itself, whether it is 
the United States that should make the deci- 
sion for it by withholding supplies, that it 
should no longer defend itself. 

These are all questions that are involved 
in the examination that is now going on. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, General Thieu [Nguyen 
Van Thieu, President of the Republic of 
Viet-Nam] seems to have adopted some of 
the Administration's langtiage in explaining 
about ivhy he retreated; namely, that the 
United States failed to supply him tvith aid. 
In fact, he said it woidd be an act of betrayal 
if we continued to fail to supply aid. Now, 
how is that going to help your problems with 
the U.S. Congress? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think, Mr. Lisagor 
[Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], that 
one of the most important things that all of 
us can do— the Administration, Congress, 
and if I may say so, the press as well— is to 
recognize that we are facing a great human 
tragedy and that we don't try to gloat over 
arguments that may have been made or to 
try to pick on things that men who obviously 


are in despair now may be saying. 

There are certain facts in the situation 
which may be difficult and unpleasant, but 
which are nevertheless true. It is a fact that 
the aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut by a 
third the first year and by another 50 per- 
cent the following year. 

This coincided with a worldwide inflation 
and a fourfold increase in fuel prices, so that 
a situation was created, for a variety of 
reasons, in which almost all of the American 
military aid had to be given for ammunition 
and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and 
none for new equipment. 

Even the ammunition had to be rationed, 
according to General Weyand, and so that 
individual guns could, for example, fire only 
two rounds a day. To what extent did such 
a situation contribute to the demoralization 
of the army, and to what extent the cer- 
tainty, as they were looking at the situation, 
of constantly declining aid levels produced a 
decision to withdraw, which in turn pro- 
duced a panic, I think is fairly evident. 

This is far from saying this was the inten- 
tion of those who cut the aid, and I think it 
is safe to say that you can tell from the 
public statements that senior Administration 
officials made that there was no expectation 
of a massive North Vietnamese attack this 

So, there were a number of factors in- 
volved here, and I think there is some merit 
in what General Thieu is saying now. I 
think some of the adjectives he used are 
those of a desperate man who is in great 
anguish. And I think it is also fair to say 
that the United States, for 10 years, put in 
a great deal of its efforts and of its blood 
and of its treasure, and that, too, should 
weigh in the scale, and that we made a 
very great effort through a long period of 
time. So, we have to evaluate it over an 
extended period of time. 

Q. Could I just follow that a moment? 
We keep talking about a massive North Viet- 
namese invasion, and many of us have been 
led to believe that this ivas a case of ivith- 
drawal by General Thieu. The President 
commented on that in San Diego, saying it 
was a poorly planned and unnecessary affair. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Would yon he more precise about what 

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of our 
understanding, what happened was the fol- 
lowing: In December, the North Vietnamese 
plan was to continue an intensified version of 
the operations of last year; that is to say, 
to pick off outlying district towns and per- 
haps to attack one or two provincial capitals. 
In January, for a variety of reasons, the 
North Vietnamese decided to make a larger 
attack, and they concentrated on the Prov- 
ince of Phuoc Long, in total violation of the 
Paris accords. When they succeeded in that 
operation without significant opposition 
from the South Vietnamese Government, 
which felt itself ovei-extended, and without 
any military reaction or even military moves 
by the United States, they decided to make 
an all-out attack this year. 

From the middle of January on, a massive 
infiltration of North Vietnamese divisions 
started. President Thieu at that point 
was faced with a situation — also President 
Thieu found out during the battle of Ban 
Me Thuot, which followed the battle of 
Phuoc Long, of his fleet of C-130's only six 
were flyable because of the absence of spare 
pai'ts so that his strategic mobility had been 
substantially reduced. 

As he saw the North Vietnamese buildup 
and as he saw the prospects of American 
aid in any case declining whatever the deci- 
sion of the Congress would be — I think it 
was a reasonable assumption that the level 
of aid would be declining — he made the stra- 
tegic decision of consolidating his forces 
this year, depriving the North Vietnamese 
of the momentum of this campaign season, 
use his supplies up in the battles next year, 
and hope for new appropriations in 1977. 
This was his strategic assessment. 
I In terms of a strategic assessment, it 
I made a lot of sense. The trouble was that 
i in executing it, it was not planned with suf- 
jficient care, with sufficient understanding of 
[the logistic system of South Viet-Nam. And 
it was compounded by the fact that the 
South Vietnamese divisions have their de- 
pendents living with them — so that when a 

April 28, 1975 

South Vietnamese division moved, all of 
their dependents moved with them, which in 
turn triggered a mass exodus of refugees, 
immobilizing these armies, and at some point 
along this retreat that turned into a panic 
where the soldiers were trying to take care 
of their families. 

So, the decision was triggered by a correct 
evalution of his prospects, the prospects be- 
ing that if he kept his units strung out, they 
would probably be defeated by this massive 
North Vietnamese invasion ; and to try to 
get to a more consolidated line, in executing 
what was probably a correct strategic deci- 
sion, he of course brought about conse- 
quences with which we are familiar, which 
are tragic. I am just trying to explain our 
best understanding of what happened. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has 
spent about $1W-$150 billion in South Viet- 
Nam. What is it that makes the Adminis- 
tration think that $300 million, or even an 
amount somewhat larger than that, would 
do any good? What is it that makes you think 
additional money is ever going to he able to 
make the South Vietnamese Army fight or 
solve the situation, when you spend $1U0- 
$150 billion and you are in the situation 
you are in noiv? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I 
pointed out, this whole situation is going to 
be reviewed by the National Security Coun- 
cil on Tuesday, and I do not want to pre- 
judge all of these decisions. 

There is, however, also involved a question 
of the obligations a country has that for 10 
years has fought somewhere, which has en- 
couraged millions of people to associate 
themselves with the United States, and 
whether it should then refuse to let them 
defend themselves if they want to defend 

This is one argument on the military side. 
On the humanitarian side, I think it is im- 
portant and decisive that the United States 
has an obligation to the hundreds of thou- 
sands who were closely associated with it 
and must make a maximum effort on the 
level of refugees and otherwise. 


Q. I am not talking about the humani- 
tarian side, Mr. Secretary. I am, asking, in 
effect, tvhether $lJtO-$150 hillioyi is not as 
much moral obligation as the United States 
can undertake? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is the decision 
that will have to be made by first the Presi- 
dent and then the Congress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, woidd you anticipate 
that the President wotdd make these deci- 
sions in time to tell us about them in the so- 
called "state of the world" address Thurs- 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had an 
opportunity to discuss with the President 
in great detail what he intends to say in 
this address. My impression is he will deal 
with the immediate foreign policy situation 
that he feels the United States is confront- 
ing, and I would think it is extremely prob- 
able that he would put before the Congress 
on that occasion at least some preliminary 
ideas of at least some immediate measures 
that in his judgment have to be taken. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the Neiv York Times 
has a report from Paris this mm-ning that 
the French Government has initiated plans 
to implement the Paris peace accords and 
to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, 
that the French are going to be active in all 
of Viet-Nam in humanitarian and refugee 
work. Do you have any comment on that? 
Have you been informed of this, and ivhat is 
the outlook of this taking place? 

Secretary Kissinger: We would gratefully 
welcome any attempt by any nation, includ- 
ing France, to participate in the humani- 
tarian effort. 

Secondly, we have attempted to encourage 
all of the signatories of the Paris accords 
to bring about their implementation ; and 
therefore, if France is attempting to bring 
about an implementation of the Paris ac- 
cords, we would certainly look at their pro- 
posals with sympathy. 

We have not received an official French 
proposal — and, indeed, I was not aware of 
this particular report — but the United States 

strongly favors the implementation of the 
Paris accords, which have been grossly and 
outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would 
support the efforts of any country that 
would attempt to bring about an implemen- 
tation of those accords. 

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press Inter- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard around 
here that this is not our war. We have also 
seen some pretty pessimistic reports from 
everywhere that the ball game is over. And 
also, you seem to neglect the area ivhile you 
are concentrating on the Middle East. What 
do you have to say for that? Do you think 
Soidheast Asia is still as viable as yon 
thought it was two years ago? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my trip 
to the Middle East to deal with the question 
that I was dealing with, other problems, had 
been scheduled for many months ; and when 
I left on the trip to the Middle East, we 
had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of 
which was well understood and which really 
required a congressional decision. It did not 
require decisions by the Administration. 

We did not expect an imminent crisis in 
Viet-Nam, and you remember that the Secre- 
tary of Defense stated a view, which all of 
us shared, that the attacks this year would 
not be of a critical nature; so that the dis- 
integration of the situation in the northern 
half of Viet-Nam was quite unexpected to us 
in the sense that we were not told in advance 
of the decision to evacuate. 

It really did not reach the proportions it 
has until after my return from the Middle 
East. There is no question that South Viet- 
Nam faces an extremely grave situation. 
There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in 
South Viet-Nam, in blatant violation of the 
Paris accords. And there is no agreement 
in history that is self-enforcing. If the sig- 
natories of the agreement cannot enforce it, 
either by actions of their own or by aid to 
the aggrieved parties, then a difficult situa- 
tion is inevitable. 

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam 
was not permitted to infiltrate or to add any 
additional forces to those it already had in 


Department of State Bulletin 

South Viet-Nam. At that time, it had some- 
thing like 80,000 to 100,000 people in South 
Viet-Nam. Today, it has closer to 400,000 
in South Viet-Nam. 

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam 
was not permitted to introduce new equip- 
ment except through ICCS [International 
Commission of Control and Supervision] 
checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to- 
one basis for equipment that had been lost, 
damaged, and destroyed. 

The North Vietnamese never even per- 
mitted the establishment of these check- 
points and totally disregarded the agree- 
ment. This is what brought about the change 
in the military situation, which was com- 
pounded by the fact that the South Vietnam- 
ese Army inventories were running down 
while the North Vietnamese inventories 
were increasing. 

This is the objective structure of what 
happened in the last two years. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Administration 
any indication from the Democratic leader- 
ship of Congress that Congress will he any 
more receptive to providing more military 
aid now than they were before they went 
into recess? 

Secretary Kissiyiger: As you know, the 
Congress is in recess right now, and I am 
confident that the President is going to be 
in touch with the congressional leadership. 

He has not had an opportunity, to the 
best of my knowledge, to be in touch with 
the congressional leadership, but again, let 
me make one point: It is unavoidable that 
when one analyzes the causes of a situation, 
it may be taken as a criticism of this or that 

I think, in the history of Viet-Nam, there 
is enough criticism to go around. There 
have been mistakes made by the executive 
branch, and there have been mis judgments 
made by the legislative. 

I think the major requirement for the 
United States, recognizing that we will now 
have a diflficult set of decisions and a difficult 
set of debates, is to cpme out of this with 
dignity and without adding to the bitter- 
ness and viciousness which has so drained 

us over the years. We will try to do our best 
to contribute to this. Whether we will always 
succeed, I don't know. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said at your last 
press conference, in some very strong lan- 
guage, that the problem was that this was 
now a question of what kind of people we 
are and tvhether or not we ivill destroy de- 
liberately an ally. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. 

Q. The scenario that you gave us today 
indicates that while that $300 million would 
have been needed, there was a proper, com- 
prehensible decision to make, yet it was 
poorly executed, and that is ivhy ive have 
the problem. Your scenario does not really 
seem to back up the question of layiyig the 

Secretary Kissinger: Wait just a minute. 
It is not just a question of $300 million. It 
is a question that since 1973 the combina- 
tion of declining aid levels, inflation, and 
rising fuel prices has led to a constant attri- 
tion of the South Vietnamese Army. It is 
not just a decision of this Congress to delay 
$300 million. It is a process that has been 
going on for a period of two years. 

The statement I made in the press con- 
ference, which was under slightly different 
military conditions, at least as they were 
then perceived in Washington, was in terms 
of those decisions; but nevertheless it is a 
very important moral question for the 
United States whether when people who, 
with its encouragement, have fought for 
many years should in their hour of extrem- 
ity be told by the United States that while 
they want to continue fighting that the 
United States would no longer help them 
defend themselves against an enemy who 
has never been told by its allies that there 
is a limit beyond which they won't support 

I maintain that is a question that we 
ought to ask ourselves as a people. Regard- 
less of the probable outcome of the war, I 
think it is a serious question. It is not meant 
necessarily as a criticism of anybody, and 
I really believe that at this moment, having 

^pril 28, 1975 


paid so much in our national unity on this 
issue, we should conduct this debate not 
with an attitude of who is going to pin the 
blame on whom, but with an attitude that 
we are facing a great tragedy in which 
there is involved something of American 
credibility, something of American honor, 
something of how we are perceived by other 
people in the world, on which serious people 
may have different questions but in which, 
for God's sake, we ought to stop talking as 
if one side had the monopoly of wisdom, 
morality, and insight and that serious people 
trying to deal with this problem are trying 
to run a confidence game. This is all that I 
am trying to suggest. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my 
question really was getting toivard, are you 
personally convinced that if we had voted 
that extra $300 million that was requested 
for the emergency supplemental or if we 
had actually appropriated the full amotint 
requested in the beginning, $1.14. billion, that 
we ivoidd not have faced the situation we 
now face, either at this time or sometime 
doivn the road? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe personally 
that it is not just the $300 million. It is the 
$300 million coming on top of a lot of other 
things. I believe that if it had not been for 
the moralities of executive authority result- 
ing from Watergate, if the aid levels had 
been appropriate over the years, and if we 
had been freer to conduct foreign policy 
than was possible under these circumstances 
— partly for reasons in which the executive 
shares a responsibility — I believe that cer- 
tainly the difficulties we face this year could 
have been avoided for a number of years. 

For how long, it is hard to say, but very 
often, if we look over the postwar period, a 
period of time gain gets a possibility of 
things developing. But I would add, more- 
over, that it would have made a lot of dif- 
ference to us as a people, that if it hap- 
pened, if it had more clearly happened as 
a result of actions not so much under our 
control. But I would finally add, since you 
asked the question, and I did not volunteer 
this statement, that at some point in this 

discussion — we now cannot avoid the dis- 
cussion — at some point in this discussion 
we ought to stop this inquiry and ask our- 
selves where we go from here. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. 
One is, you keep referring to the massive 
violations by the North Vietnamese, and in 
view of their record, I wonder why you 
thought at the time the agreements were 
negotiated, or at any other time, that they 
ivere going to abide by them? We knew very 
early, as you said, they did not allow us to 
establish checkpoints. 

My other question is, do you think there 
would be any benefit if the United States 
were able to provide some military aid now, 
through bombing or any other measiire, to 
stem the tide of what is going on? 

Secretary Kissinger: The first thing I 
think the people ought to remember is the 
kind of national debate that was going on 
in the United States in 1971 and 1972. I 
think it is indisputable that there was over- 
whelming consensus developing that the 
United States should end its participation in 
the war. 

And you may remember that before I went 
on my last negotiation, the Democratic 
caucus had already voted to set a terminal 
date to our participation in the war; that 
is, January 1973. 

Let me point out this did not affect the 
actual terms of the negotiations, which were 
substantially agreed to before that. So, I 
am simply trying to reconstruct the national 
mood, which was that the American military 
participation in the war had to be ended. 

The major debate that then occurred was 
whether the United States should deliberate- 
ly overthrow the government with which it 
was associated; and that we refused to do. 

Now, that the North Vietnamese would 
press against the edges of the agreement 
was to be expected. What was not to be 
expected was that, partly through legislative 
action and partly through our internal divi- 
sions, we would find ourselves in a position 
where a forceful diplomacy became extreme- 
ly difficult, and this certainly accelerated the 
violations and made them substantially free. 


Department of State Bulletin 

So, we had no illusions that we were deal- 
ing with a country other than one that had 
violated every other agreement that it had 
made, but under the conditions in which the 
agreement was made of a strong period in 
American foreign policy, we believed that 
we would be able to exercise sufficient in- 
fluence on the situation to keep the viola- 
tions to manageable proportions and also to 
obtain sufficient aid to permit the South 
Vietnamese to handle the problem. 

So, those expectations, for reasons that no 
one could possibly predict at that time, were 
not fulfilled. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a look at the future 
rather than the past. I have two questions. 
One, isn't it likely that if we provided the 
$300 million at this point, the likelihood 
would be that it would only prolong the fight- 
ing, cost more lives, and end in the same 
result? Tivo, the President and General 
Weyand have said they think the situation is 
salvageable. I ivonder what evidence you 
have to give any hope that it is salvageable? 

Secretary Kissinger: The President will 
study all the recommendations of General 
Weyand, plus the judgment of all of his 
senior advisers over the next days, and I 
think it is for the President then to make 
the judgment and to state it in his press 

I would like also to point out that even 
if this situation should finally wind up in 
some negotiation, it is not a matter of in- 
diff"erence whether it is done in such a way 
that permits the maximum extraction of 
refugees and of those whose very lives are 
at stake in the present situation. 

So, there are very many levels of objec- 
tives that can be set. There is a point of 
view, which we will be examining, that the 
situation can be stabilized by a combination 
of the shortened lines, infusion of American 
aid, and other measures. That point of view, 
together with other points of view, will be 
considered over the next few days, and the 
President will report his conclusions to the 
Congress on Thursday. 

My point in appearing here is to tell you 
primarily what the status of our discussion 

April 28, 1975 

is at this moment; and at this moment the 
President has really done nothing but spend 
about 90 percent of his time listening and 
asking questions to the purely military 
aspect of General Weyand's report. 

He will get a further discussion of that 
this afternoon, together with the intelligence 
appraisal, and then this whole matter will 
be submitted to the National Security Coun- 
cil ; so I do not want to preempt his decisions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is 
of the essence, and with the events hap- 
pening as quickly as they are over there, 
isn't time being wasted with the President 
being out here? Isn't this ivhole policy- 
making process being delayed because of the 
distances between here and Washington? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to 
answer that question. Isn't time being 
wasted ? 

Q. Isn't time being wasted in the policy- 
making decision with NSC being all back in 
Washington, you are here. General Weyand 
is here, the President is here. Couldn't it be 
done faster if everything was concentrated 
back there ? It seems the middle of the week 
is awfully late for something so important. 

Secretary Kissinger: There are about $175 
million left in the pipeline in the current 
appropriations. We are expediting the ship- 
ment of that equipment to Viet-Nam. No 
matter what decision is made by the Presi- 
dent, it could not take effect for a number 
of weeks. 

Therefore we believe in decisions of this 
importance it is extremely crucial that there 
be a very careful and a very prayerful ex- 
amination of all the choices before us, and 
there is no effective delay, no matter what 
decisions the President eventually decides. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the 
other part of that question about whether 
bombing is still an option and whether that 
would be of any assistance, help to the South 

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the ■ 
introduction of American military forces in 
or over Viet-Nam is prohibited by specific 


legislation that was passed in July 1973, 
which was, I may say, another complicated 
factor in the enforcement of the agreement. 
It is not so much a question of what we 
would have done. It is a question of what the 
other side knew we could not possibly do. 
Therefore, before any such action could be 
comtemplated, the President would have to 
ask authority from the Congress to do that; 
and I do not anticipate that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions 
that is troubling many Americans and some 
people in this room, as you have already 
judged, is that ivhat is happening in Viet- 
Nam today was foreseen by vfiany people 
once the American troops withdrew. My 
question is, why then must the nation be 
asked to wear a hair shirt because of what 
has happened? 

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is not 
whether the nation must be made to wear a 
hair shirt. The President is trying, to the 
best of his abilities, to make clear what he 
takes to be the causes of that situation. 

We will never know whether it would have 
happened if enforcement had been carried 
out more aggressively and aid had been 
given more substantially. He is simply try- 
ing to point out his analysis of what brought 
about the present situation. After all, the 
people who predicted this could have been 
wrong. Maybe they could have been right. 
We do not know now. 

Q. You do acknowledge that a great many 
people did predict it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, yes, and I am 
saying, of course, there were many people 
who made that argument, and that still does 
not change the question of whether the 
United States, having made all these in- 
vestments, should not have carried out at 
least its moral obligations more fully. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what 
some of the options are that are being con- 
sidered? We are not going to get a chance 
to talk to General Weyand, so we don't know 
what the suggestions are. 

Secretary Kissinger: I really cannot prop- 

erly go into it. Partly this is due to the fact 
that this morning General Weyand concen- 
trated, I would say, exclusively on two things 
— his analysis of the reasons for the develop- 
ment of the military situation and, secondly, 
his analysis of the military prospects. 

We have not yet covered the humanitarian 
problems, the evacuation problems of refu- 
gees, the possibilities that were alluded to, 
of which we have no formal indication, of 
restoration of the Paris accords. 

So, all of these will have to be issues that 
will have to be examined in developing the 
options, but what we are planning is to go 
over that this afternoon, to sketch out some 
of the main options as we see them. 

Then, the Embassy staff, together with 
General Weyand, the Defense Department, 
and the Central Intelligence Agency, will 
pull them together into a more compre- 
hensive option paper, which will then be 
put before the National Security Council 
on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President spoke in 
his press conference of solemn commitments 
we had made to South Viet-Nam. This, I 
am sure you are aware, has raised many 
questions of secret agreements or tacit tin- 
derstandings or that kind of thing. First 
of all, what solemn commitments was the 
President referring to? Was he referring 
only to the one-for-one replacement, ivhich, 
as I understand it, was not a commitment 
but an option? And if he was not referring 
to that, what was he talking about? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I have explained, 
I think, at a previous press conference, he 
was not talking of a legal commitment. He 
was talking of a moral commitment. I be- 
lieve that the South Vietnamese had every 
reason to think that if they permitted Amer- 
ican troops to withdraw and if they enabled 
us to retrieve our prisoners, that we would 
carry out what we had called the Vietnami- 
zation process in enabling them to defend 

We did not give them any specific figures, 
and we did not give them any definite prom- 


Department of State Bulletin 

ises, except to indicate that obviously, having 
signed the Paris agreement, we would have 
an interest in its enforcement. 

But I believe that what the President 
was talking about was a moral obligation, 
not a legal commitment. He was talking 
about something growing out of a 10-year 
engagement of the United States ended by 
our withdrawal, not about secret clauses in 
particular documents. 

There is no question that when we were 
negotiating the agreement we ourselves be- 
lieved that the American debate had not con- 
cerned economic or military aid ; and I think 
if you check the record, there was no debate 
on that subject at the time. 

The American debate had concerned the 
question of whether enough Americans had 
died there and whether the South Vietnam- 
ese should not be able to defend themselves, 
and I believe, in all fairness, we all have to 
admit to ourselves, that we all believed that 
if the South Vietnamese would make the 
effort to defend themselves, there would be 
great receptivity in this country to help 
them do it as long as our prisoners could 
come back and Americans could stop 
dying there. That was the assumption with- 
in which we were operating, and I think 
if you read the back files of newspapers 
and congressional debates, that was the 
essence of our debate at the time. 

Therefore it was never put in the form 
of a legal commitment, and it is not that 
we are violating a legal commitment. It is 
the President's perception of the moral obli- 
gation growing out of the context of events. 

I just want to say again, many of you 
have heard me brief on this subject now for 
six years, and I think none of you have ever 
heard me question the travail and concern 
of those who have opposed the war, and all 
we can ask is that those of you who have 
been critical ought to keep in mind that 
there is a great human tragedy that those 
in the Administration are viewing and they 
are trying to deal with it in the best interest 
of the United States and in the best interests 
of world peace. 

Thank you. 


Current Actions 



Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention 
on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 
1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 
1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974. 
Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975. 


Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 

Ratification deposited: Romania (with declara- 
tion), March 6, 1975. 


Agreement on an international energy program. 
Done at Paris November 18, 1974.' 
Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 11, 


Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of 
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of 
bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Ge- 
neva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 
8, 1928. 
Ratification deposited: United States, April 10, 

1975 (with reservation). 
Entered into force for the United States: April 

10, 1975. 


Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. En- 
tered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Qatar, April 4, 1975. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 7, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975. 

Not in force. 

April 28, 1975 


Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975. 


Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975. 
Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975. 

Program-Carrying Signals — 
Distribution by Satellite 

Convention relating to the distribution of pro- 
gramme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. 
Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.' 
Signature: Yugoslavia, March 31, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 

Accession deposited: Canada (with a declara- 
tion), March 7, 1975. 
International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 
1, 1974.' 

Signature: Spain (subject to ratification), March 
4, 1975. 

Sea, Exploration of 

Convention for the International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen Sep- 
tember 12, 1964. Entered into force July 22, 1968; 
for the United States April 18, 1973. TIAS 7628. 

Protocol to the convention for the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (TIAS 
7628). Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.' 
Accession deposited: German Democratic Repub- 
lic, February 17, 1975. 


Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO). 

Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered 

into force November 1, 1974.^ 

Declarations of approval deposited: Bangladesh, 
February 19, 1975; Cuba, January 8, 1975; 
Czechoslovakia, February 10, 1975; Dahomey, 
December 31, 1974; Ecuador, February 11, 1975; 
El Salvador, February 11, 1975; Hungary, No- 
vember 12, 1974; Israel, January 20, 1975; 
Poland, February 21, 1975; Uganda, December 
12, 1974. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Open for 
signature at Washington from March 25 through 
April 14, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, 
with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 
1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Mauritius, March 25, 1975; Brazil, 
March 31, 1975; Korea, April 3, 1975; Pakistan, 
April 4, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics (with statement) April 8, 1975; Algeria, 
Austria, Egypt, Guatemala, South Africa, United 
States, April 10, 1975; Australia, Finland, 
Morocco, April 11, 1975. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Open for 
signature at Washington from March 25 through 
April 14, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, 
with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 
1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Signature: United States (with statement), April 
10, 1975. 



Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed 
minutes, exchanges of notes and aide memoire. 
Signed at Brasilia March 14, 1975. Enters into 
force on the date mutually agreed by exchange 
of notes, upon completion of the internal proce- 
dures of both parties. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 25, 1974 
(TIAS 7993). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Santiago April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 
1, 1975. 


Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 
1973. Entered into force March 11, 1975. 
Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. 
Signed at Colombo March 25, 1975. Entered into 
force March 25, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

" Not in force for the United States. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX April 28, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 1870 

Asia. President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations 
With the Rest of the World (address before 
a joint session of Congress) 529 

Congress. President Ford Reviews U.S. Rela- 
tions With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) . . . 529 

Economic Affairs. President Ford Reviews 
U.S. Relations With the Rest of the World 
(address before a joint session of Congress) 529 

Energy. President Ford Reviews U.S. Rela- 
tions With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) . . . 529 

Europe. President Ford Reviews U.S. Rela- 
tions With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) . . . 529 

Greece. President Ford Reviews U.S. Rela- 
tions With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) . . . 529 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia) 

President Ford Reiterates Request for Assist- 
ance to Cambodia (statement by press sec- 
retary) 538 

President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations With 
the Rest of the World (address before a 
joint session of Congress) 529 

President Ford's News Conference at San 

Diego April 3 (excerpts) 542 

U.S. Personnel Evacuated From Phnom Penh 

(Ford, Department statement) 540 

Middle East. President Ford Reviews U.S. Re- 
lations With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) . . . 529 

Presidential Documents 

Assistance in Evacuating Refugees ' From 

South Vietnamese Seaports 540 

President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations With 

the Rest of the World 529 

President Ford Saddened by Deaths in Viet- 

Nam Orphan Airlift Crash 541 

President Ford's News Conference at San 

Diego April 3 (excerpts) 542 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 555 

Turkey. President Ford Reviews U.S. Rela- 
tions With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) .... 529 

U.S.S.R. President Ford Reviews U.S. Rela- 
tions With the Rest of the World (address 
before a joint session of Congress) .... 529 


Assistance in Evacuating Refugees From 

South Vietnamese Seaports (Ford) . . . 540 

President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations With 
the Rest of the World (address before a 
joint session of Congress) 529 

President Ford Saddened by Deaths in Viet- 
Nam Orphan Airlift Crasjfi (statement) . . 541 

President Ford's News Conference at San 
Diego April 3 (excerpts) 542 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Palm Springs April 5 547 

U.S. Calls on North Viet-Nam To End Mili- 
tary Offensive (note to participants in In- 
ternational Conference on Viet-Nam and 
members of ICCS; note to North Viet-Nam) 539 

Name Index 

Ford, President 529, 540, 541, 542 

Kissinger, Secretary 547 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 7-13 

Pre.is releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to April 7 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 183 
of April 5. 

No. Date Subjnt 

*184 4/7 Easum sworn in as Ambassador 
to Nigeria (biographic data). 

^■"185 4/9 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, May 5. 

*186 4/9 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, May 9. 

*187 4/9 Bowdler sworn in as Ambassador 
to the Republic of South Africa 
(biographic data). 

tl88 4/9 U.S. -Colombia joint communique. 

■189 4/10 Laise sworn in as Director Gen- 
eral of the Foreign Service (bio- 
graphic data). 
190 4/10 International Women's Year staff 

*191 4/10 Overseas Schools Advisory Coun- 
cil, May 12. 

*192 4/11 Shlaudeman sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Venezuela (biographic 
193 4/11 Diplomatic note on Viet-Nam. 
193A4/11 Diplomatic note to North Viet- 

*194 4/11 Ruckelshaus to chair Commission 
on the Observance of Interna- 
tional Women's Year. 

'•194A 4/11 Agenda of Commission on the 
Observance of International 
Women's Year. 

*194B 4/11 Members of Commission on the 
Observance of International 
Women's Year. 

*195 4/11 U.S. and Jamaica extend textile 

*196 4/11 Seven leaders in higher educa- 
tion to visit the Soviet Union. 

*• Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 

official business 


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Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
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months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXII 

No. 1871 

May 5, 1975 


Address by Secretary Kissinger and Questions and Answers 
Before the American Society of Neivspaper Editors 557 


Excerpts From Transcript 567 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXII, No. 1871 
May 5, 1975 

For sale by the Superintendent of Document* 

U.S. Government PrintinB Office 

WashinBton, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.16 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are uort 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed In 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by tht 
OfKce of Media Services, Bureau oi 
Public Affairs, provides the public ane 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments ii 
the field of U.S. foreign relations am 
on the work of the Department am 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issuei 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addressei 
and news conferences of the Presiden 
and the Secretary of State and othe 
officers of the Department, as well a 
special articles on various phases o 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information i 
included concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which th 
United States is or may become i 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department o 
State, United Nations documents, en- 
legislative material in the field o 
international relations are also lisiet 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding Strength Through Adversity 

Folloiving is an address by Secretary 
Kissinger made before the Amei'lcari Society 
of Newspaper Editors at Washington on 
April 17, together with the transcript of a 
question-and-a7iswer session after the ad- 


Press release 204 dated April 17; as prepared for delivery 

I am here to sound a note of hope about 
the future of our foreign policy despite the 
fact that we are now going through a period 
of adversity. 

A nation facing setbacks can submerge it- 
self in acrimony, looking for scapegoats 
rather than lessons. It can ignore or gloss 
over its difficulties and fatuously proceed as 
if nothing serious had happened. 

Or it can examine its situation dispassion- 
ately, draw appropriate conclusions, and 
chart its future with realism and hope. 

President Ford has chosen this latter 
course. A week ago he called upon Congress 
and the American people to turn this time 
of difficulty into a demonstration of spirit — 
to prove once again our devotion and our 
courage and to put these into the service of 
building a better world. 

For the entire postwar period our strength 
and our leadership have been essential in 
preserving peace and promoting progress. If 
either falters, major shifts in political align- 
ments will occur all around the world. The 
result will be new dangers for America's 
security and economic well-being. The Middle 
East war and oil embargo of 1973 demon- 
strated how distant events can threaten 
world peace and global prosperity simul- 
taneously. A reduction of American influence 

in key areas can have disastrous conse- 

How other nations perceive us is thus a 
matter of major consequence. Every day I 
see reports from our embassies relaying 
anguished questions raised by our friends. 
What do events in Indochina, the southern 
flank of NATO, and the Middle East sig- 
nify for America's competence — constancy — 
credibility — coherence? How will Americans 
react? What are the implications for future 
American policy? We can be certain that 
potential adversaries are asking themselves 
the same questions — not with sympathy, but 
to estimate their opportunities. 

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing 
to dangers produces a self-fulfilling proph- 
ecy, that the prediction of consequences 
brings them about. Unfortunately, life is 
not that simple. We cannot achieve credi- 
bility by rhetoric; we cannot manufacture 
coherence by proclamation; and we cannot 
change facts by not talking about them. 

We can do little about the world's judg- 
ment of our past actions. But we have it 
within our power to take charge of our 
future: if the United States responds to 
adversity with dignity, if we make clear to 
the world that we continue to hold a coherent 
perception of a constructive international 
role and mean to implement it, we can usher 
in a new era of creativity and accomplish- 
ment. We intend to do just that. 

I know that it is not easy for a people that 
faces major domestic difficulties to gear it- 
self up for new international eff'orts. But 
our economic future is bound up with the 
rest of the world — and with international 
developments in energy, trade, and economic 
policy. Our economic health depends on the 
preservation of American leadership abroad. 

This country has no choice. We must, 

May 5, 1975 


for our own sake, play a major role in world 
affairs. We have strong assets: a sound 
foreign policy design, major international 
achievements in recent years, and the enor- 
mous capacities of an industrious and gifted 
people. We have the resources, and the will, 
to turn adversity into opportunity. 


Let me start with our most tragic and 
immediate problem. 

I can add nothing to the President's re- 
quest for military and humanitarian assist- 
ance for the anguished people of South 
Viet-Nam. I support this appeal and have 
testified at length to that effect before con- 
gressional committees over the past several 

The time will come when it will be clear 
that no President could do less than to ask 
aid for those whom we encouraged to de- 
fend their independence and at whose side 
we fought for over a decade. Then Amer- 
icans will be glad that they had a President 
who refused to abandon those who des- 
perately sought help in an hour of travail. 

In Indochina our nation undertook a major 
enterprise for almost 15 years. We invested 
enormous prestige; tens of thousands died, 
and many more were wounded, imprisoned, 
and lost; we spent over $150 billion; and our 
domestic fabric was severely strained. 
Whether or not this enterprise was well con- 
ceived does not now change the nature of our 
problem. When such an effort founders, it is 
an event of profound significance — for our- 
selves and for others. 

I, for one, do not believe that it was igno- 
ble to have sought to preserve the independ- 
ence of a small and brave people. Only a 
very idealistic nation could have persevered 
in the face of so much discouragement. 

But where so many think that the war 
was a dreadful mistake, where thousands 
grieve for those they loved and others sor- 
row over their country's setback, there has 
been sufficient heartache for all to share. 

The Viet-Nam debate has now run its 
course. The time has come for restraint and 
compassion. The Administration has made 


its case. Let all now abide by the verdict of 
the Congress — without recrimination or vin- 

The Design 

Let us therefore look to the future. We 
start with a sound foreign policy structure. 

We are convinced that a continuing strong 
American role is indispensable to global sta- 
bility and progress. Therefore the central 
thrust of our foreign policy has been to 
adjust our role in the world and the con- 
ceptions, methods, and commitments which 
define it to the conditions of a new era — 
including an America fatigued by Indochina 

The postwar order of international rela- 
tions ended with the last decade. No sudden 
upheaval marked the passage of that era, 
but the cumulative change by the end of the 
1960's was profound. Gone w^as the rigid 
bipolar confrontation of the cold war. In 
its place was a more fluid and complex world 
— with many centers of power, more subtle 
dangers, and new hopeful opportunities. 
Western Europe and Japan were strongei 
and more self-confident; our alliances needec 
to be adjusted toward a more equal partner- 
ship. The Communist world had fragmented 
over doctrine and national interests; there 
were promising prospects for more stable 
relations based on restraint and negotiation 
And many of our friends in other parts of 
the globe were now better prepared to shoul- 
der responsibility for their security and well- 
being, but they needed our assistance during! 
the period of transition. 

At home, the American people and Con- 
gress were weary from two decades of global 
exertion and years of domestic turmoil. They 
were not prepared for confrontation unless 
all avenues toward peace had been explored. 

The challenge for our foreign policy has 
been to define an effective but more balanced 
U.S. role in the world, reducing excessive 
commitments without swinging toward pre- 
cipitate and dangerous withdrawal. 

We have come a long way. 

Our major allies in the Atlantic world and 
Japan have grown in strength politically and 
economically; our alliances are firm anchors 

Department of State Bulletin 

of world security and prosperity. They are 
the basis for close cooperation on a range of 
unprecedented new problems, from detente 
to energy. 

We have launched a hopeful new dialogue 
with Latin America. 

We are looking to a new era of relations 
with Africa. 

We have taken historic steps to stabilize 
and improve our relations with our major ad- 
versaries. We have reduced tensions, deep- 
ened dialogue, and reached a number of 
major agreements. 

We have begun the process of controlling 
the rival strategic arms programs which, 
unconstrained, threaten global security. 
When the Vladivostok agreement is com- 
pleted, a ceiling will have been placed for 
the first time on the level of strategic arse- 
nals of the superpowers. 

We have helped to ease longstanding po- 
litical conflicts in such sensitive areas as 
Berlin and the Middle East. 

And we have taken the major initiatives 
to mobilize the international response to new 
global challenges such as energy, food, the 
environment, and the law of the sea. 

In all these areas the American role has 
frequently been decisive. The design still 
stands; our responsibilities remain. There is 
every prospect for major progress. There is 
every reason for confidence. 

The Domestic Dimension 

If this be true, what then is the cause 
of our problem? Why the setbacks? Why 
the signs of impasse between the executive 
and the Congress? What must we do to pull 
ourselves together? 

Setbacks are bound to occur in a world 
which no nation alone can dominate or con- 
trol. The peculiar aspect of many of our 
problems is that they are of our own making. 
Domestic division has either compounded or 
caused difficulties from the southern flank 
of NATO to the Pacific, from the eastern 
Mediterranean to relations between the su- 

Paradoxically, herein resides a cause for 

May 5, 1975 

optirnism. For to the extent that the causes 
of our difl^culties are within ourselves, so are 
the remedies. 

The American people expect an effective 
foreign policy which preserves the peace and 
furthers our national interests. They want 
their leaders to shape the future, not just 
manage the present. This requires bold- 
ness, direction, nuance, and — above all — con- 
fidence between the public and the govern- 
ment and between the executive and the 
legislative branches of the government. But 
precisely this mutual confidence has been 
eroding over the past decade. 

There are many causes for this state of 
affairs. Some afflict democracies everywhere ; 
some are unique to America's tradition and 
recent history. Modern democracies are be- 
sieged by social, economic, and political 
challenges that cut across national bound- 
aries and lie at the margin of governments' 
ability to control. The energies of leaders 
are too often consumed by the management 
of bureaucracy, which turns questions of 
public purpose into issues for institutional 
bargaining. Instant communications force 
the pace of events and of expectations. Per- 
suasion, the essential method of democracy, 
becomes extraordinarily difficult in an era 
where issues are complex and outcomes un- 
certain. A premium is placed on simpHfica- 
tion — an invitation to demagogues. Too 
often, the result is a disaffection that simul- 
taneously debunks government and drains it 
of the very confidence that a democracy 
needs to act with conviction. 

All of this has compounded the complex 
problem of executive-legislative relations. In 
every country, the authority of the modern 
state seems frustratingly impersonal or re- 
mote from those whose lives it increasingly 
affects; in nearly every democracy, execu- 
tive authority is challenged by legislators 
who themselves find it difficult to affect policy 
except piecemeal or negatively. Issues be- 
come so technical that legislative oversight 
becomes increasingly difficult just as the 
issues become increasingly vital. The very 
essence of problem-solving on domestic is- 
sues — accommodation of special interests — 
robs foreign policy of consistency and focus 


when applied to our dealings with other 

Statesmen must act, even when premises 
cannot be proved; they must decide, even 
when intangibles will determine the out- 
come. Yet predictions are impossible to 
prove; consequences avoided are never evi- 
dent. Skepticism and suspicion thus become 
a way of life and infect the atmosphere of 
executive-legislative debate; reasoned argu- 
ments are overwhelmed by a series of con- 
frontations on peripheral issues. 

America faces as well the problem of its 
new generation. The gulf between their his- 
torical experience and ours is enormous. 
They have been traumatized by Viet-Nam as 
we were by Munich. Their nightmare is 
foreign commitment as ours was abdication 
from international responsibility. It is pos- 
sible that both generations learned their 
lessons too well. The young take for granted 
the great postwar achievements in restoring 
Europe, building peacetime alliances, and 
maintaining global prosperity. An imper- 
sonal, technological, bureaucratized world 
provides them too few incentives for dedica- 
tion and idealism. 

Let us remember that America's commit- 
ment to international involvement has always 
been ambivalent — even while our doubts 
were being temporarily submerged by the 
exertions of World War II and the postwar 
era. The roots of isolationism, nourished by 
geography and history, go deep in the Amer- 
ican tradition. The reluctance to be involved 
in foreign conflicts, the belief that we some- 
how defile ourselves if we engage in "power 
politics" and balances of power, the sense 
that foreign policy is a form of Old World 
imperialism, the notion that weapons are the 
causes of conflict, the belief that humani- 
tarian assistance and participation in the 
economic order are an adequate substitute 
for political engagement — all these were 
familiar characteristics of the American iso- 
lationism of the twenties and thirties. We 
took our power for granted, attributed our 
successes to virtue, and blamed our failures 
on the evil of others. We disparaged means. 
In our foreign involvement we have oscil- 
lated between exuberance and exhaustion, be- 

tween crusading and retreats into self-doubt. 
Following the Second World War a 
broad spectrum of civic leaders, professional 
groups, educators, businessmen, clergy, the 
media, congressional and national leaders of 
both parties led American public opinion to 
a new internationalist consensus. Taught by 
them and experience of the war, the nation 
understood that we best secured our domestic 
tranquillity and prosperity by enlightened 
participation and leadership in world aff'airs. 
Assistance to friends and allies was not a 
price to be paid, but a service to be rendered 
to international stability and therefore to 
our self-interest. 

But in the last decade, as a consequence 
of Indochina and other frustrations of global 
engagement, some of our earlier impulses 
have reasserted themselves. Leadership opin- 
ion has, to an alarming degree, turned sharp- 
ly against many of the internationalist 
premises of the postwar period. We now 
hear, and have for several years, that suffer- 
ing is prolonged by American involvement, 
that injustice is perpetuated by American 
inaction, that defense spending is wasteful 
at best and produces conflict at worse, that 
American intelligence activities are immoral, 
that the necessary confidentiality of diplo- 
macy is a plot to deceive the public, that 
flexibility is cynical and amoral — and that 
tranquillity is somehow to be brought about 
by an abstract purity of motive for which 
history offers no example. 

This has a profound — and inevitable — im- 
pact on the national mood and on the na- 
tional consensus regarding foreign policy. In 
the nation with the highest standard of liv- 
ing and one of the richest cultures in the 
world, in the nation that is certainly the most 
secure in the world, in the nation which has 
come closest of all to the ideals of civil 
liberty and pluralist democracy, we find 
a deep and chronic self-doubt, especially in 
the large urban centers and among presump- 
tive leaders. 

Will the American people support a re- 
sponsible and active American foreign policy 
in these conditions? I deeply believe that 
they will — if their leaders, in and out of 
government, give them a sense that they have 


Department of State Bulletin 

something to be proud of and something 
important to accomplish. 

When one ventures away from Washing- 
ton into the heart of America, one is struck 
by the confidence, the buoyancy, and the lack 
of any corrosive cynicism. We who sit at 
what my friend Stewart Alsop, a great jour- 
nalist, once called "the center" tend to dwell 
too much on our problems ; we dissect in 
overly exquisite detail our difficulties and our 

I find it remarkable that two-thirds of the 
Amai'icans interviewed in a nationwide poll 
in December, at a time of severe recession, 
still thought an active role in the world 
served their country's interests better than 
withdrawal. Even as other nations are close- 
ly watching the way we act in Washington, 
I suspect they marvel at the resiliency of 
our people and our institutions. 

There is a great reservoir of confidence 
within America. We have the values, the 
means, and we bear the responsibility to 
strive for a safer and better world. And 
there is a great reservoir of confidence 
around the globe in this country's values and 

Where Do We Go From Her*? 

So, let us learn the right lessons from to- 
day's trials. 

We shall have to pay the price for our set- 
backs in Indochina by increasing our exer- 
tions. We no longer have the margin of 
safety. In the era of American predom- 
inance, America's preferences held great 
sway. We could overwhelm our problems 
with our resources. We had little need to re- 
sort to the style of nations conducting for- 
eign policy with limited means: patience, 
subtlety, flexibility. Today, disarray, abdica- 
tion of responsibility, or shortsightedness 
exact a price that may prove beyond our 

We are still the largest single factor in 
international affairs, but we are one nation 
among many. The weight of our influence 
now depends crucially on our purposeful- 
ness, our perseverance, our creativity, our 

power, and our perceived reliability. We shall 
have to work harder to establish the co- 
herence and constancy of our policy — and we 

We must give up the illusion that foreign 
policy can choose between morality and prag- 
matism. America cannot be true to itself 
unless it upholds humane values and the dig- 
nity of the individual. But equally it cannot 
realize its values unless it is secure. No 
nation has a monopoly of justice or virtue, 
and none has the capacity to enforce its own 
conceptions globally. In the nuclear age espe- 
cially, diplomacy — like democracy — often in- 
volves the compromise of clashing principles. 
I need not remind you that there are some 
140 nations in the world, of which only a 
bare handful subscribe to our values. 

Abstract moralism can easily turn into 
retreat from painful choices or endless inter- 
ference in the domestic afi^airs of others; 
strict pragmatism, on the other hand, robs 
policy of vision and heart. Principles with- 
out security spell impotence; security with- 
out principles means irrelevance. The Amer- 
ican people must never forget that our 
strength gives force to our principles and 
our principles give purpose to our strength. 

Let us understand, too, the nature of our 
commitments. We have an obligation of 
steadfastness simply by virtue of our posi- 
tion as a great power upon which many 
others depend. Thus our actions and policies 
over time embody their own commitment 
whether or not they are enshrined in legal 
documents. Indeed, our actions and the per- 
ception of them by other countries may rep- 
resent our most important commitments. 

At the same time, diplomacy must be per- 
mitted a degree of confidentiality, or most 
serious exchange with other governments is 
destroyed. To focus the national debate on 
so-called secret agreements which no party 
has ever sought to implement and whose 
alleged subject matter has been prohibited 
by law for two years is to indulge what 
Mencken called the "national appetite for 
bogus revelation." It goes without saying 
that a commitment involving national action 
must be known to the Congress or it is mean- 

May 5, 1975 


One lesson we must surely learn from 
Viet-Nam is that new commitments of our 
nation's honor and prestige must be care- 
fully weighed. As Walter Lippmann observed, 
"In foreign relations, as in all other rela- 
tions, a policy has been formed only when 
commitments and power have been brought 
into balance." But after our recent experi- 
ences we have a special obligation to make 
certain that commitments we have made will 
be rigorously kept and that this is under- 
stood by all concerned. Let no ally doubt our 
steadfastness. Let no nation ever believe 
again that it can tear up with impunity a 
solemn agreement signed with the United 

We must continue our policy of seeking 
to ease tensions. But we shall insist that the 
easing of tensions cannot occur selectively. 
We shall not forget who supplied the arms 
which North Viet-Nam used to make a mock- 
ery of its signature on the Paris accords. 

Nor can we overlook the melancholy fact 
that not one of the other signatories of the 
Paris accords has responded to our repeated 
requests that they at least point out North 
Viet-Nam's flagrant violations of these 
agreements. Such silence can only under- 
mine any meaningful standards of interna- 
tional responsibility. 

At home, a great responsibility rests upon 
all of us in Washington. 

Comity between the executive and legisla- 
tive branches is the only possible basis for 
national action. The decade-long struggle 
in this country over executive dominance in 
foreign affairs is over. The recognition that 
the Congress is a coequal branch of govern- 
ment is the dominant fact of national poli- 
tics today. 

The executive accepts that the Congress 
must have both the sense and the reality of 
participation; foreign policy must be a 
shared enterprise. The question is whether 
the Congress will go beyond the setting of 
guidelines to the conduct of tactics ; whether 
it will deprive the executive of discretion and 
authority in the conduct of diplomacy while 
at the same time remaining institutionally 
incapable of formulating or carrying out a 
clear national policy of its own. 

The effective performance of our constitu- 
tional system has always rested on the 
restrained exercise of the powers and rights 
conferred by it. At this moment in our 
history there is a grave national imperative 
for a spirit of cooperation and humility be- 
tween the two branches of our government. 

Cooperation must be a two-way street. Just 
as the executive has an obligation to re- 
examine and then to explain its policies, so 
the Congress should reconsider the actions 
which have paralyzed our policies in the 
eastern Mediterranean, weakened our hand 
in relations with the U.S.S.R., and inhibited 
our dialogue in this hemisphere. Foreign 
policy must have continuity. If it becomes 
partisan, paralysis results. Problems are 
passed on to the future under progressively 
worse conditions. 

When other countries look to the United 
States, they see one nation. When they look 
to Washington, they see one government. 
They judge us as a unit — not as a series of 
unrelated or uncoordinated institutions. If 
we cannot agree among ourselves, there is 
little hope that we can negotiate effectively 
with those abroad. 

So one of the most important lessons to 
be drawn from recent events is the need to 
restore the civility of our domestic discourse. 
Over the years of the Viet-Nam debate ra- 
tional dialogue has yielded to emotion, sweep- 
ing far beyond the issues involved. Not only 
judgments but motives have been called into 
question. Not only policy but character has 
been attacked. What began as consensus 
progressively deteriorated into poisonous 

Leaders in government must do their 
share. The Administration, following the 
President's example, will strive for modera- 
tion and mutual respect in the national dia- 
logue. We know that if we ask for public 
confidence we must keep faith with the 

Debate is the essence of democracy. But 
it can elevate the nation only if conducted 
with restraint. 

The American people yearn for an end to 
the bitterness and divisiveness of the past 


Department of State Bulletin 

decade. Our domestic stability requires it. 
Our international responsibilities impose it. 
You, in this audience, are today in a unique 
position to contribute to the healing of the 

The Coming Agenda 

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great 
man ever complains a want of opportunity." 
Neither does a great nation. 

Our resources are vast; our leadership is 
essential; our opportunities are unprece- 
dented and insistent. 

The challenges of the coming decades will 
dwarf today's disputes. A new world order 
is taking shape around us. It will engulf us 
or isolate us if we do not act boldly. We 
cannot consume ourselves in self-destruction. 
We have great responsibilities: 

— We must maintain the vigor of the great 
democratic alliances. They can provide the 
anchor of shared values and purposes as we 
grapple with a radically new agenda. 

— We must overcome the current economic 
and energy crisis. A domestic energy pro- 
gram is thus an urgent national priority. 
Looking ahead, we envisage a fundamental- 
ly reformed international economic system, a 
Bretton Woods for the 1980's and beyond. 

— We must stand up for what we believe 
in international forums, including the United 
Nations, and resist the politics of resent- 
ment, of confrontation, and stale ideology. 
International collaboration has a more vital 
role now than ever, but so has mutual respect 
among nations. 

— We must meet our continuing responsi- 
bility for peace in many regions of the 
world, especially where we uniquely have the 
confidence of both sides and where failure 
could spell disaster beyond the confines of 
the region, as in the Middle East. We will 
not be pushed by threats of war or economic 
pressure into giving up vital interests. But 
equally, we will not, in the President's words, 
"accept stagnation or stalemate with all its 
attendant risks to peace and prosperity." ' 

— We must stop the spiral, and the spread, 
of nuclear weapons. We can then move on 

to a more ambitious agenda: mutual reduc- 
tions in .strategic arms, control of other 
weaponry, military restraint in other en- 

— We must overcome two scourges of man- 
kind: famine and the vagaries of nature. 
We reaffirm the food program announced at 
the World Food Conference last November. 
Our fundamental challenge is to help others 
feed themselves so that no child goes to bed 
hungry in the year 2000. 

— We must continue to reduce conflict and 
tensions with our adversaries. Over time, 
we hope that vigilance and conciliation will 
lead to more positive relationships and ulti- 
mately a true global community. 

