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Volume LXXIV 

No. 1919 

April 5, 1976 


Address by Secretary Kissinger 425 

Address by Assistant Secretary Hartman 433 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Lewis 443 


For index see inside back cover 


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U.S. Government Printing Office 

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appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

Vol. LXXIV, No. 1919 
April 5, 1976 

The Department of State BULLl 
a meekly publication issued bj 
Office of Media Services, Buret 
Public Affairs, provides tfie pubb 
interested agencies of tfie goveri 
witfi information on developmei 
tite field of U.S. foreign relation 
on tfie work of tfie Departmen 
tfie Foreign Service. 
Tfie BULLETIN includes sf 
press releases on foreign policy, 
by tfie Wfiite House and tfie D 
ment, and statements, add, 
and news conferences of tfie Prt 
and tfie Secretary of State and 
officers of tfie Department, as i It 
special articles on various pfia r ( 
international affairs and tfte fui im 
of tfie Department. Informal 
included concerning treaties and 
national agreements to wide 
United States is or may bee 
party and on treaties of general 
national interest. 
Publications of the Departmi 
State, United Nations documem 
legislative material in the fl 
international relations are also 

America's Permanent Interests 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 

I deeply appreciate the honor you bestow 
upon me today, not only because it is given 
me by old Massachusetts friends but also for 
the name it bears. Throughout his long 
career as legislator, Governor, and Secretary 
of State, Christian Herter embodied the 
ideals of selfless public service and respon- 
sible patriotism which have always marked 
our nation's great leaders. Most of all. 
Christian Herter was a man who had faith 
in his country and its goodness. He under- 
stood the decisive role this nation must play 
in the world for security and progress and 

In this election year, some 10 years after 
Chris Herter's death, we would all do well to 
remember his wisdom. For America is still 
the great and good country he knew it was, 
and our participation in the international 
scene remains decisive if our era is to know 
peace and a better life for mankind. We must 
never forget that this nation has permanent 
interests and concerns that must be pre- 
served through and beyond this election 

This can be a time of national renewal — 
when Americans freely renegotiate their 
social compact. Or if the quest for short- 
term political gain prevails over all other 
considerations, it can be a period of mislead- 
ing oversimplification, further divisiveness, 
and sterile recrimination. 

This Administration has for many months 
been prepared to put its policies, its 
premises, and its design for the future be- 

'■ Made before the Boston World Affairs Council at 
Boston, Mass., on Mar. 11 upon receiving the Chris- 
tian A. Herter Memorial Award (text from press 
release 121). 

fore the American people. The President has 
often spoken about our concerns and hopes 
in the world. In the past 14 months alone, I 
have given 17 major speeches, some 20 
major news conferences, and countless inter- 
views across this country, and I have testi- 
fied 39 times before congressional commit- 

Certainly there is room for differences on 
the policies to be pursued in a complex and 
dangerous world. But those who challenge 
current policies have an obligation to go be- 
yond criticisms, slogans, and abuse and set 
forth in detail their premises and alterna- 
tives, the likely costs, opportunities, and 

America has come through a difficult 
time— when our institutions have been under 
challenge, our purposes doubted, and our 
will questioned. The time has come, as Adlai 
Stevenson said, to "talk .sense to the Ameri- 
can people." As a nation we face new 
dangers and opportunities; neither will wait 
for our decisions next November, and both 
can be profoundly affected by what we say 
and do in the meantime. Complex realities 
cannot be resolved or evaded by nostalgic 

Throughout the turmoil of this decade, 
our foreign policy has pursued our funda- 
mental national goals with energy and con- 
sistent purpose: 

— We are at peace for the first time in 
over a decade. No American fighting men are 
engaged in combat anywhere in the world. 

— Relations with our friends and allies in 
the Atlantic community and with Japan have 
never been stronger. 

— A new and durable relationship with the 

April 5, 1976 


People's Republic of China has been opened 
and fostered. 

— Confrontation in the heart of Europe 
has been eased. A four-power agreement on 
Berlin has leplaced a decade and a half of 
crisis and confrontation. 

— We negotiated an interim agreement 
limiting strategic arms with the Soviet 
Union which forestalled the numerical ex- 
pansion of Soviet strategic programs while 
permitting us to undertake needed programs 
of our own. 

— We are now negotiating a long-term 
agreement which, if successfully concluded, 
will for the first time in history set an upper 
limit on total numbers of strategic weapons, 
requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle 
some of its existing systems. 

— Significant progress toward a durable 
settlement in the Middle East has been 
made. Much work and many dangers remain, 
but the peace process is underway for the 
first time since the creation of the State of 

— There is a new maturity and impetus 
to our relations with Latin America reflect- 
ing changing realities in the hemisphere and 
the growing importance of these countries 
on the international scene. 

— The United States has taken the role of 
global leadership in putting forward a com- 
prehensive agenda for a new and mutually 
beneficial relationship between the developed 
and developing nations. 

— We have defended human rights and 
dignity in all international bodies as well 
as in our bilateral relations. 

This is a record of American accomplish- 
ment that transcends partisanship, for much 
of it was accomplished with the cooperation 
of both parties. It reflects the ideals of the 
American people. It portends for this nation 
a continuing role of moral and political lead- 
ership — if we have the understanding, the 
will, and the unity to seize the opportunity 
history has given us. 

Thirty years ago this country began its 
first sustained peacetime involvement in 
foreign affairs. We achieved great things. 


and we can continue to do so as long as w 
are prepared to face the fact that we live i 
a more complex time: 

— Today the Soviet Union is a supei-powe 
Nothing we could have done would hav 
halted this evolution after the impetus th; 
two generations of industrial and technoloj. 
ical advance have given to Soviet militar 
and economic growth. But together wit 
others we must assure that Russian powe 
and influence are not translated into an e> 
pansion of Soviet control and dominance bt 
yond the U.S.S.R.'s borders. This is pr( 
requisite to a more constructive relationshii 

— Today scores of new nations have com 
into being, creating new centers of influenc( 
These nations make insistent claims on th 
global system, testing their new economi 
power and seeking a greater role and shar 
in the world's prosperity. 

— Today the forces of democracy ar 
called upon to show renewed creativity an 
vision. In a world of complexity — in a worl 
of equilibrium and coexistence, of compet 
tion and interdependence — it is our demc 
cratic values that give meaning to our sacr 
fice and purpose to our exertions. Thus th 
cohesion of the industrial democracies has 
moral as well as a political and economic sij^ 

Americans are a realistic people who hav 
never considered the definition of a challeng 
as a prophecy of doom or a sign of pessimisn 
Instead, we have seen it as a call to battb 
". . . the bi-avest," said Thucydides, "ar 
surely those who have the clearest vision o 
what is before them, glory and danger alikt 
and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it. 
That has always been the test of democ 
racy — and it has always been the strengtl 
of the American people. 

Equilibrium and Peace 

Let me now deal with America's perma 
nent interests: peace, progress, and justice 

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, thi 
world's fears of catastrophe and its hope: 
for peace have hinged on the relationshi] 

Department of State Bullet! 


'between the United States and the Soviet 

In an era when two nations have the 
: power to visit utter devastation on the world 
'in a matter of hours, there can be no greater 
ilimperative than assuring that the relation- 
s-ship between the superpowers be managed 
effectively and rationally. 

This is an unprecedented task. Histori- 
s:ally, a conflict of ideology and geopolitical 
s interests such as that which characterizes 
tthe current international scene has almost 
- nvariably led to conflict. But in the age of 
hermonuclear weapons and strategic equal- 
ly, humanity could not survive such a I'epe- 
ition of history. No amount of tough rhet- 
)ric can change these realities. The future 
)f our nation and of mankind depends on 
low well we avoid confrontation without giv- 
ng up vital interests and how well we estab- 
r ish a more hopeful and stable relationship 
without surrender of principle. 

We therefore face the necessity of a dual 

lolicy. On the one hand, we are determined 

prevent Soviet military power from being 

V sed for political expansion; we will firmly 

; iscourage and resist adventurist policies. 

!ut at the same time, we cannot escalate 

f. very political dispute into a central crisis; 

or can we i"est on identifying foreign policy 

nth crisis management. We have an obliga- 

' ion to work for a more positive future. We 

■' lust couple opposition to pressure and irre- 

''• ponsibility with concerned eff'orts to build a 

lore cooperative world. 

'■ History can inform — or mislead — us in 
lis quest. 

" For a generation after World War II, 
tatesmen and nations were traumatized by 
le experience of Munich ; they believed that 
istory had shown the folly of permitting 
11 adversary to gain a preponderance of 
ower. This was and remains a crucial 
A later generation was chastened by the 

"' xperience of Viet-Nam ; it is determined 
lat America shall never again overextend 
nd exhaust itself by direct involvement in 

' emote wars with no clear strategic signifi- 
ance. This, too, is a crucial lesson. 

But equally important and too often ne- 
glected is the lesson learned by an earlier 
generation. Before the outbreak of the First 
World War, there was a virtual equilibrium 
of power. Through crisis after crisis, nations 
moved to confrontation and then retreated 
to compromise. Stability was taken for 
granted until — without any conscious deci- 
sion to overturn the international structure 
— a crisis much like any other went out of 
control. Nation after nation slid into a war 
whose causes they did not understand but 
from which they could not extricate them- 
selves. The result was the death of tens of 
millions, the destruction of the global order, 
and domestic upheavals whose consequences 
still torment mankind. 

If we are to learn from history, we cannot 
pick and choose the lessons from which we 
will draw inspiration. The history of this 
century tells us: 

— That an imbalance of power encourages 
aggression ; 

— That overcommitment cannot be sus- 
tained domestically; and 

— That an equilibrium based on constant 
confrontation will ultimately end in cata- 

But the lessons of history are never auto- 
matic; each generation must apply them to 
concrete circumstances. 

There is no question that peace rests, in 
the first instance, on the maintenance of a 
balance of global stability. Without the ulti- 
mate sanction of power, conciliation soon 
becomes surrender. Moderation is a virtue 
only in those who are thought to have a 

No service is done to the nation by those 
who portray an exaggerated specter of 
Soviet power and of American weakness, by 
those who hesitate to resist when we are 
challenged, or by those who fail to see the 
opportunities we have to shape the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship by our own confident 

Soviet strength is uneven ; the weaknesses 
and frustrations of the Soviet system are 
glaring and have been clearly documented. 

Ipril 5, 1976 


Despite the inevitable increase in its power, 
the Soviet Union remains far behind us and 
our allies in any overall assessment of mili- 
tary, economic, and technological strength; 
it would be reckless in the extreme for the 
Soviet Union to challenge the industrial de- 
mocracies. And Soviet society is no longer in- 
sulated from the influences and attractions 
of the outside world or impervious to the 
need for external contacts. 

The great industrial democracies possess 
the means to counter Soviet expansion and 
to moderate Soviet behavior. We must not 
abdicate this responsibility by weakening 
ourselves either by failing to support our 
defenses or refusing to use our power in de- 
fense of our interests; we must, along with 
our allies, always do what is necessary to 
maintain our security. 

It is true that we cannot be the world's 
policeman. Not all local wars and regional 
conflicts aff'ect global stability or America's 
national interest. But if one superpower sys- 
tematically exploits these conflicts for its 
own advantage and tips the scales decisively 
by its intervention, gradually the overall bal- 
ance will be affected. If adventurism is al- 
lowed to succeed in local crises, an ominous 
precedent of wider consequence is set. Other 
nations will adjust their policies to their per- 
ception of the dominant trend. Our ability to 
control future crises will diminish. And if 
this pattern is not broken, America will ulti- 
mately face harder choices, higher costs, 
and more severe crises. 

But our obligation goes beyond the bal- 
ance of power. An equilibrium is too precari- 
ous a foundation for our long-term future. 
There is no tranquillity in a balance of terror 
constantly contested. We must avoid the twin 
temptations of provocation and escapism. 
Our course must be steady and not reflect 
momentary fashions ; it must be a policy that 
our adversaries respect, our allies support, 
and our people believe in and sustain. 

Therefore we have sought with the Soviet 
Union to push back the shadow of nuclear 
catastrophe — by settling concrete problems 
such as Berlin so as to ease confrontations 
and negotiating on limitation of strategic 
arms so as to slow the arms race. And we 


have held out the prospect of cooperative r< 
lations in the economic and other fields 
political conditions permit their implement! 
tion and further development. 

It goes without saying that this proces 
requires reciprocity. It cannot survive a coi 
stant attempt to seek unilateral advantag 
It cannot, specifically, survive any moi 
Angolas. If the Soviet Union is ready to fac 
genuine coexistence, we are prepared 1 
make every effort to shape a pattern of r 
straint and mutual interest which will gi^ 
coexistence a more reliable and positive chai 
acter making both sides conscious of whi 
would be lost by confrontation and what C£ 
be gained by cooperation. 

And we are convinced that when a vigo 
ous response to Soviet encroachment is call< 
for, the President will have the support 
the American people — and of our allies — 
the extent that he can demonstrate that tli 
crisis was imposed upon us; that it did ni 
result from opportunities we missed to in 
prove the prospects of peace. 

No policy will soon, if ever, eliminate tl 
competition and irreconcilable ideological d: 
ferences between the United States and t' 
Soviet Union. Nor will it make all interes 
compatible. We are engaged in a protract 
process with inevitable ups and downs. Bi 
there is no alternative to the policy of pe 
alties for adventurism and incentives for ] 
straint. What do those who speak so glil 
about "one-way streets" or "preemptive cc 
cessions" propose concretely that this cot 
try do? What precisely has been given Ui 
What level of confrontation do they see' 
What threats would they make? What ris 
would they run? What precise changes 
our defense posture, what level of expeni 
ture over what period of time, do they adv 
cate? How, concretely, do they suggest ma 
aging the U.S.-Soviet relationship in an e 
of strategic equality? 

It is time we heard answers to the 

In short we must — and we shall — pura 
the two strands of our policy toward t 
Soviet Union: Firmness in the face of pn 
sure and the vision to work for a better j 
ture. This is well within our capacities. \ 

Department of State BulU 

)we this to our people, to our future, to our 
Hies, and to the rest of mankind. 

'he World Community 

The upheavals of this century have pro- 
uced another task — the fundamental need 
•f reshaping the structure of international 
elations. For the first time in history the 
nternational system has become truly glo- 
al. Decolonization and the expansion of the 
/■orld economy have given birth to scores of 
ew nations and new centers of power and 

Our current world, numbering nearly 150 
ations, can be the seedbed for growing eco- 
omic warfare, political instability, and ideo- 
tgical confrontation — or it can become a 
immunity marked by unprecedented inter- 
ational collaboration. The interdependence 
f nations — the indivisibility of our security 
id our prosperity — can accelerate our com- 
lon progress or our common decline. 
Therefore, just as we seek to move be- 
)nd a balance of power in East-West rela- 
ons, so must we transcend tests of strength 

North-South relations and build a true 
orld community. 

We do so in our own self-interest, for 

day's web of economic relationships links 

te destinies of all mankind. The price and 

ipply of energy, the conditions of trade, the 

tpansion of world food production, the tech- 

)logical bases for economic development, 

'6 protection of the world's environment, 

■e rules of law that govern the world's 

'eans and outer space — these are concerns 

at affect all nations and that can be satis- 

ctorily addressed only in a framework of 

ternational cooperation. 

Here, too, we need to sustain a complex 

ilicy. We must resist tactics of confronta- 

on, but our larger goal must be to shape 

«w international relationships that will last 

'er decades to come. We will not be stam- 

sded by pressures or threats. But it is in 

ir own interest to create an international 

onomic system that all nations will regard 

legitimate because they have a stake in it 
lid because they consider it just. 
As the world's strongest power, the United 

iril 5, 1976 

States could survive an era of economic war- 
fare. But even we would be hurt, and no 
American true to the humane heritage of 
his country could find satisfaction in the 
world that confrontation would bring in its 
wake. The benefits of common effort are so 
apparent and the prospects of economic 
strife so damaging that there is no moral or 
practical alternative to a world of expanded 

Therefore, at the World Food Conference 
in 1974, at the special session of the U.N. 
General Assembly last September, and in the 
Conference on International Economic Co- 
operation now underway in Paris, the United 
States has taken the lead in offering pro- 
grams of practical cooperation. We have 
presented — and are vigorously following 
through on — a wide range of proposals to 
safeguard export earnings, accelerate indus- 
trial and agricultural growth, better condi- 
tions of trade and investment in key com- 
modities, and meet the plight of the poorest 
countries. In every area of concern we have 
proposed forms of collaboration among all 
nations, including the other industrial coun- 
tries, the newly wealthy oil producers, and 
the developing countries themselves. 

It is the West — and overwhelmingly this 
nation — that has the resources, the technol- 
ogy, the skills, the organizational ability, and 
the good will that attract and invite the co- 
operation of the developing nations. In the 
global dialogue among the industrial and de- 
veloping worlds, the Communist nations are 
conspicuous by their absence and, indeed, by 
their irrelevance. 

Yet at the very moment when the indus- 
trial democracies are responding to the as- 
pirations of the developing countries, many 
of the same countries attempt to extort what 
has in fact been freely offered. Lopsided vot- 
ing, unworkable resolutions, and arbitrary 
procedures too often dominate the United 
Nations and other international bodies. Na- 
tions which originally chose nonalignment 
to shield themselves from the pressures of 
global coalitions have themselves formed a 
rigid, ideological, confrontationist coalition 
of their own. One of the most evident blocs 
in the world today is, ironically, the almost 


automatic alignment of the nonaligned. 

The United States remains ready to re- 
spond responsibly and positively to countries 
which seriously seek justice and an equitable 
world economic system. But progress de- 
pends on a spirit of mutual respect, realism, 
and practical cooperation. Let there be no 
mistake about it: extortion will not work and 
will not be supinely accepted. The stakes are 
too high for self-righteous rhetoric or ado- 
lescent posturing. 

At issue is not simply the economic ar- 
rangements of the next quarter century but 
the legitimacy of the international order. 

Technology and the realities of interde- 
pendence have given our generation the op- 
portunity to determine the relationships 
between the developed and developing coun- 
tries over the next quarter century. It is the 
quality of statesmanship to recognize that 
our necessity, our practical aspirations, and 
our moral purpose are linked. The United 
States is ready for that challenge. 

The Moral Unity of the Great Democracies 

Our efforts to build peace and progress re- 
flect our deep-seated belief in freedom and 
in the hope of a better future for all man- 
kind. These are values we share with our 
closest allies, the great industrial democra- 

The resilience of our countries in recover- 
ing from economic difficulty and in consoli- 
dating our cooperation has an importance far 
beyond our immediate well-being. For while 
foreign policy is unthinkable without an ele- 
ment of pragmatism, pragmatism without 
underlying moral purpose is like a rudderless 

Together, the United States and our allies 
have maintained the global peace and sus- 
tained the world economy for more than 30 
years. The spirit of innovation and progress 
in our societies has no match anywhere, cer- 
tainly not in societies laying claim to being 
"revolutionary." Rarely in history have al- 
liances survived — let alone flourished — as 
ours have in vastly changing global and geo- 
political conditions. The ideals of the indus- 
trial democracies give purpose to our efforts 


to improve relations with the East, to th 
dialogue with the Third World, and to man; 
other spheres of common endeavor. 

Our ties with the great industrial democ 
racies are therefore not alliances of conven 
ience but a union of principle in defense o 
values and a way of life. 

It is in this context that we must be con 
cerned about the possibility of Communis 
parties coming to power — or sharing ii 
power— in governments in NATO countrie? 
Ultimately, the decision must, of course, b 
made by the voters of the countries con 
cerned. But no one should expect that thi 
question is not of concern to this govern 

Whether some of the Communist pai 
ties in Western Europe are in fact independ 
ent of Moscow cannot be determined whe 
their electoral self-interest so overwhelm 
ingly coincides with their claims. 

Their internal procedures — their Leninis 
principles and dogmas — remain the antithc 
sis of democratic parties. And were they t 
gain power, they would do so after havin 
advocated for decades programs and value 
detrimental to our traditional ties. By tha 
record, they would inevitably give low prioi 
ity to security and Western defense effort: 
which are essential not only to Europe's fret 
dom but to maintaining the world balance c 
power. They would be tempted to orier 
their economies to a much greater extei 
toward the East. We would have to expe( 
that Western European governments i 
which Communists play a dominant rol 
would, at best, steer their countries' policie 
toward the positions of the nonaligned. 

The political solidarity and collective d( 
fense of the West, and thus NATO, would b 
inevitably weakened, if not undermined. An 
in this country, the commitment of th 
American people to maintain the balance o 
power in Europe, justified though it migh 
be on pragmatic geopolitical grounds, woul 
lack the moral base on which it has stoo 
for 30 years. 

We consider the unity of the great Indus 
trial democracies crucial to all we do in th 
world. For this reason we have sought t 
expand our cooperation to areas beyond ou 

Department of State Bulletil 

mutual defense — in improved political con- 
sultation, in coordinating our approaches to 
negotiations with the East, in reinforcing 
our respective economic policies, in develop- 
ing a common energy policy, and in fashion- 
ing common approaches for the increasingly 
important dialogue with the developing na- 
tions. We have made remarkable progress in 
all these areas. We are determined to con- 
tinue. Our foreign policy has no higher 

The Debate at Home 

This, then, is the design of our foreign 
(policy : 

— We have the military and economic 
'power, together with our allies, to prevent 
; aggression. 

— We have the self-confidence and vision 
ito go beyond confrontation to a reduction of 
Itensions and ultimately a more cooperative 

— We have the resources, technology, and 
organizational genius to build a new rela- 
tionship with the developing nations. 

— We have the moral courage to hold high, 
(together with our allies, the banners of 
(freedom in a turbulent and changing world. 

The challenges before us are monumental. 
But it is not every generation that is given 
the opportunity to shape a new international 
)rder. If the opportunity is missed, we shall 
ive in a world of chaos and danger. If it is 
•ealized we will have entered an era of peace 
ind progress and justice. 

But we can realize our hopes only as a 
niited people. Our challenge — and its solu- 
;ion — lies in ourselves. Our greatest foreign 
Dolicy problem is our divisions at home. Our 
H'eatest foreign policy need is national co- 
lesion and a return to the awareness that 
n foreign policy we are all engaged in a com- 
non national endeavor. 

The world watches with amazement — our 
idversaries with glee and our friends with 
growing dismay — how America seems bent 
)n eroding its influence and destroying its 
ichievements in world affairs through an 
)rgy of recrimination. 

They see our policies in Africa, the east- 
ern Mediterranean, in Latin America, in 
East-West relations undermined by arbi- 
trary congressional actions that may take 
decades to undo. 

They see our intelligence system gravely 
damaged by unremitting, undiscriminating 

They see a country virtually incapable of 
behaving with the discretion that is indis- 
pensable for diplomacy. 

They see revelations of malfeasance 
abroad on the part of American firms wreak 
grave damage on the political structures of 
friendly nations. Whatever wrongs were 
committed — reprehensible as they are — 
should be dealt with in a manner consistent 
with our own judicial procedures and with 
the dignity of allied nations. 

They see some critics suddenly pretend- 
ing that the Soviets are 10 feet tall and that 
America, despite all the evidence to the con- 
trary, is becoming a second-rate nation. They 
know these erroneous and reckless allega- 
tions to be dangerous, because they may, if 
continued, persuade allies and adversaries of 
our weakness, tempting the one to accommo- 
dation and the other to adventurism. 

They see this Administration — which has 
been condemned by one set of critics for its 
vigorous reaction to expansionism in South- 
east Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa — 
simultaneously charged by another group of 
opponents with permitting unilateral Soviet 

They see that the Administration whose 
defense budgets have been cut some $39 bil- 
lion by the Congress in the past seven years 
is simultaneously charged with neglecting 
American defenses. 

The American people see all this, too, and 
wonder when it will end. They know that we 
cannot escape either our responsibilities or 
the geopolitical realities of the world around 
us. For a great nation that does not manage 
events will soon be overwhelmed by them. 

If one group of critics undermines arms 
control negotiations and cuts off the prospect 
of more constructive ties with the Soviet 
Union while another group cuts away at our 
defense budgets and intelligence services and 

iXpril 5, 1976 


thwarts American resistance to Soviet ad- 
venturism, both combined will — whether 
they have intended it or not — end by wreck- 
ing the nation's ability to conduct a strong, 
creative, moderate, and prudent foreign pol- 
icy. The result will be paralysis, no matter 
who wins in November. And if America can- 
not act, others will, and we and all the free 
peoples of the world will pay the price. 

So our problem is at once more complex 
and simpler than in times past. The chal- 
lenges are unprecedented but the remedies 
are in our own hands. This Administration 
has confidence in the strength, resilience, 
and vigor of America. If we summon the 
American spirit and restore our unity, we 
will have a decisive and positive impact on 
a world which, more than ever, affects our 
lives and cries out for our leadership. 

Those who have faith in America will tell 
the American people the truth: 

— That we are strong and at peace; 

— That there are no easy or final answers 
to our problems; 

— That we must conduct a long-term and 
responsible foreign policy, without escape 
and without respite; 

— That what is attainable at any one mo- 
ment will inevitably fall short of the ideal ; 

— That the reach of our power and pur- 
pose has its limits; 

— That nevertheless we have the strength 
and determination to defend our interests 
and the conviction to uphold our values ; and 

— That we have the opportunity to leave 
our children a more cooperative, more just, 
and more peaceful world than we found. 

In this Bicentennial year, we celebrate 
ideals which began to take shape around the 
shores of Massachusetts Bay some 350 years 
ago. We have accomplished great things as 
a united people. There is much yet to do. 

This country's work in the world is not a 
burden but a triumph — and the measure of 
greatness yet to come. 

Americans have always made history 
rather than let history chart our course. We, 
the present generation of Americans, will do 
no less. So let this year mark the end of our 
divisions. Let it usher in an era of national 
reconciliation and rededication by all Ameri- 
icans to their common destiny. Let us have a 
clear vision of what is before us — glory and 
danger alike — and go forward together to 
meet it. 

U.S. Increases Economic Assistance 
to Portugal 

Press release 128 dated March 16 

At the conclusion of a meeting on March 
16 between the Secretary of State and the 
Portuguese Minister of Finance, it was an- 
nounced that the United States would in- 
crease its program of economic assistance 
to Portugal by $40 million to a new total of 
$240 million over the next 12 to 18 months, 
if Congress approves. This assistance is tc 
support Portugal's economic recovery whik 
the country continues its progress toward 
democratic government and economic stabil- 
ity. That portion of the assistance requiring 
congressional approval has already been sen1 
to the Congress in budget requests for fisca 
years 1976 and 1977. 

The $240 million includes developmeni 
loans and technical assistance grants. Public 
Law 480 loans, housing investment guaran 
tees and agricultural commodity imports ar 
ranged through the Commodity Credit Cor 
poration, as well as a $35 million grant tc 
assist in the resettlement and relief of Por 
tuguese nationals from Africa. 


Department of State Bulletin 

The United States and the Soviet Union 

Address by Arthur A. Hartman 
Assistant Secretary for European Affair's ' 

My announced theme tonight is detente — 
what it is and what it isn't. The word 
'detente" has aroused strong emotions 
among Americans — in some, a favorable re- 
action ; in many, an unfavorable one. In 
ome cases the meaning of "detente" has been 
misunderstood ; in other cases it has been 
misrepresented. Indeed, several days ago 
President Ford said he found the word so 
mhelpful that he has stopped using it 

Tonight, therefore, I would like to bring 
'he debate on the subject down to specifics. 

ask you to put the word "detente" out of 
our mind and join me in taking a sober look 
it the fundamental and sometimes intract- 
ible aspects of our policy toward the Soviet 
Jnion. It is a policy of unique importance 
or all of us because it relates to the only 
ither superpower existing today or likely to 
xist for many years to come. I propose to 
xamine : 

— First, our military relationship with the 
soviet Union, including the strategic re- 

— Second, the areas of bilateral U.S.-Soviet 
ooperation, particularly the economic area; 

— Third, our relationship with Moscow in 
vorld areas of possible confrontation, like 
Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. 

Mistakes have been made in our policy to- 
vard the Soviet Union. All history is a record 
if opportunities gained and opportunities 

' Made at Rice University, Houston, Tex., on Mar. 4. 

lost. But I am convinced that the basic lines 
of our present policy are the only ones we 
can reasonably pursue. And I invite each 
of you to ask yourself at every point in our 
discussion tonight the same questions I con- 
sistently ask myself. Are there feasible al- 
ternatives to what we are trying to do? And 
is it possible to summon a national consensus 
around those alternatives? 

Let me begin our discussion by asserting 
that the basic international problem of our 
time — perhaps of this whole half-century — 
is dealing with the consequences of the fact 
that the U.S.S.R. has become a superpower 
with the ability to project its military 
strength in global terms. The growth and ex- 
pansion of Russian continental power began 
long before the Bolshevik Revolution brought 
the Communists to power. But this thrust 
has been accelerated by the Soviet regime, 
which has taken a country with a large and 
talented population, given it an ideology 
that pretends to universalism, and ruled it 
with an authoritarian devotion to the acquisi- 
tion and retention of power. 

This historical drive to superpower status 
is not a process which was or is in our power 
to stop. Let us recall that the Soviets exploded 
their first nuclear bomb in 1949, during the 
Administration of President Truman, and 
that they launched the first vehicle which 
could deliver it to intercontinental targets 
in 1957, during the Administration of Presi- 
dent Eisenhower. Neither Administration 
was "soft" on communism or on the Soviet 
Union. The fact is that no U.S. Administra- 
tion could have stopped this development of 

April 5, 1976 


Soviet strategic power short of using our 
preponderant nuclear strength to try to wipe 
out the Soviet Union and most of its people 
— an option which I trust no responsible 
American leader would ever seriously con- 

Having developed the two essential stra- 
tegic weapons, it was only a matter of time 
before the Soviet Union reached the military 
status of a great power. Today we Americans 
must cope with the implications of this in- 
evitable accretion of Soviet strength. It is 
perhaps the most complex task we have ever 
faced ill our foreign policy, because we must 
deal with a state which has the strength to 
destroy us, just as we have the power to 
destroy it. Today the Soviet leaders have the 
capacity to refuse to make concessions to 
us simply because we demand them, just as 
we have always had the capacity to refuse 
to accept any demands they make of us. 

I ask you to ponder the implications of one 
simple statement which applies to all re- 
lationships between adversaries who are 
equals or near-equals — whether they be in- 
dividuals or political groups or states — and 
which describes the reality of our current 
problem with the Soviet Union. The state- 
ment is this: We can get nothing that we 
want from the Soviets except by taking ac- 
count, in one way or another, of Soviet inter- 
ests. This means that our policy toward the 
Soviet Union — to a far greater degree than 
in eai'lier periods — must often proceed by a 
balancing of interests, which will mean ac- 
commodation or compromise by both sides. 
This new imperative may seem obvious. Yet 
it is ignored by many people who express 
themselves on U.S.-Soviet relations — people 
who concede on the one hand that the 
U.S.S.R. is now a superpower but seem to 
expect, on the other hand, that we can pursue 
negotiations with the Soviets as if they had 
just lost a war and were about to sign a 
document of surrender. 

Soviet power has developed unevenly, with 
large gaps, disparities, and weaknesses. The 
Soviets' new military status should not ob- 
scure in our own minds the many problems 
they still face. The Soviet commitment to 


defense priorities has exposed and exacer 
bated the economic difficulties which hav; 
dogged them ever since the Bolshevik Revolu 
tion. Their agriculture is singularly unpro 
ductive; their consumer sector is stunted 
and their gross national product is only hal 
of ours though their population is greater 
They have a continuing nationality problem 
which will increase now that non-Russiai 
nationalities are a majority, and a growinj 
one, of the population. Externally, their con 
trol of Eastern Europe to the west is in 
herently unstable since it is based not oi 
affinities but on force. They confront a hos 
tile China to the east. Their authority in th 
Communist movement is being furthe 
eroded as the rift with parties in Wester 
Europe widens. And their recent victory i 
Angola is balanced by setbacks over the pas 
few years in countries like Egypt an 

The Soviet Union is thus not a fully dc 
veloped superpower in every sphere of it 
national activity. This uneven developmeii 
of Soviet power offers us opportunities a 
well as problems. But Soviet militar 
strength still confronts us with the need t 
deal with the U.S.S.R. in different ways tha 
we have before. 

This is not a problem which confronts th; 
Administration only. It will be a problem tV 
the next Administration and the next or 
after that. Indeed, I think that it will be 
problem for Americans for at least the lif( 
time of every person in this room. 

Military Aspect of the Relationship 

Thus the importance of our military n 
lationship with the Soviet Union, the firs 
aspect of our relationship I want to discus 
tonight. How do we deal with this new Sovif 
power? History offers us no precedents. I 
the past the rise of a major new militar 
power — Napoleon's France, Bismarck' 
Prussia, Hitler's Germany, Tojo's Japan- 
has usually led to full-scale war. But war i 
not an option for us anymore, because of th 
destructive power of nuclear weapons. 

Surely the only sane course in today's cor 

Department of State Bulletii 


ditions is to try to preserve our security and 
promote our national interests in a way that 
minimizes the risk of nuclear conflict. That, 
in our view, is the first and most vital objec- 
tive of our policy toward the Soviet Union. 
And we must pursue it regardless of un- 
certainties in the other aspects of our bi- 
lateral relations. 

This Administration is not the first to 
reach that conclusion. President Truman in 
1946 advanced a plan to put under inter- 
national control the entire process of pro- 
ducing atomic weapons. President Eisen- 
hower in 1955 proposed to the Soviet Union 
flights by planes of one nation across the terri- 
tory of the other to prevent surprises in mili- 
tary preparations. The Soviets rejected both 
proposals. It was Eisenhower who 21 years 
ago said that "Since the advent of nuclear 
weapons, it seems clear that there is no 
longer any alternative to peace. ..." * 

The first major arms control agreement 
we reached with the Soviet Union — the 
treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmos- 
jhere, in space , and under water — was 
dgned in 1963 during the Kennedy Ad- 

Ever since, successive American Admin- 
strations have steadfastly pursued addi- 
ional agreements to limit the strategic arms 
•ace. To have done otherwise would surely 
lave meant accepting the inevitability of a 
lever-ending arms race with all its destabi- 
izing implications. 

Would Americans have accepted this? I 
lo not think so. And that is why I profoundly 
lisagree with those who say we should be 
)repared to withhold a SALT agreement 
rom the Soviets until they improve their 
•ehavior in areas of tension or on human 
ights or on some other unquestionably im- 
portant issue. Such an attitude assumes that 
lALT agreements are somehow a concession 
ve make to the Soviet Union, that they benefit 
-loscow but don't benefit us. On the contrary, 
v'hile the Soviets see the limitation of stra- 
egic arms to be in their interest — for other- 

" For remarks by President Eisenhower at a De- 
artment of State honors award ceremony on Oct. 19, 
954, see Bulletin of Nov. 1, 1954, p. 636. 

wise they would not enter into a negotiation 
— it is surely also in our own interest and, 
above all, in the interest of peace. 

Remember what I said about the necessity 
of balance and accommodation in achieving 
our objectives. Remember, too, that we can- 
not expect the Soviets to consent to an arms 
control agreement which creates a net mili- 
tary disadvantage for them. Arms control 
agreements must contain a balance of ad- 
vantages, or they cannot be negotiated. 

In SALT, as in every agreement between 
two dedicated parties, there's no such thing 
as a free lunch — you can't expect your adver- 
sary to make unilateral concessions. What is 
important is to look at the overall strategic 
balance and to ask, first, whether we have the 
ability to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on our 
country and, second, whether we will con- 
tinue to have that ability if we are able to 
negotiate the ceilings on strategic weapons 
which are the essence of our current SALT 
Two negotiation. 

There is no doubt in my mind that we can 
answer both questions in the affirmative. In 
some aspects of strategic power we are ahead 
of the Soviets, in some we are behind — as is 
only natural, since each side freely made 
different strategic choices years ago. For ex- 
ample, the Soviets decided that their path to 
strategic security lay through building 
heavier weapons than we were building. 
They decided on this direction because of 
their strategic doctrine and because their 
accuracy and explosive technology were not 
as advanced as ours. We, on the other hand, 
developed an advantage in reliability, ac- 
curacy, diversity, and sophistication. 

In the SALT One offensive-weapons 
agreement signed in 1972 and running 
until 1977, we froze the total number of 
strategic missile launchers on each side. We 
continued to enjoy our advantage in reentry 
vehicle numbers and in heavy bombers and 
thus in deliverable weapons, which after all, 
are what do the damage. This imposed no 
special restriction on us, because we had no 
plans for additional launchers for the dur- 
ation of the agreement. But it did stop the 
continued growth in numbers of Soviet 

ipril 5, 1976 


launchers. The U.S. lead in warheads has 
actually increased in the four years since 
the SALT One agreement was signed ; it is 
now 8,500 to 2,500, or more than 3 to 1. 

In negotiating SALT Two, provided we can 
resolve the cruise missile and "Backfire" 
bomber problems, we will have an agreement 
which sets the same ceiling for each side on 
total strategic vehicles and MIRV'ed [multi- 
ple independently targetable reentry vehi- 
cles] launchers and puts us in a position to 
seek significant reductions in SALT Three. 
If we decide in the future that we will need 
missiles as heavy as the Soviet missiles, 
nothing in the SALT Two agreement will 
prevent us from building them, just as noth- 
ing in the SALT One agreement prevented us. 

What if we fail to get any kind of SALT 
Two agreement and the SALT One offensive- 
weapons agreement expires next year? Quite 
simply, we will be back to Square 1, with no 
agreed limitations of any kind on offensive 
strategic weapons. We will then have two 
choices. We can let the Soviet Union, un- 
restrained by an agreement, possibly pass 
us in the strategic areas in which it trails 
and increase its lead in the areas in which 
it is ahead. Or we can match the Soviets in 
a new spiral of the arms race. That would 
obviously carry a high price tag, which, con- 
sidering the difficulty of getting another 
SALT agreement following a period in which 
new and more complex weapons are deployed, 
would involve not only money but tensions 
and dangers as well. 

Surely it is both safer and cheaper to make 
our best efforts to reach an agreement. And 
those who disagree, it seems to me, owe the 
American people an explanation of just how 
they would deal with the inevitable conse- 
quences of the failure to reach a SALT agree- 

Before I leave the security aspect of our 
relationship with the Soviet Union, I want 
to stress the importance of keeping both our 
strategic and our conventional forces strong 
enough to deter Soviet aggression. That 
means second to none. We cannot afford to 
base our relationship with the Soviet Union 
on blind faith, in view of the continuing mas- 


sive Soviet military buildups and of state- 
ments such as General Secretary Brezhnev 
[Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of 
the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union] made last week 
that "relaxation of tensions does not in the 
slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or 
change, the laws of the class struggle." 

Preponderant Soviet military power could 
quickly translate itself into political pres- 
sures which could have a destabilizing effect 
on Europe and perhaps even on ourselves. 
When Stalin asked Churchill how many di- 
visions the Pope had, he was expressing a 
view that only military power is ultimately 
translatable into political influence. More- 
over, Soviet military superiority would make 
arms control far more difficult, since we 
would never agree to a treaty enshrining an 
actual Soviet superiority and the Soviets 
would never agree to a treaty dismantling 
that superiority. Thus, the preservation of 
an equilibrium of power is not contradictory 
to our policy of seeking arms control 
measures with the Soviets. On the contrary, 
it is vital to that policy. 

The Trading Relationship 

Let me now turn to the second aspect of 
our relationship with the U.S.S.R. — to the 
aspect of bilateral cooperation, in which the 
most important factor is trade. 

Imagine a mythical country with a strong 
interest in trade with the United States. W( 
begin a trading relationship with it, which 
burgeons quickly to an annual trade of $2.1 
billion a year. Furthermore, the balance oi 
trade results in a large export surplus to thf 
advantage of the United States. Indeed, ir 
one year we export $1.8 billion and impor' 
only $0.3 billion, for a trade surplus of $l.f 
billion, or about 15 percent of our overal 
trade surplus worldwide for that year. More 
over, the prospects for the year to come an 
even better, due largely to a new trade agree 
ment which guarantees U.S. exports in thi 
value of $1 billion a year for the next f:v( 

Would such a trade situation be generall: 

Department of State Bulletii 

acclaimed in the United States as an unmiti- 
gated asset for us? Logically it would. In 
fact it is not, because the country is of course 
not mythical. It is the Soviet Union ; those 
are the trade figures for last year; and the 
agreement is the grain agreement we nego- 
tiated last fall. Let us look at the facts on 
_ that grain agreement. 

In 1971 the Soviet Union imported 2.9 
million tons of gi-ain from the United States — 
literally chickenfeed. In 1972, in an uncon- 
trolled U.S. market, it imported 13.7 million 
tons — over four times as much. You remem- 
ber what happened. The price of bread and 
the price of meat rose. As consumers we all 
had to pay more at the supermarket for basic 
foodstuffs. The objective of the U.S. negoti- 
ators in the 1975 grain negotiations was to 
prevent this from happening again — to guar- 
antee a market in the U.S.S.R. for our farm- 
ers' grain while safeguarding the interests 
of consumers like you and me. And that is 
exactly what we did. 

The current grain agreement stipulates 
that the Soviet Union must buy at least 6 
million tons of grain a year — about a billion 
dollars' worth — and that it must transport 
at least a third of it on American ships. It 
cannot buy over 8 million tons without con- 
sulting us so we have a chance to assess the 
potential effect on U.S. food prices. And if 
our own grain stocks run low, we can reduce 
the amount of grain the Soviets buy. This 
helps our farmers. It helps the makers of 
farm machinery. It helps our shippers. It 
helps our trade and payments balance. And 
it should considerably moderate effects on 
food prices. 

Moreover, there is a political value which, 
indeed, applies to our whole trading relation- 
ship with the Soviet Union. In creating in- 
centives for the Soviet economy to move from 
its historical emphasis on self-sufficiency, we 
are creating a pattern of Soviet economic 
dependence on ourselves and on other West- 
ern countries. This pattern does not in it- 
self totally preclude the possibility of war; 
after all, the two World Wars of this century 
were between major trading partners. But 
it does make it necessary for Soviet policy- 

makers to consider the potential costs in 
economic terms of expansionist or aggressive 
policies. In effect we are introducing — for 
the first time — a major Western economic 
factor into their decisionmaking process. The 
larger the economic relationship, the larger 
the factor. In time it could become a major 
incentive for Soviet political restraint. 

Thus, while we support an increase in emi- 
gration from the Soviet Union — a subject I 
will want to discuss a bit later — for both 
economic and political reasons we have op- 
posed the action of Congress to link trade 
with Soviet emigration policy. Congress has 
made improved Soviet performance on letting 
people leave the U.S.S.R. a condition of sub- 
stantial Export-Import Bank credits — credits 
which are designed to stimulate U.S. exports. 
It has also made emigration a condition of 
granting most-favored-nation treatment to 
Soviet exports to the United States — treat- 
ment which 100 other countries get. Evei-y 
economic tool at our disposal is a potential 
asset in both our political and our economic 
relationship with the U.S.S.R. It is a mis- 
fortune that, even for the best of motives, we 
have denied ourselves the use of such tools. 

Bilateral Cooperation Programs 

Other aspects of our bilateral cooperation 
with the Soviet Union, principally the 11 
bilateral cooperation agreements we signed 
at summit meetings, also have a long-term 
puiTJose from the U.S. point of view. The idea 
is to create patterns of cooperation in a 
society which for hundreds of years has been 
suspicious of, and resistant to. Western in- 
fluences. We are not sanguine about sweeping 
early results, but the process seems to us a 
useful one as long as its importance is not 
exaggerated. We now have over 150 joint 
projects underway with the Soviets — on 
space, health, energy, environment, transpor- 
tation, and many other problems. 

It is sometimes argued that in strictly 
technological terms the Soviets are benefit- 
ing more from these agreements than we are. 
Obviously it is impossible to draw an overall 
balance sheet. But we carefully vet every 

April 5, 1976 


project to make sure it does not involve the 
export of U.S. goods or technology which 
could make a significant contribution to 
Soviet military potential in a way detrimental 
to our national security. And remember that 
the Soviets made the major military break- 
throughs of the 1940's and 1950's, which I 
have already described, at a time when there 
was virtually no trade or technological ex- 
change with the West. 

Moreover, we ourselves are gaining a great 
deal from these programs. For example, in 
the field of energy, which is of such concern 
in the United States, the Soviets are doing 
important work in developing efficient ways to 
burn conventional fossil fuels; to transmit 
electricity over long distances; and to use, by 
way of controlled thermonuclear fusion, 
heavy hydrogen — of which there is a plenti- 
ful supply in ordinary water — to generate 
electric power. The United States is plugged 
into all of these developments through our 
joint agreements on energy and on atomic 

The Guatemala tragedy has reminded us of 
the destructive dangers of earthquakes. The 
Soviets are ahead of us in the theory of 
earthquake prediction ; using Soviet expertise 
available through the environmental agree- 
ment, we were able to predict earthquakes 
in New York State and California in 1974. 

I don't need, in Houston, to recall for you 
the Apollo-Soyuz program. You may be in- 
terested to know that, also under the space 
agreement, the Soviets have provided us with 
pictures of Mars, taken by their orbiting 
satellites, which will help us to select alter- 
nate landing sites for our own Viking space- 
craft when it lands on Mars this July. 

F'inally, in De Bakey country, it's surely 
superfluous to mention the sophisticated 
work the Soviets are doing, pai'alleling ours, 
on artificial hearts and the cooperative eff"ort 
which Dr. De Bakey himself is leading under 
the heart agreement. 

These are long-range programs of bilateral 
cooperation whose effectiveness as an element 
for political restraint will develop only over 
time. Of course we have it in our power to 
suspend or cancel them at any moment, and 

in any case the Soviet Union certainly knows 
that the programs would not survive a period 
of intense hostility. But, considering their 
long-term purposes and possibilities from the 
point of view of U.S. interests, we would 
certainly want to weigh the pros and cons 
carefully before we tried to use them to 
advance shortrun or immediate goals. 

Areas of Possible Political Confrontation 

I come now to the third aspect of our 
relationship with the Soviet Union, and the 
most difficult to assess. It is our relationship 
with Moscow in areas of possible political 
confrontation. At the Moscow summit of 1972 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. pledged 
to do all they could to keep situations from 
arising which would increase international 
tensions and pledged not to seek unilateral 
advantage at the expense of one another. 

We could not expect Moscow to set aside 
immediately and completely its radically dif- 
ferent concept of the world, its global policies 
which are often in conflict with ours, or its 
ideology. But we can expect the Soviets to 
initiate a process of moderating their inter- 
national conduct, and we can expect to use 
our broadening relationship with them to 
offer rewards for moderation and exact pen- 
alties for aggressive behavior. Realistically, 
progress will only be slow. But we have made 
clear to the Soviets one overriding reality: 
that the American people could not support 
a long-term cooperative relationship with the 
Soviet Union if it did not employ restraint 
in its international behavior. 

The Soviet record has been mixed. A large 
plus was the Berlin Agreement, which was 
negotiated in 1971 before the first Moscow 
summit and came into force in 1972, just 
after it. Many of you do not remember the 
attempt by Stalin in the 1940's to starve out 
the people of West Berlin by closing the ac- 
cess routes across East Germany and the 
threats by Khrushchev in the 1950's and 
1960's to turn West Berlin and its 2 million 
free citizens over to the Communist rule of 
Walter Ulbricht's East Germany. Those of 
us who do remember those crises know how 


Department of State Bulletin 

close we may have come to war over Berlin. 

Today Berlin is no longer a flashpoint of 
East-West tension. The four-power agree- 
ment commits the Soviet Union to see that 
traffic along the access routes from West 
Germany to West Berlin is unimpeded and 
even facilitated and that the ties between 
West Germany and West Berlin are main- 
tained and developed. Since the signing of 
the agreement, there has not been a major 
incident on the access routes. 

The Middle East, another major potential 
area of U.S.-Soviet confrontation, illustrates 
clearly the need for a U.S. policy of carrot 
and stick. During the Middle East war of 
October 1973, the Soviet Union put three 
of its divisions in Eastern Europe on airborne 
alert — potentially for use in the conflict area 
— and then informed us that it might send 
Soviet troops unilaterally into the Middle 
East. We felt we had to make a strong re- 
sponse, considering the potential conse- 
quences for peace of the intrusion of Soviet 
troops for the first time in the Middle East. 
Our own alert, which was criticized at the 
time as overreaction, seems to me entirely 
justified. As it happened, no Soviet troops 
were sent. 

But it has been necessary to mix firmness 
with restraint. We could not have ended 
Soviet influence in the Middle East had we 
wanted to. It has genuine interests in the 
area, as do we, and a close relationship— 
:hough a rather unstable one — with a number 
Df Arab countries and movements. We have 
therefore encouraged the Soviets to use their 
ties in the area to assist the political process, 
)r at least not to impede it. In 1974 and 1975, 
when the United States took the lead in me- 
iiating negotiations between the Israelis and 
the Arabs, the Soviets, though not having a 
lirect role in that process, accepted the proc- 
ess with relatively good grace. 

I don't want to turn this into a catalogue 
rf trouble spots, but I do want to say a word 
about Angola. Here the major issue was the 
intrusion of massive Soviet power into an 
area remote both from Soviet borders and 
,Soviet interests. The 200 million dollars' 
worth of military equipment which the 

April 5, 1976 

Soviets have provided the MPLA [Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in 
the past year exceeds all the other military 
equipment supplied by all parties to all of 
sub-Saharan Africa in the previous year. The 
Soviets and their Cuban cohorts were clearly 
the interventionists, mixing in the tensions 
of southern Africa directly in the face of the 
Organization of African Unity's declared op- 
position to foreign interference. We felt we 
had to respond, and we wanted to do so where 
it would have the most effect — directly on 
the ground, not through denial of grain or 
other such indirect measures which would 
be both ineffective and disproportionately 
costly to our own interests. 

Our failure to win congressional support 
for this action could set an unfortunate prec- 
edent. I don't argue that we should neces- 
sarily try to contain the Soviets automat- 
ically at every place on the globe where 
they choose to press. But we must make 
clear to them — and actions speak louder than 
words — that they cannot expect to use their 
power with impunity to seek unilateral ad- 
vantage. This is a challenge which will face 
future American Administrations. And they 
will need the understanding and support of 
the American people and Congress, just as 
this Administration does. 

Think for a moment of how secure we 
in America, and our friends in Western 
Europe, would feel if the Soviets felt that 
they could push their power outward with- 
out any risk of resistance. In my view, a 
policy of moderating Soviet behavior and 
lessening the dangers of conflict must include 
a readiness to let the Soviets know that we 
have the means and the will to protect our 
interests anywhere in the world. 

Human Rights and Human Values 

Before ending, I want to say a word about 
the role human rights and human values 
play in our relationship to the Soviet Union. 
Let me begin by asserting that Americans 
are never likely to be indifferent to the way 
another country treats its own people. To the 
extent our revolution and our history stand 


for something in the world, we will remain 
concerned about the human condition every- 
where. That is how we are built. Our Declara- 
tion of Independence pledges a "decent re- 
spect to the opinions of mankind," and we 
tend to subject other countries to the same 
scrutiny which we have received, and wel- 
comed, ourselves. We are an open society in 
an increasingly open world. 

The Soviet regime consistently asserts 
that, whatever the state of our bilateral re- 
lations, the ideological struggle will continue. 
I believe that Americans have nothing to fear 
from such a struggle. For, while we don't 
have — and don't want — an ideology, the 
power of the ideas expressed in our Declara- 
tion of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of 
Rights is far stronger and more durable than 
the doctrines of Lenin or the thoughts of 
Mao. So our answer to the Soviets is: "Let 
the struggle of ideas go on; we will continue 
to let your ideas into our country and we 
challenge you to let our ideas into yours." 

Realistically, however, we can expect at 
best only slow and meager progress from 
the Soviet Union in this area. Ever since the 
16th century, foreign travelers to Russia 
have noted and described the degree to which 
individual rights have been subordinated to 
the all-powerful interests of the state. There 
is nothing distinctly Soviet about this ap- 
proach to government and society. It is pro- 
foundly Russian. And the forces for change 
are contending with half a millennium of 
Russian tradition. 

This means, it seems to me, that we must 
put the greatest weight of our policies on 
objectives where we can have a real effect, 
such as advancing our security interests and 
moderating Soviet international behavior. In 
areas which the Soviets assert to be their 
internal affair, we must do what we can — but 
in the sober realization that our efforts will 
meet stubborn resistance, even to the point 
of being counterproductive if pushed too far 
too fast. 

Let me cite an example. In a significant 
incident, the American Congress called on the 
Administration to severely restrict the U.S. 
trading relationship with the Russian Gov- 


ernment because of the way that government 
treated Jews. The vote was almost unani- 
mous. The one Congressman who voted 
against the legislation complained that such 
pressure would not benefit the Jews and 
would harm American business. 

I have not just described the passage by 
Congress in 1974 of legislation to tie the 
U.S.-Soviet trading relationship to Soviet 
emigration policy; I have described a resolu- 
tion passed by the House of Representatives 
in 1911 to terminate a bilateral trade treaty 
with the Russian Government of Czar Nicho- 
las II. The point — as drawn by our wisest 
expert on the Soviet Union, George Kennan, 
who has told this story in one of his books — 
is that some differences between Russia and 
the United States may never be reconciled. 

The modern counterpart of that story is 
perhaps even more poignant. In 1972 and 
1973, when there were strong behind-the- 
scenes pressures on the Soviet Union from 
the United States, Jewish emigration from 
the U.S.S.R. averaged 2,600-2,900 per month. 
In 1974, when the claim became more eX' 
plicit that congressional trade legislation was 
a potent tool to force internal changes in tht 
U.S.S.R., the rate dropped to 1,700 per month 
In 1975, following the passage of legislatior 
to restrict trade, the rate fell further, tc 
1,100 per month. Those figures tell the story 
By trying to force the Soviets to take action; 
— however important in moral terms — whicl 
they considered within their sovereign com 
petence, we repeated the mistake of 1911. 

If the lesson to be learned is that we can 
not expect overnight change from the Soviet; 
in the human rights field, it is nevertheles; 
also true that, besides the 1972 and 197J 
emigration figures, we have made some prog 
ress in other areas touching on humai 

I refer, for example, to the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe — thi 
so-called Helsinki Conference — which endec 
at summit level last July. Since this confer 
ence has been misunderstood by many in th< 
United States, let me take a minute to maki 
clear what it did and did not do. 

The Helsinki Conference — or CSCE, as wi 


Department of State Bulletii 

ureaucrats perversely call it — began as a 
oviet initiative in 1969 designed to con- 
rm the territorial and political status quo in 
lurope, which would mean confirming also 
oviet hegemony over its Eastern European 
eighbors. That is not how the conference 
ided, however. Indeed, for simply agreeing 
) go to the CSCE negotiation at all, the West 
icacted a price from the Soviets which al- 
?ady altered the status quo in Europe in 
uman terms. 

The price was the Berlin Agreement, 
hose conclusion NATO made a precondition 
) starting the CSCE talks. Apart from the 
uaranteed access I have already described, 
16 agreement made it possible for the people 
: West Berlin to make visits to East Berlin 
id East Germany, often to see relatives, 
'lends, former homes — something which the 
ast German government had not allowed 
lem to do before. Since the Berlin Agree- 
lent went into effect in June 1972, some 12 
illion visits have been made by West Berlin- 
's to East Berlin and East Germany through 
16 infamous Berlin Wall — a dramatic change 
■ the status quo and one with a direct effect 
I several million people whose isolation had 
«en one of the most tragic remnants of the 
Id war. 

Even when CSCE began, the Soviets found 
e ground had shifted under them. They 
id hoped for a fuzzy declaration that would 
eate a sense of euphoria in the West and 
nore the real reasons for division in Europe, 
stead, the NATO members, aided in certain 
stances by pressures from neutrals and 
en Eastern Europeans, introduced a list of 
solutions to promote freer contacts between 
oples in the Eastern and Western halves of 
nope and freer exchanges of ideas and in- 
rmation. The Soviets didn't want any of 
is, but in the end they had to take some of 

In the process of compromise, the West 
d not get all the Soviet concessions we 
inted. But we did get explicit Soviet ad- 
ission that Europe would not have to be 
:ked into a territorial status quo but that 
ontiers could be changed by peaceful means 
id by agreement. We did get the establish- 

ment of a principle that there should be freer 
East-West contacts. And we did get the 
Soviet Union to admit — for the first time 
ever — that its internal policies, and those of 
the Eastern European Communist countries, 
which affect those contacts are a legitimate 
subject for East-West discourse. 

I don't want to exaggerate the importance 
of CSCE. The conference will be significant 
only if its words are turned into actions. At 
the least, CSCE is part of a process of open- 
ing up the East to Western influences and 
views. Far from confirming the status quo, 
the Helsinki Conference is part of the proc- 
ess of looking to the future and laying the 
groundwork for the kind of contact between 
East and West in Europe which has positive 
implications not only for peace but also for 
human rights. Surely the United States has 
been right to engage in this process rather 
than revert to the physical and ideological 
barriers which have kept Europe divided for 
30 years. 

A Complex Relationship 

This, then, is an account of our complex 
relationship with the Soviet Union. In de- 
scribing it, I have not once used the word 
"detente." That word can only get in the way 
of understanding the problems involved. Let 
me conclude by summing up what our policy 
of improving relations with the Soviet Union 
is and what it is not: 

— It is not a luxury which we can choose to 
pursue or not pursue. It is a necessity 
brought about by the fact that the Soviet 
Union has become a superpower in military 

— It is not the pursuit of summit meetings 
or joint communiques or paper agreements. 
It is the pursuit of a long-term relationship 
with the Soviet Union which will reduce the 
threat of war. 

— It is not a profit-and-loss sheet in which 
a plus for one side is necessarily a minus for 
the other. It is a recognition that there must 
be a mutual U.S. and Soviet interest in the 
primary objectives of arms control agree- 

Jril 5, 1976 


ments and political restraints to make the 
world safer in a nuclear age. 

— It is not based on a pleasant atmosphere 
or good will or trust. It is based on a U.S. 
defense second to none, on the preservation 
of an equilibrium of power, and on verifiable 
agreements which must be in our national 

— It is not a matter of being tough for the 
sake of toughness or being soft for the sake 
of not offending Moscow. It is a necessary 
combination of incentives for Soviet restraint 
and penalties for Soviet aggression. 

— It is not a blind eye turned to human 
rights and liberties. It is a desire to advance 
those rights and liberties within the limits 
of the possible and in the understanding that 
the major influence we can exert on the 
Soviet Union is in moderating its inter- 
national, not its internal, behavior. 

— It is, finally, not a short-term or a parti- 
san policy. It is, and must be, a national 
policy which will have to continue for a gen- 
eration or longer — for as long, in fact, as 
the Soviet Union remains a military great 

The problem of the Soviet Union, then, is 
a problem for all of us and will be a problem 
for a long time to come. I, for one, am con- 
fident that we can manage it successfully, 
though perhaps it will never be really solved. 
As Secretary Kissinger has said : " 

We have a design and the material assets to deal 
with the Soviet Union. We will succeed if we move 
forward as a united people. 

In the final analysis, the conduct of our 
relationship with the Soviet Union depends 
upon the support of the American people — 
upon your support. I have described tonight 
a policy which I believe is worthy of that sup- 
port. The choices, now and in the future, will 
be yours. 

' For Secretary Kissinger's address at San Fran- 
cisco, Calif., on Feb. 3, see Bulletin of Feb. 23, 
1976, p. 201. 

International Tin Agreement 
Signed by the United States 

Department Announcement ^ 

Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Ac 
ing Permanent Representative of the Unit€ 
States to the United Nations, signed t\ 
Fifth International Tin Agreement on beha 
of the United States on March 11. The sig] 
ing took place at the United Nations, whi( 
has been designated as the depository f< 
the agreement. The President plans to tran 
mit the agreement to the U.S. Senate for i 
advice and consent to ratification. 

The Fifth International Tin Agreement 
scheduled to come into force for a five-ye; 
period on July 1, 1976, and will replace tl 
Fourth International Tin Agreement, whic 
is scheduled to terminate on June 30, 197 
The United States was not a member of tl 
fourth or earlier tin agreements. Like i 
predecessors, the fifth agreement aims 
stabilize tin prices within limits agreed ( 
jointly by its producer and consumer cou 
try members by balancing tin supply wi 

Stability of tin prices is important both 
its producers, many of whom are developii 
countries that rely on tin exports in ord 
to finance economic development progran 
and to its consumers, for whom it is a vil 
industrial raw material used in the prodi 
tion of tinplate for food canning and for 
range of other products. 

Like the International Coffee Agreemei 
which we signed on February 27, the f 
agreement is another important element 
the program presented by Secretary Kissi 
ger at the seventh special session of t 
General Assembly. As the world's leadii 
consumer of tin, the United States looks fc 
ward to participating in the work of t 
International Tin Council, which admin; 
ters the agreement. 

'Issued on Mar. 11 (text from press release 121 


Department of State Bullet 


ie Role of the United States in the United Nations 

Statement by Samuel W. Lewis 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs 

I gx-eatly appreciate your invitation to ap- 
ar before this committee on behalf of the 
ministration to discuss U.S. pohcy toward 
i United Nations. 

We are passing through a time of turbu- 
ice in that organization, and these hear- 
:s can help all of us, public and Adminis- 
tion alike, to steer a firmer course. 
Consultation between the executive branch 
1 the Congress on U.N. matters is growing, 
i we welcome that trend. Within the last 
If year there has been a particularly close 
1 productive cooperation between mem- 
s of Congi-ess and the executive branch 
connection with U.S. participation in the 
tenth special session of the General As- 
ably, held last September, on the subject 
world economic cooperation. Several from 
3 committee and other interested mem- 
s of Congress met with Secretary Kissin- 

on several occasions during the months 
Dreparation, commented on our ideas, and 

foi'ward many creative suggestions of 
ir own. Many were reflected in the pro- 
als we put forward in New York. A large 
aber of Senators and Congressmen then 
lied our delegation at the session itself, 
Iticipating actively in the negotiations, 
"he seventh special session endorsed a 
fprehensive agenda for action by con- 
lus, a resolution which the United States 

'resented to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
i.tions on Mar. 18 (text from press release 134). 
complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
d by the committee and will be available from 
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
ting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

I 5, 1976 

was happy to support. We are convinced that 
the collaboration between the congressional 
and executive branches had a major bearing 
on the success of our efforts to shape the 
outcome. This example should surely provide 
the model for our efforts in future major 
U.N. endeavors. 

But we are equally aware of more worri- 
some trends. The regular session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly last fall was marked by high 
contention. The United States and some of 
its friends, particularly Israel, seemed to 
take it on the chin. Among other actions, a 
resolution was adopted which Americans fun- 
damentally i-eject, which they rightly believe 
to be a wholly unjustified distortion of basic 
truths — the resolution equating Zionism and 
racism. And other hostile resolutions were 
adopted in an atmosphere of confrontation — 
raising serious questions in the minds of 
many Americans about the United Nations 
itself and about the utility of U.S. participa- 
tion in its work. 

Indeed, throughout recent decades there 
have been large-scale changes in the politi- 
cal environment at the United Nations, espe- 
cially in the General Assembly. Originally, 
the organization consisted of about 50 coun- 
tries, most of which practiced a fairly polite 
brand of diplomacy — along 19th-century 
lines. Now, however, membership has ex- 
panded to nearly 150 with the addition of 
about 100 new nations. These countries share 
a deep dissatisfaction over the cards they 
were dealt when they became independent. 
They want to narrow the great gulf of eco- 
nomic inequality. They want a weightier po- 


litical role in the international state system. 
They are impatient, and many are eager to 
dramatize their causes even if this involves 
a disregai'd for traditional niceties of di- 
plomacy. Americans understandably are 
affronted when our country is attacked, or 
repeatedly outvoted, by small new nations 
whose independence we championed. 

At the same time, many Americans under- 
stand that global cooperation is more than 
ever essential to meet inescapable global 
problems. We are all increasingly aware that 
the interdependence of nations in both the 
economic and security spheres can have a 
direct effect on the lives of our citizens. 

The oil embargo that followed the last 
major Middle East conflict produced serious 
hardship in many countries, including our 
own. Many saw vividly for the first time the 
inescapable facts of economic interdepend- 
ence — that political decisions by other gov- 
ernments can damage America's prosperity, 
can impact on whether millions of Americans 
have jobs or suffer the economic and social 
hardships of unemployment, on whether our 
businesses and our economy grow and flour- 
ish, on whether or not our budget can read- 
ily sustain vital social, educational, and 
health programs. 

In addition to these pragmatic concerns, 
there is another factor which makes your 
current review particularly important. Our 
government was the chief architect of the 
U.N. system. We acted in the shadow of a 
global disaster whose incalculable cost had 
convinced men and women in every land that 
a new basis for global cooperation had to be 
established. Through all the disappointments 
and setbacks of the past 30 years, we have 
remained among the chief supporters of con- 
structive and innovative work within the 
U.N. system. This is because, as President 
Ford has said: - 

The United States retains the idealism that made 
us the driving force behind the creation of the 
United Nations over three decades ago as a world- 
wide system to promote peace and progress. 

Any assessment of the role of the United 
States in the United Nations must therefore 
take into account not merely the issues of 


the moment but our fundamental interes 
and the basic ideals of the American peop 

Moreover, it is essential that we view o 
role in the United Nations as an integi 
part of our overall foreign policy, not as 
separate segment. The United States see 
on many fronts to build an international sj 
tern congenial to the pursuit of our natior 
foreign policy goals. Our participation in t 
United Nations represents only one part 
although certainly an important part- 
that larger effort. 

If this central point is accepted, it mea 
that we can approach the United Nations 
a practical way. We should ask ourselves: 

• — Not whether the United Nations c 
solve all of the world's evils, but whether 
can contribute significantly to the achic 
ment of American purposes. 

— Not whether the United States can v 
every dispute in the United Nations, I 
whether through firm, imaginative, and 
tient participation we can help the Unil 
Nations to play its role in building a wo 
order in which all countries, rich and po 
new and old, feel a genuine stake. 

To help find answers to these fundamen 
questions, I would like today to review h 
we see U.S. interests in the U.N. system 
a whole; second, how the General Assem 
fits into this picture ; third, where we sti 
now in our effort to encourage more resp 
sible participation in the United Nations 
other states ; fourth, what future course 
would be in our interest to follow ; and lasi 
what paths we should avoid if we are to p 
tect our basic interests. 

The Nature of the U.N. System 

The United Nations is often seen as 
simple, single entity. As a consequence, si 
plistic judgments too often affirm that 
United Nations is either good or bad, gett: 

' For President Ford's remarks on Mar. 15 at 
swearing-in of William Scranton as U.S. Represei 
tive to the United Nations, see Weekly Compila' 
of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 22, 1976! 

Department of State Bull* 

9 rse or better, in the U.S. interest or con- 

]j xy to it. 

1 The U.N. system, however, is composed of 
vast array of institutions embracing an 

ii tremely wide spectrum of activities. It in- 
des bodies of nearly universal member 
ip and relatively small subgroups. It 
ludes specialized agencies handling the 
ulation of daily international intercourse 
technical fields like shipping, aviation, 
nmunications, finance. It includes bodies 
rking on highly political security issues 
i others wrestling with the complexities 
international economic policy. It includes 
fans which funnel development and hu- 
^nitarian aid to many countries. Within 
.ny of these institutions there are different 
)es of subbodies — conferences, executive 
irds, expert groups. Clearly, regarding this 
ige of activities, no single, simple judg- 
nt of success or failure can be made. 
; believe, however, it may assist in our re- 
w to consider U.N. activities in two broad 
leres : First, those relating directly to the 
intenance of international peace and se- 
ity and, second, those relating to eco- 
mic and social cooperation, 
lln the security area, the United Nations, 
i the Security Council in particular, has 
de vital contributions to maintaining 
rid peace. Let me illustrate by recalling 
ent peacekeeping efforts in the Middle 


During the fourth Arab-Israeli war in 
73, our efforts to achieve a cease-fire and 
jid dangerous escalation of the conflict 
countered enormous difficulties. In the ne- 
tiations it became clear that disengage- 
int between the opposing forces would de- 
nd upon the availability of an independent, 
ipartial organization that could provide 
Beekeeping forces and observe compliance 
Ith the disengagement plan. This was an 
^rnent regarded as indispensable by all 
les. The United Nations provided that 
lispensable element. 

This experience, incidentally, underscores 
sey point in any overall assessment regard- 
g the value of the United Nations. It would 
completely misleading to attempt to tally 
apparent successes and failures within 

the U.N. system and then draw a 
conclusion based on a comparison of the 
totals as if all of these events were of rough- 
ly equal importance. In fact, they are not. 

The U.N. operations in the Middle East 
were an essential ingredient in terminating 
the fourth Arab-Israeli war. We all know 
that the conflict, had it continued, would not 
only have deepened the misery within the 
area, but it would have gravely jeopardized 
world peace. No one can be certain that an- 
other world war including the United States 
would not ultimately have ensued. The 
United Nations performed a role of incalcu- 
lable importance to the United States. 

The United Nations continues to play such 
a role. The mandates of the U.N. forces both 
in Sinai and on the Golan Heights have been 
extended. These forces remain integral ele- 
ments in preserving options for negotiations 
toward a just and lasting peace. 

As Secretary of State Kissinger recently 
said : ^ 

If this organization had no other accomplishment 
than its effective peacekeeping role in this troubled 
area, it would have well justified itself. 

In other areas of political tension, the 
Security Council has also played an impor- 
tant role. It has served increasingly as one 
of the mechanisms through which a growing 
crisis may be defused or negotiated or at 
least kept from erupting. On a number of 
occasions, it has permitted a government 
being pressed toward a military reaction or 
intransigence to allay such pressures by tak- 
ing the issue to the Council. This was true, 
for example, of a number of the sessions de- 
voted to Cyprus, to the Spanish Sahara, to 
Djibouti, and to Iceland as well. In Cyprus, 
a peacekeeping force has been deployed at 
the direction of the Council since 1964. The 
Force, in addition to patrolling the lines of 
confrontation, has contributed to the satis- 
faction of humanitarian needs. 

The Security Council continues to be occu- 

' For Secretary Kissinger's address before the U.N. 
General Assembly on Sept. 22, 1975, see Bulletin 
of Oct. 13, 1975, p. 545. 

)ril 5, 1976 


pied with important business, including the 
problems of southern Africa and the thorny 
Middle East dispute. Although inevitably 
there will be conflicting viewpoints, we find 
that the Council has been conducting its pro- 
ceedings in a serious and responsible atmos- 
phere, employing relatively new informal 
procedures which reduce somewhat the 
temptation for delegates to play to world 
propaganda galleries. 

The Security Council will continue to be 
available in the event of unforeseen crises — 
ready to meet at all times and at a moment's 
notice. Its constant availability provides an 
appropriate check against efforts by other 
bodies to issue recommendations bearing on 
security matters. Since the charter has as- 
signed the Council primary responsibility in 
the area of peace and security, recommenda- 
tions of other bodies remain only that. It is 
only the Council — in which the United States 
retains its veto — which can take binding 

Let me turn now to the U.N.'s activities 
affecting international economic and social 
cooperation. This is a vast realm involving 
both the conduct of day-to-day work in regu- 
lating the world's continuing business and 
also the development of goals and concrete 
programs regarding global problems of eco- 
nomic interdependence, as at the seventh 
special session. 

I would like first to sketch several exam- 
ples of continuing day-to-day business within 
the U.N. system which are of intrinsic im- 
portance to our citizens : 

The International Civil Aviation Organi- 
zation, for example, helps to set and main- 
tain high standards for international air 
transportation. Needless to say, for our citi- 
zens, who probably use international air 
transportation more than the citizens of any 
other country in the world, international co- 
operation in improving safety and efficiency 
is of vital, direct importance. And the stand- 
ards developed by the ICAO will assist many 
countries to take measures that can lessen 
the occurrence of aircraft hijacking. 

For many years the World Health Organi- 

zation has worked patiently and with detf 
mination to rid the world of the highly cc 
tagious and age-old disease smallpox. The 
endeavors have been outstandingly succej 
ful. The WHO also maintains a worldwi 
alert system to warn governments of t 
outbreak of serious contagious diseases an 
where in the world, and this activity 
clearly of great value to our own health o1 
cials and to Americans — millions of them 
who travel abroad. 

The Food and Agriculture Organizati 
maintains programs which directly less 
the threat of introduction into the Unit 
States of foreign plant and animal diseas 
and pests. This organization has establish 
a progi-am in which over 100 countries pj 
ticipate to maintain internationally accept 
food standards. The United States, as 
major food exporter and importer, direcl 
benefits, not only because international tra 
is facilitated, but also because the heal 
and safety of Americans is better protects 
Moreover, new research programs sponsor 
by the FAO are expected to improve t 
varieties of our food crops. 

Several bodies within the U.N. system ai. 
encouraging programs to control productii' 
of opium and other dangerous drugs and 
curtail international drug trafficking. The^ 
efforts largely respond to priorities we ha 
urged, and they are of undoubted benefit 
the overall U.S. effort to counter drug abu 
among our citizens. 

The International Monetary Fund, anoth 
organization within the U.N. system, pla 
an indispensable role in promoting intern 
tional monetary cooperation, facilitating i 
ternational trade and finance, and promt 
ing world economic stability. These are are 
in which our own country has huge interes 
which would be diflficult to exaggerate. 

A little known body within the U.N. sy 
tern is the U.N. Disaster Relief Office, 
helps to coordinate assistance from mai 
parts of the world when a country has bei 
overwhelmed by natural disaster. 

The International Atomic Energy Agem 
plays an indispensable role in the effort 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Tl 


Department of State Bullet 

igency is responsible for establishing safe- 
Liards standards and carrying out interna- 
onal inspections to insure that nuclear ma- 
rials are not being transferred from peace- 
il uses to weapons uses. 
The World Meteorological Organization 
aintains a World Weather Watch — a global 
jtwork of meteorological stations collecting 
id exchanging weather information on a 
intinuous basis. This program has made 
)ssible improved forecasts for U.S. passen- 
;r jets crossing the Atlantic and the Pacific, 
has also enabled more accurate forecasts 
hurricanes originating in the Caribbean 
hich affect the eastern half of the United 
-ates. Large-scale research programs coor- 
nated by this U.N. body will improve our 
iderstanding of climate changes which are 
ndamental to agricultural and economic 

The Intergovernmental Maritime Consul- 
ttive Organization is developing standards 
nich nations are generally following to pre- 
int pollution of the seas. This organization's 
i)rk in the field of safety at sea has long 
len recognized as of the highest value to 
countries whose ships and peoples travel 
le oceans. 

This list of examples could be extended al- 
ost indefinitely. I have mentioned only a 
w to illustrate the range of work being 
ne within the U.N. system today which 
"ects directly the interests and concerns 
our citizens. 

I have already referred to last September's 

\^enth special session of the General As- 

mbly on world economic cooperation. At 

at session our government presented a 

mprehensive set of proposals which i-e- 

llted in the adoption of a wide-ranging 

lactical program for improving economic 

operation between the developing countries 

Id the industrial world. 

trhe important point to bear in mind about 

e special session is that it provided an 

tportunity for us to see whether it was pos- 

S)le to fashion approaches to current eco- 

tmic problems which would be in the mu- 

t'll interest of all countries. I cannot stress 

this point too strongly. What the U.S. Gov- 
ernment was proposing at the special session 
was a nonideological approach to problems 
of economic interdependence, based on con- 
crete steps of benefit to poor countries and 
rich countries alike. We found an overwhelm- 
ing majority of governments in the Third 
and Fourth Worlds ready to try this path 
with us. 

Since September, we have been vigorously 
following up on our special session proposals. 
At meetings of the International Monetary 
Fund in Jamaica two months ago, the 
United States took the lead in achieving 
adoption of measures to stabilize the earn- 
ings of developing countries and to help meet 
the severe balance-of-payments problems 
which many of them are experiencing. We 
have gotten well underway in the North- 
South dialogue at the Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation taking place in 
Paris. At the multilateral trade negotiations 
in Geneva, we are vigorously promoting our 
special session proposals. And in anticipation 
of the fourth UNCTAD, the U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development in May of this 
year, the Department of State is working 
intensively on further practical proposals to 
implement more of the broad negotiating 
agenda adopted at the special session. 

Let me conclude this part of my statement 
with this observation: As we build on the 
program begun at the seventh special ses- 
sion, we will not merely be assisting the less 
fortunate ; we will be helping to create 
healthier conditions throughout the world 
which provide more opportunities for Ameri- 
can business. The long-term results will cre- 
ate more jobs for American workers and also 
lessen the danger of raw material scarcities 
which can fuel a worldwide inflation that 
would erode the real income of consumers in 
the United States and throughout the de- 
veloped world. 

It is easy for most Americans to agree 
that bodies like the World Health Organi- 
zation or the Security Council are indispen- 
sable and continue to merit full American 
support. But many question the usefulness 
of the General Assembly or other parts of 

/ ril 5, 1976 


the U.N. system whose utility is less obvi- 
ous ; they are prone to call on our govern- 
ment to cease participating or to reduce our 
financial support. 

This issue has recently arisen with re- 
spect to the General Assembly because of 
parliamentary abuses which have taken place 
there and because that body has recently 
taken a number of irresponsible actions — 
such as passage of the resolution equating 
Zionism and racism. The question is a valid 
one. But in order to answer it, we must first 
take a careful look at the overall activity of 
the General Assembly to see how it fits with 
other activities of the United Nations and 
how American interests are affected by its 

The Role of the General Assembly 

The General Assembly is the central body 
of the United Nations. It considers and dis- 
poses of certain subjects which are dealt 
with nowhere else in the U.N. system, but it 
also provides guidance and coordination for 
many activities handled by specialized and 
technical bodies. Moreover, many of the ac- 
tivities of the United Nations which we 
strongly support are financed through deci- 
sions taken by the General Assembly. 

The best way for me to explain the As- 
sembly's role might be to provide a series of 
illustrations showing the interconnection 
between the General Assembly and other 
activities : 

Support for Middle East peacekeeping 
operations. Peacekeeping operations in the 
Middle East and elsewhere have been fi- 
nanced in accordance with decisions of the 
General Assembly. While the members of 
the Security Council take policy decisions 
which set the basic lines of action, all U.N. 
members have a responsibility to contribute 
to the costs. All members jointly determine 
the amount and apportionment of the as- 
sessed expenses and in fact have done so 
through the General Assembly. Needless to 
say, the essential peacekeeping operations in 
the Middle East could not be carried out 
unless there were successful cooperation in 

determining how to pay for the troops, su] 
plies, and other burdens inherent in the.- 
large operations. We are pleased that a pa 
tern of cooperation in providing financi 
support for Middle East peacekeeping hs 
continued within the General Assembly. 

Consideration of security issues. It is oftt 
thought that security issues are dealt wi1 
seriously only within the Security Counc 
This is not so. Many of the most importai 
security issues of significance to the Unit( 
States have been considered by both the S 
curity Council and the General Assemb 
and there is unavoidable interaction betwet 
the two bodies. This has, for example, be« 
the case with the Middle East, with Kore 
and with Cyprus. In the latter case, the Ge 
eral Assembly has adopted resolutions whii 
the United States considered moderate ai 
constructive and which have had a direct i 
fluence in stimulating talks between t! 
Greek and Turkish communities. It is encoi; 
aging that talks have recently resumed und 
the auspices of the Secretary General, who 
pursuing his mission with skill and dedic 
tion. I should also mention in passing that t 
Security Council and the General Assemt 
are further interconnected because it is t 
General Assembly which elects the nonpt 
manent members of the Security Council. 

Promotion of economic and social coope', 
tion. Within the United Nations, the Gene: 
Assembly has not merely a partial role, 1: 
a predominant one. I have already cited t 
seventh special session of the Assembly 
world economic cooperation. A meeting 
that sort could only have taken place in t 
General Assembly. It will be the Gene: 
Assembly and some of its subsidiary bodi 
the Second Committee and the Economic a 
Social Council, which will monitor implem( 
tation of many of the concrete measures 1 
economic cooperation which the Unit 
States has proposed. 

U.N. involvement in international dr 
control. As the result of a U.S. initiative, f 
General Assembly adopted in 1970 a reso 
tion authorizing establishment of the U. 
Fund for Drug Abuse Control. The technii 
and executing personnel for many of t 


Department of State Bulk 

Ajects financed by the Fund come from the 

jpision of Narcotic Drugs, part of the U.N. 

Jretariat, which is supported by the budget 

the United Nations as voted by the Gen- 

)\ Assembly. The Fund's most important 

jiject has been its assistance to Turkey in 

tiiiir up strict controls over its poppy pro- 

tinn. It was not so long ago that it was 

It'll that heroin from Turkish opium 

once again appear on the streets of 

lean cities. In 1975 the Fund-supported 

sh program prevented this from hap- 

II iiiR. Today the Fund is helping the Turk- 

s| Government to make this success per- 


7(r General Assembly is also responsible 

ippnrting unprecedented diplomatic ef- 

hi achieve international agreement at a 

e't'K of U.N. conferences on the laiv of the 

( I think it is broadly recognized that the 

' ted States must persevere, no matter how 

1 the task, in working out with other 

oatries fair, sound, and effective rules to 

tein this enormous sector of our planet. 

Id peace and security are at stake, as is 

future rational and peaceful exploitation 

: he resources of the oceans and the sea- 

)f 5. The third major session of the confer- 

■ is now underway in New York, and we 

hopeful that a comprehensive oceans 

■ ty may soon be in sight. 

hf U.N. Fund for Poptdation Activities is 

I -her activity directly connected with the 

I eral Assembly. Many members of the 

kgress and public have been deeply con- 

e led with the difficult dilemma of trying to 

a;e meaningful gains through development 

s stance when population growth outstrips 

: lomic growth. The U.N. Fund for Popu- 

>ii Activities is supporting important 

lets that help countries to slow down 

'isive population growth rates. The 

li's connection with the General Assem- 

is very direct. Several years ago the 

eral Assembly debated and adopted a 

Id plan of action on this subject — a 

i;or step forward for the nations of the 

Id. This General Assembly action pro- 

s a fundamental framework and impetus 

all population control activities, includ- 

ing particularly those of the U.N. Fund. 

The U.N. Environment Program is a crea- 
ture of the General Assembly, having been 
established by a resolution of the Assembly 
in 1972, and the budget of the United Na- 
tions contributes to its work. Since the 
U.N.'s Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment, the United States has at- 
tached great importance to the mounting of 
a major U.N. program to begin the work 
necessary to reverse worldwide deteriora- 
tion of the human environment. A concerted 
worldwide program can only be realized 
within the U.N. system, and the Assembly 
has taken the essential steps to launch and 
support this effort. 

The General Assembly has also recently 
played a constructive role in planning world- 
wide cooperative efforts to cope ivith inter- 
national food problems. The Assembly de- 
cided, as a result of a U.S. initiative, to con- 
vene a World Food Conference. Held in 
November 1974, the conference was gener- 
ally successful. Among many other actions, 
the conference led to the formation of the 
World Food Council, which reports to the 
General Assembly. World food problems 
clearly are of central importance to the 
United States, both for humanitarian rea- 
sons and because they have direct impact on 
our own economic well-being. 

The U.N. Disaster Relief Office, to which 
I earlier referred, is another activity guided 
and supported by the General Assembly. We 
believe that the worldwide coordination ef- 
forts of this organization can save the 
American Government, and thus the Ameri- 
can taxpayer, significant sums by helping 
to avoid overlapping or duplicative disaster 
relief efforts. The United States has always 
responded generously when other countries 
are struck by natural disaster, as recently 
occurred in Guatemala. I am sure that we 
will continue to do so. The functioning of 
the U.N.'s disaster relief coordination efl^ort 
is of real practical value to the United 

Finally, the General Assembly also serves 
as the only truly global forum for promoting 
disarmament agreements which are in our 

v^l 5, 1976 


interests and the broad interests of all other 
nations. Certain negotiations, like the Stra- 
tegic Arms Limitation Talks, must of course 
be carried out by the nations most directly 
involved, the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
But there are other vital disarmament areas, 
like the current effort to control forms of 
wai'fare based upon manipulation of man's 
environment, which should merit wide inter- 
national support and participation. The 
General Assembly has recently discussed a 
draft agreement proposed by the United 
States. The Assembly's activities are a nec- 
essary part of the process of achieving 
broad international support for a sound 

There is another aspect of the General 
Assembly which I have not so far discussed. 
That is its role as a universal forum to de- 
bate basic viewpoints, to develop consensus 
when this is possible, and to register honest 

We must expect to encounter serious dif- 
ferences in point of view among the nearly 
150 countries that comprise the United Na- 
tions. These differences do not derive pri- 
marily from hostility to the United States, 
though hostility is sometimes a factor. More 
often they reflect the diversity of interests 
among countries widely differing in geogra- 
phy, state of development, and historical 
background. Amid such diversity, the United 
States will not always have its way, and 
indeed it should not expect to. What is im- 
portant is that countries pursue their dif- 
ferences in a spirit of mutual respect and 
that they still attempt, to the greatest ex- 
tent possible, to agree on concrete measures 
from which there can be common gain. 

Obviously, these precepts have not always 
been followed and there have been recent 
instances when countries have gone beyond 
the bounds of vigorous, constructive debate 
and have attempted to establish by "parlia- 
mentary victories" doctrines which a sub- 
stantial part of the world cannot accept. 

But even where there is sharp conflict, it 
is important that all of us keep in mind this 
fundamental aspect of the United Nations: 
It is not some abstract entity called the 

United Nations which is responsible for c 
agreements or irresponsible and confron 
tional acts ; it is individual countries act 
through their representatives which m^ 
decisions about what should be propos 
supported, or opposed at the United Natio 
In this sense the United Nations is bul 
mirror of the attitudes of governme: 
throughout the world. 

Certainly any parliamentary body can c 
tort the reflection of the real views of th 
represented. For example, there is no dot 
that in many representational bodies, 
eluding the United Nations, the extent 
support for or opposition to a particular p 
posal is often aft'ected by old-fashioned "1 
rolling" or by whether a particular rep 
sentative desires to build personal supp 
for an elected oflice in the body. In gene: 
however, the opinions and concerns of g( 
ernments are mirrored in the actions of tW 
U.N. representatives. 

Let us keep one point firmly in mind: 1 
United States does not fear vigorous debs 
When widespread disagreement about an 
portant issue exists, it is in our interest t 
it be exposed and debated. The reality 
differing viewpoints, differing objectives, 
not go away simply because countries r 
find it expedient in one forum or anothei 
hold back in expressing their opinions. i 
discussion of differing viewpoints is an es^ ■ 
tial first step toward making progress i 
understanding the full dimensions of a pi ■ 
lem, the interests at stake, and in identify ', 
and enlarging on those areas where tli ; 
may be common ground. 

This does not mean that we welcome r 
enjoy hostile or exaggerated attacks. W i 
debate is carried on in an irresponsible fa ■ 
ion, positions can harden and the prospe 5 
for accommodation diminish. We will tht - 
fore work in every way to encourage seii' 
responsible debate, while forcefully rel - 
ting unwarranted attacks on our good nai ■ 
But the United States is a strong enoi i 
country, and our overall record of past c - 
structive achievements is impressive enou ■ 
that we need not shrink timidly from 2 
fray — even when the going gets pretty tou ■ 


Department of State Bull" 

here We Stand 

I have already discussed where we stand 

th respect to some of the main substantive 

hjects within the U.N. system. As I have 

lit ated, we believe the United Nations has 

iu\ and is continuing to do, responsible 

)rk in many areas relating to maintaining 

eniational peace and security. We also be- 

vo that the United Nations is doing essen- 

1 work on many economic and social issues. 

ihat I would like to focus on now is where 

v stand in our reinforced diplomatic efforts 

r encourage a greater degree of responsi- 

' ity and genuine cooperation among all 

c.intries in the United Nations. 

The United States has for some time been 

d tressed by what has seemed a growing 

t'nd toward confrontation within the U.N. 

- ^tem. We witnessed an acute example of 

. 3 confrontation nearly two years ago at 

t i sixth special session of the General As- 

snbly. Many less developed and nonaligned 

cantries seemed much more interested at 

it session in preserving an artificial bloc 

ty through which they could score "vic- 

ies" over the industrial world than in com- 

to grips with the real economic issues at 

s ke. We were distressed not solely because 

the negative political ramifications of this 

a itude but also because the practice of 

rnniing through "precooked," confronta- 

t nal resolutions would destroy all possibil- 

i' of practical cooperation. 

)ur concern led us to begin a sustained ef- 
f t to encourage a turning away from con- 
f ntation toward cooperation. The Secretary 
State made a series of major statements 
d 'ing 1975 in which he spelled out with ut- 
n st clarity that countries cannot have it 
b h ways : they cannot expect to challenge 
ai confront us in some arenas and then 
a:omatically expect our full cooperation in 
ers. And we did much more. We attempted 
t demonstrate, not only in conjunction with 
t.! Secretary's statements, but in numerous 
d'lomatic representations, that through the 
pictice of cooperation and conciliation, 
t 'ough the beginning of genuine dialogue, 
t ;re were concrete gains to be realized by 

Since confrontation seemed to have 
reached a peak at the sixth special session, 
we decided to focus special effort on our 
preparations for the seventh special session 
in September of last year. We viewed that 
session as a test case, to see whether coun- 
tries would negotiate rather than confront 
in the General Assembly when we ourselves 
made major efforts to present concrete action 

We believe this effort was a success, and I 
am pleased to say that this is not solely a 
view of the Administration but also one that 
has been expressed by the congressional 
group which participated in the special ses- 
sion. The congressional advisers reported 
that the session "marks a significant turning 
point in U.S. relations with the developing 
countries and sets the stage for a new era of 
economic partnership between rich and poor 
nations." They also said that the session 
"eases a decade of confrontation over how 
to narrow the widening gap in the distribu- 
tion and control of global resources." And 
they referred to "the success of the Seventh 
Special Session, in creating a positive dialog 
and an atmosphere of negotiation on North/ 
South issues." 

Shortly after these encouraging develop- 
ments were taking place, however, the Gen- 
eral Assembly was also the scene of some 
actions based on confrontation and political 
antagonism. One such action stood out at the 
last General Assembly — the resolution equat- 
ing Zionism and racism. It was a distressing 
and deplorable resolution which we know to 
be wholly unju.stified. Nonetheless, it is our 
duty, no matter how strongly we feel about 
that resolution, to assess it objectively: 

The first thing which needs to be said is 
that the resolution is not binding on us, or 
on any other member of the United Nations. 
Like most General Assembly resolutions, it 
is merely a recommendation. As Secretary 
Kissinger has said : "The United States will 
ignore this vote, pay no attention to it. ..." * 

' For questions and answers following Secretary 
Kissinger's address at Pittsburgh, Pa., on Nov. 12, 
1975, see Bulletin of Dec. 1, 1975, p. 765. 

^ril 5, 1976 


Second, we must recognize that, through- 
out this deplorable episode, some countries 
displayed objectivity and good sense. In other 
words, a substantial number of countries, in- 
cluding many from the Third World, refused 
to be bulldozed by the extremist leadership. 
This means that the extremists had no iron 
grip on all votes of the nonaligned. True, in 
the end the numerical vote went against us, 
but in the long run, it may be of more signifi- 
cance that bloc solidarity was fractured. 

Third, we must ask ourselves : What are 
the practical consequences of the Zionism 
resolution? Is it likely to lead to the exclu- 
sion of Israel from the General Assembly? 
It should be recalled that some U.N. members 
did try last year to begin an effort to exclude 
Israel. Fortunately the effort was thwarted, 
largely because many African and nonaligned 
countries did not support it. Some of the 
countries which were expulsion did, 
however, support the resolution equating 
Zionism and racism. They have said that they 
did so because they believed it represented a 
way to register a sti'ong protest regarding 
the Palestinian problem. We will, in any 
event, continue as we have in the past to 
resist with the utmost seriousness any un- 
constitutional exclusion of a member of the 
United Nations from General Assembly ac- 
tivities. Such an abuse of the charter would 
pose the gravest threat to the viability of the 
organization as a whole and call fundamen- 
tally into question continuing U.S. support 
and participation. 

Foi(rth, will there be other consequences 
of the Zionism resolution affecting the work 
of the United Nations ? Yes, there will be. Of 
most immediate significance, the Zionism 
resolution applies to other recently adopted 
resolutions relating to the Decade for Action 
To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimina- 
tion, which was launched in 1973. We there- 
fore decided not to participate in this activity. 
Recently we took concrete steps to imple- 
ment this policy. We instructed our repre- 
sentative at UNESCO [U.N. Educational. 
Scientific and Cultural Organization] to in- 
form the Director General that we would not 

participate in a meeting of experts to draft 
UNESCO declaration on racism. The meetii 
was postponed. 

U.S. Policy in the Future 

I would like now to discuss, in light of th 
review, what we in the Administration b 
lieve should be the American approach 
participation in the United Nations. I shj 
do so first in terms of the direct positi 
steps we think should be pursued in order 
advance American interests, and then I won 
like to outline some of the policies which 
believe it would be contrary or harmful 
American interests to adopt. 

First, the steps we intend to pursue: 

— The Administration intends to contin 
to support in an effective, vigorous, a 
tough-minded way all of those programs 
the United Nations which offer benefits 
the American people. As I think I have dei 
onstrated, there are programs and activiti 
of benefit throughout the entire system: 
the Security Council, in specialized agencii 
in many technical and ad hoc committees, a 
in the General Assembly itself. 

— We will continue selectively to refuse 
participate in U.N. activities which we 1 
lieve are fundamentally unsound or gros; 
irresponsible. An immediate consequence 
this approach is our decision, caused by i 
resolution equating Zionism and racism, r 
to participate in the Decade To Combat R; 
ism. We hope that our firm stand will gi 
many countries serious second thougl 
about the wisdom of letting a situation ( 
velop in which over the longer term th 
lose more than they gain. 

— On the diplomatic front, we have inten 
fied our efforts to impress on other govei 
ments that standards of cooperation a 
restraint largely prevalent in the conduct 
bilateral relations should also prevail 
multilateral relations. We are doing evei 
thing possible to counter the belief that ; 
tacks on the motivation and the basic go 
faith of the United States can be safely ai 


Department of State Bulk 

;,jxpensively delivered in international 
f urns. While we welcome honest and vigor- 
lis debate over issues, countries should not 
|i;lieve, without any concern for the conse- 
aences, that they can attack the vital inter- 
jits of the United States in belialf of some 
stract concept of group solidarity, particu- 
ly when their own national interests are 
t involved. When we see a consistent pat- 
n of hostility toward the United States, 
justified by any reasonable and honest 
Ferences of policy, we will consider whether 
jre are appropriate direct bilateral re- 
)nses that we should carry out. It will of 
irse continue to be our duty in any such 
ies to keep in mind the practical balance 
American national interests. 
—In meetings of international organiza- 
ns, and particularly in the General Assem- 
, we will continue to speak out firmly and 
'cefully in behalf of American interests, 
ere may be differences of judgment from 
ae to time on precisely how this may best 
done, but basically an approach of vigor 
1 candor on our part strengthens our par- 
^pation in the United Nations. Others will 
)w that we care more about the work of 
United Nations and about their opinions 
len we take the time and the trouble to 
Ifage ourselves in vigorous give-and-take, 
reover, it seems clear that such an ap- 
lach will be strongly supported by the 
lerican people and will be important for 
intaining the public's confidence in our 

—To strengthen our capacity to interrelate 

actively our multilateral and bilateral 

lomacy, the Department of State has 

can important new organizational steps. 

! have established within the Bureau of 

ernational Organization Affairs a new 

ice of Multilateral AflFairs, under the su- 

"vision of a Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

'.te. The basic responsibility of this office 

,0 work even more intensively than in the 

••t with our regional bureaus and our em- 

ji'.sies in order to achieve maximum possible 

i )port from other countries in pursuing 

sues of greatest concern to the United 

States. The overall thrust of this eflfort will 
be to increase our effectiveness in persuading 
others on the merits of the issues. There is a 
tremendous job to be done here. We need to 
approach governments early. We need to 
build up serious and frank dialogues with 
many countries which continue throughout 
the year. We need to frame our arguments 
in ways which are most meaningful to coun- 
tries with dissimilar backgrounds. In short, 
we need to use all opportunities, both in our 
bilateral and multilateral contacts, to per- 
suade — to build a climate of greater under- 

— In addition to these specific immediate 
actions, we are taking broader long-range 
actions to build up the capability of the per- 
sonnel of the Department of State and the 
Foreign Service to perform more effectively 
in advancing American interests in inter- 
national organizations. We are building up 
work on multilateral affairs as a specialty. 
To be sure that the best oflRcers are attracted 
to assignments in multilateral diplomacy, we 
are establishing new training programs and 
designating positions in our embassies to con- 
centrate on multilateral affairs problems on 
a year-round basis. The success of all of our 
efforts in multilateral affairs ultimately will 
depend to a large measure on the talents, 
skills, and training of our personnel. 

Let me discuss now certain courses of ac- 
tion which we do not think are in the 
American interest: 

First, withdratval from the United Nations 
as a whole. The President has made clear 
that the United States continues to support 
the United Nations. We believe that the or- 
ganization as a whole serves many important 
American interests. This option would hurt, 
not help, the United States. 

Second, cessation of our active participa- 
tion in the General Assembly. We do not be- 
lieve this is either a desirable or a practical 
course of action. There are many Assembly 
activities which are beneficial to us and 
many which are intertwined with vital activ- 
ities in other forums like the Security Coun- 

Hl 5, 1976 


cil. For us to cease our active participation 
in the Assembly's work would deprive us of 
an influential voice on such issues as: the 
funding and administration of peacekeeping 
operations ; the planning and shaping of im- 
portant international conferences, like the 
World Food Conference and the Law of the 
Sea Conference; the development of new 
international institutions like the Interna- 
tional Fund for Agricultural Development ; 
the formulation and approval of the U.N. 
budget, which supports such activities as 
international drug control and worldwide ef- 
forts to improve the environment. 

