(navigation image)
Home American Libraries | Canadian Libraries | Universal Library | Community Texts | Project Gutenberg | Children's Library | Biodiversity Heritage Library | Additional Collections
Search: Advanced Search
Anonymous User (login or join us)
Upload
See other formats

Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




Superintendent of Documents 

us. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourlh-Class Rate 
Book 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



/-3: 



73, 



vm 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXm 



No. 1893 



October 6, 1975 



GLOBAL PEACE, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE UNITED STATES 
Address by Secretary Kissinger 493 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT CINCINNATI 

SEPTEMBER 17 509 

SECRETARY KISSINGER APPEARS 

BEFORE SOUTHERN GOVERNORS CONFERENCE 

Informal Rewarks and, Questions and Anstvers 516 



Boston Public Library 

NOV 18 Wt> 
DEPOSITORY 

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1893 
October 6, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washinston. D.C. 20402 

PRICE; 

yZ issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic ^42.50, foreign S53.15 

Sinjrle copy S.'j cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 
approve<l by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United States 



Address by Secretary Kissinger '^ 



Ohio has been described as the heart of 
Middle America and the breeding ground of 
Presidents. So it is not surprising that we 
have here today such outstanding represent- 
atives of the people of the Midwest as Con- 
gressmen Clancy, Kindness, and Gradison 
and two Senators who have so distinguished 
themselves in public service as to merit men- 
tion as potential nominees for the highest 
position in the land. 

It is a great honor to be here with Sena- 
tor Taft, who in every respect brings credit 
and added distinction to his esteemed family 
and his beloved city. 

John Glenn made a great contribution to 
his country and to mankind before he came 
to Washington and is destined for another 
distinguished career in the service of the 
nation. 

And as for me, the privilege of talking to 
five Members of Congress who have no op- 
portunity either to talk back or to question 
me makes the trip alone worthwhile. [Laugh- 
er and applause.] 

As America enters its 200th year as a 
free nation, our role has grown central to 
the peace and progress of the world. We 
have become the engine of the global econ- 
omy, the rock of security for those who 
share our values, the creative force in build- 
ing international institutions, and the pio- 
neer in science and technology. 



' Made on Sept. 16 at Cincinnati, Ohio, before a 
dinner meeting sponsored by the Greater Cincinnati 
Chamber of Commerce and 11 other area organiza- 
tions (text of the four introductory paragraphs from 
press release 482A; balance of address from press 
release 482). 



Americans have carried the burdens of 
world leadership for a generation. They have 
done so with dedication and good will but, 
understandably, they ask when and if their 
labors can cease. They want to know what 
our purposes are in international affairs. 
They sense that the world needs us, but they 
ask : Do we need the world ? 

The past three decades have taught us 
that our commitment to global leadership is 
not an act of choice, but a recognition of 
reality. Awesome weapons can span conti- 
nents in minutes. The international economic 
system thrives or declines as one. Conflict in 
faraway regions has vast political, security, 
and economic repercussions here at home. 
Communication makes us instantly aware of 
developments in every corner of the globe — 
of the travels of diplomats, the movement of 
troops, or the hunger of little children. World 
peace and American security, global well- 
being and American prosperity, have become 
virtually inseparable. 

The past thi-ee decades have also taught 
us that our contribution is indispensable. 
We cannot solve every problem, but few so- 
lutions are possible without us. Other coun- 
tries must do more, but we cannot ignore 
the responsibility that rests on us. If we do 
not help resist aggression, if we do not work 
for a dynamic world economy, if we do not 
promote liberty and justice, no other nation 
can — at least no other nation that shares our 
values. 

Americans have a right to be proud of how 
they have met this challenge. Through five 
Administrations of both political parties we 



October 6, 1975 



493 



led in assisting Europe and Japan recover 
from the devastation of the Second World 
War. We helped create a trading and mone- 
tary system that has spread prosperity in 
our own land and around the world. We 
forged alliances with the major democracies 
that have kept the global peace for a genera- 
tion. We have mediated and helped resolve 
conflicts. We have fed the hungry, educated 
men and women from other lands, and wel- 
comed those who fled oppression to our 
shores. With all humility we can say that no 
other nation in history has made comparable 
efforts on such a scale. 

The Design of Global Peace 

But history has rewarded our exertions 
with new challenges. The world has been 
transformed over the 30 years since World 
War II partly because of the success of this 
nation's policies. 

In the early years of the postwar period, 
we were militarily and economically the 
world's predominant power. Our allies were 
recovering; new nations were just coming 
into being; potential adversaries were re- 
strained by our nuclear supremacy. 

Today's world is radically difl'erent. The 
industrialized nations are strong and self- 
confident ; our alliances are cooperative en- 
deavors between equals. We have preserved 
the world balance of power — but in the 
process both superpowers have acquired the 
capacity to destroy civilized life in a matter 
of hours. The growth of the world's eco- 
nomic system has spread economic power 
more widely among the new nations; they 
seek a greater role in international affairs 
and a larger share of the world economy. 

The United States remains the largest 
single factor in international affairs. But we 
must learn what most other nations in his- 
tory have known: that one country can 
neither escape from the world nor dominate 
it. We can no longer overwhelm problems 
with our resources. We no longer have the 
luxury of simple choices. 

Thus, beyond the issues that make daily 
headlines, we have sought to conduct a for- 
eign policy that takes account of the funda- 
mental changes in the international order. 



We cannot afford oscillation between ex- 
tremes of crusading and isolation. We must 
maintain a steady course which offers hope 
for long-term international stability and 
progress, a course which Americans can sup- 
port, which gives courage to our allies and 
pause to our adversaries. 

Our first priority is the vigor of our alli- 
ances with the great democracies of the At- 
lantic community and Japan. We formed 
these ties a generation ago to protect weaker 
friends against military danger. Today we 
work together as equals on issues going far 
beyond security. We have coordinated our 
efforts to ease tensions with the East; we 
have built new institutions of energy co- 
operation ; we have developed common ap- 
proaches to the developing countries. And we 
have begun to harmonize our economic poli- 
cies to move together toward noninflationary 
economic recovery. The vitality of Western 
democracy and the solidarity of our alli- 
ances are an essential factor of global sta- 
bility. 

On the basis of allied cohesion and 
strength, we have also sought to place our 
relations with the Communist countries on 
a more stable and long-term basis. For 30 
years, mankind's hopes for peace and its 
fear of war have turned on the relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union. 

Today strategic nuclear parity has trans- 
formed international politics. Your govern- 
ment — in any Administration — must man- 
age a basic conflict of values and interests 
with the Soviet Union in the shadow of nu- 
clear holocaust. Never before in history have 
the weapons of war been so devastating — 
and so ill suited to the pursuit of spe- 
cific policy objectives. Therefore the United 
States has engaged the Soviet Union in nego- 
tiations on the limitation of strategic arma- 
ments. We have solved political disputes such 
as Berlin and restrained great-power con- 
flict in the Middle East to give both sides a 
continuing stake in positive political rela- 
tions. We have begun more normal contacts 
in trade and scientific, technical, and cul- 
tural exchanges. And we have regularized 
our consultations at the highest level. 

The necessity of coexistence in the shadow 



494 



Department of State Bulletin 



of nuclear peril does not mean a coincidence 
of moral purpose. This country knows the 
moral difference between freedom and tyr- 
anny. But we shall also never lose sight of 
the fact that in the age of nuclear weapons, 
peace, too, is a moral imperative. We shall 
insist on reciprocity, but we believe that in- 
centives for cooperation and penalties for 
intransigence are more effective than rhe- 
torical posturing. We shall keep our military 
strength second to none; but we will not 
succumb to the illusion that military power 
offers the final answer to international prob- 
lems. 

On the basis of firmness and flexibility, 
strength and willingness to negotiate, we 
shall strive to moderate conflicts and to bring 
a more secure world to future generations. 

As we have maintained alliance cohesion 
and begun to ease tensions with the Com- 
munist powers, a new dimension has been 
added to the spectrum of international issues 
before us: the future of the relationship be- 
tween developed and developing countries. 
The vast and growing problems of energy, 
food, raw materials, and economic develop- 
ment now face us in all their complexity, as 
the fundamental issues of the last quarter of 
the 20th century. 

These problems are not technical, or at 
bottom even economic. They go to the heart 
of the question of international order: 
whether the world can accommodate the 
needs of all nations, whether countries will 
regulate their affairs by cooperation or by 
confrontation, whether international rela- 
tions will reflect the search for mutual bene- 
fit and common progress or turn into tests 
of strength. The United States is in a better 
position than any other nation to go it alone 
or to face such a test of strength, but we 
know that ultimately the whole world will 
suffer. 

The United States has made its position 
clear. At the U.N. special session called to 
discuss these issues two weeks ago, I pledged 
our country to a cooperative, understanding 
approach. I said that we are prepared to work 
with other nations to put the technological 
and economic genius of the modern age into 
the service of all mankind. The United States 
is convinced that the developed and the 



developing nations working together can 
achieve through cooperation what neither 
can extort through economic warfare or ideo- 
logical pressure — economic advance for all 
our peoples. 

In this spirit, the United States presented 
a comprehensive and detailed program for 
economic and social cooperation to the spe- 
cial session. These proposals and this atti- 
tude will guide us in future discussions with 
the less developed nations. The results at 
the special session which just concluded to- 
day were constructive. Discussions took place 
in a conciliatory spirit, and the final docu- 
ment produced considerable convergence be- 
tween the developed and the developing 
countries and the outlines of a consumer 
program of action. 

Cooperation must remain a two-way street. 
If nations wield their special strengths as 
weapons, the promise of global progress will 
give way to the perils of global confronta- 
tion. 

The most critical immediate issue, of 
course, is the question of the price of oil. 
We and our partners in the International 
Energy Agency have already taken major 
steps to conserve oil and to establish finan- 
cial structures that will help us cope with 
the impact of rising oil prices. Much still 
remains to be done; but the United States, 
in cooperation with other industrial nations, 
will make a determined effort to reverse the 
conditions that have enabled oil prices to be 
set unilaterally. The United States can not 
and will not entrust its political and eco- 
nomic destiny to decisions made elsewhere. 

At the same time, we are ready to seek 
a new relationship with the oil-producing na- 
tions. We ought to be partners, not adver- 
saries. Consumers must have reliable access 
to oil supplies at reasonable prices. To invest 
their new oil wealth, the producers must be- 
come major importers of our products. We 
are ready to cooperate with the oil producers 
in linking our economies on equitable terms. 

Next month the oil producers, developing 
countries, and industrial countries will meet 
to launch a dialogue on energy, raw mate- 
rials, development, and finance first proposed 
by President Giscard d'Estaing of France. 
We have worked hard to make these meet- 



i 



October 6, 1975 



495 



ings possible. We will work hard to make 
them a success. They provide us the oppor- 
tunity to shape new constructive relation- 
ships in the world economy. 

But another oil price rise would severely 
jeopardize these hopes. It could set off a re- 
lentless sequence of action and reaction, to 
the detriment of all countries, developed and 
developing. This vicious cycle must be avoid- 
ed. The possibilities of a cooperative world 
order depend upon it. 

Peace in the Middle East 

There is no more vivid example of the 
stake that we have in the world around us, 
and the decisive contribution that this na- 
tion can make, than the conflict in the Mid- 
dle East. 

The Congress is now deliberating on the 
recent Egyptian-Israeli agreement. As it does 
so, it is important for the American people 
to understand why the United States is in- 
volved, what strategy we have pursued, the 
significance of the agreement, and where we 
will go from here. 

The Middle East lies at the crossroads of 
three continents. Because of the area's stra- 
tegic importance and because it provides the 
energy on which much of the world depends, 
outside powers have continued to involve 
themselves in its conflicts, often competi- 
tively. 

For the United States a diplomatic role in 
the Middle East is not a preference, but a 
matter of vital interest: 

— Because of our historical and moral com- 
mitment to the survival and security of 
Israel ; 

— Because of our important concerns in 
the Arab world, an area of more than 150 
million people and the site of the world's 
largest oil reserves; 

— Because perpetual crisis in the Middle 
East would severely strain our relations with 
our most important allies in Europe and 
Japan ; 

— Because upheaval in the Middle East 
jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic 
recovery, threatening the well-being of the 
industrial nations and the hopes of the de- 
veloping world; and 



— Because tension in the Middle East in- 
creases the prospect of direct U.S.-Soviet 
confrontation with its attendant nuclear risk. 

Each successive Middle East crisis has 
presented us with painful choices between 
our many commitments and interests. And 
each successive crisis accelerates the trends 
of radicalism in the area, putting greater 
pressures on America's friends in the mod- 
erate Arab world, and heightening all the 
tensions and dangers. 

The stake of every American in peace in 
the Middle East was dramatically and con- 
cretely illustrated by the Middle East war 
of 1973: 

— The oil embargo, coupled with the OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries] price increases, cost Americans half a 
million jobs and over $10 billion in national 
output. It added at least five percentage 
points to the price index, contributing to the 
w^orst inflation since World War II. It set the 
stage for a serious worldwide recession, from 
which we are only now recovei'ing two years 
later. 

— Partly because of their greater depend- 
ence on Middle East oil, our principal allies 
in Western Europe and Japan separated from 
us over Middle East policy, in the most 
serious strain in our alliances since they 
were founded. 

—The 1973 crisis tested the course of U.S.- 
Soviet relations, leading us briefly to the 
verge of confrontation in the October 24 
alert. 

The October war also set in train momen- 
tum that is now irreversible. Events can be 
channeled toward diplomatic progress, or 
they can pull us headlong toward another 
war. 

This is why the United States since Octo- 
ber 1973 has been actively engaged in pro- 
moting a peaceful solution. 

We have no illusions about the difficulties. 
The Middle East has seen more than its 
share of dashed hopes and disappointment. 
But progi'ess depends crucially — even de- 
cisively — on the United States. Time and 
again the parties have turned to us for 
mediation. Time and again we have acceded 



496 



Department of State Bulletin 



to these requests because we are convinced 
that stagnation invites disaster. The next 
Middle East war will pose greater risks, 
complexities, and dangers and cause more 
dislocations than any previous conflict. 

What, then, has been our approach? 

For nearly three decades it was axiomatic 
that all issues pertaining to oU the countries 
involved had to be addressed comprehen- 
sively: the final frontiers of Israel and the 
reciprocal guarantees of peace of the Arab 
states, the future of the Palestinians, the 
status of Jerusalem, and the question of in- 
ternational guarantees should all be con- 
.sidered together. 

But for 30 years it proved nearly impos- 
sible even to begin the process of negotia- 
tion. Every attempt to discuss a comprehen- 
sive solution failed — from the partition plan, 
to the Lausanne conference [1949], to the 
Rogers plan and the Four-Power talks of 
1969 and 1970, to the U.N. Security Council 
deliberations. To discuss simultaneously is- 
sues of such complexity, between countries 
whose deep mutual mistrust rejected even 
the concept of compromise, was futile until 
a minimum of confidence had been estab- 
lished. In the long history of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, it is a new and relatively recent de- 
velopment that opinion in the Arab world 
has begun to think in terms of recognizing 
a sovereign Israel and that Israel has begun 
to see peace as a tangible goal rather than 
a distant dream. 

The United States therefore concluded that 
instead of seeking to deal with all problems 
at once, we should proceed step by step with 
the parties prepared to negotiate and on 
the issues where some room for maneuver 
seemed possible. We believed that once the 
parties began a negotiating process they 
would develop a stake in success. Solutions 
to problems more easily negotiable would 
build mutual confidence. On each side a sense 
would grow that negotiations could produce 
benefits and that agreements would be kept 
-agreements that could become building 
blocks for a final peace. 

Ultimately we expected that the step-by- 
step process would bring about, for the first 
time, the basic political conditions needed for 
the overall settlement called for by Security 



Council Resolution 338. This remains our 
goal. 

Progress since the October war has been 
without precedent since the beginning of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Security Council 
Resolution 338 launched a negotiating proc- 
ess and the first Geneva Conference. Agree- 
ments to separate the opposing forces and 
establish U.N. buffer zones to strengthen the 
cease-fire were successfully negotiated be- 
tween Egypt and Israel in January 1974 and 
between Syria and Israel in May 1974. 

The role of the United States was crucial 
in helping the parties reach these agree- 
ments. It reflected the fact that only we had 
developed strong relationships of trust with 
all parties. Major Arab countries that broke 
diplomatic relations with the United States 
in 1967 moved in 1973 and 1974 to restore 
their ties with us, creating a new climate of 
confidence and thereby the conditions for 
progress. And our traditional friendship with 
Israel has been reinforced in the crucible of 
crisis and the long months of close associa- 
tion in negotiations. 

The momentum of progress was inter- 
rupted in the summer and fall of 1974: first 
by our Presidential succession, then by the 
decision of the Arab summit at Rabat which 
made negotiations over the West Bank im- 
possible. 

When negotiations were resumed in March 
of this year, they first ended in deadlock. 
We therefore reexamined our approach, ask- 
ing whether we should continue the step-by- 
step strategy or move directly to the Geneva 
Conference and a comprehensive approach. 
The imminent crisis we feared as a result of 
the March deadlock did not materialize — 
almost solely because everyone expected that 
the United States, in one way or another, 
would resume its effort. 

The President consulted widely — with con- 
gi'essional and civic leaders, with our Ambas- 
sadors from the area, and with the Middle 
East parties. He met with King Hussein, 
Pi'esident Sadat, Prime Minister Rabin, and 
Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. We bene- 
fited from the views of the new Saudi lead- 
ership, which is continuing the policy of the 
highly respected late King Faisal. 

The President concluded that the time was 



October 6, 1975 



497 



still not ripe for a comprehensive approach. 
In the wake of an apparent failure, the in- 
tractability of the issues would only be com- 
liounded by their being combined. Bringing 
all the parties, including the most irrecon- 
cilable, together in one dramatic public nego- 
tiation was an invitation to a deepened stale- 
mate. This could discredit the whole process 
of negotiation and create a slide toward war. 
It was widely understood that the momentum 
of diplomatic progress had to be restored 
l)efore Geneva was convened to consider the 
broader issues. 

New Egypt-Israel Agreement 

Therefore, at the request of both sides the 
United States resumed its step-by-step effort. 
The result was the new agreement between 
Egypt and Israel which was signed in Ge- 
neva on September 4. 

The agreement is fair and balanced: 

— Territorially, it provides for withdrawal 
of Israeli forces from the eastern coast of 
the Gulf of Suez and from the strategic 
Sinai passes. Egypt recovers a significant 
portion of its territory. Including the eco- 
nomically important oilfields. 

— Militarily, the agreement reaffirms the 
cease-fire. It widens the buffer zone and ex- 
tends the limitations of forces that were 
negotiated in the disengagement agreement 
of January 1974. These balanced provisions 
markedly reduce the danger of surprise at- 
tack that figured centrally in the wars of 
1967 and 1973. 

— Politically, the agreement, which re- 
mains in force until it is superseded by an- 
other one, commits both sides to a peaceful 
solution to the Middle East conflict and to 
refrain from u.se or threat of force or of 
military blockade. It permits nonmilitary 
Israeli cargoes to go through the newly re- 
opened Suez Canal. 

Both Prime Minister Rabin and President 
Sadat have hailed the agreement as a pos- 
sible turning point. It represents the most 
far-reaching practical test of peace — politi- 
cal, military, and psychological — in the his- 
tory of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For the first 
time, Israel and an Arab state have taken a 



step not just to halt fighting or to disen- 
tangle forces but to reduce the danger of 
future war and to commit themselves tv. 
peaceful settlement of the conflict. The efi'ort 
that went into it and the inhibitions that 
both sides had to overcome reflect a serious 
determination to end a generation of vio- 
lence. And both sides have affirmed that the 
agreement is a significant step in a process 
that must be continued toward a just and 
durable peace. 

The achievement owes much to the cour- 
age of leaders on both sides. 

President Sadat and his government moved 
Egypt on the path of moderation and de- 
velopment; they have understood that a po- 
litical process offered the only realistic hope 
for the achievement of all Arab interests. 

Credit is due equally to the courage of 
Prime Minister Rabin and the Government 
of Israel. Israel's dilemma is that to obtain 
peace it must give up tangible assets such 
as territory for intangible concessions such 
as assurances and recognition. Israel's lead- 
ers realized that only negotiation offered a 
hope to achieve what Israel has sought for 
27 years — new political conditions that would 
mean acceptance by its neighbors, in return 
for withdrawal from territory. They had the 
wisdom to recognize that the time had come 
to start this difficult, even painful process. 

The presence of 200 civilian Americans to 
assist with the early-warning system in the 
small area of the passes is a limited — but 
crucial — American responsibility. It was not 
a role we sought. We accepted it at the re- 
quest of both sides only when it became 
totally clear that there would be no agree- 
ment without it and only on carefully limited 
terms. We agreed because failure would have 
posed grave risks for the United States. 

In the aftermath of Indochina the con- 
cerns of some Americans about this presence 
are understandable. But the two cases are 
totally different. The American presence in 
the Sinai is not a step into conflict; it is a 
move which gives added insurance against 
conflict. It is limited to 200 volunteer civil- 
ians by agreement with both sides. They will 
be stationed in a small but important sector 
of the U.N. neutral zone. They are not com- 
bat personnel or advisers engaged on one side 



498 



Department of State Bulletin 



of an ongoing war. They serve both sides at 
their request and complement the U.N. pres- 
ence from such countries as Canada, Sweden, 
Austria, and Finland. 

Our presence in the area is not new. In- 
deed, 36 Americans are at this moment serv- 
ing with the United Nations Truce Super- 
vision Organization in the Middle East. 
Americans have been serving in this capac- 
ity for over 25 years. 

The agreement provides the President the 
right to withdraw the American personnel if 
they are in jeopardy. We are prepared, as 
well, to accept a congi-essional proposal mak- 
ing the withdrawal mandatory in case of 
hostilities. 

In short, what we have proposed to the 
Congress and the American people is not an 
engagement in war, but an investment in 
peace. 

Military and Economic Assistance 

There will also be deliberation in the Con- 
gress over military and economic assistance 
to the parties. We will submit our recom- 
mendations within a month. This assistance 
is not part of the agreement itself. Indeed, 
most of the assistance we shall request would 
have been sought even if there were no 
agreement. But in the present context our 
aid takes on new significance; it is central to 
our policy and vital to the chances for a 
lasting peace in the Middle East. 

Economic and military support for Israel's 
security has been American policy during 
five Administrations. Last May, 76 U.S. Sen- 
ators wrote to President Ford urging that 
the United States "be responsive to Israel's 
urgent economic and military needs." The 
Administration's request for new assistance 
to Israel is responsive to this call ; it will re- 
flect longstanding criteria of assistance ; only 
a small part grows out of new requirements 
arising from the agreement. 

The case for aid to Egypt is equally strong. 
Egypt has taken important steps toward 
peace and closer relations with the West. 
Egypt deserves our encouragement. Ameri- 
can technology and capital, public and pri- 
vate, can strengthen all the constructive tend- 



encies in the Middle East. The .symbolic and 
substantive significance of American support 
to Egypt is immeasurable. 

Thus, the additional burden of U.S. assist- 
ance is modest, infinitely smaller than the 
demonstrated costs of another war — which 
in 1973 required direct appropriations to 
Israel of $2.2 billion in addition to the indi- 
rect costs. But its role is crucial. It reduces 
the incentives for war; it, too, is an invest- 
ment in peace. 

Continuing Process Toward Peace 

Where do we go from here? 

The Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a step 
in a continuing process. The agreement states 
explicitly that the parties shall continue the 
negotiating efforts to reach an overall final 
peace settlement in accordance with Resolu- 
tion 338. 

The path ahead will be difficult. In the im- 
mediate future, we must begin the imple- 
mentation of the Egj^ptian-Israeli agree- 
ment. This must await the deliberation and 
decision of the Congress. When this is set- 
tled and if the agreement goes into effect, 
we will start our consultations with all con- 
cerned to assure that there is consensus on 
the next step. We will not move precipitously, 
because we want confidence to build. We will 
not move without careful preparation, be- 
cause we want the process to continue to 
succeed. 

But the effort to achieve a lasting peace 
must resume. The Egyptian-Israeli agree- 
ment has created new opportunities for the 
future — but these opportunities must be 
seized, or they will disappear. The United 
States did not help negotiate this agreement 
in order to put an end to the process of peace, 
but to give it new impetus. There can be no 
stagnation, for the area remains tense and 
volatile. 

For our part, we stand ready to assist 
as the parties desire. We will seriously en- 
courage a negotiation between Syria and 
Israel. We are prepared to consult all coun- 
tries concerned, including the Soviet Union, 
about the timing and substance of a recon- 
vened Geneva Conference. And we are fully 
aware that there will be no permanent peace 



October 6, 1975 



499 



unless it includes arrangements that take 
into account the legitimate interests of the 
Palestinian people. 

The United States seeks no special ad- 
vantage in the Middle East. It has always 
been our policy that the nations of the re- 
gion should be free to determine their own 
relationships with any outside power. There- 
fore the United States would not understand, 
and would be obliged to oppose, efforts by any 
outside power to thwart the Egyptian-Israeli 
agreement. 

In the search for a final peace, the United 
States is prepai'ed to work with the Soviet 
Union. We are cosponsors of the Security 
Council resolutions that launched this hope- 
ful course of negotiation ; we are cochairmen 
of the Geneva Peace Conference, which met 
at an early crucial phase. While we have had 
important differences with the Soviet Union 
over the substance of a settlement, our two 
countries have held parallel views that the 
Middle East situation poses grave dangers 
and that partial steps must be part of, and 
contribute to, progress toward a comprehen- 
sive solution. 

In the Middle East there is a yearning for 
peace surpassing any known for a genera- 
tion. Let us seize this historic opportunity. 
Tiie suffering and bravery of the peoples of 
the Middle East demand it; the highest in- 
terests of the United States require it. 

This is why the American people, their 
Congress, and the President are, to an ex- 
traordinary degree, united on the course of 
our Middle East policy. And this is w-hy we 
will not cease our effort. 



American Leadership and American Unity 

Ladies and gentlemen, we Americans have 
spent the better part of a decade apologiz- 
ing to ourselves and the world for what we 
thought we had become. We have spent most 
of the last three years enmeshed in a na- 
tional tragedy that caused many to lose sight 
of what our country has meant, and con- 
tinues to mean, to the billions abroad who 
look to the United States as a beacon of free- 
dom and hope. 



Today the issues that threatened our unity 
and confidence are in the process of being 
put behind us. A world of turmoil, danger, 
and opportunity cries out for our purposeful 
leadership. There is no doubt of our physical 
capacity and technical skill. But we must 
put them in the service of a common pur- 
pose. 

After a decade of challenge and crises, we 
must strive to insure that our government 
will be united, that our people will have con- 
fidence, that our country will be strong, and 
that our freedoms will flourish. As we enter 
the year of a political campaign at home — 
in an era of unprecedented challenge abroad 
— a spirit of unity and bipartisanship be- 
comes our international as well as national 
duty. We cannot afford a year and a half of 
partisan warfare. Our foreign policy must 
be a common enterprise of all Americans, for 
what we do — or fail to do — will inevitably 
affect events for many years to come. 

If the past two years of effort in the Mid- 
dle East have lessened the dangers of war 
and set that part of the world on the road 
to peace— as I pray they have — it is the 
United States that has made the difference. 
It is the United States alone among the 
world's nations that Israel and its Arab 
neighbors were prepared to trust. It has been 
deeply moving for me to observe, after all 
the travails and self-doubts of the last dec- 
ade, the confidence that others have in us. 
The nations of the Middle East have thus 
done us a service, in reminding us of how 
in serving our international responsibility we 
also serve our own highest goals. 

In the final analysis it is our own prin- 
ciples and hopes that define our obligation. 
America has always stood for something be- 
yond our own material success: we have al- 
ways believed — correctly — that we meant 
something to others. Our Founding Fathers 
spoke of the rights and hopes of all men. 
Our belief in the inalienable rights of man 
is no less compelling today — no less worthy 
of sacrifice — than it was 200 years ago when 
a few dreamers came together in Philadel- 
phia to proclaim history's only truly perma- 
nent revolution. 



500 



Department of State Bulletin 



Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Cincinnati Address 

I'lt^s iflea.se 482B dated September 16 

William M. Liggett, president of the Greater 
Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce: Dr. Kis- 
singer has now kindly consented to field your 
quest ions. If we can have the first question, 
we will proceed with the question period. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems the Portuguese 
situation may he in the process of solving it- 
self without too much U.S. help. May we 
conclude from this that it represents a new 
direction in the U.S. foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: If you are Secretary 
of State, you take credit for whatever hap- 
pens, even if it is not done with U.S. help. 

The situation in Portugal has had a long 
history. It ai'ose out of a protracted colonial 
war and an authoritarian regime that failed 
to respond to popular wishes. When the rev- 
olution occurred last April, the Communist 
Party, which had been in opposition, emerged 
as the best organized, though not the most 
numerical, party. In addition, many of the 
officers who had served in Africa had also 
come back with authoritarian ideas, partly 
because military service does not always in- 
spire ideas of democracy. 

The result has been that for the greatei- 
part of this period the Communist Party ac- 
quired a disproportionate influence. And for 
a while it looked as if they would become the 
dominant force. 

In recent months, our West European al- 
lies and we have made it clear to the mod- 
erate forces in Portugal and to the political 
parties in Portugal that we supported their 
eifort to create a democratic pluralistic soci- 
ety. This may have encouraged them to re- 
sist more strongly and to bring about a 
better evolution. But the problem is far from 
solved and will continue to require substan- 
tial efforts on everybody's part. 

Q. Dr. Kissitiger, my question is: With the 
economy of the country as it is today, where 
will the dollars come from to support your 
Mideast policy, and what ivill be the ongoing 
effect on the economy? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, the points that 
I made in my speech are that the additional 
costs of the settlement in the Middle East 
are negligible and that the cost of a conflict 
in the Middle East would be enormous. It is 
not that aid to Israel and Egypt are new 
charges on our budget as a result of this 
agreement. It is rather that these have been 
figures which we have been appropriating 
year after year. Last year the total aid voted 
for Israel amounted to $2.5 billion, which is 
more than we will be asking for this year 
after the agreement. So the sums that we 
are talking about for the Middle East are 
this time in the context of a move toward 
peace rather than to continue an endless 
stalemate, and they are a better investment 
than would be the case under conditions of 
stalemate, and a much better investment 
than if it drifted toward war. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the re- 
cently negotiated treaty bettveen Israel and 
Egypt puts the United States in a more 
powerful bargaining position with the OPEC 
countries [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries'^ ; and if so, ivhy ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the primary 
reason why we have been involved in these 
negotiations in the Middle East is because 
the demonstrated consequences to the United 
States of a conflict in the Middle East have 
immediate effects on our security and a 
major effect on our economy. In addition, it 
may be that the United States is in a some- 
what better bargaining position with at least 
some of the OPEC countries that are inter- 
ested in this conflict. 

But I want to make clear that our motiva- 
tion is not the pressure from the oil-produc- 
ing countries and that we do not let our for- 
eign policy be determined by the price of oil. 
If there are any benefits, they are indirect, 
and they were not the basic motivation of 
our negotiations. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger — 

Secretary Kissinger: I think this group is 
more disciplined than the one on my left. 
[Laughter.] 



October 6, 1975 



501 



Q. George Ball, writing in Neivsiveek, has 
taken the position that the interim agreement 
between Egypt and Israel precludes the possi- 
bilit)/ of a long-range settlement with the 
other Arab nations becaiise all possibilities 
for compromise have been exhausted notv. 
What is ijonr reaction to Mr. Ball's position ? 

Secretarij Kissinger: Well, I am not in 
complete agreement with Mr. Ball. [Laugh- 
ter.] He seems to be saying that we should 
not make the agreements that we could be 
making, in order to reserve their possibilities 
for some future time. 

The problem of making a permanent peace 
in the Middle East has the same elements 
with or without the agreement. But with 
this agreement the tension is less, the pres- 
sures of an imminent war are reduced, and 
the other Arab countries, after the period of 
turmoil that inevitably followed this agree- 
ment, may come to realize — and we hope will 
come to realize — that the process of modera- 
tion is the only hope of bringing the conflict 
to a conclusion and achieving their goals. 

So I cannot fully accept all the arguments 
made by Mr. Ball. In fact, I cannot accept 
any of them. [Laughter and applause.] 

Q. Do yon agree that it is time ive lifted 
the embargo against Cuba? 

Secretarij Kissinger: Our policy toward 
Cuba is that we are prepared to move grad- 
ually toward an improvement of relations on 
the basis of reciprocity. 

There have been two kinds of embargoes 
against Cuba. There have been the American 
sanctions ; there have been the OAS [Organi- 
zation of American States] sanctions. An 
increasing number of OAS countries have 
gone ahead to ignore the OAS sanctions ; and 
as a result, we agreed to an OAS resolution 
in Costa Rica in July which leaves each coun- 
try free to do what it wants to do — which 
was exactly the situation before the resolu- 
tion, except that it now makes it legal. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
we will not lift the sanctions as the first step 
in the process; but we are prepared to dis- 
cuss an improvement of our relationship 
that could in time lead to a lifting of the 
sanctions. 

502 



Q. Hello, Dr. Kissinger, it's nice to see you 
in Cincinnati. 

Secretary Kissinger: Nice to see you. 

Q. And I apologize for my long question. 

What can we, as patriotic Americans and 
inheritors of a humane, democratic tradition, 
do to foster understanding among our fellow 
men and give constructive aid to our elected 
representatives so that the programs which 
promote eqiiality and peace among the na- 
tions will not get bogged doion in selfish mis- 
representation by the media, slanted inter- 
ests, and political power plays? [Laughter 
and applause.'\ 

Secretary Kissinger: I think what you are 
doing here is a very good way of going about 
it. [Laughter.] 

Q. I saw you last Monday in Washington. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you please explain 
the Russian sporadic grain buying, and can 
we get them to trade oil for grain? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Russian sporadic 
grain buying is explained by the fact that in 
the past they have only purchased American 
grain when their own harvest fell short ; and 
this seems to have happened in cycles of 
every three or four years. In the interim, 
they did very little buying. 

We feel that the massive entry of the 
Soviet Union into our grain market at irregu- 
lar intervals puts an excessive burden on our 
consumers and makes it very difficult for us 
to take account of all the requirements both 
of our consumers and of other traditional 
customers. 

It is for this reason that we have proposed 
to the Soviet Union that they negotiate with 
us a long-term grain agreement with lower 
and upper limits, which would enable our 
farmers to do their planning and which would 
minimize the impact on the American con- 
sumers and still keep us free to supply our 
traditional customers such as Japan. 

We are now in the process of negotiating 
such an agreement, which is of benefit to us, 
even on its own merit, unrelated to any- 
thing else. 

At the same time, we are having prelimi- 

Department of State Bulletin 



V 






nary discussions about the purchase of some 
Soviet oil. These discussions are not yet ad- 
vanced to a point where we can draw any 
conclusions about their feasibility, but they 
are being undertaken. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, many people regret the 
lack of attention to our Latin American 
neighbors in your own administration of the 
State Department, and, in truth, in all recent 
U.S. foreign policy. Woidd you explain this 
inattention? Our hope is that you and Nancy 
will take a shuttle weekend down there some- 
time. [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course you will 
never find an official who will admit that his 
policy is anything than the best that can be 
jjursued. [Laughter.] 

I would not agree that there has been inat- 
tention to Latin America. It is, of course, 
true that not every policy in every area of the 
world can be pursued with equal intensity. 
But in fact we attach great importance to 
our relationships in the Western Hemisphere. 
In fact, two years ago we started something 
called the new dialogue between Latin Amer- 
ica and the United States, because of our 
conviction that if the relationship between 
developing and developed countries is going 
to work anywhere, it ought to work in the 
Western Hemisphere, where we are dealing 
with countries of comparable background, 
comparable aspirations. 

There have been setbacks — some of th?m 
caused by some legislative actions here, some 
of them caused by the tendency of Latin 
American countries to seek their identity in 
opposition to the United States — so that the 
process has not been smooth. But we are 
committed to improving relationships in the 
Western Hemisphere. We are trying to de- 
velop a new relationship, and it is a process, 
as in all relations between the developed and 
developing countries, that runs up against 
prickly self-esteem and a historical legacy — 
but on which perhaps not very dramatic, 
steady progress is being made. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I am interested in the 
question of: What is the effect of continuing 
Federal Government borrowing on the money 
market, and also the creation of new capital ? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, it used to be said 
that my knowledge of economics was an ar- 
gument against universal suffrage. [Laugh- 
ter.] And I tended to believe that until I 
started dealing with the economists. [Laugh- 
ter and applause.] 

But for the sake of good relations with my 
friend the Secretary of the Treasury, I had 
better not make policy pronouncements about 
the impact of his borrowing on the capital 
market — though experts have told me that 
it is not healthy. [Laughter and applause.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in light of your remarks 
this eveyiing and with the new interim, settle- 
ment between Egypt and Israel, can we look 
forward in the near future to any significant 
movement toward a new shuttle between 
Syria and Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: My colleagues and I 
leave every shuttle with the iron determina- 
tion never again to be caught in such a 
situation. [Laughter.] And having gone 
through a 30-day shuttle between Syria and 
Israel once before, I am sure that I speak for 
all of my colleagues if I say we first must 
restore our sanity after the last one before 
we contemplate a new one. [Laughter.] 

But having said all of this, we will encour- 
age — as I said in my speech — negotiations 
between Syria and Israel. In the first in- 
stance, they should take place as they did 
in the case of Egypt — through diplomatic 
channels. If the parties narrow their differ- 
ences, and if they should think it helpful, we 
will of course be prepared to do what is nec- 
essary to help them reach a final settlement. 

But we are still some time away from that 
point. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have already an- 
swered part of my question, but nevertheless 
I would like to ask this: Why cayi't we trade 
our wheat or other foodstuffs to the Soviet 
Union, or other oil-producing countries, for 
oil at the going world price for oil and food? 

This is not part of the question: Dr. Kissin- 
ger, I would like to thank you for the great 
work you are doing for our country and the 
world for peace. [Applause."] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have already 



October 6, 1975 



503 



explained what we are attempting to do in 
relation to the Soviet Union. You have to 
remember that the Soviet surplus of oil is 
not great in relationship to our needs. But 
within this margin, we are having prelimi- 
nary discussions. 

With respect to other countries, those 
countries with the largest surplus of oil also 
have relatively small requirements for the 
import of food, requirements which they 
can meet elsewhere. 

But as a basic proposition, we believe that 
we are managing our food surplus respon- 
sibly, keeping in mind the requirements of 
all of humanity. We think that the oil pro- 
ducers should apply a similar standard in 
managing their scarce commodity. [Ap- 
plause.] 

Q. Dr. KiHsinger, back to Egypt. As part of 
the economic assistance to Egypt, ivill the 
Administration ask for most-favored-nation 
status for this country? 

Secretary Kissinger: I suspect that Egypt 
already has most-favored-nation status. The 
ovei-whelming majority of countries have 
most-favored-nation status. There is a spe- 
cial prohibition with respect to Communist 
nations that was passed in the 1950's in the 
aftermath of the Korean war. Incidentally, 
the Soviet Union had most-favored-natlon 
status before the Korean war, but Stalin 
never took advantage of it. I suspect — I would 
have to check this — that Egypt already has 
most-favored-nation status; and therefore 
we would not have to ask for it. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, otivioiisly, you endure as 
one of the most successful negotiators of the 
century. I sincerely mean that. To which per- 
sonal attribute do you most attribute this? 
^Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: The morale of my 
staff requires frequent absences from the 
country. [Laughter.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I see the United Nations 
as an even greater potential for interaction 
between nations and a greater peace tool. 
However, many of our residents in the Mid- 
west seem to be very lukewarm toward the 
United Nations. What is your assessment of 
the real value of the United Nations to the 

504 



United States and to the rest of the ivorld, 
currently? 

Secretary Kissinger: I spoke about the 
United Nations a few months ago in Mil- 
waukee [July 14]. I think the United Na- 
tions in many areas is doing important work. 
In many technical areas, in some areas of 
development, its contribution is quite cru- 
cial. In the area of peacekeeping, as for ex- 
ample in the Middle East, Cyprus, and else- 
where, the United Nations plays an indis- 
pensable role. 

On the other hand, I am frank to say that 
there have been certain tendencies in the 
United Nations recently that have filled us 
power. It was our concern that if these tend- 
ency by the nations of the so-called Group 
of 77 to form a rigid bloc of their own and, 
because they have a numerical majority in 
the United Nations, to try to steamroller it 
into decisions that reflect neither the justice 
of the issue nor the actual distribution of 
power. It was our concern that if these tend- 
encies continued, gradually the United Na- 
tions would lose much of its political utility. 

The recent special session of the General 
Assembly that just concluded today, has to 
some extent reversed some of these tenden- 
cies. If that atmosphere, if that spirit can 
be carried forward, then perhaps it will be 
possible to give the United Nations again 
the significance that many people hope for 
it to have. 

We want to avoid that it becomes the 
arena of sterile ideological confrontations — 
and that requires a spirit of compromise and 
a willingness to cooperate on all parts. 

So we are going into the next General As- 
sembly, which is starting this week, with an 
open mind and with the recognition that the 
United Nations has done much good in many 
parts of the world, but also that some of the 
tendencies of recent years should not be re- 
peated — namely, bloc voting, ideological con- 
frontations, and similar tactics. [Applause.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, my question is: What is 
your opinion on the traditional manner in 
which the Ai-abs conduct their business, pri- 
marily in the area of accepting a fee that 
some Americans consider kickbacks, bribes, 
et cetera? 

Department of State Bulletin 






Secretary Kissinger: Some of these prac- 
tices are not considered illegal, or even un- 
usual, in other parts of the world. 

The United States does not condone — we 
have made a formal statement in which we 
'' have told our corporations that we do not 
^'' approve of illegal or unethical conduct in 
their activities abroad. In some of the more 
flagrant cases which have come to our atten- 
tion, we have used our moral influence — be- 
cause we have no legal jurisdiction beyond 
the United States — to stop practices which 
are not in accord with basic American con- 
victions. 

So I can confine my remarks to the con- 
duct of Americans, rather than to the con- 
duct of foreigners. We think that American 
companies are, on the whole, best served to 
' conduct themselves within the American 
' legal and ethical norms — even if other con- 
duct is condoned in other parts of the world. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, someday your power will 
he diminished — 

Secretary Kissinger: Begin again — I did 
not get that. [Laughter.] 

Q. Obviously, someday your power will be 
diminished. That happens to all of us. 

Secretary Kissinger: I thought I heard 
that. [Laughter.] I thought I heard you say 
that. 

Q. When this happens, do you feel your 
programs toill be continued? 

Secretary Kissinger: I was so shocked by 
the first sentence — [Laughter.] Could you 
repeat the second one again? 

Q. Obviously, I think a great deal of what 
you are doing, and I am asking you — after 
you no longer wield the power you wield now 
—do you think the programs that you have 
in motion ivill continue, sir? 

Secretary Kissinger: That first part of 
your sentence has given enormous hope to 
my associates. [Laughter.] 

I think any foreign policy to be valid has 
to transcend the individual. And the reason 
— whatever successes are achieved by our 
foreign policy — is importantly due to the 
fact that we have now, at the top level of 

October 6, 1975 



the State Department, the ablest younger 
group that has been there in three decades. 
I am confident that after I leave, these indi- 
viduals will be able to serve my successors 
with equal dedication and equal ability, and 
that the main lines of the foreign policy will 
be continued. [Applause.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is being done to 
solve the problem of the missing in action in 
Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Kissinger: In Viet-Nam, with the 
North Vietnamese, we are dealing with a 
country that ever since we have started deal- 
ing has systematically used the anguish of 
American families to achieve its political 
ends and to attempt to blackmail us. 

Under the Paris Agreement, there was 
supposed to be a full accounting of the miss- 
ing in action. That has not been carried out. 

At the time that North Viet-Nam applied 
for membership in the United Nations, they 
notified us that they had the remains of 
three Americans whom they would turn over. 
When we voted against their membership in 
the United Nations, they withdrew this offer. 

We voted against their membership in the 
United Nations not as an anti-North Vietnam- 
ese gesture, but as a question of principle. 
We did not see why we should vote for the 
admission of Communist countries to the 
United Nations when South Korea, which 
has been a nation for a longer period, and 
which fulfills the criteria of U.N. member- 
ship at least as well as North Viet-Nam, 
had been denied admission. We do not ac- 
cept the principle of "selective universality." 

So this was not directed as an act against 
North Viet-Nam. Nevertheless, North Viet- 
Nam rejected this offer, withdrew its offer. 
We consider this a cynical exploitation of the 
anguish of people who have already suffered 
too much, and we cannot let ourselves be 
pressured by these tactics. 

We are appealing to North Viet-Nam at 
regular intervals for this accounting. We 
have appealed to their allies. We have ap- 
pealed to neutrals that have helped them. 
But I regret to say, it has not been effective. 

I think that over the years we are prepared 
to improve our relationships with the Viet- 
namese; and when that happens, perhaps 

505 



some progress will be made on the missing 
in action. All I can say is, we will continue 
our efforts. But in the short term, I am not 
too optimistic. 

The chairman: Mr. Secretary, let me again 
tell you hoiv grateful we are for these hours 
you have spent in Cincinnati today. 1 knoic 
you go back to Washington with the feeling 
that the Greater Cincinnati area does have 
an interest iyi world affairs. We thank you for 
being here. 



President Ford's News Conference 
of September 16 

Following are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news corifer- 
ence held by President Ford in the Oval Office 
at the White House on September 16.^ 

Q. I think you probably read the [Wash- 
ington'i Post today, and also Jack Anderson, 
concerning secret accords ivith Israel for sup- 
plying the newest technology, including mis- 
siles that could be armed with nuclear war- 
heads and so forth. Is this true? 

President Ford: That material has all been 
submitted to the responsible committees in 
the Congress. The announcement concerning 
the F-16 and the Pershing missile — those 
are not fiiTn commitments. 

They do involve negotiations between the 
United States and Israel. They are on a 
shopping hst, and they will be discussed with 
representatives of the Israeli Government. 

Q. Do you really think you should arm one 
power in the Middle East at a time when you 
are moving toward peace with the potential 
of offensive weapons in that — 

President Ford: We have for a long, long 
time supplied Israel with very substantial 
amounts of military hardware. This was a 
policy established a good many years ago, 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 22. 



and we have always felt that the survival of 
Israel in the Middle East was very impor- 
tant, and the military hardware that we have 
in the past and will in the future provide 
for that survival — as I indicated at the out- 
set, these items were on a list open for dis- 
cussion between the United States and the 
Israeli Government. 

Q. Mr. President, is the United States mov- 
ing toward a security treaty tvith Israel? This 
document tvhich we read in the Post suggests 
quite a close, more formalized defense rela- 
tionship with Israel. 

President Ford: I wouldn't say a security 
treaty. I would simply reiterate what I have 
said before: that historically the United 
States has supplied Israel with very substan- 
tial military weaponry and it is our plan to 
do so in the future. 

But there is no firm commitment on any 
of the weapons that I think got in the head- 
lines this morning. They are merely open 
for discussion. 

Q. Sir, part of this agreement ivith Israel 
involves our providing them with oil either 
through foreign credits or giving oil to them 
from our own supply. We don't have enough 
for ourselves and can't afford, to pay for tvhat 
we are getting. Hon- can we supply Israel 
over several years? 

President Ford: We believe there are 
sources available to Israel to keep Israel 
secure after they have given up the oilfields 
in the Middle East. We are not concerned 
that these supplies will be turned off, and 
therefore it will have no adverse impact, as 
we see it, on our own supplies. 

Q. But we will pay for this oil, will we not? 
We will pay for this through foreign credits ? 

President Ford: This is a part of the over- 
all military economic agreement with Israel, 
and it is a step, I believe, in maintaining the 
peace. I think it is fair to point out that 
several months ago 76 Senators sent me a 
letter actually urging that I recommend to 
the Congress more money for Israel and no 
guarantee of peace, whereas at the present 



506 



Department of State Bulletin 



time we have made this agreement — or 
Israel and Egypt have made this agree- 
ment — and the prospective cost to the United 
States is less than what the 76 Senators rec- 
ommended that we propose to the Congress 
for Israel. 

So we not only have peace and a step 
toward a broader peace, but it is also at a 
lesser cost than what the 76 Senators 
promoted. 

Q. Mr. President, as you know, a good 
many congressional offices are receiving mail 
ichich runs contrary to yovr proposal for the 
Middle East peace settlement, particularly 
objecting to the use of American civilian tech- 
nicians in the Sinai. I ivas wondering, sir, if 
as you say that is worth the risk? How long 
are those Americans going to be there, and. is 
that not an open-ended commitment? 

President Ford: They will be there during 
the term of the agreement unless I, or an- 
other President, withdraw them because of 
any danger to their lives. It is a case of not 
more than 200 American civilians performing 
a highly technical warning-station responsi- 
bility in a U.N. buffer zone. I think it is a 
good contribution by the United States to 
the establishment and permanency of peace 
in the Middle East. 

Q. May I folloio up, please? I woidd like to 
ask what you would do if in the course of 
their term in the Sinai, the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] moves in and kid- 
naped some of them, captured them, or if 
perhaps they were killed? Would you then 
use American intervention — the question be- 
ing then, can you flatly ride out there would 
be no American intervention to protect those 
technicians ? 

President Ford: I am not going to specu- 
late on something I do not anticipate will 
happen. I think I or any other President 
would use utmost caution in the protection 
of the lives of any Americans. 

Yes? 

Q. Mr. President, to follow that up, if you 
are committed to the use of Americans on the 



Egyptian front, would you also, later per- 
haps, be committed to the principle of using 
Americans on the Jordanian or the Syrian 
front ? 

President Ford: I don't think I should 
speculate about any negotiations or agree- 
ments that have not yet begun. It is a very 
valuable contribution to peace in the present 
agreement, but I would not want to make 
any commitment concerning any other. 

• • • • • 

Q. Mr. President, was President Sadat 
aware before he initialed this agreement, 
signed the agreement, that the U.S. would be 
discussing tvith Israel the missiles and the 
other shopping list of things you have men- 
tioned, in specifics? 

President Ford: I think they were familiar 
with the fact we anticipated a commitment 
to Israel for sizable military hardware. I 
can't indicate to you whether they knew the 
precise weapons or not but they knew, of 
course, we were going to make a substantial 
commitment in weapons to Israel. 

Q. Mr. President, in this agreement pub- 
lished in the Post today, it refers to the 
United States viewing with particularly grav- 
ity threats made against Israel by a world 
power and goes on to say that the United 
States ivould promptly constdt with Israel on 
support or assistance that it could lend. 

Nou\ does this go forivard toward a secu- 
rity treaty, or does it not, and, if so, doesn't it 
have to be taken to the Congress first to be 
approved? 

President Ford: That language does not 
constitute a treaty. The words speak for 
themselves. 

• • • • * 

Q. Mr. President, does the potential agree- 
ment between Israel and Egypt with the U.S. 
participation make your job easier on the 
Turkish aid matter in Congress? Is there a 
parallel that you can draw, that your legis- 
lative people can draw for the Congressmen? 

President Ford: I don't believe there is any 



October 6, 1975 



507 



neat analogy between the two, but the fact 
that we have made headway in the Middle 
East and achieved it through negotiation 
ought to be helpful in convincing the Con- 
gress that negotiations in the Turkish aid 
embargo is the way to solve the problem. 
But, there is no direct connection between 
the two problems as such. 



Tenth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks 
Held at Washington 

Jo'mt U.S.-Spain Communique ' 

The tenth round of negotiations took place 
in Washington September 15-17. As in the 
past, the Spanish Under Secretary for For- 
eign Affairs, Mr. Juan Jose Rovira, headed 
the Spanish Delegation and Ambassador-at- 
Large Robert J. McCloskey led the United 
States Delegation. 

The two delegations met in plenary ses- 
sions September 15-17 and continued to ex- 
amine their positions in a spirit of mutual 



determination to lay the basis for a new 
agreement. While the present agreement ex- 
pires September 25, 1975, it provides that, in 
the event it is not renewed, U.S. forces may 
remain in Spain for one year in accord with 
and in the form prescribed by Article 39 of 
the present agreement.- It is understood 
that this provision will be applied in a way 
which would permit the two sides to continue 
to work on a new agreement without inter- 
rupting the cooperative defense arrange- 
ments which serve the interests of both 
countries, and both sides expect that nego- 
tiations looking toward a new agreement will 
continue beyond the expiration date. 

The working group set up to study the 
problems arising in connection with the im- 
plementing annexes of a new agreement will 
remain in Washington to continue its work. 
In addition, Spanish representatives to the 
working group on customs and fiscal matters 
will come to Washington for talks on Sep- 
tember 23 and 24. 



^Issued on Sept. 17 (text from press release 486). 

- For text of the Agreement of Friendship and 
Cooperation Between the United States and Spain i i 
signed at Washington on Aug. 6, 1970, see Bulletin j j 
of Aug. 31, 1970, p. 237. 



508 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Cincinnati September 17 



Press release 490 dated September 18 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said last night that 
the U.S. aid to Egypt and Israel is not part 
of the agreement. As a practical matter, what 
icoidd it do to the agreement if Congress will 
not approve the amount of aid Egypt ex- 
pects? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, as 
part of the agreement Egypt does not ex- 
pect any particular amount. And I would 
think that the agreement would be imple- 
mented even if Congress does not appropri- 
ate the amount we are going to be request- 
ing, actually from either side. 

Nevertheless, as I pointed out yesterday, 
the prospects of peace in the Middle East, 
the whole evolution in the area, would be 
adversely affected if the Congress would not 
agree to the general range of figures that 
we are going to be proposing. But it is not 
tied to the agreement, and the agreement it- 
self would almost certainly go forward — 
would certainly go forward. But since we 
have always considered the agreement as 
only one step in the progress, the process 
would be adversely affected. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, along that same line — 
and this seems to be one of the most sensitive 
areas of the Sinai accord — if the Congress 
does not go along with the idea of placing 200 
technicians in the Sinai, what will happen to 
the agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: The technicians are 
linked to the agreement; and if Congress 
does not go ahead, then at the minimum 
there would have to be a renegotiation of 
the agreement. 

The American proposal is technically in 
the form of a proposal although we did it 
at the request of the parties; the document 



that establishes the American presence is 
an organic part of the overall agreement; 
and therefore, if the Congress did not ap- 
prove it, the agreement, at a minimum, would 
have to be i-enegotiated. It certainly would 
not be automatically implemented the way it 
is not foreseen. 

One point that I would like to stress is 
that there will never be 200 Americans in 
the Sinai at any one moment. Two hundred 
is the total number of Americans that are 
assigned to that mission. Since they will have 
to operate in three shifts, as a practical mat- 
ter there will never be more than 60 or so — 
60 to 70 — in the pass area at any one 
moment. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the agree- 
ment signed in Geneva several weeks ago, the 
New York Times reports that there is a 
separate agreement involving an amount of 
American aid totaling somewhat, 1 think they 
speculated, $2.5 billion. Now, contrasted tvith 
the alternative, a new Middle East war, do 
you think this amount is justified? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the sepa- 
rate agreement between Israel and the 
United States was submitted by us to the 
Congress. This is not something that we 
obscured from the Congress. It was sub- 
mitted by us to the Congress in a classified 
form and then leaked to the newspapers, and 
it raises questions of how one can handle 
these documents in the future. 

Now as for the amount, we have also told 
the Congress the approximate order of mag- 
nitude that we are going to request, which 
would be less than $2 5 billion. 

There are two considerations with respect 
to this aid. One, the 1973 war required nearly 
$2.5 billion in appropriations for the war 
alone in addition to the regular appropria- 



October 6, 1975 



509 



tions that Israel was getting. In addition, it 
cost us beyond $10 billion for the direct costs 
of the oil embargo, together with the intan- 
gible costs of a 5 percent rise in our price 
index, large unemployment, and so forth. 
So there is no question that the amounts we 
are thinking about now would be trifling 
compared to what a war would cost us. 

Secondly, if I may just make one other 
point. One should not have this debate on the 
issue that the agreement is producing the 
need for this aid. A substantial amount of 
aid has been voted by the Congress year 
after year without an agreement. Last year 
the Congress appropriated nearly $3 billion 
for Israel, some of it emergency aid, without 
an agreement. As I said yesterday, 76 Sena- 
tors had already asked us to meet Israel's 
needs before the agreement. So the reason- 
able debate is to do it in terms of additional 
cost and not to take the whole package, the 
oveinvhelming part of which would have been 
submitted to the Congress even without the 
agreement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will this agreement in- 
clude Pershing ground-to-ground missiles and 
the F-16? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
Pershing missiles, all the United States has 
agreed to do is to study the problem. We 
have not made a commitment. With respect 
to the F-16, this is a modernization of the 
F-4's. There, too, we have not yet made a 
commitment, as the President pointed out 
yesterday. 

You have to remember also we are talking 
about weapons here — in the F-16 — that 
could not be delivered before the late seven- 
ties or early eighties. We are talking here 
about a long-term relationship, and not about 
something that is going to happen tomorrow. 

The Israel Defense Minister is arriving in 
Washington — I think he arrived last night — 
and there are going to be technical discus- 
sions with him. The next thing that will 
happen is a technical study of what can be 
done. 

There have been no commitments made 
with respect to either of these weapons, but 
especially there have been no commitments 
made with respect to the Pershing. 



Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your speech last night 
you mentioned the future of the Palestinians 
and the final resolution of the Middle East 
crisis. Do you foresee the creation of a Pales- 
tinian state? And do you anticipate a role for 
yourself in any negotiations that might go 
into the creation of that Palestinian state? 

Secretary Kissinger: Anyone who has been 
on a shuttle leaves with the determination 
not to get involved in another negotiation if 
he can possibly help it. 

The future of the Palestinians has many 
aspects. It has the aspect of the future of 
the West Bank, the relationship of the West 
Bank settlement to those Palestinians who 
are not living on the West Bank, and similar 
matters. 

The U.S. preference prior to Rabat had 
been that the issue should be settled in a 
negotiation between Jordan and Israel. That 
was the position we supported, and that is 
.still basically our preference. 

With respect to the PLO [Palestine Lib- 
eration Organization], until the PLO accepts 
the existence of the State of Israel and 
accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338, the United States has no decision to 
make, because we cannot encourage a nego- 
tiating process between parties one of which 
wants to destroy the other and has it as its 
avowed policy to destroy the other. But a 
settlement of the Palestinians and a settle- 
ment of the West Bank will have to be part 
of an overall settlement. As we discuss it, 
the United States would be prepared to be 
helpful. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you sign with Israel 
an agreement refusing to allow the Palestine 
Liberation Organization to take part in Ge- 
neva peace talks unless Israel approved? And 
did you agree not to have the United States 
recognize the PLO miless the PLO recognized 
Israel's rights as a sovereign nation? 

Secretary Kissinger: Technically we have 
not signed any agreement with Israel. We 
have agreed on some documents that we 
might agree to. 

Secondly, you have to remember that in 
every previous negotiation and at every pre- 
vious critical point we have had what are 






510 



Department of State Bulletin 



called memoranda of understandings between 
us and Israel that up to now have guided 
our policies and have not been made public. 
In this particular case, because of the Ameri- 
can presence that we have recommended, we 
felt morally obliged to submit to the Con- 
gress the whole record of our commitments, 
and this is why these things are becoming 
public in a more absolute way than would 
otheinvise be the case. 

Our position vis-a-vis Israel is exactly the 
one I have publicly stated today ; that is, vis- 
a-vis Israel and the PLO. Our position is 
exactly what I have stated; it is neithrr 
more nor less. Unless the PLO recognizes the 
existence of Israel and the relevant resolu- 
tions, we cannot make a decision. After that, 
we will see. That is not a secret agreement; 
that is a public statement. We have also ex- 
pressed it as a formal statement to the Is- 
raelis, but it is merely codifying what we 
have repeatedly said publicly and what I 
have said again publicly this morning. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I believe you said last 
night the Administration would agree to pro- 
visions to withdraw Americans from the 
Sinai if hostilities should begin there. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Americans would be manning the earlij- 
warjiing system. Wouldn't such a withdrawal 
in part defeat their purpose of being there? 
And how would they get out once hostilities 
did begin? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you have to re- 
member that the Americans are in an area 
in which there are now 5,000 U.N. troops, 
and in which there may well be more be- 
cause the area is now larger. So practically, 
it is almost impossible for hostilities to begin 
unless something has previously happened to 
the U.N. forces. 

The American presence is not designed as 
an early-warning system for one side. The 
American presence is designed to give both 
sides assurances in periods of relative stabil- 
ity that there are no surprise attacks being 
planned by the other. Under conditions of 
extreme tension — where a war is imminent — 
we have a new situation. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, from your perspective 
what do you think the chances are that Con- 
gress will approve sending the 200 techni- 
cians? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to 
speak for the Congress. My impression in 
talking to many Congressmen and testifying 
before many committees is that the Congress 
will approve the 200 technicians with the 
same enthusiasm with which the Adminis- 
tration agreed to them in the first place. 

Q. Hoiv much enthusiasm is that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Minimum. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel positive about 
the concept and goals of the new economic 
order agreed on by the United Nations, yes- 
terday I believe? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not seen the 
explanations the various parties have given 
of that document. We do not consider this a 
statement of a new economic order. Indeed, 
the theme of my speech to the United Na- 
tions was to forget the debate on slogans — 
that we would declare a moratorium on our 
favorite slogans and we want the developing 
countries to declare a moratorium on their 
favorite slogans, among which the "new eco- 
nomic order" figures prominently. 

We submitted 41 proposals of various or- 
ders of significance to the United Nations as 
our idea of where progress could be made. 
I think about 14 of them were adopted. The 
others are still being studied. We think that 
the results of the special session, whatever 
title you give them, ended a period of con- 
frontation for the time being between the 
developing countries and the developed coun- 
tries and at least created an opportunity for 
the process to go forward on a cooperative 
basis. If that turns out to be the case, then 
the special session will have been a water- 
shed in our relationships to the developing 
world. 

We do not accept the phrase "new eco- 
nomic order." We are trying to get the de- 
bate on concrete specifics that we have sup- 
ported, and on that basis I think both the 
atmosphere and the results of this special 
session were a definite step forward. 



October 6, 1975 



511 



Q. Dr. Kissinger, in two speeches yesterdai/ 
— one here last night and one in Florida-- 
you warned the oil-producing nations of con- 
sequences if then again raised the pi ice of oil. 
What is the United States prepared to do? 
How far tvould we go if that eveyitualitii took 
place ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have to keep in 
mind that the basic thing that the United 
States can do is to adopt an energy policy of 
our own that shifts the mai'ket power away 
from the producers. In the absence of this, 
we are not in a position to do something 
dramatically immediate. 

On the other hand, if the oil-producing 
countries insist on policies that, in our judg- 
ment, impair the economic progress of the 
industrialized nations, sooner or later it is 
bound to have some effect on the political 
relationships. At what point that would oc- 
cur, I do not now want to say. But we be- 
lieve it is essential that a cooperative rela- 
tionship develop between the producers and 
consumers, and we will make a major contri- 
bution to that effect. 

Q. There nms speculation about some mili- 
t'lry-type action — 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think — 

Q. — i)i some eventuality. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that would be 
inappropriate in any of the contingencies now 
foreseeable. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the Washington Post re- 
ports that in the memorandum of agreement 
the United States agrees to undertake con- 
servation measures in order to make ai'ailable 
oil to Israel should both the United States 
and Israel be placed under an oil embargo. 
Would you yourself .s^ipport gas rationing in 
the United States in order to keep Israel sup- 
plied? And if not, what sort of conservation 
did you have in mind? 

Secretary Kissinger: Rather than debate 
what the Washington Post said, the United 
States agrees that in case of a general em- 
bargo, the United States would apply to Is- 
rael the same general formula that already 



exists within the lEA [International Energy 
Agency] with respect to Western Europe 
and Japan and the other members of the lEA. 

This means that all of the members of the 
lEA have agreed that in case of an embargo 
against any one of them, there would be cer- 
tain percentage cuts in consumption and a 
certain percentage sharing of imports. This 
is to prevent selective embargoes and to 
make sure that an embargo against one is 
an embargo against all. Therefore the issue 
will never come up in the fonn of American 
gas rationing so that Israel can have oil ; that 
way the issue will never come up. If there 
is an embargo against the United States — 
whether or not Israel is affected — the United 
States is obliged by its agreement with the 
other countries to accept certain cuts in 
consumption that would enable us to share 
in everybody's pool of oil. These would be 
tlie principles that would be applied. 

You have to remember, also, that the total 
requirement of Israel is about 120,000 bar- 
rels a day while our total imports are about 
7 million barrels a day. So we are talking 
about an infinitesimal portion that could 
not possibly affect the American consumer. 

But I repeat, the United States is under 
no obligation — just because Israel is em- 
bargoed — to do anything to its own consump- 
tion. The consumption requirements arise 
when there is a general embargo and there 
is a general sharing of oil with Western 
Europe and Japan primarily. 

Q. Do I understand, then, that there is no 
specific energy agreement between the United 
States- 
Secretary Kissinger: There is a specific 
energy agreement to apply the lEA cri- 
teria, which are another agreement. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spent your time, ap- 
parently, chiefly on the Middle East and be- 
for that, Viet-Nam, ivith detente, disarma- 
ment, and China throivn in for fringe bene- 
fits. Now last night you said that the funda- 
mental issues of the last quarter of a century 
are issues of energy, food, raw materials, and 
economic development, and more, more steam 
is surrounding those issues. 



512 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: That is right. 

Q. Treasury has a piece of that action. Mr. 
Hiitz [Earl L. Bidz, Secretary of Agriculture'} 
has a piece of that action, and, indeed, result- 
ing in the kind of excessive burdens upon 
consumers as you mentioned last night. 

The State Department is active and inter- 
ested, but the xvhole American policy seems 
uncoordinated. Is there a need in your esti- 
mation for greater coordination of Atnerican 
policy in diplomatic activity on these great 
issues of the last quarter of the century? And 
would you accept the nomination of taking 
that on as your ne.rt great priority? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, you 
know I will be glad to handle foreign coun- 
tries, but for me to announce that I want 
supervision of the Treasury and Agriculture 
Departments may mean that I have to stay 
in Cincinnati. [Laughter.] In fact, there are 
going to be many State Department officials 
who will also vote for that. [Laughter.] 

You must not judge the amount of time 
that a senior official spends on a problem by 
the amount of news coverage it gets. You 
take the Middle East negotiations. They have 
received, because of their drama and because 
of the impact of a failure on the United 
States, an enormous amount of attention in 
the press. This does not mean, however, that 
I am spending most of my time on the Mid- 
dle East. In fact, between May and the end 
of August, until I actually went on the shut- 
tle, I spent relatively little time on the Mid- 
dle East because the positions were well 
known. Until one or the other or both parties 
moved, there was not really very much that 
I could do. Then I spent a very intensive 
two-week period. 

On the other hand, if you asked on what 
did I spend most of my time between Maj' 
and the end of August, it was probably on 
the preparation of the message for the spe- 
cial session, because as you pointed out, this 
required a tremendous amount of coordina- 
tion within our government between Treas- 
ury, Agriculture, Commerce, 0MB [Office of 
Management and the Budget], and other 
agencies and it required an enormous amount 
of congressional consultations. That, how- 



ever, did not lend itself to newspaper cover- 
age day after day until the whole process 
was completed. So there were only one or 
two newspaper stories about it, and those 
reported a speech. 

Now it is true that our government has 
not been, on the whole, organized for the 
conduct of major strategic economic foreign 
policy because of the fragmentation. This 
has been enormously improved in recent 
months. The cooperation between Treasury 
and the State Department is really intimate. 
Secretary Simon [William E. Simon, Secre- 
tary of the Treasury] participated actively 
and supported our approach at the special 
session. On agriculture policy, too, such as 
the grain sale negotiations with the Soviet 
Union, there is now an effective coordination. 
So that I think that what you are referring 
to is substantially coming into being at this 
moment. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said in your speech 
last night that the American people, the Con- 
gress, and the President are united to an 
extraordinary degree on the Middle East 
policy. The White House reported last week 
that the mail ivas ruyining 10 to 1 against the 
Sinai agreemeyit and the Congressmen from 
this area report that their mail, although 
light, is overwhelmingly negative. What is 
your exndence of such overwhelming public 
support, and do you think you can get favor- 
able action out of Congress without a greater 
expression of public support? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is strong 
support for a peace effort in the Middle East. 
I think that the American public under the 
impact of the events in Indochina is suspi- 
cious about an American presence anywhere 
in new areas, and I am not saying that the 
American public supports every individual 
idea that is put forward. But I have the 
sense, both from editorial support and from 
general public support, that they are behind 
the general effort. 

I believe that the Congress, as I have said, 
will support this agreement, because I be- 
lieve they will come to the same conclusions 
that we did — while we were not looking for 
an opportunity to estabUsh an American 



October 6, 1975 



513 



presence and while we would have preferred 
to do without it, it turned out that no agi-ee- 
ment could have been negotiated unless this 
happened. And so I believe that the Congress 
will support it. 

My impression in the mail that is not ad- 
dressed to specific provisions is one of over- 
whelming support. That does not mean that 
every last idea has equal support. But the 
idea of bringing about peace in the Middle 
East lias, in my judgment, the strong sup- 
port of the American public. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, he asked the same ques- 
tion I had, so let me ask you this: What cov- 
tact have you had with former President 
Nixon concerning the Middle East agreement 
between Egypt and Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: President Nixon did 
me the honor of appointing me to two very 
responsible positions, including my present 
one. Therefore I call him about once a month 
for a general chat. I did not have any dis- 
cussions with him about the particular nego- 
tiations. And he is given briefings by the 
White House, from time to time, of an in- 
telligence nature. He did not participate in 
advice on these negotiations, and I did not 
consult him about these negotiations, but I 
did call him after they were concluded and 
gave him a general rundown of what had 
been done. 

Q. And what was his reactionl 

Secretary Kissinger: It was generally sup- 
lX)rtive. I did not ask for his support. I just 
told him what had been done. It was not 
asking him to support it, it was just a brief 
conversation in which I told him what had 
been done. 

Q. Did his resignation have any bearing on 
the holdup in the agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: His resignation pro- 
duced a hiatus in a whole number of initia- 
tives, because in the last month of his period 
in oflSce and in the first months of President 
Ford's being in office, there was an inevitable 



transition period which made it difficult to 
act with the coherence and decisiveness that 
would have occurred — it happens at the be- 
ginning and end of every administration. 

Q. Wouldn't the Israelis have signed the 
interim agreement without the suggestion 
that the United States would ultimately sup- 
ply them ivith the Pershing missiles and the 
F-16 fighter-bombers? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has 
not agreed to supply them with Pershing 
missiles. The United States has agreed to 
study the problem of Pershing missiles, and 
therefore that issue is totally separate from 
the agi-eement. 

The F-16 is the next-generation plane 
after the F-4, which by 1980 will be about 
20 years old, so this is not a new realm of 
technology. This is more a logical evolution. 
There, too, no commitment has been made 
as to any specific numbers or rate of deliv- 
ery, and the United States has an ongoing 
military-supply relationship with Israel that 
has been renewed at periodic intervals. 
Sometimes this is in relationship to major 
events such as an agreement, but there is not 
that degree of organic relationship. In fact, 
this particular paragraph to which you are 
referring, was submitted to the Congress — 
it was really a marginal case. It was not in 
any basic document. We extracted it from 
something else in order to lean over back- 
ward to make sure that nothing would turn 
up later that could be construed as an Ameri- 
can commitment. It was not directly, organi- 
cally related to the agreement. 

Q. Then are you saying that the Israelis 
wotdd have signed the interim agreement 
even if we had not suggested that ive would 
study the matter of the Pershing missiles and 
the F-16's? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that is hard to 
say. That would be hard to say. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I understand that you 
have a very tight schedule. On behalf of all 
of the assembled news media, I want to thank 






i 



514 



Department of State Bulletin 



you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you take another 
one? Mr. Secretary, I detected from you a 
sense of less than enthusiasm about the whole 
question of leaks. Can you tell us how you see 
leaks complicating your negotiations and 
why, on the reverse side, are you not in favor 
of such leaks on the theory that the more 
everybody knows, the easier your job will be? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are in favor of the 
public knowing the nature of our commit- 
ments, and therefore, we made the fullest 
disclosure that has been made of any record 
of a negotiation to the congressional com- 
mittees. 

Secondly, we were working with the con- 
gressional committees on a document that 
would have been published later this week 
or early next week that would have stated 
the essence of these commitments, but per- 
haps in a manner that would have created 
fewer diplomatic problems. 

A balance has to be struck between the 
need of disclosure, which is to say that the 
public has to know what the major commit- 
ments are of the United States. But then, 
there has to be an area of diplomacy which 
has to be kept confidential because of the 
necessity of confidence between governments, 
because some things are expressed in a way 
that is perfectly clear in terms of the action 
that has to follow but if it is published will 
force the kind of debate and the kind of clari- 
fication and explanation that will make things 
extremely complicated and, sometimes, ex- 
tremely difficult for the various parties. 

So the problem we have is to strike a bal- 
ance between the necessity of the public 
knowing what it is the United States is 



obliged to undertake and, at the same time, 
l^roviding enough leeway for diplomatic 
flexibility. 



Letters of Credence 

Burma 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma, U 
Tin Lat, presented his credentials to Presi- 
dent Ford on September 3.^ 

Guinea-Bissau 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Gil Vicente Vaz 
Fernandes, presented his credentials to 
President Ford on September 3.> 

Lesotho 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Kingdom of Lesotho, Teboho J. Mashologu, 
presented his credentials to President Ford 
on September 3.^ 

Mali 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of Mali, Mamadou Boubacar Kante, 
presented his credentials to President Ford 
on September 3.' 

South Africa 

The newly appointed Ambassador of the 
Republic of South Africa, Roelof Frederik 
Botha, presented his credentials to President 
Ford on September 3.^ 



' For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the 
President's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated Sept. 3. 



October 6, 1975 



515 



Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern Governors Conference 



Following are inforrnal remarks made by 
Secretary Kissinger before the Southern Gov- 
ernors Conference at Orlando, Fla., on Sep- 
tember 16 and the tra)>script of the questions 
and answers which followed. 



INFORMAL REMARKS 

Pre^^s release 481 dated September 16 

America's active role in the world is not 
a matter of preference or a favor to others, 
but a reflection of interdependence and a 
recognition of our own vital interests. Peace 
for us is inseparable from global tranquillity. 
Prosperity for us is bound up with the prog- 
ress of the rest of the world. 

No challenge on the contemporary agenda 
illustrates these propositions more dramatic- 
ally than energy. 

America's factories and farms, our trans- 
portation and housing, the pace of our 
growth, and the prospects for our environ- 
ment are all centrally aff'ected by energy. 
The 1973 oil embargo and price increases ac- 
celerated inflation and exacerbated recession 
around the world. They cost this country 
half a million jobs and over $10 billion in na- 
tional production. In many industrial coun- 
tries economic decline threatened political 
instability, and our allies' vulnerability to the 
oil crisis had significant foreign policy ef- 
fects. In the developing world, hopes for eco- 
nomic expansion have been shattered by the 
dramatic rise in the costs of basic imported 
goods, food and fertilizer as well as fuel. 
Thus the energy crisis affects not only the 
standard of living of Americans but the basic 
conditions of international relations. It has 
become, inescapably, an urgent priority of 
national policy. 

What is the energy crisis, and what must 
we do to resolve it? 



The crisis results from two fundamental 
shifts in the world economy. First, for the 
last quarter century the United States and 
the industrial nations have become increas- 
ingly dependent upon foreign oil. The growth 
of our domestic energy production has not 
kept pace with the demand for energy that 
our growing economies need. In 1950, the 
United States was virtually self-suflicient ; in 
1960, we produced 93 percent of the energy 
and 84 percent of the oil we required; in 
1974, we produced only 85 percent of our 
energy and 65 percent of our oil. If this 
trend continues, we may produce only 75 per- 
cent of our energy and 50 percent of our oil 
10 years from now. 

Second, the growing dependence on im- 
ports has enabled the oil-exporting countries 
to raise oil prices some 500 percent in the 
past two years. As a result of the huge fi- 
nancial resources they have amassed, they 
have even been able to meet a decline in 
demand — primarily caused by recession — by 
cutting production rather than price. Before 
the 1973 embargo OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] members 
produced at virtually full capacity. Now they 
are producing at only 72 percent of capacity. 
In 1973 the price was about $3 a barrel ; now 
it is over $12, and OPEC is considering addi- 
tional large price increases. 

Thus, for the first time the supply and 
price of energy — a central element in the 
economies of all countries — can be manipu- 
lated by nations that do not necessarily have 
an interest in our well-being. And the vast 
financial weight the oil producers are acquir- 
ing gives them a new capacity for influencing 
the world monetary system and financial 
practices according to their own political ob- 
jectives. 

By the end of last year producers had al- 
ready accumulated some $75 billion in for- 



516 



Department of State Bulletin 



eign assets. Each new dollar added to the 
price of oil increases their revenue by $10 
billion. This is a transfer of wealth and power 
unprecedented in suddenness and scale and 
carries with it great political leverage. 

The producers' market power will remain 
unchallenged so long as the United States 
and other consumer nations do not drastic- 
ally reduce their dependence on imported oil. 

To deal with this ci'isis our country has 
developed a sound and comprehensive energy 
strategy. It has four elements: 

— First, we must defend ourselves against 
short-term dangers. This means protection 
against another oil embargo, against sudden 
shifts in the assets held by oil countries, and 
against the threats to development in the 
poorer countries buffeted by price rises. 

— Second, we must make America invul- 
nerable to external energy pressures over 
the longer term. This requires reducing our 
annual increase in energy consumption, mas- 
sive development of new sources of energy, 
and stocking oil on a scale large enough to 
replace imports in case of a new embargo. 

—Third, we must join our efforts with the 
other industrial consuming countries. Col- 
lective action on conservation and develop- 
ment will reinforce our individual efforts. 

—Finally, we must forge cooperation be- 
tween consumers and producers of oil. We 
must create conditions under which we all 
help shape the price of oil through the world 
market and we all benefit from an expanding 
world economy. 

The four elements of our strategy are 
interlinked. It does no good to make plans 
against a new embargo if each year the in- 
dustrial countries grow more dependent on 
imported energy. Cooperative arrangements 
with other consumers will be ineffective if 
American vulnerability grows with every 
passing year. Conservation will prove a stop- 
gap unless we act now — and massively — to 
develop alternative sources of energy. 

If all these elements of our strategy are 
vigorously pursued, we will gradually shift 
the balance in the world energy market. The 
cartel members will have to share with each 
other progressively greater production cut- 
backs in order to maintain the price. At the 



same time, their need to pay for imports for 
consumption and for development and se- 
curity programs will grow. At some point 
OPEC will lose its exclusive ability to deter- 
mine the price of oil. 

Short-Term and Longer Term Measures 

We have made considerable progress in 
carrying forward our strategy, especially 
with respect to near-term dangers. 

Acting rapidly in the early stages of the 
energy crisis, the United States and 17 other 
industrial nations joined in the International 
Energy Agency (lEA) for mutual assistance 
in the event of future oil embargoes. We 
agreed to build up oil stocks, to reduce con- 
sumption by the same percentage in the 
event of a new emergency, and to share avail- 
able oil. Thus an embargo against one would 
be an embargo against all. 

Early this year, at U.S. initiative, the in- 
dusti-ial countries agreed on a $25 billion 
support fund, to offset abrupt or predatory 
shifts of funds by OPEC, as well as balance- 
of-payments problems induced by high oil 
prices. The existence of this fund should 
enable industrial countries to resume their 
economic expansion without fear of finan- 
cial disruption. 

Also at U.S. initiative, the International 
Monetary Fund will create a special Trust 
Fund for concessional loans to developing 
counti'ies hit hardest by oil price increases. 

These steps are useful. But much remains 
to be done, especially for our longer term 
position. 

First, we must intensify our effort to 
conserve energy in general and imported oil 
in particular. 

Second, we must initiate now the measures 
needed to insure the availability of major 
amounts of new energy by the end of this 
decade and into the 1980's. 

The impact of conservation measures will 
be immediate. We have already seen a reduc- 
tion in oil consumption in response to the 
massive rise in prices. But more rigorous 
programs are required. 

New energy production from fossil fuels 
and from nonconventional energy resources 
must be energetically fostered. 



October 6, 1975 



517 



Decontrol of oil prices will both promote 
conservation and spur domestic oil produc- 
tion. Further legislative action is now needed 
to carry out the President's program — to in- 
sure greater supplies of natural gas, to open 
up our nation's vast energy reserves, and 
to fund the development of new nonconven- 
tional sources such as synthetic, solar, and 
geothermal energy. 

Finally, to protect us from the threat of 
another embargo, the President has asked 
Congress to authorize the establishment of 
a strategic storage program and provide 
him with standby authority to take rapid 
conservation measures in future emergen- 
cies. These proposals, too, require urgent 
appi'oval. 



Collective Consumer Action 

But action by the United States alone is 
not enough. We must proceed in parallel 
with other major consuming countries. For 
only by acting together can we end the oil 
producers' power to set prices unilaterally. 

We and our partners in the International 
Energy Agency must set firm overall targets, 
divided equitably among us, and continue to 
verify each other's performance. 

We must also join to accelerate produc- 
tion of new energy. Development costs will 
be enormous. We must work together to in- 
sure that financial resources are available. 
We must greatly expand our joint research 
and development, pooling national programs. 
Finally, we must assure participating energy- 
deficient countries that they will directlj' 
benefit from the development programs. 

We must assui'e a common basis for all 
industrial countries to develop alternative 
supplies by agreeing that none of us will 
permit imported oil to be sold in our econo- 
mies below a certain minimum price level. 
This will provide incentives for investment 
in new energy sources. And it will protect 
those who invest in higher cost energy from 
sufl'ering a competitive disadvantage if the 
oil importers engage in predatory pricing. 

We must enable energy-deficient countries 
to participate in such programs in other 
industrial countries with some assurance 



that they will directly benefit from the de- 
velopment programs. 

All these actions are part of a compre- 
hensive package for long-term energy coop- 
eration the lEA is developing with a deadline 
of December 1. We and our partners must 
meet this deadline. Unless consumer nations 
take joint action, no balanced dialogue with 
the producers is possible. 

Relations with Producers 

At the same time, we will seek a new- 
relationship with the oil-producing nations. 
We are natural partners, not adversaries. 
Consumers must have reliable access to oil 
supplies at reasonable prices. To invest their 
new oil wealth, the producers must become 
major participants in the global financial and 
economic system. And to convert their new 
wealth into goods, they must become major 
importers of our products. We are ready to 
cooperate with the oil producers in linking 
our economies on equitable terms. We are 
prepared to shape new constructive relation- 
ships. 

But another oil price rise would severely 
jeopardize these hopes. It could set off a re- 
lentless sequence of action and reaction, to 
the detriment of the entire world commu- 
nity. The expansion of the economies of the 
industrial countries would be inhibited by 
fears of further price rises and permanent 
inflation. OPEC oil exports would stagnate, 
leading to demands for even further price 
hikes. The most seriously affected victims 
would be the developing countries ; their ex- 
ports would plunge, their energy costs would 
soar, and their crippling debt burden would 
mount even higher. All nations have an in- 
terest in avoiding this. 

Whatever the decision of the oil producers, 
the United States cannot entrust its political 
and economic destiny to decisions made else- 
where. Congress and the Administration 
must cooperate in a determined energy policy 
so that this country will recapture control 
over our future. Together with our allies, we 
will work to reverse the conditions that have 
enabled oil prices to be set unilaterally. As 
the largest energy consumer, our leadership 
is decisive. We will not fail our responsibility. 



518 



Department of State Bulletin 



QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Press release 481A dated September 16 

Governor Mandel of Maryland: Thank you 
very much, Mr. Secretary. As I said earlier, 
the Secretary has agreed — and as he has indi- 
cated — to answer any questions. And rve'd 
like to get into the question-and-ansiver 
period. 

Governor Busbee. 

Talks With U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil 

Governor Busbee of Georgia: Mr. Secre- 
tary, I'd like to ask a question concerning two 
basic commodities: food and oil. With the 
United States having the greatest potential 
of any nation as far as production of food, 
and recognizing the fact that every few 
years Russia suffers a severe food shortage, 
what do you think of the possibility of some 
long-range trade agreement on food, grain, et 
cetera, from the United States and Russia on 
oil? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is true that the 
United States is the largest producer of sur- 
plus foods in the world. The United States 
has made a number of proposals to indicate 
how a rare commodity can be used in a re- 
sponsible manner and to the benefit of every- 
body. 

At this moment we are negotiating with 
the Soviet Union about a long-term agree- 
ment with respect to the sale of grain. We 
have Under Secretary [for Economic Afi'airs 
Charles W.] Robinson in Moscow — he has 
just returned from Moscow — with a view to 
preventing the sudden incursions into our 
market and to stabilize the demand. 

We are also having some discussions, in 
a more preliminary stage, with the Soviet 
Union about oil. 

And so we are addressing both of these 
problems. Of course, the Soviets' capacity 
to export oil is limited. 

Price Floor for Imported Oil 

Governor Mandel: Governor Briscoe of 
Texas. 
Governor Briscoe: Mr. Secretary, you men- 



tioned a floor on the price of imported oil. 
Could you indicate ivhat you think that floor 
should be or when that policy might be imple- 
mented? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are now negotiat- 
ing with our allies in Europe and in Japan 
on a floor that would be set to protect at 
least the cheaper alternative sources of en- 
ergy. And this would be part of the general 
package that will be concluded — that we hope 
will be concluded by December 1. 

This floor can operate in several ways. 
It does not have to be a fixed price — that is, 
each country could be — it could be set, for 
example, by import levies so that imported 
oil could be bought at lower prices but then 
would be sold at the minimum price. But if 
we do not do this, we may be in the position 
of having made huge investments for alter- 
nate sources which could then be undercut 
by predatory pricing. We hope that we will 
have an agreement on this by December 1. 

As for the level, since this is at the mo- 
ment being negotiated, I would rather not 
give an answer; but we have it down to a 
range that is now the subject of negotiations. 

Governor Briscoe: Thank you. 

Economic impact of OPEC Oil Price Increases 

Governor Mandel: Governor Bond. 

Governor Bond of Missouri: Mr. Secretary, 
one of the most obtuse and difficult concepts 
for the average American to understand, I 
believe, is the balance-of -payments problem. 
And ive, I thitik, can explain to them the 
dangers of suffering another Arab oil em- 
bargo. But how do you explain to someone 
who has never been abroad what impact the 
continuing and increasing outflow of dollars 
for OPEC oil would have on the American 
consumer? How is the American consumer 
likely to be affected if we continue to increase 
our paytnents abroad? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the payments 
abroad will sooner or later have to be trans- 
lated into the purchase of goods and services, 
and it gives leverage to the producers in two 
ways. 



October 6, 1975 



519 



One, by the end of last year they had al- 
ready accumulated $75 billion in foreign as- 
sets, and every dollar in increase in the price 
of oil adds $10 billion to this in addition to 
the aniuial gross. This year it will be sub- 
stantially higher than $75 billion, at the end 
of this year. Shifting these funds around is 
already a source of considerable leverage. 
In 1973, a run on the dollar was started, I 
think, by a shift of $3 or $4 billion. That 
happened normally, and not as the result of 
a deliberate policy by any particular country. 
So when you have $75 billion, you have a 
very substantial sum. 

Secondly, when these holdings are con- 
verted into goods and services, they will un- 
doubtedly contribute to the inflationary pres- 
sure, in addition to the fact that the in- 
crease in the price of energy contributes to 
the inflationary pressures even before these 
assets are disposed of. 

So the overall impact of the constant rise 
in the price of oil is to compound all inflation- 
ary pressures in the industrialized world, 
and it is one of the significant reasons for 
the stagnation of the economies of the 
industrialized countries. 

Govei'nor Mandel: Governor Trihhitt, Dela- 
ware. 

Governor Tribbitt: Mr. Secretary, two 
que.ttion.'i. Yon couldn't or wovldn't want to 
limit all ijour qiiestions to the subject of 
energy, .so the fir.'tt question: When the OPEC 
countries meet later this month, do you ex- 
pect them to raise the price of crude? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have a view on the 
subject. I just do not want to be accused 
of having made come true what I predict. 
[Laughter.] They're certainly talking in this 
direction. The United States is opposed to 
any further increase in the price of oil, and 
we believe it is unjustified. But many of 
them are talking in the direction of increas- 
ing the price. I will keep my private expec- 
tations to myself. [Laughter.] 

North Vietnamese Use of MIA Issue 

Governor Tribbitt: The other question is 
not related to energy. Mr. Secretary, what 



negotiations are going on with the MIA's 
with respect to the Viet-Nam conflict? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I negotiated 
with the North Vietnamese for four years, 
and they have used the anguish of Ameri- 
cans for blackmail for all this period. 

First they used the prisoners; now they 
are using the missing in action. At the time 
when they applied for membership in the 
United Nations, they suddenly agreed to pro- 
duce three bodies — gave us the names. When 
we vetoed their membership they withdrew 
their offer for those — for the remains. 

We vetoed their membership only because 
we did not want to accept a double standard 
in the United Nations. We are prepared to 
let North Viet-Nam enter the United Na- 
tions if South Korea would also be admitted 
into the United Nations; but we did not ac- 
cept the concept of "selective universality," 
where our friends are barred from the United 
Nations and Communist nations are ad- 
mitted. So this was not directed as such 
against North Viet-Nam. 

Nevertheless, as a result of a totally un- 
related issue, the North Vietnamese have 
withdrawn their — withdrew the ofl'er that 
they had already made. We are approaching 
them periodically through many channels and 
now, most of the time, directly. 

I feel that they will use the missing in 
action for their political purposes, and we 
do not believe that American foreign policy 
should be shaped by the holding of hostages 
— and even less by the remains of Ameri- 
cans who died in action. 

Conduct of Foreign Economic Policy 

Governor Mandel: Governor Waller of 
Mississippi. 

Governor Waller: We all had the pleasure 
of taking about six trade missions to different 
pa7ts of the world — particularly the Orient 
and the Middle East in April of this particu- 
lar year. And the mis.sions were staffed, Mr. 
Secretary, ivith biisinessmen who were sell- 
ing. And I was along to help make appoint- 
ments and contacts for long-range sales, 
contracts on food and fiber products, con- 
sumer goods, and so forth. And from the 



520 



Department of State Bulletin 



dviciission which I had with Amba)^!<ador 
Helms in Tehran and other places, it appears 
to us from the outside looking in that our 
staffing in the foreign offices are woefully in- 
adequate, based upon the new trade efforts 
where the dollars are. 

Secretary Kissinger: You mean in our Em- 
bassies ? 

Governor Waller: Yes, sir. And, also, the 
fragmentation between Commerce and Agri- 
culture and State. And I just wondered if you 
were aware of this and if any plans were 
underway to give us the tools that the Japa- 
nese hare, that the French have, in tnany of 
the marketplaces. We believe that the staff 
could be as little as 25 percent of the size and 
configuration needed to help the American 
businessman meet the competition in differ- 
ent markets. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think you are 
right that our economic representation 
abroad has not always kept pace with the 
realities of the modern world. We used to 
operate largely through one or two commer- 
cial or economic counselors, and that view is 
not to be considered to be the most promis- 
ing career within the Foreign Service. 

Secondly — those of you who know Wash- 
ington will agree — the various departments 
sometimes deal with each other as sovereign 
entities, making short-term diplomatic treat- 
ies of coexistence. [Laughter.] They do not 
always develop the most coherent policy. 

Now, we have attempted to improve the 
situation, and it cannot be done as rapidly 
as one would like. We have in Washington 
now, in the Economic Policy Board and else- 
where, I think the most cohesive organiza- 
tion for the conduct of foreign economic 
policy. For example, in the approach to the 
United Nations — and, in fact, on the whole 
range of foreign economic policy — the co- 
operation now, especially between the Treas- 
ury Department and the State Department, 
is very intimate. The Secretary of Treasury 
and I meet at least once a week, and our 
subordinates meet daily. 

In addition, we have staffed the economic 
divisions of the State Department with the 



ablest people that we could find. The Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 
Mr. Enders, has certainly not been a shrink- 
ing violet in international negotiations; and 
he has been largely responsible for the en- 
ergy program that I have mentioned. 

In the field — there will be a time lag be- 
fore all of this can be translated into the 
field. 

I agree with your comment; I hope that 
we are aware of it. We are certainly trying 
to move in this direction because — you are 
right — the economic dimension of foreign 
policy is becoming increasingly important 
and we have not in the past been organized 
in Washington or staflfed in the field to carry 
it out. 

Energy Research and Development 

Governor Mandel: Governor Pryor, Arkan- 
sas. 

Governor Pryor: Mr. Secretary, we talk a 
great deal about finding and exploring new 
ways for seeking alternative sources of ener- 
gy. I talk about it in speeches, and I guess all 
of us talk about it in speeches, and you talk 
about it in speeches. It sounds very good. But 
it's beginning, I think, to have a hollow ring, 
because I don't know, in fact, that we are 
really making a wholesale effort to seek alter- 
native sources of energy. And from time to 
time we hear about developments. 

For example, the University of Nebraska 
recently came forth with a type of fuel made 
from grain, I understand, and it potvers an 
automobile much less expensively than our 
traditional methods. And suddenly we don't 
hear of those things any more. 

I remember back in the late forties we had 
a tougher automobile that came out, and it 
worked so well and did so splendidly and got 
so many miles to a gallon of gasoline; and, 
before you know it, it was off the market — 
it ivorked. And the reason it ivas off the 
market was because it worked. And, really, 
are we doing our part? And are ive really 
doing any more than talking about it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I said in my 
introductory remarks, there are people in 



October 6, 1975 



521 



this room who will tell you that excessive 
humility is not my province. [Laughter.] T 
am not an expert on the domestic energy 
program. 

As I understand it, we are spending over 
$10 billion in research and we are encourag- 
ing investments in alternative sources. 

The difficulty is that it will take three to 
five years — or five years, really, before any 
substantial results can show. And in the in- 
terval, much of the emphasis will have to bo 
placed on consei'vation. 

I am certain that other proposals will be 
made in the course of this year to encourage 
investment in alternative sources ; but we 
are now at a stage where much of it is in 
research and development and the result will 
not show up for two or three years. 

International Cooperation on Energy 

Governor Mandel: Governor Edwards of 
Louisiana. 

Governor Edirards: Mr. Secretary, I would 
not presume to give you any advice on diplo- 
matic relations, because that ivould be like an 
atheist trying to teach the Pope catechism. 
[Laughter.] You are in the southern part 
of the United States. I think it's important 
for those of ns in positions of leadership to 
express our opinions. 

I must say to you that I listened in awe and 
amazement at some of the statements you 
made about what we were going to do for the 
developing countries and the developed coun- 
tries m the Fir.'it World, the Second World, 
the Third World, and the Fourth World 
about economic stability and industrial de- 
velopment, employment, and what have you. 
And I simply suggest to you that I hope we 
can do it for them a helluva lot better than 
we have been able to do it for ourselves, be- 
cause we haven't done it in thiji country yet. 
And I think Americans ayid the world ought 
to come to grips with that reality. And I 
suggest — / know you spend a lot of time in 
Washington and other foreign cities [laugh- 
ter], but America has serious problems. And 
unless we get independent in this country in- 
sofar as the production of energy is con- 
cerned, we're never going to be able to help 
other countries and we're never going to be 



able to help ourselves. And I would certainly 
like to see the American thrust on this thing 
beamed toward making America the inde- 
pendent country it ought to be in the field of 
production and use of energy. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Governor, I do 
not know exactly what you were referring 
to. if you refer to these remarks here. My 
basic point, with respect to energy is that 
the energy crisis affects us and it affects our 
in-incipal allies. And it therefore affects the 
.security of the whole free world. 

Now, we consume about 50 percent of the 
energy of the world. And therefore it is 
clear — and I agree with you — that we must 
exercise a position of leadership; that if we 
do not make ourselves invulnerable, if not 
independent, or substantially invulnerable to 
oil pressures, nobody else can do it. 

At the same time, if we do not cooperate 
with our allies in Europe and Japan, their 
sense of impotence will be enhanced, and 
their vulnerability to pressures — not just 
from the producers but from their neigh- 
bors — will also increase. And, therefore, 
since the cohesion of the free world must be 
one of our principal foreign policy objectives, 
we have to cooperate with them. 

Now, this cooperation, in fact, does not 
involve any significant outlays for the 
United States. For example, we are trying to 
establish common conservation targets with 
them in order to multiply the efforts that we 
may make in conservation. We are trying to 
pool research and development efforts to 
some extent so that we can share in each 
other's technology. We are not talking here 
about a giveaway program, because we are 
talking of the cooperation of countries at a 
substantial level of economic well-being. 

As far as the developing world is concerned 
in energy, they are being to a considerable 
extent — or to some extent, at least — financed 
by the oil producers themselves; and there- 
fore in international forums we have never 
been able to get the support of the so-called 
Third World on the energy question. 

So what I was talking about here is pri- 
marily the relationship between the United 
States and the industrial countries of West- 
ern Euroije and Japan, and not in the form 



522 



Department of State Bulletin 



of American financial outlays but in the 
form of political and economic cooperation. 
The second general observation I would 
make is: I agree with you that it is impor- 
tant for us — crucial for us — to deal with our 
domestic problems. But I do not believe — and 
tliat may be a professional bias — that we 
can choose between our domestic and for- 
eign problems. I think we are now in a posi- 
tion where, if we cannot solve both, we will 
not be able to solve either. 

Detente and Human Rights 

Governor Mcmdel: Governor Boren. 

Governor Boren of Oklahoma: Mr. Secre- 
tary, I have two interrelated questions. The 
first is this: The Helsinki statements and 
other receyit statements appear to give only 
broad lipservice to the concept of doing some- 
thing about freedom of emigration out of the 
Soviet Union and religious freedom for both 
Christians and. Jews and intellectual freedom 
within the Soviet Union. Are we in fact, 
really, trying to exert any real leverage on 
this sitxation—or have we really, as a matter 
of fact, decided to treat that as a matter of 
internal affairs for the Soviet Union? 

That's the first question. The second ques- 
tion is: If ire could draw a distinction be- 
tween coexistence and detente — detente being 
a somewhat more intimate, friendlier, or 
closer relationship than mere coexistence — 
how much can the arguments for detente be 
founded strictly upon economic justification 
as opposed to political justification? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, "detente" is a 
French word, and it means something like 
relaxation of tensions. It has not, in our 
view, any moral significance. And if it sug- 
gests to you anything more intimate than 
coexistence, then this must be because it 
may have been used too loosely in rhetoric. 

Let me state what our policy is toward the 
Soviet Union, and then I can get to your 
specific question. 

We recognize that the Soviet Union is 
ideologically opposed to us. Secondly, we rec- 
ognize that the Soviet Union is a super- 
power whose geopolitical interests are often 
at variance with ours. And therefore we 



conduct the policy of coexistence, detente, 
relaxation of tensions — whatever you want 
to call it — with no illusions about the struc- 
ture of what we are dealing with. 

At the same time, we recognize we are 
living in a world that is different from our 
historical experience. Until the end of World 
War II, the United States could be secure 
behind two oceans, and changes in the world 
l)alance of power had to be of an enormous 
magnitude before we were affected. 

For about a generation after World War 
II, we had such an ovei'whelming military 
superiority that we could overwhelm most 
of our problems with our resources. But 
today we live in a world in which, while we 
are still the single strongest factor, we are 
no longer predominant. 

We also are in a situation of effective nu- 
clear parity, in which neither side will be 
able to gain a decisive strategic advantage 
unless one side simply quits. 

Under these conditions, we have to con- 
duct a policy in which we try to limit or con- 
tain the power of other countries through 
creating balances, backed by our military 
strength around the world. We also face the 
fact that under current conditions nuclear 
war would be an extraordinary calamity. 

Therefore we are attempting to create a 
situation where we will not give up our vital 
interests but where we will also not un- 
necessarily run the risk of confrontation; 
where we give an opportunity to the Soviet 
Union to pursue a more moderate course 
but where, when challenged, we act with 
great firmness, as we did at the time of the 
building of a submarine base in Cuba, as we 
did during the Jordan crisis of 1970, as we 
did during the Middle East alert of 1973. 

We must have a military strength which 
does not tempt aggression. Without that, no 
policy of coexistence — relaxation — is possi- 
ble. But beyond that, we must have a di- 
plomacy that gives an opportunity for 
settling disputes by peaceful means. And we 
have the problem of balancing incentives 
and penalties for the Soviet Union in the 
correct way. 

Now, there are endless disputes of what 
the correct balance of incentives and penal- 



October 6, 1975 



523 



ties is. I, for example, do not believe that 
economic relations should be conducted for 
their own sake. I have always believed that 
they should be linked to progress on foreign 
ix)licy issues. 

Now, on the Helsinki declaration, there 
was a great deal of — there were many mis- 
conceptions. One, for example: It was not 
primarily an American show. It was agi-eed 
to by 34 heads of government, or 34 govern- 
ments; and in fact the United States did 
not play the dominant role in shaping it. 
Secondly, the Helsinki declaration recognized 
nothing that had not already been accepted 
in previous international conferences to 
which we were a part. Thirdly, insofar as 
there was anything new in the Helsinki 
declaration, it was in the area of human 
rights and human contacts — not as far as 
you would wish it, but nevertheless there 
were formal declarations. 

Now, our view with respect to human 
rights has been this: We have believed that 
we could be more effective by quiet, un- 
dramatic representations than by turning 
them into tests of prestige. And I think our 
experience with Jewish emigration proves 
this. We had increased the emigration from 
400 in 1969 to 38,000 in 1973, when by mak- 
ing it a formal test, it dropped again to 
10,000. 

