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Full text of "Department of State bulletin"

BOSTON 
PUBLIC 
LIBRARY 




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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1945 



October 4, 1976 



SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 11 409 

DEPARTMENT URGES CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT 
WITH TURKEY ON DEFENSE COOPERATION 

Statement by Under Secretary Habib 424 

U.S. RESPONSIBILITIES IN WORLD POPULATION ISSUES 
Address by Marshall Green 419 

DEPARTMENT TESTIFIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN IRAN 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Atherton 429 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

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Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
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funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through January 31. 1981. 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1945 
October 4, 1976 

The Department of State BULLETIN, 

a weekly publication issued by the 

Office of Media Services, Bureau of 

Public Affairs, provides the public and 

interested agencies of the government 

with information on developments in 

the field of U.S. foreign relations and 

on the work of the Department ani 

the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selectet 

press releases on foreign policy, issuei 

by the White House and the Depart 

ment, and statements, addresses 

and news conferences of the Presiden 

and the Secretary of State and othe 

officers of the Department, as well a. 

special articles on various phases o 

international affairs and the function 

of the Department. Information i 

included concerning treaties and inter 

national agreements to which th 

United States is or may become 

party and on treaties of general inter 

national interest. 

Publications of the Department o 
State, United Nations documents, an 
legislative material in the field c 
international relations are also listei 









Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of September 1 1 



Press release 429 dated September 11 

Secretary Kissinger: Before I take ques- 
tions I wanted to make a few points about 
the trip to Africa that I am undertaking 
starting on Monday. 

First, the American diplomatic effort is 
being undertaken with the support and 
with the encouragement of all of the 
parties involved. 

Second, there is no "American plan." 
The solutions have to be found in Africa 
and have to be found by negotiations 
among the parties. 

Third, the United States has agreed to 
offer its good offices because no other coun- 
try was available to perform this role and 
because the risks to world peace of an 
escalating violence in southern Africa 
were very severe. 

Fourth, war had already started in 
southern Africa. The danger of its expan- 
sion, the danger of foreign intervention, 
the impact on the national security of the 
United States and on world peace dictated 
that we make an effort to find a peaceful 
Isolution. The worst that can happen if this 
effort fails is what was certain to happen 
if the effort is not made. 

We are dealing with three problems: 
Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa — 
each having different aspects and each 
having different timetables. 

On this trip we will deal primarily with 
the issues of Namibia and Rhodesia. It is 
not a negotiation that will lend itself to 
dramatic final conclusions, because there 
are, in the case of Rhodesia, four states, 
four liberation movements, the Rhodesian 
settlers, and South Africa involved ; in the 
case of Namibia, several African states, 
again South Africa, the national movement 



recognized by the Organization of African 
Unity, namely, SWAPO [South West 
Africa People's Organization], and sev- 
eral internal groups assembled in a con- 
stitutional conference. 

We are pursuing this policy, which will 
not support violence and which stands 
opposed to foreign intervention, in the in- 
terest of world peace, in the national inter- 
est of the United States, and above all for 
the interests of the peoples of Africa. 

Now I will be glad to take questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think any ar- 
rangements you can help to make to resolve 
the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia can 
have any lasting relevance and stability in a 
region where the strongest nation, South 
Africa, is saying through Prime Minister 
Vorster that they intend to preserve their 
system of white rule? 

Secretary Kissinger: The solutions to Rho- 
desia and Namibia, if they can be achieved, 
can have a lasting character. 

The purpose is to enable a transition to 
independence in Namibia and to majority 
rule and protection of minority rights in 
Rhodesia under conditions that will enable 
all the communities to live together and in 
which the bloodshed is put to an end. 

The conditions in South Africa are more 
complicated and require a much longer 
timespan for their evolution. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you go into some de- 
tail on the apparent American-British incen- 
tive plan to help bring about a transition to 
black rule in Rhodesia? There has been a lot 
of speculation about it. I know you have 
spoken to people on the Hill about it. Could 
you provide us with some details? 



October 4, 1976 



409 



Secretary Kissinger: Obviously, any solu- 
tion in Rhodesia will have to have political 
components and economic components. It 
should not be seen as an effort to buy out 
the white settlers. Rather, Rhodesia is a 
rich country that can have a substantial 
economic rate of progress after full in- 
dependence is achieved. 

What we have been discussing with the 
United Kingdom and with other interested 
parties is a scheme that can be used either 
for investment in Rhodesia to spur eco- 
nomic progress or as a safety net for those 
settlers who want to leave — or for both. 
Some of the funds can come from private 
sources that have economic interests there. 
Some can come from governments. 

The leadership in this effort will have 
to be taken by the United Kingdom, which 
has the legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, 
with our support. We have talked to other 
countries, and the Government of France 
has already announced its support. So this 
plan is going to have a wide basis, but its 
exact features cannot be discussed until it 
has evolved further. But its basic philoso- 
phy is what I have outlined here. 

Establishing Framework for Negotiations 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two 
questions based on your statement. 

You say that this is not a negotiation which 
lends itself to final conclusions; therefore, 
what ivoidd you expect to achieve on this, 
and when might you get a final conclusion? 

And then you also said that the ivorst that 
can happen if the effort fails is that what was 
certain to happen will happen, if the effort 
were not made. What is that? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
second question: We are facing a situation 
now in which a so-called "armed struggle" 
is already taking place in Rhodesia and is 
beginning in Namibia. 

The history of these struggles is that they 
lead to escalating violence, drawing in 
more and more countries, and have the 
danger of foreign intervention and the 
probability of the radicalization of the 



whole continent of Africa, in which moder- 
ate governments will find it less and less 
possible to concentrate on the aspirations 
of their people and become more and more 
focused on events in southern Africa. For 
this reason, we want to provide a non- 
violent alternative to this prospect. 

Now this prospect is before us. This 
prospect has a short time limit, and there- 
fore it cannot wait for our own electoral 
processes. This is what will almost cer- 
tainly happen if efforts of negotiation fail. 

Now I have forgotten your first question. 

Q. The first question was that in your state- 
ment you said this is not a negotiation that 
ivill lend itself to dramatic conclusions — 

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. 

Q. What do you expect to achieve, and 
when might you expect a final conclusion? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, we 
are dealing with about eight parties on 
the side of black Africa. In Rhodesia we 
are dealing with the white settlers and we 
are dealing with South Africa. And in 
Namibia also we are dealing with many 
different groups. 

Therefore in both cases an objective is 
to establish a framework for negotiations 
in which then the details will have to be 
worked out by the various parties con- 
cerned. We cannot supply the details by 
which transitions to independence are 
achieved. What we can do is to bring the 
parties sufficiently close so that they think 
a negotiating effort — they believe in a ne- 
gotiating effort — and perhaps establish 
some of the basic conditions for the 
negotiations. 

Whether this can be achieved in both 
cases in one trip, I would question; but 
progress toward these objectives can be 
made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how important is it to end 
the guerrilla struggle that is already taking 
place on Rhodesia's borders, and beginning in 
Namibia? And will you seek any commit- 
ments from the frontline nations to diminish 
their support of the guerrilla struggle if you 






410 



Department of State Bulletin 






succeed in creating the conditions for major- 
ity ride in Rhodesia ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody 
tgrees that if a peaceful solution can be 
ound, then there is no purpose in a guer- 
illa struggle. So the problem is: Can one 
ind conditions in which all parties can 
igree to this? 

But as I pointed out, the United States 
lloes not support violent solutions when 
>eaceful alternatives are available. 

Bernie [Bernard Gwertzman, New York 
Hmes]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you feel that you 
tourself should engage in a shuttle diplo- 
macy? Why cannot this be done through 
wre orthodox diplomatic channels? While 
here has been widespread support on the 
{ill, one Congressman yesterday character- 
zed this mission as "Lone Ranger" diplo- 
macy, and I wonder if you ivould address 
ourself to why you feel you yourself must 
e involved. 

Secretary Kissinger: That Congressman 
vas not very original, it seems to me. He 
ilagiarized a Southern Governor. [Laugh- 
er.] 

We have had three missions in Africa. 
?he British have had two. And a point has 
learly been reached where, since the 
'residents of so many black African states 
re involved as well as the leaders of 
outhern Africa, matters cannot be brought 
eyond this point by the exchanges of 
otes, by referring documents back for 
etailed instructions, and what is needed 
ow is an impetus in which the negotiations 
an be conducted somewhat more flexibly. 

This is true especially in South Africa as 
/ell, where some difficult decisions have to 
e taken. 

So this is what led all of the parties con- 
erned to believe that this was the best 
/ay to proceed. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you 
nil be seeing some black African leaders 
nthin South Africa itself. Now, you men- 
ioned earlier that you didn't expect to ac- 
omplish anything on the South African ques- 



tion on this particular trip. What would be 
the purpose of your meeting with black Afri- 
cans ivithin South Africa? 

Secretary Kissinger: I expect to meet rep- 
resentatives of all communities in South 
Africa, and not only of the white communi- 
ty, primarily to inform myself on conditions 
there so that I can form a better judg- 
ment of what the right American policy 
might be. 

U.S. National Interest 

Q. Mr. Secretary, many Americans believe 
that there is no U.S. interest in southern 
Africa and that our national security is not 
concerned there. You, however, have a con- 
trary view, and I wonder if you can elaborate 
on that a bit more. 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, at 
issue is not only the future of two states 
in southern Africa but the potential evolu- 
tion of all of Africa, with its profound im-. 
pact on Europe and on the Middle East. 

It is the fixed American policy that 
solutions to complicated international is- 
sues should not be sought by violence. And 
conversely, if the principle of violent solu- 
tions is established, it will have an impact 
on other areas of the world. 

Secondly, all European countries recog- 
nize the interests that they have in a mod- 
erate evolution of events in Africa; and 
this is why we have received public sup- 
port from the United Kingdom, with which 
we have been cooperating most closely, 
from the President of France, and from 
the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, together 
with diplomatic support from all our 
other allies. 

Therefore the consequences of the radi- 
calization of Africa would be serious in 
many other parts of the world. We are 
now at a moment when we can still, with 
relatively small effort, at least attempt to 
arrest this. 

We have been urged, not only by the 
states of southern Africa but by all the 
moderate leaders in Africa, to engage in 



•ctober 4, 1976 



411 



this enterprise, because they understand 
what is at stake for the future of their 
countries. 

And therefore we believe that the na- 
tional interest of the United States is in- 
volved. Success is not guaranteed, but an 
effort must be made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the current 
situation to result possibly in any further 
currency devaluation, such as in the South 
African rand and the British pound? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think I should 
be asked economic questions, since there 
are so many people here who will tell you 
that I am an argument against universal 
suffrage on these issues. 

I have not even thought about this. I 
don't expect that it will have any impact on 
devaluation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you think 
the West German Federal Republic can play 
being helpful in this African settlement? 

Secretary Kissinger: As Chancellor Schmidt 
said at a press conference in Hamburg, 
the Federal Republic has a historic rela- 
tionship to some of the population in 
Namibia. I understand there are about 
30,000 people of German origin that live 
in Namibia, and so the Federal Republic 
can be helpful, especially helpful, in any 
efforts that may be made there; but it has 
indicated that it will give its general sup- 
port to efforts in southern Africa generally. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if this matter is so im- 
portant to U.S. national security, why ivasn't 
a great deal more done long ago when the 
positions were not so fixed and when it ivas 
more possible to make progress in the area? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because the condi- 
tions for making progress did not exist 
previously. Until the collapse of the Portu- 
guese colonial empire, the conditions did 
not exist. 

Secondly, the United States did not feel 
that it had a primary responsibility in an 
area that had been traditionally governed 
by European countries and where many 



European countries had a longer historica 
interest; and therefore we wanted to giv 
every opportunity to Great Britain, whic! 
was engaged in a diplomatic effort wit 
respect to Rhodesia — for this effort t 
succeed. 

It was the combination of a number c 
factors which made it clear that thes 
methods would not work and that unde: 
lined the urgency of the situation. 

Solution Primarily African Matter 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence tfa 
black Rhodesian unity is possible, and w\ 
you meet with any black Rhodesians on th\ 
trip ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The meeting in D; 
[es Salaam], which was supposed to- 
which brought together the so-called fror 
line Presidents and the various liberate 
movements, was more successful in brin 
ing about unity among the frontlii 
Presidents than among liberation mov 
ments. I would say that at this mome 
there is little evidence of unity among the 
movements. 

With respect to whether I should me 
them or not, I will be guided by the reco: 
mendations of the African Presidents. 

I have taken the position that in ore 
to avoid foreign intervention on the moc 
of Angola, the United States would r 
deal directly with the liberation raoi 
ments, provided no other country wou 
do this. If any of the Presidents think — 
if the Presidents think that it would 
desirable for me to meet with them, th 
I would be prepared to do it. 

But I must stress that the solution 
these problems is primarily an Afric i 
matter and for the parties concerned. T ; 
United States can act as an intermediary 
the United States can offer suggestio]. 
The United States cannot bring abet 
unity; the United States cannot by itsf 
bring about moderation ; and the final oilr! 
come depends on the wisdom and t? 
capacity to work together of the Afric') 
parties. 



412 



Department of State Bulle* 



Q. How critical is unity among the libera- 
ion groups to your current effort? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is not for me to 
etermine how a solution is to be achieved, 
f the African Presidents and the various 
iberation movements feel that they can 
egotiate by having individual teams, then 
; is not for me to decide that they should 
se another method. 

So I would say that the organization of 
jhe negotiations on the black African side 
epends on the African Presidents and it 
I not going to be prescribed by the United 
,tates. 

idmission of Viet-Nam to United Nations 

i Q. To change the subject to another area, 
foes the United States intend to block the 
Admission of Viet-Nam to the United Na- 
ions? And if so, does this have any domestic 
\olitical implications here or reasons for do- 
ng so? 

Secretary Kissinger: The President stated 
.ublicly this week that we considered the 
esture of releasing the names of 12 miss- 
lg in action as insufficient. And what we 
re considering is whether a government 
lat is not fulfilling one of its basic obliga- 
,ons under an international agreement 
r ould be able to fulfill its obligations under 
le U.N. Charter, and this is — we will 
lake our decision when the case actually 
Dmes before the Security Council. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, does President Ford feel 

hat there is any political gain in your em- 

nrking on this diplomatic shuttle ? 

And, secondly, you are talking about the 

vmplexity of this issue. Is it possible for you 

» complete the beginnings of success in this 

I sue, assuming you make progress, prior to 

tie election or in the period prior to inaugu- 

ition? Aren't you against some sort of po- 

: Heal deadline ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think, first of all, 
ith respect to political benefits it was 
icepted wisdom that the trip to Africa 

April was not a spectacular success in 



many of the primary elections that were 
then taking place. 

It was undertaken, and it was supported 
by the President at the time, because he 
concluded that we could not, in the na- 
tional interests of the United States, delay 
any longer. 

Whether progress is possible before the 
election, I cannot say. But that progress 
needs to be made during this year if the 
situation is not. to get dangerously out of 
control on at least some of the issues, I 
believe all the students of the subject 
agree to. 

The impact of this negotiation on the 
election is impossible to determine. It 
should have no impact whatsoever. I was 
on the Hill yesterday meeting with 47 
Senators, and I found that there was an 
essentially nonpartisan support. 

What we are doing in the pursuit of 
peace in Africa is not a party matter. It is 
a matter for all the American people, and 
it will not be handled as a party issue, and 
I believe it will not be handled as a parti- 
san issue by either side. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about a 
framework of negotiations, does that mean 
that you need a commitment from Rhodesia 
to transfer power to the black majority with- 
in two years, and can you get that on this 
trip? Can you get it without having someone 
to whom to transfer power? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to pre- 
dict what is possible within any particular 
time frame. What we are trying to do on 
this trip is to move matters forward toward 
the point where negotiations can start and 
where some specific proposals may emerge. 

I would not expect that this can be 
achieved with respect to Rhodesia on one 
trip. 

With respect to Namibia, the issue is 
whether a framework of participants in 
possible negotiations can emerge. I am 
somewhat more hopeful on this. But even 
that issue involves so many parties, I 
would not want to predict until I had 
talked to them. 



ctober 4, 1976 



413 



Q. Mr. Secretary, to folloiv up Don Ober- 
dorfer's question, it has been alleged not only 
that U.S. policy before last April was indiffer- 
ent to Africa, but that it actively aided the 
white minority regimes. Particularly as a 
token of this is the Byrd amendment. Last 
April you promised that the Administration 
would take steps to repeal that amendment. 
That was almost five months ago. No steps 
have been made. 

Are you going to be able to explain this to 
the African heads of state? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the 
African heads of state understand that if 
a negotiation can be arranged over Rho- 
desia, the issue of sanctions will then be 
substantially irrelevant. The issue of sanc- 
tions arises only under conditions when 
there is no progress in the negotiations and 
no prospect for a transition in the govern- 
mental structure. 

Therefore I have found that there is 
substantial understanding on the part of 
the black African Presidents for the steps 
we have been taking. 



Developments in Lebanon 

Q. Mr. Secretary, during the period that 
you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an im- 
portant date in the transition of power from 
President Fra?ijiyah to President Sarkis — 
President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, 
there are reports that Syria is making inten- 
sive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated 
solution that will allow Sarkis to take power 
in normal conditions. 

What are your expectations for Lebanon 
in the next tivo weeks, and what is your view 
of the Syrian efforts? Is the United States in 
favor of them? 

Secretary Kissinger: I had an opportunity 
yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service 
officers who just returned from the Chris- 
tian part of Lebanon and who have had an 
opportunity to talk to President Sarkis. 
Also, I will be taking with me on this 
trip, an expert on the Middle East, so that 



I can be in close touch with developments 
in Lebanon. 

We favor a negotiated solution on the 
basis of the formula that was worked out 
in Damascus earlier this year, and we have 
generally supported the political efforts 
based on that formula. 

Whether the advent of a new Presiden 
would lead to a rapid solution is not ye 
clear. 

We support the independence and terri 
torial integrity and unity of Lebanon. W< 
will use our influence in this direction. W< 
have invited President Sarkis to send i 
representative to the United States fo 
further talks soon after his installatior 
and we will use our influence in the direc 
tion of the unity and integrity of Lebanor 

Panmunjom Incident 

Q. I have a two-part question. One, what i 
your evaluation of the aftermath of the Pai 
munjom incident? And, two, there have bee" 
conflicting reports about the role of the k 
fluence of the Soviet Union and China towai 
Kim Il-song's role in this case. Will you b 
come a fair judge over this important issi 
[sic] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that Nor 
Korea realized that the United States ai 
its allies in the Korean Peninsula wou 
not tolerate such brutal behavior. They, 
effect, apologized for the incident. As 
result of the discussions, the guardpos 
that they had on our side of the line in tl 
Panmunjom area have been removed, ai 
I believe that conditions have been creati 
in which a repetition of such incidents 
relatively less likely. 

We have also shown our capacity to i 
inforce Korea very rapidly and our deU 
mination not to permit any transgressio 
in Korea. 

As for the role of the Soviet Union ai 
the People's Republic of China, we are ill 
familiar with any diplomatic initiativ- 
that they may have taken. We did not a: 
them to pass any messages. We notic 
that their press was not particularly vocl 



414 



Department of State Bullc 



in support of North Korea, and we con- 
sider this positive, since it was a brutal act 
of murder. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you or the President 
or any senior member of the Administration 
be talking with former Defense Secretary 
Schlesinger when he returns from China? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I had an exten- 
sive talk with former Secretary Schle- 
singer before he went to China. I expect 
to have an extensive talk with him after 
he returns, and we have had reports of 
his — we've had some fragmentary reports 
of his conversations there, and he's be- 
haved himself with a great sense of re- 
sponsibility. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you're an old hand at 
being a troubleshooter in many parts of the 
world. I'm wondering now, as you're about 
to leave, hoiv ivould you rate your oton 
chances of succeeding? 

Secretary Kissinger: I was afraid you 
meant as I'm about to leave office, and 
I thought 1981 wasn't that imminent. 
[Laughter.] 

This is the most complex negotiation pro- 
cedurally in which I've been engaged, and 
the chances of success are very difficult to 
evaluate, because it depends on so many 
intangibles and because there isn't any one 
interlocutor on each side. 

Senator [Dick] Clark estimated my 
chances at success at 1 in 20. I rate my 
chances higher than that, but I don't want 
to give an exact percentage. 

African Liberation Movements 

Q. Mr. Secretary, twice this morning you've 
mentioned that your mission has the support 
of all the parties concerned in the area. By 
saying that, do you mean the black liberation 
movements? Do you have any word from 
them that they welcome the mission which 
you are about to undertake? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have made clear 
that we have not dealt directly with the 



black liberation movements. So when I 
speak of the parties I speak of the states in 
the area; and the relationship of the liber- 
ation movements to this process is being 
worked out by the so-called frontline Presi- 
dents. We have not had any direct discus- 
sion with the liberation movements. 

Q. If I can folloiv that up, you said, as I 
understood it, that you would not deal with 
them — 

Secretary Kissinger: Excuse me. We've had 
a discussion with SWAPO with respect to 
Namibia, and I would apply my statement 
to them. 

Q. Well, that perhaps is the point I was 
making. Some of these movements, as I 
understand it, have had relations or have had 
contacts with other governments in the past. 
Where you said you would not deal with them 
as long as other governments did not, I won- 
dered how you took that into account. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, clearly, if out- 
side powers become very active in southern 
Africa, then the danger of Africa becom- 
ing an arena for superpower conflict is very 
great, and I have said that the United 
States stands opposed to outside interven- 
tion in African affairs. 

Up to now we have the impression that 
in the last months the Rhodesian liberation 
movements have dealt with the outside 
world substantially through the various 
frontline Presidents, which is the under- 
standing that I have of the situation. 
Should that change, then the United States 
would also have to reexamine its position. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, back to Rhodesia, again 
on the financial aspects — what was the re- 
action of the people on the Hill to the dimen- 
sions of the plan? And could you be clearer — 
is it a case of the United States being asked 
to spend several hundred million dollars in 
allocations, or is it a kind of possibility ; is it 
an insurance plan? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are talking pri- 
marily of an insurance plan. Nor are we 
saying that the American part of this in- 



Oetober 4, 1976 



415 



surance plan has to come entirely from gov- 
ernmental sources; there are other sources 
that may also be available. 

So we have not worked out a figure; we 
have not yet worked out a governmental 
participation. But we are talking of some- 
thing that is essentially an insurance plan 
rather than a direct commitment, and 
we're talking of a consortium in which the 
United Kingdom will be the convoking 
country with our support and which will 
have the support, we expect, of most indus- 
trial democracies. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate being 
able to present this package to [Rhodesian~\ 
Prime Minister Smith during this trip? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not yet de- 
cided whether I will meet with Prime Min- 
ister Smith on this trip. This depends on 
the evolution of the discussions and on our 
estimate of his basic attitude. 



Death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 
People's Republic of China 

Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
died at Peking on September 9. Following is 
a statement made by President Ford that day, 
together with the transcript of a news con- 
ference held that day by Secretary Kissinger. 

PRESIDENT FORD 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13 

The People's Republic of China an- 
nounced today the passing away of Chair- 
man Mao Tse-tung. 

Chairman Mao was a giant figure in 
modern Chinese history. He was a leader 
whose actions profoundly affected the de- 
velopment of his own country. His influ- 
ence on history will extend far beyond 
the borders of China. 

Americans will remember that it was 



under Chairman Mao that China moved 
together with the United States to end a 
generation of hostility and to launch a new 
and more positive era in relations between 
our two countries. 

I am confident that the trend of im- 
proved relations between the People's Re- 
public of China and the United States, 
which Chairman Mao helped to create, will 
continue to contribute to world peace and 
stability. 

On behalf of the U.S. Government and 
the American people, I offer condolences to 
the Government and to the people of the 
People's Republic of China. 

Thank you very much. 



SECRETARY KISSINGER 

Press release 423 dated September 9 

Secretary Kissinger: I will just read a 
statement, and then I will answer a few 
questions about Chairman Mao's death. I 
will probably have a press conference to- 
morrow where we can take other questions. 

I extend my sympathy to the people and 
the Government of the People's Republic 
of China on the occasion of Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung's death. 

Chairman Mao was a historic figure who 
changed the course of events in the world. 
He had a tremendous impact on the present 
and on the future of his country. 

In the last years of his life, we worked 
closely with him on the improvement of 
relations between our two countries. His 
personal interest in that process was a vital 
factor in the Sino-American rapproche- 
ment which began in 1972. 

We have since that time created a du- 
rable relationship based on mutual under- 
standing and a perception of common 
interests; and we, for our part, will con- 
tinue to cement our ties with the People's 
Republic of China in accordance with the 
Shanghai communique. 

This is the formal statement, and I will 
be glad to take a few questions. 



416 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you 
think the opening between Washington and 
Peking ivas the result of Mao's philosophy and 
i work ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that during 
his lifetime all the major decisions in China 
were either made by him or followed 
guidelines laid down by him. In the case of 
the opening of relations between the Peo- 
ple's Republic and the United States, it is 
clear that that relationship bore his per- 
sonal stamp; and on many occasions in my 
conversations with Prime Minister Chou 
En-lai, he would interrupt the meeting to 
say that he would have to consult with 
Chairman Mao in order to get further in- 
structions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you 
know about Chinese leaders now, can you say 
with any confidence that China will continue 
to follow a policy of "open door" toivard the 
United States? 

Secretary Kissinger: When any historic 
figure disappears, it is extremely difficult 
to predict everything that his successors 
will do. The basis of the relationship be- 
tween China and the United States is mu- 
tual interest. I believe that these mutual 
interests are to some extent independent of 
personalities and that therefore the main 
lines of the policies are likely to be con- 
tinued. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you at all personally 
regretful that the United States ivas not able, 
to make more progress on the Taiwan issue 
■ while Chairman Mao ivas alive? 

Secretary Kissinger: The specific issues 
that are involved in the process of normal- 
ization of relations with the People's Re- 
public of China cannot be tied to the 
lifetime of personalities. I had the occasion 
five times for extended conversations with 
Chairman Mao, and I believe he was a 
man of very great vision; but the relation- 
ship between our two countries cannot be 
given a timetable that is geared to indi- 
viduals. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any expecta- 
tion of visitiyig China between now and Janu- 
ary 20, and has the death of Mao in any way 
affected those expectations? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have no expectation 
of visiting the People's Republic before the 
election. What travels I may undertake 
after the election could be affected by the 
outcome. [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the 
prospects that China might move now to re- 
move the strain in relations with the Soviet 
Union, since Mao was considered to be per- 
sonally hostile to the Russians? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that the basic 
line of the Chinese policy toward the Soviet 
Union has been determined by the funda- 
mental interests of China and not by the 
personal preferences of an individual. It 
is therefore likely that the main lines of 
Chinese foreign policy will be continued, 
though there could be modifications of 
tactics. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you've met with Mao, as 
you said, several tunes. Could you give us 
some flavor of those conversations — what 
kind of things you talked about, how he 
looked upon history, or something more than 
just the fact that you met with him? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mao was an 
enormously forceful personality — a man 
who tended to be the center of the room 
simply by the enormous willpower that he 
reflected. He preferred to conduct his con- 
versations in the form of a dialogue in 
which he made brief, epigrammatic, rather 
pithy comments and invited the other 
party's reaction to his comments. 

I found that nothing he said, even 
though it seemed totally unplanned, was 
ever without purpose; and therefore these 
conversations tended to be rather complex 
and extremely illuminating. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the President were to 
telephone Peking and say, "I want to talk to 
the leader," who'd talk to him? 



October 4, 1976 



417 



Secretary Kissinger: I think he would talk 
to the Prime Minister. 

Q. Do you think he's the man who's in con- 
trol there noiv? 

Secretary Kissinger: He is the man who is 
in charge of the government, and he would 
certainly be the interlocutor for the Pres- 
ident. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently there have been 
reports of internal strife in China. Do you 
think Mao's death ivill intensify this? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there have been 
reports of various factions, but these re- 
ports occur repeatedly. The United States 
deals with the government in Peking, and 
the internal affairs of China are matters 
for the Chinese and not for us. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that normal- 
ization of relations will be easier or more 
difficult for yourself or your successor after 
Mao's death? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe, from our 
side, as I pointed out in my statement, nor- 
malization will continue; and I'm sure that 
from the Chinese side the basic lines of the 
policy, as we have known them, will con- 
tinue to be pursued. 

Q. Well, that doesn't really answer the 
question, though. Some people on the Chinese 
political scene seem to be a bit more antago- 
nistic or hostile toward the United States. 
Now, if Mao's death gives them more power 
in the future, will this make it more difficult 
to settle Taiwan with them? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, obviously, if 
people who are more hostile to the United 
States should take power in China, this 
might complicate our relationship. We 
have seen, as of now, no evidence of it; 
but, of course, it is very early to tell. 

I do not believe that Chinese policy is 
basically influenced by the personal likes 
and dislikes of Chinese leaders, but by their 
assessment of what is in the long-term in- 
terest of China. 

We have to remember that when a tow- 
ering figure disappears from the scene not 



even his successors can know exactly what 
the shape of events will be, and it is pre- 
mature to speculate as to what the future 
evolution should be. 

President Calls for Full Accounting 
of Americans Missing in Viet-Nam 

The Vietnamese Embassy at Paris on Sep- 
tember 6 published and furnished to the U.S. 
Embassy a list of 12 U.S. airmen whom they 
described as having died in air crashes in 
Viet-Nam. Following is a statement by Presi- 
dent Ford made in the press briefing room at 
the White House on September 7. 

We?kly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13 

At my direction, the American Embassy 
in Paris today contacted North Vietnamese 
representatives and informed them that we 
expect that the United States will be pro- 
vided with a full accounting without fur- 
ther delay of all Americans missing in ac- 
tion in Viet-Nam. 

Speaking on behalf of all Americans, I 
welcome the fact that the Vietnamese hav 
finally begun to keep their promise to pro 
vide information on our men missing ii 
action in Southeast Asia. 

While the report on these 12 men wa 
grim, it at least resolved their status and 
removed the crushing burden of anxiet 
and uncertainty from their relatives and 
their loved ones. 

But none of us can be satisfied with this 
limited action by the Vietnamese. What 
they have done is to release information of 
only a dozen men. They still have informa- 
tion on hundreds more. 

For wives, parents, and friends of the 
men still missing, the anxiety and the un- 
certainty continues. It is callous and cruel 
to exploit human suffering in the hope of 
diplomatic advantage. 

The Vietnamese have an obligation to 
provide a full accounting of all Americans 
missing in action. I call upon them to do so 
without further delay. Normalization of 
relations cannot take place until Viet-Nam 
accounts for all our men missing in action. 



418 



Department of State Bulletin 



U.S. Responsibilities in World Population Issues 



Address by Marshall Green 
Coordinator of Population Affairs 1 



The population problem is too often de- 
fined in narrow Malthusian terms of too 
many people pressing on inadequate food 
supplies. This is but one dimension of the 
problem, and not the most serious one at 
present, although it may be some years 
hence. Today the most serious manifesta- 
tions of overpopulation are an alarming 
increase in unemployment as well as wide- 
spread environmental degradation. 

An excellent booklet recently circulated 
by the Worldwatch Institute, and funded 
in part by the United Nations, specifies 22 
different ways in which current excessive 
worldwide population growth poses dan- 
gers to mankind. These dimensions include 
impending world food shortages, pollution 
and disruption of the earth's ecosystem, 
depletion of mineral and water resources, 
energy shortages, erosion, deforestation, 
expanding deserts, unemployment, over- 
crowded cities, crime and juvenile delin- 
quency, deteriorating living conditions, so- 
cial unrest, authoritarianism, and political 
conflict. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons are 
proliferating in a crowded, restive world. 

No country is spared the impact of popu- 
lation growth, even countries like the 
United States where population growth 
rates are not large. For we all live on a 
shrinking planet, small enough that events 
half a world away have a large, growing 
impact upon us all. 



1 Made before the Commonwealth Club of Cali- 
fornia at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 10 (text 
from press release 433 dated Sept. 13; opening 
paragraphs omitted). 



Moreover, high population growth rates 
and resulting unemployment in the less de- 
veloped world generate enormous pres- 
sures for migration. As Gen. [Leonard F.] 
Chapman, Commissioner of the Immigra- 
tion and Naturalization Service, told this 
club last year, legal immigrants to the 
United States now number over 400,000 per 
year, but illegal immigrants in recent years 
have annually totaled over twice that fig- 
ure. What impact does this have on our 
economy? Even more seriously, what is the 
impact on our society of such large-scale 
violations of our laws? 

And we have our own internal popula- 
tion growth problems. Every year the 
equivalent of a city the size of Philadelphia 
is added to our population. Even relatively 
small increases in population slowly but 
relentlessly aggravate a lot of problems 
like air, water, and noise pollution; impose 
greater demands on resources; and con- 
tribute to the tensions of overcrowded 
cities, to higher and higher social costs, and 
to congested highways and recreational 
areas. Coping with all these issues will in- 
evitably involve more and more permits, 
licenses, red tape, and bureaucracy — in 
short, increasing limitations on our vaunted 
free way of life. The Rockefeller Commis- 
sion on Population Growth stated in its re- 
port to the President in March 1972 that 
Americans 50 years from now will look 
back with envy on what, from their vantage 
point, appears to be the relatively unfet- 
tered life of the 1970's. 

I suspect that you are all fairly familiar 



October 4, 1976 



419 



with these warnings, for the dangers in- 
volved in population growth are increas- 
ingly sensed. This is particularly true of 
young Americans. A recent survey con- 
ducted by the Overseas Development Coun- 
cil and the U.S. Coalition for Development 
showed that two-thirds of Americans 18-25 
years old identified overpopulation as the 
second most serious world problem. The 
most serious was regarded as pollution, 
which is closely related to population 
growth. In fact, I coined the word "popul- 
ation" to cover them both. 

Yet there is still a tendency on the part 
of too many people to see population growth 
as somebody else's problem, not their own, 
or as one to be left for future generations to 
solve. Leaders and bureaucrats are all too 
prone to give greater attention to the pro- 
cedural and short-term than to the substan- 
tive and long-term. 

Obstacles and Achievements 

The fundamental question is whether 
mankind can cope effectively with popula- 
tion growth. Perhaps not. That, in essence, 
summarizes the school of thought which 
sees mankind as having irretrievably lost 
the race to control population growth. 
Others espouse a totally contrary view. 
Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute, for 
example, sees an abundant life for all a 
century from now, and he goes on to por- 
tray a happy world of 15 billion souls thriv- 
ing on food substitutes derived from con- 
verting wood and agricultural waste into 
glucose. 

My own view of the future, and the one 
I believe is generally shared in our gov- 
ernment, is that mankind can still save it- 
self even though the hour is late. I take this 
view despite the many obstacles to effec- 
tive population programs around the 
world. We are still plagued with obstacles 
such as: 

— Traditionalism (large families are just 
a way of life) . 

— Male machismo (you find these char- 



acters all around the world, not just in 
Latin America). 

— Ignorance, illiteracy, suspicion, and 
the desire of some countries or tribal areas 
to outnumber their neighbors. 

— Desire for many sons and even daugh- 
ters to provide for their parents in their 
old age. This in many ways is the most un- 
derstandable reason for large families in 
the absence of social security systems 
which poor countries cannot afford or per- 
haps even operate. 

A principal obstacle to combating popu- 
lation growth is lack of administrative com- 
petence and the prevalence of bureaucratic 
delays, inertia, and general inefficiency. 

Moreover, few doctors and nurses are 
willing to serve in rural areas, understand- 
ably preferring the social and professional 
amenities of the cities. Many of them mi- 
grate abroad to strange places like Los 
Angeles where the pay is higher. I was told 
in India that most of the graduating class 
at Baroda Medical School last year piled i 
into buses to go to our consulate in Calcutta 
to apply for U.S. visas. 

But there is a much more hopeful side 
to the population problem. 

Today the great bulk of the world's pop- 
ulation lives in countries where family 
planning is not only accepted but where 
governments actually favor and promote 
family planning. This percentage is stead- 
ily increasing, although most of sub- 
Saharan Africa and much of Latin America 
are still hesitant to go the route of govern- 
ment-sponsored family planning programs 
However, even in those countries, most gov- 
ernments have come to recognize that spac- i 
ing of children is important for the health 
of mother and child alike and that high 
population growth rates dim prospects foi 
economic growth and better conditions ol 
life. 

One of the most important achievement* 
was the World Population Plan of Action I 
adopted by consensus by 136 nations at 
the Bucharest Conference in 1974. They 
agreed that nations should have popula- 
tion programs and that every married 



420 



Department of State Bulletin 



couple had the right to plan its family and 
to have the information and means to do 
so. Family planning had at long last gained 
worldwide respectability. 

There is now mounting evidence that 
population programs launched some years 
ago are having a real impact on reducing 
birth rates in developing countries like 
China, Korea, Thailand, Colombia, the 
Philippines, Tunisia, and Costa Rica. 

It is true that industrialization, modern- 
ization, and increased literacy are helping 
to reduce birth rates, but it would be wrong 
to deny the important role which family 
planning has played in that regard. 



U.S. Support for Family Planning Programs 

The United States has taken the lead in 
promoting worldwide family planning. We 
started 10 years ago to help countries 
launch their programs, and ever since, we 
have contributed roughly one-quarter of all 
foreign and domestic funds devoted to that 
purpose, including those of receiving coun- 
tries. The total worldwide sum, while grow- 
ing, is not large. It involves from all 
sources, including contributions from all 
governments, organizations, and private 
groups, only about half a billion dollars a 
i year, which is about half the cost of a Tri- 
i dent submarine. 

Our support has largely taken the form 
t of providing family planning supplies 
either directly through bilateral agree- 
i ments or indirectly through U.N. organiza- 
tions like the UNFPA [U.N. Fund for Pop- 
f ulation Activities] or nongovernmental 
it international groups like IPPF [Interna- 
: tional Planned Parenthood Foundation] 
j or private U.S. groups like the Population 
i Council, Pathfinder Fund, Family Planning 
i International Assistance, and the Ford 
Foundation. We have also financed a large 
ci share of worldwide biomedical and social 
I sciences research involved in population 
i issues. 

v The United States has a special obliga- 
ils tion in this regard. We have long been the 
iei major aid donor nation, and our assistance 



left 



Dctober 4, 1976 



has enabled countries to reduce their mor- 
tality rates. This is as it should be, but we 
have thereby helped to promote the so- 
called population explosion. To be specific, 
we have been giving 16 times as much for- 
eign aid to mortality reduction programs 
(such as food aid, nutrition, and health) as 
we have to fertility reduction programs; 
namely, family planning. 

Clearly it is our responsibility to help 
insure that all of our aid has maximum de- 
velopmental impact, that it stimulates re- 
ceiving countries to increase their own food 
production, and that it assists the poorest 
people in these countries to increase their 
incomes. To serve these objectives, should 
not a larger percentage of our aid be in 
the form of support for other countries' 
population programs? 

This is not to deny our awareness that 
whatever promotes economic development, 
improves education, and hastens moderni- 
zation generally will also create a more 
favorable setting for helping countries to 
cope with excessive population growth 
rates. But it does raise the further question 
of how effective any outside economic as- 
sistance can be if the receiving country is 
inattentive to its own population problems. 

Needless to say, the main task is not 
ours, but the countries threatened by ex- 
cessive population growth. We can only 
help them in carrying out programs of their 
own devising. Some of these countries want 
no outside assistance; others are prepared 
to accept nonbilateral assistance; and still 
others have no restrictions on the sources 
of support. Our responses must be condi- 
tioned by these preferences. 

Elements of Successful Population Programs 

However, I am strongly persuaded that 
the most successful population programs 
involve four interrelated elements and that 
if any country is really serious about cop- 
ing with its population problems it would 
do well to give due weight to all four of 
these elements. They are: 

1. Leadership commitment; that is, lead- 



421 



ers of countries with serious population 
problems speaking out clearly and firmly in 
support of population programs and seeing 
that effective national programs are car- 
ried out at the village or community level. 

2. Innovative approaches designed to 
root family planning in the villages, such 
as wives' clubs of Korea and Indonesia or 
the community-based distribution systems 
that are beginning to appear in Asia and 
Latin America. 

3. Training paramedics to provide gen- 
eral health services, including family plan- 
ning, in the communities where these peo- 
ple are known and trusted. This offers 
extensive personalized family planning ad- 
vice and services to people even in remote 
rural areas at costs which the poorer na- 
tions can afford. Currently we are support- 
ing this approach in some 17 countries and 
hope to see it expanded widely. I should 
point out that innovative approaches com- 
bined with paramedic systems can produce 
rather dramatic results. For example, new 
acceptor rates in West Java have more 
than doubled in recent months with the in- 
troduction last January of the so-called 
STMK program. Involved are 1,200 teams 
of two persons each, one a health worker, 
the other a motivator, calling on each 
household to counsel on health and family 
planning. Personalized approaches are far 
more effective than billboards, radio pro- 
grams, and the like. 

4. Improved status of women. This is not 
just a question of liberating women from 
traditional endless childbearing. It is a po- 
litical and economic necessity — politically, 
because human rights must be the ultimate 
purpose of government; economically, be- 
cause women continue to be the most 
underrated economic resource of nations. 

It will be readily seen that these basic 
elements of a successful population pro- 
gram demand intensive efforts by govern- 
ments and extensive involvement of their 
people. In the economic jargon of our 
times, the problem requires a people-inten- 
sive solution. It would be a mistake to infer 
that our supply-oriented assistance can 



solve other countries' population problems. 
It will definitely help, but the basic issue 
is, after all, not the supply of family plan- 
ning services so much as creating the de- 
mand for those services. And that job is for 
governments and communities in develop- 
ing countries to carry out as best they know 
how, drawing on the success stories of 
other countries tailored to their own re- 
quirements. 

Particularly in the case of developing 
countries so far uncommitted to population 
programs, our help must take into account 
the various sensitivities and attitudes in- 
volved. We must, for example, avoid the 
language of "birth control" or ''population 
control" in favor of "family planning" and 
"responsibility in parenthood," with em- 
phasis on promoting basic human rights 
and the well-being of mother and child, as 
well as the economic benefits to a commu- 
nity and nation. Introduction and extension 
of primary health services provides the 
most widely acceptable way of moving to- 
ward family planning in most developing 
countries. 

In all of our assistance, we would do well 
to maintain a low profile. It is probable 
that we will have to work more and more 
through international organizations and 
private voluntary groups since these non- 
U.S. Government entities are rather widely 
preferred in countries now entering th( 
family planning field. 

I suppose we can look back with some 
satisfaction to the indispensable role the 
United States has played in world family 
planning. We have been fortunate in hav- 
ing had the services of a number of dedi- 
cated, hard-working Americans both in and 
out of the government. On the other hand, 
the job could have been done even better 
had there been more involvement of our 
leaders and diplomats, especially our Am- 
bassadors. The issue has, quite frankly 
been left too exclusively in the hands oi 
AID [Agency for International Develop- 
ment] officials without the involvement o1 
our total diplomacy. The subject of popu- 
lation has rarely come up in meetings be- 



422 



Department of State Bulletir 



tween our leaders and other leaders, or be- 
tween our Ambassadors and the heads of 
governments to which they are accredited. 
Yet these are the American officials who 
have ready access to the leaders of other 
countries — often in an informal setting — 

: and who are therefore in the best position 
to discuss population and related issues 

,with men and women who decide policies 
and programs. It is not a matter of our lec- 
turing them or they us, but of learning from 
each other. 

If population is the key issue it is in some 
countries, why not talk about it? I am 
hopeful that this situation is now being cor- 
rected. Certainly, our Ambassadors over 
the past year have been given clear direc- 
tions on this subject, and the results are 
beginning to show. 

It is customary for after-luncheon speak- 
ers, especially diplomats, to end up with 
pleasant, optimistic conclusions that digest 
well along with the host's coffee and cigars, 
but I must desist. Population problems can 
only be aggravated by any attempts to 
gloss them over. The world has been far too 
slow in coming to grips with the population 
explosion. It has dillydallied until the prob- 
lem has now reached the point where a 
horrendous spectacle of human misery 
threatens to unfold. 

It was during our lifetime — yours and 
mine — that the worldwide population ex- 
plosion occurred, and it is therefore our 
special responsibility, while time remains, 
to mitigate its effects as far as humanly 
possible. Otherwise, we leave a grim legacy 
to our children and their children. Our re- 
sponsibility must be for the world forever. 



U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Consultations 
on Chemical Weapons Prohibition 

Following is the text of a communique 
agreed upon by U.S. and Soviet delegations 
at Geneva on August 30. 

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency i>ress release 76-17 
dated August 30 

Pursuant to an agreement between the 
USA and the USSR taken on the basis of 
the Summit communique of July 3, 1974, 
consultations were conducted in Geneva 
between August 16 and August 27, for the 
purpose of further consideration of issues 
related to a possible joint initiative in the 
CCD with respect to the conclusion of an 
international convention dealing with the 
most dangerous, lethal means of chemical 
warfare as a first step toward complete and 
effective prohibition of chemical weapons. 
The representatives of the U.S. and USSR 
to the Conference of the Committee on Dis- 
armament, Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. 
and Ambassador V. I. Likhatchev, headed 
their respective delegations, which in- 
cluded technical experts. Questions, par- 
ticularly those of a technical nature, linked 
to the definition of the scope of prohibition 
and with measures for verification of a pos- 
sible agreement on chemical weapons, were 
considered. The discussions of these and 
several other problems were useful. 

The delegations will submit the results 
of their deliberations to their governments. 
The consultations will be continued, after 
due consideration of the issues raised in the 
course of the discussions, at a time to be 
determined. 







ctober 4, 1976 



423 



THE CONGRESS 



Department Urges Congressional Approval of Agreement 
With Turkey on Defense Cooperation 



Statement by Philip C. Habib 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs l 



I am here today to describe the im- 
portance the Administration attaches to 
restoring a relationship of trust and confi- 
dence beween the United States and Tur- 
key, a relationship which has been bene- 
ficial to the United States and to Western 
security interests for almost three decades. 
Specifically I ask that the committee recom- 
mend approval of the U.S.-Turkish Defense 
Cooperation Agreement concluded in 
Washington on March 26, 1976, and trans- 
mitted to the Congress by the President on 
June 16, 1976. 

Mr. Chairman, we believe that this 
agreement, and a comparable agreement 
now being negotiated with Greece, are es- 
sential elements if we are to refurbish and 
strengthen our ties with these two close 
friends and allies. Both agreements replace 
and supplement earlier mutual defense ar- 
rangements with these countries that have 
proven to be in our national interests. Both 
are designed to promote our continuing ob- 
jectives in the vital southeastern flank of 
NATO and the general area of the eastern 
Mediterranean. Both have been structured 
in a way that we believe reflects the needs 



1 Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations on Sept. 15. The complete transcript of the 
hearings will be published by the committee and will 
be available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C. 
20402. 



424 



and sensitivities of these two allies as well 
as our own basic national interests. 

The Defense Cooperation Agreement 
with Turkey provides the basis for a reopen- 
ing of strategic U.S. facilities in Turkey and 
the continued operation of other U.S. and 
NATO installations. The new agreement 
flows directly from our mutual responsi- 
bilities and obligations under the North 
Atlantic Treaty. It is consistent with, but 
not identical to, the 1969 Defense Coopera- 
tion Agreement with Turkey. Founded on 
reciprocal respect for the sovereignty of 
the parties, the new agreement authorizes 
U.S. participation in defense measures pur- 
suant to article III of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. It is understood that when the 
agreement enters into force, activities will 
resume which were suspended by the Gov- 
ernment of Turkey in July 1975, when the 
Turkish Government requested negotiation 
of a new defense cooperation agreement. 

The agreement provides a mutually ac- 
ceptable framework for this important se- 
curity cooperation. The installations au- 
thorized by the agreement will be Turkish 
Armed Forces installations under Turkish 
command, but the agreement clearly 
provides for U.S. command and control 
authority over all U.S. Armed Forces per- 
sonnel, other members of the U.S. national 
element at each installation, and U.S. equip- 
ment and support facilities. 



Department of State Bulletin 



The installations shall be operated 
jointly. In order to facilitate this objective 
the United States is committed to a pro- 
gram of technical training of Turkish per- 
sonnel. 

Other provisions of the agreement deal 
with traditional operational and adminis- 
trative matters, including operation and 
maintenance of the installations; ceilings 
on levels of U.S. personnel and equipment; 
import, export, and in-country supply pro- 
cedures; status of forces and property 
questions. 

The installations and support facilities 
which Turkey has made available to the 
United States over the past 30 years have 
played an important strategic role. They 
have provided our easternmost operating 
base in the NATO area for combat aircraft, 
as well as major airlift, POL [petroleum, 
oil, and lubricants] storage, refueling, sup- 
ply, training, and communications opera- 
tions. U.S. intelligence collection in Turkey 
has allowed the monitoring of Soviet mis- 
sile testing, has been a primary source of 
vital early-warning information on Soviet 
missile and satellite launchings, and has 
been an important data link on explosions 
of Chinese and Soviet nuclear devices. 

Much of this lost information cannot be 
duplicated by other systems and sites now 
available to us. The adverse effect of this 
intelligence loss increases rather than di- 
minishes with the passage of time, and we 
do not foresee resolution of the problem 
by the substitution of other-country sites or 
more sophisticated technology in the near 
future. In sum, we need the Turkish fa- 
cilities. 

The agreement provides also for contin- 
ued U.S. assistance in helping Turkey meet 
its important NATO defense obligations. 
The agreement commits the United States 
to furnish Turkey a total of $1 billion in 
grants, FMS [foreign military sales] cred- 
its, and loan guarantees over a four-year 
period. However, only one-fifth of this 
total will be grant aid. The balance, or 
$800 million, will take the form of Federal 



Financing Bank loan guarantees, which re- 
quire an appropriation of only 10 percent 
of the principal amount of the guaranteed 
loans. 

This level of assistance is modest, given 
the size of the Turkish military forces and 
their importance to us as key elements in 
the North Atlantic Treaty alliance. It is 
also consistent with past levels of U.S. mili- 
tary assistance to Turkey. It is responsive to 
U.S. needs in ways and at levels which we 
think are acceptable to the Congress and 
the American people. 

Security of Mediterranean Region 

Mr. Chairman, I need hardly remind this 
committee of the crucial role of the south- 
eastern flank of Europe in insuring the 
overall integrity of our common defense. 
Our position throughout southern Europe 
and the Near East is dependent on the 
maintenance of a system of security rela- 
tionships which we have built up in the 
eastern Mediterranean and which have 
served this country well over many years. 
Turkey's role in this structure is of obvious 
importance, particularly in light of the in- 
creasingly strong Soviet military presence 
in the Mediterranean area. Turkey shares 
common borders with the Soviet Union and 
Bulgaria, and it controls the Turkish 
Straits. Turkey's Armed Force of 500,000 
men is the largest of all our NATO part- 
ners and requires the Warsaw Pact to de- 
vote substantial ground and air forces to 
this area. Turkey borders on areas of the 
Middle East and Iran of increasing sensi- 
tivity to U.S. interests. 

Turkey thus adds major strength to the 
Western alliance system and is a link to 
other important U.S. defense relationships 
in the area. In turn the NATO alliance and 
the American partnership provide Turkey 
a bulwark against pressures from its Soviet 
neighbor, the temptations of neutralism, 
and a too-close association with radical 
forces in the Arab world. Our alliance with 
Turkey and our close bilateral relationship 



October 4, 1976 



425 



have thus served our mutual interests, and 
I believe it is clear to members of the com- 
mittee from their own contacts with the 
Turkish leadership that this mutuality of 
interests should and can continue. 

In our view, anything that undercuts 
these relationships will have the effect of 
undermining our security and vital inter- 
ests throughout the Mediterranean region. 
Our facilities in Turkey have served our 
interests in many times of crisis, both in the 
context of NATO and in other areas of the 
eastern Mediterranean. They have given us 
mobility, in terms of both access and tran- 
sit, that is not elsewhere available. Any 
weakening of this association could thus 
jeopardize, in times of real crisis, our abil- 
ity to come to the assistance of our other 
friends and allies in the Mediterranean. 
For inevitably a loss of access to facilities 
in Turkey, both those now suspended and 
others which continue to function, would 
not be felt in Turkey alone but would 
impact on the utility of all our other de- 
fense arrangements in the area and on our 
capacity to be responsive to our commit- 
ments. 

Mr. Chairman, it is for this, among many 
reasons, that we are concerned over Tur- 
key's capacity to assist in the common de- 
fense. Since the imposition of the arms em- 
bargo, and even with the partial relaxation 
of restrictions subsequently enacted, Tur- 
key's Armed Forces have suffered contin- 
ued deterioration in their capability to 
fulfill important NATO responsibilities. 
Turkey is an active and dedicated partici- 
pant in the NATO military structure. Its 
commitment to NATO remains public and 
strong. But NATO authorities are agreed 
that, under present U.S. restrictions, Tur- 
key's military capability to conduct sus- 
tained combat operations in support of 
NATO has been impaired. Although sev- 
eral NATO members have acted to help 
meet this impairment, it is clear that 
Turkey's ability to maintain its vital con- 
tribution to NATO will continue to depend 
on the flow of equipment from the United 



426 



States, its major and historic supplier. 

We regret that Turkey felt it necessary 
to suspend the operation of U.S. intelli- 
gence facilities in Turkey until new de- 
fense cooperation arrangements between 
us are worked out and approved. These in- 
telligence facilities remain of great impor- 
tance to the common defense, and we 
understand the committee will hear sepa- 
rately from other government agencies on 
this matter. I think we are all agreed, 
however, that what we are ultimately 
concerned with here is not only these 
individual facilities in themselves but also 
a restoration, through the agreement which 
we have concluded with Turkey, of an 
overall political relationship of fundamen- 
tal significance. 

In the postwar period Turkey has made 
tremendous strides forward in moderniz- 
ing its economy and in moving toward an 
open and pluralistic society. Turkey fought 
with us in Korea. In 1952, with our encour- 
agement, it joined NATO. Turkey's leader- 
ship is committed to continuation of the 
closest possible ties with Western Europe 
and the United States. These are policy 
directions we wish to encourage and sup- 
port. The reestablishment of a close and 
effective security relationship will give us 
the means to do this. 

Negotiation of Agreement With Greece 

Mr. Chairman, in emphasizing the im- 
portance of this agreement with Turkey to 
the overall interests of the United States in 
the eastern Mediterranean, let me also em- 
phasize our strong view that Greece re- 
mains equally important. We are in no 
sense making a choice for Turkey. We will 
make no choices among allies. Our security 
interests, and we believe those of Turkey 
and Greece as well, require that both coun- 
tries remain committed to the NATO alli- 
ance and to the defense structure that has 
been served so well by Greek and Turkish 
participation in the past. 

For that reason we seek also to update 



Department of State Bulletin 



and modernize our defense arrangements 
with Greece. Secretary Kissinger and For- 
eign Minister [Dimitrios S.] Bitsios of 
Greece agreed on a set of principles last 
April which is now being negotiated into 
an agreement between the two countries. 
Unlike Turkey, the Government of Greece 
has preferred to include all detailed ar- 
rangements for our facilities in Greece in 
appendices to the agreement itself. This has 
required highly technical and time-consum- 
ing discussions to assure that all points are 
covered to the mutual satisfaction of both 
parties. Several rounds of negotiations have 
been held, and a team headed by Ambas- 
sador [Jack B.] Kubisch is actively at work 
in Athens at this time. 



The Cyprus Question 

Mr. Chairman, at this juncture I would 
like to say a few words about Cyprus and 
its relationship to the other subjects I have 
just been discussing. We are keenly and 
indeed painfully aware of the adverse im- 
plications of the continued impasse on 
Cyprus and of deepening Greek-Turkish 
distrust over conditions in the Aegean. 
American interests have suffered and will 
continue to suffer so long as this impasse 
and these conditions continue. So do the 
basic interests of Greece and Turkey, and 
those of the alliance as a whole. 

For two years the U.S. Government has 
been in the forefront of efforts to restore 
peace and stability to Cyprus. We have 
seized every opportunity to advance the 
cause of a fair and equitable settlement to 
this difficult problem. We have worked di- 
rectly with the parties themselves; we have 
worked closely with U.N. Secretary Gen- 
eral [Kurt] Waldheim; we have worked 
with our Western allies, who share our firm 
desire that a satisfactory solution be found. 

Secretary Kissinger has given special 
emphasis to the Cyprus problem in the nu- 
merous and frequent encounters he has had 
with his Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot coun- 
terparts; with U.N. Secretary General 



Waldheim; and in consultations with our 
major Western allies. In several instances, 
the stalled negotiating process was set into 
motion following such an initiative by the 
Secretary. Unfortunately the history of the 
talks has been one of brief inconclusive 
rounds followed by long recesses — during 
which the position of each side seems to 
become more rigid and less susceptible to 
outside efforts at conciliation. The Presi- 
dent's five Cyprus reports to Congress re- 
cord the active efforts of the United States 
and other parties to convert the Cyprus sit- 
uation from a series of lost opportunities 
into a sustained negotiating process which 
offers promise of a final resolution of this 
complex problem. 

This experience has brought home one 
immutable fact of the Cyprus situation. The 
will to achieve results in Cyprus can have 
no effect unless it is shared by the parties 
themselves. We and our allies can advance 
the cause no further than the two Cypriot 
communities themselves are willing to do. 
Mutual suspicion and distrust still greatly 
hinder the parties' ability even to test one 
another by entering into serious discussions 
of the outstanding issues. Efforts at a dia- 
logue are bogged down in procedural dis- 
agreements. 

We do not intend to let our efforts flag. 
But it is patently evident that a long diffi- 
cult path lies ahead. Our ability to act as 
an effective catalyst in this process depends 
in great measure on the depth and strength 
of our relationships with the parties in- 
volved. Anything that will ameliorate that 
relationship — anything that will strengthen 
mutual confidence — will add to our ability 
to help the parties on a path to an equi- 
table settlement. Conversely, anything 
which vitiates our ability to so act will re- 
duce the prospects for a reasonable conclu- 
sion of the Cyprus question. 

An eventual solution will require com- 
promise and new perspectives in the light 
of practical considerations and recognition 
that the situation which existed prior to 
1974 is forever gone. The two sides must 



October 4, 1976 



427 



come to the realization that both must 
demonstrate statesmanship and flexibility if 
the Cypriot people are to live again in a 
stable and secure environment. 



The Aegean Dispute 

Let me comment similarly but briefly on 
the situation in the Aegean, where tension 
has recently received even more headlines 
than that in Cyprus. The Aegean problem 
involves deep and complex and emotional 
differences between Greece and Turkey, 
differences which we, together with our 
allies, have tried to help resolve. 

On August 25 the U.N. Security Council 
adopted a resolution, cosponsored by the 
United States, Britain, France, and Italy. 
The resolution appealed to the parties to 
exercise utmost restraint in the present sit- 
uation, to resume direct negotiations over 
their differences and to seek mutually ac- 
ceptable solutions, and to take into account 
the contribution that appropriate judicial 
means, in particular the International Court 
of Justice, are qualified to make to the 
settlement of any remaining legal differ- 
ences. 

The fact that the Security Council was 
able to adopt a resolution on this contro- 
versial matter by consensus represents a 
very constructive step by the international 
community. We believe it should help to 
move Greece and Turkey toward a peace- 
ful solution of this complex dispute. As for 
the United States, we will continue, as we 
have in the past, to do everything in our 



power to urge the parties to settle this 
matter peacefully. 

But I must emphasize again, Mr. Chair- 
man, what is perhaps a truism but which 
is also basic, and that is that we can play 
a helpful role, on this or the Cyprus issue, 
only to the degree that we have a relation- 
ship of mutual confidence with both Greece 
and Turkey. It is that need that our De- 
fense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey 
— as well as that with Greece — is designed 
to serve. 

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I would like 
again to emphasize the importance the Ad- 
ministration attaches to having a strong 
and stable Turkey firmly committed to 
NATO and the West. Only with a Turkish 
ally of this kind can our overall Mediter- 
ranean policies be firmly anchored. And 
only with the passage by Congress of a 
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agree- 
ment can Turkish-American relations be 
restored. We ask the support of the Con- 
gress, therefore, in dealing with the whole 
complex of foreign policy issues which I 
have outlined this morning and which have 
been so detrimental to our interests for the 
past two years. All of us want to preserve 
our friendship and security ties with both 
Greece and Turkey. All of us want a just 
and durable Cyprus settlement and a 
peaceful resolution of the dispute over the 
Aegean. We believe this process can best 
begin by congressional approval of the 
U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agree- 
ment and the similar agreement with 
Greece. I ask your assistance in bringing 
this about. 



428 



Department of State Bulletin 



Department Testifies on Human Rights in Iran 



Statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs l 



The observance of basic human rights in 
all countries of the world and the willing- 
ness and ability of governments to carry 
out the aims of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the conventions on 
human rights are important foreign policy 
objectives of the United States. They are 
important because they are inherently 
right. They are important if we are to be 
true to our traditions and values, to our 
international obligations, and to the intent 
of the Congress. Even viewed in terms of 
realpolitik, we know that the observance 
or violation of human rights affects the 
long-term stability of countries and thus 
affects the realization of U.S. national 
interests and objectives. 

As others of my colleagues have said be- 
fore me, we must of course, in approaching 
the issue of human rights in every country, 
weigh our policies in the light of the total- 
ity of our interests in our relations with 
that country. We must also approach this 
issue in recognition of the fact that there 
are wide varieties of social and legal sys- 
tems throughout the world, extraordinarily 
diverse cultures, and widely varying his- 
torical experiences and political and eco- 
nomic systems. 

Our interests in our bilateral relations 



1 Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations on Sept. 8. The complete transcript 
of the hearings will be published by the committee 
and will be available from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20420. 



October 4, 1976 



with Iran, and the ways in which Iranian 
policies are congruent with and supportive 
of ours in the Middle East, in South Asia, 
and globally — all this is a matter of public 
record which I need not reiterate today. 

It is important, however, to put the ques- 
tion of political and civil rights in Iran, 
which is basically what is before us today, 
in the perspective of Iran's historical ex- 
perience and in the context of human rights 
in Iran in their broadest sense. I ask the 
subcommittee's indulgence, Mr. Chairman 
[Representative Donald M. Fraser], in 
what may at first seem a diversion but what 
I sincerely believe is directly relevant to 
an honest examination of the issues. I apol- 
ogize that some of what I will say covers 
ground already gone over by Mr. Butler 
[William J. Butler, Chairman of the Exec- 
utive Committee of the International Com- 
mission of Jurists] in his thoughtful 
testimony, but I am sure you will agree 
that it is important to have in the record 
executive branch views on some of the 
points he covered. 

Iran, like Turkey and other ancient coun- 
tries of the Near East, suffered in the 19th 
century what it regards as indignities at 
the hands of the West. Accordingly, they 
are today extraordinarily nationalistic and 
keenly sensitive to their sovereign rights 
and their distinctive cultural and political 
heritage. 

Present-day Iran has a legacy of an an- 
cient and complex culture and social sys- 
tem. It is an extraordinarily diverse land, 
with at least three or four major ethnic and 



429 



linguistic groups and wide variations with- 
in the population in outlook, aspirations, 
expectations, and educational levels. It is 
not an exaggeration to state that for the 
last 40 to 50 years, Iranian leadership has 
been involved in the difficult and demand- 
ing task of creating and building a modern 
national state on the foundation of a tra- 
ditional and, in many ways, feudal civili- 
zation. 

The task of modernizing a traditional 
land and people with what were until re- 
cently very limited financial resources and 
a narrow skilled-manpower base is as great 
in Iran as it has been elsewhere. There 
have been severe social shocks to the sys- 
tem and disruption in the traditional way 
of life. The Government of Iran in the last 
few decades has made great progress in 
this process but has a long way yet to 
travel. 

There are practices and procedures in 
Iran's judicial, penal, political, and infor- 
mational systems which vary considerably 
from our own. Iran's legal system, for ex- 
ample, has for about 75 years been based 
on the Napoleonic Code, but it operates in 
a country whose very long history includes 
cultural, religious, and political systems 
which are in no way linked to Western tra- 
ditions. Mixed with the Napoleonic Code 
are Islamic traditions and local customs. 
Among the latter, one of the most relevant 
to our discussion is the country's history of 
strong central leadership — a monarchical 
tradition that dates back 2,500 years. 

However, we share with modern-day 
Iran many aspirations and hopes for our 
respective peoples, and this has been one 
of the bases for the particularly close and 
mutually beneficial relationship which has 
been firmly established over the last three 
decades. 

The Shah of Iran for nearly two decades 
has been instituting what was first called 
the White Revolution and, later, the Shah- 
People Revolution. Whether it be called a 
revolution or a forced evolution, one thing 
is clear: Iran is undergoing a massive proc- 
ess of change in every sphere of human 
enterprise. 



430 



What I will sketch out here are some of 
the efforts which are being made rapidly 
to transform this traditional society into a 
modern one. Iranian leaders face major 
problems and would be the first to admit 
that their country has far to go to cope 
with all of them. The programs they have 
instituted can be considered very impres- 
sive efforts to raise the conditions of life 
for the Iranian people. 

Economic and Social Reforms 

Land reform was among the most visibly 
successful elements of the social and eco- 
nomic reform instituted in the 1960's. In 
the first phase of land reform in 1962, 
nearly 600,000 farm families received titles 
to the land they were tilling for the large, 
in many cases absentee, landholders. In the 
second phase five years later, over 2 million 
farmers benefited from land distribution. 
One can roughly estimate that a third or 
more of the population was beneficially af- 
fected by these major initiatives. 

Another major area of beneficial change 
resulted from the new Literacy Corps, 
which was first dispatched to the country- 
side in 1963. Since that time, approximately 
100,000 young Iranians, over 10,000 of 
whom are women, have worked in the vil- 
lages, teaching the children and adults to 
read and write and to acquire a number of 
other skills. 

Perhaps one of the most significant fea- 
tures politically and socially of this effort 
has been bringing together the newly edu- 
cated class in the corps with remote vil- 
lagers. A result of this has been the spread- 
ing of new or modern ideas and concepts 
and presenting visible evidence that the 
leaders of government were concerned 
about the development of the nation's hu- 
man resources. This has not always beer 
the case in Iran's long history. Also, an un- 
expected dividend of this experience is 
that thousands of the corpsmen and womer 
have elected to become teachers. 

The success of the Literacy Corps, whicr 
has been popular in the villages, led ir 
1964 to the creation of the Health Corp*! 



Department of State Bulletir 






to bring medical care to rural areas where 
there were no doctors. In the 12 years that 
have followed, over 9,000 Health Corps- 
men — about one-third doctors and the re- 
mainder trained medical assistants — have 
given regularly scheduled outpatient treat- 
ment from rural clinics and by the use of 
mobile vans. A Women's Health Corps has 
recently been formed, which will empha- 
size family planning. 

The Health Corps program is universally 
popular in Iran, for it provides a service 
which everyone wants. It has been one 
more effort to meet the felt needs of the 
people. 

The Extension and Development Corps 
is the last of these unique institutions — so 
reminiscent of our own Peace Corps — that 
I will mention today. This organization was 
envisioned as successor to the agricultural 
extension program which had been heavily 
emphasized during the period of American 
Point 4 aid to Iran. It was announced si- 
multaneously with the Health Corps in 
September 1964 (although the first teams 
did not go to the field until May 1965) and 
was expected to function in tandem with 
that program and with* the Literacy Corps. 
Service requirements are the same: 4 
months of training and 14 months of serv- 
ice in a village. University-trained agrono- 
mists and veterinarians serve as second 
lieutenants, and high school graduates are 
extension agents with the rank of ser- 
geant. 

The Extension and Development Corps 
was to bring to the rural areas of Iran, in 
' the Shah's words, "development, pros- 
'' perity, advanced agricultural methods and 
a new method of social thinking." Roughly 
5,000 corpsmen are serving, and the total 
number who have taken part in the pro- 
gram is over 24,000. 

One of the most serious problems tradi- 
''' tionally faced by farmers in Iran (and in 

ell. 

u ; many other developing countries) was ac- 
cess to a reasonably equitable juridical 

11 ' process to settle disputes. Traditionally, the 

, landlord or his agent imposed a decision, 

or the headman of the village negotiated 

the dispute. The only appeal from the 



landlord's decision was to the courts in a 
town or city, but the time and money in- 
volved effectively removed this form 
of potential redress from most of the 
peasantry. 

To remedy this situation, the House of 
Equity decree was issued in December 
1963. It provided for the election by secret 
ballot of three chief judges and two alter- 
nates from a list of villagers to serve as a 
village court. An interesting interconnec- 
tion of these various reforms is that the 
Literacy Corpsman generally serves as the 
secretary to the court. These village courts 
are empowered to try all financial disputes 
involving less than 5,000 rials (about $70) 
and to adjudicate cases such as inherit- 
ance, trespass, adultery, breach of prom- 
ise, water sharing, and land boundaries — in 
other words, elemental disputes that often 
ravage villages and lead to violence. A 
somewhat similar concept has now been 
introduced in over 200 towns in Iran. 

The most controversial reform when it 
was first brought up in 1962 involved vot- 
ing rights, for it involved giving women the 
vote as well and generally improving their 
status in society. Whereas land reform 
benefited all the farmers working land 
where they lived, the advent of women's 
suffrage was unpalatable to all but the 
most liberal Iranians in all walks of life. 

As in all social reforms, progress in 
women's rights has been gradual; laws 
have been passed giving women the right 
to hold property and to sue for divorce for 
cause, but social attitudes have changed 
more gradually than the laws. But the 
changes in the status of Iranian women, 
particularly in the cities, are impressive. 

Programs To Benefit City Dwellers and Workers 

Mr. Chairman, I have selected the above 
reforms out of the 17 which are included 
in the Shah-People Revolution because they 
relate directly to a number of fundamental 
economic and social rights: justice and 
equity for the farmers and villagers 
through land reform and village courts; 
increased literacy, without which no coun- 



October 4, 1976 



431 



try can prosper; new efforts to provide 
health care; assistance in other forms of 
rural development; and improvement in 
the status of women. In sum, they amount 
to a significant improvement in the human 
rights of millions of Iranians. 

Except for the voting reform, these re- 
forms and most of the others of the 1960's 
largely benefited the rural areas where the 
vast bulk of the population still lives. 

However, in Iran in recent years, as in 
all rapidly developing countries, the move- 
ment to the city from the countryside is 
altering the demographic balance. The 
Government of Iran is now facing the very 
problems — and the benefits — we all face 
with urbanization. Tehran, for example, is 
now a city of over 4 million people, where- 
as two decades ago the population would 
have numbered only several hundred 
thousand. Our own experience shows that 
there are no panaceas for the problems 
confronting the new urban proletariat. 
However, having made major changes in 
the rural areas, the government is now at- 
tempting to meet the needs of the city 
dweller and worker. 

An early reform was a profit-sharing 
scheme which called for employers to pay 
bonuses to their workers based either on 
gross income, net profit, or production 
levels. A rough estimate is that 270,000 
workers are benefiting from the program. 
The most recent addition to the reform 
program took place last year when the 
Iranian Government set in motion a stock 
divestiture program under which up to 49 
percent of stock in a particular industry 
will be offered to workers and farmers. It 
is too early to say what the results of this 
bold plan will be, but it is reflective of the 
government's intent to provide ownership- 
participation and new benefits to the 
industrial worker. 

In addition to these reforms — which I 
again note are a part of the Shah-People 
Revolution — the government has intro- 
duced a wide variety of measures aimed at 
implementing the social and economic 
rights of its people. 



432 



The prices of many staples — flour, salt, 
and sugar, for example — are heavily sub- 
sidized by the government to keep them 
within reach of even the less well-off citi- 
zen. The government spends approxi- 
mately $1 billion per year on this 
program. 

Education is now free through the high 
school level, and a very large scholarship 
program provides for free college educa- 
tion. There are approximately 20,000 Iran- 
ians studying in this country, many of 
them with Iranian governmental financial 
assistance. 

A new social security system, patterned 
on our own social security law, has been 
introduced. 

There is a wide variety of other social 
and economic improvements which are 
being implemented or which will be com- 
menced in the near future. 

I will not go into further detail at this 
time, but you may be interested to know 
that of Iran's anticipated expenditure of 
$92.5 billion (excludes foreign loan repay- 
ments, foreign investments by Iran, and 
miscellaneous items and welfare support; 
the latter item consists largely of the gov- 
ernment's food commodity support pro- 
gram) in the current five-year plan, ap- 
proximately 55 percent is dedicated to 
what can be fairly viewed as directly con- 
tributing to the social and economic better- 
ment of the people. Per capita income is 
about $1,600, compared to only $700 a 
few years ago. The rich are getting richer, 
but even a short visit to Iran reveals much 
better than dry statistics that a substantial 
middle class is developing and more peo- 
ple have more disposable income. 

Mr. Chairman, I have briefly touched up- 
on some key elements of the programs and 
actions of the Government of Iran for two 
reasons: 

1. The first is to draw more attention to 
the significant degree of social change 
which is bubbling in this traditional society 
and the major strides taken toward fulfill- 
ment of goals addressed in the interna- 
tional documents on human rights. 

Department of State Bulletin 



2. The second point I wish to make is 
that Iran is clearly in a period of major 
social change. The people who have bet- 
tered their lives, or have a reasonable ex- 
pectation of doing so, are many. But other 
forces have also been deeply affected by 
the change — the vested interests whose 
power in society and body politic has been 
reduced or eliminated. In many societies, 
the position of traditional power elites is 
very frequently undermined by the process 
of change. In fact, modernization in the 
best sense of that word is possible only if 
the grip of older elites is loosened or a 
unique consensus of old and . new is 
achieved. In Iran the large landholders 
and the leaders of large tribal groups have 
seen the bases of their strength severely 
eroded by land reform and the other re- 
forms which I previously mentioned. The 
religiously conservative elements in the so- 
ciety, powerful in varying degrees in all 
Moslem countries, have at times vigor- 
ously opposed the whole process of mod- 
ernization, which they consider to be 
sectarian and anti-Islamic. 

The voting rights proposal referred to 
earlier, for example, .brought about large- 
scale rioting in the streets of Tehran in 
1963. These riots, which were put down 
with force by the government, had been 
organized by a leading cleric who ex- 
ploited the strong antifeminist sentiment 
in the society. 

Extremist Opposition Movements 

There is another important source of 
opposition to the Iranian changes of re- 
cent years. To this day, Mr. Chairman, the 
Government of Iran is confronted by the 
opposition — using at times brutal and 
harsh methods — of extremists from the 
Left and the Right. 

I will not go into a long presentation on 
the development of the Communist or radi- 
cal leftist movements in Iran, but let me 
recall that large parts of northern and 
western Iran were occupied by Soviet 
forces between 1941 and 1946. This was 



the second occupation in this century by 
Russian forces of significant parts of Iran. 
In the war years the Soviet Union actively 
encouraged and abetted separatist move- 
ments in these areas and substantially 
helped in the development of an Iranian 
Communist Party, the Tudeh Party, which 
owed its principal allegiance at that time 
to the Soviet Union. 

In the latter stage of Prime Minister 
Mossadegh's government in 1953, the 
Tudeh Party was virtually in control of 
and had organized a broad conspiracy 
throughout the country. When the Shah re- 
asserted his control, the Tudeh Party and 
the advocacy of communism were out- 
lawed. The advocacy of communism is still 
a crime, and the accused are tried in the 
military courts. 

Thus the Government of Iran has faced 
during the past 30 years strong opposition 
from an extreme leftist movement, tied in 
various ways to the outside, and opposi- 
tion from the indigenous, extremely tradi- 
tional forces who resent change and 
modernity. 

As I noted above, the opposition to the 
Government of Iran has frequently taken 
a violent and brutal turn. By this I mean 
terrorist actions, which we saw senselessly 
reflected only a week ago in the murders 
of three American civilians. 

Terrorism as a form of political action 
is not a new phenomenon in Iranian his- 
tory. It has long historical and cultural 
roots. Since the 1960's a number of sepa- 
rate terrorist groups whose principal plat- 
form has been the violent overthrow of the 
regime have come and gone, but this phe- 
nomenon continues. The victims of the 
terrorists have included an Iranian Prime 
Minister, numerous police and government 
officials, and six Americans. Plots to kidnap 
the Empress of Iran and the Crown 
Prince were uncovered, and several efforts 
to murder the Shah were made. You will 
also recall that in 1949 the Shah was 
wounded by a terrorist attack. Relatively 
little is known about the numbers of ter- 
rorists involved — they are not particularly 



October 4, 1976 



433 



large, we are told — but through stealth 
and individual murder, they are able to 
make their presence felt. 

Neither do we know a great deal about 
the various political programs of these 
groups, for their principal motivation ap- 
pears to be the destruction of the current 
society and its leaders; these groups have 
not promoted constructive alternatives. It 
appears that, in effect, the terrorists come 
from two ideological currents — one ex- 
treme leftist if not neo-anarchist, and the 
other strongly influenced by extreme re- 
ligious conservatism. 

At times there have appeared to be two 
separate movements, both of which can be 
hazily linked to earlier terrorist organiza- 
tions. But it also appears that the two 
groups have often worked together in 
individual political murders and may in 
fact be wings of the same movement 
brought together in a loose federation — 
having in common their hatred of the 
regime. We do know that elements repre- 
senting at least one of these groups were 
involved in the murder of the two Ameri- 
can colonels last year in Tehran. 

It is also very clear that in addition to 
the indigenous support that the terrorists 
receive, they have established links with a 
variety of terrorist movements abroad and 
have received substantial financial assist- 
ance and very large quantities of arms. In 
recent successful attacks on terrorist safe- 
houses in Tehran, large caches of foreign 
arms — machineguns, hand grenades, pis- 
tols, et cetera — have been found, as well as 
sums of money. 

All of us have been horrified by the Lod 
massacre, the murders at the Olympic 
games, the numerous hijackings of civil- 
ian airliners, and the numerous individual 
assassinations, including the murder of 
American Ambassadors and other officials, 
which have taken place throughout the 
world. The media, except on rare occa- 
sions, have not paid as much attention, 
quite understandably, to the fact that the 
Iranian leadership is faced today, and has 
been faced for many years, with a terror- 



434 



ist movement which need not take sec- 
ond place to any group in its brutality. 
This problem — this cancer — must be kept 
in mind when we view events in Iran. 

Investigation and Trial Procedures 

In view of these disruptions and their 
threat to the security of the state and to 
its leaders, the Government of Iran through 
its legislative processes has determined 
that persons charged with actions against 
the security of the state or of actions against 
official persons and property will be tried 
by the military court system. 

The International Commission of Jurists 
and others have criticized this procedure 
and have made a number of charges con- 
cerning the treatment given to people who 
fall within the military court system. The 
procedures of that court system do not, in 
fact, meet the criteria set forth in rele- 
vant international conventions or those we 
have established for our court systems, al- 
though the courts do operate according tc 
Iranian law. 

Investigating authorities in Iran have the 
power to detain suspects during investiga 
tions of alleged crimes without forma 
charges being immediately placed. Deten 
tion for persons involved in crimes having 
to do with state security can either last onlj 
a few hours for the initial questioning— 
which is probably the case for the vasi 
majority of cases — or up to one to foui 
months for the rare fuller investigations 01 
detainees on whom prima facie evidence 
of a crime has been gathered or who hav( 
a previous record. 

When formal charges are made, the ac 
cused has a right to select counsel from i 
list and, to the best of my knowledge, this 
right is generally observed in practice. I] 
the accused prisoner does not make i 
choice of counsel from the list, the cour 
appoints counsel. 

We understand that visits from familj 
and friends are not permitted during the 
investigatory stage but that during the 

Department of State Bulletir 



trial and later, if the individual is sen- 
tenced, such visits are generally permitted. 

We have also seen reports from indi- 
viduals who claim that torture has been 
used in the investigatory period. While 
we have no direct verifiable evidence of 
this, it is difficult to discount the many 
persistent reports, particularly in the con- 
text of terrorist violence, that there have 
been cases of harsh methods being used by 
the Iranian police and security services. I 
do not condone such treatment in the Ira- 
nian system or any other system. I simply 
must reiterate again the context of the 
charges. Most of the charges of torture are 
at least two to three years old. The only 
recent charges, largely made by Iranians 
abroad, all concerned terrorists who were 
allegedly killed or maimed under torture. 

As Mr. Butler noted, it is very difficult 
to obtain information on this situation. 
However, in a number of specific cases that 
our Embassy in Tehran has been able to 
examine, we have found that many of 
those alleged to have been tortured had 
been killed or wounded in armed ex- 
changes with the security forces or suf- 
fered wounds during the clandestine prepa- 
ration of explosives. 

I should at the same time point out that 
while the Iranian penal code imposes se- 
vere penalties on those who order or prac- 
tice torture, we have no information on 
cases where these penalties have been 
imposed. 

Political Crimes and Sentences 

Mr. Chairman, a fair amount has been 
written about the number of "political 
prisoners," and in your invitation to me you 
requested that I comment on this matter. 
There is no precise definition of the term 
"political prisoner" in the Iranian context, 
but there may well be a number — perhaps 
100 to 150 — who would fall within the 
definition in your letter; that is, "persons 
who have been detained, arrested or pun- 
ished for their beliefs or opinions but who 
have neither used nor advocated violence." 



As I said earlier, membership in a Com- 
munist movement or the advocacy of com- 
munism is illegal under Iranian law. I 
simply do not know how many persons are 
jailed for what we would consider normal 
political dissent. I am reasonably certain 
that the large majority of prisoners who 
have gone through the military court sys- 
tem were convicted for involvement in 
planning or carrying out violent acts 
against the security of the state or overtly 
engaged in acts of terrorism or were asso- 
ciated in some way with the terrorists. 
The number of such people in prison today 
is probably in the range of 2,800 to 3,500. 

Iran has for some years had an amnesty 
program, and this month 307 prisoners con- 
victed by military tribunals were released 
to commemorate the golden jubilee of the 
Pahlavi dynasty, as were nearly 1,800 
persons convicted in civil courts for vari- 
ous offenses. Earlier this year 247 persons 
convicted in military courts were pardoned 
and released. This is the largest single 
group in recent times, as far as I am aware, 
but each year substantial numbers of prison- 
ers who were not directly involved in ter- 
rorist murders have been amnestied. Last 
year over 200 were released. 

We estimate that over 90 percent of the 
ex-members of the Tudeh Party who were 
arrested have been released and integrated 
into the society. In fact, in one recent Cabi- 
net, two members were ex-Tudeh Party 
members. 

You also wished me to comment upon 
the number of persons convicted of "poli- 
tical crimes" and the sentences which they 
have received. We have no information on 
the numbers convicted, but sentences have 
ranged from a few years to life imprison- 
ment and to the death sentence. In his re- 
port Mr. Butler wrote that of the 424 
prisoners whose names were listed, ". . . 
75 have been executed, 55 have been given 
life sentences, 33 have been sentenced to 
between 10 and 15 years imprisonment and 
others have been given lesser sentences." 
Mr. Butler's statistics are probably within 
a reasonable order of magnitude, but let 



October 4, 1976 



435 



me add that recently an American jour- 
nalist from a major U.S. newspaper visited 
an Iranian prison and was introduced to 
and interviewed a number of prisoners who 
opponents of the Government of Iran have 
long claimed had died in prison from 
torture. 

The Iranian criminal code specifically 
calls for the death penalty for persons 
involved in actions against internal secu- 
rity which result in the death of others or 
in the destruction of major government 
property. Conspiracy to commit such 
crimes can result in sentences of up to 
three years. Violence against an individual 
which does not result in his death has been 
punishable by from three to five years of 
hard labor, but a recent law has required 
a minimum sentence of five years for crimes 
involving a threat to state security. 

In addition to the executions referred to 
by Mr. Butler, a number of others found 
guilty in the courts have been executed this 
year in conformance with the law. Among 
these were the chief planner and some of 
the persons actively involved in the murder 
of the two American colonels last year. 

The Iranian Government also deals firm- 
ly with other acts of terrorism. A couple of 
years ago, Iraqi terrorists who hijacked a 
plane to Iran were tried and executed 
under Iranian law. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly to ad- 
dress two other questions which you put to 
me and to submit as an enclosure to this 
statement, in order tb save time, answers 
to a few other matters in which you have 
shown interest. I would be glad to answer 
questions on those matters as well. 

We believe that the Iranian Government 
has no doubt as to U.S. views on the ob- 
servance of human rights. The Iranian Gov- 
ernment is also aware of the legislation in 
which you have played a prominent role, 
Mr. Chairman. 

However, we have not made official rep- 
resentations to Iran on the condition of 
human rights in that country for two rea- 
sons. First, we believe that the administra- 



tion of Iranian judicial and penal systems 
is above all a matter of internal Iranian re- 
sponsibility and that one sovereign country 
should not interfere lightly in another's 
domestic affairs. This is admittedly a mat- 
ter of fine judgment on which there can be 
honest differences. In reaching our judg- 
ment, we have also taken into account the 
remarkable progress which has been made 
in Iran in many areas of human rights as 
well as the unique and extraordinarily dif- 
ficult problems of terrorism and other 
manifestations of social disruption. If 
Iran's internal practices in matters relat- 
ing to human rights were a growing affront 
to international standards, we would of 
course reconsider our judgment. The trend 
appears to us, however, to be in the 
opposite direction. 

In applying section 502B of the For- 
eign Assistance Act to Iran, we are about 
to begin the formulation of fiscal year 1978 
security assistance programs. Available 
evidence regarding Iran's observance of 
internationally recognized human rights 
will be taken into account in this process, 
and a report to Congress on human rights 
in Iran will accompany our fiscal year 1978 
legislative request. 

The human rights situation in Iran was 
considered by the U.N. Commission on Hu- 
man Rights in 1975. The Commission mem- 
bers determined that there was not suffi- 
cient evidence presented to the Commis- 
sion on which to base further action. The 
Commission adopted the following con- 
sensus decision: "The Commission decides 
that in the case of Iran, no action is called 
for under [Economic and Social] Council 
resolution 1503." 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United 
States no longer has economic or military 
assistance programs with Iran, although 
Iran has purchased through the foreign 
military sales system a substantial amount 
of military equipment to strengthen its se- 
curity and to permit it to play a responsible 
security role in the area. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I credit 



436 



Department of State Bulletin 



Iranian leadership for its considerable skill 
and hard work in developing the land and 
training the people so that all Iranians will 
in time have a better life. Because this 
goal is violently opposed by both the ex- 
treme Left and the extreme Right without 
regard for the rights of their victims, there 
have been times that practices and proce- 
dures to deal with that opposition which 
we could not approve for ourselves have 
taken place. But when I place these in the 
broad context which I have tried to develop 
for you today, I believe that the advances 
which have been made in improving the 
human rights of the broad majority of 
Iran's population under considerable ad- 
versity far outweigh such abuses as have 
occurred in an attempt to control the vio- 
lent challenges to the government. 



U.S. -Republic of Korea Convention 
on Taxation Transmitted to Senate 

Message From President Ford i 

To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice 
and consent to ratification, the Convention 
signed at Seoul on June 4, 1976, between 
the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Re- 
public of Korea for the Avoidance of Dou- 
ble Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and the Encouragement of International 
Trade and Investment, together with a 
related exchange of notes. 

There is no convention on this subject 
presently in force between the United 
States and Korea. 

The Convention follows generally the 
form and content of most conventions of 
this type recently concluded by the United 
States. Its primary purpose is to identify 
clearly the tax interests of the two coun- 
tries to avoid double taxation and to help 
prevent the illegal evasion of taxation. 



For the information of the Senate, I also 
transmit, a covering report of the Depart- 
ment of State with respect to the Con- 
vention. 

This Convention would promote closer 
economic cooperation and more active trade 
between the United States and Korea. 

I urge the Senate to act favorably at an 
early date on this Convention and its re- 
lated exchange of notes and to give its 
advice and consent to ratification. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, September 3, 1976. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

Disaster Assistance in Angola. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, 
and Energy of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. November 5, 1975-March 10, 1976. 
207 pp. 

Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations. December 18, 1975-May 3, 1976. 
119 pp. 

Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
in the United States. Hearings before the Subcom- 
mittee on International Organizations of the House 
Committee on International Relations. Part I. 
March 17-25, 1976. 110 pp. 

Proposed Sale of C-130's to Egypt. Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 31- 
April 2, 1976. 121 pp. 

To Require Certain Actions by the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on International Economic Policy of the 
House Committee on International Relations. May 
25-June 8, 1976. 180 pp. 

Anti-Semitism and Reprisals Against Jewish Emigra- 
tion in the Soviet Union. Hearing before the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations of the 
House Committee on International Relations. May 
27, 1976. 26 pp. 



'Transmitted on Sept. 3 (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 6); 
also printed as S. Ex. P, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which 
includes the texts of the convention and the exchange 
of notes and the report of the Department of State. 



October 4, 1976 



437 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Agriculture 

International plant protection convention. Done at 
Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 
3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. 
TIAS 7465. 

Adherences deposited: Mexico, May 26, 1976; 
Papua New Guinea, June 1, 1976. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. 1 
Signatures: Bolivia, Portugal, July 15, 1976; India, 

July 16, 1976; Indonesia, Kenya, July 22, 1976; 

Peru, July 23, 1976; Ireland, Jamaica, July 26, 

1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Sweden, July 7, 1976; 

Trinidad and Tobago, July 2, 1976. 
Acceptance deposited: Peru, August 31, 1976. 

Conservation 

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done 
at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force 
May 26, 1976. 2 

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 15, 1976. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at 
Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 
1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. 
TIAS 6820. 

Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, August 
30, 1976. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 1 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 15, 1976. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 
1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975. 2 
Ratifications deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, August 23, 1976; Bulgaria, Byelorus- 
sian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, September 1, 1976. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 15, 1976. 



Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 
1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. 
TIAS 7502. 

Accession deposited: Equatorial Guinea, August 
30, 1976. 

Inter-American Development Bank 

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington 
April 8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 
1959. TIAS 4397. 

Signatures: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal 
Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, 
July 9, 1976. 
Acceptances deposited: Belgium, Federal Republic 
of Germany, 3 Israel, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, 3 Yugoslavia, July 9, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Denmark, July 9, 1976. 

Load Lines 

Amendments to the international convention on load 
lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at 
London October 12, 1971. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Israel, August 25, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at 
New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force 
December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 
1967. TIAS 6298. 

Ratification deposited: Indonesia, September 3, 
1976. 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. En- 
tered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Ratification deposited: Indonesia, September 3, 
1976. 

Property — Industrial 

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial 
property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Lisbon 
October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. 
Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. 
Notification of succession: Bahamas, August 31, 
1976. 

Seals 

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on 
conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 
3948). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. 1 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 15, 1976. 

Seals — Antarctic 

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, 
with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 
1972. 1 



1 Not in force. 

2 Not in force for the United States. 

3 With statements. 



438 



Department of State Bulletin 



Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 15, 1976. 

Space 

Convention on international liability for damage 
caused by space objects. Done at Washington, Lon- 
don, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into 
force September 1, 1972; for the United States 
October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762. 

Ratification deposited: Czechoslovakia, September 
8, 1976. 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 

I January 14, 1975. 1 
Signature: Singapore, August 31, 1976. 

Tin 

J'ifth international tin agreement, with annexes 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally July 1, 1976. 
Ratification deposited: Romania, September 3. 

1976. 
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Septem- 
ber 15, 1976. 

rade 

J rotocol of provisional application of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at 
Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1948. TIAS 1700. 

De facto application: Angola, November 11, 1975; 
Cape Verde, July 5, 1975; Guinea-Bissau, Sep- 
tember 10, 1974; Mozambique, June 25, 1975; 
Sao Tome and Principe, July 12, 1975. 

Vheat 

| 'rotocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 
1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with re- 
spect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with 
respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Nigeria, September 15, 

1976. 
Accession deposited: Syria, September 15, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

epublic of China 

greement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. 
Signed at Washington September 15, 1976. Enters 
into force on a date to be mutually agreed by 
exchange of notes. 

evador 

greement relating to eligibility for U.S. military 
assistance and training pursuant to the Interna- 
tional Security Assistance and Arms Export Con- 



trol Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Quito August 17 and September 3, 1976. Entered 
into force September 3, 1976. 

Indonesia 

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military 
assistance and training pursuant to the Interna- 
tional Security Assistance and Arms Export Con- 
trol Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Jakarta August 3 and 24, 1976. Entered into force 
August 24, 1976. 

Kenya 

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military 
assistance and training pursuant to the Interna- 
tional Security Assistance and Arms Export Con- 
trol Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Nairobi August 10 and 24. 1976. Entered into force 
August 24, 1976. 

Korea 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of February 18, 1976 
(TIAS 8261). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Seoul August 9, 1976. Entered into force August 9, 
1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of September 12, 
1975, to indemnify and safeguard the U.S. Govern- 
ment, its personnel and contractors for liability 
arising out of aircraft operations training in sup- 
port of the cooperative program to curb illegal 
narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Mexico August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 
13, 1976. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 7, 1975 (TIAS 
8189). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad 
August 10, 1976. Entered into force August 10, 
1976. 

Poland 

Agreement amending and extending the air transport 
agreement of July 19, 1972 (TIAS 7535). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Warsaw August 26, 1976. 
Enters into force November 1, 1976. 

Swaziland 

Arrangement for radio communications between ama- 
teur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Mbabane July 7 and August 
20, 1976. Entered into force September 19, 1976. 

United Kingdom 

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signa- 
ture, and exchange of notes. Signed at London 
June 8, 1972. 1 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
September 10, 1976. 



*Not in force. 



1 Not in force. 



ctober 4, 1976 







439 



PUBLICATIONS 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

The United States Passport, Past, Present, Future. 

History of the U.S. passport including issuance au- 
thority; regular passports; no-fee passports; fees; 
documents in lieu of passports; passport application 
processing equipment; and Passport Office policies. 
Includes list of exhibits, tables, glossary, and index. 
Pub. 8851. Department and Foreign Service Series 
153. 242 pp. $5.10. (Cat. No. S1.69:8851). (Stock No. 
044-000-01608-7). 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Convention, with 
related letters, with the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics. TIAS 8225. 36 pp. 50*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8225). 

Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 

Convention with Other Governments. TIAS 8226. 
60 pp. 75*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8226). 

Energy — Long Term Cooperation Program. Agree- 
ment with other governments. TIAS 8229. 84 pp. 
95*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8229). 

Naval Support Facility on Diego Garcia. Agreement 
with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland. TIAS 8230. 30 pp. 45*. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:8230). 

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Ireland ex- 
tending the agreement of June 28 and 29, 1973. TIAS 
8239. 3 pp. 35*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8239). 

Early Warning System — Privileges and Immunities. 

Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8241. 6 pp. 35*. (Cat. 
No. S9.10:8241). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 
8242. 7 pp. 35*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8242). 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Subject 

International initiatives relating 
to the ozone layer. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea, working group 
on container transport, Oct. 13. 

Kissinger: departure, Andrews 
Air Force Base. 

Green: Commonwealth Club, San 
Francisco, Sept. 10. 

Advisory Panel on Folk Music and 
Jazz, Oct. 14. 

Kissinger: arrival, Dar es Salaam. 

U.S. and Republic of China sign 
new fisheries agreement. 

Kissinger: news conference, Dar 
es Salaam. 

Robinson: Conference Board, New 
York, N.Y. 

Kissinger, Mwale: arrival, Lusaka. 

Study Group 7 of the U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the Inter- 
national Radio Consultative Com- 
mittee, Oct. 5. 

SCC, Oct. 19. 

Government Advisory Committee 
on International Book and Li- 
brary Program, Oct. 27-28. 

Kaunda, Kissinger: remarks, Lu- 
saka. 

Program for the state visit of 
President William R. Tolbert of 
Liberia. 

U.S. -Italian scientific meeting on 
Sept. 16 on release of toxic sub- 
stances at Seveso in July. 

Kissinger: statement on Law of 
the Sea Conference. 

Kissinger: departure statement 
and news conference, Lusaka. 

Kissinger: remarks following 
meeting with Rhodesian delega- 
tion at U.S. Embassy residence, 
Pretoria. 

Kissinger: remarks following 
meeting with Rhodesian delega- 
tion at South African Prime 
Minister's residence. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



No. 


Date 


*430 


9/13 


*431 


9/13 


t432 


9/13 


433 


9/13 


*434 


9/14 


f435 
t436 


9/14 
9/15 


f437 


9/15 


t438 


9/16 


1439 
*'440 


9/16 
9/17 


*441 
*442 


9/17 
9/17 


t443 


9/16 


*444 


9/17 



*445 9/17 



t446 
t447 
f448 



9/17 
9/17 
9/19 



f449 9/19 



440 



Department of State Bulletii 



INDEX October U, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1945 



Africa. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
of September 11 409 

Arms Control and Disarmament. U.S. and 

U.S.S.R. Hold Consultations on Chemical 
Weapons Prohibition (communique) . . . 423 

China. Death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 

People's Republic of China (Ford, Kissinger) 416 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 437 

Department Testifies on Human Rights in 
Iran (Atherton) 429 

Department Urges Congressional Approval of 
Agreement With Turkey on Defense Coop- 
eration (Habib) 424 

U.S. -Republic of Korea Convention on Taxation 
Transmitted to Senate (Ford) 437 

Cyprus. Department Urges Congressional Ap- 
proval of Agreement With Turkey on De- 
fense Cooperation (Habib) 424 

Economic Affairs. U.S.-Republic of Korea Con- 
vention on Taxation Transmitted to Senate 
(Ford) 437 

Greece. Department Urges Congressional Ap- 
proval of Agreement With Turkey on De- 
fense Cooperation (Habib) 424 

Human Rights. Department Testifies on Human 
Rights in Iran (Atherton) 429 

Iran. Department Testifies on Human Rights 
in Iran (Atherton) 429 

Korea 

"Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 

September 11 409 

iU.S. -Republic of Korea Convention on Taxa- 
tion Transmitted to Senate (Ford) .... 437 

ILebanon. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of September 11 409 

^Military Affairs. Department Urges Congres- 
sional Approval of Agreement With Turkey 
on Defense Cooperation (Habib) 424 

Namibia. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence of September 11 409 



Population. U.S. Responsibilities in World 
Population Issues (Green) 419 

Presidential Documents 

Death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, People's 
Republic of China 416 

President Calls for Full Accounting of Amer- 
icans Missing in Viet-Nam 418 

U.S.-Republic of Korea Convention on Taxa- 
tion Transmitted to Senate 437 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 440 

South Africa. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference of September 11 409 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger's News 
Conference of September 11 409 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 438 

Department Urges Congressional Approval of 
Agreement With Turkey on Defense Coop- 
eration (Habib) 424 

U.S.-Republic of Korea Convention on Taxa- 
tion Transmitted to Senate (Ford) .... 437 

Turkey. Department Urges Congressional Ap- 
proval of Agreement With Turkey on De- 
fense Cooperation (Habib) 424 

U.S.S.R. U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Consultations 
on Chemical Weapons Prohibition (com- 
munique) 423 

Viet-Nam 

President Calls for Full Accounting of Amer- 
icans Missing in Viet-Nam (Ford) .... 418 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of 
September 11 409 



Name Index 

Atherton, Alfred L.. Jr 429 

Ford, President 416, 418, 437 

Green, Marshall 419 

Habib, Philip C 424 

Kissinger, Secretary 409, 416 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXV • No. 1946 • October 11, 1976 



U.S. BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN A WORLD OF CHANGE 

Address by Deputy Secretary Robinson UU1 

DEPARTMENT TESTIFIES ON PROPOSED MILITARY SALES 

TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS 

Statement by Under Secretary Habib UU7 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



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U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN a3 the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE B U L L E T 1 1 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1946 
October 11, 1976 

The Department of State BULLETl 
a weekly publication issued by i 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public c 
interested agencies of the governnn 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations t 
on the work of the Department i 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selec 
press releases on foreign policy, issi 
by the White House and the Depc 
ment, and statements, addrest 
and news conferences of the Presid 
and the Secretary of State and ot, 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functu 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and ini 
national agreements to which 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general int 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, i 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also list 



: 






U.S. Business and Government in a World of Change 



Address by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson 



Secretary Kissinger regretted very much 
;hat he could not be here today. He had 
:ounted on this occasion for two important 
■easons. First, he has taken a great inter- 
est in the role of business in the inter- 
lational arena. He fully recognizes its 
critical importance in relations among the 
ndustrial democracies, between them and 
he developing world, and in East-West 
•elations as well. Second, the Secretary is 
veil aware of the significance of the Con- 
f erence Board, which represents the high- 
est echelons of America's private sector — 
nd which constantly has demonstrated the 
vill and the capacity to contribute ideas 
nd new approaches to the most pressing 
>roblems of our society. 

My remarks today will, of course, reflect 
he Secretary's views. They will reflect not 
mly the official view, but also my own 
(articular dual perspective, developed 
rom my recent experience in government 
ollowing my earlier career as a business- 
nan. This experience has strengthened my 
ong-held conviction that government and 
usiness executives have many interests in 
fommon. 

— First, we both are confronted by a 
eries of short-term crises which must be 
lanaged decisively without benefit of all 
Ihe relevant information. If we wait until 
ill the facts are marshaled, we are gen- 
erally too late. This calls for judgment and 

large quotient of courage. Furthermore, 



'Made before the Conference Board at New York, 
LY., on Sept. 16 (text as delivered). 



although anyone who is making no mis- 
takes very likely is making no contribution, 
we must be right most of the time. You in 
business face an annual audit, with per- 
formance measured in profit and other 
financial terms. We in government also 
have to face an audit — every morning 
when the editorial pages go to press, in 
addition to the quadrennial variety, the 
national elections. 