Third, reduction in the U.S. contribution to 
the U.N.'ti budget. This also would be a self- 
defeating course. We have a treaty obliga- 
tion to pay our assessed contribution to a 
U.N. budget properly adopted by its mem- 
bers. The Administration does not intend to 
disregard the treaty obligations of the 
United States, and we are certain the Con- 
gress would agree. But even if this funda- 
mental consideration were not present, it 
would still serve no practical purpose to re- 
duce unilaterally our contribution. There is no 
realistic way to prevent activities which we 
do not like as a result of such a reduction. 
The Soviet Union tried this course when it 
refused to pay its assessments for U.N. 
bonds required to relieve financial strains 
arising out of U.N. peacekeeping operations. 
The net result was not to stop the peace- 
keeping operations, but to place additional 
burdens on the funding of all activities cov- 
ered by the U.N. budget. We should not our- 
selves consider reductions which would only 
have the impact of making it harder to 
support the many activities which we feel 
are beneficial. I would note in passing that 
under the present assessment rates the 
United States is treated specially — and 
favorably. If the formula used for calculat- 
ing the dues of others — for example, the 
United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union — 
were applied strictly to the United States, 
we would pay more than the 25 percent we 
do now. A great many countries now con- 
tribute a larger share of their gross national 

product to the United Nations than does 
United States. 

Fourth, cutting off U.S. bilateral assista'i 
to all countries which supported the Zioni 
resolution or other resolutions which w^ 
egregiously irresponsible or hostile. We 
lieve that this type of shotgun approj 
would harm American interests. It would 
playing into the hands of extremist adv 
saries for us to lash out equally at all yt 
voted for the Zionism resolution, with( 
recognizing important differences in und 
lying situations and even some possible c 
ferences in motives. In short, our bilate 
programs serve a great many American 
terests and are carried out for a wide i 
complex variety of reasons. We should 
subordinate all of these American intere 
to a single vote, no matter how offensive, 
a recommendatory resolution which we 
many other members intend to disrega 

Fifth, reduction of U.S. support for mu 
lateral development assistance, especic 
through the U.N. Development Progri 
This also would be contrary to Ameri( 
interests. By cutting back on our own c 
tributions, we would be lessening sigi 
cantly the money available for many cl 
friends who benefit from UNDP progra 
In addition, we would be lessening the ass 
ance available to many of the poorest co 
tries, like the drought-stricken nations 
Africa. This dimension — that some aid is 
an essentially humanitarian character — ; 
argues against proposals to cut back on 
bilateral economic assistance. But there 
an even more fundamental point involv 
the calculation of U.S. interests. We do 
support UNDP as a favor to other natic 
We do so because we believe it is in 
interest. We believe that the developm 
efforts fostered by the UNDP and ot' 
multilateral programs will over time conti 
ute to creating a healthier, expanding wo 
economy — one in which there will be m* 
opportunities for American business, 
growing and profitable trade, all of wh 
can have the consequence of greater Ami 
can prosperity. 


Department of State BuIN 


Y. Chairman, this hearing provides a valu- 
occasion for the Congress and the Admin- 
ition to consider together issues of fun- 
.ental importance to the American people, 
breadth of our interests involved com- 
lends our physical security, our economic 
-being, and even our ability to pursue the 
of way of life which we cherish, 
is clear that it would be wrong, even 
ic, to take only a short-range view of 
i^idual activities within the U.N. system, 
the Secretary of State commented last 
in Pittsburgh, "we also will keep in 
1 that we have long-term obligations and 
we will not be driven by the emotions 
le day." ' All of us, I submit, must make 
y conceivable effort to keep our sights 

on our larger long-range goals, 
e will not, Mr. Chairman, ever experience 
ny continuing body, domestic or inter- 
onal, a steady and straight graph of 
esses or failures. There will be ups and 
IS. We have recently experienced a seri- 
ow point. But we have also experienced 
I points that are very high indeed. Fore- 
among these is the outstanding Ameri- 
success at the seventh special session 
aternational economic cooperation. We 
3t exclude that other high points, other 
>sses, are possible. In fact, we believe 
they are. But we can achieve them not 
vithdrawing but by participating — by 
ng and fighting for what we know to be 

3 will not ignore our difficulties. We will 
iretend that we have not had setbacks — 
ise indeed we have. But equally, we in 
Administration, and we hope and trust 
this is true of Americans generally, will 
?ive up in a fight where there are im- 
int and fundamental gains to be made 
ur country. 

id we must maintain histoi'ical perspec- 

Since the United Nations was founded 

30 years ago at San Francisco, the 

i has witnessed fundamental changes 

)r Secretary Kissinger's news conference at 
lurgh on Nov. 12, 1975, see ibid., p. 770. 

which no one could have predicted. 

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, on the occa- 
sion of the U.N.'s 20th anniversary, shortly 
before his death, described the situation this 
way: " 

In tlie bright glow of 194.5 too many looked to the 
United Nations for the full and final answer to world 
peace. And in retrospect that day may .-ieem to have 
opened with the hint of a false dawn. 

Certainly we have learned the hard way how elu- 
sive is peace, how durable is man's destructive drive, 
how various are the forms of his aggressions. 

We have learned, too, how distant is the dream of 
those better standards of life in larger freedom, how 
qualified our capacity to practice tolerance, how con- 
ditional our claims to the dignity and worth of the 
human person, how reserved our respect for the 
obligations of law. 

He then described the changes taking 
place in the world: 

Already science and technology are integrating our 
world into an open workshop where each new inven- 
tion defines a new task, and reveals a shared interest, 
and invites yet another common venture. 

In our sprawling workshop of the world community, 
nations are joined in cooperative endeavor: improv- 
ing soils, purifying water, harnessing rivers, eradi- 
cating disease, feeding children, diffusing knowledge, 
spreading technology, surveying resources, lending 
capital, probing the seas, forecasting the weather, 
setting standards, developing law, and working away 
at a near infinitude of down-to-earth tasks — tasks 
for which science has given us the knowledge, and 
technology has given us the tools, and common sense 
has given us the wit to perceive that common interest 
impels us to common enterprise. 

Common enterprise is the pulse of world commu- 
nity, the heartbeat of a working peace .... 

Mr. Chairman, I can find no words that 
better express my own view of the United 
Nations than those spoken by this great 
American on that occasion: 

... we support the United Nations; and we shall 
work in the future, as we have worked in the past, 
to add strength, and influence, and permanence to 
all that the organization stands for in this, our 
tempestuous, tormented, talented world of diversity 
in which all men are brothers and all brothers are 
somehow, wondrously, different — save in their need 
for peace. 

' For an address made by Ambassador Stevenson 
at the U.N. 20th anniversary commemorative session 
at San Francisco, Calif., on June 25, 1965, see 
Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 101. 

5, 1976 



January 12, 1976; Union of Soviet Socialis 
publics, December 29, 1975; United States 
camber 16, 1975. 


Current Actions 



Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973.' 

Acceptance deposited: People's Republic of China. 
March 5, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.^ 
Acceptance deposited: Algeria, March 8, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971.' 

Accession deposited: Syrian Arab Republic, March 
8, 1976. 


Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Open for signature 
at U.N. Headquarters from July 1, 1975, to April 
30, 1976, inclusive.' 
Signature: United States, March 11, 1976. 


Statutes of the World Tourism Organization. Done 
at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into 
force January 2, 1975; for the United States De- 
cember 12, 1975. 

Declarations of adoption deposited: Austria, De- 
cember 22, 1975; Bulgaria, January 21, 1976; 
Cuba, December 11, 1975; France, December 31, 
1975; Federal Republic of Germany, January 29, 
1976; Poland, February 10, 1976; Switzerland, 


Agreement relating to interim understandings 
cerning air transport sei'vices. Effected bj 
change of notes at Washington December 29, 
and January 19, 1976. Entered into force Jai 
19, 1976. 


Agreement amending the agreement of May 12, 
(TIAS 8079), relating to trade in cotton, 
and man-made fiber textiles. Effected by exc! 
of notes at Washington March 11 and 16, 
Entered into force March 16, 1976. 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commo 
Signed at Washington March 18, 1976. Ei 
into force March 18, 1976. 


Not in force. 

GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or 
number from the Superintendent of Document 
Goveryiment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
A 25-percent discount is ynade on orders for 
more copies of any one ptiblication viailed 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Sv 
tendent of Documents, must accompany 
Prices shown below, which include domestic pi. 
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Agricultural Commodities. Agi-eements with tl 
public of Korea amending the agreement of Af 
1973, as amended. TIAS 8142. 7 pp. 50<'. (Cs 

Desalting Plant. Agreement with Israel. TIAS 
31 pp. IQi. (Cat. No. S9.10:8144). 


Department of State B 

INDEX April 5, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1919 

American Principles. America's Permanent 
Interests (Kissinger) 425 

Commodities. International Tin Agreement 
Signed by the United States (Department 
announcement) 442 

Congress. The Role of the United States in 
the United Nations (Lewis) 443 

Developing Countries. America's Permanent 
Interests (Kissinger) 425 

Disarmament. The United States and the 
Soviet Union (Hartman) 433 

Economic Affairs. International Tin Agree- 
ment Signed by the United States (Depart- 
ment announcement) 442 

Foreign Aid. U.S. Increases Economic Assist- 
ance to Portugal 432 

Human Rights. The United States and the 
Soviet Union (Hartman) 433 

Industrial Democracies. America's Permanent 
Interests (Kissinger) 425 

Portugal. U.S. Increases Economic Assistance 
to Portugal 432 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 456 

Trade. The United States and the Soviet 
Union (Hartman) 433 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 456 

international Tin Agreement Signed by the 
United States (Department announcement) . 442 


America's Permanent Interests (Kissinger) . . 425 
The United States and the Soviet Union 
(Hartman) 433 

Jnited Nations. The Role of the United States 
in the United Nations (Lewis) 443 

Name Index 

lartman, Arthur A 433 

tissinger, Secretary 425 

iswis, Samuel W 443 







Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 15-21 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Sobjcct 

Kissinger: Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations. 

U.S. increases program of eco- 
nomic assistance to Portugal. 

Secretary's Advisory Committee 
of Private International Law, 
Study Group on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judg- 
ments, Cambridge, Mass., Apr. 
*130 3/18 Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC) Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea, working group 
on ship design and equipment, 
Apr. 13. 
*131 3/18 Advisory Committee on Interna- 
tional Intellectual Property, In- 
ternational Industrial Property 
Panel, Apr. 28. 

U.S. and Mexico amend textile 
agreement. Mar. 16. 

U.S. and Yugoslavia terminate 
textile agreement, Feb. 14. 

Lewis: Senate Committee on For- 
eign Relations. 

International investment experts 
of nine nations meet in 30-day 
seminar and tour project. 

Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Programs, Apr. 22. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad- 
visory Committee, Boston, Mass., 
Apr. 18. 

SCC, U.S. National Committee for 
the Prevention of Marine Pollu- 
tion, Working Group on seg- 
regated ballast in existing tank- 
ers, Apr. 8. 
*139 3/19 Edward W. Mulcahy sworn in as 
Ambassador to Tunisia (bio- 
graphic data). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 















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of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 




Volume LXXIV 

No. 1920 

April 12, 1976 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 457 



Statement by Secretary Kissinger 
Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 481 


For index see tnside hack cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1920 
April 12, 1976 

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Washington, D.C. 20402 


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^)reign Policy and National Security 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 

I have come here today to talk to you 
bout the vital and intimate relationship be- 
ween America's foreign policy and our na- 
ional security. It is appropriate that I do 
in Texas, a state so long dedicated to a 
ti ong and resolute America, a state that has 
i\eii our nation three distinguished Ameri- 
;uis who presently serve in Washington and 
liom I am proud to consider friends — Bill 
lements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; 
leorge Mahon, the chairman of the Appro- 
riations Committee of the House of Repre- 
entatives; and John Tower of the Senate 
ained Services Committee. All three of 
lese men have worked long and hard to 
ssure a strong defense for America. All 
nee deserve the grateful thanks of their 

As Secretary of State I am not, of course, 
irectly involved in the preparation of our 
efense budget or in decisions regarding par- 
cular weapons programs. But as the Presi- 
ent's principal adviser on foreign policy, no 
lie knows better than I that a strong de- 
;nse is crucial for our role in the world. 
or a great and responsible power, diplo- 
uicy without strength would be empty. If 
e were weak we could not negotiate; we 
3uld only hope or accommodate. It is the 
anfidence of strength that permits us to act 
dth conciliation and responsibility to help 
iiape a more peaceful world. 

Other nations must not be led to doubt 

' Made at Dallas, Tex., on Mar. 22 before a dinner 
leeting sponsored by Southern Methodist University, 
If World Affairs Council of Dallas, and other local 
I'Canizations (text from press release 141). 

either our strength or our resolution. For 
how others see us determines the risks they 
are prepared to run and the degree to which 
they are willing to place confidence in our 
policies. If adversaries consider us weak or 
irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable. 
If allies doubt our constancy, reti'eat and 
political shifts are certain. 

And so as Secretary of State, I am in- 
evitably a partisan of a strong America and a 
strong defense as the underpinning of a 
strong foreign policy. I have a responsibility 
to make clear to the American people and to 
other nations that our power is indeed ade- 
quate to our current challenges, that we are 
improving our forces to meet changing con- 
ditions, that America understands its inter- 
ests and values and will defend them, and 
that the American people will never permit 
those hostile to us to shape the world in 
which we live. 

I do not accept the propositions that other 
nations have gained military ascendancy 
over us, that the Administration has ne- 
glected our defenses, or that negotiations to 
reduce the threat of nuclear war are unwise. 
These charges sound remarkably like the 
"missile gap" claims which aroused anxi- 
eties in 1960, only to dissolve suddenly a few- 
weeks after the election. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we do face serious 
challenges to our security. They derive from 
the unprecedented conditions of the thermo- 
nuclear age, the ambiguities of contempo- 
rary power, and the perpetual revolution in 
technology. Our task is to understand the 
real and permanent requirements of our se- 
curity, rather than to be seduced by the 

ipril 12, 1976 


outmoded vocabulary of a simpler time. 

What are the national security issues we 
face? What is the true condition of our na- 
tional defense? 

—First, the inevitable growth of Soviet 
economic and military power has produced 
essential strategic equality. We cannot halt 
this growth, but we must counterbalance it 
and prevent its use for political expansion. 

— Second, America remains the most pow- 
erful nation in the world. It will remain so, 
if the Congress approves the President's 
proposed defense budget. But evolving tech- 
nology and the military programs of others 
impose upon us the need for constant vigi- 
lance and continuing major effort. 

— Third, technology has revolutionized the 
instruments of war and introduced an un- 
paralleled complexity into the perceptions of 
power and the choices that we must make 
to maintain it. The defense establishment 
we have today is the product of decisions 
taken 10 to 15 years ago. Equally, the de- 
cisions we make today will determine our 
defense posture in the eighties and beyond. 
And the kind of forces we have will deter- 
mine the kind of diplomacy we are able to 

— Fourth, as nuclear arsenals grow, the 
horrors of nuclear war become ever more 
apparent while at the same time the threat 
of all-out nuclear war to deter or resist less- 
than-all-out aggression becomes ever less 
plausible. Under the umbrella of strategic 
equivalence, testing and probing at the local 
and regional levels become more likely. 
Hence over the next decade we must increase 
and modernize the forces — air, land, and 
sea — for local defense. 

— Fifth, while a weak defense posture pro- 
duces a weak foreign policy, a strong defense 
does not necessarily produce a strong for- 
eign policy. Our role in the world depends 
as well on how realistically we perceive our 
national interests, on our unity as a people, 
and on our willingness to persevere in pur- 
suit of our national goals. 

— Finally, for Americans, physical 
strength can never be an end in itself. So 
long as we are true to ourselves, every Ad- 

ministration has the obligation to seek t 
control the spiral of nuclear weapons and t 
give mankind hope for a more secure an-j 
just future. 

The Long-Range Challenge of Defense 

Let me discuss each of these challenges 

To cope with the implications of Sovie 
power has become a permanent responsibi! 
ity of American defense and foreign policj 
Sixty years of Soviet industrial and ecc 
nomic growth, and a political system tha 
gives top priority to military buildup, have- 
inevitably — brought the Soviet Union to 
position of rough equilibrium with th 
United States. No policy or decision on ou 
part brought this about. Nothing we coul 
have done would have prevented it. Nothin 
we can do now will make it disappear. 

But while we cannot prevent the growt 
of Soviet military strength, we can and mu.' 
maintain the strength to balance it and ii 
sure that it will not be used for politic; 
expansion. There is no alternative to a sul 
stantial defense budget over the long tern 
We have a permanent responsibility an 
need a steady course that does not chang 
with the fads of the moment. We canm 
afford the oscillation between assaults c 
defense spending and cries of panic, betwee 
cuts of $40 billion in Administration defen.' 
budget requests over seven years ai 
charges of neglect of our defenses. 

This claim on our perseverance is a ne 
experience for Americans. Throughout mo; 
of our history we have been able to mobili; 
urgently in time of war and then to disari 
unilaterally when victory was achievei 
After World War II we rapidly demob 
lized our armies, relying largely on our ni 
clear monopoly to preserve the peace. Thu 
when the Korean war broke out we wei 
little better prepared than we had been 1 
summers previously. Only recently have v. 
begun to understand — and then reluctanti 
— that foreign policy and military strateg 
are inextricably linked, that we must mail 
tain defense preparedness over the Ion 
term, and that we will live for as far ahea 


Department of State Bullet 

as we can see in a twilight between tran- 
quillity and open confrontation. We need a 
defense posture that is relevant to our dan- 
gers, comprehensible to our friends, credible 
to our adversaries, and that we are prepared 
to sustain over the long term. 

The Imperatives of Technology 

Technology has transformed the condi- 
tions and calculations of military strength 
in unprecedented fashion. 
I The paradox of contemporary military 
Istrength is that a momentous increase in 
the element of power has eroded the tradi- 
tional relationship of power to policy. Until 
the end of World War II, it would never have 
)ccurred to a leader that there might be an 
ipper limit to useful military power. Since 
;he technological choices were limited, 
;trength was largely defined in quantitative 
erms. Today, the problem is to insure that 
)ur strength is relevant to our foreign policy 
)bjectives. Under current conditions, no 
natter how we or our adversaries improve 
he size or quality of our strategic arsenals, 
aie overriding fact remains: an all-out 
trategic nuclear exchange would kill hun- 
Ireds of millions on both sides in a matter 
f hours and utterly devastate the nations 

Thus the current strategic problem is vir- 
ually the diametric opposite of the historic 
ne. Planners used to pursue increased over- 
11 power. Today we have a total strength 
nimaginable a generation ago, but we must 
esign, diversify, and refine our forces so 
hat they are relevant to — and able to sup- 
ort — rational foreign policy objectives. His- 
orically, military planners could treat the 
echnology of their time as stable; today, 
echnology revolutionizes military capabili- 
ies in both strategic and tactical forces 
very decade and thus presents policymakers 
nth an ever-increasing spectrum of choice. 

And yet, the choices we make now will 
ot, in most cases, really affect the structure 
f our forces for from 5 to 10 years — the 
ime it takes to design new weapons, build 
liem, and deploy them. Thus the policies 

Administrations are able to carry out are 
largely shaped by decisions in which they 
took no part. Decisions made in the 1960's 
largely determined our strategic posture for 
the 1970's. We can do little to change the 
impact of those earlier decisions ; the Admin- 
istration in power in the eighties will be 
able to do little to change the impact of the 
decisions we make today. This is a sobering 
challenge, and it turns national security 
policy into a nonpartisan responsibility. 

In choosing among the options that tech- 
nology gives, we — and every Administration 
--must keep certain principles in mind: 

— First, we must not simply duplicate 
Soviet choices. The Soviet Union has a dif- 
ferent geopolitical problem, a different force 
structure, and perhaps a different strategic 

— Second, because of the costs of modern 
forces, we face complex choices. In many 
areas we face a trade-off between quantity 
and quality, between numbers and sophisti- 

— Third, because of our higher wage 
scales, particularly for our volunteer forces, 
any increase in our forces will weigh much 
more heavily on our economy than on that 
of adversaries whose pay scales are only a 
fraction of ours. For this reason, and the 
value we place on human life, we have al- 
ways had an incentive, indeed an impera- 
tive, to put a premium on technology — 
where we are superior — rather than on sheer 

— Fourth, we must see beyond the num- 
bers game. Quality confers advantages as 
much as quantity and can sometimes sub- 
stitute for it. Yet even we cannot afford 
every weapon that technology makes pos- 

— Fifth, at some point numbers count. 
Technology cannot substitute indefinitely for 
numerical strength. The belief that there is 
an unlimited amount of fat to be cut in the 
defense budget is an illusion. Reductions al- 
most inevitably translate into a reduction of 

America possesses the economic and tech- 

pril 12, 1976 


nological foundation to remain militarily pre- 
eminent; we can afford whatever military 
forces our security requires. The challenge 
we face is not to our physical strength — 
which is unequaled — but to our will to main- 
tain it in all relevant categories and to use 
it when necessary to defend our interests 
and values. 

Strategic Forces 

Our nation's security requires, first and 
foremost, strategic forces that can deter at- 
tack and that insure swift and flexible retali- 
ation if aggression occurs. 

We have such forces today. Our technol- 
ogy has always been ahead of the U.S.S.R. 
by at least five years ; with appropriate effort 
we can insure that this will continue to be 
the case. 

We are determined to maintain the stra- 
tegic balance at whatever level is required. 
We will never allow the balance to be tipped 
against us either by unilateral decision or a 
buildup of the other side, by a one-sided 
agreement or by a violation of an agreement. 

But we must be clear what maintaining 
the balance means. We must not mesmerize 
ourselves with fictitious "gaps." Our forces 
were designed according to different criteria 
than those of the Soviet Union ; their ade- 
quacy must be judged by our strategic 
needs, not theirs. 

In the middle sixties we could have con- 
tinued the deployment of heavy throw- 
weight missiles, following the Titan or the 
Atlas. But the Administration then in office 
decided instead to rely — in addition to our 
large bomber force — on an arsenal of 1,000 
new relatively light, sophisticated, and ex- 
tremely accurate intercontinental ballistic 
missiles and 656 submarine-launched mis- 
siles on 41 boats. We deployed these systems 
rapidly, halting our buildup of launchers in 
the 1960's when it was judged that techno- 
logical improvements were more important 
than an increase in numbers. 

The Soviet Union chose a different course. 
Because of its more limited technological 

capabilities, it emphasized missiles whos' 
greater throw-weight compensated for thei 
substantially poorer accuracy. But — con 
trary to the expectations of American offi 
cials in the 1960's — the Soviets also chose t' 
expand their numbers of launchers beyom 
what we had. Thus, the Soviets passed ou 
numerical levels by 1970 and continued t 
add an average of 200 missiles a year — unti 
we succeeded in halting this buildup in th 
SALT agreement of 1972. 

Therefore — as a consequence of unilatera 
decisions made a decade ago by both sides- 
Soviet missile forces today are somewha 
larger in number and considerably heavie 
in throw-weight, while ours are superior i 
reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophisti 
cation. We possess far larger numbers o 
warheads — 8,500 to their 2,500 — and w 
have several hundred more strategi 

Whether we move in the direction c 
greater throw-weight will largely depend o 
recommendations made by the Departmer 
of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
is not essentially a foreign policy decisioi 
But in making it we will be governed by ou 
needs, not by a compulsion to duplicate th 
Soviet force structure. 

The destructiveness of missiles depends o 
a combination of explosive power and acci 
racy. For most purposes, as accuracy in 
proves, explosive power becomes less impo 
tant— and heavy land-based missiles becon 
in fact more vulnerable. Since we ha\ 
stressed accuracy, we may decide that w 
do not need to approach the level of throv 
weight of Soviet weapons, though nothing- 
certainly no SALT agreement — prevents i 
from substantially increasing our throv 
weight if we choose. 

Whatever our decision regarding technic; 
issues, no responsible leader should encoui 
age the illusion that America can ever agai 
recapture the strategic superiority of th 
early postwar period. In the forties, we ha 
a nuclear monopoly. In the fifties and earl 
sixties, we had ovei-whelming preponderance 
As late as the Cuban missile crisis of 196! 
the Soviet Union possessed less than 10 


Department of State Bulleli 

strategic systems while we had thousands. 
But today, when each side has thousands 
)f launchers and many more warheads, a de- 
cisive or politically significant margin of 
>uperiority is out of reach. If one side ex- 
pands or improves its forces, sooner or later 
;he other side will balance the effort. 

The Soviet Union first developed an ICBM; 
,ve matched it. We then added a lead in 
lumbers of strategic missiles to the lead we 
ilready had in bombers; they caught up and 
airpassed us in missile numbers, though we 
;till remain far ahead in numbers of bomb- 
'rs. When our Trident submarines are in pro- 
luction by the end of this decade, we will 
)egin to redress that numerical imbalance 
is well as improve the flexibility and surviv- 
ibility of our forces. 

We were the first to put modern ballistic 
iiissiles on submarines, and we were the first 
put multiple warheads on missiles. Though 
i/e remain ahead in both categories, the So- 
iets found ways to narrow the gap. And the 
ame will be true in the future, whether in 
lissile accuracy or submarine, aircraft, or 
ruise missile technology. 

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can 
mg be preserved by either side. A perceived 
aequality could shake the confidence of 
ther countries even when its precise mili- 
ary significance is difficult to define. There- 
ore we certainly will not permit a perceived 
r actual imbalance to arise against us and 
he Soviet Union is likely to follow similar 

The probable outcome of each succeeding 
ound of the strategic arms race will be the 
estoration of equilibrium, at a higher and 
ostlier level of forces and probably with less 
olitical stability. Such temporary advan- 
ages as can be achieved are not strate- 
ically decisive. 

The long leadtimes for the deployment of 
lodern weapons should always permit coun- 
ermeasures to be taken. If both sides re- 
aain vigilant, neither side will be able to 
educe the effects of a counterblow against 
c to acceptable levels. 

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming 
J.S. inferiority in straitegic weapons ignore 

these facts and the real choices facing mod- 
ern leaders. 

No nuclear weapon has ever been used in 
modern wartime conditions or against an op- 
ponent possessing means of retaliation. In- 
deed, neither side has even tested the launch- 
ing of more than a few missiles at a time; 
neither side has ever fired them in a north- 
south direction as they would have to do in 
wartime. Yet initiation of an all-out surprise 
attack would depend on substantial confi- 
dence that thousands of reentry vehicles 
launched in carefully coordinated attacks — 
from land, sea, and air — would knock out all 
their targets thousands of miles away with 
a timing and reliability exactly as predicted, 
before the other side launched any forces to 
preempt or retaliate, and with such effective- 
ness that retaliation would not produce un- 
acceptable damage. Any miscalculation or 
technical failure would mean national catas- 
trophe. Assertions that one side is "ahead" 
by the margins now under discussion pale in 
significance when an attack would depend 
on decisions based on such massive uncer- 
tainties and risks. 

For these reasons, the strategic arsenals 
of the two sides find their principal purpose 
in matching and deterring the forces of the 
opponent and in making certain that third 
countries perceive no inequality. In no re- 
cent crisis has an American President come 
close to considering the use of strategic nu- 
clear weapons. In no crisis since 1962 — and 
perhaps not even then — has the strategic 
balance been the decisive factor. Even in 
Korea, when we possessed an overwhelming 
superiority, it was not relevant to the out- 

Strategic Arms Limitation 

It is against this background that we have 
vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in 
strategic arms. These are compelling rea- 
sons for pursuing such talks. 

— Since successive rounds of competitive 
programs will almost certainly yield only 
equilibrium, we have sought to regulate the 

tkpril 12, 1976 


competition and to maintain the equivalence 
that will exist in any case at lower levels. 

— Stabilizing the strategic balance frees 
resources to strengthen our forces in areas 
where they are most needed ; it will ease the 
problem of enhancing our capabilities for re- 
gional defense and in seapower, the areas 
where an imbalance could have serious geo- 
political consequences. 

— Agreed limitations and a more calcu- 
lable strategic relationship will facilitate ef- 
forts to reduce political confrontations and 

— And, finally, the American people ex- 
pect their leaders to pursue every respon- 
sible approach to peace and stability in the 
thermonuclear era. Only then can we expect 
them to support the sacrifices necessary to 
maintain our defensive strength. 

We have made progress toward these 
goals. In the 1972 SALT agreements we 
froze antiballistic missile systems in their 
infancy and thus avoided potentially massive 
expenditures and instabilities. We halted the 
momentum of the Soviet missile buildup for 
five years — a period in which, because of the 
long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity 
for deployment of our own. We intended to 
use that five-year interval to negotiate a 
longer term and more comprehensive agree- 
ment based on numerical equality and, fail- 
ing that, to close the numerical gap by oui- 
own eflforts as our modernization programs 

This is precisely what President Ford 
achieved at Vladivostok a year and a half 
ago and what we are trying to enshrine in a 
binding treaty that would run through 1985. 
Both sides would have equal ceilings on mis- 
siles, heavy bombers, and on multiwarhead 
missiles; this would require the Soviets to 
dismantle many weapons, while our planned 
forces would not be affected. And neither 
the weapons of our allies nor our forward- 
based nuclear systems, such as carriers and 
tactical aircraft, would be included; these 
had been Soviet demands since 1969. 

These are major accomplishments which 
are ovenvhelmingly in our interest, particu- 
larly when we compare them to the situation 


which could have prevailed had we failed t« 
achieve restraints on Soviet programs. Nev 
ertheless, very important issues remain to b* 
resolved. We will make every effort to con 
elude a satisfactory agreement, but we wil 
be driven solely by the national interest and 
not by arbitrary or artificial deadlines. 

The SALT agreements are the opposite Oj 
one-sided concessions to the U.S.S.R., as they 
are so often portrayed. Soviet offensive pro 
grams were slowed ; none of ours were af 
fected. Nor has the Administration counte 
nanced Soviet violations of the first SAL"] 
agreement, as has been irresponsibl; 
charged. In fact we have carefully watche( 
every aspect of Soviet performance. It is th' 
unanimous view of all agencies of our gov 
ernment — only recently reconfirmed — tha 
no Soviet violation has occurred and tha 
none of the ambiguous actions that we hav 
noted and raised has affected our securitj) 
But we will remain vigilant. All ambiguoui 
information will be carefully analyzed. Ni 
violations will be tolerated. We will insist oi 
full explanations where questionable activit; 
has occurred. 

We will maintain the strategic balance s$ 
whatever level is required — preferably witH 
in the limits of successful SALT negotia 
tions but, if necessary, without those limita 
We will not heed those who maintain that aid 
that is required are limited, minimum deten 
rence forces — to threaten the Soviet civiliai 
population. To follow their advice would d« 
prive us of all options save capitulation ani 
the massive destruction of civilian life; 
would create a large numerical imbalancr 
against us, which could have significant po 
litical consequences, possibly tempting ou 
adversaries and upsetting our friends. 

But neither will we be deflected by con 
trived and incredible scenarios, by inflatei 
versions of Soviet strength, or by irrespon 
sible attacks on SALT into diverting defensi 
resources away from vital areas — the forca 
for regional and local defense and our Navj 
For these are the areas where shortfalls am 
imbalances can rapidly turn into geopoliti 
cal shifts that jeopardize our fundaments 
interests and those of our allies. 

Department of State BulleHl 

Military Strength for Regional Defense 

Under conditions of nuclear parity, world 
peace is more likely to be threatened by 
shifts in local or regional balances — in Eu- 
rope, the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, 
or Africa — than by strategic nuclear at- 
tack. Thus, our forces that can be used for 
local defense deserve our particular atten- 
tion and increased resources. 

The issue is not the simplistic one of the 
size of the Soviet Army. There is nothing 
new about the size of the Soviet Army. Dur- 
ing the entire posftwar period, the Soviet 
standing army has always been larger than 
ours; at times it has been three times the 
size. The Soviet Union has a much greater 
landmass to defend and perceives major de- 
fense problems both in Eastern Europe and 
on its Asian front, where nearly half of the 
Soviet Army is now stationed. We, by con- 
trast, enjoy the shields of friendly neighbors 
and wide oceans. And we are linked with 
close allies with substantial forces of their 

The new and long-foreseen problem is that 
under conditions of nuclear balance our ad- 
versaries may be increasingly tempted to 
probe at the regional level. This temptation 
must be discouraged. If leaders around the 
world come to assume that the United States 
lacks either the forces or the will to resist 
while others intervene to impose solutions, 
they will accommodate themselves to what 
they will regard as the dominant trend. And 
an unopposed superpower may draw danger- 
ous conclusions when the next opportunity 
for intervention beckons. Over time, the 
global balance of power and influence will 
inevitably shift to the advantage of those 
who care nothing about America's values 
or well-being. 

Thus our strong capability for local and 
regional defense is essential for us; and to- 
gether with our allies, we must build up 
these forces. In a crisis, the President must 
have other choices than capitulation or re- 
sort to strategic nuclear weapons. 

We are not the world's policeman — but 
we cannot permit the Soviet Union or its 
surrogates to become the world's policeman 

either, if we care anything about our se- 
curity and the fate of freedom in the world. 
It does no good to preach strategic superior- 
ity while practicing regional retreat. 

This was the issue in Angola. The United 
States had no significant stake in a purely 
Angolan civil war. The issue was — and re- 
mains — the unacceptable precedent of mas- 
sive Soviet and Cuban military intervention 
in a conflict thousands of miles from their 
shores — with its broad implications for the 
rest of Africa and, indeed, many other 
regions of the world. The danger was, and 
is, that our inaction — our legislatively im- 
posed failure even to send financial help to 
Africans who sought to resist — will lead to 
further Soviet and Cuban pressures on the 
mistaken assumption that America has lost 
the will to counter adventurism or even to 
help others do so. 

It is time, therefore, to be clear that, as 
far as we are concerned, Angola has set no 
precedent. It is time that the world be re- 
minded that America remains capable of 
forthright and decisive action. The Ameri- 
can people know that the United States 
cannot remain aloof if basic principles of re- 
sponsible international conduct are flouted 
and the geopolitical balance is threatened by 
a pattern of outside interventions in local 

The United States has made clear its 
strong support for majority rule and minor- 
ity rights in southern Africa. We have no 
stake in, and we will give no encouragement 
to, illegal regimes there. The President and 
I have made clear that rapid change is re- 
quired and that the opportunity for nego- 
tiated solutions must be seized. We will make 
major efforts to promote these objectives 
and to help all parties to return to the nego- 
tiating table. The proposals made today by 
Foreign Secretary [of the United Kingdom 
James] Callaghan in the House of Commons 
seem to us a most constructive approach. 
We welcome them. 

xBut let no one believe that American sup- 
port can be extorted by the threat of Cuban 
troops or Soviet arms. Our cooperation is not 
available to those who rely on Cuban troops. 

April 12, 1976 


The United States cannot acquiesce indefi- 
nitely in tlie presence of Cuban expedition- 
ary forces in distant lands for the purpose 
of pressure and to determine the political 
evolution by force of arms. 

We have issued these warnings before. 1 
repeat them today. The United States w\\] 
not accept further Cuban military inter- 
ventions abroad. 

We are certain that the American people 
unde)-stand and support these two equal 
principles of our policy — our support for 
majority rule in Africa and our firm opposi- 
tion to military intervention. 

Ladies and gentlemen, Angola reminds us 
that military capabilities by themselves can- 
not solve our foreign policy problems. No 
matter how massive our arsenals or how 
flexible our forces, they will carry little 
weight if we become so confused in our 
decisionmaking and so constrained in defin- 
ing our interests that no one believes we 
will ever act when challenged. 

The issue is not an open-ended commit- 
ment or a policy of indiscriminate Ameri- 
can intervention. Decisions on whether and 
how to take action must always result from 
careful analysis and open discussion. It can- 
not be rammed down the throats of an un- 
willing Congress or public. 

But neither can we avoid decisions when 
their time has clearly come. Global stability 
simply cannot survive the presumption that 
our natural choice will always be passivity; 
such a course would insure that the world 
will witness dangerous challenges and major 
changes highly inimical to our interests and 
our ideals. 

The Strength and Will of America 

If America's defense is to match the na- 
tion's needs, it must meet three basic re- 
quirements : 

— Our strategic forces must be sufficient 
to deter attack and credibly maintain the 
nuclear balance. 

— Our forces for regional defense, to- 
gether with those of our allies, must be 


clearly capable of resisting threat and 

— And at home we must once again unite 
behind the proposition that aggression un- 
resisted is aggression encouraged. We must 
be prepared to recognize genuine threats to 
the global balance, whether they emerge as 
direct challenges to us or as regional encroach- 
ment at a greater distance. And we must be 
prepared to do something about them. 

These are the real issues our leaders now 
face and will surely face in the future. Theyi 
require answers to some hard questions, such 
as the following: Where can our defense 
dollars be most productively spent? What 
programs are needed that are not already, 
underway? What would be the costs ol 
these programs and over what period of! 
time? What, if anything, would we have to 
give up? What are the premises of oun 
defense policy — against what threats andJ 
with what diplomacy? 

Administration and critics alike must) 
answer these questions if we are to have an 
eft'ective national policy. And in this spirit. 
I have spoken today about the relationship! 
between defense and foreign policy. 

Ladies and gentlemen, military strength 
is crucial to America's security and well 
being. But we must take care not to becomt 
so obsessed with power alone that we become 
a "Fortress America" and neglect our ulti 
mate political and moral responsibilities. 

Our nation is the beacon of hope to all wh( 
love freedom not simply because it is strong 
but because it represents mankind's age- 
old dream of dignity and self-respect. Others 
before us have wielded overwhelming mili- 
tary power and abdicated moral responsi- 
bility or engendered fear and hatred. Oui 
resources — military, industrial, technologi 
cal, economic, and cultural — are beyond chal 
lenge; with dedication and effort they shall 
remain so. But a world of tenuous balance, 0* 
a nuclear equilibrium constantly contested 
is too barren and perilous and uninspiring; 
America has always stood for somethina 
deeper than throwing its weight around; we 
shall see to it that we shall never relinquish 

Deparlment of State Bullelii 


r moral leadership in the search for a just 

d lasting peace. 

We have gone through a difficult decade 
' t because we were weak, but because we 

re divided. None of our setbacks has been 

ised by lack of American power, or even 

k of relevant power. The fundamental 
. :illenge to America therefore is to generate 
li wisdom, the creativity, and the will to 
"iicate ourselves to the peace and progress 


America's ultimate strength has always 
bm the conviction and basic unity of its 
pjple. And despite a decade and more of 

ting — despite assassination, war, and in- 

tutional crisis — we still remain a vital and 
J imistic and confident people. 

[t is time once again for Americans to 
h d their heads high. It is important to re- 
el once again some fundamental truths: 

—We are still the strongest nation on the 
f e of the earth. 

—We are the most generous nation in 
b tory ; we have fed the starving, opened 
■ arms and our hearts to refugees from 
ler lands, and given more of our substance 

to the poor and downtrodden around the 
world than any other nation. 

— We are needed to maintain the world's 

— We are essential to any hopes for sta- 
bility and human progress. 

— We remain the bulwark of democracy 
and the land of promise to millions who 
yearn for freedom and a better life for them- 
selves and their children. 

— We therefore have a responsibility to 
hold high the banner of freedom and human 
dignity for all mankind. 

Our record of achievements should be but 
prologue to what this generation of Ameri- 
cans has it within its power to accomplish. 
For the first time in history, we can work 
with others to create an era of peace and 
prosperity for all mankind. 

We shall not fail. With faith in the good- 
ness and the promise of America we shall 
master our future. And those who celebrate 
America's tricentennial will look back and 
say that this generation of Americans was 
worthy of the ideals and the greatness of 
our history. 

lestions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at Dallas 

MS release 141B dated March 23 

p. Dr. Kissinger, what are the possibilities 
u shooting war in the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in the 
h Idle East is extremely complicated. 

fou have the tensions between the Israelis 
ftl their neighbors that have plotted for 
1 r genei'ations. You have internal tensions 

many countries, such as Lebanon, which 
c 1 spark a conflagration without any par- 
t liar plan by any country. And therefore 
t ■ problem in the Middle East is extremely 

3n the other hand, in the last two years 
nre progress has been made toward peace 

in the Middle East than in the entire post- 
war period. So if we can create the penalties 
for irresponsible conduct that I tried to de- 
scribe in my speech, and if we can continue 
the efforts to promote negotiations among 
the parties that we have done in the last 
two years, I think that considerable progress 
can be made toward peace and a shooting 
war can be avoided. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, noiv that Egypt's turn to 
the West is complete and they have renounced 
the Soviet Union, what in your opinion are 
the Soviet Union long-range goals now in 
regard to the Middle East? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union has 

>ril 12, 1976 


had a historic interest in maintaining a posi- 
tion of influence in the Middle East, and it 
will no doubt continue to maintain that inter- 
est. The problem is what it can do concretely 
to bring it about. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
our principal objective in the Middle East 
is not to play big-power politics with the 
hopes of the people in the Middle East but 
to help them find their way toward a peace- 
ful solution. 

If the Soviet Union has any ideas of how 
to bring about a peaceful solution, we will 
be glad to hear it. But basically the decision 
of Egypt gives us a great opportunity and 
imposes on us a heavy responsibility, be- 
cause we have to demonstrate that those men 
who relied on us are also going to see some 
possibility for having their aspirations 

But on the whole, 1 would consider it a 
vei-y positive development. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would ijou. consider ap- 
pointing a task force to implement an equi- 
table a7id diplomatic solution for the handling 
of the illegal aliens and poverty? 

Secretary Kissinger: I can tell you that 
the State Department is throbbing with task 
forces. [Laughter.] And no promise is 
easier to make than to appoint another task 
force. [Laughter.] The problem is what a 
task force can do concretely about it. 

I think, from what I understand, most 
people know what the problem is. The difl^- 
culty is to find the personnel to do something 
about it. But in principle, yes, I considered 
establishing a task force. 

Q. I was particularly thinking about get- 
ting input from the various sectors of the 
comynunity, the various groups that would 
have a direct interest in the problem. I know 
that task forces are very effective in Dallas, 
and I was wondering if you would consider 
such a task force on a national level. 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to dis- 
illusion you, but task forces are not very 
effective in the State Department. [Laugh- 


Q. Coming back to Lebanon, what is Pr^ 
deyit Asad [of Syria] up to in the cur) r 
conflict in Lebanon? He seems to be count . 
acting the PLO [Palestine Liberation Orgc - 
zation'] there. 

Secretary Kissinger: The basic conflict n 
Lebanon has arisen because the balance - 
tween the Christian community and 
Moslem community has been upset by e 
large influx of Palestinians that have c- 
ated, in effect, their own organization ; 
that probably has the most effectiv - 
"probably" — it certainly has the most efl ■ 
five — army that operates today in Lebaiii. 

As a result, the political structure ii 
Lebanon, which was weighted slightly n 
favor of the Christians, maybe by a mar ii 
of 55 to 45, is being altered to at least eqi 1- 
ity for the Moslems and perhaps a reveiil 
of the balance- — ^a condition which the Ch ;• 
tian community in Lebanon finds very d I- 
cult to accept. 

Now, Syria has actually attempted to r y 
a moderating role in Lebanon. It has ;- 
tempted to prevent the pendulum f i n 
swinging so far over to the Moslem side t it 
the Christians, in despair, will secede or t it 
an open and prolonged civil war would br k 

This has led to the paradox that som* if 
the Syrian efforts have been to curtail 
PLO power. 

On the other hand, after the Lebar 
aiTny has disintegrated under the impaci 
upheaval, there is no effective force i\ 
to bring up to enforce whatever has b 
achieved in the negotiations. So we fac 'a 
very complex situation in which the dar )r 
of an Israeli attack becomes very grea ii 
the Syrians move their own forces in d 
where, however, there are no other coui 
clearly visible. 

We are telling all parties that the Un: 
States is interested in the independence 
sovereignty of Lebanon and in the coex 
ence there of the two communities. And 
are in touch with all of the parties in orjr 
to urge restraint and to act, if we can, e a 
mediator. But it is an enormously com i- 
cated situation. 

Department of State Bui 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what meaning do you 
flcf 071 a recent uprising in Ramallah, and 
you think that President Sadat [of Egypt] 
s the power to unify the Arabs and 
ing about peaceful coexistence with the 
'aelis ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is a great 

•moil in the Arab world, and there it has 

; prospects for negotiation development. 

I of the groups that will be subject to ne- 
gtiation have a temptation to demonstrate 
ti'ir power or their influence, and events on 

' West Bank are a reflection of tendencies 
lithe Arab world. 

One of the reasons why the United States 

) ieves, and has repeatedly asserted, that 

jiiation in the Middle East is in nobody's 

ei est — not of the Arabs, and not of Israel, 
ause the longer these foi'ces are con- 

ni'd, the bigger will be the inevitable ex- 
jsion — and these events underline the im- 
1 tance of making progress toward a settle- 
la nt in the Middle East. 

^ow bringing about the unity of the 
il>.s is a task which, up to now, has eluded 
1 ny states. 

'resident Sadat has taken a very 

U'smanlike approach. He has been the 

i t Arab leader to move toward peace with 

[: ael ; he has been willing to take steps on 

1 own. 

Viid therefore, if the peace prospects con- 
t Lie and the other Arab states see that it is 
i only way to achieve some of their aspira- 
t: is, I think his moral influence in the Arab 
n M will survive. 

le is now under very great attack for the 
' y courageous decisions he took last year, 

' I believe that he will be vindicated by 
nts, and it will be seen that it was an 

ivitable step to promote further progress 
'v.ard peace in the Middle East. 

]. Mr. Secretary, of course energy is of 
Tat concern to us here in Texas. Would 
' jilease comment on the status of domestic 
f -sufficiency in energy as related to the 
rid energy market and particularly to our 
iDual defense requirements? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has 

become progressively less self-suflicient in 
energy throughout the sixties and also in the 
seventies. The increase in consumption has 
outpaced new discoveries of energy for new 
technology. And this is a process that must 
be reversed if we ai'e not going to run major 
risks with our national security. So I be- 
lieve it is essential that the United States 
substantially reduce its dependence on im- 
ported oil and on imported energy. And the 
program that has been recommended by the 
Administration, or any other program that 
brings about conservation and a rapid de- 
velopment of alternative resources, is essen- 
tial, because if current trends continue, by 
the late 1970's we will be more dependent on 
foreign oil than we are today, and then in a 
crisis very serious consequences could 

Now, we believe, we hope, the energy bill 
will give us various tools, including the stor- 
age of oil, that will make an embargo less 
dangerous to us. But we must make a major 
efi'ort to reduce our dependence by the late 
seventies and early eighties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please describe 
the credit terms of payment proposed by your 
five-year agreement to sell grain to the Soviet 
Union and the reasons for providing those 
terms ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are no credit 
terms associated with the grain sale. It is 
substantially for cash. The reason for the 
five-year grain agreement is the following: 
The Soviet Union, before the grain agree- 
ment, was operating in our market as a free 
purchaser. Therefore, through a period of 
shortage in the Soviet Union, they would 
make massive purchases and drive up our 
domestic prices. But then, in years when the 
Soviet Union has no need for it, they would 
stop their purchases. So we constantly 
oscillated between massive Soviet invasions 
of the American grain market, which we 
could not afi'ect, to periods when they would 
not. So, the five-year agreement is designed 
to give some stability to our fanners, but 
also, in periods of extreme shortage in the 
Soviet Union, to force the Soviet Union to 

h\\ 12, 1976 


negotiate for additional purchases beyond 
what is in the agreement, which is in the 
range of 6 to 8 million tons a year, far 
below what they need in an emergency 
period. And it is therefore better, it seems 
to us, to meet our economic needs, the needs 
of our farmers, as well as other national 
needs. But no credit terms are involved. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what would he the hnpact 
on Middle East negotiations as the result of 
major oil reserves in the Sinai and Gulf of 
Suez by Israel — peace, war, or favorable 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends, of 
course, where these oil reserves are located. 
I pray that they are not on the dividing line 
between Israel and Egypt. [Laughter.] 

So, anything that contributes to the 
Egyptian balance-of-payments problem — or 
to the solution of the Egyptian balance-of- 
payments problem is helpful. 

IsraeH oil explorations in the Gulf of Sinai 
raised for the Arabs the problem that they 
do not recognize the Israeli right to operate 
in the Gulf of Sinai, nor has Israel raised 
that as part of a peace settlement. They 
would want to control the shoreline that is 
basically the Gulf of Sinai. So, by the defini- 
tion of both sides, this would be a temporary 

I think, on the whole, these oil explora 
tions will not affect the prospects of negotia- 
tions one way or the other. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, again in the Far East, 
in Thaila7id, we all know about the elections 
coming up there in April. What is the short- 
and long-term outlook for Thailand? Is it the 
standup domino? 

Secretary Kissinger: I will have to tell you 
frankly the complexities of Thai domestic 

politics have eluded me, and I thought 
would study it after the elections are ov 
when the number of parties will be a lit 
bit reduced. [Laughter.] 

But, leaving aside the threatening of pol 
ical dialogue — which, of course, is uniq 
to the Thai traditions — the basic situati 
in Thailand is that, with the collapse of o 
efforts in Indochina, the Thais, who wt 
loyal allies during the war and who reli 
on the United States, are looking for a diffi' 
ent angle. 

And if you look at Thai history, Thaila 
is the only Asian country, the only count 
in South Asia, that was never colonized a 
that managed to maintain its independei i 
by careful adjustment to dominant tren 
Now, their assessment of the present siti 
tion is that the dominant trend in Indochi , 
in that part of the world, is North Viet-Na , 
and that it must be counterbalanced, if it c 
be counterbalanced at all, by the Peopl 
Republic of China. It does not reflect hos ■ 
ity to the United States. The leaders of Th • 
land we know are basically well dispo.M^ 
toward the United States. 

It is their assessment that the risks tl* 
they would run by maintaining signific! 
American military forces there are greai 
than the benefits that would come fr 
them. And it illustrates what Senator ToTi" 
said earlier: A foreign policy decision hai 
multiplier effect. If we want to maintain < 
defense far from our shores, other countr 
must have the conviction that the Unr 
States is relevant to their problem. If tl 
does not exist, they will not run what see 
to them an unnecessary risk. That is the r I 
structure of what is going on in Thaila* 
And which of the various factions domin» 
is really less impoi'tant than their percept 
of the lessons of Viet-Nam. 


Department of State Bulli 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Dallas March 23 

Press release 145 dated March 23 

Secretary Kissinger: I will take questions 
first from local reporters before I expose 
you to the savage folkways of Washington. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you issued some 
rather stern warmings against Cuba — ivarn- 
ings stemming from Cuba's adventure in 
Africa. What measures is this country rvill- 
iiig to take to make sure that these kinds of 
adventures don't happen again, or ivhat ivould 
we do if, in fact, they did? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not prepared at 
this time to go beyond what I said yester- 
day. We have made clear that we are op- 
posed — we cannot accept — any fui'ther 
Cuban military adventures. 

We have also made clear that we stand 
strongly for a majority rule and a rapid 
political change in southern Africa, but not 
to be brought about by outside military 

What we will do in concrete circumstances, 
I do not think I should say under present 
conditions. And we are still studying this. 

Q. What options are open to you? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible for 
any senior official to put out, ahead of time, 
all the things that the United States will or 
will not do in all the circumstances that may 
arise. But we have pointed out the dangers 
to Cuba. We are serious about what we have 
said, and we hope that it will not be neces- 
sary to answer your question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will we rely on military 
intervention or a possible invasion of Cuba? 

Secretary Kissinger: I just do not want to 
go into any specific measures, from which 

you should not draw any conclusions either 
for or against. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you think you ivill 
have the backing of Congress in the things 
that you said last night? 

Secretary Kissinger: The first duty of peo- 
ple in responsible positions is to put foi-ward 
their best judgment of what the situation 
requires before a crisis occurs. We were 
accused in the case of Angola of not having 
made the issues clear. We are now making 
the issues clear; and we think that if we 
persist in this, we will have the support of 
Congress. But there is no concrete decision 
that we are asking the Congress to take at 
this moment. 

Q. Btit ivith all due respect, you are not 
making the issues clear. You are making them 
deliberately ambiguous, whereas if you 
wanted to make them clear, you could rule 
out the military option. 

Secretary Kissinger: We are making the 
issues clear. We cannot state ahead of time 
what we will do in what circumstances when 
we don't know what the circumstances yet 

We have made clear our opposition and 
our nonacceptance of further Cuban military 
actions. And beyond this, we will not now 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, what is the United States 
doing to make sure that the transition from 
a minority government in South Africa and 
Rhodesia comes about? Why is the United 
States — like $1 billion — why is $1 billion in- 
vested in South Africa if the United States 
is concerned about that government becoming 
a majority-ruled government ? 

April 12, 1976 


Secretary Kissinger: The United States in 
recent weeks, both the President and I, have 
strongly supported a majority rule in 
Rhodesia. Yesterday we publicly backed the 
proposals of the British Foreign Secretary, 
which go in the same direction in a very 
concrete way — and we have declared them 

I plan to go to Africa at the end of April, 
and I will have further talks there with 
African leaders about means to achieve these 
objectives. I stated in my speech yesterday 
that the United States will work for these 
objectives. I have also stated that we will 
not work under the pressure of Cuban 
threats. This is the framework of our basic 

Question of Israeli Boundaries 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your attempts to get 
Israel to ivithdraiv fully back to 1967 bound- 
aries, don't you think that is leaning more 
toward Egypt's needs rather than Israel's 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not stated 
a position on where the final boundaries 
should be, and the United States has exer- 
cised no pressure with respect to any speci- 
fic final boundaries. 

Up to now, the negotiations between Israel 
and the Arab states have concerned inter- 
mediate steps in which the issue of final 
boundaries has not arisen, and there is no 
negotiation going on now in which final 
boundaries have been discussed, nor has the 
United States stated a position on final 

Q. Why was the word "detente" recently 
dropped from your vocabidary? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because the President 
ordered it. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, Senator Byrd [Senator 
Robert C. Byrd, W. Va.] said today that your 
statements about Cuban intervention shoidd 
have come from the President himself. We 
can assume, can we not, that you are talking 
ivith the full approval of the President? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, my state- 
ments were read by the President, were dis- 
cussed again with the President shortly be- 
fore I left Washington. And of course 1 
would not make such statements without the 
full and detailed approval of the President. 

Desirability of Foreign Policy Debate 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you seemed to indicate 
in your Boston speech that campaign rhetoric 
regarding the relevant implementation of our 
foreign policy was detrimental to that issue. 
Do you mean by that that it is not a viable 
campaign issue for the President to — 

Secretary Kissinger: I think if you read 
the entire text of my Boston speech, I did 
not say that debate of our foreign policy was 
undesirable. In fact, I stated very clearly that 
debate on our foreign policy was useful and, 
indeed, essential. 

What I did say was that certain mislead- 
ing statements did not help the conduct of 
foreign policy, and I tried to explain why I 
believe this. 

I do believe that essentially the foreign 
policy of the United States ought to be non- 
partisan. I believe this because foreign coun- 
tries that have to deal with us should not 
have to worry that every four to eight years 
there will be radical changes in the direction 
of our foreign policy, because that itself is 
an element of insecurity. 

And therefore, I feel very strongly, which- 
ever party is in office, that a major effort 
should be made to conduct foreign policy 
on as nonpartisan a basis as is possible. 
That does not mean that issues cannot be 
discussed, but it means that the issues should 
be separated as much as possible from 
strictly partisan controversy. So I dealt with 
certain charges, specific charges, that had 
been made. 

I specifically believe that there are many 
issues of foreign policy that are important to 
discuss, and must be discussed, and I have 
attempted in my speeches to lay out in great 
detail, and in some complexity, how the Ad- 
ministration views its foreign policy and its 
relationship between defense policy and for- 


Department of Stale Bulletin 

eign policy. And in that framework, I think 
discussions with that degree of detail can be 
extremely helpful. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we did not act in Angola, 
and ive didn't, to a certain extent, act in Viet- 
'Nam before the fall. Why should the Cubans 
believe that tve will act if they invade Rho- 
desia, for example? What precedent is there 
to convince them? 

Secretary Kissinger: I can only state the 
policy of the United States — what we will do, 
how we will do it. 

You have called attention to an important 
problem, which is that the credibility of the 
United States is one of the issues in the con- 
duct of our foreign policy. It is one of the 
problems we now have. But we cannot do 
more than to state, as solemnly as we can, 
what the framework of our policy is. 

Q. You are becoming increasingly a political 
target in this election year. Would you con- 
sider resigning if Henry Kissinger becomes 
7 political liability to the Ford Administ 
tion ? 


Secretary Kissinger: Well, that is such an 
inconceivable idea to me that I haven't ad- 
dressed it. [Laughter.] 

But I think that I am not holding office 
simply to hold office. I am trying to serve 
the country, and if I should not be able to 
serve the country properly, then I would of 
.•ourse resign. 

Position on Southern Africa 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if Cuba were to move 
against Rhodesia or South West Africa and 
the United States were to take action to 
thwart those Cuban moves, hoiv could the 
American action be kept separate from the 
appearance of support for a white minority 

Secretary Kissinger: I think we cannot 
possibly go into the details of a situation 
that has not yet arisen and that it is our 
purpose to keep from arising. 

The United States will support the U.N. 
resolution on Namibia. 

The United States supports the British 
initiative on Rhodesia. 

The United States will put forward its 
own conceptions on the occasion of my visit 
to Africa. That is our positive program. 

Now, what we will do in circumstances 
which I hope will not arise and which cannot 
arise unless the Soviet Union gives support to 
Cuba and unless Cuba is determined on ad- 
venturous courses — that I do not believe is 
fruitful now to discuss. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have Cuba and the Soviet 
Union been advised in some degree of speci- 
ficity the consequences of such action? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am assuming that 
our public comment will be read in the vari- 
ous embassies, and I think that, in addition, 
they know what our views are. 

The Conflict in Lebanon 

Q. On the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger, would 
you assess the idea that Syria, being heavily 
backed by the Soviet Union, and Egypt, now 
having renounced its alliance with the Soviet 
Union, that Israel in the Middle East might 
be called forivard as a balancing factor in 
favor of the Syrians ? 

Secretary Kissinger: That Israel — ? 

Q. Excuse me. That Israel, in favor of the 
Egyptians, that Israel might be introduced^ 
into the Lebanon conflict in some manner as 
a balancing factor in favor of the Egyptians. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Egypt is not 
directly involved in the Lebanon conflict, and 
any parallel action between Israel and Egypt, 
on any Arab problem, seems to me out of 
the question. 

We have urged all of the parties in Leba- 
non and concerned with Lebanon to exercise 
maximum restraint. The United States could 
not understand unilateral military action by 
any party. We support the coexistence of the 
two communities — Christian and Moslem — 
in Lebanon, and we are using our influence 
to bring about or to encourage a negotiated 

j April 12, 1976 


outcome with no outside intervention by any 

Q. But this would be unprecedented — with- 
out precedent — because didn't Israel exercise 
influence for King Hussein in some of these 
disturbances in Jordan? Isn't that pretty well 
known, really? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, not by me. But 
in any event — 

Q. But it has been in the papers. 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to be 
offensive, but not everything in the papers 
is necessarily known by me. [Laughter.] But 
our position is that we warn all countries, 
Israel or Syria or any other country, against 
unilateral military moves in the Lebanese 
situation, for any reason. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will General Secretary 
Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Sec- 
retary of the Central Committee of the Com- 
munist Party of the Soviet Unioni visit the 
United States this spring? Or rvill that be 
delayed, given the problems with detente? 

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been 
understood that General Secretary Brezhnev 
would not visit the United States unless 
there is a SALT agreement. We cannot tell 
yet whether or when there will be a SALT 
agreement, and therefore the question of a 
possible visit cannot arise until that decision 
has been made. 

Panama Canal Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Ronald Reagan has ac- 
cused the Ford Administration of negotiating 
to give away the Panama Canal. What are the 
State Department's goals in the Panama ne- 
gotiations? .And, in effect, are you negotiat- 
ing to give away the Panama Canal? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is a tough cam- 
paign, and we can understand that it is nec- 
essary to summarize some issues so that 
they are out of recognition. 

First of all, the State Department is not 
negotiating by itself. The State Department, 

most of the time, is an organ of the U.S. 
Government. Our negotiations on Panama 
are conducted on the basis of a joint position 
developed between the Department of State, 
the Department of Defense, and the Chair- 
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

The issue is not between Panama and the 
United States, but the issue is the relation- 
ship of the United States to the whole West- 
ern Hemisphere. And therefore what we are 
exploring, on the basis of a joint position of 
all of the agencies, is whether it is possible 
to negotiate an agreement that preserves the 
essential American interests in the defense 
of the Panama Canal and the essential Amer- 
ican interests in the safe operation of the 
Panama Canal while taking into account 
some of the Latin American concerns with 
respect to the water and land rights and 
some of the jurisdictional issues. This is the 
issue that is now being negotiated. 

Q. Well, why did you change the 1903 

Secretary Kissinger: We have not yet 
changed the 1903 treaty. That is the subject 
of negotiations. The negotiations have not 
been concluded. When they are concluded, 
they must be approved by the Congress. The 
Congress is being kept fully informed about 
what is being negotiated. And only then can 
a judgment be made. But the issue emphat- 
ically is not to give away the Panama Canal. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the 60-page 
report that the State Department and other 
officials received from President Nixon? Did 
it have any significant or helpful information? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated that it 
was generally helpful, and it gave a full ac- 
count of President Nixon's conversations and 
his impressions. And since he was the first 
American to have extensive talks — he was 
the only American to have extensive talks — 
with the new Acting Premier of China, and 
because he had extensive talks with Chair- 
man Mao, we found the report generally 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt has 


Department of State Bulletin 

aid that, based on personal conversatiotis 
vith you, he feels that your view of America's 
vie in future history is pessimistic, that 
imerica is on the downgrade, and that you 
Mve to get the best kind of deal you can from 
he Soviet Union because of America's in- 
erior position. If you feel that this is an in- 
orrect assessment, what precisely is your 
ietv of America's future role? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am going to nomi- 
,ate the good admiral for the Pulitzer Prize 
or fiction. And he has not yet fully realized 
hat his opponent in the Virginia senatorial 
ampaign is called "Byrd," not "Kissinger." 

I do not believe that the United States 
/ill be defeated. I do not believe that the 
Jnited States is on the decline. I do not 
elieve that the United States must get the 
est deal it can. 

I believe that the United States is essen- 
ial to preserve the security of the free world 
nd for any progress in the world that exists. 

In a period of great national difficulty, of 
le Viet-Nam war, of Watergate, of endless 
ivestigations, we have tried to preserve the 
ale of the United States as that major fac- 
n\ And I believe that to explain to the 
.merican people that the policy is complex, 
lat our involvement is permanent, and that 
ur problems are nevertheless soluble, is a 
ign of optimism and of confidence in the 
.merican people, rather than the opposite. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please com- 
lent on the recent book written by Mr. Golan, 
articularly on the fact that he accused you 
f negotiating in bad faith in the Middle 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is an in- 
ustry now of books about me. I have not 
ead the Golan book, and I do not intend to 
ead the Golan book. 

I have read excerpts in various newspa- 
ers. I have yet to find one that is not either 
Dtally inaccurate or substantially distorted or 
taken out of context that it has no mean- 
ig. For that reason — and on the doctor's 
dvice to keep my blood pressure within 

some reasonable ranges — I have decided not 
to read the Golan book. 

Relations With People's Republic of China 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it is reported that you 
and President Ford have lost the chance for 
the United States to get a China-U.S. agree- 
ment, although President Nixon and you got 
us in a very advantageous position in that re- 
gard, in that you and the President did not 
take action at a point when you were able to 
— also, that detente with the Soviets is 
virtually ineffective without a China-U.S. 
agreement. Is that true? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are pursuing the 
basic policy that was set out in the Shang- 
hai communique, which is to move toward 
normalization with the People's Republic of 
China. We are doing that at the pace that is 
consistent with the American national inter- 
ests, and it is essentially the policy that was 
also pursued in the previous Administration. 

As far as using one of the Communist 
countries against the other is concerned, this 
is beyond the scope of American foreign 
policy. Both of these countries are led by 
leaders of some experience. They will pur- 
sue their own interests. We cannot manipu- 
late them to serve our own. We will normal- 
ize our relations with the People's Republic 
of China, as we have indicated in the Shang- 
hai communique, but we are not going to do 
this on the basis of anti-Soviet maneuvers, 
anymore than our policy toward the Soviet 
Union is motivated by anti-Chinese inten- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night you tvere asked, 
folloiving the dinner, about the problems of 
"ivetback" labor in Texas and Arizona and 
other border states. Where on the spectrum 
of priorities does this lie in the State Depart- 
ment ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I will tell you, it is a 
big organization — the State Department is a 
big organization — and I would be misleading 
you if I gave you the impression that when I 

Vpril 12, 1976 


come in in the morning at 8 o'clock, my first 
question is: What is happening to the "wet- 
back" problem on the Texas-Arizona Irorder? 
[Laughter.] We recognize it as a problem. It 
is being worked on, but — 

Q. On a scale of 1 to 100, where would it 
lie? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I can't count that 
high, not without taking off my shoes. 

Jewish Emigration From the Soviet Union 

Q. What is the Administration's cur)'ent 
position on the Jews of Soviet Russia who 
are desirous of leaving hut meet with restric- 
tions ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Administration, 
in a way, started this whole issue of Jewish 

In 1969, there were 400 Jews leaving the 
Soviet Union. As our relationship with the 
Soviet Union developed, we made it clear in 
a quiet, nongovernmental fashion — or non- 
confrontational fashion — that our own judg- 
ment of the sincerity of the Soviet Union in 
improving relations would be affected by 
what they did in what was essentially a do- 
mestic problem. By these methods, the emi- 
gration rose from 400 in 1969 to 35,000-plus 
in 1973. At that point, it became an issue of 
government-to-government confrontation as 
a result of legislative pressure, and the rate 
of emigration declined. 

We continue to believe that the best meth- 
ods for achieving progress are those of quiet 
diplomacy and not of government-to-govern- 
ment confrontation. 

Q. Is this still a concern of the Administra- 
tion, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been a 
concern of the Administration, and it re- 
mains a concern of the Administration. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, looking back at the Nixon 
Administration, the buck has been passed back 
and forth in regard to wiretapping. Who 
ordered the iviretapping , you or Mr. Nixon? 

Secretary Kissinger: Look, it is highly im , 
proper to discuss publicly a complicated issu( | 
in which depositions are taken over man,^ 
hours and for any of the parties to this con 
troversy to give their version, as has beei 
done. The versions that have been given t( 
the press do not, in my view, reflect what i; 
in the documents. But beyond that, I do no 
want to go. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how significant was thi 
revelation of multinational payoffs to coum 
tries like Japan and Italy to their continueo 
survival and our relations with them? 

Secretary Kissinger: The revelations havt 
had a very serious effect on the domestic siti 
nation of many of these countries. That ii 
not to condone what went on there — that i, 
not to condone the actions that are implicil 
in these revelations. But it has produced comi 
plicated domestic issues in many of thesi 

We are pursuing the investigation now bj 
judicial means, and we are making availabU 
to the countries concerned in their judicia* 
processes what we find out. We do not be 
lieve that these issues should be tried ii 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, ivhat is the status of th 
XSSM 39 [National Security Study Memo 
randum] deal, a)id why was it nicknamed th 
"tarbaby memo"? 

Seoetary Kissinger: You have got me. 
have never heard of the phrase "the tarbabj 
memo." In fact, I don't even know what it is 

Q. The policy on southern Africa that yo\ 
wrote — 

Secretary Kissinger: No. First of all, I are" 
flattered to be given so much credit — and ii 
you gave me half a chance, I would prob 
ably take more. 

But you have to understand what thes* 
memoranda were. They were written in th( 
early days of the Nixon Administration b^ 
an interdepartmental process. I did not writi 
it. I did not participate in the writing of it 
They reflected an interdepartmental process 
by which various options were put befon 


Department of State Bulletir 

he President that stated in a general way — 
11 a very general way — what the basic direc- 
ions of the policy would be. Of three or four 
iptions — I do not remember the details — the 
'resident chose one. But the papers were not 
vritten by me, nor did I participate in their 
writing. Nor can you deduce the foreign pol- 
cy of this government by a paper that was 
vritten early in the Nixon Administration 
nd which indicated just a very general ori- 
ntation in a period more than seven years 

('ertainly what has been said on southern 
Africa in recent months is quite different 
rom what is in that document. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is the eighth or ninth 
top recently for you. Is this politically in- 
clined to help President Ford's campaign, 
'articidarly with the criticism that opponents 
are leveled at his foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have been making a 
rip about once a month since January 1975. 

usually give speeches of reasonable com- 
lexity, in which you don't get to the verb 
ntil about the third page, so they do not 
nid themselves to easy political rhetoric. 

What I am attempting to do in these 
peeches and in these private meetings that 

have is to put before the public and the 
jadership groups in various cities our ap- 
roach to foreign policy. And I deliberately 
ry to put it in all its complexity so that 
hey can see how it looks to those who have 

decision to make. 

I spend much of my time — I spent about 
our hours today — answering questions so 
hat I can learn what is on the minds of 
eople in these towns. 

I have done this long before the campaign 
tarted. I am attempting to do it in a non- 
lartisan manner. I do not attack people. I 
lave to respond if somebody criticizes an 
spect of our foreign policy. I have to ex- 
ilain what our foreign policy is. But I do 
lot participate in the political campaign. I 
vill not participate, and I will not give par- 
isan speeches. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Mexican Govern- 
nent complained in any manner to the gov- 

ernment of this country on the jailbreak in 
Piedras Negras a couple weeks ago, in which 
it was reported that possibly a couple from 
across the border in this country partici- 
pated in the jailbreak? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is not my day for 
Mexican problems. [Laughter.] 

This morning, I was asked a question 
about something in a private meeting, some- 
thing that happened that I didn't know 
about, and I frankly haven't heard about 
that jailbreak — from which I assume that 
the Mexican Government has not complained 
to us. But maybe it was considered too com- 
plicated by our Assistant Secretary for Latin 
American affairs for me to handle. [Laugh- 

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Program 
for Education in Southern Africa 

Folloiving is the text of a letter dated 
March 19 from William W. Scranton, U.S. 
Representative to the United Natioyis, to Kurt 
Waldheini, U.N. Secretary General. 

USUN press release 34 dated March 19 

The Permanent Representative of the 
United States presents his compliments to 
the Secretary-General and has the honor 
to inform him that the United States hereby 
pledges the amount of $50,000, subject to 
United States Congressional approval, to the 
United Nations Educational and Training 
Program for Southern Africa for 1976, with 
the stipulation that this contribution is to be 
specially earmarked for training for Na- 
mibians. The United States fully recognizes 
the United Nations' unique responsibility for 
Namibia and considers it a necessary and 
appropriate effort to aid some of the ter- 
ritory's people. 

The United States makes its pledge on the 
condition that its contribution shall not ex- 
ceed one-third of the total voluntary con- 
tributions to the United Nations Educational 
and Training Program for Southern Africa. 

April 12, 1976 


Secretary Kissinger Addresses Foreign Diplomat Travel Program 

Followhig are remarks made by Secretarti 
Kissinger on March 22 at a Travel Program 
for Foreign Diplomats, Inc., luncheon at the 
Department of State, together with the tran- 
script of the questions and answers which 

Press release 143 dated March 22 


Chairman [Robert B.] Anderson, Chair- 
man [Melvin] Laird, ladies and gentlemen: 
No one who has been in and out of Washing- 
ton over the past few decades can fail to be 
impressed with the exceptional caliber of 
diplomatic representation here and, indeed, 
at consular posts around our country. Many 
of the diplomats stationed here are graduates 
of American universities. Most of them speak 
Enghsh almost as well as I do. And, most 
importantly, they are impressively — indeed, 
sometimes disconcertingly — familiar with the 
complexity of America's institutions, the 
variety of our people, and the range of 
American opinion. 

Diplomacy has changed markedly since the 
days of my old friend Metternich. In those 
days diplomats could learn all they needed to 
know about the country to which they were 
accredited by attending the right salons and 
dances or courting the Grand Duchess. 

Today, though we might all regret it, that 
is not enough. Today the people count. And 
the people are increasingly aware of the 
impact of government and international re- 
lations on their lives. Interdependence, they 
know, is not a slogan but a reality. This has 
imposed on diplomats everywhere a new and 
complex but fascinating responsibility to 
know more about the culture and people of 
the country to which they are posted. 

The enormous impact of public opinion 
American foreign pohcy is sufficient reaso 
for foreign diplomats to take advantage c 
the travel program — and for me to seek t 
spend as much time as I can listening to tH 
American people and exchanging views wit 

Since I became Secretary of State, I haw 
given nearly 20 speeches around the countrj 
The format usually includes a major speed 
before regional groups interested in foreigi 
policy, a press conference, and other oppon 
tunities for dialogues, so that I have beei 
listening as well as talking. Let me tell you 
little of what I have learned: 



— First, it is clear to me that the America 
people neither share nor understand th 
cynicism and hypocrisy and the pretens 
which seem to afflict Washington. Our pec 
pie know that their economic well-being i 
tied to a global economy. They know thf 
their security depends on global stabilit; 
And they know that their values must be d« 
fended, and their hopes must be shared an 
fulfilled through cooperation. 

Americans still believe that their countr 
has a vital role to play in the world. The 
are convinced that our problems and th 
world's problems can be solved only with 
constructive American contribution. The 
know that America has permanent interest 
and purposes that go beyond partisanshi 
and reach far into the future and must b 
sustained long after the issues and the pas 
sions of an election year are past. 

— Second, there is a continuing awarenes 
of the importance of our relations with ou 
traditional friends and allies among the in 
dustrial democracies of the North Atlantii 
community and East Asia. Our shared mora 
and cultural heritage and the similarity o; 
the domestic and international challenge; 



Department of State Bulletir 

facing our societies make coordination among 
us ever more essential to the success of our 
efforts, whether in relations among ourselves 
or with other nations of the world. 

— Third, there is a consensus in this coun- 
try on the need for peace through strength. 
Reasonable people may disagree over how 
much American strength is enough to pro- 
tect our security or the precise balance of 
advantage one should seek or expect in our 
relationship with potential adversaries. Our 
people know we must be strong — in strategic 
and in conventional forces — if the global 
balance of stability is to be maintained. They 
know as well that our power must be usable 
and that the world must know we have the 
will to use it when needed. The American 
people seek security, peace, and stability, 
without either confrontation or capitulation. 

— And finally, I have found an increasing 
realization of the importance of relations be- 
tween America and other industrial nations 
and the developing world. Foreign assistance 
legislation, which had become increasingly 
unpopular in the country and the Congress 
in recent years, has regained support. The 
traditional generous impulses of the Ameri- 
can people always will be aroused by human 
tragedies such as the recent devastation in 
Guatemala. And our concept of fairness will, 
I believe, support changes in the interna- 
tional economic system to improve opportuni- 
ties for developing countries to share in its 
management and its benefits. We are, of 
course, tired of the confrontationist rhetoric 
often directed against us, but we realize that 
there is, after all, only one world. Problems 
such as population, the environment, and the 
use of the oceans can only be solved by inter- 
national accommodation and cooperation — no 
one country alone has the resources or the 
ability to do what must be done. If we are 
met fairly and in a sense of mutual respect 
and practical cooperation, America stands 
ready to respond positively and to help build 
a new era of international cooperation. 

Ladies and gentlemen, all of the nations 
represented here today — all of the nations 
that have at one time or another benefited 
from the travel program — have much to do 

together. International cooperation is no 
longer an idea ; it is an inescapable necessity. 
The traditional patterns of international con- 
duct are no longer suflncient. Ambition, 
threat, and oppression can only delay our 
common progress and hasten our mutual 
decline. We have no more urgent task than 
to get to know each other better — to under- 
stand that the positive aspirations of all our 
peoples can be reconciled and that, together, 
we can build a better world for ourselves and 
the generations that follow after us. 

We here today represent different cultures, 
different governments, and different interests 
— but the common ground for our effort is 
the well-being of humanity, and our common 
responsibility is to find ways to promote that 
well-being. The travel program that many of 
you here today have so generously sponsored 
and others of you have participated in is an 
important contribution to mutual under- 
standing and a common determination to 
rise above the issues that divide nations so 
that we may, together, work for the brother- 
hood of man and the progress, with justice 
and freedom, of the human community. 

My congratulations to those diplomats who 
have been able to take advantage of the 
travel program; and my grateful thanks, 
on behalf of the Department of State and 
the President, to the sponsors of the program 
for their unique and valuable private con- 
tribution to understanding among peoples 
and nations. 


Mr. Laird: Ladies and gentlemen, the Sec- 
retary of State has agreed to respond to a few 
questions. And we are going to open up the 
program for four questions — three or four — 
and I tvould like to present the Secretary of 
State to answer those questions at this time. 
Who will be first? 

Secretary Kissinger: When I agreed to do 
this, I didn't realize that there would be so 
many diplomats here who now will write 
reports of truly staggering profundity and so 
many newsmen who can now put a dateline 

April 12, 1976 


on what they have already written. 
[Laughter] . 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you like to com- 
ment on your trip to South America and con- 
clusions or any observations of how we can 
better work with our neighbors down south? 

Secretary Kissinger: This was my first 
visit to Latin America, except for visits to 
Mexico and one trip to Brazil many years 
ago — about 15 years ago. 

I was very impressed by the eagerness of 
the host countries to work with us on finding 
some means of cooperation in the Western 
Hemisphere and the realization that here in 
the Western Hemisphere we have many com- 
mon problems and a tradition of working to- 
gether that could be an example for relations 
between developed and developing countries. 

There are, of course, special issues, which 
we all know- — the transfer of technology, a 
great concern with what is considered to be 
growing protectionism in the United States, 
some concern over provisions of our trade 
legislation. I visited Latin America in the 
aftermath of Angola, and I would say that 
there was a profound concern with the long- 
term intentions of Cuba. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
we are now working on a program which we 
will submit at the meeting of the OAS in 
June, as I had indicated we would do when I 
stopped in Venezuela. We will see whether 
we can work out some answers to the con- 
cerns of Latin Americans. We have sug- 
gested for a long time some code of conduct 
for multinational corporations which would 
spell out, on the one hand, the responsibilities 
of the multinational corporations but, on the 
other hand, the responsibilities of the host 
governments to the multinational corpora- 
tions, because in the long term it will have to 
be private investment that will have to 
supply the technology and the transfer of 
capital that so many of the countries there 
need for an accelerated economic growth. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to com- 
ment on Lebanon and any part that we are 
playing to arrange a peace in that war-torn 
country ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the question is 
the situation in Lebanon and what part wp 
can play to bring peace to that country. 

The basic problem in Lebanon is that the 
traditional balance between the Christian 
community and the Moslem community has 
broken down, partly as the result of the in- 
flux of Palestinians, so that probably the 
Palestinians are the best organized — certain- 
ly the best armed — group in the country, 
and that therefore the slight preponderance 
of influence that the Christian community 
enjoyed until last summer is now being con- 

In the process of the civil war, the Leb- 
anese Army has been gradually reduced in 
effectiveness so that there is no local force 
that can maintain the peace — or no effective^ 
local force that can maintain the peace — andl 
therefore various outside Arab countries have 
attempted to influence events, always keep- 
ing in mind the danger that there might be 
an Israeli move if substantial outside forces 
were introduced. 

The United States is interested in the 
unity and sovereignty of Lebanon. It believes' 
that both communities should find a way to 
live together as, after all, they have throughi 
most of Lebanon's history. We have madefl 
efforts to be diplomatically helpful. We have 
talked to many of the Arab states. We have 
of course been in touch especially with Syria, 
which has played a mediating role, and with 
Egypt, with which we exchange ideas on all 
subjects of mutual concern. 

There is nothing we can do physically, but 
we are trying to bring home to all of the 
parties concerned the consequences of irre- 
sponsible action. 

When there is a promising course, we have 
occasionally taken it up with one or the other 
of the parties ; and we have strongly warned 
all outside countries, including Israel and in- 
cluding Syria, against rash military moves, 
because the United States could not support 
unilateral intervention — indeed, would oppose 
unilateral intervention. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you find that govern- 
ments have a tendency to hold back or delay 


Department of State Bulletin 

onimitments in the year of the Presidential 

Secretary Kissinger: Most of all, our gov- 
■rnment. [Laughter.] But I think there are 
I lot of countries that are watching events. 

have noticed that with the primary victories 
if the President, the willingness to make 
ommitments by other countries is begin- 
ling to increase — not that they would ever 
nterfere in our domestic affairs. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the tveek of April 12- 
6, a meeting was planned, organized by the 
Itate Institute of Technology and Science 
rum Russia and the Stanford Research In- 
titute, to be held in San Francisco; and one 
■y one the Soviet delegation indicated it ivill 
'ot come. The meeting has now been canceled, 
lo you feel that this is part of a geyieral 
•rcakdown of the agreements made [»i- 
mlible'] 1 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think there has 
leen a general breakdown in the agreements 
hat have been made in the last few years, 
nd I would like to stress that the basic direc- 
ion of, on the one hand, resisting aggressive 
aoves but, on the other hand, looking for a 
tabler and more secure international envi- 
onment — that basic direction has not been 
hanged. And, indeed, there is no realistic 
Iternative for it. 

We have taken very strong objection to 
ioviet actions and Cuban actions in Angola, 
nd we will not hold still for a repetition of 
imilar actions. We have made this clear, but 
ve believe that fundamentally the problem 
if peace, the problem of how to establish a 
afer international environment, when both 
ides have tremendous thermonuclear arse- 
lals, is a basic problem of our period which 
iny Administration would have to face and 
vhich must be solved in our time. 

Mr. Laird: Woidd you take one more ques- 
ion, and then we'll be through. 

Secretary Kissinger: As long as it isn't 
'rom you. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of General Haig's 
•ecent remarks — 

Secretary Kissinger: He makes so many. 
Which ones? 

Q. The last one, assessing the rise of Soviet 
power in its armed forces in Europe. And in 
view of the observations of other experts and 
by virtue of the certain political develop- 
ments in Western Europe, what do you fore- 
see [inaudible] America's role in Western 
Europe ? 

Secretary Kis.^inger: Well, first, let us get 
clear about the growth of Soviet power. 
Soviet power is undoubtedly growing — so, 
for that matter, is ours. It is inevitable that 
a country with the industrial base and the 
technology of the Soviet Union will gradually 
expand its military capability. And as Soviet 
forces are modernized, they also become more 
effective. Therefore, inevitably, Soviet power 
will grow. And if we want to torment our- 
selves, every four years some Administration 
can be accused that during its term of office 
Soviet power has grown, and that will be 
true. The problem is not whether Soviet power 
gi'ows; the problem is whether we can resist 
it, whether we can balance it. For that, we 
have the capability. 

Now, in Western Europe, as in many de- 
mocracies, there have been strong pressures 
on the defense program because of the re- 
cession, because of, in some countries, the 
domestic conditions. Therefore the buildup 
of European forces in some European coun- 
tries has not been as rapid as we would have 
wished and has certainly not kept pace with 
the growth of the Soviet forces. 

Over a period of time this is going to pro- 
duce a weakness in the capacity for regional 
defense in Europe — and that at the precise 
moment when the thermonuclear forces, no 
matter what is done, are going to come more 
and more into balance. This is the strategic 
problem of the next decade, and the only 
thing we have to remember is that its solu- 
tion depends on the willingness of the West- 
ern countries — including the United States — 
to maintain adequate defense budgets and 
that we should not blame the Soviet Union 
for our own failure to maintain our defense 
budgets if we don't do it. 

April 12, 1976 


With respect to the domestic developments 
in various countries, I have been warned that 
I am talking too much about that as it is ; 
but I have stated repeatedly that the United 
States considers that the advent of Commu- 
nist parties to power in European countries, 
or in NATO countries, is bound to weaken 
NATO, and it is bound to lead to a set of 
domestic priorities which will enhance this 
defense problem which we have described, 
which will shift the spectrum of foreign 
policy more toward a neutralist dii'ection, 
and which is therefore a source of great con- 
cern to us. 

Ultimately, obviously, it depends on the 
voters of the countries concerned. But if we 
are asked, we are going to say what our pre- 
diction of the consequences is. 

But, again, I would like to stress: The 
problem of defense of the West is soluble, and 
it is soluble by Western efforts. 

Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland 
Visits the United States 

Liam Cosgrave, Pritne Minister of Ireland, 
made an official visit to the United States 
March 17-22. While in Washington March 
17-18, he met with President Ford and other 
government officials and addressed a joint 
meeting of the Congress.^ Following is the 
text of a U.S.-Ireland joint communique dated 
March 17 and released March 18. 

V\'hitt' House press release dated March 18 

1. The President welcomed the Prime 
Minister and stressed the significance he 
attached to the visit in connection with the 
celebration of the Bicentennial of American 
independence. The Prime Minister agreed 
with this view and thanked the President 
for his invitation. Both the President and 
the Prime Minister expressed the conviction 
that the visit would help to strengthen the 

ties of kinship, friendship, affection aE 
mutual interest which bind their countri. 
so closely. 

2. The President and the Prime Minist( 
discussed matters of common concern inclu' 
ing international political developments ar 
economic matters. The two leaders also di 
cussed the development of the Europea 
Economic Community and Ireland's place : 
its progress. 

3. On economic matters, both welcome 
the close relations that exist between the 
two countries, and the Prime Minister ind 
cated in particular the welcome of his Go 
ernment for American investment in Irelai 
and the benefits to the two countries whit 
could accrue from it. The President and tl 
Prime Minister reviewed the improvii 
economic picture on both sides of the Atlant 
and, in this connection, the President unde 
scored the importance of close consultatioi 
and cooperation between the United Stat 
and the European Community. 

4. The President and the Prime Ministi 
noted with regret the continued violeni 
arising from the Northern Ireland situatio 
They deplored all support for organizatioi 
involved directly or indirectly in campaigi 
of violence and reiterated in particular the 
determination to continue and to intensi: 
their cooperation in the prosecution of illeg 
activities. They appealed to the Americ; 
and Irish people to refrain from supportin 
with financial or other aid, this violence. 

5. The Prime Minister invited the Pres 
dent to visit Ireland at a mutually agreeab 
future date, and the President accepted tl 
invitation with pleasure. 

' For exchanges of greetings and toasts betwei 
President Ford and Prime Minister Cosgrave ( 
Mar. 17, see Weekly Compilation of Presidenti 
Documents dated Mar. 22, 1976, pp. 438 and 443; fi 
the Prime Minister's address before a joint meetir 
of the Congress, see Congressional Record of Mar. 1 
1976, p. H 2006. 


Department of State Bulleti 


The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger ' 

There could be no better moment for the 
'dispassionate public discussion and national 
ielf-examination" in foreign policy for which 
it^ou, Mr. Chairman [Senator John J. Spark- 
nan], have called these hearings. 

The moment is propitious not primarily 
because of the numerical happenstance of 
)ur 200th year, or of the political milestone 
)f this Presidential election campaign, but 
:)ecause of the era we have entered in inter- 
lational affairs. It is a moment to take stock 
)f our country's record and consider our fu- 
:ure course, to reflect about the transforma- 
:ions of the international order which we can 
serceive from this vantage point — some al- 
ready completed and some still in train — 
that have altered many of the circumstances 
in which American foreign policy is con- 

Today I want to focus on what lies ahead 
of us: the international issues that will con- 
front the American public, the President, 
and the Congress, regardless of party, as we 
enter our third century. For we must re- 
member, amid all our debates, that this 
nation has permanent interests and concerns 
in the world that must be preserved through 
and beyond this election year. This nation 
faces objective conditions in the world that 
are not the result of the machinations of 
personalities nor even, often, the product of 
our national decisions. They are realities 

; ' Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on Mar. 16 during hearings on foreign pol- 
icy choices for the 1970's and 1980's (text from press 
release 127). The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 

■ Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

brought by the ebb and flow of history. The 
issues they raise must be addressed with 
seriousness, understanding, and objectivity if 
we as a people are to remain masters of 
events and of our own destiny. 
As President Ford has said : - 

.\merica has had a unique role in the world since 
the day of our independence 200 years ago. And ever 
since the end of World War II we have borne suc- 
cessfully a heavy responsibility for insuring a stable 
world order and hope for human progress. 

That responsibility continues — not only as 
a task we shoulder for others or in fulfill- 
ment of our ideals, but as a responsibility to 
ourselves — to create a world environment in 
which America and its values can thrive. 

Mr. Chairman, in foreign policy we stand 
on the firm ground of America's strength 
and clear purpose. We face the future with 
confidence. We have made considerable prog- 
ress in strengthening partnership with our 
allies, in managing the global issues of peace 
and security, and in beginning a new era of 
cooperation on the global problems of inter- 
dependence. The potential for further ad- 
vance is great. 

But today the world looks anxiously to 
America to gauge whether we will choose to 
build upon this progress. They ask whether 
America will use its strength to respond to 
today's challenges. One of the greatest fac- 
tors of uncertainty in the world today is 
concern about America's will and constancy. 
These doubts are not caused by statements 
made in the heat of a political campaign 

■ For an excerpt from President Ford's state of the 
Union address made on Jan. 19, see Bulletin of 
Feb. 9, 1976, p. 145. 

April 12, 1976 


but, rather, by a decade of convulsions cul- 
minating in a serious question as to the basic 
direction of American foreign policy. These 
doubts must be dispelled. I am convinced 
that they will be dispelled — not by public 
statements, but by demonstrations of the 
purposefulness of national policy, the vigor 
of the American economy, and the renewed 
unity of the American people, on which all 
else depends. We are going through a period 
of adjustment and reappraisal. We must all 
woi'k together, so that we are the stronger 
for it when it is completed. 

The American people, and the Congress as 
their elected representatives, have a central 
part to play in the enterprise of national re- 
affirmation. Their contribution is essential as 
a matter of constitutional principle in the 
making of foreign policy, and as a matter of 
practical necessity in the implementation of 
any successful long-term course. As Senator 
Case has pointed out: 

Congress has an important rolt- in lielping voters 
make known their concerns and to Ruide the execu- 
tive branch in its conduct of foreign policy. A democ- 
racy such as ours cannot hope to successfully carry 
out for any length of time a foreign policy which 
does not have firm domestic roots. 

These hearings have already provided 
much insight into the American public's per- 
ceptions of foreign policy, which we have 
found extremely useful. 

The International Environment 

Through most of our history, Mr. Chair- 
man, our peace and secui'ity were provided 
for us. The successful growth of our demo- 
cratic society at home, and the absence of 
direct threat from abroad, nourished our 
sense of uniqueness and the belief that it 
was our own choice whether and when we 
would participate in the world. We entered 
wars only when overwhelming danger 
threatened. We identified exertion in for- 
eign affairs as a temporary interruption of 
our domestic tranquillity. Once aroused, we 
were implacable, fighting "the war to end 
all wars," or until "unconditional surrender." 

We had margin for error. Our history, ex- 
cept for the Civil War, was without tragedy. 

and our resources and good fortune left us 
without the sense of external limits that so 
colored the experience of almost every other 
nation. Our successes seemed to teach us that 
any problem could be solved — once and for 
all — by determined effort. The qualities on 
which all other nations in history depended 
to insure their survival in a hostile or am- 
biguous environment — subtlety, maneuver, 
imagination, consistency — were disparaged 
in America as cynical or immoral. The equi- 
librium of power which kept the peace for 
long periods in the turbulent history of 
Europe was denounced in this country as a 
preoccupation with power at the expense of 
moral principle. 

Even in the first 25 years after Worli 
War II — an era of great creativity and un^ 
precedented American engagement in for 
eign affairs — we acted as if the world's se 
curity and economic development could be 
conclusively insured by the commitment of 
American resources, know-how, and effort. 
We were encouraged — even impelled — to act 
as we did by our unprecedented predomi- 
nance in a world shattered by war and the 
collapse of the great colonial empires. 

At the same time, the central charactei 
of moral values in American life always 
made us acutely sensitive to the purity of 
means — and when we disposed of over- 
whelming power we had a great luxury of 
choice. Our moral certainty made com- 
promise difficult ; our preponderance ofter 
made it seem unnecessary. 

Today, power takes many forms and oui 
circumstances are more complex. In military 
power, while we still have massive strength, 
we no longer enjoy meaningful nuclear su- 
premacy. In economic terms we remain the 
world's most productive economy; but we 
must now share leadership with Western 
Europe, Canada, and Japan; we must deal 
with the newly wealthy and developing na- 
tions ; and we must make new choices re- 
garding our economic relations with the 
Communist countries. Our moral influence, 
our democratic principles, are still far more 
valued by the world's millions than we 
realize: but we must compete with ideolo- 
gies which assert progressive goals but 



Department of State Bulletin 

■^3ursue them by oppressive methods. 

All Americans have a right to be proud 
)f what this nation accomplished in our 
)ast 30 years of world leadership. We as- 
;isted European and Japanese recovery; we 
milt indispensable alliances; we established 
m international economic system; and we 
;ustained global peace and global progress 
or a generation. 

We have great things yet to do, requiring 
lur unity, our dedication, and our strength, 
li'or we live, and our children will live, in a 
nore complex time: 

— First, we face the necessity of drawing 
m the new strength and vitality of our 
lilies and friends to intensify our partner- 
hip with them. They have become, again, 
najor centers of power and initiative. This 
s a lasting success of our foreign policy. 
Vnd today, our unity with the great indus- 
rial democracies is fundamental to all we 
eek to accomplish in the world. It is we who 
naintain the global balance of power that 
;eeps the peace. And it is our unmatched 
conomic dynamism that is the best hope for 
, world of widening prosperity. Above all, 
ur moral unity and commitment to the 
alues of democracy are crucial to the ful- 
illment of our own dreams as well as to the 
reative use of man's energies in solving the 
iroblems of the future. In a complex world — 
if equilibrium and coexistence, of competi- 
ion and interdependence — it is our ideals 
hat give meaning and purpose to our 

— For we face, secondly, the age-old chal- 
enge of maintaining peace, but in the un- 
)recedented dimension of an age of thermo- 
uiclear weapons. The Soviet Union, after 60 
^ears of economic and industrial growth, has 
—inevitably — reached the status of a super- 
jower. As a result, we must conduct a dual 
)olicy. We and our allies must restrain So- 
viet power and prevent its use to upset 
global stability. At the same time, our gen- 
eration faces the long-term challenge of put- 
;ing the U.S.-Soviet relationship on a more 
secure, constructive, and durable basis. 

We must, as well, continue the progress 
ive have made in fashioning a new relation- 

ship with the People's Republic of China. We 
consider the opening to the People's Republic 
of China one of the key elements of our 
foreign policy. 

Beyond this, global security presents other 
permanent necessities. There is the continu- 
ing need to moderate and resolve regional 
conflicts which threaten global economic or 
political stability. And there is the urgent 
and growing challenge of preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, which 
gravely increases the risks of nuclear 

— The third central challenge is to build 
a wider world community out of the turbu- 
lent environment of today's nearly 150 in- 
dependent nations. Two World Wars in this 
century and the process of decolonization 
have broken down the international order of 
previous centuries. For the first time in 
history the international community has be- 
come truly global. The new nations make in- 
sistent demands on the global system, test- 
ing their new economic power and seeking a 
greater role and more equitable share in the 
world's prosperity. A new pattern of rela- 
tionships must be fashioned out of coopera- 
tion for mutual benefit, impelled by the 
reality of our global interdependence. 

Our friendships with nations in Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa, on the basis of 
mutual respect and practical cooperation, 
take on a new importance as the building 
blocks of world community. We must recog- 
nize that no world order will be stable over 
the last quarter of this century unless all its 
participants consider that they have a stake 
in it and that it is legitimate and just. 

These are the basic challenges facing this 
nation as we enter our third century. 

In such a world, Mr. Chairman, this coun- 
try can no longer choose whether or not it is 
involved in international affairs. On a shrink- 
ing planet, there is no hiding place. There 
are no simple answers. This nation cannot 
aflford to swing recklessly between abdication 
and confrontation ; we must pursue a long- 
term course. Although we are stronger than 
any other, we cannot operate primarily by 
throwing our weight around. Lasting peace 

^pril 12, 1976 



is not achievable without an international 
consensus. We must learn to conduct foreign 
policy as other nations have had to conduct 
it foi- many centuries, without escape and 
without respite. We must learn patience, 
precision, perspective — knowing that what is 
attainable falls short of the ideal, mindful 
of the necessities of self-preservation, de- 
riving from our moral conviction the courage 
to persevere. For America finds itself, for 
the first time in its history, irrevocably and 
permanently involved in international affairs. 

The world needs desperately our strength 
and our purpose. Without American 
strength, there can be no security; without 
American convictions, there can be no 

Americans have always regarded chal- 
lenges as a test, not an obstacle. We have 
great opportunities for creative diplomacy, 
to shape from this turbulence and complex- 
ity a world community of greater stability 
and hope. We, more than any other country, 
are in a position to determine — or have a 
decisive impact upon — the evolution of the 
global order. 

Forty years ago when the forces of de- 
mocracy faced a great threat, the United 
States was waiting in the wings to come to 
Europe's rescue. Today there is no one wait- 
ing in the wings to come to our rescue. 

Let me discuss at greater length some of 
the basic long-term challenges we face. 

The Unity of the Industrial Democracies 

The cornerstone of our foreign policy is — 
as it has been for a generation — our partner- 
ship with our principal allies in the Atlantic 
community and Japan. These partnerships 
began three decades ago as a means of col- 
lective security against aggression and of 
cooperation for economic recovery from the 
devastation of World War II. In the succeed- 
ing period our alliances have been the bul- 
wark of the global balance of power. Our 
cooperation with the great industrial democ- 
racies has been the underpinning of the 
world economic system which has sustained 
global prosperity and spread it to the far 
corners of the earth. 

Rarely in history have alliances survived 
as ours have survived, and indeed flourished, 
through so many vast changes in the inter- 
national environment. And in the last few 
years, we and our allies have not only con- 
tinued to strengthen our common defenses; 
we have extended our collaboration success- 
fully into new dimensions of common en- 
deavor — in improved political consultation, 
in coordinating our approaches to negotia- 
tions with the Communist countries, in de- 
veloping a common energy policy and strat- 
egy, in reinforcing our respective economic 
policies for recovery from recession, in en- 
vironmental cooperation, and in fashioning 
common approaches for the dialogue with 
the developing countries. 