But this is a question of tactics; this is 
not a question of objectives or purpose. And 
our test over the next decade is whether 
we have the strength to pursue both a policy 
of relaxation of tension and keep up our 
military defenses, whether we are prepared to 
be flexible in our diplomacy and yet firm in 
our purposes and avoid oscillating between 
extremes of intransigence and extremes of 
conciliation — which had been the case in 
l^revious periods. This is what I would define 
to be the basic problem. 

Panama Canal Negotiations 

Goi^ervor Mandel: Goi'ernor Wallace of 
Alabama. 

Governor Wallace: Mr. Secretary, after the 
unfortunate conclusion of the matter of Indo- 
china, do you feel that the United States now 



can afford to give up control of the Panama 
Canal? 

Secretary Kissinger: On the issue of the 
Panama Canal, the question is what is 
meant by control of the Panama Canal and 
how we define our vital interests in relation 
to the Panama Canal. 

The United States must maintain the 
right, unilaterally, to defend the Panama 
Canal for an indefinite future, or for a long 
future. On the other hand, the United States 
can ease some of the other conditions in the 
Canal Zone. 

Our problem with respect to the Panama 
Canal is this: How do we best defend our 
defense requirements that are vital in the 
Panama Canal area? Do we do it most 
effectively by digging in, turning Panama 
into a potential area of guerrilla conflict 
backed by all of Latin America, and turning 
it into an issue of peiTnanent confrontation 
between all of Latin America and the United 
States in which military force may have to 
be used for an indefinite period? Or is it 
Ijossible to make arrangements in which our 
defense interests can be maintained for 
many decades and our operating interest can 
also be maintained for several decades and 
thereby defuse the immediate situation? 

Nobody is in favor of turning over our 
defense of the Panama Canal, and nobody 
is in favor of turning over the essential 
operating requirements. What we are talk- 
ing about is whether we can develop a 
status for the Panama Canal — and we're not 
sure yet that this can be done — that meets 
our essential defense requirements and 
avoids a situation in which we may have a 
Viet-Nam-type situation in Central America 
for the indefinite future backed by all of 
Latin America. 

If we can find an honorable way of doing 
it, we would hke to explore it. As we explore 
it, we will consult closely with the interested 
members of the Congi-ess, and there will not 
be any secret negotiations that are sprung 
on people unexpectedly. This is really the 
issue. We are in the process of exploring it, 
and I do not know whether it is possible to 
achieve what I've described. If it isn't, then 
there can be no agreement. 



524 



Department of State Bulletin 



Purpose of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Grain and Oil Talks 

Governor Mandel: Governor Godwin of 
Virginia. 

Governor Godwin: Mr. Secretary, I was 
iconderinf! if ijou coidd comment — // it irotdd 
he appropriate for yon to make any comment 
— on what impact, short-term-wise or longer, 
that the Soviet-American nepotiatio)is, in 
reference to our export of wheat and their 
making available to us oil, would have on our 
riiergij situation. 

Secreta) ij Kissinger: I would like to stress 
that the negotiations on grain and oil are 
technically separate negotiations; they are 
not organically linked, though there is a 
conceptual connection between the two. 

Our interest in a long-term agreement on 
grain is to prevent these fluctuations in 
Soviet demand, which can have a profound 
effect on our prices and in which the Soviet 
Union enters our market only in periods of 
severe shortage in the Soviet Union. 

So we would like — and we are in the proc- 
ess of negotiating — a longer tenn agreement, 
which would at one and the same time stabi- 
lize prices in the United States by giving 
our farmers an opportunity for long-term 
planning and put a ceiling on what can be 
bought in periods of difficulty in the Soviet 
Union. 

With respect to what is available in terms 
of energy from the Soviet Union, I do not 
think it would have a decisive impact on our 
energy situation, but it would have a sym- 
bolic impact. And therefore we are pursuing 
the negotiations. 

The Soviet Union and the OPEC Nations 

Governor Mandel: Governor Edwards, 
South Carolina. 

Governor Edwards: Mr. Secretary, just 
prior to your speech, Admiral [Elmo i?.] 
Zumwalt said that the Russians ivere using 
economic factors to their benefit and that 
they had participated in urging the unity of 
the OPEC nations— that they had urged the 
embargo and had urged the OPEC nations to 
quadruple prices and raise prices a second 
time and promise them help, military aid in 



case of need, and urge the OPEC nations to 
remove their assets from free-world banks. 
Could you comment on the part that you feel 
the Soviet Union played in our energy crisis 
with OPEC? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to 
disagree with the admiral, with whom I was 
associated for many years in Washington. I 
have stated that I recognize that the Soviet 
Union is impelled by ideological hostility. 
I do not doubt that Radio Moscow from time 
to time makes the claims that were men- 
tioned. At the same time, in terms of syste- 
matic policy, I am not aware that the Soviet 
Union has formally or systematically made 
the suggestion. I am aware of occasional 
radio broadcasts from Moscow to selected 
Arab audiences that use some of these argu- 
ments, but so far the Soviet Union has bene- 
fited from the OPEC increase; but I think 
we should not exaggerate the Soviet influ- 
ence by saying that they have engineered it. 

What has happened has been to the ad- 
vantage of the Soviet Union, but it has not 
been the result of Soviet policies. It is much 
more due to practice organic to the Middle 
East and therefore more manageable within 
the context of our relationship to the Middle 
East than as an aspect of East- West rela- 
tions. 



Egypt-Israel Agreement and U.S. Assistance 

Governor Mandel: Governor Blanton, Ten- 
nessee. 

Governor Blanton: Mr. Secretary, I want 
to express my appreciation for your attend- 
ing this conference. And I ivould like to ask 
you: In the recent peace agreement between 
Israel and Egypt, besides the technicians, 
how much money did it cost us; and hoiv is it 
split between the two? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with respect to 
the agreement between Egypt and Israel, 
first of all, if implemented — and if we can 
ever keep everybody quiet for a few weeks, 
it may even get implemented [laughter] — 
it will represent the most significant step 
toward peace that has been taken in the 
history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. And our 



October 6, 1975 



525 



own obligations with respect to it should be 
seen in that context. 

Now, with respect to what it costs us: 
Since we had not computed exactly what we 
would liave given without the agreement. I 
cannot give you an absolute figure, but I 
think it is important to keep in mind that 
substantial aid for Israel has been a part of 
annual appropriations, quite independent of 
this agreement. 

For example, last year something like $2. .5 
billion was appropriated for Israel — partly 
to pay for the cost of the 1973 war, and 
]xirtly to pay for their other necessities. 

Secondly, prior to the agreement, 76 Sena- 
tors wrote a letter to the President pointing 
out that the assistance to Israel should be 
computed on the basis of Israel's needs and 
not on the basis of any political considera- 
tions, and Israel had submitted a request of 
$2..59 billion before the agreement. 

Now, we have not yet settled the exact 
figures that will be submitted to the Con- 
gress, but it will be below $2.59 billion. It 
will be in the area of $2.2 billion, $2.3 billion. 
And therefore, on that level, you could not 
prove that there was any additional sum that 
has been given as a result of the agi-eement, 
though I assume this is simply very hard to 
compute, but we're talking about modest 
sums. 

With respect to Egypt, here is the most 
significant Arab country — a country that 
was substantially close to the Soviet Union 
in 1972 and '73, that has now put more of 
its reliance on the West. It has chosen the 
path of moderation and peace. And there- 
fore we feel that it is symbolically of gi-eat 
importance that the United States contribute 
to an opportunity of economic — not mili- 
tary — development of Eg.vpt. 

There again, we have not made a foiTnal 
agreement with Egypt. We had planned to 
increase our economic aid to Egypt in any 
event, even without the agreement. And 
there, too, it may involve a slight increase 
over what we had planned. But if you are 
asking about the additional sums that the 
agreement cost us, we are talking of a few 
hundred million dollars; we are not talking 
about huge sums. 



Prospects for Agricultural Exports 

Governor Mandel: Any other questions? 
Governoi- Bond of Missouri. 

Governor Bond: Mr. Secretary, what would 
you say are the long-term and intermediate- 
term prospects for our agricultural exports, 
particidarly with the OPEC ^nations, or 
should we be looking to this — 

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't hear the be- 
ginning of the question. 

Governor Bond: I'm concerned about our 
agricultural exports. Several of the states 
here represented are very heavily involved in 
agriculture. We're interested in knowing 
what the potential would be for expanding 
America's export of agricultural products 
and whether you see the OPEC countries as 
a potentially significant market for Amer- 
ica's agricultural exports. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I pointed out, 
we are talking about a long-teiTn agi-ee- 
ment with the Soviet Union. 

Secondly, we have an obligation — which is 
not foiTnalized but which is very real — for 
long-teiTn supplies to Japan. 

In addition, we are encouraging the export 
of agricultural commodities, as we have an 
obligation to do since we have urged our 
farmers to produce at maximum capacity. 

Over a period of years, we think that the 
markets in the OPEC counti'ies can increase. 
But, of course, those with the largest sur- 
pluses also have relatively small popula- 
tions, so that there is a limit to what can be 
done. 

We think that over the next years the 
markets for American agricultural products 
will be good. And, in fact, our major difl^- 
culty will be whether we can meet the world 
demand rather than whether we can sell our 
agricultural products. 

Policy on Kidnaping and Terrorism 

Governor Mandel: Governor Holshouser. 

Governor Holshouser of North Carolina: 
Mr, Secretary, could you give us any com- 
ment on the status of negotiations about the 
Americans in Ethiopia over the weekend? 



526 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: When Americans are 
captured, we are always in great difficulty 
because we do not want to get into a posi- 
tion where we encourage terrorists to cap- 
ture Americans in order to get negotiations 
started for their aim. So our general posi- 
tion has been— and it is heartbreaking in 
individual cases, always heartbreaking our 
general position has been that we will not, as 
a government, negotiate for the release of 
/ mericans that have been captured. 

Now, in this particular case, the only de- 
mands that have been made on us have come 
tlirough totally unauthenticated sources; so 
we haven't any decision to make. We have 
lieai-d radio broadcasts on Beirut radio of 
what the demands are, but they have not 
been tied to anything that we can do or by 
anybody that we can deal with. But oui- 
general position has been that we will not 
negotiate, as a government, with kidnapers 
of Americans because there are so many 
Americans in so many parts of the world — 
tourists, newsmen, not only officials — that 
it would be impossible to protect them all 
unless the kidnapers can gain no benefit 
from it. 

U.S.-Bahamas Spiny Lobster Negotiations 

Governor Mandel: Governor Askeiv. 

Governor Askew of Florida: Mr. Kissinger, 
as jjou know, we have had a difference — the 
United States with the Bahamas — on the 
question of the taking of the spiny lobster 
and the jurisdiction. We have a substantial 
number of fishermen in south Florida de- 
pendent upon this. 

The State Department conducted the nego- 
tiations, which did not prove successful, with 
the Bahamian Government. And it's my 
understanding that efforts are being made to 
try to arbitrate through international means 
the possible phasing out, if we can't get some 
additional understanding ivith the Bahamian 
Government, to permit us, on a reciprocal 
basis, to fish for these lobster. 

I just wonder if you have any comment, 
any hope that we might have that there's 
anything further that the State Department 
might be able to do to insure access of these 



traditional grounds with some cooperative 
agreement between the Bahamian Govern- 
ment and the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, since I am not 
running for office in Florida, I have to tell 
you that until fairly recently — about two 
months ago, I think — I never even heard 
there was such an animal as the spiny lob- 
ster. [Laughter.] But I have in the mean- 
time. 

And what we are going to try to do is to 
see— in the context of the negotiations on 
the spiny lobster, the Government of the 
Bahamas has used against us certain legal 
principles which we have applied with re- 
spect to the Maine lobster, so that we did 
not have a very brilliant negotiating posi- 
tion [laughter] — and what we are trying 
to do right now is to see whether we can 
find a context for that negotiation that 
broadens the framework somewhat beyond 
the immediate issue of the lobster, within 
which perhaps some solution can be found. 

Relationships With Latin America 

Governor Askew: Just one other question, 
and that is: On the question of South Amer- 
ica — again, with the proximity of Florida, in 
particular, and the southeastern United 
States, where yov have these Governors rep- 
resented — what, really, is the posture of any 
particular position in regard generally to 
Latin America to the United States'! 

Secretary Kissinger: Latin America is the 
part of the world with which we have the 
most, the longest, uninterrupted relation- 
ship. And it is the part of the world in which 
the relationship between industrial countries 
and developing countries is being conducted 
among people of at least comparable back- 
ground and similar aspirations. Therefore 
we have always believed that our relation- 
ships in the Western Hemisphere are very 
important to our relationships to the rest of 
the world. 

Inevitably, in many Latin American 
countries, there is a temptation to define 
their identity through opposition to the 
United States. And therefore the rhetoric of 



October 6, 1975 



527 



many Latin American countries vis-a-vis 
tlie United States tends to be on occasion 
Ijeiligerent. 

Still, we believe that we can make prog- 
ress in developing a cooperative relationship. 
We have started what is called the new 
dialogue with the countries of the Western 
Hemisphere. And though it has had its ups 
and downs due to many causes, we believe 
tliat, on the whole, it is progressing. And 
we are prepared to make a major effort to 
improve our relationship with the Western 
Hemisphere on the basis of reciprocity. 

Goverrmr Mandel: Tiru other Governors 
have indicated they'd like to ask questions, 
and at the conclusion of those two questions 
ive're going to hare to terminate this part of 
the pyogranK I think the Secretary has been 
inmsiiaUii generous of his time, and we don't 
want to impose on him. Governor Edwards 
of South Carolina and Governor Busbee have 
indicated a desire to ask questions. Arid after 
those two we'll have to conclude this part of 
the program. Governor Edwards. 

Reopening of the Suez Canal 

Governor Edwa)-ds: Mr. Secretary, I un- 
derstand the United States paid most of the 
cost for opening the Suez Canal. I may be 
mistaken, but this is what I've been told. 
What are the advantages to opening the Suez 
Canal? It seems to me that it gives access to 
that great modern Soviet fleet through the 
Dardenelles into the Mediterranean and 
down into the Indian Ocean, where our ship- 
ping lanes are so vital to keep our energy 
supplies open for the industrial world. Woidd 
you comment on that, please? 

Secretary Kissinger: As long as you are 
talking about the Soviet Navy, I have to say 
I have seen statements that in 1973 the 
United States was affected in the conduct of 
the Middle East crisis by its fear of the 
Soviet Navy. This may have been true of 
our Navy; it wasn't true of our government. 
[Laughter.] We all suffered from the illu- 
sion that our Navy was far superior to the 
Soviet Navy, and we conducted ourselves 
accordingly. [Laughter.] We may have been 



wrong, but we acted as if we were superior. 
[Laughter.] We believed it, too. 

Now, as far as opening of the Suez Canal 
is concerned, it is clear that opening of the 
Suez Canal makes it easier for the Soviets 
to move ships from the Mediterranean into 
the Indian Ocean. Of course, there is no law 
that prohibits the American Navy to follow 
any Soviet ship into the Indian Ocean 
through the Suez Canal if we want to. But 
the major argument for opening the Suez 
Canal was, first of all, of course, the desire 
of Egypt to do it; and, secondly, because of 
tlie general assessment that it would con- 
tribute to the stabilization of the Middle 
East by creating additional inhibitions 
against the opening of hostilities. And there- 
fore, balancing the advantages of peace in 
the Middle East against the strategic dis- 
advantage of permitting — shortening the 
Soviet travel time, it was decided to go ahead 
with it, especially since it was really sub- 
stantially out of our control. 

Whether we, in fact, paid the greatest 
part of this, I would have to look into this. 
I know we paid something for it. I know 
other countries also did. But I'd have to 
check whether it is, in fact, true that we paid 
the largest part of it. 

State Department Regional Representative 

Governor Mandel: Governor Busbee of 
Georgia. 

Governor Busbee: Mr. Secretary, this 
might be a good, one to conclude on. 

You've heard a lot of interest by the Gov- 
ernors in international affairs. Governor Wal- 
ler just alluded to the involvement ive're all 
engaged in, in economic trade missions, in- 
vestment, and so forth with other countries 
and our dealings tvith them. We found it 
necessary that we be provided relevant in- 
formation on the interpretation of State De- 
partment policy in these various areas — and 
also the necessity for arranging for the visits 
of our economic missions to other countries. 
And we have just passed, unanimously, at 
the Southern Governors' Conference, a formal 
request to you that we be provided a State 
Department regional representative in the 



' 



528 



Department of State Bulletin 



southeastern area on a pilot basis to see how 
It works. And we've had a lot of discussion 
on bureaucracy and our jjosition with bu- 
reaucracn, but I think that the State Depart- 
ment is the only Department that's not 
represented on a regional basis; we need you, 
u-e want you, and we woidd just like some 
response in our request to you that we try 
this. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I saw that. I 
ivad the resolution, and I welcome it. I have 
to look into what the bureaucratic aspects 
are of appointing a regional representative. 
And given the way the State Department 
operates, it will take at least 10 yeai-s. 
[Laughter.] 

Governor Busbee: Thank you. I don't think 
this is a fatal response. I brought you down 
to Georgia and fed you my grits — and 1 
thought you would give a more favorable 
answer. [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Quite seriously, I am 
very sympathetic to the resolution. And 
we will either appoint a regional represen- 
tative or we will establish some liaison with 
the Southern Governors' Conference so tliat 
we can meet the request of this resolution. 

We welcome the resolution, and we will 
work with it to realize its objectives. I just 
want to look into the best method to do it, 
because the first time I saw it was last night 
and I could not talk to any of my associates 
about how to implement it. 

Governor Mandel: Governor Holshouser 
just can't restrai7i himself. Go ahead. 

Governor Holshouser: Marvin, I think we 
ought to assure the Secretary, though, that 
we don't intend this as any encouragement 
for some of those people in Washington who 



already think the Soidh is a foreign country 
anyway. [Laughter.] 

Governor Mandel: On that note, I think on 
behalf of all of the Governors here today I'd 
like to express our deep appreciation to 
the Secretary for not only coming here but 
for the candor and the manner in which 
he responded to all of the questions that ivere 
asked him. And on behalf of all the Gov- 
ernors, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. 
We deeplji appreciate having you. [Applause.] 



U.S. To Assist in Airlift 
From Angola to Portugal 

Department Announcement ' 

In response to Portuguese President Costa 
Gomes' urgent appeal for support on human- 
itarian grounds for the airlift of Portuguese 
citizens from Angola to Portugal, the U.S. 
Government is providing two U.S.-flag char- 
tered civilian aircraft with civilian crews for 
an indefinite period of time. We anticipate 
that the aircraft will begin flying within 72 
hours, after logistical and other arrange- 
ments have been completed with the Portu- 
guese Government. 

The U.S. Government has already con- 
tributed $200,000 to an appeal by the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross for re- 
lief assistance to Angolans displaced by the 
fighting. We are prepared to respond to fur- 
ther appeals by international agencies for 
relief assistance within Angola. 



' Read to news correspondents on Sept. 2 by 
Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Rela- 
tions. 



October 6, 1975 



529 



I 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Firing Line" 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
irith Secretary Kissinger by William F. 
Buckley, Jr., on September 10 broadcast on 
the public television and radio program 
"Firing Line" beginning September 13. 

Press i-elease 479 dated September 11 

Mr. Buckley: When President Nixon and 
his party traveled to Peking in 1972, Art 
Buchwald wrote that he had come into pos- 
xessioyi of captured Chinese Communist 
documents indicating that Chinese intelli- 
gence had unearthed a supersecret U.S. 
agency called the State Department; that 
indeed the head of that Department, called, 
by insiders the Secretary of State, icas actu- 
ally traveling with the President — a white- 
haired gentleman who mingled discreetly 
irith a crowd of reporters, cidtivating in- 
conspicuousness, while the business of state 
was handled ostensibly and ostentatiously 
by Presidential aide Henry Kissinger. Art 
Buchwald having blotvn the operation, Presi- 
dent Nixon in due course surfaced the De- 
partment of State by naming Henry Kissin- 
ger as its head. 

He is, I guess it is safe to say, the most 
cowipiciious Secretary of State in America)! 
history. And although, as every schoolboy 
knows, the authority to write foreign policy 
is the prerogative of the President, the reli- 
ance of the incumbent President on the ad- 
vice of Mr. Kissinger is ividely advertised by 
the President himself. 

The paradox is that Mr. Kissinger's huge 
personal successes are not reflected on the 
historical record. It is as if everyone at the 
Olympic stadium joined in carrying an ath- 
lete on their shoulders in an endless tri- 
umphal procession without pausing to realize 
that in fact he had won no gold medals at 
all. Perhaps he struck the fancy of the croivd 
because they kneiv that he ivas fated to lose 



but admired the brilliance of his perform- 
ance. Perhaps in the great seizure of auto- 
hypno.'iis, the crowd thought he ivas ivinning 
even as inconspicuous musclebound little 
athletes were busily scoring in one event 
after another. Moreover, the allure of the 
champion is strengthened, not weakened, by 
his own refusal to declare himself the iv in- 
ner. Sometimes he seems to be saying that 
thetc are no such things as diplomatic vic- 
tories. Sometimes he seems to be sayiyig even 
darker things, such as that the end of West- 
on civilization is in sight and our descent 
should be dignified and perhaps even good- 
natured. 

I shoidd like to begin by asking Secretary 
Kissinger why he thought to give President 
Nixon to read a one-volume edition of Speng- 
ler's "Decline of the West." 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, because I had 
discussed my early interest in philosophy of 
history with President Nixon, I pointed out 
to him that I thought that Spengler — with 
many of whose conclusions I did not agree 
— nevertheless, in his perception of the rise 
and fall of civilizations as integrated units — 
that is to say, in which politics, art, archi- 
tecture, science were all part of the same 
perception — was an interesting way of look- 
ing at the problem of civilization, not neces- 
sarily a prediction of our civilization. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, did you expect that he 
would learn to see more acutely what was 
happening to our civilization simply by 
mastering Spengler's technique or by shar- 
ing in Spengler's weltschmerz? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all I 
think it is incorrect to say that Spengler 
suffered from weltschmerz. I think that what 
Spengler attempted to do was to show that 
civilizations follow a certain rhythm and a 
certain sequence of events, and it is there- 



530 



Department of State Bulletin 



fore wrong to say it is optimistic or pessi- 
mistic. It is more important to understand 
whether his perception had some validity. 

The reason, however, that I discussed this 
with President Nixon was to emphasize that 
the manifestation of events which had come 
uj) in the form of tactical decisions are very 
often quite misleading and that a statesman 
has to understand what the trend of events 
is — whether it is in a positive or in a nega- 
tive direction — and has to understand that 
there are many seemingly unrelated mani- 
festations of a total culture that affect the 
scope of policy and the direction that it can 
take. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, but it's — 

Secretary Kissinger: I was much less 
interested in the predictions of Spengler 
than in his perception. 

Mr. Buckley: Than in his technique? 

Secretary Kissinger: Besides, he had read 
Toynbee, so I had to give him another ap- 
proach. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, there is a certain irre- 
versibility, isn't there, in Spengler's view of 
things, ivhich I take it you did not ivant to 
suggest to the President? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
there is an irreversibility in events, but I dc 
believe that to reverse a trend requires more 
than proclamations. It is important to under- 
stand what the trend is before one can re- 
verse it. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, I think most people 
woidd agree, although sometimes trends are 
accidentally reversed even by people who fail 
to understand them, just as they are unin- 
tentionally accelerated. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but if you make 
policy, you cannot do it in the expectation 
of a miracle or of an accidental reversal. 
The problem of policymaking is to get some 
conscious control over events. Now, if an 
accident helps you, you are lucky ; but you 
cannot conduct affairs on the basis of the 
expectation of winning at roulette. 

Mr. Buckley: No, but doesn't the making 
of policy sometimes call simply for the buy- 



ing of safe time? I remember when Mr. 
Churchill, speaking in 1949 at MIT — per- 
haps you were there — said that perhaps the 
death — he did not name him, but his allusion 
ujas clearly to Stalin — would give to the West 
the .mme advantages that the death of 
Genghis Khan gave ms. And there's a sense 
in which policy can be understood as hoping 
that things will change for the better, mean- 
while simphj playing it as safe as you can. 
Is that correct? 

Secretary Kissinger: Sometimes you have 
to play for time in the expectation of some 
change, such as the one to which Churchill 
referred. But to the extent possible, there 
has to be some rational explanation of what 
you are waiting for ; you cannot simply con- 
duct policy waiting for a favorable accident. 
It was a perfectly rational expectation that 
the death of Stalin would bring about im- 
portant domestic changes in the Soviet 
Union ; therefore playing for that time was 
a reasonable course of action. 

Mr. Buckley: Is it rational to expect that 
the collision of Marxist ideology with his- 
torical reality will affect — in such a way as 
to be advantageous to the West — Soviet pol- 
icy in the future? 

Secietary Kissinger: Well, first of all, no 
system of government and no ideology has 
ever remained unaffected by time. And it 
would be an extraordinary event if Marxist 
ideology were to remain unchanged as the 
only ideology in history. So I believe the 
evolution of history will inevitably bring 
about a change in Marxist ideology. 

Now, whether that change of Marxist 
ideology will be for the benefit of the West, 
whether it will lead to a possibility of a more 
conciliatory foreign policy, or whether in- 
stead it will lead to a gradual spread of 
Marxist perceptions around the world — this 
depends not only on time, but it depends on 
the nature of the opposition. It depends on 
the vitality of competing values and on the 
ability to prevent major foreign policy suc- 
cesses by countries that profess the Marxist 
ideology. 

Mr. Buckley: But isn't there a sense in 
which the vitality of the opposition to the 



October 6, 1975 



531 



i/roirfh of Marxist doctrines plays into tfy 
theoretical hands of the tablet-keepers of 
Marxism — because this of course is what 
they predicted: that we woidd resist and re- 
sist, even at bayonet point, inasmtich as we 
were dominated by our fascination and greed 
for property and domination of the riding 
class — of the working class? 

Secretary Kissinger: So you think that 
the fact of resistance fuels Marxist ideology? 

Mr. Buckley: Yes; I say it can, yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: But, surely, the op- 
posite could not be true — that the absence 
of resistance would weaken Communist 
ideology. I cannot accept this proposition. It 
depends on the nature of the resistance, and 
il depends on the adaptation that Marxism 
itself has to make to contemporary realities. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, are we prepared foi 
either contingency? There is the possibility, 
as you .say, that the evolution of the Com- 
munist idea will go in the direction — in a 
beneficent direction, in a direction conducive 
to the interest of the West — ajid there is the 
alternative possibility. We seem to be pre- 
paring almost exclusively for the lattei 
rather than for the former. 

Secretary Kissinger: That they are going 
in a beneficent — 

Mr. Buckley: In a beneficent direction. 

Secretary Kissinger: Not at all. It is my 
view that whether it will go in a direction 
beneficial to the West or whether it will con- 
firm existing stereotypes depends very im- 
portantly on the performance of the West, 
or on the performance of the non-Commu- 
nist world, and on the adaptations that 
Marxist ideology has to make to reality — 
and to a reality that we ourselves have to be 
instrumental in creating. 

I do not agree with you at all that our 
policy is based on the proposition that with- 
out effort on our part history will do our 
work for us and that Marxist ideology will 
change without effort on our side and with- 
out our resistance to foreign policy pressure. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, I believe you — to begin 
with — ayid it seems to me that your record 



makes this plain. But it also seems to me 
that here you are not in harmony with the 
American establishment. The American 
establishment seems to subsidize anti-Com- 
munist efforts up to a certain point — at 
u-hich point attrition takes over and they 
pull out. It seems to be plain that the dis- 
nstei of Indochina, against which you strug- 
gled, was a disaster nevertheless. And it has 
certainly confirmed those Marxists who 
hejiere that the imperialist world, as they 
call us, is soft and lacking in purpose. Now, 
to what extent is this a realistic historical 
judgment, or to what extent is it simply a 
capricious application of ideological theories? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have always 
considered Indochina a disaster, perhaps 
partly because we did not think through the 
implications of what we were doing at the 
beginning — 



Mr. Buckley: Does 
eluded? 



ive mean you in- 



Secretary Kissinger: Well — 
Mr. Btickley: Which was it? 

Secretary Kissinger: — pre my being in of- 
fice; those decisions were made in the previ- 
ous Administration — and partly because the 
magnitude of the task we had set for our- 
selves was not clear when it was set. And 
then the American public was not prepared 
to stick with it. 

So it failed for a variety of reasons, but 
none of them was that any of the policy- 
makers — as it drew to a conclusion — thought 
that history would do our job for us or that 
failure in Indochina would help us in the 
general relationship with the Communist 
world. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, do you consider that the 
American public is coextensive with the 
American Congress when you use that term? 
Is it the public that let us down or is it the 
Congress that let u^ doivn? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the Indo- 
china problem is a very complex one because 
in a way you can say we let ourselves down 
by entering too lightly on an enterprise 
whose magnitude was not understood, by 



532 



Department of State Bulletin 



methods which were inappropriate to the 
scale of the — 

Mr. Buckley: Of the problem. 

Secretary Kissinger: — of the problem and 
then were caught by what I would think was 
a minority, but nevertheless a very deter- 
mined minority, in a situation in which the 
effective public support disintegrated. 

I do not know whether I would make a dis- 
tinction here between the Congress and the 
public. I think probably the Congress came 
to reflect public sentiment so that finally, in 
the ultimate collapse last spring, there was 
clearly no public support for any continuation 
of the American effort. All public opinion 
polls seemed to show this. 

Mr. Buckley: Now, is it possible that your 
own policies and those of President Nixon 
and President Ford contributed to the con- 
fusion that rendered the voice of the Ameri- 
can public or the American Coyigress so in- 
decisive? 

I give you one example: A question k'os 
asked of President Ford in March of this 
year, the answer to tvhich I will spare you 
the embarrassment of reading. But the ques- 
tion was: "Mr. President, the question is 
raised by many critics of our policy in South- 
east Asia as to why we can conduct a policy 
of detente with the two Communist super- 
powers in the world and could not follow a 
policy of detente with Cambodia and South 
Viet-Nam. Could you explain that to us?" 

The ansiver is he could not. Now, I'm sure 
you can. But it takes us some high-flying 
and dialectical reconciliations, doesn't it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Not at all, in my view 
— although I would not make Indochina pol- 
icy the test case of our foreign policy in 
general. Our policy has been firmly opposed 
to an expansion of the Communist sphere or 
to foreign policy adventures by Communist 
countries. Therefore, to the extent that North 
Viet-Nam was engaging in systematic aggres- 
sion against all of its neighbors, it was abso- 
lutely consistent with our policy that we 
would resist that. 

To us, the policy of relaxation of tensions 
with the two major Communist countries 



does not presuppose any degree of ideological 
approbation. It is a practical accommodation 
to new realities, and it does not go so far as 
to acquiesce in any foreign policy adventures. 
Therefore, at the time of the Jordan crisis 
of 1970, the building of a submarine base in 
Cuba, the Middle East crisis in 1973, the Ad- 
ministration always reacted with extreme 
firmness to what we perceived to be foreign 
policy challenges by any of the Communist 
countries. And I think the American public 
will have to understand that, on the one side, 
in the age of nuclear superpowers and the 
capability of destroying tens of millions of 
people in a very brief time in a war, the 
problem of peace is of great consequence — 
but at the same time not to disarm ourselves 
where we will not resist foreign pressures. 

Now, this requires a more sophisticated, a 
more complicated perception of the interna- 
tional environment than was possible in the 
forties and fifties. But I see no inconsistency 
between resisting foreign expansion and at- 
tempting to moderate the conduct of the 
Communist countries at the same time. 

Mr. Buckley: But, Mr. Secretary, the ag- 
gression by the North Vietnamese depended 
for its success on Soviet and Red Chinese 
arms. It is an aggression that they would 
have had to have used slingshots to fuel if it 
had not been for the fact that they were 
clearly client states of the two great super- 
powers ivith whom we were carrying on this 
policy of detente. So isn't it some sort of a 
semantical illusion to suppose that you can 
jrrescind the North Vietnamese act of aggres- 
sion as though it were not in fact sponsored 
by the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not think it 
was sponsored by the Soviet Union. I think it 
was supported by the Soviet Union. I think 
that there was a clear generic and indigenous 
impetus to the North Vietnamese military 
actions in Indochina. 

Secondly, the policy of relaxation of ten- 
sion began systematically only after the Indo- 
china war was already started; and I think 
it was used in part, to some effect, to bring 
it to a conclusion on terms which, if we had 
su.stained our effort, would have been — if we 



October 6, 1975 



533 



had sustained our assistance — a tolerable out- 
come. 

But I do not believe that the case of Indo- 
china, which goes back to the early sixties, is 
a good test case of the general policy. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, ivould you say that the 
activities of the Soviet Union in Portugal 
irould be a better example? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that we 
have to recognize that the Soviet Union and 
the United States are ideological opponents, 
that the relaxation of tensions has never been 
conceived by any of us as ending competition 
and the possibility of conflict. It is a means 
by which a competition which is inevitable — 
in the nature of present circumstances — is 
regulated while reducing the danger of nu- 
clear war. 

With respect to Portugal, the basic cause 
of the disintegration of the political situation 
in Portugal is due to factors indigenous to 
Portugal. It is true that the Soviet Union has 
given some assistance to the Communist 
Party in Portugal. It is also true that, until 
recently, this could be an important factor 
only because the West did not resist with the 
determination that it should have. 

So it is not our view that the Soviet Union 
will not take advantage of opportunities that 
may be presented. It is, however, our view 
that they can be maintained, if we act with 
wisdom and determination, within manage- 
able bounds. 

Mr. Buckley: But since we operate in a 
free society, you really do need a thing called 
"public support," the lack of which made it 
impossible for you to .'itick it out in Indochina. 
But isn't that public support gravely threat- 
ened by shifting moral perceptions that flow 
out of the ideological egalitarianism that goes 
into detente? 

Let me give you one example: The Gallup 
poll reported, one month after your return in 
1972 from Peking, as follows: "In the period 
leading up to this historic event, we have 
seen a far more favorable image that the U.S. 
public has of the Chinese Communists today 
than they did in the mid-sixties. Respondents 
to the poll were asked to select from a list of 



23 favorable and unfavorable adjectives, 
those which they feel best describe the Chi- 
nese Communists. The terms 'ignorant, war- 
like, sly, and treacherous' were named most 
often in 1966, but now the measurement 
taken shows them to be 'hard-working, in- 
telligent, artistic, progressive, and practi- 
cal' " 

Now, the transformation in the People's 
Republic of China between 1966 and 1972 
was in fact a radical transformation. There 
is a sense in which conservative elements 
were defeated during the Cultural Revolu- 
tion, the old Communist cadres. In any 
event — 

Secretary Kissinger: Not your kind of 
conservatism. 

Mr. Buckley: No, no; not mine. And I'm 
glad to say not yours — which is a compli- 
ment. But it is plain that the American people 
— as witness those who have traveled in 
China — people like Ken Galbraith, Scotty 
Reston, Barbara Tuchman — cotne back and, 
sure enough, we hear those old voices from 
the thirties: "The trains are running on 
time." 

Now, how can a free society husband the 
moral flywheel necessary to distinguish be- 
tween desirable and undesirable societies, in 
the wake of such relativism as is stimulated 
by the philosophy of detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first let me say 
that if one pushed your argument to a con- 
clusion, one would have to say that the United 
States must maintain international tensions 
in order to make sure that its people have the 
correct perception of the nature of the soci- 
eties with which they are dealing. 

It is one of the tasks before us to enable 
the United States to conduct a vital foreign 
policy without moral relativism and also 
without the black and white categories with 
which we tended to sustain ourselves in the 
past. 

In the past, we used to think that relations 
between countries were either peace or war, 
that wars were caused by evil people, and 
that if we approached relations of peace with 
a country, or eased relations with a country 



534 



Department of State Bulletin 



that also indicated an improvement in the 
moral climate of this country. 

In the world in which we find ourselves 
HOW, in the world of nuclear superpowers, in 
the world in which American power is no 
longer as predominant as it was in the late 
1940's, it is necessary for us to conduct a 
more complicated foreign policy without 
these simple categories of a more fortunate 
historical past. 

So I think we have to come to an under- 
standing that the Communist societies are 
morally, in their internal structure, not ac- 
ceptable to us ; that their ideology is one that 
is not compatible necessarily with our own 
but that, nevertheless, on the plane of day-to- 
day foreign policy, we may be prepared to 
make those practical accommodations that 
preserve the peace, as long as vital interests 
are not threatened. 

The moral quality of life in China did not 
dramatically change between 1969 and 1972, 
and in no public statement have I ever 
claimed that the fact that we are working 
out specific arrangements either with the 
People's Republic of China or with the Soviet 
Union indicates that there has been an evolu- 
luiion in their domestic structure toward a 
more pluralistic system. 

We have to avoid creating the illusion that 
progress on some foreign policy questions — 
such as nuclear arms agreement — means that 
there has been a change in the domestic 
.structure. So this Gallup poll in part reflects 
a kind of perception of the nature of the in- 
ternational environment that inevitably will 
have to be changed. I believe that it is the 
task of our national leaders to be able to 
maintain both the moral strength of the 
country and to do the practical steps that 
need to be taken for whatever national pur- 
poses we set ourselves. 

Mr. Buckle]) : But they're not very good at 
it. Notv, you and Mr. Nixon didn't invent co- 
existence. The idea of coexistence, as a matter 
of fact, teas affirmed by Eisenhower; and he 
did, in fact, meet Khrushchev here in one tense 
day in 1959. But he sought to make it plain 
by those fine gestures that diplomats study 
that there was a continuing — indeed, a rather 



heated — disapproval of the means by which 
Khrushchev maintained himself in power and 
his people subject. 

I'm trying to say that in an enthusiasm 
for detente the American people are listening 
to rapturous descriptions of life in China, in 
the course of which— 

Secretary Kissinger: Not from us. 

Mr. Buckley: Not from you, but from the 
people ivith whom you have associated very 
closely. As a matter of fact, this may amuse 
yon. CREEP [Committee for the Reelection 
of the President'\ — Mr. Nixon's organization 
— one of its items that it had was a stock 
letter. 

Secretary Kissinger: I just have to say I 
do not go skiing with Mr. Galbraith — largely 
because I do not ski. 

Mr. Buckley: You mean that's the only 
reason you can think of. Well, that was a 
diversionary maneuver, Mr. Secretary. As a 
matter of fact, Mr. Galbraith and I are very 
good friends; but when we tried to make a 
date for a "Firing Line" just a couple of 
months ago arid he told me he couldn't make 
it on the first of April because he tvas lectur- 
ing at the University of Moscow, I asked him 
what "left" did he have to teach them. 

But in any case, CREEP— an official or- 
ganization devoted to the reelection of Mr. 
Nixo7i — was sending out a form letter to 
every newspaper in the United States that 
carried anything I wrote disparaging to 
China, and it didn't say the kind of things 
you said. It didn't say: "Mr. Buckley is a 
child, and he doesn't recognize that we can't 
ignore 700 million people" — and so forth. It 
said: "Mr. Buckley fails to understand the 
great achievements that Mao Tse-tung has 
performed for the Chinese people" — the kind, 
of thing that they used to say about Hitler 
before he became tridy insufferable. 

Now, what I'm saying is that all of a sud- 
den you find yourself face to face with ter- 
rible problems that issue from that confusion. 
They started to give you hell when they found 
out that you tried to "destabilize" the coming 
to power of Allende in Chile. I don't think 
that they would have given you hell for try- 



October 6, 1975 



535 



hig to do that in an age, which was not no 
long ago, when it teas uyiderstood that ive had 
to coexist with the enemy, but that we cer- 
tainly were going to do everything that we 
could to help people to stay free. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that 
the nature of our domestic debate on foreign 
policy has been severely affected by the up- 
heavals of the sixties, by the assassinations, 
by Viet-Nam, by Watergate. And I believe 
that there are much more fundamental fac- 
tors in the randomness of debate where one 
can, at one and the same time, be accused of 
being too tough and too soft on Communist 
countries than the policy of relaxation of ten- 
sions, because what is the policy of relaxation 
of tensions? It attempts to recognize that in 
the nuclear age statesmen have a responsi- 
bility not to risk nuclear war lightly. Sec- 
ondly, they attempt to take into account the 
realities of major Communist countries and 
the realities of the American power position 
in the present world. They attempt to do this 
while maintaining the overall military bal- 
ance and the overall geopolitical balance. 

This is, without question, a much more 
complicated task than the one that existed in 
the fifties. If you look at the foreign policy of 
the fifties and sixties, to which you refer 
with some nostalgia, you will see wild oscil- 
lations between extremes of intransigence 
and extremes of conciliation. And as early as 
the summit meetings of 1954, you could find 
rapturous quotes of how the fact that the 
leaders met in an atmosphere of better 
human relations — how that changed the 
whole nature of the environment. 

What we have attempted to do is to con- 
duct foreign policy on a more sober basis and 
to avoid these wild swings between extremes 
of conciliation and extremes of intransigence 
— to find a policy that is geared to our na- 
tional interest and to our basic values and 
that can be sustained over a period of time. 

Now, I — 

Mr. Buckley: You see, I think — 

Secretary Kissinger: — I deplore this par- 
ticular statement that CREEP sent out, but 
they were not selected for that. 



Mr. Buckley: It wasn't considered a dirty 
trick, you see. 

Secretary Kissinger: No, no; I don't con- 
sider it a dirty trick, but they were not se- 
lected for their positions because of their 
competence in foreign policy. 

Mr. Buckley: No, no. I gave it merely as 
an example because they were attempting to 
.say something that the people ivould find in- 
fernally plausible. You see, as — 

Secretary Kissinger: In an election year — 
under pressure of an electoral period — many 
ill-considered things are being done. But I do 
not think you will find any official statement 
from the Department of State since I have 
become Secretary of State— or from the 
White House, for that matter — which would 
make these claims. 

Mr. Buckley: No. You see, I am not saying 
that you personally endorse this vietv of life 
in China. I am saying that certain deductions 
are draicn from the intimacy of the highest 
diplomatic contacts with China, which results 
in Gallup finding that the majority of the 
American people think of the poor Chinese as 
intelligent, artistic, progressive, and practi- 
cal. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I think the 
solution to this problem is not to generate 
artificial crises, but to try to overcome the 
simple Manichaeanism — 

Mr. Buckley: Yes. 

Secretary Kissinger: — in which one side 
has to assert absolute good and the other 
absolute evil before you can develop a practi- 
cal policy, because it is precisely this attitude 
that leads to these wild swings that over a 
period of time will also demoralize our public. 

Mr. Buckley: You are talking about some- 
body who can be excommunicated if you lose 
Manichaeanism, so I'd be very careful not to 
engage in that heresy. But I do sharply 
understand what you are saying, tvhat you 
are trying to achieve; but I am here to pre- 
dict great, great troubles for you — as ivitness 
this: 



536 



Department of State Bulletin 



//( the last few months, if you had elected 
to go to the help of Portugal — / am not sure 
the American people would have, in fact, per- 
mitted ijou to do so. I think there would have 
been a standard lachrymose editorial in the 
Xew York Times and in the Washington Post 
ireeping over lost Portuguese liberties, but 
saying, after all, they were used to being 
without liberty. But they would be much 
more interested in u-hether the CIA had 
d topped an unfriendly balloon over south 
Portugal and would haul you up and ask you 
it you u-rre up to your old Chilean tricks 
again. 

Noir. my point is that .schematically your 
policy is easier to understand in a society in 
which you hare total power to dominate for- 
eign policy but the difficulties that you arc 
likely to get into are precisely those that trace 
to America's attempt to infuse some sense of 
moral purpose into their foreign policy. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but first of all I 
believe that there is no inconsistency between 
infusing a moral purpose in our foreign pol- 
icy and the policies we are pursuing. I believe 
that moral purpose must be related to a series 
of practical steps that can be taken. Practical 
steps without moral purpose become random. 
And without moral purpose, no leader will 
have the assurance and the confidence to act 
in situations in which the choices are always 
unclear at a moment when the scope for ac- 
tion is still relatively wide. 

So I do not accept the antithesis between 
moral purpose and pragmatism. I think with- 
out strong moral purpose there cannot be an 
effective foreign policy. At the same time, 
when one translates moral purpose into pol- 
icy, one has to look at the realities of the situ- 
ation or one runs the risk of empty posturing. 

Now, in this translation, there is the dan- 
ger of moral confusion that you have de- 
scribed; and this is particularly great if the 
opponents of the prevailing policy — whatever 
the prevailing policy is — state their case in 
very absolute terms because — 

Mr. Buckley: It is surrealistic. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is right, because 
they will not be responsible for the conse- 



quences of their assertions, and they do not 
necessarily look at the alternatives that were 
in fact available. It is in those terms that I 
believe we have a problem of educating the 
public. We are living in a more complicated 
period than the one in which we formed our 
historical perceptions, and we have this prob- 
lem of education at a time when respect for 
authority of whatever kind — but especially 
executive authority— is declining, for reasons 
independent of the specifics that we have 
been discussing but due to the upheavals of 
the sixties and seventies, and where the — 

Mr. Buckley: An atomized ethos. 

Secretary Kissinger: You have that, and 
you hft7e executive-legislative difficulties. So 
we are in a very difficult period for the con- 
duct of foreign policy. There is no question 
about this. 

But if the American people develop the 
idea that its government is artificially creat- 
ing crises or unnecessarily creating crises, we 
would repeat the divisions of the Viet-Nam 
war — which, even though I believe they were 
caused by a minority, contributed substan- 
tially to the demoralization of what you con- 
sider the American establishment. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, if I understand you 
correctly, if an Allende were to come to power 
tomorrow, you would not feel that you could 
recommend such action as you thought ap- 
propriate in 1970, so that even in the last 
four years — 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I am not saying 
that. And I would also go back to what you 
said about Portugal. I think that the realities 
of our situation — and not the realities of the 
relaxation-of-tensions policy, because that 
was a very minor factor— but the realities of 
the domestic evolution that has occurred in 
this country required a rather deliberate ap- 
proach to the problems of Portugal, particu- 
larly because Portugal is more a West Euro- 
pean problem than a U.S. problem, and we 
thought it was important to bring the West 
Europeans with us. 

Our perception of the evolution in Portu- 
gal was always clear, was repeatedly stated, 
and was in fact frequently criticized for be- 



October 6, 1975 



537 



ing too pessimistic. Once we had achieved an 
agreement with the West European countries 
about the nature of the danger, I do not think 
it would be correct to say that we were totally 
passive about the evolution there. 

With respect to what one would do in sim- 
ilar circumstances, in the case of Chile — a 
case which has been wildly oversimplified in 
much of the discussion — I think our percep- 
tion of the problem would not be radically 
different from what it was in 1970. 

Mr. Biickk'ij: Your perception would not 
be, I'm sure. But does that mean that you 
wotdd feel that you could share that percep- 
tion with the relevant committees of Co7i- 
fjress and u'in them around — or do you think 
that there has been "sea change" there? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but the sea 
change that has occurred in America is not, 
in my view, caused by the policy that is being 
conducted vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and 
Communist China. The sea change that has 
been caused in America is an almost meta- 
physical revulsion against foreign involve- 
ments that involve risks. And, in fact, the 
anomaly of the situation in which we find 
ourselves is that, on the one hand, there 
is theoretical anticommuni.sm ; on the other 
hand, there is an enormous practical reluc- 
tance to run any of the risks that would be 
associated with the rhetoric that many en- 
gage in. 

It is one thing to have a crisis that lasts a 
day or two — such as the Cambodia incident, 
or the Mayaguez incident, but the real test 
is to sustain a crisis over an extended period 
of time. And there I would think that any- 
thing that looks to the public like a massive 
foreign involvement would require the most 
meticulous justification before it could be 
supported. This is our diflSculty in the Con- 
gress. 

And it surfaces, for example, with respect 
to the technicians that we are proposing, at 
the urgent and insistent request of the 
parties, to send to the Sinai, in which there is 
a considerable debate starting over 200 Amer- 
icans in an area where there are already — 

Mr. Buckley: Volunteers. 



Secretary Kissinger: — volunteers — civil- 
ians, unarmed, in an area where Sweden has 
over a thousand troops, Finland has nearly 
a thousand, Austria has about 800, Canada 
has hundreds — troops — without any debate in 
their countries that it might involve them in 
a war. 

This is the psychological environment in 
which we have to conduct our foreign policy 
and which has to be understood when one 
engages in rhetoric of confrontation. 

Mr. Buckley: What caused that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think what has 
caused it is in part the experience of Viet- 
Nam, in part the experience of Watergate, in 
part the disillusionment of the sixties and 
seventies. But it is a fact that anyone in a 
responsible position must take into account. 

Mr. Buckley: So, therefore, you would not 
really differentiate my pessimism from your 
own. You simply insist that those difficulties 
that you have issue from a recalcitrant pub- 
lic. 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am not that 
pessimistic. I believe that, first of all, in my 
travels in the country, I have the sense that 
the public wants to believe in its government 
and wants to believe that it has a sense of 
direction. We are going through a period of 
temporary difficulty, and I believe we have to 
adjust our perceptions to a new reality that 
has emerged a generation after the end of 
World War II. We have to explain that at 
one and the same time we may oppose coun- 
tries and yet cooperate with them for specific 
limited purposes, that we have an obligation 
to prevent nuclear war, and that this never- 
theless does not mean that a final moral 
reconciliation has taken place. 

I believe that this can be done, depending 
on the willingness of the various leadership 
groups in this country to accept complexity. 

If we insist on simplification, then we will 
have endless domestic "civil wars" between 
simplifiers on both sides of the debate. 

Mr. Buckley: Do you find more resistance 
to complexity among hard-hats or among 
Harvard professors? I ivon't tell Galbraith 
what you say. 



1 



538 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: No. It's about equal. 

Mr. Buckley: About equal. So, therefore, it 
is a problem. It runs right through all classes 
of Americans. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would think 
that, at least, from where I sit, the public, the 
general public, despite all the shocks, is less 
cynical in this country, basically healthier, 
basically more vital, than in any other West- 
ern country. And, therefore, fundamentally, 
we are the hope of the non-Communist world. 
If we do not lead, there will be no leadership. 
And if we do not act with confidence, no one 
el.se will. 

So I am not basically pessimistic about the 
future of this country. We tend to tear our- 
selves apart in our leadership groups with 
some of the debates that you and I have been 
discussing here. But structurally, I think this 
country is still a very vital and very hopeful 
phenomenon. 

Mr. Buckley: Did you find it difficidt, tvhen 
people come to you — Congressmen, Senators, 
Goveinors, and so on — to bring them around 
on points that you consider to be vital? 

I think, for instance, of the difficulties that 
you had on the Turkish issue, which struck 
Die as one of the few questions coyicerning 
which there is clearly a right answer and a 
wrong an.^wer. Now, did you actually attempt 
to persuade Congressmen to permit the sale 
of arms to Turkey? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think one of 
the problems with respect to Turkish aid is 
that I believe there is clearly a right answer, 
but I also believe that public opinion at large 
is not greatly exercised on this issue because 
it is too obstruse and esoteric for them ; 
therefore, relatively small minorities that are 
highly organized, very vocal, and very pas- 
sionate, can have a major impact. 

Secondly, the original vote on Turkish aid 
occurred at the absolute low point of execu- 
tive authority in the immediate aftermath 
of— 

Mr. Buckley: Of the resignation of Presi- 
dent Nixon? 



Secretary Kissinger: — of the resignation 
of President Nixon and at a time when the 
congressional leadership which was with us 
had lost control of its followers. And so I am 
certain that if that vote came up today the 
Congress would never override a Presidential 
veto. 

At that time it overrode three Presidential 
vetos, really out of a desire to assert itself. 
Then I think perhaps we made some mistakes 
initially in presenting the issue, and that 
pushed the whole debate in a wrong direction. 

I do not think an event like the Turkish 
aid vote could be repeated today, but it is 
symptomatic for what can happen in a 
slightly disintegrated situation. 

Mr. Buckley: Well, if it is as important as 
you say it is, and as important as it is in my 
opinion, why is there not a greater sense of 
alarm in Europe and. in America over the 
whole thing? 

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, I think in Europe 
there is very profound alarm. The Secretary 
General of NATO, for example, has invited 
himself to Washington — indeed, he is meet- 
ing with the President today— and I repeat, 
he invited himself; we did not invite him — 
to register — he's a good friend of ours, I 
must say. I emphasize the fact that he in- 
vited himself only to indicate the alarm that 
he is feeling about the erosion of the relation- 
ship of Turkey to NATO, which coincides 
with the alarm we feel about the erosion of 
our relationship with Turkey under condi- 
tions that are of no help to Greece and Cy- 
prus. It is one of those decisions that help 
nobody. 

Mr. Buckley: Is the United Nations less 
and less appropriately the chamber in which 
questions of this kind can be discussed? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United Nations, 
in its present form, has not proved suitable 
for dealing with the fundamental issues of 
peace and war. It provides a forum for the 
exchange of ideas. It sometimes provides a 
vehicle in which parties can meet con- 
veniently. It does a useful job on certain tech- 
nical problems. 



October 6, 1975 



539 



I have expressed our concern about the 
bloc voting that is developing there, and I 
must say this expression of concern may have 
contributed to the relative moderation that 
has occurred at this special session of the 
General Assembly which is drawing to a 
close this week. 

But on issues like the Cyprus issue — or 
even more, on East-West issues — the United 
Nations has not proved to be the appropriate 
forum for their resolution. 

M)-. Buckhnj: When ijoii npoke rather men- 
aciiiglji, name people thought, about its per- 
haps becomivf/ an empty shell, you meant if 
it continued in its general irresponsibilitij, in 
its refusal to accept the credentials of vari- 
ous comitries? 

Secretary Kissinger: If the United Nations 
violates its charter in order to give expres- 
sions of political approval or disapproval to 
certain countries, such as the refusal to ac- 
cept credentials of countries, which has the 
practical effect of expelling them from the 
General Assembly — something that is re- 
served to the Security Council and not to the 
General Assembly — when the largest single 
group in the General Assembly always in- 
variably votes as a bloc, then the processes of 
recent debate and pressure politics take over. 
Under those circumstances it will degenerate 
gradually into a confrontation from which 
no one will benefit and which we don't par- 
ticularly have to fear — but in which, in my 
view, it will become an empty shell. 

Now, I have to say that the warnings we 
have expressed have contributed to a some- 
what more moderate approach in this one 
two-week .session. How long this will last we 
will have to see. 

Mr. Buckley: We have only a minute or 
two. I'd like to ask you this, Mr. Secretary: 
I once said to President Nixon that one of the 
things that I admired hugely about Ronald 
Reagan was that he really didn't care what 
the New York Times thought about him. And 
Nixon .mid, "Well, I don't care at all." 
[Laughter.] 

Now, it seemed to be plain that he did care. 



And it seems to me that most people care, be- 
cause it is, in a sense, along with the Wash- 
ington Post and a few others, the voice of the 
establishment. 

On the basis of your experience with the 
Presidency, do you think it's possible for a 
President, effectively and over a prolonged 
period of time, to defy the Americati estab- 
lishment? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, the test of 
Ronald Reagan would be whether he doesn't 
care- it's no great achievement not to care 
about the New York Times in Sacramento. 
The test will be how he would feel if he were 
in Wa.shington. 

Is it possible to define the "American 
establishment"? Well, I do not think the 
American establishment is all that homogene- 
ous; and I think that Presidents and Secre- 
taries of State — if they know their mind, if 
they can present it properly to the public — 
have an opportunity to carry out the policy 
that they think is in the national interest. 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. To Hold Discussions 
on Grain Purchases 

Statement by President Ford * 

The purchase by the Soviet Union of 
wheat and feed grains in the United States 
has been highly erratic over the years. The 
following table shows these purchases for 
recent years, including purchases to date for 
the 1975-76 season: 



lisf 



£* 



Years 



1971-72 
1972-73 
1973-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 (to date) 



Feed 

grains Wheat Total 

(in millions of metric tons) 

2.8 0.0 2.8 

4.2 9.5 13.7 

3.4 2.7 6.1 

.8 1.0 1.8 

5.8 4.4 10.2 



The considerable variation in large bulk 
purchases by a single state-trading company 
contrasts with the more steady purchases of 



' Issued on Sept. 9 (text from White House press 
release). 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



these grains by such customers as commer- 
cial enterprises in Japan and Western 
Europe. Because these purchases are highly 
variable and uncertain, American farmers 
have not been able to count on this market in 
their planting intentions to the extent they 
have on other foreign purchasers. Moreover, 
highly volatile and unpredictable purchases 
emerging after the crop planting tend to con- 
tribute to price instability. 

It would contribute materially to the in- 
terests of the American farmer, workers in 
the transportation industries, and American 
consumers, as well as be in the interests of 
our customers abroad, if we could develop 
a longer term and more certain purchase 
understanding with the Soviet Union provid- 
ing, among other features, for certain mini- 
mum purchases. 

It will take some time to explore the pos- 
sibilities of a long-term agreement. The 
country must have a new procedure for the 
sale of feed grains and wheat to such a large 
state purchaser as the Soviet Union. I am 
sending representatives to the Soviet Union 
at once.- I am also establishing a Food Com- 
mittee of the Economic Policy Board/Na- 
tional Security Council in my office to 
monitor these developments. 

We have already sold a volume of wheat 
and feed grains which will take four to six 
months to ship at maximum rates of trans- 
portation operations. Accordingly, there is 
no immediate necessity to decide about fur- 
ther future sales at this time, and I am ex- 
tending the present moratorium on sales to 
the Soviet Union until mid-October when ad- 
ditional information on world supplies and 
demands is available. This extended period 
should provide the opportunity to negotiate 
for a long-term agreement with the Soviet 
Union. 

Under these circumstances, I am request- 
ing the longshoremen to resume voluntarily 
the shipping of American grain while these 
discussions go forward, and the matter can 
be reassessed in the middle of October. 



' A U.S. delegation headed by Under Secretary for 
Economic Affairs Charles W. Robinson left Wash- 
ington for Moscow on Sept. 10. 



It will be necessary to complete the nego- 
tiations over shipping rates in order to make 
it possible for American ships to carry wheat 
and to assure that at least one-third of the 
tonnage is carried in American ships, as pro- 
vided by the agreement with the Soviet 
Union which expires on December 31, 1975, 
which is also under renegotiation.^ 



U.S. Supports U.N. Membership 
of Three New African Countries 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council on August 18 by U.S. Rep- 
resentative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 

IJSUN pr-ess release 84 dated Autjust 18 

The U.S. delegation welcomes the prospect 
that this year there will be three new Afri- 
can members of the United Nations: the 
Republic of Cape Verde, the Democratic Re- 
public of Sao Tome and Principe, and the 
People's Republic of Mozambique. 

The United States is particularly pleased to 
support the membership application of the 
Republic of Cape Verde because of the very 
long ties of friendship between our two coun- 
tries. In his letter of July 5 — the day of Cape 
Verde's independence- — President Ford stated 
to the President of the Republic of Cape 
Verde, His Excellency Aristides Pereira, 
how much we as a nation look forward "to 
the opportunity for our two nations to work 
together in the cause of peace, freedom and 
the welfare of mankind." 

There is a long history of friendship and 
cooperation between the peoples of our two 
states and, indeed, the close bond of kinship. 
These ties go back to the early days of our 
own national independence. The first Ameri- 
can consulate in Cape Verde was established 
in 1816. Over these many decades a large 
number of Cape Verdeans have emigrated 
to the United States. Leaders of the Cape 
Verdean community estimate that between 

= For text of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Agreement Re- 
garding Certain Maritime Matters, signed at Wash- 
ington on Oct. 14, 1972, see Bulletin of Dec. 4, 
1972, p. 664. 



October 6, 1975 



541 



200,000 and 300,000 American citizens are of 
Cape Verdean descent. They have added 
their language, their culture, and their fine 
traits of energy and self-reliance to the 
Amei'ican scene. 

T am especially glad to welcome to this 
Security Council chamber this afternoon 
three distinguished Americans of Cape 
Verdean descent, Mr. Raymond Almeida, 
Mr. Anthony Ramos, and Mr. Salah Matteos. 
They are present in the gallery. 

I must at the same time express regret 
that the Council has acted so hastily in the 
case of Cape Verdean membership as not to 
make it possible for a representative of the 
new Government of the Republic of Cape 
Verde also to be present on this occasion, as 
1 understand was requested. 

Mr. President, perhaps not many around 
this table have had the privilege, which was 
mine, of having visited personally the Cape 
Verde Islands. I well remember from that 
visit the busy activity in the streets of Praia, 
the capital; the beautiful and active harbor 
of Mindelo; and the verdant agricultural 
valleys of Santo Antao. The stalwart quali- 
ties of the people of this new republic are a 
vivid memory for me and a source of 
strength for the new state. 

The United States welcomes the Republic 
of Cape Verde to the United Nations, and we 
look forwai'd to working with its representa- 
tives in our common mission of furthering 
international peace, cooperation, and devel- 
opment. In this spirit of cooperation, the 
United States has responded to the appeal of 
the Republic of Cape Verde for assistance in 
alleviating the effects of a serious eight-year 
drought. My government is pi'oviding the 
islands with $5 million in food and technical 
assistance. 

Mr. President, the United States also sup- 
ported the application of the Government of 
Sao Tome and Principe for membership in 
the United Nations. The islands of Sao Tome 
and Principe have a long historical tradi- 
tion and a rich cultural heritage. My govern- 
ment was pleased to have been represented 
at the independence ceremonies of Sao Tome 
and Principe on July 12. The American dele- 
gation at the ceremonies was greatly im- 



pressed with the beauty of the islands and 
the warmth of their people. We are sympa- 
thetic to the aspirations of the Government 
of Sao Tome and Principe for progress. To 
assist in the islands' economic development, 
the United States has made available schol- 
arships in this country to help develop skilled 
resources for the islands. We look forward 
to cooperating closely with the representa- 
tives of the Democratic Republic of Sao 
Tome and Principe in pursuing the lofty 
goals of the United Nations to which we are 
dedicated. 

The United States has also voted in favor 
of the admission of the People's Republic of 
Mozambique to the United Nations. Together 
with Guinea-Bissau — for whose membership 
we voted in the 29th General Assembly — 
Mozambique, the Republic of Cape Verde, 
and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome 
and Principe, all of whom this Council has 
just recommended be admitted, constitute an 
important addition of African states to the 
United Nations.' Their admission is another 
step toward the development of a worldwide 
organization in which we hope all those na- 
tions that desire membership and are willing 
and able to carry out their obligations will be 
represented. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 2d Session 

The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: 
Before and After the Coup. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. March 14-October 22, 1974. 
574 pp. 

Problems of Protecting Civilians Under Interna- 
tional Law in the Middle East Conflict. Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on International Organi- 
zations and Movements of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. April 4, 1974. 108 pp. 



' The Council on Aug. 18 adopted unanimously 
Resolutions 372-374 recommending to the General 
Assembly that the Republic of Cape Verde, the 
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, and 
the People's Republic of Mozambique be admitted 
to the United Nations. 



542 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States and Chile During the Allende Years, 
1970-1973. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. July ], 1971-September 18, 
1974. 677 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Arbitration 

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 
10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the 
United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Accession deposited: Chile, September 4, 1975. 

Aviation 

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the con- 
vention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 
1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos 
Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force 
October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605. 

Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, September 16, 
1975. 

Coffee 

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Ap- 
proved by the International Coffee Council at 
London September 26, 1974." 
Accession deposited: Zaire, August 13, 1975. 

Energy 

Memorandum of understanding concerning coopera- 
tive information exchange relating to the develop- 
ment of solar heating and cooling systems in build- 
ings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1-4, 
1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 
Signature: Thermal Insulation Laboratory Tech- 
nical University of Denmark, August 26, 1975. 

Phonograms 

Convention for the protection of producers of phono- 
grams against unauthorized duplication of their 
phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. 
Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United 
States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808. 
Notifi-catio7r from World Intellectual Property Or- 
ganization that ratification deposited: Brazil, 
August 28, 1975. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 



1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Ratification deposited: Tunisia, August 28, 1975. 

Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention, with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torre- 
molinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1975.= 

Ratifications deposited: Australia, Papua New 
Guinea, June 23, 1975; Japan, June 17, 1975. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 63.32, 6590, 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment 
plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast sta- 
tions, with annexes and final protocol. Done at 
Geneva June 8, 1974.' 
Xotification of approval: Spain, July 3, 1975. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, September 15, 1975.' 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, September 15, 1975.' 

BILATERAL 

Canada 

Agreement extending the agreement of April 2 and 
May 9, 1974 relating to the construction, installa- 
tion, and maintenance of a seismograph station 
at Kluane Lake, Yukon Territory. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Ottawa July 15 and August 
13, 1975. Entered into force August 13, 1975. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of April 18, 
1962 (TIAS 5043), relating to the assignment 
and use of television channels along the U.S.- 
Mexican border. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Tlatelolco and Mexico August 20, 1975. En- 
tered into force August 20, 1975. 

Zaire 

Memorandum of understanding concerning direct 
access by a Zairian ground station to data gen- 
erated by U.S. Earth Resources Technology Satel- 
lites (ERTS) and availability to the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration of the 
data so acquired. Signed at Washington and Kin- 
shasa January 6 and 31, 1975. Entered into force 
January 31, 1975. 



' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). 



October 6, 1975 



543 



PUBLICATIONS 



1974 Digest of U.S. Practice 
in International Law Released 

Press release 441 dated August 26 

The Department of State released on August 26 
the "Digest of United States Practice in Interna- 
tiona! Law, 1974," edited by Arthur W. Rovine of 
the Office of the Legal Adviser. 

This second annual volume includes all significant 
developments in U.S. practice in international law 
during the calendar year 1974. The digest contains 
chapters on the law of the sea, aviation and space 
law, international economic law, treaty law, peace- 
ful settlement of disputes, legal regulation of the 
use of force, the position of the individual in inter- 
national law, and many other subjects. 

Of special interest in the 1974 volume are discus- 
sions of the Trade Act of 1974, the Agreement on 
an International Energy Program, current initiatives 
on food and population problems, the establishment 
of several bilateral joint cooperation commissions, 
revised guidelines of the Department of State on 
treaties and executive agreements, developments at 
the 1974 Caracas Conference on Law of the Sea, 
significant developments in arms limitation with the 
Soviet Union, adoption of a definition of "aggres- 
sion," protection of human rights, and actions 
within U.N. bodies regarding principles of interna- 
tional economic relations for both developing and 
developed countries. 

Orders for the digest, accompanied by checks or 
money orders, should be sent to the Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. The price of the 1974 vol- 
ume (Department of State publication 8809; GPO 
cat. no. S7.13:974) is $10.25. The 1973 volume (De- 
partment of State publication 8756; GPO cat. no. 
87.13:973) is available for $7.50. 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Sobject 

481 9/16 Kissinger: Southern Governors 

Conference: informal remarks. 
481A 9/16 Kissinger: questions and answers. 

482 9/16 Kissinger: Cincinnati Chamber of 

Commeixe. 
482A 9/16 Liggett. Kissinger: introductory 

remarks. 
482B 9/16 Kissinger: questions and answers. 
*483 9/16 Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCO, Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), work- 
ing group on subdivision and 
stability, Oct. 9. 
*484 9/16 sec, SOLAS, working group on 

container operations, Oct. 14. 
t485 9/17 Myerson: seventh special session 

of U.N. General Assembly. 
486 9/17 U.S.-Spain cooperative defense 
negotiations: joint communique. 
t487 9/17 U.S.-New Zealand economic con- 
sultations: joint communique. 
""488 9/18 Advisory Committee for U.S. 
Participation in the U.N. Con- 
ference on Human Settlements, 
Sept. 18. 
*489 9/18 Study groups 10 and 11 of U.S. 
National Committee for Inter- 
national Radio Consultative 
Committee (CCIR), Oct. 15. 
490 9/18 Kissinger: news conference, Cin- 
cinnati, Sept. 17. 
*491 9/19 Polish agricultural minister visits 

U.S. 
*492 9/19 Study group CMTT of U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for CCIR, Oct. 
21. 
!1!^? ^/^^ Study group 1 of CCIR, Nov. 25. 
*494 9/19 Program for visit of President 
Alfonso Lopez Michelsen of Co- 
lombia, Sept. 24-27. 
1495 9/19 Kissinger: Joint Economic Com- 
mittee. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



544 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 6, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1893 



Agriculture 

Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern 
Governors Conference (informal remarks, 

questions and answers) 516 

f.S. and U.S.S.R. To Hold Discussions on Grain 
Purchases (statement by President Ford) . . 540 

gola. U.S. To Assist in Airlift From Angola 
to Portugal (Department announcement) . . 529 

ihamas. Secretary Kissinger Appears Before 
Southern Governors Conference (informal re- 
marks, questions and answers) 516 

irma. Letters of Credence (Tin Lat) . . . 515 

ipe Verde. U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of 
Three New African Countries (Bennett) . . 541 

lina. Secretary Kissinger Intei-viewed for 
"Firing Line" 530 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to 

Foreign Policy 542 

Cuba. Questions and Answers Following the 

Secretary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Economic Affairs 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern 
Governors Conference (informal remarks, 
questions and answers) 516 

Egypt 

Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United 
States (Kissinger) 493 

President Ford's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 16 (excerpts) 506 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Cin- 
cinnati September 17 509 

Energy 

Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern 
Grovernors Conference (informal remarks, 
questions and answers) 516 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Cin- 
cinnati September 17 509 

Guinea-Bissau. Letters of Credence (Fernandes) 515 

Indochina. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
"Firing Line" 530 

Israel 

Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United 

States (Kissinger) 493 

President Ford's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 16 (excerpts) 506 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Cin- 
cinnati September 17 509 

Latin America 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Secretary Kisssinger Appears Before Southern 
Governors Conference (informal remarks, 
questions and answers) 516 

Lesotho. Letters of Credence (Mashologu) . . 515 

Mali. Letters of Credence (Kante) 515 

Middle East 

Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United 
States (Kissinger) 493 

President Ford's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 16 (excerpts) 506 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern 
Governors Conference (infoi-mal remarks, 
questions and answers) 516 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Firing 
Line" 530 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Cin- 
cinnati September 17 509 



Mozambique. U.S. Supports U.N. Membership 
of Three New African Countries (Bennett) . 541 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger Appears Before 
Southern Governors Conference (informal re- 
marks, questions and answers) 516 

Portugal 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Firing 
Line" 530 

U.S. To Assist in Airlift From Angola to 
Portugal (Department announcement) . . 529 

Presidential Documents 

President Ford's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 16 (excerpts) 506 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. To Hold Discussions on 
Grain Purchases 540 

Publications. 1974 Digest of U.S. Practice in 
International Law Released 544 

Sao Tome and Principe. U.S. Supports U.N. 
Membership of Three New African Countries 
(Bennett) 541 

South Africa. Letters of Credence (Botha) . . 515 

Spain. Tenth Round of U.S.-Spain Talks Held 
at Washington (joint communique) . . . 508 

Terrorism. Secretary Kissinger Appears Before 
Southern Governors Conference (informal re- 
marks, questions and answers) 516 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 543 

Turkey 

President Ford's News Conference of Septem- 
ber 16 (excerpts) 506 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Firing 
Line" 5.30 

U.S.S.R. 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Secretary Kissinger Appears Before Southern 
Governors Conference (informal remarks, 
questions and answers) 516 

Secretary Kissinger Intei-viewed for "Firing 
Line" 530 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. To Hold Discussions on Grain 

Purchases (statement by President Ford) . . 540 

United Nations 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Cincinnati Address 501 

Secretai-y Kissinger Appears Before Southern 
Governors Conference (informal remarks, 
questions and answers) 516 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for "Firing 
Line" 530 

U.S. Supports U.N. Membership of Three New 
African Countries (Bennett) 541 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Kissinger Appears Before 
Southern Governors Conference (informal re- 
marks, questions and answers) 516 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 541 

Botha, Roelof Frederik 515 

Fernandes, Gil Vicente Vaz 515 

Ford, President 506, 540 

Kante, Mamadou Boubacar 515 

Kissinger, Secretary . , . 493, 501, 509, 516, 530 

Mashologu, Teboho J 515 

Tin Lat, U 515 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourlh-Class Rate 
Book 




5* 



Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



■ 



C:«?(/ 







THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXm 



No. 1894 



October 13, 1975 



BUILDING INTERNATIONAL ORDER 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 

Before the 30th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly 54S 

UNITED STATES GIVES VIEWS ON RESOLUTION ADOPTED 

BY SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 

Statements by Ambassador Moynihan and Ambassador Myerson 

and Text of Resolution 557 

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA: 

STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONSHIP 

Toast by Secretary Kissinger 571 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside hack cover 



i" 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI^ 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894 
October 13, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.60, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication arc not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETl 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public 
interested agencies of the govern, 
with information on developments 
tfte field of U.S. foreign relations 
on the work of the Department 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes seleefm 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet^ 
by the White House and the Depi 
ment, and statements, address) 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and othei 
officers of the Department, as well ai 
special articles on various phases oi 
international affairs and the function* 
of the Department. Information U 
included concerning treaties and inter' 
national agreements to which tht 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department ot 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Ad 
m] 

1 
iiai 






luilding International Order 



Address by Secretary Kissinger ' 



At the outset, let me say how pleased we 
re that our deliberations this year take 
lace under the Presidency of the distin- 
uished Prime Minister of Luxembourg 
Gaston Thorn]. His contribution to Euro- 
ean cooperation, his diplomatic skills, his 
edication to democracy give us confidence 
•«^hat this 30th session will be marked by a 
onstructive and creative spirit. 

And I want also to pay tribute to the dis- 
inguished Secretary General [Kurt Wald- 
leim], whose fairness, leadership, and tire- 
ess effort are dedicated to carrying this 
irganization foi^ward into a new era of co- 
iperation for world peace. 

This century has seen war and cataclysm 
)n an unprecedented scale. It has witnessed 
;he breakdown of established patterns of 
)rder and practices of international conduct. 
[t has suffered global economic depression 
and cycles of famine. It has experienced the 
birth of thermonuclear weapons and the pro- 
liferation of armaments around the planet. 
Ours is a world of continuing turmoil and 
ideological division. 

But this century has also seen the triumph 
of the principle of self-determination and 
national independence. A truly global com- 
munity has begun to evolve, reflected in a 
multitude of institutions of international co- 
operation. We have shaped new methods of 
peaceful settlement, arms limitation, and new 
institutions to promote economic develop- 
ment and to combat hunger and disease 



' Made before the 30th United Nations General 
Assembly on Sept. 22 (text from press release 496). 



worldwide. And our very presence here sig- 
nifies the hope of all nations that disputes 
and conflicts can be resolved by cooperative 
means. 

As we deliberate the future, an event of 
potentially vast implication has just been 
achieved in this organization : the unanimous 
agreement produced by the seventh special 
session of the General Assembly on measures 
to improve the economic condition of man- 
kind. Despite differences of ideology and ap- 
proaches to economic development, the na- 
tions assembled here began to move toward 
the recognition that our interdependence 
spells either common progress or common 
disaster, that in our age no nation or group 
of nations can achieve its aims by pressure 
or confrontation and that the attempt to do 
so would damage everyone. They agreed to 
transcend the stereotypes of the past in the 
search for a cooperative future. The special 
session forged a sense of common purpose 
based on the equality and cooperation of 
states. Now we must dedicate ourselves to 
implementing this consensus. 

Let us carry forward the spirit of con- 
ciliation into the deliberations of this regu- 
lar session. Let us address the issues of 
world peace — the foundation of all else we 
do on this planet — with this same conscious- 
ness of our common destiny. 

It is our common duty to avoid empty 
slogans and endless recriminations. We must 
instead sustain, strengthen, and extend the 
international environment we and our pos- 
terity will require for the maintenance of 
peace and the furtherance of progress. 



October 13, 1975 



545 



Only in a structure of cooperation can dis- 
putes be settled and clashes contained. Only 
in an atmosphere of conciliation can the in- 
security of nations, out of which so much 
conflict arises, be eased and habits of com- 
promise and accommodation be nurtured. 
Social progress, justice, and human rights 
can thrive only in an atmosphere of reduced 
international tension. 

The United States stands ready to dedi- 
cate itself to cooperative efforts to harmo- 
nize the different perspectives of the world 
community in creating a new sense of secu- 
rity and well-being. We do so not out of fear, 
for we are better able to sustain ourselves in 
situations of confrontation than most other 
nations. Nor do we do so out of a sense of 
guilt, for we believe that we have on the 
whole used our power for constructive ends. 

We affirm our common destiny because of 
our recognition of global interdependence 
and because global peace requires it. Indeed, 
there is no realistic alternative to shared re- 
sponsibility in dealing with the international 
agenda of peace, security, economic well- 
being, and justice. 

Let me set forth the views of the United 
States on the work we face in each of these 
areas. 

Building for Peace 

Our first and transcendent concern is for 
peace in the world. 

Peace is never automatic. It is more than 
the absence of war. And it is inseparable 
from security. 

A world in which the survival of nations 
is at the mercy of a few would spell oppres- 
sion and injustice and fear. There can be no 
security without equilibrium and no safety 
without restraint. Only when the rights of 
nations are respected, when accommodation 
supplants force, can man's energies be de- 
voted to the realization of his deepest aspi- 
rations. 

The United States will pursue the cause of 
peace with patience and an attitude of con- 
ciliation in many spheres : 

— We shall nurture and deepen the ties of 
cooperation with our friends and allies. 
— We shall strive to improve relations 

546 



with countries of different ideology or poll 
cal conviction. 

— We shall always stand ready to assist 
the settlement of regional disputes. 

— We shall intensify our efforts to h; 
the spiral of nuclear armament. 

— We shall strive to improve man's ei 
nomic and social condition and to strengths 
the collaboration between developed and dej 
veloping nations. 

— We shall struggle for the realization 
fundamental human rights. 



rec 

ieli 

ijejiBnit 






II 



Relations With Allies and Friends 

America's close ties with the industrii 
democracies of North America, Western Eu 
rope, and Japan have been the cornerstoiW-igW 
of world stability and peace for three deqj uj 
ades. Today, looking beyond immediate sd ^^ 
curity and defense, we are working togetheK .^^^jj 
on a range of new issues. Through our con- 
sultations, we have begun joint efforts t« 
ease international tensions, to coordinate 
our national policies for economic recovery | ■ 
to work together on common challenges such ) 1 1 
as energy and the environment, and to ad- 
dress the great issues that concern the de- 
veloping countries. 

These endeavors are in pursuit of univer- 
sal goals; they are not directed at any na- 
tion or group of nations. They are designed! J 
as building blocks for a broader international 
community. 

In the same spirit, the United States has 
opened a new dialogue with its neighbors in 
Central and Latin America. We have taken 
important steps toward resolving major 
political problems; we have begun close 
consultations for cooperation in promoting 
economic and social development. Alliance 
relations in the Western Hemisphere have a 
long history and great promise for the fu- 
ture. With imagination and dedication, we 
can make inter-American cooperation on the 
tasks of development an example and a pillar 
of the global community. 



East-West Relations 



\ 



Peace, to be secure, must place on a more 
durable and reliable basis the relations be- 
tween the nations possessing the means to 
destroy our planet. 

Department of State Bulletin 



: 



ff 



use 



In recent years, the bipolar confrontation 
of the last generation has given way to the 
beginning of dialogue and an easing of direct 
conflict. In this body, of all organizations, 
there is surely an appreciation of the global 
importance of lessened tension between the 
nuclear superpowers. All nations have a 
stake in its success. When weapons of mass 
destruction can span continents in minutes, 
nuclear conflict threatens the survival of all 
mankind. 

We recognize that the suspicion and ri- 
valry of a generation will not be swept away 
with a document or a conference. Real ideo- 
logical and political differences exist. We 
shall firmly defend our vital interests and 
those of our friends. But we shall never lose 
sight of the fact that in our age peace is a 
practical necessity as well as a moral im- 
perative. We shall pursue the relaxation of 
tensions on the basis of strict reciprocity. 
We know the difi'erence between posturing 
and policy; we will not encourage the belief 
than anyone can benefit from artificial ten- 
sions. We are deeply conscious that we owe 
it to future generations not to be swayed by 
momentary passions. 

The state of U.S.-Soviet relations today 
and just a decade ago present a dramatic 
contrast. The world is no longer continually 
shaken by chronic and bitter confrontations. 
Periodic consultations — including at the 
highest level — encourage restraint and am- 
plify areas of mutual interest. The forth- 
coming meeting between President Ford 
and General Secretary Brezhnev should 
strengthen this process. 

Principles of mutual restraint have been 
enunciated at various summit meetings; 
they were reaffirmed by the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe two 
months ago. These principles provide a 
standard of behavior by which our actions 
will be tested. If they are observed — as we 
insist — and if neither nde seeks unilateral 
advantage, the specter of general war will 
be lifted not only from our own people but 
from all nations. There is no more important 
task before us. 

We have likewise pursued more construc- 
tive and beneficial relationships with the 
countries of Eastern Europe. The United 



States has many traditional and deep-rooted 
bonds of friendship with the proud peoples 
of that region. We see widening possibilities 
for practical cooperation as the barriers be- 
tween East and West in Europe diminish. 

There is no relationship to which the 
United States assigns greater significance 
than its new ties with the People's Republic 
of China. We believe that the well-being and 
progress of a quarter of humanity is an im- 
portant element in global stability. 

The hostility of decades between our two 
nations has been replaced by a relationship 
of mutual respect which is now a durable 
feature of the world scene. It serves not only 
the interest of our two countries but also 
the broader interests of peace and stability 
in Asia and around the world. President 
Ford plans to visit the People's Republic of 
China later this year to confirm the vitality 
of our relationship and to advance the ties 
between us on the basis of the strict imple- 
mentation of the Shanghai communique. We 
take seriously the process of normalizing our 
relation.ship. We are dedicated to pursuing it. 

Containing Regional Conflicts 

The world community must find a way to 
contain or resolve regional conflicts before 
they spread into global confrontations. 

Nowhere has the danger been greater 
than in the Middle East. Nowhere has the 
need for persistent and imaginative negotia- 
tion between suspicious rivals been more evi- 
dent. Nowhere is there greater promise of 
moving fi'om perennial crisis toward peace. 
Nowhere has the U.N. Security Council 
established a clearer framework of principles 
than in its Resolutions 242 and 338. 

The road toward a lasting peace stretches 
long and hard before us. The Middle East 
has seen more than its share of dashed hopes 
and disappointment. But the conclusion of 
the recent Sinai agreement marks a major 
step forward. It is the first agreement in the 
long and tragic history of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which is not the immediate conse- 
quence of hostilities. It could mark a turn- 
ing point. 

The agreement deserves the support of all 
the countries assembled here, because every 
nation here has an interest in progress to- 



Oetober 13, 1975 



547 



ward peace in the Middle East. It is another 
step in the process launched by Security 
Council Resolution 338. The alternative was 
a continuing stalemate which would have led 
over time to another war, creating a serious 
threat to world peace and the prospect of 
broad global economic dislocation. 

Neither fear of the future nor pride 
should obscure the fact that an unusual op- 
portunity for further progress on all issues 
now exists. But opportunities must be seized 
or they will disappear. I want to emphasize 
that the United States did not help negotiate 
this agreement in order to put an end to the 
process of peace, but to give it new impetus. 

President Ford has stated that we will not 
accept stalemate and stagnation in the Mid- 
dle East. That was true before the Sinai 
agreement was signed ; it remains true to- 
day. The objective of our policy is not merely 
to create another temporary truce, but to 
sustain the momentum of negotiations. The 
United States is determined to take every 
feasible step to help promote further prac- 
tical progress toward final peace. 

As a first step, it is essential that the 
Sinai agreement be carried out impeccably, 
within the terms and the time frame that 
are stipulated. 

In the improved atmosphere thus created, 
the United States stands ready to partici- 
pate in any promising initiative toward peace 
at the request of the parties concerned. 

We have made clear that we are prepared 
to make a serious effort to encourage nego- 
tiations between Syria and Israel. 

We also intend to consult over the coming 
weeks with all concerned regarding the re- 
opening of the Geneva Conference, which 
met at an early crucial phase. As cochairmen 
of the Geneva Conference together with the 
Soviet Union, our two countries have special 
responsibilities in this regard. 

We are prepared also to explore possibil- 
ities for perhaps a more informal multilateral 
meeting to assess conditions and to discuss 
the future. 

The United States seeks no special bene- 
fit; we do not attempt to exclude any coun- 
try. We will cooperate with any nation that 
is willing to make a contribution. We have no 
preference for any particular procedure. We 



will support whatever process seems most 
promising. Our approach will continue to be 
both flexible and determined. 

The search for final peace must be con- 
ducted on a wide basis. We are in frequent 
touch with governments in the Middle East. 
We have already begun discussions with the 
Soviet Union with a view to assessing the 
current situation in the Middle East and 
weighing possible diplomatic approaches to 
bring about a just and durable peace in ac- 
cordance with Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338. While we have had important 
differences with the Soviet Union, our two 
countries have held parallel views that the 
situation in the Middle East poses grave 
dangers and that partial steps must be part 
of and contribute to progress toward a com- 
prehensive settlement. 

The role of the world organization remains 
essential. If this organization had no other 
accomplishment than its effective peacekeep- 
ing role in this troubled area, it would have 
well justified itself. These soldiers of peace, 
wearing the blue beret of the United Nations 
as members of UNTSO, UNEF, UNDOF 
[U.N. Truce Supervision Organization, U.N. 
Emei-gency Force, U.N. Disengagement Ob- 
server Force], have become indispensable to 
the maintenance of the two 1974 disengage- 
ment accords as well as the Sinai agreement. 
I want to take this occasion to salute Sec- 
retary General Waldheim and his staff and 
General Siilasvuo [Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo, 
of Finland], the Chief Coordinator of the 
U.N. peacekeeping missions in the Middle 
East, and all the men and women from many 
countries who have served in the forces with- 
out an enemy. 

The deliberations of this Assembly regard- 
ing the Middle East also play a central role. 
They can encourage progress or exacerbate 
tensions. 

Procedural decisions can be based on the 
recognition that dialogue requires universal- 
ity of membership, or they can fuel a futile 
self-defeating effort to discriminate — in vio- 
lation of the charter — against a member 
state whose participation is vital for a solu- 
tion. 

The Middle East will continue to be an 
area of anguish, turmoil, and peril until a 



548 



Department of State Bulletin 



ust and durable peace is achieved. Such a 
)eace must meet the principal concerns and 
nterests of all in the area; among these are 
erritorial integrity, the right to live in peace 
md security, and the legitimate interests of 
he Palestinians. 

In the Middle East today there is a yearn- 
ng for peace surpassing any known for three 
lecades. Let us not doom the region to an- 
)ther generation of futile struggle. Instead, 
et the world community seize the historic 
)pportunity before it. The suffering and 
jravery of all the peoples of the Middle East 
ry out for it; the hopes and interests of 
ill the world's peoples demand it. The United 
States promises its full dedication to further 
progress toward peace. 

The contribution of the United Nations to 
he process of peace is essential in Cyprus 
is well. The Secretary General has the re- 
jponsibilities of organizing the peacekeep- 
ng forces on the island and of facilitating 
;he talks between the leaders of the Greek 
md Turkish communities. 

Strict maintenance of the cease-fire is im- 
perative. For this we look to the restraint 
jf the parties and the efficacy of the U.N. 
peacekeeping forces. 

We know that the world community shares 
our sense of urgency that the negotiating 
process be resumed and that the parties 
demonstrate flexibility and statesmanship. 
The status quo on the island must not be- 
come permanent; a rapid and equitable solu- 
tion is essential. The Secretary General has 
worked tirelessly and imaginatively under 
the most difficult circumstances to narrow 
the diff'erences. He deserves the full support 
of the parties and of every nation here. 

The details of a Cyprus settlement are for 
the two communities themselves to decide. 
However, in keeping with U.N. resolutions 
which the United States has fully supported, 
the following principles are essential: 

— A settlement must preserve the inde- 
pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integ- 
rity of Cyprus. 

— It must insure that both the Greek 
Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communi- 
ties can live in freedom and have a large 
voice in their own affairs. 



October 13, 1975 



— The present dividing lines cannot be 
permanent. There must be agreed territorial 
arrangements which reflect the economic re- 
quirements of the Greek Cypriot community 
and take account of its self-respect. 

— ^There must be provision for the with- 
drawal of foreign military forces other than 
those present under the authority of inter- 
national agreements. 

— And there must be security for all Cyp- 
riots; the needs and wishes of the refugees 
who have been the principal victims and 
whose tragic plight touches us all must be 
dealt with speedily and with compassion. 

These goals match the aspirations of the 
overwhelming majority of the Cypriot 
people as well as the interests of all neigh- 
boring states. 

Another area where this organization will 
be called upon to take responsible action is 
the Korean Peninsula. 

This requires, above all, maintenance of 
the armistice, pending agreement by all of 
the parties most directly concerned to re- 
place it with a new arrangement. The exist- 
ing armistice is the only legal instrument 
committing the parties to maintain the peace. 
It is a carefully designed structure for moni- 
toring and policing the military demarcation 
line. 

The U.N. commander in chief is a signa- 
tory to that agreement. The armistice ma- 
chinery functions daily. None of the signa- 
tories has repudiated it. Nor could they do 
so without serious risks to the peace of the 
world. 

Since 1972, South and North Korea have 
pledged themselves to enter into a dialogue 
and to seek unification without resort to 
arms. This Assembly in 1973 and 1974 en- 
couraged this process — first in a consensus 
resolution supporting talks between the two 
sides; then in a resolution which looked to- 
ward termination of the U.N. Command. The 
United States agrees that 20 years after the 
end of the Korean war, it is timely to termi- 
nate the U.N. Command. We have, in fact, 
cosponsored a resolution to that effect which 
is now before you. 

It would be foolhardy, however, to termi- 
nate the U.N. Command without new ar- 

549 



rangements to preserve the integrity of the 
armistice agreement. In the interest of peace, 
the United States cannot accept any solution 
which fails to provide for the continuing 
validity of the armistice agreement. 

The Republic of Korea and the United 
States have stated their general readiness 
to meet with representatives of the other 
side and with other members of the Security 
Council to discuss termination of the U.N. 
Command while preserving the armistice 
agreement. 

Today I can be more specific. The United 
States and the Republic of Korea, looking 
forward to the time when a lasting solution 
of the Korean problem can be achieved, are 
herewith proposing to the parties of the 
armistice the convening of a conference to 
discuss ways to preserve the armistice agree- 
ment. At such a meeting, we would also be 
prepared to explore other measures to re- 
duce tension on the Korean Peninsula, in- 
cluding the possibility of a larger conference 
to negotiate a more fundamental arrange- 
ment. 

It would be in keeping with this spirit of 
dialogue for this body to open its doors to 
full membership for the two Korean Gov- 
ernments. The United States supports the 
dual entry of both South and North Korea 
into the United Nations without prejudice 
to their eventual reunification. For our part, 
if North Korea and its allies would move to 
improve their relations with the Republic 
of Korea, we would be prepared to take 
similar reciprocal actions. 

It goes without saying that no proposal 
for security arrangements on the Korean 
Peninsula which attempts to exclude the Re- 
public of Korea from the discussions can be 
accepted by the United States. The United 
Nations can contribute significantly to the 
process of peace on the Korean Peninsula by 
supporting a responsible approach. 

Over the past year the United States has 
followed carefully and with great sympathy 
the efforts to reach peaceful settlements in 
southern Africa. 

We welcome the statesmanlike efforts of 
both black and white African leaders who 
are seeking to prevent violence and blood- 

550 



(SI 



shed and to promote a negotiated settlemen 
in Rhodesia. The differences between the tw{ 
communities in that country, while subsi,an 
tial, have been narrowed significantly in th« 
last decade. Both sides in Rhodesia am 
Rhodesia's neighbors — black and white— » 
have an interest in averting civil war. Wei ^ 
will support all efforts to bring about 
peaceful settlement. 

In underlining our goal of peaceful change 
for southern Africa, I want to emphasize the 
importance of an early settlement ir 
Namibia. My government's opposition tc 
South Africa's continuing occupation of 
Namibia and our rejection of South Africa's 
apartheid system are well known. The United 
States has consistently conveyed our position 
on this subject to South Africa. We will con- 
tinue to do so. 

We believe that the people of Namibia 
should be given the opportunity within ai 
short time to express their views on thei 
political future and constitutional structure 
of their country freely and under U.N. su- 
pervision. 



ithi 
ib\ 
irAi 
li 
ires' 
lit I 
i«ti 

•I 
jtrsi 



.^1 



Building International Security 

Peace in the world will be fragile and 
tenuous without a curb and eventually an 
end of the arms race. This is why the United 
States has embarked with the Soviet Union 
upon the difficult and complex negotiation 
to limit strategic arms. Our objectives are 
to prevent unchecked destabilizing competi- 
tion in strategic armaments, to achieve re- 
duction of these arms, to lessen further the 
likelihood of hasty decisions in time of crisis, 
and to ease the economic burden of the nu- 
clear arms race. 

The Vladivostok accord of last fall marked 
a major step toward achieving these goals. 
When the agreement in principle is trans- 
lated into a treaty, agreed ceilings will be 
placed on strategic force levels for a 10-year 
period. This unprecedented step will slow 
the pace of new arms programs, especially 
those driven by fear of major deplojTnents 
by the other side. And it will enhance pros- 
pects for international stability and for po- 
litical accommodation in other areas. 

The United States is actively engaged in 

Department of State Bulletin 



now 



ther arms control negotiations. Together 

ith the Soviet Union, we have made prog- 

■ess toward establishing a regime for peace- 

ul nuclear explosions. And we have agreed 

set a threshold on the underground test- 
ng of nuclear weapons. These are significant 
teps toward a verifiable comprehensive test 
)an. 

In addition, the United States and the 
J.S.S.R. have presented to the Conference 
)f the Committee on Disarmament texts of 

1 Convention on the Prohibition of Military 
)r Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques. These techniques 
ire still at a primitive stage of development, 
Dut man's mastery of environmental forces 
continues to advance. Misuse of this knowl- 
edge might open new avenues of military 
competition and wreak untold and irre- 
versible harm upon all humanity. We urge 
;he conference to complete its consideration 
rapidly. 

Another urgent task is a substantial re- 
duction in the high levels of military forces 
now confronting each other in various parts 
of the world. The United States believes that 
the time has come to give new impetus to 
the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions in Central Europe. The sig- 
nificance of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe depends importantly 
on whether we can achieve progress in this 
area. An agreement that enhances mutual 
security in Central Europe is feasible and 
essential. We will work toward this goal. 

The world faces a paradox with respect to 
the proliferation of nuclear energy. Men 
have fashioned from the atom weapons 
which can in minutes end the civilization of 
centuries. Simultaneously, the atom is fast 
becoming a more and more essential source 
of energy. It is clear that the cost and even- 
tual scarcity of oil and other fossil fuel will 
increasingly spread nuc'ear power around 
the world in the decades ahead. 

But the spreading of nuclear power poses 
starkly the danger of proliferating nuclear 
weapons capabilities — and the related risks 
of the theft of nuclear materials, blackmail 
by terrorists, accidents, or the injection of 
the nuclear threat into regional political con- 



flicts. Now is the time to act. If we fail to 
restrain nuclear proliferation, future gener- 
ations will live on a planet shadowed by 
nuclear catastrophe. 

Over the past year, the United States has 
repeatedly urged new efforts among the 
supplier states to strengthen and standardize 
safeguards and controls on export of nu- 
clear materials. We must not allow these 
safeguards to be eroded by commercial com- 
petition. We must insure the broad avail- 
ability of peaceful nuclear energy under 
safe, economical, and reliable conditions. 

The United States has intensified its ef- 
forts within the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) and with other na- 
tions to broaden and strengthen international 
standards and safeguards and has proposed 
an international convention setting standards 
to protect the physical security of nuclear 
materials in use, storage, or transfer. 

The United States continues to urge the 
widest possible adherence to the Nonprolifer- 
ation Treaty and the associated safeguard 
measures of the IAEA. 

The greatest single danger of unrestrained 
nuclear proliferation resides in the spread 
under national control of reprocessing facili- 
ties for the atomic materials in nuclear 
power plants. The United States therefore 
proposes — as a major step to reinforce all 
other measures — the establishment of multi- 
national regional nuclear fuel cycle centers. 
These centers would serve energy needs on a 
commercially sound basis and encourage re- 
gional energy cooperation. Their existence 
would reduce the incentive for small and in- 
efficient reprocessing facilities, limit the 
possibility of diverting peaceful nuclear ma- 
terials to national military use, and create a 
better framework for applying eflfective 
international safeguards. 

We urge that groups of nations begin now 
to explore this concept and that all states 
support the IAEA's work in this field. 

Building Economic Well-Being 

In the last two years, the world commu- 
nity has been reminded dramatically to 
what extent economic relations are an essen- 
tial foundation of the international order. 



October 13, 1975 



551 



Economic conditions not only underpin every 
society's ability to achieve its national goals, 
but all national economies are sustained by 
the global economic system. The conduct of 
our economic affairs will therefore determine 
to an extraordinary degree whether our po- 
litical relations will be based on cooperation 
or conflict. 

It would be one of history's most tragic 
ironies if, at a time when we are putting be- 
hind us the tensions of the cold war, we were 
to enter a new period of conflict between 
North and South, rich and poor. At the re- 
cently concluded special session, the United 
States called for an end to the sterile con- 
frontation of the past. We stated that when 
the ancient dream of mankind — a world 
without poverty — becomes a possibility, our 
moral convictions also make it a duty. And 
we emphasized that only cooperation — not 
extortion — can achieve this goal. 

The special session gives us ground for 
hope that — at least for the immediate future 
— a choice has been made to turn away from 
confrontation toward cooperation. The 
United States is proud to support the final 
document which is the product of the ardu- 
ous effort and dedication of so many in this 
chamber. 

The United States considers the achieve- 
ments of the special session a beginning, not 
an end. As recommended by the final report, 
we must now move forward in available 
forums to give reality and content to the ob- 
jectives on which we have agreed. In the 
difficult negotiations ahead, my government 
will participate energetically in a coopera- 
tive and conciliatory spirit. 

Building for Justice 

Beyond peace, security, and prosperity lies 
a deeper universal aspiration for dignity and 
equal opportunity. Mankind will never be 
spared all the tragedies inherent in the cycle 
of life and death. But we do have it in our 
power to eliminate or ease the burden of 
social tragedy and of organized injustice. 

The United States has therefore tradition- 
ally been an advocate of extending the reach 
of international law in international affairs. 

552 



We have offered our help to the victims o 
disease and natural disaster. We have beei 
a champion of liberty and a beacon to th( 
oppressed. There is no longer any disputf 
that international human rights are on th( 
agenda of international diplomacy. 

The reach of international law must ex- 
tend to the last frontiers of our planet, tht 
oceans. They are the common heritage ol 
mankind, but they can turn into arenas ol 
conflict unless governed by law. They hold 
untapped sources of energy, minerals, and 
protein; their environmental integrity is 
crucial to our survival. 

The United States welcomed the U.N. 
mandate for a comprehensive treaty govern- 
ing the use of the oceans and their resources. 
Last month in Montreal, I set forth our ap- 
proach to this negotiation and urged that 
next year's session of the Law of the Sea 
Conference move matters to a rapid and sua 
cessful conclusion. No international negotia 
tion is more vital for long-term political and 
economic stability and the prosperity of our 
globe. 

International law must also come to grips 
with international terrorism. Innumerable 
innocent lives have been lost as a consequence 
of the lack of internationally accepted stand- 
ards specifically designed to avert unlawful 
and dangerous interference with civil avia- 
tion. The hijacking of aircraft, the kidnap- 
ing and murder of innocent civilian victims 
for presumed political gain remain a plague 
on civilized man. This remains one of the 
underdeveloped areas of international law 
which merits the most urgent attention of 
this organization. 

Compassion for our fellow men requires 
that we mobilize international resources to 
combat the age-old scourges of mankind — 
disease, famine, and natural disaster. We are 
pleased that a concerted effort has been 
undertaken by the World Health Organiza- 
tion and interested governments, in response 
to our initiative at the last General Assem- 
bly, to control schistosomiasis, a disease 
which afflicts and debilitates over 200 million 
people in 70 countries and imposes a great 
human and economic cost. 

The great human rights must be recog- 

Department of State Bulletin 



nized, respected, and given reality in the 
affairs of nations. The earliest U.N. declara- 
tions and the recent Helsinki Conference 
leave no doubt that these are matters of 
international concern. The United States will 
support these principles. Throughout the 
world, in all continents, violations of human 
rights must be opposed whether they are 
inflicted by one race upon another — or upon 
members of the same race. Human rights 
must be cherished regardless of race, sex, or 
religion. There can be no double standard. 

The U.N. Human Rights Commission has 
taken its first steps against gross violations 
of human rights where serious and reliable 
allegations are submitted by individuals. We 
support these steps. The organized concern 
of the world community can be a potent 
weapon in the war against degradation of 
human values. 

One of the most persistent and serious 
problems is torture, a practice which all na- 
tions should abhor. It is an absolute debase- 
ment of the function of government when its 
overwhelming power is used not for people's 
welfare but as an instrument of their suffer- 
ing. 

The United States urges this Assembly to 
adopt the declaration of the recent world 
congress on this issue in Geneva. In addition, 
we propose that this General Assembly es- 
tablish a group of experts, to be appointed 
by the Secretary General, to study the na- 
ture and extent of torture in the world to- 
day and to report back to the next Assembly. 

Mr. President, this organization was cre- 
ated in the belief that the universality of 
the human race can be reflected in the con- 
duct of international affairs. This chamber 
symbolizes the hope that mankind places in 
the force of nations working together in the 
common interest with reason, responsibility, 
and mutual respect. The problems we face 
are complex and perilous. The sterile slogans 
of yesterday, the solutions of the past, the 
dwelling upon old resentments, can only 
widen the gaps between us and allow the 
dangers to peace and the well-being of our 
peoples to fester and grow. 