— Second, although we both deal with 
day-to-day crises, our ultimate success or 
failure will depend on the extent to which 
we are sensitive to the dynamics of our 
respective worlds and move intelligently in 
anticipation of future conditions. The Bible 
says: "Where there is no vision the people 
perish." However, both business and gov- 
ernment face a world in which change is 
taking place at such speed that long-range 
vision is blurred. Yet, we know that bas- 
ing our long-range policies on nothing 
more than current conditions will doom 
our ventures to failure at the outset. 

— Third, our increasing interdependence, 
coupled with increasing domestic demands 
on government, is forcing a growing gov- 
ernment involvement in international eco- 
nomic affairs. Today, even in the case of 
the United States, where the private sector 
plays the lead role in international eco- 
nomic activities, the government is forced 
to take a close look at international trade 
and investment, assurance of supply of 
critical materials, and the global implica- 
tions of domestic economic policies. This 
poses for government and business com- 



>ctober 11, 1976 



441 






munity alike the challenge of creating a 
new cooperative relationship. 

We are pleased that this conference is ad- 
dressing this critical challenge, and we will 
be greatly interested in your conclusions. 
Thus we share interests — and we both 
must look at history to insure sound 
decisions. 

Historical Trends 

The foundations of the political situa- 
tion we are facing were laid during the 
three decades following World War II. To 
understand the forces now at work on our 
global society we must first focus on the 
basic changes during this period, which 
are now emerging with increasing clarity. 

The United States is no longer able to 
dominate world events as in the 1950's and 
1960's. We can and must continue to play 
the lead role in resolving global problems, 
but this requires a more subtle and an in- 
creasingly multilateral approach. For ex- 
ample, there is no way the United States 
could solve the energy crisis alone, with- 
out cooperating with the other industrial- 
ized oil importers and the principal export- 
ers. Yet at the same time no solution to 
this problem could possibly come about 
without the active leadership and partici- 
pation of the United States. 

— We have moved from a bipolar to a 
multipolar world, at least in economic mat- 
ters, with shifting international groupings 
related to specific issues. Institutions tail- 
ored to old requirements must be adjusted 
to the new ones. Because the United States 
cannot go it alone, we need new structures 
of multilateral relations. Older economic 
institutions, established by and substan- 
tially for the developed nations — the 
World Bank, IMF [International Monetary 
Fund], GATT [General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade], and others — must find 
ways of serving global interests involving 
responsible participation by the newly rich 
oil exporters, the less developed countries, 
and ultimately the Communist countries. 

— Attitudes on foreign assistance have 



442 



changed. In the past we tended to justify 
aid in anti-Communist terms. The decline 
of bipolarity in the world has contributed 
to a decline in real terms in U.S. foreign 
aid. We must develop a new national con- 
sensus on foreign assistance which reflects 
both our moral obligation and our self- 
interest in the improvement of economic 
opportunity and buying power throughout 
the world. It is in both our short- and long- 
run interests to assure accelerated develop- 
ment in the less developed countries. 
Otherwise we will pay the higher costs of 
instability, confrontation, and dangerous 
political upheaval. 

— During the 30 years since the founding 
of the United Nations, its membership has 
nearly tripled, from 51 to 144. Many oJ 
these new nations are on the margins 01 
economic viability; yet they are deeplj 
nationalistic. Meanwhile, the continued ex 
pansion of world industrialization an( 
trade, and the need for foreign investmen 
and assistance for the less developed na 
tions, have created a stubborn reality o 
international economic interdependenci 
which runs counter to the spirit of absolut 
political and economic independence 
Opening the doors to full participation b; 
the developing world in a new inter 
national economic order will be a tasl 
ahead for the industrialized democracie 
over the next decade. 



Challenges to Government and Business 

As a result of these developments, botl 
American business and government fac 
important challenges. Developing the dia 
logue with the previously neglected sector 
of the world's economic community can b 
accomplished through closer government 
business partnership and also throug' 
business and government acting singly, bu • 
in mutually supportive roles. 

In the time available to me, I will no 
attempt an exhaustive listing of challenge 
and responses, but will highlight a few. 
like to stress the word "challenge" o 
"opportunity," a positive approach whic " r 



l 



-- 



Department of State Bulleti " ; : 



derives from my own experience in busi- 
ness. 

I would like to cite five important areas 
of challenge in the global economy which 
will have a critical bearing on future busi- 
ness and governmental behavior and 
policies. 

— Economic cooperation among the in- 
dustrial countries, for this is a key to global 
economic welfare and prosperity. 

— North-South economic relations, for 
here the politics of numbers, the growth of 
material interdependence, and the de- 
mands of fair play will press for changes 
in the global economy. 

— East-West economic policy, for it is 
time to take a fresh look at this entire 
area which fuses business, politics, and 
security. 

— Energy, for this is not only a critical 
long-term economic challenge rooted in 
Dur past patterns of behavior, but its con- 
nection to the nuclear proliferation issue 
nakes it a pivotal problem for world peace. 

— Managing the wealth of the oceans, 
which tests the world community's ability 
;o agree on rules and procedures for tap- 
ring the vast resources which are a com- 
non global heritage. 



Collaboration Among Industrialized Countries 

First, let me discuss the common chal- 
enge which the industrial democracies 
ace in managing our economies. An un- 
precedented expansion of trade and in- 
vestment, pressure on resources, the 20th- 
entury revolution in technology, trans- 
•ortation, and communication, and the im- 
ierative of improving the environment and 
he quality of life, together have created 
onditions in which no one country can 
atisfy its domestic requirements in isola- 
'on. There is no alternative to closer co- 
peration among the industrial democra- 
ies — to control inflation, to maintain 
moothly functioning economic arrange- 
lents among the countries in which the 
verwhelming amount of global activity 



takes place, and to develop further the 
ties that bind us to the countries of the 
world that share our most fundamental 
moral values. 

In fact, during the past few years collab- 
oration with Western Europe, Canada, and 
Japan has become the bedrock of our for- 
eign economic policy. Our relationship has 
become one of greater equality and shar- 
ing of initiative and responsibility. We 
have worked closely together on the man- 
agement of national economic policies, in- 
cluding the process of recovery, as illus- 
trated by the Rambouillet and Puerto Rico 
summits as well as by the reinvigoration of 
other coordinating mechanisms like the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in Paris. We have col- 
laborated to avert protectionist tendencies 
in trade and consulted closely on the issues 
of energy and raw materials. We have also 
worked to strengthen the trade and mone- 
tary systems and to develop balanced 
guidelines for private international invest- 
ment, in order to devise an effective frame- 
work for the operation of private enter- 
prise. And we have made considerable 
progress in developing a long-range 
strategy for the West to meet the challenge 
of the energy crisis. 

The leaders of the Western nations — 
President Ford and his counterparts — dem- 
onstrated determination and wisdom in 
preserving an open world market and 
avoiding panic reactions in dealing with 
global recession. They led us through the 
worst recession of the post-World War II 
era with a minimum of recrimination and 
with a maximum of cooperation. Today 
economic cooperation among the industrial- 
ized democracies probably is the closest 
in at least a decade. 

For the future we face two key chal- 
lenges with regard to economic relations 
with Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. 
First, we must continue, expand, and im- 
prove the policy collaboration which has 
begun. And second, we must cooperate to 
extend the benefits and vitality of our econ- 
omies to other parts of the world. For the 



ctober 11, 1976 



443 



arrangements which are fashioned among 
the industrial democracies must be seen as 
only a first step in a more extensive struc- 
ture of global cooperation which includes 
the developing countries and must also take 
account of the centrally planned economies 
of the East. 

North-South Relations 

A second major challenge we face is our 
relations with the developing countries. 
After our industrial partners, it is the Third 
World where our economic interests are 
most at stake. It is this region from which 
we will be importing a substantial and in- 
creasing portion of our raw materials in 
the future and which holds the potential 
for future growth in export markets. 
Efforts to improve the functioning of the 
global economic system cannot be success- 
ful without responsible cooperation from 
key developing countries. Nor can a stable, 
prosperous international community be con- 
structed and sustained unless all its princi- 
pal participants feel that they have a stake 
in cooperating and believe that their views 
are heeded. 

Be it resource development, technology 
transfer, the activities of multilateral cor- 
porations, or commodity trade, the need 
now and in the future will be for the devel- 
opment of policies which are responsive to 
the economic imperatives of interdepend- 
ence but which also recognize the diversity 
among countries and allow governments 
sufficient flexibility to exercise their legiti- 
mate national prerogatives. 

Political leaders in the developing world 
are calling for a new economic order. They 
want greater benefits from the interna- 
tional economic system and a greater voice 
in the management of the global economy. 
We believe that it is imperative that the 
United States and other industrial democra- 
cies respond with measures that contribute 
to development and to the evolution of a 
more orderly and progressive world econ- 
omy. We are therefore proposing pragmatic 
solutions to concrete problems in trade, 



444 



finance, resource, and technology issues. A 
good example is Secretary Kissinger's re- 
cent proposal for an International Resources 
Bank to restore the flow of private capital 
and technology to Third World resource 
projects. This pragmatic initiative is re- 
sponsive to the deteriorating climate for 
private investment in resource development 
in the Third World and designed to bene- 
fit both industrial and developing nations. 
We need more ideas like this one. And in 
their creation and their execution we need 
your advice and your participation. 

Another area where your active partici- 
pation is essential is in the formulation of 
our responses to the demand of the devel- 
oping countries for greater and more 
liberal access to Western industrial tech- 
nology. We are calling an initial meeting 
on November 11 of business executives and 
representatives of other nongovernmental 
groups to discuss the issues we face in a 
series of forthcoming U.N. conferences on 
science, technology, and development. 
Your advice at this early stage will con- 
tribute to more constructive and practical 
U.S. positions. 

Our objective is to create conditions foi 
global growth from which all countries 
benefit. We are firmly convinced that forms 
of private investment and technology trans- 
fer which are adapted to the changing in- 
ternational environment are the most effi- 
cient mechanism for achieving this. 

East-West Economic Relationship 

We must also devote renewed attentior 
to our relations with the centrally planned 
economies of Eastern Europe, where w* 
face special difficulties. Yet this element ir 
the global economy cannot be ignored. Th( 
past effect of Soviet purchases on the work 
grain market is a good illustration; bui 
other examples, such as energy develop 
ment, rising Eastern debt to Western com- 
mercial banks, and the growing role ol 
state-controlled shipping, demonstrate th( 
increasing economic relationship betweer 
East and West. 






Department of State Bulletir 



j ; „ 



The future course of this relationship 
will require the attention of both the pub- 
lic and private sectors. We must consider 
how economic relations can be organized so 
as to provide appropriate benefits to all 
parties; how East-West cooperation can be 
applied to the pressing international eco- 
nomic issues of our time, such as food se- 
curity and adequate resource development; 
and how relations with the centrally 
planned economies can make a positive 
contribution to the stable political environ- 
ment we all seek. 

The Energy Problem 

The details of the energy crisis need no 
elaboration. The oil embargo, escalating oil 
prices, and the growing percentage of U.S. 
energy consumption which is imported are 
well known to everyone here. To respond 
to these challenges we are moving in four 
areas: 

— We are pursuing domestic measures to 
reduce our vulnerability to international 
pricing and supply decisions by gradually 
lifting price controls, directing more re- 
search into alternative energy sources, and 
building a national oil stockpile. 

— We are cooperating with other indus- 
trialized oil-consuming nations to reduce 
our collective vulnerability to manipulation 
of oil supplies and prices. 

— We are cooperating with the non-oil 
developing countries. We have proposed 
the establishment of an International En- 
ergy Institute, to provide assistance and co- 
operation in technology and research to 
help these countries develop appropriate 
alternative energy sources. 

— And we are trying to cooperate with 
the oil-exporting nations to encourage re- 
sponsible international action on supply 
and prices. We are doing this in various 
multilateral forums and bilaterally, includ- 
ing cooperation with the business commu- 
nity in the context of joint commissions. 

But the magnitude of the challenge de- 
mands that we all do more in all of these 



October 11, 1976 



areas. Largely because of congressional in- 
action or opposition, our domestic energy 
policy is not yet adequate to our need to 
reduce our vulnerability to foreign oil sup- 
ply pressures. Moreover, we must devote 
increasing attention to the longer term pic- 
ture and our transition to the post-oil age. 
The complexities of this transition are al- 
ready apparent, for the imperative of pro- 
viding for future energy needs has 
stimulated a drive by developing nations to 
acquire nuclear power plants with all its 
implications for the proliferation of nu- 
clear weapons. 

Law of the Sea 

The law of the sea negotiations are 
among the most complex and difficult of 
our age. The delegations now meeting in 
New York are seeking to establish a viable 
legal regime for 70 percent of the earth's 
surface. The interests involved cut across 
the traditional North-South and East-West 
rivalries, and no country has a greater in- 
terest in their successful conclusion than 
the United States. 

Technology has enabled us to drill for 
oil farther and farther out from the coasts 
in ever deeper waters, to exploit the living 
resources of the oceans ever more effi- 
ciently, to carry crude oil by sea in huge 
supertankers controlled by computers, and 
in the near future, to mine the deep seabed 
for industrial minerals. 

The proposed law of the sea convention 
sets forth broad obligations and responsi- 
bilities on the part of both maritime and 
coastal states to preserve the oceans' integ- 
rity and to cooperate with other states in 
protecting the oceans from pollution. The 
convention also will insure the freedom of 
navigation through and over straits and in 
the economic zone so that maritime trade 
can be carried out effectively. 

Recently the Secretary of State presented 
a package proposal to resolve the out- 
standing issues dealing with mining for 
mineral nodules on the ocean floor. Indi- 
vidual nations and their companies would 



445 



have assured access to mining sites, along 
with an international Enterprise which 
would be an arm of the proposed Seabed 
Authority. We and other countries are will- 
ing to assist this international Enterprise 
in a broadly shared financing and staffing 
of its intended operations with the under- 
standing that all nations would also have 
assured access to the seabed. 

Above all, the law of the sea negotiations 
are aimed at establishing an order for the 
oceans that will prevent or resolve peace- 
fully conflict over the uses of the oceans 
among more than 150 states. Success in this 
effort could give hope to all that the com- 
munity of nations can cooperate to solve 
the complex global challenges ahead. 



Importance of Sharing Views 

These challenges confront both business 
and government with the opportunity to 
work together to forge new patterns of co- 
operation. I am not suggesting that Ameri- 
can business support American foreign 
policy regardless of its profit consequences. 
Businessmen do have both the right and 
the obligation to make their foreign policy 
views known to the Administration and, of 
course, to the Congress. That approach 
may not be as much fun as sitting back 
and complaining when, in your judgment, 
the government makes a mistake. But in 
the long run, it is essential if the private 
sector's interests are to be preserved. 

By the same token, the government can- 
not afford to regard the actions of Ameri- 
can business abroad as natural phenomena 
which cannot be influence.d when national 
interests are at stake. For example, the 
U.S. Government is quite rightly concerned 
about the consequences of questionable 
payments by American firms to foreign 
government officials. Even though such 



payments may be the mother's milk of do- 
mestic politics in certain foreign countries, 
our government cannot stand idly by and 
watch as foreign governments friendly to 
us are shaken to the roots because of reve- 
lations of questionable or illegal payments. 

The Conference Board was among the 
first to recognize the need for positive ac- 
tion by the business community to improve 
its corporate citizenship in overseas opera- 
tions and to avoid the taint of corruption. 
Your international corporate social respon- 
sibility program has, over the past five 
years, stimulated practical measures by 
scores of U.S. companies and by other busi- 
ness associations to improve both the 
actual behavior and the image of U.S. 
business. 

We stand at a point in history when val- 
ues and realities are often in a state of 
tension. It is a time of tension between the 
value of freedom and the need for order; 
between the intensity of nationalism and 
the reality of interdependence; between 
the dynamism of free enterprise and the 
demands for economic equality. The genius 
of America lies in reconciling positions 
which to others often seem hopelessly con- 
tradictory — and in doing so without de- 
tracting from the great principles that are 
our special heritage. Nowhere is the pos- 
sibility of such achievement more obvious 
or more needed than in the interface of the 
private and public sectors of this country. 

We have begun to perceive the chal- 
lenges we face and to delineate the forms 
of our future cooperative progress. No 
other nation has our advantages; no other 
nation can provide the leadership needed if 
the world of tomorrow is to preserve the 
values we care about while dealing effec- 
tively with changing realities. The prob- 
lems are vast indeed, but never in history 
have our problems more truly offered us 
such opportunities for progress. 



446 



Department of State Bulletin 



Department Testifies on Proposed Military Sales 
to Foreign Governments 



Statement by Philip C. Habib 

Under Secretary for Political Affairs i 



I am particularly happy to have this 
opportunity to discuss with the members 
of the International Political and Military 
Affairs Subcommittee the important role 
of arms transfers in our foreign relations 
with friendly and allied governments. 

The occasion for this meeting is of 
course your consideration of the notifica- 
tions before the Congress of our intention, 
in response to requests from 14 foreign 
governments, to provide a variety of mili- 
tary equipment and defense services. The 
total value of these proposed sales is over 
$6 billion, a figure that has naturally at- 
tracted considerable notice and comment. 
The figure is an impressive one, but I be- 
lieve we can place it in better perspective 
through an examination of its component 
parts. 

Before turning to the specific cases be- 
fore you, however, I would like to make 
one general comment that applies to all of 
them. That is, as we know from hard ex- 
perience, it simply costs a vast amount 
more today to erect an adequate defense 
than it did 20 or even 5 years ago. 

Not only does sophistication add sub- 
stantially to the price, but there is a con- 



1 Made before the Subcommittee on International 
Political and Military Affairs of the House Commit- 
tee on International Relations on Sept. 21. The com- 
plete transcript of the hearings will be published by 
the committee and will be available from the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



stant rise in costs owing to inflation. In the 
early 1950's, when our security assistance 
program almost wholly consisted of grants, 
we provided allies with equipment worth 
about $5 billion a year; in today's prices 
that would be well over $10 billion a 
year — higher than today's sales figures. 
So from the inflationary point of view 
alone, the dollar values of today's arms 
transfers are not out of line with those of 
earlier periods. 

More significantly, the actual number of 
weapons systems transferred is smaller in 
many cases because of the high unit cost 
of sophisticated weapons. As an example, 
the most modern jet fighter available in 
the 1950's would have cost about $700,000 
in fiscal year 1975 dollars; today's most 
modern jets cost 10 or 15 times that figure. 
The cost of even far less exotic hardware, 
such as tanks, has more than doubled 
owing to increasing sophistication. 

In short, because of both inflation and 
sophistication a billion dollars buys far less 
arms than in earlier years. 



The Middle East 

Now I would like to comment on the 
specific proposals for sales included among 
the notifications before you. 

Let me first speak of Iran. There are 
eight letters of offer for Iran, which total 
$4.4 billion. Over $3.8 billion, or over half 



October 11, 1976 



447 



of the total amount of all 43 notifications, 
is attributable to Iran's request to purchase 
160 F-16's with follow-on support. 

Iran wishes to have the F-16 aircraft 
as its aircraft of the 1980's and 1990's. 
Deliveries will not begin until the early 
1980's and will take several years to com- 
plete. The delivery schedule has been 
planned in order not to overburden Iranian 
facilities or available trained manpower 
and not to interfere with our own or 
NATO acquisition of the plane. Although, 
if this transaction is approved, some pay- 
ments will be made by Iran next year, the 
schedule of payments and deliveries will 
stretch well into the 1980's. 

This purchase is characteristic of the 
Iranian Government's desire to project its 
development requirements into the future 
and to act now rather than to delay a deci- 
sion which might be adversely affected by 
inflation or other external factors. 

To put in perspective the sums involved 
in the F-16 sales package, we should not 
ignore the fact that our nonmilitary trade 
with Iran will, it is estimated, total $22-$23 
billion during the period 1975-80, with a 
$6-$7 billion surplus in our favor in civil- 
ian goods alone. 

More basically, our military sales to 
Iran add to the strength of a valued ally 
and to that nation's ability to continue to 
carry out a policy on which we and the 
Iranians agree. They also provide the es- 
sential assurances that the United States 
has not changed its mind about Iran, that 
we remain committed to a close relation- 
ship in all fields, and that close coordina- 
tion with the United States on the part of 
the Iranians is still justified. For we are not 
only talking about past and present poli- 
cies, including relevant military sales, but 
also about our future relations. 

The next group of requests for military 
equipment is from Israel. Seven letters of 
offer, totaling $266 million, cover largely 
helicopters and munitions for systems al- 
ready in Israel's inventory. These sales 
are a part of our continuing supply of mili- 
tary equipment to Israel. Since the October 



448 



1973 war, the United States has provided 
over $5 billion in funds for the purchase 
of military items to support our ongoing as- 
sistance to Israel. Several major letters of 
offer, totaling approximately $1 billion, 
were submitted several months ago. These 
letters of offer are in addition to those 
major requests and are fully supportive of 
efforts to assure Israel's security. 

The next country I wish to discuss is 
Saudi Arabia. Ten letters of offer have 
been submitted at a value of $664 million, 
of which $555 million is attributable to 
construction, inflationary increases, or sup- 
port equipment. Thus, less than one-sixth 
of the Saudi package represents money for 
new weapons. 

Saudi Arabia is a good example of where 
a large percentage of sales is not for arms. 
Even the dollar amounts listed do not nec- 
essarily reflect money that will flow to the 
United States. We should bear in mind 
that the actual construction work, which 
will be managed by the Corps of Engineers 
in the cases under consideration, will be 
open to international tender and not re- 
served for U.S. firms. 

The two items on the Saudi list that have 
given most concern have been letters of 
offer for 850 Sidewinder missiles and 650 
Maverick missiles. Both of these requests 
would supply the armaments needed foi 
the 110 F-5 aircraft that we have already 
sold the Saudis. The missiles will be spe- 
cially fitted on the F-5's and cannot be 
readily shifted to other aircraft. Both let 
ters of offer have been considerably re- 
duced from the original Saudi request and 
in response to congressional concerns, froir 
the level we believe justifiable. These pro 
posed sales are, I believe, minimal in terms 
of what is required to arm the Saud: 
aircraft. 

Saudi Arabia, like Iran, is a strong force 
for moderation in the Middle East. Its sup- 
port for the moderate Arab governments 
that are committed to a negotiated solu 
tion of the Arab-Israel dispute is of greal 
importance to our own interest in see- 
ing a lasting Middle Eastern settlement 



Department of State Bulletir 



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achieved. Saudi Arabia is also the force 
for restraint on oil price increases within 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries]. 

With few other Arab countries has the 
United States enjoyed such a steady long- 
term relationship of cooperation. Saudi 
Arabia looks to the United States not only 
as the power most likely to preserve peace 
in the world but as the most reliable sup- 
plier of its own requirements for civilian 
and military development. Expenditures 
under the current Saudi five-year develop- 
ment plan are estimated to total $142 bil- 
lion. If we are to enjoy a close and pro- 
ductive relationship with Saudi Arabia in 
Ithose policy areas that are important to 
Jus, we should expect to meet reason- 
able requests in other areas of mutual 
importance. 

It is a key component of our well- 
punded relationship with Saudi Arabia 
i:hat we respond positively to reasonable 
(requests for the arms the Saudis need for 
kelf-defense. This large country has vast 
i-esources and a small and scattered popu- 
lation. It has no significant geographical 
Darriers and, with radical Arab regimes to 
:he north and the south, believes that it 
must equip itself with weapons that make 
|up for its deficiencies and vulnerabilities. 

The armaments requested in the notifi- 
cations before you are reasonable in terms 
)f Saudi requirements for national defense. 
They are justifiable in terms of the paral- 
el course that U.S. and Saudi policies have 
'ollowed and may be expected to follow 
licross a broad spectrum of our interests. 

'akistan and East Asia 

Five letters of offer, totaling $84 million, 
irovide munitions and support equipment 
or the Pakistani Armed Forces. Granting 
'akistan's request for these armaments is 
. modest response indeed in terms of the 
ondition of the country's military forces. 
Ve do not believe that the supply of these 
rmaments will contribute to an escalation 
f arms purchases in South Asia. 



A relatively small portion (less than 
$355 million) of the total is proposed for 
four countries of the East Asian region. It 
includes OV-10 aircraft, M-48A1 tanks, 
and Sidewinder missiles for Korea, F-5E 
aircraft and 105mm howitzers for the 
Philippines, aircraft for Australia, and 
F-5E aircraft and Sidewinder missiles for 
Singapore. 

We believe that these transfers will 
serve U.S. interests by assisting allied and 
friendly governments of this area to im- 
prove their defense capabilities and there- 
by contribute to continuing peace and 
stability in East Asia. 

The tanks for Korea have been well 
used by the U.S. Army. Before they are 
placed in service the Republic of Korea 
Army will give them a major overhaul and 
modification. These tanks will replace the 
existing seriously overage M-47 tank force. 
As you know, North Korea maintains a 
preponderantly larger tank force. The 
F-5E's and the Sidewinder missiles are 
part of our longstanding efforts to mod- 
ernize the Korean Air Force. 

The balance of the letters of offer before 
you are destined for European countries. I 
do not believe there are any items for 
concern among them, but we would be 
happy to answer any questions on those 
letters of offer. 

Decisionmaking Process on Arms Sales 

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I 
would like to make some general remarks 
about the background of these proposed 
sales. 

I can assure you that we are very much 
aware of the criticism that has been di- 
rected at our decisionmaking on arms sales. 
I would like to stress that the proposed 
sales that are before you have been sub- 
jected to a thorough review process and 
decided on their own individual merits. We 
have not relaxed our standards in decid- 
ing whether or not to sell military equip- 
ment abroad. Indeed, both the Depart- 
ment of State and the Department of De- 



>ctober 11, 1976 



449 



fense view their primary responsibility as 
regulating and managing sales programs, 
not promoting them. 

The review process begins generally in 
the field where our military missions and 
our Embassies first receive an indication 
of foreign interest in a U.S. defense arti- 
cle or service. Our people are not salesmen 
and do not push the sales of weapons 
abroad; rather they work with their for- 
eign counterparts when possible to assure 
that estimates of national defense require- 
ments are accurate and reasonable. Thus 
frequently a foreign nation's desire for a 
particular system is either reduced in 
number or delayed in time following the 
advice of our personnel. On many occa- 
sions, we have been successful in persuad- 
ing foreign counterparts that a particular 
glamorous system is not appropriate to 
their requirements. 

Our arms industry — like our agriculture 
and our other advanced technology indus- 
tries — happens to be the best in the world. 
We not only manufacture the best planes, 
ships, and other systems; we provide better 
training and more reliable logistical sup- 
port. We do not seek to force arms sales on 
others. Our products are sought by mod- 
ernizing states. Further, this preference for 
dealing with the United States indicates a 
confidence in the United States as a respon- 
sible world power whose policies are di- 
rected toward the goals of peace and sta- 
bility, rather than disruption, subversion, 
or the stimulation of conflicts. 

When a request is relayed by our mili- 
tary missions or Embassies to Washington, 
it is carefully studied in the Departments 
of State, Defense, ACDA [Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency], and other 
agencies. A large number of factors are 
evaluated, but a crucial factor is the role 
the country plays, its relationship to U.S. 
interests in its area, and how our response 
will affect the furtherance of our specific 
policy goals and our own national interests. 

Let me emphasize that we do not sell 
arms unless there is a very substantial area 



450 



of policy congruence — particularly secu- 
rity policy — between ourselves and the re- 
cipient. All of the nations which we are dis- 
cussing today can meet that standard. 

Among the other factors in our pre- 
decision review, we examine whether the 
introduction of a new military system would 
affect the regional security balance or per- 
haps stimulate other requests from neigh- 
boring countries that would lead to im- 
balances. We also have to examine realis- 
tically the alternative sources of supply 
that the country may have and whether a 
refusal on our part to sell a particular sys- 
tem would simply result in another sup- 
plier — e.g., the Soviet Union — making the 
sale. 

The desire for modern arms by our 
friends and allies is understandable when 
they see potential adversaries well supplied 
with modern hardware by the Soviet Union 
and its friends. The continuing efforts bj 
the Soviets to provide weapons to its 
friends have added to the sense of insecu- 
rity of many friendly governments. Iraq, foi 
example, which has less than a third o1 
Iran's population, has a rough equivalencj 
in number of Soviet-supplied modern tank: 
and aircraft. As we have seen in widelj 
scattered areas, the Soviet Union is no - 
constrained in the supply of weapons t( 
its friends. 

In our review process, we are not gov 
erned by U.S. balance-of-payments consid 
erations. The sale and its relation to oui 
broad national interests are dominant. Bu' 
economic and social factors are taken int( 
account. A proposed sale is vetted in term; 
of the country's development goals and it; 
ability to finance the particular system. 

We have to make a clear judgment tha" 
the supply of a system to a foreign countrj 
would not weaken the readiness of oui 
own forces. In addition, we weigh th( 
threat to be countered or deterred and th( 
burden that a new system would place or 
the foreign nation's ability to absorb new 
equipment. The value of our defense co 
operation with the proposed recipienl 



Department of State Bulletir 



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country is of importance. We have to cal- 
culate how a positive or negative decision 
on a proposed sale might affect any spe- 
cial interests, such as access to facilities or 
airspace rights, that we may enjoy with 
the recipient country. 

Finally, except in special circumstances, 
we do not sell or otherwise transfer cer- 
tain sensitive items which would tend to 
weaken our technological lead or which we 
feel it otherwise inappropriate to sell to 
foreign nations. There have been a num- 
ber of cases in which we have refused to 
sell arms to our friends, although for obvi- 
ous reasons these do not normally make 
the headlines nor do we seek to publicize 
them to the detriment of our relations. 

Mr. Chairman, I know that the need to 
consider such a large number of cases at 
one time imposes a heavy burden on the 
Congress. We would have avoided this, had 
it been feasible to do so. We were faced, 
however, with the fact that all of these 
cases were ready for submission to the Con- 
gress by the end of the summer or the early 
fall. This meant that to prevent disruptions 
in planned production and delivery sched- 
ules, to meet the desires of nations anxious 
to avoid delays in the receipt of equipment 
arid services, and to prevent inflation from 
raising the cost of the items involved, these 
cases should be submitted as soon as possi- 
ble. We were also aware, however, of your 
strong desire to have 30 days while the Con- 
gress is in session to review such cases and 
of the intention of Congress to recess in 
early October. 

To delay these submissions until January 
would, it was clear, have resulted in a 
delay of at least five months in each case, 
and perhaps longer, with consequent harm- 
ful effects to the programs and to our rela- 
tions with the recipient nations. It would 
also have meant that the new Congress 
would have been faced with a problem of 
even greater magnitude in the early months 
of next year if it had to deal with almost a 
half year's backlog of sales in addition to 
the continuing flow of new sales requests. 



For the countries involved, it would have 
simply meant further significant delay, in- 
creased costs, and possibly disrupted pro- 
duction schedules. 

In conclusion, let me again stress that we 
take very seriously the obligation we have 
to consult with Congress on our sales of 
military equipment abroad. To the extent 
we can, we are ready to provide you with 
the information you need to further your 
deliberations. I shall be pleased now to at- 
tempt to answer your questions and to re- 
ceive your comments. 



U.S. Calls for Equitable Resolution 
of Law of the Sea Issues 

Follotving is a statement by Secretary Kis- 
singer issued on September 17 upon the com- 
pletion of the fourth substantive session of 
the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of 
the Sea. 

Press release 446 dated September 17 

The law of the sea negotiations have 
just ended their current session in New York 
on September 17. The work they have 
undertaken is among the most important, 
complex, and difficult of any negotiations in 
this century. The delegations are attempt- 
ing to establish a legal regime for nearly 
three-quarters of the surface of the globe. 
With some 150 nations participating, each 
seeking to protect its interests, it is not 
surprising that progress has been slow, 
given the diversity of views represented. 
However, significant progress has been 
made since the first substantive session in 
1974. 

The present revised single negotiating 
text represents a consensus on a large 
number of issues before the conference. 
This text has been maintained in this ses- 
sion as the basis for negotiations. A broad 
consensus already exists in certain key 
areas, including a 12-mile territorial sea, 
establishing coastal state resource and 
other rights in a 200-mile economic zone, 



»w 



October 11, 1976 



451 



protecting navigational rights, and marine 
pollution. However, the United States be- 
lieves the present text remains imperfect 
and requires further changes in a certain 
number of key areas, such as: 

— A regime for mining deep seabed 
minerals. 

— The nature of the economic zone. 

— The provisions for marine scientific re- 
search in the economic zone. 

— The articles dealing with the exploita- 
tion of resources in the continental margin 
beyond 200 miles. 

— The rights of landlocked and geo- 
graphically disadvantaged states in the 
economic zone. 

During meetings between myself and 
certain other delegations September 1-2, 
the United States put forward important 
new ideas on a number of key topics still 
at issue. With respect to deep seabed min- 
ing we proposed a package approach 
which would include assured access in all 
its aspects to deep seabed mining sites by 
all nations and their citizens along with a 
financing arrangement to enable the pro- 
posed Enterprise (the independent operat- 
ing arm of the International Seabed Au- 
thority) to get into business. As part of 
that package we further proposed that 
there could be a review, in 25 years per- 
haps, to determine if the provisions of the 
treaty regarding the system of seabed ex- 
ploitation were working adequately. This 
was a significant move which generated 
considerable interest which we believe can 
be transformed at the next session into 
specific treaty language. 

A number of delegations, representing 
all concerned groups, have expressed to us 
their belief that our package proposal rep- 
resented a constructive contribution to the 
negotiations. This reaction is encouraging, 
and we intend in this same spirit to follow 
up this initiative both during the period 
between sessions and at the next session. 
On the other hand, some delegations chose 
tactics of confrontation. Such tactics can- 
not work and will inevitably lead to dead- 
lock and unilateral action. 



452 



With respect to the issues in Committee 
II of the conference dealing with naviga- 
tion and the nature of the economic zone, 
the United States continues to believe that 
a satisfactory solution is within reach. While 
specific language on the nature of the 
proposed economic zone has not yet been 
agreed, several promising ideas have been 
considered. We believe that a solution can 
be found which will provide for both the 
legitimate interests of the coastal states in 
protecting their resource and other inter- 
ests and the high seas freedoms of the 
international community in the economic 
zone. These provisions are important in 
maintaining global security and supporting 
our allies in this dangerous age. 

In Committee III the United States is 
seeking protection of the marine environ- 
ment and preservation of the right to con- 
duct marine scientific research. The present 
text already contains important provisions 
on ocean pollution which we seek to 
strengthen. With respect to marine scien- 
tific research in the economic zone, we 
have proposed a compromise which will 
give the coastal states the right to control 
marine scientific research directly related 
to resource exploitation but which will in- 
sure the right to conduct other forms o] 
marine scientific research which benefit al 
mankind. 

In order for an overall package settle- 
ment to be viable, the treaty must contair 
provisions for comprehensive, obligatory 
and binding third-party dispute settlement 
This session has made considerable prog- 
ress toward that goal. 

We believe that equitable resolution o1 
these and other key issues in these negotia- 
tions can be found. Unless this is the case 
various governments may conclude agree- 
ment is not possible, resulting in unilatera 
action which can lead to conflict over the 
uses of ocean space. 

The United States has a major interesl 
as a global power in preventing such con- 
flict and thus will continue to seek overal 
solutions acceptable to all groups of coun- 
tries. In so doing, however, we will con- 
tinue vigorously to safeguard essentia 

Department of State Bulletir 



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V. 



American interests. We will work coopera- 
tively with other nations, but we expect a 
reciprocal attitude of good will and reason- 
ableness. There are limits beyond which 
the United States will not go, and we are 
close to such limits now. 

We must now move toward businesslike 
negotiations and toward a recognition that 
the alternative to a treaty would serve no 
national or international community inter- 
est. I continue to believe that a law of 
the sea convention can be achieved. The 
United States will seek to build on the 
progress made to date and will continue its 
intensive efforts to achieve a treaty. A suc- 
cessful outcome will bring major benefits 
to this nation and help shape a more 
peaceful and prosperous international 
community. 



Policy of Refusal To Negotiate 
With Terrorists Reiterated 

Following is a statement read to news cor- 
respondents on September 15 by Frederick Z. 
'Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations. 

I would like to state categorically and 
for the record that the policy which in- 
jvolves a refusal on the part of the U.S. 
[Government to negotiate with terrorists, 
|to comply with monetary or in-kind ran- 
som demands, or to accede to any terrorist 
demands has not changed and will not 
change. 



The maintenance of this no-negotiations, 
no-concessions policy is based on our firm 
belief that future incidents can be deterred 
only when it is widely understood and rec- 
ognized that such acts cannot succeed and 
will not further the cause of the individual 
terrorist or international terrorist organiza- 
tion. 

American Ambassadors are, and for some 
time have been, authorized to demand the 
well-being of hostages and request their 
unconditional release on humanitarian 
grounds. American Ambassadors are not, 
and never have been, authorized to make 
concessions of any kind. Ambassador [to 
France Kenneth] Rush operated in the full 
cognizance of this policy [during the Sep- 
tember 10-12 hijacking to Paris of a TWA 
New York-Chicago flight] and in no way 
violated those standard instructions. 

This may be the most difficult of policies 
to follow and in any individual incident 
may require difficult decisions. However, as 
Secretary Kissinger stated in Orlando last 
September, ". . . our general position has 
been that we will not negotiate, as a gov- 
ernment,, with kidnapers of Americans be- 
cause there are so many Americans in so 
many parts of the world . . . that it 
would be impossible to protect them all 
unless the kidnapers can gain no benefit 
from such acts." ' 



1 For remarks by Secretary Kissinger and ques- 
tions and answers before the Southern Governors 
Conference at Orlando, Fla., on Sept. 16, 1975, see 
Bulletin of Oct. 6, 1975, p. 516. 



> 



ctober 11, 1976 



453 



Department Discusses Policies in the Nuclear Field 
With Respect to the Republic of China 



Following is a statement by Arthur W. 
Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted to the 
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International 
Organizations, and Security Agreements of 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on September 22. 1 

It is my honor to appear before this dis- 
tinguished committee and to testify con- 
cerning our policies in the nuclear field 
with respect to Taiwan. 

The Administration is deeply committed 
to preventing the further proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. In recent years, great ef- 
fort has been devoted to restricting the 
spread of national uranium enrichment and 
spent fuel reprocessing facilities. I believe 
we have made significant progress in these 
areas; we are determined to do more. 

Our nuclear policies with respect to the 
Republic of China combine cooperation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with 
determined vigilance against the possibility 
of potential nuclear proliferation. The main 
elements of our policy are: 

— To cooperate with the Republic of 
China's plans to meet a growing portion of 
its electric power needs from nuclear re- 
actors; 

— To cooperate in those areas of peace- 
ful nuclear research and training for which 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



the Republic of China has a legitimate 
need; 

— To insure that the Republic of China 
abides by its policy not to develop nuclear 
weapons; and 

— To insure that the Republic of China 
does not obtain a national reprocessing or 
enrichment capability. 

In many respects, the issues we confront 
and the policies we are pursuing in the nu- 
clear field with the Republic of China are 
similar to those we face in other areas of 
the world. However, our nuclear relations 
with Taiwan are unique in other respects. 

First, we are, in a practical sense, Tai- 
wan's only source of reactors and enriched 
uranium fuel for its nuclear power pro- 
gram. This reduces the problems of coordi- 
nation with other suppliers and increases 
Taiwan's dependence on a cooperative U.S. 
attitude in order to maintain its nuclear 
power program. 

Second, our nuclear policies in the Re- 
public of China must be determined within 
the context of our overall China policy. 
They must be compatible with our commit- 
ment to normalize our relations with the 
People's Republic of China and with our 
interest in encouraging a peaceful solution 
of the Taiwan problem. 

For these reasons, our nuclear policies 
with respect to Taiwan are formulated 
with great care and circumspection. 

Since the late 1960's, the Republic of 
China has been planning to meet an in- 
creasing portion of its energy requirements 
from nuclear power. The Republic of China 



tf< 



454 



Department of State Bulletin - 



has industrialized rapidly over the past 
decade and expects this trend to continue. 
Its energy needs have grown proportion- 
ately. Domestic energy sources, largely 
hydroelectric, meet only a fraction of Tai- 
wan's needs. As the Republic of China's 
efforts to develop offshore oil have yet to 
bear fruit, the Republic expects to remain 
totally dependent for the foreseeable fu- 
ture on imports for its growing fossil-fuel 
needs. Consequently, the Republic of China 
is convinced that diversification into nu- 
clear power is essential to its continued eco- 
nomic growth; the energy crisis in 1973 
reinforced their belief in the correctness of 
this decision. 

There are presently four nuclear gener- 
ating units under construction on Taiwan; 
two others are in the planning stage. The 
first nuclear generating unit is scheduled to 
begin operation next year. These four gen- 
erating units will provide approximately a 
third of total projected electric generating 
capacity when they become operational. 
When all six are completed in the mid- 
1980's, nuclear power will provide 45 per- 
cent of the island's electric generating ca- 
pacity. The Republic of China is aware that 
this program is crucial to its continued eco- 
nomic vitality. Moreover, it will be invest- 
ing several billion dollars in this program, 
a sizable stake in terms of Taiwan's econ- 
omy. The nuclear power plants and the 
low enriched uranium to fuel them are all 
being supplied by American companies. 

In addition to its nuclear power program, 
the Republic of China has been conducting 
a modest program in nuclear research since 
the late 1950's. This program began at 
Tsinghua University, which has a small re- 
search reactor supplied by the United 
States. In the mid-1960's the government 
intensified its research program and estab- 
lished a government agency, the Institute 
for Nuclear Energy Research (INER), for 
this purpose. INER has developed plans for 
research into all aspects of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. INER has an operational fuel-fabri- 



cation plant and a Canadian-supplied 40- 
megawatt research reactor. The Institute 
has been constructing a small reprocessing 
laboratory since 1969, but this laboratory is 
not yet operational. 

U.S. involvement in Taiwan's nuclear 
power and research programs is governed 
by the terms of the U.S. -Republic of China 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil 
Uses of Atomic Energy. This agreement re- 
stricts our nuclear cooperation to peaceful 
purposes, provides for the application 
of IAEA [International Atomic Energy 
Agency] safeguards and gives the United 
States a veto over the reprocessing of 
U.S. -supplied fuel. All U.S. -supplied facili- 
ties and materials are under IAEA safe- 
guards and have been periodically in- 
spected by the IAEA, most recently in July 
of this year. 

Over the years the Administration has 
restricted U.S. cooperation to those areas 
where we believe that Taiwan has legiti- 
mate research and training requirements 
and which do not endanger our nonprolif- 
eration objectives. Despite the interest of 
Republic of China scientists in all aspects 
of the nuclear fuel cycle, we have not ex- 
tended such cooperation to reprocessing 
and, in fact, have made clear our deter- 
mined opposition to such activities. We do 
not believe that Taiwan's nuclear power 
program provides an economic justification 
for a national enrichment or reprocessing 
program. We have made clear that any 
attempt by the Republic of China to de- 
velop such programs will seriously jeop- 
ardize our cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy. 

The Republic of China has enunciated 
a consistent policy with respect to nuclear 
weapons and nonproliferation. The main 
elements of its policy are that: 

— The Republic of China has been a 
party to the Nonproliferation Treaty since 
its inception and will abide by its treaty 
obligations. 



October 11, 1976 



455 



— The Republic of China has no inten- 
tion to develop nuclear weapons. 

— All nuclear facilities in the Republic 
of China are for peaceful purposes. 

— All nuclear facilities in the Republic 
of China arc subject to IAEA safeguards. 
The IAEA's inspections have not revealed 
any irregularities. 

Premier Chiang Ching-kuo publicly re- 
iterated this policy last week following a 
meeting of his Cabinet. In doing so the 
Premier publicly stated for the first time 
that the Republic of China does not plan 
to acquire a facility for reprocessing spent 
nuclear fuel. We welcome this commitment. 

Over the past few years American offi- 
cials have made clear to the Republic of 
China this Administration's determined op- 
position to any activities which would cast 
doubt on its commitment to nonprolifera- 
tion. This position was again conveyed to 
the Republic of China early this month and 
resulted in assurances to us by the Premier 
similar to his public ones of last week. 
These have been subsequently confirmed in 
a note to us by the Republic of China stat- 
ing that: 

The Government of the Republic of China has no 
intention whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons, or 
a nuclear explosive device, or to engage in any activ- 
ities related to reprocessing purposes. 

We are pleased with this forthcoming 
position, which should eliminate any ambi- 
guities concerning nuclear activities on Tai- 
wan. This development is continuing evi- 
dence of the seriousness which we attach 
to preventing the spread of sensitive nu- 
clear facilities. I can assure you, Mr. Chair- 
man, that the Republic of China is fully 
aware : 

— That the United States is opposed to 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear explosive devices; 

— That the United States is opposed to 
the spread of national reprocessing facili- 
ties;, and 

— That actions by the Republic of China 
contrary to these policies would fundamen- 
tally jeopardize continued U.S. cooperation 



456 



with the Republic in the peaceful use of 
atomic energy as well as other important 
relationships. 

I can also assure you, Mr. Chairman, that 
the Republic of China is fully cognizant of 
section 305 of the International Security 
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 
1976, which denies economic and military 
assistance to countries which import un- 
safeguarded national reprocessing facili- 
ties. 

Our approaches to the Republic of China 
on nonproliferation have been supple- 
mented by bilateral consultations which we 
have undertaken this year and previously 
with the governments of countries which 
are potential suppliers of nuclear equip- 
ment to Taiwan. These consultations have 
been designed to insure that the policies of 
various suppliers are compatible. The re- 
sponses from other governments have been 
favorable. 

The Republic of China, in common with 
an increasing number of other nonnuclear 
states, has the economic and scientific base 
from which to develop nuclear weapons or 
a nuclear explosive device, should they 
choose to do so and if they were in a posi- 
tion to procure or produce the necessary 
quantities of weapons-grade fissionable ma- 
terials. Their declared national policy is 
not to acquire nuclear weapons or explo- 
sive devices nor to develop the technology 
which would enable them to produce ma- 
terials required to accomplish this. I cannot 
overestimate the seriousness with which 
the U.S. Government would view any devi- 
ation from this declared policy by the Re- 
public of China. 

I can assure you that we follow every as- 
pect of Taiwan's nuclear program with 
the utmost diligence. Our contacts with 
Taiwan in the nuclear field have evolved 
over a period of years, and they will con- 
tinue to do so in the future. Our coopera- 
tion in peaceful uses has been mutually 
beneficial. Our nonproliferation objectives 
have been maintained, and their continued 
maintenance will be an essential aspect of 
our relationship with the Republic of China. 

Department of State Bulletin 



Department Testifies on Question 
of Human Rights in North Korea 

Following is a statement by Oscar V. Arm- 
strong, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted to the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations 
of the House Committee on International 
Relations on September 9. 1 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
before you to testify on the question of 
human rights in North Korea. 

Let me begin by saying that North 
Korea is perhaps the most closed society 
in the world. The press and other media 
are totally controlled by the party. Only 
a few carefully selected officials are per- 
mitted to leave the country, and then only 
on official business. Foreign visitors or 
diplomats in North Korea, including even 
those from other Communist countries, are 
prevented from having contacts with ordi- 
nary citizens, and their movements are 
carefully controlled. 

Virtually nothing is heard from this 
tightly closed society except what the 
totalitarian regime permits. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to obtain de- 
tailed information on civil practices or on 
the extent to which dissatisfaction or 
underground dissent exists within North 
Korea. Nevertheless, the silence which 
emanates to the outside world from other 
than official sources is in itself an indica- 
tion of the absence of basic human rights 
in North Korea. 

The situation can be briefly summarized. 
Although P'yongyang has promulgated for- 
mal guarantees for individual rights, North 
Korean theory and practice deny these 
same rights in the name of the collective 
good, and the regime has established an 
extensive network of sanctions to enforce 
that denial. 

North Korea's Constitution, adopted in 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. 



December 1972, includes the following 
guarantees: 

— "The right to elect and be elected" 
regardless of party affiliation and political 
views. 

— "Freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
association and demonstration." 

— Religious liberty. 

— "The inviolability of person and resi- 
dence and privacy of correspondence." 

— "Equal rights" in political, economic, 
and cultural life. 

At the same time, the Constitution also 
lists fundamental "duties" which provide a 
theoretical basis for denying individual 
rights. Thus, all citizens must: 

— "Strictly observe the laws of the state 
and the socialist norm of life and the so- 
cialist rules of conduct." 

— "Display a high degree of collectivist 
spirit." 

— "Voluntarily and honestly participate 
in work." 

— "Heighten their revolutionary vigi- 
lance against the maneuvers of the im- 
perialists and all hostile elements." 

Moreover, the regime clearly places more 
importance on respect for the authority of 
Kim Il-song, who is both head of govern- 
ment and head of the Korean Workers 
Party (the Korean Communist Party), than 
on respect for civil liberties. The Septem- 
ber 1974 issue of the authoritative party 
monthly Kulloja, for example, maintained : 

Adherence to the absolute principle of the execu- 
tion of the Leader's instructions means accepting the 
Leader's instructions as law and supreme command, 
and carrying them through to the end, with total 
devotion and self sacrifice, without complaints on 
grounds of trivial reasons, excuses or unfavorable 
conditions, and with such strong will, that even death 
does not relieve one of his duties to carry through 
the Leader's instructions to the end. 

I would like to mention some specific as- 
pects of what we would consider to be 
essential human rights. One is the electoral 
process. Elections are held for national and 
local assemblies, but the regime does not 
permit the election of candidates whose 



October 11, 1976 



457 



views differ from those of the leadership. 
Thus in national elections in 1967 and 
1972, the government announced 100 per- 
cent voter participation and 100 percent 
approval of the officially sanctioned slates. 

The regime has permitted a few members 
of two minor parties — the Korean Demo- 
cratic Party and the Chondokyo (or Young 
Friends) Party — to be elected to the Su- 
preme People's Assembly, which is the 
national legislature. But these parties exist 
in little more than name only. The Korean 
Workers Party has total control of the 
state and its operations. All key officials 
and the vast majority of the members of 
the Supreme People's Assembly belong to 
it. 

Despite the constitutional facade, free- 
dom of speech, press, assembly, association 
and demonstration, and religion simply do 
not exist. There is virtually no opportunity 
for open expression of views contradicting 
the official line. The regime controls and 
censors all information media, whose offi- 
cials come from the top ranks of trusted 
party cadre. 

In more private milieus, such as the fac- 
tory, school, or neighborhood, the expres- 
sion of dissenting views is discouraged by a 
pervasive police presence, the outlawing of 
unauthorized gatherings, preemption by 
the party of much of the citizen's free time, 
and the organization of residential areas 
into small citizens' units that spy upon their 
own members. Regimentation of the society 
is further implemented by required partici- 
pation in mass organizations. 

Religious groups have been severely re- 
stricted, and public worship may have been 
banned entirely. After 1945 the state con- 
fiscated most of the land belonging to 
Christian and Buddhist organizations. 
Pyongyang's main theological seminary 
became Kim Il-song University. Christians 
were discriminated against in jobs and the 
education of their children. 

Like free speech, privacy has political 
significance and is therefore restricted. In- 
formation obtained in earlier years showed 
that the political police, called the Political 



458 



Defense Bureau, had used wiretaps, mail 
intercepts, and searches without court au- 
thorization to uncover opposition. In addi- 
tion there were paid informants in every 
village and factory. Surveillance was used 
both to gather evidence and to intimidate. 
There is no evidence that these practices 
have changed. 

Freedom of movement exists neither in 
principle nor in practice. Travel within the 
country requires special food rations plus 
permission from local security authorities 
and one's employer. Changing jobs requires 
official permission. Transfers, therefore, 
are most commonly dictated by the desire 
of the state rather than the individual's 
wishes, and undesirable work assignments 
in remote areas are used as a form of pun- 
ishment. 

North Korean law defines espionage, 
sabotage, treason, and agitation against the 
state as political crimes. Other crimes are 
termed economic and moral. Evidently the 
more serious crimes are those in the "politi- 
cal" category. 

In the past, severe punishment has been 
meted out for these crimes. In 1952 and 
1953 several top officials apparently died 
as scapegoats for the unsatisfactory out- 
come of the Korean war. Ho Ka-I, a Vice 
Premier, "committed suicide" after he was 
criticized for malfeasance. Former South 
Korean Labor Party leader Pak Hon-yong, 
who went to P'yongyang during the Korean 
war, and 10 of his supporters among the 
top leaders of the Korean Workers Party 
were executed for allegedly plotting 
against the government. 

The country's most severe political crack- 
down occurred in 1958 and 1959. During 
what was called a "collective guidance 
campaign," virtually the entire population 
was screened and subjected to intense in- 
terrogation about their political loyalty. 
South Korean sources claim that several 
hundred people were killed, about 2,000 
imprisoned, 5,000 assigned to labor reform, 
and 8,000 families resettled. 

During this period, some criticism of 
Kim Il-song occurred. Kim responded by 

Department of State Bulletin 



purging the party of members of factions 
known to oppose him. Since then, he has 
taken pains to recruit leaders loyal to him, 
including a large number of relatives: 
Kim's uncle is a Vice President; Kim's 
younger brother is a Vice Premier; his wife 
is head of the Korean Women's Union; an 
in-law is Foreign Minister. Kim has also 
i apparently designated his son to succeed 
him as head of the party and government. 
Little is known about the current treat- 
ment of persons convicted of political 
crimes, although North Korean propa- 
; ganda suggests there is an official prefer- 
ence for "rehabilitating" them through in- 
I tensive political indoctrination. Indeed, the 
1 very effective prevention of open dissent 
may reduce the need for more severe forms 
i of punishment. Nevertheless, a North Ko- 
I rean defector in 1967 stated that the cen- 
tral authorities but not the local police used 
physical coercion and that army units were 
permitted to use electric shock or to beat 
I suspected enemy agents. 

I might note that the South Korean peo- 
ple have no illusions about individual free- 
doms in the North. Today in South Korea, 
I even the most ardent domestic critics main- 
tain that the nation must remain strong to 
prevent the imposition of communism by 
I the North. 

I will close by quoting two North Korean 

statements spanning 18 years. In 1956, as 

de-Stalinization started in the Soviet Union, 

I North Korean judicial officials began to dis- 

I cuss the need to end legal discrimination 

I based on class distinctions. These officials 

incurred the wrath of Kim, who responded 

: in 1958 with a purge of the legal profes- 

I sion. In April that year Kim appeared be- 

fore a convention of jurists and condemned 

i those who had advocated that "law should 

t be applied equally to everyone" and that 

)j "human rights" should be upheld. Kim as- 

s serted that on the contrary, law must be 

1 used as a weapon to safeguard the Social- 

i ist system and the dictatorship of the 

proletariat. 

In 1972 the regime adopted the consti- 
tution which included the guarantees I 



mentioned earlier. But the North Koreans 
continue to hold that the function of law is 
not to protect the individual but to insure 
his conformity to norms imposed by the 
party. Thus the government newspaper 
Minju Choson observed in March this year: 
"The law of our country serves to uproot 
outdated thoughts and conventions in the 
minds of our people, and to indoctrinate 
and transform them through legal sanc- 
tions . . (It) guarantees the task of dyeing 
the whole society one color with the revo- 
lutionary thought of the great leader by 
serving as a weapon of dictatorship to de- 
stroy all sorts of obstructive machinations 
by class enemies." 



United States Reaffirms Commitment 
to Integrity and Unity of Lebanon 

Department Statement ' 

The United States is convinced that the 
occasion of the installation of a new Presi- 
dent of Lebanon offers an opportunity 
which must not be lost to bring an end to 
the fighting and to begin rebuilding na- 
tional institutions. It will be essential for 
all parties in Lebanon to support and 
strengthen the authority of Lebanon's new 
President elected by legitimate processes 
so that all Lebanese may promptly begin 
their return to productive life. 

The violence and destruction in Lebanon 
have gone on far too long. The costs in 
human suffering have been far too high. 
It is clear that no one can gain from con- 
tinued fighting: countless more men, 
women, and children will lose lives, prop- 
erty, and hope for the future. It is a time 
for magnanimity, restraint, and compro- 
mise. 

The United States believes that a solu- 
tion can be found that will preserve the 
country's independence, territorial integ- 



' Read to news correspondents on Sept. 23 by Fred- 
erick Z. Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations; 
also issued as press release 464. 



October 11, 1976 



459 



rity, and national unity. Solutions based on 
the partition of Lebanon are invitations to 
further strife and instability. The states so 
created would not be viable and would in- 
vite external intervention. 

We continue to believe that the princi- 
ples for a political accommodation among 
the Lebanese parties enunciated last Jan- 
uary and February provide a basis for insti- 
tutions that will meet the needs of the Leb- 
anese people and nation. We hope that 
President Sarkis will be able to bring his 
countrymen to the roundtable talks he has 
proposed as soon as possible so that the 
process of reconciliation and rebuilding can 

begin. 

The major objective in negotiating a so- 
lution will be to preserve a united country, 
led by a central government which will 
assure security and opportunity for all indi- 
viduals and communities in the country. 
The principles proposed in January and 
February were designed to give practical 
political expression to the concept that 
there should be a partnership of equals in 
a reunited Lebanon. In our view, this calls 
for political, economic, and social adjust- 
ments that all Lebanese will perceive as 
fair and equitable. It presupposes that the 
government will have at its disposal secu- 
rity forces loyal to it which can restore 
confidence in the authority and ability of 
the government to maintain domestic order. 
And it will require that the Palestinians in 
Lebanon live in peace with their Lebanese 
hosts and neighbors without challenging 
the authority of a central Lebanese admin- 
istration. 

The governments of the area and the 
Arab League are in a position, each in its 
own way, to make constructive contribu- 
tions to a political solution of the conflict. 
Continuation of the fighting cannot serve 
their interests. Peace in the Middle East 
and international stability will be in jeop- 



ardy as long as the fighting continues. An 
end to the fighting in turn would create 
conditions more conducive to a resumption 
of the search for a negotiated settlement 
of the broader Middle East question which 
would take into account the concerns of 
the states of the area for their security and 
territorial integrity, as well as the legiti- 
mate interests of the Palestinian people. 

We are prepared to help to bring an end 
to the fighting in Lebanon and to achieve 
a political solution. The interests of the 
United States lie in alleviation of human 
suffering, in the restoration of unity and 
stability based on justice in Lebanon, and 
in the reduction of tension and the estab- 
lishment of peace among the nations of the 
Middle East. We will be prepared to sup- 
port or undertake any diplomatic initiative 
requested by the parties. 

We will continue our humanitarian pro- 
grams, which already amount to more than 
$10 million in hospital and other medical 
equipment and supplies and foodstuffs dis- 
tributed as fairly as possible on both sides 
of the lines. We will do this and more as 
necessary. We are considering ways of 
shipping substantial quantities of wheat 
under Public Law 480. 

We will also play our part, after a set- 
tlement is achieved, in helping President 
Sarkis and his government rebuild Leb- 
anese institutions and the Lebanese econ- 
omy. We have invited him to send a per- 
sonal envoy to Washington as soon as he 
considers it appropriate in order to discuss 
specific ways in which we can be helpful. 
We have sought from the Congress an ap- 
propriation of $20 million to begin the 
process. 

This is a time of opportunity and hope 
for a suffering people in an area already 
too long devastated by war. The United 
States shares the conviction that this op- 
portunity must not be lost. 



460 



Department of State Bulletin 



The U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), May-June 1976 



by Stanley D. Schiff » 



The United Nations Conference on Hu- 
man Settlements (Habitat) was held at 
Vancouver May 31-June 11. Habitat was 
the latest in a series of major U.N. confer- 
ences (the environment, population, food, 
and the role of women) which have di- 
rected world attention at significant as- 
pects of the planetary condition. 

The idea for this conference originated 
at the Stockholm Conference on the Hu- 
man Environment in 1972. Many of the de- 
veloping countries there believed that the 
concern of the industrialized countries with 
environmental pollution was remote from 
their own concerns about poverty and the 
manmade environment. The Stockholm 
meeting recommended that a Conference 
on Human Settlements be held. The 27th 
U.N. General Assembly endorsed the rec- 
ommendation in December 1972 and ac- 
cepted the invitation of the Canadian Gov- 
ernment to hold the conference in Van- 
couver, British Columbia. 

In its Resolution 3128 (XXVIII) , adopted 
on December 13, 1973, the U.N. General 
Assembly stated that the purpose of the 
conference would be: 



... to serve as a practical means to exchange in- 
formation about solutions to problems of human settle- 
ments against a broad background of environmental 
^ and other concerns which may lead to the formation 
of policies and actions by Governments and interna- 
tional organizations. 

The conference had other purposes, 
'robably the most important of these was 



1 Report prepared especially for the Bulletin. Mr. 
Schiff was Coordinator of U.S. Participation in the 
labitat Conference. 



|letir Dctober 11, 1976 



to alert governments, private citizens, and 
the international community to the con- 
spicuous lack of correlation between eco- 
nomic growth and the quality of life in hu- 
man settlements. This was not an argument 
against growth ; rather, it was an appeal 
for recognition that growth by itself is no 
guarantor of better living conditions. If 
quality and not just quantity was to be the 
guiding consideration, then priorities would 
have to be altered and thinking habits 
would have to be modified. That is a mes- 
sage Habitat aimed at imparting. 

Carla A. Hills, Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, headed the U.S. dele- 
gation, and Russell W. Peterson, Chairman 
of the Council on Environmental Quality, 
served as her alternate. In her statement to 
the conference on June 1, Secretary Hills 
said: 

Habitat is a creative challenge. Since it is certain 
that our often sterile — and too often rigid — thinking 
of the past will not serve the awesome needs of the 
future, this conference demands a radical change in 
our entire perception of human settlements. Above 
all, it calls for a long-range comprehensive approach 
to the problems and opportunities of human settle- 
ments rather than dealing separately and short range 
with each contributing factor. 

Recommendations for National Action 

A 56-nation preparatory committee had 
agreed that the conference would concen- 
trate its attention on three documents: a 
Declaration of Principles; Recommenda- 
tions for National Action ; and a Program 
of International Cooperation. Of the three, 
national action would be the centerpiece in- 



461 



asmuch as settlement problems are pri- 
marily national responsibilities. The role of 
the international community would be es- 
sentially supportive of national efforts. 

The framework for the national action 
recommendations comprised six major topics: 

Settlement Policies and Strategies 

Settlement Planning 

Institutions and Management 

Shelter, Infrastructure and Services 

Land 

Public Participation 

The 64 recommendations for national ac- 
tion, under these six headings, are cast in 
the form of general guidelines; they do not 
form a rigid blueprint for universal appli- 
cation. While the document as a whole em- 
phasizes the Third World's problems, much 
of the thinking incorporated in it is rele- 
vant to the industrialized countries. 

Together the recommendations consti- 
tute a powerful argument for changes in 
thinking which respect and do not deny 
complexity. That is almost revolutionary 
doctrine, since most governments are accus- 
tomed to dealing with such problems as 
industry location, housing, transportation, 
and water supply in isolation from each 
other. What the conference urges is a new 
approach which attempts to comprehend 
all of these elements — and more — in deal- 
ing with settlements. It also suggests that 
governments will have to alter priorities if 
improvements in the quality of life are to 
be more equitably distributed among re- 
gions within a country and among socio- 
economic groups. 

The basic thought underlying the na- 
tional action recommendations is summa- 
rized in the preamble to the section of the 
document relating to settlement policies 
and strategies : 

Human settlements of today embody the outcome 
of generations of ideas, decisions and physical invest- 
ment; it is not possible, therefore, to achieve radical 
modifications overnight. But population growth and 
rapid changes in the location of human activities pro- 
ceed at such a pace that, by the end of the century 
we shall have to build "another world on top of the 
present one". If properly directed, this formidable 



462 



task could mobilize untapped resources and be turned 
into a unique opportunity for changing our man- 
made environment: this is the challenge of human 
settlement strategies. 

Habitat added another dimension to the 
development process — the dimension of the 
use of space and of land, a dimension not 
well appreciated by economic policymak- 
ers and decisionmakers. Where industry 
and other economic activity are located has 
a significant influence on which settlements 
grow and which stagnate or decline. What 
Habitat suggests to governments is that 
they seek consciously to consider the spa- 
tial consequences of their investment de- 
cisions. 

But the document is as much concerned 
with social, economic, and environmental 
factors as it is with the physical. Its recom- 
mendations are laced with repeated refer- 
ences to measures designed to safeguard 
against further environmental degradation. 
Woven into the recommendations is recog- 
nition of the need to include women in the 
planning and decisionmaking that affect 
the quality of their lives. Compassion for 
the poorest elements in society and for 
children, the elderly, and the handicapped 
is writ large in the documents. 

There are two other ideas incorporated 
in the recommendations that are notable. 
The first is the acceptance of the important 
role which regional and local governments 
have to play in the formulation and execu- 
tion of human settlements policy. It is ar 
admission that the problems are too com- 
plex to be dealt with effectively by a cen- 
tral government acting alone. Secondly, th( 
conference put a rather surprising degree 
of emphasis on the necessity for govern- 
ments to consult their publics actively ir 
the formulation and implementation of hu 
man settlements actions so that policj 
would be more responsive to their needs. 



International Cooperation 

The conference had a twofold task in th< 
area of international cooperation: to de 
vise an institutional arrangement withii 



Department of State Bulletii 



% 






the United Nations for dealing with human 
settlements activities and to recommend 
specific programs of activity. 

Within the U.N. system, virtually every 
organ and agency carries on activities 
which might come under the heading of 
| human settlements. However, two organi- 
zations have responsibilities which are most 
clearly associated with the major subject- 
jarea interests identified by the preparatory 
committee. They are the Center for Hous- 
ing, Building and Planning, which comes 
under the U.N.'s Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs and is located in New 
York, and the U.N. Foundation for Habitat 
and Human Settlements, which is attached 
to the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) 
and is located in Nairobi. 

Within the preparatory committee a 
strong consensus had developed on two 
(basic points: that no new and separate or- 
ganization to deal with human settlements 
should be created and that the Center and 
the Foundation should be consolidated to 
form the secretariat of a human settle- 
ments unit. Where views divided was on 
the question of whether the consolidated 
unit should be responsible to the Depart- 
ment of Economic and Social Affairs or to 
UNEP and whether it should be located in 
New York, Nairobi, or possibly elsewhere. 
The conference reached a consensus on 
an organizational arrangement with the 
following main features: 

— At the global level, a consolidated sec- 
retariat comprised primarily of the staffs 
of the Center for Housing, Building and 
Planning and the U.N. Foundation for Hab- 
itat and Human Settlements and an inter- 
governmental body of no more than 58 
members which would provide policy guid- 
ance to that secretariat. 

— At the regional level, a small human 
settlements secretariat unit in each of the 
regional economic commissions and an in- 
:ergovernmental committee. 

The organization would serve as a focal 
3oint within the United Nations for human 
settlements activities. The framework for 



its future programs is based on the six topics 
which formed the framework for the na- 
tional action recommendations. The motive 
in using an identical framework was to 
forge a direct link between national action 
and international cooperation. Using those 
six topics as a framework, the organization 
will identify selective priorities in its future 
activites based on the needs and problems 
of the regions and countries within the 
regions. 

The document also reflects a concern 
that was broadly shared; namely, the need 
for better coordination within the U.N. sys- 
tem as. a whole and* the maintenance of 
close links with the World Bank and the 
U.N. Development Program (UNDP). In 
addition, the conference recommended that 
at both global and regional levels coopera- 
tion should be sought with universities, re- 
search and scientific institutes, and non- 
governmental organizations and voluntary 
organizations. 

Left in optional form in the document for 
General Assembly decision were the ques- 
tions about organizational link and loca- 
tion. The basic options were those de- 
scribed above. They were the ones which 
received the greatest attention in Vancou- 
ver; and among those delegations which 
expressed a preference, a very clear ma- 
jority favored integrating the human set- 
tlements unit with the Department of Eco- 
nomic and Social Affairs and locating it in 
New York. 

This was the position expressed by the 
U.S. delegation. Among the reasons cited 
by the United States in support of this view 
were : 

— The need for closer integration of hu- 
man settlements policy with economic and 
social policy at the national level has its 
parallel at the international level. 

— The kinds of international programs 
that will be needed will have an essentially 
developmental and not environmental char- 
acter. 

— Most of the funds that will be required 
for activities in these areas are going to 
have to come from the UNDP and interna- 



5ctober 11, 1976 



463 



tional financial institutions. That will re- 
quire close working relations with the 
UNDP and the World Bank. 

— If the Human Settlements Foundation 
is to perform the kind of financial function 
that was foreseen for it, it should be close 
to a major capital market. 

However, the majority of delegations did 
not indicate any preference at all, and it 
was this which made it impossible to envis- 
age getting a final recommendation in Van- 
couver, whether by consensus or vote. 
Thus, the resolution of these questions was 
left up to the General Assembly. 

The Declaration of Principles 

Intended as the inspirational message 
from the conference, the Declaration of 
Principles was also the most political of the 
documents in Vancouver. 

The process of shaping the draft decla- 
ration during the preparatory phase had 
been largely free of contentious political 
issues. The preparatory committee mem- 
bership, dominated by urban managers, 
planners, and environmentalists, had devel- 
oped an esprit de corps which took it be- 
yond cooperativeness to cordiality. This 
was reflected in the suggestion made by one 
delegate, to which no one took exception, 
that it might be better to postpone the con- 
ference and just allow the committee to 
continue its existence indefinitely. 

Psychologically, the conference was to- 
tally unprepared for the political assault 
which occurred in Vancouver. Long-unre- 
solved political issues, many relating to the 
Palestinian problem, were cast into human 
settlements terms and injected into the dis- 
cussion not only of the Declaration of Prin- 
ciples but of the Recommendations for Na- 
tional Action as well. The repugnant Zion- 
ism-racism resolution adopted by a deeply 
divided U.N. General Assembly in Novem- 
ber 1975 was resurrected. References to the 
New International Economic Order and the 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties in 
the declaration multiplied and were pro- 
posed in forms which would have required 



464 



countries which opposed these resolutions 
when they were debated in the U.N. Gen- 
eral Assembly to modify their positions 
substantially. 

At a quite early stage in the considera- 
tion of the declaration, the Group of 77 
produced a revision of the draft prepared 
by the Secretariat which was so substantial 
that it represented an almost new draft. A 
working group identified 13 paragraphs in 
that document as controversial. Negotia- 
tions were to concentrate on those issues. 
The negotiations never materialized, be- 
cause the Group of 77 made acceptance of 
the Zionism-racism resolution a precondi- 
tion to their willingness to negotiate on the 
other 12 disputed provisions. This offer was 
rejected. Consequently, it was decided to 
forgo committee discussion of the document 
and instead refer it directly to the plenary. 

In plenary, a U.S. procedural proposal 
that the document be voted on as a whole 
(rather than paragraph by paragraph) was 
accepted. 

The final vote on the declaration was 
89-15, with 10 abstentions. The United 
States was among those countries which 
voted against adoption. In a statement fol- 
lowing the vote, the U.S. delegation said: 

... we are sorely disappointed that so much time 
and effort has been expended in discussions of prob- 
lems of a political nature, essentially extraneous to 
the substantive work of this conference. There is 
good reason to believe that public esteem for the 
United Nations will be seriously impaired by this 
record. Continuation of this type of tactic does not 
bode well for my country's support and participation 
in future U.N. conferences concerned with global 
problems demanding international attention. Now, 
Mr. President, does it contribute to cooperation and 
progress at conferences such as these to have the 
rules of procedure deliberately subverted to the politi- 
cal objectives of a numerical majority? 

The references in the U.S. statement to 
the subversion of rules of procedure related 
to parliamentary maneuvering which oc- 
curred during plenary consideration of the 
committee report and particularly to a 
Cuban amendment which "condemned set- 
tlement planning and implementation for 
the purpose of prolonging and consolidat- 
ing occupation and subjugation in territo- 






Department of State Bulletin 



I 



:l 






ries and lands acquired through coercion 
and intimidation" as violations of U.N. 
principles and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 

The Pakistan delegation proposed that 
the conference rules of procedure be 
changed so that amendments on substantive 
matters could be approved by a simple ma- 
jority rather than a two-thirds vote. The 
conference President stated that the Pak- 
istani proposal was itself a substantive one 
and therefore required a two-thirds major- 
ity. When he asked the conference to sup- 
port his view, he was overruled by a vote 
of 59-30 (U.S.), with 6 abstentions. Follow- 
ing that, the plenary went on to approve 
the Cuban amendment by a vote of 77-8 
(U.S.), with 20 abstentions. 

Achievements of the Conference 

At its first meeting in January 1975, the 
(Habitat preparatory committee settled on 
an assumption which subsequently shaped 
the structure and content of the conference. 
That was that human settlements problems 
are essentially national rather than inter- 
national and that national (and local) gov- 
ernments bear the primary responsibility 
for dealing with them. 

Those problems are most acute in the 
developing world, where rapid population 
growth, poverty, and underdevelopment 
give them a dimension unknown in the in- 
dustrialized countries. 

Among its larger purposes, Habitat was 
intended to bring world attention to bear 
pn this complex of problems and to encour- 
age governments to undertake commit- 
ments to respond to them. But Habitat also 
sought to alter the nature of the response. 
[t aimed at persuading governments (and 
;heir publics) to develop approaches which 
would integrate human settlements policy 
>vith social and economic policy. It aimed 
it stimulating governments to consider 
carefully the interrelationships among im- 
Dortant sectors of human settlements activ- 
ty (housing, transportation, for example) 
•ather than ignoring them. It sought to 



stress the need for governments to modify 
domestic policies and priorities so as to give 
the poor access to basic shelter and serv- 
ices. In brief, it had a strong conceptual 
thrust. 

The primacy assigned to national action 
implied that the role of the international 
community would be a somewhat limited 
one. Consequently, the international as- 
pects of the conference would be of sub- 
ordinate importance. It is against this 
general background that the accomplish- 
ments of the conference need to be 
assessed. 

Perhaps the most impressive achieve- 
ment of Vancouver was the ability of over 
130 nations, diverse in so many ways, to 
produce, in the Recommendations for Na- 
tional Action, a meaningful document 
centered on domestic political and eco- 
nomic issues and to adopt it by consensus. 

This was significant in several respects. 
First, it indicates quite clearly that, politi- 
cally, it is possible for a large group of 
countries to discuss serious substantive 
problems in a serious way and arrive at a 
mutually satisfactory result despite the 
many obvious differences among them. 

Secondly, the document — while hardly 
perfect — is a high-quality one. It embodies 
the conceptual thrust the conference 
aimed at. 

Since it had to accommodate diversity, it 
could not be — and is not — a rigid blueprint 
for all governments to follow. The recom- 
mendations represent a set of guidelines 
which governments can draw on as they 
deem fit. But they are comprehensive in 
scope, reflect a concern and compassion for 
the poor, and are democratic in spirit. And, 
most importantly, they can be of real value, 
especially to developing countries. 

Habitat produced a large measure of 
agreement on the details of an institutional 
arrangement for international action, thus 
laying the groundwork for a decision by 
the U.N. General Assembly at its fall 1976 
session. Those details establish a broad 
framework within which specific programs 
of assistance can be designed. That frame- 



October 11, 1976 



465 



work provides for a close link between 
national action and future international 
programs. 

Habitat brought modern communications 
technology into major international con- 
ferences for the first time. Approximately 
235 films were submitted by governments 
for use at the conference. 

One of Habitat's objectives was to 
make possible a global exchange of experi- 
ences. Films were selected as the vehicle 
for communicating to a global audience the 
lessons learned from national experience — 
the successes and the failures in human 
settlements activities. It was an invitation to 
candor which some accepted and others — 
blinded by ideology to failure — did not. 
Nevertheless, there were some insightful 
films produced and shown. 

Provided the General Assembly approves 
the recommendations made by the confer- 
ence, the audiovisual program will be con- 
tinued. Some of the films will be valuable 
training material. 

Each of the previous major U.N. confer- 
ences — environment, population, food, and 
the role of women — examined the plane- 
tary condition from a different perspec- 
tive. Each was able to build upon the gains 
achieved in previous conferences and to 
extend man's recognition and understand- 
ing of global interdependence in new 
directions. 

The Habitat national action recommen- 
dations reflect a profound concern for the 
safeguarding of the natural environment. 
They reiterate the necessity of giving 
women opportunity to participate fully and 
actively in the processes which determine 
the quality of life in human settlements. 
Although the national action paper does 
not include the more specific provisions on 
family planning that the United States and 
a number of other countries wanted — due 
to inadvertence and misunderstanding — 
there is no doubt that the significance of 
rapid population growth to human settle- 
ments problems is fully appreciated by 
most countries. 

Habitat in these areas represented con- 



solidation. But it broke new ground of its 
own — in altering perceptions of domestic 
problems and their priorities and in gain- 
ing acceptance of the fundamental princi- 
ple that people should be given the oppor- 
tunity to participate in decisions which 
affect the quality of their lives. 



Current Treaty Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. 1 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
September 21. 1976. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers (CSC), i 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet So- 
cialist Republic," Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Re- 
public, 2 September 6, 1976. 
Enters into force: September 6. 1977. 3 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 

Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. 

Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 

Signature and acceptance : Comoros, September 

21, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Israel. September 8, 1976. 

Scientific Cooperation 

Memorandum of understanding amending the memo- 
randum of understanding of July 21 and 22, 1976, 
for a transatlantic balloon program. Opened for 
signature at Washington August 9, 1976. Entered 
into force August 13, 1976. 

Space 

Convention on registration of objects launched into 
outer space. Opened for signature at New York 
January 14, 1975. 
Ratification deposited: United States, September 

15, 1976. 
Entered into force: September 15, 1976. 



' Not in force. 

2 With statement. 

;> Not for the United States. 



466 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 
v. 



foi 



Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: United Kingdom, September 
23, 1976/ 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: United Kingdom, September 
23, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Afghanistan 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, 
with minutes of understanding. Signed at Kabul 
August 8, 1976. Entered into force August 8, 1976. 

Australia 

Agreement between the United States and Australia 
on procedures for mutual assistance in administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington 
September 13, 1976. Entered into force September 
13, 1976. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports 
from Costa Rica during calendar year 1976. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at San Jose April 23 
and August 6, 1976. Entered into force August 6, 
1976. 

Haiti 

Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 
and 23, 1976 relating to trade in cotton, wool, and 
man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Washington Septem- 
ber 14, 1976. Entered into force September 14, 1976. 

Indonesia 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976 (TIAS 
8308). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta 
September 8 and 11, 1976. Entered into force Sep- 
tember 11, 1976. 



4 Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Bailiwick of Guernsey, 
Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, 
Saint Helena and Dependencies and Tuvalu. 



Nepal 

Agreement relating to the improvement of production 
technology for foodgrain crops and cropping sys- 
tems, with annexes. Signed at Kathmandu June 30, 
1976. Entered into force June 30, 1976. 

Spain 

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supple- 
mentary agreements and related notes. Signed at 
Madrid January 24, 1976. 

Ratifications exchanged: September 21, 1976. 
Entered into force: September 21, 1976. 



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Air Transport Services. Agreement with Ecuador 
supplementing the agreement of January 8, 1947, as 
amended. TIAS 8205. 28 pp. 45*. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
8205). 

International Wheat Agreement, 1971 — Modification 
and Extension of Wheat Trade Convention and Food 
Aid Convention. Protocols with other governments. 
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Extradition. Treaty with Australia. TIAS 8234. 18 
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Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 
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Extradition. Treaty with Canada. TIAS 8237. 39 pp. 
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Her' 



October 11, 1976 



467 



International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. 
Protocol with other governments amending article 
14(2) of the convention of September 12, 1964. TIAS 
8238. 9 pp. 35e\ (Cat. No. S9.10:8238). 

Relations. Memorandum of understanding with Bra- 
zil. TIAS 8240. 7 pp. 35^. (Cat. No. S9.10:8240). 

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Nigeria. 
TIAS 8243. 5 pp. 35e\ (Cat. No. S9.10:8243). 

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Colombia. 
TIAS 8244. 5 pp. 35c\ (Cat. No. S9.10:8244). 

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with the Nether- 
lands. TIAS 8245. 5 pp. 35o\ (Cat. No. S9.10:8245). 



Atomic Energy — Research Participation and Techni- 
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6 pp. 35e\ (Cat. No. S9.10:8246). 

Remote Sensing From Satellites and Aircraft. Agree- 
ment with Canada amending and extending the agree- 
ment of May 14, 1971. TIAS 8247. 8 pp. 35e\ (Cat. 
No. S9.10:8247). 

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Mapping, 
Charting and Geodesy. Memorandum with Mexico. 
TIAS 8248. 4 pp. 35c\ (Cat. No. S9.10:8248). 

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Austria 
amending the interim agreement of November 6, 1973. 
TIAS 8250. 3 pp. 35c*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8250). 



No. 



Date 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Kissinger: arrival, Lusaka. 

Kissinger: departure, Lusaka. 

U.S.-Brazil joint groups on scientific 
and technological cooperation and 
on energy, Brasilia, Sept. 16-17. 

Nguza, Kissinger: arrival, Kinshasa, 
Sept. 21. 

Advisory Committee on the Law of 
the Sea, Nov. 4-5. 

Kissinger: news conference, Kinshasa. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life at 
Sea, working group on radiocom- 
munications, Oct. 21. 

U.S.-Canada discussions on Great 
Lakes levels. 

Ralph E. Becker sworn in as Ambas- 
sador to Honduras (biographic 
data). 

Osogo, Kissinger: arrival, Nairobi. 

Julius L. Katz sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Economic and Busi- 
ness Affairs (biographic data). 



^461 9/23 



|450 
t451 

t452 


9/20 
9/21 
9/21 


*'453 


9/22 


*454 


9/22 


t455 


9/22 
9/22 


*457 


9/22 


*458 


9/22 


*459 
*460 


9/22 
9/23 



Study group 5 of the U.S. National 
Committee of the International 
Telegraph and Telephone Consulta- 
tive Committee, Oct. 28. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advis- 
ory Committee, Boston. Oct. 14. 

Kissinger: interview by ORTF, Kin- 
shasa, Sept. 22. 

Statement on occasion of inaugura- 
tion of President Elias Sarkis of 
Lebanon. 

Kissinger: remarks. Nakuru, Kenya. 

Osogo, Kissinger: departure, Nairobi. 

Callaghan, Kissinger: remarks before 
meeting, London. 

Callaghan, Kissinger: news confer- 
ence following meeting, London. 

Kissinger: interview by Walter 
Cronkite via satellite. 

U.S. and Haiti amend textile agree- 
ment. 

Donald S. Lowitz and Monroe D. 
Donsker elected Chairman and Vice 
Chairman of Board of Foreign 
Scholarships (biographic data). 

Kissinger, Crosland: news conference, 
London. 

Kissinger: arrival, Andrews Air Force 
Base. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



*462 


9/23 


*463 


9/23 


464 


9/23 


*465 
*-466 
*467 


9/23 
9/23 
9/23 


•'•468 


9/23 


*469 


9/23 


*470 


9/23 


*471 


9/24 


t472 


9/24 


t473 


9/24 



468 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 11, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1946 



Arms Control and Disarmament. Department 
Discusses Policies in the Nuclear Field With 
Respect to the Republic of China (Hummel) 454 

Asia. Department Testifies on Proposed Mili- 
tary Sales to Foreign Governments (Habib) 447 

China. Department Discusses Policies in the 
Nuclear Field With Respect to the Republic 
of China (Hummel) 454 

Congress 

Department Discusses Policies in the Nuclear 
Field With Respect to the Republic of China 
(Hummel) 454 

Department Testifies on Proposed Military 

Sales to Foreign Governments (Habib) . . 447 

Department Testifies on Question of Human 
Rights in North Korea (Armstrong) . . . 457 

Developing Countries. U.S. Business and Gov- 
ernment in a World of Change (Robinson) . 441 

Economic Affairs 

The U.N. Conference on Human Settlements 
(Habitat), May-June 1976 (Schiff) .... 461 

U.S. Business and Government in a World of 
Change (Robinson) 441 

Energy. U.S. Business and Government in a 
World of Change (Robinson) 441 

Environment. The U.N. Conference on Human 
Settlements (Habitat), May-June 1976 
(Schiff) 461 

Human Rights. Department Testifies on Ques- 
tion of Human Rights in North Korea 
(Armstrong) 457 

Industrial Democracies. U.S. Business and Gov- 
ernment in a World of Change (Robinson) . 441 

Iran. Department Testifies on Proposed Mili- 
tary Sales to Foreign Governments (Habib) 447 



Israel. Department Testifies on Proposed Mili- 
tary Sales to Foreign Governments (Habib) 447 

Korea. Department Testifies on Question of 
Human Rights in North Korea (Armstrong) 457 

Law of the Sea 

U.S. Business and Government in a World of 
Change (Robinson) 441 

U.S. Calls for Equitable Resolution of Law of 
the Sea Issues (Kissinger) 451 

Lebanon. United States Reaffirms Commitment 
to Integrity and Unity of Lebanon (Depart- 
ment statement) 459 

Military Affairs. Department Testifies on Pro- 
posed Military Sales to Foreign Govern- 
ments (Habib) 447 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 467 

Saudi Arabia. Department Testifies on Pro- 
posed Military Sales to Foreign Govern- 
ments (Habib) 447 

Terrorism. Policy of Refusal To Negotiate 
With Terrorists Reiterated (Department 
statement) 453 

Treaty Information. Current Treaty Actions . 466 

United Nations. The U.N. Conference on 
Human Settlements (Habitat), May-June 
1976 (Schiff) 461 

Name Index 

Armstrong, Oscar V 457 

Habib, Philip C 447 

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr 454 

Kissinger, Secretary 451 

Robinson, Charles W 441 

Schiff, Stanley D 461 






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]/J: 





THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV • No. 1947 



October 18, 1976 



SOUTHEAST ASIA: U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICIES 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Hummel 469 

AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND COMMODITY ARRANGEMENTS 

Address by Assistant Secretary Katz 483 

DEPARTMENT SUMMARIZES PROGRAMS AND OBJECTIVES 
IN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL 

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robinson 489 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1947 
October 18, 1976 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

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Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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The Department of State BULLETIh 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau o 
Public Affairs, provides the public an 
interested agencies of the governmen 
with information on developments i 
the field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department an 
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The BULLETIN includes selecte 
press releases on foreign policy, issue 
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and the Secretary of State and otht 
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United States is or may become 
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Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and Policies 



Statement by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs l 



It is a pleasure to be with you today to 
discuss the situation in Southeast Asia and 
U.S. policy toward the area. 

I think it would be most useful first to 
look at the broad trends that seem to be at 
work in Southeast Asia, then to move on 
to consider our interests and policies in the 
region, and after that to mention regional 
cooperation, before talking briefly about 
individual countries in the area, including 
those of Indochina. 

First, I would like to review the broad 
;rends evident in the foreign and domestic 
policies of the non-Communist states of 
Southeast Asia since the fall of Saigon. 

These nations were greatly concerned 
hat events in Indochina might cause the 
United States to withdraw from the region 
and that Hanoi might move strongly to 
undermine its neighbors. These initial fears 
lave largely subsided as we have reassured 
these nations of our continued interest and 
commitment to the area. Our determination 
to continue to play a role in the area was 
ymbolized by visits of President Ford to 
Indonesia and the Philippines last Decem- 
er and Vice President Rockefeller to 
Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New 

ealand this spring. 

At the same time, the nations of the area 
lave modified their policies, often in direc- 



1 Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investi- 
ations of the House Committee on International 
delations on Sept. 28. The complete transcript of the 
learings will be published by the committee and will 
)e available from the Superintendent of Documents, 
J.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
E0402. 



October 18, 1976 



tions already underway before 1975, to 
adapt themselves to the changed interna- 
tional environment. 

As you know, these states had been mov- 
ing toward improving relations with the 
People's Republic of China for some time, 
particularly since the visit of President 
Nixon to China in 1972. Malaysia estab- 
lished relations with China in 1974, and 
Thailand and the Philippines followed suit 
in 1975 after Saigon's fall. Singapore and 
Indonesia have not yet done so, but Prime 
Minister Lee of Singapore was well re- 
ceived on a recent trip to the People's Re- 
public of China. These countries now all 
have diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union and also with the Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam. 

At the same time as they balanced their 
close ties with the West by new openings 
to Communist countries, these nations have 
also modestly increased the attention they 
pay to their own security, recognizing that 
they must take the primary responsibility 
for their own defense, especially internal 
security. 

Indochina developments have also en- 
couraged these nations to emphasize their 
own self-reliance and independence in 
other ways. One aspect of this more self- 
reliant mood has been some increase in 
emphasis on ties with the Third World and 
the nonaligned movement and, more specif- 
ically, support for the New International 
Economic Order, the detailed program of 
Third World demands on the industrialized 
countries. 

On the economic side, these countries are 



469 



now emerging from the world recession in 
reasonably good shape. In some cases their 
recovery has lagged somewhat behind that 
of the industrialized countries, because im- 
provement in their export picture necessar- 
ily depends on the prior improvement of 
the economies of the industrialized nations, 
including Japan. 

Since the fall of Saigon we have not seen 
a major increase in the level of Communist 
insurgent activity in Southeast Asia. At 
present none of the insurgencies represents 
a threat to the existence of the central gov- 
ernment of the country in which it oper- 
ates, and these nations have a reasonably 
good chance of coping successfully with 
the various rebel movements even though 
it will be very difficult to suppress them 
entirely. 

In concluding this discussion of the 
broader aspects of Southeast Asia at pres- 
ent, I would note there seems to be a rough 
equilibrium among the interests of the 
major powers at the present time. There 
have been continuing good ties with the 
United States, and in some ways our rela- 
tionships are becoming broader and deeper. 
The People's Republic of China and the 
U.S.S.R. are competing for influence in the 
area but are doing so through such tradi- 
tional means as diplomatic relations, trade, 
and aid, rather than through any signifi- 
cantly increased support to insurgent move- 
ments or Communist parties. Japan is an 
important economic influence and, like the 
United States, it would like to see stability 
in the area preserved. Thus at present no 
major power is aggressively seeking a pre- 
dominant role in the region. 

Policies Derived From U.S. Interests 

Now, let me turn to U.S. interests in the 
region. 

— First, we support the sovereignty and 
independence of the countries in the region 
and would like to see the maintenance of 
an equilibrium which will preserve their 
independence. 



470 



— Second, American strength is basic to 
any stable balance of power in the Pacific 
and contributes to peace and progress. Our 
use of bases in the Philippines is important 
to us as an element of stability not only in 
Southeast Asia but in East Asia as a whole, 
as well as being related to the global stra- 
tegic picture. Similarly we have an interest 
in maintaining free use of the sea and air 
lanes through this area connecting the 
western Pacific with the Indian Ocean. 

— Third, we desire friendly political re- 
lationships with the non-Communist nations 
which will facilitate the resolution of bi- 
lateral problems and gain their support in 
multilateral forums. 

— Fourth, we have mutually beneficial 
economic relationships with the non-Com- 
munist nations in this area. Indonesia sup- 
plies a growing percentage of our oil re- 
quirements and is even more important to 
our ally Japan. The area is also an impor- 
tant source of tin, copper, rubber, and 
other materials. It is also an important 
market and a region offering significant in- 
vestment opportunities. 

— Fifth, we have an interest in reducing 
tensions and working for a stable peace. 

Our policies in the region derive quite 
naturally from the interests which I have 
just stated. As President Ford stated last 
December 7 in his review of our Asian pol- 
icy: ". . . American strength is basic to any 
stable balance of power in the Pacific. . . . 
without security, there can be neither 
peace nor progress." 

Part of our military presence in the Asia- 
Pacific region is the Philippine bases. We 
also undertake various diplomatic efforts 
to preserve our naval and aerial mobility 
by maintaining access to the various straits 
in the region. One aspect of this effort is 
carried out in the law of the sea negotia- 
tions designed to preserve our mobility on 
a worldwide basis. 

We maintain a friendly political dialogue 
with the nations in this area. By discussing 
our policies with these countries on a regu- 
lar basis, we help maintain the existing 



Department of State Bulletin 






friendly relationships and also improve the 
Drospects of gaining their support on 
broader international questions, especially 
n the United Nations. 

In the economic area we seek to keep 
)pen the channels of trade and investment, 
^n recent years there have been some ef- 
forts by these nations to increase the bene- 
its they derive from foreign investment, 
vhich in some cases have had the effect of 
-educing their attractiveness to investors. 
This trend was compounded by the eco- 
lomic recession. Despite this, the leaders 
)f these nations generally realize the vital 
•ole that private foreign investment can 
Dlay in their economic development plans, 
ind they understand that to attract foreign 
nvestment they have to permit foreign in- 
/estors a fair return. It can also be said 
hat American companies now understand 
nore than before that their relations with 
;hese countries must involve mutual benefit. 

These countries are also of interest to us 
n the global negotiations on economic is- 
sues which are usually referred to as the 
^orth-South dialogue. While they are firm 
supporters of changes in international eco- 
lomic relationships which they believe are 
lecessary to increase the rate of develop- 
nent in their countries, these are moderate 
lations which have indicated their willing- 
less to cooperate with the United States 
is we show them we are on a constructive 
)ath. Thus our economic relations with 
hese nations also have an important multi- 
ateral element. 

Our policies include continuing modest 
iconomic and military assistance to those 
lations that need it. In the economic 
sphere, obviously Singapore, with a per 
capita income well over $2,000, does not 
leed our assistance; and we are phasing 
)ut economic aid to Thailand, which has a 
>asically healthy and growing economy. On 
he other hand we are continuing aid to 
ndonesia, which has great natural re- 
ources but also great problems of popula- 
ion pressures and organization for devel- 
>pment as well as a very low per capita 



gross national product. With regard to 
security assistance it should be noted that 
arms acquisitions in the area are modest 
and there is no arms race taking place. A 
significant proportion of our economic as- 
sistance is supplied through multilateral 
institutions, notably the Asian Development 
Bank, which utilizes its resources effec- 
tively and deserves more vigorous U.S. sup- 
port. 

Regional Cooperation 

In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and the Philippines formed a 
group for regional cooperation called the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). 

The gradual development of this organi- 
zation was given a new stimulus by Indo- 
china developments, and the member coun- 
tries held their first summit meeting last 
February in Bali, which gave further im- 
petus to ASEAN's general cohesiveness and 
area of cooperation. At this meeting the 
leaders signed a number of interlocking 
documents including a Declaration of Con- 
cord, a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 
and an agreement on the establishment of 
an ASEAN Secretariat. It also was agreed 
that the organization should move ahead 
with joint industrial projects, preferential 
trade arrangements, and organization of a 
permanent secretariat with an Indonesian 
as the first ASEAN Secretary General. 
This organization has a consultative ar- 
rangement in the economic field with the 
European Economic Community and simi- 
lar arrangements with several other coun- 
tries. 

We welcome the efforts of the Southeast 
Asian nations to strengthen their own inde- 
pendence by increasing their efforts at re- 
gional cooperation. We would be prepared 
to enter into economic consultation with the 
ASEAN nations but are leaving the initia- 
tive to them. 

One of the question marks in Southeast 
Asia during the past year or more has been 



)ctober 18, 1976 



471 



how relations would develop between the 
new Communist states of Indochina and the 
ASEAN grouping. In July and August the 
Vietnamese Vice Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs made official visits to all ASEAN cap- 
itals except Bangkok, and the Thai Foreign 
Minister went to Hanoi and Vientiane in 
August. During these visits the Vietnamese 
emphasized their desire for peaceful and 
friendly relations and seemed to accept the 
assurances of host government officials that 
ASEAN is a truly neutral group. Diplo- 
matic relations were established with the 
Philippines July 12 and with Thailand 
August 6, completing the establishment of 
such relations between the Socialist Repub- 
lic of Vietnam and all ASEAN members. 

However, at the recent nonaligned meet- 
ing in Colombo, Vietnam and Laos opposed 
a Malaysian position advocating a zone of 
peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast 
Asia, which has been a standard ASEAN 
concept since 1971. Vietnam and Laos pro- 
posed language welcoming the Communist 
victories and demanding an end to U.S. 
alliances and bases. Furthermore, they 
sharply attacked ASEAN and ASEAN 
members for allegedly supporting U.S. "ag- 
gression" in the Indochina conflict. This 
incident suggests that the future of rela- 
tions between Indochina and the ASEAN 
nations remains to be defined and that 
Hanoi can be expected to continue its ef- 
forts to reduce or eliminate the U.S. pres- 
ence in Southeast Asia and to influence the 
foreign and domestic politics of its neigh- 
bors. 

Indochinese Nations 

Vietnam maintains ties with both the 
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of 
China, but their relations appear to be 
closer with Moscow than with Peking. The 
Vietnamese are very influential in Laos, 
and the two countries work together 
closely. Cambodia, on the other hand, has 
gone its own way. The Cambodian popula- 
tion has become strictly regimented, as the 
new Communist leaders have carried out 



472 



I 



i 



■ 



fo 



n 



their ruthless revolution. The Soviet Unions 
is active in Hanoi and Vientiane but has 
not been allowed to open an Embassy in|oi 
Phnom Penh, where there are only a hand 
ful of embassies and the principal foreign 
ties are with the People's Republic of 
China. Cambodia recently established nom 
inal ties with a number of Western coun 
tries and with Japan. 

During the first year after the fall oj 
Saigon, Hanoi was largely occupied wit! 
moving toward the reunification of th( 
country. This was formally accomplishec 
in July of this year, although many prob 
lems of establishing firm political contro 
over the South, of administration, and o 
economic unification and development re 
main to be overcome. In contrast to Cam 
bodia, the new Socialist Republic of Viet 
nam has been conducting an active foreig 
policy and is seeking to enter a large nun- 
ber of international organizations, ofte 
claiming the seat previously held by th 
Republic of Vietnam. 

We look to the future and not to the pa: 
in our relations with Vietnam. We are pr<. 
pared to meet to discuss all issues and ha\ 
indicated this willingness to the Vietnan 
ese. So far no discussions have taken plac 
For us the most serious single obstacle i 
proceeding toward normalization of rel; 
tions is the refusal of Hanoi to give us a fu 
accounting for those missing in actic 
(MIA's). Hanoi for its part continues 1 
demand economic assistance under tl 
Paris agreement. We believe that the Par 
agreement was so massively violated l 
Hanoi that we have no obligation to pr ■ 
vide assistance, and in any case Congre I : 
has prohibited such assistance by law. 

On September 13 we indicated our inte 
tion to veto Vietnam's application for mer 
bership in the United Nations on tl 
grounds that their actions so far on tl 
MIA issue do not reflect willingness to fi 
fill the humanitarian obligations of tl i 
U.N. Charter. Security Council consider 
tion of the Vietnamese application has be* 
deferred. 

We have maintained an Embassy in Lac .% 



Department of State Bullet Ity 



Ik 



." 



I 



ill 



t 



vhich has been headed by a Charge for 
he past year. There is little substance to 
ur relationship at the present time. 

Jon-Communist Southeast Asian Nations 

I would now like to say a few words 
pout each of the six non-Communist na- 
tions of Southeast Asia. 

>inma 

Burma attempts to maintain a policy of 
trict neutrality in its external relations, 
!.nd the Burmese Government has chosen 
conomic policies which offer little scope 
lor American trade or investment. Thus our 
elationships with Burma are not so diverse 
Is those with other Southeast Asian coun- 
ries. The Burmese Government has an ac- 
ive antinarcotics effort, which is also, of 
|,ourse, a matter the United States is very 
concerned with, and we have provided the 
ilurmese Government with some equipment 
lor this purpose, including helicopters. 

1 'ha Hand 

The nation most affected by Indochina 
levelopments was Thailand, which has 
lommon borders with Laos and Cambodia, 
fhe fall of Saigon brought immediate con- 
cern based on the potential of a revolution- 
ry and well-armed Hanoi and fear of a 
omplete U.S. withdrawal from the region. 
P>ne reaction was to proceed rapidly to 
istablish diplomatic relations with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China, which was per- 
ceived as a counterweight to Hanoi, with 
le latter's close association with the So- 
iet Union. 

Thailand also sought to initiate talks 
rith the new Communist governments in 
irder to establish friendly relations and 
iscuss common problems. At present Thai- 
md has diplomatic relations with all three 
udochina states, although Embassies have 
ot yet been established in Hanoi and 
ihnom Penh. Negotiations between Thai- 
.nd and its neighbors have made some 
rogress on such issues as trade, refugees, 



and the avoidance of border incidents. At 
the same time, Vietnam apparently has not 
increased its support for Thai insurgents, 
although the type of Hanoi support ren- 
dered in the past continues. Communist in- 
surgencies continue to exist in the North 
and Northeast, and Moslem separatists are 
troublesome along the southern border. 

We were already drawing down our 
troop presence in Thailand in the spring 
of 1975, and further reductions were con- 
templated for the future. We were pre- 
pared to retain some residual facilities; but 
it was not possible to come to agreement 
on status-of-forces issues, and our last 
troops departed July 20 of this year except 
for a small group involved with military 
assistance. 

In 1973 Thailand's military government 
was overthrown. The most recent elections 
were held last April, bringing to power 
Prime Minister Seni Pramot, who presides 
over a coalition of four parties in the Na- 
tional Assembly. We wish this democratic 
experiment well and hope it will succeed. 

Thailand has a rather healthy economy 
which has permitted us to begin phasing 
out economic aid. We are still assisting the 
Thai with a modest military assistance pro- 
gram which is focusing increasingly on 
credit sales and less on grant aid. 

Malaysia 

This relatively prosperous and well-run 
nation, with a per capita gross national 
product of about $700, has a strategic loca- 
tion on the Malacca Strait and is a source 
of rubber and tin. Its moderate government 
shares our goal of a peaceful and stable 
Southeast Asia. 