All these eflforts to build peace and pro- 
mote progress reflect our common belief in 
freedom and our common hope of a better 
future for all mankind. These are perma- 
nent values of this nation, and therefore our 
alliances and friendships that are based on 
them and designed to further them are per- 
manent interests of the United States. 

Our cohesion has a more than technical 
significance. While foreign policy is unthink- 
able without pragmatism, pragmatism with- 
out moral purpose is like a rudderless 

Our ties with the great democracies are 
thus not an alliance of convenience, but a 
union of principle in defense of democratic 
values and our way of life. It is our ideals 
that inspire not only our self-defense but 
all else that we do. And the resilience of our 
countries in responding to all our modern 
challenges is a testimony to the spirit and 
moral strength of our free peoples. 

As we look to the future, there is no 
higher priority in our foreign policy than 
sustaining the vitality of democracy and the 
unity of democracies. The world will become 
more, not less, complex; our power will 
grow more, not less, interwoven with others; 
our values will be more, not less, challenged. 
In such a world, the solidarity of our rela- 
tions with those who share our heritage, our 
way of life, our ideals, takes on more, and 
not less, importance for as far ahead as we 
can see. 


Department of State Bulletin 

, Our responsibilities are, first, our common 
fefense. The closeness of our collaboration 
a defense matters is gi'eater today than at 
ny time in the past decade. We must main- 
lin it because it is the stability of the mili- 
iry balance that has brought about what- 
;er hope there is of easing tensions in 
urope and in Asia. 

There is greater sharing of responsibility 
11 North Atlantic defense today. The Presi- 
tent has taken the initiative in promoting 
ich improvements as improved standardiza- 
on of equipment and more effective force 
ructuring. But the United States must re- 
,ain conscious of its own special responsi- 
lity in the alliance — to maintain the stra- 
ngle balance and to contribute its crucial 
lare to maintaining the conventional bai- 
lee in Europe and the Mediterranean, and 
ore generally. 

Our security is a precondition of all else 
lat we do. On this foundation, we will face 
rer the coming period a broad range of 
sks beyond the traditional enterprise of 
illective defense. 

We will continue to seek to enhance our 
•curity and general peace through arms 
mtrol and negotiation of political conflicts, 
'e hope to see progress in the talks on mu- 
lal and balanced force reductions in Europe, 
'e expect that the 1971 Quadripartite 
greement on Berlin, which ended a chronic 
•isis of more than two decades, fore- 
ladows an era of enhanced security in 
antral Europe. 

In the coming decade, the collaboration of 
16 industrial democracies can be the dy- 
imic force in the building of a more secure 
id progressive international order. We have 
ade a remarkable beginning. New steps 
ave been taken in the last few years, and 
irther will be taken, to strengthen Euro- 
ean unity; this has the strong support of 
le United States. The new institutions and 
rograms of our collective energy strategy 
re in place. We have discussed and devel- 
ped common approaches to the new dialogue 
ith the developing nations. The passage of 
le Trade Act of 1974 enabled this country 
) enter into a new round of trade negotia- 
ons with Europe and Japan to make basic 

improvements in the world trading system. 
In recent months, the Rambouillet economic 
summit and the Jamaica reform of the inter- 
national monetary system demonstrate that 
the future of our cooperation among the 
industrial democracies will be as fruitful as 
the past. 

In this regard, I want to mention an im- 
portant item of business before this com- 
mittee: approval of our participation in the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] Financial Support 
Fund. This is the contingency mechanism, 
proposed by the United States, to insure 
mutual support among the industrial nations 
in the face of financial disruptions or pres- 
sures by actions of the oil cartel. At little 
cost, this mechanism will provide a financial 
safety net, combat protectionism, and pro- 
mote our cooperation on energy policy. It is 
vital for the industrial nations' independ- 
ence. Seven other OECD members have rati- 
fied it, and the rest are expected to do so by 
the middle of this year. I hope the Congress 
will move quickly to do the same, to rein- 
force the solidarity of the industrial democ- 

It is our belief that in an era when our 
democratic values are under challenge in the 
world and our societies have been buffeted 
by economic diflliculties at home, the solidar- 
ity and cooperation of the great democracies 
are of crucial importance for giving impetus 
to all our efforts. We have proved what we 
can do and vindicated the faith of our people 
in the values and future of our societies. We 
have proved that our unity can be as dy- 
namic a force for building a new inter- 
national order today as it was 30 years 

The new solidarity we are building can 
draw its inspiration from our hopes and 
ideals, rather than merely our common dan- 
gers. A thriving Europe and Japan and North 
America will not only be secure and prosper- 
ous but a magnet to the Communist coun- 
tries and to the developing world. And so we 
can enter the last quarter of this century 
confident that we are masters of our own 
destiny — and making a decisive contribution 
to the world's destiny. 

pril 12, 1976 


Peace and Equilibrium 

Of the challenges that the democracies 
face, none are more fundamental than the 
issues of peace and war. These issues — the 
traditional foreign policy agenda — ^take on 
in this era an unprecedented dimension. 

There are three principal aspects to this 
problem of peace: 

— Relations with the major Communist 
powers ; 

— The effort to resolve regional conflicts 
and disputes peacefully; and 

— The increasing danger of nuclear weap- 
ons proliferation. 

We live in a world in which this country 
must now deal with a country of roughly 
equal power. This is not a familiar world for 
modern Americans. Yet it is the kind of 
world in which we will live for the rest of 
this century and beyond, no matter what we 
do in the military field. 

Thirty years ago, the United States, alone 
among the major nations of the world, 
emerged from the Second World War with 
its economy and society undamaged by war. 
We enjoyed a tremendous preponderance in 
economic power and a monopoly on nuclear 
weapons. This great physical strength gave 
impetus to the willingness of the American 
people to take responsibility for helping to 
shape a better postwar international order. 
The creativity and generosity that this na- 
tion displayed in that period are a lasting 
tribute to the American spirit. 

Today, because of the inevitable recovery 
and growth of our allies — and our adver- 
saries — the United States now finds itself in 
a world of relative kinds of equilibrium. In 
strategic military power, the world is still 
bipolar. Economic power is more widely dis- 
persed among many major nations, including 
the wealthier of the developing nations. In 
moral and ideological influence, many nations 
and philosophies contend. The task of con- 
solidating peace thus presents itself in this 
era as a far more complex problem than ever 
before, both practically and morally. 

With our allies, we have learned to share 
responsibility and leadership, and this has 

enhanced our collaboration in every dimei j 
sion of common endeavor. But with our a> ' 
versaries, we face the imperative of coexis 
ence in an age of thermonuclear weapons ar i 
strategic parity. We must defend our inte < 
ests, our principles, and our allies, while ii 
suring at all times that international confli( i 
does not degenerate into cataclysm. We mu: \ 
resist expansionism and pressures, but v. ! 
must on this foundation seek to build habi' 
of restraint that will over the long term lea, » 
to a reliable reduction of tensions. J 

This government has therefore move 
with energy and purpose over the last se^' 
eral years, and in concert with our allies, 1 
consolidate and transform our relationshii{ 
with the major Commmiist powers, for 
new era and for our long-term future. 

We have established a new and durabi 
and hopeful relationship with the People 
Republic of China, a nation comprisir 
nearly one-quarter of mankind. This ne' 
relationship has made an important con 
tribution to peace in Asia and in the worli 
President Ford is committed to continue tb 
process of normalization of our relations 
accordance with the principles of the Shanji 
hai communique. 

And this country in the last several yea 
has opened up positive relations with cou 
tries in Eastern Europe. Two America 
Presidents have visited Poland, Yugoslavi 
and Romania, to demonstrate that, in oi 
view, European security and relaxation > 
tensions apply to Eastern as wefl as Westei 
Europe. This remains, and must remain, 
basic principle of American policy. 

In an age when two nations have tl 
power to visit utter destruction on the who 
planet in hours, there can be no greater in 
perative than assuring a rational and secu] 
relationship between the nuclear supe 
powers. This is a challenge without prec- 
dent. Historically a conflict of ideology ar 
geopolitical interest such as now characte 
izes the international scene has almost ii 
variably led to war. But in the age of strati 
gic equality, humanity could not survi\ 
such a repetition of history. War woul 
mean mutual suicide. 

Therefore, with respect to the Sovi* 


Department of Stote Bulloti 

ciion, the United States faces the necessity 
'i a dual policy. We must preserve stability 
sis ; not rest upon it. We must firmly resist 
ai I deter adventurism. But at the same time 
iti must keep open the possibility of more 
H istructive relations between the United 
li ites and the Soviet Union — resolving polit- 
!iiii^|l disputes by negotiation, such as Ber- 

3; working out stable agreements to limit 
ategic arms on both sides, as in the SALT 
ieije agreements and the accord at Vladivo- 
ilk; and when political conditions permit it, 
ivil'eloping our bilateral cooperation in eco- 
dnic and other fields to give both sides a 
n.ted interest in continuing and improving 
iijjitical relations. 

r lA'^e have an obligation to mankind to work 
li a more secure world. We have an obliga- 
itjln to the American people to insure that a 
litjsis, if it is imposed upon us, does not re- 
m from any lack of vision of the United 

•^'Ve face a long-term problem, and we must 
I'lflhion and maintain a long-term policy. An 
ttfiilibrium of power is indispensable to any 
1)6 of peace. But a balance of power con- 
i ntly contested is too precarious a founda- 
lii for our long-term future. So this coun- 
!S , in its third century, must avoid the twin 
it iptations of provocation and escapism. We 
a st maintain a steady and confident 
i; irse ; it must be a policy that our adver- 
3 ies respect, our allies support, and our 
ic iple believe in and sustain. 
' 3y whatever name we call it, the U.S.- 
: /iet relationship must be founded on cer- 
t n fundamental principles, which this coun- 
t has affirmed consistently for the last 
3 'en years : 

—First, we will maintain our military 
- ength. The United States must maintain 
8 equilibrium of power through a strong 
rtional and allied defense. The United 
f ites will do what is necessary to maintain 
ti balance in all significant categories of 
rlitary strength, including conventional as 
\ 11 as strategic forces. 

—Secondly, this country is prepared to 
■ got kite solutions to political problems. The 
:71 agreement on Berlin is an example. 

And both superpowers share a basic respon- 
sibility to insure that the world is spared the 
holocaust of a nuclear war. Strategic arms 
limitation is therefore a permanent, mutual, 
and fundamental interest. At Vladivostok in 
1974, President Ford reached agreement on 
the outline of a comprehensive agreement 
putting an equal ceiling on strategic forces 
on both sides for a 10-year period. The is- 
sues that remain in completing that agree- 
ment are soluble. An agreement on the basis 
of strict reciprocity is attainable. 

— Both sides have vital interests, but have 
an overriding interest in avoidance of major 
conflict. Therefore long-term peace can only 
be founded on the practice and habit of re- 
straint. Exploiting local crises for unilateral 
gain is not acceptable. This nation will not 
seek confrontations lightly, but we are de- 
termined to defend peace by systematic 
resistance to pressures and irresponsible ac- 
tions. The growth of Soviet economic and 
military power could not have been pre- 
vented ; what can be prevented is the use of 
that power to upset the global balance. With- 
out restraint there is no possibility of a 
meaningful relaxation of tensions. 

— If we preserve security on this basis, 
opportunities exist for creative diplomacy to 
engage the Soviet Union more firmly in con- 
structive participation in the international 
system. We are prepared to hold out the 
prospect of increasing bilateral cooperation 
in the economic, technical, and other fields 
to give both sides an increasing stake in posi- 
tive political relations. Over the long term 
we have it within our capacity to make our 
coexistence durable and secure and to turn it 
into cooperation. 

This is the broad agenda for the future of 
the U.S.-Soviet relationship. More specifi- 
cally : 

— We cannot prevent the growth of Soviet 
power, but we can prevent its use for uni- 
lateral advantage and political expansion. 

— We must accept the reality that sover- 
eign states, especially ones of roughly equal 
power, cannot impose unacceptable condi- 
tions on each other, and ultimately and in- 
evitably must proceed by compromise. 

•ril 12, 1976 


— The United States will never stand for 
violation of a solemn treaty or agreement. 

— We can never tolerate a shift in the 
strategic balance against us, either in un- 
satisfactory agreements or violations of 
agreements or by neglect of our own defense 

— We are determined to pursue the effort 
to negotiate a sanei- and more secure stra- 
tegic balance on equitable terms because it 
is in our interest and in the interest of world 

Any Administration conscious of the long- 
term requirements of peace will find itself 
implementing the same dual approach of 
firmness in the face of pressure and readi- 
ness to work for a more cooperative world. 
Of course, differences are inevitable as to 
the practical application of these principles. 
But as President Kennedy said: "■ 

... in the final analysis our most basic common 
link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We 
all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's 
future. And we are all mortal. 

As the United States and Soviet Union 
have taken important steps toward regulat- 
ing their own competition, the problem of 
local conflicts persists and indeed, to some 
extent, increases. The world begins to take 
for granted the invulnerability of global sta- 
bility to local disturbances. The world has 
permitted too many of the underlying causes 
of regional conflicts to continue unattended 
until the parties came to believe their only 
recourse was to war. And because each crisis 
ultimately has been contained, the world has 
remained complacent. We cannot forget the 
ominous lesson of 1914. Tolerance of local 
conflict tempts world holocaust. We have no 
guarantee that some local crisis will not ex- 
plode beyond control. We have a responsi- 
bility to prevent such crises. 

This must be a permanent preoccupation 
of statesmen who are concerned for the pres- 
ervation of peace over the next decades. In 
the modern era, global communications have 
shrunk our planet and created a global con- 

'For President Kennedy's address at American 
University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see 
Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2. 

sciousness. Nations and peoples are 
creasingly sensitive to events and issues 
other parts of the globe. Our moral princi 
extends our concern for the fate of our i 
low men. Ideological conflict respects 
boundaries and calls into question even 1 ■ 
legitimacy of domestic structures. 

We cannot expect stability to continue • 
definitely unless determined efforts are mi ; 
to moderate and resolve local political c- 
flicts peacefully. 

The United States is not the world's - 
liceman. But we have learned from bit r 
experience — as recently as 1973 — that c- 
flicts can erupt and spread and directly tou; 
the interests and well-being of this count . 
Helping to settle disputes is a longstand ; 
American tradition, in our interest and ; 
world interest. 

Nowhere is there greater urgency than i 
the Middle East. The agreements negotia i 
between the parties over the past few yet , 
in accordance with Resolutions 242 and 3 , 
are unprecedented steps toward an ultim ; 
peace. These efforts must and will contiii . 
Both sides must contribute to the proce ; 
the United States remains committed to ■ 
sist. The elements for further progress ■ 
ward peace exist. Stagnation runs a gr ? 
risk of further upheaval, of benefit to neit i 
side and of grave implications for the pe e 
and economic well-being of the world. 

Proliferation of nuclear weapons tech, ■ 
ogy could add a more ominous dimensior d 
a world in which regional political confl s 
persist. The dangers so long predicted n < 
be coming closer at hand. As I said to e 
U.N. General Assembly in September 19 : 

The world has growm so accustomed to the e> ■ 
ence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they II 
never be used .... 

In a world where many nations possess nuc r 
weapons, dangers would be vastly compoundeti 
would be infinitely more difficult, if not impose , 
to maintain stability among a large number of i- 
clear powers. Local wars would take on a new din c 
sion. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into ■ 
gions where political conflict remains intense d 
the parties consider their vital interests overwhe i- 
ingly involved. There would, as well, be a va y 
heightened risk of direct involvement of the m; ir 
nuclear powers. 


Department of State Bull n 

Therefore, halting proliferation is a major 
foreign policy objective of this Administra- 
tion, as it has been for all previous Admin- 
istrations since the dawn of the nuclear age. 
As I explained to your colleagues on the 
Senate Government Operations Committee 
just a week ago, we have intensified our 
efforts, in international bodies, with other 
nations who are principal exporters of nu- 
clear materials, with potential nuclear powers 
— and with Congress — to insure that 
the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can 
be spread widely without at the same time 
spreading the perils of holocaust. It is a chal- 
lenge to statesmanship to see beyond the im- 
mediate economic gains from unrestrained 
competition in nuclear exports and to act to 
halt a mushrooming danger. 

Shaping a World Community 

The upheavals of the 20th century have 
bequeathed to us another fundamental task: 
I'to adapt the international structure to the 
new realities of our time. We must fashion 
constructive long-term relationships between 
the industrial and developing nations, rich 
and poor. North and South ; we must adapt 
and reinvigorate our friendships in Latin 
America, Asia, and Africa, taking into ac- 
count their new role and importance on the 
world scene ; and together with all nations, 
we must address the new problems of an in- 
terdependent world which can only be solved 
through multilateral cooperation. 

A central issue of foreign policy over the 
next generation will be the relationship be- 
tween the industrial and developing nations. 
Decolonization and the expansion of the 
world economy have given birth to new coun- 
tries and new centers of power and initiative. 
The world environment of the next decades 
can be the seedbed of political instability, 
ideological confrontation, and economic war- 
fare — or it can become a community marked 
by international collaboration on an unprece- 
dented scale. The interdependence of nations, 
the indivisibility of our security and our 
prosperity, can accelerate our common prog- 
ress or our common decline. 

Therefore, just as we must go beyond 

maintaining equilibrium if we are to insure 
peace, so must we transcend tests of strength 
in North-South relations and seek to build a 
true world community. In international 
forums, the United States will resist pres- 
sure tactics, one-way morality, and propa- 
gandistic assaults on our dignity and on 
common sense. We will defend our interests 
and beliefs without apology. We will resist 
attempts at blackmail or extortion. 

We know that world order depends ulti- 
mately on cooperative efforts and concrete 
solutions to the problems in our relations. 
The price and supply of energy, the condi- 
tions of trade, the expansion of world food 
production, the technological bases for eco- 
nomic development, the protection of the 
world environment, the rules of law that gov- 
ern the world's oceans and outer space — 
these are concerns that affect all nations and 
that can be satisfactorily addressed only on 
the basis of mutual respect and in a frame- 
work of international collaboration. This is 
the agenda of an interdependent world. 

We have much reason for confidence. It is 
the West — and overwhelmingly this country 
— that has the resources, the technology, 
the skills, the organizational ability, and the 
good will that are the key to the success of 
these international efforts. In the global dia- 
logue among the industrial and developing 
worlds, the Communist nations are conspicu- 
ous by their absence and, indeed, by their ir- 

Therefore we have begun the dialogue 
with the developing nations. At the World 
P'ood Conference in 1974, which was called at 
our initiative, and at the seventh special ses- 
sion of the U.N. General Assembly last 
September and in the Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation now underway 
in Paris, the United States has taken the 
role of leadership. We have undertaken it 
with a strong contribution from the Con- 
gress and in the spirit of the highest ideals 
of the American people. This must continue. 

The United States has presented a wide 
range of proposals for practical cooperation 
that could shape a constructive long-term 
economic relationship between the developed 
and developing countries: to safeguard ex- 

April 12, 1976 


port earnings against economic cycles and 
natural disasters, to accelerate growth and 
agricultural production, to improve conditions 
of trade and investment in key commodities, 
and to address the urgent needs of the poor- 
est countries. In every area of concern we 
have proposed methods of cooperation among 
all countries, including the other industrial 
countries, the newly wealthy oil producers, 
and the developing countries. Many of our 
proposals of last September have already 
been implemented. More can be done. If we 
are met in a constructive spirit, we will re- 
spond. There is a full agenda before us, im- 
plementing proposals that have already been 
made, and going beyond. 

The United States has longstanding friend- 
ships on a bilaterial basis with the nations 
of Latin America, Asia, and Africa which we 
seek to adapt, improve, and build upon. 

Latin America, which I have recently vis- 
ited, is for the United States a region of spe- 
cial ties and special interest. It is as well a 
continent in a process of transition. Hemi- 
spheric relationships — bilateral, regional, 
multilateral, and global — are in flux. An eai'- 
lier community of the Americas bounded by 
exclusivity has given way to a more open 
relationship which turns not on convention 
but on mutual respect, common interests, 
and cooperative problem-solving and a more 
active role in the events outside the region. 
At the same time, the importance of Latin 
America to the United States is steadily in- 
creasing — as elements of the global economy, 
as participants in the world's political 
forums, and in their new role as the most 
developed of the developing nations. 

The United States must adapt to these 
changing realities, and it has begun to do so. 
Equally, we maintain our conviction that the 
Americas must not reject, but build upon, 
the precious heritage of our tradition of co- 
operation. This is the formula for our future 
progress. The great issues of global inter- 
dependence are before us ; with this special 
advantage, and on the basis of respect and 
sovereign equality, we here in this hemi- 
sphere can cooperate to find mutually bene- 
ficial solutions. If we succeed, our collabora- 
tion can be a model for the wider world 

community that we seek. 

Our relations with Asia are crucial as well, 
for in Asia the interests of all the major 
powers in the world intersect. The stability 
of the region will be as central to world peace 
over the coming decades as it has been in 
past decades. President Ford's trip to Asia 
in December both reaffirmed America's fun- 
damental stake in Asia and opened a fresh 
chapter in our relations with the nations of 
the region. He set forth the premises of our 
country's future approach to Asia: 

— American strength is basic to any stable 
balance of power in the Pacific and therefore 
to global stability. 

— Partnership with Japan is a pillar of our 
Asian policy. 

— The process of normalization of relations 
with the People's Republic of China is indis- 
pensable. America's ties with one-quarter of 
mankind are inevitably of crucial importance 
to the world of the future. 

— We have a continuing stake in stability 
and security in Southeast Asia, an area of 
great dynamism and promise. 

— Peace in Asia depends upon the resolu- 
tion of outstanding political conflicts, most 
prominently that of the Korean Peninsula. 

— Economic cooperation among the peoples 
of the Pacific Basin is essential to fulfilling 
the aspirations of the peoples of the region 
for a better future. 

And very soon I will visit another area of 
great change and importance: Africa. The 
dramatic spread of national independence in 
Africa has had a major impact on world in- 
stitutions and on the scope of international 
afl'airs. Africa's economic importance and its 
economic relations with other continents are 
growing. And America's traditional concern 
for the cause of independence and self-deter- 
mination and racial justice, and the identifi- 
cation of many Americans with their African 
heritage, have given a more profound dimen- 
sion to our interest in the continent's future. 

Our African policy over the coming decade 
will be guided by these principles and 
concerns : 

— We want to see Africa attain prosperity 


Department of State Bulletin 

for its people and become a major partici- 
pant in the international economic system. 

— We support the desire of African na- 
tions to chart their own course in domestic, 
regional, and international affairs, to choose 
their own social system and a nonaligned for- 
eign policy. 

— We want to see self-determination, racial 
justice, and human rights spread throughout 
Africa. As President Ford has recently made 
clear again, majority rule in Rhodesia and 
Namibia is the unequivocal commitment of 
the United States. 

— We want to see the African continent 
be free of great-power rivalry or conflict. We 
have our own interest in seeing that local 
conflicts there not be exploited and exacer- 
bated by outside forces intervening for uni- 
lateral advantage. 

A broader range of issues facing this coun- 
|ltry in the coming years has to do with the 
multilateral challenges of an era of increas- 
ing global interdependence 
I There are many urgent and unprecedented 
issues that can be addressed only on a global 
basis and whose resolution will fundamen- 
tally shape the future of this planet. A cen- 
tral example is the Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, which resumes its work this week 
in New York. In this unprecedented negoti- 
ation, over 100 nations are seeking to write 
new rules of law governing the use of the 
world's oceans. The implications for interna- 
tional security, for the use of vast resources, 
for scientific research, and for the protection 
of the environment are vast. The United 
States will continue its work with others to 
assure that the oceans become an arena of 
global cooperation and enrichment rather 
than global conflict. 

Also of great importance is the use of 
outer space, which presents us as well with 
the potential for conflict or the possibility of 
collaboration. We have the opportunity to 
substitute international law for power compe- 
tition in the formative stage of an important 
international activity. 

The modern age has not only given us the 
benefits of technology; it has also spawned 
the plagues of aircraft hijacking, interna- 

tional terrorism, and new techniques of war- 
fare. The international community must 
stand together against these affronts to man- 
kind. The United States has promoted and 
must continue to promote the strengthening 
of international organizations and interna- 
tional law to deal with these issues. 

Compassion for our fellow man requires 
that we mobilize international resources to 
combat the age-old scourges of disease, fam- 
ine, and natural disaster. And concern for 
basic human rights calls upon the interna- 
tional community to oppose violations to in- 
dividual dignity wherever and by whomever 
they are practiced. The practice of torture 
must be discredited and banished. Human 
rights must be cherished and promoted re- 
gardless of race, sex, religion, or political 

We must extend the scope and reach of 
international institutions for cooperation. 
The United Nations, an organization in which 
the American people have invested great 
hopes, must be a mechanism of practical col- 
laboration instead of an arena of rhetorical 
confrontation if it is to fulfill the mission of 
its charter and its responsibilities for peace 
in the modern era. Procedural abuses and 
one-sided resolutions cannot be accepted. The 
value of this organization, if properly used, 
remains considerable — in peacekeeping, dis- 
pute settlement, and promoting cooperation 
for economic development and health and 
scores of other endeavors. 

Only through a pattern of international co- 
operation can all these problems be success- 
fully addressed. And only in a structure of 
global peace can the insecurity of nations, out 
of which so much conflict arises, be eased, 
and habits of compromise and accommoda- 
tion be nurtured. Social progress, justice, and 
human rights can thrive only in an atmos- 
phere of stability and reduced international 

Our Debate at Home 

This, then, is the design of our foreign 
policy : 

— To promote, together with our allies, the 

April 12, 1976 


strength and ideals of freedom and democ- 
racy in a turbulent world ; 

— To master the traditional challenges of 
peace and war, to maintain an equilibrium of 
strength, but to go beyond balance to a more 
postive future; and 

— To shape a long-term relationship of 
mutual benefit with the developing countries 
and to turn all the issues of interdependence 
into the cement of a new global community. 

These are the challenges of our third 

Since this nation was born in struggle 200 
years ago, Americans have never shrunk 
from challenge. We have never regarded the 
problems we face as cause for pessimism or 
despair. On the contrary, America's tradi- 
tional spirit and optimism have always given 
millions around the world the hope that the 
complex issues of today can and will be 
solved. The world knows full well that no 
solutions are possible without the active par- 
ticipation and commitment of a united Amer- 
ican people. To describe the complex and 
long-term tasks we face is therefore the 
greatest expression of confidence in America. 

We remain the world's greatest democ- 
racy; we are the engine of the global econ- 
omy ; we have been for 30 years the bulwark 
of the balance of power and the beacon of 
freedom. The physical strength, the organi- 
zational skill, the creative genius of this 
country make us — as we have always been 
since our Revolution — the hope of mankind. 

What we face today is not a test of our 
physical strength, which is unparalleled, but 
a qualitative challenge unlike anything we 
have ever faced before. It is a challenge to 
our will and courage and sense of responsi- 
bility. We are tested to show whether we 
understand what a world of complexity and 
ambiguity requires of us. It is not every gen- 
eration that is given the opportunity to 
shape a new international order. If the op- 
portunity is missed, we shall live in a world 
of increasing chaos and danger. If it is real- 
ized, we shall have begun an era of greater 
peace and progress and justice. 

A heavy responsibility lies with us here 
in Washington. The Congress and the execu- 

tive owe the American people an end to the 
divisions of the past decade. The divisive is- 
sues are no longer with us. The tasks ahead 
of us are not partisan or ideological issues; 
they are great tasks for America in a new 
century, in a new world that, more than ever, 
impinges upon our lives and cries out for our 
leadership. Even more than our resources, 
the creative vitality of this nation has been 
a tremendous force for good and continues 
to be so. 

We can accomplish great things — but we 
can do so only as a united people. Beyond all 
the special concerns and special interests lies 
the national interest. Congress and the ex- 
ecutive. Republicans and Democrats, have a 
common stake in the effectiveness and suc- 
cess of American foreign policy. Most of the 
major initiatives this government has taken 
on fundamental issues — with our allies, with 
the People's Republic of China, with the 
Soviet Union, with the developing nations, in 
the Middle East — have had broad and deep 
support in the Congress and in the country. 

Therefore, just as we have the capacity to 
build a more durable international structure, 
so we have the capacity and opportunity to 
rebuild the consensus among the executive 
and legislative branches and among our 
people that will give new impetus to our re- 
sponsible leadership in the world in our third 
century. This is the deepest desire of the 
President and the strongest commitment of 
all his Administration. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, 
I hope that this discussion of what we see 
as the issues of the future will be helpful in 
the building of such a consensus. The issues 
are complex; the degree of public under- 
standing required to deal with them is higher 
than at any time in our historical experience. 
And even if we can reach a consensus on 
objectives and priorities, our resources and' 
options are limited and we cannot hope 
always to prevail or to be right. 

These hearings are a wise and welcome 
step in promoting the understanding and 
consensus that are required. Our gift as a 
people is problem-solving and harnessing the 
capacities of widely diverse groups of people 


Department of State Bulletin 

arge-scale common endeavor. This is ex- 

y what is required of us, both in building 

L>\v international structure and in develop- 

tlie public support needed to sustain our 

yticipation in it over the long term, 
n the last analysis, we must come to- 
iler because the world needs us, because 

II horizons that beckon us in the decades 

ojome are as near, or as far, as we have the 

flrage to seek them. 

)|partment Discusses Issues 
nSouthern Africa 

'h merit by William E. Schaufele, Jr. 
i.istant Secretary for African Affairs ' 

am pleased to have this opportunity to 
i iiss southern African issues with you 

ly. In the wake of the Angolan experi- 
1 3, I think it is generally accepted that the 
If 3 of events in the region has recently 

I kened. The demand for change has been 

II iisified because of the failure so far to 
€:h a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia, 
r ^tration over lack of real progress toward 
H -determination in Namibia, and the lack 
if significant change in the practice of 
iirtheid in South Africa. The objectives of 
« -determination and majority rule are 
u; as valid as they ever were, but the con- 
i led recalcitrance of minority regimes has 
n ie their realization more complicated, 
n 'e likely to be achieved by violence. We 
n5t identify ways in which we can help the 
Mples of southern Africa attain their right- 
t places among the nations of the world. 

would like to give you a brief descrip- 
i 1 of the present situation, as we see it, 
n southern Africa and then an outline of 
wsent U.S. policy. 

'he situation in southern Africa today 
nsents the prospect for both progress and 

Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs 
'f;he Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
*!■. 19. The complete transcript of the hearings will 
»« published by the committee and will be available 
'in the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

't Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

disaster. The isolation of the Ian Smith 
regime in Southern Rhodesia has been dram- 
atized by Mozambique's imposition of eco- 
nomic sanctions. The reports of increased 
guerrilla activity on the border between 
those two countries makes the need for set- 
tlement more urgent than ever. As for the 
other side of the continent, a new Security 
Council resolution passed in January calling 
again for an end to South Africa's illegal 
occupation of Namibia only serves to empha- 
size, if that is necessary, the painfully slow 
process of self-determination there. Guer- 
rilla movements in both areas continue to 
build their arsenals and the regimes con- 
cerned continue strongly to resist just and 
constructive change. 

I would not say there is no progress to- 
ward a peaceful resolution of the three great 
issues in southern Africa. What positive as- 
pects we do see, however, are few. The talks 
between the African National Council and 
the Smith regime continue, although some 
have given up hope for success. In Namibia 
the constitutional conference sponsored by 
the illegal South African administration 
seems to be making some progress toward 
breaking down some apartheid practices in 
the territory. 

We still have hope for a peaceful resolu- 
tion in Rhodesia and that South Africa will 
make a strenuous effort to comply with the 
Security Council resolution on Namibia be- 
fore the August 31 deadline. 

Overall U.S. policy toward southern Africa 
is based on several considerations: 

— An unequivocal support for majority 
rule ; 

— An equally firm condemnation of those 
governments which perpetuate the political 
and economic inequality on the basis of race ; 

— A strong preference for a peaceful reali- 
zation of self-determination and majority 
rule; and 

— The determination that the area should 
not become the arena for superpower ri- 

Wednesday of this week we joined the 
Security Council in unanimous passage of a 
resolution of support — moral and material — 

\\\ 12, 1976 


for Mozambique to help that country 
through the hardships it will incur in imple- 
menting U.N. sanctions. 

State Department officers both here in the 
United States and overseas maintain con- 
tact with liberation movements. 

We maintain diplomatic relations with 
South Africa. Both bilaterally and through 
international organizations, we are con- 
stantly trying to convince that government 
that it is in its own best interests to make 
progress toward independence for Namibia 
and elimination of apartheid. 

Mr. Chairman, that is basically how we see 
the situation and our policy in Southern 
Africa. Now I would like to say a few more 
specific things about our policy toward lib- 
eration movements. There are liberation 
movements active in all three areas we have 
mentioned, Namibia, Rhodesia, and South 
Africa. Let me address each country sepa- 

In Namibia we have identified 13 "nation- 
alist" organizations and 27 political parties. 
Only one organization, however, is active 
both within the country and, as a liberation 
movement, outside Namibia. That organiza- 
tion is SWAPO [South West Africa People's 
Organization], which maintains oflices in 
New York, London, and Dakar as well as its 
headquarters in Lusaka. It is the only 
Namibian organization which has organized 
itself to field a military force— its goals, 
Namibian independence and the formatioii 
of a democi-atic unitary state. It has gained 
OAU [Organization of African Unity] rec- 
ognition as the legitimate "independence 
movement" for the Namibian people. State 
Department officials both here and abroad 
have maintained contact with SWAPO rep- 

We are also in communication with other 
Namibian nationalist movements such as 
SWANUF [South West African National 
United Front], which maintains an ofl^ce in 
New York and with the Namibian National 
Convention, whose leader, Chief Clemens 
Kapuuo, was in this country recently. 

One of the characteristics of the national- 

ist movement in Rhodesia, particularly si 
1963, has been its factionalization — based 
much or more on the personality of lead 
as on ideological or tribal grounds. 

The present Rhodesian African Natic 
Council (ANC) might best be described 
an umbrella organization, under which f 
former separate nationalist organizatic 
the African National Congress, the Z 
babwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), 
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZAN 
and the Front for the Liberation of Z 
babwe, were fused into a new African '. 
tional Council in 1974. 

Temporary leadership of the ANC ' 
vested originally in Bishop Abel Muzon 
in order to eliminate the divisions caused 
the intense rivalries between ZAPU, led 
Joshua Nkomo, and ZANU, led by the F 
erend Ndbaningi Sithole. 

In September 1975 the ANC split into 
factions, roughly following the fori 
ZAPU-ZANU split. An "internal wing" 
led by Mr. Nkomo, while an "external wi 
was led by Bishop Muzorewa and the F 
erend Sithole. 

The Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZL 
composed of some 4,000 to 6,000 militi 
from both the former ZANU and ZAPU 
tions, is now training in Mozambique. 

Since mid-December last year the "in 
nal," or Nkomo, faction of the ANC has t 
engaged in negotiations with Ian Smitl' 
an attempt to work out a peaceful neg 
ated transition to majority rule. These t; 
are continuing. In anticipation that 
Nkomo-Smith talks would break down or 
to produce an acceptable settlement, 
"external" wing of the ANC and the Z 
have been concentrating on building up 
training the nationalist guerrilla forces 
an expanded armed struggle. 

We are in contact with (and have b 
since the early 1960's) the leadership of 
various factions, both at our embassies o^ 
seas and in Washington. 

There are a number of organizations 
side South Africa which represent Afri 


Department of State Bull n 

lirations in one form or another. These 

lude political parties associated with 
lomelands" structures, as well as organi- 

ticins affiliated with the "Black Conscious- 

ss Movement," such as the South African 
. lulents Organization and the Black Peo- 
I3's Convention, which have developed in 
le urban areas in recent years. 

The South African organizations which 
:e most active on the international scene 
:e the African National Congress and the 
Im Africanist Congress. They are recog- 
r^ed as representatives of the people of 
iuth Africa by the OAU and most African 
i mitries. Both organizations led passive re- 
-tance campaigns against apartheid laws 
1 South Africa; and after the Sharpeville 
footings in 1960, both were banned. In re- 
tnt years, they have been headquartered 

Since their exile, both organizations have 
ome to believe that armed struggle will be 
1 cessary to eliminate white minority dom- 

ilion in South Africa; however, neither, 
t our knowledge, has been very effective in 
( iploying these tactics so far. 

U.S. officials assigned to capitals where 
i rican National Congress and Pan Af ri- 
taist Congress representatives are located 
{ ve met with them. However, the U.S. 
canot endorse or support the tactics es- 
jused by African National Congress and 
ts Pan Africanist Congress. A resort to 
i 'ce would involve incalculable costs in 
1 man life and suffering. As long as there 
i any prospect for peaceful change, no re- 
:onsible government could promote such a 
( velopment. 

I have tried briefly, Mr. Chairman, to ad- 
( ess myself to some of the issues in which 
] understand you have expressed a particu- 
1- interest. You may rest assured that the 
liited States supports the objectives of self- 
( termination and majority rule in southern 
-frica, and as the President said the other 
( y, majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia 
i the unequivocal commitment of the United 
I ates. 

U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Sent to Senate 

Message From President Ford * 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith the Treaty between 
the United States of America and the Swiss 
Confederation on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, signed at Bern on May 25, 
1973, six exchanges of interpretative letters 
of the same date, and an exchange of inter- 
pretative letters dated December 23, 1975. I 
urge that the Senate advise and consent to 
ratification of the Treaty and related 

The Treaty is the first major international 
agreement by the United States aimed at 
obtaining information and evidence needed 
for criminal investigations and prosecutions. 
Cooperation of this kind with Switzerland 
is uniquely important because of its position 
as an international financial center. Despite 
the general cooperation of Swiss authorities 
in criminal cases, the procedures for obtain- 
ing needed information have been generally 
ponderous and inadequate. Despite this co- 
operation. United States law enforcement 
and investigative agencies have frequently 
encountered severe difficulties in obtaining 
needed information from Swiss banks be- 
cause of banking secrecy laws. 

The new Treaty, as implemented by Swiss 
legislation, should open up new avenues of 
cooperation in Switzerland and greatly facili- 
tate the work of the United States law 
enforcement and prosecutive agencies, 
especially in dealing with cases involving 
organized crime. Assistance will extend to 
ascertaining the whereabouts of persons, 
taking testimony, producing and preserving 
judicial and other documents, records and 
evidence, and serving and authenticating 

' Transmitted on Feb. 18 (text from White House 
press release) ; also printed as S. Ex. F, 94th Cong., 
2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and 
interpretative letters and the report of the Depart- 
ment of State. 

|iril 12, 1976 


judicial and administrative documents. 

The Treaty is expected to provide a useful 
and significant tool in combating crime and 
bringing offenders to justice. I recommend 
that the Senate give the Treaty and related 
letters prompt consideration and consent to 
their ratification. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, February 18, 1976. 


U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution 
on Assistance to Mozambique 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative W. 
Tapley Bennett, Jr., on March 17, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 


USUN press release :i3 dated March 17 

The delegation of the United States is 
pleased to join with the other delegations 
who have spoken to commend the Govern- 
ment of Mozambique for its decision to en- 
force fully mandatory sanctions against the 
illegal government in Rhodesia. We believe 
this decision represents a major step for- 
ward in the efforts of the United Nations to 
enforce sanctions and thereby Ijring an end 
to minority rule in Rhodesia. 

It is the sincere hope of my government 
that the enforcement of sanctions by Mozam- 
bique will be coupled with the adoption by 
this Council of a resolution on assistance to 
Mozambique which is placed in the context of 
article 50 of the U.N. Charter. We believe 
that the support of this Council for Mozam- 
bique will be a clear sign to the regime in 

Salisbury that the United Nations is cor 
mitted to the peaceful transition to majori 
rule which is so urgently needed in th 

Accordingly, the United States will vote 
favor of the resolution before us because \ 
take its pui-pose to be twofold: 

— First, to issue an appeal for assistance 
Mozambique under article 50 of the charte 
Mozambique has properly and commendab 
imposed .sanctions on Rhodesia's minori' 
government and accordingly has reason 
seek recourse under article 50. 

— And second, to demonstrate that t! 
Council speaks with one voice on Rhodesis 
matters. There should be no doubt that th 
Council favors the urgent implementation 
majority rule in Rhodesia. 

I shall have to say frankly that we are di 
appointed that the resolution contains a nuii 
ber of elements which do not bear on its ma 
objectives. The charges of aggression in tl 
third pi'eambular and second operative par 
graphs undoubtedly desei-ve careful attentio 
But my government wishes to make cle? 
that it does not regard them as related to tB 
appeal which the Council is making on behs 
of Mozambique under article 50. We view til 
appeal as premised solely on Mozambiqua 
compliance with Security Council Resol 
tions 232 and 253 and the costs which ens 
from that compliance. We would normal 
have abstained on this resolution becau. 
of the insertion of these references. In fac 
we did so in a similar situation in the Counc 
in 1973. Today, however, we shall vote 
favor, with the explanation I have just give 
in order to leave no doubt that we support tl 
principal purpose of this resolution as w( 
as the purpose of Security Council Resol 
tions 232 and 253, which it reinforces. 

Mr. President, my government will gi^ 
favorable consideration to assistance to M 
zambique in offsetting the heavy financi 
burdens it will incur by closing its bord( 
with Rhodesia. I 

The United States remains unequivocal 
its support for the efforts of the British Go 
ernment to bring an end to the rebellion : 
Rhodesia. We continue to believe strong; 


Department of State Bullet 

;it majority rule is a vital and urgent 
cessity in Rhodesia. I call the Council's 
rticular attention to the statement in 
icago by President Ford on March 13 [in 
interview for the Chicago Sun-Times] 

The United States is totally dedicated to seeing to 
that the majority becomes the rulinR power in 


The President added that: 

f we believe in the right of the majority to rule 
b that situation, there has to be a change in the 
pwer as far as the Government is concerned. 
Viether it can be done is a question that we have 
t face. The British Government has tried for years 
pet Smith to move. The United States has been 
liing. I think they just have to move and if they 
di't ... we have to be on the right side morally 
ai the right side morally is to be for majority rule. 

On March 16, yesterday, Secretary of State 
Issinger made the following statement to 
t? Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 

n Southern Rhodesia we are not supporting the 
\ ite government or the white authorities ... I, in 
' ? statement before the committee, again made 

;ir that we stand for majority rule and we will 
c nothing to support the white minority to continue 
t exercise authority in Rhodesia. 

^0 what we can do about it in any given instance 

lends on the circumstances, but we have to make 
car what we stand for and then we have to work 
t vard it. 

I believe these statements make very 
c 'ar where the United States stands on the 
] lodesian question. It is time for true self- 
< termination and for majority rule in 

J lodesia. 


The Security Council, 

Taking note of the statement made by the Presi- 

iiit of the People's Republic of Mozambique on 3 

arch 1976 (S/12005), 

Having heard the statement of the Foreign Min- 
er of the People's Republic of Mozambique, 
Gravely concerned at the situation created by the 
ovocative and aggressive acts committed by the 

:2gal minority regime in Southern Rhodesia against 

■= security and territorial integrity of the People's 

.^public of Mozambique, 

'U.N. doc. S/RES/386; adopted unanimously on 
ar. 17. 

Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of 

Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to self-determination 
and independence, in accordance with General Assem- 
bly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and 
the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoy- 
ment of such rights, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, 

Recalling its resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 
imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, 

Recalling further its resolutions 277 (1970) of 
18 March 1970 and 318 (1972) of 28 July 1972, 

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Gov- 
ernment of Mozambique to sever immediately all 
trade and communication links with Southern Rho- 
desia in accordance with the decision of the Council 
and in strict observance of economic sanctions, 

Considering that this decision constitutes an im- 
portant contribution to the realization of the United 
Nations objectives in Southern Rhodesia in accord- 
ance with the principles and purposes of the Charter 
of the United Nations, 

Recognizing that the action of the Government of 
Mozambique is in accordance with resolution 253 

Bearing in mind the provisions of Articles 49 and 
50 of the Charter of the United Nations, 

1. Commends the Government of Mozambique for 
its decision to sever all economic and trade relations 
with Southern Rhodesia; 

2. Condemns all provocative and aggressive acts, 
including military incursions, against the People's 
Republic of Mozambique by the illegal minority 
regime of Southern Rhodesia; 

3. Takes note of the urgent and special economic 
needs of Mozambique arising from its implementa- 
tion of resolution 253 (1968), as indicated in the 
statement by its Foreign Minister; 

4. Appeals to all States to provide immediate 
financial, technical and material assistance to Mozam- 
bique, so that Mozambique can carry out its economic 
development programme nonnally and enhance its 
capacity to implement fully the system of sanctions; 

5. Requests the United Nations and the organiza- 
tions and programmes concerned, in particular the 
Economic and Social Council, the United Nations De- 
velopment Programme, the World Food Programme, 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and all United Nations specialized agencies to assist 
Mozambique in the present economic situation and 
to consider periodically the question of economic 
assistance to Mozambique as envisaged in the pres- 
ent resolution; 

6. Requests the Secretary-General, in collaboration 
with the appropriate organizations of the United 
Nations system, to organize, with immediate effect, 
all forms of financial, technical and material assist- 
ance to Mozambique to enable it to overcome the 
economic difficulties arising from its application of 
economic sanctions against the racist regime in 
Southern Rhodesia. 

pril 12, 1976 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign New Agreement 
on Middle Atlantic Fisheries 

Joint Communique ' 

Representatives of the United States of 
America and the Union of Soviet SociaHst 
Republics met in Washington February 17 
to March 1, 1976, to renegotiate the agree- 
ment between their two governments con- 
cerning fisheries in the Middle Atlantic 
Ocean off the coast of the United States and 
discuss related matters. The United States 
was represejited by Ambassador Rozanne L. 
Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs. The 
Soviet Union was represented by Vladimir M. 
Kamentsev, First Deputy Minister of Fish- 
eries of the U.S.S.R. 

The two representatives succeeded in com- 
pleting negotiations on a new agreement that 
will provide improved protection to stocks of 
fish in the Middle Atlantic region in the in- 
terests of sound conservation and manage- 
ment and based on the best available 
scientific evidence. The new agreement was 
signed on March 1, 1976. 

The new agreement also provides for an 
expanded joint research program on the 
principal fish stocks of the region. Progress 
on these studies will be reviewed later in the 
year at a special meeting of American and 
Soviet scientists and statistical special- 

Taking into account anticipated legal and 
jurisdictional changes in the field of fisheries 
off the coasts of the United States, and the 
need to provide for an orderly transition to 
the future regime, both sides agreed to meet 
at a convenient time for the purpose of dis- 
cussing questions of mutual interest regard- 

ing the principles that will apply to th 
future fisheries relations. 

Both sides expressed their satisfacti 
with the new agreement and their inten 
in continued mutually beneficial cooperati_ 
in the field of fisheries. 

Current Actions 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the developme 
production, and stockpiling of bacteriologi 
(biological) and toxin weapons and on their 
struction. Done at Washington, London, and Ml 
cow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 
1975. TIAS 8062. 

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, March 


Customs convention on the ATA carnet for the te- 
porary admission of goods, with annex. Done 
Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into fo 
July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 19^ 
TIAS 6631. 

Accession deposited: South Africa, December 


Memorandum of understanding concerning coope 
tive information exchange relating to the devel 
ment of solar heating and cooling systems in bu; 
ings. Fonnulated at Odeillo, France, October 1 
1974. Entered into force July 1, 1975. 
Signature: Department of the Environment of ■ 
United Kingdom, February 6, 1976. 

Long-term cooperation program in the field 
energy. Adopted at Paris January 30, 1976. I' 
tered into force March 8, 1976. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done 

London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 

1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 

Notification of succession : Surinam, November : 
Amendments to the international convention on lo 

lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted 

London October 12, 1971.= 

Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, Februa" 
12, 1976. 

'Issued on Mar. 1 (text from press release 110). 

' Effective April 1, 1976. Applicable to entire a 
toms area which includes Botswana, Lesotho, Swa 
land, and South Africa. 

" Not in force. 

Department of State Bullet 

Xotification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 


'^ritime Matters 

mention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 

Acceptance deposited: Portugal, March 17, 1976. 
iiviMition on facilitation of international maritime 

raffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Sntered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
?tates May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 
^lendment of article VII of the convention on fa- 
■ilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 

TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 

\'ntificatiov of succession : Surinam, November 25, 

/lendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
inipiided, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 

ultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
\.dopted at London October 17, 1974.= 
icceptance deposited: Iraq, March 11, 1976. 

dircotic Drugs 

(. ivpntion on psychotropic substances. Done at 
/ienna February 21, 1971.= 
Accession deposited: Uruguay, March 16, 1976. 

( Pollution 

I ernational convention for the prevention of pollu- 

ion of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London 

tlay 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; 

or the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 

:900, 6109. 

Acceptance deposited: Uruguay, December 9, 1975. 
/ lendments to the international convention for the 

)revention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as 

imended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London 

)ctober 21, 1969.= 

Acceptance deposited: Spain, February 25, 1976. 
] ernational convention relating to intervention on 

he high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 

vith annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 

Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 

'Ratifications deposited: Panama, January 7, 1976; 
Yugoslavia, February 3, 1976. 

Notification of succession : Surinam, November 25, 
Lernational convention on civil liability for oil pol- 

ution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 

1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.' 
Extended by the United Kingdom to: Bailiwick of 
Jersey, Bailiwick of Guernsey, and the Isle of 
Man, February 1, 1976; Bermuda, February 3, 

.' f ety at Sea 

^ternational regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea. Approved by the International Conference on 
Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 

to June 16, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 

1965. TIAS 5813. 

Notification of succession: Surinam, November 25, 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 

London November 30, 1966.= 

Acceptances deposited: Iran, February 27, 1976; 
Nauru, November 25, 1975. 
Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 

October 20, 1972.= 

Accession deposited: Syria, February 16, 1976. 


Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. 
Entered into force September 1, 1974.= 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 

March 23, 1976, with declarations. 
Notification of approval: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, October 9, 1975. 
Telephone regulations, with appendices and final 
protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered 
into force September 1, 1974.' 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 

March 23, 1976, with declarations. 
Notification of approval: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, October 9, 1975. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 
7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan 
for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, 
with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva 
June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976." 
histrnment of ratification signed by the President : 

March 23, 1976, with reservation. 
Notifications of approval: Denmark, November 20, 
1975; Federal Republic of Germany, November 
26, 1975;* Japan, November 18, 1975; Uganda, 
November 11, 1975; United Kingdom, including 
Antigua, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis, An- 
guilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and territories 
under the territorial sovereignty of the United 
Kingdom, as well as the State of Brunei, the 
Solomon Islands, and, within the limits of juris- 
diction therein, the Condominium of the Nev? 
Hebrides, November 19, 1975. 


Arrangement regarding international trade in tex- 
tiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 
1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except 
for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, which entered 
into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840. 
Acceptance deposited: Spain, February 27, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 

= Not in force. 

= Not in force for the United States. 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). 

nil 12, 1976 


agreement) 1971. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton from March 17 through April 7, 1976. Enters 
into force on June 19, 1976, with respect to certain 
provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other 

Signatures: Algeria, IVlarch 25, 1976; Brazil, 
March 24, 1976; Peru, March 22, 1976. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton March 17 through April 7, 1976. Enters into 
force on June 19, 1976, with respect to certain 
provisions; July 1, 1976, with respect to other 

Women — Political Rights 

Inter-American convention on the granting of polit- 
ical rights to women. Signed at Bogota May 2, 
1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.' 
histrument of ratification signed by the President: 
March 22, 1976. 

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.' 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
March 22, 1976. 



Agreement relating to consolidation and reschedul- 
ing of certain debts owed to the United States, 
with annexes. Signed at Washington March 3, 
1976. Enters into force upon notification by each 
government that certain legal requirements have 
been met. 


Treaty on extradition, as amended by exchange of 
notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974. Signed at Wash- 
ington December 3, 1971. 
Ratifications exchanged: March 22, 1976. 
Entered into force: March 22, 1976. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agri- 
cultural commodities of October 28, 1975. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Cairo March 6, 1976. En- 
tered into force March 6, 1976. 


Agreement extending the agreement of February 26, 
1971, as amended, for the coordination of preven- 
tive and repressive action against illicit traffic in 
narcotics and dangerous drugs. Signed at San 
Francisco March 9, 1976; entered into force March 
9, 1976. 


Agreement relating to procedures for mutual assii 
ance in administration of justice in connection wi 
the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Sigm 
at Washington March 23, 1976; entered into for 
March 23, 1976. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Protocol to the treaty of May 26, 1972 (TIAS 7503 
on the limitation of antiballistic missile systeir 
Signed at Moscow July 3, 1974." 
Instrument of ratification signed by the Presiden 
March 19, 1976. 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 22-28 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 


' Not in force. 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). 

No. Date 

*140 3/22 
141 3/22 

n41A 3/23 

*142 3/22 
143 3/22 

*144 3/24 

145 3/23 
*146 3/24 
*147 3/25 

*148 3/25 

*149 3/25 

*150 3/25 

nSl 3/25 

*152 3/25 

*'153 3/26 

Advisory Panel on Music, Apr. 20. 

Kissinger: World Affairs Council 
of Dallas, Tex. 

Cox, Tower, Kissinger: introduc- 
tory remarks. Mar. 22. 

Kissinger: questions and answers 
following address, Mar. 22. 

U.S. and Hungary terminate tex- 
tile agreement. 

Kissinger: Travel Program for 
Foreign Diplomats luncheon. 

U.S. National Committee for the 
International Telegraph and 
Telephone Consultative Commit- 
tee, Apr. 20. 

Kissinger: news conference, Dallas, 

U.S. and Philippines to resume 
economic talks. Mar. 29. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Apr. 19. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCO, U.S. National Committee 
for the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution, working group on seg- 
regated ballast in existing tank- 
ers, Apr. 22. 

sec. Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on radiocommunications, 
Apr. 15. 

sec, SOLAS, working group on 
standards of training and watch- 
keeping, Apr. 20. 

sec, SOLAS, working group on 
bulk chemicals, Apr. 21. 

Thirtieth anniversary of Ful- 
bright-Hays scholarship pro- 
gram to be observed by alumni. 
Kissinger: Subcommittee on For- 
eign Assistance of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Department of State Bulleti 

INDEX April 12, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1920 


Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Dallas March 23 469 

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Program for Edu- 
cation in Southern Africa (letter from Am- 
bassador Scranton to U.N. Secretary General) 475 

China. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Dallas March 23 469 


Department Discusses Issues in Southern 
Africa (Schaufele) 493 

The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 481 

U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Sent to Senate (message from 
President Ford) 495 


Foreign Policy and National Security (Kis- 
singer) .• • 457 

Secretary Kissinger Addresses Foreign Diplo- 
mat Travel Program 476 

{Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Dallas March 23 469 

Developing Countries. The Future and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 481 

Diplomacy. Secretary Kissinger Addresses For- 
eign Diplomat Travel Program 476 

Disarmament. Foreign Policy and National 
Security (Kissinger) 457 

Economic Affairs 

1 Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Dallas March 23 469 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign New Agreement on 
Middle Atlantic Fisheries (joint communique) 498 

Energy. Questions and Answers Following the 

Secretary's Address at Dallas 465 

Environment. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign New 
Agreement on Middle Atlantic Fisheries 
(joint communique) 498 

Industrial Democracies. The Future and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 481 

Ireland. Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland 
Visits the United States (joint communique) 480 

Latin America. Secretary Kissinger Addresses 
Foreign Diplomat Travel Program .... 476 


Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Dallas 465 

Secretary Kissinger Addresses Foreign Diplo- 
mat Travel Program 476 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Dallas March 23 469 

Mexico. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Dallas March 23 469 

Middle East 

Questions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at Dallas 465 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Dallas March 23 469 

Military Affairs. Foreign Policy and National 
Security (Kissinger) 457 

Mozambique. U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution 
on Assistance to Mozambique (Bennett, text 
of resolution) 496 


Department Discusses Issues in Southern 

Africa (Schaufele) ■ ■ 493 

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Program for Edu- 
cation in Southern Africa (letter from Am- 
bassador Scranton to U.N. Secretary General) 475 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Dallas March 23 469 

Presidential Documents 

Prime Minister Cosgrave of Ireland Visits the 
United States • 480 

U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Sent to Senate 495 

South Africa. Department Discusses Issues in 

Southern Africa (Schaufele) 493 

Southern Rhodesia 

Department Discusses Issues in Southern 
Africa (Schaufele) 493 

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Assistance to 

Mozambique (Bennett, text of resolution) . 496 

Switzerland. U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Assistance 
in Criminal Matters Sent to Senate (message 
from President Ford) 495 

Thailand. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at Dallas 465 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 498 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign New Agreement on 

Middle Atlantic Fisheries (joint communique) 498 
U.S.-Swiss Treaty on Assistance in Criminal 
Matters Sent to Senate (message from 
President Ford) 495 


Foreign Policy and National Security (Kis- 
singer) 457 

The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy (Kissinger) 481 

Secretary Kissinger Addresses Foreign Diplo- 
mat Travel Program 476 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Dallas March 23 469 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign New Agreement on 

Middle Atlantic Fisheries (joint communique) 498 

United Nations 

U.S. Makes Pledge to U.N. Program for Educa- 
tion in Southern Africa (letter from Ambas- 
sador Scranton to U.N. Secretary General) 475 

U.S. Supports U.N. Resolution on Assistance to 
Mozambique (Bennett, text of resolution) . 496 

Name Index 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 496 

Ford, President 495 

Kissinger, Secretary . . . 457, 465, 469, 476, 481 

Schaufele, William E., Jr 493 

Scranton, William W 475 

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Volume LXXIV 

No. 1921 

April 19, 1976 


Statement by Secretary Kissinger 501 


Address by Ambassador Enders 508 



Statement by Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff 51i 



Statements by Ambassador Scranton and Text of Draft Resolution 526 


For index see inside hack cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1921 
April 19, 1976 

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interested agencies of tlie governm 
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tlte field of U.S. foreign relations i 
on tfie work of tfie Department i 
tlte Foreign Service. 
Tlte BULLETIN includes selee 
press releases on foreign policy, iss> 
by tfie Wfiite House and tlte Depi • 
ment, and statements, addresi , 
and news conferences of tfie Presid '. 
and tfie Secretary of State and ot • 
officers of tlte Department, as well i 
special articles on various pftases ' 
international affairs and tlte fundi '. 
of tfie Department. Information i 
included concerning treaties and int ■ 
national agreements to wfiicli 
United States is or mag becomi i 
party and on treaties of general ini ■ 
national interest. 

Publications of tlte Department ' 
State, United Nations documents, t '. 
legislative material in tfie field 
international relations are also lisi • 

}curity Assistance and Foreign Policy 

Statement by Secretary Kissinger 

I am happy to have the opportunity to 
stify on the Administration's request for 
curity assistance authorization for fiscal 
■ar 1977. The request follows closely on the 
'els of that for the current year, about 
lich I testified before this committee last 

Security assistance is an essential ele- 
eiit of our overall foreign policy. That 
ilicy is designed to help build a more peace- 
1, stable, and prosperous world order in 
lich America's own security, prosperity, 
id values will be furthered. 
The basic elements of our foreign policy— 
hich we believe will guide any Congress and 
dministration, whether Republican or Dem- 
irat — include these: 

-To maintain our own strength and pur- 
)se as a nation. 

-To maintain and continually revitalize 
ir relations with allies and friendly coun- 
ies with which we share values and in- 

— To reduce the risk of war with our po- 
:ntial adversaries and move toward more 
itional and normal relationships despite con- 
nuing differences. 

-To discourage the spread of nuclear- 
'eapons capability and otherwise to help to 
esolve regional conflicts that threaten world 

' Made before the House Committee on Inter- 
»tionaI Relations on Mar. 29 (text from press re- 
ase 155). The complete transcript of the hearings 
iill be published by the committee and will be 
i^ailable from the Superintendent of Documents, 

.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 

'j.pril 19, 1976 

— To resolve international economic issues 
in a way which enhances economic and polit- 
ical stability, prosperity, and justice. 

This is the context for designing and de- 
ciding upon our security assistance policy. 
These are the purposes it must — and does — 

The foundation of our foreign policy is 
security. Our own military strength, our 
alliances, and the security assistance pro- 
grams which support them have been the 
bedrock of our security since World War II, 
and they remain so today. In an era of devas- 
tating nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear 
balance between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the conventional strength of 
our alliances is essential to maintain global 
stability and to leave our potential adver- 
saries no rational alternative to restraint and 

The persistence of regional conflicts con- 
tinues to pose risks to global stability. The 
carefully considered transfer of defense 
equipment may be essential in creating and 
stabilizing regional balances of power, as a 
precondition to the attack on the root causes 
of disputes. 

Finally, every nation has the paramount 
concern and sovereign responsibility to main- 
tain its own security and to define its needs. 
The United States cannot expect to retain 
influence with nations whose perceived de- 
fense needs we disregard. Conversely, de- 
fense supply links to these countries can 
enhance our influence and cooperation with 
them on other international issues of im- 
portance to us. 


Thus, we believe it is important that arms 
transfers continue to be approached in the 
context of our overall national interests and 
objectives. These include foreign policy as 
well as our defense readiness and our econ- 
omy. We fully recognize the vital role of con- 
gressional support and oversight for the 
security assistance i^rogram. 

An Overview of the Authorization Requests 

Our specific autliorization requests for 
fiscal year 1977 reflect cost-conscious atten- 
tion by the executive branch : 

— The proposed foreign military sales 
credit program and our resultant request 
for new obligational authority are both ap- 
proximately $200 million less than for 1976. 
The new-obligational-authority request is for 
$840 million; down from $1,065 million last 
year. This will fund a total program of over 
$2 billion, of which approximately lialf is for 
essential assistance to Israel. 

— Security supporting assistance programs 
have been reduced from last year by over 
$100 million to $1.8 billion. Nearly 95 percent 
of this amount is requested for the Middle 
East. The programs supported by tliese funds 
are a vital component of our Middle East 
peace eff'ort. 

— The international narcotics control pro- 
gram is reduced from last year, to $34 mil- 
lion. We reduced it in the expectation that 
major equipment items for tlie opium poppy 
eradication efl!"orts in Mexico and Burma will 
already have been provided. Turkish control 
of its opium poppy production, the vigorous 
eradication efforts now being undertaken in 
Mexico, and the beginnings of excellent 
results in Burma offer hope that this inter- 
national security assistance program, which 
means so much to the health of our own peo- 
ple, is achieving its objectives. 

— Foreign military training is programed 
at $30.2 million. This program is highly cost- 
effective in improving the efficiency of allied 
and friendly military forces. Foreign govern- 
ments are to an increasing extent paying for 
the training they receive from the United 
States. This modest grant program provides 

long-range benefits in terms of mutual 
fense and military cooperation. 

Regional Programs: The Middle East 

In fiscal year 1977 our security assistai 
program for the Middle East absorbs aim 
70 percent of our total program. 

Our request has been designed to prot 
and further interests of vital importance 
the United States and is a central part of ( 
eft'orts to help achieve progress toward pe; 
in the Middle East. 

Every American Government since li 
has demonstrated a moral commitment to i 
survival and security of the State of Isr; 
and we are certain that all future gove 
ments will continue to honor that comn 
ment. We also have important interests i 
friendships in the Arab world. Tliere is the 
fore an urgent need to avoid perpetual cri 
between Israel and the Arabs. These cri 
strain our relations with allies, jeopard 
our hopes for world economic recovery, i 
risk a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation. 

The ability of Israel to persevere in 
own defense is one of the essential consta 
of our Middle Eastern policy. Although Isr 
has recently imposed even more string' 
domestic austerity measures, its assu 
survival depends upon substantial econoi 
and military assistance, which can come o 
from the United States. Our program 
Israel represents our best judgment of 
appropriate assistance required from us 
maintain the defensive strength and econoi 
health which Israel requires for its secur 
and survival. 

Our request for Egypt — which is entir 
for nonmilitary supporting assistance — a 
rests on basic requirements and conside 
tions of U.S. national interests. Egypt ho 
a historic position of leadership in the Ai 
world and has courageously committed its 
to pursuing peace. Egypt has demonstral 
its good faith and sincerity by ending 
longtime close dependence on the Sov 
Union and by moving toward closer relatic 
with the West. It is clearly in our interest 
demonstrate that countries which purs 


Department of State Bui 

eh policies can obtain the support of the 
lited States. Our security assistance to, and 
r growing friendship with, Egypt are 
ned at achieving this objective. In this 
nnection we have advised the Congress of 
r intention to provide Egypt with six 
130 transport aircraft. We are pleased that 
is committee has set aside a separate time 
the near future when we may discuss this 
msfer in some detail. 
Jordan, which is of strategic importance in 
e Arab-Israeli dispute, has long been recog- 
;ed as a force of moderation in the Middle 
st. Jordan is a strong friend of the United 
ates and is working to overcome its serious 
jblems of economic underdevelopment. Our 
urity assistance contributes to Jordan's 
v'elopment and helps Jordan to maintain its 
litically moderate course. 
Syria will play an integral part in any 
iceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dis- 
te. Our nonmilitary supporting assistance 
)grani with Syria is essential to maintain- 
f the close working relationship we need 
we continue our peace efforts. 
\Ve stress that our security assistance to, 
i improved relations witli, Arab nations do 
: undermine in any sense our traditional 
endship with Israel. The policy of en- 
iraging constructive and moderate forces 
the Arab world is the best way we can 
Ip all the parties to attain a durable peace 
it will assure the survival and security of 

During the past year, the Middle East 
icial requirements fund permitted us to re- 
5nd promptly to special needs arising from 
r Middle East peace efforts. We will con- 
ue to need this capability to move rapidly 
support activities contributing to peace in 
i area and to maintain our support mission 
the Sinai. 

Much remains to be done to achieve peace 
the Middle East. Oui- efforts to generate 
rther movement in the Middle East peace 
gotiations are entering another difficult and 
tical period. We are determined to main- 
n the momentum toward peace. We are 
rrently engaged in intensive consultations 
th all the governments directly concerned 

»ril 19, 1976 

to try to reach agreement on how to proceed. 
Our security assistance program and our 
close, cooperative relations with countries of 
the region will be as important to our efforts 
in the future as they were to helping us to 
achieve the interim Sinai agreement in 1975. 
We will continue to need the sustained, 
strong support of the Congress and the 
American people for these efforts. 

Other Regional Programs 

Aside from the Middle East program re- 
quest for $2.9 billion, the breakdown of our 
fiscal year 1977 requests is as follows: 




rcentaye of 



million i 

Total Program 




East Asia 



Latin Amei-ica 






Near East 




In Europe, Greece and Turkey continue to 
be the focal points of our program. We must 
continue to give substance to our concern for 
their security and stability and for the 
friendship that has so long characterized our 
relations with these nations. The MAP 
[military assistance programs], FMS [for- 
eign military sales], and training funds re- 
quested should help to return our mutual 
defense relationships to a more normal foot- 
ing and allow both Greece and Turkey to play 
more effective roles within NATO. 

As you know, the Turkish Foreign Minister 
and I signed a new defense cooperation agree- 
ment between the United States and Turkey 
on March 26 which will be submitted to Con- 
gress in the near future under a joint resolu- 
tion. This agreement will replace the U.S.- 
Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement of 
1969 and will, when approved by the Con- 
gress, provide for the resumption of our use 
of important intelligence facilities and in- 
stallations in Turkey. The agreement estab- 
lishes the level of U.S. assistance to Turkey 
during a four-year period at $250 million per 
year, one-fifth of which will be in grant as- 


sistance, the remainder in credit and guaran- 
tees. The implementation of this agreement 
will restore the traditional U.S.-Turkish re- 
lationship within the NATO alliance, con- 
tribute to the settlement of problems in the 
eastern Mediterranean, and strengthen the 
conditions for peace and stability in that 

We also have key strategic interests at the 
western end of the Mediterranean, on the 
Iberian Peninsula. 

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
with Spain is currently before the Senate for 
its advice and consent. We engaged in ex- 
tensive consultations with the Congress dur- 
ing the negotiations with the Spanish Gov- 
ernment and decided to submit it as a treaty 
largely because of the advice which we re- 
ceived. This treaty is a unique agreement 
which encompasses both a closer relationship 
with Spain and an agreement for the use of 
facilities in Spain in exchange for a five- 
year program of assistance. We consider this 
a particularly significant agreement which 
serves U.S. interests in the Atlantic area and 
supports Spain at a time when it is moving 
into a new era in its domestic and inter- 
national activities. We have suggested to the 
Senate that a joint resolution for authoriza- 
tion might be appropriate. We request that 
the Congress take whatever measures are 
necessary to authorize the funds in tlie 

In regard to Portugal, the supporting as- 
sistance funds which we are requesting will 
contribute to its ability to deal with massive 
economic dislocations left in the wake of last 
year's political turmoil and will help to sup- 
port its emerging democratic process. 

East Asia 

In East Asia, we are continuing our secu- 
rity relationship with the Republic of Korea. 
As a result of Korea's continuing economic 
progress, we are terminating our grant 
material assistance program after fiscal year 
1976 and are now requesting only those MAP 
gi-ant funds needed to deliver material pre- 

viously funded under MAP. If we receive 
FMS funding levels requested in our fie 
year 1977 program, we will complete the jo 
U.S.-Republic of Korea modernization p, 
begun in 1970. For its part, the Republic 
Korea is now undertaking a further five-yi 
force-improvement plan on its own initiat 
and with its own resources. At the sa 
time, we for our part expect to continue 
request significant levels of FMS guaranti 
loans in support of our mutual security 
jectives in Korea. 

We know the committee's concerns 
human rights matters. The Korean hun 
rights situation is an important element 
our policy considerations. We have stron 
made known our views to the Korean G 
ernment and there should be no doubt ab 
the concern of the United States on 
human rights issue. 

At the same time we cannot lose sight 
our basic concerns over the security situat 
on the Korean Peninsula and its importa 
to the peace and security of the area. Our 
quest is based on our own assessment of 
need to maintain the military balance 
Korea and is in support of our security 
jectives in Korea, Japan, and East / 

For Thailand we have requested continu 
grant MAP and FMS credit funds. We 
lieve the essential objectives of our supi 
for Thai self-suflRciency remain valid. 

Latin America 

In Latin America, the common progi 
denominator continues to be training. We 
lieve that training provides, at minimal c 
significant benefits in terms of working-l< 
contacts between American officers and tl 
Latin American counterparts, some of wl n 
may be expected to rise to positions of lea( ■ 
ship in their respective governments. I)-, 
posed FMS credits are modest in relatioi .o 
both the purchasers' means and modern i- 
tion requirements, and entirely consist it 
with the tendency of Latin American go\i i- 
ments to hold defense expenditures to a « 
level in favor of development spending. 


Department of State BulM 



recent events in Africa iiave shown that 
unilateral restraint cannot prevent the 
iroduction of arms and great-power in- 
•ests into this continent. We support self- 
;ermination for the peoples of Africa and 
iih to contribute to tlie peaceful resolution 
» regional conflicts. As you are aware, I am 
Binning to visit several African countries 
\\ the near future, which will provide op- 
pi^tunities to discuss with various national 
ders our perceptions and evolving policies 
th respect to conflict areas. Our security 
istance program consists of modest FMS 
idits for Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, and 
ire. MAP is limited to Ethiopia. Low-key 
lining efforts in these countries, plus 
ana and Senegal, would enhance our pres- 
; bilateral cooperation while minimizing 
r military involvement. 
Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my re- 
,rks to the essentiality of our security as- 
tance program, its place in our overall 
■eign policy design, and the basic criteria 
der which it is employed. I have focused 
the area of greatest present urgency, the 
ddle East, and have reviewed our proposals 
• other regions. I am now ready to respond 
your questions on these or other matters 
'taining to our security assistance program 
planned for fiscal year 1977. 

i cretary Discusses Proposed Sale 
Transport Aircraft to Egypt 

atement by Secretary Kissinger ' 

The President has asked me to convey to 
u his strong support for the government- 
-government cash sale of six C-130 trans- 
rt aircraft to Egypt and for the training of 
ryptians in the U.S. service schools. In the 
•esidential Determination forwarded to 
)ngress on March 25, the President stated 
at this sale and such training will 
rengthen the security of the United States 

and promote world peace.^ I want to address 
this morning the question of why we firmly 
believe this to be the case. 

We have felt from the beginning of our 
discussion with Egypt about the C-130 sale 
that, modest as it is, it represents a policy 
decision that should be the subject of full 
consultation between the executive and the 
Legislature. This is particularly true in light 
of the history of restrictive legislation re- 
lating to our relationship with Egypt, legis- 
lation that was enacted in a very different 
era of U.S.-Egyptian relations. 

I would like to begin by putting this sale 
and the training in the context of the policy 
we have been following in the Middle East 
since 1973 — with congressional support — to 
help bring about a .settlement of the intrac- 
table and complex Arab-Israeli dispute, to 
support and insure the survival and security 
of Israel, and to improve our relations with 
the Arab states of the region. It has been vital 
to this endeavor to gain and hold the confi- 
dence of the Arab states most involved, as 
well as to keep the confidence of Israel. 

The Arab states — with some of whom we 
had had little or no relationship for seven 
years — had to develop confidence that we 
took their concerns seriously and were pre- 
pared to treat their legitimate needs fairly 
and with sympathy. We were asking the 
Arab leaders, in their own interests, to break 
with the past and follow us in the difficult 
steps that could lead to a negotiated peace. 
Their confidence in us and in our capacity to 
respond to their needs and interests was and 
is essential if we are to maintain progress 
toward a settlement. 

Egypt, under President Sadat, has taken 
the lead on the Arab side in cooperating with 
our endeavors to help the region break out of 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assist- 
ance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on Apr. 2 (text from press release 157). The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

= For text of Presidential Determination No. 76-11, 
see 41 Fed. Reg. 14163, Apr. 2, 1976. 

»ril 19, 1976 


the cycle of recurring war. Egypt has also 
moved to reorient its policy, after more than 
20 years, away from the Soviet Union and 
toward the United States. These positive de- 
velopments in Egyptian policy provide both 
opportunities and challenges. The opportuni- 
ties, I think, are clear, both in terms of our 
bilateral relationship and in terms of our 
search for peace. The challenges are equally 

The Arab world as a whole is aware of 
what President Sadat has staked in signing 
the Sinai II agreement with Israel, in abro- 
gating the friendship treaty with the Soviet 
Union, and in taking his economy off a war 
basis and rebuilding the cities along the Suez 
Canal. Other Arab states are skeptical that 
he can derive sufficient benefit from this 
new policy to make it advantageous for 

Let me say a word about what I mean by 
"advantageous for Egypt." For the first time 
in the history of the Arab-Israeli dispute, 
there are voices in the Arab world — Egypt 
among them — that say they are prepared to 
make peace with Israel. Given our fundamen- 
tal commitment to Israel's right to exist, this 
step was necessary before there could be 
common ground for cooperation between the 
United States and the Arab world in the 
search for a political solution to the problems 
that have brought four Arab-Israeli wars in 
25 years. 

Egypt seeks a peace that will meet its 
legitimate concerns for sovereignty over 
Arab territory and justice for the Palestin- 
ians without bringing into question Israel's 
right to exist in peace and security. Egypt 
under President Sadat's leadership has 
sought to throw off the shackles of the past. 
We must seek to do the same in our relations 
with Egypt. 

We must, in other words, by the respon- 
siveness of our policy, help give Sadat a posi- 
tive answer to make it possible for him to 
continue on the course he has chosen and 
encourage the other Arab states to follow 
his example. For this reason, and to build a 
durable bilateral relationship, we have broad- 
ened our ties with Egypt extensively in the 


past two years, primarily in the econon 
field. The Administration has requested $7 
million to finance an economic assistance pi 
gram with Egypt this year. The Public Lj 
480 program adds about another $1 

A U.S.-Egyptian joint commission h 
been established, and its activities ha 
added a further dimension to our relatio 
ship. There are biannual joint working groi 
meetings in medicine and health ; educati 
and culture; agriculture, science, and ec 
nomics. These meetings, and the joint pre 
ects developed by them, have resulted in 
broadening of our relationship with Egy] 
Our doctors talk with theirs about probler 
of concern to us both. In other fields, Ame 
can specialists are working closely with the 
Egyptian counterparts. There are over 1 
projects currently underway in Egypt uiid; 
the aegis of the joint commission. The 
projects are being funded by U.S.-own 
Egyptian pounds which have been generat 
by the Public Law 480 program. 

In the private sector, a joint U.S.-Egypti; 
business council has been formed and 
headed by Thomas Murphy, chairman of i 
board of General Motors Corporation. Th 
council has helped Egyptian Government ol 
cials to understand better how a modern mj 
ket economy works today and in what w 
government bureaucracies can facilitate p 
vate investment and thereby accelerate ec 
nomic development. 

While the economic side of our relatio 
ship will remain the most important. Pre; 
dent Sadat considers that some evidence 
American willingness to help meet his n 
tional security needs through the sale 
some military equipment would be very ir 
portant to him. The supply of military equi 
ment from the Soviet Union had largely drii 
up during the course of 1975; and the abr 
gation of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, as w( 
as the cancellation of Soviet access to Ale: 
andria shipyard facilities, can only be e: 
pected to cut Egypt off even more complete 
from that source. 

To meet President Sadat's needs for s 
American gesture of this sort, we have dl 


Department of State Bulleti 


ed to sell the six C-130's to Egypt and to 

ovide some training for Egyptian military 

rsonnel in American service schools. This 

an indivdual step and sets no precedent 

. r the future. There is no further comniit- 

SHent on our part. 
What we are intending to do is clearly of 
uch greater political than military impor- 
nce. If we fail now to follow through — if 
)ngress should reject the sale — it would 
ive very serious consequences not only in 
?ypt but throughout the Aral) world. The 
pacity of the United States to respond to 
vernments that adopt policies we favor 
3uld be called into further question by 
untries who have long been skeptical on 
lis score. 

.S. and Soviet Union To Continue 
Negotiations on PNE Agreement 

S'. statement ' 

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) 
as signed on July 3, 1974, and scheduled to 
ke effect on March 31, 1976. However, arti- 
s III of that treaty calls for the United 
ates and U.S.S.R. to negotiate a separate 
rreement governing the conduct of under- 
•ound nuclear explosions for peaceful pur- 
)ses (PNE's). At the time of signing the 
PBT and on several subsequent occasions, 
e stated that in view of the close relation- 
lip between the verification of a threshold 
1 iniclear-weapon tests and the conduct of 
;aceful nuclear explosions, we would not 
■esent the TTBT to the Senate for ratifica- 
on until a satisfactory PNE agreement had 
^en concluded. 

The negotiations for a PNE agreement 
;gan in October 1974 with the agreed 
ajective of insuring that peaceful nuclear 
^plosions would not be conducted so as to 

' Read to news correspondents on Mar. 31 by Robert 
Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary for 
ress Relations; also made available to news corre- 
loiidents at the White House. 

provide weapons-related benefits that were 
otherwise precluded by the TTBT. The two 
sides have made considerable progress in 
completing an agreement, and the negotia- 
tions are continuing in Moscow to resolve the 
few remaining issues. 

The two sides hope that a satisfactory 
agreement can be concluded within the next 
several weeks. During this period, we expect 
that neither side will conduct weapons tests 
above the threshold of 150 kilotons. For the 
immediate future, we have no plans for high- 
yield weapons tests above the threshold of 
150 kilotons. 

Department Gives U.S. Position 
on Developments in Lebanon 

Following is a statement read to neivs cor- 
respondents on March 29 by Robert L. 
Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary 
for Press Relations. 

The situation in Lebanon has become more 
acute during the past week, and we want to 
make clear the U.S. position concerning de- 
velopments there. 

We believe that a resolution of the Leb- 
anese crisis can only come with agreement 
among the Lebanese on a basic political solu- 
tion that gives adequate opportunity and 
security to all groups and communities in the 
country. The political compromise worked out 
with constructive Syrian assistance in con- 
nection with the January 22 cease-fire ap- 
pears to us to provide a fair basis for such a 

It appears to us, moreover, that a cease- 
fire and an orderly and constitutional resolu- 
tion of the Presidential question are neces- 
sary if progress is to be made on the more 
fundamental issues. 

We believe that military intervention by 
any outside party contains great dangers and 
must be avoided. 

The United States is prepared to help all 
the parties toward a political solution on the 
basis of these principles. 

pril 19, 1976 


Canada and the United States: The Framework and the Agenda 

Address by Thomas 0. Enders 
Ambassador to Canada ' 

When our two Secretaries of State met 
here last fall, they officially graduated 
Canada and the United States from a 
"special" to a "unique" relationship. That 
may have mystified some people whose 
dictionaries said the two words mean the 
same thing. But everyone agrees with the 
two Secretaries that what we have going 
between us is in many ways unique. Our 
common roots ; the shared experience of peo- 
pling the continent; the vastness and the 
extraordinarily powerful growth of travel, 
economic exchange, communication between 
us; the fact that we not only proclaim our 
friendship but really like each other — all of 
this seems without parallel. 

But let me ask you to look for a moment 
at Canada and the United States in another 
way — as an advance model of the relation- 
ships which will exist in the 21st century 
between all the industrial democracies. 
Everywhere — Europe, Japan, and America— 
you find countries being drawn together 
in the same way. Trade and travel gen- 
erally grow much faster between coun- 
tries than within them. Most industrial 
countries, not just one or two, are i-apidly 
increasing their investment abroad. We al- 
ready have each other's radio; increasingly 
we have each other's television; when TV 
satellites begin in a decade, television will 
cease to be a domestic matter and become 
wholly international. 

' Made before a luncheon meeting of the Canadian 
Club at Ottawa on Mar. 23. 

Everywhere in the industrial world yc 
also find the same eff'ects of interdependenc 
As countries grow closer, more players g( 
into the act. No longer are national admini: 
trations exclusively or even mainly t\ 
medium for relations between countries. Th 
other power centers — parliaments, region, 
and local governments, regulatory bodies- 
well as individuals and firms — all condu< 
more and more business across frontiers. 

As countries grow closer, too, they ofte 
find that they can't lessen dependence in or 
sector without increasing it in others. F( 
example, if a country invests heavily i 
resource self-sufficiency, it may become lei 
competitive in manufacturing; if it restric 
trade, it may become more dependent c 
foreign investment. 

Most of us are pretty ambivalent aboi 
this vast movement toward interdependenc 
We know that growing exchanges are nece 
sary to our prosperity, to the vitality of oi 
arts and sciences. We know that no goveri 
ment — not yours, not mine — has much powe 
over these trends: we can retard a little her 
accelerate a little there, but not change th 
direction. But our need to be ourselves, to ej 
ercise sovereignty, to control our own destin 
remains as intense and as fundamental a 
ever. Indeed, maybe it's more intense. 

For the industrial democracies to succee 
in the next generation we have to meet bot 
of these conflicting needs. We must be abl 
to pursue our separate destinies; we mus 
protect the immensity of our joint interests 

In this regard Canada and the Unitei 


Department of State Bulletit 

tates are like the rest of the industrial 
emocracies, only more so. The process of 
iterdependence has gone much further here 
lian elsewhere. 

I think it is fair to say that in the genera- 
ion following World War II, Canada and 
lie United States achieved a substantial suc- 
ess in meeting both of the conflicting needs 
f interdependence. On the one hand, oui- 
cade, our capital flows, our travel, our 
:ientific and cultural exchanges grew at 
ites unprecedented anywhere, giving power- 
il impulse to our prosperity. On the other 
and, we showed how our relationship could 
volve to meet new needs. Within a genera- 
on we moved from the occasionally senti- 
leiital celebration of our similarities to the 
iticulate pursuit of separate national 

In the 1970's we have both been subject 
) major shocks, and a sense of economic 
isecurity has spread throughout North 
Lmerica. The collapse of the postwar 
loiietary system in 1971 and the devaluation 
f the U.S. dollar, the OPEC [Organization 
f Petroleum Exporting Countries] embargo 
f 1973 with the new consciousness of 
esource vulnerability it produced, the wide- 
pread joblessness of the recession in 1975, 
nd most of all, the high inflation of these last 
ears have all weakened our confidence, 
igainst this background, there has been 
ome turbulence between us. We have had 
ifficulty in solving all problems to mutual 
atisfaction. Some have even predicted that 
lie relationship would develop in an adver- 
ary mode. 

Now confidence is returning throughout 
he industrial world. Although far from con- 
uered, the energy crisis is better under- 
tood, and the first adjustments to it made, 
^though it remains a threat, inflation is 
iminishing. The slow-paced but strong re- 
overy underway has a fair chance of lead- 
ng to another period of sustained expansion. 
t is the right time to consider how we would 
ike the relations between Canada and the 
Jnited States to evolve in the next few years. 

Perspectives on Areas of Disagreement 

Let me start with some of the issues on 
which we have differed these past years: oil 
and gas pricing and supplies, cable television 
commercial deletion and substitution, invest- 
ment, and potash. There are four reflections 
I would like to make to see whether I can 
put the issues I have mentioned into per- 

First, the common characteristic in these 
issues is that in each case actions were taken 
or proposed that had the effect of restricting 
exchanges between us. The overall image 
they give is one of cutting back. Moreover, 
it is cutting back by one of the two partners, 
for the actions on which we have differed 
were for the most part taken by you. It is 
for that reason that Americans have asked 
what their meaning is and wondered where 
we are going from here. 

Second, neither the U.S. Government nor 
the American citizens and firms involved con- 
test the full and entire right of Canadian 
authorities to take these actions, but equity 
has been an issue. People on my side of the 
border have felt that their interests were 
not being taken into account. 

Third, in only a few cases is the impact of 
these actions on U.S. national interests 
major, although regional impact can be sub- 
stantial. But the cun'ent sense of economic 
insecurity is such on both sides of the border 
that these differences, remaining unresolved, 
have been perceived as more threatening 
than they would have been in the past. 

In oil, our goal, like yours, is to bring 
domestic prices toward world levels. A phas- 
ing-in of Canadian export prices would have 
eased our adjustment, but it was not 
essential. The phase-out of Canadian oil ex- 
ports is tough to adjust to ; but it need not be 
a fundamental setback to us, given Canadian 
willingness to encourage swaps to the captive 
refineries on the northern tier of American 
states. A larger part of our oil imports will 
be sourced in insecure supplies, but the con- 
tingency plan agreed by the International 

\pril 19, 1976 


Energy Agency, including Canada and the 
United States, provides for sharing import 
shortfalls due to selective or general em- 
bargoes. And frankly, Canadian oil has been 
pricing itself out of the market. 

The stakes in gas are greater. Although 
some adjustment has been and is still pos- 
sible — we still use some of the imported gas 
for electricity generation, for example — U.S 
customers have few options if Canada cuts 
the supply or raises the price of natural gas. 
American consumers wonder why Canadian 
gas must not just match, but continually lead, 
free market prices in the United States. 

The stakes in television commercial dele- 
tion and substitution are not great in material 
terms. The immediate argument is about a 
gross advertising budget accruing to U.S. 
stations of $20 million. But the dispute has 
attracted public interest and seems to pose 
questions of principle far beyond its com- 
mercial impact. 

In investment the question is whether 
and how the rules under which investment 
has been attracted or encouraged will be 
changed before it is amortized. The United 
States understands that your authorities 
will wish to decide whether and under what 
conditions foreign enterprise can establish in 
Canada. But once established, we believe 
that it should be given national treatment. 
Nor do we contest the right of your authori- 
ties to expropriate — or buy into — U.S. enter- 
prises for authentic public purposes, pro- 
vided payment is made fullj', promptly, and 
effectively. But we are concerned where 
takeover is used to gain a quasi-monopoly 
position. Saskatchewan's proposal to acquire 
half the potash capacity in its province 
would give it control of one-third of the U.S. 
potash supply. Although welcome, statements 
that this power would be used benignly are 
not adequate reassurance. 

Whatever the precise material impact of 
these actions, the general sense of economic 
insecurity makes them appear more than 
threatening. Although it is true that by 
objective standards the average family in 
both our countries has never been better off, 
many feel impoverished. The energy crisis 

and recession have contributed, but prolonget 
inflation is the major cause. Canada and th 
United States have always bargained har< 
together, but recently our mutual sensitivit; 
to even marginal changes in economic ar 
rangements has become much greater. 

Fourth, the assertion of Canadian nationa 
purpose is not an issue between us. Ameri 
cans understand and respect it. We expec 
you to be yourselves. We understand wh; 
you wish to diversify your foreign interests 
we will cooperate with that effort. Fev 
Americans who have dealt with Canada hav 
ever doubted the separateness of Canadiai 
interests and destiny. 

At the same time we are both consciou 
that the end of the "special relationship' 
frees us both from historical hangups ii 
pursuing our interests. In the future we wil 
not negotiate together on the basis of ex 
ceptional dispensations and concessions, bu 
as we do with other countries. This is 
sound and fundamental development in ou 

New Problems and New Opportunities 

So much for the past. Let me turn to th 
future. The world is again changing. Th( 
great economic shocks are now behind uSI 
Our economies are again moving forwarc 
The recovery from the double crisis of re 
cession and inflation is painfully slow, bu 
we are recovering. We can be at the threshol 
of another prolonged expansion that agail 
off'ers the means not now available for a ne\\ 
transformation of our societies. 

The problems we will face in the nex 
years will be quite diff'erent than the one 
we have faced. They will demand new form 
of cooperation between us. 

More and more it is coming through tha 
the energy crisis translates into a questio: 
of how to mobilize the vast capital invest 
ments needed to exploit such opportunitie 
as the Arctic, the continental shelf, our coa 
gasification, and your tar sands. In neithe 
country is resource availability itself an; 
longer the main issue. 

Indeed, investment may be the critica 


Department of State Bulletir 

^ssue throughout our economies in the com- 
(ing decade. Its lag is the reason why this 
^recovery is only half as fast as others in the 
postwar period. Added energy needs, the 
nsing cost of environmental protection, the 
leed to avoid in the future the supply bot- 
:lenecks that choked off the last expansion 
—all mean that sustained growth in the fu- 
ure will require proportionately much more 
;apital formation than in the past. In the 
United States both liberals and conservatives 
ire beginning to ask whether we will not 
lave to run sustained budget surpluses or 
)ecome, like you, major capital importers to 
ivoid capital-market crunches. 

Canada-U.S. economic relations are also 
•hanging. You have had more success than 
ve in sustaining economic activity in this 
ecession: your unemployment has been 
i^hter than ours, while our price-wage per- 
ormance, although not good, has been bet- 
er than yours. As a result, the U.S. 
)ayments deficit of the early 1970's with 
anada has turned into a substantial surplus, 
inanced by large capital imports by Canada. 
\lS your price-wage spiral slows down and 
s our recovery proceeds, our economies will 
irobably move back into synchronization. 
)Ut most projections show substantial capi- 
al imports by Canada continuing into the 
980's on the assumption of a medium 
rowth rate. Decision by Canada either to 
un the economy at a significantly lower 
ate than the United States, or to take 
leasures to cut consumption and increase 
avings, could of course reduce or eliminate 
hat need. 

At the same time the economy is turning 
xpansionary, it is being brought home to 
s again how insecure the world is. The steady 
ear-in-year-out increase in Soviet conven- 
ional military capability is calling into 
uestion the military balance in Central 
Europe. If the NATO allies do not meet the 
hallenge by increasing their own capability 
mount a nonnuclear defense in Europe, 
t'e will be forced back toward a tripwire 
ituation with all its jeopardies. 
With the great economic shocks behind 
s, should we not also put behind us the 

defensive, sometimes restrictionary, mode 
of relationship to which they gave rise? If 
we do not, I believe we cannot master the 
new problems and opportunities now thrust- 
ing upon us. 

Points of Reference for New Approach 

What sort of an approach should we 
adopt? I believe there are five points of 

First, of course, consult before taking ac- 
tion that affects the other country. This, and 
its corollary — willingness to consider accom- 
modation where appropriate — is fundamen- 
tal. As a result of the initiative of Minister 
MacEachen [Allan MacEachen, Secretary of 
State for External Affairs], consultation 
has become a recognized goal between us. It 
is developing particularly well in the field of 
environment, where the concept is emerging 
of contact in advance of development that 
might cause pollution. Current examples are 
the Sage Creek coal development in British 
Columbia and the Garrison Diversion project 
in North Dakota. 

Second, build in predictability. Uncertain- 
ty has been a corrosive force in the field of 
energy exchanges; it has been of some con- 
cern in investment. 

In energy, you now export to us a million 
barrels a day in oil equivalent in oil, gas, 
and electricity. We export to you 200,000 
barrels a day in oil equivalent, essentially m 
coking and steam coal. When net crude oil 
exports are eliminated in accordance with 
your decision, current contracts would call 
for somewhat less than a half million bar- 
rels a day in oil equivalent in energy ex- 
ports fi'om you, and perhaps half that much 
from us, yours in the Pacific Northwest and 
a range of border states, ours in Ontario. 
Would it not be in our interest to consider 
together how better to assure predictability 
in prices and supplies in each of these flows? 

In investment we have the same two-way 
flow, only it is far more massive and far 
more important. U.S. policy is to maintain 
an open capital market in our own country. 
We recognize Canada's desire to review the 

^^pril 19, 1976 


new establishment of foreign firms against 
criteria of national benefit. Provided all for- 
eign firms, U.S. and others, are treated 
alike, that review process is not an issue be- 
tween us. But if we think that major two- 
way flows are in our mutual interest as an 
impulse to growth, then we should make the 
conditions of capital exchange as stable and 
as little onerous as possible. 

Third, de-bilateralize where appropriate. 
This has always been a major element in 
strategies for handling Canada-U.S. rela- 
tions. In a wide range of areas we have 
sought to bring our relationships under 
multilateral codes, with agreed procedures 
for negotiation and settlement of differ- 
ences. Canada and the United States took 
the lead, for example, in developing rules to 
govern trade and payments in GATT [Gen- 
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], in 
the IMF [International Monetary Fund], in 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development]. We are both 
committed to make the current multilateral 
trade negotiations a major success, and we 
can use that negotiation to solve many of 
our bilateral trading problems. The same 
applies to the law of the sea negotiations, 
which are now reaching the critical stage. 
And in the last two years we have made 
progress in developing multilateral frame- 
works for energy and investment, two areas 
where they have been absent in the past. 

Fourth, try to deal with each issue on its 
own terms. In the past we've generally tried 
to avoid trade-offs on unrelated questions. 
Of course, few important decisions have been 
made either in the Canadian Cabinet or in 
the U.S. Administration without asking how 
the rest of the relationship was going. But 
both of us have felt that to link various is- 
sues at different stages of ripeness, with 
different regional constituencies and differ- 
ent supporting interests, would make them 
less solvable, not more. Some now, on both 
sides of the border, are urging us to start 
linking issues. That would be wrong. Across- 
the-board bargaining could easily produce 
frustration and, quite possibly, brawls. But 
it is obvious that we can avoid linkage only 


if we can show that good progress can b 
made in the case-by-case approach. 

Fifth, go for the expansionary solutioi 
We must not play Canada-U.S. relations as 
zero-sum game where what we get you los 
and what you get we lose. Nothing could b 
more destructive of our mutual interests an 
of our mutual confidence. Instead we shoul 
aim for the solution that does not take awa 
from either of us, but permits a new highe 
level balance of advantage to emerge. 

That is what we did when faced with th 
conflict between Canada's interest in protec 
ing jobs and investment in its automotive ii 
dustry and our joint interest in the mo5 
efficient possible production of cars an 
trucks. Instead of dividing the industr 
with tariff walls, we integrated it under 
duty-free regime, with growth in Canadiai 
employment and capacity safeguardec 
Everybody has a different view on the pn 
cise numbers in that deal. But few in eithe 
country challenge the concept. 

The expansionary solution is also whi 
you chose when Canada stated its intentic 
to assert a new role in the world by divers 
fying its foreign political and economic rel» 
tions — the famous "third option." Canaci 
made clear that it would do so not by brea. 
ing or lessening its ties to the United State 
and not by discriminating against us, but I 
building new ties to other countries. V 
responded that we understood and cou 
fully cooperate with that. 

Defense and fisheries are current oppo 
tunities for such expansionary action. G 
transmission is a possible candidate, i 
though neither country can now know whe: 
its interest will lie. 

Canada's decision to upgrade its militai 
equipment is timely and important. The Ion; 
range patrol aircraft Canada proposes to a 
quire will make NATO's ability to mount 
sustained nonnuclear defense in Europe si; 
nificantly more credible by helping to assui 
resupply by sea. The proposed purchase is 
major one, but it may generate through of 
set agreements an equivalent amount of bus 
ness for Canadian industry or even more, 
sustained effort to satisfy the necessai 

Department of State Bulleti 

erms and conditions is being made on both 
.ides. I am hopeful that this purchase, al- 
eady agreed in principle, will soon be made 
inal. Both your reequipment program and 
airs can be expected to generate substantial 
ipportunities for two-way trade in the next 

In fisheries we may have an important new 
ipportunity to find for the decades-old sal- 
non problem a solution that expands oppor- 
unities for fishing interests on both sides of 
he border. Equally urgently, we must find a 
vay to accommodate each other's fishing in- 
erests in the expected 200-mile coastal eco- 
lomic zone before it comes into effect. 

In gas transmission neither country can 
low know what its interest is: whether eco- 
lomic, social, and environmental factors 
avor separate systems or a joint pipeline 
or bringing North Slope and Mackenzie 
)elta gas to market. But we have a mutual 
nterest in acting so that we each can keep 
■ur options open until data is available on 
t^hich to base decisions. As they now shape 
p, the timetables on both sides would dove- 
ail with results of the Canadian Na- 
ional Energy Board hearings and the in- 
uiry of Canadian Justice Berger expected 
iter this year and with the Federal Power 
Commission recommendation to the Presi- 
!ent expected in early 1977. 

lesponse to New Environment 

I do not ofl'er here a blueprint or a pro- 
gram. Canada-U.S. relations are constantly 
hanging. There are always new opportuni- 
ies, and there are often new differences. 
The five points are suggested only as guides 
ir references. I have drawn them from an 
malysis of how we have succeeded and how 
ve have failed in the past. But they are in- 
ended to respond to the new environment 
)f an expanding world economy and a de- 
;eriorating world security picture. In con- 
:rast to the time of economic trouble from 
tvhich we are now slowly emerging, objective 
conditions within the next few years are 
•nuch more likely to push us to new coopera- 
tion than to new clashes of interest. We 

should not let our own attitudes lag behind. 