We have it in our power to prove to future 
generations that the last quarter of the 20th 



century was not an era of violence and con- 
flict, but one of the creative epochs of world 
history. 

My country's history, Mr. President, tells 
us that it is possible to fashion unity while 
cherishing diversity, that common action is 
possible despite the variety of races, inter- 
ests, and beliefs we see here in this chamber. 
Progress and peace and justice are attainable. 

So we say to all peoples and governments: 
Let us fashion together a new world order. 
Let its arrangements be just. Let the new na- 
tions help shape it and feel it is theirs. Let 
the old nations use their strengths and skills 
for the benefit of all mankind. Let us all 
work together to enrich the spirit and to 
ennoble mankind. 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
for CBS "Morning News" 

Folloiving is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by Richard C. Hot- 
telet recorded at Neiv York September 22 
for broadcast on the CBS television program 
"Morning Neivs" on September 23. 

Press release 499 dated September 23 

Mr. Hottelet: Mr. Secretary, you advanced 
a neiv proposal in your speech to the General 
Assembly — a multilateral consultation on the 
Middle East. What do you have in mind ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it was really 
something for the purpose of exploration. If 
it is too difficult to assemble a formal con- 
ference because various parties don't know 
exactly where it would be going, then it 
seemed to me that perhaps a group of the 
states most concerned could meet to take 
stock, to see whether they can chart some 
course in the future, and use that as a point 
of departure for a more formal conference. 
For example, in the producer-consumer con- 
ference, we have a preparatory meeting — 
something of that nature. 

Mr. Hottelet: How many states would you 
think would be involved? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would think 



October 13, 1975 



553 



that — all of the states of the Geneva Confer- 
ence. But we are flexible about this. Our 
major interest is to get a process of peace in 
the Middle East to continue to move. 

Mr. Hottelet: Is this a kind of help-wanted 
ad to solicit ideas at a time when you need 
more movement? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. We have ideas 
and will be presenting them to the various 
governments. But since we just started that 
process, I do not want to go any further 
until we have had some replies. 

Mr. Hottelet: Could you see the Arabs sit- 
ting down with the Israelis, even in an in- 
formal conference like this? 

Secretary Kissinger: They are sitting down 
with them— have agreed to sit down with 
them in Geneva and in fact sat down with 
them in Geneva. 

Mr. Hottelet: Have your explorations on 
this brought any signs of interest from the 
parties involved? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have just started 
them. 

Mr. Hottelet: Mr. Secretary, you have 
spoken to the Soviet Union, Foreign Minister 
Gromyko specifically, on the Middle East. Do 
you get any sense of whether the Russians 
will raise objections next month ivhen the 
Security Council has to renew the mandate of 
the U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, they of course 
have to speak for themselves. My impression 
is that they will not endorse the agreement 
but also that they will do nothing to thwart 
the agreement. 

Mr. Hottelet: Syria is an open question. 
Do you see any possibility of movement there 
between the Israelis and the Syrians? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have said in my 
speech that we would make a serious effort 
to encourage negotiations between Syria and 
Israel. That is what we will do. 

Mr. Hottelet: What can yo2i do that you 
have not done? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have not 



really made a significant effort since the dis- 
engagement agreement between Syria and 
Israel. So we would be attempting to see 
whether we can find a basis for negotiation 
between the parties. That we have not at- 
tempted yet. 

Mr. Hottelet: Do you see yourself going 
back to the Middle East shuttle, Damascus- 
Jerusalem? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the Egyptian nego- 
tiation we started in diplomatic channels, 
and we spent several months of diplomatic 
exploration before we decided whether an- 
other step was needed. We would certainly 
begin the Syrian negotiation in — Syrian- 
Israeli negotiation — in diplomatic channels 
before we went to more dramatic steps. 

Mr. Hottelet: You do see a possibility, 
though, of getting that moving. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Mr. Hottelet: The question of tveapons de- 
liveries to both sides in the Middle East has 
caused a lot of concern. Have you ever dis- 
cussed with the Soviet Union the possibility 
of an agreement on a ceiling of arms de- 
liveries ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we talked about 
it to them several years ago. At that time 
the answer was that they would agree to 
this only in the context of a final settlement. 
We have not recently discussed it. There is 
the additional complication that with the way 
arms are now being transferred among some 
of the Middle Eastern countries, the ceiling 
would have to be applied to very many coun- 
tries. It could no longer be applied only to 
the so-called confrontation states. 

Mr. Hottelet: There seems to be an escala- 
tion in the types of iveapons, too — the notion 
of a ■i-50-mile Pershing rocket to Israel. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that this has 
been blown out of any proportion. The Per- 
shing missile was on the Israeli shopping list 
which was submitted to the United States 
last August. It has been before the United 
States since last August. There is absolutely 
nothing new about it. 

The United States has not agreed to sup- 



554 



Department of State Bulletin 



ply it. It has agreed again, after the reassess- 
ment, to continue the study that was already 
going on. 

There has been no commitment. The Pres- 
ident has said it. I have said it. Secretary 
[of Defense James R.] Schlesinger has said 
it. And we have enough real problems not to 
torment ourselves with artificial ones. 

Mr. Hottelet: Do your experts think that 
the Israelis need the Pershing for their se- 
curity ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis think 
they need the Pershing. The purpose of the 
study is to sort out some of the questions 
that are now being asked — whether it is nec- 
essary for the defense of Israel, what the 
strategic implications would be — and no deci- 
sions have been made of any kind. 

Mr. Hottelet: The Egyptians are saying 
that giving the Israelis the Pershings would 
violate the Sinai agreement, that portion of 
it which says that neither side will emplace 
iveapons which can reach the other's lines. 

Secretary Kissinger: That would be a 
somewhat exaggerated interpretation. But it 
really is not useful at this moment, when all 
we have done is to agree to study it and 
when this would be one of the factors we 
would keep in mind in studying it. 

But I repeat— what the United States has 
agreed to do is to study the list for a 10-year 
program that Israel submitted to us last 
year, the study of which was interrupted as 
a result of the reassessment. Most of the 
weapons that are being talked about have 
delivery dates even if we approve them, 
which we also haven't done yet — have deliv- 
ery dates of about 1980 and afterward. So 
many political things are going to happen in 
the interval. And it has to be seen in the 
context of a supply arrangement that has 
been going on for a long time, and not of a 
dramatic decision that suddenly escalates the 
level of armaments. 

Mr. Hottelet: You have come back here to 
a U.N. General Assembly which is a far cry 
from the one you spoke to a year ago. How 
do you assess this new mood? 

Secretary Kissinger: Last year we were 



concerned that a spirit of confrontation was 
becoming dominant in the Assembly, and we 
feared that automatic majorities were trying 
to steamroU numerical minorities whose mi- 
nority status, however, did not reflect their 
power or their influence. We thought that 
sooner or later this would lead to a reduction 
in the signiflcance of the United Nations, 
and I pointed that out in a speech in July. 

Since then, and perhaps also in part as a 
result of a rather sweeping initiative we 
took at the beginning of the special session 
of the General Assembly, there seems to have 
been a new mood. The special session — ^the 
sixth special session last year ended in bitter- 
ness. The seventh special session this year 
ended in a concilatory atmosphere in which 
a good part of our program was adopted in 
principle and in which we took into account 
some of the key concerns of the developing 
countries. 

What I attempted to do today is to give 
the political counterpart to the essentially 
economic and social program that we devel- 
oped, to continue the spirit of seeking co- 
operative solutions — because we cannot con- 
tinue to live in this period in a world that is 
divided between East and West, North and 
South. And somebody has to take the leader- 
ship in bridging the gap, the differences. And 
we have attempted to do this. 

Mr. Hottelet: Do you see a process of co- 
operation developing in the energy field, for 
instance, and specifically in the case of oil 
prices, which comes up for deliberation by 
the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries'] Foreign Ministers on 
Thursday ? 

Secretary Kissinger: One should never 
make a prediction that can be proved true or 
false so quickly. We have stated our view on 
oil prices. We would think it unfortunate if 
there were an increase in oil prices under 
present conditions. Whether our advice will 
be taken remains to be seen. If it isn't, we 
would consider it a setback. But our basic 
approach will be continued. 

Mr. Hottelet: But you feel that the new 
atmosphere at the United Nations perhaps 
suggests a smaller desire on the part of the 



October 13, 1975 



555 



OPEC people foi- a confrontation with you 
and a challenge? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to 
speak about any particular group. I have the 
sense that on the whole there is less of an 
attitude of confrontation, that nations are 
willing to look at the other point of view, 
and in this year much more than previous 
years, a recognition that we are all part of 
the same big enterprise and that you cannot 
be better off by making somebody else worse 
off. For you to be better off, everybody has 
to be better off. 

Mr. Hottelet: You spoke at some length 
about Korea. Are you seriously ivorried 
about the possibility of new trouble there? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I am not seri- 
ously worried about new trouble in Korea. 
But there have been proposals by the other 
side that the U.N. Command should be termi- 
nated. We can understand that 20 years after 
the end of the Korean War, the U.N. institu- 
tions that were formed at that time be termi- 
nated. But we also are concerned that the 
armistice agreement, which is the only legal 
basis on which present institutional arrange- 
ments are formed, be continued. 

So we have agreed to end the U.N. Com- 
mand, but rather than have the North 
Koreans and Chinese believe that all we 
want to do is continue the status quo, we 
have offered a conference to look at a con- 
tinuation of the armistice agreement, and 
also to look at measures to end tensions in 
the Korean Peninsula, including perhaps 
calling a larger conference for purposes of 
more fundamental arrangements, which 
means moving toward peace. 

Mr. Hottelet: One has the impression that 
there is some ambivalence in the Japanese 
attitude toward Korea — that is to say, 



Japan's readiness to see North Korea take 
over the whole of the peninsula. Do you see 
this in your dealings with them? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have never heard 
of any ambivalence. I have always had the 
impression that the Japanese would feel that 
their own .security is severely jeopardized if 
North Korea took over the whole peninsula. 

Mr. Hottelet: I heard some Japanese say 
that they live cheek by jowl ivith the Soviet 
Union and China, so that a Communist 
Korea really wouldn't be that much trouble 
to them. 

Secretary Kissinger: I have never heard 
them say that in Washington. 

Mr. Hottelet: The question of nuclear fuel, 
proliferation of nuclear materials for electric 
potver, is something that obviously concerns 
you, because you spoke about it not only this 
year but last year. H is too late to get this 
genie back in the bottle? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is not too late. 
I think we can still do it. We may have an- 
other year or so to do it. But if the complete 
nuclear fuel cycle is spread around the world, 
then more and more countries will have the 
capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and 
then in another decade or so we will live in a 
world that will be extremely precarious. 

Mr. Hottelet: Would you see any forbear- 
ance on the part of people, like the Brazil- 
ians, for instance, who are embarked on this 
course to turn back? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are talking to 
other suppliers to see whether we can get 
agreed rules— because if competition starts 
in lowering safeguards, then of course the 
genie will really be out of the bottle, and 20 
years from now people will ask themselves 
what possessed them. 



556 



Department of State Bulletin 



wsf 



United States Gives Views on Resolution Adopted 
by Seventh Special Session of U.N. General Assembly 



Following are texts of a statement made in 
the Ad Hoc Committee of the Seventh Spe- 
cial Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly by U.S. Representative Jacob M. 
Myerson on September 16, a statement made 
in plenary by U.S. Representative Daniel P. 
Moynihan that day, and a resolution adopted 
by the Assembly that day. 



AMBASSADOR MYERSON, AD HOC COMMIHEE 

USUN press release 93 dated September 16 

I have a few brief comments, Mr. Chair- 
man, and I would request that they be in- 
scribed in the record verbatim. 

The United States joins in most of the 
specific undertakings of this resolution, and 
we warmly associate ourselves with its larger 
objectives. However, the United States can 
not and does not accept any implication that 
the world is now embarked on establish- 
ment of something called "the new interna- 
tional economic order." Further, sir, while 
we have joined in the consensus on this re- 
port and we are very pleased to have done 
so, I wish to make it clear that the United 
States maintains its position on the resolu- 
tions of the sixth special session and on cer- 
tain provisions of the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States and on the Lima 
Declaration.' 

With regard to trade, I would like to make 
some short comments. V/e joined others in 
pledging a series of actions of benefit to de- 
veloping countries. Specific actions are left 
to each country. 

It is our expectation that these actions 
will substantially increase the growth of de- 
veloping countries, thus counteracting infla- 
tion and thereby sustaining real incomes. 



But our purpose is not to set world prices 
or to manipulate the terms of trade. 

It was proposed that commodity prices be 
indexed, that is, fixed by agreement and 
augmented as prices for industrial goods rise. 
We have agreed to join others in the study 
of such a proposal. However, the United 
States has to make clear it does not support 
such a proposal. The commitments we have 
made are to assist developing countries' ex- 
ports within the market, rather than sup- 
planting market mechanisms. 

With regard to transfer of resources, the 
United States recognizes the need of de- 
veloping countries for transfer of real re- 
sources, and it recognizes the importance of 
a smoothly functioning, stable international 
monetary system. There are, however, sev- 
eral specific paragraphs in this section with 
which the United States is unable to concur. 

First, the United States fully supports the 
objective of an effective increase in official 
development assistance and intends to in- 
crease the level of its own assistance. It 
does not, however, consider the establishment 
of specific targets as likely to achieve the 
intended result. The United States does not 
subscribe to the paragraph dealing with the 
link between special drawing rights (SDR) 



' For a U.S. statement in the sixth special session 
on May 1, 1974, and texts of the resolutions (Declara- 
tion and Program of Action on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order), see Bulletin 
of May 27, 1974, p. 569; for a U.S. statement in the 
U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 6, 1974, and text of 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1975, p. 146; for a U.S. state- 
ment at the Second General Conference of the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization at 
Lima on Mar. 18, 1975, see Bulletin of Apr. 21, 
1975, p. 518; for text of the Lima Declaration and 
Plan of Action on Industrial Development Coopera- 
tion, see U.N. doc. A/10112, chap. IV. 



October 13, 1975 



557 



and development assistance. The United 
States position is that it does not support an 
SDR-aid link. This position is unchanged, 
sir. 

We differ with the paragraph dealing with 
the reform of the international monetary 
system. We share the general objective of 
placing the SDR in the center of the inter- 
national monetary system, but we believe 
that in the absence of agreement on all the 
interrelated components of a fully reformed 
international monetary system, it is inap- 
propriate to specify selected aims or ele- 
ments. 

Finally, the United States is not fully in 
accord with the paragraph dealing with de- 
cisionmaking in international financial insti- 
tutions. We support an evolving role for de- 
veloping nations. We believe, however, that 
participation in decisionmaking must be equi- 
table for all members and take due account 
of relative economic positions and contribu- 
tions of resources to the institutions as well 
as the need for efficient operational decision- 
making. 

With regard to science and technology, Mr. 
Chairman, just one brief comment for the 
record. We support work on international 
guidelines for the transfer of technology, in- 
cluding most especially the progress being 
achieved at UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on 
Trade and Development]. We do not believe 
that adoption of a legally binding code of 
conduct is the path to pursue, and we do 
not read the resolution as so indicating. 

With regard to the section on industriali- 
zation, sir, we believe that redeployment of 
industries should be a matter of the evolu- 
tion of economies rather than a question of 
international policy or negotiation. While 
government policy can facilitate such an evo- 
lutionary approach, we believe it must take 
into account the economic structures of the 
countries concerned as well as the economic, 
social, and security goals, including especially 
protection of workingmen's rights. 

The United States does not support those 
paragraphs dealing with the UNIDO [U.N. 
Industrial Development Organization] sys- 
tem of consultations. 

Food and agriculture, one very brief re- 



mark. With regard to the statement in the 
second paragraph about market access and 
adjustment measures, we understand devel- 
oping countries' interests; but we cannot 
concur in the sentence as formulated, since 
it is inconsistent with U.S. policy. 



AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, PLENARY 

USUN press release 94 dated September 16 

On behalf of the United States, which 
styles itself non-Socialist, I would like to 
make these brief remarks. 

The French term for a special session of 
the United Nations General Assembly is ses- 
sion extraordinaire. Taken most directly into 
English, this reads "extraordinary session," 
and I cannot but feel that the great ma- 
jority of the nations which have now unani- 
mously adopted this resolution have also con- 
cluded that the special session has indeed 
been an extraordinary one. 

Perhaps never before in the history of the 
United Nations has there been so intensive 
and so genuine a negotiation between so 
many nations on so profoundly important a 
range of issues. We have shown that we can 
negotiate in good faith and, doing so, reach 
genuine accord. Not least we have shown 
that this can be done in the unique and in- 
dispensable setting of the United Nations. 
Mr. President, this system works. 

At the outset of this special session, the 
United States asserted that we assembled 
here with an opportunity to improve the 
condition of mankind. We may well have 
done so. Rather, it may well turn out that 
we have done so, for the task is yet ahead 
of us. We are, however, unmistakably begun. 



TEXT OF RESOLUTION ^ 

Development and international economic co-operation 

The General Assembly, 

Determined to eliminate injustice and inequality 
which afflict vast sections of humanity and to ac- 
celerate the development of developing countries, 



= U.N. doc. A/RES/3362 (S-VII); adopted by the 
ad hoc committee and by the Assembly on Sept. 16. 



558 



Department of State Bulletin 



Recalling the Declaration and the Programme of 
Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order, as well as the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States, which lay down the 
foundations of the new international economic order, 

Reaffirming the fundamental purposes of the 
above-mentioned documents and the rights and duties 
of all States to seek and participate in the solutions 
of the problems afflicting the world, in particular 
the imperative need of redressing the economic im- 
balance between developed and developing countries. 

Recalling further the International Development 
Strategy for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade, which should be reviewed in the light of the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order, and determined to 
implement the targets and policy measures contained 
in the International Development Strategy,'' 

Conscious that the accelerated development of de- 
veloping countries would be a decisive element for 
the promotion of world peace and security, 

Recognizing that greater co-operation among 
States in the fields of trade, industry, science and 
technology as well as in other fields of economic 
activities, based on the principles of the Declaration 
and the Programme of Action on the Establishment 
of a New International Economic Order and of the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 
would also contribute to strengthening peace and 
security in the world. 

Believing that the over-all objective of the new 
international economic order is to increase the capac- 
ity of developing countries, individually and collec- 
tively, to pursue their development, 

Decides, to this end and in the context of the fore- 
going, to set in motion the following measures as the 
basis and framework for the work of the competent 
bodies and organizations of the United Nations sys- 
tem: 

I. International Trade 

1. Concerted efforts should be made in favour of 
the developing countries towards expanding and 
diversifying their trade, improving and diversifying 
their productive capacity, improving their productiv- 
ity and increasing their export earnings, with a view 
to counteracting the adverse effects of inflation — 
thereby sustaining real incomes — and with a view to 
improving the terms of trade of the developing coun- 
tries and in order to eliminate the economic imbal- 
ance between developed and developing countries. 

2. Concerted action should be taken to accelerate 
the growth and diversification of the export trade of 
developing countries in manufactures and semi-manu- 
factures and in processed and semi-processed prod- 
ucts in order to increase their share in world indus- 



' For text of the International Development Strat- 
egy (General Assembly Resolution 2626 (XXV)), see 
Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 612. 



trial output and world trade within the framework 
of an expanding world economy. 

3. An important aim of the fourth session of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment, in addition to work in progress elsewhere, 
should be to reach decisions on the improvement of 
market structures in the field of raw materials and 
commodities of export interest to the developing 
countries, including decisions with respect to an inte- 
grated programme and the applicability of elements 
thereof. In this connexion, taking into account the 
distinctive features of individual raw materials and 
commodities, the decisions should bear on the fol- 
lowing: 

(a) Appropriate international stocking and other 
forms of market arrangements for securing stable, 
remunerative and equitable prices for commodities 
of export interest to developing countries and pro- 
moting equilibrium between supply and demand, in- 
cluding, where possible, long-term multilateral com- 
mitments; 

(6) Adequate international financing facilities for 
such stocking and market arrangements; 

(c) Where possible, promotion of long-term and 
medium-term contracts; 

(d) Substantially improve facilities for compensa- 
tory financing of export revenue fluctuations through 
the widening and enlarging of the existing facilities. 
Note has been taken of the various proposals regard- 
ing a comprehensive scheme for the stabilization of 
export earnings of developing countries and for a 
Development Security Facility as well as specific 
measures for the benefit of the developing countries 
most in need; 

(c) Promotion of processing of raw materials in 
producing developing countries and expansion and 
diversification of their exports, particularly to de- 
veloped countries; 

(/) Effective opportunities to improve the share 
of developing countries in transport, marketing and 
distribution of their primary commodities and to en- 
courage measures of world significance for the evolu- 
tion of the infrastructure and secondary capacity of 
developing countries from the production of primary 
commodities to processing, transport and marketing, 
and to the production of finished manufactured goods, 
their transport, distribution and exchange, including 
advanced financial and exchange institutions for the 
remunerative management of trade transactions; 

4. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development should pre- 
sent a report to the Conference at its fourth session 
on the impact of an integrated programme on the 
imports of developing countries which are net im- 
porters of raw materials and commodities, including 
those lacking in natural resources, and recommend 
any remedial measures that may be necessary. 

5. A number of options are open to the interna- 
tional community to preserve the purchasing power 



October 13, 1975 



559 



of developing countries. These need to be further 
studied on a priority basis. The Secretary-General of 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment should continue to study direct and indirect 
indexation schemes and other options with a view to 
making concrete proposals before the Conference at 
its fourth session. 

6. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development should pre- 
pare a preliminary study on the proportion between 
prices of raw materials and commodities exported by 
developing countries and the final consumer price, 
particularly in developed countries, and submit it, if 
possible, to the Conference at its fourth session. 

7. Developed countries should fully implement 
agreed provisions on the principle of standstill as 
regards imports from developing countries, and any 
departure should be subjected to such measures as 
consultations and multilateral surveillance and com- 
pensation, in accordance with internationally agreed 
criteria and procedures. 

8. Developed countries should take effective steps 
within the framework of multilateral trade negotia- 
tions for the reduction or removal, where feasible 
and appropriate, of non-tariff barriers affecting the 
products of export intere.st to developing countries 
on a differential and more favourable basis for de- 
veloping countries. The Generalized Scheme of Pref- 
erences should not terminate at the end of the period 
of ten years originally envisaged and should be con- 
tinuously improved through wider coverage, deeper 
cuts and other measures, bearing in mind the inter- 
ests of those developing countries which enjoy spe- 
cial advantages and the need for finding ways and 
means for protecting their interests. 

9. Countervailing duties should be applied only in 
conformity with internationally agreed obligations. 
Developed countries should exercise maximum re- 
straint within the framework of international obli- 
gations in the imposition of countervailing duties on 
the imports of products from developing countries. 
The multilateral trade negotiations under way should 
take fully into account the particular interests of 
developing countries with a view to providing them 
differential and more favourable treatment in appro- 
priate cases. 

10. Restrictive business practices adversely affect- 
ing international trade, particularly that of develop- 
ing countries, should be eliminated and efforts should 
be made at the national and international levels with 
the objective of negotiating a set of equitable princi- 
ples and rules. 

11. Special measures should be undertaken by de- 
veloped countries and developing countries in a posi- 
tion to do so to assist in the structural transformation 
of the economy of the least developed, land-locked 
and island developing countries. 

12. Emergency measures as spelled out in section X 
of General Assembly resolution 3202 (S-VI) should 
be undertaken on a temporary basis to meet the 



specific problems of the most seriously affected coun- 
tries as defined in Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) 
and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, without any detri- 
ment to the interests of the developing countries as 
a whole. 

13. Further expansion of trade between the social- 
ist countries of Eastern Europe and the developing 
countries should be intensified as is provided for in 
resolutions 15 (II) of 25 March 1968 and 53 (III) of 
19 May 1972 of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. Additional measures and 
appropriate orientation to achieve this end are neces- 
sary. 

II. Transfer of Real Resources for Financing 
THE Development of Developing Countries 
and International Monetary Reforms 

1. Concessional financial resources to developing 
countries need to be increased substantially, their 
terms and conditions ameliorated and their flow 
made predictable, continuous and increasingly as- 
sured so as to facilitate the implementation by de- 
veloping countries of long-term programmes for eco- 
nomic and social development. Financial assistance 
should, as a general rule, be untied. 

2. Developed countries confirm their continued com- 
mitment in respect of the targets relating to the 
transfer of resources, in particular the official de- 
velopment assistance target of 0.7 per cent of gross 
national product, as agreed in the International De- 
velopment Strategy for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade, and adopt as their common aim 
an effective increase in official development assistance 
with a view to achieving these targets by the end 
of the decade. Developed countries which have not 
yet made a commitment in respect of these targets 
undertake to make their best efforts to reach these 
targets in the remaining part of this decade. 

3. The establishment of a link between the special 
drawing rights and development assistance should 
form part of the consideration by the International 
Monetary Fund of the creation of new special draw- 
ing rights as and when they are created according 
to the needs of international liquidity. Agreement 
should be reached at an early date on the establish- 
ment of a trust fund, to be financed partly through 
the International Monetary Fund gold sales and 
partly through voluntary contributions and to be 
governed by an appropriate body, for the benefit of 
developing countries. Consideration of other means 
of transfer of real resources which are predictable, 
assured and continuous should be expedited in ap- 
propriate bodies. 

4. Developed countries and international organiza- 
tions should enhance the real value and volume of 
assistance to developing countries and ensure that 
the developing countries obtain the largest possible 
share in the procurement of equipment, consultants 
and consultancy services. Such assistance should be 
on softer terms and, as a general rule, untied. 



560 



Department of State Bulletin 



5. In order to enlarge the pool of resources avail- 
able for financing development, there is an urgent 
need to increase substantially the capital of the 
World Bank Group, and in particular the resources 
of the International Development Association, to 
enable it to make additional capital available to the 
poorest countries on highly concessional terms. 

6. The resources of the development institutions of 
the United Nations system, in particular the United 
Nations Development Programme, should also be in- 
creased. The funds at the disposal of the regional 
development banks should be augmented. These in- 
creases should be without prejudice to bilateral de- 
velopment assistance flows. 

7. To the extent desirable, the World Bank Group 
is invited to consider new ways of supplementing its 
financing with private management, skills, technol- 
ogy and capital and also new approaches to increase 
financing of development in developing countries, in 
accordance with their national plans and priorities. 

8. The burden of debt on developing countries is 
increasing to a point where the import capacity as 
well as reserves have come under serious strain. At 
its fourth session the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development shall consider the need for, 
and the possibility of, convening as soon as possible 
a conference of major donor, creditor and debtor 
countries to devise ways and means to mitigate this 
burden, taking into account the development needs 
of developing countries, with special attention to the 
plight of the most seriously affected countries as de- 
fined in General Assembly resolutions 3201 (S-VI) 
and 3202 (S-VI). 

9. Developing countries should be granted increased 
access on favourable terms to the capital markets of 
developed countries. To this end, the joint Develop- 
ment Committee of the International Monetary Fund 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development should progress as rapidly as possible 
in its work. Appropriate United Nations bodies and 
other related intergovernmental agencies should be 
invited to examine ways and means of increasing 
the flow of public and private resources to developing 
countries, including proposals made at the current 
session to provide investment in private and public 
enterprises in the developing countries. Consideration 
should be given to the examination of an interna- 
tional investment trust and to the expansion of the 
International Finance Corporation capital without 
prejudice to the increase in resources of other inter- 
governmental financial and development institutions 
and bilateral assistance flows. 

10. Developed and developing countries should 
further co-operate through investment of financial 
resources and supply of technology and equipment to 
developing countries by developed countries and by 
developing countries in a position to do so. 

11. Developed countries, and developing countries 
in a position to do so, are urged to make adequate 
contributions to the United Nations Special Fund 



with a view to an early implementation of a pro- 
gramme of lending, preferably in 1976. 

12. Developed countries should improve terms and 
conditions of their assistance so as to include a pre- 
ponderant grant element for the least developed, 
land-locked and island developing countries. 

13. In providing additional resources for assisting 
the most seriously affected countries in helping them 
to meet their serious balance-of-payments deficits, all 
developed countries, and developing countries in a 
position to do so, and international organizations 
such as the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development and the International Monetary 
Fund, should undertake specific measures in their 
favour, including those provided in General Assembly 
resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI). 

14. Special attention should be given by the inter- 
national community to the phenomena of natural dis- 
asters which frequently afflict many parts of the 
world, with far-reaching devastating economic, so- 
cial and structural consequences, particularly in the 
least developed countries. To this end, the General 
Assembly at its thirtieth session, in considering this 
problem, should examine and adopt appropriate 
measures. 

1.5. The role of national reserve currencies should 
be reduced and the special drawing rights should be- 
come the central reserve asset of the international 
monetary system in order to provide for greater 
international control over the creation and equitable 
distribution of liquidity and in order to limit poten- 
tial losses as a consequence of exchange rate fluctua- 
tions. Arrangements for gold should be consistent 
with the agreed objective of reducing the role of 
gold in the system and with equitable distribution 
of new international liquidity and should in particu- 
lar take into consideration the needs of developing 
countries for increased liquidity. 

16. The process of decision-making should be fair 
and responsive to change and should be most spe- 
cially responsive to the emergence of new economic 
influence on the part of developing countries. The 
participation of developing countries in the decision- 
making process in the competent organs of inter- 
national finance and development institutions should 
be adequately increased and made more effective 
without adversely affecting the broad geographic 
representation of developing countries and in accord- 
ance with the existing and evolving rules. 

17. The compensatory financing facility now avail- 
able through the International Monetary Fund should 
be expanded and liberalized. In this connexion, early 
consideration should be given by the Fund and other 
appropriate United Nations bodies to various pro- 
posals made at the current session — including the 
examination of a new development security facility — 
which would mitigate export earnings shortfalls of 
developing countries, with special regard to the poor- 
est countries, and thus provide greater assistance to 
their continued economic development. Early con- 



Oefober 13, 1975 



561 



sideration should also be given by the International 
Monetary Fund to proposals to expand and liberalize 
its coverage of current transactions to include manu- 
factures and services, to ensure that, whenever pos- 
sible, compensation for export shortfalls takes place 
at the same time they occur, to take into account, in 
determining the quantum of compensation, move- 
ments in import prices and to lengthen the repay- 
ment period. 

18. Drawing under the buffer stock financing facil- 
ity of the International Monetary Fund should be 
accorded treatment with respect to floating alongside 
the gold tranche, similar to that under the compen- 
satory financing facility, and the Fund should expe- 
dite its study of the possibility of an amendment of 
the Articles of Agreement, to be presented to the 
Interim Committee, if possible in its next meeting, 
that would permit the Fund to provide assistance 
directly to international buffer stocks of primary 
products. 

III. Science and Technology 

1. Developed and developing countries should co- 
operate in the establishment, strengthening and de- 
velopment of the scientific and technological infra- 
structure of developing countries. Developed coun- 
tries should also take appropriate measures, such as 
contribution to the establishment of an industrial 
technological information bank and consideration of 
the possibility of regional and sectoral banks, in 
order to make available a greater flow to developing 
countries of information permitting the selection of 
technologies, in particular advanced technologies. 
Consideration should also be given to the establish- 
ment of an international centre for the exchange of 
technological information for the sharing of research 
findings relevant to developing countries. For the 
above purposes institutional arrangements within the 
United Nations system should be examined by the 
General Assembly at its thirtieth session. 

2. Developed countries should significantly expand 
their assistance to developing countries for direct 
support to their science and technology programmes, 
as well as increase substantially the proportion of 
their research and development devoted to specific 
problems of primary interest to developing countries, 
and in the creation of suitable indigenous technology, 
in accordance with feasible targets to be agreed upon. 
The General Assembly invites the Secretary-General 
to carry out a preliminary study and to report to the 
Assembly at its thirty-first session on the possibility 
of establishing, within the framework of the United 
Nations system, an international energy institute to 
assist all developing countries in energy resources 
research and development. 

3. All States should co-operate in evolving an 
international code of conduct for the transfer of 
technology, corresponding, in particular, to the spe- 
cial needs of the developing countries. Work on such 
a code should therefore be continued within the 



United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment and concluded in time for decisions to be 
reached at the fourth session of the Conference, in- 
cluding a decision on the legal character of such a 
code with the objective of the adoption of a code of 
conduct prior to the end of 1977. International con- 
ventions on patents and trade marks should be re- 
viewed and revised to meet, in particular, the special 
needs of the developing countries, in order that these 
conventions may become more satisfactory instru- 
ments for aiding developing countries in the transfer 
and development of technology. National patents sys- 
tems should, without delay, be brought into line with 
the international patent system in its revised form. 

4. Developed countries should facilitate access of 
developing countries on favourable terms and condi- 
tions, and on an urgent basis, to informatique, to 
relevant information on advanced and other tech- 
nologies suited to their specific needs as well as on 
new uses of existing technology, new developments, 
and possibilities of adapting them to local needs. 
Inasmuch as in market economies advanced technol- 
ogies with respect to industrial production are most 
frequently developed by private institutions, devel- 
oped countries should facilitate and encourage these 
institutions in providing effective technologies in sup- 
port of the priorities of developing countries. 

5. Developed countries should give developing 
countries the freest and fullest possible access to 
technologies whose transfer is not subject to private 
decision. 

6. Developed countries should improve the trans- 
parency of the industrial property market in order 
to facilitate the technological choices of developing 
countries. In this respect, relevant organizations of 
the United Nations system, with the collaboration of 
developed countries, should undertake projects in the 
fields of information, consultancy and training for 
the benefit of developing countries. 

7. A United Nations Conference on Science and 
Technology for Development should be held in 1978 
or 1979 with the main objectives of strengthening the 
technological capacity of developing countries to en- 
able them to apply science and technology to their 
own development; adopting effective means for the 
utilization of scientific and technological potentials 
in the solution of development problems of regional 
and global significance, especially for the benefit of 
developing countries; and providing instruments of 
co-operation to developing countries in the utiliza- 
tion of science and technology for solving socio-eco- 
nomic problems that cannot be solved by individual 
action, in accordance with national priorities, taking 
into account the recommendations made by the Inter- 
governmental Working Group of the Committee on 
Science and Technology for Development. 

8. The United Nations system should play a major 
role, with appropriate financing, in achieving the 
above-stated objectives and in developing scientific 
and technological co-operation between all States in 



562 



Department of State Bulletin 



order to ensure the application of science and tech- 
nology to development. The work of the relevant 
United Nations bodies, in particular that of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment, the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, the International Labour Organisation, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cul- 
tural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organi- 
zation of the United Nations, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and the United Nations De- 
velopment Programme, to facilitate the transfer and 
diffusion of technology should be given urgent prior- 
ity. The Secretary-General of the United Nations 
should take steps to ensure that the technology and 
experience available within the United Nations sys- 
tem is widely disseminated and readily available to 
the developing countries in need of it. 

9. The World Health Organization and the compe- 
tent organs of the United Nations system, in particu- 
lar the United Nations Children's Fund, should in- 
tensify the international effort aimed at improving 
health conditions in developing countries by giving 
priority to prevention of disease and malnutrition and 
by providing primary health services to the commu- 
nities, including maternal and child health and fam- 
ily welfare. 

10. Since the outflow of qualified personnel from 
developing to developed countries seriously hampers 
the development of the former, there is an urgent 
need to formulate national and international policies 
to avoid the "brain drain" and to obviate its adverse 
effects. 

IV. Industrialization 

1. The General Assembly endorses the Lima Decla- 
ration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development 
Co-operation and requests all Governments to take 
individually and/or collectively the necessary meas- 
ures and decisions required to implement effectively 
their undertakings in terms of the Lima Declaration 
and Plan of Action. 

2. Developed countries should facilitate the devel- 
opment of new policies and strengthen existing poli- 
cies, including labour market policies, which would 
encourage the redeployment of their industries which 
are less competitive internationally to developing 
countries, thus* leading to structural adjustments in 
the former and a higher degree of utilization of 
natural and human resources in the latter. Such 
policies may take into account the economic struc- 
ture and the economic, social and security objectives 
of the developed countries ;oncemed and the need 
for such industries to move into more viable lines of 
production or into other sectors of the economy. 

3. A system of consultations as provided for by the 
Lima Plan of Action should be established at the 
global, regional, interregional and sectoral levels 
within the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization and within other appropriate interna- 
tional bodies, between developed and developing 



countries and among developing countries them- 
selves, in order to facilitate the achievement of the 
goals set forth in the field of industrialization, in- 
cluding the redeployment of certain productive capac- 
ities existing in developed countries and the creation 
of new industrial facilities in developing countries. 
In this context, the United Nations Industrial De- 
velopment Organization should serve as a forum for 
negotiation of agreements in the field of industry 
between developed and developing countries and 
among developing countries themselves, at the re- 
quest of the countries concerned. 

4. The Executive Director of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization should take im- 
mediate action to ensure the readiness of that or- 
ganization to serve as a forum for consultations and 
negotiation of agreements in the field of industry. 
In reporting to the next session of the Industrial 
Development Board on actions taken in this respect, 
the Executive Director should also include proposals 
for the establishment of a system of consultations. 
The Industrial Development Board is invited to draw 
up, at an early date, the rules of procedure according 
to which this system would operate. 

5. To promote co-operation between developed and 
developing countries, both should endeavour to dis- 
seminate appropriate information about their prior- 
ity areas for industrial co-operation and the form 
they would like such co-operation to take. The efforts 
undertaken by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development on tripartite co-operation 
between countries having different economic and so- 
cial systems could lead to constructive proposals for 
the industrialization of developing countries. 

6. Developed countries should, whenever possible, 
encourage their enterprises to participate in invest- 
ment projects within the framework of the develop- 
ment plans and programmes of the developing coun- 
tries which so desire; such participation should be 
carried out in accordance with the laws and regula- 
tions of the developing countries concerned. 

7. A joint study should be undertaken by all Gov- 
ernments under the auspices of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, in consultation 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, making full 
use of the knowledge, experience and capacity exist- 
ing in the United Nations system of methods and 
mechanisms for diversified financial and technical 
co-operation which are geared to the special and 
changing requirements of international industrial co- 
operation, as well as of a general set of guidelines 
for bilateral industrial co-operation. A progress re- 
port on this study should be submitted to the General 
Assembly at its thirty-first session. 

8. Special attention should be given to the particu- 
lar problems in the industrialization of the least 
developed, land-locked and island developing coun- 
tries — in order to put at their disposal those technical 
and financial resources as well as critical goods 



October 13, 1975 



563 



which need to be provided to them to enable them to 
overcome their specific problems and to play their 
due role in the world economy, warranted by their 
human and material resources. 

9. The General Assembly endorses the recom- 
mendation of the Second General Conference of the 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
to convert that organization into a specialized agency 
and decides to establish an intergovernmental com- 
mittee of the whole, including States which partici- 
pated in the Second General Conference, to meet in 
Vienna to draw up a constitution for the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization as a 
specialized agency, to be submitted to a conference 
of plenipotentiaries to be convened by the Secretary- 
General in the last quarter of 1976. 

10. In view of the importance of the forthcoming 
World Employment Conference, Governments should 
undertake adequate preparations and consultations. 

V. Food and Agriculture 

1. The solution to world food problems lies pri- 
marily in increasing rapidly food production in the 
developing countries. To this end, urgent and neces- 
sary changes in the pattern of world food production 
should be introduced and trade policy measures 
should be implemented, in order to obtain a notable 
increase in agricultural production and the export 
earnings of developing countries. 

2. To achieve these objectives, it is essential that 
developed countries and developing countries in a 
position to do so should substantially increase the 
volume of assistance to developing countries for agri- 
culture and food production, and that developed 
countries should effectively facilitate access to their 
markets for food and agricultural products of export 
interest to developing countries, both in raw and 
processed form, and adopt adjustment measures, 
where necessary. 

3. Developing countries should accord high priority 
to agricultural and fisheries development, increase 
investment accordingly and adopt policies which give 
adequate incentives to agricultural producers. It is a 
responsibility of each State concerned, in accordance 
with its sovereign judgement and development plans 
and policies, to promote interaction between expan- 
sion of food production and socio-economic reforms, 
with a view to achieving an integrated rural devel- 
opment. The further reduction of post-harvest food 
losses in developing countries should be undertaken 
as a matter of priority, with a view to reaching at 
least a 50 per cent reduction by 1985. All countries 
and competent international organizations should 
co-operate financially and technically in the effort to 
achieve this objective. Particular attention should be 
given to improvement in the systems of distribution 
of food-stuffs. 

4. The Consultative Group on Food Production and 
Investment in Developing Countries should quickly 



identify developing countries having the potential for 
most rapid and efficient increase of food production, 
as well as the potential for rapid agricultural expan- 
sion in other developing countries, especially the 
countries with food deficits. Such an assessment 
would assist developed countries and the competent 
international organizations to concentrate resources 
for the rapid increase of agricultural production in 
the developing countries. 

5. Developed countries should adopt policies aimed 
at ensuring a stable supply and sufficient quantity 
of fertilizers and other production inputs to develop- 
ing countries at reasonable prices. They should also 
provide assistance to, and promote investments in, 
developing countries to improve the efficiency of their 
fertilizer and other agricultural input industries. Ad- 
vantage should be taken of the mechanism provided 
by the International Fertilizer Supply Scheme. 

6. In order to make additional resources available 
on concessional terms for agricultural development in 
developing countries, developed countries and devel- 
oping countries in a position to do so should pledge, 
on a voluntary basis, substantial contributions to the 
proposed International Fund for Agricultural De- 
velopment so as to enable it to come into being by 
the end of 1975, with initial resources of SDR [spe- 
cial drawing rights] 1,000 million. Thereafter, addi- 
tional resources should be provided to the Fund on 
a continuing basis. 

7. In view of the significant impact of basic and 
applied agricultural research on increasing the quan- 
tity and quality of food production, developed coun- 
tries should support the expansion of the work of 
the existing international agricultural research 
centres. Through their bilateral programmes they 
should strengthen their links with these international 
research centres and with the national agricultural 
research centres in developing countries. With re- 
spect to the improvement of the productivity and 
competitiveness with synthetics of non-food agricul- 
tural and forestry products, research and technologi- 
cal assistance should be co-ordinated and financed 
through an appropriate mechanism. 

8. In view of the importance of food aid as a transi- 
tional measure, all countries should accept both the 
principle of a minimum food aid target and the con- 
cept of forward planning of food aid. The target for 
the 1975-1976 season should be 10 million tons of 
food grains. They should also accept the principle 
that food aid should be channelled on the basis of 
objective assessment of requirements in the recipient 
countries. In this respect all countries are urged to 
participate in the Global Information and Early 
Warning System on Food and Agriculture. 

9. Developed countries should increase the grant 
component of food aid, where food is not at present 
provided as grants, and should accept multilateral 
channelling of these resources at an expanding rate. 
In providing food grains and financing on soft-terms 



564 



Department of State Bulletin 



to developing countries in need of such assistance, de- 
veloped countries and the World Food Programme 
should take due account of the interests of the food- 
exporting- developing countries and should ensure 
that such assistance includes, wherever possible, pur- 
chases of food from the food-exporting developing 
countries. 

10. Developed countries and developing countries in 
a position to do so should provide food grains and 
financial assistance on most favourable terms to the 
most seriously affected countries, to enable them to 
meet their food and agricultural development re- 
quirements within the constraints of their balance-of- 
payments position. Donor countries should also pro- 
vide aid on soft terms, in cash and in kind, through 
bilateral and multilateral channels, to enable the 
most seriously affected countries to obtain their esti- 
mated requirements of about 1 million tons of plant 
nutrients during 1975-1976. 

11. Developed countries should carry out both their 
bilateral and multilateral food aid channelling in ac- 
cordance with the procedures of the Principles of 
Surplus Disposal of the Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization of the United Nations so as to avoid 
causing undue fluctuations in market prices or the 
disruption of commercial markets for exports of 
interest to exporting developing countries. 

12. All countries should subscribe to the Inter- 
national Undertaking on World Food Security. They 
should build up and maintain world food-grain re- 
serves, to be held nationally or regionally and 
strategically located in developed and developing, 
importing and exporting countries, large enough to 
cover foreseeable major production shortfalls. Inten- 
sive work should be continued on a priority basis in 
the World Food Council and other appropriate 
forums in order to determine, inter alia, the size of 
the required reserve, taking into account among 
other things the proposal made at the current session 
that the components of wheat and rice in the total 
reserve should be 30 million tons. The World Food 
Council should report to the General Assembly on 
this matter at its thirty-first session. Developed 
countries should assist developing countries in their 
efforts to build up and maintain their agreed shares 
of such reserves. Pending the establishment of the 
world food-grain reserve, developed countries and 
developing countries in a position to do so should 
earmark stocks and/or funds to be placed at the dis- 
posal of the World Food Programme as an emer- 
gency reserve to strengthen the capacity of the 
Programme to deal with crisis situations in develop- 
ing countries. The aim should be a target of not less 
than 500,000 tons. 

13. Members of the General Assembly reaffirm 
their full support for the resolutions of the World 
Food Conference and call upon the World Food Coun- 
cil to monitor the implementation of the provisions 
under section V of the present resolution and to 



report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first 
session. 

VI. Co-Operation Among Developing Countries 

1. Developed countries and the United Nations sys- 
tem are urged to provide, as and when requested, 
support and assistance to developing countries in 
strengthening and enlarging their mutual co-opera- 
tion at subregional, regional and interregional levels. 
In this regard, suitable institutional arrangements 
within the United Nations development system should 
be made and, when appropriate, strengthened, such 
as those within the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, the United Nations Indus- 
trial Development Organization and the United Na- 
tions Development Programme. 

2. The Secretary-General, together with the rele- 
vant organizations of the United Nations system, is 
requested to continue to provide support to ongoing 
projects and activities, and to commission further 
studies through institutions in developing countries, 
which would take into account the material already 
available within the United Nations system, including 
in particular the regional commissions and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and 
in accordance with existing subregional and regional 
arrangements. These further studies, which should 
be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty- 
first session, should, as a first step, cover: 

(a) Utilization of know-how, skills, natural re- 
sources, technology and funds available within de- 
veloping countries for promotion of investments in 
industry, agriculture, transport and communications; 

(6) Trade liberalization measures including pay- 
ments and clearing arrangements, covering primary 
commodities, manufactured goods and services, such 
as banking, shipping, insurance and reinsurance; 

(c) Transfer of technology. 

3. These studies on co-operation among developing 
countries, together with other initiatives, would con- 
tribute to the evolution towards a system for the 
economic development of developing countries. 

VII. Restructuring of the Economic and Social 
Sectors of the United Nations System 

1. With a view to initiating the process of restruc- 
turing the United Nations system so as to make it 
more fully capable of dealing with problems of inter- 
national economic co-operation and development in a 
comprehensive and effective manner, in pursuance of 
General Assembly resolutions 3172 (XXVIII) of 17 
December 1973 and 3343 (XXIX) of 17 December 
1974, and to make it more responsive to the require- 
ments of the provisions of the Declaration and the 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a 
New International Economic Order as well as those 
of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, an Ad Hoc Committee on the Restructuring 



October 13, 1975 



565 



of the Economic and Social Sectors of the United 
Nations System, which shall be a committee of the 
whole of the General Assembly open to the partici- 
pation of all States,' is hereby established to prepare 
detailed action proposals. The Ad Hoc Committee 
should start its work immediately and inform the 
General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the 
progress made, and submit its report to the Assembly 
at its thirty-first session, through the Economic and 
Social Council at its resumed session. The Ad Hoc 
Committee should take into account in its work, 
inter alia, the relevant proposals and documentation 
submitted in preparation for the seventh special ses- 
sion of the General Assembly pursuant to Assembly 
resolution 3343 (XXIX) and other relevant decisions, 
including the report of the Group of Experts on the 
Structure of the United Nations System, entitled 
A New United Nations Structure for Global Eco- 
nomic Co-operation," the records of the relevant 



' It is the understanding of the General Assembly 
that the "all States" formula will be applied in ac- 
cordance with the established practice of the General 
Assembly. [Footnote in original.] 

'U.N. doc. E/AC.62/9 (U.N. publication, sales no. 
E.75.II.A.7). 



deliberations of the Economic and Social Council, the 
Trade and Development Board, the Governing Coun- 
cil of the United Nations Development Programme 
and the seventh special session of the CJeneral As- 
sembly, as well as the results of the forthcoming 
deliberations on institutional arrangements of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment at its fourth session and of the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Environment Pro- 
gramme at its fourth session. All United Nations 
organs, including the regional commissions, as well 
as the specialized agencies and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, are invited to participate at 
the executive level in the work of the Ad Hoc Com- 
mittee and to respond to requests that the Committee 
may make to them for information, data or views. 

2. The Economic and Social Council should mean- 
while continue the process of rationalization and re- 
form which it has undertaken in accordance with 
Council resolution 1768 (LIV) of 18 May 1973 and 
General Assembly resolution 3341 (XXIX) of 17 
December 1974, and should take into full considera- 
tion those recommendations of the Ad Hoc Commit- 
tee that fall within the scope of these resolutions at 
the latest at its resumed sixty-first session. 



Ambassador Moynihan and Assistant Secretary Enders Discuss 
Seventh Special Session of U.N. General Assembly 



Following is the transcript of a news 
conference held at U.N. Headquarters on 
September 16 by Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, and 
Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for 
Economic and Business Affairs. 

USUN press release 96 dated September 16 

Ambassador Moynihan: Ladies and gentle- 
men, you know my colleague Tom Enders, 
who is certainly the spirit in Washington 
behind this enterprise. I think it would be 
most useful to you if he spoke. 

Mr. Enders: Pat, I think the really signifi- 
cant thing about what happened this last 
two weeks here, culminating last night, was 
to put the rich countries and the poor coun- 
tries of the world very squarely on a path 
toward negotiation. We have all been aware 
of the threatening clash between them, the 



coalitions drawn up on one side and another. 

During this session I think that many peo- 
ple were aware that there was a lot of hesi- 
tation on the part of many people here as to 
whether it was possible to find a cooperative 
route. And we found one. We found it not 
by agreeing on all the proposals and ideas 
and concepts put forward on all sides. You 
have seen that there was a very substantial 
measure of agreement. There are a lot of 
things that we did not agree on. There were 
some unrealistic demands put forward. It was 
important to make very clear that those pro- 
posals were unrealistic. We made apparent 
what we could do, what we couldn't do, and 
why. But there was a very large measure 
of agreement and a very clear direction, now, 
that we should get down to business and 
start negotiating. 

And the proposals that the United States 



566 



Department of State Bulletin 



put forward in Secretary Kissinger's speech, 
which Ambassador Moynihan delivered, will 
now be going forward in all the relevant 
forums — and a lot of new proposals and ideas 
that others have put foi'ward. 

I think, Pat, it's important to say that this 
effort on the part of the American delega- 
tion owes a great deal to its congressional 
advisers and to the participation of Congress 
in general. They worked all during the sum- 
mer on the proposals that Secretary Kissin- 
ger put forward. They have been extremely 
active in advising Ambassador Moynihan on 
the tactics and procedures and substance of 
this session. They will be also giving their 
own press conference in Washington later 
today, I think at 4 o'clock. 

But it is very important to note that this 
is a large collective effort involving a broad 
section, representatives of the Congress, and 
I think that's one of the reasons why it's 
been so successful. 

Q. How much of this depends upon the 
Congress — as Mr. Enders mentioned the Con- 
gress — how much of the reservations were 
pinpointed to appease the possible opposition 
in the Congress and which items can you 
proceed on to implement the commitments 
without the Congress? 

Mr. Enders: I think that a very large num- 
ber of the items that were proposed or sug- 
gested will ultimately require some form of 
congressional action or concurrence. Negoti- 
ation of the commodity agreement will be 
submitted to the Senate as a treaty. The 
replenishment of the International Finance 
Corporation obviously requires appropria- 
tions. The development security facility, the 
$10 billion security facility that we have pro- 
posed, can be acted upon by the IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund], but in order to 
have the funds for it, the IMF replenishment 
which is now agreed will require authoriza- 
tion by our Congress and by the parlia- 
ments of other countries. So clearly a very 
large measure of congressional involvement 
is there. 

I think it would be wrong to say, however, 
that the reservations were motivated by con- 
cern over congressional reaction. They are 



rather matters of policy of the executive 
branch, very largely shared I think in Con- 
gress, but by no means only limited to Con- 
gress. 

For an example, it was proposed that the 
United States might triple its pledge for aid 
to seven-tenths of 1 percent. The Adminis- 
tration, and I believe the Congress, intends 
to increase our aid outlays. We expect in 
the coming years they will grow substan- 
tially larger. However, an unrealistic com- 
mitment to a massive jump is not something 
at a time of inflation and recession and great 
social needs that could be supported in this 
country. And therefore we did not go along 
with it. However, we can increase aid. 

Q. Excuse me, but we were given 0.33 per- 
cent as our current average, but it's much 
less than — 

Mr. Enders: I think it's 0.28 or 0.3, two 
and a half times. """ 

Q. Can you possibly give us, put a dollar- 
figure value on the totality of proposals of 
Secretary Kissinger? 

Mr. Enders: No, because the objective and 
the design of these proposals is to recognize 
that we are not going to achieve the more 
equal relationship with the developing coun- 
tries simply by large budgetary transfers. 
We are seeking to get a new relationship. 

It is based on a recognition, as Secretary 
Kissinger said in his speech, that large 
budgetary transfers are no longer very wel- 
come by the developing world — I must say 
automatic budgetary transfers — and the po- 
litical base for them no longer really exists 
in the developed world. 

This is rather an effort to look to trade, 
to look to other forms of finance, to look to 
industrial development and agricultural de- 
velopment, for the way in which we are going 
to solve the problem of poverty and develop- 
ment in the world. 

The proposals that we have made, then, 
ultimately result in far greater economic ac- 
tivity than would come from a simple set of 
aid proposals, but they are not designed to 
be added up in a single package. 

Q. Mr. Enders, have you at the end of this 



October 13, 1975 



567 



session gone any further at all from the origi- 
nal positions laid out in the Kissinger speech? 
Are there any further compromises you have 
made or does the Kissinger speech still repre- 
sent your final position? 

Mr. Enders: I think if you read the docu- 
ment, you will see that although we have not 
put on the table additional specific proposals 
we have joined the majority here in a very 
broad action— particularly in the trade field 
but also in the finance field — designed to 
solve these problems, and we have indicated 
that we are quite willing to participate in 
the proposals that others have made in study- 
ing them and in negotiating them. 

So that we are not simply saying we will 
deal only with our own proposals, we are 
joining the process and dealing with others. 

Q. Mr. Enders, you said that the job now 
is to get down to the business of negotiating, 
and in one of the brief position papers dur- 
ing the session that the United States put 
out, there 2vas a statement that said copper 
shotdd receive special emphasis. I iconder, is 
that one of the things high on the agenda for 
getting doum to the business of real negotia- 
tion? 

Mr. Enders: Copper is a commodity in 
which there is no active consumer-producer 
group, and we think there should be one 
because this is one of the most unstable 
markets. It is the second largest commodity 
produced by developing countries, and im- 
portant parts of the developing world have 
their economic destiny affected by that 
market. 

Ours is an offer to start examining how 
that market could be made more efficient, 
more effective; and that we think is an 
urgent matter. 

Q. Mr. Enders, over the past couple of days 
metnbers of the U.S. delegation made rather 
strong statements concerning the role of Al- 
geria and Iraq in the negotiations here. 

Ambassador Moynihan: I will clarify sim- 
ply to the extent of saying that it has been 
the judgment of many members of the Group 
of 77 that there were within them divisions 
which included a group of countries, vari- 



ously described, which did not feel that there 
was enough to be gained from the kind of 
negotiated settlement which we reached. 
They felt they should persist in what had 
been a pattern of stating demands and not 
yielding them and at the end of such ses- 
sions as we have had now, instead of reach- 
ing agreement, recording disagreement as 
a matter of principle. This is a perfectly un- 
derstandable, perfectly defensible political 
tactic — strategy really — with respect to a 
new set of arguments and positions. 

That view was represented vigorously by 
some nations here at this session, and it was 
repeatedly done. In the end, faced with that 
as the received practice — established prac- 
tice you could almost say — versus the pros- 
pect of reaching a negotiated agreement, 
larger, stronger, more numerous voices were 
raised in the 77 to get into this relationship 
with the industrial countries of the West, of 
Japan and some others, and to commence a 
process which is only clearly begun, in no 
sense concluded. 

It is not for us at this point to characterize 
any nation as having been on one side or 
the other of meetings in which we were not 
participants. The important point about it is 
that we ended up with a unanimous docu- 
ment adopted at 4 o'clock this morning and 
that unanimity was confirmed at around 
11:30 this morning. 

Q. Mr. Enders, Mr. [Jacob M.] Myerson 
says there are several specific paragraphs 
with u'hich the United States is unable to 
concur. 

Mr. Enders: That's correct, sir. 

Q. He makes many reservations to the 
unanimous document. My question is whether 
further negotiation on the points which Mr. 
Myerson reserved is possible, or are toe fore- 
closed here on these provisions? 

Mr. Enders: Well, the session has ended. 
We are going on to do the things that are 
agreed here and others as well, because this 
document is by no means exclusive, however 
long it is. But those represent firm positions 
for the United States at this time, and I 
might add that they are positions which a 
fairly large number of other countries that 



568 



Department of State Bulletin 



nay not have expressed them in the form of 
■eservations also share. 

So you will not find them unique. But we 
lave not put them down in the sense of: 
This is an ultimatum, you know, we are not 
xoing to — this is it, fellows, and that's all 
here is ever going to be. 

Things change. I am not predicting that 
for any given set of proposals here, but this 
s our position now. It is a position that is 
>vell known, and it is quite firm. 

H Q. Mr. Enders, isn't that the same result 
IS you have achieved as ivas reached at the 
nxth special session, a unanimity with reser- 
vations which we understood was unsatis- 
factory, or if it's different from the sixth 
special session, in your vieiv, could you tell us 
ko2v it's different? 

Mr. Enders: I think the difference here has 
been fundamental, as essentially I under- 
stand what has happened. There, there was 
an attempt to legislate the doctrine of a ma- 
jority, a large majority, and impose it upon a 
minority numerically but which represents 
the larger part of the world's economy. It 
was an attempt without negotiation, without 
the development of serious proposals to set 
the direction for the world's economy. It was 
the first of the great confrontations between 
the North and the South, and it has led to an 
increasingly tense period of economic diplo- 
macy. 

In contrast, in this session the whole pro- 
cedure was different. Each of the substan- 
tive proposals here was carefully negotiated 
in a contact group between members of the 
77 and members of the industrial countries. 
Documents were exchanged, adjusted. There 
was in fact a genuine process of negotiation 
in order to get an agreed result from which 
we all could go forward. That result, I think 
most significant in the area of trade but also 
important in other areas, is I think signifi- 
cant not so much for the precise things that 
it says but that it is based on agreement, a 
sense of ability to reach a result, and a de- 
sire now to move quite quickly on to the 
relevant forums. 

So I think the first thing to say is that 
the whole process of this is different, and 

October 13, 1975 



that is why this meeting can be a decisive 
turn. 

I think the second thing to say, though, 
is that if you compare the documents be- 
tween the two sessions you will see an ex- 
traordinary difference of tone and an ex- 
traordinary difference in the quality of the 
proposals. This one is far more moderate. It 
reflects far more deeply the proposals and 
suggestions and attitudes and concepts of 
the industrial countries. Some 28 of Secre- 
tary Kissinger's proposals and policy recom- 
mendations that he made in his speech are 
included in this document in one form or 
another. 

We regard it as having been very respon- 
sive to our needs as well as to the others. 

Ambassador Moynihan: Could I suggest 
also that, as the Secretary General observed, 
the proposals we dealt with here were charac- 
terized by a certain depth of study and in- 
quiry. They weren't put together in a hurry; 
they came to this session after a year or 
more of study elsewhere. We have all learned 
a lot, and that learning, I think, has brought 
a measure of shared understanding of reality 
that makes for successful negotiation. 

Q. Last December the United States took a 
negative attitude totvard the Special Fund. Is 
there a possibility, I'd like to knoiv, of a 
change in terms of participating without con- 
tribution or ivith a contribution? And, sec- 
ondly, my question deals with the fact that 
we also have been criticized in the past 
for our negative attitude toward UNCTAD 
[U.N. Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment]. Since that organization is mentioned 
many, many times in this final paper, do we 
see it as having a significant role to play in 
carrying out commodity and trade studies 
and other actions that are called for? 

Mr. Enders: On the Special Fund, as you 
know, there are two modes of participation 
in it. One is with outright contribution, and 
a relatively small number of countries have 
done so. Another is a contribution or addi- 
tional contributions to the most seriously 
affected, designed to respond to their last 
year very urgent, this year almost desper- 
ate, balance-of-payments situations. And the 

569 



United States would participate in that fund 
by a contribution. 

As regards the UNCTAD, the UNCTAD 
has in the past been not a very successful 
forum for dealing with many of the problems 
we are talking about here. It is by its nature 
a forum that is difficult to mobilize for in- 
dividual problems because very often it's 
hard to break it down into the groups of 
countries that have real interests at stake 
in a specific area. So individual negotiations 
on commodities or trade or sectors or finance 
are much more apt to be successful. On the 
other hand, we are certainly willing, this 
document indicates, to participate fully in 
the discussions in UNCTAD and will be do- 
ing so. 

Q. Mr. Enders, the American working pa- 
per spoke not unsympathetically of the new 
international economic order, but Ambassa- 
dor Myerson's remarks last night ivere rather 
critical. Why the change? 

Mr. Enders: The working paper was an 
American eff'ort at a consensus paper, de- 
signed to respond to the concerns not only of 
the industrial countries and our own pro- 
posals but of the developing countries, of 
their concepts and of their rhetoric, recog- 
nizing the importance of that. 

The paper was not designed to put a stamp 
of American approval on "the" new inter- 
national order; it spoke of "a" new interna- 
tional economic order, and it recognized that 
this is a major aim of the developing coun- 
tries and a major slogan that they use. We 
are willing to accept that kind of language, 
but we are not willing to accept the con- 
cept of "the" international economic order, 
which is a rigid, statist concept that we do 
not believe is compatible with our own con- 
cepts of how to run an economy or a society 
or is likely to succeed in the world economy. 

So what we are willing to say is, "a con- 
sensus document" ; let's see whether we can't 



find some other concepts and language that 

both sides use and come together on that, 

but make no mistake about the substance. 

I 
Q. Mr. Enders, the thing on that, I guess 

the preamble here says, "reaffirming the 

fundamental purposes of the above-mentioned 

documents," that is, including the new in- 

ternatio7ial economic order. Do you consider 

this language acceptable, reaffirming the 

fundamental purposes or — ii 

Mr. Enders: Does it say "a" or "the"? Are 
you talking about the preambulars? 

Q. The fundamental purposes. 

Mr. Enders: That's the point of Ambas- 
sador Myerson's statement. It says "the." 
And that refers to a specific set of concepts 
that are not acceptable to us. 



United States and Mozambique 
Establish Diplomatic Relations 

Following is the text of a communique 
initialed at New York on September 23 by 
Secretary Kissinger and Joachim Alberto 
Chissano, Foreign Minister of the People's 
Republic of Mozambique. 

Press release 498 dated September 23 

The Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People's 
Republic of Mozambique, desirous of 
strengthening the friendship existing be- 
tween the peoples of the United States of 
America and of Mozambique based on the 
principles of mutual respect, sovereign equal- 
ity and non-interference in the internal af- 
fairs of each other, have decided to establish 
diplomatic relations, at the ambassadorial 
level, between their respective countries with 
eifect from the Twenty-Third day of Septem- 
ber Nineteen Hundred Seventy Five. 



570 



Department of State Bulletin 



The United States and Africa: Strengthening the Relationship 



Toast by Secretary Kissinger ' 



An 



Some 15 years ago Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan added a new and durable phrase 
to the English language when, in speaking of 
Africa, he said, "The wind of change is blow- 
ing through the continent." When the 20th 
century opened. Western colonialism stood at 
its zenith. Today, only the barest vestiges of 
Western colonialism remain in Africa. Never 
before in history has so revolutionary a re- 
versal occurred with such rapidity. Morally 
and politically, the spread of national inde- 
pendence has already transformed world in- 
stitutions and the nature of international af- 
fairs. Today we feel the winds of change 
blowing from Africa, and they will affect the 
course we set for generations to come. 

The first official function at which I pre- 
sided as Secretary of State two years ago 
was a luncheon here for the representatives 
of the Organization of African Unity. Since 
then the world has undergone continuing 
change — as much in Africa as anywhere else. 

In Africa, the Portuguese African colonial 
empire has come to an end. The effects of 
that on southern Africa are being felt in 
Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa; and 
their full course has yet to be run. 

Also of great importance, major changes 
have taken place in the international econ- 
omy, as reflected in the recent special session. 
The developing nations of Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America are claiming more control 
over their economic destiny and a greater 
share in global prosperity. 



' Given on Sept. 23 at a dinner at the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations in honor of Foreign Ministers 
and Permanent Representatives to the United Na- 
tions of member nations of the Organization of 
African Unity (text from press release 500). 

October 13, 1975 



Africa continues to face enormous prob- 
lems. The trials of economic development, 
exacerbated by the problems of the world 
economy and the exorbitant rises in the price 
of oil, continue to pose challenges for Afri- 
can nations despite the progress they have 
made. The arbitrary boundaries established 
by the colonial powers left many African 
countries vulnerable to ethnic strife. Social 
change and development, as they succeed, 
challenge national unity and cultural identity 
far more profoundly than other nations have 
experienced. The job of nation-building in 
Africa is formidable indeed. 

The people of this country wish you well 
and offer you our help. 

There is growing interest in America in 
African issues and African problems. Tra- 
ditionally America has been dedicated to in- 
dependence and self-determination and to 
the rights of man. We have been strong 
advocates of decolonization since the be- 
ginning of the postwar period. The special 
identification of black Americans with their 
African heritage intensifies our belief, and 
our will to demonstrate, that men of all races 
can live and prosper together. 

Because of these ties, and with the eco- 
nomic interdependence of Africa and Amer- 
ica becoming increasingly obvious, Ameri- 
cans owe it to ourselves and to Africa to 
define clearly and to state candidly our policy 
toward the continent of Africa. Therefore, 
today I would like to go beyond the usual 
toast for occasions such as this and talk with 
you informally about some of the important 
issues in relations between the United States 
and Africa. 

America has three major concerns: 

571 



— That Africa attain prosperity for its 
people and become a strong participant in 
the economic order, an economic partner with 
a growing stake in the international system ; 

— That self-determination, racial justice, 
and human rights spread to all of Africa; 
and 

— That the continent be free of great- 
power rivalry or conflict. 

The United States seeks neither military 
allies nor ideological confrontation in Africa. 
As Adlai Stevenson once said here at the 
United Nations, "Africa for the Africans 
means Africa for the Africans and not Africa 
as a hunting ground for alien ambitions." ^ 

Economic Development 

The people of Africa entered the era of 
independence with high aspirations. Eco- 
nomic development has become both their 
highest national goal and a symbol of their 
drive for a more significant role in world 
afi'airs. 

Much progress has been made. National 
incomes in Africa have risen rapidly in the 
last two decades. Africa's overall trade has 
increased about fourfold in the last 15 years. 

But development hopes in Africa have too 
often been crushed by the cycles of natural 
disasters and the shocks of worldwide eco- 
nomic instability. No continent suffers so 
cruelly when crops fail for lack of rain. No 
continent endures a heavier burden when 
prices of primary commodities fluctuate vio- 
lently in response to shifts in the world 
economy. 

The United States has set as one of the 
fundamental goals of its foreign policy to 
help lay the foundations for a new era of 
international cooperation embracing devel- 
oped and developing countries in an open and 
durable international system. Africa has an 
important role in this international system. 
Our mutual success will determine the na- 
ture of political and economic relations in 
the world over the remainder of this century. 



° For a statement by Ambassador Stevenson made 
in the U.N. Security Council on Feb. 15, 1961, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 13, 1961, p. 359. 



572 



The United States offered a comprehen- 
sive practical approach to economic develop- ^ 
ment at the seventh special session. My gov- 
ernment was pleased that our suggestions 
formed the basis for a highly significant 
consensus among the developed and develop- 
ing countries, which we hope will mark the 
end of a period of fruitless confrontation and 
misunderstanding. i ii 

Our major aims are: 

— To make developing countries more se- 
cure against drastic economic diflticulties aris- 
ing from cyclical declines in export earnings 
and in food production; 

— To accelerate economic growth by im*^| 
proving their access to capital, technology, 
and management skills; 

— To provide special treatment to improve 
their opportunities in trading relations ; 

— To make commodity markets function 
more smoothly and beneficially for both pro- 
ducers and consumers ; and 

—To devote special attention to the urgent 
needs of the poorest countries. 

Our proposals apply to all developing coun- 
tries. But many of them are particularly ap- 
propriate to Africa: 

— Sixteen of the world's twenty-five least 
developed countries are in Africa. Our bi- 
lateral assistance program is increasingly 
concentrated on the least developed. Above 
and beyond our emergency assistance to the , 
Sahelian drought area, our regular aid ap- i 
propriation for Africa this fiscal year reflects 
an increase of about 60 percent over last 
year. 

— We expect African countries to benefit 
particularly from the development security 
facility which we propose to create in the 
International Monetary Fund to counter 
drastic shortfalls in export earnings for 
economies which are particularly dependent 
on a few highly volatile primary commodi- 
ties. 

— But stabilizing earnings is not enough. 
The United States supports measures to im- 
prove markets for individual commodities, 
including coffee, cocoa, and copper, which 
are so important to Africa. 

— We also propose to double our bilateral 
assistance to expand agricultural production. 

Department of State Bulletin 



— We will raise our proposed contribution 
to the African Development Fund to $25 
million. 

— In addition to the proposals we made to 
the United Nations, the United States has 
attempted to mobilize international support 
for a coordinated long-term development pro- 
gram to provide basic economic security for 
the Sahelian countries. We have supported 
this effort already with massive assistance 
of more than $100 million. 

The key to sustaining development over 
the long run is expanded trade and invest- 
ment. Growing exports of manufactured, as 
well as primary, products generate the for- 
eign exchange needed to buy the imports to 
fuel further development. The United States 
provides a large and growing market for the 
products of African countries. Our trade 
with Africa had grown to about $8 billion in 
1974, almost eight times its volume in 1960. 
The rapid implementation of the U.S. gen- 
eralized system of preferences should spell 
even greater expansion in the years to come. 

American private investment has been a 
valuable source of the capital, management, 
and technology that are essential to Afri- 
can development. Direct U.S. investment in 
Africa has increased more than four times 
since 1960. 

We are encouraged by these striking in- 
creases in the magnitude and relative im- 
portance of trade and investment relation- 
ships between the United States and inde- 
pendent black Africa. We expect this trend 
to continue, and we will do what we can to 
assure that it does so. 

Southern Africa 

Economic progress is of utmost impor- 
tance to Africa; but at the same time, the 
political challenges of the continent, par- 
ticularly the issue of southern Africa, sum- 
mon the urgent attention of the world com- 
munity. 

We believe that these problems can and 
must be solved. They should be solved peace- 
fully. We are mindful of the Lusaka Mani- 
festo, which combines a commitment to hu- 
man dignity and equality with a clear under- 



standing of what is a realistic and hopeful 
approach to this profound challenge. 

No problem is more complex than the 
racial issues in South Africa itself. My 
country's convictions on apartheid are well 
known. It is contrary to all we believe in and 
stand for. The U.S. position has been long- 
standing and consistent. We note that the 
wind of change continues to blow, inexorably. 
The signs of change that are visible in South 
Africa must be encouraged and accelerated. 
We are pleased to see the constructive 
measures taken by African governments to 
promote better relations and peaceful change. 
We believe change is inevitable, and efforts 
to promote a progressive and peaceful evolu- 
tion will have our support. 

The United States also continues to sup- 
port the International Court of Justice's ad- 
visory opinion of 1971 affirming the General 
Assembly's 1966 decision which terminated 
the South African mandate over Namibia. 
The United States will take no steps that 
would legitimize South Africa's administra- 
tion of the territory. We repeatedly have pro- 
tested violations of the rights of black Na- 
mibians by the authorities there. 

As I indicated in my address yesterday, 
we believe that all Namibians should be given 
the opportunity to express their views freely, 
and under U.N. supervision, on the political 
and constitutional structure of their coun- 
try. We have expressed this view consist- 
ently to South Africa. We will continue to do 
so. We welcome public statements of South 
African leaders that they accept the principle 
of independence and self-determination for 
Namibia. 

For the past decade, Rhodesia has been a 
major international issue. The maintenance 
by force of an illegal regime based on white 
supremacy is of deep concern to African gov- 
ernments and to my government. Over the 
past year, the United States has watched 
with sympathy the attempt to negotiate a 
peaceful solution in Rhodesia. We have noted, 
in particular, the statesmanlike efforts of 
the leaders of African countries — especially 
President Kaunda [of Zambia], Prime Min- 
ister Vorster [of South Africa], President 
Khama [of Botswana], President Nyerere 



October 13, 1975 



573 



[of Tanzania] , and President Machel [of Mo- 
zambique] — to avert violence and bloodshed. 
We would encourage them to continue in 
their difficult task of bringing the parties to- 
gether. 

The United States intends to adhere 
scrupulously to the U.N.'s economic sanc- 
tions against Rhodesia. President Ford and 
his entire Administration continue to urge 
repeal of the Byrd amendment and expect 
this will be accomplished during the cun-ent 
session of the Congress. 

The United Nations has tried in various 
ways to exert a positive influence on change 
in southern Africa. I should add, however, 
that we have opposed, and will continue to 
oppose, actions that are incompatible with 
the U.N. Charter. In particular, we will not 
retreat from our opposition to the expulsion 
of any member of the United Nations. We 
believe this would be contrary to the best 
interests and effectiveness of this organiza- 
tion. Universality is a fundamental principle 
that we stand for in this body. The charter^s 
provisions for members' full exercise of their 
prerogatives are another. We do not believe 
that these principles can be ignored in one 
case and applied in another. This is why, 
despite our disapproval of South Africa's 
policies, we do not believe this organization 
can afford to start down the path of exclud- 
ing members because of criticism of their 
domestic policies. 

Former Portuguese Territories 

Since we last sat down together, three 
more African nations — Mozambique, Sao 
Tome and Principe, and Cape Verde— have 
become independent. We welcome them to 
the U.N. family, and we look forward to es- 
tablishing regular relations with them. We 
stand ready to assist in their economic de- 
velopment. 

But I want to say a cautionary word about 
Angola. Events in Angola have taken a dis- 
tressing turn, with widespread violence. We 
are most alarmed at the interference of 
extracontinental powers who do not wish 
Africa well and whose involvement is incon- 
sistent with the promise of true independ- 



ence. We believe a fair and peaceful solution 
must be negotiated, giving all groups repre- 
senting the Angolan people a fair role in its 
future. 



The Spirit of Cooperation 

Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues: Twenty 
years ago there were only three independent 
African states. Today you comprise more 
than one-third of the membership of the 
United Nations. Africa's numbers and re- 
sources and the energies of its peoples have 
given Africa a strong and important role in 
world affairs. 

We do not expect you to be in concert with 
us on all international issues. We ask only 
that as we respect your interests, are mind- 
ful of your rights, and sympathize with your 
concerns, you give us the same consideration. 
Let us base our relations on mutual respect. 
Let us address our differences openly and as 
friends, in the recognition that only by co- 
operation can we achieve the aspirations of 
our peoples. 

Let us be guided by the flexibility and the 
spirit of conciliation which were so evident 
during the special session. Let us replace the 
sterility of confrontation with the promise 
inherent in our collaboration. Let us search 
diligently for areas of agreement and strive 
to overcome any misunderstandings. 

Strengthening the relationship between 
the United States and Africa is a major ob- 
jective of American policy. We support your 
self-determination, sovereignty, and terri- 
torial integrity. We want to help you in your 
efforts to develop your economies and im- 
prove the well-being of your people. Like 
yours, our behef in racial justice is unalter- 
able. 

America has many ties to Africa and a 
deep commitment to its future. 

It is my profound hope that this session 
of the General Assembly will be remembered 
as a time when we began to come together 
as truly united nations, a time when we ear- 
nestly searched for reasons to agree, a time 
when the interdependence of mankind be- 
gan to be fully understood. The nations of 



574 



Department of State Bulletin 



Africa will have a major part in determining 
whether this will come to pass. 

Ladies and gentlemen, please raise your 
glasses with me in a toast to the future of 
Africa, the Organization of African Unity, 
and the United Nations in a world of peace. 



Annual Meeting of SEATO Council 
Held at New York 

Folloiving is the text of a press statement 
issued at the conclusion of the annual meet- 
ing of the SEATO Council held at Neiv York 
on September 21^. 

1. The Council of the South-East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), comprising 
Ministerial Representatives of Australia, 
New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, held 
their Twentieth Annual Meeting in New 
York on 24 September. 

2. The Council reviewed events in the 
Treaty Area in the year since they had last 
met. They considered the role of SEATO in 
light of the new situation in the South-East 
Asian region. While noting that the Organi- 
zation had over the years made a useful 
contribution to stability and development in 
the region, they decided that in view of the 
changing circumstances it should now be 
phased out. 

3. The Council accordingly instructed the 
Secretary-General to prepare a detailed plan 
for the phasing out process to be conducted 
in an orderly and systematic manner. Recog- 
nizing that many of the projects and ac- 
tivities in which the Organization had been 
engaged were of substantial value and 
might be continued under other auspices, 
possibly with bilateral or multilateral tech- 
nical and economic support, the Council re- 
quested the Secretary-General and the Nego- 
tiating Bodies to explore this subject further. 

4. The Council expressed its appreciation 
to the Government of Thailand for having 
been the host to SEATO during its existence 
and for all the facilities accorded by the 
Government of Thailand to the Organization. 



Secretary Kissinger Discusses 
Goals of U.S. Energy Policy 

Following is a statement by Secretary Kis- 
singer made before the Subcommittee on 
Energy of the Joint Economic Committee of 
the Congress on September 19.^ 

Press release 495 dated September 19 

The events set in motion by the October 
1973 war exposed the dangerous vulnerabil- 
ity we had incurred as a result of our grow- 
ing dependence on imported oil. The oil em- 
bargo and the series of massive oil price 
increases which followed underscored the 
degree to which we had lost control over the 
price of a central element of our economic 
system. We also found that our own economic 
well-being and security were threatened by 
the energy vulnerability of our allies and 
that the escalating price of energy had 
wreaked havoc on the pi'Ograms of develop- 
ing countries. 

Over the past two years our objective has 
been to develop a comprehensive strategy to 
end our domestic and international energy 
vulnerability. Our goal has been to build a 
series of policies which would: 

— Protect us against short-term dangers 
such as embargoes and the destabilizing 
movements of assets held by oil countries ; 

— Provide support for developing countries 
hard hit by high oil prices ; 

— Make possible a return to noninflation- 
ary growth, and 

— Create the political and institutional 
conditions for a productive dialogue between 
consumer and producer countries. 



progress m 



We have made substantial 
meeting the immediate crisis. 

We and our partners in the International 
Energy Agency (lEA) have joined in a plan 
for mutual assistance in the event of a fu- 
ture embargo. In April we and other indus- 
trialized countries agreed on a $25 billion 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



October 13, 1975 



575 



support fund to offset abrupt or predatory 
shifts of funds by OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] as well as 
balance-of-payments problems. Also at our 
initiative, the International Monetary Fund 
will create a special Trust Fund for conces- 
sional loans to developing countries hit hard- 
est by oil price increases. We have also co- 
ordinated closely with Germany, France, 
Japan, and Britain to restore sustained eco- 
nomic expansion in the industrial world. 

Despite this progress much remains to be 
done if we are to overcome the impact of 
the energy crisis. 

Here at home we must move rapidly in 
reducing our dependence on imported oil. Our 
present vulnerability will continue, and in- 
deed increase, unless we intensify our con- 
servation efforts and promptly initiate those 
programs and policy measures which will in- 
sure the availability of major amounts of 
new energy by the end of this decade and 
into the 1980's. 

For the short term we look to conservation 
as the primary means of reducing our import 
dependence. In this regard, the decontrol of 
domestic oil prices is the single most im- 
portant conservation measure we can take. 

But there should also be other elements in 
our domestic energy policy, including the 
deregulation of natural gas, as well as the 
accelerated exploi-ation of potential resources 
in Alaska and on the outer continental shelf. 

We cannot succeed alone in this effort. 
We must work closely with other major con- 
suming countries if we expect to end the 
monopoly power of the producer countries 
in unilaterally setting oil prices. 

We and our lEA partners are now develop- 
ing a comprehensive program of long-term 
cooperation. In the conservation area we will 
set overall targets based on equitable burden 
sharing among members, and we will verify 
each other's performance. 

To accelerate the development of new en- 
ergy, lEA members must pool their resources 
and expand research and development ef- 
forts. To cover the massive development 
costs, lEA countries must work together to 
insure that the necessary financial resources 
will be available. 

It is also important that we establish a 



common basis for developing alternative sup- 
plies by agreeing that none of the lEA coun- 
tries will permit imported oil to be sold in 
our economies below a certain minimum price 
level. The object of this element of consumer 
policy is to assure that our efforts are not 
disrupted by predatory pricing by OPEC and 
to protect those countries that invest heavily 
in higher cost energy from being put at 
a competitive disadvantage if the oil pro- 
ducers engage in predatory pricing. 

These efforts by the United States and its 
lEA partners are extremely important, for 
without serious joint effort by the consumer 
countries our credibility will be questioned 
and no balanced dialogue with producer coun- 
tries will be possible. We seek such a dialogue 
with the producing countries, one that will 
underscore our mutual interests rather than 
our differences. If we and our lEA partners 
seek reliable access to oil supplies at stable 
prices, the producing countries also seek se- 
cure outlets for their growing assets and 
greater participation in the world financial 
and economic system. 

We have worked hard to launch a produc- 
tive dialogue on energy, raw materials, de- 
velopment, and finance. We look forward to 
the meetings on these subjects which will 
begin next month. They offer an opportunity 
for consumer and producer countries alike 
to demonstrate their ability to create new 
ties and relationships. 

A major test of the producer country com- 
mitment to a more positive relationship will 
occur in the next few days when OPEC coun- 
tries meet to decide whether or not to extend 
their own moratorium on oil price increases. 
After the dramatic price increases of the 
past two years another oil price rise can only 
endanger the positive dialogue which we all 
seek. It will affect the expansionary policies 
of industrialized countries. It will further 
weaken the economies of the developing 
countries, so many of which are already in 
precarious condition. It could also result in 
the stagnation of OPEC oil exports and lead 
to demands for yet higher oil prices. Such a 
series of events is in the interest of no one 
and can only jeopardize our hopes for a new 
and constructive relationship. 

Regardless of the decisions of the oil pro- 



576 



Department of State Bulletin 



ducers, the United States must regain con- 
trol of its own economic future. Our leader- 
ship role in the world demands that we 
demonstrate our national resolve to overcome 
;he problems we face and our determination 
lot to entrust our political and economic 
iestiny to others. 



Continued U.S. Participation 
in Coffee Organization Urged 

Folloiving is a statement by Julius L. Katz, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic 
uid Business Affairs, submitted to the Senate 
'^ommittee on Foreign Relations on Septem- 
ber 16} 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
jefore your committee this morning to dis- 
uss the protocol for the continuation in 
'orce of the International Coffee Agreement 
)f 1968, as extended. This protocol contains 
10 economic provisions, but preserves the 
egal basis for the continuation of the Inter- 
national Coffee Organization through Sep- 
. ember 30, 1976. Without our ratification of 
Lhis protocol, U.S. membership in the Inter- 
;iational Coffee Organization would expire 
)n September 30 of this year. 

The purpose of this extension is to con- 
tinue the International Coffee Organization 
IS a forum for discussion and negotiation of 
1 new international coffee agreement. Con- 
siderable progress has been made in negotia- 
tions for a new agreement in the past several 
months. Negotiations will resume in No- 
\'ember and are expected to be concluded 
l:)efore the end of this year. I believe that it 
s in our best interest to participate fully in 
Dhe November negotiations as a member in 
?ood standing of the International Coffee 
(Organization. 

i In this statement I propose to review the 
itiistory of U.S. participation in previous 
coffee agreements, recent developments in 



'The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
'rem the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
srnment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

October 13, 1975 



world coffee markets, and our reasons for 
continuing cooperation between producers 
and consumers of coffee. 

The United States has participated in inter- 
national coffee agreements since 1962. Both 
the 1962 agreement and its successor, the 
1968 International Coffee Agreement, were 
designed primarily to deal with persistent 
overproduction of coffee and accumulated 
surpluses which threatened to depress prices 
and the export earnings of a large number 
of developing countries in Latin America 
and Africa. Through a system of export 
quotas and other measures, these agree- 
ments made possible the reduction of surplus 
stocks without a disastrous price fall. At the 
same time, the agreements contributed to 
the achievement of a better balance between 
production and consumption during the 
1960's. These agreements were, of course, 
submitted as treaties to your committee and 
received the advice and consent of the 
Senate. 

Severe frosts in the coffee-growing regions 
of Brazil in 1969 and 1972 sharply reduced 
Brazilian coffee harvests. As a result world 
production was below consumption in the 
early 1970's, and the general level of world 
stocks declined. The frosts, together with 
other factors such as international monetary 
adjustments, resulted in sharply higher 
coffee prices. In this situation the United 
States questioned the need to continue re- 
strictions on the flow of coffee to the mar- 
ket, and the quota system was suspended in 
December 1972. 

In 1973, member countries decided to ex- 
tend the 1968 agreement for a period of two 
years with virtually all the economic provi- 
sions deleted. This decision came after it had 
become clear that producers and consumers 
could not reach agreement on the means of 
adapting the 1968 agreement to the changed 
market situation. Nonetheless, producers and 
consumers did agree that the International 
Coffee Organization should be preserved as a 
center for the collection, analysis, and dis- 
semination of data on coffee production, con- 
sumption, and trade, as well as a forum for 
discussion and eventual negotiation of a new 
agreement. Forty-two producing countries 

577 



and 17 consuming countries are members of 
the current agreement. 

One of tiie principal reasons for the fail- 
ure to reach agreement in 1973 was a side 
agreement announced by major producers to 
withhold coffee from the market. The United 
States and others protested that such one- 
sided action was incompatible with the spirit 
and objectives of producer-consumer cooper- 
ation. Between 1972 and 1974, producers on 
several occasions announced their intention 
to restrict the supply of coffee to world 
markets. However, the statistical data which 
later became available indicate that produc- 
ers did not in fact restrict exports. On the 
contrary, exports increased from 53.3 million 
bags in 1971 to 57.7 million bags in 1972 and 
61.6 million bags in 1973. Nevertheless, the 
absence of producer and consumer agi'ee- 
ment on supply objectives created uncer- 
tainty in coffee markets and unnecessary 
tension between producers and consumers. 

Coffee prices continued relatively high 
through 1973 and early 1974. By mid-1974 
Brazilian production had recovered fully 
from the 1972 frost and the mai'ket antici- 
pated a return to surplus production. Prices 
began to decline and dropped considerably 
below their 1974 highs. Through the first 
half of this year coffee prices remained 
around 50 cents per pound, a decline of 
roughly 50 percent from their highs. 

This situation was dramatically reversed 
on July 17 when the coffee-growing regions 
of Brazil were hit by the most severe frost 
since 1912. Initial reports placed the loss 
as high as 50 percent of expected production 
in 1976. This news caused the price of green 
coffee on the New York market to jump from 
about 55 cents per pound to 85 cents per 
pound in a matter of days. The damage re- 
ports have since been confirmed. 

A Department of Agriculture team sur- 
veyed the frost area in August and estimated 
Brazilian production in 1976 would fall 
within a range of 8 to 11 million bags, com- 
pared to 24 million bags this year and 28 
million bags previously forecast for 1976. 
The Department of Agriculture also pointed 
out that due to the severity of the frost 1977 



coffee production would also be reduced. 
Thus the outlook for the next several years 
appears to be one of relatively tight balance 
between supply and demand. 

Earlier this year serious negotiations re- 
sumed for a new coffee agi'eement in the 
International Coffee Organization. Brazil and 
a number of other producing countries pre- 
sented proposals in March. The United States 
presented its proposals in April. Substantial 
progress toward a new international coffee 
agreement with economic provisions was 
made at a Coffee Council meeting in June and 
July of this year. We reached agi'eement in 
principle on a number of features which I 
believe would offer additional protection to 
consumers. These included provisions for 
automatic suspension of quotas when prices 
rise by a predetermined amount, a more flex- 
ible arrangement for quota allocation, and a 
clear undei-standing that the objective of the 
agreement would be price stabilization, not 
price fixing. We also received assurances 
from producers that they would refrain from 
further one-sided attempts to regulate coffee 
supply. 

However, we did not conclude an agree- 
ment, primarily because the producers were 
unable to resolve their differences over ini- 
tial division of market shares. The Council 
adjourned after scheduling another meet- 
ing for early November and requesting 
producers to resolve their difficulties in the 
meantime. Overall, we found the producers 
reasonable and willing to compromise on 
most of the issues of importance to us. 

Subsequent to the meeting, the frost in 
Brazil raised speculation on whether pro- 
ducers would still be interested in pursuing 
an agreement. Similar circumstances follow- 
ing the 1972 frost led to the breakdown of 
the old agreement. This time we received 
immediate assurances from the major pro- 
ducers — Brazil, Colombia, the Ivory Coast, 
and others — that they remain firmly com- 
mitted to renewed producer-consumer co- 
operation in an international agi'eement. 

Brazil, in particular, expressed concern 
that higher prices may lead to permanent 
loss in consumption and may stimulate in- 



578 



Department of State Bulletin 



creased planting followed by surplus produc- 
tion and depressed prices several years later. 
At the same time, Brazil has announced a 
program valued at about $1 billion to re- 
habilitate and restore production. Brazil is 
thus making a massive effort to protect its 
market position in the United States and 
elsewhere. 

We have informally told the major produc- 
ers that we, too, are interested in continuing 
cooperation. We have cautioned them of the 
detrimental effect on the world coffee trade 
which might result from excessively high 
prices. We have made clear that we could 
not participate in a new agreement if produc- 
ers attempt coordinated measures to exploit 
the tight supply situation. We think the 
producers understand our position. Thus far, 
they have acted responsibly. 

It is against this background that we hope 
the committee will support the President's 
recommendation that the Senate give its 
advice and consent to acceptance of the 
protocol. We believe that continuation of the 
present agreement will provide the time re- 
quired to complete negotiation of a new 
agreement and the necessary constitutional 
procedures for its ratification and entry into 
force October 1, 1976. 

We believe that U.S. membership in the 
International Coffee Organization will pro- 
mote U.S. foreign policy interests. By re- 
sponding positively to the desire of the pro- 
ducing countries of this hemisphere and of 
the developing world generally to preserve 
the institutional cooperation of the past 12 
years, the United States reaffirms the mutual 
commitment to seeking constructive solu- 
tions to problems which vitally affect the 
economies of many nations. U.S. participa- 
tion will demonstrate our continuing concern 
for the economic well-being of producing 
countries. At the same time we can better 
safeguard the interests of our consumers 
in the context of cooperative international 
arrangements than we can in a situation 
where producers alone are determining the 
conditions of trade of this important com- 
modity. Particularly in view of the tight sup- 
ply outlook for the next several years, I be- 



lieve that it is in our best interest as con- 
sumers to continue the cooperation which 
has been the hallmark of the international 
coffee agreements. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



93d Congress, 2d Session 

The Middle East, 1974: New Hopes, New Challenges. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near 
East and South Asia of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. April 9-June 27, 1974. 202 pp. 

A Brief History of Emergency Powers in the United 
States. A working paper prepared for the Senate 
Special Committee on National Emergencies and 
Delegated Emergency Powers. Prepared by Harold 
C. Relyea of the Government and General Re- 
search Division, Library of Congress. July 1974. 
140 pp. 

The Persian Gulf, 1974: Money, Politics, Arms, and 
Power. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the 
Near East and South Asia of the House Commit- 
tee on Foreign Affairs. July 30-August 12, 1974. 
267 pp. 

Detente. Hearings before the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. August 15-October 8, 1974. 
524 pp. 

World Hunger, Health, and Refugee Problems. Part 
V: Human Disasters in Cyprus, Bangladesh, 
Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee To 
Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees 
and tescapees of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Health of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. 
August 20, 1974. 208 pp. 

Human Rights in Chile. Hearings before the Sub- 
committees on International Organizations and 
Movements and on Inter-American Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part 2. 
November 19, 1974. 99 pp. 

The Crisis of the African Drought. Hearing before 
the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs. November 19, 1974. 
143 pp. 

Kissinger-Simon Proposals for Financing Oil Im- 
ports. Hearings before the Joint Economic Com- 
mittee. November 25-29, 1974. 109 pp. 

Torture and Oppression in Brazil. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations and 
Movements of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. December 11, 1974. 51 pp. 

Economic Issues Between the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea. Hearing before the Subcom- 
mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. December 17, 1974. 
42 pp. 



October 13, 1975 



579 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. En- 
tered into force April 7, 1948; for the United 
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086. 
Acceptance deposited: Mozambique, September 11, 
1975. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done 
at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 
21, 1968. TIAS 6331. 
Accession deposited: Oman, August 20, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil 
pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, September 19, 
1975. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions 
at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. En- 
tered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813. 
Acceptance deposited: Oman, August 20, 1975. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered 
into force September 1, 1972; for the United 
States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: Kenya, September 25, 1975. 



Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, September 23, 
1975. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, September 23, 
1975. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris 
November 16, 1972.= 
Acceptance deposited: France (with declaration), 

June 27, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, July 4, 1975. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
relating to the agreement of October 4, 1974 
(TIAS 7949), with agreed minutes. Signed at 
Dacca September 11, 1975. Entered into force 
September 11, 1975. 

Cape Verde 

Loan agreement for agricultural sector support 
(rural works), with annex. Signed at Mindelo 
June 30, 1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975. 

Grant agreement relating to food for work and dis- 
tribution. Signed at Mindelo June 30, 1975. En- 
tered into force June 30, 1975. 



' Not in force for the United States. 
"' Not in force. 



580 



Department of State Bulletin 



klNDEX October 13, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894 



frica 

luilding International Order (Kissinger) . . 545 
'he United States and Africa: Streng^thening 
the Relationship (Kissinger) 571 

rms Control. Building International Order 
(Kissinger) 545 

>sia. Annual Meeting of SEATO Council Held 
at New York (press statement) 575 

Irazil. Continued U.S. Participation in Coffee 
Organization Urged (Katz) 577 

immodities. Continued U.S. Participation in 
Coffee Organization Urged (Katz) .... 577 

ingress 
longressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 579 

Continued U.S. Participation in Coffee Organi- 
zation Urged (Katz) 577 

icretary Kissinger Discusses Goals of U.S. 
Energy Policy (statement) 575 

lyprus. Building International Order (Kis- 
singer) 545 

developing Countries 

'Ambassador Moynihan and Assistant Secretary 
Enders Discuss Seventh Special Session of 
U.N. General Assembly (transcript of news 
conference) 566 

United States Gives Views on Resolution 
Adopted by Seventh Special Session of U.N. 
General Assembly (Moynihan, Myerson, text 
of resolution) 557 

Iconomic Affairs 

bassador Moynihan and Assistant Secretary 
Enders Discuss Seventh Special Session of 
U.N. General Assembly (transcript of news 

conference) 566 

iuilding International Order (Kissinger) . . 545 
Continued U.S. Participation in Coffee Organi- 
zation Urged (Katz) 577 

nited States Gives Views on Resolution 
Adopted by Seventh Special Session of U.N. 
General Assembly (Moynihan, Myerson, text 
of resolution) 557 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Discusses Goals 

of U.S. Energy Policy (statement) . . . 575 

Europe. Building International Order (Kis- 
singer) 545 

Human Rights. Building International Order 

(Kissinger) 545 

International Law. Building International 

Order (Kissinger) 545 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Annual Meeting of SEATO Council Held at 
New York (press statement) ...... 575 

Israel. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
CBS "Morning News" 553 

Korea. Building International Order (Kissin- 
ger) 545 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS 
"Morning News" 553 

Middle East 

Building International Order (Kissinger) . . 545 
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS 
"Morning News" 553 



Mozambique. United States and Mozambique 
Establish Diplomatic Relations (communi- 
que) 570 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 580 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
CBS "Morning News" 553 

United Nations 

Ambassador Moynihan and Assistant Secretary 
Enders Discuss Seventh Special Session of 
U.N. General Assembly (transcript of news 
conference) 566 

Building International Order (Kissinger) . . 545 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for CBS 
"Morning News" 553 

United States Gives Views on Resolution 
Adopted by Seventh Special Session of U.N. 
General Assembly (Moynihan, Myerson, text 
of resolution) 557 

Name Index 

Enders, Thomas O 566 

Katz, Julius L 577 

Kissinger, Secretary 545, 553, 571, 575 

Myerson, Jacob M 557 

Moynihan, Daniel P 557, 566 



Check List of Department of State 


Press Releases: September 22-28 


Press releases may be obtained from the 


Off.ce 


of Press Relations, Department of State, 


Washington 


D.C. 20520. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


496 


9/22 


Kissinger: U.N. General Assembly. 


*497 


9/23 


Fine Arts Committee, Nov. 18. 


498 


9/23 


U.S.-Mozambique joint communi- 
que. 


499 


9/23 


Kissinger, Hottelet: interview, 
Sept. 22. 


500 


9/23 


Kissinger: toast at dinner for 
OAU Foreign Ministers and 
Representatives to the U.N. 


*501 


9/25 


Shipping Coordinating Committee 
working group, Oct. 16. 


*'502 


9/25 


Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Oct. 30. 


*503 


9/25 


Advisory Committee on Interna- 
tional Intellectual Property, Oct. 
24. 

Eagleburger: House Select Com- 


t504 


9/25 






mittee on Intelligence. 


*505 


9/26 


Program for the visit of the Em- 
peror of Japan to the U.S., Sept. 
30-Oct. 13. 

ted. 


* Not prir 


t Held for 


a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 



'^Mn 



Special Fourth-Class Rate 
Book 



Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



kj.- 



i'Y/ff^ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXm 



No. 1895 



October 20, 1975 



FURTHERING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Toast by Secretary Kissinger 581 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: OUR COMMON FUTURE 
Toast by Secretary Kissinger 584 

PRESIDENT LOPEZ OF COLOMBIA MAKES STATE VISIT 
TO THE UNITED STATES 588 

DEPARTMENT REVIEWS RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 

IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Rogers 596 



Superinten 

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside hack cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1895 
October 20, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETl 
a weekly publication issued by tt 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public ai{ 
interested agencies of t/ie governmeU 
witfi information on developments 
t/ie field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on tfie work of the Department 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes seleete 
press releases on foreign policy, issu 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depar 
ment, and statements, addresse 
and news conferences of tfie Presides 
and tfie Secretary of State and oth 
officers of tfie Department, as well 
special articles on various pftases 
international affairs and tfie functio^ 
of tfie Department, tnformation 
included concerning treaties and inte 
national agreements to wfiicti t^ 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inte 
national interest. 
Publications of tfie Department 
State, United Nations documents, an 
legislative material in tfie field 
international relations are also list 



Ill 



nik E 

imiili 
tiiiwi 
wnli 

uU 
tl,m 

lUm 
fmli 
id 4 

I IMS 

hm 

iid'oii 

\kk i 
urn 
wliiH 

wnl 



Furthering Peace in the Middle East 



Toast by Secretary Kissinger ' 



It is a pleasure to welcome you. Seeing so 
many relaxed and happy faces, I know that 
you must be delighted to be here among 
friends in quiet, peaceful New York— far 
from the tensions and conflict and bitterness 
of Vienna. 

I am especially pleased by this opportunity 
to reciprocate at least in part the warm 
hospitality off'ered to me so often by several 
of the Arab countries represented here. My 
wife, Nancy, feels neglected when several 
months go by without my offering her an 
opportunity to visit the Middle East. So, for 
personal as well as high policy reasons, I 
am obliged to remain actively engaged in 
helping negotiate a settlement. 

It was almost two years ago today that I 
first met as Secretary of State with the 
representatives of the Arab League here at 
the United Nations. 

I remember saying then that I recognized 
that the situation in the Middle East was 
intolerable for the Arab nations; I pledged 
that the United States would involve itself 
actively in the search for a just and lasting 
peace. 

And in the days that followed, in private 
meetings with some of you and with some 
of your predecessors — we remember with 
affection [Saudi Arabian Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs] Umar Saqqaf, whose 
passing grieved us all — I gave my personal 
promise to make a special effort to begin 
concrete steps toward peace. 



' Given on Sept. 29 at a dinner at the U.S. Mission 
to the United Nations in honor of the heads of dele- 
gations and Permanent Representatives to the United 
Nations of member nations of the Arab League (text 
from press release 506). 

October 20, 1975 



While those talks were still going on, war 
broke out. The costs — political, economic, 
human — were tragically high. 

Tonight I would like to reflect with you 
briefly on the distance that we, the United 
States and the people of the Middle East, 
have traveled together in these two years. 

The Middle East at a New Crossroads 

For centuries, men have seen the Middle 
East as the crossroads of three continents. 
Long ago, when armies and caravans moved 
on foot, and when trade first began to move 
through the Suez Canal, that statement had 
strategic meaning. 

Today the Middle East stands at a new 
ci-ossroads — not only of geography but of 
issues and concerns that affect the lives of 
hundreds of millions of people in all corners 
of the world. 

The Middle East today is an area where 
mankind's effort to build a peaceful, equita- 
ble, and prosperous world will be tested. 

Little did we know two years ago what 
our active involvement in the search for 
peace would mean in effort and anguish, nor 
to the relationship between the United 
States and the peoples and leaders of the 
Middle East. 