The new Prime Minister is making a 
strong effort to continue strengthening the 
Malaysian economy and to deal equitably 
with the divisions between the Malay ma- 
jority and the large Chinese minority. He 
must also deal with a longstanding Com- 
munist insurgency which, although not of 
a magnitude seriously to threaten the na- 
tion's security, has increased its activities 
noticeably since the fall of Saigon. 



ctober 18, 1976 



473 



Singapore 

Singapore is unique in the area for its 
small size (225 square miles) and its large 
per capita income ($2,200). Prime Min- 
ister Lee Kuan Yew is publicly skeptical of 
Hanoi and supportive of a continued Amer- 
ican military presence in the region in 
order to balance other major powers. 

We, of course, desire friendly relations 
with this strategically situated and ener- 
getic country. We are also interested in 
Singapore's position as the leading South- 
east Asian commercial center, in its large 
oil-refining industry, and in encouraging 
our already large ($900 million) invest- 
ment stake in this country. 

Indonesia 

Indonesia's 135 million people give it 
half the population of the region, and it 
stretches over an archipelago 3,000 miles 
long that dominates the sea routes between 
the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 
In spite of its great natural resources, espe- 
cially oil, Indonesia remains among the 
poorest countries of the region in terms of 
per capita income. The government which 
took over in 1966 following an abortive 
Communist-supported coup in late 1965, 
although predominantly military, has con- 
sciously kept military spending to a mini- 
mum so as to devote the maximum of re- 
sources to economic development. 

The changed situation in Southeast Asia 
following the fall of Saigon has indicated 
to the Indonesian leadership the need to 
upgrade modestly the efficiency and mobil- 
ity of Indonesian forces to insure the de- 
fense of this farflung island nation. We are 
helping through a small program of grant 
aid and military sales credits. 

Indonesia supplies about 8 percent of 
U.S. oil imports, and a larger percentage of 
Japan's. Indonesia has been a stable sup- 
plier; it did not participate in the 1973 
Arab embargo. Increasing supplies of oil 
and liquefied natural gas are expected to 
be available in the future. We already have 
about $2 billion in private investment in 



the country, mostly in the energy field. 

There is no question that Indonesia, its 
resources, and its friendly, moderate gov- 
ernment are of political, strategic, and eco- 
nomic importance to us. Although Indo- 
nesia is careful to maintain its nonaligned 
position, our relations have been close. 
President Suharto visited Washington in 
July 1975, President Ford visited Jakarta 
last December, and consultations between 
Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister 
Malik, took place in Washington last June. 

Philippines 

We have close historical ties with this 
nation, consecrated by our joint struggle ir 
World War II. However, we are careful noi 
to take the Philippines for granted, and w< 
deal with that country as a fully independ 
ent nation which has the duty of safe 
guarding its own interests. 

After the Communist takeover in Indo 
china, President Marcos called for a "re 
assessment" of the American military pres 
ence in his country. When President Fori 
visited the Philippines last December, h 
and President Marcos agreed that the mil: 
tary bases used by the United States in th 
Philippines remain important in maintair 
ing an effective U.S. presence in the wesl 
ern Pacific in support of the mutual obje( 
tives of the defense of both countries, seci 
rity of the Pacific region, and world peac< 
The two Presidents also agreed that neg( 
tiations to revise existing arrangement 
would be conducted "in the clear recogn 
tion of Philippine sovereignty." These n(| 
gotiations began in April and are sti 
continuing. We are confident that they wi 
eventually prove successful, but comple 
issues remain to be resolved. 

Our economic interests are significant- 
over $2 billion in investments and a flou! 
ishing trade relationship. Last year w 
began discussion with the Philippine Go 1 
ernment of a new agreement regardin 
economic and commercial relations, whic 
would replace the expired Laurel-Langle 
Agreement. 



474 



Department of State Bullet 



The Philippine Government's desire to 
make clear its independence, and also to 
further its economic interests, has led it to 
take an active part in the Group of 77, 
which coordinates economic policy among 
the less developed countries on certain is- 
sues. The Philippines has also balanced its 
close Western ties by establishing relations 
with the People's Republic of China in 
June 1975 and with the Soviet Union in 
June 1976. But I am confident we can con- 
tinue to have close and friendly relations 
based on mutual respect and mutual in- 
terest. 

U.S. Support for Southeast Asian Aspirations 

In conclusion, I think it is important that 
we approach the problems of Southeast 
Asia with the understanding that the fu- 
ture of this area will depend primarily on 
the internal strength and efforts of the 
countries themselves. They themselves rec- 
ognize this and indeed have made great 
strides over the years in improving their 
economies and modernizing their socie- 
ties. 

They have also gained experience and 
confidence in their own abilities. The inter- 
national context of Sino-Soviet tension and 
U.S. detente policies with both of the major 
Communist powers has contributed to the 
general equilibrium which appears to have 
been established in the area. 

We intend to maintain a strong military 
presence in the western Pacific. Our pres- 
ence there is an important element for 
stability in Southeast Asia as well as for 
'the strategic balance in the western Pacific 
region as a whole. 

Under present conditions the challenges 
the countries of Southeast Asia face are 
primarily economic, political, and social in 
nature, with serious external threats a less 
likely contingency. In these circumstances 
we should do what we can to support the 
aspirations of the peoples of Southeast 
Asia, based on our common interest in the 
preservation of their sovereignty and inde- 
pendence. 



Department Discusses Arms Sales 
and U.S. -Saudi Arabia Relations 

Following is a statement by Alfred L. 
Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, submitted 
to the House Committee on International 
Relations on September 27. 1 

I appreciate very much the opportunity 
to appear before this committee to discuss 
an issue of key importance to broad U.S. 
interests — our military supply relationship 
with Saudi Arabia, which in turn is an in- 
tegral part of the overall relationship be- 
tween our two countries. 

An aspect of this longstanding relation- 
ship is under question — the Administra- 
tion's proposal to sell 650 Maverick mis- 
siles. This issue is of gravest concern to the 
Administration. We are deeply concerned 
that singling out Saudi Arabia by dis- 
approving this sale could do serious dam- 
age to our national interests and those of 
our allies in the industrial nations. 

This committee is aware that our excel- 
lent relations with Saudi Arabia represent 
years of mutual effort to develop trust. 

This committee is aware of the major 
expansion in that relationship in recent 
years. Our arms supply relationship is but 
one aspect of broad ties which have served 
U.S. interests remarkably well, but it is an 
important aspect and integral to the pur- 
suit of our broader interests. 

This committee is well aware of the im- 
portance of Saudi Arabia to our search for 
peace in the Middle East, to our concern 
for the security of the Persian Gulf, and to 
the world's economic health. 

Against this background I would stress 
a few central points: 

— Over many years, as the United States 
has sought peace in the explosive Middle 
East, Saudi Arabia has remained a stead- 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings will be 
published by the committee and will be available from 
the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Washington, D.C. 20402. 



October 18, 1976 



475 



fast friend and a force for moderation. Its 
political and financial support for the Arab 
nations that are committed to a negotiated 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a 
critical component of our efforts to achieve 
a Middle East peace. 

— This year we expect to export over $3 
billion in American goods and services to 
Saudi Arabia, providing thousands of jobs 
for Americans. Only a fraction of these ex- 
ports will represent military items. 

— Saudi Arabia has been a stalwart part- 
ner in our objective of resisting the expan- 
sion of Soviet influence and radical move- 
ments in the Arabian Peninsula and Per- 
sian Gulf. 

— Saudi Arabia is playing a key role in 
seeking to bring the tragedy and travail in 
Lebanon to an end. 

— Saudi Arabia has been supportive of 
our position on a number of important is- 
sues in various international fora. At the 
recent nonaligned conference in Colombo, 
for example, it entered reservations on 
resolutions hostile to our positions on Korea 
and Puerto Rico. 

— Saudi Arabia is a major and construc- 
tive force in the world economy, in finance, 
in economic development, and, most sig- 
nificantly, in energy. It is Saudi Arabia 
which has prevented further increases in 
crude oil prices this year. The world looks 
to Saudi Arabia to restrain efforts by other 
OPEC countries [Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries] to increase 
prices sharply in the years to come. The 
growing share of our energy imports that 
comes from Saudi oil is a well-known fact. 

In this context our concern for Saudi 
security insures that Saudi Arabia will feel 
confident enough in its relationship with us 
to continue to be helpful to our national 
objectives in the Middle East and through- 
out the world. 

Clearly Saudi Arabia pursues the policies 
it does because it considers those policies 
in its own national interest, not because 
they are in the U.S. interest. It has been a 
fundamental tenet of Saudi policy for over 



476 



30 years that a close relationship with the 
United States is in the Saudi national inter- 
est because of our position of leadership in 
the non-Communist world and because of 
the benefits Saudi Arabia derives from that 
relationship in the economic and techno- 
logical development of its society. In many 
spheres the policies of the Saudi Govern- 
ment and its close ties with the United 
States are under attack by radical states 
and movements in the area. It has with- 
stood those attacks because of its confi- 
dence in the constancy of the relationship 
between us. 

This is what is at stake in the issue we 
are considering today. When I say that 
disapproval of this sale could do serious 
damage to our national interests, I do not 
mean this one act would destroy our rela- 
tionship overnight. The Saudis and we 
have an interest in preserving that rela- 
tionship. What I do mean is that the as- 
sumptions on which that relationship is 
based would be called into question in 
Saudi minds. An erosion of confidence, al- 
ready shaken by what Saudi Arabia sees 
as a pattern of attacks in this country on 
the U.S. -Saudi relationship, would be set 
in motion, whose consequences we would 
come to regret over time. 

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to em- 
phasize on his behalf what we risk if w( 
treat a proven friend in this way, singling 
it out for disapproval from among all th< 
nations to which we supply defense articles 
and striking at the spirit of mutual confi 
dence on which that friendship is based. 

What we risk is nothing less than under 
mining moderation and stability in th< 
Middle East and jeopardizing our own eco 
nomic well-being. The issue today tran 
scends the narrow question of whether o: 
not we sell Maverick missiles to Saud 
Arabia, and how many we sell. It goes t< 
the heart of a relationship that has serve< 
well our interests and the interests of peac 
in the Middle East. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to tun 
to the specific question which lies before u 
— the letter of offer for 650 Maverick mis 



Department of State Bulleti 



siles for Saudi Arabia. Various questions 
and reservations have been raised about 
this sale. I would like to try briefly to ad- 
dress these. 

First, why do we consider it important to 
supply military equipment to Saudi Arabia? 

For over a quarter of a century our mili- 
tary supply relationship has been one of 
the foundation stones of an overall rela- 
tionship which has fostered Saudi confi- 
dence in this country and Saudi receptivity 
toward our international goals. Our long 
cooperation in this field has been a major 
factor inducing the Saudis to value con- 
sultation on a wide variety of other sub- 
jects including, as I noted previously, sup- 
port for our Middle East peacemaking 
efforts and efforts to hold down oil prices. 

Secondly, why should this particular 
weapon — the Maverick — be sold to Saudi 
Arabia? 

These missiles, like all other arms we 
have sold to Saudi Arabia, are intended to 
defend the Kingdom against external ag- 
gression and, with specific reference to the 
\ Maverick, against ground attacks by hos- 
tile armored units. Saudi Arabia, with 2 
trillion dollars' worth of oil reserves to 
Iprotect, is as large as the United States 
east of the Mississippi and has long borders 
to defend; and much of the terrain is 
ihighly suited to armor operations. 

An important fact to keep in mind is the 
small size of the Saudi Army. While Israel, 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan measure their 
ground forces in corps or armies or at least 
divisions, Saudi Arabia can muster only 
brigades. It thus becomes apparent why the 
Saudis need to support such small and dis- 
persed defensive forces through the use of 
a weapon like the Maverick. 

Thirdly, some question has been raised 
about the appropriateness of the precise 
number of these missiles in this letter of 
offer. 

Our proposal to sell the Maverick rests 
on professional American military judg- 
ments related to a carefully devised pro- 
gram for modernizing the Saudi Armed 
Forces. The original proposal was to sell 



1,500 of these weapons, in addition to the 
1,000 already supplied. We have reduced 
that figure to the present 650 not because 
we thought the original figure was arrived 
at through faulty analysis, but because of 
the strong feelings among some members 
of Congress about the sale of a larger 
number at this time. The original figure o± 
1,500 Mavericks requested by Saudi 
Arabia itself represented a reduction, at 
U.S. Air Force prompting, of an earlier 
Saudi request. We held advance informal 
consultations with the Congress on this and 
other sales and made a bona fide effort to 
take congressional concerns into account 
by reducing the numbers of both Side- 
winder and Maverick missiles agreed upon 
in negotiations with Saudi Arabia. This de- 
cision itself was not without some costs to 
our relationship, but those costs will be 
magnified many times if the sale is rejected 
in its totality. 

Finally, concerns have been expressed 
that these missiles may become a threat to 
Israel, either because Saudi Arabia might 
use them itself in an attack on Israel or 
because Saudi Arabia might transfer some 
of these missiles to a third country. 

Obviously, there is never a 100 percent 
guarantee of what may or may not happen 
in the future. Even should these concerns 
prove justified by later events, however, a 
sale of 650 Mavericks will not have any 
appreciable impact on the balance of 
power in the Arab-Israeli context. A fun- 
damental principle of American Middle 
East policy is the preservation of the secu- 
rity and survival of Israel. It would be un- 
thinkable on the face of it that we should, 
by this or any other sale of military goods 
and services to Saudi Arabia or any other 
country, undermine that basic policy of 
support for Israel's security and survival. 

But the main point I want to stress here 
is the following. Both experience and logic 
strongly suggest that the concern that the 
sale of these missiles will pose a threat to 
Israel is an unjustified concern. In the 
Arab-Israeli dispute, there is no doubt 
about where Saudi sympathies lie politi- 



October 18, 1976 



477 



cally. But Saudi Arabia has never been a 
combatant in any Arab-Israeli war. Its 
armed forces are small in number, and 
their primary mission is to defend the vast 
territory and resources of the Kingdom. 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia knows that 
were it to use for aggressive purposes the 
weapons we sell it, it would jeopardize the 
entire relationship with the United States 
which it so highly values. And most impor- 
tant of all, the entire thrust of Saudi policy 
is directed toward a peaceful settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, toward avoiding 
further Arab-Israeli wars, not toward pro- 
moting them. 

Secondly, let me address the concern 
about unauthorized arms transfers to third 
parties. Over many years Saudi Arabia has 
never made an unauthorized transfer of 
U.S. equipment. Saudi Arabia values its 
military supply relationship with us. We 
believe they would not wish to jeopardize 
this relationship — and very directly, their 
own security — by such irresponsible acts as 
the transfer of weapons in violation of their 
agreements with us. In the specific case of 
the Maverick, moreover, there are addi- 
tional technical considerations which make 
transfer extremely unlikely. Mavericks 
cannot be used on aircraft other than those 
which have been specifically designed to 
handle them, and in the Arab Middle East 
only the Saudis have such aircraft. 

Mr. Chairman, in recent months there 
has been much publicity about the flow of 
arms to the Persian Gulf. The Administra- 
tion is convinced that U.S. policy in this 
regard is sound and supportive of peace 
and security in this area. But however 
much honest men may differ on this com- 
plex question, there is no doubt that re- 
fusal to sell this one item — the Maverick — 
to Saudi Arabia can only be regarded by 
the Saudi Government as a discriminatory 
act. 

I have sought to be candid with the com- 
mittee about the repercussions upon our 
relationship with Saudi Arabia and on our 
national interests that we believe could 
flow from a decision to deny this request. 



_ 



We must ask ourselves whether we wish — 
whether, indeed, it is justified in any way 
— to give a signal to an old friend which 
would seem to repudiate the trust and con- 
fidence it has long placed in the United 
States as the main supporter of its na- 
tional security. 

Today our relations with Saudi Arabia 
rest on hard-won tmtual confidence. Our 
relationship has been reflected in coopera-J 
tion, not confrontation. But in prudence we 
must not take Saudi good will for granted. 
The Administration is deeply concerned 
that blocking the Maverick sale will dc 
serious damage to a relationship whicr 
over the years has produced major divi 
dends for the United States and could havt 
over time the most serious political anc 
economic repercussions for our own na 
tional interests. 



Department Reviews Recent Trends 
in India 

Following is a statement by Adolph Dub 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Easter 
and South Asian Affairs, made before th \ 
Subcommittee on International Organizatio 
of the House Committee on International Ri 
lations on September 23. 1 



It is our understanding that the commi 
tee is interested in a discussion of U.S. ec< 
nomic assistance, both multilateral an 
bilateral, to India and a review of deve 
opments there over the past year. M 
colleague Arthur Gardiner from AI 
[Agency for International Development] 
prepared to speak directly on the subject < 
economic assistance. With your permissio: 
Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide 
background to his remarks by sketchir 
out the main Indian internal trends sin< 
the proclamation of the emergency ( 



1 The complete transcript of the hearings will 
published by the committee and will be availat 
from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gover 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



478 



Department of State Bullet 






Tune 26, 1975, and by saying a few words 
ibout the state of Indo-U.S. relations. 

India is the world's second most populous 
country, a nation with over 600 million 
Deople which, in its 29 years of independ- 
ence, has been trying to cope with massive 
ievelopmental problems. The high rate of 
lliteracy, currently estimated at 70 per- 
cent, the approximately $120 per capita 
mnual income, and the country's 14 official 
anguages and regional diversity point up 
he magnitude of the problems and the 
omplexity of dealing with these problems 
n a country whose population exceeds that 
|>f Latin America and Africa combined. 

In the South Asian region our primary 
oncerns have been the promotion of re- 
gional stability and the normalization of 
elations between the nations of the sub- 
ontinent and the avoidance of interference 
y outside powers. We hope that the gov- 
rnments of the region can focus their main 
jttention on their massive human and so- 
jial development problems, 
i In keeping with American concerns for 
jie developing world, we hold a longstand- 
lg interest in the economic progress of the 
iountries of South Asia and over the years 
ave provided substantial economic assist- 
nce to India. We have no security assist- 
nce with India except for a small MAP 
military assistance program] training pro- 
ram under which six officers attended U.S. 
irvice schools in fiscal year 1975 and 17 
i fiscal year 1976. 

India has been dominated since inde- 
;sndence by the Congress Party. In June 
1975 the President of India, acting on the 
ivice of the Prime Minister, invoked arti- 
<e 352 of the Indian Constitution to de- 
iare a national emergency on the grounds 
Hat the security of India was threatened 
V internal disturbance. The proclamation 
jive the central government broad powers 
1 take executive action and other emer- 
gency measures that restrict the funda- 
lental rights provided under article 19 of 
te Indian Constitution. 

In justifying the emergency, the Indian 
bvernment stated that elements of the 



political opposition were creating a situa- 
tion that threatened the security of the 
state. In particular, the government cited 
the call by opposition leader J. P. Narayan 
for the police and the military to disobey 
orders as well as the effort for a nationwide 
strike and other measures designed to 
paralyze the functioning of the Administra- 
tion. 

The government, using emergency pow- 
ers, arrested a substantial number of 
political opponents. The Indian Home Min- 
ister has suggested publicly that about 
12,000-14,000 such persons may currently 
be detained. It is our understanding that 
among those currently detained are 30 
members of the Indian Parliament. In ac- 
cordance with the Maintenance of Internal 
Security Act, which has just been extended 
by Parliament to June 1977, individuals 
detained under the emergency do not have 
recourse to the judiciary and the govern- 
ment need not file specific charges. 

India also imposed press censorship and 
postponed national elections which would 
normally have been held by March 1976. 
Both of these measures were later ap- 
proved by Parliament. In the case of the 
press, Parliament has enacted legislation 
which provides for certain curbs to con- 
tinue after the emergency is lifted. How- 
ever, press curbs on foreign newsmen were 
recently removed. 

The government has stated on a number 
of occasions that the emergency is a tem- 
porary measure but has not, so far, indi- 
cated when it will be lifted. Some political 
prisoners, including opposition leader J. P. 
Narayan, have been released from jail, 
but many remain under detention. The 
major opposition parties have continued to 
function, although a number of smaller 
groups, which the government branded as 
communal, terrorist, or antinational, were 
banned last year. 

Economically, the situation in India has 
improved in the past year and a half after 
an extended period of stagnation. The gov- 
ernment announced a 20-point program 
which included a variety of measures such 



(tober 18, 1976 



479 



as abolition of bonded labor and imple- 
mentation of land reform. The government 
in 1976 also announced a national popula- 
tion program signaling a far more serious 
intent to come to grips with what observers 
have long felt is India's major economic 
problem — the need to control its burgeon- 
ing population. 

Following an excellent summer and 
winter harvest, food production in 1975-76 
has reached an alltime record of an esti- 
mated 115-117 million tons. Industrial pro- 
duction, after a period of poor perform- 
ance, has also increased. Especially note- 
worthy has been a drastic reduction in the 
rate of inflation, which was running close 
to 30 percent and during the past year was 
down to zero. 

An excellent monsoon explains much of 
the improvement. Since agriculture repre- 
sents 45 percent of India's gross national 
product, the rains continue to have a major 
impact on overall Indian economic per- 
formance. 

In India's external relations there have 
been signs of a strengthened trend toward 
regional stability and indications of inter- 
est in more balanced relations than previ- 
ously was the case with major external 
powers. 

In South Asia, India and Pakistan have 
made significant progress toward normali- 
zation of relations. Diplomatic relations 
were resumed in July 1976 for the first 
time since 1971, and rail and air links 
were restored at the same time after a rup- 
ture of 11 years. 

Relations between India and Bangladesh 
have recently been less satisfactory, and 
the Bangladeshis have taken the dispute 
over the Farakka Barrage to the United 
Nations. However, here, too, the situation 
is not without hope. Both countries have 
affirmed their desire for a peaceful and 
mutually satisfactory resolution of out- 
standing problems. 

India has signaled an interest in reduced 
tensions with the People's Republic of 
China by sending an Ambassador to Pe- 
king for the first time since the 1962 border 



war. China has reciprocated, and the new 
Chinese envoy arrived in Delhi just a few 
days ago. 

Our own relations with India have been 
relatively stable in recent months, with 
fewer ups and downs than a year or so ago. 
There have been recent signs of Indian 
interest in further improvements. The Sep- 
tember 20 New York Times interview by 
the Indian Ambassador-designate, Kewal 
Singh, reflects this upbeat mood. Our own 
attitude toward India remains basically un- 
changed. As we have stated on many occa- 
sions: 

— We regard India as an important coun- 
try whose stability and viability will have a 
major impact on the peace and stability of 
Asia. 

— We believe that stable and productive 
relations between our two countries, on the 
basis of mutual respect and reciprocity, 
serve our national interest. 

— We recognize that, given our differing 
geographic positions and historical expe- 
riences, working out a "mature relation- 
ship" will take time; but this remains a 
goal worth pursuing. 

With regard to the human rights situa- 
tion in India, the President and the Secre 
tary of State have made clear our prefer- 
ence for democratic norms in India as 
elsewhere. This Administration is also or 
the record in making clear that the promo 
tion, respect, and observance of bask 
human rights in all countries is an impor- 
tant foreign policy objective of the Unitec 
States. We do not condone repressive meas- 
ures taken by other governments againsi 
their citizens or others. We have remainec 
circumspect in official comment on specific 
facets of the situation in India. 

In realistic terms, we have limited influ 
ence with India. Since a principal com 
plaint on our part about the Indian conduc 
toward the United States has been tnt 
tendency, although not recently, of th( 
Indian Government to address problem; 
through public polemic, it would seem in 
appropriate for us to pursue the verj 



480 



Department of State Bulletii 






course which we have asked the Indians 
not to follow. 

I know you will have specific questions 
on the situation in India, and I will be 
happy to answer these as fully and frankly 
as I can. 



President Tolbert of Liberia 
Visits the United States 

President William R. Tolbert of the Re- 
public of Liberia made a state visit to the 
United States September 20-26. While in 
Washington September 21-24, he met with 
President Ford and other government offi- 
cials and addressed a joint meeting of the 
Congress. Following are remarks by Presi- 
dent Ford and President Tolbert made at a 
welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn at 
the White House on September 21} 

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 27 

PRESIDENT FORD 

President Tolbert, Mrs. Tolbert, ladies 
and gentlemen: I am particularly pleased 
to welcome back to Washington a distin- 
guished friend of the United States of 
America. President Tolbert, your state visit 
is the first by an African leader in our third 
century of American history. We are proud 
and honored to have the red, white, and 
blue of Liberia fly side by side with our 
own colors. 

Americans and Liberians share a very 
unique and special relationship. Both coun- 
tries were founded by men and women who 
deeply believe in liberty and justice. The 
Liberian national motto, "The love of lib- 
erty brought us here," could apply just as 
well to the United States of America. 



1 For an exchange of toasts between President Ford 
and President Tolbert at a White House dinner on 
Sept. 21, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential 
Documents dated Sept. 27, 1976, p. 1362; for Presi- 
dent Tolbert's address before a joint meeting of the 
Congress, see Congressional Record of Sept. 23, 1976, 
p. H 10951. 



You have arrived here at a time when 
Americans are seeking to assist Africans 
to achieve peaceful solutions to extremely 
difficult problems. I have sent our Secre- 
tary of State to Africa, in full knowledge 
of the complexity of the problems and of 
the limitations of our role. Any realistic 
and enduring settlement must be made in 
Africa. We can only offer our assistance in 
encouraging the parties to negotiate to pre- 
vent increased violence and bloodshed. 

Mr. President, as a distinguished African 
statesman, you are fully aware of the dan- 
ger and the challenge that faces all men 
and women of good will in the southern 
portion of your continent. We greatly ap- 
preciate and value your wise counsel, your 
moderation, and your support. We assure 
you that the United States will remain a 
trusted friend, worthy of your confidence 
and that of all Liberians and all the peoples 
of Africa. 

Americans have noted with admiration 
the determination [with] which Liberia is 
developing its potentialities. We will con- 
tinue to help Liberia help herself. 

As President of Liberia, you have con- 
tributed much to the material and spiritual 
evolution of your people. But you have also 
given yourself internationally as an or- 
dained Baptist minister, through your lead- 
ership of the Baptist World Alliance. As 
the first black elected president of the Bap- 
tist World Alliance, you have advanced the 
vision of President Tubman [William V. S. 
Tubman, President of Liberia 1944-71] 
through your inspired work for the benefit 
of man and the glory of God. 

We thank you and all the people of 
Liberia not only for your visit, but for Li- 
beria's many manifestations of friendship 
in this Bicentennial Year. I was especially 
gratified to know of your personal partici- 
pation, Mr. President, in our Fourth of July 
celebration in Monrovia. 

Mr. President, you are a welcome visitor 
to the nation's capital and to the White 
House. I look forward to our discussions. 
Through these exchanges, we can advance 



October 18, 1976 



481 



the cause of peaceful progress for Africa 
and for all humanity. The American people 
join in welcoming you and strengthening, 
during this visit, the very close ties between 
our two peoples. 



PRESIDENT TOLBERT 

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished 
ladies and gentlemen, friends: We are pro- 
foundly touched by your thrillingly warm 
remarks of welcome, Mr. President, ex- 
tended to Mrs. Tolbert, members of my 
official party, and to me, at the commence- 
ment of our visit to your great nation on 
this most historic and significant occasion. 

We are gratified that you have paid my 
country — and Africa — the signal honor of 
this unique invitation to share with you, 
and all citizens of America at the captivat- 
ing joys of your historic Bicentennial cele- 
brations. Impressed as we are by your 
exhilaratingly warm reception of us, we 
sincerely ask, in turn, that you accept of us, 
Mr. President, our heartfelt appreciation 
and gratitude. 

As we enthusiastically rejoice with you 
in the Spirit of '76, we salute you and all 
the great people of the United States of 
America and extend our hearty congratu- 
lations as you enter upon your third cen- 
tury of dynamic and inspiring nationhood. 

The microcosm of the whole world, 
America has illuminated the limitless po- 
tentials of the human family when it is free 
to think, free to decide, and free to act. 
America is a viable land of spectacular and 
expanding opportunity. The model of re- 
siliency and renewal, America is an historic 
land where challenges are pursued with 
courage and with skill. A mosaic of devo- 
tion and resolve, the American people are 



admired for their ingenious quests, for ex- 
cellence in science and statecraft, in indus- 
try and enterprise. 

America is indeed a creative land of 
surging patriotism and surging proficiency. 
With her towering stature and command- 
ing influence in the comity of nations, she 
has defended and expanded democracy 
around the world, fostering integrity, 
spawning opportunities, and endeavoring 
to sever the scourge of injustice and indig- 
nity from the noble family of mankind. 

The Liberian nation and people are 
proud to have traditionally enjoyed with 
you, Mr. President, and the great American 
people, a unique and special friendship 
during the span of our 130 years of inde- 
pendence. We have drawn exceptional 
inspiration from your unrelenting and 
outstanding leadership in the world for 
genuine understanding and productive co- 
operation, and we embrace the fervent 
hope that America's innovative initiative 
will be clearly evident in man's continuing 
search for peace and in the struggle 
against poverty, exploitation, suppression, 
oppression, injustice, and human indignity. 

It is indeed our deepest wish, Mr. Presi- 
dent, that the essence of the Spirit of '76 
will enrich the living conditions of our one 
world so that all God's children may ob- 
tain a better quality of life in a framework 
of equality, of vibrant opportunity, and of 
social justice. 

We ask that you be so kind as to accept 
from the government and people of Li- 
beria, and in our own name, Mr. President, 
our fondest wishes for unprecedented 
heights of happiness and achievement for 
the enterprising, most industrious and il- j 
lustrious nation and people of the United 
States of America. 

Thank you. 



482 



Department of State Bulletin 



■' 



Agricultural Trade and Commodity Arrangements 



Address by Julius L. Katz 

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs l 



I am pleased to participate in this sym- 
posium on free markets sponsored by the 
Chicago Board of Trade. No principle has 
been more important to our nation's devel- 
opment and to the elaboration of our for- 
eign economic policy than the concept of 
free markets. It is appropriate that we 
should review the role that markets con- 
tinue to play in our national economic life. 

I have been asked to address the question 
of government policies and free interna- 
tional agricultural markets. It is my inten- 
tion to approach this topic by discussing 
our market-oriented agricultural policies, 
our attempts to reduce barriers to agricul- 
tural trade, and our general commodity 
policy. I then propose to examine the rela- 
tionship of these approaches to two cur- 
rent sets of issues affecting agricultural 
trade : Grain reserves discussions and the 
multilateral trade talks, and the UNCTAD 
[United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development] "common fund" proposal. 

For the past decade the United States 
has been moving toward a more market- 
oriented agricultural policy which permits 
farmers to obtain maximum returns from 
their land. The shift in farm policy, from 
supply management techniques to a market- 
oriented approach, is embodied in the Agri- 
culture and Consumer Protection Act of 
1973, the basic farm legislation of the 
nation. 

During the period of transition, the 



1 Made before the Chicago Board of Trade on 
Sept. 24. 



October 18, 1976 



United States enjoyed unprecedented suc- 
cess in world markets. By dismantling the 
decades-old system of production restraints, 
the United States has been able to serve 
the growing foreign demand for U.S. agri- 
cultural output and at the same time pro- 
vide ample supplies for American con- 
sumers. The response of U.S. farmers in 
producing the extra food and fiber needed 
by the world has demonstrated again the 
powerful incentive to production that free 
markets can provide. 

The success of our market-oriented agri- 
cultural policy at home depends critically 
on substantially increased foreign demand 
for agricultural products. Growing foreign 
markets, although not accounting for all 
the increased demand for U.S. farm prod- 
ucts, have been the most dramatic and best 
publicized factor in our success. 

U.S. Government support of efforts to 
reduce barriers to trade, including those 
that restrict exports of agricultural prod- 
ucts, is one of the oldest themes of U.S. 
foreign economic policy. 

As early as 1934 the United States, under 
the authority of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act, sought to negotiate mu- 
tual reductions in trade barriers. 

After World War II the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade established a 
framework for further liberalization of 
trade among the world's trading nations. 

In subsequent rounds of tariff negotia- 
tions held during the postwar years, much 
progress has been achieved in reducing the 
level of tariff protection, particularly in 



483 



industrial goods. Progress in lowering bar- 
riers to agricultural trade has been much 
slower, although the United States did ob- 
tain some benefit for its farm sector during 
this period. The European Community's 
duty-free binding on soybeans, negotiated 
during the Dillon round, is probably the 
most important concession the United 
States received in this area. 

U.S. support for efforts to reduce bar- 
riers to trade over the last 40 years stems 
from our belief that freer trade and mar- 
kets are the best means to build the inter- 
national economy. Unfettered markets 
allow producers to maximize the return 
from their assets, encourage a rational allo- 
cation of investment over the long run, and 
increase consumer choice at lower prices. 

International Action on Specific Commodities 

Our support of market-oriented policies 
is also evident in the commodity field, 
where our fundamental objective is to 
allow international markets to operate as 
fully and freely as possible with a minimum 
of restrictions on the flow of goods, serv- 
ices, capital, and technology across inter- 
national borders. 

We know of course that international 
commodity markets do not always operate 
perfectly. Markets are subject to a variety 
of restrictions, and the degree of competi- 
tion varies from commodity to commodity. 
Moreover, some commodities are subject to 
severe and volatile price swings which 
actually operate in some instances to de- 
stabilize rather than stabilize the process 
of rational decisionmaking by those in- 
volved in investment, production, and con- 
sumption. Producers of such commodities 
are subject to sudden and unpredictable 
changes in incomes, while consumers have 
to cope with sudden and unpredictable 
changes in prices. 

Many countries believe that commodity 
agreements designed not only to stabilize 
prices but to raise them, and thereby trans- 
fer resources from the developed consum- 



484 



ing countries to the developing producing 
countries, can provide generally applicable 
across-the-board answers to all commodity 
problems. This approach is based on sev- 
eral fundamental misconceptions. First, 
more than 70 percent of non-fuel commodi- 
ties are produced by developed rather than 
developing countries; thus the net effect of 
an across-the-board price rise would be to 
penalize the developing countries, not to 
assist them. 

More importantly, we have strong reason 
to question the feasibility of arbitrary pric- 
ing without regard to basic market trends. 
While prices for particular commodities 
can be maintained at fixed levels for cer- 
tain periods of time at high cost, such a 
policy over time will cause misallocation of 
investment and distortion of consumption 
patterns. Uneconomically high prices en- 
courage unneeded production and discour- 
age needed consumption, and someone pays 
for this inefficiency through support of 
stocks and/or price supports until the sys- 
tem finally breaks down. 

Our own approach begins with a strong 
preference for arrangements which will 
improve the functioning of markets and 
will avoid, whenever possible, resort to re- 
strictionist approaches. It combines this 
with a recognition that the problems of 
and solutions for each commodity are dif- 
ferent. 

For some commodities, the problem is 
chiefly one of excessive restrictions on the 
free flow in international trade of that com- 
modity or processed versions of it. For 
others it is a problem of instability of 
returns to producers, which can best be 
handled through compensatory financing 
measures such as that already existing 
within the International Monetary Fund. 

For some commodities, efforts at price 
stabilization around longer term market 
trends may be desirable. The means for 
achieving such improved price stabilization 
can vary from simple improvements in ex- 
change of market information to formal 
international agreements, which may in- 



Department of State Bulletin 



elude provision for buffer stocks, such as 
the tin agreement, or standby export 
quotas, such as the coffee agreement. 

In this context, I would like to emphasize 
the commitment the United States has 
undertaken internationally to examine com- 
modity problems on a case-by-case basis in 
international forums. We are committed, 
and rightly so, to the idea of improved 
cooperation between producers and con- 
sumers with respect to commodities which 
are traded internationally. We have 
pledged ourselves to assure that an ade- 
quate and effective means of communica- 
tion, in the form of producer-consumer 
groups, exists for all major internationally 
traded commodities. 

The fact that the United States is not 
only willing but committed in a positive 
sense to establishing and making such 
groups work effectively does not in any 
way undermine the basis on which we enter 
into such international discussions. Our 
aim is to make the international markets 
for commodities work better — in the nega- 
tive sense of opposing any arrangements 
which would undermine their effectiveness 
and in the positive sense of promoting 
measures which will further strengthen 
these markets. 

Grain Reserves and the Trade Talks 

I would like now to comment briefly on 
two sets of current issues directly affecting 
agricultural markets. The first involves the 
grain reserves discussions in the Interna- 
tional Wheat Council and the multilateral 
trade negotiations in Geneva. The other 
issue involves UNCTAD's proposal for a 
common fund. 

The central element of world agricul- 
tural markets is grain. Over the past sev- 
eral years, after a generation of relative 
calm, we have experienced conditions of 
perhaps unprecedented change and uncer- 
tainty. Fortunately, the producer response 
to these conditions has been positive and 
dynamic. Thanks largely to the reaction 
on the part of American farmers, the world 



weathered the food crisis of the early 
1970's. But the question is: What lies 
ahead? It would be well to recall the dis- 
ruptions we have experienced — inflation, 
the adverse impact on livestock producers 
and consumers, and export interruptions — 
and think about how we should regard the 
future. 

We have undertaken several steps to 
avoid recurrence of some of these prob- 
lems. We have increased our levels of food 
aid to provide more effective assistance to 
those poorest nations who suffer the most 
in times of short supply. We have nego- 
tiated a long-term arrangement that will 
moderate the disruptive impact of the So- 
viet Union in world markets. 

Last year the United States made an at- 
tempt to address the problems of world 
food security in a comprehensive manner. 
In the forum of the International Wheat 
Council in London, the United States pro- 
posed the negotiation of a new interna- 
tional arrangement on world grains — an 
arrangement centered on the establishment 
of an international system of national re- 
serves that would provide food security in 
time of disruptive shortfalls in grain pro- 
duction and also provide for an equitable 
sharing of the burden and responsibility 
for carrying those reserves when produc- 
tion is normal or in surplus. 

Our proposal is still on the table and in 
fact is being discussed in London this week. 
So far the discussions have not achieved 
much progress toward a new grains ar- 
rangement because of lack of support from 
other countries and here at home. 

Lack of support from other countries is 
understandable, since they are accustomed 
to the United States being the residual sup- 
plier, carrying the world's grain stocks and 
bearing the financial cost. Naturally, they 
like the United States to play this role. 

Lack of support at home, however, espe- 
cially from the farm community has, I 
believe, been caused in part by a misunder- 
standing of our proposal. Some have 
thought, for example, that the U.S. reserves 
proposal would put the government back 



October 18, 1976 



485 



in the grain business, controlling stocks 
and depressing prices. Government-owned 
stocks are not a part of the proposal and in 
fact were carefully avoided in its prepa- 
ration. 

The essential issue with respect to our 
reserves proposal was, and is, not whether 
reserves will exist, but how reserves will be 
distributed in the world. 

American farmers came into this crop 
year carrying stocks of 600 million bushels 
of wheat. The U.S. Department of Agricul- 
ture forecasts that they will carry out 900 
million bushels. Two or three years of this 
kind of experience will inevitably drive 
land out of production and raise the possi- 
bility that a serious production shortfall in 
one or a group of countries could throw 
world grain markets once again into a crisis 
situation. 

The U.S. reserves proposal is an attempt 
to provide some insurance against such an 
occurrence, insurance for which we would 
not be the only one paying the premium 
but for whch there would be reasonable 
burden-sharing among all participating 
countries, exporters and importers alike. 

The results of work in London toward a 
new grains arrangement could well be the 
foundation for the efforts of the negotiators 
in Geneva working to liberalize further the 
international trading system. 

This latest round of trade talks, the 
multilateral trade negotiations, differs from 
its predecessors in important respects. 

First, the success of previous negotiations 
in reducing tariffs has made relatively more 
important such nontariff barriers to trade 
as standards, subsidies, and variable levies. 

Second, the trading nations have agreed 
to give certain less developed countries 
(LDC's) special and differential treatment 
during this round. This approach, in some 
respects, marks a departure from the policy 
of equal treatment that had prevailed dur- 
ing the last 30 years. 

Finally, the United States has insisted 
that agriculture fully share in the fruits of 
trade agreements negotiated during the 
multilateral trade negotiations. We believe 



agriculture, in which the United States has 
a demonstrated comparative advantage, 
could benefit significantly from the achieve- 
ment of our negotiating objectives in agri- 
culture for greater access to foreign mar- 
kets and measures to deal with export sub- 
sidies. 

UNCTAD's Common Fund 

Another international activity with pos- 
sibly important implications for free agri- 
cultural markets is the so-called common 
fund scheme recently proposed by the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development and on which negotiations 
will begin shortly. 

The objective of such a fund would be to 
improve LDC earnings from commodities 
by at least stabilizing commodity prices 
around a long-term trend, but preferably 
by raising commodity prices to levels 
higher than they would otherwise be. The 
primary device to achieve this objective 
would be the creation of buffer stocks for 
individual commodities. Buffer stocks would 
be established for at least 10 "core" com- 
modities representing roughly three-quar- 
ters of the value of agricultural and mineral 
commodity exports by less developed coun- 
tries, according to UNCTAD. 

The fund is estimated at $6 billion, with 
$2 billion paid in by governments and the 
balance to be raised by borrowing. Under 
the UNCTAD Secretariat's various formulas 
for financing, the U.S. share would be from 
8 to 11 percent, or about $200 million. 

The proposal for a common fund has be- 
come a major objective for many less de- 
veloped countries. Many of the developing 
countries have made it a yardstick by 
which progress in the dialogue between the 
developed and developing worlds is to be 
measured. 

The United States has serious objections 
to the common fund approach, which is 
based on serious misconceptions: (1) that 
price is, in itself, a generally feasible and 
desirable measure to improve the export 
earnings of less developed countries; and' 






486 



Department of State Bulletin 



(2) that the chief obstacle to the establish- 
ment of buffer stocks is the lack of money. 
As I indicated earlier, price fluctuation 
is only one aspect of the commodities prob- 
lem. The costs and benefits of price meas- 
ures must be assessed in the broader con- 
text of problems of each commodity, in- 
cluding diversification, market promotion, 
vulnerability to substitutes, and other as- 
pects. Even in those cases where price 
stabilization is desirable, the obstacles to 
buffer stocks are not financial as much as: 

— The lack of agreement by exporters 
and importers on price objectives; 

— The unworkability in many cases of 
buffer schemes because of perishability, 
cost of storage, or competition from sub- 
stitutes; and 

— The ineffectiveness of some of the 
market improvement proposals for a num- 
ber of commodities. 

We continue to believe that we should 
rely to the greatest extent possible on 
freely operating markets to facilitate the 
flow of goods between producers and con- 
sumers and to deal with serious problems 
in ways that will expand, rather than re- 
strict, trade. Our fundamental considera- 
tion in evaluating proposals for any spe- 
cific commodity arrangement will continue 
to be whether it would contribute to im- 
provement in the functioning of the market 
for that commodity. 

In addition to considering buffer stocks 
and their financing, we will also continue 
to emphasize (1) adequate investment in 
resource development to meet market de- 
mand in the decades ahead; (2) improve- 
ment of market access for the processed 
goods of developing countries; (3) secu- 
rity of supply for consumers; and (4) 
stable growth for the commodity export 
earnings of the developing countries. 

It is clear that we are involved in a 
phase of intensive international discussions 
on a range of matters which could directly 
affect the operation of international mar- 
kets. Such issues have come to the fore as 
the world economy has become increas- 



ingly interdependent and as new voices 
have been heard on the world scene seek- 
ing international solutions to economic 
problems. 

We enter these discussions prepared to 
explore all suggested approaches fully and 
with an open mind. It remains our basic 
premise and conviction, however, that fully 
functioning markets are the preferred 
model since they are the most efficient allo- 
cators of investment, production, and con- 
sumption. 



U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement 
on Marcona Mining Co. Issue 

Department Announcement 1 

The United States has reached agree- 
ment with the Government of Peru on 
compensation for the assets of the Marcona 
Mining Company that were nationalized in 
July 1975. A long and complicated prob- 
lem has thus been resolved to the satisfac- 
tion of all concerned. 

The settlement consists of a cash pay- 
ment to Marcona and a contract for sales 
of Peruvian iron ore in the United States 
that will increase Peru's foreign exchange 
earnings and provide Marcona with addi- 
tional compensation. The aggregate value 
of this settlement constitutes just compen- 
sation under international law and within 
the meaning of the laws of both the United 
States and Peru. 

Full details of the settlement are con- 
tained in an intergovernmental agreement, 
which will be made public as soon as it is 
approved by the Peruvian Cabinet. In sub- 
stance, the compensation consists of $37 
million in cash and an ore sales contract 
at prices the Government of Peru estimates 
will provide Marcona an additional com- 
pensation of $22.44 million but which, de- 
pending on market conditions, may ulti- 
mately produce more or less compensation 
than the valuation amount. Finally, Mar- 



Issued on Sept. 23. 



October 18, 1976 



487 



cona will receive approximately $2 million 
in compensation from a previously con- 
cluded shipping contract. 

This agreement will have a broad and 
positive impact. It removes an obstacle to 
the constructive relations to which both 
governments are committed. Because it 
demonstrates that fair and equitable treat- 
ment for foreign capital can be assured 
within the Peruvian revolutionary process, 
the settlement constitutes a point of de- 
parture for increased private as well as 
public cooperation and practical progress 
on a wide variety of fronts. 

This agreement marks the successful 
conclusion of painstaking negotiations that 
required imaginative effort on both sides. 

The United States was represented by an 
interagency team headed by former Under 
Secretary of State Carlyle E. Maw acting 
as Special Representative of President 
Ford. 



President Issues Policy Statement 
on International Air Transportation 

Statement by President Ford 1 

International aviation is essential in a 
world that has become economically inter- 
dependent. Historically, the United States 
has had a leadership role in the develop- 
ment of international air transportation 
and intends to continue that role. 

Aviation is an essential part of the for- 
eign commerce of the United States. It is 
required for mail, high priority cargo, 
government, business, and urgent personal 
travel. A desirable low-cost means of inter- 
national pleasure travel, aviation helps 



1 Issued on Sept. 8 (text from White House press 
release); also printed in the 32-page policy statement 
entitled "International Air Transportation Policy of 
the United States," which is available from the Office 
of Public Affairs (S-80), Department of Transporta- 
tion, Washington, D.C. 20590. 



bring the people of many cultures and 
nationalities together, creating a greater 
sense of friendship and mutual under- 
standing. 

The United States seeks an international 
economic environment and air transporta- 
tion structure conducive to healthy com- 
petition among all air carriers. We shall 
rely upon competitive market forces to the 
greatest extent feasible, for it is a basic 
tenet of our economic philosophy that 
marketplace competition provides im- 
proved services and permits the well man- 
aged carrier to earn a profit while lower- 
ing total costs. At the same time, we rec- 
ognize that other nations may differ in 
their view as to how such transportation 
should be organized and operated. We 
shall work through appropriate bilateral 
and multilateral forums to bring about 
constructive change for the benefit of air 
travelers, shippers, and carriers of all 
nations. 

The international air carrier industry 
should continue to have the primary re- 
sponsibility for adapting its air transport 
product to public demand. Regulatory re- 
gimes imposed by governments should not 
stifle the industry's flexibility to respond 
to this demand, nor should they remove 
incentives to keep costs low. 

The Economic Policy Board Task Force 
on International Air Transportation Policy, 
chaired by the Departments of Transpor- 
tation and State, has recommended a com- 
prehensive statement of United States 
policy. The statement sets forth the ob- 
jectives the United States will seek in 
negotiations with other nations. It also calls 
for balanced revisions of certain regulatory 
policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board. 

I am approving this statement of inter- 
national air transportation policy to super- 
sede the one issued June 22, 1970, and am 
directing that this new statement of policy 
guidance be used henceforth by officials of 
the Government in dealing with inter- 
national aviation matters. 



488 



Department of State Bulletin 



Department Summarizes Programs and Objectives 
in International Narcotics Control 



Statement by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson 



I am pleased to appear before you today 
to discuss the activities of the Department 
of State in narcotics control. This is the 
first time the Department of State has testi- 
fied before this newly created select com- 
mittee ; and I wish to take the occasion to 
congratulate you, Mr. Chairman [Repre- 
sentative Lester L. Wolff], and all of the 
members of the committee on your selection 
for this important assignment. We look 
forward to working with you in the period 
ahead as we all strive to make our drug 
abuse control efforts more effective. 

Drug abuse reached dramatic propor- 
tions in the United States during the last 
decade. Because much of the narcotics 
abused in the United States came from 
abroad, curtailing the illegal flow into the 
United States became a high-priority for- 
eign relations issue. In 1971, the Depart- 
ment of State was given the leadership role 
in developing and coordinating an inter- 
national drug control program. For this 
purpose, the President created the Cabinet 
Committee on International Narcotics Con- 
trol, chaired by the Secretary of State. An 
organization chart of the committee is sub- 
mitted for the record. 



1 Made before the House Select Committee on Nar- 
cotics Abuse and Control on Sept. 27. The complete 
transcript of the hearings will be published by the 
committee and will be available from the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



Under this Cabinet Committee, plans 
were developed to obtain cooperation from 
foreign governments. Working through our 
Embassies, narcotics control action pro- 
grams were prepared for the principal 
countries involved in illicit production and 
trafficking. These programs have been 
under continuing review. Their major em- 
phasis has been on law enforcement coop- 
eration and exchange of narcotics intelli- 
gence, building foreign institutions for 
narcotics control, and control or eradica- 
tion of crops producing these drugs. Opium 
and opiates, particularly heroin, and co- 
caine have been the main objects of our 
international program. 

Our diplomatic initiatives have been 
supported by international narcotics con- 
trol funds appropriated in the Foreign As- 
sistance Act but administered by the 
Department of State with the advice and 
assistance of the agencies in the Cabinet 
Committee structure. 

Such expenditures, which have amounted 
to $147 million over the past five years, 
have been used to furnish training and 
equipment to build up the law enforcement 
capability of foreign governments, to assist 
them in controlling or eradicating nar- 
cotics-producing crops, and to support the 
U.N. narcotics control structure. The prin- 
cipal funded projects have been in Turkey, 
Mexico, Thailand, and Burma. A country 



October 18, 1976 



489 



breakdown of our control program funds 
for fiscal years 1975-77 is also submitted 
for the record. 

In addition, there has been a significant 
buildup in U.S. enforcement liaison person- 
nel stationed abroad. There are 287 Drug 
Enforcement Administration personnel now 
assigned to our Embassies and consulates 
to work with foreign enforcement officers. 
They numbered 91 in 1971. Moreover, we 
have a Foreign Service officer serving as 
Narcotics Coordinator in each of our Em- 
bassies playing a role in this field, and 
there are AID [Agency for International 
Development] technicians helping with our 
major programs. 

Drug abuse in the United States, after 
improving from 1972 to 1973, took a turn 
for the worse early in 1974. This deteriora- 
tion led the President to ask the Domestic 
Council to establish a task force to review 
the overall effort and recommend ways to 
make the Federal drug abuse program 
more effective. The resulting "White Paper 
on Drug Abuse" underscored the increas- 
ing availability and use of illicit drugs and 
estimated the social cost of drug abuse at 
$17 billion a year. 

The international narcotics control pro- 
gram is an essential part of the national 
strategy called for in the white paper. As 
long as demand continues high in the 
United States, traffickers will make every 
effort to find sources of drugs to supply that 
demand. However, we have seen that 
lowered availability results in reduced ad- 
diction rates. Therefore we endeavor to 
reduce supply. 

We are informed that customs and police 
efforts here and abroad are quite success- 
ful if they seize 10 to 20 percent of the 
drugs that are flowing in the illicit trade. 
Thus the only way to achieve sharply 
higher percentages of supply reduction is 
to control or eradicate the crops that pro- 
duce these drugs. The international pro- 
gram is charged with this extraordinarily 



difficult task. Obviously, success requires 
high levels of cooperation from foreign 
governments. 

Narcotics Control Assistance to Mexico 

The principal challenge today is, as it 
was five years ago, the flow of heroin into 
our country. But the primary source has 
changed. Prior to 1972 most of the heroin 
smuggled into the United States came from 
Turkish opium which had escaped that 
government's controls. It was processed 
into heroin in France and smuggled into 
our country in a trade which became 
known as the "French connection." The 
French connection was neutralized follow- 
ing the Turkish Government ban on opium 
poppy cultivation and highly effective co- 
operative enforcement actions of the 
French authorities. Unfortunately, how- 
ever, Mexico then emerged as the most 
important source of heroin on the U.S. 
market, according to seizure data. 

Mexico is therefore our first-priority 
country program. For fiscal year 1976, 
which includes an additional interim quar- 
ter, our narcotics control assistance to Mex- 
ico amounted to $14.5 million, or 30 per- 
cent of the total program. An additional 
$11 million for Mexico is programed for 
fiscal year 1977. 

This assistance has been mainly aircraft 
and related technical assistance. The Mex- 
ican Government is pursuing a very vigor- 
ous program in poppy crop destruction. It 
is also attempting to interdict illicit traf- 
ficking. 

A year ago the Mexican Government de- 
cided to move from the manual destruction 
of poppy plants to spraying them with 
herbicides by helicopters. Over 20,000 
fields were sprayed and destroyed earlier 
this year, virtually all of those then planted 
to poppy. However, a number of the fields I 
had unfortunately been harvested before ! 
they were destroyed, and we can assume I 
that most of them were replanted soon 



490 



Department of State Bulletin 



after destruction. Therefore, lasting effec- 
tiveness of the eradication program will re- 
quire continuation of the efforts by the 
Mexican Government. We can take heart 
in the stated intention of President-elect 
Lopez Portillo to continue with the eradi- 
cation program. 

Programs in Burma and Thailand 

With the prospect that the Mexican 
source of heroin may be brought under 
control, we are increasingly concerned that 
traffickers will turn to other sources of 
opium, such as Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, 
and Afghanistan. We are stepping up our 
efforts to help these governments reduce 
illegal opium production and trafficking 
there. 

Burma produces the largest quantity of 
illicit opium in the world, estimated at 450 
tons per year. Two years ago, the Burmese 
Government began a campaign to crack 
down on opium production and trafficking. 
To do the job, it needed helicopters to sup- 
port raids on illegal poppy fields and her- 
oin laboratories located in areas not under 
its full control. 

With the arrival of six U.S.-supplied heli- 
copters in late summer of 1975, the Bur- 
mese authorities began mounting major 
operations against narcotics refinery sites, 
drug caravans, and trafficking organiza- 
tions. During the 1975-76 growing season, 
they seized and destroyed 17 major heroin 
laboratories, intercepted nine large drug 
caravans, and destroyed 18,000 acres of 
opium poppies. These efforts reduced sig- 
nificantly the amount of heroin that would 
have been available that year for export 
from Burma. 

For fiscal year 1976, we programed 12 
additional helicopters for Burma to aug- 
ment its capabilities. Six of these have 
been delivered, and the final six are sched- 
uled for delivery by the end of calendar 
year 1976. Our narcotics control expendi- 



tures for Burma for fiscal year 1976 were 
$13.3 million. Our fiscal year 1977 request 
is for $3.6 million, essentially to maintain 
the current program. 

Despite the successes in Burma, we rec- 
ognize that virtually all the growing areas 
are outside of government control and that 
sizable levels of production are likely to 
continue for years to come. Such supplies 
will remain a potential source for traffick- 
ing destined for the United States, espe- 
cially if our other sources are diminished. 

In Thailand, the great majority of illicit 
opium is discovered while it is in transit 
from Burma to the international markets. 
Several important steps were taken in vari- 
ous narcotics-related areas during the past 
year. Thai customs, aided by a U.S. customs 
advisory team, has increased narcotics 
seizures at Bangkok International Airport. 
Specially trained narcotics-sensor dogs also 
began checking outgoing luggage. In the 
port area, the newly organized customs 
narcotics unit made its first drug seizures 
on ships departing the harbor. 

While such efforts are all to the good, 
we should like to see a more successful and 
determined Thai program to disrupt the 
flow of narcotics through Thailand. We 
have discussed this matter with the Thai 
Government and have received assurances 
of increased activity. 

Pakistan and Afghanistan 

In Pakistan about 150 tons of illicit 
opium are produced annually in areas 
either not under government control or 
where the local economy has dependence 
upon opium production. With U.N. and 
U.S. assistance, the Pakistan authorities 
are undertaking studies and pilot projects 
designed to provide alternative sources of 
income for the traditional growers of 
opium. We are also providing transporta- 
tion and communications equipment to help 
the Government of Pakistan establish a 



October 18, 1976 



491 



network of 25 field investigation units at 
strategic points throughout the country to 
concentrate on the interdiction of illicit 
opium traffic. 

Progress is not as rapid as we would like 
to see with respect to both the income re- 
placement project and the establishment 
of the investigation units, and we recently 
brought our concern to the attention of the 
Government of Pakistan. The Pakistan 
Government has stated that these programs 
will be moved ahead as rapidly as possible. 

About 150 tons of opium are also illicitly 
produced in uncontrolled areas in Afghan- 
istan. There is a U.N. program supporting 
police narcotics control efforts, and the 
Government of Afghanistan is seeking a 
program to provide alternative sources of 
income to its farmers. Afghanistan is a non- 
aligned country and wants all international 
narcotics assistance channeled through the 
United Nations. 

Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia 

Recently, new possibilities have opened 
for us to deal with the flow of cocaine 
to the United States. Much of the cocaine 
smuggled into our country is refined in 
Colombia from coca paste produced from 
coca plants grown in Peru and Bolivia. 

In June 1976, President Banzer of Bo- 
livia and Secretary Kissinger met and laid 
the groundwork for an expanded action 
program directed at coca. 

We then sought and obtained President 
Ford's approval of a program which pro- 
vides funding over a five-year period of 
up to $45 million of AID concessional loan 
funds for agricultural assistance to poor 
farmers in the coca-growing areas, if the 
two governments can develop promising 
projects and programs leading to effective 
control of coca production. We wish even- 
tually to see production reduced to approxi- 
mately the levels required by the tradi- 
tional chewers among the population of the 
high Andes and for the small legal require- 



ment for coca flavoring. The program also 
calls for up to $8 million in additional nar- 
cotics control funds to strengthen enforce- 
ment. 

We have a request from Peru for a simi- 
lar program. 

In September 1975, President Lopez of 
Colombia and President Ford discussed the 
increasing cocaine problem. Subsequently, 
the President directed that we expand our 
assistance to the Colombian efforts to inter- 
dict cocaine traffic destined for the United 
States. 

Importance of U.N. Fund 

A few comments on Turkey. The Turkish 
Government rescinded its ban on opium 
poppy cultivation in 1974. However, with 
assistance and technical advice from the 
U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the 
Turkish authorities are thus far effectively 
controlling their production, which is now 
in poppy straw form. The role the U.N. 
Fund played in helping the government 
attain successful control over the Turkish 
poppy crop — a control not attained before 
— underscores the importance to U.S. na- 
tional interests of the U.N. Fund. 

Since its inception we have provided 
about 80 percent of the financial contribu- I 
tions the Fund has received. We are hope- 
ful that other nations will see it in their 
interest to give stronger support in the fu- 
ture to the Fund. Nevertheless it remains 
important to us to be sure the Fund has the 
resources necessary to meet assistance re- 
quests, particularly in cases where nar- 
cotics likely to come to the United States 
can thereby be controlled. 

Convention on Psychotropic Substances 

Mr. Chairman, we are greatly interested 
in action by the Congress which would en- 
able U.S. ratification, without much further 
delay, of the 1971 Convention on Psycho- 
tropic Substances. We were the moving 
force behind the Vienna Conference which 






492 



Department of State Bulletin 



drew up this convention extending controls 
to the psychotropic substances, the man- 
made mind-bending drugs, such as amphet- 
amines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens, 
which were then, and still are, heavily 
abused. While the convention was sent to 
the Senate for ratification in mid-1971, that 
action unfortunately awaits congressional 
approval of enabling domestic legislation. 
This delay, we believe, is prejudicial to our 
national interests. 

It would be awkward for us to urge the 
developing countries to approve increased 
international controls over opium poppy 
straw and bracteatum poppy straw — which 
we would like to do now — while we our- 
selves have not agreed to parallel controls 
on the manmade drugs manufactured in 
the industrialized countries. And in the 
absence of our ratification, we cannot effec- 
tively persuade the other industrial nations 
to subject their psychotropic substances to 
international controls. We must, however, 
as we are victimized by these drugs made 
abroad and being smuggled into the United 
States through third countries. 

The Cabinet Committee agencies will 
continue the activities described. They will 
also pursue coordinated efforts to obtain 
U.S. jurisdiction over drug traffickers 
through extradition and expulsion. At the 
same time, a new program is being imple- 
mented to exchange judicial evidence for 
prosecution abroad in cases where foreign 
traffickers are more likely to be caught and 
tried there. Further, increased action will 
be directed against the financial resources 
of narcotics traffickers. 

This, Mr. Chairman, is an overview of the 
programs and objectives. We are dealing 
with a heightening problem of national 
concern, and I assure you that the Depart- 
ment of State and the other agencies rep- 
resented on the President's Cabinet Com- 
mittee on International Narcotics Control 
will energetically pursue the goal of re- 
ducing the flow of drugs of abuse into the 
United States. 



U.S. -Brazil Science and Technology 
and Energy Groups Meet at Brasilia 

Joint Statement l 

The first meetings of the U.S.-Brazil 
Joint Groups on Scientific and Technologi- 
cal Cooperation and Energy Technology 
were held at Itamaraty, Brasilia on Sep- 
tember 16 and 17, 1976. The two Joint 
Groups were established in connection with 
the understanding concerning consultations 
on matters of mutual interest reached be- 
tween the Secretary of State of the United 
States and the Minister of External Rela- 
tions of Brazil on February 21, 1976, in 
Brasilia. 

Ambassador Frederick Irving, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Oceans and Inter- 
national Environmental and Scientific Af- 
fairs, served as U.S. Cochairman at both 
meetings. The Brazilian Cochairmen for 
the meetings on science and technology 
and on energy were Ambassador Francisco 
de Assis Grieco and Ambassador Cabral 
de Mello, respectively. 

These Joint Group meetings represent 
one effort among others by both countries 
to build upon a tradition of friendship and 
cooperation, to determine new areas where 
interests converge, and to forge new ties 
based on mutual benefit and shared objec- 
tives and goals in science, technology, and 
energy. 

The Joint Group on Scientific and Tech- 
nological Cooperation adopted terms of 
reference for its future activities, recom- 
mended renewing and broadening the 1971 
Agreement between the United States and 
Brazil on Scientific Cooperation to include 
technological as well as scientific coopera- 
tion, and identified new areas with poten- 
tial for scientific and technological cooper- 
ation, including agriculture, scientific and 
technical information, natural resources, 



1 Issued at Washington and Brasilia (text from 
press release 452 dated September 21). 



October 18, 1976 



493 



medical science, basic and applied sciences, 
and technology. 

Both sides agreed to search for mutually 
acceptable ways and mechanisms for ex- 
panding scientific and technological coop- 
eration. 

Both delegations agreed on the mutual 
interest of the two countries in the ques- 
tion of the transfer of technology as well 
as the importance of cooperation in the 
context of, and compatible with, ongoing 
multilateral international activities. 

In its discussions, the Joint Group on 
Energy Technology reviewed national pro- 
grams in various new energy technologies 
such as solar power, hydrogen, coal gasifi- 
cation, and bioconversion and identified a 
number of topics of interest to both coun- 
tries. The above-mentioned technologies 
were considered by both sides to hold the 
highest priority for potential cooperation. 
The Joint Group decided to exchange visits 
of experts in solar energy and hydrogen 
technology in the next two months to dis- 
cuss possible cooperative projects. Special- 
ists in hydrogen are slated to meet in 
Brazil in October; a meeting of experts in 
solar energy technology will take place 
in the United States in November. 

The Joint Groups agreed to meet next in 
Washington on mutually acceptable dates. 



U.S. and Republic of China Sign 
New Fisheries Agreement 

Joint Statement ! 

Representatives of the Governments of 
the Republic of China and the United 
States signed on September 15 an agree- 
ment relating to fishing activities by the 
Republic of China off the coasts of the 
United States, which will come into force 
after the completion of internal procedures 
by both governments. 



1 Issued on Sept. 15 (text from press release 436). 



The agreement sets out the principles 
and arrangements which will govern fish- 
ing by nationals and vessels of the Republic 
of China within the fishery conservation 
zone of the United States beginning March 
1, 1977. 

The Honorable James C. H. Shen, Am- 
bassador of the Republic of China to the 
United States, signed for the Republic of 
China. Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, signed for 
the United States. 

Ambassador Shen and Ambassador Ridg- 
way headed delegations which began nego- 
tiating the new agreement in Washington, 
D.C., September 8. The negotiations, held 
in an atmosphere of friendship and co- 
operation, were completed September 10. 
Both delegations expressed their satisfac- 
tion with the new accord. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

Development, Use, and Control of Nuclear Energy 
for the Common Defense and Security and for 
Peaceful Purposes. Second annual report to the 
Congress by the Joint Committee on Atomic 
Energy pursuant to section 202(b) of the Atomic 
Energy Act, as amended. H. Rept. 94-1347. July 19, 

1976. 197 pp. 

Audit of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development 
Corporation, Calendar Year 1975. Communication 
from the Comptroller General of the United States 
transmitting a report on the audit. H. Doc. 94-568. 
July 28, 1976. 17 pp. 

To Implement the Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- 
tion Between the United States and Spain. Markup 
sessions of the House Committee on International 
Relations on S. 3557. July 29-August 4, 1976. 22 pp. 

Implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation Between the United States and Spain. 
Report of the House Committee on International 
Relations to accompany H.R. 14940. H. Rept. 
94-1393. August 5, 1976. 55 pp. 

Tijuana River Flood Control Project. Report of the 
House Committee on International Relations to ac- 
company H.R. 14973. H. Rept. 94-1399, Part 1. 
August 9, 1976. 10 pp. 



494 



Department of State Bulletin 



Current Treaty Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 194G, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643. 8086). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973. 1 

Notifications of acceptance: Israel, September 8, 
1976; Philippines, September 17, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
4044. 
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, September 22, 

1976; Gabon, September 28, 1976. 
Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 1 
Acceptances deposited: Bahrain, September 22, 

1976; Morocco, September 17, 1976. 

Oil Pollution 

International convention relating to intervention on 
the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, 
with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. 
Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, September 6, 1976. 

Postal 

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 
5881, 7150), general regulations with final protocol 
i and annex, and the universal postal convention with 
final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at 
Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 
1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 

Ratifications deposited: Austria, July 29, 1976; 
Barbados, July 22, 1976; Vatican City State, 
August 17, 1976. 
■R Accession deposited: Maldives, July 22, 1976. 
) Money orders and postal travellers' checks agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne 
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
I TIAS 8232. 

Ratifications deposited: Austria, July 29, 1976; 
Vatican City State, August 17, 1976. 

Slave Trade 

' Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. 
Concluded at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered 



into force March 9, 1927; for the United States 
March 21, 1929. TS 778. 

Notification of succession deposited: Barbados 
July 22, 1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat 
trade convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1. 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratifications deposited: Switzerland, September 
27, 1976; Kenya, September 28, 1976. 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, September 27 
1976. 



BILATERAL 



Canada 



Not in force. 



Agreement on mapping, charting and geodesy, with 
annexes. Signed at Ottawa August 24, 1976. En- 
tered into force August 24. 1976. 

Israel 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of December 16, 1974 
(TIAS 7978). Signed at Washington September 30, 
1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976. 

Oman 

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Muscat September 
9, 1976. Entered into force September 9, 1976. 

Portugal 

Loan agreement relating to construction of schools, 
with annex. Signed at Lisbon August 13, 1976. 
Entered into force August 13, 1976. 

Agreement amending the grant agreement of Febru- 
ary 28, 1975, for technical consultations and train- 
ing. Signed at Lisbon August 13, 1976. Entered 
into force August 13, 1976. 

Loan agreement for basic sanitation, with annex. 
Signed at Lisbon August 13, 1976. Entered into 
force August 13, 1976. 

Turkey 

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the Lockheed 
Aircraft Corporation and the McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation matters. Signed at Washington July 8, 
1976. Entered into force July 8, 1976. 



October 18, 1976 



495 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock- 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or 
more copies of any one publication mailed to the 
same address. Remittances, payable to the Superin- 
tendent of Documents, must accompany orders. 
Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, 
are subject to change. 

The United States and the Third World. In the first 
of a series of discussion papers, the Department of 
State provides some essential facts and alternative 
views on issues involving the United States and the 
Third World. Topics include Third World grievances, 
development, population, environment, the U.S. AID 
program, trade, commodities, energy, investments, 
debts, and multinational corporations. Pub. 8863. 
General Foreign Policy Series 301. 65 pp. $1.05. (Cat. 
No. S1.71:8863). 

The United States and the United Nations. This De- 
partment of State Discussion Paper examines the 
value of the U.S. role in the United Nations. The 
focal point for the discussion is the contradictory 
concepts of great power primacy and sovereign 
equality and how they relate to recent actions in the 
General Assembly. Pub. 8875. General Foreign Policy 
Series 302. 17 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. Si. 71:8875). 



Air Charter Services. Agreement with France extend- 
ing the agreement of May 7, 1973, as amended and 
extended. TIAS 8236. 3 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8236), 

Reciprocal Fishing Privileges. Agreement with Can- 
ada extending the agreement of June 15, 1973, as 
extended. TIAS 8251. 6 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8251). 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Aircraft Earnings. Agree- 
ment with Chile. TIAS 8252. 5 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. 
S9.10:8252). 

Fisheries — Shrimp. Agreement, with agreed minute, 
with Brazil. TIAS 8253. 38 pp. 50?. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
8253). 

Monitoring of the Stratosphere. Agreement with 
other governments. TIAS 8255. 16 pp. 35c 1 . (Cat. No 
S9.10:8255). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sr 
Lanka. TIAS 8256. 12 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8256) 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egyp 
amending the agreement of October 28. 1975. TIAS 
8259. 10 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8259). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Re 
public of Korea. TIAS 8261. 24 pp. 45?. (Cat. Nc 
S9.10:8261). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Chil 
amending the agreement of July 31, 1975. TIAS 826S 
4 pp. 35?. (Cat. No. S9.10:8262). 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 27-Oct. 3 

Press releases may be obtained from the Office 
of Press Relations, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C. 20520. 



Subject 

Advisory Committee on International 
Intellectual Property, International 
Industrial Property Panel, Nov. 4. 

Davis Eugene Boster sworn in as 
Ambassador to Guatemala (bio- 
graphic data). 

Kissinger: NBC-TV "Today" show. 

Regional foreign policy conference, 
Salt Lake City, Oct. 21. 

Ronald D. Palmer sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Togo (biographic data). 

U.S. mayors to attend Conference on 
Culture and Urban Development, 
Munich, Oct. 10-17. 

T. Frank Crigler sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Rwanda (biographic 
data). 

Foreign specialists to study key U.S. 
economic sectors, Oct. 11-Nov. 5. 

Kissinger, Chatti: toasts, New York. 



*483 9/29 



''484 9/29 



t485 
*486 



9/30 
9/30 



No. 


Date 


*474 


9/27 


*475 


9/28 


1476 

*477 


9/28 
9/28 


*478 


9/28 


*479 


9/28 



*487 10/1 



'488 10/1 



'480 9/29 



*481 
1482 



9/29 
9/29 



Kissinger: remarks to press prior to 
meeting with U.N. Secretary Gen- 
eral Waldheim. 

Kissinger: questions and answers fol- 
lowing meeting. 

Kissinger: U.N. General Assembly. 

Francois Dickman sworn in as Am- 
bassador to United Arab Emirates 
(biographic data). 

Advisory Committee to U.S. National 
Section of International Commis- 
sion for Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas. Oct. 27. 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS), working 
group on ship design and equip- 
ment, Oct. 27. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship 
design and equipment, Oct. 28. 

U.S. -Spanish Council: joint commu- 
nique. 

William C. Bradford sworn in as Am- 
bassador to Chad (biographic data). 

Kissinger: National Conference of 
Editorial Writers. Hilton Head, S.C. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



:: '489 


10/1 


t490 


10/1 


*491 


10/1 


f492 


10/2 



496 



Department of State Bullet; 



INDEX October 18, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 191*7 



Agriculture. Agricultural Trade and Commod- 
ity Arrangements (Katz) 483 

Asia 

Department Summarizes Programs and Objec- 
tives in International Narcotics Control 
(Robinson) 489 

Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and Policies 

(Hummel) 469 

Aviation. President Issues Policy Statement on 
International Air Transportation (Ford) . . 488 

Brazil. U.S.-Brazil Science and Technology and 
Energy Groups Meet at Brasilia (joint 
statement) 493 

Burma. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

Cambodia. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

China. U.S. and Republic of China Sign New 
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) . . 494 

Commodities. Agricultural Trade and Commod- 
ity Arrangements (Katz) 483 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 494 

Department Discusses Arms Sales and U.S.- 
Saudi Arabia Relations (Atherton) .... 475 

Department Reviews Recent Trends in India 

(Dubs) 478 

Department Summarizes Programs and Objec- 
tives in International Narcotics Control 
(Robinson) 489 

Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and Policies 

(Hummel) 469 

Economic Affairs 

Agricultural Trade and Commodity Arrange- 
ments (Katz) 483 

U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Marcona 
Mining Co. Issue (Department announce- 
ment) .... 487 

U.S. and Republic of China Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement) 494 

Energy. U.S.-Brazil Science and Technology 
and Energy Groups Meet at Brasilia (joint 
statement) 493 

Human Rights. Department Reviews Recent 
Trends in India (Dubs) 478 

India. Department Reviews Recent Trends in 
India (Dubs) 478 

Indonesia. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

os. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and Poli- 
cies (Hummel) 469 

itin America. Department Summarizes Pro- 
grams and Objectives in International Nar- 
cotics Control (Robinson) 489 



Liberia. President Tolbert of Liberia Visits the 

United States (Ford, Tolbert) 481 

Malaysia. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

Military Affairs. Department Discusses Arms 
Sales and U.S. -Saudi Arabia Relations 
(Atherton) 475 

Narcotics Control. Department Summarizes 
Programs and Objectives in International 
Narcotics Control (Robinson) 489 

Peru. U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Mar- 
cona Mining Co. Issue (Department an- 
nouncement) 487 

Philippines. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

Presidential Documents 

President Issues Policy Statement on Inter- 
national Air Transportation 488 

President Tolbert of Liberia Visits the United 
States 481 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 496 

Saudi Arabia. Department Discusses Arms 
Sales and U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations 
(Atherton) 475 

Science and Technology. U.S.-Brazil Science 
and Technology and Energy Groups Meet at 
Brasilia (joint statement) 493 

Singapore. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

Thailand. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 

Trade. Agricultural Trade and Commodity Ar- 
rangements (Katz) 483 

Treaty Information 

Current Treaty Actions 495 

U.S. and Republic of China Sign New Fisheries 
Agreement (joint statement) 494 

United Nations. Department Summarizes Pro- 
grams and Objectives in International Nar- 
cotics Control (Robinson) 489 

Vietnam. Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and 
Policies (Hummel) 469 



Name Index 



Atherton, Alfred L., Jr 475 

Dubs, Adolph 478 

Ford, President 481, 488 

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr 469 

Katz. Julius L 483 

Robinson, Charles W 489 

Tolbert, William R 481 



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7?M 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV • No. 1948 



October 25, 1976 



TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 
Before the United Nations General Assembly U97 

SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSES SOUTHERN AFRICAN ISSUES 

WITH AFRICAN AND BRITISH OFFICIALS 

Visit to Africa and the United Kingdom 511 

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
Statement by Under Secretary Rogers 532 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETir 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

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domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
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agement and Budget through January 31. 1981. 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



lo 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1948 
October 25, 1976 

The Department of State BULLET1 
a weekly publication issued by t 
Office of Media Services, Bureau 
Public Affairs, provides the public a 
interested agencies of the governme 
with information on developments 
the field of U.S. foreign relations a 
on the work of the Department a 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes select 
press releases on foreign policy, issn 
by the White House and the Depa 
ment, and statements, address 
and news conferences of the Presidt 
and the Secretary of State and otl 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the functk 
of the Department. Information 
included concerning treaties and inti 
national agreements to which i 
United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general inU 
national interest. 
Publications of the Department 
State, United Nations documents, a 
legislative material in the field 
international relations are also list 



iti 



Toward a New Understanding of Community 



Address by Secretary Kissinger 



Let me first congratulate this body for 
electing Ambassador [Hamilton Shirley] 
Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to preside over 
his 31st session of the General Assembly. 
He is a diplomat of great international 
stature who, among his many distinctions, 
las provided indispensable leadership to 
the crucial negotiations on the law of the 
sea. 

I would also like to pay tribute to the 
Secretary General for his tireless efforts on 
behalf of the world community. He suc- 
cessfully embodies the charter's principles 
of fairness, impartiality, and dedication to 
;he causes of global peace and human dig- 
nity. 

The United Nations was born of the con- 
viction that peace is both indivisible and 
more than mere stability, that for peace to 
De lasting it must fulfill mankind's aspira- 
tions for justice, freedom, economic well- 
being, the rule of law, and the promotion 
of human rights. But the history of this 
organization has been in considerable 
measure the gradual awareness that hu- 
manity would not inevitably share a single 
pproach to these goals. 

The United Nations has survived — and 
lelped to manage — 30 years of vast change 
n the international system. It has come 
;hrough the bitterness of the cold war. It 
las played a vital role in the dismantling 
)f the colonial empires. It has helped mod- 
erate conflicts and is manning truce lines 
n critical parts of the world. It has carried 



1 Made before the 31st United Nations General 
Assembly on Sept. 30 (text from press release 485). 



out unprecedented efforts in such areas as 
public health, development assistance, and 
technical cooperation. 

But the most important challenge of this 
organization lies still ahead: to vindicate 
mankind's positive and nobler goals and 
help nations achieve a new understanding 
of community. 

With modern communications, human 
endeavor has become a single experience 
for peoples in every part of the planet. We 
share the wonders of science and technol- 
ogy, the trials of industrialization and so- 
cial change, and a constant awareness of 
the fate and dreams of our fellow men. 

The world has shrunk, but the nations of 
the world have not come closer together. 
Paradoxically, nationalism has been on the 
rise at the precise time when the most 
serious issues we all face can only be re- 
solved through a recognition of our inter- 
dependence. The moral and political co- 
hesion of our world may be eroding just 
when a sense of community has become 
indispensable. 

Fragmentation has affected even this 
body. Nations have taken decisions on a 
bloc or regional basis by rigid ideologies, 
before even listening to the debate in these 
halls; on many issues positions have been 
predetermined by prior conferences con- 
taining more than half the membership of 
the United Nations. The tendency is wide- 
spread to come here for battle rather than 
negotiation. If these trends continue, the 
hope for world community will dissipate 
and the moral influence of this organiza- 
tion will progressively diminish. 



: October 25, 1976 



497 



This would be a tragedy. Members of this 
organization are today engaged in a multi- 
plicity of endeavors to find just solutions 
for complex and explosive problems. There 
is a fragile tranquillity, but beneath the 
surface it is challenged by fundamental 
forces of change — technological, economic, 
social. More than ever this is a time for 
statecraft and restraint, for persistence but 
also daring in the pursuit of peace and 
justice. The dogmas of perpetual strife pro- 
duce only bloodshed and bitterness; they 
unleash the forces of destruction and re- 
pression and plant the seeds of future con- 
flict. Appeals to hatred — whether on the 
basis of race or class or color or nationality 
or ideology — will, in the end, rebound 
against those who launch them and will not 
advance the cause of freedom and justice 
in the world. 

Let us never forget that the United Na- 
tions benefits the smaller and weaker 
nations most of all. It is they that would 
suffer most from its failure. For without the 
rule of law, disputes would be settled as 
they have been all too frequently and pain- 
fully in history — by test of strength. It is 
not the weak that will prevail in the world 
of chaos. 

The United States believes that this 31st 
General Assembly must free itself of the 
ideological and confrontational tactics that 
marked some of its predecessors and dedi- 
cate itself to a program of common action. 

The United States comes to the General 
Assembly prepared to work on programs 
of common action. We will offer concrete 
proposals. We will listen to the ideas of 
others. We will resist pressure and seek 
cooperation. 

The Problem of Peace 

Let me now discuss the three principal 
challenges we face: the problem of peace, 
the challenge of economic well-being, and 
the agenda of global interdependence. 

The age of the United Nations has also 
been an age of frequent conflict. We have 
been spared a third world war but cannot 



498 



assume that this condition will prevail for- 
ever, or without exertion. An era of thermo- 
nuclear weapons and persistent national 
rivalries requires our utmost effort to keep 
at bay the scourge of war. Our generation 
must build out of the multitude of nations 
a structure of relations that frees the ener- 
gies of nations and peoples for the positive 
endeavors of mankind, without the fear or 
threat of war. 

Central to American foreign policy are 
our sister democracies — the industrial na- 
tions of North America, Western Europe, 
the southern Pacific and Japan, and our 
traditional friends in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. We are bound to these nations by 
the ties of history, civilization, culture, 
shared principles, and a generation of 
common endeavors. 

Our alliances, founded on the bedrock of 
mutual security, now reach beyond the 
common defense to a range of new issues: 
the social challenges shared by advanced 
technological societies, common approaches 
to easing tensions with our adversaries, and 
shaping positive relations with the develop- 
ing world. The common efforts of the in- 
dustrial democracies are not directed at 
exclusive ends but as a bridge to a broader, 
more secure and cooperative international 
system and to increasing freedom and 
prosperity for all nations. 

The United States is proud of its his- 
torical friendships in the Western Hemi- 
sphere. In the modern era they must be — 
and are — based on equality and mutual 
benefit. We have a unique advantage: the 
great dialogue between the developed and 
the developing nations can find its most 
creative solution in the hemisphere where 
modern democracy was born and where 
cooperation between developed and devel- 
oping, large and small, is a longstanding 
tradition. 

Throughout history, ideology and power 
have tempted nations to seek unilateral 
advantage. But the inescapable lesson of 
the nuclear age is that the politics of tests 
of strength has become incompatible with 
the survival of humanity. Traditional power 

Department of State Bulletin 



politics becomes irrational when war can 
destroy civilized life and neither side can 
gain a decisive strategic advantage. 

Accordingly, the great nuclear powers 
have particular responsibilities for restraint 
and vision. They are in a position to know 
the full extent of the catastrophe which 
could overwhelm mankind. They must take 
care not to fuel disputes if they conduct 
their rivalries by traditional methods. If 
they turn local conflicts into aspects of a 
global competition, sooner or later their 
competition will get out of control. 

The United States believes that the fu- 
ture of mankind requires coexistence with 
the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot ob- 
scure the necessity for a more constructive 
relationship. We will insist that restraint 
be reciprocal not just in bilateral relations 
but around the globe. There can be no se- 
lective detente. We will maintain our de- 
fenses and our vigilance. But we know that 
tough rhetoric is not strength, that we owe 
future generations more hopeful prospects 
than a delicate equilibrium of awesome 
forces. 

Peace requires a balance of strategic 
power. This the United States will main- 
tain. But the United States is convinced 
that the goal of strategic balance is achiev- 
able more safely by agreement than 
through an arms race. The negotiations on 
the limitation of armaments are therefore 
at the heart of U.S.-Soviet relations. 

Unprecedented agreements limiting and 
controlling nuclear weapons have been 
reached. A historic effort is being made to 
place a ceiling on the strategic arsenals of 
both sides in accordance with the Vladi- 
vostok accord. And once this is achieved 
we are ready to seek immediately to lower 
the levels of strategic arms. 

The United States welcomes the recent 
progress that has been made in further 
curtailing nuclear weapons testing and in 
establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear 
explosions for the first time. The two trea- 
ties now signed and awaiting ratification 
should be the basis for further progress in 
this field. 

October 25, 1976 



Together with several of our European 
allies, we are continuing efforts to achieve 
a balanced reduction in the military forces 
facing each other in Central Europe. In 
some respects this is the most complex 
negotiation on arms limitation yet under- 
taken. It is our hope that through patient 
effort reciprocal reductions will soon be 
achieved that enhance the security of all 
countries involved. 

The United States remains committed to 
the work of the Geneva Disarmament Com- 
mittee. We welcome the progress there on 
banning environmental modification for 
destructive purposes. We will seriously 
examine all ideas, of whatever origin, to 
reduce the burdens of armaments. We will 
advance our own initiatives not for pur- 
poses of propaganda or unilateral advan- 
tage but to promote peace and security 
for all. 

But coexistence and negotiations on the 
control of arms do not take place in a 
vacuum. We have been disturbed by the 
continuing accumulation of armaments and 
by recent instances of military intervention 
to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant 
continents. We have noted crude attempts 
to distort the purposes of diplomacy and 
to impede hopeful progress toward peace- 
ful solutions to complex issues. These ef- 
forts only foster tensions; they cannot be 
reconciled with the policy of improving 
relations. 

And they will inevitably be resisted. For 
coexistence to be something better than an 
uneasy armistice, both sides must recognize 
that ideology and power politics today con- 
front the realities of the nuclear age and 
that a striving for unilateral advantage 
will not be accepted. 

In recent years the new relationship be- 
tween the United States and the People's 
Republic of China has held great signifi- 
cance for global security. 

We came together out of necessity and a 
mutual belief that the world should remain 
free of military blackmail and the will to 
hegemony. We have set out a new path: in 
wide-ranging consultations, bilateral ex- 



499 



changes, the opening of offices in our re- 
spective capitals, and an accelerating 
movement toward normalization. And we 
have derived reciprocal benefits: a clear 
understanding of the aspirations of our 
peoples, better prospects for international 
equilibrium, reduced tensions in Asia, and 
increased opportunities for parallel actions 
on global issues. 

These elements form the basis for a 
growing and lasting relationship founded 
on objective common interests. The United 
States is committed to strengthen the bonds 
between us and to proceed toward the 
normalization of our relations in strict con- 
formity with the principles of the Shanghai 
communique. As this process moves for- 
ward, each side must display restraint and 
respect for the interests and convictions of 
the other. We will keep Chinese interests 
in mind on all international issues and will 
do our utmost to take account of them. But 
if the relationship is to prosper, there must 
be similar sensitivity to our views and con- 
cerns. On this basis, the progressive de- 
velopment of our relations with the world's 
most populous nation will be a key element 
of the foreign policy of the United States. 

The world today is witness to continuing 
regional crises. Any one of them could 
blossom into larger conflict. Each one com- 
mands our most diligent efforts of concilia- 
tion and cooperation. The United States has 
played, and is prepared to continue to play, 
an active role in the search for peace in 
many areas: southern Africa, the Middle 
East, Korea, and Cyprus. 

Southern Africa 

Racial injustice and the grudging retreat 
of colonial power have conspired to make 
southern Africa an acid test of the world's 
hope for peace and justice under the 
charter. A host of voices have been heard 
in this chamber warning that if we failed 
quickly to find solutions to the crises of 
Namibia and Rhodesia, that part of the 
globe could become a vicious battleground 
with consequences for every part of the 
world. 



500 



I have just been to Africa, at President 
Ford's request, to see what we could do to 
help the peoples of that continent achieve 
their aspirations for freedom and justice. 

An opportunity to pull back from the 
brink now exists. I believe that Africa has 
before it the prize for which it has 
struggled for so long: the opportunity for 
Africans to shape a future of peace, jus- 
tice, racial harmony, and progress. 

The United Nations since its inception 
has been concerned with the issue of Nami- 
bia. For 30 years that territory has been a 
test of this institution's ability to make its 
decisions effective. 

In recent months the United States has 
vigorously sought to help the parties con- 
cerned speed up the process toward Nami- 
bian independence. The United States 
favors the following elements: the inde- 
pendence of Namibia with a fixed, short 
time limit, the calling of a constitutional 
conference at a neutral location under U.N. 
aegis, and the participation in that confer- 
ence of all authentic national forces in- 
cluding, specifically, SWAPO [South West 
Africa People's Organization]. 

Progress has been made in achieving all 
of these goals. We will exert our efforts tc 
remove the remaining obstacles and bring 
into being a conference which can ther 
fashion, with good will and wisdom, a de< 
sign for the new state of Namibia and its 
relationship with its neighbors. We pledge 
our continued solicitude for the independ 
ence of Namibia so that it may, in the end 
be a proud achievement of this organiza- 
tion and a symbol of international coopera- 
tion. 

Less than a week ago the Rhodesian au- 
thorities announced that they are prepared 
to meet with the nationalist leaders oi 
Zimbabwe to form an interim government 
to bring about majority rule within twc 
years. This is in itself a historic break from 
the past. The African Presidents, in calling 
for immediate negotiations, have shown 
that they are prepared to seize this oppor- 
tunity for a settlement. And the Govern- 
ment of the United Kingdom, in expressing 

Department of State Bulletin 



i 






I 



■its willingness to assemble a conference, 
■has shown its high sense of responsibility 
land concern for the rapid and just inde- 
pendence of Rhodesia. 

Inevitably after a decade of strife, sus- 
picions run deep. Many obstacles remain. 
■Magnanimity is never easy, and less so 
after a generation of bitterness and racial 
iconflict. But let us not lose sight of what 
Bias been achieved: a commitment to ma- 
jority rule within two years, a commitment 
to form immediately a transitional govern- 
pient with an African majority in the Cab- 
inet and an African prime minister, a readi- 
ness to follow this with a constitutional 
^conference to define the legal framework 
[of an independent Zimbabwe. 

The United States, together with other 
(countries, has made major efforts, and we 
will continue to do what we can to sup- 
port the hopeful process that is now pos- 
sible. But it is those in Africa who must 
[shape the future. The people of Rhodesia, 
•and the neighboring states, now face a 
supreme challenge. Their ability to work 
together, their capacity to unify, will be 
tested in the months ahead as never before. 

There may be some countries who see a 
chance for advantage in fueling the flames 
Df war and racial hatred. But they are not 
motivated by concern for the peoples of 
Africa or for peace. And if they succeed 
they could doom opportunities that might 
never return. 

In South Africa itself, the pace of change 
accelerates. The system of apartheid, by 
.whatever name, is a denial of our common 
humanity and a challenge to the conscience 
)f mankind. Change is inevitable. The lead- 
2rs of South Africa have shown wisdom in 
facilitating a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. 
The world community takes note of it and 
lrges the same wisdom — while there is 
still time — to bring racial justice to South 
Africa. 

As for the United States, we have become 
•onvinced that our values and our interests 
ire best served by an Africa seeking its 
>wn destiny free of outside intervention. 
Therefore we will back no faction, whether 



in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We will not seek 
to impose solutions anywhere. The leader- 
ship and the future of an independent 
Zimbabwe, as for the rest of Africa, are 
for Africans to decide. The United States 
will abide by their decision. We call on all 
other non-African states to do likewise. 

The United States wants no special posi- 
tion or sphere of influence. We respect 
African unity. The rivalry and interfer- 
ence of non-African powers would make a 
mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for 
independence from foreign domination. It 
will inevitably be resisted. And it is a di- 
rect challenge to the most fundamental 
principles upon which the United Nations 
is founded. 

Every nation that has signed the charter 
is pledged to allow the nations of Africa, 
whose peoples have suffered so much, to 
fulfill at long last their dreams of inde- 
pendence, peace, unity, and human dignity 
in their own way and by their own deci- 
sions. 

Middle East 

The United Nations, since its birth, has 
been involved in the chronic conflict in the 
Middle East. Each successive war has 
brought greater perils: an increased dan- 
ger of great-power confrontation and more 
severe global economic dislocations. 

At the request of the parties, the United 
States has been actively engaged in the 
search for peace in the Middle East. Since 
the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides 
has produced unprecedented steps toward 
a resolution of this bitter conflict. There 
have been three agreements that lessen the 
danger of war, and mutual commitments 
have been made to pursue the negotiating 
process with urgency until a final peace is 
achieved. As a result we are closer to the 
goal of peace than at any time in a genera- 
tion. 

The role of the United Nations has been 
crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 
1973 under its aegis, and the implementa- 
tion of subsequent agreements has been 
negotiated in its working groups. Security 



October 25, 1976 



501 



Council resolutions form the only agreed 
framework for negotiations. The U.N. 
Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer 
Force, and Truce Supervision Organization 
are even now helping maintain peace on 
the truce lines. I want to compliment the 
Secretary General and his colleagues in 
New York, Geneva, and on the ground in 
the Middle East for their vigorous support 
of the peace process at critical moments. 

The United States remains committed to 
help the parties reach a settlement. The 
step-by-step negotiations of the past three 
years have now brought us to a point where 
comprehensive solutions seem possible. The 
decision before us now is how the next 
phase of negotiations should be launched. 

The United States is prepared to partici- 
pate in an early resumption of the work of 
the Geneva Conference. We think a prepar- 
atory conference might be useful for a 
discussion of the structure of future nego- 
tiations, but we are open to other sugges- 
tions. Whatever steps are taken must be 
carefully prepared so that once the process 
begins the nations concerned will advance 
steadily toward agreement. 

The groundwork that has been laid rep- 
resents a historic opportunity. The United 
States will do all it can to assure that by 
the time this Assembly meets next year it 
will be possible to report significant further 
progress toward a just and lasting peace in 
the Middle East. 

Since the General Assembly last met, 
overwhelming tragedy has befallen the 
people of Lebanon. The United States 
strongly supports the sovereignty, unity, 
and territorial integrity of that troubled 
country. We oppose partition. We hope 
that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned 
to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All 
members of the United Nations, and all the 
conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obli- 
gation to support the efforts of the new 
President of Lebanon to restore peace and 
to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. 
And the agencies of the U.N. system can 
play an important role in the reconstruc- 
tion effort. 



502 



Korea 

The confrontation between North and 
South Korea remains a threat to interna- 
tional peace and stability. The vital inter- 
ests of world powers intersect in Korea; 
conflict there inevitably threatens wider 
war. 

We and many other U.N. members wel- 
come the fact that a contentious and sterile 
debate on Korea will be avoided this fall. 
Let this opportunity be used, then, to ad- 
dress the central problem of how the 
Korean people can determine their future 
and achieve their ultimate goal of peaceful 
reunification without a renewal of armed 
conflict. 

Our own views on the problem of Korea 
are well known. We have called for a re- 
sumption of a serious dialogue between 
North and South Korea. We have urged 
wider negotiations to promote security and 
reduce tensions. We are prepared to have 
the U.N. Command dissolved so long as the 
armistice agreement — which is the onlj 
existing legal arrangement committing the 
parties to keep the peace — is either pre 
served or replaced by more durable ar- 
rangements. We are willing to improve 
relations with North Korea provided tha' 
its allies are ready to take similar step.' 
toward the Republic of Korea. We an 
ready to talk with North Korea about th( 
peninsula's future, but we will not do s( 
without the participation of the Republic 
of Korea. 

Last fall the United States proposed i 
conference including all the parties mos 
directly concerned — North and Soutl 
Korea, the United States, and the People'! 
Republic of China — to discuss ways o: 
adapting the armistice agreement to nev 
conditions and replacing it with more per 
manent arrangements. On July 22 I statec 
our readiness to meet immediately witl 
these parties to consider the appropriate 
venue for such a conference. I reaffirm tha 
readiness here today. 

If such a conference proves impracti 
cable right now, the United States wouk 

Department of State Bulletir 



, 



7 






•;: 



k 






\ 



support a phased approach. Preliminary 
talks between North and South Korea, in- 
cluding discussions on the venue and scope 
of the conference, could start immediately. 
Kn this phase the United States and the 
People's Republic of China could partici- 
pate as observers or in an advisory role. If 
such discussions yielded concrete results, 
the United States and China could join the 
talks formally. This, in turn, could set the 
stage for a wider conference in which 
other countries could associate themselves 
with arrangements that guarantee a dura- 
ble peace on the peninsula. 

We hope that North Korea and other 
concerned parties will respond affirma- 
tively to this proposed procedure or offer 
a constructive alternative suggestion. 

Cyprus 

The world community is deeply con- 
cerned over the continuing stalemate on the 
Cyprus problem. Domestic pressures, na- 
tionalistic objectives, and international 
rivalries have combined to block the parties 
from taking even the most elementary 
steps toward a solution. On those few occa- 
sions when representatives of the two 
Cypriot communities have come together, 
they have fallen into inconclusive proce- 
dural disputes. The passage of time has 
served only to complicate domestic diffi- 
culties and to diminish the possibilities for 
constructive conciliation. The danger of 
conflict between Greece and Turkey has 
spread to other issues, as we have recently 
seen in the Aegean. 

All concerned need to focus on commit- 
:ing themselves to achieve the overriding 
objectives: assuring the well-being of the 
suffering Cypriot people and peace in the 
eastern Mediterranean. 

A settlement must come from the Cypriot 
communities themselves. It is they who 
nust decide how their island's economy, 
society, and government shall be recon- 
structed. It is they who must decide the 
iltimate relationship of the two communi- 
:ies and the territorial extent of each area. 

The United States is ready to assist in 



restoring momentum to the negotiating 
process. We believe that agreeing to a set 
of principles might help the parties to re- 
sume negotiations. We would suggest some 
concepts along the following lines: 

— A settlement should preserve the inde- 
pendence, sovereignty, and territorial in- 
tegrity of Cyprus; 

— The present dividing lines on Cyprus 
must be adjusted to reduce the area cur- 
rently controlled by the Turkish side; 

— The territorial arrangement should 
take into account the economic require- 
ments and humanitarian concerns of the 
two Cypriot communities, including the 
plight of those who remain refugees; 

— A constitutional arrangement should 
provide conditions under which the two 
Cypriot communities can live in freedom 
and have a large voice in their own affairs; 
and 

— Security arrangements should be 
agreed that permit the withdrawal of for- 
eign military forces other than those pres- 
ent under international agreement. 

I have discussed this approach with the 
Secretary General and with several West- 
ern European leaders. In the days ahead 
the United States will consult along these 
lines with all interested parties. In the 
meantime we urge the Secretary General 
to continue his dedicated efforts. 

Economic Development and Progress 

The economic division of our planet be- 
tween the Northern and Southern Hemi- 
spheres, between the industrial and devel- 
oping nations, is a dominant issue of our 
time. Our mutual dependence for our pros- 
perity is a reality, not a slogan. It should 
summon our best efforts to make common 
progress. We must commit ourselves to 
bring mankind's dreams of a better life to 
closer reality in our lifetime. 

There are many reasons why coopera- 
tion has not made greater strides: 

— The industrial democracies have some- 
times been more willing to pay lipservice 



October 25, 1976 



503 



to the challenge of development than to 
match rhetoric with real resources. 

— The oil-producing nations command 
great wealth, and some have been gener- 
ous in their contribution to international 
development. But the overall performance 
in putting that wealth to positive uses has 
been inadequate to the challenge. 

The countries with nonmarket econo- 
mies are quite prepared to undertake 
verbal assaults, but their performance is in 
inverse ratio to their rhetoric. Their real 
contribution to development assistance has 
been minimal. Last year, for example, the 
nonmarket economies provided only about 
4 percent of the public aid flowing to the 
developing nations. 

— The developing nations are under- 
standably frustrated and impatient with 
poverty, illiteracy, and disease. But too 
often they have made demands for change 
that are as confrontational as they are un- 
realistic. They sometimes speak of new 
economic orders as if growth were a quick 
fix requiring only that the world's wealth 
be properly redistributed through tests of 
strength instead of a process of self-help 
over generations. Ultimately such tactics 
lose more than they gain, for they under- 
mine the popular support in the industrial 
democracies which is imperative to provide 
the resources and market access — available 
nowhere else — to sustain development. 

The objectives of the developing nations 
are clear: a rapid rise in the incomes of 
their people, a greater role in the interna- 
tional decisions which affect them, and fair 
access to the world's economic opportuni- 
ties. 

The objectives of the industrial nations 
are equally plain: an efficient and open 
system of world trade and investment; ex- 
panding opportunities and production for 
both North and South; the reliable and 
equitable development of the world's re- 
sources of food, energy, and raw materials; 
a world economy in which prosperity is as 
close to universal as our imagination and 
our energies allow. 

These goals are complementary; indeed 



504 



they must be, for neither side can achieve 
its aims at the expense of the other. They 
can be realized only through cooperation. 
We took a major step forward together 
a year ago, at the seventh special session 
of this Assembly. And we have since fol- 
lowed through on many fronts: 



„•; 

1: 
%-■ 

i 
jet 



ft 
in 



— We have taken steps to protect the , : . 
economic security of developing nationsLi 
against cyclical financial disaster. The JI 
newly expanded compensatory finance f a-1 F 
cility of the International Monetary Fundk. 
(IMF) has disbursed over $2 billion to de-hu 
veloping nations this year alone. 

— An IMF trust fund financed by gold p 
sales has been established for the benefit^ 
of the low-income countries. 

— Replenishments for the World Bank,L 
the Inter-American Development Bank, 
and the Asian Development Bank will pro- 
vide additional resources for development. 

— Worldwide food aid has expanded. We 
have committed ourselves to expand the 
world supply of food. With a U.S. contri- 
bution of $200 million, we have brought „ a , 
the International Fund for Agricultural.^ 
Development close to operation. 

— The major industrial nations have 
moved to expand trade opportunities for 
the developing world. We have joined in a |,jf 
solemn pledge to complete by next year the 
liberalization of world trade through the 
Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotia 
tions. For its part, the United States has',: 
established a system of generalized prefer- 
ences which has significantly stimulated 
exports from developing nations to the 
United States. 



8i 



It 



II! 



I 



The United States continued this process 
by putting forward a number of new pro- 
posals at the fourth ministerial United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment in May 1976. We proposed a compre- 
hensive plan to improve the capacity of the 
developing countries to select, adapt, im- 
prove, and manage technology for develop- 
ment. We committed ourselves to improve- 
ments in the quality of aid, proposing that 
a greater proportion of aid to poor coun 



Department of State Bulletin 



ries be on a grant basis and untied to purc- 
hases from donor nations. We agreed to 
, serious effort to improve markets of 18 
asic commodities. 