Our two societies are among the most suc- 
cessful the world has known. They have pro- 
duced not only prosperity but a personal lib- 
erty and a possibility for social change that 
is unmatched anywhere. In different ways 
each is based on the diffusion, or even an 
opposition of, powers and on the organized 
tension among them. But neither country 
could survive without a widely shared sense 
of the common good. 

The only thing that could really threaten 
our future would be the loss of that sense of 
the common good, so that our domestic poli- 
tics would be organized into a purely adver- 
sary process. That is why we fear sustained 
inflation so much, for prolonged price in- 
creases make it every man for himself. That 
is why we have been so shaken by the energy 
crisis, for it brought out the instinct of 
hoarding in us. That is why sustained unem- 
ployment can be so dangerous, for it sets the 
working against the jobless. 

The same reflections apply to the way in 
which Canada and the United States relate 
to each other. It is necessary and right that 
there should always be a careful calculus of 
interest and constant bargaining between us. 
But there must also be a sense of the com- 
mon good, of what advantages us both, of 
what will make us both grow. 

I am optimistic about the way relations 
between Canada and the United States will 
develop in the next few years. We all should 
be. It is our mutual interest to succeed to- 
gether. I also think it is the will of both our 
countries that we should succeed. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Aus- 
tralia, Nicholas Fancourt Parkinson, pre- 
.sented his credentials to President Ford on 
March 16. For texts of the Ambassador's 
remarks and the President's reply, see De- 
partment of State press release dated 
March 16. 

I April 19, 1976 



The Triangular Relationship of the United States, 
the U.S.S.R., and the People's Republic of China 

Statement by Winston Lord 
Director, Policy Planning Staff ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to participate 
in your committee's examination of one of 
tlie most critical subjects in foreign policy: 
the triangular relationship of the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the People's 
Republic of China. Our relations with the 
world's largest country and with the world's 
most populous country are cardinal elements 
in our pursuit of a more secure and moderate 
international system. 

The Soviet Union possesses great industrial 
prowess and military strength. It is directed 
by leaders dedicated to developing Soviet 
power and enhancing Soviet influence. Aside 
from ourselves, only the U.S.S.R. has stra- 
tegic capabilities and conventional forces with 
a global reach. It is thus at once our principal 
rival in a geopolitical contest and an inevi- 
table partner if we are to help shape a more 
positive globe. There can be no higher im- 
perative than insuring that the vast nuclear 
arsenals we each hold are never used — for 
the ensuing holocaust could engulf not only 
our two countries but civilization itself. Our 
own security and global stability hinge funda- 
mentally upon the success of our endeavors 
to manage this relationship. 

China as well is a vast nation, with one- 

^ Made before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign 
Policy Research and Development of the House 
Committee on International Relations on Mar. 23. 
The complete transcript of the hearings will be pub- 
lished by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

quarter of the world's population, a long and 
rich history, impressive economic potential, 
a growing nuclear capability, and substantial 
political influence. There can be no lasting 
equilibrium in Asia, and ultimately in the 
world, without China's constructive partici- 
pation. Building a positive and durable re- 
lationship with that nation is at the heart 
of our international policy. 

U.S. Policy Toward the U.S.S.R. 

The relationship with the Soviet Union has 
been a central challenge for America for 
three decades. The power of the U.S.S.R. is 
continuing to grow. The United States could 
not have prevented the Soviet Union's rise 
to the stature of a superpower, nor can we 
make its power disappear. Our objective is 
to create inhibitions against the Soviets using 
their strength in ways that jeopardize our 
interests or those of our friends and, over 
time, to channel their energies in more pos- 
itive directions. This is no simple task, for 
the conditions are unprecedented : we have 
competing national interests; our ideologies 
and values clash ; we each possess arsenals of 
awesome destructiveness ; and each of us can 
project its influence throughout the world. 

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger 
have recently set forth our approach toward 
the Soviet Union in considerable detail. Let 
me, therefore, just briefly review the high- 

We must pursue a complex dual policy. 


Department of State Bulletin 

)n the one hand, we need to demonstrate 
trength and resolve. We and our allies must 
laintain levels of military capability suffi- 
ient to dissuade the Soviet Union from seek- 
\g to further its positions by force. And we 
nist firmly oppose adventurism. 

On the other hand, we must seek to shape 
10 re constructive bilateral relations and 
lol)al patterns of restraint and cooperation. 
I'e must work for reliable agreements to 
niit strategic arms on both sides. We must 
e prepared to resolve political disputes 
irough negotiation. Developing bilateral 
es in commercial and many other areas on 
le basis of reciprocal benefits is an important 
xrt of this process; it can help encourage 
oviet interests in improved relations and 
loderate international conduct. 

In short, we need both to maintain pen- 
ties for irresponsible Soviet behavior and 
) develop incentives for Moscow to pursue 
more constructive course. 
There have been positive accomplishments. 
'e concluded one major agreement on stra- 
■gic arms; and we are working toward a 
imprehensive second accord which — for the 
•st time — would place a ceiling on the stra- 
gic arms race, thus reducing the threat 

nuclear war and enabling us to avoid ex- 
?nditures on forces that would have only 
arginal military or political utility. We 
u'e eased tensions and negotiated solutions 
1 a number of problems ; for example, the 
ur-power agreement on Berlin defused one 

the traditional crisis areas. We have ex- 
mded our relations with the U.S.S.R. in 
•mmerce, technology, and many other fields 
1 the basis of mutual benefit; for example, 
st year's grain agreement, while helping 

meet Soviet requirements, assured profits 
' our farmers, alleviated pressures on our 
•ices, and protected our traditional foreign 
istomers against unrestricted Soviet forays 
to our market during future periods of 
lort supply. 

If we have made significant progress on 
ime fronts, problems remain on others, 
ost serious is the imperative of prevent- 
g expansionism and the exacerbation of 
'gional conflicts. In Angola, the Soviet 

Union and a Cuban expeditionary force in- 
tervened to impose a solution on a turbulent 
local struggle. To allow such a pattern to 
develop without opposition would create a 
dangerous destabilizing trend in world aflTairs. 
Leaders of nations in Africa and elsewhere 
would tailor their perceptions and decisions 
accordingly. Continued American passivity 
would send misleading signals to the Soviet 
Union, and China as well. We might well face 
harder choices and higher risks in the future. 

We have made clear to Soviet leaders that 
persistent attempts to gain unilateral advan- 
tage could not help but damage the state of 
our relations and thereby undermine global 

Thus we face the long-term challenge of 
maintaining a stable balance and striving to 
go beyond this to build a peaceful and secure 
world. While Americans can reasonably dis- 
agree on the tactical details of our policy 
toward Moscow, I believe that for the fore- 
seeable future any Administration will need 
to follow this two-track approach. 

Let me now turn to our relations with 
the other major Communist state. 

U.S. Policy Toward China 

Mutual concerns and incentives prompted 
the United States and the People's Republic 
of China to launch a new beginning together 
after two decades of hostility and isolation. 
Our shared interests provide the foundation 
for a durable and growing relationship. 

Positive relations with the People's Repub- 
lic of China oflFer us a variety of benefits: 
improved prospects for preserving global 
equilibrium ; reduced dangers of conflict in 
Asia, an area where the interests of all the 
world's major powers intersect; the growth 
of mutually beneficial bilateral ties, including 
cultural and educational exchanges, and com- 
mercial opportunities; and possibilities for 
cooperation or compatible action on global 

The Chinese also derive advantages from 
this relationship : a hedge against Soviet dip- 
lomatic and military pressures, broader ac- 
cess to the international community, oppor- 

pril 19, 1976 


tunities for trade and technology, and the 
prospect of progress on the Taiwan question. 

We and the Chinese share common con- 
cerns that the world remain free from 
domination by military force or blackmail — 
"hegemony," as we have described it in our 
various communiques. We have also agreed 
to pursue the normalization of our relations. 
We remain dedicated to these objectives as 
set forth in the Shanghai communique. 

There has been significant progress. Ex- 
tensive and wide-ranging talks between oui' 
two leaderships have deepened mutual per- 
ceptions — reducing the risks of miscalcula- 
tions where we disagree and increasing the 
chances for parallel actions where we agree. 
Our respective approaches to various regions 
and problems often reinforce one another. 
We have established liaison offices in each 
other's capitals. "\\'e have increased trade and 
promoted scientific and cultural exchanges. 

The Taiwan question presents some difli- 
cult issues. We have acknowledged that 
Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait 
maintain that there is but one China, of 
which Taiwan is a part; and we do not 
challenge that position. We have affirmed our 
own interest in a peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves. And 
with that prospect in mind we have reduced 
our forces on Taiwan — 10,000 at the time 
the Shanghai communique was signed, less 
than 2,500 now. This process will continue. 

There is understanding on both sides about 
the pace at which our relations have evolved. 
At the same time we cannot afford to be 
complacent. We see important national in- 
terests served by a consolidation of this re- 
lationship. We see no evidence thus far that 
foreign policy is a significant issue in the 
current campaign with the P.R.C., although, 
as in any country, there is a necessary re- 
lationship between domestic politics and the 
pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The 
Chinese, in a variety of ways, continue to 
signal to us their continuing interest in sus- 
taining and developing Sino-American rela- 
tions. In any event, the crucial factor for the 
Chinese will be their perception of the 

strength, steadiness, and vision of the Unitec 
States on the world scene. 

The basic decisions on how we will com 
plete the normalization process have not ye 
been made, but the direction of our policy ii 
clear. We are confident that with mutua 
efforts we will move ahead progressively t( 
strengthen our ties. 

The Sino-Soviet Dispute 

The Sino-Soviet dispute remains a funda 
mental feature of the contemporary globa 

The roots of this rivalry run deep. Ther 
are numerous and longstanding territorif 
and political disputes. These are compounde 
by perceptions of ideological heresy, racia 
tension, memories of past betrayals, and th 
convictions of political leaders on both side; 
The relationship is also marked by the classi 
characteristics of rivalry between two powei 
ful neighbors. Mutual suspicions are reir 
forced by military buildups in the borde 
areas and intense competitive maneuverin 
for positions in Asia and beyond. 

While war is by no means unimaginable, : 
seems improbable when both sides posse.' 
impressive deterrent capabilities. The moi 
likely prospect is continued confrontatio 
and geopolitical competition. The basic coi 
flicts of interests, the clash of ideologies, th 
readiness of forces deployed on the border 
the intensity of mutual suspicions — all suj 
gest that the present pattern will continu- 

Nevertheless, we must not regard the Sine 
Soviet confrontation as an immutable coi 
dition. While renewal of a tight Sino-Sovit 
alliance is difficult to conceive, at least 
limited improvement in relations cannot t 
ruled out. It is possible that the Russians an 
Chinese may come to see incentives for moc 
erating their bilateral relations — their desii 
for greater diplomatic flexibility in their dea 
ings with us and with others, the lessenin 
of at least border tensions, the opening 
caused by leadership successions in bot 

We have no crystal ball. Rather than speci 


Department of State Bulleti 

late on the future course of Sino-Soviet re- 
lations, let me specify more precisely the U.S. 

— We did not create the dispute. It springs 
from sources independent of our will or our 
policy. To attempt to manipulate the rivalry, 
to ineddle in it, or to take sides would be 
dangerous, indeed self-defeating. 

— At the same time, in a triangular re- 
lationship it is undeniably advantageous for 
us to have better relations with each of the 
other two actors than they have with one 
another. But it does not follow that we would 
want to see this rivalry escalate into con- 
flirt. As history abundantly attests, large- 
scale clashes among major powers are ex- 
L-eedingly difficult to contain. In addition to 
tragic loss of life in the region, there would 
loom great dangers for global stability. 

— Neither can we genuinely wish to see the 
two major Communist powers locked once 
again in close alliance. Clearly this would 
pose fresh dangers in the world. A limited 
thaw in Sino-Soviet relations, however, would 
not automatically redound to our disadvan- 
tage, provided it was not based on shared op- 
position to the United States. 

— Our interests compel us to pursue our 
well-established policies of seeking improved 
relations with both the U.S.S.R. and China. 
Both courses are essential for maintaining 
a global equilibrium and shaping a more 
peaceful and positive international structure. 
The record to date suggests that improve- 
ment in our ties with one does not harm our 
ties with the other. Indeed, our relations 
with both countries were perhaps most active 
and positive during the same period, in 

— We therefore do not intend to be in- 
structed by either party on the course we 
should adopt toward its rival. Our policies 
must be dictated by our interests, not by 
others' injunctions. At the same time, we will 
make clear that we are not colluding with, or 
accommodating, one at the expense of the 

— With both the Soviets and Chinese we 

have deep differences in national interests 
and purposes. We also have ideologies and 
values that clash, including our approach to 
human rights and individual freedom. We will 
not maintain any illusions or attempt to hide 
our differences. But in the thermonuclear age, 
we have an obligation to our people and the 
world to moderate our relationships. We must 
seek to move not only from confrontation to 
coexistence but onward to cooperation. 

— Our success in managing our relations 
with both nations depends fundamentally on 
the strength and vitality of our alliances with 
Western Europe and Japan. We must pre- 
serve the integrity of those bonds if we are 
to deal effectively with potential adversaries, 
and we must harmonize our policies with our 
allies lest differential approaches generate 
competition among friends. Our partnerships 
with the industrial democracies come first in 
our diplomacy; they will not be jeopardized 
in the pursuit of other objectives. 

—Finally, the progress of our policies to- 
ward both the Soviets and the Chinese re- 
quires a solid domestic foundation: our 
material strength, our unity of purpose, our 
appreciation of the realities around us. 
Neither Moscow nor Peking will respect us if 
we do not act with determination and vision 
in the world. Thus our first priority in this 
aspect of our foreign policy, as in all others, 
is to heal our divisions at home and act 
once again as a confident, purposeful inter- 
national power. 

This is a complex policy, but it is dictated 
by the objective conditions of international 
relations today. In the past Americans have 
had the luxury of emphasizing one strand of 
policy at a time — either resistance to ad- 
venturism or cooperation with others for 
mutual benefit. The challenge of our era — 
in a world of competing values, nuclear 
weapons, and interdependence — is to pursue 
both at the same time. 

The issues at stake run far deeper than 
questions of any one faction or party or Ad- 
ministration. The imperatives of shaping 
stable relations with the Soviet Union and 

April 19, 1976 


the People's Republic of China will be with 
us for as far ahead as we can see. This long- 
range challenge, indeed all that we do in the 
world, will crucially require the cohesion of 
the American people and cooperation between 
the executive and legislative branches. 

I remain confident that, after a turbulent 
decade, we will demonstrate our resiliency and 
once again achieve peace at home so that we 
can better promote peace in the world. 

Department Discusses U.S. Policy 
on Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons 

Folloiving is a .statement by George S. Vest, 
Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, 
made before the Subcommittee on Inter- 
national Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
House Committee on International Relations 
on March 25} 

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with 
you the issues relating to the possible initial 
use of nuclear weapons. The Department of 
State shares the concern underlying the pro- 
posals which these hearings are considering. 
"We must try to make nuclear war less likely 
and do so in ways which preserve this coun- 
try's security. 

I would Hke to discuss first the reasoning 
which underlies our policy regarding the 
initial use of nuclear weapons. The central 
objective of U.S. strategic nuclear forces is 
to deter nuclear attack on and nuclear 
coercion of the United States and its allies. 
This objective requires as a minimum that 
these forces, even after absorbing an all-out 
first strike, be able to inflict an unacceptable 
level of damage on our enemies. In addition, 
we must maintain an overall military capa- 
bility that can meet any level of enemy attack 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

with a deliberate and credible response. Re- 
cent improvements in U.S. strategic forces 
and in command and control are intended to 
enhance the flexibility of our forces to meet 
all these contingencies. Flexibility — that is, 
the ability to use our forces in a variety of 
ways — should help to decrease the chance of 

I want to emphasize that this policy in 
no sense implies that the United States is 
embracing as our national policy the concept 
of a disarming first strike. By "disarming 
first strike," I mean an attack designed to 
deprive a potential enemy of its basic stra- 
tegic retaliatory capability. We recognize 
that an attempt to develop a capability for 
such an attack could be destabilizing in a 
crisis situation and thus contrary to our best 

In point of fact, neither we nor the Soviet 
Union now or foreseeably have the technical 
means of acquiring a first-strike capability. 
Our strategic arsenal is sufficiently large, 
flexible, diversified, and survivable so that 
our basic retaliatory force would survive an 
enemy first strike. The U.S.S.R. has the same 

Turning to the question of how best to 
deter a conventional attack, our reasoning is 
that the primary defense against such an 
attack is the conventional capability of the 
United States allied to the collective or indi- 
vidual conventional capabilities of our 
partners. Because of the horrors of nuclear 
warfare, we believe that this must continue 
to be our policy. We cannot, however, cate- 
gorically rule out the tactical use of nuclear 
weapons in response to major nonnuclear ag- 
gression if such an attack could not be con- 
tained by conventional forces. While such an 
eventuality may be extremely remote, in 
situations where our vital interests are at 
stake our choice must not be restricted to 
either holocaust or surrender; rather we 
must maintain the option for limited use of 
nuclear weapons to achieve a limited political 
and military objective. 


Department of State Bulletini 

I believe this reasoning is valid in a world 
.here nuclear forces exist, where resources 
or conventional forces are finite, where ten- 
ions remain, where countries continue to 
ely on U.S. power to assist in deterring ag- 
ression, and where the United States is also 
ependent on its allies to mount an adequate 
3vel of deterrent force. 

Let me now turn from the basic reasoning 
nderlying our position on the use of nuclear 
.eapons to the issues raised by these hear- 

I see three specific points which the Con- 
ress might address as it considers the var- 
nis proposals before this subcommittee. 

The first and most basic question, of 
ourse, is: What would be the effect on de- 
errence and on control of escalation if the 
Inited States were to renounce the possibil- 
y of being the first to use nuclear weapons ? 
t is axiomatic, I would maintain, that U.S. 
uclear capabiUty and the willingness to use 
; are fundamental factors in deterring the 
utbreak of war or in deterring the escalation 
f a war to levels of intensity that could 
roperly be described as a nuclear holocaust. 

A potential aggressor could interpret an 
imerican renunciation of the first use of nu- 
lear weapons as a guarantee that he could 
se any level of conventional forces without 
ear of provoking a nuclear response. This 
iterpretation would undermine the implicit 
scalatory risk which is central to deterring 
ggression against the United States and its 
Hies. Moreover, by reducing any enemy's 
ncertainty, renunciation of first use would 
reatly simplify his planning and conduct of 
onventional operations. 

I think that we should also consider the 
ffects on our planning of a policy which 
/ould limit policymakers to a choice of either 
onventional response or possible defeat. One 
aight cynically argue that in the final anal- 
sis all bets are off if the United States were 
aced with an impending defeat, but I think 
ve should recognize that a delay in using a 
imited number of small-yield nuclear weap- 
ms might require the United States to plan 

on using more and larger nuclear weapons 
later to stave off defeat. 

Present U.S. defense concepts envisage 
limited nuclear retaliation if necessary to 
demonstrate resolve to an attacker, to gain 
time for renewed diplomatic action to control 
escalation, or to convince the aggressor to 
restore the status quo. This approach, we 
believe, does not increase the likelihood of 
nuclear war but, on the contrary, reduces it 
by strengthening deterrence and thus reduc- 
ing the possibility that war will break out in 
the first place. 

A second question is: What would be the 
effect on our allies of a U.S. renunciation of 
first use? The security relationships we have 
with these countries have contributed to the 
stability of entire regions of the world. The 
present strategic parity between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union makes all the more im- 
portant the maintenance of the collective 
strength of our alliance systems. 

In my judgment, if we were to sever the 
escalatory ladder between conventional de- 
fense and strategic retaliation, allied states 
might doubt U.S. willingness to employ its 
strategic forces for their defense. The gen- 
eral effect would be to undermine our allies' 
faith in our commitments and cause them to 
question the willingness of the United States 
to come to their aid against any kind of 
armed aggression. 

A third important question is : What would 
be the effect of a renunciation of first use on 
the likelihood of nuclear-weapon prolifera- 
tion? I fear that renunciation would raise 
the question of whether an attack on our 
allies would become more likely because po- 
tential enemies have been assured that the 
United States and the allies would only re- 
spond conventionally. 

Reducing the protection of our nuclear 
umbrella might cause some near-nuclear- 
weapon states to decide that they could no 
longer fully rely on us to assist in deterrence 
and defense and that they should therefore 
develop their own nuclear-weapon capability. 
I believe that this might also be the case 

jXpril 19, 1976 


even with the more limited proposal to for- 
swear first use against non-nuclear-weapon 
states party to the Nonproliferation Treaty 

A no-first-use policy against non-nuclear- 
weapon states party to the NPT is designed, 
obviously, to encourage wider NPT adherence 
and enhance the security of NPT parties. The 
most pressing security concern, however, for 
many non-nuclear-weapon states is often the 
possibility of conventional armed conflict — 
probably with neighboring non-nuclear-weap- 
on states — and not the activities of the major 
nuclear powers. To the extent that nuclear 
weapons are the object of concern in such 
situations, it is typically, if not invariably, 
the fear that their neighbors might develop 
these weapons, thereby upsetting regional 
power relationships. I question whether a 
no-first-use policy adopted by the United 
States would alleviate that type of security 
concern. I should add that, in my opinion, a 
limited nonuse assurance could be seen by 
allies and potential enemies as the opening 
wedge to the more sweeping nonuse pledges, 
and til us at least some of the problems I dis- 
cussed in association with the broader no- 
first-use policy could arise with these limited 

Lastly, I would like to stress that I take it 
as a categorical imperative that the United 
States must strive to minimize and, if pos- 
sible, eliminate resort to military force — both 
nuclear and conventional. Focusing on only 
one form of conflict, as these resolutions do, 
not only distorts the problem but, more seri- 
ously, could even make the other form of 
warfare — conventional — more likely. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the Depart- 
ment of State shares the deep desire of the 
sponsors of these resolutions to find ways of 
reducing the likelihood of nuclear war and 
inhibiting the proliferation of nuclear weap- 
ons and thereby better to assure a peaceful 
world that is consistent with our national 
interests. We constantly strive to reach this 
goal, but our reasoning has taken us in a 
different direction than that advocated by the 
sponsors of these resolutions. 

The Activities of the Department 
in Export Control 

Folloiving is a statement by Maijnard W 
Glitman, Deputij Assistant Secretary for In- 
ternational Trade Policy, made before tht 
Subcommittee on International Finance o) 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs on March 22.^ 

I would like to review briefly the activities 
and duties of the Department of State as 
they relate to the application of export con^ 
trols under the Export Administration Act 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Ad 
(Battle Act), and other relevant legislation 
These activities are carried out on both th( 
national and the international levels. 

On the national level the Department o: 
State participates in the formulation of U.S 
policy and decisionmaking in the area o: 
export controls in the various committee; 
set up for this purpose. The principal of thesi 
is the Advisory Committee on Export Policy 
chaired by the Department of Commerce ; it; 
working-level committee, the Operating Com 
mittee; and its Cabinet-level body, the Ex 
port Administration Review Board. At thes' 
committees the Department of State's objec 
tive is to insure that the decisions made i: 
the committees are consistent with the over 
all foreign policy objectives of the Unite 
States and with U.S. positions taken in th 
international committee for the coordinatio 
of export control policies among cooperatin: 

The Department of State also participate 
actively in the work of the East-West Foi 
eign Trade Board and its working group i: 
monitoring the flow of trade and technolog; 
to the non-market-economy countries. 

The Department of State and U.S. Foreigi 
Service posts lend assistance to Commerce i: 
carrying out the purposes of the Export Ad 
ministration Act. This consists particularl; 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will b 
published by the committee and will be available fror 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Governmen 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


Department of State Bulletii 

,if providing information on possible con- 
■iignees of U.S. goods and equipment and 
checking on tlae use to be made of exports 
from the United States. These functions may 
be carried out before the U.S. export licensing 
takes place or as a postlicensing check to be 
certain that diversion does not occur. The De- 
partment of State through its missions abroad 
Also carries out such contacts or bilateral ne- 
gotiations with other governments as may be 
appropriate to insure against violation of U.S. 
export controls or to obtain cooperation with 
respect to particular problems. 

On the international level the Department 
af State is responsible for U.S. participation 
in the multilateral committee for coordinat- 
ing export control policies — the Coordinat- 
ing Committee, known simply as COCOM. 
We maintain a resident delegation to COCOM 
in Paris and provide, with the cooperation 
3f other Washington agencies, the technical 
support that is necessary for list reviews or 
jther specialized meetings. 

COCOM is a voluntary organization which, 
IS its name indicates, coordinates the policies 
af independent governments. It was estab- 
lished in 1950 and its membership consists 
)f 15 countries: the NATO countries minus 
Iceland, plus Japan. All actions and decisions 
by COCOM are confidential by agreement, 
including the lists of controlled commodities. 
Tlie committee meets regularly in Paris to 
consider changes in its lists and procedures 
and to pass on requests for exceptions to the 
embargo made by member countries. 

Actions in COCOM are in effect recom- 
mendations to member governments, and 
they become effective only as they are carried 
out by member governments through their 
individual export control programs under 
tiieir own national laws and regulations. A 
basic rule of COCOM from the outset has 
been that there must be unanimous agree- 
ment on all COCOM final recommendations. 
A COCOM decision therefore means in effect 
that each member country has decided under 
its own laws and policies to embargo an 
identical list of items; but this is in the case 
of each country a unilateral decision — there 

is no legal obligation to embargo the items 
and no surrender of sovereignty. 

COCOM maintains three lists of controlled 
commodities. List I consists of military-re- 
lated items as well as technology and equip- 
ment for their manufacture. The other lists 
are self-de.scriptive : a munitions list and an 
atomic energy list. Although these lists are 
subject to constant review by the Committee, 
the practice is to have a review encompass- 
ing a number of items every two or three 

Although all countries agree to control the 
items on the lists, provision is made in the 
procedures of the Committee to allow ship- 
ments for civil end uses under the special 
exceptions policy, because the controlled 
items often have acceptable civilian as well 
as military uses. For such an exception to 
be made, both the civil end use and end user 
must be known and there must be minimal 
risk of divei-sion to a strategic or militai'y 

With the growth of trade with the Com- 
munist countries and their increasing in- 
terest in high-technology items, the number 
of exceptions cases has grown appreciably in 
recent years. Thus in 1975 there were 1,798 
cases submitted to the Committee, compared 
with 1,380 cases in 1974. The U.S. share 
has also increased, from 41 percent in 1974 
to 44 percent in 1975. 

In the case of actions on exceptions cases, 
while the rule of unanimity applies, there 
is not in reality a "veto" power. In the case 
of exceptions, the action of COCOM con- 
stitutes a recommendation to the exporting 
government. Although governments normally 
follow such recommendations, they do not 
invariably do so, if they feel their national 
interests are deeply enough involved. 

I believe that if we were to look at COCOM 
objectively as it has existed and operated 
over its 26-year history, we would conclude 
that it has been an effective instrument in 
contributing to the security of the free world. 
Over this history there have been problems, 
most of which we have been able to over- 
come. In some cases member countries have 

April 19, 1976 


taken actions that were not acceptable to 
other member countries, but this must be 
expected in an organization of sovereign 
states which can only recommend specific 
actions to its members. 

There have also been accusations that one 
or another COCOM country was using the 
Committee to gain a competitive advantage 
and, without the knowledge of the Committee, 
taking actions in violation of COCOM agree- 
ments. In the United States we hear this 
mainly from American exporters who believe 
that their exports are being discriminated 
against. We hear similar accusations in other 
countries, however, where the United States 
is charged with discriminating in favor of 
its exporters or of taking the lead in institut- 
ing a broadening of the exceptions categories 
to favor U.S. exporters. 

All such reports are carefully studied. As 
yet we have found no evidence that member 
governments are subverting the COCOM 
system. In many cases, such reports are 
based on rumors or insufficient knowledge of 
what is controlled by COCOM and what is 
not. In some cases it arises from honest 
differences between COCOM member gov- 
ernments on interpreting what is or is not 
covered by a specific item as it appears on 
the list. In view of the complexity of these 
items and the problem of translating controls 
into national languages, this is not surpris- 
ing. To the extent possible, the Committee 
attempts to resolve these differences when 
they appear so that we will have common 

If it appears that an exporter in one of 
the member countries has violated the 
COCOM control and the control of his na- 
tional government, the matter may be studied 
by the Enforcement Subcommittee of 
COCOM. This subcommittee meets periodic- 
ally to review the enforcement activities 
of the members and to suggest remedial 
actions where this may be necessary. 

I would like to stress in conclusion, Mr. 
Chairman, that as an instrument devised by 
man COCOM is not perfect. Whatever may 

be its defects, however, such a multilatera 
approach to a strategic trade control systen 
is the only one that can be effective. We arc 
prepared to work for its improvement ir 
ways that the executive branch, the Con- 
gress, or the other participating members 
think might improve its decisionmaking 
process and strengthen relationships among 
its members. Meanwhile, we believe COCOM 
continues to be an important element in as- 
suring the mutual security of the cooperat- 
ing countries. 

International Economic Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Mennage From President Ford ' 

To the Congreaa of the United States: 

America in 1975 renewed and strength- 
ened its commitment to pursue the tradi 
tional U.S. goals of freer trade and enhancec 
global economic stability and prosperity. Th( 
United States has proposed a series of majoi 
economic initiatives providing leadership h 
efforts to improve trade and monetary ar 
rangements, to establish cooperative mech 
anisms for dealing with the problems of foo( 
and energy, and to offer effective interna 
tional responses to those nations in greates 
need. 1975 was a year of achievement whicl 
produced new and more effective interna 
tional economic policies, as the followin} 
highlights indicate. 

Economic Summit Meeting 

In November I met with the heads of thi 
governments of France, West Germany; 

'Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White HouSf 
press release). Tlie President's message, together 
with the Annual Report of the Council on Interna* 
tional Economic Policy, is printed in "Internationa^ 
Economic Report of the Pi-esident, Transmitted ti 
the Congress March 1976"; for sale by the Superin 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printinfi 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (189 pp.; $4.85; stocH 
no. 041-015-00075-6). 


Department of State Bulletin 

Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom at 
Ramboiiillet, France to discuss the world 
economic situation and economic problems 
common to our countries. The Summit Meet- 
ing concentrated on the need for new efforts 
in the areas of world trade, monetary mat- 
ters and raw materials, including energy. We 
agreed that sustained, stable economic 
growth in the industrial nations will be fa- 
icilitated by our cooperative efforts. This 
Imeeting, and the accompanying bilateral 
talks I had with leaders of the major in- 
jdustrialized democracies, established a new 
spirit of cooperation and confidence stem- 
ming from a deeper understanding of our 
icommon destiny. They set the stage for our 
'efforts to deal with a variety of specific in- 
ternational economic challenges facing us 
in 1976. 

Monetary Affairs 

Efforts to revise the international mone- 
tary system resulted in major reforms. At 
the recent meeting of the International Mon- 
etary Fund's Interim Committee in Jamaica, 
we reached agreement on amendments to 
the IMF Articles of Agreement with respect 
to quotas, exchange rates, and the role of 
gold. The negotiations resulted in the first 
major revision of the international mone- 
tary system since the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Conference. The exchange rate provisions of 
the IMF Articles of Agreement will be 
amended to provide a flexible framework for 
the future evolution of the system. The In- 
terim Committee also reached agreement on 
steps to phase gold out of the international 
monetary system. 

Multilateral Trade Negotiations 

The Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 
Geneva have gained momentum since early 
1975. At the Rambouillet Summit we unani- 
mously agreed to seek a successful conclu- 
sion of these negotiations by 1977. The 
United States will continue to provide strong 
support and leadership to the effort to re- 

duce trade barriers and otherwise improve 
the world trading system. 


The establishment of the International 
Energy Agency by the United States and its 
OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera- 
tion and Development] partners constituted 
a major response to the economic imbalance 
in the vital area of energy. The IE A has de- 
veloped the details of an International En- 
ergy Program designed to limit the vulner- 
ability of the participating nations to sup- 
ply interruptions. Agreement was also 
reached on longer-term cooperation to re- 
duce consumption and develop alternative 
energy sources in order to lessen depend- 
ence on imported energy. We have estab- 
lished emergency arrangements providing 
for energy reserves, consumption restraint 
measures, and allocation procedures. 

Developing Countries 

The United States is committed to assist- 
ing developing countries in their efforts to 
achieve economic progress. Our response to 
the needs of the less developed countries 
was expressed clearly and positively at the 
Seventh Special Session of the United Na- 
tions in September. We proposed a new de- 
velopment security facility in the IMF to 
stabilize overall export earnings in develop- 
ing countries, and numerous other ideas — 
including trade preferences — to achieve 
mutually beneficial solutions to the problems 
of economic development. 


At the Seventh Special Session of the 
United Nations we indicated that we will 
consider participating in various commodity 
agreements on a case-by-case basis. We also 
announced that we intend to join the Fifth 
International Tin Agreement, subject to Con- 
gressional approval. The need, value and 
structure of commodity agreements vary for 
different commodities. In considering com- 

April 19, 1976 


modity agreements on a case-by-case basis, 
we will oppose concerted efforts to manipu- 
late supplies and prices which ignore the 
interests of consuming countries while seek- 
ing to assure developing countries adequate 
income from their natural resources. 

Food and Aqrindtvre 

The United States in 1975 continued its 
vital leadership in seeking strengthened co- 
operation to increase world food production 
and trade. We proposed an expanded inter- 
national grain reserve system and enlarged 
our food aid assistance. We will continue our 
policy of encouraging maximum agricultural 
production, and our efforts to achieve an 
efficient distribution system to assure that 
hungry people will be fed. 

U.S.-Soviet Agreements on Grai7i and Oil 

Last October, the United States and the 
Soviet Union signed an agreement providing 
for regular and orderly sales of American 
wheat and corn during the next five years. 
The American people — our farmers, our 
workers, and our consumers — will benefit 
from this agreement. The Soviet Union is 
committed to purchasing at least six million 
metric tons of grain per year, representing 
one billion dollars in annual export earnings. 

In signing this agreement, we have assured 
a stable, long-term foreign market for our 
grain, and a more reliable flow of payments 
from abroad. We have assured American 
farmers that the Soviet Union will be a 
regular buyer of grain at market prices, 
thereby increasing the incentive for full pro- 
duction. We have provided jobs for American 
transportation workers and seamen. We have 
neutralized a great destabilizing factor in 
our grain markets. Perhaps most impor- 
tantly, we have preserved our private mar- 
keting system, permitting us to maintain our 
highly successful policy of all-out production 
and open markets. 

In the same constructive spirit, the gov- 
ernments of the United States and the Soviet 
Union have also committed themselves to 
negotiations on a five-year agreement for the 


purchase of Soviet oil. These negotiations are 
currently undei'way. 

Multinational Corporations 

Multinational corporations (MNC's) con- 
tinue to be a highly visible and controversia 
factor in international affairs. MNC's hav( 
made major contributions to world economic 
development and will continue to do so in th( 
future. While the major portion of foreigr 
investment by multinational corporations ii 
concentrated in industrial nations, many de 
veloping countries actively seek investment; 
by MNC's, recognizing their potential con 
tribution to economic development. Recog 
nizing the generally positive impact of MNC; 
on world trade and production, I am dis 
tressed by reports of corrupt practices b; 
some companies. For that reason, I hav 
directed that members of my Administratioi 
undertake efforts, both domestically and in 
ternationally, to assure that multinationa 
coi"porations obey the laws and conform witl 
the public policies of the countries in whicl 
they do business. 

We are participating in the development o 
an international code to provide guideline 
for responsible corporate behavior. Th 
Organization for Economic Cooperation an 
Development has made substantial progres 
toward drafting a code, and similar efl5"ort 
will be undertaken in the United Nations an 
the Organization of American States in 197( 
It is highly important that such codes c 
conduct provide that both multinational coi 
porations and host governments share th 
responsibility for eliminating abuses. 


The United States policy on internatiom 
investment is based on our belief that a fre 
market system without artificial barriers c 
incentives leads to the most efficient alloc? 
tion of capital in the world economy. AccorW 
ingly we provide "national treatment" ci 
foreign investors in the United States, treaV 
ing them equally with domestic firms, and w 
expect similar treatment of U.S. compania 
investing abroad. 

Department of State Bulletil 

P'ollowing a comprehensive review of Ad- 
ninistration policy toward inward invest- 
nent, we concluded that it would be desirable 
o establish arrangements to monitor the flow 
)f foreign investments in the United States. 
?y Executive Order, I established the Com- 
nittee on Foreign Investment in the United 
5tates, to monitor the impact of foreign in- 
estment in the United States and coordinate 
he implementation of U.S. policy on such in- 
•estment. A new Office of Foreign Investment 
vas established in the Department of Com- 
merce. We have also asked foreign govern- 
nents contemplating significant investments 
n this country to consult with us prior to 
iiaking such investments. 

•Export Policy 

U.S. exports continue to play a vital role 
n strengthening our domestic economy. We 
.re continuing our efforts to expand U.S. 
xports by providing competitive export 
inancing, improved market information, and 
n increased foreign awareness of U.S. pred- 
icts. The United States prefers not to in- 
erfere with competitive markets. We oppose 
he use of export subsidies and similar meas- 
res which artificially distort trading re- 
ationships. At the same time, we must 
ealistically take into account export policies 
if competitive countries, and we will continue 
promote U.S. exports by insuring that 
ompetitive credit terms are available 
hrough the Export-Import Bank and the 
Commodity Credit Corporation of the Depart- 
nent of Agriculture, and sufl^cient tax in- 
centives are available through the Domestic 
nternational Sales Coi"poration mechanism 
meet foreign competition. 

As we enter the last quarter of the twenti- 
eth century, our policies are directed toward 
A'orking with others to ensure that the 
ivorld's talents and resources better serve 
;he well-being of mankind. We continue to 
ieek a world in which all people can prosper, 
i world without hunger or severe want, a 
world in which the best efforts of all nations 
are prized and rewarded, so that their prog- 
ress and health are ensured. 

My Council on International Economic 

Policy plays a significant role in the develop- 
ment of America's international economic 
policies to meet immediate needs and guide 
our future course. Through its participation 
on the Economic Policy Board we have 
achieved better coordination of U.S. domestic 
and international economic policy than ever 
before in our history. 

This, the fourth International Economic 
Report of the President, measures the range 
of the Administration's concerns and the 
character of the American response to major 
international economic issues. I am proud 
of our progress and accomplishments in 1975. 
I am confident that they will lead toward a 
more free and open world of international 
economic relations benefitting the American 
people and all people. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House. March 17, 1976. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Pood Problems of Developing Countries: Implications 
for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on International Resources, Food, and Energy of 
the House Committee on International Relations. 
iVIay 21-June 5, 1975. 355 pp. 

Diego Garcia, 1975: The Debate Over the Base and 
the Island's Former Inhabitants. Hearings before 
the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
House Committee on International Relations. June 
.5-November 4. 1975. 123 pp. 

The Economic Impact of Forthcoming OPEC Price 
Rise and "Old" Oil Decontrol. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Consumer Economics of the Joint 
Economic Committee. July 10-14, 1975. 112 pp. 

94th Congress, 2d Session 

Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Canned Hams 
and Shoulders from the European Economic Com- 
munity. Communication from the Assistant Secre- 
tary of the Treasury (Enforcement, Operations, 
and Tariff Affairs). H. Doc. 94-350. January 26, 
1976. 9 pp. 

International Security Assistance and Arms E.xport 
Control Act of 1976. Report of the Senate Commit- 
tee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 2662. S. 
Rept. 94-605. January 30, 1976. 140 pp. 

April 19, 1976 



U.S. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on the Situation 
in the Territories Occupied by Israel 

Follorving are statements made in the 
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- 
tive William W. Scranton on March 22, 
23, and 25, together with the text of a draft 
resolution which was vetoed by the United 
States on March 25. 


Statement of March 22 

USIIN piess releast 3fi (con-. 1) dated March 22 

I am sure that you are all aware that the 
proposal on participation by the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 
Security Council before us today is the same 
as was made on December 4 and on January 
12. On those two occasions a move was made 
to invite the PLO to participate in the debate 
with "the same rights of participation as are 
conferred when a Member State is invited 
to participate under rule 37." 

I am sure that you are equally aware the 
the United States strongly opposed that pro- 
posal when it was made on those two occa- 
sions. There is a longstanding American tra- 
dition, in which we believe very thoroughly, 
of giving a hearing to all sides ; and we would 
not oppose the Council's granting a hearing 
under the appropriate provision of the 
Council's rules, which is rule 39. But we do 
oppose the proposal to grant a hearing under 
rule 37. For my government this position is 
based on principle — and a principle that can- 
not be eroded either by its continuing viola- 
tion, no matter how many times, or by time 


The United States has twice described the 
proposal as a "concerted attempt to disregard 
the rules of procedure and to accord to the 
Palestine Liberation Organization a role 
greater even than that which over the years 
the Council has granted to observer govern- 
ments and a role greater by far than has ir 
more recent times been granted to the* 
spokesmen of legitimate national liberation 
movements invited here under rule 39." ' 

We made it clear then, as I am making ii 
clear now, that the United States is not pre- 
pared to agree, and we do not believe this 
Council should agree, to an ad hoc departun 
from the rules of procedure which comport; 
neither with the law nor the political require 
ments of the situation. 

We are of the view that the rules of pro 
cedure, if applied, in rule 39 would havi 
adequately provided a hearing of the view^ 
of Palestinians on the subject before thi 
Council. That this subject is of concern ti 
Palestinians is beyond question, just as i.- 
the fact that a comprehensive settlemen 
must answer the question of the future o 
the Palestinian people. The U.S. position oi 
these facets of the Middle East problem i; 

As I join in the deliberations of thi; 
Council, and I appreciate very kindly, sir 
your opening comments, I am impressed b: 
its history, always have been, and I an 
committed to its future. I hope to play a par 
in preserving the Security Council for futun 

' For statements by U.S. Representative Daniel P 
Moynihan made in the Security Council on Dec. 4 
1975, and Jan. 12, 1976, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1976 
p. 21, and Feb. 16, 1976, p. 189. 

Department of State Bulletir 

venerations and in developing its lawful 
30\vers and procedures. That is why I called 
'or a vote on the proposal before us under 
•ule 37 and why I will vote against that 

Itatement of March 23 ^ 

At the outset, it is especially noteworthy, 
'. think, that Israel has joined in our delibera- 
ions. My government warmly welcomes 
srael's decision to do so. 

For the events that have brought us to- 
gether today are a corollary and a conse- 
[uence of the tragic dispute that has oc- 
upied this Council with such regularity over 
;he years. As such, they raise two categories 
>f issues that we must have in mind if we 
ire to deal with them constructively. 

First is the question of bringing to an 
jarly end the situation that gives rise to 
;hese disturbances and to other forms of 
iolence in the Middle East. So long as the 
ituation persists we can expect continuing 
tension and occasional violence, however we 
night, and we must, regret it. It is not neces- 
sary for me to belabor this point. Surely it 
IS evident to all of us. 

The occupation of territories in the 1967 
var has always been seen by the world com- 
munity to be an abnormal state of affairs 
hat would be brought to an end as part of a 
Deace settlement. Resolution 242, adopted by 
:his Council shortly after the end of the 1967 
war that led to the occupation, established 
ihe basic bargain that would constitute a 
settlement. This bargain was withdrawal of 
Israeli forces in return for termination of all 
;laims or states of belligerency and respect 
'or and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
erritorial integrity, and political independ- 
snce of every state in the area and their 

"The Council on Mar. 22 adopted by a vote of 11 
1 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions (France, Italy, U.K.), 
he proposal to invite the PLO to participate in the 
lebate. Under article 27 of the U.N. Charter, "Deci- 
iions of the Council on procedural matters shall be 
nade by an affirmative vote of nine members" and 
ire not subject to the veto. 

'Introductory personal remarks omitted (text from 
USUN press release 37). 

right to live in peace within secure and recog- 
nized boundaries free from threats or acts of 

My government has committed itself to do 
all it can to bring about this settlement and, 
in the words of Resolution 338, to implement 
Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts and 
to further negotiations between the parties 
concerned under appropriate auspices aimed 
at establishing a just and durable peace in 
the Middle East, which is what we are here 
for. We are engaged at this moment in an 
effort to regain momentum, as all of you 
know, in the negotiating process that has 
brought some unusual progress — and it must 
bring more. 

The second focus of our consideration must 
be the conduct of the occupation itself. In 
asking for this meeting, the letter of com- 
plaint circulated by the Permanent Repre- 
sentatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and 
of Pakistan identifies three issues: 

— The administration of the holy sites ; 
— ^The situation in Jerusalem ; and 
— Israeli actions in regard to the civilian 
population of the occupied territories and the 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. 

The position of the United States on these 
issues is clear and of long standing. I pro- 
pose to review the U.S. position today once 
more to point out that there are proper 
principles and there are procedures undei- 
international law and practice which, when 
applied and maintained, will contribute to 
civil order and will, over the longer run, 
facilitate a just and a lasting peace. 

First, there is a matter of the holy sites 
and practice of religion in the occupied areas. 
The deep religious attachment of Moslems 
and Jews and Christians to the holy places 
of Jerusalem has added a uniquely volatile 
element to the tensions that inhere in an 
occupation situation. The area known to 
Moslems as the Haram as-Sharif and to Jews 
as the Temple Mount is of particular sensi- 
tivity. Israel's punctilious administration of 
the holy places in Jerusalem has, in our judg- 
ment, greatly minimized the tensions. To my 
government, the standard to be followed in 

{April 19, 1976 


administering the holy sites is contained in 
article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War. All parties to the Arab- 
Israel conflict are signatories of the conven- 
tion. Article 27 of the convention prescribes, 
inter alia, that: 

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, 
to respect for their persons, their honour, their fam- 
ily rights, their religious convictions and practices, 
and their manners and customs. 

With regard to the immediate problem 
before us — a ruling by a lower Israeli court 
which would have the effect of altering the 
status of the Haram — it is our view that 
Israel's responsibilities under article 27 to 
preserve religious practices as they were at 
the time the occupation began cannot be 
changed by the ruling of an Israeli court. We 
are gratified, deeply gratified, that the 
Supreme Court of Israel has upheld the 
Israeli Government's position. 

The status of the holy places is, of course, 
only one facet, however important, very im- 
portant, of the problem of the status of 
Jerusalem itself. The U.S. position on the 
status of Jerusalem has been stated here 
on numerous occasions since the Arab por- 
tion of that city was occupied by Israel in 

Ambassador Yost said in 1969 : * 

. . . the part of Jerusalem that came under the 
control of Israel in the June war, like other areas 
occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence 
subject to the provisions of international law govern- 
ing the rights and obligations of an occupying power. 

Ambassador Goldberg said in 1968, to this 
Council : ^ 

The United States does not accept or recognize 
unilateral actions by any states in the area as alter- 
ing the status of Jerusalem. 

' For a statement by U.S. Representative Charles 
W. Yost made in the Security Council on July 1, 1969, 
see Bulletin of July 28, 1969, p. 76. 

° For a statement by U.S. Representative Arthur W. 
Goldberg made in the Security Council on May 9, 
1968, see Bulletin of June 3, 1968, p. 732. 

I emphasize, as did Ambassador Goldberg, 
that as far as the United States is concerned 
such unilateral measures, including ex- 
propriation of land or other administrative 
action taken by the Government of Israel, 
cannot be considered other than interim and 
provisional and cannot affect the present in- 
ternational status nor prejudge the final and 
permanent status of Jerusalem. The U.S. 
position could not be clearer. Since 1967 we 
have restated here, in other fora, and to the 
Government of Israel that the future of 
Jerusalem will be determined only through 
the instruments and processes of negotiation, 
agreement, and accommodation. Unilateral 
attempts to predetermine that future have 
no standing. 

Next I turn to the question of Israeli set- 
tlements in the occupied territories. Again, 
my government believes that international 
law sets the appropriate standards. An oc- 
cupier must maintain the occupied area as 
intact and unaltered as possible, without in- 
terfering with the customary life of the area 
and any changes must be necessitated by the 
immediate needs of the occupation and b( 
consistent with international law. The Fourth 
Geneva Convention speaks directly to th( 
issue of population transfer in article 49 : 

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfe 
parts of its own civilian population into the territor; 
it occupies. 

Clearly, then, substantial resettlement o: 
the Israeli civilian population in occupiec 
territories, including East Jerusalem, is il 
legal under the convention and cannot bi 
considered to have prejudged the outcomi 
of future negotiations between the partie; 
on the location of the borders of states o; 
the Middle East. Indeed, the presence o: 
these settlements is seen by my governmen 
as an obstacle to the success of the negotia 
tions for a just and final peace between Israe 
and its neighbors. 

The real issues of peace and stability ii 
the Middle East are very difl!icult indeed. Anc 
unilateral acts, such as civilian populatioi 


Department of State Bulletir 

transfers, have been taken wliich serve to 
inrtame emotions on both sides. 

Mr. President, I welcome the opportunity 
— indeed I do — this meeting of the Council 
has provided to review the issues involved 
in the administration of the holy sites, the 
( status of Jerusalem, and in addition, the 
! question of Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories. Now, as to prospective action by 
this Council, my government will apply 
three tests: 

— First, do the facts and judgment on 
which the resolution is based correspond to 
the actual situation? Facts. 

— Second, will the Council's action in 
practice advance the proper administration 
of the areas involved? 

— And most important of all, will the 
Council's action help or hinder the peaceful 
settlement process, the framework for which 
was established by Security Council Resolu- 
tions 242 and 338? 

Statement of March 25 

USUN press release 38 dated March 25 

I want once more to recognize and appreci- 
ate the comments that three or four of the 
representatives made this morning in giving 
me a warm welcome to this Council, and I am 
indeed grateful for their very kind comments. 
It reminds me, incidentally, that it is in some 
contrast to the welcome that I had outside 
this Council today. I daresay that I have now 
written a new record in representatives' 
records to this Council — that I don't think 
anybody else can match — by having a dem- 
onstration requesting my ouster hardly be- 
fore I have sat down. 

Secondly, I would like to say to the distin- 
guished representative from Pakistan how 
much I appreciate the comments that he has 
made to me, in a very quiet and deliberate 
way, a few moments ago addressed to me and 
quoting some of the comments that I made 
on behalf of my government on Tuesday. 
And, sir, I shall try to respond and explain 

our vote in the same quiet and deliberate 
way, briefly. 

The distinguished representative from 
Pakistan has quoted to you the three tests 
that I laid out in that intervention on 
Tuesday. I shall not repeat them. But they 
are the tests that have been carefully meas- 
ured by my government — and when I say 
"carefully" I mean just that word. 

We have carefully measured the draft 
resolution that is now before all of you 
against these criteria and concluded that it 
fails to meet the criteria, especially because 
it reflects or implies judgments which, on 
balance, do not correspond to the actual situ- 
ation in the area. 

Parts of the resolution, for example, are 
based on the judgment that Israel is per- 
sisting in a policy aimed at changing the 
religious character of the city of Jerusalem. 
We believe, my government and I, that this 
conclusion is incorrect. Quite to the contrary, 
we think Israel's administration of the holy 
places in Jerusalem has literally and actively 
minimized tensions. 

Secondly, and I think this is extremely 
important, you will remember that one of 
the tests was whether the Council's action 
would help or hinder the peaceful settlement 

On Tuesday I said to you that my gov- 
ernment has committed itself to do all it 
can to bring about a settlement. We take 
a back seat to no nation in this regard. We 
are engaged, as I said then, at this moment 
in an effort to regain momentum in the 
negotiating process that has brought some 
unusual progress. And I think it is fair to say 
that there has been more progress in this 
effort than anything else that' has been 
undertaken since the 1967 war, although we 
are as aware as everyone else that there 
must be more. It is our belief and our strong 
feeling that this draft resolution would not 
help in that peaceful settlement process. And 
because the draft failed, in our judgment, 
to meet the tests that we brought to you — 
and which I brought to the attention of you 

(April 19, 1976 


on Tuesday — in the vote that is forthcoming 
the United States will vote no. 



The Security Council, 

Having considered recent developments in the 
occupied Arab territories, 

Deeply concerned at the serious situation which 
has arisen in these territories as a result of con- 
tinued Israeli occupation, 

Deeply concerned further at the measures taken 
by the Israeli authorities leading to the present grave 
situation, including measures aimed at changing the 
physical, cultural, demographic and religious char- 
acter of the occupied territories and, in particular, 
the City of Jerusalem, the establishment of Israeli 
settlements in the occupied territories and other 
violations of the human rights of the inhabitants of 
those territories, 

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition 
of territory by war, 

Recalling and reaffirming the resolutions of the 
General Assembly and the Security Council calling 
upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken 
and to desist from taking any further action which 
would alter the status of the City of Jerusalem and 
the character of the occupied Arab territories, 

Noting that, notwithstanding the aforementioned 
resolutions, Israel persists in its policy aiming at 
changing the physical, cultural, demographic and 
religious character of the City of Jerusalem in 

Reaffirming the urgent need for establishing a just 
and lasting peace in the Middle East, 

1. Deplores Israel's failure to put a stop to actions 
and policies tending to change the status of the City 
of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken 
to that effect; 

2. Calls on Israel, pending the speedy termination 
of its occupation, to refrain from all measures against 
the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories; 

3. Calls on Israel to respect and uphold the 
inviolability of the Holy Places which are under its 
occupation and to desist from the expropriation of or 
encroachment upon Arab lands and property or the 
establishment of Israeli settlements thereon in the 
occupied Arab territories and to desist from all other 
action and policies designed to change the legal status 
of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures 
already taken to that effect; 

4. Decides to keep the situation under constant 
attention with a view to meeting again should 
circumstances so require. 

°U.N. doc. S/12022; the draft resolution was not 
adopted owing to the negative vote of a permanent 
member of the Council, the vote being 14 in favor, 
1 against (U.S.). 

President Ford Signs Ratifications 
of Women's Rights Conventions 

Following is a statement by President Ford 
issued on March 22 upon signing the instru- 
ments of ratification of the Inter-American 
Convention on the Granting of Political 
Rights to Wotnen and the Convention on the 
Political Rights of Women. 

Whiti- House press release dated March 22 

I am pleased to have the opportunity of 
signing the Inter-American Convention on 
the Granting of Political Rights to Women 
signed in Bogota in 1948 and the Convention 
on the Political Rights of Women signed by 
the U.N. General Assembly in 1953. 

Our ratification of the 19th amendment to 
our Constitution in 1920 granted women in 
this country equal voting rights with men. 
The ratification of these two conventions 
serves to underscore our firm dedication to 
the principle of equality of political rights 
for women. Indeed, the preamble to the 
Charter of the United Nations, to which our 
nation and others subscribe, provides that 
we "reaffirm faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the 
human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small. . . ." 

International Women's Year, 1975, has just 
concluded. We have now entered the U.N. 
Decade for Women as adopted by the 30th 
General Assembly of the United Nations. 
This Decade, 1975-85, will provide an op- 
portunity to put into action the recommenda- 
tions and suggestions resulting from IWY. 
This will serve as an opportunity for effec- 
tively measuring our commitment to con- 
tinuing the advancement of the status of 
women. It is highly appropriate that the rati- 
fication of these two conventions by the U.S. 
Senate took place during the beginning of 
our Bicentennial year. 


Department of State Bulletin 


i! Current Actions 


Economic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of 
; the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 

Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.' 
I Ratification deposited: United Kingdom. March 
9, 1976. 


Constitution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered 
into force April 7, 1948; for the United States 
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086. 
Acceptance deposited: Sao Tome and Principe, 
March 23, 1976. 

Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil 
' or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 

18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 


Xotification of signature: Finland, March 9, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
■ amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.' 
Acceptances deposited: Mexico, March 23, 1976; 
New Zealand, March 24, 1976. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention on civil liability for oil 
pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.= 
Ratification deposited: Poland, March 18, 1976. 
Accession deposited: South Africa, March 17, 1976. 

Program-Carrying Signals — 
Distribution by Satellite 

Convention relating to the distribution of programme- 
carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at 
Brussels May 21, 1974.' 
Ratification deposited: Mexico, March 18, 1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual 
Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 
14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the 
United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Ghana, March 12, 1976. 


International telecommunication convention with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga- 
Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force 
January 1, 1975." 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 

March 24, 1976, with declaration. 
Ratifications deposited : Republic of Korea, January 

22, 1976; Liechtenstein, February 4, 1976; 

Panama, January 15, 1976. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 
1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6590, 7435), 
to establish a new frequency allotment plan for 
high-frequency radio-telephone coast stations, with 
annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 
1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.' 
Notifications of approxml: Finland, January 22, 

1976; Republic of Korea, December 3, 1975; 

Switzerland, February 6, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; 
July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Israel, Mauritius, April 1, 1976; 

Argentina, Ecuador, India, Sweden, April 2, 1976. 
Declaration of provisional application deposited: 

Argentina, April 2, 1976. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force on 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; 
July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Argentina, Sweden, April 2, 1976. 
Declaration of provisional application deposited: 

Argentina, April 2, 1976. 



Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed 
minutes, and exchange of notes. Signed at Brasilia 
March 14, 1975. 
Entered into force: March 22, 1976. 


Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of May 14, 1971 (TIAS 7125), regarding a joint 
program in the field of experimental remote sensing 
from satellites and aircraft. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Ottawa March 19 and 22, 1976. Entered 
into force March 22, 1976; effective May 14, 1975. 


Procedures for mutual assistance in the administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington 
March 29, 1976. Enters into force upon notification 
by Italy that all requirements under Italian law 

' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 

April 19, 1976 


to implement the provisions have been accom- 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 14, 1975. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Amman March 
4, 1976. Entered into force March 4, 1976. 


Procedures for mutual assistance relating to the 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at 
Washington March 29, 1976. Entered into force 
March 29, 1976. 

Saudi Arabia 

Project agreement for technical cooperation in 
science and technology, with appendices. Signed 
at Riyadh February 29, 1976. Enters into force 
upon organization of the Saudi Arabia National 
Center for Science and Technology and deposit 
by Saudi Arabia of the sums described in appen- 
dices B-E for the first calendar year of the agree- 


Agreement relative to defense cooperation pursuant 
to article III of the North Atlantic Treaty of April 
4, 1949 (TIAS 1964), in order to resist armed 
attack in the North Atlantic Treaty Area, with 
exchange of notes. Signed at Washington March 
26, 1976. Enters into force on the date of an ex- 
change of notes indicating the approval by both 
parties of the agreement in accordance with their 
respective legal procedures. 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. A 25-percent discou7it is 7nade on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. 

Agreement with Korea. TIAS 8124. 20 pp. 40«'. (Cat. 
No. 89.10:8124). 

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aero- 
nautical Products and Components. Agreement with 
Australia. TIAS 8126. 9 pp. 30«i. (Cat. No. S9.10: 


Economic Cooperation. Agreement with Israel. TIA 
8127. 15 pp. 40(f. (Cat. No. S9.10:8127). 

Economic Cooperation. Agreement with Saudi Arabi. 
TIAS 8128. 10 pp. 30<f. (Cat. No. 89.10:8128). 

Remote Sensing — Acquisition of Satellite Data. Mem( 
randum of Understanding with Zaire. TIAS 812 
6 pp. 25^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8129). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jamaic: 
TIAS 8130. 19 pp. m<}. (Cat. No. 89.10:8130). 

Illegal Entry of Migratory Workers. Agreement wit 
Mexico. TIAS 8131. 18 pp. 35<(. (Cat. No. 89.10:8131 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with the Czech( 
Slovak Socialist Republic extending the agreement ( 
February 28, 1969, as amended and extended. TIA 
8132. 6 pp. hQt (Cat. No. 89.10:8132). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Indonesi: 
TIAS 8133. 16 pp. 60«'. (Cat. No. 89.10:8133). 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 813 
9 pp. 50«;. (Cat. No. 89.10:8134). 

Trade — Cheese Imports. Agreement with the Eun 
pean Economic Community. TIAS 8135. 3 pp. 50 
(Cat. No. 89.10:8135). 

Refugee Relief in the Republic of Viet-Nam, La« 
and the Khmer Republic. Agreement with the Inte 
national Committee of the Red Cross amending tl 
agreement of February 20 and March 16 and 1 
1975, as amended. TIAS 8136. 2 pp. 25<(. (Cat. N 

Seismograph Station Near Kluane Lake, Yukon Te 
ritory. Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8137. 5 p 
50^. (Cat. No. 891.10:8137). 

Trade — Meat Imports, Agreement with the Domir 
can Republic. TIAS 8138. 6 pp. 50«'. (Cat. No. 89.1 

Purchase of Defense Articles and Services. Agre 
ment with the United Arab Emirates. TIAS 813 
3 pp. SO^. (Cat. No. 89.10:8139). 

International Patent Classification, Agreement wii 
Other Governments. TIAS 8140. 47 pp. 90^. (Cat. N 

International Office of Epizootics. Agreement wii 
Other Governments. TIAS 8141. 17 pp. 60«'. (Cat. N 

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgiu 
amending Annex B to the agreement of January 2 
1950. TIAS 8145. 5 pp. 506 (Cat. No. 89.10:8145). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egyj 
amending the agreement of June 7. 1974, as amende' 
TIAS 8147. 4 pp. 50^ (Cat. No. 89.10:8147). 

Economic and Social Development. Agreement wit 
the United Nations. TIAS 8148. 9 pp. 50(*. (Cat. N 

Trade in Textiles. Agreement with Peru. TIAS 815: 
6 pp. bOt (Cat. No. 89.10:8153). 

Department of State Bulleti 

NDEX April 19, 1976 Vol. LXXIV. No. 1921 

Africa. Security Assistance and Foreign Policy 
(Kissinger) 501 

Vsia. Security Assistance and Foreign Policy 
(Kissinger) 501 

Vustralia. Letters of Credence (Parkinson) . . 513 

!7anada. Canada and the United States: The 
Framework and the Agenda (Enders) . . TiOS 

!^hina. The Triangular Relationship of the 
United States, the U.S.S.R., and the People's 
Republic of China (Lord) &14 


The Activities of the Uepartnieiit in Export 
Control (Glitman) 520 

congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 525 

Jepartment Discusses U.S. Policy on Possible 
Use of Nuclear Weapons (Vest) 518 

nternational Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) 522 

Secretary Discusses Proposed Sale of Transport 
Aircraft to Egypt (statement before Senate 
subcommittee) 505 

Security Assistance and Foreign Policy (Kis- 
singer) 501 

"•he Triangular Relationship of the United 
States, the U.S.S.R., and the People's Re- 
public of China (Lord) 514 

)isarmament. U.S. and Soviet Union To Con- 
tinue Negotiations on PNE Agreement (U.S. 
statement) 507 

Economic Affairs 

'he Activities of the Department in Export 
Control (Glitman) 520 

Canada and the United States: The Framework 
and the Agenda (Enders) 508 

nternational Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) 522 

igypt. Secretary Discusses Proposed Sale of 
"Transport Aircraft to Egypt (statement 
before Senate subcommittee) 

Ourope. Security Assistance and Foreign Policy 

''oreign Aid. Security Assistance and Foreign 
Policy (Kissinger) 

luman Rights. President Ford Signs Ratifica- 
tions of Women's Rights Conventions (state- 

srael. U.S. Vetoes Security Council Resolution 
on the Situation in the Territories Occupied 
by Israel (Scranton, text of draft resolution) 

..atin America. Security Assistance and For- 
eign Policy (Kissinger) 

.lebanon. Department Gives U.S. Position on 
Developments in Lebanon (Department 

Middle East 

Secretary Discusses Proposed Sale of Transport 
Aircraft to Egypt (statement before Senate 

Security Assistance and Foreign Policy (Kis- 

U.S. Vetoes Security Council Resolution on the 
Situation in the Territories Occupied by Is- 
rael (Scranton, text of draft resolution) . . 








Military Affairs. Department Discusses U.S. 
Policy on Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons 
(Vest) 518 

Presidential Documents 

International Economic Report Transmitted to 
the Congress 522 

President Ford Signs Ratifications of Women's 
Rights Conventions 530 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 532 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 531 

President Ford Signs Ratifications of Women's 

Rights Conventions (statement) 530 


The Triangular Relationship of the United 
States, the U.S.S.R., and the People's Re- 
public of China (Lord) 514 

U.S. and Soviet Union To Continue Negotia- 
tions on PNE Agreement (U.S. statement) . 507 

United Nations. U.S. Vetoes Security Council 
Resolution on the Situation in the Territories 
Occupied by Israel (Scranton, text of draft 
resolution) 526 

Name Index 

Enders, Thomas O 508 

Ford, President 522, 530 

Glitman, Maynard W 520 

Kissinger, Secretary 501, 505 

Lord, Winston 514 

Parkinson, Nicholas Fancourt 513 

Scranton, William W 526 

Vest, George S 518 

Checklist of Department of State 
News Releases: March 29-April 4 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*154 3/29 Program for the state visit to 
Washington of King Hussein of 
Jordan, Mar. 29-Apr. 1. 
155 3/29 Kissinger: House Committee on 
International Relations. 

*156 3/30 Advisory Committee on Trans- 
national Enterprises, Apr. 20. 
157 4/2 Kissinger: Subcommittee on For- 
eign Assistance of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 

*158 4/2 Kissinger: American Foreign Serv- 
ice Association memorial plaque 

tl59 4/4 Kissinger: American Jewish Con- 

*159A 4/4 Rosovsky, Hertzberg, Kissinger: 
introductory remarks. 

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washington. dc. 20402 


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Washington, D.C. 20402. 






Volume LXXIV 

No. 1922 

April 26, 1976 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 533 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 5^7 

Address by Marshall Green 550 


For index see inside back cover o ^^- a . Uo.^^ i-.^rai> 

Superintendent of Documents 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1922 
April 26, 1976 

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Ifhe Law of the Sea: A Test of International Cooperation 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 

I want to speak to you today about one 
f the most important international negotia- 
ions that has ever taken place: the global 
onference now underway here in New York 
n the law of the sea. Last summer in Mon- 
real I set forth a comprehensive U.S. pro- 
ram to help bring matters at this year's 
onference to a rapid and successful con- 
jlusion. Today I will offer new proposals 
^hich address the remaining important 

sues before us, so that this great negotia- 
011 may lead to a final result this year. 
■ For we live in an age when the accelerating 
jirces of modern life — technological, eco- 
omic, social, and political—are leading the 
i'opies of the world into unprecedented and 
iterrelated areas of human activity. New 
rospects are opening before us — fraught 

ith potential for international contention but 
lied as well with the hope of unparalleled 
uman advancement. 

The principal problems which all nations 
ice today are truly global in nature. They 

anscend geographic and political bound- 
ries. Their complexity eludes the conven- 
onal solutions of the past, and their pace 
iitstrips the measured processes of tradi- 

onal diplomacy. 

There is the imperative of peace — the 
^miliar but vastly more urgent require- 
lents of maintaining global stability, re- 
viving conflicts, easing tensions — these 
;sues dominate the agenda of relations 

' Made before the Foreign Policy Association, the 
■ S. Council of the International Chamber of Com- 
erce, and the U.N. Association of the U.S.A. at 
e\v York, N.Y., on Apr. 8 (text from press release 

between East and West. And there are the 
new challenges of the world's economy and 
of cooperative solutions to such international 
problems as food, energy, population, trade, 
and the environment. These are the agenda of 
the modern period, particularly in the evolv- 
ing relationship between the developed and 
the developing nations. 

In an international order composed of 
sovereign states, the precondition of efi^ective 
policy is security. But security, while es- 
sential, is not enough. The American people 
will never be satisfied with a world whose 
stability depends on a balance of terror con- 
stantly contested. 

Therefore, side by side with seeking to 
maintain the security of free countries, the 
United States has striven to build a new 
world based on cooperation. .We are con- 
vinced that our common progress requires 
nations to acknowledge their interdependence 
and act out of a sense of community. There- 
fore, at the seventh special session of the 
U.N. General Assembly in September of last 
year we made a major effort to project our 
vision of a more positive future. We sought 
to mobilize collaboration on a global scale 
on many current issues of economic develop- 
ment. We were gratified by the response to 
our initiatives. We are prepared to accelerate 
our effort. 

Virtually all major elements of this new 
age of interdependence are involved in one 
of the great issues of our time: the question 
of mankind's use of the oceans. In no area 
are the challenges more complex or the 
stakes higher. No other common effort holds 
so much positive hope for the future relation- 

kpril 26, 1976 


ship between ricli nations and poor over the 
last quarter of this century and beyond. 

Today I want to speak to you about the 
urgency of this issue. The law of the sea 
negotiations now are at a critical stage. There 
have been many successes, but they will prove 
stillborn unless all tlie remaining issues are 
settled soon. The United States believes that 
if the present session does not complete its 
work, another— and final — session should be 
assembled this summer. If the negotiations 
are not completed this year, the world will 
have lost its best chance to achieve a treaty 
in this generation. 

I want to focus today upon the most im- 
portant problems remaining before the con- 
ference to speed their solution. I shall set 
forth proposals which in our view can serve 
as the basis for a widely accepted treaty. 

The Importance of the Oceans 

Most issues in international affairs im- 
pinge on our consciousness in the form of 
crisis, but many of the most important prob- 
lems which crucially affect our future come 
to us far less dramatically. The world is 
undergoing fundamental economic, techno- 
logical, and social transformations which do 
not dominate the daily headlines. Some of 
them are even more profound in their con- 
sequences than most immediate political 
crises. In no area is this more true than the 
oceans, a realm which covers 70 percent of 
the earth's surface. 

Freedom of the seas remains basic to the 
security and well-being of most nations. 
Tlie seaboi-ne commerce of the globe is ex- 
pected to quadruple within a few decades. 
The reliance of the world's people upon the 
seas to carry food and energy is increasing. 
Modern technology has enabled industries to 
sweep the seas for fish and to probe the 
oceans' floors for vital minerals and 
resources. Mankind's growing dependence 
on the seas, and the burgeoning world popu- 
lation along their shores, are already bur- 
dening the ecology of the oceans— a develop- 
ment of potentially catastrophic significance, 
for the oceans are the very source of life 


as we know it, the charactei'istic distingui>^^ 
ing our world from all other planets. 

These developments have brought wi1 
them a vast array of competitive practir. 
and claims, which — unless they are harm 
nized threaten an era of unrestrained cor 
mercial rivalry, mounting political turmo 
and eventually military conflict. We stand 
danger of repeating with respect to tl 
oceans the bitter rivalries that have in- 
duced endless conflict on land. 

A cooperative international regime 
govern the use of the oceans and tlie 
resources is therefore an urgent necessit 
It is, as well, an unprecedented opportuni 
for the nations of the world to devise tl 
first truly global solution to a global pro 
lem. And the opportunity is all the great 
because we start with a clean slate. 

Thus the multilateral effort to agree up' 
a comprehensive treaty on the law of t 
sea has implications beyond the technii 
problems of the use of the oceans. It touch 
upon basic issues underlying the long-tei 
stability and prosperity of our globe. T 
current negotiation is a milestone in 
struggle to submit man's endeavors to t 
constraints of international law. 

Let us understand more precisely wb 
is at stake: 

— In a world of growing scarcity, t 
oceans hold untapped riches of minerals at 
energy. For example, it is estimated that 
percent of the world's petroleum an 
virtually inexhaustible supplies of miner 
lie beneath the sea. Our economic grow 
and technological progress will be grea' 
affected by the uses made of these resourc 

— In a world where the growth of pop 
lation threatens to overwhelm the eartl 
capacity to produce food, the fish of the sa 
are an increasingly precious — and enda 
gered — source of protein. The well-being 
indeed the very survival of future genej 
tions may well depend upon whether ma 
kind can halt the present wanton depleti 
of this vast storehouse of nutrition. 

— In a world in which the health of 
planet our children will inherit depends up 

Department of State BulU 


Hecisions we make today, the environmental 
itegrity of the oceans, which affects the 
uality of hfe everywhere, is vital. 
— And in a world still buffeted by national 
)nflicts, economic confrontation, and politi- 
il strife, the free and fair use of the oceans 
crucial to future peace and progress. 

The oceans are not merely the repository 
wealth and promise; they are, as well, 
le last completely untamed frontier of our 
anet. As such, their potential — for achieve- 
ent or for strife — is vast. 
In the 19th century, the Industrial Revo- 
tion gave birth to improved communica- 
lons, technological innovations, and new 
rms of business organization which im- 
easurably expanded man's capacity to ex- 
oit the frontiers and territories of the 
itire globe. In less than one generation, 
le-fifth of the land area of the planet and 
le-tenth of its inhabitants were gathered 
t(i the domain of imperial powers in an un- 
strained scramble for colonies. The costs 
in affronts to human dignity, in material 
iste and deprivation, and in military con- 
L't and political turbulence — haunt us still. 
Like the non-Western lands of a century 
fore, today it is the oceans which suddenly 
, e accessible to new technology and alluring 
exploration. Their promise may be even 
i eater than the untapped lands of the 
intury past. So, too, is their potential for 
inflict. The decision will be ours. 
The international community now stands 
; the threshold of what can easily turn into 
. new period of unheralded competitive 
J tivity. It is our contention that the nations 
I the world cannot afford to indulge in 
; other round of unrestrained struggle for 
■ e wealth of our planet when the globe is 
i 'eady burdened by ideological strife and 
' ernionuclear weapons. 
The United States could survive such com- 
; tition better than other nations ; and 
:ould it be necessary, we are prepared to 
< fend our interests. Indeed, we could gain a 
jeat deal unilaterally in the near term. But 
'3 would do so in an environment of con- 
ant and mounting conflict. All nations, in- 

cluding our own, ultimately would lose under 
such unpredictable and dangerous conditions. 

That is not the kind of world we want to 
see. Our preference is to help build a ra- 
tional and cooperative structure of inter- 
national conduct to usher in a time of peace 
and progress for all peoples. We see the 
oceans as a trust which this generation holds 
— not only for all mankind but for future 
generations as well. 

The legacy of history makes this a difficult 
task. For centuries, the songs and legends of 
peoples everywhere have seen the oceans as 
the very symbol of escape from boundaries, 
convention, and restraint. The oceans have 
beckoned mankind to rewards of wealth and 
power, which awaited those brave and imag- 
inative enough to master the forces of 

In the modern era the international law 
of the sea has been dominated by a simple 
but fundamental principle: freedom of the 
seas. Beyond a narrow belt of territorial 
waters off the shores of coastal states, it 
has long been established and universally 
accepted that the seas were free to all for 
fishing and navigation. 

Today the simple rules of the past are 
challenged. Pressure on available food, fuel, 
and other resources has heightened aware- 
ness of the ocean's potential. The reach of 
technology and modern communications has 
tempted nations to seek to exercise control 
over ocean areas to a degree unimagined in 
the past. Thus coastal states have begun to 
assert jurisdictional claims far out to sea, 
claims which unavoidably conflict with the 
established law and with the practices of 
others and w'hich have brought a pattern of 
almost constant international conflict. Off 
the shores of nearly every continent, forces 
of coastal states challenge foreign fishing 
vessels: the "cod war" between Iceland and 
Great Britain, tuna boat seizures off South 
America, Soviet trawling off New England — 
these are but some examples. 

It is evident that there is no alternative 
to chaos but a new global regime defining 
an agreed set of rules and procedures. The 
problem of the oceans is inherently inter- 

-pril 26, 1976 


national. No unilateral or national solution is 
likely to prevail without continual conflict. 
The Law of the Sea Conference presents the 
nations of the world with their choice and 
their opportunity. Failure to agree is certain 
to bring further, more intense confrontation, 
as the nations of the world, now numbering 
some 150, go all out to extend unilateral 

Progress to Date at Law of the Sea Conference 

These are the reasons why the intei- 
national community has engaged itself in a 
concentrated effort to devise rules to govern 
the domain of the oceans. Substantive 
negotiations on a law of the sea treaty began 
in 1974 in Caracas; a second session was held 
in Geneva last year. Now, here in New York, 
work is underway aimed at concluding a 
treaty before this year is out. 

It is no exaggeration to say that this is 
one of the most significant negotiations in 
diplomatic history. The United States ap- 
proaches this negotiation with the conviction 
tliat we simply cannot afford to fail. 

The issues before the Law of the Sea Con- 
ference cover virtually every area and aspect 
of man's uses of the seas, from the coastline 
to the farthest deep seabed. Like the oceans 
themselves, these various issues are inter- 
I'elated parts of a single entity. Without 
agreement on all the issues, agreement on 
any will be empty; for nations will not ac- 
cept a partial solution — all the less so as 
some of the concessions that have been made 
were based on the expectation of progress on 
the issues which are not yet solved. 

Significant progress has been made on 
many key problems. Most prominent among 
them are: 

First, the extent of the territorial sea>i, and 
the related issue of free transit through 
straits. The conference has already reached 
widespread agreement on extending the ter- 
ritorial sea — the area where a nation exer- 
cises full sovereignty — to 12 miles. Even 
more importantly, there is substantial agree- 
ment on guaranteed unimpeded transit 


through and over straits used for intt 
national navigation. This is of crucial ir 
portance, for it means that the straits who 
use is most vital to international commerc 
and global security, such as the Straits ( 
Gibraltar and Malacca, will remain open 
international sea and air transit. This is 
principle to which the United States attachtt 
the utmost importance. 

Second, the degree of control that a coasti 
state can exercise in the adjacent offsho 
area beyond its territorial umters. This is tl 
so-called economic zone, in which lie son 
of the world's most important fishin 
grounds as well as major deposits of oil, ga 
and minerals. Growing international practiil 
has made it clear that in the absence of i 
international treaty, coastal nations woui 
eventually attempt to establish the extent 
their own zone and determine for themselvi 
what activities — national and international- 
could be carried out there. These would 1 
areas through which most of the world 
shipping moves and which are as well tl 
richest ground for economic exploitation. Tf 
complexities and confrontations which wou 
result from such an approach are obvious. 

Therefore we are gratified that the co 
ference is ready to settle upon a 200-mi 
economic zone. This will permit coastal sta 
control over some activities while maintai 
ing vital and traditional international fr« 
donis. The coastal states will control fisheir 
mineral, and other resource activities, 
the same time, freedom of navigation ai 
other freedoms of the international cow 
munity must be retained ; in this sense tf 
economic zone remains part of the high set- 
In addition, the treaty must protect certai 
international interests, such as insuri 
adequate food supply, conserving higW 
migratory species, and accommodating t 
concerns of states — including the landlock 
— that otherwise would derive little bene 
from the economic zone. 

Third, the rights of coastal states and tf 
international community over continent 
margin resources where the margin extern 
beyond 200 miles. The continental margin i 
the natural prolongation of the continent 

Department of State Bullet 

'indmass under the oceans. The question is: 
V'ho shall have the right to extract seabed 
esources in this region, and who shall share 
1 the benefits of such exploitation? We seek 
solution which will meet the international 
jmmunity's interest in the area beyond 200 
liles and still take into account the desire 
f coastal states with broad margins to ex- 
jloit their margin resources beyond the 
roposed economic zone. 
The conference has before it a reasonable 
roposal for agreement on this question. In 
eneral, the coastal states would have juris- 
iction over continental margin resources 
eyond 200 miles to a limit with a precise 

Under the system now being negotiated 
le treaty would also provide for the coastal 
ates to share with the international corn- 
unity a specified percentage of the value 
' mineral resources exploited in that area 
)r the benefit of the developing countries, in- 
uding the landlocked countries. The coastal 
ate would pay a royalty based upon the 
due of production at the wellhead in ac- 
)rdance with a formula fixed in the treaty; 
le money would then be distributed by an 
ternational authority under a formula still 
img negotiated. 

Fourth, the protection of the marine envi- 
mment. Effective international measures to 
•otect the oceans from pollution are vital 
I the health — indeed, to the very survival 
■ our planet. The law of the sea treaty will 
?al with all aspects of marine pollution, 
n the critical issue of pollution caused by 
■agoing vessels, we anticipate that the con- 
■rence will provide for effective enforce- 
ent of environmental protection regulations, 
'^e must now put forth our best efforts to 
'ach satisfactory agreement on the enforce- 
ent of regulations covering all the out- 
;anding issues concerning the protection of 
le marine environment. 

Progress on these key issues has been 
eartening. But we must reach agreement on 
le remaining issues, or else the encouraging 
rogress made to date will be lost and inter- 
ational anarchy will threaten. 

The Remaining Issues 

There are three major remaining unre- 
solved issues: 

Fi7-st, ways must be found to encourage 
marine scientific research for the benefit of 
all mankind while at the same time protect- 
ing the legitimate interests of coastal states 
in their 200-mile economic zone, the area in 
which some 80 percent of such research now 
takes place. 

Second, the treaty must include provisions 
for compulsory and impartial settlement of 
disputes in order that differences of interpre- 
tation and incompatible practices can be 
settled peacefully. 

And third, we must create an international 
regime for the exploitation of resources of 
the deep seaheds, those heretofore inacces- 
sible reaches of the seas beyond the economic 
zone and continental margin. 

United States Proposals 

The United States today proposes the 
following package as a contribution to help- 
ing the conference reach a swift and compre- 
hensive solution on the major remaining 

Marine Scientific Research 

The health, the safety, and the progress of 
the world's people may vitally depend upon 
the extent of marine scientific research ; it 
must be fostered and not impeded. To further 
marine scientific research the United States 
is jirepared to agree to a reasonable balance 
between coastal state and international in- 
terests in marine scientific research in the 
economic zone. We will agree to coastal state 
control of scientific research which is directly 
related to the exploration and exploitation of 
the resources of the economic zone. But we 
shall also insist that other marine scientific 
research not be hampered. 

We recognize that this distinction is bound 
to raise difficult questions in practice. This 
is why we believe that its determination can- 
not be left either to the coastal state or to 

jpril 26, 1976 


the state seeking to do scientific research ; it 
must ultimately be decided by an impartial 

Foi- our part, the United States is prepared 
to guarantee that coastal states will receive 
advance notice of scientific research in the 
economic zone, will have the right to partici- 
pate in that research, and will receive data 
and results of such research as well as as- 
sistance in interpreting the significance of 
those results. 

This proposal would help resolve the differ- 
ences between those who desii'e complete 
coastal state control over all marine scientific 
research and those who seek to maintain 
complete freedom for such research in the 
proposed economic zone. 

Dispute Settlement 

No nation could accept unilateral interpre- 
tation of a treaty of such vast scope by 
individual states or by an international sea- 
bed organization or any other interested 

To promote the fair settlement of disputes 
involving the interpretation of the treaty, 
the United States proposes the establishment 
of an impartial dispute-settlement mechanism 
whose findings would be binding on all 
signatory states. 

Such a mechanism would insure that all 
states have recourse to a legal jjrocess which 
would be nonpolitical, rapid, and impartial 
to all. It would especially protect the rights 
of all states in the economic zone by resolving 
differences in interpretation of the treaty 
which might lead to serious conflict between 
parties. It must be responsible for assuring 
the proper balance between the rights of 
coastal states and the rights of other states 
which also use, and indeed often are depend- 
ent upon, the economic zones of coastal 
states. And its decisions must be obligatory. 

Establishment of a professional, impartial, 
and compulsory dispute-settlement mecha- 
nism is necessary to insure that the oceans 
will be governed by the rule of law rather 
than the rule of force. Unless this point is 
accepted, many nations could not agree to 


the treaty, since only through such a mechi 
nism can they be assured that their interesi 
will be fairly protected. And agreement o 
this matter will make accommodation o 
other issues easier. 

The Deep Seabeds 




The third, and the most complex and vita 
issue remaining before the conference is th 
problem of the deep seabeds. 

For decades we have known that the dee 
seabeds contain great potential i-esources c 
nickel, manganese, cobalt, and copper- 
resources whose accessibility could contribul 
significantly to global economic growth in tb 
future. It is only recently that the technologi 
has been developed which can enable us 1 
reach those deposits and extract them. 

The conference has not yet approach© 
agreement on the issue of the deep seabedli 
because it lias confronted serious phil( 
sophical disagreements. Some have argue 
that commercial exploitation unrestrained b 
international treaty would be in the best ii 
terests of the United States. In fact th> 
country is many years ahead of any othfi 
in the technology of deep sea mining, ar 
we are in all respects prepared to protei 
our interests. If the deep seabeds are m 
subject to international agreement, tl> 
United States can and will proceed to explo/' 
and mine on its own. 

But while such a course might bring us 
short-term advantage, it poses long-ter: 
dangers. Eventually any one country 
technical skills are bound to be duplicate 
by others. A race would then begin to can 
out deep sea domains for exploitation. Th 
cannot but escalate into economic warfari 
endanger the freedom of navigation, aH 
ultimately lead to tests of strength and mill 
tary confrontations. 

America would not be true to itself, or 1 
its moral heritage, if it accepted a world i 
which might makes right — where power aloi) 
decides the clash of interests. And from 
practical standpoint, no one recognizes m 
clearly than American industry that inv 
ment, access, and profit can best be protecte 



Department of State Bulleti 

1 ail established and predictable environ- 

On the other hand, there are those who 
/ould place all the deep seabeds' resources 
nder an international authority. Such a pro- 
osal would not provide adequate incentives 
nd guarantees for those nations whose 
echnological achievement and entrepreneur- 
il boldness are required if the deep seabeds 
re to benefit all mankind. It would give con- 
rol to those who do not have the resources 
undertake deep seabed mining. 

Let me briefly review the specific issues 
efore us and then set forth the proposals 
'hicli we believe can form the basis for a new 
onsensus on the deep seabeds. 

First, the decisionmaking machinery for 
lanaging the deep seabeds. There has been 
onsiderable debate over the form and the 
owers of the decisionmaking machinery 
stablished under the treaty. The United 
itates is prepared to accept international 
lachinery; but such machinery must be 
alanced and equitable and insure that the 
slative economic interests of the countries 
'ith important activities in the deep seabeds 
e protected, even though those countries 
lay be a numerical minority. 

Second, access to the deep seabeds. The 
Dnference has been struggling with the 
;sue of which nations, which firms, and 
'hich international authorities will have 
irect access to, and share in the benefits 
rom, the developing of deep seabed 

The United States understands the concern 
liat the riches of the seas not be the ex- 
lusive preserve of only the most powerful 
nd technologically advanced nations. We 
ecognize that the world community should 
hare in the benefits of deep seabed exploita- 

What the United States cannot accept is 
hat the riglit of access to seabed minerals 
le given exclusively to an international 
uthority or be so severely restricted as effec- 
ively to deny access to the firms of any 
ndividual nation including our own. We are 
rratified to note an increasing awareness of 

the need to avoid such extreme positions and 
to move now to a genuine accommodation that 
would permit reasonable assurances to all 
states and their nationals that their access to 
these resources will not be denied. 

Third, the effect of seabed mining on land- 
based producers. Land-based producers of 
seabed minerals are concerned that seabed 
production may adversely aflfect their 
national economies. This is an especially 
serious problem since many of these pro- 
ducers are poor, developing countries. We 
take these concerns seriously. But at the 
same time it must be recognized that com- 
mercial seabed production of these metals is 
at least five years away. For many years 
thereafter, seabed production will amount to 
only a fraction of total global production. 
Moreover, global metal markets are expand- 
ing and should easily be able to accommodate 
additional production from the seabeds with- 
out adversely affecting revenues of land- 
based producer countries. 

The United States is prepared to make a 
major efl'ort to resolve these issues equitably 
and to bring the Law of the Sea Conference 
to a .swift and successful conclusion. In this 
spirit, the United States offers the following 
proposals : 

First, to insure an equitable decisionmak- 
ing system, the United States continues to 
believe that the treaty should authorize the 
formation of an International Seabed 
Resource Authority to supervise exploration 
and development of the deep seabeds. The 
Authority would be comprised of four princi- 
pal organs: An Assembly of all member 
states, to give general policy guidance; a 
Council, to serve as the executive, policy- 
level, and main decisionmaking forum, setting 
operational and environmental rules for 
mining and supervising the contracts for 
deep seabed mining; a Tribunal, to resolve 
disputes through legal processes; and a 
Secretariat, to carry out the day-to-day ad- 
ministrative activities of the Authority. 

The United States proposes : 

— That the power of the Authority be 

April 26, 1976 



carefully detailed by the treaty in order to 
pi-eserve all those rights regarding the uses 
of the seas which fall outside the com- 
petence of the Authority, and to avoid any 
jurisdictional overlap with other international 

— That the composition and structure of 
the Council reflect tlie producer and consumer 
interests of those states most concerned with 
seabed mining. All nations whose vital 
national economic concerns are affected by 
decisions of the Authority must have a voice 
and influence in the Council commensurate 
with their interests. 

— That the proposed permanent seabed 
Tribunal adjudicate questions of interpreta- 
tion of the treaty and of the powers of the 
International Authority raised by parties to 
the treaty or by private companies engaged 
in seabed mining. Without a Tribunal, un- 
resolved contention is a certainty. Such a 
body will be necessary if any seabed proposal 
is to win wide acceptance. 

Second, to insure that all nations, developed 
and developing, have adequate access to sea- 
bed mining sites: 

— The United States proposes that the 
treaty should guarantee nondiscriminatory 
access for states and their nationals to deep 
seabed resources under specified and reason- 
able conditions. The requirement of guar- 
anteed access will not be met if the treaty 
contains arbitrai'y or restrictive limitations 
on the number of mine sites which any nation 
might exploit. And such restrictions are un- 
necessary because deep seabed mining cannot 
be monopolized ; there are many more pro- 
ductive seabed mining sites than conceivably 
can be mined for centuries to come. 

■ — The United States accepts that an 
"Enterprise" should be established as part 
of the International Seabed Resource Author- 
ity and given the right to exploit the deep 
seabeds under the same conditions as apply 
to all mining. 

— The United States could accept as part 
of an overall settlement a system in which 
prime mining sites are reserved for exclusive 
exploitation by the Enterprise or by the 
developing countries directly — if this ap- 





proach meets with broad support. Unde 
this system, each individual contractor woulr 
propose two mine sites for exploitation. Th( 
Authority would then select one of these 
sites, which would be mined by the Authority 
directly or made available to developing 
countries at its discretion. The other site 
would be mined by the contractor on his 

— The United States proposes that tht 
International Authority should supervise { 
system of revenue sharing from mining 
activities for the use of the international com 
munity, primarily for the needs of the pooresi 
countries. These revenues will not onlj 
advance the growth of developing countries 
they will provide tangible evidence that i 
fair shai'e in global economic activity can bt 
achieved by a policy of cooperation. Revenue 
sharing could be based either on royalties oi 
on a system of profit sharing from contraci 
mining. Such a system would give reality t{ 
the designation of the deep seabeds as the 
common heritage of all mankind. 

— Finally, the United States is prepared t( 
make a major eflFort to enhance the skill; 
and access of developing countries to ad' 
vanced deep seabed mining technology ii 
order to assist their capabilities in this field 
For example, incentives should be establishec 
for private companies to participate in agree 
ments to share technology and train person 
nel from developing countries. 

Third, in response to the legitimate con, 
cerns of land-based producers of mineral; 
found in the deep seabeds, we ofl'er tht 
following steps as an additional major con 
tribution to the negotiations: 

— The United States is prepared to accept i 
temporary limitation, for a period fixed ir 
the treaty, on production of the seabec 
minerals tied to the pi'ojected growth in tht 
world nickel market, currently estimated to 
be about 6 percent a year. This would lit 
effect limit production of other minei'als coni 
tained in deep seabed nodules, including copi 
per. After this period, the seabed production 
should be governed by overall mai'ket con^ 

— The United States proposes that the 

Department of State Bulletii 


nternational Seabed Resource Authority 
lave the right to participate in any inter- 
lational agreements on seabed-produced com- 
nodities in accordance with the amount of 
n'oduction for whicli it is directly responsi- 
)ie. The United States is prepared to ex- 
imine with flexibihty the details of arrange- 
nents concerning tlie relationships between 
he Authority and any eventual commodity 

— The United States proposes that some of 
he revenues of the Authority be used for 
idjustment assistance and that the World 
?ank, regional development banks, and other 
nternational institutions assist countries to 
mprove their competitiveness or diversify 
nto other kinds of production if they are 
eriously injured by production from the 
leep seabeds. An urgent task of the Inter- 
lational Authority, when it is established, 
\vi\\ be to devise an adjustment assistance 
irogram in collaboration with other inter- 
lational institutions for countries which suf- 
er economic dislocations as a result of deep 
eabed mining. 

These proposals on the issue of deep sea- 
led resources are offered in the spirit of 
ooperation and compromise that charac- 
erized our economic proposals at the seventh 
pecial session and that guides our policies 
oward the developing nations. The United 
;tates is examining a range of commodity 
iroblems and ways in which they might be 
airly resolved. We intend to play an active 
ole at the U.N. Conference on Trade and 
)evelopment next month in Nairobi and come 
orward with specific proposals. We look to- 
ward a constructive dialogue in the Raw 
/[aterials Commission of the Conference on 
nternational Economic Cooperation in Paris, 
^nd we are actively committed to producer- 
onsumer forums to discuss individual com- 
nodities — such as the recent forum on 

The United States believes that the world 
•ommunity has before it a grave responsi- 
)ility. Our country cannot delay in its efforts 
;o develop an assured supply of critical 
■esources through our deep seabed mining 
.projects. We strongly prefer an international 

agreement to provide a stable legal environ- 
ment before such development begins, one 
that insures that all resources are managed 
for the good of the global community and 
that all can participate. But if agreement is 
not reached this year, it will be increasingly 
difficult to resist pressure to proceed unilat- 
erally. An agreement on the deep seabed can 
turn the world's interdependence from a 
slogan into a reality. A sense of community 
which nations have striven to achieve on land 
for centuries could be realized in a regime 
for the oceans. 

The Possibility and the Promise 

The nations of the world now have before 
them a rare, if not unique, opportunity. If we 
can look beyond the pressures and the politics 
of today to envision the requirements of a 
better tomorrow, then we can understand the 
true meaning of the task before us. 

Let us pause to realize what this treaty 
can mean — to this generation and to the 
possible realization of humanity's dream of a 
progressive ascent toward justice and a good 
life for all peoples. 

If the conference is successful, mankind's 
rights and responsibilities with regard to the 
oceans will be clear to all. 

This will mean freedom of navigation, pre- 
serving the rights of all on the seas. 

It will mean a greater flourishing of trade 
and commerce, bringing the benefits of a 
freer flow of goods to consumers and pro- 
ducers alike. 

It will mean that the oceans, recognized as 
"the source of all" since Homer's day, can 
continue to enrich and support our planet's 

It will mean that there will be a compre- 
hensive regime for all of the world's oceans 
embracing not only territorial waters but a 
new economic zone, the continental margin, 
and the deep seabeds. 

It will mean the realization of the promise 
of scientific research in the oceans — the 
further probing of the mysteries of our 
planet to better the lives and preserve the 
health of all. 

It will mean that the seas' resources of 

'Vpril 26, 1976 


nutrition and raw materials can be tapped for 
the use of the entire human community. 

It will mean tliat an arena of conflict, and 
one which is becoming increasingly danger- 
ous, will become an area for cooperative 

It will mean that the entii'e international 
community — the developing as well as de- 
veloped, landlocked as well as coastal — will 
share in the uses, the nourishment, the mate- 
rial resources, and the revenues which this 
great treaty could provide. For the poorer 
countries in particular, it will mean revenues 
from the continental margin and the deep 
seabeds, and the opportunity to participate in 
deep sea mining through an international 

And above all, it will mean the nations of 
the world have proved that the challenges 
of the future can be solved cooperatively; 
that for the first time mankind has been able 
to surmount traditional enmities and ambi- 
tions in the service of a better vision. 

These, then, are the stakes ; these are the 
possibilities we hold in our grasp. Will we 
have the maturity and the judgment to go 
forward? Will we fulfill the obligation which 
future historians — without question — will 
assign to us? I believe we shall. The United 
States is determined that we shall. The pos- 
sibility and the promise have never been 
more clear. Through reason, through responsi- 
bility, and by working together, we shall 

With hindsight it is easy to identify the 
moments in history when humanity broke 
fi'om old ways and moved in new directions. 

But for those living through such times, it j 
usually difficult to see the true significanc 
oven of epoch-making events. 

That is why the nations who are engagei 
in the Law of the Sea Conference hav 
come to a unique moment in history. Onl, 
rarely does mankind comprehend the signif 
icance of change in the world as we so clearl; 
do today. We share a common perception of 

— The need to contain potential conflict 
— The importance of cooperative solution 

to shared problems ; and 

— The necessity to achieve the full an' 

fair use of the possibilities of our planel 

both material and moral. 

If a second session is necessary this yea- 
to complete the work of the conference, le 
us make that session the final one. To undei 
line the importance the President attache 
to these negotiations, he has asked me t 
lead the U.S. delegation to that session. I 
is our hope that otlier nations will attae' 
similarly high importance to it and be pre 
pared to discuss the remaining issues befor 
us at a decisive political level. This shoul 
be a time for determined action, a time t 
avoid rhetoric and to commit ourselves t 
decisions and a final agreement. 

The United States calls upon all nation 
deliberating this great treaty to summon th 
sense of responsibility and urgency whic 
history and this task demand of us. For ou 
part, the United States pledges to work tir< 
lessly to seize this rare chance for decisiv 
progress on one of the great challenges of ou 


Department of State Bulletil 

Questions and Answers Following the Secretary's Address at New York City 

ts^ release 162B dated April 8 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you comment on 
le charge made by Ronald Reagan that the 
dministration policy of detente is a onc- 
■ay street? 

Secretary Kissinger: I first of all want to 
lake clear that I am using the word only 
1 response to a question, so let me ex- 
lain what the policy that used to be called 
ietente" involves. [Laughter.] 
The United States faces several problems : 
ne, how to contain growing Soviet power 
id, secondly, how to build a world whose 
!curity and progress is not constantly de- 
jndent on a balance of terror. 
The United States must take both of these 
roblems seriously. We have a problem of 
icurity. The growth of Soviet power is not 
lused by the policies of any Administration ; 
is the inevitable byproduct of the develop- 
ent of Soviet technology and Soviet 
idustry. And, therefore, from that point of 
ew, every four years we can run a Presi- 
jntial campaign on the issue that Soviet 
)wer has grown in the interval. 
Our responsibility is to prevent the Soviet 
nion from using this power so as to expand 
s political domination for its political inter- 
it. This we are attempting to do, and I 
elieve we have succeeded in doing. But, 
?condly, when one looks at history one can- 
Dt afford, in the thermonuclear age, to rely 
n an international environment in which 
le great powers settle their disputes by 
ndless confrontations. 
Our generation is traumatized by the ex- 
erience of Munich, where a disparity of 
trength produced a war. But we would do 
'ell to remember that a war that caused 
qually great dislocations started in 1914, 
1 the First World War, when there was a 

rough equality of strength and where nations 
had faced each other down for 50 years, 
until a crisis much like any other exploded 
into war that killed millions of people and 
destroyed the structure of the international 
order as it existed for a century. 