I have made 11 trips to the Middle East, 
amounting in time to almost one week out 
of six over this two-year period. And two 
Presidents of the United States have met 
with many of the area's chiefs of state, 
heads of government, and foreign ministers. 

More important than these statistics has 
been the dramatic evidence of new jmlicies, 
attitudes, and our ability to work together. 



581 



Our political and economic ties have been 
I'estored ; we have organized new efforts of 
collaboration for economic development; we 
have worked closely together in the diplo- 
macy of Middle East peace. 

There is no longer any doubt today of the 
United States' irrevocable commitment and 
active involvement in furthering peace and 
progress in the Middle East. The American 
people are conscious of this new approach 
and support it. Important changes have 
taken place in the American people's atti- 
tudes. This is irreversible — and of tremen- 
dous importance for the future. 

The United States, when it approached 
this problem in 1973, did so with the philoso- 
phy of realism and evenhandedness. Both 
sides in the area would be called upon to 
contribute reciprocally to the process of 
settlement. We launched, as you know, the 
step-by-step approach, as the most promis- 
ing avenue to implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338. 

Therefore, first of all, it should be obvious 
that no interim agreement has been or can 
be an end in itself. The only durable solution 
is a just and comprehensive peace. The 
United States remains committed to that 
objective. Each step taken or to be taken by 
any country is intended to make that goal 
more achievable and is therefore a step for 
all. We have always intended that the step- 
by-step approach would merge at some point 
with discussion of an overall settlement. 

Second, we recognize that peace in the 
Middle East is not divisible. Each nation 
and people which is party to the Arab-Israeli 
problem must find some fair satisfaction of 
its legitimate interests. It is in the nature 
of compromise that extreme solutions can- 
not be realized. It is in the nature of a last- 
ing peace that partial solutions will not en- 
dure. The United States has no interest or 
purpose in dividing the Arab world. On the 
contrary, only a united Arab world can make 
a final peace. The United States is prepared 
to make the same effort for any Arab state 
that it has already made on behalf of 
some. 

Third, it is in the nature of gradual move- 
ment toward peace that it must address all 

582 



the key problems in a balanced way at each 
step. The questions of territory, borders, 
and military deployments cannot be dealt 
with unless at the same time the issues of 
political and economic settlement are given 
equal attention. If we are to move forward 
we must move evenhandedly on both sides 
of the equation. 

Fourth, any step taken must be judged in 
the light of the alternatives that were faced. 
Each party has the right to judge the gains 
and compromises that are possible for it at 
any given stage as it accepts or rejects par- 
tial steps toward peace. I believe that the 
agreements reached have achieved Arab ob- 
jectives as well as mutual objectives and 
have created conditions for further move- 
ment more effectively than any available 
alternative. They have been steps forward. 
No other methods have worked. War would 
have been a futile step backward. At the end 
of such a conflict, we would all have found 
exactly the same problems which confront 
us today — and perhaps more, infinitely more, 
complicated conditions. 

Last Mai'ch, after the suspension of our 
negotiations, it was the governments in the 
area, on both sides, that pressed upon us 
that another, early, step toward peace must 
be the first priority. That is why we made a 
renewed effort to help Egypt and Israel 
achieve the interim agreement signed in 
Geneva September 4. 

That agreement was not a peace agree- 
ment. It was taken to give further momen- 
tum toward peace. It was taken to accelerate 
the process of movement. It was taken in 
full understanding on all sides that steady 
progress toward peace must continue. The 
challenge now is to build on the progress 
that has been made. 

President Ford has asked me to say to you 
here on his behalf that the United States 
remains just as energetically committed to 
progress now as it has been for the past two 
years. We will not rest until we have 
achieved the goal of a just and lasting peace 
— unless the parties themselves decide to 
abandon their effort. 

What the next step will be of course will 
depend on the judgment of the parties to 

Department of State Bulletin 



the negotiations. We have suggested several 
alternative procedures, and we are open- 
minded. The object of our consultations in 
the days immediately ahead will be to deter- 
mine how to proceed between Israel and 
Syria, if the parties desire; to begin con- 
sidering how the negotiations for an overall 
settlement can be organized ; and to refine 
our thinking on how the legitimate interests 
of the Palestinian people can be met in an 
overall peace. 

To this effort we pledge our continued 
energies, and in this effort we count on con- 
tinuing to work closely together with the 
leaders of the Arab nations. 

The Middle East and the World Economy 

We and our friends in the Middle East, of 
course, have other common concerns beyond 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

In the Middle East, as elsewhere in the 
world, the United States seeks to help build 
a durable framework of peace that will free 
the energies of peoples to pursue the great 
social, economic, and human objectives of 
mankind. 

Central to this is the global dialogue on 
the interdependence of the world economy, 
in which we and the Middle East countries 
are important participants. This dialogue is 
well begun. 

The Middle East has a unique position 
and a unique responsibility. At a time when 
many countries, particularly developing 
countries, face problems of inflation and 
stagnation, slackening production and grow- 
ing unemployment, balance-of-payments defi- 
cits, and great uncertainty about prospects 
for foreign borrowing and investment, the 
oil-producing countries of the Middle East 
have reaped great benefits from sharp in- 
creases in oil prices. But they have done so 
at a heavy cost to all other countries. 

I want to express the appreciation of the 
American people to those Arab countries 
which at the recent OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] meeting 
tried to assert a sense of global responsi- 
bility. 

Cooperation is a two-way street. The 



United States is willing to assist you in the 
achievement of your development goals, but 
we hope that you will in turn show under- 
standing of the needs of the rest of the 
world. Inflation hurts us all. In your region 
it is exacerbated by manpower shortages, 
transportation bottlenecks, and other fac- 
tors which impede the rapid achievement of 
impressive industrial and agricultural goals. 
We and other industrialized countries have 
cooperated and will continue to cooperate in 
meeting these extraordinary needs. We have 
made practical proposals before the seventh 
special session. We look forward to the 
forthcoming producer-consumer conference 
to work out these issues in a cooperative 
spirit. 

We are natural partners, not adversaries. 
Consumers must have reliable access to oil 
supplies at reasonable prices. To invest their 
new oil wealth, the producers must become 
major participants in the global financial 
and economic system. And to convert their 
new wealth into goods, they must become 
major importers of our products. We are 
ready to cooperate with the countries of the 
Middle East in linking our economies on 
equitable terms. 

Our interdependence is a fact, and the 
Middle East has a great responsibility in 
the global economy. Unilateral actions to ad- 
vance national interests will serve no na- 
tion's interest if the results are to weaken 
the world economy. All of us must conduct 
our policies with the objective of fostering 
global growth and stability. The United 
States has attempted to wield its power in 
this spirit. 

The United States and the Middle East 

The important changes in our relations in 
recent years, which have brought our peo- 
ples and our governments closer together, 
are irreversible. 

As old patterns of thought change and 
dramatic new events take place, it is not 
surprising that searching questions are 
asked and conflicting voices are heard. This 
is true today in the Arab world, and it is 
true in this country; for changes of percep- 



Oclober 20, 1975 



583 



tion never come easily or proceed smoothly. 
The present debate in the Middle East over 
the latest step toward peace has its counter- 
part today in my country. The American 
people are now increasingly conscious of 
both the complexities and importance of our 
interests and involvement in the Middle 
East. 

The statesmanship and demonstrated com- 
mitment to peace of leaders in the Middle 
East have played an important, indeed a 
decisive, role in this process. The progress 
that has been achieved and the progress that 
will be made is due to their realization 
that Arab goals can best be achieved in the 
framework of U.S. -Arab cooperation, and not 
by confrontation. The United States will 
not shrink from its responsibilities — unless 
our efforts are rejected by the countries in 
the area. 

I believe also that the discussion now go- 
ing on in our Congress and in our country as 



a whole attests to the seriousness with which 
we approach our responsibilities. When the 
vote is taken in the Congress, it will be 
clear that we will not abandon our effort nor 
will we abandon those in the Middle East 
who have long sought our support. But 
neither will we interrupt our quest for peace 
nor cease our efforts to improve relations 
with the Arab world. 

The end result, I am convinced, will be the 
forging of an even sounder foundation, 
based on national consensus, for U.S. rela- 
tions with all of the countries in the Middle 
East. And I hope that the time will come 
soon when we who are assembled here will 
look back at this time as the period when 
we took the tui-n toward a final peace. 

Therefore let us raise our glasses to co- 
operation between the United States and its 
Arab friends and to the fulfillment of the 
aspirations of the Arab nations, and of all 
nations, for peace, justice, and well-being. 



The Western Hemisphere: Our Common Future 



Toast by Secretary Kissinger ' 



This is the third year I have enjoyed the 
considerable honor as Secretary of State of 
the United States of meeting with you for 
lunch at this Center for Inter-American 
Relations. I do so this time, as before, as an 
expression of the importance that we, the 
people of the United States, attach to our 
friendship with our fellow nations of the 
Western Hemisphere. 

The Western Hemisphere has for cen- 
turies represented the hope of mankind. 
And so it does today. The United States is 



' Given at a luncheon at the Center for Inter-Amer- 
ican Relations at New York on Sept. 30 honoring 
Latin American Foreign Ministers and Permanent 
Representatives to the United Nations (text from 
press release 507). 



convinced that if we and our Latin Ameri- 
can friends, with whom we have a tradition 
of political cooperation, can solve the press- 
ing problems of the modern age we can once 
again be a beacon to humanity. 

It makes a difference to the people of the 
United States that the nations of the hemi- 
sphere share a common heritage. We were 
born in the same struggle against foreign 
domination and colonial tyranny. We have a 
proud history of mutual support in time of 
trouble. We have a generation of successful 
practical experience with mechanisms of co- 
operation on our political and economic chal- 
lenges. 

Two years ago I suggested that we begin a 
dialogue for a more creative cooperation on 



584 



Department of State Bulletin 



the basis of mutual respect to meet the new 
challenges in this age. This was not a slogan 
or a momentary shift of mood. Our purpose 
was, and must be, to transform the affairs of 
the nations of the Americas for the decades 
to come. The road ahead will be long. Deep- 
seated change is never easy. But the spirit 
which the nations of the hemisphere have 
brought to the effort gives me great hope 
and gives us all a bright prospect. 
Our initiative has had two objectives : 

First, as I said at the outset two years 
ago, it was right that we should put aside 
the bitterness of old political disputes. The 
proposal was a way of saying that we must 
break with the mutually misdirected mono- 
logues which so often marred our relations 
in the past and move forward in a new spirit 
to address our common problems. 

Second, our effort had to be inspired by a 
broader and positive vision of the future of 
this hemisphere. It was, and is, clear to all 
that the goals we share in this era — peace, 
prosperity, and justice — call for a new in- 
tensity of cooperation; hence our mutual ef- 
fort will require regular and candid con- 
sultation. 

Let me touch on what we have done in 
these two areas since we met the first time. 

First, to eliminate the political vestiges of 
the past: 

— We have modified the Rio Treaty to 
make it more responsive to the will of the 
majority. We have applied the modified prin- 
ciple to the issue of collective sanctions 
against Cuba, thereby removing a divisive 
issue from our agenda. 

— The United States and Panama have 
made good progress toward a modernized 
canal treaty which will accommodate the in- 
terests and aspirations of both countries. We 
have no doubt that these negotiations should 
proceed to a successful conclusion based on 
justice and equality. I am convinced that 
the balanced treaty that we and Panama will 
achieve will be approved by the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the American people. 

— Disputes over control of the seas are 
another traditional problem in our relations. 



We are beginning to make headway on 
this as well. The discussions that will begin 
shortly among interested governments can 
lead to a regional agreement on a regime for 
tuna fishing in the eastern Pacific and de- 
fuse what has been a longstanding and 
needless complication to hemispheric coop- 
eration. 

— At the same time we wish to work with 
Latin America on the overall shape of the 
future international law of the sea. Two 
months ago in Montreal I set forth a com- 
prehensive U.S. position for the next phase 
of this crucial negotiation. We look forward 
to substantial and concrete progress at the 
next law of the sea session in March. This 
is a matter of fundamental political impor- 
tance to the nations of this hemisphere and 
around the world. 

— Another important issue has been the 
rights and obligations of foreign investors 
in your economies. There are differing per- 
spectives on this issue, naturally, arising 
from our respective interests and histories. 
These differences cannot be expected to dis- 
appear magically at the first attempt at a 
solution. But as I pointed out before the 
seventh special session [of the U.N. General 
Assembly], the United States believes there 
are vast resources available in the channel 
of private investment and our common aims 
should be to work out agreed principles of 
conduct on the basis of sovereign equality, 
mutual respect, and national dignity. The 
United States is prepared to have intensive 
consultations on this subject within the OAS 
and to discuss the issue as well in interna- 
tional forums. Meanwhile, we will deal with 
individual cases as they arise, in the light 
of our complementary interest in increasing 
the flow of capital and technology to Latin 
America through all available means. And 
the United States will work with the attitude 
that we should not permit these individual 
problems to disrupt our important overall 
relationships. 

But beyond these specific steps forward, 
we are pleased at the remarkable improve- 
ment on both sides in the spirit and tenor 
of our discussions. In the many forums where 



October 20, 1975 



585 



our work together is carried out, and perhaps 
most notably the OAS, it seems to me that 
the character of our deliberations has mark- 
edly changed. Ritualistic invocation of empty 
abstractions has given way to serious, in- 
formal, and frank discourse about concrete 
issues. Ideological sloganeering has subsided ; 
the overheated rhetoric of North-South con- 
frontation has diminished. Procedures have 
been adapted to solve problems. We have 
thus been able to clarify our differences and 
find realistic solutions where our interests 
converge. 

Let me now turn to the secorid area of 
our common endeavor, our cooperation for 
economic and social progress. 

The dramatic evidence of our global eco- 
nomic interdependence in the past two years 
has complicated our regional relationship. 
Many issues important to that relationship, 
such as commodity agreements and access to 
markets, can be resolved effectively only in 
a global forum in the context of the current 
discussion of relations between the developed 
and the developing countries. We must find 
these solutions. We in the Western Hemi- 
sphere can work to shape these new global 
arrangements so that they are responsive to 
our common needs. 

Latin America's needs and opportunities 
are unique in the developing world. By and 
large, your countries are among the most ad- 
vanced of the developing world. But this 
higher stage of development has its own dif- 
ficulties. Because you are more indu.strialized 
and have created more complex and more 
open economies, your countries are perhaps 
more vulnerable to fluctuations in export 
earnings, to sudden increases in the cost of 
imported intermediate goods, and to the ebb 
and flow of private capital. 

The arbitrary oil price rises and the world 
recession have damaged the economic pros- 
pects of every nation. The world community 
has shown some awareness of the needs of 
the very poorest countries, and the indus- 
trialized nations have put in place some emer- 
gency measures to meet those needs. It is 
time now that the world community address 
itself to the problems of development pe- 



culiar to Latin America and that it enlarge 
the opportunities for growth of the econ- 
omies here in this hemisphere which are 
embarked on the experience of industrializa- 
tion. 

It was for these reasons that in our ini- 
tiative at the special session I stressed meas- 
ures which are particularly relevant to Latin 
America : 

— I recommended creation of a $10 billion 
development security facility within the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund to address what 
is the single most historic impediment to 
Latin America's development efforts: the 
violent fluctuations in export earnings which 
have distorted and unbalanced even the best 
laid of Latin America's development plans. 

— I also supported the creation of a 
regional Latin American safety net to 
help cushion particular balance-of -payments 
emergencies within this hemisphere. 

— I reiterated the importance of improved 
access to private capital markets and pro- 
posed an International Investment Trust. 
This is of particular importance for Latin 
America, since several nations of the hemi- 
sphere are on the threshold of being active 
competitors for funds in capital markets, 
which would be of great benefit to the pros- 
pects for growth. 

— I also proposed the organization, on a 
case-by-case basis, of new methods of pro- 
ducer-consumer cooperation with respect to 
specific commodities. Because of its historic 
dependence on commodity exports, Latin 
America has been in the forefront of the 
effort to develop commodity arrangements. 
We are prepared to discuss these issues. 

— I was pleased to announce the forthcom- 
ing implementation of our generalized tariff 
preferences scheme, which was designed 
from the beginning with Latin America's 
needs in mind. 

The U.S. Government is gratified that 
these proposals were received in the special 
session in a serious and constructive way. We 
look foi-ward to further discussions of the 
details. We are prepared to have special con- 
sultations with our Western Hemisphere 
partners before negotiations in wider forums. 



586 



Department of State Bulletin 



These will be the attitudes and hopes we 
will bring to our relations with your coun- 
tries in the months ahead. But we are more 
and more aware that no single policy can 
take into full account the rich complexity of 
Latin America and the Caribbean. However 
helpful the regional concept may be, it is 
in the end an abstraction. We do not con- 
duct relations with abstractions. We conduct 
relations with distinct nations. 

We will continue to do so in this hemi- 
sphere, guided by the common challenge and 
the cooperative attitudes toward all which I 
have described. But we will not forget that 
each of your countries is different. Each is 
worthy of our respect and attention. Each 
has its own problems and its own national 
values and aspirations. I pledge to you our 
best efforts to try to understand, and to be 
as responsive as we can, to each distinctive 
set of national interests. We will not sur- 
render to a single formula our desire for 
warm and productive relations with each na- 
tion in the hemisphere. 

Excellencies and friends : In this, the West- 
ern Hemisphere, we share a legacy from the 
past; we share the anguish of the present; 
we share a promise for the future. The world 
has entered a challenging era. But nowhere 
on this planet is there a better prospect that 
mankind can master the future than here 
among the family of American nations. We 
are diverse, and we cherish our identities; 
yet we share a common heritage, and our 
destinies depend on our collaboration. The 
Americas are synonymous with hope. The 
dream that has inspired our peoples for five 
centuries must be rekindled by our genera- 
tion. What we do here in the Western Hemi- 
sphere has a meaning not only for ourselves 
but for a world that needs some proof of 



what free peoples working together can ac- 
complish. It is in our power to fashion a 
common vision for the future. 

During the coming year, the nations of 
this hemisphere will be celebrating the 150th 
anniversary of their first inter-American con- 
ference, called by Simon Bolivar, and the 
200th anniversary of the United States. 
There is no more fitting time than this to 
rededicate ourselves to the dream of the 
Americas. 

Excellencies and friends, please join me in 
a toast to the peoples of the Western Hemi- 
sphere and to our common future. May we 
strengthen our collaboration in the pursuit 
of a freer, more just, and more generous 
world. 



U.S. and Spain Set New Framework 
of Cooperative Relationships 

Joint Statement ' 

Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign 
Minister Cortina today concluded a series of 
meetings held over the past two weeks in 
New York and Washington by agreeing to a 
new framework agreement governing coop- 
erative relationships between the United 
States and Spain. The new agreement would 
replace the one which was negotiated in 1970 
and which expired on September 25. The two 
Ministers also agreed that the working 
groups will now resume their activities on 
the supplementary documents which will 
have to be completed before the new agree- 
ment can be brought into effect. 



'Issued at Washington on Oct. 4. 



October 20, 1975 



587 



President Lopez of Colombia Makes State Visit to the United States 



Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, President of the 
Republic of Colombia, made a state visit to 
the United States September 2Jf-27. He met 
with President Ford and other government 
officials at Washington September 25-26. 
Following are an exchange of greetings be- 
tween President Ford and President Lopez 
at a welcoming ceremony in the East Room 
of the White House on September 25 and 
their exchange of toasts at a dinyier at the 
White House that evening, together with the 
text of a joint communique issued on Sep- 
tember 26. 



REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY 

White House press release dated September 25 

President Ford 

Mr. President: It is a great pleasure and 
privilege for me to welcome you to the 
United States for this state visit. 

The President of Colombia, His Excellency 
Dr. Alfonso Lopez Michelsen and his wife, 
the distinguished First Lady of Colombia, 
Cecilia: President Lopez is no stranger to 
the United States. As a young man he studied 
here briefly. Also, I am told he and Mrs. 
Lopez spent part of their honeymoon in Wil- 
liamsburg, Virginia. 

During his long and distinguished service 
in his country, he has frequently visited the 
United States in various important official 
capacities. His election as President was one 
of the largest votes in Colombia's history. 

It is indeed a great personal pleasure for 
me to welcome him to the United States 
once again. This time the United States 
honors him as a chief of state of Colombia, 
the first Latin American chief executive I 
have had the privilege of welcoming to Wash- 
ington for a state dinner. 



President Lopez represents a nation with 
a long tradition of democratic government. 
Colombia's friendship with the United States 
is characterized by the mutual respect each 
of our two nations has for the independent 
ideas and sovereign integrity of the other. 

As a respected intellectual, author, and 
statesman, Dr. Lopez has been a champion of 
the idea that relationships between nations 
must be based on the rule of law, noninter- 
vention, and respect for national sovereignty. 

He voiced that conviction in an address to 
the Council on Foreign Relations in New 
York in January of 1974 when he said, and 
I quote: 

For a country like ours, there is only one guarantee 
for survival: the effective application of international 
law, a deep sense of human solidarity, and the prin- 
ciple of self-determination of nations. 

Your visit, Mr. President, is timely indeed. 
The nations of the world face pressing issues 
in international trade, in monetary policy, 
and the challenges of explosive scientific and 
technological progress. The problems of 
peace, justice, hunger, inflation, and pollu- 
tion can no longer be solved by each nation 
alone. 

Each of us now is caught in the same tide 
of world events — consumer and producer, 
rich and poor, powerful and weak. We must 
therefore work together for the solution of 
our problems. We must step up our efforts 
to modernize and strengthen our hemispheric 
relations. 

The nations of Latin America share the 
same intricate web of social, political, and 
economic elements which comprise the civili- 
zation of the Western world. At the same 
time, they share the problems of developing 
societies elsewhere in the world. 

All of these circumstances provide an im- 
portant bond linking our two nations which 



588 



Department of State Bulletin 



have a long, long tradition of friendly rela- 
tions based on respect for each other's sov- 
ereignty and independence. 

That is why I have invited President Lopez 
to visit Washington. We have much to talk 
about. I look forward to our frank and can- 
did discussions. We expect to examine care- 
fully our bilateral relations and their prob- 
able future course. We will review together 
the issues of current concern in the inter- 
American system and the alternatives that 
open into the future. We will discuss world 
issues of particular concern to our two coun- 
tries. 

I know that the intellect and statesman- 
ship of President Lopez will further our com- 
mon quest for constructive solutions and 
mutual understandings. 

And so, as you say, Mr. President, Men 
venido. 



President Lopez 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford : The warmth and 
friendliness of this welcome does not take us 
by surprise. It is a reflection of the nature 
of the relations between Colombia and the 
United States, which, during the last quarter 
of this century, have remained untarnished. 

Of course, our points of view have occa- 
sionally been different on certain matters of 
continental interest. But this has only con- 
tributed to strengthening our friendship on 
the basis of mutual respect. We have become 
accustomed to the practice of agreeing to 
disagree, abiding by the rules in order to 
resolve our conflicts. 

Our presence here on the same site so 
often visited by prominent statesmen has a 
special significance on this occasion. The 
White House is not a palace. Its name de- 
rives from its occupants, men who seek to 
interpret the will of the people they rule. 

We evoke the memory of patricians, sol- 
diers, statesmen, thinkers, and popular lead- 
ers who embody the collective aspirations of 
their times. Despite their difference in char- 
acter and background, they have honored the 
North American tradition of democratic gov- 
ernment without yielding to authoritarian 
temptations. 



The system they have contributed to 
create has proven strong enough to with- 
stand the most serious crisis. In these 
troubled times, there is something both com- 
forting and old-fashioned in your manner 
that is reminiscent of your early predeces- 
sors. Even though you preside over one of 
the most powerful nations in the world, mak- 
ing daily decisions which bear on the destiny 
of mankind, you continue to be the same 
straightforward unassuming citizen who as 
a Congressman won the respect of his col- 
leagues and who has earned the affection of 
the people of the United States, symbolizing 
today the essence of what the Founding 
Fathers of this country wanted their nation 
to be. They wanted their leaders to be model 
citizens of a democracy, unencumbered by 
the falsity of royalty. 

I am witnessing today in this place and 
surroundings that the wishes of the Ameri- 
can people have been fulfilled. 

President Ford's human touch greatly con- 
tributes to insure that this meeting will be 
patterned as a sincere exchange between 
friends. This is the proper way to deal with 
common problems. The nature of the chal- 
lenge confronting us today and the above- 
mentioned circumstances make me look for- 
ward to the conversations we are about to 
begin and the confidence that the outcome 
will be of mutual benefit for our two coun- 
tries. 



TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER 

White House press release dated September 25 

President Ford 

In proposing a toast to you, Mr. President, 
and to the great Republic of Colombia, I 
think it is fitting to note that your state visit 
to the United States coincides with the 150th 
anniversary year of the first treaty between 
our two countries. 

Soon after Colombia won its independence 
in 1819, the great liberator, Simon Bolivar, 
sent one of his first diplomatic representa- 
tives to this country— Don Manuel Torres. 
As head of the Colombian mission, he be- 
came the first accredited envoy of a Spanish 



October 20, 1975 



589 



American power in the United States. As 
early as 1820, Mr. President, Manuel Torres 
was instructed to negotiate a commercial 
treaty with the United States on the basis, 
and I quote, of "equality and reciprocity." 
That treaty was proclaimed on May 31, 1825. 
Thus, Mr. President, the roots of our friendly 
relations are long and deep. 

This relationship was furthered by an 
illustrious former President of Colombia, Al- 
fonzo Lopez Pumarejo, whose distinguished 
son honors us with his presence here to- 
night. During his inaugural address in 1934, 
President Lopez Pumarejo said, and I quote: 

Our foreign relations in the future must not be 
based on that formal reciprocity of soulless diplo- 
matic notes that travel from chancery to chancery. 
We shall try to take advantage of every opportunity 
to invigorate the ties of cooperation and active 
friendship with all nations but, above all, with those 
of our hemisphere. 

How well this distinguished leader and — 
permit me to add, Excellency — his distin- 
guished son have succeeded in that very high 
purpose. Our mutual relations today are born 
of a very precious common heritage forged 
out of the travail of wars of independence. 
Both of our nations paid with the blood of 
patriots to achieve the dream of freedom, 
both in your country as well as in ours. 

That common experience, I think, gives 
us common aspirations. Both of our nations 
desire to see the rule of law apply to our 
relations and to those among all nations. 
Both seek equality and reciprocity among 
nations. Both share the common knowledge 
that in the complex world of today nations 
bound in historic friendship and traditions 
must depend very directly upon one another. 

Your country is renowned for its moral 
and intellectual leadership, for its modera- 
tion, for its keen sense of justice, and for 
its dedication to greater progress and social 
justice for your people and the peoples of 
our hemisphere. We of the United States 
admire these goals you have set not only for 
yourselves, but we appreciate them as great 
objectives for all of your people. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join 
me in a toast to His Excellency the President 
of Colombia, to Mrs. Lopez, and to the people 



of Colombia. May our two countries always 
walk together in a mutual confidence and 
respect and may our historic friendship con- ' 
tribute to the achievement of these noble 
goals of mankind — justice, peace, and free- 
dom. 

President Lopez 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, Mr. Vice Presi- 
dent, Mrs. Rockefeller, Mr. Secretary of 
State, distinguished Members of the Senate 
and the House, ladies and gentlemen: Six 
years ago, a few hours before man first set 
foot on the moon, another President of Co- 
lombia, Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, then the 
guest of President Richard Nixon, had the 
honor of speaking in this very room. The 
dream cherished for centuries by poets and 
fiction writers was brought to reality by 
American science and technology. We had 
evidently reached a landmark in the history 
of mankind. 

Today, when the United States is prepar- 
ing the Bicentennial celebration of the Decla- 
ration of Independence, it seems fitting to 
ask which of the two events constitutes a 
greater contribution to Western civilization. 
The Declaration of Independence had a de- 
cisive influence on the process that led to 
the French Revolution. It carried the seeds 
of the Constitution of Philadelphia, which 
has been so often imitated over the last two 
centuries. 

The space feat, repeated later by other 
nations, is a source of controversy sur- 
rounded by ever-diminishing admiration. 
Few would disagree, however, that the Con- 
stitution of Philadelphia has been one of 
the key elements in the spiritual and mate- 
rial progress of this great nation. 

In the view of the distinguished English 
historian James Bryce, the two outstanding 
achievements of the human spirit in the field 
of political organization are the written Con- 
stitution of the United States and the un- 
written set of rules known as the British 
Constitution. Both have withstood the test 
of time. 

In an era when people's admiration tends 
to be easily captivated by material accom- 



590 



Department of State Bulletin 



plishments and much emphasis given to the 
gap between the pace of technological prog- 
ress and the slow pace of social and human 
science, it is worth noting the foresight of 
the Founding Fathers. With profound in- 
sight into the legal matters of their day, 
they created the framework for the develop- 
ment of a different world which could not 
have been foreseen. 

Those of us who believe in freedom and 
equality will be with you in spirit during 
the commemoration of the Declaration of 
Independence. A rendezvous — to be present 
on that historical occasion — would be per- 
haps out of order. The opportunity given to 
us by the encounter should transcend the 
formalities of protocol. 

We should reflect upon the achievements 
of the past and meditate upon freedom in 
general and the state of freedom in our con- 
tinent in particular. 

The future of humanity is intimately 
linked to the question of freedom. The his- 
tory of civilization, as we have known it, is 
one of continuous ascent toward attainment 
of that freedom — religious freedom, freedom 
of dissent, freedom to assemble, freedom to 
claim for better working conditions, and in 
recent years, freedom from fear, freedom 
from want, freedom from unemployment. 

These values, which have become common- 
place, have ceased to be commonplace at a 
time when liberty suffers an eclipse within 
our own continent. But just listing them, we 
can see how difficult it is to disentangle 
the knot of very often contradictory rights; 
for economic freedom is not always com- 
patible with the freedom from poverty or 
from unemployment, and an unlimited free- 
dom to employ will tend to hinder labor's 
conquests. 

Very often other economic systems led 
people, particularly the young, to believe that 
freedom as a value must give way to the 
demands of economic life. Without forgetting 
the obvious difl^iculties, we must double our 
efforts to see that the next generation will 
not have to barter freedom of spirit for 
shelter from economic hardship. 

This is at least the case of my country. 
Although it is true that we don't cling to any 



specific form of social system and even less 
to any foreign model and that we ai-e ready 
to seek a better redistribution of our in- 
come through the implementation of pro- 
grams such as tax, agrarian, and educational 
reforms, there is nonetheless something upon 
which we cannot compromise. That is the 
quality of our life and therefore the right 
to think our own thoughts and dream our 
own dreams. 

I am confident, Mr. President, that this 
meeting will bring about a better undei*- 
standing which I already anticipate between 
our two countries, also that we will find a 
sense of partnership within a legal system 
based on impersonal and abstract rules 
within which there will always be the right 
to dissent. 

I have spoken on other questions about 
our own joint duties and responsibilities in 
this hemisphere. Going further now, I bring 
to your attention something that has been 
outlined in the past but which has recently 
acquired growing importance; namely, that 
the responsibility for maintaining a world of 
spiritual freedom is a task which demands 
economic sacrifices. The sacrifices concern 
everyone equally but mainly those who can 
make them. 

Colombia has recognized this not only with 
words but with deeds. We have given, for 
example, preferential treatment to Bolivia 
and Ecuador, relatively less developed coun- 
tries within the subregional Andean Pact. 
We have promptly approved the increase in 
our share of the capital subscriptions for 
the World Bank and the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank. We have also made a con- 
tribution to the Caribbean Development Bank 
in order to provide financial support for the 
former European possessions in the area. 

In every international forum, we have 
sought an understanding between producers 
and consumers, trading off sometimes, as in 
the case of coffee and sugar, windfall gains 
for permanent stability. 

As of the next U.S. fiscal year, we will 
forgo any further loans from the Agency for 
International Development. Considering the 
fact that our export earnings are sufficient 
for our balance-of-payments requirements, 



October 20, 1975 



591 



we feel that the resources released thereby 
can be more useful to needier countries. 

This contribution, however modest, is in 
accordance with our means. It is, nonethe- 
less, tangible evidence that Colombia is ready 
and willing to bear its share of its humani- 
tarian obligations, following thus the ex- 
ample set by the United States in the postwar 
era when, for the first time in the history 
of mankind, massive resources from one na- 
tion were destined to benefit nonnationals. 

The Marshall plan turned the defeated into 
victors with the help of the country which, 
having suffered less material damages, was 
in a position, if so desired, to impose its 
will upon the rest of the world. 

From a Latin American point of view, the 
new Trade Act of the United States is not 
without shortcomings, among other reasons, 
because of the discriminatory treatment 
given to Ecuador and Venezuela. Neverthe- 
less, it contains positive provisions that favor 
a lowering of tarifl's, which should benefit the 
developing countries. Let's hope that it will 
be implemented in the spirit of liberalization 
of trade rather than that of narrowminded 
protectionism. 

Colombia has applied for membership to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
and hopes, also, that these negotiations will 
provide a new scope for our foreign trade. 
Not in vain did we treble our sales of goods 
and services to the world in the last five 
years through the diversification of our own 
exports and the widening of markets for 
Colombian products in Latin America, Eu- 
rope, and the United States. 

Although I am not here as a spokesman 
for other Latin American nations, this is 
an appropriate occasion to underline some 
of the conclusions which we have reached at 
so-called summit meetings among neighbor- 
ing countries and add a few of my own 
vintage. 

In the past, the relationship between our 
two subcontinents has tended to reflect an 
American campaign slogan or a unilateral 
definition of policy, suitable perhaps for do- 
mestic political pui-poses but totally unre- 
lated to Latin American aspirations. 

Neither "the big stick," nor "the good 



neighbor," nor "the low profile," nor "the 
benign neglect" satisfy us, because of their 
one-sided connotation. What is required is a 
new relationship between the United States 
and Latin America jointly formulated by 
both parties according to their needs and 
aspirations. 

For this we already have a forum at the 
Organization of American States and an or- 
ganization to present coherently our common 
points of view through the recently estab- 
lished Latin American economic system, 
SELA. 

We are convinced that a nation which, 
through the years, has been capable of or- 
ganizing the American Union, starting with 
states so dissimilar in their origin as were 
the Thirteen Colonies and latecomers such 
as Hawaii and Alaska, must have an equal 
capacity to conciliate with the inter-Ameri- 
can system, a community of forces, without 
disregarding the particular features of each 
state and their freedom to select their own 
economic structure. 

It would be a tragedy for our continent 
that while Europe is creating instruments 
of economic cooperation that don't imply 
political obligations, such as the Lome Con- 
vention, we should still stumble on the same 
difficulties or perhaps more serious ones 
than those we encountered 40 or 60 years 
ago. 

This is the reason why Colombia sponsored 
the lifting of the embargo against Cuba, re- 
gardless of our ideological differences. The 
record of failures of this type of measure is 
still fresh in our minds — Ethiopia, Spain, 
Rhodesia, and others — while we cannot re- 
call any example which has been successful. 

In the case of Cuba, where the sanctions 
were not applied, neither by European na- 
tions nor by some countries of this hemi- 
sphere, we would have been fooling ourselves 
if we pretended to continue believing in their 
effectiveness, when the United States itself 
was allowing its multinational corporations 
located in countries which were not pledged 
to sanctions to supply the Caribbean island 
with the capital and the know-how for prod- 
ucts which we ourselves were already pro- 
ducing. 



592 



Department of State Bulletin 



It has been a realistic step on the part of 
President Ford's Administration to adopt its 
own line of conduct toward Cuba while ab- 
staining from the attempt to influence the 
decision of others on this matter. 

A treaty that binds Colombia and the 
United States guarantees free passage 
through the Panama Canal to the warships 
and supply vessels of our navy. We don't 
overstep any boundaries when we raise the 
issue of the isthmus here or elsewhere. Co- 
lombia has a vital interest in the area based 
on geographical as well as historical con- 
siderations which have been recognized both 
by the United States and by Panama. 

Taking a long-time view, we consider the 
canal question as something of continental 
and worldwide interest. The far-reaching 
policy of understanding at the hemispheric 
level cannot survive if permanently jeopard- 
ized by transit incidents, military maneu- 
vers of one side or the other, student pro- 
tests, and symbolic gestures that could very 
well one day start a bonfire in the continent. 

With due respect for the position of the 
United States, it is necessary to recognize 
realistically and impartially that the con- 
siderations that prevailed at the beginning of 
this century are irrelevant in 1975. 

The preservation of unjust situations can 
never be our ideal. We are conscious of the 
spirit which moves the American Govern- 
ment to remove causes of friction. In 1972 
we reached an agreement concerning the 
Roncador and Quita Sueiio and Serrana out- 
croppings in the Caribbean, thus putting an 
end to the modus vivendi established between 
the United States and Colombia in 1928. 

Recently, Under [Assistant] Secretary of 
State Rogers has insisted before the U.S. 
Senate on the ratification of this treaty. If 
the intention is to terminate this modus vi- 
vendi — admitting that reason assisted Co- 
lombia, owners of Spanish titles, before the 
argument of a so-called exploitation of guano 
invoked during the American Civil War — 
we cannot see the reason for consulting the 
International Court of Justice to determine 
if third-party rights exist. 

A transitory modus vivendi is ended by 
defining the claims of subscribing parts, not 



Ijy having one of these become a spokesman 
for the interests of third parties which, not 
having been part of the initial pact, are not 
affected by the new one. 

We have noted with satisfaction that the 
need for a consensus in international rela- 
tions is now being discussed. This is also 
our policy. This consensus may seek to main- 
tain the status quo or to help to bring about 
a new order. We don't believe that under 
the present circumstances the first of these 
alternatives could be conceded. At present, 
countries which only 5, 10, or 15 years ago 
were politically dependent now have their 
own seats at the bargaining table. They come 
either on their own behalf or on behalf of 
other countries afflicted by similar problems. 

Is there anything improper in the emer- 
gence of this new bargaining power? Colom- 
bia does not have atomic weapons, exportable 
fuel supplies, or large stockpiles of grain 
to enter national negotiations. Yet we are 
not surprised when nations that dispose of 
such assets such as these use them to in- 
crease their bargaining position. 

Certain historical similarities exist be- 
tween the postwar era in which we live and 
the period of reconstruction of Europe after 
the Napoleonic wars. The French Emperor 
had been at war with a coalition of powers 
dissimilar in their ideologies, populations, 
economic and military strength. Two Euro- 
pean statesmen brought forth different view- 
points in their attempt to build a lasting 
peace. Whereas Metternich endeavored to 
maintain the status quo through the Holy 
Alliance, Canning moved in the direction of 
change by recognizing the independence of 
the newly created Latin American Republics 
and their right to self-determination. 

Am I wrong in assuming that the great 
turn we are seeing in American foreign 
policy leans toward Canning's philosophy? 
His experience of liberalization didn't turn 
out to be so unfortunate. Its aftermath coin- 
cided with the Victorian era, which marked 
the epitome of the influence of the British 
Empire. 

On the other hand, the Austrian Empire 
soon after Metternich was gone became the 
"sick man" of Europe, and his policy of the 



October 20, 1975 



593 



spheres of influence and balance of power be- 
gan to crack down, giving way to the coming 
crisis. 

Mr. President, the whole world, and 
America in particular, is eager to see 
whether the great powers are willing to 
undertake or accept new initiatives without 
freezing past injustices under the name of 
peace. 

Colombia, with its modest resources, is 
ready to support the United States in spon- 
soring changes and in acknowledging new 
realities. Let's preserve what is worth being 
preserved, and let's recognize that obsoles- 
cence of what has to be i-eplaced. For these 
we claim our rights, but at the same time, 
we are ready to undertake our responsibil- 
ities and our commitments. 

A toast for the prosperity of the United 
States. Mr. President and Mrs. Ford. 



TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE 

White House press release dated September 26 

The State Visit of President and Mrs. Alfonso 
Lopez Michelsen to Washington at the invitation of 
President and Mrs. Gerald Ford provided an oppor- 
tunity for serious discussion and exchange of views 
with respect to international, regional and bilateral 
topics of interest. 

Accompanying the President during the September 
25-26 visit to Washington were Colombian Ambassa- 
dor and Mrs. Julio Cesar Turbay Ayala, Minister of 
Finance Rodrigo Botero, Minister of Agriculture 
Rafael Pardo, Minister of Economic Development 
Jorge Ramirez, Minister of Public Works Humberto 
Salcedo, the Mayors of Bogota and Cali, and the 
President's two sons, Felipe and Alfonso Lopez. Sev- 
eral of these officials were accompanied by their 
wives. The visit provided an opportunity to meet with 
their United States counterparts for discussion of 
problems of mutual interest. 

President Lopez, in his conversations with Presi- 
dent Ford, Vice President Rockefeller, and Secretary 
of State Kissinger examined world economic and 
political issues in detail. They discussed prospects 
for improved international economic cooperation in 
light of the achievements of the Seventh Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly. They discussed 
the special problems faced by Colombia and other 
developing countries in the hemisphere, which, be- 
cause they are in a more advanced stage of develop- 
ment and are integrated into the world economy, are 



also greatly affected by changes in the international 
economic conditions. They agreed that representa- 
tives of their governments would consult further as 
the initiatives stemming from the Seventh Special 
Session unfold. 

The Presidents also reviewed global problems of 
security and opportunities for peace. 

Western Hemisphere issues were examined in 
depth and with equal frankness. President Lopez 
explained to President Ford the position of Colombia 
on a number of points. He emphasized his interest 
and that of Latin America in general in a favorable 
outcome to the present Panama Canal negotiations. 
President Ford assured President Lopez of the de- 
sire of the United States to pursue the negotiations 
now underway with Panama in good faith in an 
effort to reach an agreement which would accom- 
modate the interests of both countries in the Canal. 
President Ford confirmed U.S. recognition of the 
validity of Colombia's rights in the Canal under the 
Urrutia-Thomson Treaty. He expressed determination 
to consult with Colombia at an appropriate point in 
the negotiating process regarding the future status 
of those rights. 

The two Presidents and their advisors also dis- 
cussed the United States Trade Reform Act of 1974, 
noted that technical discussions were recently held 
on the Act in Washington, and that further high- 
level conversations will take place in the near future 
with regard to the implications of the Act for Colom- 
bia and for Latin America in general. President 
Lopez stressed the importance to Latin America of 
greater access to the United States market. 

With regard to ratification of the Quita Suefio 
Treaty, the two Presidents noted that the U.S. Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee has just held public 
hearings, and President Ford assured his visitor of 
continuing Administration support for early ratifi- 
cation. 

Multilateral negotiations looking toward an inter- 
national coffee agreement were discussed by the two 
Presidents and they agreed as to the importance of 
continuing efforts in this direction. 

The AID program of bilateral assistance to Colom- 
bia was also discussed. The substantive achievements 
of the collaborative program over prior years were 
noted with satisfaction. It was mutually agreed that, 
as Colombia has become less dependent on conces- 
sional external financing, the AID bilateral program 
could be brought to an orderly phase-out, and that 
appropriate agencies of the two governments would 
work out a plan for such an orderly termination of 
AID assistance. 

The visit provided an opportunity for review of 
the status of completion of the Inter-American High- 
way through construction of the Darien Gap segment 
in Colombia. Progress toward related control of hoof- 
and-mouth disease in Northern Colombia was exam- 



594 



Department of State Bulletin 



ined, and attendant problems were reviewed. It was 
agreed that a high-level consultative group would 
meet shortly to consider questions related to the 
Inter-American Highway in the region of the Darien. 

International narcotics control was also discussed, 
with both Presidents emphasizing their recognition 
of the menace posed by international trafficking. The 
leaders of both countries committed themselves to 
reinforced joint efforts to combat and eradicate this 
evil. 

President Ford informed President Lopez that 
funds have been requested to reestablish a United 
States Consulate at Barranquilla on the North Coast 
of Colombia and that he would pursue this matter 
as necessary with the Congress. President Lopez ex- 
pressed his agreement and pleasure. 

In conclusion, the two Chiefs of State and their 
advisors noted the increasing degree of interdepend- 
ence which characterizes our modern world and 
agreed that Colombia and the United States — two 
democratic nations which share many values and 
goals — should seek means of ever greater coopera- 
tion on the bilateral, regional and international 
planes. 



President Welcomes Passage of Bill 
Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo 

Statement by President Ford ' 

I welcome the passage by the Congress of 
S. 2230, which provides for a partial lifting 
of the embargo on U.S. arms for Turkey. 
This action is an essential first step in the 
process of rebuilding a relationship of trust 
and friendship with valued friends and allies 
in the eastern Mediterranean. 

The congressional vote reflects a coopera- 
tive effort with the Senate and House of 
Representatives on the difficult question of 
Cyprus and the vital task of restoring sta- 
bility and security along NATO's strategi- 
cally important southern flank. 

With the partial lifting of the embargo, 



'Issued on Oct. 3 (text from White House press 
release). 



I intend to take action in four broad areas 
in the weeks ahead: 

Fiist, we will seek to rebuild our security 
relationship with Turkey to underscore that 
Turkey's membership in the Western alliance 
and partnership with the United States serve 
the very important interest of both nations. 

Second, we will make a major effort to 
encourage resumption of the Cyprus nego- 
tiations and to facilitate progress by the 
parties involved — Greece, Turkey, and Cy- 
prus — toward a peaceful and equitable set- 
tlement of this dispute. In this connection, 
we will fulfill whatever role the parties them- 
selves want us to play in achieving a settle- 
ment acceptable to all. In accordance with 
S. 2230, I will submit to the Congress within 
60 days of enactment a report on progress 
made in reaching a solution to the Cyprus 
problem. 

Third, the Administration will intensify 
cooperation with appropriate international 
humanitarian agencies to find ways to allevi- 
ate the suffering of the many people dis- 
placed as a result of the 1974 hostilities. The 
plight of these unfortunate people makes 
progress toward solution of the Cyprus prob- 
lem all the more important. 

Finally, the Administration intends to pro- 
vide support to the democratic government 
of Greece. In that regard, we will pursue ef- 
forts to help that country overcome its cur- 
rent economic and security problems. Also, 
in compliance with S. 2230, I will submit 
within 60 days my recommendations for as- 
sistance to Greece for fiscal year 1976. 

Our goals in the eastern Mediterranean in 
the months ahead — to help the parties in- 
volved achieve a Cyprus settlement, to re- 
build a relationship of trust and friendship 
with both Greece and Turkey, to alleviate 
the suffering on Cyprus and to meet Greece's 
needs for assistance — are objectives on 
which we all can agree. Let us now join in 
working together to achieve them. 



October 20, 1975 



595 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Reviews Recent Developments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba 



Statement by William D. Rogers 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ' 



I appear before the Subcommittee on 
International Trade and Commerce and the 
Subcommittee on International Organiza- 
tions to testify on developments in the evo- 
lution of our Cuba policy since my last ap- 
pearance before you, on June 11 of this year. 
It is a pleasure to be here. 

Let me lay down a few general principles: 

— We are ready. We are prepared to im- 
prove our relations with Cuba. Hostility is 
not a permanent and unalterable part of our 
policy. 

— We are willing to enter into a dialogue 
with Cuba. But the dialogue must be on a 
basis of reciprocity. 

— The process to this end must be direct 
discussion between the parties. We will not 
bargain through the press or through inter- 
mediaries. 

—We are prepared to engage in such di- 
rect exchanges without preconditions or 
ultimatum. 

— Resolution of the problems between us 
will not be easy and will not be furthered by 
calculated offense to the other party. 

— We cannot put aside the interests of a 
half-million Cuban refugees to whom we 



' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Organizations of the House Committee on 
International Relations on Sept. 23. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



have given asylum. The human dimension of 
our relations with Cuba is at the top of our 
agenda. 

— Nor can we ignore the substantial 
claims for compensation held by U.S. na- 
tionals. 

— In all events, our negotiations toward 
these ends must be sober and businesslike. 

This afternoon I would like to begin by 
reviewing the events of significance in U.S.- 
Cuban relations since my last appearance 
here. These are: the termination of manda- 
tory OAS sanctions against Cuba at San 
Jose (which you may want to pursue with 
your former colleague. Ambassador Bill 
Mailliard, who is here with me), our lifting 
of third-country restrictions, and various 
developments in the world affecting the 
emergent U.S.-Cuban dialogue, as well as 
U.S. and Cuban official statements and ges- 
tures. 

I discussed at length the multilateral con- 
straints on trade with Cuba during my last 
appearance before your subcommittees. At 
that time I said we wanted to clear the 
multilateral decks of this issue in order to 
remove a divisive issue and restore the in- 
tegrity of the Rio Treaty. This was accom- 
plished at the end of July in a manner re- 
flecting a healthy consensus of opinion 
within the OAS. 

A Conference of Plenipotentiaries was 
held July 16-26 in San Jose, Costa Rica, to 
consider amendment of the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio 



596 



Department of State Bulletin 



Treaty). A protocol of amendment was 
signed on July 26. The key amendment was 
the provision that a vote to rescind sanc- 
tions against a state would be taken by a 
vote of an absolute majority rather than by 
a vote of two-thirds as is required by the 
existing Rio Treaty. These amendments are 
of course subject to ratification and will be 
submitted soon to the Senate for its advice 
and consent. 

As a result of a resolution of the OAS 
Permanent Council meeting held in San Jose 
on July 26, the OAS Representatives met at 
the 16th Meeting of Consultation of Min- 
isters of Foreign Affairs on July 29, serving 
as Organ of Consultation under the Rio 
Treaty. The delegations of Argentina, Co- 
lombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Haiti, Hon- 
duras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela cosponsored a draft 
resolution which solemnly reaffirmed the 
principle of nonintervention and left parties 
to the Rio Treaty freedom of action in de- 
ciding whether or not to continue to desist 
from ti'ade and diplomatic relations with 
Cuba. 

The action at San Jose removed an anom- 
aly — the anomaly of mandatory sanctions 
which were no longer acceptable to a ma- 
jority of the OAS members. The United 
States saw the San Jose result as a prac- 
tical diplomatic, as well as legally sound, 
means of restoring the integrity of the Rio 
Treaty. Therefore we gave our support to 
the resolution and voted in favor of it along 
with 15 other OAS members. 

Those who voted against were Chile, Para- 
guay, and Uruguay. Brazil and Nicaragua 
abstained. All the other nations — 16 in all — 
voted for the resolution. It is now in effect. 
The member states have freedom of action 
either to continue the suspension of or to 
reinstitute commercial and diplomatic ties 
with Cuba. 

Lifting U.S. Third-Country Constraints 

As a logical and practical corollary to the 
termination of mandatory OAS sanctions the 
U.S. Government on August 21 announced 
modifications of those aspects of our Cuban 



denial policy which affect other countries. 
These modifications were: 

— To grant licenses permitting transac- 
tions between U.S. subsidiaries abroad and 
Cuba for trade in foreign-made goods when 
those subsidiaries are operating in countries 
where local law or policy favors trade with 
Cuba. Specific licenses continue to be re- 
quired in each case, and they will remain 
subject to regulations concerning U.S.-origin 
parts, components, strategic goods, and tech- 
nology. 

— To permit bunkering in the United 
States of ships of third countries which have 
carried goods to or from Cuba. 

—To end the denial of U.S. bilateral as- 
sistance to countries which allow their ships 
or aircraft to carry goods to and from Cuba. 

In addition, the Administration has ex- 
pressed its support for the provision in H.R. 
9005 2 which gives the President broader 
waiver authority to provide Public Law 480 
title I food sales to countries which trade 
with Cuba. Section 664 of the Foreign As- 
sistance Act already provides the necessary 
authority to waive section 620(a)(3) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act, and that authority 
has been exercised for all countries that 
trade or may wish to trade with Cuba. 

This action did not resolve and was not 
put forward as the resolution of a bilateral 
issue with Cuba. As Secretary Kissinger has 
made clear, bilateral issues, including our 
own direct-trade ban, will be subject to nego- 
tiations with the Cubans on the basis of 
reciprocity. This was basically a measure to 
remove a recun-ent source of friction be- 
tween the United States and friendly coun- 
tries both in this hemisphere and overseas 
which, for reasons of their own, have en- 
gaged in trade or never ceased to trade with 
Cuba. The termination of the mandatory 
aspect of the OAS sanctions at San Jose 
made it inconsistent for us to continue to 



- A bill to authorize assistance for disaster relief 
and rehabilitation, to provide for overseas distribu- 
tion and production of agricultural commodities, to 
amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, and for 
other purposes. 



October 20, 1975 



597 



apply our own restrictions to third countries 
that trade with and ship to Cuba. 



U.S.-Cuban Bilateral Relations 

While our vote at San Jose and lifting 
third-country sanctions were aimed at re- 
moving multilateral problems flowing from 
our Cuba denial policy, they were favorably 
received by Cuba. 

On our side Secretary Kissinger has said 
that we are prepared to start a dialogue with 
Cuba on the basis of reciprocity. Once such 
a dialogue is in progress, we can better 
judge what possibilities there are for im- 
proving our relationships. 

As I testified last time, the Administration 
does not commend H.R. 6382.^ We do oppose 
it because it would dismantle our bilateral 
trade constraints automatically, with no 
quid pro quo in return. The executive branch 
already has the power and discretion to drop 
the U.S. trade ban. We can do so when it is 
timely. We do not need additional authority 
from Congress. 

Would some other legislation, however, be 
appropriate as a prelude to executive branch 
negotiations with Cuba? As I have indicated, 
we do favor a broader waiver authority 
under P.L. 480, title I; this is now in H.R. 
9005. We trust that legislation will commend 
itself to the Congress. 

Beyond that we see no particular need for 
Congress to go. It would not be helpful for 
the Congress, either in this case or gener- 
ally, to attempt to lay down binding nego- 
tiating instructions to the executive branch 
which would provide for a particular se- 
quence which the two sides must follow in 
ironing out their differences. This is the vice 
of the draft legislation which would provide 
that the trade ban be automatically dropped 
the moment we have assurances that the 
Cubans are prepared to "enter into direct 
negotiations" on compensation. Such a for- 
mula is too precise. In addition, it fails to 
take into account the important human di- 



' A bill to amend the Foreigrn Assistance Act of 
1961 with respect to Cuba, and for other purposes. 



mension of our interest in Cuba. 

If the Congress is determined to speak to 
the issue, we suggest that it do so in a 
fashion which makes clear it agrees that the 
process of improving relations must be re- 
ciprocal. It should not prescribe a particular 
sequence of steps and actions. And it should 
not fail to take into account the totality of 
interests we will bring to the table, includ- 
ing family visits, just compensation for the 
American citizens whose property has been 
confiscated by the Government of Cuba, and 
a variety of other complex questions inher- 
ent in the process of improving relations. 



Cuban Support of Revolutionary Activities 

Mr. Chairman, you asked me to provide 
information and analysis of Cuban involve- 
ment in terrorist and revolutionary activity 
in Europe, particularly Portugal and France. 

Cuba has developed a highly professional 
intelligence system — DGI, or the Directorate 
General of Intelligence. It works outside 
Cuba. Our best estimate is that it is ulti- 
mately controlled by the Cubans themselves, 
but there is good reason to suppose that this 
service cooperates closely with the Soviet 
KGB, as do the intelligence services of other 
Communist countries allied with or heavily 
dependent upon the U.S.S.R. 

As to Portugal, it is clear that Castro 
would like the Communist Party in Portugal 
to succeed. In a superficial sense it would 
give him some company — the company of 
those who achieved power themselves and 
then threw in their lot with Moscow, like 
Mao Tse-tung and Tito. And although Mao 
Tse-tung and Tito have adjusted their pos- 
ture differently toward Moscow, they — as 
well as Castro — did start out by shaping the 
revolution their own ways. One can specu- 
late that Castro envisages a leftist or "So- 
cialist" Portugal veering toward communism 
as giving him a Latin comrade in the "So- 
cialist" world; but as demonstrated by the 
elections last April and by the more recent 
anti-Communist demonstrations, popular 
support for a Cuban-style regime is low. 

As for France, the "Carlos affair" in Paris 



598 



Department of State Bulletin 



and the subsequent expulsion of three Cuban 
diplomats from France, I can only say that 
it is a murky business. I doubt if I can make 
any useful new comment. But lest the Carlos 
affair be given undue significance, I should 
state as a general proposition that we do not 
think that Cuba is playing a major, or even 
significant, role in encouraging terrorism in 
Europe. Cuba's conclusion of an understand- 
ing with the United States against hijacking 
implies a commitment against terrorism as 
an instrument of political struggle, however 
useful terrorism may have seemed at an 
earlier stage. The hijacking agreement was 
an important step forward. Cuba has car- 
ried it out scrupulously. 



Cuba and Puerto Rican Nationalism 

I suggested earlier that one of the major 
problems to the reciprocal improvement of 
relations with Cuba at this stage is the 
achievement of mutual respect and obliga- 
tion. This is a phrase used with deliberation 
and care in Secretary Kissinger's speech in 
Houston on March 1 of this year. If I can 
elaborate on this statement, I would say 
that if Cuba wants to normalize its relation- 
ship with us, Cuba should indicate this in 
deeds as well as words. 

There is the matter of Puerto Rico. The 
people of Puerto Rico have freely chosen to 
organize their own government in associa- 
tion with the United States. Millions of 
Puerto Ricans live in the continental United 
States. A few of the people of Puerto Rico 
would like to be independent; most would 
not. 

Why does Cuba continue to agitate for 
Puerto Rican independence and lobby for it 
at the United Nations when the people of 
Puerto Rico have rejected it by a free vote, 
in the full exercise of their right of self- 
determination ? It has been said that the 
"Cuban George Washington," Jose Marti, 
once described Cuba and Puerto Rico as two 
wings of the same bird. The implication of 
this is evidently that as goes Cuba, so goes 
Puerto Rico. 

But the cases are not the same. The 



United States and Puerto Rico have created 
a new association, by free choice. We do not 
believe that merely because both Cuba and 
Puerto Rico were separated from Spain at 
the same time that Cuba has any special 
rights or responsibilities to advise the 
people of Puerto Rico about their true aspi- 
rations three-quarters of a century later. 
Rather, we regard this as unwarranted inter- 
ference in the internal affairs of the United 
States and of Puerto Rico and an effort to 
substitute the will of Havana for the free 
choice of the people of Puerto Rico. 

In closing, I would like to state again that 
we have put a policy of permanent hostility 
behind us. We are ready to begin a dialogue 
with Cuba. Because of the complexity and 
delicacy of the issues that must be resolved, 
the support and understanding of the Con- 
gress and the American people is particu- 
larly important. Let us see what emerges 
from the coming dialogue. The Administra- 
tion, in turn, will continue to consult with 
Congress on developments in our Cuba policy. 



Guidelines Explained for Testimony 
to House Intelligence Committee 

Statement by Lawrence S. Eagleburger 
Deputy Under Secretary for Management ' 

I welcome this opportunity to appear to- 
day to explain the guidelines that have been 
established for officials of the State Depart- 
ment in giving testimony to this committee 
or its staff. 

In a memorandum which I signed on 
September 22, a copy of which is available 
to the committee, I set forth three require- 
ments. They are: 

— State Department officials are to de- 
cline, by order of the President, to discuss 
classified material. 



' Made before the House Select Committee on In- 
telligence on Sept. 25 (text from press release 504). 
The transcript of the hearing will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



October 20, 1975 



599 



— The Department of State insists that a 
State Department representative be present 
during the interviews. Should the inter- 
viewees wish to be represented by their own 
legal counsel, the State Department repre- 
sentative will be in addition to that private 
legal counsel. 

— The interviewees are to decline, by order 
of the Secretary of State, to give informa- 
tion which would disclose options considered 
by or recommended to more senior officers 
in the Department of State. 

Let me first address the question of classi- 
fied material. As the committee is aware, 
the President has directed that, pending 
resolution of the dispute between the execu- 
tive branch and this committee over the re- 
sponsibility for declassification and release 
of classified information, members of the 
executive branch are prohibited from fur- 
nishing classified information to the com- 
mittee. Naturally, all officials of the Depart- 
ment of State are bound by this decision. 

The other two conditions imposed by the 
Department are based on principles of the 
utmost importance to the employees and 
operations of the Department. It is not, at 
this point, clear to me that we in the Depart- 
ment and the members of this committee 
disagree on these principles. If there is dis- 
agreement, I want to be sure that we clearly 
understand the issues over which we are at 
odds. 

Let me therefore state at the outset what 
we believe those principles to be. 

First, it is the responsibility of the Secre- 
tary and myself — as it was with our prede- 
cessors — to protect the integrity of the per- 
sonnel of the Department of State and the 
Foreign Service. These people constitute a 
highly professional organization, an organi- 
zation that must have a sense of cohesion 
and loyalty. And that loyalty runs down 
from the Secretary to all of his subordinates, 
just as it runs upward. 

Second, it is also our responsibility to 
oppose steps that would imperil the ability 
of the Department of State effectively to 
formulate and conduct foreign policy. 

As to the first point of principle — the 



confidential and orderly operation of the 
policymaking process itself — it is our belief 
that for this process to operate, all relevant 
officials must have unqualified freedom to 
discuss, debate, develop, and recommend 
various policy options. Secretary Kissinger 
has repeatedly emphasized this both as a 
matter of principle and as essential to an 
effective policy-formulation process. 

But this process cannot work in practice 
if it has to take place in public or if those 
involved must expect that their advice and 
recommendations will be scrutinized and 
criticized after the fact. Under these circum- 
stances candid advice cannot be assured ; the 
policymaker will have to discount opinions 
to the extent he believes they are tailored 
with a view to public exposure. Nor can we 
permit a situation to develop in which offi- 
cers of the Department are reluctant to ex- 
press opinions freely because they fear that 
they will be subject to public criticism, ridi- 
cule, or punishment for advocacy of a course 
of action which might at the moment be 
unpopular but which they believe to be in 
the long-range national interest. Nor can we 
permit a situation to develop in which others 
would be tempted to play to the grandstand 
by advocating policies simply because they 
have popular appeal. 

This is far from a hypothetical issue. To 
cite a single example, the Foreign Service 
and the Department of State were torn 
apart in the late 1940's and early 1950's 
over an issue that raised some of the same 
concerns that are before us today: the abil- 
ity of Foreign Service officers to give to the 
Secretary and their other superiors their 
candid advice, secure in the knowledge that 
this advice will remain confidential. The 
events of those years not only injured indi- 
viduals but also did significant damage to 
the process by which foreign policy is made. 
Who can be certain how many recommenda- 
tions during the years that followed were 
colored by memories of those experiences? 

As Deputy Under Secretary for Manage- 
ment, the principal official responsible for 
the personnel of the Department and the 
Foreign Service, I have an obligation to see 
that the Department of State never again 



'1 ; 



600 



Department of State Bulletin 



faces such a circumstance. I know that I 
have, and will continue to have, the full 
support of Secretary Kissinger as I carry 
out that obligation. 

The second point of principle is that of 
"executive responsibility" for policy. It is 
the Secretary of State and his immediate 
principal advisers who are responsible for 
determining the basic questions of policy. 
And it is the Secretary and his principal 
advisers who are, and must be, accountable 
for the decisions they make and the actions 
they authorize. Thus, just as we must pre- 
serve the confidentiality of the decisionmak- 
ing process, so must we preserve the ac- 
countability of the decisionmaker. It is there- 
fore those who bear responsibility for policy 
— rather than junior and middle-grade For- 
eign Service officers — who should be held 
accountable for it. 

If senior officials are responsible — as we 
believe they must be — they alone should be 
the ones to describe, explain, and defend 
their decisions. Thus, once the issue of clas- 
sified information is resolved, we will be 
prepared to permit policy-level officials to 
appear before this committee to discuss the 
main considerations that were taken into 
account in formulating the policies finally 
decided upon as well as intelligence informa- 
tion relating to the specific questions before 
this committee. The Department will also be 
willing to make available to the committee, 
as we have in the past. State Department 
intelligence officers to discuss the facts con- 
cerning the intelligence situation surround- 
ing the events under examination by the 
committee. But we would not want any offi- 
cial who does appear to respond to questions 
designed to associate any particular indi- 
vidual with any particular course of action 
or recommendation. The sanctity of the pri- 
vacy of internal debate, discussion, personal 
views, and recommendations must, we be- 
lieve, be preserved. 

Finally, we also have insisted on a third 
limitation for the protection of our em- 
ployees: a State Department representative 
must be present during the interview of any 
subordinate officials of the State Depart- 
ment to provide advice to the interviewee 



on the application of the existing guidelines 
and, in the case of informal interviews, 
where no formal record is kept, to help note 
and remember the points covered. 

Mr. Chairman, if the differences over 
classified information can be resolved, the 
Department is prepared to be cooperative in 
meeting the needs of this committee for in- 
formation. We have an obligation and a duty 
to do so. But I also have another obligation 
and duty to the members of the Department 
of State and the Foreign Service: to assure 
them the freedom and protection they need 
and must have if they are to give the De- 
partment — and the country — their best. 



Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid 
to Viet-Nam Discussed 

Following is a joint State-Treasurxj-Com- 
merce statement made before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Trade and Commerce 
of the House Committee on International 
Relations on September 9 by Robert H. 
Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs.^ 

I am Robert H. Miller, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs. I am appearing today jointly with 
my colleagues Mr. James B. Clawson, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for En- 
forcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs, 
and Mr. Rauer H. Meyer, Director of the Of- 
fice of Export Administration of the Depart- 
ment of Commerce. This statement reflects 
the joint views of all three Departments. 
We are pleased to appear today to review 
the Administration's position on private hu- 
manitarian assistance to Viet-Nam supplied 
within the context of the export and foreign 
assets controls presently in force against 
both North and South Viet-Nam. 

Let me first review a bit of background. 
In 1958 an embargo was imposed over U.S. 



' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



October 20, 1975 



601 



exports to "Communist-controlled areas of 
Viet-Nam." When South Viet-Nam fell under 
Communist control in April 1975, export 
control regulations in force against the Com- 
munist-controlled part of the country in ef- 
fect were automatically extended to all of 
Viet-Nam. 

The Foreign Assets Control Regulations 
were first applied to North Viet-Nam on May 
5, 1964, in the light of the continued North 
Vietnamese military attacks against the 
former Republic of Viet-Nam. At the same 
time, the National Liberation Front of South 
Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong, and the National 
Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam Red 
Cross were listed as "specifically designated 
nationals" under the regulations, on a de- 
termination that they acted for or on behalf 
of the authorities exercising control over 
North Viet-Nam. 

The licensing policy in general, under both 
the Treasury and Commerce regulations in 
the period prior to the fall of Saigon, was 
to deny licenses for shipments to North Viet- 
Nam or to areas controlled by the Pro- 
visional Revolutionary Government of South 
Viet-Nam ; i.e., the Viet Cong. An exception 
to this denial policy was granted toward the 
end of 1966 for a limited amount of funds 
from private sources to be used to purchase 
foreign-origin medical supplies for civilian 
relief work in North Viet-Nam and Viet 
Cong-controlled areas. It was hoped that 
there would be impartial observation when 
the goods arrived to assure that supplies 
would be used solely for civilian relief and 
that the relief program might develop chan- 
nels through which assistance could be for- 
warded to American prisoners of war. How- 
ever, the program was discontinued in Febru- 
ary 1967 when it became clear that North 
Viet-Nam refused to admit impartial ob- 
servers. 

With regard to export controls, during the 
time the embargo policy has been in effect, 
either for North Viet-Nam alone or for the 
rest of the area, there were few applications 
for licenses to make humanitarian shipments 
prior to 1971. However, in 1969 authoriza- 
tion was sought for the supply of some gen- 
eral-purpose antibiotics and syringes for the 



Viet Cong. This was denied because there 
was no way to insure that the goods in ques- 
tion would not be used to support the war 
effort of the Communist forces. At that time, 
any application or inquiry that was made 
would have been reviewed carefully to de- 
termine the likelihood that the goods would 
be used for other than civilian medical or 
charitable purposes. 

Since 1971, several applications for North 
Viet-Nam have been approved because the 
commodities were specialized enough and 
contacts by the donors with the consignees 
were such that the likelihood of diversion 
from civilian purposes was considered mini- 
mal. Examples of goods approved were equip- 
ment and supplies for cardiac surgery, neuro- 
surgery, and related postoperative care; 
equipment for an enzymology laboratory; 
intrauterine devices for a clinic; gift parcel 
of clothing, teabags, and raisins; ear, nose, 
and throat equipment. 

Applications were denied for instruments 
or equipment intended for unidentified scien- 
tific research in North Viet-Nam because the 
transactions could not be related to medical 
or charitable purposes. A request for advice 
as to possible licensing action was received 
in 1974 regarding a transaction whereby a 
U.S. firm would sell several million dollars' 
worth of building materials to a foreign firm 
for a UNICEF [United Nations Children's 
Fund] school-building project in North Viet- 
Nam. It was decided this proposal did not 
qualify as an exemption to the embargo be- 
cause the transaction was commercial in 
nature rather than private nonprofit assist- 
ance and the magnitude of the transaction 
so far exceeded the level of U.S. humani- 
tarian assistance theretofore given. 

When Phnom Penh and Saigon fell in April 
1975, our economic controls were extended 
to Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. As I have 
testified earlier before this committee, the 
purpose of these controls is to deny to the 
present regimes the use of Cambodian and 
South Vietnamese assets held in the United 
States; to prevent them from extracting 
under duress from private Cambodian and 
Vietnamese nationals their assets in the 
United States; to keep Cambodian and Viet- 



602 



Department of State Bulletin 



namese assets in the United States frozen 
for possible use in the satisfaction of pri- 
vate claims of American citizens for losses of 
property in those areas, pending further de- 
terminations to be made with respect to fu- 
ture U.S. relationships with those countries ; 
and to deny these countries the benefits of 
trading with the United States. 

During the first half of this year, we re- 
ceived several license applications from pri- 
vate agencies to authorize shipments of as- 
sistance to Viet-Nam. The fighting in South 
Viet-Nam was reaching a climax in that 
period, and action on the applications was 
therefore temporarily delayed. In July, sev- 
eral applications to send strictly humani- 
tarian items were approved. At the same 
time, a number of other applications involv- 
ing equipment more of an economic assist- 
ance nature were not approved. 

These latest decisions have been made 
within the context of the Administration's 
stated policy that the responsibility for pro- 
viding reconstruction aid to the present re- 
gimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh has passed 
to those countries which assisted those re- 
gimes to come to power by force of arms but 
that we are prepared to consider requests for 
humanitarian assistance on a case-by-case 
basis. Humanitarian aid is construed as be- 
ing limited to items traditionally considered 
to be of humanitarian character, such as 
medical supplies, drugs, food, school equip- 
ment, and .school supplies.^ It is anticipated 
that in each case in which a license is is- 
sued, the humanitarian agencies providing 
the supplies will carry out end-use checks 
through their resident or visiting personnel. 

We have thus recently licensed the ship- 
ment of medical supplies, foodstuffs, school 
supplies, and pediatric drugs to North and 
South Viet-Nam. Simultaneously, we denied 
a license to ship drilling machines, lathes, 
electric furnaces, and similar industrial items 
to Viet-Nam. While this machinery was said 
to be intended to be used to produce surgi- 
cal prosthetic appliances, it was quite clear 



''cf. articles 23, 55, et al, Geneva Convention Rela- 
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, 6 U.N.T.S. 3516. [Footnote in original.] 



October 20, 1975 



that the machinery was of an industrial 
character and could be used to produce all 
sorts of commodities. 

We also denied an application to ship 
machinery to produce wood screws, metal 
button blanks, and berets. This machinery 
was said to be intended for use in coopera- 
tive workshops. A significant amount of 
North Viet-Nam's industrial output comes 
from cooperative workshops, and it is evi- 
dent that this shipment was for economic 
assistance purposes rather than strictly hu- 
manitarian purposes. To the extent these 
workshops may employ some handicapped 
workers, there is a charitable aspect, but 
it is basically true that the manufacture of 
screws, clothing, and buttons is an industrial 
undertaking and does not qualify as tradi- 
tional humanitarian assistance. 

In addition, we have disapproved shipments 
of agricultural implements and fishing equip- 
ment because these, too, were felt to be eco- 
nomic in nature. The exception for such 
equipment that was authorized in 1973 was 
made in the relatively hopeful atmosphere 
that existed in the months following the 
signing of the Paris agreements. 

As to the future, we will continue to look 
at all requests for private humanitarian as- 
sistance on a case-by-case basis in light of 
the circumstances of the time, the scope and 
nature of the proposed assistance, and the 
attitudes and actions of both North and 
South Viet-Nam. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Special Appropriations for Assistance to Refugees 
From Cambodia and Vietnam. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Appropriations to accom- 
pany H.R. 6894. S. Rept. 94-138. May 15, 1975. 
4 pp. 

Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975. Report of 
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries to accompany H.R. 5522; H. Rept. 
94-295; June 14, 1975; 22 pp. Report of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce to accompany H.R. 5522; 
S. Rept. 94-269; July 9, 1975; 16 pp. 



603 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



fere 



live in 



U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission 
of North and South Viet-Nam 

Following are statements by U.S. Repre- 
sentative Daniel P. Moynihan made in ple- 
nary session of the U.N. General Assembly 
on September 19 and in the Security Council 
on September 26 and 30. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN, 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SEPTEMBER 19 

USUN press release 98 dated September 19 

The recent admission of three new mem- 
ber states has moved the United Nations 
still closer to the goal of universality. The 
United States has warmly welcomed the Peo- 
ple's Republic of Mozambique, the Republic 
of Cape Verde, and the Democratic Republic 
of Sao Tome and Principe to the United Na- 
tions. May their membership contribute to 
their prosperity, happiness, and independ- 
ence and to the wisdom and effectiveness of 
our Assembly. 

Let me also emphasize, Mr. President, that 
the United States is ready for the admission 
of all qualified states not now members of 
the United Nations. As the goal of univer- 
sality comes nearer and nearer, our hopes 
for universality intensify. 

Unhappily, though, there are those fully 
qualified whose admission is being denied for 
political motives. The United States is not 
opposed to the admission of the two Vietnam- 
ese states, but we are not prepared to agree 
to their admission as part of a practice of 
selective admissions by which the Republic 
of Korea is excluded. For this reason, the 
United States has abstained on the proposal 
that the Security Council should again con- 
sider the applications of the two Viet-Nams.' 

We have had no objection to the usual 
practice of discussing the admission of new 

604 



iieiii 
;iea.l 



lit its 



members, that item, in the General Assem- 
bly. However, we do think that the Assembly 
has not acted wisely, perhaps, in departing 
from the longstanding tradition that only 
representatives of member states are en- 
titled to speak in plenary as against appro- 
priate committees. 

Now, Mr. President, a final remark. The-J** 
distinguished Representative of Albania has 
just extended his comments on the subject 
of admission of the Viet-Nams to indicate his 
strong disapproval of the admission of the 
Republic of Korea. And he called attention in 



wasK 



sen I 



Lai 



his remarks to what he judges to have been 
the previous practice of the United States 
in blocking, through the veto, the admission 
of new members. I should like, with great 
respect to the distinguished delegate, to sug- 
gest that he has got his superpowers mixed 
up. It is the superpower that styles itself 
Socialist that has done the blocking in the 
past. We, the superpower that styles itselflffsP^f 
non-Socialist, have, alas, never exercised that 
power until just most recently and with 
great regret. I would caution the distin- 
guished delegate not to let opportunities of 
that kind pass him by. They don't come 
every day. 

I would like in great seriousness, however, 
to make one remark ; it comes almost as a 
cri de coeur. As we discuss this issue, we are 
dealing with the nature of a representative 
institution. For ill or good, the U.N. Charter 
is primarily the work, the drafting, of con- 
stitutional lawyers versed in the representa- 
tive tradition of Western democracy. 

Now we recognize that this is not a uni- 
versal tradition. We recognize that it is per- 



' The Assembly on Sept. 19 adopted by a vote of 
123 to 0, with 9 abstentions (U.S.), a resolution 
(A/RES/3366 (XXX)) requesting the Security 
Council "to reconsider immediately and favourably" 
the applications of the Democratic Republic of Viet- 
Nam and the Republic of South Viet-Nam for ad- 
mission to membership in the United Nations. 



Department of State Bulletin 



iisio: 
iirely 

-'0 

tirity 



ientat: 
silv s 



lot re 



«1 



taem 

'its „ 

Icoi 
tktilll 



Iiaps subscribed to by fewer nations today 
than it may have been even at that time. 
We recognize that for many nations who 
:ome to this forum the idea of a representa- 
tive institution in which minority views are 
accorded rights, in which minority views are 
'xpressed, is in a sense an unfamihar idea, 
■ven an ahen idea, possibly an intolerable 
dea. That may be the condition domestically 
)f many nations. But it cannot be the condi- 
tion of a United Nations that truly carries 
Hit its charter responsibilities. We are here 
epresentative of nations committed to the 
■barter. 

The charter calls for the membership of 
states which are otherwise equal to the ad- 
nission standards. The Republic of Korea is 
uirely one such state. Four times in the his- 
;ory of this institution, four times, the Se- 
curity Council by majority vote has recom- 
nended its admission. However, this last 
occasion, if you recall, the majority did 
;omething which is abhorrent to the tradi- 
;ion of representative institutions. It refused 
n'en to consider the application of a new 
nember. 

Ladies and gentlemen, how we conduct our 
:espective internal affairs is the concern of 
?ach individual nation and not for any other 
to dictate. Yet I say to you the United Na- 
tions will die if it does not remain repre- 
sentative. We have here a system that will 
jnly succeed if its fundamental spirit of 
representativeness is allowed its true and 
full play. We have here a system which does 
not reflect on any other system, but only 
3n this one. If we wish the United Nations 
to work, we must follow the charter which 
establishes the working principles of the 
United Nations. 



STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR MOYNIHAN 
IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL 

Statement of September 26 

I SUN press release 103 dated September 26 

I could not hope in my remarks to equal 
the intellectual vigor or the authority with 
which the distinguished Foreign Minister of 



Costa Rica has just spoken. I would only 
hope it be understood that I wholly endorse 
what he says, which derives from an under- 
standing of the nature of democratic socie- 
ties which I think is shared by some mem- 
bers of this Council and about which we do 
not have to consult with one another in 
advance in order to know that we agree on 
fundamental principles. We have heard them 
from a man of conviction; if little else was 
to be hoped for from this meeting of the 
Security Council, that at least has been 
gained. 

Nor need I recapitulate the statement I 
made to the Council on August 11. I only 
wish to assure the members that there has 
been no change in my government's basic 
position on the applications before us. 

In 1948 the United States sought a ruling 
from the International Court of Justice on 
the propriety of "linkage" of applications for 
membership in the United Nations. The reply 
of the Court made it clear that "package 
deals," as they were termed, are not in order. 
Each application should be considered on its 
merits on the basis of established criteria. 
In our view, the Republic of Korea fully 
meets these criteria. Justice and procedure — 
procedure perhaps being the more important 
of those matters — requires that this fully 
qualified state be admitted to the United Na- 
tions forthwith and that its desire to do so 
be not linked to the case of North Korea. 

We are of course prepared to see North 
Korea enter the United Nations along with 
the Republic of Korea. Equally, it is North 
Korea's privilege to stay outside the U.N. 
community if it does not wish to assume the 
obligations of membership at this time. How- 
ever, the one-third of the Korean people liv- 
ing in North Korea have no right to stand 
in the way of the desire of the two-thirds 
of the Korean people who live in the Repub- 
lic of Korea to assume the privileges, and the 
duties and responsibilities, of U.N. member- 
ship. 

Neither, in our view, is the Security Coun- 
cil entitled, authorized, or wise in linking 
those two matters, in the face of the judg- 
ment of the Court and indeed our recent 
well-established practice. 



I October 20, 1975 



605 



The principle of universality is not divis- 
ible. My delegation is not prepared to see it 
flouted in the case of the Republic of Korea 
only to be hailed in the case of the Viet- 
Nams. It is not my government's desire in 
any way to stand in the way of admission of 
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and 
the Republic of South Viet-Nam, but my 
government will continue to support in every 
feasible way the Republic of Korea's desire 
to participate as a member in the United Na- 
tions. 

The General Assembly has on four sepa- 
rate occasions found the Republic of Korea 
qualified for U.N. membership. At the re- 
quest of the Assembly, the Security Council 
has repeatedly reconsidered the application 
of the Republic of Korea, but its admission 
has been prevented by repeated vetoes. Now, 
with the Security Council about to recon- 
sider, after a parallel finding and request 
from the Assembly, the applications of the 
two Vietnamese Republics, my government 
must insist that all three applicants be 
treated equally. If this necessitates a second 
veto of the applications of the two Viet- 
Nams, my government, though with regret, 
can act accordingly. 

Allow me, Mr. President, to emphasize a 
further point. We believe that the goal of 
unification can best be sought through the 
framework of the United Nations. We find 
it hard to follow the argument that to as- 
sume the responsibility of membership in 
the United Nations would somehow diminish 
the prospect for peaceful reunification. On 
the contrary, it should enhance that prospect. 

Finally, let me simply refer to the 
thoughts which I left with the General As- 
sembly in my comments on the occasion on 
which the resolution before us was adopted. 
It may have come to pass, Mr. President, 
that the United Nations is made up prin- 
cipally of one-party states, but it cannot 
come to pass that we shall have a one- 
party United Nations. I accept, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that there may be members of this 
Council who do not believe that the behavior 
of liberal democracies derives from firmly 
held principles. But they are wrong in this, 



606 



and I fear before this issue is resolved they 
shall have learned just how wrong they are.) 

Statement of September 30 

USUN press release 105 dated September 30 

The Security Council has again declined) 
to consider the application of the Republic 
of Korea, a state fully qualified for member- 
ship in the United Nations. The United 
States has accordingly vetoed the member- 
ship applications of the Republic of South 
Viet-Nam and of the Democratic Republic 
of Viet-Nam.- 

In this era of dialogue, which was under- 
lined so distinctly during the seventh spe- 
cial session of the General Assembly, the 
United States cannot accept that the ad- 
mission of a fully qualified applicant should 
be dependent on the wishes of a nonmember 
state. The Republic of Korea, with a popu- 
lation of over 35 million persons, has been 
duly constituted as a state since August 15, 
1948. It has been a U.N. observer since 1949. 
It enjoys diplomatic relations wath over 90 
states which are members of the United 
Nations. The Republic of Korea has re- 
peated its assurances that its admission to 
the United Nations would in no way dilute 
its hopes for peaceful reunification on the 
Korean Peninsula. Indeed, membership in 
the United Nations, with its dedication to 
peace and harmony, should promote unifica- 
tion, not set it back. 

The United States favors admission of all 
qualified states desiring membership, includ- 
ing, I repeat, the Viet-Nams. The United 
States hopes that the parties directly con- 
cerned in this impasse will discuss this ques- 
tion urgently so that it may be resolved. 



= The Council on Sept. 26 approved by a vote of 14 
to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), the inclusion on the 
agenda of the letter from the Secretary-General 
transmitting General Assembly Resolution 3366 
(XXX); the inclusion of the application of the Re- 
public of Korea on the agenda did not obtain the nine 
votes required, the vote being 7 (U.S.) in favor, 7 
against, with 1 abstention. On Sept. 30 the Council 
voted on the draft resolutions to admit South Viet- 
Nam and North Viet-Nam; the votes were 14 in 
favor and 1 (U.S.) against. 



Department of State Bulletin 



i 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Arbitration 



Convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 
10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the 
United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997. 
Accession deposited: United Kingdom, September 
24, 1975. 

Aviation 

International air services transit agreement. Done 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. 
Acceptance deposited: Lesotho, October 2, 1975. 

Coffee 

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended, with annex. Approved by the Inter- 
national Coffee Council at London September 26, 
1974. Entered into force October 1, 1975. 
Notification to apply protocol provisionally : United 
States, September .30, 1975. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into 
force July 1, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, August 6, 1975. 

Energy 

Memorandum of understanding concerning coopera- 
tive information exchange relating to the develop- 
ment of solar heating and cooling systems in build- 
ings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1-4, 
1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 
Sigyiature: Le Secretaire general des Services de 
Programmation de la Politique scientifique, Bel- 
gium, September 4, 1975. 

Finance 

Onchocerciasis Fund Agreement, with annexes. Done 
at Washington May 7, 1975. Entered into force 
May 7, 1975. 

Signatures: African Development Bank, Septem- 
ber 2, 1975; Japan, Netherlands,' June 27, 1975. 



Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). 
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.' 
Acceptances deposited: Guinea, Singapore, Sep- 
tember 22, 1975; Maldives, September 16, 1975. 

Meteorology 

Amendments to the convention of the World Meteoro- 
logical Organization of October 11, 1947, as 
amended. Adopted by the Seventh Congress of the 
World Meteorological Organization, Geneva, April 
28-May 25, 1975. Entered into force May 20, 1975. 

Nuclear Weapons — Nonproliferation 

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. 

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 

1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. 

Ratification deposited: Venezuela, September 26, 

1975. 

Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 21, 1969.= 
Acceptance deposited: Syria, September 10, 1975. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 12, 1971.= 

Acceptances deposited: Saudi Arabia, September 
5, 1975; Syria, September 10, 1975. 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 
October 15, 1971.= 

Acceptances deposited: Saudi Arabia, September 
5, 1975; Syria, September 10, 1975. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that accession deposited: Congo 

(Brazzaville), September 5, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London November 30. 1966.= 
Acceptance deposited: Syria, September 10, 1975. 



' With reservation as to acceptance. 



= Not in force. 



October 20, 1975 



607 



Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London October 25, 1967.= 
Acceptance deposited: Syria, September 10, 1975. 

Trade 

Protocol of provisional application of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at 
Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 

De facto application : Papua New Guinea, Septem- 
ber 16, 1975. 

BILATERAL 

Italy 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 19, 
1967, as extended, for a cooperative program in 
science. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome 
August 25 and September 10, 1975. Entered into 
force September 10, 1975. 

Portugal 

Loan agreement relating to housing for low-income 
families, with annex. Signed at Lisbon June 30, 
1975. Entered into force June 30, 1975. 



PUBLICATIONS 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20^02. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shoivn below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

Telecommunication — Pre-sunrise Operation of Cer- 
tain Standard (AM) Radio Broadcasting Stations. 

Agreement with Canada modifying the agreement of 
March 31 and June 12, 1967, as amended. TIAS 
8015. 4 pp. 25i. (Cat. No. S9.10:8015). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangla- 
desh amending the agreement of October 14, 1974, 
as amended. TIAS 8016. 2 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 
89.10:8016). 



'- Not in force. 



Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
October 8, 1974. TIAS 8017. 4 pp. 25?!. (Cat. Ko. 
89.10:8017). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica 
amending and extending the agreement of September 
29, 1967, as amended and extended. TIAS 8018. 4 
pp. 25<f. (Cat. No. 89.10:8018). 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Israel extending the agreement of July 
12, 1955, as amended and extended. TIAS 8019. 6 
pp. 25C. (Cat. No. 89.10:8019). 

Fisheries. Agreement with the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics extending the ag^reements of Febru- 
ary 21, 1973, as extended. TIAS 8020. 5 pp. 25<f. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8020). 

Fisheries — Certain Fisheries Problems on the High 
Seas in the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean. Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. TIAS 8021. 29 pp. 45^^. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
8021). 

Fisheries — Consideration of Claims Resulting from 
Damage to Fishing Vessels or Gear and Measures 
To Prevent Fishing Conflicts. Agreement with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics amending the 
agreement of February 21, 1973, as amended. TIAS 
8022. 10 pp. 30«(. (Cat. No. 89.10:8022). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with the Re- 
public of Korea amending the agreement of April 
12, 1973, as amended. TIAS 8023. 8 pp. 30(!. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8023). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
amending the agreement of November 23, 1974. TIAS 
8024. 4 pp. 25<'. (Cat. No. 89.10:8024). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam amending the agreement of 
October 8, 1974, as amended. TIAS 8025. 6 pp. 25<>. 
(Cat. No. 89.10:8025). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India. 
TIAS 8026. 20 pp. 40^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8026). 

Trade in Textiles With Macao. Ag^reement with Por- 
tugal. TIAS 8027. 23 pp. 40('. (Cat. No. 89.10:8027). 

Technical Consultations and Training. Agreement 
with Portugal. TIAS 8028. 17 pp. 40(J (Cat. No. 
89.10:8028). 

Military Mission to Iran. Agreement with Iran ex- 
tending the agreement of October 6, 1947, as 
amended and extended. TIAS 8029. 4 pp. 25«*. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8029). 

Agricultural Commodities. Ag^reement with Chile 
amending the agreement of October 25, 1974, as 
amended. TIAS 8030. 4 pp. 25(f. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
8030). 

Finance — Consulting Services. Agreement with Por- 
tugal. TIAS 8038. 23 pp. 40<f. (Cat. No. 89.10:8038). 



; 






608 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 20, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1895 



Colombia. President Lopez of Colombia Makes 
State Visit to the United States (Ford, 
Lopez, joint communique) 588 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 603 

Department Reviews Recent Developments in 

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Rogers) .... 596 

Guidelines Explained for Testimony to House 
Intelligence Committee (Eagleburger) . . . 599 

Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid to Viet- 
Nam Discussed (joint State-Treasury-Com- 
merce statement before House subcommittee) 601 

Cuba. Department Reviews Recent Develop- 
ments in U.S. Policy Toward Cuba (Rogers) 596 

Cyprus. President Welcomes Passage of Bill 
Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo (state- 
ment by President Ford) 595 

Department and Foreign Service. Guidelines 
Explained for Testimony to House Intelli- 
gence Committee (Eagleburger) .... 599 

Export Controls. Policy on Private Humani- 
tarian Aid to Viet-Nam Discussed (joint 
State-Treasury-Commerce statement before 
House subcommittee) 601 

Greece. President Welcomes Passage of Bill 
Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo (state- 
ment by President Ford) 595 

Korea. U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of 

North and South Viet-Nam (Moynihan) . . 604 

Latin America. The Western Hemisphere: Our 
Common Future (Kissinger) 584 

Middle East. Furthering Peace in the Middle 
East (Kissinger) 581 

Organization of American States. Department 
Reviews Recent Developments in U.S. Policy 
Toward Cuba (Rogers) 596 

Presidential Documents 

President Lopez of Colombia Makes State Visit 
to the United States 588 

President Welcomes Passage of Bill Modifying 
Turkish Arms Embargo 595 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 608 

Spain. U.S. and Spain Set New Framework of 

Cooperative Relationships (joint statement) 587 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 607 

Turkey. President Welcomes Passage of Bill 
Modifying Turkish Arms Embargo (state- 
ment by President Ford) 595 



United Nations 

U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of North 
and South Viet-Nam (Moynihan) .... 



604 



Viet-Nam 

Policy on Private Humanitarian Aid to Viet- 
Nam Discussed (joint State-Treasury-Com- 
merce statement before House subcommittee) 601 

U.S. Repeats Veto of U.N. Admission of North 
and South Viet-Nam (Moynihan) .... 604 



Name Index 

Eagleburger, Lawrence S 599 

Ford, President 588, 595 

Kissinger, Secretary 581, 584 

Lopez Michelsen, Alfonso 588 

Miller, Robert H 601 

Moynihan, Daniel P 604 

Rogers, William D 596 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 29-Oct. 5 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

506 9/29 Kissinger: toast at dinner for Arab 

League members' U.N. Repre- 
sentatives, New York. 

507 9/30 Kissinger: toast at luncheon for 

Latin American Foreign Min- 
isters and U.N. Representatives, 
New York. 

*508 10/1 Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
U.S. National Committee for the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution, 
working group on oil content 
meters, Nov. 6. 

*509 10/1 Advisory Committee on the Law of 
the Sea, Oct. 21-22. 

fSlO 10/1 International Commission for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
seventh special meeting. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



il 






Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



POSTAGE AND FEES PAID 

Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourth-Class Rate 
Book 




1l 



fl 



liiate 



Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



VA 



m 



J: 



7^?& 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXin 



No. 1896 



October 27, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSES EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT 
Statement Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 609 

EMPEROR HIROHITO OF JAPAN MAKES STATE VISIT 
TO THE UNITED STATES 615 

DEPARTMENT OPPOSES UNILATERAL ESTABLISHMENT 
OF 200-MILE U.S. FISHERIES ZONE 
Statements Before the House Committee on International Relations 623 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T I 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1896 
October 27, 1975 



Seer 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.16 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 



U 01 

neS 



The Department of State BULLET, 
a weekly publication issued by ti 
OfKce of Media Services, Bureau ti 
Public Affairs, provides the public 
interested agencies of the governmei 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ai^ 
on the work of the Department m 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selectet 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses 
and news conferences of the Presided 
and the Secretary of State and ot 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functioi 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which tlU 
United States is or may become t 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, ai 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also Ustt 



stale 
raeli: 
-.ere 
iioni 
fori 
Fo 
■:ite 
'::m 
'\m 
Aije 




ivorli 



oiir( 

coiiM 



MHpl, 
Vtll 

Siiperi 



Octet 



Secretary Kissinger Discusses Egypt-Israel Agreement 



Statement Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations ' 



I welcome this opportunity to appear be- 
fore your committee to testify on the recent 
agreement between Israel and Egypt. That 
agreement — if carried out in good faith by 
both parties — may well mark a historic turn- 
ing point, away from the cycle of war and 
stalemate that has for so long afflicted Is- 
raelis and Arabs and the world at large. I am 
here to urge prompt and positive congres- 
sional action to help further the prospects 
for peace in the Middle East. 

For more than 30 years the issues in dis- 
pute in that troubled region have been recog- 
nized by successive American Administra- 
tions as having profound consequences for 
America's own interests. The U.S. diplomatic 
role in the Middle East is a matter of vital 
national importance: 

— We have a historic and moral commit- 
ment to the survival and security of Israel. 

— We have important interests in the Arab 
world with its 150 million people and the 
World's largest oil reserves. 

— We know that the world's hopes, and 
our own, for economic recovery and progress 
could be dashed by another upheaval in the 
Middle East. 

— W'e must avoid the severe strains on our 
relations with our allies in Europe and Japan 
that perpetual crisis in the Middle East 
would almost certainly entail. 

— We face the dangers of a direct U.S.- 



'Made on Oct. 7 (text from press release 522). The 
complete transcript of the hearings will be published 
by the committee and will be available from the 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Soviet confrontation, with its attendant nu- 
clear risk, if tension in the Middle East 
should increase. 

The October war of 1973 brought home to 
every American, in concrete and dramatic 
ways, the price we pay for continued Arab- 
Israeli conflict. The oil embargo triggered by 
that war cost us 500,000 jobs, more than 
$10 billion in national production, and a 
rampant inflation. The 1973 crisis put our 
alliances with Western Europe and Japan 
under the most serious strain they had ever 
known. And it brought us to the verge of a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union, requir- 
ing us to place our military forces on a 
global alert. 

Thus for the most basic reasons of na- 
tional policy we owe it to the American 
people to do all we can to insure that the 
Middle East moves toward peace and away 
from conflict. 

If the past two years of vigorous diplo- 
matic endeavor have promoted the prospects 
of peace — as I beheve they have — the United 
States has made the difference. We have 
maintained our special relationship with Is- 
rael, while at the same time dramatically 
improving our relations with the Arab world. 
It is the United States alone among the 
world's nations that both Israel and its Arab 
neighbors have been prepared to trust. This 
link of confidence must be maintained. With- 
out it the Middle East will have lost the key 
element of its stability. Without it the period 
ahead — difficult at best — may well grow un- 
manageable. 

It is our strong conviction that the Sinai 



October 27, 1975 



609 



agreement is indispensable to the process of 
peace. Were I here today to report that we 
had failed to obtain a Sinai agreement, I 
would have to tell you as well that the pros- 
pects of still another Arab-Israeli war were 
infinitely and eminently greater. Instead, I 
can state that the prospects for peace in the 
Middle East have been significantly advanced 
and that good chances exist for even further 
progress — if we have the wisdom and the na- 
tional will to seize the opportunity before us. 

Hailed by both Prime Minister Rabin and 
President Sadat as a possible turning point, 
the Sinai agreement represents the most far- 
reaching, practical test of peace — political, 
military, and psychological — in the long and 
tragic history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
For the first time in more than two decades, 
Israel and an Arab state have agreed not 
just to disentangle their forces in the after- 
math of war but to commit themselves to 
the peaceful resolution of the differences that 
for so long have made them mortal enemies. 

Thus, what we are proposing to the Con- 
gress — as we seek approval for the station- 
ing of no more than 200 technicians in the 
Sinai — is an investment in peace. But we 
must never forget that the most precarious 
part of the road toward a just and lasting 
peace still lies ahead. We will require na- 
tional unity and a sympathetic understanding 
for the delicacy of the process if we are to 
continue the journey. 

With these considerations in mind, Mr. 
Chairman, I urge this committee and the 
Congress to respond promptly and sympa- 
thetically to the President's request for ap- 
proval of the stationing of up to 200 Ameri- 
cans in the Sinai — a request that has now 
been before the Congress for more than four 
weeks. 

The proposed American presence is a 
limited but crucial American responsibility. 
It is not a role we sought ; it is a role we ac- 
cepted reluctantly, at the request of both 
sides — and only when it was clear that there 
would be no agreement without it. The Amer- 
ican personnel will be volunteers, and they 
will be civilians. Their function is to assist in 



an early-warning system in the small area 
of the Sinai passes in the U.N. buffer zone. 
They are not combat personnel or advisers 
for one side; they will serve both sides, at 
their request. They will complement the 
U.N. military contingents already there from 
such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria, 
and Finland whose responsibility it is to pro- 
tect the buffer zone. Nor is our own pres- 
ence in the area new — 36 Americans are 
serving there at this moment with the United 
Nations Truce Supervision Organization; 
Americans have been serving in this capacity 
for over 25 years. 

The proposal we ask you to approve pro- 
vides that the President may withdraw these 
volunteer technicians if we believe them to 
be in jeopardy or no longer necessary. We 
are prepared as well to accept the congres- 
sional proposal to make withdrawal manda- 
tory in the event of hostilities. 

Mr. Chairman, I am well aware of, and 
respect, this committee's desire to be cer- 
tain that it has before it all undertakings 
relevant to its consideration and approval 
of the proposal for U.S. participation in the 
Sinai early-warning system. 

We have made an unprecedented effort to 
meet the committee's concerns. Within days 
of my return from the Middle East we volun- 
tarily supplied to the committees of Con- 
gress, on a classified basis, highly sensitive 
material relevant to the negotiation of the 
Sinai accord. Included in this material was 
information from the record of the nego- 
tiations of the very category which Presi- 
dent Washington declined to furnish to the 
House of Representatives in 1794 and which 
no Administration has supplied since. 

Four weeks ago, we provided four sets of 
documents to the appropriate congressional 
committees. They are : 

— First, the U.S. proposal for stationing 
technicians in the Sinai. 

— Second, the unclassified agreement be- 
tween Israel and Egypt, and its military 
annex. 

—Third, the classified documents which 



610 



Department of State Bulletin 



the Administration has certified incUide all 
of the assurances, undertakings, and com- 
mitments which we consider to be legally 
binding upon the United States. These docu- 
ments also contain many provisions which 
are not considered legally binding ; they were 
submitted because they were contained in 
documents which include binding clauses and 
which were initialed or signed by the United 
States and one of the parties. 

— Fourth, extracts from other classified 
documents in the negotiating record which 
the Administration believes are legally bind- 
ing assurances, undertakings, or commit- 
ments. We have included in this category 
certain provisions which, although not re- 
garded by the Administration as binding, 
might be so regarded by others. 

Finally, the Legal Adviser of the State 
Department submitted yesterday to this com- 
mittee on a classified basis a memorandum 
which provides his assessment of the legal 
character of all the documents previously 
given to the Congress. 

We presented these classified documents on 
the assumption that they would be treated 
as if they had been transmitted under the 
Case Act [Public Law 92-403], which pro- 
vides for submission of executive agreements 
to the Congress, but with "an appropriate in- 
junction of secrecy to be removed only upon 
due notice from the President." 

Mr. Chairman, the executive branch has 
complied with both the letter and spirit of 
the committee's resolution requesting the 
President to inform the committee "of all the 
assurances and undertakings by the United 
States on which Israel and Egypt are relying 
in entering into the Sinai Agreement. . . ." 
I am authorized on behalf of the President 
to state that there are no other assurances 
or undertakings, beyond those already sub- 
mitted to the Congress, which are binding 
upon the United States. We will make no 
contrary claim in the future; nor can any 
other government. 

Mr. Chairman, if there has been a dis- 
agreement between this committee and the 



executive branch over the past several weeks, 
it has concerned not disclosure to the Con- 
gress — which has been complete — but the 
form of disclosure to the public. 

We had hoped that a summary could be 
worked out with the committee which could 
have been certified as containing all com- 
mitments so that the full Senate would feel 
free to vote unreservedly on the U.S. tech- 
nicians. This procedure was intended as a 
means of satisfying the needs of the Con- 
gress and the rights of the American people 
to know, while at the same time maintain- 
ing the integrity and confidentiality of the 
diplomatic process. We believed that we were 
following the precedents set in previous 
negotiations in the Middle East, when classi- 
fied documents were submitted to the Con- 
gress but not made public. Our purpose was 
to avoid a situation in which other govern- 
ments would feel compelled to take a public 
position and to protect our ability to act as 
a mediator in the future. 

This plan became problematical when the 
confidential documents were leaked. This 
created a new and very difl^cult situation. 
The Administration disagrees with the de- 
cision of the committee to publish these 
documents and maintains that it in no way 
sets a precedent. We consider that the pro- 
visions of the Case Act regarding classifica- 
tion remain valid; they should be respected 
in the future. 

We recognize that the committee faced an 
unusual problem to which no good answer 
existed. We are prepared to work with this 
committee to develop procedures for future 
negotiations which will permit ground rules 
to be clearly established in advance so that 
all parties will know what to expect. 

With regard to the U.S. undertakings, the 
Administration is particularly concerned 
about two points: 

— First, that congi-essional approval of the 
proposal on the technicians not link the Sinai 
agreement to the U.S. undertakings — which 
are distinct and separate; and 

— Second, that U.S. statements of inten- 



October 27, 1975 



611 



tion not be given a legally binding character 
which was never intended and is not in- 
herent in them. 