These measures undertaken since we met 
ere just a year ago assist — not with rhet- 
ric and promises, but in practical and con- 
rete ways — the peoples of the world who 
re struggling to throw off the chains of 
overty. 

Much remains to be done. 

First, the application of science and tech- 
ology is at the very heart of the develop- 
aent process. The United States, conscious 
f its pioneering role in technology, has put 
brward three basic principles, which we 
/ill support with funds and talent: 

— To train individuals who can identify, 
elect, and manage the future technology 
jf the developing world; 

— To build both national and interna- 
onal institutions to create indigenous 
pchnology, as well as adapt foreign de- 
ligns and inventions; and 
• — To spur the private sector to make its 
iiaximum contribution to the development 
Jnd transfer of technological progress. 

i To achieve these goals, we are today ex- 
ending an invitation to the World Confer- 
pce on Science and Technology for Devel- 
pment, now scheduled for 1979, to meet 
li this country. In preparation for that 
leeting, we have asked members of the 
iidustrial, academic, and professional sci- 
intific communities throughout the United 
tates to meet in Washington in November, 
ihey will review the important initiatives 
|iis country can take to expand the techno- 
;>gical base for development, and they will 
■rive to develop new approaches. 
I Second, the ministerial meeting of the 
conference on International Economic Co- 
'Deration in Paris should be given new 
:ipetus. We are making several new pro- 
posals: 

— We will seek to help nations facing se- 
r ire debt burdens. For acute cases we will 
1'opose guidelines for debt renegotiation. 
Bpr countries facing longer term problems, 



we will propose systematic examination of 
remedial measures, including increased aid. 
— We will advance new ideas for ex- 
panded cooperation in energy including a 
regular process of information exchange 
among energy producers and users, and an 
expanded transfer of energy-related tech- 
nology to energy-poor developing nations. 

Third, the industrial democracies have 
been far too willing to wait for the de- 
mands of the developing countries rather 
than to advance their own proposals. Now, 
however, the OECD [Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development] 
countries, at the suggestion of the United 
States, have agreed to examine long-range 
development planning and to develop a 
more coherent and comprehensive ap- 
proach to global growth and economic jus- 
tice. 

Fourth, natural disaster each year takes 
thousands of lives and costs billions of dol- 
lars. It strikes most those who can afford it 
the least, the poorest peoples of the world. 
Its toll is magnified by a large array of 
global issues: overpopulation, food scar- 
city, damage to the ecology, and economic 
underdevelopment. The United Nations has 
a unique capacity to address these global 
concerns and thus improve man's odds 
against nature. We urge this body to take 
the lead in strengthening international co- 
operation to prevent and alleviate natural 
calamity. 

Our dream is that all the children of the 
world can live with hope and widening op- 
portunity. No nation can accomplish this 
alone; no group of nations can achieve it 
through confrontation. But together there 
is a chance for major progress — and in our 
generation. 

Interdependence and Community 

It is an irony of our time that an age of 
ideological and nationalistic rivalry has 
spawned as well a host of challenges that 
no nation can possibly solve by itself: 

— The proliferation of nuclear weapons 
capabilities adds a new dimension of dan- 



<:tober 25, 1976 



505 



ger to political conflicts, regionally and 
globally. 

— As technology opens up the oceans, 
conflicting national claims and interests 
threaten chaos. 

— Man's inventiveness has developed the 
horrible new tool of terror that claims inno- 
cent victims on every continent. 

— Human and civil rights are widely 
abused and have now become an accepted 
concern of the world community. 

Let me set forth the U.S. position on 
these topics-. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation 

The growing danger of the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons raises stark questions 
about man's ability to insure his very exist- 
ence. 

We have lived through three perilous 
decades in which the catastrophe of nu- 
clear war has been avoided despite a stra- 
tegic rivalry between a relatively few na- 
tions. 

But now a wholly new situation impends. 
Many nations have the potential to build 
nuclear weapons. If this potential were to 
materialize, threats to use nuclear weap- 
ons, fed by mutually reinforcing misconcep- 
tions, could become a recurrent feature of 
local conflicts in every quarter of the globe. 
And there will be growing dangers of acci- 
dents, blackmail, theft, and nuclear ter- 
rorism. Unless current trends are altered 
rapidly, the likelihood of nuclear devasta- 
tion could grow steadily in the years to 
come. 

We must look first to the roots of the 
problem: 

— Since the 1973 energy crisis and dras- 
tic rise in oil prices, both developed and 
developing nations have seen in nuclear en- 
ergy a means both of lowering the cost of 
electricity and of reducing reliance upon 
imported petroleum. 

— In an age of growing nationalism some 
see the acquisition and expansion of nu- 
clear power as symbols of enhanced na- 
tional prestige. And it is also clear that 



506 



some nations, in attaining this peaceful 
technology, may wish to provide for them- 
selves a future option to acquire nuclear 
weapons. 

A nation that acquires the potential for 
a nuclear weapons capability must accept 
the consequences of its action. It is bound 
to trigger offsetting actions by its neighbors 
and stimulate broader proliferation, there- 
by accelerating a process that ultimately 
will undermine its own security. And it is 
disingenuous to label as "peaceful" nuclear 
devices which palpably are capable of 
massive military destruction. The spread of 
nuclear reactor and fuel cycle capabilities, 
especially in the absence of evident eco- 
nomic need and combined with ambiguous 
political and military motives, threatens to 
proliferate nuclear weapons with all their 
dangers. 

Time is of the essence. In no area of in- 
ternational concern does the future of this 
planet depend more directly upon what this 
generation elects to do — or fails to do. We 
must move on three broad fronts: 

— First, international safeguards musi 
be strengthened and strictly enforced. Th( 
supply and use of nuclear materials associ- 
ated with civilian nuclear energy programs 
must be carefully safeguarded so that the} 
will not be diverted. Nuclear suppliers musi 
impose the utmost restraint upon them 
selves and not permit the temptations o1 
commercial advantage to override the risks 
of proliferation. The physical security oJ 
nuclear materials — whether in use, storage 
or transfer — must be increased. The Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency must re- 
ceive the full support of all nations in mak- 
ing its safeguards effective, reliable, anc 
universally applicable. Any violator of the 
IAEA safeguards must face immediate and 
drastic penalties. 

— Second, adherence to safeguards 
while of prime importance, is no guarantee 
against future proliferation. We must con- 
tinue our efforts to forge international re- 
straints against the acquisition or transfer 
of reprocessing facilities which produce 

Department of State Bulletin 



^separated plutonium and of enrichment fa- 
cilities which produce highly enriched ura- 
nium — both of which are usable for the 
construction of nuclear weapons. 

— Third, we must recognize that one of 
the principal incentives for seeking sensi- 
tive reprocessing and enrichment technol- 
ogy is the fear that essential nonsensitive 
materials, notably reactor-grade uranium 
fuel, will not be made available on a reliable 
basis. Nations that show their sense of in- 
ternational responsibility by accepting 
effective restraints have a right to expect 
reliable and economical supply of peaceful 
nuclear reactors and associated nonsensi- 
tive fuel. The United States, as a principal 
supplier of these items, is prepared to be 
responsive in this regard. 

In the near future President Ford will 
announce a comprehensive American pro- 
gram for international action on nonprolif- 
eration that reconciles global aspirations 
for assured nuclear supply with global re- 
quirements for nuclear control. 

We continue to approach the prolifera- 
tion problem in full recognition of the re- 
sponsibility that we and other nuclear pow- 
ers have — both in limiting our weapons 
arsenals and in insuring that the benefits 
of peaceful nuclear energy can be made 
available to all states within a shared 
framework of effective international safe- 
guards. In this way the atom can be seen 
once again as a boon and not a menace to 
mankind. 

Laiv of the Sea Negotiations 

Another issue of vast global consequence 
is the law of the sea. The negotiations 
which have just recessed in New York rep- 
resent one of the most important, complex, 
and ambitious diplomatic undertakings in 
history. 

Consider what is at stake: 

— Mankind is attempting to devise an 
international regime for nearly three quar- 
ters of the earth's surface. 

— Some 150 nations are participating, 
reflecting all the globe's diverse national 



perspectives, ideologies, and practical con- 
cerns. 

— A broad sweep of vital issues is in- 
volved: economic development, military se- 
curity, freedom of navigation, crucial and 
dwindling living resources, the ocean's 
fragile ecology, marine scientific research, 
and vast potential mineral wealth. 

— The world community is aspiring to 
shape major new international legal prin- 
ciples: the extension of the long-estab- 
lished territorial sea, the creation of a 
completely new concept of an economic 
zone extending 200 miles, and the designa- 
tion of the deep seabeds as the "common 
heritage of mankind." 

We have traveled an extraordinary dis- 
tance in these negotiations in recent years 
— thanks in no small part to the skill and 
dedication of the distinguished President 
of this Assembly. Agreement exists on key 
concepts: a 12-mile territorial sea, free 
passage over and through straits, a 200- 
mile economic zone, and important pollu- 
tion controls. In many fields we have re- 
placed ideological debates with serious 
efforts to find concrete solutions. And there 
is growing consensus that the outstanding 
problems must be solved at the next 
session. 

But there is hardly room for compla- 
cency. Important issues remain which, if 
not settled, could cause us to forfeit all our 
hard-won progress. The conference has yet 
to agree on the balance between coastal 
state and international rights in the eco- 
nomic zone, on the freedom of marine sci- 
entific research, on arrangements for 
dispute settlement, and most crucially, on 
the regime for exploitation of the deep sea- 
beds. 

The United States has made major pro- 
posals to resolve the deep seabed issue. We 
have agreed that the seabeds are the 
common heritage of all mankind. We have 
proposed a dual system for the exploitation 
of seabed minerals by which half of the 
mining sites would be reserved for the In- 
ternational Authority and half could be 
developed by individual nations and their 



October 25, 1976 



507 



nationals on the basis of their technical 
capacity. We have offered to find financing 
and to transfer the technology needed to 
make international mining a practical real- 
ity. And in light of the many uncertainties 
that lie ahead, we have proposed that there 
be a review — for example, in 25 years — to 
determine whether the provisions on sea- 
bed mining are working equitably. 

In response some nations have escalated 
both their demands and the stridency with 
which they advocate them. 

I must say candidly that there are limits 
beyond which no American Administration 
can, or will, go. If attempts are made to 
compel concessions which exceed those 
limits, unilateralism will become inevitable. 
Countries which have no technological ca- 
pacity for mining the seabeds in the fore- 
seeable future should not seek to impose a 
doctrine of total internationalization on 
nations which alone have this capacity and 
which have voluntarily offered to share it. 
The United States has an interest in the 
progressive development of international 
law, stable order, and global cooperation. 
We are prepared to make sacrifices for this 
— but they cannot go beyond equitable 
bounds. 

Let us therefore put aside delaying tac- 
tics and pressures and take the path of co- 
operation. If we have the vision to con- 
clude a treaty considered fair and just by 
mankind, our labors will have profound 
meaning not only for the regime of the 
oceans but for all efforts to build a peace- 
ful, cooperative, and prosperous interna- 
tional community. The United States will 
spend the interval between sessions of the 
conference reviewing its positions and will 
approach other nations well in advance of 
the next session at the political level to es- 
tablish the best possible conditions for its 
success. 

International Terrorism 

A generation that dreams of world peace 
and economic progress is plagued by a new, 
brutal, cowardly, and indiscriminate form 
of violence: international terrorism. Small 



groups have rejected the norms of civilized 
behavior and wantonly taken the lives of 
defenseless men, women, and children- 
innocent victims with no power to affect the 
course of events. In the year since I last 
addressed this body, there have been 11 
hijackings, 19 kidnapings, 42 armed at- 
tacks, and 112 bombings perpetrated by 
international terrorists. Over 70 people 
have lost their lives, and over 200 have 
been injured. 

It is time this organization said to the 
world that the vicious murder and abuse of 
innocents cannot be absolved or excused by 
the invocation of lofty motives. Criminal 
acts against humanity, whatever the pro- 
fessed objective, cannot be excused by any 
civilized nation. 

The threat of terrorism should be dealt 
with through the cooperative efforts of all 
countries. More stringent steps must be 
taken now to deny skyjackers and terror- 
ists a safe haven. 

Additional measures are required to pro- 
tect passengers in both transit and termi- 
nal areas, as well as in flight. 

The United States will work within th 
International Civil Aviation Organizatio 
to expand its present technical assistance 
to include the security of air carriers and 
terminal facilities. We urge the universal 
implementation of aviation security stand 
ards adopted by the ICAO. We are pre 
pared to assist the efforts of othe 
governments to implement those standards. 
The United States will support new initi- 
atives which will insure the safety of the 
innocent. The proposal of the distinguishe 
Foreign Minister of the Federal Republi 
of Germany against the taking of hostage 
deserves the most serious and sympatheti 
consideration of this Assembly. 

The United States will do everything 
within its power to work cooperatively in 
the United Nations and in other interna- 
tional bodies to put an end to the scourge 
of terrorism. But we have an obligation to 
protect the lives of our citizens as they 
travel at home or abroad, and we intend to 
meet that obligation. Therefore, if multi 



508 



Department of State Bulletin 



lateral efforts are blocked by those deter- 
mined to pursue their ends without regard 
for suffering or death, then the United 
States will act through its own legislative 
processes and in conjunction with others 
willing to join us. 

Terrorism is an international problem. It 
is inconceivable that an organization of the 
world's nations would fail to take effective 
action against it. 

Human Rights 

The final measure of all we do together, 
of course, is man himself. Our common ef- 
forts to define, preserve, and enhance re- 
spect for the rights of man thus represent 
an ultimate test of international coopera- 
tion. 

We Americans, in the year of our Bicen- 
tennial, are conscious — and proud — of our 
own traditions. Our founders wrote 200 
years ago of the equality and inalienable 
rights of all men. Since then the ideals of 
liberty and democracy have become the uni- 
versal and indestructible goals of mankind. 

But the plain truth — of tragic propor- 
tions — is that human rights are in jeopardy 
over most of the globe. Arbitrary arrest, 
denial of fundamental procedural rights, 
slave labor, stifling of freedom of religion, 
racial injustice, political repression, the 
use of torture, and restraints on communi- 
cations and expression — these abuses are 
too prevalent. 

The performance of the U.N. system in 
protecting human rights has fallen far 
short of what was envisaged when this or- 
ganization was founded. The principles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
are clear enough. But their invocation and 
application, in general debates of this body 
and in the forums of the Human Rights 
Commission, have been marred by hypoc- 
risy, double standards, and discrimination. 
Flagrant and consistent deprivation of hu- 
man rights is no less heinous in one country 
3r one social system than in another. Nor 
is it more acceptable when practiced upon 
members of the same race than when in- 



flicted by one race upon another. 

The international community has a 
unique role to play. The application of the 
standards of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights should be entrusted to fair 
and capable international bodies. But at the 
same time let us insure that these bodies 
do not become platforms from which na- 
tions which are the worst transgressors 
pass hypocritical judgment on the alleged 
shortcomings. 

Let us together pursue practical ap- 
proaches: 

— To build on the foundations already 
laid at previous Assemblies and at the Hu- 
man Rights Commission to lessen the abom- 
inable practice of officially sanctioned 
torture ; 

— To promote acceptance of procedures 
for protecting the rights of people subject 
to detention, such as access to courts, coun- 
sel, and families and prompt release or fair 
and public trial ; 

— To improve the working procedures of 
international bodies concerned with human 
rights so that they may function fairly and 
effectively; and 

— To strengthen the capability of the 
United Nations to meet the tragic problems 
of the ever-growing number of refugees 
whose human rights have been stripped 
away by conflict in almost every continent. 

The United States pledges its firm sup- 
port to these efforts. 

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, 
distinguished delegates: The challenge to 
statesmanship in this generation is to ad- 
vance from the management of crises to 
the building of a more stable and just in- 
ternational order — an order resting not on 
power but on restraint of power, not on 
the strength of arms but on the strength of 
the human spirit. 

Global forces of change now shape our 
future. Order will come in one of two ways : 
through its imposition by the strong and 
the ruthless or by the wise and farsighted 
use of international institutions through 
which we enlarge the sphere of common 



Dctober 25, 1976 



509 



interests and enhance the sense of com- 
munity. 

It is easy and tempting to press relent- 
lessly for national advantage. It is infi- 
nitely more difficult to act in recognition of 
the rights of others. Throughout history, 
the greatness of men and nations has been 
measured by their actions in times of acute 
peril. Today there is no single crisis to con- 
quer. There is instead a persisting chal- 
lenge of staggering complexity — the need 
to create a universal community based on 
cooperation, peace, and justice. 

If we falter, future generations will pay 
for our failure. If we succeed, it will have 
been worthy of the hopes of mankind. I 
am confident that we can succeed. 

And it is here, in the assembly of na- 
tions, that we should begin. 



Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 31st U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 22 confirmed 
the nominations of the following-named 
persons to be Representatives and Alter- 
nate Representatives of the United States 
to the 31st session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations: 

Representatives 

William W. Scranton 

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. 

George McGovern, U.S. Senator from the State 

of South Dakota 
Howard H. Baker, Jr., U.S. Senator from the 

State of Tennessee 
Rev. Robert P. Hupp 

Alternate Representatives 

Albert W. Sherer, Jr. 
Jacob M. Myerson 
Nancy V. Rawls 
Stephen Hess 
Ersa Hines Poston 



United Nations Day, 1976 

A PROCLAMATION 1 

On October 24 we will observe the 31st anniversary 
of the United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945 by 
governments determined to prevent a repetition of 
world war, to encourage the development of human 
rights and justice, and to remove the underlying 
causes of conflict by promoting economic and social 
progress for all nations. 

The United States has played a leading role in 
encouraging the Organization to fulfill the promise 
of the Charter. We, and the rest of mankind, have 
benefited greatly from the vital contributions made 
by the Organization, particularly the Security Council, 
to the maintenance of world peace — the most striking 
reminder being the current peacekeeping role of the 
United Nations in the Middle East. 

The United Nations has also been a forum foi 
other areas of international concern: conferences tc 
work out laws to govern the use of the oceans, tc 
promote arms control, and to focus world attention or 
such problems as human rights, health, education 
and hunger; new programs to promote trade am 
economic developments; and other activities designee 
to solve many of the new problems associated wit! 
independence in today's world. 

Now, Therefore, I, Gerald R. Ford, President o:. 
the United States of America, do hereby designate 
Sunday, October 24, 1976, as United Nations Day. 
urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that da; 
with community programs that will promote tb 
United Nations and its affiliated agencies. 

I have appointed Edgar Speer to be United State 
National Chairman for United Nations Day and 
through him, I call upon State and local officials i 
encourage citizens' groups and all agencies of com 
munication to engage in appropriate observances o 
United Nations Day in cooperation with the Unitei 
Nations Association of the United States of Americ; 
and other interested organizations. 

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set m; 
hand this seventh day of September in the year o 
our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of th 
Independence of the United States of America th 
two hundred and first. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



1 No. 4454; 41 Fed. Reg. 38147. 



510 



Department of State Bulletii 



Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern African Issues 
With African and British Officials 



Secretary Kissinger visited Tanzania Sep- 
tember 14-15 and 21, Zambia September 
15-17 and 20-21, South Africa September 
17-20, Zaire September 21-22, Kenya Sep- 
tember 22-23, and the United Kingdom Sep- 
tember 2S-2U. He met with the Presidents 
of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Kenya; at 
Pretoria he met with South African Prime 
Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster and 
with a Rhodesian delegation headed by Ian D. 
Smith; he met ivith British Prime Minister 
James Callaghan and Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commomvealth Affairs Anthony 
Crosland at London. Folloiving are state- 
ments and news conferences by Secretary 
Kissinger and a news conference held by the 
Secretary and Foreign Secretary Crosland. 1 



ARRIVAL, DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA, 
SEPTEMBER 14 



The United States wants nothing for it- 
self except its interest in peace and in eco- 
nomic and social progress. The conflict that 
we are trying to end is a conflict which will 
affect most of all the peoples of Africa. 
The progress we are trying to bring will 
benefit, above all, the peoples of Africa. 

We will do what we are asked to do; we 
will do nothing that is not requested; we 
will take no initiatives that are not invited; 
and whatever progress will occur depends 
on the attitude of the parties and the good 
will of the participants. We are prepared 
to make the effort that is encouraged. 

And in this spirit I look forward very 
much to my talks with the distinguished 
leader of this country, President Nyerere, 
with whom we have had close communica- 
tions over the recent months and who has 
encouraged us in our enterprise. 



Press release 435 dated September 14 

I have come here at the direction of 
President Ford to talk with President 
Nyerere about the prospects for peace in 
southern Africa. 

This initiative started at the request of 
African leaders during my visit in April. 
Every step that has brought us here has 
been carefully discussed with leaders in 
Africa, and especially with the frontline 
Presidents. Every step we will take in the 
future will be closely coordinated with the 
frontline Presidents. 



1 Other press releases relating to the Secretary's 
trip are Nos. 432 of Sept. 13, 439 of Sept. 15, 443 of 
Sept. 16, 448 of Sept. 19, 450 of Sept. 20, 451 of 
Sept. 21, 453 and 459 of Sept. 22, and 463 and 465-469 
of Sept. 23. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, DAR ES SALAAM, 
SEPTEMBER 15 

Press release 437 dated September 15 

Secretary Kissinger: I understand this is 
a day of press conferences. We will go 
right to the questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, we've just come from a 
press conference with President Nyerere 
which was, to say the least, not encouraging 
for your mission. On both the Namibian and 
the Rhodesian questions, he said he received 
nothing of encouragement. In fact, on the 
Namibian question he said he is now less 
hopeful than before. Does this reflect your 
views on the future? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have said from the 



October 25, 1976 



511 



beginning that whatever can be achieved 
depends on the attitude of the parties. All 
the United States can do is to enable the 
parties to deal with each other; to bring 
whatever ideas they have; occasionally to 
offer a suggestion, based on the knowledge 
of having talked to the parties, of what 
might be possible. But ultimately it is up 
to the parties to decide. 

Nothing has changed from what was 
known a week ago, and therefore I cannot 
make judgments based on fluctuating 
moods. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the fact alone that 
nothing has changed since last week an un- 
hopeful sign? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, nothing could 
change since last week, since the positions 
of the parties — the purpose of my visit here 
was to get clear about the view of Tan- 
zania. I will then take the views of the 
frontline Presidents to Pretoria, and then 
I will return to Lusaka and here. At that 
point we will be able to judge whether any 
progress has been made. But it is not pos- 
sible to judge that on the first day. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the other purposes 
of your visit here was to find out what deci- 
sions were taken at the five-nation African 
summit. Can you give us some idea as to 
what the consensus ivas at that summit? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have a rather clearer 
idea now of what the views were. I do not 
believe that it is up to me to discuss the 
decisions of the five-nation African summit. 
I think this is a question that should be 
addressed to President Nyerere. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what if the worst comes 
to the worst? Should the peaceful negotia- 
tions you are undertaking right noiu fail and 
the armed struggle is intensified, which side 
ivill the United States support? 

Secretary Kissinger: We can give no blank 
check in advance. We are here to find 
peaceful solutions. We have at this mo- 
ment not given up expectations of peaceful 
solutions, and that is a question that can 



512 



be addressed when we know the circum- I 
stances which made peaceful solutions im- 

possible. 

Q. Will you clarify the four points put by I 
the Tanzanian Government on fear of the I 
American intervention in the present situa- I 
Hon in southern Africa? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has I 
made clear on many occasions that it has I 
no intention of intervening in southern Af- 
rica. The United States pursues a policy 
that African development should be in the 
hands of Africans. We also oppose the in- 
tervention of any other outside powers. The 
United States has no intention by itself to 
initiate intervention in Africa. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere made 
clear that he thought only the South Africans 
and SWAPO [South West Africa People's 
Organization] should be represented at a 
constitutional conference on Namibia. Is it 
the American view that the tribal and ethnic 
groups that were represented at the Wind- 
hoek conference should also participate? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is 
putting forward no program of its own. 
The United States communicates the posi- 
tions of the parties, each to the other, with 
the explanation that each party gives for its 
position. At the end of that process the 
parties will have to decide whether they 
can reconcile their differences. And in any 
negotiation each side has a tendency to 
state its optimum conditions at the outset, 
and if a solution is reached, it will depend 
on whether there is a willingness to com- 
promise by one or both sides. That deter- 
mination will have to be made later. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, both in the statement by 
the Tanzanian Government yesterday and in 
the press conference of President Nyerere, 
there ivas a strong implication and a fear 
expressed in a way that your approach, the 
American approach, toward the problems of 
southern Africa is unduly obsessed with the 
fear of the spread of communism here. Since 
this does seem to be a rather important fear 



Department of State Bulletin 



here, I tvonder if you ivould address yourself 
to it? 

Secretary Kissinger: They are two sepa- 
rate problems. We do not say that the lib- 
eration movements are Communist, and we 
do not fear the liberation movements, 
either in their own right or because they 
are Communist. On the other hand, we are 
concerned when there are interventions 
from outside the continent here. But, in 
themselves, our concern here is to help 
bring a peaceful solution, to enable the 
peoples of this area to make progress. 

We can only repeat that the lives that 
will be saved will be African lives. The 
progress that will be made will be African 
progress. It is not something from which 
i the United States benefits, and it is not a 
J part of an anti-Communist crusade against 
; l any particular movement, because it is pre- 
cisely these movements that will ultimately 
i benefit from a peaceful solution. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you 
heard here today, are you more or less hope- 
ful about the possibilities of finding a peace- 
. ful solution? 

Secretary Kissinger: My views are ap- 
proximately those with which I came. That 
c is to say, I have heard the views now ex- 
> plained in greater detail by the President 
f of Tanzania. I am certain that since this is 
1 the beginning of the process they were not 
( understated. These views have been ex- 
! pressed; they will be faithfully conveyed 
in Pretoria. The views of the other side will 
fbe equally faithfully repeated here. 

I found no surprises and nothing to 
I change my basic view, which is that the 
j chances are somewhat less than 50-50; 
that the worst that can happen if this mis- 
sion does not succeed is what is certain to 
happen without this mission; that no one 
else was available — no other country was 
available — to undertake it; that the effort 
has to be made, and if it should fail and 
conflict should prove unavoidable, at least 
we will know it is not because the United 
States failed to make a major effort. 



Q. Woidd you be able to confirm what Pres- 
ident Nyerere said, and that ivas that Cuban 
intervention in Angola took place only after 
South African intervention? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, I hope you all 
realize I have not seen a transcript of Pres- 
ident Nyerere's press conference. 

Our understanding is that Cubans were 
in Angola before South Africans, and I 
seem to recall a speech by Fidel Castro in 
which he pointed out that the reason they 
reinforced the Cubans is because some of 
them had been killed by South Africans, 
from which one would assume they were 
there before the South Africans. But I 
would have to check this to make sure. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, another thing President 
Nyerere indicated ivas that — in fact, he said 
something to the effect — that he didn't under- 
stand how even intelligent people could be so 
preoccupied with the subject of Cuba. I think 
we might infer from that that there has been 
rather a difference of opinion betiveen your- 
self and the President on the subject. Has it 
come up? 

Secretary Kissinger: The subject of Cuba 
was not discussed between President 
Nyerere and myself. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Tanzanian 
Government asked that the United States de- 
clare its support for the freedom fighters in 
the event that negotiations fail. Have you 
given President Nyerere such assurances, or 
are you prepared to make such a declaration 
of support? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I have indicated, 
we do not operate on the assumption that 
negotiations will fail, and until the negoti- 
ations have failed, we cannot make any 
such commitment. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere put it 
slightly differently today. He said that be- 
cause of an ambiguity it would be a good 
thing if the United States ivoidd say it ivill 
not help those who are fighting majority rule 
— in other ivords, the Smith regime — if the 



O 



ctober 25, 1976 



513 



guerrilla war should become ivorse. Can 
you — 

Secretary Kissinger: We stated our posi- 
tion in the Lusaka speech, and this remains 
American policy. 2 I am conducting my con- 
versations with President Nyerere privately 
and not by commenting on his press con- 
ference. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you at this point 
clarify at all what you regard as the specific 
obstacles you are facing in trying to be help- 
ful in both the Rhodesian and the Namibian 
situations? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is clear that a con- 
flict that has gone on for so many years and 
has such a long history has created pro- 
found distrust and so many efforts have 
failed that the parties are becoming more 
and more committed to the process of 
struggle rather than to the process of nego- 
tiation. I think this is the basic underlying 
obstacle — the reluctance of anybody to 
admit that negotiations are possible before 
they know that negotiations will succeed. 
And of course they will never find out 
whether negotiations will succeed until 
they first admit that they are possible. This 
is the underlying difficulty. 

Then there are many specific issues: the 
composition of conferences, the basic 
agenda that conferences might address, 
what issues should be dealt with as pre- 
conditions, and which issues can be left to 
the conference. All of these are before the 
various parties, and all of these will be ex- 
plored over the next few days. 

Q. I'd like to follow that up. Have you 
made at this stage any advance in these pro- 
cedural questions? 

Secretary Kissinger: An advance has been 
made over the time that these discussions 
started. But it would be rash to say that a 
solution is in sight. 



- For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka, 
Zambia, on Apr. 27. see Bulletin of May 31, 1976, 
p. 672. 



514 



Q. Woidd the process of negotiation in 
Rhodesia toward majority rule be hastened 
if the present government were to be re- 
moved or otherwise removed itself? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are dealing with 
the issues and not with the personalities 
and structures. We are telling each side 
what we believe the requirements of a suc- 
cessful negotiation are. 

Which authorities carry this out is for 
the people concerned to determine. 

Q. Early this year the United States par- 
ticipated in the Security Council triple veto 
which saved South Africa from U.N. military 
and economic sanctions. With U.S. national 
investments and political interests in South 
Africa, do you really think the United States 
can be an impartial peacemaker in southern 
Africa ? 

Secretary Kissinger: On my visit to Africa 
in April, every African leader that I saw 
urged me to get in touch with Prime Min- 
ister Vorster since it was their belief that 
he held the key to a solution in southerr 
Africa. 

We would not be engaged in this process 
if we did not believe that our influence car 
bring about peace and in the direction thai 
has been requested by black African lead- 
ers. Whether it will succeed or not is foi 
the future to determine and depends on the 
attitude of all of the parties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere spoki 
of the possibility of a proclamation betweet 
yourself and Ian Smith being drawn up. Cat 
you tell us if this was in fact discussed? Anc 
secondly, was the question of compensation 
for white settlers in Rhodesia discusseo 
today ? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is absolutelj 
no possibility of a joint proclamation be- 
tween Ian Smith and the U.S. Government 
The question of compensation — the issue 
isn't compensation. The question of a finan- 
cial-guarantees plan was discussed and mel 
with the approval of President Nyerere. 



Department of State Bulletin 



I 



ll 






I! 






Q. The President said that this did crop up. 
\Do iv e take it from that that you rejected the 
\question of a joint proclamation? 

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of a joint 
iproclamation has never come up, was never 
idiscussed between President Nyerere and 
myself, has never been requested by the 
Rhodesians or anybody else. Indeed, we 
lhave not been in touch with the Rhodesians, 
so it could not have come up. At any rate, 
that is not a possibility. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the apparent is- 
sues of difference, though, is that President 
Nyerere said that it ivas his belief that the 
great majority of ivhites in Rhodesia ivoidd 
leave. Is that an African consensus, and how 
does it square with your own views on the 
future of Rhodesia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know 
whether he said "should" or "would." And 
our position has been that the communities 
should be enabled to live together, that 
there should be no discrimination of one 
side against the other, but that the final 
relationship between the communities is 
one that has to be settled by a constitu- 
tional conference or some other device, 
which is at this point premature. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your prob- 
lem about measuring any degree of progress 
ht this particular time. But after all, you've 
had a weekend of talks with Prime Minister 
Vorster; you've had today with President 
Nyerere. Do you find, even in a tentative way, 
Uhe possibility of coinciding views that in fact 
makes you a touch more optimistic than 
you're prepared to concede today? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are several 
coinciding views and several sharply dif- 
ferent views. The question which we face 
in the next week is whether the different 
dews can be bridged. This I cannot judge 
jntil we have had further conversations. If 
ihere were not some possibility of bridging 
:hese views we would not have undertaken 
;he journey. 



Q. On the question of guarantees to the 
white community in Rhodesia — in addition to 
the perhaps billion dollars that is being talked 
about to safeguard the white minority in 
Rhodesia, there seems to be another element, 
an element concerning the relationship or 
some guarantees being given by a black ma- 
jority government to the white community in 
Rhodesia. Now, ivoidd these guarantees in- 
clude things like the right to live, work, and 
vote in Rhodesia like any other citizen, or is 
there something else involved? 

Secretary Kissinger: It has always been my 
understanding from the African Presidents 
that they want a society that is not based 
on any racial discrimination from either 
side. I have never been given any other 
indication. 

What specific guarantees will be worked 
out in this connection will depend on a con- 
ference, if there is a peaceful settlement, 
that will eventually have to take place be- 
tween Rhodesian nationalists and the Rho- 
desian white settlers under British aegis. 
I am in no position to go into the precise 
details. The United States is not prescrib- 
ing the details of the settlement. The 
United States indicates its general attitude 
on the kind of solution it favors, but it can- 
not compel the parties to accept that pref- 
erence. 

Q. Certain circles have said that the sud- 
den interest the United States has shown in 
the southern Africa problem is because of the 
fear of communism. Would you subscribe to 
that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not know 
who these circles are. On my previous visit 
all of the leaders I met were very critical 
of the United States for not showing suffi- 
cient interest in Africa and urged us to 
show interest in Africa. Now we are show- 
ing interest in Africa. Why can you not 
ascribe it to the persuasiveness of your 
leaders? [Laughter.] 

Q. Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be logical for 
anybody, for an African in particular, to take 



Dctober 25, 1976 



515 



the U.S. initiative suspiciously, particularly 
when you consider that it is the Americans 
who are propping up the Smith regime eco- 
nomically 1 ? 

Secretary Kissinger: What we are seeking 
to achieve is what African leaders have 
been asking for. Every move we have made 
has been made in close consultation with 
the leaders of Africa. If the leaders of 
Africa are suspicious and if the leaders of 
Africa believe that the American initiative 
cannot be helpful, then we will of course 
stop this initiative. We will have to be 
judged by the results. And we have tried in 
good faith to prevent a conflict the major 
impact of which will be on Africa. It is 
now up to Africans to decide whether they 
will wish to continue to cooperate with this 
or not. So far everything that has been 
done has been with the encouragement and 
with the approval of African leaders. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there are American 
troops in [inaudible] ? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has no objection to the MPLA [Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola] 
as a political force. The FRELIMO [Mo- 
zambique Liberation Front] in Mozam- 
bique, whose political views are nearly 
indistinguishable from MPLA, was recog- 
nized by the United States as soon as it 
took office, and we have established a rea- 
sonable relationship with Mozambique. 

Our objection to Angola was the massive 
infusion of Soviet military help to begin 
with, followed by the sending of an expe- 
ditionary force, which was not — or could 
not have happened on the part of so small 
a country as Cuba without Soviet support. 
Therefore it seemed to us a massive out- 
side intervention into the affairs of Africa. 

This is the view of the United States on 
that subject, and it is a quite different 
matter whether an expeditionary force 
appears in a civil war or as part of a nor- 
mal alliance relationship. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, last week the summit 
conference was attended by President Agos- 



516 



tinho Neto [of Angola]. In view of the fact 
that your government does not recognize his 
government, do you expect you might have 
to meet with him at some point, and how 
would you surmount this problem? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that 
I will meet President Neto on this trip. 

Q. Last month the State Department stated 
that the South African promise to grant 
Namibia independence did not go far enough. 
What would you find acceptable in terms of 
independence? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated that 
simply giving a date for independence did 
not go far enough. Our view is that there 
has to be a procedure by which all authen- 
tic groups can participate in the negotia- 
tions, and a conference which is acceptable 
to those parties most concerned. 

Q. On the question of South Africa, I 
understand that you did discuss this with 
President Nyerere today, but it ivas widely 
reported that during your talks with Prime 
Minister Vorster in Zurich you were seeking 
to find out whether or not Vorster was ivill- 
ing to detach or separate the future of South 
Africa from the futures of Namibia and 
Zimbabwe. You have yourself stated on sev- 
eral occasions that you see the necessity for 
the end of the apartheid system in South 
Africa. But the logical extension of ending 
apartheid in South Africa is black majority 
rule, and therefore it would seem that any 
detachment or separation of the issues of 
southern Africa would only be a matter of 
time. 

If it is correct to assume that eventually 
we would be looking for black majority rule 
in South Africa, then what kind of time 
period are ice talking about? Are we talking 
about one year, ten years, or maybe a hun- 
dred years? 

Secretary Kissinger: I would not want to 
speculate about the amount of time. You 
are quite right that time is what is implied 
by the phrase of separating the problem. 

But time is of the essence if a peaceful 

Department of State Bulletin 



n 



solution to so complex a problem as that 
of South Africa is to be found. We have no 
precise timetable. Some timetables were 
given publicly by African leaders. We have 
no timetable of our own. 



DEPARTURE STATEMENT, NEWS CONFERENCE, 
LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, SEPTEMBER 17 

Press release 447 dated September 17 

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, 
on behalf of my whole delegation, I would 
like to thank you and President Kaunda 
for the warm reception we have received 
here. This was not a stop for negotiation. 
It was a stop to clarify the principles that 
will be taken to Pretoria and that we hope 
will form the basis for progress toward 
justice and peace in southern Africa. 

We were encouraged by the spirit of the 
talks and by the moral support which we 
have received here, but it is of course clear 
that the serious negotiation lies ahead of 
us and that the decisions on whether the 
objective of peace — in human dignity — 
can be achieved are not going to be made 
in Lusaka. 

So, Mr. Foreign Minister, I leave with 
the determination to make a major effort. 
I have been strengthened in this by my 
conversations with your President and his 
associates, and I want to thank you once 
again for the extraordinary reception we 
have had here. 

Now I will be glad to take a few ques- 
tions. 

Q. Will your stop in Pretoria be a negoti- 
ating stop? 

Secretary Kissinger: My stop in Pretoria, 
I hope, will move matters forward so that 
when I return to Lusaka we will have some- 
thing more precise to work with than is the 
case today. 

Q. Are you going to see Smith? 

Secretary Kissinger: I stated last Saturday 
before I left Washington that I would meet 



Smith only under the condition that this 
was the final element in reaching a satis- 
factory conclusion. I do not have this 
knowledge today, and therefore there is no 
basis for my meeting him at this time. 

Q. Could you spell that out for us, Mr. 
Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated my view 
and the American position. There is no 
point in repeating it every day, since I 
have not heard anything yet about the dis- 
cussions between Prime Minister Vorster 
and Mr. Smith. I will not see Mr. Smith to 
negotiate; I will see him if it helps to move 
matters to a conclusion and only if some 
clear result is in prospect. Since that is not 
the case today, there is nothing that I can 
add to what has already been said. 

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, if your negotia- 
tions fail and other friends of Africa come to 
help with the only other alternative of armed 
struggle, will you still be talking about out- 
side intervention? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States is 
opposed to outside intervention in Africa. 
All the African Presidents with whom I 
have spoken mentioned their determination 
to deal with these questions as an African 
problem. There is no point in my specu- 
lating now about what may happen, since 
I have not come here to fail. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are your chances 
now that you have had two views from Tan- 
zania and Zambia that the armed struggle 
should be intensified? What are your chances 
in the event of total rejection of your initia- 
tives? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to spec- 
ulate about what the United States will do 
in the case of the failure of a mission whose 
failure we do not anticipate. We stated our 
policy here in Lusaka as supporting the 
objectives of majority rule, minority rights, 
freedom, and human dignity in southern 
Africa. These objectives we will support 
regardless of the success of one diplomatic 
mission. 



October 25, 1976 



517 



Q. With regard to your talks with John 
Vorster, how nearer is Namibia to independ- 
ence ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that we have 
made some progress, or I would not have 
come here. I thought that the progress that 
had been made warranted this effort be- 
cause I agree with President Kaunda's 
statement of yesterday — that if we do not 
make this effort and if peaceful efforts 
fail, the consequences for the southern part 
of Africa will be too ghastly to contem- 
plate. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you worried about 
Communist influence in Namibia and Rho- 
desia ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have to separate two 
problems. One is the internal direction of 
African movements. We believe that Afri- 
can nationalism will take care of its own 
evolution and of its own direction. 

The second problem is outside military 
intervention from outside Africa, either 
from the Soviet Union or from other coun- 
tries supported by the Soviet Union. That 
we oppose. 

The direction of the liberation move- 
ments is a matter for Africans to settle, and 
we will not intervene in this. 

Q. Has Britain got any special role to play 
in your initiatives? 

Secretary Kissinger: Britain has the legal 
and historic responsibility for Rhodesia. 
Every initiative that we have taken has 
been taken in the closest coordination with 
Great Britain. And if my efforts either on 
this trip or later should succeed, Great 
Britain will have to provide the legal 
framework by which a further evolution 
takes place. This has been agreed to by all 
of the parties. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would 
share with us your feelings as you are about 
to embark on the South African trip? 



Secretary Kissinger: I believe that a com- 
bination of factors has produced a situa- 
tion where the United States, alone in the 
world, is in a position to make a contribu- 
tion to avoiding a conflagration. We have 
this responsibility, which we did not seek. 

It is in the interest first of the peoples of 
southern Africa, but eventually of all of 
the peoples of the world, that the world 
not be divided between races, that there 
not be a race war, and that outside powers 
not manipulate the aspirations of the peo- 
ple. If I can help on behalf of the United 
States, I believe that this reflects the values 
of human dignity and freedom and justice 
for which the United States has always 
stood. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you be a little more 
specific about what you hope to accomplish 
in South Africa? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated the ob- 
jectives repeatedly. We will try to move 
Rhodesia and Namibia toward independ- 
ence, majority rule, minority rights, and a 
constitutional framework in which, as 
President Kaunda said yesterday, all the 
races and all the people can live side by 
side in human dignity. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you explain 
America's late arrival on the scene? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States 
has gone through a very difficult decade in 
which it was occupied with many problems 
in other parts of the world. 

Secondly, until the process of decoloni- 
zation had reached a certain point, it was 
not possible for the United States to make 
its influence felt the way it is attempting 
to do now. 

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, the frontline 
countries have discussed this type of negotia- 
tions before, but it failed. Now they have 
adopted that the only solution is to intensify 
armed struggle. Noiv America has arrived 
on the scene late. Are you genuinely shuttling 



518 



Department of State Bulletin 



diplomacy, or are you simply displaying some 
kind of intellectual superiority? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not see how 
I can demonstrate intellectual superiority 
by failing. I am here. When I was in Africa 
in April, all of the African countries, in- 
cluding this, urged the United States to 
make an effort. I know all previous efforts 
have failed, and I told President Kaunda 
this morning that if we fail we will join a 
distinguished company. But I also said I 
have not come here to fail. 

A just peace and a just solution must be 
one that the people of the area accept and 
believe in. It cannot be one that outsiders 
impose on them. And it has nothing to do 
with demonstrating any particular quality. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are four frontline 
states; that is, Zambia, Tanzania, Botstvana, 
and Mozambique. But the Secretary of State 
has only visited Tanzania and Zambia. Is 
there any special reason why he has not gone 
to Mozambique or Botswana? 

Secretary Kissinger: Associates of mine 
have already visited Mozambique, and 
other associates of mine will visit Botswana 
on Saturday. And in any event, we recog- 
nize that the decisions will be taken by 
the four frontline Presidents. We count on 
their unity, and we will work with them 
cooperatively. 

Q. But precisely, has John Vorster indi- 
cated to you at any time that he is prepared 
to give independence to Namibia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I hope that when I 
return here the principle of independence 
for Namibia will be beyond question. 

Foreign Minister Mwale: Mr. Secretary of 
State, Madame Kissinger, once again on 
behalf of the party, the Government, and 
indeed the people of Zambia, we wish you 
all the success in your difficult task and 
wish you a safe trip to Pretoria and back 
to Zambia. 

Thank you very much. 



STATEMENT, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA, 
SEPTEMBER 19 

I reported to Mr. Smith the propositions 
developed jointly by the United States and 
the United Kingdom in close consultation 
with the Presidents of black Africa. Mr. 
Smith and his colleagues considered these 
propositions, and they have now returned 
to Salisbury. I am satisfied that Mr. Smith 
and his three close collaborators will report 
favorably to their other colleagues. After 
consultation with their colleagues, they will 
have to present these propositions to their 
party caucus. 

While the Rhodesian institutional proc- 
esses are taking place, I will seek certain 
clarifications from the Presidents of black 
Africa, particularly President Kaunda and 
President Nyerere. We expect that this 
process of clarification and consultation 
will be concluded toward the end of this 
week. 



NEWS CONFERENCE, KINSHASA, ZAIRE, 
SEPTEMBER 22 

Press release 455 dated September 22 

Q. What did you discuss with our Presi- 
dent ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We had a very 
friendly and cordial talk in which we re- 
viewed primarily the situation in southern 
Africa. After this press conference we will 
have another meeting over lunch in which 
we will discuss primarily U.S.-Zairian bi- 
lateral relationships. 

I reported to the President about the 
diplomatic steps that have been taken to 
attempt to ease the situation in southern 
Africa and to bring progress toward inde- 



:! Made following a meeting with Prime Minister 
Vorster and the Rhodesian delegation at the Prime 
Minister's residence (text from press release 449, 
which also includes questions and answers). 



October 25, 1976 



519 



pendence and majority rule. Of course I 
had kept the President informed through- 
out by letters and cables, and we had a 
very good exchange of views on the situa- 
tion in southern Africa and throughout 
Africa. 

Q. We will have a chance to ask President 
Mobutu later, but do you now feel you have 
the support of the Zairian Government in 
your plan to set up negotiations in southern 
Africa ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course the Presi- 
dent will have to answer for himself, but I 
had the impression of being given great 
encouragement. 

Q. One has the impression that your gov- 
ernment attempts to avoid direct contact with 
African nationalists. What is your govern- 
ment doing for the African nationalists? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is not correct. 
Our position is that the problems of Africa 
should be dealt with by Africans and there- 
fore we have asked all superpowers to 
avoid contact with the African nationalist 
movements and to permit the African Pres- 
idents to deal directly with the nationalist 
movements. On this basis and on this basis 
alone do we believe that the evolution of 
Africa can be in African hands. 

We will meet with African nationalist 
movements if the African Presidents ask 
us, but we do not want superpowers or 
anybody else to begin supporting one group 
against another, because this will export 
the rivalries of the superpowers into the 
continent and it will prevent these nation- 
alist movements from pursuing nationalist 
objectives. So we have given the leadership 
of these various conflicts in Africa to the 
African Presidents, and we are working 
through the African Presidents. 

Q. But still, Mr. Secretary, you do not hesi- 
tate to have direct contact with the holders 
of power of white rule in southern Africa? 

Secretary Kissinger: When I was in South 
Africa I talked to a group of black leaders, 



many of whom were in strong opposition — 
in fact, all of whom were in strong opposi- 
tion — to the governmental leaders; and 
members of my party talked to other black 
leaders. So in South Africa I made it a 
point to talk to the leaders of the black 
and colored communities. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm that Ian 
Smith has accepted the principle of the ac- 
cession of the majority to rule? 

Secretary Kissinger: For me to perform 
the function that I am trying to exercise 
it is important that I do not speak for the 
parties and permit the parties to speak for 
themselves. I have indicated that I believe 
considerable progress has been made. I 
think it is clear that majority rule is the 
objective. So I will wait until Mr. Smith 
has spoken for himself — which I under- 
stand will take place on Friday [Septem- 
ber 24] — but I have indicated that, in my 
judgment, considerable progress has been 
made. 

Q. The last time we were here, sir, there 
ivas great concern about the presence of 
Cuban troops in Angola, ivhich is a yieighbor- 
ing state. Could you tell us now ivhat the 
situation is with respect to the Cubans in 
Angola ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have no clear in- 
dications. We received reports of some 
having been withdrawn, maybe on the 
order of 2,000 to 3,000; but on the other 
hand, we also have reports of many civil- 
ians coming in to replace them. 

The withdrawal of the Cuban troops, if 
there has been any, has not been strate- 
gically significant, because over 10,000 still 
remain; and we remain concerned about an 
African country whose government can 
sustain itself only by the presence of an 
expeditionary force from across the ocean. 

Q. Since your talks with President Nyerere, 
have you communicated any further vieius of 
the black African Presidents to the Smith 
regime in order to provide any further clari- 









520 



Department of State Bulletin 



fication which would produce a positive deci- 
sion by the Rhodesian white minority? 

Secretary Kissinger: As part of my efforts 
here, I attempt to make sure that all of the 
parties know what the other parties are 
thinking. I have conveyed through the 
South Africans my understanding of the 
thinking of President Kaunda as well as of 
President Nyerere to the Rhodesian au- 
thorities so that they can take it into their 
consideration as they make their decisions 
this week. 

Q. You've talked about Rhodesia. Now I 
should like to know what you have resolved 
about Namibia. 

Secretary Kissinger: The discussions about 
Namibia are still in progress. Everybody 
agrees that progress has been made. 

The United States is in favor of the par- 
ticipation of -all the authentic groups, in- 
cluding SWAPO, in any discussions con- 
cerning Namibia. We are also in favor of 
a U.N. role in this. And I believe that prog- 
ress has been made toward achieving these 
objectives, as well as South Africa's role in 
the discussions. The precise relationship of 
the various groups to each other in these 
negotiations still remains to be worked out, 
but we are hopeful that in the weeks ahead 
we can make further progress toward the 
objective of setting up a conference about 
the independence of Namibia. 

Before we end the press conference I 
want to say that in my discussions with 
President Mobutu he suggested that it 
would be important that the OAU [Orga- 
nization of African Unity] be formally in- 
formed about the results of our efforts in 
southern Africa. I accepted his suggestions, 
and I will send an emissary to see the Pres- 
ident of the OAU to inform him of the 
efforts that have taken place during the 
last week. 

Q. Who is the President of the OAU? 

Secretary Kissinger: That's the Prime 
Minister of Mauritius. 



NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER 
AND BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND' 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I wanted 
to thank Mr. Crosland for agreeing to come 
over here. After it had been set up as a 
press conference for me, he agreed to join 
me. 

I wanted to make only one point before 
we go to questions: that I have seen many 
references that the Rhodesian authorities 
are now considering a Kissinger proposal. 
I think it is well to understand what is 
being considered in Salisbury, or what has 
been considered in Salisbury all week. 

First of all, the basis of the proposals is 
the plan put forward by Prime Minister 
Callaghan on March 22. This has been 
elaborated in detailed consultations be- 
tween the British and American Govern- 
ments. There have been five missions to 
Africa, three American and two British, in 
which these ideas were discussed in great 
detail with the African Presidents and re- 
fined in the light of their comment. 

So what is being considered in Salisbury 
is not the plan of an individual, but what 
we hope reflects a consensus between the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the 
essential requirements of the leaders of 
Africa. It is on this basis that we hope to 
make our contribution to the solution of 
the future of southern Africa. 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I would like 
to underline that. The British Government 
for the last two or three weeks has delib- 
erately remained in a not very visible posi- 
tion on the grounds that you couldn't have 
people trying to negotiate vicariously over 
a distance of 5,000 miles or whatever it is. 

But what Dr. Kissinger says is right. This 
has been very much of a joint plan. I 
think my first event as Foreign Secretary 
was to meet Dr. Kissinger on an airfield in 
Lincolnshire and since then we have met 
six times at least, with the Prime Minister 



' Held at London on Sept. 24 (text from press re- 
lease 472). 



October 25, 1976 



521 



very often, to discuss this. Respective offi- 
cials — British officials — have been to Wash- 
ington many times; State Department offi- 
cials have been to London many times; and 
as Dr. Kissinger says, the missions to south- 
ern Africa have been, to some extent, 
shared between the two countries. 

So he's quite right to say — though I 
should add that this in no way diminishes 
the very high proportion of the total credit 
that he, Dr. Kissinger, deserves — he's quite 
right to say that the plan within the broad 
framework of which he's been operating 
in recent weeks, and indeed in recent 
months, has been to a very large extent a 
collective one. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could folloiv that up 
with a question to both of you gentlemen. 
Now that the shuttle is finished — / presume 
you are not going back — does the lead in the 
diplomatic process now pass to the British? 

Secretary Kissinger: If the Rhodesian au- 
thorities decide favorably, the next step 
will have to be a discussion of legal and 
governmental coordination in Rhodesia. 
Britain has a historic and legal role in this 
respect, and it would therefore seem to us 
natural that Britain would be in a position 
to be very helpful to the parties, if the 
parties requested it. 

But the United States will be prepared 
to back up whatever efforts Britain will 
make and to continue its interests in a 
peaceful solution of this problem. 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I think that's 
absolutely right. Britain has a constitu- 
tional and a legal responsibility which, of 
course, the United States does not have, 
and therefore it will fall to Britain in any 
event to carry through the required legis- 
lation to validate and legalize what, hope- 
fully, will emerge in Rhodesia. 

But quite apart from that, if diplomatic 
help is wanted to bring the two sides to- 
gether, in the early stages in particular, 
Britain, I think, would have to take the 
lead in providing such diplomatic assist- 
ance as we could which would help toward 
an agreed settlement. 



Q. Mr. Secretary, assuming that there is a 
peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia, ivhat 
steps have you taken, or what guarantees 
have you sought, that you won't end up with 
another Angola, where the Russians come in 
and back one faction very heavily and there's 
a civil war and a radical regime takes over? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, the major 
responsibility to prevent this will be with 
the Presidents of Africa, and we would as- 
sume that they could not want Africa 
turned into an arena for great-power com- 
petition. It is our understanding that once 
an interim government has been formed, 
guerrilla war would cease. 

Q. Two points, sir. Has a document of any 
kind been passed to the Smith government? 
Is there anything that has been signed, ini- 
tialed, or exchanged in the form of papers? 
And secondly, you started to say what hap- 
pens if the operation goes well in the hand- 
over to the British. What happens if it gets 
sticky ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We'll get the blame. 
[Laughter.] 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: That's right. 
[Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to your 
first question, no document has been ini- 
tialed or signed. Several points have been 
put forward as our best distillation of 
the consensus that I have earlier described, 
and it is those points which the Rhodesian 
authorities have been discussing all week. 

We do not know precisely what Mr. 
Smith is going to say tonight, although he 
knows precisely what we think the basis of 
a settlement would be. 

Q. Could you just follow up on that? Are 
those points oral, or are they in writing so 
there can be less ambiguity about what's been 
said ? 

Secretary Kissinger: We gave him the 
points in writing. 

Q. Could you describe the arguments that 
you put to Mr. Smith when you talked to him 



522 



Department of State Bulletin 



in South Africa and which seem to have 
persuaded him to accept a deal? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe I 
should go into it at this [inaudible]. 

Q. Secretary Crosland, could you please 
tell us, in view of the possible threat of out- 
side intervention in Rhodesia or to one of the 
liberation groups, what is your feeling about 
how quickly the constitutional conference 
should be convened and an interim govern- 
ment should come into existence? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, gener- 
ally as quickly as possible. It's impossible 
to lay down or foresee a precise timetable 
for this. But the last thing we want — as- 
suming that Mr. Smith's response tonight 
is "yes," unequivocally "yes," the last thing 
we want then is a long delay in which 
everything would get muddled and other 
people would start poking their noses in 
and the rest of it. 

I can't set a time, but I would much 
rather that it was a matter of weeks at the 
most — anyway, as soon as possible. 

Q. Before the constitutional conference or 
before an interim government? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, first of 
all, before talks take place between the 
whites and the blacks on the formation of 
an interim government and, secondly, be- 
fore the formation of an interim govern- 
ment. And, as soon as an interim govern- 
ment is formed, then we will take in 
London the necessary legal and parlia- 
mentary action to legalize it. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, have you any doubts at 
all as to whether Mr. Smith ivill accept the 
peace plan? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am hopeful that he 
will. I have no doubt at the moment, but 
we just cannot be sure until he has spoken. 

Q. Do you think that the Rhodesia peace 
plan has removed the danger of a race war 
in southern Africa if it proceeds according 
to plan? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it has given 



us the possibility to avoid that danger, and 
it has already sharply reduced it. 

Q. Can you give any idea of the cost to 
Great Britain and the United States of the 
peace plan if it's carried out? 

Secretary Kissinger: We are going to be 
studying this next week jointly in Wash- 
ington. We have not arrived at a figure yet. 

Q. Do you think that at some point that, 
as part of this process, Rhodesia will have 
to renounce UDI [unilateral declaration of 
independence'] ? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, if this 
process goes well there are two constitu- 
tional acts that are involved. 

The first one is to legalize the interim 
government that will come, we hope, into 
being in a short space of time ; and the 
second is at the end of two years, when 
majority rule has been achieved within the 
conditions laid down by the Prime Minister 
on March 22. We shall then need final 
legislation which will confer total inde- 
pendence on what will then be a majority 
black government in Rhodesia. 

Q. Sir, did you mean to say "at the end of 
two years" as firmly as that? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Well, I can't 
say. Nobody has laid down the actual day; 
but Dr. Kissinger, as I understand it, and 
the British Government have been con- 
sistently talking within the phrase used by 
the Prime Minister on March 22, of 18 
months to two years. 

Q. Is that Dr. Kissinger's view, too, about 
the terms in which he has been conducting 
the talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is and has been 
my view. 

Q. You spoke of the talks within Rhodesia 
betiveen black and white about the formation 
of an interim government before any U.K. 
legislation. Is there a possibility that those 
talks could break down in view of the divi- 
sions on the African side, or do you have 



October 25, 1976 



523 



assurances from the African side that an 
interim government can be formed? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have taken 
consistently the position that the African 
side is responsible for its representation 
and for its program. The African Presi- 
dents seem to be confident that they can 
produce a delegation; and we would ex- 
pect that, after all the anguish that both 
sides have gone through, they would con- 
duct the discussions with a sense of respon- 
sibility. And on that basis we believe a 
solution could be found. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the history of mili- 
tary dictatorships and so forth in Africa, 
what kind of future do you see for Rhodesia 
in the event that black majority rule is estab- 
lished ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think we 
should — we have not even taken the first 
steps on that road yet, and it is premature 
to speculate until we see how these dis- 
cussions are going. 

Q. Mr. Crosland, this tivo years more or 
less — when does the clock start running — 
today, at the point of Mr. Smith's announce- 
ment, or at the beginning of a constitutional 
conference or when? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I can't give 
you a cut-and-dried answer on a particular 
day. Let's wait and see what Mr. Smith is 
going to say tonight. Let us wait and see 
what reaction there is to that from the 
black African states, and then we shall be 
able to lay down the kind of timetable and 
program which we want to see fulfilled. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you have been so 
concerned about the danger of the racial war 
in southern Africa, I wonder if you could 
explain once more how the establishment of 
black, and quite possibly militant, regimes on 
the borders of South Africa, will reduce the 
pressure leading to such confrontations in 
that country. 

Secretary Kissinger: We now have a war 
going on in Rhodesia, and we have the 



danger of war in Namibia. What we are 
attempting to do is to demonstrate the pos- 
sibility of peaceful solutions and of the 
utility of negotiations. Any step that is 
taken is not going to be a final step in that 
process. We believe that if this process 
that, hopefully, will start today will be 
carried out to its conclusion, it will con- 
tribute to moderation in Africa and to 
creating additional incentives for negoti- 
ated solutions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. Is it your 
understanding that during the interim gov- 
ernment Mr. Smith ivill remain as Prime 
Minister? Secondly, who do you now under- 
stand ivill chair the constitutional talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: You must understand 
that before Mr. Smith has spoken it would 
not be appropriate for me to go into the 
details of all the ideas that he may put 
forward for all of the negotiations that 
would ensue. 

The United States has generally taken 
the position that it is for each side to put 
forward its representatives and that the 
United States would not prescribe to either 
side who should represent it in any talks 
that might result. And so let us wait until 
after Mr. Smith has spoken and then see 
what delegations are actually being pro- 
duced by the two sides. 

Q. On the constitutional talks? 

Secretary Kissinger: On the constitutional 
talks — we haven't actually thought through 
the chairmanship. 

We believe that Britain has an impor- 
tant contribution to make. How it will 
exercise this will obviously depend on the 
parties and on the decisions of the British 
Government. 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Could I just 
add one word to that? We can't see the 
nature of the constitutional talks at the 
moment. We don't know whether this will 
take the form of a standard, regular type 
of conference or whether the talks will be 
very much more informal. 



524 



Department of State Bulletin 



So any discussions of who will take the 
chair is premature, but I repeat what I 
said earlier — that as far as diplomatic help 
and activity is concerned, the British Gov- 
ernment will give all the assistance that it 
possibly can to whatever talks occur and 
to make sure they come to a successful con- 
clusion. 

Q. Does that mean, Foreign Secretary, that 
you are opposed in principle to Britain taking 
the chair at such constitutional talks? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: No. I'm not 
opposed in principle; I'm not in favor in 
principle. I can't see the scenario and so 
I've got to keep all the options open until 
I can see the scenario more clearly. 

Q. Mr. Crosland, are you expecting Mr. 
Smith to come to London for the constitu- 
tional conference as part or as head of that 
delegation, and would you be happy for that 
to take place? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I think it 
highly unlikely that the constitutional con- 
ference would take place in London to 
begin with. I think it would almost cer- 
tainly take place in Africa. 

Q. And would the British Government be 
happy for Mr. Smith to be part or head of 
that Rhodesian delegation? 

Foreign Secretary Croslayid: Well, we 
wouldn't be responsible. I've said we'd give 
what help we can to the constitutional con- 
ference but the people to answer that 
question would be the black negotiating 
team, not the British Government. 

Q. But you're still prepared for Mr. Smith 
to be the head of the interim government 
until the transfer of power takes place? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: I'm not either 
prepared nor unprepared. This is a matter 
which has got to be the subject of agree- 
ment between the white Rhodesians who- 
ever they're led by in a week's time, on the 
one hand, and the black Rhodesians, or the 
black Presidents behind them, on the other 



hand; and it's not for the British Govern- 
ment at this moment of time to say what we 
think should come out of that negotiating 
process. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could we hear from both 
you and from Mr. Crosland, if you could, on 
your views as to what has produced what you 
hope will be a successful conclusion? What 
have been the factors ivhich at this time, 
after 11 years, seemingly have brought the 
situation to this climax? 

Secretary Kissinger: Personal charm. 
[Laughter.] I think — 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: As soon as he 
said "personal charm," someone said "Mr. 
Crosland." [Laughter.] 

Secretary Kissinger: It was a combination 
of factors. A continuation of the war, the 
assessment by the Rhodesian authorities of 
the likely trends, the participation of the 
South African Government in the negotia- 
tions, and the commitment of the U.S. Gov- 
ernment to a peaceful solution and its 
willingness to engage itself, together with 
the efforts that Great Britain has been 
making consistently, produced new factors 
in the situation. 

Q. Mr. Crosland, could you tell us which 
will come first, the constitutional conference 
or the interim government? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: No, I can't 
tell you. 

Q. Mr. Crosland, do I take it from your 
earlier reply of the two constitutional acts 
that are required, that it will be unnecessary 
for Mr. Smith to actually renounce UDI in a 
formal way? 

Foreign Secretary Crosland: Let me make 
this absolutely clear — that we have — that 
Dr. Kissinger has been pushing, as a joint 
approach to both sides, a certain number 
of possibilities that form part of a plan 
which we hope will be broadly adopted 
and will lead to the two sides negotiating 
together. But if Mr. Smith says what we 
hope and if the African sides react favor- 



October 25, 1976 



525 



ably to that, then at that point it becomes 
for negotiations in Africa to answer the 
various questions that have been raised 
during the last two or three minutes. 

It is not for the U.K. Government nor — 
if it comes to that — for the U.S. Govern- 
ment to say in advance they want this, they 
don't want that, the other. This is for the 
whites and blacks in Africa to agree 
amongst themselves. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere of 
Tanzania is quoted as saying that you put a 
lot of pressure on Rhodesia through South 
Africa. What kind of pressure did you put, 
and what kind of ultimatum did you deliver? 

Secretary Kissinger: We delivered no ulti- 
matum, and we reviewed the likely evolu- 
tion of events and the alternatives that 
were available and we believe that this 
contributed to the decision. There were no 
addition — there were no threats or pres- 
sure. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I bring you back to 
the question of money, please? There have 
been reports that in order to get this plan, 
a safety net in the amount of $1.5-$2 billion 
is being considered, with an American con- 
tribution that could run to $U00-$500 million. 
Could you now sort out the money figures 
for us, please? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, none of the fig- 
ures have any official status. Secondly, the 
idea of a safety net is a somewhat crude 
description of a complicated scheme that 
has been discussed among officials, that 
would be alternatively available for the 
investment or for an insurance scheme for 
those who might eventually wish to emi- 
grate. 

There will be discussions next week in 
Washington between American, British, 
and South African officials to try to refine 
this and come up with specific figures. At 
this point no specific figures have been 
agreed to. 

Q. You said just now that you assumed that 



there would be a cease-fire in the guerrilla 
war as soon as the basic settlement had been 
accepted by Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has used 
the device of saying that there has not been 
a cease-fire to wriggle out from previous 
obligations. Are you now confident — 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I said when an 
interim government is formed. But I be- 
lieve that this, too, should await Mr. 
Smith's speech and the negotiations that 
we hope will follow this speech. 

Q. Has Mr. Smith asked that the guerrilla 
cease-fire should be a condition of his imple- 
menting your suggestions? 

Secretary Kissinger: Again, I believe that 
Mr. Smith will have to speak for himself 
but I — my impression is that he will put 
forward whatever — if he — what he says 
without preconditions. 

Q. Is there any room for Mr. Smith today 
to say, "yes, but," or does he have to say 
"yes" or "no" specifically to the total pack- 
age? Is there any room for him to hedge on 
this? 

Secretary Kissinger: I really am in no 
position to speak for Mr. Smith. Our im- 
pression is, as he has said himself, that his 
statement will be clear and unambiguous 
and will leave no room for evasion; this I 
gather from his own public statements. 

Q. But does he have to accept the total or 
reject the total or can he accept most of it 
and say, "but I don't want this piece"? 

Secretary Kissinger: We'll know in a few 
hours. We think the process would be 
helped most if the total package were put 
forward. 

Q. If there is any prospect of them not 
accepting the total package, would you con- 
sider returning, or would you say that that's 
the end of negotiations? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the mat- 
ter has gone so far that it must be con- 






526 



Department of State Bulletin 



eluded. But why speculate about what may 
happen tonight? 

Q. I just ivondered what you think might 
happen if he didn't accept. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't operate 
on that assumption. I operate on the as- 
sumption that — that the total package will 
be put forward. 

Q. Which do you think should come first, 
the constitutional conference or the forma- 
tion of a government? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think it extremely 
important that the solutions for southern 
Africa be seen to be African solutions and 
that the United States and the United King- 
dom, whose primary interest has been to 
produce peace in southern Africa, not ap- 
pear to be dictating the precise outcome. 
Therefore I believe that we should wait 
for, first, Mr. Smith's speech and then the 
African reaction. 

As my colleague has already stated, the 
United Kingdom is willing to be helpful ; 
the United States is prepared to be sup- 
portive ; but let us first get some other re- 
actions on the table. 

Q. Have you spoken with Mr. S?nith since 
leaving Africa or any representative of his 
government? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I have not. 

Q. Do you expect any trouble from the 
Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger, because they 
have been kicking you rather hard over what 
you have been trying to do? Do you think 
that they can stir up diplomatic trouble in 
the United Nations or elsewhere in Africa to 
try and sabotage the whole plan? 

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that it 
should be in the interest of all countries to 
promote peace in southern Africa; and we 
would hope that the Soviet Union would 
not, for the sake of ideology or great- 
power rivalry, try to introduce an element 
of contention which must above all hurt 



the peoples of southern Africa and destroy 
an opportunity for peace. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, it seems from both you 
gentlemen, then, the United States and the 
United Kingdom do not want to take much 
responsibility for the actual solutions. Can 
you say how it would be possible for the 
blacks and whites in Rhodesia to work out 
an interim government by themselves? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, we did not say 
they should do it by themselves. I think we 
both said that we would be active, sup- 
portive, cooperative, in any way that we 
are asked and in any way that can be 
useful. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 



ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, SEPTEMBER 24 

Press release 473 dated September 24 

The mission to Africa which I undertook 
on behalf of the President was aimed at 
the achievement of the most fundamental 
values in which all Americans believe: 
peace, justice, and human dignity. We have 
made encouraging progress. 

We believe there is now a good oppor- 
tunity for settling the issue of Rhodesia and 
making progress toward negotiations on 
Namibia. Much remains to be done that 
depends on the good will of all the parties 
concerned. The United States remains pre- 
pared to give its good offices and to co- 
operate with Great Britain, which, with 
respect to Rhodesia, has a historic and con- 
stitutional role to play. 

I would like to thank all of the govern- 
ments whose cooperation was so essential 
and whose representatives did me the 
courtesy of coming out here and all of my 
associates whose indefatigable work made 
this possible. 

I now will report to the President imme- 
diately, and early next week I will report 
to the Congress. 



October 25, 1976 



527 



President Ford Pledges U.S. Support 
for Efforts for Solution in Africa 

Statement by President Ford 1 

I am very pleased to hear of the an- 
nouncement today by Ian Smith of Rho- 
desia. On behalf of the Rhodesian authori- 
ties, he has accepted proposals that can 
head off an escalating conflict and should 
produce negotiations which can bring 
southern Africa closer to peace. 

The United States is proud to have made 
a contribution — but we have not done so 
alone. The principles of the settlement set 
forth are based on the plan outlined by 
Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. I 
wish to pay tribute to the Prime Minister 
and to the United Kingdom, with whom we 
have closely cooperated. Farsighted and 
indispensable contributions were also made 
by the various African Presidents. I would 
like as well to acknowledge the construc- 
tive role played by Prime Minister Vorster 
of South Africa. 

The road is now open for an African 
solution to an African problem — free of 
outside intervention, violence, and bitter- 
ness. This has been the objective of the 
United States, and the purpose of the skill- 
ful and energetic diplomacy that we have 
pursued. We call on other nations to sup- 
port, not impede, the African search for a 
peaceful settlement. 

The United States is prepared to con- 
tinue to help. We will not prescribe for the 
peoples of Africa what only they can bring 
about. But we will be available to lend our 
full support to the efforts of the British, 
the Rhodesians of both races, and the Afri- 
can states concerned. 

It is my earnest hope that the several 
parties will now move swiftly to establish 
the conditions for independence in which 



1 Made in the press briefing room at the White 
House on Sept. 24 (text from Weekly Compilation of 
Presidential Documents dated Sept. 27). 



all of its peoples can live together in har- 
mony. Today we have seen an act of real- 
ism that is the first step toward that goal. 
With good will on all sides, that vision can 
become a reality. 

A threat to world peace has been eased. 
We can take satisfaction in the role we 
have played. I extend my best wishes to the 
peoples of Rhodesia and of all Africa. I 
call on all nations to help them shape a 
future of peace, prosperity, and human 
dignity. 



Secretary Discusses Southern Africa 
in Interview for NBC "Today" Show 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by Tom Brokaw 
and Richard Valeriana recorded on Septem- 
ber 27 and broadcast on the NBC-TV 
"Today" show on September 28. 

Press release 476 dated September 28 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. Secretary, you worked 
out the details of a two-year transition to 
black majority rule in Rhodesia. Mr. \_lan D.] 
Smith stated the conditions in a speech to 
Rhodesians last Friday. Noiv the black Presi- 
dents who have been participating in these 
negotiations are very critical of at least an 
element of those conditions. What has hap- 
pened? 

Secretary Kissinger: The basic proposals 
that were put forward were for majority 
rule in two years, a transitional govern- 
ment to be established immediately, a con- 
stitutional conference to work out the 
constitution at the end of the two years; 
and those points have been accepted. 

Secondly, it isn't correct to say that 
Smith made these proposals. The proposals 
that Smith put forward were the result of 
discussions between the United States, 
Great Britain, and the African Presidents 
prior to my meeting with Smith. 

I think one has to understand that each 



528 



Department of State Bulletin 



of these leaders has his own constituency. 
For African leaders to say they accept 
proposals of Smith is almost impossible. 

They have indicated that there are cer- 
tain things they want to negotiate. They 
have indicated that they made no precon- 
ditions. We have received messages today 
from three of the leaders who attended the 
meeting, stressing that they think matters 
are on track and that they are looking for- 
ward to early negotiations. 

So, I think we should cut through the 
rhetoric and look at the reality. And there 
is going to be a lot of rhetoric in the next 
few weeks. 

Mr. Brokaiv: But are you saying that 
these African leaders have been critical for 
their own domestic political purposes? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying that ob- 
viously there will have to be negotiations 
for the transition. 

Mr. Brokaiv: How many of these condi- 
tions does Mr. Smith think are negotiable? 

Secretary Kissinger: The composition of 
the government, the allocation of ministers 
— none of this has been settled yet. This 
requires negotiation. Prior to this, it is 
quite possible for both sides to make public 
statements that may seem irreconcilable. 

But we should always remember that the 
biggest steps have been taken and that the 
differences that remain are relatively small 
compared to the steps that have already 
been taken. 

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, have the 
African Presidents rejected anything that 
they told you they would approve, or are they 
upping the ante now? 

Secretary Kissinger: The African Presi- 
dents have not indicated a rejection of any- 
thing specific. The African Presidents have 
made a general statement that they will 
not accept the dictation of Smith with re- 
spect to all the details of the transitional 
government. 



On the other hand, what Smith has put 
forward was not his idea, but in itself re- 
flected a compromise between many points 
of view. So, we will have to wait until a 
conference meets to find out what the real 
differences are. 

The British are sending a minister to 
Africa within the next day, with the ex- 
plicit purpose of getting the conference 
which all sides have now asked for to meet 
to work out the details. 

Mr. Valeriani: There is no chance that you 
are going to go back, is there? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is no chance 
that I will go back. 

Mr. Brokaiv: Will the conference have to 
take place in Rhodesia, as Mr. Smith seemed 
to indicate on Friday when he said it would 
be worked out in Rhodesia? 

Secretary Kissinger: The locale of the con- 
ference in Rhodesia was not part of those 
five points. And I think that the basic point 
is that it should meet at a mutually agree- 
able place. 

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, if I can look 
back, it is very difficult to believe that this 
came about without your putting a great deal 
of pressure on Rhodesia or a great deal of 
pressure on South Africa to put pressure on 
Rhodesia in turn. How much pressure did you 
have to apply on South Africa? What did you 
have to promise South Africa? 

Secretary Kissinger: We promised nothing 
to South Africa. Leaders make a decision 
on the basis of their assessment of what is 
likely to happen. South African leaders 
understood, as the Rhodesian leaders came 
to understand, that the alternative to a 
negotiation and to a peaceful settlement is 
an escalating war whose outcome would be 
extremely problematical for them and 
which has the great risk of expansion with- 
out changing the outcome. 

Those were the basic facts that every- 
body faced. And when those facts became 



October 25, 1976 



529 



clear, certain conclusions followed. We did 
not have to bring any additional pressure 
other than an analysis of the facts. 

Mr. Valeriani: What is to prevent the Rus- 
sians from coming in now and backing a 
faction as they did in Angola, stirring up a 
civil war and having another Angola, which 
you are specifically trying to avoid? 

Secretary Kissinger: This has to be largely 
the responsibility of the African Presidents. 
It is up to the Africans to decide whether 
they want their continent to become the 
arena for great-power rivalry — because in- 
evitably, outside intervention, as a regular 
pattern, cannot be ignored — or whether 
they want African solutions to African 
problems. 

As far as the United States is concerned, 
we seek no sphere of influence in Africa. 
Up to now, the African Presidents have 
prevented any of the outside powers from 
backing any one of the factions. We sup- 
port this; and if this continues, there can 
be a moderate, responsible, and peaceful 
outcome to Rhodesia. 

Mr. Brokaw: What do you see as the U.S. 
continuing role in Rhodesia during this in- 
terim period over the two years — economic- 
ally, in terms of assistance, and so on? 

Secretary Kissinger: The immediate prob- 
lem is to bring the various parties to the 
conference table within the framework of 
the principles that have been laid out. 

Britain has to take the lead in this be- 
cause Britain has the constitutional and 
historical responsibility. 

We will back it up diplomatically. We 
have been in close contact with all of the 
African Presidents in recent days, and 
nothing we have heard would indicate that 
this conference will not take place. 

After the conference has met, after the 
transitional government is established, then 
it will be our policy to encourage this 
transitional government, and we will be 
prepared to talk with anyone about eco- 
nomic and other relationships. 



Mr. Brokaw: But no commitments have 
now been made prior to the establishment of 
that? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are no secret 
commitments. There are plans for eco- 
nomic cooperation, which are in the proc- 
ess of being worked out and which will be 
submitted to the Congress before they are 
implemented. 

Mr. Valeriani: You apparently have made 
a lot of guarantees to Rhodesian whites, or 
provisions for Rhodesian ivhites. 

Secretary Kissinger: That is not correct. 

Mr. Valeriani: Well, there is an interna- 
tional fund of some sort, isn't there? 

Secretary Kissinger: There is the idea of 
a fund that can be used for investment as 
well as for guarantees. The purpose is not 
to drive the whites out, but to enable the 
whites to stay there. 

Mr. Valeriani: Why should the American 
taxpayer provide that kind of guarantee for 
Rhodesian whites? 

Secretary Kissinger: Because the conse- 
quences of a race war in southern Africa 
with foreign intervention and of the radi- 
calization of all of Africa, which would be 
the alternative, would cost the American 
taxpayer infinitely more than what we are 
thinking about now might cost. 

Mr. Brokaw: What is the next step in 
South Africa, in that country? What kind of 
pressure does this put now on Prime Min- 
ister Vorster? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think South Africa 
has to face the necessity of change and the 
domestic pressures that its system has im- 
posed, and Prime Minister Vorster will 
have to consider what the evolution of his 
own country should be. 

Mr. Brokaw: In the not too distant future? 

Secretary Kissinger: In the not too distant 
future. 



530 



Department of State Bulletin 



Mr. Brokaiv: After Rhodesia has a change 
to majority rule? 

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to go 
into details of what the South African 
Government should do. But most thought- 
ful South Africans I met realize that some 
changes were necessary. 

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. Secretary, very briefly, 
is this the last of your major shuttle-diplo- 
macy efforts in far-distant points? Can you 
foresee any other place you will have to go? 



Secretary Kissinger 
tion. 



Not before the elec- 



Mr. Brokaiv: Thank you very much, Mr. 
Secretary. 



International Economic Support 
for Rhodesia Settlement Discussed 

Following is a press statement issued on 
October 7 at Washington. 

Meetings were held for two days, Octo- 
ber 6-7, between senior officials of the 
United States and Great Britain, and peri- 
odically in consultation with the South 
African Ambassador to the United States. 
The officials discussed ways and means of 
providing international economic support 
for a Rhodesian settlement. 

The purpose of this international effort 



should be to assist a new government to 
promote : 

— Widespread economic and social de- 
velopment of Zimbabwe; 

— Rapid expansion of economic opportu- 
nities and skills of the black majority; and 

— Economic security for all segments of 
the population so that they might contrib- 
ute their skills and enthusiasm to Zim- 
babwe development. 

The officials discussed the resources that 
might be required and the kinds of pro- 
grams for development and economic secu- 
rity that might be supported by an inter- 
national fund. They examined ways of 
administering and operating the fund for 
prompt and effective assistance to the Zim- 
babwe economy. They discussed how the 
fund could work with the interim govern- 
ment and the future independent govern- 
ment of Zimbabwe. They considered how 
development assistance to Zimbabwe might 
be related to development needs in the 
southern Africa region after the lifting of 
economic sanctions against Rhodesia. 

The officials discussed how they might 
communicate the views expressed and 
progress achieved at these meetings to 
other potential participants in the inter- 
national fund. Toward this end, the offi- 
cials will consult with their respective 
governments over the next few days and 
resume their discussions next week in 
London. 



October 25, 1976 



531 



The Search for Peace in Southern Africa 



Statement by William D. Rogers 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs i 



This is a critical moment in our relations 
with Africa. The Secretary of State has 
just returned from two weeks in Africa. 
The purpose of his trip was to explore 
whether the United States could play a 
constructive role in the search for peaceful 
solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rho- 
desia. 

We began the effort convinced that the 
prospects were less than favorable. You, 
Mr. Chairman [Senator Dick Clark], esti- 
mated them to be 1 in 20. It now ap- 
pears, however, that in fact we have made 
some progress on Namibia and that there 
may be at hand a major breakthrough 
toward majority rule in Rhodesia within 
two years. 

I would like to say a few words about 
this effort, since it is not unrelated to the 
central issue before this committee — South 
Africa — nor was South Africa entirely ir- 
relevant to the effort. First, however, I 
would like to express our appreciation to 
you, Mr. Chairman, for your interest and 
understanding and for the interest and 
understanding of other members of this 
committee and of the Senate. As you know, 
we have made particular efforts to keep the 
Senate advised of the Department's initia- 



1 Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs 
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 
Sept. 30. The complete transcript of the hearings 
will be published by the committee and will be avail- 
able from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



tives. A few hours before he left, the Sec- 
retary met with almost half the Senate for 
a full briefing. 

We have tried, both before and since the 
trip, to keep you and others, Mr. Chairman, 
advised. And we will continue to do so, 
for we entertain no illusions that the search 
for peace in southern Africa is the monop- 
oly of any single branch of our govern- 
ment nor, may I add, of any single party 
of our political system. 

I would like, first, to discuss with you the 
reasons for undertaking this effort and, 
second, where we stand. 

Why have we made the effort? 

I should stress first why we did not make 
the effort. We did not make the effort to 
establish a sphere of influence for the 
United States. We did not make the effort 
to place our own nominees in power in Rho- 
desia or Namibia. We did not make the 
effort to perpetuate injustice. 

We made the effort because the alterna- 
tive to a peaceful solution is violence: race 
wars in Namibia and Rhodesia, wars which 
will pit blacks against whites, pride 
against vengeance, and which would be an 
open invitation to foreign intervention and 
the radicalization of all of Africa. 

Sustained racial warfare in southern 
Africa would polarize international rela- 
tions everywhere and poison the atmos- 
phere for international cooperation. In 
addition it could inflame old passions in our 



532 



Department of State Bulletin 



own country. We have enjoyed three dec- 
ades of progress in race relations in the 
United States. A full-blown race war on the 
television screens of this country could set 
us back a considerable way. 

It was for these several reasons — and 
because all other efforts had finally failed 
— that the Secretary undertook his trip to 
southern Africa earlier this month. 

Its purpose was to get the parties them- 
selves to undertake to find African solu- 
tions to African problems, not on the 
battlefield but at the bargaining table. We 
could impose no final result, and we knew 
this from the outset. We could only help 
to begin the process, a process by which 
those directly affected could agree to con- 
sult together, to determine for themselves 
the shape and structure of a free, inde- 
pendent, and unitary Namibia and Rho- 
desia. 

On Namibia, we have made progress. We 
consulted at considerable length with 
South Africa. The decisive moment has not 
yet come to hand, but our meetings give us 
reason to believe that there is room for 
compromise and hope on this issue, as the 
Secretary will suggest in his statement to 
the General Assembly of the United Na- 
tions today. 



Complex Problem of Rhodesia 

On Rhodesia, events unfolded rather 
more rapidly than many had thought pos- 
sible. Rhodesia, as you know, is an extraor- 
dinarily complex problem. The parties in- 
volved include the four frontline Presi- 
dents, the highly diverse national liberation 
movements, the British Government, the 
South African Government, and the au- 
thorities in Salisbury. 

We and the British undertook some five 
missions to Africa to consult with African 
leaders prior to the meeting in early Sep- 
tember in Zurich with Prime Minister 
Vorster [of South Africa]. After that meet- 
ing we had a most careful review of the 
situation with both President Nyerere [of 



October 25, 1976 



Tanzania] and President Kaunda [of Zam- 
bia]. Following that review, the Secretary 
traveled to Pretoria to meet with Prime 
Minister Vorster and then with Mr. Smith 
[Ian D. Smith, of Rhodesia]. We then com- 
municated the views of Mr. Smith to the 
frontline Presidents through Presidents 
Nyerere and Kaunda. The proposals which 
we discussed were derived from working 
papers which the United Kingdom and the 
United States put together. 

On Friday of last week, Mr. Smith an- 
nounced that, for the first time since 1965 
when Salisbury announced its independ- 
ence from Britain, he would accept major- 
ity rule and that majority rule would occur, 
furthermore, within two years. In addition, 
he agreed that Britain should enact the 
enabling legislation necessary to legitimate 
the process to majority rule and that a 
government of transition should be imme- 
diately organized with major black par- 
ticipation. 

The Presidents of the frontline states 
have responded by stating that they also 
agree that an early meeting should be 
called to organize the new government and 
have accepted the basic proposals put for- 
ward for majority rule within two years. 

The United Kingdom announced yester- 
day that, in view of the acceptance of this 
framework, it is convening a conference of 
the parties to begin now the establishment 
of the government of transition. 

In our view, the path is now open to the 
parties for the peaceful resolution of the 
crisis of Rhodesia. We have no illusions 
about the process which has begun, how- 
ever. There will be problems, difficulties, 
and hitches enough in the months ahead. 
Rhodesia knows hatred, fear, and frustra- 
tion. The sense of conciliation and the 
spirit of compassion and understanding 
which are so essential to compromise and 
negotiation are hard to maintain in such 
an atmosphere. Already the African Presi- 
dents have said publicly that, though the 
Rhodesian nationalists will take no pre- 
conditions to the bargaining table, they 



533 



cannot accept all that Smith has, at our 
suggestion, put forward as to the structure 
of the two-year transitional government. 

All we can be certain is that the opening 
is at hand. It rests with the parties now to 
determine whether they can seize the op- 
portunity before them. We and the United 
Kingdom, which has the ultimate legal and 
constitutional responsibilities in Rhodesia, 
are pledged to do all in our power to bring 
them together. 

Easing Economic Shock of Transition 

Mr. Smith also mentioned in his state- 
ment on September 24 a summary of ideas 
which the United Kingdom and the United 
States had put together relating to the ex- 
tent to which the international community 
can cooperate to ease the economic shocks 
of the transition to majority rule. 

The objective of this effort would be to 
maintain confidence in the future of Rho- 
desia. This proposal would be intended to 
give an incentive to those who have a posi- 
tive contribution to make to stay in Rho- 
desia and work for the future of the coun- 
try. Its overall aim would be to expand 
industrial and mineral production in Rho- 
desia, to enhance agricultural potential, 
and to provide the funds for necessary 
training and skills. 

Its broader purposes would be: to equip 
black Rhodesians to take advantage of the 
opportunities which will be opened to them 
in a majority-ruled Rhodesia, to expand 
investment in the country, and to allow the 
economy to adjust to the removal of sanc- 
tions. 

It is not a plan to buy out the holdings of 
the white Rhodesians. No one would be 
paid to leave. It is not like the program the 
British Government employed in Kenya. 
As I have said, its overall objective is to 
maintain a sense of confidence in the eco- 
nomic future of the country, not to encour- 
age emigration and capital flight. 

At this point we are not able to say what 
the dimensions of an American contribu- 
tion to such a plan might be. As you know, 



534 



we will be holding tripartite meetings here 
in Washington shortly with representatives 
of both the British and South African Gov- 
ernments to elaborate the concept and 
work out the shape of the financial com* 
mitment which might be necessary. As 
soon as these studies are completed, we 
will share their results with the Congress 
and with the several other nations which 
we expect will join us. 

This has been the purpose and effect of 
the Secretary's recent efforts in Africa. Its 
emphasis, in terms of practical, immediate 
results, has been on Namibia and Rhodesia. 
But we have not lost sight of South Africa 
itself. 

•U.S. Interests in South Africa 

I know you have expressed concern, Mr. 
Chairman, as have others, that with our 
concentration on these two territories we 
would ignore, or compromise, our interests 
in the problem of South Africa itself. But 
we do not think that an effort in Rhodesia 
and Namibia will dilute our capacity to 
influence favorably developments in South 
Africa. To the contrary. If we can somehow 
avoid war in those two neighboring areas 
and shift from violence to negotiation as 
the way to resolve racial conflict, we may 
have a profoundly positive effect on the 
circumstances within South Africa itself 
and its own prospects for peaceful evolu- 
tion. 

I am grateful, therefore, to have this 
opportunity to review with you our inter- 
ests in South Africa, our policy toward that 
country, and the implications of recent de- 
velopments in South Africa. 

South Africa plays an important role in 
the world economy, and it is located at the 
crossroads of major trade routes used by 
ourselves and our allies. It is an important 
and populous African country, a source of 
valuable raw materials. 

Our investment and trade in South Af 
rica each constitute slightly more than 
1 percent of our total worldwide private 



Department of State Bulletin 






foreign investment and total worldwide 
trade. Nonetheless, South Africa is an ac- 
tive trading partner. In 1975 the United 
States exported about 1.3 billion dollars' 
worth of goods to South Africa, which ac- 
counted for about 30 percent of our total 
exports to all of Africa and 1.4 percent of 
our total exports to all countries. Last year 
we imported $840 million in products from 
South Africa, which was equivalent to 
about 10 percent of our total imports from 
Africa and slightly less than 1 percent of 
our total imports from worldwide sources. 
South Africa is also an important but not 
vital source of a variety of essential min- 
erals such as antimony, manganese, vana- 
dium, chromite, and platinum. The book 
value of American private investment fn 
South Africa at the end of 1974 totaled 
$1.46 billion, which was about 40 percent 
of our total investments in Africa but only 
slightly more than 1 percent of our total 
worldwide private foreign investments. 

Our strategic interests in South Africa 
are modest. While South Africa is strate- 
gically located on the lines of communica- 
tion between the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans, we have determined that U.S. use 
of South African port facilities is not now 
vital to our defense needs. While we con- 
' tinue to maintain, on a standby basis, the 
,i contract-operated tracking station, near 
Johannesburg, of the U.S. Air Force South 
Atlantic Missile Test Range, it has been 
used only infrequently in recent years. 

South Africa's agricultural lands are 
varied and productive; it has been en- 
dowed with an unusually broad range of 
mineral resources. Its people, too, are a 
significant resource, with a strong sense of 
pride and an eagerness for advancement. 
Drawing on its natural and human re- 
sources, South Africa has been able in the 
past century to create a solid base for in- 
dustrial development. Especially in the 
(postwar years, South Africa has undergone 
a period of rapid economic growth. 

I review these elements of South Africa's 
potential for two reasons: to point up the 



October 25, 1976 



future that could be South Africa's and to 
place the material American interests there 
in perspective. 

South Africa's Policies of Apartheid 

As to South Africa's system of institu- 
tionalized racial discrimination, the views 
of the United States have been clear and 
consistent. They were publicly reaffirmed 
by Secretary Kissinger in his address in 
Lusaka in April and in other public state- 
ments since that time, and he will restate 
them today to the U.N. General Assembly. 
They have been privately reaffirmed in his 
discussions with Prime Minister Vorster. 

The United States views those policies 
not only as unjust but also as unwise. As 
the Secretary stated in Philadelphia on 
August 31 : "No system that leads to peri- 
odic upheavals and violence can possibly 
be just or acceptable — nor can it last." The 
violence which has persisted in South Af- 
rica since last June has eliminated with 
tragic finality any thought or pretense that 
the system of institutionalized discrimina- 
tion will ever be accepted by the black 
people of that country. 

This was impressed upon all of us in 
moving terms by the South African black 
leaders we met in Pretoria two weeks ago. 
In two momentous meetings, the Secretary 
heard the full spectrum of views on South 
Africa. He learned much. And, I add, by 
listening to them, he symbolized the Amer- 
ican commitment to interracial coopera- 
tion. 

U.S. representatives have frequently de- 
scribed those elements of our policy toward 
South Africa which are designed to com- 
municate our strong views on apartheid to 
the South African Government and people. 
Without pretending to have the solutions 
to South Africa's complex problems, we 
intend to use our influence to bring about 
peaceful change, equality of opportunity, 
and basic human rights for all South Afri- 
cans. 

We recognize, however, that there may 



535 



be additional ways to further social devel- 
opment and meaningful change within 
South Africa. We agree with witnesses, Mr. 
Chairman, who have testified in recent 
days about the positive effect that Ameri- 
can firms in South Africa, committed to 
enlightened business practices, could have 
on developments there. 

We believe it is important, for example, 
for American business to continue to re- 
flect the principles of the United States in 
their operations in South Africa, and we 
believe that this can be done despite the 
existence of institutionalized racial dis- 
crimination. 

You are aware, Mr. Chairman, of our 
policy to encourage American businessmen 
to take positive steps to enhance the well- 
being of their black employees. We believe 
that American businesses can do, and will 
find it in their interest to do, more in this 
regard. In examining this question further, 
we will take into account the proposals ex- 
pressed by the witnesses who have dis- 
cussed this subject with your subcommittee. 

Other measures designed to exert a posi- 
tive influence on the pace of progress in 
South Africa have included our extensive 
exchange program under which South Afri- 
cans, representing a broad cross section of 
South Africa's population, have visited the 
United States. In addition the American 
Embassy and our three consulates general 
in South Africa have vigorously worked to 
project, through their activities and the 
behavior of their staffs, the values for 
which we stand. I believe you may be able 
to testify, Mr. Chairman, to the commit- 
ment of our official representatives to these 
objectives. 

The conviction that communication and 
exposure to positive influences are impor- 
tant if change is to be brought about in 
South Africa is also an important element 
behind our determination to continue to 
oppose the isolation of South Africa from 
the rest of the international community. 
We believe that excluding South Africa, 
and other nations as well, from interna- 



536 



tional organizations can have serious detri- 
mental effects both on South Africa and on 
the organizations themselves. 

Mr. Chairman, these aspects of our pol- 
icy toward South Africa have not changed. 

What has changed is that we are now 
actively engaged in a positive effort to 
effectuate change in southern Africa by 
finding solutions to the most immediate and 
acute problems there. Events both inside 
and outside South Africa have added a 
measure of urgency to the need for change 
in South Africa. The key role that South 
Africa must play if the peaceful evolution 
of Namibia and Rhodesia to independence 
and majority rule is to take place has long 
been recognized, and American officials 
have long been urged by African leaders 
to "use their influence" with South Africa 
to this end. The Secretary discussed this 
point with African leaders during his first 
visit to the continent in April. Since then, 
we have been in close touch with the South 
African Government, as well as with lead- 
ers of black Africa, in recent negotiations 
on Namibia and Rhodesia. All these parties 
played a positive and constructive role in 
this effort, including Prime Minister Vor- 
ster of South Africa. 

But I wish to make it clear that South 
Africa's participation in these efforts was! 
not secured by any trades or concessions 
involving other aspects of our policy which 
I described earlier. None were asked, and 
none were offered. There was no quid pro 
quo. Secretary Kissinger stated in June 
that the United States would not sacrifice 
its principles elsewhere in the search for 
peaceful solutions for Namibia and Rho- 
desia. 

Recent events have shown the tragic pro- 
portions of the South African problem. It 
is, as I said earlier, a highly complex one. 
It is not a conventional case of decoloniza 
tion. Blacks and whites have been in that 
land for hundreds of years. Neither is 
alien; all of its peoples are, in a root sense, 
African. 

The search for a solution will demand 



Department of State Bulletin 



the most extraordinary effort of will, com- 
passion, understanding, and conciliation by 
all South Africans. It is the issue of justice 
and decency which transcends Africa and 
reaches out to touch the moral sense of all 
mankind. The United States cannot be in- 
different to it. And as the Secretary of 
State has made clear in his Lusaka state- 
ment and since, we shall not be. 



Report on 1975 U.S. Participation 
in the U.N. Transmitted to Congress 

Message From President Ford J 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I am pleased to send to the Congress the 
30th annual report on United States par- 
ticipation in the United Nations and its 
many subsidiary bodies. 

This report shows how the United States 
worked to advance its interests through the 
main activities of the United Nations sys- 
tem during Calendar Year 1975. It de- 
scribes the outcome of important meetings 
such as the seventh special session of the 
General Assembly on world economic co- 
operation and the landmark International 
Women's Year conference; it covers the 
work of the Security Council in the Middle 
East and other areas; and it reports on 
such contentious political issues as the 
resolution of the 30th General Assembly 
equating Zionism with Racism with which 
we vigorously disagreed. These events, and 

j many other UN activities, reflect an active 
year for the United States in the United 
Nations during which we persisted in our 
long-term effort to promote peace, eco- 

j. nomic progress and social justice within a 

e worldwide framework. 



transmitted on Oct. 1 (text from White House 
)ress release); the report, entitled "U.S. Participa- 
tion in the UN — Report by the President to the 
Congress for the Year 1975," is for sale by the 
•Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Print- 
ng Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Department of 
Instate publication 8880; 410 pp.). 



In the area of security and crisis manage- 
ment, the United Nations was effective in 
carrying out its primary purpose: contrib- 
uting to the maintenance of international 
peace. United Nations peacekeeping forces 
in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights 
areas of the Middle East continued to sepa- 
rate previous combatants while the search 
for a more durable peace continued. Simi- 
larly, in Cyprus, United Nations peacekeep- 
ing forces helped to patrol the lines where 
confrontation existed and contributed to 
humanitarian needs. The Security Council, 
in addition to making the arrangements for 
the continuation of the mandates for these 
forces, also helped reduce tensions over the 
Western Sahara and East Timor. 

A major area of activity of direct impor- 
tance for American interests was the sev- 
enth special session of the General Assem- 
bly on development and international 
economic cooperation. Convened Septem- 
ber 1 just prior to the 30th regular session, 
this meeting established a new agenda for 
international cooperation on the planning 
of our emerging global economic system. 
Prior to this meeting there had been divi- 
sion, confrontation and acrimony within 
the United Nations and elsewhere, over 
how to improve the world economic system 
and how to accelerate the process of de- 
velopment. Determined to make the most 
of this opportunity and to search for com- 
mon ground, the United States outlined a 
broad program of practical initiatives 
which would be of benefit to both develop- 
ing and developed countries. The partici- 
pants in this historic meeting responded 
positively to the U.S. approach, adopting a 
consensus resolution which embraced most 
of our proposals. This session demonstrated 
that the UN can help to advance America's 
fundamental interests when we exercise 
leadership in the organization. 

An international conference of great im- 
portance to the United States was the 
World Conference of the International 
Women's Year in Mexico City. This meet- 
ing, which grew out of a 1974 U.S. initia- 



ii Dctober 25, 1976 



537 



tive, marked the first time that the prob- 
lems of women had been the subject of 
such a major international conference. 
With some exceptions the conference re- 
corded a number of major achievements. 
The United States made significant contri- 
butions to the World Plan of Action which 
was adopted at the conference, thus setting 
in motion a program that will gradually 
help the world to realize the full rights and 
potential of half of its people. 

At my direction in November 1975, Sec- 
retary of State Kissinger sent a letter to 
the Director General of the International 
Labor Organization announcing our inten- 
tion to withdraw from that organization in 
1977 unless reforms are made before then. 
We cited four special areas of concern: 
erosion of tripartite representation; selec- 
tive concern for human rights; disregard 
of due process; and increasing politiciza- 
tion of a technical agency. We took this 
step only after the most careful delibera- 
tion and, as we have stated, we will make 
every effort to promote conditions that 
could permit us to continue to participate 
in the organization. 

The 30th session of the General Assem- 
bly was marked both by cooperation and 
contention. Many economic and social is- 
sues were debated, resulting in resolutions 
adopted by consensus. But political differ- 
ences arose among the members over such 
issues as Korea, the Middle East, human 
rights and decolonization. Among other 
actions, a resolution equating Zionism with 
Racism was adopted over strong United 
States opposition. We view this resolution 
as a fundamental distortion of the truth 
and, as a result of its adoption, announced 
that we would not participate in the activ- 
ities of the Decade for Action to Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination. 

These are but a few of the important 
events in the United Nations during the 
past year. Much of the work of the United 
Nations is unknown because it is not regu- 
larly reported through the news media. 
The economic, social and technical coordi- 
nation work of the United Nations, which 



538 



account for more than 90 percent of its 
total resources, include such important ac- 
tivities as: 

—Maintaining international aviation 
safety standards; 

— Helping to prevent the spread of nu- 
clear weapons; 

— Working to combat illicit drug pro- 
duction and trafficking; 

— Improving health conditions and 
standards worldwide and combating dis- 
ease and plague; 

— Setting improved international stand- 
ards for the environment; 

— Improving international food stand- 
ards and preventing plant and animal dis- 
ease from crossing borders; 

— Providing economic development and 
technical assistance to the poorer nations 
of the world ; and 

— Providing food assistance and disaster 
relief. 

As the world's strongest economic power 
with the greatest global reach, the United 
States derives many tangible benefits from 
these United Nations activities, many of 
which resulted from American initiative 
and leadership. 

Despite difficulties inherent in working 
within an organization of so many sover- 
eign states having differing interests and 
backgrounds, I believe that we are making 
progress in achieving our purposes in the 
United Nations. The United States is work- 
ing actively to defend its interests, to op- 
pose irresponsible actions and to promote 
cooperation among UN members in fulfill 
ment of the great purposes of the Chartei 
which we helped to frame. 

As the world grows increasingly complex 
and interdependent, I conclude that United 
States leadership and participation in the 
United Nations serves our interests anc 
hopes for realizing mankind's aspiration.' 
for a world of peace, economic progress 
and social justice. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, October 1, 1976. 