— We must insure that the oceans and 
space become areas of cooperation rather 
than conflict. We can then leave to future 
generations vast economic and technological 
resources to enrich life on this earth. 

Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a 
creative and decisive role in the new order 
which is taking form around us. In an era 
of turbulence, uncertainty, and conflict, the 
world still looks to us for a protecting hand, 
a mediating influence, a path to follow. It 
sees in us, most of all, a tradition and vision 
of hope. Just as America has symbolized for 
generations man's conquest of nature, so too 
has America — with its banner of progress 
and freedom — symbolized man's mastery 
over his own future. 

For the better part of two centuries our 
forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively 
weak country, met adversity with courage 
and imagination. In the course of their 
struggle they built the freest, richest, and 
most powerful nation the world has ever 
known. As we, their heirs, take America 
into its third century, as we take up the 
unprecedented agenda of the modern world, 
we are determined to rediscover the belief 
in ourselves that characterized the most cre- 
ative periods in our country. 

We have come of age, and we shall do our 

' For President Ford's address before a joint 
session of the Congress on Apr. 10, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 28, 1975, p. 529. 

May 5, 1975 



Q. Arnold Rosenfeld, the Dayton Daily 
News. After the last round of Middle East 
talks, the Administration gave the impres- 
sion that the burden of the failure of the 
talks rested mostly with Israel. If that im- 
plication was deliberate, on ivhat specific 
points was Israel less forthcoming than 
Egypt; and ivhat has been your personal 
recommendation to the Administration con- 
cerniyig the large grant of military aid sub- 
sequently asked by Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Administration 
statement had emphasized the fact that the 
responsibility for negotiations that are com- 
pleted is rather difficult to apportion because 
it leads to very complicated assessments. And 
I don't think any useful purpose is served 
now by rehearsing all the complicated ele- 
ments that went into this negotiation. 

The major thrust of the assessment that is 
now going on concerns the direction of our 
diplomacy in the Middle East as we have to 
prepare, as a result of the suspension of 
these talks, for a more multilateral diplo- 
macy. We have to develop a position for the 
Geneva Conference, when it takes place, and 
we have to approach the problem of rela- 
tionships with many of the participants in 
the Middle East crisis. 

The problem of assistance to Israel will 
be seen in that context. But as I have pointed 
out in my first press conference after I re- 
turned from the Middle East, the American 
commitment to the survival of Israel will 
not be affected and cannot be affected by this 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Charles Withers, Ro- 
chester, Minnesota, Post Bulletin. We had 
two prominent Democratic Senators who 
spoke to us this morning. One of them. 
Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen, ivas asked in a 
question hoiv tvould he conduct foreign policy 
if he ivere elected President. He said the 
first thing he tvould do ivould be to put an 
end to one-mayi, personalized foreign policy. 
A bit earlier than that. Senator [Henry M.] 
Jackson tvas asked how he thinks the Mid- 

dle East crisis should be settled or what 
should be done about it, and he said we 
should end this "Mickey Mouse" shtittle di- 
plomacy and get the parties to the conference 
table. I wonder if you might have any com- 
ment on these observations by the Senators? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I understand 
the problem of the two gentlemen having 
to campaign for 18 months. [Laughter and 

With respect to the last point, of getting 
the parties around the conference table — 
during World War II somebody suggested 
that the way to deal with the submarine 
problem was to heat the ocean and to boil 
them to the surface. [Laughter.] So he was 
asked how to do this. He said, "I have given 
you the idea. The technical implementation 
is up to you." [Laughter and applause.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm Bill Mullen, Pom- 
pano Beach, Florida, Sun Sentinel. Do not 
the events in Southeast Asia attest to the 
tightening of Communist encirclement of the 
free world and the shrinking of our in- 

Secretary Kissinger: Events in Southeast 
Asia indicate many things. But they include 
the fact that the question of whether a ter- 
minal date should be put to assistance was 
obviously not asked by the Communist allies 
of Hanoi as insistently as it was asked in 
the United States. And this was certainly a 
factor in the development of the situation. 

Now, we can ask a measure of restraint 
from the Communist countries. But I don't 
think detente has yet reached the point 
where we can ask them to reduce their aid 
to their allies when we reduce our aid to 
our allies. 

But the impact of events is as I ti'ied to 
describe it in my speech. It will require 
greater efforts from us and a greater de- 
termination to achieve a coherent foreign 

Q. Secretary Kissinger, my name is Dick 
Stnyser, from the Oak Ridger, Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee. Senator Jackson, in his remarks 


Department of State Bulletin 

this morning, referred to the high Adminis- 
tration official who always seems to be on the 
Secretary of State's plane. In all seriovsness, 
I would like to ask yon hoiv you think the 
comments that come from this high Admiyi- 
istration official serve the Secretary of State, 
the press, and most of all, the public. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my experience 
is that that high official almost always agrees 
with the Secretary of State. [Laughter.] 
And therefore it serves the coherence of the 
public presentation of American foreign 

The problem that exists when 14 or 15 
members of the press travel with the Secre- 
tary of State is quite different from the rela- 
tionship of the Secretary with the press here 
in Washington. When there has to be a 
daily briefing, it can be done in two ways — 
either by a spokesman on the record or by 
some of the chief actors on background. And 
in the particular circumstances of a delicate 
negotiation, I think that this arrangement 
has worked reasonably well, as long as the 
senior spokesman and the Secretary agree 
with each other. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am John McCormally, 
of the Burlington, Iowa, Hawkeye. The 
PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Govern- 
ment] has charged there are as many as 
25,000 Americans in South Viet-Nam. The 
Secretary of Defense has put the figure at 
about 3,800. Hotv many are there, and are 
you satisfied ivith Ambassador [Graham'] 
Martin's handling of the situation? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, the number 
that was there before we started reductions 
did not exceed 6,000. The number is now 
somewhat below 4,000. We are, as the Presi- 
dent pointed out yesterday, attempting to 
reduce nonessential personnel. Ambassador 
Martin has an extraordinarily difficult job — 
to maintain the morale and the confidence 
of the gK)vernment to which he is accredited 
and at the same time to reduce to the greatest 
extent possible the risks to the Americans in 
South Viet-Nam. He is discharging this re- 
sponsibility with great skill and with great 
dignity in an extraordinarily difficult situa- 

tion. And he has my full support. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been rumors 
of late pertaining to your possible resigna- 
tion. There indeed has been some sugges- 
tion from editorial writers that you do that. 
My question is, today is it your intention to 
serve at least until after the 1976 Presiden- 
tial election ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as edi- 
torial writers are concerned, I can under- 
stand that even editorial writers cannot be 
right a hundred percent of the time. These 
stories of my resignation arise from time to 
time to sustain the morale of some of my 
closer associates [laughter] and even of 
some of our Ambassadors. But I have no 
intention of resigning. And I will serve as 
long as this is considered useful by the 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Hodding Carter of Delta 
Democrat-Times of Greenville, Mississippi. 
You said very eloquently that the Viet-Nam 
debate has now run its course — ive must 
look to the future without recrimination and 
vindictiveness. Do you agree that anyone 
loho attempts to make it a good campaign 
issue in 1976 would be doing a disservice to 
the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Vice President 
Rockefeller, whom you are referring to, is 
a close friend of mine whom I admire enor- 
mously. I do not believe that he intends to 
make it an issue in the 1976 campaign. I 
have only seen fragmentary reports of com- 
ments. I think he was stating a general view 
of what might happen. I have stated the 
view of the Administration, which is shared 
by all high officials. 

We must now, while this debate is going 
on, defend our view with respect to military 
and humanitarian assistance. We will accept 
the verdict of the Congress without recrimi- 
nation and without scapegoating. And this 
will be our attitude. 

Howard H. Hays, President, ASNE: We 
have time for one more question. 

Secretary Kissinger: That's usually the 
one that destroys me. [Laughter.] 

May 5, 1975 


Q. Mr. Secretary, Robert Phelps of the 
Boston Globe. 

Secretary Kissinger: I knew it. [Laugh- 

Q. I have ivhat we like to call a two-pronged 
question. The first prong is this: Have yon 
or has the U.S. Government directly or in- 
directly been in touch with the North Viet- 
namese regarding the possibility of evacuat- 
ing South Vietnamese who have aided the 
United States and tvho would be endangered 
in case of the North Vietnamese and Viet 
Cong takeover? And the second prong is 
this: If you have, or if you haven't, would 
be willing to — would you favor a termina- 
tion of — ivould you be ivilling to offer this: 
a termiyiation of U.S. aid, economic and 
military, to South Viet-Nam in exchange for 
a free evacuation of those who tvould be in 
danger — South Vietnamese ? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
second part of your question, it is the Admin- 
istration's view that we will not make the 
decision for the South Vietnamese as to how 
long and under what circumstances they 
should resist. And we believe strongly that 
it will be seen to have been the right and 
honorable thing to do to ask for continued 
assistance to a people whom we encouraged 
and at whose side we fought, knowing all 
the passions and all the difficulties involved. 

And we have therefore opposed a terminal 

With respect to the first que.stion, if the 
worst should come to pass and if it were 
not possible to .stabilize the situation, we feel 
we have a moral obligation to help in the 
evacuation of many of those whose associa- 
tion with us now endangers their lives. How 
to bring this about and by what steps and 
at what period is an extraordinarily delicate 
question. And it is one that I really cannot 
answer in an open press conference. 

Thank you very much. 

U.S. Expresses Sadness at Fall 

of Government of Khmer Republic 

Statement by President Ford ^ 

The United States views the fall of the 
Government of the Khmer Republic with 
sadness and compassion. 

I wish to express my admiration for the 
Cambodian Government leaders and people, 
who showed great courage until the end, and 
to their armed forces, who fought valiantly 
with their remaining supplies. 

'Issued Apr. 17 (text from White House press 
release) . 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Ford Interviewed at Convention 
of American Society of Newspaper Editors 

Following are excerpts from the transcript 
of an interview with President Ford by a 
panel of editors and publishers at the annual 
convention of the American Society of News- 
paper Editors at Washington on April 16. ^ 

President Ford: I am very, very pleased to 
be with you today and to have this opportu- 
nity to continue a dialogue which has been 
my pleasure in many parts of the country 
with many of you in various regional meet- 
ings during the past few months. 

Those exchanges and the one which will 
begin shortly are exceedingly valuable to me 
in providing an insight into the attitudes and 
the concerns of the people who are your 
readers and my constituents. 

Before answering the questions put to me 
by the distinguished panel, let me add, if I 
might, a few comments to the speech that I 
made to the Congress last Thursday night, 
and to the American people. 

Let me, if I might, express in broad terms 
some deep beliefs that I have. 

First, I firmly believe that the United 
States must play a very major role in world 
affairs in the years ahead. It is a great and 
difficult responsibility, but it is one, in my 
judgment, that our nation must continue to 

This has been my conviction, going back to 
my first political campaign in the fall of 1948. 
It was my conviction when I took my first 
oath of office on January 3, 1949. For a period 
of better than 25 years in the Congress — as a 
Member of the House and part of that time 
as a leadership role in the minority party — 
it has been my conviction. 

' For the complete transcript, see White House 
press release dated Apr. 16. 

As long as I am President of the United 
States I will seek to carry on that very im- 
portant responsibility of our country. I be- 
lieve to be successful in this effort, this en- 
deavor, the Congress and the President must 
work together. 

It is my belief that if we are to be success- 
ful in the achievement of success in the area 
of foreign policy, the American people, to the 
degree that they can, must be united. 

I also believe that our foreign policy, if 
you look at the record — at least during the 
period that I was honored to be a part of 
our government in the Congress or in the 
executive branch — that our foreign policy 
has been a successful one. 

Of course, there have been some instances 
where we did not achieve all that we sought, 
in some cases because the circumstances 
were well beyond our control. In a few 
instances where we have not been as success- 
ful as we would have liked, I think we self- 
inflicted some problems that helped to bring 
that unfortunate result. 

I also believe to maintain peace and to 
insure it, certainly in the future, the United 
States must remain strong militarily. We 
must have a broad, strong, well-led military 
establishment — and I include in that an in- 
telligence system that can be extremely help- 
ful to me and to Presidents in the future. 

I believe also that we must work with 
friend and foe alike. We have many, many 
friends throughout the world. We have some 
potential adversaries, and we have some that 
are true adversaries. But if we are to achieve 
what we all want, we have to work with all. 

It is my strong belief that we can achieve 
unity at home. I see no reason why the 
Congress and the President cannot work to- 
gether. That doesn't mean that all 535 

May 5, 1975 


Members of the House and Senate will agree 
with me, but I can assure you that what I 
have said on more than one occasion I be- 
lieve and I will try to implement, that I will 
work with the Congress and I know many, if 
not all, in the Congress will try to work 
with me. 

If we do get this unity at home and if we 
do develop a closer relationship between the 
President and the Congress, I think we can 
continue a successful foreign policy in build- 
ing a better world and achieving, on a more 
permanent basis, peace for all. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. Reston [James B. Reston, member of 
the board and columnist. New York Times]. 

Q. Mr. President, two points. There is a 
story on the ticker this morning out of 
Geneva that the Cambodian Government has 
asked for a cease-fire and that this informa- 
tion has been passed to Prince Sihanouk in 
Peking. Covid yon tell vs anything about 
that, sir? 

President Ford: Mr. Reston, I just re- 
ceived a note from one of my staff members, 
Ron Nessen, indicating that we had gotten 
the information after I had left the White 
House to the effect that the Cambodian 
Government has communicated with Siha- 
nouk indicating that the Cambodian Govern- 
ment will work with the Khmer Rouge to 
try and negotiate a settlement. 

It is my recollection, from a quick look 
at that information that was given to me 
at the luncheon table, that Prince Sihanouk 
is in no position to really achieve or accom- 
plish the results that we all want; namely, 
a negotiated settlement in that unfortunate 

I can only say from our point of view we 
will help in any way we can to further 
negotiations to end that conflict. 

Q. On that same point, coidd I ask you 
whether you have been in touch with the 
North Vietnamese about a cease-fire in South 
Viet-Nam or with any other governments to 
try to bring that about? 

President Ford: Over a period of time we 
have communicated with all of the signa- 

tories of the Paris accords, which were 
signed in January of 1973. The efforts that 
we have made are broad and comprehensive, 
and when I say we have indicated our feel- 
ings to all signatories, of course that includes 
the North Vietnamese. 

Mr. Funk [R. D. Funk, editor, Santa 
Monica, Calif., Outlook]. 

Q. Mr. President, is the United States in 
direct contact noiv, in a situation of negotia- 
tion, ivith the North Vietnamese for a cease- 
fire around Saigon? 

President Ford: We are not in direct ne- 
gotiations in that regard. 

Q. Thank you. 

Q. Mr. President, tvhen a delegation of 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
ivas in China the last time around, there %vas 
considerable emphasis placed by the Chinese 
leaders, leading all the way from Premier 
CIiou on down, that no firm relationship with 
the United States was possible until Taiwan, 
so to speak, ivas taken out of the picture 
and placed under Chinese rule. You are go- 
ing back to China. Is that on your agenda? 

President Ford: The relationship be- 
tween the United States and the People's 
Republic of China, which was reopened sev- 
eral years ago, is predicated on the Shanghai 
communique. This relationship is continuing, 
I would say, on schedule. 

I am going back to the People's Republic 
of China late this fall. I was there for about 
two weeks in June and July of 1972. I would 
say that no firm agenda for that forthcoming 
meeting has been established. So, I am not in 
a position to comment directly on the ques- 
tion that you ask. 

Q. Mr. President, you have reaffirmed 
your confidence in the present American 
foreign policy, but I wonder if you could ex- 
pand on that just a little bit. Are we com,- 
mitted to co)itaining communism around the 
world? Are ice committed to a heavy pro- 
gram of economic aid? Are we committed to 
a heavy program of military aid? Will we 
get into armed intervention in desperate 
cases ? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Presidevt Ford: We are committed to a 
furtherance of a policy of detente with the 
Soviet Union. I think that policy is in our 
mutual interests. It won't solve all the prob- 
lems where either we or they are involved, 
but it has helped to reduce tensions. It has 
helped in other ways where our joint coop- 
eration could be helpful. 

We do, as a country, at least while I am 
President, expect to continue our relation- 
ship with Western Europe, with NATO. We 
hope to strengthen it. We hope to eliminate 
some of the current problems, such as the 
problem between Greece and Turkey at the 
present time over Cyprus. 

We do expect to continue working in the 
Middle East, which includes some economic 
aid, some military assistance for various 
countries in that area of the world. 

I think we have an obligation to continue 
to have a presence in the Pacific, in Latin 
America, in Africa. It is my judgment that 
in each of these cases we will probably con- 
tinue both economic and military assistance 
on a selective basis. 

I am not saying this is the containment of 
communism. It is a furtherance of the policy 
of the United States aimed at our security 
and the maintenance of peace on a global 

Q. Mr. President, in response to Mr. Kirk- 
Patrick's [Clayton Kirkpatrick, editor, Chi- 
cago Tribune'] question, you mentioned our 
policy of detente in an affirmative way. The 
Chinese and Russian military aid to the 
North Vietnamese has been placed at ap- 
proximately $1.5 billion. My question is, 
doesn't that or does that violate the spirit of 
detente, and if so, of tvhat purpose is 

President Ford: I think it is worthwhile to 
point out that none of the signatories to the 
Paris accords have sought to enforce the 
violations [provisions] of those accords, in- 
cluding, of course, the People's Republic of 
China and the Soviet Union. 

In the agreement that was signed in Paris 
in January of 1973,' the United States, as 
part of its agreement with South Viet-Nam, 
agreed to supply replacement war materiel, 

to give economic aid. 

The Soviet Union and the People's Re- 
public of China, I assume, made the same 
commitment to North Viet-Nam. 

It appears that they have maintained that 
commitment. Unfortunately, the United 
States did not carry out its commitment in 
the supplying of military hardware and eco- 
nomic aid to South Viet-Nam. 

I wish we had. I think if we had, this 
present tragic situation in South Viet-Nam 
would not have occurred. 

But I don't think we can blame the Soviet 
Union and the People's Republic of China 
in this case. If we had done with our ally 
what we promised, I think this whole trag- 
edy could have been eliminated. 

Nevertheless we hope to and are working 
through the countries that are a part or 
were a part of the Paris accords to try and 
achieve a cease-fire, and will continue to 
do so. 

Q. On that point, you have asked for more 
thayi $700 million ivorth of militay-y aid. 
There is some obvious psychological and 
symbolic reason for simply asking, but mili- 
tarily speaking, if you could get the package 
through Congress and get it to South Viet- 
Nam, tvould it militarily do any good at this 

President Ford: I am absolutely convinced 
if Congress made available $722 million in 
military assistance in a timely way by the 
date that I suggested, or sometime shortly 
thereafter, the South Vietnamese could 
stabilize the military situation in Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. President, you keep talking about 
commitments and promises, and tve are get- 
ting hung up on these ivords. In the light of 
this controversy, why should the Thieu- 
Nixon correspondence not be released? 

President Ford: It is not the usual custom 
for correspondence between heads of state, 
as I understand it, to be released. I can say 
from my own experience, not referring to 
the correspondence to which you refer, that 
if it is expected that such correspondence 

May 5, 1975 


will be public, I think on some occasions, or 
in some instances, you would have to com- 
promise on what you would say. I think that 
would be true of any correspondence that I 
received from any other head of state. If you 
are going to have a frank, free exchange, I 
think it has to be between the heads of 

Now, I have personally reviewed the cor- 
respondence to which you refer between 
President Nixon and President Thieu, and 
I can assure you that there was nothing in 
any of those communications that was differ- 
ent from what was stated as our public 
policy. The words are virtually identical, 
with some variation, of course, but the in- 
tent, the commitments are identical with that 
which was stated as our country's policy and 
our country's commitment. 

Q. Sir, on that question of your trip to 
Red China that Mr. Isaacs [Norman Isaacs, 
president and publisher, Wilmington, Del., 
Ne2vs Journal] raised, it seems that doivn 
the road it has been specidated that the 
policy or the purpose of detente is to estab- 
lish normal diplomatic relations with a 
country that you described last Thursday as 
having one-quarter of the population of the 
ivorld. That loould assume the establishment 
of an embassy in Peking, which would auto- 
matically assume the de-recognition, of some 
kind, of Taiwan. If that is in the cards, ivhat 
kind of guarantees would you seek, what 
kind of quid pro quo would you seek from 
Peking to insure the continued existence of 

President Ford: I honestly don't believe 
that I should discuss, under these circum- 
stances, any of the agenda or any of the 
details of the continuation of our relations 
with the People's Republic of China. 

We have excellent relations, as I am sure 
you know, with the Republic of China. We 
value that relationship. We are concerned, 
of course, and will continue to be concerned 
about the Republic of China's security and 

And it doesn't seem to me at this time in 
this forum that I should discuss any nego- 

tiations that might take place between the 
United States and the People's Republic of 

Q. It is our policy for the continued exist- 
ence and guarantee of the defense of Taiwan. 
Is that our continuing policy? 

President Ford: I said, and if I might I 
would more or less repeat it, we do value that 
relationship between the United States and 
the Republic of China. I think that is best 
indicated by the high-level delegation that 
I sent for the funeral services of Chiang 
Kai-shek.- I believe that having sent Vice 
President Rockefeller there, with the others 
that were included, is a clear indication that 
we consider our relationship, our coopera- 
tion, with the Republic of China a matter of 
very, very great importance to us. 

Q. Mr. President, there have been some 
conflicting news stories out of Viet-Nam 
about the possible, if it is necessary, evacua- 
tion of not only Americans but of South 
Vietnamese nationals from Saigon. Is there 
any playi or policy about such evacuation? 

President Ford: I have ordered the evacua- 
tion of all nonessential U.S. personnel in 
South Viet-Nam, and we are phasing down 
on a daily basis such U.S. personnel who 
have no responsibilities either for the gov- 
ernment or for whatever other purpose they 
are there. 

The present plan is to keep those there 
who have a position of responsibility, a 
meaningful job. I am not in the position to 
speculate as to how many that will be or 
when there might be a change in the situa- 

- Vice President Rockefeller headed the U.S. dele- 
gation to the funeral of President Chiang. Other 
members of the delegation were Senators Barry M. 
Goldwater, Arizona, and Hiram L. Fong, Hawaii; 
Representative Roy A. Taylor, North Carolina; Anna 
Chennaiilt of Washington, D.C., vice president for 
international affairs, Flying Tiger Lines, Inc.; 
Jack M. Eckerd of Clearwater, Fla., chairman of the 
board, Jack Eckerd Corp.; Dr. Arnold 0. Beckman of 
Newport, Calif., president, Beckman Instruments; 
Walter P. McConaughy of Atlanta, Ga., former 
Ambassador to the Republic of China; Dr. Walter H. 
Judd of Washington, D.C., former Representative 
from Minnesota. 


Department of State Bulletin 

tion. I think it is too fluid at this moment to 
make any categorical comment. 

Q. That is speaking about Americans, and 
I think we understand that. But is there any 
policy about the potential evacuation of 
South Vietnamese? 

President Ford: Excuse me. In my speech 
last Thursday, I indicated there are a num- 
ber of South Vietnamese who, over a period 
of almost two decades, have stood with us 
in various official capacities — longtime em- 
ployees of the Federal Government, our gov- 
ernment, who have been dedicated to the 
cause that not I, but a number of Presidents, 
have pursued. 

I think we have an obligation to them. 
To the extent that I can under the law or, 
hopefully, if the law is clarified, I think we 
have a responsibility to them. But I don't 
think I ought to talk about an evacuation. I 
hope we are in a position where we can 
clarify or stabilize the situation and get a 
negotiated settlement that wouldn't put their 
lives in jeopardy. 

Q. Mr. President, you have talked a great 
deal about the moral obligation of this coun- 
try to provide more military arms for South 
Viet-Nam. But ivhat about the moral obliga- 
tion to the suffering people of that country, 
the moral obligation to end that war? 

President Ford: Mr. Reston, the agre^e- 
ment which was signed, I think, by 12 na- 
tions in January of 1973 in Paris — and I 
was there, I saw the signing — was accom- 
plished with the expectation that that war 
would end. If the agreement had been lived 
up to, the war would not now be going on. 

We have continued in various ways to try 
and achieve a cease-fire, and I can assure you 
that we intend to continue those efforts. 

But it is tragic, in my judgment, that what 
everybody thought was good in January of 
1973 has been violated and now we are faced 
with a terrible catastrophe at the present 

Q. But woidd we not then a year from 

noiv, or five years from now, still have the 
same ynoral obligation you speak of? 

President Ford: It is my best judgment, 
based on experts within the Administration, 
both economic and military, that if we had 
made available for the next three years rea- 
sonable sums of military aid and economic 
assistance that South Viet-Nam would have 
been viable, that it could have met any of its 
economic problems, could have met any 
military challenges. 

This is another of the tragedies. For just 
a relatively small additional commitment in 
economic and military aid, relatively small 
compared to the $150 billion that we spent, 
that at the last minute of the last quarter we 
don't make that special effort, and now we 
are faced with this human tragedy. It just 
makes me sick every day I hear about it, 
read about it, and see it. 

United States Mourns Death 
of Chiang Kai-shek 

Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Repub- 
lic of China, died at Taipei April 5. Follow- 
ing is a statement by President Ford issued 
that day at Palm Springs, Calif. 

White House pre;s release (Palm Springs) dated April 5 

I was deeply saddened at the death of the 
President of the Republic of China, Chiang 
Kai-shek. His passing marks the end of an 
era in Chinese history. 

President Chiang was a man of firm in- 
tegrity, high courage, and deep political con- 
viction. The last surviving major Allied 
leader of the Second World War, he will be 
remembered by people from all walks of life 
and from every part of the world for his 
dignity and dedication to principles in which 
he believed. 

Mrs. Ford joins me in behalf of all Ameri- 
cans in expressing our sincere condolence to 
Madame Chiang, to President Chiang's fam- 
ily, and to his countrymen in this time of 

May 5, 1975 


The National Interest and National Strength 

Address by President Ford ^ 

This year especially, as we prepare for the 
celebration of our Bicentennial, it would be 
good for all Americans to do some soul- 
searching about where we are going as a 
nation and what we are doing with the pre- 
cious heritage of freedom that we inherited. 
This is a good time both to look backward 
and to look forward — a good time to take 

In so doing, we should not fall into the 
trap of blind nostalgia — of persuading our- 
selves that America's best years are behind 
us. There is a lot of negative talk like that 
going around in Washington and elsewhere. 
I think it can best be answered in one word: 

The truth is that if we were to somehow 
travel back in time together to the American 
Revolution, we might be more shocked by 
the similarities than by the differences. If 
anything, times were tougher then. 

We were a divided people. Many historians 
estimate the colonists were split into three 
factions: those who favored independence, 
those who supported the royal cause, and 
those who straddled the fence waiting to see 
which side would win. 

Inflation was more than a serious problem 
during the American Revolution. It was a 
near-fatal disease. Printing-press money, the 
so-called Continental dollar, was only worth 
a fraction of its paper value. Many farmers 
and merchants refused to accept it even from 
hungry American soldiers trying to buy 

' Made before the 84th Continental Congress of 
the Daughters of the American Revolution at Wash- 
ington on Apr. 15 (text from White House press 
release; introductory paragraphs omitted). 

Too often, American armies were de- 
feated, defeated in battle, and driven to 
humiliating retreats. Disease, lack of equip- 
ment, and lack of training were chronic. We 
were dependent on foreign assistance for 
many of our weapons, uniforms, and equip- 
ment — and even for foreign advisers to train 
our troops. 

If the French Government had not spent 
millions to help equip American forces and 
if we had not been assisted by a French army 
and a fleet at Yorktown, the American Revo- 
lution might have dragged on inconclusively 
for many, many years. 

Yet, out of all of the suffering and uncer- 
tainty, a new nation was born and grew up 
into one of the biggest and most powerful 
nations in the history of the world. 

Character had a lot to do with it — the 
courage and vision of men like Washington, 
shared by thousands of soldiers and the 
valiant, patriotic women who sustained their 
fighting men, as they have in all struggles, 
with their work and with their prayers. 

Values were also very, very important — 
the moral imperatives and political ideals 
that were expressed with such eloquence by 
Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson and 
with such clarity by Alexander Hamilton and 
James Madison. 

And divine providence also had something 
to do with it. Nor were our forefathers 
ashamed to acknowledge their debt to this 
source of strength in their dire time of 
trouble. Call it divine providence or call it 
destiny, 13 small colonies clustered along the 
Atlantic coast somehow managed to produce 
one of the most brilliant generations of 
leaders known to history — the soldiers and 


Department of State Bulletin 

the statesmen we know as the founders of 
this great country. 

But even more remarkable than the genius 
of the founders themselves is the fact that 
generation after generation of Americans 
have continued to build on the foundation 
that they left us. Fortunately for us and for 
the world, we have never lost sight of their 
great dream. 

Other countries, of course, have had bril- 
liant leaders. But no other country can point 
to two centuries dedicated to expanding and 
perfecting a continuing revolution in a free 

This is what makes America unique in 
the history of nations. 

And that is why, although our experience 
in Indochina has been one of heroic sacrifices 
and great disappointments, I am convinced 
that we can and will emerge from this ordeal 
stronger and wiser as a nation, just as we 
have from others even greater in the past. 

This brings me to the soul-searching — the 
inventory of opportunities, of challenges be- 
fore us today. How do we stand today? Are 
we still on the right course? 

It would be impossible for me in the time 
here to go over every single issue — political, 
military, diplomatic, and economic — that this 
question raises, so let me focus, if I might, on 
just one of them — our national defense. 

I ask this question: Are we strong enough 
today? And, just as important, will we be 
strong enough tomorrow? 

The Importance of a Strong Defense Posture 

According to a recent poll, some Ameri- 
cans have questions about our world position 
and the cost of maintaining that position. 
The poll indicated that Americans want the 
United States, and I quote, "to play an active 
role in the world." Yet, at the same time, 
they believe the defense budget should be re- 
duced. Some want it emasculated. Americans 
still believe that being strong militarily is 
important. They want, in the words of the 
poll's report, "a powerful and militarily 
secure standing for the United States in the 
world." What they don't like is the price tag 
that comes with it. 

This is a basic dilemma. When a nation 
wants to achieve contradictory goals, such 
as military security and less defense spend- 
ing, sooner or later citizens must make a 

It is bacoming fashionable in some quar- 
ters to charge that military force is out- 
moded in the modern world. It is argued, for 
example, that modern weaponry, especially 
nuclear armaments, are too destructive to 
use and that therefore they won't ever be 

Further, it is argued, when we have ap- 
plied military power it has not produced the 
results we wanted, such as in Southeast Asia. 

Finally, it is said that we are unlikely to 
be attacked in any event. Detente, according 
to this kind of reasoning, guarantees that 
future conflicts will be nonviolent ones which 
may be settled by negotiation. 

It is my judgment that these arguments 
ignore a basic fact of international politics, 
one that has been proven repeatedly through- 
out history: National interest can be 
guarded only by national strength. In a con- 
flict-ridden world, national strength in the 
broadest sense must be supported by military 

It is often overlooked that detente — the 
process of reducing tensions with the 
U.S.S.R. — has been possible only because of 
U.S. strength and U.S. resolve. 

It was after a prolonged period of cold war 
testing and confrontation, during which the 
United States and the rest of the Western 
world stood fast, that it became possible to 
move forward with the U.S.S.R. in negotia- 
tions aimed at reducing the chances for 
grave miscalculations and reducing the risk 
of nuclear war. 

In these negotiations, we have safe- 
guarded our vital defense interests. To 
weaken our defenses is to weaken one of the 
foundations of detente. 

A posture of deliberate weakness is most 
dangerous when the worldwide military bal- 
ance threatens to deteriorate, but at any time 
weakness would be folly for the United 
States, a great nation with interests span- 
ning the globe. 

If we were to cut ourselves back to such a 

May 5, 1975 


weak posture, as some recommend, we would 
soon find ourselves paying an unacceptable 
price. We cannot shrink our economy back to 
pre-1939 dimensions. We cannot turn our 
back on the rest of the world as we foolishly 
sought to do in the 1930's. 

Like it or not, we are a great power, and 
our real choice is whether to succeed or fail 
in a role we cannot shirk. There is no other 
nation in the whole free world capable of 
stepping into our role. 

If we conclude, as I believe we must, that 
we still need a strong national defense, the 
next issue is quite obvious: How much and 
what kind? 

The answer depends on continuing vigilant 
assessment of the defenses needed to safe- 
guard this great nation, an assessment 
measured in terms of the intentions and ca- 
pabilities of potential adversaries and the 
common strength forged by our alliances. 

Strategic Arms Balance 

Our nuclear deterrent must be gauged 
against the nuclear capabilities and inten- 
tions of others and, in particular, the Soviet 
Union. It is for this reason that the SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotia- 
tions and the Vladivostok agreements I 
signed with General Secretary Brezhnev are 
of such importance. We are working respon- 
sibly to put a cap on the nuclear arms race. 
Similarly, the amount and the type of con- 
ventional forces required will depend on our 
continuing ability to maintain a truly effec- 
tive national defense. 

It will also depend on our ability to meet 
our security commitments and on our ability 
with our allies to work with the Warsaw 
Pact nations toward reduction in forces, 
which will increase the prospect for inter- 
national stability. 

It is of fundamental importance to both 
the United States and to the world that the 
strategic balance be maintained, and stra- 
tegic nuclear forces are the foundation of 
our defense. 

We will work toward further strategic 
arms limitations. We will maintain a stra- 
tegic arms balance. 

Neither we, nor our allies, can afford the 
consequences if this fundamental balance 
shifts against us. I promise you that no de- 
fense budget I submit to the Congress will 
ever sell us short or shift the balance against 
the United States of America. 

I respectfully call upon each and every 
Member of the Congress, House and Senate, 
to make the same pledge; for our survival as 
a nation could well depend upon it. I call 
upon you to let your Senators and Congress- 
men know how you feel individually and col- 
lectively. Let us never forget this: that our 
Pledge of Allegiance is to "one nation indi- 
visible," not one nation indefensible. 

NATO Security and Conventional Forces 

In the area of conventional forces, we also 
confront some difficult challenges. Our 
troops in Europe, for example, are a key 
element in shielding Europe from military 
attacks or pressures of one kind or another. 
Present force levels are necessary to main- 
tain a satisfactory conventional military 
balance between the alliance on the one hand 
and the Warsaw Pact nations on the other. 

Unilateral reductions by the United States 
would upset that balance and constitute a 
major political change. The United States 
has agreed with our allies that there will be 
no unilateral troop reductions, except 
through mutual negotiations. 

Our troop levels in that part of the world 
are not an obstacle to improved East-West 
relations in Europe. On the contrary, a stable 
military balance has been the starting point 
for hopeful new diplomacy. 

For their part, the Europeans contribute 
the largest part of the conventional defense 
of the alliance. Unilateral U.S. reductions 
would undercut their efforts and would un- 
dermine confidence in the United States for 
the support of the alliance. 

There are two other crucial areas of con- 
ventional forces necessary to maintain our 
side of the strategic balance: one, our long- 
range air capability, and sea power. 

If we are to sustain our ability to react 
appropriately to threats to our interests 
from faraway shores, we may need to in- 


Department of State Bulletin 

crease our already considerable abilities to 
airlift troops and supplies long distances. 

The United States and its allies depend 
heavily on the freedom of the seas for trade 
and for commerce. Thus, it is vital for us to 
maintain a full range of capabilities on the 
many oceans of the world. 

Last summer, the Atlantic alliance cele- 
brated its 25th year — a quarter of a century 
anniversary — 25 years of peace through 
strength on the European Continent. To 
mark the occasion and to reaffirm our collec- 
tive resolve, we joined with other member 
nations in a Declaration of Atlantic Rela- 
tions. I will be meeting personally with allied 
leaders in the very near future to seek 
further progress toward our common goal — 
a peaceful and a secure free world. 

But neither NATO nor the United States 
can guarantee a peaceful and secure free 
world if we allow our defenses to erode. 

Keeping America Strong 

Now, what about the price tag? What is 
it costing us to maintain our militai-y 
strength? Critics of a strong defense say 
that the defense budget is higher than ever. 
But the truth is — and this we must under- 
stand and we must tell others — in terms of 
what each dollar will buy, the defense budget 
is now lower than any time since 1964, prior 
to our Viet-Nam buildup. 

The reason for this is that inflation hfis 
taken just as high a toll of the defense dol- 
lar's purchasing power as it has from every 
family, from every business, from every com- 
munity. Take away the effects of inflation 
and real pay increases, which are necessary 
to recruit our new all-volunteer forces, and 
what is left of the defense budget has actu- 
ally declined in purchasing power during the 
last four years. 

For example, in 1968, defense spending 
represented about 60 percent of our total 
Federal Government spending. Today, it is 
down to about 27 percent. 

We cannot afford, as I see it, to let our de- 
fense strength slide down while other nations 
build up their forces. It is the obligation, as 
I see it, of each of us to keep America 

strong — the obligation of the Congress, of 
this Administration, and of each American 
concerned about the future of his or her 
great country. 

And I pledge to you as solemnly and as 
strongly as I can that I will do my part, and 
I am sure each and every one of you will do 
your part. 

A great hero who led our people both in 
war and in peace, Dwight Eisenhower, once 
said that "a true posture of defense is com- 
posed of three factors — spiritual, military, 
and economic." 

We have the economic and industrial 
strength it takes to keep America a first-rate 

Spiritual strength is less tangible. It is 
hard to measure in any exact way. But I 
can tell you this: I have traveled to just 
about every corner of America since becom- 
ing President, and everywhere I found the 
same confidence, the same good spirit, and 
the same willingness to pull together to make 
this an even greater and better country. 

That is the American spirit that we can 
be proud of today, as we have in the past. 

Yes, we have our problems, our doubts, 
and some have many questions. Yet, we also 
have the strength to ask tough questions and 
to seek honest answers, painful though they 
may be. And the American people still have 
the character and the vision that was tem- 
pered in the forge of the Revolution 200 
years ago. 

Finally, there is our actual military estab- 
lishment. I have already talked this morning 
about some of the hardware and some of the 
costs. I will just add that I don't think we 
have ever had finer, better motivated men 
and women serving under the American flag 
than we have today — and I have met a lot of 
these fine young people, and you and I 
should be very proud of them. They are of 
the stock which George Washington would 
have been proud to command. The command- 
ers of today are proud of them. 

George Washington made the point that 
I have tried to put across today. To be pre- 
pared for war, George Washington declared, 
is one of the most effective means of pre- 
serving the peace. 

May 5, 1975 


Peace is what, we are really talking about. 
the building of peace and the preserving of 
peace. And only a strong America can build 
a strong and durable peace. 

And as I conclude, let me say this: As 
children of the American Revolution, we owe 
this both to the patriots who came before us 
and to the generations who one day will in- 
herit from us all that we have achieved to- 
gether in two centuries of struggle. 

Thank you very much. 

Geneva Protocol of 1925 and 
Biological Weapons Convention 

Following is a statement by President 
Ford issued on January 22 upon signinr/ 
the instruments of ratification of the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons 
Convention,^ together with the text of an 
Executive order signed April 8. 


white House press release dated January 23 

I have signed today the instruments of 
ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 
and the Biological Weapons Convention, to 
which the Senate gave its advice and con- 
sent on December 16, 1974. 

With deep gratification, I announce the 
U.S. ratification of the protocol, thus com- 
pleting a process which began almost 50 
years ago when the United States proposed 
at Geneva a ban on the use in war of "as- 
phyxiating, poisonous or other gases." 

While the ratification of the protocol has 
been delayed for many years, the United 
States has long supported the principles and 
objectives of the Geneva Protocol. 

The protocol was submitted to the Senate 
in 1926 and again in 1970. Following exten- 
sive congressional hearings in 1971, during 

' For remarks made by President Ford upon sign- 
ing the instruments of ratification, see Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 
27, 1975, p. 73. 

which differing views developed, the execu- 
tive branch undertook a thorough and com- 
prehensive review of the military, legal, and 
political issues relating to the protocol. As 
a result, we have defined a new policy to 
govern any future use in war of riot control 
agents and chemical herbicides. While re- 
affirming the current U.S. understanding of 
the scope of the protocol as not extending 
to riot control agents and chemical herbi- 
cides, I have decided that the United States 
shall renounce as a matter of national policy: 

1. First use of herbicides in war except 
use, under regulations applicable to their 
domestic use, for control of vegetation with- 
in U.S. bases and installations or around 
their immediate defensive perimeters. 

2. First use of riot control agents in war 
except in defensive military modes to save 
lives, such as, use of riot control agents in 
riot situations, to reduce civilian casualties, 
for rescue missions, and to protect rear area 

This policy is detailed in the Executive 
order which I will issue today. The order 
also reaffirms our policy established in 1971 
that any use in war of chemical herbicides 
and riot control agents must be approved by 
me in advance. 

I am very pleased to have signed a second 
international agreement, entitled the Con- 
vention on the Prohibition of the Develop- 
ment, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteri- 
ological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and 
on Their Destruction. This is the first such 
agreement since World War II to provide 
for the actual elimination of an entire class 
of weapons. As you may recall, the United 
States had already unilaterally renounced 
these weapons before the convention was 
negotiated. Our entire stockpile of biological 
and toxin agents and weapons has been de- 
stroyed, and our biological warfare facili- 
ties have been converted to peaceful uses. 

The convention provides that it will come 
into force upon the deposit of instruments 
of ratification by the three depositaries — 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the U.S.S.R. — and at least 19 other coun- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tries. Thirty-seven countries have ah'eady 
ratified the convention. The United King- 
dom has completed the parliamentary pro- 
cedures for ratification, and the Soviet 
Union has announced its intention to ratify 
very soon. While I have signed the U.S. 
instrument of ratification today, its deposit 
will be deferred until we have coordinated 
that action with the United Kingdom and 
the U.S.S.R.2 

It is my earnest hope that all nations will 
find it in their interest to join in this pro- 
hibition against biological weapons. 

and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of 
the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take 
all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the 
Armed Forces of the United States of any riot con- 
trol agents and chemical herbicides in war is pro- 
hibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in 

Sec. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe 
the rules and regulations he deems necessary to 
ensure that the national policy herein announced 
shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United 


The White House, April 8, 1975. 

renuncration of certain uses in war of 
Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents 

The United States renounces, as a matter of 
national policy, first use of herbicides in war except 
use, under regulations applicable to their domestic 
use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and 
installations or around their immediate defensive 
perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in 
war except in defensive military modes to save lives 
such as: 

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control 
situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. 
military control, to include controlling rioting pris- 
oners of war. 

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in 
which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks 
and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. 

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions 
in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and 
passengers, and escaping prisoners. 

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon 
areas outside the zone of immediate combat to pro- 
tect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and 
paramilitary organizations. 

I have determined that the provisions and pro- 
cedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to 
ensure proper implementation and observance of 
such national policy. 

Now, Therefore, by virtue of the authority vested 
in me as President of the United States of America 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States 

' The U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. instruments of rati- 
fication of the Biological Weapons Convention were 
deposited Mar. 26; the U.S. instrument of ratifica- 
tion of the Geneva Protocol was deposited Apr. 10. 

MO Fed. Reg. 16187. 

United Nations Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publica- 
tions may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Report by the Secretary General on the United Na- 
tions operation in Cyprus (for the period May 23 
to December 5, 1974). S/11568. December 6, 1974. 
21 pp. 

.Seventh report of the Security Council committee 
established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. 
S/11594. January 9, 1975. 48 pp. 

Special report of the Security Council committee 
established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) 
concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on 
external participation in the expansion of the Rho- 
desian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. S/11597. 
January 15, 1975. 68 pp. 

Special report of the Secretary (Jeneral on develop- 
ments in Cyprus. S/11624. February 18, 1975. 
18 pp. 

General Assembly 

Letter dated January 20, 1975, from the Permanent 
Representative of Portugal addressed to the Sec- 
retary General transmitting the text of the agree- 
ment between Portugal and the three liberation 
movements of Angola, aiming at the establishment 
of the self-determination and independence of An- 
gola. A/10040. January 22, 1975. 13 pp. 

May 5, 1975 


The Nonproliferation Treaty and Our Worldwide Security Structure 

Address by Fred C. Ikle 

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency * 

It seems particularly appropriate that we 
should meet here on Capitol Hill to discuss 
nuclear proliferation. Congress has shown 
leadership on this issue since the first Atomic 
Energy Act, the McMahon Act of 1946. And 
Congress provides the necessary continuity 
and long-term concern. U.S. efforts to nego- 
tiate the Nonproliferation Treaty were given 
strong impetus by the Pastore resolution of 
1966. Of the 56 original sponsors of that 
resolution, half continue to serve in the 
Senate today. 

To prepare a new arms control initiative 
can take months; to negotiate it can take 
years. If agreement is reached, its effects 
may be felt over decades. The history of the 
Nonproliferation Treaty has already 
spanned the Administrations of three Presi- 
dents. Next month's Review Conference 
involves the fourth. 

The role of Congress is also critical in 
backing up our policies, such as through 
legislation in behalf of export controls and 
financial support for international safe- 
guards. Congress understands full well why 
it must give continuing attention to nuclear 
proliferation. The way this problem is man- 
aged will have the deepest impact on Amer- 
ica's future. Our political system, our open 
society, could not survive in a world where 
the threat of nuclear destruction would be 
an everyday tool for political ends. 

Now that I have pleaded for your active 
participation, I want to be frank and open 

' Made at Washington on Apr. 9 before a con- 
ference on the Nonproliferation Treaty sponsored 
by the Arms Control Association (text from ACDA 
press release). 

with you. The news on nuclear proliferation 
is bad. 

Several countries not now nuclear-weap- 
ons states appear to be making determined 
efforts to acquire a capability that would 
enable them to build their own atomic 
bombs. How far they will go, and how many 
others will join them, are still open ques- 
tions. And in the future we will have to face 
the fact that some governments might not be 
able to defeat all attempts of criminal groups 
to acquire the materials to make bombs. Un- 
less we find new ways to cope with this risk, 
it will increase because of the growing 
spread of peaceful uses. 

Indeed, today the spread of nuclear- 
weapons capability is riding on the wave of 
peaceful uses of the atom. The world's first 
five nuclear-weapons states clearly started 
out with a military program. Now it is 
peaceful technology that provides not only 
the means but also the cover in all cases 
where we fear that a new weapons program 
might be on the way. At the same time, we 
must of course recognize that beneficial uses 
of the atom will legitimately expand. 

Many advanced industrial countries, be- 
cause of their competence in technology, 
could have embarked on nuclear-weapons 
programs some time ago. Yet they held on 
to their decision not to do so. Canada, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan 
are conspicuous examples. Capability did not 
automatically produce intent. But now we 
suspect that the intent to make nuclear 
weapons exists in several places even though 
the capability is not yet there. 

We can slow down the spread of nuclear- 


Department of State Bulletin 

weapons capability from country to country. 
We cannot stop it by ourselves. In a way, the 
United States has contribiited to this spread, 
starting in 1954 when we abandoned the 
strict secrecy and tight controls on nuclear 
technology and began to help other countries 
acquire nuclear reactors and know-how. 

Today we have to rely mainly on political 
incentives and political constraints to pre- 
vent nuclear arms competition from infect- 
ing country after country — to preserve a 
world in which nuclear weapons will not be 
used. This fact is what makes the Nonpro- 
liferation Treaty so important. 

What does this treaty do? 

It is true that the treaty does not include 
all the critical countries. For example, India, 
Israel, Brazil, and Argentina have indicated 
that at this time they will not be parties. 
Further, any party to the treaty could legally 
withdraw in three months if its supreme 
national interests are jeopardized, or a gov- 
ernment could simply violate the treaty. But 
any arms control agreement can be aban- 
doned by a determined, independent nation. 
The Nonproliferation Treaty is about as 
binding as most other treaties and is ade- 
quately verifiable. In this treaty, a common 
vision unites over 80 countries: they all look 
to a world so ordered that man's most de- 
structive invention will threaten no one. 

However, some have argued that the bene- 
fits of the treaty are unconvincing to non- 
nuclear-weapons states, since the principal 
nuclear powers have so far failed to under- 
take genuine nuclear disarmament. The 
treaty, they say, is merely a device for the 
superpowers to maintain their dominance. 

This argument is wrong. While progress 
in nuclear arms control has been much 
slower than one would wish, the two major 
nuclear powers have imposed important 
arms limitations upon themselves. Indeed, 
through the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 
1972, the United States and the Soviet Union 
agreed not to build armaments precisely in 
the area where their worldwide monopoly 
was beyond dispute; no other country could 
build an ABM system in the foreseeable 

Another criticism of the Nonproliferation 
Treaty (pressed mostly by less industrialized 
countries) is that the nuclear-weapons states 
have not been sufficiently forthcoming in 
providing peaceful nuclear assistance and 
that the controls on proliferation hinder 
peaceful development. 

This charge is totally false. The less in- 
dustrialized countries have reached their 
present level in peaceful nuclear technology 
only because of the assistance they received 
from nuclear-weapons states or from certain 
nuclear-industrial countries, such as Canada, 
that are strong supporters of the Nonpro- 
liferation Treaty. Our efforts to prevent the 
export of nuclear technology from spreading 
nuclear arms does not infringe on any right 
of any country. On the contrary, the only 
universal treaty obligation to export tech- 
nology, that I know of, is the obligation 
created by the Nonproliferation Treaty — 
the obligation to contribute to the develop- 
ment of peaceful nuclear applications in non- 
nuclear-weapons states. The importing 
countries can't have it both ways, no matter 
how rich or poor they are; they cannot de- 
nounce the Nonproliferation Treaty and yet 
claim the right to nuclear assistance that 
was created solely by this treaty. 

Other objections are that the treaty is in- 
adequate to deal with one or another of the 
many problems of nuclear weapons — the 
control of nuclear technology through export 
restrictions and safeguards, the manage- 
ment of nuclear-waste disposal, and above 
all, the security of nations who agree to give 
up nuclear arms. The answer is not to dis- 
count the value of the treaty, but to supple- 
ment it. 

We must continue eff"orts to separate nu- 
clear exports that safely serve peaceful 
purposes from those that will proliferate 
weapons capabilities. But the U.S. Govern- 
ment cannot do this alone. The International 
Atomic Energy Agency must play a critical 
role here. We should give this Agency our 
fullest political and financial backing. It 
faces a gigantic task with quite limited 
means. As a contribution to this end, the 
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 

May 5, 1975 


Agency has developed a number of instru- 
ments to assist international inspectors in 
detecting theft or diversion of dangerous 

Unhappily, shortsighted commercial inter- 
ests sometimes militate against the applica- 
tion of effective controls. It is essential that 
supplier nations agree not to undercut each 
other on nuclear safeguards. You would 
think that all nations willing to export nu- 
clear materials or equipment would be 
anxious to prevent proliferation. Even the 
largest nations would suffer grievously if 
nuclear explosives became widely available, 
and the welfare and independence of 
medium-sized or smaller industrial nations 
might be even more threatened. Thus, I hope 
all the exporters of nuclear technology will 
keep their own long-term self-interest 
in mind. 

Another problem we face is that of nu- 
clear wastes. At the present time, these 
wastes — spent fuel from reactors — are sim- 
ply accumulating, and of course they will 
accumulate increasingly as more reactors 
come into use. They are dangerous now from 
the standpoint of possible permanent con- 
tamination of the environment; but they 
might become far more dangerous still if 
there were a widespread effort to reprocess 
them and thus extract plutonium which 
could be used for weapons as well as for 
reactor fuel. Several imaginative solutions 
have been suggested, which seem promising 
on technical and economic grounds. But 
there are still great gaps in our knowledge. 

The big question remains: Will nations 
agree not to acquire nuclear weapons? 