We cannot conduct our affairs on that 
basis, and any Administration has a responsi- 
bility to look for a better arrangement. This 
is what we have attempted to do. I do not 
believe that this policy has represented a 
one-way street. A lasting peace is in every- 
body's interest. It is not a favor we do to 
anybody else. And we are prepared to dis- 
cuss or to debate any specific agreement 
that has been made to see whether it was in 
the mutual interest. 

I would argue that the agreements that 
have been made have been equitable and that 
the strategy we are pursuing is required by 
the necessities of the thermonuclear age, in 
which peace must be achieved by something 
better than posturing. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, because of the great 
importance of NATO, I feel, to our govern- 
ment, ive should support the U.S.-Turkish 
agreement that has just been made. Can yon 
show us why this would also be in the best 
interest of Greece — which I believe it would 
be, because they are not members of NATO — 
and ivould be helped by the strong support of 
the Turks, who have been great friends of 
ours ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my confidence 
in myself has been remarked upon; but I 
would not assume that I could easily per- 
suade the Greeks that an agreement between 
the United States and Turkey is likely to be 
in their interest. I think it is not necessarily 
because they are right but the passions on 
this issue run, as you know, very deep. I re- 

vpril 26, 1976 


call meeting with a group of Greek-American 
leaders, and I was what I thought extremely 
persuasive and asked one of them to sum up 
what we had discussed. He said, "Kill the 
Turks." [Laughter.] 

But if you ask me to explain it to a non- 
Greek audience, I would say that Turkey at 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean, stand- 
ing between the Soviet Union and the Middle 
East, maintaining one of the largest armies 
in NATO, is an essential element of the 
security of the West, including the security 
of Greece. The failure by the Congress to 
approve this agreement would lead to an 
irreparable blow to security of the eastern 
Mediterranean under conditions in which 
the tensions in the Middle East have to be 
one of our principal security and foreign 
policy concerns. 

So we hope very much that the Congress 
will see matters in the same light — all the 
more so as we are prepared to make a par- 
allel arrangement with Greece and are in the 
process of negotiating with Greece right 
now. The United States does not feel that 
it should choose between two countries 
whose friendship it has valued, whose con- 
tribution to the common defense is essential. 
And we will pursue a policy of friendship 
with both Greece and Turkey, and we will 
make a major effort to contribute to a solu- 
tion of the conflicts between them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, another question relating 
to NATO. Whij could not NATO endure if 
Communi.'its entered the governments of 
France or Italy, provided the Communist 
parties of those tico countries become truly 
national Communist parties? 

Secretary Kissinge)-: You are putting me 
into a position where tomorrow I'll be ac- 
cused again in certain European countries of 
intervening in their domestic afl'airs. 

The basic problem with Communist parties 
in European governments, as far as the 
United States is concerned, is not that they 
are dependent on Moscow but that they are 
Communist and they would therefore bring 
with them a set of priorities and a set of 

electoral commitments and a tradition th 
makes it extremely unlikely that it would i 
possible to pursue the kind of cooperati' 
policies that have existed in the past. 

The United States has had friendly rel 
tions with many Communist countries, ai 
it is quite possible for the United States 
have friendly relations with other countrii 
that go Communist. But it is hard to belie^ 
that the present NATO structure, the pre 
ent integration of military planning, of poll 
ical consultation, could continue if there we 
a significant contribution of Communi 
parties in many European countries. It wou 
be a change in our relationship. 

What its historical significance is to 1 
remains to be seen. 

Now, the United States cannot affect tl 
decisions of the voters of these countrie 
but the United States at least should n* 
delude itself that the coming to power 
Communist parties in West European cou 
tries would not produce a massive chanj 
in the postwar situation as we have known 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a question on Ango 
and Cuba: What measures do you belie 
the United States can take to deter Cut 
from further military intervention in bla< 
Africa ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I can already see 1 1 
outraged editorials coming out of this met 
ing. [Laughter.] 

The United States is concerned that Soviei 
sponsored interventions by surrogate cou 
tries in trouble spots is going to lead to 
situation in which the political conditions 
major parts of the world are going to 1 
determined by the willingness of the Sovi 
Union and its surrogates to intervene. 

This is of consequence not only in Afrit 
but also in the Middle East. It applies iw 
only to Cuba but to other countries th« 
could have adventurist tendencies. In tinw 
it will spread to the Western Hemispheit 
This is why we have attempted to make clea 
that the United States could not accept tH 
fact that the Soviet Union, operating wil! 
surrogates in distant parts of the world, H 
tervenes with military force. 


Department of State Bullet 

'i| What we will do in concrete circumstances 
liwill have to leave for those circumstances 
i determine. But people would make a mis- 

,'ike if they thought we were not serious. 


j Q. Mr. Secretary, a question regarding 
\hina: Could you comment on the effect of 
lie current succession problems in the Peo- 

'e's Republic of China on U.S.-China rela- 


Sccrctarii Kissinger: I must say that I 
ave some sympathy for what Teng Hsiao- 
'ing has been going through. I am in the 
lA'all poster" stage myself. [Laughter.] 
The succession problem in China is pri- 
arily a matter of Chinese internal policies, 
id we have been told repeatedly in public 
atements and otherwise that it does not 
Tect the basic direction of Chinese foreign 
)licy. The basic direction of Chinese foreign 
)licy depends on the Chinese perception of 
le degree to which the United States can 
ay an effective international role. I don't 
)ubt that right now in China, at similar 
eetings, the question is asked: "What do 
)u think is going on in all these upheavals 
the United States, and how will this affect 
5 foreign policy?" [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, another question on 
frica: Could you please indicate the present 
.S. Government position regarding the 
niggle for independeyice among the mu- 
ritij people in southern Africa, especially 
it relates to the role of the U.S. Govern- 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
is stated very strongly its support for ma- 
irity rule in southern Africa, and we do not 
ish that any regime in southern Africa con- 
rue our opposition to Cuban and Soviet 
ilitary intervention as an endorsement of 
s practices and its policies. The United 
tates will support majority rule. 
I am planning to go to Africa in a few 
eeks ; and on this occasion I will make clear 
tid I will attempt to organize, together with 
le interested black African states, a set of 
Dlicies and procedures which we hope will 
•ad to majority rule. But we will not be pres- 

sured into it by Soviet threats or Cuban inter- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the Administrutiun 
have any playis to move our relationship with 
China off dead center? 

Secretary Kissinger: We don't believe that 
our relationship with China is on dead center. 
Our relationship with China depends on the 
national interests as they are perceived by 
both sides. It has been pursued with care and 
seriousness by both sides. We intend to pur- 
sue the course of normalization, and we in- 
tend to achieve the objectives set forth in the 
Shanghai communique.' 

The pace at which this proceeds must be 
determined by international conditions as 
well as by the domestic possibilities of each 
side. But I think on the essential inter- 
national concerns our policies with respect to 
China are on course, and we expect that this 
process will continue. 

I am delighted that Mr. Gates [Thomas S. 
Gates, Jr.] has agreed to head the Liaison 
Office in order to give a further impetus to 
this relationship. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the recent session of 
the Human Rights Commission and since 
then in a speech of Leonard Garment, the 
United States seemed to be taking a new 
position in confronting the hypocrisy which 
has dominated all Human Rights Commissiou 
sessions in recent years. Is this a sign that 
we are giving neiv importance to huynan 
rights? And are we going to again become 
the leader respecting human rights in the 
world ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Garment in the 
Human Rights Commission reflected the 
basic policies of the U.S. Government. We 
have made clear that we do attach consider- 
able importance to the human rights ques- 
tion. In our appointment of Ambassador 
Moynihan and in our general conduct in such 
institutions as the Human Rights Commis- 
sion, we have tried to symbolize it. 

' For text of the communique, see Bulletin of 
Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435. 

upril 26, 1976 


Mr. Garment reflects the basic policies of 
this government — as most of our Ambas- 
sadors do. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please deiwlop 
the idea, the rationale, of the "more organic 
relationship of the Soviet Union in Eastern 
Europe," recently reported as an objective 
of our foreign, policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me tell you 
two things. 

A few weeks ago I spent about 10 days 
preparing a carefully considered statement 
on Soviet policy which I delivered at a meet- 
ing like this in San Francisco. Since the paper 
was unclassified, it was not generally re- 
ported. [Laughter.] 

The document to which you refer is a sum- 
mary of extemporaneous remarks which were 
supposed to stimulate discussion, by one of 
my associates in whom I have complete con- 
fidence ; and it had been filtered through 
several layers before it had reached its pres- 
ent formulation. 

What Mr. [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt attempted 
to say was to restate the basic policy of the 
United States. What he said was that the 
present relationship between the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe is unnatural; that it 
was our policy to encourage greater auton- 
omy in Eastern Europe — that it was our 
policy, which he then expressed in the word 
"organic," to contrast it with the unnatural 

He might have used a happier adjective — 
or maybe the note taker might have chosen 

a happier adjective, but he was not promu i 
gating a new policy. He was stating that tl 
present relationship of dominance is not or 
that we can condone or accept and that ■ 
is our policy to encourage Eastern Europ 
in the direction of greater autonomy. 

And I consider the use that has been mad 
of this summary — the amount of attentio 
that it has received — a deliberate distortio 
in order to create a political issue which i 
no way reflects the views of the Administn 
tion, which are the views that have been coi 
sistently followed in the postwar period. 

Q. The last question, Mr. Secretary: Ho-t 
do iiou assess the outlook for the Paris talk 
o)t. economic and resources questions ivit 
the oil-producing and Third World coun 

tries ? 

Secretary Kissinger: So far, it is too earl 
to tell. We have pursued, since the seventh 
special session [of the U.N. General Ai 
sembly] a deliberate policy of making cor 
crete, detailed, and we hope forward-lookin» 
proposals. We have tried to move the dialogic 
from ideological confrontations and slogar 
to the specific issues that the nations of th 
world face. So far, this attitude has dom 
nated the discussion in Paris. 

We will make further proposals at th 
UNCTAD Conference [U.N. Conference c 
Trade and Development] in Nairobi; and 
believe that if all countries continue to woi' 
in the spirit that has so far been exhibiten 
we can make significant progress during tl* 


Department of State Bulletil 

Israel and the United States 

Address by Secretary Kissinger ' 

The greatness of America has not been so 
"much its physical strength as its moral 
significance. Since its birth this nation has 
^tood for something larger than itself. 
lAmericans have always had a sense of mis- 
sion; we have been inspired by the knowledge 
that we were champions of liberty and prog- 
ress for all mankind. We have been not only 
a refuge for those fleeing persecution but the 
'defense of democracy and a bulwark for 
others in time of need, a feeder of the 
iiungry, and a solace to the suffering. And 
■nistory continues to present us these chal- 
eiiges and more. Today we bear a central 
responsibility for maintaining peace and 
shaping a global structure which can help 
realize mankind's dream of an end to con- 
flict and hatred. 

These are the qualities and responsibilities 
and hopes which tie America to Israel. No 
people knows more vividly than the Jewish 
people that morality must be more than a 
theory — it must be a quality of human con- 
duct. No people yearns more for tranquillity 
than those who historically have been the 
first victims of its loss. And no people per- 
ceives more acutely that peace depends ulti- 
mately not on political arrangements, but on 
the conscience of mankind. 

History is often cruel, but the wisest are 
those who know that fate can be shaped by 
human faith and human courage. The true 
realists are those who recognize that all great 
achievements were a dream before they 
became a reality. These are qualities that 

' Made before the American Jewish Congress at 
Washington, D.C., on Apr. 4 (text from press release 

have enabled the Jewish people to survive 
their tragedies. These are the qualities that 
brought about the State of Israel. These are 
qualities that guarantee the future of the 
people of Israel. And these are qualities 
which peoples and nations everywhere must 
possess if they are to be free. 

The Moral Basis of Foreign Policy 

History challenges us amid the world's 
ambiguities to shape events by our own pur- 
poses and ideals. If democratic societies like 
America and Israel are to prosper, we must 
summon the unity and resolve to be masters 
of our futures on the basis of our values. 

The decisions that must be made are 
always difficult, for foreign policy deals with 
the interaction of sovereign entities. No coun- 
try, no matter how strong, can impose its 
will on the world. Today, in a world of 
thermonuclear weapons, diffusion of power, 
and growing interdependence, foreign policy 
is more than ever an enterprise of incomplete 
and imperfect solutions. Tension is unavoid- 
able between moral values, which are invar- 
iably cast in absolute terms, and efforts to 
achieve them, which of necessity involve com- 

This accounts for much of the foreign 
policy debate in democratic societies, which 
to some extent is a rebellion against the con- 
temporary world. In all democratic societies 
the temptation is great to deny the circum- 
stances of the contemporary world and to 
blame them on individuals, to confuse opti- 
mism with the shallow projection of the 

But we cannot escape the conditions around 

April 26, 1976 


us. Morality without pragmatic action is 
empty, just as pragmatism without moral 
direction is like a rudderless ship. The true 
optimists are those who are prepared to face 
complexity and who have the faith that their 
people can master it by dedication and vision. 

If democracies like America and Israel are 
to survive and flourish in a world of sovereign 
states and competing wills, we must stand 
firmly for our belief in human dignity ; 
othei-wise we will lose our bearings. There is 
no way to make these choices and to navigate 
between the shoals of temptation and danger 
without a strong inner moral conviction. 
Equally, we need a mature and hardlieaded 
understanding of the difficult choices that 
must be made, lest we substitute wishful 
thinking for tlie requirements of survival. 

For Americans, foreign policy has always 
been more than the search for stability. 
Americans have a vision of a world of justice 
that drives all our efforts. A pragmatic policy 
alone would be empty of humanity; it would 
lack direction and roots and heart. 

But, equally, if policy becomes excessively 
moralistic, it can turn quixotic or dangerous. 
A presumed monopoly on virtue can make 
impossible any solution or negotiation. Good 
results may be given up or sabotaged in the 
quest for the elusive ideal. Some of this 
country's most serious errors — of both in- 
volvement and abdication — were driven by 
misguided moral arguments. Some interven- 
tions began as crusades to reform other 
societies; and we were isolationist in the 
1930's to preserve our purity and register 
our distaste for the balance of power. 

Our responsibility to conduct a moral, far- 
sighted, and realistic policy has grown in 
recent years. In a world made smaller by 
technology and communications, events any- 
where are instantly known and have effects in 
distant places. Never before have the desti- 
nies of nations been more intertwined — not 
only practically but morally. 

And so we have a stake in a peaceful world 
and an environment where man's aspirations 
for justice and liberty and dignity have the 
greatest chance of fulfillment. The ultimate 
safety of every minority, every oppressed 


people, lies in a world where respect foi 
human dignity governs the affairs of nations 
Peace can be said to exist only when the. 
insecurity of nations is eased, the hopes oi' 
people for economic advance are fulfilled, 
international liabits of restraint and con- 
ciliation are nurtured, and men experience 
at last the blessings of a world of justice and 

Peace in the Middle East 

I have spoken at some length about the 
moral foundation of our foreign policy to this 
group which is so concerned and serious 
about the survival of Israel. For the relation- 
ship between America and Israel depends 
ultimately not on formal assurances, but on 
the links of our peoples and the reality of our? 

The survival and security of Israel are 
unequivocal and permanent moral commit- 
ments of the United States. Israel is a loyal 
friend and a fellow democracy whose very 
existence represents the commitment of all 
free peoples. The moral strength of the people 
of Israel, which has so often meant the 
margin of victory in war, gives us confidence 
that Israel will also win peace. No people has 
earned it more. 

Time and events have brought us to a 
threshold in Middle East history — an un- 
precedented opportunity to realize the peace 
of which we all have dreamed, a peace in the 
interest of all the peoples of a region that 
has experienced enough anguish for this 

— Israel, having proven by its own courage 
that it is here to stay, has taken equally 
courageous steps toward peaceful resolution 
of the conflict. 

— Some of its Arab neighbors, for the 
first time ever, are now speaking openly and 
wisely of making peace and ending genera- 
tions of conflict. 

— The United States has demonstrated to 
both sides its commitment to continue to 
promote a just and enduring solution. 

— The relationships among the major out- 
side powers, if conducted with reason and 

Department of State Bulletin 

lirmness, can create a global environment of 
restraint that will enhance security and the 
possibilities of peaceful settlement in the 
Middle East. 

Israel obviously faces profound problems — 
not the least of which is that in any negotia- 
tion with its neighbors, it will be asked to 
yield the physical buffers of territory in ex- 
hange for intangible pledges. Indeed, Israel's 
jains will be intangible even as it achieves 
_ts own stated objectives of a formal peace 
treaty and diplomatic recognition by its 
neighbors. So the process of peace inevitably 
presents it with many anguishing decisions— 
md the pain is shared by all of us who are 
friends of Israel and who are dedicated to 
Ifurther progress toward peace. Throughout 
this process we owe Israel our compassion 
;ind support. 

The risks and obstacles are many. Steps 
taken must be carefully thought out and 
realistic. But we must move together with 
jourage and with a vision of how reality can 
l^e shaped by a vision of peace. And we must 
not paralyze ourselves by a suspiciousness 
that deprives our relationship of dignity and 
our cooperation of significance. 

The United States will help keep Israel 
strong — to insure that peace is seen clearly 
to be the only feasible course. We will never 
abandon Israel -either by failing to provide 
crucial assistance or by misconceived or sepa- 
rate negotiations or by irresolution when 
challenged to meet our own responsibility to 
maintain the global balance of power. 

We will never forget that America's re- 
sponsibility for peace includes, above all, 
responsibility for the fate of smaller nations 
who rely upon us as the ultimate defender of 
their survival and freedom and that Israel's 
fate is inseparable from the future of human 
dignity. America will not abandon a friend, 
because to do so in one part of the world 
would shake confidence in every part of the 
world. There will be no American weakness 
or abdication, for this can only tempt adver- 
saries, confuse allies, and undermine security 
in the world, ultimately to the grave peril of 
our country. 

Moral ideals and practical interest thus 
come together. Peace in the Middle East is 
a goal shared by Americans and by Israelis 
alike. The road toward it will be a common 
one. And so, in truth, as we pursue the 
course of peace, our guarantees rest not so 
much in any formal agreements or reassur- 
ances endlessly repeated as in the deeper ties 
of emotion and morality, history and princi- 
ple, that can never be sundered. 

The dream of peace is the dream of the 
prophet Isaiah: "nation shall not lift up 
sword against nation, neither shall they learn 
war any more." It is written in the Book of 
Numbers : "The Lord lift up his countenance 
upon thee, and give thee peace." This dream 
is both an inspiration and a duty. And those 
who strive for it know both the pain and the 
exhilaration of man's noblest endeavor. 

The United States and Israel will have 
the courage and the faith to seek this dream 
and fulfill it. 

April 26, 1976 


The World Population Crisis and the American Role 

Address by Marshall Green 
Coordinator of Population Affairs ' 

The world population passed the 4 billion 
mark last Saturday, according to the Popu- 
lation Reference Bureau. It took us from the 
dawn of time until about the year 1830 to 
reach the 1 billion mark. A hundred years 
later, in 1930, we were 2 billion; 30 years 
later, in 1960, 3 billion; and today we are 4 
billion. It now looks as though we will reach 
5 billion in 1987 and 6 billion in 1997. Longer 
range projections of population at current 
growth rates produce horrendous results. 
"Someday there will be standing room 
only," announced one of our officials to an 
audience in Vermont. From the back of the 
room an elderly lady observed: "Well, that 
ought to slow 'em down a little." 

The world population crisis has been gen- 
erated not by any general rise in birth rates 
around the world but, rather, through a 
sharp drop in death rates. Thus, one of 
mankind's greatest successes — a massive re- 
duction in death rates over the past cen- 
tury, due largely to scientific and technologi- 
cal advances — has paradoxically provided the 
seeds of what could be mankind's greatest 
disaster: excessive population growth. 

There seems to be a general widespread 
awareness of this fact but not enough action. 
For it is also paradoxical that this issue, so 
intimately involved in sex, seems to have so 
little "sex appeal." 

There is a certain intractability about the 
population problem that defies analogy with 
any other issue on the world's agenda. En- 

' Made before the Cleveland Council on World Af- 
fairs at Cleveland, Ohio, on Mar. 30. 

vironmental pollution, for example, smart 
our eyes, fouls our rivers and lakes, create 
health hazards. We are accordingly com 
pelled to take immediate action, even legjj 
action. The arms race and nuclear buildu 
involve massive risks that demand the im 
mediate attention of world leaders and entai 
enormous costs. 

But the population explosion? It can 
even be heard. Yet every day it produces 
net increase of 200,000 inhabitants on thi 
limited planet. 

Too many people still see population « 
someone else's problem, not their own — o 
something that we can think about tomorrov 
for today there are too many other issue 
demanding our full attention. Such procraa 
tination can only lead to disaster for us al 
wherever we may live. 

Effects of Rapid Population Growth 

Impact on Food Supplies. Perhaps the moa 
recognizable challenge of rapid populatio* 
growth will be whether there will be enougl 
food in the years ahead, particularly fo 
poorer nations which are not now self-suffi 
cient in food production. What will be th 
fate of those countries as population presse 
increasingly against the limits of availabli 
land, water, and agricultural capital as wel 
as other resources? Some commentators be 
lieve that today between 10 and 20 millioi 
people die annually from causes directly o; 
indirectly related to undernourishment 
World food resei'ves are at their lowest level; 


Department of State Bulletir 

in years. Fish stocks and catches have 
peaked and are now declining. 

Yet population growth entails ever-growing 
demands for food. Whether or not these de- 
mands can be met will depend not only on 
increasing food production but also on suc- 
cess in limiting population growth. Unless 
the developing countries can do this, their 
annual import requirements of cereals will 
exceed 100 million tons by the end of the 
century. Apart from the question of whether 
developing countries could pay for such levels 
of food imports, there is the question of 
whether such levels would be available for 
export. Much of the world is increasingly de- 
pendent on the United States and Canada — 
one geographic-climatic zone — for food im- 
ports. North American grain exports for 
1976 are estimated at 100 million tons, but 
most of these exports go to Europe and 
•Japan. So how can anticipated food demands 
be met in the decades ahead? Only through 
increasing worldwide food production and 
lowering population reproduction. 

Impact on Environment. No doubt the 
main cause of global pollution has been in- 
dustrialization and rising living standards. It 
is thus the developed, not the developing, 
countries which have been the principal pol- 
luters. But in the developing countries, ef- 
forts to increase food production for grow- 
ing numbers of people often result in de- 
forestation and floods, the overgrazing of 
land and the advancing of deserts, and the 
encroachment of expanding urban areas on 
former food-producing land. 

Social and Political Impact. Less evident 
are the social, pohtical, and strategic con- 
sequences of excessive population growth. 
Today, migration from rural areas to cities 
is often a disruptive factor in developing 
societies. The current surge of humanity 
into already overcrowded cities overtaxes 
.■social, educational, and sanitary services 
and contributes to urban unemployment, 
juvenile delinquency, crime, and social un- 
rest. The latter often translates into political 
difficulties resulting either in chronically 
weak and therefore politically unstable re- 

gimes or increasingly authoritarian govern- 
ments. Friction and even wars between na- 
tions have often been marked by population 
l)ressures, and we now live in a world where 
nuclear weapons are proliferating. 

Impact on Economic Development. Many 
developing nations argue that the key solu- 
tion to reducing population growth rates is 
economic development, and it is true that 
economic development has usually — but not 
always — -been attended by drops in birth 
rates. On the other hand, population growth 
rates in many countries make it all the more 
difficult for those nations to achieve their 
economic goals. 

Rapid population growth has an adverse 
effect on almost every aspect of economic 
and social progress. Specifically, it: 

— Lowers per capita GNP growth rates ; 

— Absorbs large amounts of resources 
needed for more productive investment in 
development ; 

— Increases the income disparity between 
rich and poor; 

— Reduces family savings and domestic 

— Absorbs large amounts of scarce foreign 
exchange for food imports (or the loss of 
food surpluses for export) ; and 

— Intensifies unemployment and under- 
employment in many developing countries 
where not enough productive jobs are cre- 
ated to absorb annual increases in the labor 

Virtually all countries have population 
problems of sorts. We in the United States 
are no exception, as the recent report on 
"Population Growth and the American Fu- 
ture" by the Rockefeller Commission points 
out. In the United States, there has been a 
drop in the birth rate to parallel the drop in 
the death rate, so that our rate of increase 
is now only about 0.7 percent (including net 
immigration). But we do have population 
distribution problems so that some areas, 
particularly our larger cities, are showing 
strains in providing government services to 
an increasing number of people within lim- 

April 26, 1976 


ited budgets, have serious pollution prob- 
lems, and seem increasingly threatened by 
crime. We also face some increasingly seri- 
ous issues created by the rapidly growing 
populations of countries to the south of our 
own. Yet our interest is focused most sharply 
on the population problem around the world 
for the many ways in which it will affect 
the entire planet. 

U.S. Approach to World Population Issues 

Perhaps we spend too much time dwelling 
on the magnitude of the population problem 
and not enough time focusing on the real 
question: What can be done about it? It is 
my conviction that something can be done 
about it — otherwise I would not have taken 
on the assignment of coordinating population 
affairs and chairing the newly established 
U.S. Interagency Task Force on Population 
Policy. This task force, which includes rep- 
resentatives of 16 U.S. Government agencies, 
has international (not national) responsi- 
bilities. Its creation exemplifies our concern 
with worldwide population issues. 

It would be dangerously simplistic to sug- 
gest that the many problems I have already 
discussed, like food shortages, environmental 
deterioration, static economic development, 
social unrest, and political extremism, can 
be solved by controlling population growth 
alone. There are many other issues that 
must be taken into account, but population 
problems are deeply involved in them all. 

The U.S. approach to world population 
issues is based on mutuality of concerns and 
respect for the rights and responsibilities of 
other countries in developing their own 
policies and programs. Every country faces 
somewhat different problems, whose solu- 
tions must accommodate to the realities, 
peculiarities, and circumstances of that par- 
ticular country. 

We cannot solve the problems of Asia or 
Africa or Latin America. We can, however, 
help the problem solvers of Asia or Africa or 
Latin America. They are the ones that must 
take the lead, speak up clearly, and commit 
enough of their own resources in dealing 


with their problems. We stand ready to help. 

We also recognize that there is no single 
solution, no simple solution, and no short- 
term solution to the population problem. It 
is one that calls for the combined talents of 
scientists, economists, doctors, educators, 
government workers, and private voluntary 
organizations. Above all, it calls for greater 
involvement of leaders and diplomats than 
there has been over the past several decades. 

The stage has at long last been set for 
more effective action by the nations of the 
world. One hundred and thirty-six nations 
agreed in late 1974 at the World Population 
Conference in Bucharest on a World Popula- 
tion Plan of Action, which calls upon nations 
to establish population policies and to recog- 
nize the right of every man and woman to 
plan the size of their families and to have 
the means for doing so. In short, family 
planning has gained worldwide acceptance. 

Today, many countries have drawn up 
sound population policies and programs. 
Family planning has enlisted the active sup- 
port of many leaders and a great many dedi- 
cated people — especially women working as 
doctors, demographers, midwives, motiva- 
tors, as activists in family planning associa- 
tions, and above all, as mothers. Knowledge 
of family planning is widespread, and means 
of contraception are ever more widely avail- 
able, although they have not yet come within 
reach of most people in the more remote 
rural areas. As a result of these develop- 
ments, there has been a gradual lowering of 
both birth rates and death rates in many 
countries and an actual decrease in popula- 
tion growth rates in some countries. 

Having said all this, success or failure in 
dealing with excessive population growth 
lies, in the last analysis, with decisions and 
actions taken by the individual. What moti- 
vates the individual to have as many chil- 
dren as he or she has? What does family 
planning mean to the poor man or woman 
who sees many sons as the only i'oad to 
old-age security? How do educational levels 
impact on the problem? To what extent do 
better health and nutrition, especially of chil- 
dren, tend to reduce fertility rates? All 

Department of State Bulletin 

these items and many other factors will have 
a direct or indirect bearing on the individual 

Thus, our general contributions to social 
and economic development will, at this most 
liasic level, have a salutary impact on the 
population problem quite apart from their 
other virtues or advantages. But we also 
know that overall development is not likely 
to proceed fast enough to have a decisive 
effect on slowing population growth. Indeed, 
economic growth is sometimes not sufficient 
to keep up with growing population, with the 
. result that per capita standards of living 
:lecline instead of improve. 

The United States, accordingly, welcomes 
iioves that are being undertaken in many 
■uuntries to integrate family planning with 
lealth and nutrition. People are far more 
•eceptive to this approach, which is not 
)nly humane but also cost-effective in the 
ong run, since all three — health, family 
planning, and nutrition — can be served by 
)ne administrative structure, with doctors 
uid especially other health workers in a 
josition to perform all three services. 

The United States also welcomes move- 
ments in many countries of the world to 
strengthen the local communities — usually 
;he village— and to create within that vil- 
age a spirit of social and economic coopera- 
;ion. Among many other advantages, family 
planning has better chances of success when 
t is rooted in community life and when 
Dcople can see within their own visible hori- 
'.ons how limiting family size improves health 
ind economic prospects for everyone in that 

The very permanence of the community 
s an important consideration. National gov- 
ernments come and go. Individuals come and 
?o. But communities go on forever. We all 
know how population programs must con- 
tinue for many years to take real effect. A 
solid community organization also provides 
effective means for group involvement and 
"mutual handholding" as well as for making 
family planning services locally available 
and for monitoring and encouraging their 
I use. 

We recognize the great importance of in- 
creased efforts in the fields of biomedical and 
population sciences research. We will con- 
tinue carefully to coordinate our efforts with 
those of other nations and international or- 
ganizations with a view to finding family 
planning methods that are safe and widely 
acceptable and do not depend excessively on 
expensive medical structures. 

Government and Private Assistance 

In the long run, what we and other donors 
can do to be of help will be minimal com- 
pared to what a country does to help itself. 
Obviously, we cannot give support unless 
such support is requested. Types and 
amounts of support must then be determined 
on the basis of need and effective utilization, 
as well as what the assisted country is doing 
to help itself. 

U.S. population assistance has totaled over 
$800 million in the pa-st 10 years, reaching a 
high of $125 million in fiscal year 1973, de- 
creasing to $110 million in FY 1975. We aim 
to reverse this downward trend this fiscal 
year, though Congress will have the final deci- 
sion. We are seeking to encourage other donor 
nations and international organizations to be 
more generous; and they are likely to do 
more if we do more, as indeed we should in 
terms of this critically important world 

We see this increasingly as an undertak- 
ing that requires the combined efforts and 
contributions of many countries and even 
greater involvement and support for the U.N. 
Fund for Population Activities, the World 
Health Organization, the U.N. Development 
Program, the World Bank and the regional 
banks, and UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund] , 
as well as private groups like the Interna- 
tional Planned Parenthood Federation and 
the Population Council. I want to pay spe- 
cial tribute to the many Americans who give 
their support to private voluntary organiza- 
tions that are doing a great service for 
humanity. ■ 

It so happens that countries facing the 
gravest population issues are the ones most 

I April 26, 1976 


in need of help: not just in family planning, 
of course, but in food, agriculture, education, 
health, and development generally. For those 
who want our help and deserve it, we must 
not be found wanting. We all have too much 
at stake to do otherwise. 

Prospects for the Future 

Ladies and gentlemen, to this formal 
statement of our government's policy on 
world population issues, I wish to add a per- 
sonal footnote. 

I have just returned from a round-the- 
world trip that took me to the big-popula- 
tion countries of Asia. There, in the course 
of six weeks, I visited more villages and city 
slum areas than I did in my 37 years of dip- 
lomatic service. I finally saw the real Asia, 
which had always been there, but I had been 
passing on the other side of the street. 

My travels deeply convinced me that we 
all must pay far greater attention to what is 
happening in the villages of the world, which 
is where most Asians, Africans, and Latin 
Americans live. Already there are dynamic 
stirrings in the villages of Asia for men to 
bi'eak free from apathy and hopelessness 
and for women to break free from the servi- 
tude of endless and mindless childbearing. 

There are the beginnings of wide interest 
in I'esponsible parenthood ; and in some coun- 
tries, like Korea and Indonesia, family plan- 
ning is actually spearheading community 
development and promoting village political 
life. This is a vast undertaking and yet it 
does not depend on impossibly large sums of 
money — after all, worldwide, less than half 
the cost of one aircraft carrier is being spent 
each year on family planning by all the gov- 
ernments and private agencies of the world, 
donors and recipient nations alike. 

What it does require is the involvement 
of people in solving their own problems. Un- 
questionably, the two most encouraging 
things I saw on my trip were: the great 
numbers of people — especially women — in- 
terested in responsible parenthood and the 
opportunities for improving conditions of 
life through strengthening the political, so- 
cial, and economic life of the villages — in 




other words, community development, includ- 
ing family planning. 

I am convinced that while the communitj 
approach may not be the answer, it is ar 
important part of any answer. It is often sur- 
prising what people can do collectively wher 
they are given a bit of leadership and encour 
agement. That will probably have to come 
from the outside at the outset, but it wil 
unlock in many communities capabilities 
that are already latent and only need to bf 

Let me take you finally to the pooresi 
country of Asia, to a country sometimes re- 
ferred to as a "basket case": Bangladesh 
This is a nation of 83 million souls living ir 
the deltas of the Ganges and Brahmaputn 
Rivers — a nation the size of Wisconsin thai 
hasn't got a rock, a stone, or a pebble, for ii 
is all alluvial soil. Our Embassy's fact shee 
will tell you that there are 1,200 people t< 
the square mile, but during the annua 
floods, there are 25,000 people to the square 
mile of unflooded land, which is then sharec 
with even greater numbers of cattle anc 
snakes. Many of these people are condemnec 
to die if family planning is not far mor< 
widely practiced than it is today. The Bang 
ladesh Government knows it and is realistic 
ally seeking to act, though the time is late 

I look back from the extremities of my trij 
haunted by a memory, an ineffaceable mem 
ory, of the visit to a little riverine village ii 
the heartland of Bangladesh. I was sur 
rounded by swarms of children, and I remem 
ber particularly the upturned face of a littli 
girl who never looked away, smiling, and hold 
ing in her arms a baby brother plagued witl 
an eye infection. He kept rubbing his in 
flamed eye with the back of his hand. Bui 
the little girl kept smiling — a madonna oJ 
tomorrow. I can never accept that these chil- 
dren are "basket cases." 

There is hope, but only if there is respon- 
sible parenthood. This is our concern and ev- 
erybody's concern, but it is up to the nations 
and people of Asia and elsewhere to get or 
with the job. 

We stand ready to help to the extent they 
seek, need, and properly use that help. 

Department of State Bulletin 


/resident Determines Import Relief 
»r Specialty Steel Industry 

Follotving is a statement issued by the 
office of the Special Representative for Trade 
Jegotiations (STR) on March 16. 

rR press lelease 220 dated March 16 

President Ford has determined to grant 
Tiport relief to the specialty steel industry, 
imbassador Frederick B. Dent, the Presi- 
ent's Special Representative for Trade Ne- 
otiations, announced on March 16. This is 
lie first affirmative action taken under the 
scape clause provisions of the Trade Act of 

The United Steelworkers of America and 
tie Tool and Stainless Steel Industry Com- 
littee petitioned the U.S. International 
(rade Commission (USITC) on July 16, 1975, 
or import relief. On January 16, 1976, the 
rSITC found that the industry was seriously 
Bjured substantially due to increased im- 
orts. During most of 1975, 25 percent or 
acre of the industry's 30,000-person woi-k 
orce was laid off, and less than half of the 
ttdustry's production capacity was utilized, 
ausing profits to plummet. At the same time 
mports rose slightly in tonnage terms and 
ignificantly increased their share of the U.S. 

The President has directed the Special 
;epresentative for Trade Negotiations to 
ttempt to negotiate orderly marketing 
greements with key supplying countries for 
pecialty steel products covered by the 
ISITC's affirmative finding of injury. It is 
itended that these agreements limit im- 
orts over a three-year period while the do- 
lestic specialty steel industry recovers from 
ne high unemployment and depressed oper- 
ting levels of 1975. Should orderly market- 
Qg agreements not be negotiated success- 
ully, the President will proclaim import 
uotas for a period of three years to take 
ffect no later than June 14, 1976. Such 
[uotas would be set at overall levels com- 
larable to those recommended by the USITC. 

This should be sufficient for the industry 

to recover a healthy employment and profit 
position. Relief will be reduced or discon- 
tinued when the President determines, with 
the advice of the USITC and the Secretaries 
of Commerce and Labor, that this recovery 
is taking place. 

International consultations have been re- 
quested by the United States in the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] to discuss the problems of our 
specialty steel industry and the proposed 
U.S. actions. The United States has notified 
the specialty steel case under the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and it is 
expected that consultations will take place 
under the provisions of the GATT. Bilateral 
discussions with key supplying countries are 
being initiated. 

In recognition of the special problems of 
the specialty and carbon steel industry, the 
President has directed the Special Represent- 
ative for Trade Negotiations, in the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations, to negotiate on a 
sectoral basis solutions to the problems of 
cyclical distortions in steel trade, while liber- 
alizing the conditions of this trade. 

Finally, the President has directed the Sec- 
retary of Labor to expedite processing of 
trade adjustment assistance petitions, to as- 
sist the large number of unemployed spe- 
cialty steel workers. About 3,400 of 8,500 
workers laid off are already eligible for such 

The decision not to implement at this time 
the USITC's proposed remedy of quotas for 
the next five years is based on several con- 
siderations. This remedy is too inflexible in 
view of the rapid expansions and contrac- 
tions of the specialty steel market and is not 
well suited to the needs of the industry dur- 
ing recovery from a recession period. The 
U.S. Government also desires to avoid uni- 
lateral restrictive action by trying to re- 
solve specialty steel import problems through 
agreements with the other major nations in- 
volved. In this manner, the disruption to 
trade can be reduced and the special concerns 
of other nations can be taken into account, 
while the injury to the domestic industry is 

Vpril 26, 1976 



Standardization of NATO Equipment 
Discussed by Department 

Following is a statement by James E. 
Goodby, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico- 
Military Affairs, made before the Subcom- 
mittees on Research and Development and on 
Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Armed Services on March 31} 

I welcome this opportunity to meet witli 
the distinguished members of this committee 
and with our friends from various European 
parhaments in an exchange of views on 
NATO rationalization, standardization, and 
interoperability. My prepared statement deals 
mainly with the foreign policy aspects of 
these issues. 

A set of events is now in motion which 
could have a profound effect on NATO's de- 
fense capabilities in the future. In the face 
of intransigent budgetary realities, we can- 
not afford to let NATO's defense efforts 
continue as a collection of individual national 
eft'orts. Business as usual will not counter the 
erosion. Clearly rationalization, standardiza- 
tion, and interoperability are ideas whose 
time has come. 

The development of U.S. policy on ration- 
alization, standardization, and interoper- 
ability represents bipartisan statesmanship 
between the executive branch and the Con- 
gress reminiscent of the Vandenberg era, 
which spawned NATO. Speaking at the 
NATO summit on May 29, 1975, President 
Ford said: 

A generation after its creation, the alliance wastes 
vast sums each year, sacrificing military effectiveness. 
We have simply not done enough to standardize our 
weapons. We must correct this. We must also agree 

^ The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


among ourselves on a sensible division of weapon 
development programs and production responsibilitie 
And we must do more to enhance our mutual capacit 
to support each other both in battle and logisticall; 
The pressures on defense budgets throughout th 
alliance should by now have convinced each of i 
that we simply must rationalize our coUectiv 

The President also said: 

We must make more effective use of our defens 
resources. We need to achieve our longstanding goal 
of common procedures and equipment. Our researc 
and development efforts must be more than the sui 
of individual parts. Let us become truly one in on 
allocation of defense tasks, support, and productio) 

In the Congress, the so-called Nunn amenc 
ment to the Department of Defense Apprc 
priation Authorization Act, 1974, directe 
the Secretary of Defense to assess the cos 
and loss of military effectiveness resultin 
from failure to standardize weapons i 
NATO. Furthermore, the Secretary c 
Defense was directed to come up with a li? 
of actions to advance standardization i 
NATO and submit an annual report to tli 
Congress on the subject. 

The so-called Culver-Nunn amendment t 
the Department of Defense Appropriatio 
Authorization Act, 1976, states in sectio 
814 (a) : 

It is the sense of the Congress that equipmen 
procedures, ammunition, fuel and other militar 
impedimenta for land, air and naval forces of tl 
United States stationed in Europe under the tern 
of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardize 
or made interoperable with that of other member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to th 
maximum extent feasible. In carrying out such polio 
the Secretary of Defense shall, to the maximui 
feasible extent, initiate and carry out procuremeii 
procedures that provide for the acquisition of equi]; 
ment which is standardized or interoperable wit 
equipment of other members of the North Atlanti 
Treaty Organization whenever such equipment i 
designed primarily to be used by personnel of th 
Armed Forces of the United States stationed i 
Europe under the terms of the North Atlantic Treat} 

Department of State Bulletii 

Clearly the Congress has laid the keel upon 
fhkh tlie U.S. rationalization, standardiza- 
ion, and interoperability policy has been 

; Drawing on the policy basis that I have 
ist outlined, the Administration has opened 
;. dialogue with our NATO allies aimed at 
eveloping agreed procedures and a program 
f action. Early last fall, we proposed that 
ork begin in NATO on the development of 

set of guidelines on standardization to 
hich all members could adhere. In effect, 
e viewed agreed guidelines as forming 
le "rules of the game." The types of issues 
id considerations which we suggested might 
; incorporated in such guidelines included 
le following: 

— Military benefits that would result from 

eater standardization, interoperability, and 

^xibility among allied forces. 

— Standardization as a long-term commit- 


— Coproduction of standard systems, with 

least one production line in the United 
ates and one in Europe in most cases; but 
hen coproduction doesn't make sense, facili- 
te direct purchases. 

-Rationalizing the European defense pro- 
iction base, including the need to rationalize 
uropean R. & D. [research and develop- 
ent], seek economies of scale in production, 
id avoid protectionism as a way to prop up 
efficient industries. 

— Harmonization of weapons requirements 
id military doctrine. 
I — Early identification of opportunities for 
iiandardization and the need for long-term 

& D. planning. 

We emphasized the importance of a mech- 
lism which included France to address these 
sues and suggested that a senior ad hoc 
mmittee working closely under the North 
tlantic Council prepare basic principles and 
lidelines for ministerial consideration in 
ecember, looking forward to development of 
more specific plan of action that would be 
aproved by ministers in the spring. We in- 
cated that the initiative for rationalizing 
uropean defense production efforts within 

the alliance rested with the Europeans. 

At the same time the United States was pre- 
paring its initiative, the Eurogroup members 
(the European aUies less Iceland, Portugal, 
and France) were attempting to organize 
themselves on issues of procurement and pro- 
duction and also include France in the process. 
Meeting in The Hague on November 5, 1975, 
Eurogroup defense ministers agreed to 
establish a European defense procurement 
secretariat, to seek to establish armaments 
collaboration in an independent forum open 
to all European members of the alliance, and 
to open a dialogue with the United States 
and Canada with a view to developing specific 
proposals for transatlantic cooperation. 

At the NATO ministerial meetings in 
December 1975, we agreed with our allies to 
set aside our initiative temporarily to give 
the European allies an opportunity to coordi- 
nate among themselves on a European basis 
first. Subsequently, the members of Euro- 
group, together with France, met in Rome on 
February 2 and established an Independent 
European Program Group, which is working 
toward harmonizing national equipment 
schedules and replacement dates, reaching 
agreement on joint projects, and eliminating 
duplication of development efforts. 

We are sympathetic to such European 
efforts to rationalize their defense procure- 
ment and production. We also believe such 
efforts should ultimately serve to strengthen 
overall alliance defense. We await with in- 
terest a fuller elaboration of the views of the 
Independent European Program Group's plan 
of action and expect that relevant discus- 
sions with the United States and other allies 
will take place as the program and its objec- 
tives become more clear. 

We also believe that it is important to 
take advantage of the current high-level in- 
terest and political momentum for ration- 
alization, standardization, and interopera- 
bility and resume, at an appropriate time 
when our allies are prepared and willing, a 
discussion within NATO of the broad aspects 
of the subject matter, aimed at more clearly 
defining a possible framework for trans- 
atlantic cooperation. 

pril 26, 1976 


Currently in NATO, efforts are being con- 
centrated on interoperability. While in some 
ways interoperability is more involved with 
"nuts and bolts" and conceptually less dra- 
matic than standardization, nevertheless it 
does offer the most immediate opportunity 
for achieving real progress. I might add that 
this work is being vigorously pursued in the 
North Atlantic Council with full participation 
of all members and with strong endorsement 
from the United States. 

In sum, rationalization, standardization, 
and interoperability can make an important 
contribution by improving the military 
effectiveness of the alliance. Additionally, 
actions in these areas provide a strong sense 
of cohesion on the political side which in the 
long term may be equally important. 

Security Relations With South Korea 
Discussed by Department 

FoUowing is a statement by Philip C. 
Habib, Assistant Secretary for East Asian 
and Pacific Affairs, made before the Sub- 
committee on Foreign Assistance of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
April 8.^ 

I welcome this opportunity to appear 
before your subcommittee to discuss our 
security relationships with the Republic of 

As the members of the subcommittee are 
aware, military tensions continue to exist 
on the Korean Peninsula. Large armed forces 
face each other on each side of the demili- 
tarized zone, and unfortunately the promis- 
ing South-North dialogue which began 
several years ago has withered away. North 
Korea remains intransigently committed to 
unification on its own terms and has em- 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

barked on a major campaign to isolate th< 
Republic of Korea internationally. 

In this situation we believe, however, tha 
with our force _ presence a rough militar; 
balance prevails and that none of the majo 
powers would wish to see a major outbreal 
of hostilities. At the same time, the possi 
bility of a major incident or accident remains 

In the security area, the United State 
has a clear single objective — to preserv 
peace and security on the Korean Peninsula 
In pursuit of this objective we have , 
Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republi 
of Korea and substantial American forces ar 
present there. In addition, we have had ove 
the years a military assistance prograr 
which has supported the efforts of the Repul: 
lie of Korea to strengthen its own ability t 
defend itself. Our policies have been — an 
remain — key elements in maintaining th 
military balance in Korea and in preservin 
peace on the peninsula. 

In the military assistance field, our pre 
grams have changed as the Republic of Kore 
has been able to increasingly bear the ec( 
nomic costs of its own defense. As you knov 
after fiscal year 1976 we will provide ii 
further grant materiel assistance. We hop 
also, if our requests before the Congress ai 
approved, to meet our modernization-pla 
objectives in fiscal year 1977. The Republ 
of Korea has recently embarked, on its ow 
initiative and with its own resources, on 
major force-improvement plan, to be a 
complished over the next five years, to f urtht 
modernize its armed forces. For our part, v. 
expect to continue to request significai 
levels of FMS [foreign military sales] gua 
anteed loans in support of our mutual seci 
rity objectives in Korea. 

While seeking to maintain the militai 
balance on the Korean Peninsula, we h.a^ 
also tried both publicly and privately to n 
duce tensions and promote more durab 
arrangements for peace in Korea. As Sd 
retary Kissinger noted in his November 2 
Detroit speech, we and the Republic of Kore 
desire to move to a more permanent solutioi 
We have proposed a conference including th 


Department of State Bulleti 

Republic of Korea, North Korea, the United 
Jtates, and the People's Republic of China to 
liscuss the dissolution of the U.N. Command 
vhile preserving the armistice agreement. 
\.nd in that context we are willing to con- 
ider other measures to reduce tensions, in- 
luding a wider conference to negotiate more 
undamental arrangements for peace in 

We will not, however, acquiesce in any 
■roposals which would exclude the Republic 
f Korea from discussions about its future, 
md we will not allow our military presence, 
;hich derives from bilateral agreements, to 
e dictated by third parties. But we are pre- 
ared — now — to transform the armistice ar- 
angements into a permanent peace. 

Also as part of our efforts to reduce ten- 
ions on the peninsula, we have publicly 
idicated our willingness to reciprocate 
iioves by North Korea and its allies to im- 
irove their relations with the Republic of 
;orea. And in support of seeking an improved 
ialogue between North and South Korea, 
'e have suggested dual entry of both Koreas 
ito the United Nations without prejudice 
) their eventual reunification. 

The President in his East-West Center 
peech on December 7, 1975, reaffirmed our 
Lipport for the Republic of Korea and noted 
lat the United States was ready to consider 
instructive ways of easing tensions on the 
eninsula. Unfortunately, we have received 

constructive response to any of our efforts 
!'om the other side. 

In the present circumstances, we believe 
ur continued security relationship with the 
epublic of Korea remains a crucial element 

1 maintaining peace and stability on the 
lorean Peninsula and in the region as a 
'hole, including Japan. As you are aware, 
he Government of Japan shares fully our 
iew on the importance of the U.S. security 
elationship with the Republic of Korea. 
'urther, our current security policies sup- 
ort our broader efforts to reach a more 
isting arrangement on the Korean Penin- 
ula, whatever the short-term prospects. 

At the same time, we do recognize the 

problems caused for the United States by the 
domestic policies of the Park government. 
Obviously, the Korean human rights situa- 
ation is an important element in our policy 

We have made clear that we are not happy 
over what has happened recently in South 
Korea. We have strongly and unequivocally 
made known our views to the Korean Gov- 
ernment, both in public and through diplo- 
matic channels. And we have stressed to 
them the unfavorable impact of their actions 
within the United States. There should be 
no doubt about the strong concern of the 
American people and the U.S. Government 
over the human rights issue. It should be 
noted, however, that our basic security rela- 
tionship with the Republic of Korea is not 
an issue between President Park and his 
domestic critics. 

In sum, our Mutual Defense Treaty com- 
mitment, military presence, and military as- 
sistance relationship with the Republic of 
Korea have been and remain essential ele- 
ments in maintaining the military balance 
on the Korean Peninsula. We recognize — and 
this has been the consistent U.S. Government 
position — that the specific level of our forces 
in Korea is not immutable. It is a function 
of the North Korean threat, the ability of 
the Republic of Korea forces {o meet that 
threat, and the prevailing international situ- 
ation. However, in the present period in par- 
ticular, we have stressed our continuing in- 
terest in East Asia and have assured our 
allies that we intend to honor our commit- 
ments and maintain our presence in the area. 
In that context the United States has no 
present plans for significant force reduction 
in Korea. 

We understand that pending fiscal year 
1976 congressional legislation would require 
an annual report on various aspects of our 
security relationship with the Republic of 
Korea. We believe that such an annual as- 
sessment will provide a useful framework 
for both the executive branch and the Con- 
gress in addressing the specific future ques- 
tions relating to that relationship. 

Vpril 26, 1976 



U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution 
on South African Forces in Angola 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Secvrity Council by U.S. Representative 
William W. Scranton on March 31, together 
with the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 


USUN press I'elease 40 dated March 31 

The U.S. delegation has listened with deep 
interest to the statements that have been 
made in this Council on the agenda item that 
is before us. Our delegation welcomes the 
withdrawal of South African troops from 
Angola. The exchanges which resulted in this 
announcement are encouraging both Ijecause 
they suggest that the situation on the fron- 
tier can be dealt with by peaceful means and 
because they mark the withdrawal of a 
foreign military force from an area where it 
does not belong. 

The withdrawal of South Africa from 
Angola can only serve to highlight for the 
international community the tragic fact that 
there remain other, even larger, foreign in- 
terventions in southern Africa. I fully under- 
stand, Mr. President, the appeal you have 
made, and the appeal that has been supported 
by the Representative of Tanzania and 
others, that the Council remember the sub- 
ject of our agenda and focus attention there- 
on. We do not, of course, interpret this appeal 
to mean that this debate should proceed as 
if the end of one case of wrongful inter- 
national behavior in southern Africa should 
somehow blind us to others. 

A number of speakers have already re- 
ferred, quite rightfully, to another case of 
such wrongful behavior : the continued illegal 
occupation of Namibia by South Africa. The 
United States, for its part, continues strongly 

to support the Security Council's resolutioi 
on this subject unanimously adopted o' 
January 30 of this year. The United State 
holds firm to its policy of support for ma 
jority rule in southern Africa. 

But there is still another case of unac 
ceptable international behavior which mus* 
be brought to an end. I refer of course to th 
presence on the African Continent of a larg 
Cuban expeditionary force, now numberin; 
over 13,000 men — an adventure which coul 
never have been begun and could not be con 
tinued now without the support of the Sovie 
Union, a permanent member of this Counci 
It is an adventure which is based on an as- 
sumption that Cuba can introduce itself a 
an arbiter of intra-African affairs, using th 
most modern weapons and a trained e> 
peditionary force to that very end. This i 
a peculiarly and particularly dangerous prec 
edent, not only for Africa but for the entir 

The attempt by the Cuban Representativ 
to distort the tragic history of foreign ii 
tervention in Angola's civil war is a sel 
serving misstatement of the facts, which ai 
themselves by now well known to many ( 
the members and the observers at th 
Council. Cuban armed intervention in Ango 
began long before the date cited by the Cub;i 
Representative, which was November 5. 

Regardless of how you judge the Cub;i 
intervention, one cannot ignore the publ 
statement of Cuban Deputy Premier Carle 
Rodriguez that Cuba dispatched 250 militai 
advisory personnel to Angola in the lal 
spring of 1975. This move coincided with tl 
arrival of massive amounts of weapons su] 
plied by the Soviet Union. Furthemiore, tl 
available evidence indicates that Cuba d' 
cided no later than mid-August 1975 to con 
mit sufficient numbers of combat troops 1 
Angola to impose the movement they su] 
ported as the only government of Angola, 
state this with confidence since we know thi 
during September 1975 five Cuban vessei 
transported around 1,500 combat troops fro: 
Cuba to Angola and that by late October 
least 2,000 Cuban combat troops were d 
ployed inside Angola. 


Department of State Bulleti 

Tin's intervention into an indigenous 
ifrican struggle was occurring at the same 
ime the OAU [Organization of African 
Jnity] Conciliation Commission on Angola 
/as calling for all states to refrain from in- 
ervention in Angola, a call that my govern- 
lent supported. 

From the beginning of the struggle in 
ingola the U.S. Government sought three 
irincipal goals: an end to bloodshed, the op- 
ortunity for all competing factions through 
lieir own efforts to be represented in the 
overnment of an independent Angola, and 
lie cessation of all foreign military involve- 
lent. And just as the end to South Africa's 
rongful intervention is very welcome, so the 
;)ntinuing Cuban and Soviet intervention is 
•rong : 

— Wrong because it deprived the Angolan 
eople of the ability to exercise self-determi- 
ation freely, uncoerced by foreign military 

— Wrong because of its massive size. Soviet 
id to Angola in 1975 and early 1976 far 
xceeded the entire amount of military aid 
3 sub-Saharan Africa from all sources in 

— Wrong because it can no longer be 
elated to any of the alleged purposes it pre- 
jnded to serve. 

— Wrong because of its implications for 
ne future, in Africa and elsewhere in the 

What are the implications of the presence 
f such combat forces in Africa supplied and 
quipped by a great power? 

First, the central development in the en- 
ire history of modern Africa has been the 
mergence of African nations from colonial 
tatus to independence. In area after area, in 
ountry after country of Africa, the end of 
oreign domination has resulted in the re- 
iioval of foreign troops. Proudly, and rightly 
iroudly, independent governments have 
.risen instead. This has been a powerful 
rend in modern African history and a trend 
vhich all friends of Africa welcome and sup- 
)ort. Thus, in Angola the Cuban military 
)resence in large numbers has been and con- 

tinues to be inconsistent with this history, 
with the great traditions of modern Africa, 
and with the firmly stated convictions of 
Africa's leaders. 

Second, the radical departure from modern 
African tradition represented by the massive 
Cuban movement in Angola must be termi- 
nated. The continued presence of Cuban com- 
bat forces in Africa risks establishing a 
pattern of action and competition for foreign 
sponsorship which can fundamentally under- 
mine what has been achieved in Africa these 
past 20 years. The involvement of Cuban 
troops in Angola, if not terminated, can only 
serve to turn back the clock of history to an 
earlier epoch. 

I say this because the United States sup- 
ports African independence. We support the 
principles of nonintervention and of territo- 
rial integrity and of the nonuse of force in 
Africa. President Ford has made clear that 
rapid change is required in southern Africa 
and that tlie opportunity for negotiated solu- 
tions must be seized and moved forward. The 
United States supports majority rule in 
southern Africa. Our dedication to these 
objectives and our friendship for Africa im- 
pels us to point to this continuing anomaly 
of the Cuban presence: 

— We believe the African nations are aware 
of the threat to their independence and 
sovereignty posed by the presence of those 
who purport to be their disinterested friends. 

— We believe they recognize that Cuban 
and Soviet actions are designed to serve 
Cuban, and Soviet, global objectives which 
have nothing to do with peace and progress 
in Africa. 

— We believe the African nations, and all 
members of this Council, know what is re- 
quired: the immediate and total withdrawal 
of all foreign military forces from Angola. 

The United States strongly supports the 
motivations inherent in this resolution that 
is before us for African independence but 
shall abstain from the vote on this draft 
resolution because of its failure to apply to 
other, continuing foreign interventions. 

The resolution purports to reflect a con- 

^pril 26, 1976 


elusion by the Council on the situation in 
Angola and asks for responsive action by 
South Africa. It says nothing whatsoever 
about the irresponsibility of those who em- 
ployed by far the most destructive weaponry 
there. Furthermore, the operative part of the 
resolution unaccountably fails to set forth 
what should be a key requirement: that all 
states refrain from intervening in the affairs 
of Angola. 

Thus, to the extent that the resolution 
reflects the efforts of this Council to deal 
with the problem of foreign involvement in 
Angola, in our judgment it falls badly short 
of that mark. It cites South Africa's unwar- 
ranted violation of Angola's territorial in- 
tegrity, yet the resolution is totally silent 
on the continuing presence of the Cuban ex- 
peditionary force in Angola. Such a blatant 
disregard of facts, such a double standard, 
such an exercise in hypocrisy cannot further, 
in our judgment, this Council's discharge of 
its own responsibilities. Accordingly, the 
United States will abstain on this resolution, 
as strongly as we feel about the independence 
of African states. 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the letter of the Permanent 
Representative of Kenya on behalf of the African 
Group of States at the United Nations (S/12007), 

Having heard the statement of the i-epresentative 
of the People's Republic of Angola, 

Recalling the principle that no State or group of 
States has the right to intervene, directly or in- 
directly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or 
external affairs of any other State, 

Recalling also the inherent and lawful right of 
every State, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to 
request assistance from any other State or group of 

Bearing in mind that all States Members of the 
United Nations must refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 

territorial integrity or political independence of air 
State, or in any other manner inconsistent with th 
purposes of the United Nations, 

Gravely concerned at the acts of aggressio. 
committed by South Africa against the People' 
Republic of Angola and the violation of its sovei 
eignty and territorial integrity, 

Condemning the utilization by South Africa oj 
the international Territory of Namibia to mount thai 

Gravely concerned also at the damage an( 
destruction done by the South African invadinj 
forces in Angola and by their seizure of Angola! 
equipment and materials, 

Xofing the letter of the Permanent Representativ 
of South Africa regarding the withdrawal of Souti 
African troops (S/12026), 


1. Condemns South Africa's aggression agains 

the People's Republic of Angola; 

2. Demands that South Africa scrupulously respeo 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrif 
of the People's Republic of Angola; 

3. Demands also that South Africa desist from th 
utilization of the international Territory of Namibi 
to mount provocative or aggressive acts against th 
People's Republic of Angola or any other neighboui 
ing African State; 

4. Calls upon the Government of South Africa t 
meet the just claims of the People's Republic c 
Angola for a full compensation for the damage an 
destruction inflicted on its State and for the restoi 
ation of the equipment and materials which il 
invading forces seized; 

5. Reqtiests the Secretary-General to follow th 
implementation of this resolution. 


'U.N. doc. S/RES/387 (1976); adopted by the 
Council on Mar. 31 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 5 absten- 
tions (France, Italy, Japan, U.K., U.S.); the People's 
Republic of China did not participate in the vote. 

Current Actions 



Amendment of article V of the agreement O' 
September 25, 1956 (TIAS 4049), on the join 
financing of certain air navigation services i 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands to increase th 
financial limit for services. Adopted by the ICA( 
Council at Montreal March 17, 1976. Entered int 
force March 17, 1976. 


Department of State Bulletii 

onsular Relations 

ptional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. 
Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United 
States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 1976. 

iplomatic Relations 

ptional protocol to the Vienna convention on diplo- 
matic relations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. 
Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United 
States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502. 
Accession deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 1976. 

:onomic Cooperation 

greement establishing a financial support fund of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Turkey, April 2, 1976. 


institution of the World Health Organization, as 
amended. Done at New York July 22, 1946. Entered 
into force April 7, 1948; for the United States 
June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 8086. 
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, March 25, 1976. 


strument for the amendment of the constitution of 
the International Labor Organization. Done at 
Montreal October 9, 1946. Entered into force April 
20, 1948. TIAS 1868. 

Admission to membership: Surinam, February 24, 

aritime Matters 

•nendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490), 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974." 
Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, March 30, 1976. 


invention of the World Meteorological Organization. 
Done at Washington October 11, 1947, Entered into 
force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052, 
Accession deposited: Comoro Islands, March 19, 

•jfety at Sea 

mendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 
at London November 26, 1968.' 
Acceptance deposited: Belgium, March 19, 1976. 


;temational telecommunication convention with 
annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremo- 

linos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 

1, 1975. 

Ratification deposited: United States (with dec- 
laration), April 7, 1976. 

Entered into force for the United States: April 
7, 1976. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973.' 
Accession deposited: Pakistan, March 29, 1976. 


Declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Done at Geneva July 23, 1975. Entered into force 
January 22, 1976; for the United States May 1, 
Acceptance deposited: United States, April 1, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 

trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into force 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Cuba (with declarations), 
April 6, 1976. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 
19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 
1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Signatures: Japan, Portugal, South Africa, Swit- 
zerland, United States, April 5, 1976; Austria, 
Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba (with- declarations), 
Finland, Guatemala, Kenya, Republic of Korea, 
Norway, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(with statement), Vatican City State, April 6, 
1976; Australia, Canada, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Greece, Iraq, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tunisia, 
Venezuela, April 7, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Vatican City State, April 

6, 1976. 
Declaration of provisional application deposited: 
Cuba, April 6, 1976. 
Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 
19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 
1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Sigyiafures: Japan (with reservation), Switzer- 
land (with reservation), United States (with 
statement), April 5, 1976; Finland, April 6, 1976; 
Australia, Canada, April 7, 1976. 

^ Not in force. 

.pri! 26, 1976 


Women — Political Rights 

Convention on thf political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 
7, 1954; for the United Stat<>s July 7, 1976. 
Accession deposited: United States, April 8, 1976. 



Treaty on extradition. Sijf7ied at WashinKton May 

14, 1974. 

Ratifications exchanged : April 8, 1976. 

Entered into force: May 8, 1976. 
Extradition treaty. Signed at London December 22, 

1931. Entered into force June 24, 1935. 

Terminated: April 8, 1976. 


Extradition convention. Signed at Washington July 
12, 1889. Entered into force April 4, 1890. TS 139. 
Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into 

force of the treaty of extradition, signed at 

Washington December 3, 1971). 
Supplementai-y extradition convention. Signed at 
Wa.shington December 13, 1900. Entered into force 
May 2, 1901. TS 391. 
Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into 

force of the treaty of extradition, signed at 

Washington December 3, 1971). 
Supplementary extradition convention. Signed at 
London April 12, 1905. Entered into force February 
22, 1907, TS 458. 
Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into 

force of the treaty of extradition, signed at 

Washington December 3, 1971). 
Supplementary extradition convention. Signed at 
London May 15, 1922. Entered into force November 
3, 1922. TS 666. 
Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into 

force of the treaty of extradition, signed at 

Washington December 3, 1971). 
Convention to provide for extradition on account of 
crimes or offenses against narcotic laws. Signed at 
Washington Januai-y 8, 1925. Entered into force 
July 27, 1925. TS 719. 
Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry into 

force of the treaty of extradition, signed at 

Washington December 3, 1971). 

Supplementary convention to the supplement: 
convention between the United States and ti, i 
United Kingdom for the mutual extradition 
fugitive criminals signed at Washington Decembe 
13, 1900. Signed at Ottawa October 26, 195j 
Entered into force July 11, 1952. TIAS 2454. 
Terminated: March 22, 1976 (upon entry int 
force of the treaty of extradition, signed 
Washington December 3, 1971). 


Agreement for sales of agricultural commoditie 
relating to the March 20, 1975, agreement, wit 
memorandum of understanding. Signed at Port-at 
Prince March 22, 1976. Entered into force Marc 
22, 1976. 

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool an 
manmade fiber textiles and textile products, wit 
annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-ai 
Prince March 22 and 23, 1976. Entered into fore 
March 23, 1976; effective January 1, 1976. 


Agreement on research participation and technic; 
exchange in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Con 
mission LOFT [loss-of-fluid tests] program. Signe 
at Tokyo February 23, 1976. Entered into fore 
February 23, 1976. 


Agreement amending the agreement of June 26, 197 
relating to trade in cotton, wool and manmac 
fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of notes ; 
Washington March 24 and April 1, 1976. Enteri 
into force April 1, 1976. 


The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call 
attention to the following error which appears 
in the April 5 issue: 

p. i51, col. 1: The last two lines should 
read: "there were concrete gains to be realized 
by all." 


Department of State Bulleti 

[NDEX April 26, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1922 

Lfrica. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at New York City . . . 543 

ngola. U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution on 
South African Forces in Angola (Scranton, 
text of resolution) 560 

/hina. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at New York City . . . 543 


lecurity Relations With South Korea Discussed 
by Department (Habib) 558 

Itandardization of NAtO Equipment Dis- 
cussed by Department (Goodby) 556 

luba. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at New York City . . . 543 

Economic Affairs 

he Law of the Sea: A Test of International 
Cooperation (Kissinger) 533 

'resident Determines Import Relief for Spe- 
cialty Steel Industry (STR announcement) 555 

luestions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at New York City 543 

'oreign Aid. Security Relations With South 
Korea Discussed by Department (Habib) . . 558 

(uman Rights. Questions and Answers Follow- 
ing the Secretary's Address at New York City 543 

"<rael. Israel and the United States (Kissinger) 547 

;orea. Security Relations With South Korea 
Discussed by Department (Habib) .... 558 

aw of the Sea. The Law of the Sea: A Test of 
International Cooperation (Kissinger) . . . 533 

lilitary Affairs 

ecurity Relations With South Korea Discussed 
by Department (Habib) 558 

tandardization of NATO Equipment Discussed 
by Department (Goodby) 556 

lorth Atlantic Treaty Organization 

uestions and Answers Following the Secre- 
tary's Address at New York City 543 

tandardization of NATO Equipment Discussed 
by Department (Goodby) 556 

npulation. The World Population Crisis and 
the American Role (Green) 550 

outh Africa. U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolution 
on South African Forces in Angola (Scran- 
ton, text of resolution) 560 

reaty Information. Current Actions .... 562 

'.S.S.R. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at New York City . . . 543 

'nited Nations. U.S. Abstains on U.N. Resolu- 
tion on South African Forces in Angola 
(Scranton, text of resolution) 560 

Name Index 

Goodby, James E 556 

Green, Marshall 550 

Habib, Philip C • 558 

Kissinger, Secretary 533, 543, 547 

Scranton, William W 560 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 5-1 1 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Snbject 

*160 4/5 Robert Strausz-Hupe sworn in as 
U.S. Permanent Representative 
on the Council of NATO (bio- 
graphic data). 

tl61 4/7 North Pacific Fur Seal Commis- 
sion meets at Moscow. 
162 4/8 Kissinger: Foreign Policy Associa- 
tion, U.S. Council of the Inter- 
national Chamber of Commerce, 
U.N. Association of the U.S.A., 
New York. 

*162A4/8 Carter L. Burgess: introduction 
of Secretary Kissinger. 
162B 4/9 Kissinger: questions and answers 
following address, Apr. 8. 

*163 4/9 U.S.-Philippine negotiations on 
military bases to begin Apr. 12. 

*164 4/9 Kissinger: remarks following 
meeting with Ambassador Ham- 
ilton Shirley Amerasinghe, 
President, Law of the Sea Con- 
ference, New York, Apr. 8. 

*165 4/9 Charles W. Robinson sworn in as 
Deputy Secretary (biographic 

*166 4/9 Kissinger: remarks before heads 
of delegations. Law of the Sea 
Conference, New York, Apr. 8. 

tl67 4/9 General index to "Treaties and 
Otlier International Agreements 
of the United States of America 
1776-1949" released. 

*168 4/9 Kissinger: remarks at pi'esenta- 
tion of Edward Weintal award 
to Peter Lisagor. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 20402 


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7^^ 3 



Volume LXXIV 

No. 1923 

May 3, 1976 

Remarks by Secretary Kissinger and Questions and Answers 565 

Address by Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt 576 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1923 
May 3, 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


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Single copy 85 cents 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLET 
a weekly publication issued by 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public i 
interested agencies of the governm 
with information on developments' 
the field of U.S. foreign relations i 
on the work of the Department i 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selee 
press releases on foreign policy, iss 
by the White House and the Depi • 
ment, and statements, addres i, 
and news conferences of the PresiA i ■ 
and the Secretary of State and oi r 
officers of the Department, as well » 
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of the Department. Information ! 
included concerning treaties and in. • 
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United States is or may become i 
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Publications of the Department f 
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ijSecretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual Meeting 
of the American Society of Newspaper Editors 

Following are remarks by Secretary Kis- 
<itiger, together with the ti-anscript of a panel 
li.'^cussion and question-and-ansiver session 
icith members of the American Society of 
yi}('spaper Editors at Washington on April 
l.J. Members of the panel were James Thom- 
son. Jr., curator, Nieman Foundation; 
'^.rnjamin Read, chairman, Marshall Fund: 
i lialmers M. Roberts, former diplomatic 
i'orrespo7ident, the Washington Post; and 
^Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., the Washington Star. 
i<(irge Chaplin, vice president of the soci- 
tij and editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, 
ras the moderator.^ 

'less release 174 dated April 13 

The only point that 1 really want to make 
fcbout the conduct of foreign policy is to 
stress the difference between the analysis of 
'oreign policy and the conduct of foreign 
policy. The analyst has available any amount 
)f time that he wishes. There is no over- 
whelming compulsion to write an editorial on 
my given day. And there are many days 
hat would be happier if such compulsion 
;hat exists were resisted. [Laughter.] But 
;he policymaker has to operate in a very lim- 
ted time frame. His responses very often are 
iloser to those of an athlete than to those of 
i thinker — in the sense that events crowd in 
pn him very rapidly and he has to respond to 
them in a very limited time frame. And I 
would like to emphasize that the overwhelm- 
ng aspect of decisions at a high level is the 
;onfusion as to the state of facts. 

I mention this because there has lately 

' Mr. Chaplin's introduction of Secretary Kissinger 
md the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's re- 
iiiarks are not printed here. 


ay 3, 1976 

been — in fact, over the last decade — an in- 
creasing problem about credibility as between 
the press and the government. And while no 
doubt the government has sometimes misled 
the press, either deliberately or uninten- 
tionally, I think it is important to keep in 
mind that sometimes by giving the best ex- 
planation and the best statement of events 
there is an inevitable element of confusion. 

Secondly, the essence of policymaking is to 
project the future; and with respect to this, 
it is important to keep in mind that when the 
scope of action is greatest, the facts on which 
to base such action are at a minimum. When 
the facts are available, the scope for action 
has very frequently disappeared. 

In 1936, one French division could have 
stopped the German reoccupation of the 
Rhineland, and we would today still be argu- 
ing about whether Hitler was a misunder- 
stood nationalist or a maniac bent on world 
domination. By 1941 we all knew what Hitler 
was, and it was a knowledge that had to be 
acquired at the cost of tens of millions of 
lives. So today when we argue about An- 
gola or about Turkey or about other issues, 
we have to remember we are doing it on the 
basis of projections that cannot be proved 
true when they are made — which is in itself 
an invitation to demagoguery and which in 
any event adds an element of uncertainty to 
the debate. 

And finally, some policymakers are re- 
sponsible not only for the best that could 
happen but also for the worst that could 
happen. They do not have the luxury of pro- 
jecting only the most favorable circum- 
stances of certain events. They must keep 
in mind also what will occur if these events 


do not turn out as was predicted. 

I would apply this to the current debate 
about the advent of Communist parties to 
governments in Western Europe. It is not 
impossible to project favorable scenarios. 
But the policymaker does not have the pos- 
sibility, after the event, of saying: "I made 
a terrible mistake, and I am now going to 
write another book or another editorial." 
His decisions are largely irrevocable. 

Now, with respect to our foreign policy, 
I understand that it has been described as 
acrobatic rather than as architectural; and 
I noticed there are many people who are 
working on taking the safety net away, 
too. [Laughter.] 

It goes without saying that I reject all 
such comments as biased, malicious, or one- 
sided — or all three put together. But if an 
acrobat may make an architectural comment 
[laughter], what we have attempted to do 
was to guide American foreign policy in a 
period of transition between a time when 
American strength was preeminent and a 
period when America will have to conduct 
foreign policy the way most nations in his- 
tory have had to conduct it. 

Through most of the postwar period, our 
decisions in foreign policy — and, to a signifi- 
cant extent, even in defense policy- — could be 
made more or less unilaterally. We were not 
dealing with any country of roughly equiva- 
lent power, nor were we facing a situation 
where other parts of the world — such as 
Europe and Japan and the developing na- 
tions — were gaining in strength and self- 
confidence and had a desire to play a more 
significant role in the shaping of the inter- 
national order. 

And finally, America, after its tremendous 
exertions in the postwar period — the Ameri- 
can public was reaching a point where the 
exclusive assumption by the United States 
of responsibility in the world was no longer 

So, for all of these reasons, we have tried 
to develop a policy which was geared less 
to cycles of confrontation and retreat — less 
to emotional commitments to favorite gov- 
ernments — but we have tried to develop a 

conception of permanent interests. And th 
is a difficult process for the United Stat; 
because all of our traditions tend to run 
counter to it — the idealistic tradition th; ' 
tends to unite us with like-minded peopl 
the pragmatic tradition that waits for 
problem to arise before we deal with it, tl 
legalistic tradition that tries to deal wit 
issues in terms of the framework of into 
national law. 

But I believe that in East- West relatim 
we have had the problem of both contain ii 
the growth of Soviet power and keepir 
open the option of a future not exclusive! 
dependent on a balance of terror, constant! 

In relations with Western Europe ar 
Japan we have had to adjust — and I belie\ 
we have adjusted successfully — to the 
greater self-confidence and the necessity ( 
their playing a greater role. 

In relation to the developing countries, ; 
the seventh special session [of the U.IJ 
General Assembly] and in other, forthcon 
ing meetings, on trips to Latin America ar 
Africa, we will lay out an agenda — all < 
which are building blocks. They cannot I 
completed in any one Administration. An 
if they are to be meaningful, they must 1 
carried out by other Administrations over i 
indefinite period of time. 

We are now in an election year; but \ 
must not create the impression abroad th; 
American foreign policy is subject to tot 
revision at regular intervals, because that 
itself becomes an element of instability. It 
essential that we have a debate, but it is ali 
essential that the reality that the choices 
a nation are not infinite be faced as well. 

And finally, I would like to stress that 
believe that we have gone through a decac 
of national trauma and that sometimes i 
the relations between the press and the go 
ernment the attitudes are those of genera^ 
who endlessly fight old battles over and ov« 
again. What we need in this country over th 
next decade or so, if we are going to complel 
the architectural task that is inevitable an 
that is necessary for world peace, is som 
confidence in ourselves, some compassion an 


Department of State Bulleti 

understanding of the complexity of decision- 

And while I recognize that the relationship 
of the press to government is importantly 
and healthily an adversary relationship, as 
Americans we are also partners in a common 
task and we must never forget that the peace 
and progress of the world depends finally on 
American vision and on American constancy. 

Relationship With People's Republic of China 

Mr. Chaplin: Thank yoti, Mr. Secretary. 
There comes now a question-and-answer pe- 
riod, with questions by our distinguished 
panel here in the front of the room. And if 
there is time later, tve will go to the floor for 

Just to start things rolling, I might ask the 
Secretary if he would comment on hoiv much 
'wposure he's had to the new Premier of the 
People's Republic of China and how long he 
fhinks it might take for that situation to 
<ettle into some form of stability. 

Secretary Kissinger: I have never met the 
new Premier of China, and I have had occa- 
iioi\ to say previously that we really know 
v'ery little more than is publicly available 
ibout the debates that are now going on in- 
side China. 

It is our impression that, as of now, the 
oasic direction of Chinese foreign policy is 
;iot affected by the domestic changes that 
lave taken place there. But we have had, on 
the governmental level, no contact with the 
iiew Prime Minister. 

Mr. Thomson: May I answer, to follow up 
"briefly on that question, by citing East Asia^i 
specialists, both outside the government and 
n-en inside the government, who are begin- 
ning to express a fear that we lost, as a na- 
tion, a precious opportunity to rectify our 
relations with China in a more final sense 
fulfilling the Shanghai com.munique — through 
recognizing Taiwan, through keeping a tacit 
defense agreement and establishing full diplo- 
matic relations ivith the People's Republic. 
All this to have been done while Chou En-lai 
was alive — // possible, certainly before Mao 

passes. Do you feel yourself, sir, some sadness 
about a lost opportunity in that regard, and 
do you think it cotdd be retrieved? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that basic- 
ally the relationship between the People's 
Republic of China and the United States is 
based on necessity. That is to say, we were 
brought together because international trends 
produced a certain compatibility of interest. 

The issue of Taiwan is, of course, impor- 
tant; and the United States stated certain 
principles in the Shanghai communique with 
respect to the issue of Taiwan. But I believe 
that the dominant factor in the relationship 
has been the degree to which we have looked 
at certain problems in international affairs in 
a parallel manner. 

The implementation of the Shanghai com- 
munique has faced problems because of do- 
mestic upheavals here and domestic upheav- 
als in China. But the direction is clear, and 
it will be implemented. So I do not believe 
that that has been a major factor in U.S.- 
Chinese relations. And I believe that the 
trends that are taking place in China, and 
whatever questions there may exist in China, 
depend much more on their assessment of 
our capacity to conduct a global policy that 
understands geopolitical factors than it is 
tied to Taiwan. 

Western European Communist Parties 

Mr. Roberts: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned 
Italy. You have been sounding some alarm 
bells in Western Europe about Communists 
getting into Western European countries. 
And Italy is the obvious instant problem, or 
(dmost instant. I wish you ivoidd tell us a little 
bit about ivhat your policy is. And, especially, 
how do you answer this time the question — 
the reason, it seems quite evident here — that 
Italy is contemplating the entry of Commii- 
nists into the government is that the Chris- 
tian Democratic Party has run out of steam; 
it has become a disaster. 

Noiv, in the old days, ive used to ship sev- 
eral hundred thousand dollars through the 
CIA to CD politicians. This is pretty 7nuch 

iMay 3, 1976 


ove7\ And, furthermore, it is very question- 
able whether it loould do any good. 

How do you bridge, in other words, the gap 
between what you would call the "conceptual 
approach," I guess, of not having Communists 
in the Italian Government and the necessity 
and the desire of the Italian people to get a 
government which will make the economic 
and political reforms that that country so 
desperately needs? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first I think we 
ought to be clear on what I said and under 
what circumstances it was said. I made a 
fairly considered statement on the subject a 
few weeks ago in Boston — which, due to the 
fact that it was not classified, received very 
little attention. [Laughter.] 

I previously met with a group of Ambassa- 
dors in London in a session which was sup- 
posed to generate a free exchange of ideas — 
or, at least, a degree of free exchange of 
ideas as is possible when a Secretary of State 
meets his Ambassadors. But, at any rate, I 
made a number of extemporaneous remarks 
that were designed to generate comment. 
Those remarks have been very widely re- 
ported, and are usually taken as the text of 
editorials and other discussions. Neverthe- 
less, I don't disavow what I've said or I 
would not have said them in this manner for 
publication and for purposes other than for 
getting a discussion started. 

What is the problem with respect to com- 
munism in Western Europe ? As Secretary of 
State, I have an obligation to make clear 
what I believe the consequences of certain 
events are, even if we cannot necessarily 
influence them. I believe that the advent of 
communism in major European countries is 
likely to produce a sequence of events in 
which other European countries will also be 
tempted to move in the same direction. 

This, in turn, is going to produce govern- 
ments with which the degree of cooperation 
that has become characteristic of Atlantic 
relations will become increasingly diflicult, 
in which their own internal priorities are 
going to be away from the concern with 
defense, which will create new opportunities 
for outside pressures and toward a more 


neutralistic conception of foreign policy. 

I therefore believe that the United State: 
must not create the impression that it couk 
be indiff'erent to such developments. In man] 
respects, we cannot affect it. And if any gov 
ernment, if any people, votes in a way tha 
will produce a Communist government o 
admits a major participation of Communist; 
in that government, we will have to dea 
with that reality. But we should not delud( 
ourselves that it would not mark a historii 
change that would have long-term and ver; 
serious consequences. 

Now, how you get social and political re 
form in any individual European country de 
pends somewhat on your conception. Ii 
1948, faced with a similar situation, th' 
Western countries got together with th^ 
United States and developed a program tha 
produced a social and economic change. I 
that does not happen in 1976, then perhap 
the present trends are inevitable. I do no 
believe they are inevitable. And if they ar 
inevitable, I do not believe that they ar 
desirable. And I do not believe that Ameri 
can leaders should engage in wishful think 
ing about it. So when I am asked about thi 
issue, I must point out the serious conse 
quences. If it happens, we will then have t 
deal with it; but it will certainly mark 
historic turning point in Atlantic relatioi 

Mr. Roberts: If my colleagues will forbea 
a minute, I would like to ask you what I thin 
is a corollary to that problem. For many year 
the U.S. Government, long before you got t 
Washington, was very blind to the Sino 
Soviet break, to the general change ivithi^i th 
Communist world, and to the end of Kremlii 

Aren't your )-emarks about Italian Com 
munists and Western European government 
based on an assumption equally open to chal 
lenge, whether one accepts the word of th. 
leadership, for example, of the Italian Com 
munist Party today? Don't we have enoug) 
experience in the development of the Commu 
nist world, socialism and Marxism and Lenin 
ism, or whatever term you want to use, ti 
look at developments like the Italian Com 

Department of State Bullet! 

muniM Party, the differences, say, to the 
French, the Portuguese, and so on? Are we 
just reacting? Are you basing your reaction 
on a lot of old assumptions that might be 
open to challenge? 

Mr. Thomson: And if 1 may just add to 
that, aren't you, in pushing wishful thinking 
as the enemy, giving forth what we might call 
\^' worst case" thinking? 

,J Secretary Kissi)iger: I, of course, have to 
'reject all these hypotheses as being based on 
Ian insufficient knowledge of the facts. 


But seriously, with respect to the first 
question: Are the Communist parties in 
Western Europe dependent on Moscow? My 
analysis does not depend at all on whether 
;hese parties are dependent on Moscow. I 
lon't know whether they follow Moscow or 
lot. Nor does anybody else. 

It is impossible to determine what the real 
onvictions are when public statements and 
electoral self-interest so totally coincide. My 
■oncern is that these parties reflect, first, a 
^eninist internal organization. Secondly, 
hat they would come to power through a 
;et of priorities that would certainly alter 
he domestic priorities of the country in 
vhich they are. And thirdly, at the very best 
hey would conduct a kind of foreign policy 
hat is difi'erent in character from the pro- 
.Vestern foreign policy that has character- 
zed Atlantic relationships. 

In the sixties France was governed by 
'resident de Gaulle, who was sometimes ex- 
tremely difficult for the United States to deal 
vith. But nevertheless there was never any 
luestion that in moments of crisis De Gaulle 
vas emotionally and substantively a man of 
:he West. 

A Communist leader in Western Europe, 
;ven if he is technically independent of Mos- 
:ow, would be in quite the reverse position. He 
night be extremely difficult for Moscow to 
leal with, but I doubt whether in a moment 
)f crisis his attitude toward Moscow might 
■lot be very similar to that of De Gaulle 
coward Washington. That is a change of 
nuance, but that is of great importance. 

Secondly, it makes a great deal of differ- 
ence whether there is an independent Com- 
munist government in Eastern Europe or an 
independent Communist government in 
Western Europe. 

And thirdly, about the "worst case" hy- 
pothesis. We are dealing here with one of 
the situations that I described earlier. No- 
body can prove what the tendencies will be. 
What I predict is my best judgment of what 
is likely to happen over a historic period — 
not in the first six months, maybe not even 
ill the first five years. But if you look ahead 
over a 10-year period, I believe the result of 
what we are discussing here would be that 
there will be a Western Europe in which 
many countries will be in a different moral 
relationship to the United States than has 
characterized the entire postwar period. 

Now, it is not impossible for the United 
States to defend countries like this, too. But 
we would have to do it strictly on balance- 
of -power grounds, on those grounds which 
are most foreign to our national genius. And 
if it is true, which I believe it is, that the 
United States must have ties to at least one 
part of the world that go beyond mere bal- 
ance of power, then I think that this would 
mark a major change. And I would say this 
even though I recognized the merit of what 
you have said, that there may be nothing 
we can do about it, if the people in Italy or 
any other country choose to go a different 

Approaches to Economic and Social Problems 

Mr. Read: Mr. Secretary, absent a Marshall 
plan or anything like it, and absent a percep- 
tion of common danger, which was the thread 
of U.S.-European relations in that earlier 
phase, do you see anything that could be done, 
that isn't being done at this stage, that might 
be called international approaches to domes- 
tic problem solving? 

It occurs to me that there are in these met- 
ropolitan societies ivhich are noiv in place in 
Europe and here, with the degree of affluence 
that does exist despite economic ups and 
downs, that the similarity of problems and 

V\ay 3, 1976 


the lessons that can be learned in domestic 
area after domestic area that ive usually think 
of as having no international tie, would bene- 
fit enormously from some of the problem- 
solving techniques that have been evolved in 
housing, in transport, in cities, in administra- 
tion of justice, and in a gamut of domestic 

My concern is that we seem to be very 
badly structured as a government to realize 
any such opportunities. The large Embassies 
in West Europe with all of the defense, in- 
telligence, and commercial attaches have no 
one that perceives his role as following such 
affairs, not even as reporting on them — the 
science attaches to a very small degree, but 
then they do not know the urban scene here. 
None of the great domestic agencies of gov- 
ernment have a single permanent person in 
Europe — HUD [Housing and Urban Develop- 
ment'}, Transportation. Can the State De- 
partment respond to this, or does it require a 
new approach in kind? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, let me say that 
1 completely agree with you that the eco- 
nomic and social problems that are facing 
Europe are soluble. Secondly, that the insti- 
tutions in many respects exist through 
which they could be approached as the Com- 
mon Market moves toward political unity. As 
these many institutions for cooperative ac- 
tion, including the Energy Agency, begin to 
bite, there will be many opportunities to 
deal with the economic and social problems. 
But it is also true that the significance of 
the economic and social changes and the 
scope of creative actions are not always fully 
understood by governments, including our 
own government. 

The State Department is organized to deal 
with diplomatic exchanges and with — to the 
greatest extent possible, excluding the Sec- 
retary of State from any significant deci- 
sions. [Laughter.] But the basic thrust of 
the State Department, as of any big govern- 
mental agency, is to answer day-to-day 
problems that are generated in the Em- 
bassies or here. 

Now, how one can get a government or- 
ganized to deal with the important in addi- 

tion to the urgent — that I think is a ver 
valid concern. And I have to tell you car i 
didly I do not believe we are sufficiently we 
organized to deal with the range of issue 
that you have raised. When we do deal wit 
them, we are better organized to deal wit 
them with relation to developing countrie 
than with relation to developed countrie; 
And we have managed to come forward wit 
a number of initiatives in the North-Soutji 
dialogue, and we will come forward wit'j 
more in May at the UNCTAD [U.N. Confei 
ence on Trade and Development] meetinj: 
But I have to agree that this is an area tlui 
requires greater consistent attention. 

Middle East Diplomacy 

Mr. Yoder: Mr. Secretary, it seems to m. 
the most striking thing about the things sai 
by your distinguished opposition critics tht 
morning, or the most striking premise, iva 
that the United States was still in a situation 
in which it can define problems in the worli 
and then present its definition for discussio' 
as an agenda. And to this end, on the question 
of the Middle East, it was said that generalU 
your diplomacy, your step-by-step diplomac 
in the Middle East, had taken the problem 
at the wrong end. What should be done, as 
understood the proposition, was that iM 
United States should put forward a plan taU 
ing into account the very long-distance, lon^ 
run objectives for a stable peace in that are 
and then say to the potential belligerents 
active or potential belligerents in that case- 
"Here it is, let's have your remarks on th\ 
solution of the problem." Cotdd you commen 
on that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. First of all, th 
diff'erence between our views and those c 
our critics very significantly concerns th 
question of timing. We have always recoj 
nized that at some point in the peacemakint 
process there would have to be a compreher 
sive approach rather than a step-by-step aj 

The difference between my views an| 
those of my distinguished presumptive sua 
cessors [laughter] is their retrospectivl 


Department of State Bulletil 

lew that we should have done this in 1973. 
low, it can, of course, never be proved what 
TOuld have been the right pohcy in 1973. 
5ut if you look at the conditions of 1973, in 
^hich all of the Arab countries, including 
igypt, were considered to be substantially 
n the Soviet side, in which there were Is- 
aeli armies at the outskirts of Cairo and 
)amascus, in which Western Europe and 
apan were suffering and we were suffering 
rom an oil embargo, in which there was a 
;reat danger that the war might flare up 
gain and the economic dislocations that had 
Iready occurred might become unmanage- 

We thought that it was, above all, impor- 
ant to get the peace process started, to deal 
/ith those Arab countries that were willing 
take a risk for peace, and then as the 
larties gained confidence in the process of 
eace, to move toward progressively bolder 

If we had put forward a comprehensive 
cheme— at least that was our judgment 
nder the conditions that then existed — you 
uist remember also the domestic difficulties 
, hat existed in the United States at that 
eriod. We thought that the danger of its 
ailing would sharpen the embargo, increase 
lOviet domination of the countries con- 
erned, and enhance the radicalism of the 

So we thought it was important to take 
he specific steps that have been taken and 
hat, while of course they have not solved 
he problem, have given us the time in which 
work on a more comprehensive solution. 

I think it is now generally agreed, and 
srael agrees, too, that the time for indi- 
idual steps with individual countries is 
irobably over and that we now have to work 
n a wider canvas. And I think as events in 
^ebanon have proved, we are still the coun- 
ry toward which most of the parties in the 
i Vliddle East look for constructive solutions 
the problem. 

A year or so down the road, whatever dis- 

igreement I may have with the distin- 

^ mulshed panel of this morning as to the 

'Specifics they would put forward in a com- 

prehensive solution, I think the basic strat- 
egy will l)egin to emerge, so we are only 
really debating whether that strategy should 
have been adopted in 1973 and whether time 
was lost or not. I believe that if we had 
adopted it in 1973 the danger of a blowup 
would have been outweighed by anything 
that could have been achieved at that period. 

Mr. Chaplin: I am afraid I have to cut in. 
The Secretary has a tight schedule, and I 
think it is only fair to go to the floor for a 
few minutes and give members an opportu- 
nity to ask questions. 

I remind you of the rule that members only 
may ask questions. You should use the mikes 
which are scattered around the aisles of the 
room, and kindly identify yourself and your 
paper, please. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that I am not an e.tpert 
on anything, I will have to ask this question 
necessarily briefly. [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: I have trouble with 
people with accents. [Laughter.] 

Q. I don't. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Secretary, this morning some of your 
urticidate and presumptuous successors had 
some comments to make about the Middle 
East, Russia, and Panama. In your judgment, 
which of those take priority as overriding 
problems for this country? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe that 
we can really choose among our problems. I 
think the relationship between us and the 
industrial democracies is essential to having 
a constructive diplomacy; that the relations 
between us and the Soviet Union are essen- 
tial for any long-term peace. And I believe 
that the Middle East is sufficiently explosive 
so that it could make all other policies fail. 
And I fear that we cannot set priorities 
here and that unless we can deal with all of 
these issues simultaneously, we may not be 
able to deal with any of them effectively. 

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation 

Q. Mr. Secretary, a few iveeks ago you 
testified before the Government Operations 

Aay 3, 1976 


Committee, and Senator Ribicoff expressed 
concern over nuclear proliferation. As I re- 
call, it was his concern that the United States 
was not working ivith the Soviet Union to 
prevent such countries as France and West 
Germany from peddling )iiiclear material to 
terrorist groups and to emerging nations. 
And I don't think at that time that you fully 
ansivered the Senator's questions. Could you 
ansiver them today? 

Secretary Kissinger: I feel that I answered 
fully, maybe not satisfactorily. 

Q. Could you try again? 

Secretary Kissinger: If I remember Sena- 
tor Ribicoff's proposition, it was that the 
United States should work with the Soviet 
Union to impose upon our West European 
allies certain restraints by making a joint 
agreement to withhold nuclear materials 
and, in effect, establishing a U.S.-Soviet 

I pointed out at the time that during the 
period when the Administration is being 
attacked for being too conciliatory to the 
Soviet Union and neglecting our allies, it 
was not the most self-evident proposal that 
we should now impose a form of nuclear con- 
dominium on our Western European allies to- 
gether with the Soviet Union. And I pointed 
out, and I repeat it today, that this would be 
an extremely fateful step that we are not 
prepared to take. 

Q. How do you propose to prevent the other 
nations from getting the nuclear materials 
tvhich Senator Ribicoff wants to keep out of 
their hands? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are working with 
seven nuclear suppliers at this moment on 
establishing by agreement, including the So- 
viet Union but including also the West Euro- 
pean countries — we are working with them 
to establish certain rules for the transfer of 
nuclear technology. And we have made enor- 
mous progress in that respect. 

There is only one area in which the West 
Europeans and we have not reached full 


agreement yet. And we are going to resun^ 
discussions in June. That area is the estal 
lishment of reprocessing plants in oth( 
countries. We hold the view that they shoul 
be under multinational control. They ;ii 
satisfied if they are under binational contro 
We have agreed, however, on the kind c 
safeguards that should be establishec 
Therefore I believe that with negotiation 
resuming in June, with very great progres 
having already been made so that there ar 
now agreed safeguards, and so that there i 
no longer competition between the seven ni 
clear suppliers about the degree of safe 
guards, we are not prepared to take the fat( 
ful step of making a bilateral arrangemer 
with the Soviet Union to bring pressure o 
our West European allies. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions, sir. Woul 
you, on a scale of one to ten, relate to th 
audience the degree in ivhich President Nixo 
and President Ford have accepted the tvisdoi 
of your counsel? [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: I can't do it on 
scale of one to ten. And besides, I am nc 
reckless. [Laughter.] And I don't kno-' 
whether Rogers Morton will get a recordin 
of what I am going to say. [Laughter.] Bt 
in the relationship between either an A; 
sistant to the President and the Presiden 
or the Secretary of State and the Presiden 
Dean Acheson made a very wise commer 
to the effect that this relationship can wor 
well as long as the Secretary of State alway 
remembers who is the President. 

And the discussions rarely take the forr 
of an issue in which the President has t 
give a yes or no answer. Much more frf 
quently the decisions are shaped over man; 
days and weeks of discussions in which it i 
very hard to say whose idea dominated a 
any given moment. I worked very closely oi 
foreign policy matters with President Nixon 
and I have worked very closely, perhaps evei 
more frequent contact, with President Ford 
And I really find it very difficult to rate i 
on a scale of one to ten. 

Department of State Bulletii 


(ing Hussein of Jordan 
Visits Washington 

King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom 
f Jordan made a state visit to Washington 
{arch 29-April 1, during which he met with 
'resident Ford and other government offi- 
ials. Following is an exchange of toasts 
etween President Ford and King Hifssein 
t a dinner at the White House on March 30.^ 

^eekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April o 


Your Majesties and honored guests: It was 
1 1959 that President Eisenhower had the 
onor of welcoming you, Your Majesty, to 
he White House on your first visit to Wash- 
agton, D.C., and to our country. Fifteen 
rears later, it was my great privilege to greet 
(ou as the first chief of state that I had the 
onor of having at the White House in my 

In that time span, the world political scene 
as changed very profoundly. Yet throughout 
[his process of change, there have been reas- 
Uring elements of stability and constancy 
1 the relationship between countries and the 
eoples of the world. A particularly note- 
worthy example is the friendship and the 
ery great mutual trust between the United 
tates and the Hashemite Kingdom of 

Your Majesties, our people share many, 
aany goals. Together we aspire to economic 
!S well as overall well-being of our fellow 
lountrymen, to the universal betterment of 
luman kindness and conditioning, and to 
iloser cooperation between states. We aspire 
Q the ideals of freedom and dignity for the 

But there is one very special, particular 
roal which we look upon, we both deeply wish 

' For an exchange of greetings between President 
'ord and King Hussein on Mar. 30, see Weekly 
'ompilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 
, 1976, p. 512. 

to attain — it is a just and a very lasting peace 
for all nations and for all peoples in the 
Middle East. Our two countries are deter- 
mined to work together to overcome all 
obstacles that stand between us and that end. 

I believe that Americans are most fortu- 
nate to have you as a very staunch and stead- 
fast friend. I know that you share our hopes 
for peace as well as freedom. You have dem- 
onstrated outstandingly your willingness to 
join us in facing very squarely the great 
challenges of our time not only in the Middle 
East but elsewhere. 