The Administration is convinced that con- 
gressional approval of the proposal to sta- 
tion technicians in the Sinai does not import 
or imply approval of anything more. 

The United States is not a party to the 
Sinai agreement. That agreement is between 
Israel and Egypt; they are the only signa- 
tories and the only states bound by it. The 
agreement repeatedly speaks of the obliga- 
tions of "the parties" ; it is beyond dispute 
that "the parties" are Egypt and Israel, and 
not the United States. 

The agreement provides, in an annex, that 
in the buffer zone between Egypt and Israel 
— in which the United Nations Emergency 
Force will continue to perform its functions 
— there will be established an early-warning 
system entrusted to U.S. civilian personnel. 
The proposal of the United States, for which 
approval of the Congress is being sought, 
provides details of that early-warning sys- 
tem. That proposal is described as a part of 
the agreement between Egypt and Israel, but 
that does not imply that the United States 
is party to this agreement. By the same 
token the U.S. assurances and undertakings 
before this committee, while given on the 
occasion of, and concordant with, the con- 
clusion of the Sinai agreement between 
Egypt and Israel, are not in any sense part 
of the Sinai agreement. 

Thus, even if the United States were un- 
able to fulfill all of the intentions we have 
expressed, the parties — Egypt and Israel — 
would nonetheless remain bound by the Sinai 
agreement. The obligations of the Egyptian- 
Israeli agreement are clear, direct, and un- 
qualified ; they stand on their own. 

A vote in favor of the specific, limited 
U.S. role in the early-warning system will 
not thereby commit the Congress to a posi- 
tion on any other issue — whether it be the 
question of undertakings and assurances to 
the parties involved, our continuing rela- 
tions with various countries of the area, a 
given level of budget support, or our policies 
and programs in the Middle East. Those are 
separate issues which you will want to con- 



sider carefully at the appropriate time. Many 
will come up in the normal authorization and 
appropriation process; they are not an in- 
tegral part of the EgjT)tian-Israeli agree- 
ment. 

Let me turn now to the question of the 
nature of American assurances and under- 
takings to Israel and Egypt. 

The special position of trust enjoyed by 
the United States inevitably means that both 
sides attach great significance to our views. 
Statements of our intentions, therefore, 
served as a lubricant in this most recent 
negotiation just as they have in every pre- 
vious mediation effort. But they must be 
seen in perspective and in the light of his- 
torical practice. It is extremely important, 
therefore, that in approving the sending of 
U.S. technicians the Congress should take 
care not inadvertently to create commit- 
ments that were never intended. 

We have submitted all documents contain- 
ing U.S. commitments. Not all provisions in 
these documents amount to binding under- 
takings. They include: 

— First, assurances by the United States 
of our political intentions. These are often 
statements typical of diplomatic exchange; 
in some instances they are merely formal 
reaffirmations of existing American policy. 
Other provisions refer to contingencies which 
may never arise and are related — sometimes 
explicitly — to present circumstances subject 
to rapid change. 

— Second, undertakings or assurances by 
the United States which are conditional on 
existing or prior authorization and appro- 
priation by the Congress or which fall within 
the constitutional authority of the Presi- 
dent to conduct the foreign relations of the 
United States. 

Thus to speak of memoranda of agreement 
as executive agreements is by no means to 
say that each of their individual provisions 
is binding upon the United States. That de- 
pends entirely upon the content of the spe- 
cific provisions in question. Moreover, noth- 
ing in these particular documents constrains 
congressional action in any issue involving 
the future legislative process. 



612 



Department of State Bulletin 



The fact that many provisions are not 
by any standard international commitments 
does not mean, of course, that the United 
States is morally or politically free to act 
as if they did not exist. On the contrary, 
they are important statements of diplomatic 
policy and engage the good faith of the 
United States so long as the circumstances 
that gave rise to them continue. But they 
are not binding commitments of the United 
States. 

Mr. Chairman, I should like to conclude 
with this thought: the Sinai accord could 
prove to be a historic milestone. It is not 
a peace agreement, but it can be an im- 
portant step in that direction. 

The United States remains committed to 
helping bring a just, durable, and compre- 
hensive peace to the Middle East. We do not 
consider the Sinai agreement as permitting 
stagnation in the process of negotiation ; its 
purpose is to give impetus to that process. 
We are prepared to work with all the parties 
toward a solution of all the issues yet re- 
maining — including the issue of the future 
of the Palestinians. 

Whether the Sinai agreement fulfills its 
promise depends crucially on the confidence 
and trust America inspires. Yet we cannot 
gain — nor retain — confidence abroad if we 
lack it at home. Whether there will be peace 
or war in the Middle East depends impor- 
tantly on whether America is at peace with 
itself, whether America is united in its pur- 
pose. 

The challenge now is to build on the prog- 
ress that has been made. So let us get on 
with the job, for there will be no Sinai ac- 
cord unless the Congress of the United 
States takes positive action to approve the 
proposal to place up to 200 technicians in the 
Sinai. And if there is no accord, then all that 
America has worked for, and all that the 
Middle East has hoped for, may well be 
lost. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully ask that 
this committee act now to approve the reso- 
lution before it so that Israel and Egypt can 
get on with the business of implementing the 
Sinai accord and so that the march toward 
peace can be resumed in the Middle East. 



President Urges Approval of U.S. Role 
in Sinai Early Warning System 

Following is the text of a letter dated 
September 29 from President Ford to 
Speaker of the House Carl Albert.^ 

September 29, 1975. 

Dear Mr. Speaker: I am writing to 
emphasize the importance of a Congressional 
decision in the coming week on U.S. partici- 
pation in the Early Warning System which 
is an integral part of the Agreement signed 
between the Governments of Egypt and Is- 
rael on September 4 in Geneva. 

Over the past two years, our Government 
has played an essential role in helping defuse 
the tensions in the Middle East. We have 
chosen this course because we recognized, as 
has every American Administration over the 
past 30 years, that the issues involved in 
that troubled area are central to the Ameri- 
can national interest. 

The September 4 agreement, like the two 
preceding disengagement agreements, was 
negotiated with the assistance of the United 
States. The parties themselves have de- 
scribed it as a significant step towards peace 
in the Middle East. It will reduce the risks 
of war, create new opportunities for negotiat- 
ing peace, and help provide a stable environ- 
ment in which global economic dislocations 
can be avoided. This Agreement is in the 
overall national interest of the United States. 

There would have been no Agreement 
without provision for American participa- 
tion in the Early Warning System. That 
System is designed to reduce the danger of 
sui-prise attack, and the parties to the Agree- 
ment were able to agree to entrust the Sys- 
tem only to the United States. The special 
American role was the only one in which 
both sides had adequate confidence. 

I want to be certain that the leaders of 
the Congress fully understand the conse- 



' Released Sept. 30 (text from Weekly Compilation 
of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 6). Identical 
letters were also sent to Representatives William S. 
Broomfield, Thomas E. Morgan, and John J. Rhodes 
and to Senators Clifford P. Case, Mike Mansfield, 
Hugh Scott, and John J. Sparkman. 



October 27, 1975 



613 



quences of further delay in acting on this im- 
portant matter. 

The first step in the implementation of the 
basic Agreement under the timetable nego- 
tiated and agreed to by Egypt and Israel in 
Geneva on September 22 is scheduled to be 
taken October 5. This process will not begin, 
however, until the Congress has acted on 
the proposed United States role in the Early 
Warning System. Delay in Congressional ac- 
tion will, therefore, delay implementation of 
the basic Agreement. It will risk causing the 
lengthy and difficult negotiations on the en- 
tire five-month implementing timetable to be 
reopened. It will prevent a lessening of the 
risks of war. If for any reason the Agree- 
ment should fail, the responsibility would be 
heavy indeed. 

The issue before the Congress now is 
whether the Congress will approve accept- 
ance by the United States of the role that 
has been proposed for it. There are other 
issues which the Congress must eventually 
consider in connection with our continuing 
relations, policies, and programs in the Mid- 
dle East — particularly our programs of mili- 
tary and economic assistance there. The Con- 
gress will want to consider those carefully 
at the appropriate time, but they are not 
integral to the implementation of the Agree- 
ment between Egypt and Israel. Voting in 
favor of the U.S. role in the Early Warning 



System will not commit anyone to take a 
position one way or another on these issues. 
In summary, I met with the leadership 
three weeks ago to describe what was in- 
volved in the new Agreement between Egypt 
and Israel and to request urgent approval of 
U.S. participation in its implementation. This 
question has been under intensive discus- 
sion in the Congress for nearly three weeks. 
All relevant papers and all U.S. commitments 
related to the Agreement have been sub- 
mitted to the appropriate committees of the 
Congress. If action is not completed in the 
coming week, the United States will be in 
the position of holding up implementation of 
an Agreement which two key Middle Eastern 
countries have signed as a significant step 
towards peace. The Middle East is an area 
where American policy has long had broad 
bipartisan support. The issue presently be- 
fore the Congress offers an opportunity to 
reaffirm that tradition and to demonstrate 
how the E.xecutive and Legislative branches 
can work together on a foreign policy matter 
of high importance to the national interest 
and for the benefit of world peace. I, there- 
fore, urge strongly that action be completed 
as early as possible and no later than Friday, 
October 3. 



Sincerely, 



Gerald R. Ford. 



614 



Department of State Bulletin 



Emperor Hirohito of Japan Makes State Visit to the United States 



Emperor Hirohito of Japan made a state 
visit to the United States September 30- 
October 13. Following are an exchange of 
greetings between President Ford and His 
Majesty at a loelcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House on October 
2, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at 
the White House that evening, and their 
exchange of toasts at a dinner given by His 
Majesty at the Smithsonian Institution on 
October 3. 

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 6 

President Ford 

Your Majesties: It is an honor for me to 
extend to you, on behalf of the American 
people, a warm and heartfelt welcome to the 
United States. Mrs. Ford joins me with the 
greatest personal pleasure for both of us in 
greeting Your Majesties here today. 

This first state visit for an Emperor and 
Empress of Japan to the United States is an 
historic occasion with profound importance. 
Japan and the United States have had a 
special and unique relationship since the days 
when Commodore Perry sailed to Japan more 
than 120 years ago. 

Our early relations were marked by many 
memorable events. The United States was 
the first country to establish a treaty rela- 
tionship with Japan, the first to station a 
consul in Japan, and the first to receive a 
diplomatic mission from Japan. That mission 
was received by President Buchanan in 1860 
here in the White House. 

During the illustrious reign of your illus- 
trious grandfather. Emperor Meiji, Japan 
chose the United States as the first stop for 
the Iwakura mission. Japan's special envoys 
were received by President Grant. 

October 27, 1975 



After President Grant left the Presidency, 
he visited Japan and met the Emperor. This 
was in 1879, almost a century ago. Emperor 
Meiji said: 

America and Japan, being near neighbors, sepa- 
rated only by an ocean, will become more and more 
closely connected with each other as time goes on. 

These prophetic words symbolized our mu- 
tual desire to establish a sound and lasting 
friendship. What was a century ago a vision- 
ary goal has now become a reality for mil- 
lions of Americans and Japanese. Our peo- 
ples are bound together by a multitude of 
institutional and personal ties. The constant 
flow of knowledge, ideas, and cultural in- 
fluences between our two countries enriches 
the depth and meaning of our ties each 
year. It is this broad public involvement 
which fulfills the hopes of our eai'ly leaders. 

The greetings of friendship which we ex- 
change today represent the deep sentiments 
of both nations. 

At a time when the benefits of cooperative 
relations between our two countries are mu- 
tually acclaimed. Your Majesty's visit sym- 
bolizes and strengthens the ties of friendship 
between our two peoples. 

The warm memories of my trip to Japan 
last fall remains vivid. Mrs. Ford and I have 
happily anticipated Your Majesty's visit. We 
earnestly hope that your stay in Washington 
and your journey to other parts of the 
United States will be as pleasant to Your 
Majesties personally as they are important 
to the history of our two great nations. 

His Majesty ' 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gen- 
tlemen : Thank you most sincerely, Mr. Pres- 
ident, for your gracious words of welcome. 



' Emperor Hirohito spoke in Japanese on all three 
occasions. 

615 



It has long been my wish to come to the 
United States, and the Empress and I deeply 
appreciate your kind invitation to pay this 
official visit. 

We are indeed delighted to be here at this 
historic moment on the very eve of the Bi- 
centennial of American independence, when 
the American people reflect on the past and 
look to the future. 

For me, also, this visit is a valuable op- 
portunity to reflect on the past relationships 
between Japan and the United States and 
look to its future. Our peoples withstood the 
challenges of one tragic interlude when the 
Pacific Ocean, symbol of tranquillity, was in- 
stead a rough and stormy sea, and have built 
today unchanging ties of friendship and good 
will. I feel immeasurably gratified by this 
happy development and look forward with 
great anticipation to the future of our re- 
lationship. 

Mr. President, you visited Japan last year 
as the first incumbent President of the 
United States to do so and impressed us 
deeply by your eagerness to meet and mingle 
with our people. I know that your visit has 
contributed greatly to the mutual trust be- 
tween our two peoples. 

Although our stay in your country is for 
but a brief two weeks, we hope to meet with 
Americans from every walk of life and to 
glimpse a variety of American sights. We 
will be happy if we, too, can contribute to 
everlasting friendship between our two peo- 
ples through our visit. 

May I thank you again, Mr. President, for 
your warm hospitality. Permit me, also, to 
extend to all the citizens of your great coun- 
try my best wishes for continued prosperity. 

TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER, OCTOBER 2 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 6 

President Ford 

Your Majesties, our distinguished guests 
from Japan, ladies and gentlemen : This first 
state visit to the United States by an Em- 
peror and an Empress is an occasion of great, 
great importance to all of us. It symbolizes 
the very unique and the very close ties of 



friendship between our countries as well as 
our people. 

My nation. Your Majesties, has looked for- 
ward to this happy occasion for a long, long 
time. Four years ago, it was a great honor 
for Americans for you. Your Majesties, to 
stop in Alaska at the beginning of your first 
foreign travel as an Emperor and Empress. 
On that occasion, your stay was much too 
brief. 

Last year I had the great honor of being 
the first incumbent American President to 
visit Japan. And I am grateful, deeply grate- 
ful, and was obviously most impressed with 
the wonderful reception that I received from 
you as well as the people of Japan. 

The first official visit to the United States 
by a Japanese Emperor, occurring as it does 
during my Administration, is another source 
of great personal satisfaction. It was my 
profound pleasure earlier today to welcome 
you officially to the United States on behalf 
of all of our people. 

While the cultural heritages of our two 
countries are quite different, our people share 
a very common aspiration and a similar 
commitment to democratic freedoms and in- 
stitutions. Your Majesties, we confront to- 
gether the challenges of an advanced indus- 
trial society and seek a very peaceful world 
in which all nations prosper and all people 
pursue fulfilling lives. 

Because Americans and Japanese have 
patiently nurtured these very fundamental 
bonds, our cultural differences have been a 
source of mutual enrichment rather than a 
barrier to friendship and to understanding. 

Through the interaction of our peoples, 
Japan has very profoundly influenced Amer- 
ica. Japanese cherry trees, as we all know, 
are well known to Americans because of their 
very prominent place in the heart of our 
National Capital. These very beautiful cherry 
blossoms symbolize the profound cultural in- 
fluence of Japan on modern America. 

Japan's art, its architecture, its pottery, 
its prints, its gardens, and almost above all, 
its graciousness, all have enriched American 
life and American thought. The Japanese 
emphasis on consensus and harmony in hu- 
man relations also influences the life as well 



616 



Department of State Bulletin 



as the work of the American people. 

Because Japan's influence upon America 
has been very subtle, it is not always easily 
recognized. Therefore Your Majesty's visit 
provides Americans an opportunity to pause 
and acknowledge your country's contribu- 
tions to our national culture. 

Your Majesties, I can assure you that 
America places the highest possible value 
on our distinctive and mutually beneficial 
relations with your nation. Americans are 
determined to preserve, Americans are de- 
termined to strengthen, our ties of friend- 
ship and cooperation with Japan. 

Ladies and gentlemen, in that spirit, I ask 
all of you to join me in a toast to Their 
Majesties' continued good health and to the 
perpetuation of the sincere friendship be- 
tween the American and Japanese people 
which this historic visit symbolizes: Your 
Majesties. 

His Majesty 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentle- 
men: I wish to offer my sincere appreciation 
for your most thoughtful words. I am deeply 
moved by your warm expression of good will 
toward Japan and the people of Japan. 

Your visit to Japan last fall, Mr. Presi- 
dent, brought a bright and happy page in the 
120-year-long history of Japanese-American 
relations. Ever since your visit, the Empress 
and I have been looking forward to this mo- 
ment when we might be with you again, Mr. 
President, and with Mrs. Ford for the first 
time. 

We also thank you cordially for your gra- 
cious hospitality this evening at the White 
House. We are mindful that in this house 
great leaders of your country have presided 
since the early years of the nation, making 
their indelible marks on national and world 
history. 

Our first night in the United States we 
spent at Williamsburg resting from our long 
journey and savoring, in the calm atmos- 
phere of that picturesque town, historic re- 
minders of the birth of this nation. Those 
associations are deepened for us tonight, in 
your company and in this historic house. 

October 27, 1975 



Japan-United States Friendship Days 

A PROCLAMATION' 

Their Majesties, the Emperor and Empress 
of Japan will officially begin their State visit 
to the United States of America on October 2, 
1975. This visit which extends through October 
13, 1975 will be the first State visit to the 
United States of America by a reigning Em- 
peror of Japan. The State visit of the Emperor 
and Empress of Japan openly symbolizes the 
close ties of friendship, goodwill and common 
goals to which the Japanese and American 
people are dedicated. Their visit will contribute 
immeasurably to mutual understanding and re- 
spect between the United States of America 
and Japan. 

We warmly welcome Their Majesties to our 
country. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, do here- 
by designate the period beginning October 2, 
1975, through October 13, 1975, as Japan- 
United States Friendship Days. 

I call upon the people of the United States 
and interested groups and organizations to 
observe this period with appropriate ceremonies 
and activities. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set 
my hand this Second day of October, in the 
year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, 
and of the Independence of the United States 
of America the two hundredth. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



'No. 4397; 40 Fed. Reg. 45791. 



I recall the wise counsel which your first 
President, George Washington, gave the 
American people upon leaving the Oifice of 
the Presidency in 1796: "Observe good faith 
and justice toward all nations. Cultivate 
peace and harmony with all." This precept 
is still valid in today's world. It is an idea 
shared by the Japanese people in their con- 
tinuing efforts to cultivate peace and har- 
mony within the international community. 

It has been my wish for many years to 
visit the United States. There is one thing 
in particular which I have hoped to convey 
to the American people, should my visit be 
materialized; that is, to extend in my own 
words my gratitude to the people of the 

617 



United States for the friendly hand of good 
will and assistance their great country af- 
forded us for our postwar reconstruction im- 
mediately following that most unfortunate 
war which I deeply deplore. 

Today a new generation with no personal 
memory of those years is about to be in the 
majority in both our countries. Yet I am 
confident that the story of the generosity 
and good will of the American people will 
be retold from generation to generation of 
Japanese for the rest of time. 

The United States has made extraordinary 
contributions to the well-being and progress 
among mankind during the past two cen- 
turies. Today, on the eve of your Bicenten- 
nial and amidst the shifting tides of history, 
the United States continues to stand for the 
high ideals which gave this nation birth. 

The American people are still contribut- 
ing to further development of this most 
vigorous and creative society and to the 
building of peace and prosperity in the world. 

Mankind is now engaged in a common en- 
deavor — the creation of a just and peaceful 
international community. For this lofty ob- 
jective, it is my hope that Japan and the 
United States, as two powerful and stable 
nations, will cooperate actively on the basis 
of even better understanding of each other 
through further dialogue, drawing strengths 
from the richness of our past histories and 
traditions. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I propose a toast to 
the health of the President of the United 
States of America and Mrs. Ford and to the 
American people on the threshold of your 
third glorious century as a nation. 



TOASTS AT DINNER GIVEN BY THE EMPEROR, 
OCTOBER 3 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 6 

His Majesty 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gen- 
tlemen: The Empress and I are greatly hon- 
ored to be with you this evening, Mr. Presi- 
dent, Mrs. Ford, and distinguished great 



guests representing the broad spectrum of 
the American people. 

May I take this opportunity to impress on 
you our sincere appreciation for the cordial 
hospitality extended to us by the President 
and the people of the United States. 

The Japanese-American relationship began 
some 120 years ago when Commodore Mat- 
thew Perry reached our shore to begin the 
process of opening Japan to the outside 
world. Five years later Japan dispatched its 
first delegation to the United States on the 
mission of exchanging the instruments of 
ratification of our Treaty of Amity and Com- 
merce. It is recorded that the delegation 
visited this Smithsonian Institution. 

One of Japan's leading intellectuals at 
the time of my grandfather, the Emperor 
Meiji, was Yukichi Fukuzawa. He accom- 
panied the delegation to the United States 
aboard the escort ship Kanrin Maru. Upon 
his return, Fukuzawa wrote a book entitled 
"Seiyo-jijo" or "Things Western." In this 
volume Fukuzawa described how the United 
States, under the "purest form of republican 
government," had been living up to the ideals 
of its Founding Fathers and included a full 
Japanese translation of the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States. His en- 
lightening suggestions were a source of in- 
spiration to the Japanese people of the time, 
who were just beginning to emerge out of 
centuries of isolation into the age of modern- 
ization. 

Succeeding generations of Japanese and 
Americans have built on those early inter- 
changes, establishing in our time a relation- 
ship of extensive cooperation in political, eco- 
nomic, industrial, academic, cultural, and 
many other fields. 

Today, as the United States is about to 
celebrate its Bicentennial, Japan and the 
United States have become the nearest of 
neighbors, despite the vast reach of the Pa- 
cific Ocean, which separates our two coun- 
tries, and despite the great distances be- 
tween our respective histories, traditions, 
languages, and cultures. Never before in his- 
tory have two such distant and different 
peoples forged such close bonds of friendship. 



618 



Department of State Bulletin 



I am confident that friendship, so well 
tested through a number of trials in the past, 
is an enduring one which will withstand 
whatever vicissitude there may be in future 
history. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to join 
me in a toast to the continued health of 
the President of the United States of Amer- 
ica and Mrs. Ford and to the prosperity of 
this great Republic. 

President Ford 

Your Majesties: Mrs. Ford and I are 
deeply honored to be your guests this eve- 
ning. Japanese hospitality is always warm 
and most gracious, as I can testify from my 
visit last year to Tokyo and Kyoto. 

Your kind and very thoughtful words have 
made a deep impression upon Mrs. Ford, my- 
self, and the American people, and it is an 
honor for me this evening to have an op- 
portunity to respond. 

Your Majesties' visit to Washington has 
been pleasant, as I have gathered from our 
discussions, but all too brief. Tomorrow, you 
leave for a journey across America. Many 
Americans you will meet and the places you 
will visit have longstanding and important 
connections with Japan. 

I am very pleased that Your Majesty will 
see some of our small towns as well as our 
great cities. The farm you will visit in Illi- 
nois is symbolic of the importance of agri- 
culture as well as trade in American and 
Japanese relations. 

I am particularly happy that Your Maj- 
esties will visit the oceanographic research 
centers in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, and 
La Jolla, California, where some of Amer- 
ica's leading marine biologists will have an 
opportunity to discuss matters of mutual 
interest. Your Majesty's personal role in sci- 
entific research symbolizes the contribution 
that international scientific exchanges have 



made to the advancement of knowledge in 
our two nations and to their mutual benefit. 

Mrs. Ford and I are very pleased that 
time has been found for Your Majesty the 
Empress to meet Americans who share her 
artistic interests and humanitarian concerns. 
We are glad that you will also have time to 
relax and enjoy other aspects of American 
life, such as football on Sunday, Disneyland 
later, and the tropical beauty of Hawaii. 

Your visit, of course, draws attention as 
well to the place Americans of Japanese an- 
cestry occupy in our national life. While their 
numbers are not large, their contributions 
to American life have been most significant. 
Through quiet and very diligent endeavor, 
Japanese-Americans have attained highly re- 
spected places in the most exalted ranks of 
every profession, in the arts and sciences, 
and of course in public affairs. The cultural 
heritage that they have given us has en- 
riched American life. They are actually a 
living bond between our two great countries. 

Your Majesty, when you assumed the 
throne in 1926, you chose the Japanese words 
"showa," meaning "enlightened peace," as 
the name of your reign. Those words ex- 
pressed an exalted ideal, and now in the un- 
precedented 50th year of your reign, the 
Japanese people's accomplishments and their 
place in the world have fulfilled your early 
hopes. 

Your Majesties' historic visit has enhanced 
Japanese-American relations with a new dig- 
nity, and it has made us even more aware of 
the benefits of peace as well as friendship 
between us. It has also reinvigorated our 
shared determination to encourage even 
closer ties and greater cooperation between 
the Japanese and the American people. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join 
me in expressing appreciation for Their Maj- 
esties' hospitality this evening as I propose 
a toast to Their Majesties the Emperor and 
the Empress of Japan. 



October 27, 1975 



619 



Indo-U.S. Joint Commission Meets at Washington 



I 



The Indo-U.S. Joint Commission met at 
Washington October 6-7. Folloiving are re- 
marks made by Secretary Kissinger and 
Y. B. Chavan, Indian Minister of External 
Affairs, made on October 7 upon the signing 
of the agreed minutes, together with the text 
of a communique issued at the conclusion of 
the meeting. 



REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY 

Piess release 523A dated October 7 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished guests : 
I think the signing of this agreement is an 
auspicious occasion which symboHzes the 
work that has been done during the past 
year by the Joint Commission and the work 
that still lies ahead. 

The United States and India agreed last 
year, on the occasion of my visit to New 
Delhi, to place our relationship on a more 
long-term and more effective and more per- 
manent basis, free from some of the emo- 
tional swings that had characterized some 
of our relationship previously. 

In this new and more matura relationship, 
both sides have come to understand their 
permanent common interest in peace, sta- 
bility, and progress ; and they can cooperate 
on global problems from the point of their 
different perspectives but nevertheless keep- 
ing always in mind that they have a com- 
mon stake in world peace and a common in- 
terest that development take place on the 
basis of cooperation and not confrontation. 

We agree with what the Foreign Minister 
said to the United Nations: that nations 
should begin confronting problems and not 



each other. This is the spirit in which the 
relationship between the developed and the 
developing nations should take place, to 
which India and the United States can make 
an important contribution. 

I'd like to thank the chairmen of the Sub- 
commissions that have done such effective 
work. We will continue our exchanges on 
the subjects that the Commission deals with 
as well as on other political problems of com- 
mon interest, and we hope to have another 
meeting of this Joint Commission next spring 
in India. 

Thank you very much. 

Foreign Minister Chavan 

Mr. Secretary of State and friends: I con- 
sider this a significant occasion. Today we 
have signed a document which encompasses 
the work put in by three Subcommissions of 
the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission on economic, 
commercial, scientific, technological, educa- 
tional, and cultural cooperation in working 
out a program for the coming years. 

I'm glad that both our sides have been able 
to reach agreement on a wide-ranging area 
in each of the specified fields. 

What we have tried to achieve in the docu- 
ment we have signed today is to lay down 
guidelines for an action-oriented and time- 
borne program which we expect will lead to 
tangible results in the years ahead. 

The Joint Business Council, which has been 
set up under the auspices of the Subcommis- 
sion on Economic and Commercial Affairs, 
will, we hope, serve as a useful body enabling 
a fuller exchange of views and practical co- 
operation between business leaders of both 
countries. A significant organizational aspect 
of the Joint Business Council, from our 



620 



Department of State Bulletin 



viewpoint, is the participation of Indian 
public-sector organizations in the work of the 
Council. 

Another important body which has been 
agreed to is the Working Group on Indus- 
trial Cooperation, which will be entrusted 
with the task of identifying and promoting 
joint industrial interests in third countries 
involving Indian manufacturing and consult- 
ancy services. And the earnestness of our 
two governments to secure maximum benefit 
to both sides from such cooperation is high- 
lighted by our agreement to hold initial dis- 
cussions with a view to conclude a treaty to 
avoid double taxation. 

I would like to make a special mention here 
of the very useful exchange of views which 
I have had with Secretary of State Dr. Kis- 
singer, as well as with other colleagues in 
the U.S. Government. 

I also have had the privilege of meeting 
President Ford and to view Indo-U.S. rela- 
tions in broad perspective. 

I share your view, Mr. Secretary, that the 
Joint Commission provides an institutional 
framework for developing our relations on a 
mature, a realistic, and stable basis free 
from day-to-day fluctuations. 

I take this opportunity to express my 
thanks to the Government of the United 
States — and, in particular, to Secretary of 
State Dr. Kissinger — for the excellent ar- 
rangements made and the warm hospitality 
extended to me and the members of delega- 
tions. 

Thank you very much. 



TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE 

Press release rj23 dated October 7 

The Indo-U.S. Joint Commission met in Washing- 
ton October 6-7 to discuss new ways to expand co- 
operation between the two countries in trade and 
investment, science and technology, and education and 
culture. The co-chairmen, Secretary of State Henry 
A. Kissinger and Indian Minister for External Af- 
fairs Shri Y. B. Chavan, commended the three sub- 
commissions for the excellent beginning they have 
made in each of these fields since the Joint Commis- 
sion was founded in October 1974 during Secretary 
Kissinger's visit to New Delhi. The co-chairmen re- 



October 27, 1975 



viewed the constructive approaches already under 
way in each area and focused on how to build on 
this beginning. 

Economics and Commerce 

After hearing a report by Indian Finance Secretary 
M. G. Kaul on the progress of the Ek;onomic and 
Commercial Subcommission in promoting trade and 
investment, the Joint Commission endorsed plans for 
a wide-ranging program to: 

— Increase trade between the United States and 
India. This expansion is to be led by increased Indian 
exports to the United States of manufactured goods 
and modern industrial machinery and American ex- 
ports to India of high technology products and cap- 
ital equipment. 

— Stimulate trade promotion in each country 
through trade missions, trade shows, exhibits and 
catalog shows. 

— Proceed with the establishment of a Joint Busi- 
ness Council bringing together business leaders of 
both countries. The first meeting is to take place in 
New Delhi February 2-4, 1976. Its co-chairmen are 
distinguished business personalities, Mr. Orville Free- 
man and Mr. Harish Mahindra. The Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States and the Federation 
of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, to- 
gether with organizations from the Indian public 
sector, have agreed to participate. 

— Actively encourage joint ventures between In- 
dian and U.S. firms in third countries. 

— Continue the mutually beneficial consultations on 
agricultural inputs. The Agricultural Inputs Working 
Group met in February and October 1975, and made 
recommendations concerning the organization of an 
international seminar on fertilizer usage, the en- 
couragement of Indo-U.S. collaboration in fertilizer 
projects in third countries, and Indo-U.S. cooperation 
in fertilizer research. The Working Group will meet 
again early in 1976. 

— Conduct talks on a tax treaty between the 
United States and India in Washington October 16- 
17, 1975. 

The Indian delegation explained the opportunities 
for foreign investment in areas with high export po- 
tential, and those involving new technology not now 
available in India. It is expected that these oppor- 
tunities will also be actively pursued through the 
Joint Business Council. 

Plans are well advanced for the next meeting of 
the Economic and Commercial Subcommission in New 
Delhi in March 1976, following the meeting of the 
Joint Business Council. 

Science and Technology 

After a report by Dr. Nag Chaudhuri, Indian co- 
chairman of the Science and Technology Subcommis- 
sion and Vice Chancellor of Nehru University, the 
Joint Commission confirmed the interest of both coun- 



621 



tries in intensifying cooperation in the following 
areas: 

— agriculture; 

— energy and natural resources; 

— health; 

— electronics and communications; 

— environment; 

— exchanges of scientists and information. 

More than 20 joint projects have been approved 
by both Governments since January 1975. The two 
sides noted that these projects build on the history of 
long cooperation between them in science and tech- 
nology and are calculated to extend the practical 
benefits of the collaborative research of the past 15 
years. The co-chairmen stressed that cooperative pro- 
grams that are implemented by agreement of the 
two governments meet the test of mutual benefit and 
are fully endoi-sed by both Governments. 

The Subcommission on Science and Technology will 
hold its next meeting in New Delhi in the first half 
of December, 1975. 

Education and Culture 

The Joint Commission then considered a report 
submitted by Dr. Robert F. Goheen, American co- 
chairman of the Educational and Cultural Subcom- 
mission and Chairman of the Council on Foundations 
in the United States. 

The Joint Commission reviewed preparations for 
the first two joint seminars, one on "Museums as 
Educational Resources" and the other on "Methods 
in History, Old and New." The former will be held 
in the United States and the latter in India. Two 
other seminars are being planned for 1976: "Link- 
ages of Agriculture and Education" and "Educational 
Technology." 

The Joint Commission also endorsed the idea of a 
program of scholarships and visitorships to enable 
professionals from both sides to pursue specialized 
studies. 



The Joint Commission approved the idea of an ex- 
change of major cultural exhibitions between the two 
countries. An exhibition of Indian culture and art is 
being planned to tour the United States in 1977. 
Plans call for a comparable presentation of U.S. cul- 
ture and art in India in 1978. 

Finally, the Joint Commission approved the estab- 
lishment of a U.S. Secretariat for the Subcommission 
on Education and Culture at the Asia Society in New 
York City, and of an Indian Secretariat at the Indian 
Council for Cultural Relations in New Delhi. 

Dr. Goheen reported that the Subcommission would 
meet again on May 4-6, 1976 in New York City. 

Participation 

In addition to the Secretary of State and Minister 
of External Affairs, the following participated as 
Joint Conmiission members: 

For the United States 

Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll 

Ambassador to India William B. Saxbe 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South 

Asian Affairs Alfred L. Atherton 
Acting Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Inter- 
national Environmental and Scientific Affairs 
Myron Kratzer 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and 

Business Affairs Joel Biller 
Dr. Robert Goheen, Chairman, Council on Founda- 
tions 

For the Republic of India 

G. Parthasarathi, Chairman, Policy Planning Com- 
mittee, Ministry of External Affairs 

Ambassador T. N. Kaul, Ambassador to the United 
States 

Kewal Singh, Foreign Secretary, Minister of Ex- 
ternal Affairs 

M. G. Kaul, Secretary, Ministry of Finance 

Dr. B. D. Nag Chaudhuri, Vice Chancellor of Nehru 
University 



622 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Opposes Unilateral Establishment 
of 200-Mile U.S. Fisheries Zone 



Following are statements made before the 
House Committee on International Relations 
on September 2U by Under Secretary for 
Security Assistance Carlyle E. Maiu, who is 
Special Representative of the President for 
the Latv of the Sea Conference; John Norton 
Moore, Chairman of the National Security 
Council Interagency Task Force on the Law 
of the Sea and Deputy Special Representa- 
tive of the President for the Law of the Sea 
Conference; and Thomas A. Clingan, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries 
Affairs.'^ 



STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY MAW 

Chairman [Thomas E.] Morgan and mem- 
bers of the committee : 

I am pleased to appear today on behalf of 
the executive branch to testify on H.R. 200, 
which proposes to create an exclusive fish- 
eries zone extending 200 miles off the coasts 
of the United States. With me to describe the 
executive branch position are John Norton 
Moore, Chairman of the NSC Interagency 
Task Force on the Law of the Sea and 
Deputy Special Representative of the Presi- 
dent for the Law of the Sea Conference, and 
Thomas Clingan, who for the past year has 
served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs and 
as our principal fisheries negotiator. 

Mr. Chairman, we particularly appreciate 
the opportunity to testify today in light of 



^ The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



the very heavy schedule of foreign policy 
matters before this committee. As Secretary 
Kissinger has indicated to you, the Adminis- 
tration believes that the proposed 200-mile 
fisheries legislation raises serious foreign 
policy questions. Secretary Kissinger spoke 
about some of the foreign policy implica- 
tions on August 11 before the annual meet- 
ing of the American Bar Association in Mon- 
treal. He has asked me to elaborate on these 
implications today. 

The Administration shares the concern of 
members of Congress about the serious 
depletion of many fish stocks as a result 
of overfishing. As you know, we are ac- 
tively supporting the creation of a 200-mile 
economic resource zone that would include 
coastal fisheries as part of a comprehensive 
law of the sea treaty. 

However, it is one thing to establish a 
fisheries zone by agreement with the nations 
concerned. It is quite another to establish 
such a zone unilaterally in contravention of 
the existing rights of other nations to fish on 
the high seas. The President supports the 
establishment of a 200-mile fisheries zone 
by negotiation; he strongly opposes uni- 
lateral claims to jurisdiction on the high 
seas, such as the claim contemplated by H.R. 
200. 

The President is committed to undertake 
immediate initiatives to deal with the prob- 
lem of foreign overfishing. As Secretary Kis- 
singer announced in his speech to the Amer- 
ican Bar Association, the United States will 
begin now to negotiate interim agreements 
with nations fishing off our coasts as a tran- 
sition to an eventual 200-mile fisheries zone. 
We intend to establish, through negotiation 
rather than unilateral action, a transition to 



October 27, 1975 



623 



a 200-mile fisheries zone as rapidly as pos- 
sible. 

Before I ask Tom Clingan to outline our 
proposed plan for accomplishing this result, 
I would like to discuss briefly some of the 
serious adverse consequences which could re- 
sult from enactment of legislation such as 
H.R. 200. 

This legislation will seriously increase the 
potential for conflict around the world in at 
least two respects. Conflict may result, first, 
from our enforcement eff'orts against na- 
tions fishing off' our coasts and, secondly, from 
our attempts to protect our global oceans 
interests in more comprehensive zones — 
which certainly will be declared unilaterally 
by other nations, following our example. 

With respect to the first point, the United 
States has consistently resisted as a matter 
of principle the unilateral claims of other 
nations to jurisdiction over fisheries 200 
miles off" their coasts. Other states can be 
expected to resist our eff'orts unilaterally to 
assert such jurisdiction. Mr. Chairman, I am 
sure that members of this committee do not 
need any description from me of the enforce- 
ment problems we will face if other nations 
refuse to recognize our jurisdiction. 

With respect to the second point— conflicts 
resulting from our attempts to protect our 
global oceans interests — if the United States 
sets a precedent by acting unilaterally, a 
number of other nations can be expected to 
make claims which may not be limited to 
fisheries and which could purport to inter- 
fere with our rights of navigation, scientific 
research, and important defense and secu- 
rity interests. If all coastal states claimed 
200-mile zones without internationally agreed 
rules as to the content of these zones, one- 
third of the world's oceans would be subject 
to conflicting rules and claims, the very area 
in which much of the world's shipping 
travels. 

I believe that the essential question for 
this committee to consider is whether rules 
governing uses of the oceans are to be de- 
veloped through international agreement or 
are to be established by an uncontrollable 



pattern of inconsistent claims. 

The United States is a world leader not 
only because of its power but also because, 
in the years since World War II, we have 
attempted to minimize the possibilities of 
conflict and have taken the extra step to- 
ward building a structure of law in the world. 
What the United States does is of far greater 
consequence than what some other nations, 
with more limited concerns, may do. Our 
example in the oceans can encourage inter- 
national cooperation, or it can promote in- 
ternational disorder. If the United States 
participates in a process whereby each na- 
tion proclaims its own rules of law and 
seeks to impose them on others, the very 
basis of international law will be shaken. 

We believe that ultimately the rules de- 
fining the content of a 200-mile economic re- 
source zone, including fisheries, will be estab- 
lished by a law of the sea treaty. John Nor- 
ton Moore will elaborate on the impact that 
passage of this legislation will have on the 
Law of the Sea Conference. 

We are all agreed that we must act to 
meet the legitimate, pressing concerns re- 
lating to our coastal and distant-water fish- 
ing interests. We do not promise to solve 
these problems overnight; we do promise 
that we will begin now to negotiate agree- 
ments that will create a system of conserva- 
tion and enforcement that will protect im- 
portant U.S. fisheries resources. 

In this connection, I addressed the open- 
ing session of the special meeting of the In- 
ternational Commission for the Northwest 
Atlantic Fisheries in Montreal this past Mon- 
day morning to stress the importance that 
the United States attaches to a reduction of 
quotas for foreign fishermen in the fisheries 
off' New England and the Middle Atlantic 
states. I also delivered a personal message to 
the meeting from President Ford. I would 
like to give to the committee, for insertion 
in the record, a copy of the President's mes- 
sage, my remarks, and the remarks of Min- 
ister LeBlanc, the Canadian Minister of 
Fisheries. 

Mr. Chairman, I would now like to ask 



624 



Department of State Bulletin 



John Norton Moore briefly to address the 
question of how enactment of H.R. 200 would 
afl^ect the Law of the Sea Conference. 

STATEMENT BY MR. MOORE 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on 
behalf of the Administration in opposition to 
H.R. 200, a bill which would unilaterally ex- 
tend U.S. fisheries jurisdiction over coastal 
and anadromous species of fish. No issue has 
presented a starker choice for the future of 
our national oceans policy. How we decide 
this issue will largely determine whether we 
move foi-ward to cooperative solutions to 
oceans problems or precipitate a spiral of 
unilateral national claims leading inevitably 
to confrontation and conflict. 

Before turning to the substance of my 
testimony I would like to thank you and the 
other members of this committee who have 
strongly supported the work of the U.S. 
delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on 
the Law of the Sea. The members of this 
committee have recognized the importance 
of a timely and successful law of the sea 
treaty which fully pi'otects the vital inter- 
ests of the United States and the world com- 
munity as a whole. For our part, we recog- 
nize that the formulation of U.S. oceans 
policy is a shared responsibility between Con- 
gress and the executive, and we are deter- 
mined to make the law of the sea a model of 
cooperative partnership. 

As Under Secretary Maw has indicated, 
the Administration has recently concluded a 
thorough evaluation of our interim fisheries 
policy, and the President has determined 
strongly to oppose measures unilaterally ex- 
tending our fisheries jurisdiction. Factors 
which were weighed in that determination 
include the following. 

First, we are continuing to make progress 
toward a comprehensive law of the sea treaty 
which will provide balanced protection for 
all U.S. oceans interests and particularly our 
fisheries interests. 

The single negotiating text prepared at 
the Geneva session of the conference pro- 



vides for a 200-mile economic zone with 
coastal state preferential rights and man- 
agement responsibility over coastal species 
within the zone and broad protection for our 
important anadromous stocks within and be- 
yond the zone. It is agreed that these pro- 
visions, when implemented, will protect 
coastal and anadromous species on a world- 
wide basis. With your permission I would 
like to submit for the record the relevant 
provisions of the single negotiating text deal- 
ing with the fisheries issues. 

Although we have been disappointed with 
the work schedule of the Law of the Sea 
Conference, we believe that we are approach- 
ing the final stages in this important and 
complex multilateral negotiation. I would 
like to emphasize, however, that the nego- 
tiation cannot be completed before mid-1976 
at the earliest, and at this time it is not 
clear whether a treaty can be completed dur- 
ing 1976. 

Second, in the period between now and the 
conclusion of a fully effective law of the 
sea treaty, eff'orts to insure greater protec- 
tion of fish stocks through unilateral action 
could well be seriously counterproductive. 
Unilateral action by the United States will 
not be accepted and could result in a harden- 
ing of foreign positions. 

Third, a unilateral extension of fisheries 
jurisdiction such as that of H.R. 200 would 
be accompanied by a variety of serious costs 
to our oceans policy and international rela- 
tions. These include: 

• — A risk of confrontation with nations 
fishing off' our coasts ; 

— As Ambassador Clingan will develop, 
serious harm to U.S. distant-water fishing 
interests, particularly our important tuna 
and shrimp fleets; 

— Harm to development of universal fish- 
eries conservation obligations; 

— Serious harm to the law of the sea 
negotiations and the U.N. system; 

— A serious setback to the development of 
international legal institutions and the rule 
of law in the oceans; it is generally agreed 



October 27, 1975 



625 



that a unilateral extension of U.S. fisheries 
jurisdiction to 200 miles would be incon- 
sistent with existing international law; 

— Harm to our opportunity to achieve in- 
ternational agreement accommodating vital 
security interests, strategic mobility on the 
oceans, and freedom of navigation for the 
movement of commercial cargoes, such as 
oil; and 

— Substantial enforcement costs. It is ob- 
viously more costly to enforce against non- 
consenting nations fishing off our coasts than 
against nations who have agreed to our juris- 
diction, such as through a law of the sea 
treaty. 

Finally, we note that H.R. 200 is not a 
narrowly drawn conservation measure aimed 
solely at the prevention of depletion of stocks 
off the U.S. coasts and applying across-the- 
board to both U.S. and foreign fishermen. 
Rather, it is a sweeping measure aimed at 
broad extension of fisheries jurisdiction and 
preferential rights for U.S. fishermen. We 
believe such objectives, which we support, 
are best pursued through negotiations. In- 
deed, H.R. 200 tragically threatens to under- 
mine the progress made in the Third U.N. 
Conference toward general acceptance of 
these objectives as part of a comprehensive 
law of the sea treaty. 

We must not and will not sacrifice the 
interests of U.S. fishermen in the protection 
of stocks off our coasts. We are committed 
to a 200-mile economic zone as part of a 
comprehensive law of the sea treaty and to 
beginning immediately to negotiate the tran- 
sition to the 200-mile zone. A unilateral ex- 
tension of jurisdiction at this time, how- 
ever, would not be in the interests of our 
fishermen or of the overall oceans and po- 
litical interests of our nation. 

From time to time there is an issue of 
transcendent importance for national policy 
and the direction of our foreign relations. 
This is such a time and such an issue. It is 
imperative that we join together in reaffirm- 
ing cooperative solutions to our oceans prob- 
lems. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 



626 



STATEMENT BY MR. ClINGAN 

It is a pleasure for me to appear before 
this committee today and to describe some 
major fisheries initiatives which this Admin- 
istration plans to take to cope with our fish- 
eries problems. 

The executive branch made a commitment 
this spring to review interim fisheries poli- 
cies. This careful review has now been com- 
pleted. In explaining the Administration's 
continued opposition to unilateral legislation 
by the United States, Secretary Kissinger 
indicated in a speech in Montreal last month 
that we would begin now to negotiate new 
agreements with other nations as a transi- 
tion to a 200-mile fisheries zone. 

We hope that such a zone will eventually 
be recognized by a law of the sea treaty. 
Fisheries questions, like other oceans issues, 
can best be resolved within the context of 
broad multilateral agreement. However, I 
would like to make it clear that the course 
of action which I am going to outline is not 
necessarily linked either to existing arrange- 
ments or to the timing of the Law of the 
Sea Conference. Most importantly, the course 
of action is based on negotiation, not uni- 
lateral action, and is designed to insure that 
the benefits of a 200-mile coastal fisheries 
zone is in practical effect as soon as possible. 

Our plan will be to accomplish through 
negotiations the following objectives within 
200 miles off our coasts : 

— Establishment of an effective conserva- 
tion regime based on the best available scien- 
tific evidence; 

— Consistent with such a regime, the crea- 
tion of preferential harvesting rights for 
U.S. fishermen to the full limits of their har- 
vesting capacity, with the surplus allocated 
among foreign fishermen, thereby substan- 
tially reducing foreign catches; 

— Implementation of a standardized sys- 
tem for collection of fisheries data with in- 
formation contributed by both foreign and 
domestic fishermen ; 

— Introduction of more effective enforce- 
ment procedures ; and 



Department of State Bulletin 



pa 



— Implementation of satisfactory arrange- 
ments to resolve gear conflicts and insure 
adequate foreign compensation to U.S. fish- 
ermen in case of negligence by foreign fisher- 
men. 

Mr. Chairman, we plan to accomplish these 
objectives by working within the framework 
of existing fisheries commissions wherever 
possible as well as through bilateral agree- 
ments. We presently have at least 11 bilateral 
fisheries agreements due for renegotiation 
next year, as well as regular meetings of six 
multilateral fisheries commissions. We in- 
tend during these negotiations to establish 
the philosophical underpinnings of our plan 
and to accomplish through phased negotia- 
tions, rather than by unilateral action, the 
functional equivalent of a 200-mile fisheries 
zone. 

We are now completing plans for specific 
steps to be taken and will announce these 
in the coming several weeks. We will, of 
course, be consulting with interested mem- 
bers of Congress in this regard. 

We also intend to work closely with our 
neighbors to resolve potential differences and 
are developing, on a priority basis, other 
initiatives to resolve the problems of our dis- 
tant-water fishermen. Upon completion of 
the first round of fisheries negotiations next 
year, we will be able to assess more fully 
the success of our plan. 

Obviously, we cannot assure success. There 
are, however, several factors favorable to 
such agreements that have not been present 
in past fisheries negotiations. The first, of 
course, is the widespread agreement in the 
Law of the Sea Conference on a 200-mile 
coastal fisheries zone, and the second is the 
great pressures building in coastal fishing 
states to declare such zones if international 
agreement is not reached. 

Distant-water fishing states such as the 
U.S.S.R. have indicated their willingness to 
accept a 200-mile zone covering fisheries as 
part of a comprehensive law of the sea 
treaty. Other nations recognize the reality 
of this situation. These nations must be pre- 
pared to negotiate mutually acceptable ar- 



October 27, 1975 



rangements that will permit their continued 
participation in coastal fisheries. Our own 
distant-water fishing fleets are similarly af- 
fected, and we believe that the course of bi- 
lateral and multilateral agreement will also 
permit negotiations on behalf of our shrimp 
and tuna fleets that unilateral action on our 
part might preclude. 

To direct the implementation of our fish- 
eries plan, the Department of State has es- 
tablished a special task force with inter- 
agency participation. I have agreed to stay 
on with the Department to chair this group 
and to direct our efforts to solve these prob- 
lems in the shortest possible time. 

Mr. Chairman, I believe the executive 
branch and the Congress hold similar views 
on the fisheries objectives to be accom- 
plished. Any course of action must meet 
long-range conservation requirements and be 
sound from the point of view of fisheries 
management as well as a negotiating point 
of view. The plan will meet these require- 
ments. 



Department Supports Convention 
on Protection of Diplomats 

Statement by Monroe Leigh 
Legal Adviser ' 

I appreciate the opportunity to present the 
views of the Department of State on the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punish- 
ment of Crimes Against Internationally Pro- 
tected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 
which was submitted by President Ford with 
a view to receiving the advice and consent 
of the Senate to ratification. ^ 



' Read before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on Sept. 16 by Deputy Assistant Legal Ad- 
viser Ronald J. Bettauer. The complete transcript of 
the hearings will be published by the committee and 
will be available from the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing^ton, 
D.C. 20402. 

° For text of the President's message, see Bulletin 
of Dec. 9, 1974, p. 803; for text of the convention, see 
Bulletin of Jan. 28, 1974, p. 92. 



627 



As Secretary Kissinger recently said in his 
Montreal speech [August 11], the interna- 
tional community has a duty to act vigor- 
ously to combat international terrorism. 

A major U.S. initiative in the multilateral 
area was the development of the Convention 
on the Protection of Diplomats. The United 
States took a leading role in the negotiation 
of the convention at the 1973 session of the 
United Nations General Assembly. The draft 
that was submitted to the Assembly, more- 
over, was produced by the International Law 
Commission under the chairmanship of its 
U.S. member. Ambassador Richard D. Kear- 
ney. 

Adoption of the draft by the Assembly 
brought to fruition a major diplomatic effort 
by the United States. A long-established 
principle of inviolability of diplomatic agents 
was being threatened by random acts of 
violence in various parts of the world. Al- 
though the international legal obligation to 
protect these persons was never questioned, 
the mechanism for international cooperation 
to insure that perpetrators of serious at- 
tacks against such persons are brought to 
justice, no matter where they may flee, was 
lacking. 

The General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions responded to the need by adopting the 
convention and in effect declaring that no 
diplomat may be attacked with impunity. 
In signing the convention two weeks after 
its adoption, the United States acted under a 
strong sense of urgency because it was 
thought that the convention should go into 
force as promptly as possible. The urgency 
remains. Attacks against diplomats have con- 
tinued. In March 1974, Vice Consul John 
Patterson was kidnaped from the American 
Consulate in Hermosillo, Mexico, and his 
body was found 107 days later. In April 1974, 
a USIA officer was wounded during a kidnap- 
ing in Cordoba, Argentina. In August 1974, 
U.S. Ambassador Rodger Davies was assas- 
sinated in Nicosia, Cyprus. In September 
1974, another USIA officer was kidnaped, 
this time in the Dominican Republic. In Feb- 
ruary 1975, U.S. Consular Agent in Argen- 
tina John Egan was kidnaped from his home 
and later found murdered. 



628 



The Congress has taken action already to 
deal with attacks on diplomats that occur in 
U.S. territory. In 1972 Public Law 92-539 
was enacted to cover crimes against foreign 
officials and official guests of the United 
States. That act was the basis, for example, 
for the conviction of Napoleon Lechoco in 
June 1975 for the kidnaping of the Philip- 
pine Ambassador in Washington, D.C. The 
enactment of P.L. 92-539 established a do- 
mestic legal framework for dealing with at- 
tacks on diplomats in the United States. This 
must be .supplemented by U.S. participation 
in the international system which will permit 
us more effectively to deal with attacks on 
U.S. diplomats and other diplomats abroad. 
The convention and its implementing legis- 
lation are designed to achieve this. 

The basic mechanism of the convention is 
similar to that employed in the field of inter- 
ference with civil aviation — specifically in 
the Hague (Hijacking) and Montreal (Sabo- 
tage) Conventions. The convention requires 
submission for prosecution or extradition of 
persons alleged to have committed serious 
crimes against diplomats. Such crimes as 
murder and kidnaping, as well as threats 
and attempts, are covered. Under the im- 
plementing legislation being proposed by 
the Departments of State and Justice, we 
will establish jurisdiction over such offenses, 
wherever they occur. We would then be able 
to prosecute or extradite the alleged offender 
for such crimes, wherever they occur. 

As of now there are only nine parties to 
the convention and 28 signatories, including 
the United States. Since 22 states must be- 
come parties before the convention comes 
into force, it is not yet in force. We believe 
expeditious U.S. action in ratifying the con- 
vention can maintain our leadership in com- 
bating international terrorism. Our ratifica- 
tion would certainly be an incentive for other 
states to ratify. And it is only with wide 
ratification that the convention can be truly 
effective in limiting attacks on diplomats. 

We therefore urge the committee to rec- 
ommend that the Senate give its advice and 
consent to ratification of this important con- 
vention. We will also recommend prompt 
and favorable action by the appropriate corn- 



Department of State Bulletin 



«r 



mittees on draft implementing legislation, 
which the Departments of State and Justice 
will shortly submit jointly. Such legislation 
must be passed before the United States is in 
a position to carry out its obligations under 
the convention. 



Congressional Documents 
at Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 1st Session 

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for As- 
sistance to the Republic of South Vietnam for 
Fiscal Year 1975. Hearings before Subcommittees 
of the House Committee on Appropriations. April 
21, 1975. 46 pp. 

Use of United States Military Forces in the Evacua- 
tion of United States Citizens and Others from 
South Vietnam. Communication from the Presi- 
dent of the United States transmitting a report on 
participation of United States military forces in 
the evacuation of United States citizens and 
others from South Vietnam, pursuant to section 
4 of the vi^ar powers resolution (Public Law 
93-148). H. Doc. 94-124. May 1, 1975. 2 pp. 

The United States and the United Nations. Hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on the United States and the United Nations (May 
7-22, 1975) and on the nomination of Daniel Pat- 
rick Moynihan to be U.S. Representative to the 
Unit<?d Nations (June 4, 1975). 538 pp. 

Authorizing U.S. Contributions to United Nations 
Peacekeeping Forces. Report of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations to accompany 
S. 818. H. Kept. 94-200. May 12, 1975. 4 pp. 

Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act Amendments of 
1975. Report of the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 5709. 
H. Rept. 94-216. May 15, 1975. 27 pp. 

Endorsing the World Food Conference of 1976 in 
Ames, Iowa. Report of the House Committee on 
International Relations to accompany H. Con. Res. 
136. H. Rept. 94-218. May 15, 1975. 2 pp. 

Temporary Rental of Railroad Rolling Stock by 
Foreign Corporations. Report of the House Com- 
mittee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 
5559. H. Rept. 94-251. June 3, 1975. 5 pp. 

State Department Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 
1976 and 1977. Report of the House Committee 
on International Relations to accompany H.R. 
7500. H. Rept. 94-264. June 5, 1975. 15 pp. 

Protocols for the Further Extension of the Wheat 
Trade and Food Aid Conventions, 1971. Message 
from the President of the United States trans- 
mitting the protocols. S. Ex. C. June 11, 1975. 8 pp. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 
1975. Report of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations to accompany H.R. 7567. H. Rept. 
94-281. June 11, 1975. 24 pp. 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AND CONFERENCES 



October 27, 1975 



Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Meeting 
Held at Montreal 

A special meeting of the International 
Commission for the Northivest Atlantic Fish- 
eries (ICNAF) was held at Montreal Sep- 
tember 22-28. Following are texts of a mes- 
sage from President Ford, lohich ivas read be- 
fore the meeting on September 22 by Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance Carlyle E. 
Maiv, together with a U.S. statement issued 
at Montreal on September 28 at the conclu- 
sion of the meeting. 



MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 29 

This special meeting of the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fish- 
eries takes up the most difficult problem in 
the Commission's twenty-five year history. I 
send my warmest greetings and good wishes 
to the participants. 

It is imperative that the Commission suc- 
ceed in establishing adequate conservation 
measures and enforcement procedures to re- 
build the important fishery stocks of the 
Northwest Atlantic. If agreement cannot be 
reached on reasonable conservation and en- 
forcement measures, the ability of the Com- 
mission to fulfill its stated purposes will be 
called into question. For our part, I pledge 
the full support of the United States to 
sound fisheries management and conserva- 
tion practices, based on scientific evidence 
and implemented within the framework of 
internationally negotiated agreements. 

I am strongly opposed to unilateral claims 
by nations to jurisdiction on the high seas. 
However, pressures for unilateral measures 
do exist, and will continue to mount, if inter- 
national arrangements do not prove to be 
effective. 



629 



It is my earnest hope that the Commission 
will vindicate the trust we place in it and 
fully justify our mutual efforts to find co- 
operative approaches to fisheries conserva- 
tion and management for the benefit of all 
mankind. In this spirit, I send you best 
wishes for a productive and rewarding ses- 
sion. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



U.S. STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION 
OF THE MEETING 

Press release 510 dated October 1 

Satisfactory agreement was reached September 28 
on all major U.S. proposals before the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
(ICNAF). The seventh special meeting of the Com- 
mission concluded Sunday after a week of delibera- 
tions which were characterized as some of the most 
successful in the Commission's 25-year history by 
David H. Wallace, chairman of the U.S. delegation. 

The special meeting of the 17-member-nation body 
which deals with the conservation of fish stocks in 
the Northwest Atlantic was called at the request of 
the United States and Canada to resolve outstanding 
issues on the reduction of fishing effort and quotas 
in the convention area which had not been satisfac- 
torily resolved at the annual meeting of the Com- 
mission in June. 

The Commission took positive action on U.S. pro- 
posals for a reduced 1976 overall catch quota for 
the entire fish biomass off the U.S. coast, a closure 
of most of the Georges Bank area to vessels capable 
of catching valuable and depleted groundfish species, 
a national system of vessel registration, and more 
restrictive and enforceable exemption provisions for 
trawl net fisheries conducted off the U.S. and Cana- 
dian coasts. 

Opening ceremonies at the start of the special 
meeting on September 22 included an address by U.S. 
Under Secretary of State Carlyle E. Maw, who 
brought with him a message from the President of 
the United States of America. The President's mes- 
sage to the Commission stressed the great impor- 
tance which the United States attaches to effective 
conservation measures, efficient enforcement of those 
measures, and the particular importance of a success- 
ful ICNAF meeting at this critical time. 

A principal U.S. objective at the Montreal meeting 
was to obtain a 1976 overall fishing quota for the 
area off the U.S. coast which would allow a rapid 
recovery of the depleted biomass. This "second tier 
quota" is allocated nationally to limit what each 
nation can harvest from the biomass as a whole. It 
is imposed as a ceiling figure over the individual 
species quotas and is less than the sum of the indi- 



vidual species quotas in order to encourage the de- 
velopment of fishing methods which concentrate on 
the target species and reduce the bycatch of other 
species. 

The second-tier system was first approved in 1973 
for application in the 1974 fishing season in an effort 
to substantially reduce overall foreign catches off the 
U.S. coast. Second-tier-quota levels established for 
1974 and 1975 were designed to stabilize the biomass, 
and the Commission had agreed that the 1976 level 
would be set at an amount which would allow re- 
covery of the biomass to the maximum-sustainable- 
yield level. 

The June annual meeting had agreed to what the 
United States regarded as an excessive level of 
724,000 metric tons by excluding squids from the 
regulation. This had not been the case in either 1974 
or 1975. Scientists estimated that at such a level at 
least a full decade would be required for stock re- 
covery. The United States regarded this as unaccept- 
able and filed a formal objection to the regulation 
under the rules of the Commission. As a result of 
this week's meeting, the Commission has agreed to 
set the 1976 level at 650,000 metric tons including 
squids. This level should provide a high probability 
of recovery within seven years, according to U.S. 
fisheries scientists. 

No action had been taken at the June meeting on 
a U.S. proposal to limit bycatches of valuable and 
seriously depleted yellowtail flounder and haddock 
stocks on Georges Bank through closure of this area 
to vessels using gear capable of catching these 
groundfish. Arguments had been raised by others 
that such a regulation would seriously interfere with 
fisheries for species such as cod and the hakes. At 
the Montreal meeting, agreement was reached on a 
regulation closing a large area on Georges Bank to 
such vessels throughout the year. Though slightly 
smaller than the area originally proposed for closure 
by the United States, the area is sufficiently large to 
provide satisfactory protection for these important 
stocks. 

Further progress in the critical area of improved 
international enforcement was also a principal U.S. 
objective at the special meeting. This was achieved 
to a significant extent with the approval of a U.S.- 
proposed system of national registration for vessels 
engaged in fishing or fish processing in the conven- 
tion area. Such a system is designed to assist mem- 
ber governments and international enforcement per- 
sonnel in monitoring fishing effort deployed through- 
out the area. 

U.S. efforts at the annual meeting in June to secure 
approval of such a system had not been successful. 
Additional progress in this area as well as added 
control over bycatches of regulated species was 
achieved with the approval of a more restrictive and 
more easily enforceable exemption for trawl net fish- 
eries conducted oflF both the U.S. and Canadian coasts. 

Canada was successful in securing approval for a 



630 



Department of State Bulletin 



regulation designed to substantially reduce fishing 
effort on groundfish stocks in five portions of the 
convention area off the Canadian coast. The regula- 
tion provides for reduction in fishing days for vari- 
ous fishing vessel tonnage and gear categories rang- 
ing from 40 to 50 percent from that reported in the 
1972 and 1973 periods. 

The meeting concluded with an announcement by 
the observer from Cuba that action required for Cuba 
to become a member of the Commission would be 
immediately initiated by his government. The Com- 
mission had approved adjustments in quota alloca- 
tions for a number of stocks providing the specified 
catch allocations necessary for Cuba to fish within 
established conservation regulations throughout 1976. 

The next meeting of the Commission will be held 
in Rome, Italy, in January 1976. The meeting has 
been called to establish quotas for a number of North- 
west Atlantic herring stocks fished off both U.S. and 
Canadian coasts. Additional proposals on enforce- 
ment, made by the United States, will also be on 
the agenda. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Aviation 

Additional protocol no. 3 to amend the convention 
for the unification of certain rules relating to 
international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on 
October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by 
the protocols done at The Hague on September 28, 
1955, and at Guatemala City on March 8, 1971. 
Done at Montreal September 25, 1975. Enters into 
force on the 90th day after the deposit of the 30th 
instrument of ratification. 

Signatiii-es : Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Portugal, Switzerland, United King- 
dom, United States, Venezuela, September 25, 
1975. 
Montreal protocol no. 4 to amend the convention for 
the unification of certain rules relating to inter- 
national carriage by air signed at Warsaw on 
October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by 
the protocol done at The Hague on September 28, 
1955. Done at Montreal September 25, 1975. Enters 
into force on the 90th day after the deposit of the 
30th instrument of ratification. 
Signatures: Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Portugal, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, 
Zaire, September 25, 1975. 



Bills of Lading 

International convention for the unification of certain 
rules relating to bills of lading and protocol of 
signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. 
Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the United 
States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233. 
Adherence deposited: Lebanon, July 19, 1975. 

Protocol to amend the international convention for 
the unification of certain rules of law relating to 
bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 1924 
(51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 23, 
1968.' 
Accession deposited: Lebanon, July 19, 1975. 

Energy 

Memorandum of understanding concerning coopera- 
tive information exchange relating to the develop- 
ment of solar heating and cooling systems in build- 
ings. Formulated at Odeillo, France, October 1-4, 
1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 
Signature: Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche 
(Italy), July 21, 1975. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 

Reconstruction and Development, as amended. 

Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered 

into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 

Signature and acceptance: Papua New Guinea, 
October 9, 1975. 
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 

Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. 

Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 

Signature and acceptance: Papua New Guinea, 
October 9, 1975. 

Racial Discrimination 

International convention on the elimination of all 
forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York 
December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 
1969.= 

Ratification deposited: Australia, September 30, 
1975. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention for the unification of certain rules with 

respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Done at 

Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into force 

March 1, 1913. 37 Stat. 1658. 

Adherence deposited: Oman, August 21, 1975. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London November 26, 1968.' 

Acceptance deposited: Syria, September 10, 1975. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptance deposited: Syria, September 10, 1975. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 12, 1971.' 

Acceptance deposited: Syria, September 10, 1975. 



' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 



October 27, 1975 



631 



Telecommunications 

International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 
1915.' 
Ratifications deposited: Finland, July 28, 1975; 

Mexico, July 23, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Korea, Democratic People's 
Republic, September 24, 1975. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Liberia, September 30, 1975. 

Trade 

Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered 
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptance deposited: Jamaica, September 17, 
1975. 

Whaling 

Amendments to paragraphs 1, 2(c), 3(c), 5, 6, 8, 
11-15, 17(a), 20, and 22 to the schedule to the 
international whaling convention, 1946 (TIAS 
1849). Adopted at London June 27, 1975. Entered 
into force October 3, 1975. 



BILATERAL 

Egypt 

Agreement amending the arrangement of April 13 
and 25, 1974 (TIAS 7882), relating to assistance 
by the United States in the clearance of mines and 
unexploded ordnance from the Suez Canal so as to 



' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 



make the operations applicable to the Port Said 
area. Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo 
August 20 and September 25, 1975. Entered into 
force September 25, 1975. 

Ethiopia 

Grant agreement relating to a drought recovery and 
rehabilitation program in Ethiopia, with annexes. 
Signed at Addis Ababa February 20, 1975. Entered 
into force February 20, 1975. 

Agreement amending the agreement of February 20, 
1975, relating to a drought recovery and rehabili-'' 
tation program in Ethiopia. Signed at Addis Ababa 
April 17, 1975. Entered into force April 17, 1975. 

India 

Agreed minutes of the second session of the U.S.- 
India Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, 
Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural 
Cooperation. Signed at Washington October 7, 1975. 
Entered into force October 7, 1975. 

Iran 

Agreement amending and extending the military 
mission agreement of November 27, 1943, as 
amended and extended (57 Stat. 1262, TIAS 1941, 
7803). Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran 
April 12, August 3 and 14, 1975. Entered into force 
August 14, 1975, effective March 21, 1975. 

Peru 

Agreement terminating the agreement of November 
23, 1971 relating to trade in cotton textiles and 
providing for consultation on problems of market 
disruption caused by exports of textiles or textile 
products from Peru. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Lima June 13 and September 10, 1975. Entered 
into force September 10, 1975. 

Singapore 

Agreement concerning U.S. participation on a limited 
voluntary basis in the Central Provident Fund Act 
for certain employees of the U.S. Government in 
Singapore. Effected by exchange of notes at Singa- 
pore September 8 and 9, 1975. Entered into force 
September 9, 1975. 



632 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 27, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1896 



Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 629 

Department Opposes Unilateral Establishment 
of 200-Mile U.S. Fisheries Zone (Clingan, 
Maw, Moore) 623 

Department Supports Convention on Protection 
of Diplomats (Leigh) 627 

President Urges Approval of U.S. Role in Sinai 
Early Warning System (letter to Speaker 
of the House) 613 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Egypt-Israel 
Agreement (statement before Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations) 609 

Economic Affairs 

Department Opposes Unilateral Establishment 
of 200-Mile U.S. Fisheries Zone (Clingan, 
Maw, Moore) 623 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Meeting Held at 
Montreal (message from President Ford, 
U.S. statement) 629 

Egypt 

President Urges Approval of U.S. Role in Sinai 
Early Warning System (letter to Speaker 
of the House) 613 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Egypt-Israel 
Agreement (statement before Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations) 609 

India. Indo-U.S. Joint Commission Meets at 
Washington (Chavan, Kissinger, joint com- 
munique) 620 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Meeting Held 
at Montreal (message from President Ford, 
U.S. statement) 629 

Israel 

President Urges Approval of U.S. Role in Sinai 
Early Warning System (letter to Speaker 
of the House) 613 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Egypt-Israel 
Agreement (statement before Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations) 609 

Japan 

Emperor Hirohito of Japan Makes State Visit 
to the United States (Ford, Emperor Hiro- 
hito) 615 

Japan-United States Friendship Days (procla- 
mation) 616 

Law of the Sea. Department Opposes Unilat- 
eral Establishment of 200-Mile U.S. Fisheries 
Zone (Clingan, Maw, Moore) ...... 623 

Middle East 

President Urges Approval of U.S. Role in Sinai 
Early Warning Systeni (letter to Speaker 
of the House) 613 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Egypt-Israel 
Agreement (statement before Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations) 609 

Presidential Documents 

Emperor Hirohito of Japan Makes State Visit 
to the United States 615 

Japan-United States Friendship Days (procla- 
mation) 616 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Meeting Held at 
Montreal 629 



President Urges Approval of U.S. Role in Sinai 
Early Warning System 613 

Terrorism. Department Supports Convention on 
Protection of Diplomats (Leigh) 627 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 631 

Department Supports Convention on Protection 
of Diplomats (Leigh) 627 



Name Index 

Chavan, Y. B 620 

Clingan, Thomas A 623 

Emperor Hirohito 615 

Ford, President 613, 615, 616 

Kissinger, Secretary 609, 620, 629 

Leigh, Monroe 627 

Maw, Carlyle E 623 

Moore, John Norton 623 



Check List of Department of State 


Press Releases: October 6-12 


Press releases may be obtained from the 


Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 


Washington 


, D.C. 20520. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


*511 


10/6 


Energy officials of 21 nations to 
visit U.S. Oct. 6-31. 


*512 


10/6 


Edward Albee to tour Japan. 


*-513 


10/6 


Advisery Panel on Music, Nov. 3. 


*514 


10/6 


U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Oct. 31. 


*515 


10/6 


Advisory Committee on "Foreign 
Relations of the United States," 
Nov. 14. 


*516 


10/6 


Fine Arts Committee, Nov. 17. 


*517 


10/6 


Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCO, Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) working 
group on ship design and equip- 
ment, Nov. 5. 


*518 


10/6 


sec, SOLAS, working group on 
standards of training and watch- 
keeping, Nov. 5. 


*519 


10/6 


sec, SOLAS, working group on 
fire protection, Nov. 6. 


*520 


10/6 


sec, SOLAS, working group on 
life-saving appliances, Nov. 6. 


*-521 


10/7 


U.S. and Peru terminate textile 
agreement. 


522 


10/7 


Kissinger: Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee. 


523 


10/7 


Indo-U.S. Joint Commission com- 
munique. 


523A 10/7 


Kissinger, Chavan: remarks. 


*524 


10/9 


U.S. women leaders to visit NATO 
Oct. 11-25. 

ited. 


* Not prir 



/J 



Superintendent of Documents 
us. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. DC. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourth-Class Rate 
Book 




7 



Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



AJ: 



74 



vsr? 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXm • No. 1897 • November 3, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER VISITS CANADA 633 

SECRETARY REPLIES TO HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE 

REQUEST FOR "DISSENT CHANNEL" MEMORANDUM 

Text of Letter 6i5 

UNITED STATES REJECTS ALLEGATIONS IN U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
Statetnent by Clarence M. Mitchell, Jr. 6^9 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN! 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1897 
November 3, 1975 



For aale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic $42.50, foreign $63.16 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, 



The Department of State BULLETIN; 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department ani 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addresses,\ 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other\ 
officers of the Department, as well av 
special articles on various phases ot< 
international affairs and the funetiona] 
of the Department. Information ia 
included concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 






Secretary Kissinger Visits Canada 



Secretary Kissinger visited Ottawa Octo- 
ber 14-15. Folloxving are remarks made by 
Allan MacEachen, Canadian Secretary of 
State for External Affairs, and Secretary 
Kissinger upon Secretary Kissinger's arrival 
on October H, their exchange of toasts at a 
dinner given by Minister MacEachen that 
evening, and the transcript of a news con- 
ference they held on October 15. 



ARRIVAL, on AW A, OCTOBER 14 

Press release 526 dated October 14 

Minister MacEachen 

Mr. Secretary: On behalf of the Govern- 
ment of Canada, and on my own behalf, it 
is a deep pleasure for me to welcome you and 
Mrs. Kissinger to Canada. This is your third 
visit to our capital in recent years, and in 
many ways you could not have picked a better 
time to come to Ottawa, bedecked as it is 
in the reds and golds of autumn. 

In our meetings, Mr. Secretary, at various 
places throughout the world — in Europe, at 
the United Nations, in Washington — I have 
placed great value on the discussions we have 
had about matters of mutual interest to both 
our countries. I have profited from learning 
of your views on major issues facing our na- 
tions and our contemporary world. Our dis- 
cussions have been very much in the tradi- 
tion of the close communication which has 
existed between our two countries. 

In this tradition, your visit to Ottawa will, 
I am sure, add further to our mutual under- 
standing and enhance what I believe to be a 
unique bilateral relationship. Our discussions 
will, I think, be friendly and wide-ranging 
and of the kind that takes place between 
foreign ministers of countries which are old 
friends who know and respect each other. 



During your all too short stay in Ottawa, 
Mr. Secretary, you will have an opportunity 
to meet the Prime Minister of Canada, a 
number of my colleagues in the Cabinet, 
members of the opposition, and Canadians 
from different parts of our vast land. I know 
that all whom you will meet will join me 
in welcoming you and in voicing appreciation 
for the indefatigable and constructive efforts 
you have made to enhance peace and stability 
in our troubled world. Bearing in mind the 
Bicentennial of your great nation, I want to 
express the profound admiration of Cana- 
dians for the achievements, creativity, vital- 
ity, and leadership which is so representative 
of the United States of America. 

Thank you. 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Minister: On behalf of my colleagues 
and myself, I would like to express our great 
pleasure at being able to realize this long- 
held plan to visit Canada. I have visited 
Canada — this is in fact the third time in re- 
cent months — but this is my first official visit 
to Ottawa and I look forward to friendly, 
warm, and detailed talks with my colleague 
and with other Ministers. 

The Foreign Minister has correctly char- 
acterized our relationship not as special, as 
has sometimes been said, but as unique. We 
have closer consultation with Canada than 
with any other nation. We share more com- 
mon problems, and we share the need for 
parallel solutions on a whole range of issues. 

Canada is no longer a junior partner, but 
a country which rightfully takes its place 
in the economic and political councils of the 
world — a country whose participation we 
think is crucial in the meetings of the pro- 
ducers and consumers and also at the eco- 
nomic summit that is being planned for Paris 
in November. 



November 3, 1975 



633 



Beyond this, we have benefited enormously 
from the frequent, cordial, and informal ex- 
changes of view that take place at all levels 
between all ministries and also at the highest 
levels. I look forward very much to my talks 
with my colleague here as well as with the 
Prime Minister and to the warm and cordial 
reception which I have already received and 
which I know is always characteristic of 
Ottawa. 

Thank you very much. 



EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, OCTOBER 14 

Press release 532 dated October 16 

Minister MacEachen 

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger: Your visit 
to Ottawa is the first occasion that I have 
of returning the hospitality you have ex- 
tended to me in Washington — and also 
aboard your U.S. jet, which seems to have 
become your natural habitat! I welcome this 
further opportunity of exchanging views 
with you, an experience I found rewarding 
both on the ground and in the air. 

This evening could have been devoted to a 
working dinner; but I felt it would be more 
useful to bring you in contact not only with 
Ministers and government officials, but also 
with members of the opposition and citizens 
from all the regions of Canada. Around this 
table we have a cross-section of the Canadian 
people involved in a variety of ways in the 
very close and diversified relationship that 
exists between our two countries. 

During our talks tomorrow, we shall be 
exchanging views on the international situa- 
tion. In this way we will be participating in 
the process of building a lasting structure of 
peace and security, the main aim of your 
foreign policy. 

As a student of history, Mr. Kissinger, you 
are aware of the inherent instability of any 
world order which is too heavily weighted in 
favor of a given country. As a citizen of the 
United States, you recognize the need for 
pragmatism and flexibility in the conduct of 
foreign affairs — principles which, I hasten to 
recall in the spirit of your country's Bi- 
centennial celebrations, Alexander Hamilton 



and Thomas Jefferson, each in his own way, 
made the cornerstone of the United States 
foreign policy. 

What you seek to achieve, Mr. Secretary, 
was well described in a speech you made in 
New Delhi last October. Allow me to quote a 
few sentences from it: 

Our goal (you said) is to move toward a world 
where power blocs and balances are not dominant; 
where justice, not stability, can be our overriding 
preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation 
in the global interest to be in their national interest. 
For all that has been achieved, we must realize that 
we have taken only the first hesitant steps on a long 
and arduous road. 

This goal, which induced the U.S. Govern- 
ment to recast its diplomacy in a multipolar 
framework, is very similar to our own. We do 
not emphasize the same elements in the evolv- 
ing power structure; nor do we necessarily 
draw the same policy conclusions from the 
same elements. For we are distinct societies, 
each with its own history, array of national 
interests, and bevy of domestic constraints. 
But there is no doubt in my mind that the 
current evolution of the United States foreign 
policy allows Canada to implement its own 
policy of diversification — what we call the 
"third option"; that is, an attempt to de- 
velop further and deepen our relations with 
other countries of the world while moving on 
with our very close and valued links with 
your country, the first and the most im- 
portant among all our partners. 

Thus we hope to play a role on the world 
scene which corresponds to Canada's aspira- 
tions and resources. As you have stated 
many times yourself, leadership in the in- 
ternational community cannot be the burden 
of only one great power. I would add that 
leadership equally cannot be the exclusive 
prerogative of the great powers. Thus it 
should be considered quite normal for mid- 
dle powers and even small countries to par- 
ticipate in the resolution of international 
problems or in the defusing of localized con- 
flicts. This form of leadership sometimes 
carries risks; it is nonetheless necessary to 
assure humanity's constant progression to- 
ward the new political and economic order 
to which all peoples aspire. 

On occasion we in Canada have been able 



634 



Department of State Bulletin 



5 



to play a leading role in world affairs. We 
have done so with your sympathy and under- 
standing, and we are confident this will be 
so in the future. That a middle power border- 
ing the world's strongest power can act 
freely and independently is high tribute to 
the maturity of our bilateral relationship and 
our conception of international relations. 

Our shared heritage of North American 
development, our joint achievement of the 
largest bilateral trading relationship in the 
world, and similarities in our basic values 
have all contributed to our healthy and mu- 
tually beneficial relationship. That each gov- 
ernment responds with different perspectives 
to different imperatives only serves to under- 
score the significance, and the soundness, of 
our mutual accomplishment in maintaining 
continued good relations. Indeed, the mutual 
respect, enormous good will, and undeniable 
benefits accruing to both countries as a re- 
sult of the successful cooperation of our so- 
cieties point up the unique importance of our 
relationship, no matter from whose perspec- 
tive it is viewed. 

As a Canadian, Mr. Secretary, I have be- 
come increasingly conscious of Canada's dis- 
tinctiveness, as well as of her capacity and 
determination to chart and control her 
chosen course. 

As a Member of Parliament and as a 
Minister of the Crown, I am particularly 
aware of the interests and priorities of the 
Government of Canada. I refer particularly 
to: 

— Assuring stable economic growth and 
thus jobs for Canadians and adequate in- 
comes for their efforts. 

— Combating inflation so that these are 
not dissipated. 

— Stimulating the development of our 
manufacturing sector, especially of those in- 
dustries which have a high technological 
base. 

— Assuring a rational development of our 
own energy resources so that long-term do- 
mestic needs can be met. 

— Deriving significant benefit from foreign 
investments in Canada. 

But as Foreign Minister, I am struck by 
the interdependence of the world's political 



and economic entities, by the need for na- 
tions to take reasonable account of each 
other's legitimate interests, and by the heavy 
burden upon us all to work unrelentingly for 
the elusive balance between safeguarding the 
vital interests of one's own nation and avoid- 
ing injustice and prejudice to the proper in- 
terests of other nations. 

Canada and the United States, because of 
our complex and varied interrelations, inevi- 
tably and frequently make decisions which 
affect the interests of the other — perhaps 
now more than ever before. 

The challenge we face, and constantly, is 
to keep abreast conceptually of the changes 
that have taken place or will take place in 
our relationship, so that mutual understand- 
ing is based on reality rather than fiction 
or emotion — past or present — so that this 
understanding effectively bears upon the 
resolution of bilateral issues. 

It is with these thoughts in mind and in 
the spirit that has stimulated these thoughts 
that it is now my great privilege and distinct 
honor to propose a toast to the enduring 
friendship between Canada and the United 
States of America and to the continued 
health and prosperity of our esteemed guests. 
Dr. Henry Kissinger and his charming wife, 
Nancy. 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Minister, distinguished guests: First 
of all, on behalf of Nancy and myself, I 
would like to thank you for the very warm 
reception we have had here and to thank 
Allan for the occasion to let us meet so many 
old friends. 

As I was preparing for this trip, it was 
called to my attention that after the War of 
Independence about half of the students of 
Harvard left the United States and settled 
in Canada. I could say many things about 
this, including the fact that it proves what 
a strong nation you are to have over- 
come so important a handicap. But then, of 
course, we were left with the other half, 
so we started from about the same position. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. MacEachen was nice enough to refer 
to American foreign policy at this moment. 



November 3, 1975 



635 



It is true we have gone through an important 
period of transition in recent years. As 
events turned out, the late sixties and early- 
seventies in the United States marked the 
end of the period that was inaugurated by 
the great acts of creation immediately fol- 
lowing World War II. We had come to the 
end of the men, and maybe of the ideas, 
which had formed the immediate postwar 
period. In that period, American physical 
power was predominant, and the legacy of 
the New Deal created the belief that all 
problems in the world could be solved by a 
kind of social engineering. Economic aid by 
itself seemed to be the solvent of political 
instability. We thought for a while, and not 
unsuccessfully, that all problems could be 
dealt with by massive applications of re- 
sources and good will. 

Now, this policy, which is often derided 
in the United States today, was, on the 
whole, quite successful. It took an element of 
naivete and faith to take a shattered conti- 
nent and help build its self-confidence and 
its political consciousness. And it took an 
element of good will to deal with defeated 
enemies on the basis of equality and the 
consciousness of the need to rebuild an in- 
ternational order. 

But the achievements of the forties and 
fifties brought with them a new world, in 
which other countries had to play an in- 
creasingly important role; and the shatter- 
ing impact of Viet-Nam and of Watergate 
taught Americans that there were limits to 
what could be achieved, even with our re- 
sources, and that America, too, was not im- 
mune from the domestic turmoil that had 
afflicted other nations. 

We are now in a period in which we must 
found our foreign policy on a more mature 
conception — one that oscillates less wildly 
between excessive idealism and excessive 
pragmatism, one that can be sustained by 
our public over an indefinite period of time. 
In this effort we face the challenge that we 
must deal on many fronts and in highly 
ambiguous situations. 

We must improve relations with old ad- 
versaries — not because the ideologies have 



become less clashing, and not because the 
dangers have disappeared, but because in 
the nuclear age every leader has a preemi- 
nent responsibility to do his utmost to pre- 
vent the danger of nuclear war, and if 
he cannot prevent confrontations, to have 
demonstrated to his public beyond any ques- 
tion that he has used every means to avoid 
a catastrophe. So we must be strong enough 
to pursue a policy of relaxation of tensions 
without illusion and not to believe that good 
will alone can produce relaxation but also 
not to fall into the danger of mock-heroic 
rhetoric. 

We must adjust our alliances to new con- 
ditions of equality and partnership and 
change old habits of preeminence to the new 
requirements of a global international sys- 
tem. We must change alliances based on de- 
fense against a common danger to the new 
challenges of our period in the relations be- 
tween North and South and the necessities of 
interdependence. 

We must deal with the problem of the 
relationship between the developed and the 
developing countries without sentimentality 
but also without arrogance. We do not favor 
the creation of a new bloc distinguished only 
by calling itself nonaligned, but we also be- 
lieve that the developed countries have an 
obligation to help the developing countries 
to find a place in the community of nations 
in a manner in which they believe that their 
just aspirations are being met and that truly 
cooperative efforts can succeed. 

I go into all this detail because it makes 
perhaps more meaningful the conventional 
pleasantries that one would otherwise say 
about the relationship between Canada and 
the United States. We used to speak of a 
"special relationship," and I agree that that 
no longer exists, if it ever did. On the other 
hand, we have a very close and very intimate 
relationship, and one that is peculiarly im- 
portant in the period that I have described; 
because if we have to found a new interna- 
tional system that is built on justice and 
equality in which all nations participate be- 
cause they feel it is partly their own, then 
the relationship of a rather powerful coun- 



636 



Department of State Bulletin 



try with perhaps what is too modestly called 
a middle power in such close proximity be- 
comes of crucial importance. We can deal 
with each other without complexes; we can 
found our relationship on the consciousness 
of interdependence; we can live with dis- 
agreements, recognizing the different origins, 
the different background, and the different 
domestic necessities. We also know that 
agreement is not pursued as an end in it- 
self and that when we do agree — which we 
do, after all, on the vast majority of funda- 
mental issues — that agreement is all the 
more meaningful for having been freely 
achieved. 

In this sense, in striking the balance be- 
tween national consciousness and interna- 
tional responsibility, between self-conlidence 
and the necessities of interdependence, our 
two countries can set an example to many 
other parts of the world. 

In no place in the world today is it possible 
for any one nation, no matter how powerful, 
to achieve its security or its prosperity by its 
own efforts. A few years ago the United 
States proposed the economic coordination 
of the policies of the major industrial coun- 
tries. That was considered then a daring 
idea; it is today commonplace. When in a 
few weeks the economic summit meets, that 
will be one of its principal objectives. As 
I stated on my arrival this afternoon, the 
United States considers it essential that 
Canada participate in such an effort, because 
it is only through the free cooperation of 
friendly nations that the interdependence of 
the world can be vindicated. 

This is why I was very glad to be invited 
to come here — to continue conversations that 
have been going on informally and easily 
over the months and years of our joint 
service and conversations that will continue 
over the years to come. 

I told the Minister when I arrived that I 
don't really know how to handle the situa- 
tion in which we would both have to try very 
hard to make the talks fail. [Laughter.] It 
is in this spirit that I look forward to our 
talks tomorrow. 

I should like to propose a toast to the 



friendship between the Canadian and the 
American peoples and to our host, the Min- 
ister. 

NEWS CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 15 

Press release 630 dated October IB 

Minister MacEachen: I want to begin by 
expressing our pleasure that Dr. Kissinger 
has been able to make this official visit to 
Canada and to have been able to spend the 
last day in discussions and talks with the 
Prime Minister, members of the government, 
and myself. We have had a good deal to say 
to each other about general and international 
questions, and we have talked on the whole 
range of bilateral questions, relationships be- 
tween Canada and the United States. I be- 
lieve the talks were extremely frank and 
cordial and in an extremely good atmosphere. 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no country 
with which we have closer ties and better 
communication than Canada. We reviewed 
the whole range of world problems as well 
as bilateral issues between the United States 
and Canada, of which there are several, but 
none of them insoluble. The atmosphere was 
very friendly, very warm, and I found the 
talks extremely useful. And on behalf of my 
colleagues I would like to express my appre- 
ciation to Mr. MacEachen, the Prime Min- 
ister, and to all the others who have made 
our stay here so useful and at the same time 
so enjoyable. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you loell know, there 
is legislation coming up in Parliament here 
affecting American publishing and television 
interests. We have heard that, particularly, 
American television interests have impressed 
on you the necessity of bringing their views 
before the Canadian Government. Have you 
discussed this issue in Ottawa, and do you 
have a position yourself on it at the moment? 

Secretary Kissinger: Feelings on the issue 
of deletion of television commercials on 
Canadian cable television are rather intense 
in the United States. I receive a large volume 
of mail from influential Senators on that sub- 
ject. I have brought that fact to the atten- 
tion of the Canadian Government, and I 



November 3, 1975 



637 



am told that this issue is before the courts 
in Canada at this moment, so we have to 
wait for the court decision. In the mean- 
time, I have asked that no commercials of 
this program be run in the United States. 
[Laughter.] 

Q. I do not know if we can comply ivith 
that. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, a number of reports have 
come out in recent months about activities 
of the Central Intelligence Agency in coun- 
tries in ivhich the United States has sub- 
stantial interests. Given the fact that the 
United States has very substantial interests 
in Canada, it would seem reasonable that the 
activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 
v}oidd be someivhat in that proportion. I 
wonder, since you are chairman of that 
group of iO that oversees the CIA activities, 
would you comment on the extent to ivhich 
they do operate in Canada and, if so, what 
you learn that's interesting? [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Your assumption 
may be reasonable, but it isn't true. I am 
not aware that we are learning very much 
that is interesting, which may reflect the 
scale of activities here. 

Q. That is not a very direct answer, sir. 

Secretary Kissinger: The answer is that 
your assumption is incorrect. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, a question in the multi- 
lateral field: In Helsinki President Ford said 
that the results of that conference were to 
be judged not by the promises made, but by 
the promises kept. And he said that peace 
is not a piece of paper. I wonder if you could 
give us your assessment — it's a little bit 
early in the game — thus far of the degree to 
which those agreements reached at Helsinki 
are tvorking, particularly in the area of 
better human contacts between East and 
West and the freer flow of information and 
peoples? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early 
to draw any conclusions; there have been 
some beneficial results in the sense of 
multiple-entry visas for journalists, and 
there has been some progress in reuniting 



families. But I think that it is too early to 
draw any final conclusions whether those 
represent isolated cases or a trend that is 
related to the Helsinki Conference. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Canadian policy in the 
past fete years has been one of attempted 
detachment, or dissimilation from the United 
States, something called there the "third 
option." This has been particularly manifest 
in an attempt to get something we call a 
contractual link with Europe. I ivonder what 
is the American response to this policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out yes- 
terday evening in my toast, we judge our 
relationship with Canada not by the other 
links that Canada may have nor by whether 
the motives are those of independence or so- 
called special relationship, but by whether on 
the fundamental issues we can achieve a cer- 
tain parallelism of action. We believe that the 
international system will be most stable if 
the key countries in it, among which we 
count Canada, feel that it is in part their 
own. 

Therefore we see no incongruity between 
an independent stance and close association 
with the United States. In fact, we would 
make the argument that a sense of inde- 
pendence makes the closer ties more mean- 
ingful. 

Therefore we do not object to a contractual 
relationship between Canada and Europe, or 
to any other options that Canada chooses to 
develop, as long as opposition to the United 
States does not become a cardinal principle 
for its own sake, which we do not believe is 
the case. 

I have found in practice that we can deal 
with Canada on the basis of equality on the 
specific issues that concern us and achieve a 
substantial area of agreement. Therefore I 
consider our relationships to be very healthy. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I ivonder if I could trade 
on your reputation as a diplomat to give us 
an opinion on whether the umpire blew a 
call last night? [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: That's really testing 
my reputation as a diplomat. I am a Red Sox 
fan, so I'm a little biased. 



638 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Dr. Kissinger, the word from Washing- 
ton is that in the State Department you have 
not responded to the subpoena from the Pike 
committee [House Select Committee on In- 
teUigerice] for the memorandum on the 
Cyprus affair. Can you tell us, Dr. Kissinger, 
whether you informed Mr. Pike that you 
would not comply and whether you feel there 
is any possibility of a citation for contempt? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe you re- 
ceived some press reports that were some- 
what premature. Quite frankly, my associ- 
ates did not look at the subpoena in sufficient 
detail to realize that it had a time and not 
just a date on it. So we thought that we 
had all day in order to respond ; in fact, 
shortly before noon I submitted a letter to 
the Pike committee in which I stated my 
views on the subject and made some pro- 
posals to the Pike committee on how the 
matter might be resolved. So we have re- 
sponded in some detail to the request of 
the committee. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you state your 
vieivs or give them to us in shorthand form, 
and outline, perhaps, suggestions you may 
have made? 

Secretary Kissinger: We plan to release 
the letter; but in shorthand form, our view 
is that any officer of the Department of 
State can testify as to facts available to 
him. Any policymaking officer of the De- 
partment of State, that is, any Presidential 
appointee, can testify as to the recommenda- 
tions he received and recommendations he 
passed on; and I am of course prepared to 
testify as to the opinions I received and as 
to the opinions — recommendations I made. 
We are not prepared to attach the opinions 
we received to the names of officers at the 
middle and junior level, because we believe 
that this is contrary to the integrity of the 
policymaking process and that it is essential 
for the integrity of the Foreign Service that 
they can make recommendations that are not 
subject to later public scrutiny, and that 
those whom the President has appointed to 
policymaking positions bear the responsibil- 
ity before the Congress and before the pub- 
lic. But we are prepared to state the sub- 



stance of the opinions; we are simply not 
prepared to attach them to names. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, for some time now we 
have been led to believe that the Canada-U.S. 
pipeline treaty is ready to be signed. Is there 
any reason for the delay? Also, I would like 
to ask you whether in your personal view 
you favor a trans-Alaska or a trans-Cana- 
dian route for Alaskan gas? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have no per- 
sonal view on that subject. I consider that 
a technical matter to be discussed. As to 
whether the treaty is about ready to be 
signed, I think we are making some progress. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. MacEachen has 
spoken of the end of the special relationship 
between Canada and the United States; yet 
you said today that there is no country with 
ivhich you have closer ties and better com- 
munication. You have also spoken of nego- 
tiating on the basis of equality. I wonder 
how these things can be reconciled in view of 
the fact that U.S. investment in this country 
is greater than that of any country in any 
other country in the world? How can toe talk 
about equality and how can ive talk about 
the end of the special relationship in the 
light of that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'll let Mr. Mac- 
Eachen explain what he meant by the end 
of the special relationship. 

Q. I have been trying to get him to do so 
for months. [Laughter.] 

Minister MacEachen: Except that you en- 
dorsed that it ended, whatever it was, you 
agreed last night that it had ended. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is right; I 
agreed last night and several Canadians have 
been pained with me ever since. It is appar- 
ently all right for Canadians to say it, but 
not for Americans. [Laughter.] 

I would make a distinction between a claim 
to a special relationship and realities within 
which foreign policy has to be conducted. 
Inevitably, any Canadian government and 
any U.S. government will come up against 
the realities that you have described. But 
we make no claim to special treatment, and 



November 3, 1975 



639 



we do not interpret what I have said as a 
claim to a preferential treatment. 

We do believe that there is, for reasons of 
history and for reasons of close economic 
relationship, a natural affinity between our 
long-range national purposes that makes 
communication easy and the solution of 
fundamental problems in a common frame- 
work substantially necessary. But if that 
turns out to be wrong, then each country 
must go its own way according to its own 
convictions. 

Minister MacEachen: I agreed with what 
you said last night. I agree with what you 
say today. I think what I have been saying 
about the special relationship, at least as I 
interpreted it, is that when we do discuss 
issues, normally we discuss them in the light 
of our own national interests. Where there is 
conflict, we attempt to harmonize the dif- 
ferences, or reduce the element of conflict; 
and where we reach an impasse, we recog- 
nize it as such and act accordingly in deal- 
ing with issues, which, from my point of 
view, can only lead to an even healthier re- 
lationship between our two countries. 

However, in defining it in that particular 
way, a limited definition, I certainly agree 
with what Dr. Kissinger has described with 
respect to the kind of relationship that we 
do have with the United States, which I de- 
scribed last night as "unique" — and which 
someone told me today in the Webster dic- 
tionary was a synonym for "special"; so I 
don't know where that leaves us. The rela- 
tionship is satisfactory, in any event. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you satisfied with 
the scale of Canadian contribution to collec- 
tive Western defense? Would you like to sec 
Canada do more? 

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the 
problem of defense today. Our view is that 
as strategic weapons become more compli- 
cated, and as the defense of the North At- 
lantic area takes on a more differentiated 
character, that the role of conventional 
weapons and, at any rate, of substrategic op- 
tions becomes more and more crucial ; and 
that means that all of the members of 
NATO, and particularly those whose contri- 

640 



butions primarily in the conventional field, 
have to look again at the assumptions that 
were formed in a period when American 
strategic predominance was the principal 
field of NATO. So it is in this sense and in 
this framework that our discussions have 
been conducted. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States and 
Canada signed an agreement in 1972 to 
clean up the Great Lakes, but the United 
States has been dragging its feet ever since 
and most of the American projects are far 
behind schedule. What is the United States 
going to do to live up to its part of the agree- 
ment ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We agreed that we 
have an obligation under this agreement and, 
regrettably, we are behind schedule. The Ad- 
ministration will make a major effort with 
the Congress to encourage it to allocate the 
funds that are needed and to prevent the 
diversion of funds that have already been 
appropriated that might cause further de- 
lays. We agree with the objectives. We rec- 
ognize we have an obligation, and the Ad- 
ministration will do its utmost to live up to 
these obligations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few days ago I was 
talking to Dr. Luns [Joseph Luns, Secretary 
General of NATOI in Brussels, and he ex- 
pressed, shall I say, concern about Canada's 
contribution to NATO. A few moments after 
that, a gentleman who described himself as 
a senior NATO official — / must confess, a 
phrase that sounded vaguely familiar — went 
on to say that Canada's contribution was 
utterly contemptible and that Canada appar- 
ently had no concept of the importance of the 
problems facing NATO vis-a-vis Portugal 
and other sectors of the defense front. Would 
you like to comment on those rather high- 
ranking statements, and perhaps Mr. Mac- 
Eachen ivould like to as well? 

Secretary Kissinger: Was that an Ameri- 
can NATO official? 

Q. It was not an American. It was an offi- 
cial with a European accent. [Laughter."] 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not share these 
views. I had the opportunity to listen to your 

Department of State Bulletin 



Kipal 
ndin 



■(jit 



tami, 
leAii- 
with 
tethe 
It the 
been 
!r de- 
erec- 
eAd- 
up to 

I IMS 

rstori/ 

iwda's 
; $tt 
ij IS 
a, « 
-mt 

<l ICO! 



vour 



lullelin 



Prime Minister at the NATO summit meet- 
ing, and I had the opportunity to talk to him 
at great length today, to your Foreign Min- 
ister and your Defense Minister. I think that 
the problem of the defense of the Atlantic 
is fully understood in Canada; and while we 
would, on the whole, prefer to see a larger 
effort in conventional defense by several of 
our allies, I do not believe that these adjec- 
tives were appropriate. 

I have not had a discussion with any 
Canadian about events in Portugal, so I can 
give no judgment about this particular as- 
pect. I find that [in] our philosophical 
understanding of the level of the approach 
to the problems of the Western world — I do 
not find any substantial difference between 
the U.S. Administration and the Canadian 
Government. 

Minister MacEachen: I have just one 
comment on that. And I refer to the state- 
ment to which Dr. Kissinger referred made 
by the Prime Minister at the summit, at the 
recent summit in Brussels, in which he re- 
peated our commitment to the alliance in 
terms which were, I believe, quite satisfac- 
tory and which indicated that the Canadian 
effort would be continued in a character that 
would be regarded as satisfactory by the 
other members of the alliance. And I believe 
that was certainly a very solid and funda- 
mental commitment by the head of the Gov- 
ernment of Canada. I would regard these 
comments to which you have referred as 
offensive. 

Q. They were not made, Mr. MacEachen, 
by me. 

Minister MacEachen: To which you have 
referred. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, should there be a posi- 
tive response in the United States and Can- 
ada to the appeal by the Russian-citizen 
Nobel Prize winner for a campaign in the 
West for mare civil rights in the U.S.S.R.? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has repeatedly stated its concern on this sub- 
ject in the European Security Conference 
and in certain bilateral discussions with the 
Soviet Union. We have, on the whole, be- 



November 3, 1975 



lieved that we could be more effective by 
making our appeal in a nondramatic way, 
but this is a question of method, not a ques- 
tion of principle. 

Q. Have you any advice for other than 
governmental organizations on how they 
cotdd respond to that appeal? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it would 
be appropriate for me to give that advice. 

Q. Two questions, Mr. Secretary. You are 
one of the chief architects of detente. In his 
talks with [President of France ValerT/'] Gis- 
card d'Estaing, Mr. [Leonid /.] Brezhnev 
has just reaffirmed the Soviet position that 
there is no such thing as ideology for de-' 
tente; that it is out of the question. Do you 
think any other form, of detente has any 
value and has any meaning without ideologi- 
cal detente? 