The answer is this: A country will agree 
if, in its judgment, its security is served by 
doing so. The Nonproliferation Treaty, 
basically, ties together many countries into 
a multilateral commitment not to start nu- 
clear arms competition with each other. 
Many nations understand that such competi- 
tion would exacerbate existing conflicts in 
their area, raising new instability and the 
chances of nuclear war. Yet these countries 
will also consider whether their self-denial 

of nuclear arms might not adversely affect 
their security from nuclear blackmail, or 
from armed attack, by the present nuclear 

Given the ideological and national con- 
flicts in the world, nations forgoing nuclear 
weapons for defense will naturally seek pro- 
tection by other means. Protection through 
a strong alliance, for many nations, is now 
the alternative to a desperate search for 
security by getting their own nuclear bombs. 
And let us face this fact squarely: Alliances 
protecting most of these countries at this 
time would not survive without continuing 
American support. 

So we are presented with two choices. One 
is to prepare for an autarkic America, 
which, by terminating alliances, has in effect 
resigned itself to further nuclear prolifera- 
tion, an America that tries to rely on its own 
resources only, an America that tries to pro- 
tect itself behind barriers of air and missile 
defenses and a tightly guarded border. Our 
standard of living would be lower and our 
personal freedoms severely curtailed. But we 
could claim to be free of foreign entangle- 
ments, without troops and bases overseas, 
and no demands from allies to worry about. 

The second choice hopefully open to us 
is to play a leading role in maintaining a 
worldwide security structure that will give 
non-nuclear nations the confidence to forgo 
their own nuclear forces. Unless we play this 
role, we will lose both our right and our 
capability to act against nuclear prolifera- 

We can't have it both ways; we can't be 
free from foreign involvements and be effec- 
tive against nuclear proliferation. fc,< 

U.S. Alternate Executive Director 
of IDB Confirmed 

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the 
nomination of Yan Michael Ross to be U.S. 
Alternate Executive Director of the Inter- 
American Development Bank. 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Ford Names Commission 
on International Women's Year 

White House press release (Palm Springs. Calif.) tiated April 2 

President Ford on April 2 announced his 
intention to appoint 33 persons as members 
of the National Commission on the Observ- 
ance of International Women's Year, 1975. 
The President is also designating Jill 
Ruckelshaus to chair the Commission. The 
members are: 

JrLL Ruckelshaus, of Rockville, Md., Director, Or- 
ganizational Relations, National Center for Volun- 
tary Action, Washington, D.C. 

Ethel Allen, of Philadelphia, Pa., physician, 
surgeon, and Philadelphia city councilwoman. 

Anne L. Armstrong, of Armstrong, Tex., former 
Counsellor to the President. 

Margaret Long Arnold, of Saugerties on Hudson, 
N.Y., executive assistant to the executive director, 
National Retired Teachers Association, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 

Elizabeth Athanasakos, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., 

Barbara R. Bergmann, of Bethesda, Md., professor 
of economics, University of Maryland, College 
Park, Md. 

Patricia T. Carbine, of New York, N.Y., publisher 
and editor in chief, Ms. Magazine. 

Weston Christopherson, of Lake Forest, 111., presi- 
dent, Jewel Companies, Chicago, 111. 

Mary Stallings Coleman, of Battle Creek, Mich., 
justice, Michigan Supreme Court, Lansing, Mich. 

Helen K. Copley, of LaJolla, Calif., chairman and 
chief executive officer of the Copley Newspapers. 

Audrey Rowe Colom, of Washington, D.C, coordi- 
nator of the D.C. Child Advocacy Office, Children's 
Defense Fund. 

Richard Cornuelle, of New York, N.Y., author. 

WiNFiELD Dunn, of Nashville, Tenn., consultant, 
business and government, former Governor of 

Catherine Claire Eike, of Lawrence, Kans., as- 
sistant to the dean of women, the University of 

Paula Gibson, of Four Lakes, Wash., student, Gon- 
zaga University, Spokane, Wash. 

Gilda Bojorquez Gjurich, of Montabello, Calif., 
president and senior partner, Los Amigos Con- 
struction Co., Santa Fe Springs, Calif. 

Ella T. Grasso, of Windsor Locks, Conn., Governor 
of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn. 

Hanna Holborn Gray, of New Haven, Conn., pro- 
vost, Yale University. 

Martha Griffiths, of Farmington Hills, Mich., at- 
torney, former Congresswoman. 

Lenore Hershey, of New York, N.Y., editor in chief 
of the Ladies Home Journal. 

Velma Murphy Hill, of New York, N.Y., assistant 
to the President, United Federation of Teachers. 

Patricia Hutar, of Glenview, 111., U.S. Representa- 
tive to the U.N. Commission on the Status of 

Rita Z. Johnston, of Bethesda, Md., U.S. Delegate 
and Vice Chairman of the Inter-American Com- 
mission of Women, Organization of American 

Ellen I. Kikby, of Petersburg, W. Va., public health 
nurse for Grant County, W. Va. 

Dorothy Vale Kissinger, of Mesa, Ariz., coowner 
and manager, Sahuaro Lake Guest Ranch. 

Clare Boothe Luce, of Honolulu, Hawaii. 

William Crawford Mercer, of Wellesley Hills, 
Mass., president. New England Telephone and 
Telegraph, Boston, Mass. 

Ersa H. Poston, of Loudonville, N.Y., president, 
New York State Civil Service Commission, Al- 
bany, N.Y. 

Joel Read, of Milwaukee, Wis., president, Alverne 
College, Milwaukee, Wis. 

Betty Smith, of Eugene, Oreg., member. National 
Board of Directors, YMCA. 

Barbara Walters, of New York, N.Y., cohost of 
the Today Show. 

Annie Dodge Wauneka, of Ganado, Ariz., member 
of the Navajo Tribal Council, Window Rock, Ariz. 

Gerridee Wheeler, of Bismarck, N. Dak., president. 
National Association of Mental Health. 

The Commission shall consist of not more 
than 35 members to be appointed by the 
President from among citizens in private 
life.' The President shall designate the pre- 
siding officer, who may designate from 
among the members of the Commission as 
many vice presiding officers as necessary. 

The President of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives 
may designate two Members of each House 
to serve on the Commission.^ 

The Commission shall promote the na- 

' President Ford announced on Apr. 14 (White 
House press release) two additional members of the 
Commission: Katherine Hepburn, of Old Saybrook, 
Conn., actress, and Alan Alda, of Leonia, N.J., actor 
and writer. 

- The congressional members of the Commission 
are Senators Birch Bayh and Charles Percy and 
Representatives Bella Abzug and Margaret Heckler. 

May 5, 1975 


tional observance in the United States of 
International Women's Year. To this end, it 
will focus attention on the need to encourage 
appropriate and relevant cooperative activity 
in the field of women's rights and respon- 

The Commission shall conclude its work 
by the end of the year 1975 and make a re- 
port to the President within 30 days there- 
after. The Commission shall then be 

tionships between the two countries. 

The Secretary of State and the Foreign 
Minister of Colombia agreed that they would 
maintain an active exchange of views on 
the issues discussed in the months ahead and 
especially prior to the OAS General Assem- 
bly in May. 

Presidential Determination 

for Generalized Tariff Preferences 

United States and Colombia Review 
Hemispheric Matters 

Following is the text of a joint commu- 
nique issued on April 9 at the conclusion of 
a visit to Washington by Indalecio Lievano 
Aguirre, Foreign Minister of Colombia. 

Press release 188 dated April 9 

The Foreign Minister of Colombia Dr. 
Indalecio Lievano Aguirre and the Secretary 
of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger announced 
that they met on April 8 in Washington for 
the purpose of reviewing matters of common 
interest in the hemisphere. The Foreign 
Minister traveled to Washington at the invi- 
tation of the Secretary of State for consulta- 
tions prior to the Secretary's Latin Ameri- 
can trip. They discussed the forthcoming 
General Assembly of the OAS and the major 
agenda items for that meeting. They also 
reviewed the current state of the hemisphere 
and perspectives for U.S.-Latin American 
relations over the longer term. The Foreign 
Minister of Colombia delivered to the Sec- 
retary a letter to President Ford sent jointly 
by the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica 
and Venezuela. 

The two principals also discussed prepara- 
tions for the forthcoming state visit of 
President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen sched- 
uled for the fall. 

The talks were helpful and constructive. 
They served to confirm the warm and co- 
operative spirit which characterizes rela- 


Determination Under Section 502(b) of the Trade 
Act of 1974 

[Presidential Determination No, 75-11] 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, March 2U, 1975. 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the 
Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby 
determine on the basis of a review conducted by in- 
terested agencies of the Executive Branch of each 
of the relevant investment disputes that, in the case 
of each country listed below, good faith negotiations 
to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensa- 
tion under the applicable provisions of international 
law are in progress, or such country is otherwise 
taking steps to discharge its obligations under in- 
ternational law, as prescribed in Section 502(b) (4) 
(D) (ii) of the Act: 









Central African Republic 

Sri Lanka 

Congo (Brazzaville) 






El Salvador 


In accordance with Section 502(b) (4) of the Act 
I am furnishing a copy of this determination to the 
Senate and House of Representatives. 

This Determination shall be published in the 
Federal Register. 

40 Fed. Reg. 15377, Apr. 7. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Military and Humanitarian Assistance to South Viet-Nam 

Following are statements made before 
the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 
April 15 by Secretary Kissinger and be- 
fore the House Committee on International 
Affairs on April 15 by Daniel Parker, 
Administrator, Agency for International De- 
velopment, and on April 18 by Secretary 


Press release 199 dated April 16 

The long and agonizing conflict in Indo- 
china has reached a tragic stage. The events 
of the past month have been discussed at 
great length before the Congress and re- 
quire little additional elaboration. In Viet- 
Nam President Thieu ordered a strategic 
withdrawal from a number of areas he re- 
garded as militarily untenable. However, the 
withdrawal took place in great haste, without 
adequate advance planning, and with insuf- 
ficient coordination. It was further compli- 
cated by a massive flow of civilian refugees 
seeking to escape the advancing North Viet- 
namese Army. Disorganization engendered 
confusion; fear led to panic. The results, as 
we all know, were tragic losses — of territory, 
of population, of material, and of morale. 

But to fully understand what has hap- 
pened, it is necessary to have an appreciation 
of all that went before. The North Viet- 
namese offensive, and the South Vietnamese 
response, did not come about by chance — 

' The complete transcripts of the hearings will be 
published by the committees and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

although chance is always an element in 
warfare. The origins of these events are 
complex, and I believe it would be useful to 
review them briefly. 

Since January 1973, Hanoi has violated — 
continuously, systematically, and energeti- 
cally — the most fundamental provisions of 
the Paris agreement. It steadily increased 
the numbers of its troops in the South. It 
improved and expanded its logistics system 
in the South. It increased the armaments 
and ammunition of its forces in the South. 
And as you know, it blocked all efforts to 
account for personnel missing in action. 
These are facts, and they are indisputable. 
All of these actions were of course in total 
violation of the agreement. Parallel to these 
efforts, Hanoi attempted — with considerable 
success — to immobilize the various mecha- 
nisms established by the agreement to mon- 
itor and curtail violations of the cease-fire. 
Thus, it assiduously prepared the way for 
further military actions. 

South Viet-Nam's record of adherence to 
the agreement has not been perfect. It is, 
however, qualitatively and quantitatively far 
better than Hanoi's. South Viet-Nam did not 
build up its armed forces. It undertook no 
major offensive actions — although it traded 
thrusts and probes with the Communists. It 
cooperated fully in establishing and support- 
ing the cease-fire control mechanisms pro- 
vided for in the agreement. And it sought, 
as did the United States, full implementa- 
tion of those provisions of the agreement 
calling for an accounting of soldiers missing 
in action. 

But perhaps more relevant to an under- 
standing of recent events are the following 

May 5, 1975 


While North Viet-Nam had available sev- 
eral reserve divisions which it could commit 
to battle at times and places of its choosing, 
the South had no strategic reserves. Its 
forces were stretched thin, defending lines 
of communication and population centers 
throughout the country. 

While North Viet-Nam, by early this year, 
had accumulated in South Viet-Nam enough 
ammunition for two years of intensive com- 
bat. South Vietnamese commanders had to 
ration ammunition as their stocks declined 
and were not replenished. 

While North Viet-Nam had enough fuel in 
the South to operate its tanks and armored 
vehicles for at least 18 months. South Viet- 
Nam faced stringent shortages. 

In sum, while Hanoi was strengthening its 
army in the South, the combat effectiveness 
of South Viet-Nam's army gradually grew 
weaker. While Hanoi built up its reserve 
divisions and accumulated ammunition, fuel, 
and other military supplies, U.S. aid levels 
to Viet-Nam were cut — first by half in 1973 
and then by another third in 1974. This 
coincided with a worldwide inflation and a 
fourfold increase in fuel prices. As a result 
almost all of our military aid had to be de- 
voted to ammunition and fuel. Very little 
was available for spare parts, and none for 
new equipment. 

These imbalances became painfully evi- 
dent when the offensive broke full force, and 
they contributed to the tragedy which un- 
folded. Moreover, the steady diminution in 
the resources available to the Army of South 
Viet-Nam unquestionably affected the morale 
of its officers and men. South Vietnamese 
units in the northern and central provinces 
knew full well that they faced an enemy 
superior both in numbers and in firepower. 
They knew that reinforcements and resup- 
ply would not be forthcoming. When the 
fighting began they also knew, as they had 
begun to suspect, that the United States 
would not respond. I would suggest that all 
of these factors added significantly to the 
sense of helplessness, despair, and, eventual- 
ly, panic which we witnessed in late March 
and early April. 

I would add that it is both inaccurate and 

unfair to hold South Viet-Nam responsible 
for blocking progress toward a political so- 
lution to the conflfct. Saigon's proposals in 
its conversations with PRG [Provisional 
Revolutionary Government] representatives 
in Paris were in general constructive and 
conciliatory. There was no progress toward 
a compromise political settlement because 
Hanoi intended that there should not be. In- 
stead, North Viet-Nam's strategy was to lay 
the groundwork for an eventual military 
offensive, one which would either bring out- 
right victory or at least allow Hanoi to dic- 
tate the terms of a political solution. 

Neither the United States nor South Viet- 
Nam entered into the Paris agreement with 
the expectation that Hanoi would abide by 
it in every respect. We did believe, however, 
that the agreement was sufficiently equitable 
to both sides that its major provisions could 
be accepted and acted upon by Hanoi and 
that the contest could be shifted thereby 
from a military to a political track. However, 
our two governments also recognized that, 
since the agreement manifestly was not self- 
enforcing, Hanoi's adherence depended heav- 
ily on maintaining a military parity in South 
Viet-Nam. So long as North Viet-Nam con- 
fronted a strong South Vietnamese army 
and so long as the possibility existed of U.S. 
intervention to offset the strategic advan- 
tages of the North, Hanoi could be expected 
to forgo major military action. Both of those 
essential conditions were dissipated over the 
past two years. Hanoi attained a clear mili- 
tary superiority, and it became increasingly 
convinced that U.S. intervention could be 
ruled out. It therefore returned to a military 
course, with the results we have seen. 

The present situation in Viet-Nam is omi- 
nous. North Viet-Nam's combat forces far 
outnumber those of the South, and they are 
better armed. Perhaps more important, they 
enjoy a psychological momentum which can 
be as decisive as armaments in battle. South 
Viet-Nam must reorganize and reequip its 
forces, and it must restore the morale of its 
army and its people. These tasks will be 
difficult, and they can be performed only by 
the South Vietnamese. However, a successful 
defense will also require resources — arms. 


Department of State Bulletin 

fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies — and 
these can come only from the United States. 

Large quantities of equipment and sup- 
plies, totaling perhaps $800 million, were 
lost in South Viet-Nam's precipitous retreat 
from the northern and central areas. Much 
of this should not have been lost, and we re- 
gret that it happened. But South Viet-Narp 
is now faced with a different strategic and 
tactical situation and different military re- 
quirements. Although the amount of mili- 
tary assistance the President has requested 
is of the same general magnitude as the 
value of the equipment lost, we are not at- 
tempting simply to replace those losses. The 
President's request, based on General Wey- 
and's [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of 
Staff, United States Army] assessment, rep- 
resents our best judgment as to what is 
needed now, in this new situation, to defend 
what is left of South Viet-Nam. Weapons, 
ammunition, and supplies to reequip four 
divisions, to form a number of ranger groups 
into divisional units, and to upgrade some 
territorial forces into infantry regiments 
will require some $326 million. The balance 
of our request is for ammunition, fuel, spare 
parts, and medical supplies to sustain up to 
60 days of intensive combat and to pay for 
the cost of transporting those items. These 
are minimum requirements, and they are 
needed .urgently. 

The human tragedy of Viet-Nam has never 
been more acute than it now is. Hundreds of 
thousands of South Vietnamese have sought 
to flee Communist control and are homeless 
refugees. They have our compassion, and 
they must also have our help. Despite com- 
mendable efforts by the South Vietnamese 
Government, the burden of caring for these 
innocent victims is beyond its capacity. The 
United States has already done much to as- 
sist these people, but many remain without 
adequate food, shelter, or medical care. The 
President has asked that additional efforts 
and additional resources be devoted to this 
humanitarian effort. I ask that the Congress 
respond generously and quickly. 

The objectives of the United States in this 
immensely difficult situation remain as they 
were when the Paris agreement was signed 

— to end the military conflict and establish 
conditions which will allow a fair political 
solution to be achieved. We believe that de- 
spite the tragic experience to date, the Paris 
agreement remains a valid framework with- 
in which to proceed toward such a solution. 
However, today, as in 1973, battlefield condi- 
tions will affect political perceptions and the 
outcome of negotiations. We therefore be- 
lieve that in order for a political settlement 
to be reached which preserves any degree of 
self-determination for the people of South 
Viet-Nam, the present military situation 
must be stabilized. It is for these reasons 
that the President has asked Congress to 
appropriate urgently additional funds for 
military assistance for Viet-Nam. 

I am acutely aware of the emotions 
aroused in this country by our long and 
difficult involvement in Viet-Nam. I under- 
stand what the cost has been for this nation 
and why frustration and anger continue to 
dominate our national debate. Many will 
argue that we have done more than enough 
for the Government and the people of South 
Viet-Nam. I do not agree with that propo- 
sition, however, nor do I believe that to re- 
view endlessly the wisdom of our original 
involvement serves a useful purpose now. 
For despite the agony of this nation's ex- 
perience in Indochina and the substantial 
reappraisal which has taken place concern- 
ing our proper role there, few would deny 
that we are still involved or that what we 
do — or fail to do — will still weigh heavily in 
the outcome. We cannot by our actions alone 
insure the survival of South Viet-Nam. But 
we can, alone, by our inaction assure its 

The United States has no legal obligation 
to the Government and the people of South 
Viet-Nam of which the Congress is not aware. 
But we do have a deep moral obligation — 
rooted in the history of our involvement and 
sustained by the continuing efforts of our 
friends. We cannot easily set it aside. In 
addition to the obvious consequences for the 
people of Viet-Nam, our failure to act in 
accordance with that obligation would in- 
evitably influence other nations' perceptions 
of our constancy and our determination. 

May 5, 1975 


American credibility would not collapse, and 
American honor would not be destroyed. But 
both would be weakened, to the detriment of 
this nation and of the peaceful world order 
we have sought to build. 

Mr. Chairman, as our Ambassador in 
Phnom Penh was about to be evacuated last 
week he received a letter from a longtime 
friend of the United States who has been 
publicly marked for execution. Let me share 
that letter with you: 

Dear Excellency and Friend, I thank you very 
sincerely for your letter and for your offer to trans- 
port me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in 
such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in par- 
ticular for your great country, I never believed for 
a moment that you would have this sentiment of 
abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You 
have refused us your protection, and we can do 
nothing about it. 

You leave, and my wish is that you and your 
country will find happiness under this sky. But, 
mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot 
and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because 
we all are bom and must die one day. 

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I 
suspect that neither Ambassador [John 
Gunther] Dean nor I will ever be able to for- 
get that letter or the brave man who wrote 
it. Let us now, as Americans, act together 
to assure that we receive no more letters of 
this kind. 


I come to your committee today to ask 
for your assistance. We are urgently pro- 
posing and seeking your approval for a 
humanitarian undertaking, an undertaking 
which I believe does credit to the spirit of 
charity and sympathy — especially for those 
with whom we as a people have long been 
associated — that has in the past been a well- 
spring of our national character. 

In the past three weeks, the people of 
South Viet-Nam, a generation of whom have 
never known lasting tranquillity, have again 
been faced with a disruptive cataclysm of 

enormous human proportions. These events 
are familiar to us all. In the face of an 
assault by North Vietnamese divisions in 
direct violation of the Paris peace accords, 
millions, motivated by a mixture of con- 
viction, allegiance, and fear, fled the north- 
ern and central portions of South Viet-Nam. 
They left their villages and towns, they left 
their friends and sometimes their families, 
they left their belongings, and they left the 
soil from which they earned a living or the 
work in which they were otherwise em- 
ployed. In this exodus, many died, and not 
all — or even most — escaped. The armies of 
the North rolled southward faster than those 
who sought to flee. 

Our first thoughts and our first actions 
were to assist those who sought refuge in the 
territory still controlled by the Government 
of South Viet-Nam (GVN). We dispatched 
ships to augment the 40-odd craft made 
available for this purpose by the Government 
of South Viet-Nam and the several mercy 
vessels furnished by other nations. Events 
moved too rapidly, and we were only par- 
tially successful, but through these effoi'ts 
about 150,000 people were brought to safety. 
Others, roughly estimated at 850,000, moved 
and are still moving by their own efforts 
on rivers and by land to the refugee sites 
that are under GVN control. To date, nearly 
500,000 refugees have been officially regis- 
tered by the government. 

This process of counting by registration 
invariably lags behind the reality of dis- 
placed human beings, both because of the 
time involved in assembling data and be- 
cause the movement of persons still con- 
tinues. Our best estimate today — and I need 
not tell you that today's numbers may well 
be wrong tomorrow — is that the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam will shortly face 
the responsibility of caring for approximate- 
ly 1 million new refugees. 

To assist in that eff"ort we have allotted 
almost all of the limited Foreign Assistance 
Act resources remaining available to us ; in 
addition, we have made 100,000 tons of rice 
and an additional 13,500 tons of high-protein 


Department of State Bulletin 

food supplements available on a grant basis 
under Public Law 480 to be distributed by 
both voluntary agencies and the South 
Vietnamese Government to those most des- 
perately in need. 

Let me note at this point that to the enor- 
mous problem of refugee relief must be 
added the weight of an already severe condi- 
tion of unemployment and recession in the 
urban areas — a condition created in large 
measure by the withdrawal of American 
forces and funds — that with certainty must 
worsen drastically as the disruption of war 
takes its toll on the productive economy. 
Many will be without work. Any humani- 
tarian effort must be no less concerned for 
those who suffer deprivation in the cities 
than for those displaced by the war. Suffer- 
ing is made no less bearable for being once 
removed from its cause. 

We are confident that the Government of 
South Viet-Nam possesses the all-too-experi- 
enced human resources to undertake an 
orderly and reliable relief effort, given some 
measure of assistance from the voluntary 
agencies, the international organizations, 
and AID personnel. (To the subject of those 
agencies and organizations I would like to 
return shortly.) We are equally certain, how- 
ever, that without new financial resources 
from outside donors, misery and starvation 
and sickness, unacceptable on any human 
basis, will inevitably ensue. 

I am here today to ask you approve 1?he 
commitment by the United States of a large 
but by no means all-inclusive portion of tho.se 
resources. Specifically, I am asking you to 
authorize an additional $73 million for that 
purpose, which, taken together with the $177 
million previously authorized but not yet 
appropriated for assistance to Indochina, 
will make available $250 million to lighten 
the burden and ease the suffering of the 
refugees, the war victims, and the unem- 
ployed of South Viet-Nam. At the same time 
I am asking you to waive previous alloca- 
tions of Indochina funds which could impede 
the humanitarian effort. 

Let me emphasize at the outset that the 

program we sketch here is illustrative. 
Planning here and in Saigon is actively 
underway. Our objective is to assist the 
Government of South Viet-Nam to heal the 
human wounds of war by reuniting families, 
assisting them during a difficult transition 
period, resettling them in new homes, and 
bringing them back into the productive econ- 
omy. The funds we seek will be contributed 
to meet these objectives. We will be attempt- 
ing as best we can to fashion programs that 
adequately care for relief needs and also 
focus on the inextricably related objective 
of increasing jobs, reducing inflation, and in 
other ways creating an economic climate 
which permits the South Vietnamese people 
to move away from this hour of trouble 
toward productive, self-sufficient, and peace- 
ful lives. 

As we see the situation now, the funds 
we seek are not going to be expended on 
long-term projects. Rather, our request re- 
flects our best estimate of the initial relief 
costs for the refugees and of the ongoing 
and elemental requirements for a period of 
six months of the people whom I have men- 
tioned — the refugees, the war victims, the 
urban unemployed. 

Let me describe briefly for you our pro- 
jections of aggregate needs. 

First, with respect to the emergency trans- 
portation of refugees to the temporary sites 
within South Viet-Nam, we have an esti- 
mated requirement of about $10 million. 

Second, with respect to the care of refu- 
gees, there are four broad categories of 

Temporary Refugee Sites must be devel- 
oped and constructed. At present, we fore- 
see the need for nine sites on the mainland 
to accommodate about 100,000 people each 
and one on the Island of Phu Quoc. The loca- 
tions of the nine other sites have not been 
determined as yet, but we would expect 
them to be sited on good agricultural land 
in the delta. A site must be cleared, roads 
and shelters constructed, drainage ditches 
dug, water supplies and sanitary facilities 

May 5, 1975 


formed, medical, educational and adminis- 
trative facilities provided. These items and 
many others related to providing essential 
goods and services are" expected to cost 
roughly $10 million per site, or $100 million 
in total. 

Refitqee Relief Allowances and Camp 
Operations Costs of roughly $10 per person 
per month must be provided. This will en- 
able the refugees to buy food with which 
to supplement their rice ration of 500 grams 
per day, charcoal with which to cook, and 
cloth with which to clothe themselves. Addi- 
tionally, these funds would pay for food 
handling and storage, transport, and related 
costs. The total cost for this for six months 
will be $60 million. 

Work Programs to employ the refugees 
must also be developed, in order to permit 
at least one family member to supplement 
the family's meager income. We expect most 
of the laborers would be women. Our past 
experience tells us that we can expect that 
some 200,000 people would be so employed, 
if given the opportunity, at $1 per day. For 
six months this would require $30 million. 
These refugees will provide the bulk of non- 
skilled labor needed in the construction of 
refugee camp facilities. They will also pro- 
vide the nonskilled labor required to main- 
tain minimal standards for sanitary facilities 
in the camps and maintain in good repair 
drainage ditches, roads, fencing, water facil- 
ities, and other camp infrastructure. 

Integrated Relief and Resettlement Sup- 
port Teams — The voluntary agencies are 
ready to assist in the refugee relief and 
resettlement program when the security sit- 
uation stabilizes sufficiently to allow staff 
to operate with some degree of safety. Their 
contribution will be the provision of support 
and advisory teams that would include physi- 
cians, nurses, medical assistants, and others. 
Their major responsibility will be to provide 
advisory and other support needed in the 
relief effort. A total of $12 million is planned 
for these teams. 

Third, with respect to the rapidly growing 
needs of the urban unemployed, we would 

begin developing, together with the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam, programs to pro- 
vide assistance to the urban destitute and 
to provide work for the unemployed and 
underemployed wherever feasible. We pro- 
pose a program costing $10 million. 

Fourth, with respect to the refugees lo- 
cated on the Island of Phu Quoc, we believe 
that circumstances permit the immediate 
initiation of resettlement efforts. We should 
keep in mind that temporary camps give 
only some relief to human misery. Resettle- 
ment permits people to move into tolerable 
and productive lives. 

The Phu Quoc resettlement program 
should move rapidly. The refugees have 
been given access to 18,000 hectares of land 
on the i-sland. Clearing the land for agricul- 
ture use, grading for roadways and drainage 
ditches, and providing water wells and other 
structures await the necessary funding. The 
onset of the rainy season in June and July 
of 1976 is the critical target period for gain- 
ing access to the land if a December 1976 
harvest is to be realized. The Norwegian 
Government has recently grant-financed a 
fishing project on Phu Quoc which will pro- 
vide boats and fishing gear for 4,000 families 
(some 20,000 persons). Experts estimate 
this is the maximum-sized fishing enterprise 
that should be undertaken at this time. We 
have not yet received estimated GVN cost 
data. However, we anticipate that as a 
minimum, the Government of South Viet- 
Nam will provide teachers for the 250 class- 
rooms we envisage for the Phu Quoc re- 
settlement program as well as administrative 
and technical personnel for the refugee and 
resettlement site. We propose $28 million 
for this resettlement program. 

It is clear that the funds we seek are but 
a fraction of the total costs which will be 
incurred in South Viet-Nam. Our best pres- 
ent estimate is that approximately $750 
million to $1 billion will be needed to carry 
a relief and resettlement program for refu- 
gees through to its conclusion. We are re- 
questing $250 million now to begin the job 
as quickly as possible. We hope and expect 


Department of State Bulletin 

that others will contribute to the effort. 

American voluntary agencies with which 
AID has been working in both Cambodia 
and South Viet-Nam have assured us that 
they stand ready to respond to human need 
in any area where they are at liberty to 
operate. They are prepared to undertake 
relief and rehabilitation as well as their on- 
going programs. Although their U.S. per- 
sonnel have been i-educed, those remaining, 
along with local staffs, are assisting with 
the refugee problem. And they have highly 
experienced staff standing on call in nearby 
countries awaiting the opportunity to assist 
once the situation stabilizes. 

The foreign assistance dollars we provide 
will perform double duty. We estimate that 
80 percent of our funds will be used to 
finance local piaster costs of the relief effort. 
The dollars will be available to the Govern- 
ment of South Viet-Nam to finance imports 
of essential commodities needed to keep the 
economy of Viet-Nam in balance by match- 
ing the increased money supply generated 
by the relief program with imported goods. 
Our objective is to require that the dollars 
be spent in the United States under the Com- 
modity Import Program to the extent con- 
sistent with our primary objective of pro- 
viding prompt financing for relief efforts 
and avoiding the general human suffering 
which can be caused by hyperinflation. 

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by frank- 
ly admitting that I cannot tell you what will 
happen to South Viet-Nam in the coming 
weeks and months. We think it has a 
chance. But I can tell you what will happen 
to the people of South Viet-Nam if we and 
others do not provide the needed humani- 
tarian resources. Hundreds of thousands 
will starve. They will have no shelter, no 
schools, no medical facilities. They will live — 
some of them will live, for a while anyway — 
in unmitigated human misery. We must act 
urgently. The rains come in less than two 
months; as much of the infrastructure for 
refugee life as possible must be in place by 

We believe that AID — through its long 

experience and working i-elationships with 
the vast machinery of the South Vietnam- 
ese Government and with the voluntary 
agencies and organizations (which have per- 
formed a truly priceless service to the people 
of that embattled land) — is up to the task. 
I hope that we will have your quick support. 


Press release 206 dated April 18 

I welcome the opportunity to appear now 
before this committee. My remarks will be 
very brief in. order to let you get directly to 

The tragedy in Viet-Nam has been dis- 
cussed at great length in recent weeks, and 
my own views are well known to you. 

Although we are no longer fighting in Viet- 
Nam, we are still involved there, and what 
we do — or fail to do — can still influence the 
outcome. Thus, we are faced with a diffi- 
cult national decision. 

The question before us now is what can 
be done and should be done to restore some 
prospect of a negotiated settlement such as 
we sought so earnestly in Paris and to pro- 
vide for the safety and well-being of the 
people of South Viet-Nam caught up in this 

The President's request includes the pro- 
vision of adequate military and humanitar- 
ian assistance. He has also asked the Con- 
gress to clarify existing provisions of law 
regarding the use of U.S. forces in the evac- 
uation of Americans and Vietnamese should 
the worst come to pass. 

The request for military assistance was 
made to provide the people of South Viet- 
Nam the means to defend against those who 
seek to impose their will by force. If South 
Viet-Nam is unable to continue its struggle, 
it should not be by virtue of the cessation 
of U.S. support so long as the will to resist 

No aspect of the situation in Viet-Nam 
touches the hearts of Americans today as 

May 5, 1975 


much as the enormous human tragedy repre- 
sented by hundreds of thousands of up- 
rooted refugees. They have our compassion, 
and they need our immediate help. The 
President's request for humanitarian assist- 
ance was to provide the food, shelter, and 
medical care these unfortunate victims of 
the war must have. 

In this regard, I want to acknowledge the 
serious and urgent efforts this committee 
has engaged in to adopt legislation for the 
kind of humanitarian and evacuation effort, 
if that should become necessary, which is 
consistent with our responsibilities. I com- 
mend the committee for its conscientious 
and expeditious accomplishment. I urge 
your colleagues in the other committees of 
the House and Senate to act as swiftly as 
you have. 

Report on Use of U.S. Armed Forces 
in Evacuation From Cambodia 

Folloiving is the text of a letter dated 
April 12 from President Ford to Speaker of 
the House Carl Albert, i 

The Honorable the SPEAKER, 
House of Representatives. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: As you and other 
members of Congress were advised, in view 
of circumstances in Cambodia, the Unitfed 
States had certain contingency plans to 
utilize United States Armed Forces to assure 
the safe evacuation of U.S. Nationals from 
that country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the 
Khmer Communist forces had ruptured 
Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) 
defensive lines to the north, northwest and 
east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar 
range of Pochentong Airfield and the out- 
skirts of Phnom Penh. In view of this de- 
teriorating military situation, and on the 

' Released Apr. 14 (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 21); an identi- 
cal letter was sent to Nelson A. Rockefeller, Presi- 
dent of the Senate. 

recommendations of the American Ambassa- 
dor there, I ordered U.S. military forces to 
proceed with the planned evacuation out of 
consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens. 

In accordance with my desire that the 
Congress be fully informed on this matter, 
and taking note of Section 4 of the War 
Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), I wish to 
report to you that the first elements of the 
U.S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 
8:34 P.M. EDT on 11 April. Military forces 
included 350 ground combat troops of the 
U.S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting 
tactical air and command and control ele- 
ments. The Marines were deployed from 
helicopters to assure the security of helicop- 
ter landing zone within the city of Phnom 
Penh. The first helicopter landed at approxi- 
mately 10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and 
the last evacuees and ground security force 
Marines departed the Cambodian landing 
zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 
April 1975. The last elements of the force to 
leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire. 
There was no firing by U.S. forces at any 
time during the operation. No U.S. Armed 
Forces personnel were killed, wounded or 
missing, and there were no casualties among 
the American evacuees. 

Although these forces were equipped for 
combat within the meaning of Section 4(a) 
(2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was 
to effect the evacuation of U.S. Nationals. 
Present information indicates that a total of 
82 U.S. citizens were evacuated and that the 
task force was also able to accommodate 35 
third country nationals and 159 Cambodians 
including employees of the U.S. Government. 

The operation was ordered and conducted 
pursuant to the President's Constitutional 
executive power and authority as Command- 
er in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces. 

I am sure you share with me my pride in 
the Armed Forces of the United States and 
my thankfulness that the operation was con- 
ducted without incident. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 12, 1975. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safegruards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bi- 
lateral agreement between the United States and 
Israel of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 
4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for co- 
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna April 4, 1975. Entered into 
force April 4, 1975. 

Signatures: Israel, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: March 26, 1975. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973. 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, April 10, 1975; 

Chile, February 14, 1975; Ecuador, February 

11, 1975; Uruguay, April 2, 1975. 
Enters into force: July 1, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil 
pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
Ratifications deposited: France, Sweden, United 

Kingdom, March 17, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Norway, March 21, 1975. 
Enters into force: June 19, 1975.^ 

International convention on the establishment of an 
international fund for compensation for oil pollu- 
tion damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 
Ratifications deposited: Norway, March 21, 1975; 

Sweden, March 17, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975. 


Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. 
Entered into force September 1, 1974.^ 
Notifications of approval: Central African Re- 
public, Fiji, January 3, 1975; New Zealand, 
December 4, 1974. 

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final 

protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 

into force September 1, 1974." 

Notifications of approval: Central African Re- 
public, Fiji, January 3, 1975; New Zealand, De- 
cember 4, 1974. 
International telecommunication convention with 

annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- 

molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force 

January 1, 1975.' 

Ratifications deposited: Canada, January 20, 
1975; Ecuador, January 24, 1975. 

Accession deposited: Maldives, January 16, 1975. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Argentina, Canada, Cuba (with state- 
ment), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, 
Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Vatican City State, Venezuela, April 14, 1975. 
Declarations of provisional application deposited: 
Argentina, Cuba, April 14, 1975. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Australia, Finland, April 11, 1975; 
Argentina, Canada, Japan (with reservation), 
Sweden, Switzerland (with statement), April 
14, 1975. 
Declaration of provisional application deposited: 
Argentina, April 14, 1975. 



Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 
7855). Eff'ected by exchange of notes at Cairo 
April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975. 


Agreement extending the agreement of July 12, 
1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 
5723, 5909, 6091), for cooperation concerning civil 
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington 
January 13, 1975. 
Entered into force: March 24, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of November 27, 1974 

' Will not enter into force for the United States 
on this date. 
' Not in force. 
' Not in force for the United States. 

May 5, 1975 


(TIAS 7995). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Amman March 20, 1975. Entered into force 
March 20, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 
7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul 
March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 13, 

United Kingdom 

Agreement extending the agreement of March 30, 
1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7594, 
7832), relating to implementation and enforce- 
ment of civil aviation advance charter rules. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at London April 2 
and 3, 1975. Entered into force April 3, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 8, 1974 
(TIAS 7952). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 
13, 1975. 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20J,02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
loo or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the Su- 
perintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder — $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 30^ each. 

Ecuador Cat. No. S1.123:EC9 

Pub. 7771 6 pp. 

French Territory of Afars . Cat. No. S1.123:88AF 

and Issas Pub. 8429 4 pp. 

The Gambia Cat. No. SI. 123:014 

Pub. 8014 4 pp. 

Lesotho . 

. Cat. No. S1.123:J76 

Pub. 7956 4 pp. 

. Cat. No. S1.123:L49 

Pub. 7816 5 pp. 

. Cat. No. S1.123:L56 

Pub. 8091 5 pp. 

. Cat. No. S1.123:M29/4 

Pub. 8026 4 pp. 

. Cat. No. S1.123:N51 

Pub. 7772 4 pp. 

Nuclear Science and Technology Information. Memo- 
randum of understanding signed by the United 
States, EURATOM, Belgium, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Neth- 
erlands. TIAS 7939. 70 pp. S54. (Cat. No. S9.10: 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam. TIAS 7952. 15 pp. 40^. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:7952). 

Transfer of Military Scrap. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
November 8 and December 14, 1972. TIAS 7953. 5 
pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10:7953). 

Nonscheduled Air Services. Agreement with Jordan. 
TIAS 7954. 45 pp. 65C. (Cat. No. S9.10:7954). 

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Helicopters and Related 
Assistance. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7955. 7 
pp. 30«*. (Cat. No. S9.10:7955). 

Narcotic Drugs — Detection of Opium Poppy Cultiva- 
tion. Agreement with Mexico amending the agree- 
ment of June 10 and 24, 1974. TIAS 7956. 4 pp. 25<?. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7956). 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards Pursuant 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with the 
Philippines and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency suspending the agreement of July 15, 1968. 
TIAS 7957. 3 pp. 25«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7957). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of Au- 
gust 29, 1972, as amended. TIAS 7958. 4 pp. 25^. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7958). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
November 9, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7959. 4 pp. 25(f. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:7959). 

Whaling — Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter- 
national Whaling Convention of 1946. TIAS 7960. 4 
pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7960). 

Parcel Post. Agreement and regulations of execution 
with Macao. TIAS 7961. 33 pp. 45^. (Cat. No. 89.10: 

Parcel Post. Agreement and regulations of execution 
with Cyprus. TIAS 7962. 33 pp. 45<f. (Cat. No. 

Grants of Military Equipment and Materiel. Agree- 
ment with Tunisia. TIAS 7964. 5 pp. 25^ (Cat. No. 

Cooperation. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 7967. 3 pp. 
25<t. (Cat. No. 89.10:7967). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 5, lyJd VOL JbAJilJ, A'O. 1871 

American Principles. U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Finding Strength Through Adversity (Kis- 
singer) 557 


President Ford Interviewed at Convention of 
American Society of Nevi^spaper Editors 
(excerpts from transcript) 567 

United States Mourns Death of Chiang Kai- 
shek (Ford) 571 

Colombia. United States and Colombia Review 

Hemispheric Matters (joint communique) . 582 


Military and Humanitarian Assistance to 

South Viet-Nam (Kissinger, Parker) . . . 583 

Report on Use of U.S. Armed Forces in 
Evacuation From Cambodia (letter from 
President Ford to Speaker of the House) . 590 


Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological Weap- 
ons Convention (Ford, Executive order) . . 576 

The Nonproliferation Treaty and Our World- 
wide Security Structure (Ikle) 578 

Human Rights. President Ford Names Com- 
mission on International Women's Year . . 581 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
U.S. Alternate Executive Director of IDB 
Confirmed 580 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia) 

President Ford Interviewed at Convention of 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(excerpts from transcript) 567 

Report on Use of U.S. Armed Forces in 
Evacuation From Cambodia (letter from 
President Ford to Speaker of the House) . 590 

U.S. Expresses Sadness at Fall of Government 
of Khmer Republic (Ford) 566 

Middle East. U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding 
Strength Through Adversity (Kissinger) . 557 

Military Affairs. The National Interest and 
National Strength (Ford) 572 

Presidential Documents 

Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological Weap- 
ons Convention (Executive order) .... 576 

rhe National Interest and National Strength . 572 

President Ford Interviewed at Convention of 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(excerpts from transcript) 567 

Presidential Determination for Generalized 
Tariff Preferences 582 

Report on Use of U.S. Armed Forces in 
Evacuation From Cambodia 590 

U.S. Expresses Sadness at Fall of Govern- 
ment of Khmer Republic 566 

United States Mourns Death of Chiang Kai- 
shek 571 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 592 

Frade. Presidential Determination for Gener- 
alized Tariff Preferences 582 

Freaty Information 

Current Actions 691 

Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological Weap- 
ons Convention (Ford, Executive order) . . 576 

U.S.S.R. The National Interest and National 
Strength (Ford) 572 

President Ford Interviewed at Convention of 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(excerpts from transcript) 567 

United Nations. U.N. Documents 577 


Military and Humanitarian Assistance to 

South Viet-Nam (Kissinger, Parker) . . . 583 

President Ford Interviewed at Convention of 
American Society of Newspaper Editors 
(excerpts from transcript) 567 

U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding Strength 
Through Adversity (Kissinger) 557 

Name Index 

Ford, President . . 566, 567, 571, 572, 576, 582, 590 

Ikle, Fred C 578 

Kissinger, Secretary 557, 583 

Parker, Daniel 583 

Ross, Yan Michael 580 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to April 14 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 188 
of April 9. 

No. Date Subject 

*197 4/14 ANZUS Council meeting, April 

*198 4/15 Fine Arts Committee, May 19. 
199 4/15 Kissinger: Senate Appropria- 
tions Committee. 

*200 4/16 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, May 14. 

*201 4/16 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad- 
visory Committee, May 15. 

*202 4/16 Archeological exhibit from the 
People's Republic of China to 
visit San Francisco June 28- 
Aug. 28. 

*203 4/16 Equal Rights Amendment ratifi- 
cation adopted as top priority 
of International Women's Year 
Kissinger: American Society of 

Newspaper Editors. 
Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee Meeting, U.S. National 
Center for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution. 
Kissinger: House International 

Relations Committee. 
Dr. Nag Chaudhuri, Vice-Chan- 
cellor of India's Jawarlharlal 
Nehru University, named Lin- 
coln Lecturer. 

t208 4/19 Kissinger: L'Express interview. 

* Not printed. 

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Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXII 

No. 1872 

May 12, 1975 

Address by President Ford 593 



Excerpts From Transcript 596 


Superintendent of Documents 

JUL 31875 


For index see inside back cover 



Vol. LXXII, No. 1872 
May 12, 1975 

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with information on developments i 
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The BULLETIN includes selsctt 
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An Agenda for America's Third Century 

Address by President Ford ^ 

Today, America can regain the sense of 
pride that existed before Viet-Nam, but it 
cannot be achieved by refighting a war that 
is finished as far as America is concerned. 

As I see it, the time has come to look for- 
ward to an agenda for the future, to unify, 
to bind up the nation's wounds, and to 
restore its health and its optimistic self- 

In New Orleans, a great battle was fought 
after a war was over. In New Orleans to- 
night, we can begin a great national recon- 
ciliation. The first engagement must be with 
the problems of today, but just as important- 
ly, the problems of the future. 

That is why I think it is so appropriate 
that I find myself tonight at a university 
which addresses itself to preparing young 
people for the challenge of tomorrow. 

I ask that we stop refighting the battles 
and the recriminations of the past. I ask 
that we look now at what is right with 
America — at our possibilities and our poten- 
tialities for change and growth, achievement 
and sharing. I ask that we accept the re- 
sponsibility of leadership as a good neighbor 
to all peoples and an enemy of none. 

I ask that we strive to become, in the 
finest American tradition, something more 
tomorrow than we are today. 

Instead of my addressing the image of 
America, I prefer to consider the reality of 
America. It is true that we have launched 
our Bicentennial celebration without having 

' Made at Tulane University, New Orleans, La., 
on Apr. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Apr. 28; introductory 
paragraphs omitted). 

achieved human perfection, but we have at- 
tained a very remarkable self-governed so- 
ciety that possesses the flexibility and the 
dynamism to grow and undertake an entire- 
ly new agenda, an agenda for America's 
third century. 

So I ask you to join me in helping to write 
that agenda. I am as determined as a Presi- 
dent can be to seek national rediscovery of 
the belief in ourselves that characterized the 
most creative periods in our nation's history. 
The greatest challenge of creativity, as I 
see it, lies ahead. 

We, of course, are saddened indeed by the 
events in Indochina; but these events, tragic 
as they are, portend neither the end of the 
world nor of America's leadership in the 

Let me put it this way, if I might. Some 
tend to feel that if we do not succeed in 
everything everywhere, then we have suc- 
ceeded in nothing anywhere. 

I reject categorically such polarized think- 
ing. We can and we should help others to 
help themselves; but the fate of responsible 
men and women everywhere, in the final 
decision, rests in their own hands, not in 

America's future depends upon Ameri- 
cans, especially your generation, which is 
now equipping itself to assume the chal- 
lenges of the future, to help write the agenda 
for America. 

Earlier today in this great community, I 
spoke about the need to maintain our de- 
fenses. Tonight I would like to talk about 
another kind of strength, the true source of 
American power that transcends all of the 

May 12, 1975 


deterrent powers for paace of our Armed 
Forces. I am speaking here of our belief 
in ourselves and our belief in our nation. 

Abraham Lincoln asked, in his own words, 
"What constitutes the bulwark of our own 
liberty and independence?" He answered: 

It is not our frowning: battlements, our bristling 
sea coasts, our army and our navy .... Our defense 
is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage 
of all men, in all lands everywhere. 

It is in this spirit that we must now move 
beyond the discords of the past decade. It 
is in this spirit that I ask you to join me in 
writing an agenda for the future. 

I welcome your invitation, particularly, 
tonight because I know it is at Tulane and 
other centers of thought throughout our great 
country that much consideration is being 
given to the kind of future that Americans 
want and, just as importantly, will work for. 

Each of you are preparing yourselves for 
the future, and I am deeply interested in 
your preparations and your opinions and 
your goals. However, tonight, with your in- 
dulgence, let me share with you my own 

I envision a creative program that goes 
as far as our courage and our capacities can 
take us, both at home and abroad. My goal 
is for a cooperative world at peace, using 
its resources to build, not to destroy. 

As President, I am determined to offer 
leadership to overcome our current economic 
problems. My goal is for jobs for all who 
want to work and economic opportunity for 
all who want to achieve. 

I am determined to seek self-sufficiency in 
energy as an urgent national priority. My 
goal is to make America independent of for- 
eign energy sources by 1985. Of course, I 
will pursue interdependence with other na- 
tions and a reformed international economic 

My goal is for a world in which consum- 
ing and producing nations achieve a working 
balance. I will address the humanitarian 
issues of hunger and famine, of health and 
of healing. My goal is to achieve or to assure 
basic needs and an effective system to achieve 
this result. 

I recognize the need for technology that 

enriches life while preserving our natural 
environment. My goal is to stimulate pro- 
ductivity but use technology to redeem, not 
to destroy, our environment. 

I will strive for new cooperation rather 
than conflict in the peaceful exploration of 
our oceans and our space. My goal is to use 
resources for peaceful progress rather than 
war and destruction. 

Let America symbolize humanity's strug- 
gle to conquer nature and master technology. 
The time has now come for our government 
to facilitate the individual's control over his 
or her future and of the future of America. 

But the future requires more than Ameri- 
cans congratulating themselves on how much 
we know and how many products that we 
can produce. It requires new knowledge to 
meet new problems. We must not only be 
motivated to build a better America; we 
must know how to do it. 

If we really want a humane America that 
will, for instance, contribute to the allevia- 
tion of the world's hunger, we must realize 
that good intentions do not feed people. 
Some problems, as anyone who served in 
the Congress knows, are complex. There are 
no easy answers. Willpower alone does not 
grow food. 

We thought in a well-intentioned past that 
we could export our technology lock, stock, 
and barrel to developing nations. We did it 
with the best of intentions. But we are now 
learning that a strain of rice that grows 
in one place will not grow in another, that 
factories that produce at 100 percent in one 
nation produce less than half as much in a 
society where temperaments and work habits 
are somewhat different. 

Yet the world economy has become inter- 
dependent. Not only food technology, but 
money management, natural resources and 
energy, research and development — all kinds 
of this group require an organized world 
society that makes the maximum effective 
use of the world's resources. 

I want to tell the world: Let's grow food 
together, but let's also learn more about 
nutrition, about weather forecasting, about 
irrigation, about the many other specialties 
involved in helping people to help themselves. 


Department of State Bulletin 

We must learn more about people, about 
the development of communities, architec- 
ture, engineering-, education, motivation, pro- 
ductivity, public health and medicine, arts 
and sciences, political, legal, and social or- 
ganization. All of these specialties, and many, 
many more, are required if young people 
like you are to help this nation develop an 
agenda for our future, your future, our 
country's future. 

I challenge, for example, the medical 
students in this audience to put on their 
agenda the achievement of a cure for cancer. 
I challenge the engineers in this audience 
to devise new techniques for developing 
cheap, clean, and plentiful energy and, as a 
by-product, to control floods. I challenge the 
law students in this audience to find ways 
to speed the administration of equal justice 
and make good citizens out of convicted 
criminals. I challenge education, those of you 
as education majors, to do real teaching for 
real life. I challenge the arts majors in this 
audience to compose the great American sym- 
phony, to write the great American novel, and 
to enrich and inspire our daily lives. 

America's leadership is essential. Amer- 
ica's resources are vast. America's oppor- 
tunities are unprecedented. 

As we strive together to perfect a new 
agenda, I put high on the list of important 
points the maintenance of alliances and part- 
nerships with other people and other na- 
tions. These do provide a basis of shared 
values, even as we stand up with determina- 
tion for what we believe. 

This, of course, requires a continuing com- 
mitment to peace and a determination to 
use our good offices wherever possible to pro- 
mote better relations between nations of this 

The new agenda, that which is developed 
by you and by us, must place a high priority 
on the need to stop the spread of nuclear 
weapons and to work for the mutual reduc- 
tion in strategic arms and control of other 

I must say parenthetically the successful 
negotiations at Vladivostok, in my opinion, 
are just a beginning. 

Your generation of Americans is uniquely 
endowed by history to give new meaning to 
the pride and spirit of America. The magne- 
tism of an American society confident of 
its own strength will attract the good will 
and the esteem of all people wherever they 
might be in this globe in which we live. 

It will enhance our own perception of our- 
selves and our pride in being an American. 
We can — we can, and I say it with emphasis 
— write a new agenda for our future. 