I was extremely pleased to discuss at 
length some of the most complicated and con- 
troversial issues which both our countries 
face in the Middle East. His Majesty and I 
agreed that in addition to the progress that 
peacemaking efforts have achieved so far, 
much, much more remains to be done. 

We are both very conscious of the many 
difficult problems that must be overcome to 
secure a just and a lasting peace. These prob- 
lems will not be solved tonight or even 
tomorrow in our meeting in the morning, 
but we know that they must be solved, and 
we will double and redouble our efforts in 
that i-egard. 

We are jointly committed to persevere in 
the pursuit of peace. We are more than ever 
determined that the negotiating process must 
continue. A settlement must be obtained that 
will fulfill the aspiration of all states and all 
peoples of the Middle East for peace, stabil- 
ity, and human progress. Certainly the 
United States could not hope for a more able 
and honored associate in this historic task 
than His Majesty King Hussein. 

Your Majesty, your determination, your 
courage, your dedication to the cause of 
peace in the Middle East are so well known to 
all of us that any repetition on my part of 
your distinguished accomplishments is totally 

You are no less famed for your personal 
courage, your forthrightness, your dedication 
to the welfare of your people, and for your 
loyalty to your friends. I am proud to salute 

V\ay 3, 1976 


you tonight not only as a statesman and a 
leader, but also as a close personal friend 
and as a friend of our country. 

I must say that I take very special pleasure 
in welcoming another outstanding represent- 
ative of Jordan, Her Majesty the Queen. She 
was once in our country as a student, and we 
are delighted to welcome her as a gracious 
queen whose charm captivates us as it does 
the Joi'danian people. 

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise 
and join me in a toast to His Majesty King 
Hussein of Jordan, a partner in the search 
for peace, a distinguished leader, and a true 
friend of the United States, and to Her 
Majesty Queen Alia. 


Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished 
guests: Thank you, Mr. President, for the 
thoughts you have expressed so eloquently. 
The welcome and hospitality you and Mrs. 
Ford have so graciously extended to me and 
my wife are deeply appreciated. We feel very 
much at home, which is fitting for friends. 

The friendship between Jordan and the 
United States is indeed unique. It stems from 
common values which we both hold dearer 
than life — freedom, equality, honor, and 
human dignity. It has grown during a most 
difficult period in the lives of both countries. 
Friendship deserves a more serious consider- 
ation of those who enjoy it. When there is 
joy, you call upon friends to celebrate. When 
there is sorrow, friends come to comfort you. 
When there is a task to be done, friends join 
together in common effort. There is honor 
and pride in true friendship, as is evident 
here tonight. 

Mr. President, our visit with you comes 
at a time of both joy and sorrow — joy in 
being here to celebrate the 200th anniversary 
of this great nation, sorrow in the knowledge 
tha,t difficulties in our part of the world have 
muDfciplied and intensified. 

Friends share, as we do with you, most of 
the same goals and aspirations, the same 
principles and values. Friends share their 
expectations, too. 

I bring with me on this journey the e 
pectations of the people of Jordan and tl 
entire area that steps can be initiated ar i 
quickened to achieve the goal which h: j 
eluded us for many more years than oi 
would wish to remember — peace in the Midd ■ 
East. We who enjoy the common bond ( ■ 
friendship must make every effort to reac 
this goal while it is still attainable. 

We also share with you an unusual fac 
the names of our founding capitals. Phil; 
delphia was the birthplace of your indepen( 
ence. Philadelphia was as well the anciei 
name of our capital, Amman. The meaniii 
of both was the same— brotherly love. 

It is a custom among Arabs to call the 
closest friends brothers. We would like 1 
siiare this custom with you and to conve 
the best wishes and warmest greetings froi 
the people of Jordan to you, Mr. Presidei 
and Mrs. Ford, and to all of your fello 

Ladies and gentlemen, may I ask you t 
join with me in a toast to the President < 
the United States and Mrs. Ford. 

U.S. and Philippines Hold 
Economic Talks 

Joint Statement * 

Representatives of the United States ar 
Philippine Governments met in Washingtoi 
D.C. March 29 through April 9, 1976 in puj 
suance of the Joint Communique issued las 
December by President Ford and Presider 
Marcos. The Communique called for resump 
tion of talks aimed at enhancing economl 
cooperation between the two countrie 
through measures that would modernize th« 
terms for conducting their economic am 
commercial relations, taking account of th? 
end of the Laurel-Langley Agreement, an« 
giving due consideration to the requirement! 
for the development of the Philippin* 

The Philippine delegation presented ne\ 

'- Issued on Apr. 12 (text from press release 169) 


Department of State Bulletii 

drafts, on trade and on investment respec- 
tively, in response to a draft treaty of eco- 
nomic cooperation and development proposed 
liy the U.S. panel in July 1974. 

The two delegations discussed the main 
points of these drafts and indicated their 
respective positions. 

The negotiations achieved significant prog- 
ress and provided important clarification of 
the interests of each side. 

The two delegations agreed that the tra- 
dition of friendly ties between the Philip- 
pines and the United States would remain 
as the foundation of close and mutually 
beneficial economic relations. They expressed 
their confidence that these relations will be 
maintained and expanded in a manner that 
will contribute significantly to the welfare 
3f both nations as new patterns and needs 
3volve reflecting their growing relations and 
:he increasing complexity of the world's 

Both delegations agreed that negotiations 
ire to be resumed later this year. 

The Philippine delegation was led by Am- 
bassador Wilfredo Vega, Philippine Repre- 
sentative to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
md Trade (GATT), as Chairman, and Am- 
bassador Pablo Suarez, Assistant Secretary 
'or Economic Affairs in the Department of 
^'oreign Affairs, as Co-chairman. The delega- 
:ion included oflficials from the Department 
)f Foreign Affairs, the Tariff Commission, 
he Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Board 
)f Investments, the Central Bank of the 
J'hilippines, the Department of Justice, the 
National Economic Development Authority, 
md the Philippine Embassy in Washington. 

The United States delegation was led by 
Deputy Assistant Secretary Lester Edmond 
)f the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Af- 
:airs of the Department of State. Trade dis- 

cussions were led by Mr. Stephen Lande, 
Assistant Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations, and investment talks by Mr. 
Richard Smith, Director of the State De- 
partment OflJice of Investment Affairs. Other 
members of the delegation included officials 
of the Department of State, of the Ofl^ce of 
the Special Representative for Trade Nego- 
tiations of the Executive Office of the Presi- 
dent, and of the Departments of Treasury, 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor. 

U.S. and Philippines Open Talks 
on U.S. Use of Military Bases 

Joint Statement ' 

General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, met with 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger today 
[April 12] to begin negotiations regarding 
new arrangements between the Philippines 
and the United States for the use by the 
U.S. armed forces of facilities in Philippine 
military bases. 

Following a luncheon given by Secretary 
Kissinger for General Romulo, they met 
with their advisers for a discussion of the 
general principles which should govern the 
negotiations. At this session, the initial 
views of both governments were expressed 
in a cordial atmosphere. The U.S. side pre- 
sented a draft agreement for consideration. 
The Philippine delegation proposed and it 
was agreed that negotiations should be con- 
tinued in Manila in early June after each 
side has had an opportunity to study the 
comments made at this opening meeting. 

'Issued on Apr, 12 (text from press release 172). 

■May 3, 1976 


U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Nuclear Age 

Address by Helmut Sonnenfeldt 
Counselor of the Department ' 

At the dawn of the nuclear age, Albert 
Einstein remarked that: "The unleashed 
power of the atom bomb has changed every- 
thing save our mode of thinking. . . ." 

That did not apply to James Forrestal, 
who deeply understood, and struggled to 
make others understand, the fundamental 
principles of international relations in our 
time — that peace and freedom depend in 
large measure upon the wisdom, confidence, 
and power of the United States ; that this 
power must be ready and usable for all forms 
of conflict; and that the attainment of our 
country's goals requires of Americans a new 
understanding of the crucial relationship 
between military power and foreign policy. 

The relationship between power and pol- 
icy has been demonstrated time and again 
throughout our history by the U.S. Navy — 
from the blockade of Tripoli in 1804 to the 
quarantine of Cuba in 1962 and in the cru- 
cial peacetime presence of our fleets around 
the world today. As Under Secretary and 
later Secretary of the Navy, James For- 
restal saw that, in the words of Churchill: 
"the Navy has a dual function. In war it is 
our means of safety ; in peace it sustains the 
prestige, repute, and influence . . . ." 

As Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal 
was one of that handful of farseeing Ameri- 
cans who, in the early years after World 
War II, shaped the American policies which 
brought a new world order from the chaos 
of war, which promoted a new level of eco- 

' Made at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., 
on Apr. 6 as part of the Academy's James Forrestal 
Lecture Series (text from press release 171 dated 
Apr. 12). 

nomic prosperity, and which helped sustaii 
freedom around the globe. 

Today I want to talk to you about th( 
challenge which confronted Forrestal aiK 
the American leaders of his generation, 
want to explore how and why Americal, 
found itself thrust into a global contest witl^ 
the Soviet Union, how we responded to tha' 
challenge, and how the relationship betweei; 
the two superpowers has evolved over th( 
last three decades. 

America's sudden preeminence on th( 
world scene and its deepening rivalry with 
the Soviet Union were not events for whiclt 
Americans had planned, or prepared. Few ir 
this country, or indeed in any other, hac 
looked into the future with the insight o: 
that most perceptive social and political ob 
server, Alexis de Tocqueville, who as earl] 
as 1835 had written: 

There are at the present time two great nations ii 
the world, which started from different points, bu< 
seem to tend towards the same end. I allude to thi 
Russians and the Americans. Both of them haV' 
gi'own up unnoticed; and while the attention of man 
kind was directed elsewhere, they have suddenl; 
placed themselves in the front rank among the na. 
tions, and the world learned their existence and thei: 
greatness at almost the same time. 

One hundred and ten years after Tocque- 
ville wrote these lines, American and Rus< 
sian soldiers met in Central Europe, ending 
a war which had seen the collapse of nearlj) 
every other major world power. Long before 
this event, however, there were forces at 
work shaping American and Russian socie- 
ties which would in large measure determine 
the shape of the confrontation to come. 

Comparison of the historical development 


Department of State Bulletir 

of the United States and the Soviet Union 
reveals some striking, if partial, similari- 
ties. Both countries developed on the periph- 
ery of European civilization. Both had, for 
most of their history, open frontiers ; and 
both channeled much of their national 
energy and ambition into the move across a 
great continent — we westward, they to the 
east. As these two nations expanded to 
transcontinental proportions, the societies of 
both were transformed by the inclusion of 
peoples of widely varied race, religion, and 
culture. For the people of both societies, 
their distance from the centers of European 
culture was accompanied, and perhaps com- 
pensated for, by a widely felt sense of his- 
;oric national mission — a conviction that they 
tvere the repository of unique virtues and 
/alues to be preserved and promoted. 

Fifty-nine years ago today the United 
States declared war on Imperial Germany 
uid so entered irrevocably into its new role 
IS a great power. President Woodrow Wilson, 
n the message to Congress in which he 
•ecommended this war as necessary to make 
he world "safe for democracy," also paused 
take note of the great revolution then 
weeping Russia: 

Does not every American feel that assurance has 
*een added to our hope for the future peace of the 
vorld by the wonderful and heartening things that 
lave been happening within the last few weeks in 
Russia? . . . Here is a fit partner for a League of 

Thus it seemed for a brief time that the 
oarallel growth of these two great trans- 
tontinental nations would culminate in de- 
i'elopment of similar political institutions 
md social values. But alas, the many actual 
md seeming parallels in the growth of Rus- 

ia and America which I have noted were 
)utweighed by even more profound diver- 
gences, which in the end frustrated the ef- 
'orts of those who sought to bring democ- 

acy and individual liberty to Russia. 

Thus, while both nations had grown to 
mcompass peoples of varied race, religion, 
ind culture, America had done so by the 
■hoice of those millions who had flocked to 

ts shores, while Russia incorporated other 

j(Aay 3, 1976 

peoples by force — through conquest. Amer- 
ica lay on the western fringe of European 
civilization and drew upon the intellectual 
and technological resources of the most 
vigorous and advanced nations of Western 
Europe, even as it profited from immigra- 
tion from the eastern part of the continent, 
whose people contributed their own diverse 
talents and their passion for freedom. Rus- 
sia, on the other hand, had only distant and 
precarious contact with the West. Western 
influence seldom permeated beyond a thin 
layer of intellectuals and aristocrats. 

In consequence, America, the transplanted 
colonial society, was more mobile and open 
than even the most liberal nations of Eu- 
rope, while Russia, the traditional, largely 
peasant society, became, over the years, 
more stratified and rigid than that conti- 
nent's most conservative nations. 

In America, that sense of historic mission 
I have referred to took many forms, from 
"know-nothing" isolationism to Manifest 
Destiny. But whatever its form, the Ameri- 
can people's sense of national purpose was 
derived from a deep commitment to liberty 
and democracy. This devotion to personal 
freedom at home has insured that when 
called upon to play a world role, Americans 
would seek to lead by example and persua- 
sion rather than coercion. 

The Russian sense of unique national 
destiny has also served historically to justify 
both isolationism and expansionism. In 
either case, however, there has been a strong 
element of mystic and visionary Messianism, 
in which the traditional Russian virtues of 
faith, order, and obedience have been empha- 
sized over those of freedom, debate, dissent, 
or inquiry, though these latter could never 
be eradicated entirely. Marxist-Leninist ide- 
ology, which imbues its adherents with an 
almost religious conviction that they are 
part of a historical process whose triumph 
is scientifically determined, has reinforced 
the traditional Russian sense of destiny and 

Lest it be thought that I am commenting 
on Soviet and American historical develop- 
ment only on the basis of hindsight, let me 
once again cite Tocqueville, who closed the 


first volume of his observations on Ameri- 
can democracy, published in 1835, as follows: 

The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest 
to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the 
unguided strength and common sense of the citizens; 
the Russian centres all the authority of society in a 
single arm: the principal instrument of the former 
is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting- 
point is different, and their courses are not the same; 
yet each of them seems marked out by the will of 
Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe. 

The growth of new powers on the periph- 
eries of older societies, and their struggle 
for leadership, is a familiar feature of world 
history even if it takes various forms. Rome 
and Carthage vied to the death over the suc- 
cession to Greek civilization; Christian and 
Moslem societies fought to divide the rem- 
nants of the Roman Empire. In this perspec- 
tive, competition between the United States 
and the Soviet Union takes on a certain in- 

Historical parallels are imperfect, but 
there is one fundamental difference between 
the current rivalry and those which pre- 
ceded it. Today, for the first time in history 
both sides have the capacity to visit almost 
instantaneous devastation on each other, 
and on most of mankind in the process. Thus, 
if this rivalry follows the historical pattern 
of eventual open warfare and is settled by 
force, it will be our own, and history's, most 
catastrophic contest. 

For more than 30 years American leaders 
have had to deal with the Soviet Union with- 
in the growing constraints of this nuclear 

Initially, at the close of World War II, we 
sought to avoid the coming confrontation 
and to build on our wartime cooperation. 
Our hopes were based on an overly optimis- 
tic assessment that shared interests would 
dominate our relations. 

American policymakers and the American 
public were at that time only beginning to 
realize that the total, if temporary, collapse 
of continental Europe as an independent 
source of power and decision held enormous 
implications for global stability. We failed 
to foresee that Soviet security concerns in 

Eastern Europe — a mixture of ambition ai: 
of a historic fear vastly magnified by tb 
trauma of World War II — would impel Mo 
cow to establish a satellite empire in th; 
region. Our understanding of Soviet In 
havior was clouded by the misconceptio 
that in using terms such as "democracy 
and "independence" to describe their pos 
war intentions toward Eastern Europe, th 
Soviets meant what Americans understoo 
those terms to mean. They did not. 

The Policies of Containment 

America's efforts to extend cooperatio 
with the Soviet Union into the postwar ei 
had little prospect of success once it becan^ 
apparent that the Soviets were determine 
to create a chain of rigidly controlled cliei 
states along their western border, serviii 
not only as a buffer against presumed fo: 
eign hostility but as a potential springboai 
for further expansion. 

America's response was to begin erectin 
barriers to further Soviet expansion aroun 
the Soviet periphery. Our earlier efforts 1 
increasingly draw the U.S.S.R. into th 
international arena — through the United N; 
tions, for instance — were frustrated and 1 
all intents and purposes suspended. Contaii 
ment replaced cooperation as the focal poii 
for our relations with the Soviet Union. \^ 
sought to isolate and quarantine, to imper 
the spread of its ideology, and thereby i 
generate pressures throughout the Commi 
nist world for a more moderate and libera 
izing evolution of its societies. 

Containment as a strategy for dealin 
with the growth of Soviet power and tli 
threat of its expansion yielded many lastin 
benefits. With our assistance, Japan and th 
nations of Western Europe were econom 
cally, politically, and socially reborn. Th 
Atlantic alliance was formed and the NAT' 
structure put in place. The world's gres 
industrial democracies achieved a degree c 
common purpose and action unparalleled i 
history. Soviet expansion was successfull 
blocked in both Europe and Asia. 


Department of State Buiietil 

Ill Over the years the hoped-for evokition 
I vithin the Communist world occurred to a 
(8 legree, but far less than had been wished. 
li Those nations in a position to reject Soviet 
Ij lomination, such as China and Yugoslavia, 
ii lid so. Within the Soviet Union and Eastern 
;j Surope some of the worst abuses of Stalinist 
ijl yranny were moderated, and in the latter 

•egion impulses toward greater national 

dentity were reawakened. 

he End of an Era 

But while the strategy of containment 
ould restrain the extension of Soviet con- 
rol over new geographical areas, these poli- 
ies could not remove or fundamentally 
ransform the Soviet system nor prevent the 
ontinued growth of Soviet power and the 
nfluence which accompanied it. Thus, over 

period of 30 years the Soviet Union built 
he sinews of strength and accumulated the 
laval, air, and strategic nuclear forces neces- 
ary to project its power beyond the Eura- 
ian landmass. Internally, the Soviet leader- 
hip, while instituting certain reforms, has 
iken care to maintain its control over all 
spects of Soviet national life. 

By the late 1960's, after more than two 
ecades of cold war confrontation, it was 
vident that the policies of containment were 
y themselves no longer adequate to deal 
'ith this vastly more powerful Soviet Union 
perating in a vastly more complex world, 
hus, for many years after 1945, the power 
alance was essentially bipolar. By 1965 it 
as still largely so in the military sense but 
ad become more diverse in other respects. 
[ot only had China split with the Soviet 
fnion, not only had Western Europe and 
apan gained new vigor; but the process of 
ecolonization had also transformed most 
f the world's Southern Hemisphere, more 
lan doubling the number of actors on the 
iternational stage — and creating new cen- 
3rs of power and influence. 

By and large, these new nations recog- 
ized the dangers of Soviet expansionism 
nd rejected the Soviet domestic order as a 

model. But they also saw significant advan- 
tages in contacts with the Soviets. Many 
sought what they considered temporary ar- 
rangements to obtain Soviet support in con- 
flicts and disputes with former metropolitan 
countries and others, and the Soviets moved 
to exploit these opportunities. 

In any case, most of the new nations did 
not regard the maintenance of the global 
balance of power as something they could or 
should do much about. Their peoples, in 
many instances, shared little of the West's 
political tradition, social values, or economic 
prosperity. Their leaders were for the most 
part not prepared to participate in efforts 
to isolate the Soviet Union or to prevent the 
expansion of its influence by aligning them- 
selves with the West. 

By the latter half of the 1960's the Soviet 
Union — after nearly 50 years of industrial 
growth under a regime committed to the 
accumulation of military strength — was 
finally approaching nuclear parity with the 
United States. With strategic forces in 
rough equilibrium, the importance of other 
forces took on a new importance. The main- 
tenance of the local balance of power in 
places of potential confrontation became in- 
creasingly significant to the global equilib- 

Another consequence of effective nuclear 
parity was that for the first time both the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. had objec- 
tively acquired essentially reciprocal incen- 
tives to avoid a nuclear war; to minimize, 
or at any rate control, the confrontations 
which created the risk of such a war; and 
to find ways that might build some limita- 
tions into the buildup of strategic arsenals. 
The Soviet leaders indicated their readiness 
to pursue these interests with us through 
negotiations, which have been in progress 
for several years now. 

Changes within the Communist world also 
presented new challenges and new opportu- 
nities to Western policymakers. As Commu- 
nist economies became more advanced and 
their societies more complex, they became 
more open to outside influence and needful 

toy 3, 1976 


of outside technology, resources, and mar- 
kets. Pressures for national independence 
and identity, always present below the sur- 
face, asserted themselves more insistently. 

Beyond Containment 

The evolving circumstances I have out- 
lined—the impossibility of effectively iso- 
lating the Soviet Union in a world of over 
100 nation-states, the imperatives of the new 
nuclear equation, and the apparent Soviet 
desire, if not indeed necessity, to put rela- 
tionships with the West on a more secure 
and rewarding footing — these changes mili- 
tated for an updating of Western policies. 

In reexamining their approach to East- 
West relations, Western governments real- 
ized that their basic problem remained the 
continued growth of Soviet power, as well as 
the fundamental difference in values and 
systems between East and West. They 
understood that the capacity to balance So- 
viet power with our own was an essential 
prerequisite for the conduct of any effective 
policy. But Western leaders also saw that 
changes within the Communist world and 
in the world at large required that a second 
dimension be added to the West's strategy 
for dealing with the Soviet Union, a dimen- 
sion based upon limited yet concrete coop- 
eration in areas of mutual interest. 

This second dimension complemented, but 
in no sense replaced, the maintenance of a 
properly balanced power relationship. In 
fact, as I have said, its success depended 
upon the maintenance of such a balance. But 
provided that the West kept its defenses 
strong, this second dimension offered oppor- 
tunities to forge links based on mutual inter- 
est which could over the long run engage the 
Soviet leadership in a network of more coop- 
erative relationships with the West and thus 
provide incentives for restraint. 

Throughout this decade Western govern- 
ments have pursued these two tracks, main- 
taining and, when necessary, employing our 
power on the one hand, while we simultane- 
ously sought through negotiation and agree- 
ment to fashion a more stable relationship 
with the Soviet Union. 


The United States has engaged the Soviet 
Union in negotiations designed to converl 
the incentives for restraining open-endec 
competition in military programs into prac 
tical arrangements that will help maintain ; 
stable nuclear balance. So far this has re 
suited in an agreement limiting antiballistii 
missile defense on both sides and an interin 
agreement placing temporary limits on of- 
fensive strategic weapons. Negotiations on i 
follow-on agreement to put more permaneni 
equal numerical ceilings on these forces con 

The United States has also sought to re 
spond actively to the desire of the Easteri 
European peoples for greater independence 
and more constructive ties with the rest o: 
the world. Since 1969, we have thus insti 
tuted new economic, political, and cultura 
contacts with those countries, at a pace am 
in forms adapted to the particular condition; 
prevailing in each. Through high-level visit; 
such as those of President Ford last year ti 
Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, we havi 
encouraged movement toward normal rela 
tions based on national sovereignty and inde 

At the same time we have worked to re 
duce other longstanding sources of tensior 
The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin ha 
defused a flashpoint which periodical! 
threatened the peace of Central Europe- 
and the world — for 30 years. The Federa 
Republic of Germany, for its part, has take:< 
a leading role in forging new relationship 
with the nations of Eastern Europe, recon 
ciling old differences and improving th 
human condition for Europeans, East am 
West. This is of course an objective we sup 
port and work toward also. 

With our NATO allies we have enterei 
into negotiations with several Warsaw Pac 
governments to reduce conventional forc' 
levels in Central Europe. Given the dispari 
ties in types and numbers of forces, and th< 
different distance involved in any withdrawa 
of U.S. and Soviet troops, the problem w 
face in arriving at a mutually acceptable 
formula for balanced force reductions i; 
formidable. Our objective is to establish i 

Department of State Bulletii 



tommon ceiling on Eastern and Western 

The United States also joined with 33 na- 
Jtions of Europe, East and West, and with the 
Soviet Union, in the negotiations leading to 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe, held in Helsinki last July. As a 
precondition for even entering these negotia- 
tions, the West obtained progress on Berlin. 

In the conference's Final Act it was 
established that hunnan rights are a legiti- 
mate matter for international discourse ; 
Eastern participants gave specific moral and 
[political commitments to make improve- 
ments in this area. In addition the West re- 
ceived Eastern recognition, for the first 
time, of the principle of peaceful change of 
(frontiers in Europe. And the occasion of the 
isigning of the Final Act in Helsinki gave 
lOur President and other Western leaders the 
•opportunity to address all the peoples of 
lEurope — West, East, and neutral — with the 
(message that we seek freedom, independ- 
•ence, security, and a decent life for all of 

These various negotiations have been ac- 
icompanied by a gradual expansion of eco- 
inomic, scientific, social, and cultural contacts 
•with the East. If pursued on the basis of 
ireciprocity and mutual benefit, these can 
•over time provide greater scope for inde- 
pendent action for the countries of Eastern 
Europe while they create a web of construc- 
tive contacts that can give new incentives 
for more responsible Soviet behavior inter- 

The process of creating a more stable and 
constructive relationship with the East is 
neither simple nor easy. We have missed 
some opportunities. 

In the economic area, for instance, there 
has been a tendency in Western countries to 
let the legitimate quest for commercial ad- 
vantage in Eastern markets overshadow the 
need to develop and pursue a purposeful strat- 
egy. This has tended to undercut the influ- 
ence which the economic strength of the 
Western industrialized woi'ld could exert. 

In our own case, the failure of various 
agreements in the trade field to enter into 

force has inhibited our ability to conduct an 
East- West economic policy which could maxi- 
mize our long-term influence. At the same 
time, the ability of the American businessman 
to compete for Soviet business on an equal 
basis has been reduced. But the link estab- 
lished between trade relations and human 
rights issues also failed to advance the 
latter eftort. In fact, earlier encouraging 
trends in emigration from the Soviet Union 
were reversed. 

The Soviet Union has recently created new 
obstacles to the creation of a firmer, more 
constructive, and more enduring relationship 
with the West. In considering the aftermath 
of the Soviet decision to intervene directly 
and by Cuban proxy in Angola, the West 
must ponder the effects of having helped 
to create the power vacuum which opened 
in Angola last year and which the Soviets 
then moved to fill. The Soviets exploited this 
local conflict for unilateral advantage, an 
action inconsistent with any eff'ort to foster 
mutual restraint and more cooperative rela- 
tions between our two countries. 

But these events also illustrate the time- 
tested truth that one's interests will not be 
respected unless they are defended. We 
should not ignore that lesson. 

This Administration has taken steps to 
insure that the Soviets realize that their 
present intervention in Angola is unaccepta- 
ble and that its repetition in other areas of 
Africa or the world will be met with deter- 

The Challenge Before Us 

In the early years after World War II, the 
American public's attitude toward the So- 
viet Union swung from the extremes of 
hopeful trust to profoundest fear and sus- 
picion. In subsequent years, many again be- 
gan to hope that the elements of moderation 
which had started to characterize the East- 
West competition would at some finite time 
lead to the end of rivalry and permit drastic 
reductions in our eff'orts. Today, opinion has 
again reverted to concern over the state of 
the balance of power, though, as the Presi- 

May 3, 1976 


dent has made clear, our power is in fact 
enormous, varied, and fully adequate to 
safeguard our security interests. 

America can no longer afford these swings 
between extremes. After 30 years of dealing 
with the Soviet Union as a competitor and 
as a superpower, American policy and Amer- 
ican perception must, above all, exhibit con- 
sistency and determination. There must be 
a clear recognition that we will be obliged 
to cope with the problem of Soviet power 
for as far ahead as we can see. Decisions 
made and strategies devised today must 
transcend more transitory moods and pur- 
poses so that they can help us shape the 
years ahead in conformity with our values 
and interests. 

As we pursue our national debate, we 
should not lose sight of certain basic propo- 
sitions, on which I would hope all Americans 
would agree. No matter what policies we 
adopt, we should realize that the United 
States and the Soviet Union will be engaged 
in a wide-ranging geopolitical and ideologi- 
cal competition for the rest of our lives and 
for those of our children. Each side will 
retain the ability to wreak vast nuclear de- 
struction on the other, but only at the cost 
of suffering catastrophic destruction itself. 
The Soviet Union will continue to build its 
power and its ability to project its influence 
in the world. 

If we are to preserve our way of life for 
the long haul, the United States and its 
allies will have to retain the capability and 
the will to resist probes in many areas. 
Never must we allow ourselves to fall be- 
hind in the power to defend our interests or 
permit the impression to be created that we 
have lost the collective will to make the 
decision to use it. Yet at the same time our 
continuing rivalry with the Soviet Union 
will go forward in a constantly shrinking 
world, one in which our ever more inter- 
acting economies, environments, and socie- 
ties will give us opportunities — if not indeed 
compel us — to seek common solutions to 
common problems. 

America's challenge is to work within 
these ongoing and basically unchangeable 

elements. If we are to succeed in this long- 
term task of constructing a more reliable 
structure for peace, we are going to have to 
expand our thinking about the U.S.-Soviet 
relationship beyond the black and white 
categories which have characterized Amer- 
ica's debate on this issue since it became an 

Friend-enemy, trustworthy-faithless, co- 
operate-confront — these are the stark alter- 
natives which of course still pervade rela- 
tions, but beyond which we must set our 
sights. Americans must grasp the reality of 
the Soviet Union as a permanent competitor 
— an adversary — and yet also sometimes a 
partner. The Soviet Union, like most na- 
tions, follows its perceived self-interests. 

America must be prepared to cooperate 
with the Soviet Union when this advances 
common interests, confront it when we have 
to — working always toward an overall rela- 
tionship which, in accordance with our high- 
est values, insures a peace that is stable and 
just and gives freedom an ever-growing 
scope. Our policies must over the long run 
seek to establish and maintain a balance 
of risks and benefits that will place a pre- 
mium on restraint. We must insure that any 
irresponsible and adventurous efforts to ob- 
tain unilateral gain and so to tip the power 
balance are subject to tangible penalties. 

The Soviet Union for its part must also 
conduct its continuing economic, political, 
and ideological competition with the West 
within the framework of the imperatives of 
a nuclear age. It must perceive and adhere 
to certain written and unwritten guidelines 
for the conduct of our relations. It must 
know that failure to do so will reverse the 
process on which we have been working for 
several years now and will greatly increase 
both the burdens and risks for both sides. 

The task America faces today, that of 
confronting another global superpower and 
of structuring our relationship within all 
the constraints of a nuclear age, is a chal- 
lenge without historic precedents. Yet there 
seems to me little doubt that a nation which 
conducted the modern world's first success- 
ful experiment in democracy, which ad- 


Department of State Bulletin 

vaiiced the frontiers of human liberty and 
dignity further than any other, which broke 
the secrets of the atom, which helped build 
a new world order out of the ashes of World 
War II, which reached the moon, and which 
now enters its third century of freedom — 
that this nation will continue to demonstrate 
the judgment, the diplomatic skills, the 
moral constancy, the realism but also the 
idealism and the essential unity needed to 
forge a firmer basis for a just world peace. 

Task Force on Questionable Corporate 
Payments Abroad Established 

Following is a statement by President 
Ford issued on March 31. 

White House press release dated March 31 

Recent disclosures that American-based 
corporations have made questionable pay- 
ments during the course of their overseas 
operations have raised substantial public 
policy issues here at home. 

The Federal Government is already under- 
taking a number of firm actions to deal with 
this matter. Full-scale investigations to de- 
termine whether U.S. laws have been vio- 
lated are currently underway in the Securi- 
ties and Exchange Commission, the Internal 
'Revenue Service, and elsewhere. In addition, 
I have directed my advisers in the areas of 
foreign policy and international trade to 
work with other governments abroad in 
seeking to develop a better set of guidelines 
for all corporations. 

To insure that our approach to this issue 
is both comprehensive and properly coordi- 
nated, I am today establishing a Cabinet- 
level Task Force on Questionable Corporate 
Payments Abroad. 

The task force will be chaired by the Sec- 
retary of Commei-ce, Elliott Richardson, and 
it will include among its members the Secre- 
taries of State, Treasury, and Defense, as 
well as the Attorney General and other 
high-ranking members of the Administra- 

May 3, 1976 

I have directed the task force to conduct 
a sweeping policy review of this matter and 
to recommend such additional policy steps as 
may be warranted. The views of the broad- 
est base of interest groups and individuals 
are to be solicited as part of this effort. I 
have also asked that periodic progress re- 
ports be submitted to me during the course 
of the review and that a final report be on 
my desk before the end of the current calen- 
dar year. 

The purpose of this task force is not to 
punish American corporations, but to insure 
that the United States has a clear policy and 
that we have an effective, active program to 
implement that policy. 

To the extent that the questionable pay- 
ments abroad have arisen from corrupt prac- 
tices on the part of American corporations, 
the United States bears a clear responsibil- 
ity to the entire international community to 
bring them to a halt. Corrupt business prac- 
tices strike at the very heart of our own 
moral code and our faith in free enterprise. 
Businesses in this country run the risk of 
ever greater governmental regulation if they 
illegally take advantage of consumers, in- 
vestors, and taxpayers. 

Before we condemn American citizens out 
of hand, however, it is essential that we also 
recognize the possibility that some of the 
questionable payments abroad may result 
from extortion by foreign interests. To the 
extent that such practices exist, I believe 
ihat the United States has an equal respon- 
sibility to our own businesses to protect 
them from strong-arm practices^ It is in- 
cumbent upon us to work with foreign gov- 
ernments to curb any such abuses. 

From the facts at hand it is not clear to 
me where true justice lies in this matter, 
and that issue may never be resolved to 
everyone's satisfaction. The central policy 

' Other members of the task force are the Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations; the Director, 
Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to 
the President for Economic Affairs; the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs; and the 
Executive Director, Council on International Eco- 
nomic Policy. 


question that needs to be addressed today is 
rather how we can arrive at clear, enforce- 
able standards to prevent such questionable 
activities in the future. That is the key issue 
to which this new task force will direct its 

Expansion of Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board Announced 

Statement by President Ford ' 

Two weeks ago, I announced to the nation 
a comprehensive program to strengthen the 
foreign intelligence agencies of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment. My actions were designed to achieve 
two basic objectives: 

— First, to insure that we have the best 
possible information on which to base our 
policies toward other nations; and 

— Second, to insure that our foreign intel- 
ligence agencies do not infringe on the rights 
of American citizens. 

Today, as an additional part of this etfort, I 
am announcing the expansion of my Foreign 
Intelligence Advisory Board. This Board was 
set up in 1956 in order to provide independ- 
ent, nonpartisan advice on the effectiveness 
of the intelligence community in meeting the 
intelligence needs of the President. Since 
1974, the Board has been composed of 10 
members, all of whom are private citizens. 

I am announcing today that I am expand- 

ing the Board to 17 members, and I am ap- 
pointing the following members to the Board : 

Stephen Ailes 

Leslie C. Arends 

Adm. George W. Anderson 

William 0. Baker 

William J. Casey 

Leo Cherne 

John B. Connally 

John S. Foster, Jr. 

Robert W. Galvin 

Gordon Gray 
Melvin Laird 
Edwin H. Land 
Gen. Lyman L. 

Clare Boothe Luce 
Robert Murphy 
Edward Teller 
Edward Bennett 


' Issued on Mar. 1 1 ( text from White House press 

I am announcing my decision to have Leo 
Cherne serve as the new Chairman of the 

The intelligence needs of the seventies and 
beyond require the use of highly sophisti- 
cated technology. Furthermore, there are new 
areas of concern which demand our attention. 
No longer does this country face only military 
threats. New threats are presented in such 
areas as economic reprisal and international 
terrorism. The combined experience and ex- 
pertise of the members of this Board will be 
an invaluable resource as we seek solutions tc 
the foreign intelligence problems of today 
and the future. 

In developing the nation's offensive and 
defensive strategy to conduct foreign policy 
and provide for the national security, we 
must be able to deal with problems covering, 
the broadest spectrum of activities. 

By strengthening the Board as I have done 
today, and by giving the Board my full per- 
sonal support, I fully anticipate that the' 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will con- 
tinue its indispensable role in advising me on 
the effectiveness of our foreign intelligence 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Urges Approval of Appropriations 
for International Financial Institutions 

Statement by Paul H. Boeker 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development ' 

The current international political and 
economic climate makes these hearings on 
appropriations for the international finan- 
cial institutions particularly important. At 
present we are engaged in an extensive 
North-South dialogue with the developed 
and developing countries. Discussions are 
.mderway on all forms of economic coopera- 
tion and development. Our support of the 
nternational financial institutions is a major 
aart of our commitment to international 
economic cooperation. 

This new era of cooperation began with 
:he seventh special session of the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly in September 1975. In con- 
rast to the confrontational conclusion of the 
sixth special session, the seventh special 
session negotiated and adopted a meaning- 
ful consensus resolution. This session was an 
mportant turning point in the relations be- 
tween developing countries and the indus- 
trialized nations, especially the United 
States. Three months later, in December, 
ministers from 27 countries met in Paris to 
initiate the Conference on International 
Economic Cooperation. 

The focus of both these meetings was the 
aeed for greater cooperation to improve the 

' Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Opera- 
tions of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on 
Apr. 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will 
be published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
iment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

international economic system. A central 
issue in this system is the achievement of 
economic development. 

More than 2 billion of the world's poorest 
people living in over 100 developing coun- 
tries look to assistance, including that from 
the United States, to augment their own 
efforts to attain an acceptable level of eco- 
nomic progress. The developing nations need 
our skills and capital resources to help feed 
their people, assist in training human re- 
sources, attain an equitable participation in 
the benefits of growth, and develop their 
natural resources. The other side of this 
issue is the economic and political impact of 
these developing countries on the United 
States. The United States, for example, has 
increasingly close relations with these coun- 
tries. From them we seek: 

— Cooperation in finding international 
solutions to complex world problems — food, 
energy, population, environment, et cetera. 

— Opportunities for mutually productive 
and profitable investment of capital and 

— Markets for the products of U.S. enter- 
prises — the developing countries now buy 
nearly a third of U.S. exports and supply 
two-fifths of U.S. imports — which create 
jobs for workers on both ends of the trade 

— Raw material imports to meet the needs 
of American industry and American con- 

May 3, 1976 


sumers; the United States buys from 50 to 
100 percent of its requirements of major 
minerals such as tin, bauxite, and manga- 
nese from the less developed world. 

The international financial institutions are 
vital instruments in helping us achieve our 
political objective of developing a stable 
international structure. The funds we have 
requested are urgently needed if these insti- 
tutions are to carry out these programs to 
foster economic development. 

Each of the institutions for which we are 
requesting funds has a unique role to play 
in the process of international economic de- 
velopment. The World Bank Group is de- 
signed to address global problems, while the 
regional banks are structured to deal with 
specific regional aspects of development. 
Each one is a specific instrument designed to 
deal with particular problems. 

The International Development Association 

One of the most serious development prob- 
lems we face is the dilemma of the poorest 
developing countries. In the past few years 
the plight of the poorest has worsened. The 
rising prices of imported petroleum, fertil- 
izer, and food; the slackened demand for 
their exports to developed countries ; and the 
erosion by inflation of the real value of de- 
velopment assistance — all have dealt severe 
blows to the growth aspirations of the poor- 
est nations^ These nations, with a popula- 
tion of 1 billion and incomes averaging less 
than $200 per capita, on the most likely set 
of assumptions will suff'er an actual decline 
in their per capita incomes over the next 
few years. The effect of this on the already 
marginal condition of life of the poorest 40 
percent within these countries is an appall- 
ing prospect. 

No coherent foreign policy can ignore the 
over 900 million people living on the edges 
of our modern society with incomes under 
$75 a year. This is a problem that tran- 
scends regional differences and which calls 
for the combined efforts of all concerned 
countries. The poorest developing countries 

desperately need additional assistance on 
concessionary terms. 

The institution designed, at U.S. initia- 
tive, to deal with the problems of the poorest 
is the International Development Associa- 
tion. IDA is our principal instrument for 
channeling assistance to the poorest seg- 
ments of the world's population, and as 
such it serves an important foreign policy 

During the negotiation of the fourth re- 
plenishment, the U.S. share was reduced 
from 40 percent to 33 percent of the total. 
Given this reduction in our share, it is im- 
portant that the Congress appropriate the 
funds requested so that we can participate 
in this institution in a manner consistent 
with our foreign policy objectives. 

From our national point of view, IDA en- 
courages development in the poorest coun- 
tries along lines which are both effective 
and compatible with our own economy. IDM 
stresses the role of market forces in the 
effective allocation of resources, the develop- 
ment of outward-looking trading economies; 
the critical role of private enterprise, and 
the importance of spreading development 
benefits to the poorest people. 

The United States is already a year be- 
hind most other donors in contributing tc 
the fourth replenishment, and the fiscal yeai 
1976 appropriation fell $55 million short ol 
our agreed-upon payment for that year 
Such shortfalls call into question our support 
for IDA and unless redressed could endangei 
IDA'S ability to carry out its full program. 
We feel the IDA serves an important and 
necessary function in the framework of an 
interdependent economic system and urge 
support for the full Administration request. 
It is the Administration's intention also to 
seek in fiscal year 1977 the $55 million which 
was cut in fiscal year 1976. 

The International Finance Corporation 

Another aspect of development which re- 
quires a global approach is the need for 
increased access to capital markets. 

In his address to the seventh special ses- 


Department of State Bulletin 

sion, Secretary of State Kissinger high- 
liohted the importance of assisting the de- 
\eloping countries' capital markets as a 
means of accelerating their economic growth. 
To help stimulate this process, he proposed 
a fourfold increase in the capital resources 
of the International Finance Corporation. 
The final resolution of the seventh ses- 
sion gave recognition to the importance of 
capital-market access and to a replenishment 
of the IFC's resources. 

U.S. support of the IFC is based on the 
premise that a vigorous private sector i.; 
generally a critical element in the process 
of economic development. High levels of 
private investment have been a common 
, factor for rapidly growing developing coun- 
tries; for example, in Brazil, South Korea, 
md Taiwan. 

Within the World Bank Group, the IFC 
IS the institution focused primarily on the 
private sector and the only institution able 
;o make equity investments and to lend with 
)ut government guarantees. The IFC needs 
I .substantial capital replenishment, however, 
f it is to play an appropriate catalytic role 
n an expanded efi'ort at private-sector 

Another area where increased IFC involve- 
nent will be possible only with increased 
capital is in the minerals sector. Tight supply 
Droblems and soaring prices for a large num- 
oer of critical industrial raw materials dur- 
ng 1973-74, the example set by the oil 
cartel, and the imposition of unilateral ex- 
Dort controls on selected commodities have 
caused every government to focus on com- 
-nodity issues. Adequate and sustained in- 
k'estment is a key element in assuring reason- 
ible prices, smoothly functioning commodity 
:rade, national economic development, and 
in general a diffusion of the growing politi- 
:ization which more than ever characterizes 
resource issues. With an increased capital 
base, the IFC can use its technical mana- 
gerial and financial expertise to bring to- 
gether foreign private investors and host 
governments in this important sector. 

The IFC and IDA are global institutions 

designed to deal with global problems of 
considerable foreign policy interest to us. 
However, there are regional problems as 
well, and the various regional banks have 
been specially tailored to meet these unique 

The Inter-American Development Bank 

In fiscal year 1977, we are seeking appro- 
priations for the first tranche of the re- 
cently approved replenishment of the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB), which 
includes funds for the ordinary capital as 
well as the Fund for Special Operations. We 
also intend to seek the $50 million which 
was not appropriated in fiscal year 1976. 

The IDB has always been of particular 
interest to the United States because of our 
special ties and common heritage with Latin 
America. These links were underlined ia 
Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to the 
region. The Americas have been partners 
in cooperative ventures almost from the time 
of independence. Together we have led the 
world in building international organizations 
for both collective security and economic 

The economic ties between the United 
States and Latin America are a common 
bond. Nearly a fifth of our imports and ex- 
ports take place with Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Of basic commodities 
we obtain from abroad, we look to this area 
for 34 percent of the petroleum, 68 percent 
of the coffee, 57 percent of the sugar, 47 
percent of the copper, 35 percent of the iron 
ore, and 96 percent of the bauxite. Last year 
we exported over $17 billion worth of U.S.- 
made goods to the region, much of it paid for 
by the long-term improvements in Latin 
American foreign exchange earnings, some 
of it through loans obtained from sources 
such as the IDB. Official borrowing remains 
important in view of the area's enormous 
need for capital goods, supplies, and the like. 

The United States, in addition, has more 
than 17 billion dollars' worth of direct pri- 
vate investment in this part of the hemi- 

May 3, 1976 


sphere. A prospering Latin America can 
benefit the United States. A stagnant Latin 
America would damage substantially our 

As Latin America advances and develops 
greater global interests, the importance of 
hemispheric cooperation actually becomes 
more essential. A keystone of that coopera- 
tion is the Inter-American Development 

The IDB today is the single most impor- 
tant source of official development capital 
for the nations of this hemisphere. Our par- 
ticipation in the IDB is a litmus test of our 
sincerity in proclaiming our interest in Latin 
American economic development. 

I should also note that the authorization 
legislation provides for the expansion of the 
IDB's membership to include a number of 
nonregional donor countries. We welcome 
this development which provides for in- 
creased burden sharing in this important 

The Asian Development Bank 

Just as the IDB underlines our support for 
economic progress in Latin America, so the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) has become 
an increasingly important aspect of our 
relations with Asia. 

The United States is a Pacific power, and 
our history has been inextricably linked to 
Asia. President Ford underlined the impor- 
tance of Asia to the United States during his 
visit last year. 

The security interests of four of the great 
world powers intersect in Asia — Japan, 
China, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States. All have important interests in the 
region. All are affected by economic and 
political changes in other countries of the 
area. It is an area vast in population, rich in 
culture, and abundant in resources. The 
United States has been involved in three long 
and costly Asian wars in the past 35 years. 

We have learned at painful cost that equi- 
librium in Asia is essential to our own peace 
and safety and that no stable order in that 
region can be maintained without our active 

Today more than ever the continent of 
Asia has become an important element in the 
economic strength and progress of our own 
country. Several East Asian countries have 
become major trading partners of the United 
States. U.S. investment in the region has 
grown rapidly in the past decade and has 
further potential. Asia is also an important 
and stable supplier of our raw materials, 
providing nearly all of our natural rubber, 
tin, and coconut oil, and has become a stable 
alternative source of a portion (8 percent) 
of our petroleum imports. 

In order to maintain our political and eco- 
nomic interests in this important part of thf 
world, a fundamental U.S. foreign policy ob- 
jective over the years has been to support 
the establishment of a stable political situa- 
tion. Essential to that equilibrium, however 
is a reduction in historical animosities 
through the development of common inter 
ests and better communication among th( 
nations of the area. Acute population pres 
sures and the effects of the energy crisis am 
the recent worldwide recession must be met 
External threats, insurgency, and subversioi 
must also be faced by several countries. Ii 
this atmosphere we deem it essential tha 
sustained economic growth and progress bi 
maintained. Regional institutions like thi 
ADB can do much to promote such growth 

Providing assistance through the ADI 
contributes to the dual U.S. objective o: 
helping the neediest people to help them 
selves and to maintain peace and stability ii 
the region through economic and ' socia 
progress. But beyond that, the fullest possi 
ble support of the ADB represents an im 
portant signal of American commitment t< 
continued political and economic presence ii 
an area of the world of longstanding impor 
tance to us. Such support of the ADB i; 


Department of State Bulletin 


L'loarly in accord with the principles of our 
policy in the Pacific enunciated by President 
Ford in his Honolulu speech and will be an 
effective demonstration and confirmation of 
the shared interest between the United 
States and the nations of Asia. 

In fiscal year 1977, we are seeking appro- 
priations of $120.6 million for the third in- 
stallment of the first ADB ordinary capital 
•eplenishment, $24.1 million of which is 
to be paid-in and $96.5 million of which is 

In addition, the Administration will re- 
juest $50 million for the first installment 
)f the Asian Development Fund replenish- 
i-nent, as well as a budget amendment for 
^25 million, the portion of the fiscal year 
[976 ADF request which was not approved. 

'he African Development Fund 

The newest of the three concessionary 
levelopment funds is in Africa. We are ex- 
remely pleased that both Houses have acted 
' avorably on our request for authorizing 
■egislation which would enable the United 
States to join the African Development 
i^und (AfDF), and we hope the conference 
ommittee will be able to resolve the few 
lifferences shortly. 

Our relations with Africa have become an 
ncreasingly important aspect of our over-all 
oreign policy. Twenty-five years ago there 
vere only five independent African states. 
^oday African countries comprise more than 
•ne-third of the membership of the United 
•Jations. Africa's numbers and resources 
.nd the energies of its peoples have given 
\.frica a strong and important role in world 

Africa faces enormous political problems, 
n Africa, the Portuguese African colonial 
mpire has come to an abrupt end. The ef- 
ects of that are now being strongly felt in 
Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, and other 

areas of southern Africa. To the north, the 
future of the Spanish Sahara has created an- 
other source of political instability. 

Africa faces severe economic problems as 
well. The effects of the recent world reces- 
sion, exacerbated by the rises in the price 
of oil, have limited the progress of African 
nations in achieving their own development 
goals. In Africa, the job of nation-building 
and regional political stability are insepa- 
rable and must be facilitated with all appro- 
priate means. 

In this regard, the importance of the legis- 
lation to support the African Development 
Fund cannot be overemphasized. Our pri- 
mary purpose in seeking to join the African 
Development Fund is to take our place with 
other donors in providing the financial re- 
sources required by an institution already 
proven effective in the African development 

The AfDF is complementary to our par- 
ticipation in the World Bank Group, which 
also lends to Africa. The World Bank con- 
centrates on larger, more complex projects, 
while the AfDF focuses on small-scale basic 
infrastructure projects and calls on the first- 
hand knowledge and African experience of 
its staff to meet problems unique to Africa. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the inter- 
national financial institutions are becoming 
increasingly important in an interdependent 
world. They will, if adequately supported, 
play an increasing role in supporting inter- 
national development and cooperation. They 
hold promise as institutions that can con- 
tribute significantly to more effective rela- 
tionships between the industrialized coun- 
tries and the developing world and to solving 
economic problems beyond the scope of in- 
dividual nations or private companies. 

In short, the international financial in- 
stitutions, if adequately supported, can serve 
as an important instrument to provide eco- 
nomic and social development worldwide, an 
objective of long-term importance and deep 
significance to America. 

I^ay 3, 1976 


Southern Rhodesia Developments 
Reviewed by Department 

Folloiving is a statement by James B. 
Blake, Depntii Assistant Secretary for Afri- 
can Affairs, made before the Subcommittee 
on International Resources, Food, and 
Energy of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations on April 13.^ 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear 
before you in connection with the commit- 
tee's examination of resources in Rhodesiji 
and the current Rhodesian situation. 

I understand the Department of Com- 
merce has provided you with an overall sur- 
vey of the major resources of Rhodesia. I 
will therefore confine my remarks to a brief 
overview of the current situation in that 

Developments within the last month have 
greatly reduced the prospects for a peaceful 
solution to the Rhodesian problem. 

Negotiations between nationalist leader 
Joshua Nkomo and the Smith regime, aimed 
at reaching a peaceful settlement, broke 
down on March 19 over the basic issue of 
majority rule and the establishment of fully 
representative government in Southern 

In an attempt to revive these talks, the 
United Kingdom on March 22 through Mr. 
Callaghan (then Foreign Secretary, now 
Prime Minister) stated its willingness to 
assist Rhodesia to achieve legitimate inde- 
pendence and to provide financial, educa- 
tional, and developmental assistance under 
certain conditions. The conditions were ac- 
ceptance by the Smith regime of the princi- 
ple of majority rule and agreement that 
elections would be held within 18-24 months, 
no independence before majority rule, and 
no long drawn-out negotiations. 

As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, the 
United Kingdom remains legally responsible 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 


for Southern Rhodesia, still a British col- 
ony, which unilaterally and illegally declared 
its independence in 1965. 

With the breakdown of the settlement 
talks and Smith's quick rejection of the 
British proposals on March 23, the Rho- 
desian nationalists and their independent 
black African supporters increasingly re- 
gard armed struggle as the only way of at- 
taining the goal of an independent majority- 
ruled Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe. 

Even before the collapse of the settlement 
talks, nationalist guerrillas, now located in 
Mozambique along that country's 800-mile 
common border with Rhodesia, had begun 
to step up their cross-border incursions into 
Rhodesia. These have so far been more of 
a harassment than a serious threat to the 
regime. However, they can now be expected 
to increase in both frequency and intensity, 
thereby posing a growing security problem 
for Ian Smith's forces. 

In this connection we estimate that the 
nationalist guerrillas now number some 
4,000-6,000, in various stages of training 
and readiness. Although they are probably 
not yet sufficiently organized or equipped 
to mount a major guerrilla threat inside 
Rhodesia, they already have, as noted ear- 
lier, a capacity to launch short-term cross- 
Ijorder incursions. 

Within the next 6-8 months these forces 
supplemented by additional trained guer- 
rillas, may well be in a position to moun1 
and sustain a long-term guerrilla war inside 
Rhodesia. According to a recent statement 
by the Rhodesian Minister of Defense, some 
700-1,000 guerrillas are currently operating 
inside Rhodesia at any given time. 

Although surrounded by hostile neighbors 
and by South Africa, which has encouraged 
Smith to reach a negotiated settlement, the 
Rhodesian regime seems confident of its 
ability to contain and deal with the current 
insurgent challenge. However, the spread of 
guerrilla activity along the length of the 
Mozambican and Zambian borders or a sig- 
nificant quantitive increase in guerrilla 
numbers could pose a severe strain on Rho- 

Department of State Bulletin 


esia's manpower resources and on the lim- 

t'd equipment the security forces possess. 

Smith seemingly still assumes that if the 
;afety of Rhodesian whites is seriously 
eopardized, South Africa at least would 
ome to his aid — despite South African 
'rime Minister Vorster's repeated state- 
tients that it will not. (Smith may also still 
lope — again, despite clear statements to the 
ontrary from the United Kingdom and the 
Jnited States — for British and U.S. assist- 
nce because of economic interests, assumed 
acial affinities, or concern over allegedly 
xpanding Communist influence.) 

Barring a sudden and, for the present at 
east, unexpected change in the white re- 
:ime's opposition to majority rule, or a 
hange of leadership in Salisbury, the pros- 
lects for the immediate future in Rhodesia 
ire for an escalation of insurgency along the 
•order areas and occasional deeper forays 
nside Rhodesia. The possibility of urban un- 
lest and disturbances cannot be excluded as 
he armed struggle grows. 

These developments will inevitably place 
ncreasing strains on the Rhodesian econ- 
imy, and at some point the Smith regime 
nay be forced by economic as well as mili- 
ary considerations to reconsider its nego- 
iating position on majority rule. 

Although the U.N. economic sanctions 
,iave not had the hoped-for effect on the Rho- 
esian economy, they have had a cumulative 
fleet, reflected by the regime's present poor 
oreign exchange position. The Mozambican 
ction on March 3 in imposing full sanctions 
gainst Rhodesia will further intensify the 
conomic pressures on Rhodesia. At the time 
Ihodesia's rail access to Mozambican ports 
if Beira and Maputo was cut off, it was esti- 
nated that some 40-50 percent of the re- 
rime's imports and exports went through 
Vlozambique — including most of its raw 
nineral ore shipments. Although Rhodesia 
nay try to divert part of this through its 
lirect rail link with South Africa, it is not 
;lear how much additional Rhodesian traffic 
iouth Africa will be able, or willing, to ab- 

The growing isolation of Rhodesia, com- 
bined with increasing security and economic 
pressures, has not yet caused a major dis- 
affection within the white population. There 
are, however, some signs of growing unease. 
Over the past two years, white emigration- 
immigration statistics have shown increases 
in emigration and decreases in immigration. 
Last year, for example, there would have 
been a net loss in the white population had 
it not been for the influx of white Portu- 
guese settlers following Mozambican inde- 

U.S. policy toward Rhodesia has been con- 
sistent. As you know, Mr. Chairman, we 
continue to recognize British sovereignty 
over Rhodesia. We do not recognize the il- 
legal regime in Rhodesia; and we have sup- 
ported efforts of the United Kingdom, the 
United Nations, and others to encourage a 
peaceful negotiated transition to majority 
rule. Both the President and the Secretary 
have clearly and recently reiterated our un- 
equivocal commitment to majority rule in 
Rhodesia. The Secretary has also empha- 
sized that the United States is not support- 
ing and will not support the minority regime 
in Rhodesia. 

Consistent with our long-term policy, we 
have supported and voted for the Security 
Council sanctions against Rhodesia. We co- 
sponsored the extension of sanctions April 6. 

In this regard it also should be noted that, 
with the exception of chrome and other 
strategic materials which are imported only 
because of the Byrd amendment, we have 
fully observed and enforced these sanctions 
and have investigated all cases of alleged 
violations that have come to our attention. 
In the most recent case involving alleged 
violations, four persons in California were 
prosecuted and fined on March 29 for having 
imported Rhodesian African art falsely 
labeled as being of South African origin. 

Since the imposition of sanctions, there 
has been no direct U.S. investment in Rho- 
desia. Residual U.S. investment at that time 
was estimated at about $45-$50 million, 
mostly concentrated in mining activities. 

|V\ay 3, 1976 


Union Carbide and Foote Minerals were the 
major investors. Since the imposition of 
sanctions these investments have been under 
the control of the Rhodesian regime, and the 
U.S. investors receive no benefits from them. 

As you also know, the Administration has 
supported efforts by concerned Members of 
the Congress to repeal the Byrd amendment. 
It is a grave violation of our international 
obligations and has been a constant irritant 
in our relations with independent black Afri- 
can nations. 

Mr. Chairman, there is one aspect of U.S. 
policy toward Rhodesia which is sometimes 
overlooked in the discussion of military 
forces, economic sanctions, and legal ques- 
tions. Since the early 1960's the United 
States has provided educational and train- 
ing opportunities for black Rhodesians of all 
nationalist parties. To date approximately 
200 black Rhodesians have received univer- 
sity training at both the graduate and under- 
graduate level in the United States. An addi- 
tional 300 have been trained at the second- 
ary and postsecondary level, including voca- 
tional training, in various countries of inde- 
pendent black Africa — especially Zambia. 

We believe this aspect of our policy is as 
important as all of the others because it 
looks to the future of Rhodesia when, hope- 
fully, its black and white populations will be 
able to live together, secure in their rights 
under a government truly representative of 
them all. 

Third Progress Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am sub- 
mitting a further report on the progress of 
Cyprus negotiations and the efforts this Ad- 
ministration is making to help find a lasting 
solution to the problems of the island. In 
two previous reports, I detailed the Admin- 


istration's major effort to encourage th 
resumption of negotiations between th 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot commi 
nities. My most recent report, submitted i 
February, indicated that the two sides ha 
agreed to resume the intercommunal negc 
tiating process later that month. That roun 
of talks did, in fact, take place. 

The Greek Cypriot negotiator and hi 
Turkish Cypriot counterpart met in Vienn 
February 17-21, 1976, under the aegis c 
UN Secretary General Waldheim. The mee1 
ings concluded with agreement by the tw 
sides to exchange proposals on the key sul 
stantive Cyprus issues — including control c 
territory — within six weeks. Moreover, th 
parties agreed to meet again in Vienna fo 
lowing the exchange of written proposal 
for the purpose, according to a joint ar 
nouncement made on February 21, of estal 
lishing a common basis before the pn 
posals are submitted to mixed committee 
which will function in Cyprus during n 
cesses in the Vienna-level talks. 

The commitment of both sides to introduc 
negotiating proposals on the key territori; 
and constitutional issues must be viewed a 
a significant advance. Until the recent V 
enna meeting, the two sides had never bee 
able to agree on a procedural formula whic 
would allow the exchange of their respectiv 
positions on these key issues of the Cypri 
problem. That obstacle has now been ove: 

At the recent Vienna talks, the Gree 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot negotiatoi 
also agreed to resume talks in Nicosia o 
humanitarian considerations. To date, si 
meetings have been held which have dea 
with the problem of missing persons, amon 
other issues, and the situation of the Gree 
Cypriots living in the Turkish sector. Ther 
is evidence that these talks are producin 
concrete results. For example, according t 
a United Nations communique issued at th 
conclusion of the March 27 Nicosia meeting 
nine schools will be reopened in the Turkis. 


'Transmitted on Apr. 9 (text from White Hous 
press release). 

Department of State Bulletii 

Bctor on the island to provide for the edu- 
ational needs of the Greek Cypriot popu- 
ition that has chosen to remain in that 

The United States continues to remain 
lert to any opportunity to assist the nego- 
ating process more directly. During the 
scent visit to Washington of Turkish For- 
ign Minister Caglayangil, I emphasized the 
eed for both sides to negotiate in good faith 
3 that progress on the Cyprus problem can 
8 realized as expeditiously as possible. Sec- 
tary of State Kissinger also addressed the 
yprus question in his discussions with the 
'oreign Minister. It was clear from our con- 
ersations that Foreign Minister Caglayan- 
il believes these negotiations should be 
ustained so that the entire spectrum of 
isues can be considered. 
In sum, we are encouraged that the nego- 
ating process has been resumed and that a 
rocedure has been developed whereby the 
ritical issues can finally be subjected to 
Tious negotiations. An important threshold 
as been crossed. Equally encouraging is 
He impetus that has been created to work 
at the humanitarian problems. Now we 
lust all work to maintain and increase mo- 
ientum. We are ourselves again reviewing 
(16 situation to see what more can be done 
I) complement the efforts of UN Secretary 
•eneral Waldheim and the parties, now that 
tie stage has been reached where proposals 
re being exchanged. We will give serious 
Dnsideration to any initiative or action — 
onsonant with the wishes of those involved 
•which would provide greater impetus to 
ne process that is now underway. In the 
'eeks ahead, we will be in touch with the 
arties to explore such possibilities. 

For the moment, we urge that the two 
ides engage in realistic and statesmanlike 
iscussions on the major issues such as ter- 
itory. For our part, we shall continue to 
levote our energies and resources to finding 
just solution to the problems of Cyprus. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 9, 1976. 

toy 3, 1976 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st Session 

Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on 
International Relations. March 6-December 11, 
1975. 233 pp. 

Indochina Evacuation and Refugee Problems. Hear- 
ings before the Subcommittee To Investigate Prob- 
lems Connected With Refugees and Escapees of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Part I: Oper- 
ation P.abylift and Humanitarian Needs; April 8, 
1975; 134 pp. Part II: The Evacuation; April 15- 
30, 1975; 257 pp. Part III: Reception and Resettle- 
ment in the U.S.; May 13, 1975; 145 pp. Part IV: 
Staff Reports; June 8 and July 8, 1975; 191 pp. 
Part V: Conditions in Indochina and Refugees in 
the U.S.; July 24, 1975; 245 pp. 

U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba. Hearings before the 
Subcommittees on International Trade and Com- 
merce and on International Organizations of the 
House Committee on International Relations. 
May 8-September 23, 1975. 653 pp. 

Multinational Corporations and United States 
Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on multinational corporations of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations on political contribu- 
tions to foreign governments. Part 12. May 16- 
September 12, 1975. 1175 pp. 

Priorities for Peace in the Middle East. Hearings be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
Asian Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
. Relations on The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Priorities 
for Peace. July 23-24, 1975. 217 pp. 

The International Legal and Institutional Aspects of 
the Stratosphere Ozone Problem. Staff report pre- 
pared for the use of the Senate Committee on 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences. August 15, 1975. 

143 pp. 

U.S. Foreign Energy Policy. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Energy of the Joint Economic Com- 
mittee. September 17-19, 1975. 75 pp. 

The Palestinian Issue in Middle East Peace Efforts. 
Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on In- 
vestigations of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations. September 30-November 12, 
1975. 293 pp. 

Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy 
Implications. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs of the 
House Committee on International Relations. 
October 21-November 5, 1975. 506 pp. 

Negotiation and Statecraft. Hearings before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Senate Committee on Government Operations. 
Part 4. With Panel on the International Freedom 
To Write and Publish. November 18, 1975. 149 pp. 

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropri- 
ations for Fiscal Year 1976. Middle East Security 


Assistance Program. Hearings before a subcom- 
mittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations. 
November 20-December 16, 1975. 145 pp. 

Human Rights in Chile. Hearing before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Organizations of the House 
Committee on International Relations. December 9, 
1975. 36 pp. 

Women's Political Rights Conventions. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany Ex. D, 81st Cong., 1st sess.; and Ex. J, 88th 
Cong., 1st sess. S. Ex. Rept. 94-20. December 18, 
1975. 7 pp. 

Restrictions on Assistance to Angola. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany S.J. Res. 156. S. Rept. 94-584. December 18, 
1975. 6 pp. 


U.S. Supports Further Sanctions 
Against Southern Rhodesia 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
William W. Scranton on April 6, together 
with the te.vt of a resolution adopted by the 
Council that day. 


USUN press release 43 dated April 6 

This is the first Security Council meeting 
since 1973 convened specifically on the ques- 
tion of Rhodesian sanctions. I welcome this 
meeting because it provides an opportunity 
to further strengthen those sanctions. It 
ofl'ers an opportunity as well to reaffirm our 
strong opposition to the illegal Smith regime 
in Rhodesia and to express the Security 
Council's full support for the urgent trans- 
fer of power in Rhodesia to the majority of 
Rhodesia's citizens. 

For these reasons, the United States was 
pleased to join other members of the Coun- 

cil in cosponsoring and adopting unanimous 
the resolution that is before us. We suppo 
fully the extension of sanctions against tl 
illegal government in Rhodesia to include ii 
surance, trade names, and franchises. 

The United States has scrupulously e: 
forced sanctions against Rhodesia, excej 
with regard to the importation of Rhodesif 
minerals under the so-called Byrd amem 
ment. The United States reports to the S 
curity Council's Sanctions Committee in d 
tail every shipload of these minerals in 
ported into the United States under th 
domestic legislation. 

From its very first days in office, the Ai 
ministration of President Ford has supportt 
the repeal of the Byrd amendment. This co: 
tinues to be U.S. policy. We wish once aga 
to be able to say that the United States is 
full compliance with U.N. sanctions. 

We recognize the need to repeal the Byi 
amendment not only for the intended effe 
in Southern Rhodesia but also in the intere 
of upholding our international obligation 
In the same spirit, my delegation urges tl 
governments of those nations whose maj( 
violations are less well publicized to take i 
appropriate steps to tighten their admini 
tration of the sanctions imposed by Securi' 
Council Resolution 253 (1968). 

The United States remains firm both 
support of U.N. resolutions which have co 
demned the illegal Smith regime and in oi 
commitment to the implementation of tl 
principles of self-determination and majori' 
rule in Rhodesia. The position of the Unitt 
States on this matter was stated most r 
cently by President Ford in Chicago [c 
March 12 in an interview for the Chicaj 
Sun-Times] when he said: "The Unite 
States is totally dedicated to seeing to it th; 
the majority becomes the ruling power : 
Rhodesia." And then the President adde 
this: "If we believe in the right of the m; 
jority to rule in that situation, there has 1 
be a change in the power as far as the go' 
ernment is concerned." 


Department of State Bulletll Kg 

Mr. President, the unanimous adoption of 
this resolution by the Security Council must 
constitute a signal to the Smith regime that 
it cannot expect support from anyone in the 
international community in pursuing a policy 
which is morally and politically wrong. 


in Southern Rhodesia the right to use any trade name 
or from entering into any franchising agreement in- 
volving the use of any trade name, trade mark or 
registered design in connexion with the sale or distri- 
bution of any products, commodities or services of 
such an undertaking; 

3. Urges, having regard to the principle stated in 
Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not 
Members of the United Nations to act in accordance 
with the provisions of the present resolution. 

The Security Council, 

Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 No- 
vember 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, 221 
(1966) of 9 April 1966, 232 (1966) of 16 December 
1966, 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968 and 277 (1970) of 
18 March 1970, 

Reaffirming that the measures provided for in 
;hose resolutions, as well as the measures initiated 
)y Member States in pursuance thereof, shall con- 
inue in effect. 

Taking into account the recommendations made 
)y the Security Council Committee established in 
jursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the 
juestion of Southern Rhodesia in its special report of 
5 December 1975 (S/11913), 

Reaffirming that the present situation in Southern 
Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace 
md security. 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
Jnited Nations, 

1. Decides that all Member States shall take ap- 
)ropriate measures to ensure that their nationals and 
lersons in their territories do not insure: 

(a) Any commodities or products exported from 
Southern Rhodesia after the date of this resolution 
n contravention of Security Council resolution 253 
1968) which they know or have reasonable cause to 

relieve to have been so exported; 

(b) Any commodities or products which they know 
ir have reasonable cause to believe ai'e destined or 
ntended for importation into Southern Rhodesia after 
he date of this resolution in contravention of resolu- 
ion 253 (1968); 

(c) Commodities, products or other property in 
Bouthern Rhodesia of any commercial, industrial or 
)ublic utility undertaking in Southern Rhodesia, in 
contravention of resolution 253 (1968); 

2. Decides that all Member States shall take ap- 
jropriate measures to prevent their nationals and 
jersons in their Territories from granting to any 
;ommercial, industrial or public utility undertaking 


'U.N. doc. S/RES/388 (1976); adopted by the 
Houncil unanimously on Apr. 6. 

Department Releases 1976 Edition 
of "Treaties in Force" 

Press release 104 dated Febniary 27 

The Department of State on February 27 released 
"Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States in 
Force on January 1, 1976." 

This is a collection reflecting the bilateral relations 
of the United States with 167 countries or other 
political entities and the multilateral relations of 
the United States with other contracting parties to 
more than 375 treaties and agreements on 92 sub- 
jects. The 1976 edition lists some 300 new treaties 
and agreements including the biological weapons con- 
vention; the 1925 protocol on poisonous gases; the 
convention on ocean dumping; the international 
energy agreement; the world heritage convention; 
the statutes of the World Tourism Organization: 
the extradition treaty with Italy; the tax conventions 
with Iceland and the U.S.S.R.; the consular conven- 
tion with Bulgaria; and the fisheries agreements 
with Poland and the U.S.S.R. 

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are 
arranged by country or other political entity, and 
the multilateral treaties and other agreements are 
arranged by subject with names of countries which 
have become parties. Date of signature, date of 
entry into force for the United States, and citations 
to texts are furnished for each agreement. 

This edition includes citations to volumes 1 through 
12 of the new compilation entitled "Treaties and 
Other International Agreements of the United States 
of America" 1776-1949 (Bevans). 

"Treaties in Force" provides information concern- 
ing treaty relations with numerous newly independ- 

t^Aay 3, 1976 


ent states, indicating wherever possible the provi- 
sions of their constitutions and independence ar- 
rangements regarding assumption of treaty obliga- 

Infonnation on current treaty actions, supplement- 
ing the information contained in "Treaties in Force," 
is published weekly in the Department of State 

The 1976 edition of "Treaties in Force" (461 pp.) 
is Department of State publication 8847 (GPO cat. 
no. 89.14:976). It is for sale by the Superintendent 
of Documents. United States Government Printing 
Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. for $6.90. 


Current Actions 



Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agri- 
cultural Sciences. Done at Washington January 15, 
1944, Entered into force November 30, 1944. TS 987. 
Adherences deposited: Barbados, February 17, 
1976; Trinidad and Tobago, March 3, 1976. 


Convention on international trade in endangered 

species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 

Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into 

force July 1, 1975. 

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many, March 22, 1976." 

Accession deposited: Papua New Guinea, Decem- 
ber 12, 1975. 


Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Coun- 
cil, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 
1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the 
United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063. 
Accession deposited: Senegal. March 10, 1976. 

Defense — Reciprocal Assistance 

Protocol of amendment to the inter-American treaty 
of reciprocal assistance of September 2, 1947. Done 
at San Jose July 26, 1975." 

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, Feb- 
ruary 18, 1976. 

' Applicable to West Berlin. 
" Not in force. 


Convention on the settlement of investment dispute 
between states and nationals of other states. Dor, 
at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into fore 
October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090. 
Signature: Mali, April 9. 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Cor 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March ( 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 404' 
Acceptayice deposited: Gabon. April 1, 1976. 


Convention on registration of objects launched int 
outer space. Opened for signature at New Yor 
January 14, 1975.' 
Signature : Czechoslovakia, April 5. 1976. 


Telephone regulations, with appendices and final pn 
tocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered int 
force September 1, 1974. 
Ratification deposited: United States, with decl; 

rations, April 14, 1976. 
Entered into force for the United States: Apr 

14, 1976. 

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, an 
final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 197.' 
Entered into force September 1, 1974. 
Ratification deposited: United States, with decli 

rations, April 14, 1976. 
Entered into force for the United States: Apr 

14, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the whe£ 
trade convention (part of the international whe; 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done : 
Washington March 25, 1975. Entered into fore 
June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provision 
and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provision 
Accession deposited: Tunisia, April 13, 1976. 



Loan agreement relating to expansion and improvf 
ment of agricultural research capability in nor 
rice crops and cropping systems, with annex an 
related letter. Signed at Dacca March 29, 197t 
Entered into force March 29, 1976. 

Agreement amending the agricultural commoditie 
agreement of September 11, 1975 (TIAS 8191) 
Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca March 3C 
1976. Entered into force March 30, 1976. 


Agreement regarding consolidation and reschedulini 
of certain debts owed to the United States, witl 
annexes. Signed at Washington March 4, 1976 
Enters into force upon notification by each govern 
ment that certain legal requirements have beei 


Department of State Bulletii 

INDEX May 3, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1923 

Atomic Energy. Secretary Kissinger Inter- 
viewed at Annual Meeting of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors 565 

China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors 565 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 593 

Department Urges Approval of Appropria- 
tions for International Financial Institutions 
(Boeker) 585 

Southern Rhodesia Developments Reviewed by 
Department (Blake) 590 

Third Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) 592 

Cyprus. Third Progress Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to the Congress (message from 
President Ford) 592 

Developing Countries. Department Urges Ap- 
proval of Appropriations for International 
Financial Institutions (Boeker) 585 

Economic Affairs 

Department Urges Approval of Appropriations 
for International Financial Institutions 
(Boeker) 585 

Task Force on Questionable Corporate Pay- 
ments Abroad Established (Ford) 583 

U.S. and Philippines Hold Economic Talks 
(joint statement) 574 

Europe. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors 565 

Intelligence. Expansion of Foreign Intelligence 
Advisory Board Announced (Ford) .... 584 

Jordan. King Hussein of Jordan Visits Wash- 
ington (exchange of toasts between Presi- 
dent Ford and King Hussein) 573 

<Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
at Annual Meeting of the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors 565 

Military Affairs. U.S. and Philippines Open 
Talks on U.S. Use of Military Bases (joint 
statement) 575 


U.S. and Philippines Hold Economic Talks 
(joint statement) 574 

U.S. and Philippines Open Talks on U.S. Use of 
Military Bases (joint statement) .... 575 

Presidential Documents 

Expansion of Foreign Intelligence Advisory 
Board Announced 584 

King Hussein of Jordan Visits Washington . . 573 

Task Force on Questionable Corporate Pay- 
ments Abroad Established 583 

Third Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted 
to the Congress 592 

Publications. Department Releases 1976 Edition 
of "Treaties in Force" 595 

Southern Rhodesia 

Southern Rhodesia Developments Reviewed by 
Department (Blake) 590 

U.S. Supports Further Sanctions Against 
Southern Rhodesia (Scranton, text of U.N. 
Security Council resolution) 594 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 596 


Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual 
Meeting of the American Society of News- 
paper Editors 565 

U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Nuclear Age 

(Sonnenfeldt) 576 

United Nations. U.S. Supports Further Sanc- 
tions Against Southern Rhodesia (Scranton, 

text of U.N. Security Council resolution) . . 594 

Name Index 

Blake, James B 590 

Boeker, Paul H 585 

Ford, President 573, 583, 584, 592 

King Hussein I 573 

Kissinger, Secretary 565 

Scranton, William W 594 

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut 576 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

169 4/12 U.S.-Philippines economic negotia- 
tions: joint statement. 
*170 4/12 Advisory Committee on Law of 
the Sea, June 4-5. 

171 4/12 Sonnenfeldt: U.S. Naval Academy, 

Apr. 6. 

172 4/12 U.S.-Philippines negotiations on 

military bases: joint statement. 

*173 4/12 Foreign affairs experts from 10 
Latin American countries to par- 
ticipate in seminar beginning 
Apr. 19. 
174 4/13 Kissinger: American Society of 
Newspaper Editors. 

*'175 4/14 Thomas S. Gates, Jr., sworn in as 
Chief of U.S. Liaison Office, Pe- 
king, People's Republic of China 
(biographic data). 

*176 4/14 David S. Smith sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Sweden (biographic 

*177 4/14 Kissinger: Subcommittee on For- 
eign Operations of the Senate 
Committee on Appropriations. 

*178 4/14 U.S. and Korea amend textile 
agreement. Mar. 24. 

*179 4/14 Advisory Committee for U.S. Par- 
ticipation in the U.N. Conference 
on Human Settlements (Habi- 
tat), May 10-11. 

tl80 4/15 Principles To Guide Future U.S.- 
Greek Defense Cooperation, ini- 
tialed Apr. 15; Greek Foreign 
Minister Bitsios' letter of Apr. 7 
and Secretary Kissinger's reply 
of Apr. 10. 

tl81 4/16 Kissinger: Downtown Rotary Club, 
Phoenix, Ariz. 

*181A 4/16 Moss, Goldwater, Kissinger: intro- 
ductory remarks. 

tlSlB 4/16 Kissinger: questions and answers. 

*182 4/16 U.S. and Haiti sign textile agree- 
ment. Mar. 22. 

^Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. dc. 204o2 


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Washington, D.C. 20402. 





Volume LXXIV 

No. 1924 

May 10, 1976 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 597 



Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Katz 607 

boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 

JUN 51976 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1924 
May 10, 1976 

For snle by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


62 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $S3.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BVLLETl 
a weekly publication issued by i 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public a 
interested agencies of the governmt 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations a 
on the work of the Department a 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, issu 
by the White House and the Depa, 
ment, and statements, address 
and news conferences of the Presidt 
and the Secretary of State and otl 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the funclic 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and int 
national agreements to which i 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intt 
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Publications of the Department 
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legislative material in the field 
international relations are also listi 

\ Strong Foreign Policy for a Confident America 

Address by Secretary Kissinger ' 

I am happy to be here in the great South- 
rest, where the freshness and vitality of 
he American spirit are so evident. 

In recent years we have seen opinion on 
breign policy in this country swing back and 
orth erratically — from peace demonstra- 
ions to calls for confrontation, from anti- 
nilitarism to concern for a strong defense, 
rom overinvolvement to a new isolationism, 
rom enthusiasm to disillusionment, and 
sack again. 

Today some would have Americans believe 
hat the issue is between those who are opti- 
pistic and those who are pessimistic about 
America. But that is not the problem before 
s. The real issue is whether we understand 
he complexities and the opportunities that 
,re before us. 

Winston Churchill once said: "When dan- 
cer is far off, we may think of our weakness; 
vhen it is near, we must not forget our 
trength." A period of thermonuclear peril 
tnd global upheaval is not the moment to 
orget our successes, our unequaled reserves 
)f military and economic power, or the deci- 
;ive advantages we enjoy as a free people 
vith a free productive system. 

In this Bicentennial year it is time to re- 
nind ourselves that an effective foreign pol- 
cy must reflect the values and permanent 
nterests of our nation, and not the fashion- 
ible trends of the moment. These values and 
nterests antedate this election year and 
nust be maintained beyond it. 

' Made at Phoenix, Ariz., on Apr. 16 before a 
uncheon meeting sponsored by the Downtown Rotary 
Club (text from press release 181). 

I am here to tell you that America re- 
mains — and will remain — the most powerful 
nation in the world. I am here to tell you 
that the President and his Administration 
have founded their policies on a fundamental 
faith in America's vast strength and poten- 
tial for greatness. We see challenging 
trends, but we are confident that they can be 
mastered. We see dangers, but we are cer- 
tain that they can be overcome. 

The optimist is not one who pretends that 
challenges do not exist; that is escapism. 
The true optimist has faith in his nation ; he 
believes that challenges are to be mastered, 
not avoided. He is willing to trust the in- 
telligence of the public, for he knows that 
Americans can understand and deal with 
complexity. He knows that Americans have 
always regarded challenge not as a cause for 
despair, but as a call to action, a stimulus to 
achievement, and a priceless chance to shape 
the future. 

The Founding Fathers, the pioneers who 
opened up this vast land, the men and women 
who built the greatest and freest and most 
productive society in history — they were 
people of confidence and hope. Those of us 
today who truly have faith in America will 
live up to that tradition. 

To oversimplify, to substitute brittle 
rhetoric for hard thinking, is not confidence 
in America. To offer slogans instead of 
answers is to show little faith in the Ameri- 
can people. 

The task of foreign policy is to under- 
stand our reality, to perceive the challenges 
to our interests and principles. It is to devise 
means for meeting those challenges. And it 

May 10, 1976 


is to persevere toward our goals unafraid 
and unswayed by the passions of the 

Government in a free society has the obli- 
gation to tell the people the truth, without 
sugar-coating or resorting to scare tactics. 
The real issue before our country now is not 
between optimists and pessimists, but be- 
tween those who support a strong American 
leadership in the world and those who be- 
lieve that America cannot, or should not, 
play such a role. 

The Administration has made its choice. 
Our policy is based on the conviction that 
without America's determination there can 
be no security, without our dedication there 
can be no progress, and without our ex- 
ample there can be no freedom. 

America's Response to Challenge 

In the inevitable self-criticism of a de- 
mocracy, we must take care not to create 
an impression of impatience or uncertainty. 
We must never forget the great achieve- 
ments of American foreign policy over three 
decades of involvement in world affairs. 

The United States took the lead in help- 
ing Europe and Japan recover from devas- 
tation and join us in alliances that are the 
pillars of global stability. We opposed ag- 
gression ; we mediated conilicts. We created 
the international economic institutions that 
expanded trade and prosperity worldwide. 
We became the world's leader in technology, 
in agricultural productivity, in economic 
enterprise. We led the world's struggle 
against famine, disease, and natural dis- 
aster; we promoted education and economic 
development in every quarter of the globe; 
we welcomed refugees from oppression to 
our shores. 

And amid all the turmoil of recent years 
at home, our foreign policy has seen one of 
its most fruitful periods. Today: 

— We are at peace. 

— We are the world's strongest nation 
militarily and economically; our techno- 
logical superiority is unquestioned, continu- 
ing, and growing. 


— Our alliances are cooperating more 
closely than at any time in many years. 

— We have begun to forge more rational 
and long-term relations with potential ad- 
versaries. Our new relationship with China 
is growing and durable and a positive factor 
in the world scene. With the Soviet Union 
we have resolved some conflicts, such as Ber- 
lin, and slowed some aspects of the arms 

— For the first time in 30 years, we have 
helped the countries of the Middle East take 
significant steps toward peace. 

— We have been leaders in shaping new 
economic relations between the industrial 
world and the developing world. 

This is a record of which we can be 
proud and on which we should seek to build. 
So let us not delude ourselves with 
fairy tales of America being second best 
and forever taken in by wily foreigners. 

Americans have nothing to fear from 
competition, for in almost every area of 
rivalry we have the advantage. Americans' 
know we have the capacity, if we have the 
will, to maintain freedom and peace. They 
understand, too, that our strength is essen- 
tial for peace, but also that peace must be 
something better than a precarious balance 
of terror. 

Therefore our foreign policy is designed 
to further three principal objectives: 

— To strengthen the unity of the great 
industrial democracies and our alliances. 

— To maintain the global balance of power 
and to build on this foundation a lasting 

— To fashion between the industrial world 
and the developing nations positive and re- 
liable economic relations to insure mutual 

Let me discuss these in turn. 

The Challenge of Democracy 

Our first priority is our relationship with 
the great industrial democracies. 

There is no doubt that freedom today isi 
under serious challenge. Democratic socie- 
ties are in a numerical minority in the 

Department of State Bulletin' 

world ; and within many of them, antidemo- 
cratic forces are gaining in strength. 

The dangers are real, but so is our col- 
lective capacity to respond. We and our allies 
account for 65 percent of the world's pro- 
duction and 70 percent of its trade; we are 
the world's most industrialized and urban- 
ized societies ; it is we who are the pioneers 
of the modern age, we who have the experi- 
ence, the intellectual creativity, and the re- 
sources to lead attempts to solve the eco- 
nomic and social problems facing this shrink- 
ing planet— there is no reason for us to 
falter. Many of the challenges to the indus- 
trial democracies are of their own making. 
Therefore they can be mastered with con- 
fidence, vision, and creativity. 

We are by nature a self-critical people and 
never more so than in our election year. 
This causes us sometimes to take for granted 
the solid achievements of the recent past: 

— Faced with an oil embargo and an 
energy crisis, the United States took the 
lead in establishing, together with the other 
industrial democracies, a new institution, 
the International Energy Agency. This co- 
operative enterprise will enable the indus- 
trial democracies to support each other in 
case of another embargo. It has established 
common conservation policies and common 
policies for the development of alternative 
sources of energy. A great challenge has 
brought forth a cooperative and vital 

— Faced with global recession, the heads 
of government of the United States, Great 
fi Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan 
met to concert their economic policies. They 
stimulated fresh approaches to reinforce 
each others' programs for recovery, trade, 
and energy. They agreed on monetary re- 
form which over time may usher in a period 
of unparalleled economic progress. Most 
fundamentally, they symbolized their politi- 
cal cohesion and shared moral values. 

— Faced with the growth of Soviet power, 
we have strengthened the defenses of our 
alliances with new programs of planning, 
consultation, modernization, and standardi- 

— Faced with the need to fashion more 
balanced partnerships, we have intensified 
our consultations and our collaboration. 

These are not the actions of governments 
uncertain of their future. They reflect the 
conviction that no force in the world can 
match the voluntary association of fi'ee peo- 
ples. Our relations with the industrial de- 
mocracies have never been stronger and 
our unity never more effective. With eco- 
nomic recovery well underway we will be 
even stronger, individually and collectively. 

Together with the other industrial democ- 
racies we face, with confidence, a vast 

— The United States is determined to 
protect our nation's security and that of our 
friends and allies; we will do our part to 
maintain the global balance that has pre- 
served peace and freedom for three dec- 

— Together we will foster economic prog- 
ress and social justice in our societies, for 
the principles of freedom and human dig- 
nity which we cherish must rest on a firm 
foundation of responsiveness to the needs 
of our peoples. 

— We will intensify collaboration on the 
great new issues of our time : the economic, 
political, and social challenges of global 
interdependence, the easing of tensions be- 
tween East and West, and the forging of 
cooperation between developed and develop- 
ing countries. 

— The United States has encouraged and 
welcomed those of its allies that moved 
from dictatorship toward democracy. For 
the same reason we will continue to warn 
against those who would turn over a major 
share in Western democratic governments 
to Communist parties suddenly seeking re- 
spectability. We would do our allies no favor 
if we encouraged wishful thinking that the 
advent of Communist parties into power will 
not represent a watershed in our relations. 
The basic reality is that our people will not 
accept the same close and confidential rela- 
tionship with Western countries where 
Communist parties have been granted a 
major share in govei-nment. 

May 10, 1976 


— We will stand for the cause of liberty 
and independence around the world; for if 
we do not champion our own cause, no one 
else will do it for us. 

— We will never forget that the democra- 
tic nations hold in trust humanity's highest 
principles and aspirations and that they 
thus bear a grave responsibility. 

The Challenge of Peace 

Time and again in this century Americans 
have fought for peace. No people knows bet- 
ter than we the meaning of that responsi- 
bility, especially in an age shadowed by the 
menace of nuclear cataclysm. When war 
would threaten the life of literally every 
American, there is no higher duty than the 
dedicated search for peace. 

But peace is far more than the mere ab- 
sence of war. We will never make, in the 
name of peace, agreements that jeopardize 
our values and interests or the values and 
interests of our friends. We know, too, that 
the mere desire for peace is not enough. 
Since the days of Thucydides, statesmen 
have recognized that peace with justice 
comes only "where the pressure of necessity 
is equal; for the powerful exact what they 
can, and the weak grant what they must." 
There can be no security without an equi- 
librium, and no safety without a balance of 

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the 
world's fears of catastrophe and its hopes 
for peace have hinged centrally upon the 
relationship between the United States and 
the Soviet Union. When two superpowers 
have the capacity to destroy mankind in a 
matter of hours, there can be no greater 
imperative than managing the relationship 
between them with wisdom and restraint. 

The growth of the Soviet Union to super- 
power status was inevitable, given its indus- 
trial and technological base. Nothing we 
could have done would have prevented it; 
nothing we do now will make it go away. 
What we can do, together with our friends, 
is to maintain our strength and our consid- 
erable advantages and demonstrate our de- 


termination to prevent the irresponsible use 
of Soviet power. At the same time we must 
strive to go beyond a balance of force to 
shape a safer and more durable relationship 
of coexistence. Peace thus requires a dual 
policy. And we have worked hard at both 
these tasks. 

We have kept our strategic forces suffi- 
cient to deter attack and maintain the nu- 
clear balance. And because we know that 
the perception of power can be almost as 
important as the reality, we have made cer- 
tain that other nations recognize the ade- 
quacy of our strength. 

Nevertheless the strategic arms competi- 
tion takes place in unprecedented conditions. 
As late as the end of World War II, every 
increase in destructive power was strategi- 
cally useful. Today additions to the nuclear 
arsenals of either side do not automatically 
lead to political or military advantage. In- 
deed, at current and foreseeable levels of 
nuclear arms it becomes increasingly danger- 
ous to invoke them. In no crisis since 1962 
have the strategic arsenals of the two sides 
determined the outcome. 

The tendency toward stalemate inherent 
in the nuclear arms race produces new re- 
quirements for our national defense. Under 
the umbrella of strategic standoff, increas- 
ing attention must be given to regional de- 
fense. For it is in peripheral areas where a 
military imbalance can be turned into a geo- 
political change that could in time affect the 
global balance. This is why we are expand- 
ing our Army from 13 to 16 divisions, de- 
veloping a new generation of fighter air- 
craft, and accelerating our naval construc- 
tion, and it is why we must spend what is 
necessary to meet the new overall require- 

In assessing current debates and charges 
it is important that the public understand 
the long-range nature of modern military 
planning. Because of the long leadtimes in 
the development of new weapons, the forces 
in being today reflect decisions taken in the 
sixties; the decisions we make today will 
not affect our forces until at least the early 
eighties. This imposes upon us the need for 
careful long-range planning and analysis of 

Department of State Bulletin 

needs. With modern weapons, national de- 
fense cannot be assured by quick fixes. Not 
every category of weapon is as useful for us 
as it is for our adversaries, and vice versa. 
We must and we shall maintain a steady 
course, mindful that what we decide today 
will affect the security of Americans for 

At the same time we must look beyond 
security to a safer, more durable pattern of 
coexistence. A balance of terror constantly 
contested is an unsatisfactory foundation for 
our security. We shall defend the global bal- 
ance with vigilance, but at the same time 
we shall continue to search for new patterns 
of restraint, of communication, and of co- 
operation. Only when the rights of nations 
are respected, when accommodation takes 
the place of force, can man's energies be 
devoted to the realization of his higher 

To check and ultimately to reverse the 
nuclear spiral, we have sought and achieved 
important arms control agreements with the 
Soviet Union. The Strategic Arms Limitation 
Agreement of 1972 halted the Soviet numeri- 
cal buildup, and the Vladivostok agreement 
places an equal ceiling on strategic forces of 
both sides. When this ceiling is translated 
into a formal agreement, we shall have re- 
duced the danger of nuclear cataclysm. At 
the same time we will be able to devote the 
priorities in our planning to regional defense, 
where the needs are greatest. 

In the past week we have achieved a new 
agreement which will limit the size of peace- 
ful nuclear explosions and, for the first 
time, allow the United States to conduct on- 
site inspections on Soviet territory. This is 
a principle which we have sought to estab- 
lish throughout the postwar period. Its 
achievement is not only a significant symbol 
but an important practical step to bring 
greater discipline to the nuclear age. 

In addition to anns control, we have en- 
gaged the Soviet Union in efforts to resolve 
concrete political problems. For example, the 
Berlin Agreement of 1971 was a negotiated 
solution to a perennial problem that had 
threatened major war on at least three occa- 
sions in 20 years. And we have also reached 

agreement on many bilateral projects that 
are based strictly on mutual benefit and can 
help moderate Soviet behavior. 

We must see these achievements in per- 
spective. We cannot relax our vigilance. We 
must not believe that the conflict of two gen- 
erations can be quickly overcome. For the 
foreseeable future we and the Soviet Union 
will remain ideological adversaries. But we 
have an obligation to explore all honorable 
roads to reduction of tensions and a relation- 
ship based on coexistence rather than on 
tests of strength. We cannot stop trying, for 
we owe our children a better world than we 

These, then, are the realities of our policy 
toward the Soviet Union: 

— We have the military, diplomatic, and 
economic capacity to prevent the use of So- 
viet power for unilateral advantage or 
political expansion. 

— We shall maintain the strategic and 
conventional forces needed to protect our 
security, and we shall muster the political 
will to insure that local situations are not 
exploited for unilateral gain which could 
undermine global stability. 

— We will never tolerate a shift in the 
strategic balance against us, whether by 
violations of agreements already concluded, 
by making unwise new agreements, or by 
neglect of our own programs. 

— At the same time we must recognize 
that sovereign states of roughly equal 
power cannot impose unacceptable conditions 
on each other and ultimately must deal with 
each other by compromise. 

— We shall pursue the two strands of our 
policy toward the Soviet Union: firmness in 
the face of pressure and readiness to work 
on the basis of strict reciprocity for a more 
cooperative world. This is an obligation we 
have to our people, to our future, and to 

The Challenge of Prosperity 

In recent years no issue has demanded 
more of our attention than the prospects of 
the world economy. This nation has un- 
rivaled economic strength, but in an inter- 

May 10, 1976 


dependent world we must work with others 
if our economy is to thrive. 

The facts of interdependence were brought 
home to us dramatically by the oil embargo 
of 1973. It accelerated inflation and produced 
the largest unemployment, as well as the 
most severe recession, of the postwar 
period. It is estimated to have cost us up- 
ward of $10 billion in lost production. 

The global economy is now a single sys- 
tem; interdependence can strain it or en- 
hance it. For the first time in history hu- 
manity's age-old dream of a just, stable, and 
prosperous world for all is a realistic 

American policy has been designed to 
serve our interests in a global context of 
cooperation, for our nation's prosperity re- 
quires a healthy and cooperative world en- 
vironment. The price and supply of energy 
and raw materials, the conditions of trade 
and investment, the protection of the en- 
vironment, international law to govern the 
use of the oceans and space — these are all 
issues on which our prosperity and progress 

As the world's strongest power, the 
United States could best sui-vive an era of 
economic warfare. At home we are leading 
the recovery from the most diflJicult eco- 
nomic period since the 1930's — a perform- 
ance which stands in sharp contrast to those 
economies based on rigid principles of plan- 
ning, on labor extracted by compulsion or 
capital formed through inadequate compen- 
sation of labor. Abroad, our technological 
innovation, global business expertise, and 
commercial dynamism have reinforced 
American interests and spread prosperity to 
every part of our planet. It is America that 
is the engine of the global economy, we to 
whom the developing nations address their 
claims and their complaints — -for they know 
that our open economic system more than 
any other fosters the prospects for growth 
and widening opportunity for all. 

But while we are prepared to defend our 
economic interests unilaterally, we know, 
too, that nations will prosper together or 
they will suffer together. 


This is why the United States has taken 
the lead in advancing the vision of an open, 
growing, and cooperative world economy. 

It was the United States that called for 
and helped launch the World Food Confer- 
ence in 1974, where we offered concrete pro- 
posals to improve world food production and 
offer every human being security against 

At the special session of the United Na- 
tions last September and at the Conference 
on International Economic Cooperation now 
undeinvay in Paris, we have set forth a wide 
range of practical initiatives which address 
all the key global economic issues: raw ma- 
terials, development, finance, and most 
important, energy. 

A week ago I presented the Law of the 
Sea Conference in New York with new 
American proposals designed to move this 
historic negotiation to a successful conclu- 
sion this year. This would be a major diplo- 
matic event with far-reaching implications! 
for security and commerce, for food andBi 
energy, for raw materials and research, and 
for international law and cooperation. 

Later this month I will attend the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development, 
where we will continue to demonstrate 
American leadership on the broad range of 
relations between North and South. 

These U.S. initiatives have substantially 
improved the international atmosphere and 
laid the foundations for progress on one of 
the great endeavors of the modern era — the 
construction of a truly just and cooperative 
international economy. 

These are the realities of the global eco- 
nomic challenge: 

— Today, all national economies are sus- 
tained by the global economic system; inter- 
dependence is not a slogan, but a reality, 
and goes to the heart of the international 
order. Prosperity and justice underpin every 
society's ability to achieve its national goals. 

— Since we are the single greatest concen- 
tration of economic wealth and power, global 
prosperity and our own well-being depend 
crucially on this country's leadership. What 
is asked of us now is not so much our re- 

Department of State Bulletin 

sources, but our creativity and vision in help- 
iiio- the world organize equitable patterns of 
economic relations. 

— The United States will not be pressured ; 
nor will we yield to blackmail or threats. 
Those who indulge in unrealistic proposals, 
one-sided bloc voting, appeals to stale ideolo- 
gies of confrontation or resentment, will 
only block cooperative progress. 

^Here, too, we will pursue a dual policy; 
we will resist pressures, but we are prepared 
to participate constructively in cooperative 
efforts based on mutual respect. 

The American Responsibility 

Thus the challenges we face are great and 
:omplex. But the record shows that we have 
•esponded, with confidence and with success. 
Durs is not the record of a tired nation, but 
)f a vibrant people for whom frontiers have 
,dways denoted a challenge, not a limit. We 
lire not weak; we have no intention of letting 
)thers determine our future. 