The second question: Was there a trade- 
off between Eastern Europe and the Middle 
East in Helsinki? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
first question, what Mr. Brezhnev has said, 
both the President and I have also often 
said; namely, that we recognize that there 
are profound differences of ideology between 
the Communist and non-Communist world. 
The relaxation of tensions is not based on 
the assumption that differences of ideology 
have disappeared, but on the realities of the 
contemporary period in which nuclear super- 
powers confront each other and in which the 
necessity to prevent nuclear war and at the 
same time prevent aggression — those twin 
necessities have to be recognized, and we have 
to avoid the impression that the relaxation 
of tensions is a favor we grant or that we 
can withhold it as a punishment. It is a 
necessity of this period, and our problem is 
to have a relaxation of tensions without 
weakening the defenses of the West. We 
have to do both of these simultaneously. 

With respect to the second question, of 
whether there was a trade-off of Eastern 
Europe for the Middle East, I do not con- 
sider that the European Security Conference 
sacrificed Eastern Europe or made conces- 
sions on Eastern Europe. The borders that 
were referred to had all been established by 



641 






treaties that antedated Helsinki. There were 
no borders that were recognized by Helsinki 
that had not been accepted previously. 

With respect to the political influence in 
Eastern Europe, it has generally been ac- 
cepted that the freedom of maneuver of the 
various countries is enhanced in a period of 
relaxation of tension, and it is precisely 
those countries most concerned with their 
autonomy that have also been the greatest 
advocates of a relaxation of tensions. 

To answer your question specifically, there 
was no relationship whatever between what 
happened in the Middle East and what hap- 
pened in Helsinki. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, earlier this year both 
you and the President indicated that the 
United States may use military force in the 
oil-producing countries in the Middle East. 
In light of that, what would be the U.S. re- 
action to cutbacks of energy exports from 
Canada to the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we could get 
some excitement started if I do not answer 
that question very carefully. [Laughter.] 

I was going to make history here by being 
the first Secretary of State to have visited 
Canada without calling attention to the "un- 
defended frontier." 

I would think that we will settle our 
energy problems between ourselves without 
recourse to force, and while we would not 
object to Canada increasing its defense ex- 
penditures, I don't think we would go to this 
extreme to get you to increase them. 
[Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke of a major 
effort with the Congress on the Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement. We've been hear- 
ing of renewed efforts to meet American 
commitments for many years, and of course 
now the commitment is only a couple of 
months aivay. Was there any discussion in 
detail of this issue this week, and if so, how 
hard did the Canadian Government press 
you on this? 

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed it this 
morning, and the Canadian Government 
pressed us with its characteristic eloquence 



and intensity. [Laughter.] As those journal- 
ists who have accompanied me there will tell 
you, it happens occasionally that this Ad- 
ministration gets defeated in Congress, and 
we will do our best to avoid this unhappy 
event. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could 
tell me whether or not the question of both 
coasts were discussed this morning in your 
talks ivith either Mr. MacEachen or the 
Prime Minister — the stands on the possible 
200-mile jurisdiction zone for fisheries and 
lesources and also whether or not the issue 
of tankers in the Puget Sound ivas discussed 
and Head Harbour passage on the other 
coast ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, both of these 
problems were discussed at great length. 
And our views on the subject of the law of 
the sea, as I understand our views, are very 
similar. We would prefer that the legisla- 
tion, that the regime for the economic zones, 
be established by international treaty and 
not by unilateral legislation. We appreciate 
the fact that Canada up to now has resisted 
the temptation for unilateral legislation. We, 
of course, have our own domestic pressures 
in favor of unilateral legislation. 

With respect to the tankers in the Puget 
Sound, that was discussed, but no final con- 
clusion was reached. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Head Harbour passage? 

Secretary Kissinger: That, too, was raised, 
and again no conclusion was reached. 

Minister MacEachen: On the question of 
the law of the sea, I think we had Dr. Kis- 
singer cover the ground four times since his 
arrival in Ottawa. I do not think he could 
have failed to realize the interest that vari- 
ous members of the government had in this 
particular question. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, ive understand that you 
are proposing to transfer Ambassador 
Porter from Canada to Saudi Arabia and 
replace him here tvith Mr. Thomas Enders. 
Can you tell me ivhat your timing is on that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not think 



642 



Department of State Bulletin 



any official announcements have been made. 
I do want to say that Ambassador Porter is 
of course a very old friend of mine and some- 
body whose judgment I respect enormously. 
Assistant Secretary Enders is also one of 
my most valued assistants, who has had a 
very major role in designing certain aspects 
of our economic policy. We are dealing here 
with two of the superior officers in the For- 
eign Service. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in response to the Pike 
committee, isn't this a bit of a surrender, 
and even though the names ivon't be at- 
tached, won't it have a chilling effect on dis- 
senting views? After all, the junior officer's 
views are going to be conveyed to Congress 
even without his nam,e. Wouldn't he be 
wiser to just go along and present a united 
front so at least his agency seems unified? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think you should 
wait until my response is published. We will 
not submit documents, even without names. 
We may give a summary of all the dissenting 
views from all sources that were received. 
No officer's recommendations will be sub- 
mitted, with or without names. 

We are prepared to give a general sum- 
mary of all dissenting views on a subject, 
but we are not going to segregate individual 
opinions. 



President Ford Signs Legislation 
on Sinai Early-Warning System 

Following are remarks made by President 
Ford on October 13 upon signing H.J. Res. 
683, a joint resolution to implement the U.S. 
proposal for the early-warning system in 
Sinai (Public Law 94-110). 

White House press release dated October 13 

I am deeply gratified today to sign this 
important measure which was approved last 
week by an overwhelming majority of both 
Houses of the Congress. My signature re- 
affirms the commitment of the United States 
to work toward a just and lasting peace for 
all nations and all peoples in the Middle East. 



The Sinai agreement, which American 
civilians will help support, is a significant 
step toward an overall settlement in the 
Middle East. But neither the United States 
nor Egypt nor Israel see it as an end to 
itself. 

The war in October 1973 brought home to 
Americans just how dangerous another 
Arab-Israeli conflict would be, not only for 
the people of the area but for the entire 
world. It also brought home the pressing 
need for a just settlement of the problems 
which underlie the tension and instability 
in that part of the world. 

As a result, for two years our government, 
with the government of the countries di- 
rectly involved, has been engaged in vigor- 
ous diplomatic efforts to promote the pros- 
pects of peace on the basis of Security 
Council Resolutions 338 and 242. 

With the help and the negotiating skill of 
Secretary of State Kissinger we have made 
great progress, in good part because of the 
trust placed in the United States by both 
Israel and its Arab neighbors. This confi- 
dence must be maintained if there is to be 
further progress and if the United States is 
to retain the mutually beneficial relation- 
ships it has established with Israel and the 
Arab states. 

We must continue our diplomatic efforts 
with the parties in order to sustain the mo- 
mentum toward peace generated by the 
Sinai agreement; and the United States 
must accept the responsibilities which flow 
from our stake in peace in the Middle East 
and from our bilateral relationships, which 
form the foundation for success in our 
diplomatic efforts. 

I will soon consult Congress on what is 
required to sustain these bilateral relation- 
ships, just as the Administration has con- 
sulted Congress very fully over the past 
month on the latest diplomatic step, includ- 
ing the use of U.S. civilians to further the 
peace process. 

We anticipate the same support and under- 
standing by the Congress. The overall Mid- 
dle East policy of the United States is 
founded upon the most basic reasons of na- 



November 3, 1975 



643 



tional necessity as well as our desire to help 
bring peace to a region whose peoples have 
suffered too much already. 

I reaffirm today that we will not accept 
stagnation or stalemate in the Middle East. 
The participation of the U.S. civilians in the 
Sinai early-warning system demonstrates 
that determination. 

I appreciate very greatly the cooperation 
of the Congress in this important contribu- 
tion to stability and peace. 



President Ford's News Conference of 
October 9 

Folloiving are excerpts relating to foreign 
policy from the transcript of a news confer- 
ence held bij President Ford in the Old Exec- 
utive Office Building on October 9.' 

Q. Mr. President, it now seems pretty cer- 
tain that Congress tvill approve sending 
American civilians to the Sinai. My question 
is: Will any of these Americans be draivn 
from the military establishment, CIA, or the 
intelligence agencies, and is recruiting under- 
tcay noiv? 

President Ford: I can only tell you that 
the American technicians will be American 
civilians. They are highly qualified, very 
technically oriented individuals who have to 
operate very sophisticated electronics equip- 
ment. The actual recruiting, I assume, will 
begin very shortly. I am certain they will 
not be in the military. 

Q. Well, they may not be in the military 
after they go to the Sinai, but are they being 
drawn from that area? 

President Ford: I can't give you the 
specifics on that, except that I can assure 
you that they are civilian technicians and 



' For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compila- 
tion of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 13, 1975, 
p. 1146. 



will have no relationship to our military. 

Q. Mr. President, a two-part question: Is 
there any delay in the formal announcement 
of our negotiations ivith the Soviets on the 
ivheat sale, and as a companion question, are 
we also negotiating with the Russians on the 
sale of their oil at a favorable price to us? 

President Ford: We have coming out to- 
morrow, I think at 3 :00 or 3 :30, an an- 
nouncement as to the status of our wheat, 
corn, soybean crop reports. When we put on 
the temporary suspension of the sale of these 
commodities overseas to the Soviet Union 
and to others, we said we would await that 
crop report. As soon as we get that report, 
I presume there will be some announcements 
as to further sales to one or more countries. 

Now, we are negotiating right at the pres- 
ent time with the Soviet Union for a five- 
year sale of grain of an annual amount 
which is very substantial, with an option, 
perhaps, for them to buy more. It will be a 
very good agreement if some of the final de- 
tails are worked out. 

At the same time, there are some negotia- 
tions going on involving the purchase by the 
United States of Soviet oil. Whether or not 
the two will be tied together is not firmly 
decided yet. We are more likely to have one 
announced and then continue negotiations on 
the other. But on the other hand, it is pos- 
sible that we will be successful in both. 

Q. Mr. President, tvill the price, do you 
hope, be lower than the established price by 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries'] ? 

President Ford: Well, as far as grain is 
concerned, of course the Soviet Union will 
buy our grain in our open American markets 
at the market prices. You don't buy in an 
open market in the Soviet Union; you pay 
what the government decides. Now we hope 
that in the negotiations we can negotiate a 
favorable price, but we have not concluded 
those negotiations at the present time. 



644 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE CONGRESS 



Secretary Replies to House Intelligence Committee Request 
for "Dissent Channel" Memorandum 



Following is the text of a letter dated 
October- 14 from Secretary Kissinger to 
Chairman Otis G. Pike of the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence, ivhich was de- 
livered to the committee on October 15. 

Press lelease 536 dated October 20 

Washington, October lU, 1975. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have given much 
thought to the Select Committee's October 2 
request that I provide it with a copy of a 
dissent memorandum, on the Cyprus crisis, 
sent me by a Foreign Service Officer in Au- 
gust 1974. After careful consideration I have 
decided that I cannot comply with that re- 
quest. I respectfully request the Committee 
to work with me on alternate methods of 
putting before it the information relevant 
to its inquiry. 

The "Dissent Channel," through which 
this memorandum was submitted, provides 
those officers of the Department of State 
who disagree with established policy, or who 
have new policies to recommend, a means 
for communicating their views to the high- 
est levels of the Department. "Dissent Chan- 
nel" messages and memoranda are for- 
warded to the Secretary of State, and are 
normally given restricted distribution within 
the Department. They cannot be stopped by 
any intermediate office. 

Mr. Chairman, I take this position reluc- 
tantly, and only because I have concluded 
that the circumstances are compelling. I am 
convinced that I would be remiss in my duty 
as Secretary of State were I to follow a 
different course. 

The challenges that face our nation in the 
field of foreign affairs have never been more 



November 3, 1975 



difficult; the pace of events has never been 
so rapid ; the revolutionary character of the 
changes taking place around us has seldom 
been more pronounced. If we are to prosper 
— indeed, if we are to survive — it will re- 
quire the confidence of the American people 
and of the nations of the world in the wis- 
dom of our foreign policy and the effective- 
ness of our foreign policy establishment. 
Basic to this sense of confidence, of course, 
is the quality and professionalism of the De- 
partment of State and the Foreign Service. 
And the strength of those institutions de- 
pends, to a critical degree, upon the judg- 
ment and strength of purpose of the men 
and women who serve in them. It is my view 
that to turn over the dissent memorandum 
as requested would inevitably be destructive 
of the decision-making process of the De- 
partment, and hence do great damage to the 
conduct of our foreign relations and the 
national security of the United States. 

Since the founding of the Republic, every 
Secretary of State has been regarded as the 
principal adviser to the President in the for- 
mulation of foreign policy and in the conduct 
of foreign relations. If the Secretary of 
State is to discharge his obligations and 
duties to the President and the national 
interest, he must have the benefit of the best 
available advice and criticism from his sub- 
ordinates; they in turn, if they are to give 
their best, must enjoy a guarantee that their 
advice or criticism, candidly given, will re- 
main privileged. 

As the Supreme Court has said: "the im- 
portance of this confidentiality is too plain 
to require further discussion. Human expe- 
rience teaches that those who expect public 



645 



dissemination of their remarks may well 
temper candor with a concern for appear- 
ances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decision-making process." 

As the Cyprus crisis evolved, I received 
many recommendations for various courses 
of action from my subordinates. Their views 
were freely offered and fully considered in 
the policy-making process. But the final 
choices of what policies to recommend to the 
President were mine, and they sometimes 
differed from the courses of action proposed 
to me by some of my associates. My decisions 
occasionally led to vigorous dissent, both 
during meetings with those of my colleagues 
who disagreed, and in written memoranda, 
as in the case presently before us. Should the 
Select Committee so desire, I am prepared 
personally to come before the Committee to 
describe in detail the dissenting views put to 
me, and my reasons for rejecting them. 

But were I to agree to release the docu- 
ment requested, even on a classified basis, I 
would be party to the destruction of the 
privacy of communication which the Secre- 
tary of State must have with his subordi- 
nates regarding their opinions. Once the 
confidentiality of internal communications 
had been breached, it would be but a short 
step to public exploitation of the subordi- 
nate's views. The result would be to place 
Department officers in an intolerable posi- 
tion — at times praised, at times criticized 
for their views; at times praised, at times 
criticized for dissenting; at times praised, at 
times criticized for not dissenting. 

Thus, my decision to withhold the docu- 
ment is not based on a desire to keep any- 
thing from the Select Committee with re- 
gard to the Cyprus crisis or any other sub- 
ject. On the contrary, the Department and 
I are both prepared to cooperate with the 
Committee in the pursuit of its legislatively 
established purposes. The issue is not what 
information the Committee should receive; 
we agree on that question. Rather, the issue 
is from whom the information should be 
sought, and the form in which it should be 
delivered. 

It is my strong belief that the Committee 
should look to the policy levels of the De- 



partment, and not to junior and middle-level 
officers, for the policy information they seek. 
It is my principal advisers and I who are 
responsible for policy, and it is we who 
should be held accountable before the Con- 
gress and the American people for the man- 
ner in which we exercise the authority and 
responsibility vested in us by the President 
and Congress of the United States. 

In keeping with this principle I am pre- 
pared now, as I have been from the begin- 
ning, to do the following: 

— Authorize any officer of the Department 
or the Foreign Service, regardless of rank, 
to testify before the Select Committee on all 
facts known by that officer about the collec- 
tion and use of intelligence information in 
foreign relations crises. 

— Authorize any policy level officer of the 
Department or the Foreign Service to testify 
before the Select Committee on recommenda- 
tions received by him from his subordinates, 
but without identification of authorship, and 
any recommendations he forwarded to his 
superiors. 

—Supply the Committee with a summary 
from all sources, but without identification 
of authorship, of views and recommenda- 
tions on the Cyprus crisis, and criticisms of 
our handling of it. 

— Appear personally before the Commit- 
tee to testify as to the policy of the United 
States with regard to the Cyprus crisis, as 
well as the policy of this Department with 
regard to the accountability of junior and 
middle-level oflScers for their views and 
recommendations. 

The issue raised by the request for the 
dissent memorandum runs to the funda- 
mental question of whether the Secretary of 
State should be asked to disclose the advice, 
recommendations, or dissents to policy that 
come to him from subordinate officers. 

That the nation must have the most com- 
petent and professional Foreign Service pos- 
sible is surely beyond question. It must be 
the repository for the lessons learned over 
more than three decades of world involve- 
ment ; the institution to which each new Ad- 
ministration looks for the wisdom garnered 



646 



Department of State Bulletin 



from the past and the initiatives so neces- 
sary to cope with the future. It must be loyal 
to the President, no matter what his politi- 
cal persuasion ; it must inspire confidence in 
its judgment from the Congress, no matter 
what party is in power there. The Foreign 
Service, in a word, should be America's 
guarantee of continuity in the conduct of our 
foreign affairs. 

We now have an outstanding, disciplined, 
and dedicated Foreign Service — perhaps the 
best in the world. It is the continued 
strength and utility of this institution that 
will be undermined by revealing the opinions 
and judgments of junior and middle-level 
officers. 

While I know that the Select Committee 
has no intention of embarrassing or exploit- 
ing junior and middle-grade officers of the 
Department, there have been other times 
and other committees — and there may be 
again — where positions taken by Foreign 
Service Officers were exposed to ex post 
facto public examination and recrimination. 
The results are too well known to need 
elaboration here : gross injustice to loyal 
public servants, a sapping of the morale and 
abilities of the Foreign Service, and serious 
damage to the ability of the Department and 
the President to formulate and conduct the 
foreign affairs of the nation. Mr. Chairman, 
I cannot, in good conscience, by my own 
failure to raise the issue of principle, be re- 
sponsible for contributing to a situation in 
which similar excesses could occur again. 

The considerations I have outlined relate 
to the broad question of testimony from, and 
documents authored by, junior and middle- 
level officers. The request for a specific dis- 
sent memorandum raises a particular issue 
within that broader framework. The "Dis- 
sent Channel," established by my predeces- 
sor, had its origin in the recommendations 
of special Task Forces made up of career 
professionals from the Department of State, 
the Foreign Service and other foreign af- 
fairs agencies. Two of these Task Forces 
recommended that improved means be found 
to transmit new ideas to the Department's 
decision-makers, to subject policy to the 
challenge of an adversary review, and to en- 



courage the expression of dissenting views. 

The very purposes of the "Dissent Chan- 
nel" — to promote an atmosphere of openness 
in the formulation of foreign policy, to stim- 
ulate fresh, creative ideas, and to encourage 
a questioning of established policies — are 
inconsistent with disclosure of such reports 
to an investigative committee of the Con- 
gress, and perhaps ultimately to the public. 
Dissent memoranda are, by their very na- 
ture, statements of the author's opinions. If 
their confidentiality cannot be assured, if 
they are to be held up to subsequent Con- 
gressional or public autopsy, the whole pur- 
pose of the "Dissent Channel" will have been 
corrupted and the Channel itself will soon 
cease to be a viable instrument. Those whose 
legitimate purpose is to argue with a policy 
because they sincerely believe it to be ill- 
conceived, or because they have new but un- 
orthodox ideas, will recognize the Channel 
for what it has become and cease to use it; 
those who care little about what the policy 
is, and even less about seeking to change 
that policy through the institutional proc- 
esses open to them, will be encouraged to use 
the Channel as a tool for their own ends. 

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, I can- 
not agree to the release of "Dissent Chan- 
nel" messages — irrespective of their con- 
tents. I am, however, ready to supply a sum- 
mary of all contrary advice I received on the 
Cyprus crisis, so long as it is not necessary 
to disclose the source of this advice. 

Every Secretary of State has an obliga- 
tion to his country and to his successor to 
build a professional, effective, dedicated, and 
disciplined Foreign Service. Were I to com- 
ply with the request before me I would have 
failed in that obligation. I would have been 
partly responsible for a process that would 
almost inevitably have politicized the For- 
eign Service, discouraged courageous advice 
and the free expression of dissenting opin- 
ion, and encouraged timidity and caution. 

On another occasion when the State De- 
partment was under investigation my great 
predecessor. Dean Acheson, wrote that there 
is a right way and a wrong way to deal with 
the Department of State. "The right way," 
he said, "met the evil and preserved the insti- 



November 3, 1975 



647 



tution; the wrong way did not meet the evil 
and destroyed the institution. More than 
that, it destroyed the faith of the country in 
its Government, and of our allies in us." 

I am prepared to work with the House 
Select Committee on Intelligence in a coop- 
erative spirit so that, for the sake of our 
country, we may jointly, on the basis of the 
proposals contained in this letter, find the 
"right" way to accommodate our mutual 
concerns. I am prepared to meet with the 
Committee at its convenience to search for 
a reasonable solution — a solution which will 
meet the needs of the Committee, protect the 
integrity of the Department of State, and 
promote the effective conduct of the foreign 
relations of the United States. 
Sincerely, 

Henry A. Kissinger. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 1st Session 

U.S. Relations With Latin America. Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
February 21-28, 1975. 235 pp. 

The Rhodesian Sanctions Bill. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I; 
February 26-March 11, 1975; 114 pp. Part II; June 
19, 1975; 31 pp. 

U.S. Policy and Request for Sale of Arms to Ethi- 
opia. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Political and Military Affairs of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 5, 1975. 
54 pp. 

Legislation on the International Energy Agency. 
Hearing before the Subcommittees on International 
Organizations and on International Resources, 
Food, and Energy of the House Committee on 
International Relations. March 26, 1975. 79 pp. 

Great Decisions in Foreign Policy. Hearing before 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
1975 National Conference on Great Decisions in 
United States Foreign Policy. April 9, 1975. 26 pp. 

Proposal To Control Opium From the Golden Triangle 
and Terminate the Shan Opium Trade. Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy 
Research and Development of the House Committee 
on International Relations. April 22-23, 1975. 
290 pp. 



U.S. International Energy Policy. Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, 
and Energy of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. May 1, 1975. 189 pp. 

The OECD Financial Support Fund ($25 Billion 
Safety Net). Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Trade and Commerce of the House 
Committee on International Relations. May 5, 1975. 
68 pp. 

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations. May 6, 1975. 
52 pp. 

War Powers: A Test of Compliance. Relative to the 
Danang Sealift, the Evacuation of Phnom Penh, 
the Evacuation of Saigon, and the Mayaguez Inci- 
dent. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
House Committee on International Relations. May 
7-June 4, 1975. 136 pp. 

Seizure of the Mayaguez. Hearings before the House 
Committee on International Relations and its Sub- 
committee on International Political and Military 
Affairs. Part I. May 14-15, 1975. 131 pp. 

U.S. Antarctic Policy. Hearing before the Subcom- 
mittee on Oceans and International Environment 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on 
U.S. policy with respect to mineral exploration 
and exploitation in the Antarctic. Executive hear- 
ing held May 15, 1975; made public July 6, 1975. 
112 pp. 

Issues at the Special Session of the 1975 U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Organizations of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations. May 19^uly 8, 
1975. 224 pp. 

Food Problems of Developing Countries: Implications 
for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Resources, Food, and Energy of 
the House Committee on International Relations. 
May 21-June 5, 1975. 355 pp. 

Law of the Sea. Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Oceans and International Environment of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on achieve- 
ments of the Geneva session of the Third United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference. May 22, 1975. 
116 pp. 

United States Embargo of Trade With South Viet- 
nam and Cambodia. Hearing before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Trade and Commerce of 
the House Committee on International Relations. 
June 4, 1975. 21 pp. 

Romanian Trade Agreement. Hearings before the 
Senate Committee on Finance. June 6-July 8, 1975. 
199 pp. 

Japan-United States Friendship Act. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to ac- 
company S. 824; S. Rept. 94-188; June 10, 1975; 
6 pp. Report of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations to accompany H.R. 9667; H. 
Rept. 94-503; September 24, 1975; 6 pp. Confer- 
ence report to accompany S. 824; H. Rept. 94-526; 
October 2, 1975; 10 pp. 



648 



Department of State Bulletin 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



United States Rejects Allegations 
in U.N. General Assembly 

Following is a statement in exercise of the 
right of reply made in plenary session of the 
U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representa- 
tive Clarence M. Mitchell, Jr., on October 6. 

USUN press rt'lease 109 dated October 6 

Mr. President, distinguished citizens of the 
world who have the honor to be here repre- 
senting your countries : I know that you have 
had a long day. I know that many will con- 
sider that an extended speech would neces- 
sarily be an imposition. Therefore I advise 
you in advance that what I have to say is 
not long. I would hope to stay within the 
limitation of 10 minutes, which is what I 
understand to be our rule. 

I want also to make it clear that what I 
say is not said so much in anger or rancor, 
because I think we have had too much of 
that. What I am saying is with the hope that 
we can set the record straight so that the 
world as it looks at us will have both sides 
of the problem which prompts my appear- 
ance here. 

I am replying on behalf of my government 
to the statements made this morning by the 
Representative of Dahomey. 

I was especially interested during that in- 
tervention to find that while Ambassador 
Moynihan was criticized for things he is 
quoted as saying outside this chamber,' there 
was not a word of reply to the report of the 
International Commission of Jurists of June 
1974 concerning the deaths and disappear- 
ances of tens of thousands of Ugandans in 
the course of the Amin regime. This report 
and the findings of the report are the reality 



^ For an address by Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Rep- 
resentative to the United Nations, made at San 
Francisco, Calif., on Oct. 3, see USUN press release 
108 dated Oct. 5, 1975. 



November 3, 1975 



of the controversy. I might say a man is just 
as dead if he is killed by a black person as 
he is if he is killed by a white person. 

In our country we believe the right of 
freedom of speech is sacred. We wish always 
to protect that right of our own citizens. We 
also want to protect it for our visitors, 
whether they be heads of mighty states, 
whether they be representatives of newly 
born nations, or tourists or immigrants who 
come to our country. In that spirit we listen 
with respect and will continue to give re- 
spectful attention to the views of all who 
speak in this chamber, whether or not we 
agree with them. 

I have been here myself since early in the 
month of September. I have walked these 
aisles. I have shaken hands with the men and 
women who have spoken, not always because 
I have agreed with them but because I be- 
lieve they had the right to be heard and I 
wanted to assure them by a handshake and 
a look into their faces that I was listening. 

We accorded that kind of respect to the 
President of Uganda. On behalf of my coun- 
try, I personally listened for the entire 
length of his presentation as Chairman of 
the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. 
I also listened to what began on page 9 of 
his printed text, which I have here with me. 
In item 39, he said this, and I quote, "I 
should now like to discuss a few points in 
my capacity as President of Uganda." What 
he said from that point on contains much 
that constitutes an affront to millions of citi- 
zens of the United States. In our country — 
and many of you who are here represent 
countries who were with us — we fought a 
long and costly war against one kind of 
racism. That racism had been inflicted on 
the world by a dictator who exterminated 
millions of humans because they were not 
members of what he called the "master race." 
Perhaps if we had been less courteous with 
that dictator in the beginning, immense hu- 

649 



man suffering and loss would have been 
avoided. 

Speaking as President of Uganda — and, I 
emphasize, not as Chairman of OAU — Presi- 
dent Amin said on page 13, item 50, of his 
printed text, which I have here, and I quote : 

The United States has been colonized by the Zion- 
ists who hold the tools of development and power. 
They own virtually all of the banking institutions, 
the major manufacturing and processing industries, 
the major means of communication, and have so 
much infiltrated the CIA that they have proven a 
great threat to the nations and the people who may 
be opposed to the Zionist movement. 

He then said, "They have turned the CIA 
into a murder squad to eliminate any form 
of just resistance anywhere in the world." 
That is the end of the quotation. 

Further on he called for the extermination 
of the State of Israel, and there is also a 
gratuitous suggestion to the blacks of the 
United States that the conditions in which 
they suffer are of their own doing and that 
if they would just straighten themselves out, 
they would not have the kinds of troubles 
that they now suffer from. 

It is interesting to note that in his re- 
marks this morning the Representative of 
Dahomey further compounded this insulting 
and ludicrous type of address with this ques- 
tion, and I quote — he said of our leader of 
the delegation from the United States — "Is 
Moynihan representing Zionism or the United 
States? If he is representing Zionism he 
should go to Israel as soon as possible." It 
is ironic that in his very next statement the 
Representative of Dahomey appealed to Am- 
bassador Moynihan to act "in a more respon- 
sible way." 

It is also ironic that the remarks of the 
Representative of Dahomey are in sharp con- 
trast to the fact that it was the OAU itself 
which at Kampala took the decision to look 
at the Israeli question in a moderate rather 
than an extremist way. Ambassador Moyni- 
han in his San Francisco speech gave full 
credit to the OAU for this wise decision. And 
I say, with all the sincerity that I can com- 
mand, I thank the OAU for whatever it has 
done constructively to bring moderation into 
this troublesome question. 



The fact is that President Amin's words 
are the kind that have been used through 
the centuries to persecute minorities, par- 
ticularly the Jews. Usually, such words are 
preceded by such utterances as "I like the 
Jews," or "Some of my best friends are 
black." As we find at the beginning of item 
52 on page 13 of President Amin's speech, 
this is also the technique that he used. But 
we in our country are not deceived by fair- 
sounding language that is used to mask rhet- 
oric that sows the seeds of hate. We will 
raise our voices against an attack on any of 
our people. Any assault on any segment of 
us is an attack on all of us. We are one peo- 
ple in the United States. When we are as- 
sailed with cruel and degrading words, we 
feel, and we are, free to express our indigna- 
tion. That is what has to be done. It is my 
personal view that this is an occasion for 
pride, and not for apologies. 

We will raise our voices not only in the 
defense of the Jews, but we will raise our 
voices in defense of the Arabs who are dis- 
tinguished citizens in our land. We will raise 
our voices in the defense of persons of Asian 
ancestry, and we will even raise our voices 
in the defense of those with whom we do not 
agree politically, when they are attacked 
unfairly. 

Mr. President, during the seventh special 
session the United States offered a plan for 
partnership. Through hard work and nego- 
tiation, that session was a success. And we 
thought — I still believe, my country still be- 
lieves — that we were and are on the road to 
building a partnership in this world. This 
continues to be our real work. 

We now have a choice: We can continue 
our arguments about President Amin or 
others who may say similar things, or we 
can turn, Mr. President and distinguished 
citizens of the world who are here, to the 
real problem at hand — improving the quality 
of life for all of the world's population; re- 
lieving children of the pangs of hunger ; plac- 
ing a roof over the heads of those who are 
in need of homes; assuring that talent is 
not wasted, because we give to those who 
have the ability an opportunity to learn — 
and above all, talking in a spirit of construc- 



leri 



650 



Department of State Bulletin 



IW 



■ par- 
is are 
:etke 

Is are 



ewll 

my of 
entof 
,e peo- 
le as- 



IS my 
)nfor 



seour 
re dis- 
I raise 



tive reason so that we do not end up at each 
other's throats but rather as men and women 
of good will, talking about our differences. 

Surely we may not always agree, but if 
we are always rational, if we are always fair, 
if we are always willing to listen — and not, 
as some may do, walk out in pique rather 
than even listen — if we do these things, I 
believe that we have a great opportunity in 
this period of human history to begin build- 
ing a world which we have always dreamed 
we could have, which would reflect, as this 
^reat chamber reflects, the hues of mankind, 
the political beliefs of mankind, and all of 
the things that have made this world a place 
where we have an opportunity to build some- 
thing which may not be close to paradise 
but will be far better than anything we have 
ione before. 



an for 



rod to 



lin or 
or we 

uistieii 
totlie 
luality 
in; re- 
'; plac- 
lioare 
leBt is 
cwlio 
arn- 
istriic- 



iullelin 



U.S. Supports U.N. Membership 
of Papua New Guinea 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council on September 22 by U.S. 
Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 

USUN press release 101 dated September 22 

My delegation concurred wholeheartedly 
in the recommendation of the Council's Com- 
mittee on the Admission of New Members, 
ind we support with particular satisfaction 
the application of Papua New Guinea for 
membership in the United Nations. 

My government was pleased to be repre- 
sented at the Papua New Guinea independ- 
ence celebrations in Port Moresby on Sep- 
tember 16. We welcome the independence of 
Papua New Guinea and have established 
diplomatic relations. As a result of U.S. 
E)articipation as a member of the Trusteeship 
Council in visiting missions to Papua New 
Guinea and in deliberations concerning that 
new nation here in New York, we have come 
to appreciate the warmth and hospitality of 
\er people, the striking beauty of her land 
and seas, and the dedication and diligence 
of her elected leaders and their commitment 
to the welfare of their people. 

If I may be pardoned a personal refer- 

November 3, 1975 



ence, Mr. President, it was my privilege to 
lead a U.N. visiting mission to Papua New 
Guinea in 1972 to observe the elections for 
the House of Assembly, a four-week elec- 
toral process which was carried off with 
smooth efficiency by the administering 
power and with the reasoned exercise of 
their free will by the people of Papua New 
Guinea. That electoral process has led on 
directly through a series of steps in the 
constitutional process to the recent cere- 
monies of independence in Port Moresby, 
which have resulted in our meeting here to- 
day. Great credit is due both to the people 
of Papua New Guinea and to Australia, the 
administering power under the trusteeship 
agreement, for this orderly process of self- 
determination. 

Papua New Guinea begins its life as a new 
nation with excellent prospects. Its function- 
ing representative democracy and Constitu- 
tion fully debated by the people's representa- 
tives, as well as the admirable respect which 
the Papua New Guineans have shown for 
human rights and due process of law, bode 
well for the future. Papua New Guinea has 
cordial relations with its neighbors and en- 
joys rich natural resources and the elements 
of a sound and expanding economy. 

In contrast to many new members of the 
United Nations, Papua New Guinea already 
has a wealth of firsthand experience in this 
organization through its participation in the 
deliberations of the Trusteeship Council and 
the Fourth Committee. Among those who 
have been most active in Papua New 
Guinea's participation here in New York 
and for whom my delegation has developed 
great respect is Ralph Karepa, who has 
worked closely with the Australian delega- 
tion and who, I understand, will now be 
Papua New Guinea's representative in New 
York. We look forward to working with him 
and with his delegation during this session 
and during the years to come. 

My delegation would also like to welcome 
to this chamber Senator Donald Willesee, 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia, 
and to express to him personally and to the 
Government of Australia our admiration for 
the exemplary manner in which Australia 



651 



has discharged its responsibilities as the ad- 
ministering authority under the trusteeship 
agreement. 

Mr. President, the United States believes 
that Papua New Guinea will be a valuable 
and productive new member in the commu- 
nity of nations, and we warmly have sup- 
ported its application for membership in the 
United Nations.' 



Agenda of the 30th Regular Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly ^ 

1. 



Opening of the session by the Chairman of the 
delegation of Algeria. 
Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 
Credentials of representatives to the thirtieth 
session of the General Assembly: 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 
Election of the President. 

Constitution of the Main Committees and elec- 
tion of officers. 

Election of the Vice-Presidents. 
Notification by the Secretary-General under 
Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 
Adoption of the agenda. 
General debate. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the work of 
the Organization. 
Report of the Security Council. 
Report of the Economic and Social Council. 
Report of the Trusteeship Council. 
Report of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

Election of five non-permanent members of the 
Security Council. 

Election of eighteen members of the Economic 
and Social Council. 

Election of five members of the International 
Court of Justice. 

Election of fifteen members of the Industrial 
Development Board. 

19. Election of twenty members of the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Environment Pro- 
gramme. 



2. 
3. 



4. 
5. 

6. 

7. 



9. 
10. 

11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 



' The Council on Sept. 22 adopted unanimously a 
resolution (S/RES/375 (1975)) recommending to the 
General Assembly "that Papua New Guinea be ad- 
mitted to membership in the United Nations." 

■Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 19 (items 
1-125) and Sept. 29 (item 126) (text from U.N. doc. 
A/10251 and Add. 1). 



652 



20. Election of twelve members of the World Food 
Council. 

21. Election of twelve members of the Board of* 
Governors of the United Nations Special Fund. 

22. Admission of new Members to the United Na- 
tions: 

(a) Special report of the Security Council (A/ 
10179, A/10238); 

(b) Other reports of the Security Council. 

23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and'i 
Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementation of 
the Declaration on the Granting of Independ- 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

24. Scientific work on peace research: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

25. Appointment of the members of the Peace Ob- 
servation Commission. 

26. Restitution of works of art to countries victims 
of expropriation: report of the Secretary-Gen- 
eral. 

27. Question of Palestine: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

28. Co-operation between the United Nations and 
the Organization of African Unity: report of 
the Secretary-General. 

29. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations 
with regard to the maintenance and consolida- 
tion of international peace and security, the de- 
velopment of co-operation among all nations and 
the promotion of the rules of international law 
in relations between States: reports of the Sec- 
retary-General. 

30. Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea. 

31. Economic and social consequences of the arma- 
ments race and its extremely harmful effects on 
world peace and security. 

32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses 
of outer space: report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

33. Preparation of an international convention on 
principles governing the use by States of arti- 
ficial earth satellites for direct television broad- 
casting: report of the Committee on the Peace- 
ful Uses of Outer Space. 

34. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 
3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General. 

35. Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all 
aspects of their possible use: reports of the' 
Secretary-General. 

36. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weap- 
ons: report of the Conference of the Committee 
on Disarmament. 

37. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and ther- 
monuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty de- 
signed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: 
report of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament. 



325! 
rati: 
Trei 
i»l 
. top 
Oce; 
Cos 



il Gen 



\l m 

repc 

«. top 

«, fa 

tea, 
the 
net 

fe top 
326! 
ficat 
fori 
Aim 
Seer 

a Esta 
the 
Secr 

il M 
nieii 
pun 



a 



the 
. Decl 
zone 
Gene 
tap] 
Stra 
ofth 
Efe( 
Natii 



Department of Stale Bulletin 



il.( 



II. 



peaci 
repoi 
ing( 

■ iiepo 
Iirae 
theP 

• Politi 
Soitl 
(a) I 



N'venilni 



38. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 54. 
3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and 
ratification of Additional Protocol II of the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 

in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 

39. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian 
Ocean a.s a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Indian Ocean. 

40. World Disarmament Conference: report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament 
Conference. 55. 

41. General and complete disarmament: 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Committee 

on Di.sarmament; 56. 

(b) Report of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

42. Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade: 
report of the Secretary-General. 

43. Implementation of the Declaration on the De- 
nuclearization of Africa. 

44. Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear- 57. 
weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of 

the Conference of the Committee on Disarma- 58. 

ment. 

45. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 
3262 (XXIX) concerning the signature and rati- 
fication of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty 
for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the 
Secretary-General. 

46. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 
the region of the Middle East: report of the 
Secretary-(;eneral. 

47. Prohibition of action to influence the environ- 
ment and climate for military and other hostile 
purposes, which arc incompatible with the main- 59. 
tenance of international security, human well- 
being and health: report of the Conference of 

the Committee on Disarmament. 

48. Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free 
zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary- 
(jeneral. 

49. Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Strengthening of International Security: report 60. 
of the Secretary-General. 

50. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United 
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of 61. 
Atomic Radiation. 

61. Comprehensive review of the whole question of 
peace-keeping operations in all their aspects: 
report of the Special Committee on Peace-keep- 
ing Operations. 62. 

52. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of 
the Population of the Occupied Territories. 

53. Policies of apartheid of the Government of 63. 
South Africa: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee against 64. 
Apartheid; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 65. 



November 3, 1975 



(d) 
(e) 

(f) 



United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 

(a) Report of the Commissioner-General; 

(b) Report of the Working Group on the Fi- 
nancing of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East; 

(c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine; 

(d) Report of the Secretary-General. 

United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment: report of the Trade and Develop- 
ment Board. 

United Nations Industrial Development Organi- 
zation: 

(a) Report of the Second General Conference of 
the United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization; 

(b) Report of the Industrial Development 
Board. 

United Nations Institute for Training and Re- 
search: report of the Executive Director. 
Operational activities for development: 

(a) United Nations Development Programme; 

(b) United Nations Capital Development Fund; 

(c) Technical co-operation activities undertaken 
by the Secretary-General; 
United Nations Volunteers programme; 
United Nations Fund for Population Activ- 
ities; 

United Nations Children's Fund; 

(g) World Food Programme; 

(h) Confirmation of the appointment of the Ad- 
ministrator of the United Nations Develop- 
ment Programme. 

United Nations Environment Programme: 

(a) Report of the Governing Council; 

(b) Habitat: United Nations Conference on 
Human Settlements: report of the Secre- 
tary-General; 

(c) Criteria governing multilateral financing of 

housing and human settlements: report of 
the Secretary-(;eneral. 
Food problems: 

(a) Report of the World Food Council; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 
United Nations Special Fund: 

(a) Report of the Board of Governors; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(c) Confirmation of the appointment of the 
Executive Director. 

United Nations University: 

(a) Report of the Council of the United Nations 
University; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co- 
ordinator: report of the Secretary-General. 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States. 
Mid-term review and appraisal of progress in 



653 



the implementation of the International Devel- 81. 

opment Strategy for the Second United Nations 
Development Decade. 

66. Economic co-operation among developing coun- 82. 
tries: report of the Secretary-General. 

67. Technical co-operation among developing coun- 83. 
tries. 

68. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimination: 

(a) Decade for Action to Combat Racism and 
Racial Discrimination; 

(b) Report of the Committee on the Elimina- 81. 
tion of Racial Discrimination; 

(c) Status of the International Convention on 

the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

69. Human rights and scientific and technological 85. 
developments: reports of the Secretary-General. 

70. Human rights in armed conflicts: protection of 86. 
journalists engaged in dangerous missions in 

areas of armed conflict. 

71. World social situation: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

72. Policies and programmes relating to youth: re- 
ports of the Secretary-General. 

73. Alternative approaches and ways and means 
within the United Nations system for improving 

the effective enjoyment of human rights and 87. 

fundamental freedoms: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

74. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in relation to deten- 
tion and imprisonment. 

75. International Women's Year, including the pro- 
posals and recommendations of the World Con- 
ference of the International Women's Year. 

76. Status and role of women in society, with spe- 
cial reference to the need for achieving equal 
rights for women and to women's contribution 
to the attainment of the goals of the Second 
United Nations Development Decade, to the 88. 
struggle against colonialism, racism and racial 
discrimination and to the strengthening of 
international peace and of co-operation between 
States. 

77. Importance of the universal realization of the 89. 
right of peoples to self-determination and of 

the speedy granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples for the effective guarantee 
and observance of human rights: report of the 
Secretary-General. 90. 

78. Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of 
human rights of political, military, economic 
and other forms of assistance given to colonial 
and racist regimes in southern Africa. 

79. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance. 

80. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees: 

(a) Report of the High Commissioner; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 



654 



I 



3. 



National experience in achieving far-reaching( 

social and economic changes for the purpose ofi 

social progress: report of the Secretary-General.]' 

Unified approach to development analysis and! 

planning. 

Freedom of information: 

(a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Informa- 
tion; 

(b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Informa-' 
tion. 

Status of the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political Right 
and the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: repor'* 
of the Secretary-General. 
United Nations conference for an intemationaii 
convention on adoption law. 
Information from Non- Self -Governing Terril ^■ 
tories transmitted under Article 73 e of thi' 
Charter of the United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on th«< 
Situation with regard to the Implementa 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting o 
Independence to Colonial Countries am 
Peoples. 

Question of Namibia: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on th 
Situation with regard to the Implementa 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting oi 
Independence to Colonial Countries an 
Peoples; 

(b) Report of the United Nations Council fo 
Namibia; 

(c) United Nations Fund for Namibia: report 
of the United Nations Council for Namibii 
and of the Secretary-General; 

(d) Appointment of the United Nations Com 
missioner for Namibia. 

Question of Territories under Portuguese adi 
ministration: report of the Special Committe' 



Cm 
, Imp 

Peo! 
Intel 
Unit 



Ji Unit 
pa 
Seer 



on the Situation with regard to the Implementa' '■ -Wmii 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of Indei 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 
Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of tk 
Special Committee on the Situation with regar 
to the Implementation of the Declaration on th '■ 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countrie 
and Peoples. 

Activities of foreign economic and other intei 
ests which are impeding the implementation c 
the Declaration on the Granting of Indepencj '■ 
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in SoutH fctioi 
em Rhodesia and Namibia and in all othet "^ Seal 



Terr: 



(c)l 



(e)l 



(f)I 



). Pnjgi 
lepor 

t. Propi 
ISi^ 

Revie 
mcki 
andi 
port( 
Progr 



Territories under colonial domination and el 
forts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid ani 
racial discrimination in southern Africa: repoi 
of the Special Committee on the Situation wit 
regard to the Implementation of the Declan 



Department of State Bulleti 



theUi 
uiltl 
report 
iitijli 
Joint 
ipectii 
Patter 
lalRf 
IklRf 
Puklici 
ion 



ueei] 
ikeCoi 
■^Ppoin 



'»emb«r 



9. 



I- 



i. 



tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 

Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant- 
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples by the specialized agencies and the 
international institutions associated with the 
United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Sit- 
uation with regard to the Implementation 
of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 
United Nations Educational and Training Pro- 
gramme for Southern Africa: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

Offers by Member States of study and training 
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing 
Territories: report of the Secretary-General. 
Financial reports and accounts for the year 
1974 and reports of the Board of Auditors: 
(a) United Nations Development Programme; 

United Nations Children's Fund; 

United Nations Relief and Works Agency 

for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 

United Nations Institute for Training and 

Research; 
(e) Voluntary funds administered by the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; 

Fund of the United Nations Environment 

Programme ; 

United Nations Fund for Population Activ- 
ities. 
Programme budget for the biennium 1974-1975: 
report of the Secretary-General. 
Proposed programme budget for the biennium 
1976-1977 and medium-term plan for the period 
1976-1979. 

Review of the intergovernmental and expert 
machinery dealing with the formulation, review 
and approval of programmes and budgets: re- 
port of the Working Group on United Nations 
Programme and Budget Machinery. 
Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of 
the United Nations with the specialized agencies 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency: 
report of the Advisory Committee on Admin- 
istrative and Budgetary Questions. 
Joint Inspection Unit: reports of the Joint In- 
spection Unit. 
Pattern of conferences: 

(a) Report of the Committee on Conferences; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 
Publications and documentation of the United 
Nations: report of the Secretary-General. 
Scale of assessments for the apportionment of 
the expenses of the United Nations: report of 
the Committee on Contributions. 
Appointments to fill vacancies in the member- 
ship of subsidiary organs of the General Assem- 
bly: 



(b) 
(c) 

(d) 



(f) 



(g) 



>vember 3, 1975 



(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Questions; 

(b) Committee on Contributions; 

(c) Board of Auditors; 

(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of the 
appointments made by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral; 

(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal. 

104. Personnel questions: 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of 
the Secretary-General; 

(b) Other personnel questions: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

105. United Nations salary system: 

(a) Report of the International Civil Service 
Commission; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

106. United Nations pension system: 

(a) Report of the United Nations Joint Staff 
Pension Board; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

107. Financing of the United Nations Emergency 
Force and of the United Nations Disengagement 
Observer Force: report of the Secretary-General. 

108. Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its twenty-seventh session. 

109. Succession of States in respect of treaties: re- 
port of the Secretary-General. 

110. Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on the work of its 
eighth session. 

111. Question of diplomatic asylum: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

112. Report of the Committee on Relations with the 
Host Country. 

113. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter 
of the United Nations. 

114. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: 
report of the Secretary-General. 

115. Implementation by States of the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
of 1961 and measures to increase the number of 
parties to the Convention. 

116. Measures to prevent international terrorism 
which endangers or takes innocent human lives 
or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and study 
of the underlying causes of those forms of ter- 
rorism and acts of violence which lie in misery, 
frustration, grievance and despair and which 
cause some people to sacrifice human lives, in- 
cluding their own, in an attempt to effect radical 
changes: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
International Terrorism. 

117. United Nations Programme of Assistance in the 
Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Ap- 
preciation of International Law: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

118. Resolutions adopted by the United Nations Con- 
ference on the Representation of States in Their 
Relations with International Organizations: 



655 



119. 



120. 



121. 



122. 



123. 



124. 
125. 
126. 



(a) Resolution relating to the observer status 
of national liberation movements recognized 
by the Organization of African Unity 
and/or by the League of Arab States; 

(b) Resolution relating to the application of the 
Convention in future activities of interna- 
tional organizations. 

Question of Korea: 

(a) Creation of favourable conditions for con- 
verting the armistice into a durable peace 
in Korea and accelerating the independent 
and peaceful reunification of Korea; 

(b) Urgent need to implement fully the con- 
sensus of the twenty-eighth session of the 
General Assembly on the Korean question 
and to maintain peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula. 

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 
the South Pacific. 

Observer status for the Islamic Conference at 
the United Nations. 

Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and gen- 
eral prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. 
Development and international economic co- 
operation: implementation of the decisions 
adopted by the General Assembly at its seventh 
special session. 

The situation in the Middle East. 
Question of Cyprus. 

Prohibition of the development and manufacture 
of new types of weapons of mass destruction 
and new systems of such weapons. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Customs 

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Coun- 
cil, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 
1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the 
United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: People's Republic of the 
Congo, September 2, 1975. 



Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973.' 
Acceptance deposited: Somalia, October 8, 1975. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 

Accessions deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975; 
Saudi Arabia, September 5, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London 
May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; 
for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 
4900, 6109. 
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975. 

Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. 
Done at London November 2, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 
1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into 
force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, September 12, 1975. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, October 10, 
1975. 



BILATERAL 



Germany, Federal Republic of 

Arrangement on cooperation in the field of nuclear 
facilities safety, with patent addendum. Signed at 
Bonn October 1, 1975. Entered into force October 
1, 1975. 



' Not in force. 



656 



Department of State Bultetim 



INDEX November 3, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1897 



itioil 

riculture. President Ford's News Conference 
|bf October 9 (excerpts) 644 

]; ^Bnada. Secretary Kissinger Visits Canada 
"(Kissinger, MacEachen) 633 

;ongress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

^Policy 648 

jsident Ford Signs Legislation on Sinai 
/arly-Warning System (remarks) .... 643 
^ jretary Replies to House Intelligence Com- 
►mittee Request for "Dissent Channel" Memo- 
randum (letter to Chairman Pike) .... 645 

spartment and Foreign Service. Secretary 
"ieplies to House Intelligence Committee Re- 
quest for "Dissent Channel" Memorandum 
'letter to Chairman Pike) 645 

iergy. President Ford's News Conference of 
[October 9 (excerpts) 644 

iddle East 

isident Ford Signs Legislation on Sinai 
<arly-Warning System (remarks) .... 643 
['resident Ford's News Conference of October 
_9 (excerpts) 644 

lua New Guinea. U.S. Supports U.N. Mem- 
(ership of Papua New Guinea (Bennett) . . 651 

isidentia] Documents 

jsident Ford Signs Legislation on Sinai 

Early-Warning System 643 

!sident Ford's News Conference of October 
(excerpts) 644 

iaty Information. Current Actions .... 656 

;anda. United States Rejects Allegations in 
"".N. General Assembly (Mitchell) ... 649 

r.S.S.R. President Ford's News Conference of 
)ctober 9 (excerpts) 644 

lited Nations 

[enda of the 30th Regular Session of the 

'T.N. General Assembly 652 

lited States Rejects Allegations in U.N. 

~ >neral Assembly (Mitchell) 649 

Supports U.N. Membership of Papua New 
iuinea (Bennett) 651 



Name Index 



Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 651 

Ford, President 643, 644 

Kissinger, Secretary 633. 645 

MacEachen, Allan 633 

Mitchell, Clarence M., Jr 649 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*525 10/14 Rector and representatives of 
Moscow State University to 
tour U.S. 
526 10/14 Kissinger, MacEachen: arrival, 
Ottawa. 

*527 10/16 Study groups 10 and 11 of U.S. 
National Committee for CCIR, 
Nov. 5. 

*528 10/16 Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Nov. 12-13. 

*529 10/16 U.S. and Malta terminate textile 

agreement. 
530 10/15 Kissinger, MacEachen: news con- 
ference. 

*531 10/16 Discussion of the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Human Settlements 
(Habitat), Oct. 17. 
532 10/16 Kissinger, MacEachen: toasts, 
Ottawa, Oct. 14. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



rlll 



ucleil 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourth-Class Rate 
Book 




Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to. Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



n 



) 



'J: 



Tf. 



y^?s 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXm 



No. 1898 



November 10, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED ON "MEET THE PRESS" 

Transcript of Interview 657 

SECOND PREPARATORY MEETING HELD FOR CONFERENCE 

ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 

Statements by Under Secretary Robinson 

and Texts of Final Declaration and Related Documents 665 



Boston Public Library 
c,,r^n1■iT^<r>.lf^pnf of Document? 

DJ^POSITORY 

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



i«relar) 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $63.16 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 

approved by the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 

copyrighted and items contained herein may be 

reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 

appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 

the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 




Vol. LXXIII, No. 1898 
November 10, 1975 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
OfKee of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public ani 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments iti 
the field of US. foreign relations ani j 
on the work of the Department ani \ 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selecteif^'^'^ 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is. 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which th 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also Ustei 



Xminjp 
jrar i« I 



ki 



Mr, 



Noveml 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Meet the Press" 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
vith Secretary Kissinger on the NBC tele- 
vision and radio program "Meet the Press" 
)n October 12. Interviewing the Secretary 
oere Clifton Daniel, Netv York Times; Rob- 
irt Keatley, Wall Street Journal; Peter 
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News; Richard 
Valeriani, NBC News; and Lawrence E. 
Spivak, "Meet the Press" moderator. 

Mr. Spivak: Our guest today on "Meet the 
Press" is the Secretary of State, Henry A. 
Kissinger, who recently completed his second 
ijear in office. He serves concurrently as As- 
istant to the President for National Secu- 
ity Affairs, a position he has held since 
1969. Secretary Kissinger was born in Ger- 
many in 1923 and came to the United States 
in 1938. He received his undergraduate and 
graduate degrees from Harvard and was a 
member of the faculty from 19 5^ to 1971. 
Among his many aivards is the Nobel Peace 
Prize, tvhich he won in 1973. 

We will have the first questions now from 
Richard Valeriani of NBC News. 

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, Egyptian 
President Sadat has said that he will ask for 
American military aid when he comes to 
Washington later this month. What will be 
the Administration's response? 

Secretary Kissinger: President Sadat has 
indicated to many visitors tiiat he would 
ask for military aid, having interrupted his 
relationship with the Soviet Union. We don't 
know whether in fact he will have a specific 
shopping list or will ask for it in general. 

I don't think we will be prepared at this 
moment to make any specific commitments 
of military aid, but we will be prepared to 



November 10, 1975 



discuss the problem with him in general 
terms. 

Mr. Valeriani: Have you given him any 
assurances that you will give such a request 
sympathetic consideration or serious con- 
sideration ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are prepared to 
discuss it with him, but at this time not in 
terms of specific shopping lists. 

Mr. Valeriani: On the other side of the 
equation, Mr. Secretary, by making so many 
promises to Israel in order to get Israel in 
the right mood to make certain concessions 
in the Sinai agreement, haven't you really 
given up most of your leverage for getting 
Israel to make tougher concessions down the 
road in negotiations on the Golan Heights 
or the Palestinians? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, the so- 
called concessions to Israel, or assurances to 
Israel, have to be seen in the historical con- 
text; and the assurances that were given in 
connection with this most recent agreement 
were not substantially different from assur- 
ances that have been given in connection 
with other agreements. When you are deal- 
ing with a country which has only one steady 
ally, assurances are of very great conse- 
quence. 

Secondly, the relationship with Israel 
should not be conceived in terms of a pres- 
sure operation in which we must be able 
to pressure Israel before every negotiation, 
and finally, our basic relationship with Israel 
depends on a continuing need for close con- 
sultation and close cooperation between us 
and Israel. That fact is going to weigh 
heavily in Israeli considerations, whatever 



657 



decisions may have been made on this or 
that item. 

So I believe that the nature of our relation- 
ship with Israel gives us sufficient oppor- 
tunity to have our vievk^s heard sympathet- 
ically. 

Mr. Valeriani: Why was it necessary to 
put all this in ivriting in specific terms now, 
if not so that Israel can avoid pressure in the 
future ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is — the sort of 
understandings that have been published 
have been characteristic of American-Israeli 
relations through the whole history of Amer- 
ican-Israeli relations. 

The only difference is that in the past 
these documents — at least in recent years, 
these documents have been submitted to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on a 
classified basis. This time they were pub- 
lished, and their being published gave them a 
formality and subjected them to a kind of 
textual analysis that was never intended and 
which, if one had brought them into the 
context of the overall and long-term rela- 
tionships, would have made it clear that it 
was not an unusual event in our relation- 
ship. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Negotiations 

Mr. Keatley: Mr. Secretary, the second 
Soviet-American strategic arms control 
agreement is about a year or so behind the 
schedule once expected. What are the pros- 
pects for concluding it any time dtiring '75? 

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't say it is a 
year behind schedule. It may be a few months 
behind the most optimistic schedule, which 
was June-July of this year. 

I think the prospect of having a second 
strategic arms limitation agreement within 
the next months is good. Whether it will be 
in 1975 or in the early part of 1976, we will 
know more clearly after I receive a response 
to the propositions that we made to Foreign 
Minister Gromyko when he was here in Octo- 
ber. 

Mr. Keatley: Some people think delay is 
due to a Soviet effort to limit American 

658 



weapons while not restraining seriously its ' 
own programs. What convinces you that the i 
Soviets do iraiit an agreement that restrains \ 
both sides in roughly comparable ways? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think in fairness 
one has to point out that most of the signifi- 
cant concessions over the last 18 months in 
the negotiations have been made by the So- 
viet Union — with respect to equal aggre- 
gates; with respect to taking forward-base 
systems out of the negotiations, which means 
that several hundred or close to a thousand 
American airplanes are not counted; and 
with respect to the verification procedures. 
I do not think it is fair to say that the issue 
is to limit our systems while not limiting the 
Soviet systems. The issue is that the two 
forces have been designed in a way which 
makes it difficult to compare the weapons on 
both sides and to know how to bring them 
into relation with each other. 

Finally, we are down to only two or three 
issues and they can be settled at any time, 
after which it will take about four to six 
weeks of technical discussions to work out 
the final details. About 90 percent of the 
negotiation is substantially completed. 

U.S. Commitments in Sinai Negotiations 

Mr. Daniel: Mr. Secretary, you have re- 
marked that our pledges to Israel have been 
published. But they were not published by 
the State Department. This latest agreement 
in the Middle East is going to cost us Ameri- 
cans billions of dollars arid may involve us 
in highly dangerous commitments. Why can't 
we know formally, officially, and fully what 
has been promised in our names? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, every- 
thing that has been published was submitted 
by the State Department within three days 
of the completion of the negotiations to the 
Congress; so there was absolutely no attempt 
to keep anything from the Congress. 

Secondly, we were prepared to work out 
with the Congress an agreed summary that 
would have put before the public the essence 
of the American commitment so that the 
American public would have known precisely 
what it was we were really committed to. 

Department of State Bulletin 



fl! 



inies; 
igniii- 
thsin 
leSo 
0t 



etw 



nitte 
I da! 

toft 
tci 

isenti 
it* 



What we attempted to avoid was formula- 
tions that in themselves were not legally 
binding, but Indicated a general guidepost of 
policy, and to avoid forcing other govern- 
ments to take a formal position with respect 
to understandings that in the past had al- 
ways been handled on this basis. 

Finally, I do not agree that this recent 
agreement cost the American public billions 
of dollars. Last year the Congress voted, in 
a combination of emergency and regular aid, 
$3 billion for Israel without the agreement. 
Before the agreement Israel requested $2.6 
billion as its regular need for economic and 
security assistance, and we had set aside in 
our planning a certain amount to be asked 
for Egypt. In fact, we will ask for less than 
the Israeli request when we submit our aid 
package to the Congress, and the additional 
sums that this agreement costs are, if any- 
thing, relatively small. Beyond that, we have 
taken no commitments that involve actions 
by the United States that involve the threat 
of war, or the risk of war. 

I think these are facts that have to be 
understood. And I repeat: We put every- 
thing before the Congress that was later 
published, and the only disagreement con- 
cerned the form of publication and whether 
we could work out with the Congress a form 
of publication that would [not] risk the 
foreign policy dangers. 

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, quite apart 
from the amounts involved, given the mood 
of the Congress, have you made commit- 
ments or promises or assurances in the Sinai 
negotiations that this Administration, or pos- 
sibly the next Administration, will not be 
able to fulfill? 

Secretary Kissinger: The basic commit- 
ments of the United States have been put 
before the Congress. There are two cate- 
gories of actions — those that can be done 
on Presidential authority and those that re- 
quire congressional authorization and ap- 
propriation. 

Those that can be carried out on the basis 
of Presidential authority, we are certain we 
are able to fulfill either in this Administra- 
tion or in succeeding Administrations. 

November 10, 1975 



Those that require congressional action 
have been carefully limited in all the docu- 
ments we have agreed to, as being subject 
to congressional action. No specific amounts 
were mentioned, and there the mood that 
you describe may in fact be a factor. But we 
think it is terribly important that the Ameri- 
can people understand that it is not the 
agreement that provides the need — that 
creates the need for assistance to the parties, 
but the long-term national interests of the 
United States, and that the assistance to the 
parties antedates the agreement. 

Executive-Congressional Cooperation 

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, you have been 
met with a great deal of skepticism and sus- 
picion in the Congress in the debate over the 
Sinai negotiations in your own testimony. 
Has this been a recoil against the secrecy 
that has gone on in the recent past and the 
lack of consultation that went on in other 
foreign policy matters recently? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think in fairness to 
the Congress one has to point out, if one 
reads the whole transcript of all the sessions, 
executive and public, there was overwhelm- 
ing support for the agreement. Its basic atti- 
tude — maybe not in front of television cam- 
eras, but the basic attitude in the relation- 
ship between the congressional committees 
and the executive was one of dealing with a 
common problem in a joint way. 

However, there is profound concern in the 
Congress, much of which I can understand, 
that the pendulum had swung too far in the 
fifties and sixties in the direction of execu- 
tive discretion, and the Congress wants to 
make very sure that it is not giving a blank 
check to the executive for consequences that 
the Congress never intended, as it believes 
it did in the case of the Tonkin Gulf Resolu- 
tion. That intention, I think, is justified, and 
we are prepared to cooperate with it. 

There is concern with excessive secrecy 
which, too, we are attempting to meet. On 
the other hand, one has to understand that 
a certain amount of confidentiality is essen- 
tial or the diplomatic process will stop. So 
somewhere between those two extremes one 

659 



has to find a joint position between the Con- 
gress and the executive. But we are not com- 
plaining about what happens in the Con- 
gress. 

Capacity of Democracies To Solve Problems 

Mr. Spivak: Mr. Secretary, in his New 
York Times column of August 15, James 
Reston ivrites that you believe "the capitalist 
and Communist worlds are ttvo bankrupt 
.•systems in conflict noiv, neither adequate to 
the requirements and possibilities of a safe 
and decent ivorld." Does that accurately de- 
scribe your analysis of the world situation 
today ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think it is too 
abbreviated a formulation. 

I was struck, on the trip to Europe with 
the President on the occasion of the Euro- 
pean Security Conference, at the problems 
that it seemed to me the East European 
countries had in establishing widespread sup- 
port. 

One is also struck by the debates that are 
going on in Western Europe about the sta- 
bility of the governments, and so I feel that 
the modern industrialized states have a basic 
problem of how to relate the complexity of 
their problems, the difficulty of the issues 
that the people face, to an overall national 
purpose that gains long-term support. 

Basically I believe that the Western capi- 
talist systems are more dynamic, with all 
their debates, than the ones on the other 
side; and therefore I am basically optimistic 
about the potentiality of the democratic sys- 
tems to prevail and to defend themselves. 

Response to Violations of Sinai Agreement 

Mr. Valeriani: Another question on the 
agreement, Mr. Secretary. In the confidential 
assurances to Egypt, the United States 
promises to consult with Egypt in the event 
of an Israeli violation of the agreement on 
the significance of the violation and possible 
remedial action. Now, what does "remedial 
action" mean? Would that involve holding 
up supplies to Israel in the case of an attack? 



Secretary Kissinger: First of all, exactly 
the same assurance was given to Israel, and 
both sides knew that the same assurance was 
given to the other side. What it meant was 
that the United States as the party that was 
the principal mediator in the negotiations, 
that knew the record of the negotiations, 
would make an effort, in case of a violation, 
to point out what its judgment was of the 
significance and of the possible cause of the 
violations. 

What remedial action we would take has 
not been discussed with either side. 

In the other two disengagement agree- 
ments, those between Syria and Israel and 
those between Egypt and Israel, what hap- 
pened is that a violation will be brought to 
our attention and we then bring it to the 
attention of the side that is accused. In every 
case that I can remember a remedy has been 
found. This is one of those clauses that codi- 
fies existing practice and is not a novel de- 
parture. 

Purpose of Forthcoming Visits to Peking 

Mr. Keatley: Next iveek you tvill be in 
Peking, and next month President Ford ivill 
go there. Will these visits result in diplo- 
matic recognition of the Peking government 
by the United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: The basic purpose — 
the basic relationship between us and the 
People's Republic of China is the result of 
the congruence of some perceptions of the 
international environment, and therefore on 
many of these visits a significant part of 
the discussion concerns a review of the in- 
ternational situation and to see to what de- 
gree we agree or disagree. 

The process of normalization of relations 
between the People's Republic and the United 
States has been established in the Shanghai 
communique. We intend to live up to this, 
and we intend to continue the process of 
normalization to its ultimate conclusion. I 
do not anticipate that it will be completed 
on the next visit, but I do not exclude that 
some progress would be made. 



660 



Department of State Bulletin 



Realities Underlying U.S.-Soviet Relations 

Mr. Daniel: Mr. Secretary, Warren Nutter, 
former Assistant Secretary of Defense, has 
published a study in which he says that your 
diplomacy in Russia has created too much 
' detente and overrelaxation of tension, that 
.77 the United States is giving aivay too much 
for too little. As you know, many conserva- 
tives are consequently very suspicious of 
detente. Does this mean that the Ford Ad- 
ministration is going to retain its full faith 
in detente, or will there be some change 
under the pressure of 1976 politics? 



ikelui 



at 

light t« 

toll! 

Devei] 

as 

at 

ivel ii 



mm\ 



Itlii 



fore 01 
Biiof 
the ifl' 
hatdfr 



UniteJ 



lulleli" 



Secretarij Kissinger: The impression is 
created that detente, which is a bad word 
anyway, is something that we grant to the 
Russians as a favor and that we withhold as 
a punishment. 

The fact of the matter is that there are 
certain basic conditions that bring about this 
policy: the fact that the Soviet Union and 
the United States possess nuclear weapons 
capable of destroying humanity; the fact 
that we impinge upon each other in many 
parts of the world, so that we are, at one 
and the same time, rivals and yet we must 
regulate our conduct in such a way that we 
do not destroy humanity in conducting our 
disputes. We are ideological opponents ; yet 
in a way we are doomed to coexist. 

Those are the realities. They cannot be 
removed by rhetoric, and those are realities 
to which every President has been brought 
back throughout the history of the postwar 
period. 

The foreign policy of this country will be 
conducted with concern for the national in- 
terest and for world peace, and it will not 
be affected by the Presidential campaign. 

Confidentiality Within Executive Branch 

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, you are 
known for playing diplomacy close to the 
vest, and some former intelligence officials 
in the government have said that what you 
and the .President, President Nixon as well 
as Ford, have talked about to foreign leaders 



November 10, 1975 



never got communicated through the system 
so that they could make expert appraisals of 
that. Are those charges true? 

Secretary Kissinger: I sometimes suspect 
that if I started reading the most top-secret 
documents from the top of the Washington 
Monument we would still be accused of play- 
ing diplomacy close to the vest. 

To some extent a certain amount of con- 
fidentiality is essential. This depends entirely 
on the relationship of confidence that exists 
between the head of the State Department 
Intelligence, for example, and the Secretary 
of State. The current Director of Intelligence 
in the Department of State attends every top- 
level meeting with Soviet and other key 
leaders, and he has no problem of receiving 
access. 

There are some — in every Administration 
there have been some extremely confidential 
documents that were not necessarily dis- 
tributed to every intelligence analyst in town. 
They are always distributed to some key ad- 
visers. Who the key advisers are depends on 
whom the Secretary of State and the Presi- 
dent have confidence in, but it is in the in- 
terest of the President and the Secretary of 
State to get the widest possible relevant ad- 
vice. So I would reject this particular 
charge. 



Grain and Oil Negotiations With U.S.S.R. 

Mr. Spivak: Gentlemen, we have less than 
three minutes. 

Mr. Secretary, the President has just 
lifted the embargo on grain sales to Poland. 
Can you tell us what is holding up the deci- 
sion on grain sales to the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are still discuss- 
ing a long-term grain deal with the Soviet 
Union, and until that is completed we are 
not in a good position to judge the total 
availabilities in relation to the demands, but 
as the President indicated yesterday [in a 
news conference at Detroit, Mich., on Octo- 
ber 10], we are making progress in that 
long-term grain deal. 



661 



Mr. Spivak: Are you certain that a deal 
will go through? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not certain, but 
I am optimistic. 

Mr. Spivak: Will the United States be 
likely to attach any significant reciprocal 
conditions to a deal? 

Secretary Kissinger: The context in which 
a deal is made is always clear. The condi- 
tions of the agreement themselves as they 
now stand and as they will be negotiated 
are, in our view, very favorable to the United 
States. 

Mr. Valeriani: Hotv close are you to mak- 
ing a deal, Mr. Secretary, and in that con- 
nection, do you think you can make a deal 
for buying Russian oil? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are discussing 
both of these issues, not directly linked, but 
in a parallel framework. We are quite close 
to making a deal on grain. We still have some 
additional considerations to discuss in the 
case of oil, but we have made progress on 
that, too. 

Mr. Spivak: We have less than a minute. 

Mr. Keatley: If President Ford is elected 
next year and if he asks, will you stay on as 
Secretary of State? 

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't — first of 
all, I haven't been asked yet, and that is a 
decision I will make then. 

Mr. Daniel: Mr. Secretary, you seem to 
agree that we are now coming to the end of 
the step-by-step process of maintaining peace 
in the Middle East. Where do we go from 
here ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we then have 
to find some larger frameworks which com- 
bine several of the issues and several of the 
parties and maybe all of the issues and all 
of the parties. We are in a process of con- 
sultation about that now. 

Mr. Spivak: I am sorry, but our time is up. 
Thank you. Secretary Kissinger, for being 
with us today on "Meet the Press." 



FIve-Year Grain Supply Agreement 
With U.S.S.R. Signed at Moscow 

Am agreement between the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. on the supply of grain ivas 
signed at Moscow on October 20 by Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Charles W. Robinson and Soviet Minister of 
Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev. Folloiving is 
a statement by President Ford issued at 
Washington that day, together with the text 
of the agreement. 



STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD 

White House press release dated October 20 

The American people — our many grain- 
farming communities, our workers, our 
farmers, and our consumers — will benefit 
from the agreement signed in Moscow today 
providing for regular and orderly sales of 
wheat and corn to the Soviet Union during 
the next five years. Under this agreement, 
the Soviet Union has committed to purchase 
6 million metric tons of grain per year, rep- 
resenting $1 billion in annual export earn- 
ings. Accordingly, I am today terminating 
the temporary suspension of sales of grain to 
the Soviet Union. 

The benefits to the American economy are 
that we have: 

— Obtained a stable long-term foreign 
market. 

— Assured a more stable flow of payments 
from abroad. 

— Assured the American farmer that the 
Soviet Union will be a regular buyer for 
grain at market prices. 

— Increased incentives for full production 
by the farmer. 

— Facilitated the hiring of labor, the pur- 
chase of new fai-ming machinery, and the 
general stimulation of agriculture and busi- 
ness. 

— Neutralized a great destabilizing factor 
in recent years. 

— Provided jobs for American transporta- 
tion workers and seamen. 



662 



Department of State Bulletin 



The United States during this harvest sea- 
son can rejoice over the best crop in years. 

The favorable economic implications are 
obvious. We have obtained Soviet commit- 
ment that additional purchase of grain in the 
current crop year wfill not be so large as to 
disrupt the U.S. market. I have directed the 
Department of Agriculture to continue to 
monitor closely export sales and the Eco- 
nomic Policy Board-National Security Coun- 
cil Food Committee to follow closely grain 
market price trends and related matters. 

The long-term agreement signed in Mos- 
cow today promotes American economic sta- 
bility. It represents a positive step in our 
relations with the Soviet Union. In this 
constructive spirit, the two governments 
have also committed themselves to begin 
detailed negotiations on mutually beneficial 
terms for a five-year agreement for the pur- 
chase of Soviet oil. Negotiations will start 
this month. 



AGREEMENT ON THE SUPPLY OF GRAIN 

Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government 
OF the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the Supply of Grain 

The Government of the United States of America 
("USA") and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics ("USSR"); 

Recalling the "Basic Principles of Relations Be- 
tween the United States of America and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics" of May 29, 1972; 

Desiring to strengthen long-term cooperation be- 
tween the two countries on the basis of mutual bene- 
fit and equality; 

Mindful of the importance which the production of 
food, particularly grain, has for the peoples of both 
countries; 

Recognizing the need to stabilize trade in grain 
between the two countries; 

Affirming their conviction that cooperation in the 
field of trade will contribute to overall improvement 
of relations between the two countries; 

Have agreed as follows: 

Article I 

The Government of the USA and the Government 
of the USSR hereby enter into an Agreement for the 
purchase and sale of wheat and com for supply to 
the USSR. To this end, during the period that this 



Agreement is in force, except as otherwise agreed 
by the Parties, (i) the foreign trade organizations 
of the USSR shall purchase from private commercial 
sources, for shipment in each twelve month period 
beginning October 1, 1976, six million metric tons of 
wheat and corn, in approximately equal proportions, 
grown in the USA; and (ii) the Government of the 
USA shall employ its good offices to facilitate and 
encourage such sales by private commercial sources. 

The foreign trade organizations of the USSR may 
increase this quantity without consultations by up 
to two million metric tons in any twelve month pe- 
riod, beginning October 1, 1976 unless the Govern- 
ment of the USA determines that the USA has a 
grain supply of less than 22.5 million metric tons as 
defined in Article V. 

Purchases/sales of wheat and corn under this 
Agreement will be made at the market price pre- 
vailing for these products at the time of purchase/ 
sale and in accordance with normal commercial 
terms. 

Article II 

During the term of this Agreement, except as 
otherwise agreed by the Parties, the Government of 
the USA shall not exercise any discretionary author- 
ity available to it under United States law to control 
exports of wheat and corn purchased for supply to 
the USSR in accordance with Article I. 

Article III 

In carrying out their obligations under this Agree- 
ment, the foreign trade organizations of the USSR 
shall endeavor to space their purchases in the USA 
and shipments to the USSR as evenly as possible 
over each 12-month period. 

Article IV 

The Government of the USSR shall assure that, 
except as the Parties may otherwise agree, all wheat 
and corn grown in the USA and purchased by for- 
eign trade organizations of the USSR shall be sup- 
plied for consumption in the USSR. 

Article V 

In any year this Agreement is in force when the 
total grain supply in the USA, defined as the official 
United States Department of Agriculture estimates 
of the carry-in stocks of grain plus the official United 
States Department of Agriculture forward crop esti- 
mates for the coming crop year, falls below 225 mil- 
lion metric tons of all grains, the Government of the 
USA may reduce the quantity of wheat and corn 
available for purchase by foreign trade organiza- 
tions of the USSR under Article I(i). 

Article VI 

Whenever the Government of the USSR wishes the 
foreign trade organizations of the USSR to be able 



** November 10, 1975 



663 



to purchase more wheat or com grown in the USA 
than the amounts specified in Article I, it shall 
immediately notify the Government of the USA. 

Whenever the Government of the USA wishes 
private commercial sources to be able to sell more 
wheat or corn grown in the USA than the amounts 
specified in Article I, it shall immediately notify the 
Government of the USSR. 

In both instances, the Parties will consult as soon 
as possible in order to reach agreement on possible 
quantities of grain to be supplied to the USSR prior 
to purchase/sale or conclusion of contracts for the 
purchase/sale of grain in amounts above those speci- 
fied in Article I. 

Article VII 

It is understood that the shipment of wheat and 
com from the USA to the USSR under this Agree- 
ment shall be in accord with the provisions of the 
American-Soviet Agreement on Maritime Matters 
which is in force during the period of shipments 
hereunder. 

Article VIII 

The Parties shall hold consultations concerning the 
implementation of this Agreement and related mat- 
ters at intervals of six months beginning six months 
after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, 
and at any other time at the request of either Party. 

Article IX 

This Agreement shall enter into force on execution 
and shall remain in force until September 30, 1981 
unless extended for a mutually agreed period. 

Done at Moscow, this 20th day of October, 1975, 
in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, 
both texts being equally authentic. 



For the Government 
of the United States 
of America: 

Charles W. Robinson 



For the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics: 

N. S. Patolichev 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

United States Policy on Review of the United Na- 
tions Charter. Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations. July 17, 1975. 63 pp. 

Arts and Artifacts Indemnity Act. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare 
to accompany S. 1800. S. Rept. 94-289. July 21, 
1975. 7 pp. 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Negotiating 
on Purchase of Soviet Oil 

Following is a letter of intent dated Octo- 
ber 20 signed by Charles W. Robinson, 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. 

His Excellency 
N. S. Patolichev 
Minister of Foreign Trade 
Moscow, U.S.S.R. 

Dear Mr. Minister: This is to confirm the under- 
standing arising out of our discussions that our 
two Governments intend to commence negotiation 
promptly to conclude an Agreement concerning the 
purchase and shipment of Soviet oil. This Agreement 
will provide for the following: 

(1) The Government of the Union of Soviet So- 
cialist Republics will, for a period of five years, oflfer 
for sale annually ten million metric tons of crude oil 
and petroleum products. 

The Government of the United States may pur- 
chase the crude oil and petroleum products for its 
own use or, by the agreement of the Parties, the 
purchase of crude oil and petroleum products may be 
made by United States' firms. 

(3) About 70 percent of the total quantity off'ered 
for sale will be crude oil. The remainder may be 
petroleum products, in particular diesel oil and 
naphtha. 

(4) Some portion of the crude oil or petroleum 
products will be shipped to the United States, partly 
in tankers used to transport grain from the United 
States to the Soviet Union. 

(5) Some portion of the crude oil or petroleum 
products may be delivered to Europe or other agreed 
marketing areas. 

(6) Prices for crude oil and petroleum products will 
be mutually agreed at a level which will assure the 
interests of both the Government of the United 
States and the Government of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics. 

In addition it is further understood that both Gov- 
ernments will work for the extension and expansion 
of the cooperative efforts already underway in the 
field of energy. Such efforts will be particularly di- 
rected toward the fuller application of the techno- 
logical capability of both countries in increasing 
energy output from existing sources and in develop- 
ing new sources of energy. 
Sincerely yours, 

Charles W. Robinson 

Under Secretary of State 

for Economic Affairs 



664 



Department of State Bulletin 



Second Preparatory Meeting Held for Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation 



A preparatory meeting for the Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation tvas 
held at Paris October 13-16. Folloiving are 
statements made in the meeting on October 
13 and 16 by Under Secretary for Economic 
Affairs Charles W. Robinson, ivho headed 
the U.S. delegation, together ivith the texts 
of the final declaration adopted by the meet- 
ing on October 16, the aide memoire at- 
tached to the French Government's letter of 
invitation dated September 15, and lists, sub- 
mitted to the preparatory meeting by the 
United States and by the seven representa- 
tives of the developing countries, of proposed 
subjects for discussion by the four commis- 
sions to be created by the conference, which 
will be convened at Paris on December 16. 



STATEMENTS BY UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON 



Statement of October 13 

I am pleased to be in Paris to meet again 
— with a renewed sense of dedication and 
common commitment — to address questions 
of the highest importance to us and to all 
nations. 

At our initial meeting in April, despite a 
lack of concrete progress we more clearly 
defined the issues and established the need 
for a continuing process of constructive dia- 
logue to further international economic co- 
operation. Shortly after that meeting, Secre- 
tary of State Kissinger affirmed the deter- 
mination of the United States to build new, 
constructive relationships among developed 
and developing countries. He encouraged 
active efforts to resume this dialogue on a 
basis that would promise positive results. 



In the six months since the April meeting 
of this group in Paris, I have spent much of 
my time visiting many of the countries rep- 
resented at this meeting and consulting with 
all other participants. These opportunities 
for a frank and thorough exchange of views 
have, I believe, been extremely helpful in 
contributing to the planning of this meeting. 
I am indebted to all of you for the coopera- 
tion and support we received in this effort. 

The presence of the U.S. delegation here 
today reflects my country's sense of dedica- 
tion to a serious dialogue. The problems we 
will address are fundamental to the health 
of the world economy and central to our 
growing interdependence. Some of them will 
be extremely complex. Only our most dili- 
gent efforts can achieve concrete and practi- 
cal solutions. We may perceive some prob- 
lems very differently, and we need to 
harmonize and resolve these differences. We 
may perceive other problems similarly, and 
we need to build on such foundations of 
agreement. But for all these problems, I be- 
lieve that cooperative solutions are over- 
whelmingly in our common interest. As 
Secretary of State Kissinger stated in his 
September 1 speech to the U.N. special 
session : 

We profoundly believe that neither the poor nor 
the rich nations can achieve their purposes in isola- 
tion. . . . 

The reality is that ample incentives exist for co- 
operation on the basis of mutual respect. 

The United States views this preparatory 
conference as an essential step in our search 
for a new global consensus based on coopera- 
tion. We seek a consensus to: 

— Further human progress and under- 
standing. 



November 10, 1975 



665 



— Contribute to the world's basic economic 
security and sustained economic growth. 

— Lay the basis for moving forward on 
the vital global issues of energy, raw mate- 
rials, food, and economic development. 

— Address the needs of the poorest coun- 
tries, whose economies most urgently need 
the regenerative flow of capital and technol- 
ogy which only a new environment of co- 
operation and understanding will insure. 

At this meeting we can begin to construct 
a framework for developing this consensus. 
But it will take great determination and a 
capacity for finding compromise to realize 
the outcome that we all deeply desire: the 
launching of a concerted effort to achieve 
significant progress on the great issues of 
economic interdependence between our 
peoples. 

The United States believes that a pre- 
requisite — essential although by no means 
sufficient — for the economic progress of the 
developing countries is a stable and expand- 
ing world economy. Without this it will be 
far more difficult to undertake the other 
measures that are necessary to assure that 
the developing countries are able to accelerate 
their economic growth. We should recognize 
this shared interest and work together to 
lay the foundations for world economic pros- 
perity. 

Similarly, the fundamental economic 
health of the developing world is important 
to progress and growth in the industrialized 
countries. We accept the reality of economic 
interdependence. We recognize that what 
diminishes the economic success of the de- 
veloping nations can diminish our own. We 
wish to share the fruits of increased eco- 
nomic growth and the responsibilities for 
shaping a world economy that promotes this 
growth. 

A number of dramatic developments have 
created new challenges. The world energy 
market has changed profoundly as a result 
of large oil price increases since 1973. This 
has created problems as well as opportuni- 
ties. Those countries with large and growing 



surpluses have the opportunity to marshal 
resources for the good of their peoples and 
others. Those countries in deficit, particu- 
larly the developing countries, have the 
problem of sustaining growth. Our global 
task is to best use these opportunities and to 
solve these problems to the satisfaction of all. 

In this preparatory meeting, and in the 
Conference of Ministers to follow, the 
United States will work toward relationships 
with developing countries that reflect these 
realities. Proposals we make will take ac- 
count of our interdependence and the con- 
tinual change in our economic and political 
relationships. They will indicate our concern 
that all countries participate in international 
decisions according to their capabilities and 
in accordance with their responsibilities. We 
will search for consensus on measures to 
assure stability and security in the basic 
requirements for economic growth. 

In short we seek — and expect — to engage 
in a constructive dialogue characterized by 
reason and cooperation. 

Finally, we should like to commend the 
President of the French Republic and the 
French Government, whose substantial ef- 
forts and hospitality have been instrumental 
in enabling this meeting to reconvene. We 
are fully in accord with the consensus upon 
which this resumed dialogue is based. The 
language of the French consensus memo- 
randum appears to accommodate the inter- 
est of all participants. It embodies under- 
standings which should facilitate the prog- 
ress we all desire and provides guidance 
which should permit the commissions to 
determine the most effective and expeditious 
ways to address their areas of responsibility 
without undue restrictions. We trust that all 
participants will continue to support this 
plan. 

With regard to the work of the four com- 
missions, there are a number of specific pro- 
posals in Secretary Kissinger's address to 
the seventh special session which could 
profitably be discussed. Other participants 
will have their own conceptions of what sub- 



666 



Department of State Bulletin 



jects should be considered. We will welcome 
the opportunity of exchanging views with 
them. 

Our efforts at this preparatory meeting 
are essentially procedural. The important 
substantive work comes later. It is our pur- 
pose to agree on when, where, and how this 
is to be pursued. My government very much 
welcomes this step. We look forward to 
working with all participating countries 
with a renewed spirit of cooperation. We 
pledge our best efforts and good will in 
moving toward a successful conclusion. 

Statement of October 16 

We returned to Paris this week to resume 
the dialogue with solid hopes founded in the 
consensus proposal circulated by the Gov- 
frnment of France. I am very pleased to say 
that our hopes were fulfilled. 

The consensus which brought us back to 
Paris was the work of six months of inten- 
sive contacts and frank exchanges among 
our governments following our April meet- 
ing. These six months brought major changes 
— in the world itself, in our perceptions, and 
in our official views. My government, for 
fxample, further developed its policies in 
this area, with the resulting initiatives that 
were elaborated in Secretary Kissinger's 
speech to the U.N. seventh special session. 

There is now throughout the world a 
heightened sensitivity to the problems of the 
poorest countries. We also see a deeper 
recognition of the interdependence of all the 
nations of the world. As Secretary Kissin- 
Ker said at the U.N. special session : ". . . 
neither the poor nor the rich nations can 
achieve their purposes in isolation." The 
improvement of life in each of our countries 
is linked to progress in all of our countries 
and in the world economy. In a world where 
so many more interests join than divide us, 
we have also come to realize that shared re- 
sponsibilities underlie international rela- 
tions. 

At no time during this conference have I 



doubted that we would succeed. Given the 
needs and problems that brought us here, we 
had an obligation to succeed — to persevere 
and confirm the understandings that will 
carry us into the next stage of this dialogue. 

With hard bargaining, but in an atmos- 
phere of good will, compromise, and mutual 
understanding, we now have taken the step 
which enables us to launch the dialogue be- 
tween our countries. Our purpose is to 
strengthen international economic coopera- 
tion in the critical areas of energy, develop- 
ment, raw materials — including foodstuffs 
— and related financial matters. 

I wish to congratulate and thank all my 
colleagues from the various delegations for 
their con.structive contributions both during 
and prior to this meeting. I would also like 
to join with my colleagues in acknowledging 
the special credit due the Government of 
France. It was instrumental in achieving 
the consensus upon which this dialogue was 
based. As our gracious hosts last April and 
this week — and as our hosts-to-be in Decem- 
ber — our French friends have helped greatly 
to bring us together as human beings as well 
as official representatives of our countries. I 
would like particularly to thank the chair- 
man of the conference, M. de Guiringaud 
[Louis de Guiringaud, Permanent Repre- 
sentative of France to the United Nations], 
for his tireless efforts in making this meet- 
ing a success. 

Particularly difficult and challenging inter- 
national economic problems have emerged in 
the last two years. Our aim is to meet these 
problems and to convert them — as much as 
we can — into opportunities, seeking practi- 
cal results through cooperative action. We 
see this as a joint venture among developed 
and developing countries. 

We have no illusions about the difficulties 
ahead in building a new global consensus. 
However, one thing is clear: through the 
efforts and good will of all participants, we 
can look forward to a true dialogue, in which 
the participants — with increasing conver- 
gence in their perceptions of the problems — 



November 10, 1975 



667 



will hear each other out on all subjects of 
interest which fit within the agreed frame- 
work. 

The preparatory meeting this week has 
achieved its purpose by clarifying and re- 
confirming the consensus. My government is 
determined now to move ahead. We look for- 
ward to the December Conference of Min- 
isters to launch the dialogue on which our 
hopes are based. Beyond the conference, we 
look to the prompt engagement of the four 
commissions in the substantive issues of the 
dialogue. We have taken an important step 
at this meeting in establishing the dialogue 
which can and must contribute significantly 
to human progress and to the well-being of 
all of our peoples. 

TEXT OF FINAL DECLARATION ' 

Final Declaration of the Preparatory Meeting 
FOR the Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Co-operation 

Paris, 16 October 1975. 

1. The participants in the Preparatory Meeting for 
the international Conference proposed by the Presi- 
dent of the French Republic, which was held in Paris 
from 7 to 15 April 1975, met again at the Interna- 
tional Conference Centre from 13 to 16 October 1975 
under the technical chairmanship of Mr. de Guirin- 
gaud, Ambassador of France, with a view to pursu- 
ing preparation for the dialogue on energy, raw 
materials, problems of development, including all 
related financial questions. 

2. The ten delegations confirmed the agreement of 
their authorities on the convening of an international 
conference on these questions. They decided that the 
Conference will be called the "Conference on Inter- 
national Economic Co-operation", that it will be held 
in Paris, that it will be composed of 27 members 
desigrnated as indicated below, and that it will be 
convened at ministerial level on 16 December 1975 
for a session of two or possibly three days. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations will be 
invited to the Ministerial Conference. 

3. The European Economic Community, the United 
States and Japan, on the one hand, and the seven 
developing countries participating in the Preparatory 
Meeting (Algeria, Brazil, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela, Zaire), on the other hand, will assume 



' Preparatory meeting doc. RP/II/12; adopted by 
consensus. 



responsibility for the designation, from among their 
respective groups and according to the procedures 
which the industrialized countries and the developing 
countries, respectively, deem appropriate, of five in- 
dustrialized countries and twelve developing coun- 
tries, to be added to the present participants so as 
to bring to twenty-seven the number of participants 
in the Conference. The French Government will be 
notified, within a period which should not exceed one 
month, of the list thus established of the delegations 
to be invited to the Ministerial Conference. 

4. The ten delegations also decided that the Con- 
ference should have two co-chairmen chosen respec- 
tively by each of the two participating groups from 
among its members, and that they should preside 
alternately over the meetings in a manner to be 
agreed between them. The participants in the Prepar- 
atory Meeting recommend that the two co-chairmen 
should be designated as soon as possible after the 
lists of participants in the Conference have been 
completed, and they suggest that the two co-chair- 
men should begin, immediately after being desig- 
nated, to take together all necessary steps, in liaison 
with the host country, to ensure that the Ministerial 
Conference proceeds satisfactorily. 

5. The Preparatory Meeting proposes to the Min- 
isterial Conference that it set up a commission for 
energy, a commission for raw materials, a commis- 
sion for development and a commission for financial 
affairs. Each of these commissions should consist of 
fifteen members, ten of them representing developing 
countries and five representing industrialized coun- 
tries, chosen by each of the two groups of partici- 
pants in the Conference from among its members. 

6. In determining the composition of its repre- 
sentation in each commission, each of the two groups 
at the Conference should choose from among its 
members those who, because of their special interest 
and the overall significance of their participation, 
seem best suited to take part in order that the work 
may be carried out in an effective and responsible 
manner. 

7. The chairmanship of each of the commissions 
should be assumed by two co-chairmen designated 
by each of the two groups respectively. Joint meet- 
ings of the co-chairmen of the commissions may be 
planned if the need arises. 

8. The Preparatory Meeting recommends that the 
intergovernmental functional organizations which 
are directly concerned with the problems considered, 
and which the Ministerial Conference deems to be 
able to make a useful contribution to their discus- 
sion, be represented on a permanent basis in the 
corresponding commissions by observers with the 
right to speak but without the right to vote, and 
hence not participating in the formation of a con- 
sensus. In addition to the United Nations Secretariat, 
the list of these organizations should include, in 



668 



Department of State Bulletin 



particular, OPEC, lEA, UNCTAD, OECD, FAO, 
GATT, UNIDO, UNDP, IMF and IBRD.- Further- 
more, each commission may invite appropriate inter- 
governmental functional organizations to participate 
as observers ad hoc in the examination of specific 
questions. 

9. Members of the Conference wishing to follow 
the work of a commission to which they do not be- 
long should be entitled to appoint a representative 
in the capacity of auditor without the right to speak. 

10. The activities of the four commissions whose 
establishment is recommended by the Preparatory 
Meeting will proceed on the basis of the relevant 
paragraphs of the Aide-Memoire annexed to the 
French Government's invitation to this Meeting, in 
the light of the following clarifications and inter- 
pretations: 

(a) It is understood that the Commission on Energy 
will facilitate all arrangements which may seem 
advisable in the field of energy. 

(b) It is understood that the Commission on Raw 
Materials will take into account the progress made 
in other international forums and will be entrusted 
with facilitating the establishment or reinforcement, 
as the case may be, of arrangements which may seem 
advisable in the field of raw materials — including 
foodstuffs — which are of particular interest to devel- 
oping countries. 

(c) It is understood that the Commission on De- 
velopment will take into account the progress in 
other international forums and the results achieved, 
and will be entrusted with facilitating the establish- 
ment or reinforcement, as the case may be, of ar- 
rangements for accelerating the development of 
developing countries, on the basis of close co-opera- 
tion. 

(d) It is understood that the Commission on Finan- 
cial Affairs may discuss financial issues, including 
their monetary aspects, of importance to member 
countries, while respecting the jurisdiction of inter- 
national institutions (IMF, IBRD). 

(e) It is understood that the four Commissions 
should function in parallel and that the results of 
their work are linked and should be submitted to the 
Ministerial Conference. 

11. It is agreed that any delegation may raise any 



- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; 
International Energy Agency; United Nations Con- 
ference on Trade and Development; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development; Food and 
Agriculture Organization; General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade; United Nations Industrial Devel- 
opment Organization; United Nations Development 
Program; Internationa! Monetary Fund; Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 



subject relevant to the themes of the dialogue for 
discussion in the Commissions. 

12. It has been agreed in accordance with the rele- 
vant paragraphs of the above-mentioned Aide- 
Memoire that the Ministerial Conference will be 
called upon to set the general guidelines for the 
work of the Commissions. 

13. The Preparatory Meeting recommends to the 
Ministerial Conference that the relevant paragraphs 
of the above-mentioned Aide-Memoire, as interpreted 
and clarified above, as well as the above-mentioned 
principle that any relevant subject may be raised 
for discussion in the Commissions, serve as the gen- 
eral guidelines for the Commissions. 

14. Some delegations have already tabled with this 
Preparatory Meeting documents proposing subjects 
to be discussed in the Commissions. The Preparatory 
Meeting recommends that the Ministerial Conference 
agree that these and any other proposals which may 
be tabled subsequently in accordance with the gen- 
eral guidelines be discussed in the Commissions. 

15. As regards the practical measures, the Prepar- 
atory Meeting recommends that the Conference adopt 
English, Arabic, Spanish and French as official lan- 
guages and working languages. 

16. The Preparatory Meeting recommends that the 
Conference adopt the Rules of Procedure which it 
itself had adopted, and which are based, in particu- 
lar, on the principle of "consensus", according to 
which decisions and recommendations are adopted 
when the Chair has established that no member dele- 
gation has made any objection. 

17. The Preparatory Meeting considers that the 
Conference should have an international secretariat 
with an exclusively administrative and technical 
function, the Ministerial meeting being responsible, 
on the basis of proposals by the two co-chairmen, 
for determining its organization, establishing its 
operational procedure and allocating the financial 
costs in respect of it. It is understood, however, that 
pending a decision on the provisions to be adopted 
for the continuation of the work, the French Govern- 
ment will assume responsibility and provide the 
secretariat for the Ministerial meeting scheduled for 
December 1975, under the conditions in which these 
services were provided for the Preparatory Meeting. 

18. The Preparatory Meeting finally recommends 
that the Ministerial Conference decide to meet again 
at ministerial level in about twelve months' time. 
One or several meetings of the Conference at the 
level of government officials could possibly be held 
at least six months after the first meeting of the 
Conference at ministerial level. 

19. In conclusion, the participants paid tribute to 
FYesident Giscard d'Estaing for the initiative taken 
by him, thanks to which a dialogue was successfully 
initiated, and to the French Government for all the 
efforts it has made towards that end. 



November 10, 1975 



669 



TEXT OF AIDE MEMOIRE ATTACHED 
TO LEHER OF INVITATION 

Aide Memoire Attached to the French Govern- 
ment's Letter of Invitation Dated September 
15, 1975 

1.1. It has been agreed that the questions to be 
discussed during the dialogue between industrialized 
countries and developing countries are energy, raw 
materials and the problems of development, includ- 
ing all related financial questions. 

1.2. These questions will be dealt with on equal 
footing. The participants in the dialogue will in 
particular spare no effort to advance toward con- 
structive solutions on each of these subjects. 

2.1. A new preparatory meeting will be held in 
Paris at as early a date as possible, and no later 
than October 15, comprising the same members, at 
the same level and in accordance with the same rules 
of procedure (particularly as regards observers) as 
the preparatory meeting last April. 

2.2. The name of this meeting will be: "Prepara- 
tory meeting for the conference between industrial- 
ized countries and developing countries" or "Prepar- 
atory meeting for the conference on international 
economic cooperation". 

2.3. The task of the preparatory meeting will be: 

— To confirm the consensus reached at the April 
preparatory meeting on the convening of a limited 
but representative conference, on the number of its 
participants and on the procedure for their selection. 

— To submit to the conference proposals on the 
setting up of commissions and their composition 
(members and observers). 

2.4. The preliminary meeting should be prepared 
in such a way that it reaches a consensus within no 
more than two to three days. 

3.1. The preparatory meeting will be followed up, 
within a maximum of two months, by the conference 
itself. The conference will comprise 27 members, 
eight from the industrialized countries and 19 from 
the developing countries. Each of these two groups 
will select its representatives to the conference within 
one month after the preparatory meeting. 

3.2. The conference will open at the ministerial 
level. In order to ensure the actual participation of 
all the ministers, it would be preferable that its 
duration does not exceed three days. 

3.3. The essential task of the conference will be to 
decide on the proposals to be submitted for its ap- 
proval by the preparatory meeting. 

3.4. This should induce it to set up four commis- 
sions, corresponding to the themes of the dialogue, 
to determine their composition, to set general guide- 
lines for them within the framework of paragraphs 



4.3. to 4.6. inclusive and to agree on what follow-up 
their work should have. 

4.1. These commissions will not have more than 
15 members. In determining its representation in 
each commission, each of the two groups at the con- 
ference will choose from among its members, those 
who, because of their special interest and the overall 
significance of their participation seem best suited to 
take part in order that the work may be carried out 
in an effective and responsible manner. The chair- 
manship of each of the commissions will be assumed 
by two co-chairmen designated by each of the two 
groups respectively. 

4.2. The commissions will be composed of high- 
level experts representing their government. 

4.3. The commission on energy, within the frame- 
work of an overall study of prospects for energy 
production and consumption in the world, including 
hydrocarbons, will be entrusted with facilitating 
through suitable ways and means the arrangements 
between oil producers and consumers which may 
seem advisable. 

4.4. The commission on raw materials, through 
suitable ways and means and taking the existing 
situation into account, will be entrusted with facili- 
tating the arrangements which may seem advisable 
in the area of raw materials — including food prod- 
ucts — which are of particular interest to the develop- 
ing countries. 

4.5. The commission on development, through suit- 
able ways and means and taking the existing situa- 
tion into account, will be entrusted with facilitating 
the arrangements which may seem advisable in the 
area of cooperation for development. 

4.6. The commission on financial affairs, while re- 
specting the jurisdiction of international institutions 
(IMF, World Bank) will study all financial prob- 
lems, including their monetary aspects, related to 
the work of the three preceding commissions. It will 
be composed of an appropriate number of members 
from each of these three commissions. 

4.7. The commissions on raw materials and devel- 
opment will, in particular, take into consideration 
the work carried out by other appropriate interna- 
tional bodies and will establish the necessary con- 
tacts with these groups. 

4.8. Joint meetings of the co-chairmen of these 
commissions may be planned if the need arises. 

4.9. Observers from organizations which are di- 
rectly concerned with the problems being discussed 
will be able to attend the commissions and will have 
the right to speak. 

5.1. The conference will meet again at the min- 
isterial level in about 12 months. 

5.2. One or several meetings of the conference at 
the level of government officials may possibly be 
held at least six months after the first meeting of 
the conference at the ministerial level. 



670 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ilelin 



U.S. LIST OF SUBJECTS ^ 

Lists of Subjects to be Discussed by the Com- 
missions, AS proposed by the United States 
OF America 

Commission on Energy: 

(1) Oil prices, their relationship to long term de- 
mand and supply for energy and to world economic 
progress; 

(2) Security of supply and markets for oil and oil 
products; 

(3) Cooperation among developed and developing 
countries to promote increased energy supplies. 

Commission on Raw Materials: 

(1) Access to supply and markets for raw mate- 
rials; 

(2) Problems of stability of export earnings; 

(3) Growth and diversification of export trade; 

(4) Enhancement of long run supply of raw mate- 
rials through application of capital, management, 
and technology with mutual respect for contractual 
obligations; 

(5) Enhancement of functioning and stability of 
markets for commodities, including food, on a case- 
by-case basis. 

Commission on Development: 

(1) Problems caused by payments deficits of de- 
veloping countries particularly the most seriously 
affected; 

(2) Financial assistance, arrangements conducive 
to the transfer of technology, international invest- 
ment and capital market access to accelerate growth 
in developing countries; 

(3) Promotion of agricultural and food production 
through, inter alia, enlargement of world food pro- 
duction capacity, particularly in developing countries, 
and food aid; 

(4) Promotion of development through enhanced 
trade opportunities among developed and developing 
countries; 

(5) Policies for promoting rapid industrial growth. 

Commission on Financial Affairs: 

Financial issues related to work of other commis- 
sions, for example: 

On Energy 

— Financial consequences of energy prices; 
— Conditions for international investment; in- 
cluding placement of surplus oil funds. 