I am glad that Tulane University and 
other gi-eat American educational institu- 
tions are reaching out to others in programs 
to work with developing nations, and I look 
forward with confidence to your participa- 
tion in every aspect of America's future. And 
I urge Americans of all ages to unite in this 
Bicentennial year to take responsibilities for 
themselves, as our ancestors did. 

Let us resolve tonight to rediscover the old 
virtues of confidence and self-reliance and 
capability that characterized our forefathers 
two centuries ago. 

I pledge, as I know you do, each one of 
us, to do our part. Let the beacon lights of 
the past shine forth from historic New 
Orleans, and from Tulane University, and 
from every other corner of this land to 
illuminate a boundless future for all Amer- 
icans and a peace for all mankind. 

Thank you very much. 

May 12, 1975 


"A Conversation With President Ford"— An Interview 
for CBS Television and Radio 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of an intervieiv 
tvith President Ford by Walter Cronkite, 
Eric Sevareid, and Bob Schieffer broadcast 
live on CBS television and radio on April 21.^ 

Mr. Croyikite: Mr. President, just this mo- 
ment as ive came on the air, I was surprised 
over this little machine here that the Asso- 
ciated Pi-ess and the United Press Interna- 
tional are reporting from Honolulu that a 
large number of battle-equipped marines, 
800 or so, have left Hatvaii by air, on char- 
tered aircraft. Can you tell us what their 
destination is and what is up? 

President Ford: That is part of a 
movement to strengthen, or to bring up to 
strength, the Marine detachment in that 
area of the Pacific. It is not an unusual mili- 
tary movement. On the other hand, we 
felt under the circumstances that it was wise 
to bring that Marine group in that area 
of the world — the South Pacific — up to 

Mr. Cronkite: Can you tell us where they 
are going, sir? 

President Ford: I don't think I should be 
any more definitive than that. 

Mr. Cronkite: They are not going directly 
to Saigon? 

President Ford: No, they are not. 

Mr. Cronkite: Now that President Thieu 
[Nguyen Van Thieu, of South Viet-Nam] 
has resigned, which was the big neivs this 
morning, of course, are rve involved in, are 
we acting as an intermediary in any negotia- 

' For the complete transcript, see White House 
press release dated Apr. 21. 

tions for a peaceful settlement out there? 

President Ford: We are exploring with a 
number of governments negotiating oppor- 
tunities, but in this very rapid change, with 
President Thieu stepping down, there really 
hasn't been an opportunity for us to make 
contact with a new government. And the 
net result is we are planning to explore 
with them and with other governments in 
that area or connected with that area so 
that we don't miss any opportunity to try 
and get a cease-fii'e. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, what is your 
own estimate of the situation noiv? Do you 
think that the Hanoi people want to nego- 
tiate the turnover of the city, a peaceful 
turnover, or just drive ahead? 

President Ford: Eric, I wish I knew. I 
don't think anybody can be absolutely cer- 
tain, except the North Vietnamese them- 

You get the impression that in the last 
few days they were anxious to move in very 
quickly for a quick takeover. On the other 
hand, within the last 12, 24 hours, there 
seems to be a slowdown. It is not certain 
from what we see just what their tactic will 
be. We naturally hope that there is a period 
when the fighting will cease or the military 
activity will become less intense so that nego- 
tiations might be undertaken or even a cease- 
fire achieved. 

But it is so fluid right now I don't think 
anybody can be certain what the North 
Vietnamese are going to do. 

Mr. Sevareid: Are they communicating 
ivith our government through third parties 
or otherwise? 

President Ford: We have communications 


Department of State Bulletin 

with other governments. I can't tell you 
whether the North Vietnamese are commu- 
nicating with them or not. I don't know. 

Mr. Sevareid: President Thicu, tvhen he 
stepped down, said one of the reasons was 
American pressure. What ivas our role in 
his resignation ? 

President Ford: Our government made no 
direct request that President Thieu step 
down. There was no pressure by me or any- 
one in Washington in that regard. 

There may have been some on the scene 
in Saigon who may have talked to President 
Thieu, but there was no pressure from here 
to force President Thieu to step down and 
he made, I am sure, the final decision all on 
his own. 

Mr. Sevareid: Surely our representatives 
there woidd not speak tvithout your author- 
ity on this matter? 

President Ford: It is a question of how 
you phrase it. We never asked anybody to 
ask him to step down. There were discus- 
sions as to whether or not he should or 
shouldn't, but there was no direct request 
from me for him to relinquish his role as the 
head of state. 

After all, he was an elected President. He 
was the head of that government, properly 
chosen, so his decision, as far as we know, 
was made totally on his own. 

Evacuation From Viet-Nam 

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, on the evac- 
uation, you have expressed hope that some- 
thing coidd he arranged so tens of thousands 
of loyal South Vietnmnese could he hrought 
out of the country. 

Do you think it is possihle to have some- 
thing like that if the North Vietnamese op- 
pose it or if the Viet Co7ig are not willing 
to go along ivith it? Are any kinds of nego- 
tiations underway right noiv to try to set 
up some sort of an arrangement like that? 

President Ford: I would agree with you 
that if the North Vietnamese make a mili- 
tary effort, it would be virtually impossible 
to do so unless we moved in substantial 

U.S. military personnel to protect the evac- 
uation. On the other hand, if the South 
Vietnamese should make it difficult in their 
disappointment that our support hadn't been 
as much as they thought it should be, their 
involvement would make it virtually impos- 
sible, again without a sizable U.S. military 
commitment. That is one reason why we 
want a cease-fire. That is why we want the 
military operation stopped — so that we can 
certainly get all the Americans out without 
any trouble and, hopefully, those South Viet- 
namese that we feel a special obligation to. 
But at the moment, it does not appear 
that that is possible. We intend to keep 
working on it because we feel it is the 
humane and proper thing to do. 

Mr. Schieffer: What if it is not possible? 
Then xvhat do you do? Do you ask the Con- 
gress to let you send those troops in there, 
American troops to protect the withdrawal? 
Do you send them in tvithout congressional 
approval? What do you do next? 

President Ford: As you know, I have asked 
the Congress to clarify my authority as 
President to send American troops in to 
bring about the evacuation of friendly South 
Vietnamese or South Vietnamese that we 
have an obligation to, or at least I think 
we do. There is no problem in sending U.S. 
military personnel into South Viet-Nam to 
evacuate Americans. That is permitted under 
the War Powers Act, providing we give ade- 
quate prenotification to the Congress. 

That is what we did in the case of Phnom 
Penh, in our personnel there. But if we are 
going to have a sizable evacuation of South 
Vietnamese, I would think the Congress 
ought to clarify the law and give me specific 
authority. Whether they will or not, I can't 
tell you at this point. 

Mr. Schieffer: If you do send them in 
and if Congress gives you the authority, they 
ivill have to have airpower. It will have to 
he a sizable commitment. They will almost 
have to have an open-ended authority in 
order to protect themselves. That is xvhat 
you are asking for, isn't it? 

President Ford: Unless the North Viet- 

May 12, 1975 


namese and the South Vietnamese have a 
cease-fire, and then the evacuation of those 
South Vietnamese could be done very easily. 
Now, if there is a military conflict still 
going on, or if either one side or the other 
shows displeasure about this, and if we 
decided to do it — there are a number of 
"ifs" in that — yes, there would have to be 
some fairly sizable U.S. — on a short term — 
very precise, military involvement, not on a 
broad scale, of course. 

Factors Contributing to Vietnamese Fullback 

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, ivhen did 
you last talk to President Thieu? 

President Ford: I have not personally 
talked to President Thieu since I became 
President. I have had a number of exchanges 
of correspondence with him, but the last 
time I talked to him was when he was in 
the United States and I was minority leader. 
That was roughly two years ago, as I 

Mr. Croyikite: Gracious, ive have this hot- 
line with the potential great-power adver- 
sary, the Soviet Union, and yet, with an 
ally who is in dire straits at this moment 
there is no communication betiveen the Pres- 
idents. It seems strange. 

President Ford: Well, there is very good 
communication between myself, our Secre- 
tary of State, and our Ambassador there. 
So, there is no lack of communication in 
and through proper channels. I don't think 
it is essential in this situation that there be 
a direct communication between myself and 
former President Thieu. 

Mr. Cronkite: Might it help to solve some 
of the misunderstandings if you had talked 
directly to him? 

President Ford: I don't think so. We have 
had communications back and forth, both by 
message and as well as by correspondence. 
I think we understand one another. I think 
some of his comments were more directed at 
our government as a whole than directed at 
me personally. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, one of his 
coynments 7vas that the United States had 
led the South Vietiiamese people to their 
deaths. Do you have any specific reply to that 

President Ford: There were some public 
and corresponding private commitments 
made in 1972-1973 where I think that the 
President of South Viet-Nam could have 
come to the conclusion, as he did, that the 
U.S. Government would do two things: One, 
replace military hardware on a one-for-one 
basis, keep his military strength sufficiently 
high so that he could meet any of the chal- 
lenges of the North, and in addition there 
was a commitment that we, as a nation, 
would try to enforce the agreements that 
were signed in Paris in January of 1973. 

Now, unfortunately, the Congress in 
August of 1973 removed the latter, took 
away from the President the power to move 
in a military way to enforce the agreements 
that were signed in Paris. 

So, we were left then only with the other 
commitment, and unfortunately the replace- 
ment of military hardware was not lived up 
to. I therefore can understand President 
Thieu's disappointment in the rather trau- 
matic times that he went through in the last 
week. I can understand his observations. 

Mr. Sevareid: What is the relative iveight 
that you assign to, first, this question of how 
much aid we seyit or didn't send, and his use 
of it, especially in this pullback? Where is 
the greater mistake? Because historically 
this is terribly important. 

President Ford: It is my judgment — and 
history will be probably more precise — 
but it is my judgment at the moment that 
the failure of the Congress to appropriate 
the military aid requested — the previous Ad- 
ministration asked for $1.4 billion for this 
fiscal year ; Congress authorized $1 billion ; 
Congress appropriated $700 million — and 
the failure to make the commitment for this 
fiscal year of something close to what was 
asked for certainly raised doubts in the 
mind of President Thieu and his military 
that we would be supplying sufficient mili- 


Department of State Bulletin 

tary hardware for them to adequately defend 
their various positions in South Viet-Nam. 

Now, the lack of support certainly had an 
impact on the decision that President Thieu 
made to withdraw precipitously. I don't 
think he would have withdrawn if the sup- 
poi't had been there. It wasn't there, so he 
decided to withdraw. 

Unfortunately, the withdrawal was hastily 
done, inadequately prepared, and consequent- 
ly was a chaotic withdrawal of the forces 
from military regions 1, 2, and 3. 

How you place the blame, what percent- 
ages, our failure to supply the arms, what 
percentage related to the hastily and inade- 
quately prepared withdrawal — the experts, 
after they study the records, probably can 
give you a better assessment ; but the initial 
kickoff came for the withdrawal from the 
failure of our government to adequately sup- 
port the military request for help. 

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what I don't 
understand is, if they are saying we have 
got to leave because the United States is not 
going to give us some more equipment, why 
did they leave all the equipment up there that 
they had? Why did they abandon so much of 
that equipment? 

President Ford: As I was saying, the with- 
drawal was very poorly planned and hastily 
determined. I am not an Army man. I was 
in the Navy. But I have talked to a good 
many Army and Marine Corps experts, and 
they tell me that a withdrawal, military 
withdrawal, is the most difficult maneuver 
to execute, and this decision by Presi- 
dent Thieu was hastily done without 
adequate preparation, and it in effect became 
a rout. 

When you are in a panic state of mind, 
inevitably you are going to leave a lot of 
military hardware. It is tragic. There is no 
excuse for that kind of a military operation, 
but even though that happened, if they had 
been given military aid that General Weyand 
[Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, 
United States Army] recommended during 
the last month, I am convinced that with 
that additional military hardware on time, 

there could have been a stabilization of the 
situation which, in my judgment, would have 
led more quickly to a cease-fire. 

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you have 
said you were not advised of this withdrawal 
of President Thieu's. Are you certain, how- 
ever, that none of the American military 
or diplomatic advisers out in Saigon did not 
agree with him that a limited ivithdrawal 
might be effective in bringing pressure on 
Congress to vote these funds and that there- 
fore there was an American participation 
in that decision? 

President Ford: As far as I know, Walter, 
there was no prenotification to any, certain- 
ly high-ranking, U.S. military or civilian 
official of the withdrawal decision. 

Mr. Sevareid: This whole affair is going 
to be argued over. There will be vast books 
on it for years and years. Wouldn't it be 
wisest to publish the correspondence be- 
tween former President Nixon and President 
Thieu, xohich is disputed now, the 1973 
correspondence after the Paris accords? 

President Ford: In the first place, I have 
personally read the correspondence. The per- 
sonal correspondence between President 
Nixon and President Thieu corresponds with 
the public record. I have personally verified 
that. I don't think in this atmosphere it 
would be wise to establish the precedent of 
publishing the personal correspondence be- 
tween heads of state. 

Maybe historically, after a period of time, 
it might be possible in this instance, but if 
we establish a precedent for the publication 
of correspondence between heads of state, 
I don't think that that correspondence or 
that kind of correspondence will be effective 
because heads of state — I have learned first- 
hand — have to be very frank in their ex- 
changes with one another, and to establish 
a precedent that such correspondence would 
be public, I think will downgrade what heads 
of state try to do in order to solve problems. 

Mr. Sevareid: Of course, there is no way 
to keep President Thieu from publishing it? 

May 12, 1975 


President Ford: No. 

Mr. Sevareid: Things like this have been 
judicioitsl]/ leaked when it served the pur- 
pose of the President or the Secretary of 
State. You have no such plans for that? 

President Ford: No, I have no such plans, 
and to be very frank about it, it seems to 
me that the American people today are 
yearning for a new start. As I said in my 
state of the vi'orld address to the Congress, 
let's start afresh. 

Now, unless I am pressed, I don't say the 
Congress did this or did that. I have to be 
frank if I am asked the categorical question. 

I think we ought to turn back the past and 
take a long look at how we can solve these 
problems affirmatively in the future. Viet- 
Nam has been a trauma for this country for 
15 years or more. A lot of blame can be 
shared by a good many people — Democrats 
as well as Republicans, Congress as well as 

We have some big jobs to do in other parts 
of the world. We have treaty commitments 
to keep. We have relations with adversaries 
or potential adversaries that we should be 
concerned about. It is my judgment, under 
these circumstances, we should look ahead 
and not concentrate on the problems of the 
past where a good bit of blame can be shared 
by many. 

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, Vice Presi- 
dent Rockefeller suggested he thinks this 
tvould he an issue in the. 1976 campaign. Will 
you make it an issue in 1976 or will you try 
to keep it out of the campaign? 

President Ford: I will not make it a cam- 
paign issue in 1976. 

Mr. Schieffer: Will Mr. Rockefeller? I 
didn't quite understand ivhat he was driving 
at in that recent interview when he said, yon 
know, if 2,000 or 3,000 Americans die in this 
evacuation, that raises some issues. 

President Ford: Well, of course, the rec- 
ord — whatever a man in public office says — 
can be in and of itself a campaign issue. But 
I can speak only for myself, and I do not 
intend to go out and point the finger or make 
a speech concerning those who have differed 

with me who I might privately think con 
tributed to the problem. 

By 1976, I would hope we could look for- 
ward, with some progress in the field of 
foreign policy. I think we have got some 
potential successes that will be very much 
possible as we look ahead. 

So, rather than to replay the past with all 
the division and divisive feelings between 
good people in this country, I just hope we 
can admit we made some mistakes, not try 
to assess the blame, but decide how we can 
solve the problems that are on our doorstep. 

And we have a few, but they are solvable 
if we stick together, if we have a high de- 
gree of American unity. 

Mr. Cronkite: There is not much trouble — 
leaving the Viet-Nam issue as the nation has 
Jiad, in leaving Viet-Nam here tonight, but 
I ivould like to ask just one more. Have you 
talked to former President Nixon about any 
aspects of this Viet-Nam thing in the last 
few weeks? 

President Ford: After my state of the 
world speech April 10, he called me, con- 
gratulated me on it. We discussed what I 
had said. It was a rather short but a very 
friendly chat on the telephone. 

Mr. Cronkite: Any talk about secret agree- 

President Ford: As I recall the conversa- 
tion, he reiterated what I have said, that 
the public record corresponds with the pri- 
vate correspondence in reference to the com- 
mitments, moral or legal or otherwise. 

Mr. Cronkite: Speaking of your state of 
the world address, there was speculation 
around just before that address that you 
were going to use it to put your own stamp 
on foreign policy. I think the phrase was "to 
get out from under the shadow" of Secretary 
Henry Kissinger. Do you feel you did that 
ivith that speech, or was that ever your in- 

President Ford: It wasn't done to show 
any particular purpose, other than the prob- 
lems we had. Viet-Nam, of course, was num- 
ber one on the agenda. We did want to 


Department of State Bulletin 

indicate that — and I must say "we," it means 
the Administration — that we were strength- 
ening NATO. We had to solve the problem 
of the dispute between Greece and Turkey 
over Cyprus. 

It was sort of a world look, and I don't 
think it was necessary for me to put my 
own imprint. I think it is more important 
to deal with reality rather than to try and 
go off on my own. 

The problems have to be solved, and I 
don't care who has the label for it. 

Foreign Policy Decisionmaking 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, we all get 
the impression, and have since you have 
been in office, that you get your foreign 
policy advice exclusively from Henry Kis- 
singer. If that isn't so, who else do you 
listen to? 

President Ford: That is a good question, 
and I would like to answer it quite frankly. 
The National Security Council meets on the 
major decisions that I have to make — SALT 
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], MBFR 
[Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], et 

I get the recommendations from the Na- 
tional Security Council. It includes Secre- 
tary Kissinger, Secretary Schlesinger [Sec- 
retary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] , the 
head of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. The major decisions come 
to me in option papers from the National 
Security Council. 

I meet daily with Secretary Kissinger for 
about an hour, because I think it is impor- 
tant for me to be brought up day by day on 
what the circumstances are in the various 
areas where we have potential decision- 
making on the agenda. But, the actual in- 
formation that is involved in a major deci- 
sion comes through the National Security 

Mr. Sevareid: Suppose there is a position 
paper or policy recommendation from some- 
body in the National Security Council to 
ivhich the Secretary is opposed? Coidd it 
get to you? Coidd it get past him to you? 

Presideyit Ford: Oh, yes. Surely. No ques- 
tion about that. As a matter of fact, in our 
discussions in the National Security Council, 
particularly when we were preparing for 
SALT Two negotiations, there were some 
options proposed by one individual or others. 

There wasn't unanimity at the outset, but 
by having, as I recall, three or four NSC 
meetings, we resolved those differences. At 
the outset there were differences, but when 
we got there, there was unanimity on what 
we decided. 

Mr. Sevareid: One more short question 
on this. It tvas the complaiyit of many people 
that worked with President Johnson on the 
Viet-Nam tvar that he never had time to 
read any of the books about Indochina, the 
French experience, the Viet Minh movement, 
and so on. Have you ever had time to read 
any of the books about that part of the 

President Ford: I, over the years, have 
read four to five books, but I have had the 
experience of sitting on a Committee on 
Appropriations that had involvement going 
back as early as 1953, with economic-mili- 
tary aid to South Viet-Nam, and those hear- 
ings on appropriations for economic and 
military aid would go into the problems of 
South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, South 
Viet-Nam, in great depth. 

So, this outside reading, plus the testi- 
mony, plus the opportunity to visit South 
Viet-Nam I think has given me a fairly 
good background on the history as well as 
the current circumstances. 

Mr. Cronkite: John Hersey, in that ex- 
cellent New York Times Magazine piece yes- 
terday, said that you are quite impatient 
ivith palace feuds — 

President Ford: That is an understate- 

Mr. Cronkite: — yet, reports have gone 
around quite continually here in Washington 
that there are members of your most inti- 
mate White House staff who would like to 
see Dr. Kissinger go. Are you aware of that? 

May 12, 1975 


President Ford: If they believe it, they 
have never said it to me. I happen to think 
Henry Kissinger is an outstanding Secretary 
of State. I have thought it since I have 
known him and he has been in the job. 

Fortunately, my personal acquaintance- 
ship with Secretary Kissinger goes back 10 
or 15 years, so I have known him over a 
period of time, and it is my strong feeling 
that he has made a tremendous contribution 
to world peace. 

He has been the most effective Secretary 
of State, certainly in my period of service 
in the Congress, or in the Vice Presidency, 
or the White House. I have never heard any- 
body on my staff ever make a recommenda- 
tion to me that Secretary Kissinger should 

Mr. Cronldte: What about suggestions — 

President Ford: I would strongly disagree 
with them and let them know it quite forth- 

Mr. Cronldte: What about suggestions 
that perhaps someone else shoidd be the 
national security adviser, that he shoidd give 
up one of those hats? How do you feel about 

President Ford: If you were to draw a 
chart, I think you might make a good argu- 
ment that that job ought to be divided. 

On the other hand, sometimes in govern- 
ment you get unique individuals who can 
very successfully handle a combination of 
jobs like Secretary Kissinger is doing today 
as head of the National Security Council and 
Secretary of State. 

If you get that kind of a person, you ought 
to take advantage of that capability. And 
therefore, under the current circumstances, 
I would not recommend, nor would I want, 
a division of those two responsibilities. 

Mr. Cronldte: Is there any talk of his re- 

President Ford: I have talked to Secretary 
of State Kissinger. I have asked him to 
stay and he is committed to stay through 
the end of this Administration, January 20, 

CIA's Role and Congressional Oversight 

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you said last 
fall — changing the subject — regarding the 
CIA, that you were ordering a study on hoiv 
better to keep Congress informed of CIA 
activities. Can you tell us ho^v that study is 
coming, and can we expect any report on 
that in the near future? 

President Ford: I appointed the Rocke- 
feller Commission, an excellent group, and 
they are now in the process of taking testi- 
mony from people within the government 
and people outside of the government. It is 
a very thorough investigation. They have an 
outstanding staff. 

I would expect within the next 60 to 90 
days I would have from that commission its 
recommendations for any structural changes 
or any other changes that might be made, 
but I haven't gotten that report yet. 

Mr. Cronkite: That is the only study. 
There is not a study on just congressional 
liaison unth the CIA? 

President Fo)d: No. That, to some extent, 
is a separate issue. The Congress, in recent 
years, has broadened the number of people 
who are filled in by the CIA. 

When I was on the Committee on Appro- 
priations, I don't think there were more than 
10 or 12 people in the Congress, House and 
Senate, who were kept abreast of the budget 
of the CIA, the activities of the CIA, but to- 
day I would guess that it is close to 50 to 75. 

Now, when the number of people being 
told reaches that magnitude, inevitably there 
can and will be leaks about some of the jobs 
or activities being undertaken by the CIA. 

Of course, the CIA under those circum- 
stances can't possibly operate effectively, 
either covertly or overtly, so I think we have 
got to find a better way of adequately keep- 
ing the Congress informed, but not enlarging 
the number who have to be informed. 

Mr. Seva7-eid: Mr. President, tvouldn't the 
whole thing be safer and clearer and cleaner 
if it was simply the law that the CIA gather 
intelligence only and engage in no covert po- 
litical operations abroad? 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Ford: If we lived in a different 
world — 

Mr. Sevareid: It might help to make the 
world different. 

President Ford: Well, I can't imagine the 
United States saying we would not under- 
take any covert activities, and knowing at 
the same time that friends, as well as foes, 
are undertaking covert activity, not only in 
the United States but elsewhere. 

That would be like tying a President's hand 
behind his back in the planning and execu- 
tion of foreign policy. I believe that we have 
to have an outstanding intelligence-gather- 
ing group, such as the CIA or in the other in- 
telligence-collection organizations in our gov- 
ernment. But I also think we have to have 
some operational activity. 

Now, we cannot compete in this very real 
world if you are just going to tie the United 
States with one hand behind its back and 
everybody else has got two good hands to car- 
ry out their operations. 

Mr. Cronkite: Do you people mean by 
covert activities — / want to get clear on this 
— does this mean the use of the "dirty tricks" 
department to sxipport friendly governments 
and try to bring down unfriendly ones? 

President Ford: It covers a wide range of 
activities, Walter. I wouldn't want to get in 
and try to pinpoint or define them, but it cov- 
ers a wide range of activities. I just happen 
to believe, as President, but I believed it 
when I was in the Congress, that our gov- 
ernment must carry out certain covert ac- 

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what do we 
get for that, for these covert activities? We 
hear about this business of "destabilizing" 
the government in Chile — we didn't seem to 
help ourselves very much iw that — the Phoe- 
nix program zw Viet-Nam, the "secret war" 
in Laos. Is it that tve just never hear of the 
successful ones? 

President Ford: A good intelligence covert 
activity, you don't go around talking about. 

Mr. Schieffer: Have there ever been any 
good ones? 

President Ford: There have been some 
most successful ones, and I don't think it is 
wise for us today to talk about the good ones 
or even the bad ones in the past. 

It is a very risky business, but it is a very 
important part of our national security, and 
I don't think we should discuss— certainly I 
shouldn't discuss — specifics. I shouldn't indi- 
cate we have done this or done that. 

But I can assure you that, if we are to com- 
pete with foes on the one hand, or even be 
equal in the execution of foreign policy with 
our friends, we have to have covert activities 
carried out. 

Mr. Cronkite: Hoiv in a democracy can the 
people have an input into what governments 
overseas they are going to knock off or what 
ones they are going to support? It seems to 
be antithetical to the whole principle of de- 

President Ford: Every four years, Walter, 
the American people elect a President, and 
they elect a Congress every two years, or 
most of the Congress every two years. 

The American people, I think, have to 
make a judgment that the people they elect 
are going to carry out, of course, domestic 
policy, but equally important, foreign policy. 

And the implementation of foreign policy 
inevitably means that you are going to have 
intelligence gathering as well as operational 
activities by your intelligence organization. 

Options for Middle East Negotiations 

Mr. Cronkite: Can we move on to the 
Middle East now? Are you reconciled to a 
Geneva meeting noiv or would you still like 
to see some more direct diplomacy in the step- 
by-step Kissinger pattern? 

President Ford: I think, following the 
very serious disappointment of the last nego- 
tiations between Isi-ael and Egypt, we are 
committed, at least in principle, to going to 

Now in the meantime, we are going 
through this process of reassessment of our 
whole Middle Eastern policy which, prior to 
the suspension of the negotiations between 

May 12, 1975 


Egypt and Israel, had been a very successful 

Now, there really are three options. You 
could resume the suspended negotiations 
without making a commitment to go to Ge- 
neva. You could go to Geneva and try to get 
an overall settlement, which is a very com- 
plicated matter. Many people advocate it, 
however. But while you were going through 
this negotiation for an overall settlement, as 
a third option you might have an interim 
negotiated settlement between two of the 
parties, such as Israel and Egypt. 

Now, those are basically the three options. 
We have not made any decision yet. We have 
had our Ambassadors from the Middle East 
come back and report to me. We have under- 
taken a study under the leadership of Joe 
Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs] to bring together the best 
thinking and all of the options. 

We have brought in, or Secretary Kissin- 
ger has brought in, some outside experts in 
the Middle East. Last week, I had a meeting 
with a former State Department official. 
Gene Rostow, who is an expert in this area. 
But right at the moment, we have made no 
firm decision as to what our next particular 
step will be in the Middle East. 

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, can you fore- 
see any possible circumstances in which you 
would feel it right to send American armed 
forces into the Middle East on land or in the 
air? In other words, military intervention? 

President Ford: I can't foresee any, Eric, 
but — and I see no reason to do so. So, I think 
the answer is pretty categorically no. 

Mr. Sevareid: What about a wholly differ- 
ent level, if there were agreement for a Rus- 
sian-American peace patrol and the alterna- 
tive to that ivas another Mideast war, would 
you go that far? 

President Ford: You put it on about the 
most extreme alternatives. We want peace in 
the Middle East, and I think the Soviet Un- 
ion does, too. 

I would hope that there wouldn't be a need 
for either the United States or the Soviet 
Union having any peacekeeping responsibili- 

ties with their own forces in the Middle East. 

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, does the re- 
assessment now going on of the Middle East 
policy also include a reassessment of the U.S. 
position toivard the Palestinians ? 

President Ford: If you take the path of an 
overall settlement and going to Geneva, I 
think you have to have an analysis of what 
is going to happen there because the Palestin- 
ians are going to demand recognition. 

But I don't mean to infer that we have 
made any decision. But the Palestinians have 
to be examined as a part of the overall Mid- 
dle East situation. I am not making any com- 
mitment one way or another, but it has to be 
part of the problem that we are analyzing. 

Mr. Schieffer: Let me ask you this just 
as a followup. Could the Palestinians be in- 
cluded if they refuse to deal with the Israe- 

President Ford: I don't see how, because 
the Israelis, in the first place, don't recog- 
nize the Palestinians as a proper party, and 
the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] 
doesn't recognize the existence of Israel. So, 
I think that is an impasse right there, and 
it will be one of the most difficult things that 
will have to be worked out if it is worked out 
at Geneva. 

Mr. Schieffer: Do you have any feel for 
when there ivill be a date for the Geneva 
Conference reconvening? 

President Ford: I have seen a lot of spec- 
ulation early this summer, but no set time 
has been determined. 

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, the Israeli 
Foreign Minister, [Yigal^ Allan, is in Wash- 
ington now, and there are reports out of Je- 
rusalem today that he is going to suggest a 
summit meeting between you and President 
[Prime Minister] Rabin. Do you expect to 
have such a meeting? 

President Ford: I wouldn't expect that t 
would make any commitment on that until 
we are further along in our reassessment. It 
may be desirable at some point. It may be 
desirable to meet other parties, or other 


Department of State Bulletin 

heads of state, in the Middle East, but 1 don't 
want to make any commitment tonight as to 
any one or as to more than one. 

Mr. Cronkite: Doesn't that sort of imply 
that we are still being a little bit hardnosed 
in our disappointment over the Kissinger 
mission ? 

President Ford: No, I think it is wise for 
us to take a look ourselves at the new op- 
tions or different options. I certainly wouldn't 
rule out a meeting with Mr. Rabin, but I 
don't want to make any commitment to one 
until we have moved a bit further down in 
the process of a reassessment. 

I reiterate that if we meet with one, we 
certainly ought to give others an opportu- 
nity, other heads of state, to have the same 

Mr. Cronkite: So, there won't be any 
favored-nation treatment of Israel in the fu- 

President Ford: I think we have to, in this 
very difficult situation, where the possibility 
of war is certainly a serious one, if you have 
a war, you are inevitably going to have an 
oil embargo — I think we have to be very cau- 
tious in our process of reassessment. 

Republic of Korea Ratifies 
Nonproliferation Treaty 

Remarks by J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.^ 

Today the Republic of Korea deposited the 
instrument of ratification by which it be- 
comes a party to the Treaty on the Nonpro- 
liferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United 
States welcomes this important act by the 
Republic of Korea to join the 85 countries 
which have given concrete expression to their 
determination to combat the danger of nu- 
clear proliferation by becoming parties to 
the NPT. 

Korea is one of several countries which 
have completed ratification of the NPT in 
recent months. These developments enhance 

the effectiveness of the treaty, which, as Sec- 
retary Kissinger said in his address to the 
U.N. General Assembly last autumn, de- 
serves full and continuing international sup- 
port. We hope the Korean example will en- 
courage still other countries to become NPT 
parties, for we believe that the security of 
the international community and each of its 
members can be furthered by wider support 
for the treaty. 

Secretary Regrets Postponement 
of Trip to South America 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ^ 

Events in Indochina are unfolding with 
such unexpected speed that the President has 
asked me to stay in Washington in the days 
just ahead. It is with great reluctance and 
even greater personal regret that I must 
therefore postpone my trip to South America 
scheduled for later this week. 

I have communicated with the Foreign 
Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Vene- 
zuela to inform them of this decision and of 
my determination to visit South America at 
a later date. 

The forging of strengthened ties with our 
neighbors in this hemisphere is a cardinal 
objective of our foreign policy. The aspira- 
tions of Latin America and the United States 
are indissolubly linked and are of signifi- 
cance for the rest of the world. 

For these reasons, I particularly regret the 
postponement of my South American trip 
under these circumstances. And I look 
forward to working with my colleagues at 
the OAS General Assembly here in Wash- 
ington next month, where we will have 
another opportunity to discuss our common 

■ Made at a ceremony in the Treaty Room of the 
Department of State on Apr. 23 (text from press 
release 213). Mr. Zurhellen is Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 

'^ Issued on Apr. 21. 

May 12, 1975 


Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Express of France 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by Pierre Salinger 
of L'Express of France condncted at the De- 
partment of State on April 12. 

Press release 208 dated April 19 

Q. You have said on a number of occasions 
that you are more a historian than a states- 
man. I wonder whether you might step back 
a minute in your role of a statesman and 
take on your role as a historian and give me 
an assessment of American foreign policy 
from 1969 to 1975. 

Secretary Kissinger: When I came into 
office with the Nixon administration, we 
were really at the end of a period of Ameri- 
can foreign policy in which a redesign would 
have been necessary to do no matter who 
took over. I think myself, for example, in 
retrospect that the Kennedy period will be 
seen as the last flowering of the previous era 
rather than as the beginning of a new era. 
I don't say this as a criticism, but simply 
to define the problem. 

What was the situation we faced ? In most 
of the postwar period we could operate with 
a simplicity of the cold war until 1969 — of 
absolute good against absolute evil or pre- 
venting military aggression against allies. 
Insofar as we were engaged in economic 
development, we did so really as a projection 
of this abroad on the theory that economic 
development would produce political sta- 
bility. And we were operating with enor- 
mous self-confidence and self-assurance; that 
is, as the only major Western country that 
had come out of the war undamaged and in- 
deed had been generally successful in every- 
thing that it attempted. 

When we came into office in 1969, we faced 
a dramatically changed environment. First, 
Western Europe and Japan had regained 

economic vitality and some political con- 
stancy. Secondly, the simplicities of the cold 
war began to evaporate. 

The domestic pressures in all countries for 
putting an end to tension became greater and 
greater, and within the Communist world it 
was self-evident that we were no longer con- 
fronting a monolith. America had gone 
through two assassinations and a war in 
Viet-Nam which was a profound shock to us 
because we entered it rather lightheartedly 
and with great self-confidence, and when we 
came into office we found 550,000 men en- 
gaged in a war against which public opinion 
was increasingly turning, including the very 
people who had gotten us into the war. 

With respect to newly developing coun- 
tries it became clear that we faced a problem 
that was much more philosophical than 
economic in terms of their perception of the 

So our problem was how to orient America 
in this world and how to do it in such a way 
that we could avoid these oscillations be- 
tween excessive moralism and excessive 
pragmatism, with excessive concern with 
power and total rejection of power, which 
have been fairly characteristic of American 
policy. This was the basic goal we set our- 

I think we did establish a new relationship 
with Europe, with some strain, but I would 
say all our relations now are more mature 
and calmer than at any period since the 
fifties. The same is true of Japan. 

I think we have taken, I hope, creative ac- 
count of the polarity of the Communist 
world. We have tried to respond to the need 
to ease tensions, and we disengaged our mili- 
tary forces from Viet-Nam. 

I think we have made progress in the Mid- 
dle East, too, but I think we had better dis- 


Department of State Bulletin 

cuss that more as a tactical than as a 
philosophical problem. 

What have been our difficulties? Our diffi- 
culties have been almost entirely domestic on 
a variety of levels. 

In order to be able to unify the country 
when the war in Viet-Nam was finished, we 
believed that those who were opposed to the 
war in Viet-Nam would be satisfied with our 
withdrawal and those who favored an honor- 
able ending would be satisfied if the United 
States would not destroy an ally. 

We will never know whether there would 
have been a domestic tranquillity, but within 
three months of the end of that war we were 
projected into the middle of the Watergate 
crisis that no one could foresee and that had 
an enormously debilitating impact on our 
executive authority. The conduct of foreign 
policy without executive authority becomes 
extremely difficult. 

This in turn triggered a series of actions 
by the Congress which in a number of cases 
such as Turkey and Indochina have acceler- 
ated our difficulties and encouraged pressure 
groups of all kinds to influence foreign 
policy. I think this has been an unexpected 
event or at least unpredicted by us. 

So, we face now a problem that while the 
design of our foreign policy is intact, the 
authority to implement it may be impaired, 
and it is a primary responsibility to attempt 
to restore that through partnership with the 
Congress and through perhaps getting more 
of a public consensus. 

Finally, all of this has happened at a time 
when the establishment that carried our 
foreign policy has been both disintegrated 
and demoralized. 

At the time of the Kennedy period, you 
still had a group of people who had carried 
American foreign policy, who helped shape 
public opinion and on whom a President 
could count to perform missions. These peo- 
ple are now 15 years older and really have 
had no adequate replacements. 

So that the administration — and I would 
say this would be true as well of a Democrat 
as well as a Republican administration — 
is more naked to day-to-day pressures of 

public opinion than has been the case 
throughout the entire postwar period. 

This is how I would assess the pluses and 
minuses of American foreign policy, and I 
am absolutely confident that we can restore 
the situation now that certain of our traumas 
are seen in that perspective. 

Foreign Policy and Domestic Problems 

Q. About three moiiths ago in an interview 
with an American magazine, you said, and I 
quote, The political problem is that the whole 
Western world with the exception perhaps of 
the United States is suffering from a political 
malaise, inner uncertainty and from lack of 
direction. Those very words have been used 
in Etirope to describe ivhat is going on in the 
United States. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say 
that they can probably be applied in some 
respects to the United States right now. I 
know there is a school of thought that says 
if you admit difficulties you are causing 
these difficulties. These are the people prob- 
ably who would have recommended that 
Churchill in 1940 say that a group of British 
yachtsmen decided to cross the channel and 
happened to congregate off the coast of Dun- 

We have had assassinations and two 
Presidents driven from office, a war which 
as generally seen is not successful, so we 
have this problem. But we also have great 
strengths, great resources, and a basically 
correct design of foreign policy, and there- 
fore I believe that we can overcome our 
domestic problems, and I believe that we can 
start a period of new creativity. 

I would therefore reject the term "political 
malaise." We are having major difficulties. 
We are determined to overcome them. And 
I am confident we shall. 

Q. Do you think realistically that in the 
short term the problems of American foreign 
policy, as they relate to internal politics in 
America, can be righted until you have an 
election and have a President who has been 
elected running the country? 

May 12, 1975 


Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think they 
can be, yes, and in fact they must be. History 
won't wait two years until we can have an 
election. Moreover, our election could easily 
be conducted in terms that would not of itself 
give a clear-cut answer, especially if the 
President doesn't exercise active leadership. 

So the President has to act in terms of the 
problems he now faces, which he is deter- 
mined to do. 

We have some anomalies in our situation 
domestically in the sense that if there was 
ever an election fought on issues it was the 
last one. Sixty-two percent of the public 
voted for a strong foreign policy and moder- 
ate conservatism and, in a way, were disen- 
franchised because of the series of events 
over which they had absolutely no control, 
which were totally unforeseeable, and which 
produced the collapse of the Nixon Presi- 
dency. That is an anomalous situation. 

There is no reason to suppose that a new 
election fought on those issues would pro- 
duce a different result. 

Q. Yet today public polls would indicate 
that less than W percent of the American 
people ivould be willing to intervene in 
Europe if there tvas a military overrun of 
Europe by the Soviet Union, less than 30 
percent in Israel if_ Israel was to fall to the 
Arabs, and it seems that there is a real trend 
of isolationism in this country. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that there is 
a certain trend, but this I think is partly due 
to this disassociation from the political 
process that has resulted from Watergate. 

Every public opinion poll shows that about 
70 percent of the people support our foreign 
policy, which is certainly not isolationist, so 
a great deal depends on whether the public 
finds leadership with which it can identify. 

Q. You have said that credibility of the 
United States in one part of the world is very 
important in how people in other parts of the 
tvorld vietv that credibility. There are those 
who say that by saying that you are planting 
in people's minds the feeling that the Ameri- 
can credibility is no longer to be counted on. 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that when 
a major country engages in a decade in a 
major effort which then does not obviously 
succeed, it raises questions about wisdom, 
judgment, and effectiveness, and questions 
about the impact of that setback on the 
psyche of the country. 

Now, I say this is a problem the United 
States has to face. I cite it also as a problem 
we can overcome and will overcome. But we 
will surely not overcome it if we pretend that 
it does not exist and we are going to continue 
business as usual. 

So I repeat: I think it has produced a 
problem that affects our general stance in the 
world. I want Americans to face this. When 
they face it, they can also overcome it. I 
don't believe that my saying it creates the 
problem. It is my duty as Secretary of State 
to describe the world as it is. 

Q. And you have said that if American 
leadership is not there, there is no other 
leadership in the Western world. But as to 
that leadership present today, are you get- 
ting the impression from your reports from 
abroad that people still have confidence in 
American leadership? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think right now 
people around the world, from what I can 
learn, are worried at a minimum about how 
America will assess its present situation. I 
believe we have to face the fact that the past 
decade has raised certain doubts about 
American leadership. I say this in order to 
reestablish American leadership and not to 
abdicate it. 

I think the President is absolutely deter- 
mined to conduct a strong foreign policy, and 
in the weeks ahead you will see that he will 
speak increasingly on foreign policy. 

I believe that the design of our foreign 
policy can be maintained, and I believe also 
that our friends will be more reassured if we 
admit that we have a problem which we are 
trying to solve than if we pretend that we 
don't have a problem that they recognize. 

Q. Let me go away from the past for a 
minute and ask you to look into the future 
a little bit. If you were to portray the best 


Department of State Bulletin 

and the worst scenario for American policy 
in the world over the next five years, how 
would you see those tivo possibilities? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the best sce- 
nario would be one in which our cohesion with 
Europe is strengthened and the relationship 
across the Atlantic is fostered, in which we 
can develop a new set of relationships with 
Japan, Western Europe, and the United 
States that are adjusted to issues that tran- 
scend events, in which detente becomes not a 
tactical policy but the method of operation of 
the great powers, in which relations with 
China would continue toward normalization, 
and in which in our relationships with the 
underdeveloped world we overcome the pres- 
ent dilemma of simultaneous confrontation 
and cooperation in a spirit in which at least 
the general conceptions of a desirable world 
structure begin to emerge. 

The worst scenario is one which will show 
a gradual disintegration of the domestic 
stability of all of our friendly countries, ac- 
companied by a growing sense of impotence 
and less self-confidence by the United States, 
which will sooner or later trigger a series 
of more aggressive actions by hostile powers 
and increasing confrontations with the less 
developed world. 

I would put into the best scenario also a 
creative solution to problems of energy, food, 
and raw materials, and in the worst scenario 
that these issues become increasingly issues 
of confrontation. 

Both scenarios are possible. I believe we 
can achieve the best scenario. I think the 
building blocks are there, and I think the will 
is there. We are going through one of those 
difficult periods now which perhaps because 
of their very difficulty can be used to start 
new creations and so, in a funny way, I am 
more optimistic now than I was six months 

Six months ago I saw the dangers, but 
very few others agreed with me. Now I think 
most people can see the dangers and there- 
fore they can also seize the opportunities. 
Six months ago people were satisfied that 
things were getting juggled into reasonable 
shape, and now they know they have got to 

work for it. So I think the possibilities now 
are better, strangely enough, than say last 
October when I would give occasionally 
gloomy interviews and everyone was saying, 
"What in God's name is he talking about?" 
Now that some of these events have hap- 
pened, I think we are in a much better posi- 
tion to transcend our problems. 

U.S.-Soviet Relations 

Q. Hoiu would you assess the state of 
U.S.-Soviet relations and detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have had 
a setback in the trade agreement. I think 
there is a tendency on the negative side to 
use detente as a sort of a palliative while the 
bureaucracies on both sides, and especially 
on the Soviet side, continue on traditional 
courses. I think in America too many people 
have taken detente for granted and have 
forgotten what it was like to live in the cold 
war, and so they think they can hack away 
at it and think that then there is no price 
for it. 

I think we have a possibility and indeed a 
duty to attempt to transform the cold war 
into a more cooperative relationship. I think 
when two countries possess the capability to 
destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct 
foreign policy by traditional maxims. My 
disagreement with some of our domestic op- 
ponents is that they think that if they would 
only apply some of the old pure-power polit- 
ical terms to Soviet-American relations they 
might get some unspecified concessions, but 
they also might get a series of confrontations 
out of proportion to anything that we began. 
To be sure, we have to defend our vital in- 
terests, but Soviet-American relations are 
not designed for tests of manhood. 

I think the relationship has had a setback. 
It has had a period of stagnation. I have the 
impression that the Soviet Union is now 
fairly anxious to pick it up again. I think 
that the possibilities to move in a positive 
direction still exist. 

Q. Do you agree with those who say that 
the ability or the possibility of the super- 

May 12, 1975 


powers — the United States and the Soviet 
Union — to influence events in the world is 
becoming less and less? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not when they are 
dealing with each other, but dealing with 
third powers. It depends on how determined 
they are to influence events. If they really 
are determined to influence them, I think 
that they can do it. 

Q. If that is true, don't you think that the 
current perception of the American situa- 
tion, ivhether that is true or not, may not 
influence the Soviet Union to start moving 
into areas ivhere it has not traditionally 

Secretary Kissinger: It is one of the dan- 
gers of the situation; but I think that the 
Soviet Union will find over the next few 
months that this perception is not the real 
perception, because I think that the Presi- 
dent and his associates are absolutely deter- 
mined to strengthen American foreign 

Q. Are you in touch with the Soviet Union 
in any way to indicate to them this American 
determination ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they also 
know our determination to pursue detente. 
They know both. 

Middle East Negotiations 

Q. Do you think there is any possibility 
of having a netv round of talks in which the 
United States played a role before a new 
Geneva Conference was assembled? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is entirely up to 
the parties. The United States cannot be in 
a position where it seems more interested in 
an interim settlement than the parties them- 

It is not enough to have a desire to resume 
them. Something has to be put into the nego- 
tiations that is different from what preceded 
it, and until we see that from one or both 
of the parties, there is no point in our en- 
gaging ourselves. 

Q. It is generally believed that the rela- 
tions between the United States and Israel 
are less good today than they were before 
those negotiations because of the feeling that 
perhaps Israel could have gone further in 
those negotiations. 

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't say our 
relations are less good, I would say our rela- 
tions are now different in the sense that 
when we were the sole mediator there could 
be a degree of coordination that is more diffi- 
cult to achieve than when we are dealing 
with a wider forum. 

In any event, it forces us to assess how we 
are. to conduct this diplomacy. This is the 
essence of our reassessment. Our reassess- 
ment isn't primarily concerned with ques- 
tions of economic and military aid. 

Q. There is a feeling in Israel that there 
is an erosion of support for Israel in the 
United States. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, my 
friend Abba Eban once said to me that Israel 
considered objectivity 100 percent agreement 
with their point of view. So if you slip-to 98 
percent, you can already be "accused of 
erosion and deterioration. 

I think there are two separate problems — 
the relation between the Israeli Government 
and the U.S. Government, and the perception 
of the American public of the American role 
in the world. I think in general the readiness 
to give foreign aid and to run the risk of war 
has deteriorated in America, but I think that 
Israel has suffered less from that deteriora- 
tion than almost any other country. 

Q. What would be your prognosis if you 
went to Geneva without any further con- 

Secretary Kissinger: I would send some- 
one who has a lot of time. 

Viet-Nam and Cambodia 

Q. The Cambodian Ambassador was 
quoted as saying yesterday that after using 
Cambodia for five years and carrying out 
American policy in Southeast Asia, the 


Department of State Bulletin 

Americans have now abandoned a naive peo- 
ple to their fate. 

Secretary Kissinger: What happened in 
Cambodia is heartbreaking. In our domestic 
debate, Cambodia is often described as if we 
went into it because we didn't have enough 
of a war going on so we had to add another 
neutral country. 

In fact, we entered Cambodia because 
there were 60,000 North Vietnamese in sanc- 
tuaries along the border, and we picked up 
between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of war 
materiel. After we entered Cambodia, our 
casualties dropped from over 100 a week to 
less than 50 a week and finally to 10 a week 
because, in effect, our operation in Cambodia 
deprived the North Vietnamese of the ability 
to conduct military operations in military 
regions 3 and 4, Saigon and the delta. So 
from the point of view of achieving our with- 
drawal, the operation in Cambodia was a 

However, from the beginning, from 1970 
on, we were prevented from conducting our 
operations in Cambodia for any purpose 
other than promoting the withdrawal of 
Americans. We were forced to put a limit of 
30 miles on the extent of our penetration and 
from really conducting operations in a way 
that would have supported the Government 
of Cambodia. 

I must say I have great admiration for the 
bravery of the government that stayed when 
we withdrew, and I am very saddened by the 
fact that in its final days we were not even 
able to give them ammunition. I am not 
proud of it. 

Q. Isn't it entirely possible that the situa- 
tion in Viet-Nam may be identical, the 
Americans may be evacuating, the last 
Americans from Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is 
settled, but it would be idle to deny that 
South Viet-Nam is in very grave danger. But 
there the situation is different. We cannot be 
accused of not having made an all-out fight. 
We can be accused in the last two years of 
having reduced our aid too precipitously and 

maybe having triggered panic by the nature 
of our domestic debate this year and trig- 
gered panic and encouraged moves, but we 
have made a monumental effort in South 
Viet-Nam. Cambodia is always different. 

Q. Those who are your harshest critics 
say if you had made an effort after the 1973 
accord of Paris to bring about a political 
settlement in Cambodia and Viet-Nam in- 
stead of concentrating on military help, that 
this might not have happened. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my experience 
in these negotiations is that you cannot have 
political settlement without military stabi- 
lization. I think we can demonstrate that in 
the summer of 1973 we were closer to a 
political settlement in Cambodia than at any 
other period and that this possibility evap- 
orated when the right to conduct bombing 
in Cambodia was removed so that we lost 
the ability to trade the end of the bombing 
for some political concessions. 

As for the rest, I believe that the North 
Vietnamese would have negotiated only un- 
der conditions in which any possibility of a 
military takeover was foreclosed to them, 
and as these conditions deteriorated, the 
possibility of a political settlement deterio- 
rated, too. 

Q. What is your reaction to the statement 
of President d'Estaing [Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, of France] this week about the 
need for political settlement in Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with him. 
The question is what kind of a political set- 
tlement and how it is going to be achieved, 
but I substantially agree with him. 

Q. His statement pretty much let it be 
understood that a political settlement can 
only be achieved tvith the departure of 
President Thieu, the President of South 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United 
States has been in Viet-Nam and Indochina 
now for 15 years. I would hate to think that 
everybody that ever worked with us wound 
up being discarded by the United States. 

May 12, 1975 


Now, basically the political evolution in 
Saigon depends on the people of South Viet- 
Nam, and the United States will accept any 
political settlement that the people of South 
Viet-Nam negotiate among themselves. But 
I don't think we will participate in any 
political preconditions of this kind. 

Q. I remember the period from 1969 to 
1972 ivhen you were carr%iing out the policy 
of bringivg Americans back home from Viet- 
Nam that you replied repeatedly to critics of 
your policy at that time and stated to them 
this ivas the ivay you had to do it in order to 
prevent a debate in this country that cojtld. 
tear the country apart in terms of trijing to 
pin blame for the disaster in Viet-Nam. 

Secretary Kissinger: I thought it was es- 
sential that America withdraw from Viet- 
Nam in a manner that Americans could feel 
carried out the obligations inherent in hav- 
ing 550,000 troops there, and very often, 
popular policies become much less popular 
when people recognize the consequences of 
what they have done. Chamberlain was 
extremely popular in Britain in 1938, and 
that didn't protect him from those very same 
people 18 months later. 

Q. Are you concerned that the cwrent 
effort of the Administration attempting to 
pin the blame for the problems in South 
Viet-Nam and Cambodia on the Congress 
ivill produce exactly the same kind of debate 
that you were trying to avoid? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that 
the debate that was started this year on the 
supplemental request was quite unnecessary 
and it wasn't started by us. But it is my in- 
tention, and I know it is the intention of the 
President, that we will not engage in a 
period of recrimination and we will not look 
for scapegoats. 