America has the strength, resilience, and 
jurpose to meet the modern era on its own 
erms. We are determined to help shape an 
nternational environment which, more than 
;ver before in history, improves the lives and 
•eflects the values of our people. 

So let us stop disparaging our strength, 
'ither moral or material; because when we 
lo, friends of America grow uncertain, 
memies become bold, and a world yearning 
or leadership loses hope. 

Let us tell our people and the world the 
ruth: America will continue to meet the 
hallenges of its time. America and its allies 
•ossess the greatest economic and military 
)0wer the world has ever seen. We have the 
ourage and the self-confidence to prevent 
luclear war. We have the vision and the 
pirit to help shape a more peaceful, more 
table world. We have the resources, the tech- 
lology, the skill, and the organizing genius 
build a world economic system together 
vith all nations, developing and developed 
ilike. And this will fulfill the aspirations of 
ill peoples for dignity and well-being. 

It is in this spirit that next week I shall 
go to Africa, where I will carry America's 
message of hope, social justice, aspiration 
for human dignity, the rule of the majority, 
and cooperation. And I shall also warn 
against foreign intervention, direct or sur- 
rogate, that would block all hope for prog- 

But we can realize our historic responsi- 
bility only as a united and confident people. 
Our greatest foreign policy need is to end 
our divisions and self-denigration, to recall 
that we have permanent interests and values 
that we must nurture and defend, to recap- 
ture the sense that we are all engaged in a 
common enterprise. 

We remain the world's strongest nation, 
but we no longer have the overwhelming 
global predominance of previous decades. To- 
day we must lead not by our power alone 
but by our wisdom, boldness, vision, and 
perseverance. We must be a steadfast friend 
to those who would be our friend; we must 
be a determined opponent of those who 
would be our enemy. We must maintain 
simultaneously our defenses, our alliances, 
our principles, and our commitment to a co- 
operative world. And I have every confidence 
in our ability to do so. 

In this Bicentennial year we honor our 
Founding Fathers for many things — but 
most of all for their faith in the American 
people, on whom the success of the American 
experiment has always depended. They were 
dreamers who believed in the future and 
the nation they had created. They were opti- 
mists, because they believed that free men 
of courage could shape their destiny. And 
in the end, they were realists, because they 
were right. 

At its foundation America was, because 
of its promise, the hope of the world. Today 
it remains, because of what it has become, 
the best hope of all mankind. 

This generation of Americans, like every 
generation before it, will shape its destiny 
and in helping the world will help itself. For 
what we, and the world around us, shall be 
is in our hands. And like those Americans 
who have gone before us, we shall not fail. 

Way 10, 1976 


Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Address at Phoenix 

Press release 181B dated April 16 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I speak a broken Eng- 
lish, and I hope that my message and my 
question will be nnderstood properly. 

Secretary Kissinger: People with accents 
give me great trouble. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you are one of the 
most prominent members of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, woidd you tell us, first, 
why for less than three decades every Sec- 
retary of the United States but one had to 
be and was a member of the Council on For- 
eign Relations and hoiv that happens. 

Second, what is the position of the Coun- 
cil 071 Foreign Relations toivard ruthless 
e.vpansion of communism through appease- 
ment, formation of a world government, 
total surrender, or any other course. 

Please ansioer. 

Secretary Kissinger: The Council on For- 
eign Relations usually represents a govern- 
ment-in-exile — that is, those members with 
foreign policy experience who are not serv- 
ing in the government and meet in New 
York to reminisce about their days of glory 
and to prepare themselves for the day that 
they may be called back to Washington. 

There is obviously no requirement that 
one be a member of the Council on Foreign 
Relations in order to be Secretary of State. 
But it so happens that it usually selects peo- 
ple with foreign policy experience, and it 
does not hurt to have foreign policy experi- 
ence to be Secretary of State. So, it is not 
absolutely necessary. [Laughter.] 

Now, there is no such thing as a unified 
position of the Council on Foreign Relations. 
I myself have not attended a meeting in 
eight years. And given the views of most of 
the members of the Council on Foreign Re- 
lations, I am not likely to be invited to 
another one for another eight years. Insofar 
as there is a dominant view in the Council at 
this moment, it would be rather diametri- 


cally opposed to the foreign policy that we 
are conducting. 

I say all of this only to emphasize that one 
should not believe that there is a homo- 
geneous body that meets to define policies. 

Now, if you asked me what is the view of 
the Council on Foreign Relations toward 
Soviet expansion and similar matters, I find 
it hard to give you a coherent answer. I can 
tell you what my view toward Soviet expan- 
sion is, which is to oppose it, to resist it, to 
build the strength that enables us to resist 
it, and to conduct a policy which prevents it. 
And that is more important — [Applause.] 

Q. I am Margaret Long, and my question 
is that the Los Angeles Times today reported 
that President Ford intends to nominate 
John Connolly of Texas as Secretary of State 
after the November election. My question is, 
is this true or is this just an attempt to gain 
rotes for the Texas primary? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I have to 
say my father is keeping a scrapbook of 
articles in which I get mentioned. And he is 
extremely pleased whenever I get mentioned, 
no matter what the context. [Laughter.] 

As far as 1 can tell, there is a bitter com- 
petition going on for a place which may not 
be vacant. And I figure if I get enough peo- 
ple into the race, they can all be occupied 
through the primary season and beyond. So, 
I welcome Mr. Connally to the competition. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Sandra O'Connor speak- 
ing. I respectfidly ask ivhether the United 
States is negotiating ivith Panama concern- 
ing the ownership, operation, or control of 
the Panama Canal. And if so, to what pur- 
pose or goal? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain the 
condition with which we are attempting to 
deal in the Panama negotiations. 

The issue is not between us and the Gov- 
ernment of Panama. The issue is whether it 
is possible for the United States to achieve 
safe, neutral passage of all ships through, 
the Panama Canal under conditions in which* 
we do not have to fight all of Latin America. 

Department of State Bulletini 

Now, if necessary, we will defend our in- 
terests in the Panama Canal against all of 
Latin America, if we must. But, in the mean- 
time, we want to explore whether it is pos- 
sible to achieve arrangements in which our 
interests in the defense of the canal and in 
the operation of the canal are fully safe- 
guarded but in which, at the same time, we 
are avoiding the possibilities that are in- 
herent in that situation, where all of the 
Latin American countries could unite against 
the United States on that narrow issue. 

I repeat: The United States will not sur- 
render its interests in the defense of the 
canal or its interests in the operation of the 
canal. Any agreement that will be negotiated 
will be submitted to the Congress. And as 
we are negotiating it, we are briefing the 
Congress; and if we do it sufficiently in ex- 
ecutive sessions, we can be sure that the 
public will know it. [Laughter.] 

So, one has to look at the problem, and one 
should not play lightly with that issue, be- 
I cause it could involve our entire relation- 
ship with all of the Latin American nations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't believe it is very 
hard to imagine a situation where Commu- 
)iist-domiriated governments in southern 
Africa would allow Russiati bases on the 
South Atlantic. Should the United States en- 
courage an arms buildup in Brazil and 
Argentina to counter such a situation? 

Seer eta rn Kissinger: I have stated, to the 
dismay of much editorial opinion, that the 
United States will oppose expeditionary 
forces and the use of surrogate power in 
Africa. Therefore I do not want at this mo- 
ment to deal with a situation in which the 
United States is assumed to have accepted 
the buildup of foreign military bases in 
southern Africa. 

We have an interest in the security of our 
sealanes in the southern Atlantic. And we 
will work together with other interested 
countries to do whatever is necessary to as- 
sure the safety of the sealanes. 

Q. You travel extensively, and you must be 
under great pressure. Hoiv do you relax and 
what do you do to stay healthy? [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: I travel because oc- 
casionally I have the need to visit a friendly 
capital. [Laughter.] And I am sure that my 
staff members here are going to give their 
own press conferences, and they will say 
that I relax by harassing my staff. 
[Laughter.] They are all smiling here. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, Craig Durkin. Recently, 
Time magazine carried a story on Israel 
having atomic weapons, and I would like to 
know if you can confirm or deny this and 
irhat the implications of this are on U.S. 
foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: Time magazine 
seems to have sources that were more pre- 
cise than the ones with which we are 
familiar, because they gave an extraordinary 
amount of detail. 

Israel has stated publicly that it would not 
be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into 
the Middle East. I do not know what the 
precise meaning of that statement is. 

The United States believes generally that 
the spread of nuclear weapons to other coun- 
tries, particularly in extremely explosive sit- 
uations or dangerous situations such as the 
Middle East, is not helpful for stability. And 
we have done our utmost in all circumstances 
to discourage such a threat. But the precise 
details of this particular story are perhaps 
not suitable for a public discussion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the 
Soviet troop buildup in Eastern Europe 
might portend an attempted Soviet occupa- 
tion of Yugoslavia in the event of Tito's 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not have the 
impression that there is a buildup of Soviet 
forces in Eastern Europe. What is taking 
place in Eastern Europe is that Soviet forces 
are being modernized as equipment is being 
replaced, and therefore the combat effective- 
ness of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe is 
being strengthened, together with all other 
Soviet forces. And this is the reason why I 
stressed in my prepared remarks the in- 
creasing need to strengthen the capacity of 
the United States to undertake local defenses 
of many areas. 

May 10, 1976 


With respect to Yugoslavia, the United 
States beheves that the independence and 
sovereignty of Yugoslavia should be, and 
must be, respected and that it should have 
the opportunity to develop its policies free 
of outside military pressure. We have no 
evidence that the Soviet Union is, at this 
moment, considering any military action 
against Yugoslavia. But if such an event 
were to occur, it would present a very grave 
situation, and it is one that the United 
States could not accept. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, "detente" is a word that 
has been, used and misused many times in 
recent years, and I notice you did not use it 
once in your speech. My question is: What 
is your interpretation of this ivord, particu- 
larly as it pertains to the relationship of the 
United States with both the U.S.S.R. and 
China ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I just want the record 
to show that I am explaining the word only 
in response to a question. [Laughter.] 

The word "detente" attempts to deal with 
the reality of our relationship with the 
Soviet Union, which, as I indicated in my 
prepared remarks, has two aspects. 

On the one hand, we have the fact that 
Soviet power is growing and must be 
matched and that Soviet expansion must be 
prevented. So, on this level, the United 
States is determined not to permit any 
change in the global balance of power that 
could affect our security. 

Secondly, if we look ahead over 10, 15, 20 
years, we have an obligation to keep in mind 
that if there are endless confrontations, 

there is always the danger that one of them 
will escalate into war. Therefore we are at- 
tempting to create a better environment and 
a kind of coexistence that is less dependent 
on a balance of terror. This, of course, will 
require changes in the Soviet perception of 
the world. And it will require strict reci- 
procity in all agreements that may be made 
with the Soviet Union. 

The challenge before us is whether we are 
capable of conducting this two-track policy 
— resistance to aggression and a willingness 
to build a better world. 

This is what is meant by the word 
"detente" and I do not believe that there is 
an effective alternative to it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Chou En-lai's death — 
will it alter U.S. foreign policy toward main- 
land China? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our policy toward 
mainland China is based on our view of our 
national interests. We began to reestablish 
contact with mainland China because, both 
in Peking and in the United States, we be- 
came convinced that there were certain com- 
mon interests that would permit us to work 
together in those limited areas. 

As far as we are concerned, those policies 
do not depend on personalities, but they de- 
pend rather on the overall global situation. 

So, on our side, we have no reason to 
change our policy. On the Chinese side, we 
have the impression that they, too, will con- 
tinue the policies that are now being carried 

So, we do not anticipate any drastic 
change in U.S.-Chinese relations. 


Department of State Bulletin 




eci nternational Commodity Policy: CofFee, Cocoa, Sugar, 

in, Copper, and Bauxite 



Statement by Julius L. Katz 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs ' 

I appreciate this opportunity to appear be- 
ore these subcommittees to discuss inter- 
lational commodity policy. This is a subject 
If considerable interest and importance, par- 
icularly in view of the meeting of the 
(JNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and 
)evelopment] next month in Nairobi. This 
tearing provides a useful opportunity to re- 
tiew where we stand in our consideration of 
ine aspect of our commodity policy — the ex- 
imination of individual commodity problems. 

Our overall approach to commodity policy 
B to examine specific commodity problems 
nalytically and to consider broadly based 
lolutions, not excluding, but certainly not 
imited to, price stabilization measures. One 
pproach is to stabilize export earnings 
hrough compensatory financing. For a num- 
ler of commodities the problem in fact is 
lot excessive price volatility, but low returns 
producers. In such cases, diversification, 
mproved cost efficiency, product improve- 
nent, or other forms of market promotion 
aay be the appropz-iate solution. For other 
ommodities, obstacles to capital investment 

' Submitted to the Subcommittees on International 
iesources, Food and Energy, on International Eco- 
lomic Policy, on International Organizations, and on 
nternational Trade and Commerce of the House Com- 
nittee on International Relations on Apr. 14. The 
■omplete transcript of the hearings will be published 
)y the committee and will be available from the 
superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
I'rinting Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

may be the most serious limiting factor, and 
we have made proposals to expand opportu- 
nities for investment in new capacity. Finally, 
efforts to promote market access and to as- 
sure access to supply are essential elements 
of U.S. commodity policy. 

As a further introduction to this state- 
ment, I should note that in our examination 
of individual commodity problems we pro- 
ceed on the basis of the fundamental premise 
of our international economic policy, that of 
seeking an open world economy that permits 
market forces to operate, with minimum re- 
strictions on the flow of goods, services, capi- 
tal, and technology across international 
boundaries. We also seek a concerted and 
sustained effort by the economically ad- 
vanced countries to improve the prospects 
for economic development and social prog- 
ress in the developing countries. We are 
prepared to consult and, where appropriate, 
cooperate with other countries to resolve 
persistent problems which have arisen in 
the international commodity trade. 

Against this general background, Mr. 
Chairman, I propose to discuss six commodi- 
ties: coffee, cocoa, sugar, tin, copper, and 
bauxite. The first four are the subject of ex- 
isting international agreements. Copper and 
bauxite are covered by producer associa- 
tions. The six taken together illustrate well 
the need for case-by-case examination of 
individual commodity problems. 

May 10, 1976 



Coffee is the largest agricultural export of 
the developing world. In 1974 world coffee 
exports amounted to over $4 billion. More 
than 40 producing countries export signifi- 
cant amounts of coffee. Brazil is by far the 
largest exporter, with about one-third of the 
world market. Colombia is second, with just 
over 10 percent of the world market, fol- 
lowed by Uganda, the Ivory Coast, and An- 
gola, each with about 5 percent of the mar- 
ket. In all, 10 countries account for about 75 
percent of total world exports. 

Coffee is a tree crop, with a minimum of 
three years required from time of planting 
to harvest of the first fruit. Coffee, like 
other agricultural products, is vulnerable to 
the vagaries of weather. It is particularly 
vulnerable to the periodic frosts which have 
hit the coft'ee-growing regions of Brazil. 
Variations in annual production are quite 
large, production having ranged in recent 
years between 60 and 80 million bags. 

While production variations have a con- 
siderable effect on price, an equally impor- 
tant factor is the level of world inventories. 
Brazil, the largest producer, has tradition- 
ally maintained sizable stock levels in order 
to protect its market when frosts have re- 
duced its production below normal export 

Coffee is a classic example of a boom-or- 
bust commodity. High prices in 1954 were 
followed several years later by significant 
production increases, stock accumulation, 
and sharply falling prices. In 1962, the 
United States and Brazil undertook a joint 
initiative which resulted in the International 
Coffee Agreement of 1962. This agreement 
was designed to stabilize prices at levels 
equitable to both producers and consumers 
and to permit the orderly marketing of 
accumulated stocks. 

By 1972, both producers and consumers 
recognized that the world coffee outlook had 
changed. Consumption was exceeding pro- 
duction, stocks were declining, and prices 
received by producers had improved consid- 
erably. Accordingly, the economic provisions 
of the International Coffee Agreement were 

suspended and the International Coffee Or- 
ganization was preserved as a forum for 
negotiation of a new agreement. 

Today's world coffee market is suffering 
from the effects of the severe frost in Brazil- 
last July that cut Brazilian production from* 
an anticipated 28 million bags to about 9: 
million bags. Prices are at record highs, and' 
it will require at least three years before! 
production is restored. 

Against the background of the Braziliani 
frost and a changed supply-demand outlooki 
compared to the earlier coffee agreements, 
negotiations were conducted last Decemberi 
for a new International Coffee Agreement. 
After a thorough review within the Admin- 
istration, we have concluded there are sub- 
stantial advantages for the United Statesi 
in this new arrangement. It will protect con- 
sumers during the next few years of tighti 
supplies and give producers protectioni 
against drastic price drops when productioiu 
is restored to normal. Its objectives are tof 
provide a steady flow of coffee onto the mar-' 
ket, to encourage producers to restore ade- 
quate production levels, and to stabilizeti 
prices around long-term market trends. 

Major features are as follows: 

— There are no fixed prices in the agree- 
ment, and there is no price indexation. 

— Export quotas are the main instrument! 
for stabilizing prices whenever supplies aret 
in surplus. 

— The agreement will enter into forcet 
October 1, 1976, with quotas in suspense, andl 
they probably will not come into operation! 
for at least three years. 

— When quotas are suspended there is no 
obligation on our part to exclude coffee fromi 
any source. 

— When quotas are in effect, they will be 
suspended automatically when prices rise 15' 
percent above an agreed level. 

— Export performance during the first two 
years of the agreement will be a major fac- 
tor in the calculation of individual producing- 
country export shares in the event quotas i 
are imposed. A country which improves its 
performance during the next two years i 




Department of State Bulletin 

will be rewarded with a permanent quota 

— -All decisions regarding prices and quo- 
tas require a two-thirds majority of produc- 
ers and consumers voting separately. The 
United States has 40 percent of consumer 

The agreement should provide producers 
with a more stable source of export earnings. 
It should also meet our needs as consumers 
by encouraging producers to ship all the 
:offee they have and to invest in planting 
programs that will restore production to 
normal levels. The net effect of the agree- 
ment's provisions and incentives is thus to 
attempt to influence market forces but not 
control them. 

The President authorized signature of the 
agreement, and it was signed on February 
27, of this year. The President subsequently 
requested the advice and consent of the Sen- 
ate to ratification. The Administration will 
request implementing legislation from both 
Houses of Congress. 


Like coffee, cocoa is also a tree crop. 
However, there are many differences. There 
are considerably fewer cocoa-producing coun- 
tries; only 14 countries produce significant 
amounts. Five countries account for almost 
80 percent of total world cocoa exports. 
Cocoa production seldom varies more than 
15 percent from year to year, while coffee 
production may vary as much as 30 percent. 
Unlike coffee, cocoa cannot be easily stored 
in the producing countries. The quality of 
cocoa deteriorates rapidly in the hot, humid 
climates in which it is grown. Therefore 
cocoa must be shipped fairly rapidly, and any 
arrangement to stabilize prices must take 
this factor into account. 

In 1974, 1.7 billion dollars' worth of cocoa 
beans entered world trade. Of that, the 
United States imported about 316 million 
dollars' worth. 

Ghana is the largest producer, with about 
25 percent of world production in crop year 
1974/75, with Nigeria, the Ivory Coast, 

Brazil, and Cameroon following. Ghana's 
market share has been declining in the face 
of stiff competition from the fastest grow- 
ing producers, the Ivory Coast and Brazil. 

Record cocoa production in crop year 
1971/72 was followed by two years of lower 
production. Prices rose to record highs in 
1974. Since then, they have fallen some- 
what, but the market outlook is expected to 
remain firm. Higher prices will bring in- 
creased production, but not for several years. 
As might be expected, most of the supply 
response to high prices will probably come 
from the Ivory Coast and Brazil, the most 
dynamic producers. 

On the demand side, the response to 
higher prices has been a sharp drop in con- 
sumption. In the United States, cocoa grind- 
ings fell by 10 percent in 1975. Part of this 
drop can be explained by increased use of 
other fats and oils to supplement or extend 
the cocoa content of confectionery products. 

Negotiations for an International Cocoa 
Agreement have been held off and on for 
over 20 years. The United States partici- 
pated in the UNCTAD cocoa conference of 
1972, but we did not join the agreement 
which emerged. The 1972 cocoa agreement 
relied on export quotas as the principal 
operating mechanism, with surplus stocks to 
be stored by the Cocoa Organization in con- 
suming countries. The United States be- 
lieved the agreement was too rigid and in- 
flexible and would not accomplish its aims 
if tested. The 1972 agreement was never 
tested. Since it came into operation in 1973, 
prices have remained well above its price 

The 1972 agreement was renegotiated in 
October 1975. The United States partici- 
pated actively and constructively in those 
negotiations. Specifically, we detailed our ob- 
jections to the old agreement and proposed 
that the primary tool to be used for price 
stabilization should be a buffer stock. Our 
proposal included the following: 

— The buffer stock would operate to de- 
fend a maximum and minimum price within 
a 20-cent range. 

— The buffer stock could purchase up to 

May 10, 1976 


250.000 metric tons from normal commercial 

— The buffer stock would store cocoa pur- 
chased in locations most suitable to preser- 
vation of quaUty. 

— The Cocoa Council would have the au- 
thority to periodically review and adjust the 
price range for buffer stock purchases. 
Prices would not be fixed for the life of the 

The U.S. proposal was welcomed by a num- 
ber of producer and consumer delegates. 
However, many countries felt that the U.S. 
proposal required more of a change to the 
old agreement than they could accept. Ac- 
cordingly, the U.S. delegation sought to con- 
tinue the negotiations to give fuller consid- 
eration to our proposal. However, the con- 
ference voted to proceed with the conclusion 
of the International Cocoa Agreement of 
1975. The United States and the Ivory 
Coast both expressed strong reservations on 
the agreement reached. 

The International Cocoa Agreement of 
1975 is generally similar to the 1972 agree- 
ment, relying on export quotas to defend a 
rigid price range. Prices are fixed for the 
life of the agreement. 

As the agreement now stands, it is an ar- 
rangement — cumbersome in its design and 
potentially disruptive of the market — that 
combines features of both export quotas and 
buffer stocks. The first line of price defense 
is an export quota. The formula for calcu- 
lating each member's quota share is, in our 
view, inflexible and will not reflect actual 
production. It will penalize the dynamic pro- 
ducers. The buffer stock buys only the cocoa 
resulting from a quota cut. As a result, any 
further surplus will be retained in the pro- 
ducing country until it spoils or is smuggled 
to markets. 

We have announced that we do not pro- 
pose to sign the new International Cocoa 
Agreement in its present form because we 
consider it unsound and unworkable. We 
have reiterated our willingness to continue 
attempts at renegotiation. We are awaiting 


the reaction of other countries. At this 
point, it is uncertain whether or not the 
agreement concluded will enter into force 
on October 1, 1976. 


Sugar is a more complex commodity than 
coffee or cocoa. It is produced in both devel- 
oped and developing countries from both 
sugar cane and sugar beets. Each type of 
production has its own peculiarities — sugar 
cane requires one to two years to pi'oduce, 
while sugar beets are an annual crop. New 
sugar production is expensive — it costs an 
estimated $50 million in capital investment 
just to build one new plant to process 100,000 
tons annually. Sugar is experiencing grow- 
ing competition from other sweeteners such 
as high-fructose corn syrup. 

The United States produces over 50 per- 
cent of its domestic sugar consumption re- 
quirements and imports the balance. We im- 
port sugar from more than 30 nations. In 

1974, we imported 2.3 billion dollars' worth 
of sugar, or 26.6 percent of world imports 
by volume. 

Until December 1974, both our domestic 
sugar production and our imports were regu- 
lated by sugar legislation. Since January 

1975, the United States has participated' 
fully in the world market. Except for a 
small tariff, our domestic producers have 
been competing directly with other sugar 
producers throughout the world. The United 
States is neither the world's most efl!icient 
sugar producer nor the least efficient. 

The first International Sugar Agreement 
was negotiated in 1937, and we were mem- 
bers until 1968. The present agreement has 
no operational mechanisms, and the United 
States is not a member. However, prelimi- 
nary discussions are currently underway in 
London at the International Sugar Organiza- 
tion to deteiTnine whether the time is now 
ripe for a new International Sugar Agree- 
ment. The United States is participating as 
an observer. A negotiating conference has 

Department of State Bulletin 

jeeii scheduled tentatively for Geneva in Oc- 
tober of this year. However, it now appears 
ikely the conference may be deferred until 
spring of 1977. The United States will par- 
ticipate fully in these negotiations when they 
we held. 


The United States is the world's leading 
consumer of tin, using over 25 percent of 
mnual world production. In 1974, we con- 
sumed some 66,000 tons of tin, and in 1975 
ibout 44,000 tons. Tinplate production is the 
;hief end use for tin, followed by solder and 
)ther alloys, and chemicals. Approximately 
^5-80 percent of our tin consumption is of 
jrimary or new tin, with secondary or re- 
;ycled tin accounting for the remainder. U.S. 
lomestic tin production is negligible, and we 
•ely on imports for most of our tin needs, 
n 1974, our tin imports amounted to $326 
nillion. In addition, the United States has a 
itrategic stockpile of about 205,000 tons, of 
vhich some 165,000 tons are surplus to cur- 
•ent objectives. Sales from the GSA [Gen- 
eral Services Administration] stockpile have 
lupplemented our tin imports in recent 

Malaysia is the world's leading tin pro- 
lucer, accounting for about 30 percent of 
istimated output. Bolivia, Indonesia, and 
Thailand combined provide another 30 per- 
cent; and the Soviet Union, a net importer, 
md the People's Republic of China produce 
m estimated 22 percent. 

Since 1956, world tin trade has been in- 
luenced by four successive five-year Inter- 
lational Tin Agreements. A new, fifth tin 
igreement is scheduled to come into force 
;his July 1. The United States did not join 
;he first four agreements, but we have 
signed the fifth agreement. 

Membership in the current fourth tin 
Igreement includes seven exporting coun- 
tries accounting for an estimated two-thirds 
of world tin production, and 22 consumer 
countries. The seven tin agreement producer 
members are Malaysia, Bolivia, Indonesia, 

Thailand, Australia, Nigeria, and Zaire. 
China is the only significant exporter not a 
member of the tin agreement. Consumer 
members include all major consumers with 
the exception of the United States. 

I will provide copies of a detailed summary 
and analysis of the fifth agreement and the 
report of the U.S. delegation to the negotiat- 
ing conference for the committee's use. 

Basically, the tin agreement seeks to sta- 
bilize tin prices within agreed price limits. 
This is done mainly through a buffer stock 
which buys tin to defend a floor price and 
sells tin to defend a ceiling. In addition, the 
agreement permits the imposition of export 
controls by producer members when neces- 
sary to supplement buffer stock operations 
in defending the floor. 

Buffer stock financing contributions are 
compulsory for producer and voluntary for 
consumer members. Thus far, four consumer 
members, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and the United Kingdom, either have made 
contributions or will do so under the fifth 
agreement. The United States has announced 
it does not intend to make a contribution. 

Decisions on price ranges, export controls, 
and other matters are made by the Inter- 
national Tin Council. Producers and con- 
sumers share voting power equally, with 
each group holding 1,000 votes. All decisions 
require at least a majority of both groups, 
voting separately. The United States will 
hold an estimated 255 of the 1,000 consumer 

The executive branch undertook an inten- 
sive interagency review of the fifth agree- 
ment last summer. This study concluded that 
U.S. membership would have no adverse eco- 
nomic effects on the United States. 

As a member of the tin agreement the 
United States would have two basic obliga- 

— To pay a proportionate share of the In- 
ternational Tin Council's administrative ex- 
penses. For the United States, this would be 
an estimated $115,000 for the first year. 

— To consult with the International Tin 

May 10, 1976 


Council on tin disposals fi'om our stockpile. 

Since we have always consulted with the 
Tin Council, the obligation to consult on 
stockpile disposals will have little practical 
effect. However, the United States has re- 
tained and will retain the right of final deci- 
sion concerning its stockpile disposals. 

We believe that U.S. membership in the 
tin agreement will bring benefits : 

— Through its membership in the Tin 
Council the United States will be able to in- 
fluence the council's policies aflfecting the 
long-term supply of tin. 

— Our foreign relations will benefit from 
our support of one of the oldest and most 
successful producer-consumer organizations. 

Because we concluded that membership in 
the International Tin Agreement would have 
no adverse consequences for the United 
States and our participation will provide 
benefits, the President decided to sign the 
agreement, which we did on March 11. The 
agreement will shortly be submitted to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to ratifica- 
tion as a treaty. 


In terms of dollar volume, copper is the 
most important nonfuel mineral traded in 
international commodity markets. In 1974, 
total copper exports amounted to over $6 
billion. The economies of a number of less 
developed countries (Zambia, Chile, Zaire, 
and Peru) are heavily dependent on copper 

The United States is relatively self-suffi- 
cient in copper, supplying between 85 and 90 
percent of its needs domestically, while 
Japan and Western Europe must import 
most of the copper they consume. Because 
of our self-sufficiency and the structure of 
our copper market, with much of our copper 
produced by a few large integrated com- 
panies and sold on the basis of long-term 
prices established by individual producers, 
we have been relatively insulated from the 
wider price volatility of the world copper 
market, in which prices fluctuate on a daily 




Recent wide fluctuations in the copper 
market have produced new momentum for 
international discussions between copper 
consumers and producers. In his address to 
the U.N. General Assembly in September 
1975 Secretary Kissinger gave priority to 
the establishment of a consumer-producer 
forum for copper. The call for dialogue was 
taken up by CIPEC (the Intergovernmental 
Council of Copper Exporting Countries) at ai 
meeting in Lima in November 1975. CIPEC 
membership consists of Chile, Peru, Zaire, 
Zambia, and Indonesia, and two associate! 
members, Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
CIPEC claims it represents about 72 percent 
of internationally traded copper, or 45 per- 
cent of free-world mine production. 

Prior to last November, CIPEC had re- 
peatedly indicated that it was neither inter- 
ested in, nor ready for, discussions witb 
consumers. Its new attitude was based partly 
on CIPEC's realization that copper's sensi- 
tivity to industrial cycles and its own lim- 
ited control of the market would continue 
to render ineffective any unilateral efforts on. 
its part to stabilize or raise prices. 

The United States welcomed the CIPEC 
call for a dialogue with consumers and indi- 
cated our interest in a discussion withoul 
preconditions. Early this year, CIPEC re- 
quested the assistance of UNCTAD ir 
scheduling intergovernmental consultationf 
on copper. 

Some 30 major producers and consumera 
of copper met in Geneva March 23-27, 1976 
for ad hoc consultations. The consultation 
were held in a cooperative and pragmatic 
atmosphere, marked by generally moderate 
and constructive producer attitudes. Th< 
United States, whose delegation included ad 
visers from our copper industry, participateo 
actively in the discussions, and we an 
pleased with both the tone and the results. 

The discussions resulted in agreement to 
(a) establish a permanent producer-con- 
sumer forum for copper, (b) set up an in- 
terim committee to facilitate its establish- 
ment, and (c) accept a tentative list oi 
studies to be carried out by the new organi- 
zation. The interim committee is to submit 
its proposals before October to the UNCTADi 





Department of State Bulletin 

.ecretariat, which will call another consulta- 
ion on copper before December 1976. Spe- 
ific methods of stabilizing the copper mar- 
et were not discussed during the meeting. 
At the UNCTAD meeting and other 
orums, the United States has taken the po- 
ition that consideration of specific arrange- 
lents or mechanisms for bringing greater 
tability to the copper market is premature 
ntil an adequate base of information and 
nalysis is developed. When we entered the 
INCTAD consultations, we stated that we 
elieved their main purpose was to launch a 
etailed exploration of the nature and prob- 
•ms of the international copper industry 
nd market. We supported the establishment 
f a permanent consultative body of con- 
imers and producers of copper in which 
li.s exploration could be conducted. This 
jsition met with general acceptance on the 
art of both consumers and producers. 


Bauxite is the chief source of aluminum, 
hich ranks second in importance only to 
;eel in terms of metal consumption. As in 
le case of tin, the United States must rely 
1 imports for its basic and intermediate 
uminum raw materials. We import about 
5 percent of our bauxite needs, with about 
ine-tenths of our imports coming from the 
2veloping countries in the Caribbean area, 
bout 35 percent of our alumina, the inter- 
lediate step between bauxite and aluminum, 

imported, largely from Australia and Ja- 

As these figures would indicate, aluminum 
nd its raw materials are the focus of con- 
derable attention in discussions between de- 
eloped and developing countries. Several 
ictors help explain why: 

— Bauxite is concentrated largely in the 
eveloping countries. Apart from Australia, 
le major deposits are found in Jamaica, 
urinam, Guinea, Guyana, the Dominican 
epublic, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and India. 

— Alumina and aluminum processing, on 
le other hand, occurs primarily in the de- 
eloped countries. As with other raw mate- 

rials, the bauxite producers wish to obtain 
for themselves more of the value added by 
further processing bauxite into alumina and 

— Alumina and aluminum processing is 
high cost. The large amounts of capital re- 
quired for such facilities indicate that 
multinational corporations, state-owned en- 
terprises, and/or international lending con- 
sortia will be the major source of future in- 

— Finally, the international aluminum in- 
dustry is highly integrated. Most production 
takes place within companies which are in- 
volved in all stages from ore mining to 
fabrication of final aluminum products. 
Thus, bauxite is not an internationally 
traded commodity in the sense that the 
other commodities I have discussed today 
are, and it is difficult to find a "market" 
price for bauxite. As a consequence, bauxite- 
producing countries have concentrated less 
on questions of price and more on taxes and 
production levies. 

To deal with what they saw as common 
problems, seven major bauxite producers 
established the International Bauxite Asso- 
ciation (IBA) in 1974. The producer-only 
IBA now has 11 members: Australia, the 
Dominican Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Guy- 
ana, Haiti, Indonesia, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, 
Surinam, and Yugoslavia (plus Greece, 
India, and Trinidad and Tobago as observ- 
ers) . All of its decisions must be unanimous. 

The IBA has denied that it has any price- 
fixing ambitions along the lines of OPEC 
[Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries]. Instead, it sees itself largely as a 
clearinghouse for exchanges of economic and 
technical information that will assist mem- 
bers in coordinating development of their 
bauxite industries. However, the IBA has 
initiated studies which carry implications 
that could afi'ect the operations of the major 
privately owned international aluminum 
companies. Areas under study by the IBA 
include taxation policy, and a formula to 
"index" the price of bauxite to the price of 
finished aluminum. 

There are a number of constraints on the 

•tey 10, 1976 


IBA's ability to act arbitrarily to increase 
prices. First, aluminum is vulnerable to 
many potential substitutes, including copper 
for electrical uses; steel, paper, glass, and 
plastics for packaging; steel and wood for 
construction; and a range of metals for 
other uses. Also, aluminum is the most 
abundant metallic element in the earth's 
crust, and is plentiful in the United States 
and elsewhere in various minerals other than 
bauxite. There are problems of transition 
and relative costs in using nonbauxitic min- 
erals for aluminum, but over the longer term 
these sources can become important. 

To date the IBA has declined to allow con- 
sumer countries to participate in its activ- 
ities. This attitude is in contrast to those of 
other intergovernmental organizations deal- 
ing with metals. We believe that cooperative 
producer-consumer efforts are more likely to 
find workable solutions to mutual problems 
than can either group working in isolation. 
For this reason we hope that the IBA will 
come to see the value of consumer participa- 
tion in its activities. 

Mr. Chairman, as can be seen from this 
brief review of six commodities, it is difficult 
to generalize about the nature of the prob- 
lems affecting commodity trade and the best 
solutions to them. An international agree- 
ment to deal with the problems of coffee is 
no more appropriate for cocoa than it would 
be for bananas. A tin agreement would not 
work for copper or bauxite. Each individual 
commodity must be examined and discussed 
in its own context. Among the factors which 
must be considered are the nature of the mar- 
ket, the location of production, the perish- 
ability of the product, the competition from 
substitutes, the sensitivity of supply and 
demand to changes in price, and the range 
of domestic interests involved, whether from 
industrial processors, growers, or consum- 

Mr. Chairman, commodity policy is one of 
the major issues under active international 
discussion. Because of our importance as 
both a major producer and a major consumer 
of commodities, we have a special interest 


as well as a special responsibility in thi 
dialogue. The United States has played an; 
will continue to play a leadership role ii 
these discussions. 

International Coffee Agreement 
Transmitted to the Senate 

Message From President Ford ' 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I am transmitting herewith, for the advic 
and consent of the Senate to ratification, th 
International Coffee Agreement, 1976. I 
doing so, I am the fourth President sine 
1962 to seek favorable Senate consideratio: 
of an International Cofi'ee Agreement. Th 
1976 Agreement is similar to those of 196 
and 1968, but it contains a number of ir 
novative features which represent a consic 
erable improvement for consumers. I strong 
ly urge that the Senate give advice and con 
sent to ratification of this Agreement, thu 
agreeing that the spirit of cooperation, whic 
has characterized the international coffe 
community these past 14 years, should t 
continued and strengthened. 

Negotiation of the 1976 Agreement bega^ 
in January of 1975 and continued througl 
out the year. On October 28, 1975, the Sei 
ate unanimously approved the Protocol fc 
the Continuation in Force of the Inte: 
national Coffee Agreement of 1968, as Ei^' 
tended, which allowed the continued exis 
ence of the International Coffee Organizatio 
through September 30, 1976, preserving 
as a source of statistical information and s 
the forum for negotiation of the new Agrei 
ment. These negotiations were completed i 
December and resulted in a greatly improve 
International Coffee Agreement. 

The Coffee Agreement of 1962, and if 
successor, the Coffee Agreement of 1968, wei 

'Transmitted on Apr. 5 (text from White Hous 
press release); also printed as S. Ex. H, 94th Cong 
2d sess., which includes the texts of the agreemes 
and the report of the Department of State. 

Department of State Bulleti 


lesigned to stabilize the export earnings of 
)roducing countries by moderating the tra- 
litional boom or bust cycle of coffee pro- 
hiction. These Agreements were largely 
luccessful in meeting their objectives. Over- 
)i-oduction was brought under control and 
iccumulated surpluses were reduced without 
I disastrous disruption of the market. At 
he same time, consumers enjoyed relative 
brice stability. However, the Agreements 
vere not designed to deal with situations of 
hort supply. 

The situation the coffee community faces 
oday differs considerably from the situa- 
ions in 1962 and 1968. Coffee is no longer 
n surplus, and inventories in both produc- 
ng and consuming countries are low. On 
uly 17, 1975, the coffee growing regions of 
?razil were hit by the most severe frost 
ince 1918, destroying hundreds of millions 
f coffee trees and thus sharply reducing the 
iroductive capacity of the world's largest 
iroducer for the next several years. The 
yorld faces a period of short supply of cof- 
ee. How long this period may last will de- 
lend on how well the international coffee 
ommunity can manage its efforts to restore 
iroduction and stocks. 

The International Coffee Agreement of 
976 was concluded after the Brazilian frost 
nd takes into account our experience in the 
962 and 1968 Agreements. It contains a 
lumber of new features designed to deal 
i'ith the situation we expect to face in the 
uture. The Agreement contains strong new 
ncentives for the early restoration of nor- 
nal supplies to consumer member markets. 

The most important features of the new 
Agreement are the following: 

— The Agreement is intended to stabilize 
)rices within the range of long term market 
rends and to encourage the restoration of 
idequate production levels. There are no 
ixed price objectives. 

— Consumers are provided with assurances 
;here will be no I'estriction on the flow of 
;offee to the market while prices are high. 
Thus, the Agreement commences with its 

export quotas in suspense. Producers have 
assurances of renewed consumer cooperation 
should a temporary production surplus re- 
appear. The Agreement should act as a stim- 
ulus to producing countries to restore pro- 
duction to levels adequate to meet consump- 
tion needs at reasonable prices. 

— Those coffee producers who perform 
best during the next two years will be re- 
wai'ded with a permanent increase in their 
basic quotas, which is an additional incentive 
to ship to the market every available bag of 

— Quotas will go to those countries which 
have coffee available to ship through a new 
and more flexible system of annual quota 

— The Agreement is the most generous in 
its quota allocation to the smallest producers, 
and allows them the highest growth rates. 

Now, as in 1962 and 1968, coffee remains 
in financial terms the most important non- 
petroleum commodity exported by develop- 
ing countries. A large number of developing 
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia 
rely on coffee as a major source of their ex- 
port earnings. Altogether, 43 producing na- 
tions participated in the negotiation of the 
new Agreement and are expected to join it. 

As the world's largest consuming country, 
coffee is also important to the U.S. In 1974, 
we impoi-ted coffee valued at $1.5 billion. 
In that same year, we exported agricultural 
and manufactured products to the coffee 
producing countries worth over $15 billion. 
We are good customers of the coffee produc- 
ing countries, and they are good customers 
of ours. 

We and the other consuming countries 
have constructed a unique cooperative rela- 
tionship with the coffee producing countries 
within the framework of International Coffee 
Agreements. We have attempted, with a 
good measure of success, to find constructive 
solutions to the problems which affect the 
production and trade of coffee. I strongly 
urge this mutually beneficial effort as repre- 
sented in the new Agreement be continued. 

May 10, 1976 


I am also transmitting the report sub- 
mitted to me by the Department of State on 
the International Coffee Agreement of 1976. 

I I'ecommend that the Senate give early 
and favorable consideration to this Agree- 
ment and its advice and consent to ratifica- 
tion. The Secretary of State will submit 
legislation to implement the Agreement 
through September 30, 1979. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 5, 1976. 


Current Actions 


Judicial Procedure 

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or 

commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 

1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444. 

Ratification deposited: Finland (with reservations 

and declarations), April 7, 1976. 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for the 
safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at 
London November 26, 1968.' 
Acceptance deposited: Nauru, November 25, 1975. 


International telecommunication convention with an- 
nexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-ToiTemolinos 
October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1 
1975; for the United States April 7, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President, ivith declaration. 
April 19, 1976. 


Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex 
Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.' 
Accession deposited: Tanzania, April 12, 1976. 



Agreement establishing the Israel-United States Bi 
national Industrial Research and Developmen" 
Foundation, with annexes. Signed at Jerusalent 
March 3, 1976. Enters into force on the date botV 
governments make their contributions to the en 
dowment of the Foundation. 

Organization for the Development of the 
Senegal River 

Grant agreement for the environmental assessment o: 
the Senegal River Basin, with side letter am 
annex. Signed at Dakar February 25, 1976. Entere( 
into force February 25, 1976. 


Loan agreement concerning the financing of studie; 
and planning and consulting services directly re 
lated to capital projects and economic developmen 
programs in the Philippines. Signed at Manil: 
March 11, 1976. Entered into force March 11, 1976 

Not in force. 



Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 10, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 192 J^ 

Arms Control. A Strong Foreign Policy for a 
Confident America (Kissinger) .... 597 

China. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at Phoenix .... 604 


International Coflfee Agreement Transmitted to 
the Senate (message from President Ford) 614 

International Commodity Policy: Coffee, Cocoa, 
Sugar, Tin, Copper, and Bauxite (Katz) . 607 


International Coffee Agreement Transmitted 
to the Senate (message from President 
Ford) 614 

International Commodity Policy: Coffee, Cocoa, 
Sugar, Tin, Copper, and Bauxite (Katz) . 607 

Developing Countries. A Strong Foreign Policy 
for a Confident America (Kissinger) . . . 597 

Economic Affairs 

International Commodity Policy: Coffee, Cocoa, 
Sugar, Tin, Copper, and Bauxite (Katz) 607 

A Strong Foreign Policy for a Confident 
America (Kissinger) 597 

Industrial Democracie.s. A Strong Foreign 
Policy for a Confident America (Kissinger) 597 

I.srael. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at Phoenix .... 604 

Panama. Questions and Answers Following the 
Secretary's Address at Phoenix .... 604 

Presidential Documents. International Coffee 
Agreement Transmitted to the Senate . . 614 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 616 

International Coffee Agreement Transmitted to 

the Senate (message from President Ford) . 614 


Questions and Answers Following the Sec- 
retary's Address at Phoenix 604 

A Strong Foreign Policy for a Confident 
America (Kissinger) 597 

Yugoslavia. Questions and Answers Following 
the Secretary's Address at Phoenix .... 604 

Name Index 

Ford, President 614 

Katz, Julius L 607 

Kissinger, Secretary 597, 604 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 19-25 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Oflice of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

n83 4/20 Advisory Committee to the U.S. 
Section of the National Commis- 
sion for the Conservation of At- 
lantic Tunas established. 
*184 4/21 William A. Anders sworn in as 
Ambassador to Norway (bio- 
graphic data). 

"185 4/21 W. Beverly Carter, Jr., sworn in 
as Ambassador to Liberia (bio- 
graphic data). 

tl86 4/22 Kissinger: news conference. 

*187 4/22 U.S. Advisory Commission on In- 
ternational Educational and Cul- 
tural Affairs, May 17. 

*188 4/22 Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC), Subcommittee on Mari- 
time Law, May 26. 

*189 4/22 SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on container transport, 
June 30. 

*190 4/22 SCC, SOLAS, working group on 
radiocommunications, May 20. 

tl91 4/22 U.S. and Canada extend fisheries 

*192 4/22 SCC, May 27. 

tl93 4/23 Kissinger: departure, Andrews Air 
Force Base. 

n94 4/23 Richard J. Bloomfield sworn in as 
Ambassador to Ecuador (bio- 
graphic data). 

tl95 4/24 Kissinger, Brown: remarks, Lon- 
don, Apr. 23. 

tl96 4/24 Kissinger, Crosland: remarks, 
Waddington Royal Air Force 
Base, England. 

tl97 4/24 Kissinger: arrival, Nairobi. 

tl98 4/25 Kissinger: remarks, Nakuru, 

tl99 4/25 Kissinger: remarks, Nakuru, 

t200 4/25 Kissinger: departure, Nairobi. 

t201 4/25 Kissinger: arrival, Dar es Salaam. 

t202 4/25 Kissinger: toast, Dar es Salaam. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

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U.S. government printing office 



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Volume LXXIV 

No. 1925 

May 17, 1976 




Statement by Deputi/ Assistant Secretary Boeker 631 


For index see inside back cover 


Vol. LXXIV, No. 1925 
May 17, 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.16 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this pei'iodical is necessarj' 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
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approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers* Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart' 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases et 
international affairs and the function* 
of the Department. Information h 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 22 

Tress release 186 dated April 22 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in January you gave a 
'■cry optimistic report on the status of de- 
tente and SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks]. Since then it is evident that the 
situation has deteriorated. Can you tell us 
ii-hat happened and what are the prospects 
for improvement, if any? 

Secretary Kissinger: The principal ele- 
ment in the deterioration of relations with 
the Soviet Union is Soviet actions in Angola. 
We pointed out at the time, and we repeat, 
that we consider those actions irresponsible 
— inconsistent with the principles that 
govern the conduct between our nations — 
and the introduction of Cuban surrogate 
forces a very dangerous development. 

On the other hand, the basic necessities 
of preserving peace in the nuclear age and 
of regulating the relationship between the 
superpowers remain. And therefore the 
United States will continue to pursue the 
dual policy that we have emphasized over 
recent months. 

That is to say, first, we will resist irre- 
sponsible actions or the expansion of Soviet 
political influence by military power or the 
use of surrogate forces. Secondly, we re- 
main ready to work for a more peaceful 
world and more just international arrange- 
ments on the basis of strict reciprocity. We 
will pursue both of these strands, and we 
remain ready to pursue both of these 

Q. [Marvin Kalb, CBS Neivs] Mr. Secre- 
tary, do you believe that the United States 
today is capable of resisting irresponsible 
action by the Soviet Union? Does it have 
that kind of unity and coherence? 

Secretary Kissinger: Is it appropriate to 
welcome you back after a considerably ex- 
tended absence. 

The United States has the military ca- 
pacity, and it has the political will to resist 
irresponsible actions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I folloiv up the 
African part of that question? You and the 
President have been urging the Soviets to 
act with restraint in Africa. Hoiv do you 
define restraint? Does it require the removal 
of the last Cuban and Soviet military per- 
son ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our basic view with 
respect to Africa is that African problems 
should be settled by African nations and that 
Africa should be kept free of great-power 

The United States is prepared to act ac- 
cording to this principle, and it hopes that 
other major countries will act in the same 
manner. The United States would be ex- 
tremely concerned, as we have pointed out 
on a number of occasions, if the use of sur- 
rogate military forces, which could only take 
place with the support of a superpower, 
became an accepted pattern of dealing with 
issues in Africa. 

Now, we will make clear during my visit 
what our position is with respect to south- 
ern Africa and our strong support for ma- 
jority rule in southern Africa. We will also 
make clear our support for the development 
objectives of African nations. And finally, we 
will make clear our support for the unity of 
African nations. 

We have no interest in splitting the 
African nations or lining them up into 
groups, some of which support one super- 

May 17, 1976 


power and others another superpower. But 
we believe, of course, that this requires re- 
straint by all sides, and this must be our 

Q. SpecificaUy 07i that, hotv will the So- 
viets have to act to convince the United 
States that they are acting responsibly in 
Africa ? 

Secretary Kissinger: They would have to 
act to live up to these principles of not inter- 
fering with military force and/or large-scale 
military equipment in internal African prob- 
lems. And we believe, of course, that Cuban 
troops should be withdrawn from Africa. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the Cubans 
and the Soviet Union doing at this particu- 
lar time? Angola is now more or less over. 
Is there .'itill a flow of Soviet arms? Is there 
still a replacement or continuing level of 
Cuban forces in Angola? And what is your 
perception of what the Cuban surrogate 
forces will be doing next? 

Secretary Kissinger: The present level of 
Cuban forces in Africa, including all the 
countries, is in excess of 15,000. Our esti- 
mate of Cuban forces in Angola is 13,000 or 
14,000. There has been some rotation. That 
is, some troops have been replaced by other, 
more technical personnel. But the total 
number of Cuban foi'ces in Angola is roughly 
at the level at which it has been since the 
end of January. 

We receive conflicting reports about what 
Cuban forces are doing in other parts of 
Africa or whether Cuban forces from Angola 
are being moved from Angola to other areas. 
We have had no confirmed reports, but we 
have warned repeatedly that the use of 
Cuban surrogate forces is going to increase 
international tensions enormously and is go- 
ing to be incompatible with the relaxation 
of tensions and is going to be a very danger- 
ous course. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to Mr. Freed's 
[Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press'\ ques- 
tion, may we assume that the chances for a 
SALT agreement in the present political 

climate for the foreseeable future are pretty 
m uch eliminated ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to dis- 
illusion you in the face of your frequent pre- 
dictions on the subject. 

As the President pointed out yesterday, 
we remain prepared to continue the SALT 
negotiations, and we believe that an equi- 
table SALT agreement is possible and is de- 
sirable. We are not operating against an 
artificial deadline. We are studying the 
Soviet reply. We have had several meetings 
on the subject. And we will answer it in due 
course. I would not preclude the possibility 
that significant progress can be made this 

Q. Mr. Secretary, some observers have 
noted that there may be a contradiction in 
the American pledges of support for black 
majority rule in southern Africa and your 
warnings against Cuban or Soviet interfer- 
ence in that some of the black nations may 
be hoping or relying on Cuban or Soviet help 
in achieving the objective of black African 
rule. I want to ask you whether you feel on 
this trip you can make credible the Ameri- 
can commitment to support black African 
majority rule. 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course the 
achievement of African objectives has to be 
primarily an African problem, but I will be 
prepared to discuss with my African hosts 
the concrete policies that could be imple- 
mented to bring about majority rule. And I 
will be prepared to put forward what the 
United States in its turn is prepared to do 
or to support. 

I do not accept the proposition that the 
use of extracontinental military force sup- 
ported by one of the superpowers is the only 
way of achieving the aspirations of the black 
African countries. And it is indeed our belief 
that it is the way that leads to the greatest 
danger that Africa will become a part of 
the great-power rivalry. 

So we recognize that this strong desire 
exists on the part of the black African na- 
tions, that it must be given a realistic per- 


Department of State Bulletin 

spective, and we believe that this is achiev- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that major- 
ity ride i)i Rhodesia is possible in the next 
decade ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I do. 

Election Campaign and U.S. -Soviet Relations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could tve go back to de- 
tente for a moment? I ivould like to read to 
you and ifivite your comment on a question 
from a Tony Leivis [Anthony Lewis, New 
York Times] column last week. He's speak- 
ing — he's uniting about your speeches across 
the country. He says: "The Kissinger road- 
show has a desperate tone, and no wonder. 
For the Secretary of State is campaigning at 
the same time on behalf of a policy and of a 
President who has effectively abandoned 
that policy." How much is your own Admin- 
istration responsible for the slow progress 
in detente at this point — leaving aside the 
Reagans and the Jacksons? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have noticed that 
the op-ed page of the New York Times is not 
unanimous in support of me. The policy that 
I have stated is of course the policy of the 
President. The statements about the objec- 
tives of the United States with respect to 
relations with the Soviet Union are the views 
of the President, as of course they are my 
own views. Therefore I cannot accept the 
particular statement that you have read. 

We have, as I pointed out at the time — as 
a result of Watergate, of the aftermath of 
Watergate, of a series of congressional-ex- 
ecutive disagreements — we have suffered 
from a lack of clarity in other countries' 
minds about what the United States can and 
will do in given circumstances. For this we 
have paid a price. This we are attempting to 
rectify. And this, any Administration will 
have to overcome. 

But the basic objective of seeking to pre- 
vent Soviet expansion and at the same time 
to build a safer world than one that depends 
entirely on nuclear confrontation, those 

objectives are fixed and will have to be pur- 
sued by any Administration. 

Q. A brief follow, if I may. But aren't yon 
making any concessions on your own to the 
fact that there is a political campaign going 
on noui? Isn't detente slotving doivn by U.S. 
desires — by Administration desires — to avoid 
a campaign problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: The primary prob- 
lem in relations with the Soviet Union has 
been the irresponsible Soviet action in 
Angola. The basic foreign policy of the 
United States depends on the national in- 
terests of the United States, and it is not a 
partisan matter. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you talked about Water- 
gate. Going beyond Watergate, given the 
fact that we are now in the Presidential 
campaign with the inevitable attacks on for- 
eign policy, are you finding that these at- 
tacks are affecting the perception of the 
United States abroad and affecting Amer- 
ica's ability to operate in the international 

Secretary Kissinger: Inevitably, when the 
United States is described as second rate, 
when it is alleged that senior officials of the 
U.S. Government are resigned to getting the 
best deal they can from a nation that is 
perceived to be dominant — all charges which 
are wrong and irresponsible — inevitably this 
is bound to affect the perceptions of other 

On the other hand, I believe that other 
countries have seen enough of American 
political campaigns to know that candidates 
sometimes get cai'ried away with the ex- 
uberance of their speechwriters, and there- 
fore I think it will be seen in the correct 
perspective as the campaign — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your remarks about 
U.S.-Soviet relations, you said the United 
States has the military capacity and the 
political tvill to resist. Other than rhetoric, 
how has the United States demonstrated 
either of those capacities in the past feiv 

May 17, 1976 


Secretary Kissinger: In the past few 
weeks there has been no occasion to demon- 
strate that capacity. 

Q. I am fipeakinfi more of ivill than mili- 
tarij capacity. 

Secretary Kissinger: I can only speak for 
the Administration. The Administration be- 
lieves that we have the military capacity. 
And we certainly have the will to resist any 
expansionist moves, any irresponsible ac- 

We believe also that, after an understand- 
able readjustment in the executive-congres- 
sional balance, that within the Congress 
there is a growing realization that in times 
of crisis, decisive American action may be 
necessaiy. What the congressional reaction 
will be in specific circumstances can of 
course not be determined until the circum- 
stances arise. 

Q. Well, one of the charges that's been 
leveled against the Administration is of an 
umvillingness to use some of the web of rela- 
tionships that you've built up over the past 
couple of years with the Soviet Union — to 
withhold from the Soviets, for example, 
some of the scientific information, or thp 
unheal, as in the grain deal. Ca7i you give 
one instance where the United States, over 
the past few months, has implemented any 
of these tools? 

Secretary Kissinger: The fact is that as a 
result of legislative actions, this web of 
relationships exists more in the imagination 
of some writers than in reality. 

There are no technological exchanges of 
any significance that could have been inter- 
rupted. The only item of any significance 
that was available for interruption was the 
sale of grain. 

As you know, the Administration is al- 
ready being accused of having interrupted 
that for four months last year, and it is 
obvious that a major trading relationship 
cannot be interrupted every three months 
and still be available as a part of a fabric of 
the overall relationship. 

Except for that, there are no significant 
exchanges in which the government partici- 

pates that could have been interrupted. We 
did interrupt those items that were mostly 
of a discussion nature that were available 
to us to indicate our displeasure with the 
actions that had been taken. But — I repeat — 
the United States will use the tools it has 
available; and it would have used more tools 
had they been made available, in case there 
were irresponsible actions. 

Q. Mr. Secreta7-y, are you seeing any re- 
action ivhatsoever — in any positive form — 
to these warnings that you have been sound- 
ing since February? You have said that 
U.S.-Soviet relatioiis cannot survive another 
Angola. Are you not having greater difficulty 
distinguishing betiveen the validity of main- 
taining these two tracks than you have hadi 
before, if the weight that you are putting 
and you are emphasizing here is so heavy- 
on the danger the Soviet Union is putting o«i 
the maintenance of the total relationship? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'm not absolutely 
sure that I understand all the ramifications- 
of the question. 

Q. Try any one of them. 

Secretary Kissinger: But as I understand 
the question, of course there haven't been 
any more Angolas since January. I would 
not consider that conclusive within any four- 
month period ; and I believe that the Soviet 
Union is taking stock, just as we are, of the 
significance of recent events. 

I can only repeat that the basic validity 
of our two-track approach remains in effect. 

Of course, in specific periods it may be that 
one has to put more emphasis on one side 
rather than the other. 

At this point, we have to warn against 
the dangers of irresponsible actions because 
there is a danger of irresponsible action. But 
we would also emphasize that we are pre- 
pared to work for a better relationship and 
the choice is essentially up to the Soviet 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I can go back to an 
earlier question here and your answer about 
the American commitment to black majority 
rule in Africa — the Administration is on 
record as opposing the Byrd amendment but 


Department of State Bulletin 

doesn't reallji do anything to get it repealed. 
You made strong statements reaffirming the 
commitment to black majority ride only 
after the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened 
i)i Angola. And the only question was: How 
are you going to make credible now, in view 
of this past history, this commitment and 
this desire for change in southern Africa? 

Achievement of African Objectives 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that will be one 
of the problems on my African trip; and I 
think that the decision that will have to be 
made by African countries, as by us, is to 
what extent they want to continue discus- 
sions about the past or to what extent they 
are willing to turn to the future. 

There have been periods, for example, in 
our Middle East policy when it would have 
been equally correct to say that the United 
States did not pursue an extremely active 
Middle East policy. When we decided that 
the time was right to move — for whatever 
reason — we became more active. 

The same is true in Africa. I am going to 
Africa with an open mind and with the in- 
tention of working together with African 
nations to achieve those objectives which we 
share. It is now up, in part, to the African 
nations to see with what attitude they will 

We will certainly go with an attitude of 
good will and with an open mind and with 
some concrete ideas, which we are prepared 
to modify, of how these objectives — both in 
the political field and in the economic field — 
can be realized. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Kaunda {of 
Zambia] and President Nyerere [of Tan- 
zania] have both advocated that roar is prob- 
ably the only solution for the racial problem. 
The leaders of the black African movement 
in Rhodesia have described your visit as an 
attempt to set up a puppet regime of Afri- 
cans. Do you think you might be missing the 
boat on this one? Are you going in a little 
bit too late? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that remains to 

be seen. We certainly do not go to set up a 
puppet regime. It is beyond our capabilities, 
and it is beyond our intentions. 

The only successful African policy is one 
in which African nations can achieve African 
objectives without outside intervention. 
Whether war is the only means available de- 
pends in part on the progress of negotiations 
between, especially, the Rhodesian regime 
and the black liberation movements in that 

We have strongly supported the urgent 
resumption of negotiations. We have also 
supported the proposals put forward by the 
then British Foreign Secretary Callaghan. 

So I believe that it may be possible to 
achieve these objectives by peaceful means, 
and that is certainly our preference. 

Complex Situation in Lebanon 

Q. Before you go ahead, may I ask three 
related Mideast questions? 

First of all, has any compromise been 
reached on the transition funds for Israel? 

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my 
knowledge, no. 

Q. Secondly, has there been any change in 
the U.S. position regarding ivhether Israel 
should negotiate with the PLO [Palestine 
Liberation Organization] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. 

Q. And, third, what's your current assess- 
ment of the situation in Lebanon and the 
number of Syrian troops now in Lebanon? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the situation in 
Lebanon remains precarious. You have many 
factions, with partially incompatible objec- 
tives. You have the total absence, at this 
moment, of a central authority with its own 
means of enforcing its directives. Now you 
have a precarious cease-fire. You have an 
attempt to work out a constitutional solu- 

And over all of this hangs the threat of 
various kinds of outside intervention, some 
by countries in the area, some by countries 
outside of the area. 

Now, we're attempting to assist the 

May 17, 1976 


parties in walking through this minefield, 
in avoiding outside intervention, in achiev- 
ing a political solution that preserves a de- 
gree of autonomy for both of the communi- 
ties and that preserves the integrity and 
sovereignty of Lebanon. 

There has been some Syrian military in- 
tervention in the border areas. There has 
not been a massive military intervention in 
the key areas. 

We are opposed to the military interven- 
tion of outside countries, and we have re- 
peatedly pointed out the factual situation 
that there is a flashpoint at which events 
could become irreversible. 

Up to now, we think that the general 
evolution in Lebanon has moved in the direc- 
tion of a constitutional solution which pre- 
serves a position for both of the communi- 
ties. And we believe also that the best way 
to prevent outside intervention is to bring 
about this constitutional solution within 
Lebanon as rapidly as possible. 

I think we have announced that Ambas- 
sador [L. Dean] Brown — who has done an 
outstanding job — is returning for consulta- 
tions. I'm meeting with him in London 
tomorrow night, and then he's coming back 
to the United States. 

His assignment was always to be a tem- 
porary assignment. He will return briefly 
to Lebanon, and then he will be replaced by 
Ambassador Meloy [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] 
in the first part of May. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you cotdd 
take us into your confidence and share some 
of your private thoughts ivith us. That is 
essentially the question that Barry [Barrtt 
Schiceid. Associated Press] put to you he- 

What are you not doing in order to ac- 
commodate to the political requirements of 
President Ford under attack by Senator 
Jackson and Governor Reagan? What areas 
of American foreign policy are now languish- 
ing—loitering, so to speak — because you 
find yourself hampered by political require- 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it would be 

very difficult to answer this in absolute 
terms. There are no occasions when the 
President and I meet where he would say, 
"We cannot do this for political reasons." 

On the other hand, it is clear that when 
there are so many candidates in the field, 
and when there's a possibility of being ac- 
cused of political motivations in making a 
dramatic move, that there is a temptation — 
or a tendency — to defer dramatic moves that 
could be seen as being politically motivated 
until that particular element of discord is 
removed. And that is not so much because 
of any immediate controversy but because 
of the necessity that our foreign policy be 
seen as the foreign policy of a unified coun- 
try and not as being inspired by partisan 

So, on the whole, I think it is true that 
as foreign countries look at the United 
States every four years, there is a certain 
slowdown in new initiatives that can be car- 
ried out. This is part of the price we pay for 
our free political process. It seems to happen 
every four years. And it is unavoidable, to 
some extent — though compressing the politi- 
cal campaign would not hurt our foreign 

Q. Mr. Secretary, just a second ago, when 
you said that there was a threat of some out- 
•s/rfe intervention in Lebanon from countries 
outside of the area— not only from countries 
— u-ei'e you referring to the Soviet Union? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
there is any immediate threat of Soviet in- 
tervention in the area. There's the general 
danger that in case of a Middle East war 
that outside powers might be drawn in, at 
least, in the form of confrontations, as has 
happened in every other Middle East con- 

Jerry [Jeremiah O'Leary, Washington 
Star] . 

Purpose of Visit to Africa 

Q. With respect to your forthcoming trip 
to Africa, you state you're in favor of major- 
ity rule. Why hasn't the Administration 


Department of State Bulletin 

))Hide a concerted effort to repeal the Byrd 
uDiendment? There was an attempt by some 
Congressmen to do that in the last two 
weeks, but they said they coiddn't do it vn- 
less there was Administration support. 

Secretary Kissinger: In the last few weeks 
there was an attempt to hang a repeal of the 
Byrd amendment on another piece of legisla- 
tion. I would expect that after my return 
from Africa we will take another look at 
the Byrd amendment, and we will make our 
position clear to the Congress insofar as it 
isn't clear today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up that, is the 
United States ready to do anything to limit 
our economic relations with South Africa; 
and are ive ready to give any kind of sup- 
port, economic or otherwise, to any of the 
liberation groups, particularly Rhodesian 
groups ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United 
States has already restricted its economic 
contact — its governmental economic contact 
with South Africa — but we will announce an 
integrated policy after my trip to Africa, 
after I've had an opportunity to meet with 
key leaders, and after I have had an oppor- 
tunity to report to the President for any 
decisions that he may want to make. 

Q. Will it be any .specific objective, Mr. 
Secretary, of yours on this trip to try to get 
negotiations between the Smith regime and 
the black nationalist government of — 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not say this 
is a specific objective by which you can 
measure the trip. We strongly favor the re- 
sumption of negotiations on Rhodesia at the 
earliest possible occasion. The primary ob- 
jective of the trip is to establish with 
African leaders a community of concerns 
with respect to the problem of the political 
evolution of southern Africa and with re- 
spect to the problem of development which 
affects Africa more than any other region 
of the world, since all of its countries are 
really developing countries. 

It's for this reason that I'm returning 
from Dakar clear across the continent to 

head our delegation at the UNCTAD Confer- 
ence [U.N. Conference on Trade and Devel- 
opment] in Nairobi — to put forward what I 
hope will be considered constructive Ameri- 
can proposals to the general problem of de- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in what country will you 
meet irith the black leaders of Rhodesia? 

Secretary Kissinger: Probably in Zambia. 

Q. Mr. Nkomo [Jo.'^hua Nkomo, African 
National Council], and ivho else? 

Secretary Kissinger: We will see as the 
trip develops. But certainly Mr. Nkomo. 

MIA's and Normalizing U.S. -Hanoi Relations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been nearly a year 
si7ice the fall of Saigon. You have had an 
exchange of messages tvith the leaders in 
Hanoi. What is your evaluation of the pros- 
pects toward normalization? 

Secretary Kissinger: The leaders in Hanoi 
developed certain patterns of dealing with 
us during the Vietnamese war which are not 
always conducive to improving relations be- 
tween the United States and Hanoi. They 
have a tendency to proceed by the formula- 
tion of ultimatums and to suffer from the 
misapprehension that we need an improved 
relationship with Hanoi in order to affect 
the outcome of our elections. I have read 
this in various newspaper accounts in Hanoi. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
our principal interest is to get an accounting 
for the missing in action. And there is no 
possibility of improving our relationship 
without an accounting for the missing in 

If Hanoi believes that we are doing this in 
order to affect the outcome of the election, 
we are perfectly prepared to wait for dis- 
cussions until after the election and thereby 
remove this particular issue. 

We have stated publicly that we are, in 
principle, prepared to have talks with Hanoi 
in which each side will be free to raise any 
issue that it wishes and that then the out- 
come of these talks can determine whether 

May 17, 1976 


there is a sufficient basis for normalizing 

As far as we are concerned, the absolute 
precondition is a complete accounting for the 
missing in action. 

Response to Cuban Attitudes 

Q. Mr. Secretanj, there seems to have been 
something of a disparity between your state- 
ments on relations with Cuba and the Presi- 
dent's. The President said that it ivas all 
over in attempts to achieve some kind of 
normalization. You said it was interrupted. 
And the President said that Castro ivas an 
"international outlaw, " and you didn't. 

I ask now, in light of this apparent dis- 
parity, what has to be done to get some kind 
of attempt at normalization ivith Cuba going 
again? And how do you implement the hi- 
jacking agreement with a man who has been 
termed an international outlaw? 

Secretary Kissinger: The President has a 
more plastic way of expressing himself 
than I do — or I may have a more compli- 
cated way of expressing myself. 

We, of course, are prepared to implement 
the hijacking agreement, and we do not ap- 
prove of any activities that may be mounted 
from American territory against Cuban 

There is no possibility of continuing any 
discussions with Cuba about normalization 
of relations as long as Cuban military forces 
are stationed in Africa, and as long as Cuba 
continues the attacks on America — on Amer- 
ican policy in Puerto Rico and elsewhere. 

So, unless there is a substantial change in 
Cuban attitudes, the process of improving 
relations can be considered suspended. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about the 
status of the Hawk missile deal with Jordan. 
Has it fallen through? Is it true that it is out 
of the question? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Hawk missile 
deal with Jordan, which was originally com- 
puted primarily on the basis of hardware, 
when the additional collateral costs became 

evident went beyond what Saudi Arabia had 
originally promised to Jordan. There are now 
discussions going on between Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia and between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia to see whether Saudi 
Arabia would be prepared to support the 
additional costs that would be involved in the 
Hawk deal. 

These discussions are still going on, and 
until we have a conclusive answer we cannot 
tell whether the Hawk deal can be imple- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did you mean when 
you said the President has a "plastic way" 
of expressing himself? 

Secretary Kissinger: You are absolutely 
determined that I ruin myself before I get 
off to Africa. [Laughter.] 

Q. Plastic melts in heat. I don't under- 
stand the term. 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware that 
plastic melts in heat. I think that the Presi- 
dent's use of adjectives is more graphic than 
mine because, being from the Teutonic tradi- 
tion, you cannot tell what a sentence of mine 
means until I place the verb at the end of it. 

Perception of U.S. Policy in Election Year 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it a fair summary of 
your response to Bernie Kalh's question that 
there will be no new initiatives in dealings 
u-ith the Soviet Union — what? Until the 
Republican Convention or until the election? 
Until Reagan is out of the way? What are 
you saying exactly? 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

Seo'etary Kissinger: Wait a minute. Do 
you want to answer the question? 

Q. No. [Laughter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: As I understood 
Bernie Kalb's question, it was in the great 
philosophical tradition of these press con- 

Q. Yes. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secrefanj Kissinger: And he asked me to 
jjive a brief political science lecture on the 
impact of political campaigns on the conduct 
of foreign policy, and I stated, as a general 
pioposition, that those new initiatives that 
might be considered by the public as being 
motivated by partisan considerations would 
tend to be deferred until it is clearer that 
tliey are not motivated by partisan consid- 
erations — if they can be deferred. 

On the other hand, there are many well- 
established policies, including SALT, which 
the President reaffirmed again yesterday, 
basic relationships with Western Europe, 
basic relationships with Japan and other 
areas, as well as new African policies, that 
will of course be pursued with energy and 
conviction during the campaign. 

I simply responded in a philosophical way 
to a philosophical question, and you should 
not draw — 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I strip my question 
of the philosophy noiv, and take you to the 
specifics? Can yon itemize, for example, ivhat 
initiatires might in fact be deferred because 
they might be perceived, as you suggest, as 
deriving from partisan consideration? What 
would you feel is being in fact put off until 
the election? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I didn't 
(Say that matters would be put off until the 
election. I stated the fact that as far as for- 
eign governments are concerned, the percep- 
tion of the United States in an election year, 
with all the controversy that is going on 
about basic policies and our basic intentions, 
tends to be that in an election year there is 
a slowdown on great new initiatives. 

There is no specific initiative, as I specifi- 
cally pointed out, which has been deferred as 
a result of the electoral campaign. But it is 
obvious that the attention of key personnel 
is focused not exclusively on foreign policy. 
At least that is my impression. 

Q. To get less philosophical, isn't that — 

Q. Assistant Secretary [for Inter-Ameri- 
can Affairs William D.I Rogers called in 

Chilean junta .Ambassador Manuel Trucco to 
criticize the continuing violations of human 
rights in that country and particularly 
harassment of the Chileans who had met 
with U.S. Congressmen in Chile recently. 
This u-ould seem to indicate Administration 
displeasure nnth the military regime's poli- 
cies. But, at the same time, it has been an- 
nounced that you plan to attend the OAS 
meeting in Santiago in June, and that possi- 
bility has been criticized by some as one that 
would legitimize that dictatorship's policies. 
Do you plan to attend the meeting, and 
could you please respond to the criticism? 

Secretary Kissinger: The meeting in San- 
tiago is a meeting of all the foreign minis- 
ters of the Western Hemisphere. It is a 
meeting of the OAS in Santiago. All other 
foreign ministers, with one possible excep- 
tion, are planning to attend. 

The purpose of my visit to this meeting 
would be to continue discussions about our 
Western Hemisphere policy with my Latin 
American colleagues. And when I go, if I go, 
which is highly probable, I would plan to 
visit those countries in Latin America, or 
most of those countries in Latin America, 
that I did not have an opportunity to visit 
on my first trip. 

Panama Canal Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the negotiation on 
the Panama Canal an example of the sort 
of thing that is being deferred until after 
the election? And in that connection, doesn't 
the controversy over the canal in a way help 
ijoiir negotiatiyig position, to shoiv hoiv much 
opposition and hoiv slotvly you have to go? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to 
encourage any more of the statements which 
we have suff"ered with respect to the Panama 

With respect to the Panama Canal, there 
are a number of key issues that have to be 
settled before we can be sure that an agree- 
ment is possible. 

We believe that the basic issue is under 

May 17, 1976 


what conditions the free and open and neu- 
tral access through the canal, which is es- 
sential for the United States, can best be 
guaranteed, and under what conditions our 
relationships with the Western Hemisphere, 
with other nations of the Western Hemi- 
sphere, can best be preserved. 

It is our judgment that the negotiations 
that are now going on are the best way of 
doing this. Their pace is importantly deter- 
mined by the ability to settle specific issues, 
and the degree to which the current debate 
influences the negotiating process can be 
ai'gued on both sides. 

Q. Mv. Secretarii there is a recent report 
that the State Department not only knew of 
some overseas payoffs by American corpora- 
tions regarding arms sales, but also in some 
cases the Department asked officials to assist 
in those arms sales. Ambassador Akins 
[James E. Akins, former Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia] is supposed to testify on that 
next month. 

Secretary Kissinger: I think those state- 
ments are absoltuely irresponsible. The only 
case that has come to my attention, which 
was after it was published in a newspaper, 
involved a request to us by the Defense De- 
partment to clarify some requests that, in 
turn, had been made to the Defense Depart- 
ment with respect to some fees, not with 
respect to some payoffs. 

We sent a routine cable, which was done 
at a very low level on a routine basis, to find 
out the Saudi perception of their legal obli- 
gations. It was quite the opposite of what 
has been alleged. It was not an attempt to 
bring about a payment, but to determine 
what the legal status of this particular 
incident was. 

And I welcome Ambassador Akins testify- 
ing about this. 

Q. Why do you think he had a different 
perception of those cables than you do? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because he has re- 
tired as Ambassador, and he has been going 
through his cables at a frantic rate. [Laugh- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, concerning your stop- 
over in Paris, luill you be discussing with the 
French Government the proposal by a group 
of French parliamentarians that the French 
set up some kind of safeguarding peace force 
in Lebanon once the new government has 
been formed? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have no particular 
agenda to discuss in Paris. 

Of course, France, with its long tradition 
of relationships in Africa, will — I would ex- 
pect its leaders will want to discuss my im- 
pressions of the African trip. 

Also, we are looking forward to the visit 
of President Giscard d'Estaing to this coun- 
try, and I expect to discuss with him in gen- 
eral terms a possible agenda of his meeting 
with President Ford. 

Finally, with respect to Lebanon, France 
again has had a historic relationship. There 
have been French missions to Lebanon. We 
have exchanged information during this 
recent crisis. I do not plan to discuss any 
particular solution or any particular French 
role in Lebanon or in the solution of the 
Lebanese crisis, but I will be prepared to 
discuss it if my French hosts would care to 
raise it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President said, as I 
understand him, that his purpose in the 
Panama Canal negotiations is to retain U.S. 
rights to control, maintenance, and defense 
through the life of the pending treaty. Is that 
your perception of the negotiations? Is that 
the perception of the Panamanians, as you 
understand it? 

Secretary Kissi)iger: That is substantially 
my perception of the negotiations. But in 
any event, the United States, regardless of 
control and defense arrangements, will in- 
sist on the permanent, free, and neutral and 
open passage of American ships through the 

Q. Is the United States ivilling to share 
control and maintenance during the life of 
the treaty? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Q. Since ijou are ffoing to see black Kho- 
(Icxian leadert! on f/i/.s trip, will you also see 
icliite Rhodesian leaders anytvhere? 

Secretaiii Kissinger: I do not plan to see 
white Rhodesian leaders on this trip. 

I do not consider this trip to be the last 
word in our African policy. I expect it to be 
the basis from which an integrated African 
policy will be developed, and therefore we 
expect to be in contact with other leaders in 
both black African countries as well as in 
white southern African countries, or with 
southern African regimes, after I return to 
the United States. 

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses 
Situation in Lebanon 

While en route to Africa, Secretary Kissin- 
ger met with Ambassador L. Dean Brown at 
London on April 23. Folloiving are remarks 
to the press after their meeting. 

Press release 195 dated April 24 

Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Brown 
and I have had a very good, very helpful 

As you know. Ambassador Brown was sent 
to Lebanon four weeks ago, taking leave 
from his position as president of the Middle 
East Institute, and left with something like 
24 hours' notice. At that time, the situation 
in Lebanon was chaotic, and the danger of 
outside intervention was very great. In the 
interval, partly as a result of his extraor- 
dinary efforts, we can now talk about the 
beginning of a restoration of constitutional 
government in Lebanon. 

We discussed such things as the creation 
of a security force and the danger of the 
situation in Lebanon escalating into a Middle 
East crisis has been reduced. 

We've repeatedly pointed out that it re- 
mains a delicate process and that it could 
easily be upset by irresponsible actions of 

individuals, actions of outside powers. And 
the U.S. view is that all of the factions, all 
of the interested outside powers should con- 
tinue to exhibit the constructive attitude 
that has brought matters to this point. 

Ambassador Brown is going to return to 
the United States to report to the President. 
He will then return to Lebanon for a few 
days, and then he will have completed his 
mission with great distinction and as a great 
service to peace in the area — a great service 
to the foreign policy of the United States. 

Q. What do you mean by the "creation of a 
security force"? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, 
the security force in the country — the mili- 
tary forces and the police — disintegrated 
under the impact of the civil war, and when 
a new President is elected and the govern- 
ment is reconstituted, one of the obvious 
problems it will face is how to create a force 
that is responsive to the government and 
that can intei-pose itself between the various 
factions. And there are some ideas on this 
subject that are now being explored and with 
which Ambassador Brown has also been 

Q. Will there be Lebanese forces or outside 


Secretary Kissinger: We are talking about 
Lebanese forces drawn perhaps from some 
of the factions or separately recruited. We 
don't want to go into any of the details, but 
we are specifically talking about Lebanese 
security forces to deal with Lebanese prob- 

Q. Will there be indigenous Palestinians in 
that security force? 

Secretary Kissinger: The composition of 
the security forces is one of the subjects 
that is under negotiation right now; and I 
don't think it is for us to speculate as to the 
elements, but obviously a security force to 
be effective must be acceptable to all of the 
parties there and all of the parties that feel 

May 17, 1976 


Q. What kind of time frame are you talk- 
ing about? 

Seeretanj Kissinger: We, of course, do not 
control the time frame. Again I must stress 
the situation is tenuous and delicate, and it 
has been brought to this point through the 
constructive attitude of all of the parties. 
On the assumption that that continues, we 
would think that the election of a new Presi- 
dent could be completed within a two-week 
period and that the beginning of a return 
to more noi'mal processes should start im- 
mediately after that. 

Q. Has the danger of massive outside inter- 
vention been reduced? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is my impression 
from Ambassador Brown's report that the 
danger of outside intervention has been re- 
duced. But, of course, if the situation in 
Lebanon should blow up again, the danger 
could return. 

Q. Are the Syria^i troops still in there? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think there 
has been any significant change in troop 
deployment since I answered questions at a 
press conference yesterday. 

Q. Would the United States play any role — 
perhajis as a guarantor in case security 
forces u-ere to be established? 

Secretary Kissinger: Our basic position 
has been to avoid intervention by outside 
powers or to give outside powers the right 
of intervention, and therefore we would be- 
lieve that the best solution would be one in 
which the Lebanese factions agree among 
themselves as to the creation of the security 

Q. What are the prospects for Syrians re- 
moving their troops from Lebanon? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this is a ques- 
tion that will have to be negotiated between 
the Lebanese and the Syrians, but it is our 
impression that they are there as part of the 
immediate situation and not a permanent 
feature of the Lebanese scene. 

Q. What is the U.S. role in the creation of 

the security force? Is Ambassador Brotvn 
trying to get factions to agree on the com- 
positions or — 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is 
fair to say that Ambassador Brown has been 
one of the very few people who has been in 
touch with all of the factions — and I say 
very few, probably the only person in 
Lebanon — and therefore he has been in a 
position to carry the views of the various 
parties to the others. My judgment is that 
he's played a very useful, in fact, almost de- 
cisive role in this diplomatic process. 

And we will do as we indicated when we 
sent Ambassador Brown — he will be ready to 
do what the parties ask him to do and to 
help them to move toward common objec- 
tives. And when he leaves — in about two 
weeks — Ambassador Meloy [Francis E. 
Meloy, Jr.] will replace him to perform again 
whatever functions — 

Q. Ambassador Brown, did you have any 
direct or indirect contacts ivith the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in your negotia- 
tions ? 

Ambassador Broum: I did not. 

Q. Can I ask you something else, if I 
ivould, please? In Indianapolis early today, 
President Ford said there was no prospect 
the United States tvill extend diplomatic re- 
lations to North Viet-Nam. Some reporters 
out there sense a contradiction in ivhat you 
said in the past. What are the prospects and 
is there any contradiction betiveen your posi- 
tion and the President's? 

Secretary Kissinger: President Ford and I 

meet practically every day, and it is tradi- 
tional that the foreign policy of the Secre- 
tary of State coincides with the foreign 
policy of the President — a tradition which 
is not going to be interrupted this year. 

As I understand the President's state- 
ment, and I have talked to General Scowcroft 
[Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs] 
in the interval, and I believe the President 
has spoken in this sense today as well, it was 
his assessment since — it was the President's 


Department of State Bulletin 

assessment that since we had not been given 
a satisfactory answer to the missing in 
action that he saw no prospect of normaliz- 
ing relations. And therefore the policy of the 
Administration is as the President expressed 
it in Hawaii in December. As we've repeated 
since, we're prepared to talk to North Viet- 
Nam, but the absolute precondition before 
considering any other move is an accounting 
of the missing in action. 

U.S. and Greece Initial Principles 
for Future Defense Cooperation 

FoUotving is the text of a statement of 
principles initialed at Washington on Ap7'il 
15 by Secretary Kissinger and Greek Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs Dimitri S. Bitsios, 
together with the texts of a letter from. For- 
eign Minister Bitsios to Secretary Kissinger 
dated April 7 and Secretary Kissinger's reply 
dated April 10. 


' Principles To Guide Future 

United States-Greek Defense 

1. The Governments of the United States 
of America and Greece will complete as soon 
as possible a new defense cooperation agree- 
ment to replace the 1953 United States-Greek 
military facilities agreement and other re- 
lated agreements. The United States Govern- 
ment will submit this Agreement to Con- 
gress for approval. 

2. The new Agreement will be designed 
to modernize the United States-Greek de- 
fense relationship reflecting the traditionally 
close association between the United States 
and Greece and the mutuality of their de- 
fense interests in the North Atlantic Al- 

3. This new Agreement will define the 
status and set forth the terms for operations 
of military installations in Greece where 
United States personnel are present. It will 

be similar to the United States-Turkish 
Agreement and will embody, inter alia, the 
following principles: 

(A) Each installation will be a Greek 
military installation under a Greek com- 

(B) The installations shall serve only pur- 
poses authorized by the Government of 
Greece. Their activities shall be carried out 
on the basis of mutually agreed programs. 

(C) There shall be participation of Greek 
personnel up to 50% of the total strength 
required for agreed joint technical opera- 
tions and related maintenance activities and 
services of the facilities and there shall be 
provisions for the training of such personnel 
for this purpose. 

(D) All intelligence information including 
raw data produced by the installations shall 
be shared fully by the two Governments ac- 
cording to mutually agreed procedures. A 
joint use plan for the United States forces 
communications system in Greece shall be 
agreed upon. 

(E) The Agreement shall remain in effect 
for four years and there shall be provisions 
for the termination thereof before its ex- 
piration, as well as for its renewal. 

(F) Within this framework there shall be 
annexes to this Agreement covering each 
major installation (Nea Makri, Souda Bay, 
Iraklion), the United States element at the 
Hellenikon Greek Air Force Base, as well as 
annexes dealing with status of forces 
(SOFA), and command and control. 

(G) The annex covering Souda Bay will 
be a revision of the 1959 Souda Bay Agree- 
ment. Meanwhile it is understood that 
United States operations at this aii-field will 
be in accordance with the 1959 Agreement. 

(H) It is understood that, pending the 
conclusion of the new Agreement within a 
reasonable time. United States operations 
now being conducted from facilities in 
Greece, which serve mutual defense inter- 
ests, will be allowed to continue. 

4. As an integral part of the new defense 
cooperation agreement, provision will be 
made for a four-year commitment to Greece 
of military assistance totaling 700 million 

May 17, 1976 


dollars, a part of which will be grant aid. 
This commitment will be designed to further 
develop the defense preparedness of Greece 
and meet its defense needs in pursuit of 
North Atlantic Alliance goals. 

Washington, April 15, 1976. 


Foreign Minister Bitsios' Letter, April 7 

Dear Mr. Secretary: As you are aware, the sign- 
ing of a new defense cooperation agreement between 
the United States and Turkey creates problems and 
raises serious apprehensions in Greece. In light of 
this development, I will want to di.scuss with you how 
we should deal with the status of American facilities 
in Greece. 

Meanwhile, I would appreciate having your position 
on the United States attitude toward the resolution 
of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and par- 
ticularly on the danger of a serious deterioration in 
the situation in the Aegean. I would also like to 
know in what way the United States Government en- 
visions its agreement with Turkey as contributing to 
the achievement of a speedy and just solution to the 
Cyprus question in light of previous assurances that 
the United States would make a major effort to this 

I believe your responses to these questions will 
assist my Government in formulating its policy. I 
hope they will be adequate to dissipate our conceni 
to the benefit of both our countries and the Western 
Alliance as a whole. 

DiMiTRi S. Bitsios 

Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Republic of Greece 

' Texts from press release 180 dated Apr. 15. 

Secretary Kissinger's Letter, April 10 

Dear Mr. Minister: Thank you for your letter 
of April 7 in which you posed some questions regard- 
ing United States policy in the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean. I welcome this opportunity to make our posi- 
tion clear with regard to these issues. 

You have asked about our attitude toward the reso- 
lution of disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
particularly in the Aegean area. In this regard I 
should like to reiterate our conviction that these dis- 
putes must be settled through peaceful procedures 
and that each side should avoid provocative actions. 
We have previously stated our belief that neither side 
should seek a military solution to these disputes. 
This remains United States policy. Therefore the 
United States would actively and unequivocally op- 
pose either side's seeking a military solution and 
will make a major effort to prevent such a course 
of action. 

I should like to re-emphasize, with regard to 
Cyprus, that the United States remains fully com- 
mitted to the objective of an early and just settlement 
of this issue. As I said in my United Nations address, 
the present dividing lines in Cyprus cannot be perma- 
nent. There must be just territorial arrangements. 
We intend to contribute actively in the search for a 
solution to the Cyprus problem that will preserve the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 

With regard to the defense relationship between 
Greece and the United States, I believe it would be 
useful if you could come to Washington to discuss 
this is.sue in detail. I would welcome an opportunity 
to discuss with you other subjects of mutual interest 
as well. At that time we could agree on the frame- 
work of a new defense cooperation agreement be- 
tween the United States and Greece that would bene- 
fit both of our countries and contribute to the main- 
tenance of peace and security in the Eastern Mediter- 

Warm regards, 

Henry A. Kissinger. 


Department of State Bulletin 



Department Reviews Major Issues Before Forthcoming Meeting 
of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 

Statement by Paul H. Boeker 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development ' 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss 
the fourth ministerial session of the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development 

The UNCTAD Conference, to be held in 
Nairobi from May 3 to 28, comes at an im- 
portant juncture in the course of relations 
(between developing countries and industrial 
countries, particularly the United States. At 
ithe seventh special session of the U.N. Gen- 
leral Assembly last fall, the United States 
(Offered a comprehensive, constructive pro- 
|gram to address the critical developmental 
tproblems of the developing countries, which 
we pledged to pursue in a pragmatic step-by- 
step way if developing countries would join 
lus in this effort. The developing countries 

Iiaccepted this challenge and in the consensus 
iresolution of the seventh special session sus- 
pended the confrontational politics of the 
preceding period in favor of an era of negoti- 
ation of joint responses to the development 

Since last September, the United States 
and other countries have invested consider- 
able effort to make this endeavor successful. 

' Made before the Subcommittees on International 
Resources, Food and Energy, on International Eco- 
nomic Policy, on International Organizations, and on 
International Trade and Commerce of the House 
Committee on International Relations on Apr. 26. 
The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

We have done so because economic progress 
of developing countries fosters economic 
growth here, because we seek to strengthen 
their attachment to an international econom- 
ic system that has served us well, and be- 
cause we wish to encoui'age moderation and 
cooperation on the part of these countries 
in international relations generally. 

Progress so far in implementing the pro- 
gram agreed at the seventh special session 
has been encouraging: 

—In December 1975, the ministers of the 
Conference on International Economic Co- 
operation launched the North-South dia- 
logue. Meetings of the commissions estab- 
lished at the ministerial meeting have been 
held monthly since February 1976 to pre- 
pare for a second ministerial meeting late 
this year. 

— In January 1976, the finance ministers 
of the International Monetary Fund's Com- 
mittee of Twenty set in place a series of 
measures promising strengthened economic 
security for developing countries in a turbu- 
lent era of international monetary relations. 
Responding to U.S. proposals, a very signifi- 
cant expansion of the IMF's financing for 
export earnings stabilization was endorsed, 
and a Trust Fund, financed through profits 
from IMF gold, was established for the poor- 
est developing countries. Also, regular fi- 
nancing from the IMF was expanded by 
almost half. All of these measures were con- 

May 17, 1976 


eluded with the particular needs of the de- 
veloping countries in mind. 

— This spring, draft articles have been 
agreed for a new International Fund for 
Agricultural Development. 

— The multilateral trade negotiations have 
been launched, with a particular focus on 
expanding trade opportunities for developing 

— ^The resources of several international 
development institutions have been increased 
or are in the process of being so. 

Response to Developing Countries' Concerns 

The task of UNCTAD IV will be to carry 
this work further and to fill in the frame- 
work of the seventh special session program 
in those areas of particular concern to 
UNCTAD. As a universal forum and one 
created exclusively to address problems of 
development. UNCTAD is of special impor- 
tance to developing countries. A poor outcome 
in Nairobi would thus affect the broader 
North-South dialogue in other forums. A 
poor showing at UNCTAD IV would also be 
a setback for efforts to find positive and con- 
structive ways to promote growth and eco- 
nomic security among developing countries. 

UNCTAD IV also comes at a sensitive 
time for our industrial allies. They are more 
dependent on the developing countries than 
we are for trade and for sources of critical 
raw materials. They feel perhaps more than 
we do an imperative to be responsive to the 
problems of the Third World. Yet they look 
very much to the United States for leader- 
ship, for without us global development co- 
operation cannot prosper. Therefore an ele- 
ment of our strategy for UNCTAD IV is to 
work with other industrial countries in 
formulating consensus programs to address 
the problems of economic security and 
gi-owth of developing countries. 

Equally important, we must continue to 
convince the developing world that it has 
both a stake in and responsibility for improv- 
ing the functioning of the world economy. 

We have contributed much since the Sec- 
ond World War to structure the internation- 
al system in such a way that trade and fi- 

nance would flow more freely between and 
among countries, that resources would be 
allocated primarily on the basis of compara- 
tive advantage. At present, there are strong 
underlying tendencies among countries to 
question the suitability of the international 
system built since World War II. More and 
more countries, not only developing coun- 
tries, are arguing for greater government 
intervention in the allocative process in 
order to gain for themselves a greater por- 
tion of the benefits that have resulted from 
expanded trade and unimpeded financial 

The developing countries, in particular, do 
not feel that they have gotten a fair share 
of the benefits of the remarkable growth 
since World War II. Our choice is either to 
assist the developing countries in increasing 
their benefits within the basic system we 
have helped to build or to hope — with un- 
certain prospects — that a broad challenge to, 
and possible disruption of, that system by* 
others will leave us unscathed. We have 
chosen the first option. 

In preparation for this conference, the- 
developing countries met in Manila ir 
February and formulated what is referred 
to as the Manila Declaration and Program of 
Action. It lays out developing countries' per- 
ceptions of their problems and their ap- 
proaches to resolving them. 

The Manila Declaration emphasizes thref' 
major issues to be discussed at UNCTAE 
IV: commodities, debt, and transfer of tech- 
nology. The declaration represents, of 
course, a political compromise. On substan- 
tive matters, there are significant differences 
in emphasis among developing countries. Tht 
Africans place the highest priority on com- 
modity issues. The poorer developing coun- 
tries, particularly South Asians, feel thai 
debt relief is the most pressing problem 
Finally, the Latin American countries, whici; 
in general are further along in the develop- 
ment process, want to focus on transfer ol 
technology. Our presentation at UNCTAE 
IV will focus on these three issues. 

We want to be as forthcoming as possible, 
consistent with our national interest, on the 
substantive issues of major concern to de- 


Department of State Bulletin 

veloping countries: commodities, debt, and 
technology transfer. We want to use the oc- 
casion of UNCTAD IV to frankly express 
our views on these problems and propose 
concrete action plans and programs to re- 
solve them. 

The United States cannot accept all the 
specific demands made by developing coun- 
tries on these issues as enunciated in the 
Manila Declaration and Program of Action. 
But it is clearly in our interest to respond 
constructively to their general concerns, 
many of which we share. By presenting 
workable alternatives to developing-country 
demands which offer positive approaches to 
solving their fundamental problems, we hope 
to maintain U.S. leadership and industrial 
countries' unity in an international effort to 
achieve economic security and growth for 
less developed countries in an atmosphere 
of consensu.s and cooperation. 

Approach to Commodity Problems 

In commodities, the developing countries 
will seek acceptance of the integrated com- 
modities program developed by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat. The central feature of 
this program is a common fund for financ- 
ing international buffer stocks. The inte- 
grated commodities program contains many 
aspects which we can support, but the com- 
mon fund strikes us as a very questionable 
allocation of capital for development coopera- 
tion. In a sense the common fund creates 
I financing before agreement is reached on 
what is to be financed. 

We believe that any comprehensive ap- 
proach to commodity problems must be 
based on four fundamental elements: (1) 
producer-consumer consultation and case-by- 
case commodity negotiations, (2) earnings 
stabilization for commodity exports of de- 
veloping countries, (3) adequate arrange- 
ments for resource development in develop- 
ing countries to prevent erosion of their 
market position, and (4) improved market 
access for commodities and processed prod- 
ucts of developing countries. 

In the area of commodity consultation, 
the United States favors establishment of a 

consumer-producer forum for each of the 
major commodities in international trade. 
While most would undoubtedly lead to forms 
of cooperation other than commodity agree- 
ments, the United States has indicated in a 
number of cases, most recently tin and cof- 
fee, that we are willing to participate in 
agreements we find meet our interests. 

For most developing countries, however, 
arrangements for export earnings stabiliza- 
tion offer more direct benefits than price 
stabilization efforts. Because of the broader 
benefits of earnings stabilization, the United 
States has placed particular stress on this 
technique for addressing commodity earn- 
ings fluctuations of developing countries. We 
are gratified at the considerable benefits de- 
veloping countries are deriving from the 
liberalized facilities of the International 
Monetary Fund, which the United States 

To maintain and, if possible, improve their 
trade position in commodities, developing 
countries will have to invest heavily and at- 
tract investment in agricultural and natural 
resource production. Unfortunately the pros- 
pects here are not bright, and the trends are 
more in the direction of increased self-suf- 
ficiency for industrial countries in commod- 
ities and growing import dependence for de- 
veloping countries, particularly for food. To 
help meet this problem, the United States 
has offered to support a new International 
Fund for Agricultural Development. We also 
hope new mechanisms can be developed to 
revive investment in mineral and energy 
resources in developing countries on a basis 
compatible with their political and economic 

To improve market access for developing 
countries we will take a number of steps in 
the multilateral trade negotiations. We have 
made a comprehensive offer on tropical prod- 
ucts trade. We also plan a major attack on 
tariff escalation as it affects processed com- 
modity products of developing countries. 

In addition we are willing to address the 
problem of financing for buffer stock ar- 
rangements when these are found by pro- 
ducers and consumers to be a necessary part 

May 17, 1976 


of an agreed commodity arrangement. 

A program containing these elements will 
respond constructively to the problems faced 
by less developed countries in the commod- 
ities field while still preserving the case-by- 
case approach to commodity arrangements 
that we prefer. This approach would also 
put greater emphasis on private-sector par- 
ticipation in new and expanded raw material 
production and in seeking firmer supply- 
access commitments from producers. 

Means of Reducing Need for Debt Relief 

In the broad area of balance-of-payments 
financing, the Group of 77 have focused their 
attention on one specific issue: debt prob- 
lems. They are seeking generalized schemes 
for debt relief, including debt moratoria for 
the poorest and most severely affected de- 
veloping countries, as a means of easing 
their balance of payments and, over the 
longer term, to enhance the flow of develop- 
ment assistance. 

The United States cannot support general- 
ized debt relief. We believe it would under- 
mine creditor-debtor confidence. Where debt 
rescheduling is absolutely necessary, we 
have supported and will continue to support 
an examination of each situation on a case- 
by-case basis. 