Department of State Bulletir 



tori 

taei 



H 



Aviation 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Amendment of part IV of annex I of the 1956 agree- 
ments on the joint financing of certain air naviga- 
tion services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands 
and in Iceland by deletion of requirements for pro- 
vision of LORAN services. Adopted by the ICAO 
Council at Montreal June 14, 1976; effective Decem- 
ber 29, 1977. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 

Done at London December 3, 1975. 

Notifications of provisional application deposited: 
Guatemala, August 16, 1976; Congo, September 10, 
1976; Kenya, September 17, 1976; Mexico, Sep- 
tember 23, 1976; Finland, France, Tanzania, 
September 24, 1976; Belgium, Luxembourg, Sep- 
tember 28, 1976; Italy. Japan, September 29, 
1976; Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, 
Liberia. Nigeria, Spain, Cameroon, Yugoslavia, 
Zaire, September 30, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, September 17, 
1976; Jamaica, United States, September 24, 
1976; Federal Republic of Germany, September 
29, 1976; Australia, September 30, 1976. 

Accession deposited: Madagascar, September 29, 
1976. 

Provisional entry into force: October 1, 1976. 

Conservation 

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done 
at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force 
May 26, 1976. 1 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 
September 30. 1976. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973. 2 

Acceptances deposited: Madagascar, September 27, 
1976; Laos, September 28, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 2 
Acceptance deposited: Tanzania, September 28, 
1976. 



October 25, 1976 



Seals 

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on 
conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 
3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976. 2 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 

September 29, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, October 6, 1976; 

United States, October 4, 1976. 
Acceptance deposited: Japan, October 6, 1976. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally July 1, 1976. 

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
September 30, 1976. 

Wheat 

Protocol modifying and further extending the 
wheat trade convention (part of the international 
wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done 
at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19, 1976. with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, 
October 7, 1976. 3 

Protocol modifying and further extending the food 
aid convention (part of the international wheat 
agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at 
Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force 
June 19. 1976, with respect to certain provisions, 
and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. 
Accession deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, 
October 7, 1976. 3 



BILATERAL 

Canada 

Arrangement relating to information in the nuclear 
field, with patent addendum and annexes. Signed 
at Ottawa and Washington August 6 and Septem- 
ber 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976. 

German Democratic Republic 

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the 
United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and 
related letter. Signed at Washington October 5, 
1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually 
agreed by exchange of notes. 

Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement concerning mutual assistance in the ad- 
ministration of justice in connection with the Lock- 
heed Aircraft Corporation matter, with agreed 
minutes. Signed at Washington September 24, 
1976. Entered into force September 24, 1976. 



1 Not in force for the United States. 

" Not in force. 

3 Applicable to Berlin (West). 



539 



Greece 

Agreement relating to payment to the United States 
of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles 
and eligibility for United States military assistance 
and training under the military assistance pro- 
gram. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens 
August 31, 1976. Entered into force August 31, 
1976. 

Guinea 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of April 21, 1976, with 
memorandum of understanding. Signed at Conakry 
September 22, 1976. Entered into force Septem- 
ber 22, 1976. 

Israel 

Cash grant agreement to provide necessary foreign 
exchange to support the economic requirements of 
Israel. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. 
Entered into force September 22, 1976. 

Loan agreement to promote the economic and politi- 
cal stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at 
Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into 
force September 22, 1976. 

Program assistance grant agreement to promote the 
economic and political stability of Israel, with at- 
tachments. Signed at Washington September 22, 
1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976. 

Italy 

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administra- 
tion of justice in connection with the Lockheed Air- 
craft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington 
March 29, 1976. 
Entered into force: April 12, 1976. 

Peru 

Agreement relating to compensation for the expro- 
priated assets of the Marcona Mining Company. 
Signed at Lima September 22. 1976. Enters into 
force upon signature and acceptance of the promis- 
sory note and ore sales contract referred to in the 
agreement. 

Philippines 

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed 
at Manila October 1, 1976. Enters into force 30 
days after the exchange of instruments of rati- 
fication. 

Syria 

Agreement amending the agreement of April 20, 
1976, for sales of agricultural commodities. Ef- 
fected by exchange of letters at Damascus Septem- 



ber 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force September 
29, 1976. 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement 
of October 18, 1972, relating to establishment of 
the Temporary Purchasing Commission for the 
procurement of equipment for the Kama River 
Truck Complex. Effected by exchange of letters at 
Moscow and Washington June 7 and September 13, 
1976. Entered into force September 13, 1976. 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 4-10 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*493 10/4 U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs: cancellation of 
Oct. 8 meeting. 
*494 10/5 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.. sworn in 
as Ambassador to Federal Re- 
public of Germany (biographic 
data). 

Advisory Committee on Transna- 
tional Enterprises, Oct. 28. 

U.S. and German Democratic Re- 
public sign fisheries agreement. 

Experts from world's major sci- 
ence museums to study U.S. 
centers, Oct. 10-Nov. 14. 

Kissinger: toasts at luncheon for 
Latin American delegations to 
U.N., New York. 

U.S. -Canada discussions on border 
television, Oct. 6: joint commu- 
nique. 

Edward E. Masters sworn in as 
Ambassador to Bangladesh (bio- 
graphic data). 

Kissinger: toast at luncheon for 
African delegations to U.N., 
New York. 

Patricia M. Byrne sworn in as 
Ambassador to Mali (biographic 
data). 

Shipping Coordinating Committee, 
Subcommittee on Safety of Life 
at Sea, working group on car- 
riage of dangerous goods, Nov. 9. 
*504 10/8 Kissinger, Waldheim: news con- 
ference following meeting. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



*495 


10/6 


f496 


10/6 


*497 


10/6 


f498 


10/7 


*499 


10/7 


*500 


10/7 


t501 


10/8 


*502 


10/8 


*503 


10/8 



540 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX October 25, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 19U8 



Africa 

President Ford Pledges U.S. Support for 
Efforts for Solution in Africa (statement) . 528 

The Search for Peace in Southern Africa 

(Rogers) 532 

Secretary Discusses Southern Africa in Inter- 
view for NBC "Today" Show 528 

Toward a New Understanding of Community 

(Kissinger) 497 

Arms Control and Disarmament. Toward a New 

Understanding of Community (Kissinger) . 497 

China. Toward a New Understanding of Com- 
munity (Kissinger) 497 

Congress 

Report on 1975 U.S. Participation in the U.N. 

Transmitted to Congress (message from 

President Ford) 537 

The Search for Peace in Southern Africa 

(Rogers) 532 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 31st U.N. 

General Assembly 510 

Cyprus. Toward a New Understanding of Com- 
munity (Kissinger) 497 

Developing Countries. Toward a New Under- 
standing of Community (Kissinger) . . . 497 

Human Rights. Toward a New Understanding 
of Community (Kissinger) 497 

Korea. Toward a New Understanding of Com- 
munity (Kissinger) 497 

Law of the Sea. Toward a New Understanding 
of Community (Kissinger) 497 

Middle East. Toward a New Understanding of 
Community (Kissinger) 497 

Namibia 

The Search for Peace in Southern Africa 

(Rogers) 532 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern Afri- 
can Issues With African and British Officials 
(Crosland, Kissinger) 511 

Presidential Documents 

President Ford Pledges U.S. Support for 
Efforts for Solution in Africa 528 

Report on 1975 U.S. Participation in the U.N. 
Transmitted to Congress 537 

United Nations Day, 1976 (proclamation) . . 510 

South Africa 

The Search for Peace in Southern Africa 

(Rogers) 532 

Secretary Discusses Southern Africa in Inter- 
view for NBC "Today" Show 528 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern Afri- 
can Issues With African and British Officials 
(Crosland, Kissinger) 511 



Southern Rhodesia 

International Economic Support for Rhodesia 
Settlement Discussed (press statement fol- 
lowing meetings at Washington) 531 

President Ford Pledges U.S. Support for 

Efforts for Solution in Africa (statement) . 528 

The Search for Peace in Southern Africa 

(Rogers) 532 

Secretary Discusses Southern Africa in Inter- 
view for NBC "Today" Show 528 

Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern Afri- 
can Issues With African and British Officials 
(Crosland, Kissinger) 511 

Tanzania. Secretary Kissinger Discusses South- 
ern African Issues With African and British 
Officials (Crosland, Kissinger) 511 

Terrorism. Toward a New Understanding of 

Community (Kissinger) 497 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 539 

U.S.S.R. Toward a New Understanding of 
Community (Kissinger) 497 

United Kingdom. Secretary Kissinger Discusses 
Southern African Issues With African and 
British Officials (Crosland, Kissinger) . . . 511 

United Nations 

Report on 1975 U.S. Participation in the U.N. 

Transmitted to Congress (message from 

President Ford) 537 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 31st U.N. 

General Assembly 510 

Toward a New Understanding of Community 

(Kissinger) 497 

United Nations Day, 1976 (proclamation) . . 510 

Zaire. Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern 
African Issues With African and British 
Officials (Crosland, Kissinger) 511 

Zambia. Secretary Kissinger Discusses South- 
ern African Issues With African and British 
Officials (Crosland, Kissinger) 511 

Name Index 

Baker, Howard H., Jr 510 

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 510 

Crosland, Anthony 511 

Ford, President 510, 528, 537 

Hess, Stephen , 510 

Hupp, Rev. Robert P 510 

Kissinger, Secretary 497, 511, 528 

McGovern, George 510 

Myerson, Jacob M 510 

Poston, Ersa Hines 510 

Rawls, Nancy V 510 

Rogers, William D 532 

Scranton, William W 510 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 510 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXV • No. 1949 • November 1, 1976 



SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED AT ANNUAL MEETING 
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF EDITORIAL WRITERS 541 

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE RELATIONSHIP: 

FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE EFFORTS 

Toast by Secretary Kissinger 555 

STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONSHIP 

BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA 

Toast by Secretary Kissinger 559 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 



For index see inside back cover 



NOV 1 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
quired by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through January 31, 1981. 

Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1949 
November 1, 1976 



The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by tht 
Office of Media Services, Bureau o\ 
Public Affairs, provides the public am 
interested agencies of the governmem 
with information on developments ii 
the field of U.S. foreign relations am 
on the work of the Department am 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes select* 
press releases on foreign policy, issuet 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addressei 
and news conferences of the Presiden 
and the Secretary of State and othe 
officers of the Department, as well a 
special articles on various phases o 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information i 
included concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which th 
United States is or may become > 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department o 
State, United Nations documents, am 
legislative material in the field o 
international relations are also listed 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual Meeting 
of the National Conference of Editorial Writers 



Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger by a panel at the 
unnual meeting of the Natio?ial Conference of 
Editorial Writers (NCEW) at Hilton Head, 
E.C., on October 2. Members of the panel were 
Kobert Barnard, Louisville Courier- Journal ; 
Eig Gissler, Milwaukee Journal; Paul Green- 
herg, Pine Bluff Commercial; and Joseph 
ftroud, Detroit Free Press. John Zakarian, 
president of the conference, St. Louis Post- 
yispatch, tvas the moderator. 1 

[Press release 492 dated October 2 

Secretary Kissinger: ... I thought I could 

perhaps lead things off by making a few 

general observations about the conduct of 

oreign policy. 

The basic foreign policy of the United 

tates is determined by the objective con- 

litions in which the United States finds 

tself, by the values of our people, and only 

o some extent by the views of the leaders. 

'he foreign policy of a great nation cannot 

hange every four or eight years. It must 

eflect some permanent characteristics. To 

he extent that other nations believe that 

he United States changes its fundamental 

>olicy at regular intervals — to that extent, 

ve become a factor of instability and in- 

ecurity. 

Of course there are practical differences. 

nd of course it can be that mistakes are 

ade of such magnitude that a radical shift 

necessary. But sooner or later we must 

evelop a consensus about our fundamental 

irection and our basic interests that is not 



1 Mr. Zakarian's introduction of Secretary Kissin- 
er and the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's 
sniarks are not printed here. 



in itself subject to partisan debate. I am 
not saying it isn't subject to debate, but not 
to partisan debate. The basic goals that any 
administration has to pursue concern the 
problem of peace, the problem of world 
order, and the problem of the relationship 
of our values to the values of other so- 
cieties. 

The problem of peace has, in our age, an 
unprecedented character. Throughout his- 
tory it would have been inconceivable that 
any nation could accumulate too much 
power for effective political use. As late as 
the end of World War II, every increment 
of additional power would have been mili- 
tarily useful. 

Today we live in a period in which a 
nuclear war would mean destruction for all 
parties and in which the relative advan- 
tage of one side against the other pales 
compared to the destruction that is in- 
volved, which could well be the end of 
civilized life as we understand it. Therefore 
the traditional power politics, the accumu- 
lation of marginal advantages, the postur- 
ing vis-a-vis opponents, has to be carried 
out today, if at all, with a sense of respon- 
sibility and a degree of circumspection that 
is unparalleled. And every President will, 
sooner or later, be driven to the conviction 
which was first enunciated by President 
Eisenhower: There is no alternative to 
peace. 

Therefore the problem of how to control 
nuclear arms, how to prevent the spread 
of nuclear weapons, must be a paramount 
concern of American policy. And tough 
rhetoric is no substitute for the perception 
of this overriding necessity. 

To be sure, we have to make certain that 



lovember 1, 1976 



541 



the desire for peace does not lead other 
countries to try to seek unilateral advan- 
tages. And we have to be able to combine 
a concern with our values and our interests, 
and those of our allies, with a readiness to 
seek honorable solutions with adversaries. 
Where to strike this balance is one of the 
problems with which policymakers have to 
deal and which will no doubt come up in 
our discussions. 

The second problem is the problem of 
world order. If it is true that conflicts can- 
not be settled by tests of strength, then we 
need an international system most of whose 
participants feel that they have a stake in 
it and are therefore not prepared to test it 
by military means. 

This presents us with the problem of how 
to relate ourselves to our friends and allies ; 
how to deal with opposing ideologies com- 
mitted to revolutionary theories, if not al- 
ways practice; and how to find a place in 
such a world for the hundred or so new 
nations that have come into being since 
World War II with experiences quite differ- 
ent and problems quite different from those 
of the older states. 

And thirdly, there is the problem of the 
relationship of our values to the other goals 
of our foreign policy. Without security, 
there can be no peace. But pure pragma- 
tism leads to paralysis; it makes every 
problem insoluble. Moral issues appear in 
absolute form. But in foreign policy, at any 
one time, only partial solutions are pos- 
sible. And if every nation of the world 
insists on the immediate implementation of 
all of its principles, eternal conflict is in- 
evitable. 

Therefore the difficult aspect of foreign 
policy is that one constantly has to strike 
balances between conciliation and security, 
between order and progress, between 
values and what can be attained at any 
period. This is where the act of judgment 
comes in — an act that is compounded by 
the fact that when the scope for action is 
greatest, the knowledge on which to base 
such action in foreign policy is at a mini- 
mum ; when the knowledge is greatest, the 



542 



scope for action has often disappeared. 

Nobody can ever prove that an assess 
ment is true until it is too late to effect it. 

In 1936, when the Germans occupied th< 
Rhineland, it would have been very easi 
for France to stop the advance of Hitler 
But if they had done it, if France had don« 
this, the world would still be debatim 
today whether Hitler was a maniac bent oi 
world domination or a misunderstood na 
tionalist. By 1941 everybody knew that h 
was a maniac bent on world domination. I 
was a knowledge acquired at the cost o\ 
20 million lives. 

So the policymaker is always faced wit! 
the dilemma that when he can act, he car 
not prove that he is right. And by the tim 
he can prove that he is right, then he ca 
no longer very often be creative. 

Of course, not everything you cannc 
prove is right. And this is where the ur 
certainties in our debates arise anc 
frankly, where the credibility gap that ou 
newspapers are so fond of emphasizin 
very often develops. 

But I think I have explained enough per 
plexities to turn this over to the panel. An 
I see that all of our distinguished frienc 
here have copious notes in front of then 
so let me volunteer for assassinatioi 
[Laughter.] 

Initiatives in Southern Africa 

Mr. Barnard: Mr. Secretary, this is 
rather general [inaudible'], typical of Amer 
can editorial writers. You have just returne 
from your first African safari, I believe, an 
I wonder if Rhodesia's black-ruled neighbor 
agreed to the terms for a transitional go'i 
ernment announced by Ian Smith. And thei 
is still a question of funds for members c 
the white minority ivho choose to sell out an 
leave the country. What share of those fund 
which I think we have seen estimated at pe\ 
haps $2 billion, would the United States, i 
your view, be expected to pay? And woul 
you anticipate any difficulty in persuadin 
Congress to put out the money? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let me perhaps fir; 






Department of State Bulleti 



k 






I 



make clear one point. The terms that Mr. 
Smith announced were not terms he had 
originated and was putting to his neigh- 
bors. They represented a U.S. -U.K. distilla- 
tion of months of consultations, of five 
missions — three American, two British — to 
Africa, of what we thought the best avail- 
able compromise might be that would move 
matters toward majority rule under condi- 
tions in which the rights of the minorities 
would be protected and under conditions 
in which the transition would occur with 
moderation and yet with all possible speed. 
So it is not something that was originated 
by Mr. Smith. 

On the whole, I believe that the program 
that is now being discussed has in many of 
its main elements been acceptable as a 
basis for negotiation. Of course there are 
many elements that were left open — the 
composition of most parts of the govern- 
ment. And of course every party at a nego- 
tiation is free to raise whatever issue it 
wishes. But much of what one reads today 
should be seen as a process by which the 
various parties establish their negotiating 
position. 

Now with respect to the fund, the fund 
we are discussing is not designed to buy 
out the white population. The fund is more 
designed to enable the white population to 
stay by developing the Rhodesian economy, 
and only as its second function is a sort of 
insurance scheme for those who want relief. 
The fewer people, of course, the less has 
to be paid out of this fund for the purpose 
of the settlers. 

Now, we are attempting to do this as an 
international project. The United Kingdom, 
France, and other European countries have 
already agreed in principle. We are dis- 
cussing it also with Canada, Australia, and 
we hope to have a very wide base of sup- 
port for it. 

As far as the United States own contri- 
bution is concerned, we think that perhaps 
part of it can be contributed from private 
sources. Discussions as to the amount, of 
the total amount, will begin next week in 
Washington, and we don't have a figure to 



(November 1, 1976 



i 



put before the public yet. When we do, of 
course, the part of it that has to come from 
public funds will have to go to the Con- 
gress. 

Will we get support for it? I believe that 
the American public will understand that 
the cost of a moderate evolution in south- 
ern Africa is much less than the ultimate 
cost of an escalation of violence there. And 
therefore we hope that we can get support. 
We have briefed many congressional com- 
mittees. And so far we haven't been able 
to give them any figures, but we have 
briefed them on the concept before we left 
and since we returned, and we have had 
very good and, I must say, bipartisan re- 
action on it. 

Mr. Barnard: And what is your best guess- 
timate? The current uncertainty over 
whether black leaders ivill accept the terms 
announced [inaudible'] . 

Secretary Kissinger: You see, some of the 
things that the black leaders have rejected 
are not central to the issue. For example, 
whether the conference should take place 
inside Rhodesia, which Ian Smith proposed 
— that was not part of the five-point pro- 
gram we recommended. And I think that 
this will have to find a solution by mutual 
agreement, because obviously a conference 
should take place at a place that is mutu- 
ally acceptable. 

I believe that, secondly, a lot depends on 
how some of the African nations sort out 
the relationship between the more mod- 
erate and the more radical elements. 

Our impression is that, as of now, prog- 
ress is being made toward assembling the 
conference and that the basic framework 
that they accepted in Lusaka, which is to 
say a conference which creates a transi- 
tional government which leads to a consti- 
tutional conference which drafts a consti- 
tution for full independence, that that 
framework is going to be implemented. It 
will take a few weeks to sort all of this out, 
but it is going about as we expected. 

Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, I have a per- 
haps personal question. Fatigue can often 



543 






lead to slips in judgment. If your style of 
diplomacy is marked by hectic activity, shut- 
tling, jet lag, hopscotching, always with a 
briefcase full of explosive questions, I won- 
der, how do you deal with the inevitable 
stress and guard against diplomatic blunders 
occurring perhaps just through sheer ex- 
haustion? 

Secretary Kissinger: By beating my dog. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr. Gissler: After the dog is dead, sir, 
what happens? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know how 
you can guard against blunder. One prob- 
lem may be that there is a gap between the 
public perception of how diplomacy is con- 
ducted and how it is actually conducted. 

Before I go on one of these trips, there 
are months of very careful preparation. I 
do not go on one of these trips unless I and 
my colleagues have made the judgment 
that we have carried matters to the maxi- 
mum point they can be carried through the 
exchange of diplomatic notes. 

The shuttle that concluded last week was 
started in April with the speech in Lusaka, 
was carried forward through a series of 
meetings and a series of missions to Africa. 
And what we have to balance is the stress 
of this type of diplomacy against the prob- 
lem that we might not be able to carry it 
off at all if one circulated notes. 

But I am not saying that this style of 
diplomacy is the way it must be conducted 
by every Secretary of State and every Pres- 
ident. 

We have faced a number of issues that 
tended to crystallize in a dramatic way and 
that required some intermediary to bring 
them to a point of decision, in Africa, for 
example. Now I would think that in the 
negotiation on the constitution that is now 
started, the role of high-level diplomacy 
would be very minimal. 

So I would say one cannot make a gen- 
eral judgment as to how foreign policy 
should be conducted. And any style of 
diplomacy has its risk of failures, and ulti- 
mately it has to be judged by its record. 



544 



Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, you come 
out for majority rule in Rhodesia. Would you 
also be in favor of majority rule in South 
Africa ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I am in favor of 
the principle of majority rule in South 
Africa, but I think one also has to under- 
stand that the situation in South Africa is 
infinitely more complicated than it is in 
Rhodesia, in the sense that the settlers have 
been there for hundreds of years and that 
a system has developed that is repugnant 
to us but that it will take some time to 
change. And therefore, while I believe 
strongly that the system must be changed 
— I have emphasized this in a number of 
public speeches — I also believe that it 
would be in the interests of all the people, 
black and white, if it occurs in an evolu- 
tionary manner and without violence. 

Mr. Greenberg: How would you envision 
this process? Would one day you be making 
a similar shuttle for South Africa, say? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have to tell yoi 
quite candidly that I have no blueprint foi 
the future of South Africa. I believe tha' 
the first, the major steps must be taken bj 
the Government of South Africa, and tha' 
to the degree that it can be handled in th( 
South African context, to that extent i 
would be to everybody's benefit. 

If the problem becomes internationalized! 
it means it has almost certainly already go 
out of control. They now have some little 
time to consider the consequences of th< 
internal situation in South Africa. And w( 
hope that it will move in a — that they wil 
take advantage of this period. 

Diplomatic Process in the Middle East 

Mr. Stroud: Mr. Secretary, ivhat reason di 
you have now to believe that the reconvenini 
of the Geneva Conference on the Middle Eas 
would be productive? And isn't there tfa 
danger now that the critics who said that th> 
step-by-step process would deal away som* 
of your trump cards too early may be provei 
right ? 

Department of State Bulletir 



■ 



: 'E 



Secretary Kissinger: You always have to 
compare the — of course you have to re- 
member that it is unlikely, despite my well- 
known objectivity, that I will agree with 
i my critics. [Laughter.] 

But you always have to compare the 
alternatives that were in fact available. In 
1973 the United States had no diplomatic 
relations with any of the key Arab coun- 
tries. The Soviet Union was acting as the 
lawyer of the Arab countries. Israeli armies 
were confronting the Arabs along dividing 
lines that were extremely unstable. 

To attempt a comprehensive solution 
under those circumstances involved — if an 
oil embargo was still in force, to attempt a 
comprehensive solution under those cir- 
cumstances involved a high risk of an ex- 
plosion. And a step-by-step approach 
enabled the parties to get used to the proc- 
ess of negotiation, to gain confidence that 
progress could be made. 

It was always envisaged that the step-by- 
step approach would sooner or later lead 
to a more comprehensive approach. It was 
never conceived as an alternative to a 
comprehensive solution, but as a step to- 
ward a comprehensive solution. 

I think now the conditions are approach- 
ing where comprehensive solutions can re- 
sult. Whether it has to be one grand solu- 
tion, or whether a series of stages within 
a larger framework, that will have to be 
seen as the negotiations begin. 

I do not believe that we have given away 
any key bargaining chips that will be 
needed later. On the contrary, I think we 
created conditions from which comprehen- 
sive solutions can now be attempted with- 
Dut the risk of an explosion and without the 
risk of an alienation of some of the major 
countries involved. 

Mr. Stroud: What is the leverage from this 
ooint on? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what was the 
everage in 1973? In 1973 we were all sub- 
ject to an oil embargo. We had no diplo- 
natic relations with any of the key 
countries. And it is an illusion to believe 



that we had a leverage in 1973 that we 
have lost in 1976. 

The leverage that we have now is that 
we are the only country that is in friendly 
relations with all of the chief actors in this 
process. We are the only country without 
whose help progress simply is not possible. 
And that leverage is the chief contribution 
we can make to the process. 

The basic leverage as to the Israelis and 
the Arabs is about what it was in 1973; 
that is to say, the Israelis have territory 
which the Arabs want, and the Arabs have 
legitimacy which the Israelis want. Now, 
how to balance off the tangible return of 
territories, which has to be part of the 
settlement, against the Arab commitment 
to peace, which is certainly more revocable 
than is the giving up of territories, that has 
been the essence of the negotiation all 
along. And the Israelis have not given up 
so much territory that this problem has 
changed. 

This is the essential issue in the negotia- 
tion. What has improved is the readiness 
of the Arab countries to accept the exist- 
ence of Israel. What has improved also is 
the greater confidence Israel has acquired 
in the process of negotiation. What has 
fundamentally changed is the diplomatic 
position of the United States in the Middle 
East, which is a dramatic reversal of what 
it was in 1973. And this is why the condi- 
tions now, either for a Geneva Conference 
or some other diplomatic process, seemed 
to us better now than they have been at any 
period since the end of the war. 

The Conflict in Lebanon 

Mr. Barnard: While ive are on the Middle 
East — enormous supplies of arms seem to 
have poured into Lebanon and complicated 
the problem there. Can you tell us whether 
the United States or Israel has given either 
overt or covert support to any faction there, 
partiadarly the Christians? And if not, 
where do you think all those arms have been 
coming from? 

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has 



November 1, 1976 



545 



not given any arms to any of the factions. 
We have no official knowledge of what 
Israel may have done. But the majority of 
arms, the overwhelming majority of arms 
in Lebanon, come from the Soviet Union 
one way or the other, either through Libya 
or through Syria. 

The chief conflict is between the Syrians 
and the Palestinians, both of which are 
armed by the Soviet Union and come di- 
rectly from Soviet sources. 

Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, there ivould 
seem to be at least one part of the Middle 
East where American policy ivould seem to 
have been very ineffectual, and that would be 
in Lebanon, where we seem to have adopted 
a policy of just waiting for the blood to 
settle. I wonder if that doesn't raise the 
larger question of morality in foreign policy. 
A recent poll by the State Department indi- 
cates that Americans feel — to quote one of its 
findings — that Washington simply has not 
appeared to be animated in the last decade 
or so by the same root sense of right and 
wrong as the American people. How would 
you respond to that kind of feeling? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, let me 
make clear what the poll is. 

The State Department — we have started 
in the last year, in order to find out what 
the public is concerned about, to hold a 
series of town meetings around the country 
in which we have invited concerned citi- 
zens to state their criticism. And we are 
sending senior officials to sessions which are 
entirely devoted to the public expressing 
their concerns. Our officials then write re- 
ports to me about what they consider to be 
these concerns, and we distribute these re- 
ports, also, to the newspapers in the towns 
where the town meetings were held. So 
this is not a very secret operation. Now, 
somebody leaked one of these reports in 
Washington that had already been distrib- 
uted to the hometown newspapers of the 
people concerned. 

I just want to make clear all of these re- 
ports are going to be critical, because the 
town meetings are organized to elicit con- 
cerns and not elicit approvals. 



546 



Now, let me get to your question of 
morality last and deal with Lebanon first. 

Whatever our moral convictions may be, 
we cannot carry them to the point where 
the United States must settle every conflict 
in every part of the world in order to be 
cured. 

We have in Lebanon passions that have 
been built up over centuries. We have 
armies that have been built up over dec- 
ades. 

For the United States to attempt to im- 
pose peace by our own forces would make 
us the policeman of the world. We have 
attempted to do our best to prevent outside 
intervention. We have sent a special envoy 
there. We have lost an Ambassador, who 
was murdered there on a peace mission. 

We have stopped short of military inter- 
vention, because that would require a mas- 
sive degree of an American commitment 
that we do not feel is warranted in these 
circumstances. But we also believe that the 
evolution in Lebanon, painful as it is, could 
lead to a situation in which the overall 
peace process can be resumed under condi- 
tions where all of the parties have learned 
how tenuous and fragile the situation is. 

This does not mean that we would not 
want to have the war ended as quickly as 
possible. And we have offered repeatedly 
our good offices. The only thing we have 
refrained from doing is to send in Ameri- 
can military forces. 

Now, on the basic question of the roots 
of American morality and its relationship 
to American foreign policy. 

The United States for the greatest part 
of our history, or at least for the greatest 
part of our modern history, could live with 
the conviction that we could dip in and out 
of foreign policy as we chose. And we 
could be both isolationists and interven- 
tionists on the principle that we were 
morally superior to the rest of the world, 
partly caused by the fact that we never 
had to make the hard choices of security 
that countries that did not have two great 
oceans had to confront. 

Now, in the sixties and the seventies — I 



Department of State Bulletin 



% 






the late sixties and seventies — we have 

I suddenly come up against the limitations of 

Ipur power. And we now have to conduct 

foreign policy the way most other nations 

iiave had to conduct it throughout their 

jiistory, where we cannot do everything we 

jlvant, where we cannot implement all our 

preferences, and where we cannot impose 

ill our values. And this produces a certain 

'esentment, and it produces the illusion 

;hat, somehow or other, we could go back 

:o an earlier pattern if only those in power 

Ivere more morally committed. 

Now, I am not saying that security con- 
siderations have to be dominant. In fact, I 
relieve that without moral convictions to 
, jerve as a compass point, foreign policy 
i becomes entirely practical and entirely ir- 
relevant. But the role of our moral values 
n foreign policy is to give us the strength 
;o approach our goals in stages and to set 
i general direction which we hope is com- 
Datible with the values of our society. 

But what the American people will be 
earning in the years ahead, as we have 
ilready learned in Vietnam and elsewhere, 
s how to reconcile our needs with our 
imits and how to be moral without being 
ible to be absolutists. That is a very 
;ough problem, and it is one of the uncer- 
;ainties in our foreign policy. 

Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, earlier you 
\uoted President Eisenhower approvingly. 
Vould you consider his intervention in Leba- 
lon to have been a failure? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I think that Pres- 
dent Eisenhower, under the conditions 
hat then existed, with the forces that were 
hen at work in Lebanon, conducted an 
>peration that was a marginal success. A 
imilar [inaudible] the United States today 
vould require many divisions, would in- 
volve us in all the inter-Arab disputes that 
r ou now see in Lebanon, and could not be 
ustified to the American people by Ameri- 
can purposes that we could explain after- 
vard. 

After all, what is the conflict of Leba- 
lon? You have the Christian community 



November 1, 1976 



and the Moslem community that have co- 
existed side by side for many decades, but 
not always. You have within the Moslem 
community, the splits between the radical 
factions and the moderate factions. And 
you have the presence of the Palestinians, 
who constitute almost a state within a state. 
All of this overlaid by Arab rivalries in 
which the Libyans and the Iraqis back the 
radicals and the Syrians have backed the 
moderate Arabs and have cooperated with 
the Christians. 

For the United States to inject American 
military power into such a situation, under 
present circumstances, would lead us into 
a morass. 

I think there are certain situations which, 
tragic as they are, we cannot overcome 
with military power. And that is the only 
thing that we have not done in Lebanon. 

Public Discussions on Foreign Policy Issues 

Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, your remarks 
about the moral core of American foreign 
policy suggest that certain widespread public 
understanding or an agreement on certain 
objectives is essential, yet some very thought- 
ful critics say that you have done relatively 
little, especially after the collapse in Vietnam, 
to stimulate the kind of great debate neces- 
sary in this country to achieve that kind of 
understanding. 

I wonder if the hard truth is that top pol- 
icymakers, even in a democracy, are fearfid 
of taking really tough questions to the people 
for thorough free-swinging discussion? 

Secretary Kissinger: When I was in pri- 
vate life, nothing used to infuriate me more 
than a public official who, when being 
questioned at my university, would explain 
that nothing he had ever done could pos- 
sibly have been wrong. Well, I am here to 
tell you that nothing I have ever done could 
possibly have been wrong. [Laughter.] 

There are two problems. Did I try to ex- 
plain American foreign policy to the Amer- 
ican people? I think I have made a major 
effort. I have gone to 28 cities in the last 
18 months. Wherever I have gone, I have 



547 



given a speech. I have subjected myself to 
a question period from the audience. I have 
met with leaders of the community. I have 
met with the newspaper editors and pub- 
lishers. I have spent a whole day in order 
to explain some aspect of foreign policy, as 
I understood it, and to respond to questions. 
And we have had these town meetings 
which I described. 

There is, however, inherent in high office 
the problem that almost all of the problems 
one deals with are imposed on one and that 
the time for reflection, with the best will 
in the world, is limited. And obviously — 
and I think this panel and this discussion 
prove it — it stands to reason that I have to 
believe that what we did was right or we 
wouldn't have done it. 

Now, obviously, in retrospect one can 
change one's mind about something. But on 
the whole, if one has been serious and 
thoughtful, one will tend to believe that 
one was right. 

So as you go through eight years, you 
tend to accumulate a certain vested interest 
in the policies that have been carried out 
inevitably, and as you go through eight 
years, the times available for reflection are 
limited. This will be true of any possible 
successors as well as of any possible in- 
cumbent. 

So in the process of government it may 
not always be possible, even with the best 
intentions, to put everything before the 
public. But I have attempted to make a 
serious effort, and I think — I have spent a 
lot of time on the speeches that I have 
given publicly, but I am sure that there is 
always a lot more that could be done. 

Mr. Gissler: Do you have any suggestions 
as to how we can raise the level of serious 
public discussions on questions like for ivhom 
and for what we might be prepared to fight 
in the world if necessary? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure that 
that is a question that can be answered in 
a serious public discussion by senior offi- 
cials in this way. I think we can ask, in a 



548 



serious public discussion, what we take to 
be our basic purposes in the world, what 
kind of a world we are trying to bring 
about, what our overall conception is of 
the nature of the security, of the nature of 
peace. Those are questions, I think, that we 
can and should debate. 

I think to ask a question in the abstract 
— are we prepared to fight, say, for Korea 
— without having answered these other 
questions first is going to lead to a rather 
bitter debate that may not be very mean- 
ingful. 

Relations With Vietnam 

Mr. Stroud: Speaking of the debate about 
foreign policy issues, there is still great con- 
cern among many Americans about the 
Americans missing in action in Vietnam. And 
I am curious, is this a real impediment noiu 
to the normalization of relations with Viet- 
nam? Or is the election the real impediment 
to the normalization of the relations ivith 
Vietnam ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the miss 
ing in action are a real impediment to th* 
normalization of relations with Vietnam. 

Basically we have no conflict with Viet- 
nam now. After our experience in Vietnam 
we are the one great power that can bi 
guaranteed not to have any national objec 
tives to achieve in Indochina. So eventuallj 
the normalization of relations between u. 1 
and Vietnam will come. 

On the other hand, we believe that the 
behavior of the North Vietnamese in noi 
turning over to us lists which we are con- 
fident they must have is a cruel and heart 
less act and one for which we are not pre 
pared to pay any price. If that is accom 
plished, normalization will follow verj 
rapidly. 

Mr. Stroud: Can you define ivhat sort o\ 
response would be considered adequate? 

Secretary Kissinger: We would feel tha 
there is no reason for the North Vietnam- 
ese not to turn over all the informatior 



Department of State Bulletir 



' 



they have on the missing in action. It would 
be a humane gesture. It is not something 
that does us any good as a nation, but it 
will help ease the minds of many hundreds 
of people. 

We therefore believe that it should be 
done. It would wipe the slate clean. And 
we will certainly be prepared to normalize 
relations rapidly after that. 

Mr. Barnard: Mr. Secretary, we know the 
Secretary of State and the American people 
endure a lot of election rhetoric — 

Secretary Kissinger: So far it has not been 
as bad as the primary rhetoric. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Barnard: Several iveeks ago, you were 
quoted, I think, as saying that despite some 
of the things that Jimmy Carter ivas saying, 
you didn't see any substantial difference in 
the foreign policy. Since then, he has given 
the B'nai B'rith speech and has been quoted 
lustily in Playboy [laughter'] , referring again 
to you not only as "the Lone Ranger" but 
criticizing you for a number of your policies, 
including insufficient stress on morality and 
other assorted sins. 

I notice it is creeping into the columns 
now, into at least one column, which pre- 
sumably is a token of more to come, that 
there is some hope in the Carter camp that 
you can be hung around Ford's neck as some 
sort of albatross. Does this change your per- 
ception of how a Carter administration might 
operate in foreign policy? 

Secretary Kissinger: I was asked on that 
occasion to comment on one speech, but 
that was before Governor Carter had de- 
veloped the full complexity of his thought. 
[Laughter.] Now that he has developed his 
thinking in several directions [laughter], I 
would not necessarily make the same state- 
ment again. But the President will have an 
opportunity to debate foreign policy with 
Mr. Carter on Wednesday, and I don't want 
to preempt his preparations for this. 

Mr. Zakarian: I see you're whetting your 
knife. 



U.S. Arms Sales Abroad 

Mr. Greenberg: There is one area of the 
foreign policy in which you might have a 
special knowledge or interest, and that is the 
arms sales abroad. The Democratic candidate 
for President has not been alone in deploring 
the size of American arms shipments abroad, 
on the theory that they ivill actually ignite 
ivars and we will be drawn into them. Do 
you see any of that sort of danger in the 
amount of armaments this country is ship- 
ping to various nations abroad? 

Secretary Kissinger: One has to analyze 
where the arms are going before one can 
judge whether they will ignite wars and, 
secondly, whether the United States will be 
drawn into those wars if they are ignited. 

Many of the figures that are being used 
are vastly inflated. I see references, for 
example, to $7.5 billion of arms to Saudi 
Arabia. Of that $7.5 billion, the over- 
whelming part of it is going for construc- 
tion by the Corps of Engineers, and it is not 
going for weapons. And it is technically in 
the military budget, but it is to build can- 
tonments for the Saudi Army and has noth- 
ing to do, as such, with the arms race. 

Another percentage goes to Iran. Now 
Iran has pursued a policy that has been 
very parallel to ours in the Middle East. It 
has not joined the embargo. It has declared 
that it wouldn't join the embargo. It has 
sold oil even to Israel during this period. 

Countries that threaten it are countries 
like the Soviet Union and countries armed 
by the Soviet Union, such as Iraq. And 
therefore I cannot foresee — nor has Iran 
ever transferred arms to another country. 
So it is difficult to foresee any war that Iran 
would start that would draw us in. And to 
the extent that Iran is capable of protecting 
itself, we are less likely to be drawn in than 
we would be if it were defenseless. 

On the other hand, I do agree that we 
should look at the question of arms sales 
more systematically, and we have created, 
now, a new group to make sure that the 



November 1, 1976 



549 



question you put is being dealt with in a 
responsible manner. 

It is my judgment that the arms sales 
have contributed much more to stability 
than to the opposite. But we are not pushing 
arms sales. We are responding to needs 
that countries feel — and most of which 
they would be in a position to get anyway 
from other sources. 

Mr. Greenberg: But, Mr. Secretary, those 
figures on Saudi Arabia include something 
like 600-700 Sidewinder missiles. Noiv what 
possible defense justification could there be 
for a country like Saudi Ai^abia to have that 
many missiles, except perhaps to defend its 
interests against Iran, which we have also 
supplied with — 

Secretary Kissinger: Much more to defend 
its interests against some neighbors it has 
that are armed by the Soviet Union. And 
of the Sidewinders, a large — a significant 
percentage is going to have to be used for 
training purposes. So that what will be left 
is a minimum defensive package. And if 
you look at the countries surrounding 
Saudi Arabia, you would not pick Iran as 
the most likely one to attack it. 

Lesson of Vietnam War 

Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, your remarks 
addressed toward Lebanon as a potential 
policy quagmire bring to mind our tragedy 
in Vietnam. It is often said that one thing 
we can salvage from Vietnam is a lesson. 
Yet there seems to be continuing disagree- 
ment over precisely what that lesson is. 
Some say it shows the limits of American 
imperialism. Others, including, I think, the 
Republican platform writers, indicate that 
the lesson is that we should never again fight 
such a war unless ice intend to fight it all 
out and win. I wonder if you could tell us 
what you feel the fundamental lesson of 
Vietnam is? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that a funda- 
mental lesson of Vietnam is that before the 
United States gets itself militarily engaged 



550 



in any war, it must make an assessment of 
what its fundamental interest is, and sec- 
ondly, whether it can serve this interest by 
military means. 

I do agree that when the United States 
becomes militarily engaged, it should 
prevail, and if it cannot prevail, it should 
not engage itself. But before the United 
States engages itself, it must have the per- 
ception — not in abstract slogans, but 
through the best analysis that can be made 
— of what the fundamental American in- 
terest is, what the nature of its engagement 
is, and what limits we want to set to that 
engagement. 

Otherwise we are going to be drawn 
from one commitment to another in order 
to make good the previous commitment. 
But it is important also to understand what 
involves a commitment. I do not believe 
that selling arms to a country commits us 
then to the series of events that led to 
Vietnam. 

Mr. Gissler: What about South Korea? We 
are not just selling arms. We also have com- 
bat troops stationed there. 

Secretary Kissinger: South Korea — our 
interest in South Korea is produced by the 
confluence there of many power centers, by 
our historical relationship, and above all, 
by the fact that Japan considers that its 
security is closely affected by what hap- 
pens on the Korean Peninsula. And there- 
fore, for the United States to suddenly 
disengage from Korea would have drastic 
consequences in Japan and in all of North- 
east Asia. 

Mr. Stroud: Mr. Secretary, in the ivake of 
the fall of Saigon, you were quoted a number 
of times with a fairly pessimistic appraisal 
of the world perception of the United States 
after Vietnam and the feeling we had a great 
need to reestablish the authority of the 
United States in the world, the credibility of 
the United States in the world. Do you feel 
that that perception has changed signifi- 
cantly? 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the 
fact that it is a combination of the tragedies 
of the last four years. Many countries 
around the world were asking what the 
role of the United States — or to what ex- 
tent it could rely on the United States as a 
stabilizing factor or as a factor for prog- 
ress. 

I believe that since the collapse of Viet- 
nam, we have conducted a policy that has 
restored some of our credibility and re- 
solved some of the doubts, but it continues 
to be, for several reasons, including some of 
our domestic debates, one of the challenges 
of American foreign policy. 

Mr. Zakarian: Members of the panel, thank 
you. We shall receive questions from the floor. 
We have about 15 minutes, and questions are 
open only to members of NCEW. Please state 
your name and your newspaper, and then ask 
the question. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, my name is Smith Hemp- 
stone, and I am a syndicated columnist. 

You were described, I believe, in the Ori- 
ana Fallaci interview several years ago as a 
historian having a tragic sense of destiny. 

In Admiral [Elmo R.~] Zumwalt's book, 
while he may have confused Athens with the 
Theban League, he puts across the impres- 
sion, in his view, that you feel that your role 
has been one of trying to get the best deal 
possible in a declining power situation. 

I wonder if you could tell us precisely how 
you do view your role in the past seven and 
a half years, and how you foresee the shape 
of the world evolving in the next few years 
and America's role in it? 

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I have 
nominated Admiral Zumwalt on a number 
of occasions for the Pulitzer Prize for fic- 
tion. [Laughter.] I think it took him a while 
to realize that his opponent in Virginia 
was called Byrd and not Kissinger. 

Anybody who has ever been on a train 
going to an Army-Navy game would think 
it is not the most suitable place for reflec- 
tions on the philosophy of history [laugh- 
ter] — or normally believe that the partici- 



November 1, 1976 



pants in any conversation necessarily would 
recollect exactly what was said, particu- 
larly what was said on the way home from 
the game [laughter]. 

Now, what did I conceive to be my role? 
I believe, seriously now, that I am likely to 
be more reflective about this out of office 
in 1981 than I am likely to be at this time. 
[Laughter.] 

But I have served in Washington during 
a period of fundamental transition when 
the United States had to liquidate a war 
which we found when we got there. The 
first such experience in our history when 
we had to adjust our relations with our 
allies, when we had to find new ways of 
dealing with our adversaries, and when the 
revolution that is inherent in the process 
by which these new nations came into being 
is beginning to gather momentum. 

It has been my conviction that we could 
not continue to operate by managing crises 
or by abstract declarations of political in- 
tent, but that we had to develop some per- 
ception of the national interest that could 
be maintained over an indefinite period. 

Now, this is a difficult thing to put across 
in America, because we have almost no 
strand in our foreign policy thinking that 
is geared to this. We have an idealistic tra- 
dition. We have a pragmatic tradition. We 
have an international law tradition. But we 
do not have a tradition of thinking of the 
world as a political process with no termi- 
nal date in which whatever you do only 
buys you an entrance price to another 
problem. 

So it is inevitable that there is a lot of 
debate. And it is inevitable that people 
who think that there should be neat and 
final solutions would believe that one pre- 
ferred contingent solutions. 

It is indeed my conviction that we can- 
not define a terminal date at which we can 
say all our problems have disappeared. We 
are now part of an international process 
which is unending insofar as I can foresee, 
which we can manage, which we can di- 
rect, and in which our purposes have to be 



551 



clearly defined, but in which we can no 
longer sell our programs the way we did in 
the immediate postwar period by promising 
the American people an end to exertion 
and an end to problems if only one more 
program were carried out. 

And I think this explains some of the 
sort of criticism that Admiral Zumwalt 
makes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Stuart Loory of the Chi- 
cago Sun-Times. 

Coming back to your quotation from Presi- 
dent Eisenhower about there being no alter- 
native to peace, the Coyigress, within the past 
couple of weeks, appropriated $10 U billion for 
defense spending in the next year. There 
are reports that the Pentagon is going to re- 
quest $130 billion in the authorization for 
next year. Are you satisfied that the United 
States is spending the least amount of money 
necessary for defense to further American 
foreign policy aims? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am satisfied that we 
need, under present conditions, the amounts 
that have been requested. I am not satisfied 
that we can continue international relations 
indefinitely on the basis of an arms race. 
And therefore I have believed strongly that 
limitations of strategic arms and negotia- 
tions on the limitations of other arms are 
necessary. 

I believe that the constant accumulation 
of armaments on both sides is going to lead 
to a situation that could have some of the 
characteristics that led to World War I, in 
which the political leadership at some point 
lost control over events. But I do not be- 
lieve that we can achieve this unilaterally. 
Until we can negotiate an agreed limitation 
of arms, I am afraid we have to match 
what the other side is doing. 

Q. Gil Cranberg of the Des Moines Register 
and Tribune. 

Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Sen- 
ate Select Committee To Study Governmental 
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac- 
tivities'] reported that the United States has 
an extensive covert propaganda operation 



abroad. This involves having hundreds of 
foreign journalists on the U.S. payroll and 
the planting of false and misleading informa- 
tion, some of which unavoidably is picked up 
and published in this country. 

The Church committee complained about 
it. This organization is complaining about it. 
Our complaint ivas directed to the CIA [Cen- 
tral Intelligence Agency']. Siyice this activity 
presumably is in the furtherance of U.S. for- 
eign policy objectives, perhaps the complaint 
should have been directed to you. In any case, 
ivould you tell us why you think such covert 
propaganda activity is desirable, and whether 
you ivould consider having it discontinued? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't believe 
that putting misleading information out as 
news is ever justifiable. The problem arises 
that in many parts of the world the media 
are dominated by, or heavily influenced by, 
foreign powers that are hostile to us, and 
an attempt is made to get our point of view 
across. 

But I would not accept this as saying that 
it is ever justified to put out misleading in- 
formation. I would think that any informa- 
tion that is placed through any American 
governmental organization should be such 
that it could be published here without mis- 
leading the American public. 

Q. So you disagree with the practice. 

Secretary Kissinger: I disagree with the 
practice of placing misleading information 
into foreign newspapers. 

Q. Do you have the power to order that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure I have. 
If it was done in the past — I doubt very seri- 
ously that it is being done today. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Fred Sherman of 
the Miami Herald. 

You achieved great success in the Middle 
East in getting the Israelis to talk to the 
Arabs. You pulled off an apparent miracle in 
Africa getting the white minority and the 
blacks to talk. Do you think there is any For 
eign Minister in the world with the same 



552 



Department of State Bulletin! 



measure of genius that could get Havana 
and Washington off the same way? [Laugh- 
ter.'] 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as to the first 
part of your question, the answer is obvi- 
ously no. [Laughter.] 

But as far as Havana and Washington 
are concerned, we were beginning to move 
toward normalizing relations when Cuba 
placed 15,000 troops into Angola. This 
cannot be justified on any Cuban grounds. 

That made clear that either Cuba is act- 
ing as a surrogate for the Soviet Union or 
it is pursuing a revolutionary foreign pol- 
icy in distant parts of the globe or, what is 
more likely, it was a combination of the 
two. That, plus the extremely aggressive 
Cuban policy vis-a-vis Puerto Rico, has 
made it very difficult for us to get into a 
sensible dialogue. 

Q. Sir, in your concern over the Rhodesian 
situation, did you have any fear that the 
Cubans might move into Rhodesia? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that there 
is a danger that if the evolution in Africa 
is not channeled into a moderate direction, 
foreign intervention, whether Cuban or 
otherwise, would become more and more 
probable. As this accelerates, a race war 
becomes more and more inevitable. And if 
a major race war starts, it is bound to radi- 
ie calize all of Africa and have serious conse- 
r quences in other parts of the world. 

And therefore we are trying very hard 
to return African — the evolution in Africa 
into African hands and to keep all foreign 
., powers out, including ourselves. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Tom Caulfield from 
Savannah Morning News. 

Partly, you — / don't think anyone at all 
has had much to say about the Soviet Union, 
so I ivill ask a question about that. And this 
is a local question, because in Savannah, 
ivhich is located UO miles from, here across 
the Savannah River, we had last week de- 
velop a situation in ivhich an American com- 
pany has announced intention to set up a 
redistribution headquarters in Savannah for 

lelif November 1, 1976 



the distribution of Russian-made automo- 
biles. And this will employ about 150 people 
at the outset and 300 people ultimately. 

We have an anomalous situation, there- 
fore, a communistic government being in- 
volved in a capitalistic society. And some 
people at home have expressed misgivings be- 
cause Savannah was captured by the British 
and captured by the Yankees [laughter], and 
here perhaps is a good case for us to get 
captured again [laughter]. 

But my question is, this is an obvious prod- 
uct of detente, and in such a trade-off of 
American jobs for dollars going to Russia, 
tvho is the net winner — the United States or 
the Soviet Union? 

Trade With the USSR. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't believe 
that Savannah is going to be captured by 
Russian automobiles, unless they have de- 
veloped a new one in the last few weeks. 
[Laughter.] 

But to answer your question, who is the 
net winner in trade between the Soviet 
Union and the United States? It is a diffi- 
cult question to answer in the abstract. I 
would think that an economy of the size of 
ours can afford to trade with the Soviet 
Union without any danger of our economy 
being in any way significantly influenced 
by the Soviet Union. 

The second question is whether our trade 
with the Soviet Union strengthens the So- 
viet Union in any competition they may 
engage in with the United States. 

Well, this depends on what sort of trade 
we engage in and also what moderation the 
Soviet Union shows in the conduct of its 
foreign policy. 

If the Soviet Union conducts itself in an 
extremely hostile and aggressive manner, 
then I would think the possibilities for 
normal trade between our two countries 
would be very small. If relations over a 
period of years become calm, if the Soviet 
Union shows restraint in other parts of the 
world, then I think trade, especially in non- 
strategic items, might contribute to giving 



553 



an additional incentive for this moderation. 
We have always believed that trade 
should follow political accommodation. 
And therefore a great deal depends on the 
basic state of our relations with the Soviet 
Union as to whether it is beneficial or not. 



President Ford Signs Ratifications 
of Conventions on Terrorism 

Statement by President Ford 1 

Within the last few months we have 
witnessed a new outbreak of international 
terrorism, some of which has been directed 
against persons who carry the important 
burdens of diplomacy. Last summer we 
were grieved by the brutal murders of our 
Ambassador to Lebanon [Francis E. Meloy, 
Jr.] and his Economic Counselor [Robert 
O. Waring]. We also have seen a series of 
acts of violence directed against diplomatic 
missions in the United States for which we 
have host-country responsibilities. These 
acts cannot and will not be tolerated in the 
United States, nor should they be tolerated 
anywhere in the world. Preventing or pun- 
ishing such acts is a prime concern of this 
government and one which I will pursue 
with all the force of this office. 

Today [October 8] I am pleased to affix 
my signature to three documents which 
once again demonstrate the commitment 
of the United States to sustain its struggle 
against international terrorism. Through 
our efforts and with others in the United 
Nations, the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes Against Inter- 
nationally Protected Persons, Including 
Diplomatic Agents, was adopted in 1972. A 
few years previously we had supported the 
adoption in the Organization of American 
States of the Convention To Prevent and 
Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the 
Form of Crimes Against Persons and Re- 
lated Extortion That Are of International 
Significance. 



The Senate gave its advice and consent 
to the ratification of both of these conven- 
tions, and implementing legislation was re- 
quested from the Congress which would 
enable us to discharge our obligations 
under them. I congratulate the Members of 
Congress whose prompt and effective ef- 
forts have made this bill available for my 
signature. The Act for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Internation- 
ally Protected Persons (H.R. 15552) 2 will 
serve as a significant law enforcement tool 
for us to deal more effectively with the 
menace of terrorism, and it will assist us in 
discharging our important responsibilities 
under the two international conventions 
which I am today authorizing for ratifica- 
tion. 

An important feature of this bill will be 
to give extraterritorial effect to our law in 
order to enable us to punish those who 
commit offenses against internationally 
protected persons, wherever those offenses 
may occur. With this law we will in many 
cases in the future have an improved basis 
to request extradition and, if granted, to 
prosecute such criminal terrorists as those 
who murdered Ambassador Meloy and 
Economic Counselor Waring. 

I call upon all nations to join in this vital 
endeavor. I particularly urge those coun- 
tries which have not become parties tc 
these conventions to do so. 

I hope that a new initiative against ter- 
rorism as it affects innocent persons and 
disrupts the fabric of society will be ad- 
dressed at the current session of the United 
Nations General Assembly. The full force 
of world opinion and diplomatic actior 
must be brought to bear on this threat tc 
world peace and order. 

I pledge our full support to any con 
structive proposals to combat terrorism. '.< 
am therefore happy to sign this act anc 
these instruments of ratification as a re, 
affirmation of the commitment of the U.S 
Government to bring an end to terrorism 






:: 



1 Issued at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 10 (text fron 
White House press release). 
"Public Law 94-467, approved Oct. 8. 



1 






554 



Department of State Bulletin 



■N 



The Western Hemisphere Relationship: Foundation for Future Efforts 



Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger 
at a luncheon at Neiv York on October 7 in 
honor of Lati?i American heads of delega- 
tions to the 31st U.N. General Assembly and 
Permanent Representatives to the United 
Nations. 

Press release 498 dated October 7 

In this decade the cardinal objective of 
U.S. foreign policy — over all the world — 
has been to create a tradition of coopera- 
tive international relations based on equal- 
ity, mutual respect, and shared benefit. We 
have done so in the recognition that the 
world would not operate according to an 
American design and that the world's prob- 
lems would not be solved by prescription. 
But more importantly, we have done so in 
the firm conviction that the community of 
nations has before it now an opportunity 
for unprecedented progress toward build- 
ing a better world — and that a new struc- 
ture of peace and progress could be con- 
structed in which other nations felt a sense 
of participation, so that in forming it they 

; could make it their own. 

Nothing has been more central to our 
hopes than the relationships of the nations 
of this hemisphere. They are a priceless 

' foundation of past achievement, a vital and 
progressing process of present cooperation, 
and our brightest vision for the future of 
what like-minded nations can accomplish 
by working together. 

We have sustained an awareness that 

,' ; our destinies are linked : by geography, 

I culture, history, and shared ideals. 

We have achieved the crucial elements 
of successful cooperative effort: ours is a 
hemisphere of peace, in which problems 
are solved not by resort to international 



^November 1, 1976 



conflict or rhetorical confrontation but by 
responsible discussion and negotiation con- 
ducted with a unique spirit of mutual re- 
gard and respect. 

Our achievement is all the more durable 
and impressive because it has not been eas- 
ily won. The United States, in its relation- 
ship with its sister republics in the Western 
Hemisphere, has gone through many 
cycles. There was a time when we unilat- 
erally declared what foreign nations could 
do in the Western Hemisphere. Two gen- 
erations ago we centered our relations 
around a Good Neighbor policy based upon 
the principle of nonintervention in the in- 
ternal or external affairs of another. The 
1960's brought the Alliance for Progress, 
in which, on the whole, the United States 
sought to develop a program for all of the 
Western Hemisphere. 

In recent years we have, I believe, en- 
tered a new and exciting era in our rela- 
tionships — bringing wider scope for diver- 
sity and openness. We are achieving a new 
and productive balance of responsibility 
and effort within the Americas. It is a time 
increasingly marked by consultation, coop- 
eration, and brighter prospects for building 
stronger and more mutually beneficial rela- 
tions in our hemisphere — and making our 
advancement a model for the wider inter- 
national progress among nations that our 
times so clearly demand. 

It is to these ends that the President and 
his Administration vent our best efforts to 
intensify and strengthen the cooperation 
beween Latin America and the United 
States. 

That is why I have attended every ses- 
sion of the General Assembly of the OAS 
held since I became Secretary of State, and 



555 



that is why I have traveled twice to Latin 
America this year, and that is why I have 
held meetings with the Presidents and 
chiefs of state of most nations of the hemi- 
sphere and with virtually all the Foreign 
Ministers. 

I have done so out of the conviction that 
the long and close ties among the countries 
of the New World now provide an un- 
precedentedly sound foundation upon 
which our nations can come together to 
work to solve the most compelling issues 
of our time. 

My visits to 10 of your countries this 
year have reaffirmed my conviction that 
we share that recognition, that we are 
moving ahead to adapt and advance our 
ties to meet the needs of our era. 

We have done much in the last three 
years: 

Bilaterally, we have made special efforts 
to accommodate differences, to find areas 
of common interest rather than attempt to 
dictate to each other's policies. We have 
shown through practice that trade and in- 
vestment can be promoted to mutual bene- 
fit. Our commitment to conciliation has led 
us to unprecedented negotiations, with 
Panama, and, on particular bilateral con- 
cerns, with Peru. 

These intensified bilateral contacts, both 
formal and informal, are laying the ground- 
work for important multilateral progress 
on pressing international problems, from 
corporate conduct to cooperation for de- 
velopment, from narcotics to law of the 
sea. 

Regionally, we have reaffirmed our com- 
mitment to the Organization of American 
States and to efforts to make it responsive 
to the concerns of all its members. 

In Costa Rica 15 months ago, we ratified 
our support for the Rio Treaty as an instru- 
ment of collective security. At the OAS 
General Assembly last June, we confirmed 
the important role of the OAS in protecting 
human rights and maintaining regional 
peace — and we began to develop positive 



556 



new forms of cooperation on trade and 
technology. 

Globally, our countries have shown grow- 
ing awareness of the need for a new era 
of economic relations between the nations 
of North and South. We have brought more 
than our individual perspectives on com- 
modities, trade, debt, and technology to 
the United Nations, UNCTAD [United Na- 
tions Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment], and CIEC [Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation], By drawing 
on our special experience with the com- 
plexities of interdependence, we of the 
Americas are helping to define new and 
workable approaches to these vital issues 
which require the best of our private as 
well as our public talents and energies. The 
United States is dedicated to cooperate in 
development throughout the world. But as 
we seek progress on a wider scale, we rec- 
ognize our close and special ties to the 
nations of the Americas. We regard the 
concerns of this hemisphere as our first 
priority. 

In all these areas, the record is one oi 
practical case-by-case progress. We seek nc 
sweeping solutions, we will not force oui 
relations into a single mold or formula. II 
is a good record. It needs no flowery rhet- 
oric to embellish it. The days of inflated 
claims and goals are over. Today, ours is 2 
hemisphere of mutual confidence anc 
growing cooperation for peace and prog 
ress. 

Yet it is in the nature of the unending 
challenge of foreign affairs that we car 
never solve all problems. And in this pres 
ent era, new issues constantly arise. W< 
must therefore do all we can to insure tha 
problems we face are dealt with construe 
tively and that we work together to deter 
mine the future directions of our coopera 
tion. This is why the processes of consulta 
tion we have recently emphasized amonj 
us are particularly important. Yet consulta 
tions without the broader framework of H 
shared vision could well become little mon 



Department of State Bulletii | \ ; 






than sterile recountings of our respective 
limitations and problems. 

We in this hemisphere have that shared 
vision. 

Far more than any like region of the 
world, we are bound together by a com- 
mon heritage. And yet we are not Euro- 
pean. Our traditions and institutions have 
something new in them. Men were search- 
ing for it before they were sure there ivas 
an America. Columbus wrote to Ferdinand 
and Isabella that: 

Your Highnesses ordained that I should not go 
eastward by land in the usual manner but by the 
western way which no one about whom we have 
positive information has ever followed. 

Columbus found his new western way. 
We who now inhabit the lands he discov- 
ered 484 years ago next week similarly 
are finding ways to the future that are both 
new and western. 

Thus our hemisphere has for centuries 
symbolized man's readiness to grasp his 
own destiny, to set out upon uncharted 
ways in search of a better world. 

Today that spirit is more alive and more 
important than ever. But the challenges of 
our time require even more than boldness 
and readiness for tomorrow. 

Ours is a time of complex uncertainty. 
We are called upon to reconcile funda- 
mental philosophical dilemmas: 

— We must pursue our commitment to 
great human equality without removing the 
incentives for individual initiative; 

— We must preserve the security and 
independence of our nations without sacri- 
ficing the resources needed for economic 
development; and 

— We must learn to balance our need for 
social order with our responsibility to indi- 
vidual freedom. We must vindicate our own 
commitment to human rights. 

The tension between equality and initia- 
tive lies at the heart of our desires for a 
fair yet dynamic global system. In the 
United States, we emphasize the impor- 
tance of a market economy based on an 



open play of economic forces. We believe 
growth depends importantly on individual 
entrepreneurship. Other nations emphasize 
the need for greater state intervention in 
their economies to insure more equitable 
distribution of the fruits of growth. 

These differing emphases in economic 
policy can frequently be significant, but 
they are not a cause for ponderous ideo- 
logical confrontation. Each of our coun- 
tries, to be successful, will have to find a 
route to special progress that does not end 
individual incentive. Not to strive for 
equality is to risk violent revolution; not 
to provide incentives is to risk decay. 

Our mutual dependence, furthermore, 
requires us to extend our economic coop- 
eration beyond our national borders. That 
is why we have held intensive bilateral 
consultations on the Geneva trade negotia- 
tions. That is why the United States has 
ratified its participation in commodity 
agreements for wheat, coffee, and tin; why 
we have joined in producer-consumer con- 
sultations on copper in the past two weeks; 
and why we look forward to hemisphere 
consultations on sugar prior to the nego- 
tiations to take place next April. 

Recent events have taught us all that 
global prosperity is indivisible; no nation 
can prosper alone. The challenge we face 
is to reconcile our often distinct but inter- 
acting dimensions of concern on the basis 
of respect and an openminded assessment 
that differing approaches can offer com- 
mon benefits. 

There is a tension as well between the 
demands of security and development. We 
in the Americas have done far better than 
most regions of the world in avoiding 
armed conflict. In Latin America as a 
whole, defense expenditures as a percen- 
tage of national income are the lowest of 
any region in the world. These records are 
enviable. To maintain them in the face of 
the spiraling costs and offensive potential 
of modern military technology will require 
increased cooperation among potential an- 
tagonists as well as friends. 



November 1, 1976 



557 



This is easier said than done. The need 
to cooperate with perceived adversaries in 
the restraint of defense expenditures pro- 
vides no emotional satisfaction. But vast 
domestic expenditures are needed if we are 
to hope to fulfill the positive aspirations of 
our peoples. None of us in this room will 
see a time when there are enough resources 
to enable us to forgo the necessity for 
choice. 

And finally, the balance between free- 
dom and order is inherently tenuous and 
constantly changing. It will vary for each 
of us, in accordance with national tradi- 
tions and historical circumstances. 

But all of our nations were founded to 
protect human freedom and dignity. Man 
is the measure of all our effort. This hemi- 
sphere is the world's laboratory of human 
freedom, the just and ultimate refuge of 
the rights of man. We must not turn away 
from what is best in our own tradition. If 
we deny these principles in the search for 
growth and stability, we hazard the very 
foundations of our national existence and 
what is most precious to our common ex- 
perience. 

There are tensions that no nation or 
group of nations can ever fully resolve, of 
course — tensions which are inherent in the 
conduct of public affairs. In our time, they 
pose special challenges. Each nation must 
find its own equilibrium. But there is much 
we must do together to enhance, protect, 
and further respect for human rights in 
the Americas. 

And as we cooperate to resolve these 
discrepancies of the human relationship, 
we must also engage together the immedi- 
ate material needs before us. Our concrete, 
common problems are real enough, and our 
cooperative response can do as much as 
anything to forward all our hopes for a 
dynamic, secure, and just future for all 
our peoples. 

Several proposals made in the last Gen- 
eral Assembly of the OAS in Santiago pro- 
vide a basis for new forms of cooperation. 



These proposals establish our regional 
agenda for the coming year. They include 
mechanisms for: 

— Financing basic resource development; 

— Increasing agricultural productivity; 

— Facilitating social and infrastructural 
projects in middle- as well as low-income 
developing countries; and 

— Improving the development, adapta- 
tion, and transfer of technology. 

Our best effort will be needed to develop 
these proposals in a manner worthy of our 
common potential in the next half year. 
We must insure that the Special General 
Assembly on development and the com- 
panion Special General Assembly on the 
structure of the OAS are the culmination 
of our common efforts. 

The international scene today is marked 
by shifting constellations of problems, ten- 
sions, and opportunities. We in our hemi- 
sphere experience them in as great a range 
and intensity as any group of nations on 
earth. 

In the last few years we have, I believe, 
astutely perceived the problems, the op- 
portunities, and the foundations upon 
which we can build. And we have begun 
to go forward — not on the wings of in- 
flated rhetoric and unrealistic goals, but 
maturely, responsibly, and practically. 

The world is aware of our work. In a 
time when international cooperation is an 
imperative for each nation, we can be as- 
sured that all will closely monitor those 
from whom the most progress can be ex- 
pected — those whose shared experience, 
values, and outlook are the moral origin 
of a unique intimacy and a unique poten- 
tial for progress. 

Let us resolve to continue to go forward, 
not just for this year and next — but to 
make our work together a model for the 
world for the rest of this century. 

Gentlemen, I offer a toast to the future 
of inter-American cooperation. 



558 



Department of State Bulletin 



Strengthening the Relationship Between the United States and Africa 



Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger 
at a luncheon at New York on October 8 in 
honor of African Foreign Ministers and 
Permanent Representatives to the United 
Nations. 

Press release 501 dated October 8 

I've been so much in Africa in the past 
year that I am filing an application to be 
an honorary member of the OAU [Organi- 
zation of African Unity]. Then you will 
have to sit through even more of my 
speeches. 

When we met here a year ago, I said 
that America's policy toward Africa was 
founded upon three principles: 

— That self-determination, racial justice, 
and human rights spread to all of Africa; 

— That Africa attain prosperity for its 
people and become a strong participant in 
the international economic order; and 

— That the continent be free of great- 
power rivalry or conflict. 

I think none of us could then have fore- 
told the dramatic events which have taken 
place this past year in pursuit of each of 
these goals. 

A year ago, events in Rhodesia seemed to 
be moving inexorably and swiftly to- 
ward war, a war that would have had 
devastating consequences for that country 
and its neighbors. There was every pros- 
pect of conflict that would leave a legacy 
of bitterness, division, and confrontation 
that could well set back the progress of 
southern Africa for generations. 

Today, as a result of the resolute deter- 
mination of the African people and the re- 



sponsible and far-seeing decisions of their 
leaders, the situation has changed dra- 
matically. A breakthrough has been 
achieved. A negotiation is about to begin; 
the framework of a settlement exists. An 
opportunity is now before us for a peaceful 
transition to a majority-ruled multiracial 
society in Zimbabwe. 

A year ago the prospects were dim that 
the Namibian problem could be rapidly or 
satisfactorily resolved. 

Today, the inevitability of Namibian in- 
dependence is accepted by all parties con- 
cerned. More important, a way toward 
agreement among Namibia, South Africa, 
and the United Nations now appears open. 
Determined efforts are now underway to 
bring about a constitutional conference at 
a neutral location under U.N. aegis in 
which all authentic national forces, spe- 
cifically including SWAPO [South West 
Africa People's Organization], will be able 
to fashion a design for the new state of 
Namibia. 

And in the course of the year past, the 
forces of change have asserted themselves 
dramatically in South Africa. It is mani- 
fest that the internal political, economic, 
and social structure of that country must 
change. A system based on institutionalized 
injustice, and that brings periodic violence 
and upheaval, cannot last. The leaders of 
South Africa have taken responsible steps 
to help facilitate a process of change in 
Rhodesia. The world now looks to them to 
exercise the same wisdom to bring racial 
justice to South Africa. 

The past year also has brought the be- 
ginnings of what could be a new economic 



November 1, 1976 



559 



era for Africa. And it is clear that ulti- 
mately it is economic development which 
will determine whether the aspirations of 
the African people for progress and human 
dignity will be fulfilled. 

Africa's great natural wealth and con- 
siderable potential for agricultural and 
industrial development have long been im- 
peded by an array of problems: 

— Recurrent drought and natural dis- 
aster; 

— Heavy reliance by many nations on 
the production of a single commodity and, 
as a result, extraordinary dependence on 
the vagaries of the world economy; and 

— A crushing historical burden of pov- 
erty. 

In the past year the international com- 
munity has laid the groundwork for an 
attack on all these problems. It is increas- 
ingly recognized that in place of sporadic 
relief efforts to ease the aftereffects of 
natural disasters, what is needed is com- 
prehensive international programs to ad- 
dress fundamental conditions. Last May in 
Dakar I outlined one such program, a pro- 
gram for international cooperation to help 
the nations of the Sahel develop additional 
water resources , increase crop acreage 
through modern agricultural techniques, 
and improve food storage — all aimed at 
making the Sahel less vulnerable to crisis 
in the future. 

Broad-based multinational cooperation 
has been accelerated to reform the global 
economic system for the benefit of the de- 
veloping nations. In the past year — since 
the seventh special session [of the U.N. 
General Assembly] — major steps proposed 
at that session have been implemented and 
promising new measures discussed. Steps 
have not only been proposed but carried 
out — to expand agricultural production 
worldwide, to improve the earnings poten- 
tial and market stability of key raw mate- 
rials, to reduce trade barriers to tropical 
product exports into the United States, to 
help those hard hit by increasing energy 
costs, and to stimulate the flow of modern 



technology so as to promote growth and 
diversify economies now excessively de- 
pendent on a single commodity. Africa is a 
principal beneficiary of these reforms in 
the international economy. 

Africa's trade with and investment from 
the United States and the industrial nations 
of the West are crucial and expanding. 
Africa wants to earn its way. But for some, 
particularly the poorest and least devel- 
oped, trade and investment are not enough 
to overcome the legacy of pervasive pov- 
erty. U.S. bilateral assistance programs will 
therefore concentrate increasingly on these 
countries, and in sectors where the need is 
greatest. 

The United States also believes that 
closer cooperation among the industrial 
democracies of North America, Western 
Europe, and Japan can mean a much 
greater contribution to the economic devel- 
opment of Africa. Therefore we welcome 
the proposal of President Giscard d'Estaing 
of France for a fund to organize and co- 
ordinate Western assistance efforts to 
Africa. We hope to move ahead on this 
proposal. And we are seeking to further 
strengthen coordination through the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] to insure that the col- 
lective efforts of the industrial nations are 
efficiently organized to bring the maximum 
benefit to Africa. 

Economic development is a painful and 
long-term process which depends most of 
all on the sustained and substantial efforts 
of the developing countries themselves. But 
this has been a historic year in the effort 
of the community of nations to narrow the 
gulf between North and South both eco- 
nomically and politically. All those who 
seek either order or progress are beginning 
to recognize that we can have neither un- 
less the last quarter of this century is an 
era of international cooperation. 

The advances made toward racial justice 
and economic progress, if they are main- 
tained and built upon, can strengthen the 
basis of African unity and self-determina- 
tion and thereby serve as a bulwark 



560 



Department of State Bulletin 



against unwanted outside intervention in 
the affairs of the African people. 

The United States is firmly committed to 
the concept of Africa for Africans. That is 
why, for example, we have agreed with the 
Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tan- 
zania, and Zambia that non-African na- 
tions should not deal directly with the 
liberation movements of southern Africa. 
The United States seeks no bloc and plays 
no favorites among groups or leaders; we 
will not oppose any African faction or 
group, regardless of its ideology, if it is 
truly independent and African. We will 
continue our firm opposition to the exten- 
sion of great-power rivalry or conflict to 
the African Continent. 

Thus, in the course of the past year, 
Africa's drive for justice, for progress, for 
true independence, has been severely 
tested in every dimension. Africa has sur- 
vived those tests and finds itself at a pos- 
sible turning point in its history. 

The statesmanship of Africa's leaders 
has won widespread recognition. The resil- 
ience of Africa's economies and the deter- 
mination of its peoples to achieve racial 
justice have been amply demonstrated to 
the world. 

But progress achieved will not continue 
automatically. Difficult decisions must be 
made, additional statesmanship must be 
shown, if just solutions are to be achieved. 

Yet continued progress is crucial. For we 
are all aware that the important steps to- 
ward peace and justice in Rhodesia, steps 
to avert bloodshed and widening war, can 
easily be undone. And there are those who, 
for their own purposes, do not want to see 
a peaceful settlement in either Rhodesia 
or Namibia. 

Together, African states, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States have 
fashioned an opportunity for peace and 
foundation for progress in southern Africa. 
Essential elements of a negotiated settle- 
ment have been achieved: 

— The authorities in Rhodesia have ac- 
cepted the principle of majority rule 
within two years. 



— The parties have agreed that an in- 
terim government will be established im- 
mediately. 

— Agreement has been reached on the 
time and place for a conference. 

— A number of Western governments 
have agreed to participate in a fund to 
facilitate the transition to majority rule 
and to enhance the economic future of an 
independent Zimbabwe. 

For the first time in 11 years, a rapid, 
satisfactory, and peaceful end to the Rho- 
desian crisis is within reach. To lose this 
opportunity would be monumental tragedy. 
To seize it can mean a new day of hope to 
southern Africa. History will not forgive a 
failure to seize the moment. Whether by 
neglect or design, such a failure will be 
tantamount to a decision to choose vio- 
lence, chaos, and widening destruction over 
a rapid and peaceful solution. No country 
in southern Africa will be spared either 
the pain of warfare or the judgment of 
history. 

Continued movement toward an accord 
for Namibia is also crucial. My talks with 
leaders of black African states, the South 
African Prime Minister, and Mr. Sam Nu- 
joma of the South West Africa People's 
Organization lead me to believe that those 
involved want a peaceful solution and are 
willing to modify their positions in order 
to achieve it. As in Rhodesia, success is not 
assured. Nevertheless, with determination 
and a readiness to compromise, the parties 
are now in a position to end the dispute 
that has been a source of serious interna- 
tional discord for almost three decades. 

The focus of the moment is on the south- 
ern part of the continent, but the U.S. com- 
mitment applies to all of Africa and to all 
the great issues I have mentioned: justice, 
progress, and independence. 

Last year I said to the permanent mem- 
bers of the OAU who met with me that 
strengthening the relationship between the 
United States and Africa is a major objec- 
tive of American policy. It was then, it is 
now, and shall continue to be so in the 
future. Africa can count on us. 



November 1, 1976 



561 



There can no longer be any question 
that America is committed to Africa's goals 
and to working with the nations of Africa 
to solve the continent's problems. In return, 
we expect to find respect for our concerns 
and perspectives. 

Let us set aside the suspicions of the past 
and work for our common future. Together 
we can reconstitute the community of man 
on the basis of mutual benefit and shared 
endeavor. We can show that races can live 
together, that there is an alternative to 
hatred. 

If Africa succeeds, it will have much to 
teach the world, and so much to contribute 
to it. 

I therefore ask you to join me in a toast: 

— To the well-being of the peoples of 
Africa ; 

— To friendship and cooperation be- 
tween the United States and Africa; and 

— To peace, prosperity, and justice for 
peoples everywhere. 



Secretary Kissinger Reaffirms 
Principles for Middle East Peace 

Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger 
at a luncheon at Neiv York on September 29 
in honor of Arab states' heads of delegations 
to the 31st U.N. General Assembly and Per- 
manent Representatives to the United Na- 
tions. 1 

Press release 482 dated September 29 

This is the fourth time I have met with 
you since I've become Secretary of State. 
I have just returned from Africa, and I 
don't want to say anything insulting to my 
Arab friends; but I must tell you that com- 
pared to the passions that exist in Africa 
the Middle East has almost Anglo-Saxon 
restraint. [Laughter.] 



1 A toast by Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib 
Chatty and the opening paragraphs of Secretary 
Kissinger's toast, which are included in press re- 
lease 482, are not printed here. 



I have visited many of your countries, 
and I know we cannot compete in hospital- 
ity. With respect to hospitality, we are the 
underdeveloped region compared to our 
experiences in the Middle East. 

But as I look back over the four meetings 
we have had, the first time we assembled 
here everyone wanted to know with great 
suspicion what we were going to do. And I 
said all the conventional things about Secu- 
rity Council Resolution 242. 

You saw to it that, soon after, another 
Security Council resolution became neces- 
sary. But as I look back, I feel that despite 
all the ups and downs very great progress 
has been made toward peace in the Middle 
East. First of all, the traditional friendship 
between the United States and the coun- 
tries of the Arab world has been restored 
with respect to at least very many of them. 
And we have had an opportunity to make 
a contribution to three agreements that 
have begun the difficult and complicated 
process toward peace. 

When I met with you last year, I pointed 
out four principles which I would like to 
repeat today: 

— The first was that the only durable 
solution is a just and comprehensive peace 
and that the United States remains com- 
mitted to that objective. 

— Second, we recognize that peace in the 
Middle East is not divisible. Each nation 
and people which is party to the Arab- 
Israeli problem must find a fair satisfaction 
of its legitimate interests. 

— Third, it is in the nature of movement 
toward peace that all the key problems 
must be dealt with in a balanced way. The 
questions of territory, borders, military de- 
ployments, cannot be dealt with unless at 
the same time political and economic settle- 
ment are given equal attention. 

— And fourth, any step taken must be 
judged in the light of the alternatives that 
are available. 

We have proceeded on a step-by-step 
basis, but we believe that now conditions 



562 



Department of State Bulletin 






exist that make comprehensive solutions 
the most useful approach. And we believe 
also that conditions are coming about in 
which the search for peace can be resumed 
with energy and with conviction. And I 
want to assure you that the United States 
remains committed to this objective and 
that we hope that significant progress can 
be made in the months ahead. 

Since we last met, also there has been 
the tragedy of the civil war in Lebanon. As 
we stated on the occasion of the inaugura- 
tion of the new Lebanese President, the 
United States is committed to an independ- 
ent, sovereign, and united Lebanon. We do 
not favor partition. We favor an opportu- 
nity for the people of Lebanon to live their 
own lives and to determine their own des- 
tinies. And we will be available to give any 
advice and assistance that the parties may 
request of us. 

We can only express the hope now that 
this tragic conflict will soon come to an 
end, because it is the unity of the Arab 
nations that is an essential precondition to 
an effective policy of peace in the Middle 
East. And if we are to achieve the objec- 
tives of a just and lasting peace about 
which we have spoken so long, which we 
must strive to implement, then unity among 
the Arab nations is of the greatest impor- 
tance. 

Our countries are also concerned with 
many economic problems and the relations 
between the developed and developing na- 
tions. The countries of the Middle East are 
playing an increasingly important role. The 
oil-producing countries, because of their 
wealth and because of their influence on 
the global economy, have an unparalleled 
responsibility which must be exercised for 
the benefit of all. We are discussing it with 
them and other countries of the Middle 
East in the United Nations, in the Confer- 
ence on International Economic Coopera- 
tion; and we are doing so with the attitude 
that the dialogue between the industrial 
and the developing world is perhaps the 
deepest challenge of our time. 



November 1, 1976 



We must solve it cooperatively. We can- 
not create a world community in which one 
party is condemned to permanent poverty. 
We cannot create a world community 
either through tactics of confrontation. So 
the United States is prepared to work co- 
operatively and constructively with the 
nations assembled in this room for the com- 
mon benefit of all mankind. 

Now, distinguished friends, let me con- 
clude by saying that I know that we have 
not yet traveled except the beginning of 
the road toward peace. But I also believe 
that we have created conditions from 
which the rest of the distance can be trav- 
eled if we work on it with conviction and 
with confidence in each other. 

I have personally valued the associations 
that have been formed with so many of 
you over the years. And I am grateful that 
you have done me the honor of joining me 
again for this meeting. So I would like to 
propose a toast to peace in the Middle East 
and to the lasting friendship between the 
peoples of the Middle East and the Ameri- 
can people. 



United States-Spanish Council 
Holds Inaugural Session 

Joint Communique ! 

The United States-Spanish Council, estab- 
lished by the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation, which entered into force Sep- 
tember 21, 1976, was formally constituted 
on October 1, 1976, at a meeting under the 
joint Chairmanship of Secretary of State 
Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister 
Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. The meeting was 
also attended by the permanent military 
representatives on the Council, General 
George Brown, Chairman of the United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Lt. General 
Carlos Fernandez Vallespin, President of 



1 Issued following the meeting at Washington on 
Oct. 1 (text from press release 490). 



563 



the Council of Chiefs of Staff of Spain, by 
Ambassador Wells Stabler, United States 
Ambassador to Spain and permanent U.S. 
representative on the Council and, as par- 
ticipants in this meeting, by Spanish Am- 
bassador to the U.S. Jaime Alba, Spanish 
Ambassador-at-Large Juan Jose Rovira y 
Sanchez Herrero and Mr. Juan Duran 
Loriga Rodriganez, Director General of 
North American and Pacific Affairs of the 
Spanish Foreign Ministry. 

In fulfillment of its responsibility for 
overseeing implementation of the Treaty 
of Friendship and Cooperation, the Council 
noted with approval the plans for early 
constitution of the various bodies under its 
aegis, and expressed confidence that these 
bodies will soon be operating effectively to 
achieve the aims and objectives of the 
Treaty. 

The Council's review of the current 
world situation reaffirmed the value of the 
Treaty at this juncture in world affairs and 
its important contribution to the Western 
Community. 

In the field of defense cooperation, the 
Council underlined the commitment of both 
governments under the Treaty to develop 
appropriate plans and coordination be- 
tween their respective armed forces in 
order to enhance their own security and 
that of the Western World. The Council 
likewise confirmed the importance of estab- 
lishing coordination with the North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization. The Council 
took note of preparations to establish the 
Combined Military Coordination and Plan- 
ning Staff in Madrid as provided in the 
Treaty, and requested the Joint Military 
Committee, with the assistance of the Com- 
bined Staff once it is established to develop 
a work program to carry out their respon- 
sibilities under the Treaty for review by the 
Council at its next meeting. The Joint Mili- 
tary Committee is also meeting on Octo- 
ber 1 in Washington, D.C. 

With regard to economic cooperation, 
the Council noted the importance of the 
Joint Economic Committee, which has been 
created under the Treaty to serve as the 



principal vehicle for bilateral economic 
consultations, and which will be convened 
in the fall. This Committee will also seek to 
coordinate the positions of both govern- 
ments on questions of mutual interest, both 
bilateral and multilateral. 

The Council similarly approved plans for 
early convening of the Joint Committee on 
Educational and Cultural Affairs and the 
Joint Committee on Scientific and Techno- 
logical Cooperation, both of which will be 
expanding cooperative programs in their 
respective fields. The Council in particular 
took favorable note of preliminary discus- 
sion already held on the development of 
joint solar energy research programs. 

In all of these fields, it is an objective of 
the two countries to contribute to closer 
European and Atlantic cooperation. 

The Council, which is to meet at least 
semi-annually, will next be convened at the 
call of the Co-Chairmen. 



Increase in Customs Duties 
on Sugar Announced 

Statement by President Ford x 

Since July the price of raw sugar has 
steadily declined and is now below the cost 
of production for most U.S. sugar pro- 
ducers. At current price levels many U.S. 
sugarbeet and sugarcane producers are un- 
able to operate profitably. I have watched 
these developments with growing concern, 
mindful of the important contribution that 
our sugar industry makes to the national 
economy. Consequently, when prices plum- 
meted in August, the interagency Task 
Force on Sugar Policy was reconstituted to 
update the supply, demand, and price out- 
look for the remainder of 1976 and to con- 
sider the policy implications of these pro- 
jections. The task force has now completed 



1 Issued on Sept. 21 (text from White House press 
release). 






564 



Department of State Bulletin 



its review and has reported to me its analy- 
sis of the problem and the policy options. 

After reviewing the work of this task 
force and determining the views of mem- 
bers of Congress from the affected areas, I 
have decided to give my full support to the 
request of the Senate Finance Committee 
for an escape clause investigation by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission under 
section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. I 
fully agree with the Finance Committee 
that this matter requires a full and com- 
plete examination by the USITC. Further, 
because of the urgency of the problem for 
America's sugar producers, I am asking the 
USITC to expedite its review and to report 
its findings as soon as possible. 

In addition, in view of the depressed 
state of the sugar industry, I have decided, 
pending completion of the USITC investi- 
gation, to raise the duty on imported sugar 
from .625 cents per pound to 1.875 cents 
per pound effective immediately. Increased 
custom duties will offer domestic producers 
some protection from imports while the 
USITC investigation is underway. I empha- 
size that this is an interim measure which I 
will review following receipt of the findings 
of the USITC and that I am not prejudging 
the eventual findings and recommendations 
of the USITC with respect to the question 
of injury or possible remedial measures. 



U.S. and German Democratic Republic 
Sign Fisheries Agreement 

Joint Statement 1 

On October 5, 1976, representatives of 
the Governments of the United States of 
America and the German Democratic Re- 
public signed an Agreement which will 
govern future fishing activity by vessels of 
the German Democratic Republic off the 
coasts of the United States. The Agreement 
will come into force upon completion of 



1 Issued on Oct. 6 (text from press release 496). 



November 1, 1976 



internal procedures by both governments. 

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Dep- 
uty Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and Fisheries Affairs, signed for the United 
States. Mr. Werner Lange, Head of the 
Department of International Relations of 
the Ministry for District Managed Industry 
and Foodstuffs Industry, signed for the 
German Democratic Republic. 

Negotiations on the Agreement began on 
September 27, 1976, and were concluded 
this week. Both delegations expressed sat- 
isfaction with the new accord, and the hope 
that it will contribute to mutual under- 
standing and cooperation between the two 
governments. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

U.S. Policy Toward Africa. Hearings before the Sub- 
committees on African Affairs and on Arms Con 
trol, International Organizations and Security 
Agreements and the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations. March 5-May 27, 1976. 336 pp. 

Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and 
China — 1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee 
on Priorities and Economy in Government of the 
Joint Economic Committee. Part 2. Executive 
sessions. May 24-June 15, 1976. 122 pp. 

Extension of the Export Administration Act of 
1969. Hearings before the House Committee on 
International Relations; June 8-August 24, 1976; 
809 pp. Markup sessions of the committee; Au- 
gust 26-September 1, 1976; 92 pp. Report of the 
committee, together with supplemental and addi- 
tional views, to accompany H.R. 15377; H. Rept. 
94-1469; September 2, 1976; 54 pp. 

The Right-to-Food Resolution. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, 
and Energy of the House Committee on Interna- 
tional Relations. June 22-29. 1976. 632 pp. 

Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from 
the President of the United States transmitting 
notice of his intention to exercise his authority 
under section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, as amended, to waive the restriction 
of section 620(m) of the act as it applies to se- 
curity assistance to Spain for fiscal year 1976. 
H. Doc. 94-549. July 19, 1976. 3 pp. 

Revolution Into Democracy: Portugal After the 
Coup. A report by Senator George McGovern to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Au- 
gust 1976. Ill pp. 



565 



INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES 



United States Restates Position 
on U.N. Decade Against Racism 

Following is a statement made in Commit- 
tee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) 
of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Repre- 
sentative Jacob M. Myerson on October 6. 

USUN press release 110 dated October 6 

The subject before us — the elimination 
of all forms of racial discrimination — is 
one which my country and my government 
address with pride. Americans are this 
year consciously renewing the basic com- 
mitments made when our nation was 
founded 200 years ago. In particular, we 
recall the proposition in our Declaration of 
Independence that "all men are created 
equal." Our nation and our society are 
based on the principle that freedom, equal- 
ity, and dignity are inherent attributes of 
the individual and not a privilege accorded 
by the state. Our Constitution guarantees 
equality under the law. As is well known, 
the United States has struggled to sustain 
and improve the implementation of this 
principle, a struggle that has met with 
dramatic success in recent times. 

Just as we have worked within our own 
borders, we have also joined in efforts on 
the international level aimed at ending the 
practice of racial discrimination wherever 
it is practiced. We believe that the United 
States has an important contribution to 
make in this area. 

The statements and actions of Secretary 
Kissinger provide evidence of our determi- 
nation to pursue these matters in relation 
to the African Continent. In a recent state- 
ment in Lusaka, the Secretary said: ' 

Of all the challenges before us, of all the pur- 
poses we have in common, racial justice is one of 
the most basic. This is a dominant issue of our age, 
within nations and among nations. 



We know from our own experience that the goal 
of racial justice is both compelling and achievable. 
Our support for this principle in southern Africa 
is not simply a matter of foreign policy but an 
imperative of our own moral heritage. 

Thus the United States firmly opposes 
apartheid and racism as those terms have 
been broadly understood over the years. 
We are speaking and acting in the interest 
of racial justice. 

What I have just said, Mr. Chairman, is 
by way of background to the brief com- 
ments my delegation wishes to make as the 
General Assembly once again considers the 
progress achieved under the Decade for 
Action To Combat Racism and Racial Dis- 
crimination. 

In his report on the results of the 29th 
session of the Commission on Human 
Rights, held in 1973, the U.S. Representa- 
tive described what was in his view the 
outstanding single event of that session. 
This was the unanimous adoption of a pro- 
gram for the Decade for Action To Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination. The 
consensus achieved in the Commission on 
Human Rights was manifested several 
weeks later in the Economic and Social 
Council. Finally, the General Assembly by 
consensus approved Resolution 3057 desig- 
nating the period beginning December 10, 
1973, as the Decade. In this same resolu- 
tion the Assembly approved the associated 
program. 

The genuine agreement embodied in 
Resolution 3057 was due, above all, to an 
aversion to racism that is common to mem- 
bers of this organization. It was also due 
to the skillful and devoted efforts of a num- 
ber of individuals and delegations to find 
common ground in treating a malady that 



1 For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka, 
Zambia, on Apr. 27, see Bulletin of May 31, 1976, 
p. 672. 



566 



Department of State Bulletin 



has plagued mankind for centuries. The 
measures provided for in the program — at 
the national, the regional, and the interna- 
tional levels — gave us hope that by 1983 
we would be able to look back with satis- 
faction to a record of significant progress. 

My government joined wholeheartedly in 
supporting the Decade. Our national ef- 
forts, especially in the years just prior to 
1973, had included the enactment of much 
new legislation with critical provisions for 
implementation. Steps taken at that time 
have led to significant advances in assuring 
true equality for all Americans. Our own 
history, as well as the history of other coun- 
tries, has demonstrated the great difficulty 
of overcoming ancient prejudices and 
vested interests and the complexity of the 
measures needed. In particular, our expe- 
rience has repeatedly demonstrated the 
necessity of a strong supporting consensus 
rising above differences of economic status, 
geography, or political affiliation. 

My government remains eager to join in 
supporting all legitimate efforts, including 
those originally proposed in the framework 
of the Decade. But our present discussion 
takes place in an altered setting due to the 
adoption by the 30th General Assembly of 
Resolution 3379 purporting to equate Zion- 
ism with racism and racial discrimination. 

Mr. Chairman, I wish to make clear that 
the passage of one year has in no way 
diminished the force or totality of our re- 
jection of Resolution 3379 or the thinking 
that lies behind it. Not only was its adop- 
tion misguided and highly disruptive, but 
its effects have, as we all know, distorted 
the Decade and raised the most serious ob- 
stacles to carrying out its program. My 
government deeply regrets this state of 
affairs. We hope that men of good will 
can find ways and means to overcome the 
barriers raised by this resolution and to 
right the wrong that was done at the 30th 
General Assembly. We continue to hope 
that actions can be taken to restore the 
Decade's original objectives. Until that 
happens, however, the United States will 
maintain the position it announced last 

November 1, 1976 



year: we shall neither participate in nor 
support the Decade for Action To Combat 
Racism and Racial Discrimination. 

Mr. Chairman, it is thus with regret but 
with equal confidence in the rightness of 
our views that we have today restated our 
position on the Decade, our rejection of the 
proposition that Zionism is a form of rac- 
ism or racial discrimination, and our com- 
mitment to all genuine and sincere efforts 
to overcome racism and racial discrimina- 
tion. 



Agenda of the 31st Regular Session 
of the U.N. General Assembly 1 

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the 
delegation of Luxembourg. 

2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation. 

3. Credentials of representatives to the thirty- 
first session of the General Assembly: 

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Commit- 
tee; 

(b) Report of the Credentials Committee. 

4. Election of the President. 

5. Constitution of the Main Committees and elec- 
tion of officers. 

6. Election of the Vice-Presidents. 

7. Notification by the Secretary-General under 
Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the 
United Nations. 

8. Adoption of the agenda. 

9. General debate. 

10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work 
of the Organization. 

11. Report of the Security Council. 

12. Report of the Economic and Social Council. 

13. Report of the International Court of Justice. 

14. Report of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

15. Election of five non-permanent members of the 
Security Council. 

16. Election of eighteen members of the Economic 
and Social Council. 

17. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 

18. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial 
Development Board. 

19. Election of nineteen members of the Governing 
Council of the United Nations Environment 
Programme. 



1 Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 24 (items 
1-122) and Oct. 4 (items 123-124) (text from U.N. 
doc. A/31/251 and Add. 1). 



567 



20. Election of twelve members of the World Food 
Council. 

21. Election of twelve members of the Board of 
Governors of the United Nations Special Fund. 

22. Election of seven members of the Committee 
for Programme and Co-ordination. 

23. Election of the members of the International 
Law Commission. 

24. Election of seventeen members of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law. 

25. Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
and Peoples: report of the Special Committee 
on the Situation with regard to the Imple- 
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples. 

26. Admission of new Members to the United Na- 
tions. 

27. Question of Palestine: 

(a) Report of the Committee on the Exercise 
of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestin- 
ian People; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

28. Co-operation between the United Nations and 
the Organization of African Unity: report of 
the Secretary-General. 

29. The situation in the Middle East. 

30. Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea. 

31. International co-operation in the peaceful uses 
of outer space: report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

32. Preparation of an international convention on 
principles governing the use by States of arti- 
ficial earth satellites for direct television 
broadcasting: report of the Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 

33. Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Strengthening of International Security: re- 
port of the Secretary-General. 

34. Reduction of military budgets: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

35. Incendiary and other specific conventional 
weapons which may be the subject of prohibi- 
tions or restrictions of use for humanitarian 
reasons: report of the Secretary-General. 

36. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) 
weapons: report of the Conference of the Com- 
mittee on Disarmament. 

37. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and ther- 
monuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty 
designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: 
report of the Conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament. 

38. Implementation of General Assembly resolu- 
tion 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and 
ratification of Additional Protocol II of the 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). 



39. Implementation of the Declaration of the In- 
dian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. 

40. World Disarmament Conference: report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament 
Conference. 

41. Effective measures to implement the purposes 
and objectives of the Disarmament Decade. 

42. Implementation of the Declaration on the De- 
nuclearization of Africa. 

43. Comprehensive study of the question of nu- 
clear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: 
report of the Secretary-General. 

44. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in the region of the Middle East. 

45. Convention on the prohibition of military or 
any other hostile use of environmental modi- 
fication techniques: report of the Conference 
of the Committee on Disarmament. 

46. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone 
in South Asia. 

47. Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and 
general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. 

48. Prohibition of the development and manufac- 
ture of new types of weapons of mass destruc- 
tion and new systems of such weapons: report 
of the Conference of the Committee on Dis- 
armament. 

49. General and complete disarmament: 

(a) Report of the Conference of the Commit- 
tee on Disarmament; 

(b) Report of the International Atomic Ener- 
gy Agency; 

(c) Report of the Secretary-General. 

50. Strengthening of the role of the United Na- 
tions in the field of disarmament: report of the 
Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role 
of the United Nations in the Field of Disarma- 
ment. 

51. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the 
Effects of Atomic Radiation. 

52. Policies of apartheid of the Government of 
South Africa: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee against 
Apartheid ; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

53. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East: 

(a) Report of the Commissioner-General; 

(b) Report of the Working Group on the Fi- 
nancing of the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in 
the Near East; 

(c) Report of the United Nations Conciliation 
Commission for Palestine; 

(d) Report of the Secretary-General. 

54. Comprehensive review of the whole question 
of peace-keeping operations in all their as- 
pects: report of the Special Committee on 
Peace-keeping Operations. 



568 



Department of State Bulletin 



55. Report of the Special Committee to Investigate 
Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights 
of the Population of the Occupied Territories. 

56. United Nations Conference on Trade and De- 
velopment: 

(a) Report of the Conference on its fourth 
session; 

(b) Report of the Trade and Development 
Board; 

(c) Report of the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development; 

(d) Confirmation of the appointment of the 
Secretary-General. 

57. United Nations Industrial Development Orga- 
nization : report of the Industrial Develop- 
ment Board. 

58. United Nations Institute for Training and Re- 
search : report of the Executive Director. 

59. Operational activities for development: 

(a) United Nations Development Programme; 

(b) United Nations Capital Development 
Fund ; 

(c) Technical co-operation activities under- 
taken by the Secretary-General; 

(d) United Nations Volunteers programme; 

(e) United Nations Fund for Population Ac- 
tivities; 

(f) United Nations Children's Fund; 

(g) World Food Programme. 

60. United Nations Environment Programme: 

(a) Report of the Governing Council; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(c) Habitat: United Nations Conference on 
Human Settlements : report of the Secre- 
tary-General; 

(d) Election of the Executive Director. 

61. Food problems: report of the World Food 
Council. 

62. United Nations Special Fund: 

(a) Report of the Board of Governors; 

(b) Confirmation of the appointment of the 
Executive Director. 

63. United Nations University: 

(a) Report of the Council of the United Na- 
tions University; 

(b) Report of the Secretary-General. 

64. Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief 
Coordinator : reports of the Secretary-General. 

65. Revision of the International Development 
Strategy for the Second United Nations De- 
velopment Decade. 

66. Development and international economic co- 
operation: implementation of the decisions 
adopted by the General Assembly at its sev- 
enth special session: 

(a) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Restructuring of the Economic and Social 
Sectors of the United Nations System; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

67. Economic co-operation among developing 



November 1, 1976 



countries: report of the Secretary-General. 

68. Technical co-operation among developing coun- 
tries. 

69. Elimination of all forms of racial discrimina- 
tion: 

(a) Decade for Action to Combat Racism and 
Racial Discrimination: report of the Sec- 
retary-General; 

(b) Reports of the Committee on the Elimi- 
nation of Racial Discrimination; 

(c) Status of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination: report of the Secretary- 
General ; 

(d) Status of the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid. 

70. Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of 
human rights of political, military, economic 
and other forms of assistance given to colonial 
and racist regimes in southern Africa. 

71. Human rights and scientific and technological 
developments. 

72. World social situation: report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

73. Policies and programmes relating to youth: 
reports of the Secretary-General. 

74. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrad- 
ing treatment or punishment. 

75. United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, 
Development and Peace: report of the Secre- 
tary-General. 

76. Importance of the universal realization of the 
right of peoples to self-determination and of 
the speedy granting of independence to colonial 
countries and peoples for the effective guar- 
antee and observance of human rights: report 
of the Secretary-General. 

77. Elimination of all forms of religious intoler- 
ance. 

78. Office of the United Nations High Commis 
sioner for Refugees: report of the High Com- 
missioner. 

79. National experience in achieving far-reaching 
social and economic changes for the purpose 
of social progress: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

80. Freedom of information : 

(a) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Informa- 
tion; 

(b) Draft Convention on Freedom of Informa- 
tion. 

81. Status of the International Covenant on Eco- 
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Inter- 
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
and the Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: report 
of the Secretary-General. 

82. United Nations conference for an international 
convention on adoption law. 



569 



83. Preservation and further development of cul- 
tural values. 

84. Information from Non-Self-Governing Terri- 
tories transmitted under Article 73e of the 
Charter of the United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Secretary-General; 

(b) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples. 