Developments in Europe 

Q. Let me turn, if I can, for a minute to 
Europe. NATO, ivhich had its 25th anni- 
versary last year, seems to be in more trouble 
right now than it has been in its entire his- 
tory, with the Greeks and Turks questioning 

NATO commitments, and you have the dan- 
ger of Portugal leaving NATO. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in the so-called 
southern tier we are having massive prob- 
lems, and they haven't been made easier by 
our domestic events with respect to Turkey 
and Greece. 

As I told you, the Western alliance now 
faces a period not so much of strain between 
Europe and the United States as adjustment 
of the domestic structures of various Euro- 
pean countries. The Cyprus problem should 
be settled by negotiation, and I think can be 
settled by negotiation, if the parties are ever 
left alone long enough to develop some 
rhythm in their negotiations. We will try 
to be helpful. 

The problem in Portugal, too, is very 
serious, because it could be taken as a test 
case for possible evolutions in other coun- 
tries, and not only if the Communists take 
over. It could also be the case if the Com- 
munists become the sinews of non-Commu- 
nist government, and perhaps especially so. 

I would think in the Western alliance now 
the major problem is not the debate that 
seemed so important two years ago between 
Europe and the United States. I think that 
has been almost substantially or almost com- 
pletely overcome by the domestic evolution 
in many European countries, and I would 
say, irrespective of Europe, also the domestic 
evolution in America. 

Q. Would you see any responsibility on the 
part of European couyitries to try to do some- 
thing about the evolution of matters in 

Secretary Kissinger: It is not an appro- 
priate subject for me to discuss, but cer- 
tainly it is a subject in which I am in close 
contact with my colleagues. 

Q. How do you judge the current state of 
U.S.-French relations ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the rela- 
tions between France and the United States 
began to improve very rapidly after the be- 
ginning of the Presidency of Giscard 
d'Estaing and also under the foreign minis- 
try of Sauvagnargues. 


Department of State Bulletin 

I think the meeting between the two 
Presidents in Martinique was one of the 
most successful meetings that I have at- 
tended, not only in the sense of formal agree- 
ments, although some substantial ones were 
made, but in the sense that I think both sides 
are now dealing with each other without 

We recognize that France is performing 
or playing a somewhat special role in 
Europe. I think France understands that the 
last problem with respect to America now 
is an unquenchable thirst for domination — 
quite the contrary. So we are now dealing 
with each other in a much more matter-of- 
fact way, much less theological. We began to 
have many disagreements on the energy con- 
ference last November, and it was very 
rapidly settled, and since then I think it is 
correct to say that we have worked together 
most cooperatively. 

It has become a matter of course for the 
two Presidents and for the two Foreign 
Ministers to exchange ideas as to events of 
major international importance, so much a 
matter of course that it isn't even reported 
any more when letters are exchanged. 

I would say on the whole that the state of 
the relations between France and the United 
States is better than it has been since I have 
been involved in government, which is since 
1961. This doesn't mean that there aren't 
some problems. 

Q. What is your view on the termination 
of the preparatory energy conference this 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me be clear: Of 
course we recognize the interconnection be- 
tween energy and other resource issues, but 
experience has shown that a "global" nego- 
tiation on all issues leads to stalemate. Con- 

sequently, we were prepared to respond 
positively to the French initiative for a mul- 
tilateral conference focused on energy while 
other problems were dealt with in other 
forums, whether existing ones or, where re- 
quired, new ones. We remain ready to pro- 
ceed in this manner. 

Q. How do you see your own future ? What 
is the future of Henry Kissinger? 

Secretary Kissinger: For the morale of 
some of our Ambassadors, I would like to 
keep open the possibility of a potential 
vacancy, and also, quite frankly, I was not 
overly eager to be involved or to have foreign 
policy involved in the political campaign. 

But if my analysis of the situation is cor- 
rect, as I believe it is, and if we have an 
obligation to rally other countries and our 
own people to the real tasks and opportuni- 
ties before us, then this is not a time in 
which I can leave, unless the President asked 
me to leave, which he has not done. 

So I would think that I would stay for a 
foreseeable future. What happens after that, 
I have absolutely no idea, and I have never 
thought about it. There aren't too many jobs 
for which being Secretary of State prepares 

Mr. Salinger: Mr. Secretary, thank you. 

Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations 

The Senate on March 19 confirmed the 
nomination of Frederick B. Dent to be Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations, 
with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary. 

May 12, 1975 


President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Washington 

Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Re- 
public of Zambia, visited Washington April 
18-21. He met tvith President Ford, Secre- 
tary Kissinger, and other U.S. Government 
officials. Following is an exchange of toasts 
between President Ford and President 
Kaunda at a dinner at the White House on 
April 19. 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 28 


Mr. President, Mrs. Kaunda, Kaweche 
Kaunda, distinguished guests: Let me say 
that Mrs. Ford and I are extremely delighted 
to have you, Mr. President, your family, and 
your distinguished gue.sts with us here this 
evening. It has been a great pleasure for 
me to talk to your lovely wife and to know 
of your delightful family, and on behalf of 
Mrs. Ford and myself, we extend and wish 
to you our very, very best. 

Your visit to Washington is a mark of 
friendship that has existed between our two 
nations since Zambia gained her independ- 
ence in 1964. 

America knows and respects you, Mr. 
President, but also I should say we know 
that in the modern history of Zambia and 
the history of Kenneth Kaunda, they are 
inseparable. Your moral and intellectual 
leadership guided your country to independ- 
ence, and for that we praise you. 

Your leader.ship has made your young na- 
tion an example of respect and admiration 
throughout the world. The American people 
join me in saluting you for your accomplish- 
ments, your dedication, and your wisdom in 
a controversial and difficult world. 

We ask that you convey to your people 
in Zambia our admiration for them and for 
you and our greetings. 

Mr. President, we have been following de- 
velopments in southern Africa with great, 
great interest. For many years the United 
States has supported self-determination for 
the peoples of that area, and we continue to 
do so today. 

We view the coming independence of 
Mozambique, Angola, and the island terri- 
tories with great satisfaction, just as we 
viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau 
just last year. 

May I say, Mr. President, America stands 
ready to help the emerging countries, the 
emerging nations, and to provide what as- 
sistance we can, and we know, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that these new states will continue to 
look to you for wise, wise counsel as they 
build to nationhood in the future. 

Much still remains to be done in southern 
Africa. In this connection, Mr. President, we 
welcome your commitment to change through 
peaceful negotiations and understanding be- 
tween the parties concerned, rather than 
through recourse to violence. 

We deeply believe that patient diplomacy 
will bear great fruit, and we promise our con- 
tinued efforts and our support as you seek, 
with others, to resolve these problems at 
the conference table. 

Mr. President, in my April 10 speech to 
the Congress and to the American people, 
I noted that America is developing a closer 
relationship with nations of Africa, and I 
said that Africans must know that America 
is a true and concerned friend, reliable both 
in word as well as in deed. 

Your visit, Mr. President, coming so soon 
after that occasion, is most timely for all of 
us. I hope that you will take back to your 
countrymen and to all Africans our renewed 
pledge of friendship. 

Our wide-ranging discussions, Mr. Presi- 
dent, this afternoon after my return from 


Department of State Bulletin 

some of our historic celebrations of our 
200th, or Bicentennial, anniversary covered 
matters of common interest and concern, and 
it confirmed the relationship between your 
country and my country. 

There is, however, one area, Mr. Presi- 
dent, of mutual interest which we tacitly did 
not discuss. I have since found, tonight, from 
your lovely wife, that we have a close and 
intimate interest in a special area. I 
understand that you do enjoy playing golf. 
[Laughter.] I feel sure, Mr. President, that 
our common problems, nationally, interna- 
tionally, bilaterally, on some occasions in the 
future can best be resolved by a little compe- 
tition on the links. [Laughter.] I intend to 
make an honest effort to see if our friend- 
ship cannot be broadened by such an ex- 

So, I say to you, Mr. President, to your 
lovely wife and your son and your colleagues 
here this evening, let me propose a toast 
to you, to the Republic of Zambia, and to 
the continuing excellent relations between 
our two countries: To you, Mr. President, 
and to your Republic and to your wonderful 


Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, brothers and 
sisters: I first want to express my deep 
appreciation and gratitude for inviting me 
to visit Washington, D.C. I also thank you, 
the government, and the people of the United 
States for their warm welcome and the kind 
hospitality given to my wife and the entire 
Zambian delegation. 

Mr. President, we are happy to be in 
Washington, D.C. It is a very brief visit, 
but since we come for specific objectives, it is 
not the duration that matters, but the results. 

So far, we have done a lot. We find we 
have a lot in common on vital issues affect- 
ing mankind. Our discussions have been 
characterized by a spirit of frankness and 

This spirit, coupled by the definition of 
areas of urgent action, should move the 
United States and Africa closer toward the 
attainment of our common objectives. 

We come, Mr. President, to America with 
a clear purpose. We simply want to be un- 
derstood. We seek American understanding 
of Africa's objectives and America's fullest 
support in the attainment of these objectives. 

The relations between Zambia and the 
United States cause me no concern, because 
they are cordial, although there is room for 
improvement through more sound coopera- 

What gives Zambia and Africa great cause 
for concern is, Mr. President, America's 
policy toward Africa — or is it the lack of 
it, which, of course, can mean the same 

I have not worked at the U.N., but I have 
been told that at the U.N. sometimes there 
are tricks in which an abstention in a vote 
can be a vote for or against. A no-policy 
position may not be a neutral position indica- 
tive of a passive posture, but a deliberate 
act of policy to support the status quo or to 
influence events in one direction or the other 
at a particular time. 

We have, in recent years, been most 
anxious, Mr. President, about the nature and 
degree of the United States' participation in 
building conditions for genuine peace based 
on human equality, human dignity, freedom, 
and justice for all — for all — particularly in 
southern Africa. 

You will forgive us, Mr. President, for our 
candor if we reaffirmed on this occasion our 
dismay at the fact that America has not ful- 
filled our expectations. Our dismay arises 
from a number of factors. We are agreed 
that peace is central, that peace is central to 
all human endeavors. '\ 

Our struggle for independence was de- 
signed to build peace, and thank God, our 
people have enjoyed internal peace. 

We are agreed, Mr. President, that we 
must help strengthen peace wherever it is 
threatened. There has been no peace in 
southern Africa for a very long time, a very 
long time indeed, even if there was no war 
as such. 

The absence of war does not necessarily 
mean peace. Peace, as you know, Mr. Presi- 
dent, dear brothers and sisters, is something 
much deeper, much deeper than that. 

May 12, 1975 


The threat of escalation of violence is 
now real. It is our duty to avoid such an 
escalation. We want to build peace in the 
place of violence, racial harmony in place of 
disharmony, prosperity in place of economic 
stagnation, security in place of insecurity 
now dogging every family every day. 

Mr. President, to build genuine peace in 
southern Africa, we must recognize with 
honesty the root causes of the existing con- 

First, colonialism in Rhodesia and Nami- 
bia. The existence of a rebel regime in Rho- 
desia has since compounded that problem. 
Second, apartheid and racial domination in 
South Africa. Over the last few years, a num- 
ber of catalytic factors have given strength 
to these forces of evil. 

External economic and strategic interests 
have flourished in colonial and apartheid re- 
gimes. Realism and moral conscience dictate 
that those who believe in peace must join 
hands in promoting conditions for peace. We 
cannot declare our commitment to peace and 
yet strengthen forces which stand in the 
way of the attainment of that peace. 

The era of colonialism has ended. Apart- 
heid cannot endure the test of time. Our 
obligation is that these evil systems end 
peacefully, peacefully. To achieve our aim, 
we need America's total commitment, total 
commitment to action consistent with that 

So far, American policy, let alone action, 
has been low keyed. This has given psycho- 
logical comfort to the forces of evil. 

We become, Mr. President, even more dis- 
mayed when the current posture of America 
toward Africa is set against the background 
of historical performance in the late fifties 
and early sixties. 

We cannot but recall that America did not 
wait for and march in step with the colonial 
powers but, rather, boldly, boldly marched 
ahead with the colonial peoples in their 
struggles to fulfill their aspirations — an 
America undaunted by the strong forces of 
reaction against the wind of change, whose 
nationals helped teach the colonial settlers 
about the evils of racial discrimination; an 
America whose Assistant Secretary for Afri- 

can Affairs, "Soapy" Williams [G. Mennen 
Williams], could be slapped in the face by a 
white reactionary on our soil and yet, un- 
daunted, still smile, still stand by American 
principles of freedom, justice, and national 
independence based on majority rule. Yes, 
the reactionaries hated Americans for "spoil- 
ing the natives," as they would say, for help- 
ing dismantle colonialism. 

We ask and wonder what has happened 
throughout America. Have the principles 
changed? The aspirations of the oppressed 
have not changed at all. In desperation, their 
anger has exploded their patience. Their 
resolve to fight, if peaceful negotiations are 
impossible, is borne out by history. 

So, their struggle has now received the 
baptism of fire. Victories in Mozambique 
and Angola have given them added inspira- 
tion. Africa has no reason, no reason at all, 
not to support the liberation movements. 

Can America still end only with declara- 
tions of support for the principles of freedom 
and racial justice? This, I submit, Mr. Presi- 
dent, would not be enough. Southern Africa 
is poised for a dangerous armed conflict. 
Peace is at stake. 

The conflict with disastrous consequences 
can be averted, but I submit again, Mr. 
President, there is not much time. Urgent 
action is required. 

At this time, America cannot realistically 
wait and see what administering powers will 
do or to pledge to support their efi'orts when 
none are in plan. America must heed the call 
of the oppressed. 

America, once an apostle in decolonization, 
must not be a mere disciple of those which 
promise but never perform and thus give 
strength to evils of colonialism and apart- 

If we want peace, we must end the era of 
inertia in Rhodesia and Namibia and vigor- 
ously work for ending apartheid. America 
must now be in the vanguard of democratic 
revolution in southern Africa. 

This is not the first time we make this 
appeal. It is Africa's constant plea. 

Now, Africa has taken an unequivocal 
stand on decolonization. We do not want to 
fight a war to win freedom and full national 


Department of State Bulletin 

independence in southern Africa. Africa 
wants to achieve these objectives by peaceful 
means ; that is, through negotiations. 

Our declaration to give high priority to 
peaceful methods to resolve the current 
crisis is a conscious decision, a conscious 
decision. We feel it to be our moral duty to 
avoid bloodshed where we can. 

We are determined to fulfill this obliga- 
tion — but, Mr. President, not at any price, 
not at any price, not at the price of freedom 
and justice. There we say no. No. 

Africa has made it clear that if the road 
to peaceful change is closed by the stone 
walls of racial bigotry and force of arms by 
minority regimes, then we are equally duty- 
bound to take the inescapable alternative. 

The oppressed people have a right to an- 
swer force with force, and Africa and all 
her friends in the world will support them. 

Liberation movements fought fascist 
Portugal. We supported them. They won. 
Now we must turn to Rhodesia and Namibia. 

Can America stand and be counted in im- 
plementing the Dar es Salaam strategy 
adopted by Africa? In Dar es Salaam early 
this month, Mr. President, Africa reaffirmed 
its commitment, its commitment to a peace- 
ful solution to the crisis in southern Africa 
as a first priority. 

Our strategy opens even new doors, now 
new doors to peaceful change, if those caught 
up in the crisis seek an honorable exit. Here 
is a chance in a century to achieve peace 
based on human equality and human dignity 
without further violence. 

We call upon America to support our ef- 
forts in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia 
and Namibia immediately and the ending of 
apartheid in South Africa. If we are com- 
mitted to peace, then let us join hands in 
building peace by removing factors under- 
lying the current crisis. 

If the oppressed peoples fail to achieve 
these noble ends by peaceful means, we call 
upon America not to give any support to the 
oppressors. Even now we call upon America 
to desist from direct and indirect support 
to minority regimes, for this puts America 
in direct conflict with the interests of 
Africa; that is, peace deeply rooted, deeply 

rooted in human dignity and equality and 
freedom without discrimination. 

We have recently demonstrated, Mr. 
President, our readiness to make peaceful 
change possible in Mozambique and Angola. 
We are equally committed to assist the op- 
pressed if they should convince us that the 
road to peaceful change is closed and armed 
struggle is the only alternative. 

The rebels in Rhodesia, assisted by South 
African troops, have committed some of the 
worst atrocities on the continent. Africa 
cannot allow them to continue, and we urge 
America not to allow them to continue. 

Victory for the majority is a matter of 
time, a matter of time. Let us, therefore, 
make it as painless as possible to those who 
have dominated their fellow men for years. 

Mr. President, we wish America, we wish 
America to understand our aims and ob- 
jectives. We are not fighting whites; we are 
fighting an evil and brutal system. On this 
there must be no compromise, none at all. 

America should also understand our strat- 
egy. We want to achieve our objectives by 
peaceful methods first and foremost. Africa 
is ready to try this approach with patience 
and exhaust all possible tactics — for peace 
is too precious, is too precious for all of us 
— but our patience and the patience of the 
oppre.ssed has its limits. 

Mr. President, we are here only for a short 
time. We have no other mission except to 
take the opportunity of the visit to put 
Africa's stand clearly. We want to avoid 
confrontation, but let us not be pushed. 

Once again, Mr. President, on behalf of 
my wife and my compatriots, and indeed on 
my own behalf, I thank you, Mrs. Ford, and 
our colleagues, brothers and sisters, for this 
warm welcome and hospitality. 

This is indeed a memorable visit, memor- 
able because it has been fruitful, and it 
coincides with the launching only yesterday 
of your Bicentennial celebrations. We con- 
gratulate the people of the United States for 
their tremendous achievements since inde- 
pendence, which have justified the anti- 
colonialist struggle of their Founding 

Finally, I take the opportunity of inviting 

May 12, 1975 


you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Ford, to pay 
a visit to Zambia. We will be happy to re- 
ceive you in our country at any time con- 
venient to you. 

And may I say, sir, at that time I might 
answer the challenge of playing golf. 

I now invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to 
join me and my wife and my colleagues in 
this toast to the President and Mrs. Ford: 
Mr. President, Mrs. Ford. Bilateral relations. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Temporary Suspension of Presidential Authority To 
Impose Fees on, or Otherwise Adjust, Petroleum 
Imports. Report from the Senate Committee on 
Finance, together with minority and supple- 
mental views, to accompany H.R. 1767. S. Kept. 
94-11. February 17, 1975. 23 pp. 

Proposed Legislation To Amend the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Act. Communication from the 
President of the United States transmitting a 
draft of proposed legislation to amend the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in 
order to extend the authorization of appropria- 
tions, and for other purposes. February 19, 1975. 
H. Doc. 94-54. 3 pp. 

Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications 
Related to NATO and the Middle East. Study 
prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investi- 
gations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, by 
the Congressional Research Service, Library of 
Congress. February 28, 1975. 63 pp. 

Standby Energy Authorities Act. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
together with minority and additional views, to 
accompany S. 622. S. Rept. 94-26. March 5, 1975. 
90 pp. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appro- 
priation Bill, 1975. Report of the House Commit- 
tee on Appropriations, together with separate and 
dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 4592. H. 
Rept. 94-53. March 10, 1975. 71 pp. 

Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third 
Congress, January 3, 1973-December 20, 1974. 
S. Rept. 94-37. March 17, 1975. 196 pp. 

Pan American Day and 
Pan American Week 


Each year, we and other members of the Organi- 
zation of American States celebrate our shared 
origins and the close ties that continue to flourish 
among us. To do this, we commemorate a significant 
event in the diplomatic history of the Western 
Hemisphere — the founding, late in the last century, 
of the International Union of the American Re- 
publics. This year marks the 85th anniversary of 
the establishment of that first inter-governmental 
regional organization and forerunner of the Organi- 
zation of American States. 

From its earliest days, the organization has taken 
for its two major objectives the maintenance of 
peace and the promotion of economic, social and 
cultural development in the Americas. The strength 
and longevity of inter-American cooperation in 
furtherance of these goals derives from its tested 
ability to evolve and reconstitute itself to meet new 
realities and new challenges over the years. 

In the Americas, we have come to recognize the 
fresh challenge presented by a new interdependence, 
which is global as well as hemispheric, linking de- 
veloped with less developed countries both in and 
beyond the hemisphere. We sense the opportunity 
for effective inter-American cooperation to advance 
our traditional goals of peace and progress for our 
hemisphere while strengthening the global coopera- 
tion decreed by our world. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
Monday, April 14, 1975, as Pan American Day, and 
the week beginning April 13, 1975, as Pan American 
Week, and I call upon the Governors of the fifty 
states, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, and appropriate officials of all other areas 
under the flag of the United States to issue similar 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this eleventh day of April, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the one 
hundred ninety-ninth. 

/^^^ ^^ 

' 40 Fed. Reg. 16643. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Conference 
of Oil Producers and Consumers Held at Paris 

A preparatory meeting for the interna- 
tional conference on energy and related 
economic problems was held at Paris April 
7-15.^ Following is a statement made in the 
meeting on April 7 by Charles W. Robinson, 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, who 
headed the U.S. delegation, together with a 
statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs, issued to the 
press on April 15 at the conclusion of the 


The United States is pleased to participate 
in this preparatory meeting for the interna- 
tional conference on energy and related 
economic problems, which initiates an im- 
portant — in fact an essential— dialogue be- 
tween oil producer and consumer countries. 
We congratulate the Government of France 
for its initiative and express our apprecia- 
tion for its efforts in convening this meeting 
today. We also extend thanks for the gener- 
ous hospitality which is being extended to 
those of us fortunate enough to be invited 
to Paris in April. 

There have been various analyses and in- 
terpretations of the oil crisis that began in 
the autumn of 1973. There are clearly dif- 
ferences of view among us, which will be 
discussed in the conference that we will be 
organizing at this preparatory meeting, but 
there are also many areas of common in- 
terest to which we will need to devote our 
primary efforts. 

' Attending the meeting were the United States, 
the European Common Market, and Japan for the 
industrialized consumer countries; Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria for the producing coun- 
tries; and Brazil, India, and Zaire for the developing 
consumer countries. 

I believe that we can agree on at least two 

First, the quintupling of oil prices over the 
past two years, although posing problems 
for the world economy, has heightened 
awareness of the interdependence of nations. 

Second, the problems emanating from the 
current oil situation cannot be resolved 
through confrontation or by unilateral ac- 
tion, but only through cooperative efforts 
among all major parties. 

We all share a common concern that the 
social and economic well-being of our peo- 
ples be enhanced rather than retarded, that 
developing nations be able to look forward 
to their rapid development rather than have 
their prospects undermined, and that the in- 
ternational financial and trading system be 
responsible enough and strong enough to 
cope with new stresses and meet our common 

In calling the Washington Energy Con- 
ference a little more than a year ago, we 
made clear from the outset that the initial 
discussion among the major industriahzed 
importers of oil was only a first step toward 
the necessary dialogue between both con- 
sumers and producers of oil. 

At the conclusion of the Washington Con- 
ference, ministers of the major industrial- 
ized countries stated their recognition of 
the "need to develop a cooperative multi- 
lateral relationship with producing coun- 
tries, and other consuming countries that 
takes into account the long-term interests 
of all." 

Returning to this theme in February, one 
year later, Secretary Kissinger stated that: 

In an interdependent world, our hopes for pros- 
perity and stability rest ultimately on a cooperative 
long-term relationship between consumers and 

May 12, 1975 


The producers seek a better life for their peoples 
and a future free from dependence on a single de- 
pleting resource; the industrialized nations seek to 
preserve the hard-earned economic and social prog- 
ress of centuries; the poorer nations seek desper- 
ately to resume their advance toward a more hope- 
ful existence. 

A year has passed since the Washington 
Conference. In that time, energy problems 
and the inflation and recession to which they 
have contributed have adversely affected 
large numbers of people throughout the 
world. We and other like-minded consumer 
nations have agreed on a series of collective 
measures to enable our economies and the 
world economy to meet the problems as- 
sociated with the increased price of oil. We 
sought the consumer cooperation that we 
considered necessary to insure a substantive 
and constructive dialogue. The International 
Energy Agency, present today as an ob- 
server, was established last November in 
recognition that a degree of consumer 
solidarity had been achieved and to serve 
as the institutional vehicle for the further 
elaboration of necessary cooperative meas- 

Our purpose at this preparatory meeting 
is to organize the procedures for the con- 
ference that will build on the dialogue ini- 
tiated at this meeting. Toward this end, we 
need to strike a balance between the immense 
scale and complexity of the world energy 
problem on the one hand and the constraint 
of realistic expectations for concrete results 
on the other. It is certainly true that today 
we are living in a highly interdependent 
world economy. The countries of the world 
have an interest in many economic issues in 
addition to the international oil situation. 
But if we are to have a conference with a 
reasonable expectation of tangible results, 
we must set bounds as to what such a meet- 
ing is designed to achieve. We must there- 
fore consider carefully the scope of both the 
agenda and participation of the conference. 

With regard to the agenda, we are here, 
in the words of the invitation received from 
the President of the French Republic, to 
organize a conference "to examine the 
energy problems to which many aspects of 

international economic relations are linked." 
The social, economic, and political dimen- 
sions of this problem are enormous, and the 
characteristics of the relations between pro- 
ducers and consumers of oil are in many 
respects unique. Our discussions are bound 
to overlap at times with other aspects of the 
world economy, and due account must be 
taken of such linkages. But I feel strongly 
that the work program to be developed here 
should be concentrated on the specifics of 
energy and related matters and not become 
diluted with parallel discussions of other 
issues, however important they may be. 

I say this recognizing that oil is only one 
of the major commodities traded on world 
markets and that, indeed, all commodities 
are interrelated within the world trade and 
financial system. We recognize the need for 
imaginative new initiatives in this area and 
are indeed prepared to discuss these other 
issues elsewhere in appropriate fora, and I 
take particular note of the upcoming special 
session of the U.N. General Assembly in 
September. The point I wish to make here 
is simply that we have more than enough to 
handle with the energy-related problems in 
the eff"ort we are initiating today. To broaden 
the scope of our discussions would substan- 
tially decrease the likelihood of a productive 

As for the number of participants in the 
main conference, we would foresee a reason- 
able limitation in participation, but with 
balanced representation of industrialized 
consumer countries, developing consumer 
countries, and the oil-exporting countries. 
The total number should be sufl^iciently re- 
stricted to permit constructive discussions 
but large enough that all interests are 
adequately represented. 

It will obviously be impossible for us in 
this preparatory meeting to designate in a 
specific manner the participants in the even- 
tual main conference. However, we can con- 
centrate on developing procedures under 
which participants can be designated in the 
period between the end of this meeting and 
the convening of the full conference. 

In conclusion, we are initiating a process 


Department of State Bulletin 

of vital and far-reaching concern to the 
international economy. The people of our 
nations and of other nations expect and de- 
serve constructive results from this process. 
We must respond with determination and 
imagination and take the initial steps at this 
meeting toward more harmonious relation- 
ships in energy and related economic fields. 
I pledge the best efforts of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment to that end. 


I wish to express appreciation to the Gov- 
ernment of France for acting as host at this 
preparatory meeting, on behalf of Under 
Secretary Robinson, the U.S. delegation, and 
myself. It has provided a useful opportunity 
for an exchange of views among industrial- 
ized countries, oil-exporting nations, and 
developing countries on a range of subjects 
of mutual interest. The meetings have pro- 
ceeded constructively, and there has been a 
genuine desire to understand and appreciate 
respective points of view. 

We are disappointed that we have not been 
able to complete the arrangements necessary 
for the convening of a formal conference. We 
have agreed to return to our capitals to con- 
sider various points of view which have been 
discussed in considerable detail over the past 
nine days. We will remain in contact through 
appropriate channels to resume together 
preparations for a conference as quickly as 

As you are aware, the major subject of 
discussion during the last several days has 
been the proposed draft agenda for a full 
conference. I do not believe it useful to com- 
ment in detail on the various issues involved 
in these discussions. There has been a basic 
difference of view with regard to the scope 
and objectives of the proposed conference. 

We were, of course, invited here by the 
President of the French Republic to prepare 
for a conference on energy and energy- 
related issues. We came here ready to discuss 
these issues, which are of central concern 
to all countries. Others have insisted on a 
much broader conference, extending to all 

aspects of the relationship between the in- 
dustrialized countries and the developing 

We have been and will continue to be 
willing to discuss seriously raw materials 
and other development issues in forums 
more directly concerned with them and to at- 
tempt therein to seek mutually beneficial 
solutions. However, we believe that the pro- 
posed conference could achieve constructive 
results only if it were focused on a relatively 
limited number of points related to the cen- 
tral subject of energy. 

I would like to stress that the discussions 
of the past nine days have taken place in an 
atmosphere of cordiality, and genuine at- 
tempts have been made to understand respec- 
tive points of view. In this sense we must all 
consider this meeting has not been a failed 
effort. The United States attaches great im- 
portance to its exchanges with each of the 
countries represented at this meeting. Our 
intention is to continue our efforts to pro- 
mote cooperation with them through all 

U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector 
Extended for Three Months 

Folloioing is a statement made in the U.N. 
Semrity Council by U.S. Representative 
John Scali on April 17, together with the 
text of a resolution adopted by the Council 
that day. 


USUN press release 31 dated April 17 

I would like to congratulate you, Mr. 
President [Louis de Guiringaud of France], 
for your leadership in the consultations 
which have led today to the agreement of the 
Council to renew the mandate of UNEF. The 
United States is pleased to join in this con- 
sensus and to support extension of the 
United Nations Emergency Force and its 

May 12, 1975 


Once again I wish to offer my govern- 
ment's appreciation to those countries which 
have supplied and maintained contingents 
for UNEF, to the civilian staff, the UNTSO 
[U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] ob- 
servers in the field, and particularly to the 
U.N. troops who contribute so directly to 
the continuous search for peace in the area. 

The Commander of UNEF, Lt. Gen. Ensio 
Siilasvuo, deserves a special tribute from us 
all for his exemplary and steadfast leader- 
ship of UNEF since its inception. His exam- 
ple provides an enviable model for any 
future U.N. peacekeeping endeavors. 

The Secretary General and his head- 
quarters staff also deserve our highest com- 
mendation for continuing to perform such a 
difficult task so well. The operational 
efficiency of the UNEF force is borne out by 
the latest report of the Secretary General. 
The most conclusive evidence of UNEF's 
effectiveness is that the situation has re- 
mained quiet and that both sides have gen- 
erally complied with the agreement of dis- 
engagement and cooperated with UNEF. In 
consequence there have been no significant 
incidents since the preceding report of the 
Secretary General. 

These U.N. peacekeeping troops are es- 
sential not only in maintaining the lines of 
separation between Egypt and Israel and 
providing a deterrent to renewed hostilities 
but also in creating a climate of trust and 
confidence upon which the success of further 
negotiations depends. The U.N. Emergency 
Force and the disengagement agreement be- 
tween Egypt and Israel are both means to 
an end, not settlements themselves. They are 
part of the process toward an overall peace- 
ful solution through negotiations as envis- 
aged in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 

As a matter of principle, we would have 
preferred an extension for a longer period 
of time. But whether the mandate is extended 
for three or six months or even longer, we 
believe there is an urgent need to move ahead 
in achieving a negotiated settlement. 

The last time this Council met to renew a 
U.N. peacekeeping force in the Middle East, 

I said that no one could doubt that the road 
toward peace would be long and difficult, 
that it would try the patience and test the 
good will of all concerned. This has been 
proven all too true. But the essential point 
is that we are still on that road — the road 
toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle 
East. The United States is determined to 
continue that search. As President Ford said 
in his address to the joint session of 

The United States will move ahead on whatever 
course looks most promising, either toward an over- 
all settlement or interim agreements should the 
parties themselves desire them. We will not accept 
stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks 
to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and 
outside of the region. 

Renewal of UNEF today is an important 
contribution toward continued movement in 
this process. We are happy to join with the 
Council in this action, and we pledge our best 
efforts in the continued search for peace in 
the Middle East. 


The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 
341 (1973), 346 (1974) and 362 (1974), 

Having considered the report of the Secretary- 
General on the United Nations Emergency Force 
(S/11670 and Corr. 1), 

Having noted the developments in the situation 
in the Middle East, 

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of 
tension in the area, 

Decides : 

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to imple- 
ment immediately Security Council resolution 338 
(1973) ; 

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations 
Emergency Force for a period of three months, that 
is, until' 24 July 1975; 

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit 
at the end of this period a report on the develop- 
ments in the situation and the measures taken to 
implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973). 

'U.N. doc. S/RES/368 (1975); adopted by the 
Council on Apr. 17 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the 
People's Republic of China and Iraq not participat- 
ing in the vote. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Current Actions 



Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Ap- 
proved by the International Coffee Council at 
London September 26, 1974.' 

Signature and acceptance deposited: Uganda, 
March 11, 1975. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in 
civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague 
March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 
1972. TIAS 7444. 

Ratification deposited: Portugal (with reserva- 
tions and declarations) , March 12, 1975. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 

Acceptance deposited: Austria, April 2, 1975. 
Amendment of article VII of the convention on 
facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (applicable to Berlin (West)), December 
30, 1974; Tunisia, February 19, 1975; United 
States, April 2, 1975. 


Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 

1967. TIAS 6298. 

Ratification deposited: Italy, April 14, 1975. 
Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 

Vienna February 21, 1971.' 

Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 18, 1975. 
Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 

drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.' 

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, April 18, 1975; 
Italy, April 14, 1975. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 

Ratification deposited: Republic of Korea, April 
23, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force May 6, 1975. 
Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 26 

International convention on civil liability for oil 
pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
1969. Enters into force June 19, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, April 

2, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Denmark, April 2, 1975. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 12, 1971.' 
Acceptance deposited: France, March 24, 1975. 

International convention on the establishment of an 
international fund for compensation for oil pollu- 
tion damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.' 
Accession deposited: Denmark, April 2, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

Agreement regarding financial support of the North 

Atlantic ice patrol. Done at Washington January 

4, 1956. Entered into force July 5, 1956. TIAS 


Acceptance deposited: Poland, April 22, 1975. 
Convention on the international regulations for 

preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 

October 20, 1972.' 

Accession deposited: Romania (with statements), 
March 27, 1975. 


Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 
Signature: Switzerland, April 14, 1975. 


International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- 
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force 
January 1, 1975.'' 
Accession deposited: Colombia, February 21, 1975. 



Agreement transferring the facility for research on 
aerospace disturbances at Amberley to the Aus- 
tralian National University. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Canberra January 31 and February 
26, 1975. Entered into force February 26, 1975. 

Agreement concerning a program of research on 
aero-space disturbances. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Canberra January 3, 1964. Entered into 
force January 3, 1964. TIAS 5510. 
Terminated: February 26, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 

May 12, 1975 


Agreement for the establishment and operation of 
additional facilities in connection with a program 
of research on aero-space disturbances. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Canberra April 12, 1965. 
TIAS 5801. 
Terminated: February 2G, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 
(TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Dacca April 11, 1975. Entered into force April 11, 

International Committee of the Red Cross 

Grant agreement concerning emergency relief and 
assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war 
victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and 
the Khmer Republic. Signed at Washington and 
Geneva February 20 and March 16 and 17, 1975. 
Entered into force March 17, 1975. 


Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended, 
relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington April 2, 1975. 
Entered into force April 2, 1975. 


Agreement on trade relations. Signed at Bucharest 
April 2, 1975. Enters into force on the date of 
exchange of written notice of acceptance by the 
two governments. 


Loan agreement to assist Syria to increase its 
agricultural production. Signed at Damascus 
February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 
27, 1975. 

Grant agreement for general participant training. 
Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered 
into force February 27, 1975. 

Grant agreement to promote the economic develop- 
ment of Syria. Signed at Damascus February 27, 
1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975. 

United Nations Children's Fund 

Grant agreement concerning assistance for children 
and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and 
Laos. Signed at Washington and New York 
December 26 and 30, 1974. Entered into force 
December 30, 1974. 

Agreement amending the grant agreement of De- 
cember 26 and 30, 1974, concerning assistance for 
children and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cam- 
bodia, and Laos. Signed at New York February 
10 and 14, 1975. Entered into force February 14, 


Agreement supplementing the agreement of Novem- 
ber 5, 1957, as supplemented and modified (TIAS 
3932, 5419, 6869), relating to investment guaran- 
ties. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon 
January 13 and March 7, 1975. Entered into 
force March 7, 1975. 


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Department of State Bulletin 

iiNucA may iz, i>i/o vol.l,a.a.ii i\o.i^i^ 

Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia Visits 
Washington (Ford, Kaunda) 614 

American Principles. An Agenda for Ameri- 
ca's Third Century (Ford) 593 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 618 

Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative for 

Trade Negotiations 613 

Disarmament. Republic of Korea Ratifies Non- 
proliferation Treaty (remarks by Deputy 
Assistant Secretary Zurhellen) 605 

Economic Affairs. Preparatory Meeting for 
Proposed Conference of Oil Producers and 
Consumers Held at Paris (Enders, Robin- 
son) 619 

Egypt. U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Ex- 
tended for Three Months (Scali, text of 
resolution) 621 

Energy. Preparatory Meeting for Proposed 
Conference of Oil Producers and Consumers 
Held at Paris (Enders, Robinson) .... 619 

France. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
L'Express of France 606 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Confer- 
ence of Oil Producers and Consumers Held 
at Paris (Enders, Robinson) 619 

Israel. U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Ex- 
tended for Three Months (Scali, text of 
resolution) 621 

Khmer Republic (Cambodia). Secretary Kis- 
singer Interviewed for L'Express of France 606 

Korea. Republic of Korea Ratifies Nonprolif- 
eration Treaty (remarks by Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary Zurhellen) 605 

Latin America 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week 

(proclamation) 618 

Secretary Regrets Postponement of Trip to 
South America (statement) 605 

Middle East 

"A Conversation With President Ford" — An 
Interview for CBS Television and Radio 
(excerpts) 596 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Ex- 
press of France 606 

U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Extended 

for Three Months (Scali, text of resolution) 621 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secre- 
tary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Express of 
France 606 

Presidential Documents 

An Agenda for America's Third Century . . 593 

"A Conversation With President Ford" — An 
Interview for CBS Television and Radio 
(excerpts) . . . . ' 596 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week 

(proclamation) 618 

President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Wash- 
ington 614 

U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector E.xtended 
for Three Months 621 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 624 

Trade. Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations 613 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions g23 

Republic of Korea Ratifies Nonproliferation 
Treaty (remarks by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Zurhellen) 605 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 

L'Express of France 606 

United Nations. U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel 
Sector Extended for Three Months (Scali, 
text of resolution) 621 


"A Conversation With President Ford" — An 
Interview for CBS Television and Radio 
(excerpts) 596 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Ex- 
press of France 606 

Zambia. President Kaunda of Zambia Visits 

Washington (Ford, Kaunda) 614 

Name Index 

Dent, Frederick B 613 

Enders, Thomas O 619 

Ford, President 593, 596, 614, 618 

Kaunda, Kenneth D 614 

Kissinger, Secretary 605, 606 

Robinson, Charles W 619 

Scali, John 621 

Zurhellen, J. Owen, Jr 605 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to April 21 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 208 
of April 19. 

Mo. Date Snbjet^t 

*209 4/21 Foreign agricultural and nutri- 
tional specialists visit U.S. 

*210 4/22 Reinhardt sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs 
(biographic data). 

*211 4/22 Regional Foreign Policy Confer- 
ence, Pittsburgh, Pa., Apr. 29. 

*212 4/22 Study Group I of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the 
CCITT, May 15. 
213 4/23 Republic of Korea ratifies Non- 
proliferation Treaty. 

*214 4/23 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, May 22. 

*215 4/23 Regional Foreign Policy Con- 
ference, Birmingham, Ala. 
May 7. 

t216 4/24 U.S. and Canada extend Fisher- 
ies Agreement. 

*217 4/25 Maj. Gen. David S. Parker, 
former Canal Zone Governor, 
receives Department of State 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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Washington, D.C. 20402. 





Volume LXXII • No. 1873 • May 19, 1975 




Address by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll 63U 


Address by Fred C. Ikle 

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 641 



Statement by Assistant Secretary Enders 647 


For index sefe Mm^er.gtPCfc f^y.fXj-^, 

Superintendent ot Documents 



VOL. LXXII, No. 1873 
• May 19, 1975 

For sale hy the Superintemlent of Documents 

U.S. Goveinment Printinsr Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

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by the Director of the Office of 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

ST.\TE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 


The Department of State BULLETll 
a weekly publication issued by t/ 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tlie public 
interested agencies of tlie govern 
witli information on developments, 
tlie field of U.S. foreign relations 
on the woric of the Department m 
tlie Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, issw 
by the White House and the Depot 
ment, and statements, address* 
and news conferences of the Preside 
and the Secretary of State and otk 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functioi 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inte 
national agreements to which tl 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general in^ 
national interest. 

Publications of tlie Department 
State, United Nations documents, 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also lis 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 29 

Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at the 
Old Executive Office Building on April 29. 

Press release 220 dated April 29 

Mr. Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Sec- 
retary to President Ford] : The briefing was 
delayed until the evacuation was completed, 
and the last helicopters are now in the air. 
I would like to read a statement by the 

[At this point Mr. Nessen read a statement by 
President Ford, the text of which follows.] 

"During the past week, I had ordered the 
reduction of American personnel in the U.S. 
Mission in Saigon to levels that could be 
quickly evacuated during an emergency, 
while enabling that mission to continue to 
fulfill its duties. 

"During the day on Monday, Washington 
time, the airport at Saigon came under per- 
sistent rocket, as well as artillery, fire and 
was effectively closed. The military situation 
in the area deteriorated rapidly. 

"I therefore ordered the evacuation of all 
American personnel remaining in South 

"The evacuation has been completed. I 
commend the personnel of the Armed Forces 
who accomplished it, as well as Ambassador 
Graham Martin and the staff of his mission, 
who served so well under difficult conditions. 
"This action closes a chapter in the Ameri- 
can experience. I ask all Americans to close 
ranks, to avoid recrimination about the past, 
to look ahead to the many goals we share, 
and to work together on the great tasks that 
remain to be accomplished." 

Copies of this statement will be available 
as you leave the briefing. 

Now, to give you details of the events 
of the past few days and to answer your 

May 19, 1975 

questions. Secretary of State Kissinger. 

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and Gentle- 
men, when the President spoke before the 
Congress [April 10], he stated as our objec- 
tive the stabilization of the situation in Viet- 

We made clear at that time, as well as be- 
fore many congressional hearings, that our 
purpose was to bring about the most con- 
trolled and the most humane solution that 
was possible and that these objectives re- 
quired the course which the President had 

Our priorities were as follows: We sought 
to save the American lives still in Viet-Nam. 
We tried to rescue as many South Vietnam- 
ese that had worked with the United States 
for 15 years in reliance on our commitments 
as we possibly could. And we sought to bring 
about as humane an outcome as was achiev- 
able under the conditions that existed. 

Over the past two weeks, the American 
personnel in Viet-Nam have been progres- 
sively reduced. Our objective was to reduce 
at a rate that was significant enough so that 
we would finally be able to evacuate rapidly 
but which would not produce a panic which 
might prevent anybody from getting out. 

Our objective was also to fulfill the human 
obligation which we felt to the tens of thou- 
sands of South Vietnamese who had worked 
with us for over a decade. 

Finally, we sought, through various inter- 
mediaries, to bring about as humane a po- 
litical evolution as we could. 

By Sunday evening [April 27], the person- 
nel in our mission had been reduced to 950 
and there were 8,000 South Vietnamese to be 
considered in a particularly high-risk cate- 
gory—between 5,000 and 8,000. We do not 
know the exact number. 

On Monday evening, Washington time. 


around 5 o'clock, which was Tuesday morn- 
ing in Saigon, the airport in Tan Son Nhiit 
was rocketed and received artillery fire. 

The President called an NSC [National 
Security Council] meeting. He decided that 
if the shelling stopped by dawn Saigon time, 
we would attempt to operate with fixed-wing 
aircraft from Tan Son Nhut Airport for one 
more day to remove the high-risk South 
Vietnamese, together with all the Defense 
Attache's Ofiice [DAO], which was located 
near the Tan Son Nhut Airport. 

He also ordered a substantial reduction of 
the remaining American personnel in South 

I may point out that the American person-, 
nel in Saigon was divided into two groups; 
one with the Defense Attache's Office, which 
was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport; 
the second one, which was related to the 
Embassy and was with the U.S. Mission in 
downtown Saigon. 

The shelling did stop early in the morning 
on Tuesday, Saigon time, or about 9 p.m. 
last night, Washington time. We then at- 
tempted to land C-130's but found that the 
population at the airport had got out of con- 
trol and had flooded the runways. It proved 
impossible to land any more fixed-wing air- 

The President thereupon ordered that the 
DAO personnel, together with those civilians 
that had been made ready to be evacuated, 
be moved to the DAO compound, which is 
near Tan Son Nhut Airport; and at about 
11:00 last night, he ordered the evacuation 
of all Americans from Tan Son Nhut and 
from the Embassy as well. 

This operation has been going on all day, 
which of course is night in Saigon, and under 
difficult circumstances, and the total num- 
ber of those evacuated numbers about 6,500 
— we will have the exact figures for you 
tomorrow — of which about 1,000 are Ameri- 

Our Ambassador has left, and the evacua- 
tion can be said to be completed. 

In the period since the President spoke to 
the Congress, we have therefore succeeded 
in evacuating all of the Americans who were 
in South Viet-Nam, losing the two marines 

last night to rocket fire and two pilots today 
on a helicopter. 

We succeeded in evacuating something on 
the order of 55,000 South Vietnamese. And 
we hope we have contributed to a political 
evolution that may spare the South Vietnam- 
ese some of the more drastic consequences 
of a political change, but this remains to be 
seen. This last point remains to be seen. 

As far as the Administration is concerned, 
I can only underline the point made by the 
President. We do not believe that this is a 
time for recrimination. It is a time to heal 
wounds, to look at our international obliga- 
tions, and to remember that peace and prog- 
ress in the world has depended importantly 
on American commitment and American con- 
viction and that the peace and progress of 
our own people is closely tied to that of the 
rest of the world. 

I will be glad to answer questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you made some reference 
a few lueeks back to those tvfio believe in the 
doynino theory, and while I don't remember 
exactly your words, the point ivas it is easy 
to laugh at it but there is some justification 
for subscribing to that theory. Now that this 
chapter is over, can you give us your esti- 
ynate of the security of Thailand and other 
countries in the area, or the near area? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early 
to make a final assessment. 

There is no question that the outcome in 
Indochina will have consequences not only in 
Asia but in many other parts of the world. 
To deny these consequences is to miss the 
possibility of dealing with them. 

So, I believe there will be consequences. 
But I am confident that we can deal with 
them, and we are determined to manage and 
to progress along the road toward a perma- 
nent peace that we have sought; but there 
is no question that there will be consequences. 

Q. Now that it is over, could you tell us, 
or elaborate in more detail, what ive did 
through various intermediaries to bring 
about, I think you said, as humane a political 
solution as possible, and why those efforts 
seem to have failed? 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not agree 
with the proposition that these efforts have 
failed because at least some of the efforts, 
especially those related to evacuation, were 
carried out through intermediaries. I think 
it is premature for me to go into all of the 
details, but we did deal with Hanoi and with 
the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Gov- 
ernment] through different intermediaries, 
and we were in a position to put our views 
and receive responses. 

Q. May I folloiv on that by saying, why, 
then, tvas it necessary to stage a rescue op- 
eration in the final stages? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the final stages, it 
was always foreseen that a helicopter lift for 
some contingents would be necessary. I be- 
lieve that the dynamics of the situation in 
South Viet-Nam and the impatience of the 
North Vietnamese to seize power brought 
about an acceleration of events in the last 
day and a half. 

But you will remember there was a period 
of about five days when both civilian and 
U.S. personnel were evacuated without any 
substantial opposition — in fact, more than 
five days, about a week. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, do you 
now anticipate that the North Vietnamese 
intend to move in and forcefully seize Sai- 
gon? Do you anticipate there will be a bloody 
battle of Saigon, or is there still a chance for 
an orderly transition? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is very difficult 
to judge at this moment. I think it is im- 
portant to point out that the Communist de- 
mands have been escalating as the military 
situation has changed in their favor. 

So, a week ago they were asking only for 
the removal of President [Nguyen Van] 
Thieu. When he resigned, they immediately 
asked for the removal of his successor, speci- 
fying that General [Duong Van] Minh would 
be acceptable. When President [Tran Van] 
Huong resigned in favor of General Minh, 
he was now described as a member of a clique 
which includes all of the members of his ad- 

A week ago, the Communist demand was 

for the removal of American military per- 
sonnel. This quickly escalated into a removal 
of all American personnel. 

Then a new demand was put forward for 
the dismantling of the South Vietnamese mil- 
itary apparatus. When that was agreed to, 
they added to it the demand for the disman- 
tling of the South Vietnamese administrative 
apparatus. So, it is clear that what is being 
aimed at is a substantial political takeover. 

Now, whether it is possible to avoid a bat- 
tle for Saigon, it is too early to judge. I 
would hope — and we certainly have at- 
tempted to work in that direction — that such 
a battle can be avoided. And it is basically 
unnecessary because it seems to us that the 
South Vietnamese Government is prepared 
to draw the conclusions from the existing sit- 
uation and, in fact, look forward to corre- 
spond to the demands of the Communist side. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the 
United States noiv oives any allegiance at all 
to the Paris pact? Are we now bound in any 
way by the Paris agreements? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as the 
United States is concerned, there are not 
many provisions of the Paris agreement that 
are still relevant. As far as the North Viet- 
namese are concerned, they have stated that 
they wish to carry out the Paris accords, 
though by what definition is not fully clear 
to me. We would certainly support this if it 
has any meaning. 

Q. May I ask one follow-up? Do you now 
favor American aid in rebuilding North Viet- 

Secretary Kissinger: North Viet-Nam? 

Q. North Viet-Nam. 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do not favor 
American aid for rebuilding North Viet- 

Q. South Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to 
South Viet-Nam, we will have to see what 
kind of government emerges and indeed 
whether there is going to be a South Viet- 
Nam. We would certainly look at particular 

May 19, 1975 


specific humanitarian requests that can be 
carried out by humanitarian agencies, but 
we do believe that the primary responsibility 
should fall on those who supply the weapons 
for this political change. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I tvould like to ask a 
question about the length of time that it took 
to complete this evacuation. First, the ques- 
tion of tvhether days went by after the end 
became obvious before ordering the evacua- 
tion; second, if after ordering it there was a 
one-hour delay in helicopter landings, ap- 
parently caused by military confusion; third, 
whether the evacuation was prolonged by 
picking up thousands of Vietnamese instead 
of concentrating on Americans; and foxirth, 
whether this ivas delayed even further by 
Ambassador Martin's desire to be the last 
man to leave the sinking ship. 

In other words, I tried to put the specifics 
in order to ask you, did it take too long to get 
out of there, to ivrite this last chapter? 

Secretary Kissinger: We got out, with all 
of the personnel that were there, without 
panic and without the substantial casualties 
that could have occurred if civil order had 
totally broken down. We also managed to 
save 56,000 people whose lives were in the 
most severe jeopardy. 

We had to make a judgment every day 
how many people we thought we could safely 
remove without triggering a panic and at 
the same time still be able to carry out our 
principal function and the remaining func- 

I think these objectives were achieved and 
they were carried out successfully. There- 
fore I do not believe that there was an undue 
delay, because an evacuation has been going 
on for two weeks. 

The difference between the last stage and 
the previous period was that the last stage 
was done by helicopter and the previous 
stage had been done by fixed-wing. 

I think the ability to conduct a final evac- 
uation by helicopter without casualties dur- 
ing the operation, at least casualties caused 
by hostile action, is closely related to the 
policies that were pursued in the preceding 
two weeks. 