On Raw Materials 

— Financial implications of commodity arrange- 
ments; 
— Export earnings stabilization. 



November 10, 1975 



On Development 

— Financing of investment projects in the de- 
veloping countries; 

— Financing of food imports of developing coun- 
tries and increased agricultural production; 

— Approaches to payments deficits of developing 

countries. 



DEVELOPING COUNTRIES' LIST OF SUBJECTS * 

Document Submitted by Algeria, Saudi Arabia, 
Brasil, India, Iran, Venezuela and Zaire, in 
Connection With the Subjects To Be Discussed 
BY THE Commissions 

The delegations of the countries mentioned above 
recommend that the general guidelines be inspired 
by the provisions of the Resolution 3362 of the Sev- 
enth Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly on "Development and International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation", and also take into account, inter 
alia, the following: 

1. — The Commission on Energy should consider: 
development and conditions of supply and demand of 
energy, hydro-carbons and other resources, including 
the protection of the purchasing power of energy 
export earnings. 

2. — The Commission on Raw Materials should 
consider: development and supply conditions of raw 
materials in respect of development needs of devel- 
oping countries, including the revalorization and 
protection of the purchasing power of developing 
countries export earnings. 

3. — The Commission on Development should con- 
sider: trade (access to markets for products of de- 
veloping countries, etc.); accelerated industrializa- 
tion; transfer of technology; development of agri- 
culture; development of infrastructure; problems of 
supply of food and fertilizers (special attention to 
devising measures for ensuring adequate supplies of 
food and fertilizers at reasonable prices to develop- 
ing countries); special and urgent attention to the 
question of the grave difficulties of MSAC's [most 
seriously afl'ected countries] created by the current 
economic situation ; and the need to increase present 
assistance to meet their pressing requirements. 

4. — The Commission on Financial Affairs should 
consider: relevant aspects of international monetary 
problems; financial co-operation and investment; and 
financial flows and investments in industrialized 
countries, including the problems of long-term in- 
vestments, the protection of the real value of finan- 



' Preparatory meeting doc. RP 11/11, Oct. 13, 1975. 
* Preparatory meeting doc. RP 11/10 and Corr. 



671 



cial assets, and problems of the international finan- 
cial markets. 

15 October 1975 



World Law Day, 1975 

A PROCLAMATION" 

Recognizing the need to destroy the discriminatory 
barriers of legal inequality which confront women 
throughout the world, the United Nations General 
Assembly proclaimed 1975 as International Women's 
Year. 

At home, the President, by Proclamation No. 4262, 
set aside the year 1975 as International Women's 
Year in the United States, and, by Executive Order 
No. 11832, created a National Commission on the 
Observance of International Women's Year. In 1972, 
the Congress adopted a proposed constitutional 
amendment which would ensure the equality of men 
and women before the law. If a few more States 
ratify that proposed amendment, it will become a 
fitting constitutional heritage of our Bicentennial era. 

Our eff"orts at home have been linked with those of 
other nations. This year, citizens of the United States 
participated in the world Conference on International 
Women's Year held in iVlexico City on June 19 
through July 2, 1975, to develop guidelines for a sus- 
tained, long-term effort to achieve the objectives of 
International Women's Year. 

Also this year, members of our Nation's legal pro- 
fession will be joined by lawyers, professors and 
jurists from more than one hundred nations during 
the week of October 12, 1975, at a World Law Con- 
ference, under the auspices of the World Peace 
Through Law Center, held in our Nation's capital. 
The agenda of the World Law Conference will deal 
with a host of international legal issues, ranging 
from the role of multinational companies to laws 
governing oil pollution at sea. 

The theme of the World Law Conference is the 
achievement of legal equality between men and 
women. A portion of the agenda will be devoted to 
discussing the elimination of discrimination against 
women. 

The President of the United States, along with the 
leaders of other nations, for more than a decade has 
encouraged the significant international efforts rep- 
resented by these World Law Conferences. With its 
theme of legal equality between men and women, it 
is fitting, during this International Women's Year, 
to do so again. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby designate 



Sunday, October 12, 1975, as World Law Day in the 
United States. 

I call upon all Americans, men and women, espe- 
cially members of the legal, educational and religious 
communities, to give recognition to the importance 
of law in our Nation's international quest for peace, 
human dignity and equality before the law for 
women and men. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this second day of October, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the two 
hundredth. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



Presidential Determination 
on Military Sales to Turkey 

Memorandum of October 10, 1975 ' 
Military Sales to the Government of Turkey 

[Presidential Determination No. 76-4] 

Memorandum foe the Secretary of State 

The White House, 
Washington, October 10, 1975. 

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by section 
2(b)(1)(A) of the Act of October 6, 1975 to au- 
thorize appropriations for the Board of International 
Broadcasting for fiscal year 1976; and to promote 
improved relations between the United States, Greece, 
and Turkey, to assist in the solution of the refugee 
program on Cyprus, and to otherwise strengthen the 
North Atlantic Alliance, I hereby determine and 
certify that 

a) The furnishing to the Government of Turkey 
of those defense articles and defense services with 
respect to which contracts of sale were signed under 
section 21 or section 22 of the Foreign Military Sales 
Act on or before February 5, 1975; and 

b) The issuance of licenses for the transportation 
to the Government of Turkey of arms, ammunition, 
and implements of war (including technical data re- 
lating thereto), 

are important to the national security interests of 
the United States. 

You are requested on my behalf to report this 
determination and certification to the Congress as 
required by law. 

This determination and certification shall be pub- 
lished in the Federal Register. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



"No. 4398; 40 Fed. Reg. 46085. 



" 40 Fed. Reg. 49073, Oct. 21, 1975. 



672 



Department of State Bulletin 



THE UNITED NATIONS 



U.S. Discusses Issues in Direct Television Broadcasting 
ancJ Remote Sensing by Satellite 



Following is a statement made in Com- 
\mittee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. 
General Assembly by U.S. Representative 
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on October 13. 

luSUN press release 116 dated October 13 

I Nineteen seventy-five has been an ex- 
Itremely active year both in the actual ex- 
ploration and use of outer space and in the 
work of the Outer Space Committee. There 
have been a number of developments in each 
which we believe are worthy of attention as 
the First Committee reviews the question of 
the peaceful uses of outer space. 

During the past year the United States 
has continued to participate actively with 
other nations in the exploration of outer 
space. We have, for example, launched Ariel- 
5, the fifth in a series of scientific satellites, 
undertaken in cooperation with Great Brit- 
ain ; the Intasat, an ionospheric satellite pre- 
pared by Spain; and Helios-1, the first of 
two solar probes built by the Federal Re- 
public of Germany and designed to fly closer 
to the sun than any previous spacecraft. 

In addition, consistent with our pledge 
to provide nondiscriminatory reimbursable 
launch assistance for foreign satellite proj- 
ects for peaceful purpose?, we have provided 
four launches within the past year. These 
have included two French and German Sym- 
phonie communications satellites; the Tele- 
sat-3, a Canadian communications satellite; 
and Cos-B, a European Space Agency satel- 
lite for gamma radiation studies. 

International cooperation has also played 
an increasing role in the development of the 
Space Transportation System, a new ap- 
proach to space flight which will eventually 
replace costly expendable launch vehicles and 



provide expanded opportunities for useful 
space activities throughout the world. The 
European Space Agency has proceeded on 
schedule with the development of Spacelab, 
an orbiting manned laboratory which will 
provide 7-to-30-day missions in space. Inter- 
national planning for the first shuttle mis- 
sion is already underway. The development 
by Canada of the remote manipulator system 
will permit shuttle astronauts to deliver, 
service, and retrieve payloads in space. 

One of the most dramatic examples of in- 
ternational cooperation in space this year 
was the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, which 
was successfully flown last July. We believe 
that this mission was more than a technical 
success in space exploration. We hope that 
it will stand in the perspective of time as a 
general landmark demonstration of the feasi- 
bility of highly complex technical projects 
among nations when there is the will to work 
toward common objectives. 

Finally, I wish to mention two cooperative 
projects which particularly illustrate the po- 
tential benefits for developing as well as de- 
veloped countries from the use of outer space. 
One was the inauguration August 1 of Indian 
educational broadcasting through the U.S. 
ATS-6 satellite directly into augmented 
community receivers in more than 2,000 In- 
dian villages. An additional 3,000 villages are 
reached through terrestrial rebroadcast sta- 
tions. We have heard very positive reports 
from the first few weeks of this Satellite In- 
structional Television Experiment, and we 
look forward to learning about its continued 
progress. 

The second project relates to the continua- 
tion of an experiment in remote sensing of 
the Earth's natural environment; namely, 



November 10, 1975 



673 



the launching last January of Landsat 2. At 
the present time, scientists sponsored and 
funded by 55 countries and five international 
organizations have participated in Landsat 
investigations. Canada, Brazil, and Italy al- 
ready have ground stations operating for di- 
rect reception of Landsat data, and so far 
in 1975 additional station agreements have 
been concluded with Chile, Iran, and Zaire. 

While these and other developments were 
occurring in outer space, extremely impor- 
tant related work was also taking place here 
at U.N. Headquarters in the deliberations of 
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space and its Legal and Scientific and Tech- 
nical Subcommittees. 

The two primary areas of interest before 
those bodies are direct television broadcast- 
ing by satellite and remote sensing of the 
Earth's natural environment and resources. 
Both of these subjects entail extremely im- 
portant and complex issues, and I would like 
to comment on the principal questions raised. 

Direct Television Broadcasting by Satellite 

During its 1975 session the Legal Subcom- 
mittee devoted considerable time to develop- 
ing the texts of 14 draft principles to guide 
those conducting direct television broadcast- 
ing by satellite.' Even though substantial 
portions of those draft principles remain un- 
agreed, development of these texts was 
nevertheless a substantial accomplishment 
which resulted from very careful and de- 
tailed consideration of the many important 
issues involved. We have made significant 
progress; we also have considerable work 
before us. 

The question of prior consent to broad- 
casting is probably the most difficult of the 
remaining issues under debate. Although 
risking the pitfalls of generalization and 
oversimplification, I believe it is reasonable 
to describe the debate as one in which one 
point of view is that direct television broad- 
casting through satellites should not be 
undertaken without the prior consent of the 
governments of all states where those sig- 
nals may be received. The other principal 



'U.N. doc. A/AC.105/147, annex II. 



point of view is essentially that, within the 
scope of reasonable voluntary guidelines de- 
veloped on a cooperative basis, broadcasters 
should be able to air programs without the 
constraint of prior program-content censor- 
ship and that concerns about an imbalance 
of cultural impacts should be accommodated 
by encouraging a two-way flow of ideas and 
information rather than simply a one-way 
communication. 

The United States has since the beginning 
of this debate encouraged the development 
and beneficial use of this new technology. We 
believe that increased communication among 
peoples reduces prejudices and misunder- 
standings whereas inhibited and restrictive 
communication encourages them. We believe 
that the potential benefits for developing and 
developed countries far outweigh the poten- 
tial risks. 

The adoption of a prior-consent regime is, 
in our view, undesirable in principle; and 
it is probably infeasible in practice, unless 
we wish simply to set this technology aside. 
As a practical matter, a system in which the 
prior consent of every receiving state were 
required would be a system in which very 
little broadcasting would ever take place ex- 
cept domestically within the largest coun- 
tries. Even with substantial progress in beam 
shaping, regional broadcasts in most areas 
of the world would be receivable in a con- 
siderable number of states, and I think it 
is a realistic, if unfortunate, assessment that 
there are few areas of the world with suffi- 
cient political compatibility that all states 
in a region would give their consent. The 
I'esult would be that the benefits of such 
communications would not be attainable, 
even if they were desired by a majority of 
states and population in an area. 

The United States continues to believe 
that with imagination and good will a for- 
mula can be found which will not deny to 
the world the potential benefits of direct tele- 
vision broadcasting and which at the same 
time will give reassurance to those who have 
legitimate concerns about the potential im- 
pact of this new communications technology. 

For example, there are a number of im- 
portant considerations of a technical nature 



i 



the a 






674 



Department of State Bulletin 



y 

telt 





which deserve attention. Those include the 
incompatibility of television transmitters in 
some countries with the receivers in others. 
In addition, local governments have the abil- 
ity to regulate the sale and possession of es- 
sential signal adaptors. 

We have closely reviewed proposals that 
the agreement of states in an anticipated re- 
ception area be obtained before a direct tele- 
vision broadcasting satellite is launched, 
thereby attempting to provide for agreement 
to the activity without getting into program- 
content evaluation. This carefully developed 
proposal has many reasonable elements but, 
unfortunately, in the end does not seem to 
solve the basic problem. It still would permit 
a single state to prohibit broadcasting over 
an entire region, regardless of the desires of 
others. In addition, there would be nothing to 
prevent a state from making its agreement 
to the launch dependent on prior censorship 
of program content. Also, this proposal 
would not seem to offer protection from the 
possibility that consent might be withdrawn 
sometime after it was initially given. If, for 
instance, a group of states had invested in a 
regional broadcasting system and then one 
of them suddenly withdrew its agreement, 
either the prior-consent requirement would 
have to be discarded or the regional broad- 
casting system abandoned. A unilateral right 
to prohibit open communications could be 
much more dangerous than a unilateral right 
to initiate broadcasts which may or may not 
have the prior consent of every single state 
concerned. 

We recognize that the differences among 
states are significant on this issue and that 
divergent views, including ours, are strongly 
held. The United States has been strongly 
advocating the principles of maximizing the 
free and open exchange of information and 
ideas, principles which we believe are in 
the interests of all peoples, not simply of 
citizens of the United States. At the same 
time we recognize the concerns of others. In 
order to assist these deliberations, we tabled 
in 1974 a paper containing draft principles 
on direct broadcasting which reflected the 
approach which we felt the international 
community should adopt to deal with this 

November 10, 1975 



new technology.^ We have continued to give 
serious consideration to additional ways of 
reconciling differences among states on this 
issue. 

Proposal for Notification and Consultation 

Based on our review of the points and 
interests raised in the debates on direct 
broadcasting during the last year, we would 
like to propose a new approach which we be- 
lieve might serve as an effective basis for 
reconciling many of our divergent interests. 

In his August statement on international 
law before the American Bar Association 
meeting in Montreal, Secretary of State Kis- 
singer suggested that any system for direct 
television broadcasting by satellite should be 
accompanied by full consultations among the 
countries concerned. I wish to elaborate on 
the meaning of this suggestion. In particu- 
lar, we are proposing that before direct tele- 
vision broadcasting is undertaken, states 
within the reception area should be notified 
of the intention to broadcast. Those who 
broadcast should be prepared, on a reciprocal 
basis, to assume an obligation to give formal 
notification to states within the likely broad- 
cast area. In addition, those who broadcast 
should agree to consult fully with the gov- 
ernments of the states in the intended re- 
ception area if the latter so request, with 
the intention of making good-faith efforts 
to reconcile problems that may be raised. 

We believe that this approach would offer 
protection for any state which has legitimate 
concerns about direct television broadcasting 
into its territory, without establishing an 
international scheme based on prior con- 
sent. We do not envisage establishment 
through these procedures of a right of any 
state to prohibit others from undertaking 
broadcasting. We do envisage that such noti- 
fication and consultation requirements would 
go substantively beyond the technical con- 
sultations now provided for within the ITU 
[International Telecommunication Union]. 

It is our belief that the actual process of 
consultations, which would cause the parties 
to deal expressly with problems which may 



' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 22, 1974, p. 450. 



675 



arise, would go very far to reconcile differ- 
ences. The very process of bona fide consulta- 
tions would give the broadcaster considerable 
incentive to work out mutually satisfactory 
solutions and would guarantee those in the 
reception area a full opportunity to resolve 
problems they may foresee. Broadcasters 
would clearly not wish to alienate prospective 
audiences and hence would desire to recon- 
cile differences. The natural dynamic of the 
dialogue would work in favor of reconcilia- 
tion. 

Neither the United States nor others who 
are attempting to ensure continued oppor- 
tunities for the beneficial development of 
the new communications technology wish 
this technology itself to become a source of 
international discord or friction. On the con- 
trary, it is through such developments that 
we would hope for the growth of better 
communication and understanding among 
peoples, and hence the gradual reduction of 
tensions. We have proposed this formula, not 
in anticipation of satisfying everyone com- 
pletely, an accomplishment which does not 
seem possible with such great divisions, but 
in genuine hope of accommodating at least 
the most essential interests of both sides of 
this debate. Advocates of both points of view 
obviously must demonstrate some flexibility 
if we are ever to reach agreement. It is our 
hope that this approach will be a helpful 
and constructive basis for our further dis- 
cussion in the Legal Subcommittee on this 
issue. 

Remote Sensing of the Earth 

Nineteen seventy-five has also been a nota- 
ble year both in space and at the conference 
table for remote sensing of the Earth's nat- 
ural environment and resources. As I men- 
tioned earlier in these remarks, in January 
the United States launched its second experi- 
mental remote sensing satellite, the Landsat 
2. In the spring at its 14th session, the Legal 
Subcommittee for the first time devoted a 
significant amount of time to the question of 
the legal implications of remote sensing and 
took the first small but important step to- 
ward a thorough, detailed, and constructive 



676 






analysis of the issues involved. In May the , 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee de- 
voted a considerable portion of its 12th ses- 
sion to the technical and organizational 
aspects of remote sensing. 

As in the case of direct television broad- 
casting, the Outer Space Committee is deal- 
ing with a set of issues of broad scope and 
considerable complexity. In February the 
U.S. Representative to the Legal Subcom- 
mittee introduced a working paper in order 
to express more clearly the approach which 
we believe the international community 
should take in order to insure for all coun- 
tries, regardless of their stages of economic 
and technological development, the maxi- 
mum opportunities to share in the benefits 
of remote sensing.^ 

As is reflected in the U.S. working paper, 
we strongly believe that substantial benefits 
for all states, at every stage of economic and 
technical development, can be obtained from 
an open and shared system of earth observa- 
tion from satellites such as the Landsat 
space platforms with which we are experi- 
menting. Convincing evidence of the poten- 
tial benefits already realized can be easily 
found in the experiments of over 50 states 
now participating directly in the Landsat 
program. 

Our total shared understanding about the 
natural features and resources of the Earth 
has been greatly expanded. That understand- 
ing will continue to grow as scientists 
throughout the world continue to improve 
their analytical techniques and as we pool 
and share with each other the knowledge 
gained. Although our body of information 
will be greatly increased by periodic cover- 
age of the world's surface, the United States 
has already shared and continues to make 
available to all interested parties at least 
one-time coverage of over 90 percent of the 
Earth's land surface. The peaceful explora- 
tion and use of outer space has given us all 
an invigorating common cause in the inter- 
ests of all countries and has given us an 
encouraging example that openness and 



^ For text of the working paper, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 31, 1975, p. 423. 



Department of State Bulletin 



liharing can be to our common benefit, rather 
than to our collective or individual detri- 

jnent. 

I 

J.S. Support for Open Sharing of Data 

The Legal Subcommittee also has before 
it two proposals which would restrict data 
dissemination, proposals which we believe 
would reverse the beneficial pattern of inter- 
national cooperation which so many of us 
have been attempting to build for these 
many years. If adopted and applied, either 
Df these would almost inevitably result in a 
monopoly on remote sensing data by highly 
industrialized states which have their own 
satellites. 

For example, if the United States and 
ather countries with such remote sensing 
satellites were to agree not to make available 
to third countries data of a sensed country 
without the latter's consent, we would in 
fact be able to share very little with anyone 
Liutside of the United States, although it 

I would be our intention to continue to make 
the data available here. The natural swath 
of the satellite sensors commonly cuts across 
many national boundaries. The exercise of 
separating the billions of data bits along the 
lines of political boundaries is both finan- 
cially prohibitive and scientifically disadvan- 
tageous. Absent such separation, in many 
parts of the world the consent of every coun- 
try in a region might have to be obtained, 
through a time-consuming and complicated 
process which would insure at the very least 
that the data release to countries without 
' satellites would be much delayed and prob- 
ably that it would be prohibited completely. 
There would be little incentive to pursue such 
a process. 

How, for example, could we or any other 
jcountry continue to permit most other states 
to operate ground receiving stations under 
jsuch a restrictive data-dissemination sys- 
Item? Normal coverage by a ground station 
jis a circle approximately 3,000 kilometers in 
radius. For example, a station in the middle 
of South America could pick up data of at 
least part of every country on that conti- 



November 10, 1975 



nent. In other areas of the world it would be 
more; in some areas fewer. Under a restric- 
tive data-dissemination proposal, we could 
not permit such a ground station to read out 
the data without the prior consent of all the 
countries in the region, because the operator 
of that ground station would be a third 
country ; that is, neither the sensed nor the 
sensing country. 

Such a system, in our view, would exacer- 
bate the divisions between the rich and poor, 
the technologically advanced and the less ad- 
vanced, and the large and the small, in ways 
that the vast majority of states have been 
calling out to reverse, not to perpetuate. We 
do not believe such a policy is in the interest 
of the international community. 

This result would be contrary to the spirit 
of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which urges 
that such activities be undertaken in the 
interests and for the benefit of all countries, 
and would run squarely against the conclu- 
sions of the very body that we last year re- 
quested to examine the organizational as- 
pects of this question. I refer in particular 
to paragraph 27 (iii) of the report of the 
12th session of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee.* 

There the subcommittee noted with satis- 
faction that receiving stations in various 
countries were set up or planned to work 
with the Landsat program and recognized 
the importance of these stations for obtain- 
ing coverage of most of North and South 
America, most of Europe, and large parts of 
Africa and West Asia. The subcommittee 
also expressed the hope that countries in 
other regions would set up similar stations 
and that all countries planning to do so 
would associate with them data storage, data 
dissemination, and training facilities that 
could be made available on reasonable terms 
to other countries in their regions. In addi- 
tion, the subcommittee expressed the view 
that states should operate ground stations in 
such a manner as to maximize their contri- 
bution to scientific research concerning prob- 
lems of a global nature. 

The results of the open data-dissemina- 



*U.N. doc. A/AC.105/150. 



677 



tion provisions in the agreements establish- 
ing those ground stations are a practical 
daily demonstration that open dissemination 
can increase benefits without harm. 

The United States believes that the Scien- 
tific and Technical Subcommittee adopted 
the proper conclusions on this issue in its 
report, conclusions which when followed by 
responsive action in the Legal Subcommittee 
would insure an equitable opportunity for all 
states to share in the benefits from these 
new technological developments. The report 
of the Outer Space Committee's 30th ses- 
sion, which was held just last June,^ con- 
tains the recommendation that the Legal 
Subcommittee should inter alia take into ac- 
count the discussions, views, and conclusions 
concerning organizational, economic, and 
technical aspects of remote sensing in the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. We 
support that recommendation and will do 
our part to insure that it is respected. 

We look forward to the resumption in the 
Legal Subcommittee of our efforts toward a 
thorough and detailed examination of the 
legal implications of remote sensing. On the 
basis of issues raised in that examination, 
we will be looking for common elements of 
agreement, and when it appears that any of 
those common elements could be developed 
into general statements of principle, we 
along with others will endeavor to develop 
them. 

In the remote sensing area we believe that 
a policy of open sharing, coupled with active 
programs of assistance in learning how to 
analyze and use the data, can continue to 
provide valuable opportunities for all states 
to share in the potential benefits from re- 
mote sensing. The United States has no de- 
sire to force upon any other country data 
from our space programs. We would urge 
the international community, however, to 
pursue a policy in which more countries, not 
fewer, participate in such sharing, a policy 
in which more knowledge, not less, is made 
universally available in order to help us all 
improve the state of our common experience 
here on Earth. 



'U.N. doc. A/10020, supp. 20. 



U.S. Rejects Call by Cuba in U.N. 
for Puerto Rican Independence 

Following is a statement in exercise of the 
right of reply made in plenary session of the 
U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representa- 
tive Carmen Maymi on October 8. 

USUN press release 111 dated October 8 

Earlier this afternoon, the Cuban Repre- 
sentative saw fit once again to attempt to 
intervene in the internal affairs of the United 
States and the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. My government regrets that the Cuban 
delegation makes it necessary for us to state 
once more the facts of the case and our very 
strong and well-known views on the subject. 

The people of Puerto Rico attained self- 
government by fully and freely participat- 
ing in a referendum in 1952 in which they 
voted to establish a Commonwealth freely j 
associated with the United States and in 
which they adopted a Constitution for that 
Commonwealth. They have repeatedly re- 
affirmed that decision in free elections con- 
ducted on the basis of universal adult suf- 
frage in 1956, 1960, 1964, 1968, and 1972 
and in a status referendum in 1967. 

The eighth session of the General Assem- 
bly of the United Nations in 1953 specifically 
recognized Puerto Rico's attainment of self- 
government by adopting Resolution 748, 
which states in operative paragraph 5 that: 

... the people of Puerto Rico have been invested 
with attributes of political sovereignty which clearly 
identify the status of self-government attained by 
the Puerto Rican people as that of an autonomous 
political entity; 

Operative paragraph 6 of the same resolu- 
tion states that: 

. . . the Declaration regarding Non-Self-Goveming 
Territories and the provisions established under it in 
Chapter XI of the Charter can no longer be applied 
to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; 

The 26th session of the General Assembly 
in 1971 endorsed these decisions on the self- 
governing status of Puerto Rico by reject- 
ing a proposal to include an item on Puerto 
Rico in its agenda. 

In 1972, as in previous elections, the over- 



678 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



whelming majority of the Puerto Rican peo- 
ple supported the Commonwealth and State- 
hood Parties. Only slightly more than 4 per- 
cent of the electorate voted for the Inde- 
pendence Party. 

Misrepresentations in this forum will not 
change these facts, nor will such attacks 
weaken the adherence of the United States 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to 
decisions made by the people of Puerto Rico 
in free democratic elections. 



TREATY INFORMATION 












Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International agreement for the creation at Paris of 
an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. 
Done at Paris January 25, 1924. Entered into force 
January 17, 1925; for the United States July 29, 
1975. 
Proclaimed by the President : October 18, 1975. 

Aviation 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force 
January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 

Accession deposited: Morocco (with a reserva- 
tion), October 24, 1975. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Morocco (with a reserva- 
tion), October 24, 1975. 

Coffee 

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved 
by the International Coffee Council at London 
September 26, 1974. Entered into force October 1, 
1975. 
Acceptance deposited: Netherlands, August 26, 

1975. 
Accession deposited: Japan, October 10, 1975; 

Papua New Guinea, October 15, 1975. 



Ratifications deposited: Brazil, August 6, 1975; 
Jamaica, Mexico, Portugal, September 30, 1975; 
Yugoslavia, September 24, 1975. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Greece, October 14, 1975. 

Copyright 

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at 
Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 
1974. TIAS 7868. 

Ratification deposited: Mexico, July 31, 1975. 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 5, 1975. 

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to works of stateless persons and 
refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered 
into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 5, 1975. 

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright con- 
vention, as revised, concerning the application of 
that convention to the works of certain interna- 
tional organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. 
Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. 
Accession deposited: Bangladesh, May 5, 1975. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973.' 
Acceptance deposited: Spain, October 10, 1975. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, September 19, 
1975.= 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 
1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), Sep- 
tember 2, 1975. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975.' 
Signature: Austria, October 14, 1975. 



November 10, 1975 



' Not in force. 

" Extended to Surinam and the Netherlands An- 
tilles. 



679 



Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, October 20, 1975. 



BILATERAL 



Barbados 



Agreement relating to a cooperative program for 
operation and maintenance of a rawinsonde station 
at Seawell Airport, Barbados. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Bridgetown October 13, 1975. 
Entered into force October 13, 1975; effective July 
1, 1970. 

Chile 

Memorandum of understanding concerning direct ac- 
cess by a Chilean ground station to data generated 
by NASA Landsat satellites and availability to the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration of 
the data so acquired. Signed at Santiago and 
Washington July 24 and September 8, 1975. 
Entered into force September 8, 1975. 

Israel 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of December 16, 1974 
(TIAS 7978). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington October 17, 1975. Entered into force 
October 17, 1975. 

Malta 

Agreement providing for consultations on problems 
of market disruption caused by cotton textile or 
cotton textile product exports from Malta. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Floriana and Valletta 
September 17 and 22, 1975. Entered into force 
September 22, 1975. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of November 9, 
1972 (TIAS 7697), concerning frequency modula- 
tion broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band with 
annexes and related notes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico August 21, 1975. Entered into 
force August 21, 1975. 

Agreement to indemnify and safeguard the United 
States Government, its personnel, and contractors 
for liability arising out of aircraft operations 
training in support of the cooperative program to 
curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Mexico September 12, 1975. Entered 
into force September 12, 1975. 



PUBLICATIONS 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are stibject to change. 

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading 
list. (A complete set of all Background Notes cur- 
rently in stock — at least 140 — $21.80; 1-year sub- 
scription service for approximately 77 updated or 
new Notes— $23.10; plastic binder— $1.50.) Single 
copies of those listed below are available at 30^ each. 

Australia Cat. No. S1.123:AU7/2 

Pub. 8149 8 pp. 

Chile Cat. No. S1.123:C43 

Pub. 7998 8 pp. 

Finland Cat. No. S1.123:F49 

Pub. 8262 6 pp. 

German Democratic Republic Cat. No. SI. 123:031/2 

Pub. 7957 7 pp. 

Assistance for Children and Mothers. Agreements 
with the United Nations Children's Fund amending 
the agreement of December 26 and 30, 1974. TIAS 
8031. 4 pp. 25('. (Cat. No. S9.10:8031). 

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos 
and the Khmer Republic. Agreement with the Inter- 
national Committee of the Red Cross. TIAS 8032. 
14 pp. SO^ (Cat. No. 89.10:8032). 

Furnishing Federal Catalog Data and Services. 

Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8034. 3 pp. 25<*. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8034). 

Surplus Property Settlement. Agreement with India. 
TIAS 8035. 2 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8035). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Panama 
amending the agreement of March 31, 1949, as 
amended. TIAS 8036. 11 pp. 30<t. (Cat. No. 89.10: 
8036). 



680 



Department of State Bulletin 



JDEX November 10, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1898 



riculture. Five- Year Grain Supply Agree- 
_ nent With U.S.S.R. Signed at Moscow (Ford, 
'text of agreement) 662 

|.\rms Control. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
on "Meet the Press" 



ina. Secretary Kissinger 
?Meet the Press" . . . 



Interviewed on 



657 



657 



gress 
ongressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 664 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Meet the 
Press" 657 

;uba. U.S. Rejects Call by Cuba in U.N. for 
Puerto Rican Independence (Maymi) . . . 678 

Sconomic Affairs. Second Preparatory Meeting 
Held for Conference on Intei-national Eco- 
nomic Cooperation (Robinson, final declara- 
tion, French aide memoire, U.S. and develop- 
ing countries' lists of subjects for discussions 
by commissions) 665 

Igypt. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
"Meet the Press" 



657 



657 



Europe. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 

iuman Rights. World Law Day, 1975 (procla- 
mation) 672 

nternational Law. World Law Day, 1975 
(proclamation) 672 

nternational Organizations and Conferences. 

Second Preparatory Meeting Held for Con- 
ference on International Economic Coopera- 
tion (Robinson, final declaration, French aide 
memoire, U.S. and developing countries' lists 
of subjects for discussions by commissions) . 665 

Israel. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on 
"Meet the Press" 657 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
on "Meet the Press" 657 

*etroleum. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Negotiating on 
Purchase of Soviet Oil (letter of intent) . . 664 

'residential Documents 

rive-Year Grain Supply Agreement With 
U.S.S.R. Signed at Moscow 662 

'residential Determination on Military Sales 
to Turkey 672 

A^orld Law Day, 1975 (proclamation) .... 672 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 680 

)pace. U.S. Discusses Issues m Direct Tele- 
vision Broadcasting and Remote Sensing by 
Satellite (Bennett) 673 

Treaty Information 

iJurrent Actions 679 

rive- Year Grain Supply Agreement With 
U.S.S.R. Signed at Moscow (Ford, text of 
agreement) 662 

Turkey. Presidential Determination on Military 
Sales to Turkey (text) 672 

[J.S.S.R. 

?ive-Year Grain Supply Agreement With 



U.S.S.R. Signed at Moscow (Ford, text of 
agreement) 662 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Meet the 
Press" 657 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Negotiating on Purchase of 
Soviet Oil (letter of intent) 664 

United Nations 

U.S. Discusses Issues in Direct Television 
Broadcasting and Remote Sensing by Satel- 
lite (Bennett) 673 

U.S. Rejects Call by Cuba in U.N. for Puerto 
Rican Independence (Maymi) 678 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 673 

Ford, President 662, 672 

Kissinger. Secretary 657 

Maymi, Carmen 678 

Robinson, Charles W 665 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

t532A 10/19 Kissinger: Interview for Time 
Magazine. 

*533 10/20 Drug abuse treatment specialists 
from 18 countries to tour U.S. 

t534 10/20 Kissinger: news conference. An- 
chorage, Alaska, Oct. 18. 

t535 10/20 Kissinger, Ch'iao Kuan-hua: 

toasts, Peking, Oct. 19. 
536 10/20 Kissinger: letter to House Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Oct. 
14 (printed in Nov. 3 issue). 

*537 10/23 U.S. and Canada request Inter- 
national Joint Commission re- 
view of Garrison Diversion 
Unit. 

t538 10/22 Kissinger. Ch'iao Kuan-hua: 
toasts, Peking. 

*539 10/23 Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, working group on 
radio communications, Nov. 20 
and Dec. 18. 

t540 10/23 Kissinger: interview with three 
networks, Tokyo. 

*'541 10/24 Program for the state visit of 
President Anwar al-Sadat of 
Egypt to the U.S., Oct. 26- 
Nov. 5. 

t542 10/25 Kissinger: U.N. Day concert. 

t543 10/25 Kissinger: toast, U.N. Day dinner. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



/]: 



Superintendent of Documents 

us. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourth-Clatt Rote 
Book 




7j 



'/i 



T 



V( 



Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to. Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



(3: 



n 



V^f? 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXm 



No. 1899 



November 17, 1975 



SECRETARY KISSINGER VISITS 
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 681 

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED FOR TIME MAGAZINE 691 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES MILITARY EXPORTS TO KUWAIT 

AND OTHER PERSIAN GULF NATIONS 

Staterrt,snt by Deputy Assistant Secretary Sober 702 

DEPARTMENT DISCUSSES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 

Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Katz 707 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLET I 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1899 
November 17, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OfBce 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29. 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



'Ml 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by t 
0/Rce of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides tfie public ai 
interested agencies of tfie governmei 
witfi information on developments in 
t/ie field of U.S. foreign relations ani 
on tfie work of tfie Department ai 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, iss 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie Depari 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of tfie Presidei 
and tfie Secretary of State and oti 
officers of tfie Department, as well 
special articles on various pfiases 
international affairs and tfie functioi 
of tfie Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inte] 
national agreements to wfiicfi tl 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inti 
national interest. 
Publications of tfie Department 
State, United Nations documents, ai 
legislative material in tfie field 
international relations are also listi 



Secretary Kissinger Visits the People's Republic of China 



Secretary Kissinger visited Peking October 
19-23. He met with Japanese Government 
officials at Tokyo October 18-19 and 23. 
Follotving are exchanges of toasts between 
Secretary Kissinger and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Ch'iao Kuan-hua at Peking on Octo- 
I ber 19 and 22, together with the transcript 
,, of an intervieiv with Secretary Kissinger at 
".. ( Tokyo on October 23 by Ted Koppel of ABC 
. t Neivs, Bernard Kalb of CBS News, and Don 
ti Oliver of NBC News. 



BANQUET GIVEN BY FOREIGN MINISTER 
CH'IAO AT PEKING ON OCTOBER 19 

Piess release 535 dated October 20 

Toast by Foreign Minister Ch'iao 

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger, Mr. 
Bush, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, and 
Mrs. Bush, American guests, comrades : I 
wish to express, in the name of my Chi- 
nese colleagues present, our welcome to the 
Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, and his 
party, who have come again to Peking to 
prepare for President Ford's visit to China 
later this year. 

The current international situation is char- 
acterized by great disorder under heaven, 
and the situation is excellent. The basic 
contradictions in the world are sharpening. 
The factors for both revolution and war are 
increasing. The stark reality is not that de- 
tente has developed to a new stage but that 
the danger of a new world war is mounting. 
We do not believe there is any lasting peace. 
Things develop according to objective laws 
independently of man's will. The only way 
to deal with hegemonism is to wage a tit-for- 
tat struggle against it. To base oneself on 



illusions, to mistake hopes or wishes for 
reality and act accordingly, will only abet the 
ambitions of expansionism and lead to grave 
consequences. 

In this regard, the history of the Second 
World War provides a useful lesson. In the 
face of the growing danger of war, China's 
fundamental policy is to "dig tunnels deep, 
store grain everywhere, and never seek he- 
gemony," to persist in independence and self- 
reliance, and make all necessary prepara- 
tions. We are deeply convinced that, what- 
ever zigzags and reverses there may be in 
the development of history, the general trend 
of the world is toward light and not darkness. 

A new page was turned in the relations 
between China and the United States with 
President Nixon's visit to China and the 
issuance of the Shanghai communique by 
our two sides in 1972. On the whole, Sino- 
U.S. relations have moved forward in the 
last few years. China and the United States 
have different social systems, and there are 
essential differences between their policies. 

However, in the current turbulent world 
situation, our two sides have common points 
as well. This has been set forth clearly in 
the Shanghai communique. So long as our 
two sides earnestly observe in actual prac- 
tice the principles established in the Shang- 
hai communique, there is reason to believe 
that Sino-U.S. relations will continue to move 
ahead. This is the common desire of the Chi- 
nese and American peoples. On the Chinese 
side, we will do our part to promote Sino- 
U.S. relations in the spirit of the Shanghai 
communique, as we have done all along. 

Now I propose a toast: To the friendship 
between the Chinese and American peoples; 
to the health of the Secretary of State and 
Mrs. Kissinger; to the health of Mr. Bush, 



November 17, 1975 



681 



chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, and Mrs. 
Bush ; to the health of all American guests ; 
and to the health of the Chinese comrades 
here. 

Toast by Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Vice Premier [Teng Hsiao-p'ing] , Mr. 
Foreign Minister, Chief of the Liaison Office 
in Washington [Huang Chen] : On this my 
eighth trip to China, I have finally found the 
courage to say something in Chinese. I ask 
your indulgence to listen carefully while I 
say it: Pan chiu jung yi, ch'ing k'o nan, 
which for those of you who think I spoke 
Cantonese means: "It is easy to prepare a 
banquet, but it is hard to be a good host." 

On each of my visits the table is always 
magnificently set. But it is the warmth of 
the welcome that has made all of these 
evenings memorable. 

I understand that today is the 40th an- 
niversary of the end of the Long March. 
This occasion therefore has profound mean- 
ing for the People's Republic of China and 
those here tonight — including the Vice Pre- 
mier and Ambassador Huang — who made 
that epic march. That event was testimony 
to the world, as well, of the courage and the 
vision of those who set out on a path whose 
length and contours they could not know. 
Their success was a triumph of spirit as 
much as exertion. And it demonstrates that 
faith is even more important than material 
circumstances in achieving great things. 

As I said in my speech to the United Na- 
tions, there is no relationship to which the 
United States assigns greater significance 
than its ties with the People's Republic of 
China. 

The differences between us are apparent. 
Our task is not to intensify those differences. 
Our task is to advance our relationship on 
the basis of our mutual interests. Such a re- 
lationship would strengthen each of us. It 
would threaten no one, and it would con- 
tribute to the well-being of all peoples. It is 
a relationship which we intend to be a du- 
rable feature of the world scene. 

Each country must pursue a policy suit- 
able to its own circumstances. The United 



States will resist hegemony, as we have al- 
ready stated in the Shanghai communique. 
But the United States will also make every 
effort to avoid needless confrontations, when 
it can do so without threatening the security 
of third countries. In this policy we will be 
guided by actions and realities, and not 
rhetoric. 

President Ford will soon be coming to 
China. He has visited you before, but now 
he comes as President with the intention of 
strengthening our relations on the basis of 
the Shanghai communique and to give ex- 
pression to the American interest in a China 
that is making progress in a peaceful and 
secure world. 

During the next few days we will have the 
opportunity to exchange views on a wide 
range of matters of common interest. These 
regular consultations have become a valuable 
feature of our relationship. Once again, I 
look forward to my meetings with the Vice 
Premier and the Foreign Minister. 

And now may I propose a toast: To the 
health of Chairman Mao and Premier Chou 
En-lai, to whom we wish a rapid recovery; 
to the health of the Vice Premier and the 
Foreign Minister; to the health of the Chief 
of the Liaison Office in Washington; to the 
health of all our friends here today; and to 
the friendship of the American people and 
Chinese peoples. Kan pei. 



BANQUET GIVEN BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 
AT PEKING ON OCTOBER 22 



Press release 



dated October 22 



Toast by Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, 
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chinese friends 
and colleagues, ladies and gentlemen: On 
behalf of all my American colleagues, I ex- 
tend a cordial welcome to all our Chinese 
friends to this dinner this evening. And as 
a sign of my respect for them, I will not 
again inflict on them Chinese with a Canton- 
ese accent. 

We are satisfied with our visit. Our two 
countries are too self-reliant to need reas- 



682 



Department of State Bulletin 



surance and too experienced to confuse words 
with reality or tactics with strategy. We 
ended our isolation from each other because 
of our perceptions of our national interests. 
We will strengthen our relationship by deep- 
ening these common perceptions. And we will 
nurture our relationship by respecting each 
other's views regarding our national interest. 

Once again we benefited greatly from the 
friendly and wide-ranging discussions I had 
last evening with Chairman Mao. And many 
issues of common concern were examined 
thoroughly and usefully in extensive talks 
with the Vice Premier, the Foreign Minister, 
and other Chinese ofl!icials. 

The preparations for President Ford's visit 
to China later this year are proceeding well. 
It will serve to promote Sino-U.S. relation- 
ships on the basis of the principles of the 
Shanghai communique. I would like to thank 
our Chinese hosts for making our sojourn 
here once again a memorable experience 
through the openness and farsightedness of 
the talks, the splendors of China's history 
and culture, and the autumn beauty of the 
Fragrant Hills. 

And with pleasure, I propose a toast: To 
the health of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and 
Premier Chou En-lai; to the health of the 
Vice Premier, the Foreign Minister, and the 
Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office in Wash- 
ington; to the health of all our friends here 
today ; and to the friendship of the American 
and Chinese peoples. Kari pei. 

Toast by Foreign Minister Ch'iao 

Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger, Mr. 
Bush, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, and 
Mrs. Bush, American guests, comrades: The 
Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, will con- 
clude his eighth visit to China tomorrow. 
We would like to thank Mr. Secretary for 
inviting us to this banquet on the eve of 
his departure. 

Yesterday, Chairman Mao Tse-tung met 
with Secretary of State Kissinger, and they 
had a conversation on a wide range of sub- 
jects in a friendly atmosphere. 

In the last few days, our two sides had a 
frank exchange of views on the current in- 



ternational situation, international issues of 
common interest, and Sino-U.S. relations. 
Our talks have enabled us to have a clearer 
understanding of each other's views. This is 
useful. Both sides reaffirmed the principles 
established in the Shanghai communique and 
stated that they will promote Sino-U.S. re- 
lations in accordance with these principles. 

Finally, I wish Mr. Secretary and his party 
a pleasant journey. 

I propose a toast: To the friendship be- 
tween the Chinese and American peoples; to 
the health of the Secretary of State and 
Mrs. Kissinger: to the health of the Chief 
of the U.S. Liaison Office and Mrs. Bush; to 
the health of all American guests and Chi- 
nese comrades present. 

INTERVIEW AT TOKYO ON OCTOBER 23 

Press release 540 dated October 23 

Mr. Oliver: Mr. Secretary, someone said 
that the meetings in Peking were in a rather 
chilly atmosphere, with some criticism of the 
United States on the opening night's banquet 
and rather curt statements on the closing 
night. How would you characterize the meet- 
ings, and what do you think they accom- 
plished ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Chinese described 
the meetings as friendly and wide ranging, 
which I think is essentially correct. We had 
very full discussions. We covered the topics 
in about the manner which we expected, and 
we are satisfied with the visit. I think it 
laid the basis for the Presidential visit and 
maintained the relationship at the level 
which both sides want. 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, the Chinese made 
a point and have made the point of attacking 
various aspects of U.S. foreign policy that 
you personally are very much and promi- 
nently identified with. They have sharply 
attacked detente. They have sharply attacked, 
for example, the Helsinki Conference. Did 
you find in any way that, on a personal level, 
because of these policies the Chinese were a 
touch cool in your direction? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, personal relations 



November 17, 1975 



683 



are outstanding. This was my eighth visit 
to China in four years. These are all peo- 
ple I know well. We don't go to China to 
ask approval for our other policies. They 
don't ask approval for their policies. So we 
discuss matters of mutual interest, and on 
the personal level the relationship is ex- 
tremely good. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, you had an 
extraordinarily long meeting unth Chairman 
Mao. Do you regard him on the basis of your 
meeting as still an active force in China to- 
day, or does he have a largely hoyiorific role? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I cannot deter- 
mine the internal arrangements in China; 
but my impression was of a man of very 
powerful intelligence, very strong views, and 
I see no reason to doubt that he is in charge 
of events in China. 

Mr. Koppel: I understand that you can't 
go into detail, hut can you give us the sense 
of the mood? Hoiv did these meetings go 
when you went in to see Mao? 

Secretary Kissinger: They're in a rather 
sparse room, and he likes to joke. I have 
learned that all of his remarks are rather 
carefully thought out. I think the discus- 
sions were well described as wide ranging, 
very acute. 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, do you have the 
feeling that the Chinese want, very much so, 
the United States to remain in Asia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have the impression 
that the Chinese, with all the things that 
may have been said at the banquets — I think 
the Chinese basically understand our global 
policy and understand the necessity of our 
role in Asia and certainly have given no 
sign either to us or to any other country 
that they want us to end it. 

Mr. Kalb: Are you suggesting the Chinese 
ivould like to see the United States remain 
in Asia ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is for 
them to say what they would like to do. I 
have heard no opposition to it nor, to my 
knowledge, have other Asian countries. 



Mr. Oliver: With the possibility of a change 
in leadership in China with Mao ill, with 
Chou En-lai in the hospital, do you feel the 
Chinese are in any position right now to 
make any commitments toward progress in 
U.S.-Sino relationships ? 

Secretary Kissinger: It depends on what 
you mean by progress in U.S.-Sino relation- 
ships. On the issues of global international 
concern, we have many points of common 
views and we are pursuing those. On other 
issues of a purely bilatei'al nature having 
to deal with commercial relations and so 
forth, we are not advancing matters a great 
deal. But those are essentially of secondary 
importance. I don't know how much this is 
related to the leadership position. I think 
this is a calculated policy of the Chinese 
leadership. 

Mr. Koppel: Mr. Secretary, it's been al- 
most a year since you were in China last, 
and a great deal has happened worldwide 
since then, and a great deal has happened 
internally in the United States. Do you have 
the feeling that China's perception of us has 
changed, and if so, in what direction? 

Secretary Kissinger: China's interest in 
the United States depends on their percep- 
tion of how effectively we perform interna- 
tionally and how able we are to carry out 
our policies or to get domestic support for 
our policies. I would guess that since I first 
went there in 1971, the series of upheavals 
we have gone through have not greatly 
strengthened that perception. But on the 
whole, I am satisfied with this trip. I think 
the relations between China and the United 
States are basically sound. 

Mr. Koppel: If I understand you correctly 
you seem to be saying that the Chinese feel 
ive are a shade xveaker than we were two or 
three years ago. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I'm not saying 
this is necessarily explicit, but this could 
be part of their perception. 

Mr. Koppel: But this is your sense? 

Secretary Kissinger: It's probably true, but 
again I want to stress that the basic rela- 
tionship was sound on this trip. 



684 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, listening to some 
'/ the Chinese officials that we talked with, 
re got the feeling that in their attacks on 
letente there seemed to be a desire, a hope, 
>n the part of the Chinese that the United 
states wotdd go back to the cold umr days 
is-a-vis the Soviet Union. How do you handle 
hat one in your negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: We do not make any 
ittempt to encourage this split between the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
'hina. We do not tell them how they should 
■onduct their relations with the Soviet Union, 
md we conduct our own relations with the 
soviet Union. Similarly, we do not permit the 
soviet Union to tell us how to conduct our 
elations with the People's Republic. Th" 
wo great Communist countries have a major 
lisagreement of their own, and it is up to 
hem to deal with it. 

Mr. Kalb: Forgetting about ivhat one side 
nay tell the other, how do you handle the 
subject? How did both sides handle the sub- 
let of the Soviet Union during the talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: When the occasion 

irises we state our perception of the prob- 

. lem, and it's obvious they're stating their 

,pc. perception. We should, however, not over- 

„„ look the fact that both of us are opposed to 

expansionism. We may have different per- 

jj,., ceptions on how to resist it or whether it is 

,1; possible to ease the conditions, but the 

United States has no illusions that — if there 

,|,; is expansionism, we have many international 

:„i obligations to resist it. 



indication that they feel that detente with 
the Soviet Union, from the American point 
of vieiv, is a bar to better relations with 
China? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, no such point was 
made to us — 

Mr. Oliver: Did the Chinese seem to be 
worried about the relationship? ■ 

Secretary Kissinger: — nor would we ac- 
cept such a proposition from either the So- 
viet Union vis-a-vis China or from China 
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. 

Mr. Koppel: Wouldn't it be fair to say 
then, Mr. Secretary, that the Chinese are not 
happy with what they see as a softening of 
our relationship toward the Soviet Union. 
Don't they want to see us toughen it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, since we opened 
our relations with China in 1971 — and after 
all, I was one of the principal architects of 
this — at that time, we were already engaged 
in improving our relations with the Soviet 
Union. We have pursued the improvement 
of relations with both sides simultaneously. 

Mr. Koppel: No, I understand that, but I'm 
asking you about the Chinese attitude. It 
seemed to us that they wanted the United 
States to get tough ivith the Soviet Union. 

Secretary Kissinger: No, but you have to 
distinguish between the formal position of 
the Chinese and what we may be talking 
about privately. In any event we do not con- 
sider that a basic subject to negotiations. 



Mr. Oliver: Did the Chinese give you any Newsmen: Thank you. 



November 17, 1975 



685 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Anchorage, Alaska, October 18 



Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger at Elmen- 
dorf Air Force Base. Anchorage, Alaska, on 
October 18 irhile en route to Peking. 

Press release 534 dated October 20 

Q. Can you give us your views on the 200- 
mile limit? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, we 
have been negotiating an international agree- 
ment on the 200-mile — on the law of the 
seas, which is one of the most complicated 
negotiations and potentially one of the most 
important that our nation is engaged in. I 
have great understanding and great sym- 
pathy for those who are advocating the uni- 
lateral legislation. I agree with them that 
fishing should be protected, and therefore I 
substantially agree with their objective. 

However, it is my position that the fish- 
eries can best be protected by having an in- 
ternationally accepted agreement in which 
all nations apply an accepted standard and 
which preserves all the existing interna- 
tional agreements. The danger is that if one 
nation goes unilaterally, all other nations are 
also going to go unilaterally and that the 
outcome of this is likely to be that not only 
fishing rights but transit through straits and 
other interests we have on the oceans are 
going to be affected. 

On the other hand, if the law of the seas 
negotiations should not be concluded in a 
reasonable time, then I would support uni- 
lateral legislation; so we are really talking 
now about giving us an opportunity to con- 
clude the law of the seas negotiations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the United States 
could become self-sufficient in energy, xoould 
it make sense to explore domestic oil and gas 
in order to perhaps undersell OPEC [Organi- 



686 



;vrjtar 
■ if portin 



.,,1 Wter b: 



Kit, ail' 



zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries'] o\ 
the market? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, until the 1950' ij i Ik < 
we were in a position really to set the worl vi 
oil prices by selling our oil on the worl - ^l 
market, and therefore we could regulate th'i"f'°' 



world price by setting our price at a certai; 
level and therefore making sure that no on' "' 
could go much above that. That conditio;; 
disappeared when we needed all of our o: j 
for ourselves and became even more acut i 
when we had to import up to 30 percent oij 
ours. If we should ever again get into a pos v|| 
tion where we can again export energy tha 
would of course change the negotiating pos 
ture of all of the sides, and it would be 
highly desirable position. But that conditio 
will not exist until the middle eighties, i 
then. 



tajipf 



Secret 



olwhat 
Mi t 



Q. Mr. Secretary, you said on the fishin 
situation that if the international agreemen 
could not be completed in a reasormbl 
amount of time you would support unilaterc 
action. What's a reasonable amount of time 



\m 
a nor 
ttcan 
IS ha 
m- p 
lie Pei 
present 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are hopeful 
that we can arrange for a double session nexn 
year. There will be a session that starts v.Wri 
March in New York. We are going to proposJfes 
that in addition to that session there blfljupi 
another one in the fall. So we hope that ai 
least the so-called economic zone can b 
negotiated next year; that is, the zone ii 
which a country — of 200 miles — in which 
country would have the right to exploit th' 
resources including fisheries. And again, ou 
concern is that if one nation goes unilateral 
and then every other nation starts goinj 
unilateral, if then these unilateral actions o 
these nations don't mesh and if some na 
tions don't recognize it and abrogate thai 



Department of State Bulletii^ 



a 



kilt 

Seer 
Sons' 
Peeple 
tleir 1 
forew 
toeac 



N«ver« 






existing agreements, that we are likely to 
have chaos and that we are likely to be hurt 
worse than we are now. 

But I again want to emphasize that I 
understand the concern of those who are 
supporting the unilateral legislation and I 
have a great sympathy for the plight of the 
fishermen. We just believe we can protect it 
better by getting an international agree- 
ment, and we hope that perhaps, with some 
patience and analyzing the situation, that 
will be clear to other people. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, ivith tvhom will you be 
negotiating in China and what do you expect 
to happen as a result of the President's visit 
— hoiv soon an Ambassador? 

Secretary Kissinger: How soon an Ambas- 
sador? Well, in the past my discussions on 
China — my discussions have been either with 
the Prime Minister, Chou En-lai, who is now 
ill; and therefore I would assume that they 
would be with the Vice Premier, Teng Hsiao- 
p'ing. I will be able to give a better estimate 
of what is going to be achieved by the Presi- 
dent's trip after I have concluded my nego- 
tiations, or my visit there. 

I would not expect that we will achieve 
full normalization of relations this year. But 
we can make some progress. And of course 
as I said in the United Nations, we attach 
very great significance to our relations with 
the People's Republic of China, even at the 
present level of diplomatic contact. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been recent 
reports out of the Far East of the China 
Neivs Agency criticizing Soviet general for- 
eign policy. Do you think that this renewed 
Sino-Soviet criticism of each other will have 
any effect upon the President's visit and/or 
Soviet detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: We conduct our rela- 
tions with both the Soviet Union and the 
People's Republic of China independent of 
their relations with each other. And there- 
fore we have our own interests with relation 
to each of them, our own objectives. And 
we leave their own relations to each other to 
them to work out. 



November 17, 1975 



Q. So you don't see it as posing any kind 
of a problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that whatever 
difficulties may exist in Sino-Soviet relations 
will not affect the President's trip. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, which, from the national 
security point of view, route for the gasline 
from Alaska would you consider safer? Down 
the coast ivith tankers or across Canada? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't really know 
whether that from a national security point 
of view, this is decisive. This is being largely 
considered from an economic point of view 
and from a technical point of view. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the subject of the 200- 
mile legislation, if the House has already 
passed it and it's up before the Senate note, 
ivhat happens if that bill is approved by the 
Senate? Are you going to urge President 
Ford to veto that legislation in order to get 
the time you need? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the Pres- 
ident knows the issues, and I can only state 
my view with respect to the international 
implications. He will have to weigh it in re- 
lation to domestic considerations as well. We 
will spend our efforts in the next months 
trying to persuade a number of Senators 
that the course we are proposing is in the 
best interests of even the fishermen and in 
the best overall interests of the country. But 
I don't want to take a position as to what 
I would recommend in case that bill passes 
the Congress. And of course I can't speak 
for the President as to what he would do if it 
passes the Congress. 

Q. On the subject of oil, there have been 
recent reports that China may have substan- 
tial oil deposits. And will that come up in 
your discussions at all? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you see, from 
our point of view — I don't expect it to come 
up. But from our point of view, if there is 
more oil on the market, if the worldwide 
supply of oil increases, the pressure on prices 
increases, too, even if it isn't sold to us, be- 
cause the way the prices are being main- 



687 



tained is by the OPEC nations cutting pro- 
duction so that the production is in line with 
whatever level of prices are set. Obviously, 
the more supply there is, the more difficult 
it will be to regulate an agreed market. 

Q. As for Chozt En-lai's health, how do you 
think that America's relationship with China 
ivould be affected if Chou En-lai died, say 
ivithin the next couple of months? Have you 
considered this? 

Secretary Kissinger: It wouldn't be a tact- 
ful thing for me to say on the way to 
China — 

Q. But it is a consideration. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we're all mortal. 
But the relations between the People's Re- 
public and the United States don't depend 
on personalities. They depend on the basic 
interests of both countries, and we would 
think that the main lines of both policies — 
the policies of both countries — would con- 
tinue regardless of who is in o'lice in either 
country. Though, of course, Chou En-lai is a 
man of outstanding abilities. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported today 
that negotiators in Moscow are close to a 
long-term graiyi agreement with Russia. 
Would you tell us exactly where the State 
Department stands? What are you looking 
for in a long-term agreement? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have been 
trying to avoid a situation where we have to 
— where supplies of grain to the Soviet Union 
are determined by the emergencies in the 
Soviet Union so that when the Soviet Union 
bought massively it would lead to steep in- 
creases in prices in the United States. And 
since we didn't know from year to year what 
the Soviet needs would be — and indeed, the 
Soviet Union didn't necessarily know from 
year to year what its needs would be — this 
introduced an element of great uncertainty 
into the calculations of the farmers and into 
the prices. 

So what we are attempting to do is to get 
a five-year agreement with an agreed mini- 
mum purchase and a maximum purchase. 
That way our farmers can plan their pro- 
duction, and the Soviets can make their pur- 

688 



chases without a major effect on the price 
of food for the consumer. And in effect, it 
means they are spreading their purchases 
over many years rather than going into a 
peak buying period in which they oscillate 
from about 18 million tons in 1972 to a mil- 
lion tons a year or two later, and now this 
year they're going up again. And we are 
optimistic that we can achieve this agree- 
ment. 

Q. Do yoti consider this just a part of the 
overall detente policy- 
Secretary Kissinger: Well, everything is 
part of the overall relationship. But we are 
not selling grain to the Soviet Union be- 
cause of detente. We are selling it in the 
mutual interest. It's in the interest of our 
farmers ; it's in the interest of the overall re- 
lationship; and it's in our interest to have it 
on a long-term basis. 

Q. Since the crackdown in India by Indira 
Gandhi earlier this year, the U.S. Govern- 
ment has not taken any kind of stand. I ivas 
wondering, do you have any kind of proposals 
for taking a stand on that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that isn't ex- 
actly true. The President has expressed his 
views. But, as a basic problem for American 
foreign policy, we have to consider that we 
came into office at a time when it was gen- 
erally accepted that the United States had 
overextended itself by getting involved in too 
many parts of the world. The United States 
cannot act both as a commentator on every- 
body's problems and assume responsibility 
for everybody's domestic evolution and at the 
same time gear its commitments to its capa- 
bilities. 

So, as a general rule, we gear our foreign 
policy to the foreign actions of other coun- 
tries and to those actions that affect us. We 
have made clear our preference for demo- 
cratic institutions in other countries. And 
that applies also, of course, to India. But 
we cannot — and as I pointed out, the Presi- 
dent did express his views on the subject. 

Q. OK, so then economically we have not 
made any steps to change our economic rela- 
tionship ? 

Department of State Bulletin 



Sffff 

(tally t 

1 ji'Jia' 

*rc' 
::.ifli' 

(i.3f 

I ,t(illli)ll 



m III 

_ I'M 

iem 

iimans. 
other I 
jndhe 

OEtOI 

ilissi 
Iks t 



So? 

tons; 

I Sinai a 

thi 



m vie 
tbt! 
BBitat 
tliecaj 
tiyto 
few 
lent, ( 
iik 
of the 



O.J] 
iODieiti 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, economically we 
really don't have — we have no economic aid 
program to India at this moment, though one 
is under consideration. So this is not a case 
where we are in the position to change very 
much. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if invited, would you re- 
main as Secretary of State in the second Ford 
Administration ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that I 
should declare myself until the President is 
reelected and has asked me. 

Q. A criticism of the Sinai accord is that it 
does not meet ivith a question of the Pales- 
tinians' rights or Golan. And do you think a 
Golan Heights agreement will resolve this 
problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Sinai accord 
did not deal with a question of the Pales- 
tinians, nor did it deal with some of the 
other questions. The reason we supported 
and helped negotiate the Sinai accord was 
our conviction that the attempt to deal with 
all issues simultaneously under the condi- 
tions that existed at the end of last year 
would have certainly led to a stalemate and 
that a stalemate had a high probability of 
leading to an explosion which would have 
serious consequences, even for our country. 

So we took the largest bite that seemed 
to us possible at the time, which was the 
Sinai agreement between Egypt and Israel. 
And anyone who saw these negotiations will 
probably agree that even that negotiation 
strained the capability of the countries con- 
cerned from a domestic point of view. It is 
our view that, having made this agreement, 
when things settle down and when the imple- 
mentation gets into full swing, which is now 
the case, then other countries will begin to 
try to follow this example. But sooner or 
later we will have to make an overall settle- 
ment, or contribute to an overall settlement, 
and that will have to include a consideration 
of the Palestinians. We've always said this, 
and that remains our position. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it's been suggested re- 
cently that you're going to try and negotiate 
some kind of a settlement between Israel and 



Syria. I was wondering if you have made any 
specific plans yet for that type of diplomacy? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have indi- 
cated that we are prepared to do for any of 
the adjoining states what we've done for 
Egypt. So we are prepared to act as a media- 
tor in the negotiations between Israel and 
Syria. And Israel has indicated its readiness 
to negotiate with Syria without precondi- 
tions. Syria, for a variety of reasons, has 
been reluctant to begin these negotiations. 
And therefore we are waiting for an oppor- 
tunity to bring the two parties together. At 
this moment there is no negotiation going 
on or any immediate prospects. 

Q. Do the negotiations in this case involve 
as much money as it did with Egypt? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it's impor- 
tant to understand that the negotiations be- 
tween Egypt and Israel did not involve any 
significant amount of money. Israel had 
asked us for a sum of money prior to the 
agreement and independent of the agree- 
ment, which 76 Senators supported, and 
which is larger than the amount we are go- 
ing to give — recommend to the Congress for 
next year. Last year the Congress voted $3 
billion for Israel in a combination of emer- 
gency and continuing appropriations quite 
independent of these agreements. Similarly, 
we had already put into our planning budget 
a significant sum for Egypt, which we will 
increase only marginally because of the 
agreement, and by "marginally" I mean a 
few hundred million dollars. We're not talk- 
ing about ordinary sums. 

So in short, the aid to the Middle East 
is an investment in the American national 
interest which we have been continuing for 
over 15 years and which is essentially inde- 
pendent of the Sinai agreement. 

Q. Just what is the status of negotiations 
between the Canadian Government and the 
United States, relative to gaslines? 

Secretary Kissinger: The negotiations are 
continuing, and we hope to bring them to a 
conclusion, but I can't estimate when that 
will be. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of the negotia- 



November 17, 1975 



689 



tions, would the economic considerations be 
such that it might be better to go through 
Canada ivith the pipeline if negotiations were 
successful, rather than go through Alaskal 

Secretary Kissinger: Than the one we are 
building through Alaska? 

Q. The natural gas pipeline. 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know. I really 
haven't thought that one through. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since recent attempts on 
the President's life, haiw you increased your 
security, like, are you ivearing a bulletproof 
vest? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. No, I'm not wear- 
ing a bulletproof vest. I'm gaining weight so 
rapidly that that would be no problem. That's 
my best protection. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were at the second 
game of the Woiid Series. Wotdd you tell me 
which team you were favoring in the Series? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as a Yankee fan 
I'm sort of an American League adherent. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, with the new shipmeyit 
of arms to Turkey, just what is the future of 
our bases over there now? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it's always diffi- 
cult to restore a relationship once it has been 
damaged. The issue of our bases in Turkey 
has now become a domestic issue in Turkish 
politics. We hope, and indeed we expect, that 
operations can be restored at our bases now 
that we have lifted at least the most irritat- 
ing parts of the embargo. We also hope that 
pi'ogress can be made on negotiations on 
Cyprus. 

We are in close contact with the Turkish 
Government on both of those issues. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, I knotv it's a terrible 
choice, but which do you prefer: newsmen 
listening in on your private conversations or 
reading the garbage? 

Secretary Kissinger: They found less in 
the garbage than they did in the talk. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you had a few minutes 
with Senator Gravel before you came to talk 
with the press. What were you discussing 
with the Senator? 

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Gravel has 
been very helpful to us in the law of the seas 
negotiations, and I got his latest views on 
the subject. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of your earlier 
comment that the more oil that can go on the 
market it will bring pressure on the OPEC 
price setup — the Alaska oil has to be sold in 
the United States. Woidd it, perhaps in the 
future, be a good idea to change that legisla- 
tion so that it could be — 

Secretary Kissinger: No, because the 
Alaska oil that is sold in the United States 
means that we have to import less oil. To the 
extent that we import less oil, that means 
that oil will then go on the international 
market. So it doesn't really make any differ- 
ence where the total pool of available oil is 
sold, just as long as the pool increases and 
the countries that are not prepared to cut 
production in order to sustain the price get 
it on the market. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Alaska press corps 
appreciates very much you stopping to chat 
ivith us. 

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you very much. 






ki, 



690 



Department of State Bulletin 



BtWetl 



""(mbei 



I 



iecretary Kissinger Interviewed for Time Magazine 






Following is an interview with Secretary 
issinger by Time diplomatic editor Jerrold 
'checter and State Department correspond- 
nt Strobe Talbott. which was conducted at 
Vashington prior to the Secretary's October 
Jf-15 visit to Ottawa, as published in the 
)ctober 27 issue of Time. 



ress release 532A dated October 19 

Q. Will the continuing tensioyi betiveen you 
nd Congress affect American foreign pol- 
cy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that 
here is tension between me and the Congress 

, <n a personal basis. I have, I think, extremely 
rood personal relationships with most mem- 
)ers of the Congress. But personal relations 
ire not the issue. We are going through a 
)eriod right now where, in the aftermath 
)f Viet-Nam and Watergate, the Congress is 
ittempting to shift the balance between 
executive and congressional power. There is 

' [also] a profound feeling of distrust in the 
I!ongress of executive discretion, which 
:auses them to insist on a kind of documen- 
;ary evidence which no congressional com- 
nittee ever asked for before. At the same 
:ime, the structure of the committees has 
disintegrated to such an extent that the 
documentary evidence becomes public, creat- 

'' ing new foreign policy problems. 

To some extent, I favor [the tension]. I 
think the balance swung too far toward 
executive authority in the sixties. But there 
is a danger that it may swing too far toward 
congressional authority in the seventies. And 
■ this will tend to paralyze foreign policy. 

Can this problem be solved by taking Con- 
gressmen into negotiations? I don't want to 
exclude this totally. But it is not enough, for 
example, to have somebody in on a negotia- 
tion unless he knows all of the strategy that 



went into it. And it raises the issue of what 
happens if there is not complete agreement 
as to tactics. 

In foreign policy, unless you have an over- 
all design, your behavior grows random. It 
is as if, when you are playing chess, a group 
of kibitzers keeps making moves for you. 
They may be better chess players than you 
are, but they cannot possibly get a coherent 
game developed. Especially if, at the same 
time, you have to explain each of your moves 
publicly so that your opponent can hear it. 

I don't know exactly what the solution is. 
I know I am spending over half of my time 
now before congressional committees. And 
that, too, is getting to be a problem in policy- 
making. I spent 42 hours in testimony and 
in private conversations with Congressmen 
in a three-week period on the Sinai accord. 
That is a lot of time, and it is in addition to 
the normal congressional contacts. 

Q. You talk about kibitzers. Isn't that part 
of an open democracy? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no parlia- 
ment in the world that has the access to 
policymaking that the Congress of the 
United States has — not in Britain, not in 
France, not in any of the democracies. The 
key decisions have to be subjected to con- 
gressional approval. The democratic process 
involves an approval [by Congress] of the 
general direction in which a country is going 
as well as of specific individual steps. But to 
attempt to subject every single decision to 
individual approval will lead to the fragmen- 
tation of all effort and will finally lead to 
chaos and no national policy. 

Q. In an article in the Public Interest, U.N. 
Ambassador Daniel Moynihan wrote that 
"liberal democracy on the American model 
tends to the condition of monarchy in the 



November 17, 1975 



691 



19th century: a holdover form of govern- 
ment, one which persists in isolated or pecu- 
liar places here and there, but which has 
simply no relevance to the future. It is where 
the world was, not where it is going." 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't agree at all. 
Where the world is going depends impor- 
tantly on the United States. 

In the 1950's every new country wanted to 
be democratic because we were impressive 
or looked impressive, powerful, and purpose- 
ful. In the 1970's, after all we have gone 
through, that condition no longer exists. This 
is not an inevitable result. It may well be 
that democracy is not going to make it. But 
if democracy isn't going to make it, this is 
going to mean such a monumental change 
in the American perception of the world and 
of itself that it will have the profoundest 
consequences within America over a period 
of time. 

Democracy in the 19th century was an 
essentially aristocratic phenomenon. You had 
limited ruling groups in most countries. This 
was not true of the United States, although 
we did have restricted franchises. And you 
had, above all, a doctrine of limited govern- 
ment and relatively simple issues. Now the 
government is involved in every aspect of 
life. The issues become unbelievably complex. 

Another problem is that in almost every 
democratic country so much energy is ab- 
sorbed in getting into office that leaders are 
not always as well prepared as they could 
be and have to learn their job by doing it. 

All of this has created a crisis of leader- 
ship in many democratic countries. But it is 
a crisis that we must solve. 

Q. Do you think we are better off than 
European countries? 

Secretary Kissinger: Far better. The Amer- 
ican body politic is basically healthy. Our 
people are confident. They want to believe 
in their government. There is not the funda- 
mental division you have in many foreign 
countries. Too often, the Communist vote re- 
flects the fact that a significant segment of 
the population has opted out of the demo- 
cratic pix)cess and has lost confidence in their 
government. 

692 



Q. Do the totalitarian countries have an~, 
advantage over us? j| 

Secretary Kissinger: They are at an ad-.,| 
vantage over us with respect to any onei 
decision they may want to make. However, Ij 
they face a problem of initiative and crea-;j 
tivity. Moreover, the quality of leadership ini 
most totalitarian countries is worse, because i 
they have a problem of how to replace 
leaders at the very top and how to rotate^ 
leaders at middle levels. 

The Communist appeal in the Third World^j 
is not due to their own merit. NondemocraticI 
forms are gaining. Much of the world has its( 
origin in some form of revolution. On tht 
whole, revolutionaries don't make revolutior' 
in oi*der to give up power after they havej, 
seized it. Therefore, in many parts of the 
world, there is a tendency toward totalitar- 
ianism simply because the generation thall 
seized power did not go through all thatf 
suffering in order to yield it. Our revolutior 
was very peculiar, [since] it was made bj 
people who knew who they were to begir 
with, and who thought they were carrying 
out an existing tradition. 

Q. Could we tolerate Communists in tM 
government of Italy or in France? 

Secretary Kissinger: If you deal with 
modern complicated democratic state, lika 
Italy and France, it is not directly in oun 
power to prevent it. It must be the responsi 
bility of the governments concerned to pre" 
vent it. The alienation from government canw 
not be remedied primarily by the Unites 
States. iJ 

At the same time, insofar as we can, it is 
necessary for the Western democracies to re<! 
capture the sense that they can control thei^ 
own destiny — that they are not subject t( 
blind economic forces that sweep across, thaK 
produce unemployment, that produce infla< 
tion. This is the reasoning behind the planned 
summit meeting in November. 

Q. How do you think detente is perceive^ 
by the American public? 

Secretary Kissinger: The detente debatd 
suffers from a number of misconceptions am' 
oversimplifications. One is that detente is { 

Department of State Bulletii 



(a(or « 



dear su] 



Thini 



Fourt 

It is nol 
\i whiel 



(oiintry 
Ifaterf 
restrict: 
tonfroB 
(eople 
:' -^ip 
Ibeli 
out H'it 



are giv: 
Wk 
lateral 

%]\ 

i(h\t 
\<m 
Mn\ 
ra(i/j i 
11% 

km 
general 
fflistaki 
In \% 
wheat 1 
feoui 

Noveml 



favor we grant to the Soviet Union, or that 
we can withhold it as a punishment. The fact 
is that we are attempting to carry out a 
foreign policy geared to the realities of the 
period. One, thajt the Soviet Union is a nu- 
clear superpower, whose military potential 
cannot be effectively wiped out in a surprise 
attack, any more than ours can. This being 
the case, any war between us will involve 
colossal, indeed catastrophic, damage. 

Second, the United States is no longer pre- 
dominant, though it is still probably the 
strongest nation. 

Third, the prevention of Soviet expansion, 
which remains a primary objective of Ameri- 
can policy, has to be carried out in a more 
complicated way than in the 1940's and 
1950's. 

Fourth, the world is no longer monolithic. 
It is not one in which we can give orders or 
in which we can dominate a Western group 
and the Soviets dominate an Eastern group. 

And fifth, we have to consider what this 
country has gone through with Viet-Nam, 
Watergate, and the attendant congressional 
restrictions. For us to run the risks of a 
confrontation that will be considered by our 
people as unnecessary is to invite massive 
foreign policy defeats. 

I believe that the policy we are carrying 
out with the Soviet Union has put us in the 
best position to resist Soviet pressures and 
in the best position to exploit possibilities of 
positive development in Soviet policies. Now, 
however, the debate gets carried on as if we 
are giving away things to the Soviet Union. 
Where has the Soviet Union made a uni- 
lateral gain? 

Q. It has been charged that because of 
detente ive gave the Russians too generous 
terms in the 1972 wheat deal and that at 
Helsinki we allowed the Soviet Union to 
ratify its dominant position in Eastern Eu- 
rope. 

Secretary Kissinger: The wheat deal is 
generally recognized today as a bureaucratic 
mistake. It had nothing to do with detente. 
In 1972 the decision was made to sell them 
wheat because it was considered a good thing 
for our farmers. And for that reason, it 



wasn't watched sufficiently at the political 
level. That was a mistake, but it was not a 
mistake of detente. 

The so-called Helsinki issue has to be seen 
in the context of the evolution of East-West 
relationships. We used it as an incentive to 
get a Berlin Agreement and the start of 
mutual balanced force reductions in Europe 
by refusing to agree to a European Security 
Conference until after a Berlin Agreement. 
And that in turn quieted down an explosive 
situation, we hope for the foreseeable future. 

With respect to the frontiers, Helsinki 
ratified nothing that had not been ratified 
before at Yalta, Potsdam, and in the peace 
treaties. The Soviet poHtical position in East- 
ern Europe depends on military predomi- 
nance and on history since 1950, which has 
made it clear that the Soviet Union would not 
tolerate a breakaway from its form of gov- 
ernment and that the West would not inter- 
vene if the Soviet Union asserted itself mili- 
tarily. 

Q. If we don't have a SALT agreement this 
year or early next year, would that basically 
change the relationship between the United 
States and the U.S.S.R.? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to give 
a specific deadline for the SALT agreement. 
But if the SALT negotiation should fail, both 
sides will be forced to build their strategic 
forces in anticipation of what the other side 
might do. 

In our case it would mean that rather than 
the Soviet Union reducing their strategic 
forces from the approximately 2,600 units 
they have now to 2,400, we would have to 
calculate that they will stay at 2,600 — or 
maybe go on beyond that. To match this 
would involve a significant increase in our 
strategic defense budget. That, in turn, can 
only be justified on the basis of an increased 
danger. So the rhetoric of both sides will be- 
come more confrontational, and I would think 
that it would lead to a substantial chilling 
in the relationship — if not to a return of the 
cold war. 

Q. Isn't there a basic difference between 
the Pentagon and the State Department on 
our SALT negotiating position? 



November 17, 1975 



693 



Secretary Kissinger: If there is a basic 
difference, I know about it only from the 
newspapers. The last position that was given 
to Foreign Minister [Andrei A.] Gromyko 
was jointly worked out by the Secretary of 
Defense and myself. It was then approved 
by the President. If there should be a dis- 
agreement — and the disagreement is always 
much more in the press than in reality — 
then it will be settled by the President. 

Q. Do you expect that there tvill be an 
agreement this year? 

Secretary Kissinger: It's now getting 
rather late in the year. It would take about 
six to eight weeks, even after an agreement 
in principle, to work out all the technical de- 
tails. So it may slip beyond the end of this 
year. 

Q. Would it be possible for Brezhnev [Leo- 
nid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union] to come to the United 
States before a SALT agreement is worked 
out? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would think it's 
unlikely. I think his visit would be tied to a 
SALT agreement. 

Q. Do you agree — as the Chinese have 
charged — that the danger of war between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. is increasing? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not see the 
danger of war increasing with the Soviet 
Union. I think that in the next decade, as 
Soviet power grows — and it will grow not as 
a result of detente, but as a result of technol- 
ogy and economic development — the tempta- 
tion to achieve political positions commen- 
surate with that power may also grow. And 
in that sense there could be a danger of in- 
creased conflicts if we do not, prior to that 
event, regulate our relationships in some 
manner, and if we fail to keep up our de- 
fenses. 

Q. Would it be in our strategic interest if 



there was war between the Soviet Union and 
China ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. We are not -stim- 
ulating the rivalry; we are doing nothing to 
encourage that conflict. It exists ; it is a fact 
of political life. It is not anything in which 
we can ourselves get involved. But a war 
between those two countries would be un- 
fortunate. We're trying to improve relations 
with both [countries] . Of course, each might 
prefer it if we did not have a relationship 
with the other. For our purposes, it is better 
to have a relationship with both. 

Q. Why should the President go to China 
this year? 

Secretary Kissinger: The President is go- 
ing because the essence of our relationship 
with China depends on a mutual understand- 
ing of each other's perceptions of the world. 
That requires a periodic exchange [of views] 
at the highest level. There hasn't been a 
meeting between the top Chinese leaders and 
an American President for nearly four years. 
In a relationship in which so much depends 
on intangibles, an occasional meeting is quite 
important. [The trip] will certainly not be 
just ceremonial. 

Q. Do you expect the question of normali- 
zation of relations — sho7-t of our breaking of 
relations with Taiwan — to be resolved? 

Secretary Kissinger: The issue will cer- 
tainly come up, and we'll discuss it in the 
spirit of the Shanghai communique, which 
provides that the purpose of our contacts is 
to achieve full normalization. We don't have 
a timetable right now. [As for the Chinese] 
well, they've stated publicly that they're 
patient. 

Q. There have been reports that you ivill 
make a visit to Israel and Syria in December. 
Is that correct? 

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not. Short 
of some crisis that I now don't see, I don't 
believe that I will visit Israel and Syria at 
that time. 



694 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Do you feel that there tvill be a major 
reassessment of American commitment to 
Israel — and Ameiican policy in the Middle 
East in general — when the aid appropria- 
tions are presented to Congress? 

Secretary Kissinger: The aid discussions 
take on a very curious form. The impression 
has been created that the aid requests for 
Israel and Egypt are caused by the Sinai 
agreement. Indeed, I saw it in your magazine 
that "Kissinger promised them certain 
things." The fact is that before the agree- 
ment the Israelis asked for $2.6 billion and 
were confident enough of getting it that they 
put it into their budget as a public figure. 
Seventy-six Senators urged us to meet that 
request. 

Last year Israel received $3 billion of 
emergency and regular aid, and a substantial 
sum for Israel has been in every budget for 
the last 15 years. Similarly, we had allocated 
a certain amount for Egypt prior to the 
agreement. Aid levels were never discussed 
with Egypt during the agreement. We set the 
levels unilaterally after the agreement was 
completed. Aid to Israel and Egypt reflects 
our own interests; it is not a payment for 
the agreement. 

Q. What about a reassessment in terms of 
our own domestic priorities — for example, 
the problems in New York? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is not a fair 
choice ; because if you sacrifice an ally abroad, 
even if it has no immediate consequences, the 
long-term consequences in terms of your in- 
ternational position are very severe. We must 
overcome the idea that when we deal with 
foreign governments it is a favor that we do 
them, that we can withdraw without penalty 
to ourselves. If we have a close relationship 
with a foreign government, it must be be- 
cause we believe that we have permanent 
interests. If we don't, then that relationship 
is in trouble. But if we do have permanent 
interests, then we cannot choose between 
New York and, say, Israel. 



Q. There's been considerable questioning 
and criticism — 

Secretary Kissinger: If it's criticism, it was 
unfair. [Laughter.] 

Q. — about the failure of the United States 
to speak out for trial by jury and the rights 
of the accused in the case of the summary 
execution of Basques and leftist terrorists in 
Spain. Why loas that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have the im- 
pression that trial by jury is part of the 
Spanish legal tradition. Trial by jury isn't 
the case in France and Germany. It's not 
the case in any country that has the Napo- 
leonic Code or the Roman law. Trial by jury 
is an Anglo-Saxon concept that exists only 
in countries within the Anglo-Saxon juris- 
prudence. 

We did not take an official position on the 
legal proceedings that were carried out in 
Spain, and I don't think that was the objec- 
tion of many of the Europeans. Rather it was 
a rallying point for a historical resentment 
of Franco Spain, which is rooted in the ex- 
perience of the Spanish Civil War. The rela- 
tionship between Spain and the West — bring- 
ing Spain back to the West — is one of the 
critical problems of our foreign policy over 
the next five to ten years. 

Q. What are your top-priority items in for- 
eign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: In foreign policy 
there are always periods of innovation and 
then there are periods of consolidation. We 
went through a period of innovation with 
respect to the Communist countries between 
'71 and '73. We are now in the process of 
consolidating this. We then went through a 
period of innovation in our relations with 
Western Europe and Japan in the period of 
'73 and '75. This is still going on. Although 
it has not been, in my view, adequately noted, 
I think our relationship with the industrial 
democracies is better and more creative than 
it has been at any time since the late 1940's. 
The things that were considered very ad- 



November 17, 1975 



695 



vanced in '73, when I put forward the Year 
of Europe, are now accepted as a matter of 
course. At that time when we proposed that 
economic policies should be coordinated, this 
was rejected. Today it is made as a demand. 
This is a period I would put in the middle of 
its creative phase. 

Then we have the relationship with the 
new countries in which we have just begun 
the process of construction with the seventh 
special session. 

Those are the three areas which are in 
various states of evolution. Of course, you 
have critical problems like the Middle East, 
which must, in my view, in the next three 
to five years make a substantial advance to- 
ward peace — or maybe achieve peace. 

One of the things we've often discussed is 
the vitality of Western institutions in the 
period of change. This is perhaps our deep- 
est problem, to which a foreign policy maker 
can contribute by performance but not di- 
rectly. 

Q. Last week you met with the Portuguese 
Foreign Minister and the Administration has 
put forward to Congress the proposal for $85 
rniUion in aid. Hotv do you now feel about the 
survival of pluralist democracy in Portugal? 

Secretary Kissinger: My position has been 
that without a systematic effort to encourage 
the pluralistic forces in Portugal, they would 
be defeated. For a while there was a dis- 
agreement between us and the West Euro- 
peans, who thought that the forces of the 
government that was in office earlier this year 
would over a period of time produce plural- 
ism. I was skeptical about this. During the 
summer the West Europeans came to the 
same conclusions we had earlier reached ; 
namely, that pluralism had to be actively en- 
couraged. And that has always been my posi- 
tion. I think it is still a very precarious situ- 
ation in Portugal, the outcome of which is 
not clear. Recent trends are more encourag- 
ing. 

Q. In your U.N. speech you suggested a 
conference between the concerned potvers 
about the future of North and South Korea. 



That was rejected by the Chinese and the 
North Koreans. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but I'm not sure 
that is absolutely their last word on the sub- 
ject. Even if there is no formal conference, 
we can have exchanges of views. We are not 
opposed to North Korea as such. What we 
don't want to do is have bilateral talks with 
North Korea to the exclusion of South Ko- 
rea. We don't want to have South Korea 
maneuvered into the position of an interna- 
tional pariah while we settle the future of 
North Korea in negotiations with other 
countries. We would be prepared to partici- 
pate in any negotiations or in any conference 
whose composition was reasonably balanced 
that included South Korea. Similarly, if the 
Soviet Union or the People's Republic were 
prepared to I'ecognize South Korea, we would 
be prepared to recognize North Korea. 

Q. In 1961 in "A World Restored," you 
wrote that "statesmen often share the fate of 
prophets" — that they're without honor in 
their own country. Do you feel that you're 
suffering this fate? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the lead time 
for prophecy has shortened. I think in the 
country there's a general feeling that our 
foreign policy is reasonably effective. Some 
of the criticism is the natural result of an 
election year. Some of it is the inevitable 
consequence of having been in office for 
seven years, in which you accumulate a lot 
of mortgages on yourself. 

Inevitably, after one is out of office, one's 
policies will be seen in clearer perspective, 
because then the alternatives will have to be 
tried or rejected by somebody else. But, on 
the whole, the criticism does not go to the 
central core of the policy and, therefore, I 
believe the central core of the policy will be 
carried on after I leave office — even if an- 
other Administration succeeds us. 

Q. It sounds like you'll stay, if the Presi- 
dent's elected. 

Secretary Kissinger: Don't scare me like 
that. I'd lose at least my dog, and probably 
my wife. [Laughter.] 



696 



Department of State Bulletin 



United Nations Day, 1975 

Following are texts of a statement by Sec- 
retary Kissinger made at the U.N. Day con- 
cert at Washington on October 25, his toast 
at a U.N. Day dinner later that evening, and 
a proclamation signed by President Ford on 
October 13. 



STATEMENT AT U.N. DAY CONCERT 

I'res-- release 542 dated October 25 

Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies 
and gentlemen : This 30th anniversary of the 
United Nations cannot be simply an occasion 
for celebration; it must be a moment of re- 
dedication. Those of us who value this insti- 
tution as indispensable must help it meet its 
challenges — as we have done successfully in 
the past. 

The events of the last few years have 
taught the world many new lessons: the les- 
sons that our economic fortunes are interde- 
pendent, that the problems of global peace 
and security are indivisible, that concerns for 
human rights transcend international bound- 
aries. This recognition of the collective des- 
tiny of the human race could mark the begin- 
nings of what dreamers have dreamt for ages 
— the emergence of a true global community. 
For the United Nations, this could perhaps be 
the era of its greatest achievements. 

But recent history has also seen other 
trends : the formation of new blocs, attempts 
at economic warfare, and ideological intoler- 
ance. Sadly, we have seen these also reflected 
in the United Nations in practices and actions 
that threaten the U.N.'s role as an instru- 
ment of conciliation. This bears no resem- 
blance to the expectations of the American 
people when the organization was founded ; it 
cannot continue without a price being paid. 

We in this hall are dedicated to seek to 
preserve this institution. We have not for- 
gotten, in the face of all the frustrations and 
challenges that the organization has con- 
fronted in 30 years, that the United Nations 
reflects and, indeed, embodies all our hopes. 
If nations can learn to act in concert and with 



responsibility and in awareness of our com- 
mon future, this, too, will be reflected in the 
United Nations. 

Therefore nothing is more welcome than 
this commitment of faith by those of you 
here. Nothing is more needed than this readi- 
ness to persevere to bring the goals of the 
United Nations to reality. 

The great orchestra and great music we 
are about to hear should recall to us that man 
is not a creature of circumstance or of de- 
spair. Man is driven and ennobled by his 
dreams. Let us make the next 30 years of the 
United Nations the era of its fulfillment. 



TOAST AT U.N. DAY DINNER 

P^e1^ release 543 dated October 25 

Excellencies, honored guests, and friends: 
We are gathered here, as every year, in trib- 
ute to the United Nations. We celebrate the 
30th anniversary of its existence. But unlike 
every year, we meet now at a time of testing 
for this vital institution. 

The birth of the United Nations at San 
Francisco 30 years ago was a moment of 
hope. It was a time when men and women of 
good will and good sense, sickened by war, 
depression, and persecution, seized upon a 
precious moment of international consensus 
and sketched out a vision of a better future. 

Statesmen had tried a quarter century 
earlier to build a new world order and a last- 
ing peace ; that first efl'ort had failed almost 
totally. Yet there could have been no better 
tribute to the indomitable spirit of man than 
the effort of a new generation of statesmen 
to embrace the same ideals and to found a 
new world organization — hoping this time 
for a diff"erent outcome, convinced that no 
other course gave any real hope to humanity. 

Another generation now separates us from 
those events. On this anniversary we may 
appropriately ask how much those renewed 
hopes may be said to have succeeded. 

The answer surely is that we have not 
done so badly. After 20 years of the League 
of Nations, the whole of the world was again 
at war. After 30 years of the United Nations, 



November 17, 1975 



697 



we find oui-selves at one of the rarest mo- 
ments of modern international history — a 
moment when in all the world not one state 
is engaged in hostilities with another. In this 
tragic century, such moments are precious 
indeed. 

And it is not simply a peace of exhaustion. 
There has been a genuine diminution of di- 
rect conflict among the great powers ; there 
have been solutions to chronic problems ; and 
there exist the elements for a balanced and 
secure international structure. In 30 years 
there have been wars, but no world war. 
There has been more than enough economic 
disorder, but no world depression — and in- 
deed, a long-term trend of growth and strong 
institutions of international cooperation. 

It cannot be denied that the organization 
we honor tonight has played a central part 
in this positive evolution. And such a past 
promises a hopeful future. 

This promise was never more in evidence 
than at the recent seventh special session of 
the General Assembly, which met in Septem- 
ber to answer the global challenge of eco- 
nomic development. The disparities of wealth 
and well-being to which we addressed our 
concern were hardly new ; what was new was 
that the nations of the world, great and 
small, escaped the pointless and destructive 
exercise which had absorbed so much energy 
in international institutions in years past. 
For once there was peace in the world, and 
for once there was an appreciation of our 
common stake in the advance of the global 
economy and of all its participants. The 
unanimous agreement with which that ses- 
sion closed, to which the United States made 
a major contribution, may have moved us a 
step closer toward the goals of economic 
progress and economic justice. 

Just last week the Security Council made 
another important contribution to strength- 
ening world peace by extending UNEF 
[United Nations Emergency Force] one year 
and by entrusting Secretary General Wald- 
heim with the urgent task of promoting a 
settlement of the Spanish Sahara dispute. 

These are demonstrations of the potential 
of the United Nations. And it is those areas 
of international endeavor that increasingly 



define what the modern age of international 
relations is all about. For the United Nations, 
this could perhaps be the era of its greatest 
achievement. 

But if that promise is to be fulfilled, the 
same spirit of mutual respect that marked 
that session must govern the conduct of 
states. 

We have seen a disturbing contrary trend 
— ideological intolerance, procedural abuses, 
bloc majorities, one-sided voting — resulting 
in a one-way morality that clearly under- 
mines the U.N.'s role as an instrument of 
conciliation. The resolution naming Zionism 
as a form of racism is an example ; it under- 
mines the U.N.'s necessary and valuable 
campaign against racial discrimination, and 
it threatens the U.N.'s capacity as mediator 
in the Middle East. We will work to defeat 
its passage by the General Assembly; we 
call on all nations to reconcile their vote 
with universal moral principles. 

The U.N. Charter sets a standard for inter- 
national cooperation. Implicit in it are basic 
truths : 

— That diversity of principles and beliefs 
must be respected; 

— That disputes are to be settled by fair 
and peaceful means; 

— That international decisions must recog- 
nize the interests of all those involved, so 
that all will have a stake in their observance ; 

— That practical agreements, not rhetoric, 
are the only way to lasting progress; and 

— That mutuality of benefit is essential to 
sustained cooperation. 

This is the attitude of the United States. 

As we Americans review our nation's past 
in this Bicentennial period, we are reminded 
anew that unity can be fashioned from the 
diversity of peoples and yet preserve it. The 
divisions of history, interest, and values 
which mark the international arena do not 
prevent cooperative action. Indeed, our times 
make it imperative. For in today's world, 
military conflict on any scale ultimately can 
endanger the survival of all ; economic war- 
fare, for whatever cause, jeopardizes the 
prosperity of all; injustice, wherever it oc- 
curs, diminishes all humanity. 



698 



Department of State Bulletin 



Ladies and gentlemen: The American 
people want to see the United Nations fulfill 
the vision and faith of its founders. After 
three decades of challenge, it remains our 
opportunity for a better future. Its success 
is the world's success; its failure is the 
world's failure. Let us build on what it has 
achieved, and let us correct its shortcomings. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you, on behalf 
of the President, to join me in a toast to the 
United Nations on its 30th anniversary. 



TEXT OF PROCLAMATION 4400 ' 

United Nations Day, 1975 

Each year, throughout the world, nations com- 
memorate October 24 as United Nations Day. This 
year is the 30th Anniversary of the United Nations 
Charter. Originally with 51 nations as members, the 
United Nations today includes 141 nations, thus 
membership is nearly universal. 

The primary purpose of the United Nations is to 
maintain international peace and security. Had the 
work of the organization included nothing more than 
its efforts for peace in the Middle East — through 
truce observers, emergency forces, and mediation 
services — it would have justified its existence. But 
its record of achievement is far greater, and it con- 
tinues to face new tasks with skill and imagination. 

Today, the United Nations is adjusting to the new 
realities of economic interdependence. At the Sev- 
enth Special Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly in September of this year, great progress 
was made toward reaching agreements through 
which the interests of all nations — less developed as 
well as developed — can be promoted through coopera- 
tive action. In the field of economic development, as 
in peacekeeping, the United Nations has proved its 
usefulness to all its members. 

The United Nations also has accelerated its efforts 
to stress the individual rights of women and the 
need to use their talents for the progress of society. 
By its designation of 1975 as "International Women's 
Year" the United Nations has recognized the impor- 
tance of women's increasing contributions to the 
cause of peace and friendly relations among the 
Nations of the world. 

Many important tasks are still before the United 
Nations. These include agreements on Law of the 
Sea, procedures to eliminate torture and efforts to 
control debilitating diseases. We cannot be satisfied 
until great progress has been made in these and 
other areas of international concern. 

I ask the American people to look at the United 



Nations with true perspective — neither exaggerating 
its accomplishments nor ignoring its shortcomings, 
but seeing clearly its record and its potential for 
constructive action in the best interests of the United 
States and of all other members. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby designate 
Friday, October 24, 1975, as United Nations Day. I 
urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day 
with community programs that will promote the 
United Nations and its affiliated agencies. 

I have appointed H. J. Haynes to be United States 
National Chairman for United Nations Day and, 
through him, I call upon State and local oflScials to 
encourage citizens' groups and all agencies of com- 
munication to engage in appropriate observances of 
United Nations Day in cooperation with the United 
Nations Association of the United States of America 
and other interested organizations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this thirteenth day of October, in the year of 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the 
Independence of the United States of America the 
two hundredth. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



U.S. and New Zealand Hold 
Economic Consultations 

Joint Communique ' 

The Fifth United States/New Zealand Bi- 
lateral Economic Consultations were held in 
Washington on Monday, September 15, and 
Tuesday, September 16, 1975. The Govern- 
ments of the two countries agreed in 1969 
that such consultations should be held on a 
regular basis to provide an opportunity for 
senior economic policy officials of both coun- 
tries to exchange views on major issues in an 
informal atmosphere. The last meeting was 
held in Wellington in February, 1974. 

The discussions were cordial and useful to 
both sides. They covered items of mutual in- 
terest in international economic policy and 
bilateral economic and commercial relations. 
Among the items discussed were progress to- 
ward resuming the producer-consumer dia- 
logue, particularly concerning energy and 
commodities, world food programs and poli- 
cies, the view of both nations on cooperation 



'40 Fed. Reg. 48337. 



' Issued on Sept. 17 (text from press release 487). 



November 17, 1975 



699 



with developing countries and on the Seventh 
Special Session of the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly, the progress of GATT MTN 
negotiations [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade multilateral trade negotiations] 
toward further liberalization of world trade, 
and some bilateral trade issues. 

Regarding energy issues, the American 
delegation reviewed the United States posi- 
tion favoring an early reconvening of the 
Preparatory meeting to prepare for a multi- 
lateral dialogue with the oil-producing and 
developing countries on the broad range of 
economic issues we now face. The New Zea- 
land delegation referred to the decision by 
New Zealand to join the International En- 
ergy Agency, and expressed its hope that the 
agreement which has emerged to rejume tho 
dialogue will lead to greater stability of oil 
prices and supply. 

During a discussion of commodity policy, 
the United States representatives referred 
to Secretary Kissinger's statement to the 
United Nations Special Session on September 
1 recognizing the serious problems for de- 
veloping countries caused by fluctuations in 
commodity export earnings, and outlining 
specific proposals the United States is willing 
to support to help solve this problem. The 
United States delegation expressed its hope 
that constructive measures will emerge from 
the discussions and from consideration of 
these proposals. 

The New Zealand delegation expressed its 
support for the United States proposals for 
a substantial increase in the compensatory 
financing facilities of the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] , supplemented from the pro- 
posed Trust Fund, to be made available for 
developing countries. The New Zealand dele- 
gation urged that IMF compensatory financ- 
ing should continue to provide access for 
countries which are heavily dependent on 
primary products for their export earnings 
and which have made use of the facility in 
the past. The United States side expressed 
its willingness to explore in the IMF arrange- 
ments which would address this concern of 
the New Zealand delegation. 



World food programs were discussed and 
the American delegation stated that, subject 
to Congressional authorization and sufficient 
support from other donors, the United States 
would make a direct contribution to the new 
International Fund for Agricultural Develop- 
ment. The New Zealand representatives said 
that New Zealand was a joint sponsor of the 
Fund and ha3 announced its intention to 
make a contribution. 

Concerning the current round of Multi- 
lateral Trade Negotiations in Geneva, both 
countries agreed that it is critically impor- 
tant to achieve significant liberalization of 
both industrial and agricultural trade during 
the course of these negotiations. Both sides 
stated they would work closely with each 
other to ensure that progress is made in the 
negotiations on both industrial and agricul- 
tural products. 

Each delegation had the opportunity to 
present a review of its domestic economy and 
its international economic policy. The New 
Zealand delegation stressed the urgent need 
for an early expansion of economic activity 
in industrial countries to stimulate inter- 
national trade. The United States delegation 
reported on the course of the recovery in the 
United States economy which has been 
underway since the second quarter of 1975. 

The American delegation emphasized the 
importance it attaches to strengthening eco- 
nomic cooperation with countries in the East 
Asia and Pacific region. 

The major bilateral issues discussed were 
New Zealand's export of meat to the United 
States, the market for New Zealand dairy 
products in the United States, United States 
import duties on raw wool and wool yarn, 
and the application of New Zealand's import 
policy to some products of interest to the 
United States, such as tobacco and poultry 
products. 

In particular, the New Zealand delegation 
welcomed the recent United States decision 
to allocate an interim shortfall in beef im- 
ports, and expressed the hope that the 
United States would allocate a further short- 
fall as soon as possible. The American dele- 



700 



Department of State Bulletin 



gation noted its intention to complete an 
assessment of prospects for a further short- 
fall when adequate data are available. 

Both sides expressed their support for a 
general liberalization of international trade, 
and agreed that the United States Govern- 
ment and the Government of New Zealand 
would consult to the maximum extent pos- 
sible to help resolve specific bilateral trade 
issues. 

Both delegations were pleased to have this 
opportunity to exchange views. The consul- 
tations have given each country's representa- 
tives a better understanding of the other's 
policies and objectives. 

The New Zealand delegation was led by 
Mr. Noel V. Lough, Deputy Secretary of 
the Treasury, and included Lloyd White, Am- 
bassador to the United States, Mr. Henry C. 
Holden, Minister (Commercial), New Zea- 
land Embassy, Washington, Mr. A. K. Robin- 
son, Assistant Secretary (Export Services), 
Department of Trade and Industry, Mr. 
Gerald C. Hensley, Chief of Economic Di- 
vision, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
Richard F. Nottage, Counselor, New Zealand 
Embassy, Mr. Donald M. Stracy, Counselor 
(Financial), New Zealand Embassy, and Mr. 
William E. Dolan, First Secretary (Com- 
mercial), New Zealand Embassy. 

The United States delegation was led by 
Mr. Paul H. Boeker, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for International Finance and 
Development, and included Ambassador Clay- 
ton Yeutter, Deputy Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations, Mr. Maynard W. 
Glitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 



State for International Trade Policy, Mr. 
Lester E. Edmond, Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, Mr. F. Lisle Widman, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of the Treasury for Inter- 
national Monetary and Investment Affairs, 
Mr. Richard Goodman, Associate Adminis- 
trator, Foreign Agricultural Service, Depart- 
ment of Agriculture, and Mr. Clarence Siegel, 
Acting Director, Office of International Trade 
Policy, Department of Commerce. 



U.S. Makes Contribution 
to UNITAR 

LISUN press release 102 dated September 25 

Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. 
Representative to the United Nations, pre- 
sented to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations on September 25 a check in 
the amount of $290,000. This check repre- 
sents an initial and partial contribution 
from the United States to the U.N. Institute 
for Training and Research for 1975. 

By making this contribution, the U.S. 
Government indicates its wish that UNI- 
TAR's traditional and more recent functions 
continue to evolve in a way which will pro- 
vide benefits to the U.N. system and to the 
member nations of the United Nations. At 
the same time, the United States wishes to 
urge other countries who have not yet con- 
tributed in proportion to their resources to 
join it in providing funds. 