85. Question of Namibia: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples ; 

(b) Report of the United Nations Council for 
Namibia; 

(c) United Nations Fund for Namibia: report 
of the Secretary-General; 

(d) Appointment of the United Nations Com- 
missioner for Namibia. 

86. Question of Southern Rhodesia: report of the 
Special Committee on the Situation with re- 
gard to the Implementation of the Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. 

87. Activities of foreign economic and other inter- 
ests which are impeding the implementation 
of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde- 
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 
Southern Rhodesia and Namibia and in all 
other Territories under colonial domination and 
efforts to eliminate colonialism, apartheid and 
racial discrimination in southern Africa: re- 
port of the Special Committee on the Situation 
with regard to the Implementation of the Decla- 
ration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples. 

88. Implementation of the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun- 
tries and Peoples by the specialized agencies 
and the international institutions associated 
with the United Nations: 

(a) Report of the Special Committee on the 
Situation with regard to the Implementa- 
tion of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples; 

(b) Reports of the Secretary-General. 

89. United Nations Educational and Training Pro- 
gramme for Southern Africa: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

90. Offers by Member States of study and train- 
ing facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self- 
Governing Territories: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

91. Financial reports and accounts, and reports 
of the Board of Auditors: 

(a) United Nations; 



570 



(b) United Nations Development Programme; 

(c) United Nations Children's Fund; 

(d) United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; 

(e) United Nations Institute for Training and 
Research; 

(f) Voluntary funds administered by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees; 

(g) Fund of the United Nations Environment 
Programme; 

(h) United Nations Fund for Population Ac- 
tivities. 

92. Programme budget for the biennium 1976- 
1977. 

93. Medium-term plan: 

(a) Medium-term plan for the period 1978- 
1981 and revised plan for 1977; 

(b) Implementation of the recommendations 
of the Joint Inspection Unit: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

94. Financial emergency of the United Nations: 
report of the Negotiating Committee on the 
Financial Emergency of the United Nations. 

95. Review of the intergovernmental and expert 
machinery dealing with the formulation, re- 
view and approval of programmes and budgets. 

96. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination 
of the United Nations with the specialized 
agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency: report of the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 

97. Joint Inspection Unit: 

(a) Reports of the Joint Inspection Unit; 

(b) Question of the continuation of the Joint 
Inspection Unit. 

98. Pattern of conferences: report of the Com- 
mittee on Conferences. 

99. United Nations accommodation: 

(a) Utilization of office accommodation in the 
United Nations system; 

(b) Utilization of office accommodation and 
conference facilities at the Donaupark 
Centre in Vienna: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

100. Scale of assessments for the apportionment 
of the expenses of the United Nations : report 
of the Committee on Contributions. 

101. Appointments to fill vacancies in the member- 
ship of subsidiary organs of the General As- 
sembly : 

(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions; 

(b) Committee on Contributions; 

(c) Board of Auditors; 

(d) Investments Committee: confirmation of 
the appointments made by the Secretary- 
General; 

(e) United Nations Administrative Tribunal; 

(f) International Civil Service Commission; 

(g) United Nations Staff Pension Committee. 



Department of State Bulletin 



102. Personnel questions: 

(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of 
the Secretary-General; 

(b) Other personnel questions: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

103. Report of the International Civil Service Com- 
mission. 

104. United Nations pension system: report of the 
United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board. 

105. Financing of the United Nations Emergency 
Force and of the United Nations Disengage- 
ment Observer Force: report of the Secretary- 
General. 

106. Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its twenty-eighth session. 

107. Conference of plenipotentiaries on succession 
of States in respect of treaties: report of the 
Secretary-General. 

108. Report of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law on the work of its 
ninth session. 

109. Report of the Committee on Relations with the 
Host Country. 

110. Report of the Special Committee on the 
Charter of the United Nations and on the 
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. 

111. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: 
report of the Secretary-General. 

112. Implementation by States of the provisions of 
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 
of 1961 : report of the Secretary-General. 

113. Measures to prevent international terrorism 
which endangers or takes innocent human 
lives or jeopardizes fundamental freedoms, and 
study of the underlying causes of those forms 
of terrorism and acts of violence which lie in 
misery, frustration, grievance and despair and 
which cause some people to sacrifice human 
lives, including their own, in an attempt to 
effect radical changes: report of the Ad Hoc 
Committee on International Terrorism. 

114. Resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Conference on the Representation of States in 
their Relations with International Organiza- 
tions : 

(a) Resolution relating to the observer status 
of national liberation movements recog- 
nized by the Organization of African Unity 
and/or by the League of Arab States; 

(b) Resolution relating to the application of 
the Convention in future activities of 
international organizations. 

115. Consolidation and progressive evolution of the 
norms and principles of international economic 
development law. 

116. Implementation of the conclusions of the first 
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 

117. One hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the 
Amphictyonic Congress of Panama. 

118. Question of Cyprus. 



120. 



121. 



119. Observer status for the Commonwealth Secre- 
tariat at the United Nations. 
Co-operation and assistance in the application 
and improvement of mass communications for 
social progress and development. 
Situation arising out of unilateral withdrawal 
of Ganges waters at Farakka. 

122. Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte. 

123. Drafting of an international convention 
against the taking of hostages. 

124. Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of 
force in international relations. 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Coffee 



International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 
Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into 
force provisionally October 1, 1976. 
Ratifications deposited: Brazil, Central African 

Republic, Ecuador, September 28, 1976. 
Notifications of provisional application deposited: 

Dominican Republic, Ireland, Paraguay, Togo, 

European Economic Community, September 28. 

1976; Angola, Honduras. Rwanda. Sierra Leone, 

September 30, 1976. 

Containers 

International convention for safe containers (CSC), 
with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Enters into force September 6, 1977. 1 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 
October 8, 1976. 

Cultural Property 

Convention on the means of prohibiting and pre- 
venting the illicit import, export, and transfer of 
ownership of cultural property. Done at Paris 
November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24 
1972. 2 
Ratification deposited: Nepal, June 23, 1976. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with an- 
nexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2. 



1 Not for the United States. 

- Not in force for the United States. 



November 1, 1976 



571 



1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975. 2 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President : 
October 8, 1976. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22 : . 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643. 8086). 
Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973. 3 
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, October 4, 1976. 

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitu- 
tion of the World Health Organization of July 22. 
1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). 
Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976. 3 
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, October 4. 1976. 

Refugees 

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at 
New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force 
October 4, 1967; for the United States Novem- 
ber 1. 1968. TIAS 6577. 
Accession deposited: Uganda, September 27, 1976 

Safety at Sea 

Amendments to the international convention for 
the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). 
Adopted at London October 12, 1971. 3 
Acceptance deposited: Israel, September 23, 1976 

Amendments to chapters II, III, IV, and V of the 
international convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London 
November 20, 1973. 3 
Acceptance deposited: Israel, September 23, 1976. 

Amendment to chapter VI of the international con- 
vention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 
5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973. 3 
Acceptance deposited: Czechoslovakia, September 
23, 1976. 

Seals 

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on 
conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 
3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976. 
Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics, October 12, 1976. 
Entered into force: October 12, 1976. 

Slave Trade 

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed 
at Geneva on September 25, 1926, with annex. 
Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered 
into force December 7, 1953, for the protocol; 
July 7, 1955, for annex to protocol. 
Notification of succession: Barbados, July 22, 
1976. 

Terrorism 

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of ter- 
rorism taking the form of crimes against persons 
and related extortion that are of international 
significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 
1971. Entered into force October 16. 1973. 2 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
October 8, 1976. 



Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Adopted by the U.N. 
General Assembly December 14, 1973. 3 
Instrument of ratification signed by the President: 
October 8, 1976. 

World Heritage 

Convention concerning the protection of the world 
cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris 
November 23, 1972. Entered into force December 
17, 1975. TIAS 8226. 
Ratification deposited: Poland, June 29, 1976. 



BILATERAL 



Federal Republic of Germany 

Agreement on cooperation in the field of biomedical 
research and technology. Signed at Bonn Septem- 
ber 22. 1976. Entered into force September 22, 
1976. 

Israel 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of September 30, 1976. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington 
October 12, 1976. Entered into force October 12, 
1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement amending the agreement of November 9, 
1972. as amended (TIAS 7697, 8152, 8301), con- 
cerning frequency modulation broadcasting in the 
88 to 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Mexico September 9 and 15, 1976. En- 
tered into force September 15, 1976. 

Agreement relating to the provision of additional 
assistance by the United States to curb illegal 
traffic in narcotics and amending the agreements 
of August 9, 1976. and May 18, 1976. Effected 
by exchange of letters at Mexico September 30, 
1976. Entered into force September 30. 1976. 

Pakistan 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of August 7, 1975 (TIAS 
8189), with minutes. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Islamabad August 20, 1976. Entered into 
force August 20, 1976. 

Spain 

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supple- 
mentary agreements and exchanges of notes. 
Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976. Entered into 
force September 21, 1976. 

Proclaimed by the President: October 8, 1976, 
with declaration. 



- Not in force for the United States. 
'■' Not in force. 



572 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 1, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 19 U9 



Africa 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual 
Meeting of the National Conference of Edi- 
torial Writers 541 

Strengthening the Relationship Between the 
United States and Africa (toast by Secretary 
Kissinger) 559 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 565 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at An- 
nual Meeting of the National Conference of 
Editorial Writers 541 

Economic Affairs 

Increase in Customs Duties on Sugar An- 
nounced (Ford) 564 

U.S. and German Democratic Republic Sign 
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) . . 565 

The Western Hemisphere Relationship: Foun- 
dation for Future Efforts (toast by Secre- 
tary Kissinger) 555 

Germany. U.S. and German Democratic Re- 
public Sign Fisheries Agreement (joint 
statement) 565 

Human Rights 

United States Restates Position on U.N. 
Decade Against Racism (Myerson) .... 566 

The Western Hemisphere Relationship: Foun- 
dation for Future Efforts (toast by Secre- 
tary Kissinger) 555 

Korea. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at 
Annual Meeting of the National Conference 
of Editorial Writers 541 

Latin America. The Western Hemisphere Re- 
lationship: Foundation for Future Efforts 
(toast by Secretary Kissinger) 555 

Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger Reaffirms Princi- 
ples for Middle East Peace (toast) .... 562 

Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual 
Meeting of the National Conference of Edi- 
torial Writers 541 

Secretary Kissinger Reaffirms Principles for 
Middle East Peace (toast) 562 

Military Affairs. Secretary Kissinger Inter- 
viewed at Annual Meeting of the National 
Conference of Editorial Writers 541 

Namibia. Strengthening the Relationship Be- 
tween the United States and Africa (toast 
by Secretary Kissinger) 559 

Presidential Documents 

Increase in Customs Duties on Sugar An- 
nounced 564 

President Ford Signs Ratifications of Conven- 
tions on Terrorism (statement) 554 

Southern Rhodesia. Strengthening the Relation- 
ship Between the United States and Africa 
(toast by Secretary Kissinger) 559 

Spain. United States-Spanish Council Holds 
Inaugural Session (joint communique) . . 563 

Terrorism. President Ford Signs Ratifications 

of Conventions on Terrorism (statement) . 554 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 571 

President Ford Signs Ratifications of Conven- 
tions on Terrorism (statement) 554 

U.S. and German Democratic Republic Sign 
Fisheries Agreement (joint statement) . . 565 



U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at 
Annual Meeting of the National Conference 
of Editorial Writers 541 

United Nations 

Agenda of the 31st Regular Session of the 

U.N. General Assembly 567 

United States Restates Position on U N 
Decade Against Racism (Myerson) .... 566 

Vietnam. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at 
Annual Meeting of the National Conference 
of Editorial Writers 541 

Name Index 

Ford, President 554, 564 

Kissinger, Secretary 541, 555, 559, 562 

Myerson, Jacob M 566 



No. 


Date 


*505 


10/12 


*506 


10/12 



*507 10/12 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



Subject 

U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs, Nov. 4. 

Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee (SCC), U.S. National Com- 
mittee for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution, Nov. 8. 

SCC, Subcommittee on Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
working group on standards 
of training and watchkeeping. 
Nov. 10. 

Monteagle Stearns sworn in as 
Ambassador to Ivory Coast 
(biographic data). 

Wat T. Cluverius sworn in as 
Ambassador to Bahrain (bio- 
graphic data). 

Recent developments on IFAD. 

Resolution of U.S.-U.K. civil 
aviation dispute. 

U.S. Advisory Commission on 
International Educational and 
Cultural Affairs releases 12th 
annual report. 

Melissa F. Wells sworn in as 
Ambassador to Cape Verde 
and Guinea-Bissau (biographic 
data). 

Kissinger: interview with Bar- 
bara Walters for ABC-TV 
Evening News, Oct. 14. 

Advisory Committee on "For- 
eign Relations of the United 
States," Nov. 12. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group on 
safety of navigation, Nov. 17. 

SCC, SOLAS, working group on 
radiocommunications, Nov. 18. 

Kissinger : news conference, 
Harvard University. 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 



Volume LXXV 



No. 1950 



November 8, 1976 



THE SECRETARY'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT HARVARD OCTOBER 15 573 

THE FOUNDATION OF U.S.-JAPAN TIES : COMMON INTERESTS 

AND SHARED VALUES 

Address by Assistant Secretary Hummel 582 

UNITED STATES REVIEWS PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS 
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 

Statement by Senator McGovern 
U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly 587 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1950 
November 8, 1976 






ii 



The Department of State BULLETM 
a weekly publication issued by th 
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Public Affairs, provides the public an 
interested agencies of the governmen 
with information on developments i 
the field of U.S. foreign relations an 
on the work of the Department an 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selecte 
press releases on foreign policy, issue 
by the White House and the Depan 
ment, and statements, addresse 
and news conferences of the Preside* 
and the Secretary of State and otht 
officers of the Department, as well c 
special articles on various phases e 
international affairs and the function 
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included concerning treaties and inter 
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United States is or may become 
party and on treaties of general intet 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department o 
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international relations are also listet 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Harvard October 15 



Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger on Octo- 
ber 15 at Cambridge, Mass., where he 
participated in the Harvard East Asia Con- 
ference. 

Press release 518 dated October 15 

Professor Fairbank: Ladies and gentle- 
men, I am John Fairbank, representing 
Harvard University. 

Harvard has called this press conference 
and is extremely glad that Secretary Kis- 
singer is able to come here today, because 
we have an interest in East Asia that we 
hink is absolutely essential to develop in 
the public interest. The Secretary is helping 
us in this way at our request. We appreci- 
ate it very much. I hope each of you will 
identify your paper as you ask questions. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is this Administra- 
tion doing at this moment to secure a final 
accounting of American servicemen missing 
in action in Southeast Asia, and also a com- 
ment from you on the cooperation of the 
present government in Vietnam on this 
matter? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have made it clear 
to the Government of Vietnam that prog- 
ress toward normalization and progress 
toward better relations with the United 
States absolutely depend on an accounting 
for the missing in action. We are prepared 
to discuss this with the Vietnamese. We've 
lad diplomatic exchanges in Paris, and we 
expect to start some discussions with them 
in the near future on that subject. 

Now, so far, the Vietnamese Government 
las not been particularly cooperative. They 
have been feeding out just a few names to 
influence particular decisions. But we think 



that as a question of principle we cannot 
let the Vietnamese Government blackmail 
American families with an anguish that has 
been going on for years in order to do 
something that they should have done 
under the armistice agreement to begin 
with. 

So we hope that in the future that we 
will get a complete accounting for the 
missing in action, and that will then permit 
progress toward normalization. 

Q. Just a followup on that: Is this Ad- 
ministration prepared to veto the entrance of 
the Government of Vietnam into the United 
Nations until this matter is resolved? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have vetoed 
it before. We have made it clear that we 
would veto it before, and the President has 
stated that this is a precondition. 

Cuba's Statement on Hijacking Agreement 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how is the State Depart- 
ment responding to Fidel Castro's statement 
[on Oct. 15] that his country is canceling the 
1973 skyjacking agreement with the United 
States? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, in my speech to 
the United Nations I condemned terrorism 
as an instrument of national policy pursued 
by any nation, for whatever cause. The 
United States is not engaged in any activ- 
ity of this kind, and the charge by Fidel 
Castro that the United States or its govern- 
ment or any agency of the government had 
anything to do with the explosion of that 
airliner is totally false. 

Secondly, we think that it is an act of 
complete irresponsibility to encourage hi- 



November 8, 1976 



573 



jacking at this moment at a time when the 
— when one of the biggest of human prob- 
lems is the taking of hostages that cannot 
possibly influence political decisions or for- 
eign policy decisions. 

And we have stated today, and I repeat 
again, that we will hold the Cuban Gov- 
ernment accountable for any actions that 
result from their decision. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, the Democratic Presiden- 
tial nominee, Jimmy Carter, says that when 
it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, 
are the President of the United States in that 
particular area, that you really have the re- 
sponsibility, that President Ford apparently 
has very little input in foreign policy matters. 
Could you respond to that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I will respond to that 
question. But could I ask you to — in your 
other questions to leave them out of the 
partisan areas. You can mention criticisms 
and ask me to comment on criticisms, but 
don't get me into specific references to 
personalities. In this particular case I think 
I would have to say that this shows that 
Mr. Carter has more experience as a Gov- 
ernor than at the Federal level. 

There is no such thing — Dean Acheson 
used to say that there can be a strong Pres- 
ident and a strong Secretary of State as 
long as the Secretary of State knows who 
is President. 

The final decisions are always made by 
the President. I see the President three or 
four times a week. I am on the telephone 
with him constantly. There is no major 
decision that is taken which is not made 
by the President. 

In the day-to-day conduct of foreign 
policy every President has to delegate cer- 
tain tactical decisions to somebody — to his 
security adviser, to his Secretary of State — 
and that, too, has happened with every 
President in the postwar period. President 
Ford and I have had a very close working 
relationship, and it is in the nature of such 
a relationship that the points of view of the 
two partners merge. 



574 



But it is always clear who is the senior 
partner and who is the junior partner. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a 
sense when President Ford admittedly made 
a blunder during the second debate with 
Jimmy Carter on the Eastern European situ- 
ation, that that indicated that he ivas not on 
top of the situation, that he ivasn't aware 
fully of certain foreign policy issues? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. That indicated 
that under the pressure of a debate he did 
not make a point as felicitously as he might 
have made it, as he has since admitted. 

Nobody who knows his record could be- 
lieve that on this particular issue he did not 
know exactly what the facts were. He had 
one thing in mind and he expressed it in a 
manner that created the wrong impression, 
and he has stated that publicly and has 
clarified it. 

But there was no misapprehension in his 
mind as to the presence of Soviet divisions 
in Eastern Europe. And we have been nego- 
tiating for years to reduce the number oi 
those divisions. And he has personally vis- 
ited three East European countries. 

Q. Mr. President — 

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate the pro- 
motion, but [laughter] there's a constitu- 
tional provision against it. 

Negotiating New Panama Canal Arrangement! 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction 
to Carter's remarks on the Panama Canal, 
and has that affected the negotiations in any 
way ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Could you leave 
names out of these questions? [Laughter.] 

It has not affected the negotiations, 
which are just on the verge of resuming. 

We have stated repeatedly that with re- 
spect to the Panama Canal it is not an issue 
between the United States and Panama. It 
is an issue of the U.S. position with respect 
to the Western Hemisphere and ultimately 



Department of State Bulletin 



• 



(rith respect to all of the new nations in 
he world. 

If there is a consensus in the Western 
Hemisphere on any point, it is that the 
Ipxisting arrangements in Panama are to be 
(changed. And if the United States relies 
agimply on the physical assertion of its 
■power — which we have, and of course we 
lire stronger than Panama — then we are 
jgoing to mortgage the possibilities of a 
{more creative relationship in the Western 
'Hemisphere. 

So therefore the problem is whether we 
j:an assure access through the canal, free 
fend unimpeded access through the canal, 
fey arrangements different from those that 
now exist. 

This is the essence of the negotiation, 
Jmd I do not think it helps to make extreme 
statements in this regard. 

Any agreement that we make — first of 
I ill, there's no doubt — not one line of an 
igreement exists at this moment. Once a 
lhoncept of an agreement is agreed to, it 
will be discussed with the Congress. Once 
i:he treaty exists, it will have to be ap- 
proved by two-thirds of the Senate. 

So there is plenty of opportunity for a 
Irull debate, and it will take an overwhelm- 
ng majority to pass it. And we believe that 
:;he negotiations are in the national inter- 
est, and I believe that any President will 
lome to the same conclusion that every 
^President has come to since 1964; namely, 
hat these negotiations should be continued 
ind that all possibilities should be ex- 
plored. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us a little 
hit about the East Asia Conference and ivhy 
\t is important for you to be meeting ivith 
wusinessmen? Will you give us a little bit of 
mour concept of the role of multinationals in 
Kast Asia? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, I am 
neeting with this conference primarily be- 
cause my friend John Fairbank has asked 
ne to meet with it. And I did not call the 



lovember 8, 1976 



conference, nor did I have anything to do 
with the membership of the conference. 

As I understood it, Harvard is calling a 
conference of Americans with interests in 
Asia and attempting to bring that group 
together with faculty members that have 
been studying the problems of Asia. 

Now, I believe that this is an excellent 
idea. I think that Americans who are ac- 
tive in Asia ought to understand the cul- 
tural, political, and economic conditions of 
the area. And I believe that professors who 
are studying the area can benefit from 
some of the practical experiences which 
some of these corporations and others who 
are interested in the area have. I have 
always believed that one of the problems in 
our society is to bring together those who 
have an opportunity to reflect about the 
problems with those who have to be active 
in the area. 

So I have welcomed this opportunity and, 
as you know, I am speaking off the record. 
I am not using it to make any public pro- 
nouncement. I am doing it to help my 
former colleagues at Harvard and my old 
institution to engage in a worthwhile pro- 
gram. 



Impact of Change of Leadership in China 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us 
if you or President Ford have plans for visit- 
ing the new Chinese leader at any time in 
the near future? And could you also give us 
your assessment of the kind of relations we 
are likely to have with the new government? 

Secretary Kissinger: There are no plans 
now for either President Ford or myself to 
visit China, because while we have no 
doubt about the election, there is a certain 
decorum about making plans [laughter] 
until the results are clear. 

It has been more or less an annual event 
that the Secretary of State would visit 
China at some point during the year, and 
that could happen, although no plans exist 
now. 



575 



There are no plans whatever for the 
President to visit China. And there is some- 
thing to be said for perhaps having a re- 
turn visit at some point or to meet at some 
other place. But this, I think, has to be de- 
cided after the election. 

As for the impact of changes in leader- 
ship on policy, the long-term policy of any 
country, and especially of a country that 
moves with the care and thoughtfulness of 
the People's Republic of China, doesn't de- 
pend so much on personalities as on a per- 
ception of their interests and of their 
values. 

I think that the basic factors that 
brought the United States and China into 
contact with each other are still operating 
and are likely to continue. 

Of course personalities affect the style 
of diplomacy and may affect how certain 
things are carried out, but I do not expect 
a fundamental change in the relationship, 
and it is too early for us to tell what differ- 
ences of style might emerge. 

Southern African Liberation Movements 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to South 
Africa, why do you refuse so far to meet with 
key African liberation organizations, particu- 
larly the African National Congress and the 
Pan African Congress? And why do you 
schedule meetings excluding these legitimate 
organizations, spokespersons for the African 
people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South 
Africa ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let's separate the 
liberation movements in Rhodesia — Zim- 
babwe — from those in Namibia, for a mo- 
ment. 

When I visited Africa in April, I met 
with the Presidents of the so-called front- 
line states. They all felt at the time that 
the experience of Angola should not be 
repeated; that is to say, they did not want 
any of the outside powers to back one par- 
ticular liberation movement and thereby 
get a fight started among the liberation 
movements. 



I then agreed with President Nyerere [of 
Tanzania] and President Kaunda [of Zam- 
bia] and President Khama [of Botswana] 
that the United States would not get in 
touch directly with the liberation move- 
ments, in order to permit the African prob- 
lems to be dealt with by Africans. And we 
agreed to deal with these liberation move- 
ments through the frontline Presidents pro- 
vided that all other countries did the same. 

They have seen to it that these liberation 
movements would not become the play- 
thing of great-power rivalry. And it is not 
failure to recognize these movements; it 
is, rather, our attempt to insulate the prob- 
lem from superpower rivalry. 

Now that they are going to Geneva, we 
will of course deal with them, and our 
whole policy has been to put these libera- 
tion movements into a position where they 
could negotiate directly for the future of 
their own country. 

With respect to the liberation movement 
in Namibia, which is to say SWAPO [South 
West Africa People's Organization], I have 
met with [Sam] Nujoma and my repre- 
sentatives have met with Nujoma. In that 
case, we do not have the special conditions 
of many movements, since as one movement 
he deals also with Communist countries. 
And we deal with him and we have recog- 
nized him as an important factor, as a key 
factor, in the negotiations. In fact we are 
just now waiting for him to come back to 
New York from Africa, before I have an- 
other meeting with him. 

With respect to, again, to the Rhodesian 
movements, I want to repeat: we recognize 
them; we accept them; we do not want to 
choose among them. That is to say, we 
want the African Presidents and the lead- 
ers themselves to determine their own rela- 
tionships, but we will recognize them and 
we support them. 

Q. Well, is it not a fact that the State De- \ 
partment has had a preference for Joshua \ 
Nkomo in Zimbabwe? 

Secretary Kissinger: That is not a fact. 



576 



Department of State Bulletin 



Q. That is not a fact? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. Nkomo was rec- 
ognized by all of the movements as the 
chief negotiator at the last negotiation, in 
February, which broke down. 

At this moment, we are meticulously 
staying away from indicating any prefer- 
ence. And when Mr. Schaufele [Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs William E. 
Schaufele, Jr.] visited Salisbury he was in 
touch with [Bishop Abel] Muzorewa as 
well as with Nkomo, as well as with repre- 
sentatives of [Robert] Mugabe. 

Aircraft Hijacking 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, on the hijacking ques- 
tion, do you feel at this point that these inci- 
dents of skyjacking will increase? And also, 
ivhat can the United States do about it now 
that Castro has canceled the arrangement? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to spec- 
ulate what exactly Castro intends to do 
with this arrangement and what it means 
with respect to his actual performance. 

Theoretically he could carry out the 
same obligations, which is to say to return 
the skyjackers without having the formal 
obligation to do so. If he, however, delib- 
erately encourages skyjackings to Cuba, it 
would be an act of extraordinary irrespon- 
sibility. Because I think whatever the dis- 
putes between countries may be, no country 
should use the suffering of innocent people 
who, I repeat, have absolutely no possibil- 
ity of affecting events for the sort of rivalry 
that now exists. 

Q. What can the United States do about 
that? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I said we will 
hold them accountable. What we will do 
we will have to study. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, because you are return- 
ing to help Harvard for the East Asia Con- 
ference, would you give any thought to re- 
turning to Harvard in any capacity after you 
leave office? 



Secretary Kissinger: Well, this won't be a 
problem before 1981, so we will have many 
opportunities to discuss this. [Laughter.] 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, last night the President 
said that Jimmy Carter had slandered the 
name of the United States when he criticized 
American foreign policy under yourself in 
the Ford Administration. How far can a 
Democratic candidate go in his criticism be- 
fore the President has to go run and hide 
behind the American flag to defend against 
it? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I consider the 
office of the Secretary of State essentially 
a nonpartisan office, and I think the candi- 
dates have to determine for themselves 
how far they should go and what they can 
say. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave 
before about staying on until 1981 — 

Secretary Kissinger: That was a joke. 
[Laughter.] That was to demoralize my 
staff. 

Q. Does that mean you are prepared to stay 
with President Ford if he is reelected? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. I've said repeat- 
edly that eight years is a long time — espe- 
cially eight years as turbulent as these have 
been — that I did not want to state before 
the election was over what I would do be- 
fore the President has talked to me, but 
that on the whole I thought that eight 
years is a long time. So I have not made my 
final decision. I want to wait until the 
President has talked to me. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying 
you'd prefer to leave, although you will serve 
at his request if he's reelected? 

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't really stated 
what I will do, because I want to look at 
it under the conditions that then exist and 
I owe the President the opportunity to dis- 
cuss it with me. 

Q. Is there any other job you prefer to 
take ? 



November 8, 1976 



577 



Secretary Kissinger: No. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you, is it 
true that — is it possible that recent arms 
sales by the United States to Israel were 
motivated by political considerations before 
the election? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the 
President has answered this yesterday. 
These items have been before the Admin- 
istration for several months. They come up 
for an almost monthly review. And the 
President decided to act because he 
thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that 
it was in the best interests of the United 
States. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on 
Mr. Krimer's question of before, since you 
said your answer to that ivas a joke. Taking 
for granted that you tvill at some point leave 
the State Department, would you at that 
point consider returning to Harvard? And if 
so, have you at any time discussed that possi- 
bility ivith any member of the Harvard ad- 
ministration? 

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't discussed 
it with any member of the Harvard admin- 
istration, and I have really not given any 
systematic thought to what I'm going to do 
when I leave this position. I have taken the 
view that after I've announced my resigna- 
tion, or after the voters announce my res- 
ignation for me [laughter], I can then 
make the decision on what I might want to 
do. But I think it's inappropriate for some- 
body in my office to discuss his future with 
anybody until he's resigned. 

Q. Mr. Kissinger, I understand the United 
States is investigating the cause of the crash 
of the Cuban plane off Barbados. 

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. 

Q. Can you tell me who is doing the in- 
vestigating, what the investigation has 
learned so far? 

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my 
information, we have asked the CIA [Cen- 



tral Intelligence Agency] to check into it. 
I don't know whether the FBI [Federal 
Bureau of Investigation] is making a for- 
mal investigation of it. 

We have offered the governments con- 
cerned any assistance that they might re- 
quest, since it did not occur on American 
soil. But I can state categorically that no 
official of the U.S. Government, nobody 
paid by the American Government, nobody 
in contact with the American Government, 
has had anything to do with this crash of 
the airliner. We consider actions like this 
totally reprehensible. 

The Issue of Chile 

Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the 
CIA has been accused by some Southeast 
Asia observers of more or less manipulating 
the recent military takeover in Thailand. 
Noiv, have the U.S. interests gone so far as to 
try to emulate the type of military dictator- 
ship that ivas set up in Chile ? Are we talking 
about that topic? 

Secretary Kissinger: "Emulate," you 
mean? We have had absolutely nothing to 
do with the upheaval in Thailand, and 
therefore there's no point comparing it 
with Chile. We had absolutely nothing to 
do with it. We didn't know about it before- 
hand. 

Q. Is Chile still an issue? 

Secretary Kissinger: That depends with 
whom. 

Q. With the United States, with the recent 
car blowup in Washington, D.C.? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we of course 
totally condemn the murder of former Am- 
bassador [of Chile to the U.S. Orlando] 
Letelier, whom I knew personally and re- 
spected even when we had our differences. 
We have seen no evidence yet as to who 
was behind this assassination. But whoever 
was behind it, it is an absolutely outrageous 
act. 

We also had nothing to do — as the 



578 



Department of State Bulletin 



Church committee [Senate Select Commit- 
tee To Study Governmental Operations 
With Respect to Intelligence Activities] 
said — with the overthrow of the Chilean 
Government. We had nothing to do with 
the military junta that overthrew it. 

Q. Despite some of the evidence to the con- 
trary? 

Secretary Kissinger: The Church commit- 
tee made clear that we had nothing to do 
with the military junta. What we were at- 
tempting to do was to strengthen the demo- 
cratic parties, who in turn had nothing to 
do with the overthrow, for the 1976 elec- 
tion. That was a different matter. 

Q. Can we say without a doubt that the 
United States had nothing to do with the 
recent bombing in Washington, D.C.? 

Secretary Kissinger: You mean of Letelier? 

Q. Exactly. 

Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely. 

Q. Thank you. 

Q. You mentioned earlier that you're going 
to consider your fate following the election, 
and perhaps that fate might be decided by 
the voters. How much of an impact do you 
yourself feel your performance during the 
last eight years will have on this election? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, foreign policy 
is inevitably an issue in any election, and 
that's inevitable. These have been eight 
turbulent years. I believe that they were 
the period in which we had to make the 
change from a belief in American omnip- 
otence, in which we could overwhelm 
every problem with our power, to a period 
in which we have had to conduct foreign 
policy the way other nations have had to 
conduct it throughout history — with a con- 
sciousness of a national purpose, a choice 
of means — where we have had to establish 
new relationships with old allies, open new 
relationships with old adversaries, liqui- 
date vestiges of a war which we found, 



and deal simultaneously with a revolution 
that is represented by the new nations. 

I don't want to judge myself how effec- 
tively all of this has been done, and I don't 
frankly believe that candidates are in the 
best position to judge that either, although 
obviously they must make their cases. 

We will leave to history what the ulti- 
mate assessment is. But without doubt, an 
eight-year record in foreign policy will be 
subject to discussion. 

Q. Will you be an asset to Gerald Ford on 
election day, or a liability? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't go into the 
public opinion or polling business, and I 
can't judge it. My obligation is, under the 
direction of the President, to conduct for- 
eign policy and to advise the President as 
to what I believe to be in the best interests 
of the United States and world peace. 

Now, I understand that most polls show 
that I have an adequate public support, but 
this is not the ultimate test of a Secretary 
of State. 



China and World Equilibrium 

Q. Secretary Kissinger, do you think that 
at some point the United States should or 
might sell arms to China, provide any kind of 
defense equipment to China? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have never had 
any request for the sale of arms to China. 
We have never had any discussions with 
China about the sale of arms. 

We believe that the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of China is very important 
to the world equilibrium, and we would 
consider it a grave matter if this were 
threatened by an outside power. But we 
have never had any defense discussions 
with China. I don't foresee any, but I do 
have to state our general view that it would 
not be taken lightly if there were a mas- 
sive assault on China. 

Q. Is it correct, as former Secretary [of 
Defense James R.] Schlesinger has said, that 



November 8, 1976 



579 



the State Department ivithheld invitations 
for him to visit China? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe that 
Secretary Schlesinger said this; and the 
only formal invitation to Secretary Schles- 
inger that was issued happened to coincide 
with his departure from the government, 
so that the problem of withholding it did 
not arise. 

Q. He said that Uvo invitations were ex- 
tended previously. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, with respect to 
the first — I don't think he said it. I think a 
member of his party must have misunder- 
stood. There was no formal invitation the 
year before. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if this does turn out to 
be your last year in office, could you look back 
and think about what might be the major 
disappointment and major accomplishment 
during your period as Secretary of State? 

Secretary Kissinger: You know, when you 
are in this sort of a position, you perform 
almost like an athlete, in the sense of re- 
acting to the series of situations that de- 
velop very rapidly. I would think that I 
would be much more reflective about it 
after I'm out of office than while I'm in 
office. 

I would think that the major accomplish- 
ment would be the attempt to shift Ameri- 
can foreign policy from a perception that 
we could do everything simultaneously to 
an attempt to relate our commitments to 
our means and our purposes and to our 
possibilities. This involved recasting our 
relationships with allies, developing new 
relationships with adversaries, and begin- 
ning new approaches to the new countries. 

The disappointment has been that in the 
period after 1973, the executive authority 
of the United States was so weakened by a 
series of crises that many of the building 
blocks that were in place in 1973 could not 
be used as rapidly as I would have hoped 
and that perhaps more energy had to be 
spent on preserving what existed than on 
building what might have been possible. 



I could list specific things that were dis- 
appointing, as you would expect in an 
eight-year period, but if you want it on a 
general plane, these would be what I con- 
sider the accomplishments and what I 
consider the sadnesses. 

Q. More specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are you 
disappointed that the United States did not 
establish full diplomatic relations with main- 
land China before Mao Tse-tung's death and 
that perhaps now this period is going to be 
a longer period because of the transition that 
mainland China is going through? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the proc- 
ess of normalization is one to which we're 
committed and which we intend to carry 
out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever 
been tied by the Chinese, to a personality 
or to a specific leader. And I believe that 
that process can continue. 

Q. When will it be completed, or what's 
holding it up now? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what has held 
it up is to discuss the modalities about the 
future of Taiwan, which will have to be 
discussed with the new leadership. 

Q. I'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that 
you do get your walking papers from the 
electorate in November. You say you don't 
know what job you're going to take. But 
most of us, I think, would concede in all 
probability you ivill receive an offer to write 
your memoirs or write a book on your eight 
years. On balance, given equal office space 
and background, would you rather write that 
on the banks of the Potomac or the banks of 
the Charles? {Laughter. "\ 

Secretary Kissinger: Almost certainly not 
on the banks of the Potomac. [Laughter.] 
Where else, I don't know, but almost cer- 
tainly not on the banks of the Potomac. 

Q. Recently I have read that Mexico was 
going to communism, quoting from one decla- 
ration of one of the Senators of the United 
States. What is your point of view about 
that? Do you think Mexico is really going to 
the Communists? 



580 



Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: Absolutely not. I 
know Mexico a little. I know its leaders 
very well. I know its incumbent President 
well. I know the President-elect well. 

Of course, Mexico is given to heroic 
rhetoric, which may not always be literally 
understood in the United States. [Laugh- 
ter.] But Mexico is not going toward com- 
munism, and I know no leader in Mexico 
who has any Communist biases, though of 
course the Mexican Revolution produces a 
certain sympathy for Third World causes. 
And, inevitably, when a country has as 
powerful a neighbor as the United States, 
there are going to be many points of fric- 
tion. But the fact is we usually solve our 
points of friction. And we have repeatedly 
rejected this accusation that has been made 
by several Congressmen and Senators. 

Q. A few minutes ago you said that public 
opinion polls are not the ultimate test for a 
Secretary of State. 

Secretary Kissinger: Of a Secretary of 
State. 

Q. Yes. If they are not, what is the ulti- 
mate test? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think the ultimate 
test of a Secretary of State — the obligation 
of a Secretary of State is to give his best 
judgment to the President as to what is in 
the national interest. And if he is responsi- 
ble, he'll understand that the national in- 
terest cannot be separated from the world 
interest. The President then has to make 
the political decision as to how this judg- 
ment can be carried out within the Ameri- 
can political context. It's the President who 
has to make that decision. 

I don't think a Secretary of State should 
take his own public opinion polls as to his 
own popularity. The Secretary of State 
ought to be expendable and usually is ex- 



pended [laughter], but he should not 
worry about his own popularity primarily. 
He should advise the President. Then the 
President has to make the judgment. And 
eventually he'll be judged by history and 
whether he's left the world somewhat more 
peaceful and perhaps more progressive 
than he found it. 

The press: Thank you very much. 



Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe 

White Houss press release dated October 12 

President Ford announced on October 12 
the appointment of three individuals to 
serve as executive branch Commissioner- 
Observers to the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Those individ- 
uals represent the Departments of State, 
Defense, and Commerce. 

Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser, Department of State 
James G. Poor, Principal Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary of Defense (International Security Affairs) 
Mansfield Sprague, Counselor to the Secretary of 
Commerce 

The purpose of the Commission is to 
monitor the acts of the signatories as they 
affect compliance with or violation of the 
articles of the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in 
particular regard to the provisions relating 
to cooperation in humanitarian fields. 1 The 
Commission is also authorized to monitor 
and encourage the development of pro- 
grams and activities of the U.S. Govern- 
ment and private organizations with a view 
toward taking advantage of the provisions 
of the Final Act to expand East-West eco- 
nomic cooperation. 



1 For text of the Final Act. adopted at Helsinki on 
Aug. 1, 1975, see Bulletin of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323. 



November 8, 1976 



581 



The Foundation of U.S.- Japan Ties: Common Interests and Shared Values 



Address by Arthur* W. Hummel, Jr. 

Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 1 



I am pleased to be your guest this eve- 
ning. The Japan-America Society has long 
been a consistent and sensible advocate in 
this town of the importance of Japan to the 
United States and the need to maintain in 
good repair our ties with that country. 
There have been periods in the last decade 
when the priority of our relations with 
Japan has been temporarily obscured — by 
our concerns elsewhere in Asia or the 
world or, conversely, by a tendency to im- 
pute to the relationship a degree of auto- 
maticity, to assume that because Japan and 
the United States share so many common 
interests our relations are bound to proceed 
smoothly. 

None of us wants the U.S. -Japan rela- 
tionship to dominate the headlines, since 
headlines ordinarily highlight problems 
rather than accomplishments. Nor do we 
necessarily believe that the central pre- 
occupation of policymakers in either gov- 
ernment should be the bilateral relation- 
ship. In fact, for so complex an organism 
it does run remarkably smoothly. On the 
other hand, because it is so large, so suc- 
cessful, and so complex the U.S.-Japan re- 
lationship should be both a source of great 
satisfaction and a focus of our continuing 
intense attention. The Japan-America Soci- 
ety and other similar groups around the 
country help us in insuring that our Japan 
connection receives the recognition and the 
attention it deserves. 



1 Made before the Japan-America Society at Wash- 
ington on Oct. 19. 



One problem which those of us who deal 
with Japan and speak about Japan con- 
stantly face is that the American people, 
and most particularly groups such as this 
one, are increasingly knowledgeable and 
sophisticated observers of U.S.-Japan rela- 
tions. The broad outlines of our respective 
policies are known and understood, and in 
attempting to review them it is difficult to 
avoid what seem to be cliches. Quite cor- 
rectly, people tend to challenge cliches. 
Even people in government. 

I would say that our ties with Japan, and 
our policies toward it, are examined as 
constantly and as critically as is any other 
relationship this country maintains. We 
think we are on the right track. We do not 
believe that, simply because our approach 
toward Japan has achieved a certain ma- 
turity, sharp new departures are called for. 
We do not expect our present policies, or 
those of Japan, to prove immutable in 
every respect. Policies must reflect circum- 
stances, and circumstances change. But we 
do think that the essential foundation of 
the U.S.-Japan relationship, constructed of 
common interests and shared values, will 
endure. 

In other words, many of those cliches 
about Japan and the United States are 
true. At the risk of repeating a few of them 
I want to sketch briefly how we currently 
see our relations with Japan, as we near 
the end of what has been a very eventful 
year. 

I think a useful way to approach a dis- 
cussion of U.S.-Japan ties is to examine 



582 



Department of State Bulletin 



them in three broad categories, separate 
but interrelated — the economic, security, 
and political dimensions of our relation- 
ship. 

Bilateral and Multilateral Economic Spheres 

First, the economic. Despite the major 
challenges both our economies have faced 
in the last two years in restoring noninfla- 
tionary growth, our bilateral economic ties 
have been remarkably trouble-free, in 
pleasant contrast to the situation of the 
early 1970's. The bilateral problems of 
those years — a massive trade imbalance; 
difficult textile negotiations; the need for 
Japan to eliminate import restrictions, 
liberalize foreign investment regulations, 
and revalue the yen — were largely re- 
solved by 1974 to the satisfaction of both 
sides. 

This was achieved through a process of 
continuing consultations at all levels and 
reflected both governments' awareness of 
the reality and the necessities of interde- 
pendence. And as that process went for- 
ward, I believe people on both sides of the 
Pacific came to understand better the im- 
portance of sustaining sound economic ties 
and to recognize that bilateral problems, 
however difficult they may appear, can in- 
deed be resolved. 

Today our bilateral economic ties are 
healthy and growing again after the 
1974-75 recession. There are problems on 
specific trade issues, ranging from citrus 
fruits to specialty steel, and negotiations 
are now underway in two areas where we 
have significant differences — civil aviation 
and fisheries. In addition, as always, there 
is a need to keep an eye on the overall 
health of our trading relationship. Huge 
surpluses on one side tend to exacerbate 
protectionist sentiments on the other. In an 
economic relationship of this magnitude 
and complexity, there inevitably will be 
problems. But recent experience has dem- 
onstrated convincingly that those problems 
need not become contentious issues be- 
tween our two countries. Where there is a 
will, there is a way. 



As our techniques for resolving bilateral 
economic problems have become more re- 
fined and effective, both governments have 
been able to focus increasingly on the 
broader multilateral aspects of the U.S.- 
Japan economic relationship — e.g., ques- 
tions of trade expansion, monetary reform, 
energy, food, and law of the sea — which 
have a pervasive influence on the prosper- 
ity of both countries and the world as a 
whole. The United States and Japan share 
a common approach to most of these global 
issues, and our two governments have co- 
operated effectively in seeking solutions to 
them. 

For example, we have worked with 
Japan in the new International Energy 
Agency to strengthen cooperation among 
oil-consuming countries and coordinate our 
positions vis-a-vis the producers on price 
and supply questions. Our respective ap- 
proaches toward the myriad North-South 
economic issues are similar, and we consult 
closely with Japan in this area. Japan is 
an increasingly weighty factor in world 
monetary affairs and has given important 
support to our initiatives in the IMF [Inter- 
national Monetary Fund] for reform of the 
international monetary system. Prime Min- 
ister Miki participated in the economic 
summits at Rambouillet and San Juan, 
which sought to improve the overall coordi- 
nation of the economic policies of the 
major industrial nations. We consult 
closely with Japan on law of the sea issues, 
where major interests of both nations are 
at stake, i.e., with respect to a deep sea- 
beds regime, continental shelf jurisdiction 
and the concept of an economic zone, and 
fisheries regulation. We are actively en- 
gaged with Japan in the multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTN) ; and in fact many 
formerly bilateral economic questions — 
e.g., liberalization of import quotas, stand- 
ardization of antidumping codes, et cetera 
— are now treated in the MTN context. 

There are of course important differences 
in the economic circumstances of Japan 
and the United States, the most obvious 
being Japan's virtually total dependence 



November 8, 1976 



583 



on outside sources of supply for its energy 
and raw materials needs; and these differ- 
ences compel differing approaches toward 
certain specific multilateral economic is- 
sues. Nevertheless, U.S. and Japanese 
interests in the multilateral economic 
sphere are fundamentally alike: we wish 
to sustain conditions which are conducive 
to a stable world economic environment, 
in which the economic needs of our socie- 
ties — and those of other industrialized and 
developing nations alike — can be fulfilled. 
Close cooperation between our two gov- 
ernments is essential if those interests are 
to be preserved and an equitable world 
economic order sustained. I have no doubt 
that such cooperation will continue to be 
forthcoming from both sides. 



Cooperation on Security Issues 

Secondly, let me touch upon the security 
dimension of our relationship. The U.S. 
alliance with Japan is a keystone of our 
security policy toward East Asia, an essen- 
tial factor in the maintenance of the peace 
and stability of the region, and a crucial 
element in our worldwide security strategy. 
For Japan the alliance is a major pillar of 
the nation's foreign policy, providing a 
strategic foundation from which it can pur- 
sue with confidence its relations with po- 
tential adversaries. Both our governments 
are determined to preserve and strengthen 
cooperation on defense issues, based on a 
common recognition of the benefits to both 
nations of this constructive alliance. 

Within the framework of the alliance, 
Japan's own security role remains limited, 
focusing on the defense of its home islands. 
We think this is appropriate and wise. The 
United States is not urging Japan to under- 
take a larger role. However, I believe both 
our governments would agree that while a 
major quantitative expansion of Japan's 
security responsibilities is inappropriate, 
there is room for qualitative improvement 
— particularly in the areas of antisub- 
marine warfare and airborne early-warn- 
ing systems — and the Japanese Govern- 



ment is addressing this issue. There can 
also be, within established limits, more ef- 
fective cooperation and coordination be- 
tween U.S. and Japanese defense elements. 
One new instrumentality for that purpose 
has already been created — the Subcom- 
mittee for Defense Cooperation — and other 
approaches are being discussed. 

During the past year and more, we have 
noticed in Japan a new tendency toward a 
more realistic, and less emotional, consider- 
ation of defense issues. Out of this has 
emerged a broader public awareness and 
understanding of the security environment 
in Northeast Asia and Japan's place in it. 
The essentiality of a Japanese defense role, 
albeit limited, and of Japan's security rela- 
tionship with the United States, has be- 
come more broadly accepted. We think this 
is a healthy development; we also believe 
it is one that must proceed at its own 
speed. So long as this country continues to 
demonstrate steadiness in its approach to 
the security issues of East Asia, and sensi- 
tivity toward the particular political and 
historical characteristics of Japan and its 
people which shape Japan's approach to- 
ward those issues, the U.S. -Japan security 
relationship will remain strong, as it must. 

Political Dimension of the Relationship 

Finally, I would like to say a few words 
about a more intangible aspect of the inter- 
relationship between Japan and the United 
States, but one which profoundly influences 
all the others. As one of the world's largest 
and most dynamic democratic societies, 
Japan shares with the United States a fun- 
damental goal: that of preserving and 
strengthening democratic institutions and 
values in a world increasingly hostile to 
them. Japan is a strong and lively democ- 
racy. Its parliamentary system is firmly 
established, it has a free and highly irrev- 
erent press, and its people and government 
are second to none in their respect for 
human rights. These institutions and these 
values, and the importance both countries 
place on maintaining them, in themselves 



584 



Department of State Bulletin 



constitute a strong bond between us in a 
world in which authoritarianism of left or 
right is all too prevalent in other countries. 

I think I should mention in this context 
a problem with which both our govern- 
ments contended earlier this year and 
which remains a difficult issue in Japan — 
the Lockheed affair — because to be seen 
in proper perspective it must be viewed in 
relation to the institutions and values which 
were brought to bear in resolving it. 

Both Japan and the United States, their 
people and their governments, deplore cor- 
ruption, whether private or public, and 
recognize the corrosive effects of bribery 
upon society. In both countries, public 
opinion, the media, and governments de- 
manded a thorough investigation of the 
allegations which were raised. The United 
States proposed, and the Japanese Govern- 
ment agreed, that cooperative efforts to 
investigate the scandal and punish the 
guilty should insofar as possible be re- 
moved from the political arena and placed 
in a legal framework. To that end, an 
agreement was reached between the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Japanese 
Justice Ministry for the exchange of all 
relevant information, in a manner which 
would at the same time protect the rights 
of individuals to the due process of law. 

The agreement — which became a model 
for agreements with other nations touched 
by this scandal — has worked well. The 
Japanese Government has expressed its 
appreciation for the assistance our investi- 
gators have provided, and our two govern- 
ments are pledged to work together in an 
international effort to devise a code of con- 
duct which will prevent repetitions of this 
brand of corporate misconduct. 

Despite its potential for doing so, the 
Lockheed affair has not significantly dam- 
aged U.S.-Japan relations. By treating the 
affair as a legal issue and placing it solely 
within the purview of law enforcement 
agencies, the bilateral political relationship 
was successfully insulated. 

In a broader sense, the common political 
values which anchor our relations with 



Japan also mean that our approaches to 
major international issues — whether politi- 
cal, economic, or security — stem from a 
similar world view and tend therefore to 
be complementary. For example: 

— Japan, like the United States, seeks 
improved relations with both the Soviet 
Union and China on a basis of equality and 
reciprocal benefit, while avoiding any in- 
volvement in Sino-Soviet differences. 

— In Southeast Asia, Japan, like the 
United States, supports the desires of the 
non-Communist nations of the region to 
maintain their independence and identity 
and to develop their economies, and its 
economic and political policies toward the 
area are designed toward this end. 

— Toward the Third World, Japan's pol- 
icies are positive and constructive as, I 
hasten to add, are ours. It recognizes the 
legitimate aspirations of the developing 
countries and is seriously seeking ways to 
meet them. 

— In the United Nations, Japan eschews 
flamboyant and meaningless rhetoric, while 
working quietly behind the scenes in sup- 
port of rational and equitable solutions to 
the political, economic, and security issues 
constantly before the world community. 

— In the area of science and technology, 
including questions of nuclear power, 
Japan has a well-developed sense of the 
benefits as well as the potential hazards of 
new applications and brings a reasoned 
and measured approach to technological 
issues. 

In short, as this audience well knows, 
Japan's is an increasingly active and influ- 
ential voice in world affairs. As Japan's 
role grows, so too does the importance of 
our bilateral relationship and its potential 
for constructive action. While perhaps a 
truism, it is nonetheless correct to say that 
our two nations can accomplish far more 
working together than could be achieved 
through the sum of our separate efforts. 

In a speech last year to the National 
Press Club [at Washington], Prime Min- 
ister Miki spoke of the broad mutuality of 



November 8, 1976 



585 



interests between Japan and the United 
States and termed Japanese-American 
amity "a powerful and positive force in the 
world." The U.S. Government fully shares 
that view. U.S. ties with Japan are indeed 
of vital importance to this country and to 
the peace and progress of mankind. I can 
report to you that they are in good shape. 
Our two countries can take pride in what 
we have achieved together, and we can 
face with confidence the challenges before 
us. 



International Navigational Rules Act 
Vetoed by President Ford 

Memorandum of Disapproval x 

I have withheld my signature from H.R. 
5446, a bill to implement the United States 
obligations under the Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea, 1972. 

The bill includes a provision which I be- 
lieve to be unconstitutional. It would em- 
power either the House of Representatives 
or the Senate to block amendments to the 
Convention's regulations merely by passing 
a resolution of disapproval. 

This provision is incompatible with the 
express pro- on in the Constitution that a 
recoil... ing the force and effect of 

law m^oi De presented to the President 
ard. if disapproved, repassed by a two- 
majority in the Senate and the 
Hon'-, of Representatives. It extends to the 

digress the power to prohibit specific 
transactions authorized by law without 
changing the law — and without following 
the constitutional process such a change 
would require. Moreover, it would involve 
the Congress directly in the performance 



1 Released at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 10 (text from 
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated 
Oct. 18). 



of Executive functions in disregard of the 
fundamental principle of separation of 
powers. 

I believe that this procedure is contrary 
to the Constitution, and that my approval 
of it would threaten an erosion of the con- 
stitutional powers and responsibilities of 
the President. I have already directed the 
Attorney General to become a party plain- 
tiff in a lawsuit challenging the constitu- 
tionality of a similar provision in the Fed- 
eral Election Campaign Act. 

In addition, this provision would allow 
the House of Representatives to block 
adoption of what is essentially an amend- 
ment to a treaty, a responsibility which is 
reserved by the Constitution to the Senate. 

This legislation would forge impermis- 
sible shackles on the President's ability to 
carry out the laws and conduct the foreign 
relations of the United States. The Presi- 
dent cannot function effectively in domes- 
tic matters, and speak for the nation au- 
thoritatively in foreign affairs, if his 
decisions under authority previously con- 
ferred can be reversed by a bare majority 
of one house of the Congress. 

The Convention — which has already 
been approved by the Senate — makes im- 
portant changes in the international rules 
for safe navigation. It will enter into force 
in July of 1977. The United States should 
become a party to it. If the United States 
does not implement the Convention before 
it enters into force, there will be major 
differences between the navigational rules 
followed by U.S. ships and by the ships of 
many other countries. These differences 
will increase the danger of collisions at sea 
and create hazards to life and property 
at sea. 

I strongly urge the 95th Congress to pass 
legislation early next year that will be con- 
sistent with our Constitution, so that the 
United States can implement the Conven- 
tion before it enters into force. 

Gerald R. Ford. 



586 



Department of State Bulletin 



United States Reviews Progress and Problems 
in International Economic Development 



Statement by Senator- George McGovern 

U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly 1 



This is an important occasion for me. I 
have followed many aspects of the work 
of the United Nations closely in the past, 
as a member of the House of Representa- 
tives, as Director of the Food for Peace 
Program under President Kennedy in 1961 
and 1962, as a member of the Senate, and 
in recent years as a member of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations. 

I am more directly familiar with the 
U.N.'s work in the area of food, which has 
been among my chief concerns throughout 
my public career. Because of that interest 
I regarded it as a special privilege to at- 
tend the World Food Conference in Rome 
in 1974. 

But I am a newcomer to the work of the 
General Assembly. I am honored to have 
been asked by the executive branch of my 
government to serve as a delegate to the 
31st session of the U.N. General Assembly 
and to share this forum with so distin- 
guished a body of men and women, who not 
only represent 145 nations of the world but 
who themselves represent a significant and 
highly diverse range of talents. The dis- 
tinguished chairman of this committee 
[Jaime Valdez, of Bolivia] is but one exam- 
ple. I congratulate him and his colleagues 
on the bureau on their election, and I 



1 Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) 
of the Assembly on Oct. 14 (text from USUN press 
release 114). 



pledge to them and to all present the co- 
operation of my delegation. 

Through most of its three decades the 
United Nations has been regarded primar- 
ily as a political organ — as indeed, in great 
measure, it still is. The organization is still 
deeply engaged in the historic process of 
decolonization, which ranks as one of the 
most important of this century. The chal- 
lenge confronting the nations of the world, 
and this organization in particular, is to 
insure the enjoyment of basic rights by all 
the people of the world, such rights as my 
country has been committed to for 200 
years. 

We are all aware that the political proc- 
ess of decolonization — which will soon in- 
clude Namibia and Zimbabwe — must be 
joined to a more balanced and equitable 
international economic order as well. Pat- 
terns of dependence must give way to a 
real interdependence, consistent with the 
needs and interests of all countries. As 
Secretary Kissinger pointed out before the 
plenary session of the General Assembly 
on September 30: 

Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a 
reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best 
efforts to make common progress. 

The work of the seventh special session 
of the U.N. General Assembly had as its 
theme the concept of interdependence. 
This same theme has been expressed in the 



November 8, 1976 



587 



Declaration of Abidjan, 2 and it is the guide- 
post for continuing negotiations in the 
various fora of UNCTAD [U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development], in the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations under GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 
in Geneva, at the Conference on Interna- 
tional Economic Cooperation in Paris, and 
elsewhere. 

It would be a delusion to ignore our dif- 
ferences on some issues. But let us also 
stress our common goals. The United States 
can subscribe to the statement of principle 
in the Declaration on the Establishment of 
a New International Economic Order 3 
which affirms that: 

. . . the interests of the developed countries and 
those of the developing countries can no longer be 
isolated from each other, that there is a close inter- 
relationship between the prosperity of the developed 
countries and the growth and development of the de- 
veloping countries, and that the prosperity of the 
international community as a whole depends on the 
prosperity of its constituent parts. 

We agree, too, that: 

International cooperation for development is the 
shared goal and common duty of all countries. 

Our objections to certain concepts and 
measures in the declaration and program 
of action passed at the sixth special session 
are well known. It is not surprising that 
differences should persist over matters of 
this magnitude. There is merit in being 
clear about where we stand. However, we 
are firmly convinced that the interests of 
all, developing and developed countries 
alike, will be served by building on areas 
of agreement and avoiding confrontation 
or ideological disputes. 

A constructive approach has been sug- 
gested by Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, of the 
Philippines, one of the founders of this 
organization. In his speech before the Gen- 
eral Assembly two weeks ago, General 
Romulo noted that our task was to seek 
and promote meaningful change in the 



'Economic and Social Council Resolution 2009 
(LXI), adopted on July 9, 1976. 

3 General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), 
adopted by the sixth special session on May 1, 1974. 



lives of the majority of the world's people, 
"not through recrimination and confronta- 
tion but through the recognition and recon- 
ciliation of legitimate interests." 

Progress Since the Seventh Special Session 

At the seventh special session of the 
General Assembly, just over a year ago, an 
effort was made to begin that process of 
reconciling interests. Despite disappoint- 
ments, progress was also made at UNC- 
TAD IV at Nairobi. 

The United States was pleased to have 
been able to join in the consensus on Reso- 
lution 3362 in the seventh special session. 4 
When I studied that resolution, I was im- 
pressed not only by the scope and the 
seriousness of the text but also at how 
much has already been done to follow up 
on it since. 

At the same time, much remains to be 
done. The fact that development is first 
and foremost a responsibility of the devel- 
oping countries themselves has been widely 
recognized. Self-reliance is a concept we 
Americans understand and applaud. Thus 
it is only natural that we welcome the goal 
of enhanced cooperation among develop- 
ing nations in the expectation that this goal 
will be approached in a manner consistent 
with the need for broad international co- 
operation. 

As Secretary Kissinger has noted in his 
address to the General Assembly: 

The industrial democracies have sometimes been 
more willing to pay lipservice to the challenge of 
development than to match rhetoric with real re- 
sources. 

I, too, as a U.S. Senator, regret these 
discrepancies. We Americans no longer 
claim, if ever we did, that our country — 
and its economic system — has all the an- 
swers to the problems of development. We 
also recognize the value of contributions 
made by states with different social sys- 
tems. But by the same token the United 



' For text of the resolution, see Bulletin of Oct. 
13, 1975, p. 558. 



588 



Department of State Bulletin 



States is not prepared to agree with sug- 
gestions that the substantial efforts we 
have made and are making on behalf of 
development and economic cooperation are 
of limited or of little use. 

One reason I am here, as a legislator, is 
to learn from you so as to bring back to 
the American Congress a better under- 
standing of the problems of the forthcom- 
ing Third Development Decade. But it may 
nonetheless be worthwhile to review some 
of the progress we have made in this last 
year. 

At the seventh special session, agreement 
was reached on the need to begin work on 
the restructuring of the economic and so- 
cial sectors of the United Nations to make 
them more capable of dealing with the 
problems of international cooperation and 
development. The U.S. delegation has par- 
ticipated actively in the deliberations of 
the ad hoc working group established for 
this purpose. I am advised by my executive 
branch colleagues that, although they had 
hoped for more progress by now, they are 
nonetheless impressed by the seriousness of 
purpose shown during the working group's 
deliberations. There would seem to be 
grounds for hope that the working group 
will be able to develop action-oriented pro- 
posals. 

An important portion of Resolution 3362 
concerned world trade. On January 1 of 
this year my own country put into effect its 
system of generalized preferences. It is a 
system covering over 2,700 tariff items 
from nearly 100 countries. I would urge 
governments of developing countries con- 
cerned to study carefully the prospects for 
increased exports of industrial products 
which this measure offers. 

Also of great longrun importance are the 
multilateral trade negotiations now under- 
way in Geneva. All participating countries 
agreed in initiating these negotiations that 
one of their major objectives is to secure 
additional benefits for the international 
trade of developing countries through re- 
ductions in both tariff and nontariff bar- 
riers. 



We agreed at the fourth conference of 
UNCTAD in Nairobi to take up, case by 
case, the problems of 18 key commodities. 
The United States will participate fully in 
this effort. We will be prepared to examine 
in depth the real problems confronting 
each market. We believe these preparatory 
meetings can be most helpful if they focus 
on the substantive and practical issues. 

In the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) we have agreed on an important 
extension of compensatory financing facili- 
ties to aid in stabilizing the incomes of 
producers of primary products. This year 
this facility will distribute some $2 billion, 
as compared with $1.3 billion for the first 
13 years of its existence. In the same con- 
text, the IMF has established a Trust 
Fund, financed through sales of IMF gold, 
which will permit concessional balance-of- 
payments assistance to the poorest coun- 
tries. 



U.S. Assistance Programs 

Another of the concerns of the seventh 
special session was the transfer of real re- 
sources. This is not a matter of words and 
expressions of solidarity — still less of rhet- 
oric about moral obligations for sins of the 
past — but of concrete contributions. I 
would like to say a word on the efforts of 
my country. 

During the course of the past month, the 
U.S. Congress passed and President Ford 
signed economic, security, and supporting 
foreign assistance legislation for our fiscal 
year 1977, which began October 1. These 
funds total $4.1 billion. 

This legislation contains a number of 
features which I believe you will find of 
special interest. 

In the U.S. bilateral aid program, the 
amount of money provided for the key 
sector of population and health has risen 
by 46 percent, funds allocated to food and 
nutrition have increased by 15 percent, 
while funds for education have risen by 
18 percent. One hundred million dollars 
was earmarked for UNDP [U.N. Develop- 



November 8, 1976 



589 



ment Program], $20 million for UNICEF 
[U.N. Children's Fund], $10 million for the 
U.N. Environment Program. The United 
States is making its first contribution to the 
U.N. Revolving Fund for Natural Resources 
Exploration. 

In fiscal year 1977 the United States will 
be providing $375 million to permit the 
continuation of the soft-loan facilities of 
the International Development Association, 
the World Bank's soft-loan window. The 
United States also intends to participate in 
a major way in the fifth replenishment of 
the International Development Association, 
which will be negotiated in the near future. 

Provision has also been made for U.S. 
contributions to the Asian and Inter-Amer- 
ican Development Banks, and to the Afri- 
can Development Fund, which I hope we in 
the Congress will soon authorize the United 
States to join. 

In addition to our regular assistance ac- 
tivities in Africa, we have supported the 
African states which enforce economic 
sanctions against Rhodesia at great costs to 
their own economies. In the fiscal year just 
ending, for example, we concluded a $10 
million grant agreement with the Govern- 
ment of Mozambique, and we have also 
provided Mozambique with significant food 
assistance. Moreover, the United States is 
providing over $30 million of assistance to 
Zambia. Let me express here my personal 
hope that the negotiations which are about 
to begin on both Zimbabwe and Namibia 
will result in a successful conclusion, so 
that the peoples of these countries may all 
benefit from international trade and eco- 
nomic assistance. 

Finally, to permit all of these sources of 
assistance to be used in the most effective 
way possible, we hope to pass legislation 
which will permit the United States to join 
with other members of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in untying much of our assistance 
to developing countries so that purchases 
must be made in the most advantageous 



markets. Procurement of goods and serv- 
ices in developing countries is already au- 
thorized under U.S. economic assistance 
legislation. 

Multilateral and Private Efforts 

The Conference on International Eco- 
nomic Cooperation in Paris has passed to 
its active phase. The United States and the 
European Community have made a pro- 
posal to help meet the problems of nations 
facing severe debt burdens. We have raised 
again in this forum our proposal for an 
International Resources Bank (IRB). 

This proposal will also be studied by a 
new working group on official capital flows 
established by the Interim Committee of 
the International Monetary Fund. 

We believe that the IRB could make a 
significant contribution to the development 
of mineral resources. Under Secretary Gen- 
eral Van Laethem [Gabriel Van Laethem, 
of France, U.N. Under Secretary General 
for Economic and Social Affairs] has 
signaled the massive demand for min- 
eral and energy resources which projected 
levels of development will bring about. 

We continue to urge other countries to 
heed the recommendation of the seventh 
special session for a replenishment of the 
capital of the International Finance Corpo- 
ration, which we see as another means of 
helping to bring increased development 
capital to where it is needed. 

It has been estimated that by the end of 
this decade, even conservative goals for 
economic growth in the developing coun- 
tries will require transfers of some $40 
billion a year from developed to developing 
countries. Official development assistance, 
whether bilateral or multilateral, cannot 
be expected to fulfill anywhere near this 
entire need. The development process must 
continue to have recourse to private capital 
as well. 

If private capital flows are included, I 
would note that in 1975 the countries of 



590 



Department of State Bulletin 






the OECD did arrive at the goal of 1 per- 
cent of GNP [gross national product] in 
transfers to the developing countries. 
Moreover, this is not just a question of 
funds. Direct private investment is a power- 
ful instrument for transferring technology, 
modern methods of organization, knowl- 
edge of markets, and other advantages. 

To be sure, countries which import cap- 
ital have every right to insist on terms 
which are in the greatest conformity with 
their national economic goals. What is 
most important, however, is the recognition 
by all parties that the only sound basis for 
investment is mutual confidence. Private 
capital has a major role to play. General- 
ized slogans about "capitalist imperialism" 
may serve the political aims of some. But 
they disserve the cause of economic de- 
velopment, and they inhibit efforts to solve 
the real problems multinational corpora- 
tions pose for us all. 

I cite these efforts not as a catalogue, 
but to stress the necessity of genuine 
international cooperation among govern- 
ments, international institutions, and pri- 
vate entities. The record also underscores 
my contention that there has been a genu- 
ine renewal of commitment in my govern- 
ment to the second great mandate of the 
U.N. Charter: that true peace is not only 
the absence of war but the realization of 
economic and social justice as well. 

Problem of Corrupt Practices 

Now let me mention several areas which 
I believe require urgent attention. 

If trade and investment is to make a 
maximum contribution to development, 
illegal or corrupt practices should be elimi- 
nated. We have recognized this in the 
United States, where the Congress has 
conducted well-publicized investigations of 
illicit practices. 

This summer's meeting of ECOSOC 
[U.N. Economic and Social Council], under 
the Presidency of the able Ambassador of 
the Ivory Coast, Mr. [Simeon] Ake, passed 



one important resolution indicating that 
these practices are an international con- 
cern. The resolution created an intergov- 
ernmental working group to examine cor- 
rupt practices in international commercial 
transactions and, most important, to work 
out the scope and content of an inter- 
national agreement to prevent and elimi- 
nate illicit payments. We look forward to 
the prompt organization of this group so 
that it can begin its working sessions this 
year. 

World Food Situation 

A problem with which I personally have 
been deeply concerned is that of feeding 
the world's people. In no other activity in 
this committee of the United Nations does 
our work touch more directly on the lives 
of the people we are representing here. 

It has been estimated that between 300 
million and 500 million people in develop- 
ing countries do not now get enough to 
eat. The U.S. Congress has given a priority 
to the countries most seriously affected by 
food shortages in determining assistance 
programs. At least 75 percent of food sold 
under title I of Public Law 480 is to be pro- 
vided to countries with an average per 
capita GNP of $300 or less, circumstances 
permitting. 

We have also been greatly encouraged 
by the responses of many nations to the 
World Food Conference recommendation 
for the establishment of a new Interna- 
tional Fund for Agricultural Development. 
The purpose of IFAD is to help finance 
programs and projects which support in- 
creased and more efficient agricultural 
production and, by so doing, to improve the 
nutritional level in the poorest food-deficit 
countries. The United States has made a 
pledge of $200 million to the initial budget 
of $1 billion set for this Fund. Good prog- 
ress has been made toward reaching this 
target. 

But the creation of this major new source 
of assistance should not make us in any 



November 8, 1976 



591 



way complacent about the world's food and 
agricultural outlook. Despite successful 
harvests last year in the United States, 
Canada, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, 
there are clouds on the horizon. 

Little has been done to insure that when 
drought or floods or severe winters again 
become punishing in certain areas — this 
year's conditions in Western Europe are an 
example — there will still be adequate sup- 
plies and that needy nations will have 
access to them. 

Beyond these seasonal dangers remains 
the grave problem of malnutrition. Govern- 
ments and international organizations have 
been slow in adopting measures designed 
to reduce postharvest losses and gain maxi- 
mum benefit from existing supplies. We 
have adopted a 10-year target for reducing 
losses by 50 percent, but how seriously are 
we pursuing it? 

The United States pledges to intensify its 
approach toward a resolution of the world 
food situation, and we urge other nations 
also to increase their efforts. Thanks in 
part to the nearly 6 million tons of food 
grains provided by the United States, the 
10-million-ton target [for food aid for the 
1975-1976 season] established by the sev- 
enth special session appears attainable. 

Likewise encouraging is the fact that for 
1975-76 governments have far oversub- 
scribed the World Food Program target of 
$440 million. For this period, pledges now 
total over $600 million. We think there is 
little doubt but that the 1977-78 target of 
$750 million also will be met. Toward this 
1977-78 target, the United States has now 
pledged $188 million in commodities, ship- 
ping services, and cash. This represents a 
substantial increase in the U.S. contribution 
to this important program. 

We have proposed and will continue to 
support an international system of nation- 
ally held grain reserves to improve world 
food security, and we hope very much that 
progress can be made in this area before 
calamity strikes again. 



Technology Transfer 

The third area of importance I would 
like to mention is the sharing of resources 
in science and technology. The United 
States believes it can make a particularly 
important contribution in the area of tech- 
nology transfer. It has been our consistent 
intention to make as much of this great 
storehouse of knowledge as possible avail- 
able to the developing countries. 

The United Nations has begun to find 
means to facilitate these transfers of tech- 
nology. We in the United States were very 
pleased at the fact that three resolutions 
in this field were passed at UNCTAD IV in 
Nairobi, providing for the strengthening of 
the technological capacity of the develop- 
ing countries. 

We wish also to commend the special 
interagency task force, and the group of 
experts who assisted, for their work lead- 
ing to the Secretary General's report on 
"The Establishment of a Network for the 
Exchange of Technological Information." 5 
We are pleased that the U.S. proposal 
made at the seventh special session to 
establish an International Center for the 
Exchange of Technological Information is 
among the suggestions melded into the task 
force's proposal. The network concept 
should enable all nations to make use of 
existing national and international capabili- 
ties for the transfer of technology, including 
both public and private sources of infor- 
mation. Where adequate capabilities dc 
not exist, we expect they will be built up. 
One component, for example, might be the 
Industrial Technological Development 
Bank, for which UNIDO [U.N. Industrial 
Development Organization] has been pre- 
paring a feasibility study. 

The seventh special session resolution 
envisages a U.N. Conference on Science 
and Technology for Development. We sup- 
port this proposal. We support the requests 
and recommendations made in Resolutions 






U.N. doc. E/5839, June 14, 1976. 



592 



Department of State Bulletin 



2028 and 2035 passed at the 61st session 
of ECOSOC this summer. We intend to pro- 
vide the U.N. Secretariat with whatever 
help we can in preparing the conference. 
We have called a meeting to be held in 
November of American scientists from in- 
dustry, government, and the academic 
world so that we may review all the possi- 
bilities of applying research in the United 
States more closely to the needs of the de- 
veloping countries. 

Finally, we have extended an invitation 
for the U.N. Conference on Science and 
Technology for Development to meet in the 
United States in 1979. I would urge all gov- 
ernments to give consideration to this invi- 
tation. In our view, holding the conference 
in the United States is the best means of 
assuring a maximum contribution of the 
American scientific community and a maxi- 
mum opportunity for our scientists to get 
firsthand information on scientific and tech- 
nical needs of developing countries. 

Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, this 
committee has a heavy load of work await- 
ing it. Our object, as before, will be to 
achieve a consensus on many positive reso- 
lutions. 

We are seeking to improve economic re- 
lations between all nations and, above all, 
to find new means of relating world pat- 
terns of assistance, of trade, and of invest- 
ment more closely to the needs of the de- 
veloping nations. 

But these words — consensus, economic 
relations — are the words of diplomacy. In 
the subjects we are discussing, they are 
means, but not ends in themselves. Let us 
always remind ourselves that the object of 
our effort is to help people. In the end, the 
success or failure of the 31st session of the 
General Assembly will not be judged only 
by foreign offices or by national legislators 
but by farmers and workers, by men and 
women whose expectations have been 
awakened and who are looking to us for 
practical steps toward realizing those ex- 
pectations. 



U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia 
in U.N. Security Council 

Folloiving is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
William W. Scranton on October 19, together 
with the text of a draft resolution which ivas 
vetoed that day by the United States and two 
other permanent members of the Security 
Council. 



STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON 

USUN press release 119 dated October 19 

The U.S. concern with the Namibian 
problem has been demonstrated dramat- 
ically by the continuing efforts of Secretary 
of State Kissinger to assist the parties in- 
volved in finding a peaceful solution to the 
problem. As you know, Secretary Kissinger 
outlined the U.S. position on the Namibian 
and Rhodesian negotiations in a speech two 
weeks ago to the General Assembly. On 
the question of Namibia the Secretary said : 

In recent months the United States has vigorously 
sought to help the parties concerned speed up the 
process toward Namibian independence. The United 
States favors the following elements: the independ- 
ence of Namibia within a fixed, short time limit; 
the calling of a constitutional conference at a 
neutral location under U.N. aegis; and the partici- 
pation in that conference of all authentic national 
forces including, specifically, SWAPO [South West 
Africa People's Organization]. 

Progress has been made in achieving all of these 
goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the re- 
maining obstacles and bring into being a conference 
which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, 
a design for the new state of Namibia and its rela- 
tionship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued 
solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that 
it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this 
organization and a symbol of international coop- 
eration. 

Mr. President, it is my firm belief that 
while the sensitive process of consultation 
is going on it does not serve a useful pur- 
pose for the Security Council to take new 
initiatives on the Namibian question. After 



November 8, 1976 



593 



many years of frustration in trying to bring 
Namibia to independence, we have now for 
the first time the prospect of results. Sub- 
stantial progress has been made toward 
reaching a peaceful settlement to the 
Namibian problem in consultation with 
South Africa and the interested African 
parties. We have in sight the possibility of 
independence for Namibia, which this 
Council has sought so persistently for so 
many years. 

We do not feel that the measures called 
for in the resolution before us will improve 
the chances to gain a free and independent 
Namibia. In fact, they could just do the 
opposite. It would be tragic if the delicate 
fabric of negotiations were to be torn 
asunder by any precipitate move at this 
time. For these reasons, Mr. President, my 
delegation will vote against the draft reso- 
lution. 

Mr. President, at this point I want to 
cover very briefly one element of the reso- 
lution. The United States has continued to 
enforce its own arms embargo toward 
South Africa. We initiated this embargo 
in 1962, even before the Security Council 
called for a voluntary embargo against 
South Africa in the following year. 

In closing, I want to emphasize and 
emphasize strongly to this Council that the 
United States has made clear to South 
Africa the urgent need for unqualified in- 
dependence for Namibia. We are keeping 
Secretary General Waldheim informed of 
the progress of our negotiations, and we 
will continue to do so and are in regular 
contact with the frontline Presidents. The 
United States will not flag in these efforts. 



TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION > 

The Security Council, 

Having heard the statement by the President of 
the United Nations Council for Namibia, 

Having considered the statement by Mr. Sam 
Nujoma. President of the South West Africa Peo- 
ple's Organization (SWAPO), 



Recalling General Assembly resolution 2145 
(XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South 
Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, 
and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which 
established a United Nations Council for Namibia, 
as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Nami- 
bia, in particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 
December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 
November 1975, 

Recalling also Security Council resolutions 245 
(1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 
1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 
12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 

(1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 
29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 

(1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 Febru- 
ary 1972, 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974 and 385 
(1976) of 30 January 1976, 

Recalling further the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 
that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw 
its presence from the Territory, 

Reaffirming the legal responsibility of the United 
Nations over Namibia, 

Concerned at South Africa's continued illegal oc- 
cupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to 
comply with resolutions and decisions of the Gen- 
eral Assembly and the Security Council, as well as 
with the advisory opinion of the International Court 
of Justice of 21 June 1971, 

Gravely concerned at South Africa's efforts to 
destroy the national unity and territorial integrity 
of Namibia, and its recent intensification of repres- 
sion against the Namibian people and its persistent 
violation of their human rights, 

Gravely concerned by the colonial war which 
South Africa is waging against the Namibian 
people, its use of military force against civilian 
populations and by the widespread use of torture 
and intimidation by military forces against the 
people of Namibia, 

Gravely concerned also at the utilization of the 
Territory of Namibia by South Africa to mount 
aggression against independent African States, 

1. Condemns South Africa's failure to comply 
with the terms of Security Council resolution 385 
(1976) of 30 January 1976; 

2. Condemns all attempts by South Africa calcu- 
lated to evade the clear demand of the United Na- 
tions for the holding of free elections under United 
Nations supervision and control in Namibia; 

3. Denounces the so-called Turnhalle constitutional 



1 U.N. doc. S/12211; the draft resolution was not 
adopted owing to the negative vote of three perma- 
nent members of the Council, the vote being 13 in 
favor, 3 against (France, U.K.. U.S.), with 2 ab- 
stentions (Italy, Japan). 



594 



Department of State Bulletin 



conference as a device for evading the clear re- 
sponsibility to comply with the requirements of 
Security Council resolutions, and in particular reso- 
lution 385 (1976) ; 

4. Reaffirms the legal responsibility of the United 
Nations over Namibia; 

5. Reaffirms its support for the struggle of the 
people of Namibia for self-determination and inde- 
pendence; 

6. Reiterates its demand that South Africa take 
immediately the necessary steps to effect the with- 
drawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 
269 (1969), 366 (1974) and 385 (1976), of its illegal 
administration maintained in Namibia and to trans- 
fer power to the people of Namibia with the assist- 
ance of the United Nations; 

7. Also demands that South Africa put an end 
forthwith to its policy of Bantustans and so-called 
homelands aimed at violating the national unity 
and the territorial integrity of Namibia; 

8. Reaffirms its declaration that in order that the 
people of Namibia be enabled to determine freely 
their own future, it is imperative that free elections 
under the supervision and control of the United 
Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one 
political entity; 

9. Demands that South Africa urgently comply 
with the foregoing provisions for the holding of 
free elections in Namibia under United Nations 
supervision and control, undertake to comply with 
the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations 
and with the advisory opinion of the International 
Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Nami- 
bia, and recognize the territorial integrity and unity 
of Namibia as a nation; 

10. Demands again that South Africa, pending the 
transfer of power provided for in the preceding 
paragraphs: 

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with 
the provisions of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights; 

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, in- 
cluding all those imprisoned or detained in con- 
nexion with offences under so-called internal secu- 
rity laws, whether such Namibians have been 
charged or tried or are held without charge and 
whether held in Namibia or South Africa; 

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all 
racially discriminatory and politically repressive 
laws and practices, particularly Bantustans and 
so-called homelands; 

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians cur- 
rently in exile for political reasons full facilities for 
return to their country without risk of arrest, de- 
tention, intimidation or imprisonment; 

11. Acting under Chapter VII of the United Na- 
tions Charter, 



(a) Determines that the illegal occupation of 
Namibia and the war being waged there by South 
Africa constitute a threat to international peace 
and security; 

(b) Decides that all States shall cease and desist 
from any form of direct or indirect military con- 
sultation, co-operation or collaboration with South 
Africa and shall prohibit their nationals from en- 
gaging in any such consultation, co-operation or 
collaboration; 

(c) Decides that all States shall take effective 
measures to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries, 
however disguised, for service in Namibia or South 
Africa; 

(d) Decides that all States shall take steps to 
ensure the termination of all arms licensing agree- 
ments between themselves or their nationals and 
South Africa and shall prohibit the transfer to 
South Africa of all information relating to arms 
and armaments; 

(e) Decides that all States shall prevent: 

(i) Any supply of arms and ammunition to 

South Africa; 
(ii) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles and military 
equipment for use of the armed forces and 
paramilitary or police organizations of 
South Africa; 

(iii) Any supply of spare parts for arms, ve- 
hicles and military equipment used by the 
armed forces and paramilitary or police or- 
ganizations of South Africa; 

(iv) Any supply of so-called dual-use aircraft, 
vehicles or equipment which could be con- 
verted to military use by South Africa; 
(v) Any activities in their territories which pro- 
mote or are calculated to promote the supply 
of arms, ammunition, military aircraft and 
military vehicles to South Africa and equip- 
ment and materials for the manufacture and 
maintenance of arms and ammunition in 
South Africa and Namibia; 

12. Decides that all States shall give effect to the 
decisions set out in paragraph 11 of this resolution 
notwithstanding any contract entered into or li- 
cence granted before the date of this resolution, 
and that they shall notify the Secretary-General of 
the measures they have taken to comply with the 
aforementioned provision; 

13. Requests the Secretary-General, for the pur- 
pose of the effective implementation of this resolu- 
tion, to arrange for the collection and systematic 
study of all available data concerning international 
trade in the items which should not be supplied to 
South Africa under paragraph 11 above; 

14. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the 
implementation of the resolution and to report to 
the Security Council on or before ; 

15. Decides to remain seized of the matter. 



November 8, 1976 



595 



TREATY INFORMATION 



ing convention of December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). 
Adopted at London June 25, 1976. Entered into 
force October 1, 1976. 



BILATERAL 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 
sultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 
1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 
4044. 
Acceptance deposited: Surinam, October 14, 1976. 

Amendment of article VII of the convention on 
facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 
(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 
1973. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, October 4, 1976. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic 
drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25. 1972. En- 
tered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118. 
Ratification deposited: Luxembourg, October 13, 
1976. 

Terrorism 

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terror- 
ism taking the form of crimes against persons 
and related extortion that are of international 
significance. Signed at Washington February 2. 
1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973. 
Ratification deposited: United States, October 20, 

1976. 
Entered into force for the United States: October 

20, 1976. 

United Nations Charter 

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Signed at San Fran- 
cisco June 26. 1945. Entered into force October 24, 
1945. 59 Stat. 1031. 
Admission to membership: Seychelles, September 

21, 1976. 

Whaling 

Amendments to paragraphs 1, 6(a)(4), (5), (6), 
6(b)(3), 6(c)(2), 11-14. 15(c), 21, 23(1) (c), 
23(2) (b) to the schedule to the international whal- 



Bangladesh 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of May 28, 
1976, relating to installation of a 50 megawatt 
hydrogenerating unit at Karnaphuli Power Station, 
Kaptai. Signed at Dacca September 17, 1976. En- 
tered into force September 17, 1976. 

Denmark 

Agreement amending the agreement of July 7, 1960, 
concerning establishment and operation of certain 
aeronautical facilities and services in Greenland, 
with appendix (TIAS 4531). Effected by exchange 
of notes at Copenhagen March 26 and September 6, 
1976. Entered into force September 6, 1976; effec- 
tive January 1. 1976. 

Sri Lanka 

Agreement extending the agreement of May 12 and 
14, 1951, as amended and extended (TIAS 2259, 
4436, 5037, 7126). relating to facilities of Radio 
Ceylon. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo 
May 19 and October 1, 1976. Entered into force 
October 1, 1976. 

Thailand 

Loan agreement relating to a project for the estab- 
lishment of modern sericulture technology in Thai- 
land, with annex. Signed at Bangkok September 8. 
1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976. 

Agreement amending the loan agreement of Decem- 
ber 11, 1975, to assist Thailand in financing an 
improved seed development program. Signed at 
Bangkok September 8, 1976. Entered into force 
September 8, 1976. 



Not in force. 



Correction 

The editor of the Bulletin wishes to call 
attention to the following error which appears 
in the October 25 issue: 



p. 500, col. 2, line 21 
"within." 



"with" should read 



596 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 8, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1950 



Agriculture. United States Reviews Progress 
and Problems in International Economic De- 
velopment (McGovern) 587 

Chile. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 

at Harvard October 15 573 

China. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 

at Harvard October 15 573 

Congress. International Navigational Rules 
Act Vetoed by President Ford (memorandum 
of disapproval) 586 

Cuba. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Harvard October 15 573 

Developing Countries. United States Reviews 
Progress and Problems in International Eco- 
nomic Development (McGovern) 587 

Economic Affairs. United States Reviews Prog- 
ress and Problems in International Economic 
Development (McGovern) 587 

Europe. Commission on Security and Coopera- 
tion in Europe (announcement of executive 
branch appointments) 581 

Foreign Aid. United States Reviews Progress 
and Problems in International Economic De- 
velopment (McGovern) 587 

Israel. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 

at Harvard October 15 573 

Japan. The Foundation of U.S.-Japan Ties: Com- 
mon Interests and Shared Values (Hummel) 582 

Mexico. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Harvard October 15 573 

Namibia 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 
Harvard October 15 573 

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. 
Security Council (Scranton. text of draft 
resolution) 593 

Panama. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Harvard October 15 573 

Presidential Documents. International Naviga- 
tional Rules Act Vetoed by President Ford . 586 

Science and Technology. United States Reviews 
Progress and Problems in International Eco- 
nomic Development (McGovern) 587 

South Africa. U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Nami- 
bia in U.N. Security Council (Scranton, text 
of draft resolution) 593 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger's News 
Conference at Harvard October 15 ... . 573 

Thailand. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Harvard October 15 573 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 596 



United Nations 

United States Reviews Progress and Problems 
in International Economic Development 
(McGovern) 587 

U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. 
Security Council (Scranton, text of draft 
resolution) 593 

Vietnam. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Harvard October 15 573 

Name Index 

Ford, President 586 

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr 582 

Kissinger, Secretary 573 

McGovern, George 

Scranton, William W 593 



Checklist of 


Department of State 


Press 


Releases: October 18-24 


Press releases may be obtained from the 


Office of Pre 


ss Relations, Department of State, 


Washington, 


D.C. 20520. 


No. 


Date 


Subject 


f519 


10/19 


Kissinger : Synagogue Council 
of America, New York, N.Y. 


*520 


10/18 


Shipping Coordinating Commit- 
tee (SCC), U.S. National Com- 
mittee for the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution, Nov. 23. 


*521 


10/18 


Department receives portrait of 
Thomas Jefferson. 


*522 


10/22 


Overseas Schools Advisory 
Council, Dec. 8. 


f523 


10/22 


Digest of U.S. Practice in Inter- 
national Law, 1975, released. 


*524 


10/22 


Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
Advisory Committee, Boston. 
Nov. 16. 


1525 


10/22 


U.S. -Tunisian Joint Commission 
communique. 


1526 


10/22 


Kissinger, Chatty: remarks at 
signing of minutes of U.S.- 
Tunisian meeting. 


*527 


10/22 


SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, working group on 
subdivision and stability, 
Nov. 18. 


1528 


10/24 


Kissinger: remarks at U.N. Day 
concert, Oct. 23. 


1529 


10/24 


Kissinger: interview on "Face 
the Nation." 

,ed. 


* Not prinl 


t Held for 


a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 
us. government printing office 

WASHINGTON, DC. 20402 



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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXV • No. 1951 • November 15, 1976 



MORAL PROMISE AND PRACTICAL NEEDS 

Address by Secretary Kissinger 597 

SECRETARY KISSINGER INTERVIEWED ON "FACE THE NATION" 606 

TRADE AND INVESTMENT: 
ANOTHER DIMENSION IN U.S.-AFRICA RELATIONS 

Address by Deputy Assistant Secretary Bolen 616 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Document* 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
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funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through January 31. 1981. 
Note: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1951 

November 15, 1976 


The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department and 
the Foreign Service. 
The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Loral Promise and Practical Needs 



Address by Secretary Kissinger 1 



Americans are today in the midst of the 
uadrennial debate about our past, our 
resent, and the future we hope to create. 
t is a dramatic demonstration of the 
trength of our democracy and the great- 
ness of our nation. Whatever the outcome, 
Americans should take pride that they 
have once again shown the vigor of a free 
ociety which gives hope to the countless 
millions around the world who are domi- 
nated by oppressive regimes and intolerant 
deologies. 

It is also, let us be frank, a time of con- 
fusion and of exaggeration. Some tell us 
we are weak; others tell us we are strong. 
Some tell us that our prestige is declining; 
others assert that our global influence for 
peace and progress has never been greater. 
Some tell us we are in retreat around the 
world; others tell us we have never been 
more respected, more successful abroad 
than we are today. 

As Secretary of State I am of course de- 
tached from partisan debate, although I 
jljseem to find my sympathies, for some rea- 
Jjson, lying with "others" rather than the 
l"some." 

But no matter how strongly Americans 
may disagree on specific issues, the history 
of the postwar period has left no doubt 
about the nature of our global responsi- 
bility. Without America's commitment, 
there can be no real security in the world. 



1 Made before the Synagogue Council of America at 
New York, N.Y., on Oct. 19 (text from press release 
519). 



November 15, 1976 



Without our dedication, there can be no 
progress. Without our strength, peoples all 
over the world will live in fear. Without 
our faith, they will live in despair. 

America's contribution to world affairs 
has derived from our conviction that while 
history is often cruel, fate can be shaped 
by human faith and courage. Our opti- 
mism has enabled us to understand that 
the greatest achievements were a dream 
before they became a reality. We have 
learned through experience, as few people 
have, that all that is creative is ultimately 
a moral affirmation — the faith that dares 
in the absence of certainty; the courage to 
go forward in the face of adversity. 

All of us here are deeply concerned 
about the survival and security of Israel. 
But we also know that the fate of even 
our closest friends cannot be assured in a 
vacuum. Peace, progress, and justice will 
not be securely won for America or Israel 
unless they are embedded in a peaceful, 
progressive, and just international order. 
The task of building such an order is the 
fundamental challenge of our time. 

No people has experienced more of 
man's exaltation — and man's depravity — 
than the Jewish people. The Jewish peo- 
ple know that survival requires unending 
struggle. But they know, as well, that 
peace, if it is to be more than a prophet's 
dream, must rest on the conscience of 
mankind made real by the concrete efforts 
of all peoples and all nations. 

America, because of its own heritage, 
is perennially engaged in such a search of 



597 



its conscience. How does our foreign pol- 
icy serve moral ends? How can America 
carry forward its role as a humane ex- 
ample and champion of justice in a world 
in which power is still often the final ar- 
biter? How do we secure both our exist- 
ence and our values? How do we recon- 
cile ends and means, principle and 
survival? 

These questions have been asked 
throughout our history; they are being 
posed again today, as they should. But 
they require more than simple answers and 
easy slogans. 

There is no doubt that policy without 
moral purpose is like a ship without a 
rudder, drifting aimlessly from crisis to 
crisis. A policy of pure calculation will be 
empty of both vision and humanity. It will 
lack not only direction but also roots and 
heart. Americans have always held the 
view that America stood for a moral pur- 
pose above and beyond its material 
achievements. 

But we must recall, as well, that policy 
is the art of the possible, the science of the 
relative. We live in a world of 150 sover- 
eign states, profound ideological differ- 
ences, and nuclear weapons. Our power is 
enormous, but it is still finite. A truly moral 
policy must relate ends to means and 
commitments to capabilities. America, to 
be true to itself, must keep its eyes on 
distant horizons; we must also keep our 
feet planted firmly in reality. We must 
learn to distinguish morality from moraliz- 
ing. We must remember that the invoca- 
tion of lofty principles has led, in our his- 
tory, as frequently to abdication as to 
overcommitment. Either tendency would 
be disastrous for international order and 
our well-being. 

The challenge of American foreign pol- 
icy is to live up to America's moral prom- 
ise while fulfilling the practical needs of 
world order. How we meet it will deter- 
mine the peace and progress of America 
and of the world. 

This is the subject I would like to dis- 
cuss with you today. 



598 



American Ideals and American Foreign Policy 

Americans always have believed that 
this country had a moral significance that 
transcended its geographic, military, or 
economic power. Unique among the na- 
tions of the world, America was created 
as a conscious act by men dedicated to a 
set of political and ethical principles they 
believed to be of universal applicability. 
Small wonder, then, that Santayana con- 
cluded that: "Being an American is, of it- 
self, almost a moral condition." 

But this idealism has also been in con- 
stant tension with another deep-seated 
strain in our historical experience. Since 
Tocqueville, it has been frequently ob- 
served that we are a pragmatic people, 
commonsensical, undogmatic, and undoctri- 
naire, a nation of practical energy, in- 
genuity, and spirit. We have made toler- 
ance and compromise the basis of our do- 
mestic political life. We have defined our 
basic goals — justice, liberty, equality, and 
progress — in open and libertarian terms, 
enlarging opportunity and freedom rathei 
than coercing a uniform standard ol 
conduct. 

America has been most effective inter- 
nationally when we have combined oui 
idealistic and our pragmatic traditions. The 
Founding Fathers were idealists whc 
launched a new experiment in human lib- 
erty. But they were also sophisticated men 
of the world ; they understood the Euro- 
pean balance of power and manipulated 
it brilliantly to secure their independence. 

For a century thereafter, we devoted our 
energies to the development of our conti- 
nent, content to influence the world by 
moral example. Shielded by two oceans 
and the British Navy and blessed by a 
bountiful nature, we came to believe our 
special situation was universally valid, even 
for nations whose narrower margin of sur- 
vival meant that their range of choices was 
far more limited than our own. We dis- 
paraged power even as we grew strong; 
we tended to see our successes as the 
product not of fortunate circumstances 
but of virtue and purity of motive. 

Department of State Bulletin 



As our power grew, we became uncom- 
fortable with its uses and responsibilities 
and impatient with the compromises of 
day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the 
status of a great power was feared and 
resisted by many Americans who fore- 
saw only a process of deepening involve- 
ment in a morally questionable world. 

In the early decades of this century we 
sought to reconcile the tension between 
ideals and interests by confining ourselves 
to humanitarian efforts and resort to our 
belief in the preeminence of law. We pio- 
neered in relief programs; we championed 
free trade and the cause of foreign invest- 
ment. We attempted to legislate solutions 
to international conflicts — we experimented 
with arbitration, conciliation, judicial ar- 
rangements, treaties to abolish war, neu- 
trality legislation, collective security sys- 
tems. 

These efforts to banish the reality of 
power were aborted by our involvement in 
two World Wars. While we had a clear 
security interest in a Europe free from 
domination by any one power, we clothed 
that interest in assertions that we would 
do battle for universal moral objectives — 
"a war to end all wars" or the uncondi- 
tional surrender of the aggressor. 

Disillusionment set in as the outcome of 
both World Wars necesssarily fell short of 
expectations. After the first war, a tide of 
isolationist sentiment rose, in which moral 
proclamations were coupled with an un- 
willingness to undertake concrete commit- 
ments. We were loath to face a world of 
imperfect security, alliances of conven- 
ience, recurrent crises, and the need for a 
political structure that would secure the 
peace. 

We undertook our first sustained period 
of peacetime world leadership in the dec- 
ades after World War II with a supreme 
self-assurance fortunately matched by 
overwhelming material superiority. And 
we faced an antagonist whose political 
system and actions on the world scene ex- 
plicitly threatened the very existence of 
our most cherished principles. 



November 15, 1976 






In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black- 
and-white divisions, we harbored few 
doubts about the validity of our traditional 
approach. We saw economic problems 
around the world — which we had solved 
successfully in our own country — and 
sought to overwhelm them with the sheer 
weight of resources, often with startling 
success. We projected our domestic experi- 
ence overseas and assumed that economic 
progress automatically led to political sta- 
bility. And in the process, without making 
a conscious decision to do so, we were try- 
ing to shape the world to our design. 

The Complexities of the Contemporary World 

Our postwar policy was marked by great 
achievements: the reconstruction of Europe 
and Japan, the resistance to aggression, the 
encouragement of decolonization. 

But we no longer live in so simple a 
world. 

We remain the strongest nation and the 
largest single influence in international 
affairs. For 30 years our leadership has 
sustained world peace, progress, and jus- 
tice. Our leadership is no less needed today, 
but it must be redefined to meet changing 
conditions. Ours is no longer a world of 
American nuclear monopoly, but one of 
substantial nuclear equivalence. Ours is no 
longer a world of two solid blocs and clear- 
cut dividing lines, but one of proliferating 
centers of power and influence. Ours is no 
longer a world amenable to national or 
regional solutions, but one of economic 
interdependence and common global chal- 
lenges. 

Thus, for the first time in American ex- 
perience, we can neither escape from the 
world nor dominate it. Rather we, like all 
other nations in history, must now conduct 
diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, per- 
sistence, and imagination if we are to pre- 
serve and forward our national goals. 

We can no longer impose our own solu- 
tions; yet our action or inaction will in- 
fluence events, often decisively. We cannot 
banish power from international affairs, 



599 



but we can use our vast power wisely and 
firmly to deter aggression and encourage 
restraint. We can encourage the resolution 
of disputes through negotiation. We can 
help construct more equitable relations 
between developed and developing nations 
and a wider community of interest among 
all nations. And we must continue to stand 
for freedom and human dignity in the 
world. 

These are worthy goals. They can be 
achieved. But they summon a different 
dimension of moral conviction than that of 
a simpler past. They require the stamina 
to persevere amid ambiguity and endless 
exertion, the courage to hold fast to what 
we believe in while recognizing that at any 
one time our hopes are likely to be only 
partially fulfilled. 

We must always keep in mind that it 
was precisely under the banners of univer- 
sal moralistic slogans that a decade and a 
half ago we launched into adventures that 
divided our country and undermined our 
international position. It is only in the last 
few years that we have finally begun to 
bring our commitments into line with our 
capabilities. 

Clearly we must maintain our values and 
our principles; but we risk disaster unless 
we relate them to concepts of the national 
interest and international order that are 
based not on impulse but on a sense of 
steady purpose that can be maintained by 
the American people for the long term. 

This is not a choice between morality 
and pragmatism. We cannot escape either 
and still remain true to our national char- 
acter or to the needs of the world com- 
munity. Our cause must be just, but it must 
prosper in a world of sovereign nations and 
competing wills. We can achieve no posi- 
tive ends unless we survive, and survival 
has its practical necessities. Neither moral- 
istic rhetoric nor obsession with pure power 
politics will produce a foreign policy 
worthy of our opportunity or adequate for 
our survival. 



The Morality of Ends and Means 

America, and the community of nations, 
today faces inescapable tasks: 

— We must maintain a secure and just 
peace. 

— We must create a cooperative and 
beneficial international order. 

— We must defend the rights and the 
dignity of man. 

Each of these challenges has both a 
moral and a practical dimension. Each in- 
volves important ends, but ends that are 
sometimes in conflict. When that is the 
case we face the real moral dilemma of 
foreign policy: the need to choose between 
valid ends and to relate our ends to means. 

Peace 

In an age when nuclear cataclysm 
threatens mankind's very survival, peace is 
a fundamental moral imperative. Without 
it, nothing else we do or seek can ulti- 
mately have meaning. Let there be no mis- 
take about it: averting the danger of nu- 
clear war, and limiting and ultimately re- 
ducing destructive nuclear arsenals, is a 
moral as well as political act. 

In the nuclear age, traditional power 
politics, the struggle for marginal advan- 
tages, and the drive for prestige and uni- 
lateral gains must yield to an unprece- 
dented sense of responsibility. History 
teaches us that balances based on constant 
tests of strength have always erupted into 
war. But common sense tells us that in the 
nuclear age history cannot be permitted to 
repeat itself. Every President, sooner or 
later, will conclude with President Eisen- 
hower that there is no alternative to 
peace. 

But peace, however crucial, cannot be 
our only goal. To seek it at any price would 
render us morally defenseless and place 
the world at the mercy of the most ruth- 
less. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus 
said, than make a desert and call it peace. 



600 



Department of State Bulletin 



There will be no security in a world 
whose obsession with peace leads to ap- 
peasement, but neither will there be se- 
curity in a world in which mock tough 
rhetoric and the accumulation of arms is 
the sole measure of competition. We owe 
our people a convincing justification for 
their exertions; we can spare no effort to 
bequeath to future generations a peace 
more hopeful than an equilibrium of ter- 
ror. 