As for Ambassador Martin, he was in a 
very difficult position. He felt a moral obliga- 
tion to the people with whom he had been 
associated, and he attempted to save as many 
of those as possible. That is not the worst 
fault a man can have. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been numer- 
ous reports of American appeals to the 
Soviets, to the Chinese. Can you say today 
in the evacuation effort were either the 
Soviets or the Chinese helpful or unhelpful 
in this diplomatic effort? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we re- 
ceived some help from the Soviet Union in 
the evacuation effort. The degree of it we will 
have to assess when we study the exchanges. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what caused the break- 
doivn of the intent ivhich was spoken of 
earlier on the Hill to try to achieve a meas- 
ure of self-determination for the people of 
South Viet-Nam, and what is your total as- 
sessment now of the effectiveness or the 
noneffectiveness of the rvhole Paris accord 
operation, ivhich you said at the outset ivas 
intended to achieve peace with honor for the 
United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: Until Sunday night 
we thought there was some considerable hope 
that the North Vietnamese would not seek a 
solution by purely military means, and when 
the transfer of power to General Minh took 
place — a person who had been designated by 
the other side as a counterpart worth talking 
to, they would be prepared to talk with — we 
thought a negotiated solution in the next few 
days was highly probable. 

Sometime Sunday night the North Viet- 
namese obviously changed signals. Why that 
is, we do not yet know, nor do I exclude that 
now that the American presence is totally 
removed and very little military structure is 
left in South Viet-Nam, that there may not 
be a sort of a negotiation, but what produced 
this sudden shift to a military option or what 
would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a 
military option, I have not had sufficient op- 
portunity to analyze. 

As to the effectiveness of the Paris ac- 
cords, I think it is important to remember 


Department of State Bulletin 

the mood in this country at the time that the 
Paris accords were being negotiated. I think 
it is worth remembering that the principal 
criticism that was then made was that the 
terms we insisted on were too tough, not that 
the terms were too generous. 

We wanted what was considered peace 
with honor, was that the United States would 
not end a war by overthrowing a government 
with which it had been associated. That still 
seems an objective that was correct. 

There were several other assumptions that 
were made at that time that were later falsi- 
fied by events that were beyond the control 
of — that indeed were unforeseeable by — any- 
body who negotiated these agreements, in- 
cluding the disintegration of or the weaken- 
ing of executive authority in the United 
States for reasons unconnected with foreign 
policy considerations. 

So, the premises of the Paris accords, in 
terms of aid, of the possibility of aid, and in 
terms of other factors, tended to disinte- 
grate. I see no purpose now in reviewing 
that particular history. Within the context 
of the time, it seemed the right thing to do. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a follow-up question on 
that. What is the current relationship of the 
United States to the South Vietnamese polit- 
ical grouping, whatever you would call it? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to see 
what grouping emerges out of whatever 
negotiations should now take place between 
the two South Vietnamese sides. After we 
have seen what grouping emerges and what 
degree of independence it has, then we can 
make a decision about what our political re- 
lationship to it is. We have not made a deci- 
sion on that. 

Q. Would you say diplomatic relations are 
in abeyance ivith the government in South 
Viet-Nam ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a fair 

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking back on the ivar 
noiv, would you say that the war tvas in vain, 
and %vhat do you feel it accomplished? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it will be a 

long time before Americans will be able to 
talk or write about the war with some dis- 
passion. It is clear that the war did not 
achieve the objectives of those who started 
the original involvement nor the objectives 
of those who sought to end that involvement, 
which they found on terms which seemed to 
them compatible with the sacrifices that had 
been made. 

What lessons we should draw from it, I 
think we should reserve for another occasion. 
But I don't think that we can solve the prob- 
lem of having entered the conflict too lightly 
by leaving it too lightly, either. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking toward the fu- 
ture, has America been so stunned by the 
experience of Viet-Nam that it will never 
again come to the military or economic aid of 
an ally? I am talking specifically in the case 
of Israel. 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out in a 
speech a few weeks ago [April 17], one les- 
son we must learn from this experience is 
that we must be very careful in the commit- 
ments we make but that we should scrupu- 
lously honor those commitments that we 

I believe that the experience in the war 
can make us more mature in the commit- 
ments we undertake and more determined 
to maintain those we have. I would therefore 
think that with relation to other countries, 
including Israel, that no lessons should be 
drawn by the enemies of our friends from 
the experiences in Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the develop- 
ments in the last rveek or so, would you agree 
that there was never any hope of stabilizing 
the South Vietnamese military situation 
after the withdrawal from the northern 
region ? 

Secretary Kissinger: When the President 
met with General Weyand [Gen. Frederick 
C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army] in 
Palm Springs, the judgment was that there 
was a slim hope, but some hope. Somewhat 
less than 50-50, but still some hope. 

The situation deteriorated with every 
passing day. Those of you whom I briefed 

May 19, 1975 


at that time will remember that I said that 
whatever — and I said it in public testimony 
on innumerable occasions — that whatever 
objective we may set ourselves and whatever 
assessment we make about the outcome, the 
Administration had no choice except to pur- 
sue the course that we did, which was de- 
signed to save the Americans still in Viet- 
Nam and the maximum number of 
Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, are 
you now reassessing the amount of humani- 
tarian aid which Congress should give to the 
South Vietnamese, and also, can you tell us 
the President's reaction and mood during the 
past 2U hours? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to 
humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam, we 
spoke to the congressional leadership this 
morning, and we urged them to pass the 
humanitarian part of the aid request that 
we have submitted to the Congress. 

The President pointed out that he would 
make a later decision as to what part of that 
humanitarian aid could be used in South 
Viet-Nam after the political evolution in 
South Viet-Nam becomes clearer. 

The President's mood was somber and de- 
termined, and we all went through a some- 
what anxious 24 hours, because until the last 
helicopter had left, we could not really know 
whether an attack on any of these com- 
pounds might start and whether missiles 
might be used against our evacuation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to 
clarify something that seems rather impor- 
tant at this point? You said here and in the 
past that a weakening of the American 
executive authority teas a factor in this 
whole outcome. Now, there have been reports 
that former President Nixon, with your ad- 
vice, had decided in April of 1973 to resume 
the bombing of North Viet-Nam but that 
Watergate intruded and he could not carry 
through on that. Is that a historic fact or 

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my 
knowledge, President Nixon had never ac- 

tually decided on any particular action. The 
Washington Special Action Group at that 
period was considering a number of reac- 
tions that could be taken to the beginning 
flagrant violations of the agreements. This 
was done on an interdepartmental basis — 
including the Department of State, my office, 
the Department of Defense — and had 
reached certain options. 

Then President Nixon, as it turned out, 
never made a final decision between these 
options. To what extent it was influenced by 
Watergate is a psychological assessment that 
one can only speculate about. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a new Asia 
developing after the Indochina situation. 
What ivill the priorities of the United States 
be in recognizing its existing commitments 
and in making neiv ones? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to as- 
sess the impact of Indochina on our allies 
and on other countries in that area and on 
their perceptions of the United States, and 
we will have to assess also what role the 
United States can responsibly play over an 
indefinite period of time, because surely 
another lesson we should draw from the 
Indochina experience is that foreign policy 
must be sustained over decades if it is to be 
eff'ective, and if it cannot be, then it has to 
be tailored to what is sustainable. 

The President has already reaffirmed our 
alliance with Japan, our defense treaty with 
Korea, and we, of course, also have treaty 
obligations and important bases in the Phil- 
ippines. We will soon be in consultation with 
many other countries in that area, including 
Indonesia and Singapore and Australia and 
New Zealand, and we hope to crystallize an 
Asian policy that is suited to present cir- 
cumstances with close consultation with our 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that 
all the Americans that wanted to come out 
are out of Saigon, and do you have any idea 
of the number of Americans ivho remained 

Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea of the 
number of Americans that remained behind. 


Department of State Bulletin I 

I am confident that every American who 
wanted to come out is out, but how many 
chose to stay behind we won't know until 
tomorrow sometime. The last contingent that 
left was the Ambassador and some of his 
immediate staff, and we won't know really 
until we get the report from them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is President Thieu tvel- 
come to seek asylum in tliis coiintry, and is 
there any possibility that the United States 
11'ould recognize an exile govermnent of 
Sonth Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Kissinger: If President Thieu 
should seek asylum in the United States, he 
would be, of course, received. 

The United States will not recognize an 
exile government of South Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what 
ivent wrong, ivhat ivere the flaws in Amer- 
ican foreign policy toward Indochina all 
these years? Why was it that so many Ad- 
ministrations repeatedly underestimated the 
power of the North Vietnamese and over- 
estimated the capability on the part of the 
South Vietnamese? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I said earlier, I 
think this is not the occasion, when the last 
American has barely left Saigon, to make 
an assessment of a decade and a half of 
American foreign policy, because it could 
equally well be argued that if five Admin- 
istrations that were staffed, after all, by 
serious people dedicated to the welfare of 
their country came to certain conclusions, 
that maybe there was something in their 
assessment, even if for a variety of reasons 
the effort did not succeed. 

As I have already pointed out, special fac- 
tors have operated in recent years. But I 
would think that what we need now in this 
country, for some weeks at least, and hope- 
fully for some months, is to heal the wounds 
and to put Viet-Nam behind us and to con- 
centrate on the problems of the future. That 
certainly will be the Administration's atti- 
tude. There will be time enough for historic 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly 
spoken of the potential conseq^ieyices of ivhat 

has happened in Southeast Asia. I would 
like to ask if you feel that your personal 
prestige and therefore your personal ability 
to negotiate between other countries has 
been damaged by what has happened? 

Secretary Kissinger: If I should ever come 
to the conclusion that I could not fulfill what 
the President has asked of me, then I would 
draw the consequences from this. Obviously, 
this has been a very painful experience, and 
it would be idle to deny this has been a pain- 
ful experience for many who have been con- 
cerned with this problem for a decade and a 

I think the problems in Viet-Nam went 
deeper than any one negotiation and that 
an analysis of the accords at the time will 
requii-e an assessment of the public pres- 
sures, of what was sustainable, l)ut I don't 
think, again, that we should go into this at 
this particular moment, nor am I probably 
the best judge of my prestige at any par- 
ticular point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what ivas it in particular 
that led you to believe until Sunday night 
that Hanoi might be ivilling to go for a non- 
military solution? Did you have some specific 
information from them to indicate that, be- 
cause certainly the battlefield situation sug- 
gested otherwise? 

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe to you, but 
the battlefield situation suggested that there 
was a standdown of significant military ac- 
tivity, and the public pronouncements were 
substantially in the direction that a negotia- 
tion would start with General Minh. There 
were also other reasons which led us to be- 
lieve that the possibility of a negotiation re- 
mained open. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have blamed the 
Soviets and the Red Chinese for breaking 
faith with the letter and the spirit of the 
Paris peace accords. The Soviet Union has 
apparently, through its broadcasts, encour- 
aged a Communist takeover in Portugal. The 
Chinese have signed a joint communique 
with North Korea encouraging North Korea 
to unify South Korea by force. 

My question is, ivhy, in view of these vio- 
lations iyi both the letter and in the spirit of 

May 19, 1975 


detente, does the United States continue to 
believe in detente; secondly, are ive ever go- 
ing to take some obvious action showing 
American displeasure at the behavior of the 
two Communist superpowers? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think it is 
important to keep in mind that our relation- 
ship with both the Soviet Union and the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China is based on ideolog- 
ical hostility but practical reasons for coop- 
eration in certain limited spheres. 

With respect to the Soviet Union, they and 
we possess the capability to destroy mankind. 
The question of how to prevent a general nu- 
clear war is a problem that some Adminis- 
tration must solve before consequences that 
would be irremedial. Therefore there is al- 
ways a common interest, and indeed a com- 
mon obligation, to attempt to deal with this 
particular problem. 

With respect to the various points you 
made, it is important for us to recognize that 
we cannot, in this situation, ask of the Soviet 
Union that it does our job for us. On the 
one hand, as I pointed out previously, of 
course the Soviet Union and the People's 
Republic must be responsible for the con- 
sequences of those actions that lead to an up- 
set of the situation in Indochina, or maybe 
in the Middle East ; that is, the introduction 
of massive armaments that will in all proba- 
bility be used offensively is an event that we 
cannot ignore. 

On the other hand, I think it would be a 
grave mistake to blame the Soviet Union for 
what happened in Portugal. It may have 
taken advantage of the situation in Portugal, 
but the fact that the Communist Party in 
Portugal has emerged despite the fact that 
it, in recent elections, had only 12 percent of 
the votes cannot be ascribed to Soviet mach- 
inations primarily, but due to causes that are 
much more complicated and also due to evo- 
lutions in Europe that have roots quite dif- 
ferent from Soviet pressures. 

So, we must not make the mistake of as- 
cribing every reverse we have to our Com- 
munist opponents, because that makes them 
appear 10 feet tall. On the other hand, we 
must not make the mistake of lulling our- 
self, with a period of detente, into believing 

that all competition has disappeared. 

Between these two extremes, we must nav- 
igate, seek to reduce tensions on the basis 
of reciprocity, and seek to promote a stabler 
world. When either of the Communist coun- 
tries have attempted actively to bring for- 
eign policy pressures, the United States has 
resisted strenuously, and again we have 
called their attention to the fact that the 
fostering of international conflict will cer- 
tainly lead to a breakdown of detente. But 
the individual examples which you gave can- 
not be ascribed to Communist actions pri- 

Q. In ordering the evacuation, to tvhat ex- 
tent were you responding exclusively to the 
military situation and to what extent ivere 
yon responding either to a request by "Big" 
Minh for all Americans to get out or to your 
own feeling that a total evacuation might 
facilitate a political settlement? 

Secretary Kissinger: When the President 
ordered total evacuation, it was done on the 
basis that Tan Son Nhut Airport had already 
been closed and that therefore the American 
personnel in Saigon — and there were 45 in 
the province — might soon become hostage to 
the approaching Communist forces. 

The order to evacuate was made before 
any request had been received from General 
Minh, and the principal, indeed the only, rea- 
son was to guarantee the safety of the re- 
maining Americans. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a report last 
night that the Communists ivere backing 
away from the airport, the rockets seemed 
to be moving back. Was that a direct result 
of negotiations and loere they prepared to let 
2is move refugees out or Americans out on 
fixed-iving aircraft? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know that 
particular report, but the shelling stopped 
about 9 p.m., last night. We could not op- 
erate fixed-wing aircraft, because the control 
at the airport broke down. And it was at 
this point that the President decided that 
with Communist forces approaching on all 
sides and with the airport being closed that 
we had to go to helicopter evacuation. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Mr. Sec7-etnnj, there is a report in New 
York that last week you sent a further re- 
quest for the good offices of the Council of 
Ministers of the Nine, the European Com- 

Secretary Kissinger: We did not approach 
the Nine last week. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any possibil- 
ity of a negotiated settlement, and also, ivith 
respect to that, ivhat can and should the 
South Vietnamese Government do now? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have already 
pointed out that the Communist demands 
have been escalating literally with every 
passing day, that as soon as one demand is 
met, an additional demand is put forward. 
So, we should have no illusions about what 
the Communist side is aiming for. 

The South Vietnamese, as far as I can 
tell, have met every demand that has so far 
been put forward on the radio. There have 
not been any direct negotiations with which 
I am familiar. 

What is attainable in the transfer of pow- 
er that would preserve a vestige of other 
forces than the Communist forces, that re- 
mains to be seen. 

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger 
Commends Efforts of Armed Forces 

Statement Issued April 29 

Department of Defense press release 204-75 dated April 29 

As the last withdrawal of Americans 
from Viet-Nam takes place, it is my special 

responsibility to address to you, the men and 
women of our Armed Forces, a few words of 
appreciation on behalf of the American 

For many of you, the tragedy of South- 
east Asia is more than a distant and abstract 
event. You have fought there; you have lost 
comrades there; you have suffered there. In 
this hour of pain and reflection, you may feel 
that your efforts and sacrifices have gone for 

That is not the case. When the passions 
have muted and the history is written, 
Americans will recall that their Armed 
Forces served them well. Under circum- 
stances more difficult than ever before faced 
by our military services, you accomplished 
the mission assigned to you by higher 
authority. In combat you were victorious, 
and you left the field with honor. 

Though you have done all that was 
asked of you, it will be stated that the war 
itself was futile. In some sense, such may be 
said of any national effort that ultimately 
fails. Yet our involvement was not purpose- 
less. It was intended to assist a small nation 
to preserve its independence in the face of 
external attack and to provide at least a 
reasonable chance to survive. That Viet-Nam 
succumbed to powerful external forces 
vitiates neither the explicit purpose behind 
our involvement nor the impulse of generos- 
ity toward those under attack that has long 
infused American policy. 

Your record of duty performed under 
difficult conditions remains unmatched. I 
salute you for it. Beyond any question you 
are entitled to the nation's respect, admira- 
tion, and gratitude. 

May 19, 1975 


Adjusting to a Changing World Economy: Investment and Trade Policy 

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll ' 

We, as a nation, must not permit recent 
events in Indochina to detract from our vi- 
sion of the future or cause us to turn away 
from the broader challenges of our time. 

I want to talk to you this evening about 
the U.S. policy on international trade and 
investment, a topic of obvious relevance 
both to the nation, as we adjust to an era of 
economic interdependence, and to the work 
of this conference. 

You, as businessmen and international 
traders, have a better appreciation than most 
Americans of the importance of our eco- 
nomic interaction with the rest of the world. 
You understand how the relatively unre- 
stricted flow of capital and goods across in- 
ternational borders is vital not only to our 
economy but to general world stability and 
prosperity. In many respects, I am preaching 
to the converted, to an audience of experts 
deeply concerned about trade and investment 
among nations. I also understand the risks 
inherent in a long after-dinner speech and 
will therefore keep my remarks brief and 
to the point. 

Let me turn first to U.S. policy on inter- 
national investment, an issue of intense in- 
terest and debate in the nation today. Since 
the time of Alexander Hamilton, American 
policy has consistently been to welcome 
foreign investment and to support the gen- 
erally free international movement of capi- 
tal. We have, from time to time, turned 
protectionist in our trade policy, but not in 
our attitude toward investment. 

Investment from abroad has historically 

' Made before the 38th Annual Chicago World 
Trade Conference at Chicago, 111., on Apr. 30 (text 
from press release 221). 

played an important role in building the 
economy and infrastructure of this nation; 
it was, as you are probably aware, an essen- 
tial element in the construction of our trans- 
continental railway system during the last 
century. Foreign investment has never been 
a threat to our security or economic integ- 
rity. Today, in a recessionary period, it is 
an important source of capital, technology, 
management, and jobs. 

Our longstanding commitment to the 
relatively nonrestrictive treatment of foreign 
investment is embodied in a wide-ranging 
bilateral network of treaties of friendship, 
commerce, and navigation with other na- 
tions. These treaties establish conditions 
favorable to private investment abroad, with 
many of them providing for a national-treat- 
ment standard to insure that foreign in- 
vestment is not discriminated against in the 
recipient country. 

You will have noticed that in describing 
our attitude toward the international flow 
of capital, I have consistently employed a 
qualifying word — "generally" free move- 
ment, "relatively" unrestricted. In discussing 
foreign investment, it is important to note 
that neither government policy nor our 
treaty system is intended to throw vital 
American industries open to uncontrolled 
investment from abroad. There are Federal 
restrictions effectively limiting the amount 
of foreign investment in areas such as atom- 
ic energy, communications, shipping and air 
transport, defense industries, and govern- 
ment-owned natural resources. 

Let us be frank to admit the real cause of 
current public concern about foreign invest- 
ment in this country; it is occasioned by the 


Department of State Bulletin 

fact that in recent years certain oil-produc- 
ing nations, many of them Arab, have ac- 
cumulated vast foreign exchange holdings 
and, at least in theory, have the potential to 
invest heavily in American companies. 

Response to New Investment Situation 

The United States has long been accus- 
tomed to investing overseas ; today we sense 
the shoe may be on the other foot, that we 
may become increasingly the target of in- 
vestment. We read alarming reports about 
how, in a specified number of years, Saudi 
Arabia will have the resources to buy up all 
companies listed on the New York Stock 

International investment, like any coop- 
erative endeavor, involves a sense of give- 
and-take; it is a two-way street. We cannot 
expect to dot the major capitals of the world 
with the Golden Arches of McDonald's and 
American branch offices without being pre- 
pared to accept the same kinds of investment 
in this country. 

Our experience to date strongly suggests 
that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries] investors do not desire 
to control large American companies and, 
indeed, lack the managerial capabilities to 
administer such establishments. These na- 
tions have shown themselves to be institu- 
tional investors, essentially conservative, 
with a legitimate objective: the best obtain- 
able long-term return on their capital. 

Contrary to popular impression, the 
United States is not being inundated with 
investment capital from abroad. Under the 
terms of the Foreign Investment Study Act 
of 1974, we are undertaking a comprehensive 
survey of foreign investment in this country. 
The survey has not yet been completed, but 
figures from other sources show that at the 
end of 1973, direct long-term foreign invest- 
ment in our private sector had a book value 
of $18 billion, a 25 percent increase over the 
previous year. About §12 billion of this in- 
vestment comes from Europe; an additional 
$4 billion from Canada. By contrast, U.S. 
direct investment abroad in 1974 had a book 
value of $107 billion. 

These figures and observations are not in- 
tended to suggest that the United States can 
simply forget about foreign investment and 
let events take their course. Our traditional 
support for freedom of investment flows 
must obviously be responsive to the new 
situation created by unprecedented capital 
accumulations by a relatively small number 
of foreign governments. 

Earlier this year the Administration un- 
dertook an extensive review of government 
policy on foreign investment. The conclu- 
sions of the study basically reaffirm our long- 
standing belief that the operation of free 
market forces will direct worldwide invest- 
ment flows in the most productive way. But 
our review also calls for prompt and effective 
action in three areas: 

— We need an improved system for collect- 
ing and analyzing data on foreign invest- 
ment coming into this country. 

— We must confirm that existing authority 
to deal with abuses by foreign investors is 
adequate and is being enforced where nec- 

— We should reach understandings with 
foreign governments, particularly those with 
a substantial capacity to invest, to consult 
with us prior to making major ofl^cial in- 
vestments in U.S. firms. 

To meet these requirements, the Admin- 
istration is moving to establish an Inter- 
agency Committee on Foreign Investment 
in the United States. The Committee will 
have primary responsibility for analyzing 
the impact on the U.S. economy of foreign 
investment and for coordinating U.S. policy 
on such investment. It will also review 
foreign investments that could be of major 
significance to our national interests and 
provide guidance on arrangements for ad- 
vance consultation with foreign governments 
on major oflScial investments. 

An Office of Foreign Investment will also 
be established to assist the Committee in its 
work, particularly by improving the gather- 
ing and dissemination of information on 
foreign investment. 

The Administration believes it now has 
the tools to deal with any potential problems 

May 19, 1975 


or abuses in the field of foreign investment. 
We are generally opposed to legislative 
initiatives that would make it more difficult 
for other nations to invest responsibly in 
this country. 

Our task is to utilize existing safeguards 
more effectively, not to impede the flow of 
foreign investment or block it from job- 
creating industries in a time of recession. 

Finally, while on the subject of invest- 
ment, let me emphasize a point made clearly 
by the President: In determining whether or 
not to invest their assets in this country, 
foreign investors should be aware that dis- 
crimination is totally contrary to American 
tradition and repugnant to our principles. 
The basic concern of our investment policy 
is not whether a potential investor is foreign, 
but whether he is prepared to abide by our 
laws and regulations. 

Private Sector Role in Trade Policy 

Investment is but one aspect, and a risky 
one at that, of increasing world economic 
interdependence. All of us have at one time 
or another been burned on our investments, 
but the respectability and evident prosperity 
of this gathering strongly suggests that a 
person of talent can operate with fairly con- 
sistent success in the field of international 

If I may be permitted a quote from a 
former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
R. A. Butler: "It takes two to make love and 
two to make trade agreements work. Un- 
requited trade or exports pay no better than 
unrequited love." The freer flow of trade 
throughout the world is a cardinal point of 
American foreign policy, one soundly based 
on our national interest and the furtherance 
of our policy objectives. 

The Trade Act of 1974 and the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations now taking place 
in Geneva are significant benchmarks in this 
country's longstanding commitment to help 
shape a more just and open international 
trading system. The Trade Act gives us the 
authority to do the job, consistent with our 
national interests. Geneva is the forum at 
which we and our trading partners will seek 

to reconcile national dift'erences and mutual 
concerns in the interest of expanded world 
trade and prosperity. 

Many of you are aware that the Trade 
Act specifically calls upon the President to 
obtain the advice of the private sector re- 
garding our negotiating objectives and bar- 
gaining positions at Geneva. An overall, 
45-member advisory committee for trade ne- 
gotiations is being established. It will include 
private sector representatives from all seg- 
ments of the American economy — industry, 
agriculture, small business, consumers, re- 
tailers, and labor — and will play a central 
role in the consultative program. 

Twenty-six industry sector advisory com- 
mittees and eight agricultural technical ad- 
visory committees are also being formed to 
act as a liaison with representatives of the 
private sector as we attempt to remove ob- 
stacles to international trade. The initial 
round of consultations with business and 
agricultural interests is well underway. 
When public hearings on trade policy are 
concluded this summer, the Administration 
will have an unprecedented stock of informa- 
tion and advice from the private sector to use 
in determining our negotiating goals and 
strategy, both overall and with regard to 
specific products. 

These committees include many members 
of the Chicago business community. They 
insure that your voices will be heard as our 
policy on international trade develops. As 
businessmen concerned with international 
commerce, you have a responsibility to make 
eflfective use of these avenues of communica- 
tion with the government and then to take 
maximum advantage of export opportunities. 
And I want to emphasize the latter as well 
as the former. Taking maximum advantage 
of export opportunities requires good old- 
fashioned work, woi'k that is essential to our 
survival as a great trading nation in a new 
world order. 

During my business and diplomatic career 
in Asia and through frequent contact with 
American businessmen overseas, I have 
noticed a real concern about delivery sched- 
ules. American representatives abroad can 
frequently get the orders but have difficulty 


Department of State Bulletin 

in delivering the goods. If we are going to 
take advantage of freer trade and compete 
successfully in the international marketplace, 
our exporters must recognize the importance 
of foreign markets and treat overseas orders 
with the same priority as domestic demand. 
Production capacity must be adequate to 
meet both domestic and overseas markets. 

Here at home, we also need the support 
and involvement of the American business 
community to obtain congressional support 
for repeal of restrictive domestic trade legis- 
lation. One example is the recent initiative by 
Congress to exclude all OPEC nations — in- 
cluding some which did not participate in 
the 1973 oil embargo such as Venezuela, 
Iran, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Indonesia — 
from the benefit of our generalized tariff 
preferences. Legislation of this nature calls 
into question our commitment to freer trade, 
creates needless irritants in our bilateral 
relations, and makes our task at Geneva all 
the more difficult. 

Geneva Trade Negotiations 

Let us take a look at some of the specific 
issues at Geneva, the problems and accom- 
plishments to date. 

The agreements reached by the 89 nations 
currently negotiating at Geneva will set the 
trade policies of much of the world for the 
coming decade. The success of these nego- 
tiations is of critical concern not only to 
the prosperity of this nation — which ex- 
ported almost $100 billion worth of goods in 
1974 — but to economic growth and stability 
around the world. 

During the Kennedy round of trade nego- 
tiations in the sixties the international com- 
munity made very substantial progress in 
reducing tariff barriers to trade. We were 
less successful in dealing with the question 
of nontariff barriers and with the liberaliza- 
tion of agricultural trade — an issue of obvi- 
ous concern to Illinois, which leads the 
United States in agricultural exports. We 
expect to do better this time. 

Given the significance of agriculture on 
our overall trade position, it is of the utmost 
importance that we be able to expand our 

access to overseas markets. For their part, 
other nations understandably require of us 
assured access to our agricultural supplies. 
We can anticipate that the agricultural nego- 
tiations will continue to be difficult since 
there are basic differences between major 
agricultural producers such as the United 
States and the European Community over 
the relationship between domestic and inter- 
national agricultural policy. The European 
Community, for example, is far more protec- 
tive of its domestic agriculture than is the 
United States. 

Resolving these differences on a basis 
leading to expanded international trade is 
important not only to the United States but 
to the future of the negotiations. Failure to 
reach accommodation on the important issue 
of agriculture could spill over into other 
areas at Geneva, crippling the negotiations 
before they are fully underway. 

At the February 1975 multilateral trade 
negotiation meeting in Geneva, working 
groups were established to deal separately 
with the principal problems of negotiations: 
tariff and nontariff barriers, agriculture, 
and safeguards for affected domestic indus- 
tries. A separate group was set up to work on 
tropical agricultural products, such as cocoa, 
bananas, and coffee, items on which there is 
opportunity for rapid progress in the nego- 

Another group will examine the concept of 
a sector approach to trade negotiations by 
looking at the barriers to trade affecting a 
broad industry rather than specific products. 
We have under study at Geneva, for example, 
all restrictions relating to the metal indus- 
try — steel, copper, zinc, and lead — in an 
effort to evaluate the prospects for removing 
them on a sectoral basis. Where we antici- 
pate that our interests are better served and 
our commitment to trade liberalization fur- 
thered, the United States is prepared to 
proceed on this integrated sector approach. 

With the exception of those dealing with 
agriculture, all the working groups at 
Geneva are now engaged in the substantive 
stage of negotiations. Upon the conclusion 
of our domestic procedures for consultation 
with the private sector, we will begin the 

May 19, 1975 


process of tabling specific proposals in the 
vai-ious negotiations. 

NontarifF Barriers and Commodities 

We have unprecedented authority to re- 
duce tariffs in return for mutual concessions 
by other nations. We also, for the first time, 
have explicit authority to attack the problem 
of nontariff barriers, which, with the suc- 
cess of the Kennedy round, have become in- 
creasingly important impediments to trade. 
We hope to reduce or eliminate some of the 
more onerous nontariff barriers by agree- 
ment on codes of conduct governing what is 
and is not acceptable internationally. 

Export subsidies constitute an important 
nontariff obstacle to trade, and we recently 
achieved an important breakthrough on this 
issue when the United States and the 
European Community, through a process of 
negotiation and compromise, reached accord 
on the difficult problem of the European 
Community's policy of subsidizing cheese 
exports to the United States. 

Other examples of our concern in the area 
of nontariff barriers are import quotas, dis- 
criminatory national standards in packaging 
or labeling, and government procurement 
practices favoring domestic industries. 

Section 108 of the Trade Act gives us the 
authority to tackle a new dimension in trade 
negotiations: access to raw materials. Sec- 
tion 108 permits U.S. negotiators to seek 
agreements assuring that we and other coun- 
tries enjoy continued access to raw material 
supplies at prices fair to both consumer and 

All nations stand to benefit from smooth- 
ing out the wide fluctuations in price that 
have recently characterized the commodities 
market. We can anticipate, however, that in 
return for concessions on commodities, pro- 
ducer states will press for modification in 
our tariff schedules which currently inhibit 
the processing of raw materials in the coun- 
try of origin. 

We recognize that the international com- 

munity has a long way to go on the sensitive 
issue of commodity trade, an issue with 
serious potential for confrontation between 
developed and less developed nations. 

We can expect that the developing nations 
will play an active role at Geneva; their con- 
cerns are by no means limited to commodi- 
ties. They will seek recognition of the special 
requirements attributable to their relative 
underdevelopment, and we are prepared to 
respond to these needs. We and other in- 
dustrialized nations, for example, have 
adopted a generalized system of tariff pref- 
erences giving developing nations substan- 
tially freer access to our domestic markets. 

The late.st round of the multilateral trade 
negotiations at Geneva has been a long time 
in coming. As you can see, progress on all 
fronts has not always been as rapid as we 
would like. Despite the existence of inevita- 
ble differences, there is an inherent impor- 
tance to the fact that the nations of the 
world are engaged in active negotiations on 
the issues of interdependence, the issues of 
the future. 

In a period of worldwide economic malaise, 
the Geneva trade negotiations hold out the 
prospect of resolving outstanding trade is- 
sues and help to forestall the possibility of 
unilateral initiatives to restrict imports or 
stimulate exports. Many nations are under 
substantial pressure to take precisely such 
measures, to return to an era of beggar-thy- 
neighbor economic practices which could 
quickly undermine the basis of the world 
trading system. 

There has already been regrettable move- 
ment in the direction of unilateral action. 
Finland, for example, has recently adopted 
an import deposit scheme requiring a po- 
tential impoi'ter to place a deposit in the 
Bank of ^''inland, where it is held for six 
months and then returned without interest. 
The Australians have placed import quotas 
on cars and a ban on meat from abroad, 
while the British have begun to subsidize 
exports through a system of "inflation in- 


Department of State Bulletin 

Unilateral action must not be permitted to 
become the pattern of the future in inter- 
national trade relations. The Geneva talks 
are a key element in the efforts of the world 
community to resolve problems in a manner 
that lays the foundation for an expanding 
world prosperity. 

It is to our, and to the world's, credit that 
we are responding to economic challenge and 
adversity, adjusting to a changing world 
economy, by looking outward, by seeking 
ways to expand the opportunities for trade 
and investment. Our government can only 
increase the potential for world trade. Gov- 
ernment and the private sector have a shared 
obligation to design a coherent national 
trade policy. But the responsibility to get 
out and compete wholeheartedly for world 
markets is mainly yours. 

An effective American international eco- 
nomic policy, backed by a dynamic and crea- 
tive business community, is essential to our 
continued prosperity. Such a policy demands 
your ideas, your understanding, your in- 
volvement, and your support. 

King Hussein of Jordan 
Visits Washington 

During a private visit to the United 
States, King Hjissein of Jordan met with 
President Ford and other government 
officials at Washington. Folloiving is an ex- 
change of toasts at a dinner given by Presi- 
dent Ford on April 29. 

While House press release dated April 29 


Your Highness: I want again to extend to 
you my personal feeling, my strong con- 
viction, that you and your country represent 
in this situation the finest in what we have 
to do in the area of peace in the Middle East. 

You have been here many, many times 

ove)' the years; and on each and every occa- 
sion, your contribution to a solution has been 
all to the good from the point of view of all 
parties concerned. We are deeply grateful 
now, as well as in the past, for this contribu- 

We had a very, I think, constructive meet- 
ing this morning, and I know you are going 
to be meeting with the Secretary of State 
tomorrow. Your personal contribution to 
this very difficult problem that the world 
faces in the Middle East is a very significant 

We have had some disappointments with 
the efforts that the Secretary of State, and 
that I, made in the Middle East. But I for 
one do not believe that we can tolerate stag- 
nation or stalemate, and we do not intend 
to do so. 

The precise key, the precise answer, is still 
being analyzed here in our country, and I am 
sure in other parts of the world. But momen- 
tum for progress has to be continued. And 
one of the benefits of my meeting with you 
this morning was that we discussed the need 
and necessity not to look back and condemn 
one party or another, or to have any adverse 
comments about one party or another. 

The important point is that we have to 
look forward. We have to be optimistic about 
what is good in the Middle East, but what, 
more importantly, is good for the world as 
a whole. 

The situation in the Middle East is totally 
related to the improvement of world condi- 
tions on a global basis. We are thankful and 
very appreciative of your continuous states- 

It has been evident to everybody over a 
long period of time, but I have personally 
had the opportunity to observe it, and I 
thank you. 

We are most grateful, and in the months 
ahead we will be very mindful of your ob- 
servations, your recommendations, as we try 
to find an answer to the problems, not only 
in the Middle East, but elsewhere. 

So, it is my great honor and privilege. 

May 19, 1975 


Your Majesty, to oflfer a toast to you for all 
that you have done and all that you will do 
for the benefit of all of the people in the 
Middle East and the people in the world: 
Your Majesty. 


This is indeed an honor and a very great 
pleasure for me, sir, to have had this oppor- 
tunity to meet with you again, sir, and to be 
among friends. 

We have indeed over the years been ever 
proud of the fact that those years that passed 
brought us closer together in many fields, 
and in many areas. We are proud of the 
friendship that has always existed between 
our two countries, the friendship that now 
we feel exists between the Arab nation and 
the United States, its government and its 

We have a commonality of interests. On 
the one hand, we share the same principles, 
uphold the same ideals, have the same hopes 
and aspirations for a better world, for a 
world where people can live in peace and in 
dignity and divert their energies and re- 
sources to further build for the generations 
to come. 

Our area is a troubled area, and trouble in 
our area is dangerous, not only to all those 
who live in it but to the future of mankind. 

I am proud of the fact that I don't speak 
only for myself, but for many of the area's 
leaders, many of our present Arab world, 
and to say that we wish for nothing more 
than a just and durable peace. 

We are proud of the fact that we have 
contributed our utmost toward that end, and 
we have determined to do our utmost for 
that end. 

We know very well that the United States 

will continue to look at our problems with 
interest and with determination to play the 
major role which only the United States can 
play for the attainment of the goal of peace. 

We have watched with admiration and re- 
spect the many efforts made under your wise 
auspices and leadership; the eff'orts and 
initiatives of our great friend. Dr. Kissinger; 
the patience, the perseverance, and the dedi- 

Regardless of the outcome to date, we ad- 
mire the spirit and we appreciate the 
tremendous eff'orts, and we will always do so. 

We look into the future with hope at the 
chance that is ahead of us — which may be 
the final chance — and a tragic history of lost 
opportunities may be taken by all concerned 
for the establishment of a just and durable 

We saw difficulties. We feel they are both 
in our area and in the world as a whole. 

I thank you for the time and the patience, 
and I look forward to my days in Washing- 
ton and the opportunity to meet and talk 
very frankly with all our friends on all 
issues of mutual interest. 

I thank you for giving me this time, and 
I can assure you that we will continue to do 
our utmost to work together for a better 
future in our area and in the world, ever 
proud of the friendship that exists between 
us, ever determined to see that we strengthen 
the ties that happily exist and have existed 
for so long between our nations and our 

Gentlemen, I would wish you to join me 
in drinking a toast to the President of the 
United States, his continued good health, suc- 
cess, and to the United States, and to the 
friendship that we hope will always grow 
between the Arab people and the people of 
the United States. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The Second Nuclear Era 

Address by Fred C. Ilcle 

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency i 

Mankind's first nuclear era began 30 
years ago. Three-fifths of the people alive 
today had not yet been born. For those who 
remember that beginning, it offers mixed 
memories. People were stunned by the de- 
structiveness of this new power. At the same 
time, they looked upon the bomb as bringing 
an end to a war that threatened to grow 
bloodier and go on for endless days. 

And there was a widespread feeling that 
the world now had a singular opportunity to 
rebuild itself in a better way. Almost every- 
one recognized the world could never be the 
same — atomic power had revolutionized the 
nature of peace and war. 

Americans were confident that their coun- 
try would show the way. Our self-confidence 
found concrete expression in a proposal to 
the United Nations — a proposal that com- 
bined our hopefulness of that time with ac- 
ceptance of our responsibility as sole pos- 
sessor of the atom bomb. This proposal, 
known as the Baruch plan, envisaged placing 
all nuclear resources throughout the world 
under the ownership and control of an in- 
dependent international authority. Its pur- 
pose was to assure that this new force served 
only peaceful ends. 

Some debate has arisen about the realism 
of the Baruch plan and even about the sin- 
cerity with which it was off'ered. Let me lay 
a myth to rest. 

Was it realistic? No, because its optimism 
demanded too great a change in the politics 

' Made before the 15th Annual Foreign Affairs 
Conference, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., 
on Apr. 23 (text from ACDA press release). 

of power. Yes, because its boldness matched 
the magnitude of the problem. 

Was it sincere? While preparing and 
pressing this proposal, did we exploit our 
nuclear monopoly to the hilt, or did we exer- 
cise self-restraint? 

What we did was this: First, the United 
States diminished its nuclear research and 
development from $940 million in 1944 to 
$280 million in 1946. Second, in 1946 and 
early 1947, the United States exploited its 
nuclear monopoly by having on hand a 
total stockpile of battle-ready weapons that 
numbered — I will give you the exact figure — 
zero. As late as April 1947, President Tru- 
man noted that we still had only few com- 
ponents of bombs and that our bombs were 
not assembled. Evidently, Harry Truman — 
that alleged cold warrior — had not ordered 
a crash program. 

These facts are available to any historian. 
Yet they have been conveniently overlooked 
in recent attempts to rewrite the history of 
how the cold war began. We do not have to 
assert that we were without flaw during that 
period. But we should not forget the truth — 
the self-restraint and generosity in Ameri- 
can foreign policy during that period, a pe- 
riod when the United States had a world 
monopoly on power without parallel in his- 

The United States, during the critical 
years of 1946 and 1947, continued to press 
for an efiiective international system of con- 
trol and ownership of the atom. It did not 
launch a massive research and development 
program to assure that its nuclear superior- 

May 19, 1975 


ity would remain unchallengeable. It did not 
rush to amass a stockpile of nuclear weap- 
ons. Thus it did not exploit its monopoly to 
impose its own interpretation of the World 
War II settlements. But at the end of 1947, 
it seemed clear that the Baruch plan — or any 
comparable, effective constraint on nuclear 
arms — would not be accepted. In 1949, the 
Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb. 
Over the next 15 years, the nuclear arsenals 
grew competitively on both sides to incom- 
prehensible levels of destructiveness. 

The United States maintained its lead in 
this deadly competition. Nevertheless, in the 
mid-1960's it took the initiative of restrain- 
ing the expansion of its strategic offensive 
and defensive forces, seeking stability by a 
renewed effort for agreed controls. This 
American self-restraint found formal ex- 
pression in the 1969 decision to discard "stra- 
tegic superiority" as official U.S. policy. The 
Soviet Union would thus be allowed to 
achieve equality where the United States had 
held an advantage for 25 years. 

This decision was based on recognition 
that a stable world order cannot be achieved 
if either superpower engages in the futile 
and dangerous pursuit of unilateral advan- 
tages. We have pursued this principle of 
equality and mutual self-restraint through 
six years of difficult strategic arms talks, 
and we continue to pursue it in other East- 
West arms control negotiations. 

Given the historic development of the 
American and Soviet positions in the world, 
parity between our strategic forces is a re- 
lationship that can add to stability. And stra- 
tegic parity is to be anchored even more 
securely in the agreement on offensive arms 
based on the accord reached at Vladivostok. 
The agreement will complement the Antibal- 
listic Missile Treaty of 1972 and its 1974 
protocol. By that groundbreaking set of 
agreements, we and the Russians effectively 
renounced major weapons systems in the 
interests of world stability. 

Now, these are substantial achievements. 
The world's two most powerful nations, to 
enhance their own security, have begun to 
rely on controlling their armaments. It might 
thus seem as if the road ahead were clear. 

Successive limitations and reductions to be 
negotiated between the United States and 
the Soviet Union might seem all that is 
needed to avoid nuclear war. 
But something more is needed. 

Complex New Problems 

For we are now moving into a new era 
that will differ fundamentally from the world 
to which we have, in part, adjusted. The 
revolutionary agent is the inexorable diffu- 
sion of nuclear technology throughout the 
world. We can slow down the spread of the 
means to make the bomb ; but we — the United 
States — cannot stop it. As if to saddle man- 
kind with a double curse, the nuclear tech- 
nology now of greatest interest throughout 
the world — reactors to produce energy — is 
also a technology that yields the material 
necessary to build nuclear bombs. From a 
powerful mixture of economic and national- 
istic motives, nation after nation will want 
this technology. The most dangerous ma- 
terial man has ever fashioned will gradually 
spread all over the world. 

In the coming era, we will no longer be 
able to prevent use of the nuclear bomb sole- 
ly by deterring one or two potential adver- 
saries. Further, we will no longer be able to 
curb nuclear arms competition through bi- 
lateral agreements alone. 

Realism forces us to recognize that most 
nations which acquire nuclear arms will in- 
sist on retaining sovereign control over them 
for decades to come. For this and other rea- 
sons, "general and complete disarmament" 
is not a guideline for policies to shape the 
foreseeable future. Yet realism also forces 
us to recognize that the continuing spread 
of nuclear materials cannot coexist for dec- 
ades with the present structure of nuclear 
deterrence on the one hand and the present 
fragile controls over nuclear explosive tech- 
nology on the other. 

Political philosophers, to be sure, may 
wish to explore the possibility of a world 
in which nation-states as we know them will 
have disappeared in a dispensation of gen- 
eral and complete disarmament. Similarly, 
military strategists may wish to speculate 


Department of State Bulletin 

on how nuclear deterrence as we now under- 
stand it could survive in a world with sev- 
eral dozens of nuclear powers and where even 
criminal groups might obtain nuclear bombs. 
But I believe neither of these worlds is realis- 
tic. Something will have to give. 

The coming era calls for realism and for 
vision, for an effort that will mobilize the 
support of other nations and draw on our 
own vast intellectual, scientific, and moral 
strength. The second nuclear age calls for a 
U.S. arms control program that reaches so 
far ahead that we can shape our future. 

Tasks for the Coming Era 

As I see such a program taking shape, 
three important tasks stand out. 

First, for many nonnuclear powers, pro- 
tection against nuclear threat or attack rests 
on American commitments. America's self- 
interest dictates that we sustain our alliances. 
If we withdrew our protection, or if confi- 
dence in it were shaken, strong internal pres- 
sures would arise in many countries to ac- 
quire nuclear armaments for their self-pro- 
tection. Then their neighbors would feel 
threatened and follow suit. 

To the degree that we appear to turn in- 
ward, we encourage nonnuclear nations — 
from Asia to Europe and the Middle East — 
to create their own nuclear forces. We will 
thus make the future less manageable and 
eventually bring arms control efforts to a 
dead end. How could arms control and dis- 
armament make progress in a world where 
nations increasingly depend for security on a 
tangled web of nuclear threats and counter- 
threats among dozens of nuclear-armed 
countries? Our alliances help protect both 
other nations and ourselves from the dan- 
gers of nuclear proliferation. 

A second task is to make safer our reliance 
on nuclear deterrence — to be very clear about 
its shortcomings and to find ways to correct 

Never in man's history has the technology 
of warfare changed so sweepingly and so 
rapidly — and never without being tested in 
real battles. We can only be thankful, of 
course, that the generation which has grown 

up since the Second World War has never 
been witness to the cruel impact of nuclear 
destruction. But to be spared such experience 
has also insulated this generation from the 
grim reality of nuclear arsenals. Today, nu- 
clear strategists of all countries analyze a 
shadow world of abstract calculations. We 
are not moved by compassion or revulsion, 
and the corrective mechanism of learning 
from experience cannot work. 

In past centuries, every advance in tech- 
nology was eventually used for war. Then, 
however, the scope and suddenness of de- 
struction were never so immense. Weaponry 
was never rigged in such a way that one 
single failure could mean the last chance had 

But we have made mutual deterrence 
hinge on cataclysmic speed. There would be 
no time for learning, no time for human com- 
passion and mercy to call a halt, no pause in 
the battle long enough for governments to re- 
flect and gain a sense of proportion. Over the 
long term, this emphasis on speed imposes a 
risk that is intolerable and unnecessary. 

Major changes in deterrence will be needed 
in the second nuclear era, when the danger 
of nuclear war from deliberate attack may 
be overshadowed by the chances of war from 
accident or miscalculation. 

We have already taken promising steps, 
both unilaterally and through agreement, to 
escape from the interlock of "hair-triggered" 
nuclear armaments where one tragic episode 
could lead to mutual genocide. We have 
reached agreements with the Soviet Union 
on measures against the risk of accidents 
and on improvements in the Washington- 
Moscow hotline. We must take further steps 
along this important road. Unilaterally, we 
continue to improve the controls and safety 
of our nuclear armaments. 

We are also adjusting our strategic doc- 
trine to changing conditions. Here we must 
carefully .strike a balance. On the one hand, 
we must not stake our survival on one single 
gamble, the gamble that deterrence will never 
be seriously tested and that we will never re- 
quire room for choice — after some nuclear 
weapons have been used — to avoid mutual 
genocide. On the other hand, we must not 

May 19, 1975 


slide back into errors of the past by per- 
mitting nuclear weapons to be regarded as a 
substitute for conventional defenses. We 
must not mistake nuclear war or the threat 
of it for an acceptable instrument of foreign 

A great deal more needs to be done to 
make deterrence safer. We must search for 
improvements with a distrust of anyone who 
pretends all is well. Year in, year out, the 
avoidance of nuclear war now depends on 
the proper working of farflung armaments, 
on the safety of alert missile forces halfway 
around the globe, on the integrity of military 
command chains stretched thousands of 
miles. We have to rely on the absolute con- 
trol of these engines of destruction, all in a 
state of readiness day and night, month after 
month, all managed by people, large com- 
munities of people, with the usual admixture 
of heroes and villains, wise men and fools. 

It would be an insult to the ingenuity of 
our strategic experts and our engineers to 
argue that for decades to come such an un- 
believably explosive contraption is the best 
we can build. 

International Guardianship 

A third task is to create an international 
guardianship of peaceful nuclear technology. 

To keep nuclear technology peaceful was 
a need manifest from the very beginning, 
but it will be far more compelling in the sec- 
ond nuclear era. Its urgency will increase as 
technology spreads and nuclear materials in- 
creasingly supply the world's energy needs. 
Hence, the effort to assure that these re- 
sources serve only peaceful ends must ex- 
pand and intensify year by year. 

Inevitably, the international guardianship 
of dangerous nuclear materials will become 
steadily more important. Its work will in- 
volve an increasing number of people and a 
broadening array of tools to coordinate or 
manage directly the flow of nuclear materials 
among a steadily growing number of coun- 
tries. The timely supply of these fuels will 
be crucial to the economy of many; their per- 

petual and total safety will be crucial to the 
safety of all people. 

The activities of this guardianship will be 
a matter of daily concern rather than a mat- 
ter of sporadic intervention in emergencies. 
It will have to deal chiefly with persistent 
problems, such as the growing worldwide 
need for nuclear-waste disposal and the ever- 
present danger of theft of nuclear materials. 

Unlike mutual deterrence and the strategic 
analysis that supports it, it will not be con- 
demned to live in a world of theory and ab- 
straction. Its workings will be tested every 
day. Hence, it can learn from trial and error. 
Because failures will not inevitably be fatal, 
experience can teach. 

Again unlike deterrence, the guardianship 
of the world's peaceful nuclear resources 
does not fix nations in a posture of deadly an- 
tagonism. The dangers which must be con- 
trolled — some manmade, some essentially 
natural forces — are the byproducts of peace- 
ful activities, not the result of a hostile arms 

Can the nations of the world ever reach the 
kind of agreement that produces an effective 
and reliable guardianship? Over the last 20 
years — when the risks were not yet so com- 
pelling — over 100 countries have learned to 
work harmoniously together in the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The 
fruitfulness of that collective effort — based 
on an American initiative — should give solid 

I do not mean to project some instant 
Utopia. There will be pitfalls of many kinds. 
The effort to build an international guardian- 
ship might become entangled in the short- 
term politics of the struggle for resources. 
Or it could fail because of ideological 
schisms. There may be breakaway or outcast 
nations whose obsolete view of the world 
blinds them to the realities of their own in- 
terests. But we have the promise of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency. And over 
80 nations support the Nonproliferation 
Treaty. These examples point the way to the 
political consensus we must create. 

A decade hence, the performance of this 


Department of State Bulletin 

international guardianship will vitally en- 
gage the attention of governments through- 
out the world. It will affect the most elemen- 
tary interests of the general public and po- 
litical leaders alike: their welfare and their 
physical survival. By the nature of its task 
and the way it must work, it can forge a com- 
mon bond among nations that may prove 
more fruitful and sturdy than any we have 
tried to create and teach a more meaningful 
collaboration than any we have known. Giv- 
en America's position as the leader in nu- 
clear technology and our skill in designing 
international institutions, we can play a par- 
ticularly creative role. 