November 17, 1975 



701 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Discusses Military Exports to Kuwait 
and Other Persian Gulf Nations 



Statement by Sidney Sober 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ' 



My statement will address, first, the gen- 
eral policy framework for our military ex- 
ports to the nations of the Persian Gulf area ; 
second, our policy toward Kuwait and its 
relation to our national interest; and finally, 
the specific relationship between those poli- 
cies and our current or proposed foreign 
military sales (FMS) programs in Kuwait. 

To begin with, however, I want to express 
our understanding of the concerns voiced by 
some Members of Congress regarding mili- 
tary sales to the gulf region. Congressman 
[Lee H.] Hamilton's statement, in introduc- 
ing his resolution on the sale of aircraft mis- 
siles to Kuwait, indicated that that resolution 
was meant to bring about discussion of the 
broader implications of that sale. We wel- 
come this opportunity to discuss those issues. 
We will be equally pleased to continue our 
discussion of other aspects of our relations 
with the states of the area. We believe that 
what we are doing is selective and rational 
and fits within a broader policy framework 
which supports our national interest. We 
welcome the chance to review these matters 
with the Congress. 

As you know, the Persian Gulf is an area 
where developments affect the relationships 



' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations on Oct. 24. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



among, and the policies of, major world 
powers. With the emergence of the oil-pro- 
ducing countries as a major power group, the 
application in 1973 of the oil embargo, and 
the quintupling of oil prices, the global stra- 
tegic equation has been affected by what 
happens in the gulf. The increasing world 
focus on the gulf has been marked by a grow- 
ing Soviet presence in the larger strategic 
region of which the gulf is a part, as the 
Soviets have sought to increase their position 
and military presence in the People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq. 
Since 1967 and particularly since the October 
1973 war, the major Arab oil producers in 
the peninsula-gulf area have become the 
principal financial support for the Arab 
states most directly involved in the Middle 
East conflict. While they are not immediately 
part of the process of reaching a Middle East 
settlement, their views are very important, 
and their leaders are regularly consulted by 
the Arab parties to the negotiations as well 
as by the Palestinians. 

Our main policy objectives for the gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula region have been con- 
sistent since we developed a comprehensive 
policy framework in anticipation of the ter- 
mination of the special British role in the 
gulf in 1971. These objectives include: 

— Promotion of collective security and 
stability in the region by encouragement of 
indigenous regional cooperative efforts and 
orderly economic progress ; 



702 



Department of State Bulletin 



— Resolution by the states in the area, 
through peaceful means, of territorial and 
other disputes between them and widening 
the channels of communication between 
them; 

— Expansion of our diplomatic, cultural, 
technical, commercial, and financial presence 
and activities ; and 

— With greater emphasis since 1973, 

(a) Continued access to the region's oil 
supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient 
quantities to meet our needs and those of our 
allies ; 

(b) Employment by the oil exporters of 
their rapidly growing incomes in construc- 
tive ways contributing to sound economic de- 
velopment and supportive of the interna- 
tional financial system. 

Military exports to the gulf region need to 
be viewed in the broader context of a policy 
which combines important political, eco- 
nomic, financial, and strategic elements. 
Without this broader framework, military 
exports would make little sense ; within that 
framework, they are an important factor in 
our ability to maintain close and productive 
relations with the gulf states in support of 
major U.S. interests. Those states view their 
military supply relationship with us as part 
of a total relationship which provides im- 
portant mutual benefits. They see our will- 
ingness to consider their requests to us — as 
against other potential suppliers — for the 
sale of military equipment and services, 
which they perceive as reasonable and neces- 
sary in their circumstances, as an integral 
element of that relationship. 

Criteria for Military Export Decisions 

The Department of State carefully scruti- 
nizes military export proposals, whether 
through commercial channels or under the 
Foreign Military Sales Act. 

We do so on a case-by-case basis, not be- 
cause the United States has no policy govern- 
ing such exports, but for precisely the oppo- 
site reasons: the continuous evolution of mili- 
tary technology, of political circumstances, 
and of the strategic equation requires care- 
ful evaluations of each proposed transaction 



in the light of our policy goals. This could 
not be done by seeking to apply any rigid, 
mechanistic guidelines. 

It is essential to bear in mind that in the 
Persian Gulf the phrase "military exports" 
does not equate to "arms sales." A large pro- 
portion of the military equipment and serv- 
ices exported to the Persian Gulf states 
consists not of weapons or arms, but of 
nonlethal services or support equipment. Spe- 
cifically, in dollar terms, approximately 40 
percent of total U.S. military exports con- 
sists of weapons systems, weapons, and 
ammunition. The remaining 60 percent con- 
sists of supporting equipment such as cargo 
aircraft, tugs, trucks, and radar equipment 
(19 percent) ; of supporting services such as 
construction, supply operations, training, 
and technical services (24 percent) ; and of 
spare parts (17 percent). Few of the items 
included in that 60 percent raise the same 
questions of appropriateness of release, im- 
pact on balance of forces, possible unau- 
thorized transfer, and so forth, which are ad- 
dressed in sales of arms per se. Thus the 
criteria we follow are mainly applied to that 
portion of our military exports whose value 
constitutes less than half of the total of what 
is generally lumped together as "arms sales" ; 
i.e., the sale of weapons, weapons systems, 
and ammunition. 

No criteria apply equally to our examina- 
tion of all reque.sts for military equipment 
and services, but some of the most common 
and most important are as follows. 

1. "Offensive" and "Defensive." There is 
no purely "offensive" or purely "defensive" 
weapon. An offensive strategy will embody 
defensive phases, and vice versa. Neverthe- 
less, certain weapons are inherently more 
suitable to offensive or defensive roles; for 
example, analysis of a proposal to sell tanks 
normally needs to be more rigorous than a 
proposal to sell antitank missiles. 

2. Foreign Political Impact. The mere pos- 
session of a weapons system by a state, how- 
ever justifiable in terms of legitimate defense 
needs and intentions, may raise the fears of 
neighboring states and therefore be de- 
stabilizing. 

3. Financial Implications. The capacity of 



November 17, 1975 



703 



the purchasing state to finance military im- 
ports, given its overall economic situation 
and requirements, must be taken into ac- 
count. 

4. Absorptive Capacity. The ability of the 
purchasing state to use proposed military im- 
ports effectively within its overall defense 
structure is a factor. 

5. Intended Uses. Given the domestic and 
foreign political character of the purchasing 
state, the Department weighs its intentions 
in requesting the weapons. This considera- 
tion also involves a judgment with respect 
to the intention and ability of the recipient 
nation to avoid or prevent transfer to third 
countries without our approval. 

6. Security Responsibilities. Obviously, the 
larger states in the gulf bear larger regional 
security burdens, and their requests are con- 
sidered in light of these responsibilities. 

7. Alternative Sources. The possibility of 
non-American sources of military weapons is 
a significant consideration. It is not so much 
a matter of competing with the British or 
the French or the Swedes or even Communist 
countries for exports or for the benefits of 
the political influence and presence that mili- 
tary exports afford. The United States would 
welcome sensible regional arms limitation 
agreements with other arms suppliers and 
purchasers, both Western and Communist, 
but in the absence of such agreements the 
United States has to arrive at its own deci- 
sions in the light of prevailing circumstances. 

8. American Productive Capacity. To the 
extent that increased volume of production 
resulting from foreign requests lowers the 
per-unit cost of weapons in U.S. inventories, 
our own military needs are better served. 
However, our productive capacity often 
places serious constraints on our ability to 
respond to foreign military requests in a 
time frame acceptable to recipient govern- 
ments because of the need to give priority 
to our defense needs. 

9. A7-ms Escalation. It is important and 
necessary to do what we can to prevent or 
discourage an arms race by potential ad- 
versary nations of the Persian Gulf. 

10. Effect on Overall U.S. Interests. The 



political impact of a refusal on our part to 
export military equipment or services must 
be weighed in terms of our total relationship 
with the country concerned and our broader 
interests in the area. 



U.S. Policy Toward Kuwait 

It has been our policy since Kuwait be- 
came independent in 1961 to encourage a 
close and cooperative relationship with that 
nation. 

Politically, that policy has been beneficial 
to the United States because of Kuwait's 
support of moderate Arab regimes, but the 
political benefit has been moderated by the 
fact that Kuwait also maintains relations 
with the more radical states in the Arab 
world and, for that matter, throughout the 
world. This is a necessity, in Kuwait's view, 
as we understand it, because its small size 
and the relatively large number of Pales- 
tinians among its population make it vulner- 
able to political pressure. Kuwait maintains 
relations with most nations and seeks to bal- 
ance its responses to political pressure from 
one on another of them. In these circum- 
stances, Kuwait inevitably finds itself at odds 
with the United States from time to time ; by 
the same token, it occasionally finds itself at 
odds with the Soviet Union or the so-called 
Third World or its OPEC [Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries] partners or 
the United Kingdom or Japan. 

Kuwait's leaders appear to believe that it 
can best remain viable by maintaining its 
independence and at the same time remaining 
a loyal and active participant in Arab causes. 
We in turn believe that the United States can 
find areas of political cooperation compatible 
with that outlook, that it is in our interest to 
do so, and that mature nations can seek such 
cooperation while agreeing to disagree on 
those issues which separate them. 

Economically, our relations reflect the fact 
that Kuwait is a free market economy, with 
large oil reserves and revenues, dependent 
on imports from the industrialized world for 
many of its needs, and anxious to use its oil 
income in such a way as to contribute both to 



704 



Department of State Bulletin 



the prosperity of the world economy and to 
that of Kuwait. 

Our economic relations with Kuwait go 
back to the thirties, when major oil conces- 
sions there were awarded to the Gulf Oil 
Company in combination with British Petro- 
leum. These two companies, operating the 
Kuwait Oil Company, have since been re- 
sponsible for the bulk of Kuwait's produc- 
tion; and U.S. participation in the exploita- 
tion of Kuwait's oil has been mutually bene- 
ficial for many years. 

In the field of investment, Kuwait has de- 
veloped highly sophisticated banking and 
financial institutions, many of them closely 
related to similar institutions in the United 
States ; and here, too, our relations have been 
mutually beneficial for some years. Kuwait 
has, incidentally, conducted its financial and 
investment affairs in a professionally re- 
sponsible fashion. 

In addition, our exports to Kuwait are 
growing and amounted to $209 million in 
1974. We are providing the Kuwaitis with 
technical assistance, on a reimbursable basis, 
in a number of areas. And Kuwait's rela- 
tively large foreign aid programs are largely 
consistent with our objectives of helping to 
insure stability and development in the less 
developed world. 

We do have some differences with Kuwait 
in the economic area, revolving largely 
around the question of oil prices. As you 
know, we regard the enormous and continu- 
ing increases in oil prices since 1973 as with- 
out justification, and have so told Kuwait. 
Within OPEC there are several different 
factions on the question of oil prices. Without 
in any way condoning the increases since 
1973, I do believe it appropriate to note that 
Kuwait has been among those OPEC mem- 
bers who have recently taken a relatively 
moderate position on this question. 

Kuwait's Defense Posture 

Kuwait maintains, for a nation of about 1 
million people, relatively small armed forces : 
an army of three brigades plus a few sepa- 
rate battalions, and an air force of fewer 



than a thousand. With these small forces, 
little land mass, and no natural barriers, and 
with its economic resources concentrated in 
a single industry and a single area, Kuwait 
has no pretensions to being capable of de- 
fending itself against a determined attack by 
one of its larger neighbors. Its armed forces 
are intended to provide a minimal deterrent 
against a potential attacker, to supplement 
internal security, and to slow an attacker 
until political means can be brought to bear. 
For in the final analysis Kuwait's real de- 
fense is political, not military. It lies in the 
perception of several of its more powerful 
neighbors that their interests are better 
served by an independent Kuwait and in the 
solidarity of the Arab nations. 

The proximate threat to Kuwait's security 
is from its northern neighbor, Iraq. Iraq does 
not accept the present border with Kuwait; 
it has periodically encroached on Kuwait 
territory; and it has expressed a desire to 
control some part or all of two Kuwait is- 
lands (Warbah and Bubiyan) which border 
the tributary of the Tigris-Euphrates on 
which the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr is situ- 
ated. Iraq's armed forces are of course a 
great deal larger and better equipped than 
those of Kuwait, and conflict between the 
two would be essentially one-sided. 

The Kuwait-Iraq Border Dispute 

To understand the current status of the 
Kuwait-Iraq border dispute, it is necessary 
to go back a bit into history. 

In 1899, in response to a request from the 
ruler of Kuwait, the British agreed to extend 
protection to Kuwait; this was a manifesta- 
tion of British and Ottoman rivalry in the 
area. In 1923, when Britain was still in con- 
trol of Iraq, the British High Commissioner 
for Iraq established the present Kuwait-Iraq 
boundary by unilateral action. When Kuwait 
became independent in 1961, the Prime Min- 
ister of Iraq, which had gained its own inde- 
pendence in 1932, declared that Kuwait was 
an integral part of Iraq. Iraqi forces were 
massed on the Iraqi side of the border, and 
the British sent a contingent of troops to 



November 17, 1975 



705 



II 



Kuwait to forestall invasion. A new Iraqi 
regime in 1963 changed direction and issued 
a joint communique with Kuwait recognizing 
Kuwait's independence. 

The communique did not. however, consti- 
tute a border settlement, and thus the ques- 
tion of sovereignty over the two disputed 
islands off Kuwait's coast was not settled. 
These islands cover access to the Iraqi port 
of Umm Qasr ; and they, rather than the land 
boundary, are probably the heart of the dis- 
pute, although it is often expressed in terms 
of the land boundary. In 1973, in fact, Iraqi 
troops occupied a Kuwaiti police post near 
the border, and they appear to still be there. 
Various settlements with regard to the is- 
lands have been proposed, but none accepted 
by both sides ; they generally revolve around 
the concept of Kuwait's granting some form 
of Iraqi control over all or part of the is- 
lands in return for Iraqi recognition of the 
land boundary. 

In any event, the dispute between the two 
nations is real. From Kuwait's point of view 
it contains the seeds of open conflict, and it 
is primarily for that reason that Kuwait has 
sought in recent years to upgrade its defen- 
sive capability. 

Kuwait's Military Relationship With the U.S. 

As a holdover from the years when the 
Briti-sh had an important political role in the 
country, Kuwait looks to the United King- 
dom as its principal source of military ad- 
visory support. British officers and personnel 
are .seconded to the Kuwait forces, and Ku- 
wait looks to this longstanding relationship 
as fundamental to their effective operation 
and deployment. 

Kuwait has sought U.S. assi-stance in the 
military field only in recent years and only 
in certain selected sectors. The first step in 
developing this relationship came in 1971, 
when Kuwait requested the United States to 
carry out a survey of its armed forces and 
of their present and future adequacy. We did 
so, and in 1972 produced a survey report 
which recommended a number of steps to 
upgrade Kuwaiti capabilities in certain fields. 
Kuwait then requested that we provide pro- 



posals for subsonic aircraft, antitank mis- 
siles, cargo vehicles, and antiaircraft mis- 
siles. It was clear from Kuwait's request 
that its principal concern was with its ability 
to defend against armor and air attack. We 
made certain proposals consistent with the 
survey we had conducted, and after almost 
two years of consideration the Kuwaitis in 
November 1974 entered into agreements with 
us on the two major weapons systems which 
they have purchased from the United States: 
several Hawk missile batteries and two 
squadrons of A-4 aircraft. Both of these pro- 
grams are scheduled to be implemented over 
a four-year period. (Prior to November 1974, 
Kuwait had purchased a small number of 
antitank missiles and a variety of trucks and 
other transport equipment.) 

The letter of offer which is currently be- 
fore the Congress is for one element of the 
A-4 package which Kuwait bought; i.e., for 
the short-range air-to-air Sidewinder mis- 
siles designed as the major defense of the 
A-4's against attack by other aircraft. I want 
to emphasize that these missiles constitute 
an integral part of the A-4 sale which was 
basically agreed upon la.st year. (One addi- 
tional letter of offer is still to be submitted, 
to cover contractor maintenance and support 
of the aircraft.) 

The status of the Kuwait Hawk program is 
somewhat similar to that for the A-4's; the 
basic sales agreement for the equipment has 
been signed, and a number of follow-on FMS 
cases will be required to complete the pack- 
age. We will in fact be submitting shortly 
two letters of offer covering contractor sup- 
port and training in the United States for 
Kuwaiti personnel. 

It is most important to note that, in both 
cases, we have already entered into firm com- 
mitments to provide the basic equipment; 
i.e., A-4 aircraft and Hawk antiaircraft mis- 
siles. Both programs are in midstream. With- 
out the essential follow-on items, these pro- 
grams would be so incomplete as to render 
the equipment useless. 

Our political, economic, and other relations 
with Kuwait have improved a good deal over 
recent years, largely as a result of the gen- 
eral improvement in our relations with the 



706 



Department of State Bulletin 



Arab world following the 1973 war and our 
efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace 
in the area. Kuwait's decision to broaden our 
relationship to include the sensitive area of 
national defense was a political gesture and, 
as such, was symptomatic of Kuwait's desire 
for closer cooperation with the United 
States. 

From our point of view, it is in the U.S. 
interest to continue to work with Kuwait in 
such areas of mutual concern, having in mind 
the political and economic weight which Ku- 
wait wields both in the Arab world and, in 
the economic sense, in the world at large. 

In summary, then, we see our selective 
military exports to the Persian Gulf region, 
and specifically to Kuwait, as serving the 
U.S. national interest in several important 
ways. 

— Support for the vital interests of the 



nations of the region is an integral part of 
our overall policy of encouraging friendly 
and mutually productive relations with those 
nations, relations which are indispensable to 
achievement of U.S. goals in the area. 

— To the degree that these nations are able 
and willing to assume responsibility for their 
own security, and the stability of the gulf 
region, through the development of appro- 
priate force structures, our own worldwide 
security posture is strengthened, because we 
and they share many of the same strategic 
goals. 

— Conversely, our refusal to meet requests 
for assistance in the vital area of national 
defense, when the nations concerned clearly 
prefer U.S. assistance to that of other coun- 
tries, would seriously jeopardize our larger 
political and economic objectives in the re- 
gion. 



Department Discusses International Economic Policy 



Statement by Julius L. Katz 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ' 



I welcome this opportunity to appear be- 
fore your subcommittee to discuss interna- 
tional economic policy. The subcommittee 
has posed provocative questions about our 
foreign economic policy objectives, our prior- 
ities, the coherence of our policies, and their 
interaction with other foreign policy goals. 
I will address each of these questions. 

The postwar period has been a period of 
radical change in international economic 
and political life. Throughout this period 
certain fundamental objectives of our for- 



' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Economic Policy of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations on Oct. 23. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20402. 



eign economic policy have persisted. The 
coherence and continuity of these basic ob- 
jectives over the past 30 years is, I think, 
remarkable. 

Our continuing objectives can be stated 
briefly. 

We want an open world economy that 
permits market forces to operate with 
minimum restrictions on the flow of goods, 
services, capital, and technology across na- 
tional boundaries. We want an international 
monetary system that facilitates trade and 
investment. We want a concerted and sus- 
tained eff'ort by the economically advanced 
countries to improve the prospects for eco- 
nomic and social progress in the developing 
countries. We want international and re- 
gional economic institutions for consulta- 
tion and cooperation governed by rules for 



November 17, 1975 



707 



economic relationships and the orderly reso- 
lution of conflicting interests. 

These are and have been the central ele- 
ments of our foreign economic policy. They 
rest on the proposition that an open world 
economy operating under agreed rules en- 
ables countries to maximize the economic 
gains from international exchange. It is also 
the most felicitous environment for interna- 
tional cooperation. 

These objectives guided us in the imme- 
diate postwar period. Profiting from the 
bitter lesson of the interwar years, when 
each nation sought — without success — to 
better itself at the expense of its neighbors 
and international economic life was strangled 
by controls, we took the leadership in de- 
veloping new international institutions and 
rules to free trade and payments of encum- 
brances and to encourage international in- 
vestment : 

—The GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade] to reduce barriers to 
trade and eliminate discriminatory treat- 
ment in international commerce. 

— The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to establish a multilateral system of 
payments and eliminate foreign exchange 
restrictions that hamper the growth of trade. 

— The World Bank to encourage interna- 
tional investment, including importantly 
private foreign investment, for economic de- 
velopment. 

The purpose common to all three institu- 
tions was the promotion of high levels of 
employment and real income and the devel- 
opment of the productive resources of their 
members. 

The world economy flourished under this 
regime. We enjoyed an unparalleled expan- 
sion of world trade, an unparalleled expan- 
sion of private international investment 
flows, rising employment, rising production, 
rising levels of personal consumption and 
well-being, the longest period of sustained 
and rapid economic growth in history. 

The foreign economic policy objectives 
that animated us 30 years ago persist today. 
But the policies, programs, and institutional 
structures needed to give effect to these ob- 



jectives change, as they must, in response 
to changing needs and circumstances. The 
economic and political contours of the world 
have altered radically. New nations have 
been born; old nations have recovered and 
surged forward; the relative economic power 
of the United States has diminished. Coun- 
tries have become more interconnected, more 
exposed and dependent on each other. Infla- 
tion and recession coexist and have spread 
throughout the world. The supply of oil is 
tightly controlled, and its price is escalating. 

Clearly, institutions and rules must be 
modernized to take account of these and 
other changes. This is the case for the trad- 
ing and the monetary system. New institu- 
tions and new programs must be developed 
to meet new problems — notably those of 
energy and food supply. The needs of the 
developing countries for increased oppor- 
tunities for growth and participation must 
be heeded. Foreign economic policy is not 
lacking in coherence — the basic objectives 
give it coherence — but policies must evolve 
in a continuing and necessary process of 
adaptation and renewal. 

The subcommittee has asked, and I quote, 
"What is in fact current U.S. international 
economic policy? What are its major short- 
term and long-term objectives?" I would like 
to respond to this inquiry by looking at cer- 
tain major constituent elements of our for- 
eign economic relations and indicating suc- 
cinctly what we are doing and why. 

Trade and Monetary System 

Trade. We are deeply engaged in the Tokyo 
round of multilateral trade negotiations, the 
seventh major such effort to reduce barriers 
to trade. Our objectives are twofold : the 
reciprocal reduction of barriers to industrial 
and agricultural trade and the improvement 
of rules governing international trading re- 
lations. We are here continuing a familiar 
and historic process of trade liberalization, 
a process that is especially important now 
because of the resurgence of protectionist 
sentiment both here and abroad. 

Tariffs, although low on average, are not 
negligible; and "tariff escalation" — that is, 



708 



Department of State Bulletin 



higher duties on processed and manufac- 
tured goods than on the raw materials from 
which they are made — is an obstacle both to 
industrialization in developing countries and 
to the efficiency of the world economy. The 
need to reduce barriers to agricultural trade 
is especially important. New rules are 
needed on nontariff trade barriers; we are 
giving priority attention in this connection 
to export subsidies and government procure- 
ment practices. And we propose to negotiate 
rules — and commitments — governing the use 
of export restraints much along the lines of 
existing rules governing import restraints. 

To improve the trade prospects of the poor 
countries and therewith their economic de- 
velopment, we expect to put into effect a 
general system of tariff preferences on Jan- 
uary 1. In the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions we will seek early agreement on reduc- 
ing barriers to tropical products that are 
the major source of LDC [less developed 
countries] export earnings. 

We want also to expand trade and normal- 
ize economic relations with the Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe, the U.S.S.R., 
and the People's Republic of China. 

Monetary System. The rigidities that de- 
veloped in the Bretton Woods system im- 
peded rather than facilitated international 
trade and investment, and radical changes 
have taken place in that system. Intensive 
work on comprehensive reform was checked 
by the energy crisis and galloping inflation. 
We are, however, participating in examina- 
tion of certain amendments to the IMF 
charter and other immediate steps in order 
to begin an evolutionary process of reform. 
Of particular importance are the amend- 
ments on exchange arrangements, reserve 
assets, and the structure and decisionmaking 
apparatus of the Fund. 

With respect to exchange rate arrange- 
ments, we recognize that these are matters 
of international concern, but we want 
greater flexibility in the choice and opera- 
tion of the exchange arrangements of indi- 
vidual members, provided the members ob- 
serve agreed policies and guidelines and 
accept the surveillance of the Fund. We op- 
pose any commitment to a return to a par 



value system, although we recognize the 
right of any country to establish and main- 
tain a par value for its currency if it wishes. 
For our part we prefer that our exchange 
rate be determined essentially by market 
forces. 

We have for some time sought to reduce 
the status and role of gold as one of the most 
important reserve assets — which it has 
under the present articles of the Fund. 
Progress has been made in reaching under- 
standing on how this should be effected. We 
want care taken to avoid the restoration of 
gold to its former position and a new pegged 
price. We believe the SDR [special drawing 
rights] — which we took the lead in creating 
— should take over many of the functions 
and the role performed by gold. 

We favor the creation in the Fund of a 
permanent council at ministerial level with 
decisionmaking authority. In this regard, it 
is important that the United States retain 
a voice commensurate with its role in eco- 
nomic and financial affairs. 



Foreign Investment Issues 

Investment. Foreign investment is a dy- 
namic and contentious issue in our inter- 
national relations. Our traditional policy is 
to provide maximum freedom for our in- 
vestors to invest abroad and for foreign in- 
vestors to invest in the United States and 
to enjoy nondiscriminatory treatment. The 
policy is based on the proposition that world 
output will be greater if capital and man- 
agement skills go where they can be em- 
ployed most efficiently — from areas of low 
return to areas of high return. 

This policy is not universally endorsed. 
Private foreign investment, and in particular 
the transnational company, which is the 
major instrument today for foreign invest- 
ment, is a highly emotional issue. Countries 
want foreign investment for the benefits it 
brings, but they fear it because it is foreign. 
We believe it would be beneficial for the 
international community to develop a body 
of basic balanced principles, of standards of 
conduct, to guide transnational enterprises 
and governments in their mutual relations. 



November 17, 1975 



709 



We are participating in such efTorts in the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] and the United Na- 
tions. The guidelines should be indicative 
rather than mandatory. An internationally 
agreed set of guidelines would give govern- 
ments and enterprises a better understand- 
ing of the expectations each has regarding 
the other's behavior. We also strongly favor 
the development of mechanisms for the 
settlement of investment disputes. Such 
mechanisms are a desirable means of de- 
politicizing and resolving disagreements be- 
tween foreign investors and host govern- 
ments. 

Concern about the inflow of private in- 
vestment into the United States, especially 
by the major oil-producing nations, has been 
evident. Following an intensive review of 
U.S. policy on foreign investment in the 
United States, we have concluded that we 
should continue our traditional commitment 
to national treatment for, and noninterfer- 
ence with, most foreign investment in the 
United States, consistent with existing laws 
and regulations. We will, however, maintain 
closer oversight of those investments through 
a new Office and Interagency Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States. In 
addition, we will seek assurances from those 
governments capable of making large invest- 
ments that they will consult with us prior to 
undertaking major investment in this coun- 
try. 

Energy and Raw Materials 

Energy. The oil embargo in 1973 and the 
staggering price increases that followed put 
enormous strains on the world economy and 
made clear the dangerous vulnerability that 
we and our allies had incurred by our grow- 
ing dependence on imported oil. Neither the 
supply nor the price of a central factor in 
our economies was any longer under our 
control. 

Our response was to develop a compre- 
hensive strategy to deal with both the imme- 
diate problems and dangers and the longer 
term implications of the new energy situa- 
tion. We joined with other major consuming 



countries in the newly created International 
Energy Agency. To cope with the shortrun 
dangers such as a new embargo and oil- 
related balance-of-payments problems, we 
and our partners in the lEA joined in a plan 
for mutual assistance in the event of em- 
bargo, involving emergency oil stocks, re- 
duced oil consumption, and oil sharing; 
agreed on a $25 billion support fund to pro- 
vide assurance of financial assistance in the 
event of severe balance-of-payments diflfi- 
culties; and at U.S. initiative, proposed that 
the International Monetary Fund create a 
trust fund for concessional loans to develop- 
ing countries hit hardest by oil price in- 
creases. 

To deal with the fundamental longer term 
problem of excessive dependence on insecure 
sources of oil and exposure to arbitrary in- 
creases in the price of oil, we and our lEA 
partners are developing a comprehensive 
program of measures to conserve energy and 
increase energy investment and production. 
It is only by reducing consumption and in- 
creasing supply that consuming countries 
can end OPEC's [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries] monopoly power over 
the oil market. 

A third element in our strategy is to have 
consumers and producers join in a dialogue 
on energj' that will emphasize our common 
interests and encourage a more positive rela- 
tionship. At the Paris preparatory confer- 
ence last week, it was agreed to hold a 
Ministerial Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation in December. At that 
conference, there will be established com- 
missions on energy, raw materials, develop- 
ment problems, and related financial ques- 
tions. The oil producers and the industrial- 
ized and the developing-country consumers 
will pursue their dialogue in these commis- 
sions. 

Commodities. Two problems are of par- 
ticular concern to us in this area. 

One is the need for sustained investment 
in raw material development, especially min- 
eral development to meet rising world needs. 
Capital requirements are enormous, and 
technology is complex; but the unfavorable 
political environment facing private foreign 



710 



Department of State Bulletin 



investment in many countries threatens to 
discourage the iiow of private capital and 
technology into natural resource develop- 
ment. While capacity is adequate now, future 
shortages could throttle world growth when 
the world economy moves out of recession. 
It is in the interest of the consuming, as well 
as the producing, countries that these re- 
sources be developed in ways that take ac- 
count of the sensitivity of countries to own- 
ership rights over their subsoil resources. 
We believe that an initiative by the World 
Bank and its affiliates, the IFC [Interna- 
tional Finance Corporation] in particular, 
in concert with private investors, would be 
an excellent means of encouraging invest- 
ments in raw materials in developing coun- 
tries. 

The second problem is the instability of 
commodity markets. A number of commodi- 
ties are subject to wide swings in price be- 
cause of cyclical variations in demand in 
industrialized countries and variations in 
supply because of weather. Such instability 
wastes resources, impedes the development 
efforts of the poor countries, and is de- 
stabilizing in the industrial countries, adding 
to inflationary pressures. High prices in 
periods of commodity shortage enter irre- 
versibly into the wage and price structure 
of industrial countries and persist after the 
commodity market has turned around. Thus 
we are prepared to consider buffer stocks or 
supply management arrangements in cases 
where such arrangements are feasible and 
appropriate. 

The problem of some commodity markets 
may not be price instability. In some cases 
prices may be stable but at levels which re- 
sult in very low earnings for producers. 
Such situations might be due to chronic 
overproduction, to competition with syn- 
thetics, to foreign trade barriers, to ineffi- 
cient production techniques, or to poor mar- 
keting practices. Thus we believe it is wrong 
to think solely in terms of price stabiliza- 
tion arrangements. We believe it is necessary 
to analyze commodities case by case to deter- 
mine the root cause of the problem and to 
consider measures appropriate to the par- 
ticular problem at hand. Such solutions 



might involve diversification, product im- 
provement, better marketing techniques, or 
efforts to improve competitiveness through 
increased efficiency. 

Finally, we believe it desirable to have 
available an effective international financial 
mechanism to deal with problems of unstable 
commodity earnings. Developing countries 
depend on the sale of primary commodities, 
especially agricultural commodities, for the 
bulk of their export earnings. When the 
market sags, their export earnings fall off, 
and their ability to maintain development 
imports is curtailed. We have proposed a 
new development security facility in the 
International Monetary Fund that would 
substantially increase the compensatory fi- 
nancing made available to developing coun- 
tries which sustain shortfalls in their export 
earnings for reasons beyond their control. 

Seeking Adequate and Secure Food Supplies 

Food. Production shortfalls and high 
prices for food during the past three years 
have heightened international concern about 
assuring the production and availability of 
food supplies worldwide. Since the World 
Food Conference in November 1974, we have 
stressed the development of policy in three 
areas: (1) increasing food production in the 
developing countries; (2) providing a rea- 
sonable level of food aid until a major ex- 
pansion of food production is brought about ; 
and (3) establishing a world food security 
reserve system. The liberalization of agri- 
cultural trade, our fourth objective, is being 
pursued in the multilateral trade negotia- 
tions. 

The widening disparity between food pro- 
duction in the developing countries and the 
requirements of their still rapidly growing 
population is of international concern. De- 
veloping countries cultivate more land but 
produce less food than the industrial coun- 
tries. They have the greatest capacity for 
increased crop yields and output over the 
next several decades. We are encouraging 
high priority for LDC agricultural develop- 
ment in existing bilateral and multilateral 
aid programs and the mobilization of new 



November 17, 1975 



711 



financial resources for this purpose in a new 
institution — the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. 

Until a major expansion of LDC produc- 
tion is achieved, food aid will continue to be 
a necessary program both to meet emer- 
gency and disaster requirements and to re- 
duce the financial burden of commercial im- 
ports for poor countries. We support a 
global target of 10 million tons of food aid 
annually and will make every effort to pro- 
vide at least 4 million tons of that total on 
a continuing basis. 

Over the past three years, poor harvests 
in some key countries and the resulting 
drawdowns of traditional gi'ain stocks have 
sharpened the world's awareness of its vul- 
nerability to food emergencies. We have 
taken the lead in seeking establishment of 
an effective international system of nation- 
ally held grain reserves to alleviate world 
shortages in bad crop years and reduce pres- 
sure on supply and markets. We believe re- 
serves should be adequate in size, fairly 
allocated, and subject to agreed guidelines 
on release and acquisition. We are actively 
engaged in the process of negotiating such 
a resei-ve system. 

Conclusion. I have tried to highlight poli- 
cies and priorities in six major functional 
areas of our economic relations. One could, 
of course, look at foreign economic policy 
from a different perspective, the perspective 
of our relations with groups of countries — 
with the rich countries and the poor. On this 
subject I will be quite brief. One of the re- 
markable features of postwar life is the suc- 
cess we have had in cultivating the habit of 
consultation among the industrialized coun- 
tries. Our relations have become more inti- 
mate, the process of collaboration more in- 
tense, the need for coordination of policy 
more evident. The summit meeting in No- 
vember will be an occasion to strengthen 
this process. As to the poor countries, it is 
in our political and economic interest to try 
to make trade, aid, and investment normal 
cooperative elements in our relations with 
these countries rather than exercises in 
confrontation. 



Secretary Kissinger in his speech to the 
U.N. special session on September 1 of this 
year laid out in detail the policies and pro- 
grams that should guide us in this effort. 
It is a positive statement on which we can 
build. I commend the speech to you. 



Department Discusses Arrangements 
With U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil 

Statement by Charles W. Robinson 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ' 

I welcome the opportunity to appear here 
today to describe new arrangements with the 
Soviet Union on trade in grains which I be- 
lieve will significantly benefit the United 
States. 

U.S.S.R. production and trade in grain 
currently are the two most unstable elements 
in the world grain economy, accounting for 
about 80 percent of the annual fluctuation in 
world trade in wheat — the principal food 
grain. Variations in Soviet imports of grain 
have been particularly marked in this decade. 
In the 1971 crop year, the Soviet Union im- 
ported about 8 million metric tons of grain, 
of which 2.9 million tons were from the 
United States. In the following crop year, 
imports totaled about 21 million tons, of 
which 13.7 were from the United States. 

It is this extreme variation which makes 
planning production for the Soviet market by 
U.S. farmers difl!icult and which affects the 
availability of supplies not only for our other 
foreign customers but also American con- 
sumers — not just homemakers but our meat 
producers as well. In view of this situa- 
tion, the President announced on September 
9 that he had directed me to explore a long- 
term agreement with the Soviet Union, which 



I 



' Made before the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on Oct. 28. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20420. 



712 



Department of State Bulletin 



was subsequently signed and announced on 
October 20. 

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. agreement on grain 
sales primarily aims at reducing this hereto- 
fore unpredictable massive intervention in 
our market. The agreement: 

— Unconditionally commits the Soviet 
Union to purchase a minimum of 6 million 
metric tons of wheat and corn annually. 

— Permits the U.S.S.R. to purchase an 
additional 2 million tons annually without 
government-to-government consultation. 

— Obliges the U.S. Government to facili- 
tate Soviet purchases and not to exercise its 
authority to control shipments of these 
amounts unless the total U.S. grain supply 
(beginning stocks of all grains except rice 
plus the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 
estimate of production) falls below 225 mil- 
lion metric tons. In this event, the U.S. Gov- 
ernment may reduce the amount which the 
Soviet side may purchase to less than 6 mil- 
lion tons. 

The agreement also provides for consulta- 
tion by the two governments in advance of 
purchases in excess of 8 million tons of 
wheat and corn in any one crop year. Ship- 
ment of grain under the agreement is to be 
in accord with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime 
agreement. 

The Soviets have assured us that their 
additional purchases of grain in the current 
crop year will not be in a volume which could 
disrupt the U.S. market. As Secretary [of 
Agriculture Earl L.] Butz noted at the time 
this agreement was announced, we view this 
volume as 7 million metric tons. 

In announcing the grain agreement, the 
President outlined its benefits to our econ- 
omy. The agreement: 

— Provides for a relatively stable long- 
term major market for U.S. grain, valued 
at about $1 billion annually. 

— Increases the incentive for American 
farmers to maintain full production. 

— Reduces fluctuations in U.S. and world 
markets by smoothing out Soviet purchases 
of U.S. grain. 



— Stimulates not only agriculture but 
such related enterprise as farm machinery 
and ocean transport. 

I will now turn briefly to the letter of in- 
tent to negotiate an agreement on sales of 
Soviet oil to the United States, which was 
also signed on October 20. 

The Soviet Union is the world's largest 
producer of crude oil, at about 9.5 million 
barrels per day, having recently surpassed 
U.S. production. The United States is the 
world's largest consumer of petroleum with 
domestic production of about 8.9 million bar- 
rels per day and imports about 6 million 
barrels per day. The U.S.S.R. exports about 
2.3 million barrels per day, mainly to East- 
ern and Western Europe. 

The U.S. and Soviet Governments have 
agreed to commence negotiation promptly of 
an agreement under which: 

—The U.S.S.R. would offer for sale to the 
United States 10 million metric tons of crude 
oil and petroleum products annually (about 
200,000 barrels per day) for five years. 

— The U.S. Government would be free to 
purchase the oil for its own use ; or by agree- 
ment, oil could be purchased by U.S. firms 
for resale, including in agreed areas out- 
side the United States. 

Prices are to be agreed at a mutually bene- 
ficial level, and efforts are to be made to- 
ward expanding technical cooperation in 
energy in ways to be agreed upon. 

The volume of potential U.S. purchases 
under such an agreement is small, but their 
significance lies in the diversification of 
sources of supply it opens for the United 
States. 

Such an agreement could also be an incen- 
tive to the Soviet Union to expand its pro- 
duction capacity more rapidly than would 
otherwise be the case. 

This brief description highlights the main 
features and effects of the arrangements we 
have concluded with the Soviet Union. I wel- 
come your questions, not only on these ar- 
rangements but on our foreign economic 
policy and current initiatives in general. 



November 17, 1975 



713 



I 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



United States ReafRrms Position 
on Southern Rhodesia 

Following is a statement by Congressman 
Donald M. Fraser, U.S. Representative to 
the U.N. General Assembly, made in Com.- 
mittee IV (Trusteeship) on October 9. 

USUN press release 112 dated October 9 

Madam Chairwoman [Fama J. Joka-Ban- 
gura, of Sierra Leone] : The U.S. delegation 
wishes to congratulate you and the other 
members of the bureau on your election and 
to assure you of our cooperation during the 
work of the committee in the days ahead. 

It is especially appropriate that you should 
be elected to chair this committee during In- 
ternational Women's Year, but I would like 
to add my voice to that of the distinguished 
Representative of Australia, who suggested 
yesterday that the election of a woman chair- 
person should become a frequent occurrence, 
not confined to particular years of commemo- 
ration. 

The U.S. delegation would also like to note 
with pleasure the presence in the committee 
this year of the representatives of Cape 
Verde, Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Prin- 
cipe. The United States was pleased to vote 
in favor of their admission into the United 
Nations and looks forward to working with 
these nations in this committee and others in 
the United Nations. 

Only three weeks ago Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger delivered a major U.S. policy 
statement on Africa before a dinner in honor 
of the Organization of African Unity For- 
eign Ministers and Permanent Representa- 
tives to the United Nations. In this speech 
the Secretary sounded the overall theme that 
strengthening the relationship between the 
United States and Africa is a major objec- 
tive of U.S. foreign policy. Madam Chair- 
woman, it is in this spirit that my delegation 



intends to participate in the work of this 
committee in the days ahead. 

On the question of Southern Rhodesia in 
particular, the Secretary noted the sympathy 
with which the United States has viewed 
the attempt to negotiate a peaceful solution 
in Southern Rhodesia over the past year. He 
specifically cited the statesmanlike efforts of 
the leaders of African countries — especially 
President Kaunda [of Zambia], Prime Min- 
ister Vorster [of South Africa], President 
Khama [of Botswana], President Nyerere 
[of Tanzania], and President Machel [of 
Mozambique] — to avert bloodshed and vio- 
lence. The United States strongly supports 
the efforts of these leaders to bring the 
parties together in negotiations. 

To maintain pressure on the minority re- 
gime in Southern Rhodesia, the United States 
intends to adhere scrupulously to the eco- 
nomic sanctions against the Smith regime. 
President Ford and his entire Administration 
remain committed to repealing the Byrd 
amendment, despite the recent failure of the 
House of Representatives to pass a bill re- 
pealing the amendment. This action by the 
House of Representatives was particularly 
disappointing to me because I had the re- 
sponsibility for managing the bill on the floor 
of the House. 

We recognize the need to repeal the Byrd 
amendment not only for the intended effect 
in Southern Rhodesia but also in the interest 
of our own self-esteem in upholding our in- 
ternational obligations. 

As a member of the House of Representa- 
tives who has worked long for the removal 
of the Byrd amendment, I can assure you 
that Congressional support for repeal is in- 
creasing. When the amendment was first 
passed in 1971, 100 members of the House 
of Representatives voted in favor of main- 
taining full compliance with the sanctions. 
When the measure was taken up again in 



714 



Department of State Bulletin 



1972, that number had increased to 140. And 
this year, it reached 187. A change of only 
12 in this year's vote would have been de- 
cisive in favor of repeal. In the Senate, a 
majority for repeal exists and was demon- 
strated by a vote of 54 to 37 in 1973. 

Earlier this week this committee heard an 
allegation that some U.S. citizens are fight- 
ing as mercenaries under the Rhodesian 
army. There are no U.S. military personnel 
in Rhodesia. My government does not ap- 
prove of participation by any American citi- 
zen in the forces of the Ian Smith regime. 
Our laws provide that any citizen enlisting 
in the armed forces of another country runs 
the risk of losing his U.S. citizenship. In 
addition he could be subjected to criminal 
prosecution under existing U.S. laws which 
provide fines and prison terms for those 
found guilty. If there is any specific evidence 
that Americans are serving in military forces 
under Ian Smith, my government wishes to 
be made aware of it in detail in order that 
appropriate legal action may be considered 
under our laws. Madam Chairwoman, I want 
to reiterate in this committee again this 
year that the United States does not collabo- 
rate in military matters in any way with the 
Smith regime in Rhodesia. 

The United States is an active participant 
in the Security Council's Sanctions Commit- 
tee. We are prepared to consider seriously 
recommendations in that committee for 
further tightening of enforcement of the 
sanctions. 

In conclusion, I would like to quote from 
the statement Secretary Kissinger made on 
the question of Rhodesia in his speech before 
the General Assembly on September 29. He 
said: 

The differences between the two communities in 
that country, while substantial, have been narrowed 
significantly in the last decade. Both sides in Rha- 
desia and Rhodesia's neighbors — black and white — 
have an interest in averting civil war. We will sup- 
port all efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement. 

This statement illustrates the importance 
which the U.S. Government attaches to the 
peaceful resolution of the Rhodesian prob- 
lem. The United States remains firm both in 



support of U.N. resolutions which have con- 
demned the illegal Smith regime and in our 
commitment to the implementation of the 
principles of self-determination and majority 
rule in Rhodesia. The United States strongly 
favors and looks forward to the creation of 
a government in Rhodesia which is elected 
freely by all of the people of that country. 



Self-Determination for Namibia 
Urged by United States 

Following is a statement made in Com,mit- 
tee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General 
Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara M. 
White on October 22. 

USUN press release 124 dated October 22 

Nine years have elapsed since the U.N. 
General Assembly, in Resolution 2145, ter- 
minated South Africa's League of Nations 
mandate to administer Namibia and itself 
assumed direct responsibility for the terri- 
tory. It has been over four years since the 
International Court of Justice concluded in 
an advisory opinion that South Africa's 
mandate over Namibia was legally termi- 
nated by the United Nations and that South 
Africa's continued occupation of the terri- 
tory was illegal. Despite numerous calls by 
the United Nations, its member states, and 
other international and private groups. 
South Africa remains today firmly en- 
trenched in its illegal occupation of Namibia. 

Madam Chairperson, the U.S. position of 
support of Resolution 2145 and the conclu- 
sions of the International Court of Justice 
is well known. So also is our support for 
Security Council Resolution 366 of Decem- 
ber 17, 1974, in which the Council unani- 
mously demanded that South Africa make a 
clear statement that it will comply with 
U.N. resolutions, withdraw from Namibia, 
and transfer power to the people of that 
territory. This committee also is well aware 
of the joint tripartite U.S., U.K., and French 
demarche to South Africa on Namibia on 
April 22. The three nations made this de- 
marche to present their own positions on 



November 17, 1975 



715 



the future of the territory and to reaffirm to 
the South African Government the need for 
a clear and unambiguous statement of pohcy 
on Namibia. We have made our views on 
this subject very clear and are continuing 
to do so. 

Like other U.N. members, we did not con- 
sider the South African Government's re- 
sponse to Security Council Resolution 366 
adequate. While we welcomed Prime Min- 
ister Vorster's May 20 statement that South 
Africa was prepared to negotiate with a mu- 
tually acceptable representative of the U.N. 
Secretary General and to meet with the 
chairman and members of the Organization 
of African Unity Committee on Namibia, we 
were particularly disappointed that Prime 
Minister Vorster stated that South Africa 
could not accept U.N. supervision of Nami- 
bia. 

The subsequent meeting of the Security 
Council on the problem of Namibia during 
the first week of June this year ended with 
a vote on a resolution which stated that the 
illegal South African occupation of Namibia 
constituted a threat to international peace 
and security and called for the institution of 
a mandatory arms embargo against South 
Africa as provided for in chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter. The United States voted 
against this resolution because we did not 
believe that mandatory sanctions were justi- 
fied by the existing situation in Namibia. 
We continue to believe that the situation, 
while of very deep concern to us, does not 
justify a call for mandatory chapter VII ac- 
tion by U.N. member states. 

The U.S. position on the future of Nami- 
bia is embodied in three principles which we 
have conveyed on numerous occasions to the 
Government of South Africa. These princi- 
ples are: 

a. All Namibians, within a short time, 
should be given the opportunity to express 
their views freely and with U.N. supervision 
on the political future and constitutional 
structure of the territory; 

b. All Namibian political groups should be 
allowed to campaign for their views and to 
participate without hindrance in peaceful 



political activities in the course of self-deter- 
mination; and 

c. The territory of Namibia should not be 
fragmented in accordance with apartheid 
policy contrary to the wishes of its people. 

It is against these three principles that 
the United States will measure progress to- 
ward the fulfillment of the right to self- 
determination for the people of Namibia. In 
the past month, the South African (Govern- 
ment has made much of the constitutional 
conference convened in Windhoek on Sep- 
tember 1 and the declaration of intent issued 
by this conference on September 12. 

The United States does not regard this 
conference, as presently constituted, or its 
declaration of intent as capable of repre- 
senting the views of all elements of the 
Namibian population or of providing defini- 
tive legitimate guidance on their constitu- 
tional preferences. First of all, certain sig- 
nificant political groups, such as SWAPO 
[South West Africa People's Organization] 
and the Namibian National Convention, are 
not represented at the conference. Secondly, 
the conference is taking place under the 
auspices of a state whose administration of 
Namibia we do not regard as legitimate. 
Concerning the declaration of intent itself, 
I would only reiterate the principle which I 
have just stated: The territory of Namibia 
should not be fragmented in accordance with 
apartheid policy contrary to the wishes of 
its people. 

The United States has noted with deep 
concern that the conference is taking place 
against a background of repression of politi- 
cal activity, illustrated by the present deten- 
tion of an estimated 30 Namibians under the 
Terrorism Act and other illegal and repres- 
sive legislation. In line with our policy of 
making clear to the South African Govern- 
ment our concern over violations of human 
rights, we have raised the matter of these 
recent detentions with the South African 
Government and are awaiting particulars on 
them. 

The United States has during the past 
year contributed $50,000, specially ear- 
marked for Namibians, to the U.N. Educa- 



716 



Department of State Bulletin 



tional and Training Program for Southern 
Africa. In addition, we have indicated our 
willingness to support the Institute for 
Namibia. We presently are awaiting budget 
estimates with a view toward making a con- 
tribution to the Institute. 

Madam Chaii-person, the Namibians have 
already been kept waiting too long to exer- 
cise their right to self-determination. We 
condemn the continued illegal occupation of 
Namibia and the persistent refusal of South 
Africa to heed U.N. resolutions and imple- 
ment a policy of prompt self-determination. 
The people of Namibia have waited long 
enough for the opportunity to express freely 
their views on the future of their territory. 
They have languished long enough under the 
repressive racial policies of the South Afri- 
can Government. Madam Chairperson, the 
United States calls again on South Africa 
to move quickly to grant political freedom 
and basic human rights to the people of 
Namibia. 



•J 



United States Reiterates Opposition 
to Apartheid 

Following is a statement made in the Spe- 
cial Political Committee of the U.N. General 
Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence 
M. Mitchell, Jr., on October 23. 

USUN press release 125 dated October 23 

Throughout its history, the U.N. General 
Assembly has rightly concerned itself with 
the problem of apartheid. We agree with the 
Organization of African Unity that there are 
few social or political systems which are as 
offensive to men and women throughout the 
world as South African apartheid. This sys- 
tem of legislated racial discrimination — I 
emphasize the words "legislated racial dis- 
crimination" because, unhappily for the 
human race, members of the human race 
may have personal prejudices, but they do 
not usually write them into the law which 
would control those who may or may not 
have racial prejudices — so compounds the 
South African brand of prejudice by having 

November 17, 1975 



it written into the statutes of that unhappy 
country as apartheid. It is a continuing af- 
front to the spirit and principles of the U.N. 
Charter. Despite some alterations made by 
the minority regime in South Africa, apart- 
heid remains today as repugnant to those 
who cherish the principles of justice and 
equality as it did 30 years ago when the 
United Nations was established. 

The United States has enunciated our 
strong opposition to apartheid in numerous 
debates in successive sessions of the General 
Assembly. As a democratic nation committed 
to the principle of equality of all men and 
women, the United States finds the system 
of apartheid odious and abhorrent. We have 
condemned many times over both the philo- 
sophical premises of the apartheid system 
and the brutalizing effects it has on all 
people of South Africa; not just the blacks 
or the "coloreds," as they classify people in 
South Africa, but whites as well — those of 
British heritage or Dutch heritage or what- 
ever — are brutalized by the system which is 
in effect in that country. Indeed, my govern- 
ment adheres to the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which condemns such 
racism as apartheid fosters. 

Further, as the Assembly will recall, the 
United States has maintained an arms em- 
bargo against South Africa since 1962. 

The U.S. Government has pursued a pol- 
icy of actively seeking to encourage in South 
Africa a peaceful change from the policies 
of apartheid to policies which will provide 
for the attainment of basic human rights by 
all South African citizens, regardless of 
race. To this end, we have adopted a policy 
of communication — to impress upon the 
Government of South Africa our opposition 
to apartheid, to signal our unequivocal sup- 
port for changes in the political and social 
system in South Africa, and to maintain 
contacts with all members of the South Afri- 
can population, including those not per- 
mitted to participate in the governing of 
that country. It is the belief of my govern- 
ment that South Africa should be exposed 
to the relentless and unceasing demands of 
the world community to eradicate the apart- 
heid system. 

717 



I 



The United States deplores the detention 
of persons whose only act is outspoken oppo- 
sition to the system of apartheid. The South 
African Government is courting disaster 
when such repressive measures have the 
effect of closing off all avenues for peaceful 
change. 

Mr. Chairman, on September 23, Secre- 
tary of State Kissinger addressed a dinner 
in honor of the Organization of African 
Unity Foreign Ministers and Permanent 
Representatives to the United Nations. In 
his speech, Seci-etary Kissinger restated U.S. 
opposition to apartheid, characterizing it as 
a system contrary to all that Americans be- 
lieve in and stand for. 

As those who may have the printed text 
of what I have just read may note, there is 
one remaining paragraph, but befoi-e I state 
that paragraph, I would like to take this 
opportunity to speak, as I believe the people 
of my country would want me to speak, from 
the heart to those who are here. It is with 
respect to the attempt to add Zionism to our 
items that we reject — and any effort to 
equate it with apartheid. 

I speak to you from the heart because I 
know so much about the struggles of the 
countries that all of you represent — that 
you have made through the years. 

I would say to my distinguished friends 
from the Soviet Union : although we have 
different approaches to economic matters, 
the hearts of our people are still warm with 
appreciation for your gallant efforts to stem 
the tide of an invader who was seeking to 
impose upon the world a doctrine of racism. 
The snows of Russia may cover their bodies, 
but they can never erase the gallant stand 
that they made on behalf of the defense of 
their country, which in turn had the col- 
lateral effect of stamping out tyranny in the 
world as it was evidenced by the invader. 

I would speak to the people of Latin 
American countries, whose spokesman from 
Honduras yesterday indicated that as early 
as 1821 that country abolished human slav- 
ery as a matter of law. I am happy to say 
that grand tradition is well known in our 
country, and we cherish all the examples 
that you have set. 

718 



I would say to the people who represent 
the Arab states that the world owes your 
ancestors, and indeed many of your con- 
temporaries, a great debt for your contri- 
bution to science and to the study of astron- 
omy and others of the great sciences. 

And so I come to the people of Israel. I 
think that it would be a terrible mistake 
historically to attempt to assign to Zionism 
a place of recent origin in human history. 
If we go back 2,500 years or more, we will 
see in ancient writings that some of you 
who follow the same religious faith that I 
follow the magnificent words: 

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, 
we wept. . . . We hanged our harps upon the willows 
in the midst thereof. For .... How shall we sing 
the Lord's song in a strange land ? 

They had been deported from their landi 
to ancient Babylon, and yet in their hearts 
they carried the memory of where they came 
from through all the long years of persecu- 
tion in early history and in the history of 
the Middle Ages, right down to the gas 
ovens at Dachau and other places where the 
people of the Jewish faith were persecuted 
simply because of their religion. They held 
on to the noble ideal that at some point they 
would reconvene in a homeland and enjoy 
what that homeland could offer to them in 
the way of memories and other advantages. 

They did not go as overlords to that place 
on the map. They went there as people who 
would be willing to work with their hands, 
to till the fields, to espouse the doctrine of 
human equality. Throughout their long his- 
tory, from what I know of the people who 
are the descendants and the past persons 
identified with Israel, they never permitted 
human slavery. They gave to us the great 
historical doctrine of what is required of 
man — that he do justly and love mercy,' 
which, it seems to me, would be a philosophy; 
that all could handle and adhere to. 

So I make a plea to all persons of all 
countries here that we do not attempt tct 
equate a religious objective, no matter how 
critical we may be of those who espouse thai 
religious objective, with an odious scheme* 
which, under law in South Africa, consigns 
to a place of degradation members of tht 

Department of State Bulletir 



ties 



if A 



ilispi 
»lio 
I pie 



(OIID 



Jay 



3! 



ilpr 
So 
lose 
or a 
«ai 
Is 



firtl 



Sol 



stnicti 



Hie 



ifria 
is we 



^emli 



ton 



human family who may be of mixed blood, 
who may be black, and in some cases, who 
may be white but disagreeing with the poli- 
cies of the nation. 

I make a special plea to the new nations 
of Africa that they do not become a part of 
this effort. I plead with them, if they are 
disposed to consider the arguments of those 

'^^^ who seek to equate Zionism and apartheid, 
I plead with them to put this over at least 
until the next session of this Assembly in 
order that it might be then considered in a 
mature way. 

I make this plea primarily because in our 
country there are thousands of black and 
white people who have looked forward to the 
day when the nations of Africa would take 
their place in the world family, and we have 
believed that because these nations have 
suffered so long under the yoke of colonial- 
ism that they would be the great exponents 
of fairness, that they would believe in the 
orderly process of discussion and disposition 
of problems. 

So I plead with you not to disappoint 
those, of whom I am one, who look to you 

™'' for a new brand of statesmanship that will 

'™ be a credit to the whole world. 

I say further that there is a tremendous 
outiX)uring of world opposition to apartheid. 
It is an argument that is clearly defined. Do 
not divide our supporters by injecting an 
element on which there is disagreement, 
which in the end, if we should incorporate a 
principle that equates Zionism with apart- 
heid, we may well be performing a service 
for those who are the exponents of apart- 
heid, because they can then divide our 
ranks and, as was said in ancient Rome, 
divide and conquer. We all know that this is 
a technique of those who are the exploiters. 
So I plead with you to keep these issues 

M" distinct in order that we may have a con- 
structive and effective fight against the evil 
of apartheid which pollutes the world. 

The U.S. Government calls on the Gov- 
ernment of South Africa to bend before the 
winds of change that are blowing through 
Africa and, indeed, throughout the world, 
as we can see from the new nations that 

nsiff became a part of this body, and to accept the 



chd 



fact that a racially repressive system is in- 
defensible, to bring to an end apartheid and 
racial injustice. The United States calls on 
the South African Government to realize 
that such a change is not only inevitable but 
it is in the interest of all South Africans 
and, indeed, it is in the interests of the 
whole world. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 

MULTILATERAL 

Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. 
TIAS 8062. 
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, October 30, 1975. 

Coffee 

Protocol for the continuation in force of the inter- 
national coffee agreement 1968, as amended and 
extended, with annex. Approved by the Interna- 
tional Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. 
Entered into force October 1, 1975. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
28, 1975. 

Defense — Reciprocal Assistance 

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty 
of reciprocal assistance (Rio Pact). Done at San 
Jose July 26, 1975. Enters into force when two- 
thirds of the signatory states have deposited their 
ratification. 

Signatures: Argentina, Bolivia,' Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecua- 
dor, El Salvador," Guatemala," Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico,' Nicaragua, Panama," Paraguay,' Peru,' 
Trinidad and Tobago, United States," Uruguay, 
and Venezuela, July 26, 1975. 

Health 

Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered 
into force April 7, 1948, for the United States 
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086. 
Acceptance deposited: Viet-Nam, Democratic Re- 
public, October 22, 1975. 



' With declaration. 
' With statement. 
' With reservation. 



November 17, 1975 



719 



lull' 



Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the Constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22, 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). 
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.' 
Acceptances deposited: Bolivia, El Salvador, Octo- 
ber 17, 1975; Dominican Republic, October 16, 
1975; Nigeria, October 15, 1975. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
4044. 

Acceptance deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), Sep- 
tember 5, 1975. 

.Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
28, 1975. 

Meteorology 

Convention of the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered 
into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052. 
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, October 21, 1975. 

Patents 

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 

patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 

1971. Entered into force October 7, 1975. 

Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that accession deposited : Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics (with a declaration), 

October 3, 1975. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972.' 

Seriate advice and conse^it to ratification: October 
28, 1975. 

Amendments to chapters II, III, IV, and V of the 
international convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London Novem- 
ber 20, 1973.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 

28, 1975. 
Acceptance deposited: Canada, October 7, 1975. 

Amendment to chapter VI of the international con- 
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 
5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.' 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
28, 1975. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 



10 



til 

'ta 



iicof 

—Tolyc 

rotai 

tlora 

Ui 



BILATERAL 
Brazil 

Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed 
minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Brasilia 
March 14, 1975.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 
28, 1975. 

Egypt 

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and 
the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to 
taxes on income. Signed at Washington October 
28, 1975. Enters into force 30 days after the ex- 
change of instruments of ratification. 

Agreement on health cooperation, with annex. Signed 
at Washington October 28, 1975. Entered into 
force provisionally October 28, 1975, and defini- 
tively on the date of exchange of notes between 
the countries notifying the completion of the con- 
stitutional procedures required in each country. 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 
7855). Signed at Washington October 28, 1975. 
Entered into force October 28, 1975. 

Agreement concerning the exhibition in the United 
States of the "Treasures of Tutankhamun" and of 
other items of Pharaonic art. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Washington October 28, 1975. Entered 
into force October 28, 1975. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement on the supply of grain by the United 
States to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Signed at Moscow October 20, 1975. Entered into 
force October 20, 1975. 






including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 

December 14, 1973.' 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: October 

28. 1975. pp,„„ 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement of 
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 
1969.' 
Accession deposited: Austria, October 7, 1975. 

United Nations Charter 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Signed at San 
Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031. 

Admission to membership: Cape Verde, Mozam- 
bique, September 16, 1975; Papua New Guinea, 
October 10, 1975; Sao Tome and Principe, Sep- 
tember 16, 1975. 



una 

reffl 



flit I 



Def„ 

ailtat 
mrjy 



cbrai 

Mil! 

'Apirt 



line 
pXitioi 



' Not in force. 



720 



Department of State Bulletin 



Time 



m 






IDEX November 17, 1975 Vol. LXXIII, No. 1899 



Agriculture. Department Discusses Arrange- 
ments With U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil 
(Robinson) 712 

panada. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Anchorage, Alaska, October 18 . . 686 

I China 
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Time 

Magazine 691 

Bcretary Kissinger Visits the People's Repub- 
lic of China (Ch'iao, Kissinger, interview at 

Tokyo) 681 

|ecretary Kissinger's News Conference at An- 
chorage, Alaska, October 18 686 

longress 

department Discusses Arrangements With 
U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil (Robinson) . . 712 
department Discusses International Economic 

Policy (Katz) 707 

Department Discusses Military Exports to Ku- 
wait and Other Persian Gulf Nations (Sober) 702 

Economic Affairs 

Department Discusses Arrangements With 

U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil (Robinson) . . 712 
(apartment Discusses International Economic 

Policy (Katz) 707 

.S. and New Zealand Hold Economic Con- 
sultations (joint communique) 699 

Energy 

Department Discusses Arrangements With 

U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil (Robinson) . . 712 
ecretary Kissinger's News Conference at An- 
chorage, Alaska, October 18 686 

ndia. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Anchorage, Alaska, October 18 ... . 686 

Brael. United States Reiterates Opposition to 
Apartheid (Mitchell) 717 

ILorea. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Time Magazine 691 

Kuwait. Department Discusses Military Ex- 
ports to Kuwait and Other Persian Gulf 
Nations (Sober) 702 

|iaw of the Sea. Secretary Kissinger's News 
Conference at Anchorage, Alaska, October 18 686 

fiddle East 

Jepartment Discusses Military Exports to Ku- 
wait and Other Persian Gulf Nations (Sober) 702 

pecretary Kissinger Interviewed for Time 
Magazine 691 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at An- 
chorage, Alaska, October 18 686 

lilitary Affairs. Department Discusses Mili- 
tary Exports to Kuwait and Other Persian 
Gulf Nations (Sober) 702 

famibia. Self-Determination for Namibia 
Urged by United States (White) .... 715 

few Zealand. U.S. and New Zealand Hold 
Economic Consultations (joint communique) 699 

Portugal. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Time Magazine 691 

Presidential Documents. United Nations Day, 

1975 697 

South Africa 

Self-Determination for Namibia Urged by 

United States (White) 715 

nited States Reiterates Opposition to Apart- 
heid (Mitchell) 717 



Southern Rhodesia. United States Reaffirms 
Position on Southern Rhodesia (Fraser) . . 714 

Spain. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for 
Time Magazine 691 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 719 

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Anchorage, Alaska, October 18 . . 686 

U.S.S.R. 

Department Discusses Arrangements With 

U.S.S.R. on Grain and Oil (Robinson) . . . 712 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for Time 
Magazine 691 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at An- 
chorage, Alaska, October 18 686 

United Nations 

Self-Determination for Namibia Urged by 

United States (White) 715 

United Nations Day, 1975 (Kissinger, text 
of proclamation) 697 

U.S. Makes Contribution to UNITAR .... 701 

United States Reaffirms Position on Southern 
Rhodesia (Fraser) 714 

United States Reiterates Opposition to Apart- 
heid (Mitchell) 717 

Name Index 

Ch'iao Kuan-hua 681 

Ford, President 697 

Fraser, Donald M 714 

Katz, Julius L 707 

Kissinger, Secretary 681, 686, 691, 697 

Mitchell, Clarence M., Jr 717 

Robinson, Charles W 712 

Sober, Sidney . 702 

White, Barbara M 715 



f 



Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Oct. 27-Nov. 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

■So. Date Subject 

*544 10/28 Advisory Committee on Trans- 
national Enterprises, Nov. 17. 

t545 10/28 Announcements of U.S.-Egypt 
agreements. 

*'545A 10/28 Kissinger, Simon, Fahmy: re- 
marks at signing ceremony. 

t546 10/28 Kissinger, Sadat: toasts. 

*547 10/29 Dean sworn in as Ambassador to 
Denmark (biographic data). 

*548 10/29 Atherton honored by National 
Civil Service League. 

*549 10/30 Secretary's Advisory Committee 
on Private International Law 
Study Group on International 
Sale of Goods, Nov. 22. 

*550 10/31 Overseas Schools Advisory Coun- 
cil, Dec. 10. 
551 10/31 Kissinger: House Select Commit- 
tee on Intelligence. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



/i 



Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printing office 

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20402 



OFFICIAL BUSINESS 



postage and fees paid 
Department of State STA-501 

Special Fourth-Class Rale 
Book 




IJl 



Subscription Renewals: To insure uninterrupted 
service, please renew your subscription promptly 
when you receive the expiration notice from the 
Superintendent of Documents. Due to the time re- 
quired to process renewals, notices are sent out 3 
months in advance of the expiration date. Any prob- 
lems involving your subscription will receive im- 
mediate attention if you write to. Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



U: 




7/^^ 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXin • No. 1900 • November 24, 1975 



PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT MAKES STATE VISIT 
TO THE UNITED STATES 721 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS 

Message From President Ford 739 

SECRETARY KISSINGER TESTIFIES ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 
Statement Before House: Committee on International Relations 742 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN^ 



Vol. LXXIII, No. 1900 
November 24, 1975 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 
domestic $42.50, foreign $63.16 
Single copy 85 cents 
Use of funds for printing this publication 
approved by the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget (January 29, 1971). 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by tki 
O/Kce of Media Services, Bureau oi 
Public Affairs, provides the public am 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department ani 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes seleetei 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter-_^ 
national agreements to which thi 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, am 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also Ustei 



it 1 

y 



nd I 



{President Sadat of Egypt Makes State Visit to the United States 



President Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab Re- 
public of Egypt made a state visit to the 
United States October 26-November 5. He 
met with President Ford and other govern- 
ment officials at Washington October 27-28 
and November 5 and at Jacksonville, Fla.. 
November 2. Folloiving are an exchange of 
greetings between President Ford and Presi- 
dent Sadat at a welcoming ceremony on the 
South Lawn of the White House on October 
27, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at 
the White House that evening, an exchange 
of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and 
President Sadat at a luncheon at the Depart- 
ment of State on October 28, an exchange of 
toasts bettveen President Sadat and Presi- 
dent Ford at a dinner given by President 
Sadat that evening, and an address made by 
President Sadat before a joint meeting of 
the Congress on November 5. 



REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY, 
OCTOBER 27 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated November 3 

President Ford 

Mr. President: It is really a great honor 
! for me to personally — as well as President of 
the United States — welcome you to our 
country. We established in Salzburg a warm 
personal friendship, which I look forward to 
expanding during your visit to the United 
States. I am particularly pleased that Mrs. 
Sadat and other members of your family 
are with you on this historic first state visit 
to the United States by an Egyptian leader. 

The U.S. Government respects your far- 
sighted statesmanship and wisdom and your 



unswerving dedication to the well-being of 
the Egyptian people and to all of the Arab 
people. 

You, Mr. President, have helped to bring 
about historic new developments in the Mid- 
dle East. It is our fervent hope that these 
developments will lead to a durable peace 
for all peoples of that region. 

The overriding purpose of our discussions 
will be to assure that progress toward peace 
will not stop. The process of peaceful nego- 
tiations between the Arab states and Israel 
must move to new fronts and to new issues. 

U.S. policy in the Middle East has two 
primary objectives. 

First, we seek peace. We have made extraor- 
dinary efforts in the last two years to help 
the nations of the Middle East find peace. 
Much has been achieved. The world has 
seen that it is possible to negotiate in the 
Middle East and that agreements can be 
reached, despite a legacy of bitter conflict 
and mutual distrust. 

The process of peace has only begun. We 
are committed to continue it. The efforts of 
the United States will continue until the 
nations directly concerned achieve a peace 
just to all the peoples of the Middle East. 

Second, we desire a strong and mutually 
beneficial relationship with every nation in 
the Middle East. The quality and the growth 
of relations between Egypt and the United 
States during the past two years give us a 
deep satisfaction. 

Your visit to Washington, Mr. President, 
is a symbol of the new dimensions of our 
relationship. Egyptians and Americans in 
all walks of life have established ties of 
friendship and cooperation in many areas of 
mutual benefit, building an historic tradition. 



November 24, 1975 



721 



\ 



We seek, with every nation of the Middle 
East, a relationship which is beneficial to the 
interest of both sides. We are pleased, Mr. 
President, that our objectives coincide with 
yours. 

You have clearly stated your desire for a 
peace that will permit you and your country- 
men to turn your energies and your re- 
sources to the improvement of life in Egypt. 
And we are pi'oud to work with you toward 
that goal. 

During your visit, Mr. President, you will 
find that many of our people have come to 
know you through news reports and through 
the many interviews you have granted so 
graciously to representatives of our media, 
to Members of our Congress, and to many 
other Americans. Your sincerity, your mod- 
eration, and your wisdom have made an im- 
pression on all who have come in contact 
with you. 

I am delighted that your visit to Wash- 
ington and to other American cities will per- 
mit more of our people to know you per- 
sonally. You will find Americans deeply 
concerned over the issues which are impor- 
tant to you — peace and justice in the Middle 
East — issues which are vital to the future 
of the whole world. 

We ai-e delighted by this opportunity to 
show the depth of our respect for you and 
for the Egyptian people and to demonstrate 
our dedication to the high ideals shared by 
Americans and Egyptians. 

On behalf of the American people, Mr. 
President, and as a personal friend, I wel- 
come you to the United States. 

President Sadat 

Mr. President: It is a great honor to me 
to meet with you again after we have met 
last June in Salzburg. It is a great honor for 
me to meet with you here and to meet with 
the American people, for whom my people 
cherish always admiration. 

Since we met last June, there has been 
great events. And I must say in full frank- 
ness, that what you have already — in the 
name of the people of the United States — 



722 



what you have done and what you have 
strived has made it possible that great 
events happen in the area where we live, 
where it is the most dangerous area in the 
whole world. Great events have taken place 
in our area since our meeting, thanks to you 
and to the people of the United States that 
are behind you in seeking peace based on 
justice. 

It is a great occasion for me and for my 
people also to get to know each other, and I 
must— on behalf of the Egyptian people and 
of the delegation and myself — I must thank 
you, Mr. President, for the warm welcome 
that you have given us since we landed on 
the U.S. land yesterday night, up to this 
moment. 

We have come here with open hearts and 
open arms. We have come to put the rela- 
tion between our two countries in its proper 
position and to thank you, Mr. President, 
personally, for what you have done since last 
June up until this moment, which could be 
considered as a turning point in the history 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the area that 
we live. 

I shall always look forward to welcoming 
you, Mr. President, in Egypt. I assure you 
that my people will hail you for all the 
efforts, the sincerity, the honesty that you 
have pushed the peace process in the last 
months. And we have achieved together the 
second disengagement agreement, which will 
be a very important milestone on the road 
to peace in our area. 

Again let me thank you, Mr. President, 
and thank the American people for all you 
have done. And I must mention now how 
my people are grateful for the great help 
they received from the United States in 
preparing the Suez Canal for navigation 
again and for the prosperity of the whole 
world. 

I assure you, Mr. President, and our 
friends the American people, that we shall 
always work for peace together and achieve 
for the coming generations all of what we 
feel of inspirations built on peace based on 
justice. 

Thank you very much. 



Department of State Bulletin 



TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER, OCTOBER 27 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated November 3 

President Ford 

Mr. President, Mrs. Sadat, ladies and 
gentlemen : It is obviously a very, very great 
honor to have Mrs. Sadat and you with us 
this evening and particularly for me to have 
the opportunity today, tonight, and to- 
morrow, and next Sunday, to strengthen 
our personal relationship. 

Although you have been in our country 
before, Mr. President, this is the first state 
visit by an Egyptian President to visit the 
United States. I believe your visit, Mr. 
President, symbolizes the very close work- 
ing relationshsip of our two countries and 
what has been achieved in the last two years. 

We honor you tonight as a friend of the 
United States and for your commitment to 
provide your people many of the same goals 
that the American people have striven for 
and cherished over the long 200 years of our 
young history. 

You are committed, I know from our per- 
sonal discussions, to improving the condi- 
tions of life for all Egyptians and for the 
people of the entire Arab world. You have 
recognized that we must work together to 
overcome the tragedy of unfulfilled lives — 
lives marked by disease, malnutrition, under- 
education, underemployment, and the devas- 
tation of war. 

Americans — and I say this from personal 
contact — respect your vigorous pursuit of 
peace and your efforts to devote your na- 
tion's energy and your nation's resources 
not to continue conflict, but to meet the 
needs of your people. 

We in the United States are committed to 
work with you toward such worthy goals. 
Failure to achieve peace in the Middle East 
will affect the lives of Americans and the 
lives of our friends in the Middle East and 
actually throughout the world. 

We share your deep belief and conviction 
that nations can gain much by working to- 
gether. Your courage, Mr. President, in tak- 
ing the first steps toward peace after almost 



three decades of warfare assures your place 
in history in the Middle East. And we con- 
gratulate you for it. 

You are the man, Mr. President, who as- 
sumed the lead in ending a conflict that for 
more than a generation absorbed the lives, 
the energies, and the substance of many, 
many nations. We have been proud to work 
with you in this very noble cause, and we 
will continue to do so. 

Mr. President, I know from my conversa- 
tions with you that we had in Salzburg, and 
from our many other exchanges, that your 
dedication to peace is for all the people of 
the Middle East. I say again tonight, em- 
phatically and categorically, that we share 
the view that the process of making peace 
for all must continue. 

No step we have taken can be an end to 
itself. There can be no peace until the legiti- 
mate interests of all the peoples of the Mid- 
dle East are taken fairly into account in a 
final peace settlement. 

I wish to address a special word, Mr. 
President, to your charming wife. My own 
wife, Betty, is doing much to inform me 
about the rights and the problems and the 
desires of women in the new freedoms of 
modern society. Sometimes she thinks I am 
an apt — and sometimes a less than apt — 
pupil. [Laughter] But anyhow, I am pleased 
to observe that Mrs. Sadat has distinguished 
herself in your nation by her contributions 
to both the well-being of all Egyptians and 
to a new consciousness of the status of 
women and the efforts in your country to 
achieve equality of opportunity. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask that you join 
me in a toast to the President of Egypt and 
to our mutual objectives: To the President. 

President Sadat 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and 
gentlemen : First of all, I would like to thank 
President Ford for his kind words and ex- 
press my sincere appreciation for the warm 
reception the American people have accorded 
to me and my family. 

It was a great pleasure to respond to 



November 24, 1975 



723 



President Ford's invitation to visit your 
beautiful country and meet with its hospi- 
table people. I come here with a message of 
friendship and amity from the Egyptian 
people to every American. I welcome the op- 
portunity to pursue with President Ford the 
talk.s we held and the contacts we have 
maintained over the past few months on 
several issues of mutual interest and com- 
mon concern. 

It is my feeling and sincere hope that this 
visit will contribute significantly to further- 
ing American relations in all domains and 
will consolidate the ties of friendship and 
understanding between the American people 
and the Arab nation. 

On the eve of your Bicentennial, I would 
like you to know that we share with you the 
determination to utilize the legacy of the 
past to pave the way for a better future, not 
only for our two peoples but for the entire 
family of man. We share with you, too, the 
hope of fulfilling the great ideals of democ- 
racy, human dignity, and equality. 

Mr. President, the past two years have 
witnessed a tangible improvement in our 
relations. For the most part, the credit for 
such an improvement is due to a greater 
degree of American understanding of our 
just cause and our legitimate struggle to 
establish peace in the area. 

We feel, rightly I hope, that the events 
following October 1973 have dissipated many 
misconceptions and myths that marred the 
healthy development of our relations for so 
long. As you know, we have always main- 
tained that if the United States adopted an 
evenhanded policy in the Middle East, there 
would be no pi'oblem between us. 

We expressed our readiness to respond 
positively to any favorable change in Ameri- 
can policy. Thus, when there appeared some 
indications that the United States has 
started to see the realities in their true 
perspective, matters began to move in the 
right direction. 

Bridges of friendships and channels of 
communication were established for our 
mutual benefit. You have my assurance 
that we intend to spare no effort to 
strengthen our relations even further and 
broaden the scope of our cooperation. 



The Egyptian people — and in fact, the 
entire Arab nation — expect the United 
States to continue to demonstrate by words 
and deeds alike its genuine interest in reach- 
ing a final peace settlement. 

We recognize and acknowledge with satis- 
faction the role you have played in the past 
few months to stimulate and accelerate the 
process of a final settlement. We realize also 
that it is your firm and solemn commitment 
to pursue this policy until the ideal of peace 
becomes a living reality. 

We do not question your dedication to 
work seriously and tirelessly toward that 
end. However, you would agree with me, Mr. 
President, that we cannot allow the situation 
to slip back to a state of "no war and no 
peace." We feel that the momentum for 
peace should not be squandered under any 
circumstances. 

Rather, it should be utilized fully and with 
a sense of urgency commensurate with the 
still persisting danger of explosion. Any 
.stalemate or stagnation will not only delay 
the settlement, but in all probability, it 
would introduce certain qualitative and 
substantive changes that would obstruct the 
road to peace. 

I trust that it has become quite evident 
that if we are really concerned with an over- 
all settlement, we have to address ourselves 
to the core of the problem; namely, the 
Palestinian question. The Palestinian people 
have been deprived for over 27 years of hav- 
ing their own state where they can lead a 
productive and fulfilling life. 

Are they not entitled to their national 
rights like all other peoples? Would it not 
be a travesty of justice to deny them the 
inalienable right to live in peace and dignity? 
Does it serve any useful purpose to per- 
petuate the state of strife and frustration? 
Fortunately, there are increasing signs that 
their cause is gaining more international 
support every day. Nations are coming to 
grips with the reality of the Palestine peo- 
ple as an indispensable factor in the equa- 
tion of peace in the Middle East. 

Many Arabs are confident that the United 
States will not dissent from this irreversible 
trend. They feel, not without reason, that 
faithfulness to the essence of the American 



724 



Department of State Bulletin 



Revolution and the heritage bequeathed upon 
this nation by its P'ounding Fathers entail 
lending the Palestinians your understanding 
and support, thus reinforcing the road to 
peace. We can all be assured that once the 
Palestinians have been accorded their basic 
right as a free people, they will become a 
force for peace, stability, and human prog- 
ress. Reason and reconciliation would prevail 
over animosity and hostility. 

Americans can understand, perhaps bet- 
ter than any other people, man's attachment 
to his land, for this has been one of the main 
characteristics of the American culture. 
Such relationship instills in us a strong love 
for our country and a devotion to defend it, 
no matter what the sacrifice is. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I am pleased to 
say that you have a President you can be 
proud of. Throughout my contacts with him, 
I have found him a statesman of great abil- 
ity, vision, and understanding. He is a 
genuine man who radiates sincerity and 
honesty. It shall give me and the Egyptian 
people immense pleasure to welcome him and 
Mrs. Ford in Egypt in the near future. 

May I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to 
join me in a toast in honor of President and 
Mrs. Ford, wishing them health, happiness, 
and fulfillment. 



TOASTS AT LUNCHEON GIVEN BY 
SECRETARY KISSINGER, OCTOBER 28 

Press release 546 dated October 28 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. President and Mrs. Sadat: You have 
been welcomed several times since you ar- 
rived here, but for my colleagues and myself 
in the Department of State who have had 
the great privilege of working so closely with 
you, it is a particular honor to welcome you 
here. 

It is hard to remember that it is less than 
two years ago that I paid my first visit to 
Cairo — the first time I had ever visited an 
Arab capital, the first high-level contact that 
had taken place in a decade — for detailed 
negotiations between various Arab countries 
and the United States. I think it was the be- 



ginning of a new era in the relation.ship 
between the countries of the Middle East and 
the United States. 

We faced a problem of how to make peace 
in an area with countries of a very long 
history and another country which was new 
and insecure and felt threatened. And I have 
always believed that once we have analyzed 
all the clauses of all the agreements, that the 
most important contribution that our hon- 
ored guest made was to understand that the 
process of peace was in the first instance a 
psychological problem and that what was 
needed was a climate of confidence between 
the United States and the principal parties 
and between the parties themselves. 

This has been, to all of us who have 
had the privilege of working with Presi- 
dent Sadat, the most moving experience. To 
change the prospects of an entire area and 
to point it away from conflict and toward 
construction and away from hatred and to- 
ward peace is an achievement that not many 
leaders have realized. 

For those of us in the United States who 
have had the privilege of participating in 
this eff"ort, we can only repeat what Presi- 
dent Ford said yesterday. The United States 
is determined to continue this process. The 
United States wants to achieve peace for all 
of the peoples in the Middle East and will 
per.severe in its efforts. And the United States 
considers the President of Egypt, and Egypt, 
a good friend with whom we will work, 
whose efforts at the construction of his coun- 
try we will support, and whose efforts for 
peace on behalf of all of the peoples in the 
area, we will also cooperate. 

So, Mr. President, two years ago when we 
first met, I did not think that you would so 
rapidly come to the United States and that 
we could greet you here in such an atmos- 
phere of friendship, but I am proud that this 
has been achieved, and I would like to ask 
all of our guests to drink a toast to the Presi- 
dent of Egypt and Mrs. Sadat. 

President Sadat 

Ladies and gentlemen: After we have en- 
joyed the hospitality of our friend Dr. Kis- 
singer, I want to tell you something. 



November 24, 1975 



725 



Since 23 years — that is the time we started 
our revolution, and I was one of the nine who 
started this revolution — I have dealt with 
three Secretaries of State, and I visited here 
in '66 in the capacity of the speaker of our 
National Assembly, and I visited also the 
Congress. 

I want to tell you in all honesty that in 
two years since Dr. Kissinger has visited us 
in Cairo and we started dealing with each 
other, a new image of the American policy 
appeared, the image that we have always 
sought. Maybe you don't know that after the 
Second World War, we were fighting for our 
independence from Great Britain. We were 
under occupation, and all the time we looked 
toward the United States. 

Even when we started our revolution, the 
first embassy, foreign embassy, in Cairo that 
we sent a message to was the American Em- 
bassy, because we knew what happened dur- 
ing the war, between the late President Roose- 
velt and Churchill ; we were following all 
this because our movement was in action at 
that time. We looked always for the United 
States to help us to gain our freedom. 

But I must tell you that in dealing with 
three Secretaries of State before Dr. Kissin- 
ger, we didn't find the real image of Amer- 
ica, of freedom. 

When I met Dr. Kissinger for the first 
time, and we started dealing with each other, 
it was a turning point in the history of the 
conflict in our area. We needed one in whom 
we can put our confidence in the United 
States so that he can bear the responsibility 
and break the snow and go forward toward a 
peaceful solution built on justice. 

After one hour of discussion with Dr. 
Kissinger for the first time, we felt as if we 
were old friends. And since that time up to 
this moment, I am proud to say that, work- 
ing together, we have achieved something 
that couldn't be achieved in a whole genera- 
tion. 

I am proud to say that our friend Dr. 
Kissinger, with his vision, foresight, and 
tireless efforts, has contributed to change the 
image of the United States to its real image 
and to help solve the most complicated prob- 
lem in the whole world — and this is the 
Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. 



I know the road is very long, and we have 
lots to do together to continue the peace 
process that we have already started. 

I wish my friend Dr. Kissinger long life ; 
Mrs. Kissinger, all the best wishes. And may 
I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to drink for 
the health of the man I hold great respect 
to, and he is the President of the United 
States, President Ford ; to my friend Dr. Kis- 
singer and to Nancy Kissinger. 



TOASTS AT DINNER GIVEN BY 
PRESIDENT SADAT, OCTOBER 28 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated November 3 

President Sadat 

President and Mrs. Ford, ladies and gen- 
tlemen : I hope I have adequately expressed 
my feeling, and that of the Egyptian people, 
toward President Ford and the people of the 
United States. What I would like to add, how- 
ever, is that the more I meet with President 
Ford and pursue with him the stimulating 
talks and pleasant conversations, the more 
confirmed becomes the initial impression I 
got when I first met him. His personality 
conveys to anyone who gets to know him 
a sense of confidence, genuineness, and 
warmth. 

As you know. President Ford and I will 
meet again more than once before I leave 
your beautiful country. And we will have the 
chance to solidify our relations even further. 
But let me now express my admiration 
and deep appreciation of President Ford's 
method of dealing with different situations 
and his enlightened approach to people and 
human relations. From this standpoint, he 
can achieve tremendous progress in various 
domains, and the United States, under his 
leadership, can reach new horizons com- 
mensurate with the challenges of our time. I 
have no doubt that he will play a most con- 
structive role, both in bringing about peace 
in the Middle East and in solving complex 
international problems. It is an asset that 
he has an able and dedicated Secretary of 
State who is a man of experience and vision. 

While I propose a toast for President Ford, 
his charming wife, and for the friendship 



726 



Department of State Bulletin 



between the American and Egyptian peoples, 
I am sure that I am expressing sentiments 
which are genuinely reciprocated by Presi- 
dent Ford, his assistants, and compatriots 
toward a country that is known for its forti- 
tude, culture, and historical heritage. 

I am certain that when my visit is com- 
pleted, the picture will be clearer to the 
American public, to government officials and 
legislators. This would definitely lead to ce- 
menting the relations between the American 
people and the Egyptian people as well as 
the entire Arab nation. 

May I propose a toast to the health of 
President Ford and Mrs. Ford, our dear 
friends. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I seize this oppor- 
tunity and present to our dear friend. Presi- 
dent Ford, our highest decoration. It is the 
Nile decoration. This is a sign of great re- 
spect to himself and to the whole American 
people. 

As a token of our friendship and our ad- 
miration to the First Lady and the ladies of 
the United States, may I present our highest 
decoration, El Kemal. 

President Ford 

Mr. President, Mrs. Sadat, ladies and gen- 
tlemen : First, may I express on behalf of my 
wife, Betty, and all the ladies that she repre- 
sents in the United States, and on behalf of 
myself as well as my countrymen, your 
thoughtfulness for the wonderful recognition 
that you have given to us and to those we 
represent. We in the United States are most 
grateful for these wonderful awards, and I 
can't express deeply enough our personal 
appreciation for your thoughtfulness. 

Obviously it is very difficult, Mr. President, 
to match your eloquence in the circumstances 
here this evening. I want to express as best 
I can the appreciation that all of us have 
for your visit to the United States. You have 
in this audience here this evening many out- 
standing Members of the legislative branch. 
Members of the House and Senate, leaders, 
individuals who you have met and I hope you 
will get better acquainted with, so that they 
can have an opportunity of getting to know 
you as I have from our first meeting in Salz- 



burg. Because I am convinced that they will 
share with me, once that acquaintanceship 
begins and develops, the strength and the 
statesmanship that you have exhibited in the 
Middle East during a most trying and a very 
difficult time. 

So, as you meet my former colleagues, the 
Members of the legislative branch of the 
Government of the United States, I am sure 
that you will learn of their importance and 
their significance in the development of our 
friendship between your government as well 
as ours. 

Your hospitality this evening, Mr. Presi- 
dent, is almost overwhelming, not only for 
Mrs. Ford and myself but all of our guests — 
your guests, I should say. 

Your historic visit to this country, and it 
is historic, will lead, I am certain, as you 
travel from here to New York, to Chicago, to 
Houston, to Florida, to a breadth of under- 
standing between not only yourself and our 
people but between your people as well as 
ours. 

I think this opportunity for you to be here 
and to travel is unique in that they find in 
you a leader in the Middle East who has not 
only had the statesmanship to strive for 
peace but the leadership to achieve and ac- 
complish peace, and to broaden and to deepen 
it, not only on behalf of your people but all 
of the Arab people. 

We feel that your presence here in the 
Capital of the United States is of a special 
significance. We were delighted to have you 
in the White House last night with Mrs. 
Sadat. And I know the Secretary hosted some 
outstanding American citizens, including 
members of the Legislature, with you as his 
principal guest today, which gave to them, as 
I have had the opportunity, to see and to 
hear the breadth and strength of your leader- 
ship in the Middle East. 

I can assure you that we in the United 
States cherish and will further the same 
ideals in the future that we have in the past. 
And we are pleased to know that those are 
likewise the same ideals and aims and ambi- 
tions that you have for your people in your 
country. 

It seems to me that as we work together, 
and we do have the need and necessity to 



November 24, 1975 



727 



do that, we can convince others in the Middle 
East that progress is essential not only in 
that area — a stalemate and stagnation cannot 
be condoned — that it is in the best interest 
of Egypt and Israel, the United States, and 
all Middle Eastern countries. And I can as- 
sure you, Mr. President, that the American 
people will work with you and seek to achieve 
with you the aims of your people and your- 
self for the kind of a peace on a broad, firm, 
equitable, secure basis that is in the dreams 
of people in all of the Middle East. 

Let me conclude, Mr. President, that Mrs. 
Ford and I have been delighted to have the 
opportunity to get better acquainted. And let 
me add in closing that I have instructed our 
Secretary of State to continue to explore 
every possibility to continue the diplo- 
matic successes that were achieved in recent 
months. 

I know that he will continue to work with 
the Foreign Minister, Foreign Minister Fah- 
my. They have been a good team in the 
step-by-step process that was essential to 
keep the momentum going. Both are sea- 
soned, tireless, effective, dedicated diplomats 
that have and will contribute to the success 
in the future. 

Let me simply conclude by saying that we 
are honored to have you in America, with 
Mrs. Sadat, and let me say that it is a 
pleasure and a privilege for me to offer a 
toast to you and the people that you repre- 
sent, the great people of the Government of 
Egypt. 



ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT SADAT 
TO THE CONGRESS, NOVEMBER 5 ' 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, distinguished 
Members of Congress: I would like, first, to thank 
you for extending this invitation to me, thus afford- 
ing me a unique opportunity to meet with you all 
in a pleasant continuation of the conversations I 
have had with a good many of you who visited 
Egypt. I have always found these talks stimulating, 
informative, and rewarding. I believe, in all sincer- 
ity, that there is no substitute for direct person-to- 
person contacts that go deep into the heart of all 
the problems which invoke our common concern and 



' Text from the Congressional Record of Nov. 5, 
p. H10642. 



capture our imagination. There is no better way 
to reach a profound insight of the complexity of the 
world we live in and grasp the immense problems 
we face today and are likely to encounter in the 
future. 

In the process, our opinions might differ, and our 
views might occasionally diverge. Indeed, our cul- 
ture emphasizes diversity and multiplicity as a 
means of reaching consensus and compatibility. 
What is required is not identity of viewpoints but 
a genuine acceptance of each other's right to hold 
different opinions and entertain different ideas. 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, we are faced, 
together with all other nations, with one of the 
greatest challenges of our time; namely, the task of 
convincing this generation, and those to follow, that 
we can finally build a viable international system 
capable of meeting the demands of tomorrow and 
solving the problems of the coming age. It is a 
foregone conclusion that old techniques are no 
longer working and that it is not possible any longer 
to encounter new problems with old ideas and worn- 
out solutions. 

The legacy of the past should be utilized not as 
an inhibiting factor but, rather, as an inspiring 
revelation. We ought not to demoralize the dreamer 
or stifle the revolutionary. 

It is true that the magnitude and entanglement 
of the problems of today have a tendency to over- 
whelm us in our endeavor to sail to the shore of 
security and fulfillment. However, we should never 
allow visionary thinking to be replaced by the ur- 
gency of alleviating short-term problems. 

To attain that, it is an absolute must to establish 
a new world order where the arbiter among nations 
is not sheer power or might, but allegiance to legiti- 
macy and compliance with the rule of law. A new 
international economic system has to be devised to 
remedy the grave injustices of the past and pave 
the way for a more equitable definition of rights 
and duties. 

The developing countries are increasingly witness- 
ing an upsurge of the feeling that the time has 
come for them to have a better standard of living, 
much more akin to that of the peoples of the indus- 
trialized countries. These hopes must be realized so 
long as we are seeking the closeness of men from 
all corners of the world, whose basic regard is the 
belief in peace, justice, and the universal brother- 
hood of man. 

I am stating all this here before you because I 
believe that this country has a special responsibility 
in the process of making the necessary adjustment 
and facilitating the transformation to the new inter- 
national structure. I believe also that the United 
States has no alternative but to accept the chal- 
lenge and bear its responsibility with vision and 
determination. 

This nation, like all other nations throughout the 
history of man, shall be judged not by the power it 
exercises or the wealth it accumulates, but by the 
values it upholds and the principles it honors. For- 



i 



728 



Department of State Bulletin 



tunately, your history is imprecated with shining 
examples of genuine devotion to higher values and 
norms. 

Abraham Lincoln chose to describe this nation as 
one "conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal." Wood- 
row Wilson stated, in an address to Congress, that 
"Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their 
honor steady to a common end and prefer the inter- 
ests of mankind to any narrow interest of their 
own. . . ." John F. Kennedy urged all sides to "join 
in creating a new endeavor, not a new balance of 
power, but a new world of law, where the strong 
are just and the weak secure and the peace pre- 
served." 

Long before that, your first President, George 
Washington, in his prophetic farewell address, 
urged all citizens to "Observe good faith and justice 
toward all nations" and warned against both "in- 
veterate antipathies against particular nations and 
passionate attachments for others," noting that a 
passionate attachment, among other evils, facilitates 
"the illusion of an imaginary common interest in 
cases where no real common interest exists." 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, I did not come 
here seeking aid or soliciting promises and commit- 
ments. Rather, I came to extend to you and all 
Americans a hand of friendship and understanding. 
I am not addressing you as an ally, but as a true 
friend who is most willing to support you when you 
are right and equally ready to draw your attention 
when we believe you are wrong. 

I will not attempt to lure you with the illusion 
that our interests are identical with yours. In fact 
they often converge but at times diverge, which is 
only natural. But in all dealings with you, we pro- 
ceed with a view to strengthen the ties of friend- 
ship and cooperation between the two nations. Our 
strict adherence to the principles of nonalignment 
guides us in our sincere drive to improve our rela- 
tions with different nations. 

There is no limit as to how far we can go in im- 
proving our relations and strengthening our ties. 
We have always admired many things in America 
and looked forward to the day when we work to- 
gether toward a better understanding. We spare 
no effort in this endeavor. You have been respon- 
sive and cooperative. Lately, more promising signs 
have surfaced in the form of a higher degree of 
understanding of the situation and a better assess- 
ment of your national interests. 

Our bilateral relations are developing along lines 
which we accept and endorse; namely, those of equal 
footing, respect for each other's independent will, 
noninterference in each other's domestic affairs, and 
mutual cooperation. We propose to work, together 
with you, toward enlarging the area of cooperation 
on a sound basis in order that it may encompass 
more and more activities, both on the official and 
nonofficial levels. We would like to see more con- 
tacts between our two peoples — parliamentarians, 
professionals, journalists, writers, artists, business- 



men, technicians, and academicians. 

Perhaps it has been established now, beyond duobt, 
that we are not ready to compromise our independ- 
ence or mortgage our will to any power under any 
circumstances. Our relations with a given nation 
are not conducted to the detriment of those we main- 
tain with other countries. We should always bear 
in mind that Egypt is the oldest nation-state that 
has enjoyed an uninterrupted existence within the 
same boundaries for over 7,000 years. You certainly 
can appreciate the impact and reflection of this 
phenomenon on our political behavior among na- 
tions today. 

We are doing all we can in order to develop our 
country socially and economically in every possible 
field. We are embarking on an ambitious but essen- 
tial plan for overall development and socioeconomic 
transformation. 

We are trying to secure a job for every man and 
woman, a hospital room for every sick person, a 
seat in the classroom for every child. We are try- 
ing to make life easier for toiling farmers and 
workers. 

We are determined to achieve all that, while 
striving, at the same time, to catch up with the 
latest advances in technology and science. We are 
earmarking more funds for investment, simultane- 
ously with the reimbursement of our accumulated 
debts. We are committed to improve the quality 
of life in Egypt. Throughout this process, we rely 
first and foremost on our own people, our own re- 
sources and, above all, on our hope in the future. 

We welcome any unconditional help from friendly 
nations in whatever form. We thank those who are 
willing to help (and may I identify you with all 
gratitude in this respect), and we understand the 
position of those who are not, for one reason or 
another. 

Perhaps you are aware of the fact that we share 
the little we have with other nations. Egyptian aid 
is given without hesitation to sister African and 
Asian countries hit by disasters. We are building 
roads, schools, hospitals in remote places, in the 
belief that whatever is good for these people is good 
for the Egyptian people. 

Our engineers, doctors, teachers, and technicians 
are contributing to the improvement of life in al- 
most every state in the region. Some have ques- 
tioned the setting of our priorities and the wisdom 
of spreading our resources in such a manner. But 
we think that human progress is indivisible and that 
every nation should share in the cost and fruit alike. 

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, many of your 
friends around the world expect American policy 
to be based on justice and fairness, supporting the 
oppressed and the deprived. Similarly, we believe 
it is important that the United States apply the 
same standards in dealing with other peoples as 
those you strove for when you launched your revo- 
lution. 

The United States has to be counted among the 
supporters of any revolution that seeks the freedom 



November 24, 1975 



729 



and dignity of man. Consequently, is there any logi- 
cal reason why the United States should treat the 
Palestinian problem differently? You are well aware 
that the Palestinians have suffered occasionally from 
excesses, lack of discipline, and abuse. 

They feel, not without justification to be sure, 
that the Palestinian people have long been neglected 
by the international community. It was only a few 
years ago that their legitimate struggle caught the 
imagination, and hence gained the sympathy, of the 
world. 

Nations began, after being aware of the plight 
of the Palestinians, to recognize their right to self- 
determination and statehood. Even when nations 
had their reservations as to certain aspects of the 
Palestinian resistance, that did not hinder them 
from lending it their understanding and support. 

Of almost all nations, the United States remains 
as the sole dissenter in the long-overdue trend of 
establishing contacts with the Palestinians. Contacts 
bring understanding. Understanding helps develop 
solutions. 

In this connection I must say, with all fairness, 
that I have seen certain promising signs in the past 
few weeks with some of you. Senators and Congress- 
men, both individually and in committees and sub- 
committees, demonstrating a keen interest in the 
cause of the Palestinians and exploring ways and 
means of solving their problem and putting an end 
to their predicament. 

Still, much remains to be done and the aggrieved 
cannot be expected to wait long. Therefore I urge 
you, in the most emphatic terms, to lend the Pales- 
tinian people your understanding and support. Help 
them to overcome despair and frustration. The con- 
tinuation of neglect and defiance is but an open 
invitation to violence, negativism, and extremism. 

With your understanding and support, moderation 
would reign and reason would prevail. Above all, a 
sympathetic stand on the part of the United States 
toward the aspirations of the Palestinians and their 
right to establish their own state shall contribute 
greatly to a speedy solution of the problem. 

I trust that what I have been reiterating for 
years has become crystal clear today; namely, that 
the Palestinian question is the heart and core of the 
entire dispute. Once solved, all other outstanding 
issues can be solved, thus realizing the hopes of 
many of us who are striving to make peace a living 
reality. 

You know that we Arabs have no problem what- 
soever coexisting with others of different ethnic or 
religious backgrounds. Our history is a testimony to 
the fact that we have never harbored any ill feeling 
toward any people. Nor have we known doctrines of 
racial or religious discrimination as did other na- 
tions. The teachings of Islam and the tenets of our 
culture make it incumbent upon us to respect all 
peoples and deal with all nations as equals; for we 
believe that Islam is a continuation of the process 
of human submission to the Divine will since the 
inception of mankind. We are commanded in our 



Holy Book to say that "we believe in God, and the 
revelation given to us, and to Abraham, Ismail, 
Isaac, Jacob and the tribes, and that given to Moses 
and Jesus and that to all prophets from their Lord. 
We make no difference between one and another of 
them and we bow to God in Islam." 

To us peace is not only a cherished ideal but also 
an imperative commandment to which we are com- 
mitted. Our way of expressing our reverence to 
the prophets is to pray to God to bestow peace on 
their souls. Is it any wonder that the Arab nation 
should be dedicated to the cause of peace, a cause 
that is inherent in its faith and profoundly inter- 
woven into the fabric of its culture ? 

Recent events have proven beyond any doubt that 
our desire to establish peace is our paramount con- 
sideration and overriding concern. We took the steps 
we did in the belief that we are paving the road 
to peace, even if this entails taking some risks. But 
let me remind you that a very important factor 
behind our attitude is the constructive and more 
impartial role we expect the United States to play. 

Enough has been mentioned about American com- 
mitments to this party or that. But the real commit- 
ment that is required of the United States is one 
to peace and justice. We are not asking your coun- 
try to abandon anyone or turn friends into enemies. 
We simply expect