Barely four years ago demonstrations in 
the streets demanded "peace" as overrid- 
ing all other considerations; today policies 
of conciliation are frequently denounced as 
unilateral concessions. Both extremes fal- 
sify our challenge. In the search for peace 
we are continually called upon to strike 
balances — between strength and concilia- 
tion, between the need to defend our values 
and our interests and the need to take into 
account the views of others, between par- 
tial and total settlements. 

The task of foreign policy is to find that 
balance between competing ends and be- 
tween ends and means. The problems of 
timing, method, and feasibility impose 
themselves on any conscientious policy de- 
cision. There are certain experiments that 
cannot be tried, not because the goals are 
undesirable, but because the consequences 
of failure would be so severe that not even 
the most elevated goal can justify the 
risk. 

The Middle East provides a vivid exam- 
ple. No people yearn for comprehensive 
peace more than the people of Israel, 
whose existence has not been recognized 
by any of its neighbors throughout its his- 
tory. There are those who argue that in 
the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire 
complex of Arab-Israeli issues — borders, 
peace obligations, refugees — should have 
been approached simultaneously at one 
conference. But the proponents of this 
course ignore the fact that at the time it 
would probably have proved disastrous: 



the United States had no diplomatic rela- 
tions with several of the key Arab coun- 
tries; the Soviet Union was in effect the 
lawyer for the Arab cause; an oil embargo 
was still in effect; and hostility between 
the Arab states and Israel remained at the 
flashpoint. Under such conditions the 
chances for success of a comprehensive ap- 
proach were slight and the penalties for 
failure were far-reaching: a continuation 
of the oil embargo, a prolonged freeze in 
U.S. relations with the Arab world, the cor- 
responding growth of Soviet influence, 
strains with our allies in Europe and 
Japan, the increased isolation of Israel, and 
the likelihood, therefore, of a resumption 
of the Middle East war in even more diffi- 
cult circumstances. 

We chose to proceed step by step on 
those issues where room for agreement 
seemed to exist. We sought to establish a 
new relationship with the Arab world, to 
reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting 
tensions, and to build a new sense of con- 
fidence in the parties directly involved so 
that overall solutions would someday be 
possible. We approached peace in stages 
but with the intention of ultimately merg- 
ing individual steps into a comprehensive 
solution. 

In the brief space of 18 months three 
agreements were reached, two between 
Egypt and Israel and one between Syria 
and Israel. As a result, the possibilities of 
achieving a genuine peace are greater 
today than they have ever been. 

Deep suspicions remain, but the first 
important steps have been taken. The be- 
ginnings of mutual trust — never before in 
evidence — are emerging. Some Arab states 
for the first time are openly speaking of 
peace and ending a generation of conflict. 
The capacity of outside countries to exacer- 
bate tensions has been reduced. The step- 
by-step approach has thus brought us to 
a point where comprehensive approaches 
are the logical next step. The decision be- 



November 15, 1976 



601 



fore us now is not whether, but how, the 
next phase of negotiations should be 
launched. And we will engage in it, to- 
gether with our Israeli friends, with new 
hope and confidence. 

International Cooperation 

America's second moral imperative is the 
growing need for global cooperation. 

We live in a world of more than 150 
countries, each asserting sovereignty and 
claiming the right to realize its national 
aspirations. Clearly no nation can fulfill all 
its goals without infringing on the rights 
of others. Hence, compromise and common 
endeavors are inescapable on some issues 
at least. The growing interdependence of 
states in the face of the polarizing ten- 
dencies of nationalism and ideologies 
makes imperative the building of world 
community. 

We live in an age of division, division be- 
tween East and West and between the ad- 
vanced industrial nations and the develop- 
ing nations. Clearly a world in which a few 
nations constitute islands of wealth in a sea 
of poverty, disease, and despair is funda- 
mentally insecure and morally intolerable. 
Those nations that consider themselves dis- 
possessed will become the seedbed of up- 
heaval. But the tactics of confrontation 
with which some of the developing nations 
have pursued their goals are also both 
intolerable and unsafe. 

The challenge of world community will 
require realistic assumptions and actions by 
North and South alike. The industrial na- 
tions should not be obsessed with guilt or 
wedded to the status quo. The developing 
nations should not seek to gain their ob- 
jectives through extortion or blackmail. 
What is required all around is a serious 
dedication to the requirements of coopera- 
tion, without which neither group can 
achieve its goals. 

The objectives of the developing nations 
are clear: they want economic develop- 
ment, a role in international decisions that 
affect them, and a fair share of global 



602 



economic benefits. The goals of the indus- 
trial nations are equally clear: widening 
prosperity, an open world system of trade 
and investments with expanding markets 
for North and South, and reliable and 
equitable development of the world's re- 
sources of food, energy, and raw materials. 

The goals of both sides can be achieved 
only if they are seen as complementary 
rather than antagonistic. The process of 
building a new era of international eco- 
nomic relationships will continue through 
the rest of this century. If those relation- 
ships are to be equitable and lasting, nego- 
tiation and compromise among diverse and 
contending interests will clearly be re- 
quired. Above all, a moral act will be neces- 
sary: on the part of the industrial nations, 
a willingness to make, while there is still 
time for conciliation, the sacrifices neces- 
sary to build a sense of community; and 
on the part of the developing nations, a 
readiness to forgo blackmail and extortion, 
now, before the world is irrevocably split 
into contending camps, and to seek 
progress through cooperation. 

For its part, the United States is com- 
mitted to the path of cooperation, to build 
a stable and creative world which all na- 
tions — new and old, weak and strong, rich 
and poor — have a stake in preserving 
because they had a part in its shaping. 

Human Values 

Our third moral imperative is the nurtur- 
ing of human values. It is the tragedy of our 
times that the very tools of technology that 
have made ours the most productive cen- 
tury in the history of man have also served 
to subject millions to a new dimension of 
intimidation and suffering and fear. 

Individual freedom of conscience and 
expression is the proudest heritage of our 
civilization. All we do in the search for 
peace, in the struggle for greater political 
cooperation and for a fair and flourishing 
international economy, is rooted in our be- 
lief that only liberty permits the fullest 
expression of mankind's creativity. We 



Department of State Bulletin 



k 



k 



[know that technological progress without 
| justice mocks humanity; that national 
Junity without freedom is a hollow triumph; 
land that nationalism without a conscious- 
ness of human community, including a 
gconcern for human rights, is likely to be- 
ll come an instrument of oppression and a 
] force for evil. 

It is our obligation as the world's lead- 
ing democracy to dedicate ourselves to as- 
suring freedom for the human spirit. But 
responsibility compels also a recognition 
of our limits. Our alliances, the political 
relationships built up between ourselves 
and other nations over the years, serve the 
cause of peace by strengthening regional 
and world security. If well conceived, they 
are not favors to others but a recognition 
of common interests. They should be with- 
drawn when those interests change ; they 
should not, as a general rule, be used as 
levers to extort a standard of conduct or 
to punish acts with which we do not agree. 
In many countries — whatever our differ- 
ences with their internal structures — the 
people are unified in seeking our protec- 
tion against outside aggression. In many 
countries, our foreign policy relationships 
have proved to be no obstacle to the forces 
of change. And in others the process of 
American disengagement has eroded the 
sense of security, creating a perceived 
need for greater internal discipline while 
[at the same time diminishing our ability 
1 to influence the domestic practices we 
Icriticize. 

There is no simple answer to the di- 
!!•■■ lemma a great democracy faces under such 
^circumstances. We have a moral, as well 
olas practical, obligation to stand up for our 
{values and to combat injustice. Those who 
c speak out for freedom and expose the 
£ transgressions of repressive regimes do so 
o: in the best American tradition. They can 
a have — and have had — a dramatic and 
^heartening impact. But there are also times 
)i- when an effort to teach another country a 
;;' moral lesson can backfire on the values we 
\'t seek to promote. 



This Administration has believed that 
we must bend every effort to enhance re- 
spect for human rights but that a public 
crusade is frequently not the most effective 
method. Our objective has been results, not 
publicity. We were concerned — and with 
good reason — that when such sensitive is- 
sues are transformed into tests of strength 
between governments, the impulse for na- 
tional prestige will defeat the most worthy 
goals. We have generally opposed at- 
tempts to deal with sensitive international 
human rights issues through legislation, not 
because of the moral view expressed, which 
we share, but because legislation is almost 
always too inflexible, too public, and too 
heavyhanded a means to accomplish what 
it seeks. 

Through quiet diplomacy, this Admin- 
istration has brought about the release or 
parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout 
the world and mitigated repressive condi- 
tions in numerous countries. But we have 
seldom publicized specific successes. 

The most striking example has been the 
case of Jewish emigration from the Soviet 
Union. The number of Soviet Jews who 
were permitted to emigrate in 1968 was 
400; by 1973 that number had risen to 
35,000. The reason for this quantum leap 
lies largely in persistent but private ap- 
proaches to the Soviet Government and the 
parallel overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet 
relations. 

Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt 
with in quiet personal discussions by the 
President or his senior officials. No public 
announcement or confrontation ever took 
place. But the results were there for all to 
see. 

When even greater advances were 
sought by confrontation and legislation, the 
result was tragic. Today Jewish emigration 
from the Soviet Union has dropped to ap- 
proximately 10,000 a year. I stress this not 
to score debating points against men whose 
seriousness of purpose and dedication to 
Jewish emigration I greatly respect. Rather 
it is to indicate that moral ends are often 



November 15, 1976 



603 



not enough in themselves. The means used 
also have a moral quality and moral conse- 
quences. 

And whatever honest differences of opin- 
ion may have existed between concerned 
individuals about the problem of Jewish 
emigration from the Soviet Union, this Ad- 
ministration remains dedicated to the ob- 
jective. It will spare no effort to increase 
the flow of emigrants once again and will 
cooperate with the relevant organizations 
in that effort. 

The issue of human rights is not, as I 
have said, an easy one, and it should be 
presented with a full awareness of its com- 
plexity. The experience of the last decade 
should have taught us that we ought not 
to exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let 
alone to shape, social and political change 
in other societies. With this painful lesson 
in mind, let me state the principles that 
guide the actions of the Ford Administra- 
tion: 

— Human rights are a legitimate inter- 
national concern and have been so defined 
in international agreements for more than 
a generation. 

— The United States will further the 
cause of human rights in appropriate inter- 
national forums and in exchanges with 
other governments. We will use all our in- 
fluence to encourage humane conduct with- 
in and between nations. 

— We will be mindful of the limits of our 
reach; we will be conscious of the differ- 
ence between public postures that satisfy 
our self-esteem and policies that bring posi- 
tive results. 

— We will never forget that the victims 
of our failures, of omission or commission, 
are human beings and thus the ultimate test 
of all we do. 

We thus return to the central problem 
of ends and means. If every nation of the 
world presses for the immediate imple- 
mentation of all of its values, hopes, and 
desires, eternal conflict is inevitable. If we 



604 



insist that others accept all our moral pref 
erences, are we then ready to use military 
force to protect those who do as we urge? 
And if those who refuse our prescriptions 
are deprived of our support, what will we 
do if the isolation of these governments 
tempts external pressures or attack by 
other countries even more repressive? Will 
we have served moral ends if we thereby 
jeopardize our own security? 

If we back up universal moral claims 
with power, we take upon ourselves the 
role of the world's policeman, a role which 
the American people have rejected in a 
decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up 
these claims, we will lose relevance and 
credibility; we will be conducting a policy 
of self-gratification without effectiveness 
and ultimately without stature. Is it more 
moral to attempt what cannot be accom- 
plished and fail than to make only those 
commitments that we know we can 
keep? 

There is nothing more essential for 
Americans today than the need to recog- 
nize the inevitable and inescapable tension 
between our moral aims, which of necessity 
are stated in universal terms, and the con- 
stant imperative of choice that is imposed 
upon us by competing goals and finite re- 
sources. The making and implementing of 
foreign policy is, like life, a constant effort 
to strike the right balance between the best 
we want and the best we can have, be- 
tween the ends we seek and the means we 
adopt. 

We need moral strength to select among 
often agonizing choices and a sense of ethi- 
cal purpose to navigate between the shoals 
of difficult decisions. But we need, as well, 
a mature sense of means, lest we substitute 
wishful thinking for the requirements of 
survival. The ultimate test of morality in 
foreign policy is not only the values we pro- 
claim but what we are willing and able to 
implement. 

I have discussed the dilemmas of moral 
choice not to counsel resignation but as a 



Department of State Bulletin 



message of hope. Fond as we are of self- 
flagellation — especially in years divisible 
by four — Americans can take pride in the 
achievements of their foreign policy in re- 
cent years, which have both a moral and a 
practical foundation: 

— We have ended the war we found and 
preserved the peace. 

— We have restructured and strength- 
ened our partnerships with the industrial 
democracies and our sister republics in this 
hemisphere. 

— We have opened new relationships 
with adversaries. 

— We have begun to curb the nuclear 
arms race. 

— We have helped to sow the seeds of 
peace in the Middle East and begun the 
process of conciliation in southern Africa. 

— We have put forth and begun to im- 
plement a comprehensive agenda for co- 
operation between the industrial and devel- 
oping worlds to combat poverty, ignorance, 
disease, misery, and hunger. 

— We have worked with others on new 
global challenges that transcend bound- 
aries and ideologies: the problems of pol- 
lution, of sharing the resources of the sea, 
of the transfer of technology. 

— We have defended our values and in- 
terests around the globe. 

But an agenda of such scope inevitably 
remains unfinished. Great opportunities lie 
before us: 

— The industrial democracies can usher 
in a new and dynamic period of creativity 
in their relations with each other and lay 
the foundation for a new approach to the 
developing world. 

— We have an early opportunity to place 
a ceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and 
move on from there to reduce them. 

— We can build on the promising founda- 
tions of the new relationship with the Peo- 
ple's Republic of China. 

— We have the possibility of major prog- 



November 15, 1976 



ress toward peace in the Middle East while 
strengthening our commitment to the se- 
curity and survival of Israel. 

— We can help the peoples of Africa 
reach for conciliation, human justice, and 
development rather than violence and 
hatred. 

— We can see to it that the atom is used 
for mankind's benefit, not its destruction. 

— The developing countries can become 
true partners in the international commu- 
nity. 

— All countries can work together to 
fashion a global community both on land 
and in the vast domains of the oceans. 

In pursuing these goals, we must have 
the courage to face complexity and the 
inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; 
we must be prepared to look behind easy 
slogans and recognize that great goals can 
only be reached by patience, and often only 
in gradual stages. 

A world of turmoil and danger cries out 
for structure and leadership. The times 
summon a steady, resolute, purposeful, and 
self-assured America. This requires confi- 
dence — the leaders' confidence in their 
values, the public's confidence in its gov- 
ernment, and the nation's collective confi- 
dence in the worth of its objectives. It is 
time to remind ourselves that while we may 
disagree about means, as Americans we all 
share the same dreams: peace, prosperity, 
and justice in our nation and throughout 
the world. 

Many years ago Abraham Lincoln pro- 
claimed that no nation could long endure 
"half slave and half free" and touched the 
conscience of a nation. Today people the 
world over cry out for liberty, dignity, re- 
spect; and they look with hope and long- 
ing to America, for we have touched the 
conscience of all mankind. If we hold to 
our ideals, if we set our sights high but 
without self-indulgence, the generations 
that come after us may at last be able to 
say that no man is a slave and no man 
a master. 



605 



Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Face the Nation" 



Folloiuing is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Kissinger on the CBS tele- 
vision and radio program "Face the Nation" 
on October 24. Interviewing the Secretary 
were Henry S. Bradsher, Washington Star, 
and George Herman and Bob Schieffer, CBS 
News. 

Press release 529 dated October 24 

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, last July you 
said publicly what you had, I gather, been 
saying privately for some time — namely, that 
Jimmy Carter's policies to that point were 
fairly consistent tvith the policies of the Ford 
Administration. I believe you called the poli- 
cies of the Carter and Ford people "compati- 
ble." Do you still think, these many months 
later, that the two policies are compatible? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, I made 
that comment when Governor Carter had 
given exactly one speech on foreign policy, 
and he had not yet exposed the full com- 
plexity of his thought. I would say now 
that there are significant areas of differ- 
ence between his statements and our policy. 

Mr. Herman: Well, Mr. Secretary, I guess 
I'm in the position of a questioner ivhose 
next question has been pretty well deter- 
mined by your first answer. You say there 
are a number of differences now between the 
Ford Admiyiistration policies and those enun- 
ciated by Governor Carter, and I guess the 
next thing to do is to fairly quickly list them. 

Secretary Kissinger: We would have a 
difference in attitude toward Communist 
participation in the governments of Eu- 
rope. We would have a difference with re- 
spect to arms sales to many countries, 
because our view would be that if we can- 
not be the world's policeman and if we 



cannot sell arms to threatened countries, 
then there is bound to be a vacuum that 
somebody is going to fill. There is a differ- 
ence in the attitudes toward countries, for 
example, like Kenya and Zaire. There is 
a difference in the degree of explicitness 
with which we should state what we will 
or will not do in the case of certain con- 
tingencies, such as came up with respect 
to Yugoslavia. And there is a difference 
about the level of the defense expendi- 
tures. 

Mr. Bradsher: Do you think that the sug- 
gestion of not being willing to defend Yugo- 
slavia in case of a Soviet attack really 
increases the danger of an attack? You men- 
tioned this as one of the problems. How can 
you draw a line around the tvorld and say 
that we will stand at certain places, or not 
draw the line, as has been suggested — as 
Governor Carter did? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is 
dangerous to state that certain countries 
are outside the American defense perimeter 
if these countries are of a great strategic 
importance and when it is generally recog- 
nized that their change in alignment would 
have serious consequences. 

In 194D, a number of then Administration 
officials were drawing a line this way which 
left Korea outside the perimeter. Whether 
that in fact contributed to the attack on 
Korea, we do not know. What we do know 
is that in 1950 when the attack occurred, 
the Administration had to change its view. 

My concern is that no miscalculation 
arise. Six Administrations, starting with 
President Truman — three Democratic and 
three Republican — have declared that the 
independence and integrity and nonalign- 



606 



Department of State Bulletin 



ment of Yugoslavia are major American 
interests. This is a view unanimously shared 
by all of our West European allies, and I 
believe that it is important that the other 
side understand that pressure on Yugo- 
slavia would have grave consequences for 
the relationship with the United States, 
without spelling out what exactly we would 
do, and that the bipartisan consensus that 
has existed with respect to this issue be re- 
stored as rapidly as we can do it. 

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. Secretary, are you sug- 
gesting then that by saying that an invasion 
of Yugoslavia would not directly threaten the 
security of the United States, that Governor 
Carter tvas issuing an invitation to the Soviet 
Union — 

Secretary Kissinger: No. 

Mr. Schieffer: — to take some action there? 

Secretary Kissinger: I am sure that that 
was not his intention, and I'm positive that 
if he were to be elected and looked at the 
facts he would reconsider that statement. 
I believe that if the statement were left to 
stand it would raise serious ambiguities. It 
is inconsistent with the entire postwar pol- 
icy of every Democratic and Republican 
Administration, incompatible with the 
views of our West European allies, and 
would be dangerous if it became American 
policy. 

Mr. Schieffer: You're not suggesting that 
in some circumstance the United States 
would actually send troops to Yugoslavia if 
something like that arose? 

Secretary Kissinger: I'm suggesting that 
for the United States to spell out exactly 
what it will do in circumstances which no 
one can yet foresee is unwise. I'm saying 
also that to declare a country of the geo- 
graphic and strategic importance of Yugo- 
slavia as lying outside an American secu- 
rity interest, however we may want to 
vindicate that interest, is dangerous, incon- 
sistent with our NATO policies. In foreign 
policy — the art of foreign policy is to pre- 
vent crises from arising and not to create 



ambiguities which the opponent might be 
tempted to probe. 

Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, let me ask 
you about — you were going down a list of 
differences between the Ford Administration, 
as you see it, and in Governor Carter's posi- 
tions. Two that are of some interest to me 
and that you had not mentioned ivere Gov- 
ernor Carter on preventing an Arab oil em- 
bargo and Governor Carter on using Ameri- 
can economic leverage to get the Soviet 
Union out of places like Angola. Are those 
not — was that omission inadvertent? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, but I wanted to 
keep my answer short. 

On an Arab oil embargo, of course the 
United States should oppose it firmly. 

I believe, in general, it is unwise to be 
excessively precise about everything that 
you might do — especially if the threat is 
one that, according to all the experts, is 
going to have extremely limited effective- 
ness. For almost all of the items in our 
trade, particularly as Governor Carter has 
specifically excluded grain, there are sub- 
stitute sources in other countries. 

Again, the art of foreign policy is to pre- 
vent an embargo from happening and not 
to stake everything on what you will do 
when the embargo in fact occurs. 

So our policy has been to attempt to 
avoid an embargo, and we should also keep 
in mind that there are many things that the 
oil producers can do between doing nothing 
and a total embargo. And then we have to 
have policies to deal with those contingen- 
cies and not just for the most extreme one. 

Encouraging Humane Values 

Mr. Bradsher: Governor Carter has criti- 
cized your policies as lacking what he con- 
siders to be morality — that you've been 
willing to deal with dictatorships rather than 
deal with matters of principle and standing 
up for liberals in some countries. Does this 
really enter into your mind as a considera- 
tion in dealing ivith a country — whether it's 
dictatorial, whether it's accused of torturing 
people ? 



November 15, 1976 



607 



Secretary Kissinger: In foreign policy, the 
United States has two objectives — at least 
two objectives. One is to maintain our se- 
curity and the security of our allies. The 
second one is to live in a world which is 
compatible with our values. 

Both of these objectives are important. 
We therefore, wherever we possibly can, 
try to encourage political forces that rep- 
resent the humane values and the demo- 
cratic values for which we stand. And 
therefore, in Santiago, Chile, at an OAS 
meeting, I made an extended statement on 
the problem of human rights. I did so again 
before the United Nations. 

At the same time, there are certain se- 
curity requirements. And you cannot im- 
plement your values unless you survive. 

In World War II, we supported Com- 
munist Russia against Nazi Germany — not 
because we agreed with its values, but be- 
cause we considered it essential for our 
survival at the time. And there are govern- 
ments around the world whose independ- 
ence, the independence of whose countries, 
is essential for American security and 
which we therefore support. Wherever we 
can, we are trying to nudge them in a di- 
rection that is compatible with our values. 

But to pretend that we can simply de- 
clare our values and transform the world 
has a high risk of a policy of constant inter- 
ventionism in every part of the world and 
then sticking us with the consequences. 

So we are trying to conduct a policy in 
which our commitments are put into some 
relationship with our capabilities. 

Mr. Bradsher: We haven't really succeeded 
in nudging anybody though, have we? 

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't think that 
is correct. I think through quiet diplomacy 
we have managed in many — 

Mr. Bradsher: Can you give an example, 
sir ? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I can. For 
example, in Chile, we have been respon- 
sible for the release of hundreds of pris- 
oners. 



Mr. Bradsher: Have we prevented the 
arrest of many more, though? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that, on the 
whole, we have contributed to an evolution 
that has not gone as rapidly as we would 
wish. But, again, we have to look at the 
alternatives of what happens if we throw 
our weight around too much. The end re- 
sult will be that we lose all influence. 

In the case of the Soviet Union, we man- 
aged to increase emigration of Jews from 
400 to 35,000 a year as long as it was done 
by quiet diplomacy. As soon as it became a 
matter of confrontation and the national 
pride of the states was involved, it went 
down again to 10,000. 

World Security and China 

Mr. Herman: Let me try nudging you in a 
different direction, Mr. Secretary. A Soviet — 
/ guess you'd call him a propagandist — Victor 
Louis said on the 15th of this month that un- 
less China adopts a more conciliatory attitude 
within a month, it will face an irreversible 
decision in Moscow. It ivas taken by some 
people to be sort of a — kind of a Soviet in- 
direct threat to the new government in China. 
And you responded in your statement, your 
news conference at Harvard, with a sort of 
a counterpressure. 

Ho w do you evaluate the situation? What 
was the meaning of that Soviet threat, if in 
fact it ivas a Soviet threat? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, we 
don't react to newsmen — at least, not to 
foreign newsmen. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Herman: Even when they are arms of 
the government, if they are? 

Secretary Kissinger: My statement at 
Harvard was made in the context, of which 
perhaps Victor Louis' statement was one 
relatively minor part, of a situation that 
might be interpreted as turmoil and might 
give rise to some temptation. 

Now, it is clear that China — a country of 
vast historical and political importance, of 
large size — if it were the subject of a mas- 



608 



Department of State Bulletin 



sive assault, that this would set a pattern 
for the security of the world that would be 
extremely unfortunate. And we therefore 
made more explicit what we had really 
said in a more guarded form earlier: that 
an attempt to upset the world equilibrium 
by a massive assault on China would not be 
taken lightly by the United States. 

Now, I am not saying that this is likely, 
and I think, in any event, one shouldn't 
conduct foreign policy on the basis of an 
assessment of other countries' intentions. 
One has to create the obstacles in a pre- 
ventive fashion. 

Mr. Herman: Have you? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that we have 
made clear that it would be a matter of the 
most serious complications if such an event 
occurred. But I am not saying such an event 
is likely. But, insofar as our views affect 
other countries' calculations, we wanted to 
make that clear. 

Mr. Schieffer: Well, Mr. Secretary, exactly 
what does that mean, though, and zvhat does 
that entail ivhen you say we would not take 
it lightly. Obviously there would be intense 
diplomacy, but does that mean that we would 
consider some sort of arms sales to China? 

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, 
China has prided itself on its self-reliance, 
and we have never had any military discus- 
sions with China. We have never had any 
request for the purchase of arms from 
China. So that issue has never been for- 
mally considered by the U.S. Government. 

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. Schlesinger, the former 
Defense Secretary, when he came back from 
China recently, said we should not reject out 
of hand any request for arms sales to China 
if that should come about. Would you agree 
with that? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is one of those 
issues that is very difficult to answer in the 
abstract. It would depend on the circum- 
stances, on the imminence of the threat, on 
how important we thought the threat was 
to our security. 

November 15, 1976 



But certainly we would take an ex- 
tremely dim view of a military attack, or 
even military pressure, on China. 

Mr. Schieffer: Well, do you really see any 
possibility of that, any real possibility of that 
coming about? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is the task of for- 
eign policy to prepare against contingencies 
and to lower temptations on the other side. 
I do not think it is a probability. I think 
that any American policymaker, given the 
importance of the issues that would be 
raised, would have to take it into account. 

Mr. Bradsher: Is this the same category 
as Yugoslavia? Can you relate the two? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are two 
kinds of American interests in the world. 
There are interests where we have a for- 
mal legal obligation, like in NATO. Then 
there are interests where the importance 
of a country is such that whether we have 
an obligation or not, we might feel our se- 
curity affected. 

I think the problem is comparable as be- 
tween China and Yugoslavia in the sense 
that an attack, a successful attack on ei- 
ther, would affect the world equilibrium 
and would affect the calculations of other 
countries and therefore could in time affect 
American security even if it didn't do so 
immediately. And it is the task of our for- 
eign policy not to plan now how we are 
going to conduct military operations, be- 
cause that is what we are trying to avoid; 
nor have we ever said that that is what we 
would do. What we are trying to do is to 
prevent the situation from coming about. 

Framework for Rhodesia Negotiations 

Mr. Herman: Let me turn you toward one 
of your own more personal pieces of work, 
and that has been to negotiate a settlement 
of the struggle in Rhodesia. That matter is 
now in the forum at Geneva, and a number 
of comments have been made by one side or 
another that the Kissinger plan, as it has 
sometimes been called — / think you prefer to 



609 



call it the Kissing er-C alia ghan, or the Cal- 
laghan-Kissinger — but in any case that the 
Kissinger plan is dead. 

Is it? Have ice lost out on that, ivhatever 
share or interest we had in it? 

Secretary Kissinger: First, let us get clear 
what it is we were trying to do. 

We were trying to stop the drift toward 
racial conflict. We were trying to bring 
about a peaceful transition toward major- 
ity rule that in the judgment of all knowl- 
edgeable people was inevitable in any 
event, except with much more bloodshed. 
We were trying to limit the influence of all 
outside countries, including our own, on the 
evolution in Africa. 

I believe we have a good chance of 
achieving all of these objectives. 

The particular terms that may have been 
worked out in order to get the process 
started could well be modified in the proc- 
ess of negotiations. 

Mr. Herman: You do not take Mr. Smith 
[Ian D. Smith, of Rhodesia'] at his word 
when he says it is the Kissinger plan, all or 
nothing ? 

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that you 
have here five parties negotiating with each 
other that have been fighting each other 
for 11 years, between whom there is enor- 
mous distrust, each of which has a constitu- 
ency to which they must appeal. 

I believe that the negotiations haven't 
even started yet. It is clear that there must 
be some room for negotiation. There will be 
many exalted statements of an epic nature 
in the process of the negotiations. I think the 
chances are better than even that they will 
succeed unless some radical elements take 
over the process and make demands that 
cannot be met. 

Mr. Herman: Let me ask you about one 
not so exalted set of statements that has been 
made; that is, the — well, I have to back into 
it a little bit. 

You have told us that you consulted with 
the Presidents of the black countries on the 
borders of Rhodesia and that the plan was 



worked out in full considtation, at least as 1 
understand it, with them. They are now say- 
ing — or some of them are now saying, their 
leaders are now saying — that that is not so, 
that the plan that you discussed with them 
is not the plan as outlined by Mr. Smith, and 
the question comes up as to who struck John? 
Who is telling the truth? Did you present 
them with a plan? Are they exaggerating the 
differences? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody is 
telling the truth. We had three American 
and two British missions in Africa before 
I went there on that last shuttle. 

The main lines of the ideas to be pre- 
sented to Smith were discussed with at 
least those African Presidents that were 
reached by these missions and that I had a 
chance to talk to personally. 

In addition, Mr. Smith added a few con- 
siderations of his own which it seemed to 
us would be better for him to put forward 
formally and permit them to be the subject 
of discussion, rather than wait until the 
Geneva conference, or wherever the con- 
ference would have taken place, and then 
create the impression that there was some 
sort of secret understanding. 

We did our best to check the framework 
of the proposals. And the essence of the 
framework has been accepted. There are 
several details about which there is dispute, 
as you would expect. 

So I think that everybody is telling the 
truth and everybody has different constitu- 
encies to whom they must appeal in the 
process of reaching a settlement. 

Mr. Schieffer: Dr. Kissinger, Governor 
Carter seems to agree with your efforts in 
Africa, but he suggested that perhaps the 
timing of your trip there and your shuttle 
had a little something to do with an election 
coming up in the United States. Is that a 
valid, criticism to make? 

Secretary Kissinger: When I first went to 
Africa in April, I think it is safe to say that 
it did not have the unanimous approval of 
many members of the Republican Party, 



610 



Department of State Bulletin 



and it was in the middle of the primary 
campaign, and there was much criticism 
that we did this. 

We did it because we thought it was in 
the national interest. If matters had bean 
permitted to drift, it was our judgment — 
it was the judgment of every knowledge- 
able person — that things would be out of 
control by the middle of next year, which 
would have been the next time anybody 
could have gotten hold of it, or by early 
next year, since the time after the election, 
whoever wins, will have to be devoted in 
part to restructuring administrations and so 
forth. It had nothing to do with the election 
campaign. And it hasn't been used in the 
election campaign, either. 

Mr. Bradsher: Mr. Secretary, six months 
or so ago, you used to make little jokes and 
quips about hoiv your time to retire might 
be coming, that you were looking forward to 
relief from the job — the type of job you have 
held for about eight years now. More re- 
cently, your little quips seem to be going the 
other way. You talk about going on until 
1981. Is this showing your loyalty to the 
President in assuming in your quips that he 
is going to be elected, or does this mean a 
change in your otvn personal attitude? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have to give 
a terminal date, or give some hope of a 
terminal date, to my colleagues in the State 
Department or their morale will break 
completely. Then, as that date approaches, 
I tend to push it a little bit more into the 
future, to spur them to new efforts. 

I have not made a final decision. When 
the President is reelected, I will discuss it 
with him at that time. 

Mr. .Schieffer: The President has said that 
you can have the job as long as you want. He 
is on the record on that. How long do you 
want it, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to de- 
prive my colleagues in the State Depart- 
ment of all hope of a termination of their 
suffering. 



Mr. Herman: I guess that is what is called 
a diplomatic ansiver. 

Let me ask you sort of a nondiplomatic 
question. We have been asking you for I 
do?i't know how many years to be a guest on 
Face the Nation, and you have always turned 
us down. Now, all of a sudden, a week before 
election day you accept us, and I am re- 
minded of your many statements that the 
Secretary of State job is a nonpolitical job. 

Was there any little element of politics in 
your accepting our offer this morning? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. As you said, you 
have been asking me for several years, and 
I seem to have been doing one of these 
shows a year, and I don't consider a press 
conference in which I don't control the 
questions — have any idea what the ques- 
tions will be — a political activity. 



U.S. -Tunisian Joint Commission Meets 
at Washington 

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission met 
at Washington October 19-21. Folloiving are 
remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and 
Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Habib 
Chatty on October 22 at the signing of the 
minutes of the meeting, together with the 
text of the joint communique of the Joint 
Commission they signed that day. 

REMARKS AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY 

Press release 526 dated October 22 

Secretary Kissinger 

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is not often that 
I meet a colleague who is engaged in shut- 
tle diplomacy. Since I saw you last, two 
weeks ago in New York, you have been 
presiding over a meeting of the Ministers 
of the Arab League and, indeed, you had 
to postpone your return here because of 
your duties in the Middle East. I want to 
express my appreciation to you for the im- 



November 15, 1976 



611 



portance that you obviously attach to our 
Joint Commission by returning here to sign 
together with me these documents and to 
give me the opportunity to benefit from 
your views on the bilateral relations be- 
tween our two countries and developments 
in the Middle East. 

In a world in which irrationality and pas- 
sions are dominant, it means a great deal 
to the United States to have as a trusted 
friend a country like Tunisia. Throughout 
its history, Tunisia has stood for balance, 
progress, and good sense in its dealings with 
its neighbors with respect to peace in the 
Middle East and with respect to its own 
development. The United States attaches 
great importance to the independence of 
Tunisia and does what it can to encourage 
the progress and economic development of 
that country. We have had distinguished 
visitors from Tunisia here this year — the 
son of President Bourguiba. We have had 
visits of our 6th Fleet to Tunisia. We have 
contributed substantially to the economic 
development of Tunisia, and we have in 
this Joint Commission an instrument by 
which these ties are institutionalized. 

Mr. Foreign Minister, I look forward to 
our talks. I am glad about the progress 
made by our Commission, and I welcome 
you here as a personal friend and as the 
representative of a country whose friend- 
ship we value, whose independence and 
progress we consider very important. 

Foreign Minister Chatty ' 

Mr. Secretary: I was very touched by the 
words you have just expressed concerning 
my country. The relations between the 
United States and Tunisia are very good. 
They go back to the very first years of the 
independence of our country, and there 
have never been any clouds over those rela- 
tions. Even before independence and in 
spite of the alliances in which the United 
States and France were engaged and in 
spite of the vicissitudes of the cold war, we 



1 Foreign Minister Chatty spoke in French. 
612 



enjoyed the benefit of the friendship and 
the sympathy of the United States. 

Following independence you supported 
us greatly. Tunisia went through some very 
painful moments with the bombing of 
Sakiet. All of this was caused by the Al- 
gerian war then raging. During this very 
serious period, the United States stood by 
our side, and it was through the good 
offices of the United States that we were 
able to resolve the problem of the station- 
ing of French troops on our territory. From 
an economic standpoint, the aid extended 
to us by the United States has been most 
significant, and it has been the most impor- 
tant aid of all of the assistance that we 
have received from other countries. As you 
yourself have stressed, Mr. Secretary, this 
aid has been well used. There are a num- 
ber of major achievements in Tunisia that 
testify to this. 

We could say that the relationship be- 
tween the United States and Tunisia stands 
out as an example from the political as well 
as the economic standpoint. From the po- 
litical standpoint the United States has al- 
ways respected our positions on the Middle 
East and in other areas. The United States 
has never attempted to exert an influence 
upon any political decision taken by Tu- 
nisia. From the economic standpoint, the 
technological and economic aid extended 
has been most fruitful. 

Tunisia is known for its moderation, its 
realism, and its spirit of conciliation. In this 
Mediterranean area which is so seriously 
beset by problems today, we have endeav- 
ored to be an agent of moderation, of dia- 
logue, and to foster the settlement of differ- 
ences through a dialogue. And in this we 
share many viewpoints with you person- 
ally, Mr. Secretary, because since you came 
to the Department of State you have 
brought with you a new spirit, a new style, 
in the Middle East — that of direct and indi- 
rect dialogue as a means to settle problems. 

Concerning now the Joint Commission, I 
am satisfied with the results as stated. I 
want to thank you and all your associates 
for the welcome extended to our side and 

Department of State Bulletin 



for the spirit of understanding that was ex- 
tended to them on this occasion. But in 
spite of all that is being done, Tunisia is 
being forced to make very special efforts 
for its development, at a time of the eco- 
nomic takeoff of the country. We need the 
assistance of all of the friends that we have 
in the world, and the United States occu- 
pies a leading place among our friends. We 
know what problems you face, having to 
spread your assistance throughout the 
world, but as we near takeoff American as- 
sistance is truly indispensable. The experi- 
ence we have had so far would be ham- 
pered if we were to fail to receive this as- 
sistance. 

I hope that the Joint Commission has 
been helpful in enabling the United States 
to understand the meaning and significance 
of our fifth [development] plan and the 
projects which will be carried out in the 
coming years. Thus, aided by this fuller un- 
derstanding, the United States, we hope, 
can make a more meaningful contribution 
to our fifth plan. And I look to the day, 
next year at the forthcoming meeting of the 
Joint Commission, when we shall have the 
pleasure to have you with us in Tunisia, 
Mr. Secretary, and to have you sign docu- 
ments which will reflect a greater contri- 
bution of the United States to our plan. 

Again, thank you for your welcome, for 
the spirit you are extending to me person- 
ally, to my President, and to my country. 
And I rejoice in this unbreakable friend- 
ship between the United States and Tu- 
nisia, a friendship of which we shall take 
very good care. 



TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE 

Press release 525 dated October 22 

The U.S. -Tunisian Joint Commission held its third 
meeting in Washington October 19-21, 1976. Min- 
ister for Planning Moustapha Zaanouni, for Tunisia, 
and Under Secretary of State William D. Rogers, 
for the United States, jointly presided over plenary 
sessions. 

Unforeseen obligations prevented the planned 
participation of the Tunisian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Habib Chatty, and consequently, that of 



U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. As 
Co-chairmen of the Commission, Minister Chatty 
and Secretary Kissinger reviewed and signed the 
Agreed Minutes of the meeting and held bilateral 
discussions on October 22. 

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary welcomed 
this opportunity to review the excellent relations 
existing between Tunisia and the United States and 
to exchange views on a broad range of regional and 
global issues. In particular, Foreign Minister Chatty 
described the intensive efforts now being undertaken 
under the aegis of the Arab League to restore peace 
and tranquility in Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger 
appreciated the opportunity to hear about these 
efforts from the Foreign Minister and to reaffirm 
the support of the United States for all steps di- 
rected toward the objective of bringing an end to 
the fighting and assuring the political independence, 
territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon. 
The Secretary reaffirmed the commitment of the 
United States to work for a just and lasting peace 
in the Middle East. He also stressed the importance 
the United States attaches to the independence and 
national development of Tunisia as a factor of 
moderation and stability in the Mediterranean re- 
gion. 

The two Ministers noted with satisfaction the 
support extended to Tunisia by the United States 
Senate in a resolution on August 3, 1976, on the 
occasion of President Bourguiba's birthday. This 
resolution, which had a most favorable effect on the 
Tunisian people, expresses the sense of the Senate 
that: "The continuation of Tunisia's economic and 
social development in circumstances of peace, lib- 
erty and independent sovereignty is important for 
the stability of the Mediterranean area and for the 
interest of the United States." And: "The United 
States should continue to contribute to the mainte- 
nance of peace and the economic and social develop- 
ment of Tunisia through the provision of appropri- 
ate levels of economic and military assistance." 

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission met in two 
plenary sessions and in a series of sessions of the 
Subcommission on Economic Development and the 
Subcommission on Trade and Investment. 

The two delegations conducted a review of U.S.- 
Tunisian cooperation in trade, investment, develop- 
ment and cultural affairs and discussed areas of 
past and prospective cooperation in multilateral 
bodies dealing with international economic and 
political policy issues. 

They reaffirmed their historic friendship and 
common commitments to work for peace in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. Speaking for 
the United States, Under Secretary Rogers said 
Tunisia would continue to find the United States 
to be a willing partner. He praised the statesman- 
ship of President Habib Bourguiba in both inter- 
national affairs and in the achievement of a "model" 
system of economic and social development which 
nurtures democracy and private initiative. 



November 15, 1976 



613 



Minister Zaanouni and other members of the 
Tunisian delegation presented and explained the 
Fifth Tunisian Plan for Economic and Social De- 
velopment, for the years 1977-81, and invited U.S 
private investment and public technical and finan- 
cial assistance. The plan requires a sharp increase 
in both domestic savings and foreign public and 
private investment in Tunisia. It is intended to 
achieve an economic growth rate of 7.5 percent, 
the addition of 48,000 jobs annually, and food self- 
sufficiency by 1981. 

In keeping with the sense of the U.S. Senate noted 
above, the U.S. delegation stated the readiness of 
U.S. Government agencies to contribute significant 
assistance, within their legal and policy guidelines 
and resources, to the achievement of the new Plan. 
The U.S. delegation said that it expected U.S. Gov- 
ernment agencies to make available to Tunisia as 
much as $65 million in grants, loans, and govern- 
ment-guaranteed private credits before the end of 
1977 for financing food supply programs, projects 
in agriculture and rural development, health and 
family planning, housing, technical cooperation and 
training and military equipment purchases. In addi- 
tion, private bank credits and private direct invest- 
ment by U.S. enterprises are expected to grow in 
pace with Tunisia's broadly based economic develop- 
ment. 

Subject to the development of mutually agreed 
projects, the U.S. delegation foresaw substantial 
increases in financing by the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank and the initiation of direct loans and loan 
guaranties on U.S. private investment projects by 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. 

The U.S. delegation announced that a group of 
U.S. private businessmen who are members of the 
Agribusiness Council, with the support of OPIC 
and a representative of AID, will undertake project 
identification in the field of agribusiness during the 
month of November in Tunisia. 

In order to assist in relieving a shortfall in Tu- 
nisia's wheat crop, the United States agreed to 
reprogram its Food for Peace allocations so as to 
provide 40,000 tons of wheat on liberal credit terms 
under Public Law 480 and an equal amount, if re- 
quired, on shorter supply credits. Grants for school 
lunch and pre-school feeding programs will continue. 
The Agency for International Development, which 
is currently required to concentrate its program in 
low-income areas, will nevertheless continue to 
provide capital assistance in selected priority areas 
and expanded technological assistance to Tunisia. 
AID will concentrate on science and technology 
transfers to enhance Tunisian development, rural 
health and family planning, housing and an ex- 
panded technical cooperation program including 
training. 

AID announced at the Joint Commission meeting 
approval of a $20 million program of Housing In- 
vestment Guaranties, the first tranche of $10 million 



614 



to be provided in the current fiscal year and the 
second half of next fiscal year. This year's program 
will finance construction and installment sale of 
about 1 500 low-income housing units in Tunis. 

The total estimate of U.S. financial assistance 
includes $25 million in military equipment purchase 
credits during the 15 months which began July 1, 
1976. 

The two delegations also noted the effective con- 
tributions of the U.S. Peace Corps, especially in the 
field of public health and vocational training, and 
that of private voluntary U.S. organizations in 
these and other fields of development and social 
welfare. 

The U.S. delegation outlined plans for an Inter- 
national Industrialization Institute, whose programs 
of research and analysis would be particularly use- 
ful to Tunisia and other countries well advanced 
along the course of industrialization. The Tunisian 
delegation asked for additional details. 

The delegations agreed to expand and invigorate 
trade-promotion programs in both countries so as 
to diversify and enlarge commercial relations. They 
agreed to provide assistance to each party's market 
research efforts in the other country. 

They expressed gratification at the growth of 
cultural relations, highlighted currently by the 
traveling exhibition in the United States of antique 
Tunisian mosaics and plans for Tunisian instructors 
to serve as French language teachers in Louisiana 
state and church schools. 

The Co-chairmen agreed that the 1977 meeting of 
the Joint Commission would be held in Tunisia at 
a mutually convenient date to be arranged. 

Henry A. Kissinger Habib Chatty 

Secretanj of State Minister of Foreign 

Affairs 

October 22, 1976, Washington, D.C. 



Secretary Kissinger Marks 
United Nations Day 

Folloiving are remarks by Secretary Kis- 
singer made at the United Nations Day 
concert at Washington on October 23. 

Press release 528 dated October 24 

Long ago, Sir Francis Bacon envisioned a 
new human community which would cause 
men's minds "to move in charity, to rest 
in providence, and to turn upon the poles 
of truth." In the more than three and a 
half centuries since then, men and nations 



Department of State Bulletin 












all too often have been vengeful rather 
than charitable, shortsighted rather than 
provident, mendacious rather than truth- 
ful. But the failings which have clouded 
mankind's hopes since the dawn of time 
have, in our era, a new and fearful dimen- 
sion. For ours is an age of potential nuclear 
cataclysm and of wars that can afflict entire 
populations. Ours is a time when the hope 
of millions for a better life seems perpetu- 
ally elusive, as the fortunate seem to pros- 
per while the destitute founder. And ours 
is a world in which too often truth and 
those who speak it are the objects of re- 
pression and regimentation. 

Our task ancT our necessity is to turn 
back the tides of hatred, discord, and fear 
and to weave from our effort a new story 
of shared human progress. The obstacles 
before us are massive, but the chance for 
achievement is great. 

As the world organization we honor to- 
night dramatically symbolizes, the nations 
have become for the first time in history an 
almost universal community, and the 
shared experiences of the modern age have 
heightened our awareness of each other 
and of our common predicament. 

We are coming to share an abhorrence 
of war, of the absolute injustice it brings 
to the innocent who are brutalized or up- 
rooted, and of the catastrophe it could 
bring to civilization and, indeed, to all of 
life on our planet. We can recognize now 
that ours has become a single global econ- 
omy, bringing complex problems but also 
the potentiality for the first time in history 
of eradicating poverty, hunger, and need- 
less human misery. And we can perceive 
the need to strengthen the institutions and 
procedures of reason to form a bulwark be- 
tween humanity and the crude and degrad- 
ing applications of coercion. 

But let us be honest. While the impera- 



tives of community are emerging, the prac- 
tices of confrontation persist. Too often we 
witness coercion rather than conciliation, 
the resort to pressure rather than the 
search for cooperation, and one-way mo- 
rality rather than the universal conscience 
of humanity. Thus it is ours to choose how 
we will reflect our interdependence. It is 
ours to choose whether nations will make 
the last quarter of this century a time of 
spiraling conflict and chaos or the dawn of 
a true human community. 

Surely, we have the means to surmount 
our problems. The reach of technology can 
conquer all but the most malevolent forces 
of nature; and our learning and our sense 
of history and place continuously advance. 
What we now have need of is the strength 
to persevere and the vision of where we 
are going. For success is a process, and not 
a final condition; and great achievements 
are dreams before they become realities. In 
the words of Homer: It is a thing possible 
to do if our hearts bid us to do it. 

So let us learn to distinguish truculence 
from strength and build a peace more 
promising than an equilibrium of force. Let 
us reconcile the national interest and the 
world interest so that we may increase the 
bounty of our planet to the benefit of all. 
And in all our labors let us extend the hori- 
zons of liberty and thus unshackle the op- 
pressed and the despairing. 

Pablo Casals once said: "The first thing 
is to do with purpose what one proposes to 
do." No generation in history has had so 
much to do nor such noble purposes to ful- 
fill. Striving together, we can harvest our 
hopes, shaping that community of which 
our ancestors dreamed and to which the 
United Nations is devoted, a human family 
in which all people can find peace, our chil- 
dren can pursue their dreams, and the hu- 
man spirit can find a new day of freedom. 



November 15, 1976 



615 



Trade and Investment: Another Dimension in U.S. -Africa Relations 



Address by David B. Bolen 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 1 



I welcome this opportunity to be with 
you this evening, and to participate in your 
conference. Colloquia such as yours are 
essential if we are to have a basic under- 
standing of American foreign policy and 
support for its purposes and goals. This is 
all the more meaningful in today's 
turbulent world. 

No people understand better than the 
American people how to respond creatively 
to the demands of rapid change. And no 
people have been more successful at find- 
ing practical solutions to the conflicts which 
change inevitably creates. 

Our own history is characterized by 
dramatic transformation. We have grown 
from a small to an immense country. We 
have developed from an agricultural to an 
industrial giant. And we have evolved 
from a country preoccupied with its own 
concerns to a nation burdened with the 
responsibilities of world leadership. 

Beyond our borders, the world itself 
changes with extraordinary rapidity. We 
are all familiar with the revolutions of our 
century — in technology, in global commu- 
nications, in the creation of weapons of 
mass destruction, and in the explosion of 
population growth. These have produced 
major challenges to our leadership. 

Nowhere is this more vividly revealed 
than in the area of trade and investment. 

I would like to approach the subject of 



1 Made before the Conference on American Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in Africa at the Uni- 
versity of Houston, Tex., on Oct. 14. 



trade and investment in the context of the 
broader issues that create the climate for 
U.S. business in Africa. 

There is a tired cliche that until very 
recently we had no coherent African pol- 
icy. I think it is accurate to say that we 
had not been as actively involved in Afri- 
can political matters as we are now, but 
the initiatives we have undertaken in 
southern Africa are grounded in principles 
and policies supported by four successive 
Administrations. 

Foremost has been our opposition to all 
systems of racial discrimination and our 
support for majority rule. The other ele- 
ments of our policy have been: recognition 
of our obligation to assist in African eco- 
nomic development and concern with 
keeping the continent free of great-power 
rivalry. 

As I said, what is new about our policy 
is the level of U.S. involvement. 

Two principal factors affect U.S.-Africa 
relations: southern African issues and 
problems of economic development. 

Southern Africa is moving rapidly toward 
a confrontation that can have deep and in- 
calculable implications for international 
stability. Rhodesia is under attack. Vio- 
lence threatens to escalate in Namibia. In 
South Africa the unrest and flashes of 
violence may be a harbinger of worse to 
come unless some way can be found to ease 
racial tensions. Racial wars in southern 
Africa would have tragic consequences 
for all concerned and would poison the 






616 



Department of State Bulletin 



atmosphere for international cooperation. 

Because of the gravity of the situation, 
and in spite of the odds against success, 
the United States undertook to use its in- 
fluence to start a process for a negotiated 
solution. We assumed this role with the 
open encouragement and active support 
of the parties involved. 

We have not sought to impose remedies 
on the Africans. As the Secretary has re- 
peatedly stated, we believe in African 
solutions for African problems. From the 
outset our goal has been to get a process 
started that would offer an alternative to 
violence. Within that context we have had 
three objectives. First, in Rhodesia, where 
the threat is most immediate, we have 
worked to establish a framework for ne- 
gotiating the peaceful transfer of power 
to the black majority, at the same time 
protecting minority rights. In Namibia our 
aim has been to find a formula for nego- 
tiating the transition to independence. In 
South Africa we continue to press the 
whites to extend equality of opportunity 
and basic human rights to all South 
Africans. 

Reality of Interdependence 

This, in very broad brush, is the political 
background against which we must view 
U.S. economic relations with Africa. Here 
the key word is "interdependence," which 
best describes the increasing interrelation- 
ship of both industrial and developing 
nations. We are learning, sometimes pain- 
fully, that we can neither escape the 
world nor dominate it. International eco- 
nomic interdependence is a reality. Our 
prosperity is becoming more and more de- 
pendent on economic cooperation with 
other countries. 

The aspiration of the less developed 
countries (LDC's) for a change in basic 
economic relationships with the United 
States and other industrialized countries 
is understandable. Both of our interests 
dictate compromise, based on the following 
elements: (1) self-regulating agreements 



with Third World suppliers of raw mate- 
rials and other commodities that provide 
us with reasonable security of access and 
them with assured income; and (2) an ar- 
rangement that insures transfers of re- 
sources from the industrialized countries 
to the poorer less developed countries to 
provide for minimum human needs and an 
increment to underpin the economic poten- 
tial of the poor countries. 

The challenge of interdependence will be 
especially acute in the decade ahead. Few 
states will be able to meet their economic 
needs independently or to insulate their 
societies and economies from increasing 
dependence on external influences. Indus- 
trial countries will be unable to manage 
their national economies without one an- 
other's cooperation in regulating the inter- 
national system of money, trade, and in- 
vestment. Technological developments will 
reinforce the need for joint endeavors to 
deal with such problems as energy, food, 
raw materials, and environmental pollution. 

While our interdependence will increase, 
we should all recognize that nationalism 
will remain the dominant ideology. And 
nationalist sentiment may well be further 
stimulated in those countries that find 
progress in economic development elusive 
or are confronted with deteriorating trade 
situations. 

Africa's Problems and Potential 

Unfortunately, poverty is still pervasive 
in most of Africa. Of the world's 29 least 
developed countries, 18 are African. De- 
pressing social and economic indicators at- 
test to the effect of poverty on the quality 
of life. In the least developed countries, 
life expectancy barely averages 43 years, 
compared to 53 years in the developing 
world and 71 years in the United States. A 
single physician serves an average popula- 
tion of 15,000 — almost five times the num- 
ber in the developing world. Only 28 per- 
cent of school-age children attend school, 
and the overall illiteracy rate exceeds 80 
percent. 



November 15, 1976 



617 



In addition to the burden of extreme 
poverty, Africa is heavily dependent on 
external economic forces over which it has 
little control. Many African states rely on 
a single commodity for their export earn- 
ings. Price fluctuations of raw materials in 
the international marketplace can have a 
drastic effect on African economies. 

A case in point is Zambia, the world's 
fifth largest producer and one of the larg- 
est exporters of copper. Over 90 percent 
of Zambia's foreign exchange and one- 
third to one-half of the government's reve- 
nue, mainly through export taxes, are de- 
rived from copper. When the price of 
copper fell from a high of $1.50 a pound to 
as low as 55 cents, it posed major economic 
problems which the government has not 
yet resolved. Zaire faces similar problems. 

Vulnerability to widely fluctuating com- 
modity prices is only one of the obstacles to 
African development. Boundaries, many of 
them a legacy of the colonial era, are fre- 
quently arbitrary with little regard for 
natural economic regions. Agriculture, the 
mainstay of the majority of African states, 
is often a victim to the capriciousness of 
nature. A dramatic example is the Sahel, 
the chronically drought-ridden region on 
the southern edge of the Sahara, where the 
desert is steadily encroaching on once- 
fertile lands. 

Most African countries lack an adequate 
infrastructure — the roads and railways 
and harbors essential for nationbuilding. 
Another serious handicap is Africa's lack 
of skilled manpower. African states place 
a high priority on education including 
vocational and management training. For- 
eign enterprises which are willing to pro- 
vide training and opportunities for Afri- 
cans for advancement to positions of re- 
sponsibility are making a sound investment 
in terms of building a reservoir of good 
will in the host country. 

The world recession and spiraling oil 
prices hit the poorest nations hardest. 
Caught between the rising costs of food 
and manufactured goods they needed to 



import and the lower prices they were re- 
ceiving for their own commodities, many of 
them were forced to cut back on their 
development. 

In spite of these problems, Africa has 
enormous growth potential. If you will bear 
with me for a few more statistics, they will 
demonstrate the extent of that potential. 
Africa possesses 96 percent of the world's 
known reserves of chromite, 42 percent of 
its cobalt, 23 percent of its manganese re- 
serves, and 64 percent of its platinum- 
group metals. Africa's iron reserves are 
twice those of the United States and two- 
thirds those of the Soviet Union. The Afri- 
can Continent is estimated to have 16 per- 
cent of the world's waterpower. Africa's 
petroleum reserves have not yet been as- 
sessed ; however, Nigeria for several years 
has been a major supplier of crude oil to 
the United States. And finally, there are 
still vast unused areas of arable land, pas- 
ture, and forest. With proper irrigation 
and modern agricultural techniques, every 
important crop in the world can be grown 
in some part of the continent. 

These figures are of more than passing 
interest to the United States, which is the 
world's leading consumer. While Ameri- 
cans constitute 6 percent of the world's 
population, we consume approximately 27 
percent of its production of raw materials. 
Projections indicate that by the end of this 
century the United States will be depend- 
ent primarily on foreign sources for 12 of 
the 13 basic industrial raw materials re- 
quired to maintain a modern economy. 

In more specific terms, how will this de- 
pendency relate to Africa? Nigeria is ob- 
vious. There are other examples. Zaire and 
Zambia are major producers of copper. 
Gabon has large reserves of uranium and 
manganese. Niger has large deposits of 
cassiterite, and Mauritania is rich in top- 
quality iron ore. Guinea has two-thirds of 
the world's known deposits of bauxite. 

In spite of Africa's natural wealth there 
are great disparities. At one end of the 
scale, Nigeria, Liberia, Gabon, Botswana, 



618 



Department of State Bulletin 



Angola, Zaire, and Zambia have good de- 
velopment prospects because they are min- 
eral producers. Other African countries, as 
I have indicated, are much less fortunate. 

Assistance, Trade, and Investment 

The United States is not indifferent to 
the problems of the developing world. We 
are willing to explore measures to improve 
and stabilize markets. We seek satisfac- 
tory international arrangements to encour- 
age investment, such as the International 
Resources Bank. We have received author- 
ity from Congress to make a greater con- 
tribution to the African Development Fund. 
We will make major efforts to stimulate the 
flow of modern technology to Africa to 
promote growth and diversify economies 
now excessively dependent on one or two 
commodities. 

U.S. bilateral assistance to Africa has 
averaged $250 million a year over the past 
three fiscal years. In addition, we have 
provided multilateral assistance through 
such agencies as the International Develop- 
ment Association, where our share of cred- 
its last year was $140 million. 

The Peace Corps is a "people-to-people" 
approach to development assistance. The 
Peace Corps program currently involves 
2,100 volunteers in 25 different African 
countries at a cost this year of $23 million. 
Each host country contributes another 
$2-$3 million. The program is active pri- 
marily in the areas of education, agricul- 
tural and rural development, and health 
and social services. 

While many African states will continue 
to need development assistance for some 
time to come, their eventual goal is to 
achieve an economy based on expanded 
trade and investment. The commercial dol- 
lar flow is substantially larger than the 
aid. Sub-Saharan African export receipts 
from the United States now reach almost 
$6 billion per year. New U.S. investment, 
which plays an important role in promot- 
ing sub-Saharan African exports, now 



totals between $100 million and $200 mil- 
lion per year. 

Although many African states retain spe- 
cial trade relationships with their former 
metropoles, most of them are eager to 
diversify their sources of trade and invest- 
ment. American technology and the widely 
recognized quality of our products make 
us an attractive alternative in African 
eyes. 

U.S. trade with Africa is still relatively 
small, but growing rapidly. Total trade 
with sub-Saharan Africa was over nine 
times greater in 1975 than in 1960. Due to 
our petroleum imports, notably from Ni- 
geria, the growth in imports from Africa 
has overshadowed that of U.S. exports. So 
while figures for exports from Africa do 
represent a sixfold increase over the past 
15 years, our share of Africa's import 
market has remained at around 10 percent. 

Because of its large oil exports, Nigeria 
accounted for 42.7 percent of U.S. trade 
with sub-Saharan Africa in 1975. Nigerian 
oil is also the reason why the United States 
continues to have an overall trade deficit 
with Africa in spite of a substantial in- 
crease in U.S. exports. Most of this increase 
was in manufactured products such as 
civilian aircraft and parts, automobiles and 
parts, and electrical machinery. 

The principal market for American 
goods continues to be South Africa, al- 
though its share of U.S. exports to the re- 
gion is declining. In 1975 the United States 
exported about 1.3 billion dollars' worth 
of goods to South Africa, which repre- 
sented about 26 percent of our total ex- 
ports to all of Africa. 

Sub-Saharan Africa is also increasingly 
important to us as a source of imports. It 
supplied a significant percentage of the 
following imports to the United States in 
1975: coffee, 28 percent; crude petroleum, 
17 percent; gem diamonds, 34 percent; 
cocoa, 47 percent; manganese and ferro- 
manganese, 32 percent; platinum-group 
metals, 48 percent; chrome and ferro- 



November 15, 1976 



619 



chrome, 39 percent; cobalt, 57 percent; 
and bauxite, 22 percent. 

U.S. direct investment in sub-Saharan 
Africa has risen dramatically to reach a 
book value of over $3 billion in 1975, over 
five times what it was in 1960. 

The principal recipients of U.S. invest- 
ment are Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, 
Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, 
and South Africa. Approximately two- 
thirds of American investment is in the 
extractive sector. The only African coun- 
tries currently receiving a significant in- 
vestment in manufacturing are Kenya, 
Ghana, Zaire, and South Africa. 

Two Problems in Pattern of U.S. Investment 

Two elements in the pattern of American 
investment in Africa pose serious problems 
for our relations with Africa : the fact that 
about one-third of that investment is in 
South Africa and the heavy concen- 
tration of our investment in the extractive 
industries. 

Let's take our investment in South 
Africa first. The majority of black Africans 
regard a $1.6 billion American investment 
in South Africa at best with suspicion, at 
worst as evidence of U.S. support for 
apartheid. American groups have joined 
with black Africans in urging that we dis- 
courage further American investment in 
South Africa. Some have gone so far as to 
urge American companies to withdraw 
completely as a sign of their disapproval of 
South Africa's racial policy. If violence 
escalates, demands that we sever our eco- 
nomic ties with South Africa may well 
increase. 

In fact, our policy has been neither to 
encourage nor discourage American private 
investment in South Africa. We have 
placed restrictions on the extension of Ex- 
imbank lending facilities to South Africa. 
And we have urged American firms — there 
are over 350 of them doing business in 
South Africa — to improve the working con- 
ditions, wages, training, and opportunities 
for advancement of their black African 
employees. 



The second problem is the heavy con- 
centration of American investment in the 
extractive industries. These industries are 
most vulnerable to expropriation and na- 
tionalization as developing countries be- 
come more insistent on absolute control 
over their own natural resources. 

While we recognize the right of foreign 
governments to nationalize industries with- 
in their territory, we insist that any nation- 
alization of American firms be accompa- 
nied by prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation. There are legislative penal- 
ties attached to U.S. aid to any country that 
fails to meet this requirement. 

Most African governments recognize the 
important contribution foreign investment 
can make to their development. They are 
aware that foreign private investment is 
the principal vehicle for the transfer of 
capital and technology and the urgently 
needed training for local manpower. For 
these reasons many African countries con- 
tinue to welcome and provide incentives to 
encourage foreign investment. 

Improving the International Economic System 

Believing that trade and investment are 
the engines of development for Third 
World countries, and in particular for 
African nations, the United States has 
taken the initiative to propose improve- 
ments in the international economic sys- 
tem in these areas. Many of these proposals 
have been brought to fruition through the 
joint efforts of the developed and the de- 
veloping nations. Other aids to trade and 
investment have been the result of uni- 
lateral U.S. decisions or policies. 

One important U.S. proposal at the 
seventh special session of the United Na- 
tions General Assembly led to the expan- 
sion of the IMF [International Monetary 
Fund] compensatory financing facility. 
This facility helps to insure basic economic 
security against economic cycles in indus- 
trial countries that reduce export earnings 
and undermine development plans. This 
year IMF has disbursed more than $2 bil- 
lion from this facility. 



620 



Department of State Bulletin 



Another action concerning the IMF has 
been the establishment of a Trust Fund for 
poorer developing countries based on prof- 
its from the sale of IMF gold. As you know, 
three gold sales have been held. The Trust 
Fund lending is expected to begin in early 
1977. 

Another of Secretary Kissinger's pro- 
posals was to proceed with the establish- 
ment of the International Fund for Agri- 
cultural Development. Draft articles es- 
tablishing the Fund have been negotiated, 
and pledges are still being accepted until 
the $1 billion target has been reached. 
The purpose of this Fund is to provide con- 
cessional financing to the developing na- 
tions to finance increased food production. 

At the May UNCTAD Conference 
[United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development] in Nairobi, the United States 
proposed the establishment of an Inter- 
national Resources Bank. This new institu- 
tion would promote more rational, system- 
atic, and equitable development of re- 
sources in developing nations. It would 
help insure supplies of raw materials to 
fulfill the growing needs of the world 
economy. 

In another aspect of the commodity sit- 
uation, the final UNCTAD resolution called 
for consultations on 18 individual commodi- 
ties. The United States is participating in 
these consultations without conceding our 
firm policy to consider commodity agree- 
ments only on a case-by-case basis. We 
feel that not all commodities are suitable 
for commodity agreements. The United 
States is a member of the International 
Coffee Agreement and the International 
Tin Agreement. 

Both developed and developing coun- 
tries are engaged in the multilateral trade 
negotiations underway in Geneva. Prod- 
ucts of special interest to the developing 
countries are currently the subject of ne- 
gotiations in the tropical products group. 
Tariff reductions would be a more binding 
concession and help integrate the develop- 
ing countries into the world trading system. 

In contrast to the multilateral nature of 
the negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. gen- 



eralized system of preferences is a uni- 
lateral grant of duty-free entry to over 
2,700 tariff items when produced in bene- 
ficiary developing countries. We believe 
this opportunity for LDC exports to enter 
the U.S. market duty free should help to 
encourage expansion and diversification of 
their exports. 

While helping improve the U.S. trade 
balance with Africa, the Export-Import 
Bank also assists African development by 
making it possible for these countries to 
purchase U.S. technology equipment. The 
Export-Import Bank has an exposure of 
almost $1.5 billion spread among 32 sub- 
Saharan African countries. The Export- 
Import Bank participates to some extent in 
virtually all large sales of U.S. products to 
African countries. Many sales of U.S. 
products to Africa would not be made if it 
were not for Eximbank financing, since 
financing is a key factor in sales to most 
countries of Africa. Products which ac- 
count for most of the Eximbank loans to 
Africa are aircraft, locomotives, mining 
equipment, industrial equipment, tele- 
communications, and electric power gen- 
erating equipment. 

The purpose of the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation is to facilitate 
U.S. private investment in friendly develop- 
ing countries. OPIC provides insurance 
against loss resulting from currency in- 
convertibility, expropriation, and war, revo- 
lution, and insurrection. It has been par- 
ticularly active in Africa, where it has 
investment guarantee agreements with 35 
sub-Saharan countries. Among the projects 
which OPIC has financed or insured are 
an aluminum refinery in Ghana, a hotel 
complex in Ivory Coast, and a dairy plant 
in Nigeria. OPIC leads investment missions 
to Africa, and it regularly holds seminars 
to acquaint businessmen with investment 
opportunities in Africa. 

Doing business in the developing world 
requires patience and a special effort — an 
effort which sometimes may hardly seem 
warranted by the size of the market. How- 
ever, looking beyond the immediate return 
to possible future benefits of expanded 



November 15, 1976 



621 



markets and access to raw materials, the 
effort should be seen as well worthwhile. 
Statistics are soon forgotten, but there 
are a few important points I hope will 
stay with you: 

— We don't do business in a vacuum. 
Political issues have a direct bearing on 
the climate for trade and investment. 

— In the increasing world competition 
for resources and markets, the United 
States will become more dependent on 
Africa. 

— Dependence, however, is a two-way 
street. Africa needs American capital and 
technological know-how to fuel its eco- 
nomic development. 

— American prosperity is tied to eco- 
nomic development in the poorer coun- 
tries. Countries with a per capita income 
of under $100 offer little opportunity for 
trade and investment. However, they do 
provide fertile ground for instability, and 
they can change the character of inter- 
national relations. Therefore, since our 
fortunes are inextricably linked, we must 
do what we can to build a community of 
interest and improve conditions in the 
poorer countries. Trade and investment are 
the principal means of achieving this end. 



Sixth Progress Report on Cyprus 
Submitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford 1 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am 
submitting my sixth periodic report on the 
Cyprus negotiations and the actions which 
this Administration is taking to assist in the 
search of a lasting solution to the problems 
still facing the people of the Republic of 
Cyprus. 

In my last report I reviewed recent steps 



1 Transmitted on Oct. 4 (text from Weekly Com- 
pilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 11). 



taken by the Administration to bring about 
further progress in the Cyprus talks, and 
I emphasized the need for the parties to 
set aside procedural problems and move on 
to discussions of key substantive issues. 

Our efforts during the past sixty days 
have been directed to encouraging the re- 
sumption of such negotiations. We have 
been in close contact with our major West- 
ern allies regarding new ideas which might 
contribute to progress in the Cyprus talks 
and have continued to work closely with 
United Nations Secretary General Wald- 
heim. Secretary of State Kissinger met with 
Mr. Waldheim in New York in late August 
to discuss the Cyprus question. Following 
that meeting Secretary General Waldheim 
asked the chief Cypriot negotiators from 
both sides to come to New York for indi- 
vidual consultations with him on how the 
negotiations might best be resumed. These 
consultations developed into a series of 
joint meetings at which both sides dis- 
cussed the issues which were blocking 
further progress. After these meetings, the 
two Cypriot negotiators agreed to continue 
their consultations in Nicosia, under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary General's 
Special Representative for Cyprus. It is my 
hope these talks will lead to resumption of 
meaningful discussion on the main issues. 

In his meetings with the Foreign Minis- 
ters of Greece and Turkey at the United 
Nations last week, Secretary Kissinger 
urged their strong support once again for a 
new round of talks. We will continue to 
work as closely as possible with the Gov- 
ernments of Greece and Turkey, with the 
UN Secretary General, with our Western 
allies, and with the parties themselves, to 
insure that every opportunity is seized in 
pursuing a just and lasting settlement on 
Cyprus. 

To focus the world's attention on the 
need for rapid progress, Secretary Kissin- 
ger stated anew the position of my Admin- 
istration in his speech before the UN 
General Assembly on September 30 when 
he emphasized that our overriding objec- 
tives remain the well-being of the Cypriot 



622 



Department of State Bulletin 



people and peace in the Eastern Mediter- 
ranean. Calling upon all concerned to 
undertake a new commitment to achieve 
these ends, he underlined once again the 
position I have repeatedly voiced: 

A settlement must come from the Cypriot com- 
munities themselves. It is they who must decide how 
their island's economy and government shall be re- 
constructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate 
relationship of the two communities and the terri- 
torial extent of each area. 

This Administration believes that in 
order to restore momentum in the negotia- 
tions a set of principles along the following 
lines might help the parties to resume talks 
on substantive issues: 

— A settlement should preserve the inde- 
pendence, sovereignty and territorial in- 
tegrity of Cyprus; 

— The present dividing lines on Cyprus 
must be adjusted to reduce the area cur- 
rently controlled by the Turkish side; 

— The territorial arrangement should 
take into account the economic require- 
ments and humanitarian concerns of the 
two Cypriot communities, including the 
plight of those who remain refugees; 

— A constitutional arrangement should 
provide conditions under which the two 
Cypriot communities can live in freedom 
and have a large vote in their own affairs; 
and 

— Security arrangements should be 
agreed that permit the withdrawal of for- 
eign military forces other than those pres- 
ent under international agreement. 

It is my strong hope that these ideas may 
be given careful consideration by all con- 
cerned. 

In addition to these steps, the United 
States also continues to provide financial 
assistance to the people of Cyprus so that 
they may overcome the burdens imposed 
on them by the events of 1974. I have just 
signed into law a bill authorizing $17.5 mil- 
lion in U.S. relief assistance for Cyprus in 
the coming fiscal year. Our assistance thus 
far, some $50 million over the past two 
years, has been a major factor in providing 



adequate homes for almost all of those un- 
fortunate Cypriots uprooted in 1974, and, 
in addition, has made a substantial contri- 
bution toward the medical needs, emer- 
gency food aid and the general welfare of 
the many displaced from their homes. We 
will continue to offer our help wherever it 
is needed. 

The United States also continues to be 
the largest financial contributor to the 
maintenance of the United Nations Peace- 
keeping Force on Cyprus, which has done 
such a highly effective job. We continue 
actively to support both the work of the 
UN Peacekeeping Force and the UN reso- 
lutions calling for a just and lasting solu- 
tion to the Cyprus problem, respect for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of that 
island, and withdrawal of all foreign mili- 
tary forces not authorized by agreements. 
While I strongly endorse all of these pre- 
cepts, the last is of special importance since 
the cause of peace can only be poorly 
served when men confront each other with 
arms. I was therefore gratified to hear of 
the withdrawal last month of a further 
portion of the Turkish armed forces from 
Cyprus. 

In summary, during the past sixty days 
we have increased our efforts to bring the 
two sides together once more for discus- 
sions in any area which might contribute 
to a more secure and normal life for the 
people of Cyprus. We have reaffirmed our 
determination to continue direct bilateral 
assistance on a large scale. We have 
worked with other members of the inter- 
national community to bring about the best 
possible set of conditions for resumption 
of the Cyprus talks at an early date. 

My Administration will further intensify 
its efforts to bring both sides together 
again with the hope, based on their meet- 
ings in New York last month, that some 
further significant advances may occur. 

The people of the United States remain 
keenly interested in promoting an equitable 
and lasting settlement on Cyprus. My Ad- 
ministration has been active at every op- 
portunity in encouraging such a settlement. 



November 15, 1976 



623 



We believe the people of both the Greek 
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities 
share equally a desire for peaceful, pro- 
ductive and secure lives. We will continue 
to use every opportunity further to encour- 
age the leaders of both sides toward a 
common solution which will achieve these 
goals. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, October 4, 1976. 



United States Encouraged by Progress 
at Preparatory Discussions on IFAD 

Press release 510 dated October 12 

The Preparatory Commission (Prepcom) 
of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) met in Rome Sep- 
tember 27-30 to discuss the interim steps 
required to establish IFAD. IFAD was an 
OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries] initiative at the November 
1974 World Food Conference. It is a pro- 
posed $1 billion multilateral mechanism 
which will provide OPEC and OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] countries with a unique 
opportunity to cooperate in the financing 
of increased food production in the devel- 
oping world on highly concessional terms. 
IFAD will emphasize assistance to the poor 
food-deficit countries. 

The United States is encouraged by the 
businesslike atmosphere which character- 
ized the Prepcom discussions among OPEC, 
OECD, and non-oil LDC [less developed 
countries] governments. We were espe- 
cially heartened by the considerable opti- 
mism among Prepcom participants that 
sufficient pledges would be forthcoming so 
that IFAD could be established soon. The 
United States has pledged $200 million, 
contingent on a total level of pledges of 
$1 billion and equitable burden-sharing 
among the categories of contributors. 



At the Prepcom meeting the Iranian 
delegation announced that Iran has agreed 
to contribute $20 million in addition to the 
pledge it has already made to IFAD. Previ- 
ous Iranian pledges totaling about $105 
million have been made through the OPEC 
Special Fund. As of September 30, total 
IFAD convertible pledges were about $965 
million, with $535 million from the OECD 
countries, $420 million from the OPEC 
countries, and $10 million from the non-oil 
LDC's. 

The United States welcomes this signifi- 
cant additional Iranian contribution as an 
important step toward attaining the $1 bil- 
lion target necessary to get IFAD estab- 
lished. This pledge further underlines the 
importance which the Government of Iran 
attaches to this initiative, which Iran has 
been involved in since its inception. It is 
another evidence of Iran's constructive role 
in international relations. 



Report on World Weather Program 
Transmitted to the Congress 

Message From President Ford J 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Weather and climate are at once familiar 
and sources of deep concern. Through tech- 
nology, we have minimized the harmful 
effects of weather and have adapted our 
civilization to a wide range of climatic 
conditions. Yet, we now know how fragile 
is the balance between our activities and 
the environment. Understanding that bal- 
ance is the key to the successful manage- 
ment of energy, food, and water resources 
and the beneficial application of technol- 



1 Transmitted on Sept. 28 (text from White House 
press release); the 73-page report, entitled "World 
Weather Program — Plan for Fiscal Year 1977," is 
for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 



624 



Department of State Bulletin 



ogy. Our national goals in improving 
weather predictions and warnings and cop- 
ing with the vagaries of climate cannot be 
accomplished except in the context of a 
world-wide endeavor. All nations play 
roles; the United States can be truly proud 
of our contributions. 

The World Weather Program is the U.S. 
commitment to an effort that will affect 
every one of us. I am pleased to report 
significant and continuing progress in fur- 
thering the goals of the World Weather 
Program. The following accomplishments 
are representative of the progress being 
made: 

— There has been a smooth transition into 
the operational use of geostationary me- 
teorological satellites. The Western Hemi- 
sphere, much of the Atlantic, and part of 
the Pacific are now observed continuously. 
A nationwide network of Satellite Field 
Service Stations has been implemented by 
NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration] to capitalize on these new 
data. Hurricane and typhoon forecasting 
has been aided, for example, as has the 
observation, tracking, and warning of se- 
vere weather over the United States. 

— The data processing system at the 
World Meteorological Center, Suitland, 
Maryland, has been expanded through the 
operational use of a third, fourth-genera- 
tion computer. This system is essential to 
handle the improved forecast models and 
the increased volume of data being re- 
ceived from the World Weather Watch. 

— Augmented environmental monitoring 
and climatic programs have been initiated 
at the South Pole, American Samoa, and 
Barrow, Alaska. 

— Engineering tests have been completed 
on large meteorological and oceanographic 
buoys. The first prototype operational sys- 
tem was moored 240 miles off the Oregon 
coast. Others are scheduled for operation 
this summer. 

— The initial data-processing phase for 



the Global Atmospheric Research Pro- 
gram's (GARP) Atlantic Tropical Experi- 
ment has been completed and scientific 
analysis is well underway. 

— A series of Data Systems Tests have 
been completed as a dress rehearsal for 
the First GARP Global Experiment which 
starts in 1978. 

— The Global Experiment received major 
impetus when over 40 nations met in Feb- 
ruary 1976 and agreed to commit ships, 
buoys, balloon systems, satellites, and other 
critical facilities for the observational pe- 
riod planned for 1977-1979. 

It is with pleasure that I transmit this 
annual report describing current planned 
Federal activities contributing to the 
World Weather Program. The report de- 
tails how the United States is following the 
intent of Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 
of the 90th Congress to participate in this 
international program. 

Gerald R. Ford. 

The White House, September 28, 1976. 



President Signs Whale Conservation 
and Protection Study Act 

Statement by President Ford l 

I am pleased to sign H.R. 15445, the 
Whale Conservation and Protection Study 

Act. 2 

This bill authorizes the Secretary of 
Commerce to conduct comprehensive stud- 
ies of all whales found in waters subject to 
U.S. jurisdiction and to report to Congress 
the results of these studies by January 1, 
1980. The bill also provides that the Secre- 



1 Issued on Oct. 18 (text from White House press 
release). 

2 Public Law 94-532, approved Oct. 17. 



November 15, 1976 



625 



tary of State will initiate negotiations with 
Mexico and Canada to develop appropriate 
bilateral agreements for the protection and 
conservation of whales. 

Although much is known of the habits of 
whales, the vastness of the oceans and the 
mobility of these mammals make it very 
difficult to monitor adequately their many 
species. This legislation will allow the col- 
lection of scientific information that will 
permit us to determine the most appropri- 
ate means of preventing the exploitation of 
whales and thus avoid their extinction. 

The United States has placed great em- 
phasis on multilateral efforts with other na- 
tions through the International Whaling 
Commission to achieve effective conserva- 
tion of whales throughout the world. The 
negotiations with Mexico and Canada di- 
rected by this bill will reinforce the efforts 
of our three nations within the Commission. 



President Signs Bill Amending 
Bretton Woods Agreements Act 

Statement by President Ford ! 



underlying economic and financial condi- 
tions is an essential prerequisite to the 
achievement of international monetary sta- 
bility. At the same time, the new system 
will provide the increased flexibility, re- 
silience, and reliance on market mecha- 
nisms which today's monetary relationships 
require, replacing the exchange rate rigid- 
ity and gold emphasis of the Bretton 
Woods system. 

In the post-World War II era, we have 
increasingly recognized the importance of 
a smoothly functioning international mone- 
tary system to American jobs, production, 
and growth and to the maintenance of a 
prosperous and stable world economy. The 
attainment of the international economic 
as well as political and national security 
objectives of the United States depends in 
large measure on our success in maintain- 
ing a strong and healthy world economy, 
and that in turn requires a sound, smoothly 
functioning, and equitable international 
monetary system. 

For all these reasons, I am especially 
pleased to sign into law this act to provide 
for amendment of the Bretton Woods 
Agreements Act. 



I have approved H.R. 13955, an act "To 
provide for amendment of the Bretton 
Woods Agreements Act, and for other pur- 
poses." 2 This legislation authorizes U.S. 
acceptance of amendments to the Articles 
of Agreement of the International Mone- 
tary Fund and U.S. consent to a proposed 
increase in its quota in the Fund. 

The reforms of the international mone- 
tary system which the United States ac- 
cepts through these amendments are the 
culmination of years of debate and nego- 
tiation following the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods par value system in 1971. 
This new international monetary system 
recognizes that development of stable 



'Issued on Oct. 21 (text from White House press 
release). 
2 Public Law 94-564; approved Oct. 19. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

94th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions 

The Vietnam-Cambodia Emergency, 1975. Hearings 
before the House Committee on International 
Relations and Its Special Subcommittee on In- 
vestigations. Part I — Vietnam Evacuation and Hu- 
manitarian Assistance; April 9-May 8, 1975; 240 
pp. Part II — The Cambodian-Vietnam Debate; 
March 6-April 14, 1975; 291 pp. Part III— Vietnam 
Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador Graham A. 
Martin; January 27, 1976; 89 pp. Part IV— Cam- 
bodia Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador John 
Gunther Dean; May 5, 1976; 64 pp. 

Shifting Balance of Power in Asia: Implications for 
Future U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcom- 
mittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and 
Development of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations. November 18, 1975-May 18, 
1976. 236 pp. 



626 



Department of State Bulletin 



TREATY INFORMATION 



Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 



Aviation 



Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts 
against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Mon- 
treal September 23, 1971. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 26, 1973. TIAS 7570. 
Ratification deposited: Barbados, August 6, 1976. 

Coffee 

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. 

Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into 

force provisionally October 1, 1976. 

Ratifications deposited: Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, 
Paraguay, October 11, 1976; Dominican Repub- 
lic, Indonesia, October 14, 1976. 

Notification of provisional application deposited: 
Gabon, October 11, 1976. 

Conservation 

Convention on international trade in endangered 
species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. 
Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into 
force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249. 
Ratifications deposited: Iran, August 3, 1976; 

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, September 9, 

1976. 

Customs 

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes 
and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. 
Entered into force December 6, 1975. 1 
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, October 12, 
1976. 

Finance 

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Done at Wash- 
ington December 27, 1945. Entered into force 
December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Comoros, October 28, 
1976. 

Health 

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution 
of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, 
as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643. 8086). Adopted at 
Geneva May 22, 1973. 2 

Acceptances deposited: Kenya, September 17, 
1976; Mauritania, September 21, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 



sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 2 
Acceptance deposited: Ghana, October 18, 1976. 

Terrorism — Protection of Diplomats 

Convention on the prevention and punishment of 
crimes against internationally protected persons, 
including diplomatic agents. Done at New York 
December 14, 1973. 1 ' 

Ratification deposited: United States, October 26, 
1976. 



BILATERAL 

Egypt 

Agreement concerning claims of nationals of the 
United States, with agreed minute and related 
notes. Signed at Cairo May 1, 1976. Entered into 
force October 27, 1976. 

Honduras 

Arrangement for hydrographic and nautical cartog- 
raphy. Signed at Tegucigalpa August 30, 1976. 
Entered into force August 30, 1976. 

Jamaica 

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, re- 
lating to the agreement of April 16, 1975 (TIAS 
8130). Signed at Kingston September 30, 1976. 
Entered into force September 30, 1976. 

Japan 

Agreement concerning enrollment of Japanese em- 
ployees of the Okinawa office of the Voice of 
America in the Employment Insurance Scheme of 
Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo 
September 30 and October 15, 1976. Entered into 
force October 15, 1976; effective April 1. 1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the 
United States and the Mexican customs services. 
Signed at Mexico September 30, 1976. Enters into 
force 60 days after the date on which the parties 
notify one another by an exchange of diplomatic 
notes that they have accepted the terms of the 
agreement. 

United Kingdom 

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signa- 
ture, and exchange of notes. Signed at London 
June 8, 1972. 
Instruments of ratification exchanged: October 21, 

1976. 
Enters into force: January 21, 1977. 
Extended to: Antigua; Belize; Bermuda; British 

Indian Ocean Territory; British Virgin Islands; 

Cayman Islands; Dominica; Falkland Islands 



1 Not in force for the United States. 
- Not in force. 



November 15, 1976 



627 



and Dependencies; Gibraltar; Gilbert Islands; 
Hong Kong; Montserrat; Pitcairn, Henderson, 
Ducie and Oeno Islands; St. Christopher, Nevis 
and Anguilla; St. Helena and Dependencies; St. 
Lucia; St. Vincent; Solomon Islands; Sovereign 
Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the 
Island of Cyprus; Turks and Caicos Islands; 
Tuvalu. 

Venezuela 

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of 
August 14, 1953, as amended (TIAS 2813, 3117, 
7549). Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas 
September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 
22, 1976. 



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Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which 
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Pub. 8069 4 pp. 

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The Great Seal of the United States. This illustrated 
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Jordan 
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea. 
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Bangla- 
desh amending the agreement of September 11, 1975. 
TIAS 8260. 12 pp. 35<*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8260). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan 
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8263. 9 pp. 354. (Cat. No. S9.10:8263). 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Portu- 
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Passenger Charter Air Services. Agreement with 
Belgium extending the memorandum of understand- 
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No. S9.10:8265). 

Air Transport Services. Agreement with Mexico ex- 
tending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as 
amended and extended. TIAS 8266. 4 pp. 35e\ (Cat. 
No. S9.10:8266). 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles 
and Textile Products. Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 
8268. 21 pp. 35<*. (Cat. No. S9.10:8268). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Thailand 
amending the agreement of March 16, 1972, as 
amended. TIAS 8269. 3 pp. 35tf. (Cat. No. S9.10: 
8269). 

Trade in Textiles — Consultations on Market Disrup- 
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10:8272). 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. 

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Tracking Station. Agreement with Ecuador. TIAS 
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628 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 15, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1951 



Africa. Trade and Investment: Another Di- 
mension in U.S.-Africa Relations (Bolen) 616 

Agriculture. United States Encouraged by 
Progress at Preparatory Discussions on 
IFAD 624 

China. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on 
"Face the Nation" 606 

Congress 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 626 

Report on World Weather Program Transmit- 
ted to the Congress (message from President 
Ford) 624 

Sixth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to 
the Congress (message from President Ford) 622 

Cyprus. Sixth Progress Report on Cyprus Sub- 
mitted to the Congress (message from Presi- 
dent Ford) 622 

Developing Countries 

Moral Promise and Practical Needs (Kissinger) 597 
Trade and Investment: Another Dimension in 
U.S.-Africa Relations (Bolen) 616 

Economic Affairs 

President Signs Bill Amending Bretton Woods 
Agreements Act (statement) 626 

Trade and Investment: Another Dimension in 

U.S.-Africa Relations (Bolen) 616 

United States Encouraged by Progress at 
Preparatory Discussions on IFAD .... 624 

U.S. -Tunisian Joint Commission Meets at 
Washington (Chatty, Kissinger, joint com- 
munique) 611 

Environment. President Signs Whale Conser- 
vation and Protection Study Act (statement) 625 

Human Rights. Moral Promise and Practical 
Needs (Kissinger) 597 

Iran. United States Encouraged by Progress at 
Preparatory Discussions on IFAD .... 624 

Israel. Moral Promise and Practical Needs 

(Kissinger) 597 

Middle East. Moral Promise and Practical 
Needs (Kissinger) 597 

Presidential Documents 

President Signs Bill Amending Bretton Woods 
Agreements Act 626 

President Signs Whale Conservation and Pro- 
tection Study Act 625 

Report on World Weather Program Transmit- 
ted to the Congress 624 

Sixth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to 
the Congress 622 

Publications. GPO Sales Publications .... 628 

Science. Report on World Weather Program 
Transmitted to the Congress (message from 
President Ford) 624 

South Africa. Trade and Investment: Another 
Dimension in U.S.-Africa Relations (Bolen) . 616 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger Inter- 
viewed on "Face the Nation" 606 



Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 627 

Tunisia. U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission Meets 
at Washington (Chatty, Kissinger, joint 
communique) 611 

U.S.S.R. 

Moral Promise and Practical Needs (Kissinger) 597 
Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Face the 
Nation" 606 

United Nations. Secretary Kissinger Marks 
United Nations Day (remarks) 614 

Yugoslavia. Secretary Kissinger Interviewed 
on "Face the Nation" 606 

Name Index 

Bolen, David B 616 

Chatty. Habib 611 

Ford, President 622, 624, 625, 626 

Kissinger, Secretary 597, 606, 611, 614 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 25-31 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 

Subject 

Kissinger: dedication of Dean 
Acheson Auditorium and Loy 
Henderson International Con- 
ference Room. 

Mrs. Dean Acheson, Loy Hender- 
son: dedication ceremony, Oct. 
26. 

"Foreign Relations," 1949, vol- 
ume I, National Security Af- 
fairs; Foreign Economic Policy, 
released. 

Kissinger: news conference, 
Hartford. Conn., Oct. 27. 

Charles A. James sworn in as 
Ambassador to Niger (bio- 
graphic data). 

Entry into force of U.S. -Egypt 
claims agreement, Oct. 27. 

Ratifications of protocol to In- 
terim Convention on Conserva- 
tion of North Pacific Fur Seals, 
Oct. 12. 

Twelve foreign environmentalists 
to meet with U.S. counterparts. 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Ad- 
visory Committee, Boston, Nov. 
22. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



No. 


Date 


*530 


10/26 


*531 


10/27 


t532 


10/27 


f533 


10/28 


*534 


10/29 


*535 


10/29 


*-536 


10/29 


*537 


10/29 


*538 


10/29 



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kJ: 




/?s*~> 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXV • No. 1952 • November 22, 1976 



NUCLEAR POLICY 

Statement by President Ford 629 

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE 
AT HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, OCTOBER 27 640 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 



BULLETIN 



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Note: Contents of this publication are not 
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STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
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the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 




Vol. LXXV, No. 1952 
November 22, 1976 



The Department of State BULLETIN, 
a weekly publication issued by the 
Office of Media Services, Bureau of 
Public Affairs, provides the public and 
interested agencies of the government 
with information on developments in 
the field of U.S. foreign relations and 
on the work of the Department am 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Depart- 
ment, and statements, addresses, 
and news conferences of the President 
and the Secretary of State and other 
officers of the Department, as well as 
special articles on various phases of 
international affairs and the functions 
of the Department. Information is 
included concerning treaties and inter- 
national agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a 
party and on treaties of general inter- 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department of 
State, United Nations documents, and 
legislative material in the field of 
international relations are also listed. 



Nuclear Policy 



Statement by President Ford 



We have known since the age of nuclear 
energy began more than 30 years ago that 
this source of energy had the potential for 
tremendous benefits for mankind and the 
potential for unparalleled destruction. 

On the one hand, there is no doubt that 
nuclear energy represents one of the best 
hopes for satisfying the rising world de- 
mand for energy with minimum environ- 
jmental impact and with the potential for 
reducing dependence on uncertain and 
Idiminishing world supplies of oil. 

On the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it 
! produces power, also produces plutonium, 
which can be chemically separated from 
the spent fuel. The plutonium can be re- 
cycled and used to generate additional 
nuclear power, thereby partially offsetting 
the need for additional energy resources. 
| Unfortunately — and this is the root of the 
i problem — the same plutonium produced 
tin nuclear power plants can, when chemi- 
Ically separated, also be used to make 
jnuclear explosives. 

The world community cannot afford to 
j let potential nuclear weapons material or 
the technology to produce it proliferate 
uncontrolled over the globe. The world 
community must insure that production and 
utilization of such material by any nation 
is carried out under the most stringent se- 
curity conditions and arrangements. 

Developing the enormous benefits of nu- 
clear energy while simultaneously develop- 



1 Issued on Oct. 28 (text from White House press 
release). 



ing the means to prevent proliferation is 
one of the major challenges facing all 
nations of the world today. 

The standards we apply in judging most 
domestic and international activities are 
not sufficiently rigorous to deal with this 
extraordinarily complex problem. Our an- 
swers cannot be partially successful. They 
will either work, in which case we shall 
stop proliferation, or they will fail and 
nuclear proliferation will accelerate as na- 
tions initially having no intention of ac- 
quiring nuclear weapons conclude that they 
are forced to do so by the actions of others. 
Should this happen, we would face a world 
in which the security of all is critically im- 
periled. Maintaining international stability 
in such an environment would be incalcu- 
lably difficult and dangerous. In times of 
regional or global crisis, risks of nuclear 
devastation would be immeasurably in- 
creased — if not through direct attack, 
then through a process of ever-expanding 
escalation. 

The problem can be handled as long as 
we understand it clearly and act wisely in 
concert with other nations. But we are 
faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail 
to comprehend it or to take effective 
measures. 

Thus, the seriousness and complexity of 
the problem place a special burden on 
those who propose ways to control pro- 
liferation. They must avoid the temptation 
for rhetorical gestures, empty threats, or 
righteous posturing. They must offer poli- 
cies and programs which deal with the 



November 22, 1976 



629 



world as it is, not as we might wish it to be. 
The goal is to prevent proliferation, not 
simply to deplore it. 

The first task in dealing with the prob- 
lem of proliferation is to understand the 
world nuclear situation. 

More than 30 nations have or plan to 
build nuclear power plants to reap the 
benefits of nuclear energy. The 1973 energy 
crisis dramatically demonstrated to all na- 
tions not only the dangers of excessive re- 
liance on oil imports but also the reality 
that the world's supply of fossil fuels is 
running out. As a result, nuclear energy is 
now properly seen by many nations as an 
indispensable way to satisfy rising energy 
demand without prematurely depleting 
finite fossil fuel resources. We must under- 
stand the motives which are leading these 
nations, developed and developing, to place 
even greater emphasis than we do on nu- 
clear power development. For unless we 
comprehend their real needs, we cannot 
expect to find ways of working with them 
to insure satisfaction of both our and their 
legitimate concerns. 

Moreover, several nations besides the 
United States have the technology needed 
to produce both the benefits and the de- 
structive potential of nuclear energy. Na- 
tions with such capabilities are able to ex- 
port their technology and facilities. 

Thus, no single nation, not even the 
United States, can realistically hope — by 
itself — to control effectively the spread of 
reprocessing technology and the resulting 
availability of plutonium. 

The United States once was the domi- 
nant world supplier of nuclear material, 
equipment, and technology. While we re- 
main a leader in this field, other suppliers 
have come to share the international mar- 
ket — with the United States now supplying 
less than half of nuclear reactor exports. 

In short, for nearly a decade the United 
States has not had a monopoly on nuclear 
technology. Although our role is large, we 
are not able to control worldwide nuclear 
development. 

For these reasons, action to control pro- 



liferation must be an international coopera- 
tive effort involving many nations, includ- 
ing both nuclear suppliers and customers. 
Common standards must be developed and 
accepted by all parties. If this is not done, 
unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear 
technology and materials will develop — 
with no one in a position to stop it. 

We in the United States must recognize 
that interests in nuclear energy vary widely 
among nations. We must recognize that 
some nations look to nuclear energy be- 
cause they have no acceptable energy alter- 
native. We must be sure that our efforts to 
control proliferation are not viewed by 
such nations as an act to prevent them 
from enjoying the benefits of nuclear 
energy. We must be sure that all nations 
recognize that the United States believes 
that nonproliferation objectives must take 
precedence over economic and energy 
benefits if a choice must be made. 



Previous Action 

During the past 30 years, the United 
States has been the unquestioned leader in 
worldwide efforts to assure that the bene- 
fits of nuclear energy are made available 
widely while its destructive uses are pre- 
vented. I have given special attention to 
these objectives during the past two years, 
and we have made important new progress, 
particularly in efforts to control the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons capability 
among the nations of the world. 

In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I 
became concerned that some nuclear sup- 
plier countries, in order to achieve com- 
petitive advantage, were prepared to offer 
nuclear exports under conditions less rigor- 
ous than we believed prudent. In the fall of 
that year, at the U.N. General Assembly, 
the United States proposed that nonprolif- 
eration measures be strengthened mate- 
rially. I also expressed my concern directly 
to my counterparts in key supplier and re- 
cipient nations. I directed the Secretary of 
State to emphasize multilateral action to 
limit this dangerous form of competition. 






630 



Department of State Bulletin 



At U.S. initiative, the first meeting of 
major nuclear suppliers was convened in 
London in April 1975. A series of meet- 
ings and intensive bilateral consultations 
followed. 

As a result of these meetings, we have 
significantly raised international standards 
through progressive new guidelines to gov- 
ern nuclear exports. These involve both 
improved safeguards and controls to pre- 
vent diversion of nuclear materials and to 
guard against the misuse of nuclear tech- 
nology and physical protection against 
theft and sabotage. The United States has 
adopted these guidelines as policy for 
nuclear exports. 

In addition, we have acted to deal 
with the special dangers associated with 
plutonium. 

— We have prohibited export of re- 
processing and other nuclear technologies 
that could contribute to proliferation. 

— We have firmly opposed reprocessing 
in Korea and Taiwan. We welcome the 
decisions of those nations to forgo such 
activities. We will continue to discourage 
national reprocessing in other locations of 
particular concern. 

— We negotiated agreements for co- 
operation with Egypt and Israel which 
contain the strictest reprocessing provi- 
sions and other nuclear controls ever in- 
cluded in the 20-year history of our nuclear 
cooperation program. 

— In addition, the United States recently 
completed negotiations to place its civil 
nuclear facilities under the safeguards of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency — 
and the IAEA has approved a proposed 
agreement for this purpose. 

New Initiatives 

Last summer, I directed that a thorough 
review be undertaken of all our nuclear 
policies and options to determine what 
further steps were needed. I have consid- 
ered carefully the results of that review, 
held discussions with congressional leaders, 
and benefited from consultations with lead- 



ers of other nations. I have decided that 
new steps are needed, building upon the 
progress of the past two years. Today I am 
announcing a number of actions and 
proposals aimed at: 

— Strengthening the commitment of the 
nations of the world to the goal of non- 
proliferation and building an effective 
system of international controls to prevent 
proliferation ; 

— Changing and strengthening U.S. do- 
mestic nuclear policies and programs to 
support our nonproliferation goals; and 

— Establishing, by these actions, a sound 
foundation for the continued and increased 
use of nuclear energy in the United States 
and in the world in a safe and economic 
manner. 

The task we face calls for an inter- 
national cooperative venture of unprece- 
dented dimensions. The United States is 
prepared to work with all other nations. 

Principal Policy Decisions 

I have concluded that the reprocessing 
and recycling of plutonium should not pro- 
ceed unless there is sound reason to con- 
clude that the world community can ef- 
fectively overcome the associated risks of 
proliferation. I believe that avoidance of 
proliferation must take precedence over eco- 
nomic interests. I have also concluded that 
the United States and other nations can 
and should increase their use of nuclear 
power for peaceful purposes even if re- 
processing and recycling of plutonium are 
found to be unacceptable. 

Vigorous action is required domestically 
and internationally to make these judg- 
ments effective. 

— I have decided that the United States 
should greatly accelerate its diplomatic 
initiatives, in conjunction with nuclear sup- 
plier and consumer nations, to control the 
spread of plutonium and technologies for 
separating plutonium. 

Effective nonproliferation measures will 



November 22, 1976 



631 



require the participation and support of 
nuclear suppliers and consumers. There 
must be coordination in restraints so that 
an effective nonproliferation system is 
achieved, and there must be cooperation in 
assuring reliable fuel supplies so that 
peaceful energy needs are met. 

— I have decided that the United States 
should no longer regard reprocessing of 
used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as 
a necessary and inevitable step in the nu- 
clear fuel cycle and that we should pursue 
reprocessing and recycling in the future 
only if they are found to be consistent with 
our international objectives. 

We must insure that our domestic poli- 
cies and programs are compatible with our 
international position on reprocessing and 
that we work closely with other nations in 
evaluating nuclear fuel reprocessing. 

— The steps I am announcing today will 
assure that the necessary increase in our 
use of nuclear energy will be carried on 
with safety and without aggravating the 
danger of proliferation. 

Even with strong efforts to conserve, we 
will have increasing demands for energy 
for a growing American economy. To sat- 
isfy these needs, we must rely on increased 
use of both nuclear energy and coal until 
more acceptable alternatives are developed. 
We will continue pushing ahead with work 
on all promising alternatives such as solar 
energy, but now we must count on the 
technology that works. We cannot expect 
a major contribution to our energy supply 
from alternative technologies until late in 
this century. 

To implement my overall policy deci- 
sions, I have decided on a number of poli- 
cies that are necessary and appropriate to 
meet our nonproliferation and energy 
objectives. 

— First, our domestic policies must be 
changed to conform to my decision on de- 
ferral of the commercialization of chemical 
reprocessing of nuclear fuel which results 
in the separation of plutonium. 



— Second, I call upon all nations to 
join us in exercising maximum restraint in 
the transfer of reprocessing and enrich- 
ment technology and facilities by avoiding 
such sensitive exports or commitments for 
a period of at least three years. 