U.S. and Greece Hold Second Round 
of Talks on Defense Matters 

Joint Statement ^ 

Delegations representing the Governments 
of Greece and the United States met in 
Athens April 7-29 for a second round of 
negotiations concerning mutual defense mat- 
ters.- The talks proceeded in a spirit of mu- 
tual understanding. The Greek and United 
States delegations, led respectively by Am- 
bassador Petros Calogeras [of the Greek 
Foreign Ministry] and Minister Monteagle 
Stearns [Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Em- 
bassy, Athens], having discussed all aspects 
of Greek-United States military cooperation, 
concluded the second round as follows: 

1. At Greek request: 

A. The United States agreed to termi- 
nate homeporting at Elefsis. 

B. The United States base at Helleni- 
kon will be closed. Certain United States 
facilities which contribute to Greek defense 
needs will continue to operate on the Greek 
Air Force Base at Hellenikon. 

' Issued at Athens and Washin^on on Apr. 29 
(text from press release 219). 

■ The first round of talks was held at Athens Feb. 

2. Agreement is also expected on the elim- 
ination, reduction and consolidation of other 
United States facilities in Greece. 

3. The privileges, immunities and exemp- 
tions of American personnel in Greece were 
reviewed and satisfactory progress has been 

The installations where United States 
facilities remain will be placed under Greek 
commanders. The scope and conditions of 
operations of remaining facilities will be 
discussed in detail in the third round. 

ANZUS Council Meeting Held 
at Washington 

Following is the text of a communique is- 
sued on April 25 at the conclusion of the 
2ith meeting of the ANZUS Council. 

The ANZUS Council held its twenty-fourth meet- 
ing in Washington on April 24 and 25, 1975. Senator 
the Honorable Donald R. Willesee, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, represented Australia; the Honor- 
able Arthur J. Faulkner, Minister of Labor, repre- 
sented New Zealand; and the Honorable Robert S. 
Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, represented 
the U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger 
also participated in the meeting. 

The Ministers exchanged views on a wide range 
of strategic, political, and economic issues of con- 
cern to the ANZUS partners. They reaffirmed the 
enduring nature of the relationship among the three 
countries, based as it is on a substantial community 
of interests and a shared heritage of representative 
democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law. 
The ANZUS treaty [Australia, New Zealand, United 
States Security Treaty] and the regular consulta- 
tions for which it provides are a natural expression 
of this close relationship. 

The Ministers welcomed the continuing process of 
detente among the major powers, and efforts to 
work toward a more stable and cooperative relation- 
ship among states. They expressed hope that re- 
newed efforts might bring about peace in areas of 
continuing conflict such as Indochina, and more 
peaceful and stable relationships in areas of recent 
or potential conflict such as the Near East. 

The Ministers reviewed the situation in Indo- 
china. The Ministers noted the plight of refugees in 

May 19, 1975 


South Viet-Nani and regretted the continuing loss 
of life and the widespread human misery caused 
by the fighting. They recognized that an early end 
to the fighting, an adherence to the Paris Agree- 
ments, and a spirit of national reconciliation were 
prerequisites to an end to the suff'ering. The Council 
expressed the hope that the wounds of war in Cam- 
bodia would be speedily healed, and noted with 
satisfaction the continued peaceful evolution in Laos. 

The Council welcomed the emergence of a new 
spirit of regional consciousness and self reliance in 
Southeast Asia and the practical measures being 
taken to develop the habit of regional cooperation. 
The Ministers applauded the progress made by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and indi- 
cated the desire of their countries to assist this 

The Ministers agreed that the South East Asia 
Treaty Organization and the Five Power Defense 
Arrangements contributed to the climate of con- 
fidence in the area and provided a useful framework 
for practical cooperation. 

The Council reviewed the world economic situation 
with special attention to its effects within the Asia/ 
Pacific region. They discussed the difficulties caused 
by the present downturn in the world economic 
situation and also the collective international effort 
which has begun to evolve a more soundly-based 
world economic order. The Ministers agreed on the 
importance of close cooperation among themselves 
and with other nations on problems of international 
finance and trade. In particular, they agreed that in 
matters relating to trade in raw materials and 
primary products the interests of both producers 
and consumers should be taken into account. The 
Ministers expressed the hope that oil exporting and 
oil importing countries would seek to reconcile dif- 
ferences between them through dialogue. They 
affirmed the need for continued efforts aimed at 
liberalisation of international trade. The Ministers 
noted the special economic problems faced by the 

less developed countries of Asia and the Pacific and 
agreed on the need for efforts to see that the net 
flow of resources to those countries is not diminished. 

The Council reviewed progress toward arms 
limitations and the limiting of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The Ministers agreed that further 
measures of arms control are a necessary con- 
comitant of the continuing trend toward detente and 
the establishment of a just and stable world order. 
Noting the need for progress toward reduction in 
nuclear weapons, the Council expressed the hope 
that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between 
the United States and the USSR will make further 
progress. The Council supported the continuing 
negotiations to achieve mutual and balanced force 
reductions in Europe as an important stage in the 
effort to bring about the limitation of conventional 
arms. The Ministers noted that a conference of the 
Parties will review the operation of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty, and expressed their hope for a 
strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The 
Council noted the conclusion of a Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty and reaffirmed its support for the early 
achievement of an effective Comprehensive Test Ban 

The Ministers welcomed the continued develop- 
ment of a community of independent and self- 
governing states in the South Pacific, including the 
forthcoming independence of Papua New Guinea. 
They noted with satisfaction the constructive role 
Australia has played in assisting the emergence of 
this new state. 

In conclusion, the ANZUS partners reaffirmed the 
great value each placed on the Alliance. They agreed 
that the continuity symbolized by the ANZUS treaty 
was important in a period of significant change, and 
that the Alliance continued to play an important role 
in the evolution of stability and normal relationships 
among states in the Asia and Pacific area. The three 
partners agreed to continue to consult closely on all 
matters of common concern. 


Department of State Bulletin 


Department Discusses Implementation of Recommendations 
of World Food Conference 

Statement by Thomas 0. Enders 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ^ 

This review of actions to follow up the rec- 
ommendations of the World Food Conference 
seems to me to be especially timely, and I ap- 
preciate the opportunity to appear here 

The World Food Conference succeeded in 
focusing attention on one of mankind's most 
basic and persistent problems — that of hun- 
ger. It laid a basis for the sustained global 
action needed to overcome this problem. In 
the intervening five months, the new institu- 
tional structures called for by the conference 
have begun to take shape. We are now pass- 
ing to the implementation phase. 

Our own program of action rests upon our 
analysis of the world food problem. The 
world's potential agricultural capacity is 
great enough, given present technolog>', to 
support the global population projected for 
the end of this century and beyond. The food 
problem therefore is one of meeting the needs 
of areas with rapidly growing populations 
and existing food deficits, particularly South 
Asia and parts of Africa. Overall, developing 
countries now import about 25 million tons 
of grain annually. This could rise to as much 
as 85 million tons by 1985, an amount which 
exporters, mainly North America, could pro- 

' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign 
Agricultural Policy of the Senate Committee on 
Agriculture and Forestry on May 1. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

vide but which would be virtually impossible 
to transport and finance on a sustained basis. 

This import requirement of developing 
countries is the "food gap." It can be met in 
the short run by increasing production among 
traditional exporters and transferring in- 
creased amounts of food on concessional 
terms. For the longer run the only solution 
is to accelerate production in the food deficit 

A coordinate problem is the shrinking mar- 
gin of safety between annual grain produc- 
tion and the consumption needs of a growing 
population, made acute by the present near- 
exhaustion of world grain reserves. To pro- 
vide a dependable degree of security of sup- 
ply and to avoid the extreme international 
price fluctuations, sharp domestic economic 
adjustments, and foreign political pressures 
of the past three years, it. is desirable to 
establish an internationally coordinated sys- 
tem of national grain reserves. 

Other spokesmen here today are best able 
to discuss the programs of the Agency for 
International Development in food aid, agri- 
cultural development assistance, and nutri- 
tion improvement, and the outlook of the De- 
partment of Agriculture on food production. 
My comments will focus on the institutional 
framework which has developed out of the 
Food Conference and on what I understand 
to be the subcommittee's particular interest 
in actions to improve world food security 
and on trade-related issues considered by the 
Food Conference. 

May 19, 1975 


Institutional Framework 

The Food Conference proposed specific 
new institutional devices in the areas of food 
aid, agricultural development and finance, 
food security, and overall coordination. Ar- 
rangements for each of these are underway. 

The prerequisite to institutional followup 
was acceptance of Food Conference resolu- 
tions by ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and So- 
cial Council] and the General Assembly. This 
was accomplished before adjournment of 
these bodies last December. 

In the area of food aid, the Food Confer- 
ence recommended that the Governing Body 
of the U.N.'s World Food Program be recon- 
stituted as the Committee on Food Aid Pol- 
icies and Programs. This was done in March 
when the former intergovernmental com- 
mittee enlarged and reformed itself to dis- 
charge new responsibilities to review and 
recommend improved coordination between 
bilateral and multilateral food aid programs, 
in addition to continuing to guide operations 
of the World Food Program. 

Work has gone forward under the joint 
auspices of the International Bank for Re- 
construction and Development (IBRD), Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and 
U.N. Development Program (UNDP) on 
formation of a Consultative Group on Food 
Production and Investment to develop means 
for increasing food production in developing 
countries. The Group is to include represen- 
tation from both donors and recipients. Do- 
nors are to be self-selected, with representa- 
tion from recipients distributed regionally. 
The Group will not control distribution of 
development resources but is to address pol- 
icy issues important to optimum benefit from 
agricultural investment, such as development 
objectives and the adequacy of resource 
flows; means for increasing resource trans- 
fers; investment strategies and food produc- 
tion policies. The initial response of both tra- 
ditional donors and potential new donors 
among the oil-exporting countries has been 
positive. The recipient developing countries 
are in the process of selecting their repre- 
sentation, and a first meeting is being planned 
for July. 

Food Conference stafi" analysts concluded 
that agricultural investment in developing 
countries should be increased from about $1.5 
billion currently to $5 billion by 198.5 to meet 
their growing needs. The conference 
grappled at length with the need for new in- 
stitutions to finance this investment and con- 
cluded that new arrangements were justified 
only to the extent that they were required to 
generate additional capital. A resolution call- 
ing for establishment of a new international 
fund for agricultural development was pro- 
posed by a number of OPEC [Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and other 
developing countries and was adopted. How- 
ever, the proposed fund must meet two cri- 
teria established by the conference; there 
must be both the promise of substantial addi- 
tional resources and of continued operation. 
U.N. Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim 
will open a consultation in Geneva next week 
to explore establishing the fund. The United 
States will participate in this consultation 
confident of its unmatched record of financial 
support for agricultural development. The 
United States is receptive to the ideas of 
others and wishes to hear them before con- 
cluding whether a new institution is needed 
and how it should be structured. 

To maintain high-level attention to the 
world food problem and to provide for con- 
tinuing review of all food-related programs 
operated by U.N. agencies, the conference 
called for a World Food Council to meet at 
ministerial level. The United States is a 
member of this Council, which will have its 
inaugural session in late June. As these pro- 
grams multiply and expand their operations, 
the Council's coordinating role will become 
increasingly important. 

World Food Security 

In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly 
last fall, President Ford expressed U.S. will- 
ingness to join in a worldwide eff'ort to nego- 
tiate, establish, and maintain an internation- 
al system of nationally held grain reserves. 

At the World Food Conference in Rome in 
November, Secretary Kissinger proposed ne- 
gotiation of an agreement on a reserves 


Department of State Bulletin 

system to include the following elements: 

— Exchange of information on levels of 
reserve and working stocks, on crop pros- 
pects, and on intentions regarding imports 
or exports. 

— Agreement on the size of global re- 
serves required to protect against famine 
and extreme price fluctuations. 

— Sharing of the responsibility for hold- 
ing reserves. 

— Guidelines on the management of na- 
tional reserves, defining the conditions for 
adding to reserves and for releasing from 

— Preference for cooperating countries in 
the distribution of reserves. 

— Procedures for adjustment of targets 
and settlement of disputes and measures for 
dealing with noncompliance. 

The World Food Conference adopted a res- 
olution on food security, in accordance with 
which the United States convened an ad hoc 
meeting of 10 other governments in Lon- 
don in February to explore the elements of 
a possible reserves agreement. While no for- 
mal consensus was reached, the discussion 
concerned the following: commodity cover- 
age; size of total reserve; criteria for distri- 
bution of stockholding responsibility among 
participants; rights and obligations of par- 

It is natural that the United States should 
take the initiative in discussing a grain re- 
serves agreement. Our role in the world food 
economy is predominant. Since 1972, the 
United States has provided about 40 percent 
of world exports of food grains and about 60 
percent of feed grains and oilseeds. 

Having assumed this leadership role, we 
believe it essential to exercise it responsibly, 
both in support of our own interests and 
those of others. This does not mean subordi- 
nating our farm policy to our foreign policy; 
it means using it constructively in our deal- 
ings with other countries. 

A reserves agreement, we believe, offers 
an opportunity to do just this. We share a 
general interest in preventing world food 
shortages and famine. The establishment of 
adequate grain reserves can play an impor- 

tant role by assuring supplies of grain to off- 
set production shortfalls. Other pi'ograms 
apart from reserves are being developed to 
assist countries to increase the general level 
of their production, to improve the means of 
food distribution and financing, and to pro- 
vide food aid where needed. These are not, 
however, among the purposes of reserves. A 
reserves agreement should, in our view, aim 
only at assuring the availability of supply. 
We believe that a reserves agreement 
would serve our own interests. 

First, it would spread the responsibility 
for holding stocks among all participants. 

Second, rules or guidelines providing for 
the accumulation of stocks would help to 
remove excess supplies from the market in 
those years when production exceeds normal 
requirements, thereby preventing uneconom- 
ic price drops. 

Third, rules for the drawdown of reserves 
would reduce the threat of stocks being 
dumped on the market. This is a point of 
particular interest to U.S. producers, who 
have been concerned that the existence in 
the past of large government-held stocks not 
subject to such rules has depressed market 
prices. Whatever its validity in the past, this 
objection can be substantially overcome by 
making the release of reserves subject to 
internationally as well as nationally accepted 
rules which would clearly define the condi- 
tions which require additional supplies of 
grain. Taken together, these rules for the 
accumulation and release of stocks would 
work to moderate extreme fluctuations in 
prices, which in general benefit neither pro- 
ducers nor consumers, but need not interfere 
with normal market operations. 

Fourth, by encouraging all major con- 
sumers to hold reserves, the agreement 
should work to avoid situations like 1972, 
when the U.S.S.R. preempted a major share 
of our grain crop at bargain prices, thereby 
shifting the burden of adjustment to their 
shortfall from the Soviet Union to the 
United States. 

Finally, the establishment of a system of 
reserves subject to known rules governing 
their release would represent an important 

May 19, 1975 


assurance to importers of the reliability of 
the United States as a supplier of the grains 
they need and would reduce the threat of 
the abrupt imposition of export controls on 
these products. 

These are the benefits which we believe 
an effective reserves system could offer to 
U.S. producers and consumers. Others may 
not fully agree, but major differences seem 
to concern not the benefits themselves but 
instead how these promises would be most 
effectively fulfilled and at what cost. 

Subsequent to the ad hoc meeting of last 
February, work on technical aspects of a 
possible reserves agreement — such as de- 
velopment of quantitative, rather than price, 
indicators for signaling acquisition and re- 
lease of stocks — began under the auspices of 
the International Wheat Council in a special 
preparatory group established to explore 
possible bases for a successor to the present 
International Wheat Agreement. The group 
is to report its progress to the next I'egular 
session of the Wheat Council in late June. 

One important problem that has yet to be 
solved is the relationship of grain reserves 
negotiations to the Tokyo round of trade 
negotiations. Clearly there are major com- 
mercial implications in a reserves negotia- 
tion. Clearly also, the problem of food 
security transcends the commercial sector 
only. We are seeking now agreement with 
the other main grain producing and consum- 
ing countries on a formula permitting urgent 
negotiation of a reserves agreement but al- 
lowing the commercial aspects of grains to 
be fully taken into account in the Tokyo 

Meanwhile, the U.N.'s Food and Agricul- 
ture Organization has completed and re- 
ferred to member governments for their 
acceptance the International Undertaking 
on World Food Security, endorsed by the 
Food Conference. The undertaking outlines 
a set of nonbinding principles to guide na- 
tional stock policies as a basis for interna- 
tional cooi'dination. FAO members were 

requested by the organization's Director 
General to notify him of their acceptance of 
the undertaking well before the meeting of 
the FAO Committee on World Food Security, 
whose establishment was recommended by 
the Food Conference. The United States in- 
formed the Director General of its accept- 
ance of the undertaking last March. 

The FAO has convened a special consulta- 
tion on world food security for later this 
month, pending creation of the standing 
committee by the FAO Council when it meets 
this fall. We believe that FAO could usefully 
contribute to improving information about 
world supply, demand, and stock situation 
for major food grains through such a com- 

Trade-Related Issues 

The World Food Conference adopted an 
elaborate resolution on trade, stabilization, 
and agricultural adjustment. It reflects both 
the concepts of preferential treatment and 
resource transfers via trade that developing 
countries put forward in advocating a new 
economic order, and of market liberalization 
included in the Tokyo Declaration that is the 
backdrop to the present multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTN). The conflicting ob- 
jectives and issues are being joined in the 
framework of the MTN. 

Meanwhile, work is going forward on par- 
ticular elements of the resolution on trade. 
The Trade Act of 1974 has provided a basis 
for the United States to join with 18 other 
developed countries in extending a gener- 
alized system of preferences to developing 
countries. So far, 89 developing countries 
and 43 dependent territories have been desig- 
nated for beneficial status under the act, with 
24 other developing countries under con- 
sideration. Meanwhile, the U.S. Interna- 
tional Trade Commission is pi'oceeding with 
its study of the impact on U.S. producers 
and consumers of extending preferences to 
a list of products recommended by an inter- 
agency task force, as required by the act. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Other specific action has been taken by the 
FAO in response to this resolution. FAO is 
convening shortly a conference to discuss 
international agricultural adjustment in 
light of discussions at the Food Conference. 

Mr. Chairman, the world has passed 
through three years of food shortages and 
food insecurity; this year, in considerable 
part thanks to freeing the productive capac- 
ity of the American farmer, we expect to 
have a better balance in food supplies. We 
must not allow this improvement to lull us 
into thinking the world food problem is 
solved. It is not. Rather we must use the 
improving market situation to rebuild a 
world food reserve on an agreed rational 
basis and to lay the basis for a long-term 
attack on what remains one of the great 
threats to the future of humanity. 

Department Supports Legislation 
on National Emergency Authorities 

Statement by Mark B. Feldman 
Deputy Legal Adviser ^ 

The Department of State appreciates the 
opportunity to testify on H.R. 3884, a bill "to 
terminate certain authorities with respect 
to national emergencies still in effect, and to 
provide for orderly implementation and 
termination of future national emergencies." 
This bill is very much the same as S. 3957 
passed by the Senate last session. 

The Department of State believes that it 
is appropriate to reexamine the national 
emergency authorities at this time, to repeal 
obsolete authorities, and to set criteria for 
national emergencies which may be declared 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Administrative 
Law and Governmental Relations of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary on Apr. 9. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

in the future. H.R. 3884 does this and at the 
same time preserves major emergency 
authorities that are- essential to the conduct 
of foreign relations. The Department wishes 
to speak particularly in support of section 
602 of H.R. 3884, which preserves essential 

The Department of State is primarily con- 
cerned with section 5(b) of the Trading 
With the Enemy Act, which provides the 
basic legal authority for a number of pro- 
grams of major foreign policy importance. 
These include: 

Foreign Assets Control Regulations 
Cuban Asset Control Regulations 
Foreign Funds Control Regulations 

Under these programs, transactions are 
prohibited which involve persons or property 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and which take 
place with Cuba, North Viet-Nam, North 
Korea, and designated nationals of those 
countries, unless specifically or generally 
licensed. In addition, property in which those 
countries or their nationals have an interest 
has been blocked and is under U.S. Govern- 
ment control. We also are holding assets of 
the People's Republic of China blocked be- 
fore May 1971 and assets of certain Eastern 
European countries. While the amounts of 
the blocked assets vary, in some cases it is 
substantial; for example, possibly in excess 
of $80 million in the case of the People's 
Republic of China. 

Mr. Chairman, an interruption of these 
programs would seriously prejudice the 
foreign relations interests of the United 
States and the interests of thousands of 
American nationals with outstanding claims 
against Cuba and the People's Republic of 
China. One effect of such interruption would 
be to release the blocked assets. Another 
would be to authorize transactions now pro- 
hibited without regard for the state of U.S. 
relations with countries concerned or the 
underlying U.S. interests served by these 
programs. Thus, for example, Cuban imports 
could come into the United States without 

May 19, 1975 


regard to other economic issues, and the 
relaxation of transaction controls with re- 
spect to North Viet-Nam would be without 
regard to any context of improved bilateral 
relations. As a result it would become very 
difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate satis- 
factory claim settlements, or to realize other 
U.S. objectives. 

The Department wishes to stress that 
these are merely the current programs under 
section 5(b) of the Trading With the 
Enemy Act and the 1950 proclamation of 
national emergency. This authority has been 
utilized in the past for programs which have 
served their purposes and been terminated, 
and it may be necessary again. The present 
international situation has the potential for 
serious difficulties in international fiscal and 
economic matters, particularly in the energy 
area, which may call for measures requiring 
recourse to this authority. Therefore the 
Department believes it is essential that sec- 
tion 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy 
Act be specifically exempted as section 602 
now provides. 

The Department has not opposed, and does 
not oppose, the replacement of section 5(b) 
by other permanent legislation. We do be- 
lieve, however, that there are a number of 
serious legal and policy questions in connec- 
tion with any such legislation that will re- 
quire protracted congressional consideration, 
and we are convinced that it would be highly 
imprudent to cast away the authority of 
section 5(b) without any assurance of such 
a replacement. 

Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like 
to make a comment on another authority 
which is of concern to the Department of 
State. Section 215 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, and the existing proclama- 
tion of emergency, are the only current 
authority for requiring American citizens to 
have a valid passport for leaving and enter- 
ing the United States. I am advised that in 
the absence of this authority the Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization Service would have 
a substantial additional administrative bur- 

den of screening persons who claim to be 
American citizens but have no passport. 

We would ask the committee to consider 
whether this additional authority, section 
215 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act, should not also be exempted for the 
reasons that I have given. 

To sum up, the Department of State be- 
lieves that H.R. 3884 preserves essential 
emergency authorities and eliminates obso- 
lete ones, so the Department has no objection 
to its enactment. 

International Economic Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford ^ 

To the Congress of the United States: 

America must adjust to turbulent global 
economic events. The world has moved from 
a period of slow economic growth in 1971 
through a two-year expansionary boom to a 
sudden and pervasive recession. Recent 
events have caused the United States, as well 
as other countries, to reappraise internation- 
al economic policies. 

This, the third annual International Eco- 
nomic Report, describes the very difficult sit- 
uation confronting us. It also reflects the 
progress made toward achieving our goal of 
an open world economy to serve the inter- 
dependent needs of all countries. 

In 1974, most of the world's economies 
were beset by problems flowing from the un- 
precedented combination of recession and 
inflation. Additional pressures, including pre- 
cipitous increases in energy costs and disap- 
pointing food harvests further strained the 

' Transmitted on Mar. 20. The President's mes- 
sage, together with the Annual Report of the Council 
on International Economic Policy, is printed in "In- 
ternational Economic Report of the President, 
Transmitted to the Congress March 1975"; for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (166 
pp., $3.60; stock no. 4115-00072). 


Department of State Bulletin 

world economy, particularly in the areas of 
trade and monetary flows and adjustments. 
Moreover, these factors contributed to the 
trend towards increasing economic national- 
ism which could frustrate our desire for an 
open world economy. 

In recent years, many governments have 
elected more direct involvement in economic 
activities, notably through restrictive sup- 
ply and pricing practices and, sometimes, by 
the expropriation of foreign investment. 
When governments manipulate international 
markets to maximize short-term benefits, 
they often do so at the expense of others and, 
ultimately, of themselves. Improved living 
standards and a more peaceful world are the 
rewards of an open world economy based on 
international cooperation. Such rewards are 
too great to allow short-sighted distractions 
to alter our course. 

Building effective economic institutions 
and policies in today's economic environment 
is more difficult, but also more necessaiy, 
than ever. Unless we act constructively, en- 
ergy and food problems, growing economic 
nationalism, the possibility of increased pro- 
tection for trade, and the prospects of world 
recession and unemployment will jeopardize 
the world cooperation developed after World 
War II. 

The United States does not and cannot 
govern the world economy. But it should ful- 
fill its responsibility as an economic leader 
among nations. The Administration recog- 
nizes this responsibility. We have taken steps 
to turn the difficult food, energy, trade and 
investment issues into positive opportunities 
for achieving cooperation with trading part- 
ners and coordination between the Nation's 
domestic and international economic policies. 
Specifically, the Trade Act of 1974 — which 
exemplified constructive cooperation between 
the Executive and Legislative Branches — 
reflects the U.S. commitment to an open and 
equitable world trading system. 

The World Food Conference, proposed by 
the United States, set in motion international 
activities to improve world food reserves. 

agricultural assistance, crop information 
systems and increased food production. At 
the time I signed the Foreign Investment 
Study Act of 1974 which authorized the col- 
lection and analysis of data on foreign in- 
vestment in the United States, I reaffirmed 
American support for the operation of free 
market forces to direct worldwide invest- 
ment flows in the most productive way. 
Therefore, we will oppose any new restric- 
tion on foreign investment in the United 
States except where absolutely necessary on 
national security grounds or to protect an 
essential national interest. 

The goal of normalization of economic re- 
lations with the Communist countries has 
been reaffirmed. America also has continued 
its commitment to help the less developed 
countries. Moreover, we have proposed that 
an International Monetary Fund trust be 
established to provide special assistance to 
the least developed countries. We will 
shortly implement a generalized system of 
preferences in trading with less developed 
countries. We are also continuing our coop- 
erative efl'orts to achieve equitable treatment 
for U.S. investment abroad. 

Recently, I sent to the Congress a compre- 
hensive energy and economic program. It is 
designed to reduce our dependence on im- 
ported oil. The plan provides incentives to 
increase domestic energy production and 
conserve energy use. The United States is 
meanwhile developing joint policies with 
other major oil-consuming countries aiming 
at increased resource development and more 
efficient use of energy. The major consuming 
countries must act jointly to build a con- 
structive relationship with the oil producing 
nations. Such actions are essential to restore 
the international confidence in adequate and 
reliable energy sources. 

These interrelated economic activities are 
aimed at achieving an improved interna- 
tional economic system. They are part of a 
balanced policy. They also accentuate the 
positive initiatives being taken to cope with 
the specialized problems of food, assistance 

May 19, 1975 


to less developed countries and East-West 
economic relations. 

The United States firmly believes that our 
own problems, and those of the rest of the 
world, can be dealt with most effectively 
through international cooperation. We lead 
in the pursuit of peace. Therefore, our 
motivating principles, our standards of con- 
duct and the guidelines we set for the con- 
duct of international economic development 
are ever more crucial to our national well- 
being, and that of the world. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, March 20, 1975. 

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol 
Extending Coffee Agreement 

Message From President Ford ^ 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice 
and consent of the Senate to acceptance, the 
Protocol for the Continuation in Force of 
the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, 
as Extended. This Protocol, which was 
adopted by the International Coffee Council 
in its Resolution Number 273 of September 
26, 1974, contains no operative economic 
provisions, but preserves the structure of 
the International Coffee Organization 
through September 30, 1976, or up to 12 
months beyond that date if the conclusion 
of a new Coffee Agreement has progressed 
to the degree specified in the Protocol. With- 
out this Protocol, the Coffee Organization 
would expire on September 30, 1975. The 
United States signed the Protocol at the 
United Nations Headquarters on January 15, 

The purpose of this extension is to con- 
tinue the International Coffee Organization 
as a source of statistical information and 
technical studies on developments in world 

' Transmitted on Apr. 16 (text from White House 
press release) ; also printed as S. Ex. B., 94th Cong., 
1st sess., which includes the texts of the protocol 
and the report of the Department of State. 

coffee markets and as a forum for discussion 
and eventual negotiation of a new coffee 
agreement whenever producing and consum- 
ing countries determine such action would 
best serve their common interests. This 
Protocol will preserve twelve years of insti- 
tutional cooperation between seventeen 
major consuming countries (of which the 
U.S. is the largest) and forty-two producing 
nations of the developing world who rely on 
coffee exports for a significant portion of 
their foreign exchange earnings. In 1973, 
for example, coffee exports from ten major 
Latin American producers earned over $2.5 
billion and six Latin American countries 
obtained more than 20 percent of their 
foreign exchange from coffee. In that same 
yeai-, the United States imported 37.3 per- 
cent of all coffee in world trade and 39.1 
percent of Latin American coffee exports. 

I believe that continued United States par- 
ticipation in the Coffee Agreement will serve 
both our foreign policy and our consumer 
interests. It will reaffirm our commitment to 
cooperate with the developing countries on 
this matter of vital interest to them. As the 
largest consuming nation, it will guarantee 
us a substantial voice in discussions and 
negotiations for a new coffee agreement. 
Preliminary work for such negotiations 
started in early January 1975. I am hopeful 
that the constructive spirit which has char- 
acterized the International Coffee Organiza- 
tion in the past will enable producing and 
consuming countries to again harmonize 
their interests in a mutually beneficial 

I am also transmitting, for the information 
of the Senate, the report submitted to me by 
the Department of State explaining the pro- 
visions of the Protocol extending the Inter- 
national Coffee Agreement of 1968, as Ex- 
tended, and providing background on the 
current state of the world coffee economy. 

I, therefore, recommend that the Senate 
give early and favorable consideration to 
this Protocol and give its advice and consent 
to acceptance. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 16, 1975. 


Department of State Bulletin 


United States and Romania Sign Agreement 
on Trade Relations 

The United States and the Socialist Re- 
public of Romania signed a trade agreement 
on April 2. Follotving is a Department an- 
nouncement issued April 3 and the texts of 
the agreement and annexes, together with 
the texts, dated April 2U, of a letter from 
President Ford to the Speaker of the House 
and the President of the Senate, a proclama- 
tion, a message from President Ford to the 
Congress, and an Executive order. 


Press release 182 dated April 3 

The United States and the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Romania signed a trade agreement on 
April 2 at Bucharest. The agreement was 
signed on behalf of the United States by Am- 
bassador to Romania Harry G. Barnes, Jr., 
and on behalf of Romania by Ion Patan, 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of For- 
eign Trade. It is the first such agreement to 
be negotiated under the provisions of the 
Trade Act of 1974. In accordance with the 
provisions required under that act, it in- 
cludes most-favored-nation (MFN) treat- 
ment for Romanian goods exported to the 
United States. 

Negotiations leading up to the agreement 
began on January 14, 1975, in Bucharest. 
The agreement is designed to give further 
impetus to improved U.S. -Romanian political 
and economic relations. It will foster addi- 
tional American exports to the growing 
markets of Romania and will remove the 
non-MFN discriminatory treatment of Ro- 
manian products in the U.S. market. MFN 
for Romania is a goal which the Administra- 
tion has pursued for several years and rep- 

resents a key to full normalization of U.S.- 
Romanian economic relations. 

This agreement will now be submitted to 
both Houses of Congress for approval. 


Text of Agreement 

Agreement on Trade Relations Between the 
United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania 

The Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of 

Conscious of the long-standing friendship between 
their countries and the American and Romanian 

Desiring to develop their relations on the basis of 
the principles set forth in the Joint Statement of 
the Presidents of the two States at Washington on 
December 5, 197.3, and reaffirming the continuing 
importance of the Joint Statement on Economic, In- 
dustrial and Technological Cooperation issued at 
Washington on December 5, 1973; 

Having agreed that commercial and economic ties 
are an important element in the general strengthen- 
ing of their bilateral relations; 

Believing that an agreement embodying under- 
takings and arrangements for the conduct of trade 
between their countries will serve the interests of 
both peoples; 

Acknowledging that favorable conditions exist for 
the further expansion of trade between their 

Recognizing that it is to their mutual advantage 
to continue to develop their commercial relations, 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

Most Favored Nation Treatment 

1. Both Parties reaffirm the importance of their 

participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs 

and Trade and the importance of the provisions and 

May 19, 1975 


principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade for their respective economic policies. Ac- 
cordingly, the Parties shall apply between them- 
selves the provisions of the General Agreement, the 
Protocol for the Accession of Romania of October 
15, 1971 to that Agreement, and Annexes to that 
Protocol including Annex B. 

2. As provided in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, the Parties agree to grant each 
other's products most-favored-nation treatment im- 
mediately and unconditionally with respect to cus- 
toms duties and charges of any kind imposed on or 
in connection with importation or exportation, and 
with respect to the method of levying such duties 
and charges, and with respect to all rules and 
formalities in connection with importation and ex- 
portation, and as otherwise provided in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, provided that to 
the extent that this or any other provision of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is incon- 
sistent vnth any subsequent provision of this Agree- 
ment, the latter shall apply. 

3. The Parties agree to maintain a satisfactory 
balance of concessions in trade and services during 
the period of this Agreement, and in particular to 
reciprocate satisfactorily reductions by the other 
Party in tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade that 
result from multilateral negotiations. In this respect, 
it is noted that Romania, as a developing country, 
could be eligible for treatment accorded to develop- 
ing countries. 

Article II 
Expansion of Trade 

1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures, 
in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, 
to encourage and facilitate the exchange of goods 
and services between the two countries on the basis 
of mutual advantage in accordance wath the pro- 
visions of this Agreement. In expectation of such 
joint efforts, both Governments envision that total 
bilateral trade in comparison with the period 1972- 
1974 will at least triple over the initial three-year 
period of this Agreement. In this respect, the Gov- 
ernment of the Socialist Republic of Romania ex- 
pects that during the period of this Agreement 
Romanian firms, companies and economic organiza- 
tions will place substantial orders in the United 
States of America for machinery and equipment, 
agricultural and industrial materials, and consumer 
goods produced in the United States of America, 
while the Government of the United States antici- 
pates that the effect of this Agreement will be to 
encourage increasing purchases by firms, companies, 
economic organizations and consumers in the United 
States of such products from the Socialist Republic 
of Romania. 

2. Commercial transactions will be effected on the 
basis of contracts to be concluded between firms, 

companies and economic organizations of the United 
States of America and those of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania, and in accordance with applicable laws 
and regulations. Such contracts will generally be 
concluded on terms customary in international com- 
mercial practice. 

Article III 

1. The Parties agree to consult promptly at the 
request of either Party should it determine that 
actual or prospective imports of products originating 
in the territory of the other Party are causing or 
threaten to cause, or are significantly contributing 
to, market disruption within a domestic industry of 
the requesting Party. 

2. Either Party may impose such restrictions as 
it deems appropriate on imports originating in the 
territory of the other Party to prevent or remedy 
such actual or threatened market disruption. 

3. The procedures under which the Parties will 
cooperate in applying this Article are set forth in 
Annex 1. 

Article IV 
Business Facilitation 

1. In accordance with applicable laws and regula- 
tions, firms, companies and economic organizations 
of one Party may open, establish and operate repre- 
sentations (as these terms are defined in Annex 3) 
in the territory of the other Party. Information 
concerning rules and regulations pertaining to such 
representations and related facilities shall be pro- 
vided by each Party upon the request of the other. 

2. Nationals, firms, companies and economic 
organizations of either Party shall be afforded ac- 
cess to all courts and, when applicable, to administra- 
tive bodies as plaintiffs or defendants, or otherwise, 
in accordance with the laws in force in the territory 
of such other Party. They shall not claim or enjoy 
immunities from suit or execution of judgment or 
other liability in the territory of the other Party 
with respect to commercial or financial transactions; 
they also shall not claim or enjoy immunities from 
taxation with respect to commercial or financial 
transactions, except as may be provided in other 
bilateral agreements. 

3. Firms, companies and economic organizations 
of one of the Parties shall be permitted to engage 
in the territory of the other Party in any com- 
mercial activity which is not contrary to the laws 
of such other Party. 

4. Firms, companies and economic organizations 
of either Party that desire to establish representa- 
tions or already operate representations in the 
territory of the other Party shall receive treatment 
no less favorable than that accorded to firms, com- 
panies and economic organizations of any third 
country in all matters relating thereto. The rights 


Department of State Bulletin 

and facilities set out in Annex 2 shall be among 
those that will be accorded such firms, companies 
and economic organizations which establish repre- 

5. For the purpose of carrying on trade between 
the territories of the two Parties and engaging in 
related commercial activities, nationals of each 
Party and employees of its firms, companies and 
economic organizations and their families shall be 
permitted to enter, to reside and to obtain appro- 
priate housing in the territory of the other Party, 
and to travel therein freely, in accordance with the 
laws relating to entry, stay and travel of aliens. 

6. The Parties affirm that no restrictions shall 
exist in principle on contacts between representa- 
tives of American and Romanian firms, companies 
and economic organizations. To this end, representa- 
tives of firms, companies and economic organizations 
of either Party shall be permitted within the terri- 
tory of the other Party to deal directly with buyers 
and users of their products, for purposes of sales 
promotion and servicing their products, in accord- 
ance with the procedures and regulations applicable 
in each country. 

7. The Parties shall as appropriate permit and 
facilitate access within their territories by repre- 
sentatives of firms, companies and economic orga- 
nizations of the other Party to information concern- 
ing markets for goods and services in accordance 
with the procedures and regulations applicable in 
each country. 

8. Firms, companies and economic organizations 
of either Party shall be permitted in accordance 
with procedures and regulations applicable within 
the territory of the other Party to advertise, con- 
clude contracts, and provide technical services to the 
same extent that firms, companies and economic 
organizations of the latter Party may do so. Duty- 
free treatment will be accorded to samples without 
commercial value and advertising materials, as 
provided in the Geneva Convention of November 
7, 1952, relating to the importation of commercial 
samples and advertising material. 

9. Each Party agrees to provide its good offices 
to assist in the solution of business facilitation 
problems and in gaining access to appropriate gov- 
ernment officials in each country. 

10. Each Party agrees to encourage the develop- 
ment on its territory of appropriate services and 
facilities and adequate access thereto and also to 
promote the activities of firms, companies and 
economic organizations of the other Party, which 
do not have representations, and their employees 
and representatives. 

11. Each Party agrees to facilitate in its territory, 
to the fullest extent practicable, the activities of 
firms, companies and economic organizations of the 
other Party acting through employees, technicians, 

experts, specialists and other representatives in 
carrying out contracts concluded between the firms, 
companies and economic organizations of the two 

12. Each Party undertakes to facilitate travel by 
tourists and other visitors and the distribution of 
information for tourists. 

13. The Parties confirm their commitment, as ex- 
pressed in the Joint Statement on Economic, Indus- 
trial, and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 
1973, to facilitate participation of their nationals, 
firms, companies and economic organizations in 
fairs and exhibitions organized in the other country. 
Each Party further undertakes to encourage and 
facilitate participation by nationals, firms, com- 
panies and economic organizations of the other 
country in trade fairs and exhibits in its territory, 
as well as to facilitate trade missions organized in 
the other country and sent by mutual agreement of 
the Parties. Subject to the laws in force within 
their territories, the Parties agree to allow the 
import and re-export on a duty-free basis of all 
articles for use by firms, companies and economic 
organizations of the other Party in fairs and ex- 
hibitions, providing that such articles are not 

Article V 

Industrial Property, hidustrial Rights and 

Processes, and Copyrights 

1. Each Party shall continue to provide nationals, 
firms, companies and economic organizations of the 
other Party with the rights with respect to industrial 
property provided in the Convention of Paris for 
the Protection of Industrial Property (as revised at 
Stockholm on July 14, 1967). 

2. With respect to industrial rights and processes 
other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 
of this Article, each Party shall provide the same 
legal protection to nationals, firms, companies and 
economic organizations of the other Party that is 
provided within its territory to its own nationals, 
firms, companies and economic organizations. 

3. Each Party agrees to provide nationals, firms, 
companies and economic organizations of the other 
Party the rights with respect to copyrights set 
forth in the Universal Copyright Convention as re- 
vised at Paris on July 24, 1971. 

Article VI 
Financial Provisions 

1. Nationals, firms, companies and economic 
organizations of each Party shall be accorded by the 
other Party most-favored-nation treatment with 
respect to payments, remittances and transfers of 
funds or financial instruments between the terri- 
tories of the two Parties, as well as between the 
territory of such other Party and that of any third 

May 19, 1975 


country. For this purpose, the Parties agree to grant 
those authorizations which are necessary. 

2. Financial transactions between nationals, firms, 
companies and economic organizations of the 
United States of America and those of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania shall be made according to 
applicable laws and regulations. All financial trans- 
actions shall be made in United States dollars or 
any other freely convertible currency mutually 
agreed upon by such nationals, firms, companies and 
economic organizations, unless they otherwise agree. 
However, expenditures in the territory of a Party 
by nationals, firms, companies and economic orga- 
nizations of the other Party may be made in local 
currency received in an authorized manner in ac- 
cordance with the regulations applicable to such 
expenditures. No restrictions shall be placed by 
either Party upon the export from its territory of 
freely convertible currencies or deposits, or instru- 
ments representative thereof, by the nationals, firms, 
companies, economic organizations or government 
of the other Party, provided such currencies, de- 
posits, or instruments were received in an authorized 
manner. If either Party maintains more than one 
rate of exchange, it shall accord to nationals, firms, 
companies and economic organizations of the other 
Party treatment no less favorable in matters relat- 
ing to rates of exchange than it accords to na- 
tionals, firms, companies and economic organizations 
of any third country. 

3. Nationals, firms, companies and economic or- 
ganizations of each Party shall be accorded most- 
favored-nation treatment by the other Party with 
respect to the opening and maintaining of accounts 
in local and any convertible currency in financial 
institutions and with respect to use of such cur- 

Article VII 

1. Vessels under the flag of either Party, and 
carrying the documents required by its law in proof 
of nationality, shall be deemed to be vessels of that 
Party both on the high seas and within the ports, 
places, and waters of the other Party. 

2. The documents of a vessel, as well as the docu- 
ments referring to crews, issued according to the 
laws and regulations of the Party under whose flag 
the vessel is navigating, will be recognized by the 
authorities of the other party. 

3. Vessels of either Party (other than warships, 
as defined in the Geneva Convention on the high 
seas of April 29, 1958) shall have liberty on equal 
terms with vessels of any third country, to come 
with their cargoes to ports, places, and waters of 
the other Party open to foreign commerce and 
navigation, except insofar as requirements of na- 
tional security limit such access; such vessels and 
cargoes shall then in all respects be accorded most- 
favored-nation treatment within the ports, places 

and waters of the other Party except insofar as 
modified by port security requirements. 

4. The provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article 
shall not apply to fishing vessels, fishery research 
vessels, or fishery support vessels. The Parties re- 
affirm the importance of their Agreement Regarding 
Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle At- 
lantic Ocean, concluded at Washington on December 
3, 1973, which shall continue to apply in accordance 
with its terms. 

Article VIII 
Disputes Settlement 

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment, as ex- 
pressed in the Joint Statement on Economic, Indus- 
trial, and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 
1973, to prompt and equitable settlement on an 
amicable basis of commercial disputes which may 

2. The Parties encourage the adoption of arbitra- 
tion for the settlement of disputes arising out of 
international commercial transactions concluded be- 
tween firms, companies and economic organizations 
of the United States of America and those of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. Such arbitration 
should be provided for by provisions in contracts 
between such firms, companies and economic or- 
ganizations, or in separate agreements between them 
in writing executed in the form required for such 
contracts. Such agreements (a) should provide for 
arbitration under the rules of arbitration of the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris; and 
(b) should specify as the place of arbitration a 
place in a country other than the United States of 
America or the Socialist Republic of Romania that 
is a party to the Convention for the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of New 
York on June 10, 1958; however, firms, companies 
and economic organizations party to a contract may 
agree upon any other form or place of arbitration. 

Article IX 
Governmental Commercial Offices 

1. In order to promote the development of trade 
and economic relations between the Parties, and to 
provide assistance to their firms, companies and 
economic organizations, and to nationals who are 
engaged in commercial activities, each Party agrees 
to permit and facilitate the establishment and opera- 
tion of governmental commercial offices of the other 
Party on a reciprocal basis. The establishment and 
operation of such offices shall be in accordance with 
applicable laws and regulations, and subject to such 
terms, conditions, privileges, and immunities as may 
be agreed upon by the Parties. The Parties agree 
that access, for commercial purposes, to such offices 
by nationals of either Party who are engaged in 
commercial activities will be unrestricted. 

2. Governmental commercial offices, and their 


Department of State Bulletin 

respective officers and staff members, to the extent 
that they enjoy diplomatic immunity, shall not 
participate directly in the negotiation, execution, or 
fulfillment of trade transactions or otherwise carry 
on trade. 

Article X 

National Security 

The provisions of this agreement shall not limit 
the right of either Party to take any action for the 
protection of its security interests. 

Article XI 
Review of Operation of Agreement 

The joint American-Romanian Economic Commis- 
sion, established in accordance with the Joint State- 
ment on Economic, Industrial and Technological 
Cooperation of December 5, 1973, shall review the 
operation of this Agreement and as necessary pre- 
pare recommendations which shall be presented to 
the Governments of both countries for the further 
improvement of trade relations between the two 

Article XII 
Dtiration and Entry Into Force 

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the 
date of exchange of written notices of acceptance 
by the two Governments, and shall remain in force 
as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article. 

2. (a) The initial term of this Agreement shall 
be three years, subject to subparagraph (c) of this 

(b) If either Party encounters or foresees a 
problem with respect to the application of this 
Agreement, including a problem concerning its 
domestic legal authority to carry out any of its 
obligations under this Agreement, such Party shall 
request immediate consultations with the other 
Party. Once consultations have been requested, the 
other Party shall enter into such consultations as 
soon as possible concerning the circumstances that 
have arisen, with a view to finding a solution which 
would make action under subparagraph (c) unneces- 

(c) If either Party is unable to carry out any 
of its obligations under this Agreement either Party 
may suspend or terminate the applicability of this 
Agreement or, with the agreement of the other 
Party, any part of this Agreement. If either Party 
takes action under this subparagraph, that Party 
will, to the fullest extent practicable and consistent 
with domestic law, seek to minimize disruption to 
existing trade relations between the two countries. 

(d) This Agreement shall be extended for 
successive periods of three years each unless either 
Party has notified, in writing, the other Party of 
the termination of this Agreement at least 30 days 
prior to its expiration. 

3. Annexes 1, 2 and 3 shall constitute an integral 
part of this Agreement. 

In Witness Whereof, the authorized representa- 
tives of the Parties have signed this Agreement. 

Done in two original copies at Bucharest this 
second day of April 1975, in English and Romanian, 
both texts being equally authentic. 

For the United States of America 

Harry G. Barnes, Jr. 
For the Socialist Republic of Romania 

Ion Patan. 

Texts of Annexes 


Procedures for the Implementation of 
Article III 

1. (a) The consultations provided for under 
Article III shall have the objectives of presenting 
and examining together the factors relating to those 
imports that may be causing or threatening to cause 
or significantly contributing to market disruption, 
and finding means of preventing or remedying such 
market disruption. Such consultations shall provide 
for a review of the production, market, and trade 
situation of the product involved (and may include 
such factors as trends in domestic production, profits 
of firms within the industry, the employment situa- 
tion, sales, inventories, rates of increase of imports, 
market share, level of imports, sources of supply, 
the situation of the exporter and any other aspect 
which may contribute to the examination of the 

Both Parties in carrying out these consultations 
shall take due account of any contracts between 
firms, companies and economic organizations of the 
United States of America and the Socialist Republic 
of Romania concluded prior to the request for 

Such consultations shall be concluded within 
ninety days of the request, unless otherwise agreed 
during the course of such consultations. 

(b) Unless a different solution is agreed upon 
during the consultations, the quantitative import 
limitations or other restrictions stated by the im- 
porting Party to be necessary to prevent or remedy 
the market disruption in question shall be imple- 

(c) At the request of the importing Party, if 
it determines that an emergency situation exists, 
the limitations or other restrictions referred to in 
its request for consultations shall be put into effect 
prior to the conclusion of such consultations. 

(d) The rights of the exporting Party referred 
to in paragraph 4(D) of the Protocol for the acces- 
sion of Romania to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade of October 15, 1971 shall apply in 
the event that action contemplated in this Annex Is 

May 19, 1975 


2. (a) In accordance with applicable laws and 
regulations, each Party shall take appropriate 
measures to ensure that exports from its country 
of the products concerned do not exceed the quanti- 
ties or vary from the restrictions established for 
imports of such products into the other country 
pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex. 

(b) Each Party may take appropriate measures 
with respect to imports into its country to ensure 
that imports of products originating in the other 
country comply with such quantitative limitations 
or other restrictions. 

Business Facilitation 
I. The firms, companies and economic organiza- 
tions of one Party, in connection with the establish- 
ment and operation of their representations in the 
territory of the other Party, as well as the employees 
of such representations, shall enjoy rights and 
facilities as provided below. 

1. Applications to establish representations and 
to obtain any necessary authorization shall be proc- 
essed and acted upon expeditiously in accordance 
with procedures and standards no less favorable than 
those accorded to the firms, companies and economic 
organizations of any third countries. 

2. Revocation or refusal to renew authoriza- 
tion to operate such representations shall require 
notice in writing at least three months prior to 
termination of authorization to such representation. 

3. Such representation shall consist of natural 
or legal persons and shall be established and oper- 
ated in accordance with procedures and regulations 
in the host country. Termination of the activities of 
a representation shall not be subject to any penalties 
when it does not contravene the provisions of any 
contract existing between the representation and the 
firms, companies and economic organizations of the 
host country. 

4. The Parties recognize that reasonable levels 
and application of fees, taxes, rents and other 
charges, and adequate notice of changes therein to 
the concerned representations and their employees, 
are beneficial to commerce and cooperation between 
the two countries. 

5. Representations shall be permitted to rent 
office space for their needs and housing for the use 
of their employees. The Parties, upon request, will 
use the good oflices at their disposal to facilitate and 
expedite the obtaining and occupying of such office 
space and housing. 

6. Representations shall be permitted to im- 
port, as promptly as desired, office machines, auto- 
mobiles, and other equipment for the purpose of 
efficient and business-like operation of the repre- 
sentation, subject to applicable customs regulations. 

7. The employees of the representations shall 
be permitted to import personal eff'ects including 
furniture and appliances. Such personal effects shall 

be entered duty-free in accordance with applicable 
customs regulations. Automobiles and similar means 
of transportation imported for the use of such em- 
ployees will be permitted to enter in accordance with 
the applicable customs regulations. Such employees 
shall also be permitted to export their imported per- 
sonal eff^ects and automobiles, free of export duties. 

8. Representations may acquire communica- 
tions facilities, such as office or home telephones for 
their employees, extensions, and telex equipment, 
which will be made available as promptly as possible 
upon application therefor, in accordance with ap- 
plicable law. 

9. The term "employees" used in paragraphs 
4, 5, 7 and 8 of this Annex refers to persons sent by 
firms, companies and economic organizations of one 
Party to perform services for their representations 
which are functioning in the territory of the other 

10. Representations may, subject to the ap- 
plicable laws and procedures, select and employ any 
person, regardless of citizenship, lawfully residing 
in or admitted to the territory of such other Party. 
Neither Party shall impose restrictions on the 
termination of employees, other than the contractual 
provisions requiring notice and compensation. 
Neither Party shall restrict the total number of 
persons to be employed as long as they are reason- 
ably needed for the conduct of business. Representa- 
tions shall hire, compensate, and terminate the 
employment of employees in accordance with the 
provisions of contracts governing their employment. 
Each Party agrees to encourage the negotiation of 
contracts in such a way that the representations of 
the other Party shall have the broadest possible 
flexibility in selecting, hiring and compensating em- 
ployees and in terminating their employment. 