We feel that debt problems are best viewed 
within the context of a country's overall 
balance-of-payments financing problems. 
Taken from this perspective, we believe that 
the recent expansion of IMF credit facihties, 
coupled with the growing demand for de- 
veloping-country exports spurred by econom- 
ic recovery in industrialized nations, will do 
much to ease financing constraints and 
thereby reduce the need for debt relief. 

For the poorest developing countries the 
basic problem is to provide more aid on 
highly concessional terms. We believe debt 
forgiveness is not the way to accomplish 
this. We will, however, support direct ap- 
proaches to the problem of increased aid for 
the poorest, on the right terms. We have 
already led the way in this field by pi-opos- 
ing the Trust Fund in the IMF for the poor- 


est, by concentrating our bilateral aid on the 
poorest, and by providing substantial re- 
-sources to various multilateral soft-loan 
funds, in particular the World Bank-Inter- 
national Development Association. 

Transfer of Technology 

In technology transfer, the less developed 
countries have placed major emphasis on the 
proposed code of conduct. The developing 
countries want to establish a legally bind- 
ing treaty which clearly defines govern- 
mental responsibilities and authority over 
the technology-transfer mechanism. 

The United States favors a system of 
voluntary guidelines. At UNCTAD IV, we 
hope to focus on the specific problem areas 
faced by developing countries and to respond 
to these problems with a coordinated com- 
prehensive approach. 

The technology transfer process comprises 
three basic stages: the research and de- 
velopment of technology, the transfer mech- 
anisms through which developing countries 
acquire technology, and the local implemen- 
tation and utilization of acquired technology. 
The developing countries perceive problems 
at each stage within this process, and we 
are prepared to respond with an action plan 
to facilitate the flow of technology through 
all three stages. 

Efl'orts will be made to gear research and 
development programs more closely to de- 
veloping-country needs and to adapt exist- 
ing technology to the requirements of de- 
velopment. As a major conduit for tech- 
nology transfer, the role of the multinational 
corporations must be addressed and new 
means explored for strengthening their con- 
tribution in the technology area. 

Finally, to strengthen capabilities in de- 
veloping countries for implementation and 
utilization of technology, we must explore 
a series of measures designed to improve 
their access to technological information, to 
expand local and regional training centers, 
and to provide technical advisory services to 
developing countries. 

We are hopeful that U.S. approaches in 

Department of State Bulletin* 


ich of these — commodities, financing, and 
ichnology transfer — will contribute to a 
instructive dialogue and conclusions on 
lese important issues at UNCTAD IV. Our 
jjective will be to work toward a result 
lat extends and strengthens the era of 
instructive negotiation on development is- 
les which the nations of the U.N. embarked 
3on last fall. 

tuter Space Registration Convention 
ansmitted to the Senate 

Uasage From President Ford 

the Senate of the United States: 
With a view to receiving the advice and 
Dnsent of the Senate to ratification, I trans- 
lit herewith the Convention on Registration 
f Objects Launched Into Outer Space, 
pened for signature at New York on January 
A, 1975. F'or the information of the Senate 
ne report of the Department of State con- 
erning the Convention is also transmitted. 

The Convention is designed to provide the 
:iternational community with a central and 
ublic registry of objects launched into outer 
pace. Pursuant to this Convention launching 
•tates would be required to submit certain 
nformation to the U.N. Secretary-General 
egarding objects which they launched into 
Hter space. The Convention builds on the 
bundation of a voluntary system of notifica- 
lon to the Secretary-General of the United 
Rations by U.N. Member States of objects 
hey have launched. That voluntary system 
.as now been observed for more than a 

The Registration Convention is an appro- 
riate addition to the Outer Space Treaty, 
!he Astronaut Rescue Agreement, and the 
jiability Convention. The Senate gave its 
onsent to these earlier treaties in the field 

'Transmitted on Mar. 18 (text from White House 
tress release); also printed as S. Ex. G, 94th Cong., 
id sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and 
he report of the Department of State. 

of space activities by unanimous vote. I hope 
that, at an early date, the Senate will also 
give its strong endorsement to this latest 

Gerald R. Ford. 
The White House, March 18, 1976. 


Current Actions 



Convention for the unification of certain rules re- 
lating to international transportation by air. Done 
at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force 
February 13, 1933; for the United States October 
29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000. 

Accession deposited: Kuwait, August 11. 1975. 
Notification of succession: Papua New Guinea, 
November 6. 1975. 

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure 
of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. 
Entered into force October 14, 1971. TIAS 7192. 
Accession deposited: Ireland, November 24, 1975. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 
19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 
Accession deposited: Cyprus, April 14, 1976. 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva 
April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. 
TIAS 5578. 

Notice of denunciation: Senegal, March 1, 1976, 
effective March 30, 1976. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done 
at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 
21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 
Extended by the United States to: Midway, Wake, 
and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. 
Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United 
States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251. 
Extended by the United States to: Midway, Wake, 
and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976. 

V\ay 17, 1976 


Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974." 
Arccptavcr deposited: Poland, March 15, 1976. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. 
Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Wash- 
ington December 29, 1972. Entered into force 
August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165. 
Ratificatio)! deposited: Tunisia. April 26, 1976. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pol- 
lution of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at 
London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 
1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. 
TIAS 4900, 6109. 

Extended by the United States to: Midway, Wake, 
and Johnston Islands, March 18. 1976. 
International convention on civil liability for oil pol- 
lution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 
1969. Entered into force June 19, 1975.= 
Extended by United Kingdom to: Belize. British 
Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands and Depend- 
encies. Gibraltar. Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, 
Montserrat, Pitcairn, St. Helena and Depend- 
encies. Seychelles. Solomon Islands, Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Tuvalu, United Kingdom Sov- 
ereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in 
the Island of Cyprus, effective April 1, 1976. 
International convention on the establishment of an 
international fund for compensation for oil pol- 
lution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 

Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, April 2. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea. 

Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force 

May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284. 

Extended by the United States to: Midway. Wake, 
and Johnston Islands, March 18, 1976. 
Amendments to the international convention for the 

safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted 

at London October 21, 1969.' 

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, March 19, 1976; 
Nauru, November 25, 1975, 
Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 

October 20, 1972.' 

Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, March 23, 1976. 

' Not in force. 

- Not in force for the United States. 

'Applicable to Bailiwick of Guernsey, Bailiwick 
of Jersey, Belize, Bermuda, British Indian Ocean 
Territory, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, 
Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Gibraltar, Gil- 
bert Islands, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Montserrat, 
Pitcairn Group, St. Helena and Dependencies, Sey- 
chelles, Solomon Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Tuvalu, United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of 
Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus. 


Convention on international liability for daniaj: 
caused by space objects. Done at Washingto 
London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered in* 
force September 1, 1972; for the United Statt 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 
Ratification deposited: Togo, April 26, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the whe: 
trade convention (part of the international whej 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Wasl 
ington March 17, 1976. Enters into force June 1: 
1976, with respect to certain provisions; July 
1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Accessio7i deposited: Malta, April 28, 1976. 



Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, rt 
lating to the agreement of November 20, 197 
Signed at Damascus April 20, 1976. Entered int 
force April 20, 1976. 


GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stoe 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.t 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. SOW 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 c 
more copies of any one publication mailed to th 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superir^ 
tendent of Documents, must accompany order: 
Prices shown below, u'hich include domestic postagt 
are subject to change. 

United States Foreign Policy, An Overview/Januar 
1976. This pamphlet in the General Foreign Polic 
Series indicates the agenda for priority attention o 
major foreign policy issues and suggests the con 
ceptual basis from which current foreign polic; 
proceeds. Pub. 8814. General Foreign Policy Serie 
296. 48 pp. 95<'. (Cat. No. S1.71:8814). 

Trade — Meat Imports. Agreement with Costa Rica 
TIAS 8143. 9 pp. SOf* (Cat. No. S9.10:8143). 

Claim.s — Relocation of Military Forces, Supplies am 
Equipment. Agreement with France. TIAS 8146. 6 pp 
SOt' (Cat. No. S9.10:8146). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Iran. TIAS| 
8149. 70 pp. $1.00. (Cat. No. S9.10:8149). 


Department of State Bulletirl 

INDEX May 17, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1925 

Africa. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of April 22 617 

Angola. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of April 22 fit? 

Chile. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of April 22 617 

Commodities. Department Reviews Major 
Issues Before Forthcoming Meeting of 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Boeker) 631 


Department Reviews Major Issues Before 
Forthcoming Meeting of United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(Boeker) 631 

Outer Space Registration Convention Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 635 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of April 22 617 

Developing Countries. Department Reviews 
Major Issues Before Forthcoming Meeting 
of United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Boeker) 631 

Economic Afifairs. Department Reviews Major 
Issues Before Forthcoming Meeting of 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Boeker) 631 

Greece. U.S. and Greece Initial Principles for 
Future Defense Cooperation (statement of 
principles, exchange of letters) 629 

Jordan. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of April 22 617 


Secretary Kissinger Discusses Situation in 
Lebanon (remarks to the press with Am- 
bassador L. Dean Brown) 627 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
April 22 617 

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of April 22 617 

Military Affairs. U.S. and Greece Initial Prin- 
ciples for Future Defense Cooperation 
(statement of principles, exchange of 
letters) 629 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of April 22 617 

Presidential Documents. Outer Space Registra- 
tion Convention Transmitted to the Senate . 635 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 636 

Saudi Arabia. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of April 22 617 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger's 

News Conference of April 22 617 

Space. Outer Space Registration Convention 
Transmitted to the Senate (message from 
President Ford) 635 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 635 

Outer Space Registration Convention Trans- 
mitted to the Senate (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 635 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of April 22 617 


Secretary Kissinger Discusses Situation in 
Lebanon (remarks to the press with Am- 
bassador L. Dean Brown) 627 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 

April 22 617 

Name Index 

Bitsios, Dimitri S 629 

Boeker, Paul H 631 

Brown, L. Dean 627 

Ford, President 635 

Kissinger, Secretary 617, 627, 629 

Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 26-May 2 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 


No. Date 

t203 4/26 

1204 4/26 

t205 4/27 

t206 4/28 

*207 4/28 

1208 4/28 
t209 4/28 

t210 4/28 
t211 4/30 
t211A 4/30 
t211B 5/1 
*212 4/30 

*-213 4/30 

t214 5/1 
t215 5/1 
t216 5/2 

Kissinger: departure, Dar es 

Kissinger: arrival, Lusaka. 

Kissinger: address, Lusaka. 

Kissinger, Nguza: arrival, Kin- 

Frederick Ii-ving sworn in as As- 
sistant Secretary for Oceans and 
International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs (biographic 

Joint U.S. -Zaire communique. 

Kissinger, Nguza: news conference, 

Kissinger, Nguza: toasts, Kinshasa. 

Kissinger: remarks, Monrovia. 

Kissinger: arrival, Monrovia. 

Kissinger: departure, Monrovia. 

Study Group 1 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Telegraph and Telephone Con- 
sultative Committee, June 2. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
Subcommittee on Maritime Law, 
June 18. 

Kissinger: arrival, Dakar. 

Kissineer: toast, Dakar. 

Kissinger: departure, Dakar. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington. d.c. 20402 


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Washington, D.C. 20402. 







Volume LXXIV • No. 1926 • May 24, 1976 


Statement by Under Secretary Sisco 637 


Address by Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh 6^2 


For index see inside hack cover 



Vol. LXXIV, No. 1926 
May 24, 1976 

For Bale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing 06Sce 

Washington. D.C. 20402 


52 issues plus semiannual indexes. 

domestic $42.50. foreign $53.16 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
quired by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through January 31, 1981. 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well at 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 


The Department of State and National Security Policy 

Statement by Joseph J. Sisco 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs ' 

I welcome your invitation to appear be- 
fore this subcommittee to engage in a dia- 
logue on national security issues. I will 
make my opening statement brief to allow 
us more time to exchange views in the ques- 
tion period. 

Defense is a fundamental concern for all 
of us, not just the Armed Forces who are 
the custodians of our military might and 
the executors of military policies. We in the 
State Department are equally involved, for 
security is the first principle of a successful 
foreign policy. And sufficient military 
strength is the foundation of our ability to 
achieve our foreign policy objectives. 

The basic elements of our foreign policy 
which we believe should guide the United 
States are these: 

— To maintain our strength and purpose 
as a nation. 

— To maintain and continually revitalize 
our relations with allies and friendly coun- 
tries with which we share values and inter- 

— To reduce the risk of war with our po- 
tential adversaries and move toward more 
rational and normal relationships despite 
continuing differences. 

' Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations on Apr. 29. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

— To discourage the spread of nuclear 
weapons capability and otherwise to help to 
resolve regional conflicts that threaten 
world peace. 

— To resolve international economic issues 
in a way which enhances economic and po- 
litical stability, prosperity, and justice. 

We need little reminder that the world is 
an uncertain and dangerous place. It is cer- 
tainly not a time when any nation bearing 
the burden of leadership can afford to 
slacken its vigilance. 

The times call for a sober assessment of 
what we need to assure our own security 
and to remind other nations that the United 
States will continue to provide responsible 
leadership and will keep its commitments 
to those who depend on our help for their 
defense. How we handle the allocation of 
our resources for defense purposes remains 
critical. How we act to meet the defense 
requirements necessary to maintain the 
world balance of power will have an impor- 
tant effect on the morale and steadfastness 
of our friends and allies, the policies of our 
adversaries, as well as our own security and 
national interests. 

The question of the future balance is as 
important for the shapers of foreign policy 
as it is for the shapers of military policy. 
In determining the military force posture 
which meets our policy requirements, we 
naturally need a standard of measurement 
that must reflect many factors, of which the 
size of Soviet forces is but one. Numbers 

May 24, 1976 


are not the only measures of military 
strength; quality is an important consider- 
ation, too. So are geopolitical factors. What 
serves the Soviets well might not do for the 
United States, and vice versa. We must also 
take into account our political and economic 
interests in vai'ious parts of the world and 
those of our allies. 

Over the years since they took power, the 
Soviet leaders have chosen to devote a sub- 
stantial proportion of their vast resources 
to building a powerful military establish- 
ment. The United States could not have 
prevented the Soviet Union from achieving 
superpower status. That is a fact of life. 

Our task is to restrain Soviet power and 
prevent it from upsetting global stability. 
At the same time, we face the long-term 
challenge of putting the U.S.-Soviet rela- 
tionship on a more secure, constructive, and 
durable basis. In an age when the threat of 
thermonuclear war remains ever present, 
we must move beyond a simple balance of 
force and periodic challenges to more stable 
relations. As President Ford has said, peace 
and a constructive relationship with the 
Soviet Union can only proceed from strength 
and an ability to negotiate our differences. 
This dual approach to relations with the 
Soviet Union has been the principal founda- 
tion of American policy in recent years. 

The defense posture which matches these 
requirements must be relevant to our dan- 
gers, comprehensible to our friends, credible 
to our adversaries, and sustainable over the 
long term. The principal facet of this pos- 
ture has not changed in 30 years: our stra- 
tegic forces must be sufficient to deter at- 
tack and credibly maintain the nuclear 
balance. I believe our present forces do that. 
With our technological lead and with con- 
tinuing effort, we can and must insure that 
these forces will be sufficient. 

But strategic forces are not enough. 
World peace in the present circumstances of 
rough strategic equivalence is more likely 
to be threatened by shifts in local or re- 
gional balances — in Europe, the Middle East, 
Asia, Latin America, or Africa — than by a 
strategic nuclear attack. Thus it is more 

important than ever to maintain and im- 
prove forces that can be used for local de- 
fense in support of our allies and to help 
maintain regional stability. 

Under current conditions, the task of 
identifying those interests and areas of the 
world of highest priority to the United 
States demands more precision than ever. 
Three areas are clearly of vital interest to 
us: Europe, the Pacific, especially Northeast 
Asia, and the Middle East. We have de- 
fended our vital interests there by firm alli- 
ances and a U.S. military presence in or 
near these areas. 

I need not rehearse for the members of 
this committee the basis for our judgment 
with regard to Western Europe; the his- 
toric, economic, political, and cultural im- 
peratives of this enduring association are 
well known. So is the presence of the con- 
tinuing Soviet military threat. 

American military strength in Asia is 
essential to preserving a stable balance of 
power. In Northeast Asia in particular, the 
interests of three great powers are engaged 
— the United States because of its close eco- 
nomic and political ties with Japan and 
Korea; China and the Soviet Union because 
of geography and their own national inter- 
ests. This adds cogency to the need for a 
strong, continuing U.S. presence in the area. 
Additionally, American strength lends credi- 
bility to our relationship with the People's 
Republic of China. 

In the Middle East the credibility of 
American power is vital. Renewed hostili- 
ties between Israel and the Arab states 
would dangerously engage the interests of 
the Soviet Union and the United States. U.S. 
forces in the Mediterranean and Europe 
serve as a deterrent to the U.S.S.R. Our 
security assistance programs are vital to 
Israel's security and survival. They also 
serve to strengthen and improve America's 
relations with Arab nations and bulwark 
the central diplomatic role of the United 
States in the Arab-Israeli problem. 

Elsewhere in the world there are many 
places where our interests are important. 
Africa is another case in point, and the 


Department of State Bulletin 

Secretary of State's current visit to that 
area serves to emphasize our commitment 
to project purpose and steadfastness lest our 
adversaries be tempted to take advantage 
of the continent's many difficulties for their 
own immediate gain. We must be prepared 
to recognize genuine threats to the global 
balance, whether they emerge as direct 
challenges to the United States or as re- 
gional encroachment at greater distance. 
And we must be prepared to meet them. 

Our diplomacy, then, demands two types 
of general-purpose forces : forces fully com- 
mitted to the defense of our main alliances 
and forces available to meet contingencies 
elsewhere which threaten vital U.S. inter- 
ests or which have implications for great- 
power confrontation. 

While we need arms to insure our na- 
tional security in the world of today, we also 
need arms control to provide a more endur- 
ing basis for maintaining it. That is the 
objective of SALT [Strategic Arms Limita- 
tion Talks] and our other arms control 
initiatives. If both sides can have confidence 
in an arms limitation agreement that puts 
neither at a disadvantage, then both na- 
tional security and world stability are 
served. Moreover, effective and equitable 
arms limitation accords which constrain the 
Soviet buildup can prevent major future in- 
creases in expenditures on our strategic 

An agreement on strategic arms limita- 
tion is not, therefoi-e, incompatible with 
maintaining a strong defense. We negotiate 
best when we negotiate from strength. And 
particularly in the absence of agreed long- 
term limitations, we will need to keep our 
guard up. For the foreseeable future we will 
need to follow both tracks, military 
strength and the pursuit of arms control. 

Thus far I have discussed the nature of 
the Department of State's interest in mili- 
tary developments as essential factors in the 
design and conduct of our foreign policy. 
Now I would like to sketch very briefly how 
we work with the Department of Defense in 
dealing with those aspects of military pol- 
icy of interest to us. 

Every day officials of the State Depart- 
ment and the officers in our missions abroad 
at all levels deal with military issues of wide 
variety and complexity. We have an entire 
bureau (Politico-Military Afl'airs) struc- 
tured and stafl'ed to deal with military prob- 
lems across the board. On a higher level of 
policy formulation, the State Department 
has specific interests which are met through 
institutionalized procedures backed up by 
informal consultations. On SALT and other 
major arms control issues State and De- 
fense representatives meet regularly with 
those of other interested agencies in work- 
ing groups under the aegis of the NSC [Na- 
tional Security Council] Verification Panel, 
the senior-level body which is the arbiter of 
major arms control issues. Other ad hoc 
groups meet under NSC auspices when 
problems arise which require interagency 
coordination, on a wide range of issues in 
which foreign policy and military policy are 
intertwined. In addition to arms control, we 
in the State Department are concerned on 
the national level with U.S. military bases 
on foreign soil, arms sales and assistance 
policies, arms procurement policies which 
involve foreign manufacturers, NATO plan- 
ning, and mutual security agreements. 

The relationship between foreign policy 
and defense programs has recently been 
recognized by the Congress and is embodied 
in section 812 of the fiscal year 1976 De- 
fense Authorization Act, which requires the 
Secretary of Defense, after consultation 
with the Secretary of State, to submit to 
the Armed Services Committees a written 
annual report on this subject. We have 
chosen to use the Secretary of Defense's an- 
nua] budget report as the vehicle for meet- 
ing this requirement, and section I of the 
fiscal year 1977 report is our response. It 
was developed through close coordination 
between State and Defense at both the 
working level and the policy level. 

I do not wish to imply an omnipresent 
State Department role in military policy- 
making. Obviously there are areas where we 
lack the technical competence to participate 
meaningfully, and we do not seek to chal- 

May 24, 1976 


lenge legitimate military prerogatives. But, 
as I hope this brief exposition has shown, 
our interest in military plans, programs, and 
policies is broad and fundamental to the 
success of our foreign policy objectives, and 
we use every available avenue to communi- 
cate our concerns. 

That being said, I wish to assure this 
committee that we agree with the general 
shape and thrust of the Defense programs 
now before the Congress for approval. We 
must of course insure that we do not over- 
react to the Soviet challenge with ill-con- 
ceived programs. But the dangers we face, 
the precarious l)alance in which the future 
of humanity hangs in the nuclear age, make 
it incumbent on the leadership of the United 
States to see to it that the balance of power 
does not tilt against us. 

U.S. Reaffirms Position on Decade 
To Combat Racism 

Following is a statement made before the 
U.N. Economic ayid Social Council by U.S. 
Representative Williatti W. Scranton on 
April 28. 

USUN Di-ess release 48 dated April 28 

The creation in 1973 of the Decade for 
Action To Combat Racism and Racial Dis- 
ciMmination was the product of consensus. 
Every member of the United Nations sup- 
ported this program. The United States 
played a leading role in shaping that con- 
sensus ; and we did so with enthusiasm, with 
hope, and with that most critical ingredient, 
realism. We ourselves were a full two dec- 
ades into the effort to institutionalize the 
results of the civil rights revolution that 
had been sparked by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the case of Brown v. Board of Education. 
We knew the difficulties of lifting a moral 
principle to the level of national law and 
then reducing it to the level of particularity 
— taking the ideals of justice and social and 


racial equality and making them part of the 
daily life of the land. 

We know that this is a complex and a 
painful task, that even small steps stir 
strong resistance, that to prevail we must 
persist, and most important, that our efforts 
depend crucially on developing and sustain- 
ing a strong supporting consensus. 

There has been no more difficult social 
problem in the United States of the sixties 
and seventies than maintaining that basic 
consensus among the people, their political 
representatives, among lay leaders and lead- 
ership institutions. But we have done so. 
And we shall continue to do so. For without 
a general belief that the elimination of 
racism and racial discrimination is a central 
goal of our society rightly defined and fairly 
pursued, our efforts would falter and then 
inevitably fail. 

Over a period of 30 years, the United Na- 
tions Ijuilt and maintained a similar con- 
sensus. The early work of the United Na- 
tions on human rights, the adoption of the 
Convention To Eliminate Racial Discrimina- 
tion, and the launching in 1973 of the Dec- 
ade To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimi- 
nation were all inspired by a common 
commitment to work against certain uni- 
versally defined wrongs. 

We Americans could not be true to our- 
selves if we failed to support every proper 
effort to combat racism and racial discrimi- 
nation at the international level. I have in 
mind most particularly one of the worst 
contemporary manifestations : apartheid. 
We flatly and absolutely oppose apartheid. 
We find the practice odious. It is a system 
which brutalizes all the people of South 
Africa — blacks, coloreds, Asians, and whites. 
It remains my government's belief that 
South Africa must be exposed to relentless 
demands of the world community until this 
deplorable system is eradicated. Our feel- 
ings extend beyond South Africa to racial 
discrimination anywhere. 

Mr. President, I must also reaffirm the 
U.S. position regarding the Decade. The un- 

Department of State Bulletin 

wise, unjust, and completely unacceptable 
action by the General Assembly in adopting 
Resolution 3379, equating Zionism with 
racism and racial discrimination, deformed 
the meaning of those terms. It demolished 
the U.N. consensus on questions relating to 
racial discrimination. 

Zionism is not racism. It is not racial dis- 
crimination. It is a justifiable and under- 
standable manifestation of national feeling 
on the part of a people entitled to a home- 
land, whose claim to a homeland was recog- 
nized by the United Nations almost 30 years 
ago. The final borders of that homeland 
have not been agreed upon, and the search 
for a just and lasting settlement of this 
dispute has absorbed our energies and our 
attentions for a number of years; but this 
early act of recognition by the United Na- 
tions is not at issue. 

The United States will never accept the 
thesis of General Assembly Resolution 3379, 
any more than it would agree that other 
legitimate national movements are to be 
condemned as forms of "racism" or "racial 
discrimination." This attitude is not the 
policy of a particular Administration at a 
particular moment. It is a view strongly 
held throughout the Congress, the executive 
branch, and the nation as a whole. 

Because the United States felt so strongly 
about Resolution 3379, it concluded and an- 
nounced that it could no longer participate 
in the Decade or support it or, specifically, 
attend the planned conference in Ghana. We 
will adhere to this position. The United 
States could resume its participation in the 
Decade only if the Decade were to return to 
its original basis, which was once accepted 
by a broad consensus. 

What I have said today I have said not 
out of anger or out of self-righteousness, 
but as a deeply felt expression of concern 
for the integrity and the vitality of the U.N. 
system. Too much is at stake — the world too 
filled with political strife — to continue to 
permit this great forum to be used to in- 
flame racial and religious antagonisms. Too 

many nations and peoples suffer the conse- 
quences of poverty and economic instability 
to permit our time to be wasted in political 
vilification. That is no answer. The answer 
is stable agreements reached through con- 

World Trade Week, 1976 


When our Nation's founders met two hundred 
years ago in Philadelphia to declare our independ- 
ence, they categorized in unambiguous terms the 
reasons that compelled them to embark upon such 
a momentous and irrevocable course. "Cutting off 
our Trade with all Parts of the World" was high on 
the list of grievances. 

The patriots who declared independence in 1776 
set the United States on the path to leadership in 
the interdependent world of 1976. Their action enabled 
us, over a period of two centuries, to construct a firm 
foundation of commercial alliances with nations 
around the globe. Last year our two-way trade with 
other nations amounted to $204 billion, with a record 
trade surplus of more than .$11 billion. 

America's performance in the world marketplace is 
a true measure of the quality of American products, 
the extent of American ingenuity, and the dedication 
of American labor and industry to international com- 
merce. Trade has been indispensable to our economic 
growth, to the greater well-being of our citizens, and 
to peaceful progress in our relationships abroad. It 
remains indispensable as we look to the new horizons 
of our third century. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President of 
the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
the week beginning May 16, 1976, as World Trade 
Week. I call upon all Americans to join with business, 
labor, agricultural, educational, professional and civic 
groups, and public officials at all levels of Govern- 
ment, in observing World Trade Week with appro- 
priate activities and ceremonies. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this eighth day of April, in the year of our 
Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America the two 

Gerald R. Ford. 

• No. 4427; 41 Fed. Reg. 14997. 

May 24, 1976 


The Challenge of Transnational Corporate "Wrongdoing" 
to the Rule of Law 

Addretis by Monroe Leigh 
Legal Adviser ' 

When 1 was invited to speak at this Law 
Day gathering in Dallas, I accepted with 
alacrity. I saw it as an opportunity to dis- 
cuss one of the most urgent of our current 
foreign policy problems — an opportunity to 
express my concern that in our preoccupa- 
tion with exposing corporate wrongdoing 
abroad, we not overlook the individual's 
claim to due process. Law Day, above all 
days, is the day on which we should recall 
the great traditions of our legal history, the 
great principles of our professional heritage. 
The concept of due process is at the very 
center of that heritage. 

In one sense, the phenomenon of trans- 
national corporate bribery which is now 
agitating both the government and the 
corporate world is as old as sin itself. 
Certainly thei'e is nothing new in the exist- 
ence of bribery, whether it be called "cum- 
shaw," "baksheesh," "grease," or any of a 
variety of regional epithets. Certainly there 
is nothing new about attempts to influence 
government action. Our own domestic laws 
are replete with special provisions designed 
to curb abuses in government procurement 
both by those who give bribes and by those 
who receive bribes. 

Li some respects, there is something new 
in the phenomenon of the multinational 
corporation. At worst, it has been depicted 
as an octopus reaching across international 
boundaries to seize whatever rights and 
privileges its superior economic power en- 

' Made before the Southwestern Legal Foundation 
at Dallas, Tex., on Apr. 29. 


ables it to procure. On the other hand, at 
best the multinational corporation has been 
a veritable catalyst of progress and develop- 
ment — not only for this country but also 
for innumerable foreign countries who need, 
and have profited from, the economic bene- 
fits which the multinational corporation can 
bring to bear in alleviating poverty and in 
raising living standards throughout the 

But still the question arises: Why has 
the phenomenon of transnational wrongdo- 
ing assumed in recent months the promi- 
nence it has achieved? In part it is attribut- 
able to the size and economic power of the 
multinational corporations involved and the 
economic dependence of certain foreign 
governments. In part it is due to the fact 
that the allegations so far made have in- 
volved prominent political figures abroad, if 
not by name, at least by innuendo. And in 
part it is due to the fact that one particular 
American multinational corporation, by its 
own admission, resorted to bribery on a 
grand scale as a matter of company policy 
in order to promote the sale of its products 
to foreign governments. 

The reaction to these disclosures in the 
United States has been profound. The reac- 
tion abroad to the allegations that senior 
political figures in various foreign countries 
have been the recipients of bribes has been 
even more profound. The Japanese are in 
the throes of what has been called their 
gi-eatest political crisis since 1946. In Hol- 
land the allegations are directed at the Royal 
Consort. In Italy the allegations come at a 

Department of State Bulletin 

juncture when it appears that the Commu- 
nist Party, for the first time, may be invited 
to participate in the government. Thus the 
foreign policy implications of the allegations 
are of enormous consequence. 

Although the fact of bribery has been 
admitted by one or more American and 
foreign corporations of multinational scope, 
the specifics in most cases remain ill defined. 
They remain obscure because the law en- 
forcement agencies in the United States and 
abroad have not yet completed their investi- 
gations. Investigation of criminal activity is 
a tedious and time-consuming matter. Yet 
there have been, as is well known, almost 
daily leaks of information about the particu- 
lars of one or another corporation's activities 

For present purposes we must assume 
that quite a number of American corpora- 
tions have made payments abroad which were 
either outright bribes or unconscionably in- 
flated commission fees or direct contribu- 
tions to political parties. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) has reported 
the use of dummy foreign subsidiaries and 
numbered Swiss bank accounts as techniques 
(for concealing such payments. Finally, it 
mow seems clear that not all of the payments 
which companies claim to have made to poli- 
Itioians abroad have in fact been made as 
alleged. This is a fact of particular impor- 
tance to what I shall say later about due 

Perhaps of equal importance from the 
standpoint of American law enforcement is 
(the disclosure that a number of corporations 
have falsified their books and records in a 
nvay that conceals from their lawyers and 
auditors, as well as from the SEC and the 
investing public, the fact that such pay- 
ments have been made. 

Unfortunately, it cannot be said that the 
practice of making questionable payments 
abroad is confined to a few wayward com- 
panies. In early March the SEC, according 
to its Chairman, was investigating 84 pub- 
licly held companies, whose 1974 revenues 
amounted to more than $200 billion. Fifty- 
five of these companies were included in the 

May 24, 1976 

"Fortune 500" list of the largest industrial 
enterprises in the United States. 

I recognize the weight of the justifications 
which have been off'ered. Some say the 
American corporations were only doing 
abroad what all competing foreign companies 
do anyway. "When in Babylon, do as the 
Babylonians do." I recognize also that there 
is nothing morally or legally wrong with the 
payment of commissions to a legitimate 
business agent, provided the amounts are 
reasonable and not inflated for purposes of 
influencing official actions by foreign govern- 
ments. I also recognize that the payment of 
contributions by corporations to political 
parties is not a violation of local law in most 
countries. Indeed, this practice was entirely 
legal in the United States until compara- 
tively recent times and is still legal in 
Canada. I recognize also that the United 
States does not have authority to punish 
off'enses against the laws of foreign coun- 

Respect for Rights of Individuals 

Having said this, however, it is necessary 
to step back and take a broader view. In 
terms of broad national interest, we must 
put our own house in order. No other objec- 
tive is consonant with the rule of law. No 
other objective will be consistent with the 
long-term self-interest of U.S. companies. 
We have for many years tried to assure 
that American enterprises respect the moral 
imperatives which undergird the economic 
order within the United States. And it now 
seems obvious that we must take steps to 
contain the corrosive effects of bribery on 
the activities of our companies abroad. 

But the rule of law cannot look only to 
the behavior of corporations. The rule of 
law also requires a decent respect for the 
rights of individuals who are alleged to have 
received bribes from American companies. 
It is essential that the names of individuals 
mentioned in unverified allegations not be 
prematurely disclosed prior to the comple- 
tion of the investigation process — prior to 
some confirmation that the allegations are 
based on reliable evidence. 


This brings me, of course, to the contro- 
versy which is now absorbing the attention 
of the media. This is especially true in Wash- 
ington, and it is hardly less true in Japan or 
in Italy. 

As the press has reported, the State De- 
partment has been requested by various 
foreign governments to make available "the 
names" of those foreign officials in high 
places alleged to have received bribes from 
American companies. Let me add that the 
State Department cannot itself supply the 
names because it does not have any of the 
documentary evidence. That information is 
held by the SEC, the Church subcommittee 
[Subcommittee on Multinational Corpora- 
tions of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations], and the Department of Justice. 

Nevertheless, these requests have pre- 
sented a dilemma for the American policy- 
maker. On the one hand, the U.S. Govern- 
ment condemns bribery as strongly as any 
government on earth. Moreover, its natural 
instinct would be to cooperate with foreign 
law enforcement officials in securing convic- 
tions for crimes which have been committed 
in foreign countries. 

On the other hand, there are competing 
considerations. First, our own law enforce- 
ment agencies, such as the Department of 
Justice and the SEC, have not completed 
their investigations. Premature disclosure of 
names can prejudice the orderly processes of 
American criminal investigation and law en- 
forcement. Secondly — and of perhaps even 
greater importance, to my mind — we do not 
believe that unverified allegations should be 
made public until such time as appropriate 
authorities either in this country or abroad 
have had an opportunity to verify the re- 
liability of the evidence. 

Consider for a moment the character of 
the evidence so far available. It consists of 
documentation supplied by American corpo- 
rations in response to subpoenas from the 
SEC and the Senate Subcommittee on Multi- 
national Corporations. Included in these files 
is the day-to-day correspondence between 
the American company and its commission 
agents abroad. It is inherent in the relation- 
ship between the U.S. principal and its for- 

eign agent that the latter is inclined to 
exaggerate the value of his services, the 
level of his contacts, and the sums of money 
required to achieve the objective of selling 
expensive military and other equipment to 
foreign governments. Moreover, there is an 
unfortunate tendency on the part of such 
overseas agents to justify their demands for 
more money by claiming the necessity to pay 
bribes, cumshaw, baksheesh, or what you 
will, in order to secure company objectives. 
All too often, the principal in the United 
States accepts the claims of the agent on the 
spot without any significant investigation. 

What I am saying is that the fact that a 
commission agent abroad mentions the name 
of a senior politician high in the government 
councils of a particular foreign country does 
not prove that money was actually paid to 
such an official. Indeed, one well-known for- 
eign commission agent now states that al- 
though he reported to the American com- 
pany that he used certain sums to bribe a 
government official, in fact he kept the 
money for himself. There is no easy way to 
get at the truth. 

Promoting Concepts of Fairness 

To be sure, the truth of any allegation 
should be investigated; but prior to an in- 
vestigation by law enforcement officials as 
to whether the evidence warrants prosecu- 
tion, the name of the alleged individual 
should not, in my judgment, be publicly re- 

In saying this, I am claiming no more for 
the foreign individual than we would take 
for granted in connection with a criminal 
investigation in the United States. The De- 
partment of Justice in its investigation of 
criminal activities treats all such investiga- 
tions as confidential. The same is true of the 
SEC investigations. Foreign law enforce- 
ment officials generally do the same. More- 
over, the Senate Subcommittee on Multina- 
tional Corporations has taken the same posi- 
tion in that it has declined to make public 
the names of foreign politicians mentioned 
in the documentation which it has secured. 

I am familiar with the line of argument 


Department of State Bulletin 

which contends that if a foreign government 
requests the names of its nationals involved 
in alleged bribetaking, that request should 
be complied with because the foreign govern- 
ment, not the United States, is responsible 
for protecting the rights of its own citi- 

Ordinarily, under customary international 
law, one would say that a foreign sovereign 
has the right to investigate and punish the 
wrongdoing of its own nationals within its 
own territory. But does this mean that the 
United States has no interest in how the in- 
vestigation is pursued? Much of the evidence 
is in this country and has come from Ameri- 
can nationals. And what of due process? In 
transmitting evidence, should the United 
States totally abstain from promoting con- 
cepts of fairness in the investigative 
process ? 

I believe that we should not abstain. In 
fact, if one takes a broader view of inter- 
national law, one could well argue that the 
concept of fairness is central to international 
principles of human rights. One might point, 
for example, to articles 55 and 56 of the 
U.N. Charter, where all U.N. members un- 
dertake to promote human rights. Article 
12 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights guarantees to an individual the pro- 
tection of the law against arbitrary inter- 
ference with his privacy and against "at- 
tacks upon his honor and reputation." This 
would at least support, if not mandate, ef- 
forts by all countries concerned to protect 
the rights of individuals involved in trans- 
national investigations. 

To put it another way, the fact that evi- 
dence is to be sent outside the territorial 
confines of the United States does not mean 
that law enforcement officials either in this 
country or abroad should disregard elemen- 
tary considerations of due process. This would 
be true whether the reputation at stake 
was that of an ordinary citizen or of a senior 
politician high in the councils of govern- ' 
ment. We should not allow formalistic notions 
of territorial sovereignty to frustrate new 
modes of international cooperation which 
safeguard these interests. 

In sum, American policymakers have had 

two objectives: First, to cooperate with 
foreign law enforcement officials, but second, 
to do so in a way which would safeguard the 
rights of the individual. 

Agreements on Exchange of Evidence 

It is a source of great personal satisfaction 
to me to be able to report that when the in- 
terested agencies of the American Govern- 
ment met to discuss this problem, there was 
unanimous agreement among those involved 
concerning applicable standards — in partic- 
ular, that considerations of due process re- 
quired that individual names be treated 
confidentially until appropriate law enforce- 
ment officials could determine whether the 
evidence justified a prosecution. I have been 
even more gratified to find that, without ex- 
ception, foreign law enforcement officials 
have readily accepted this concept, although 
in some countries the function of law en- 
forcement is allocated among branches of 
government in ways which are unfamiliar to 

In implementing this policy, our Depart- 
ment of Justice has concluded a half-dozen 
evidence exchange agreements with foreign 
law enforcement officials. These agreements 
provide for reciprocal exchange of evidence 
between the U.S. Justice Department and 
the foreign law enforcement agency, usually 
the foreign Ministry of Justice. They provide 
for mutual cooperation in securing additional 
information on illicit payments. They pro- 
vide that frequent consultation shall occur 
so that the activities of law enforcement 
officials in one country do not adversely af- 
fect investigations in the other country. And 
— most important — they provide that dur- 
ing the period of investigation the evidence 
exchanged will be treated as confidential. 

None of these exchange agreements con- 
templates a holding back of evidence because 
it may be particularly sensitive. On the con- 
trary, full exchange is to take place between 
our Department of Justice and the foreign 
law enforcement agency, but on the under- 
standing that evidence will be treated as 
confidential until a decision is made to 

May 24, 1976 


I have chosen to be rather specific about 
the objectives and conditions of this coopera- 
tion because there is no other way to deal 
with a question of due process. Due process 
has significance only in its specific applica- 
tion. Due process means dealing with large 
issues in small bits. It means adapting tradi- 
tional concepts of fairness to fit new situa- 
tions and unforeseen events. I believe it is 
the hallmark of our legal tradition that 
specific questions, like transnational wrong- 
doing, have been the focus of our legal de- 

This year the British people are lending 
us, in commemoration of the Bicentennial 
year, a rare copy of the Magna Carta, to 
••emind us of the common legal heritage of 
our two peoples. It is worth remembering 
that the concept of due process, which I have 
stressed tonight, is traceable to the Great 
Charter, which stands as the first milestone 
in the struggle for due process — in the 
struggle for balance between the individual 
rights of citizens and the claims of govern- 
ment. But if one were to go back and read 
the Great Charter, he would be surprised by 
the particularity of its content. It is merely 
a contract of 63 parts, each dealing in detail 
with a practical grievance of a small group 
of rebellious barons. It defines the scope of 
feudal rights to such occult notions as 
"wardship," "relief," and "scutage" — and 
contains elaborate provisions for enforcing 
these rights. It is a practical document, 
largely a lawyer's document- — dull on its face 
but rich in historical significance. 

The same could be said of most of the 
other great title deeds of Anglo-American 
constitutional development: the Petition of 
Right, the Constitutions of Clarendon, the 
Bill of Rights. Even our own Declaration of 
Independence, after an eloquent introduc- 
tion, is devoted to a list of specific griev- 
ances — essentially a lawyer's bill of partic- 
ulars. In short, our legal tradition is prag- 
matic more often than philosophical. We 
have chosen to focus upon the particular 
rather than the general. 

And so it has been in the application of 
the concept of due process to the problem of 


transnational bribery. We have sought to 
find a practical way to assure that the rule 
of law is applied to enforce the claims of 
justice across international boundaries while, 
at the same time, protecting the rights of the 
individual against the injustice of premature 
and ill-considered disclosure. 

U.S. Initiatives for International Solutions 

I have mentioned the evidence exchange 
agreements which have been negotiated 
between our Department of Justice and for- 
eign law enforcement agencies. However, the 
scope of U.S. governmental action to remedy 
the corrosive efi'ect of corporate bribery is 
far greater. 

I would mention in particular the SEC's 
activities over the last 18 months under its 
"voluntary" program. Under this program 
the SEC has sought to encourage more strin- 
gent accounting standards in the auditing 
profession and comprehensive disclosure by 
companies of illegal, improper, or question- 
able payments abroad. Many companies have 
opened their books to complete reauditing of 
their financial returns over the last several 

While the program I have just described 
applies only to companies listed on the 
American stock exchanges, there is reason 
to believe that this unilaterally applied 
policy of the United States will have wide- 
spread effects abroad and result in a general 
raising of standards throughout the world. 

I would mention also that the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) has recently acceler- 
ated its program to track down cases in 
which payments of bribes to foreign officials 
have improperly been claimed as tax deduc- 
tions in the United States. 

However, no amount of U.S. regulation of 
companies subject to the jurisdiction of the 
SEC and the IRS can achieve a comprehen- 
sive longrun solution to the problem of 
transnational wrongdoing. Solutions to prob- 
lems of this sort can only be achieved 
through international cooperation in estab- 
lishing common standards of conduct. 

Recently the State Department has taken 
a number of initiatives that will, we hope, 

Department of State Bulletin 

lead to such international standards. For ex- 
ample, the Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development, to which the 
United States and other industrialized na- 
tions belong, has for some time been con- 
sidering a set of guidelines for multinational 
enterprises. The United States has recently 
taken steps to insure that these guidelines 
will condemn both the giving and the solicit- 
ing of bribes or other improper benefits to 
government officials. 

More comprehensive is the United States 
proposal for an international convention on 
illicit payments. The United States proposed 
such an agreement at a meeting last month 
of the U.N. Commission on Transnational 
Corporations in Lima, Peru. It is contem- 
plated that such an international agreement 
would be based on the following principles: 

— First, the agreement would apply to all 
international trade and investment transac- 
tions between companies and governments. 
And it would apply equally to those who 
offer or make improper payments and to 
those who request or accept them. 

— Second, host governments would agree 
to establish clear guidelines concerning the 
use of agents in connection with government 
procurement. Host governments would also 
prescribe criminal penalties for corrupt 
practices by enterprises and officials in their 
territory. This emphasis on clear guidelines 
reflects a fundamental element of due proc- 
ess — that companies and their agents 
should have advance notice of what conduct 
is to be considered illegal. 

— Third, there would be uniform provi- 
sions for disclosure by enterprises, agents, 
and officials of any political contributions, 
gifts, or payments made in connection with 
the covered transactions. 

— Fourth, all governments would agree to 
cooperate and to exchange information con- 
cerning corrupt practices. It is, of course, 
contemplated that such exchanges of infor- 
mation would take into account the rights of 

This is an ambitious proposal. It requires 
cooperation among agencies within individ- 

ual countries as well as cooperation through- 
out the international community. And it 
clearly provides a major challenge for those 
who believe in the rule of law. But because 
transactions between companies and govern- 
ments have become a regular feature of 
modern international economic life, this 
challenge must be met. 

How successfully the challenge is met will, 
in large part, be determined by how well our 
solutions take into account traditional prin- 
ciples of fairness, due process, and rights of 
the individual. In this effort the legal pro- 
fession, both here and abroad, has a crucial 
role to play if the rule of law is to be 

First Sinai Support Mission Report 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Ford to the Congress dated April 
SO, together tvith the text of a letter to Presi- 
dent Ford dated April 13 from C. William 
Kontos, Special Representative of the Presi- 
dent and Director, U.S. Sinai Support Mis- 
sion, transmitting the first report of the 


White House press release dated April 30 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am transmitting herewith the First Re- 
port of the United States Sinai Support Mis- 
sion. The Report describes the manner in 
which the Support Mission is carrying out 
its mandate to implement the United States' 
responsibility for the early warning system 
in the Sinai, as specified in the Basic Agree- 
ment between Egypt and Israel of Septem- 
ber 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic 
Agreement. This Report is provided to the 

'Single copies of the report (39 pp. and 11 an- 
nexes) may be obtained from the U.S. Sinai Support 
Mission, c/o Department of State, Washington, D.C. 
20520, as long as supplies are available. 

May 24, 1976 


Congress in conformity with Public Law 94- 
110 of October 13, 1975. 

The Report inckides an account of Ameri- 
can participation in the establishment of the 
Sinai early warning system during the first 
six months following the enabling legisla- 
tion, a report on the current status of the 
early warning system, and a discussion of 
the actions now under way which will permit 
the Sinai Support Mission to conclude its 
construction and installation phase by early 
summer. When this pi'eparatory period has 
been completed and we have had an oppor- 
tunity to observe the ongoing operations of 
the early warning system, we will be better 
able to assess the feasibility of making 
technological or other changes that could 
lead to a reduction in the number of Ameri- 
can civilians assigned. 

As you know, the functions which the 
American volunteers are performing were 
requested by the Governments of Egypt and 
Isi-ael. We have accepted responsibility for 
these functions, with the concurrence of 
both Houses of the Congress, because we 
believe the United States has an important 
stake in a stable Middle East. 

The early warning system in the Sinai is 
an important investment in peace. It helps 
support the Basic Agreement between Egypt 
and Israel which represents a significant 
step toward an overall settlement. Continu- 
ing presence of the system provides in itself 
an important contribution to stability in the 
area and to the creation of a climate of con- 
fidence so necessary for further progress 
toward a just and durable peace. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 30, 1976. 


April 13, 1976. 

Dear Mr. President: On October 13, 1975, you 
signed the Joint Resolution of the Congress which 
authorized implementation of the United States 
Proposal for a U.S. early warning system in the 
Sinai, manned by up to 200 American civilians. The 

attendant duties and responsibilities were, at your 
direction, entrusted to the United States Sinai Sup- 
port Mission. I am submitting herewith an account 
of the Mission's activities to April 13, 1976 for in- 
clusion in the six-month report to the Congress re- 
quired by Section 4 of the Joint Resolution. In addi- 
tion, illustrative material and copies of documents 
are provided to contribute to an understanding of 
accomplishments to date. 

This initial six-month period has been a time of 
intense and productive activity for the Sinai Sup- 
port Mission, its overseas arm, the Sinai Field Mis- 
sion, and the private contractors who have been in- 
stalling the early warning system under our direc- 
tion and supervision. With the full cooperation of 
the Governments of Egypt and Israel and the United 
Nations authorities in the area, we were able to 
achieve operational surveillance capability on Febru- 
ary 22, 1976 simultaneously with the final move- 
ments of the Israeli armies and the assumption by the 
United Nations Emergency Force of responsibility 
for the Buffer Zone in accordance with the Basic 
Agreement of September 4, 1975 between Egypt and 
Israel and the Annex to the Basic Agreement. 

Since then, we have been engaged in improving 
our initial capability and continuing the construction 
of life-support facilities for the men and women 
who will comprise the Sinai Field Mission. Although 
the Joint Resolution agreed to the assignment of 
200 Americans with the Field Mission, we have kept 
in mind Congressional interest in reducing this 
number. I am pleased to report that the total number 
of United States Government and contractor staff of 
the Sinai Field Mission will be 174 once the con- 
struction period has ended. Other Congressional 
concerns raised during the Fall, 1975, hearings or 
expressed in the Joint Resolution have also been 
addressed: every member of the Sinai Field Mission 
is an American civilian who volunteered to work in 
the early warning system; no member was previously 
employed by a foreign intelligence gathering agency 
of the United States Government and none is oper- 
ating under the control of the Central Intelligence 
Agency or the Department of Defense. The health 
and welfare of each American in the Sinai were 
given priority consideration in the formulation of our 
plans. Security precautions have been integrated 
into the Field Mission's physical structures and 
daily procedures. Finally, with specific reference to 
Section 1 of the Joint Resolution, emergency evacu- 
ation plans have been prepared for the rapid removal 
of Sinai Field Mission personnel in the circumstances 
specified, or in such other circumstances as you may 

From its inception, the Sinai Support Mission has 
been mindful of the need to act with dispatch in 
order to fulfill its responsibility "to ensure that the 
United States' role in the early warning system en- 
hances the prospect of compliance in good faith 


Department of State Bulletin 

with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and 
thereby promotes the cause of peace." " The work 
schedule that was developed as a consequence is 
divided into three successive and distinct periods: 

1. An unusually compressed procurement/contract- 
ing period began with the formation of the Mis- 
sion in November, 1975, and ended on January 16, 
1976 with the award of a competitive contract to in- 
stall, operate and maintain the early warning system 
under Mission management to E-Systems, Inc. of 
Dallas, Texas, an electronic systems and equipment 
manufacturer. Close to fifty American firms partici- 
pated at various stages of the procurement process; 
without their full cooperation, it would not have 
been possible to maintain the accelerated schedule 
we required. 

2. It was highly desirable that the date on which 
the early warning system entrusted to the United 
States was to become operational coincide with the 
completion of the final troop redeployments in the 
Sinai and the establishment of the UN Buffer Zone. 
By making do with rudimentary shelters and con- 
centrating on the installation of the sensor fields 
and related hardware and communications links, and 
on the procedures to be followed in monitoring the 
Egyptian and Israeli surveillance stations, the men 
in the field successfully completed the first phase of 
contract implementation three days in advance of the 
February 22 deadline. Since then the sensor fields 
and watch stations have been working at full eff'ec- 
tiveness and no untoward incidents have occurred. 

3. The post-February 22 construction schedule is 
directed to improving the living and working con- 
ditions in the Field Mission's temporary structures 
and preparing the permanent facilities required for 
its ongoing operations. This period will end on July 
1 of this year. By then, all Field Mission personnel 
and operations will have been installed in their per- 
manent quarters. 

The components and capabilities of the early warn- 
ing system are also described in some detail in the 
report in order that the Congress may be assured 
that the American role in the Sinai is fully respon- 
sive to the provisions of the United States Proposal 
and the requirements of the Joint Resolution. I hope 
that other readers who may be less familiar with 
the role that you have assigned to us will find the 
documentation of value. 
Sincerely yours, 

C. William Kontos 

"-Vox text of Executive Order 11896 establishing 
the United States Sinai Support Mission, signed by 
President Ford on Jan. 13, see Bulletin of Feb. 23, 
1976, p. 232. 

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission 
Meets at Moscow 

Joint Statement 

Piess release 161 dated April 7 

Representatives of Canada, Japan, the 
U.S.S.R., and the United States met at the 
19th Annual Meeting of the North Pacific 
Fur Seal Commission in Moscow on March 
22-26, 1976. 

After a brief review of the Commission's 
history, Chairman E. B. Young of Canada 
introduced V. M. Kamentsev, Deputy Min- 
ister of Fisheries of the U.S.S.R. In his wel- 
coming address, Mr. Kamentsev placed the 
Commission's work in the context of to- 
day's concern with man's influence on the 

The Standing Scientific Committee, which 
met March 15-22, presented to the Commis- 
sion its review of research conducted in 1975 
and research plans for 1976. Construction 
was reported to be near completion on a new 
fur seal research facility at Nanaimo, 
Canada. This facility will be used to study 
reproductive cycles of captive seals. Scien- 
tists reported that, while the seal population 
on Robben Island (U.S.S.R.) is still in a de- 
pressed state, those on the Commander and 
Kuril Islands (U.S.S.R.) continue to increase 
significantly. Substantial increases in counts 
of adult males and in pup production were 
found on St. George and St. Paul Islands 
(U.S.A.). The small colonies recently dis- 
covered on San Miguel Island and nearby 
Castle Rock (U.S.A.) were also found to be 
increasing rapidly, with annual pup produc- 
tion now in excess of 300 in each colony. 

The Committee discussed the interactions 
between fur seals and fishing operations and 
agreed to intensify investigations into this 
important matter. Delegates from all mem- 
ber nations again expressed their concern 
with mortality of fur seals as a result of 
steadily increasing evidence of entanglement 
with lost or discarded fishing nets, net 
scraps, plastic cargo bands, and other debris. 

May 24, 1976 


The proportion of seals found entangled in 
such items continued to increase rapidly in 
1975. The Commission once again agreed to 
request the cooperation of all countries 
whose vessels fish in the North Pacific 
Ocean and Bering Sea, in mitigating the 
problem. It was reported that a poster on 
the subject has already been distributed by 
Japan to the Japanese fishermen, and that 
Canada and the United States have nearly 
completed a poster for distribution to their 
nationals fishing the North Pacific. The 
U.S.S.R. indicated that it is also preparing a 
similar poster. 

The Commission is composed of represent- 
atives from the member countries of Can- 
ada, Japan, the U.S.S.R., and the United 
States. The Commissioners are: Mr. E. B. 
Young, Associate Director, International 
Fisheries Policy, Fisheries and Marine Serv- 
ice, Department of the Environment, Ot- 
tawa; Mr. K. Fujimura, President, Japan 
Fisheries Resource Conservation Associa- 
tion, Tokyo; Mr. V. V. Kidanov, Deputy 
Chief, Department of Commercial Fisheries, 
Moscow; and Mr. C. J. Blondin, Assistant 
Director for International Fisheries, Na- 
tional Marine Fisheries Service, Depart- 
ment of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 

During the past year, under the Commis- 
sion's scientist exchange program. Commis- 
sioner Young, Dr. M. A. Bigg, and Mr. I. B. 
MacAskie of Canada visited fur seal scien- 
tists at the Marine Mammal Laboratory in 
Seattle, Wash., to discuss plans for a joint 
analysis of pelagic data collected by Canada 
and the United States during the period 
1958-74. In July, Dr. G. Y. Harry of the 
United States traveled to Robben Island on 
a Japanese research vessel for the purpose 
of studying the condition of the fur seal 

In 1976 Canada plans to send two re- 
searchers to the Pribilof Islands to obtain 
live fur seals for studies on reproduction. 
Japan also proposes to send one scientist to 
the Pribilof Islands and one scientist to 
Robben Island during 1976. 

According to the tradition of rotating 
Commission offices among the party govern- 
ments. Commissioner Fujimura of Japan 
was elected to be the next Chairman of the 
Commission and Commissioner Kidanov of 
the U.S.S.R. was elected Vice-Chairman. 
The next meeting of the Commission will be 
held in Tokyo starting March 21, 1977. The 
Standing Scientific Committee will meet for 
one week preceding the Commission meeting. 

Pan American Day and 
Pan American Week, 1976 


Eighty-six years ago the International Union of 
the American Republics, the predecessor of today's 
Organization of American States, was founded. Dur- 
ing the long history of this distinguished interna- 
tional body — the oldest of the world's regional or- 
ganizations — it has made important contributions to 
the preservation of peace and the promotion of social 
and economic welfare in our hemisphere. The pur- 
poses of the OAS remain the same, but conditions in 
the world are changing and new adaptations are re- 
quired. Last year the nations of the hemisphere 
agreed on an updating and strengthening of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The 
United States strongly supports the common effort 
presently underway to modernize and revitalize the 
Organization of American States, the key organ of 
the Inter-American System. We hope this important 
effort will be crowned by success and that it will con- 
tinue to serve as an example of international coopera- 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 
Wednesday, April 14, 1976, as Pan American Day, 
and the week beginning April 11 and ending April 17 
as Pan American Week, and I call upon the Gov- 
ernors of the fifty States, the Governor of the Com- 
monwealth of Puerto Rico, and appropriate officials 
of all other areas under the flag of the United States 
to issue similar proclamations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand this ninth day of April, in the year of our Lord 
nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independ- 
ence of the United States of America the two hun- 

Gerald R. Ford. 

' No. 4428; 41 Fed. Reg. 15395. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Department Supports Extension 

of Federal Energy Administration 

Following is a statement by Julius L. Katz, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic 
and Business Affairs, made before the Senate 
Committee on Government Operations on 
May 5.' 

I welcome this opportunity to meet with 
this committee today to present the State 
Department's views in support of S. 2872, 
a bill to extend the life of the B^ederal 
Energy Administration (FEA) until Sep- 
tember 30, 1979. 

The State Department has a vital interest 
in our nation's energy policy. Events of 
recent years have made energy one of the 
critical international issues, with serious im- 
plications for our security and foreign policy 
objectives. I think it useful to briefly re- 
trace for the committee the events leading 
to what is commonly termed the "inter- 
national energy crisis" and, more signif- 
icantly, to underline the degree to which our 
domestic and international energy policy 
decisions have become interdependent and 
self-reinforcing. Finally, I will touch upon 
the relationship between the State Depart- 
ment and FEA in the energy field and what 
I believe to be the respective roles of the two 

The energy crisis emerged as a major in- 
ternational issue through a sequence of 
events — an oil embargo in October 1973 
followed by price increases of some 400 per- 
cent in less than a single year. These actions 
— largely the result of political decisions — 
created an immediate crisis, both in the 
United States and around the world. The 
elements of the energy problem, however, 
had been developing over the last 20 years 
and are highlighted by the following facts: 
In 1950, the United States was virtually self- 
sufficient in oil, whereas by 1973 our reliance 

' The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 

on foreign oil had reached 35 percent of our 
requirements. Europe and Japan had become 
even more dependent on low cost, abundant, 
and convenient sources of imported oil. The 
experience of the October 1973 embargo 
taught us all how vulnerable we had become. 

The crisis focused attention dramatically 
on the reality of increasing global interde- 
pendence. The sheer magnitude and com- 
plexity of the issues involved compelled us to 
work toward a cooperative response — ini- 
tially among the oil-consuming countries and 
ultimately between consumers and pro- 

In December 1973 Secretary Kissinger 
called for collective action by the nations of 
Europe, North America, and Japan to meet 
the challenge. The outcome was the establish- 
ment of the 18-nation International Energy 
Agency (lEA) in Paris in November 1974. 

The lEA has made remarkable progress 
in forging consumer solidarity in its brief 18 
months of existence. It already has in place 
cooperative programs in two key areas — an 
oil-sharing program to reduce the group's 
vulnerability to future embargoes and a 
comprehensive long-term program to reduce 
its dependence on imported oil. We now have 
the framework — the basic tools and ana- 
lytical structure — to reduce our import de- 
pendence and thus regain a greater degree 
of influence over the world price of oil. But 
we must not delude ourselves — much work 
remains to be done here at home as well as 
in the other lEA countries to implement the 
substance of our long-term cooperative 
energy programs. 

A recent preliminary lEA analysis of oil 
import dependency trends in lEA countries 
is highly discouraging, however. This fore- 
cast suggests that collective lEA dependence 
on OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex- 
porting Countries] oil imports could increase 
substantially over the next 10 years — from 
a 1975 level of 21 million barrels per day to 
25.6 million barrels per day in 1980, and 
some 31.6 million barrels per day by 1985. 

This estimate assumes the continuation of 

May 24, 1976 


current policies, constant real oil prices, and 
relatively modest economic growth. Further- 
more, the bulk of the projected increase in 
imports would result from import growth in 
the United States and Japan, with European 
imports increasing only slightly as North 
Sea oil and gas come into production. This 
underlines the critical importance of U.S. 
energy policy — both domestically and in 
terms of our relations with other industrial- 
ized countries and the oil-exporting nations. 

Preliminary figures for 1976 show that 
U.S. dependence on imported oil — and partic- 
ularly Arab oil — is rising sharply. This is 
due to a variety of factors, including the pro- 
gressive decline in domestic production, the 
phasing-out of Canadian supplies, the con- 
tinuing momentum of our economic re- 
covei-y, and finally, the leadtimes inherent 
in implementation of energy conservation 
and import substitution efforts. 

Arab oil as a percentage of imports has 
increased nearly 60 percent between 1973 
and 1976, from a level of 22 percent to 35 
percent. OPEC sources taken together now 
provide some 78 percent of our import re- 
quirements, with the share of our traditional 
suppliers, Canada and Venezuela, down 

These trends — a growing import depend- 
ence compounded by an ever-increasing Arab 
share of our import market — are cause for 
serious concern. They lead us to question the 
efi^ect of the lessons of the October 1973 
embargo and subsequent massive price in- 
creases. Unfortunately, human nature is 
such that we prefer to forget disagreeable 
memories. I hope that this will not be the 
case. We can ill afford to ignore the memory 
of the severe damage caused by the 1973-74 
oil embargo to our economy in terms of un- 
employment, lost production, and reinforced 
inflation — not to mention the consequences 
for the entire world economy. The events of 
1973-74 constituted perhaps the most severe 
challenge to the industrialized world sijice 
the Second World War. 

We are meeting the challenge. In an un- 

precedented initiative, we successfully mobi- 
lized the major consuming countries into a 
new international institution, the Interna- 
tional Energy Agency, in which we have 
made clear our political will and determina- 
tion for energy cooperation. In record time, 
the lEA has established a framework for 
long-term cooperation which gives us the 
tools to reduce significantly our energy de- 
pendence and thus our vulnerability. The 
risk is that now, with a diminished sense of 
urgency, we will fall back into our old and 
admittedly comfortable ways. 

The role of the United States in this ef- 
fort is critical. We consume a third of the 
world's energy and half of the total oil with- 
in the lEA. Clearly, U.S. production and de- 
mand are key to the world oil supply-demand 
balance, and our action or inaction in the 
fields of conservation and new energy sup- 
plies will to a large extent influence the ulti- 
mate direction of world oil prices. 

Our partners in the lEA are acutely aware 
of this, as are the oil producers themselves. 
Thus, a strong and convincing U.S. energy 
program is essential — not only for domestic 
reasons but also in a broader global context. 
Effective measures adopted at home, rein- 
forced by complementary policies on the part 
of the other lEA industrialized economies, 
can and will work to enable us to achieve our 
agreed objectives of increased security of 
supply and prices which are determined by 
market forces. 

Both the State Department and FEA have 
important roles to play in defining and 
carrying out our national and international 
energy objectives. The State Department's 
focus, of course, is primarily on the develop- 
ment of our international energy policy. Our 
international policy must, however, be 
founded upon domestic policies and actions. 
The FEA is responsible for formulating and 
carrying out U.S. national energy policy and 
objectives. The State Department, in carry- 
ing out its responsibility for international 
energy policy, must necessarily work closely 
with FEA. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Officials from the FEA have been actively 
involved with the State Department and 
other agencies in defining and giving sub- 
stance to U.S. international energy initia- 
tives in the International Energy Agency in 
Paris and in the planning for the energy 
dialogue presently undei-way between in- 
dustrialized, oil-producing, and developing 
countries under the auspices of the Con- 
ference on International Economic Coopera- 

The programs and activities of several 
of the lEA standing groups are backstopped 
by FEA, and in some cases FEA and ERDA 
[Energy Research and Development Admin- 
istration] head our delegations to meetings 
of some lEA working groups, particularly 
with respect to energy conservation, nuclear 
activities, the lEA oil market information 
system, the accelerated development of new 
energy sources, and the oil storage pro- 

The State Department has a close work- 
ing relationship with FEA and ERDA and 
values highly their input into and support 
for the lEA program. We expect these TEA 
activities to continue to expand, particularly 
those relating to the long-term program to 
reduce dependence on imported oil. Such will 
necessitate our calling on FEA and ERDA 
expertise and resources to an even greater 
extent in backstopping these lEA programs 
as well as in formulating U.S. programs to 
meet our lEA commitments. 

Mr. Chairman, as we seek to develop a 
national energy policy the State Department 
and FEA have had and must necessarily 
have important complementary roles deriv- 
ing from the predominantly international 
and domestic focus of the two agencies re- 
spectively. And we look foi-ward to a con- 
tinued close working relationship with FEA 
as our country moves ahead to attain its 
objectives of secure energy supplies at fair 
prices. Therefore, because of the important 
role of FEA, we strongly urge enactment of 
legislation extending the life of FEA until 
September 30, 1979. 

President Ford Rejects Import Relief 
for Footwear Industry 

Folloioing w the text of a message from 
President Ford to the Congress transrnitted 
0)1 April 16 and released on April 19. 

White House press release dated April 19 

To the Congress of the United States: 

As required by Section 203(b)(2) of the 
Trade Act of 1974, I am transmitting this 
report to the Congress setting forth my de- 
tei-mination to provide adjustment assist- 
ance to the U.S. footwear industry produc- 
ing footwear covered by the affirmative find- 
ing of February 20, 1976 of the United 
States International Trade Commission 
(USITC) under section 201(d)(1) of the 
Trade Act. As my decision does not provide 
import relief to that industry, I am setting 
forth both the reasons why I have deter- 
mined that import relief is not in the na- 
tional economic interest and other actions I 
am taking to help the footwear industry and 

I have decided, considering the interests 
of both the American consumers and pro- 
ducers, that expedited adjustment assistance 
is the most effective remedy for the injury 
to the U.S. footwear industry and its em- 
ployees as a result of imports. 

My decision was based upon my evaluation 
of the national economic interest. A remedy 
involving import restraints would have less- 
ened competition in the shoe industry and 
resulted in higher shoe prices for American 
consumers at a time when lowering the rate 
of inflation is essential. Footwear makes up 
li/a percent of the Consumer Price Index. 

Import restraints would also have exposed 
industrial and agricultural trade to compen- 
satory import concessions or retaliation 
against U.S. exports. This would have been 
detrimental to American jobs and damaged 
U.S. exports. 

Adjustment assistance will benefit the 
many smaller enterprises which have been 

May 24, 1976 


seriously injured, whereas the USITC report 
casts grave doubt on import rehef as an ef- 
fective remedy for these firms ; import relief 
would disproportionately benefit the 21 
larger firms which produce 50% of domestic 
output, but which have been found to be 
competitive with imports. 

Adjustment assistance is consistent with 
the President's eflforts to control inflation, 
including costs to all consumers, which im- 
port restrictions would raise. 

The U.S. footwear industry is benefitting 
from a substantial increase in production, 
shipments, and employment as a result of 
the economic recovery. Additionally, a 
number of plants have reopened, order back- 
logs of domestic manufacturers have in- 
creased, and profitability has improved. 

As the U.S. economy recovers from the 
recession, domestic production of nonrubber 
footwear is rising significantly. In February, 
1976 (the latest month for which data are 
available) the output was 41,137,000 pairs. 
This is up from 40,985,000 in January, and 
is the highest monthly production figure 
since May, 1974. The monthly average for 
1976 to date is 41,106,100; for the year 1974, 
37,750,000 ; for 1975, 36,143,000. 

U.S. employment in the industry, which 
has also been steadily declining over recent 
years, also shows signs of picking up. The 
total average monthly employment for the 
industry in 1975 was 163,000 workers, com- 
pared to 178,000 for the year 1974. For the 
first two months of 1976 the monthly 
average is 172,000 the highest since July, 

Meanwhile, imports of the nonrubber foot- 
wear covered by the USITC recommendation 
(all except zoris and paper slippers) have 
been leveling off. In February, 1976, there 
were 29,238,000 pairs, down from 32,200,000 
in January. 

In considering the effect of import re- 
straints on the international economic in- 
terests of the United States, as required by 
the Trade Act of 1974, I have concluded that 
such restraints would be contrary to the U.S. 
policy of promoting the development of an 
open, nondiscriminatory and fair world eco- 
nomic system. The goal of this policy is to 

expand domestic employment and living 
standards through increased economic ef- 

I have directed the Secretaries of Com- 
merce and Labor to give expeditious con- 
sideration to any petitions for adjustment 
assistance filed by footwear firms producing 
articles covered by the USITC report, and 
their workers. I have also instructed the 
Secretaries to file supplementary budget re- 
quests for adjustment assistance funds, if 
necessary, to carry out my program. 

I have also directed the Special Represent- 
ative for Trade Negotiations to monitor U.S. 
footwear trade, watching both the levels and 
quantities of imports as well as of domestic 
production and employment. If significant 
changes occur, they will be reported to me 
with appropriate recommendations. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, April 16, 1976. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 2d Session 

Prohibiting Hostile Use of Environmental Modifica- 
tion Techniques. Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Oceans and International Environment of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
draft convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques. January 21, 1976. 46 pp. 

The Vietnam-Cambodia Emergency, 1975. Part Ill- 
Vietnam Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador 
Graham A. Martin. Hearing before the Special Sub- 
committee on Investigations of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations. January 27, 1976. 
88 pp. 

Angola. Hearings before the Subcommittee on African 
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- 
tions on U.S. involvement in civil war in Angola. 
January 29-February 6, 1976. 212 pp. 

The Southwest Pacific 1976. Report of a special dele- 
gation of Members of the Senate to the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. February 1976. 
6 pp. 

Foreign Boycotts and Domestic and Foreign Invest- 
ment Improved Disclosure Acts of 1975. Report of 
the Senate Committee on Banking. Housing and 
Urban Development, together with additional 
views, to accompany S. 953. S. Rept. 94-632. 
February 6, 1976. 33 pp. 


Department of State Bulletin 

Current Actions 


Biological Weapons 

Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio- 
logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruc- 
tion. Done at Washington, London, and Mo=;cow 
April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 197.5. 
TIAS 8062. 

Ratification deposited: Switzerland, with reser- 
vations, May 4, 1976. 

Cultural Property 

Statutes of the International Center for the Study of 
the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Prop- 
erty. Adopted at New Delhi November-December 
1956, Entered into force May 10, 1958; for the 
United States January 20, 1971. 
Accession deposited: Ethiopia, December 5, 1975. 

lEconomic Cooperation 

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975.' 
Ratification deposited: Belgium, April 16, 1976. 


Agreement on an international energy program. 
Done at Paris November 18, 1974. Entered into 
force January 19, 1976. 

Notification of consent to be bound deposited : 
Netherlands, March 30, 1976.= 

'Narcotic Drugs 

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at 
Vienna February 21, 1971.' 
Accession deposited: Cuba, April 26, 1976. 

Ocean Dumping 

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter, with an- 
nexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and 
Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force 
August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165. 

Accessions deposited: Kenya, January 7, 1976; 
Nigeria, March 19, 1976. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 
Accession deposited : Mexico, April 8, 1976. 


Strasbourg agreement concerning the international 
patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 
24, 1971. Entered into force October 7, 1975. TIAS 

Notification from World Intellectual Property 
Organization that ratification deposited: Lux- 
embourg (with a declaration), April 9, 1976. 

Postal Arrangements 

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 
5881, 7150), general regulations with final protocol 
and annex, and the universal postal convention 
with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done 
at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force 
January 1, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, October 23, 
1975; Canada, September 8, 1975; France, Octo- 
ber 30, 1975;' Fiji, October 14, 1975; Federal 
Republic of Germany, December 29, 1975;* Ice- 
land, October 6, 1975; Japan, August 1, 1975; 
Republic of Korea. December 23, 1975; Liech- 
tenstein, August 20, 1975; Malaysia, January 
30. 1976; Netherlands, November 21, 1975: ■" 
Switzerland, September 9, 1975; Thailand, March 

5, 1976; Tunisia, December 30, 1975; United 
Kingdom, February 23, 1976." 

Accession deposited: South Africa, February 2, 
Money orders and postal travellers' checks agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne 
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited : Belgium. October 23, 1975; 
France, October 22, 1975;= Federal Republic of 
GeiTTiany, December 29, 1975; ' Iceland, October 

6, 1975; Japan, August 1, 1975; Republic of 
Korea, December 23, 1975; Liechtenstein, 
August 20, 1975; Netherlands, November 21, 
1975;= Switzerland, September 9, 1975; Thai- 
land, March 5, 1976; Tunisia, December 30, 1975. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at 
Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 
entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 
entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6293. 
Notification from World Intellectual Property 

Organization that ratification deposited: Greece, 

April 15, 1976. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 

' Not in force. 

■' Applicable only to the Kingdom in Europe. 

' Including the territories represented by the 
French Overseas Postal and Telecommunication 

'Applicable to Berlin (West). 

" For Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. 

" Including the Channel Islands and the Isle of 

May 24, 1976 


venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 

October 20, 1972.' 

Accession deposited: Mexico, April 8, 1976. 

Seabed Disarmament 

Treaty on the prohibition of the employment of nu- 
clear weapons and other weapons of mass destruc- 
tion on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil 
thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 
1972. TIAS 7337. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, May 4, 1976. 


1976 protocol amending the interim convention on 
consei-vation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 
3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976. Enters 
into force on the date on which the fourth instru- 
ment of ratification or acceptance is deposited. 
Signatures: Canada, Japan, Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, United States, May 7, 1976. 


Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Enters into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Declaration of provisiotial application deposited: 
Morocco. April 30, 1976. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris 
November 23, 1972. Entered into force December 
17, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: Senegal, February 13, 1976. 



Treaty on extradition. Signed at Washington May 
14, 1974. Entered into force May 8, 1976. 
Proclaimed by the President: May 5, 1976. 

' Not in force. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 

agricultural commodities of September 11, 1975 

(TIAS 8191). Effected by exchange of notes at 

Dacca April 26, 1976. Entered into force April 26, 



Interim arrangement relating to safeguards cover- 
ing uranium imported from Canada to the United 
States. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa 
March 18 and 25, 1976. Entered into force March 
25, 1976. 

Agreement extending the agreement of June 15, 
1973, as extended (TIAS 7676, 8057), on reciprocal 
fishing privileges in certain areas off the coasts of 
the United States and Canada. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Ottawa April 14 and 22, 1976. 
Entered into force April 22, 1976. 


Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of July 31, 1975 (TIAS 
8188). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago 
April 19, 1976. Entered into force April 19, 1976. 


Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1975 
(TIAS 8088), concerning an international observer 
scheme for whaling operations from land stations 
in the North Pacific Ocean. Signed at Tokyo April 
9, 1976. Entered into force April 9, 1976. 

Republic of Korea 

Arrangement for exchange of technical information 
in regulatory and safety research matters and 
cooperation in development of safety standards, 
with patent addendum and appendices. Signed at 
Seoul March 18, 1976. Entered into force March 
18, 1976. 

United Kingdom 

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative 
meteorological program in the Cayman Islands. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 
6 and 13, 1976. Entered into force April 13, 1976. 

Agreement amending the convention of December 31, 
1975, for the avoidance of double taxation and the 
prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income and capital gains. Effected by exchange 
of notes at London April 13, 1976. Enters into 
force on the same date as the convention. 


Department of State Bulletin 

INDEX May 2i, 1976 Vol. LXXIV, No. 1926 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 654 

The Department of State and National Security 
Policy (Sisco) 637 

Department Supports Extension of Federal 
Energy Administration (Katz) 651 

First Sinai Support Mission Report Trans- 
mitted to the Congress (message from Presi- 
dent Ford, transmittal letter to President 
Ford) 647 

President Ford Rejects Import Relief for Foot- 
wear Industry (message to the Congress) . . 653 

Economic Affairs 

The Challenge of Transnational Corporate 

"Wrongdoing" to the Rule of Law (Leigh) . 642 

Department Supports Extension of Federal 
Energy Administration (Katz) 651 

Energy. Department Supports Extension of 
Federal Energy Administration (Katz) . . 651 

Environment. North Pacific Fur Seal Commis- 
sion Meets at Moscow (joint statement) . . 649 

Human Rights. U.S. Reaffirms Position on 
Decade To Combat Racism (Scranton) . . . 640 

International Law. The Challenge of Transna- 
tional Corporate "Wrongdoing" to the Rule 
of Law (Leigh) 642 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

North Pacific Fur Seal Commission Meets 

at Moscow (joint statement) 649 

Latin America, Pan American Day and Pan 
American Week, 1976 (proclamation) . . . 650 

Middle East. First Sinai Support Mission Re- 
port Transmitted to the Congress (message 
from President Ford, transmittal letter to 
President Ford) 647 

Military Affairs. The Department of State and 
National Security Policy (Sisco) 637 

Presidential Documents 

First Sinai Support Mission Report Trans- 
mitted to the Congress 647 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 

1976 (proclamation) 650 

President Ford Rejects Import Relief for Foot- 
wear Industry 653 

World Trade Week, 1976 (proclamation) ... 641 


President Ford Rejects Import Relief for Foot- 
wear Industry (message to the Congress) . . 653 
World Trade Week, 1976 (proclamation) ... 641 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 655 

United Nations. U.S. Reaffirms Position on 
Decade To Combat Racism (Scranton) . . . 640 

Name Index 

Ford, President 641, 647, 650, 653 

Katz, Julius L 651 

Kontos, C. William 647 

Leigh, Monroe 642 

Scranton, William W 640 

Sisco, Joseph J 637 


< List 

of Department of State 


Releases: May 3-9 

Press releases may be obtained from the 

Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 

Washington, D.C. 20520. 






U.S. and Brazil sign textile agree- 
ment, Apr. 22. 



Overseas Schools Advisory Council, 
May 27. 



U.S. -Egypt claims agreement signed 
May 1. 



Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad- 
visory Committee, May 25. 



Kissinger, Corea: toasts, Nairobi. 



U.S., U.K., and France sign strato- 
spheric monitoring agreement. 



Kissinger: remarks at dinner for 13 
heads of delegations to UNCTAD. 



Kissinger: UNCTAD, Nairobi. 



Kissinger: remarks at luncheon for 
heads of OECD delegations to 



Kissinger: intei-view with ABC, 



Frank E. Maestrone sworn in as 
Ambassador to Kuwait (bio- 
graphic data). 



Kissinger: departure, Nairobi. 



Kissinger: arrival, Paris. 



Kissinger: remarks to press, Paris. 



Kissinger, Houphouet-Boigny: re- 
marks, Paris. 



Kissinger: departure, Paris. 



Fine Arts Committee, June 18. 



Study Group 7 of the U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee, 
Atlantic City, N.J., June 4. 



Kissinger: arrival, Andrews AFB. 



Francis E. Meloy, Jr., swom in as 
Ambassador to Lebanon (bio- 
graphic data). 



Kissinger: Chizuk Amuno Syna- 
gogue, Baltimore. 


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Volume LXXIV 

No. 1927 

May 31, 1976 









For index see inside back cover 




Vol. LXXIV, No. 1927 
May 31, 1976 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing OflBce 

Washington, B.C. 20402 


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UNCTAD IV: Expanding Cooperation for Global Economic Development 

Af/rfre,s,s hi/ Secretary Kissinger ' 

We are assembled here to carry forward 
one of the most important enterprises in 
history: the endeavor of independent na- 
tions to advance global economic develop- 
ment and so to better the quality of human 
life on earth. Our goal is nothing less than 
to shape an enduring structure of inter- 
national collaboration that offers peace and 
prosperity, equal opportunity and dignity to 
all peoples. 

Man has always yearned for peace and a 
just international order. In our time these 
twin goals have become a realistic possi- 
bility. Their attainment will require us to 
meet challenges whose scale eludes the 
grasp of individual nations, whose com- 
plexity mocks the slogans and solutions of 
the past, and whose pace outstrips the meas- 
ured processes of traditional diplomacy. 

There is before us all the imperative of 
world stability — the task of resolving con- 
flicts, reducing tensions, and resisting the 
encroachment of new imperialisms, new 
oppressions, and new dangers. For this 
undertaking the United States, together 
with other nations, has assumed a heavy 

Beyond it lie our positive aspirations. 
The American people are a humane people. 
We know that stability is not enough ; peace 
must extend mankind's reach for a better 
life. In the Declaration of Independence of 
the United States, the seminal document of 
our national existence, we have written that 

' Made before the fourth ministerial meeting of 
the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development at 
Nairobi on May 6 (text from press release 224). 

"all men are created equal" and entitled to 
"Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happi- 
ness." This pursuit has brought me to 
Nairobi — to advance on behalf of President 
Ford and the U.S. Government the great 
cause we all hold in common. 

In the long sweep of history, the future of 
peace and progress may be most decisively 
determined by our response to the necessi- 
ties imposed by our economic interdepend- 
ence. This is the challenge which we have 
assembled here to address: the urgent need 
for cooperative solutions to the new global 
problems of the world economy. These is- 
sues dominate the agenda of the evolving 
relationship between North and South, the 
industrial and the developing countries. 

They are issues of economics — of an effec- 
tive system of trade, monetary relations, and 
development assistance, and of insuring that 
the prosperity of some nations does not come 
at the expense of others. They are issues of 
politics — of how nations deal with each 
other and of how we can construct an inter- 
national order that promotes peace. They 
are issues of morality — the recognition that 
economic might does not make right. And 
they are issues of justice — the awareness 
that the well-being of our peoples depends 
upon an international system fair and open 
to all. 

The modern age and our common morality 
insistently demand respect for human dig- 
nity and the fulfillment of the human per- 
sonality. But a world in which poverty and 
misery continue to afflict countless miflions 
would mock these imperatives. The daily 
preoccupation of men and women would be 

May 31, 1976 


the harsh necessities of survival; the 
energies of nations would be consumed in 
hatred and rivalry. We must build instead a 
world of cooperation and widening human 
opportunity reflecting the fundamental 
interdependence of our destinies. 

Today, the accelerating forces of modern- 
ization — technological, economic, social, and 
political — link the peoples of the world as 
never before. They can intensify conflict, or 
they can provide us with unprecedented pos- 
sibilities to advance our common aims. All 
nations are part of a global economic sys- 
tem. If that system is to flourish it must 
rest on the firm foundation of security, fair- 
ness, and opportunity to all who wish to 
participate — rich and poor, Noi'th and South, 
consumer and producer. It must embrace the 
interests of all if it is to be supported by all. 
President Ford has sent me here, committed 
to bring about a constructive and coopera- 
tive relationship between the developed and 
the developing countries over the remainder 
of this century. 

This ministerial meeting of UNCTAD is 
the first of its kind to be held in Africa. This 
is altogether fitting, for Africa's importance 
in world affairs is growing. And African 
countries have an especially high stake in a 
successful conference leading to concrete 
progress. No continent has been more vul- 
nerable to worldwide economic instabilities. 
No continent suffers so cruelly when crops 
fail for lack of rain. No continent endures a 
heavier burden when commodity prices fluc- 
tuate violently. And no continent has more 
to gain from the organized cooperation of 
all nations to promote economic and social 
progress and to insure a greater role for the 
developing nations in the world's economic 

This is a continent of proud traditions and 
new nations, of rising aspirations and of 
determination in the face of monumental 
challenge. Here it can — indeed, it must — be 
demonstrated that men of all races and 
colors can live and prosper together in peace 
with equal rights and mutual respect. 

During the past two weeks I have been 
privileged to be a guest in Africa and to 
enjoy the extraordinary hospitality of its 

people and leaders. I have greatly benefited' 
from my discussions with African states- 
men, and I have learned much about the con- 
cerns and hopes of the peoples of Africa. The' 
nations of this continent can be confident 
that the United States is prepared to co- 
operate with them in their great struggles 
for justice, economic progress, and freedom 
from external intervention. 

Today we are all especially indebted 
to the Republic of Kenya and its world- 
renowned leader. President Kenyatta, for 
making this beautiful city available as the 
site of this conference. The U.S. delegation 
has come to Nairobi to achieve, with repre- 
sentatives of other nations, a major step 
foi^ward in international cooperation. 

We begin this conference at a moment of 
opportunity. The world economy is recover- 
ing from a deep recession, my own country 
perhaps most rapidly. Increasing American 
demand for products of other countries will 
make a major contribution to recovery 
around the world. Many obstacles to sus- 
tained economic growth remain; but there 
are convincing signs that we have sur- 
mounted the worst part of the economic 
crisis and that before us, if we act with 
wisdom and energy, is the opportunity for 
a new and prolonged period of prosperity. 

This, therefore, may be a decisive mo- 
ment which off'ers us a brief, but special, op- 
portunity to reinvigorate and improve the 
world's international economic system. Now 
is the time to free the world from disruptive 
cycles of boom and bust and to enhance the 
opportunities of the developing countries. 

The United States, better than almost 
any other nation, could survive a period of 
economic warfare. We can resist confronta- 
tion and rhetorical attacks if other nations 
choose that path. And we can ignore un- 
realistic proposals and peremptory de- 
mands. But the historic opportunity which 
is at hand would slip away. It is up to us, 
as the spokesmen of nations meeting in this 
world forum, to reach beyond the doubts 
and temptations of the moment toward the 
permanent international interests of us all. 
In so doing, we can take courage from the 
knowledge that the means exist to achieve a 


Department of State Bulletin 

brighter future. It lies within our power to 
shape a world where all men can live in 
diurnity and aspire to progress. 

Let us therefore hold before us as the 
goal of this conference, and of the dialogue 
lietween developed and developing nations, 
tlie motto of the Republic of Kenya: 
"Harambee — work together for the good 
i.f all." 

Let us begin by building on the positive 
iiceomplishments of the seventh special ses- 
sion of the U.N. General Assembly last Sep- 
tember. At that meeting the industrial and 
ieveloping nations, in an encouraging dem- 
)nstration of consensus, put aside ideological 
■onfrontation, declared their common pur- 
pose of moving forward cooperatively, and 
idopted an agreed agenda for action. 

On behalf of President Ford, I call upon 
this conference to accelerate the efforts and 
:ontinue the cooperative spirit which began 
:hen. I will introduce new proposals on all 
;he priority concerns of this conference, to 
^•eflect what we have heard of your ideas 
and your aspirations in the Manila Declara- 
tion and in other forums, including the Con- 
ference on International Economic Coopera- 
;ion in Paris.^ 

These proposals represent the contribu- 
;ions of all relevant agencies of the U.S. 
]k)vernment, under the direction of the 
President. I have worked especially closely 
with my colleague Treasury Secretary 
Simon in shaping the program we are 

The strong bipartisan support which our 
ipproach enjoys results from weeks of close 
consultations between the executive and both 
Houses of our Congress. It is demonstrated 
jy the presence here of two distinguished 
Senators [Jacob K. Javits and Abraham A. 
Ribicoff] representing our two political 
aarties. Other Senators and members of the 
House of Representatives will follow as your 
ivork proceeds. 

The United States pledges its dedication 
md willingness to cooperate over the decades 

- For texts of the Manila Declaration and Program 
if Action, adopted on Feb. 7, 1976, by the third minis- 
terial meeting of the Group of 77, see U.N. doc. 

ahead. We do so with an open mind. We 
want to hear your ideas and proposals. We 
are here to exchange views and to forge a 
fresh consensus. 

The State of Our Efforts 

Let me first review what our nations to- 
gether achieved since last September. 

We agreed at the seventh special session 
to take measures to help insure basic eco- 
nomic security against cycles that devastate 
export earnings and undermine development. 
In January, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) expanded its compensatory 
financing facility, as we had proposed, to 
make available several billion dollars to 
stabilize export earnings. 

In September, we pledged to accelerate 
economic growth by improving developing 
countries' access to capital and new tech- 
nology. To these ends, the United States, 
other industrial countries, and several oil- 
producing countries have begun to marshal 
increased capital, technological, and human 
resources to promote development. Negotia- 
tions have been completed to increase World 
Bank capital by $8 billion ; we will contribute 
our fair share to a $6 billion increase in the 
resources of the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank; we will contribute to an expan- 
sion of the African Development Fund; we 
are actively participating in discussions on 
replenishment of the Asian Development 
Fund and Bank. 

At the special session, the world com- 
munity dedicated itself to improving trade 
and investment in key commodities. In- 
ternational solutions have already been 
achieved on several key commodity issues, 
including the successful negotiation of coffee 
and tin agreements. Progress is also being 
made in expanding the world's supply of its 
most vital commodity — food. 

And finally, at the special session, the 
world community made a commitment to 
meet the special needs of the poorest coun- 
tries, which have suffered the most from 
recent economic dislocations. We have made 
significant progress by providing financial 
and technical assistance to increase food 

^Aay 31, 1976 


production and by introducing new measures 
to help relieve crushing balance-of-payments 
problems of the poorest nations. 

These achievements are only the begin- 
ning of the process. We are, this year, in the 
midst of what may well be the most exten- 
sive series of international negotiations on 
trade, finance, commodities, and develop- 
ment in history — -involving more nations, 
addressing more issues, and affecting more 
people than ever before. This conference has 
a major role to play. In particular we can 
advance our work in four key areas: 

First, ive must make reneived efforts on 
commoditii issues, including the problems of 
resource investment and trade. Commodi- 
ties — energy, food, and other primary prod- 
ucts — are the building blocks of growth and 
prosperity. For many countries, develop- 
ment of resources is the key to industrial- 
ization, employment, decent incomes, and 
healthy diets. All nations need adequate sup- 
plies of primary products and fair compen- 
sation for their production. Solving the com- 
plex of these issues is a critical test of our 
ability to work together systematically to 
expand the world's wealth for the benefit 
of all. 

Second, ive must design a far-reaching 
long-term program to accelerate technology 
transfer. The quantity of capital investment 
by itself does not assure sustained develop- 
ment. There must be as well continuous 
improvements in productivity that only new 
technology and trained local manpower can 
bring. The subject deserves high priority, 
and comprehensive efforts will be required. 

Third, we must deal with serious balance- 
of-payments and debt problems ivhich face 
a number of developing cowitries. Rising 
import costs caused in large part by higher 
oil prices, and reduced export earnings due 
to recession in industrialized countries, have 
created unprecedented international pay- 
ments problems. An improved world econ- 
omy will automatically ease the problem for 
many countries. Nevertheless we must con- 
tinue to seek means of assistance for the 
particular problems of certain developing 


Fourth, we must continue to respond to 
the special and urgent needs of the poorest 
countries. Helping these nations will not 
only demonstrate the capacity of the inter- 
national economy to serve all countries 
equitably; it will also reflect our collective 
sense of responsibility. 

Let me now suggest specific new ap- 
proaches for dealing with each of these four 

A Comprehensive Approach to Commodities 

('ommodity exports are critical for devel- 
opment. The non-oil developing countries 
rely on primary products for nearly two- 
thirds of their export earnings. Yet produc- 
tion and export of these resources are vul- 
nerable to the whims of weather, the swings 
of worldwide demand, and new technology. 
Cycles of scarcity and glut, of underinvest- 
ment and overcapacity, disrupt economic 
conditions in both the developing and the 
industrial world. 

It has become clear in recent years that a 
piecemeal approach to these issues will not 
suffice. The UNCTAD Secretariat has made 
an important contribution to meeting these 
problems in its integrated commodities pro- 
gram. While the United States cannot ac- 
cept all of its elements, there are many 
parts which we are prepared to consider. 

At this conference, the United States 
proposes its own comprehensive approach to 
commodity issues. It reflects many of the 
objectives contained in the integrated pro- 
gram and our desire for constructive action 
on all aspects of the challenge. It contains 
the following elements: 

— Insuring suflScient financing for re- 
source development and for equitable shar- 
ing in the benefits by the host nation; 

— Improving the conditions of trade and 
investment in individual commodities and 
moderating excessive price fluctuations; 

— Stabilizing the overall export earnings 
of developing countries; and 

— Improving access to markets for proc- 
essed products of developing countries while 
assuring consumers reliability of supply. 

Department of State Bulletin 

Let me discuss each of these elements in 

Adequate Investment 

Most of the world's raw material produc- 
tion in fact takes place in the industrial 
countries. But if development is to take 
hold, a special effort must be made to ex- 
pand the production and exports of primary 
products of developing countries. Such a 
program must overcome the following 

First, we must deal realistically with the 
political and economic problems which are 
diverting investments from developing to 
developed countries. For, paradoxically, re- 
source development is often discouraged by 
the very countries which are most in need 
of it. Nationalization and forced change in 
the terms of concessions in some develop- 
ing countries have clouded the general cli- 
mate for resource investment in the develop- 
ing world. Social and political uncertainties 
have further complicated investment pros- 
pects. As a result, commercially viable proj- 
ects have been postponed, canceled, or re- 
located ; and capital, management, and tech- 
nology have been diverted to production of 
higher cost raw materials in the industrial- 
ized world. 

Second, in the next decade alone the total 
requirements for global investment in re- 
sources will be massive. Individual projects 
will require unprecedented sums of capital 
and complex financial arrangements. The 
time required between the beginning of a 
project and its completion is increasing. All 
these factors compound the political un- 
certainties and further inhibit rational 

Third, there is no one institution that can 
work comprehensively to facilitate resource 
development, particularly in energy and min- 
erals, or to promote equitable sharing of its 

If present trends continue, serious mis- 
allocations of capital, management, and tech- 
nology are inevitable. The costs of raw ma- 
terial and agricultural production will esca- 
late. Many potential producers will be un- 

able to attract adequate capital. All coun- 
tries will pay the price in accelerated infla- 
tion and retarded growth — with the poorest 
countries suffering the most. 

To overcome these problems the United 
States proposes the establishment of an In- 
ternational Resources Bank (IRB). This 
new institution would promote more ra- 
tional, systematic, and equitable develop- 
ment of resources in developing nations. It 
would facilitate technological development 
and management training in the develop- 
ing countries. It would help insure supplies 
of raw materials to sustain the expansion of 
the global economy and would help moder- 
ate commodity price fluctuations. 

The International Resources Bank would 
mobilize capital for sound resource develop- 
ment projects by assisting individual re- 
source projects to secure direct financing 
and issuing bonds which could be secured 
by a specific commodity. Alternatively, these 
bonds could be retired through delivery of 
a specific commodity. "Commodity bonds" of 
this type could greatly improve conditions 
of supply and market access and help devel- 
oping countries to stabilize export earnings. 

To enhance confidence for both host gov- 
ernments and investors the International 
Resources Bank would begin operations with 
a capital fund of $1 billion. It would partici- 
pate with foreign investors and the host 
government in project agreements specify- 
ing the conditions of the investment on a 
basis acceptable to all parties. Such an agree- 
ment could include a formula for production 
sharing and arrangements by investors to 
help develop the managerial, technological, 
and marketing capabilities of the host coun- 
try. The Bank would support guarantees of 
both investor and host nation performance 
in accordance with conditions established in 
the project agreement. 

To insure effective coordination with other 
public institutions, the International Re- 
sources Bank could be associated with the 
World Bank Group, in a form to be worked 
out by the participating countries. It could 
operate in close collaboration with — and ren- 
der even more effective — other institutions 

May 31, 1976 


such as the World Bank and its associate, 
the International Finance Corporation, and 
the Inter-American Development Bank as 
well as the U.N. revolving fund for mineral 

The IRB proposal offers many advantages 
and new concepts: 

— Its facilitating role as third party with 
the host country and the foreign investor 
will encourage conditions for project devel- 
opment consistent with internationally ac- 
cepted standards of equity. 

— The IRB mechanism provides multi- 
lateral guarantees of the performance of 
both the host nation and the foreign in- 
vestor in accordance with the project agree- 
ment — thereby reducing the noncommercial 
risks. This cannot fail to promote greater 
flows of investment capital for resource 
projects on reasonable terms. 

— The proposal contemplates production- 
sharing arrangements under which the for- 
eign investor is assured of an established 
percentage of total production with disposi- 
tion of the balance to be controlled by the 
host nation. This allows the host nation to 
share in production from the outset, provid- 
ing it with the basis for further processing 
of the raw material should this prove to be 
economically feasible. 

— Commodity bonds would be a fruitful 
new international instrument for forward 
purchases of commodities. They could con- 
tribute to earnings stabilization. They would 
also provide added assurance of market ac- 
cess for the host country and supply access 
for the consumer. 

— Finally, through the IRB, modern tech- 
nology would flow into developing nations. 
The two key elements required for develop- 
ment — management and technology — are pro- 
vided by the foreign investor directly in a 
new form of capital investment. The tri- 
lateral agreement could include provision for 
the progressive acquisition of technology by 
the host country and thus contribute im- 
portantly to the process of technology 

We consider the International Resources 
Bank to be an innovative and significant re- 

sponse to the basic needs of the developing 
nations and the international community. It 
will be a major advance in the sharing of 
benefits and responsibilities between indus- 
trialized and developing nations. It will help 
insure the essential flow of capital, manage- 
ment, and technology into resource develop- 
ment under conditions acceptable to host 
governments. And it will enhance the pre- 
dictability that is essential to attract capi- 
tal investment. We hope other countries will 
join us during the coming months to design 
and establish this global institution. 

Improvement of the Conditions of Trade and 
Investment in Individual Commodities 

We are all conscious of the problems the 
world economy has faced recently in this 
area. Within only two years the tight sup- 
ply and astronomical prices of many critical 
materials have been followed by a period of 
declining prices. Many economies have been 
severely shaken, and several countries have 
suffered balance-of-payments crises. Drastic 
price changes affect the developing countries 
most severely, playing havoc with foreign 
exchange earnings and development plans. 
And because raw material production proj- 
ects require years to develop and involve 
high risks, volatile prices tend to lead to 
erratic patterns of investment. 

There are a number of ways to improve 
commodity markets: long-term contractual 
arrangements, better exchange of market 
information, improved distribution, more 
efficient production methods, and better 
storage and transport facilities. 

We agree with the UNCTAD Secretariat 
that buffer stocks deserve special atten- 
tion. For those commodities where buffer 
stocks are feasible, sharp fluctuations in 
prices can be moderated by building stocks 
when markets are weak. And adequate sup-