— Third, new cooperative steps are 
needed to help assure that all nations have 
an adequate and reliable supply of energy 
for their needs. I believe, most importantly, 
that nuclear supplier nations have a special 
obligation to assure that customer nations 
have an adequate supply of fuel for their 
nuclear power plants, if those customer 
nations forgo the acquisition of reprocess- 
ing and uranium enrichment capabilities 
and accept effective proliferation controls. 

— Fourth, the United States must main- 
tain its role as a major and reliable world 
supplier of nuclear reactors and fuel for 
peaceful purposes. Our strong position as a 
supplier has provided the principal basis 
for our influence and leadership in world- 
wide nonproliferation efforts. A strong po- 
sition will be equally important in the fu- 
ture. While reaffirming this nation's intent 
to be a reliable supplier, the United States 
seeks no competitive advantage by virtue 
of the worldwide system of effective non- 
proliferation controls that I am calling for 
today. 

— Fifth, new efforts must be made to 
urge all nations to join in a full-scale inter- 
national cooperative effort — which I shall 
outline in detail — to develop a system of 
effective controls to prevent proliferation. 

— Sixth, the United States must take new 
steps with respect to its own exports to 
control proliferation, while seeking to im- 
prove multilateral guidelines. 

— Seventh, the United States must under- 
take a program to evaluate reprocessing 
in support of the international policies I 
have adopted. 

— Finally, I have concluded that new 
steps are needed to assure that we have 
in place when needed, both in the United 
States and around the world, the facilities 
for the long-term storage or disposal of 
nuclear wastes. 



632 



Department of State Bulletin 






Actions To Implement Our Nuclear Policies 

In order to implement the nuclear poli- 
cies that I have outlined, major efforts will 
be required within the United States and 
by the many nations around the world 
with an interest in nuclear energy. To 
move forward with these efforts, I am 
today taking a number of actions and mak- 
ing a number of proposals to other nations. 

I. Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel 
Reprocessing 

With respect to nuclear fuel reprocess- 
ing, I am directing agencies of the execu- 
tive branch to implement my decision to 
delay commercialization of reprocessing 
activities in the United States until un- 
certainties are resolved. Specifically, I am: 

— Directing the Administrator of the 
Energy Research and Development Admin- 
istration (ERDA) to: 

• Change ERDA policies and programs 
which heretofore have been based on the 
assumption that reprocessing would pro- 
ceed; 

• Encourage prompt action to expand 
spent fuel storage facilities, thus assuring 
utilities that they need not be concerned 
about shutdown of nuclear reactors because 
of delays; and 

• Identify the research and develop- 
ment efforts needed to investigate the 
feasibility of recovering the energy value 
from used nuclear fuel without separating 
plutonium. 

II. Restraint in the Transfer of Sensitive 

Nuclear Technology and Facilities 

Despite the gains in controlling prolifera- 
tion that have been made, the dangers 
posed by reprocessing and the prospect of 
uncontrolled availability of plutonium re- 
quire further, decisive international action. 
Effective control of the parallel risk of 
spreading uranium enrichment technology 
is also necessary. To meet these dangers: 

— I call upon all nations to join with us 
in exercising maximum restraint in the 

November 22, 1976 



transfer of reprocessing and enrichment 
technology and facilities by avoiding such 
sensitive exports or commitments for a 
period of at least three years. 

This will allow suppliers and consumers 
to work together to establish reliable means 
for meeting nuclear needs with minimum 
risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of 
plutonium use. As we proceed in these 
efforts, we must not be influenced by pres- 
sures to approve the export of these sensi- 
tive facilities. 

III. Assuring an Adequate Energy Supply 
for Customer Nations 

— I urge nuclear suppliers to provide 
nuclear consumers with fuel services in- 
stead of sensitive technology or facilities. 

Nations accepting effective nonprolifera- 
tion restraints have a right to expect re- 
liable and economic supply of nuclear 
reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel. 

All such nations would share in the bene- 
fits of an assured supply of nuclear fuel, 
even though the number and location of 
sensitive facilities to generate this fuel is 
limited to meet nonproliferation goals. The 
availability of fuel cycle services in several 
different nations can provide ample assur- 
ance to consumers of a continuing and 
stable source of supply. 

It is also desirable to continue studying 
the idea of a few suitably sited multi- 
national fuel cycle centers to serve regional 
needs, when effectively safeguarded and 
economically warranted. Through these 
and related means, we can minimize incen- 
tives for the spread of dangerous fuel 
cycle capabilities. 

The United States stands ready to take 
action, in cooperation with other concerned 
nations, to assure reliable supplies of nu- 
clear fuel at equitable prices to any country 
accepting responsible restraints on its nu- 
clear power program with regard to re- 
processing, plutonium disposition, and 
enrichment technology. 

— I am directing the Secretary of State 



633 



to initiate consultations to explore with 
other nations arrangements for coordinat- 
ing fuel services and for developing other 
means of insuring that suppliers will be 
able to offer, and consumers will be able to 
receive, an uninterrupted and economical 
supply of low-enriched uranium fuel and 
fuel services. 

These discussions will address ways to 
insure against economic disadvantage to 
cooperating nations and to remove any 
sources of competition which could under- 
mine our common nonproliferation ef- 
forts. 

To contribute to this initiative, the United 
States will offer binding letters of intent for 
the supply of nuclear fuel to current and 
prospective customers willing to accept 
such responsible restraints. 

— In addition, I am directing the Secre- 
tary of State to enter into negotiations or 
arrangements for mutual agreement on dis- 
position of spent fuel with consumer na- 
tions that adopt responsible restraints. 

Where appropriate, the United States 
will provide consumer nations with either 
fresh, low-enriched uranium fuel or make 
other equitable arrangements in return for 
mutual agreement on the disposition of 
spent fuel where such disposition demon- 
strably fosters our common and cooperative 
nonproliferation objectives. The United 
States seeks no commercial advantage in 
pursuing options for fuel disposition and 
assured fuel supplies. 

— Finally, the United States will continue 
to expand cooperative efforts with other 
countries in developing their indigenous 
nonnuclear energy resources. 

The United States has proposed and con- 
tinues to advocate the establishment of an 
International Energy Institute, specifically 
designed to help developing countries 
match the most economic and readily avail- 
able sources of energy to their power 
needs. Through this Institute and other 
appropriate means, we will offer techno- 



logical assistance in the development of 
indigenous energy resources. 

IV. Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable 
Supplier 

If the United States is to continue its 
leadership role in worldwide nonprolifera- 
tion efforts, it must be a reliable supplier 
of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful 
purposes. There are two principal actions 
we can take to contribute to this objec- 
tive. 

— I will submit to the new Congress pro- 
posed legislation that will permit the ex- 
pansion of capacity in the United States to 
produce enriched uranium, including the 
authority needed for expansion of the 
government-owned plant at Portsmouth, 
Ohio. I will also work with Congress to 
establish a framework for a private, com- 
petitive industry to finance, build, own, 
and operate enrichment plants. 

U.S. capacity has been fully committed 
since mid-1974, with the result that no new 
orders could be signed. The Congress did 
not act on my full proposal and provided 
only limited and temporary authority for 
proceeding with the Portsmouth plant. We 
must have additional authority to proceed 
with the expansion of capacity without 
further delay. 

— I will work closely with the Congress 
to insure that legislation for improving our 
export controls results in a system that 
provides maximum assurance that the 
United States will be a reliable supplier 
to other nations for the full period of 
agreements. 

One of the principal concerns with ex- 
port legislation proposed in the last Con- 
gress was the fear that foreign customers 
could be subjected to arbitrary new con- 
trols imposed well after a long-term agree- 
ment and specific contracts for nuclear 
power plants and fuel had been signed. In 
the case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable 
long-term agreements are essential, and we 






634 



Department of State Bulletin 



must adopt export controls that provide 
reliability while meeting nonproliferation 
objectives. 

V. International Controls Against Prolifera- 
tion 

To reinforce the foregoing policies, we 
must develop means to establish inter- 
national restraints over the accumulation of 
plutonium itself, whether in separated form 
or in unprocessed spent fuel. The accumu- 
lation of plutonium under national control, 
especially in a separated form, is a primary 
proliferation risk. 

— I am directing the Secretary of State 
to pursue vigorously discussions aimed at 
the establishment of a new international 
regime to provide for storage of civil plu- 
tonium and spent reactor fuel. 

The United States made this proposal to 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
and other interested nations last spring. 

Creation of such a regime will greatly 
strengthen world confidence that the grow- 
ing accumulation of excess plutonium and 
spent fuel can be stored safely, pending re- 
entry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other 
safe disposition. I urge the IAEA, which 
is empowered to establish plutonium de- 
positories, to give prompt implementation 
to this concept. 

Once a broadly representative IAEA 
storage regime is in operation, we are pre- 
pared to place our own excess civil pluto- 
nium and spent fuel under its control. 
Moreover, we are prepared to consider pro- 
viding a site for international storage under 
IAEA auspices. 

The inspection system of the IAEA re- 
mains a key element in our entire nonpro- 
liferation strategy. The world community 
must make sure that the Agency has the 
technical and human resources needed to 
keep pace with its expanding responsibili- 
ties. At my direction, we have recently 
committed substantial additional resources 
to help upgrade the IAEA's technical safe- 
guards capabilities, and I believe we must 



strengthen further the safeguards functions 
of the IAEA. 

— I am directing the Secretary of State 
and Administrator of ERDA to undertake a 
major international effort to insure that 
adequate resources for this purpose are 
made available and that we mobilize our 
best scientific talent to support that 
Agency. Our principal national laboratories 
with expertise in this area have been di- 
rected to provide assistance, on a continu- 
ing basis, to the IAEA Secretariat. 

The terrible increase in violence and ter- 
rorism throughout the world has sharpened 
our awareness of the need to assure rigor- 
ous protection for sensitive nuclear mate- 
rials and equipment. Fortunately, the need 
to cope with this problem is now broadly 
recognized. Many nations have responded 
to the initiatives which I have taken in this 
area by materially strengthening their 
physical security and by cooperating in the 
development of international guidelines by 
the IAEA. As a result of consultations 
among the major suppliers, provision for 
adequate physical security is becoming a 
normal condition of supply. 

We have an effective physical security 
system in the United States. But steps are 
needed to upgrade physical security sys- 
tems and to assure timely international col- 
laboration in the recovery of lost or stolen 
materials. 

— I have directed the Secretary of State 
to address vigorously the problem of physi- 
cal security at both bilateral and multi- 
lateral levels, including exploration of a 
possible international convention. 

The United States is committed to the 
development of the system of international 
controls that I have here outlined. Even 
when complete, however, no system of con- 
trols is likely to be effective if a potential 
violator judges that his acquisition of a 
nuclear explosive will be received with 
indifference by the international commu- 
nity. 



November 22, 1976 



635 



Any material violation of a nuclear safe- 
guards agreement — especially the diversion 
of nuclear material for use in making ex- 
plosives — must be universally judged to be 
an extremely serious affront to the world 
community, calling for the immediate im- 
position of drastic sanctions. 

— I serve notice today that the United 
States will, at a minimum, respond to vio- 
lation by any nation of any safeguards 
agreement to which we are a party with an 
immediate cutoff of our supply of nuclear 
fuel and cooperation to that nation. 

We would consider further steps, not 
necessarily confined to the area of nuclear 
cooperation, against the violator nation. 
Nor will our actions be limited to violations 
of agreements in which we are directly in- 
volved. In the event of material violation of 
any safeguards agreement, particularly 
agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate 
immediate consultations with all interested 
nations to determine appropriate action. 

Universal recognition of the total un- 
acceptability of the abrogation or violation 
of any nonproliferation agreement is one of 
the most important steps which can be 
taken to prevent further proliferation. We 
invite all concerned governments to affirm 
publicly that they will regard nuclear 
wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of 
acceptable norms of international behavior 
which would set in motion strong and im- 
mediate countermeasures. 

VI. U.S. Nuclear Export Policies 

During the past two years, the United 
States has strengthened its own national 
nuclear export policies. Our interests, how- 
ever, are not limited to controls alone. The 
United States has a special responsibility to 
share the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
energy with other countries. We have 
sought to serve other nations as a reliable 
supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment. 

Given the choice between economic bene- 
fits and progress toward our nonprolifera- 
tion goals, we have given, and will continue 
to give, priority to nonproliferation. But 



there should be no incompatibility between 
nonproliferation and assisting other nations 
in enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
power, if all supplier countries pursue com- 
mon nuclear export policies. 

There is need, however, for even more 
rigorous controls than those now commonly 
employed and for policies that favor na- 
tions accepting responsible nonproliferation 
limitations. 

— I have decided that we will henceforth 
apply new criteria in judging whether to 
enter into new or expanded nuclear coop- 
eration : 

• Adherence to the Nonproliferation 
Treaty will be a strong positive factor fa- 
voring cooperation with a non-nuclear- 
weapon state. 

• Non-nuclear-weapon states that have 
not yet adhered to the Nonproliferation 
Treaty will receive positive recognition if 
they are prepared to submit to full fuel 
cycle safeguards, pending adherence. 

• We will favor recipient nations that 
are prepared to forgo, or postpone for a 
substantial period, the establishment of na- 
tional reprocessing or enrichment activities 
or, in certain cases, prepared to shape and 
schedule their reprocessing and enriching 
facilities to foster nonproliferation needs. 

• Positive recognition will also be given 
to nations prepared to participate in an in- 
ternational storage regime, under which 
spent fuel and any separated plutonium 
would be placed pending use. 

Exceptional cases may occur in which 
nonproliferation will be served best by co- 
operating with nations not yet meeting 
these tests. However, I pledge that the Con- 
gress will not be asked to approve any new 
or amended agreement not meeting these 
new criteria unless I personally determine 
that the agreement is fully supportive of 
our nonproliferation goals. In case of such 
a determination, my reasons will be fully 
presented to the Congress. 

— With respect to countries that are cur- 
rent recipients of U.S. nuclear supply, I am 



636 



Department of State Bulletin 



directing the Secretary of State to enter 
into negotiations with the objective of con- 
forming these agreements to established 
international guidelines and to seek 
through diplomatic initiatives and fuel sup- 
ply incentives to obtain their acceptance of 
our new criteria. 

We must recognize the need for effec- 
tive multilateral approaches to nonprolif- 
eration and prevent nuclear export con- 
trols from becoming an element of 
commercial competition. 

— I am directing the Secretary of State 
to intensify discussions with other nuclear 
suppliers aimed at expanding common 
guidelines for peaceful cooperative agree- 
ments so that they conform with these 
criteria. 

In this regard, the United States would 
discuss ways of developing incentives that 
can lead to acceptance of these criteria, 
such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for 
nations accepting new restraints. 

The reliability of American assurances 
to other nations is an asset that few, if any, 
nations of the world can match. It must not 
be eroded. Indeed, nothing could more 
prejudice our efforts to strengthen our 
existing nonproliferation understandings 
than arbitrary suspensions or unwarranted 
delays in meeting supply commitments to 
countries which are dealing with us in good 
faith regarding effective safeguards and 
restraints. 

Despite my personal efforts, the 94th 
Congress adjourned without passing nu- 
clear export legislation which would have 
strengthened our effectiveness in dealing 
with other nations on nuclear matters. 

— In the absence of such legislation, I 
am directing the Secretary of State to work 
closely with the Nuclear Regulatory Com- 
mission (NRC) to insure proper emphasis 
on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear 
export licensing process. 

I will continue to work to develop bi- 
partisan support in Congress for improve- 
ments in our nuclear export laws. 



VII. Reprocessing Evaluation Program 

The world community requires an ag- 
gressive program to build the international 
controls and cooperative regimes I have 
just outlined. I am prepared to mount such 
a program in the United States. 

— I am directing the Administrator of 
ERDA to: 

• Begin immediately to define a reproc- 
essing and recycle evaluation program con- 
sistent with meeting our international 
objectives outlined earlier in this statement. 
This program should complement the Nu- 
clear Regulatory Commission's ongoing 
considerations of safety safeguards and en- 
vironmental requirements for reprocessing 
and recycling activities, particularly its 
Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed 
Oxide Fuels. 

• Investigate the feasibility of recover- 
ing the energy value from used nuclear fuel 
without separating out plutonium. 

— I am directing the Secretary of State 
to invite other nations to participate in de- 
signing and carrying out ERDA's reproc- 
essing and recycle evaluation program, 
consistent with our international energy co- 
operation and nonproliferation objectives. 
I will direct that activities carried out in 
the United States in connection with this 
program be subjected to full IAEA safe- 
guards and inspections. 

VIII. Nuclear Waste Management 

The area of our domestic nuclear pro- 
gram dealing with long-term management 
of nuclear wastes from our commercial nu- 
clear power plants has not in the past re- 
ceived sufficient attention. In my 1977 
budget, I proposed a fourfold increase in 
funding for this program, which involves 
the activities of several Federal agencies. 
We recently completed a review to deter- 
mine what additional actions are needed 
to assure availability in the mid-1980's of 
a Federally owned and managed reposi- 
tory for long-term nuclear wastes, well be- 



November 22, 1976 



637 



fore significant quantities of wastes begin 
to accumulate. 

I have been assured that the technology 
for long-term management or disposal of 
nuclear wastes is available but demonstra- 
tions are needed. 

— I have directed the Administrator of 
ERDA to take the necessary action to speed 
up this program so as to demonstrate all 
components of waste management technol- 
ogy by 1978 and to demonstrate a complete 
repository for such wastes by 1985. 

— I have further directed that the first 
demonstration depository for high-level 
wastes which will be owned by the govern- 
ment be submitted for licensing by the in- 
dependent NRC to assure its safety and 
acceptability to the public. 

In view of the decisions announced 
today, I have also directed the Administra- 
tor of ERDA to assure that the waste re- 
pository will be able to handle spent fuel 
elements as well as the separated and so- 
lidified waste that would result if we pro- 
ceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing. 

The United States continues to provide 
world leadership in nuclear waste manage- 
ment. I am inviting other nations to partici- 
pate in and learn from our programs. 

— I am directing the Secretary of State 
to discuss with other nations and the IAEA 
the possibility of establishing centrally lo- 
cated, multinationally controlled nuclear 
waste repositories so that the number of 
sites that are needed can be limited. 



Increased Use of Nuclear Energy in the U.S. 

Even with strong conservation efforts, en- 
ergy demands in the United States will con- 
tinue to increase in response to the needs 
of a growing economy. The only alternative 
over the next 15-20 years to increased use 
of both nuclear energy and coal is greater 
reliance on imported oil, which will jeop- 
ardize our nation's strength and welfare. 

We now have in the United States 62 
licensed nuclear plants, providing about 9 
percent of our electrical energy. By 1985 



we will have from 145 to 160 plants, sup- 
plying 20 percent or more of the nation's 
electricity. 

In many cases, electricity from nuclear 
plants is markedly cheaper than that pro- 
duced from either oil or coal-fired plants. 
Nuclear energy is environmentally prefer- 
able in a number of respects to other prin- 
cipal ways of generating electricity. 

Commercial nuclear power has an excel- 
lent safety record, with nearly 200 plant- 
years of experience (compiled over 18 
chronological years) without a single death 
from a nuclear accident. I have acted to 
assure that this record is maintained in the 
years ahead. For example, I have increased 
funds for the independent Nuclear Regu- 
latory Commission and for the Energy 
Research and Development Administration 
for reactor safety research and develop- 
ment. 

The decisions and actions I am announc- 
ing today will help overcome the uncer- 
tainties that have served to delay the ex- 
panded use of nuclear energy in the United 
States. While the decision to delay reproc- 
essing is significant, it will not prevent us 
from increasing our use of nuclear energy. 
We are on the right course with our nuclear 
power program in America. The changes I 
am announcing today will insure that we 
continue. 

My decisions today do not affect the U.S. 
program of research and development on 
the breeder reactor. That program assumes 
that no decision on the commercial opera- 
tions of breeder reactors, which require 
plutonium fuel, will be made before 1986. 

Conclusion 

I do not underestimate the challenge 
represented in the creation of a worldwide 
program that will permit capturing the 
benefits of nuclear energy while maintain- 
ing needed protection against nuclear pro- 
liferation. The challenge is one that can be 
managed only partially and temporarily by 
technical measures. 

It can be managed fully if the task is 
faced realistically by nations prepared to 



638 



Department of State Bulletin 



forgo perceived short-term advantages in 
favor of fundamental long-term gains. We 
call upon all nations to recognize that their 
individual and collective interests are best 
served by internationally assured and safe- 
guarded nuclear fuel supply, services, and 
storage. We ask them to turn aside from 
pursuing nuclear capabilities which are of 
doubtful economic value and have ominous 
implications for nuclear proliferation and 
instability in the world. 

The growing international consensus 
against the proliferation of nuclear weap- 
ons is a source of encouragement. But it is 
certainly not a basis for complacency. 

Success in meeting the challenge now 
before us depends on an extraordinary co- 
ordination of the policies of all nations to- 
ward the common good. The United States 
is prepared to lead, but we cannot succeed 
alone. If nations can work together con- 
structively and cooperatively to manage 
our common nuclear problems, we will en- 
hance our collective security. And we will 
be better able to concentrate our energies 
and our resources on the great tasks of con- 
struction rather than consume them in in- 
creasingly dangerous rivalry. 



Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments Signed Into Law 

Statement by President Ford * 

I have signed H.R. 14535, the Immigra- 
tion and Nationality Act Amendments of 
1976. 2 This legislation brings our immigra- 
tion procedures for the Western Hemi- 



1 Issued on Oct. 21 (text from White House press 
release). 

2 Public Law 94-571; approved Oct. 20. 



sphere into line with those for the Eastern 
Hemisphere. Among other things the en- 
rolled bill would: 

— Apply the preference system currently 
applicable to Eastern Hemisphere immi- 
grants to natives of countries of the West- 
ern Hemisphere (with minor modifica- 
tions) ; 

— Apply the 20,000-per-country limit to 
countries of the Western Hemisphere; 

— Make Western Hemisphere immi- 
grants eligible for adjustment of status to 
that of lawful permanent residents on an 
equal basis with Eastern Hemisphere immi- 
grants; 

— Apply the labor certification require- 
ments equally to immigrants native to both 
hemispheres; and 

— Provide that Cuban refugees covered 
under the Cuban Refugee Act of 1966 will 
not be charged to the Western Hemisphere 
quota (of 120,000 per year). 

This legislation will also facilitate the 
reunification of Mexican-American families 
by giving preference to Mexican nationals 
who are close relatives of U.S. citizens or 
lawful permanent residents, or who have 
needed job skills. I am concerned, how- 
ever, about one aspect of the legislation 
which has the effect of reducing the legal 
immigration into this country from Mexico. 
Currently about 40,000 natives of Mexico 
legally immigrate to the United States each 
year. This legislation would cut that num- 
ber in half. 

The United States has a very special and 
historic relationship with our neighbor to 
the south. In view of this special status we 
have with the Mexican Government and 
the Mexican people, I will submit legisla- 
tion to the Congress in January to increase 
the immigration quotas for Mexicans de- 
siring to come to the United States. 



November 22, 1976 



639 



Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Hartford, Connecticut, 
October 27 



Following is the transcript of a news con- 
ference held by Secretary Kissinger on 
October 27 at Hartford, Conn., where he ad- 
dressed the Executive Forum of the Con- 
necticut World Affairs Center. 

Press release 533 dated October 28 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day an authori- 
tative Iranian source, namely, the Shah, was 
interviewed by CBS, and he said that he has 
SAVAK secret service agents, or secret po- 
lice agents, on duty in the United States and 
they are there, he said, "checking up on any- 
body who becomes affiliated ivith circles, or- 
ganizations held hostage by a country, which 
is the role of any intelligence organization," 
and he went on to say that "they are there 
with the knowledge and consent of the U.S. 
Government." First, is that true? And sec- 
ond, if it is true, is that in conformity with 
American laic? 

Secretary Kissinger: It is true, undoubt- 
edly, that there are members of the Iranian 
intelligence services attached to the Iranian 
Embassy, just as there are members of the 
intelligence services of other countries at- 
tached to the Embassies of their country. 
It is not the practice in diplomacy to chal- 
lenge the credentials that a country gives 
to its diplomatic personnel. 

It is not correct that the United States is 
aware of the fact that Iranian intelligence 
personnel are checking on individuals liv- 
ing in the United States or keeping them 
under surveillance. We are making in- 
quiries about this matter, and if it is cor- 
rect we are going to ask that it be stopped. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Geneva talks open 



640 



tomorrow on the future of Rhodesia. Can you 
tell us if you had the explicit approval of the 
frontline African states — and, indeed, of the 
Rhodesian nationalists — for the six-point 
package that Ian Smith says cannot be broken 
apart, has to be swallowed ivhole or not at 
all? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have pointed out be- 
fore that the negotiation about Rhodesia is 
an extremely complicated one. It involves 
four nationalist participants in Geneva. It 
involves Ian Smith. It involves the British. 
In addition, the so-called frontline states 
have observers there. So we're dealing with 
an extremely complicated situation. 

The five points that Ian Smith presented 
grew out of discussions that he and I had 
in Pretoria ; and they, in turn, grew out of 
five missions — three American and two 
British — that had gone to Africa to deter- 
mine what a possible basis for a settlement 
would be. 

Obviously the conference is assembled 
for the purpose of negotiation. The five 
points included items which we believe 
could form the basis for discussion and 
which, in their major part, might be ac- 
ceptable. However, one cannot prejudge 
the outcome of a negotiation, and I think 
we have to wait now until the negotiations 
actually get going before we can determine 
what the outcome will be. 

Q. If I may follow up, are you saying, then, 
that the African states and the Rhodesian 
nationalists understood at the time that the 
five points would be negotiable in Geneva, 
and did Smith understand that? 

Department of State Bulletin 



Secretary Kissinger: The genesis of the 
five points is a rather complicated one, 
with a central core of it and some points 
that were added in the course of negotia- 
tions. 

In the course of these negotiations, it 
was not possible to assemble all of the 
frontline Presidents, nor did we talk to any 
of the nationalist leaders, because we were 
following an agreement we had made with 
President Nyerere of Tanzania that we 
would not deal directly with nationalist 
leaders and let the frontline Presidents do 
it. Now, therefore, each of the participants 
must be given an opportunity to express 
himself before any final determination can 
be made. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the talks stalemate in 
Geneva, will you intervene directly? If not. 
will that give credence to critics who say that 
your African shuttle diplomacy ivas political, 
for Presidential politics per se? 

Secretary Kissinger: Let's remember, now, 
when this African policy started. We took 
the first steps in March. I took my first trip 
to Africa in April at a time when it was 
the common wisdom of everybody that it 
would be a liability to President Ford in 
his primary campaign. At that time we 
had no idea of when it would culminate. 
On the other hand, it would have been 
very strange for the United States not to 
take a step toward peace in southern Af- 
rica just because a campaign was going on 
in this country — all the more so since this 
is not a controversial item in American 
politics as between the two parties. 

So the United States is pursuing its policy 
in Africa for the peace of the world, to pre- 
vent a race war in Africa, and to make its 
contribution toward a peaceful evolution 
based on justice. If the negotiations in 
Geneva stalemate, which I do not expect, 
the United States will do its best to get 
them started again. We have an observer 
in Geneva now. We will — next week, when 
the talks start in earnest we will reinforce 
our delegation in Geneva, which is there 
not technically as an observer but as a con- 



tact point. We will do what we are asked 
by the parties and what can be helpful to 
bring the negotiations to a successful con- 
clusion. 

Q. I include the portion about the Presi- 
dential politics because of the fact that it ivas 
thought that this road was taken because of 
the election that's coming up for the black 
Americans who are going to vote. 

Secretary Kissinger: The road was taken — 
first of all it was started about eight 
months ago. The route was taken because 
it seemed to us — and it was a judgment 
confirmed by everybody — that a race war 
was imminent in southern Africa, that it 
would lead to tremendous loss of life, that 
it would have global consequences. And 
we wanted to bring about an evolution 
toward justice, majority rule, and minority 
rights in southern Africa by an evolution- 
ary process including negotiations. It was 
the judgment of all the people, including 
foreign leaders, that if it were not done 
now the situation might get out of control. 
There were no political intentions, and it 
hasn't been used politically. 

Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and China 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet newspaper 
Pravda has accused you of trying to obstruct 
normalization of relations between the So- 
viet Union and China. And I cite your recent 
remarks that the United States would view 
with great concern the outside pressures or 
intervention in China. Pravda called the re- 
marks "a clumsy invention," and said you 
were doing this for reasons of Presidential 
politics. 

Two questions: What's your general reac- 
tion to that? And secondly, have the Soviets 
totally misread your warning? 

Secretary Kissinger: I suppose it's going to 
be impossible for me to do anything until 
November 2 which isn't going to be 
charged to Presidential politics. I don't 
know whether the Soviet Union, with its 
record of elections, is the best to judge 
what affects American politics. 



November 22, 1976 



641 



The statement was made in response to 
a question; it was not volunteered. I 
pointed out, in the unsettled conditions 
which were then existing and which were 
in part generated by Soviet newspaper 
articles, that an attack by the Soviet Union 
on China would be a grave matter. 

The Soviet Union knows better than we 
whether it has any intention of attacking 
China. We did not say that they were in- 
tending to attack China. We simply stated 
our position in case this happened. We are 
not attempting to obstruct normalization 
of relations between these two countries. 
That is beyond our capacity to do, and it 
isn't our policy. We pointed out the conse- 
quences of actions which we did not neces- 
sarily predict in order for there to be no 
misunderstanding during conditions that 
were, after all, somewhat unsettled. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if President Ford is 
elected on Tuesday, will you continue as Sec- 
retary of State? If Jimmy Carter is elected, 
what will you do? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have made no plans 
for what I will do in the improbable event 
that your second question raised. [Laugh- 
ter.] In case President Ford is elected, I 
have indicated for many months that I 
would then discuss my plans with him. And 
of course I would want to hear his reac- 
tions and his views before I make any final 
decision. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a report last 
week that you might continue for a year. Is 
there any truth to that? 

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had any 
discussion with the President. You know 
his public statements about his views on 
the matter, but I have had no discussion 
with him about it. 

Q. Let me ask you a question about Connecti- 
cut. Several months ago a Colt firearms em- 
ployee was sentenced to a prison term for his 
part in illegally selling guns to South Africa. 
There's a grand jury investigation continuing 
in Connecticut involving both Colt and Win- 



chester. Part of the evidence developed is that 
both companies had open dealings with gun 
dealers in South Africa in violation of the U.S. 
embargo. 

Does the State Department tacitly approve 
these sales? And they went on for five years 
before there ivas any action. Doesn't the State 
Department — 

Secretary Kissinger: You're asking me 
whether — 

Q. Wasn't the State Department aware of 
the sales? Did it tacitly approve them? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have to tell you 
candidly I don't know this case. It is in- 
conceivable to me that the State Depart- 
ment tacitly approved the sale of arms 
when it is American policy to embargo the 
sale of arms to South Africa. So without 
knowing the facts of the case, which I'll 
have to look into — 

Q. Even so, the case went so far that at 
least one gun dealer to South Africa visited 
the companies in Connecticut to arrange the 
sale. 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, South Africans 
are free to travel in the United States. The 
question is, did the Department of State 
cooperate with them or did anyone close 
his eyes to their purchases? And it is the 
policy of the Department of State to en- 
force the arms embargo against South 
Africa. 

Nonrecognition of Republic of Transkei 

Q. I had one other question about South 
Africa. The United Nations, in the General 
Assembly, voted yesterday 13 % to to, in 
effect, ignore the new Republic of Transkei. 
The United States abstained. Do you approve 
of that abstention? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is safe to as- 
sume that I instructed our delegation to 
abstain. [Laughter.] 

Now, with respect to the Transkei, the 
United States will not recognize the Trans- 
kei, will not establish diplomatic relations 


















642 



Department of State Bulletin 



with it. Our objection did not concern the 
essential points of the resolution. And in 
fact, if the resolution had been checked 
with us ahead of time, I am certain we 
could have modified it to a point so that 
we would not have had to abstain. 

The difficulty with the new resolution 
was that, on the one hand, they refused to 
recognize — called on members not to rec- 
ognize the Transkei, and that part we 
agreed with; on the other, they called on 
all members not to have any dealings with 
anybody in the Transkei, which had the 
consequence almost of recognizing it. And 
the United States, precisely because it will 
continue to deal with Transkei as if it were 
part of South Africa, cannot accept the 
proposition that we cannot deal with peo- 
ple that live in the Transkei just because 
South Africa has declared it an independ- 
ent state. 

So our objection was a technical one, and 
if the United Nations had separated that 
one part of it from the rest of it, we would 
have voted for it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Canadian press has 
expressed its concern about Arab boycott 
policy to the effect that American-owned com- 
panies in Canada [inaudible] . Noiv, are there 
other allies ivho share the same concern? 

Secretary Kissinger: We have had over a 
period of years, consistently, difficulty with 
American laws that we are attempting to 
apply in other countries — to American sub- 
sidiaries domiciled in foreign countries or 
to corporations of foreign countries that 
have a large number or a significant num- 
ber of American directors. We had this 
problem in connection with the Cuba boy- 
cott, and we have it now in connection with 
the Arab boycott. 

This is a matter which we are studying 
and which has no easy solution, because if 
we exempt the American subsidiaries 
abroad then any American company can 
avoid a great deal of American legislation 
simply by letting its subsidiaries abroad 
handle those matters that are the subject 



of the legislation. On the other hand, we 
can understand the concern of a country 
about the attempt to apply American legis- 
lation in its own jurisdiction. I discussed 
this subject with the Canadian Foreign 
Minister when he visited me two weeks 
ago, and we're going to pursue these dis- 
cussions in order to find an amicable solu- 
tion. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Ford has made 
the most of Governor Carter's remarks on 
Yugoslavia. a?id Governor Carter has done 
the same with the President's remarks on 
Eastern Europe. And you yourself have 
joined and jumped in on the remarks that the 
Governor made about Yugoslavia. Do you 
seriously believe that these observations are 
prompted by reactions of substance, or are 
the Governor, the President, and you yourself 
making the most of this for political reasons? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all. I 
made my comments in response to ques- 
tions. I was not volunteering any comment. 

Secondly, I would make a distinction be- 
tween what the President said and what 
the Governor said. What the President said 
was a statement of fact, which was correct- 
able. What the Governor said concerned 
an issue of policy, which could affect the 
calculation of foreign countries. It is my 
responsibility as Secretary of State that 
foreign countries not misunderstand what 
America considers to be its security inter- 
est — which concerns me more than the 
practical measures we might take to imple- 
ment our security interest. And therefore 
I stated what six other Administrations 
have stated; namely, that the United States 
has an interest in the independence and 
nonalignment of Yugoslavia. 

Now, I do not believe that it is fruitful 
to pursue this matter in the middle of a 
political campaign. I have noticed that 
Governor Carter yesterday modified his 
original statement. I think this is too serious 
an issue; it does affect the security of the 
United States. I do not believe that it is 
useful to belabor it in a political campaign, 



November 22, 1976 



643 



and it should be addressed again after the 
campaign is over. There are only four 
more days. 

Q. Since it has come up, may I ask you 
whether you from your position, in the event 
of Soviet action against Yugoslavia, would 
recommend that the United States send 
troops to Yugoslavia's support? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is a to- 
tally wrong way to state the issue. I do not 
believe that the United States should give 
a checklist ahead of time, in areas where it 
does not have any formal commitments, 
about what precisely it would or would not 
do. I have stated, as have six Administra- 
tions before this one, that the United States 
would consider a threat to the independ- 
ence and sovereignty and nonalignment of 
Yugoslavia a matter of grave concern. 
How we would implement this concern de- 
pends on the circumstances that will arise, 
and it is the purpose of our policy to pre- 
vent this threat from arising and not to 
give a checklist ahead of time of how we 
will meet it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the latest edition of 
Neiv Times magazine there is a story, 1 
think — 

Secretary Kissinger: What magazine? 

Q. New Times — suggesting that you may 
have played more than a passive role in the 
wiretapping of Morton Halperin, among oth- 
ers. What exactly was your role in that? 

Secretary Kissinger: This is a subject that 
has been exhaustively gone into before 
congressional committees. It is now before 
the courts. There is voluminous testimony 
going into the thousands of pages by now, 
and it is impossible to answer it in a press 
conference. I stand on everything that I 
have said before congressional committees 
and in depositions before the courts. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of November 2, 
as you just did, what do you think about the 
propriety of a Secretary of State making a 
public appearance, talking about foreign pol- 
icy only four or five days before the election, 



while the Administration is making foreign 
policy and the lack of experience on the other 
side a major campaign issue? 

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't drawn any 
issue in foreign policy with respect to Gov- 
ernor Carter in this appearance. I'm an- 
swering questions by the press, and my 
speech here is on an off-the-record basis to 
a group of leading citizens of this area who 
invited me in July to come to this affair. 

For the last two years, I have spoken at 
intervals of about two to three weeks in 
various parts of the country. And during 
the campaign I have made most of my ap- 
pearances on an off-the-record basis before 
selected groups. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I folloiv that with a 
somewhat more philosophical question? 
Every four years it seems that we have a 
semiparalysis effect, partly because of politi- 
cal reasons and partly because of the uncer- 
tainties in a Presidential election. Obviously 
— there are obvious hazards. Can you see any 
solution of separating the conduct of foreign 
affairs and making it relatively stable and 
continuous, despite our democratic political 
system? 

Secretary Kissinger: I don't completely 
agree that there's a paralysis in foreign 
affairs. After all, we conducted the Afri- 
can initiative in the middle of the electoral 
campaign. But it is true that the American 
election tends to create a major factor of 
uncertainty in international affairs at reg- 
ular intervals, and I think it is impor- 
tant to keep in mind that the interests of 
the United States and the values of the 
United States do not change every four 
years. 

I have always believed that the foreign 
policy of the United States should be 
nonpartisan. I would certainly cooperate 
with any effort — whether I'm in office or 
out of office — to put it on a nonpartisan 
basis and to insulate it as much as possible 
from the ordinary political campaign, un- 
less there is a fundamental issue of princi- 
ple involved, which can happen occasion- 
ally. 









644 



Department of State Bulletin 



OPEC Oil Pricing 

Q. Mr. Secretary, William Seidman, the 
President's economic adviser, ivas here this 
morning, and he said that talks were going 
on in an effort to persuade the Arabs not to 
raise the prices of oil in December. I want to 
ask you a two-part question: what is the like- 
lihood of persuading the Arabs to do that, to 
hold the line on oil prices? And if that per- 
suasive talk fails, is there any counteraction 
that the United States could take to force a 
rollback of prices? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, it's techni- 
cally not correct to speak only of the 
Arabs. It's OPEC [Organization of Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries], which includes 
Iran, Venezuela, and several other major 
producers that are not part of the Arab 
countries. 

With respect, however, to American ac- 
tions in case present efforts — which are ex- 
tensive — fail, the most effective method is 
a major American energy program; that 
is, a significant program of conservation, a 
significant program to develop alternative 
sources of energy. Until we reduce our de- 
pendence on imported oil, our bargaining 
position with respect to oil prices is likely 
to remain not as strong as it should be. And 
therefore in the new Congress it will be 
extremely important that a comprehensive 
energy program be passed because that, 
over the long term, is our most effective 
way of bringing a pressure on oil prices. 

Q. What about Mr. Carter's comments 
about a possible economic boycott if there 
were another Arab oil embargo? 

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. Carter 
applied that to the case of an embargo, not 
to the case of an individual action such as 
the oil price rise. We have our questions 
whether an economic embargo will work, 
particularly as it exempted, in Mr. Carter's 
formulation, grains, which is the one irre- 
placeable item that we are supplying. 

But again we are dealing here with a 
case in which we're attempting to prevent 
such a situation from arising and in which 
the gravest dangers are not the dangers of 



a total embargo but of many intermediate 
steps that can be taken short of an em- 
bargo. We have improved our relationships 
with the Arab countries to a point where 
an embargo is conceivable only in the most 
extreme circumstances of a total collapse 
of all Middle East efforts, which we do not 
foresee. 

Helsinki Provisions on Human Rights 

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned earlier, 
one of the reasons that America intervened 
diplomatically in southern Africa ivas to re- 
store basic human rights and dignity to the 
black majority there. In the same diplomatic 
breath, however, ice have extended a friendly 
hand in terms of economic and political gains 
(sic) to Communist and military dictator- 
ships where these basic human rights are 
only a dream. Does this mean that our for- 
eign policy has a double standard? 

Secretary Kissinger: No. Our foreign pol- 
icy has to set — first of all, it has to set 
priorities. 

Secondly, with respect to Communist 
countries, the United States has always 
used its influence to promote emigration, to 
promote a greater liberalization to make it 
easier for families to be reunited, to give 
press greater access. In the Helsinki docu- 
ment, in the so-called basket 3, for the 
first time there has been an international 
acceptance by the Communist countries 
that participated that certain essential 
human rights were part of an international 
agreement. 1 Now, to be sure, they have not 
lived up to all its provisions and even most 
of its provisions; but it does give us cri- 
teria to which to appeal and criteria to 
which we will appeal in the 1977 review 
conference of the European Security Con- 
ference that will take place in Belgrade. 

So we pursue the same principles in other 
countries, but the method of application 
will have to differ with circumstances. 



1 For text of the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, see Bulletin 
of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323; for "basket" 3, Co-operation 
in Humanitarian and Other Fields, see p. 339. 



November 22, 1976 



645 



Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us the de- 
gree of accuracy to reports that South Korea 
has been engaged in a campaign of bribery 
here in the United States on Capitol Hill? 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to these 
stories, they are now being investigated by 
the Justice Department. The Department of 
State has made available all its information 
over a period of months to the Department 
of Justice, which will have to make the 
final decisions as to the validity of these 
charges. 

Situation in Lebanon 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Arab leaders have an- 
nounced agreement on ivhat they call a peace 
plan for Lebanon after a two-day conference 
in Cairo. Can this be a true step forward for 
peace in the Middle East, and especially for 
Lebanon, with Syria insisting on maintain- 
ing most of its 20-or-so thousand troops as 
about two-thirds of a peace force there? 

Secretary Kissinger: There have been of 
course, I believe, 60 cease-fires in Lebanon. 
And therefore to predict that any one 
agreement is going to mark the end of the 
conflict is hazardous. It's interesting that 
we had a report from Beirut yesterday that 
for the first time in months there was a 
traffic jam, which meant that the popula- 
tion felt secure enough to go out into the 
streets. 

I believe that the Riyadh accord, as rati- 
fied by the Cairo summit, might well mark 
the beginning of a peaceful solution for 
Lebanon. The composition of the Arab 
force has not yet been agreed upon, but 
one would assume that it would have a pre- 
ponderance of Syrians, since they are the 
largest number of troops that are there 
now. 

The problem that now awaits solution is 
the relationship between the Christian and 
the Moslem communities in Lebanon. 

The United States has always supported 
the independence and unity of Lebanon, 
but it also favors the ability of each com- 
munity to lead its own life according to its 



646 



own traditions. And this remains to be 
worked out. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it true the United 
States is [inaudible'] on international af- 
fairs, as charged by Jimmy Carter? 

Secretary Kissinger: I think in the last 
week of a campaign many things are said 
in which the candidates get carried away 
with themselves. The United States at- 
tempts to make no promises that it doesn't 
keep and to make no threats it doesn't 
intend to execute. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines, the 
major foreign policy issues in this campaign 
appear to have been the President's mistake 
on Eastern Europe and Jimmy Carter's re- 
luctance to send troops to Yugoslavia. In view 
of the fact that there are some very impor- 
tant foreign policy questions — / think you 
have SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks], what to do next in the Middle East, 
what to do next in China — questions which 
will face any new Administration, what is 
your feeling about the quality of the foreign 
policy debate in this campaign? 

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, since I be- 
lieve we have been correct in the foreign 
policy we've carried out, I'm assuming that 
the absence of more fundamental criti- 
cisms would tend to support this. 

As I pointed out before, I really do not 
think that foreign policy should lend itself 
to a detailed partisan debate. And there- 
fore I think it is in the interest of the 
United States that at least major tactical 
questions not become the subject of foreign 
policy disputes. 

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I'd just like to followup 
and mention the SALT talks. In view of the 
fact in the last 10 years the U.S.S.R. has 
spent $10 billion on civil defense and mili- 
tary armaments, isn't it a ivaste of time — 
the SALT talks, that is? 

Secretary Kissinger: The SALT talks on 
the limitation of strategic armaments de- 
rive from the fact that both sides are de- 
veloping nuclear weapons of enormous 

Department of State Bulletin 






destructiveness and that both sides, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, for the 
first time in history face a situation in 
which two countries could destroy all of 
humanity. That is an unprecedented situa- 
tion that leaders of no country in the world 
have ever had to face before. 

What we're attempting to do in these 
talks is to put a ceiling on the strategic 
armaments of both sides, whatever they 
may have spent in the past, to put a ceiling 
on these strategic armaments and then to 
use that ceiling as a point of departure 
from which to make reductions in these 
strategic armaments. We have a prelimi- 
nary agreement to establish a ceiling that 
will be equal for both sides, and we are 
now negotiating what categories of weap- 
ons fall under each ceiling. This is what 
has held up the conclusion of the negotia- 
tions. I would think that the negotiations 
are about 85-90 percent concluded, that 
there are two issues that still remain to be 
settled. But whatever one thinks of what 
either country may have done in the field 
of armaments, it is in the interest of hu- 
manity that a ceiling be put on these weap- 
ons and that then they be reduced. 

Q. I had in mind to sort of ask you a two- 
-part question, if I could. 

Speaking of Lebanon as you were, first I'd 
like to ask you whether you have any infor- 
mation that Israel is actively involved in 
supplying arms or manpower to help the 
Christians in Lebanon. 

And secondly, I would like you to comment 
on the provision of the peace agreement that 
authorizes the Palestinians to go back to 
their old positions across the border from 
Israel and do what they can — / can't quote 
directly — but do what they can to make 
trouble for Israel. 

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the 
first question, we have no authenticated 
information that any provision of the 
American law which prohibits the trans- 
fer of American defense equipment has 
been violated. 

With respect to the second question, the 



United States has always opposed terror- 
ism as an instrument of national policy. 
Whether in fact the Palestinians will go 
back to exactly all the camps they had oc- 
cupied before, or whether that will no 
longer be technically feasible for a variety 
of reasons that have happened in recent 
weeks, only the future can tell. But the 
United States has never supported the con- 
cept of terrorist warfare by any country 
or by any group. 

Moderator [Rolf Biboiv, vice president, 
International Division, United Technologies 
Corp.] : I think in closing I should make it 
very clear to everybody that Secretary Kis- 
singer is here as a guest of the Executive 
Forum and it is at our request that he ad- 
dressed this group. We wouldn't want our 
friends in the press to have missed this op- 
portunity. So that is the specific purpose for 
his being here. 

Thank you very much. Mr. Kissinger. 



U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai 
Extended for One Year 

Following is a statement made in the U.N. 
Security Council by U.S. Representative 
Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on October 22. 

USUN press release 123 dated October 22 

This Council has acted today to continue 
for a period of one year the essential peace- 
keeping services of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai. 1 
The Emergency Force has played an indis- 
pensable role in helping to maintain the 
cease-fire called for by this Council in Reso- 
lution 338 and reaffirmed in the agreement 
between Egypt and Israel of September 4, 
1975. 

Maintenance of the cease-fire, however, 
was only one element of the carefully bal- 
anced formulation contained in Resolution 
338. In renewing UNEF for an additional 



1 The Council on Oct. 22 adopted Resolution 396 
(1976) by a vote of 13 to (the People's Republic 
of China and Libya did not participate in the voting). 



November 22, 1976 



647 



year, we must remind ourselves in the most 
urgent terms that negotiation of a just and 
durable peace was the ultimate purpose of 
that resolution. 

In welcoming this renewal, the United 
States wishes to reiterate its commitment 
to a determined effort to achieve an over- 
all settlement in the Middle East accept- 
able to all the parties. In this regard, 1 
would recall that Secretary of State 
Kissinger said on September 30, in speak- 
ing to the General Assembly: 

The United States will do all it can to assure that 
by the time this Assembly meets next year it will 
be possible to report significant progress toward a 
just and lasting peace in the Middle East. 

That pledge is equally appropriate in the 
context of this Council's deliberations 
today. 

The performance of the UNEF Com- 
mand in responding to its expanded re- 
sponsibilities during the past year has been 
exemplary in every respect. The territorial 
scope of its activities substantially widened 
as a result of the agreement of September 
4, 1975. In addition, as the Secretary Gen- 
eral noted in his report, 2 UNEF has to an 
increased extent been called upon to exer- 
cise its good offices to resolve problems in 
the implementation of that agreement 
which might otherwise have posed diffi- 
culties. We were fortunate that during this 
critical period the United Nations peace- 
keeping forces in the Middle East were 
ably led by Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo. Our 
appreciation goes also to Lt. Gen. Lilje- 
strand for his efforts as Commander of 
UNEF for the last 14 months. 

The Secretary General has noted in his 
report that UNEF has enjoyed the full 
cooperation of the parties concerned in 
discharging its complex and vital responsi- 
bilities. We would like to pay tribute here 
to the constructive spirit in which both 
sides have approached their responsibilities 
in fulfillment of the cease-fire and subse- 
quent agreements. 



We are particularly gratified to observe 
that the Secretary General has been able 
through judicious management to reduce 
the UNEF budget for the coming year with- 
out sacrificing its operational effectiveness 
in any way. I heartily congratulate him and 
his staff for this achievement. 



Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
To Take Effect January 19, 1977 

Following are texts of a statement by 
President Ford issued on October 22 and a 
letter dated November 2 from Department 
of State Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh to At- 
torney General Edward H. Levi. 

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD 

White HouFe press release dated October 22 

It is with great satisfaction that I an- 
nounce that I have signed H.R. 11315, the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. * 
This legislation, proposed by my Adminis- 
tration, continues the longstanding commit- 
ment of the United States to seek a stable 
international order under the law. 

It has often been said that the develop- 
ment of an international legal order occurs 
only through small but carefully considered 
steps. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act of 1976, which I sign today [Oct. 21], 
is such a step. 

This legislation will enable American 
citizens and foreign governments alike to 
ascertain when a foreign state can be sued 
in our courts. In this modern world where 
private citizens increasingly come into con- 
tact with foreign government activities, it 
is important to know when the courts are 
available to redress legal grievances. 

This statute will also make it easier for 
our citizens and foreign governments to 
turn to the courts to resolve ordinary legal 



U.N. doc. S/12212. 



1 Public Law 94-583, approved Oct. 21. 



648 



Department of State Bulletin 



disputes. In this respect, the Foreign Sov- 
ereign Immunities Act carries forward a 
modern and enlightened trend in interna- 
tional law. And it makes this development 
in the law available to all American citi- 
zens. 

TEXT OF LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGAL ADVISER 

November 2, 1976. 

Honorable Edward H. Levi 
Attorney General 
Department of Justice 
Washington, D.C., 20530 

Re: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
of 1976, P.L. 94-583 

Dear Mr. Attorney General: Since the Tate 
Letter of 1952, 26 Dept. State Bull. 984, my prede- 
cessors and I have endeavored to keep your Depart- 
ment apprised of Department of State policy and 
practice with respect to the sovereign immunity of 
foreign states from the jurisdiction of United States 
courts. On October 21, 1976, the President signed 
into law the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 

1976, P.L. 94-583. This legislation, which was 
drafted by both of our Departments, has as one of 
its objectives the elimination of the State Depart- 
ment's current responsibility in making sovereign 
immunity determinations. In accordance with the 
practice in most other countries, the statute places 
the responsibility for deciding sovereign immunity 
issues exclusively with the courts. 

P.L. 94-583 is to go into effect 90 days from the 
date it was approved by the President, or on 
January 19, 1977. We wish to advise you of how the 
Department of State proposes to treat sovereign 
immunity requests prior to January 19, 1977, and 
what the Department of State's interests will be 
after that date. 

Immunity from suit. Until January 19, 1977, the 
Department of State will apply the Tate Letter, 
in the event that it makes any determination with 
respect to a foreign government's immunity from 
suit. It should be noted that P.L. 94-583 embodies in 
many respects the practice under the Tate Letter. 

Immunity from attachment. Until January 19, 

1977, the Department will continue to give prompt 
attention to diplomatic requests from foreign states, 
for recognition of immunity of foreign government 
property from attachment. The Department of 
State's policy until now has been to recognize an 
immunity of all foreign government property from 
attachment — unless (1) the property in question is 
devoted to a commercial or private use; (2) the 



underlying lawsuit is based on a commercial or 
private activity of the foreign state; and (3) the 
purpose of the attachment is to commence a lawsuit 
and not to assure satisfaction of a final judgment 
The Department does not contemplate changing 
this policy before P.L. 94—583 takes effect. We have 
noted that until P.L. 94—583 takes effect, it may be 
difficult for a private litigant to commence a suit 
against a foreign state or its entities. Also, since 
P.L. 94-583 will not have any effect whatsoever on 
the running of the statute of limitations, a continua 
tion of existing policy on attachment until January 
19, 1977 might be the only way a claim for relief 
could be preserved. 

P.L. 94—583 will make two important and related 
changes in the Department's sovereign immunity 
practice with respect to attachment. First, the 
statute will prescribe a means for commencing a 
suit against a foreign state and its entities by 
service of a summons and complaint, thus making 
jurisdictional attachments of foreign government 
property unnecessary. 

Second, Section 1609 of the statute will provide 
an absolute immunity of foreign government prop- 
erty from jurisdictional attachment. Such juris- 
dictional attachments have given rise to diplomatic 
irritants in the past and, in recent years, have been 
the principal impetus for a Department of State role 
in sovereign immunity determinations. It appears 
that after January 19, 1977, any jurisdictional at- 
tachment of foreign government property could, 
under Section 1609 of P.L. 94-583, be promptly 
vacated upon motion to the appropriate court by the 
foreign state defendant. 

Immunity from execution. The Department of 
State has in the past recognized an absolute im- 
munity of foreign government property from execu- 
tion to satisfy a final judgment. The Department 
does not contemplate changing this policy in the 
period before January 19, 1977. On or after that date, 
execution may be obtained against foreign govern- 
ment property only upon court order and in con- 
formity with the other requirements of Section 1610 
of P.L. 94-583. 

Future Department of State interests. The De- 
partment of State will not make any sovereign im- 
munity determinations after the effective date of 
P.L. 94-583. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with 
the legislative intent of that Act for the Executive 
Branch to file any suggestion of immunity on or 
after January 19, 1977. 

After P.L. 94-583 takes effect, the Executive 
Branch will, of course, play the same role in sover- 
eign immunity cases that it does in other types of 
litigation — e.g., appearing as amicus curiae in cases 
of significant interest to the Government. Judicial 
construction of the new statute will be of general 
interest to the Department of State, since the 
statute, like the Tate Letter, endeavors to incorpo- 



November 22, 1976 



649 



rate international law on sovereign immunity into 
domestic United States law and practice. If a court 
should misconstrue the new statute, the United 
States may well have an interest in making its 
views on the legal issues known to an appellate 
court. 

Finally, we wish to express appreciation for the 
continuous advice and support which your Depart- 
ment has provided during the ten years of work 
and consultation that led to the enactment of P.L 
94-583. We believe that the new statute will be a 
significant step in the growth of international order 
under law, to which the United States has always 
been committed. 
Sincerely, 

Monroe Leigh. 



Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 



National Emergencies Act. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Government Operations to accompany 
H.R. 3884. S. Rept. 94-1168. August 26, 1976. 
42 pp. 

Duty Free Importation of Loose Glass Prisms Used 
in Chandeliers and Wall Brackets. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 
8656. S. Rept. 94-1173. August 26, 1976. 2 pp. 

Suspension of Duties on Certain Elbow Prostheses if 
Imported for Charitable Therapeutic Use, or for 
Free Distribution, by Certain Public or Private 
Nonprofit Institutions. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Finance to accompany H.R. 11321. S. 
Rept. 94-1174. August 26, 1976. 3 pp. 

Suspending the Duties on Certain Bicycle Parts and 
Accessories Until the Close of June 30, 1978. Re- 
port of the Senate Committee on Finance to ac- 
company H.R. 12254. S. Rept. 94-1175. August 

26, 1976. 4 pp. 

Energy Conservation and Production Revenue Act of 
1976. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance 
to accompany H.R. 6860. S. Rept. 94-1181. August 

27, 1976. 48 pp. 



94th Congress, 2d Session 

United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power 
Triangle. Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Future Foreign Policy Research and Development 
of the House Committee on International Relations. 
Part II. March 23-June 23. 1976. 194 pp. 

International Monetary Fund Amendments. Hear- 
ings before the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations; June 22-August 3, 1976; 142 pp. Re- 
port of the committee to accompany H.R. 13955; 
August 10, 1976; 21 pp. 

Communications from the Assistant Secretary of the 
Treasury (Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff 
Affairs) transmitting determinations waiving the 
imposition of countervailing duties on imports for 
a temporary period not to extend beyond January 
3, 1979. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Nor- 
wegian Cheese; H. Doc. 94-553; 7 pp; July 19, 
1976. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Finnish 
Cheese; H. Doc. 94-554; 6 pp; July 19, 1976. 
Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Swedish 
Cheese; H. Doc. 94-555; 9 pp; July 19, 1976. 
Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Brazilian 
Leather Handbags; H. Doc. 94-560; 9 pp; July 20, 
1976. 

The Assassination of American Diplomats in Beirut, 
Lebanon. Hearing before the Special Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the House Committee on Inter- 
national Relations. July 27, 1976. 43 pp. 

Mercenaries in Africa. Hearing before the Special 
Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Com- 
mittee on International Relations. August 9, 1976. 
75 pp. 

International Coffee Agreement, 1976. Report of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accom- 
pany Ex. H., 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-30. August 20. 
1976. 7 pp. 



TREATY INFORMATION 






Current Actions 



MULTILATERAL 

Conservation 

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done 
at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force 
May 26. 1976. 
Ratification deposited: United States, November 

1, 1976. 
Entered into force for the United States: Novem 

ber 1, 1976. 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 
29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. 
TIAS 5200. 
Accession deposited: Mongolia. October 15, 1976. 

Load Lines 

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at 
London April 5. 1966. Entered into force July 21, 
1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720. 

Accessions deposited: Algeria. October 4, 1976; 
Seychelles, October 1, 1976. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as 
amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con- 



650 



Department of State Bulletin 



sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). 
Adopted at London October 17, 1974. 1 
Acceptance deposited: Finland, October 19, 1976. 



Oil Pollution 

Amendments to the inter 
prevention of pollution 
amended (TIAS 4900, 
October 12, 1971. 1 
Acceptance deposited: 

Amendments to the inter 
prevention of pollution 
amended (TIAS 4900, 
October 15, 1971. 1 
Acceptance deposited: 



national convention for the 
of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
6109). Adopted at London 

Algeria. October 4, 1976. 

national convention for the 
of the sea by oil, 1954, as 
6109). Adopted at London 

Algeria, October 4, 1976. 



Postal 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final 
protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 
5881), as amended by additional protocol, general 
regulations with final protocol and annex, and the 
universal postal convention with final protocol and 
detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 
1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for 
article V of the additional protocol, which entered 
into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. 
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, August 27, 1976. 

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the 
Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 
5881, 7150), general regulations with final proto- 
col and annex, and the universal postal convention 
with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done 
at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. 
Ratifications deposited: Guinea, August 30, 1976; 

Jamaica, August 17, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, August 27, 1976. 

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agree- 
ment, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne 
July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. 
TIAS 8232. 

Ratification deposited: Guinea, August 30, 1976. 
Accession deposited: Cape Verde, August 27, 1976. 

Property — Intellectual 

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Prop- 
erty Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. 
Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United 
States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932. 
Accession deposited: Bahamas, October 4, 1976. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at sea. 
Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force 
May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284. 
Acceptance deposited: Seychelles, October 1, 1976. 

Convention on the international regulations for pre- 
venting collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London 
October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977. 
Accession deposited: Algeria. October 4, 1976. 

Seals 

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on 
conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 



3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976. Entered 

into force October 12, 1976. 

Proclaimed by the President: October 25, 1976. 

Tin 

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. 
Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force 
provisionally July 1, 1976. 

Ratification deposited: United States, October 28. 
1976. 

Tonnage Measurement 

International convention on tonnage measurement of 
ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 
1969. 1 
Accession deposited: Algeria, October 4, 1976. 



BILATERAL 

Bangladesh 

Loan agreement relating to small-scale irrigation, 
with annex and related letter. Signed at Dacca 
September 29. 1976. Entered into force September 

29, 1976. 

Bolivia 

Agreement relating to the transfer of commodities 
to Bolivia for use in a community development and 
training program. Signed at Washington Septem- 
ber 22 and October 18, 1976. Entered into force 
October 18, 1976. 

Dominican Republic 

Loan agreement relating to the agricultural sector, 
with annex. Signed at Santo Domingo September 

30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976. 

Egypt 

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of 
agricultural commodities of October 28, 1975 (TIAS 
8201). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo 
September 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force 
September 29, 1976. 

Haiti 

Project agreement relating to integrated agricultural 
development. Signed at Port-au-Prince September 
28 and 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 
1976. 

Korea 

Guaranty agreement relating to a housing loan. 

Signed at Washington July 1, 1976. Entered into 

force July 1, 1976. 
Guaranty agreement relating to a housing loan. 

Signed at Washington July 26, 1976. Entered into 

force July 26, 1976. 

Mexico 

Agreement extending the agreement of July 31, 1970, 
as amended and extended, for a cooperative mete- 



Not in force. 



November 22, 1976 



651 



orological observation program in Mexico. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco 
June 15 and July 12, 1976. Entered into force 
September 28, 1976. 

United Nations 

Agreement relating to the transfer of certain foreign 
excess property of the Sinai Support Mission to 
the United Nations Emergency Force, with an- 
nexes. Effected by exchange of letters August 26 
and September 30, 1976. Entered into force Septem- 
ber 30, 1976; effective July 1, 1976. 

World Intellectual Property Organization 

Agreement relating to a procedure for United States 
income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange 
of letters at Geneva September 7 and 15, 1976. 
Entered into force September 15, 1976; operative 
January 1, 1976. 



PUBLICATIONS 



1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume 
on National Security, Economic Policy 

Press release 532 dated October 27 (for release November 5) 

The Department of State released on November 5 
"Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949," 
volume I, "National Security Affairs, Foreign Eco- 
nomic Policy." The "Foreign Relations" series has 
been published continuously since 1861 as the official 
record of American foreign policy. 

This volume presents 836 pages of previously un- 
published documentation (much of it newly de- 
classified) on the regulation of armaments, national 
security policy, the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, foreign financial policies of the United 
States, and tentative planning for the international- 
ization of the Antarctic. Extensive coverage is 
given on the views held and the actions taken by the 
President, the Secretary of State, other high offi- 
cials, and the National Security Council regarding 
international threats to the security of the United 
States. The volume also presents documentation on 
reaction to the first test of a nuclear device in the 
Soviet Union in September 1949, the decision by the 
United States to develop the hydrogen bomb, and 
the continued inability of the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission to agree upon a plan 
for international control of atomic energy. 



"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume I, was pre 
pared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Pub 
lie Affairs, Department of State. Four volumes for 
1949 and the first half of a fifth have already been 
published, and 3% are in preparation. Copies of 
volume I (Department of State publication 8850; 
GPO cat. no. Sl.l: 949/v. I) may be obtained for 
$11.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders 
should be made out to the Superintendent of Docu- 
ments and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. 



GPO Sales Publications 

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock 
number from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 
20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 
100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to 
the same address. Remittances, payable to the 
Superintendent of Documents, must accompany 
orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic 
postage, are subject to change. 

The United States-Japan Cooperative Medical Sci- 
ence Program. Report describes research progress 
made under the U.S. -Japan Cooperative Medical Sci- 
ence Program during its second 5 years of scientific 
studies. The Program focuses on diseases of impor- 
tance in Asia and applies modern scientific ap- 
proaches from fields such as cell biology, immunol- 
ogy, and genetics. Pub. 8864. East Asian and Pacific 
Series 215. 180 pp. $2.60. (Cat. No. S1.38:8864). 

Maritime Transport. Agreement with the Socialist 
Republic of Romania. TIAS 8254. 22 pp. 35tf. (Cat. 
No. S9.10:8254). 

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. 

Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending the 
agreement of June 26, 1975. TIAS 8267. 5 pp. 35^. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:8267). 

Trade in Textiles — Consultations on Market Disrup- 
tion. Agreement with Greece. TIAS 8273. 5 pp. 35tf. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:8273). 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India modi- 
fying the agreement of August 6, 1974. TIAS 8275. 
5 pp. 35tf. (Cat. No. S9.10:8275). 

Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Protocol 
to the treaty of May 26, 1972, with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8276. 10 pp. 35tf. 
(Cat. No. S9.10:8276). 

International Coffee Agreement. Protocol with Other 
Governments for the continuation in force of the 
agreement of March 18, 1968, as amended and ex- 
tended. TIAS 8277. 30 pp. 45<f. (Cat. No. S9.10:8277). 



652 



Department of State Bulletin 



INDEX November 22, 1976 Vol. LXXV, No. 1952 



Arms Control and Disarmament. Nuclear Pol- 
icy (statement by President Ford) .... 629 

China. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 . . . 640 

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating 

to Foreign Policy 650 

Egypt. U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai Ex- 
tended for One Year (Sherer) 647 

Energy. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 . 640 

Immigration. Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments Signed Into Law (Ford) . . . 639 

International Law. Foreign Sovereign Immuni- 
ties Act To Take Effect January 19, 1977 
(statement by President Ford, letter from 
Department of State Legal Adviser to At- 
torney General) 648 

Iran. Secretary Kissinger's News Conference 
at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 . . . 640 

Israel. U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai Ex- 
tended for One Year (Sherer) 647 

Latin America. Immigration and Nationality 
Act Amendments Signed Into Law (Ford) . 639 

Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 . 640 

Middle East 

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at 

Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 ... . 640 

U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai Extended 
for One Year (Sherer) 647 

Nuclear Energy. Nuclear Policy (statement by 
President Ford) 629 

Petroleum. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Hartford, Connecticut. October 27 . 640 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Service Immunities Act To Take 
Effect January 19, 1977 648 

Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments 

Signed Into Law 639 

Nuclear Policy 629 

Publications 

GPO Sales Publications 652 

1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on National 
Security, Economic Policy 652 

South Africa. Secretary Kissinger's News Con- 
ference at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 640 

Southern Rhodesia. Secretary Kissinger's 
News Conference at Hartford, Connecticut, 
October 27 640 

Sovereign Immunities. Foreign Sovereign Im- 
munities Act To Take Effect January 19, 
1977 (statement by President Ford, letter 
from Department of State Legal Adviser to 
Attorney General) 648 



Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 650 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Kissinger's News Confer- 
ence at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27 . 640 

United Nations. U.N. Emergency Force in the 
Sinai Extended for One Year (Sherer) . . 647 



Name Index 

Ford, President 629, 639, 648 

Kissinger, Secretary 640 

Leigh, Monroe 648 

Sherer, Albert W., Jr 647 



Checklist of Department of State 
Press Releases: November 1-7 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of Press Relations, Department of State, 
Washington, D.C. 20520. 



No. 

*540 



Date 

11/3 



*541 11/3 



*542 11/3 



t543 
*544 



11/4 
11/4 



*545 11/4 



*546 
*547 



11/4 
11/5 



Subject 

Shipping Coordinating Committee 
(SCC). Subcommittee on Mari- 
time Law, Dec. 16. 

Study Group 7, U.S. National 
Committee for the International 
Radio Consultative Committee 
(CCIR), Greenbelt, Md., Nov. 29. 

Study Groups 3 and 4, U.S. Na- 
tional Committee for the Inter 
national Telegraph and Tele- 
phone Consultative Committee, 
Nov. 30. 

Maritime boundaries between the 
U.S. and Canada. 

SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of 
Life at Sea, working group on 
safety of fishing vessels, Dec. 3. 

Study Group 9, U.S. National 
Committee for the CCIR, Dec. 
9. 

U.S. National Committee for the 
CCIR, Dec. 16. 

Agreement reached on draft text 
of U.S. -Mexico treaty on 
transfer of sanctions. 



* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



Superintendent of Documents 

u.s. government printing office 

washington, d.c. 20402 



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mediate attention if you write to: Superintendent 
of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, D.C. 20402. 



i, 







7fS3 




THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

BULLETIN 

Volume LXXV • No. 1953 • November 29, 1976 



U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS: SOME FUTURE PROSPECTS 

Address by Under Secretary Rogers 653 

GOALS FOR UNESCO 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Reinhardt 661 

U.S. REVIEWS INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN SPACE ACTIVITIES 

AND WORK OF THE U.N. OUTER SPACE COMMITTEE IN 1976 

Statement by Ambassador Bennett 668 



THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 

For index see inside back cover 









THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 

U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 

PRICE: 

52 issues plus semiannual indexes, 

domestic $42.50, foreign $53.15 

Single copy 85 cents 

The Secretary of State has determined that 
the publication of this periodical is necessary 
in the transaction of the public business re- 
quired by law of this Department. Use of 
funds for printing this periodical has been 
approved by the Director of the Office of Man- 
agement and Budget through January 31. 1981. 

l\0l€: Contents of this publication are not 
copyrighted and items contained herein may be 
reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE BULLETIN as the source will be 
appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in 
the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature. 



Vol. LXXV, No. 1953 
November 29, 1976 

The Department of State BULLETIN 
a weekly publication issued by th 
Office of Media Services, Bureau o 
Public Affairs, provides the public am 
interested agencies of the governmen 
with information on developments ii 
the field of U.S. foreign relations ant 
on the work of the Department am 
the Foreign Service. 

The BULLETIN includes select* 
press releases on foreign policy, issue 
by the White House and the Depart 
ment, and statements, addressei 
and news conferences of the Presiden 
and the Secretary of State and othe 
officers of the Department, as well 
special articles on various phases 
international affairs and the function 
of the Department. Information i 
included concerning treaties and inter 
national agreements to which tht 
United States is or may become i 
party and on treaties of general inter 
national interest. 

Publications of the Department o\ 
State, United Nations documents, am 
legislative material in the field oi 
international relations are also listed 






U.S. Foreign Economic Relations: Some Future Prospects 



Address by William D. Rogers 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs l 



This morning I would like to say a word 
or two about our foreign economic engage- 
ments from three perspectives. 

First, I will try to locate the issues in 
the framework of our recent history. Sec- 
ond, I will describe where we stand now — 
our recent initiatives, our current policies, 
and the purposes which inform them. And 
third, I will look to some of the critical 
issues which will tax our wit and wisdom 
in the years immediately ahead. 

Let me begin with a brief historical per- 
spective. The seventies already are begin- 
ning to look like not one but two eras. 

The first was 1970-73. During this time 
the international monetary system of fixed 
parities collapsed. The tradition of a trad- 
ing system geared to deliberate reductions 
of trade barriers, nondiscrimination, and 
reciprocity began to show strains. And 
conflicts emerged in the area of private 
direct investment, for which there were 
few rules of the game and little consensus 
about what the rules, if any, should be. As 
the Vietnam era closed and an American 
President journeyed to Peking, there was 
an increasing awareness of the need to 
reform the international economic system. 

But this was overtaken in the second 
period, from late 1973 to the present, by 
a series of unprecedented and unantici- 
pated shocks in the global economy. First, 



1 Made before the National Planning Association's 
Committee on the Changing International Realities 
at San Francisco, Calif., on Nov. 5. 



inflation and recession managed to ravage 
the world's trade and financial centers at 
the same moment. Second, OPEC [Organi- 
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries] 
arranged a stunning increase in the price 
of oil, and this produced a massive shift of 
wealth to a handful of countries. 

At the same time, through a combina- 
tion of manmade policies and acts of God, 
global food reserves suddenly began to 
shrink, and serious students of the condi- 
tion of man began to suspect that we were 
on the brink of massive food shortages 
and a massive shortage of energy and 
other raw materials as well. Finally, the 
shift in financial resources to the oil export- 
ers produced a growing concern whether 
the world's existing financial institutions 
could in fact recycle OPEC's new funds and 
cope with the rising debt of both industrial 
and developing countries. 

At bottom was a growing doubt about 
the viability of the international economic 
structure developed since the Second 
World War and a growing fear that infla- 
tion, recession, and the financial crises 
would drive nations in desperation to re- 
solve their domestic economic difficulties at 
the expense of other countries. 

So it was that the central objective of 
international economic policy of the indus- 
trialized democracies during this period 
had to be to keep themselves afloat, pre- 
vent backsliding, and avoid beggar-thy- 
neighbor policies. 



November 29, 1976 



653 



Concrete Programs for Cooperation 

In fact, I think it fair to say we came 
through the period of crisis in 1973-75 
remarkably well. 

Our achievements are several : 

— Under the pressure of events, we have 
considerably strengthened the ties which 
bind us to the other industrialized democ- 
racies. We have established a tradition 
these last several years of working more 
closely together on economic issues than 
ever before. Rambouillet and the ministe- 
rial meeting last June of the OECD [Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development], at which both Secretary 
Simon and Secretary Kissinger spoke, and 
the summit meeting of heads of state at 
Puerto Rico in June established a commit- 
ment on the part of each of the major 
economic powers of the free world that 
their domestic economic policies cannot 
work effectively in disharmony, that there 
is a need for effective cooperation, and 
that we will work together. This newly 
emerged economic alliance is the very 
centerpiece of our international economic 
policy. 

— Trade is the vital engine of inter- 
national economic growth, and we are well 
started on the present round of reducing 
both tariff and nontariff barriers in Geneva. 
In this respect, the United States has tabled 
a generous tariff-cutting formula which 
would reduce existing tariffs on the aver- 
age of 55 percent. At the same time, we 
have unilaterally instituted our own gen- 
eralized scheme of preferences for the 
developing countries. These generalized 
preferences will give duty-free access to 
over $2 1 / 4 billion of imports coming from 
over 100 developing countries. The bene- 
ficiaries will be not only the developing 
countries themselves but also our own 
consumers. 

— We have not forgotten the lessons of 
1973-75 for resources. We are alert now 
to the need to make a special effort to 
insure that the world has the resources it 
requires for future growth. In the area of 



energy and industrial raw materials, where 
both costs and risks are increasing, Secre- 
tary Kissinger has proposed the establish- 
ment of an International Resources Bank to 
facilitate a variety of cooperative arrange- 
ments between private enterprise and 
governments and spur the expansion of re- 
source output, particularly in the develop- 
ing countries. 

— We are committed to a system of free 
movement of private capital, management, 
and technology in the interest of global 
growth. For this reason, we have made a 
major effort to improve the often" uneasy 
environment in which international busi- 
ness can operate. The OECD investment 
declaration was a remarkable achievement, 
committing the major economic powers of 
the OECD to equal treatment for foreign 
investment and the avoidance of competi- 
tive incentives or disincentives to free in- 
vestment flows. With this commitment, we 
can move forward to a system of capital 
movements that will enhance the prospect 
of efficient investment based upon compara- 
tive advantage. In addition, we are making 
a constructive contribution to the efforts of 
the U.N. Commission on Transnational Cor- 
porations, which will establish an informa- 
tion center for corporations and govern- 
ments. 

— Beginning with Secretary Kissinger's 
address at the United Nations General As- 
sembly seventh special session, we have 
made a major effort to redesign our policies 
toward the developing countries, to ad- 
dress their special needs for growth and 
development. The United States has au- 
thored virtually all of the new accomplish- 
ments in this area, beginning with the ex- 
pansion of the International Monetary 
Fund's compensatory financing facility, the 
expansion of the lending capabilities of the 
World Bank and other multilateral finan- 
cial institutions, efforts to improve LDC 
[less developed country] access to our capi- 
tal markets, and the forthcoming world 
conference on technology transfers, 
which is of such vital interest to the de- 
veloping world. 



654 



Department of State Bulletin 



In addition, we have also taken the lead 
in setting up financial facilities to help 
low-income countries weather severe bal- 
ance-of-payments problems. Specifically, 
we proposed the establishment of the cur- 
rently operating Trust Fund of the Inter- 
national Monetary Fund to subsidize loans 
to the developing countries with proceeds 
from the sale of IMF gold. 

Over the last several years, we have re- 
focused our concessional development as- 
sistance on the low-income countries and on 
the poorer sectors within those countries. 
Nearly all of our foreign development as- 
sistance now goes to promote health, edu- 
cation, food production, and population. 

At the World Food Conference, and in 
its subsequent actions, the U.S. Government 
has focused on assistance to developing 
countries to increase food production. We 
are contributing $200 million to the newly 
established International Fund for Agricul- 
tural Development. This year we are also 
supplying 60 percent of the 10-million-ton 
food aid target established by the World 
Food Conference. 

At the same time, we have not forgotten 
the lessons of the oil embargo. Under the 
International Energy Agency in Paris, we 
and 17 industrialized-country members 
have established an extensive framework 
for cooperation on emergency energy shar- 
ing as well as on the expansion of future 
production, conservation, research, and de- 
velopment. In addition, we have proposed 
the establishment of an International En- 
ergy Institute to assist developing coun- 
tries in formulating their own national 
policies and to expand development and 
production of energy in energy-poor devel- 
oping countries. 

We have, in short, emerged from a 
period of severe difficulty with a compre- 
hensive international economic policy and 
a series of specific and concrete programs 
to implement that policy. And it is well 
that this should be so — because some of 
the palpable lessons of the recent years of 
turmoil and struggle have been the increas- 
ing importance of international economic 



developments to our own domestic inter- 
ests, the heightened sensitivity of our econ- 
omy to impulses from abroad, and the 
absolute necessity for forging a comprehen- 
sive program that will enhance our own 
national interests through international 
economic cooperation. 
The world is with us: 

— This year we will import 44 percent of 
our total petroleum consumption. By 1980, 
this dependence may approach 50 percent, 
a question with serious policy implications 
to which I will return. 

— We import 90 percent of our bauxite, 
20 percent of chromium, 95 percent of plat- 
inum, 82 percent of manganese, 65 percent 
of our tin, nearly a third of our iron, all of 
our rubber. 

— This year U.S. exports will be in the 
neighborhood of $113 billion. This amounts 
to nearly 14 percent of our total output of 
goods and is directly responsible for per- 
haps 3.5 million of the more highly paid 
and technologically advanced jobs in our 
own economy. 

— American business has invested about 
a quarter of a trillion dollars abroad. The 
annual return on these investments is over 
$17 billion — an important share of total 
U.S. corporate profits. 

Clearly then, a major concern of our for- 
eign policy must be the enhancement of 
international economic cooperation. 

Seven Challenges To Address 

Let me now look ahead for a few min- 
utes. 

The future is never a simple extrapola- 
tion from the past. It would be captious to 
imply that we can rest content to do in the 
future what we have done in the past, no 
matter how well we may have done it. New 
challenges emerge. Indeed, new challenges 
are emerging even now, as I earlier sug- 
gested. 

The Industrialized Democracies 

First, and perhaps foremost, is the eco- 
nomic condition of the industrialized de- 



November 29, 1976 



655 



mocracies of North America, Europe, and 
the Far East. 

We speak constantly of interdepend- 
ence. In fact, the synchronization of the 
economies of the major industrialized pow- 
ers in recent months has been extraordi- 
narily surprising. All began the process of 
recovery from the trough of the recession 
at about the same time. Most experienced 
a surge of quick growth; in our own case, 
annual growth rates for the first half of the 
year were 9 percent. Virtually all now, 
however, are in a pause. 

The prospects for the world economy for 
1977 are for slower rates of real growth 
than in 1976. This is largely because a num- 
ber of industrial countries will be con- 
strained, by difficulties in financing bal- 
ance-of-payments deficits, to adjustment 
policies which slow the growth of aggre- 
gate demand in the short run. There clearly 
will be growth. But that growth will likely 
be below historic trends for the industrial 
world overall in the coming two years. 

In addition, several structural factors 
may make it more difficult to recover higher 
growth rates. 

Overall for the OECD countries, the 
share pf national income going to wages 
and compensation has increased dramatic- 
ally over the last decade and a half. Be- 
tween 1960 and 1964 on the one hand, and 
mid-1974-75, the share of consumption in 
relation to total domestic product has risen; 
for example, in Italy, from 47 percent to 
60 percent, and in the United Kingdom, 
from 64 percent to 71 percent. 

In addition, the relative growth in fixed 
investment, as opposed to private consump- 
tion expenditures, has altered. Consump- 
tion in the OECD area has been growing 
more rapidly than investment. This is not a 
promising change from the standpoint of 
future growth prospects. 

Finally, of course, inflation continues to 
be a serious problem, though more so in 
some countries than others, as does unem- 
ployment. 

These structural shifts will make the 
process of adjustment for future growth in 



656 



the industrialized democracies more diffi- 
cult. 

The United Kingdom and Italy, of 
course, are taking major action to promote 
needed adjustment. Both have indicated 
their intention to apply for additional IMF 
assistance, and the International Monetary 
Fund is now discussing with them the condi- 
tions for additional Fund help for the two 
countries. Although the U.S. Government is 
not a party to those discussions, we have 
made clear our deep and abiding interest in 
the success of the efforts of the United 
Kingdom and Italy to resolve their current 
economic difficulties. 

President Ford said explicitly last week 
that we stand ready to support the further 
efforts of the United Kingdom under an 
IMF-arranged agreement. 

Beyond that, however, let me emphasize 
that it is essential that we follow up on the 
1974 proposal by Secretaries Kissinger and 
Simon to create a special new contingency 
financing mechanism among the OECD in- 
dustrial democracies. The OECD Financial 
Support Fund, or so-called "safety net," 
has been ratified by most other industrial 
countries. U.S. participation is now imper- 
ative. 

Possible Oil Price Increase 

Second, OPEC will contemplate another 
increase in the price of its oil at its up- 
coming December meeting. 

Some commentators in this country have 
ventured the opinion that a 10-percent in- 
crease, for example, is not likely to be sig- 
nificant. Not so. An increase in the price of 
oil — any increase — will decidedly not be a 
matter of indifference to the economies of 
the industrialized democracies, or to the 
developing countries, by any stretch of the 
imagination. 

A few blunt facts: 

— The world's import bill for OPEC oil 
this year is $125 billion. OPEC's balance- 
of-payments surplus, which is the mirror 
image of the balance-of-payments deficit of 

Department of State Bulletin 



the rest of the world, will be about $45 
billion in 1976. 

— A 10-percent price increase would add 
more than $12 billion annually to the global 
import bill. 

— The effect will be to transfer addi- 
tional resources to OPEC, reduce the import 
capacity of oil-importing countries, add to 
the cost of the energy component of all we 
consume, and thus add to pressures for in- 
flation worldwide. 

The weaker economies in the OECD area, 
and the developing countries, would be the 
most seriously affected. And these are the 
countries which can least cope with an ad- 
ditional shock now. Even without an oil 
price increase, a number will, as I have 
said, face difficulties in financing the pay- 
ments deficits that would be implied by the 
maintenance of present growth policies. 
These countries will be required to under- 
take difficult adjustment policies to reduce 
those deficits in any event. 

An oil price increase will have an adverse 
effect, which cannot be ignored, on the 
prospects for sustained, inflation-free re- 
covery across a wide spectrum of countries 
and so on the global economic system as a 
whole. 

Relations With the Developing World 

Third, we also face an important chal- 
lenge now in our relations with the devel- 
oping world. 

Americans are a generous and humane 
people. We have a long and impressive rec- 
ord of cooperation with poor countries. 
During the late 1960's and early 1970's, 
however, our relationships took a turn for 
the worse. Increasingly frustrated in their 
efforts for rapid economic growth and im- 
pressed with the results of the OPEC price 
increases, the developing countries were 
increasingly tempted to stridency, rhetoric, 
and the alluring slogans of automatic redis- 
tribution of wealth. 

As I have indicated earlier, we have re- 
sponded, beginning at the special session of 
the United Nations General Assembly last 



year, on the one hand, with a series of posi- 
tive proposals to enhance the growth pros- 
pects of the developing world. We have, at 
the same time, tried to make clear that we 
think we are beyond the point where rhet- 
oric serves to increase public understanding 
and sympathy for the developing countries 
among the citizens of the industrialized 
democracies. And, we have pointed out, it 
is to those nations — not to the Soviet Union 
and East Europe — which the LDC's must 
look for the official aid and market oppor- 
tunities which they want and need. 

These tensions of the dialogue between 
the rich and the poor of the world will be 
close to the surface in the meeting of the 
Conference on International Economic Co- 
operation (CIEC), which is due to hold its 
concluding ministerial meeting in Paris 
next month. A successful conclusion to this 
one-year analytical effort of 27 developed, 
developing, and oil-exporting members of 
the conference is by no means assured. 
Major issues divide the North and the 
South in the CIEC conference : 

— The developing countries are propos- 
ing generalized relief or moratoria on the 
repayment of the heavy debts they have 
recently run up. The developed countries 
oppose this generalized approach to LDC 
debt. They favor a case-by-case examina- 
tion of those countries experiencing finan- 
cial difficulties and a principled effort to 
cope with overall balance-of-payments 
problems by tested aid and financing tech- 
niques. 

— The developing countries are also ask- 
ing for the indexation of the prices of their 
exports. We believe such an approach to in- 
ternational economic relations, even if it 
were technically feasible, would create 
major difficulties for the global economy 
and would be against the interests of most 
LDC's as well. 

My own view is that the time has come to 
strike a new balance in the relationships 
between the North and the South. The new 
balance should emphasize development as- 
sistance and liberal market access — not 



November 29, 1976 



657 






automatic resource-transfer devices — as the 
economic mechanisms most efficient for 
LDC development and most effective in 
shaping a global economy that serves our 
own objectives. 

The industrialized democracies as a group 
are beginning to articulate their own 
affirmative proposals for action to that end. 
At the June ministerial meeting of the 
OECD, pointing out that the North had 
fallen into the habit of reacting to the 
claims of the South, Secretary Kissinger 
urged that a program be developed by that 
organization in a way which would permit 
the industrialized democracies to take the 
initiative and demonstrate at the same time 
our commitment to help the poor nations in 
their struggle for development. 

The design of this program will be a 
major challenge for us and our allies of 
Europe and the Far East in the months and 
years ahead. 

Food Supply 

A fourth priority area for-the future will 
be food. 

As I have said, we have analyzed the 
problems we face in this area, and we have 
made proposals to address them. But the 
tough part remains — making these policies 
work. 

This year, for example, good harvests 
were a temptation for complacency. Yet 
the underlying structural problems in the 
global agricultural system remain. Malnu- 
trition is not decreasing, future production 
shortfalls are a certainty, and the inca- 
pacity of many countries to purchase grain 
when they most need it will continue to be 
a fundamental challenge to the interna- 
tional system and a tragedy in the poorest 
countries. Many analyses show that the 
food deficit in the developing world is ac- 
tually growing larger, so that by 1985 the 
developing countries will have to import 
more than the 85 million tons projected at 
the Rome Food Conference. 

Under these circumstances, the interna- 
tional community must move urgently to 



establish a system of food reserves, to 
coordinate food aid programs, and to en- 
courage developing countries to take the 
difficult domestic measures to increase ag- 
ricultural production. Unless we are able to 
make significantly more progress than we 
have to date, the world may, over the next 
quarter of a century, face a series of un- 
manageable food crises which could con- 
front the United States, as the world's 
largest food producer and exporter, with 
agonizing choices between domestic and 
international priorities. 

Challenge of Energy 

Fifth is the challenge of energy. 

We have made progress in the past year 
in managing the energy problems created 
by OPEC. But let me be frank — we have 
not done enough. This is critically the case 
with respect to our domestic policies. 

In the years since the oil embargo the 
United States has increased its dependence 
on Persian Gulf oil. We are today more vul- 
nerable to OPEC price and supply policies 
than we were in 1973. Within the OECD 
area, our domestic conservation efforts are 
so relatively ineffective that they constitute 
an embarrassment for us in our relations 
with Europe and Japan. The prospects are 
that demand for imported oil will level off 
in the other Western countries. Our con- 
sumption will increase — in fact, it will in- 
crease so substantially in the years ahead 
that we alone may insure the continued 
strength and viability of the OPEC cartel. 

The plain fact is that we do not have a 
credible domestic energy policy. We sorely 
need one. 

The longer term issues are systemic. They 
cut across all aspects of our international 
economic policy. The first is our depend- 
ence on a few, potentially unreliable sup- 
pliers. For the foreseeable future, U.S. en- 
ergy independence may be an illusion. This 
adds urgency to our policies for diversify- 
ing sources of supply and for developing 
alternative energy sources. The second set 
of issues concern the adequacy of the 



658 



Department of State Bulletin 



world's supply of oil and how we make the 
transition to the post-oil age. Extensive co- 
operation and policy coordination of all 
countries will be required if this transition 
is to be smoothly managed. 

We are facing up to these key issues, 
ranging from the technology we need to 
the global capital requirements for energy 
development, in the Paris Conference on 
International Economic Cooperation. On 
the leadership which we and our allies pro- 
vide, and on the choices we make in this 
area, hinge our economic welfare and our 
future security. 

East-West Economic Relations 

Sixth is the issue of East-West economic 
relations. 

Trade between OECD members and the 
Soviet Union and East Europe has quadru- 
pled in six years. We in the West have 
come to realize that in certain areas at 
least — agriculture being the clearest case 
— the Eastern economies can no longer be 
dealt with as afterthoughts but must be 
dealt with as integral factors in the world 
economic equation. And we are just begin- 
ning to come to grips with this new truth. 

A number of issues have emerged as a 
result: 

— How does one define effective reci- 
procity between market and nonmarket 
economies? 

— What role will the Eastern economies 
play in the global energy and raw mate- 
rials markets? 

— How do we deal with the exploding 
debt of the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu- 
rope? 

For the near future we will probably pro- 
ceed on two tracks. 

The United States is tied down by the 
Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade 
Act, which bars normal trade relations with 
countries which do not move quickly 
enough to open up emigration. We should 
spare no reasonable effort to address the 
issue of human rights abroad. But the rec- 



ord is clear that the trade policy is too 
blunt and too public an instrument. Under 
Jackson-Vanik, we get neither trade nor 
human rights. We are forgoing important 
trade opportunities open to Europe and 
Japan. And emigration is not improving. 
Hopefully, we may see some way out of this 
in the months ahead. 

In addition, we need to work more 
closely with our allies in examining the en- 
tire range of East-West economic issues 
which we all face. A first step is an analy- 
sis of the evolving East-West trade and in- 
vestment patterns to get a better notion of 
the trends in such areas as energy develop- 
ment, agricultural trade, and technology 
transfer. We have never examined the 
facts with our allies before. Such an effort 
is also now getting underway in OECD in 
response to Secretary Kissinger's initiative 
last June. We expect this analysis to be a 
major contribution to East-West economic 
relations and opportunities. 

Laiv of the Sea Negotiations 

Seventh, we must make additional prog- 
ress in the law of the sea negotiations. 

The most recent session on the law of the 
sea treaty ended two months ago in New 
York. This was the most ambitious effort 
to create international law in this century. 
Much is at stake: 

— One hundred and fifty nations are at- 
tempting to design an international regime 
for three-quarters of the earth's surface. 

— A broad sweep of issues is involved : 
economic development, military security, 
freedom of navigation, crucial and dwin- 
dling living resources, the oceans' fragile 
ecology, marine and scientific research, and 
vast mineral wealth. 

— The international community is at- 
tempting to reach agreement on entirely 
new international legal principles: the cre- 
ation of an economic zone extending 200 
miles and the designation of the deep sea- 
bed as the "common heritage of man- 
kind," principles which never existed be- 
fore. 



November 29, 1976 



659 



Progress has been made in these negotia- 
tions. But much remains to be done, and it 
may be that the next session is our last 
chance, before nations begin to turn to uni- 
lateral action and the understandings 
which we have patiently woven so far 
begin to unravel. In the next several 
months, we must move decisively on the 
following issues : 

— The balance between coastal state and 
international rights in the economic zone; 

— Freedom of marine scientific research ; 

— Arrangements for dispute settlement; 
and 

— Most difficult and important of all, the 
manner in which the mineral wealth in the 
deep seabeds will be exploited. 

The deep seabeds issue is the key to the 
negotiations. Many of the developing coun- 
tries are trying to impose a doctrine of total 
internationalization on the industrial coun- 
tries, which alone have the technological 
and financial capacity for mining the sea- 
beds in the foreseeable future. The United 
States has offered to find financing and to 
transfer the technology to make inter- 
national mining a reality. But total inter- 
nationalization is out of the question. We 
have made the most forthcoming proposal 
which we can, but there are limits beyond 
which we cannot and should not go. 

In short, in this issue as well we face a 
major international economic challenge to 
our wit and wisdom. 

I have attempted here to review our 
foreign economic policy from the early 
1970's on into the future. Vital issues are at 
stake now — not only our economic well- 
being but the larger structure of inter- 



national economic relationships as well. 
And the significance of all this for our poli- 
tical and security interests is unmistakable. 
These challenges I have catalogued are 
also opportunities. We may be standing on 
the edge of a period of political and eco- 
nomic achievement unparalleled in our gen- 
eration. It remains for us to summon the 
wisdom, the compassion, and the political 
will to face the critical choices before us. 



U.S. Encouraged by U.K. Decision 
To Seek Standby Agreement With IMF 

Statement by President Ford i 

The United States has the highest con- 
fidence in the ability of the United King- 
dom to overcome its present economic dif- 
ficulties. The British Government has taken 
a number of positive steps. 

We are further encouraged by Britain's 
decision to seek a standby agreement with 
the International Monetary Fund. As I have 
already stated publicly, the United States 
will fully support an agreement reached 
between Britain and the IMF. 

As a matter of general policy, it is the 
abiding purpose of the United States to see 
the United Kingdom as a vigorous member 
of the European Community, the North At- 
lantic alliance, and other international in- 
stitutions whose goal it is to build a better 
and safer world. 



1 Issued at Cincinnati. Ohio, on Oct. 28 (text from 
White House press release). 



660 



Department of State Bulletin 



Goals for UNESCO 



Statement by John E. Reinhardt l 



President Kenyatta set the tone for this 
conference Tuesday morning [October 26] 
with his call for "harambee." Let us work 
together for the good of all, our distin- 
guished host urged. 

This 30th-anniversary conference of 
UNESCO must heed President Kenyatta's 
exhortation. For here in Kenya we must 
begin to develop a new working consensus 
if UNESCO is to play an effective part in 
a changing global system of social and 
economic relations. 

Let us be clear about where we stand. 
The last General Conference ended in dis- 
sension. That dissension must be over- 
come. A new basis for consultation and 
cooperation must be adopted. 

I recall a Swahili proverb which says: 
"One stone will not support a cooking pot." 
In a world where interdependence has be- 
come one of the basic elements of our 
existence, we must keep our foundation 
stones together — or our organization, too, 
may fall to the ground. 

The United States is present at this con- 
ference to work with all nations to find a 
basis for consultation and cooperation. 

A few months ago, in this same confer- 
ence hall, Secretary Kissinger stressed this 
same point. Speaking at the U.N. Confer- 
ence on Trade and Development, Dr. Kis- 
singer noted that the accelerating forces of 



1 Made before the 19th General Conference of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) at Nairobi on Nov. 1. Am- 
bassador Reinhardt. who is Assistant Secretary of 
State for Public Affairs, was chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the conference. 



modernization — technological, social, and 
political — link the peoples of the world as 
never before. These forces can intensify 
conflict — or they can provide us with un- 
precedented possibilities for advancing our 
common aims. All nations are part of a 
global economic system. If this system is to 
flourish, it must rest on the firm foundation 
of security, fairness, and opportunity for 
all who wish to participate — rich and poor, 
North and South, East and West, consumer 
and producer. It must embrace the interests 
of all if it is to be supported by all. 

How do we achieve this objective? 

First, there must be commitment by all 
to bring about a constructive and coopera- 
tive relationship between the so-called de- 
veloped and the so-called developing coun- 
tries. I say "so-called" because all states, 
in a sense, are evolving — each continually 
advancing in accordance with its own cul- 
tural strengths, each with its own historical 
past, each according to its own potentiali- 
ties, each using its own model or ap- 
proaches to development. 

No one model, no one ideology, should 
be unduly advocated. No one model should 
be unduly condemned. The United States 
bases its successful development on growth 
with equity and justice, on the benefits of 
a free market economy, and on stressing 
human rights, individual freedoms, a free 
press, freedom of choice, the abundance of 
educational opportunities, and the free 
exchange of ideas and information. 

These are our beliefs. We share them 
with many other nations around the world. 



November 29, 1976 



661 



Other nations choose other roads, but there 
is no reason why this should lead to con- 
flict. Nor should this impede the building 
of a more stable and just international 
order — an order resting not on power but 
on restraint of power, not on the strength 
of arms but on the strength of the human 
spirit. 

UNESCO can take the lead in this chal- 
lenge. The central issue is to reduce the 
continued disparities between the rich and 
the poor within countries and between de- 
veloped and developing countries, to 
achieve growth with equity, and to pay 
special attention to the poorest of the poor 
within nations and among nations. 

To accomplish these goals, we must build 
upon the constitutional foundation stones 
of UNESCO — the sharing and the encour- 
aging of development in education, science, 
and culture. 

We in the United States are whole- 
heartedly dedicated to these specific goals. 
And we recognize that UNESCO has al- 
ready made significant contributions in 
each of these areas. 

The First and Second Development Dec- 
ades represent giant steps in concept. 
The Director General's [Amadou Mahtar 
M'Bow, of Senegal] mid-decade report de- 
tails progress being made. 

UNESCO's analytic work on this report 
is impressive. Especially important, for ex- 
ample, is the emphasis given by the report 
to the role of women, the improvement of 
education, and the increased consideration 
accorded to other social factors in the 
development process. 

Much can be expected from long-range 
scientific and technological planning and 
sharing, and great credit here goes to 
UNESCO. 

For example, the entire U.N. system, 
under the leadership of the Secretary Gen- 
eral of the United Nations, is mobilizing 
to address the issue of science and tech- 
nology applied for development. 

A major conference has been proposed 
for 1979. The United States strongly sup- 
ports its objectives and has offered to host 



662 



this conference. Preparations for it will 
provide opportunities for the developed 
and developing countries and for organiza- 
tions such as UNESCO to review their re- 
sponsibilities for the sharing and use of 
technology. This presents an important op- 
portunity for UNESCO — together with its 
companion U.N. agencies, each having 
major contributions to make in science and 
technology — to mount a concerted attack 
on this problem. 

Mr. President, the U.S. delegation would 
like to congratulate the Director General 
for his work in the medium-term plan and 
in the program and budget documents he 
presented to this conference. We have read 
with interest the Director General's views 
on a possible new world order in his book, 
"Moving Toward Change." He has ably 
emphasized the special role that UNESCO 
plays in the U.N. system with its focus on 
man as the center of development. 

We agree with Mr. M'Bow that UNESCO 
must be a forum from which broad philo- 
sophical perspectives can be formulated on 
the problems of our times. 

Advancing the Common Aims of All Nations 

We recognize that we are moving 
through a period of historic change as the 
world becomes an increasingly interrelated 
system and as the Western orientation that 
prevailed for several centuries comes to 
share in a more multicentered system of 
international relations. 

But to return to my earlier question. I 
repeat, we have unprecedented possibili- 
ties for advancing the common aims of all 
nations — rich and poor, North and South, 
East and West, consumer and producer. 
How do we achieve our objective? 

We feel that what is required to make 
UNESCO and other agencies effective as 
instruments of change is a political consen- 
sus that can support creative program ini- 
tiatives and combine the best of the old and 
the new. 

We feel that it is indeed important to 
address the social and cultural dimensions 
of our changing world and, as the Director 

Department of State Bulletin 



General has said, to move toward a new 
human order. But need we abandon those 
aspects of each nation's development 
which have been beneficial? Too drastic 
action may bring regrets. And a wise Afri- 
can proverb suggests that "Regrets are like 
a grandchild; they come some considerable 
time after the event." 

We hold that many features of the West- 
ern experience are especially significant in 
development today: 

1. It has become fashionable to decry 
economic growth in some countries. But I 
ask you to recall that the concept of 
"growth" and especially "growth with 
equity" is not only an economic phenome- 
non in Western development. The roots of 
this concept lie more deeply in the ideas of 
progress essential to the Scientific Revolu- 
tion and to the Enlightenment's notion of 
man's dignity and his capacity to deal with 
physical forces. 

2. Industrialization has not been non- 
cultural. Great cultural traditions have 
persisted and, indeed, become enriched 
under the pressures of rapid scientific and 
technological change. The will for cultural 
identity is no less intense in developed 
than it is in developing countries. 

3. It is the industrialized countries which 
first became increasingly responsive to the 
ecological risks of uncontrolled material 
growth. Since 1969 the United States — with 
the passage of the National Environmental 
Planning Act — has begun a continuing 
study of the impact of technological 
changes and taken steps to guard the public 
interest. Pollution is not limited to the 
developed countries. 

4. The ideas of freedom and the protec- 
tion of human rights — enunciated in the 
West — are essential to progress and 
change. They are values that need to per- 
meate any new system of international rela- 
tions. Nowhere are they more important, 
for that matter, than in those fields that 
are the special concern of UNESCO : in 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
in the freedom of scientific research and 
scholarly inquiry, in the freedom and 



rights of the creative artist, in the free 
access of all people to educational and cul- 
tural opportunities, and in a free flow of 
information. 

We in the United States are fully com- 
mitted to cooperative enterprises for better- 
ing relations among peoples and for re- 
ducing disparities and dependencies. We 
are not for abandoning the great funda- 
mental goals which have been widely 
shared guideposts in man's development. 

It is the hope of the United States that 
during the course of our deliberations in 
this UNESCO meet