11. Each Party agrees to facilitate to the 
maximum extent possible the travel of persons em- 
ployed by representations of the other Party desir- 
ing to enter its territory in furtherance of the 
purposes of this agreement and members of their 
immediate families. Each Party agrees to make 
available multiple entry visas of duration of 6 
months or longer to such persons and to members 
of their immediate families. Persons who are em- 
ployees of representations of the other Party shall 
be permitted to the maximum extent possible, in 
accordance with applicable regulations, to travel 
abroad for purposes related to the business of the 
representations by which they are employed. 

II. For the purpose of applying paragraph 10 of 
Article IV, the Parties recognize that reasonable 
levels and application of fees, rents, and other 
charges and adequate notice of changes therein to 
the concerned employees and representatives are 
beneficial to commerce and cooperation between the 
two Parties. 

III. For the purpose of applying paragraph 11 of 
Article IV, the Parties agree that the persons re- 


Department of State Bulletin 

feiTed to therein should have access to adequate 
housing and office space and communication facili- 
ties, and the ability to utilize, in accordance with 
applicable procedures, local personnel necessary for 
the carrying out of their normal activities. In addi- 
tion, in accordance with applicable customs regula- 
tions, the Parties will permit the import of tools, 
equipment and automobiles required for carrying out 
contracts, as well as, on a duty-free basis, imports 
of personal effects. The Parties will permit duty-free 
export of imported personal effects and automobiles. 
Each Party agrees to facilitate to the maximum ex- 
tent possible travel of such persons and the mem- 
bers of their immediate families desiring to enter 
and leave its territory. 


1. In this Agreement "firms, companies and 
economic organizations" of the United States of 
America shall include corporations, partnerships, 
sole proprietorships, companies and other economic 
associations constituted under the laws and regula- 
tions applicable in the United States of America, 
and "firms, companies and economic organizations" 
of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall include 
state enterprises, industrial centrals, enterprises 
with the status of centrals and other enterprises 
which carry out foreign trade activities in accord- 
ance with laws and regulations applicable in the 
Socialist Republic of Romania. 

2. In this Agreement "representation," in the 
case of the representations established in the United 
States of America, shall include subsidiaries or un- 
incorporated branches or other forms of business 
organizations legally constituted under the laws and 
regulations applicable in the territory of the United 
States of America by firms, companies, or economic 
organizations of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 
and in the case of the representations established in 
the Socialist Republic of Romania, shall include the 
agencies referred to in Article 1 of Decree No. 15 
of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania of January 25, 1971, established by a firm, 
company or economic organization of the United 
States of America. 

the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania. 
I am also enclosing the text of the Agreement on 
Trade Relations between the United States of 
America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, 
which was signed on April 2, 1975, and which is 
included as an Annex to the Proclamation. 

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the report 
which was transmitted to the Congress this date 
as required by Section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act 
of 1974, and I shall issue today an Executive Order 
waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) 
of Section 402. 

This agreement caps a decade of improvements in 
all areas of US-Romanian relations. It will place 
our trade with Romania on a nondiscriminatory 
basis that will promote continued development of 
mutually beneficial economic ties. It will thereby 
bring the structure of our economic relations into 
accord with the very satisfactory state of our 
political relations. 

This agreement is consistent with the letter and 
the spirit of the Trade Act of 1974. In addition to 
providing for mutual extension of most-favored- 
nation tariff treatment, it meets the requirements of 
Title IV that are designed to ensure overall reciproc- 
ity of economic benefits. Its special safeguard ar- 
rangements provide the strongest possible assurance 
that our trade with Romania will continue to grow 
without injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for 
American workers. American businessmen are as- 
sured of basic rights and facilities in establishing 
operations in Romania and doing business with 
Romanian enterprises. Other provisions include pro- 
tection for industrial property rights, industrial 
processes, and copyrights; and encouragement of 
third-country arbitration of commercial disputes 
under the rules of the International Chamber of 

I urge that Congress act as soon as possible to 
approve the agreement under the provisions of 
Section 407. 


Gerald R. Ford. 



White House press release dated April 24 

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) In 
accordance with Section 407 of the Trade Act of 
1974, I am transmitting herewith a copy of a Procla- 
mation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to 

' Identical letters were sent to Speaker of the 
House Carl Albert and President of the Senate 
Nelson A. Rockefeller. 

Agreement on Trade Relations Between the 
United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the 
United States Constitution, I, as President of the 
United States of America, acting through duly em- 
powered representatives, entered into negotiation 
with duly empowered representatives of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania looking toward the conclusion 

-40 Fed. Reg. 18389. 

May 19, 1975 


of an agreement governing trade relations between 
the United States of America and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania; 

The aforesaid negotiations were conducted in ac- 
cordance with the requirements of the Trade Act of 
1974 (P.L. 93-618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978); 

An "Agreement on Trade Relations between the 
United States of America and the Socialist Republic 
of Romania," including the annexes thereto, in the 
English and Romanian languages, was signed on 
April 2, 1975, by duly empowered representatives of 
the Governments of the United States of America 
and the Socialist Republic of Romania, respectively, 
and is hereto annexed; 

The said Agreement is in conformity with the 
requirements relating to bilateral commercial agree- 
ments as specified in section 405(b) of the Trade 
Act of 1974 (.88 Stat. 1978, 2061); 

It is provided in Article XII of the said Agree- 
ment that it shall enter into force on the date of 
exchange of written notices of acceptance by the 
Governments of the United States of America and 
the Socialist Republic of Romania; and 

It is provided in section 405(c) of the Trade Act 
of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2061) that a bilateral com- 
mercial agreement providing nondiscriminatory 
treatment to the products of countries heretofore 
denied such treatment, and a proclamation imple- 
menting such agreement, shall take effect only if 
approved by the Congress by the adoption of a 
concurrent resolution of approval, referred to in 
section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 
2001), of the extension of nondiscriminatory treat- 
ment to the products of the country concerned; 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, acting under the 
authority vested in me by the Constitution and the 
statutes, including section 404(a) of the Trade Act 
of 1974, do hereby proclaim as follows: 

(1) This Proclamation shall become effective and 
said agreement shall enter into force according to 
its terms, and nondiscriminatory treatment shall be 
extended to the products of the Socialist Republic 
of Romania in accordance with the terms of the said 
Agreement, on the date of exchange of written 
notices of acceptance in accordance with Article XII 
of the said Agreement, all of the foregoing to follow 
the adoption by the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, in accordance with the procedures set 
forth in section 151 of the said Act, of a concurrent 
resolution of approval of the extension of nondis- 
criminatory treatment to the products of the Social- 
ist Republic of Romania, to the end that the same 
and every part of the said Agreement may be ob- 
served and fulfilled with good faith by the United 
States of America and the citizens thereof and all 
other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof as 
of the date of its entry into force; and 

(2) General Headnote 3(e) of the Tariff Sched- 


ules of the United States is amended by deleting 
therefrom "Rumania" as of the effective date of 
this proclamation and a notice thereof shall be 
published in the Federal Register promptly there- 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this twenty-fourth day of April, in the year 
of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-five, 
and of the Independence of the United States of 
America the one hundred ninety-ninth. 

Gerald R. Ford. 


White House press release dated April 24 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Pursuant to Section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act 
of 1974, I shall issue today an Executive Order 
waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) 
of Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect 
to the Socialist Republic of Romania, and I am 
hereby making the report contemplated by Section 
402(c)(1) of the Act. 

I refer to the Declaration of the Presidents of the 
United States and of the Socialist Republic of 
Romania signed in Washington in 1973 wherein it 
was stated that "they will contribute to the solu- 
tion of humanitarian problems on the basis of 
mutual confidence and good will." I have been as- 
sured that if and when such problems arise they 
will be solved, on a reciprocal basis, in the spirit of 
that Declaration. Accordingly, I am convinced that 
the emigration practices of Romania will lead sub- 
stantially to the achievement of the objectives of 
Section 402 of the Act. I have therefore determined 
that the waiver contained in said Executive Order 
will substantially promote the objectives of Section 
402 of the Act. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 2i, 1975. 


Waiver Under the Trade Act of 1974 With Re- 
spect to the Socialist Republic of Romania 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by sec- 
tion 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public 
Law 93-618, January 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978, 2057), 
and having made the report to the Congress re- 

' 40 Fed. Reg. 18391. 

Department of State Bulletin 

quired by that provision, I hereby waive the applica- 
tion of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of 
said Act with respect to the Socialist Republic of 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 2i, 1975. 

Current Treaty Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Protocol suspending the agreement of March 1, 
1972 (TIAS 7295), between the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden, and the United 
States for the application of safeguards pursuant 
to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 
(TIAS 6839). Signed at Vienna April 14, 1975. 
Enters into force on the date on which the Agency 
receives written notification from Sweden that its 
constitutional requirements for entry into force 
of the treaty safeguards agreement and of this 
protocol have been met. 

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, 
' Sweden, and the United States. 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, March 26, 
1975; Dahomey, April 25, 1975. 


Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 
1928, as amended (TIAS 6548, 6549), relating to 
international expositions, with appendix and 
annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: Denmark, March 20, 1975. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Federal Republic 

of Germany,"^ Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 

May 2, 1975. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution 
by dumping of wastes and other matter, with 
annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, 
and Washington December 29, 1972.' 
Ratification deposited: New Zealand (not ap- 
plicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, or the Toke- 
lau Islands), April 30, 1975. 


Convention concerning the international exchange 
of publications. Donfe at Paris December 3, 1958. 
Entered into force November 23, 1961 ; for the 
United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438. 
Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Re- 
public (with declaration), February 19, 1975. 

Convention concerning the exchange of official pub- 
lications and government documents between 
states. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered 
into force May 30, 1961; for the United States 
June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439. 

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Re- 
public (with declaration), February 19, 1975. 


Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972; for the United 
States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Dahomey, April 25, 1975. 


Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as 
amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on 
space telecommunications, with annexes. Done at 
Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 
1, 1973. TIAS 7435. 

Notification of approval: Greece, February 11, 

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. 
Entered into force September 1, 1974.' 
Notification of approval: Federal Republic of 
Germany,^ February 24, 1975. 

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 
into force September 1, 1974.' 

Notification of approval: Federal Republic of 
Germany," February 24, 1975. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Ghana, April 25, 1975. 



Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and 
exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974. 
Ratifications exchanged: April 28, 1975. 
Enters into force: May 29, 1975. 

' Not in force. 

■ With statements. 

' Applicable to Berlin (West). 

' Not in force for the United States. 

May 19, 1975 



Agreement extending the agreement of June 15, 
1973, as extended (TIAS 7676, 7818), on recipro- 
cal fishing privileges in certain areas off the 
coasts of the United States and Canada. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 24, 1975. 
Entered into force April 24, 1975. 


Agreement concerning an army mission, a naval 
mission, and an air force mission of the United 
States of America armed forces in Colombia. 
Signed at Bogota October 7, 1974. 
Entered into force: April 16, 1975. 

Naval mission agreement, as amended. Signed at 
Washington October 14, 1946. Entered into force 
October 14, 1946. TIAS 1563, 3146, 4210. 

Air force mission agreement, as amended. Signed 
at Washington February 21, 1949. Entered into 
force February 21, 1949. TIAS 1893, 3146, 4210. 

Army mission agreement, as amended. Signed at 
Washington February 21, 1949. Entered into force 
February 21, 1949. TIAS 1892, 3146, 4210. 
Terminated: April 16, 1975. 

International Telecommunication Union 

Agreement relating to a procedure to reimburse the 
International Telecommunication Union for reim- 
bursement of personnel subject to payment of 
United States income tax. Effected by exchange of 
letters at Geneva April 2 and 7, '1975. Entered into 
force April 7, 1975; effective January 1, 1974. 


Agreement relating to the use of interest accrued 
in connection with payments made under agree- 
ment of April 18, 1969 (TIAS 6724), concerning 
the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 18, 1975. 
Entered into force April 18, 1975. 

Agreement extending the period for provision of 
products and services by Japan under the agree- 
ment of April 18, 1969 (TIAS 6724), concerning 
the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 18, 1975. 
Entered into force April 18, 1975. 


Agreement amending the agreement of March 16, 
1972, concerning trade in cotton textiles, with re- 
lated letters. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Bangkok April 21, 1975. Entered into force April 
21, 1975; effective April 1, 1974. 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washiyigton, D.C. 
WU02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown beloiv, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock— at least 140— $21.80; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at S0( each. 

Germany, Federal 

Republic of 


Namibia (South 

Tanzania . . 




S1.123:G31 v 



8 pp. 






8 pp. 






5 pp. 






4 pp. 






8 pp. 






8 pp. 

Narcotic Drugs — Training Program for Helicopter 
Pilots and Mechanics. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 
7982. 6 pp. 25<». (Cat. No. 89.10:7982). 

Narcotic Drugs — Provision of Assistance in Enforce- 
ment Training Activities. Agreement with Mexico. 
TIAS 7984. 5 pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. 89.10:7984). 

Military Assistance — Payments Under Foreign As- 
sistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Uruguay. 
TIAS 7985. 4 pp. 25«S. (Cat. No. 89.10:7985). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistaji. 
TIAS 7971. 20 pp. 40<r. (Cat. No. 89.10:7971). 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 19, 1975 Vol. LXXII, No. 187 A 

Australia. ANZUS Council MeetinR Held at 

Washington (communique) 645 


Department Discusses Implementation of Rec- 
ommendations of World Food Conference 
(Enders) 647 

Department Supports Legislation on National 

Emergency Authorities (Feldman) . . . 651 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 652 

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol Extending 
Coffee Agreement (message from President 
Ford) 654 

United States and Romania Sign Agreement 
on Trade Relations (Department announce- 
ment, texts of agreement and annexes, let- 
ter and message from President Ford to the 
Congress, proclamation. Executive order) . 655 

Disarmament. The Second Nuclear Era (Ikle) 641 

Economic Affairs 

Adjusting to a Changing World Economy: In- 
vestment and Trade Policy (Ingersoll) . . 634 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 652 

Food. Department Discusses Implementation 
of Recommendations of World Food Confer- 
ence (Enders) 647 

Greece. U.S. and Greece Hold Second Round 
of Talks on Defense Matters (joint state- 
ment) 645 

Isfael. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of April 29 (incorporating statement by 
President Ford) 625 

Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan Visits Wash- 
ington (Ford, Hussein) 639 

New Zealand. ANZUS Council Meeting Held 

at Washington (communique) 645 

Presidential Documents 

International Economic Report Transmitted 

to the Congress 652 

King Hussein of Jordan Visits Washington . 639 
Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 

April 29 625 

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol Extending 

Coffee Agreement 654 

United States and Romania Sign Agreement 

on Trade Relations 655 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications ... 664 

Romania. United States and Romania Sign 
Agreement on Trade Relations (Depart- 
ment announcement, texts of agreement and 
annexes, letter and message from President 
Ford to the Congress, proclamation. Execu- 
tive order) 655 


Adjusting to a Changing World Economy: 

Investment and Trade Policy (Ingersoll) . 634 

United States and Romania Sign Agreement 
on Trade Relations (Department announce- 
ment, texts of agreement and annexes, let- 
ter and message from President Ford to the 
Congress, proclamation, Executive order) . 655 

Treaty Information 

Current Treaty Actions 663 

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol Extending 
Coffee Agreement (message from President 
Ford) 654 

United States and Romania Sign Agreement 
on Trade Relations (Department announce- 
ment, texts of agreement and annexes, let- 
ter and message from President Ford to the 
Congress, proclamation. Executive order) . 655 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
April 29 (incorporating statement by Presi- 
dent Ford) 625 

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Commends 

Efforts of Armed Forces (statement) . . 633 

Name Index 

Enders, Thomas O 647 

Feldman, Mark B 651 

Ford, President 625, 639, 652. 654, 655 

King Hussein I 639 

Ikle. Fred C 641 

Ingersoll, Robert S 634 

Kissinger, Secretary 625 

Schlesinger, James R 633 



219 4/29 



*222 4/30 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 28— May 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Release issued prior to April 28 which ap- 
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 182 
of April 3. 


Program for official visit of 
Prime Minister Hedi Nouira of 

U.S. -Greek base negotiations: 
joint statement. 

Kissinger: news conference. 

Ingersoll: World Trade Confer- 
ence, Chicago. 

Delegation of U.S. veterans to 
participate in Soviet observ- 
ance of 30th anniversary of 
Allied victory in Europe. 

U.S. -Macau cotton textile agree- 
ment extended. 

Regional Foreign Policy Confer- 
ence, Birmingham, Ala., May 5. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, May 28. 

Study Group 7 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the CCIR, 
May 30. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Mexico City, 
May 29-31. 

Sisco: George Washington Uni- 
versity, May 4. 

Kissinger to visit St. Louis and 
Kansas City, Mo., May 12-13. 

Deposit of ratifications of Non- 
proliferation Treaty by five 
EURATOM countries. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

















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u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 204o2 


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lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXII 

No. 1874 

May 26, 1975 


Excerpts From Transcript 676 


Statement by Under Secretary Robinson 688 


Fw index see inside back cover 


For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

Vol. LXXII, No. 1874 
May 26, 1975 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau oi 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public am 
interested agencies of tfie governmeni 
witli information on developments u 
t/te field of U.S. foreign relations ant 
on tlie work of the Department ant 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selectet 
press releases on foreign policy, issuei 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addressea 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and oth0 
officers of Vie Department, as well m 
special articles on various phases a 
international affairs and the functiom 
of the Department. Information it 
included concerning treaties and inter' 
national agreements to which th4 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department ol 
State, United Nations documents, ani 
legislative material in the field oi 
international relations are also listedi 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for NBC "Today" Show 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by Barbara Walters 
ivhich was conducted at the Department of 
State on May 3 and broadcast on the NBC 
televisidn "Today" show May 5-8. 

Press release 231, parts I-IV. May 6-8 


Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, we are about 
to celebrate our Bicentennial. Is Viet-Nam 
our first defeat in 200 years? 

Secretary Kissinger: When a nation is en- 
gaged in a major effort for 10 years and then 
doesn't achieve its basic objectives, you have 
to say it is a significant setback, yes. 

Miss Walters: Is Viet-Nam our first defeat 
in 200 years ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends how 
you assess the War of 1812 and other events. 
It is a significant setback. 

Miss Walters: You are responsible for the 
airlift of more than 100,000 Viet-Nam refu- 
gees. How do yoii answer the American peo- 
ple who are worried about further economic 
deprivatioyi and are resisting the arrival of 
these refugees? 

Secretary Kissinger: It has been the 
American tradition to take refugees through- 
out our history, even from countries to which 
we had no special obligation. We took 675,000 
Cuban refugees. We took, I think, over 150,- 
000 Hungarian refugees. 

Here is a country in which for 15 years we 
were engaged in a major effort in which hun- 
dreds of thousands of people cooperated with 
us in the belief that the United States would 
see this effort through. The least we owe these 
people, those who were most seriously en- 
dangered, is that we make an effort to evacu- 
ate them. 

I think when the American people reflect 

about our obligation they will recognize that 
we could not decently do anything else. The 
number is about 120,000. It is one of the 
things that we can be proud of having 
achieved. I think it is a national duty to help 
them. Moreover, I believe that the impact in 
any one locality is going to be absolutely mini- 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, right now at 
this point of our history how do you see the 
fundamentals of our foreign policy, and are 
they being redefined since the fall of Viet- 

Secretary Kissinger: The fundamental goal 
of our foreign policy has to remain to pre- 
serve peace and to achieve progress — econom- 
ically, humanly, and politically — in the world. 

Now, there is a curious situation in which 
many people say there is no domino effect but 
we have to redo all our foreign policy. Both 
propositions cannot be true. 

I believe that the major objectives which 
the United States has set itself are dictated 
by our history, by our values, by our geog- 
raphy. They are unaffected by what has hap- 
pened in Viet-Nam. They are more difficult 
as a result of our setback, but we can master 
them, and we will master them. 

While Americans have some reason to be 
unhappy for various reasons about the out- 
come of Viet-Nam, if we look at the whole 
postwar record, we have preserved the global 
peace. Almost every great initiative in the 
postwar period has either been initiated by 
America or has been carried out with our 
strong support. If we want to avoid a world 
of chaos, if we want to achieve a world of 
progress, the American role is absolutely im- 
perative. I repeat, it is our goal to maintain 
it and, based on our recent experience, to 
strengthen it in a more mature way. 

With respect to Indochina, it is important 
to remember that we found 550,000 Ameri- 

May 26, 1975 


cans in Indochina when we came into office. 
We didn't put them there. In fact, we with- 
drew them. 

Our attempt has been to gear American 
commitments to American capabilities and 

Miss Walters: I would like to divide our- 
foreign policy questions now into different 
parts of the globe, starting ivith the Far East, 
to Viet-Nam. At the time of the Paris peace 
treaty many people -felt, perhaps cyyiically, 
that it was only a matter of time before North 
Viet-Nam took over all of Viet-Nam and that 
the ivithdrawal of our troops toas our way 
of getting out and saving face. These people 
ivonder ivhy you didn't knoiv this and have 
some alternate plan should Viet-Nam push 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, if so 
many people knew it, they managed to keep 
it rather quiet. I don't remember any very 
vocal statements at the time that pointed out 
what you have just said. 

Secondly, when you say why didn't we have 
an alternative plan, I would have to know 
what sort of a plan do people have in mind, 
what could we have done? 

Miss Walters: Let me make a suggestion — 
not to run your foreign policy. But for ex- 
ample, one alternative is, after Congress had 
the arms cutoff', ive might have gone to Presi- 
dent Thieu and told him, "Look, it is a new 
world, and you had better negotiate unless 
you want defeat." 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me first go back 
to where we were in January 1973 and where 
we wound up in April of '75. In January '73 
we did not foresee that Watergate would sap 
the executive authority of the United States 
to such a degree that flexibility of executive 
action inherently would be circumscribed. We 
did not foresee that the Congress would pass 
a law which prohibited us from enforcing the 
Paris agreement; and while we probably 
might have done nothing anyway, it makes a 
lot of difference for Hanoi whether it thinks 
the United States probably will not or wheth- 
er it thinks that we certainly can not. 

I do not believe that Hanoi would have sent 

19 of its 20 divisions south if these two things 
hadn't happened. Nor did we foresee that aid 
to Viet-Nam would be cut in successive years 
by 50 percent each year at a time when in- 
flation quadrupled the oil prices and inflation 
increased the cost of everything — so that 
after May 1974 no new equipment of any 
kind was sent to Viet-Nam and not even 
spare parts in any substantial quantities 
reached Viet-Nam, so that ammunition had 
to be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. 
Maybe the South Vietnamese Army was not 
ever one of the better armies in the world, 
but even a good army would have been de- 
moralized by these successive cuts. 

None of this was predictable. After it be- 
came clearer that a gradual erosion of morale 
was occurring, we tried very hard to get ne- 
gotiations started; and President Thieu, 
whatever you may think of him, on a number 
pf occasions made proposals to get these talks 
started unconditionally. 

But once the North Vietnamese realized 
what the trends were, they blocked all nego- 
tiations and went for a military solution. 

Miss Walters: So that you feel there ivas 
no other possibility? 

Secretary Kissinger: There was no other 

Miss Walters: It is noio knoivn that Presi- 
dent Nixon wrote a letter to President Thieu 
in January of 197o promising that the United 
States ivoidd move "fidl force" to punish any 
violations of the Paris peace agreement. You 
obviously knew of the content of this letter. 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course. 

Miss Walters: Why didn't you reveal to 
Congress in the past months the content of 
that letter, especially when Senator [Henry 
M.] Jackson raised this question? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is a very important 
question of the conduct of foreign policy. 
Presidents have been writing letters to for- 
eign heads of state since the founding of the 
Republic. During the difficult months when 
we were trying to convince President Thieu 
to accept the Paris accords, many letters were 
written — ^just as every President, including 


Department of State Bulletin 

President Ford, is writing, has been writing 
letters to foreign heads of government. 

If we begin revealing the contents of letters 
simply because a Senator — on top of it a 
Presidential candidate, but quite apart from 
this — a Senator alleges that there is some- 
thing in these letters, then Presidential cor- 
respondence will lose its private character. 

Moreover in this particular case. President 
Ford announced that the substance of these 
letters had been made public, not ascribed to 
correspondence, but in fact had been made 

The reason President Ford decided to not 
release these letters was to maintain the 
principle of confidentiality of Presidential 
correspondence. We do have an obligation to 
tell the Congress about obligations which the 
country has undertaken. That was done in 
many public statements in 1973, and they 
were made moot by congressional actions and 
after that it was not an issue. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, this brings 
up one of the criticisms about you today. That 
is, people say Henry Kissinger deals in ex- 
cessive secrecy. There are other letters and 
other deals perhaps being made at other con- 
ferences and other summits that perhaps the 
Congress doesn't know about. How does one 
resolve that, and how do you answer that 
criticism ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Once certain stereo- 
types develop, it is very difficult to deal with 
them. I am certain that if I read top secret 
documents in front of the Washington Monu- 
ment to a public assembly I would still be 
accused of conducting foreign policy too se- 
cretly. One has to separate it into two parts. 

The first is : Secrecy in negotiations is ab- 
solutely essential because it enables each side 
to state views and explanations which could 
be extremely embarrassing if they became 
public. It is absolutely required for the for- 
eign leaders who deal with us to know that 
they can talk to us frankly. Therefore the 
secrecy of the negotiating process must be 
preserved. Charles Evans Hughes said in 
1923 that open diplomacy can only refer to 
results, not to the process. 

The second point is: Are there secret 

agreements that people don't know about and 
that have been kept from the public? Well, 
so far, with all the allegations that have been 
made, nobody has yet produced any secret 
agreement that has not been made public. At 
one time there was an allegation that we had 
made some secret agreement about 70 mis- 
siles. That turned out to be an absurdity, but 
it is so complicated to explain that I don't 
want to go into it now. At any rate, that was 
an absurdity. 

The second argument that has been made 
is that we did not reveal a Gromyko letter 
about Jewish emigration. It is true that we 
did not reveal the letter, but the substance of 
that letter was fully disclosed to the Senate 
in the testimony before the Senate Finance 
Committee on December 3, 1974. 

The third charge has to do with the war 
in Viet-Nam, with the end of the war in Viet- 
Nam. There, too, the substance was fully 
explained. There are no secret agreements. 
No one has as yet produced any secret agree- 
ments. All they have produced are limited 
statements that were fully revealed to the 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, do you see 
our government recognizing the North Viet- 
namese Government? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we now have to 
see what the conduct of this Government is 
internationally and partially domestically. 
For example, we know that in Cambodia very 
tragic and inhuman and barbarous things are 
going on. We don't regret not having recog- 
nized Cambodia immediately. 

We want to observe the conduct of the Viet- 
namese Government for a while before we 
make this decision. 

Miss Walters: Can you tell us what part 
the Soviet Union played diplomatically, mil- 
itarily, during the tvaning days of the South 
Viet-Nam collapse? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union 
played, in the last two weeks, a moderately 
con.structive role in enabling us to understand 
the possibilities there were for evacuation, 
both of Americans and South Vietnamese, 
and for the possibilities that might exist for 
a political evolution. 

May 26, 1975 


On the other hand, I do not want to give 
the Soviet Union excessive credit for mod- 
erating the consequences that its arms 
brought about. Therefore we have to see it 
in perspective. 

Miss Walters: Did the Soviet Union tell 
you that there tvoidd he no possibility of a 
negotiated settlement, that it was going to 
end in a takeover of the city? 

Secretary Kissinger: That was not clear 
to me from the exchanges. 


Miss Walters: We talk of detente with the 
Soviet Union, but how do we reconcile de- 
tente with the country that aids the collapse 
of an ally we are committed to defend? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have to under- 
stand what detente represents. The Soviet 
Union is a country that we recognize as ideo- 
logically hostile. The Soviet Union is a great 
power that is in many parts of the world 
operating competitively with us. The Soviet 
Union is also a country that possesses an 
enormous nuclear arsenal and with which we 
have certain interests in common, such as the 
prevention of general nuclear war, such as 
limiting conflict in areas where both of us 
could get directly involved. 

In those areas detente has worked reason- 
ably well. What we cannot ask the Soviet 
Union to do is to keep itself from taking ad- 
vantage of situations in which, for whatever 
reasons, we do not do what is required to 
maintain the balance. 

It is true that Soviet arms made the con- 
quest of South Viet-Nam possible. It is also 
true that the refusal of American arms made 
the conquest of South Viet-Nam inevitable. 

Therefore, while the Soviet Union does 
have a heavy responsibility, we cannot expect 
the Soviet Union to police the world for us, 
and we have to be mature enough to recog- 
nize that we have to coexist, even in a com- 
petitive world, and perhaps hopefully be able 
to moderate over a period of years the com- 
petition in peripheral areas. 

Now, eventually the Soviet Union must 

realize that it is responsible for the conse- 
quences of its actions even in peripheral 
areas. But as a basic relationship detente has 
never meant the absence of competition. 

Miss Walters: Where does China stand now 
as a restdt of the fall of Saigon? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, China now has 
40 million Vietnamese on its frontiers who 
do not exactly suffer from a lack of confidence 
in themselves. I think China will look at the 
international situation from the point of view 
of the overall balance of power, from the 
point of view of its own national interests. I 
think it will conclude that the policy that led 
it to undertake normalization of relations 
with the United States remains the best 
course for it, just as we believe that the 
normalization of relations with the People's 
Republic of China is an important objective 
of American policy which will be maintained. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, Thailand's 
Foreign Minister has said all American sol- 
diers will be totally gone from that country 
ivithin one year. What does that mean to lis? 

Secretary Kissinger: Basically, as we as- 
sess our policy around the world, it is im- 
portant to understand that the United States 
does not do favors to other countries by being 
in an alliance with them nor do other coun- 
tries do us favors by being our allies. If other 
countries want us to withdraw our troops, 
we will of course withdraw them. 

Our security can be protected in many 
ways. What it means, however, is that for 
the Thai leaders the last few months have 
been a traumatic experience. Thailand sup- 
ported our efforts in Viet-Nam and in Indo- 
china because it believed its own security 
was intimately connected with it. And it is 
well known that we used Thai bases for many 
of the operations of the Indochina war. So 
naturally the Thai leaders are concerned 
about what this means, what our withdrawal 
from Cambodia and Viet-Nam means, about 
our general attitude in foreign policy. And 
I think they will find that we are going to 
stick by our commitments. 

If they want us to reduce our forces, and 
they have indicated that they do, and if they 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

want us to withdraw them, we are prepared 
to discuss this with them, and of course we 
will accede by their wishes. 

Miss Walteis: Senate Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield has said that we should tvith- 
draw our troops from South Korea, probably 
the next target of Commuyiist pressure. Do 
you think we shotdd? Has South Korea asked 
us to? 

Secretary Kissinger: South Korea has not 
asked us to. In South Korea there can be no 
ambiguity about our commitment because we 
have a defense treaty ratified by the Con- 
gress. If we abandon this treaty, it would 
have drastic consequences in Japan and all 
over Asia because that would be interpreted 
as our final withdrawal from Asia and our 
final withdrawal from our whole postwar for- 
eign policy. 

Miss Walters: Is there a redefinition of the 
domino theory in light of the internal rebel- 
lions going on in such coimtries as Thailand, 
the Philippines, and Malaysia; and, as part 
of that, have we as a residt of Viet-Nam 
stopped trying to persuade governments to 
resist communism? 

Secretary Kissiriger: There are two aspects 
to the domino theory. The first is : Is there a 
domino effect to foreign policy action? The 
second is : Can we, as a country, do something 
about every domino effect that may occur in 
the world? 

Miss Walters: I like your questions much 
better than mine. They are more understand- 
able. They are clearer. 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to my 
first question, there is in almost every major 
event a domino effect that is produced either 
by the change in the balance of forces, or by 
the perception of other countries of the ac- 
tions of the various participants, or by the 
general psychological climate that is created 
in the world as to who is advancing and who 
is withdrawing. That is inevitable. 

What the United States can do about it is 
another matter. For example, with respect to 
Indochina we now receive cables from places 
as far away as Latin America and Africa, 
that have no geographic interest in Southeast 

Asia, simply questioning what this means 
about the American purpose. 

Now, does it mean that the United States 
is no longer urging countries to resist in- 
ternal subversion? 

The first decision whether to resist internal 
subversion must come from the countries con- 
cerned. We probably made a mistake in Viet- 
Nam to turn Viet-Nam into a test case for 
our policy, and not for the Vietnamese policy, 
back in 1962 and 1963 when we first got our- 
selves involved there. 

So our general attitude would be that the 
basic decision of how to react to internal sub- 
version depends on the countries concerned. 

Miss Walters: Let me go back to that. Does 
that mean we should have realized that the 
trend was toward communism and said we 
will stay out ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we perhaps 
might have perceived it more in Vietnamese 
terms rather than as the outward thrust of 
a global conspiracy. 

Miss Walters: Okay. 

Secretary Kissinger: Then if there is a de- 
cision to resist internal subversion, I would 
think that the introduction of American mili- 
tary forces is the worst way of dealing with 
it, because that introduces a foreign element. 
If we want to be helpful we would be much 
better off strengthening the government's 
ability to resist and giving it assistance 
rather than introducing American military 

But as a general rule, one would really have 
to look at that country by country. We don't 
have a blanket policy in this respect that ap- 
plies to every country in the world. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, can we talk 
of the Middle East? President Ford and you 
are due to meet President Sadat in Austria 
next month and later with Prime Minister 
Rabin in Washington. What possible avenues 
for new negotiations do you see? 

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have a plan 
that we want to present to these two govern- 
ments now. But we do have the conviction 
that a prolonged stalemate in the Middle East 
involves a high risk of another Middle East 

May 26, 1975 


war with major consequences for the possi- 
bility of a conflict with the Soviet Union and 
with a major impact on the economies of all 
of the industrialized nations, including us. 
This is a danger that we are determined to 
avoid. We believe that it is also in the interest 
of all of the participants, all of the parties in 
the Middle East, including especially Israel. 

So we will talk to President Sadat and, 
when we meet, Prime Minister Rabin and 
other leaders about their ideas of how the 
Middle East can be moved to a solution. And 
after that we will formulate a precise Ameri- 
can policy. 

Miss Walters: It has been widely noted 
that you and the President criticized Israel 
for not being more flexible. What was the 
purpose of this private criticism? 

Secretary Kissinger: You know, Barbara, 
there are so many myths that go around. The 
President made a public criticism, not a pri- 
vate criticism, when he referred to inflexi- 

In terms of the long-term consequences, I 
have expressed the view that a strategy which 
on the whole had been agreed to with the Is- 
raeli Government did not succeed. 

The purpose has been not of criticism, but 
the purpose of making clear the general 
American perception of the problem was to 
make clear that new decisions had to be taken 
by all of the parties and that the progress 
toward peace in the Middle East cannot be 

Miss Walters: But when you publicly or 
privately criticized Israel, didn't this release 
President Sadat from reexamining his policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have asked all 
parties to look at their policies, and the al- 
legation of private criticism of Israel comes 
mostly from people who think they are help- 
ing Israel but who in my view are not helping 
Israel by making these allegations. 

Our view is that all parties on both sides 
have an obligation to examine what they can 
do to produce peace. On the Israeli side this 
is a question of what territory they are pre- 
pared to give up. On the Arab side it is a 
question of what concrete commitments to 

peace they are prepared to make. 

Miss Walters: Almost six iveeks ago, Presi- 
dent Ford asked for a reassessrnent of our 
policy in the Middle East. I know you have 
not finished the reassessment. They say it 
will take another week or so. But can you 
tell us anything of what has emerged? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, when 
President Ford announced this and set a ten- 
tative deadline, it was before events in Indo- 
china took a great deal of our attention. 

Secondly, it is a mistake to believe that 
there will be some clear terminal date at 
which one can say from now on the assess- 
ment is completed. But I believe that on the 
whole the decisions, the final decision, will 
not be made until President Ford has had 
an opportunity to meet with the leaders of 
the countries principally concerned. 

But the conclusion to which we have come 
is certainly to continue a major American 
efi'ort to produce progress toward peace in the 
Middle East and not to permit a long period 
of stagnation. 

Miss Walters: What assurances do Israel 
and our other allies have that we will keep 
our commitments to them ? As soon as Israelis 
hear "reassessment," and other allies, too, it 
seems to strike great fear that it could mean 
abandonment or great change. What assu7'- 
ances do they have? 

Secretary Kissinger: The President has, on 
several occasions, made clear — and so have I 
— that we will stand by our existing commit- 

Miss Walters: Could Congress charrge this? 

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly Congress 
can change our commitments, as it did In 
Viet-Nam — not our commitments, our im- 
plied obligations. 

But the situation in Viet-Nam was quite 
different from the situation in other parts 
of the world. In Viet-Nam the situation was 
extremely controversial. It has not been that 
with respect to Israel or with respect to West- 
ern Europe and most of our other alliances. 
But Congress can certainly change any com- 
mitment we have. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Miss Walters: But do you feel that Israel 
and these other allies have good reason to be 
assured that the basic policy will not change ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Assurances are not 
achieved with words alone. It depends on our 
conduct as a people. In terms of the foreign 
policy of this Administration, our allies and 
friends have no reason to fear that we will 
abandon them. 

In terms of our ovei-all performance as a 
country, it is crucial that we restore a sense 
of unity between the executive and legislative 
branches and that we perform in such a man- 
ner that other countries know that we are 
dealing with them as a united people. 


Miss Walters: If ive turn now to Europe, 
our base in the Portugiiese Azores was esseyi- 
tial to the military airlift of aid to Israel in 
the October war. Portugal has said she may 
not allow this to happen again. 

Secretary Kissinger: She said she will not 
allow it. 

Miss Walters: Do we have alternate plans? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have alternate 
possibilities, but they are much more com- 
plicated and involve a much longer route. 

Miss Walters: Are you very concerned 
about this? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is an additional 
problem in case there is a Middle East war. 

Miss Walters: What are our relations noiv 
with Portugal? What do you see happening 
with this? 

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in Por- 
tugal is in a state of evolution. There recently 
were elections which indicated gratifyingly 
that a majority of the Portuguese people 
favored the democratic parties. It is also a 
fact that the government has a very heavy 
Communist influence, out of proportion to 
the numerical strength that the party repre- 
sents. So we have to assess what the foreign 
policy of Portugal will be before we can make 
any final decisions. 

Miss Walters: You will be visiting and try- 
ing to reassess our relations ivith NATO, our 
participation in NATO. Do you expect Turkey 
and Greece to remain in NATO? Realistically, 
as things are noiv? 

Secretary Kissinger: I hope very much that 
Greece and Turkey will stay in NATO. I 
think it is in their self-interest to stay in 
NATO, but the national passions are very 
great. They are now negotiating in Vienna — 
the Greek and Turkish communities in Cy- 
prus are negotiating in Vienna. We hope that 
during the NATO summit the President and 
others will have an opportunity to exchange 
views with the Greek and Turkish leaders, 
and we hope that we can play a role in mov- 
ing things toward a negotiated outcome. 

Miss Walters: But you have expressed 
yourself as being very gloomy about what 
you see as the decline and erosion of the free 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it has been al- 

Miss Walters: It has been alleged. All 
right. Are you? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is not always true. 

Miss Walters: It has been alleged that you 
are gloomy about what you see as the decline 
and erosion of the free world. Is this true, 
that you feel this way? 

Secretary Kissinger: As a matter of fact, 
it is ; it is partly true. It is not so much ero- 
sion of the free world. I think if we look 
around the world today that in many coun- 
tries Marxist ideologies and perceptions of 
the world which are contrary to our values 
are gaining in strength and that therefore 
we have in the world both a political prob- 
lem and a philosophical problem; that is, a 
problem of the degree to which we appear 
relevant to other countries. 

In Europe, in some European countries, 
the left is gaining in strength. I am stating 
this clinically, as a fact. I am not stating that 
necessarily the United States can do a great 
deal about it. It is something to be noted. 

Miss Walters: If it happens, if it kept 

May 26, 1975 


growing little by little, will it reach us? Has 
it reached us? 

Secretary Kissinger: Will it? The United 
States cannot be an island in this world any 
longer. We are tied to the rest of the world 
through the necessities of security, increas- 
ingly by the imperatives of economics, and 
inevitably by the modern means of communi- 

So I would suppose that the intellectual and 
philosophical currents in the world will soon- 
er or later affect the United States and then 
it is a question of what other currents exist 
here to deal with them. 

Miss Walters: As a historian, do you see us 
going more to the left or more toivard the 
right? How do you see the trends? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think we are 
becoming socialistic in this country. This is 
not at all a trend. But we have had a very 
sharp division in this country which for- 
merly centered around Viet-Nam, but for 
which Viet-Nam was really a symbol be- 
tween a more radical trend and a more con- 
servative trend. And for one of the rare 
occasions in our history the contest was 
fought out in almost — it sometimes took 
extralegal forms on both sides. 

Now, I think it is too early to tell in which 
direction it goes in this country because in 
this country the traditional element is very 
strong. It is a country that has very great 
faith in its existing values. So it could really 
go in either direction. But the major point 
that I would like to make is that we have the 
great advantage over many other countries 
that our divisions are not yet unbridgeable 
and that people on both sides of political 
dividing lines can still talk to each other. 

I think we must preserve this and try to 
develop common positions rather than be- 
come, as so many other countries, divided 
into ideological blocs. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, is there any 
difference between the foreign policy of 
President Nixon and President Ford, and if 
so, how do they differ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The foreign policy of 
a great country cannot be changed at the 

whim of individuals. And if it is perceived 
that every President starts an entirely new 
foreign policy, that in itself will create an 
element of instability in the world. 

So if you look at the entire American post- 
war foreign policy, you will find that the 
changes in the major directions of the for- 
eign policy haven't been all that significant. 

What is different between various Presi- 
dents is the style, the method of doing busi- 
ness; and when new problems come up they 
must make their own decisions. 

Miss Walters: Is there anything signif- 
cayitly different between these tivo men that 
you can see in the ivay that they handle 
foreign policy that influences you, that 
changes the direction ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would think 
that in the conduct of shaping, that in shap- 
ing a domestic consensus. President Ford 
would, on the whole, be more conciliatory. 

Miss Walters: Well, it is considered in gen- 
eral that he is weaker in foreign policy than 
President Nixon. In his last speech there 
was a good deal of feeling that President 
Ford was going to put his oivn implant on 
foreign policy, but what he did was to put 
Henry Kissinger's impact. You read the 
papers, so yo2t know what I am saying. 

Secretary Kissinger: This is the sort of 
gossip that comes out of every White House. 
President Ford worked on this speech for 
many weeks. He spent days and nights on 
that speech, with many advisers. 

Now, if advisers choose to put out that 
there were different points of view which 
were never apparent in the room and that 
one adviser prevailed, this makes a dramatic 
story; but it is not true. This speech reflected 
the convictions of President Ford. 

Miss Walters: You did not go in the last 
few days and — 

Secretary Kissinger: That is nonsense. 

Miss Walters: — keep yourself in the 
White House and make the final impact and 

Secretary Kissinger: That is nonsense. 


Department of State Bulletin 

There was only one draft of the speech. I 
never heard any philosophical disagreements 
stated while I was in the room, nor did I 
change anything that already existed. It was 
predominantly a speech by President Ford 
which various of his advisers helped to draft. 

Miss Walters: Is he as knowledgeable 
about foreign policy as President Nixon? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think he would be 
the first to admit that when he came into 
office he was not as knowledgeable about 
foreign policy. On the other hand, he spends 
an enormous amount of his time on foreign 
policy. He moves with great deliberation, 
great care, and great thoroughness; and he 
masters the subjects of foreign policy with 
extraordinary attention and skill. 

Miss Walters: I am going to be visiting 
Cuba as this interview is aired. I tvill be 
going with Senator [Georgre] McGovern and 
some other reporters. This week the Orga- 
nization of American States meets here in 
Washington, and high on their list is a reas- 
sessment of the economic blockade of Cuba. 
It is suspected if Latin America does this 
we will go along. What would you want Cuba 
to do to establish normalcy, and if I do see 
Premier Castro, is there anything that I can 
ask him for you, for us ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Castro is without 
any question a remarkable man. I think it 
is important for Americans to understand 
that individuals who go into the mountains 
to lead a revolution are not motivated by 
economic considerations. If they were, they 
would be bank presidents and not revolu- 

We have made clear to Cuba that we are 
prepared to improve our relations. We have 
made certain gestures to Cuba, so far not 
reciprocated. We are prepared to discuss 
with the other countries of the Organization 
of American States the question of blockade, 
the economic blockade, and to enable them to 
express their majority view on this subject. 

But I think, Barbara, that Castro knows 
how to get in touch with us. I don't want 
to make it too tempting for him by using 
you as an intermediary. 


Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, let's talk 
about you and the criticism that is all around 
you at this point. 

Secretary Kissinger: All unjustified. That 
is my position, and I will maintain it. 

Miss Walters: Well, let's start. It has been 
said that by your holding two positions — 
Secretary of State and 7mtional security ad- 
viser — the President doesn't have the benefit 
of hearing diverse vieivs on foreign policy. 
That is a legitimate point of view. 

Secretary Kissinger: Leaving aside now 
the question of whether a man should hold 
two positions and addressing the question of 
does the President get diverse advice on 
foreign policy, the whole purpose of the na- 
tional security system as it exists is to make 
sure that the President gets every significant 
point of view that exists in the bureaucracy. 
Typically when a major decision has to be 
made, there will be first a paper in which 
every agency expresses its view, after which 
there will be a meeting of the National Se- 
curity Council at which every agency is 
represented. So the possibility of keeping 
anything from the President does not exist. 
And, moreover, any person who has been in 
a senior position for any length of time 
knows that it is essential for the President 
to make sure that the President has heard 
conflicting points of view because, if he 
doesn't and anything goes wrong for a rea- 
son which you didn't tell the President, his 
whole confidence in the policy will be under- 

Miss Walters: All right. Now you have 
often said when we have talked in the past 
about how you present things, how you pre- 
se7ited things to President Nixon, that you 
outlined all the possibilities but you also 
made recommendations. You are wearing 
two hats. Should you be? If you were stand- 
ing out there somewhere looking at this one 
man holding two jobs, do you really think 
it is best that he hold both of them? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I want 

Moy 26, 1975 


to make clear that the Secretary of Defense, 
the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, and any other official who believes 
he has something relevant to say has very 
easy access to this President. It is not being 
blocked. Secondly, the decisions are made at 
meetings at which everybody is present. If 
the President wants to ask for my recom- 
mendations, he doesn't ask in what capacity 
he is asking it. Therefore the question can- 
not be answered in the abstract. 

I agree with what the President said. If 
there is an individual who can handle both 
jobs and has the confidence of the President, 
the President should have the option of com- 
bining it. He should not be forced to either 
combine it or to separate it. He should have 
that option. 

Miss Walters: Wotdd you resign if either 
of these jobs were taken aivay from you? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is not a 
time to talk about my resigning. 

Miss Walters: I am going to have to he- 
cause other people are, Mr. Secretary. Sena- 
tor Frank Church, the leading Democrat in 
the Foreign Relations Committee, has called 
for your resignation as has the former Sec- 
retary of Defense Clark Clifford. Hoiv do you 
react to men of this stature saying the coun- 
try would be better off without you? I would 
like to know how you react as the Secretary 
of State and how you react as Henry Kissin- 
ger when you walk out of the room. 

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Church, as 
I understand it, didn't ask for my resigna- 
tion. He said we should change our policies 
or I should resign. I think that whether I 
resign or not depends on two factors: One, 
on the President's views as to my utility; 
and secondly, on my assessment of whether 
I am serving the country. 

After one has been in Washington for six 
and a half years as I have, under extremely 
difficult and sometimes passionate circum- 
stances, holding a job does not in itself hold 
any particular attraction. What I have to 
consider is the impact internationally if 
successively the President, Vice President, 
and the Secretary of State resign, and for 

what reason — what reasons are used to bring 
this about. 

Miss Walters: This intervieiv is going to 
run over a several-day period. I don't want 
to miss anything. Can I be assured that you 
will not resign between now and the end of 
the airing of this interview? Would you like 
to say something about it? 

Secretary Kissinger: I save my resigna- 
tions for visits to Salzburg. 

Miss Walters: You only resign in Austria, 
is that it? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, let's talk a 
little bit about you on a personal level now. 
You have been married notv, it is over a 
year, isn't it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Over a year, yes. 

Miss Walters: What has marriage brought 
you besides a very lovely ivife? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am very close to 
my wife. I think it has enormously contrib- 
uted to my peace of mind and to my ability 
to deal with temporary adversity. 

Miss Walters: Is there any particular 
criticism that you feel is particularly tinfair 
and that is prevalent and that you ivould 
like to answer? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't — I haven't 
really thought about this. 

Miss Walters: Perhaps the major one is 
that it has been personal diplomacy, that it 
is Henry Kissinger's personal one-to-one 
diplomacy and that hasn't worked. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, to 
say it has not worked is probably — 

Miss Walters: That is what your critics 

Secretary Kissinger: That is probably an 
overstatement. If you look at what has been 
done over the last six and one half years 
with China, with the Soviet Union, in energy, 
in food, in getting our troops out of Viet- 
Nam and our prisoners back, and in starting 
the process toward peace in the Middle East, 
I don't think it is correct to say that our 


Department of State Bulletin 

foreign policy hasn't worked. I don't want 
to identify our foreign policy with me per- 

Miss Walters: Everijone does. 

Secretary Kissinger: But I do not think 
Americans should accept the proposition that 
their foreign policy hasn't worked, because 
it has worked. We have had some setbacks, 
but nobody is batting 1.000. Most of our 
setbacks, many of our setbacks, have been 
caused by domestic problems. But on per- 
sonal diplomacy, all diplomacy is to some 
extent personal. 

Finally, the thing that probably will last 
longest, one of the aspects that will last 
longest is to get into the key positions of the 
Department of State the ablest younger peo- 
ple in the Department, so that I think now 
the Depai'tment of State has the most tough- 
minded and most forward-looking group it 
has had in 20 years. I am not working alone. 
I am working very closely with my asso- 

Miss Walters: Hoiv is your staff going to 
feel when they hear you complimenting 
them? Aren't they going to get the bends 
just from the change? 

Secretary Kissinger: I will make it up in 
private meetings. 

Miss Walters: In days past — 

Secretary Kissinger: One of my associates 
has said the highest praise they can get from 
me is the absence of abuse. 

Miss Walters: Are you really that tough? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am a perfectionist. 
I like to try to make people do things that 
they didn't think they could do. But most of 
my close associates also become close per- 
sonal friends. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, in days past 

you used to say — when we had conversations 
sometimes as well — that you wanted to leave 
office in a sense while you were ahead to 
avoid the kind of controversy and pain, for 
example, that a man like Dean Rusk went 
through. Having said that in the past, do you 
feel sometimes, do you tvish, you could have 
left sooner? 

Secretary Kissinger: For me selfishly it 
would have been better if I had left sooner. 
But I think, if I may say so, that was at a 
perhaps more immature period of my life 
because I should look at this not from the 
point of view of what may be better for me 
but for what is better for the country. Right 
now in these circumstances to leave in a 
period of turmoil, w^hen people are looking 
for a sense of direction and when foreign 
nations are watching us, I think it would not 
be a service to the country if I left as long 
as the President has confidence in me and 
asks for me to stay. 

If I ever questioned that, I would leave 
very quickly and without any difficulty. 

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, you are a 
historian as well as a statesman. If you tvere 
writing the text, what was Henry Kissin- 
ger's greatest contribtition and what was his 
greatest failure ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am sure there are 
several things that I wish I had done differ- 
ently, but w^hen you are in the middle of it 
I think it is dangerous to claim successes and 
premature to insist on failures. But there 
are, I suppose, several things I might have 
done differently. But the main lines of the 
policy — this I want to repeat— the main lines 
of the policy, if I had to do it over again, I 
would do again, substantially the same way, 
which may make me unreconstructed and 
may be one reason why I am at peace with 

May 26, 1975 


President Ford's News Conference of May 6 

Folloiving are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a netvs con- 
ference held by President Ford in the Old 
Executive Office Building on May 6.^ 

Q. Mr. President, what are the lessons of 
Viet-Nam in terms of